The Making of a Party System : Minor Parties in the Australian Senate 9781922235930, 9781922235923

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THE MAKING OF A PARTY SYSTEM

MINOR PARTIES IN THE AUSTRALIAN SENATE ZAREH GHAZARIAN

THE MAKING OF A PARTY SYSTEM

THE MAKING OF A PARTY SYSTEM MINOR PARTIES IN THE AUSTRALIAN SENATE ZAREH GHAZARIAN

© Copyright 2015 Zareh Ghazarian All rights reserved. Apart from any uses permitted by Australia’s Copyright Act 1968, no part of this book may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the copyright owners. Inquiries should be directed to the publisher. Monash University Publishing Matheson Library and Information Services Building 40 Exhibition Walk Monash University Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia www.publishing.monash.edu Monash University Publishing brings to the world publications which advance the best traditions of humane and enlightened thought. Monash University Publishing titles pass through a rigorous process of independent peer review. www.publishing.monash.edu/books/mps-9781922235923.html Series: Politics Design: Les Thomas National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Ghazarian, Zareh, author. Title:

ISBN:

Subjects:

The making of a party system: minor parties in the Australian Senate 9781922235923 (paperback)

Australia. Parliament. Senate--History.

Australia. Parliament--Officials and employees. Political parties--Australia.

Representative government and representation--Australia. Australia--Politics and government.

Dewey Number: 320.994

Printed in Australia by Griffin Press an Accredited ISO AS/NZS 14001:2004 Environmental Management System printer. The paper this book is printed on is certified against the Forest Stewardship Council ® Standards. Griffin Press holds FSC chain of custody certification SGS-COC-005088. FSC promotes environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and economically viable management of the world’s forests.

 | v

Contents List of figures and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

About the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1. Parties and party systems: Towards an Australian Senate

party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. The Senate contest and the first phase: Fragmentary

minor parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3. Here come the issue-competitive parties: The NDP . . . . . . . 39

4. Issue-based minor party politics: Australia’s green

political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5. Rise and fall: the Australian Democrats, 1984–2007 . . . . . . . 90

6. Issues-oriented politics of the right:

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

7. From Klemzig to Canberra: Family First and religious politics . . 143

8. The Re-emergence of the DLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 9. The 2013 election: Confirming the evolution in the type

of minor party elected to the Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

10. Issues, organisation, impact, volatility: Towards a

Senate-oriented minor party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

11. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

vi | The Making of a Party System

List of figures and tables Figures Figure 6.1 The three components of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Figure 6.2 Policy-making in One Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Tables Table 1.1 Minor parties that have won Senate representation in elections since 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Table 1.2 Senate election results, 1949 to 1983 – National primary vote (%) and Senate seats won by party . . . . . . . .6 Table 1.3 Senate election results, 1984 to 2013 – National primary vote (%) and Senate seats won by party . . . . . 10–11 Table 2.1 DLP primary vote (%) and Senate seats won in elections by state, 1955–1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Table 2.2 Australian Democrats primary vote (%) and Senate seats won in elections by state, 1977–1983 . . . . . . . . . . 35 Table 3.1 NDP performance in the Senate, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table 3.2 NDP performance in the Senate, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Table 4.1 Greens electoral performance in the Senate by jurisdiction – primary vote (%) and Senate seats won, 1990–2013 . . . . . 68 Table 5.1 Australian Democrats Senate primary vote (%) and seats won, 1984–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Table 6.1 Result of the Queensland division of Oxley – 1996 federal election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Table 6.2 Result of the 1998 Queensland state election . . . . . . . . 124 Table 6.3 One Nation’s primary vote in the 1998 Senate election . . . . 129 Table 6.4 One Nation primary vote (%) Senate seats won in elections, 2001–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Table 7.1 Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2004 . . . . . . 152 Table 7.2 Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2007 . . . . . . 159 Table 7.3 Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2010 and 2013 . 161

 | vii

About the author Dr Zareh Ghazarian is a Lecturer in Politics in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University. He holds a BSc and BA from Deakin University and a BA (Hons) and PhD in Political Science from Monash University. He is a leading commentator on politics and appears regularly on national and international television and radio. Dr Ghazarian’s teaching and research interests include elections, institutions of governance, political leadership and comparative politics. He has published widely in academic journals and is co-author of Australian Politics for Dummies (2010, Wiley and Sons, Brisbane).

viii | The Making of a Party System

Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who helped me complete this book. I would like to thank Nick Economou, who not only helped with drafts and advice but has been a great mentor and friend. I would also like to thank James Walter and Paul Strangio for their advice and guidance, as well as Sharon Pickering who, as Head of the School of Social Sciences at Monash University, provided invaluable support for the project. I would like to thank the participants who generously provided time to be interviewed for this project. Thanks also to the staff at Monash University Publishing for their assistance with this book. I would particularly like to thank Nathan Hollier and Joanne Mullins for their support and guidance. I would also like to thank Kate Seear, Marina Cominos and Ben Whiteley who put up with me running ideas past them and who supported me during the various stages of production.

 | ix

Introduction This book is a study of minor parties elected to the Australian Senate. Political parties play an extremely important role in liberal democracies. The study of political parties, however, is relatively young, with much research occurring after the Second World War. The bulk of this research has focused on European polities and that of the United States of America. These polities differ from the Australian system in key areas such as electoral systems and broader social milieus. When Australian political parties have been examined, the focus has often been on the major parties in the House of Representatives. This is understandable, since Australia follows the Westminster system, where the government is formed by the party (or parties) that win a majority of seats in the lower house. But the Australian parliamentary system also has a very powerful Senate, a distinctive feature of the Australian system. Aside from its structural importance, the Senate has been the chamber where minor parties have won parliamentary repres­ entation, sometimes being able to wield the balance of power. This book focuses on the party system in the Australian Senate from 1949 (when the voting system changed to proportional representation) to 2013, with particular emphasis on the minor parties that won Senate seats in this period. The first chapter argues that there has been a significant change in the Senate party system during this period, spanning over six decades. Indeed, there has been a change in the type of minor party elected to the Senate. Parties elected in the early period, especially between 1955 and 1977, were created as a result of major party fragmentation. From 1983, however, a new type of minor party began winning Senate representation. These more contemporary parties were mobilised on specific policy demands linked to broader social movements and can be thought of as ‘issue-competitive’ parties. Indeed, the relationship between new social movements and these issue-competitive parties is considered throughout the book. Also examined are the organisational structures and performance of each party in the Senate. The differing organisational models show the variability and diversity of the new social movement politics and this is reflected in the way parties spawned from new social movements are organised. As will be shown, sometimes tensions can arise from these arrangements. Ultim­ ately, the changing type of minor party being elected to the Senate has implications for the broader political debate and policies implemented by national government.

x | The Making of a Party System

The book examines each minor party in the chronological order in which each won Senate representation, with emphasis on their origins, organisation, electoral performance and impact on the Australian Senate party system. In Chapter 2, the first minor parties to win Senate seats after the change to proportional representation, including the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), Liberal Movement and Australian Democrats up to 1984, are examined. It is shown how these parties were ‘fragmentary’ minor parties because they emerged as a result of major party fragmentation. Chapter 3 considers the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) and argues that it was the first issue-competitive party to win Senate representation. The close links between the NDP and broader peace and disarmament social movements are considered, as well as how the party affected the Australian Democrats, which was a fragmentary party. Chapter 4 examines Australia’s green political parties with particular focus on the Western Australian Greens (Greens WA) and the Australian Greens. A key theme of this chapter is how these parties developed at different stages. It is shown that the Greens WA were a continuation of the NDP in Western Australia as they had close links to the peace and disarmament movement that had mobilised in response to the Hawke Government’s uranium mining and foreign policies, whereas the Australian Greens had closer links to the broader conservation movement. The Australian Greens did not develop at the same pace as the Greens WA. The conservation movement had the potential to influence the Hawke Government’s policies by being invited to be on various advisory bodies and so the differing ability to influence government policy was an important factor in the evolution of these parties. It is also argued that the Greens WA’ decision to finally join the Australian Greens in 2003 was brought about by the party’s inability to maintain Senate representation. The impact of these green parties on the Australian Democrats is also considered. The Australian Democrats party from 1984 to 2013 is examined in Chapter 5. The chapter investigates how the party responded to the changing political debate by trying to change from being a fragmentary party to an issue-competitive type. The party’s electoral record shows interesting peaks and troughs during this period. The party’s innovative organisation played a role in its eventual decline and the rise of issue-competitive parties, especially in the form of the green parties, affected the electoral performance of the Democrats. As a fragmentary party, the Democrats could not effectively reposition itself as being issue-competitive and it was eventually displaced by parties of the latter type in the Senate.

Introduction | xi

Chapter 6 examines Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, a right-populist, issue-oriented party that won Senate representation in 1998. With policies focusing on race and immigration, One Nation garnered significant support and was seen as an electoral threat to the major parties, especially the Coalition. It is shown how the party was created to advance Pauline Hanson in Australian politics. Indeed, the party’s organisation was clearly designed to give the power to determine policy solely to the leadership and keep the mass membership at arm’s length from being able to do so. This approach to organisation, however, was a major factor that contributed to the party’s disintegration. The chapter also shows that, by being a right-populist party, One Nation could not easily make the transition from being a parliamentary outsider to being a party with Senate representation – a situation reflected in the party’s failure to maintain parliamentary representation at subsequent elections. The Family First Party, which won its first Senate seat in 2004 and was returned in 2013, is considered in Chapter 7. The nascent party campaigned on a policy platform that emphasised the importance of the nuclear family. The party had connections with Assemblies of God (AOG) churches, as its founders and many of its candidates were drawn from AOG congregations. However, the party was mobilised by a deep suspicion of the Australian Greens. In particular, Chapter 7 examines how Family First sought to thwart the Greens’ attempts to win Senate representation. Rather than be seen as a religious party, Family First was pragmatic, at least in electoral politics, and used the Group Voting Ticket (GVT) effectively in its attempts to win Senate seats. The return of the DLP to the Senate in 2010, some 40 years after it was last in the federal parliament, is examined in Chapter 8. The chapter shows how the new DLP had reformed its structure and organisation. Moreover, it highlights how the party repositioned itself in the political system from being a fragmentary party to being an issue-competitive type, placing greater emphasis on social issues. As the chapter shows, the party in the modern era was no longer concerned about blocking the Labor Party nor was it focused on opposing communism. Rather, the party pursued a specific policy agenda with links to broad socially conservative movements, including antiabortion. The chapter also highlights how the party’s new approach allowed it to use the GVT system to greater advantage than in the past. Chapter 9 examines the minor parties elected to parliament in the 2013 election. This election result was unprecedented, with a record number of minor parties contesting the election and a record number of minor parties

xii | The Making of a Party System

winning seats in parliament. The chapter discusses the rise of the Liberal Democrats Party (LDP), Palmer United Party (PUP) and the Aust­ ralian Motoring Enthusiast Party (AMEP). It charts their emergence in Australian politics and examines their organisational structures. The chapter highlights the similarities between each party, especially as issuecompetitive parties. However, these parties also had elements of rightpopulism in their organisational arrangements and policy platforms. These parties were built around central leaders, while marginalising the role of ordinary members, and proposed simple solutions to solve complex social and economic problems. The chapter also shows how these minor parties took a sophisticated approach to using the Senate voting system to their advantage. Indeed, the chapter highlights how many of these parties won Senate representation due to their preference deals, rather than attracting broad electoral support. The 2013 election result confirmed that there had been a change in the type of minor party winning Senate representation. Chapter 10 examines the changing minor party system in the Australian Senate by highlighting some important evolutionary changes. First, it is argued that a transition in the type of minor party elected to the Senate has occurred. The initial parties were created as a result of major party fragmentation, but the parties elected from 1984 onwards have a closer nexus with social movements. Second, another strong sense of change can be seen in how Senate-oriented minor parties approached the problem of developing extra-parliamentary organisations. The first minor parties to win Senate seats modelled their structures on those of the major parties. The Australian Democrats, however, introduced organisational innovation and parties elected since have demonstrated different ways in structuring extra-parliamentary wings. Moreover, new social movements influenced the organisation of some issue-competitive parties. The third theme examined in Chapter 10 is the impact minor parties have made on the Senate. In considering this issue, it is argued that minor parties are also affected by having Senate representation in sometimes-deleterious ways. Indeed, some minor parties struggled to make the transition from being a party without parliamentary representation to being a Senate-based minor party. The final theme relates to the volatility of Senate-oriented minor parties and discusses that, while minor parties may win seats, their continued presence in the chamber and policy debate is far from guaranteed. As a primary source of information, the book draws upon interviews with parliamentarians, party officials, and present and former party members and supporters to gain an insight into the party’s operation in the Australian

Introduction | xiii

party system context. In some cases pseudonyms are used to maintain the anonymity requested by participants. The book also canvasses each party’s official literature on policy and examines the constitution of each political party to gain greater insight into its structures as well as examining its electoral performance at Senate contests. In accounting for the changing type of minor party elected to the Australian Senate, this book emphasises the role social movements have played in Australian politics since the 1960s. Electoral reforms also have also been very important, especially those brought about by the Hawke Government in 1983 in introducing a range of new features, including the GVT. These reforms enhanced the importance of preference deals between parties at Senate contests. The introduction of the GVT was advantageous for many, but not all, minor parties in enhancing their potential to win Senate representation. The Australian Democrats, in particular, were disadvantaged by the GVT as the party’s rules forbade preference dealing with the major parties. These changes to the electoral system played a significant role in influencing Senate contests. However, in the final analysis, the changing political debate and the mobilisation of social movements have actually caused the change in the type of minor party elected to the Senate from fragmentary to issue-competitive.

Chapter 1 | 1

Cha pte r 1

Parties and Party Systems: Towards an Australian Senate Party System Despite their prominence, there is some ambiguity on what constitutes a political party. Organised bodies of individuals committed to particular goals have existed throughout history, but Edmund Burke provided one of the earliest definitions in 1770. He defined a party as a ‘body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’ (cited in White 2006:6). There have been many more recent attempts at providing a universal definition but Mayer (1991:49) provided a consolidated broad concept of a party as being: …an organised group of people who share common values and formulate policies which they seek to implement by standing candidates for election to parliament and forming a government.

Not only do parties play an important role in fostering competition and de-centralising power, but they also play a role in the construction of the institutions of government in liberal democracies. As Schattschneider (1942:1) put it, ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties’. Indeed, political parties can unify and provide stability to the political process. They are responsible for selecting candidates for election, forming government and the opposition, providing policy choices to voters, and promoting a vibrant political debate. Parties also carry out a linking role between government and society as they incorporate ordinary citizens and allow them to influence, or even form, government. The following section looks at the notion of political parties and party systems with particular emphasis on the Australian Senate. It examines distinguishing features between major and minor parties which go to the heart of a conundrum found in many liberal democracies: the expectation that such systems should be multi-party systems to reflect the diverse views within a polity and encourage vibrant political debate and competition. Yet, in practice, many liberal democracies have a tendency to ‘two-partyism’. As

2 | The Making of a Party System

is explored in subsequent discussions, the presence of minor parties presents challenges to the idea of two-party systems, especially in the Australian case. This chapter also examines the potential sources of minor party mobilis­ation and electoral support. In doing so, it will show that there has been a change in the type of minor parties elected to the Senate – from ‘fragmentary’ to ‘issue-competitive’. However, before such discussion occurs, it is important to place the Senate and the electoral system in context.

1.1 Parties and the voting system There are differing party systems throughout liberal democracies, with the number of parties elected to parliament and/or forming government being seen as key to defining a party system. For example, the United States is understood as a strong two-party system because of the overwhelming domination of the Democratic and Republican parties in its polity. Alter­ natively, many European polities are characterised as multi-party systems. In Australia, however, the party system has been remarkably resilient, especially in the House of Representatives, which has been dom­inated by Labor and non-Labor parties almost since its inception. This pattern of domination is also apparent in the Australian Senate in which Labor and non-Labor parties have consistently won the bulk of seats, despite a change to its electoral system in 1948. The electoral results of the Australian House of Representatives demon­ strate the strength of Labor and the coalition of the Liberal and National (formerly known as Country) parties in not only winning the overwhelming majority of votes, but also seats. In fact, since 1949, only three minor parties have won a seat in the House of Representatives at a general election, with the Greens being the first to do so in 2010.1 With such a strong representative history in the House of Representatives, Labor, Liberal and National can be considered to be the major parties in Australia. They have taken turns in government and, when in opposition, have presented themselves as the alternative government. Despite being numerically smaller than the other major parties, throughout its history the National Party has held Executive Government positions, thanks to its coalition deal with the Liberal Party, thus warranting its consideration as one of the major parties. The electoral system can have a significant impact on party systems. In 1869 Henry Droop hypothesised that majority systems, like that used to 1 In 2013 the Palmer United Party and Katter’s Australian Party both won a seat each.

Chapter 1 | 3

elect parliamentarians to the Australian House of Representatives, reduced an election to a contest between the two most popular candidates. In 1881 Droop attempted to account for two-party systems in the United Kingdom and the United States and argued that a two-party system was formed, and kept alive, by the majority voting system. Similarly, in the mid 1950s Duverger enunciated what was later dubbed ‘Duverger’s Law’; that the majority system favours the two-party system. Conversely, he argued, a proportional representation system (similar to that used in the Australian Senate) would foster a multi-party system. The difference between a two-party system and a multi-party one also creates a problem in terms of differentiating between major and minor par­ ties. As a general rule, parties that win a small share of the primary vote and have a small or non-existent parliamentary presence can be regarded as a minor party. In Australia, all parties other than Labor, Liberal and National can be regarded as minor since only the afore­mentioned parties have taken turns in forming majority governments throughout Australian pol­itical history. But even then, not all minor parties have the same impact in a party system, which raises debate about the relevance of minor parties to the broader polity. Here, we must take into account Jaensch’s (1994) contri­ bution to what makes a party relevant in the Australian case. First, minor parties would be rel­evant when they could affect who would govern through distributing prefer­ences – a feature which has been enhanced since electoral reforms to the Senate in 1984. Second, minor parties would be relevant when they were in a position to hold the balance of power in the Senate. Indeed, these ‘rules’ of relevance can assist in differentiating minor parties within the polity. After all, hundreds of minor parties have contest­ ed elections throughout Australian political history, but only a handful of these parties have won parliamentary representation. Moreover, while the absolute domination of the major parties has continued in the House of Representatives, newer minor parties have been successful in winning repres­entation to the Senate. This raises the need to expand an understand­ ing of the Australian party system to include the effect of parties on the Australian Senate. Table 1.1 shows the minor parties that have won Senate represent­ation since proportional representation was first used in 1949. It shows that 13 minor parties have won seats in the Senate, the first being the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in 1955, which, at that stage, was still known as the Anti-Communist Labor Party. The DLP was to return to the Senate in 2010, though it was a qualitatively different party as will be discussed in Chapter 8. The table also shows that there was a wave of

4 | The Making of a Party System

new minor parties that first won Senate representation in 2013. These are discussed in Chapter 9. Table 1.1: Minor parties that have won Senate representation in elections since 1949 Minor party

Year first Senate seat won

Democratic Labor Party (DLP)

1955

Liberal Movement

1974

Australian Democrats

1977

Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP)

1984

Greens WA#

1990

Australian Greens

1996

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation

1998

Family First

2004

New DLP

2010

Liberal Democrats Party (LDP)

2013

Palmer United Party (PUP)

2013

Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP)

2013

# The predecessor to the Greens WA was the Vallentine Peace Group, though as explored in Chapter 4 this was not really a political party. Instead, setting up the group was a tactic employed by independent Senator Jo Vallentine to appear above the Senate ballot paper’s black line, to enhance her chances of electoral success. Source: Australian Electoral Commission

1.2 The Australian approach: towards a Senate party system The Senate is a crucial component in the Australian system of government. Following the conventions of Westminster systems, the House of Repres­ entatives is where government is formed by the party, or coalition of parties, that win a majority of seats at a general election. The Senate, on the other hand, was designed to be the ‘state’s house’ in which the interests of the individual states would be pursued by its representative senators; a concept reinforced by the fact that all states, irrespective of their population, are represented by the same number of senators. It was created to act as a check

Chapter 1 | 5

on government and is a powerful chamber in the Australian system. In fact, Section 53 of the Constitution provides the Senate with the same powers as the House of Representatives, except that it cannot initiate or amend supply and taxation bills. The number of senators is linked to Section 24 of the Constitution which states that the number of members of the House of Representatives shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of senators. This condition, also known as the Nexus Provision, ensures that the proportion of members and senators remains fairly stable. Thus parliament can increase the number of senators representing each state to increase the number of members of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, the parliament can also change the voting system of the Senate. Prior to 1949, a plurality system of voting was used to elect senators. This resulted in lopsided outcomes in which the chamber was dominated by either the government or opposition parties. But in 1948 the Chifley Labor Government enacted a move to the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method of proportional representation. As Farrell and McAllister (2006:40) have argued, the fear of imminent electoral defeat and a desire to institute a system that could give the party a chance to control the Senate, even when losing a lower house majority, motivated the Chifley government’s interest in this reform. There has always been something of an assumption that governments usually seek to alter electoral systems to achieve partisan advantage (see Colomer 2004). However, it is also the case that sometimes the consequences of reform are not as the reformers expected or hoped they would be. This is a matter of some importance in considering the next tranche of Senate electoral reforms that were enacted by another Labor Govern­ment, this time that of Prime Minister Hawke in 1983, which applied to the 1984 federal election. Notwithstanding that which Chifley hoped to achieve with his 1948 reforms, the move from block-preferential to proportional representation did at least seem to offer the prospect of a change in the representational patterns that had resulted from the old system where the Labor and nonLabor parties had dominated. Table 1.2 presents the results of Senate elections from 1949 to 1983 and also lists the performance of independents for comparative purposes. As Table 1.2 shows, the impact of proportional representation on the Senate party system was not immediately apparent. In fact, it was not until 1955 that the Anti-Communist Party – the first party outside the major party constellation – was elected to the Senate. The Anti-Communist Party (later re-named the Democratic Labor Party, or DLP) remained as the only

*

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

Double dissolution election

(6)

43.5% 22

(4)

44.7% 16

–

–

–

–

–

–

Nats^

LP+NP

CLP

Anti-Com

DLP

Ind

Lib Mov

Dems

^ The Country/National Party has fielded candidates with the Liberal Party joint ticket throughout the study period. The figure presented is the number of Country/National Party senators elected to the Senate from the joint ticket. The figure presented in parentheses is the total number of seats won by the party, including those won by the joint ticket. –

–

–

–

–

-

26.5% 8

1955 60

–

– –

–

–

–

–

1% 1

9.8% 2

–

–

33.8% 6

–

–

1.7% 2

11.1% 3

–

–

19.5% 4

1.1% 1 (2)

17.6% 8

42.2% 14

1970 60

Party joint ticket CLP = Country Liberal Party (NT) Anti-Com = Anti-Communist Labor Party DLP = Democratic Labor Party

–

–

–

0.2% 0

1% 1

–

–

8.4% 2

9.8% 0

8.4% 1

–

–

–

–

–

6.1% 1

–

–

36.3% 7

0.8% 1 (4)

1.2% 1 (3)

0.7% 1 (4) 33.2% 8

8.2% 7

45% 13

1967 60

8.2% 6

44.7% 14

1964 60

8.3% 7

44.7% 14

1961 60

-

23.4% 9

1.1% 1 (3)

0.6% 1 (4) 39.4% 8

20.7% 6

42.8% 15

1958 60

8.7% 8

40.6% 12

ALP = Australian Labor Party Lib = Liberal Party Nats = Country/National Party LP+NP = Liberal Party/Country/National

–

–

–

–

–

-

18% 7

6.2% 10

5.8% 7

Lib (2)

50.6% 17

45.9% 28

44. 9% 19

ALP

1953 60

1951* 60

1949 42

Year No. of senators

9.3% 3

11.1% 2

1.1% 1

-

-

-

1.7% 0

-

–

0.3% 1

25.6% 4

4.5% 1 (2)

13.2% 9

42.3% 15

1980 64

Ind = Independents Lib Mov = Liberal Movement (SA) Dems = Australian Democrats

–

1.1% 1

1% 1 –

1.6% 1

2.7% 0

–

0.2% 1

0.2% 1

1.8% 1

3.6% 0

–

–

34.3% 7

39.9% 17

0.5% 0 (1)

0.5% 1 (7)

1.3% 1 (6) 34.8% 16

10.6% 10

36.8% 14

1977 64

11.1% 16

40.9% 27

1975* 64

7.8% 12

47.3% 29

1974* 60

Table 1.2: Senate election results, 1949 to 1983 – National primary vote (%) and Senate seats won by party

9.6% 5

-

2.4% 1

-

-

0.3% 1

23.3% 8

4.9% 3 (4)

11.6% 16

45.5% 30

1983* 64

6 | The Making of a Party System

Chapter 1 | 7

minor party in the Senate until 1974 when the Liberal Movement won Senate representation.2 By 1977, however, the DLP and Liberal Movement had disintegrated and its position as the only party aside from the established parties was taken up by the nascent Australian Democrats. As Table 1.2 shows, the Democrats’ primary vote was the highest ever achieved by a new party when it won 11.1 per cent of the national Senate vote and two seats in 1977. And while their primary vote was lower in the 1980 and 1983 elections, the party actually increased the number of seats it held in the Senate. On initial inspection it seems that Duverger’s hypothesis is relevant to the Senate party system from 1955. After all, the monopoly of the major parties was broken by new minor parties, albeit ones which seemed to have relatively weak and patchy performances. But upon closer inspection, doubt is cast upon the applicability of Duverger’s hypothesis, since the parties elected to the Senate were essentially offshoots of the established parties. In fact, all three parties elected to the Senate from 1955 to 1983 were the result of fragmentation at the organisational level of the major parties. But the composition of the Senate and, in turn the party system, begins to change after the electoral reforms in 1983.

1.3 Changing the game: the Hawke Government’s electoral reforms The Hawke Government’s reforms – recommended by the government’s 1983 Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform – contributed to a change in the Senate party system. These reforms included the expansion of the number of senators per state from 10 to 12, triggered by the Hawke Government’s desire to increase the size of the House of Representatives to 150 and thus invoking the ‘nexus’ provision in the Constitution. The effect of the increase in the number of senators to be elected per state was a reduction in the percentage of the primary vote needed to achieve a quota from 9.1 per cent in a full Senate election (16.6 per cent in the case of a half-Senate election) to 7.7 per cent (14.4 per cent in the case of a half-Senate contest). Clearly, this represented a reduction in the size of the electoral task confronting the minor parties. The reforms also implemented the Group Ticket Vote (GVT) described by the government as a much simpler method of voting for the Senate. Instead 2 The Australia Party, discussed in Chapter 2, never actually won a Senate seat. Instead, it was represented by Reginald Turnbull, an independent senator from Tasmania, for a very short period in 1969.

8 | The Making of a Party System

of numbering every box on the ballot paper, voters had the option of voting ‘above the line’. By simply indicating their first preference the Australian Electoral Commission would distribute voters’ preferences in accordance with the vot­ing ticket their preferred party had lodged. The rates at which Australians use the GVT method are very high, albeit variable depending on party alignments and states. Crucially, the rate of GVT is especially high (between 98 and 99 per cent) for electors voting for the major parties – an important consideration on those occasions where the major parties have performed so strongly that the later stages of the Senate count involve major party surplus flowing to the minor parties, rather than a situation where a major party is awaiting the flow of minor party preferences to achieve a quota. Tied to reforms to the voting system was the change to how preferences and surpluses were counted in Senate contests. Prior to the 1983 reforms the determination of Senate seats depended on the allocation of random samples of Senate ballots – a process that was controversial, especially since it appeared to disenfranchise citizens. Following recommendations by the Joint Select Com­ mittee on Electoral Reform, the government instituted the Inclusive Gregory Method to replace random sampling, which ensured that all ballots were counted and allocated as either preferences (at full value) or surplus (at fractional value). Another critical reform introduced by the Hawke Government was the establishment of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and the introduction of public funding of elections, which was intended to assist political parties meet the costs of federal election campaigns. To be eligible for funding, parties needed to win at least 4 per cent of the primary vote in the contested area. When the scheme began, however, the amount of funding per formal first preference vote in the House of Representatives (60 cents) was double that of the Senate (30 cents). These rates were linked to the Consumer Price Index.3 An overview of Senate election results since 1984 is provided in Table 1.3. The onset of these reforms coincided with a change in Senate outcomes from 1984. Table 1.3 presents the electoral data on Senate contests since 1984 and lists the performance of independents for comparative purposes. In this case, the table includes Tasmania’s Brian Harradine notwithstanding the fact that, since the 1983 Hawke Government reforms, an organisation called the Harradine Group was formed in order to allow Brian Harradine the 3 There have been a number of changes to the model of election funding since its introduction. However, the funding disparity between the House of Representatives and the Senate was abolished by the Keating Government in 1995 (for further discussion see Ghazarian 2006).

Chapter 1 | 9

option of being individually listed and not simply grouped with the other ungrouped independents on the Senate ballot for Tasmania. However, Harradine should be considered to be an independent, and not a minor party and certainly not a group seeking to establish a national organisation. The table also includes Nick Xenophon who was elected to represent South Australia in 2007 and 2013. Xenophon also presented as an independent rather than a party seeking to establish a national organisation. As can be seen in Table 1.3, new minor parties began winning seats in the Senate from 1984 onwards. The Democrats continued to win Senate seats up to the 2004 election. The Nuclear Disarmament party (NDP) was elected in 1984 after winning over 7 per cent of the national primary vote, and returned a senator in the double dissolution election of 1987. The former NDP Senator, Jo Vallentine, also returned to the Senate in 1987 after standing as a candidate for the Vallentine Peace Group in Western Australia. Then, in 1990, the West Australian Greens won a Senate seat for the first time. In 1998 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party secured a Senate seat after winning almost 9  per cent of the national primary vote, and the newly created Family First Party entered the Senate after winning less than 2 per cent of the primary vote in 2004. In 2010 the new DLP won Senate representation though, as is discussed in Chapter 8, the party was significantly different in terms of its policy focus and position in the party system. The 2013 election result was unprecedented in that three new minor parties won Senate representation. The Liberal Democrats Party and the Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party won a Senate seat each, while the Palmer United Party won three seats in the Senate in addition to one seat in the House of Representatives. Unlike the minor parties elected to the Senate between 1955 and 1983, the parties elected to the federal parliament from 1984 were not necessarily the result of fragmentation within a major party. Rather, these parties’ emergence was underpinned by specific policy goals and/or values, or a mobilisation on a set of issues or ideas. Furthermore, the election of these new parties from 1984 now meant that the Australian Senate was starting to display the multi-party system Duverger discussed. Indeed, the 1984 election marked the point in which changes can be seen in the Senate’s party system.

0.5% 0

–

8.5% 7

1.1% 1

0.3% 1

–

7.6% 5

7.2% 1

0.3% 0

Lib Mov

Dems

NDP

Harr

0.2% 1

0.3% 1

CLP

0.4% 0

–

–

LNP

‘New’ DLP

13.8% 5

12.7% 3

LP+NP

–

7.1% 5 (7)

5.9% 2 (3)

Nats^

Anti-Com –

14.6% 12

21% 23

20.6% 14

Lib

~ Includes the Liberal National Party (LNP) result in Queensland.

^ The Country/National Party has fielded candidates with the Liberal Party joint ticket throughout the study period. The figure presented is the number of Country/Nat Party senators that were elected to the Senate from the joint ticket. The figure in parentheses is the total number of seats won by the party, including those won by the joint ticket. –

–

12.6% 5

–

0.1% 0

–

0.3% 1

–

24.5% 5

2.6% 1 (2)

38.4% 15

42.8% 32

42.2% 20

ALP

1990 76

1987* 76

1984 76

Year No. of senators

– –

0.3% 1

10.8% 5

–

0.3% 0

–

0.4% 1

–

–

5.3% 2

–

0.4% 0

–

0.3% 1

–

24.5% 6

0.2% 1

–

8.5% 4

–

0.3% 0

–

0.3% 1

–

21.2% 5

1.9% 0 (1)

2.9% 1 (2)

2.7% 1 (3) 24.4% 6

13.6% 11

37.3% 17

1998 76

16.2% 12

36.2% 14

1996 76

15.6% 11

43.5% 17

1993 76

–

–

7.3% 4

–

0.6% 0

–

0.4% 1

–

23.9% 6

1.9% 1 (2)

15.7% 12

34.3% 14

2001 76

–

–

2.1% 0

–

0.5% 0

–

0.4% 1

–

–

–

1.3% 0

–

0.9% 0

–

0.3% 1

–

30.7% 9

–

–

0.6% 0

–

1.1% 1

–

–

–

0.3% 0

–

0.8% 0

–

0.3% 1

8.1% 3

8.0% 3 0.3% 1

21.3% 5

0.5% 0 (1)

7.5% 8

30.1% 12

2013 76

29.4% ~ 8

0.3% 0 (2)

0.2% 0 (2)

1.4% 1 (3) 25.7% 6

8.6% 9

35% 15

2010 76

8.8% 8

45% 18

2007 76

17.7% 13

35% 16

2004 76

Table 1.3: Senate election results, 1984 to 2013 – National primary vote (%) and Senate seats won by party

10 | The Making of a Party System

# Includes the result of all parties with ‘Greens’ in their name except the Greens WA until the 1998 election, where the Australian Electoral Commission merged the results of the Greens WA with the Australian Greens.

* Double dissolution election

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

Grns#

WAG

PHON

FF

Xen

LDP

PUP

AMEP

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

0.4% 1

0.5% 1

0.8% 1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

0.5% 0

2.4% 1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

5.5% 0

9% 1 –

–

4.9% 2

–

–

2.7% 0

–

New DLP - Democratic Labor Party Ind - Independents Lib Mov - Liberal Movement (SA) Dems - Australian Democrats NDP - Nuclear Disarmament party Vall - Vallentine Peace Group Grns - Australian Greens WAG - Western Australian Greens PHON - Pauline Hanson’s One Nation

–

–

–

–

–

–

2.5% 0

2.0% 0

–

–

–

ALP - Australian Labor Party Lib - Liberal Party Nats - Country/National Party LP+NP - Liberal Party and Country/ National Party joint ticket LNP - Liberal National Party (Queensland) CLP - Country Liberal Party (NT) Anti-Com - Anti-Communist Labor

–

Vall

–

–

–

0.5% 1

4.9% 1

3.9% 1

1.9% 1

1.1% 1

0.5% 0

–

8.7% 4

–

FF - Family First Harr - Brian Harradine Group Xen- Nick Xenophon LDP - Liberal Democrats Party PUP - Palmer United Party AMEP - Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party

–

–

1.8% 0

0.1% 0 –

–

–

1.2% 1

–

2.1% 0

1.6% 0

1.8% 1

0.6% 0

–

13% 6

–

0.4% 0

–

9.0% 3

–

1.7% 0

–

7.7% 2

–

Chapter 1 | 11

12 | The Making of a Party System

1.4 The Senate system in transition: fragmentary to issuecompetitive The three parties elected to the Senate between 1955 and 1983 – namely the DLP, Liberal Movement and Australian Democrats – were ultimately created as the result of a split in a major party. But the success of these parties during this period did not really signal a change in the Senate party system. After all, these parties were an extension of the established party system in the Australian Senate. The DLP was the result of the bitter split of the Labor Party in the early 1950s and was ultimately created to act as a barrier to prevent the ALP from regaining government. The Liberal Movement – a South Australian phenomenon – was also the result of major party fragmentation. The Liberal Party in South Australia fragmented when former premier Steele Hall and former Attorney-General Robin Millhouse broke away from the South Australian Liberal Party because of issues related to their state’s malapportioned electoral system and their desire to broaden the party’s appeal to the electorate. As will be shown later, the Australian Democrats were also the result of fragmentation in the Liberal Party. In fact, segments of the Liberal Movement and other disillusioned Liberal Party members and supporters were marshalled by the former federal Liberal Minister Don Chipp – who also left the Liberal Party – to create the new party. Although the DLP, Liberal Movement and Democrats were different parties, pursuing different policy goals, they were created by a fragmen­tation in the major parties. Here, we are alerted to Richmond’s (1978: 331) and Jaensch and Mathieson’s (1998: 27) argument that such parties be considered secessionist in nature. From 1984 onwards however, the new parties entering the Senate were in many ways fundamentally diff­erent from the fragmentary parties, particularly because of their reason for being and their objectives in trying to win Senate seats. Post-1984 Senate parties clearly sought to pursue much more specific policy-oriented outcomes than did fragmentary parties. For example, the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) emerged from community opposition to uranium mining and concerns about Australia’s foreign policy (especially Australia’s relationship with the United States). The NDP was a precursor to the various green parties that sought to place humanitarian, ecological and conservation issues higher on the political agenda. One Nation was a party that put indigenous issues, racial matters and multiculturalism to the fore of its agenda. Family First aimed to advance the interests of the family, however obtuse the idea may be, from a socially

Chapter 1 | 13

conservative perspective. The DLP elected to the Senate in 2010 was also focused far more on policy-oriented outcomes than opposing the Labor Party or ideas about communism. Similar to Family First, the new DLP promoted socially conservative ideas relating to same-sex marriage and fer­ tility control, for example. The parties elected in 2013 also focused on advancing specific policyoriented outcomes. The Palmer United Party was concerned with reducing the level of taxation imposed on citizens while the Motoring Enthusiast Party sought to reduce government regulation on economic and social policies. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats promoted an agenda that aimed to reduce the scope of government intervention, especially on social matters. Despite diversity in their policy demands, the minor parties elected in 2013 advanced specific agendas that contrasted with those of the established parties. Indeed, all of the minor parties elected to the Australian Senate since 1984 correspond to a new type of minor party that has been winning parliamentary representation in Europe since the 1970s. These were identified by GreenPedersen (2007) as issue-competitive parties and were seen to have qualitat­ ively changed the European party system. Unlike major parties that had broadly similar social and economic policies, issue-competitive parties sought to distinguish themselves from their competitors by emphasising differences at the margin of the debate. Furthermore, issue-competitive parties were closely associated with specific agenda demands usually outside the main economic and welfare policy debates. As Green-Pedersen (2007:609) put it, issue-competitive parties sought to force ‘political opponents to pay attention to issues they would rather see disappear’ and ‘pay attention to issues that are not necessarily attractive in electoral terms’. This approach helps construct a new view of minor party politics, especially in the context of understanding Australia’s party system. Parties that attract a minority share of the vote, which pursue a relatively narrow and/ or specific policy agenda and win parliamentary seats, represent a distinctive change in the type parties that had been previously elected to the Senate. The parties that have emerged in Australia to win Senate representation since 1984 correspond with Green-Pedersen’s ‘issues competition’ typology. The election of issues-competition parties to the Senate thus constitutes a qualitative shift in the type of party finding its way to the Australian upper house. Indeed, so significant has this shift been that previously fragmentary parties – the Australian Democrats and DLP – tried to re-cast themselves as issues-oriented parties.

14 | The Making of a Party System

At this juncture it is important to note the source of issue-competitive parties since they have not emerged in a vacuum. A closer examination of the issue-competitive minor parties elected to the Australian Senate highlights the link between these parties and broader society. More specifically, many of these parties have clear links with the new social movements whose presence has also intensified in industrialised societies since the 1970s. Social movements are different from interest groups, which are an adjunct to (and work within) the established political institutions. Social movements, on the other hand, aim to transform values within civil society. More specifically, social movements work outside the established political institutions to effect change within broader society. As a result, social movements could affect government policy. Despite this general view that social movements work outside established political institutions, they may in fact spawn political parties. Drawing on European studies such as those of Kitschelt (2006:281–2) sheds light on why some social movements spawn parties while others do not. First, social movements pursued issues outside the debate of the established parties. Instead of trying to cause change in broader society from outside the established political institutions, some activists within social movements may decide to compete against the major parties in an attempt to exert influence over the political debate. Second, the rise of social movement based parties was linked to the electoral system. Social movements may cause a political party to develop when the prospect of winning parliamentary representation, or at least influencing such outcomes, is possible. Here, the importance of electoral laws, state subventions and electoral thresholds become crucial in the development of social movement parties. Proportional representation would encourage such parties to contest elections, since the electoral thresholds would be lower than in a plurality system. The potential of social movement parties to impact policy would also be enhanced in such systems. Third, social movement based parties may develop when the issues they consider important are neglected by the established political parties. Indeed, the suite of policies pursued by the established major parties tended to focus on broad economic and social issues, rather than the often-specific issues of social movement parties. As a result, social movement based parties that have specific policy goals can be greatly assisted by the major parties placing little or no emphasis on their policy demands. Social movement based parties are, however, confron­ ted by the problem of organisation, especially since social movements tend to try to be inclusive and non-hierarchical. These organisational tendencies

Chapter 1 | 15

contrast with the general structures of political parties, which tend to be hierarchical and have been famously described by Michels (2001) as adhering to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Therefore, this stark difference in organisational tendencies presents a dilemma for social movement parties and may be an ongoing cause of tension within their organisations. On one level, such parties are rooted in social movements, yet on another they are required to develop a structure that enables them to organise and contest elections. This problem of organisation is illustrated in subsequent chapters as the organisation of each issue-competitive party is examined.

1.5 Minor parties in the Australian Senate While it is possible for minor parties to influence electoral outcomes through the direction of preferences, winning parliamentary representation remains a crucial goal of political parties. Once in the Senate, however, the extent of a party’s influence on the legislative debate is dependent on various factors. Of particular relevance is the number of seats a party wins in parliament. More specifically, the influence of minor parties is greatest when they hold the balance of power as the government must then rely on their support to pass legislation. The influence of minor parties holding the balance of power is greatest when they are not beholden to either party in government or opposition. Rather, they may support either side or, as Bach (2003:52) described, may ‘swing between one and the other’. There have been notable changes in how minor parties have performed in the Senate. Some of these changes have occurred as a result of procedural changes in the chamber, especially as minor parties have been active in Senate committees. The idea of the committee system was designed to enhance the Senate’s role as a ‘check’ on the executive (see Evans 1995, 2008). Over time, a system of Senate committees was established as the major parties favoured enhancing the chamber’s powers to exercise greater scrutiny on the government. The committee system strengthened the Senate’s role as a house of review and allowed for in-depth investigation of particular matters. The committee system also fulfils an important linking role between parliament and the citizenry. For example, committees provide opportunities for the public to make representations to the parliament. Indeed, committees provide an important way in which minor parties can be involved in the parliamentary, and governing, process. And, as discussed in the following chapter, minor parties have demonstrated different ways in their approach to operating in the Senate.

16 | The Making of a Party System

1.6 Conclusion The Australian party system has been dominated by the Labor, Liberal and National parties. A contributing factor to their domination has been the electoral system, especially in the House of Representatives, and reflects Duverger’s hypothesis. But these parties have also been dominant in the Senate, even after changing to a proportional voting system in 1949. Indeed, the change to the Senate’s voting system did not have an immediate effect on the party system and it was not until 1955 that the first minor party – the DLP – was able to win representation. Even then, the Senate party system did not become a multi-party system and it was some 20 years on that the next minor party – the Liberal Movement – won Senate representation. The third party to win a Senate seat was the Australian Democrats in 1977. While having different policies and goals, these three parties were born from fragmentation within a major party: the DLP fragmented from the ALP, the Liberal Movement from the South Australian Liberal Party and the Australian Democrats from the Liberal Party. As discussed above, these parties correspond to the fragmentary model of minor parties in the Australian case. However, from 1984 onwards, minor parties that have won Senate seats have been mobilised on particular issues rather than by fragmentation within a major party. As discussed above, the NDP, Greens WA, Australian Greens, One Nation, Family First, the reconstituted DLP and the minor parties elected in 2013 were built upon pursuing particular policy goals. These parties emerged after the Hawke Government’s electoral reforms, which increased the number of Senate seats and thus reduced the electoral threshold necessary to win Senate representation. Moreover, these parties correspond to what Green-Pedersen (2007) identified as issue-competitive parties, as the issues they pursued had clear links to broader social movements. The following chapter more closely examines the first phase of minor parties elected to the Senate: the fragmentary minor parties.

Chapter 2 | 17

Cha pte r 2

The Senate contest and the first phase: Fragmentary minor parties The previous chapter highlighted the important role political parties played in liberal democracies and showed that the Australian Senate minor party system displayed two particular phases: the first between 1949 and 1983 and the second from 1984 onwards. This chapter examines the parties that won Senate representation during the first phase of the Senate party system – namely the DLP, the Liberal Movement and the Australian Democrats. These parties were very important as they broke the monopoly of the major parties in the Senate. They also shared similar origins in that they were the result of fragmentation within a major party. However, each party had a different raison-d’être and position in the Australian party system. The DLP was driven by its aim of stopping Labor regaining government, the Liberal Movement was created to reform and inject more progressive policies into the Liberal Party in South Australia, and the Democrats aimed to act as a watchdog over the major parties. To assess these parties’ impact on the Australian party system in the Senate, the following discussion examines the origins, structures and policy traditions of each party and how the parties performed in the Senate. The chapter draws attention to the parties’ influence on the political debate and shows how they set the template for other more contemporary parties that followed in the Australian Senate system.

2.1 Breaking the monopoly of the major parties in the Senate In 1955 the DLP became the first party other than the Liberal, Labor and National parties to win Senate representation. The party was the result of the bitter split in the ALP over the issue of communism, a source of ongoing debate for decades, which came to a head in the early 1950s. The Communist Party of Australia (CPA), formed in 1920, had associations with a number of trade unions and had tried to create closer links with the ALP in an attempt to gain greater relevance in mainstream politics. However, the parliamentary and organisational wings of the ALP refused to form a united front as the

18 | The Making of a Party System

party was still reeling from the split in 1917 over the issue of conscription for the First World War. This led to an acrimonious relationship between the two entities. In the early 1930s the Great Depression was having a significant effect on Australian society and the Scullin Government, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the deteriorating economy, devised what was later known as the Premiers’ Plan to reduce government expenditure. This, however, ultimately led to the ALP splitting for the second time as a swathe of Labor parliamentarians defected to support the New South Wales Labor Premier Jack Lang’s opposition to the plan. This was devastating for the Labor Party. Its vote at the 1931 election slumped to 27 per cent and it lost government to Joe Lyons’ United Australia Party. As the Great Depression continued to impact the domestic economy, the CPA began to make headway in the trade unions. Aware of the burgeoning strength of the CPA, the Labor Party acquiesced and a less corrosive relationship with the Communist Party began. The CPA consolidated its strength among some trade unions during Australia’s involvement in the Second World War. But as the CPA’s in­ fluence grew within the labour movement, other forces began mobilising in an attempt to wrest control of the unions from the CPA. In 1942 Bob Santamaria (then director of the National Secretariat of Catholic Action, a Roman Catholic organisation established in 1937) established the Catholic Social Studies Movement, which aimed to counter the communist influence in the trade union movement and became well organised in New South Wales and Victoria. 4 The ALP was also mobilising to counter communist influence in its ranks. It was decided at the conference of the New South Wales branch in 1945 to form Industrial Groups with an aim to diminish communist influence in the trade unions by winning key positions within each union. These were quickly established in Victoria, Queensland and South Australia. Thus, the battle for organisational power within the unions intensified between communist and anti-communist groups, and lasted from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1950s, climaxing at the federal conference in Tasmania in 1955. The pro-Group/Movement forces were deposed by the ALP organisation and caused the Labor Party to split as those supportive of the ‘Grouper’ and ‘Movement’ cohorts left the party. This had ramifications for the individual 4 Santamaria was never a member of the ALP (for further discussion see McManus 1976).

Chapter 2 | 19

branches of the ALP as they too underwent bitter and protracted divisions between those who aligned with the Groupers and those who remained committed to the established ALP. The agitation caused by the Groups and Movement led the Labor Party to become so bitterly factionalised that those who were displaced as a result of the battle took their supporters out of the main party to create a new party – the Democratic Labour Party.5

2.2 Democratic Labor Party: policies and traditions The Democratic Labor Party (DLP) outlined its purpose in Australian pol­ itics as thus (Democratic Labor Party 1969: 3–4): 1. To create a public awareness of the Communist threat to Australia and to win support for policies essential to our survival as a free and independent nation. 2. To erect a road block of D.L.P. votes across the A.L.P.’s path and so deny it the fruits of office.

3. To wage a war of attrition against the A.L.P. and so compel it to break its Communist connections and again become the acceptable alternative Australian Government it once was, or to force it to make way for a Party fulfilling this requirement (emphasis in original). The party’s hostility towards communism underpinned its policy ethos, especially in the areas of foreign affairs and defence. The DLP was very concerned about the threat of Russia to Australia’s alliance with Britain and the United States. Because of the potential for conflict with communist nations, the DLP advocated an increase in Australia’s defence capabilities. By 1965 the DLP was advocating that Australia have a nuclear capacity that could be used against China as well as a larger defence force that could be used in potential conflict with communist nations. The DLP’s foreign policy aimed to fashion Australia as a strong influence in the Asian region by building economic and military ties with non-communist nations. Indeed, the DLP invested much time in developing defence policies that contrasted with the major parties’.6 5 The name of the party was originally the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist). In 1957 it became the Australian Democratic Labor Party, then the Democratic Labor Party of Australia, and in 2013 it became the Democratic Labour Party. 6 The DLP was especially critical of the Coalition government’s continuing trade with China, which the party believed would lead to the increasing influence of China in the Australian economy (see Duffy 1966:340).

20 | The Making of a Party System

In conjunction with the party’s focus on defence issues, the DLP articulated other policy goals, though they remained couched in its broad, anti-communist and pro-defence ethos. In particular, the DLP encouraged citizens to relocate to rural and regional areas as a way of dispersing and decentralising industry, which would be of tactical importance in case of conflict with a communist force. The DLP’s suite of policies also emphasised socially conservative values. It pursued policies that would strengthen the idea of the nuclear family, comprising heterosexual parents and children. This clearly had links with Catholic teachings about the concept of family and underpinned the party’s housing, education and child endowment policies. Further to this attempt to increase the nation’s population (in order to buttress the nation’s defence capacity and economy), the DLP aimed to implement ‘marriage loans’ which entailed loans to all young couples to be repaid over 10 years, without interest. The DLP proposed to rebate $200 on the birth of each child so that ‘a family of five children would repay no part of the loan’ and to set up special Home Loan fund through the Reserve Bank (DLP 1969:14). Linked to policies relating to the family, the DLP advocated greater support for independent schools and in 1958 proposed a student endowment for students attending non-government schools. The DLP couched its policy in terms of giving parents the right to choose the school for their children.7 One of the more explicit demonstrations of the DLP’s conservatism was its hostility towards the Little Red School Book in 1972. The DLP positioned itself as the guardian of morality when Don Chipp, then Minister for Customs and Excise, allowed the book to be sold in Australia. Despite the DLP mobilising against Chipp, the minister’s decision prevailed (see Reynolds 1974:89).8 The DLP’s emergence and suite of policies was important, as the party contrasted with the Labor Party. The DLP’s policies also demanded more from the Coalition government, especially in terms of defence spending and imposing greater government control on particular issues concerning social policy. The DLP’s policies also attracted the support of those who were disillusioned with the major parties. In particular, the DLP sought to gain the support of voters who saw Labor’s policies as being tainted by communism. 7 The ALP had removed state aid for non-government schools from its 1957 platform. It reinstated the policy in 1961 (also see Reynolds 1972:43). 8 For further discussion on community perceptions of the DLP see Aitkin (1982:68–70).

Chapter 2 | 21

Being created by former Labor members, the DLP shared a number of organisational features with the ALP. Like the ALP, the DLP comprised six state Branches. The Federal Conference was the party’s supreme governing body but, unlike the ALP, conference decisions were not binding on the party’s parliamentary wing. This minimised the role of its wider membership. For example, the fact that Conference decisions were not binding on the parliamentary wing clearly demonstrated that the party’s decision-making powers were vested with its senators. This showed that the party was focused on its performance in the Senate as it sought to oppose the ALP. The DLP’s organisation was also significant as it demonstrated that a major party’s structures could serve as a template for a new minor party. As discussed later, other minor parties that began to develop after the DLP’s emergence took note of this template.

2.3 The importance of electors: the rise and fall of the DLP The DLP, like other minor parties, faced a number of challenges in the pursuit of parliamentary representation. As Table 2.1 shows, the DLP had a patchy history of electoral performances. Throughout 22 years, the party was able to win a total of nine Senate seats. In its inaugural election in 1955 the party won a Senate seat in Victoria after attracting almost 18 per cent of the primary vote. By 1958 the DLP had a national presence and fielded candidates in all states. Its performance in Victoria slipped but the party won a Senate seat in Tasmania where its candidate – high profile, former ALP member George Cole – won 17 per cent of the primary vote. Indeed, the power of Cole’s candidacy can be seen in Tasmania when, in the following election of 1961 which Cole did not contest, the party’s primary vote plummeted to 5.5 per cent. While the party’s national primary vote rose to 9.8 per cent, the DLP was unable to win a seat in 1961. This was despite the fact that the former ALP Premier of Queensland, Vince Gair, won almost 12 per cent of the Senate primary vote. In 1964 the DLP won two Senate seats. Vince Gair stood as the DLP’s candidate in Queensland and won the party’s first Senate seat in that state. The party also won a seat in Victoria. Frank McManus, a Grouper expelled from the ALP, had won a Senate seat in Victoria in 1955 but was defeated in 1961. In 1964 he returned to the Senate after winning almost 14 per cent of the primary vote. In Tasmania, the DLP’s performance was second only to that in Victoria as George Cole’s candidacy lifted the party’s primary vote to 13.5 per cent, although he was unable to be returned as a senator for Tasmania.

-

-

8.7

0

11

0

17.8

1

3.4

0

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

-

Seats

Vote

-

1

Seats

Vote

6.1

Vote

0

6.3

0

12.5

1

17

0

5.3

1964

4 0

0

1

13.9

0

13.5

0

2.4

1

12

0

0

5.6

1

1 7.8

19.1

0

3.9

0

3.2

1

16.4

1

7

3

11.1

1970

17.3

0

8.6

0

3.5

1

13.3

0

4.7

4.8 0

2

9.8

1967

2

8.4

7.3

0

14.1

0

5.5

0

5.5

0

11.8

10.6 0

0

7.8

0

9.8

1961

0

4.9

1

8.4

1958

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

WA

VIC

TAS

SA

QLD

NSW

National

1955

-

-

0

0

0.5

0

5.9

-

0

-

-

0

2.6

0

1.8

0

6.5

1975

2.7

0.8

0

0.9

0

4

0

2.9

0

3.6

1974

Table 2.1: DLP primary vote (%) and Senate seats won in elections by state, 1955–1977

-

-

0

6.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0

1.7

1977

22 | The Making of a Party System

Chapter 2 | 23

As Table 2.1 shows, the DLP not only won another two seats in 1967 – again, one each in Queensland and Victoria – but also increased its primary vote to 9.8 per cent. Condon Byrne, a former barrister and a former ALP senator, won a Senate seat in Queensland after gaining 13.3 per cent of the primary vote. In Victoria, the former ALP Legislative Councillor for Melbourne North, Jack Little, won over 17 per cent and a Senate seat. But the DLP’s most successful election was in 1970 when it won three Senate seats. Former Assistant General Secretary of the NSW ALP, Jack Kane won in NSW with 7 per cent of the primary vote. Vince Gair and Frank McManus were also returned as senators for Queensland and Victoria after winning 16.4 and 19.1 per cent of the primary vote respectively. The 1970 election, however, was the last time the DLP won Senate representation. In fact, as Table 2.1 illustrates, the DLP’s election performances fell away after the ALP regained government in 1972, thus eradicating the DLP’s raison d’être – that of keeping the ALP out of government. Indeed, this marked a significant diminution of the party’s influence in the national political debate thereafter. By 1977 the party had deteriorated to the point that it could only field candidates in Victoria. Following a period of instability the DLP voted to dissolve in 1978. However, as Chapter 8 discusses, a dedicated band of individuals resurrected the party in Victoria shortly afterwards. The emergence of the DLP in the Senate signalled a shift in the party system and supported Duverger’s hypothesis that a multi-party system was the product of a proportional representative voting system. But this view is tempered when the party’s state-by-state performance is considered. As discussed above, all DLP senators were former members of the ALP who had developed a significant public profile in their home states. This was an invaluable tool in their use of the proportional voting system, which required them to attain a quota of the statewide vote in order to be elected to the Senate. Table 2.1 also shows that, on many occasions, DLP candidates were able to win almost a quota or over and thus reduced their reliance on pref­ erences to win seats. This owed much to the fact that these candidates had a high public profile that had been established during their time in the ALP. Indeed, as Table 2.1 shows, the party’s performances were generally weaker when there were fewer high-profile candidates standing. Despite these variations, the election of the DLP demonstrated the democratic features of the new voting system. By allowing the DLP – a minor party with modest electoral support – to enter the Australian Senate, the Australian party system had undergone a transformation. As one analyst concluded, the DLP had ‘started a revolution in the perception of the role of the Senate and the

24 | The Making of a Party System

potential of PR for reflecting the views of any minor party which could generate around 10 per cent of the statewide first preference vote at Senate elections’ (Sharman 1999: 155).

2.4 The DLP in the Senate The DLP’s success demonstrated to the electorate that parties other than the major parties could win a place and play a role in the Australian Senate. However, as Crisp (1965:221) argued, the DLP was ‘first and foremost’ a ‘spoiling’ party. Indeed, the nature of the DLP served the interests of the Coalition since the party’s primary purpose was to keep the ALP out of government. Furthermore, the DLP consistently directed its preferences to the Coalition which strengthened its standing in the electorate. In the Senate, the DLP continued to be a spoiling party in its approach to dealing with legislation and procedure. The pattern of the party’s Senate voting showed that it usually voted with the Coalition. However, the DLP’s overwhelming support for the Coalition (or rather, its outright opposition to the ALP) was a double-edged sword for the party. While the DLP frustrated the ALP, it could never really maximise its bargaining potential with the Coalition because of its rigid opposition to Labor. The DLP’s most significant legislative victory was drawn from its policy on state aid for nongovernment schools. As noted earlier, the DLP campaigned for greater Commonwealth support for independent schools in order to give parents a greater choice as to where they sent their children for their education. But this policy was supported most by the Catholic cohort in Australia – the same cohort that underpinned the DLP (see Aitkin 1982:169). Other church denominations were supportive of state aid since their schools would also benefit from such a policy. By the early 1960s the Menzies Government had introduced a scholarship scheme and extra funding opportunities for nongovernment schools that, to a large extent, satisfied the DLP. Indeed, the DLP positioned itself as the driver of this significant legislative development, even though the DLP had very little to do with the government’s decision (Reynolds 1972:44). In fact, it was the lobbying from within the Coalition for the increase in state aid that affected government policy, rather than the presence of the DLP. In broader terms, the emergence of the DLP appeared to have affected the operation of the Australian Senate. Debates in the Senate were seen to be more intense and fruitful with the presence of the DLP, since there was always the possibility (though not probability) that the DLP would use

Chapter 2 | 25

its balance of power to vote against the Coalition government (Solomon 1971:527). This enhanced the Senate’s role as a house of review but the party’s dogmatic adherence to its anti-Labor raison d’être ultimately reflected the DLP’s spoiling focus, which meant that it could never expand the role it played in the Senate.

2.5 An alternative to the DLP: the emergence of ‘counter parties’ The DLP’s ability to win Senate seats precipitated some interesting consequences in the Australian Senate minor party system. One such consequence was the formation of the Liberal Reform Group (LRG), which later became the Australia Party. The LRG was essentially formed in opposition to the DLP and its conservative policies. This entity was set up by Gordon Barton, an entrepreneur who started the IPEC transport firm, and attracted opponents of the Vietnam War who were frustrated by the presence of the DLP in the Senate. Barton and the LRG mobilised to counter the DLP as they believed the Senate needed other parties, promoting contrasting views. The LRG contested the 1966 election but, despite its significant campaign budget, was unable to win a seat. The LRG later changed its name to the Australian Reform Movement (ARM) and continued to campaign on ending Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War (also see Everingham 2009). The members of the ARM, and Barton in particular, identified the need to have parliamentary representation in order to have a greater influence on government policy. Since the party had failed to win a seat, it sought to recruit Reginald ‘Spot’ Turnbull, who was already in the Senate as an independent from Tasmania.9 The idea of representing the ARM in the Senate was appealing to Senator Turnbull, though he argued the party’s name had to change to the Australia Party to enhance its electoral appeal (see Everingham 2009:155). Barton agreed and Senator Turnbull became the Australia Party’s parliamentary leader in July 1969. The Australia Party pursued a range of socially progressive policies such as a Bill of Rights for the Constitution, decriminalisation of homosexuality and abortion, and 9 Senator Turnbull had previously been the Minister for Health and Treasurer of Tasmania between 1948 and 1959. He was ‘sacked’ from the ALP, however, after accusations of impropriety regarding the transfer of ownership of the state lottery. He had contested the 1962 federal election as an independent and won a Senate seat in Tasmania and became the first independent senator in Australia. During his time in the Senate Senator Turnbull had been a critic of the government’s support for the Vietnam War (see Jones, 2006).

26 | The Making of a Party System

policies that opposed racial discrimination (Blackshield 1972:43). The party was strongly opposed to the military alliance with the United States and the operation of foreign military bases in Australia. These policies contrasted sharply with the DLP, which was precisely what Barton hoped to achieve. However, the Australia Party and its presence in the Senate quickly unravelled. Participatory politics was the overall ethos of the Australia Party and its organisation was heavily dependent on the participation of members – the party determined its policies by a ballot of its membership rather than allowing only delegates to decide policy. While this participatory approach sought to give all members greater ownership of the party and its decisions, it meant that formulating a decision was ‘frustratingly slow’ (Blackshield 1972:39). Such issues led Senator Turnbull to become disillusioned with the party after just two months. The Australia Party contested the 1969 federal House of Representatives election in October but performed very poorly, which led to Senator Turnbull resigning from the party and resuming his seat as an independent. The party contested subsequent elections but failed to win Senate representation. The party was also a financial drain on Barton who was providing much of the funding from his personal resources. Despite this, the party continued to operate primarily as an opposition party to the DLP.10 During this period the DLP had begun its political descent. After 1970 the DLP began to weaken and its goal of keeping Labor out of government had been made superfluous by the election of the Whitlam Government in 1972. The DLP continued to have Senate representation but, as Table 2.1 shows, by 1974 the party’s primary vote was a fraction of what it was in 1970. By 1975 the DLP’s primary vote collapsed as the party disintegrated. But the demise of the DLP (at least in terms of Senate representation) did not signal the end of minor party representation – in 1974 the Liberal Movement, another fragmentary party, won Senate representation and introduced a new style of minor party in the Senate.

2.6 The rise of the Liberal Movement The Liberal Movement was the result of a split within the Liberal and Country League (LCL) in South Australia, led by Premier Steele Hall. Hall succeeded Sir Thomas Playford, who was premier of South Australia between 1938 and 1965, as leader of the opposition in 1966. Hall, a charismatic 10 The Australia Party later merged with the Liberal Movement in 1977 to form the Australian Democrats.

Chapter 2 | 27

figure, brought with him a program to modernise elements of the LCL. He led the party to victory in the 1968 state election, defeating the Dunstan-led Labor Party. This was despite the fact that the ALP won 52 per cent of the primary vote to the LCL’s 44 per cent. Indeed, both parties won 19 seats each. It was only with the support of the sole independent, Tom Stott, that the LCL was able to form government. This situation highlighted the need for electoral reform, since the state’s current system was perceived as being unfair (see Economou and Ghazarian 2006: 14). Hall embarked on a campaign to reform the state’s malapportioned elec­ toral system but this led to bitter factionalism within the LCL. On one side of the debate was Hall, supported by senior ministers, Attorney-General Robin Millhouse and Minister for Works and Education, John Coombe and other party members with more progressive policy ideals. Opposing Hall’s plans were the conservative strand of the South Australian LCL, led by the party’s leader in the Legislative Council, Ren DeGaris. Of great concern to the LCL was the effect Hall’s electoral reform would have on the party’s electoral fortunes, especially as the urban areas of South Australia began to expand. As Hall (1973: 28) noted, the LCL’s electoral successes were built upon ‘country support, based on a weighted electoral distribution’ which had served the interests of the LCL. But Hall’s program was a threat to the party’s dominance in South Australia. More specifically, Hall was also a threat to the conservative forces in the Liberal Party. In a move designed to thwart Hall from appointing ‘progressive’ parliamentarians to his new Cabinet, the conservatives in the South Australian Liberal Party – led by Ren DeGaris – attempted to change the way ministers were selected. The anti-Hall group wanted Cabinet members to be elected rather than appointed by the parliamentary leader, which had been the method used by the Liberal Party since its inception. This issue, which was never really resolved, served as a backdrop to the power struggle in the party. When coupled with the fact that, as a result of Hall’s changes to the electoral system, the LCL lost the 1970 state election to the Dunstan-led Labor Party (which won 27 seats after winning 51.6 per cent of the primary vote), Hall’s position became untenable and he resigned from the LCL in early 1972. However, Hall had numerous allies within the LCL – especially the Young Liberals in South Australia – and received broad support. This encouraged Hall to form the Liberal Movement as a faction within the LCL to represent a progressive strand of the LCL. Indeed, the party pursued a centrist – and inclusionary – program, though its policies were tinged with progressive ideals. For example, the party argued to lower the age of

28 | The Making of a Party System

eligibility for Legislative Council members from 30 to 18 and emphasised the importance of ecological conservation (see Richmond 1978:356). Indeed, these policies were an extension of Hall’s and Millhouse’s progressive outlooks, championed during their time in government. They oversaw the reform of laws concerning fertility control in South Australia, which came into effect in 1970, and were also influential in driving reforms in the areas of Aboriginal Affairs and Social Welfare. In extending the Liberal Movement’s spirit of inclusionary politics, Hall lobbied for parliament to be broadcast on television and radio. Since the Liberal Movement originally emerged as a faction from within the LCL, it adopted the objectives of the Liberal Party, and its organisat­ ion essentially mimicked its original party, much to the chagrin of LCL members who opposed the existence of the Liberal Movement. In fact, the Liberal Movement successfully overran a number of LCL branches and stood its own candidates against incumbent parliamentarians at the South Australian state election in 1973. This led the LCL to exclude Liberal Movement members, causing some members of the Liberal Movement to go back to the LCL while three members of parliament, including Hall and Millhouse, remained in the Liberal Movement. In a determined effort to prove the wide support the Liberal Movement had in South Australia, Hall nominated as the lead Senate candidate at the 1974 double dissolution election arguing that being in the Senate would ‘provide a national platform to promote [Liberal Movement] LM policy and place the LM on the scene of national discussion and controversy’ (cited in Jaensch and Bullock 1978:97). Hall was elected to the Senate on first preferences after winning 10 per cent of the primary vote. His presence in the Senate – at a time where the major parties held 29 seats each with only one other independent – bolstered his new party’s position in the Australian party system. With the party represented in the Senate, the Liberal Movement contested the 1975 South Australian election as a separate party to the LCL, winning over 18 per cent of the primary vote and two seats in the House of Assembly – a very strong result by the nascent party.

2.7 The Liberal Movement and the Senate: the power of one? Hall positioned the Liberal Movement at a federal level as a middle-of-theroad party that would support bills on merit rather than party lines. Hall’s position as only one of two senators not aligned to either major party garnered him much media attention, especially as the events leading up to the 1975

Chapter 2 | 29

double dissolution election – caused by the Constitutional Crisis – played out. Hall was of the view that the Senate had no right to defer the Whitlam Government’s budget, and that the Opposition was acting irresponsibly (see Jaensch and Bullock 1978:137). Hall’s commitment to remain above party politics, by refusing to consistently support one major party over another, caused one newspaper to label him a fence-sitting ‘enigma’ (see Cummins 1974). However, this intermediary role was one that Hall aimed to fulfil. The idea that the Liberal Movement was a type of independent watchdog over the major parties prospered throughout 1975. The media interest in Hall reached a climax in November 1975 as the Opposition in the Senate refused to pass the Whitlam Government’s Supply Bill. On 11 November Channel 0 aired a special program titled Spotlight on Steele Hall while many other editorials lauded his behaviour – especially his disapproval of the Opposition’s tactics in the Senate – throughout the unfolding constitutional crisis (see Jaensch and Bullock 1978:137). Hall continued to support the Whitlam Government throughout the crisis much to the chagrin of federal Liberal leader Malcolm Fraser. Following the Whitlam Government’s dismissal in November 1975, the Liberal Movement moved quickly to position itself as a new type of political party in South Australia, with plans to broaden into a national party. The Liberal Movement’s slogan for the 1975 election was ‘Leave the Extremes – vote LM’. Hall was clearly attempting to recast the party as a moderating force between the major parties – a position enhanced by Hall’s actions during the Constitutional Crisis. The Liberal Movement, and especially Steele Hall, received significant attention from the media during the 1975 campaign. And while Hall was returned to the Senate, the party’s performance was significantly poorer than in 1974. In fact, in 1975 Hall had to rely on a leakage of preferences from the other parties after polling just 6.5 per cent of the state’s primary vote. The Constitutional Crisis polarised the electorate towards the major parties, which in turn reduced the Liberal Movement’s support. Furthermore, the cost of contesting these elections had taken its toll on the Liberal Movement as it had become financially crippled by the expense of the campaigns. The tentative plans made to make the Liberal Movement a national party – after Hall’s initial Senate triumph – were also made redundant as financial pressures and polarisation of the electorate by the events of the Constitutional Crisis diminished the party’s fragile support in the other states (see Jaensch and Bullock 1978). By this stage, however, the issue of modernising the electoral system had been dealt with, as had the issues of internal reform of the South Australian

30 | The Making of a Party System

Liberal Party. As a result, Hall sought to dissolve the Liberal Movement in 1976 and return to the Liberal Party. This was met with some opposition within the Liberal Movement, especially by Millhouse who refused to merge, and persisted outside the Liberal Party by creating the New Liberal Movement.11 Millhouse was the dominant figure in the new party, though other figures, such as Janine Haines, also had critical roles. At this point, however, the Australian Democrats were forming and Millhouse, Haines and the bulk of New Liberal Movement members began actively working to establish the new national party. The New Liberal Movement was subsequently absorbed into the Australian Democrats. The Liberal Movement was important as it demonstrated that minor parties could have a significant role in the Australian Senate. Its success was driven primarily by its leader, Steele Hall, whose charisma and high public profile boosted the party’s identification in the electorate. Indeed, Hall’s leadership demonstrated the importance of a charismatic leader to the electoral fortunes of nascent parties. The Liberal Movement’s brief presence in the Senate, however, had a longer lasting legacy on the shape of the party system. While the Liberal Movement was a vehicle for disenchanted moderates in the South Australian Liberal Party, it also acted as a model in the Australian party system as to how a centrist party could act as an intermediary between the major parties in the Senate. Moreover, the Liberal Movement set the template for the next fragmentary party which would have a momentous impact on the role of minor parties in, as well as the role of, the Australian Senate: the Australian Democrats.

2.8 The Australian Democrats The rise of the Australian Democrats is crucial to the Senate party system as the party built upon the template set by the Liberal Movement, and served as a source of inspiration for other minor parties that were to later win Senate representation. Where the DLP positioned itself as a negating force on the ALP (and the Australia Party positioned itself as a negating force on the DLP), the Democrats refined the Liberal Movement’s idea of being a watchdog over the major parties. This was most explicitly declared through the party’s mantra, coined before the 1980 election, to ‘keep the bastards honest’. This carried the flavour of the Liberal Movement’s 1975 tagline: 11 After the Liberal Movement episode, Hall won the Liberal Party’s preselection for the seat of Boothby, which he held in the Commonwealth Parliament from 1981 to 1996. Also see Sugita (1995).

Chapter 2 | 31

‘Leave the Extremes – vote LM’. The Democrats also featured a uniquely innovative and democratic organisational model that rejected the established parties’ hierarchical structures. The rise of the Australian Democrats was the result of the coming together of the three manifestations of fragmentation of the Liberal Party: the Australia Party, the Liberal Movement and Don Chipp. As explained above, the Australia Party contested the 1970 and 1974 federal elections but was unable to win parliamentary representation. It is important to note that although the bulk of its members supported the nascent Australian Democrats the Australia Party did not dissolve at the time of the Democrats’ formation. Instead the Australia Party, in an attenuated form (and having only a handful of financial members), continued to operate and it fielded candidates for the Senate and House of Representatives.12 The second component that helped form the Australian Democrats was the Liberal Movement discussed above. The Democrats were imbued with the Liberal Movement’s centrist program and modus operandi in the Senate as is examined below. The third component in forming the Australian Democrats was Don Chipp who resigned from the Liberal Party after serving as a sitting member in the House of Representatives from 1960.13 During his time as a Liberal Minister, Chipp had held the navy and tourism portfolios. But it was his role as Minister for Customs and Excise that raised his public profile as a proponent of socially progressive policies. In this role Chipp introduced the R rating classification for films, approved the importation of sex aids and approved the importing and production of the Little Red School Book (vehemently opposed by the DLP). Chipp’s socially progressive ideas were also in opposition to more socially conservative Liberal members and had become a source of tension. The onset of the 1975 Constitutional Crisis played a crucial role in the emergence of the new party. The crisis occurred as a result of a battle in the Senate between the major parties – the ALP and the Liberal-Country coalition – that eschewed concerns for constitutional conventions as both sides sought to secure executive power. In the aftermath of the crisis there was growing interest in finding alternatives to the major party dominance of the Australian political system, and this established the basis for revived interest in a centrist party. While the Liberal Movement was still in the 12 Members of the Australia Party who did not join the Democrats were criticised by Chipp as being ideological (see Sugita 1995). 13 Thorough accounts of the events in the lead up to Chipp’s decisions and resignation can be found in Chipp and Larkin 1978; Jaensch 1997, esp. pp.313–4.

32 | The Making of a Party System

Senate, its lack of resources limited its potential to grow into a national party. The decision of the then Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, to leave rival Don Chipp out of the post-1975 Coalition ministry made another important contribution to the dynamics that would eventually lead to the formation of the Australian Democrats. By early 1976 Chipp had begun to lay the groundwork through a series of public meetings, starting in Perth on 29 April of that year. A tour of Australian capital cities and a series of public meetings, which drew fourfigure crowds and thousands of dollars in donations, followed (Jaensch 1997:313). With burgeoning support for a new party, Chipp resigned from the Liberal Party. In his resignation speech delivered in parliament Chipp (1977:557) set the ethos for his new party: I have become disenchanted with party politics as they are practiced in this country and with the pressure groups which have an undue influence on the major political parties. The National Country Party properly represents the interests of a small sectional group… but improperly in my view, and unduly, influences national policies quite out of proportion to the small group it represents. The Labor Party is dominated by the vested interests of trade unions. The Liberal Party, although properly concerned with the vital role of private enterprise, seems too pre-occupied with the wants of what is euphemistically known as ‘big business’ to the sacrifice and detriment of medium and small-size businessmen who form the backbone of our industrial and commercial sectors. The parties seem to polarise on almost every issue, sometimes seemingly just for the sake of it, and I wonder whether the ordinary voter is not becoming sick and tired of the vested interests which unduly influence the present political parties and yearn for the emergence of a third political force, representing middle of the road policies which would owe allegiance to no outside pressure group.

As a result, the Australian Democrats was officially launched in June 1977. Fragments of the Australia Party, Liberal Movement and Liberal Party members who shared similar views to Chipp either joined the party or offered significant support. The new party sought an alternative to the major parties’ approaches to organisation in an attempt to enhance internal democracy. For all the references they made to being committed to internal democracy, the major political parties have hierarchical structures in which oligarchic

Chapter 2 | 33

tendencies can be identified both within the organisational structure and in the relationship of the parliamentary wing to the extra-parliamentary party. The Australian Democrats sought to provide an alternative by instituting a structure based on rules that aimed to protect its parliamentary wing from the dictates of caucusing (especially the disciplined form practised by the ALP), but also aimed to empower the party’s mass membership to determine crucial aspects of the party’s operation including the formation of a policy platform and in choosing the parliamentary leader.14 These organisational matters are important because they were at the centre of the dynamics that contributed to the decline of the Democrats as discussed in Chapter 5. The Democrats’ inclusionary structure was unlike any other party in the Senate but it did have a leader and it did have party meetings. It is also important to note that the Democrats rejected the organisational model of the Liberal Movement which afforded its leader significant power. The Australian Democrats would be organised along federal lines, with branches operating in each state and territory and a national secretariat to manage the party’s affairs. It was how decision-making power within the party would be distributed that caused the party’s organisation to be venerated as being both innovative and democratic. The practical application of internal party democracy took two broad forms: first, by allowing the membership to determine party policy and second, by allowing the membership to make important decisions about the party’s parliamentary wing. Party rules required the holding of a ballot of the mass membership to determine preselections, including the all-important preselections for the Senate. The matter of determining the direction of preferences, however, would be left in the hands of the state organisations but with one important proviso: party rules forbade the direction of preferences to one or other of the major parties. Party rules also provided for the holding of plebiscites at which the mass membership could determine the party’s policy platform. The significance of the mass membership’s ability to influence policy however was mitigated by another party rule allowing parliamentary Democrats to vote on bills according to their conscience. As a result, mass-membership-determined party policy could never really be binding, and this, in turn, meant that most of the party’s efforts in this area mainly concerned debating broad policy platforms. The power to instigate a leadership challenge and then determine the outcome thus lay in the hands of the party’s branch membership, although 14 In signalling its intent to maximise the participation of its members, the Democrats invited proposals for the design of its new logo. The winning design included the party’s name with green and gold stripes.

34 | The Making of a Party System

leadership challenges could also be instigated by the parliamentary wing. Unlike the rather ambiguous situation over the ability of the membership to influence non-binding party policy, the subordination of the parliamentary wing to the membership over parliamentary leadership matters was much more certain. Despite the party’s inclusionary organisation, the policy formation process had a low participation rate. Before an amendment to the Constitution in 1991 any party policy, to become such, needed to have been voted on by at least 10 per cent of the general membership of the party. On numerous occasions, however, the party ballot did not get near the 10 per cent threshold15 with normal national policy ballots being voted on by less than half this number. A participation rate of only 6 to 10 per cent was common on particular policy areas in other divisions. Despite these participation rates, the party’s structure – which reflected participatory and inclusionary ideals – made the Democrats’ organisation unique in the Australian party system (also see Gauja 2005).

2.10 The Democrats in the Senate: initial themes As Table 2.2 shows, the Australian Democrats had an immediate effect on the Australian party system at the 1977 election. The party won over 11 per cent of the primary vote and two seats in the Senate in 1977 – Don Chipp in Victoria and Colin Mason, the former head of the Australia Party, in New South Wales. However, it is interesting to note that it was actually Janine Haines who was the first senator to represent the Australian Democrats. Haines was appointed by Don Dunstan, the South Australian premier, to fill the casual vacancy left by the Liberal Movement’s Steele Hall earlier in 1977. The victory of Chipp, in particular, gave further impetus to the Australian Democrats and gave the party a charismatic and high profile leader in the Senate. Table 2.2 shows that, despite winning a lower primary vote in 1980, the party won three more Senate seats. Chipp and Mason were joined by John Siddons from Victoria, Michael Macklin from Queensland and Janine Haines, who was returned as a senator for South Australia. This resulted in the party holding the balance of power in the Senate for the first time. The opportunity for the Democrats to display how they would wield this power came in the form of the Fraser Government’s 1981 federal budget. As Young 15 This threshold was dismantled in 1991 as the Democrats realised it would prove difficult for 10 per cent of the membership to consistently vote on policy matters.

Chapter 2 | 35

(1997a:31) has shown, the Democrats opposed the government’s increase in sales tax, arguing that it would have a ‘disproportionate effect on low income workers’ and that the policy was ‘an error of judgement’ (AJPH 1982:414). The negotiations that followed set the tone for how the Democrats would operate in the future. Since the party had committed never to block supply, it had to negotiate with the major parties in order to reach outcomes that its senators felt were satisfactory. In the 1981 budget, the Democrats worked with the ALP and independent Senator Brian Harradine to persuade the government to abandon plans to raise the sales tax. When the government refused, the Democrats sided with the ALP and blocked the Sales Tax Amendment Bills. This episode crystallised the Democrats’ behaviour and position in the Senate. Instead of being a spoiler like the DLP before it, the Democrats placed great emphasis on using the Senate processes to (as Senator Lyn Allison (2005) later described it) ‘smooth the rough edges off legislation’. However, the party’s blocking of the Sales Tax Bill also signalled that it would not yield to the government on issues it felt were important. Table 2.2: Australian Democrats primary vote (%) and Senate seats won in elections by state, 1977–1983 National NSW

Victoria

Queensland

SA

WA Tasmania

1977

1980

1983*

Vote

11.3

8.3

8.6

Seats

2

3

5

Vote

8.3

6.3

7.8

Seats

1

0

1

Vote

16.2

10.0

10.7

Seats

1

1

1

Vote

8.9

9.0

7.2

Seats

0

1

1

Vote

11.2

11.8

10.7

Seats

0

1

1

Vote

12.5

8.3

6.2

Seats

0

0

1

Vote

5.8

2.9

6.3

Seats

0

0

0

* Double dissolution

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

36 | The Making of a Party System

The 1983 double dissolution election saw the Fraser Government defeated by the Hawke-led ALP. As Table 2.2 shows, the Democrats won seats in all states except Tasmania where independent senator Brian Harradine was reelected. The lowering of the quota necessary for election to the Senate in a double dissolution assisted the party in winning seats. This was illustrated by the fact that the party won Senate seats in South Australia, Queensland and Western Australia despite having a lower primary vote compared to 1980. In Victoria, Chipp was returned after winning a smaller share of the primary vote compared to his strong performance in 1977. Colin Mason was also returned in New South Wales after winning 7.8 per cent of the primary vote. The party’s overall performance between 1977 and 1983 was very strong – it managed to win 10 Senate seats in this period (also see Forrest 1987). The disaggregation of the party’s national voting performance by states provides additional insights into the structure of the party’s vote, including a clear indication of the importance of two states in particular to the party’s electoral and representational wellbeing. The state-based Senate results show that the Democrats’ strongest performances between 1977 and 1983 were in the home state of Don Chipp, Victoria. Indeed, the party managed to win a Senate seat in every election in Victoria in this period. The Democrats also performed strongly in South Australia (where the Liberal Movement had been successful) winning in excess of 10 per cent of the primary vote in each election. While the party had success in the other states, its overall performance was somewhat patchy. In Western Australia the party had won over 12 per cent in 1977, but in 1983, it won less than half that amount. In Tasmania the Democrats’ primary vote fluctuated as the party competed against independent Brian Harradine for a Senate seat. The Democrats won Senate seats in two consecutive elections in Queensland after winning under 9 per cent in the 1977 election. The party’s strong primary vote performance from 1977 to 1983 meant it had to rely on a relatively small leakage of preferences from other parties as it came close to winning a quota in its own right. This situation complemented the party’s rules forbidding it from making preference swap deals with the major parties as it was able to win seats without being reliant on preference deals. This also enhanced its position as being a party that would ‘keep the bastards honest’. The Democrats’ approach to operating in the Senate was reminiscent of the Liberal Movement’s in that the party sought to approach legislative proposals on their merits. As Haines put it, the Democrats had ‘a sort of umpire’s role’ which forced the major parties ‘to get things right’ (cited in Paul and Miller 2007:11). Aside from examples relating to legislation, the

Chapter 2 | 37

Democrats had a broader effect on the Australian Senate. Indeed, the party’s position in revitalising the role of the Senate can be considered as one of its enduring legacies, as the Democrats effectively used the Senate’s role as a check on the government. In particular, the party used the committee system to engage in more thorough research of proposed bills and legislation. Indeed, Chipp regarded the party’s advances in this area as strengthening notions of liberalism by constraining the power of the government (see Paul and Miller 2007:9). The Democrats’ scepticism about the major parties enabled it to also use its position as holding the balance of power in the Senate effectively. While the DLP had been in a similar situation earlier, it could not effectively use its leveraging power since its raison d’être was to oppose the Labor Party. In contrast, the Democrats – by refusing to consistently side with either major party – were able to better use their balance-of-power position to influence policy. Unlike the DLP (though similar to the Liberal Movement), the Democrats were comfortable in voting with, or against, either major party. This appeared to enhance the party’s role as a genuine arbiter in the Senate and reinvigorated the chamber’s role as a house of review.

2.11 Conclusion: the era of the fragmentary party The minor parties elected between 1955 and 1983 were typically fragmentary parties in that they were all created as a result of a split in one or other of the major parties. Despite this similarity, there were significant differences in what these parties set out to achieve. The DLP was a ‘spoiler party’ as it aimed to stop Labor from winning government until it had expelled all communist influence from its ranks. The advent of the DLP also mobilised the Australia Party, which aimed to counter its influence in the Senate. The Australia Party, however, could not win parliamentary representation. Instead, it operated outside parliament and would later merge with the Liberal Movement to form the Australian Democrats. The Liberal Movement, the second minor party to win Senate representation after the DLP, operated in a different manner in the Senate. While the party’s time in the upper house was brief, it broke new ground in the Australian Senate party system by casting itself as a watchdog. The Liberal Movement introduced the tradition of a centrist party, which aimed to work with all parties in the Senate and was later taken up by the Democrats. It was the case that the candidates who won Senate contests were those with high public profiles developed in their time within the major parties.

38 | The Making of a Party System

As Blondel (1987) and Walter (2008) remind us, a high public profile allows voters to form positive opinions of candidates, which can translate into electoral support. Furthermore, popular candidates and leaders can be a boon, especially for nascent parties attempting to establish a presence in a party system. The Australian case bore this out: the DLP senators had developed high public profiles from their time in the Labor Party, Steele Hall was a former LCL South Australian Premier, and the Democrats’ public face – Don Chipp – was a charismatic former Liberal minister. The DLP’s success in winning seats demonstrated that there was scope for a minor party to win a place in the Senate, but its raison d’être was so narrow and limited that its relevance was confined to the period in which the ALP was out of office. When its primary goal of keeping Labor out of office was defeated in 1972, the DLP subsequently lost its Senate representation and then disintegrated. The emergence of Steele Hall’s Liberal Movement was perhaps a more significant development in the Australian party system as its centrist outlook, coupled with its refusal to side with either party in the Senate, introduced a new perspective on how the Senate could be used as a house of review. As a result, the major parties had a greater opportunity to negotiate with the Liberal Movement. The Democrats, which absorbed much of the Liberal Movement, enhanced this centrist role in vowing to ‘keep the bastards honest’. The Democrats introduced a unique organisational model that bolstered its claims to having enacted internal party democracy. Where the DLP and Liberal Movement based their structures on that of the major parties, the Democrats introduced a completely different organisational model that emphasised inclusionary ideals. The party’s unique approach to organisation also acted as a guide for other, subsequent, minor parties, as will be examined in subsequent chapters. The Australian Democrats also demonstrated that it could be very effective in using its balance of power to shape legislation, and this was a major legacy. While this role had been played by Steele Hall, the Democrats were able to be more effective since they had a greater number of senators as well as a national structure. The party’s uniquely participatory organisation coupled with its national presence lifted the standard of operation for minor parties in the Australian system. This success in the Senate was to be something of a model for the next wave of minor parties that would impact the Senate contest, as discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 | 39

Cha pte r 3

Here come the issue-competitive parties: The NDP The minor parties that won seats in the Senate between 1949 and 1983 were fragmentary parties as they resulted from fragmentation in a major party. From 1984, however, minor parties seeking to project more specifically de­ fined agendas began winning representation, suggesting that the Senate party system was undergoing a significant change. More specifically, the newer minor parties winning Senate representation reflected the issue-competitive model. The first party of the issue-competitive type was the Nuclear Disarm­ ament Party (NDP). The party was to have a significant impact on the Australian political system. It emerged shortly after the election of the Hawke Labor Government in 1983, and its success acted as a model to other issuecompetitive parties that won seats in the Senate at later elections. This chapter looks at the emergence of the NDP, discusses its policy goals and examines the party’s strong links to the peace and disarmament movements. The NDP emerged as a political party arm of broader peace and disarmament social movements and this influenced the party’s organisat­ ional structures. This became a problem for the NDP as its organisational arrangements were ineffective and contributed to the party’s demise. An important feature of the NDP was the fact that its emergence coincided with important changes to the electoral system brought about by the Hawke Government in time for the 1984 election. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the government introduced a number of significant changes in 1983. These reforms became important to the NDP as it mobilised in the Australian party system and played a role in the party’s electoral achievements. Despite its brief period in Australian politics, the NDP’s emergence impacted other minor parties at the time, especially the Australian Democrats, which changed tack after the NDP’s electoral victories.

3.1 The emergence and organisation of the NDP The seeds of the NDP’s beginnings were sowed with the election of the Hawke-led Labor Party at the 1983 election. Despite the ALP’s commitment

40 | The Making of a Party System

to maintain the strong military alliance with the United States, some antinuclear proponents expected the new government to pursue disarmament policies. After all, the Labor Party had longstanding anti-nuclear policies that stemmed from the mid-1970s. The ALP, however, was divided over issues relating to the mining and selling of uranium, especially since the party had moved to qualify its opposition to uranium mining at its National Conference in 1982 (see Panter and Kay 1994). In particular, the party’s Socialist Left faction opposed a relaxation in policy relating to these areas. But within the first year of taking office, the Hawke Govern­ ment allowed US warships to carry out exercises off the coast of Western Australia. Furthermore, the Australian Navy provided logistics support to these exercises, code-named ‘Beacon Sound’, which were held three times a year (Henderson 1986:426). While the ALP had placated the environmental movement with its stance on the Franklin Dam during the 1983 election campaign, the issue of nuclear warships energised anti-nuclear campaigners.16 In late 1983 HMS Invincible, a British aircraft carrier, had been refused to use dry-dock facilities (which were on Australian soil) in Sydney, since its captain would not comment on whether or not it was carrying nuclear weapons (Henderson 1986:430). This was consistent with ALP policy which allowed nuclear ships to visit Australian ports, but not use dry-dock facilities, since the party’s policy did not allow nuclear weapons on Australian soil. Following this episode the United States sought clarification of the government’s policy. After much internal debate, especially at Cabinet level, the Labor Gov­ ernment modified its policy to prevent ‘only those ships from using drydock facilities which carry a significant quantity of explosives’ (Henderson 1986:431). With this new stance, the government allowed the allies’ nuclear ships virtually unfettered access to all Australian ports. At this point, the goodwill of anti-nuclear campaigners – and those from the party’s Left – towards the new government fell sharply and provoked a campaign to exert anti-nuclear pressure on the Hawke Government. Rather than yielding to the pressure, however, the government continued to pursue policies which were overwhelmingly opposed by the party’s Socialist Left faction. The government approved the Roxby Downs uranium mining project in South Australia and two new contracts for the Ranger uranium mine in the Northern Territory were also approved at a Cabinet meeting in October 16 It is important to note that anti-nuclear campaigners had a lengthy history in the Australian political system and that by 1977 there were more than 100 anti-nuclear groups in Victoria alone (for further discussion see Green 1998).

Chapter 3 | 41

1983. This resulted in the resignation of Stuart West, a member of the Left, and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs from the Cabinet. Despite the opposition within its ranks, the party’s Right faction (of which Hawke was a member) and Bill Hayden’s Centre Left faction effectively overturned the Labor Party’s policies on nuclear issues at the ALP federal conference in July 1984. Arguing that the uranium industry would generate employment and growth in the economy, the ALP adopted the three mines policy that provided for the operation of three uranium mines in Australia. However, it was accepted that Australia would not sell uranium to France while it continued its nuclear tests in the Pacific (also see Panter 1991). The ALP’s decision to modify its nuclear policies energised anti-nuclear campaigners and provided the impetus to create the NDP. The creation of the NDP was headed by the Canberra-based medical scientist, Dr Michael Denborough. Encouraged by the Hawke Government electoral reforms that had reduced the barriers confronting minor parties, Denborough proposed to start a new political party and quickly composed a short constitution. Around 70 people attended a public meeting held in the Baptist Church Hall in the Canberra suburb of Kingston in 1984 and supported the registration of the NDP with the AEC (Denborough 2007). It was agreed that the party would adopt the anti-nuclear policies of the Labor Party that had been discarded by the Hawke Government. As a result, the NDP had only three policies: the banning of nuclear weapons in Australian territory; the prohibition of foreign bases in Australia; and halting the mining and export of uranium (Quigley 1986:14). In organising itself, the NDP eschewed the conventions of political party structures. For example, it did not immediately create formal office-bearing positions or create divisions of labour within its membership. Instead, the NDP sought to operate like a loosely organised social movement in which all members had the same organisational power. This organisational approach was influenced by the fact that the party was started by people who had been part of the peace and disarmament social movement rather than in a political party. Indeed, social movements were organisationally very different from political parties as they tended to be fluid in nature. While this approach to organisation sat comfortably with Denborough – who always envisaged his new party as one of openness and maximum participation – the fast rate at which the party was growing also played a role in relegating the development of a more rigid structure. Joining the NDP was designed to be as easy as possible, with the cost to become a member set at $1.00. The party’s membership rose to an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 members in less

42 | The Making of a Party System

than a year (Quigley 1986:14). The party also had limited resources and depended heavily on Denborough as the party was run from his home in Canberra. As Denborough (2007) recalled: Everyone was working together during the party’s growth period. I have never been so busy in all my life. My wife, the poor woman, was working so hard. Another lady, a friend of my wife was an enormous help. She would go through all the correspondence and membership forms in my kitchen.

This supported an approach of ‘grow now, organise later’. The party’s bur­ geoning membership base also comprised individuals who were active in peace and disarmament groups. But the party also attracted a significant number of individuals who had never been active in any political cause. Moreover, many of these new members were extremely active in the party. Indeed, the NDP – through its structure and operation – resembled a broad social movement, rather than a conventional political party. But this approach led to some peculiar structural outcomes. Since the party had a predetermined list of three policy platforms it did not see the need to invest resources into the policy formulation process. The party’s participatory ethos also made the need for established organisational conventions, such as a delegate system, redundant. There were no restrictions placed upon the role of members and anyone who could attend a party meeting was entitled to put up motions and vote on them. This gave the party spontaneity and flexibility but it also made it unpredictable. While such features were common to social movements, their presence appeared to hinder the operation of the NDP. For example, the party’s organisation made it difficult for the resolution of issues including strategic matters with some meetings lasting for hours without resulting in a single decision. Establishing the NDP as a national party was somewhat difficult for Denborough, especially in Victoria. This was because of the existence of the Movement Against Uranium Mining (MAUM), which had similar antinuclear goals to the NDP. MAUM was a coalition of peace and disarmament groups based in Victoria and headed by Jean Melzer, a Labor senator for Victoria from 1974 to 1981. Melzer had been active on issues concerning peace and disarmament during her time in the Senate and had formed the Women for a Nuclear Free Australia group. It was Denborough’s view that Melzer had a high public profile and would be able to attract significant media attention if she joined the NDP. Furthermore, Melzer had been effective in working with the various peace and disarmament groups and had

Chapter 3 | 43

melded them to present a united front against uranium mining. Moreover, Melzer had demonstrated her capacity to work with the government and her skills and contacts would be of great benefit to the NDP. Having been relegated on the Senate ticket, Melzer agreed to resign from the Labor Party and stand as the NDP’s lead candidate in Victoria. While the NDP was able to attract members, the party struggled to broaden its appeal as it lacked a high profile leader. Since the NDP had no clear organisational structure, New South Wales members formed a ‘Sydney committee’. In their search for a charismatic candidate, the committee received advice from ‘psephologist Murray Goot about the style of candidate most likely to lead the party to success’ (Fisher 1995:10). In his report, Goot argued that a ‘glamour candidate’ was needed who could appeal to the ‘disenfranchised and the young’ rather than standing a ‘distinguished, greyhaired professor’ (Fisher 1995:10). The person who fitted this description, according to the Sydney committee, was Peter Garrett from the rock band Midnight Oil. While Denborough was supportive of a high-profile candidate representing the party, he believed that he himself should be the lead Senate candidate in New South Wales. Garrett’s emergence sowed the seeds of factionalism within the party as Denborough’s position as the face of the party was usurped by the charismatic recruit. Garrett immediately fitted the glamour candidate mould perfectly as he literally was a rock star, with a lengthy association with anti-uranium mining and peace and disarmament issues.17 It was not only Garrett’s music that gained attention. Standing at almost 200 cm and sporting a shaved head, Garrett was an easily identifiable figure. His onstage performances, music and political beliefs, coupled with his distinctive physical attributes contributed to Garrett’s charisma. Garrett’s ascension also had an immediate effect on the party’s media coverage. As former party member Peter Myers (2007) remembered: We issued press statements one after the other, but couldn’t get any publicity, until Peter Garrett… was endorsed as the Party’s Senate candidate for the state of New South Wales. Then, the media wouldn’t leave him alone. Swarms of TV cameras accompanied him wherever he went. We had all the free publicity we could want. 17 Midnight Oil built a reputation as political activists when they performed at a concert in Sydney protesting against Australia’s uranium mining policy in 1978. In 1982 the band released the hit single ‘US Forces’, gaining much mainstream attention and placing focus on Garrett as fronting the band, which defined the ‘social conscience of the nation’ (Curtis 2000).

44 | The Making of a Party System

Garrett’s arrival also had an immediate effect on the party’s support among voters. According to the Morgan Gallup Poll in late November 1984 the party was polling 8.3 per cent of the Senate primary vote. In New South Wales, where Garrett was the party’s lead candidate, the party was polling 11.7 per cent. Based on these results, it looked like Garrett would win a Senate seat. Bolstered by his arrival and significant public support, the state branches of the NDP began preparing for the 1984 election. However, the party found it hard to establish itself in Western Australia. Like Victoria, a local disarmament group, the People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND), had a significant presence in the state. The PND had similar goals to the NDP, although it was not a political party and did not wish to field candidates at the 1984 election. Indeed, the PND, of which Jo Vallentine was a prominent member, had been a very well-organised group in WA and had demonstrated its opposition to visiting US warships during the early 1980s through systematic and well-attended protests. Eventually, after much internal debate, the PND agreed to Denborough’s request to become part of the NDP just weeks before the election. In a very short time Denborough had succeeded in forming a national anti-nuclear party and the NDP fielded candidates in the House of Representatives and Senate contests.

3.2 The NDP’s 1984 electoral performance The 1984 election was the first in which the Hawke Government’s electoral reforms were in place and the campaign itself lasted seven weeks, which served the interests of the NDP as it attracted support during the fervour. As the election campaign played out, these factors became both a blessing and curse for the NDP. In order to increase the number of senators from each state to 12, seven were to be elected, rather than five as in previous elections. This resulted in a decrease in the quota necessary for election, and thus enhanced the chances of the NDP to win Senate seats. Based on public opinion polling, the NDP was looking forward to winning at least two Senate seats, thanks to the reduced quota – one in New South Wales and one in Victoria. However, the other change to impact the NDP’s electoral fortunes was the introduction of the GVT. Under this system the trading of preferences between parties became crucial. The NDP attempted to wheel and deal on preferences, although it received mixed responses from the major parties, particularly from the Labor Party. Despite the new electoral rules that seemingly made it easier for the NDP, the party faced significant electoral challenges, especially in New South Wales from the ALP. Internal public polling by the NDP showed the party’s primary vote reaching 17 per cent in

Chapter 3 | 45

New South Wales and winning a Senate seat at the expense of Labor. The Labor Party in New South Wales was indeed concerned with the prospect of Garrett’s election and used the GVT system to try to block Garrett’s ascendancy. As a result, Graham Richardson, General Secretary of the ALP in New South Wales and ardent supporter of the government’s uranium mining policy, tailored a preference deal which diminished the NDP’s electoral chances in that state. The ALP directed its preferences to other minor parties, including the Democrats, and even to the Coalition before the NDP. In short, Labor ran a ‘put the NDP last’ campaign in the Senate. As Richardson recalled (cited in Fisher 1995:28): Basically, we [the ALP] were polling well, we knew our surplus would be critical and if you look at the picture in ’84, we didn’t know Garrett very well. We all knew the Democrats very well; we had a relationship with the Democrats; we had none with Peter.

The Australian Democrats were also concerned with the rise of the NDP as it could lose seats to the new party (especially in the eastern states). Indeed, the Democrats were unsure as to how to subdue the NDP’s impact and preserve their Senate representation, especially since the Democrats also had very strong anti-nuclear policies. Unlike the NDP, however, the Democrats’ rules forbade them from engaging in preference wheeling and dealing to the same extent as the NDP. With the threat posed by the new party, the Democrats embarked on a campaign to combat the NDP, much to the new party’s chagrin. As Denborough (2007) highlighted: The level of antagonism… from the Democrats, who felt threatened, was appalling. They refused to understand – with the preferential system of voting in the Senate we could have worked together. But they were just silly and tried to break down the party. They tried so hard to stop us. Sid Spindler wanted to stop the NDP so much that he flew up from Melbourne to Canberra to try and stop a party event taking place. But God was on our side that day as thick fog blanketed the Canberra airport and stopped him from landing on time.

The attitude to the NDP by the ALP and Democrats was, however, very different in Western Australia where Jo Vallentine was the party’s lead candidate. While Vallentine had a lengthy history in the peace and disarm­ ament movement, she did not have a high national public profile as Peter Garrett did. As a result, the ALP in Western Australia did not perceive the NDP as such an electoral threat. In fact, not only did Labor direct

46 | The Making of a Party System

preferences to the NDP, but also the party attracted the preferences of the Democrats and other minor parties. Table 3.1 presents the NDP’s 1984 electoral performance in the Senate. Table 3.1: NDP performance in the Senate, 1984 NDP primary vote (%)

Number of senators elected

National

7.2

1

New South Wales

9.7

0

Victoria

7.3

0

Queensland

4.4

0

South Australia

4.6

0

Western Australia

6.8

1

Tasmania

2.9

0

Australian Capital Territory

10.3

0

Northern Territory

N/A

N/A

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

As Table 3.1 shows, the party’s national primary vote was 7.2 per cent – a strong result for a nascent party. However, the disaggregation of the party’s perform­ances highlights the importance of preference deals for the NDP. Despite the fact that the NDP won almost 10 per cent of the primary vote and was represented by the charismatic Garrett, the NDP’s electoral fortunes in New South Wales were affected by the lack of preferences, especially from the ALP. The GVT method of voting, used by at least 80 per cent of voters, ensured the Labor Party’s preference deals stopped the NDP from winning Senate representation. In the other states, the party’s performance was some­what patchy. In Victoria, where Jean Melzer was the lead candidate, the party won more than seven per cent, but the party was again hamstrung by a series of unfavourable preference deals that stopped it from winning a Senate seat. The party’s performances in the other states were more modest. In South Australia, where the Democrats were strongest, the party won 4.6 per cent of the primary vote. The NDP performed slightly weaker in Queensland and managed to win 4.4 per cent of the primary vote. Despite the NDP winning over 10 per cent of the primary vote in the Australian Capital

Chapter 3 | 47

Territory (where Denborough was the lead candidate), the party could not win a Senate seat since the quota is over 33 per cent, significantly higher than in the states. The party did not field candidates in the Northern Terri­ tory. The party’s weakest performance, however, was in Tasmania where it won 2.9 per cent of the primary vote. Indeed, the 1984 election result was bittersweet for the NDP. Garrett, who was seen as the party’s best chance to win a Senate seat, had failed in New South Wales while the littleknown Western Australian candidate, Jo Vallentine, was successful. This electoral outcome highlighted not only the importance of making beneficial preference deals with the GVT, but also highlighted the power in which the major parties (in this case the ALP) had in influencing the outcome of Senate results. The NDP fielded candidates in six House of Representative electorates in 1984 with mixed results. The party’s strongest performance was in Den­ borough’s home seat of Canberra where it won 7.6 per cent of the primary vote. However, Canberra was the only inner metropolitan seat the party contested. The other seats covered rural and outer metropolitan areas. For example, the party won 6.2 per cent of the primary vote in Eden-Monaro (New South Wales) and crossed the 4 per cent electoral threshold (at which point candidates would be eligible for electoral funding thanks to the 1984 changes to the electoral system) in Kalgoorlie (Western Australia) and Gippsland (Victoria). The party came close to crossing the 4 per cent threshold in Kingston (South Australia) and Gilmore (New South Wales) where it won 3.9 and 3.4 per cent respectively. The party’s choice of seats – and somewhat encouraging results – could be explained by the geographic size and location of these districts. Generally, these outer metropolitan and rural seats had larger areas than metropolitan electorates and led some com­munities to become concerned that if nuclear activities (such as testing of weapons or simulating war exercises) were to be undertaken by governments it would be done so in their backyard. The possibility of such activities taking place encouraged candidates to stand for the party, and also mobilised some electoral support for the party within these communities.

3.3 The NDP unravels Shortly after Jo Vallentine was elected to the Senate, the NDP became organ­ isationally unstable. Various elements combined to destabilise the party. As noted earlier, the ascension of Peter Garrett was somewhat upsetting for

48 | The Making of a Party System

Michael Denborough who felt that the party he had created was slipping from his control. To bolster his support within the party, especially in New South Wales, Denborough began encouraging members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) to join the NDP. After all, the SWP had supported the NDP during the 1984 election campaign by urging its members to give their first preferences to the NDP rather than Labor, in an act to convey their deep anger with ‘Labor’s betrayals’ (Percy 1985). Since the NDP had no strict membership rules (such as proscription), members of the SWP were allowed to easily join the party. This angered NDP members such as Garrett, Vallentine and Melzer who argued that the party needed to implement a more rigid organisational model in order to proscribe members of other parties joining the NDP. Furthermore, Senator-elect Vallentine had become concerned with how the party would operate with Senate representation. Vallentine (2007) recalled that at the first meeting she had with Denborough and other members of the NDP after the election she was simply ‘told’ about her new role as a senator. For example, her parliamentary salary would be divided between her and the party and she was told who she would have on staff. Furthermore, Vallentine was ‘told’ about the issues she would be pursuing upon entering parliament. This approach meant the party would give precedence to the organisational wing, making the parliamentary wing its servant. This highlighted the conundrum of the NDP as an entrant in the Senate. The party was able to vigorously pursue its specific policy program during the campaign as an ‘outsider’ to the Senate party system. But after winning Senate representat­ ion it was hit by the reality of becoming an ‘insider’. It was no longer enough to put forward the party’s goals. Rather, it needed to change its modus operandi in order to become an effective presence in the Senate. It was at this juncture that the party faltered. The party split at its first federal conference in April 1985 in Melbourne after it could not effectively deal with irreconcilable differences over the party’s direction and position. The views of Garrett, Vallentine, Melzer and their significant support base contrasted with those of Denborough and his supporters, which included the SWP cohort. When a motion to implement proscription at the meeting was lost, it became clear to the Garrett, Vallentine and Melzer group that they could not persuade the majority of party members to alter the party’s organisation nor its position in the party system. As a result the battle for control over the party ended. The Garrett faction left the meeting, which was attended by approximately 200 people, and effected a split in the party. The meeting, covered by a large press contingent, ended

Chapter 3 | 49

with ‘wailing’, ‘gnashing of teeth’ and ‘uncontrollable weeping’ by many attendees who lamented the party’s seemingly irreconcilable split (Vallen­ tine 2007; Denborough 2007). The media coverage also made the NDP look like an unorganised rabble, much to the delight of those who had earlier prophesised the party’s demise.18 Although Vallentine, Garrett, Melzer and others had left the Melbourne meeting, they did not immediately resign from the party. Instead, they intimated that they might rejoin the party later. With Vallentine to take up her place in the Senate on 1 July, a decision about her NDP membership needed to be made quickly. Upon returning to Perth she was greeted by an NDP membership that was, in her view, ‘puzzled and angry’ about her decision. A ballot of the membership was organised in which 87 per cent of Western Australian NDP members voted to disconnect themselves from the NDP and support Jo Vallentine to sit as an Independent Senator for Nuclear Disarmament. Thus, when Vallentine took her place in the Senate in July 1985 she did so as an independent. Vallentine was convinced that since she was elected on the platform of nuclear disarmament by the people of Western Australia she would have to fulfil their wish and advance this specific agenda. Meanwhile the NDP, under the organisational leadership of Denborough, continued to exist after the 1985 split in the other states, albeit in a weakened form. Despite the party’s apparent collapse, the NDP contested the 1987 double dissolution election, the results of which are presented in Table 3.2. As Table 3.2 shows, the NDP’s performance was significantly weaker than in 1984. The party managed to win just 1.1 per cent of the national primary vote, more than 6 per cent less than in 1984. The only state where the party’s performance did not plummet was Tasmania, where it continued to attract just under 3 per cent of the primary vote. Indeed the party’s commitment to conservation issues – albeit with emphasis on nuclear disarmament – went some way to attract support from some quarters of the environment move­ ment in that state. The party’s strongest jurisdiction was once again in the Australian Capital Territory where it won over 5 per cent, although this was less than half its result in 1984. The party did not contest a seat in Western Australia.

18 The newspapers were filled with articles that attacked the party’s implosion. Indeed, many of the articles and editorials claimed the NDP was infested with socialists and was a victim of ‘dirty politics’ (see The Age 29, 30 April 1985; Sydney Morning Herald 29, 30 April 1985; The Australian 29, 30 April 1985).

50 | The Making of a Party System

Table 3.2: NDP performance in the Senate, 1987 NDP primary vote (%)

Number of senators elected

National

1.1

1

New South Wales

1.5

0

Victoria

1.1

0

Queensland

1.4

0

South Australia

N/A

N/A

Western Australia*

4.8*

1*

Tasmania

2.8

0

Australian Capital Territory

5.1

0

N/A

N/A

Northern Territory

* After Jo Vallentine resigned from the NDP she created the Vallentine Peace Group and was re-elected in 1987. Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

Jo Vallentine formed the Vallentine Peace Group in time for the 1987 election. This group, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, pursued peace and disarmament issues. As Table 3.2 shows, Vallentine was re-elected as a senator for Western Australia. However, the party’s vote in Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales was very low as it won just 1.1, 1.4 and 1.5 per cent of the primary vote respectively. Despite winning such a low primary vote, the NDP’s lead candidate in New South Wales, Robert Wood, won Senate representation. Wood’s election was the product of the NDP’s ability to wheel and deal with other parties and harvest preferences – a lesson learned from 1984. This coupled with the fact that 1987 was a double dissolution (in which the Senate quota was halved), enhanced the NDP’s electoral chances under the GVT system. But the party’s electoral fortunes were bolstered in New South Wales by the ALP. Unlike the 1984 election – in which Labor directed preferences away from the NDP and acted as an electoral barrier to Peter Garrett – the ALP directed preferences to the NDP in 1987. The Labor Party itself had gone through significant personnel changes by this time. Graham Richardson, the architect of the 1984 deals which locked the NDP out of the Senate, had been replaced by Stephen Loosely as General Secretary. Furthermore, the NDP was seen as a spent force. The ALP therefore did not

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focus on attacking the NDP as it had done in 1984. As a result of this flow of preferences from Labor and other parties in New South Wales, Robert Wood won a Senate seat for the party. Shortly after the election, however, Elaine Nile, an unsuccessful Senate candidate from the Call to Australia Group in NSW, challenged Wood’s election on the grounds that he was constitutionally disqualified. Nile’s petition claimed that Wood’s previous convictions invalidated his election to the Senate under Section 44(ii) of the Constitution. The High Court, sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, found in favour of Wood and he took his place in the Senate in August 1987 but his election was again called into question. On this occasion, the Court found that Wood, who was born in the United Kingdom, was not an Australian citizen at the time of his nomination and thus did not qualify for election to the Senate. Wood vacated the Senate in May 1988 and the Court ordered that a recount was needed to fill the vacancy. Following the recount of the NSW Senate ballot papers, the NDP’s second Senate candidate, Irina Dunn, was elected. There was an expectation that Dunn would relinquish her position to Wood when he had sorted out his citizenship status. But again the party was plunged into bitter factional feuding when Dunn refused to resign from the Senate – a position that was supported by Denborough. This resulted in another protracted dispute in the NDP that escalated when Wood resolved his citizenship status and became eligible to enter the Senate. His supporters, who outnumbered Dunn’s, threatened to hold a ballot to force her to resign so that Wood could return to parliament. This dispute continued for several weeks, with Wood and his supporters maintaining their call for Dunn to resign, while Dunn maintained her original argument that the NSW Government could not be trusted to replace her with an NDP senator. The conflict began to be played out in the media, much to the party’s detriment. The threat of expulsion further inflamed the dispute when Ms Dunn made comments to journalists about the ineffectiveness of the party’s organisation. This dispute, and the bitter factionalism it caused, was a source of significant stress to the organisation, which also suffered a severe drop in its membership. At the party’s conference in August 1988, the NDP moved to dissociate itself from Dunn and install Wood, but Dunn rejected this call and maintained that her refusal to resign from the Senate was for the good of the NDP rather than personal gain. With only days to go before becoming a senator, Dunn sent a letter to the wider membership of the party asking whether they wanted her to continue as a senator for the NDP or become an independent. On the day Dunn was to take her place in the Senate she

52 | The Making of a Party System

resigned from the NDP and was sworn in as an Independent Senator for Nuclear Disarmament similar to Jo Vallentine some years earlier. The NDP suffered significant negative media coverage over this conflict. It again made the party seem disorganised and unprofessional and weakened the party’s level of support. The NDP’s national membership plummeted from its high of around 10,000 in 1985 to around 700 in 1988. The NDP had experienced significant success but disintegrated soon after, with much of the party’s problems stemming from its apparently poor organisational structures.

3.4 The NDP’s (former) senators in action 1985–1990 As a party borne from social movements, the NDP seemed more suited to raising awareness of peace and disarmament issues outside the Senate. Indeed, the party had to adjust to its new position as a parliamentary party after the 1984 election. Despite the fact that Vallentine was an Independent Senator for Nuclear Disarmament, rather than an NDP senator, she had undertaken to advocate the anti-nuclear position of the NDP. But on entering the Senate, Vallentine was confronted by the procedural battles and machinations of the chamber. Furthermore, Vallentine had virtually no extra-parliamentary support as she was an independent and had to initially rely on her supporters. She was also confronted by the change in her role from a parliamentary outsider – lobbying the institutions of governance on nuclear issues – to becoming an insider, where she was part of the institution. The chief problem for Vallentine was that she had limited opportunities to formally influence legislation. As Vallentine (2007) recalled: As an Independent… you don’t expect legislative outcomes… it’s tough getting others to second any motion you want debated!

As a result, Vallentine focused on using her position in the Senate to draw attention to nuclear and disarmament issues. But she found it difficult to advance her cause in the Senate as she was hamstrung by the dominance and discipline of the major parties in the chamber. As Vallentine (2007) summarised: Most of the Senate work was about making speeches, for the record… but the other really important part of it was access to the media, to represent views of those concerned about nuclear disarmament. Of course, being somewhat bold, I created certain media opportunities, again to the chagrin of fellow senators, who wouldn’t have dared do the things I did, even if they’d thought of them! Like getting arrested

Chapter 3 | 53

at Pine Gap, and going to gaol over it and getting thrown out of the WA State parliament for asking a question from the Gallery, about the impending visit of nuclear weapons and reactors to Fremantle port.

During her first term, Vallentine used her position in the Senate to enhance the public profiles of both herself as a senator and the issue of disarmament. She took an activist approach with her actions at the military base at Pine Gap in Alice Springs in 1986, and in the West Australian Parliament. Vallentine was also able to attract media attention during her regular meditation sessions on the lawns of Parliament. These tactics were successful in raising her profile and the cause she represented. In fact, in her home state, Vallentine attracted significant support from a raft of peace, disarmament and conservation groups that would ultimately band together to form the West Australian Greens. However, the success of the NDP, and its ability to win Senate representation, spurred the Australian Democrats to invest significant resources on anti-nuclear issues in the Senate. The Democrats fought against uranium mining at Kakadu by introducing the Koongarra Project Area Repeal Bill 1986. Furthermore, the Democrats lobbied for the Pacific Zone of Peace, which aimed to exclude nuclear ships and weapons in the region, much to the delight of Vallentine and the NDP. The efforts of the Democrats were enhanced as the party held five seats in the Senate. Senator Wood’s time in the Senate was too brief and interrupted by on­ going disputes over his qualifications to be a senator. Wood’s replacement Irina Dunn, however, joined Vallentine and the two senators developed a more refined approach to working in the Senate. Interestingly, Vallentine and Dunn forged a close relationship with the Democrats (which by this stage had enhanced their peace and disarmament credentials, especially after 1984). This relationship resulted in the parties working closely with one another on peace and disarmament issues in the Senate. For example, in 1989 the Hawke Government authorised the use of troops to combat protesters at the Nurrungar joint Australian–United States military base in South Australia. This resulted in the independent senators and Democrats working together to broaden the debate concerning the Australian Government’s use of military personnel. Furthermore, the more refined approach to operating in the Senate resulted in Vallentine taking a place on the Joint Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. This was a significant achievement as she became the first woman and non-major party senator to be represented on the committee. Working in the Defence Subcommittee, Vallentine used the

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opportunity to draw attention to peace and disarmament issues. As Vallentine (2007) recalled: I… asked questions [on the committee] no one else even considered and really got up their [major party senators’] noses when foreign delegations visited. I always had questions which went much further than ‘what are the trade opportunities between country ‘y’ and Australia’… I asked about their human rights records as well as their military operations and green credentials. In yet another example of how the senators were using their position in the Senate to advance a specific policy agenda, Irina Dunn also took a place on the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that was looking into the visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed vessels. In particular, the Committee examined contingency planning in the case of accidental release of ionising radiation. Despite not being on this committee herself, Jo Vallentine worked with Senator Dunn in researching for the report. The involvement of the two senators for nuclear disarmament resulted in a dissenting report authored by Senator Dunn. In this report, Senator Dunn criticised the broader report as being a partisan and partial treatment of the evidence garnered by the committee. Furthermore, she criticised the level of military secrecy involved in nuclear armed and powered vessels and branded it as ‘crippling’ for ‘the whole endeavour of the Committee’s enquiry’ (Dunn 1989:540). Senator Dunn’s dissenting report made two recommendations heavily based on the NDP’s platform. The first was that all nuclear-powered warships be excluded from Australian ports until analyses confirmed it was safe for the Australian people. The second recommendation was that all nuclear weapons be excluded from Australian ports and that non-nuclear vessels should not be able to enter Australian ports (Dunn 1989:582). The NDP no longer had representation in the Senate following the 1990 election. What had occurred, however, was that Vallentine and Dunn had shown that an issue-competitive party could be an effective presence in the Australian Senate.

3.5 Conclusion: the NDP as the harbinger of issue-competitive parties Despite its relatively short existence, the NDP made a significant impact on the Australian party system. Emanating from social movement politics, the party was the first of the issue-competitive parties to win Senate representat­ ion. Moreover, the NDP showed that it was possible for a party with a specific

Chapter 3 | 55

agenda associated with a broad social movement to be elected to the Senate. However, its electoral success was greatly dependent on gaining the prefer­ ences of the major parties, especially Labor’s. In terms of organ­isation, the NDP showed that it was extremely difficult for a party with social movement roots to make the transition to being a parliamentary party. Internal disputes, which are part of any political party, could not be dealt with effectively in the NDP as it had rejected the conventional party structures. Rather, the NDP’s organisation was influenced by social movement structures that avoided the hierarchical and oligarchic tendencies of political parties. This lack of structure fuelled internal bickering and ultimately led to its eventual demise. The party’s structural failings influenced other issue-competitive parties that followed. Indeed, as subsequent chapters discuss, no other issue-competitive minor party adopted the NDP’s approach to party organisation. Despite the NPD’s organisational problems, the party provided a model for a new approach to minor party behaviour in the Senate. Rather than be a spoiler as the DLP had been, or a centrist intermediary, like the Democrats, the NDP pursued its own anti-nuclear agenda in the parliamentary context. Jo Vallentine, in her first term in particular, used her position in the Senate to maximise media coverage on the issues central to the NDP’s agenda. Initially, her activist approach also ensured significant media coverage. The election of a second nuclear disarmament senator, however, gave further impetus and the two senators more effectively pursued the peace and dis­ armament agenda within the parliamentary structures and proceedings. Indeed, the NDP showed that it was possible for an issue-competitive minor party to work effectively in the Senate. The party’s experience thus provided a precedent and model for how such parties could use parliamentary instit­ utions to their advantage, transitioning from a parliamentary outsider to a party with parliamentary representation. The emergence of the NDP also had ramifications for the more established Australian Democrats, who were at a disadvantage in some ways in comparison to the NDP. For example, the party’s rules limited its potential to wheel and deal preferences – something the NDP did to significant effect. While the Democrats’ representation in the Senate was threatened by the NDP, it survived the nascent party’s challenge as its organisational arrangements led to its abrupt disintegration. However, the Democrats were to face stronger challengers in the form of issue-competitive parties that emerged after the NDP’s demise, especially the Greens WA and Australian Greens as discussed in the next chapter.

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Cha pte r 4

Issue-based minor party politics: Australia’s green political parties The emergence of issue-competitive parties in the Senate continued after the Nuclear Disarmament Party with the onset of green parties. These parties also appeared to have clear ties to new social movements. But the green movement, which eventually gave rise to the Australian Greens party, was divided between two broad strands; the peace and disarmament movement and the conservation movement. These two strands were quite distinct and had spawned several political parties at different times. The peace and disarmament strand developed a national party arm with the NDP in 1984 (see previous chapter). But when the NDP disintegrated, the movement mobilised to maintain a presence in the policy debate. Western Australia was the hub of peace and disarmament politics and this eventually led to the creation of the Western Australian Greens (Greens WA) – arguably a party that was a clear continuation of the NDP. It comprised former NDP members led by Jo Vallentine and continued advocating NDP policies concerning peace and disarmament. On the other hand, the conservation strand, which placed emphasis on protecting the natural environment, was galvanised by the environmental debates in Tasmania during the 1970s and 1980s. The conservation strand of green party politics, however, took a longer time than the NDP to develop into a national organisation. In accounting for this, the chapter focuses on the importance of the conservation debate to the party system throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially during the time of the Hawke and Keating governments. Initially, these Labor governments accommodated the conservation strand of the green movement and successfully integrated sections of the movement into its policies. This mitigated the need for the conservation movement to develop a party-political arm. In contrast, the government was less accommodating to the demands of the peace and disarmament movement, which, as a result, spawned a political party to influence policy. This dynamic led to a fragmentation of green party politics. In addition to these factors,

Chapter 4 | 57

the existence of the Australian Democrats – a party that placed significant emphasis on green issues – also played a role in retarding the development of a national green party. There were other challenges to the creation of a national greens party. Some segments of the green movement wanted to continue to operate like a traditional social movement outside the party political system in order to change broad social behaviour and government policy. Other segments, however, wanted the green movement to spawn a party arm to contest elections with the view to influencing government policy and directly challenging the major parties – including Labor. This division proved to be a source of tension within the green movement and served to further delay the development of the Australian Greens as a cohesive entity. Another key argument is that the development of the Australian Greens was affected by the ascent of Paul Keating, who replaced Bob Hawke as Prime Minister in December 1991. Indeed, Keating’s approach to environmental policy contrasted sharply with that of Hawke, and the conservation movement’s ability to influence government policy declined as a result. The conservation movement responded to this marginalisation by mobilising to create the Australian Greens. By doing so, the movement aimed to exert influence on the government in the electoral and legislative spheres since it no longer had a direct avenue to influencing government decisions outside parliament. While the Australian Greens developed throughout eastern Australia, the Greens WA did not join the confederated party until 2003. The Greens WA avoided joining the Australian Greens due to concerns about party organisation, and the fact that their organisation was overwhelmingly built upon the peace and disarmament movement, rather than the conservation movement, which underpinned the Australian Greens. Many in the Greens WA were also wary of becoming part of a national party, having experienced the disintegration of the NDP in the mid-1980s. The fact that the Greens WA were successful in winning Senate seats also meant that the party did not see the need to merge. However, the decision of the Greens WA to join the Australian Greens in the early 2000s was heavily influenced by the fact that the party’s electoral performance had stagnated. Indeed, the Australian Greens’ performance had steadily improved and it had displaced the Greens WA as the green party able to win Senate seats. This chapter also examines how the Australian Greens eventually outmanoeuvred other minor parties to become the third force in the Australian Senate.

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4.1 The rise of conservation politics in Australia The rise of environmental politics can be traced to the environmental campaigns in Tasmania in the mid-1960s. A critical moment in the devel­ opment of the conservation strand began in June 1965 when Eric Reece, the Labor Premier of Tasmania, announced that ‘some modification’ of Lake Pedder would be necessary to allow for hydro-electricity development (Norman 2004:56). Ultimately ‘some modification’ to the lake meant the area would be flooded by the state’s Hydro-Electric Commission. In re­ sponse to the risk of environmental damage to the area, a group known as the South West Committee (SWC) was formed in the late 1960s. The comm­ittee sought to influence policy outcomes by lobbying decision makers. But at the same time another, larger, group developed to try and stop the dam – the Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC). The LPAC attempted to change government policy through different strategies such as involving the media in its campaigns, and using non-violent activism. This more assertive style of lobbying contrasted with the quiet ‘behind the scenes’ lobbying of the SWC (see Walker 1989:161). Furthermore, the LPAC’s campaigns engaged a wider range of supporters and players. This broad-based campaign reflected a style associated with social movement. But despite the efforts of these groups, and the opposition at both national and international levels, the Tasmanian Government remained committed to the Lake Pedder project. The lobbying of the SWC and the activism of the LPAC had failed to influence state government policy. The LPAC, however, identified that it could have a greater impact on government decisions if it could influence electoral outcomes and/or win parliamentary representation. As a result, the LPAC spawned a political party to contest elections. At a special meeting in March 1972 the LPAC decided to form a single independent coalition of candidates to contest the upcoming state election. It was decided that the party’s name would be the United Tasmania Group (UTG).19 By attempting to have some influence in the electoral and (potentially) parliamentary sphere, the newly formed UTG hoped to have more success in changing government policy. The creation of a political party also attracted new support to the LPAC. Among the first to join the new party was Dr Bob Brown who was a general practitioner working in north Tasmania. 19 In creating the new party’s structure in a limited amount of time, the UTG’s structure and organisation was borrowed from the Tasmanian ALP, since it was drafted by Hugh Dell, an expelled ALP member (see Walker 1989:166).

Chapter 4 | 59

Many who joined the UTG were attracted to the new party as it had the potential to give the conservation movement a direct voice in the parliament (see Norman 2004). Despite mounting a spirited campaign, the UTG won just 3.9 per cent of the statewide vote. The UTG went on to contest nine elections in four years but the costs of the campaigns became too great for the party. Furthermore, many of the UTG’s members became disillusioned and left the party because it was unable to win parliamentary representation (see Walker 1989). This weakened the UTG and diminished its presence in the policy debate.

4.2 Re-energising conservation politics: the Franklin Dam The conservation movement was re-energised when plans to dam the Franklin River by the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission became apparent. This issue acted as a lightning rod to the conservation movement, especially in Tasmania, and smaller groups combined to create the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS). This group, which aimed to prevent destruction of Tasmania’s environment, emerged in 1976 and diminished the UTG as members joined the new organisation. It was also during this period that Bob Brown consolidated his position in the nation’s environmental debate when he staged a week-long fast on the summit of Mount Wellington to protest against the USS Enterprise, a nuclear warship, visiting Hobart in November 1976. This high public profile made Brown a central figure to the TWS and he became the Society’s director in 1979. By the early 1980s, thousands of activists had become part of the Franklin River campaign, led primarily by the TWS. The issue also split the Tasman­ ian Cabinet and led to the ousting of Labor premier, Doug Lowe, who was replaced by Harry Holgate just before a referendum about the dam was held. The Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation – which had been active on the mainland – embarked on a campaign urging voters to write ‘No Dams’ on their ballot paper.20 Despite 45 per cent of voters writing ‘No Dams’ on their ballot paper, the government proceeded with plans to dam the Gordon-below-Franklin as 47 per cent of voters had favoured this proposal (Newman 1984). The Franklin Dam remained as a significant issue in Tasmanian state politics and continued to destabilise the state Labor government. This came to a head when the government was defeated on a no-confidence motion in 20 For further information on the Australian Conservation Foundation see, for example, Lines, W.J. 2006 Patriots: Defending Australia’s Natural Heritage, UQP, St Lucia.

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the House of Assembly in March 1982 when the government whip resigned from the Labor Party. The party lost the ensuing 1982 state election to the Gray-led Liberal Party. At that election Bob Brown contested the seat of Denison and finished second to the Australian Democrats’ candidate Norm Sanders, who was duly elected. However, the new government was even more supportive of the dam than Labor. Indeed, the new premier ordered work to begin on the dam immediately after winning. By this stage the Fraser-led federal government had become more active in attempting to dissuade the Tasmanian Government from building the dam, offering significant compensation to the state (see Hutton and Connors 1999:162). With the campaign to Save the Franklin gathering momentum, Bob Brown embarked on a national tour in mid-1982 to raise awareness about the issue. He showed films and gave talks to highlight the importance of the general area. This coincided with rallies held in Sydney and Melbourne urging the federal government to intervene and stop the dam. In December 1982 the South-West was placed on the World Heritage list and Bob Brown and others began a blockade of the dam site. The Franklin Dam issue was not confined to Tasmanian politics. In fact, the issue gained importance in the federal political sphere when, in February 1983, Malcolm Fraser called a federal election. The Franklin Dam became a key issue during the campaign, especially since Bob Hawke, who had supported saving the Franklin River, succeeded Bill Hayden as the Labor leader on the same day the election was called. The Hawke-led Labor Party won the 1983 election and this quickly gave hope to those who opposed the dam that the federal government would intervene. In March 1983, the same month in which Labor won national govern­ ment, the Tasmanian Government attempted to end the blockade that had commenced in December 1982. Some 1,400 protestors were arrested. Among those arrested was Bob Brown who spent nearly three weeks in Risdon Prison. In response, Norm Sanders, an Australian Democrats’ par­ liamentarian in Tasmania’s state parliament, resigned his seat in protest against the dam and the treatment of protesters (Norman 2004:98). Follow­ ing a countback of the results, Bob Brown was elected to replace Norm Sanders for the seat of Denison in the Tasmanian Parliament as a green independent. Bob Brown, who had already gained a high public profile, was catapulted from prison to parliament. Meanwhile, the federal government had taken steps to intervene and, in mid 1983, the High Court ruled that the Commonwealth Government had the power to stop the dam. This was a significant achievement for the conservation movement.

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The success of the conservation movement in Tasmania encouraged the mobilisation of conservation groups in other states. Indeed, the early 1980s saw an increase of parties emerge with ‘green’ in their official label, but the formation of a cohesive green party was yet to commence. In Tasmania, for example, momentum towards creating a party was almost non-existent even though many in the conservation movement identified the need to win representation in the state’s parliament. In the 1986 Tasmanian state election, a coalition of Green independents was created around the incumbent parliamentarian Bob Brown. This proved to be a success as two Green Independents – Bob Brown and Gerry Bates – won parliamentary representation. But this success was overshadowed as the Gray-led Liberal Party held a three-seat majority and thus limited the role of the opposition parties in the parliament. Despite this, the two Green independents set the template for green representatives in the state’s parliament, pursuing issues such as banning semi-automatic weapons and reforming state laws on homosexuality. Despite their presence in parliament, however, the green movement, and the conservation strand in particular, remained fragmented.

4.3 Attempting to unite the green strands: development of the peace and disarmament and conservation green parties While the conservation strand of green politics in Australia had a state parliamentary presence, it was still without a national organisation through which to contest federal elections. The peace and disarmament movement was also in a fragile position, but its record of electoral success was different. The NDP disintegrated shortly after its emergence and left the peace and disarmament strand without a cohesive party arm to engage in electoral politics. In response, a Getting Together conference was organised in 1986 at the University of Sydney, with the aim of creating a new green party. The conference was attended by some 500 participants from a range of social movement groups including representatives from alternative communities, peace groups and environmental groups. Key players in green politics, such as Senator Jo Vallentine, Bob Brown and Drew Hutton, also attended the conference. The range of participants, with varying philosophies and political beliefs, could not agree to create a unified green party. One of the main reasons for disagreement was that many from broader green social movements believed that a party organisation would introduce a hierarchical structure that would be the antithesis of the free and inclusionary ethos of social movement politics. Despite this, some participants (including Bob

62 | The Making of a Party System

Brown) wanted to create a national party, but did not pursue the issue strongly, as they feared it could split the broader social movement (Hutton and Connors 1999:227). The debates that took place at the conference clearly highlighted the competing views of the participants as to the form in which green politics should take in Australia. A clear division emerged between those who wanted green groups to continue operating as social movements and those who wanted to create a new national party. This debate was also occurring in the green movement in other liberal democracies at the time. In particular, green politics in Western democracies had been divided between what Doherty (2002) identified as the ‘realos’ and ‘fundis’. As Burchell (2002:21) pointed out, the realos in green politics advocated a shift from social movement style politics to a parliamentary-based party. This school of thought contained the pragmatic activists who regarded the parliamentary process as critical to bringing about legislative and institutional change in society. However, acting within the parliamentary framework would ultimately lead to compromise: something that the other stream in the green movement rejected. Indeed, as Burchell (2002:22) highlighted, the view of the fundis stream was that lasting environmental solutions could only be brought about by radical social change. While not totally opposing the emergence of a green party, this stream emphasised the need to maintain the activist nature of social movement politics in order to advance the green cause. This division was also observed with Harris (1992:28) identifying cen­ tralists and decentralists in the green movement. Harris (1992:28) described the centralists as those in the green movement who were in favour of a ‘traditional party structure with well-defined leadership and a more pragmatic approach to electoral politics’. As Harris argued, the centralists believed that winning parliamentary representation was the most effective way of having direct influence on the policies of the national government. The decentralists, on the other hand, wanted to maintain their social move­ ment ethos and work outside the established institutions of governance to bring about ‘radical social change’, rather than make ‘deals with major parties’ (Harris 1992:28). With the green movement divided over such fundamentally different views regarding its role in Australian politics, the Getting Together Conference ended with no agreement being reached on forming a new national party. This did not deter Bob Brown who, as a member of the Tasmanian parlia­ ment, met with representatives of the Australian Democrats. He proposed

Chapter 4 | 63

to fuse elements of the green movement with the Australian Democrats and create a new green party (see Lohrey 2002:30). This offer was rejected but, during this period, Tasmania’s environment once again became a focal point in the state’s political debate. This time the issue of conservation revolved around a proposed pulp mill at Wesley Vale in the state’s north (see Buckman 2008). After much intense campaigning by environmental conservation groups, the developers of the project cancelled the plans for the mill in 1989. In the Tasmanian state election of the same year, the Green independents campaigned successfully on the Wesley Vale issue and won five seats. More significantly, they held the balance of power and entered into the Labor– Green Accord which allowed the minority Field Government to enjoy a majority in the lower house (also see Christoff 1994:359; Crowley 1996; Bennett 1998). This consolidated the position of the conservation movement in Tasmania and demonstrated that green parliamentarians could effectively operate in the parliamentary sphere. Though once again, despite the electoral success, the green movement in Tasmania and the eastern states could not unite on the issue of creating a cohesive political party. This contrasted to the machinations in Western Australia.

4.4 Leading the national charge: the evolution of the Greens WA Where the conservation strand of green politics in the eastern states remained in a more fragmented and disorganised state, the peace and dis­ armament movement in Western Australia began the process of building a new party out of the remnants of the NDP. The NDP had become a spent force in Western Australia by the time of the Getting Together Conference in 1986. Virtually all rank and file members had left the party and supported Jo Vallentine as an Independent Senator for Nuclear Disarmament. Having achieved a significantly high public profile, Jo Vallentine proposed to use her position in the Senate as a springboard to future electoral success for the movement. Rather than try to revive the NDP for the 1987 election (which Vallentine and former members believed was a ‘damaged brand’ after the 1985 split), Vallentine worked with the former members of the NDP to create a new party. While the option of Vallentine standing as an independent candidate was mooted, the introduction of above-the-line voting on the Senate ballot paper convinced Vallentine and her supporters that forming a party would enhance the movement’s potential of winning a Senate seat. Thus the new Vallentine Peace Group (VPG) was registered as a political party on 5 August 1986.

64 | The Making of a Party System

It is important to note that while the VPG fulfilled the legal require­ ments to register as a party, it was primarily designed as a vehicle to bolster Vallentine’s chances of re-election. Moreover, the VPG was clearly a continuation of the NDP in Western Australia, given that it comprised former NDP members and was led by former NDP senator Jo Vallentine. Rather than being a national party however, the Vallentine Peace Group was created to contest federal elections only in Western Australia. Jo Vallentine stood as the lead Senate candidate for the group at the 1987 election and was returned to the Senate after winning almost 5 per cent of the primary vote. Since it was a double dissolution election, the quota needed for election was significantly lower. Thus Vallentine had to rely on just a small leakage of preferences from the other parties to cross the reduced electoral threshold. With a favourable flow of preferences from the other parties, Vallentine was able to retain her Senate seat. Vallentine’s victory energised other green parties to form in Western Australia. By the late 1980s three groups had become prominent: the Alternative Coalition, Green Development and the Greens WA. The first two groups in particular reflected characteristics more common to social movements, with fluid organisational models that attempted to mitigate the oligarchic tendencies of party politics. The Alternative Coalition was focused on land rights and disarmament and comprised some Western Australian Democrats members. Green Development was an informal network of con­ servationists, which had stood candidates in the Western Australian state election in 1989. Neither group won parliamentary representation. The Greens WA group was also active in state politics but was laden with debt that it had accumulated by running various campaigns. The debt had begun to hinder the party’s operation as it struggled to raise the funds necessary for campaigning. Despite their atomised state, all these parties shared similar green goals comprising humanitarian values, environmental conservation and opposition to nuclear arms. Acknowledging the overall similarities of these parties, Jo Vallentine proposed that all the green groups merge and create a statewide force. In 1989 these groups combined with the Vallentine Peace Group to form the West Australian Greens (Greens WA) with Vallentine as leader. It was Vallentine’s electoral success, and position as a senator, which allowed her to act as a focal point for the collection of green groups in Western Australia. By 1990 the Greens WA developed an organisational structure that was heavily influenced by Jo Vallentine and her experiences as part of the NDP. The former members of the NDP in West Australia were wary of the pitfalls of a lax party structure. In particular, in framing the new party the concern

Chapter 4 | 65

was how to create a structure that would both encourage the participation of members, and also provide for a cohesive party. In essence, the Greens WA structure attempted to combine inclusionary politics with a conventional party organisation. One of the first provisions incorporated into the new structure was an issue central to the disintegration of the NDP – proscription. Members of the new party were not allowed to be members of another political party. The new Greens WA structure also ensured that office-bearers could make decisions. This feature reflected elements of hierarchy and oligarchy. This was in contrast to the NDP’s structure, which was so open and inclusionary that it ultimately inhibited the party’s decision-making ability. As discussed in Chapter 3, some NDP meetings could last several hours yet decide nothing because there were no established or codified methods for making decisions. The Greens WA structure allowed delegates to make decisions in a cooperative fashion. Its structure also attempted to strengthen the party’s ability to make policy decisions but at the expense of some of the inclusionary ethos of the NDP and other green social movements.

4.5 The beginnings of the Australian Greens While the green movement in Western Australia (dominated especially by the peace and disarmament strand) had developed a cohesive party, the greens in the eastern states were still hesitant to form a party. One reason for this was that many in the green movement felt that they were effectively influencing environmental policy from outside parliament, especially since the period between 1983 and 1990 was seen as a time of ‘environmental legislative innovation’ (Christoff 1994:351). The conservation groups, in particular, had sought significant protection measures from the Hawke Government and had lobbied Barry Cohen, Minister for the Environment from 1983 to 1987, to protect Kakadu and place the Daintree as a World Heritage listed site. But notions of success by the conservation groups were further strengthened by the inclusionary approach taken by Senator Graham Richardson, Minister for the Environment in the Hawke Government from 1987 to 1990. While Senator Richardson was particularly supportive of demands that enjoyed ‘strong public recognition and sympathy’ (Economou 1999:69), this did not diminish the fact that the conservation movement was able to have significant influence in environmental policy. The Hawke Government (which had already signalled its support for conservation issues during the Franklin Dam issue) also introduced a number of measures that fostered

66 | The Making of a Party System

a closer relationship between conservation groups and government. The Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) debate was a major forum for the conservation groups. The debate, which commenced in 1990, invited stakeholders, including conservation groups invited by government, to find ways in which ‘ecological values could be included in policy-making’ (Economou 1999:69). The Hawke Government also developed the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) to provide ‘independent, comprehensive, informed, and unbiased information and advice’ to government (Gilpin 1995:67). In creating these bodies, the Hawke Government implemented a far more holistic and national approach to the environmental debate. This, in turn, affected the operation of the conservation groups. Rather than campaign for what were sometimes rather geographically specific issues, the conservation groups were now being given the opportunity by government to engage in the national policy debate. The early 1990s was a critical period for the conservation movement. With the government’s more national approach to environmental policy, sections of the conservation movement believed it was time to revisit the issue of a nat­ ional green party. In particular, players such as Bob Brown and Drew Hutton, who had advocated such a party since the mid 1980s, once again attempted to mobilise support. Their efforts accelerated with the replacement of Bob Hawke by Paul Keating as prime minister in late 1991. Keating was seen as an economic rationalist and those in the green movement were concerned that they would not be able to have as strong a voice as they had during the Hawke years, especially if they continued to be in a fragmented state. As a result Bob Brown, with the support of his parliamentary colleagues in Tasmania, transformed the Green Independents into the Tasmanian Greens in 1992. In yet another attempt to create a broader national Greens party, Bob Brown led a series of meetings with representatives from green parties in Queensland and New South Wales and it was agreed that these parties would form a new, confederated party: the Australian Greens. Other state greens however refused to immediately join the confederation. The Victorian Greens and South Australian Greens still believed the most effective way to influence government policy was outside parliament. These sentiments were strengthened when the green movement experienced significant wins when their involvement during the Hawke Government yielded reports by the RAC in 1992 that led to the banning of mining at Coronation Hill, instead making it part of Kakadu National Park. The political landscape however changed significantly for the green movement after the Keating Labor Government was re-elected in 1993. The

Chapter 4 | 67

concerns of the green movement about Keating’s approach to conservation issues were realised when the Keating Government began to devolve Common­ wealth influence over environmental matters. In an attempt to save money, the government dismantled the RAC and ‘wound down’ the ESD (Economou 1999:71). In doing so, the Keating Government limited the capacity of the conservation movement to influence national environmental policy. But this also served to galvanise the green parties in other states. Having experienced a reduced capacity to be involved in government decision-making, the Victorian Greens, South Australian Greens and Northern Territory Greens joined the confederated Australian Greens party. This marked another significant shift in the green movement’s position in Australian politics. Rather than attempt to exert influence on government policy from outside parliament, the nascent confederated Australian Greens aimed to exert influence by being directly involved in the party system. This meant that, like the peace and disarmament movement, the conservation movement had a party arm to contest elections, the results of which are discussed below. The structure of the Australian Greens was influenced by social move­ ment ideals. Indeed, the structure of the party sought to maximise the opportunities for members to participate in decision-making, while the party sought to make decisions based on consensus, rather than voting. By being a confederation, the Australian Greens’ structure gave a large degree of autonomy to the state parties, especially in the area of policy formul­ ation. This allowed individual state parties to decide on policies that related to their specific area. The Australian Greens also reflected the organis­ ational structures implemented by the Greens WA as it sought to mitigate the organisational problems encountered by the NDP. For example, the Australian Greens employed a delegate system. Only delegates could vote at National Conference – the party’s peak decision-making forum. This reflected elements of hierarchy – oligarchy especially – as it restricted the role of some members in the party’s operation. This was an attempt by those who framed the structure to ensure that the party could be responsive and make decisions in a timely manner, while still allowing members the ability to engage in the party’s decision-making processes. .

4.6 An emerging presence: Senate election performances Table 4.1 charts the electoral performance of the Greens WA and Australian Greens in Senate contests. It is important to remember that the Greens WA remained a separate entity to the Australian Greens until the 2004 federal

68 | The Making of a Party System

election. As can be seen, the green parties, especially in the eastern states, achieved limited support in 1990. Indeed, the best result in the eastern states was in Tasmania, where the United Tasmania Group was reconstituted specifically for the 1990 election. But it was the Greens WA, led by Jo Vallentine, which won 8.4 per cent of the primary vote and a Senate seat. At this election, Vallentine’s high profile was a boon for the nascent party, although it could not win this seat without preferences, especially from Labor. Table 4.1 Greens electoral performance in the Senate by jurisdiction – primary vote (%) and Senate seats won, 1990–2013 1990

VIC

QLD

WA

SA

TAS

ACT

NT

1996

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

2.0

2.5

2.4

2.2

4.9

7.7

9.0

13.1

8.7

Seats

0

0

1

0

2

2

3

6

4

Vote

2.7

3.3

2.6

2.1

4.3

7.3

8.4

10.7

7.8

Seats

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

Vote

1.5

1.1

2.9

2.4

5.9

8.8

10

14.6

10.8

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Vote

1.8

3.2

2.4

2.1

3.3

5.4

7.3

12.8

6.0

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Vote

8.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.9

8.0

9.3

14

15.6^

Seats

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1^

Vote

2.1

1.6

2

2.2

3.4

6.6

6.4

13.3

7.1

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

Vote

4.7*

6.8

8.7

5.8

13.7

13.2

18.1

20.3

11.7

Seats

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

Vote

3.3

6.1

5.9

3.2

7.2

16.4

21.5

22.9

19.3

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Vote

-

-

6.4

4.6

4.3

7.6

8.8

13.6

8.7

Seats

-

-

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

National Vote NSW

1993

* The United Tasmania Group was reconstituted specifically for the 1990 election and fielded candidates in that state. ^ This was the result achieved at the West Australian re-election following the Court of Disputed Return’s order to hold fresh elections after 1,370 ballot papers from the 2013 election went missing. Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

Chapter 4 | 69

The first election in which the Australian Greens contested – still without the Greens WA at this stage – was the 1993 election, although there was still a phalanx of other green parties fielding candidates. At a national level the Australian Greens won 2.5 per cent of the primary vote. However, the performance of the Greens, who refused to join the confederation in Victoria and South Australia, was weaker than in 1990. The party’s performance was considerably stronger in Tasmania, but it still failed to win Senate representation. This contrasted with the Greens WA’s result. Despite the party’s primary vote falling to 5.5 per cent, the Greens WA still managed to win a Senate seat because of their ability to manufacture preference deals with other parties. For example, the Greens WA had arranged to receive the preferences of the Liberal Party and the Australian Democrats before they went to Labor. The 1996 election marked a significant change in Australian politics. The Keating-led Labor Party lost 31 seats and its primary vote fell below 39 per cent – the lowest since 1934 (though Labor’s vote was to fall below 34 per cent in 2013). Amidst this changing political landscape, the pattern of Senate representation for the greens parties also began to change as the Greens WA lost the seat they had won in 1990. It is important to note that the resurgence of the Australian Democrats, which won more than double their vote compared to 1993, had a major impact. This, coupled with the fact that the major parties also directed preferences to the Democrats before the Greens WA, meant the Greens WA lost parliamentary representation. As discussed in the next chapter, the Democrats had undergone a number of changes (such as having a new leader) in an attempt to bolster their electoral success. The 1996 election was also significant for green politics as it was the first time the Australian Greens party won Senate representation. Bob Brown, standing in Tasmania, won 8.7 per cent of the primary vote and outpolled the Australian Democrats in that state. This resulted in the Democrats’ preferences flowing to the Greens, in addition to Labor’s preferences, and thus allowed Brown to claim the party’s first Senate seat. Brown’s election to the Senate in 1996 was very important as it made him a focal point of green politics in Australia. Brown began his term in the Senate with significant parliamentary experience, which he used to advance the Greens’ agenda (a point raised later in this chapter). Despite this success, the Australian Greens failed to consolidate their position in the Senate at the 1998 election. In fact, as Table 4.1 shows, the party’s national primary vote actually fell as the party suffered swings

70 | The Making of a Party System

against it in all states except South Australia. The 1998 election was a disaster for the Greens WA and left them without Senate representation. The major causes of the party’s failure to win representation lie in the party’s preference deals and the performance of the Democrats in Western Australia, which gained a slightly higher primary vote than the Greens WA. This, coupled with the fact that the Greens WA directed their preferences to the Democrats – as did the Liberal Party – allowed the Democrats’ Brian Grieg to claim the sixth Senate seat. And while Labor directed preferences to the Greens WA, its flow of surplus votes resulted in far fewer than those of the Liberal Party. In terms of the Senate minor party system, the Greens’ performance in 1998 suggested that the Australian Democrats were able to withstand the onset of the new party. It is important to note, however, that the political debate during the 1998 campaign was dominated by taxation reform. This assisted the Democrats as the party campaign focused on its commitment that it would negotiate with the major parties to ensure that the proposed tax reforms did not have a negative impact on citizens (Bartlett 2005). With such focus on taxation and the economy, the Democrats were able to reassert their position as watchdog in the Senate. The rise of One Nation in 1998 (see Chapter 6) also meant that the Greens were unable to attract as much media attention as they would have hoped since much attention was paid to the rise of Pauline Hanson. The net result of the election left Bob Brown as the sole senator representing the Greens.

4.7 The Greens re-cast: the 2001 Tampa election The 2001 election was to be a watershed outcome. Whereas the 1998 election had been dominated by debate on taxation reform, the 2001 election was overshadowed by the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September. Coincidently, Prime Minister Howard was visiting Wash­ ington during the attacks. Amidst the climate of heightened concerns about terrorism, Australian forces intercepted the Tampa – a ship that was carrying asylum seekers. The Coalition refused to allow the asylum seekers on board the ship to reach Australian shores. The government tied in notions of potential terrorists being on board, an argument made more poignant by the terrorist attacks in the United States (see Marr and Wilkinson 2003). The government’s position was also strongly supported by the Opposition Leader, Kim Beazley, and the Labor Party. The convergence of the major parties on this issue created an opportunity for the minor parties to highlight

Chapter 4 | 71

their alternative positions. Moreover, it allowed Bob Brown to position the Australian Greens as the pre-eminent humanitarian and anti-war party in the Australian parliament. Senator Brown’s 2001 campaign sought to reinforce the notion of the Australian Greens as a party with strong views on social justice. He described the Tampa issue as a ‘black period’ in Australia’s history and criticised the government’s stance as having ‘no heart and no stomach… for the spirit of international obligations to which we are a party’ (cited in Douez 2001). When the Australian Greens launched its immigration and refugee policy, the party argued that it aimed to fill the ‘moral-leadership vacuum’ caused by the major parties’ broad agreement on asylum seekers (see The Australian, 3 September 2001). Indeed, at every opportunity Senator Brown attempted to highlight the humanitarian ethos of the Australian Greens during the election campaign. In an address to the National Press Club during the campaign Bob Brown clearly outlined the Australian Greens’ humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals, especially in dealing with the separate issues of asylum seekers and terrorism. This set the party’s core campaign themes. In building a case for the importance of his party to be represented in the Senate, Brown (2001) argued: We will be a rock of security in the Senate for voters looking for a strong humanitarian, environmental party in the Senate. The Greens voters know what they are getting in the Senate. We won’t fold, we are reliable, we are dependable and we are creative.

Brown’s message not only differentiated the party from the Coalition and Labor, but also from the Australian Democrats, which he argued were no longer able to keep their watchdog role in the Senate, especially as the party was in some disarray after the GST deal. As Grattan (2001) observed, this positioning of the Australian Greens was effective as the party was able to attract ‘globally minded humanitarians’ who did not favour the major parties’ approach to asylum seekers. This clearly placed the Australian Democrats under pressure as some voters who had thought about voting for the Democrats were more attracted to the Greens. This was seen in Victoria where some voters who had previously supported the Democrats ended up voting for the Greens in 2001. Two Victorian voters who had done just that identified the Greens’ positioning on asylum seekers as the factors that attracted them to the party. As Anderson (2005) summarised:

72 | The Making of a Party System

The major parties had the same policies – get the asylum seekers, send them back or lock them up. The Democrats still had a question mark over their leadership – and who could forget what they did with the GST? It was Bob Brown and the Greens that actually cut across as having the ability to stand up for humanitarian values. It was the first time I voted for the Greens and have stuck with them since.

Similarly Errani (2005) remarked: For me it was just so obvious what had occurred. The major parties made a drastic move to the right… it was more disgusting that Labor agreed to do so. The Greens on the other hand were the ‘constant’ party. I’d heard Bob [Brown] talk about these humanitarian ideals from years ago. So I knew what he stood for and what the Greens stood for… basically they were the real opposition to the major parties. The Democrats, in my mind, didn’t know what they stood for anymore.

The Australian Greens’ campaign yielded electoral benefits. As Table 4.1 shows, the party’s national primary vote went up to almost 5 per cent, with significant gains in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. The Greens could have claimed a Victorian Senate seat had it not been for the ALP directing its preferences to the Democrats. In New South Wales the party more than doubled its performance of 1998 and won its first ever Senate seat in that state thanks to Labor preferences. The party experienced its biggest rise in its primary vote in Tasmania as Bob Brown was returned. In Western Australia, the 2001 election result mirrored that of 1998 for the Greens WA, as the party increased its vote slightly but remained unable to win Senate representation. As in previous years, the fate of the Greens WA hinged on the flow of preferences from the major parties. Unlike previous years, however, the ALP issued a split ticket that divided its preferences between the Greens WA and the Australian Democrats. As a result of these deals, the final seat went to the Democrats instead of the Greens WA. This was a concerning result for the Greens WA. The issue of potential military conflict in Afghanistan became a critical foreign policy issue during the election campaign in addition to debates about Australia’s broader foreign policy and its alliance with the United States and the ANZUS Treaty. With such emphasis on the impending war, it was expected that the Greens WA would win a greater share of the primary vote as the party had emerged from the peace and disarmament movement. Yet the party’s poor result in Western Australia showed that an important change had occurred in green

Chapter 4 | 73

party politics. Bob Brown, since making a smooth transition from state to federal politics, had become the focal point for green politics. As a result, the states in which the Australian Greens stood recorded significant rises in their primary votes. Clearly, the 2001 election confirmed the Australian Greens had displaced the Greens WA as the green party that was best able to win Senate representation. The 2001 election loss meant the Greens WA had not won a seat for three consecutive elections. The party had struggled to find a popular leader to replace Jo Vallentine and, as history shows, minor parties that fail to win Senate representation struggle to maintain a strong organisation and have a diminished presence in the political debate. The 2001 results precipitated further discussions between the Greens WA and Australian Greens regarding the West Australians becoming part of the confederation. However, the key reason the Greens WA had remained as a separate entity to the Australian Greens related to the fact that the party had its origins in the Western Australian NDP. As Vallentine (2007) articulated, the Greens WA members (which had predominantly been part of the WA NDP) feared joining the Australian Greens – dominated by the eastern states – as potentially leading to a re-run of the problems associated with the NDP. As Vallentine (2007) put it: The Greens WA remaining as a stand-alone Green party… was caused by the lessons learnt from the NDP. We left the eastern states alone to sort out their own problems because they always seemed to have more internal problems than we did in WA. We did not want to go through the NDP experience of spending our energy on sorting the other states’ problems then have the whole thing just fail.

Many in the Greens WA felt that joining the national party could be destructive, especially if it was to result in organisational instability similar to the NDP. In response, the Australian Greens sought to assure the Greens WA members that the NDP experience was unlikely to be re-created as the Australian Greens had a clear organisational framework, which had been developed specifically to avoid the pitfalls of the NDP. After a series of discussions, the Greens WA held a vote in which 80 per cent of the state’s members were in favour of joining the Australian Greens. The Greens WA joined the Australian Greens confederation in October 2003. The Greens WA’ decision to join was likened by some in the Australian Greens, such as the party’s national policy convenor Georgia Miller (2005), as ‘the last piece of the puzzle falling into place’, and bolstered a ‘sense of unity’ among the

74 | The Making of a Party System

party in each state and territory. Rather than any significant philosophical shift between the two green parties, the electoral results motivated the Greens WA to join the Australian Greens. The benefits of the restructuring that saw the Greens WA become part of the Australian Greens were to be apparent at the next federal election.

4.8 Labor and the Greens in conflict: the 2004 election In the 2004 election, the recently nationally confederated Australian Greens’ primary vote rose significantly in all states and territories, except in Tasmania. As in a number of previous elections, the issue of Tasmania’s environment had become a significant political issue and in 2004 the focus was on forestry with the Labor Party advancing policies to conserve over 200,000 hectares of forest.21 While the Labor Party was attempting to attract the support of the Greens, it had actually arranged preference deals that would severely disadvantage the party. The Labor Party decided to direct preferences to the nascent Family First in the Senate. Labor’s strategy was clearly aimed at reducing the Greens’ representation in the chamber, while at the same time attempting to bolster its own chances of success. Despite the slightly lower primary vote won, and the fact that Labor had decided to direct preferences away from the Australian Greens, the party’s lead candidate in Tasmania, Christine Milne, was able to win a Senate seat. Had it not been for Tasmania’s relatively high percentage (compared to the other states) of voting below the line, Milne’s electoral fortunes may have been quite different. Like Bob Brown, Milne had served in the Tasmanian Parliament where she had developed a high public profile and she was the first female leader of a political party in that state. In the other states, opinion polls indicated that the Greens had increas­ ing levels of electoral support and commentators expected the party to win its first Senate seat in Victoria at the expense of the third Labor candidate, Jacinta Collins. According to a well-placed source in the Labor Party, it was self-preservation that motivated the Victorian ALP to give preferences to Family First, rather than the Greens, in an attempt to increase the chance of socially conservative incumbent Senator Jacinta Collins’ re-election (Walterson 2004): 21 This package proved to be unpopular for Labor, however, as forestry workers (and the Tasmanian branch of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union) chose to support the Howard Government’s package (for further discussion, see Hollander 2006).

Chapter 4 | 75

What Labor did clearly had two purposes. The first was to give [Jacinta] Collins a chance of hanging onto her seat. The second and probably more cynical reason was to route the Greens. We wouldn’t want a Greens senator, with completely different ideas on the way of the world, to replace Collins who was for all intents and purposes a social conservative. If preferences flowed back to Labor from Family First we could get Collins up and say ‘good-bye’ to the Greens.

Furthermore, the ALP had secured preferences from the DLP and Christian Democratic Party in order to bolster its chances of winning its third Senate seat in Victoria. Ultimately Labor believed that Family First would perform very poorly and return preferences to Labor. Obviously, this did not occur. Eric Locke, the ALP state secretary at the time, commented that the party ‘did everything [it] could to get a Labor senator elected in [Victoria]. That is not a mistake’ (cited in The Age, 12 October 2004).22 Labor’s tactics resulted in the election of the Family First candidate at the expense of the Greens. Victoria was not the only state where the ALP directed preferences to Family First before the Greens. Indeed, Labor replicated the preference deal in New South Wales and South Australia to great effect, as the tactic elected the ALP candidates at the expense of the Greens in both states. The 2004 preference deals and election outcomes were particularly bitter for the Australian Greens, as it was the party’s understanding that Labor would be directing preferences to its candidates. As a result of this belief, the Greens directed preferences to Labor in the Senate and key marginal seats – yet did not get Labor’s preferences in return. This led to outrage within the Greens as the party felt as though it had been doublecrossed by Labor. The Greens’ stronger performance in 2004 was assisted by what was occurring in the Australian Democrats. Leadership tensions and divisions over the party’s support for the GST served to destabilise the Democrats. The 2004 campaign was overshadowed by disputes occurring within the party and hindered its chances of electoral success. The party clearly struggled to attract attention to its policies, even though it had many policies similar to the Greens’ (Stott-Despoja 2005). The Australian Greens, on the other hand, were free from such internal disputes and were able to focus on articulating its opposition to the war in Iraq, a core theme of the party’s 22 Some within Labor, such as Locke, regarded the preference deal as one that had backfired. Others intimated that other factors were at work (Jones 2004:15; Risstrom 2005). While such debate is beyond this chapter’s scope, Labor’s preference deal in Victoria clearly benefited Family First.

76 | The Making of a Party System

campaign. The combined policy debate of 2004 allowed the party to reaffirm its position as one concerned with conservation as well as peace and disarm­ ament. As a result, the Greens had a total of four senators after the 2004 election and were well placed to build further on their success in 2007, especially as the Democrats continued to disintegrate. The 2004 election results clearly signalled that the Australian Greens were beginning to dis­ place the Australian Democrats as the third largest party in the Senate.

4.9 The Greens consolidate: the 2007 election The 2007 election result was significant as there was a change in national government. The Coalition, which had won government at the time Bob Brown first won Senate representation in 1996, was defeated by the Ruddled Labor Party. The 2007 election was also significant as it confirmed that the Australian Greens had displaced the Democrats in the Senate as the party with the most seats after the major parties. The Greens would start the new Senate with five senators while the Democrats had none. The Greens were able to wheel and deal preferences with Labor and this contributed to the party’s success. The Democrats, in contrast, had endured protracted leadership issues, destabilising the party. Furthermore, the Democrats were led by Lyn Allison, who had struggled to attract significant media attention and whose profile was not as high as Bob Brown’s. The nature of the political debate also complemented the Greens’ 2007 campaign where significant attention was placed on the issue of climate change.23 More specifically, much of the debate revolved around whether the major parties would ratify the Kyoto Protocol (which aimed to limit greenhouse gas emissions). The Australian Greens recorded a very strong election outcome in 2007. As Table 4.1 shows, the party won 9 per cent of the national primary vote in the Senate and a seat each in Tasmania (where Bob Brown won over 18 per cent of the primary vote and was elected without the need for preferences), South Australian and Western Australia. Labor’s preferences played a crucial part in the Australian Greens’ electoral success, although, as in previous elections, there was no guarantee Labor’s preferences would be directed to the Greens. Indeed, some Labor strategists from the party’s Right argued that dealing with Family First would be better if the ALP were to win 23 The Auspoll Exit data, for example, showed that the environment and climate change was the third highest issue for voters in 2007 following the issues of health and the economy (see Watson and Brown 2008:4).

Chapter 4 | 77

government as Family First generally voted with the government of the day, rather than dogmatically pursue philosophical arguments. The preference deal that was finally agreed to between Labor and the Greens meant the latter directed preferences to Labor in the lower house in all states except Tasmania. In return, Labor gave its Senate preferences to the Greens in all states and territories. According to a well-placed source in the Labor Party, Labor could no longer ‘sweep the Greens under the carpet’ as they were attracting a significant portion of the vote and opinion polls suggested the party could hold the balance of power in the Senate (O’Neil 2007). One of the reasons Labor directed preferences to the Greens related to the ALP’s concerns about the Greens’ potential to block legislation in the Senate. As a Labor source noted, alienating the Greens on preferences ‘could have ramifications’ for Labor’s legislative agenda in the Senate (O’Neil 2007). As Table 4.1 shows, the Australian Greens achieved a high vote in Victoria. But in 2007, Labor’s Senate performance was markedly stronger than in 2004, which ultimately resulted in Labor winning the last seat at the expense of the Greens whose candidate, Richard Di Natale, reached 0.94 of a quota at the conclusion of the count. The Greens’ South Australian result was weaker in 2007 compared to 2004 thanks to pop­ ular independent anti-pokies candidate Nick Xenophon enjoying signif­ icant support in that state. Xenophon was rewarded by winning the last Senate seat. Unlike Victoria, Labor’s performance in South Australia was stagnant, and this meant that its preferences ultimately flowed to the Australian Greens and secured the party its first seat in that state. The Greens’ performance in Western Australia rose to 9.3 per cent and Labor preferences ensured the party won a Senate seat. This also drew attention to the fact that the Greens in Western Australia were able to win a seat for the second consecutive time after joining the confederation – something it had not been able to do since the early 1990s. The 2007 election was important as the Australian Greens continued its electoral advance in Australian politics. Moreover, the results of the 2007 election showed that the Greens had displaced the Australian Democrats as the third force in the Senate by holding the highest number of seats behind the Labor and Coalition parties. After many years of development, the confederated Australian Greens party seemed to have consolidated its position in the Australian parliament and the party looked forward to becoming an even greater political force at the 2010 election.

78 | The Making of a Party System

4.10 Greens at the highest point? The 2010 election The environment became a major feature of the political debate in Kevin Rudd’s first government. Having described climate change as the ‘greatest moral, economic and social challenge of our time’, Prime Minister Rudd indicated his government would act to reduce carbon emissions. But talks to tackle the issue fell over at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. Rudd came away from the conference having failed to negotiate a plan to reduce emissions with other countries. This, in addition to other domestic policy failures and criticisms about Rudd’s leadership style, led to the Labor Party replacing him as leader with Julia Gillard in 2010. Gillard promised to give the government greater direction and called the election shortly after becoming prime minister. The 2010 poll resulted in one of the closest outcomes in electoral history, with Labor winning 50.1 per cent of the two party preferred vote to the Coalition’s 49.9 per cent. The result gave neither party a majority in the lower house and left them negotiating with the crossbenchers in the hope of winning their support to form government. The Greens achieved their most successful election results in 2010. The party won a Senate seat in each state for the first time after gaining a national vote of over 13 per cent. As the disaggregated results show in Table 4.1, the party’s candidates in Victoria and Tasmania won over a quota while the party’s candidates in the other states also came close to winning a quota in their own right. In South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland the party had to rely on a small proportion of votes flowing to its candidates. Thanks to beneficial preference deals, especially with Labor, this duly occurred. Winning the seat of Melbourne was another historic achievement for the Greens, as it became the first minor party to win a House of Represent­ atives seat at a general election since the end of the Second World War. A significant factor that influenced the result was the Liberal Party’s decision to preference the Greens ahead of Labor in an attempt to stop Labor from winning the seat. The Liberal Party had done the same in 2007 but in 2010 Adam Bandt received a 13 per cent swing to win over 36 per cent of the primary vote. He came second to the ALP’s candidate but, as he received Liberal preferences, was able to win with a two-party preferred vote of 56 per cent to Labor’s 44 per cent. With the 2010 election resulting in a hung parliament, Labor required the Greens’ support in the House of Representatives in order to form

Chapter 4 | 79

government. As a result, the party moved to sign a formal agreement that would ensure its support for Labor in return for certain policy outcomes (discussed in greater detail below). The agreement was signed in a public ceremony by Julia Gillard and Bob Brown and signalled how powerful the Greens had become in Australian politics. After less than 20 years in parliament, the Greens had reached the point where they could directly influence the policies of the national government. This was a remarkable achievement for a minor party in the Australian system. Another important step in the Greens’ evolution occurred in 2012 when Bob Brown decided to retire from politics. He was replaced as leader by Christine Milne who had a lengthy history in state politics in Tasmania, and working with major parties, as she had been involved in the Labor– Green minority government in Tasmania from 1989 to 1993. Milne had also worked as an adviser to Bob Brown until 2004 when she first won the Senate seat for Tasmania. The transition from Brown to Milne was seamless and the new leader quickly took responsibility to prepare the party for the 2013 election campaign.

4.11 What goes up must come down: the Greens’ 2013 election Having achieved significant electoral success in 2010, the Greens were focused on consolidating their position in parliament in 2013. The 2013 poll was a government-changing election. The Labor Party, which the Greens had supported to form government in 2010, had become very unpopular and opinion polls (from as early as two years before the election) indicated that it was heading for an historic defeat. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Julia Gillard faced two challenges to her leadership from former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. The first challenge was in early 2012, which Rudd lost. The impact of this, however, was that it made Labor appear rife with internal instability and disharmony which further affected its standing in the electorate. The second challenge was in June 2013. Rudd defeated Gillard and became prime minister again and was charged with the responsibility of leading Labor to the election. But the changes to leadership, and an appearance of being focused on solving internal party matters rather than governing, contributed to Labor winning just 33.4 per cent of the primary vote; its lowest ever at a federal election. This also had an impact on the electoral fortunes of the Greens. As Table 4.1 shows, the 2013 election saw a sharp fall in the Greens’ primary vote, down from 13.1 per cent in 2010 to 8.7 per cent. This meant

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that, unlike the 2010 election, the Greens failed to win a Senate quota in any state. Despite the fall in support, the party did not actually lose any seats that it had won in 2007. The party’s best performances were in Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia where the Greens won Senate seats. Indeed, the party’s ability to win seats in 2013 highlighted the important role Labor preferences played in deciding its electoral fortunes. In Tasmania and Victoria, the party won over 75 per cent of a quota and, thanks to the preference deal with Labor, was able to the electoral contests. In South Australia, the party won just under 50 per cent of a quota and its senator, Sarah Hanson-Young, was at risk of losing the seat. By way of contrast, independent Nick Xenophon had outpolled the Greens and had won almost two quotas. The Greens, however, had secured the preferences of the Palmer United Party and this, in addition to Labor preferences, allowed Hanson-Young to retain the seat. The Greens failed to win another Queensland seat because Labor decided to support Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) ahead of the Greens. The idea behind this decision was that the KAP had performed strongly in the state election earlier in the year and its preferences could bolster Labor’s chances of retaining lower house seats in Queensland. As a result, KAP preferences in key lower house seats went to Labor and in return Labor directed its preferences in the Senate to KAP. This preference deal, coupled with the fact that its primary vote halved, meant that the Greens could not maintain Senate representation in Queensland. The West Australian Senate election was highly controversial. The Greens’ candidate Scott Ludlam won 66 per cent of a quota but, during the distribution of preferences, fell 14 votes behind the Palmer United Party candidate. The AEC initially awarded the seat to the new party and refused Ludlum’s request for a re-count of the ballot papers. The AEC, however, later acquiesced and re-counted the votes only to discover that 1,370 votes were missing. This became a major source of controversy and led to the AEC calling in former federal police commissioner Mick Keelty to investigate the missing votes. The Court of Disputed Returns then ruled that a new election had to be called as the winner of the election was unclear. The re-election was held in April 2014 and the Greens won 15.6 per cent of the statewide vote. Consequently, Ludlum was re-elected and the Greens maintained Senate representation in West Australia. The general election of 2013 ended the party’s streak of four consecutive elections in which its primary vote rose. However, despite a fall in support the party was able to retain its presence in the Australian Senate. Another

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highlight for the party was that it was able to maintain its representation in the lower house, as Adam Bandt increased his primary vote and won the seat of Melbourne again. Making Bandt’s return more remarkable was the fact that the Liberal Party directed its preferences to Labor with the aim of dislodging the Greens from the lower house. Despite its lower primary vote, the 2013 election gave the party a platform to maintain a significant role in the political debate.

4.12 More than a conservation party: the Greens in the Senate An analysis of the Greens highlights how the party sought to advance its own policy agenda in the Senate. There were differences, however, in how the Greens WA and Australian Greens operated in the Senate especially when the Greens WA was still a separate entity. The Greens WA continued on the behavioural path set by Jo Vallentine during her time as an Independent Senator for Nuclear Disarmament, then as the senator for the Vallentine Peace Group. Furthermore, the Greens WA invested significant time and resources in working within Senate Committees to affect legislative outcomes. In the Senate since 1984, Vallentine worked within the established par­ liamentary practices to influence government policy (as discussed in Chapter 3). However, since forming the Greens WA in 1990, Vallentine broadened the issues she pursued in the Senate and positioned her new party as one concerned with social justice in addition to peace and disarmament. For example, Vallentine pursued protection for whistleblowers following the 1989 Queensland Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (the Fitzgerald Inquiry). In late 1991 Vallentine introduced the first federal whistleblower protection legislation, in the form of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill, but this did not have enough support in the Senate. Despite this setback, Vallentine continued to use her position as she had in the past by highlighting the concerns of her party within the parliament­ary system. She kept her place on the important Joint Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee and used the opportunities this Committee presented to pursue social justice issues in the region, including the status of women in Papua New Guinea. The effect of Vallentine’s time in the Senate was to position the Greens WA as more than just an offshoot of the NDP, and indeed more than just an environment party. Vallentine forged a behavioural mould for the Greens WA in the Senate. In January 1992 – some eight

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years after her first election victory – Vallentine resigned and was replaced by Christabel Chamarette. The Greens WA began an even more sophisticated approach to operating in the Senate when Chamarette was joined by Dee Margetts following the 1993 election. Indeed, there was a division of labour. Senator Chamarette pursued the issue of public interest whistleblowing in the Senate Select Committee and pursued broader social justice issues in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. Senator Margetts’ work in the Senate was more focused on environmental and disarmament issues and she was part of the Senate Select Committee on Dangers of Radioactive Waste. But Senator Margetts’ role was to also broaden the Greens WA’ policy net. Indeed, she became the party’s economics spokesperson and a member of a Senate committee on employment, small business and public administration. The Greens WA were able to combine working in the parliamentary system while maintaining its representation of the broader social movement from which it originated. The Australian Greens’ approach to working in the Senate contrasted with that of the Greens WA. Unlike the earlier Greens WA senators, Bob Brown entered the Senate with considerable experience in operating in the parliamentary system from his time in the Tasmanian Parliament. As a result, Brown settled quickly into his role as a senator and began advancing the party’s agenda in the federal parliament by placing particular emphasis on environmental issues. For example, Brown campaigned for greater protection of native forests and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions shortly after taking his seat in the Senate. But Brown also placed significant emphasis on the party’s social justice policies by introducing, as a private member’s bill, the Abolition of Compulsory Imprisonment Bill 1998, which sought to remove the Northern Territory’s laws for the compulsory imprisonment of those found guilty of property offences (see Zdenkowski 1999), and continually campaigned for an end to Chinese occupation of Tibet. Unlike the Greens WA senators, however, on taking his seat, Brown was not active in any Senate Committee.24 Instead, he pursued legislative change through introducing bills directly in the chamber (as a private member’s bill) or through the media by raising issue awareness. This was a markedly different approach by a federal green parliamentarian and allowed 24 It should be noted however that Brown was part of the Senate Select Committee on Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy for approximately six months from August 1999.

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Brown to focus on enhancing his party’s presence in the broader electorate without the additional burden of being in a Senate committee. Bob Brown also used his early period in the Senate to position the Australian Greens as the ‘true’ party for the environment and differentiated it from the Australian Democrats, which had also tried to cast itself as an environmental party (see Lohrey 2002). This was assisted by the Democrats’ support for the GST, which included substantial grants for diesel fuel users – a feature Brown argued would mostly benefit the logging and mining industries and contribute to global warming. Indeed, Brown further argued that the Democrats had abandoned their commitment to environmental social justice causes by pointing to the GST, which would cause a rise in public transport costs, books and other goods and services. There were instances where Bob Brown demonstrated a pragmatic approach to operating in the Senate. Such instances, however, caused signif­ icant debate within the party. This was most clearly seen after the re-election of the Howard Government in 2001, which was determined to embark on the so-called T3 phase of privatising Telstra. With opposition parties holding the majority in the Senate, the government needed four additional votes to pass the Telstra sale. As a result, the prime minister attempted to win the support of the Greens and the Democrats senators. He proposed that the government would use a proportion of the funds raised from T3 for environmental projects. In response, Brown suggested that the Greens would support T3 in exchange for promises to end land clearing and the logging of old growth forests. However, privatising Telstra was a policy that the Greens had always opposed. This presented a conundrum for the party as it was confronted by a choice between two policy imperatives. While Brown had signalled his intent to be pragmatic, many in his party rejected the plan. For example, the party’s National Convenor, Gurm Sekhon, believed the party’s members would reject Brown’s proposal. Bob Brown also received ‘lots of angry phone calls’ and was told to draw himself ‘back into line’ by party members and supporters (cited in Grattan 2002). A typical response from Greens who opposed the deal with the government was articulated by a supporter of the party from Melbourne (Ellison 2005a): I was outraged when I heard Bob Brown was thinking about selling Telstra… how could the Greens support selling Telstra to fund environmental policy? We shouldn’t be in a position where one of our key principles is exchanged for another. I felt that we needed to keep Telstra, and it was up to the government to find additional money for

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environmental projects. The Greens were never part of horse trading before, so why start doing deals on Telstra?

Another supporter of the Greens from Melbourne also highlighted how the party could actually lose electoral support because of Brown’s attempts at being pragmatic (Quick 2005): If the party supported the Telstra sale I would have never voted for them again. The Greens are a party of values. If a deal was made with Howard… the Greens would just become cronies of the government.

Bob Brown’s proposal to support the government’s T3 sale was put to the party’s National Council meeting where the delegates unanimously opposed Brown’s position. As an observer of what was occurring within the Greens, Vallentine (2007) described it as a ‘wobbly moment’ for the party as Brown had the constitutional ability to disregard the party’s decision and support the sale of Telstra in parliament. Brown, however, accepted the party’s decision and did not support the government’s proposal. This example highlighted the tension between those who tended towards political pragmatism, and those who believed that the party needed to maintain and pursue its political program. Moreover, this established an important precedent which strengthened the idea that the parliamentary wing would represent the views of the party’s members in parliament. The visit of US President George W. Bush in 2003 also presented an opportunity for the Greens’ senators to reinforce the party’s public image as being committed to particular values. In this instance, it actively opposed the War on Terror supported by the major parties. The party’s senators, Brown and Nettle, created controversy when they interjected during the President’s speech in the Australian Parliament, an event which was reported on widely in the Australian and international media. This was a significant moment for the Australian Greens as it cast the party and its senators as being activists on particular issues and demonstrated how different the Greens’ policies were from those of the major parties, especially since they continued to overwhelmingly support the War on Terror. It also contrasted the Greens with the approach of the Australian Democrats. This event bolstered the party’s support with some voters. For example, a voter from Sydney who had previously voted for the Democrats identified the Bush incident as the moment that attracted him to the party (Smyth 2005): I thought they did a fantastic job. They stood up on the world stage and showed that they are the only party that care about what is right

Chapter 4 | 85

in this world. I’ll never forget their commitment. I’ll never forget their compassion. That noble act, for me, was when I became a lifelong fan of the party.

Another voter from Melbourne also welcomed the senator’s actions and believed that it galvanised her support for the Greens (Belkin 2005): They did what I hoped they would do. They highlighted the hollowness of the major parties’ rhetoric and the heartlessness of their policies. Their actions made me proud to be an Australian again.

Following the 2004 election (at which the Greens WA had become part of the confederation), there was a total of four Greens senators. This increased representation also signalled a shift in the party’s behaviour in the Senate. The party was to be more active in Senate Committees and have a stronger presence in the scrutiny of bills and legislation. It is interesting to note, however, that it was the Greens WA’s senator, Rachel Siewert, who was most active in the committee system and was a member of no less than four committees in her first term. Indeed, Senator Siewert continued the Greens WA’s tradition of being heavily involved in the committee pro­ cesses. The other Greens senators, however, did not have as much of a role in the committees. For example, Senator Brown was on the Senate Legis­ lative and General Purpose Standing Committee on the Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts from July 2005 to October 2005. Senator Milne was in the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee for 14 months while Senator Nettle’s time in the Senate Select Committee on Indigenous Affairs ended after nine months. The Australian Greens’ performance in the Senate attracted criticism from the Australian Democrats’ senators, in particular those who had heavy committee workloads. In fact one Democrats’ senator criticised the Greens for not being active in committees and described the party as being more interested in generating media opportunities, rather than being active in the legislative process (Bartlett 2005). Despite such criticism, the reduced workload, in terms of committee work, was an advantage for the senators, especially from the eastern states. It allowed senators to work at the grassroots level. The party’s activist streak, manifested during President Bush’s visit for example, also consolidated the party’s position as one with anti-war and humanitarian values. Furthermore, the party’s role in Australian politics was significantly bolstered by the presence of Bob Brown who became the party’s formal parliamentary leader

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in 2005. His high profile, in addition to his record of campaigning for the environment, added significant gravitas to the Greens as a party in the Senate.

4.13 Playing a role in a minority government – 2010 to 2013 While the Greens senators continued to advance the party’s agenda in the Senate, the party exercised significant influence over national government when it supported Labor to form minority government following the 2010 election. The party signed an agreement with the ALP that outlined the Greens’ demands in return for supporting Labor in the lower house. These demands reflected the socially progressive policies the Greens had campaigned on since emerging. They included enhancing the integrity of parliament by establishing a new Parliamentary Budget Office to cost parties’ election promises and investigate ways to reform electoral funding. The Greens also sought an increase in dental funding as well as a parliamentary debate about the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Greens wanted Labor to act on climate change. On balance, the Labor government delivered on its promise to address the Greens’ concerns. It adopted new parliamentary procedures and established a Denticare scheme and had a debate about the war in Afghanistan in 2010. The Greens were also a major influence on guiding Labor to implement policies aimed at addressing climate change. In early 2011 Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that the government would introduce policies aimed at reducing emissions, initially by pricing carbon then moving to an emissions trading scheme. While this clearly reflected the longstanding policy goals of the Greens, it became a significant political problem for the government as it faced a swell of opposition to its plans. The opposition parties claimed Gillard had misled the public as during the election campaign she had promised not to introduce a carbon tax. The campaign against the so-called carbon tax gained significant momentum and contributed to a sharp fall in support for Labor. Despite this opposition, the government implemented its Clean Energy Future policy. The Greens’ emphasis on socially progressive policies also allowed its par­ liamentarians to make significant contributions to the debate concerning same-sex marriage laws. In 2012 the Greens voted in support of changing marriage laws but the bills were defeated in the House of Representatives when the prime minister and other Labor MPs sided with the Coalition to block changes. Despite failing to change the laws, the Greens vowed to

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pursue the issue. Clearly, the Greens had accomplished much, especially in the period after the 2010 election. But this was a double-edged sword for the party as there were clear signs some voters were concerned about the minor party’s role in the national policy debate. Indeed, one of the first things Christine Milne did as leader was to end the agreement with Labor. Arguing that Labor had weakened its environmental credentials, especially by allowing mining in the Tasmanian Tarkine wilderness, Milne sought to disaggregate her party from Labor. In doing so, Milne sought to reinvigorate the status of the Greens as an independent third force in Australian politics rather than be seen as being too close to either major party. In this way, the Greens were able to fulfil their role in Australian politics effectively as they were able to use their parliamentary presence to have a direct influence on government policy while maintaining their individual identity. In assessing the period in which the Greens have been in the Senate, it becomes clear that the party’s performance evolved as it increased its representation. During the period of the Greens WA, the focus was on Senate committee work. The emergence of Bob Brown in 1996, however, caused a shift in the party’s operation, with emphasis placed on gaining the wider community’s attention by creating greater media opportunities, for example. With Brown as the party’s focal point in parliament, the Greens also consolidated their position in the Senate. By the 2007 election, the Greens had displaced the Democrats as the third force in the Senate and had attracted significant electoral support from those who appreciated the party’s performance in the party system. The next step in the party’s evolution occurred in 2010 when it supported Labor to form minority government. This period led to the Greens achieving their most significant policy outcomes while in parliament. However, the party faced some significant challenges during this period as Labor was consistently destabilised by lead­ ership speculation. In particular, former Labor leader, Kevin Rudd, sought to reclaim the leadership position from Julia Gillard. This meant that, rather than focus on the policy debate, Labor was often distracted by internal machinations. As one Greens’ insider commented, this was frustrating to the minor party as ‘this was a golden opportunity to get our [the Greens’] agenda up, but was almost impossible thanks to Labor’s navel gazing’ (Stone 2012). Despite such frustrations, the Greens had achieved something that other minor parties found so difficult. It succeeded in advancing its policy agenda and directly influenced government policy.

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4.14 Conclusion: from a social movement to the third force in the Australian Parliament The Australian Greens developed from broad social movements, with the party concerned about the broader human condition including the impact humans made on the natural environment. However, as discussed above, the competing emphases between social movements and political parties was the problem at the hub of the green party development in Australia. The development of the Australian Greens was complicated further with the divisions within the movement over the need for a national political party. Indeed, the broader green social movement in Australia was divided between those who saw the need for a party to contest elections and those who believed that the green movement would be more effective in changing behaviour from outside the electoral sphere. Tied to this division was the fact that there were two strands of green politics that developed into political parties separately: the peace and disarmament strand, which spawned the NDP, and later, Greens WA; and the conservation movement, which spawned the Australian Greens. The reason these two strands took such different approaches to create political party arms lay in their different relationships to the policy-making process. The peace and disarmament movement was marginalised during the tenure of the Hawke Government. The conservation movement was also affected by the Hawke Government as it had a key involvement in the government’s decision-making. Indeed, in such circumstances there was little need for the conservation strand to mobilise and create a political party. However, the conservation strand did mobilise when the Keating Government began to limit its role in government decisions, a course of action compounded by the government’s focus on economic rationalist policies. Here, we are reminded of Kitschelt (2006) and Poguntke (2006) who argued that social movements were unlikely to spawn political parties when their issues were being adequately managed by the government. In contrast, such parties would be created if the government did not effectively deal with their concerns. This hypothesis has been borne out in the Australian case. The Greens WA (a continuation of the NDP) mobilised in response to the government’s policies on nuclear issues while the Australian Greens mobilised as a reaction to the devolution of conservation policy. The rise of the Australian Greens was also linked to broader social movements and the changing policy debate. In Australia, issues concerning peace and disarmament as well as conservation, came to the fore in the 1970s.

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Indeed, the emergence of these issues gave rise to the Greens. However, the electoral success of the party has been influenced by other factors as well. One was the preference deals it organised, especially with the Labor Party. Unlike the Australian Democrats who resisted wheeling and dealing, the Greens used preference deals to their advantage. In particular, the Greens had their greatest electoral success when in receipt of Labor preferences. But without Labor preferences the party struggled to win Senate representation. The other major factor has been the existence of the Australian Democrats. In earlier elections the Greens were excluded early in the Senate count and therefore were locked out of winning representation when the Democrats were polling higher than the Greens. This pattern of election results began to change from 2001 as the Australian Democrats became rife with internal instability and suffered a decline in their electoral performance. The decision of the Greens WA to join the Australian Greens, heavily influenced by the potential to maximise election performances, also played a role in consolidating the Greens in the policy debate. Indeed, the continuing success of the Greens contrasted sharply with the decline of the Australian Democrats. By 2007 the nationally confederated Australian Greens had displaced the Democrats as the third force in the Senate it and remains a significant force in the Australian Parliament today.

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Cha pte r 5

Rise and fall: The Australian Democrats, 1984–2007 In Chapter 2 the Australian Democrats party was examined as an example of a fragmentary party that had succeeded in winning Senate representation. The Democrats remained the only minor party in the Senate between 1977 and 1984, after which it was joined by the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP). A new type of minor party was emerging. The NDP arose from the peace and disarmament social movement in Australia. The party’s rise also coincided with changes to the electoral system brought in by the Hawke Government. As noted in Chapter 3, the NDP’s electoral success, and failures (especially in New South Wales in 1984) were underpinned by the preference deals it had made with other parties, in particular, the ALP. However, this posed problems for the Democrats since the party’s rules forbade it from directing preferences to the major parties. While changes to the voting process had an impact on the party system, the early 1980s also signalled a shift in the nature of the political debate with issues more closely associated with new social movements coming to the fore. As noted earlier, the Democrats were far from a single-issue party and had a suite of policies on a range of issues. As Jaensch (1983:197) reminded us, the party had four broad policy pillars which also had links to social movements: general liberalism; ‘moral libertarianism’ (especially on issues such as sexuality, abortion and marijuana); conservation of the environment; and participatory politics manifested in the party’s organisation. This chapter argues that the Democrats began to place greater emphasis on these issues to reflect the changes in the political debate. In doing so, the party tried to broaden its position within the Australian party system from a centrist ‘watchdog’ position to an issues-competitive party. This chapter charts the Australian Democrats’ electoral performance between 1984 and 2013 and highlights the elections in which the party did well and those in which it performed poorly. The Democrats can be seen to have fulfilled the role of an intermediary in the Senate between 1984 and 2007. It was not obstructionist and resisted supporting one major party

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over another in the chamber. Rather, the Democrat senators used their position to modify and amend legislation. However, the party’s performance was influenced by its leadership. In particular, the party’s performance in the Senate and wider electorate, seemed to oscillate between remaining a centrist party and – especially in later years – attempting to have a more proactive approach to the policy debate, especially as issues with links to broader social movements, such as the environment and social issues, came to the fore. The chapter argues that the Democrats’ ultimate demise was hastened by the party’s organisation, which allowed leadership tensions to perpetuate. Furthermore, this chapter shows how the new issue-competitive parties, such as the NDP, Greens WA and Australian Greens, placed the party under pressure. While the party was able to successfully counter the electoral threat posed by the NDP and Greens WA, it struggled to counter the rise of the Australian Greens, which ultimately replaced the Democrats as the third force in the Senate.

5.1 The Australian Democrats’ evolution The Australian Democrats had significant electoral success in the Senate between 1977 and 1983. However, between 1984 and 2007, the party experienced periods of electoral instability that affected its internal politics. By 2013, this instability had led to the party having no parliamentary representation and failing to win a fraction of the vote that it had in its halcyon days. Part of the problem for the Democrats was that, in addition to major party de-alignment, the party drew support from the ‘post-material’ cohort. As Inglehart (1977) and Papadakis (1990a) remind us, postmaterialist voters place great emphasis on issues concerning humanitarian, environmental and social justice matters – issues that were the cornerstones of the Australian Democrats. But such voters were often unlikely to become devout supporters of one political party. Rather, post-material voters tended to be more analytical in their decision to vote for a party. Their choice could fluctuate from one election to another. Here, the rise of the NDP (and later the West Australian and Australian Greens) significantly affected the Democrats since some of their constituencies overlapped. The Democrats, therefore, relied on a relatively brittle electoral cohort that could, and eventually did, abandon it in favour of another party which espoused postmaterial values. As Table 5.1 shows, the party’s decline, especially from 1998 onwards, was gradual but permanent.

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At the first election under the reformed Senate voting system, the Democrats’ performance was weaker compared to 1983. Its primary vote dropped 2 per cent in 1984 to 7.6 per cent. It is important to note that the NDP significantly influenced this election, especially as the new party won over 7 per cent of the primary vote. But this result also served as a warning to the Australian Democrats – it could lose electoral representation to the new type of issue-competitive party that had links to social movements. Despite the NDP’s challenge, the Democrats won five Senate seats – one each in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. The Democrats seemed to have weathered the NDP threat (thanks to Labor’s preferences which locked out the NDP, especially in New South Wales) and continued to hold the balance of power in the Senate after the 1984 election. Indeed, the party argued it had been given a ‘mandate’ from electors to ‘keep the bastards honest’ (Uhr 1997:74). With environmental and disarmament issues gaining greater importance in the political debate, the Democrats began placing further emphasis on these issues in the Senate. The party called for a ‘worldwide nuclear freeze’ and for the closure of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor (Papadakis 1997:205). In 1985 the Democrats presented the Defence Amendment (Overseas Troops) Bill 1985 to the Senate, which proposed that both houses of Par­ liament needed to approve overseas troop deployments (though as Hawke (Hansard, 21 January 1991:3) reminds us such power ‘constitutionally is the prerogative of the Executive’). The bill subsequently failed. The Democrats’ peace and disarmament credentials were also projected by the party’s proposal for the Pacific Zone of Peace that aimed to exclude nuclear ships and weapons from the Pacific Ocean. The party was vehemently opposed to uranium mining at Kakadu and, in 1986, put forward the Koongarra Project Area Repeal Bill 1986 that aimed to stop such min­ ing. In addition to its peace and disarmament proposals, the Democrats continued to reflect its core purpose as a centrist party to ‘smooth the rough edges off policy’ and ‘keep the bastards honest’. In 1986 the party opposed the government’s plan to merge the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS). The Democrats also opposed the Hawke Government’s proposal for the Australia Card. This was a significant decision, since it provided the double dissolution trigger for the 1987 election. The party also continued to enhance the Senate’s role as a house of review. In 1986 the Democrats, through Senator Michael Macklin, introduced the ‘Macklin motion’ in the chamber. This proposed a deadline for bills being introduced in the Senate in order to avoid a deluge

Chapter 5 | 93

of bills being presented to the chamber in the last weeks of a sitting period, thus necessitating their ‘hasty consideration’ (see Young 1997a:35). During this period the party maintained its intermediary, watchdog role, while pursuing specific policy agendas concerning peace, disarmament and social justice. The party began to more explicitly reflect its electoral support base with the ascension of Janine Haines who replaced Don Chipp after his retirement in 1986. As the party’s former leader suggested, the Democrats believed the party enjoyed significant electoral support from women, particularly those aged between 25 and 50 with post-material values (Stott-Despoja 2005). According to the party’s president in South Australia, it was certainly the case that this cohort formed a significant portion of the party’s membership and this was reflected in the number of women in key positions in the party (Kanck 2005). The rise of Haines to the leadership was a considerable event in Australian politics as she became the first female leader of a political party. Haines led the party to consolidate its position in the Senate in 1987 when it achieved its best performance, at least in terms of the number of seats won, in the double dissolution election. The party won seven seats with a national primary vote of 8.5 per cent. As Table 5.1 shows, the party’s primary vote increased in all states except Queensland (where it fell 1.7 per cent) and South Australia (which remained steady). Under Haines’ leadership, the party sought to place greater emphasis on issues of race and gender equality, social justice and the environment – issues more commonly associated with parties from left of the political spectrum including the nascent green parties, such as the NDP. Because the party pursued these issues more actively, some saw the party as having altered its position in the polity. For example, Malcolm Mackerras argued that the Democrats had ‘very clearly made a conscious, strategic decision that they are not appealing to votes in the middle ground but to votes on the left’ (cited in O’Reilly 1988:48). Despite this strategy, the party continued to use its balance of power in the Senate to ‘smooth the rough edges off government policy’, especially through the Senate Committee system. The party was more effective in fulfilling this role since it had more senators. And, despite the fact that there were two Independent Senators for Nuclear Disarmament, the Democrats still held the balance of power. Indeed, with Haines as leader, the party reinforced its role as an intermediary in the Senate which led to some describing the party at the time as ‘the chameleons of politics’ (O’Reilly 1988:46).

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Table 5.1: Australian Democrats Senate primary vote (%) and seats won, 1984–2013 1984

1987*

1990

1993

1996

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

7.6

8.5

12.6

5.3

10.8

8.5

7.3

2.1

1.3

0.6

0.3

Seats

5

7

5

2

5

4

4

0

0

0

0

Vote

7.3

9.0

11.7

4.9

9.5

7.3

6.2

2.2

0.8

0.7

0.2

Seats

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

Vote

6.9

8.5

14.1

3.9

10.8

9.8

7.8

1.8

1.7

0.5

0.3

Seats

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

Vote

9.2

7.5

12.4

7.0

13.2 7.8

6.6

2.2

1.8

0.8

0.3

Seats

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

Vote

4.8

5.7

9.4

4.0

9.3

6.4

5.8

2.0

1.0

0.4

0.3^

Seats

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

Vote

11.2

11.2

16.4

9.8

14.5

12.4

12.6 2.3

0.9

0.7

0.3

Seats

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

Vote

6.0

6.7

7.8

1.7

7.1

3.9

4.6

0.8

-

0.5

-

Seats

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

-

0

0

Vote

9.2

10.2

17.6

6.7

10.2

16.7

10.7

2.1

1.8

1.8

-

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Vote

4.3

-

-

-

-

5.5

7.3

4.7

1.9

-

-

Seats

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

National Vote

NSW

VIC

QLD

WA

SA

TAS

ACT

NT

* Double dissolution election ^ This was the result achieved at the West Australian re-election following the Court of Disputed Return’s order to hold fresh elections after 1,370 ballot papers from the 2013 election went missing. Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

The party continued its tradition of voting on each bill on its merit, rather than tirelessly supporting either major party, with Haines consistently attacking the major parties’ convergence on policy and support for one another in the Senate. But the leadership of Haines, and the party’s watchdog ethos, was becoming a greater target for major party attacks. Indeed, in

Chapter 5 | 95

previous years it was a practice of the major parties to ignore the Democrats so that the party did not get ‘free publicity’ (see Austin 1987). But with an evolving political debate, punctuated with environmental and social justice issues, led by Haines, the party was gaining popularity.25 By the end of 1989 the party had prepared for what would be its most successful election yet, as Table 5.1 illustrates.

5.2 The 1990 election: the Australian Democrats triumph? The 1990 election was notable for a number of reasons. The Hawkeled Labor Party made history when it won its fourth consecutive term in government, even though it had a lower two party preferred vote than the Coalition. However, it was the nature of the political debate, dominated by environmental issues, that was an important part of the 1990 campaign for the Democrats. Indeed, the environment was given such importance during the campaign that some commentators regarded the 1990 election as the ‘greening’ of Australian politics (see, for example, Bean, McAllister and Warhurst 1990). Environmental issues were not new in Australian politics, as a number of environmental matters had already emerged during election campaigns, especially during the 1980s. For example, the Franklin Dam dispute discussed in the previous chapter was a significant issue in 1983. However, broader environmental issues had come to the fore in 1990. As Papadakis (1990b: 36) noted, the depletion of the ozone layer, soil degradation and the greenhouse effect had attracted greater media focus than in previous years and had risen as an issue concerning citizens. The political significance of environmental issues in 1990 was that the major parties feared that voters with concerns about the environment would vote for a minor party, especially the Australian Democrats. How the major parties attempted to win the preferences of the Australian Democrats was one of the interesting dynamics of the 1990 campaign. For example, Bob Hawke repeatedly stressed that if voters wanted to give their first vote to a candidate concerned about the environment, then they should ‘care enough about the environment to make sure that Labor gets their second preference’ (Canberra Times, 5 March 1990). Clearly, Labor was concerned about losing key marginal seats without the Democrats’ preferences. 25 In March 1990, public opinion polling by Newspoll showed the Democrats to have 17 per cent of the national primary vote – the highest ever result in Newspoll for a minor party in Australia.

96 | The Making of a Party System

With the environment being such an important electoral issue, the Australian Democrats’ slogan for the campaign was ‘Give a Damn: Vote Democrat’ as the party attempted to position itself as one primarily con­ cerned about the environment. Indeed, the party’s campaign focused on a range of environmental issues, with policies on conservation and antiuranium mining featuring prominently. The Democrats’ position on the environment also suggested that it was directly countering the electoral threat posed by the nascent green parties. The emergence of the NDP in 1984 had served as a warning to the Democrats that it could lose electoral representation to a party with specific policy goals, especially one focused on environmental matters. By making the environment a core feature of its campaign, the Democrats attempted to thwart the success of other green parties, especially the Greens WA. The party’s approach yielded benefits as peak green groups such as the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) recommended voters who were concerned about environmental issues to give their first preference to the Democrats in all states except Tasmania and Western Australia (see Papadakis 1990b: 38–9). Voters were advised to support the United Tasmania Group (UTG) in Tasmania and the Greens WA in these states respectively. While the Democrats had attempted to win the support of the green movement, the existence of these green parties meant that the party missed out on significant green support in those two states. This suggested that the Democrats had not secured a position as an environmental party and instead would be in a constant electoral battle for Senate seats with emerging green parties. As we shall see, this was to be the case throughout subsequent elections. Despite these challenges, the Australian Democrats won 12.6 per cent of the national primary vote in the Senate in 1990 – its best performance ever, as Table 5.1 shows. In accounting for this strong performance, it is important to note that much of the Democrats’ support was due to voter de-alignment away from the Labor Party. As Mackerras (1990) showed, the distribution of the Democrats’ preferences was approximately 2:1 in favour of Labor. Furthermore, the party’s vote was significantly higher in all jurisdictions. In South Australia, the party was able to win a seat without the need for preferences (as it cleared the quota on primary votes) and came close to achieving a quota in Victoria as well. More significantly, the party was able to win Senate seats in every state except Western Australia where Jo Vallentine was re-elected under the Greens WA rubric (as discussed in

Chapter 5 | 97

Chapter 4). This was despite the fact that the Australian Democrats actually won a higher primary vote than Vallentine in 1990. This result highlighted the challenges the Australian Democrats faced in terms of winning Senate seats. The Greens WA had undertaken a preference deal with Labor that the Australian Democrats could not. It meant that Vallentine gained Labor’s preferences before the Democrats. The Democrats could not engage in such preference wheeling and dealing as it was forbidden by the party’s rules. This result also served as a warning to the Democrats that its prospects of winning parliamentary representation was once again challenged by a new party able to engage in preference wheeling and dealing. Of course, the Democrats had faced this threat before when the NDP and its preference wheeling and dealing posed a challenge in the mid 1980s. Also in the 1990 election, Janine Haines – the party’s popular leader – resigned from the Senate to contest the House of Representatives seat of Kingston in South Australia. Haines did so, believing that she could win the party’s first seat in the lower house, such was the confidence within the party at the time. Her campaign attracted much media attention and the Democrats hoped that this would act as a springboard to future electoral successes and entrench the party in the lower house. Some in the major parties saw this challenge as a threat to their hegemony. Alexander Downer, who was then the sitting Liberal member for Mayo – a lower house seat in South Australia – recounted how the Liberal Party reacted to Haines’ candidature (Downer 2004:27): I… confess that in 1990 we were very concerned about her deter­ mination to win the seat of Kingston. Janine Haines was very popular at that time. The Democrats were riding very high in 1990, and she put a substantial effort into winning the seat… I did not want to see the Democrats win the seat from the Labor Party, because I believed that if the Democrats won Kingston then that would have given the Democrats a beachhead which they would have been able to build on and… become a significant third force in Australian politics.

Despite having won over 26 per cent of the primary vote, Haines was unable to defeat Labor’s Gordon Bilney. Having ruled out a return to the Senate, Haines’ loss suddenly left the Democrats without a leader at their highest point. Notwithstanding the party’s excellent Senate performance, the outcome of the 1990 election, in particular Haines’ absence, led to a period of internal instability.

98 | The Making of a Party System

5.3 The 1993 election: the Australian Democrats in decline? After Haines’ loss Michael Macklin became the party’s interim leader. Soon after, a ballot of the party’s membership elected the Democrats’ second female leader, Janet Powell, who was the only candidate to nominate. But Powell’s leadership was short lived as rumours of a sex scandal surfaced and began to undermine her position. The leadership instability was reported in the media as the result of on a sudden breakout of high morality in the parliamentary wing, with reports of division over an alleged extra-marital affair between Powell and Victorian Senator Sid Spindler. The real reason for tension, however, lay in a struggle for control of the party amidst controversies over policy, particularly with respect to the rise of green politics. Amidst the rumours, Powell’s leadership was marked by the start of the First Gulf War. This was significant because the Australian Democrats joined the nascent green parties (in particular the Greens WA) as part of the anti-war opposition at the time the ALP and the Liberal–National coalition were converging in their support of United Nations military actions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. It was this sense of convergence between the Demo­ crats and the emerging Australian Greens party – especially on the issue of peace and disarmament – that became the catalyst for a power struggle within the Democrats. Janet Powell seemed to be quite willing to see a merger between her party and the general broader environmental and disarmament movements, including its party manifestation, the Greens WA. However, two newly elected senators, Meg Lees and Cheryl Kernot, were not so enamoured with the idea of a Democrat–Green merger. Here lay the basis of a schism within the parliamentary wing that was to result in the first real utilisation of the party’s mechanism for the mass membership to directly elect the parliamentary leader when Powell, Meg Lees and John Coulter contested a membership ballot for the leadership. With interim leader Queensland Senator Michael Macklin holding the fort while the process was discharged, the membership ballot saw the defeat of Powell (who promptly resigned and would later join the Australian Greens party), not by Lees, but by the former environmental scientist and South Australian senator John Coulter who led the party at the 1993 election. The political debate throughout the 1993 election campaign, however, was very different from 1990. Paul Keating had replaced Bob Hawke and the focus was on the Coalition’s proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST), rather than the environment, as had been the case in 1990. The Democrats and its leader, John Coulter, struggled to gain as much attention as they had

Chapter 5 | 99

in 1990 through a combination of changes to the political debate and the fact that Coulter’s profile was not as high as previous leaders. As a result, the party won just 5.3 per cent of the national primary vote, less than half its result in 1990. Table 5.1 shows that the party’s vote was significantly lower in all states and territories, including traditionally strong performing states such as Queensland and South Australia. In fact, the party failed to win 5 per cent of the primary vote in New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania where it had previously won 11.7, 14.1, 9.4 and 7.8 per cent respectively in 1990. The Democrats won two Senate seats. Cheryl Kernot won a seat in Queensland, as Labor’s weak primary vote meant its preferences went to the Democrats rather than vice versa. Meg Lees won the party’s second seat in South Australia as she needed only a relatively small number of preferences to flow her way to cross the threshold. The polarisation of the electorate on the issue of the GST contributed to the party’s weak performance in 1993. While the Democrats garnered signif­ icant support for its position on post-material issues, especially concerning the environment at the 1990 election, the emphasis on economic issues meant the party had a marginal role in the political debate in 1993. This highlighted the precarious position of the Democrats in the Australian Senate party system by showing that the party relied on major party voter de-alignment. What appeared to have occurred in 1993 was that many voters were more inclined to give their first preference to the major party that they agreed with regarding the GST rather than continue to support the Democrats (also see Forrest 1995). The Democrats’ performance suffered as a result. The party was also still grappling with the split that resulted in Powell’s removal as leader. This split affected the Democrats’ campaign and its election results as the party seemed to be disunited and disorganised (also see Forrest 1995).

5.4 The road to recovery: the Kernot leadership The party’s poor result in 1993 led to a leadership spill in which the party members elected Cheryl Kernot to replace John Coulter as leader. Kernot’s ascendency reinvigorated the Australian Democrats as she positioned the party to be more aggressive in the Senate. Soon after winning the leadership, she vowed the party would ‘wield’ its power to influence legislation more effectively (Kernot 1993). Kernot’s focus on holistic social policies concerning healthcare, housing and community services led to debates about the party shifting to the left of the political spectrum (see Economou 1997).

100 | The Making of a Party System

Kernot’s first opportunity to demonstrate her new style of leadership was the 1993 federal budget. As Young (1997b:183) noted, the Keating Government grappled with the problem of trying to reduce the deficit while avoiding tax increases and/or reducing government services. The budget was very unpopular and the Coalition indicated its intention not to pass it, which meant the government had to rely on the Australian Democrats in the Senate. Kernot led the party’s delegation in its negotiations with govern­ ment. Of particular concern was how the budget would affect low income earners. After a series of meetings the government released the ‘budget mark II’, which addressed many of the Democrats’ concerns (see Young 1997b).26 The budget was eventually passed through the Senate with the Democrats’ support. This was a significant achievement for Kernot. Not only had the party influenced the budget, but it had also reaffirmed the party’s position as being a responsible force in the Australian Senate – a return to the basic ‘keeping the bastards honest’ theme of previous years. Kernot was described as ‘someone you could do [legislative] business with’ by the major parties in the Senate (see Green Left Weekly 1996). She was a charismatic leader who sought to use the party’s position in the Senate to influence government policy. Kernot’s ascendency also reflected the party’s strong support among professional women aged between 20 and 50 living in urban centres. Furthermore, Kernot led the party on issues concerning Aboriginal land rights (see Gardiner-Garden 1993) which perpetuated the view of the party having become a more proactive, left-of-centre party, rather than being just a centrist intermediary (see Economou 1997). Kernot, however, was careful to differentiate the Democrats from the nascent Greens. After all, she had previously opposed entertaining the concept of a Democrat–Greens merger. She argued that only the Democrats could effectively influence legislation in the Senate, as the party was beholden to no group in society, and had the experience of working in the Senate since 1977. The evolution of the Australian Democrats continued when Coulter later resigned from the Senate in 1995 and was replaced by Natasha StottDespoja, who was the youngest woman to be elected to the Parliament of Australia when she entered the Senate chamber, aged 26. The Australian political landscape changed in 1996 when the Keatingled Labor Government lost the election to the Coalition. Labor’s primary vote fell below 39 per cent. With such voter de-alignment, the Democrats 26 The ‘budget mark II’ aimed to address the concerns of some ALP parliamentarians and the union movement, rather than solely placate the Democrats. For further discussion see Young (1997); Ramsey (2008).

Chapter 5 | 101

were able to improve upon the 1993 results and the Australian Democrats doubled its national primary vote to 10.8 per cent. The party’s campaign theme centred on its traditional role as an intermediary between the major parties. With a change of government apparent, Kernot vowed to reinforce the party’s position as a watchdog on the executive. As Table 5.1 shows, the party won a higher primary vote in all jurisdictions compared to 1993. A closer inspection of the results shows the party performed strongest in South Australia where it won over a quota. The party had traditionally performed well in South Australia but the young and charismatic Natasha StottDespoja, as the party’s lead candidate, was able to attract even more amount of interest and support from the electorate. The party was also able to win seats in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, thanks to preferences from the major parties. The Australian Democrats also won the last Western Australian Senate seat at the expense of the Greens WA on the back of the major parties’ preferences. This was a significant achievement for the Democrats as the Greens WA had previously defeated the party in Senate contests in Western Australia. The Democrats had withstood the challenge of the Greens WA. However, the party was now facing yet another green party challenger, in the form of the Australian Greens, and its Tasmanian Senate candidate Bob Brown. As Table 5.1 shows, the Democrats lost its Tasmanian Senate seat to Brown. As we shall see, the emergence of Bob Brown and the Australian Greens in the Senate was to have significant ramifications for the Democrats in later elections. With the election of the Howard-led Coalition Government, the Democrats once again held the critical role of sharing the balance of power in the Senate. The party began to forge a cooperative relationship with the new government and, as per the party’s axiom of ‘smoothing the rough edges off policy’, engaged in lengthy negotiations on legislation with a view to modify, rather than reject, them. Kernot’s leadership style was conducive to this as the party gained increasing media coverage on its dealings with the government, especially in the area of workplace relations. The Democrats had been instrumental in passing the Labor Government’s 1993 reforms but, with the new government eager to implement its suite of policies, Kernot’s leadership – and the position of the Democrats – was placed under pressure, especially by the ALP in the Senate. The Democrats came under fire for passing the Workplace Relations Bill 1996 but, as Kernot and the Democrats quickly pointed out, the party had made over 170 amendments to the legislation. Indeed, the party seemed to be adhering to its intermediary

102 | The Making of a Party System

role in refining and amending legislation as the Howard Government’s first term progressed. This performance, however, was causing some tension within the Democrats, with Kernot arguing that the party needed to be more aggressive in combating the government but others, such as Meg Lees, believing that the party needed to remain as an arbiter. In late 1997 Cheryl Kernot resigned both as party leader and senator for Queensland. Frustrated by the Democrats’ position as an intermediary, Kernot joined the ALP in the hope of combating the Howard Government more directly as the Labor candidate (and later member for) the Queensland seat of Dickson.27 This was a devastating development for the party, which was again left without a leader. The leadership vacancy was filled by Meg Lees from South Australia. Unlike her last attempt at the leadership, Lees was the only candidate to nominate for the position in 1997. Some within the Democrats privately conceded that Kernot’s resignation would diminish the party’s credibility in the electorate. As Bartlett (2005) argued: It’s serious when a party’s leader… walks out. My feeling was that voters would say ‘gee, what sort of party has their leader resign? They must have problems’.

Despite the obvious instability, Lees was charged with leading the party to the 1998 federal poll, which was again dominated by economic issues. Similar to 1993, the debate centred on a GST, this time proposed by the Howard Government. Unlike her predecessor, however, Lees was not as charismatic as her predecessor. But, Lees’ deputy was Senator Stott-Despoja, a charismatic politician and attractive to a younger demographic (see Rogers 2004). The two leaders presented themselves as having the competence and charisma to lead the party forward. As in previous elections, the party campaigned on the theme of being a watchdog over the major parties – a role Lees (2005) consistently argued was more important because of the proposed restructuring of the taxation system. The party’s 1998 election results showed a decrease in the primary vote in all states compared to 1996. However, compared to the 1993 election in which the GST was again an important issue, the party performed strongly in 1998, winning four seats (compared to two seats in 1993). The Democrats won a seat in New South Wales where its candidate Aden Ridgeway, from the Gumbaynggirr people, became the second indigenous 27 Kernot’s decision to join the ALP was attributed by press gallery journalist Laurie Oakes to her relationship with Gareth Evans, the deputy leader of the Labor Party (also see Williams 2003).

Chapter 5 | 103

Australian to win a seat in the Senate. Ridgeway had been an active figure in Aboriginal Affairs and had called for an apology to the stolen generation of Aboriginal children by the Australian Government. The 1998 election also saw the Democrats’ Western Australian candidate, Brian Greig, elected to the Senate. Prior to his election, Grieg established the Australian Council for Lesbian and Gay Rights, and had been a prominent figure in the gay and lesbian community in Western Australia. Indeed, the elections of Ridgeway and Greig showed that the party had incorporated figures from broader social movements. The election of these two new senators also meant that the party could be crucial to any government bill passing the Senate. The most significant of these bills was the GST, which the Howard Government wanted to implement.

5.5 Of taxes and leadership: the party in decline Shortly after the 1998 election, tensions between senators Lees and StottDespoja emerged over the direction of the party. These tensions were exacerbated by the Howard Government’s proposal to introduce a GST. Lees saw her party’s role as being the intermediary between the major parties in order to amend and pass legislation. Stott-Despoja, however, believed the party could become more forceful in nature and adopt a more confrontat­ ional style of operating in the Senate, especially in terms of lobbying the government on issues concerning humanitarian matters (especially youth and social justice). As an extension of this philosophy, Stott-Despoja rejected Lees’ assumption that the Democrats would be unified in supporting the government’s GST. This tension over the GST came to the fore when the party was thrust into negotiations with the Howard Government. While the party had canvassed the new taxation system, it had not envisaged holding the balance of power on the issue.28 As the parliamentary wing of the party considered its position, the grass­ roots membership started to polarise. A petition was signed by approx­ imately 150 members in Victoria calling on senators not to pass the GST until a full national ballot of Democrats members was held (McGregor, Saunders and Haslem 1999: 4). The petition urged the Democrats senators to delay voting on the legislation until after the ballot was counted. As 28 Indeed, the Coalition too was caught somewhat off guard, since they believed Tasmanian Senator Brian Harradine would eventually agree to pass the GST, giving government the majority in the Senate. It was only when Senator Harradine refused to pass the bill that the Democrats’ votes were courted by the government in order to negotiate on the GST (Bartlett 2005).

104 | The Making of a Party System

the negotiations progressed, sections of the party became stronger in their opposition to the GST, especially in New South Wales. Yet the national administrative wing of the party continued to provide its full support to the parliamentary wing. At a meeting of the National Executive in mid June 1999, a majority voted against moves to delay the vote in the Senate long enough to allow for a ballot of Democrats’ members. This decision was seized upon by Senator Lees who argued it would be unrealistic for the parliamentary wing of the party to freeze as the whole membership had to be consulted. Additionally, Senator Lees (2005) pointed out that the membership had already ‘voted and agreed upon the broad GST policy, which included no GST on food’. The Democrats agreed to support the government’s tax package on 28 May, subject to alteration, in particular, to exempt fresh food. The Demo­ crats’ position was bolstered by opinion poll data, as the GST remained unpopular with voters (Greig 2005). For example, Newspoll found that 51 per cent of voters opposed the original GST and supported the Senate’s blocking of the package (Newspoll, 23 May 1999). However, with food removed, 52 per cent of the electorate would accept the new tax (Newspoll, 23 May 1999). After nine days of negotiations with Prime Minister John Howard and Treasurer Peter Costello, Senator Lees announced her party would support the government’s bill.29 This enraged sections of the party’s membership who opposed the GST. On the day the GST was voted on, senators Stott-Despoja and Bartlett wore purple, as a symbol of defiance, and voted against the GST in the Senate, along with the ALP and Greens. The party’s dealings on the GST brought to a head the simmering tensions between Lees and Stott-Despoja and the party entered a particularly bitter and protracted period with rumours constantly circulating in the media about a potential for a leadership challenge. This not only destabilised the position of leader, but also undermined the party’s claim of being a capable watchdog over the major parties. This episode also clearly exacerbated tensions between the parliamentary wing and the broader membership of the party. This underlying bitterness lingered until 2001 when the ACT division of the party called for a leadership poll after the party’s dismal 29 According to Lees (2005), the main negotiator for government was the Prime Minister who was more amenable to dealing with the Democrats. The Treasurer, on the other hand, was far less willing to negotiate on the exemption of certain items. As the negotiations progressed, Treasurer Costello, according to Lees (2005) ‘sat next to Howard and acted like a schoolboy who had not gotten his way – arms folded, looking down with a frown’.

Chapter 5 | 105

performance at the West Australian state election of that year where it won just 3.7 per cent of the primary vote. Clearly, the party’s broad membership wanted to change the party’s parliamentary leadership.

5.6 A Democrats’ resurgence? The rise and fall of Stott-Despoja Following a national ballot of party members, Senator Stott-Despoja was elected leader on 6 April 2001 after winning almost 70 per cent of the vote. Despite the change in leaders, the party continued to be embroiled in internal bickering between the supporters of Stott-Despoja and Lees. Despite this, Senator Stott-Despoja’s ascendancy energised the Democrats with a jump in the party’s membership, according to insiders (Kanck 2005). In Stott-Despoja the party once again had a charismatic leader with a high public profile. Public opinion reflected this – Newspoll showed a jump in the party’s primary vote from 6.5 per cent just before Senator Stott-Despoja became leader to 10 per cent shortly after her ascendancy. The first test of Senator Stott-Despoja’s leadership came during the 2001 federal election in November. As Table 5.1 shows, the party won 7.3 per cent of the primary vote, which was just 1.2 per cent less than in 1998. More importantly, the party returned a total of four senators – one each from Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia. As Table 5.1 also shows, the party’s vote was lower in each state except in Tasmania, where its vote increased marginally, and in South Australia – the home state of Stott-Despoja. Indeed, the 2001 election results could be seen as a triumph for the party, which had spent the period since the last election squabbling over the position of the party in the Senate, manifesting in the GST debate, and resulting in the leadership change. The party’s performance also suggested that voters had not abandoned the party due to its support of the GST. However, the 2001 results also suggested that the Democrats were facing an increasing electoral challenge in the form of the Australian Greens. Significantly, the Democrats lost its New South Wales Senate seat to the Greens. Bob Brown’s re-election in Tasmania also suggested that the Greens were beginning to consolidate its place in the Senate. Clearly, the 2001 results showed that the Democrats were under real electoral pressure from the Australian Greens as the newer party won seats previously held by the Democrats. In going some way to respond to the Australian Greens’ challenge, StottDespoja attempted to position the Democrats as more than just the party to

106 | The Making of a Party System

‘keep the bastards honest’.30 As a young person, Stott-Despoja emphasised the important contribution of younger Australians in the political debate and gave further importance to the party’s Youth Poll, which had been carried out annually since 1992.31 Indeed, Stott-Despoja attempted to enhance the party’s socially progressive ethos and attempted to more explicitly advertise policies on social justice in particular – something which did not occur to the same extent under Lees’ leadership. The period between the 2001 and 2004 elections was marked by heightened concerns about terrorist attacks and national security – issues on which the Coalition Government and the Labor Opposition converged. This gave the Australian Democrats an opportunity to advance its position as a progressive party in the Australian system by espousing its anti-war and social justice policies. Stott-Despoja’s leadership, however, continued to be marred with internal conflict. This spilled over and into the public domain when, in 2002, a political website published a letter written by Senator Lees to the Democrats’ National President, criticising the new leader’s style. Shortly after, Senator Lees resigned from the party and formed the ill-fated Australian Progressive Alliance. Further undermining Stott-Despoja’s leadership was Senator Andrew Murray’s public statement that he no longer supported her as leader. Stott-Despoja’s attempts to reposition the party, or more specifically emphasise the party’s social justice credentials, especially concerning the arrival of asylum seekers, was overshadowed by the Democrats’ infighting. This was reflected in public opinion polls as the party’s primary vote fell to only 3 per cent (Newspoll 17/18, 24/25 August 2002). Furthermore, it seemed that the majority of Democrats senators no longer supported their leader. With her position untenable after only 16 months as leader, StottDespoja resigned on 22 August 2002. In this instance, the will of the party room was given precedence over the will of the overwhelming majority of the party’s membership, which had elected Senator Stott-Despoja to the leadership position.32 But the party’s instability was not ameliorated by the absence of StottDespoja as leader. Senator Brian Greig became the party’s interim leader, but was subsequently replaced by Senator Bartlett following a membership 30 In fact, media advisers advised Senator Stott-Despoja to not use the party’s famous phrase, since market research showed it was not language that suited ‘a young, blonde female’ (Stott-Despoja 2005). 31 This poll attempted to gain a greater understanding of young people’s attitudes to various social topics such as education, health and broader national issues. 32 The membership of the party also bombarded the organisation with calls to reinstate Stott-Despoja as leader to no avail. See, for example, Millett, Allard and Seccombe 2002.

Chapter 5 | 107

ballot on 5 October 2002. It was reported, however, that less than half the party’s membership voted, and many of those who did wrote the name of Senator Stott-Despoja on the ballot paper (Seccombe 2002:6). This further damaged the party. Newspoll showed the party slumping to 2.5 per cent immediately after Senator Bartlett’s ascent to the leadership (Newspoll 12/13, 19/20 October 2002). This pattern of poor polling was repeated throughout 2002 and 2003. The party was subject to yet another controversy when Senator Bartlett engaged in inappropriate behaviour in the Senate in early December 2003.33 With intense internal and external pressures to make a public apology Senator Bartlett apologised, though many Democrats clearly expected his resignation.34 Senator Bartlett defied the calls for his resignation and led the party to the 2004 federal election. By the 2004 election, however, the infighting and instability had taken its toll on the Democrats. The party’s membership had fallen (Kanck 2005) and it struggled to find the human and financial resources necessary to mount an effective election campaign. Furthermore, senators were clearly frustrated with the media coverage of the party during this period as it focused on speculation about internal instability and potential leadership challenges rather than the party’s policy agenda (Bartlett 2005). As a result, the party’s contribution to the political debate was marginalised. The party’s problems were compounded by the fact that the Australian Greens had consolidated its position in the Senate party system by presenting a consistent and coherent political message. Assisting the Australian Greens in this regard was the fact that it was free from public disputes that were consuming the 33 Senator Bartlett reportedly took five bottles of wine from a Liberal Party Christmas function and Liberal Senator Jeannie Ferris had tried to get them back (Nicholson, Debelle and Dickie 2003:1). During a late night division in the Senate, Senator Bartlett and Ferris crossed paths. According to Senator Ferris, Senator Bartlett was affected by alcohol and stumbled towards her, grabbed her arm and shouted insults at her (Nicholson, Debelle and Dickie 2003:1). The images of this confrontation immediately ran throughout the press. Senator Ferris, who suffered a bruised arm, recalled that Senator Bartlett had called her a ‘f…ing bitch’ several times and as she walked away ‘he continued to shout insults’ at her. Even as Senator Ferris went outside the building into one of the courtyards Senator Bartlett was still saying the same thing ‘over and over again’ (cited in McManus, Harvey and Frenkel 2003a: 1; Nicholson, Debelle and Dickie 2003:1). Further inflammation of the situation was caused by Senator Bartlett’s decision to send an apology card to Senator Ferris with a bottle of wine. Senator Ferris did not share Senator Bartlett’s sense of humour. 34 Compounding this difficulty was the presence of Senator Bartlett’s two-year-old daughter at the press conference where he announced his decision to take leave of the leadership position. His decision to have his daughter present triggered another round of condemnation by former leaders, Don Chipp and Janet Powell, and a number of child psychologists and family organisations (see McManus, Harvey & Frenkel 2003b: 7).

108 | The Making of a Party System

Democrats about leadership positions. Therefore, the Australian Democrats had become weaker prior to the 2004 election, making the party susceptible to the Australian Greens’ challenge.

5.7 Federal elections from 2004 to 2013: death of the Democrats In an attempt to re-establish the party’s position as a watchdog in the Senate, and ward off the Greens’ electoral threat, the Democrats’ campaign was built on the claim that their members could be trusted as parliament’s ‘lie detectors’. This slogan, an extension of ‘keeping the bastards honest’, was used along with a photograph of the Democrats’ senators, which was reminiscent of popular television police dramas of the time. In an election dominated by claims and counterclaims of about which major party was best to manage the economy and to maintain low interest rates, the Democrats struggled to attract media attention.35 The 2004 election also showed the party had clearly lost significant electoral support. The Democrats won only 2.1 per cent of the primary vote in the Senate, a negative swing of 5.2 per cent from 2001. As Table 5.1 shows, the party’s vote was significantly weaker in all states. In South Australia, traditionally the Democrats’ strongest state, the party’s vote decreased from over 10 per cent to 2.3 per cent. Furthermore, the party failed to win a Senate seat. The 2004 election was the party’s worst performance thus far – a result compounded by the fact that the Howard Government won a major­ ity in the Senate, thereby rendering the party’s traditional intermediary role irrelevant. The party had lost its relevance in the political debate and attempts to highlight its socially progressive platform were overshadowed by the rise of the Australian Greens whose focal spokesperson, Bob Brown, presented a much more cohesive approach to policy. This resulted in the Greens winning Senate seats in both Tasmania and Western Australia at the expense of the Democrats. The 2004 election showed that the Democrats were unable to resist the Australian Greens as the new party began displacing the Democrats in the Senate. In response to the poor election results, Senator Bartlett resigned from the leadership and was succeeded by Senator Lyn Allison in November 2004. She became the party’s sixth leader in seven years. Between 2004 and 2007 Senator Allison made it her goal to reaffirm the party’s position 35 Frustrated by this lack of interest during the campaign, Senator Bartlett bungee jumped at a policy launch on the Gold Coast in an attempt to highlight the rising price of public liability insurance premiums.

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as a watchdog by again drawing on the party’s historical slogan of ‘keeping the bastards honest’ (Allison 2005). The party also attempted to bolster its anti-war stance as well as its policies on the environment. Allison also sought to articulate the Democrats’ broader, socially progressive policies on issues such as maternity leave. In the Senate, the four remaining Democrats senators continued to toil in the legislative system, but their contribution was constantly undermined by a perception that the party was headed for oblivion at the next election. In attempting to reassert its role in the Senate party system, the Democrats senators were more explicit in their attempts to cast the Greens as being fixated on a narrow agenda and could thus never fulfil the role of a watchdog (Stott-Despoja 2005). Australian voters, however, had deserted the party, as had its member­ ship base. By the 2007 election the party’s membership had fallen to a few hundred and, as Table 5.1 shows, this election signalled the end of the party in the Senate. The party’s national primary vote fell to 1.3 per cent, with the party failing to achieve a 2 per cent primary vote in any state. The Democrats vacated the Senate on 1 July 2008. As Table 5.1 shows, the party contested the 2010 and 2013 federal elections but attracted even lower levels of support, failing to win 1 per cent at the national level. Coupled with the fact that the party no longer had parliamentary representation, the Democrats had lost the potential to make a significant contribution to the political debate. A major electoral problem for the Democrats was that the Australian Greens had emerged as a national party, and was attracting the support of voters concerned with social justice and humanitarian issues. Furthermore, the Greens presented as a far more cohesive and focused party compared to the Democrats. In contrast, the Democrats had gone through a number of leaders who individually had varying degrees of popularity between 1997 and 2004. The controversial ways in which some Democrats leaders had left the position also contributed to a sense that the party was unstable. Unlike challenges posed by green parties in previous elections, the Australian Democrats could not successfully counter the threat of the Australian Greens. So strong was this challenge that, after the 2007 election, the Greens had displaced the Democrats as a third force in the Senate.

5.8 Conclusion: the watchdog fails to guard itself Many challenges for the Australian Democrats arose between 1984 and 2007. The instances in which the Democrats candidates were able to win Senate seats without achieving a quota themselves depended on a decline in

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the primary vote for the ALP (and a flow of ALP surplus) and shifts in the policy debate. But the rise of the NDP, Greens WA and Australian Greens began to open up scope for these parties and the ALP to enter into dialogue about the cross-direction of preferences, particularly after the 1983 Senate electoral reforms of the Hawke Government, which introduced above-theline voting and party-determined direction of preferences under the GVT system. The problem for the Australian Democrats was that it was excluded from being able to negotiate favourable GVT outcomes, especially with the ALP. While this in itself does not account for the party’s electoral decline, its inability to wheel and deal on preferences made it more vulnerable to failure, with its declining primary vote. Without favourable preference flows from the major party GVTs, the Democrats were at a significant disadvantage to the issue-competitive minor parties – such as the NDP and the Greens – and reduced the party’s chances to win Senate representation. The Democrats’ leadership situation was also characterised by instability, especially after the defeat of Janine Haines in the 1990 election. For example, in the first 13 years the party had two leaders, but in the last 17 years it went through nine leaders. Furthermore, each leader’s term was marred by some form of internal instability, which stemmed from the fact that the leader selected by the grassroots membership was sometimes not the candidate supported by the parliamentary wing. This was a result of the party’s overzealous approach to inclusionary and participatory politics. Compounding the selection of leaders was the fact that some were neither charismatic nor effective – both critical features of minor party leadership. The Australian electorate shunned the party when it had such leaders, especially in 1993. By the mid to late 2000s, however, the party was unravelling. The Democrats’ internal disputes played a significant role in destabilising the party. For example, the pattern of the Democrats’ national Senate vote from 1998 clearly demonstrated a major failure in the party’s vote in 2004 and 2007. Indeed, it was worse than the poor performance in 1993 in that the party failed to win any seats. The really significant feature was that it indicated that the downturn in the party’s electoral performance occurred between the 2001 and 2004 contests, rather than the 1998 and 2001 elections. The significance of this trend lies in the timing of the two major political events of the period, including the party’s dealings with the Howard Coalition Government to expedite the GST and a series of changes to the party’s parliamentary leadership. The GST was introduced after the 1998 election but before the 2001 election. The Australian Democrats’ vote fell between 1998 and 2001, but not by a significant amount (certainly

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not the previously achieved nadir in 1993) and, as already noted, the party succeeded in winning four seats – in sum, a fairly strong result. The collapse in voter support for the party clearly occurred between 2001 and 2004, with elections from 2007 confirming the de-alignment of Australian Democrat support that had occurred at the 2004 contest. At one level, the events between 2001 and 2004 point to the importance of the problems associated with the Australian Democrats’ own structure as the major contributor to its demise. In this approach the GST matter simply becomes the issue that precipitated an irreconcilable disconnection between the party’s mass membership and its parliamentary wing – a potential for fundamental dysfunctionalism waiting to happen. The Australian Democrats had been at this crisis point once before between 1990 and 1993 when, after its best electoral performance, the party quickly descended into internecine struggles over Janet Powell’s leadership and whether the Democrats should merge with the Greens. And, as in the case of the Lees–Stott-Despoja struggle over the GST, the party’s cumbersome leadership rules further complicated the battle over who would lead the party. Once again the party membership came up with a leader from the weaker faction in the parliamentary wing in its leadership poll, based on a serious disconnection between the views of the mass membership and the perspective of the parliamentary party. The party’s ability to win a couple of seats, despite suffering a major decline in its vote in 1993, staved off immediate disaster. The party enjoyed no such luxury in 2004, and the replication of the collapse of the party’s result in the 2007 election resulted in the elimination of its parliamentary wing. What this suggests is that the Australian Democrats’ organisational rules and structure, sometimes vaunted for their innovative nature and their apparently strong commitment to notions of internal party democracy, were fundamentally flawed and inadequate in times of organisational stress. The fact that the party was beset with differences of opinion over policy and struggles for influence over key aspects of party political function, such as who would be parliamentary leader, is not itself particularly surprising, as power struggles and factionalism are common in party politics, especially when they involve leadership battles. The real issue thus becomes one of how well a party’s organisation can deal with these matters and, if it cannot deal with them effectively or efficiently, whether the party can prove to be durable notwithstanding the onset of crisis. In this case, the Australian Democrats failed the test. By giving the mass membership the power to determine the parliamentary leadership, the party’s rules had only really been engaged in the midst of a serious factional dispute (twice since 1977) and, on both

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occasions, they proved cumbersome and prone to installing leaders who did not have the support of their parliamentary colleagues. What is more, they became the prelude to electoral failure. In 2004, and even more so in 2007, the failure was so complete it led to collapse of the parliamentary wing and brought an end to the party’s time in the Senate. While internal problems played a role in the party’s decline, the shifting policy debate and the associated emergence of issue-competitive parties also affected the Democrats’ electoral performance. The Australian Democrats appeared to have been successful in countering the electoral threat posed by the NDP and Greens WA. However, the emergence of Bob Brown and the Australian Greens in the Senate marked a shift in the electoral contest between the Greens and Democrats. Amidst internal instability, and especially amidst a changing policy debate, the Australian Democrats clearly struggled with the onset of the Australian Greens. The 2001 election gave a definite signal to the Democrats that the Australian Greens could win Senate seats at their expense. In 2004, and certainly from 2007, it became obvious that the Australian Greens had displaced the Australian Democrats as the third force in the Australian Senate. The Australian Democrats, which originally emerged as a fragmentary party, were no longer able to resist the electoral challenge posed by an issue-competitive party, in this case the Australian Greens.

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Cha pte r 6

Issues-oriented politics of the right: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation The emergence of Pauline Hanson on to the Australian political scene after the 1996 federal election was significant for the Senate minor party system. With her controversial views on race and immigration, Hanson shifted from outspoken independent to leader of a new issue-competitive minor party: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. However, where previous issue-competitive parties had emerged during the period of the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments, One Nation mobilised just as the Coalition won government in 1996. Moreover, where the previous issue-competitive parties (the NPD, Greens WA and Australian Greens) were from the left of the political spectrum, One Nation was a party from the right. One Nation’s emergence was also interesting because, where the previous issue-competitive parties posed an electoral threat, especially to the Labor Party, One Nation affected the Coalition’s electoral support. This chapter examines the rise of Pauline Hanson and the development of her One Nation Party by paying particular attention to the party’s electoral performance in the Queensland state election of 1998, as it was at this election where One Nation was seen to be a significant threat, especially to the Coalition. The chapter then examines One Nation’s electoral performances in federal elections from 1998 to 2013. The chapter argues that it was the lack of preference wheeling and dealing that cost the party a number of Senate seats it could have won at the height of its popularity in 1998. This chapter also argues that Pauline Hanson was the critical driver of One Nation, which was a party that corresponded to the right-populist party type. In accounting for her initial success, the chapter argues that Hanson was a charismatic but essentially ‘anti-system’ figure. Her core message resonated with sections of the electorate that felt disenchanted with the policies of the major parties. Indeed, as the chapter outlines, Hanson, like other right-populist politicians, presented simple proposals to deal with complex policy issues. However, it is also argued that the party, like other right-populist parties, was an unsustainable entity. The party had a peculiar

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organisation, one that atomised its rank and file members from the party’s executive, and which contributed to the party’s eventual failure. This chapter also examines the impact of One Nation in the Senate and argues that the party could not achieve its policy goals in parliament. This highlights the difficulty for right-populist parties in working within the established parliamentary framework. Furthermore, the chapter contends that it was Pauline Hanson – rather than her party – who was gaining significant support from sections of the electorate. This was illustrated by her electoral performances in later elections (as an independent) in which she outpolled One Nation.

6.1 From Ipswich to the national stage: the emergence of Pauline Hanson Pauline Hanson was first elected to a governing position when she was elected to the Ipswich Council in Queensland in 1994. In April 1995 Hanson was one of 27 Councillors who lost their positions when the Ipswich City Council merged with Moreton Shire Council. Eager to return to the political fray, Hanson joined the Oxley branch of the Liberal Party in August 1995 in what was then considered to be a safe Labor electorate. With the Keating Government due to call an election early in 1996, Hanson was preselected as the Liberal candidate. The fact that Oxley was considered a very safe seat to Labor did not deter Hanson, and she used the community contacts and profile gained during her time as a councillor to build momentum for her campaign. Indeed, Hanson proved that she could attract significant attention, especially in the media, by outlining her views on various social issues. In a letter in January 1996 to the Queensland Times Hanson argued that Aborigines were being treated leniently by the judicial system and that governments were ‘showering’ them with money. She subsequently wrote another letter, which was published in the Courier-Mail in February 1996. In this letter she argued that a form of ‘reverse racism’ was occurring in Australia – where indigenous Australians were being advantaged at the expense of ‘white’ Australia. Hanson gained much interest through her comments and, as a result, her personality began to outstrip her party endorsement in how she was identified by the electors. Upon being made aware of her comments, the Queensland division of the Liberal Party decided to disendorse Hanson. The decision was made by the party’s state director, Jim Barron, who was aware that Hanson could be seen

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as a martyr but believed her comments would cause the party more harm if she remained a member (see Gordon 2003). Indeed, a straw poll on Brisbane talkback radio found that 99 per cent of callers disagreed with the Liberal Party’s disendorsement of Hanson and believed that the party ‘machine had stomped on a woman who simply said what she believed’ (see Gordon 2003). With sections of the community showing strong support and empathy for Hanson, the Liberal Party conceded that it had played a role in creating a ‘ready-made media juggernaut’ that could ‘carry her as far as she wants to go’ (see Gordon 2003). Interestingly, however, the close proximity of her disendorsement and the election date meant that Hanson appeared as the Liberal Party candid­ate on the ballot papers. This was in addition to the use of Liberal Party bunt­ ing and other campaign literature, identifying her as the Liberal candidate. Far from fading into obscurity Hanson’s campaign gathered greater impetus. She was liberated from the constraints of formal party discipline as she campaigned on what would become her core issues of race and immig­ ration at every opportunity. Adding further interest to her message was Hanson’s charisma. She campaigned as a ‘local’ and an ‘anti-system’ figure who was ‘unafraid to speak her mind’. This melange of circumstances worked in Hanson’s favour, as Table 6.1 shows. This was significant as Hanson was elected to parliament, which allowed her views to be aired in the federal parliamentary sphere. Hanson received a swing of almost 23 per cent compared to the Liberal Party’s performance in 1993. More importantly Hanson achieved an extraordinarily high primary vote of almost 49 per cent, which meant she had to rely on only a small percentage of preferences to flow to her from the other candidates. In comparison the Labor incumbent, Les Scott, suffered a 15 per cent swing, dropping the ALP’s primary vote to below 40 per cent. The other can­ didates representing minor parties all recorded small, positive swings, with the Democrats’ performance being the strongest. The Greens contested the seat of Oxley for the first time in 1996 and polled better than Australia’s Indigenous Peoples Party, which had actually emerged in 1993 and not as a response to Hanson’s views. Pauline Hanson’s achievements are even more remarkable when the twocandidate preferred result is considered. As Table 6.1 shows, Hanson recorded a 19.3 per cent swing towards her and won the seat of Oxley. Previously, the electorate of Oxley had been an ALP bastion in Queensland. Formerly held by Bill Hayden, from 1961 to 1988, it was the only Queensland electorate that Labor did not lose in the 1975 Constitutional Crisis election.

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Table 6.1: Result of the Queensland division of Oxley – 1996 federal election Candidate

Party on ballot paper

Primary vote (%)

Swing (%)

1.1

1.1

Carl Wyles

-

Les Scott

ALP

39.4

-15.2

Pauline Hanson

Liberal Party

48.6

+22.9

David Roy Pullen

Australian Democrats

6.1

+0.6

Victor Robb

Independent

1.6

+1.6

John Robert McKeon

Green

2.7

+2.7

0.6

+0.6

Two-candidate preferred vote (%)

Swing (%)

Bill Chapman

Australia’s Indigenous Peoples Party

Two-candidate preferred result

Les Scott

ALP

45.3

-19.3

Pauline Hanson

Liberal Party

54.7

+19.3

Source: Australian Electoral Commission

6.2 The champion of ‘average’ Australians: Hanson in the House of Representatives On Tuesday, 10 September 1996 Pauline Hanson made her inaugural speech in the House of Representatives. Presenting herself not as a ‘polished politician’ but as a ‘woman who has had her fair share of life’s knocks’, she promoted a persona of being in tune with ‘ordinary Australians’ (1996: 3860). In doing so, Hanson opened a number of policy fronts that she wanted to address. Chief among these was economic uncertainty for ‘ordinary Australians’ – a term which featured prominently in Hanson’s lexicon. Hanson also set about establishing her credentials as an anti-system politician. At the time of Hanson’s emergence, Australia was still emerging from the recession of the early 1990s and notions of trade liberalisation, globalisation and associated economic uncertainty featured prominently in much discussion regarding the economies of Western liberal democracies (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The Australian labour market had become more challenging, which was a source of significant concern for some workers. In noting the changes in the Australian and broader Western labour markets,

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Mughan, Bean and McAllister (2003:619) argued that many employees felt insecure in their jobs: The reason is simple; labor market conditions have changed for the worse for many workers. After a social democratic interlude spanning several decades, workers… find themselves thrust into, for them, an unprecedentedly competitive, unprotected and unpredictable labor market. Their common experience, and fear, is that economic globalization means not opportunity or progress, but the unimpeded ability of firms and corporations to transfer jobs… so that the secure, well-paying jobs… for them and their children are transferred to countries with lower wages.

Hanson placed great emphasis on these economic challenges and how it affected sections of the Australian community, especially in terms of the increasing competitiveness of the world economy. In doing so, Hanson be­ came the lightning rod for those who were concerned about the uncertainties of a changing labour market. The selling off of state enterprises, such as Qantas (and the then looming sale of Telstra) and ensuing retrenchments were used as evidence of falling living standards for ‘ordinary Australians’ that would only get worse if the government did not start to adopt more protection­ist policies. Hanson constantly referred to ‘ordinary Australians’ and the ‘average’ people, whom the major parties neglected. It was this cohort that Hanson argued was suffering under the policies of trade liberalisat­ ion and economic rationalisation which had been pursued by the major parties. Indeed, the constant reference to this ‘silent majority’ of ‘ordinary Australians’ became a hallmark of Hanson and the policies she pursued. The constant image of being an ‘underdog’ against the tide of professional politicians, academics and ‘do-gooders’ also became an identifying feature of Pauline Hanson (Hanson 1996:3860). The style and message of Hanson gave rise to the notion of Hansonism – which she defined as ‘telling the truth and what the silent majority wanted’ (Hanson 2005). Hanson tied her original themes of race and immigration into the eco­ nomic debate. With her views on ‘reverse racism’ and ‘preferential treatment’ of Aborigines, Hanson’s policies contrasted sharply with the policies of the Hawke and Keating Governments, which had placed much emphasis on creating inclusionary policies on indigenous affairs, multiculturalism and immigration. As former webmaster for One Nation put it, many voters re­ garded Hanson’s message as a ‘genuine breath of fresh air’ as she was saying what many Australians felt, but feared to say (Balson 2005). In particular,

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Hanson highlighted ‘reverse racism’ in which ‘mainstream Australians’ were disadvantaged by the promotion of political correctness and ‘industries’ servicing ‘Aboriginals’ and other minority groups. As Hanson stated (1996:3860): Present governments are encouraging separatism in Australia by providing opportunities, land, moneys and facilities available only to Aboriginals. Along with millions of Australians, I am fed up to the back teeth with the inequalities that are being promoted by the governments and paid for by the taxpayer under the assumption that Aboriginals are the most disadvantaged people in Australia.

Multiculturalism was also seen as a divisive and unwanted policy worthy of abolition. Hanson argued that the abolition of multiculturalism would ‘save billions of dollars’ and that Australia’s immigration policy needed to be ‘radically reviewed’ as she believed that Australia was in danger of being ‘swamped’ by Asians and that immigration ‘must be halted in the short term’ so that ‘dole queues are not added to’ (1996:3862). Hanson believed that the migrants ‘flooding’ the country were, in many cases, ‘unskilled’ and ‘not fluent in the English language’ and squeezed ‘ordinary’ Australians out of jobs. Furthermore, Hanson believed her plan to halt immigration would reduce long-term unemployment and thus ‘rescue many young and older Australians from a predicament which has become a national disgrace and crisis’. A particular concern for Hanson was the intake of Asians into the country and that Asian immigrants ‘have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate’. In one of her most poignant statements, Hanson argued that ‘if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country’ – a sentiment that would be re-visited by Prime Minister Howard in 2001 (Hanson 1996:3862). Pauline Hanson attracted significant media attention the day after her inaugural speech. Moreover, the sudden appearance of Hanson had an immediate impact on those who would later support her party. One supporter of One Nation from Victoria summarised what appealed to him when Hanson first emerged in the political debate (Berringer 2005): When Pauline first appeared it was ‘wow’ here’s someone who was saying what a lot of us were thinking. Finally someone in parliament was tuned into what ordinary Australians were thinking. She wasn’t from the ivory tower set. She was a single mum who had worked hard to get ahead in life. And I liked the way she didn’t try to sugar-coat what

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she was saying – you didn’t need to read between the lines to know what she stood for. And another thing – Pauline was easy on the eye.

Indeed, the combination of Hanson’s background, charisma and message seemed to be a potent mix. Furthermore, her assertions were not immediately repudiated by the Prime Minister, John Howard, who believed Hanson reflected the feelings of sections of the community. It is worth noting that in 1988 Howard felt that Asian immigration could be ‘slowed down a little’ and also described multiculturalism as a ‘divisive’ policy (Rubenstein 1993:153). This led some commentators to suggest that Howard was supportive of Hanson’s views (see ABC 2012).

6.3 Galvanising support and creating One Nation With growing levels of support, Hanson was approached by David Oldfield and David Ettridge with the idea of creating a political party. A Morgan poll published on 3 November 1996 had shown that a party led by Hanson would have won seven seats at a half-Senate election, or 12 seats at a full Senate election. Ettridge was a South Australian businessman who had worked in the field of promotion but had limited experience in the political sphere. He aimed to use his skills in sales and marketing to advance the Hanson ‘brand’ in Australian politics. On the other hand, Oldfield was an experienced political operator and was working for the then Minister for Workplace Relations, Tony Abbott. It was his role to give Hanson pol­ itical advice. Hanson had already started plans to create ‘Pauline Hanson’s Movement’ which would endorse like-minded candidates to stand for public office without the need to comply with Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) guidelines regarding registration (Hanson 2007:101). Oldfield and Ettridge argued against this idea on the grounds that such a movement would not be eligible for public funding during elections. This would result in missing out on significant electoral funding at an election if such high levels of support were to be achieved. After some weeks Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party was launched on 11 April 1997 in the Ipswich Civic Hall in the heart of Oxley. The party was guided by a list of 23 objectives, which began with supporting the ‘fight’ started by Pauline Hanson in her ‘efforts to bring about the necessary changes for fair and equal treatment of all Australians, within a system of government recognising and acting upon a need for Australia to be truly one nation’ (Pauline Hanson’s One Nation2003:6). The other objectives had clear links to the issues Hanson raised in her inaugural speech in parliament.

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For example, the party aimed to preserve the Australian ‘way of life’, to be strong against crime, to treat ‘all Australians equally’ with ‘government assistance based on need not race’ and to ‘re-vitalise’ the defence forces (PHON 2003:6-7). Another party objective was to ensure that Australians would have ‘reasonable access’ to firearms to ‘undertake various activities including the defence of themselves and their families in their own homes’ (Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 2003:7). Additionally the party aimed to restrict immigration, citing Australia’s ‘environment and economic concerns’ and it sought to restore tariffs, restrict foreign ownership and establish a national bank. One of the party’s core objectives was to abolish ‘divisive and discriminatory policies, such as those related to Aboriginal and multicult­ ural affairs’ and to abolish ATSIC (Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 2003:7–8). Pauline Hanson also had a crucial position in the party’s structure, which had three distinct and separate components; Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (membership) Incorporated, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (the political party), and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited. While each formed part of the broader One Nation juggernaut, they were in fact three separate legal entities. As Figure 6.1 shows, an individual became a member of the Pauline Hanson’s Support Movement upon payment of the membership fee. This was an incorporated body set up in 1997 and was the body members actually joined. The primary aim of this body was to be a non-political organisation that would provide fundraising and support the political endeavours of Hanson. Thus members were not joining the political party, but were instead joining a specifically non-political support organisation. As Figure 6.1 shows, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited was another separate entity with five subscribers: Pauline Hanson, David Ettridge, David Oldfield, Andrew Carne and Stephen Menagh. Carne had been involved in setting up the party’s membership database and Menagh was the member­ ship coordinator. This body was responsible for the man­ agement and conduct of the political party and was controlled only by these five subscribers. It was not envisaged that the general membership would eventually be part of this body. This entity was responsible for the admin­ istration and expenses of operating the political party. Figure 6.1 shows that the actual political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, which was registered as a state party in Queensland, was another separate entity. In this organisation only three members had absolute control over the body: Pauline Hanson, David Ettridge and David Oldfield. It was this body which operated the true political party at its discretion and was not hindered by dissenting rank and file members.

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Figure 6.1: The three components of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party organisation

The true form of One Nation’s organisation was constantly concealed by the party’s leaders. David Ettridge justified this approach in a letter written on 20 November 1997 to the President of the Ipswich branch. In the letter Ettridge reasoned that the party was structured in this compartmentalised manner ‘to provide protection of the political party and make each self contained entity, which if attacked by unfriendlies… not contaminate other modules’. In this letter Ettridge also gave clear directions that details of the party’s structure were not to be shared and forbade the reproduction of the letter for distribution. The architects of the party’s organisation were determined to avoid anyone outside of their immediate circle gaining insight into the party’s operation as they feared they would lose control over the party. The party’s constitution reinforced the power of Hanson, Ettridge and Old­ field. Indeed, the constitution gave them the power to expel members. While other parties also have such provisions, in One Nation, members were expelled automatically even if there was suspicion that they were working against the party, with the decision being final. This proved to be a useful mechanism that

122 | The Making of a Party System

was used by Ettridge and Oldfield to crush any dissent in the membership. As Balson (2005) recalled, the party was ‘ruled by the two Davids’ who ‘blacklisted dissidents within the party and made them outsiders’. One Nation’s policy formulation process epitomised the party’s attempt at concentrating power in the hands of a few, while isolating grassroots members from the decision-making process. Indeed this situation was ironic since, throughout her federal political life, Hanson bemoaned the lack of ‘average’ Australians’ influence on the policies of the major parties. When One Nation was launched, Hanson’s rhetoric suggested that the party operated with a participatory ethos as stated on the party’s website (Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 2004): The input of ordinary Australians from all walks of life drives our policies. We have travelled across Australia asking ordinary people what they want from Government, how should we spend your money, what can we do to make your lives better? We then develop policies to fit. It isn’t rocket science, just plain common sense.

In reality, however, rank and file members, of which there were approx­ imately 20,000 to 25,000 (see Ward 2000:91), were superfluous in One Nation’s process of determining policy. The responsibility for determining and revising national policy was given to the National Executive – a body dominated by Hanson, Oldfield and Ettridge. This was in conflict with the party’s participatory rhetoric. One nation’s policy formulation process is presented in Figure 6.2. One Nation’s National Executive was responsible for determining and revising the party’s national policy. As Figure 6.2 shows, the National Executive would consult with an Advisory Committee to undertake this task. Rank and file members of the party could submit recommendations on policy to the Advisory Committee. However, the Advisory Committee comprised the entire National Executive, in addition to the National Director, National Advisor and the state presidents and directors of each division. Rank and file members could be nominated by the National Executive, but otherwise there was no representation by ordinary members. As a result, rank and file members were actually kept at arm’s length from the policy formulation process. The membership of the National Executive did not include the party’s parliamentarians according to the constitution. However, the details of the party’s structure seemed to be of little concern to the influx of new members who joined the party, especially as it mobilised to contest its first ever election – the Queensland state election – in 1998.

Chapter 6 | 123

Figure 6.2: Policy making in One Nation Note: consultation with the Policy Advisory Committee was only at the pleasure of the National Executive.

In evaluating the development of One Nation, it is important to note that Hanson had indicated that she wanted to have an extra-parliamentary support wing shortly after entering parliament. The decision to create a political party however was at the behest of Oldfield and Ettridge. Their decision to create the party was influenced by the availability of public election funding. One Nation’s organisation placed Hanson at its core and marginalised the broader membership. This meant that Oldfield, Ettridge and Hanson had extensive powers in the organisation. The party’s structure and operation appeared to act as a vehicle for Hanson to advance her political aspirations.

6.4 A false dawn: One Nation and the 1998 Queensland state election The party’s performance at the Queensland election signalled Pauline Hanson’s One Nation was capable of winning a significant portion of votes and seats in parliament, even under a preferential voting system. As Table 6.2 shows, the party performed very strongly and won almost 23 per cent of the statewide primary vote, second only to the ALP’s primary vote of 38.9 per cent. Although the ALP suffered a swing of 4 per cent, it was able to hold on to all its seats. The parties that were most affected by One Nation’s emergence were the Liberal and National parties. As Table 6.2 shows, both parties lost a significant portion of their primary vote and lost six seats each.

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Table 6.2: Result of the 1998 Queensland state election Seats won

Change in seats

Party

Primary vote (%)

Swing (%)

ALP

38.9

-4.0

44

0

Liberal Party

16.1

-6.6

9

-6

Nationals

15.2

-11.1

23

-6

One Nation

22.7

(+22.7)

11

(+11)

Greens

2.4

-0.5

0

0

Democrats

1.6

+0.3

0

0

Others

2.8

-0.4

2

+1

Sources: Newman 1998; elections.uwa.edu.au

One Nation’s strongest performance was in rural and regional seats where its primary vote was just under 30 per cent. In the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast regions the party’s primary vote was 23 per cent, while its weakest performance was in the metropolitan region of Brisbane, where its vote was just under 17 per cent. These Queensland results suggested that the Coalition, in particular the National Party, was under siege from the nascent One Nation Party. It also showed that the Coalition could lose govern­ment at a federal level if such results were replicated at the national level, especially since private polling showed 49 per cent of voters in some rural New South Wales seats intended to vote for One Nation (cited in Kingston 1999:xvii). The Prime Minister, however, continually refused to comment on Paul­ ine Hanson – a tactic that Liberal Party headquarters regarded as the only effective way to deal with the new threat. As the party’s Director at the time, Lynton Crosby, argued, to make comment on Hanson was to give her the ‘oxygen of publicity which was essential to her survival’ (Crosby 1998). But the Liberal Party seemed deeply divided over the Hanson threat. The party’s Federal Director Andrew Robb made it clear that his party would put One Nation last. The Prime Minister, however, appeared hesitant to deprive One Nation of preferences. But following One Nation’s strong Queensland election, and trends in public polling that continued to show One Nation posed an electoral threat to the government, Prime Minister Howard urged the state divisions of the Liberal Party to put One Nation last. Clearly, the key legacy of the Queensland election was that the Liberal and National Parties did finally decide to put One Nation last. The Liberal Party in Victoria was one of the first divisions to do so. In directing its preferences to

Chapter 6 | 125

Labor before One Nation, a senior administrative figure from the Victorian division of the Liberal Party boasted that ‘it was surprising how well the major parties worked together’ to all but eliminate the One Nation threat. Labor, on the other hand, had vowed to put One Nation last when the party first emerged.

6.5 One Nation and the 1998 federal election With the party having won parliamentary representation in Queensland, there was an expectation that One Nation could win a number of Senate seats in 1998. Before the official election campaign began, many One Nation supporters believed the party would re-create the success in Queensland and win a significant number of seats in the federal parliament. As one Queenslander who voted for One Nation outlined (Charleson 2005): We saw Howard and Labor talk about the GST. I said to them [other One Nation supporters] ‘they’ve left the door open for us – they haven’t learnt that ordinary Australians want a back-to-basics approach about creating jobs and protecting jobs’. I really felt the major parties had ignored what Hanson had stood for and they’d pay for it. I was confident we’d pick up seats left, right and centre.

In the House of Representatives, the party fielded 135 candidates in 148 seats as well as contesting the Senate in all jurisdictions, with David Oldfield standing as the party’s lead Senate candidate in New South Wales. The focus of the campaign, however, was on Pauline Hanson who chose to contest the lower house seat of Blair (which covered parts of Oxley) that was created following an electoral redistribution by the AEC. Her decision to contest a lower house seat, rather than stand for the Senate, showed the confidence within the party at the time, as Hanson believed she could win the new seat. There was also an element of what appeared to be naivety in Hanson’s decision. As Hanson (1998a) explained, standing for the Senate would diminish her standing as the party’s leader: …the first rule of leadership is to lead by example and therefore never to ask someone to do what you won’t do yourself. I could not reasonably expect candidates all over Australia to stand in the lower house without facing that fight myself.

Hanson kept the party’s 1998 campaign focused on the key issues of im­ migration and enhancing the prosperity of ordinary Australians. Hanson

126 | The Making of a Party System

(1998b) also campaigned on the issue of race and Aboriginal welfare in 1998 and argued that the result of the 1967 referendum would be different, had voters been aware of the ‘reverse discrimination’ it would cause. She argued that ‘Aboriginal people… do not have a monopoly on being disadvantaged’ and called for more holistic welfare programs (Hanson 1998b). Hanson continued to lobby for the abolition of Australian and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), calling for an inquiry into its operation. In fact, Hanson claimed that she would resign from parliament if an investigation found the organisation free from corruption (Hanson 1998c). Pauline Hanson reaffirmed her party’s opposition to multiculturalism and promised to implement a ‘zero nett gain [sic]’ immigration policy with the prospect of deporting criminals back to their country of origin (Hanson 1998d). Throughout the campaign Hanson focused on the effects of the Coalition’s policies reducing protection to primary producers and the threat it posed to average Australians. In an attempt to position the party as a champion for rural and regional areas Hanson (1998e) claimed the party would ‘always promote policies that look after Australian industries and the Australian people’ and that ‘the day of the ballot box is coming’. As a result of trends revealed in the Queensland state election, Hanson targeted rural and regional seats in Queensland and New South Wales. These states had shown strong support for the party and Hanson pursued the key themes of economic protectionism at a time of globalisation and economic rationalisation. The bulk of these visits were in the form of town meetings held in civic halls. These meetings were less organised and more frequent than those held by the major parties. This was an attempt by One Nation to highlight that it valued the contribution of grassroots community members more than the major parties did. Indeed, this was an extension of the party’s populist rhetoric regarding the importance of involving ordinary Australians in the political process. As a Queenslander who voted for One Nation recalled (Darnell 2005): Town hall meetings were fun. I’d go to there and see hundreds of people that had never ever been to any political event in their life. You could see these people were pissed off with the big parties… and they relished the chance to see and speak to Hanson who made the effort to visit their local area.

Even some meetings outside Queensland and New South Wales attracted in excess of a thousand people. For example, approximately 1,200 people attended a town meeting in the electorate of Brand, the seat held by Labor

Chapter 6 | 127

leader Kim Beazley in Western Australia. Private data showed that One Nation was polling 46 per cent of the primary vote in the seat and Hanson (1998g) forecasted that ‘Beazley will lose his seat’ to her new party. In Sale, Victoria, a public meeting of the party attracted approximately 1000 people. Further private polling after this meeting showed that One Nation’s support increased in Victoria. This led Hanson (1998g) to claim that the party ‘will pick up some seats in Victoria’ and that One Nation had ‘some (Victorian) MPs running scared’. Another important feature of One Nation’s campaign was that Hanson was building a narrative that the National Party had abandoned rural and regional areas in its quest to maintain its coalition with the Liberal Party. This affected the National Party, as it did not produce an effective strategy to combat Hanson. In turn, this lifted One Nation’s support in seats held by the National Party and Hanson began to foresee electoral success. One Nation invested significant resources into the seat of Farrer, held by National Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer. Polling by One Nation showed that Fischer’s support had been halved to just 33 per cent and its own primary vote had risen to 26 per cent. Hanson (1998g) believed that Fischer would ‘need our [One Nation’s] preferences’ to win but did not ‘fancy his chances’ of getting the preferences as the party remained committed to defeating him. While Hanson and her One Nation Party attracted significant media attention, the policy debate during the election campaign revolved around an issue on which Hanson had not previously focused – taxation reform. The Coalition advocated a GST, something that had been rejected by the electorate in 1993. Labor also campaigned on tax reform and opposed the plans for a GST. In a decision that would have electoral ramifications for the party, Hanson attempted to boost her party’s economic credentials and engaged in the debate over taxation and economic policy. At the heart of the party’s economic policy was the Easytax proposal. Under this system all taxes, including income tax, would be abolished and be replaced by a flat, 2 per cent tax. Furthermore, Easytax would limit annual tax returns to a ‘simple, single page that will be able to be completed without the assistance of taxation specialists’ (Hanson 1998f). Launching the plan at a press conference, Hanson deflected criticisms by arguing that the system had not been implemented ‘anywhere in the world… so actually, it has not failed anywhere’ (cited in Kingston 1999:13). The policy, however, seemed to be rushed and superficially composed. These sentiments were reinforced by the party’s inability to provide estimates on the cost of the new tax policy.

128 | The Making of a Party System

This haphazard approach to economic policy became a hallmark of One Nation’s 1998 campaign. Rather than focus on the issues of race and immigration as it had at its emergence, the party was drawn into a debate on economic policy with the major parties. For example, the party proposed to establish a ‘people’s bank’ to allow farmers to take out loans at an interest rate of 2 per cent. David Ettridge claimed that such a bank would be funded by government printing more money – a proposal that Hanson rebuked in a hastily convened news conference in which she publicly reprimanded Ettridge for his comments. Such events damaged Hanson’s credibility and worked in favour of the Liberal and National Parties. Indeed, opinion polls showed a marked decline in the party’s support levels after the Easytax debacle. Newspoll also showed that voter satisfaction with the Prime Minister rose from 28 per cent to 44 per cent after One Nation outlined its Easytax proposal. The party’s appeal to rural and regional voters was also undermined with the National Farmer’s Federation branding the Easytax policy a ‘disaster for all sectors of the economy, especially agriculture’ (cited in Davey 2000:77). The persona of being an anti-system figure, outside mainstream politics, had attracted many voters to Hanson, but One Nation’s attempt at broadening the party’s policy net became a weakness rather than an asset for the party. This was seen as a defining moment by some One Nation supporters. One Queenslander who voted for the party argued (Darnell 2005): She [Hanson] was doing so well against the big boys [major parties] when she talked about the problems we have in the bush. We thought we’d finally get some MPs with backbones who’d fight the good fight against the big corporates. Then she went on about this taxation business and talked about printing money. I mean, what were they thinking? It just side-tracked the debate and made her a laughing stock.

Another One Nation supporter from New South Wales also saw the taxation debate as having undermined Hanson and her party (Ellison 2005a): We knew she [Hanson] wasn’t a pollie like the others. She had a few rough edges, but that’s what we liked about her. She talked about things that affected us, average Australians trying to keep our jobs at a time when every other party wanted to sell us out for the sake of economic theories. She should have… avoided talking about tax… and kept talking about her solutions to our daily problems. When she talked about tax she became just another politician wanting a new tax system.

Chapter 6 | 129

Despite starting the 1998 campaign with significant electoral support, One Nation’s popularity began to decline as the campaign progressed. The party’s attempts of diversifying the range of issues it campaigned on played a part in its electoral decline. Rather than focus on the original issues of race and immigration, which had garnered her so much support, Hanson had decided to take on the Howard Government on tax reform, but did so with a ‘rough idea’ in the form of Easytax, rather than a thorough, costed policy proposal.36 This undermined Hanson’s support as it challenged the perception of her being an anti-system figure. Furthermore, by focusing on taxation, One Nation also appeared to be a mainstream party. These factors weakened One Nation’s support at the 1998 election, the results of which are shown in Table 6.3. Table 6.3: One Nation’s primary vote in the 1998 Senate election Jurisdiction National NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT

Vote (%) Seats

9.0

1

Vote (%)

9.6

Vote (%)

4.1

Vote (%)

14.8

Vote (%)

10.4

Vote (%)

9.7

Vote (%)

3.8

Vote (%)

4.9

Vote (%)

9.3

Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats

NT

1998

Seats

0 0 1 0 0 0 0

0

Sources: Parliamentary Handbook 1999; elections.uwa.edu.au

36 Hanson later explained that she had chosen the Easytax policy over other tax plans because it ‘lowered bread prices’ (see Kingston 1999:109).

130 | The Making of a Party System

Despite One Nation’s declining support, the party performed very strongly in the Senate, winning 9 per cent of the national primary vote (see Table 6.3). This was a remarkable achievement for the nascent party. Yet the Table also shows that the party failed to secure a representational outcome commensurate with its strong performance. Its one Senate seat was in Queensland where the party’s lead candidate Heather Hill won over a quota. In Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales, One Nation won 0.73, 0.68 and 0.67 of the quota respectively. However, the party failed to win Senate seats because of the decision made by the major parties to put One Nation last in their preference lists on their GVTs. Rather than being in a position of absorbing preferences, One Nation distributed preferences, resulting in the election of other candidates at their expense. In Western Australia, One Nation lodged a split ticket that distributed its preferences to either major party – something it also did in New South Wales. In South Australia the party lodged a tri-split ticket, which directed preferences to the Liberal, National and Labor parties. One Nation reserved its lower preferences for the Democrats and the Greens in all states. By comparison, the party’s performances in Victoria and Tasmania were poor as it won 4.1 and 3.8 per cent of the primary vote respectively. Indeed, these states differed from those in which One Nation performed strongly, especially in terms of their rural and regional constituency (also see Goot and Watson 2001). The party’s performance in the territories was also patchy. In the Northern Territory it won over 9 per cent of the primary vote (or 0.28 of a quota); whereas in the Australian Capital Territory, the party won less than 5 per cent of the primary vote (0.15 of a quota). The 1998 election showed that Hanson had succeeded in garnering electoral support from the states where she had focused on campaigning. The election results also indicated that Hanson had gained the support of voters whom she wished to represent, especially from rural and regional areas in New South Wales and Queensland. Indeed, Hanson had successfully acted as a lightning rod to many voters in these areas who were disillusioned with the major parties, especially the Coalition. The lack of preferences from the major parties, however, meant that One Nation could win only one Queensland Senate seat.

6.6 From Hill to Harris: a Senate controversy One Nation’s success in Queensland was challenged by the revelation that its senator-elect Heather Hill had not renounced her British citizenship. In

Chapter 6 | 131

fact, Hill was a dual citizen of Australia and Britain. Seizing upon this, and the precedent set by the disqualification of the NDP’s Robert Wood, the defeated National Party senator Bill O’Chee challenged Hill’s election in the High Court.37 In preparing her defence Hill argued that her citizenship status would not have been queried if she had an Asian background. Since Section 44 of the Constitution states that candidates must be an Australian citizen and have renounced former citizenship, the High Court decided 4–3 against Hill and disqualified her.38 As a result Len Harris, who was the party’s second-placed candidate, replaced Hill. In similar circumstances to the NDP in 1987, Harris agreed to ‘hold the fort’ and resign from the Senate to allow Hill to become the party’s senator when she had sorted her citizenship status. But just before the final re-count to confirm Harris as the elected senator a meeting took place between Hanson, Hill and Harris. During this meeting Hanson urged Harris to surrender the Senate seat and allow her to become the party’s senator. In what was a tense meeting, Harris refused to relinquish his seat and was subsequently declared elected on 2 July 1999. The start of Harris’ time in the Senate coincided with organisational upheaval for One Nation. A former candidate of the party, Terry Sharples, called into question the party’s ‘unique’ structure by commencing action in the Queensland Supreme Court. He argued that the party’s structure did not conform to legal requirements and therefore was not entitled to election funding. Amidst this action the Minister for Workplace Relations, Tony Abbott, set up a trust fund named Australians for Honest Politics, raising close to $100,000. The purpose of this fund was to pay for legal action against One Nation. While Sharples’ case gained momentum, One Nation in Queensland plunged deeper into crisis as all 11 parliamentarians resigned from the party and created the City Country Alliance. The new party aimed to be more inclusionary than One Nation as the parliamentarians rejected the heavy handed, top-down approach of the party. One of the key organisational members of the new party was Heather Hill, the disqualified One Nation senator who had begun work as an adviser to Len Harris. She publicly spoke out against David Oldfield and claimed that One Nation was missing hundreds of thousands of dollars, hinting that fraudulent acts had been committed by those in the party’s organisation (see Balson 2000a). In 37 Robert Wood had single citizenship of the United Kingdom. 38 For a critique of this judgement see, for example, Mackerras, M. 1999 Letter to The Canberra Times, 8 July 1999.

132 | The Making of a Party System

response, Senator Harris dismissed Hill – a decision encouraged by Pauline Hanson. But the damage was already done. In August 1999 the Supreme Court found that One Nation had been fraudulently registered and had fraud­ ulently received electoral funding. Coupled with this was the fact that One Nation’s membership was haemorrhaging as swathes of branches left the party to join the City Country Alliance. Hanson and Harris went to branch meetings in an attempt to appease the dissenting members. However, most of these meetings ended in farce as both stormed out of the discussions claiming that branches were trying to ‘railroad’ them (see, for example, Sommerfield 2000). The party’s loss of members was almost as fast as the rate in which it attracted them in the first place. This period also signalled the end of the ruling triumvirate of Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield. Oldfield had already moved away from the party’s organisation when he won parlia­ mentary representation in the New South Wales Legislative Council in 1999. Ettridge resigned from the party to pursue private sector interests, but also worked with Oldfield to create two new political parties in New South Wales – the No GST party and the No Nuclear Waste party. Oldfield and Ettridge were able to circumvent the membership requirements of the Electoral Commission to create these new parties as Oldfield was a sitting parliamentarian. However, according to some commentators, the motivation to create these parties had more to do with financial reward, rather than policy (see Coorey 2000:23).

6.7 One Nation in the Senate: unfulfilled expectations Aside from the controversy that surrounded Len Harris’ election to the Senate, the party faced the problem of meeting its constituency’s expectations, especially in terms of having an effect on the decisions of government. One former One Nation supporter from Victoria argued that many supporters saw the party’s role in the Senate as being to advance the party’s agenda and influence government policy (Franks 2005): We knew that just one spot in the Senate was not enough to change everything the government did. But we did hope that he [Len Harris] could get under the skin of the big boys and really stand up for what all One Nation supporters believed in – that it was high time gov­ ernment stopped pampering minorities at the expense of average Australians.

Chapter 6 | 133

However, there was growing frustration among some One Nation voters and members who had originally supported the party as it promised to focus more on representing average Australians in parliament. As one Queensland One Nation voter stated, it was hoped that the government would bargain with One Nation to pass legislation that would result in the party being able to shape legislation (Gregson 2005). When One Nation did not have as much influence on the legislative debate, there were two identifiable stages of supporters’ attitudes towards the party in the Senate. The first stage blamed the major parties for not giving Harris a ‘fair go’. Indeed, the challenge for Harris was that opportunities to speak in the Senate were at a premium, as he was in competition for time with all political parties and independents in the chamber. A One Nation supporter argued that the party’s opportunities to participate in policy debate were being limited by the major parties (Darnell 2005): After the first six months [of One Nation in the Senate], we came to the realisation that we weren’t getting a fair go by the big parties. They seemed to have just locked Len Harris out of making a meaningful contribution in the Senate. You could see they just hated us being there.

The reality for the party was that the Senate dealt with an eclectic collection of issues, many of which had not been the focus of One Nation. Further­ more, Harris’ position was not strategically crucial, since the Democrats could wield the balance of power in the Senate between the 1998 and 2001 elections. As a result, Harris had to balance the expectations of party sup­ porters against the reality of working within the established Senate system. Making it more difficult for One Nation was the fact that Harris had no experience in the parliamentary system, and neither did his staff. However, Harris demonstrated that the party was could operate in parliament. The first bill that he introduced was for an Act to alter the constitution so that proportional representation would be used to elect senators. He later became a member of the Senate Legislative Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, and had input into the committee’s work on issues to do with the Australian meat and livestock industry. Despite this legislative work, many members felt that Harris was still having minimal effect on government policy and highlighted the problems of an anti-system party becoming a part of the system. This led to the second stage of supporters’ attitudes towards the party in the Senate; frustration with the party’s senator. As time went on, some

134 | The Making of a Party System

supporters felt that Harris was ineffective in advancing the party’s platform in the chamber. As one partisan activist from New South Wales commented (Ellison 2005b): Early on we thought it was all just the big parties ganging up on us. Then we realised that Len wasn’t helping either. Some of this was Len’s fault. He wasn’t really a charismatic guy and I think he struggled to get attention because of that.

Another partisan activist from Queensland argued (Harolds 2005): I don’t know why he just couldn’t stand up and say something! Australia was being sold off, jobs were gone and our way of life was going and he just couldn’t do anything. I wanted him to do well, but I soon realised that our chance had gone.

Furthermore, some of the party’s supporters believed that Harris had crossed a significant threshold, which stopped him from serving the party’s best interests. Clearly, some supporters implied that Harris had abandoned the party in pursuit of his own financial goals. A partisan activist from New South Wales argued (Ingleman 2005): …he was one of us before he got into the Senate. He wanted to stop the government from ripping the heart out of this country. When he got in, he became just like all the others. He was also getting a good salary… I wouldn’t be surprised… if I was in his position and saw the money I’d probably say thanks and ‘stuff you all’…

Indeed, Harris struggled to draw attention to the party’s performance in the Senate for a number of reasons. First was the fact that Pauline Hanson regularly overshadowed the party’s actions in the Senate – and especially the presence of Len Harris – even though she remained outside the parliament. Accompanying this was the fact that One Nation was unravelling. Also, One Nation’s role in the Senate was marginalised, since it did not hold the balance of power in the chamber. Another reason Harris was struggling to gain attention in the Senate was that in May 2000, some 10 months into his term, he was diagnosed with Legionnaire’s disease. This resulted in him taking extended periods of leave. Unfortunately Harris could not make a full recovery and was battling relapses of the disease during the early years of his term in the Senate. This compounded the problems faced by One Nation as it prepared to contest the 2001 federal election.

Chapter 6 | 135

6.8 One Nation unravelling: 2001–2013 Prior to the 2001 federal election, One Nation contested the Western Australian state election held in February. In response to the major parties’ preference decisions in previous years, One Nation put all sitting members last on its how-to-vote cards. This was a significant election as the party won almost 10 per cent of the primary vote and three seats in the upper house. Clearly, these results showed that One Nation could still be an electoral threat, especially to the Coalition. In fact, One Nation’s preferences were crucial to a number of Labor candidates defeating Liberal incumbents. Indeed, these results played a significant role in Labor’s election victory and also energised One Nation, as there was a sense among its members that the party could win further Senate representation in the federal election later in the year. Despite the encouraging results in Western Australia, One Nation’s extraparliamentary problems escalated during 2001 and the party had become a diminished force by the time of the election in November. In addition to the significant portions of its membership that followed its former Queensland parliamentarians to the City Country Alliance, many members had just given up on the party. The main reason was that many members felt that they were being ignored by Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield. One partisan activist from New South Wales (Ellison 2005b) commented: As a member you’d try to make a positive contribution to the party but the way it was set up, and the way these guys ran it, just didn’t allow anyone to have any impact. If you disagreed with something their attitude was ‘our way or the high way’. There’s only so much of that attitude you can take. I know heaps of people who left the party because of this.

But the circumstances of the election – in which asylum seekers and the War on Terror were critical issues – were close to the core issues of race and immigration, which the party had originally pursued. This allowed the party – especially Hanson – to become a regular contributor to the political debate. By this stage, however, the Howard Government had regained this ground from the far right. For example, in a speech on immigration, Prime Minister Howard argued that only the Australian Government would ‘decide who comes to this country’ and the circumstances in which they would come.39 This clearly echoed Hanson’s views on immigration that she had aired in her inaugural speech in 1996. 39 Howard made this statement at the Liberal Party’s campaign launch on 29 October 2001.

136 | The Making of a Party System

By reclaiming the policy debate, the Howard Government mitigated the One Nation threat in 2001. As Table 6.4 shows, One Nation’s overall performance was weaker as its national primary vote fell to 5.5 per cent, compared to 9 per cent in 1998. The party’s performances continued the pattern of support in 1998. For example, the party’s weakest states were Victoria and Tasmania where it won just 2.5 and 3.3 per cent respectively. Its strongest state was again Queensland where Hanson stood as the party’s lead candidate and won 10 per cent of the primary vote. Despite winning over 0.70 of a quota in Queensland, the lack of preferences from the major parties meant that Hanson could not win a Senate seat in 2001.The party’s performances in Western Australia and New South Wales were also relatively strong, winning 5.9 and 5.6 per cent respectively. Table 6.4: One Nation primary vote (%) Senate seats won in elections, 2001–2013 National

Vote Seats

NSW

Vote

VIC

Vote

Seats

WA

5.5

1.7

0.4

0.6

0.5

1.9

0.4

0.6

1.2*

0

0

5.6

0

0

0

0

0 0

0 0

0.01

Vote

10

3.1 (4.5)

0.2 (4.2)

0.9#

0.55#

Seats

0

0

0

Vote

5.9

2.5

1

0.6

4.6

1

0.6

0.5

3.3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2.2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Vote Seats Vote Seats

NT

2013

0.4

Seats

ACT

2010

0.4

Vote

TAS

2007

0.7

Seats SA

2004

2.5

Seats QLD (Pauline Hanson)

2001

0

0

0 (0)

0 0 0 0

Vote

4.7

Seats

0

0

0 (0)

0 0

N/A N/A

N/A

N/A

0 0

N/A N/A

N/A

N/A

#



Hanson did not contest these elections in Queensland.

*

Hanson stood as the party’s lead candidate.

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission; elections.uwa.edu.au

0

0 0

N/A N/A

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

0.3 0

N/A N/A

N/A

N/A

Chapter 6 | 137

In 2001 One Nation took a different approach to preference wheeling and dealing when it conceded it would not receive the major parties’ preferences. The party put all sitting members last – a tactic it employed in the Western Australian state election held in early 2001. Some members of One Nation saw that this tactic could also cause a change of government at the federal level (Oldfield 2001). And, despite the party’s poor performance, Hanson claimed credit for influencing the policy decisions of the major parties at the 2001 election, especially both parties’ ‘hard line’ on asylum seekers. The party’s 2001 electoral outcome triggered another round of organ­ isational instability. The internal bickering which had plagued the party since 2000 had made Hanson’s position untenable and she resigned from all positions in early 2002. Despite her resignation, Hanson still featured prominently in the broader political debate – more so than her former party’s sole senator, Len Harris. Armed with the experience of operating in the Senate gained during the first half of his term, Harris began the second half by working more closely with the established Senate systems. Indeed, Harris worked with former Labor Senator Shane Murphy, former Democrats leader Meg Lees and independent Brian Harradine in an attempt to influence policy in the Senate. For example, they negotiated with the government on the proposed deregulation of media ownership laws in 2003. When the government failed to accommodate their views, all four senators voted as a bloc against the government. This was clearly a shift in the party’s position in the Senate – it had become more assertive in terms of trying to influence policy. However, this did not placate Harris’ critics from within the party. As one supporter described it, Harris should ‘have been doing this sort of thing from the start’ (Darnell 2005). Meanwhile, Pauline Hanson was attracting even greater interest within the wider community. In 2003 the Queensland Supreme Court sentenced her and David Ettridge to three years in prison for fraudulently registering One Nation and receiving election funding. There was significant public reaction to her sentence, with some popular media outlets criticising its severity.40 Hanson and Ettridge were later successful in appealing their convictions and were released two-and-a-half months later.41 But these events placed even greater focus on Pauline Hanson while marginalising the impact Len Harris was trying to make on policy. For example, Harris had 40 One of Hanson’s most vocal supporters at this time was radio presenter Alan Jones who gave the issue much media coverage during Hanson’s time in prison. 41 During her time in prison Hanson knitted babies’ jumpers, one of which was sold at auction for $2,500 to a One Nation supporter.

138 | The Making of a Party System

become part of the committee examining the free trade agreement between Australia and the United States. His position on the committee dovetailed well with his party’s apparent opposition to free trade arrangements and their effect on sections of the Australian labour force. However, Harris attended only four of at least 13 hearings of the committee, which led to some commentators ridiculing the senator (see Ramsey, 2004). Despite this, Harris opposed the free trade agreement and recommended that Australia pursue more protectionist policies (see Senate Select Committee 2004). By this stage however One Nation’s membership had declined sharply and once-enthusiastic supporters had become apathetic towards the party’s role in the Senate. As one supporter summarised (Ellison 2005b), it was ‘too little, too late’. Hanson continued to overshadow her party’s presence in the Senate and by 2004 she had decided to have yet another attempt at a parliamentary career by standing as an independent Senate candidate at the 2004 federal election in Queensland. Her decision to do so after her incarceration was the focus of much media interest, which she gained at the expense of One Nation’s presence in the Senate in the period leading up to the election. In fact, at the 2004 election, as Table 6.4 shows, Hanson won 4.5 per cent of the primary vote compared to just 3.1 per cent of One Nation. Furthermore, as Table 6.4 again shows, the 2004 election was a disaster for One Nation as it suffered the effects of its crumbling organisation and the absence of its charismatic leader. The major parties also continued their tradition of placing the party last in the flow of preferences. As an indication of the extent of the party’s decline, it failed to field candidates in Tasmania and the two Territories and its national vote had slumped to 1.7 per cent. As well, the party’s highest primary vote was in Queensland, at just over 3 per cent.42 As Economou (2006) noted, Hanson’s candidacy split the One Nation vote and played a significant role in the election of Liberal senator, Russell Trood and Nationals senator, Barnaby Joyce. Indeed, One Nation’s flow of preferences ultimately advantaged the Coalition and ensured it won a majority in the Senate. Despite the party’s loss, some One Nation supporters saw the 2004 result as a vindication of the party’s beliefs. As one partisan activist commented (Harold 2005):

42 But even in Queensland, the party was unravelling. Len Harris was to launch the party’s campaign in northern Queensland but failed to appear, after promising the party’s candidates he would do so.

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It would have been good to see Len get back into the Senate, but by this stage our job was done. Both parties had responded to people’s concerns about immigration and protecting our way of life. We had won.

Despite this sense of achievement, when the party contested the 2007 election it recorded results worse than in 2004. As Table 6.4 shows, the party’s national primary vote was 0.4 per cent and the party failed to win over 1 per cent in any state. Once again One Nation missed out on the major parties’ preferences as the party decayed further. Pauline Hanson, on the other hand, continued to perform strongly as she launched her new party called the United Australia Party.43 Hanson’s decision to be the representative of a party was influenced (much like Jo Vallentine’s decision in the 1987 election) to appear above the ballot paper’s black line rather than as an ungrouped independent. This yielded electoral rewards as she outpolled One Nation by winning 4.2 per cent of the primary vote and $213,000 in electoral funding.44 The party contested the 2010 election but, as Table 6.4 shows, won just 0.6 per cent of the national primary vote. While slightly higher than its 2007 result, the party failed to win parliamentary representation and remained a marginal player in the political debate. In 2013, however, there was a sense of reconciliation as Hanson returned to the party she had created. Moreover, she stood as the party’s lead Senate candidate in New South Wales and won 1.2 per cent of the statewide vote. While Hanson attracted the preferences of the bulk of minor parties, she was unable to win Senate representation and One Nation remained without Senate representation.

6.9 Conclusion: One Nation – a model issue-competitive, right-populist party Hanson’s policies on race, immigration and the economy were consistent with what had been identified as ‘right-wing populism’ by researchers familiar with such politics in Europe and the United States. As Betz (1998:4) argued, providing a concise and universally accepted definition of populist politics was difficult. Instead, he identified ‘core elements’ of populism including a 43 The new United Australia Party was not the re-emergence of the UAP which had existed through the 1930s and 1940s. 44 Indeed, Hanson’s public profile had risen even further by the time of the 2007 election as it followed her appearance on the popular television series Dancing with the Stars. As Margo Kingston (2007) argued, by 2007 Hanson had become a ‘rolled gold celebrity’.

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‘pronounced faith in the common sense of the ordinary people’, that ‘simple solutions exist for the most complex problems of the modern world’, and that ‘the common people, despite possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom, have been denied the opportunity to make themselves heard’. Hainsworth (2000:11,13) identified ‘immigration politics and welfare chauvinism’ as ‘important vote-winners’ for right-wing populist candidates in addition to issues relating to unemployment and insecurity. On reflecting on the rightpopulist candidates in the United States and Europe, Hainsworth (2000:10) identified ‘immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees’ as being portrayed as ‘privileged individuals, jumping the queues ahead of the nation’s citizens and benefiting disproportionately from affirmative action programmes’. Indeed, the right-populist candidate would seek to conflate debates about immigration and national security while trying to appear as a protector of national identity and culture. However, it is the right-populist candidate’s response to ‘fix’ these areas, which adds another dimension to their presence in the political system. In particular, such candidates argued that ‘mainstream and establishment forces’ had ‘failed’ society and that they offered ‘new’ and allegedly ‘straight­ forward alternative politics’ (Hainsworth 2000:14). As Betz (1993:413–4) summarised, right-populist candidates appeal to xenophobia and combined a classic ‘liberal position on the individual and the economy with the sociopolitical agenda of the extreme and intellectual new right, and they deliver this amalgam to those disenchanted with their individual life chances and the political system’. Right-populist parties also had peculiar structural arrangements with a charismatic leader at their core. While right-wing populist leaders could galvanise supporters and strengthen their party, the organisation would be brittle, built as it was primarily around the individual politician. As Ignazi (1996:552) put it, a charismatic politician was the most important feature of such new parties as ‘no formal organization existed before or beyond the leader: the party is “insignificant” vis-a-vis the leader’. One Nation can be seen in the Australian party system to have been an issue-competitive, right-populist party. It originally advocated a specific policy platform which focused on race and immigration and the apparent decline of ‘average’ Australians, especially in terms of economic and social prosperity. Its success had much to do with the charisma of Pauline Hanson, who acted as the lightening rod to voters who felt disenfranchised by the major parties. Indeed, Hanson began to galvanise support form sections of the community who found her charisma and populist views appealing. She

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continued to garner support by focusing on issues of race, immigration and the decline of average Australians by paying particular attention to issues affecting rural and regional areas. Like other right-populist parties, One Nation’s structure was brittle as it was built around its leader. This organisational approach contributed to the party’s eventual demise. By making grassroots members superfluous Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield hoped to maintain absolute control over the party’s actions. While they succeeded for some time, the subsequent reaction against their rule caused the party to disintegrate. Electorally, One Nation performed most strongly in the first state and federal elections it contested in 1998. Indeed, its strong performance in the Queensland state election demonstrated that it was a threat to the Coalition. In response, the Coalition followed Labor’s lead and placed One Nation last on its GVT at the federal level. This lack of preferences stopped the party from winning more seats than it did in 1998. The decision to engage with the major parties on the issue of taxation reform in 1998 however shifted One Nation’s focus away from the issues on which it originally mobilised. Rather than broaden the party’s support, this reduced the party’s popularity and undermined Hanson’s position as an anti-system politician. The party faced another challenge however after winning Senate repres­ entation. It attempted to transition from being an anti-system political party to becoming part of the system. When the party was an outsider, it highlighted the failings of successive governments externally from the established political institutions. It was able to do this effectively as the party was spearheaded by Hanson, a charismatic leader who presented relatively simple solutions to complex problems – features of right-populist politics. However when the party was represented in the Senate, it became an insider. While in parliament One Nation’s problems were compounded by the dispute concerning senator-elect Heather Hill’s citizenship status – Hill was later replaced by Len Harris in the Senate. As the foregoing discussion outlined, there were great expectations about how the party would use its role in the Senate to influence government decisions. However, these expectations were rarely realised, as Senator Len Harris had to operate within the established Senate system and its associated procedural boundaries. This was a source of disappointment to many of the party’s supporters. As one partisan activist put it (Charles 2005): After winning a Senate seat the question was ‘what did the party do to change the things it wanted to change?’ The answer was ‘nothing’. The

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party was getting more coverage when it was outside of the Senate, led by Hanson.

Indeed, Len Harris’s position was made difficult by One Nation’s organ­ isational failings and the constant dominance of Pauline Hanson’s presence in the public debate. The party’s role in the Senate was also marginal as it had only one seat. This reduced its bargaining power with the major parties. Indeed, One Nation was not a party that was suited to the Senate – something which voters identified as they abandoned the party in later elections. However, Pauline Hanson continued to attract support from the elec­ torate, even after she had left One Nation. In fact, as discussed above, she outpolled her old party by standing as a Senate candidate in Queensland in 2004 and 2007 and boosted the party’s primary vote when she returned to the fold in 2013. This reaffirms the notion that a significant portion of One Nation voters were attracted to the party because of Hanson. But this also suggests that perhaps Hanson could have remained an influential figure in Australian politics as an independent with some extra-parliamentary sup­ port as she originally planned to do so before being associated with Ettridge and Oldfield who led her to create One Nation.

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Cha pte r 7

From Klemzig to Canberra: Family First and religious politics The 2004 election was an important one for the Senate minor party system. As the Howard Government was re-elected for a fourth term, Family First, a new party, won its first seat in the Senate. As will be discussed in this chapter, Family First pursued a socially conservative policy agenda that focused on supporting the nuclear family. Family First’s alleged links to the Assemblies of God (AOG) churches also attracted much attention and led to debates about whether the party was a religious party. Family First’s emergence was also interesting, as it became the second right-of-centre issue-competitive party elected to the Senate. Moreover, the party’s rise was made more fascinating as it occurred at a time when the Coalition was in government. It is important to note that the Howard Government had a range of social policies that appeared to be very similar to Family First’s. The party failed to win Senate representation in the 2007 and 2010 elections, but won a seat in 2013. In examining the party’s electoral performance, this chapter argues that Family First’s successes in 2004 and 2013 were the result of the party’s sophisticated approach to using the GVT system. In particular, it is shown how the party’s electoral victories were built upon successfully ‘harvesting’ preferences from other parties, especially the ALP, rather than in having a broad acceptance of its platform by the Australian electorate. This chapter also assesses the party’s performance in the Senate. It argues that the party’s performance in the Senate was moulded on the approach demonstrated by other issue-competitive parties, especially the NDP. This meant that Family First attempted to use the processes of the Senate (such as committees) to pursue its policy agenda. The party also avoided aligning itself to either major party. As will be discussed in this chapter, when the party held the balance of power, it attempted to investigate the legislation, rather than automatically declare whether it would support or block the particular bill. This approach also yielded significant media attention for the nascent party, on which it attempted to capitalise. This chapter also examines

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the party’s peculiar organisation, which gave immense power to the national office bearers who were also the party’s founding figures. In locating the party in the Australian minor party system, this chapter assesses the role the AOG church has played in the mobilisation of Family First, discusses the party’s religious aspects and whether it was, in fact, a religious party. The chapter, however, also examines other factors that led to the party’s emergence. In particular, this chapter argues that Family First mobilised to counter the influence of socially progressive parties in the Australian political debate, especially the Australian Greens.

7.1 Family First’s emergence Family First was created by Andrew Evans who was the pastor of the AOG Church in Klemzig, South Australia. Evans progressed through the ranks of the AOG (he was National Superintendent for 20 years and later on the World Executive of the Church) and was instrumental in writing the Church’s constitution. He garnered much support within the AOG and built a high public profile. In the early 2000s, Evans moved to create a new political party to fill a perceived void in the political debate. Arguing that there was a lack of socially conservative policies in South Australia, Evans founded the Family First Party to advance such policies. In 2002 he stood as the party’s candidate in the South Australian state election. From the outset, the party identified issues it opposed. These included same-sex marriage, euthanasia and abortion. Furthermore, the party had a zero tolerance policy on marijuana use. During the campaign, Evans demonstrated his ability to harvest preferences, thereby enhancing his chances of winning a parliamentary seat. As testament to his high public profile Evans won a primary vote that equalled 0.48 of a quota. This was a remarkable achievement for the party at its first election. In comparison, the more established Australian Greens won only 0.33 of a quota at the same election. Despite this, the Greens seemed to have a strong chance of winning parliamentary representation since it was in receipt of the preferences of both Labor and the Democrats. However, the deals organised by Evans meant that the bulk of preferences from other small parties and independent candidates flowed to Family First. The flow of preferences from the Liberal Party and One Nation further bolstered the nascent party’s electoral chances and Evans eventually won the party’s first seat in the South Australian upper house at the expense of the Greens.

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After this success, Evans planned to expand Family First to be a national party. Initially, he was accompanied by Darryn Keneally and Peter Harris, both of whom had links with the AOG. Keneally had described himself as a ‘former drug addict, drug trafficker and armed robber’ who ‘found Jesus, stopped taking drugs and went to work helping troubled youths’ (cited in Hannan and Schmidtke 2004:1). Harris, on the other hand, was a successful property developer who was also part of the Paradise Church congregation. This group of three men formed the organisational core of the party, especially during its rise to national prominence. Their efforts were spurred by the party’s burgeoning membership base. From an initial 600 members, the party’s membership base grew to 1,400 by the time Evans began his parliamentary career in the South Australian parliament (Evans 2002:74). The bulk of these members were aware of Evans’ work through their association with the AOG. From the party’s initial beginnings, however, Evans was at pains to point out that Family First was not a church party, nor linked to the AOG movement. Soon after entering the South Australian parliament, Evans introduced a bill to abolish the restriction on prosecuting sexual abuse offences that had occurred before 1 December 1982. A number of arrests followed the passing of the bill. Having legislation adopted that was a Family First initiative was a significant development for the party as it demonstrated its ability to play a role in the legislative program of the state. The party opposed laws that would give same-sex couples access to IVF rights and adoption and it opposed the Dignity in Dying Bill, which would legalise euthanasia in South Australia. In doing so, Family First attracted significant media attention and consolidated its role as a socially conservative party in South Australian politics. With the party in the South Australian parliament, Evans registered Family First as a national party in March 2004, some seven months before the federal election in that year. Thanks to his efforts, the party experienced a rapid period of organisational development as the 2004 election drew nearer. Family First established a presence in all states and established a well funded campaign war chest – some proceeds of which had links to AOG figures.45 In setting the agenda for the new national party, Andrew Evans emphasised the party’s conservative policies. First and foremost, the 45 Of the $1.6 million the party received in the 2004–05 period, less than $20,000 came directly from the Churches. The bulk of donations were from private donors and trusts. See http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/Default.aspx for the AEC’s annual returns locator service.

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party aimed to represent ‘Australian families’ and ‘family values’. Indeed, there had been much debate on the concept of family in society, but Evans described ‘families’ as ‘mums and dads, grandpas and grandmas, boys and girls, heterosexual, and singles’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004). More specifically, the party’s definition of family was: …the relationship that binds grandparents, parents and their children, mums and dads and siblings and form the basis of a living community… Family grows out of heterosexual relationships between men and women. Family life flourishes when couples strive for stable commitment to sexual fidelity to each other. Family is about striving for a shared life journey together founded on a lived experience of relationship (Family First 2006:5).

Family First made it clear that it believed in the notion of the nuclear fam­ ily, comprising a heterosexual couple and their children. This understanding forms the core basis of Family First’s policy ethos. Moreover the party, through the leadership of Andrew Evans, made it clear that it would support policies that were ‘good for the family’ and block those that were not. In positioning Family First, Harris and Fielding (2004) argued that it was a response to ‘everyday Australians’ feeling deeply disturbed that economic rationalism and a vacuum of values in society are leaving them without representation and hope’. In assessing how Family First fitted into the Australian political debate, it appears that the party attempted to attract the support of socially con­ serv­ative voters; its policy program concerned the ‘nuclear family’, being ‘tough on crime’ and upholding what the party identified as ‘traditional values’, such as the sanctity of marriage. Family First’s emergence in the federal system occurred at a time when Australia had a right-of-centre government in the form of a Coalition led by Prime Minister John Howard. Indeed, the government had been labelled by many commentators as hav­ ing socially conservative policies and a ‘1950s view’ of how society should be, especially in regards to issues concerning same-sex relationships and its focus on the nuclear family (see, for example, Maddox 2005). However, the government’s approach to dealing with such issues was usually tied to economic arguments. For example, in 2004, Treasurer Peter Costello encouraged Australian couples to have ‘one [child] for your husband and one for your wife and one for the country’ in order to halt Australia’s ageing population. Family First’s approach, however, was different. Rather than focus on economic arguments about preserving what it defined as family, the

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party concentrated on values and morals concerning this entity. The party’s emergence, and burgeoning membership base, suggested its approach was resonating with some voters.

7.2 Organisation: the Family First approach The organisational model employed by Family First established the party as a company limited by guarantee. Its constitution stated the party’s nine objectives, with particular emphasis placed on affecting legislative action to assist families (as defined by the party) in Australia. The party codified its aim to pursue legislation that would ‘result in the holistic health, wellbeing, welfare, safety and unity of families in Australia’ (Family First 2005:2). Additionally, the party made it an objective to oppose ‘proposed legislation’ that would ‘impact negatively upon families’ and would seek ‘to change existing legislation that impacted negatively upon families in Australia’ (Family First 2005:2). Their objectives also signalled the party’s intent to ‘strengthen’ its definition of ‘family’ in Australian society. For example, the party aimed to ‘provide assistance to reduce adverse social and economic impact of family breakdown in Australia’, and provide ‘effective levels of funding’ to entities that provided wholesome assistance and benefit’ to ‘strengthen and educate families in Australia’ (Family First 2005:2). The party’s approach to its organisation highlighted the importance of a central group of individuals. Much of its decision-making power was concentrated in the hands of its peak executive body, the Federal Executive Committee or, since it was a company, the ‘directors’. Andrew Evans and Peter Harris led this committee, which was responsible for the day-to-day management of the party. However, this committee also had significant powers in terms of party membership. The Directors had the power to cancel a membership without being ‘obliged or required to give any more detailed reason for any such cancellation’ (Family First 2005:4). Further peculiarities existed in the party’s federal structure. The party had neither branches nor divisions in the states. Rather, the state parties were State Associations of Family First and operated on a licensing agreement with the national company, Family First Party Australia Limited. Thus, these associations had to obtain authorisation by the Federal Executive Committee to use the name Family First Party. Each state’s operations were to be overseen by State Executives. Such a system reinforced the power of the Federal Executive Committee, the body that oversaw the state Associations. The peak congregation of the party was the National Conference, which

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would meet every two years. The decisions made at this conference were binding on all sections of the party. Those permitted to attend the conference included the directors, members of the State Executives and the state delegates, in addition to the founders of the party, Andrew Evans and his son Ashley Evans (who was also pastor at the Paradise Church). In keeping with the party’s ethos of centralising decision making, policy formulation and candidate preselection were the responsibilities of the Federal Executive Committee. While the party gave the impression of encouraging broad membership involvement in these decisions by creat­ ing policy committees and candidate selection committees, the realty was that these bodies were subordinate to the Federal Executive. Such an approach served to isolate rank and file members from important decisionmaking processes. This could be seen in the party’s preselection process, for example. The process involved committees nominating candidates that were then ratified by the Federal Executive. But the Federal Executive had the power to request an alternative nomination from the Candidate Selection Committee. Indeed, Family First’s core administrative group had significant power over the party’s functioning and decision-making. This extended to the parliamentary sphere, where parliamentarians were expected to adhere to all objectives, policies and principles formulated by the party (Family First 2005:15). If a parliamentarian failed to do so, the Federal Executive Committee had the power to disendorse that person. In the case of a parliamentary vacancy, the Federal Executive Committee had the power to choose a replacement (Family First 2005:15). Family First’s organisation clearly gave much power to the party’s founders. Some elements of its structure resembled a cadre model often associated with many right-of-centre parties. Such parties are dominated by a small group of oligarchs who have control over the party’s operation. But Family First also had a significant extra-parliamentary presence, with a large membership base and a branch structure. Family First’s organisation was innovative as it attempted to accommodate its grassroots membership within a structure that maintained the control of the oligarchs. On some levels, Family First’s approach to organisation was similar to One Nation in that it limited the scope of party members to participate in the decisionmaking process. It must be remembered, however, that One Nation actually employed an illegal structure that channelled members to another entity. In contrast, members who joined Family First actually became members of the political party.

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7.3 A bright start: Family First and the 2004 election In 2004 the Labor and Liberal parties made significant attempts to attract Family First’s favour as they sought to secure preference flows that would be crucial in winning Senate seats. There was also some concern within the major parties regarding the impact Family First would have on the Senate contest. A source from the Labor Party in Victoria provided a concise account of the major parties’ concerns (Jarman 2006): Family First had shown they were capable of winning seats at the state level, and they had shown they could organise solid preference flows to win. Their emergence concerned us on two levels. One, we were wary of their support base. Not necessarily AOG supporters, but having people campaigning at grass roots levels in each electorate. They just seemed to have heaps of foot-soldiers. Two, their deep pockets. We knew they had money and were willing to spend it to win votes.

It was not only the party’s well-resourced campaign that posed a problem for other parties. Family First’s message about supporting families was not so far removed from the major parties’ policies and, as a result, the major parties seemed to be unable to effectively counter Family First’s arguments. As a source from the Liberal Party in New South Wales highlighted (Kelvinside 2006): They came out with this bullshit about how they wanted to ‘help families’, etc. So how could we counter them? We couldn’t attack their line. We couldn’t say, well ‘we’re against families’. If we even gave a hint (of such sentiments) we’d be pilloried for ‘abandoning families’. We also couldn’t gauge the party’s support. They were just a blip in our polling, but the rhetoric from their headquarters suggested they had the potential to attract heaps of voters. We just had to hope that people would see the party as being just another wacky, shallow minor party.

Thus, some sections of the major parties were concerned about the possible electoral impact of Family First and the role its preferences would have in deciding Senate contests. Against this backdrop, Labor’s Kevin Rudd (the then opposition spokesman on foreign affairs) met with Andrew Evans in Adelaide in September 2004. Rudd, a devout Christian, earned the praise of Evans as being a ‘fine man’ but was unable to persuade Family First to direct all of its preferences to Labor. According to a source in the Labor Party in Victoria, Family First was concerned about some ‘fringe lefties

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leaking socially progressive policies into the ALP’ and that the Liberal Party was seen as ‘having less of these progressive types’ (Jarman 2006). Prime Minister John Howard, in his attempt to secure Family First’s preferences, made the commitment that a re-elected Coalition govern­ ment would include Family Impact Statements. These Statements were an initiative of Family First and required the government to explain how government decisions would affect families. According to Family First, Impact Statements were a mechanism through which all proposed legis­ lation could be considered in terms of its impact on the family.46 Howard’s commitment was hailed as a victory for the new party even before it had a presence in federal parliament. Family First’s inaugural federal campaign was extremely well resourced, especially when compared to other minor parties. In 2004 and 2005, the party’s income was over $1.6 million compared to just over $370,000 for the Democrats and approximately $477,000 for the Greens. This result owed much to the work Evans had done in trying to gain funding from donors within the AOG and broader community. Adding another positive component to the party’s emergence was the fact that it selected a leader with charismatic qualities. Andrea Mason, the party’s lead Senate candidate in South Australia, gained much media attention because she was the first Aboriginal woman to lead a political party.47 As the election drew nearer, Family First began organising a raft of preference deals. The party gave preferences to the Liberals in all but three seats. The first was in the seat of Capricornia in Queensland where it directed preferences to the Nationals before the Liberal Party. The second was in Leichhardt in northern Queensland where the sitting member, Warren Entsch, had been vocal in opposing the government’s banning of same-sex marriage in 2004. The third Liberal candidate that did not receive Family First preferences was Ingrid Tall who, according to the party, did not correspond to its definition of ‘family’ as she was homosexual. In justifying Family First’s position, John Lewis, the party’s Senate candidate in Queensland, stated that the party could not support Entsch or Tall because the party did not agree with their lifestyles. 46 However, some within the ALP do not believe Family First even raised the issue of Impact Statements with them. Rather, they suggested that Family First was always going to preference the Liberal Party and used the issue of the Statements as ‘an excuse’ (Jarman 2006). 47 Mason had previously worked as a personal assistant to Andrew Evans and was also a member of the Paradise Church in Adelaide (Das 2004:2).

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Family First, through Danny Nalliah, made further controversial com­ ments in the lead up to the 2004 election. Nalliah, a pastor with the Catch the Fire Ministries and the number two candidate on the party’s Senate ticket in Victoria, urged his followers to ‘pull down Satan’s strongholds’ in a ‘Rise up Australia’ call-to-prayer pamphlet. According to Nalliah such strongholds of Satan included Freemason, Buddhist and Hindu temples, mosques, brothels, gambling venues and bottle shops. Nalliah’s profile was further lifted by a complaint brought against him by the Islamic Council of Victoria under the state’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001. But Nalliah turned this negative event into a positive one by arguing that the case against him meant that his cause was given greater publicity.48 Despite Family First’s commitment to particular values, its preference deals of 2004 demonstrated a strong undercurrent of electoral pragmatism. Even with its apparent anti-gay and pro-family rhetoric, Family First directed Senate preferences in Western Australia to Senator Brian Greig of the Australian Democrats (a well-known gay rights lobbyist) in return for Democrats preferences. The party also directed preferences to Ross Cameron, the Liberal incumbent in the New South Wales seat of Parramatta, as part of its preference swap deal with the Liberal Party. This was despite the fact that Cameron had publicly confessed to having an extra-marital affair some two months before the election. Compounding the anomaly of Family First directing preferences to a candidate who had acted against the interests of his family, Cameron also urged voters that if they ‘want to vote for a great family man, they should probably vote for the other guy’ (cited in O’Rourke 2004:9). Family First’s decision to preference Cameron and Greig suggested the party was capable of making politically calculated decisions, which were not always based on its anti-gay and pro-family values. Cameron and Greig were preferenced favourably because of the cross-preference deals going on over the Senate ticket. Similar to its performance in the South Australian election in 2002, Family First successfully harvested preferences from other parties at the federal level in 2004. However, its chances of success were boosted by Labor’s willingness to direct preferences to Family First before the Greens in South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria. Labor’s reason for doing so elicited internal controversy as some within the party questioned why it would support such a socially conservative party, especially when Family First was 48 Had Fielding’s successful election in Victoria been disqualified, Nalliah would have been the party’s replacement senator.

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directing preferences to the Coalition. Indeed, Labor’s decisions were based more on attempting to bolster its own electoral chances (as discussed in Chapter 4) rather than support Family First’s program. As Table 7.1 shows, Family First’s performance in the 2004 Senate contest was weak. At a national level the party won less than 2 per cent of the primary vote. Its best performance was in its home state of South Australia, where it won 4 per cent of the primary vote. Family First placed much effort in South Australia and its profile was enhanced by the fact that Evans had been in state politics since 2002 and its leader, Andrea Mason, was the lead Senate candidate. Furthermore, the party saturated parts of Adelaide with its candidate’s bunting and advertised on local television during the Australian Football League’s Grand Final – one of the most watched sporting events in the country as well as one of the more expensive advertising slots. Despite not being able to win a Senate seat, Family First’s tactic of preference harvesting ensured it remained in the count until the final round. As Table 7.1 also shows, on first preferences, the party won less than a third of a quota in South Australia, but after preferences it had won almost 90 per cent of a quota. Indeed, had the party gained some more primary votes, it may have won a seat in South Australia. As it was, the party’s presence allowed the Labor candidate to win the seat, thanks to the flow of Greens’ preferences. While Family First was unsuccessful in winning a seat, it did block the Greens from gaining further representation in the Senate. Table 7.1: Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2004 Primary vote (Senate quota)

Final Senate quota after preference distribution

National

1.8%

-

New South Wales

0.6% (0.04)

0.04

Victoria

1.9% (0.13)

1.26

Queensland

3.4% (0.24)

0.43

Western Australia

0.9% (0.06)

0.06

South Australia

4.0% (0.28)

0.87

Tasmania

2.4% (0.17)

0.57

Source: elections.uwa.edu.au; www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004

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Family First’s performances in the other states reflected the party’s limited appeal within the electorate. The party’s second best performance was in Queensland where it won 3.4 per cent of the primary vote, which was approximately a quarter of a Senate quota. The party’s impact however was mitigated by the fact that the Coalition performed very strongly. This meant that Family First’s preferences were not as critical in the final count. Furthermore, the party achieved a quota of just 0.43 after distribution. This highlighted how the Coalition’s strong performance, by attracting preferences, rather than distributing them, thwarted Family First’s electoral fortunes. Family First also struggled to gain attention and support in New South Wales. The party won 0.6 per cent of the primary vote, equating to just 0.04 of a quota. Importantly, charismatic Reverend Fred Nile had forged a significant presence in that state’s political system by having been elected to the Legislative Council in 1981 as a Call to Australia Party Member. In 1997 the party changed its name to the Christian Democratic Party (CDP). The CDP has similar policies to Family First, being socially conservative and holding broad Christian values – indeed, both parties place emphasis on the importance of the nuclear family, oppose pornography and the gay and lesbian lobbies. Thus the CDP muted the emergence of Family First and acted as a hindrance to the new party in New South Wales. Family First’s final Senate quota remained steady as it was never in a position in the Senate count to attract significant preferences. Despite its preference deals in Western Australia, Family First could not stop the Greens from winning the final Senate seat, as its own performance was very weak. Family First won just 0.9 per cent of the primary vote (or 0.06 of a quota) and could not stay in the count long enough to attract a significant flow of preferences. Similar to New South Wales, Family First’s success in Western Australia was affected by the more established CDP fielding candidates. The pattern that emerged from these two states was that voters were more inclined to support the established CDP, rather than Family First. However, Family First almost blocked the Greens from winning a Tasmanian Senate seat even though it won only 2.4 per cent primary vote, which equated to just 0.17 of a quota. Once again, Family First was aided by Labor’s preferences. The party’s final Senate quota rose to 0.57. However, the Greens won the Tasmanian seat over Family First for two main reasons. The first was above-the-line voting. Some 85 per cent of Tasmanians who voted for the ALP used the GVT – a reflection of Tasmanian voters’ experience with the Hare-Clarke system. The second factor that worked against Family

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First was the very strong performance of the Greens’ candidate who polled 93 per cent of a quota. Having secured such a high vote, the Greens’ candidate only needed to rely on a small leakage of preferences from Labor voters to win her seat. This duly occurred. The party’s greatest success was in Victoria where Family First won Senate representation at the expense of the Greens. However, as flagged earlier, this result was due to some factors over which it had little influence. First and foremost was the strong performance of the Coalition, which won over three Senate quotas. The excess votes were distributed to Family First, as per the Coalition’s GVT, which some 99 per cent of voters endorsed by voting above the line. This was an important part of the equation as it allowed Family First to stay in the count. The party also gained the bulk of votes from the list of excluded parties. Moreover, Family First got Labor preferences at the key moment of the count. This catapulted the party over the quota necessary for election. As Table 7.1 shows, the party finished with over one quota.49 The success of Family First in Victoria was a vindication of the shrewd preference deals it undertook with the other parties although, it must be pointed out, the major parties were willing participants in these deals. The party’s success was assisted by 99 per cent of Victorian voters using the major parties’ GVT. After winning a Senate seat, interest shifted to the party’s newly elected senator Steve Fielding and how he would perform in the upper house.

7.4 Family First in the Senate As discussed earlier, the Howard Government’s undertaking to produce Family Impact Statements played a significant role in the preference deals between the Coalition and Family First in 2004. By the time the new Senate took its place in July 2005, however, the government had begun a campaign to publicly talk down the importance of these statements. Despite Senator Fielding’s protestations and discontent, the government essentially blocked the Impact Statements from public viewing by appending them to Cabinet submissions – documents that were not for public circulation. While Senator Fielding avoided publicly branding it as a ‘broken promise’ by the government, it was clear that the relationship with the Coalition government would not be as fruitful as originally envisaged. 49 Indeed, the issues of preference deals, Group Ticket Voting and how a candidate with such a low primary vote could win a Senate seat were immediately debated (see Brent 2004; Green 2004).

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Family First’s presence in the Senate was tempered by the fact that the Coalition had won a majority of seats. This diminished the bargaining potential of Family First and Senator Steve Fielding, as the party did not hold the balance of power in the chamber. However, one of the coalition senators was the National Party’s Barnaby Joyce who had been unwilling to support some of the government’s proposed legislation. The decisions of Joyce to oppose certain bills provided Fielding with an opportunity to become critically important to the government’s legislative program. This was to enhance Family First’s role in the Senate. One occasion where Fielding became crucial to the government’s legis­ lative program was during the debate on the government’s proposed changes to industrial relations. Fielding generated much media interest when he opposed the government’s Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 in the Senate. By doing so he demonstrated the modus operandi of the party in the Senate. He argued that the legislation was ideologically motivated and that his opposition would protect interests of the family. Fielding adhered to his party’s mantra of voting for something that was regarded as being ‘good’ for families and voting against something that was seen as ‘bad’ for families. Here, it is interesting to note Fielding’s (2005:14) justification as to why the party opposed the Industrial Relations Bill: …I do not think that… families should stand idly by and accept the Prime Minister’s idea that business ought to be able to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year without paying penalty rates… That might suit the market, but it certainly does not suit families. In fact, families suffer.

In addition to advancing the interests of the family, Fielding’s actions demonstrated that Family First was far from a Coalition sympathiser. Despite the attempts of all opposition parties, the Work Choices Bill was passed by the government-controlled Senate. Senator Fielding, however, was once again crucial to the government’s legislative program concerning Voluntary Student Unionism (VSU). These debates, which occurred in late 2005, resulted in Nationals Senator Barnaby Joyce crossing the floor in opposition to the government’s proposals to introduce VSU. The govern­ ment was able to pass the VSU bill through the Senate with the support of Fielding, who supported the plan. Senator Fielding’s actions demonstrated the party was far from a spoiler in the Senate and was willing to pass contentious government bills.

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In 2006 the government embarked on debate that was squarely within the interests of Family First: fertility control. In early 2006 a private member’s bill, sponsored by a group of female senators across parties, was introduced in parliament in order to remove the legislative right of the Health Minister to ban the fertility control drug RU486 and give it to the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA). This would mean that pharmaceutical companies could apply to the TGA to supply the drug in Australia. The abortion drug had been used in over 30 countries; but clearly Family First opposed the bill. In outlining the party’s opposition, Senator Fielding argued that the abortion rate was already too high and that the government needed to treat abortion like other social problems. As Fielding (2006) argued, ‘given we fund campaigns to reduce the road toll and reduce the drug toll, surely it is time to tackle ways to reduce the abortion toll’. As a source from the Labor Party in New South Wales remarked, the abortion debate gave Family First the chance to become ‘the darlings of the conservative right’ in Australia (Jarman 2006). And indeed, some who had voted for Family First reported that they were ‘amazed by the rising level of support’ the party gained from others who identified as major party voters (Levin 2006). The fact that the Parliament eventually passed the bill by way of a conscience vote also seemed to fuel some support for Family First’s position. As one Family First partisan activist from Victoria summarised (Levin 2006): …abortion was a fantastic break for the party. It gave it a chance to really push the point that it was the party to represent our [socially conservative] views. My friends knew I voted for them [Family First] and called me to say how they were impressed with the party’s commitment to what it believed in, and they’d vote for them next time.

Steve Fielding, and Family First, also played an integral role in national policy when the Howard Government attempted to strengthen its so-called ‘Pacific solution’, where asylum seekers were sent to Papua New Guinea and Nauru for processing. This proposal was met with some opposition within the government and at least one Coalition senator (Judith Troeth from Victoria) indicated that she would vote against the bill. This placed the bill in a precarious position in the Senate – if just one government senator voted against the bill along with all non-government senators, including Fielding, the bill would be defeated. This made Fielding a pivotal player and he made sure that his deliber­ations on whether to support or reject the bill were well documented by the media

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in a string of radio and television interviews.50 During these debates Fielding bolstered the idea that Family First was a party that would act with caution in supp­orting or opposing the government of the day. He demonstrated this most clearly by meeting with a range of government and opposition lobbyists. Senator Fielding, however, allowed the media speculation about his decis­ ion to continue unabated. The speculation cli­maxed when Fielding and his wife met with West Papuan refugees in a social setting – an event covered by many media outlets. After this meeting Senator Fielding announced that he could not support the bill as it lacked compassion. In response, the Howard Government withdrew the bill, as its defeat in the Senate appeared very likely. This episode helped bolster Family First’s claim that, in the Senate, the party was capable of influencing government policy. The pattern of Family First’s performance in the Senate showed how the party attempted to use its position in the chamber to pursue its agenda. This was most clearly demonstrated during the party’s interactions with the Coalition government on issues regarding fertility control and industrial relations laws. During these debates, the party highlighted how the proposed legislative changes would affect its definition of ‘family’. It is important to note, however, that the party’s role in the Senate was enhanced when it held the balance of power. In this regard, the party was dependent on Coalition senators crossing the floor. Senator Fielding attempted to capitalise on such opportunities in instances when senators Joyce and Troeth, for example, crossed the floor. But Family First also engaged in wider policy issues as it attempted to position itself as a party that was able to operate effectively in the Senate. This clearly attempted to show that the party could hold a position of keeping the government accountable by using its position as a check on the executive, rather than being a spoiler or sympathiser with the government or opposition. Outside parliament, however, Family First was preparing to contest the 2007 election.

7.5 Consolidation or capitulation: Family First and the 2007 election Despite the controversy over its preference deals in 2004, the Labor Party again considered directing preferences to Family First before the Greens. This was set against the backdrop of an analysis of Family First’s voting behaviour in South Australia and the Senate. Some Labor strategists argued 50 Senator Fielding’s crucial role led to his first ever interview by Laurie Oakes on the now defunct Sunday program on the Nine Network.

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that Family First generally voted with the government of the day, rather than any ingrained political allegiance to the Coalition. In contrast, some Labor strategists felt that the Greens had greater potential to be an obstruction for its own policies in the Senate. However, any chance Family First had of attracting Labor’s preferences were crushed when the Greens prematurely released details of their preference swap with Labor (as discussed in Chapter 4). This would make it almost impossible for Family First to recreate its 2004 success. Making the election of another senator even more remote was the pref­ erence deal with the Coalition. Family First directed its preferences to the Coalition in the Senate in a deal which expected all divisions of the Liberal Party to return preferences to Family First. However, the New South Wales division of the Liberal Party decided to direct its preferences to Fred Nile’s CDP. This decision was made after Prime Minister Howard intervened in the preference discussions. Howard made it clear that he wanted to give the CDP a greater chance of election, rather than Family First, especially since Family First had been very weak in New South Wales. The Democrats’ and Greens’ decision to direct their preferences to each other in the Senate in all states further dented Family First’s electoral fortunes in 2007. As a result, the party redoubled its efforts to harvest preferences and once again demonstrated that its values were no barrier to sealing potentially beneficial preference deals. Furthermore, Family First punished the major parties for their unfavourable preference deals in New South Wales and Western Australia. In these states Family First directed preferences to the Liberty and Democracy Party (LDP), discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. The LDP’s platform was the antithesis of that of Family First. The LDP identified victimless crimes, which included public nudity and fornicat­ ion; the consumption of pornography; and ‘prostitution and/or soliciting for prostitution. Furthermore, the party had a policy of ‘no criminalisation of abortion other than for later term abortions’, and ‘re-legalisation’ of ‘recreational marijuana use by adults’. While this preference deal was obviously designed to maximise Family First’s chances of winning Senate representation, it challenged assumptions that the party was committed to protecting its definition of family. Indeed, some who supported the party felt betrayed by Family First’s decision to deal with the LDP, which led to Senator Fielding being accused of ‘supping with the devil’ (see Lewis 2007). Other issues that also detracted from Family First’s 2007 campaign went to the core of the party’s beliefs. For example, the party’s candidate for the Queensland seat of Leichhardt, Ben Jacobsen, was quoted as having ‘looked

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at internet pornography’ (McKenna 2007). Despite this admission – and the associated negative media coverage – the party refused to disendorse him. Family First experienced yet another ‘porn scandal’ when pornographic pho­ tographs appeared of Andrew Quah, the party’s 22-year-old candidate for the Sydney seat of Reid. Despite denying the images were of himself, Family First expelled Quah as he had used pornography, which made his views ‘at odds with the values of the party’ (see Hannan, 2007). These scandals served to undermine the party’s rhetoric and disappointed some of its supporters. For example, a Victorian who voted for Family First in 2004 was ‘absolutely disgusted’ by the scandals and vowed to ‘never vote for a party that housed such filth’ (Levin 2007). Others shared these sentiments. A Family First voter in New South Wales argued that the revelations were ‘pretty shocking’ and they would now be ‘unlikely to support the party again’ (Quick 2007). These attitudes impacted the party’s performance in 2007 as shown in Table 7.2. Table 7.2: Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2007 Primary vote (%)

Senators elected

National

1.6

0

New South Wales

0.6

0

Victoria

2.5

0

Queensland

2.2

0

Western Australia

0.9

0

South Australia

2.9

0

Tasmania

2.0

0

Source: elections.uwa.edu.au

Considering the party had been in national politics – which afforded it access to media coverage and parliamentary resources – Family First’s per­ formance in 2007 was poor. As Table 7.2 shows, the party’s national vote was actually lower than in 2004 as it won just 1.6 per cent of the primary vote. A disaggregation of the party’s performance also shows the party’s performance remained stagnant in New South Wales and Western Australia, recreating the pattern of 2004. Family First could not remain in the Senate count long enough to start attracting preferences from other parties in New South Wales and Western Australia. Once again, it was the presence of the CDP which actually affected the party’s electoral fortunes.

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Moreover, Family First’s performance in all states was weaker compared to 2004, except in Victoria where its primary vote rose by 0.6 per cent. This equated to 0.18 of a quota, which was slightly higher than in 2004. The slight rise in the party’s vote could be attributed to the fact that it once again mobilised a significant campaign throughout the state, which also housed the party’s senator, Steve Fielding. As Fielding was the party’s sole federal parliamentary representative, he became the focal point for the media. In addition to media interviews, he made numerous appearances on television shows but this seemed to have had minimal impact on mobilising greater support for the party in Victoria. After preferences the party had won less than one-third of a Senate quota. More concerning for the party was the sharp decline in support in its birth state of South Australia, where its primary vote dropped from 4 per cent in 2004 to less than 3 per cent in 2007. It must be noted, however, that Family First did not have a star Senate candidate like Andrea Mason contesting in South Australia. Instead, the party’s lead candidate was Tony Bates, a quietly spoken executive at General Motors Holden. Additionally, the party was competing against the popular and charismatic anti-pokies campaigner, Nick Xenophon who had been initially elected as an independent to the South Australian Legislative Council in 1997 campaigning on a ‘No Pokies’ ticket. In 2006 he won over 190,000 primary votes and was re-elected along with his running mate, Ann Bressington. Standing for the Senate for the first time in 2007, Xenophon was able to garner the support of anti-major party voters in South Australia – something Family First struggled to do. The party’s performances in Queensland and Tasmania were also poorer in 2007 where it won 2.2 and 2.0 per cent of the primary vote respectively. In both states the party could not remain in the count long enough to attract significant preferences. The party appeared to not have impacted the Senate party system in 2007 as it did in 2004. This may be accounted for by considering the party’s preference deals. Unlike the previous election, the major parties directed their preferences to other parties before Family First. For example, in New South Wales, the Coalition decided to direct preferences to the CDP. It was Labor’s decision to preference the Greens before Family First, which further thwarted the party’s attempts to consolidate itself in the Senate. This meant that Family First was excluded from the Senate count well before it was in a position to attract preferences from other minor parties. The Coalition’s poorer perform­ ance in 2007 also contributed to Family First’s poorer results. The Coalition in 2007 lost government and suffered significant swings. These results meant

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that Coalition preferences could not boost Family First’s chances of election. As a result, the party could not improve on its electoral representation.

7.6 On the road to recovery: the 2010 and 2013 elections While the 2010 election was disappointing for Family First, as it could not win a Senate seat, it was important in recapturing some of the support that had been lost in 2007. As Table 7.3 shows, the party won 2.1 per cent of the national vote, a slightly higher outcome than in 2007. The party was also able to win over 4 per cent, and thus be eligible for election funding in South Australia for the first time since 2004. Table 7.3: Primary vote of Family First in the Senate, 2010 and 2013 2010 Primary vote (%) (Senators elected)

2013 Primary vote (%) (Senators elected)

National

2.1

1.1

New South Wales

0.9 (0)

0.4 (0)

Victoria

2.6 (0)

1.5 (0)

Queensland

3.4 (0)

1.1 (0)

Western Australia

1.2 (0)

0.7^ (0)

South Australia

4.1 (0)

3.8 (1)

Tasmania

1.2 (0)

1.3 (0)

^ This was the result achieved at the West Australian re-election following the Court of Disputed Return’s order to hold fresh elections after 1,370 ballot papers from the 2013 election went missing. Source: AEC

As shown in Table 7.3, the party’s primary vote was marginally higher in all jurisdictions, except Tasmania, compared to 2007. Furthermore, unlike 2007, Family First’s 2010 campaign was free from embarrassing scandals and the party was able to focus on advancing its conservative moral agenda. For example, the party’s lead Senate candidate in Queensland, Wendy Francis, likened accepting same-sex marriage as ‘legalising child abuse’ and compared children from same-sex families with the stolen generations (Grubb 2010). While this led to much controversy, some voters who voted for Family First in 2004, but not in 2007, were again attracted to the party. As one put it (Quick 2010):

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Her [Wendy Francis] comments, I think, were rough but fair. I was actually pleased she highlighted the issues of same-sex marriage and how it could weaken traditional family units. It made me realise that this party [Family First] still stood for what I believed in.

The party also focused on more explicitly attacking the Greens and its policy of harm minimisation for drug users. In one advertisement, Family First warned that a vote for the Greens would result in heroin injecting rooms being established ‘on every street corner’. Yet, despite a marginally stronger performance in 2010, Family First could not win Senate representation. The main problem was that it could not manufacture beneficial preference deals with other parties. This was not for a lack of trying as Family First had sought to harvest preferences from a wide range of parties. Like 2004, Family First demonstrated that it would engage in preference wheeling and dealing even with parties that advanced policies it opposed. For example, it was reported that it sought a preference deal with the Australian Sex Party, which supported same-sex marriage, voluntary euthanasia and fertility control. Family First, however, later refuted that such arrangements had been sought (Bills 2010). The most significant problem for Family First was that it was again unable to obtain Labor preferences because Labor and the Greens had already made a deal to swap preferences as they did in 2007. Compounding the party’s frustrations was the fact that the Democratic Labor Party won a Senate seat at the expense of Family First in Victoria, even though it won a lower primary vote. As discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the DLP had sought to mimic what Family First had done in terms of preference swaps in 2004 but, much to the chagrin of Steve Fielding, succeeded in winning Senate representation in 2010. This result led to Family First redoubling its efforts in the lead up to the 2013, with a clear aim of returning to the Senate. Like 2010, the core issues that dominated the federal 2013 election campaign did not focus on matters that were central to Family First’s raison d’être. Instead, the political debate was dominated by discussions about the carbon tax and economic management. Family First, however, had under­ gone some important changes in its approach to contesting the 2013 cam­ paign. First, Bob Day became an even more influential figure in the party. Day was a former Liberal Party member and had sought to replace Alexander Downer as the party’s candidate for the lower house seat of Mayo. After failing to win preselection, he left and later became Family First’s Chairman

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in 2008. Day had built a significant public profile while leading his housing construction company and had been appointed as an Officer of the Order of Australia for services to the housing sector. Day was also a major contributor to the Family First Party and had donated hundreds of thousands of dollars since becoming a member. As in the previous election, the party preselected Day to be its lead Senate candidate in South Australia and he began to exert greater influence over the party’s electoral strategy. Day not only became the focal point of the party throughout the 2013 campaign, but he also directed a more centralised approach to campaigning. For example, Family First discouraged candidates from communicating directly with the media. Instead, candidates were instructed to direct inquiries to the party’s website. Candidates were also advised to avoid media appearances so that they would not overshadow the public profile of the wider party. Even light-hearted attempts at attracting attention were rejected by the party. For example, its Senate candidate in Western Australia, Henry Heng, had made a music clip for his 2010 cam­ paign. The party made it clear that no such media engagements were to be undertaken in 2013. This more centralised and disciplined approach to campaigning yielded benefits for Family First. While the party had clearly been well resourced and funded, the actions of some of its candidates had attracted ridicule in past campaigns. In 2013 the party avoided being embroiled in sex scandals or accusations of being intolerant of any group in society. This approach also presented the party as a more unified and cohesive entity. As one Family First voter in Victoria put it (Levin 2013): This was probably the best campaign yet. It actually made Family First look like it meant business… and much more professional as well. Making the party, not the candidates, the focus was a good move. It also made me feel a bit more at ease… because I could vote for a party that looked and sounded professional.

While the party appeared to have a more proficient approach to campaign­ ing, it confronted significant electoral challenges in that it would be compet­ ing against raft of new minor parties that advanced policies similar to its own in the 2013 election. These parties included the Stop the Greens Party, the Australian Christians Party and Rise Up Australia Party (which was created by former Family First member Danny Nalliah). This fragmented the right-of-centre vote and, as Table 7.3 shows, almost halved Family First’s primary vote compared to 2010. The Table also shows that Family First’s

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primary vote was down in all jurisdictions and it failed to win at least 4 per cent of the primary vote in any state. Despite the challenges, Bob Day was successful in winning Senate rep­ resentation in South Australia. Like 2004, the party’s success came from shrewd preference wheeling and dealing as well as from some outcomes it had no control over. Family First was able to attract the preferences of a range of minor parties including One Nation, Katter’s Australian Party, Australian Christians, Shooters and Fishers and the Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party. Moreover, the party received Liberal Party preferences. Complicating the 2013 South Australian result was the fact that Nick Xenophon won almost 25 per cent of the primary vote which equated to 1.7 of a quota. This had a significant impact on the final outcome. After the election of Sarah Hanson-Young, who was the Greens candidate, the battle for the last two seats in the state came down to the Liberal candidate, Xenophon’s second candidate and Day. At this point Family First received the Greens preferences, allowing Day to claim the penultimate seat. Moreover, Day’s surplus allowed the Liberal Party to claim the last Senate seat in South Australia. The decision of the Greens to preference Family First had more to do with safeguarding its own electoral prospects than supporting the party’s policy agenda. Concerned that Hanson-Young would struggle to be returned, Bob Brown and others from the Greens engaged in wheeling and dealing with right-of-centre parties. They succeeded in manufacturing deals with these parties, including the Palmer United Party, which ensured Hanson-Young received preferences ahead of Xenophon’s second candidate. In response, the Greens sent their preferences to the right-of-centre parties and ultimately contributed to Day’s election.

7.7 Family First and religious politics The link between Family First and religious politics has been a major con­ troversy since the party emerged. Religious or ‘church’ parties are relatively common in many party systems around the world. Indeed, religion can act as a social cleavage in some societies and may impact on the party system (see, for example, Irvine and Gold 1980). In the Australian case, debates about religion have become more prominent since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (see Warhurst 2006; Crabb 2009). The emergence of Family First led to debate about whether Australia was experiencing a rise of a particular strain of religious politics more often

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associated with the United States. Since the 1970s, social movements and groups with links to Christian denominations have attempted to influence government policy in the US, a phenomenon known as the ‘religious right’ (for example, see Hill and Owen 1982; Bruce 1990; Blaker 2003). These movements tended to support socially conservative policies and values. For example, one of the major issues such groups mobilised on was the concept of family values. In essence, these groups sought to maintain the nuclear family – one that comprised a heterosexual relationship – as a social institution. Moreover, religious right groups have mobilised against euthanasia and abortion and have consistently opposed illicit drugs and homosexuality, while lobbying for the courts to impose more severe penalties for those found guilty of criminal activity (also see Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Meier 1999). The distinguishing feature of these types of religious right groups, which in the US have been closely associated with evangelical churches, is that their congregations supported them through significant human and financial resources (see Durham 2000). Moreover, these groups employed more politically sophisticated techniques in seeking to influence policy. For example, they engaged in direct lobbying with policy makers, and attempted to use their bourgeoning congregation membership as leverage in the electoral system (Coe and Domke 2006). Indeed, there is significant research that suggests that such religious right movements have significantly impacted electoral outcomes in the United States (see Green, Rozell and Wilcox 2001). The perception that Family First was an extension of the American evangelical religious right party is supported by the party’s origins in the AOG church. Many of its candidates were drawn from AOG church con­ gregations and the party also mounted expensive election campaigns. The party’s policy program, focusing on family values, also reflected those of the religious right in the US. It is important to note, however, that Family First consistently rejected the idea of being a religious party and argued that it was not based on religious doctrines. Also, Family First consistently positioned itself as a party not aligned with any church or religious group. This contrasted with many American religious right groups that freely admitted their program was based on religious doctrines. In their seminal study of parties mobilised on religious grounds, Gunther and Diamond (2003) argued there were two broad types of such parties. The first type was church, or religious, parties underpinned by a set of predetermined religious beliefs. As they were bound to predetermined

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religious beliefs, these parties were not fully in control of their programs. The second category was the fundamentalist party, which aimed to reorganise society around a strict religious doctrine. Such parties aimed to have no separation between religion and the state, with religious nor guiding the polity (Gunther and Diamond 2003:182). Family First, however, showed that, while it was grounded in social conservatism, it was able and willing to engage in the broader legislative debate outside its immediate areas of interest. Furthermore, Family First was unwilling to reorganise society around a religious doctrine. In fact, the party’s rhetoric constantly pointed to its position as being unaligned to any church and its social policies, which related to same-sex issues, pornography and abortion, for example, were a reflection of social conservative beliefs that were common to many right-of-centre parties (also see Mudde 2007). Warhurst (2005) noted that there was ‘unqualified excitement’ about Family First as a manifestation of ‘religious’ politics in the Australian system. Brett (2002) and Warhurst (2005) argued that religious elements had been present in Australia since the formation of the Australian party system, especially with divisions between Catholic and Protestant denominations (also see Maddox 2005). While Family First shared some elements with the religious right in America, one of its key mobilising factors was to oppose an issue-competitive party already represented in the Senate – the Australian Greens. The Greens had a range of policies that contrasted with those of Family First, in particular those relating to same-sex relationships and drug policy. Indeed, Family First was a right-of-centre issue-competitive party that sought to counter the influence of the Greens in the policy debate. Family First’s advertisements gave a clear indication of its position as a counter party in the Australian system. In its inaugural federal campaign in 2004, Family First targeted the Greens, and their leader, Bob Brown. In particular, drug policy was central to Family First’s attack on the Greens and remained a core part of the party’s attack in subsequent elections. With slogans such as ‘a vote for the Greens is a vote for extremes’, Family First portrayed the Greens as a threat to the moral fabric of society. Indeed, the Greens were branded extremists in Family First advertisements. In a series of advertisements the voice over warned: ‘Heroin? Ecstasy? The Greens want to legalise the whole lot’; and that the Greens would give ‘my kids easy access to marijuana’. Further advertisements criticised Bob Brown specifically with slogans such as, ‘That’s not Green, Bob, that’s extreme’. In yet another attempt to position the party as opposition to the Greens, and Bob Brown, the party’s federal chairman, Peter Harris argued that ‘there’s lots of logs

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in Bob’s [Brown] forest that when you turn them over, they’ve got creepy things crawling out of them’ (Debelle and Schmidkte 2004). The party also made clear its vehement opposition to what it termed the gay and lesbian lobby that was emerging at the federal level. It was the party’s view that this lobby group had disproportionate power in Australian society and it argued that this power needed to be tempered by the federal government via policies that would place greater emphasis on mainstream families, rather than minority interests. Such policies would involve placing the interests of families at their core and included enhancing welfare benefits for families. Family First’s disdain for the gay and lesbian lobby stemmed from the belief of some party members that those who comprised the lobby had infer­ ior values to those of ‘families’. The party gained attention for its disapproval of homosexuality when a campaign worker in the Queensland seat of Dickson answered ‘yes’ to a question about whether the party supported lesbians being burnt to death (Cole and Heywood 2004). A discussion at a party meeting highlighted the party’s concern about the scope of the power of the gay and lesbian lobby with members commenting (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2005): We want to defend our Christian schools to not have to employ homosexuals. But we can’t legislate about that. But they give their values to the children. The Greens have specifically said they want gays in Christian schools – they make that a clear goal.51

Indeed, some of Family First’s appeal was couched in the party’s strong anti-homosexual stance that was polar opposite of the socially progressive policies of the Greens. As one Victorian who voted for Family First put it (Miles 2006): I get a sense that there’s just too much importance put on gays in this country. I mean the Greens have been blabbering on about gay issues and transgender issues for a while and they’ve been successful in lifting these issues into mainstream society. But there’s hardly any discussion about rights for families or heterosexuals and mainstream Australians. It’s all just about same-sex couples wanting ‘this’ law changed, or changing ‘this’ law to suit their lifestyle. I’m sorry, but the last time 51 The Greens’ official policy aims for the ‘mandatory development and implementation of sexuality and gender diversity anti-discrimination policies in all public and private schools…’ (Australian Greens 2004).

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I looked families, I mean heterosexuals, were the majority in this country. What happened to their say on social policy?

Another partisan activist from Victoria also attributed her support for the party to its opposition to the progressive policies of the Greens (Neville 2006): It was about time that a party like Family First was created… it was about time that a party that said ‘right, we’re concerned about the state of families and we want to do something about it’. The major parties are just too broad – they want to please everyone. And the Greens, well, they’ve just got stupid policies. And their leader, well, what would he about know what’s good for a traditional family? So good on Family First for not worrying about offending gays and minorities and putting importance on the nuclear family with kids.

Similar sentiments were expressed by another Victorian voter who voted for Family First (Oliphant 2006): I’m not a church goer… but I didn’t see Family First as a very religious party. I saw them as a party that promoted family values. Their ‘back to basics’ approach appealed to me… I was pleased that there was finally a party that said enough is enough to the vocal minority who were hijacking politics. I was appalled with the amount of time spent on debating laws regarding homosexuals in this country… so Family First’s plan to look after heterosexuals and their families appealed to me.

Yet another Victorian partisan activist who voted for Family First identified the party’s stance on drug policy, as well as its focus on the nuclea’ family, as appealing features (Philips 2006): I didn’t want my kids to be in a country where you could get drugs like you could get lollies. These drugs are illegal for good reasons… and to top it off, they (the Greens) were encouraging everyone, especially young people, to experiment with homosexuality and that it was all just a bit of fun…

Clearly, the issue of same-sex relationships was targeted by Family First. Through its extensive advertising campaigns, the party was able to attract the support of voters who held similar views on same-sex issues. While not explicit, the party’s campaign also drew attention to the sexuality of Greens parliamentarians, especially Bob Brown’s, by suggesting that the gay

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and lesbian lobby was over-represented in the policy debate. In doing so, Family First positioned itself as a socially conservative force that attempted to mitigate the influence of the Australian Greens on policy debate.

7.8 Conclusion: based on business, Family First pursues traditional family values Family First was created by Andrew Evans to pursue a socially conservative set of policy goals in Australian politics. The party experienced its first electoral success in the South Australian state election in 2002 when Evans was elected to the state’s upper house. Evans’ success rested on a series of sophisticated preference deals he organised with other parties. In deciding to broaden Family First into a national party, Evans designed an oligarchic structure that employed an unusual framework built upon a business model. This was a deliberate attempt by Evans to maintain significant control over party affairs. Indeed, the party’s organisation has entrenched the role of Evans and those close to him as powerful decision-makers. For example, the party’s structure gave the power to make decisions regarding policy, and even preselect candid­ates, to a central body, rather than allow the input of the broader membership or local branches. The advantage for Evans was that such an organisation ensured that he maintained control of the party he created. However, as history has shown in the case of One Nation, members tended to leave the party if they felt their role was superfluous to the party’s operation. Balancing the desire to maintain control over the party, while accommodating rank and file members, may be something Family First will grapple with in the future. Family First was seen by many commentators as an extension of the American religious right movement in Australian politics. With its emphasis on family and moral values, Family First’s policies were similar to those of the American religious right. However, it must be remembered that Family First rejected claims that it was a religious party and argued it was not aligned with any church. Moreover, the party argued that it sought to represent those who supported their political agenda, rather than a set of religious values. The interesting feature about Family First’s membership was that it was predominantly drawn from the Assembly of God’s congregations and the vast bulk of the party’s candidates also had links to the AOG church. Despite these links to popular religion, Family First positioned itself as a pragmatic and secular party with socially conservative policies. This was seen in the Senate where Steve Fielding engaged in a range of policy issues by weaving his party’s conservative values into debates about legislation.

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Indeed, the party’s position on immigration and workplace relations focused on the impact policies would have on nuclear families. In rejecting these bills, Fielding demonstrated that Family First was able to pursue its policy agenda within the broader political debate. One of the reasons Family First rose and mobilised was to provide opposition to the Australian Greens – an issue-competitive party that had already won Senate seats. The party countered the Greens in two main ways. The first was by presenting a suite of socially conservative policies that were in contrast to the Australian Greens in areas such as drug policy, fertility control and especially same-sex relationships. Family First’s approach to advertising its policies was also interesting. The party focused on countering the Greens through a series of advertisements that were designed to make the Greens seem extreme and a threat to family values. Interestingly, these advertisements did not present Family First’s policies. Rather, they presented Family First as a party that stood in opposition to the Greens. Clearly, through such tactics the party sought to appeal to voters who opposed the Australian Greens’ social policies. The second way in which Family First attempted to counter the Greens was through electoral means. This was most successful in 2004 and 2013 when Family First organised a series of preference deals that bolstered its own electoral fortunes. Moreover, the party appeared to evolve over time. From 2008, under the guidance of Bob Day, the party moulded itself into a more disciplined and cohesive entity and was able to avoid the sorts of embarrassing events that haunted its 2007 campaign and offended many of its supporters. At one level, the election of a Family First senator in Victoria in 2004 and South Australian in 2013 might suggest that the party’s social conservatism resonated with sections of the community, and that the party was an example of American-style religious right movements that were beginning to mobilise significant electoral support in Australia. However, this chapter cast doubt on this view by examining the relatively poor and patchy performances of the party. Rather, the party’s federal electoral success was due to favourable circumstances and shrewd preference deals with the major parties. Its success in 2004 rested on the harvesting of preference deals from other political parties, especially the Coalition (which performed very strongly and directed its surplus to Family First) and the Labor Party. In 2013, the party benefited from the deal the Greens made with other minor parties. How crucial these factors were to the party’s success was highlighted in 2007 and 2010 when the major parties abandoned Family First in regards to trading preferences and left it without parliamentary representation.

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Cha pte r 8

The Re-emergence of the DLP In 2010 the Democratic Labor Party won Senate representation 40 years after leaving the chamber. This was a remarkable feat by the party that was considered to be dead in Australian politics by many observers. The purpose here is not to revisit the events that led to the creation of the original DLP in detail (see Chapter 2), but rather focus on the new DLP and examine the source of its mobilisation and the role it sought to play in the political debate. The original DLP and the modern incarnation of the party differ significantly in these two areas. In particular, the original DLP was primarily mobilised to block Labor from regaining government while the DLP of today is mobilised by broad social movements with the aim of advancing a program of conservative moral reform. The chapter analyses how the party changed from being a spoiler type to a more contemporary issue-competitive type of minor party.

8.1 Constructing the new DLP As discussed in Chapter 2, the original DLP was the result of the bitter split in the Labor Party caused by the perceived level of communist influence in the unions affiliated with the party in the early 1950s. The party was of the fragmentary type and sought to stop Labor from regaining government. The party’s approach, however, contributed to its demise. The DLP’s electoral performances fell away after 1972 when the election of the Whitlam Labor Government made its raison d’être – that of keeping the ALP out of government – redundant. In 1975 the Whitlam Government was dismissed by the Governor-General and the Fraser-led Coalition then held to power. But, by then, the DLP had deteriorated to the point that it could only field candidates in its traditionally strong state of Victoria. The DLP wound down in 1978 following a period of instability, though a dedicated band of individuals continued to keep the party alive in Victoria (Allan 2011:6–7). The election of the Hawke Government in 1983 coincided with several unions returning to the ALP, having left the party during the split in the 1950s. The Federated Clerks Union, the Amalgamated Carpenters and

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Joiners Union, the Ironworkers Association and the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association began the process of re-affiliating with Labor in 1984. The decision of these unions to go back to the ALP contributed to a sense of greater organisational stability in Labor ranks, especially since they had a combined membership in excess of 100,000 (AJPH 1984:397). But with Labor back in government, and having re-admitted four key unions, members of the DLP in Victoria made a concerted effort to relaunch their party. This signalled the beginning of the new DLP in Australian politics (see Fitzgerald 2003). An important person in building the new Victorian, and subsequently federal, DLP was John Mulholland who, with limited resources, operated the party from his home in Melbourne. Mulholland, who worked as a teacher, joined the original DLP in his mid 30s and took it upon himself to keep the party afloat when the party lost its Senate representation in the 1970s. Mulholland strongly opposed fertility control, same-sex marriage and euthanasia and believed that maintaining the DLP would be an effective way of promoting these policy goals in the political debate (see Green 2004). He became the party’s Secretary and succeeded in keeping the Victorian Branch constitutionally operative throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even though the party had disintegrated in other states. Mulholland’s perseverance in keeping the Victorian branch operating meant that he was regarded as the modern party’s national leader. Under his tutelage the DLP once again began to grow, but this time the level of involvement from Catholic elements was almost non-existent. The party had between 500 and 1,500 members, although the validity of these numbers was constantly questioned. Mulholland continually resisted calls from the AEC to provide the names and details of at least 500 members and challenged their request in the High Court. Mulholland’s refusal to provide details of the party’s membership to the authorities was based on his concern that doing so would ‘undermine the principle of the secret ballot, intrude on privacy and put barriers in the way of freedom of association’ (Mulholland 2004). While the exact membership numbers were unclear, it was apparent that only a handful of members were responsible for making key decisions. As Mulholland stated, the party was ‘run from the kitchen tables’ of its members and did not have a central office (cited in Ker 2006). The party contested federal and state elections in Victoria between 1984 and 2002, but attracted a very low level of electoral support. During this period the DLP refocused its policy demands. For example, the party sought to draw attention to its anti-communist platform throughout the 1980s, but when

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the Cold War ended it made a move towards placing greater emphasis on its opposition to fertility control, euthanasia and same-sex marriage throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Its impact on the electoral contest, however, was negligible, as the party had ‘faded from public consciousness’ (Davis 2006). The party’s inability to win seats did not diminish the zeal of Mulholland and other members to keep the DLP operating in Victoria. Furthermore, the party was encouraged by the 2004 federal election result, which saw the Family First Party win a Victorian Senate seat. Family First (discussed in Chapter 7) promoted similar social policies to the DLP and, despite winning a small primary vote, was able to win Senate representation. Family First’s tactics and success in 2004 served as a template for the new DLP in future elections as they showed how a minor party advancing a conservative moral agenda could win Senate representation. However, as Family First demonstrated, the key to winning parliamentary representation was to manufacture beneficial preference deals. The DLP redoubled its efforts to more clearly articulate its social policies in addition to trying to construct a range of preference deals with other parties in the lead up to subsequent state and federal elections.

8.2 Sights on the Senate: the importance of the 2006 Victorian state election The efforts of Mulholland and other DLP members were rewarded at the Victorian state election in 2006. The party did not field candidates in the lower house but did contest all eight Legislative Council districts. Mul­ holland stood as the candidate for the Northern Metropolitan Region and Peter Kavanagh contested the Western Region. Kavanagh, the grandson of Bill Barry who was an important figure in the ALP split in the 1950s, won a seat despite attracting just 2.6 per cent of the primary vote. Mulholland came close to winning the party’s second seat. The 2006 Victorian election introduced a raft of changes to the voting system used in the upper house. Key changes included the introduction of a GVT system and proportional representation. These reforms meant that, similar to the Senate, a candidate needed to win a quota of the vote in order to win a seat. This reduced the electoral barrier confronting minor parties and meant that, as in the Senate, preference deals played a significant role in deciding electoral contests. The 2006 state election also highlighted important tactical decisions that were made by the DLP in terms of recasting its role in Australian politics. The party did not focus on revisiting questions about communism – especially

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since it no longer had much relevance in the political debate in the twentyfirst century – nor did it focus on opposing the ALP. Rather, it was preocc­ upied with advancing a socially conservative moral agenda and presented policies it would pursue if elected to parliament. The new DLP’s campaign literature positioned the party as neither left nor right of the political spectrum, but rather in the centre. The party did this most explicitly on its website by stating that it promoted principles of democracy, liberty and peace (also see Madden 2011). The DLP’s suite of policies, however, espoused socially conservative values such as opposing euthanasia, fertility control and same-sex marriage. The party mounted a modest statewide campaign estimated to have cost no more than $5,000 (Ker 2006). Indeed, it did not garner much media interest nor did it engage in significant campaign activities. The party did, however, successfully use the GVT to enhance its bid to win parliamentary representation. It secured preference deals with a range of minor parties, such as People Power, the City Country Alliance and Family First. Crucially, the party also attracted the preferences of the Liberal and National Parties. The DLP also made a critically important preference-swap deal with the ALP, which had decided that the new DLP ‘was no longer the enemy’ (Jamieson 2010). This preference deal not only resulted in the ALP winning key seats on the back of DLP preferences, but also allowed the DLP’s candidate, Peter Kavanagh, to win a seat at the expense of the Australian Greens’ candidate, despite winning less than 2 per cent of the primary vote. This was a significant achievement for the new DLP. Not only did its victory grant it access to crucial parliamentary resources, but it also provided hope to its members that the party would be able to directly influence government policy. As one partisan activist noted, winning a seat provided the party with the opportunity to ‘have a direct say’ in public policy (Baldwyn 2008). The composition of the upper house, however, meant that the party did not exclusively hold the balance of power. As a result, the DLP’s impact on government policy was marginal. Another significant feature of the Victorian election campaign was the close link between the new DLP and other movements, especially Right to Life (RTL). While there were many anti-abortion groups that emerged throughout the 1960s, the first national RTL group in Australia emerged in 1970 (see Warhurst and Merrill 1982). In 1979, however, the Victorian branch, led by the charismatic Margaret Tighe, split to become Right to Life Australia (RTLA) (see Coleman 1988). The RTLA was an organisation that shared the DLP’s views on issues concerning fertility control, euthanasia

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and embryonic stem cell research and many of its members had helped the DLP in previous election campaigns by staffing polling booths on election days and delivering leaflets to households. While the RTLA comprised many Catholic members, it was not an exclusively religious organisation and sought to position itself as a secular group (see Bachelard 2009). Indeed, the RTLA was regarded as part of the broad social movement that attempted to change attitudes concerning fertility control (Warhurst 2008). Despite being a small organisation, the RTLA was seen to be the strongest anti-abortion group in Australia and it fielded candidates for election. Tighe was an effective campaigner and used techniques similar to those used by pro-life groups in the United States to advance her group’s concerns (see Sawer 1980). These included the use of shock tactics as well as campaigning against pro-choice parliamentarians (Pringle 2012). In the United States, pro-life groups have sought to exert in­ fluence over electoral contests and, on occasions, have impacted on electoral outcomes (see Durham 1994; Maxwell 2002). But in the Australia, the RTLA’s electoral forays were far less successful. As Pringle (2012: 400) noted, groups like the RTLA were largely successful in constructing a perception that they had the power to influence electoral results. In practical terms, their impact on the contest was marginal.

8.3 A battle for control: the DLP confronts the Right to Life movement Following the DLP’s election to the Victorian parliament in 2006, the RTLA sought to build even closer links with the party. This move promised to have benefits for both entities: the DLP would gain a group of new members and the RTLA would be closely linked to a party that would advance its policies on fertility control in parliament. But as the links began to strengthen between the two groups, a battle for control of the organis­ ation emerged within the RTLA that would have implications for the DLP. The contest was between the more moderate members of the RTLA, including former Victorian president Tighe, and elements of the ‘far rightwing fringe’ of the Catholic faith (Bachelard 2009). The fringe elements, led by Marcel White (who had replaced Tighe as president in 2008) and Peter McBroom, sought to introduce Catholic ‘purity’ to the RTLA. For example, White and McBroom had talked of ‘visitations from the Virgin Mary’ and accused their opponents of not ‘reciting the rosary passionately enough’ (Bachelard 2009). White had also been associated with the Tell

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the Truth Coalition which, in 2008, had mailed out graphic pamphlets of aborted foetuses in unmarked envelopes to homes across Victoria in an attempt to generate debate about fertility control at a time when changes to abortion law were being debated in the Victorian Parliament (see Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2008). Despite the zeal of its campaign, the RTLA failed to stop the passage of the Abortion Law Reform Bill 2008 and highlighted how the organisation struggled to have a significant influence on the political debate (also see Gleeson 2011). White and McBroom were also members of the DLP and, following their failed campaign to stop abortion law reform in Victoria, turned their attention to imbuing the party with a greater sense of religion. Their positions and level of influence within the DLP and RTLA were strengthened by the fact that they were able to attract new members to both organisations. Some estimates suggested that the pair had signed up 500 new members to each organisation (see Bachelard 2009). This influx was welcomed by the DLP as it had consistently struggled to keep 500 financial members. But the goal of White and his supporters was to use the DLP as a vehicle to advance their religious-based agenda in the realm of party politics. And since the DLP already held a seat in the Victorian parliament, they believed they could have an immediate impact on public policy. In response to these machinations the DLP’s Victorian parliamentarian, Peter Kavanagh and significant sections of the party moved to marginalise these religious elements and reclaim dominance over the party. They did this by reaffirming the DLP’s acceptance and tolerance of all religions and dismissed White and McBroom’s advances as extremist (Bachelard 2009). After a lengthy campaign, White acquiesced and resigned as president of the RTLA in 2009. This also diminished his influence in the DLP. After hav­ ing quelled the advancement of fringe religious elements from the RTLA, the DLP retained a significant number of moderate RTLA members. These members remained in the party because they believed it was adequately representing their policy goals without incorporating explicit religious themes. The presence of RTLA members also had a positive effect on the DLP as the party could draw on their resources to mount an effective federal election campaign in 2010.

8.4 Back from the dead: the DLP and the 2010 federal election By the time of the 2010 federal election, the DLP had been reconstituted as a federal party and fielded Senate candidates in all states. There was

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controversy, however, when Mulholland was replaced as Victorian Secretary prior to the 2010 campaign. In a lengthy legal battle that began in 2008, Mulholland disputed the vote that ousted him as state secretary.52 While the feud played out, the party selected John Madigan, a blacksmith from Ballarat with a relatively low public profile, to be its lead Senate candidate in Victoria for the 2010 federal election. With limited resources Madigan did virtually no campaigning, leaving the party in charge (see Lillebuen 2010). The DLP, meanwhile, drew on its RTLA members to bolster its presence in the electorate and assist in campaigning activities. The party’s campaign was very modest, however, with scattered letterboxing of promotional pamphlets its major activity. Throughout the campaign, the DLP emphasised that it was different from its earlier incarnation as it placed significant emphasis on promoting a conservative moral agenda, similar to that it advanced in the 2006 Victorian state election. For example, the DLP website emphasised the idea that the new DLP was different from the earlier version by presenting itself as ‘Today’s DLP’ while referring to its anti-communist program as being part of its ‘past’ (DLP 2010). Furthermore, its website outlined how the party would advance ‘the interests of Australians… by preserving, protecting and building on the family’ (DLP 2010). The new DLP’s suite of policies included opposition to the use of in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) by single women and lesbians, opposition to euthanasia and a zero tolerance to illicit drugs as well as stem cell research. The party also pursued socially conservative policies on other matters including the issue of families. One of the clearest examples of this was the party’s policy on marriage. The DLP had an absolute ‘opposition to legislative or administrative measures’ that would ‘undermine or degrade marriage by conferring on homosexual, lesbian or transsexual pairings any form of legal recognition of their relationships’. Moreover, the DLP sought to abolish the ‘dishonestly named Family Court of Australia’ as well as to strive for greater censorship of pornography (DLP 2010). The DLP, similar to its strategy in the 2006 Victorian state election, harvested preferences from a range of minor parties. The party’s electoral prospects were bolstered by swapping preferences with a range of rightof-centre parties such as Family First, One Nation and the Christian Democratic Party. Crucially, the DLP also received the preferences of the 52 This matter was resolved in June 2012 when the Court of Appeal upheld Mulholland’s case but this had no impact on the structure of the party. For further discussion, see Chip Le Grand, ‘Court victory for DLP power broker John Mulholland after four year battle’, The Australian, 15 June 2012.

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Coalition in Victoria. While the DLP won just 2.3 per cent of the primary vote in Victoria, the party was able to win a Senate seat as a result of its preference deals. As a point of comparison, Family First won 2.6 per cent of the vote yet could not maintain its Senate seat. This highlighted how effectively the new DLP had used the GVT system to win representation in the Senate. The new DLP’s success, however, was due to some factors over which it had little control. In particular, the number of right-of-centre minor parties in Victoria meant that the right-of-centre vote fragmented, resulting in a fall in the Coalition’s primary vote to an historic low of 34.4 per cent (or 2.4 quota). This meant that the Coalition was not in a position to attract preferences to win a third quota, so its surplus flowed to the minor parties. The DLP’s preference deals meant that it remained in the count long enough to attract the tranche of Coalition votes, which ultimately elected Maddigan to the Senate.53 Having won a seat in 2010, the new DLP was optimistic about its elec­ toral chances in 2013. Signalling how the party had moved away from its earlier incarnation, the party changed the spelling of its name to Democratic Labour Party (returning to the British spelling) just before the election. The party also contested 33 lower house seats compared to just seven in 2010. Its national primary vote, however, was less than 0.3 per cent. In the Senate, the party fielded candidates in all states except Western Australia and attracted 0.8 per cent of the national primary vote, 0.3 per cent lower than in 2010. Disaggregating the results shows that the DLP’s best performance was in New South Wales where the party’s lead Senate candidate was obstetrician Simon McCaffery who was also the President of the Right to Life (NSW). Despite attracting the support of the pro-life movement in the state, the party won just 1.5 per cent of the primary vote. Furthermore, in Victoria where the party held a seat, the party’s primary vote fell to 0.7 per cent. This was a disappointing result for the DLP as it suggested the party had failed to sufficiently broaden its policy platform . The party’s lead candidate in Victoria was Mark Farrell who was a small business owner. Unlike 53 In a somewhat ironic twist, the Coalition candidate who lost this contest was Julian McGauran who was first elected as a Nationals senator in 1987. Julian McGauran, along with his brother Peter (a minister in the Howard Government) had supported the DLP and shared many of the party’s socially conservative values. Moreover, the McGaurans had bankrolled the DLP’s legal challenge when the AEC sought to deregister the party in 2004. Twenty-three years after winning a Senate seat on the back of DLP preferences, and after having supported the party’s quest to remain registered, Julian McGauran’s preferences were crucial in electing the DLP back into the Senate in 2010.

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McCaffery, Farrell did not have a high profile in the pro-life movement or in the broader community. Another significant challenge for the DLP in Victoria was the fact that there was a record number of minor parties contesting the 2013 election, many of which were from the right of centre. This caused a fragmentation of the right-of-centre vote and contributed to a fall in the DLP’s support. However, the most crucial issue for the DLP in 2013 was that it was unable to manufacture beneficial preference deals as it had in 2010. Indeed, the decision of the major parties to direct their preferences to other parties, such as Family First and the Palmer United Party (PUP) before the DLP in New South Wales and Victoria, contributed to the DLP’s inability to consolidate its Senate representation.

8.5 Conclusion: risen from the dead The DLP elected to the Senate in 2010 was significantly different to the earlier incarnation of the party in terms of its source of mobilisation and the position it sought to play in the political debate. The original DLP was created as a result of a split in the ALP and primarily aimed to stop Labor from regaining government while opposing communism. In contrast, the modern version of the party was mobilised with the aim of advancing a specific policy agenda with links to broad social movements. The new DLP continued the tradition of issue-competitive parties winning Senate representation in contemporary Australian politics. While the original DLP had sought to highlight its socially conservative moral credentials during the 1970s, it could not effectively shift its position in Australian politics from being seen as a primarily anti-communist and anti-Labor party (Lyons 2008). With debates about communism no longer having much relevance, the primary focus of the new DLP was to advance a conservative moral agenda that was clearly linked to movements such as Right to Life. Furthermore, the new DLP benefited from close links with the RTLA, especially as the movement offered the party resources that were used during election campaigns. In 2010, the new DLP’s explicitly socially conservative policies played a role in motivating some Victorians to support the party. But the party’s ability to use the GVT to great effect in 2010, something it could not do in its earlier incarnation, was critical to winning Senate representation. Indeed, eschewing the anti-Labor and anticommunist focus in favour of pursuing a conservative moral agenda provided the DLP with greater scope to wheel and deal preferences with other parties and ultimately helped the party win Senate representation.

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On one level, the DLP’s recent success might suggest that the party’s program of conservative moral reform resonated with sections of the com­ munity. This chapter cast doubt on this by highlighting the low primary vote the party won in recent elections. Instead, the new DLP’s ability to win Senate representation was due to favourable circumstances and using the Hawke Government reforms effectively. Indeed, the Coalition performed so poorly in the 2010 federal election in Victoria that it had to distribute its preferences to other parties rather than finding itself in a position to win a third Senate seat. The new DLP benefited from this situation as it had manufactured preference deals that allowed it to claim the sixth and final Senate seat in Victoria. While the new DLP resembles a modern issuecompetitive party, its ability to maintain parliamentary representation in the future is heavily dependent on the electoral performance of the major parties and preference wheeling and dealing. This was highlighted in 2013 when the party failed to re-create similar preference deals and was unable to consolidate its presence in the Senate.

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Cha pte r 9

The 2013 election: Confirming the evolution in the type of minor party elected to the Senate The 2013 election was significant for the Senate minor party system as an unprecedented number of new parties won representation. The Liberal Democrats Party (LDP), the Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party (AMEP) and the Palmer United Party (PUP) all won seats for the first time. To assess these parties’ impact on the Australian party system in the Senate, the following discussion examines the origins, structures and policy traditions of each party. The chapter shows that, despite these parties appearing to be diverse in terms of their sources of mobilisation and policy programs, they shared some common themes. In particular, the chapter shows that these parties were all of the issue-competitive type and that they emerged in response to the national political debate. In locating these parties in the Australian minor party system, the chapter argues that these parties resembled right-populist parties, especially because of their distinctive organisational arrangements and policy platforms. In terms of their organisations, the chapter highlights how these parties were constructed around an individual and gave their leaders absolute control over the party’s decisions while marginalising the role of ordinary members. In regards to their policies, the chapter shows how these parties proposed simple solutions to complex social and economic policy problems. This chapter also considers the electoral performances of the new minor parties elected to the Senate in 2013. The 2013 election was unusual as the combined vote for the major parties in the Senate fell to an historic low. Furthermore, a record number of minor parties contested the 2013 election. This chapter shows that, similar to other minor parties that won Senate representation in the past, the electoral victories of these parties in 2013 was due to preference wheeling and dealing, as well as some factors over which they had little control, rather than mass support of their agendas.

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9.1 The Liberal Democrats Of the three new parties that won Senate seats in 2013, the LDP was the oldest. It first emerged in the Australian Capital Territory in 2001. The party was created by economist John Humphries and contested ACT elections but won a very small primary vote and could not win parliament­ ary representation. The party began to take a more sophisticated approach to elections when former vet David Leyonhjelm became the party’s treasurer and registered officer. Leyonhjelm had a long history in politics having joined the Labor party in the 1970s, then joining the Liberal Party in the 1980s with the aim of advocating policies that would reduce government intervention in economic and social policies. He was also a keen sports shooter and joined the Shooters Party while in the Liberal Party. In 1996, he left the Liberal Party following the Howard Government’s decision to ban semi-automatic guns after the Port Arthur murders. Leyonhjelm became chairman of the Shooters Party and managed the party’s 2003 New South Wales state election campaign in which the party retained its upper house seat. In 2005 he joined the LDP, along with Peter Whelan who became the party’s president. Whelan also had a lengthy history in politics and was active in pro-shooters groups, serving as the president of the Shooters Union NSW. Together, Leyonhjelm and Whelan worked to establish the LDP as a party focused on contesting federal, rather than state, elections. Leyonhjelm and Whelan sought to raise the public profile of their nascent party in the electorate by highlighting the LDP’s suite of policies that were quite different from the established parties’. At their core, the LDP’s principles were based on classical liberalism and advanced notions of free trade, freedom of choice and the abolition of the welfare state. As a result, the party supported policies such as euthanasia, the use of cannabis, and same-sex marriage. It also promoted the right of all citizens to own firearms well as ending prosecutions for victimless crimes, which it described as illegal but which did not threaten the rights of anyone else. These included ‘crimes’ such as abortion, public nudity and the consumption of pornography (Liberal Democrats Party 2013). Leyonhjelm and Whelan also focused on making significant changes to the party’s organisational arrangements as well as its electoral strategies in order to enhance the party’s electoral prospects. They reformed the LDP’s constitution to make it a centralised national entity. The party’s membership also rose as Leyonhjelm and Whelan attracted members from the shooters groups they had been associated with for many years. The two men also

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actively sought out new members by attending various functions such as gun and motoring enthusiast gatherings. As Whelan (2010) explained, the LDP attracted people who felt their individual liberties were being taken away by a government that was increasing in size. As he put it, the LDP attracted those who were ‘fed up with excessive bureaucracy and government intrusion into their lives’ (Whelan 2010). Indeed, the party was linked to broad social movements concerned with enhancing individual liberties, especially on the matter of gun ownership, while reducing the regulatory role of government on economic and social matters. Structurally, the LDP resembled a mass party with membership available to individuals as well as organisations. In practice, however, the party was dominated by a core group of individuals in its National Executive, led by Leyonhjelm and Whelan, who wielded significant power. The National Executive had the authority to accept or reject as well as suspend or expel members. The party’s organisation was structured to enable the two men significant influence over every facet of the party’s operation. For example, while the party sought to contest state and federal elections, the party’s organisation existed only at a federal level. This meant that rather than have state branches the National Executive was responsible for the party’s presence in the states. This mitigated any possible disputes with branches and ensured that Leyonhjelm and Whelan oversaw the party’s operation in all jurisdictions. The party’s initial electoral forays were disastrous. The party’s attempt at registering as a national entity failed after the AEC argued that its name was too similar to the Australian Democrats and the Liberal Party. Leyon­ hjelm and Whelan agreed to change the name of their party to the Liberal and Democracy Party in order to contest the 2007 election. Despite fielding candidates in all states, the party won 0.1 per cent of the national vote and failed to win parliamentary representation. Leyonhjelm stood as the party’s candidate against Prime Minister John Howard in Bennelong but won only 0.1 per cent of the vote. Convinced that the party’s name needed to be changed in order to enhance its electoral prospects, the party once again sought to be called the Liberal Democrats. Despite objections from the Liberal Party and Australian Democrats, the AEC allowed the party to use this name in future elections. As we shall see, this decision would have ramifications in the 2013 election. In the 2010 election, the LDP fielded Senate candidates in all states except Tasmania. However, its electoral performance remained poor. The party won 1.8 per cent of the national vote and was unable to win parliamentary

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representation. Following this disappointing performance, Leyonhjelm and Whelan continued to work on developing the party’s profile in the elect­ orate in order to enhance its electoral prospects in 2013. Indeed, the party contested the 2013 election by continuing to advance its suite of liberal policies, as described below. The result was positive. Standing as the lead Senate candidate in New South Wales, Leyonhjelm won 9.5 per cent of the primary vote and went on to win the party’s first seat in parliament. The party’s performance was significantly higher than its result in previous elections. While this appeared to suggest wide acceptance of its policy program, it was a combination of factors that allowed Leyonhjelm to win the seat. In 2013 the party took a sophisticated approach to using the GVT. Prior to the 2013 election, Leyonhjelm set up the new national party known as Outdoor Recreation Party (Stop the Greens) as well as having a role in setting up the Smokers Rights Party (see Crook 2013). The aim of these parties was to direct preferences to the LDP. These two parties won a combined primary vote of 0.4 per cent and assisted the LDP in winning Senate representation as their preferences went to Leyonhjelm. The LDP was also able to attract the preferences of a range of other minor parties through preference wheeling and dealing. These preferences played a major role in electing the LDP to the Senate. Two major factors also contributed to the LDP’s success. The first was that there was a record high of 110 candidates contesting the Senate elect­ ion in New South Wales but the LDP was listed first on the very long ballot paper, so benefiting the party due to the ‘primacy effect’ (see King and Leigh 2009). The party had this strategically important position on the ballot paper following the AEC’s random draw of candidates. The second factor was the result of Leyonhjelm’s efforts to change the party’s name to the Liberal Democrats. It became apparent after the election that many voters in New South Wales had given their vote to the party by mistake, thinking that they were actually voting for the Liberal Party. Conceding that the party’s primary vote was inflated with unintended support, Leyonhjelm noted that he was ‘going to be the senator for the donkeys’ (referring to the ‘donkey vote’ phenomenon) (cited in Aston 2013a). While the LDP’s success was built on the efforts of Leyonhjelm and Whelan, it was the party’s preference wheeling and dealing, in addition to benefiting from some factors it could not control, that allowed it to claim its first Senate seat.

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9.2 The Palmer United Party Of the three new parties that won Senate representation in 2013, the Palmer United Party (PUP) was the most successful as it won three Senate seats in addition to a lower house seat.54 The party was created by businessman Clive Palmer who had a lengthy history in Coalition politics. He was Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen’s media spokesman in the 1980s and was involved with the ‘Joh for Canberra’ campaign in 1987. A life member of the Liberal National Party (LNP), Palmer’s advance towards a parliamentary career began in 2012 when he sought to become the LNP’s candidate in the seat of Lilley in order to stand against then-Treasurer Wayne Swan. Within a few weeks, Palmer decided that he could not support the Coalition’s asylum seeker policy and withdrew from the contest. He also became highly critical of the Queensland LNP state government about economic policies and the influence exerted by lobbyists on government policy. In response, the LNP suspended his membership. Within a few weeks, the LNP reinstated Palmer’s membership but he resigned from the party. Freed from the constraints of party discipline, Palmer became a regular contributor to the political debate and often appeared in the media. With apparent support for his innovative proposals to solve policy problems, especially from his home state of Queensland, Palmer began to build mo­ mentum as a political force in the lead up to the 2013 election. He had built a high-public profile and had presented himself as an anti-system figure. In May, just four months before the election, Palmer announced he had created a new party that aimed to ‘take away the game from professional politicians who say the same thing’ (Jones, 2013). Initially, the party was called the United Australia Party, a name that Palmer argued signalled a continuation of the original party, which had existed throughout the 1930s and 1940s. However, Palmer was forced to change the name to Palmer United Party after the Uniting Australia Party, an unrelated party created in Queensland, successfully argued that the name ‘United Australia Party’ was too close to its own. By launching his new party, Palmer strengthened the notion of being an anti-system politician. He branded the established parties as boring because, he argued, they had virtually the same social and economic policies. Instead, Palmer promised to bring about change by offering innovative solutions to social and economic policy problems and promised to advance the interests 54 This includes the seat the party won after the 2014 re-election for the Senate seat in Western Australia.

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of ordinary Australians. In particular, the party was concerned with reduc­ ing income tax in order to stimulate the economy. The party also sought to reduce the size of government in order to motivate Australians to be more self-reliant and entrepreneurial. Rather than remain as a narrowly focused anti-tax party, however, the PUP proposed a broad suite of policies. For example, the PUP advocated an increase in the aged pension and argued that the major parties’ offshore processing of asylum seekers was a waste of taxpayer funds. Palmer’s core message resonated with sections of the electorate that felt disenchanted with the policies of the major parties. Moreover, Palmer’s charisma played a significant role in attracting electoral support. Indeed, Palmer continued to attract significant media attention through­ out the campaign, especially since his media performances were very differ­ ent from other leaders’ performances. In one appearance on commercial radio, a platform not frequented by major party leaders to the same extent, Palmer danced (published on the radio’s website) and challenged leaders of both parties to a dance contest as they had refused to include him in the televised leaders’ debate. In another interview on ABC radio, Palmer abruptly ended the discussion after the host enquired about allegations faced by two of his party’s candidates in Victoria about violence against women. These performances raised Palmer’s public profile and supported his claims of being a different type of politician from those from the established parties. Palmer personally funded his nascent party’s election campaign, which reportedly cost $12 million. So well resourced was the party that it reportedly outspent Labor in advertising in the final week of the campaign. Furthermore, the PUP contested every lower house seat and fielded candidates in every state and territory. It won a national primary vote in the lower house of 5.5 per cent which made the party the fourth best performing behind the major parties and the Greens. Moreover, Palmer won the Coalition-held lower house seat of Fairfax after winning 26.5 per cent of the primary vote. The preference deals Palmer had organised meant that he was able to win the seat by 53 votes. This was a remarkable result for a new party. Clearly, Palmer’s high public profile and message had resonated with sections of voters in the rural Queensland seat. The party was also successful in winning Senate representation. The party claimed three seats after attracting a national vote of 4.9 per cent at the general election. The first was in Queensland where the party won 9.9 per cent of the primary vote. The party’s electoral prospects were bolstered by the fact that it received the Greens’ preferences. This was because the Greens

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believed that the PUP’s asylum seeker policy was more humane than the policies of the major parties. The PUP won its second seat in Tasmania after winning 6.6 per cent of the primary vote. The flow of preferences, especially from the right-of-centre parties and the Greens, helped the party reach the required quota. In both cases, the party’s electoral chances were bolstered by the poor performance of the major parties, a point discussed later in this chapter. The Palmer United Party also won a seat in the Senate re-election in Western Australian, which was held after the AEC lost 1,370 ballot papers. The PUP performed very strongly and won 12.3 per cent of the primary vote. It relied on, and received, a small number of preferences to reach the necessary quota. In terms of its organisation, the PUP superficially resembled a mass party type. It comprised state branches and electorate councils, but while the PUP espoused notions of participatory democracy in its structures in theory, Clive Palmer was the most significant player in practice. Indeed, he installed members of his family to key positions, such as national treasurer and vice president, in order to keep ‘tight control’ of the party (Tin 2013). Like Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, it appeared that Palmer was motivated to ensure the party’s structure remained under his control by a fear of being infiltrated by opponents. Palmer justified this approach to organisation by stating that it would stop untrustworthy people from ‘finding out what you’re doing’ (cited in Tin 2013). This meant that Palmer had significant power over setting the party’s policies, preselecting candidates and making strategic decisions.55 The extent of Palmer’s influence, however, became problematic for the party’s organisation. Soon after the election, many members left the party over concerns about the extent of Palmer’s power. As one former parliament­ ary candidate argued, the party eschewed democratic processes and Palmer failed to listen to ordinary members (cited in Hurst 2013). But the freedom to act autonomously gave Palmer the ability to move quickly on strategic matters. For example, he was able to manufacture an alliance with the newly elected AMEP senator to vote with the PUP in the Senate and thus consolidate his party’s power in Australian politics. The opportunity to do so, however, came about as the AMEP experienced organisational disarray immediately after the election. 55 There was controversy, however, when Wang Zhenya became the party’s lead Senate candidate in Western Australia as Palmer had reportedly benefited from previous businesses dealings with Zhenya’s company (see Sydney Morning Herald, 22 October 2013).

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9.3 The Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party Like the PUP, the AMEP emerged just before the 2013 election. Unlike the PUP, however, the party had limited resources and a very low public profile during the campaign. The party was created by Queenslander Keith Littler, a former journalist and heavy haulage driver in the mining industry, with the aim of representing the interests of motoring enthusiasts. There was more to the party than just advocating the interests of motorists, however. As the party’s core values demonstrated, it was concerned with advancing a broad range of social and economic goals that supported ‘average Australians’. For example, the party was committed to protecting notions of mateship and community while also seeking to lower taxation. The party’s views on the role of government gave some further insight into its overall position in the political debate. In particular, the party aimed for ‘smaller’ government with minimal government interference on social and economic issues. An underlying sense that the major parties had abandoned average Australians was also apparent in the AMEP’s policy outlook. Indeed, the party stated that it arose in response to ‘the rights and civil liberties of everyday Australians being eroded at an alarming rate’ and promised to ‘bring focus back to the notion that the Government is there for the people; not, as it increasingly appears, the other way around’ (AMEP 2013). Furthermore, the party sought to protect the ‘Australian way of life’ from the policies of ‘irresponsible’ minorities (AMEP 2013; Ewart 2013). The AMEP was clearly mobilised by motoring enthusiasts, but voters who were unsatisfied with the policies of the established parties also supported it. In particular, concerns about a perceived increase in government size in addition to a reduction in individual freedoms underpinned the AMEP’s modest support base. Despite having limited experience in party politics, Keith Littler succeeded in establishing an AMEP presence in each state by attracting the support of members of various motoring enthusiast groups. Reflecting the fact the party had limited resources, the AMEP did not field candidates for the lower house, but only for the Senate. They contested these in all states, except Tasmania. The party’s strongest performances were in South Australia and Littler’s home state of Queensland where it won 0.7 per cent. The party won 0.6 per cent of the statewide vote in the general election as well winning the 2014 re-election in Western Australia. In Victoria, however, the party won a Senate seat despite the fact its candidate, Ricky Muir, attracted only 0.5 per cent of the primary vote. The AMEP’s victory was the result of sophisticated

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preference deals suggested by political consultant Glenn Druery. Indeed, in 2013 Druery, who advised interested minor parties how to best maximise their electoral prospects, met with what he called the ‘minor party alliance’ which comprised new minor parties that were unsure about how to best organise their preference flows. By following Druery’s advice, the AMEP was able to attract preferences from a range of minor parties. Furthermore, the fact that the AMEP was so new meant that other parties underestimated its capacity to attract preferences. As Druery noted after the 2013 election, the party was ‘underestimated by enough people that once they … got started it was like a snowball and they gathered everybody’. Another factor that influenced the Senate contest was the fact that the primary vote for the major parties was at historic lows. In fact, Labor’s primary vote in Victoria of 32.5 per cent was its lowest in the postwar period and the Coalition’s vote of 40.1 per cent was its second worst performance. The rise of so many new minor parties in 2013 played a role in taking votes away from the major parties. It also meant that the bulk of new parties won a very small primary vote. In fact, 34 of the 35 minor parties contesting the Victorian Senate election failed to win over 4 per cent of the primary vote. This result benefited the AMEP as its deals allowed it to take the preferences of these parties and stay in the count long enough to ultimately win a Senate seat. The party’s election stimulated debate about changing the electorate system, with critics arguing that the AMEP’s success came as a result of ‘gaming’ the system. The party attracted further controversy when a video showing Muir throwing kangaroo faeces was discovered on the internet in addition to comments he had made online describing former US president George W. Bush as the terrorist responsible for the September 11 attacks in 2001. But the party began to experience more significant internal problems just after claiming victory. While the AMEP’s structure appeared to be that of the mass party type, with its accommodation of rank and file members and a division of labour, Keith Littler dominated the party he created. Shortly after Muir was elected, the Littler-led national organisation moved to expel the Victorian branch of the party as it had corresponded with the media while unauthorised to do so, as well as having announced policies that were inconsistent with the party’s aims (Aston 2013b). This led to a bitter dispute as the Victorian branch felt that Littler’s actions marginalised the role of rank and file members. Indeed, it was apparent that Littler refused to consult, or even include, Victorian office-bearers in executive meetings. As one Victorian office-bearer put it,

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‘there was not a lot of point talking to the Littlers because they weren’t open to any discussion on things… they were doing things their way and that was the end of the argument’ (cited in Ewart 2013). The AMEP clearly struggled in its transition towards a party with parliamentary representation. With the party appearing to be immersed in a bitter dispute, Clive Palmer moved to build closer ties between his new party and Ricky Muir as he saw an opportunity to consolidate the PUP’s influence in the Senate. Acknowledging that the AMEP could also enhance its role in the Senate if it were to align itself with the PUP, Littler appeared to favour an agreement. As Muir no longer had contact with members of the Victorian arm of the party, he quickly joined the alliance with the PUP. The agreement would ensure that Muir voted with the PUP parliamentarians in the Senate. This caused significant internal instability and led to AMEP members leaving the party as they felt ‘betrayed’ and marginalised by the party’s decision-making processes.

9.5 Conclusion: analysing the class of 2013 More new minor parties were elected to the parliament in 2013 than in any previous election in Australia and all corresponded to the issue-competitive type. While there was diversity in the sources of mobilisation of the LDP, PUP and AMEP, all parties advanced a specific policy agenda with links to broad social movements. Moreover, the LDP, PUP and AMEP emerged in response to the political debate during the period of the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments. In particular, these parties vehemently opposed two key policies that were introduced by Labor in office; the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) – commonly referred to as the mining tax – and the carbon pricing scheme – commonly referred to as the carbon tax. The Rudd Government sought to implement the mining tax after a review of the taxation system. The original version of the tax sought to impose levies on mining companies for the profits they made, rather than pay mining royalties. The mining industry vigorously opposed the policy because it was concerned about the economic impact the scheme would have on its operations. It quickly moved to saturate all media platforms with antitax advertisements. In response, the government aired its own commercials supporting the scheme. This led to hostility between the government and mining sector and contributed to the decision of the Labor Party to replace Rudd with Gillard. As prime minister, Gillard quickly moved to redraft the policy in order to ameliorate the mining sector’s concerns. Labor introduced

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the new version of the tax which reduced the levy imposed on profits in 2011. By 2013, it had become apparent that the tax was not effective in raising revenue, which led to greater concerns within the mining sector about the government’s capacity to create policies associated with the industry. In a political sense, the mining tax was damaging to the Labor government for two main reasons. First, the unpopular tax played a role in the removal of an incumbent prime minister, sowing the seeds for the party’s ensuing leadership battles. Second, the tax corroded the relationship between the mining industry and the government. The introduction of the mining tax also impacted the minor party system as it mobilised a range of new parties to emerge and contest the 2013 election. Indeed, opposition to the mining tax played a role in mobilising the LDP, PUP and AMEP as these parties promised to repeal it once in parliament. Labor’s decision to implement a carbon pricing scheme also played a role in mobilising the new minor parties that won seats in 2013. Describing climate change as ‘the great moral challenge of our generation’, Kevin Rudd sought to implement an emissions trading scheme (ETS), similar to Europe, soon after winning the 2007 election. The Coalition opposition, led by Malcolm Turnbull, signalled it would support Labor’s scheme. But with many Liberal parliamentarians upset by Turnbull’s position, the party replaced him as leader with Tony Abbott who rejected an ETS. With the Coalition appearing to be in turmoil, Rudd could have sought a double dissolution election on the issue. Rudd, however, did not call an election and his leadership was terminated soon after. The responsibility of implementing climate change policy fell to Julia Gillard. Following negotiations with the crossbenchers whose support Labor needed to govern after the 2010 election, Gillard announced that her government would implement a carbon pricing scheme. It was the gov­ ernment’s intention that the scheme would eventually change to an ETS. The carbon pricing scheme became a core feature of the political debate during the Gillard government’s time in office. A problem for Labor, however, was that opinion polls, such as Newspoll, showed that the government’s popularity fell well below 50 per cent on a two-party preferred basis while its primary vote dipped to historic lows. The carbon tax mobilised many opponents within the community who vigorously objected to the proposal and led to protest rallies against the policy in capital cities. Furthermore, that opposition to the carbon tax also played a role in mobilising the new minor parties elected to parliament in 2013 as all opposed the scheme and sought to repeal it once in parliament.

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The new minor parties elected in 2013 shared other common themes in addition to their deep concerns about the carbon and mining taxes. In terms of their policy outlook, all parties proposed relatively simple proposals to address complex economic and social policies. For example, all parties sought to advance the interests of ‘ordinary Australians’ in addition to reducing the scope of government intervention but they often did not give precise or detailed explanations of how their policies would work. The new minor parties elected in 2013 also shared common organisational structures. In particular, each party demonstrated traits often associated with rightpopulist parties. Like One Nation, (another right-populist party discussed in Chapter 6), these new parties gave their leaders extensive powers while marginalising the role ordinary members could play in the party’s operation. This approach allowed the parties’ leaders to make decisions they believed were best for the party quickly and free from internal dissent. However, this approach also led to internal instability as ordinary members left the party as they realised they were almost superfluous to the party’s operation. On the one hand, the success of these new minor parties in winning parliamentary representation suggests that their policy agendas resonated with significant portions of the electorate. The examination of their electoral performances above, however, suggests that this was not the case as the parties attracted low levels of support. Indeed, in many cases the parties could not even get 4 per cent of the primary vote which would have allowed them to recoup their election deposits. The reason for the success of these new minor parties in 2013 was due to two major factors. The first was the fact that the election result was unusual as, for the first time, the major parties failed to win at least 80 per cent of the Senate primary vote. As flagged earlier in the chapter, Labor’s primary vote was at a record low. In cases where a major party’s vote falls, the support often shifts to their opponents, especially in elections where there is a change of government. This was not the case in 2013. Rather than vote for the Coalition, many voters appeared to vote for one of the new minor parties. In doing so, the 2013 election results highlighted that an anti-system sentiment was apparent in the Australian electorate. This clearly impacted on Senate contests as the fall in support for the major parties gave new minor parties opportunities to win seats. In some cases, the major parties’ performance, especially Labor’s, was so poor that it was excluded in the count and its preferences boosted the electoral fortunes of new minor parties. The second reason for new minor parties’ success in 2013 was how they used the GVT to their advantage. This book has highlighted in earlier

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chapters how minor parties used preference deals to great effect in the past. The approach of many new minor parties in 2013 highlighted how new minor parties could win Senate representation by constructing a range of sophisticated preference deals. The advent of an historically high number of minor parties meant that they were able to construct beneficial preference deals even when they could not attract the preferences of the major parties. With such a fragmentation of voting behaviour in 2013, these preference deals played a significant role in electing the new minor parties to the Senate. Indeed, the 2013 election results demonstrated how the Australian Senate minor party system had evolved. The chamber was filled with an un­ precedented number of minor parties. Moreover, all the new minor parties elected to the Senate corresponded to the issue-competitive type. Indeed, the result of the 2013 Senate contest confirmed that there had been a significant shift in the type of minor party winning Senate representation in Australia.

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Cha pte r 10

Issues, organisation, impact, volatility: Towards a Senate-oriented minor party system The Australian Senate-based minor party system has undergone some significant changes. Prior to the introduction of proportional representation in 1949, the Labor and non-Labor parties consistently dominated the Senate party system. The shift to proportional representation was an important catalyst, although its impact was not immediate and it was not until 1955 that a new minor party, the DLP, won a seat and signalled the start of a Senatebased minor party system. Since then a number of other minor parties have won Senate representation. Indeed, this qualitative change indicates that the Senate minor party system has evolved. This study highlights important evolutionary changes. First, a transition in the type of minor party elected to the Senate has occurred. The initial minor parties that won Senate representation were created as a result of major party fragmentation. The minor parties elected since 1984, however, appeared to have a closer nexus with new social movements. The second theme relates to the organisation of minor parties. An evo­ lutionary change in how Senate-oriented minor parties have approached the problem of developing extra-parliamentary organisations has emerged. The first parties to win representation modelled their organisation on the major parties’ structures. Organisational innovation was introduced by the Australian Democrats, and parties elected since have demonstrated diff­ erent ways to organise their extra-parliamentary wings. Third, the question of minor parties and their ‘impact’ is considered. Some minor parties impacted on the Senate by using its operation as a means to advance policy issues and agendas. But being in the Senate actually had significant impact on some of these parties. As discussed later in this chapter, making the transition from a party without parliamentary representation to a party with a Senate seat was a challenge for some minor parties. In many cases, a significant problem for them was trying to maintain the effective operation

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of their extra-parliamentary and parliamentary wings. Finally, the volatility of Senate-oriented minor parties is examined.

10.1 Transition: the evolution of minor party type in the Australian Senate The type of minor parties elected to the Senate has changed over time. The first minor parties elected to the Senate since the introduction of the proport­ ional representation system of voting were the result of fragmentation of the major parties. The DLP was created in the aftermath of the Labor split of the 1950s, while the Liberal Movement and the Australian Democrats emerged as a result of fragmentation of the Liberal Party in the 1960s and 1970s. These parties were important as they demonstrated that minor parties could, in fact, win seats and play a role in the Australian Senate that was otherwise dominated by the major parties. The Australian Democrats, in particular, were significant as they had a major impact on the policy debate by using the check-and-balance functions of the Senate (also see Bach 2003:183–8). This was especially the case when the party was in the position of holding the balance of power between the Labor and the Coalition parties. In doing so, the party inspired the mobilisation of other minor parties that would later win Senate representation. From 1984 onwards a new type of minor party began to win Senate rep­ resentation. Rather than being the result of major party fragmentation, the more recent parties to win Senate seats mobilised around specific policy demands, or on broad notions of how politics could be linked to debates about the human condition. They corresponded to what Green-Pedersen (2007) identified as issue-competitive parties. The link between issue-competitive parties and new social movements was particularly strong, with the NDP, Greens WA, Australian Greens, One Nation, Family First, the new DLP and the new minor parties elected in 2013 all having links to broader social movements. Along with this change to the type of minor party elected to the Senate, emerged a greater volatility that was not as apparent during the time of the fragmentary parties. The DLP’s time in the Senate spanned over two decades while the Australian Democrats (which comprised the Liberal Movement) also appeared to have a modest, but somewhat resilient, presence in the Senate party system from 1977 to 1984. By contrast, issue-competitive parties were much less stable than the fragmentary parties. The NDP, for instance, collapsed shortly after its emergence and more recent parties, such as One Nation, also experienced organisational volatility soon after entering the Senate. Despite such volatility, the rise of issue-competitive parties since

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1984 placed electoral pressure on the remaining fragmentary party: the Australian Democrats. The Australian Democrats benefited from major party de-alignment during their early period. While the major parties dominated Senate con­ tests, minor parties, depending on their electoral performance, could be in a position to win the final seat in half-Senate elections (see Mackerras 1993; Economou 2006). This trend suggested that there was not enough electoral support to allow more than one minor party to win a Senate seat in each state. During the late 1970s to early 1980s the Democrats were effective in winning a number of such contests. The party, however, began to face serious electoral challenges with the rise of issue-competitive parties, especially after the reforms to the Senate voting system. With their oftenspecific policy agendas, and an ability to wheel and deal preferences with the major parties, these new parties posed an electoral problem for the Democrats whose rules prohibited the party from making preference deals with the major parties. The NDP, Greens WA and Australian Greens appeared to be the greatest challengers to the Australian Democrats as they shared a number of similar policy goals. Initially, it appeared that the fragmentary party would be able to resist the electoral threat posed by the issue-competitive parties. In fact, the Australian Democrats withstood the threat of the NDP and were also successful in limiting the electoral success of the Greens WA in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Democrats, however, could not triumph over the Australian Greens (which gradually evolved into a nationally confederated structure) not least because of the Australian Greens preference relationship with the ALP. By 2007 the Australian Democrats had lost all Senate representation while the Australian Greens had not only consolidated its presence in the Senate, but also actually increased its representation in the chamber. What this shows is that the Australian Senate-oriented minor party system underwent a significant transition in which the fragmentary type of minor party was replaced by the issue-competitive type. The other minor parties to have won Senate representation since 1984 were of the issue-competitive type. The election of One Nation and Family First gave a stronger indication as to how the Senate minor party system had changed. The electoral victories of the new DLP in 2010 and the emergence of the LDP, PUP, AMEP and the Australian Sex Party (ASP) in 2013 confirmed how the issue-competitive type of minor party had replaced the fragmentary minor party in the Australian Senate.

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10.2 Innovation: the organisational diversity of issues-oriented minor parties Australia’s Senate-based minor parties have been organised in a variety of ways reflecting different normative assumptions about internal party democracy (or, in the case of right-of-centre minor parties, a suspicion about internal democracy). The DLP and Liberal Movement copied the template of the parties they had split from. The Australian Democrats introduced organisational innovation with a structure that aimed to encourage the participation of all its members. The importance of the Australian Demo­ crats’ approach to organisation was that it provided a model for other parties from the left-of-centre as it demonstrated that it was possible for minor parties with different organisational structures to win and maintain Senate representation. Moreover, the Australian Democrats’ approach to organ­ isation was democratic and allowed all of its members to participate in the party’s decision-making processes (also see Gauja 2005; Economou and Ghazarian 2008). The broad membership of political parties is crucial in providing human and financial resources as well as providing the pool of talent from which the party’s candidates will be drawn. As the issue-competitive parties demonstrated, there were different ways of structuring a political party and incorporating rank and file members. At this point, Macridis’ (1967:21) measure of party ‘openness’ and ‘closedness’ is useful in analysing the parties’ approaches to organisation. Macridis argued parties that were open allowed most, if not all, of their members to have easy access to deliberative procedures. Furthermore, such parties encouraged all members to be active in the party’s operation. In contrast, members in closed parties were ‘expected to follow the decisions made by the leaders without having easy access to open deliberative procedures’ (Macridis 1967:21). Closed parties also severely limited the opportunity for members to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. In assessing the organisational features of the issue-competitive minor parties in Australia a pattern has emerged. An enduring theme of the left-of-centre parties was that their structures reflected Macridis’ (1967) notion of openness. Interestingly, their organis­ ation replicated the strong commitment to inclusionary politics associated with new social movements (also see Muetzelfeldt 1984; Feher and Heller 1984). This could be seen by the emphasis these left-of-centre parties placed on attempting to maximise opportunities for all members to participate in the party’s decision-making. The NDP, for example, was so inclusionary

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that it gave all members the right to be involved in all facets of the party’s decision-making processes. Moreover, the NDP permitted members of other political parties to join the party. The problem for the NDP was that its organisation was so open that it could not effectively deal with internal disputes. This was clearly demonstrated during the party’s split in 1985. Having experienced the organisational instability of the NDP, the Greens WA implemented an organisational model that not only incorporated an inclusionary ethos, but also developed a division of labour within its ranks. In organising the party, the Greens WA incorporated some oligarchic tendencies often associated with political parties (see Michels 2001). For example, the Greens WA developed an executive charged with the task of running the day-to-day activities of the party in addition to dealing with disputes within the organisation. The party also used a delegate system, which meant that members who had the support of other members could be elected to positions where they could then participate in decision-making. There were also conditions placed on members, such as not permitting them to belong to other political parties. The Australian Greens’ approach to organisation shared similarities with the Greens WA. In particular, the Australian Greens also incorporated some oligarchic tendencies in its organisation in that the party had an executive and office-bearers, who were responsible for day-to-day affairs. The party also used a delegate system in which some members had greater potential to influence decision-making than others. The Australian Greens, however, sought to reach decisions through consensus rather than voting, and provided all members with an opportunity to participate in discussions regarding party policy. Like the Greens WA, members of the Australian Greens could stand for election to all positions within the organisation. Clearly these parties sought to be open, while implementing structures that allowed the organisation to make timely and coordinated decisions on important issues such as policy and campaigning strategies. This approach, however, became a source of tension, especially during the formative period of the Australian Greens as some from the broader conservation movement argued against implementing a rigid structure. Indeed, the tension reflected divisions between the ‘centralists’ and ‘de­ centralists’ in the conservation movement Harris (1992:28) had identified. The centralists included those who wanted to develop a party structure based on conventional party organisation, but also incorporate inclusionary and participatory themes. The decentralists advocated avoiding the oftenhierarchical structures associated with political parties and maintaining an

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organisation that reflected the openness of a broad social movement. The organisational model adopted by the current Australian Greens, however, demonstrates that the centralists not only succeeded in moulding a party that attempted to be inclusionary, but also allowed the party’s executive to be decisive. The current party’s organisation can be seen as an attempt to marry the often-competing emphases of political party organisations with those of social movements. Furthermore, a confederation was the only way the Australian Greens could bring the Greens WA into a national structure operating under one name. Many members of the Greens WA had been associated with the NDP and were suspicious of national organisations, especially after the NDP disintegrated. A confederated structure meant that the state parties could continue to have significant local autonomy, but the electorate would be presented with a party operating under one name – the Australian Greens. As a result, the Greens WA did not have to significantly alter their organisation or operation in the policy debate and were still empowered to make important decisions regarding their state. In contrast to the left-of-centre parties, the enduring theme of the parties from the right was that they reflected closedness (see again Macridis 1967). The organisation of One Nation, and the minor parties elected in 2013, was very different to those of left-of-centre issue-competitive parties. In par­ ticular, these parties deliberately sought to exclude their members from the party’s decision-making processes, a common feature of other right-populist parties around the world. Notwithstanding that its organisational model was deemed illegal by the courts, One Nation’s structure left significant power in the hands of its founding triumvirate of David Oldfield, David Ettridge and Pauline Hanson. Rank and file members had no real ability to influence decisions made by the party and the decisions of these three powerful individuals were final. However One Nation’s membership declined after many members felt they were superfluous to the party’s operation. The PUP and AMEP also experienced similar falls in membership numbers immediately after their electoral victories in 2013. Family First’s organisational model was different again as it sought to use a corporate structure. However, it also reflected elements of closedness (see Macridis 1967). For instance, it sought to limit the role of its mass membership by concentrating decision-making powers in the executive level, headed by the party’s founder. This meant that members had very little scope to contribute to the party’s policies or preselection of candidates. The party’s organisation was clearly aimed at maximising the power of the executive, rather than empower the broad membership. Indeed, the approaches taken

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by One Nation and Family First gave the party’s founders and leaders significant organisational power while restricting the role of their broad membership. Similar organisational approaches were taken by the parties elected in 2013. Each party, however, experienced internal instability following their electoral victories, as ordinary members felt marginalised in organisations dominated by the party leaders. Such organisational traits were common to many parties from the political right (for further discussion see Betz 1993; Ignazi 1996; Betz and Immerfall 1998). In summary, the left-of-centre parties provided their members with significant opportunities to make a contribution to the party’s operation, especially in decision-making. In contrast, the right-of-centre parties tended to minimise their members’ involvement. Instead, they attempted to use members’ resources without offering them opportunities to be significantly involved in the party’s operation. Indeed, the decisions of such parties were solely made by those who had helped form the party in the first place. An analysis of the minor parties’ organisation also shows how the structure of parties may impact their stability and presence in the policy debate. The NDP, which demonstrated what Macridis (1967) argued were traits associated with open parties, was prone to internal instability. Lacking a cohesive structure, the party became disjointed and allowed significant divisions to emerge within the membership. Moreover, the party did not have any effective form of dealing with such divisions as it had eschewed a conventional political party structure. As a result, the party’s openness played a significant role in its decline. One Nation, however, illustrated that closedness (Macridis 1967) could also have a deleterious effect on a political party’s longevity. One Nation’s closedness became a significant problem when its broad membership felt superfluous to the party’s operation. As a result, the bulk of its membership soon resigned and the party disintegrated. While the new parties elected in 2013 are still young, they have already experienced internal disputes concerning the party’s organisational structures. In the longer term, these disputes may lead them to a fate similar to One Nation’s. After considering the examples of what seemed to be the extremes of open and closed issue-competitive parties in Australia, it is interesting to note the approaches taken by the Greens WA and Australian Greens. It must be remembered that these parties, especially the Greens WA, emerged in the aftermath of the NDP’s decline. As a result, the parties seemed to have attempted to avoid the pitfalls of openness in a political party. Moreover, the Greens WA and Australian Greens seem to have attempted to fuse the open elements often associated with social movement politics

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with the organisational model of political parties. This meant they were not as open as social movements, or the NDP, and tended to reflect elements of oligarchy. However, these parties’ approaches seem to have enabled them to operate efficiently and have allowed them to effectively deal with various dilemmas encountered.

10.3 Impact: the evolving role of minor parties on the Senate Prior to the election of minor parties to the Senate, the chamber was seen to be a rubber stamp for the executive when the government held a majority (also see Mulgan 1996). At other times, when the opposition held a majority in the Senate, it was sometimes seen to be a house intent on blocking the government’s legislative program (also see Mulgan 1996). The emergence of minor parties in the Senate was seen by some as having the potential to reduce this polarity (see Sharman 1986). It is quite clearly the case that the election of minor parties, especially issue-competitive parties, has helped transformed the Senate’s role in the political debate. The Senate has become a forum for a broader range of ideas, compared to previous years when it was dominated by the Labor and non-Labor parties (also see Bach 2003). In particular, it appeared as though debates more closely associated with new social movements began to gain greater prominence in the Senate as a result of the emergence of issue-competitive parties. The greater variety of ideas and parties in the Senate, especially since 1984, has enhanced notions of democracy in the Australian political system. However, being in the Senate affected the minor parties as they grappled with the need to balance their role and functioning in the chamber with their focus on the pursuing specific policy outcomes. The impact of minor parties on the Senate was not immediately apparent. Indeed, the record of the DLP shows that it tended to support the Coalition and opposed the ALP in the Senate. This tendency led commentators such as Crisp (1965) to argue that the DLP was playing a spoiler role in the Senate. As a result, the DLP’s actions meant that it could be considered as part of the Labor versus non-Labor schism in the upper house. The role of minor parties, and the operation of the Senate, changed with the election of the Liberal Movement. Rather than consistently support one party, Steele Hall positioned the Liberal Movement as an intermediary between the major parties. Hall enhanced his position as an intermediary during the 1975 constitutional crisis as he believed the Senate needed to pass supply. Consequently, Hall did not support the actions of the Coalition during this

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crisis. Instead, Hall’s approach was to vote for legislation on its merits. The Liberal Movement’s time in the Senate, however, was relatively short and it was not until the Australian Democrats that the Senate began to operate more like a house of review. Under Don Chipp’s leadership, the Australian Democrats were also positioned as an intermediary in the Senate. The party boasted that it was not beholden to any group in society, and that it vowed to be a watchdog on the major parties. As a result, the Democrats sought to use the procedures of the Senate to ‘smooth the rough edges off policy’ and negotiate with the major parties to influence policy. In doing so, the Australian Democrats enhanced the power of the Australian Senate to act as a check on government. The party’s role in negotiating with government and opposition was further enhanced when it held the balance of power. Significant changes were made to the operation of the Senate during the time of fragmentary parties. One of the most important was the establish­ ment of Senate committees. These committees allowed greater scrutiny of government decisions and allowed minor parties to directly engage in more in-depth legislative debates. The committee system was utilised by the Australian Democrats in particular to engage in greater scrutiny of government decisions. The Senate began to undergo further changes with the onset of issuecompetitive parties. There was a tendency for issue-competitive parties to try to use their position in the Senate to advance their policy agenda, while negotiating with the major parties to influence policy. Here it is important to note Jo Vallentine’s time in the Senate. As discussed in Chapter 4, she was elected to represent the NDP but resigned from the party and took her seat in the Senate as an independent. During this time she pursued a range of policies that concerned peace and disarmament issues, mainly through working in the committee system. However, she also used her position as a senator to draw greater attention to particular issues in broader society through more radical means. She was arrested during protests at the Pine Gap military base and created other media opportunities in an attempt to advance her party’s cause. Vallentine’s performance in the Senate influenced how other issue-competitive parties attempted to combine legislative work with broader promotional work in the electorate. The Australian Greens was one party that seemed to be influenced by Vallentine’s performance. When Bob Brown was first elected in 1996, he sought to use his position to highlight his party’s policies. This was done through broader grassroots events, which included media appearances and

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community gatherings. Senator Brown also engaged in discussions with the major parties in the Senate, especially the Coalition Government, in an attempt to advance his party’s policy agenda. However, not all party members appreciated Brown’s attempts to deal with the major parties. Indeed, when Brown entertained the idea of selling Telstra in order to secure funding for environmental projects, it led to much internal debate and could have led to internal instability had he not complied with the wishes of his party’s broad membership to oppose the sale. This episode also hinted at problems minor parties encountered when they made the transition from being a parliamentary outsider to a party seeking to make an impact in the Senate. Indeed, ‘impact’ appeared to be a two-edged sword when considering minor parties in the Senate. One enduring theme was that issue-competitive minor parties faced significant challenges once they won Senate represent­ ation in trying to balance their desire to pursue specific policies and influence government decisions with the need to maintain a visible pres­ence in the electorate and operate in the Senate. In fact, winning a Senate seat became a major problem for some issue-competitive parties like the NDP. As noted earlier, the NDP collapsed shortly after its emergence as it seemed unable to adapt to having a parliamentary wing in addition to its extra-parliamentary organisation. Despite this, its former representatives (Jo Vallentine and Irina Dunn) still tried to use their position as independents in the Senate to advance the NDP’s policy goals. Moreover, an enduring theme was that the more successful issue-competitive parties combined working to influence legislation with working to draw attention to the parties’ policies and presence in the broader electorate. The Greens WA, and later Australian Greens, were able to manage these sometimes-competing demands, though it must be remembered that they had charismatic parliamentarians who had high public profiles before entering the Senate. Furthermore, these parties were able to use their time in the Senate to pursue their policy agendas as well as maintain a cohesive organisation and consolidate their public profiles in the electorate. Other issue-competitive parties also sought to use their position in the Senate to advance their policy agenda. Family First’s approach was similar to that of Jo Vallentine in that Steve Fielding attempted to influence government decisions by working in the committee system while attempting to advance his party’s agenda. Furthermore, he was able to be involved in policy debates that concerned matters on which the party had strong views. A significant problem for the party was that its contribution was often marginalised because it did not hold the balance of power in the Coalition-

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dominated Senate. However, at times, Fielding did hold the balance of power when a Coalition senator planned to vote against the government. In these instances, Fielding was able to draw attention to his party’s policy agenda while gaining significant media attention. Not all issue-competitive minor parties benefited from Senate repres­ entation, however. One Nation, which positioned itself as an anti-system party, experienced significant challenges when it became part of the system by winning a Senate seat. Prior to entering the Senate, the party’s rhetoric suggested that it would significantly impact government decisions by using commonsense (Hanson 1996:3860). This approach to the policy debate was a distinctive feature of right-populist parties. As Hainsworth (2004:14) noted, such parties argued that simple solutions could solve complex problems. However, a significant problem for the party was the fact that it could not influence government policy to the extent it hoped. Moreover, the party struggled to tie its often absolutist agenda on race and immigration to the broad range of policies debated in the Senate. Another problem for One Nation was that Len Harris struggled to gain media attention as the party’s senator. Indeed, the party lacked a coherent strategy in terms of operating in the Senate. For example, while Senator Harris attempted to work in the committee system, he was often absent from hearings. As a result, he could not represent the party’s views on these matters. Moreover, many One Nation voters had questioned the value of the committee system, dominated as they were by the major parties. The combination of these factors resulted in One Nation losing significant support as many of its voters and partisan activists felt that the party did not pursue its specific policy agenda strongly in the Senate. Compounding the problems for One Nation in the Senate was the fact that Pauline Hanson overshadowed the party, even though she was not in the parliament. While the other issue-competitive parties were able to use their positions in the Senate to advance their policy agendas, winning Senate representation actually undermined One Nation’s position in the policy debate. The party could no longer attack the institutions of government for making policies that were ineffective or problematic as it too was part of the system of government by being in parliament. As Ignazi (1996:552) argued, rightpopulist parties were most effective outside parliament. Once they won parliamentary representation, however, they found it difficult to maintain a cohesive organisation and also failed to effectively pursue their policy agenda (see Betz 1993; Rosenberger 2004; Zaslove 2008). Clearly, One Nation could not make the transition from parliamentary outsider to a Senate-oriented

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party. This demonstrates how being in the Senate could actually become a problem for such issue-competitive parties. Indeed, a strong theme that emerges from this analysis is that all issue-competitive parties, except One Nation, were able to pursue their policy agenda in the Senate. It remains to be seen how the minor parties elected in 2013 perform in the Senate. While minor parties have impacted on the Australian Senate, having representation in the Senate has actually impacted on minor parties. The new roles, responsibilities and position in the policy debate provided by parliamentary representation has destabilised some issue-competitive minor parties. However, the parties with clear, cohesive structures that encouraged the involvement of their broad memberships were better placed to deal with these challenges when they arose.

10.4 Volatility: Senate-oriented minor parties Australia’s electoral history shows that the major parties have consistently won the majority of votes cast in Senate contests. However, there has been an electoral cohort that has been willing to vote for parties other than Labor, Liberal or National. Despite hundreds of minor parties having emerged throughout Australian political history, only a handful won Senate representation. But the history of minor parties shows that winning a seat does not guarantee permanence in the Senate party system. The DLP, for example, was represented for a lengthy period yet was unable to maintain a permanent position in the party system. The original DLP’s demise was brought about by the election victory of the ALP in 1972 and the party’s narrow raison d’être – that of keeping Labor out of government – disappeared. The party, at a federal level, unravelled soon after losing its representation in the Senate. However, it did recast itself as an issue-competitive party and return to the Senate in 2010. Maintaining Senate representation has also proven to be a challenge for issue-competitive parties for various reasons. For example, One Nation’s decline in the Senate party system was brought about by organisational failures, though its initial failure to win a greater number of Senate seats was because the major parties refused to direct preferences to the nascent party. Indeed, preference wheeling and dealing became important in deciding the outcomes of Senate contests after the Hawke Government’s electoral reforms in 1984. The fact that One Nation presented a significant electoral threat to the Coalition played a role in its decision to put One Nation last on their how-to-vote cards.

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The election of Family First, the DLP and the parties elected in 2013 highlighted the important role that preferences played in deciding Senate contests. These parties gained seats by winning a very small percentage of the primary vote, showing how issue-competitive parties could win Senate representation even with very little support from the broader electorate. These parties’ success, however, depended on their ability to construct preference deals. As this book has shown, issue-competitive minor parties cannot win Senate representation without having constructed a range of beneficial preference deals with other parties. The NDP’s demise as a Senate party was also linked to organisational failures. The party’s split in 1985, which occurred because of the party’s peculiar organisation, weakened the party substantially. While it was able to win a Senate seat in 1987, the size of the NDP’s membership fell sharply and its organisation subsequently collapsed when the party lost its Senate representation. However, the NDP did leave a legacy to the Australian Senate minor party system as the Greens WA eventually emerged from the party’s ashes, a party that continued to gain the support of the broader peace and disarmament movement. This provided it with crucial human and financial resources and enabled the party to run effective election campaigns. This also provided the Greens WA with an electoral cohort that was united by a commitment to bring about significant change to government policy. On the one hand, the decline of the Democrats suggests that the party was not able to recover from the bitter divisions that had occurred during the Lees and Stott-Despoja era. While the Democrats had previously experienced internal divisions, the party had been able to at least win Senate seats, allowing it to survive, despite its internal problems. During this time, however, the party could not effectively regroup. One of the challenges was that it did not have a charismatic leader with the ability to unify the party. The Democrats’ demise was also brought about by the consolidation of the Australian Greens when the Greens WA joined the confederated national party. The former clearly out-manoeuvred the Democrats through prefer­ ence wheeling and dealing as well as presenting a more unified and focused party platform, with the charismatic Bob Brown as the focal point. After the 2007 election, the Democrats had been replaced as the third force in the Senate by the Australian Greens. Some interesting features can be identified when accounting for the success and volatility of minor parties in the Senate. The first relates to the origins of minor parties. The DLP, Liberal Movement and Democrats, as fragmentary parties, relied heavily on major party de-alignment for electoral

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support. The issue-competitive parties, however, sought to represent broader social movements in the Senate. There were significant differences between the approaches taken by issue-competitive parties from the left-of-centre and those from the right in terms of their sources of mobilisation, which can also be seen to have played a role in their longevity in the party system. The parties from the right-of-centre were based on charismatic leaders. Pauline Hanson and Andrew Evans served as the initial focal points for One Nation and Family First respectively. Similarly, David Leyonhjelm from the LDP, Clive Palmer from the PUP, Keith Littler from the AMEP and Wayne Dropulich from the ASP served similar roles for their respective parties. Moreover, each party’s structure and policy agenda was set by a small leadership group. These parties also implemented organisational models that minimised the role of broader social movements being involved in the party’s development. Indeed, members were kept at arm’s length from the parties’ decision-making processes. These parties were built from the ‘top down’ because charismatic leaders tended to dominate their party’s organisation as it served their aspirations for a parliamentary career. Such features were common to many right-of-centre parties in other liberal democracies (also see Betz and Immerfall 1998). As Heinisch (2003) argued, such parties’ organisations were built around charismatic leaders while their members and the broader extra-parliamentary organisation were given lower priority. In the Australian case, the attempts of Hanson and Evans to galvanise support were bolstered after winning parliamentary representation. Pauline Hanson developed her One Nation Party after winning a seat in the House of Representatives in 1996. Similarly, Evans developed Family First into a national party after winning a seat in the South Australian upper house in 2002. The new minor parties elected in 2013 also showed how their leaders sought to enhance their powers over the organisations once they won Senate representation. Another interesting feature regarding One Nation, Family First and the new minor parties that won seats in 2013 was how they attempted to position themselves in the party system. Each party had clear ideas about what it opposed. For example, among other things, One Nation opposed policies on multiculturalism, indigenous affairs and the overall effects of globalisation. Family First and the new DLP also identified issues they opposed, including fertility control, same-sex relationships and pornography. The minor parties elected in 2013 opposed government intervention while calling for the winding back of the welfare state. However, these parties could not clearly articulate what they actually stood for. Family First and the

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new DLP argued that they stood for ‘the family’ – a concept that has various contestable definitions. Similarly, One Nation and the new parties elected in 2013 called for greater government focus on ‘average Australians’, a term also difficult to define. In contrast to these parties, the left-of-centre parties were built from ‘grassroots up’ in that their emergence arose through a broad social movement rather than through a particular leader. The role of the leaders of these parties was to represent their respective social movements in parliament. Indeed, the approach taken by these parties was consistent with other leftof-centre parties’ tendencies to place less influence on leaders and focus more on developing strong extra-parliamentary organisations (also see Michels 2001). In contrast, the parties from the right emphasised the broad vision of their charismatic leaders. These differences between left-of-centre issue-competitive parties and those from the right go some way in accounting for the parties’ success and volatility in the Senate. Indeed, the left-of-centre parties arising from social movements were able to maintain a presence in the political debate. Even when they had lost representation at various elections, the extraparliamentary organisations continued to operate and stand candidates at subsequent elections. In contrast, One Nation, Family First, the new DLP and the new minor parties elected in 2013 were built by a small number of individuals in the hope of attracting the support of social movements and were prone to greater volatility.

10.5 Conclusion: four enduring themes of change The Australian Senate-oriented minor party system has undergone sig­ nificant changes over the years with four enduring themes emerging. Since the introduction of proportional representation in 1949, a shift of type of minor parties elected to the Senate is apparent. The DLP, Liberal Movement and Australian Democrats were created when there was fragmentation in the Labor and Liberal parties respectively. These parties continued to be the only minor parties in the Senate until 1984 when an important change occurred. It was at this point that issue-competitive minor parties began winning seats in the Senate. With close links to new social movements, these parties were significantly different from the earlier fragmentary type. The issue-competitive parties advanced a specific policy agenda while the fragmentary parties appeared to be either part of the Labor versus non-Labor battle in the Senate, in the case of the DLP, or sought to be intermediaries

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between the major parties as was the case with the Liberal Movement and Australian Democrats. Moreover, the election results showed that the fragmentary parties were gradually being displaced by the emerging issuecompetitive parties. Indeed, an interesting illustration of the changes to the type of minor parties elected to the Senate is provided by the demise of the Australian Democrats and the consolidation of the Australian Greens in the Senate party system. Minor parties that won Senate representation demonstrated a variety of political organisation structures. Here, a sense of evolution was also apparent, with the early parties replicating the structures of the major parties. The emergence of the Australian Democrats, however, introduced an innovative approach to organisation. This was an important development as the party demonstrated a new inclusionary model that sought to involve its broad membership and would later influence other minor parties. The NDP, and to some extent the Greens WA and Australian Greens, incorporated elements of inclusionary politics first used by the Australian Democrats. While these parties appeared to be left-of-centre adopted inclusionary structures, those from the right implemented structures that limited the role of members. Despite these differences in organisation, parties with an inclusionary structure tempered with oligarchic traits as well as a clear division of labour were best placed to mitigate internal instability. The election of minor parties to the Senate also impacted upon the operation of the chamber. For example, their involvement in the committee system allowed greater scrutiny of government. Moreover, the emergence of the Australian Democrats enhanced the operation of the Senate as a house of review. The issue-competitive parties that followed also played an important role as they brought a wider range of ideas to the policy debate in the Senate. However, an enduring theme that emerged was that that while minor parties could win Senate seats, the continued success of individual minor parties in the Senate was far from guaranteed.

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Cha pte r 11

Conclusion Following the implementation of proportional representation for Senate elections in 1949, there has been an evolution in the Australian Senate party system, particularly with respect to the impact of minor parties. The evolution in the Australian Senate minor party system began when the DLP won its first seat in the chamber in the 1950s. Despite the fact that the major parties have continued to win the bulk of seats in Senate contests, a number of minor parties have also been able to win Senate representation. The Liberal Movement won its first seat in 1974 and the Australian Democrats first won representation in 1977. All three parties that won representation prior to the 1980s emerged as a result of fragmentation in either of the major parties. The DLP emerged after the split in the Labor Party in the 1950s and the origins of the Liberal Movement can be traced to splits within the South Australian Liberal Party in the 1960s and the Australian Democrats emerged from fragmentation of the Liberal Party. These parties were fragmentary parties as a result of their similar origins. The minor party component of the Senate system was dominated by these fragmentary parties until the 1984 election, when serious changes occurred. The 1984 election followed the Hawke Government’s reforms to the Senate voting system in 1983. The reforms introduced the GVT as well as allowing voting above the line on the ballot paper and the adoption of the Inclusive Gregory Method of counting votes. Colomer (2004) argued that governments tended to alter electoral systems to achieve partisan advantage, and observers such as Sharman (1986) argued that the Hawke Government’s reforms would serve the interests of the major parties by making it more difficult for minor parties to win seats. However, it is possible that the consequences of these changes were not as the reformers had expected, or hoped they would be. In fact, the NDP won its first Senate seat in 1984. In 1990 the Greens WA won Senate representation for the first time. The Australian Greens won a seat in the Senate in 1996, and were later joined by One Nation in 1998 and Family First in 2004. In 2010, the new DLP won Senate representation and Family First, the LDP, the PUP, the AMEP and the ASP all won Senate

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seats in 2013. While the election of these parties coincided with changes to the voting system, other important changes occurred, including the rise of new social movements in the political debate. Indeed, minor parties with specific policy agendas associated with new social movements have been able to win Senate seats since the 1980s. This has coincided with the abovementioned rise of new social movement issues in the Australian policy debate. The NDP and Greens WA pursued issues relating to the peace and disarmament movement. The Australian Greens were clearly associated with the rise of conservation issues that tied the party to the broader conservation movement and peace and disarmament politics. One Nation also represented a broad social movement that opposed race and immigration policies. Similarly, Family First pursued issues that related to a social movement mobilised on popular religion as it sought to advance a socially conservative agenda, with its emphasis on family. The new DLP elected to the Senate in 2010 advanced a conservative moral agenda with links to right-to-life movements. The LDP, PUP and AMEP also had links to broad social movements concerned with reducing the scope of government intervention on social and economic policies while seeking to enhance individual liberties. The ASP, elected in 2013, also sought to represent the interests of social movements concerned with encouraging physical activity to promote healthy lifestyles. These parties have very different organisational models and approaches to performing in the Senate, notwithstanding their origins as party extensions of movement-oriented politics. These differences, however, also affected their longevity in the political debate. Parties from socially progressive movements seeking to maximise internal democracy experienced significant organisational instability. The NDP, for example, allowed anyone to join the party and gave all members the right to participate in all facets of the party’s decision-making processes. However, this created a party that became factionalised and, without a clear organisation or mechanisms for conflict resolution, ultimately contributed to the party splitting at it first national conference. Conversely, minor parties that left decision-making powers in the hands of a few also experienced significant internal instability. Parties with an organisation having oligarchic tendencies within a broader framework and which relied on the participation of its mass membership could experience greater periods of longevity. The Greens WA and Aust­ ralian Greens developed structures that created a division of labour in its broad membership, especially by having a party executive and by using a delegate system for decision-making. These parties also incorporated notions

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of democracy by allowing all members to participate in internal debates on policy and by making decisions based on consensus rather than voting. Such structures allowed these parties to deal with internal problems effectively when they arose. In particular, this approach to internal organisation seemed to be more effective in maintaining a cohesive party than the alternative approaches taken by the NDP and One Nation. As has been discussed, the parties elected to the Senate since 1984 could draw electoral support from major party de-alignment (also see Bowler and Denemark 1993). Moreover, it seemed that these parties could emerge from both the left and right of the political spectrum and they could pose an electoral threat to the major parties. Even though these minor parties won Senate representation, they were far from permanent features in the Senate minor party system. Their ability to maintain Senate representation appeared to be linked to a range of issues including organisational stability and their ability to wheel and deal preferences. Moreover, the minor parties elected to the Senate post 1984 were significantly different from those elected previously. These parties were of the issue-competitive type. As Green-Pedersen (2007) argued, such parties mobilised on specific policy demands linked to broader social movements. There were various reasons why social movements mobilised political parties. These reasons came about as the major parties were not effectively dealing with specific issues linked to new social movements. Additionally, the major parties had converged on many social and economic policy areas. As a result, social movements developed political parties in order to influence the policy debate more directly by contesting elections. These factors played a critical role in changing the type of minor party elected to the Senate from fragmentary to issue-competitive. The ramifications of this evolution have impacted the Senate party system and have the potential to further influence the policy programmes of national governments into the future.

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Chapter 11 | 223

Index Footnotes and notes are indicated by ‘n’.

A

Abbott, Tony 119, 131, 191 Abolition of Compulsory Imprisonment Bill 1998, 82 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 120, 126 Aboriginal Australians 28, 64, 100, 102–3, 114, 117–18, 120, 126, 150, 207 abortion 25, 90, 144, 156, 158, 165−6, 1746, 182 Abortion Law Reform Bill 2008: 176 above the line voting 8, 63, 110, 153, 210 Allison, Lyn 35, 76, 108–9 Alternative Coalition group (WA) 64 Anti-Communist Labor Party 3, 5–6, 10–11 anti-nuclear policies 40, 55, 92 Assemblies of God (AOG) 143−5, 149−50, 165, 169 asylum seekers see refugees and asylum seekers Australia Party abortion 25 electoral performance 26, 31, 37 ethos and history 25–6, 31 key policies 25–6, 30 leadership 7n, 25 Australian Christians Party 163 Australian Christians, Shooters and Fishers Party 164, 182 Australian Conservation Foundation 59, 96 Australian Constitution 34, 84, 92 Bill of Rights for 25 constitutional crisis 29, 31, 115, 133, 201 S. 24 (Nexus Provision) 5, 7 S. 44 (ii) 51, 131 S. 53: 5 party threshold amendment 1991: 34 Australian Council for Lesbian and Gay Rights 103 Australian Democrats pre-1984: 10–11, 17, 22, 30–3

1984–2007: 10–11, 90–112 and Aboriginal Australians 100, 102–3 abortion 90 anti-nuclear issues 53, 92 balance of power 34, 37–8, 92–3, 101–3, 133, 195, 202 decline 33, 76, 91, 98–9, 108–12, 206 divisions within 75, 89, 99−9, 102−7, 111 electoral performance pre-1984: 4, 6, 7, 9–11, 16, 22, 34–6, 124, 210 post-1984: 10–11, 90–6, 99, 101–2, 105, 108–12, 196 ethos and history 12, 26n, 31–2, 35, 55, 89–90, 92–4, 99–100, 106, 195, 197, 210 and Goods and Services Tax (GST) 71−2, 75, 83, 99, 102−5 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 110 impact on Senate party system 4, 6, 10–11, 22, 30, 34−5, 37−8, 55, 100, 107–9, 111, 195−6, 202, 209 key policies 57, 70, 72, 75, 83−4, 90–1, 93−6, 99−103, 106, 108–10 Koongarra Project Area Repeal Bill 1986: 53 leadership 37–8, 98–108, 110, 206 media coverage 28, 76, 97, 98, 101, 104, 106n, 107–8 organisation 3–4, 38, 55, 69, 76, 89–91, 93, 97, 108–9, 111, 194–5, 197, 209 relationship with green parties 69–70, 91–8, 100–1, 108–12, 144, 157, 196, 206 relationship with major parties 45, 55, 95–6, 100, 110 relationship with other minor parties 151, 157, 196 slogan, ‘keep the bastards honest’ 30, 36, 38, 92, 100, 106, 108–9, 215 social justice 91, 93, 95, 103, 106 uranium mining 53

224 | The Making of a Party System

voter base 71, 84–5, 91, 93, 95−104, 109−11, 206–7 watchdog role 17, 30, 37, 70–1, 90, 93–4, 101–2, 104, 108–9, 202 workplace relations 101 and Workplace Relations Bill 1996: 101 Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) 8, 41, 80, 119, 125, 132, 172, 178n, 183–4, 187 Australian Greens 65–89 above the line voting 153 anti-nuclear policies 92 climate change 76, 86 divisions within 83–4, 198 electoral performance 2, 4, 10–11, 57, 67–70, 72–81, 85, 87, 115, 153, 196, 206 ethos and history 56–7, 61–3, 65–7, 88, 211 and Goods and Services Tax (GST) 104 impact on Senate party system 57, 69–71, 77, 79, 82, 86–7, 89, 107, 203 key policies 16, 56, 71–2, 75–6, 82−6, 88, 92, 167n, 168, 211 leadership 206 see also Brown, Bob media coverage 70, 82, 84–5, 87, 202 merger with Greens (WA) 57, 73–4, 89, 199, 206 organisation 67, 73–4, 83–4, 109, 198–9, 200, 209, 211–12 relationship with ALP 74–9, 86–7, 157–8, 162, 196 relationship with Australian Democrats 196, 206 relationship with other major parties 78, 144, 203 relationship with other minor parties 80, 144, 158, 164, 166−9, 174, 177, 186–7 social justice 71, 82–3, 109 voter base 71–2, 84–5, 87, 109 Australian Labor Party (ALP) anti-nuclear policies 40–1 and climate change 86, 191 electoral performance 2, 6, 10–11, 23, 27, 47, 60, 76–9, 100, 115, 124,

152, 189, 191–2 factionalism 19, 40−1, 79, 87 Gillard Labor Government 86−7, 190 and Goods and Services Tax (GST) 104 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 141, 153 history 18, 31, 173, 190–1 Industrial Groups (‘Groupers’) 18–19 key policies 35, 40–1, 44, 56–7, 65–6, 70, 74, 78, 86–7, 117, 127, 190–1 relationship with DLP 24, 26, 38, 75, 174 relationship with Family First Party 74−7, 143, 149–51, 153–4, 157, 160, 162 relationship with green parties 63, 68–9, 72, 74–9, 80, 86−7, 157, 160, 196 relationship with NDP 50–1, 55, 92 relationship with other minor parties 17–18, 27, 44–5, 50–1, 74–5, 95–7, 125, 144 and trade unions 17–18, 32, 74n, 100n, 171–2 Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party (AMEP) 188–90 electoral performance 4, 9, 10–11, 181, 188, 210 ethos 181, 188–9 key policies 13, 188–1, 211 impact on Senate party system 10–11, 196, 207 leadership 181, 188–9, 207 media coverage 189 organisation 181, 187, 189, 199 relationship with minor parties 164, 186, 188–9, 190 voter base 188 Australian Progressive Alliance 106 Australian Reform Movement (ARM) 25 see also Australia Party Australian Sex Party (ASP) 162, 196, 207, 210, 211 Australians for Honest Politics 131 Australia’s Indigenous Peoples Party 115–16

Index | 225

B

balance of power and minor parties 3, 15 see also individual minor parties, e.g. Family First Party Bandt, Adam 78, 81 Baron, Jim 114–15 Barry, Bill 173 Bartlett, Andrew 104, 106–8 Barton, Gordon 25–6 Bates, Gerry 61 Bates, Tony 160 Beazley, Kim 70, 127 below the line voting 74 Bennelong, electoral division of (NSW) 183 Bilney, Gordon 97 Bjelke-Petersen, Joh 185 Blair, electoral division of (Qld) 125 block preferential system 2, 5, 45 Boothby, electoral division of (SA) 30n Brand, electoral division of (WA) 126–7 Bressington, Ann 160 Brown, Bob 58−63, 66, 69−76, 79, 82−7, 101, 105, 108, 164−6, 168−9, 202–3 Burke, Edmund 1 Byrne, Condon 23

C

Call to Australia Group/Party 51, 153 see also Christian Democratic Party Cameron, Ross 151 carbon pricing scheme (‘carbon tax’) 86, 162, 190−2 Carne, Andrew 120–1 Catholic Church/Catholics 20, 24, 166, 172, 175 Catholic Social Studies Movement (‘Movement’) 18–19 censorship 31, 177 Chamarette, Christabel 82 Chapman, Bill 116 Chifley Labor Government 5 Chipp, Don 12, 20, 31–2, 34, 36–8, 93,107n, 202 Christian Democratic Party (CDP) 75, 153, 158–60, 177 City Country Alliance 132–3, 135, 174 climate change 76, 78, 86, 95, 191

Cohen, Barry 65 Cole, George 21 Collins, Jacinta 74–5 communism and ALP 17−18, 20 and DLP 19−20, 37, 171–3, 179 Communist Party of Australia (CPA) 17−18 conservation movements 28, 49, 56−89, 211 impact on Senate party system 56–7, 59–60 influence on environmental policy 65–7, 78, 82, 88−9, 92 see also specific environmental campaigns, e.g. Franklin Dam (Tas) constitutional crisis 5, 29, 31, 115, 201–2 Coombe, John 27 Coronation Hill mine (NT) 66 Costello, Peter 104, 146 Coulter, John 98−100 Country Alliance Party 174 Country Liberal Party 6, 10–11 Country Party see National Party Court of Disputed Returns 51, 68n, 80, 94n, 161n crimes, victimless 158, 182 Crosby, Lynton 124

D

Daintree Rainforest (Qld) 65 Day, Bob 162−4, 170 defence 19, 40, 53, 120 DeGaris, Ren 27 Dell, Hugh 58n Democratic Labor/Labour Party (DLP) 17–25 balance of power 25, 34,174 decline 7, 23, 26, 37, 171, 205 electoral performance 4, 3, 6, 9–11, 13, 16, 17–18, 21–3, 38, 162, 171−80, 195, 210 ethos 19, 20, 25, 90, 171–80, 207 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 141, 153, 174, 178–9 history 12, 17, 19, 171–3, 178, 195, 205 Home Loan fund 20

226 | The Making of a Party System

impact on Senate party system 21, 23−5, 36–7, 174, 195–6, 201 key policies 13, 16–17, 19–21, 23–5, 30, 172–3, 177, 207, 211 leadership 38, 176 media coverage 174 organisation 21, 31, 172, 197 reconstituted 176−80 relationship with ALP 12, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 30, 37–8, 75, 171, 174, 179, 201 relationship with Liberal–National Coalition 24, 38, 177−8, 201 relationship with minor parties 25, 75, 162, 174, 177, 186 relationship with RTLA 174−6, 179 slogan, ‘Today’s DLP’ 177 ‘spoiling’ party 24–5, 37, 54, 171, 201 voter base 71–2, 176, 206–7 Denborough, Michael 41−6, 48–9, 51 Denison, electoral division of (Tas) 60 Di Natale, Richard 77 Dickson, electoral division of (Qld) 102, 167 disarmament see peace and disarmament movements double dissolution elections 6, 8, 9, 28–9, 36, 49–50, 92, 191 Downer, Alexander 97, 162 Droop, Henry 2 Dropulich, Wayne 207 Druery, Glenn 189 drugs 90, 144, 158, 161, 165–6, 168, 170, 177, 182 Dunn, Irina 51–3, 203 Dunstan, Don 27, 34 Duverger’s Law, 3, 7, 9, 16, 23

E

Easytax 127–9 Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) 66–7 economic rationalism 66, 88, 117, 126, 146 economy, concern about 13–14, 18, 41, 70, 76n, 108, 116–17, 120, 125–8, 139–41, 146–7, 162, 181–6, 188, 190, 192, 211–12 election results

House of Representatives 116 Senate 4, 6, 10–11, 22, 35, 46, 50, 68, 94, 129, 136, 152, 159, 161 state, 1998 (Qld) 124 elections, federal 1931 election 18 1949 election 2, 3, 6 1951 election 6 1953 election 6 1955 election 3–6, 9, 12, 15, 17–18, 21–2, 37, 194 1958 election 6, 21–2 1961 election 6, 21–2, 115 1964 election 6, 21–2 1967 election 6, 22–3 1974 election 4, 6–7, 22, 26, 28–9, 31, 42, 210 1975 election 6, 22, 26, 28–32, 115, 171, 201 1977 election 4, 6–7, 16, 22–3, 32, 34–6, 90–1, 100, 195, 210 1980 election 6–7, 34–6, 44 1983 election 5, 6–9, 12, 16, 35–7, 39–41, 60, 91–2, 171 1984 election 4–6, 8, 10, 12–13, 17, 39, 44, 46–52, 90–2, 94, 96, 109, 172, 195–6, 201, 208, 210, 212 1987 election 9–10, 49–50, 63–5, 92–4, 131, 139, 179n, 206 1990 election 4, 9–10, 52, 54, 68–9, 94–10, 210 1996 election 4, 10, 68–9, 76, 87, 94, 100–2, 113–16, 202–3, 207, 210 1998 election 4, 9–11, 68–70, 72, 94, 102–3, 105, 110, 113, 122–30, 133, 136, 141, 210 2001 election 10, 68, 70–3, 83, 89, 104–6, 108, 110–12, 134–7, 182 2004 election 4, 9–10, 67–8, 74–7, 79, 85, 94, 106–12, 136–9, 143–6, 149–54, 158–66, 170, 173, 210 2007 election 2–4, 10, 13, 68, 77–80, 86–7, 94, 109, 136, 143, 161–3, 170–1, 176–80, 183, 191, 196, 205, 210–11 2010 election 2–4, 9–10, 68, 77–80, 86–7, 94, 109, 136, 139, 144, 161–4, 170, 174, 176–80, 183, 191, 196, 205, 210–11 2013 election 9, 68n, 79, 81, 94, 104,

Index | 227

108–9, 113, 135–6, 143, 161–4, 170, 178–200, 205–11 elections, state 1968 election 27 1970 election 27 1972 election 58 1973 election 28 1982 election 60 1984 election 172 1986 election 61 1989 election 63, 64 1998 election 113, 122–5, 141 2000 election 104–5 2001 election 135, 137 2002 election 144, 169, 172 2003 election 182 2006 election 173–5, 177–8 2013 election 80 see also election results electoral reform 3, 5, 27, 29, 31, 44, 86, 110, 205, 210 electoral thresholds 13, 16, 34, 64 emissions trading scheme (ETS) 191 see also carbon pricing scheme (‘carbon tax’) Entsch, Warren 150 environment 65–6 environmental campaigns 40, 49, 53, 58–60, 63, 74, 76, 83, 87, 90, 95 see also specific campaigns, e.g. Franklin Dam (Tas) Ettridge, David 119, 120–3, 128, 132, 135, 137, 141–2, 199 euthanasia 144, 162, 165, 172–4, 177, 182 Evans, Andrew 144–50, 169, 207 Evans, Ashley 148

F

Fairfax, electoral division of (Qld) 186 Family First Party 143–70 abortion 144, 156, 166 and ALP 149 and AOG 144–5, 169 balance of power 143, 155, 157, 174, 202–4 electoral performance 4, 9–11, 44, 75, 143, 146–7, 151–5, 159–61, 169−70, 173, 178, 210 ethos 12–13, 146–8, 207–8, 211

Family Impact Statements 150, 154 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 143, 153–4 history 144−7 impact on Senate party system 152, 157, 159–61, 196, 203, 207 key policies 12, 16, 144–7, 150–1, 156–7, 161–2, 165−70, 173, 207, 211 leadership 144, 146–7, 150, 152, 200 media coverage 143, 145, 157, 159–60, 204 organisation 144–5, 147–8, 169−70, 199–200 relationship with ALP 74–5, 149–50, 152–4, 162, 179 relationship with Australian Greens 152–4, 161, 166−70 relationship with Liberal Party / Liberal–National Coalition 149–51, 154, 164, 170, 179 relationship with other minor parties 158–9, 162, 164, 177 and religious politics 164−9 slogan, ‘a vote for the Greens is a vote for extremes’ 166 voter base 149, 154–9, 1678 family values 12, 20, 146, 151, 165, 167−70, 177, 207–8, 211 Farrell, Mark 178−9 Farrer, electoral division of (NSW) 127 Ferris, Jeannie 107n fertility control 13, 28, 156–7, 162, 170, 172–7, 207 Field Labor Government (Tas) 63 Fielding, Steve 146, 151n, 154–8, 160, 162, 169–70, 183, 203–4 Fischer, Tim 127 foreign policy 19, 72 fragmentary minor parties 2, 16, 17−39, 90, 206, 210 Francis, Wendy 161−2 Franklin Dam (Tas) 59–60 Fraser Coalition Government 34, 36, 60, 171 Fraser, Malcolm 29, 32, 60 free trade 19, 54, 116–17, 138, 182

228 | The Making of a Party System

G

Gair, Vince 21, 23 Garrett, Peter 43, 45–50 gay and lesbian issues see homosexuality Gillard, Julia 78–9, 86–7, 191 Gillard Labor Government 86–7, 190 Goods and Services Tax (GST) 71–2, 75, 83, 98–9, 102−4, 110–11, 125, 127 Goot, Murray 43 Gray Liberal Government (Tas) 60 Green Development group (WA) 64 green political parties 56–89 Greens (WA) 56–7, 63–5 electoral performance 4, 9, 10–11, 57, 67–70, 72–3, 101, 124, 210 history 53, 56–7, 64, 206 impact on Senate party system 68–9, 81, 179−80, 203 key policies 16, 64, 72, 81–2, 85, 88, 211 leadership 68, 94 organisation 57, 64–5, 198–200, 209, 211–12 relationship with major parties 68–70, 72 relationship with minor parties 69–70, 96–7, 196 see also Australian Greens Grieg, Brian 70, 103, 106, 151 Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 3, 7−8, 110, 153–4 see also individual parties, e.g. One Nation Party ‘Groupers’ see Industrial Groups gun control 61, 120, 182–3

H

Haines, Janine 30, 34, 36, 93−5, 978, 110 Hall, Steele 12, 26–30, 34, 38, 201–2 Hanson, Pauline 113−15, 119−42 as Independent Senator 138−9 in Liberal Party 113−15, 116 media coverage 114–15, 118, 137–8, 139n, 204 One Nation Party 70, 119−42, 199, 207 United Australia Party, new 139 Hanson-Young, Sarah 80, 164

Harradine, Brian 8−9, 10–11, 35–6, 103n, 137 Harradine Group 8, 10–11 Harris, Len 131–4, 137–9, 141–2, 204 Harris, Peter 145–7, 166 Hawke, Bob, 41, 57, 60, 66, 95, 98 Hawke Labor Government 7, 16, 36, 39–41, 53, 56, 60, 65–6, 88, 92, 95, 110, 113, 171, 180, 205, 210 Hayden, Bill 41, 60, 115 health and healthcare 76n, 99, 106n, 147, 211 Heng, Henry 163 High Court 60, 131, 172 Hill, Heather 130–3, 141 Holgate, Harry 59 Home Loan Fund 20 homosexuality 25, 61, 103, 150–1, 153, 165, 167−9, 177 House of Representatives domination of, by major parties, 3–4, 16 electoral results 2–3, 78 number of members 5, 7 house of review see under Senate Howard Coalition Government 74n, 76, 83, 101–3, 108, 110, 129, 136, 143, 146, 154, 156–7, 182 Howard, John 104, 118–19, 124, 128, 135, 146, 150, 158, 183 humanitarian issues 12, 64, 71–2, 85, 91, 103, 109 Humphries, John 182−4 Hutton, Drew 61, 66

I

immigration 71, 103, 113, 115, 117−120, 125–6, 128–9, 135, 139−41, 170, 204, 211 Inclusive Gregory Method 8, 210 independent senators electoral performance 6, 9, 10–11, 60–1, 114, 138−9, 160, 188, 202 impact on Senate party system 54–5, 93, 193, 203 see also Hanson, Pauline; Harradine, Brian; Millhouse, Robin; Vallentine, Jo; Xenophon, Nick indigenous affairs 12, 85–6, 115–17, 207

Index | 229

Indigenous People’s Party 115–6 Industrial Groups (‘Groupers’) 18–19 in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 145, 177 issue-competitive parties 12, 16, 39–92, 110–13, 140, 143, 166, 170, 179–81, 190, 193, 195, 201–9 impact on role of Senate 201–2, 208–9, 212 organisational features of 197, 212 volatility of 194–209 see also individual minor parties, e.g. NDP

J

Jacobsen, Ben 158–9 Joyce, Barnaby 138, 155, 157

K

Kakadu National Forest (NT) 53, 65–6, 92 Kane, Jack 23 Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) 2n, 80, 164 Kavanagh, Peter 173–4, 176 Keating, Paul 66, 98 Keating Labor Government 8n, 56–7, 66–7, 69, 88, 100, 113–14 Keneally, Darryn 145 Kernot, Cheryl 98–102 Kingston, electoral division of (SA) 97 Koongarra Project Area Repeal Bill 1986: 53 Kyoto Protocol, ratification of 76

L

Labor Party see Australian Labor Party (ALP) Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC, Tas) 58 Lang, Jack 18 Lees, Meg 98, 99, 102–6, 111, 137, 206 Leichhardt, electoral division of (Qld) 150, 158 Lewis, John 150 Leyonhjelm, David 182−4, 207 Liberal and Country League (LCL, SA) 26−8, 31, 38

Liberal Democrats Party/Liberal and Democracy Party (LDP) 182−4 abortion 182 electoral performance 4, 9, 10–11, 182–4, 210 history and organisation 12, 182–3 impact on Senate party system 4, 10–11, 196 key policies 13, 182, 190–1, 211 leadership 181, 183, 207 relationship with Liberal Party 184 relationship with minor parties 184 Liberal Movement demise 7, 30–1 electoral performance 4, 6–7, 10–12, 16, 27–9, 37, 210 history 12, 17, 26–8, 30–1, 37, 90, 195, 210 impact on Senate party system 28–30, 38, 201 key policies 27–9, 36–7 media coverage 28–9 organisation 28, 30–1, 33, 38, 197 relationship with Australia Party 31 relationship with other parties 37 slogan,‘Leave the Extremes – vote LM’ 29, 31 voter base 206–7 Liberal National Party (LNP) 10–11, 185 Liberal–National Party Coalition electoral performance 2, 6, 10–11, 76–8, 113, 153, 155, 160, 180, 189 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 141, 154 key policies 20, 98, 100, 127, 146 organisation and history 21, 143 relationship with Family First Party 153–4, 164, 170 relationship with One Nation Party 124–5, 205 relationship with other minor parties 78, 160, 177–8 Liberal Party electoral performance 6, 10–11, 27, 60–1, 115, 123–4 fragmentation within 31, 195, 210 history 17, 29–30 key policies 31, 60, 70, 97, 119, 135 Pauline Hanson, disendorsement of 114–15

230 | The Making of a Party System

and preferences 69, 70, 81, 144 Liberal Reform Group (LRG) 25 Liberty and Democracy Party (LDP) 158 Lilley, electoral division of (Qld) 185 ‘Little Red School Book’ 20, 31 Little, Jack 23 Littler, Keith 188–9, 207 Locke, Eric 75 Loosely, Stephen 50 Lowe, Doug 59 Lucas Heights nuclear reactor (NSW) 92 Ludlum, Scott 80 Lyons, Joe 18

M

Mackerras, Malcolm 93 Macklin, Michael 34, 92, 98 Macridis’ measure 197, 199, 200 Madigan, John 177–8 major parties domination of the Australian parliamentary system 3, 16–17, 31, 47, 52, 57 fragmentation of 7, 9, 12, 16–7, 37, 39, 194–5, 208 relationships with minor parties see under individual minor parties, e.g. Australian Democrats Margetts, Dee 82 Mason, Andrea 150, 152, 160 Mason, Colin 34, 36 Mayo, electoral division of (SA) 97 McBroom, Peter 175−6 McCaffery, Simon 178−9 McGauran, Julian 178n McGauran, Peter 178n McKeon, John Robert 116 McManus, Frank 21, 23 Melbourne, electoral division of (Vic) 78, 81 Melzer, Jean 42–3, 46, 48–9 Menagh, Stephen 120–1 Menzies Liberal Government 24 ‘Midnight Oil’ see Garrett, Peter Miller, Georgia 73 Millhouse, Robin 12, 27–8 Milne, Christine 74, 79, 85–6 Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT, ‘mining tax’) 190–2

mining 190–1 see also uranium mining Motoring Enthusiast Party see Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party (AMEP) ‘Movement’ see Catholic Social Studies Movement (‘Movement’) Movement Against Uranium Mining (MAUM, Vic) 42 Muir, Ricky 188–90 Mulholland, John 172–3, 176−7 multiculturalism 12, 117–20, 126, 207 multi-party systems 1–3, 9, 16, 23 Murphy, Shane 137 Murray, Andrew 106 Myers, Peter 43, 219

N

Nalliah, Danny 151, 163 National Farmers’ Federation 128 National Party 2, 6, 10–11, 17, 123–4, 127, 155 see also Liberal–National Coalition National Secretariat of Catholic Action 18 Nettle, Kerry 84–5 New Liberal Movement 30 Nexus Provision 5, 7 Nile, Elaine 51 Nile, Reverend Fred 153, 158 No GST Party 132 No Nuclear Waste Party 132 Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) 39–55 demise 47–52, 54–5, 57, 60, 63, 73, 195, 200, 206 electoral performance 4, 9–11, 44–8, 50–1, 53–4, 90, 92, 210 ethos 197, 201, 203 factionalism 43, 48–9, 51, 54 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 44–7, 50–1, 55, 90 history 12, 39–41, 54 impact on Senate party system, 39, 44, 54–5, 96, 206 key policies 16, 39, 41–2, 55, 211 media coverage 43, 48–9, 51–2, 54–5 membership rules 51–2, 54 organisation 39, 41–4, 48, 55, 64–5, 198, 200–1, 203, 206, 209, 211

Index | 231

relationship to ALP 50–1, 55, 90 relationship to Australian Democrats 196 voter base 44, 113

O

O’Chee, Bill 131 Oldfield, David 119–23, 125, 131–2, 135, 141–2, 199 One Nation Party 10–11, 119–42 balance of power 134 decline 114, 129, 134–42, 200, 205 electoral performance 4, 9–11, 113–14, 123–4, 129–30, 135–42, 210 ethos and history 113–14, 119−20, 122, 169, 200, 204, 207 and Group Voting Ticket (GVT) 130, 141 impact on Senate party system 10–11, 70, 114, 129, 136, 142, 196, 204, 207 key policies 12, 114–20, 125–9, 204, 207, 211 leadership 113–14, 121, 125, 138, 140–1, 199–200, 207 media coverage 127, 137n, 204 organisation 113−14, 120–3, 128, 131, 148, 169, 187, 192, 195, 199–200, 204–5 relationship with major parties 113, 124–5, 130, 135, 137–8, 142, 144, 205 relationship with minor parties 130, 144, 164, 177 and taxation 127–9 two-candidate preferred vote 115–16 voter base 113, 117−18, 124–6, 128, 130, 132–3, 140, 142, 146−7, 149 see also Hanson, Pauline; Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Outdoor Recreation Party (Stop the Greens) 184 Oxley, electoral division of (Qld) 114−25

P

Palmer, Clive 185–7, 190 Palmer United Party (PUP) 185−7

electoral performance 2n, 4, 9, 10–11, 185−7, 210 ethos and history 181, 185 impact on Senate party system 10–11, 190, 196 key policies 13, 185–7, 190–1, 211 leadership 181, 207 media coverage 185–6 organisation 181, 187, 199 relationship with major parties 179 relationship with minor parties 80, 164, 186 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 10–11, 119–42 peace and disarmament movements 39, 40–2, 45, 49, 53, 56–7, 61–4, 88−90, 92, 202, 206, 211 People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND, WA) 44 People Power Party 174 Playford, Sir Thomas 26 plurality, voting system 5, 14 polls, public opinion 44, 76n, 79, 95n, 104–6, 114, 124, 128, 191 pornography 153, 158−9, 166, 177, 182, 207 Powell, Janet 98–9, 107n, 111 preferential voting system 3, 8, 110, 123 Premiers’ Plan 18 proportional representation 3, 5, 14, 16, 23, 133, 173, 194–5, 208, 210 public assets, sale of 83, 203 Pullen, David Roy 116

Q

Quah, Andrew 159

R

Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) 151 racial discrimination 26, 113, 115, 117, 120, 126, 128–9, 135, 139–41, 204, 211 Reece, Eric 58 refugees and asylum seekers 70−2, 106, 135, 137, 140, 156–7, 185–7 Reid, electoral division of (NSW) 159 religious politics 143–4, 164−9, 175−6, 211

232 | The Making of a Party System

Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) 66–7 reverse racism 114–15, 117−18, 126 Richardson, Graham 45, 50, 65 Ridgeway, Aden 102−3 Right to Life (RTL)/Right to Life Australia (RTLA) 174−5, 179, 211 Rise Up Australia Party 151, 163 Robb, Andrew 124 Robb, Victor 116 Rudd, Kevin 78–9, 87, 149, 191 Rudd Labor Government 76, 190

see also issue-competitive parties social welfare 28, 167, 182, 207 Socialist Workers Party (SWP) 48 South West Committee (SWC, Tas) 58 Spindler, Sid 45, 98 stem cell research 175, 177 Stop the Greens Party 163 Stott, Tom 27 Stott-Despoja, Natasha 100−7, 111, 206 Swan, Wayne 185

S

Tall, Ingrid 150 Tampa election (2001) see elections Tarkine Wilderness (Tas) 87 Tasmanian Greens 66 Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) 59, 96 taxation 13, 70, 102, 127−9, 188, 190–1 see also Easytax; Goods and Services Tax (GST) Tell the Truth Coalition 175−6 terrorism 70, 84, 106, 135, 164, 189 Tighe, Margaret 174−5 trade unionism 17−18, 32, 171–2 Troeth, Judith 156−7 Trood, Russell 138 Turnbull, Malcolm 191 Turnbull, Reginald (‘Spot’) 7n, 25, 26 two-party systems 1−3, 78, 95, 191

sales tax 35 Sales Tax Bill 35 same-sex relationships/marriage 86, 144–6, 150, 161−2, 166−8, 170, 172–4, 177, 182, 207 Sanders, Norm 60 Santamaria, Bob 18 Scott, Les 115–16 Scullin Labor Government 18 Sekhon, Gurm 83 Senate electoral results, tables 4, 6, 10−11, 22, 35, 46, 50, 68, 94, 129, 136, 152, 159, 161 house of review 15, 25, 37–8, 92, 202, 209 minor party system 17, 25, 70, 113, 143, 181, 193–11 number of senators 5, 10–11, 16 role of 4, 15, 23–5, 37–8, 92, 201–2, 209 volatility of 205–9 Senate committees 7, 8, 15, 53–4, 81–2, 85, 93, 133, 138, 143, 202–4 Sharples, Terry 131 Shooters Party see Australian Christians, Shooters and Fishers Party Siddons, John 34 Siewert, Rachel 85 Single Transferable Vote (STV) 5 Smokers Rights Party 184 social justice 81−2, 91, 93, 95, 103, 106, 109 social movement based parties, rise of 14, 196

T

U

United Australia Party, new 139 see also Palmer United Party United Australia Party, old 18 United Tasmania Group (UTG) 58−9, 68, 96 Uniting Australia Party (Qld) 185 uranium mining 40–2, 44, 53, 92

V

Vallentine, Jo 44−5, 48−9, 52−7, 61, 63−4, 68, 73, 81, 84, 96−7, 139, 202–3 Vallentine Peace Group (VPG) 4n, 9–11, 50, 63−4, 81 see also Greens WA

Index | 233

Voluntary Student Unionism (VSU) 155 voter behaviour 8, 91, 95, 99, 104

W

Wang, Zhenya 187n Wesley Vale pulp mill (Tas) 63 West, Stuart 41 West Australian Greens see Greens WA Whelan, Peter 182−4 Whistleblowers Protection Bill 81 White, Marcel 175−6 Whitlam Labor Government 26, 29, 171 Women for a Nuclear Free Australia group 42 Wood, Robert 50−1, 53, 131 workplace relations, 155, 157, 170 Workplace Relations Amendment (Workchoices) Bill 2005: 155 Workplace Relations Bill 1996: 101 Wyles, 116

X

Xenophon, Nick 9–11, 77, 80, 160, 164

Y

Young Liberals (SA) 27

THE MAKING OF A PARTY SYSTEM MINOR PARTIES IN THE AUSTRALIAN SENATE ZAREH GHAZARIAN Minor parties have come a long way in Australia. From an era when there were no minor parties in the national parliament, they have become crucial players in shaping government policy and the political debate. This book charts the rise of minor parties in the Australian Senate since the end of the Second World War, and constructs an analytical framework to explain how they became the powerful forces they are today. It shows that there has been a change in the type of minor party elected. Rather than be created as a result of a split in a major party, newer minor parties have been mobilised by broad social movements with the aim of advancing specific policy agendas. By shedding light on these parties, the book shows how minor parties have impacted the Australian political system and how they can influence governance in the future.

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