The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security 9781685858018

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The Major Powers of Northeast Asia

The Major Powers of NORTHEAST ASIA Seeking Peace and Security

edited by

Tae-Hwan Kwak Edward A. Olsen

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1996 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1996 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The major powers of northeast Asia: seeking peace and security / Tae-Hwan Kwak, Edward A. Olsen, editors, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-566-1 (he. : alk. paper) 1. Security, International. 2. East Asia—Foreign relations. 3. East Asia—Military policy. I. Kwak, Tae-Hwan, 1938II. Olsen, Edward A. JX1961.A8N67 1996 327.1'72'095—dc20

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library This book was typeset by Letra Libre, 1705 14th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements (oo) of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Material Z39.48-1984. 5

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96-12043 CIP

CONTENTS

Map of Northeast Asia

vii

Introduction Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen

1

Japanese Security Policy in Post-Cold War Asia Tsuneo Akaha

9

Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia Fei-Ling Wang

41

Australian Security Policy in Northeast Asia Dora Alves

69

Russian Security Policy in Northeast Asia Alexei D. Bogaturov

83

Russia's Policy Toward the Two Koreas Seung-Ho Joo

105

U.S.-Northeast Asian Security Relations: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism Edward A. Olsen

131

U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia: Handmaiden of Export Promotion? Thomas L. Wilborn

149

Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and U.S. Policy Lawrence E. Grinter

167

v

vi 9

CONTENTS

North Korea's Nuclear Program and Its Impact on Northeast Asian Security Seong Whun Cheon

191

10 Basic Issues in the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula Tae-Hwan Kwak

213

11 Conclusion Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen

243

About the Contributors Index About the Book

249 251 261

Northeast Asia

vii

Introduction Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen

Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of the world. It is comprised of Japan, the two Korean states in a divided nation, adjacent portions of China and Russia, and the seas that simultaneously divide and connect these countries. Northeast Asia has changed significantly since the Cold War, in part as a result of Japan's economic renaissance after World War II. Japan's emergence as a global economic superpower and its influence on the developing states of Asia is commonly described as an example of Asia's "economic miracles." In the forefront of those states that followed Japan's lead was South Korea. Although South Korea was long noted for its political repression, its "Miracle on the Han River" eventually allowed political pluralism and democracy to spread in that country. As the Cold War ended, Northeast Asia confronted an altered international framework that posed serious challenges to the states of the subregion. For all their vaunted dynamism, these states faced global changes that strained their capacities and policies. The factors that have affected Northeast Asia's adjustment following the Cold War include each state's level of participation in the regional version of the superpower Cold War, the various threat perceptions that prevailed in the region, the ways in which the Cold War camouflaged indigenous tensions, and the extent to which a local variant of the Cold War took root on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Northeast Asia is trying to come to terms with the collapse of the central organizing principle in strategic affairs, conflicting pressures for new security architectures, an emerging—yet tentative—regional balance of power, and apprehension about the stability of a continuing U.S. role in the region. China's developmental tensions and North Korea's particularly severe problems adjusting to the loss of the old world order also greatly complicate the region's situation. Northeast Asia has one foot in the post-Cold War world, but the other foot remains entangled in the legacy of the Cold War. It is trying to 1

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enter the post-Cold War era completely, along with the rest of the world, but the task is formidable. This volume addresses this adjustment process and analyzes the security situation in Northeast Asia with special emphasis on security and peace issues on the Korean peninsula. The security and military situation in this region is extremely volatile and complex. The Korean peninsula, in which the interests of the four major powers of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States are intimately intertwined, remains an area of potential international conflict. Thus, this volume centers on the security issues of the major powers in Northeast Asia and the two Koreas. The analysts whose chapters are assembled in this volume are acknowledged experts in their fields. The chapters are integrated so that the theme of Northeast Asia's adjustment to post-Cold War issues is addressed in a structured and coherent manner. To help the reader grasp the essence of the chapters, a brief summary of each is provided here. "Japanese Security Policy in Post-Cold War Asia" by Tsuneo Akaha explores Japan's search for expanded political and security roles in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific. Japan faces many formidable tasks that defy short-term solutions. First, Japan must overcome its historical insularity and ethnocentrism in order to communicate in unequivocal terms what its future intentions are. Second, Japan must develop a strategic view of the region, which is characterized by an unstable balance between nationalist-realist tendencies and economic interdependence. Third, Japan must maintain a security alliance with the United States but at the same time forge a multilateral security framework (not an organization) by engaging Russia and China in security dialogue and economic cooperation. Fourth, Japan will be well advised to keep its defense spending and capabilities limited but continue to expand its economic assistance more explicitly for the purposes of comprehensive security. Finally, Japan must develop a national consensus on the scope and nature of its participation in the United Nations, including in peacekeeping operations and the Security Council. "Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia" by Fei-Ling Wang analyzes Chinese security policy in the Northeast Asian region in the post-Cold War period. In the author's view, Chinese security policy appears to be focusing on maintaining the status quo, which is viewed by the Chinese as favorably stable and peaceful. Beijing seems to be quite relaxed in a secure Northeast Asia and enjoying its "unprecedented" best relations with every country in the region in over one hundred years. Most of the past security threats are gone, and the new challenges have yet to cause serious security concerns. Economic gains, rather than political influence, have become the main motives behind China's activi-

INTRODUCTION

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ties in this region. But Beijing watches carefully for potential security hazards to its political stability at home and its reunification of the motherland. It is very cautious about any new development that may alter the status quo. Limited by its own capacity, China appears to be playing a subtle yet familiar balance-of-power game with "Chinese characteristics" aimed at a prevention of U.S. dominance or of Japanese military resurgence in Northeast Asia, either of which would be viewed as a major security threat by Beijing. Thus, to use and contain the United States in Northeast Asia has appeared to be a major theme in China's security policy. From a short-term security perspective, the United States is welcome and even encouraged by the Chinese to continue its military presence in Northeast Asia to suppress the Japanese. But a United States that aggressively promotes human rights and political democracy is deeply feared by Beijing as a lasting and long-term challenge to the political stability of the Chinese regime. Any new actions or initiatives (such as a possible new policy on Taiwan) that may be viewed as expansionist or hegemonic behavior by the United States are therefore carefully monitored and firmly opposed. This chapter analyzes in some depth the recent Chinese actions regarding the North Korean nuclear issue as a case study to illustrate what can be expected from an economically fast-growing yet politically stagnant China. It also examines four possible explanations for Beijing's sometimes puzzling policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue. It suggests that Beijing hopes for an outcome in which Pyongyang gives up its nuclear program and Washington helps to stabilize the status quo by giving full diplomatic recognition to, and perhaps injecting dollars into, North Korea. In sum, the status quo is the best security environment China can ask for in Northeast Asia. Beijing is likely to work for the maintenance of this status quo for a considerable period of time. Therefore, a drastically growing and transforming China ironically will become a very conservative power in Northeast Asia. "Australian Security Policy in Northeast Asia" by Dora Alves analyzes the economic and security roles of Australia as an active middle power in the Asia Pacific region. From the time of the Australian Labour Party's ascension to power in 1983, the Australian government has sought "enmeshment in Asia," encouraging public awareness of the countries to the north. Australia has become sensitive to the regional liking for ample discussion and unanimity. Alves maintains that in the mid1990s, Australia's goals are to achieve self-reliance within the U.S. alliance and pursue a more independent policy as an active middle power. Striving to maintain peace in the region, it used its good offices during the impasse on the Korean peninsula. The economic development

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of Northeast Asia, closely tied to exports of Australian raw materials, has changed the pattern of world trade and benefited Australian and Southeast Asian industrial development. Joint ventures have created interdependence. Japan is now Australia's chief trading partner; South Korea and Taiwan are also important to the Australian economy. At present, shared economic interests add to the stability of the region. Australia plays an important role in the Cairns Group, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, encouraging discussion and exchanges of views. Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Gareth Evans strongly supports using established international bodies—though, in the case of the United Nations, new developments could enhance relevance to today's conditions—to settle international differences and to avert confrontation. "Russian Security Policy in Northeast Asia" by Alexei D. Bogaturov analyzes the new international environment in the region after the disbandment of the USSR. The author argues that the region is developing in accordance with a "fluctuation stability" pattern that may be described as a dynamic combination of an overall regional peace and local "pointlike" conflicts that serve to discharge overtensions resulting from a "natural process of ripening" by the regional structure. Regional security matters, it is suggested, may be analyzed within a "core-andshelter" scheme. The core of the regional relations between China and its neighboring smaller nations includes the first (inner) shelter, composed of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the Washington-Seoul axis, and the second (outer) shelter, composed of Russia's, Canada's, and Australia's policies. From a structural point of view, Russia remains an outsider in the region. However, Russia may be important as a check vis-à-vis China, whose growing might and ability to press peacefully its neighbors in the south as well as in the north may be of critical importance in the future. Russia may be especially concerned with the asymmetry between the Russian and Chinese demographic presences in the Far East and possible interethnic tensions in Xinjiang that may affect Russia and its allies in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, etc.). The Russian approach to the problem of Korea is criticized for being one-sided. Bogaturov insists Moscow should denounce the old era but simultaneously sign a new political and economic treaty with North Korea to reestablish tools to influence Pyongyang. In dealing with Tokyo, the chapter suggests that Moscow is interested in preserving U.S. control over Japan's defense policy. A breakthrough in territorial settlement is hardly possible; however, sooner or later the provisions of the 1956 Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration should be implemented. A compromise might be reached in a context of strategic accommodation among Rus-

INTRODUCTION

5

sia, the United States, and Japan in the regions of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. "Russia's Policy Toward the Two Koreas" by Seung-Ho Joo analyzes Russia's foreign policy toward the two Koreas in the broad contexts of Russia's foreign policy concept and the regional systemic structure of Northeast Asia, and discusses the major issues in Russo-Korean relations. Russia's foreign policy concept that was adopted in the spring of 1993 called for an independent and autonomous foreign policy for Russia and elevated Russia's security interests to a higher level. Subsequently, Moscow showed some signs that it might pursue a new Korean policy on the basis of an equidistant relationship with the two Korean states. Northeast Asia is undergoing a radical structural transformation in the post-Cold War era. Russia has become a regional power in decline and is pursuing the policy of preserving the status quo in Northeast Asia. To achieve its goal of regional balance and stability, Russia utilizes two policy instruments: bilateral arrangements and a collective security system. Russia's tendency to use "the Korean card" against Japan and its persistent interest in forging a close military relationship with South Korea are part of its broader scheme for bilateral arrangements. Russia's call for a multinational conference to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue is closely intertwined with its plan for a collective security system in Northeast Asia. "U.S.-Northeast Asian Security Relations: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism" by Edward A. Olsen analyzes systemic changes in Northeast Asia by examining the motives and policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea as each attempts to adapt its bilateral relationships to contemporary pressures for greater multilateralism, as well as the roots of those pressures. U.S. security relations with its two Northeast Asian allies have been primarily bilateral during the post-World War II years. Now that the world is redefining the nature of post-Cold War security and economic relationships, various pressures exist to move toward greater multilateralism. U.S. relations with South Korea and Japan are virtually certain to play a major role in the creation of these new international structures. That evolutionary process is complicated by the differences between two sets of bilateral Northeast Asian ties and how the United States performs as a nexus. There were strategic perception gaps operative in the two alliances that now must be reconciled. These differences were compounded by the separate approaches Seoul and Tokyo followed en route toward global economic interdependence in the 1970s and 1980s. From the vantage point of such different backgrounds, both Japan and South Korea today are experimenting with various forms of multilateralism. As they do so,

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they are contending with a continually evolving set of U.S. policies toward economic and military multilateralism, and their impact on U.S. leadership in the region. Although all parties are pursuing these agendas with a post-Cold War geopolitical environment characterized by uncertainty in mind, their tenuously incremental approaches to the new milieu only add to the uncertainty factor. All parties seem committed to using multilateral venues as a supplement to continuing U.S.-based bilateral arrangements, but they also are apprehensive that events might lead to multilateralism supplanting bilateralism. This anxiety is cause for caution on all sides. "U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia: Handmaiden of Export Promotion?" by Thomas L. Wilborn evaluates the Clinton administration's security policy in Northeast Asia. The United States entered the post-Cold War era with a security policy toward Northeast Asia that was widely accepted by most governments in the region, one that has also apparently been successful in achieving the primary U.S. regional security objective: a relatively stable and tranquil region. The Clinton administration adopted the main features of this policy, making changes primarily to reflect its determination that foreign policy should support its number one national priority of fostering domestic economic growth and social cohesion. In addition to the basic regional policy orientation, the Clinton administration also inherited its most serious regional security problem: North Korea's nuclear weapons potential and challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The Clinton administration has introduced three innovations into U.S. Northeast Asian policy. First, Northeast Asia (and the rest of the Pacific Rim) is receiving greater attention than it has at any other time. Second, economics has been given primacy over other aspects of foreign policy. Third, multilateral, as well as bilateral, security structures in Asia now have U.S. support. The U.S. commitment to South Korea goes beyond the concept of assuring stability. U.S. forces have been critical in deterring a North Korean attack as South Korea has improved its own military capability. The U.S-North Korea Agreed Framework may result in lower tensions, improved North-South relations, and a change in Pyongyang's offensive deployments. But until that happens, U.S. forces will remain central to deterring an attack by Pyongyang. To achieve its security objectives in Northeast Asia, the United States depends primarily upon its alliances with Japan and South Korea and the forward presence of its military forces, which have become a symbol of U.S. engagement. The cost of relying on these approaches could be significantly reduced if a regional network of security structures, which could minimize instability while promoting change, were to evolve.

INTRODUCTION

7

"Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and U.S. Policy" by Lawrence E. Grinter surveys the patterns of proliferation of Northeast Asian nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and examines how U.S. policy, unilaterally and in concert with other countries and organizations, seeks to influence the phenomenon. Proliferators such as China and North Korea are treated as are potential proliferators such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This chapter concludes with recommendations for US. policy: U.S. policy toward Asian proliferators of WMD needs to discard the "one policy fits all" approach and apply the Israeli example to East Asia. The United States needs to have ready a sanctions option against North Korea, a previously hostile and dangerous government, should negotiations fail. The United States needs to continue discussions with China, whose government is generally friendly in spite of some policies contrary to U.S. interests. And the United States needs to keep Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan assured of its commitments to their security and viability. Asia is the test bed for new, more flexible and more realistic U.S. policies of countering the proliferation of WMD. "North Korea's Nuclear Program and Its Impact on Northeast Asian Security" by Seong Whun Cheon examines seven major questions that have been raised with respect to North Korea's nuclear problem. It also addresses broader regional security measures that could support the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and enhance peace and security in Northeast Asia. It is argued that the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercises and the request of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) for a special inspection in 1993 were provocative decisions and reduced the possibility of peaceful resolution of the problem at an earlier time. It is also pointed out that North Korea has not yet developed a complete nuclear bomb and that its nuclear program is frozen. The North's current strategy is to use "the nuclear card" to gain international assurance that the regime will survive. Pyongyang's intention to convert its reactors to a light-water system should be interpreted in this context. The disclosure of the past history of the North Korean nuclear program would reveal its exact amount of plutonium, an amount somewhere between the 90 grams that North Korea reported to the IAEA and the 12 kilograms that represents the worst-case estimate. The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework signed on October 21,1994, and the bilateral Kuala Lumpur light-water reactor talks held in May 1995 are also analyzed. The efforts of North and South Korea alone to delegitimize nuclear weapons would have little influence in curbing regional proliferation attempts. However, the following measures can be taken by the regional powers to enhance security in Northeast Asia: (1) a UN resolution of comprehensive security assurance to the Korean peninsula; (2) regional

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TAE-HWAN KWAK 8. EDWARD A. OLSEN

nuclear nonproliferation measures, such as a regional test ban agreement; (3) regional arms control and disarmament efforts; and (4) a regional open skies agreement as a transparency measure. "Basic Issues in the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula" by TaeHwan Kwak analyzes basic issues that still remain obstacles to the peace/unification processes on the Korean peninsula and makes several policy recommendations for creating favorable conditions for the peace process there. The issues discussed in this chapter are the implementation of the inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation; North Korea's nuclear issue, the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, and the issue of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula; and the U.S. troop withdrawal issue. Hie author argues that a new peace regime in Korea will emerge in the late 1990s only if the inter-Korean nonaggression and denuclearization agreements discussed in this chapter are sincerely implemented. The two Koreas must work together to create essential conditions for achieving peace in Korea. In their separate chapters, Seong Whun Cheon and Tae-Hwan Kwak offer insights into the ways that the prime obstacle to Northeast Asia's transition to the post-Cold War era may be facilitated through resolution of Korea's seemingly intractable problems. Their judgments and recommendations reinforce the volume's succinct conclusion because the dynamism of some of the states in Northeast Asia cannot become the vehicle for the region's adjustment to a changing world until the entire Korean peninsula and its immediate neighbors discover the means to extend that dynamism throughout the region and use it as an instrument to facilitate the transition. When that is achieved, Northeast Asia's prospects are bright. Until that time, however, Northeast Asia will remain a troubled region, which makes the contributions to this volume particularly relevant within the context of the late 1990s.

1

Japanese Security Policy in Post-Cold War Asia Tsuneo Akaha

Japanese security policymakers today face global and regional environments that are dramatically different from what they have experienced previously in the postwar period. The environments are much more favorable for bilateral and multilateral international cooperation, on the one hand; but, on the other hand, security implications are considerably more complicated and more uncertain than they were during the Cold War era. Japan has yet to develop a stable national consensus on the desirable direction for its post-Cold War security policy. The global system of hegemonic international relations under the U.S.Soviet strategic rivalry has ended, but no stable structure has yet emerged to replace it. The threatening Soviet superpower has been replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led by postcommunist Russia, but the weakened Russia presents serious international challenges in nuclear nonproliferation, in the global environment, and in a host of other areas. China's path toward a "socialist market economy" appears successful so far, with its growth outpacing that of even some of the most dynamic economies of Asia Pacific, but post-Deng leadership transition in Beijing remains problematic, and even the booming economy may breed political instability under inflationary pressures and growing income disparity. The United States no longer faces the menacing Soviet threat of the Cold War era but has yet to develop a stable cooperative relationship with the postSoviet Russia. Washington also has serious difficulty reconciling its human rights policy with its economic policy toward Beijing. Moreover, growing transnational economic processes in Asia Pacific are deepening the interdependence among the region's economies, giving rise to the need to coordinate their foreign and domestic policies. At the same time, the increasingly wealthier countries of the region are acquiring more powerful weapons and more sophisticated arms technology, and this is generating a specter of multiple regional arms races.1 9

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Japan's own relationship with its most important ally, the United States, faces serious challenges. The Cold War rationale for the bilateral alliance has disappeared, and Tokyo and Washington must now develop a new strategic and political logic for their security alliance. They are barely able to contain the potentially destabilizing consequences of the frictions over their uncontrollable trade imbalance. The gradual drawdown of the U.S. military presence in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific forces Japan to seek a genuine postwar reconciliation with its Asian neighbors, a reconciliation that was long delayed by the Cold War system of international relations organized around the U.S.-centered bilateral alliances. The end of the Cold War has also shaken the foundation of Japanese domestic politics. It has eliminated the ideological basis of the left-right rivalry in the country. Amid the sweeping power realignment between and within all major political parties, the fragile coalition governments in Tokyo have been unable to forge a stable national consensus on post-Cold War foreign and security policies. Japanese self-confidence has also been shaken by the "bursting of the economic bubble" and the ensuing recession, the deepest recession the country has experienced since the 1940s. The dramatically altered world requires a new system of international relations based on collective, cooperative sharing of power and responsibilities. Japan cannot remain a passive actor and adjust itself to a world order constructed by others but must actively participate in the forging of a new system. At a minimum, Japan, with its enormous economic power, must play a leading, if not the leading, role in developing a post-Cold War regional security system in Asia Pacific.2 In the following analysis, I discuss the major tasks facing Japan's security and foreign policy makers vis-à-vis the post-Cold War realities of Asia Pacific. The central questions I address are what Japan's security policy priorities should be and how Japan should pursue them. First, I argue that Japan must overcome its historical insularity and ethnocentrism and learn to communicate more openly and more effectively about its interests and concerns. Second, I maintain that Japan must find a new rationale for maintaining its security alliance with the United States, forge a new relationship with post-Soviet Russia by overcoming historical legacies, and establish a balance between political and economic interests vis-à-vis China. Third, I hold that Japan must develop a credible and legitimate national defense policy under increasing spending constraints. Fourth, I suggest that Japan must squarely meet international criticisms about its foreign economic assistance—an important part of its comprehensive security policy. Finally, I discuss domestic and international obstacles to Japan's global security role, with a focus on the issues

JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

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of a permanent Japanese seat on the UN Security Council and its participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

OVERCOMING INSULARITY AND ETHNOCENTRISM

Most Japanese are aware of the growing international expectation for their international political and security roles commensurate with their economic power. They are also agreed that the end of the Cold War has opened opportunities for expanded international roles for their country. However, what many Japanese acknowledge as their insular worldview and what many foreign critics describe as Japanese ethnocentrism severely limit this nation's ability to assume important international roles.3 Some trace these national traits of the Japanese to their history and culture. A1991 study by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry stated that "the ethnocentrism of Japanese who have built our history in a nation of islands surrounded by seas on all sides, without any experience of large scale foreign invasions, is seen as peculiar from the point of view of the world's common sense."4 Japanese contemporary insularity is also due to the peculiar strategic position in which they found themselves during the postwar period. The Cold War antagonism in Asia and the U.S. policy to nurture Japan as the most important regional ally long delayed postwar reconciliation between the former imperialist Japanese and their Asian neighbors. It was not until 1965, for example, that Japan finally restored diplomatic relations with South Korea. Japanese-Chinese normalization came as recently as 1978. Japan and Russia are yet to conclude a peace treaty. The Japanese are also keenly aware of the suspicion their Asian neighbors continue to harbor about their foreign policy objectives. As Masataka Kosaka has symbolically stated, for Japan, 1945 is not over.5 The Japanese continue to stress their country's unique history as a "pacifist nation" and its future potential as a "global civilian power."6 The process of psychological and emotional reconciliation between the Japanese and their Asian neighbors is just beginning. In 1993, amid growing demands for compensation for Asian "comfort women" who were forced into working for the Japanese during World War II, Prime Minister Hosokawa expressed his personal view that Japan's war with the Asian nations was a "war of aggression" (shinryaku senso) and an "immoral war."7 In his meeting with South Korean President Kim Young-sam in Kyongju in November 1993, the Japanese prime minister offered an official apology for the atrocities Japan had committed during its colonialist control of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945, and the

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Korean leader positively evaluated the apology. The two sides also pledged cooperation at the start of a new age for Asia Pacific.8 Japanese insularity and ethnocentrism present themselves as "unilateral pacifism" (ikkoku heiwa shugi) and "unilateral prosperity" {ikkoku han'ei shugi)-, that is, the Japanese tend to pursue only their own peace and prosperity with little regard to the values and aspirations of other nations.9 These proclivities prompted Takakazu Kuriyama, the current Japanese ambassador to the United States, to implore his compatriots during the Gulf War not only to pursue the peace and security of their own country, but also to actively participate in the construction of a new world order.10 A 1987 survey of opinions among foreigners inside and outside Japan basically agreed with the Japanese self-assessments. They believed the most important obstacles to increasing Japanese international contributions were the closed nature of Japanese society and the lack of international awareness among the Japanese.11 One foreign critic has provocatively asserted that Japan is not a genuine democracy in Western terms, implying that the nation cannot be trusted as a responsible international partner.12 A related issue is whether the Japanese political system can produce a leader who is able and willing to risk expending all of his or her political capital on putting forth an activist vision of Japan's international role and taking bold and controversial foreign policy initiatives. Recent political developments in the country are not very encouraging. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had governed the country for virtually the entire postwar period, finally lost its monopoly on power following the series of political and financial scandals that eroded public confidence in its governing ability. The passage of a nonconfidence vote against the cabinet of Prime Minister Miyazawa brought the long-brewing tensions between proreform and antireform forces within his party to a head in 1993, whereupon many members quit the party and formed their own parties. The hurriedly formed coalition of ideologically disparate parties managed to defeat the LDP at the polls and elected young reformer Morihiro Hosokawa as prime minister. However, the Hosokawa administration had to focus most of its energy on holding the fragile coalition together, pressing forward with the popularly mandated political reform and coping with the deepest economic recession the country has experienced since the economic crisis in the immediate postwar years. The government also had to fend off an onslaught of delay tactics employed by the disgruntled LDP, which still occupies the largest number of parliamentary seats, against genuine political reform. Consequently, that government was not able to take major foreign policy initiatives. One notable exception was the prime minister's successful effort to bring his country and its Asian neighbors

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closer to a reconciliation by acknowledging openly that Japan's war against its neighbors in the earlier decades of the twentieth century was indeed a shinryaku senso. During his mid-March 1994 visit to Beijing, Hosokawa also admitted Japan was responsible for that war. After the Hosokawa government fell, Japan entered a period of political flux during which a relatively unstable coalition was led by the LDP and the Socialists. Throughout late 1994 and 1995, the government was headed by a Socialist politician, Tomiichi Murayama, but the LDP remained the dominant partner. As rival political parties rearranged themselves to pose a more coordinated challenge to this fragile coalition, Murayama was succeeded by Ryutaro Hashimoto. During this period, the Japanese government was made more stable by the permanent bureaucracy. This permitted Japan, in a period of political instability, to pursue a fairly consistent course in foreign policy, including that within the Asia Pacific region.

FASHIONING A NEW RATIONALE FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES

Tokyo is concerned with broadening the scope and deepening the level of its regional ties, but it is also determined to maintain close security relations with Washington. However, the seemingly endless friction between the two capitals over trade and other economic issues casts a dark shadow over the long-term prospects of those relations. There are several reasons why Tokyo and Washington should want to keep their security ties intact. First, there is no alternative security arrangement that either side can develop quickly to meet its security requirements in the post-Cold War era. Tokyo must continue to rely on Washington's security commitment as one of the two pillars of Japanese defense policy as long as the other pillar, that of building its self-defense capabilities, remains constrained by political and financial considerations. The U.S. assessment of the security situation in Asia Pacific calls for continued forward deployment of U.S. forces in the region. The U.S. military presence there is seen as an essential factor in regional stability, in discouraging the emergence of a regional hegemon, and in enhancing Washington's ability to influence a wide spectrum of important political and economic issues in the region.13 In this context, Japan's increasing burden sharing is appreciated by Washington. However, the increasing host-nation support that Tokyo provides for U.S. troops in Japan is coming under growing criticism by Japanese nationalists.14 Another reason Tokyo and Washington should each desire to maintain the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty is that it can

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help, both symbolically and substantively, to contain the potentially destabilizing effects of trade and economic frictions between their two countries. The treaty symbolizes a mutually beneficial political relationship. It also allows Washington and Tokyo to maintain a mutually acceptable burden-sharing arrangement. Moreover, the security treaty provides the United States with access to the fast-advancing Japanese defense and civilian technology with its military applications through two-way technology transfer. The U.S. interest in Japanese defense technology is motivated by both the fear of a potential competitor in future weapons development and the potential cost savings through cooperation in weapons research and development.15 Finally, the U.S.-initiated cooperation in the development of theater missile defense (TMD) in Japan is finding increasing support in Japan against the background of suspected nuclear weapons development and missile tests in North Korea.16 It is reported that the Japanese Defense Agency will include the development of TMD in a revised National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).17 U.S. views of Japanese regional security roles are more mixed. Some critics of Japan's economics-first policy urge Japan to become a "normal state" by making greater military contributions to international peace and security.18 The U.S. government continues to emphasize burden sharing among its allies, as it had during the Cold War years. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, in his 1993 defense report to Congress, pointed out that East Asia has three legacies of the Cold War—the Russian occupation of Japanese northern islands, the division of Korea, and the civil war in Cambodia—and urged Japan and South Korea to strengthen their defense capabilities and to increase their financial support for the forward-deployed U.S. forces in East Asia.19 There are critics who caution against encouraging Japanese defense buildup for fear that the economic superpower may also want to become a military power. Henry Kissinger, for example, has warned that Japan may not be content with its status as an economic giant and a military dwarf.20 There is a growing populist view in the United States that Japan, with its mercantilist policy, is a threat to U.S. national security. Some analysts predict that Japan's gross national product (GNP) will surpass that of the United States early in the first decade of the twenty-first century and that such a change will have "enormous geopolitical significance."21 Some discount such warnings and assert that the physical and geostrategic constraints of Japan will always limit the nation's ability to project power and to structure international relations.22 To quote a recent study, "The notion that it would be better for Japan to be a regular military power is strategic Old Thinking, the echo

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of concerns about burden-sharing in the global conflict with communism."23 Some analysts in the United States complain that the United States has no strategy and that Washington is poorly organized for dealing with Japan.24 To remedy the situation, the Aspen Institute's Strategic Group, chaired by Joseph Nye, has proposed that the United States encourage Japan to play a larger role in international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the Group of Seven (G7). The group has also called for the establishment of a multilateral security organization in Asia, similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.25 Regarding bilateral economic issues, Nye calls on Japan to cooperate in establishing macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies that would stimulate its national domestic demand, and he also calls on the United States to reduce its budget deficit and improve product competitiveness.26 It is probably safe to agree with Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara's conclusion in their theoretical exploration of the implications of the end of the Cold War for the U.S. strategic policy in East Asia: "The notion that Japan is destined to be the first example in history of a state wielding huge economic and technological power without corresponding military might is as implausible as the case for the inevitability of a nuclear-armed Japan. Both notions are profoundly ahistorical."27 In Japan, there is general consensus that the era of U.S. hegemony, or Pax Americana, is over and that global peace and stability require the support and cooperation of the United States, Japan, and Europe.28 This consensus, strengthened by the Gulf War, was articulated by Prime Minister Miyazawa in his policy address to Parliament on October 30,1992. Miyazawa stated that the presence and involvement of the United States is essential to the peace and prosperity of Asia Pacific and that the JapanU.S. security system and other close bilateral relations are an important precondition for Japan's active role in the region. He called for a global partnership between the two countries to construct a peaceful world order.29 Current and former Defense Agency officials also support the prime minister's position. There are some critics, however, who maintain that the Japan-U.S. security treaty has lived out its usefulness and that Tokyo and Washington should review the treaty. Motofumi Asai, for example, has argued that the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the reduction of military spending in the United States and Europe indicate the need for a similar arms reduction in Japan. The former Japanese diplomat criticized Tokyo's acquiescence to U.S. demands for further defense burden sharing and called for a revision of the bilateral security treaty.30

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ACCOMMODATING A NEW RUSSIA

Whereas Japan's task in its relations with the United States is essentially to manage the intricate web of political, military, and economic interests that tie the countries, the fundamental problem Japan faces vis-à-vis Russia is how to build bilateral relations from the ground up when the countries' foundations of power and sources of influence in the region are entirely different. At the end of the Cold War, Japan is a giant economically but a small power militarily, and most of its regional influence stems from its economic foundations of power. Russia, in contrast, is primarily a military power with little or no economic means of influence in the region. The uneven equation of power foundations between the two countries severely limits the ways and means by which they can establish a stable, interdependent relationship, and this fact cannot but have a troubling effect on the region's stability.31 The breakup of the Soviet Union and the continuing uncertainty in Russia pose a serious challenge to Japan's security policy. The Japanese Defense Agency's 1993 White Paper stated that the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union generally improved the international situation. The agency's annual report warned, however, that the Russian military, with its vast conventional and nuclear forces in the Far East, remained a "destabilizing factor." The report maintained that the continuing modernization of weapons systems, the transfer of weapons systems from Europe to the Far East, and the uncertain political situation in Moscow require "constant vigilance" on the part of Japan. The Defense Agency stated Russia still had a division of group troops on the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, although it confirmed that all the MiGs on Etorofu had been withdrawn by July 1993.32 The 1992 diplomatic bluebook of Japan warned that the present situation in Russia involved "destabilizing factors of hyperinflation, declining production, political confusion, and ethnic conflicts" and added that the instability of Russia had "serious implications for the world" because the country possessed a huge nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).33 The long-term goal for Japan (and for the entire international community) should be to ensure the emergence of a new Russia whose interests are at least compatible, but more ideally, complementary, with those of the other major powers. This would require, first and foremost, successful democratization and market development in Russia, including military-civilian conversion. However, much of the momentum for political and economic reforms that emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin's rise to power, has since been lost. Although the Russian president's decision to forcefully dislodge antiYeltsin forces from the Parliament building temporarily stopped the slip-

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pery slide toward utter political chaos, the action alienated many of his previous supporters among the intellectuals and deepened the political cleavages in the country. The radical economic reform introduced by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar (or the failure to successfully implement it) created a groundswell of opposition to the fast pace of reform. The resulting political conundrum and social chaos were exploited by the nationalist demagogue Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who was successfully elected to the new Russian Parliament in December 1993. The international community expects Japan to play a more active role. Japan, with its enormous trade and capital surpluses and the world's largest official development assistance (ODA) budget, must carry out its self-proclaimed goal of becoming a "nation that can contribute to the international community" (kokusai shakai ni kokendekiru kuni). The political and economic reforms taking place in Russia have global, political, economic, and security implications, and the international community is watching closely to see what Tokyo will do to help Russia. However, many Japanese continue to harbor ill feelings toward the Russians over the treatment of Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia during the first half of the 1940s and the unresolved territorial dispute over the Northern Territories. Tokyo has so far resisted large-scale financial aid and provided only limited technical and trade-related assistance to Russia. Serious doubts persist in Japan concerning Russia's future political outlook, military behavior, and economic performance. The business community remains skeptical about the prospects of stable market development in the chaotic Russia of today. The most crucial challenge for Japan is to offer a viable alternative to the failed reform policies. Although there are some Japanese economists who argue that the Japanese postwar economic reconstruction can provide some ideas that may be applicable to the current tasks of Russian economic reform, Tokyo has thus far been unable to seize the moment and offer a bold recommendation.34 Not only would a democratic Russia, with a market-oriented economy open to the rest of the world, represent potential commercial gains to Japan, but increased economic ties between the two countries would also help reduce the historical defense complex of the Russians and the military's influence in Russia's Asian policy. A successful conversion of Russia's military-industrial complex to civilian production would help reduce the military's presence in the region. It would obviously require both a growing civilian industry that could absorb the labor, capital, resources, and other inputs now invested in the military sector and expanding markets for new civilian products. Japan could assist in improving the quality of Russian products and developing foreign markets for Russian exports. The development of foreign markets, especially

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in the Asia Pacific region where Japan is the dominant actor, would clearly require better relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Japan is also the most important potential source of capital, technology, and information for industrial modernization and market reforms in Russia. Of particular interest to Japan in this context is the future political and economic shape of the Russian Far East. This vast region with tremendous natural resources is underpopulated (7.9 million people) and remains the least developed area in Russia. It shares a 1,342-mile border with China and North Korea and is separated by only a few miles from Japan, Alaska, and South Korea. Despite its tremendous resource potential and proximity to the dynamic Asia Pacific economy, the region has long been unable to develop close economic ties with its neighbors. Until Gorbachev's bold diplomatic initiatives during the perestroika period of 1985-1990, most Japanese viewed the Russian Far East as a heavily fortified frontier of a menacing and threatening Russia that had no business meddling in Asian affairs. Although the end of the Cold War has opened up new possibilities for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia—in economic development, in resource conservation, and in environmental protection—the continuing political uncertainty and economic crisis in Russia and the unresolved territorial dispute between Japan and Russia have so far prevented a fuller development of economic ties across the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. Successful Japanese assistance to the Russian Far East communities in this critical transition period would engender Russian desire for greater international cooperation and acceptance as a credible partner in the construction of a post-Cold War order in the region. Whether Japan can successfully develop and implement a cooperative strategy in this area will have lasting effects on future bilateral relations. The challenge Tokyo faces with respect to Russia's transformation is indeed a litmus test of its will and ability to play an important political role at crucial moments in history.

BALANCING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH CHINA

Japan's relations with China are at their best today, particularly on the economic front. From 1992 to 1993, Japanese exports to China grew a whopping 44.6 percent, and imports from China increased by 21.3 percent, for a total two-way trade of $37.8 billion in 1993.35 China is now Japan's second most important export market after the United States, and Japan has surpassed Hong Kong as the most important market for Chinese exports. Japan is also the fourth largest investor in China after Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States, and the most important

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provider of official economic assistance. Many Japanese hold the view that the Chinese pragmatism that brought the phenomenal economic growth to their country during the early 1990s is irreversible.36 Tokyo has also agreed to Beijing's request to support its bid to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Chinese leadership is showing satisfaction with the current state of economic relations with Japan and eagerness to expand them further. Beijing is eyeing continued Japanese economic assistance to develop its economic and social infrastructure, as well as private investments and modern production technology from Japan. On the political front, the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing is at its best since the normalization of relations in the 1970s. Particularly helpful has been the willingness of Prime Minister Hosokawa to publicly acknowledge Japan's responsibility for its war aggression against China earlier in the twentieth century and to offer apologies to the Chinese people, as he did during his visit to Beijing in March 1994. The Chinese leadership has expressed appreciation for the sincerest expression of contrition that has ever come from any Japanese prime minister. Although Japan has expressed a degree of concern over China's human rights record, the issue has not affected the overall relations between the two countries. In fact, many Japanese acknowledge there is a difference between Japanese and U.S. approaches to this issue. For example, following the meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa and Chinese Premier Li Peng in Beijing in March 1994, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson reported that the Japanese leader told his Chinese counterpart, "It is not wise to impose a Western democratic value on other countries," a reference to the visible criticism U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had raised about China's human rights record during his visit to Beijing that had just preceded the Japanese prime minister's visit.37 It is in the area of security that the Japanese hold some concerns about China's behavior. The combination of high-speed economic growth, continuing military modernization, and a growing emphasis on naval buildup in China is a growing concern among the Japanese, although such developments are not yet seen as a threat to Japan's security. Japan's 1993 defense report noted that China was expanding defense spending and modernizing weapons systems, including the recent deployment of the CSS-5, a new medium-range ballistic missile; but the annual report also observed that the pace of China's overall military modernization was rather slow because the nation was placing priority on economic development.38 In his meeting with the Chinese head of state Jiang Zemin in March 1994, the Japanese prime minister specifically referred to Japan's ODA charter, which identifies Japanese ODA recipients' defense

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policy, including arms acquisition, as one of the factors Tokyo considered in making aid decisions, and he subtly asked for a restraint on defensespending increases as well as improved transparency in the defense sector. Jiang reiterated what had become Beijing's standard answer to international expressions of concern over China's defense policy: that China's military buildup was of a defensive nature and China had no aggressive intent.39 This was the closest the Japanese government had come to hinting at a possible linking of economic assistance to China's defense policy, but Tokyo would not want to risk losing cooperative opportunities with Beijing on a number of issues on which the two sides shared common interests, for example, expanding trade relations, environmental problems, and regional economic cooperation. In addition to the rather obvious commercial benefits that the expanding bilateral trade and other economic relations with China bring to Japan, Tokyo is also interested in developing bilateral cooperation in the area of security. The most immediate security concern shared by Tokyo and Beijing is the nuclear development in North Korea. During his March 1994 visit to Beijing, the Japanese prime minister specifically asked the Chinese leadership to use its influence with North Korea to help resolve the impasse between Washington and Pyongyang over the latter's refusal to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea.40 In May 1993, Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto and Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen agreed to resume the bilateral security dialogue that had been suspended following the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. The first post-Tiananmen session of bilateral security consultations was held in Beijing in December 1993. The two sides were represented by bureau-level foreign ministry officials of both countries. The Japanese side pointed out to the Chinese the growing international apprehension about China's defense buildup and proposed that China improve the transparency of its defense policy by publishing an equivalent to its own Defense Agency's annual report. The Japanese showed greater eagerness than did the Chinese to share information about each other's defense policy as a first step toward confidence building. The Chinese side emphasized that it was working "in its own way" on the problem of North Korean nuclear development. The two sides also shared a favorable evaluation of the cooperation between Japanese and Chinese personnel in the Cambodian peacekeeping mission and agreed to meet again in 1994, when the security dialogue was expected to involve the two countries' defense officials in addition to foreign ministry representatives.41 What is the strategic significance of the stepped-up contacts between Japanese and Chinese leaders and policymakers? They are signs of grow-

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ing mutual interest in developing security dialogue over the general security environment of the region. Some observers in the United States are suggesting that Japan is "playing an Asia card," to deflect the mounting U.S. criticism against Japan's trade policy.42 It is premature to reach such a conclusion. There is simply no evidence that Tokyo would be willing to damage its political and security ties with Washington in favor of closer ties with Beijing. If one were to look for any indications of willingness to play a trilateral balance-of-power game in the Pacific, one would more likely find some in China than in Japan.43 For example, one could detect a hint of willingness in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's statement in a March 20,1994, interview in Beijing to the effect that China was willing to lose U.S. markets if Washington should decide not to renew China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status in June because of its human rights practice. However, in the very same interview, the foreign minister also said China still believed progress could be made in resolving its differences with Washington if discussions took place in an atmosphere of equality and mutual respect.44 Although the human rights issue could become a serious concern for U.S.-Japan relations if Washington continues to publicly press China on this problem and link it to the trade relations between the United States and China, opposition to the linkage was growing even in the United States as the June deadline for the MFN decision approached.45

RECONCILING THE PAST AND BUILDING NEW RELATIONS WITH KOREA

Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, Koreans' contempt and bitterness over Japan's colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 remain extant. In his speech before the Japanese Parliament in May 1990, for example, South Korean President Roh Taewoo spoke of the psychological barrier to a genuine friendship between his people and the Japanese. As Japan and South Korea seek to find a new framework for cooperation in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific, however, signs of reconciliation are emerging, at least at the official level. On his visit to Seoul in November 1993, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa offered a public apology to the Korean people for Japan's colonial rule of Korea. Hosokawa and Korean President Kim Young-sam both expressed a desire to overcome the legacies of history and build future-oriented bilateral relations.46 In his speech before the Japanese Parliament on March 25,1994, President Kim called for Korean and Japanese initiatives toward the construction of a multilateral framework for collective security in Asian nuclear issues

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and urged the two countries to put an end to the century-long history of disputes and discord, to establish a "new relationship and to share the same for the future world."47 Prime Minister Hosokawa agreed and stated that the two countries should take a close look at the facts of history and make efforts to broaden and internationalize Japan-South Korean relations.48 Kim visited Hosokawa's successor, Tomiichi Murayama, in Tokyo in July 1994 and called for the establishment of a "comprehensive partnership" based on an accurate understanding of history. The Japanese prime minister acknowledged that Japan's colonial rule of Korea had brought unbearable pain and sorrow upon the Korean people and pledged to hasten the domestic discussion over how to best express his country's apology and sense of regret.49 Formally, the Japanese seem ready to acknowledge their past history of aggression. After months of protracted and convoluted negotiations, in June 1995 the ruling coalition parties managed to ram through Parliament the "Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace Based on Lessons of History," in which they expressed a "deep sense of remorse" over the "instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression" in modern world history, such acts as Japan had committed in the past, and the pain and suffering the nation had inflicted upon other peoples, particularly the peoples of Asia.50 However, some Japanese politicians individually continue to deny Japan's legal responsibility for its prewar and wartime aggression. The latest manifestation of Japanese denial of history and rejection of responsibility is the statement by former Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister Michio Watanabe to the effect that the 1910 Treaty of Annexation of Korea was concluded "harmoniously" inasmuch as it was accepted by both sides without force and that the Japanese government believed the annexation was internationally legal. After an explosion of protests in South Korea, Watanabe offered an apology and retracted the term "harmoniously" from his statement.51 Japan's relations with North Korea remain strained. There are three main factors that complicate Tokyo's approach to Pyongyang: the pace of North-South Korea dialogue, the course of U.S.-North Korea relations, and issues at stake in Japan-North Korea relations themselves. Additionally, Tokyo remains sensitive to the interests of Seoul that may be affected by Tokyo-Pyongyang relations. First, the pace of North-South Korean reconciliation affects Tokyo's approach to Pyongyang, as periods of impasse in the North-South dialogue prevent any initiatives from Tokyo. Tokyo had to wait until the first high-level Seoul-Pyongyang talks commenced in September 1990 before it could initiate its own effort to explore ways to establish official relations with Pyongyang. That same month, an LDP-Socialist delegation visited Pyongyang and issued a joint declaration with the North's Korean

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Workers' Party (KWP), in which the two sides agreed that normalization and advancement of Japan-North Korea relations would serve the two peoples' interests and contribute to the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world. But the Japanese government insisted that it was not party to the declaration inasmuch as it represented an agreement between political parties. The resumption of high-level Seoul-Pyongyang talks in December 1990 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea in September 1990 prompted Tokyo to decide officially to engage Pyongyang in normalization talks. The talks began in January the following year. Both Seoul and Pyongyang were simultaneously admitted into the United Nations in September 1991; they signed a basic agreement and a declaration on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula in December. As South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in August 1992, things looked promising for TokyoPyongyang talks on diplomatic relations. Then came the nuclear impasse between North Korea and the international community, the second impediment to Japan-North Korea normalization. Tokyo was not in a position to proceed with its normalization talks with Pyongyang while the nuclear issue kept Pyongyang isolated internationally. Following Pyongyang's declaration that it would withdraw from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in March 1993, Tokyo consulted closely with both Washington and Seoul. A year later, Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Kim agreed that their two countries would join proposed international sanctions against North Korea over Pyongyang's refusal to allow I A E A inspections of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The two leaders also called for continued diplomatic efforts to resolve the impasse. Tokyo supported the IAEA resolution of June 13,1994, to stop technological assistance for North Korea and was prepared to accept the consequences of proposed economic sanctions against Pyongyang. Tokyo was deeply alarmed by Pyongyang's announcement the same day that it was withdrawing from the IAEA. Therefore, the Japanese government was relieved by the conclusion on October 21 of the U.S.-North Korean agreement committing Pyongyang to suspend its suspected nuclear weapons program in exchange for internationally assisted installation of civilian nuclear facilities. Despite some concerns about issues of implementation and Japan's financial burden, Tokyo pledged its support for the Agreed Framework and, in March 1995, joined the Korea Energy Development Organization, the international consortium established for the purpose of providing civilian nuclear technology to North Korea.52 Although uncertainties remained as to whether Pyongyang would accept Seoul's demand that North Korea accept South Korean light-water reactors (LWRs) to replace graphitemoderated reactors in the North, Tokyo's support of the Agreed Frame-

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work was likely to remain firm because it was designed to complement the broader effort by the United States to stabilize the Northeast Asian security situation, a goal Tokyo wanted to pursue for its own security interest. Tokyo and Pyongyang also have their own bilateral issues to settle before they can establish diplomatic relations. At the most fundamental level, Japan wants to clearly establish the limits of North Korea's jurisdiction, which will affect the bilateral issues to be settled, but North Korea fears that Japanese sanctioning of the limits would add legitimacy to the division of the peninsula. Second, Tokyo asserts the 1910 Treaty of Annexation of Korea was legally concluded, but Pyongyang insists the treaty was null and void from the beginning. Third, Japan asserts the San Francisco peace treaty is an important consideration in the restoration of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, but Pyongyang rejects this because it is not a party to the treaty. The most difficult issue relates to the scope of Japanese compensations for the North Koreans. In the 1990 joint declaration noted above, the LDPSocialist delegation acknowledged that Japan should fully and officially apologize to the North Korean people and compensate them for the misfortune and suffering Japan had inflicted upon them during the thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule and for the losses they suffered during the forty-five years following World War II. However, the Japanese government maintains that Japan has no responsibility for the postwar period. Even concerning the prewar period, Tokyo and Pyongyang disagree over the issue of responsibilty. The North Korean government maintains that Japan should not only settle all issues of assets and claims but also pay war reparations and compensations, whereas the Japanese government asserts that Japan and North Korea were never officially at war and therefore Japan has no obligation to pay reparations and compensations. Tokyo also rejects Pyongyang's demand that it pay damages for its complicity in the Korean War, that is, for allowing the United States to use military bases in Japan during the war. On March 30,1995, the KWP and the official Japanese delegation concluded an agreement calling on the two governments to resume the long-suspended official talks for the normalization of relations between the two countries. Both agreed there should be no preconditions for the normalization talks. On the issue of compensations, the document vaguely stated that the two sides would settle the "unfortunate past" between themselves and that they should actively pursue diplomatic normalization.53 While attempting to normalize its relations with Pyongyang, Tokyo does not wish to jeopardize its relations with Seoul, much less with the United States. Therefore, Tokyo closely consults with Seoul and Wash-

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ington. For example, LDP vice president Keizo Obuchi visited Seoul shortly after the Tokyo-Pyongyang negotiations and reassured the South Korean government that Japan would continue to coordinate closely with Seoul and Washington. Tokyo also demonstrated its sensitivity to Seoul by consulting with its leaders before deciding to respond positively to Pyongyang's request for a humanitarian shipment of rice to the starvation-stricken North Korea.54 Japanese-South Korean bilateral consultations over North Korea are supported by the growing consensus among the defense communities of both countries for the need to work together closely on other security issues in Northeast Asia. The 1994 Japanese White Paper described North Korea's behavior as a destabilizing factor not only in Northeast Asia but in the entire international society. The defense annual gave a rather detailed account of the developments in the North Korean nuclear issue and also described Pyongyang's development of the ballistic missile Nodong 1 as nearing completion.55 Tokyo was further troubled by the uncertain repercussions of Kim Il-sung's death in July for the political order in North Korea.56 South Korea has recently shown a great deal of interest in the development of multilateral consultations concerning Northeast Asian security issues. To this end, South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo proposed the establishment of the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers' conference in July 1994.57 Tokyo has not yet responded to this proposal. For now, Tokyo prefers to rely on bilateral consultations with Japan and South Korea concerning Northeast Asian security issues and supplementing them by the growing multilateral consultations in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Among the proposals the South Korean defense ministry has put forth for Japan's consideration are mutual visits by military exercise ships and joint studies of East Asian security issues. Since security consultations beyond those concerning the North Korean issue are a very sensitive issue in Japan, defense planners in Tokyo want to focus bilateral consultations on relatively noncontroversial issues such as confidencebuilding measures that each side can undertake without formal agreement. For example, in December 1994, a South Korean frigate and two supply ships paid a friendship visit to Tokyo Bay, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was scheduled to send its training vessels to South Korea in 1996.58 In June 1995, the Japanese Defense Agency and the Korean defense ministry agreed to notify each other before either side's training aircraft approach each other's air defense verification zone and to refrain from scrambling in order to prevent any accidents involving Japanese and South Korean military aircraft.59

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EXPANDING DEFENSE UNDER SPENDING CONSTRAINTS?

Tokyo's pattern of defense spending in the early 1990s reflected the rather cautious approach the planners there had adopted toward the nation's changing security environment, the Soviet policy in the Pacific being the central question. In 1994, however, the picture began to change. How to expand the nation's defense capabilities and, at the same time, reduce the economic burden that such a goal would entail was now the major preoccupation of the Japanese government. The bursting of the economic bubble, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a new (substantially weakened) Russia were the main catalysts in this shift; the bloated view of Japan's defense spending, ignoring the impact of the yen's appreciation, was another. Finally, the belated recognition by the defense policy planners that the Cold War had indeed ended was also instrumental in this process. Despite the general reduction of tension in Northeast Asia since the early 1990s, the 1993 Japanese White Paper still recommended that the nation should maintain its basic defense capability on the basis of the NDPO adopted in 1976, in the middle of the Cold War, and keep the U.S.-Japanese security treaty intact. According to the NDPO, Japan's defense was based upon the maintenance of defense capabilities allowed by the Constitution and the bilateral security treaty with the United States. Accordingly, Japan possessed only "basic defense force," which was adequate to respond to limited and small-scale aggression, and relied on U.S. cooperation to deal with greater threats. Only in January 1992 did Prime Minister Miyazawa call for a review of the national defense blueprint, citing dramatic regional and international changes as the impetus for the review. The Defense Agency reluctantly agreed to review the NDPO and accepted the impact of the end of the Cold War on the nation's defense forces.60 Moreover, at Prime Minister Hosokawa's urging, the National Security Council officially decided in February 1994 to complete the review of the NDPO by August 1994.61 Japan had increased its defense spending annually by 5.9 percent, 6.1 percent, 5.5 percent, and 3.8 percent between 1989 and 1992, respectively, and by 1993, its defense budget nominally had become the second largest in the world, next to that of the United States.62 However, the defense spending for fiscal year (FY) 1993 represented an increase over the previous year of only 1.95 percent (to $37.1 billion). In December 1993, the Defense Agency cut the 1991-1995 defense buildup program by $5.47 billion, from the original target of $214.6 billion, $4.15 billion of the cut applied to major weapons systems such as F-15 jet fighters, destroyers, and Type-90 tanks.63 The defense budget for F Y 1994 limited

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the nation's defense spending further, to $42.6 billion, or a mere 0.9 percent increase from 1993. This was the smallest increase in Japan's military spending in thirty-four years.64 Nevertheless, the F Y 1994 defense budget still authorized $304.5 million to upgrade radar and flight control and $79.1 million for computer hardware and software to enhance the capabilities of two of Japan's twenty-six Patriot firing units. The new budget also called for the purchase of four F-15 fighter aircraft and two Boeing E-767 AWACS (airborne early warning systems), in addition to the two that had been approved in the F Y 1993 defense budget.65 In August 1994, a nongovernmental advisory panel appointed under the Hosokawa government submitted its report on post-Cold War Japanese defense policy to the LDP-Socialist coalition government headed by Prime Minister Murayama, which argued in favor of simultaneously "building down" the nation's defense forces quantitatively and improving the qualitative dimension of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). While recommending a reduction of the legislated strength of SDF troops from the current 274,000 to 240,000 and a review of the number of antisubmarine warfare vessels, antisubmarine aircraft, combat aircraft, and radar stations, the panel called for qualitative improvements in their weapons. The advisory group also called for Japan-U.S. joint development of a TMD system to counter missiles from neighboring countries. Among other recommended items were long-range air transport planes, aerial refueling tankers, and improved command, communications, and intelligence capabilities—all designed to enhance the rapid mobility of a smaller military.66 Although it remains to be seen whether the government will fully adopt these nonbinding recommendations, it is likely that Japan's defense capabilities will either improve while its economic burden remains roughly the same as before or possibly decline.

ODA FATIGUE?

With the country facing mounting pressures for scaled-down government spending, it was perhaps a matter of time before Japan's commitment to ODA would also come under closer budgetary scrutiny. What could be termed "ODA fatigue" had indeed set in by 1994. Tokyo had expanded its ODA at significantly faster rates than its defense spending in recent years. Foreign economic assistance had been an important element of Japan's comprehensive security policy designed to utilize its economic resources for national and international security purposes. Public support for economic aid to developing countries had grown quite strong.

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Japan's ODA outlays had experienced a 20.8 percent nominal increase and a 10.1 percent real increase from F Y 1990 to F Y 1991. In F Y 1992, Japan disbursed the largest amount of ODA in the world, for the third time in five years. Excluding assistance to Eastern Europe, Japan's aid disbursements that year amounted to $11,149 million, an increase of 1.8 percent over the previous year. This represented 0.3 percent of the nation's GNP, placing Japan in fifteenth place in terms of disbursement spending among the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries. With the F Y 1992 disbursements, Tokyo was able to meet its medium-term goal of extending $50 billion in development assistance during the period of fiscal years 1988-1992. In 1992, Japan was able to retain the number one position in the world of quantitative ODA competition. Tokyo then set the new medium-term goal (for fiscal years 1993-1997) at $70-75 billion in total ODA disbursements, an increase of about 40-50 percent from the previous five-year spending plan.67 In the first year of the current five-year term, the Miyazawa government boosted the general account portion of the foreign aid budget to $8.1 billion, a 6.5 percent increase over F Y 1992.68 This marked the first time that Tokyo's ODA general account exceeded 1 trillion yen, or $8 billion at the then-current exchange rate of 125 yen to 1 U.S. dollar. Preliminary figures for the 1993 ODA disbursements indicated that Japan's economic assistance again was the largest in the world. Under the post-1992 recession, however, Tokyo had to reduce its ODA spending increase for F Y 1994. The F Y 1994 ODA general account budget was set at $9.1 billion, representing a record-low 4.4 percent increase over initial F Y 1993 spending.69 More recently, the Ministry of Finance recommended an increase of less than 4 percent for F Y 1995.70 Despite the downward trend in the rate of increase in ODA disbursements, however, Tokyo continued to make efforts to improve its economic assistance program in qualitative terms, although results were mixed. Tokyo had long been criticized for the relatively small grant element in its economic aid. In response, Japan increased the grant element from the F Y 1988 and F Y 1989 average of 42.4 percent to 45.6 percent in F Y 1991. However, the grant element went down again in F Y 1992, to 38.6 percent, the lowest level among the DAC members;71 Japan's preference for nongrant assistance, particularly loans, continued; and loans remained an important tool for development recipient countries' selfsufficiency, a premise of Tokyo's ODA program.72 Japan had also been criticized for its Asia-focused ODA program and neglect of other regions of the world. Asia's share had dropped from 65.1 percent in 1987 to 51 percent in 1991,73 but increased to 65 percent in 1992, with Indonesia being the largest recipient for the fifth year in a row. Eastern Europe

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and the former Soviet republics had become recipients of some Japanese economic assistance, but in 1991, Japan's disbursements to Eastern Europe (not including Russia or the CIS) amounted to only $9.9 million, or 0.1 percent of total Japanese bilateral ODA that year. Even though the disbursements in this region jumped almost tenfold to $98.9 million in 1992, they represented only 1.2 percent of total Japanese bilateral ODA outlays. As I discuss elsewhere in this chapter, Japan has been a reluctant aid provider when it comes to Russia. For example, the bulk of the $1.8 billion aid Tokyo pledged as part of a G7 financial package for Russia in April 1993 was in Export-Import Bank loans and trade insurance, which were designed to promote Japanese trade activities as much as the development of Russia. Moreover, of the $5 billion in loans and grants Tokyo promised to Russia and the other former Soviet republics between F Y 1991 and the first half of F Y 1993, only about $691 million (or 14 percent) had been disbursed by October 1993.74 It was in Asia that Japan wanted to play a leading political role and develop a security role. Tokyo developed a large assistance program for the economic reconstruction of Cambodia and Vietnam as it inserted itself more actively into the process of reconciliation between the socialist Indochinese states and the ASEAN countries. In March 1993, Tokyo also pledged to resume loans to help Vietnam finance projects to improve its social infrastructure and support Hanoi's domoi reforms. In January 1994, Japan decided to resume yen loans to Cambodia, for the first time in twenty-five years. The last time Japan extended such loans was in 1969, when Tokyo provided 1.5 billion yen for the construction of a multipurpose dam outside Pnompenh.75 In March 1994, Tokyo hosted an International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia and pledged $91.8 million in new grant aid to the economic reconstruction of the Southeast Asian nation.76 Another criticism against the traditional Japanese aid policy had been that much of its loan program was tied; that is, awardees of loans were designated by Tokyo in advance. Tokyo responded to the criticism by increasing the "untied" portion of its loans. According to the foreign ministry, the tied portion of Japan's total bilateral ODA in 1990 and 1991 was 12.5 percent and 10.8 percent, respectively, in comparison with the comparable figures for the United States of 19.2 percent and 17.0 percent. Moreover, developing countries' share of Japan-funded aid projects rose from 24 percent in F Y 1986 to 53 percent in F Y 1993, while the portion benefiting other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries rose from 9 percent to 18 percent.77 The most conspicuous indication of Japan's willingness to use its economic resources for political and security purposes was Tokyo's ODA charter adopted in June 1992, which described the philosophy, principles,

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and priorities underlying its policy. The charter stated that Tokyo's ODA policy would take into consideration the recipient country's actions to promote democratization, introduce a market-oriented economy, and work to ensure basic human rights and freedoms; its military expenditures, development and production of WMD and missiles, and arms trade; its use of foreign aid for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts; and its efforts in environmental conservation.78 However, Tokyo's record in implementing the new charter was mixed. Positive examples included the suspension of new aid to Haiti in the aftermath of the 1991 military coup there, the cessation of aid to Zaire following the political deterioration in that country, and the conditioning of aid to Sudan on improvements in its human rights record. Similarly, Japan had refrained from pledging aid to Kenya and Malawi for political reasons. "Desirable trends" in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Zambia, Mongolia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Chile had prompted Tokyo to extend or resume aid to those countries as well. However, Japan's unchanged aid policies toward Indonesia following the riots in East Timor and its continuing aid to China, a major arms exporter with a poor human rights record, came under international criticism. The 1992 ODA report by the foreign ministry acknowledged that Tokyo did not plan to implement rigidly the ODA Charter but would rather examine trends in military spending and democratization.79 At best, Tokyo was sending mixed signals about its seriousness in implementing the lofty ODA principles. Despite the mixed record, it was clear that Tokyo intended to communicate more actively its ODA philosophy to the international community.

FINDING A GLOBAL SECURITY ROLE

During the entire Cold War era, there was a conspicuous gap between Japan's lofty ideal of active diplomacy in the United Nations and the scope and nature of its actual role in the peace-and-war functions of the world organization. The nation's contribution to the UN's role in international peace and security was severely limited by domestic pacifism, represented by the popular support for the constitutional ban on Japanese participation in collective security, and by the UN's failure to establish a permanent UN force under the Secretary-General's command, as envisioned by the drafters of the UN Charter. Another obstacle to Japan's expanded international security role was the glaring disparity between its enormous economic power and the fact that the structure of the United Nations had changed little since its inception. Particularly problematic was the absence of Japan (and of Germany) as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

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With the end of the Cold War, international demands for expanded UN roles in regional conflicts are growing, with accompanying pressures on Japan to expand its role in this area. The 1991-1992 Gulf War exposed the discrepancy between Japan's financial power and its political will to participate more actively and visibly in UN-sanctioned international peacekeeping activities. Despite the $13 billion contribution the nation made to support the international coalition's military action against Iraq and humanitarian relief efforts in the affected countries, Japan failed to send any peacekeeping personnel to the region. The dispatch of minesweepers after the conflict had already ceased was criticized as too little, too late. As Japan's financial contributions to international organizations continued to increase, its participation in international peacekeeping had become a widespread, if not unanimous, international expectation. Japan's assessed contribution of $127.7 million in 1993 represented 12.4 percent of the world body's general budget. Japan's share of the UN general budget is expected to increase further, to an estimated 15 percent by 1997.80 However, the domestic debate following the Gulf War and the subsequent dispatch of SDF personnel to Cambodia in 1992-1993 had not produced a stable national consensus on the general issue of Japanese participation in international peacekeeping. Experts and public opinion in Japan recognized the importance of the Japanese contribution to international peace and security through participation in the United Nations. Nearly 70 percent of those polled in an October 1992 survey by the prime minister's office agreed that international peace and security was an important area of UN activity in which Japan should participate.81 But public support stopped short of endorsing the idea of sending Japanese to peacekeeping activities involving combat. Even the historic dispatch of SDF personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992-1993 was restricted by five conditions: (1) a cease-fire had to be in effect; (2) the parties to the conflict had to accept the peacekeeping operation; (3) the operation had to maintain neutrality; (4) the Japanese would bear only minimally required arms to protect themselves; and (5) Japanese personnel would withdraw if any one of these conditions was not met.82 Since a Japanese civilian volunteer and a police officer were killed during the Cambodia peacekeeping operation, the Japanese Defense Agency and the SDF uniformed officers bitterly complained about the untenable position into which these limitations forced them. However, the government failed to find a politically acceptable alternative. In the Somali crisis, for example, Tokyo managed to provide only financial and humanitarian aid. When SDF personnel were authorized to participate in the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozam-

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bique in 1993, their functions were again limited to noncombat, logistic, and rear support activities. The UN Secretary-General's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, inquired whether Tokyo would consider sending personnel to the UN mission deployed in the war-torn region.83 The Japanese government was reluctant to send SDF personnel to the region, but announced in February 1994 that it would extend financial and technical aid to the former Yugoslavia, including $10-15 million in humanitarian assistance, and increase its diplomatic presence in the area.84 Although the foreign ministry reportedly wished to send Japanese SDF personnel, the Defense Agency was concerned for the safety of its personnel. Japan faced a formidable constitutional issue before it could lift the self-imposed restrictions on its participation in UN peacekeeping activities. According to the architect of the pacifist postwar Japanese policy, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the Japanese Constitution prohibited the nation from exercising force even for self-defense. But when the SDF was founded in 1954, the government declared that the Constitution abandoned war but did not abandon the right of self-defense. Since then, the government had maintained that Article 9 did not prohibit the right to self-defense and therefore the maintenance of limited SDF personnel was constitutional inasmuch as they were designed to defend the nation against foreign aggression. Many pacifist Japanese continued to argue that any war, even if conducted in self-defense, and any forces maintained for self-defense purposes were prohibited by Article 9. Others maintained that war in selfdefense and forces maintained for self-defense were permitted, but that aggressive war and forces for that purpose were banned. The government's official position was that war in self-defense was allowed and Japan could maintain forces for that purpose so long as its defense capabilities were limited to minimum requirements for self-defense.85 A related constitutional issue was whether Japanese participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations constituted participation in "collective security," which was prohibited under Article 9. Some argued that participation in UN operations did not constitute exercising the state's right to belligerency and the use of force prohibited by Article 9. According to this interpretation, Japan could participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping forces that involved combat operations without changing its Constitution.86 In November 1993, Defense Agency Director-General Keisuke Nakanishi stated that he personally believed that the use of force by Japanese SDF personnel participating in international peacekeeping operations under UN command would not be a violation of the Constitution. This statement was contradicted by the chief cabinet spokesperson, Masayoshi Takemura, who reaffirmed that Japa-

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33

nese participation in UN peacekeeping operations whose purpose or mission called for the use of force would violate the Constitution.87 The Defense Agency chief's statement caused such an uproar in the country that he was forced to resign. His successor espoused a more cautious view on the issue. He stated, for example, that Japan could not participate in the peace enforcement units (PEUs) proposed by UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali if such units required the use of force.88 The constitutional debate is not likely to produce a national consensus anytime soon. One solution would be to change the Constitution to eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 9, to answer once and for all what Japan could and could not do constitutionally in self-defense, in peacekeeping, and in collective security. However, constitutional revision requiring a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Parliament and a simple majority in a national referendum is not a realistic short-term prospect. Another critical issue facing Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War era was whether the nation should be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There was strong public support for Japan's bid for enhanced world status, with 53 percent of the respondents to a Japanese foreign ministry survey in 1994 endorsing the idea.89 However, there was widespread concern that the desired permanent seat would be contingent on Japan's willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping operations including combat activities, which would require the currently impossible revision of the Constitution. The UN Secretary-General at one point suggested that Japan should consider revising its Constitution so that Japan could participate in the proposed PEUs.90 He also remarked that the existing constraints on Japanese peacekeeping operations participation weakened Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.91 Moreover, in January 1994, the U.S. Senate adopted by acclamation a nonbinding resolution opposing permanent UN Security Council seats for Japan and Germany until those countries were prepared to participate in UN peacekeeping operations including military activities.92 However, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, stated that Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations would not necessarily be a prerequisite for its gaining a permanent seat on the Security Council.93 Japan's interest in a permanent seat on the Council was qualified by the concern that the status, desirable as it was, might require the nation's participation in UN peacekeeping operations including combat. In its comment on the issue of reforming the UN Security Council, the Japanese government stated that issues of peace and stability "must be considered in close relation to economic and other nonmilitary factors." The report also maintained, "Japan is prepared to do all it can to discharge its

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responsibilities on the Security Council."94 Prime Minister Hosokawa, in his address before the UN General Assembly in September 1993, stated that most countries now felt the need "to expand the membership of the Security Council while insuring that its effectiveness is maintained" and promised that Japan would "participate constructively in the discussion of Security Council reform."95 Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, representing the Murayama government that succeeded the Hosokawa administration, went one step further when he stated before the General Assembly in September 1994 that Japan was prepared to discharge the responsibilities of a permanent Security Council member if many countries' support could be assured. He added, however, that his nation would not engage in the exercise of force, which was prohibited by its Constitution.96 This policy approach was reinforced by his political successors in 1995-1996. International support for Japan's permanent seat on the Security Council was less than uniform and less than enthusiastic. The United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Romania, and seven other countries explicitly or implicitly endorsed Japan's permanent membership in the Security Council, while Brazil, Canada, and ten other countries expressed muted support when they endorsed permanent Council seats for the "most industrialized nations of the world."97 China and Russia remained cautious about expanding the membership of the Security Council, although they did not publicly oppose Japan's permanent seat on the Council.98

CONCLUSION

Japan's desire to play expanded security roles in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific cannot easily be translated into reality. If the nation's bungling response to the Gulf War and timid participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Mozambique are any indication of its political will, its behavior in future international crises will likely be timid and qualified as well. Japan has yet to develop its preferred view of a post-Cold War international order. The end of the Cold War heightens the importance of U.S.-Japan security relations and, at the same time, complicates their management. The bilateral security relations will be seriously tested by the friction over trade and other economic issues. Japan's relations with Russia and China are better than they have ever been in the postwar era, but their future, too, is uncertain. Tokyo's view of Moscow continues to be clouded by the territorial dispute, a legacy of prewar history. Tokyo-Beijing rela-

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35

tions are likely to continue to grow, but they will be circumscribed by Tokyo's need to maintain its close alliance with Washington for the foreseeable future. The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership dictate the development of a multilateral framework for security consultations among all major powers in Asia Pacific, including the United States, Russia, China, Korea, and ASEAN countries. This type of framework should supplement, not replace, the bilateral security alliances centered on the United States. Such a development would obviate Japan's need to embark upon a major defense buildup, which would be extremely destabilizing for the region's security. Tokyo must continue to promote regional political stability through economic assistance and deepening economic interdependence. Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping must be based on both credible legal grounds and broad domestic support. Sooner or later, the Japanese will have to consider revising their Constitution to remove the ambiguities created by their government's "interpretive revisions" of Article 9; and the sooner, the better. How the Constitution should be revised will depend essentially on Japan's view of a post-Cold War world order. If Japan wants to meet the growing international expectations for its international security role, it must muster domestic and international support for its legitimacy and credibility as a permanent Security Council member. Not only must Tokyo seek support for an enhanced global stature, it must leave a visible and lasting imprint on the United Nations, among other global institutions, and promote ideas and ideals that will support these institutions' transformations in the post-Cold War world. Japan must demonstrate the relevance and worth of its historical experience and cultural values to the building of bilateral, multilateral, and global institutions through which regional and global problems can be managed. In short, Japan must carefully balance what Joseph Nye calls "hard power" and "soft power."99 Can the Japanese articulate their worldview in terms that can be universalized? Unfortunately, the nation's historical insularity and ethnocentrism will long handicap its ability to transcend the legacies of its historical isolation and its faith in its uniqueness. NOTES

1. See, for example, Douglas M. Johnson, "Anticipating Instability in the Asia-Pacific Region," Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 3 (summer 1992): 103-112; and Gerald Segal, "Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific," Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 3 (summer 1992): 83-101.

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2. For a recent comprehensive examination of Japan's international roles, see Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, eds., Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1983). 3. Joseph Nye Jr., "Coping with Japan," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 100. 4. Tsusansho "Chikyu Mondai" Kenkyukai, Chikyu Sangyo Bunka Kenkyujo, and PHP Kenkyujo, eds., Chikyudai no Shiten kara Mita Taikoku Nihon no Yakuwari (The role of big power Japan from the global perspective) (Tokyo: PHP, 1987), p. 170. 5. Masataka Kosaka, "Nihon ga Suiboshinai Tameni" (Lest Japan should decline), Bungei Shunju, January 1993, p. 98. 6. For discussions of Japan as a civilian power, see Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 5 (winter 1990/91); and Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5 (winter 1991/92): 65. 7. Asahi Shimbun, August 11,1993, p. 1. 8. Asahi Shimbun, November 7,1993, p. 1, and November 8,1993, p. 1. 9. For criticisms along these lines, see Takashi Inoguchi, Tadanori to Ikkoku Han'ei-shugi o Koete: Tenkanki no Sekai to Nihon (Beyond the free ride and unilateral prosperity: The world and Japan at a turning point) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1987); and Tsusansho "Chikyu Mondai" Kenkyukai, Chikyudai no Shiten. 10. See the interview with Kuriyama in "Wangan Mondai to Nihon no Yakuwari" (The Gulf issue and Japan's role), Gaiko Forum, March 1991, p. 5. 11. Keizai Kikakucho Sogo Keikakukyoku, ed., Nihon no Sogo Kokuryoku: Takamaru Nihon no Kokuryoku to Motomerareru Kokusaiteki Yakuwari (Japan's comprehensive national power: Japan's rising national power and expected international roles) (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1987), pp. 87,113. 12. Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Knopf, 1989). 13. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 20. 14. See Kenji Suzuki, "'Omoiyari Yosan' wa Nichibei Anpo no Akashi ka Onimotsu ka" (Is the "sympathy budget" a proof of the Japan-U.S. security relations or a burden?), Chuo Koron, January 1993, pp. 84-93. Budgeted for the hostnation support in fiscal year 1994 was 250 billion yen, or about U.S. $2.2 billion. 15. For a recent study arguing the mutuality of interests in U.S.-Japan cooperation in military research and development, see Andrew K. Hanami, "The Emerging Military-Industrial Relationship in Japan and the U.S. Connection," Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 6 (June 1993): 592-609. For a discussion of the longterm implications of Japan's high-technology defense research and development for the defense policies of its Asian neighbors, see Hisashi Nakamura and Malcolm Dando, "Japan's Military Research and Development: A High Technology Deterrent," Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (1993): 177-190. 16. For an examination of U.S. and Japanese interests in TMD, see Yoshihisa Komori, "Chiiki Misairu Boei: Reisengo no Nichibei Anpo Kyoryoku no Kirifuda" (Theater missile defense: A trump card in the post-Cold War Japan-U.S. security cooperation), Chuo Koron, July 1993, pp. 102-111. 17. Asahi Shimbun, March 15,1994, p. 1. 18. For this view, see, for example, Edward Olsen, "Target Japan as America's Economic Foe," Orbis, vol. 36, no. 4 (fall 1992): 496.

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19. Hokkaido Shimbun, January 16,1993, evening ed., p. 2. 20. Hokkaido Shimbun, January 25,1993, evening ed., p. 2. 21. C. Fred Bergsten, "Primacy of Economics," Foreign Policy, no. 87 (summer 1992): 6; cited in Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (spring 1993): 5-51. 22. Michael M. May, "Correspondence: Japan as a Superpower?" International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (winter 1993/94): 182-187. 23. Richard Betts, "East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (winter 1993/94): 57. 24. Nye, "Coping with Japan," p. 96. 25. Hokkaido Shimbun, February 1,1993, p. 3. 26. Nye, "Coping with Japan," p. 105. 27. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structure, Norms, and Policies," International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (spring 1993): 85. 28. This general consensus is found among Japanese political analysts of various ideological persuasions. See, for example, Shinkichi Eto and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Sogo Anpo to Mirai no Sentaku (Comprehensive security and future alternatives) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991); Takehiko Kamo, Kokusai Anzenhosho no Koso (A concept for international security) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990); Masataka Kosaka, Nihon Sonbo no Toki (A critical time for Japan) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1992); Yasuhiro Nakasone, Yasusuke Murakami, Seizaburo Sato, and Susumu Nishibe, Kyodo Kenkyu "Reisen-igo" (A joint study "after the Cold War") (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1992); Hideo Sato, Taigai Seisaku (External policy) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989); Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Alliance and Collective Security in the Post Cold War Era," IIGP Policy Paper 103E (Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, 1992). 29. Asahi Shimbun, December 31,1992, p. 5. 30. Motofumi Asai, "Anpo no Seisan ga Hitsuyo, Beikoku ni Geigo Yameyo" (A revision of the [Japan-U.S.] security treaty is necessary: Stop flattering the United States), Asahi Shimbun, October 22,1992, p. 9. 31. For a further exploration of this thesis, see Tsuneo Akaha, "JapaneseRussian Economic Relations and Their Implications for Asia-Pacific Security," unpublished paper presented at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation conference on "The Asia-Pacific Region: Links Between Economic and Security Relations," University of California, San Diego, May 13-15,1993. 32. Hokkaido Shimbun, July 30,1993, p. 4. 33. Hokkaido Shimbun, April 2,1993, p. 1. 34. For efforts to identify applicable Japanese postwar economic experiences in the current Russian context, see Takashi Murakami, "How Can Russia Incorporate Japanese Industrial Policy?" (Unpublished paper, 1993). 35. Japanese investments in China amounted to $2.2 billion on contract basis in 1992 (Asahi Shimbun, February 26,1994, p. 11). 36. Such a view was expressed, for example, by Naohiro Amaya, a former high-ranking official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Hokkaido Shimbun, May 2,1993, p. 3.) 37. Asahi Shimbun, March 21,1994, p. 3. 38. Takahiko Ueda, "North Korea Poses Extreme Threat: Defense White Paper Takes Aim at Arms Programs," Japan Times Weekly International Edition, August 9-15,1993, p. 3. 39. Asahi Shimbun, March 21,1994, p. 1.

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40. Patrick E. Tyler, "Japan Asks China to Press Koreans," New York Times, March 21,1994, p. A5. 41. Hokkaido Shimbun, December 21,1994, p. 7. 42. This view is attributed to Chalmers Johnson; cited in Yoichi Funabashi, "Nichi-bei-chu no Sankaku Kankei" (A triangle among Japan, the United States, and China), Asahi Shimbun, March 19,1994, p. 6. 43. A former Japanese diplomat and a self-proclaimed strategic thinker has suggested that China may use the Japanese sense of contrition and sympathy toward China to divide the Japanese over their future relations with the United States (Hisahiko Okazaki, "Chugoku Mondai Saiko: Sengo Nihon no Saigo no Tabu" [The China problem reconsidered: The last taboo of postwar Japan], Chuo Koron, February 1993, pp. 30-51). 44. Patrick E. Tyler, "Beijing Says It Could Live Well Even If U.S. Trade Was Cut Off," New York Times, March 21,1994, p. Al. 45. The New York Times also reported that even in the United States pressure was mounting on the Clinton administration not to link the human rights issue to granting the MFN status to China ("U.S. May Ease Rights Goals with Beijing," New York Times, March 24,1994, p. Al). 46. Asahi Shimbun, November 7,1994, p. 1. 47. Asahi Shimbun, March 26,1994, p. 3. 48. Asahi Shimbun, March 25,1994, p. 9. 49. Asahi Shimbun, July 24,1994, p. 2. 50. Asahi Shimbun, June 7,1995, p. 1. 51. Asahi Shimbun, June 6,1995, p. 2. 52. Japan's expected burden amounts to $1-1.2 billion, or 25-30 percent of the estimated $4 billion total cost of the installation of LWRs to replace the graphite-moderated reactors (Asahi Shimbun, February 25,1995, p. 1). 53. Tokyo also wants Pyongyang to account for the identity and whereabouts of a Japanese woman who reportedly participated in the training of one of the North Korean terrorists implicated in the Korean Air Lines bombing in 1987. This is bound to come up in future bilateral talks, although it remains to be seen how hard Tokyo will press the issue. 54. Asahi Shimbun, May 28,1995, p. 2, and May 30,1995, p. 1. 55. Asahi Shimbun, July 16,1994, p. 1. The South Korean defense ministry confirmed that North Korea has tested a new long-range missile with an estimated range of 1,500 kilometers (Asahi Shimbun, February 21,1995, p. 2). The Chinese military magazine Modern Arms quoted a South Korean analyst as saying that Nodong 1 was capable of carrying a 50-kiloton nuclear warhead or nerve gas warhead (Hokkaido Shimbun, August 12,1994, p. 5). 56. In July 1994, Japanese Transport Minister Shizuka Kamei announced that the Maritime Safety Agency was strengthening its patrol and rescue capability in the Sea of Japan to respond to a possible outflow of refugees from North Korea in the wake of Kim Il-sung's anticipated death (Hokkaido Shimbun, July 16,1994, p. 3). 57. Hokkaido Shimbun, July 27,1994, p. 5. 58. Asahi Shimbun, December 20,1994, p. 1. 59. Asahi Shimbun, June 6,1995, p. 3. 60. Asahi Shimbun, September 30,1993, p. 1. 61. Accordingly, the prime minister appointed a private advisory group and charged it with developing a recommendation as to how to revise the current defense blueprint (Asahi Shimbun, February 16,1994, p. 3).

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62. The Military Balance, 1992-1993 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); cited in Asahi Shimbun, March 5,1994, p. 4. 63. Ueda, "North Korea Poses," p. 3. 64. Barbara Wanner, "FY 1994 Defense Budget Reflects More Fiscal Than Political Constraints," JEI [Japan Economic Institute] Report, no. 7B (February 18,1994): 9. 65. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 66. For a detailed description of the advisory group's report, see Barbara Wanner, "Japan Explores Restructuring Its Self-Defense Capabilities," JEI Report, no. 38A (October 7,1994). 67. Asahi Shimbun, March 3,1993, p. 9. 68. Barbara Wanner, "Increase in FY 1993 Defense Budget Smallest in Thirty-Three Years," JEI Report, no. IB (January 8,1993): 8. 69. The actual increase was 4.8 percent (Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 1994, p. 1). 70. Ibid. 71. Asahi Shimbun, July 1,1993, p. 4; Hokkaido Shimbun, October 6,1993, p. 9. 72. Margo Grimm, "Japan's Foreign Aid Program: 1991 Update," JEI Report, no. 45A (December 6,1991): 6. 73. Ibid., p. 8. 74. B. Anne Craib, "Prospects for Japan's Foreign Aid Program: Quality Versus Quantity?" JEI Report, no. 44A (November 18,1994): 6-7. 75. Hokkaido Shimbun, January 14,1994, p. 5. Tokyo had resumed extension of grants to Cambodia in 1991. 76. Asahi Shimbun, March 12,1994, p. 2. 77. Craib, "Prospects for Japan's Foreign Aid Program," p. 9. 78. Grimm, "Japan's Foreign Aid Program," p. 10; and Asahi Shimbun, June 27,1992, p. 1. 79. Asahi Shimbun, October 6,1992, p. 3. 80. Asahi Shimbun, December 12,1993, p. 2. 81. Hokkaido Shimbun, January 18,1993, p. 3. 82. Hirofumi Iseri, "PKO Rongi no Konmei o Toku" (Resolving the confusion of the PKO [peacekeeping operations] debate), Gaiko Forum, no. 44, May 1992, pp. 33-34. 83. Asahi Shimbun, December 12,1993, p. 2. 84. Hokkaido Shimbun, February 4,1994, p. 1. 85. For a description of the constitutional debate during the parliamentary deliberations on the peace cooperation law, see ibid., pp. 31-37; and Naoki Saito, "The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law: Japan's Struggle to Define Its International Contribution," IIGP Policy Paper 102E (Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, 1992). 86. This is the position advocated in a report prepared by the LDP Special Committee concerning Japan's participation in the International Society (Iseri, "PKO Rongi," p. 33; Asahi Shimbun, February 4,1993, p. 1). 87. Asahi Shimbun, November 20,1993, p. 9. 88. Hokkaido Shimbun, December 7,1993, p. 2. 89. Hokkaido Shimbun, June 6,1994, p. 1. 90. Barbara Wanner, "Boutros-Ghali Urges More Active United Nations Role for Japan," JEI Report, no. 7B (February 26,1993): 6. The Secretary-General later had to retract his suggestion in a meeting with Prime Minister Miyazawa.

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91. Asahi Shimbun, February 5,1993, p. 3. 92. Asahi Shimbun, January 30,1994, p. 3. 93. Hokkaido Shimbun, August 20,1993, p. 2. 94. Japan Times Weekly International Edition, August 23-29,1993, p. 3. 95. Paul Lewis, "Japan and Germany Show No Zeal for Council Seats," New York Times, September 28,1993, p. A4. 96. Asahi Shimbun, September 28,1994, p. 1. 97. Hokkaido Shimbun, November 20,1993, p. 3. 98. Asahi Shimbun, July 8,1993, p. 3. 99. "Soft power" is defined as "cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions" (Joseph Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power [New York: Basic Books, 1992], pp. 166-170, 188; and Nye, "Coping with Japan," 99-100).

2

Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia Fei-Ling Wang

Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia in the 1990s appears to be focusing on maintaining the status quo, which is viewed by the Chinese as favorably stable and peaceful. Beijing seems to be quite relaxed in a secure Northeast Asia and enjoying its unprecedented good relations with all the countries in the region. Most of the past security threats are gone, and the new challenges in Northeast Asia, with perhaps the exception of the Korean peninsula, have yet to cause serious security concerns. Economic gains, rather than political influence, have become the main motives behind China's activities in this region. Nonetheless, Beijing watches carefully for potential security hazards to its political stability at home and its reunification of the motherland. As its policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue has demonstrated, China appears to be playing a subtle yet familiar balance-of-power game "with Chinese characteristics" aimed at preventing an expansion of U.S. dominance or a Japanese military resurgence in Northeast Asia, either of which would be viewed as a major security threat by Beijing. This chapter elaborates on these observations. After providing a bit of background information, I briefly describe the major objectives of Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia following the Cold War and the leading obstacles to the implementation of that policy. The recent Chinese actions and/or inaction regarding the North Korean nuclear issue are analyzed in some depth to extrapolate the general assessment of China's security concerns in the region and to illustrate what can be expected from an economically fast-growing yet politically stagnant China in the years ahead. Northeast Asia (i.e., Japan, the Korean peninsula, the Far East of Russia, and the northeast region of China and Mongolia) has always been of vital importance to China's security. Historically, therefore, Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia has always been an essential part 41

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of its overall security strategy. The invasions of China from Northeast Asia caused numerous dynastic changes in Chinese history and led to the establishment of two major non-Han dynasties: the Yuan (1271-1368) by the Mongols and the Qing (1644-1911) by the Manchus. During the nineteenth century, many of the threats to Chinese independence came from this area. First, czarist Russia took away a large chunk of territory in Northeast Asia from the Qing government. Then, the Japanese imperial power defeated the Chinese repeatedly and almost destroyed the Chinese state. Right after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao fought the United States in the Korean War (1950-1953) with his "volunteers" for fear of a U.S.-sponsored invasion via the Korean peninsula. As a consequence, the PRC became a major enemy of the United States. The hostility continued between Washington and Beijing and set the stage for a Chinese anti-U.S. security policy that lasted more than two decades. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the former Soviet Union posed the number one threat to China's security, and bloody border clashes took place along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers in Northeast Asia. By the mid-1990s, the surrounding areas of China all looked eventless, except Northeast Asia. More specifically, two sizable armies face each other along the demilitarized zone on the Korean peninsula, and a nuclear proliferation issue threatens an escalated conflict that could drag China into a direct confrontation with the United States. What makes Northeast Asia more important to China's security concerns than are other periphery areas is the traditional weight of the northeast dongbei region of China. Historically, this region has always been an economic and population center of the PRC, and Beijing is literally just next door. Much of China's heavy industry—the automobile industry and the energy industry, including the largest Chinese oil field at Daqing—is located in the three northeastern provinces. This region is also a major agriculture base that exports food to the rest of China. Because of a history of occupation by Russians and Japanese, and a heavy Soviet influence in the 1950s, Beijing has always kept an alert eye on the local leaders in the region.1 Currently, as the political regime in Beijing is increasingly weak in its control of the nation, the northeastern provinces are even more crucial to the political stability of the PRC. Some of the best field armies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have always been stationed in this area, and the largest Chinese fleet, the Beihai (North Sea) Fleet, is based in Qingdao and Port Arthur. Since the outset of Deng Xiaoping's campaigns for reform in 1978, Northeast Asia has continued to have enormous significance to China's economic development. In 1992, China's trade with Northeast Asia was about 37 percent of its total foreign trade (if Russia is included, the figure

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would be 43.4 percent).2 Chinese trade with this region (a 23 percent increase in 1991) is expanding more rapidly than its overall growth rate (17.6 percent).3 Japan has been one of the largest trade partners of China, surpassing Hong Kong by U.S. $6.5 billion in 1993,4 and a major source of technology and capital. The Sino-South Korean economic relationship got a big boost in 1992 when the two established full diplomatic relations. The bilateral trade volume in 1991-1992 jumped 56 percent,5 and Seoul expects China, now Korea's third largest trade partner, to be its largest by the year 2000.6The economic exchange between Russia and China has by far exceeded the highest level achieved during the SinoSoviet "honeymoon" in the 1950s. For the first time, scheduled fixed-wing and helicopter flights take place over the formerly very sensitive areas linking the cities and towns of the two countries across the Amur River during the ice floe seasons of spring and autumn.7 The Chinese have also acquired transit rights from the Russians on the Tumen and Ussuri Rivers, which directly lead to the Sea of Japan. Beijing has largely transformed its formerly economic assistance to North Korea into a rather profitable trade relationship.8 Even Mongolia has increased its trade with China from almost zero to over 10 percent of its foreign trade in two years, while reducing its economic dependence on Russia by half.9

TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO: OBJECTIVES AND OBSTACLES

In line with the general security considerations of China in the 1990s, Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia has demonstrated a rather relaxed attitude with a clear emphasis on maintaining the favorable status quo, "the most relaxed security posture since World War II."10 For the near future, this seems to be the main objective of Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia. With perhaps the exception of the North Korean nuclear issue, which will be analyzed later, Beijing has been relatively inactive politically in Northeast Asia lately. Even in the case of Korea, however, China appears to be acting as though it has been asked to play a limited role. As North Korea and the United States have tried to talk away the nuclear problem, Beijing seems to just concentrate on its balance-of-power policy, aiming only to preserve the status quo.11 A Relaxed Security Environment In Northeast Asia

At the end of the Cold War, even before the demise of the former Soviet Union and the rapid decline of Russian power, the Chinese started to reassess their security environment in a global atmosphere that placed heavy emphasis on reconfiguration, reform, and competition of "com-

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prehensive national power" {zonghe guoli) among the nations. The Chinese view of the world shifted from emphasizing the hegemonic struggle among the superpowers to focusing on peace and development in a multipolar world. Motivated by domestic needs and forced by the negative international response to its handling of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Beijing adopted a low profile and an "our business is our business" type of foreign policy in general. Such a relaxed view continued through the mid-1990s. Chinese analysts now believe that an emerging "multipolarity helps stability and prosperity," at least in Asia Pacific.12 They regard "the co-existence of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States without confrontation between them [as] something historically unprecedented."13 Domestic political stability is viewed as the top security priority, and a stable and relaxed international security environment is considered indispensable to that goal.14 Rapid economic development is seen as the ultimate, though maybe indirect, base for the political stability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); thus military and diplomatic goals may have to be subject to economic programs. Accordingly, Jiang Zemin said at the Fourteenth Congress of the CCP in 1992 that "the Army must consciously subordinate itself to the overall interests of national economic development."15 A leading foreign policy adviser wrote that China enjoys "the best external environment since the establishment of the People's Republic" and that Beijing can now rightfully expect a "politically stable and economically fast-growing" East Asia that is largely free from the danger of military conflicts.16 Another Chinese researcher observed: "It is the first time that China has faced no direct military threat since 1949, possibly since the opium war of 1840"; thus, "generally speaking China is satisfied with its current security environment."17 As far as Northeast Asia is concerned, Beijing believes that it is the most stable region in the post-Cold War world. To the Chinese, as will be examined later, most of the past security threats are largely gone, and many of the old issues have been rather satisfactorily addressed. Active economic activities are now more important than military or political matters. The Sino-Japanese relationship, the center of China's security concerns in Northeast Asia, is in the best shape it has been since the mid-nineteenth century. A permanent bilateral "Committee for Sino-Japanese Friendship in the Twenty-first Century" officially symbolizes the close ties between Tokyo and Beijing. Under the current security arrangement, the PRC now has few serious security problems in Northeast Asia. Whatever long-range security objectives or diplomatic ambitions Chinese leaders may have in Northeast Asia, they appear to believe that time is on their side. Beijing, therefore, confidently views this region as basically a peaceful area that poses little, if any, immediate security threat.

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Potential Threats and a Balance of Power Despite Beijing's confidence, it is nevertheless watchful regarding any potential security threats in Northeast Asia. It is very cautious about any new developments that may alter the existing picture. From a geopolitical perspective, the United States and Japan are the only two world-class players that can cause new security concerns for the Chinese. The potential security hazards in Northeast Asia, from Beijing's standpoint, are therefore two: a dominant U.S. power pursuing hegemonic policies there and a rearmed, aggressive Japan. To achieve the goal of economic development in a safe and stable international environment and to reunite China, the last thing the P R C wants is a Northeast Asia that is controlled by an external country such as the United States or a formidable Japanese political and military power.18 On the one hand, Beijing may feel very insecure, for historically justifiable reasons, if it has to follow U.S. domination or Japanese leadership in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, China worries deeply about possibly powerful support for Taiwan from a dominant U.S. presence or a restored Japanese political-military power in its drive for independence. Such support would be a major obstacle to Beijing's reunification course and is thus viewed as a direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty. Some leading strategists of the P L A believe that "hegemonism of the superpower(s) is still the long-term threat to the regional security," which may pose new security challenges to the PRC; it is implied that these superpowers are a "competing United States and Japan."19 Although Japan is now a very friendly neighbor and the United States is viewed as basically a status quo power in Northeast Asia, Beijing nonetheless plays a subtle yet familiar game of "using barbarians against barbarians" (yiyi zhiyi) when a potential threat is perceived to be developing. China's fear of restoration of a Japanese political leadership and military power in Northeast Asia has been evident for years. Preventing new Japanese militarism, especially Japanese nuclearization, is viewed as a high security priority by the Chinese.20 The Chinese press has always been very watchful for any signs in Japan that might suggest a restoration of militarism. Renmin Ribao (People's daily) ridicules and criticizes Japanese officials every August when some of them pay homage to the Yasukuni Shrine.21 The delicate Taiwan issue has always been a potential trouble point between Tokyo and Beijing. What appears to be Beijing's overreaction to any official contacts between the Japanese and the Taiwanese may actually reveal the depth of China's antipathy for foreign support for Taiwan's independence effort.22 Beijing always responds quickly to any comments by Japanese officials on history that may be interpreted as reversing history and beautifying Japan's past militarism

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and aggression.23 A military-related think tank even announced in June 1994 that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was no longer exclusively a defensive force and that Tokyo was probing world opinion on its embarkation on a "new militaristic path."24 Apparently, Chinese military leaders have some strong doubts about Tokyo's intentions in post-Cold War East Asia and believe that the Japanese ability to project power must be monitored carefully. Although it is not an immediate concern to the Chinese, and although Japanese militarism may have been used by Beijing as a convenient excuse for its own military growth, a militarily powerful Japan is always a deep fear in Chinese minds. Therefore, in order to maintain a favorable status quo, Beijing opposes unequivocally any restoration of Japanese political leadership and military power; tries to maintain friendly relations with every party in the region under the newly formulated mulin zhence (good-neighbor policy);25 mourns quietly the dramatic collapse of Soviet/Russian power; attempts to build its own economic and military force; and encourages, paradoxically, the United States to stay involved in a lesser-of-two-evils role to balance the power and to suppress the Japanese desires for military power and political leadership. Very pragmatically, to address the Japanese need to have secure sealanes without allowing Tokyo to have a mighty military machine, Beijing now genuinely but quietly prefers a continuation of the U.S. military presence in the region, mainly in Japan and South Korea. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, for example, stated publicly in March 1993 that, in principle and as a tradition, China does not support any major power stationing its troops in a foreign country; but the issue of U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea, he continued, is a legacy of the past and needs to be solved gradually .26 Despite the anxiety-causing talk about a reduction of U.S. military presence in Asia, Beijing seems to have concluded that the United States will stay in Northeast Asia militarily for the short and medium term.27 The U.S.-Japan security treaty is believed to remain in effect at least until early in the twenty-first century, and it will continue to restrain any significant growth of Japanese military power. The United States is thus used as a stabilizing force in Northeast Asia. But a resurgent United States in this region is watched carefully with deep suspicion largely because Washington, forcefully advocating its version of human rights and political democracy, can be a major threat to the political stability of the CCP regime, if not the security of China as a nation. U.S. policy, including arms sales to Taiwan, merely adds another contagious issue and serves as a reminder of the potential threat to Beijing's reunification scheme. Any new U.S. moves in Northeast Asia are therefore closely scrutinized.28 The lasting and long-term U.S. challenge has become a brake on Sino-U.S. security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Beijing, in

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addition to strengthening itself, will constantly search for buffer zones and counterweights.29 For example, the PRC has tried to picture Japan as a rich but nevertheless Asian country that may be counted on to offset Washington's threatening human rights diplomacy. In short, Beijing aims at "preventing the situation in which a major power dominates the region."30 To do so, "China takes a neutral stance towards the conflicts among the U.S., Japan and Russia" because it is desirable "for China to maintain an equilibrium among America, Japan and Russia" in order to ideally become a "balancer" in the "U.S.-JapanChina or U.S.-Russia-China triangular relations."31 The Obstacles: Old Issues Are Largely Eased

The objectives of Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia are not always easy tasks. A number of old issues and new problems constitute obstacles. Most old issues concerning Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia, however, have largely been eased or pushed to the background. For example, the lingering issue of border disputes with Russia has been basically resolved, mostly because of Russian concessions. Moscow agreed to Chinese demands over a few small islands on the Chinese side of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, and thus, "95 percent of... the border issue between Russia and China has been solved."32 Moscow and Beijing, following an earlier example set by Russia and the United States, publicly declared that their strategic nuclear weapons will no longer target each other. They also pledged to not use military force, especially nuclear force, against each other.33 As a direct result of the new Sino-Russian relationship, the Sino-Mongolian relationship entered a new era as the two sides signed a friendship treaty in 1994. Another old issue, China's territorial dispute with Japan over the continental shelf around the Senkaku Islands near Taiwan, was effectively shelved by the two sides in 1984 at Deng Xiaoping's personal suggestion.34 The chronic economic friction with Japan is eased annually with large sums of Japanese financial assistance and timely settlement of some "trade skirmishes."35 Tokyo has been generally very cautious in dealing with Taiwan and history-related issues and has successfully avoided a number of incidents that might have caused conflicts with Beijing. Finally, the age-old issue of Korean reunification, in the Chinese view, can pose little security threat to China if no other factors are involved. As Allen Whiting observed, the collapse of Soviet power enhanced Beijing's position in North Korea; therefore, the threat of an unwelcome war on the Korean peninsula "almost totally faded away" because the Chinese desire to maintain the status quo rather than to help Pyongyang unite Korea by force.36

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The Challenges: New Issues Are Emerging Some new issues have taken the front seat in China lately. First, there is the very recent problem of controlling migration, mainly illegal, over the Sino-Russian border. Reportedly, over one million Chinese have entered Russia (primarily its Far East region) and settled there illegally in recent years. Negative responses to this issue from Russia have been on the rise.37 For example, the Maritime Region Government has adopted tough policies controlling Chinese business in the Russian Far East.38 Serious hatred and conflicts between the Chinese and the Russians in the area have filled the local newspapers and become a major political issue in Far Eastern Russia.39 This problem, however, is still too new to be assessed in terms of its security implications. Second, Beijing needs to deal with the increasingly popular argument for an East Asian regional trading group or bloc and a collective security organization that would include the design for a Northeast Asia nuclear free zone.40 Given its overall security objective of maintaining the status quo, Beijing has been very cautious about this idea. On the one hand, the nationalistic PRC does not believe in a collective security arrangement. Bilateral relations have been much preferred over multinational institutions ever since Zhou Enlai's diplomatic initiatives at the Bandung conference in 1955.41 On the other hand, Beijing worries about U.S. and/or Japanese domination in such a bloc or organization. An expanded U.S. influence or a Japanese "goose-team" type of regional cooperation42 is viewed as a threat to, not help for, Chinese security. Moreover, a collective security structure may hamper China's own ambitions in the region, including its handling of the Taiwan issue. Thus, with the exception of economic organizations such as the East Asia Economic Caucus proposed by the Malaysians, Beijing has provided little more than lip service to these regional grouping ideas. China's foreign minister and his assistants have joined parties from the United States, Russia, Japan, and thirteen other nations in a series of conferences held since 1992 aimed at creating an Asia-Pacific Security Mechanism (APSM). Other than proposing general principles, Beijing has been clearly against establishing any formal institutions of APSM.43 Beijing's attitude toward a Northeast Asian nuclear free zone has been similarly cautious and lowkey. The Chinese officials were reported to be actively interested in a limited nuclear free zone in the region but insisted that the United States, having "no claim to any phase of the negotiation process of the treaty," should participate only as a "voteless advisor."44 Third, there have been pressures, mainly from the United States, for human rights improvement and political democracy in Northeast Asia. Clearly this is viewed as a threat to the political regime of the CCP and

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thus to the national security of the PRC. But President Clinton's decision to unlink the issues of human rights and the renewal of China's mostfavored-nation (MFN) status on May 26,1994, may have effectively convinced Beijing that Washington has only limited rigidness on this issue. Furthermore, Beijing may have learned by now that the U.S. domestic political process often provides ways to minimize the threat of Washington's human rights diplomacy. Except for a possible new U.S. policy on Taiwan's drive for independence or the Tibet issue, as suggested by some45 and apprehensively observed by Beijing,46 the U.S. crusade for human rights and political democracy in Asia will likely be considered by Beijing as a long-term challenge but not necessarily an immediate security problem. Fourth, the modernization of the PLA, especially the widely publicized upgrading efforts for a blue-water PLA Navy, has caused considerable, although maybe undue, negative response from many nations in and outside of East Asia.47 The Chinese naval buildup, still quite modest,48 was reported to have two primary objectives: to enable a sea-lane disruption around Taiwan when it becomes "necessary" (meaning when Taiwan decides to be an independent nation) and to strengthen Beijing's bargaining position in the disputes over the South China Sea islands and the potentially oil-rich continental shelf around those islands and coral reefs.49 Beijing may also feel that the booming economy of its coastal provinces and the rapid growth of its maritime transportation justify a larger navy.50 An additional political and bureaucratic reason may help to explain why there has seemed to be a concentrated effort to expand the Chinese navy: The new top military commander, General Liu Huaqing, deputy chairman of the CCP's and the PRC's Central Military Commissions, has been the longtime commander in chief of the PLA's Navy. The limited budget the PLA receives from Beijing, officially reported as only U.S.$7.3 billion in 1992 and 1993,51 is likely to put a tight constraint on how much the PLA Navy can expand in the near future. According to the authoritative London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), however, the actual military expenditure of the PRC is almost three times higher: U.S.$21.76 billion in 1992.52 Other even higher estimates put that figure in the neighborhood of U.S.$40 billion.53 Even at that level, given the huge size of the PLA Army, the gross inefficiency of the Chinese acquisition and maintenance system, and the expensive nature of modern naval hardware, Beijing may have to wait quite a few more years before acquiring a blue-water navy. Finally, there is the thorny issue of North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons. This ongoing contention is now the axis of the overall security situation in the post-Cold War era diplomacy in Northeast Asia. China's actions and puzzling moves regarding this issue reveal clearly Chinese

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foreign policy in the 1990s and especially Chinese security concerns in Northeast Asia. It is to that issue that we shall now turn for a close examination of Chinese security policy in the region to elaborate the general assessments. CHINA AND THE KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: A CASE STUDY

North Korea has suffered greatly as a result of the Cold War's demise, while South Korea has emerged victorious in the post-Cold War 1990s. The chronic issue of Korean reunification and the possibility of another Korean war still somehow hold people's attention and imagination. Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons, moreover, puts the Korean peninsula once again on the front pages of the world press. It may be just an interesting coincidence, but the whole issue of the North Korean nuclear program began to surface and capture the world's attention at roughly the same time as Beijing established full diplomatic relations with Seoul, although the suspected nuclear facility at Yongbyon started its operation as early as 1987. China's Actions a n d Inaction

Allegations about the North Korean nuclear program were being made even before the end of the Cold War. Some believed China was the supplier of much of North Korea's technology and materials,54 but Beijing has always denied that it exports nuclear technology and materials to the Third World.55 As my general assessment of Chinese security policy in Northeast Asia indicates, it is extremely unlikely that the PRC would help Pyongyang's effort to build a nuclear arsenal. Practically, however, it is completely possible that North Koreans acquired some of their technical knowledge and even some equipment from China.56 Acting as a wellinformed ally, the Chinese commonly and publicly dismissed the reports about nuclear buildups in North Korea as "the so-called nuclear weapon development program of [North Korea] under suspicion of the Westerners."57 They quickly jumped to the conclusion that the problem was being solved when Pyongyang signed a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 1992.58 For a long time, the alleged North Korean nuclear program was not a priority for Chinese foreign policy makers. Beijing, however, was clearly enjoying its position and power, appreciated by Washington, in mediating the issue between the United States and North Korea. The United States decided to talk to Pyongyang directly, "largely at the behest of China," and the Chinese role is officially viewed as "the key to solving the North Korea crisis."59

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The issue intensified, however, after Pyongyang abruptly removed some 8,000 fuel rods from the 5-megawatt Yongbyon reactor in May-June 1994 and withdrew from the IAEA on June 13,1994. Viewing this as a major betrayal of the agreement and clear evidence of building nuclear arms, the United States and its allies began to contemplate fullscale sanctions against North Korea despite Pyongyang's threat of military retaliation. Under U.S. pressure and provided with U.S. intelligence,60 Beijing began to semipublicly acknowledge the negative consequences of Pyongyang's nuclear program, but still maintained that North Korea was far from reaching the threshold. The foreign ministry responded to Washington's attempt to seek UN-sponsored sanctions by publicly insisting that the issue should be solved through peaceful dialogues between the "relevant parties"—meaning the United States and North Korea—rather than through any sanctions or UN actions that may "sharpen the confrontations," causing new "instabilities."61 Beijing nonetheless agreed, as a gesture, that the Security Council should issue a statement urging Pyongyang to allow IAEA inspections62 and to "deplore the adverse turn of events."63 According to the Chinese envoy to the UN Security Council, Beijing has a twofold objective: the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the safeguarding and maintenance of peace and stability in the region."64 The North Korean nuclear aspiration and the subsequent U.S-North Korean conflicts are understandably undesirable vis-à-vis that goal. Thus, Beijing has appeared to be actively working, as a mediator between the United States and North Korea, to persuade the North Koreans to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and cooperate with the IAEA inspection teams. Extensive exchange of high-level visits between Pyongyang and Beijing, including military commanders of both sides, was an indication of behind-the-scenes activities;65 and the Chinese position on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was rather explicitly stated at the highest levels.66 The IAEA inspectors have been using Beijing as the gateway to and from North Korea. Essentially, Beijing wanted Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program without a U.S. victory in the UN Security Council. The breakthroughs produced by former President Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang in mid-June 1994 might be attributed to the satisfied ego of Kim U-sung. After all, Mr. Carter was the best-known U.S. figure to ever visit North Korea, and Kim, not by error, treated Carter as though he were a current head of state. But quiet diplomacy, including Beijing's deliberate silence on whether to veto a U.S. sanction proposal in the Security Council as late as June 16, might have contributed more. Moreover, Beijing's indirect but clear messages describing the unbearable consequences of a possible UN sanction with Chinese participation on June 3 might have reached Kim Il-sung quickly

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and loudly.67 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told the visiting Japanese foreign minister on June 12 that a UN sanction would be "ineffective" but promised that China would play a "positive" and "constructive" role in the Security Council on the proposed sanction measures.68 Soon thereafter, "Clinton finds North Koreans really may be ready to talk."69 And this time, the North Korean nuclear issue seemed as though it could be solved through a rearrangement of the relationship between Washington and Pyongyang in a package deal. The momentum of dialogue apparently continued after Kim IIsung's death on July 8,1994, for an accord wasfinallysigned between the United States and North Korea in Geneva on October 21,1994. To freeze and eventually dismantle its existing nuclear program, Pyongyang would receive the equivalent of U.S.$4 billion in nuclear light-water reactors (LWRs) and U.S.$500 million in oil supply from Japan, South Korea, and the United States.70 Beijing loudly applauded the accord since it seemed to satisfy China's desires to strengthen North Korea as a stable buffer zone in Northeast Asia and to halt Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions at others' expense.71 As of mid-1995, the ups and downs of the subsequent negotiations and arguments between Washington and Pyongyang on issues such as the implementation of the Geneva agreement had not yet derailed the process. And on January 20,1995, Washington decided to ease a forty-five-year-old trade restriction against North Korea, a few days after Pyongyang did the same, in accordance with the agreement.72 The progress of the U.S.-North Korean talks prompted the New York Times to call for a step "back from military confrontation" on the peninsula.73 The Chinese have clearly welcomed these positive and relaxed moves. Walking the awkward diplomatic high rope, however, the PRC has adopted measures to show solidarity with Pyongyang. On June 12,1994, Jiang Zemin met with North Korea's visiting army chief and reemphasized the "blood-bound friendship between the two countries," while repeating the "Korean denuclearization" demands.74 Beijing has shown firm support for Kim Jong-Il, Kim Il-sung's son and successor, although this type of communist dynasty has become extremely unpopular in post-Mao China and may be even questionable in post-Kim Il-sung North Korea. Despite the fact that North Korea has increasingly and substantially defaulted in its trade payments to the PRC,75 Beijing has continued to supply Pyongyang with key commodities such as food and oil.76 More important, Beijing has made it clear that it does not want to see a UN-sponsored sanction against Pyongyang, in effect telling Washington that it probably could not get the UN Security Council to approve such sanctions. The 1961 Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance serves as afinalguarantee deterring Chinese mil-

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itary actions against North Korea, although the general language of the treaty does not automatically activate Chinese support in the event of a military action initiated by Pyongyang. Nearly one year after the breakthrough on the nuclear issue, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship appears to be in good shape as the Chinese have verbally supported almost every demand, however small, North Korea has made in the postaccord talks with the United States. Beijing has been careful to avoid involvement in the implementation of the Agreed Framework and has portrayed the accord as something entirely between North Korea and the United States, the latter representing South Korea and the IAEA, as insisted upon by the North Koreans. The low-key and pragmatic Chinese attitude toward the Korea Energy Development Organization has illustrated the Chinese policy.77 The political and economic contacts between the Chinese and South Koreans, however, have made much more impressive progress, as symbolized by Li Peng's visit to Seoul in November 1994 and the subsequent boom of economic interactions in 1995. Puzzling Moves and Serious Questions Throughout the course of the North Korean nuclear drama, there was little observable sign of any Chinese action punishing or warning the Kim regime on the nuclear issue, although the behind-the-scenes diplomacy may have been intense. In fact, sometimes it seemed that Beijing was rewarding Pyongyang for its now widely known nuclear secrets and its defiance of the IAEA. Beijing did this, however, in a clearly cautious and calculated way. For instance, on April 27,1994, demanding a peace agreement replacing the Korean Military Armistice Agreement of 1953, Pyongyang decided to withdraw from the Korean Military Armistice Committee (KMAC). Then, an office of the North Korean People's Army—Pyongyang's proposed replacement for the KMAC—opened in Panmunjom. Under the post-Kim Il-sung regime, in which Kim Jong-Il's direct role was still ambiguous, a special North Korean envoy was sent to Beijing at the end of August, and he successfully persuaded the PRC to do the same, thus effectively crippling the forty-year-old KMAC.78 It took the Chinese three months of calculation, after the negotiations had started between North Korea and the United States, to "cooperate" with the North Koreans on this maneuver. Still, shock waves were naturally sent out by this symbolic defiance action that, at the very least, caused confusion over the precarious movement. The Chinese cooperation continued after the Geneva accord. Beijing seemed to prefer that the accord be implemented smoothly and quickly but apparently did not want to force its Korean comrades. For example, Beijing never officially criticized Pyongyang's objection to the South Korean-made LWRs on the

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grounds of safety concerns; but it did let the word out that the Chinese had agreed to install thirty to forty such reactors over the next fifteen years in their own densely populated coastal areas.79 To be fair, Beijing was somewhat sincere when it suggested and urged the United States to talk to Pyongyang directly to solve the nuclear problem. The daily Renmin Ribao, for example, highly praised President Carter's "fruitful mediation" that "shows that dialogue is better than confrontation."80 Although it is widely believed to be a longtime ally of North Korea, the PRC has experienced both frustrations and an inability to prevail in its dealings with the North Koreans.81 Beijing clearly sent out signals that it did not have as much influence on the North Koreans as some may have hoped.82 For example, Pyongyang made a series of semipublic territorial demands on its Chinese "comrades" in the past;83 and at a time when Chinese can travel to, and trade with, almost every neighbor including Vietnam, the Sino-Korean border is still heavily guarded by sizable North Korean troops on the southern banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Furthermore, every year there are many more South Koreans visiting China as merchants, investors, and tourists than there are North Koreans. The limited border trade remains a government monopoly on the Korean side, one primarily based on barter.84 Pyongyang was clearly unhappy about Beijing's decision to establish a full diplomatic relationship with Seoul before the West did the same with Pyongyang. And, reportedly, Beijing's advice to not remove the nuclear rods from the Yongbyon facility without the IAEA's knowledge was defied by North Korea in May 1994.85 The real influence of Beijing over Pyongyang, then, short of endorsing U.S.-proposed sanctions in the UN or cutting off supplies of oil and food, seems at best advisory and limited.86 Unlike the situation with the former Soviet protégés in Eastern Europe, the Chinese military ended its presence in North Korea in 1958, and one can now hardly identify any pro-Beijing or China-trained factions or individuals inside the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party. North Korea is probably the most tightly sealed country in our time. Evidence suggests that Beijing has little more confidence in predicting the inside politics of Pyongyang than does the rest of the world. The existing power relationship between the PRC and North Korea is a meaningless asset unless Beijing decides to exert its share of power within it. Apparently, Beijing did not believe that the nuclear issue warranted such an action. The important question, then, is why Beijing does not want to increase its influence on the North Koreans over the nuclear issue by at least suggesting sanctions that would utilize its power with Pyongyang. If Beijing is reluctant to impose sanctions on the North Koreans, why does it also oppose sanction attempts by the United States? Why has China

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behaved so differently from the United States when they presumably share a desire to prevent a nuclear North Korea? Chinese actions and inaction are more puzzling, even paradoxical, given the fact that Beijing is acutely aware of the pernicious consequences of a nuclear North Korea: a chain reaction that could lead to a nuclear South Korea and a nuclear Japan. A breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation institutions in Asia is by no means in China's interests, especially as Beijing worries about a nuclear Taiwan down the road. A politically assertive, militarily powerful, and nuclear Japan would be a nightmare to the Chinese, who are working on their economic development and the reunification of their motherland. How can we explain the paradoxical behavior of Beijing, which seems to sincerely want a nuclear free Korea yet has thus far refused to apply any real pressure? WEIGHING THE THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLANATIONS

There are four possible explanations for Beijing's opposition to Korean nuclearization and its simultaneous resolute resistance to U.S.-proposed sanctions on North Korea. An analysis of those explanations may further reveal China's security concerns in Northeast Asia and illustrate how Beijing views post-Cold War international relations. Explanation One: Idealism or Moralistic Foreign Policy

An idealistic or moralistic explanation for Beijing's contradictory behavior takes into account that the Chinese, who were themselves bullied for pursuing their own nuclear program only decades ago, feel ethical qualms about now bullying a struggling longtime friend on the same issue. Beijing has been trying to capture the moral high ground in diplomacy ever since the 1950s, as exemplified by Zhou Enlai's famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," which advocate noninterference in other countries' domestic affairs. As a leader of the poor and the oppressed—as Beijing views itself—the PRC may find it undesirable to use economic relations to force some country to change its policy. Beijing itself has recently been pressured by a stronger nation, the United States, on the MFN issue and human rights. Presumably, the Chinese know the bitter taste of being forced to change under economic pressure. Furthermore, one can argue that Beijing's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is at best halfhearted since it supported the French striving tor force defrappe; France continues its own nuclear program, defying an international moratorium on nuclear tests, and has been accused a few times of exporting nuclear materials. Therefore, it is not out of character for Bei-

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jing to back Pyongyang, despite the fact that a nuclear Korea may be quite undesirable to the Chinese. This argument contains plausible elements but should be questioned extensively. History has demonstrated that China, just like any other nation, has a rich tradition of realpolitik and less-than-moral foreign policies. Idealism has hardly dominated the PRC's foreign policy, and there is no evidence it would do so in this context. Buying influence and exercising pressure are not alien to the Chinese. The PRC has used economic sanctions as diplomatic tools repeatedly in the past on, for example, the Albanians and the Vietnamese. Beijing did resist Washington's economic pressure on the human rights issue but complied quietly on numerous occasions—in a very realistic way.87 And the PRC may have a less-than-perfect record in antinuclear proliferation. But to have a nuclear power that is so close to home and so consequential in terms of causing a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia is something Beijing is bound to forcefully oppose. Given the unknowns and uncertainties regarding Pyongyang, Beijing's "moral support" to North Korea may be better explained in the tradition of realism than by any idealist logic. Explanation Two: Better Chinese Intelligence Beijing feels safe because it may have more intelligence than does the United States regarding the North Korean nuclear program. The PRC may have reliable, factual knowledge of the backwardness of a Pyongyang nuclear program that is grossly exaggerated by the Western intelligence community. Given the long-term relationship between China and North Korea and the fact that China is one of only two friends to North Korea (the other "good friend" of the late Kim Il-sung is the struggling ruler of Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk), it is plausible to believe that Beijing has sufficient information to decide not to waste its leverage pressuring Pyongyang. To the Chinese leaders, the whole drama of Pyongyang's nuclear program is largely a show of bargaining chips by the North Koreans or a desperate move by Pyongyang to enhance its security in a very unfriendly post-Cold War world. Essentially, Washington has somehow been deceived either by its militaryindustrial complex, its overzealous intelligence agencies, and the hypersensitive South Koreans, or perhaps by the bluffing and boasting acts of the North Koreans. It is extremely difficult for Westerners to assess the effectiveness of Chinese intelligence work, especially in a country such as North Korea, on the basis of nonclassified materials. The latest work by U.S. scholars helps little in this regard.88 But the Chinese, with a Confucian cultural legacy and patrimonial social structure similar to that of North Koreans,

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based on a similar political system and having common experience of central planning economic systems, may indeed have a more accurate understanding of Pyongyang's behavior than do Westerners.89 If the account of the last-minute medical help China rendered to Kim Il-sung given by a Hong Kong-based popular magazine was accurate90—indicating a rather intimate connection between China and North Korea—Beijing might even be able to acquire hard evidence revealing the actual status of Pyongyang's nuclear program.91 But Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly told Japanese lawmakers in April that Beijing was not certain of the true purpose of Pyongyang's nuclear program.92 Furthermore, this explanation alone is rather weak in explaining why Beijing appears to be cooperating with Pyongyang on issues such as the KMAC's dissolution. In fact, Beijing's public statements of opposition to a nuclear Korean peninsula convey substantially the Chinese suspicion over Pyongyang's real motives. In short, Beijing's inaction on Pyongyang's nuclear program has probably been based on more than limited inside information. Explanation Three: A Shrewd Geopolitical Policy Contrary to the moralistic argument, Beijing may have actually played a very realistic game to keep Korea divided and to maintain the political stability on the peninsula to its favor. To the Chinese, a stable North Korea and a controlled Korean reunification93 are more important than Pyongyang's possible acquisition of a few nuclear warheads. From its own strategic viewpoint, Beijing clearly worries much more about a military conflict or political chaos on the Korean peninsula than the alleged nuclear scheme of the North Koreans. It would certainly dread having to send another wave of "volunteers" across the Yalu River in the 1990s. Some Chinese believe that a rapid reunification of the peninsula probably would require a major political change in the North.94 For obvious reasons, Beijing does not want to see refugees flooding its northeastern provinces because of a sudden collapse of the Pyongyang regime,95 just as many South Korean elites would prefer a controlled and gradual process of Korean reunification—one different from the dramatic German reunification.96 A senior member of a major Chinese think tank wrote explicitly that in Korea, "reunification without incurring instability will serve the interests of all parties concerned. Copying of the 'German model' is not realistic ... [and] it is difficult to confine the instability in [North Korea] to North only."97 Furthermore, as South Korean scholars have observed, Korean reunification would likely reduce the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia and greatly increase the Japanese influence,98 which is not exactly in the security interests of the

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PRC. Therefore, if it has to make a choice, Beijing probably prefers to live with a possibly nuclear but divided Korea than with a collapsing North Korea that could fundamentally alter the relaxed and secure environment the PRC enjoys in Northeast Asia. Given our knowledge about the Chinese assessment of their security environment in Northeast Asia, peaceful stability on the Korean peninsula is certainly a major part of the favorable status quo that Beijing is determined to maintain. From a geopolitical viewpoint, helping the North Koreans survive and avoiding a rapid change of the current situation on the peninsula may serve Chinese interests well. Thus, Beijing would be wise to refrain from assisting the United States in punishing Pyongyang for its alleged nuclear ambitions. Explanation Four: The Real Threat To fully appreciate China's policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue, a fourth explanation may be necessary: Namely, a relaxed Beijing is watching carefully to see if the real security threat lies beyond Pyongyang's nuclear program. In other words, the Chinese may simply believe that the main threat to security in Northeast Asia is from a different source than Pyongyang's desperate drive for nuclear weapons. The PRC does not want to see the expansion of the U.S. influence that is easily interpreted as a long-term political threat to the stability of the CCP regime and to Chinese national security. Given the Chinese goal of reuniting the motherland and the fact that the United States poses a lasting challenge to the PRC's political system, the role and the influence of the United States always warrant Beijing's deep suspicion as well as serious appreciation.99 The United States, with its forceful and outright promotion of human rights and political democracy, may be justifiably viewed by Beijing as an expansionist and destabilizing force in Northeast Asia. The whole North Korean nuclear issue may be something partially, if not entirely, contrived by the United States to expand its control over post-Cold War Northeast Asia in the name of the United Nations, with a dangerous implication for the PRC. China Daily, for example, asserted that Washington might be "a little too sensitive" on the Korean nuclear issue.100 To maintain the status quo in the region, the United States must be contained or balanced. In the absence of the Soviet superpower, any hindrance to U.S. hegemonism and any buffer zone between the U.S. human rights crusaders and the CCP would be in the interests of Beijing. So why should China bother to really help Washington get rid of Pyongyang, which still can be viewed as an ally in slowing, if not stopping, the United States?101 In fact, Beijing may have actually coordinated its moves with Pyongyang to utilize the nuclear issue

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to gain a more stable international status from the United States and its allies for North Korea. Ever since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has expressed disappointment and unhappiness over the U.S. and Japanese decision to not establish full diplomatic relations with Pyongyang long after Seoul received its recognition from Moscow and Beijing. According to the Chinese press and academia, the United States now actually fits quite well into the Chinese description of "hegemonic power," a Chinese buzzword for security threat and international enemy. Washington is often publicly criticized for still being in a "Cold War mode," that is, still in the business of fighting communists, naturally including the CCP.102 The Western accounts of Beijing's military expansion and the PRC's potential military threats are often interpreted by Beijing as marketing schemes of the U.S. military-industrial complex103 or, worse, Washington's deliberate, evil, and "ulterior" attempts at weakening the Chinese.104 Beijing may have an acute understanding of Pyongyang's feeling of being cornered by the United States. The aftereffects of the Cold War,105 such as using an economic embargo for the political purposes of destabilizing ideological enemies, may indeed look like an attempt by the United States to roll back communist power on the Korean peninsula—something by which the Chinese would definitely be alarmed. The overall chilling atmosphere between Beijing and Washington since 1989 only deepens Beijing's suspicion over Washington's real intention in Northeast Asia. Yang Chenxu, a leading foreign policy adviser to the Chinese foreign ministry, argued illustratively in 1994: The Korean situation has recently become an issue of Northeast Asian security that draws the most attention. The United States plays up that there is a danger for war to break out here. The real worry of the United State is actually not this. In short, the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula is a very complicated issue. Although sometimes it moves to the edge, essentially, it is a political rather than military issue.106

Another unnamed "expert" of Chinese foreign policy in Beijing was quoted by a Hong Kong newspaper as saying in April 1994: The Korean Peninsula issue is no longer a simple dispute between South and North Korea; the different attitudes of China and [the] United States on the North Korean nuclear issue [are], essentially speaking, a strategic trial of strength between the two countries on the Korean Peninsula.107

With a different agenda and perspective, Beijing is therefore not as concerned as the United States about Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons, nor is it as fearful of an explosive southward invasion from

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North Korea. U.S. actions in Korea are easily deemed by Beijing as "unnecessary" and "hegemonic" moves that may actually harm Chinese interests. This is especially the case when the U.S. policy carries a heavy undertone of promoting human rights and political democracy. To go along with the United States in the Security Council by abstaining to vote on issues that have little direct impact on China is one thing; but to allow the United States to use UN sanctions against an ally so geographically close to home is naturally a different matter. Beijing probably does not want to see a nuclear Korean peninsula, or worse, a nuclear Japan. But it probably wants to see expanded U.S. influence in the region even less. If China had survived a direct twenty-year confrontation with the all-mighty Soviet Union, the idea of a nuclear Korea or even a nuclear Japan might be more tolerable, since the United States, Russia, and the Koreas would probably be among the enemies of a nuclear Japan anyway. But if a human rights-promoting, thus subversive, United States had its way every time, eventually dominating Northeast Asia much like its domination of the Caribbean, Beijing would find itself in a very bad security environment given its determination to sustain its political system. In that kind of scenario, Beijing could hardly find any convenient counterweight to offset the threatening United States. U.S. dominance in Northeast Asia, although unlikely at the moment, appears to be a major long-term concern for Beijing. Therefore, to Beijing, the long-term and positive impact of the peaceful ending of the North Korean nuclear crisis represents the reduction of tensions between the United States and North Korea on the Korean peninsula, "a leftover of the Cold War," that is likely to facilitate a good regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.108

CONCLUSION

Northeast Asia has always been a major component of China's security policy. After the Cold War, the PRC is rightfully relaxed in this region. It now has the best relationship it has had with every country in the region in over one hundred years, and there is almost no security threat in sight. Better still, "among the four powers [the United States, Russia, Japan, and China], China is the only country that currently has good relations with both North and South Korea."109 The Chinese feel that this is a golden opportunity for them. But Beijing is clearly watchful for new threats that are deemed to be primarily in the form of an external dominating power or a revived Japanese militarism. Limited by its own capacity, the PRC is likely to play the old balance-of-power game to maintain the favorable status quo.

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Despite the suspicions and doubts, the United States is currently viewed by Beijing as basically a status quo power in Northeast Asia and an effective help in maintaining the present security arrangement in the region. In the interests of China's short-term security objectives, then, the United States is welcome, and even encouraged by the Chinese, to continue its military presence in Northeast Asia to suppress the Japanese. But a United States that aggressively promotes human rights and political democracy is deeply feared by Beijing as a lasting and long-term challenge to the political stability of the CCP regime. Any new action or initiative (such as a possible new policy on Taiwan) that may be viewed as expansionist or hegemonic behavior on the part of the United States is therefore carefully monitored, shrewdly addressed, and firmly opposed. The recent Chinese tacit consent to the presence of Russian naval forces in the Pacific may be an indication that Beijing is preparing for the loss of U.S. help in balancing Japan. For the double security objective of using and containing the United States in Northeast Asia, Beijing sometimes has to walk the diplomatic tightrope with extraordinary skill—and with potential risks attached. A visible gap is therefore seen between the words and the deeds of Beijing. This is best exemplified by Beijing's policy on the Korean reunification and on the nuclear proliferation issues. Beijing supports Pyongyang's position of reuniting Korea with no foreign forces involved. But for its own purposes and calculations, Beijing does not want to see a rapid change of the stability, or a stalemate, on the Korean peninsula. The formerly much-criticized U.S. military presence in South Korea is now skillfully termed by the Chinese foreign minister as something "the Americans are now discussing among themselves."110 Beijing does not want to see a nuclear Korea and its horrible possible consequence: a nuclear Japan. But apparently, the PRC views the North Korean nuclear issue as an exaggeration, or even a fabrication, of the United States. It seems to believe that a U.S.-led international sanction against North Korea is more threatening to Chinese security than is a possible nuclear arsenal in the hands of Pyongyang. Therefore, Beijing earnestly encourages Washington and Pyongyang to talk things over. The best Beijing can expect from these talks is for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program and Washington to help stabilize the status quo by injecting dollars into North Korea and perhaps granting it full diplomatic recognition. By mid-1995, the development of the North Korean nuclear issue seemed to have moved the way the Chinese desired. In sum, for an economically fast-growing yet politically stagnant China, the status quo is the best security environment it can ask for in Northeast Asia. Whatever long-term interests and objectives Beijing

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may have in the region, it will likely work toward the maintenance of the favorable status quo for a considerable period of time. A drastically growing and transforming China therefore ironically becomes a conservative power in Northeast Asia.

NOTES I want to thank John W. Garver for his generous help and insightful comments and an anonymous reviewer who provided useful comments on the styles as well as the content of this chapter. Of course, I am solely responsible for any errors this chapter may still contain. 1. One of the most important and earliest political campaigns under Mao was the "Anti-Gao Gang Group" campaign in 1954. Gao Gang, a vice chairman of the PRC and the top leader of the northeast region at the time, was accused of running the region as an "independent kingdom," developing too many connections with Moscow, and challenging Mao's power in Beijing. Gao later committed suicide, and his case has remained one of the two political cases under Mao that have never been reversed (the other is the case of Lin Biao, who also built up his power base in the northeast region in the 1940s). 2. The Far East and Australasia, 1994, 25th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1994), p. 208. 3. State Statistical Bureau, 92' Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao (China development report, 1992) (Beijing: Tongji Press, 1993), p. 219. 4. Guoji Maoyi (International trade journal), Beijing, March 1994, p. 50. 5. State Statistical Bureau, 92' Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao, p. 219. 6. East Asian Daily, Seoul, April 15,1994. 7. Renmin Ribao (People's daily), Beijing, September 2,1994, p. 2. 8. For example, North Korea now imports 75 percent of its oil supply, 72 percent of its food imports, and 88 percent of its cooking coal from China (Time, June 13,1994, p. 27; and Agence France Presse [AFP] reports from Hong Kong, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-China [FBIS-China], July 14,1994, p. 8). 9. Figures provided by Luvasandorj Dawagiv, the Mongolian ambassador to the United States, on November 11,1993. 10. Shen Qurong (vice president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a major think tank in the Chinese foreign policy community), "Security Environment in Northeast Asia: Its Characteristics and Sensitivities," Contemporary International Relations, English ed., Beijing, vol. 2, no. 12 (December 1992): 13. 11. In 1995, Beijing believed that the situation on the Korean peninsula was "relaxed" and that the country was more prone to peace and stability than any other in the whole of Northeast Asia (Renmin Ribao, Beijing, January 1, 1995, p. 6). 12. Li Zhongcheng and Guo Chuanling, "World Trends, 1993," in Contemporary International Relations, English ed., Beijing, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 1993): 4. 13. Geng Huichang (president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations), "Multi-National Co-Ordination: Feasibility in AsiaPacific," Contemporary International Relations, English ed., Beijing, vol. 2, no. 11 (November 1992): 11.

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14. Deng Xiaoping's remarks to President George Bush in 1989 (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], vol. 3 [Beijing: Renmin Press, 1993], p. 284; and Jiang Zemin, "To Accelerate the Reform and Opening," Beijing Review [October 26-November 1,1992]: 16). 15. Jiang Zemin, "To Accelerate the Reform," p. 25. 16. Yang Chenxu (president of the China Institute of International Studies, the think tank of the Chinese foreign ministry), "Dongya Anquan Wenti Fengxi" (An analysis of East Asian security issues), Guoji Wenti Yanju (International studies), Beijing, no. 3 (1994): 19,21. 17. Yan Xuetong (deputy director of the Center for China's Foreign Policy Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations), "China's Regional Policy," conference paper presented at the East -West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 1994, pp. 2,4. 18. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces is already considered by Chinese experts to have much better military hardware, especially warships and fighters. Japan's military spending is also viewed as more than five times larger than China's ('"Zhonguog Junshi Weishe' shi Wuji Zhetang" ["Chinese military threat" is a groundless argument], Renmin Ribao, Beijing, April 17,1993). 19. Wu Guifu (deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in the National Defense University of the PLA) and Xia Liping (Wu Guifu's colleague), Yatao Diqu Anquan Huanjing (Security environment in Asia and the Pacific) (Beijing: PLA Press, 1995). 20. Robert A. Manning: "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," Washington Quarterly, vol. 17 (winter 1994): 45-58. 21. For example, see Gu Ping, "Ribeng de Rebayue" (A hot August in Japan), Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., August 18,1994. 22. Xinhua commentator, "Ribeng Zhengfu de Lishi Zheren" (The historical responsibility of the Japanese government), Renmin Ribao, Beijing, September 16,1994. The Chinese foreign ministry had threatened a "retrogression of political relations" if Tokyo did not cancel an entry visa issued to a Taiwanese senior official for his trip to the Asian Games in Hiroshima in the fall of 1994 (Renmin Ribao, September 23,1994, p. 1). 23. A recent case is the extraordinarily quick and strong response by the Chinese government to the comments made by Shigeto Nagona, the Japanese justice minister who was later forced to resign, on the rape of Nanjing in 1937. See China Daily, Beijing, May 5-6,1994. 24. Xiandai Jianchuan (Modern maritime vessels), Beijing, June 1994. Of course, such accusations may also be interpreted differently as Beijing's attempt to preempt Japan's critics of China's military expansion plans. 25. From Premier Li Peng's report to the National People's Congress on March 19,1993 (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., April 2,1993). 26. Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., March 24,1993, p. 1. 27. Shen Qurong, "Security Environment in Northeast Asia," p. 8. 28. For example, Beijing clearly voiced objection and unhappiness at the suggestion that the United States might consider a limited antimissile system to protect its troops and allies in Asia (Patrick Tayler, "China Warns Against 'Star Wars' Shield for U.S. Forces in Asia," New York Times, February 18,1995). 29. By the summer of 1994, Beijing made an interesting change in its decade-long position and stopped calling for a reduction of Russian naval forces in the Pacific (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., July 26,1994).

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30. Yang Chenxu, "An Analysis on East Asian Security Issues," Guoji Wenti Yanju, Beijing, no. 3 (1994): 20. 31. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy," pp. 16,18. 32. As declared by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on September 4,1994, in Moscow (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., September 5,1994, p. 3). 33. Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin, "The Joint-Communiqué of the PRC and the Russian Federation on Nuclear Targeting," Moscow, September 3,1994. 34. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1993), pp. 87-88. 35. China Daily-Business Weekly, July 31-August 6,1994, p. 1. 36. Allen S. Whiting, "The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel Kim, ed., China and the World, 3d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 267. 37. Jiang Zemin termed the large amount of illegal Chinese migration into Russia as a temporary and manageable "disorder phenomenon" (Xinhua Dianxun [Xinhua news report], Beijing, August 31,1994). 38. Every legitimate Chinese company in Russia can now hire only five permanent employees from China, and they must apply and pay for renewable annual permits of residence (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., September 10,1994). 39. This is my impression gathered from talks with Russian scholars from Vladivostok in Atlanta, December 1994. 40. For a summary on the major proposals in this regard, see Andrew Mack, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (summer 1992): 21-34; John Faust, "East Asia's Emerging Security System," Journal of East Asian Affairs (winter-spring 1994): 56-89; and John E. Endicott, "Developing a Cooperative Security Regime for Northeast Asia," Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP), Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Ga., fall 1991. 41. Zhou Enlai, "Current International Situation and Our Foreign Policy," Renmin Ribao, Beijing, July 20,1955. 42. This is an idea fashioned by some Japanese. It depicts an East Asian cooperative structure organized like a team of flying geese in which Japan would be the team leader. To other observers, this may look like just a revised design for the infamous "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." 43. Renmin Ribao, February 3,1993, and July 26,1994. From 1993 to 1994, the Chinese proposals regarding APSM, still five points, have changed quite significantly. Foreign military presence is now allowed, and the United States and Russia are no longer asked to reduce their naval forces in the Pacific. 44. John E. Endicott, "The Impact of a Limited Nuclear Free Zone on Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Northeast Asia," working report of CISTP, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Ga., summer 1994; and "Status Report #4 on the Northeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone Proposal," CISTP, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Ga., September 1993. 45. Nicholas Kristof, "More Than One Way to Squeeze China," New York Times, May 22,1994. 46. Patrick E. Tyler, "China Protests to the U.S. Policy on Taiwan Arms and Tibet," New York Times, May 6,1994. 47. For example, see Nicholas Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," New York Times, January 11,1993; Philip Ritcheson, "China's Impact on Southeast Asian Security," Military Review (May 1994): 44-57; James Gregor, "China's Shadow over Southeast Asian Waters,"

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Global Affairs, vol. 7 (summer 1992): 1-13; and Billy Song, "China and the Military Use of the Ocean," Ocean Development and International Law (1990): 213-235. 48. Several top Chinese military leaders have visited Russia and signed a few agreements for cooperation and exchanges. (See, for example, China Daily, June 29,1993.) The widely speculated massive military hardware transfer, however, has yet to take place. 49. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy," pp. 3-4. 50. Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 5-6. 51. Figures provided by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., March 24,1993, p. 1). The PLA, unlike most other armed forces in the world, engages in active business and foreign trade activities. TTie income from these extrabudget sources, however, is believed to be largely spent on luxury goods for the senior officers and on business expansions (New York Times, May 24,1994). 52. IISS, The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1993), p. 152. According to the same source, Japan's military expenditure in 1992 was U.S.$39.71 billion (p. 157) and the United States spent U.S.$277.18 billion on its military (pp. 19-20). 53. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Hong Kong, April 13,1995:24-28. 54. For example, Xiaowei Zhao, "The Threat of a New Arms Race Dominates Asian Geopolitics," Global Affairs, vol. 7 (summer 1992): 29-40. 55. For whatever reason, Beijing's claim has yet to be disproved. The fiasco of the freighter Yinghe only demonstrates the embarrassing inadequacy of U.S. intelligence in this regard. {FEER, Hong Kong, vol. 156 [August 26,1993]: 10-11; and New York Times, September 3,1993). 56. Samuel Kim, "China and the Third World," in Kim, ed., China and the World, pp. 146,148. 57. Shen Qurong, "Security Environment in Northeast Asia," pp. 14-15. 58. Chen Qimao, "The Role of the Greater Powers in the Process of Korean Reunification," in Amos A. Jordan, ed., Korean Unification—Implication for Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 74. 59. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly with North Korea," New York Times, April 23,1993. 60. Washington began to pressure the Chinese earlier; see Paul Lewis, "U.S. Urges China to Pressure North Koreans to Open Unclear Sites," New York Times, February 5,1994. 61. Foreign ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang on June 2,1994 (Xinhua Dianxun). 62. New York Times, March 31,1994, and April 1,1994. 63. Xinhua Dianxun, June 15,1994. 64. Ambassador Chen Jian's statement at the UN Security Council, April 1, 1994, and General Liu Huaqing's speech on June 13,1994 (Xinhua Dianxun). 65. Xinhua Dianxun, June 22,1994. 66. Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Liu Huaqing reportedly all repeated this stance many times in public and to the North Koreans in 1993-1994. 67. Ta Kung Pao, the "virtual Chinese official newspaper" in Hong Kong, published a report on the Korean situation, warning that North Korea would not be able to cope with full-scale economic sanctions by China, the United States,

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and Japan. China would cut off the supply of oil and even food to Pyongyang should Beijing decide to join the United States (Shih Chun-yu,"The Situation on the Korean Peninsula Becomes Tense Again," Ta Kung Pao, June 3, 1994, in FBIS-China, June 6,1994, pp. 9-10). 68. New York Times, June 13,1994. 69. New York Times, June 23,1994. 70. Steven Greenhouse, "Administration Defends North Korea Accord," New York Times, January 25,1995. 71. Xinhua Dianxun, October 22, 1994; and Mu Yi, "United States and DPRK Sign Agreement on Nuclear Issue," Shijie Zhishi (World affairs), Beijing, no. 22 (November 16,1994): 2-4. 72. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Eases Trade Limits on North Korea for First Time Since 1950," New York Times, January 21,1995. 73. "A Safety Catch for Korea," New York Times, editorial, January 25,1995. 74. Xinhua Dianxun, June 12,1994. 75. South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 23,1994, p. 8. 76. Japanese newspapers report that China shipped food in late July as emergency aid to the post-Kim Il-sung regime (Mainichi Shimbun, July 29,1994, in FBIS-China, August 1,1994, p. 9). 77. AFP reports from Beijing, in FBIS-China, February 17,1995, p. 11. 78. Xinhua Dianxun, September 1,1994. 79. "China to Build 40 ROK Nuclear Reactors," Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, February 14,1995, in FBIS-China, February 16,1995, p. 9. 80. Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., June 22,1994, p. 6. 81. Chinese scholars frequently admit this in many informal settings. 82. Jiang Zemin himself told his Japanese guests on May 17,1994, that one should not "overestimate" China's influence on North Korea to settle the nuclear issue (Kyodo from Beijing, in FBIS-China, May 17,1994, p. 1). Also see Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, June 8,1994, in FBIS-China, June 9,1994, p. 11. 83. Zhang Zhirong, "Houjing Shidai Zhongchao Guangxi Zhongde Weimiao Bianhua" (Delicate changes in Sino-North Korean relations in the post-Kim era), Dandai (Contemporary), Hong Kong, no. 41 (August 15,1994): 63-65. 84. Patrick E. Tyler, "Hole in the Wall Around North Korea," New York Times, June 27,1994. Also, "Border Trade with DPRK Is Severely Limited," AFP reports from Hong Kong, in FBIS-China, July 14,1994, pp. 7-8. 85. Yonhap, Seoul, May 10,1994, in FBIS-China, May 10,1994, p. 3. 86. Donald Klein, after piecing together secondary evidence, suggested that Beijing might have successfully applied pressure to affect Pyongyang's decision to join the UN, together with South Korea, and to be less militant ("Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Kim, ed., China and the World, pp. 117-118, 126). 87. Patrick Tyler, "China Promises U.S. to Improve Record for Human Rights," New York Times, January 16,1994; and Thomas Friedman, "China Will Yield on a Trade Issue: End to Jamming Broadcasts Meets a U.S. Condition," New York Times, May 18,1994. 88. Nicholas Eftimiades provides a good up-to-date work on the Chinese intelligence community, but it is still rather sketchy for assessing China's intelligence in North Korea: Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994).

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89. My spring 1995 contacts with some foreign policy analysts from Beijing yielded the impression that they firmly believe that the United States has a much-exaggerated estimate of the North Korean nuclear program and a misunderstanding of the difficulty of power transition in Pyongyang. 90. See, for example, "Jiang Zemin Huijian Beihan Mishi" (Jiang Zemin met North Korean secret envoy), Chien Shao (Pioneer), Hong Kong, no. 8 (August 8, 1994): 6-8. 91. The Japanese reported, based on an "internal document" of the CCP, that Beijing believes Pyongyang's nuclear program is only at "an elementary stage" (Kyodo, Tokyo, July 3,1994, in FBIS-China, July 5,1994, pp. 11-12). 92. Kyodo, Tokyo, April 30,1994, in FBIS-China, May 2,1994, p. 13. 93. "A controlled Korean reunification" refers to the active and effective role played by the two Korean governments in managing the process; namely, a change of the political map on the peninsula without a burst of new issues and chaos threatening the Sino-Korean relationship. 94. Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 12 (December 1992): 1152. 95. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy," p. 13. 96. This is the impression I got from talks with Korean scholars and officials, including analysts from the Korean Institute for Foreign Policy and National Security. Also see similar reports in Time magazine, July 18,1994, p. 29. 97. Shen Qurong, "Security Environment in Northeast Asia," p. 15. 98. Young-Kyu Park, "Post-Unification Challenges," in Jordan, ed., Korean Unification, p. 42. 99. A survey of Beijing's internal foreign policy analyses reconfirms that "the United States has always held a central place in China's analysis of international affairs" and that Beijing "understands the importance of the United States" (Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, "Chinese Perception in the Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 10 [October 1992]: 902,917). 100. China Daily, Beijing, June 9,1994. 101. A Hong Kong-based magazine made such a speculation (Lo Chieh-An, "China and DPRK Strive for Political Stability and Economic 'Break-away,'" Tang Tai, no. 41 [August 15,1994]: 57-58); a similar view is also found in another Hong Kong-based newspaper (Jen Hui-Wen, "Inside Story About China Briefing DPRK on How to Act," Hsin Pao [Star daily], Hong Kong, June 22,1994)— both in FBIS-China. 102. Shen Quron,"U.S.'s Eight Misunderstandings and China's Reality," conference paper presented to the International Conference on Sino-American Relations, Bridgeport, Conn., April 1993, pp. 2-20. 103. Beijing insists that the Chinese military expenditure is less than 3 percent of that of the United States and less than 20 percent of that of Japan (Renmin Ribao, Beijing, March 24,1993). Using IISS figures, the ratios become 7.8 percent and 54.8 percent, respectively, instead (IISS, The Military Balance, 1993-1994, pp. 152,157,19-20). 104. Li Xuejiang, "Buke Gaoren de Dongji" (The ulterior motives), Renmin Ribao, Beijing, March 3,1995, p. 6. 105. Lu Zhongwei, "Security of Northeast Asia and Prospects for Multilateral Consultation," Contemporary International Relations, English ed., Beijing, vol. 2, no. 11 (November 1992): 20. 106. Yang Chenxu: "Donga Anquan Wenti Fengxi," p. 20; emphasis added.

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107. Jen Hui-Wen, "The Chinese-U.S. Strategic Trail of Strength on the Korean Peninsula," Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, April 8,1994, p. 24. 108. Tang Tianri, "A DPRK-U.S. Agreement of Far-Reaching Impact," Liaowang (Outlook), Beijing, no. 45 (November 7, 1994), in FBIS-China, November 16,1994, pp. 8-9; and Tang Tianri, "The Forbearance of the U.S. Has Long-Term Significance," Liaowang, Beijing, no. 45 (November 7,1994), in FBISChina, January 30,1995, pp. 5-6. 109. Chen Qimao, '"Eie Role of the Greater Powers in the Process of Korean Reunification," in Jordan, ed., Korean Unification, p. 78. 110. Renmin Ribao, Beijing, March 24,1993, p. 1.

3

Australian Security Policy in Northeast Asia Dora Alves

When Prime Minister Bob Hawke first spoke of Australia's "enmeshment in Asia" in 1983, the term was not readily accepted even by some who have since adopted it with enthusiasm. As Hawke defined it, enmeshment meant radical change. "It was a case of change or be left behind, with our living standards declining, our economy and our way of life stagnant, our citizens envious and, in the long term, left to become the poor white trash of Asia." 1 Hawke realized that becoming enmeshed in Asia involved other changes. With its economic destiny linked to Asia, Australia could not be racist in its immigration or trade policies. In making the greatest change in Australia's international posture since John Curtin's wartime turn toward the United States, Australia, once reliant on "great and powerful friends,"2 affirmed a new independence that would further the national interest. Hawke foresaw a strong interconnection between foreign and domestic policy. Regional and international interests would benefit from cooperation in agriculture, education, defense, industry, sport, and tourism. Ross Garnaut, a former ambassador to China who helped formulate the new agenda, urged that Australia, as a middle power, should strive to persuade other countries and influential groups within these countries that it was in their interest to move in directions consistent with Australian interests.3 Senator Gareth Evans, minister of foreign affairs and trade, said, "The more we think in terms of community terms, web terms, network terms, rather than balance-of-power terms, I think the more confident we shall be about our future."4 To this end, the Australian government has fostered greater awareness of Northeast Asia. Asian immigrants, who in the next generation will be 10 percent of the population, foster links and increase mutual awareness. 69

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FESTINA LENTE

Not only Australian perceptions of themselves and of the world are changing: Asians, too, realize that today bilateral arrangements may no longer be sufficient. So Australia, choosing to ignore the clichés about kaleidoscopic differences, emphasizes affinities and complementary trade to encourage shared interests, cooperation, and dialogue among the region's major security players, including countries traditionally hostile or nervous about one another.5 The end of the Cold War has removed one set of ideological and strategic factors. However, the shift of the center of economic gravity to East Asia has created new security concerns apart from the dangerous contentions in the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula. Finding regional solutions that are acceptable to both small and large countries may prove difficult.6 Australian policy stresses universal human values: life, health, dignity, and the worth of the individual. Diplomatic subtlety is needed if concessions in such matters as human rights—about which Australia feels strongly—are to be made without rancor. Evans often reiterates the importance of a lowkey, step-by-step approach.

THE IMPACT OF NORTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH

East Asia is expected to be the source of 40 percent of global investment by the late 1990s. As Australia moves away from its protectionist past, the rapid, sustained growth of Northeast Asia has encouraged economic development in Southeast Asia, to Australia's immediate north. Australia has not been just a spectator of Asian development. Recognizing the complementarity of Northeast Asian economies, Australia formed, in 1986, the Cairns Group of free traders, building coalitions with the aim of freer multilateral trading conditions. Increasing use of market mechanisms and joint commercial ventures strengthen regional cooperation that can be extended to security issues. Long-term prospects for regional peace will depend increasingly on the ability of Asians to meet regularly with one another to address contentious issues before they become crises.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and subsequently the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) are important to Australian relations with Northeast Asia. The unprecedented economic growth in Northeast Asia since the 1940s

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and rapid structural change have had an impact on security policies throughout the region. Australia, with European antecedents and a democratic tradition, uses persuasion to influence regional and international relations and promote shared peaceful interests. Canberra strongly supports regional institutions that can foster transparency. It sees China's membership in the eighteen-member APEC, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the future World Trade Organization (WTO) as likely to make China more predictable. Prime Minister Paul Keating would like to see "more horsepower" injected into APEC. Commenting on APEC's strategic implications, Keating underscored the importance of engaging the major economies of China, Japan, and the United States. The evolution of the Sino-Japanese relationship would in many ways determine the future of Asia, while the Australian s . alliance relationship remains an important factor in regional stability.7 Australia is pleased by China's participation in ARE Lee Kuan-yew presciently made the point that China will adapt in its own way, not to satisfy Westerners.8 ARF met for the first time on July 1, 1994, in Bangkok, bringing together ASEAN, traditional dialogue partners, and the nations important to regional security: Russia, China, and Vietnam. ARF aims to develop confidence-building measures, particularly transparency in arms acquisition and force structure, and a weapons nonproliferation regime. ARF will begin slowly, just as ASEAN did, having regard for the Asian predilection for consultation and unanimity. In time, it should, in Evans's view, contribute to a new sense of confidence and comfort among regional nations. So disparate a grouping is unlikely to become a fullfledged collective security institution like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but ARF will be instrumental in building confidence and reducing tension and the risk of conflict among members. Northeast Asian arms expenditures are growing—particularly those of China and Korea—as obsolescent weapons systems are replaced. China's activities, including nuclear detonations and arms and technology exports, occasion concern in neighboring countries. China's reluctance to discuss controversial topics openly might be overcome by "second track" informal forums in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. Asian and Australian officials, civilian and military, will meet as private individuals to bring contentious issues into the open, striving for compromises in pragmatic discussions. Australia has achieved a more sensitive understanding of the complexity of Asian societies and believes it is crucial for each country to know what the other is doing in security terms. For a number of years, Australia's most effective regional security has been a multidimensional one in which military capability, diplomatic

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and political means, and all the components of the country's network of relations have worked together to shape a favorable environment. Economic links do not necessarily inhibit security tensions, but they can bring about significant regional cooperation as APEC has shown. Credentials can be established by dealing cooperatively with problems of contagious diseases, environmental degradation, population flows, and trade in narcotics. Australia does not see the region essentially in military terms as it did for so long, "looking out nervously, behaving defensively, and turning anxiously to Britain and the United States for reinforcement—the only possible and sensible course for Australia to take is to engage with our region in the most direct and comprehensive way possible."9 Australia used its good offices in the Sino-U.S. discussions on human rights and most-favored-nation (MFN) status and encouraged China, as North Korea's supplier of food and oil, to use its influence in the recent nuclear inspections controversy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE

Fluidity and dynamism characterize the Asia Pacific strategic environment, and there are areas where competing interests could be engaged— over ancient boundaries, undersea oil, and on the Korean peninsula. Australia prefers to emphasize dialogue rather than trying to force the pace in any way. Dialogue partners, exchanging views on threat perceptions, can arrive at shared assessments, reducing insecurity and checking the impulse to competitive arms purchases. Australia believes that confidence-building measures can make security needs and military intentions explicit, creating interdependence and mutual confidence. Tensions are eased by the exchange of budget data, doctrines, and future forward projections; less provocative military exercises with foreign observers; joint exercises; measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; enhancement of maritime surveillance, safety, and search and rescue operations; and management of oil pollution and hazardous waste—all forms of intergovernmental activity not traditionally thought of as having relevance to security. Australia has had a role greater than might be expected for a country of its size in the quest for disarmament and in the 1988 Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative and nuclear free zone proposals.10 As we have seen, Australia supports preventive diplomacy and peace building to avoid armed conflict. Now its thinking about the United Nations has evolved. In the fall issue of Foreign Policy, Evans suggested that with more than 70,000 peacekeepers in the field and about 30 million armed

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servicemen worldwide, the UN had outgrown its original purpose. He proposed regionally focused UN preventive diplomacy units to seek creative solutions to solve old problems, particularly those of disaffected national minorities. There is a chance that a UN permanent standing force might overcome the topical problem of democratic states trying to maintain domestic support for distant, dangerous overseas missions.

EXPANDING DEFENSE TIES

Despite the technology, telecommunications, and trade that are reducing differences, turbulence still results from sociopolitical unrest, uncontrolled migration, nationalism, territorial disputes—the list seems endless. At the time when the nations were anxiously calculating the possible outcome of the tense situation on the Korean peninsula, Australia announced a plan to forge security links with all its close neighbors: Admiral Alan Beaumont, chief of the Australian Defence Force, suggested in September 1994 the expansion of ties with countries whose increasing power and influence was a major factor in regional uncertainty. Contacts would be gradually expanded through low-key meetings and joint training. Surprisingly, the influential Returned Service League stated that it would not oppose these "modest" levels of defense contact. Clearly, the projected joint training, training in the protection of human rights, logistic cooperation, and other projects would be limited by distance and differences among armed forces. Russia would be a participant in the projected regional security community.

RUSSIAN FAR EAST

At present, the Russian Far East, which is part of Northeast Asia, has little influence in the region. Conversion to a free-enterprise economy has not been easy, especially for the formerly important military district of Vladivostok. Russian interest is focused on arms sales to Asia. However, the ratification of a pact between Russia and China in 1995 that settled the border dispute in the Altai Mountains, together with the pledge to not aim nuclear missiles or use force against each other, will ease tensions and ethnic disputes. Such are the difficulties—not of climate alone—that only Japan has the capital necessary for the efficient development of the area's mineral and forestry resources. However, negotiations between Russia and Japan have stalled over the question of the return of four of the Kuril Islands to Japan—a step that would be impos-

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sible for Boris Yeltsin to take domestically. The Russians appear to recall the remnants of empire and do not want to lose influence in the region. They were in Cambodia, and they are showing interest in APEC. Australia expects the Russian Far East to be inchoate for some time, but it is intent on making Russia part of the regional dialogue.

JAPAN'S GROWTH AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

Japan's economic, political, and intellectual leadership have been critical in confronting North Korea's attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Strategic predictions in the area are made difficult by lingering suspicions and questions about future stability. The U.S. influence on Japan cannot be disregarded. The Korean problem has strengthened Northeast Asian interest in a continuing U.S. security presence. Notwithstanding mutual disenchantment over trade surpluses, Japan's confidence in the United States is important as changing U.S. priorities and a declining defense budget have perturbed the region. Despite the changes since its inception in 1960, the Mutual Security Treaty is still valuable. Australia pushes for the use of established international and multinational mechanisms for tackling sensitive Japan-U.S. issues. Like the United States, Australia would like to see Japan take a larger responsibility in dealing with world problems and exercising leadership commensurate with its growing power. Since the Gulf War and its participation in Cambodian peacekeeping, Japanese public opinion reflects a more fundamental, serious interest in the outside world, an interest not confined to pop music, blue jeans, and cellular phones. There was considerable media comment when a 7.62-millimeter light machine gun, mounted on an armored personnel carrier, was sent to Goma, Zaire. The accompanying 270 ground troops constituted the first military mission under independent command sent abroad since World War II. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is reported to be now less opposed to Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, though such a proposal would not involve military contributions.11 Keating had post-APEC meetings on tariff and nontariff trade barriers with Japanese government and opposition representatives. Australia recognizes that it is a middle power, but it seeks to be an effective middle power acting as a Pacific bridge between Japan and the United States to prevent the unpredictable consequences of a real gulf developing between the two countries. Keating established rapport with Miyazawa and has spoken of the cooperation between their two countries in regional and international affairs as remarkable given the different racial, social, religious, and cultural backgrounds.

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Tomiichi Murayama, who took office in late June 1994, heads a coalition of his Social Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Sakigake Reform Party. The two elections scheduled for 1996 will reveal whether old-style politics or Ichiro Ozawa's scheme for Western-style two-party government will prevail. Whatever the political outcome, the momentum of the Australia-Japan partnership, which originally did so much to stimulate Australian mineral production, is unlikely to be reversed. Relations between the two countries have never before been so close or so broad. Australia's total regional security strategy requires gradually increasing the level of involvement with others and enhancing comfortable working relations as part of the government's wider approach to national security. Superior analysis and in-depth training for officials in Northeast Asian capitals—including, eventually, Pyongyang—are a necessity. Internationalizing the economy is crucial; Australia envisions more of its people fluent in Asian languages, Australian businesspeople moving confidently in the Asia Pacific landscape, Asian Australians playing a larger role, and a national culture shaped by, and helping to influence, neighboring cultures.12 As all sides benefit from interdependence, real progress in regional security can be achieved incrementally. Australian raw materials fueled Northeast Asian economic success; now, in some of these densely peopled countries, pollution and acid rain have led to an interest in alternative fuels such as liquefied natural gas from the northwest shelf. Canberra sees a regional security advantage in compatibility and interoperability of defense equipment. Defense industries were stimulated by the indigenous production of the Anzac frigates and the Collinsclass diesel submarines. Australia is now a competitive producer of surface ships, submarines, radar, and rifles, among other items, and has established a Defence Export Programme. Japan is preeminent in investment and aid to Asia, but, at the same time, it seeks to slow a possible arms race. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces was designed to work in tandem with the United States. It is now a powerful conventional force, particularly in the maritime sphere. Defense expenditure is rising steadily by about 5 percent in real terms. The Japanese electorate is strongly pacific and looks only to the defense of the Japanese islands. Japan is very capable of exploiting new military technologies for commercial gain, and it would be capable of producing nuclear weapons rapidly should the Korean situation make this necessary. Japan has been a constructive, low-key player in the region's security and has tried to limit China's hegemonic tendencies. Future regional security will largely depend on SinoJapanese relations.

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CHINA AND AUSTRALIA

The Chinese, with a long history of immigration to Australia, see Australia as a friendly place. When Hawke, with his gift for personal relationships, sought to redefine Australia's foreign policy in Beijing, he built on the initiatives of his predecessors, Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser. Whitlam showed great foresight in visiting China as leader of the opposition, and he later recognized Beijing as "the sole legal government of China." During Fraser's premiership, Australia was the first country to sign a bilateral aid agreement with China. More recently, Canberra gained influence by trying to dissuade the United States from withholding MFN status from China. Hawke was able to serve as a diplomatic conduit for Chinese initiatives in 1983 because the Chinese saw Australia as unthreatening and independent, and the two economies as complementary. In 1984, Beijing embarked on a joint Sino-Australian venture at Mount Channar, Western Australia, to feed the expanding Chinese steel industry. This mining venture and a 10 percent investment in Victoria's Portland Aluminium smelter were China's largest overseas investments. During Australia's depression, exports to China helped keep the Broken Hill Proprietory at Whyalla going. Australia now looks forward to a close trading relationship as China's huge demand for raw materials and services increases. China imports Australian wool, exporting woolen textiles. China is the world's largest exporter of labor-intensive goods, but its sudden urbanization and industrialization has created huge pollution problems that may, without advanced technology from overseas, threaten efforts to limit global warming. Australia sees opportunities for transportation and communications technology, mining technology, navigation equipment, and oil and gas exploration. China's coal was cheap in the planned economy, but after huge losses in the state mines, subsidies have been reduced. Eventually, higher prices for coal will make electricity more dear, creating openings in coastal markets for high-quality foreign coal. Abandoning a planned commodity economy for a market economy will result in a gradual integration of China in world markets. Insensitivity, demonstrated by parking a satellite in an orbit that interfered with others, has resulted from China's hitherto limited contacts, but, pragmatically coming to terms with the world, China did not carry out its threat to withdraw from the Asian Games. Australia welcomes the integration of China in Asia Pacific as a benefit to regional trade liberalization. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have all joined APEC. China's "transitional" economy would gain from inclusion in GATT and the future WTO, but, for the moment, China appears unwilling to

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accept the conditions. China's development is helped by direct foreign investment provided by overseas Chinese, often through the facilitating Offices for Chinese Affairs where relationships help smooth the tortuous paths to permits and supplies. It is perhaps worth noting that many natives of Hong Kong gained Australian passports in anticipation of the 1997 takeover. They, and the growing number of Taiwanese immigrants to Australia, may stimulate Sino-Australian trade. Addressing the thorny question of human rights, Evans, who like many Asians believes that confrontation can impede progress that might otherwise be made, said that though Australia shared U.S. concern over human rights violations, it did not support trade retaliation. The Australian media commented on their government's "tightrope walking" at the APEC conference. Trade needed to be nurtured simultaneously with a consistent voice against abuses since the collapse of trading relationships would remove all Australian influence over Chinese attitudes to human rights.13 Regional cooperation was demonstrated by Beijing on the last day of October 1994 when Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and South Korean President Kim Young-sam pledged to improve mutual economic relations and to cooperate in persuading North Korea to reach a nuclear agreement. In the course of a five-day visit, Li met with business leaders and visited various industrial plants. The two countries agreed to develop peaceful nuclear power and to open direct airline flights. Sino-Korean trade was expected to grow from A$9 to A$12 billion in 1995.

CHINA A N D SECURITY

Asia Pacific countries are disquieted by China's rapid economic, military, and political development. Keating has suggested that suspicion of China may be a defining element of some foreign policies. China's historical claim to maritime boundaries includes the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, but the desire to expand into the Indian Ocean (where surveillance activities have increased) may lie behind the 1993 decision to build three aircraft carriers. Early in 1995, plans were announced to build an indigenous advanced jet fighter by the turn of the century. Beijing seems to wish to avoid a military confrontation that might alarm ASEAN. In April, China remained silent when a Vietnamese naval vessel intervened after a Chinese seismic research ship intruded in Vietnamese waters. In another episode that happened to coincide with the APEC meeting, China showed restraint when Taiwanese troops on Little Quemoy accidentally shelled a suburb of Xiamen. China continues to test nuclear weapons, countering Japan's mild remonstrances with allu-

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sions to Japan's role in World War II. Australia wants to expand defense links with China and Japan to increase transparency. Hugh White, the head of the Department of Defence's international policy division, announced on November 11,1994, during a committee hearing on Sino-Australian relations, that bans imposed in 1989 had been lifted in an attempt to engage China in a regional dialogue. Canberra is anxious to gain a better understanding with China. Keating and President Jiang Zemin met at APEC. China is not thought to be in any sense inevitably hostile to Australian interests or threatening to other regional countries, but its size, strategic potential, and political arrangements prompt a range of questions about the way China will integrate into regional security affairs. In early October 1994, Australia's "one China policy" prevented the sale of Collins-class submarines to Taiwan. Contacts with Taiwan have been growing steadily, but it was felt that a military sale of "such magnitude and sensitivity" (likely worth up to A$3 billion) could not be countenanced. Australia was, however, prepared to consider the sale of defense and related equipment to Taiwan.14

CHINA AND TAIWAN

The Taiwanese are advising China how to restructure economic programs, and Taiwan, whose economic strength is already considerable, is the most important investor in China after Japan. From the late 1960s, Taiwan's growth has averaged about 8.5 percent. Production is increasingly internationally oriented. Like other Northeast Asian countries, Taiwan embraced rapid structural change as an inevitable part of growth; high savings and investment, together with the work ethic, have led to high productivity. The one-time Beijing-Taipei rivalry would appear to be fading, as Chinese troops are pulled back from Fujian and Taiwanese businesspeople flock to the mainland. However, Beijing cannot afford to look soft on various issues. Will China have the subtlety to maintain peace and stability in Taiwan, whatever the result of the elections there? Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that a Taiwanese declaration of independence would result in a Chinese invasion. Chinese maneuvers on Dongshan Island, which has a similar topography to Taiwan, renewed Taiwanese concern. China's purchase of SU-27 long-range fighter aircraft was not reassuring and probably prompted the rescheduling to an earlier date of Taiwan's Han Guan number 11 exercise, reported to have cost U.S.$20-40 million. The key to the future of Taiwan and Hong Kong after 1997 will lie in the nature of society on the mainland, which will be influ-

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enced by the results of trade and the pressures of the age of information. In Northeast Asia, only the hermetic North Korea has been immune to such influences, thwarting Northeast Asia's adjustment to post-Cold War realities and opportunities.

PROBLEMS OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The tour d'horizon of trade and security issues involving Northeast Asia provides the background to developments on the Korean peninsula,15 and Asian nations, particularly Japan, are alarmed by the development of a missile, the Nodong 1, with a 600-mile range. But it is not only the nuclear controversy that has raised anxiety. As General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out, North Korea not only has a very large conventional military capacity, but it has also rapidly developed an extensive long-range artillery program. A million-man army is a considerable burden on the overcentralized economy that since 1990 has been declining at a rate of 5 percent per annum. North Korea has never renounced the idea of unifying the peninsula by force. With 1.1 million North Korean troops within 100 kilometers of the border, a southward attack by the irrational and unpredictable nation has remained a possibility. North Korea, sensitive to the risk that there would be a political upheaval if the economy sunk too low, has been eager to isolate South Korea, playing upon psychological aspects of the situation. The present South Korean government has worried about the potential results of proposed economic sanctions, and its positions have, at times, been contradictory. Before the signing of the agreement between the United States and North Korea in Geneva on October 21, 1994, South Korea was afraid that its interests would be neglected through U.S. eagerness to reach a compromise. The U.S. goal was to prevent the production of more bombs (that might be sold by North Korea) and the possible dissemination of nuclear technology. Asian nations, watching North Korea's efforts to isolate South Korea and deal bilaterally with the United States, recalled a statement that appeared in the official North Korean news agency in March 1993 that the threat to withdraw from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty had dealt an iron-hammer blow to the imperialist United States. In 1994, Russia, wanting to be seen as subscribing to international nuclear controls, expelled a North Korean diplomat and prevented the sixty Russian scientists he had recruited to work for Pyongyang from leaving. The scheme, which nearly succeeded, involved Russian missile and space experts who would have worked on Pyongyang's nuclear

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weapons program. Thus far, the major powers—China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—have created no joint framework for dealing with the peninsular situation, whether or not it involves reunification. Both Koreas have claimed to want reunion, but bitter hostility prevails. South Korea has noted the results of German unification, especially the sudden population shifts from the poorer country. South Korea will likely invest in North Korea in an effort to bridge the economic gap during the years that the agreement, a fragile one with many ambiguities, will need for implementation. South Korea, with a population of 44 million, has become a technologically advanced society whose economic growth in recent years has averaged 7.3 percent with a steadily rising per capita income. Though under constant threat, the ambiance of South Korea has changed since the 1980 Kwangju massacre. Increasing trade has brought wider international contacts, and the trend toward democracy has been spurred by widespread resentment of official repression. President Kim Young-sam has cracked down on corruption in politics. Australia, which sees South Korea as a place of increasing promise, holds a special position by virtue of being a member of the armistice commission. Moreover, Australia has been encouraged by South Korea's willingness to act in concert to further peace and prosperity in the region and to support multinational initiatives such as APEC. Canberra has been impressed by the caliber and creativity of their South Korean interlocutors and by their contributions to regional dialogue. South Korea is now Australia's third export market and fifth largest trading partner in increasingly sophisticated manufactures. Together, Australia and South Korea can unite the economically prosperous and the developing nations of the region. South Korea has not traded directly with North Korea since 1945, but indirect trade, through Hong Kong and other third-party countries, is soaring. At the conclusion of the agreement, North Korea very promptly invited South Korean conglomerates to discuss investment in Pyongyang. There is hope that the danger of a nuclear standoff might be removed by reunification, creating a resource-rich, powerful country of 70 million people. The economically dynamic South would have a source of cheap labor, and the no-longer-isolated North Koreans might fulfill Australia's hope that they will become responsible citizens. The significant development of South Korean businesspeople setting up trade offices in North Korea and transferring labor-intensive plants there must, in time, bring modern industrial goods and investment to that formerly economically and politically isolated country. Outside its borders, little is known about current conditions in North Korea or about Kim Jong-Il's intentions. After Russian aid ended, North

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Korea made attempts to arrange joint ventures, particularly with South Korean and Japanese firms. South Korea's activities in new regional markets, especially in Russia and China, will likely attract the communists. Despite the difficulty of making inroads when every step was closely controlled, Australia has given high priority to encouraging the peninsula's peaceful unification. Canberra seems to have more faith in ARF's potential than in earlier regional initiatives. President Kim Young-sam, who met with Keating at the Bogor APEC summit, arrived in Canberra on November 17,1994, for talks on strategic issues such as developments in North Korea and regional security. Australia and South Korea have a close relationship, but this was the first visit to Australia by a Korean leader since 1988. Twelve South Korean business leaders accompanied Kim Young-sam in addition to high-level officials. Trade Minister Kim Chul-su was among those visiting Canberra. His candidacy for the secretary-generalship of the World Trade Council is supported by Australia. As the end of the twentieth century approaches, Australia is closely tied to Northeast Asia, on which its economic viability depends. Its geographical position and history enable it to act as a bridge between Asia Pacific and the West. In its efforts to reduce tension and maintain regional peace, Australia seeks to reinforce the links established by trade in its politicomilitary initiatives in every dimension and, above all, to promote dialogue to solve the problems of North Korea's noncompliance and the accommodation of China's and Japan's growing strength. In the course of preparing for the twenty-first century, it is clear that Australia will place more emphasis on its relations with Asian states than it has in the past. In this changing context, Australian foreign relations will be grounded in the issues discussed in this analysis, and Australia's importance to the other countries assessed in this volume will grow. This trend suggests that greater integration will occur within the larger region and that Australia will play an integral role. NOTES

The views in this chapter are solely those of the author. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense or of any other U.S. government agency. 1. Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann, 1994), p. 230. 2. A term used in Parliament by a former prime minister, Robert Menzies, to denote the United Kingdom and the United States. 3. Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendency, report to the prime minister and minister for foreign affairs and trade (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989). 4. Gareth Evans, statement made September 3,1993.

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5. Gareth Evans, "The New Australia in Asia," Asia Society, Hong Kong, March 30,1994. 6. Defining a Pacific Community, report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p. 14. 7. Prime Minister Paul Keating, addressing the Royal United Services Institute on regional security, the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra: The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, and The Canberra Times, September 23,1994. 8. Lee Kuan-yew in an interview with Maurice Richardson, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 1994, p. 13. 9. Gareth Evans, "Australia's Regional Security Environment," Canberra, Australian National University, July 31,1991. 10. Hawke, "Reconciliation, Recovery, Reconstruction," Memoirs. 11. Mainichi Shimbun, September 6,1994. 12. Official Australian policy has encouraged an Asian Studies Department at the University of South Queensland, an Asian Research Center at Murdoch University, a Center for Asian Studies at the University of Western Australia, and a Center for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations at Griffith University. 13. The Age, editorial, November 16,1994. 14. Gareth Evans, statement made in Washington, D.C., October 7,1994. 15. For an excellent report, see Larry Niksch and Zachary Davis, CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Nuclear Controversy Defining Treaties, Agreements, and Terms (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1994).

4

Russian Security Policy in Northeast Asia Alexei D. Bogaturov

For decades, East Asia was considered by students of international politics an unstable region, for, they argued, there was no multinational security structure there to stabilize a regional environment. By contrast, Europe was strictly divided into two multinational blocs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, which, though openly hostile to each other, provided Europe with a high degree of relative stability for almost thirty years. Stability in Europe, however, was a static stability of confrontation, or "confrontation stability."1 It chained nations to the status quo yet blockaded natural tendencies for change. European nations were enjoying a lasting peace, but the price for that peace was their explicit failure to learn how to deal with an organic dynamism of the international system. The end of the bipolar confrontation revealed weak points in the confrontation stability, so that even John Lewis Gaddis and Kenneth Waltz recognized not long ago an insufficiency of old perceptions.2 Indeed, why not call the existing East Asian regional structure (that we normally labeled "shaky") a "dynamic" and "flexible" one, by contrast to the old European structure that was considered a "standard of reliability" but appears now a fragile construction vulnerable to its own internal tensions?

FLUCTUATING STABILITY

The fact that Eastern Europe is facing blood and conflict and Western powers are unable to prevent what can result in a new Balkan war sharpens the contrast with East Asia's gradual advancement to well-being in a comparatively peaceful environment. An emotional observer would say that Asia Pacific, at last, obtained a fair reward for years of violence, want, 83

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and neglect on the part of the superpowers. But a more objective commentator would coolly remind the local nations that they, unlike the Europeans, were not corrupted by benefits of a "peace provided from above," that is, a nonconflict development under the umbrella of an implied U.S.Soviet understanding to avoid risky political activities in Europe but not necessarily in Asia. Therefore, East Asian states had to take care of themselves, and in the course of several decades, they somehow acquired the skill to maintain an overall regional peace, though an average level of conflict in the Asia Pacific region was higher than that in Europe. It has been a long-standing view, as Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal postulate, that in East Asia the cause of concern is "the absence of machinery or structures, or even the foundation for them, for regional cooperation."3 Now, too, one may feel a strong temptation to agree with this opinion, for historical experience (if we can rely upon lessons of history) shows that hard-structured alliances and strictly defined legal commitments are the best means to secure stability. For a quarter of a century, scholars (in Russia as well as in the United States) were recurrently repeating warnings along this line. There are no conflicts in East Asia, however, that can be compared with today's regional wars like those in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia. Nor was there one in the previous twenty years. Merely for the sake of comparison, recall Bismarck's famous order in nineteenth-century Europe, which survived for only about fifteen years, or the stability based on the Holy Alliance, which survived for hardly more than a decade. Isn't it due to instinctive affection for European thinking that we take an unusual, "unconventional" form of machinery in East Asia for its absence? One could argue that the peace in the region was maintained not by a local machinery, but mainly by a preeminence of U.S. presence in East Asia that was, in Donald Zagoria's well-accustomed view, the principal pillar of Asian security.4 I do not wish to downgrade the role of U.S. strategic efforts, for as early as the late 1980s Soviet/Russian experts came to recognize the stabilizing role of the United States.5 However, by reference to strategic deterrence in the relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, one can at best explain a self-restraint by each of them since the 1970s but not an overall de facto (not necessarily de jure) mutual adjustment of big and smaller local states to one another. The fact that the adjustment did exist in East Asia cannot be exhaustively explained solely in terms of counter-balancing policies of "big nations," for the United States, the former Soviet Union, and, with certain reservations, even China (although for quite different reasons), beginning in the early 1970s, could not afford an excessive degree of engagement into East Asian affairs other than those directly tied to their immediate secu-

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rity concerns. In the 1980s, the strongmen of East Asia became ever less aggressive. Analysts describe this process as a gradual withdrawal of the superpowers' engagement from the region.6 Theoretically (or historically, if looking at past experience), the process would have had to result in the rise of instability; European misfortunes alone teach us that major instabilities may be linked not only with claims for domination by one or several great powers, but also with the disengagement of these powers. This, however, was not the case in East Asia. A direct strategic involvement by the United States and the Soviet Union was decreasing, while stability of the regional environment remained basically intact. The above said, one should nevertheless not underestimate the role (good and evil) of the superpowers in East Asia. Rather, it is necessary to underscore the significance of smaller nations, which, though normally seen from a superpower perspective as a "background environment," in the meantime managed to obtain a considerable political importance by learning how to use disagreements among powerful states, as well as the growing passivism, to their advantage. No matter how essential the preeminence of the United States was, or the ambitions of the ailing USSR, the two superpowers were unable to persuade the local nations to join their rivalry. Even Japan, deeply integrated into the U.S.-based strategic net especially, and China, with its own claims for regionalwide leadership by the early 1980s, have yielded the political initiative to smaller nations. In fact, these smaller nations secured for themselves a formally unrecognized right to articulate optimal parameters for a regional security environment. The United States and other greater states, of course, could influence them, but they were definitely unwilling (or unable) to retake the lead. Since the mid-1970s, the local nations shaped an original, informal machinery to prevent big conflicts and compensated destabilizing impacts from small ones without relying heavily upon formal security structures. These structures were not ignored; however, smaller nations cooperated with them selectively, pragmatically, and preferably on an ad hoc basis. In contrast with Europe, the East Asian environment produced a "fluctuating" type of stability that was effective enough in the context of a relatively young, unripe (in terms of self-organization), and unhardened structure of Asia Pacific. Its unhardened nature turned out to be an advantage. Driven largely by nationalism, post-World War II East Asia as a region could hardly be stabilized in accordance with the Europe-based static pattern of confrontation stability. Naturally, the European regional subsystem had its own "overtensions," yet such overtensions were nor-

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mally accumulated within the rigid security structures and were not released. The East Asian version of stability, however, was distinct for the way it dealt with overtensions: They were periodically "discharged" through limited conflicts. In other words, the European model focused on preventing tensions from surfacing, but the East Asian one was designed to expose contradictions in a way that would not dismantle the regional subsystem as a whole. Small, pointlike conflicts were inseparable from the immaturity of East Asian structure. Local nations first needed to tire of their own assertiveness caused by either young nationalism and radical anti-imperialism or communist revolutionarism before they could appreciate tranquility. A potential for mutual repulsion was too strong to be compatible with a static stability. The region needed permanent fluctuations alongside permanent peace. This was how the phenomenon of a "stable instability" was created. However, the stable instability seems nothing more than a different type of stability: a dynamic one. There has been no real threat of an overall regional conflict in East Asia since the early 1970s. Despite a normally high level of apprehension, there was no new war in Korea, a "slack confrontation" between Taipei and Beijing turned into an implied understanding for a nonviolation of the status quo in the Formosa Strait, and the Soviet/Russo-Japanese territorial split remains within the frames of diplomatic etiquette. Even Vietnam overcame its "winner" syndrome and found a way to a quiet accommodation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Finally, the conflict in Cambodia tended to become a spiritless and sporadic war "according to the rules" that did not threaten others abroad. Thus, Thomas Wilborn is right in summarizing: "East Asia and the Western Pacific remains a region of high economic growth and relative stability, except for the Korean peninsula."7 Two features are characteristic of the East Asian regional stability: First, it is being maintained against the background of underdeveloped formal structures; second, the so-called normative level of conflict in East Asia is higher than that in Europe, where any small clash will supposedly escalate automatically into a "big war." The higher-than-average level of conflict in Asia Pacific has its roots in the doctrine of "flexible response." Introduced under John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s, this doctrine changed the rules of the game between the United States and the USSR, with both of the powers frightened by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. One of the indirect results of the shift (whether it was implied or unintended is unimportant) was a sort of gradual "displacement," to use the Freudian term, of conflict from the global level to the regional level or, rather, from the center of an international system to peripheral areas.

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In later years, a new important factor appeared. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, the United States turned to disengagement from Asia. The USSR, obviously driven by an opposite logic, invaded Afghanistan in 1979. However, that soon (and not unnaturally) resulted in a growing reluctance by Moscow to broaden the sphere of its direct military involvement in distant peripheral regions. There was no vacuum of power in East Asia (until the disbandment of the USSR in 1991, at least), yet both superpowers lowered the level of their respective assertiveness in regional affairs. In a way, the local nations were to rely more upon themselves than upon the agreements between the superpowers. Smaller nations were too weak to prevent or blockade local point conflicts, so they learned to accommodate them. Their vision of stability had little in common with a classical status quo thinking. Again, we need to refer to Wilborn's definition of "stability." Stability in East Asia-Pacific as an objective of U.S. foreign policy should be defined not as a status-quo and no longer (except for the Korean peninsula) as a predictable security relationship with a punitive enemy, but explicitly as an environment in which leaders of the region consider their nations sufficiently secure to pursue legitimate national and international objectives without concern about external threats and without need to divert excessive resources for weapons and other military purposes.8

This new type of stability in East Asia is based upon the principle of a dynamic combination of common interest in regional peace as a condition for well-being and progress and reasonably restricted conflicts that serve to discharge the "natural" systematic tensions that accompany a normal process of ripening the regional subsystem. What we are facing in East Asia now is an early stage of building a new security mechanism that would hardly be a multinational structure in the traditional sense of the word but, rather, a flexible combination of a multisided political dialogue with bilateral military partnerships that existed before or might be established in the future.

A CORE-AND-SHELTER STRUCTURE

Russia is a relative outsider in the Asia Pacific region. Before the 1990s, Moscow was reluctant to recognize this fact, and since the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union claimed a greater role on the seas. The Russian Federation, however, takes a more self-critical and pessimistic stand. Russia is a great continental power, and its national interests, especially

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now that the country is passing through domestic upheavals, are tied primarily to the inland space of Eurasia. Moscow's major security concerns relate to immediate neighbors rather than to worldwide rivalries. The global stage of Moscow's foreign policy seems over. After the dissolution of the USSR, the nation entered a postglobal stage. A "reasonable compression" of direct security responsibility may be an approximate definition for what is thought and done by Moscow with respect to the Far East.9 Much is being said and written in Russia about its intention to gain a more active role in the Pacific. Obstacles along the way and the unwillingness of other nations to facilitate Russia's integration into the region are often referred to as well.10 However, it is hardly realistic to hope that Russia would be able to "reenter" the region peacefully until its own economic reform reaches an advanced stage.11 Over the 1995-2005 decade, any Russian government would be preoccupied primarily with the task of dealing with a peaceful (or a not-sopeaceful) challenge by China; with a foreseeable decline of the JapanU.S. security partnership; and with the physical protection of nuclear reactors in North and South Korea. Russia's interest in other East Asian states may presumably be marginal as a function of its policy to maintain stable and cooperative relations with China, the two Koreas, and Japan. Security-related commercial interest may develop. On June 9,1994, Russia signed a $500 million contract for export of eighteen of its MiG29 fighters to Malaysia. The deal was sharply criticized in the Russian media for its barter nature, with Malaysia paying 40 percent of the fighters' cost with palm-oil supplies. Responding to critics, Russian officials argued that the purpose of the deal was not to obtain hard currency but to secure 500,000 jobs for aircraft-making enterprises over the course of the next five years. According to official sources in Moscow, the Russian government is considering the possibility of similar deals with Thailand and Australia.12 However, given the fact that Russia's ability as an arms exporter is limited and the country is gradually losing its share of the world market, East Asia could hardly become a zone of Russian military-economic influence, as were Iraq and Syria in previous decades. What may interest Moscow in Southeast Asia is, rather, a search for common ground in dealing with China. Neither Russo-Chinese nor Russo-Japanese relations are a central point of regional security in Asia Pacific. Stability there depends primarily on relations between China and smaller regional nations of ASEAN and Indochina. What is happening and may happen between China and its southern neighbors is at the core of East Asian security. Russia as a marginal player can charge China from the north, but it is hardly able or

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willing to project its influence directly over the situation in Southeast Asia, as did the USSR from the 1960s onward. The China-ASEAN-Indochina core is surrounded by two shelters. The first consists of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the U.S.-South Korean axis; the second is formed by Russia, Canada, and Australia. Thus Russia's own security role in the region is more limited than it ever was before. During Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership (1986-1991), Soviet policy in the Pacific was framed by the concept of "compensating abilities," which implied that reductions in military presence were deemed acceptable if balanced by an adequate increase in the Soviet economic and/or political posture so that an overall equilibrium for Moscow in the region remained intact. Currently, Russia's objectives are more moderate. Boris Yeltsin, with limited resources at hand and his very presidency challenged (by political rivals and his own reportedly poor health), finds himself in a position in which the proper course would be to avoid unrealistic targets. Three basic realities shape the Russian administration's approach to the region: domestic political and economic survival, reduced defense potential, and the search for new partnerships. Moscow's approach to the Pacific is based on a reasonable compression of Russian responsibilities and a slow retreat from the region. Russia's foreign policy is concerned with managing the military withdrawal from East Asia, in distinct contrast to the compensating abilities doctrine of the USSR that aimed to prevent this retreat. Realities and events in Russia, as well as in the region, will force Yeltsin to focus more attention on the Russian Far East and East Asia than was traditionally the case. There are a host of concerns in the East that will present formidable challenges: possible economic isolation; the decline of a Russian physical, demographic presence in the Russo-Chinese frontier; and finally, the all-but-lost influence over North Korean policy and Pyongyang's nuclear program. Broadly defined, Moscow faces four immediate regional challenges: (1) nuclear pollution in the event of destruction of North Korean nuclear facilities should there be a conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula; (2) nuclear proliferation and uncertainties in future security relations between China and Kazakhstan; (3) national secessionism and irredentism in Russia (pro-Mongolian tendencies in the Buryat-inhabited regions of Baikal) and China (Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia); and (4) economic underdevelopment and the discouraging demographic situation in the Russian Far East through a steady "economic penetration" by the Chinese (that is, a gradually growing number of Chinese entrepreneurs, traders, smugglers, and ordinary people seeking chances to settle in Russia).

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THE U.S.-CENTERED FRAMEWORK

Having been a principal adversary of the United States for many decades, Moscow very recently joined a regional competition for U.S. attention in East Asia. Russia is seeking a "positive engagement" into the U.S.-cored security structure at a time when the United States seems to have stopped accounting for Russia's influence in this part of the world. However, there is not a single piece of U.S. scholarship now, when addressing the regional situation, that omits Russia-related analysis.13 Ironically, the unlikelihood of a nuclear attack by the United States has not lessened Russia's concern for national security. Soviet political thinking did not seriously consider regional threats. By contrast, Russian mentality is keenly aware of the challenges and ambiguities surrounding the country's frontiers with Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea, and Japan. A strong sense of uncertainty pushes Russia to a search for reliable partners. Moscow faces a dilemma, either to act as a typical great power (i.e., to preserve maximum independence in the security realm) or to reconcile itself to a role of a junior de facto U.S. partner. The former is scarcely possible, while the latter implies an associate membership in the U.S.-centered regional security system, an option for which neither Moscow nor Washington is prepared. Moscow's experts do not seriously consider prospects for an abrupt and drastic reduction of the U.S. presence in the region. U.S. withdrawal is selective by nature and moderate by scale; it is a slow and well-directed process. Laurence Martin, a British analyst, quite accurately defined the future of the U.S. strategic role in East Asia as a "selective engagement."14 Russian observers, rather, refer to recurrent attempts by the Clinton administration to reestablish its regional leadership by means of political initiatives, if not economic guidance or omnipresent military activities. What causes doubts in Moscow is the lack of understanding of what the United States thinks of the future of Russo-U.S. relations in the Pacific. The long (1991-1995) silence from Washington on this matter may imply that the United States is driven by self-supporting interests and a desire to use Russia's decline as some sort of opportunity.15 In the fall of 1992, President Yeltsin announced new reductions in the Pacific fleet, withdrawals of tactical weapons from all battleships and submarines, and a decrease (by 50 percent) in the number of new submarines to be deployed in the Pacific. He coupled that with a declaration that Russia, within two to three years, would stop building new submarines designed "for military use." Meanwhile, the new Russian defense establishment does not appear to be enthusiastic about the reductions, largely, however, for the social repercussions they might cause.

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The United States seems to prefer dealing with Russia as a nonhostile state, but not an allied one. However, as far as one can judge, the reasonable limits of arms reduction in the Russian Far East have been reached. For some time, the present parameters of Russia's security buildup to the east of Lake Baikal will be frozen. But the idea of modernization of the Russian Armed Forces in the Far East is already under discussion. The military, many civil politicians, and local authorities are seriously concerned with a deterioration of Russia's power capabilities in the East. Given the rise of China, further setbacks in the field of arms reductions seem less probable than they did around 1992. Moreover, a new, more active line of dealing with the security environment in the northwestern Pacific is being elaborated in Moscow. And it does matter if the process of its articulation would be influenced by the prospect of real strategic cooperation with the United States and obtaining a positive security role in the Pacific, or if it would be designed according to the logic of multisided defense.

THE CHINA QUESTION

Although Russia's hopes for a positive engagement into the U.S.-cored system remain unrealistic, a part of the Russian political spectrum favors a new reconsideration of Russo-Chinese relations. Skepticism about China in the perestroika years was replaced by a sort of pro-China trend by 1993. Advocates of the pro-China line comprise the military and military-related circles, which benefit from arms deals with China, foreign trade structures and companies, and finally, moderately nationalistic, professional China intellectuals.16 To a large degree, they understand the fundamental nature of the Chinese problem and the implications of a Chinese challenge, but China is viewed mainly as leverage against the "selfish West" that "aims to subordinate Russia ultimately." Some Russian experts, such as Alexei Voskresenski, argue that although China should be watched with care, it is the only Pacific power that is really interested in Russia economically and willing to broaden cooperation immediately without any preliminary conditions.17 The economic factor overshadows security concerns that may and should cause China to do so. Skeptical views of this are relatively rare in the Russian media.18 There are 500 Russo-Chinese joint enterprises in Russia with combined capital investments of $82 million. The trade between the two countries has reached $7.7 billion. According to third-party assessments, Russian arms sales to China since 1992 have exceeded $1 bil-

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lion. Russia's exports to China advanced the latter's technology in aircraft building, power engineering, and metalworking; and Russia is a party in the Chinese program to build a new "Super-7" jet fighter in 1996. In November 1993, Russia's minister of defense, General Pavel Grachev, came to Beijing to sign a five-year agreement on military cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) that provided a general framework for Russo-Chinese personnel and information exchanges, consultation, and mutual notification on military activities in borderline regions of Russia and China. In the fall of 1992, President Yeltsin visited China, and a new Russo-Chinese summit took place in Moscow in 1994. Despite these advancements, China causes Russia apprehension. The borderline demarcation between Russia and China is not fully completed. Territorial settlement is based on the Soviet-Chinese borderline agreement of May 1991. It settled most of the problems, but three parts of the frontier remain disputed. They include two islands on the Amur River, one island on the Argun, and a 55-kilometer-long strip of the borderline to the west of Mongolia. China engaged in long negotiations on border issues with a joint delegation of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. In spring 1994, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement by which the frontier between the two countries was demarcated and many of the disputes settled. However, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan failed to attain similar goals. Especially difficult is the case of Tajikistan, for the ongoing war in the region and complicated geographic relief of the claimed areas in the Pamir Mountains make an agreement more difficult to achieve.19 A troubling matter for Russia is the strong demographic pressure China exercises in the Far East. The Russian population to the east of Lake Baikal amounts to about 30 million people. Given the vast areas in which these 30 million are dispersed, one should imagine semiempty territories on the Russian side of the frontier and overpopulated China on the other side of it. This creates a negative psychological context for Russian ground forces reductions in the East. The local population, according to newspapers, protests energetically against steps aimed at withdrawing troops or pulling them back from the frontier.20 Moreover, there is a high rate of Chinese legal and illegal ethnic penetration into Russia. According to the media, the number of Chinese actually living in Russia has reached 2 million. In fact, they may be considered a new ethnic minority there.21 According to the publication Izvestiya, in certain parts of the Maritime Province the number of Chinese nationals is so high that there is approximately one Chinese per each ethnic Russian.22 Local authorities complain that the illegal immigration by the Chinese causes crime and is tied to drug transferring,

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smuggling, and interethnic conflicts. Several clashes were reported between the local police and illegal immigrants. A report by the Trilateral Commission published in 1994 stated: "Emigration from China has also caused regional and international concerns, especially the illegal smuggling of Chinese migrants into other countries."23 In a slightly different form, Russia envisages the same problem with China along 4,350 kilometers of Russo-Chinese frontier. Chinese Muslims could be another source of instability. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states seem unlikely to play a nationalist card against China, particularly considering President Nursultan Nazarbayev's own domestic problems with nationalists and the multiethnic composition of Kazakhstan society. The danger, however, may emanate from China if the Kazakh and other non-Chinese minorities (Uigur, Kirghiz) in Xinjiang province prove to be less reasonable and selfrestrained than their kinspeople outside China. The problem for Russia would hinge on how to avoid involvement in a possible China-Kazakhstan dispute. Instability in Kazakhstan would almost automatically hurt Moscow's stake regarding the Russian nuclear presence on Kazakhstan's territory. Kazakhstan formally became Russia's ally in 1992 with the signing of the Russo-Kazakhstan Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. Kazakhstan is Russia's principal ally in Asia, much in the way that Japan is for the United States. Moscow confirmed its responsibility for Kazakhstan's national security by providing it with a nuclear umbrella, to a great extent the same pattern found in U.S.-Japan relations. Stable relations between Kazakhstan and China are crucial to denuclearize the former. Meanwhile, newspeople report that there are illegal anti-Chinese nationalistic (Uigur) organizations active in Kazakhstan and especially in Kyrgyzstan under a slogan of creation for an "independent state of Uiguristan."24 The issue of Taiwan may also be a point of Russo-Chinese disagreement. Russia favors unofficial economic relations with Taiwan, whose prosperity off the mainland remains an integral component of the regional design. Although there are no indications at present that the Russian Federation is considering diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, one should expect broadening economic cooperation. Beijing is acutely sensitive to everything that could possibly imply relations between its arch rival and the world at large. Although one may understand this sensitivity, it is less reasonable to threaten Taipei with the chimera of employing force. The reunification of China and Taiwan is scarcely likely to occur along the Korean or German patterns; the Vietnamese model also appears to be an unlikely alternative. Now that the PRC enjoys interna-

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tional recognition as a great power, it could declare nonuse of force as the principal approach to reunification in order to remove regional suspicions as to its policy. Finally, China continues nuclear tests that indicate willingness to push ahead its nuclear program. On the subject of China as a whole, Beijing's regional ambitions and increased defense spending remain relatively stable. China's activism is directed toward the South China Sea, which does not give Russia sufficient grounds to consider China an immediate threat to its national security. China's military role in the future remains difficult to assess accurately. One must take into account such factors as Japan's future military potential, the degree of confidence shown by the two Korean states, Sino-U.S. relations, U.S. policy toward Russia, and finally, reconciliation between China and Taiwan. However, as John Garver states, "weakness of China's economic instruments and the virtual nonexistence of its ideological appeal could combine with a determination to play a major role to lead Beijing to rely on military instruments."25 In the long run, Moscow will have to solve the fundamental problem of how to deal with China. Whatever pattern of action in international politics Beijing may choose, Russia may claim to enter the coming century in the Pacific at the price of "re-engagement" with Beijing (due to lack of alternatives), or it may rely upon its own ability to check China's so-far-peaceful but challenging activism in the Far East.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The "change of guards" in Pyongyang in the summer of 1994 may be the most important event in the forty-year-long Korean adjustment. A detailed analysis of North Korean developments is complicated by lack of information and the closed nature of the regime. The degree of secrecy over events in Pyongyang is probably even greater during this transition period with its accompanying personnel replacement in the highest echelon of the party-state elite. A new balance of personal relationships within the leadership in North Korea, as in any totalitarian state of a communist type, would have a decisive impact on the foreign policy of the new regime. The North Korean case might be analyzed in terms of political struggle for power; however, it may be useful to view it as a clash between generations and personalities, rather than a conflict between views and platforms. It remains unclear to what extent the North Korean elite is intellectually sophisticated and prone to comprehending international events in adequate notions. There is no doubt a stratum of educated and betterinformed cadres of state bureaucracy, party apparatus, and intellectuals

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that may be ready to accept and master ideas of openness and liberalization. However, they can hardly be strong or advanced in their social position. A hard fact is that Kim Il-sung was the last Stalinist dictator in Asia, but this also implies that the current North Korean leader represents only the first post-Stalinist generation. The struggle may still be aimed against the old guard of Kim Il-sung's mates. For several years at least, the changes in Pyongyang may be more "defensively backward-looking" than aimed at cautious renovations. Leaders akin to Gorbachev can hardly come from the first posttotalitarian generation. In this sense, the situation in North Korea might be compared (if it should be compared with any foreign country at all) not with perestroika but, rather, with the eve of the Khrushchev "thaw" in the Soviet Union. Kim Il-sung's regime was a repressive dictatorship, but even that regime was not immune to internal expectations for reconciliation, if not for change. In fact, a "revisionist" opposition did exist within North Korea, even though it consisted of party officials. It can hardly represent democrats or liberals in the conventional sense of these words, but one can admit it consisted at least of younger people who wished to give their own answers to old questions. These people need encouraging, positive signals from outside North Korea. This does not imply claiming a right to advise the North on its domestic politics. Such attempts would be definitely counterproductive. Conversely, North Korea should be "tempted" by an invitation to rejoin the world, even on its own terms; for any expanding North Korean external contacts with democratic nations would be better for the West than is the current isolation that deprives the United States and Russia largely of tools to influence Pyongyang directly (i.e., through personal contacts). A new start to Moscow's policy in Korea was given by Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze in the perestroika years. It was a principal shift from a one-sided orientation toward communists in the North to a diplomatic recognition of the South. Unusually successful, it was targeted at the establishment of a new structure of interlinked cross relations between the Soviet Union and both Korean states that would serve to bring them close to each other and facilitate integration of the communist regime into the world community. North Korea was skeptical and suspicious of Gorbachev's revisionism, but Soviet-North Korean relations were preserved at a sufficient level to press Pyongyang when necessary. By contrast, the Russian Federation's policy in East Asia (directed in 1991-1993 by the radical democratic deputy minister of foreign affairs, Georgy Kunadze) was primitively aimed to surpass everything that was started and done by the Soviet Union, disregarding remote implications.

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Thus, the Soviet concept of "balanced relations" with the North and the South was rejected, and the post-Soviet Moscow chose a one-sided orientation toward Seoul. Russo-South Korean relations benefited much from the new turnover; however, that was followed by a rapid deterioration of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. A fragile balance was broken, and Russia's role in Korean affairs was reduced. A new relationship with South Korea was embodied in the RussoKorean Treaty on Principles of Relations, the most important statement of Moscow's regional diplomacy since the 1950 Soviet-Sino Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The treaty, signed in November 1992, acted as an effective political balance to the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961 (which is a subject for renegotiation and alteration as stipulated by its provisions beginning in 1995). At the same time, Moscow need not cause any further unnecessary and potentially dangerous estrangement from Pyongyang. Above all, Seoul seeks Russia's positive influence over the North for the reunification cause. Economic cooperation and trade between Russia and South Korea are essential, but they are of secondary importance compared to the strategic implications of Russia's loss of influence over the North. In terms of conventional forces, the North seems to remain superior to the South.26 The USSR, together with China, was a major source of military aid to North Korea. Defense assistance was actually the most powerful card Moscow held to pressure the North Korean regime. But how can Russia influence Pyongyang to, say, persuade it to reestimate North Korean refusal to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guarantees now that Russo-North Korean relations have been spoiled by Moscow's actions? Yeltsin's diplomacy on this particular issue formally corresponds with the reasonable compression concept by which Russia continues to reduce its fields of direct international responsibility. Yet at the same time, Russia is shouldering its share of responsibility for China, the United States, and South Korea. North Korea has already been shoved into a corner, at least that is how it feels. The communist regime needs a guarantee of its survival as a political entity at least until the inter-Korea dialogue succeeds and an acceptable draft for reunification is reached. The South has security guarantees from the United States, friendly relations with Russia, a stable relationship with Japan, and improving ties with China. By contrast, the North has commitments from China, a morally devalued pledge to be defended from the nonexistent Soviet Union, and tense relations with Washington and Tokyo, not to mention the risk of eventual hostilities between Pyongyang and Seoul. North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 was inadequate, but it was later suspended.

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Before that, North Korea demonstrated a good degree of prudence. The fall of 1991 was marked by important inter-Korean agreements. In January 1992, six years after joining the NPT, Pyongyang signed a safeguard agreement with the IAEA. Having ratified the agreement, the North accepted six international inspections. One can argue that North Korea's prudence was directed by powerful external pressures, which is true, but it is not the whole truth. Internal pressures alone, though necessary, cannot guarantee positive results. The Team Spirit affair and the turmoil surrounding the North's withdrawal from the NPT illustrated how counterproductive sanctions can be if unaccompanied by mitigating efforts. Reasoned firmness should be accompanied by a determination to explore all possible means of reasonable accommodation. International pressure should be combined with flexibility. The United States might consider the possibility of accepting the "no-first-use" position in conjunction with similar pledges by the other powers. Personnel changes in North Korea may be a favorable precondition for reconciliation between the United States and North Korea. The new leaders in Pyongyang are interested in extricating their country from its present state of isolation, if for no other reason than political prestige at home. No matter how strongly the younger Kim may be affected by the cult of his father, formally, he will have to establish his own identity in the eyes of party members and the general populace. He can hardly choose to move from bad to worse. The idea of providing the North with light-water reactors to replace existing and planned graphite reactors that yield high levels of weaponsgrade plutonium seems potentially promising and acceptable to the North in principle (as North Korean diplomats signaled several times in the summer of 1994 in their informal discussions with Russian academics in Moscow). The issue of military installation inspections is extraordinarily complicated, but the new regime has confirmed its willingness to discuss it.27 By continuing the dialogue, the North attempts to get out of the corner, which serves the interests of all related parties. As for Russia, now that the treaty with South Korea has been signed, it is time to reconsider its policy toward the North. Naturally, North Korea feels insecure and needs certain, at least symbolic, signs of international recognition for its right to survive in its communist form. In fact, Pyongyang seeks certain political guarantees of its security. There is no reason to provide military assistance to Pyongyang in case of war. The North has to learn how to decrease the danger of war by political means. At the same time, stability would benefit Pyongyang if the regime felt less defensive. In this sense, a new political and economic treaty between Russia and the North could be useful. A new Russo-North Korean treaty would act to reestablish a legal and political infrastructure for bet-

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ter relations between Moscow and Pyongyang and to restore Russia's influence in Pyongyang. It seems equally reasonable for the United States to consider declaring its unwillingness to use force against Pyongyang in order to get North Korea to accept nonnuclear status. VIS-A-VIS JAPAN

Despite the never-ending speculations about Japan in the Russian press, Tokyo does not enjoy a high-ranking place in Moscow's priorities. This situation is becoming increasingly intolerable in light of Japan's influence in world politics and its enormous economic might. Under the Soviet rule, students of international politics point out that Soviet-Japanese relations were merely a function of Soviet-U.S. relations. However, today, Russo-U.S. relations seem better and warmer than those between Moscow and Tokyo. The end of the old-style global confrontation has altered and challenged the international environment of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Under international pressures, Japan is slowly moving toward a new concept of its participation in world politics. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces now can be sent abroad to support UN missions, and Japan is consistently claiming a permanent place in the Security Council. A new view of Japan has in turn appeared in the international community. One of the first in the Moscow academic community to note this was Japanologist Ivan Tselischev, who wrote: "Objectively, the present [Japanese] Constitution has become an obstacle on the way of one of the biggest democratic states of the world to participation in a maintenance of international peace"—a remarkable statement by a Russian scholar.28 However, Tselischev made public what many other people in Russia think: Indeed, a new international environment may encourage Japan to reconsider its peaceful Constitution that has deprived the nation of the ability to use force as a means to settle disputes. A similar, though less straightforward, observation was made by British scholar Richard Cooper, who delicately noted that in the event that China develops in an "unpromising fashion," Japan may have to turn to "defensive modernization."29 It is difficult to say whether Tokyo would be apt to reconsider its partnership with the United States, but it is clear that Japan is less satisfied with the partnership than has been the case since 1951. The economic frictions that accumulated over several decades, together with the "devalued" perception of the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, have created a new negativism in the United States toward Japan. It has become difficult to explain to Con-

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gress and the media the importance of the U.S.-Japan "special" relationship in the absence of a Russian threat. It is even more difficult to persuade the U.S. public that the "unilateral gains" Japan presumably extracts from economic relations with the United States are not what they are thought to be but, in fact, serve U.S. interests. A deterioration of the U.S.-Japan alliance is not in the interests of Russia, since a stable relationship in the strategic realm meets Russia's national interests. A militarily independent Japan would not contribute to regional security, regardless of whether it decides to go nuclear. Russia, therefore, prefers to see Tokyo well integrated into the U.S.-based security system, since improved Russo-U.S. relations indirectly stabilize the troubled ones between Tokyo and Moscow. The territorial problem is the splinter in Russo-Japanese relations. Broad public discussions on the matter led to the involvement of a large number of previously indifferent people who were largely ignorant of the substance of the dispute but more than willing to say their patriotic word. The negative dynamics here are obvious. Liberals are keeping silent while some of the former pragmatists are trying to launch an attack on the government and the president for their position that is described as lacking patriotism. The attack is aimed at the principle of "justice and law" as a foundation for settlement. Vyacheslab Zilanov, professor of law, for example, was never considered hawkish before, yet now he is an avant-garde of such writings.30 No one in Russia seriously envisages an attack on the disputed Kuril Islands by Japanese militarists. The Russian public, however, does interpret Japan's firm stand on the territorial issue to be symbolic of the humiliated position Russia finds itself in after independence. What are the implications for the future? A breakthrough in settling the territorial issue is improbable. At the same time, with the exception of orthodox communists and extreme nationalists, most Russians do not disagree in principle with the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 that stipulated a gradual territorial settlement and the conclusion of a Russian-Japanese peace treaty. But Russian policymakers understand that "there can be no and there should be no illusions. A serious development of Russo-Japanese relations autonomously from a settlement of the territorial issue is impossible."31 This does not mean, however, that a settlement may be authentic and viable if it lacks mutual concessions. What might be expected on the side of Japan (and the United States) seems to be related to Russia's strategic concerns. As Francis Fukuyama notes, "the so-called 'northern territories'... were of symbolic but little military value until the development of the nuclear-fueled ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) made access to patrol areas in the Sea of Okhotsk strategically significant."32

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This is why a stronger assent on a subregional security accord on the Sea of Japan and areas approximate to the disputed islands is to be expected. As another Russian expert, V. Makeyev, wrote: There is no sense in transferring the islands to Japan even if their strategic importance would be taken to be a limited one. This should be done only as an integral element of a radical restructuring of strategic relations in the region so that the United States and Japan would no longer be perceived as Russia's hypothetical adversaries in Asia.33

Beginning in 1994, the Japanese official attitude on the territorial issue seemed to become slightly more flexible, and the tensions caused by mutual disappointment were relaxed. That shift was directed, in part at least, by a moderating influence over Tokyo by the United States and West European nations. Japan, as General Toshiyuki Shikata stated frankly, was concerned about the "possibility that an even more serious gap might grow between Japan and the industrialized countries that want to promote economic assistance to Russia."34 Any Russian government that might be seriously aiming to settle the problem would need a persuasive justification for any concession offered to Japan (or what will be perceived as such by the Russian public). A Russo-U.S.-Japanese accord on subregional security affairs would help considerably. Although it is unlikely that direct U.S. involvement in the Russo-Japanese discourse will prove to be an attractive option for Washington, U.S. participation is an inseparable, if not a decisive, element of Russo-Japanese negotiations on bilateral security affairs. As Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond point out, "much like U.S.-Russian relations, there is a need to nest U.S.-Japanese rule making on security matters within a larger multilateral regime that incorporates Europe, Russia, China and other related regional powers."35

CONCLUSION

East Asia in the post-Cold War era is not conflict-ridden, despite the absence of a formalized regional security mechanism. U.S. military presence in the region has played a central role in the peace and stability. A new security mechanism is emerging in East Asia that is characterized by a multilateral political dialogue and bilateral military ties. The Russian Federation has sought to establish itself as an equal partner of the United States in the East Asian security framework. Russia, however, remains outside the U.S.-centered security framework because Washington is reluctant to grant Moscow the status of an equal partnership.

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Russia's pro-Western policy was placed under increasing attack by various segments of Russian society, and by 1993, Russia shifted to a proChina stance. Russia cultivates cooperative and friendly relations with China and tries to use its ties with China as leverage against the West. After Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, North Korea has been in the midst of leadership succession, and its future is uncertain. Russia's estranged relationship with North Korea is not conducive to peace and stability in East Asia. It is desirable that Russia move in the direction of concluding a new economic and political treaty with North Korea, for closer ties between the two will not only enhance Russia's influence in the Korean peninsula, but also contribute to peace and security in East Asia. The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan is likely to remain the major obstacle to their improved relationship. The territorial issues should be settled in the framework of a new security arrangement by Russia, the United States, and Japan that would provide a security guarantee to Russia in the western Pacific. Economic revitalization and the search for a positive strategic role in the region are the cornerstones of Russian policy in the Pacific. Russia has retreated, but it is still a Pacific nation that continues to search for optimal cooperation within the context of the U.S.-based regional interests. How long this line can survive and how successful it may be in the future remain to be seen. NOTES

1. The term "confrontation stability" was originally coined by a Russian scholar, Constantine Pleshakov, in 1991. For discussion of the antonymic concept of "dynamic stability," see Alexei Bogaturov and Constantine Pleshakov, "Dynamics of International Stability," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 3 (1991). A British scholar, Richard Crockatt, independently of the above-mentioned article, came rather close to defining dynamic stability as an antithesis of "static stability," or a "long peace," as it is labeled by many scholars after John Lewis Gaddis. See "Theories of Stability and the End of the Cold War," in M. Bowker and R. Brown, eds., From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 59-81. 2. See John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 5-58; and Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 44-79. 3. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asia Security," Survival, vol. 36, no. 2 (summer 1994): 14. 4. Donald Zagoria, "The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 45.

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5. For more, see Alexei Bogaturov, "Russia in East Asia: Setting a New Agenda," Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2 (summer 1993): 298-316; Alexei Bogaturov and M. Nosov, "A Lop-Sided Triangle," New Times, no. 19 (1989). 6. Buzan and Segal, "Rethinking East Asia," p. 8. 7. Thomas Wilborn, "Asia-Pacific: Regional Assessment," in S. K. Metz and E. H. Tilford Jr., eds., World View: The 1994 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, Strategic Studies Institute Special Report (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 15,1994), p. 11. 8. Thomas Wilborn. Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 23,1993), p. 6. 9. For more on the idea of a "reasonable compression," see Alexei Bogaturov, ed., Post-Global Stage: Liberal Nationalism in Russian Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (Moscow: Russian Science Foundation, 1994). The idea of "selected involvement" by Russia outside its new frontiers is also discussed in Sergei Karaganov, Vladimir Tretyakov, et al., "Strategy for Russia," report by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 27,1994. 10. See Valéry Denisov, "Excommunication from Integration," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 26, 1994, a publication remarkable for its unusually "Soviet-fashioned" presentation. 11. Some Western experts, however, argue that Russia may be on the eve of success. See, for example, Anders Aslund, "Russia's Success Story," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 5 (September-October 1994): 58-71. 12. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 7,1994. 13. See, for example, Ambassador Tommy Koh, "America's Role in Asia: Asian View," CAPA Report (Asia Foundation's Center for Asian Pacific Studies), no. 13, November 1993; Casimir Yost, "America's Role in Asia: One Year Later," CAPA Report, no. 15, February 1994. 14. Laurence Martin, "The Changing Role of the USA in Global Order," in Seizaburo Sato and Trevor Taylor, eds., Prospects for Global Order: Security Challanges for Japan and Europe in the Post-Cold War World (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), p. 90. 15. See Karen Brutents, "A New Pacific Doctrine by Clinton?" Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya {MEMO), no. 2 (1994): 91-102. Brutents is close to the circle of Gorbachev's intellectual colleagues. 16. It may be worth noting that a "liberal-nationalistic" version of Russia's priorities in world politics marks the United States and West European nations as principal partners of an "overall" significance, while China is considered "number one" in dealing with East Asia. See the above-cited report, "Strategy for Russia," by Karaganov, Tretyakov, et al. Ambassador Vladimir Lukin, a former academic expert on the Pacific and currently chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Russian State Duma, was one of the principal contributors to that analysis. 17. Alexei Voskresenski, "A Zone of Cooperation or Potential Conflict?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 3,1994. 18. For a rare skeptical overview, see Valéry Chabanov's article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 5,1994. 19. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 29,1993, and June 3,1994. 20. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 5,1994. 21. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 3,1994.

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22. Izvestiya, April 27,1994. 23. Y. Funabashi, M. Oksenberg, and Y. Weiss, An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence: A Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York, Paris, and Tokyo: The Trilateral Commission, May 1994), p. 59. 24. Igor Rotar, "Ethnic Bomb in the North-West of China," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 3,1994. 25. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1993), pp. 329-330. 26. Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Military Capabilities of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study," Asian Perspective, vol. 14, no. 1 (spring-summer 1990). 27. New York Times, September 30,1994, p. A3. 28. Ivan Tselischev, "Japan as a Political Partner: An Attempt of Comprehending an Image, Part 1," MEMO, no. 5 (1994): 92. 29. Richard Cooper, "Is There a New World Order?" in Sato and Taylor, eds., Prospects for Global Order, p. 19. 30. Vyacheslab Zilanov, "The Four-Stage Plan for Transference of the Kuril Islands Has Begun," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 28,1994. 31. Ivan Tselischev, "Japan as a Political Partner: An Attempt of Comprehending an Image, Part 2," MEMO, no. 6 (1994): 75. 32. Francis Fukuyama "The Ambiguity of 'National Interest,'" in S. Sestanovich, ed., Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 16. 33. MEMO, no. 6 (1994): 58. 34. Toshiyuki Shikata, "A Future Security System in East Asia" in Sato and Taylor, eds., Prospects for Global Order, p. 57. 35. Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace: Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 205-206.

5

Russia's Policy Toward the Two Koreas Seung-Ho Joo

After the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation became its legal successor in Northeast Asia, due to geographic proximity and historical ties. Russia inherited not only the bulk of the Soviet Union's assets, including 75 percent of the territory and 60 percent of the population, but also all of its problems (domestic and external) that undermined the old unidimensional superpower. Despite its formidable military power, Russia no longer enjoys status as a global superpower; it is now relegated to being a regional power. The chaos and confusion in Soviet foreign policy that characterized the later Gorbachev years continued in Yeltsin's Russia. Initially, Russia's foreign policy was adrift, sorely lacking a clear sense of direction and goals. Indeed, Russia's foreign policy is still influx.Yeltsin faces too many uncertainties about the locus of Russian political power, the speed and direction of economic reform, the nature of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the borders and statehood of Russia. Russia's policy toward the two Koreas is slowly taking shape. This chapter discusses Russia's foreign policy toward the two Koreas in light of new Russian foreign policy. Specifically, the following questions are examined: What is the legacy of the Soviet era as it affects Yeltsin's Korea policy? What are the main features of Russia's new foreign policy as distinct from Gorbachev's "new political thinking"? What role does the Russian Federation pursue in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era? And how has Russian policy toward the two Koreas changed, and what are the major issues involved in these changes? THE LEGACY OF THE SOVIET ERA

The Cold War atmosphere and the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict in Northeast Asia during the pre-Gorbachev era largely directed the gen105

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eral trends and goals in Soviet foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula. Soviet foreign policy during this period was influenced greatly by its ideological affinity with and the geostrategic importance of Pyongyang. Since the North Korean regime had been established under the Soviet Union's auspices in 1948, the Soviets had been keenly interested in its survival and had sustained the fraternal party-to-party links between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and North Korea's Korean Workers' Party. North Korea was considered a revolutionary trophy that had to be defended in the name of world revolution. Furthermore, the Soviets had long considered the survival and prosperity of communist North Korea to be crucial in turning the Soviet-U.S. strategic equation to their favor in the worldwide Cold War confrontation with the United States. The development of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the late 1950s further enhanced North Korea's strategic importance. Moscow had long supported North Korea's "one Korea" policy and refused to recognize Seoul as a legitimate political entity. In line with North Korea's official policy, the Soviet government had opposed South Korea's "cross recognition" formula and supported North Korea's position that cross recognition would perpetuate the present division of the Korean peninsula. Although Moscow began limited economic, cultural, and sports contacts with Seoul in the early 1970s, it had strictly limited its relations with Seoul to the nonpolitical, nonofficial level, insisting on separating politics from economics. Gorbachev's foreign policy direction and behavior vis-à-vis the two Koreas moved from a pro-North Korean policy, which called for a sustained alliance relationship with Pyongyang and a limited nonofficial relationship with Seoul, to a new policy that demanded the establishment of official relations with Seoul to promote the Soviet Union's national interests. Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula departed greatly from past policy.1 This shift reflected changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals and priorities, which in turn were affected by Gorbachev's new political thinking. New political thinking called for a new relationship with the United States and other capitalist countries, including South Korea. The ultimate goal of new political thinking was a peaceful and predictable international environment for the Soviet Union's domestic reform. Gorbachev's new policy toward the Korean peninsula unraveled in the broad context of the new political thinking. Gorbachev's new foreign policy served as the catalyst for international and regional systemic changes. The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, and the improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations eventually led to a new structure and process in the East Asian regional system.

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Sino-Soviet normalization had especially significant implications for Soviet relations with North and South Korea. In the wake of the normalization, North Korea's strategic value to Moscow became marginalized. At the same time, Seoul, with its economic prowess and vitality, became increasingly valuable to Gorbachev's reform efforts at home. Between the summer of 1988 and the summer of 1990, a new foreign policy began to be implemented that was in line with the new political thinking. Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated steadily during this period. The Kremlin tried to avoid completely alienating Pyongyang by continuing its consultations with North Korean leaders in regard to policies toward Seoul and by maintaining its leverage over the recalcitrant regime through military and economic assistance. After Seoul-Moscow normalization, the new policy toward Seoul continued. Moscow's ties with Seoul improved rapidly, while Moscow's relationship with Pyongyang became increasingly tenuous. Gorbachev's immediate goal was to facilitate South Korea's economic assistance, thereby alleviating the Soviet Union's domestic crisis. Nevertheless, the political uncertainty and economic chaos in the Soviet Union slowed Seoul-Moscow economic cooperation and trade. But the domestic crisis that loomed large by late 1990 increasingly narrowed the president's latitude of policy choice. The potentially formidable powers of the president as stipulated in the new Soviet Constitution became increasingly unusable; consequently, Gorbachev's new foreign policy was set adrift. Soviet foreign policy became increasingly de-ideologized, leaving the Kremlin without specific guidelines for foreign policy. During this period, the new political thinking increasingly became obsolete as a guide to Soviet foreign policy as improvised pragmatism took over. Soviet foreign policy behavior was no longer constrained and regulated by the new thinking, but was overwhelmed by the rapid political developments at home and abroad. Thus, Soviet foreign policy became increasingly reactive. Despite internal turmoil and confusion, the Soviet Union continued to build a friendly and cooperative relationship with Seoul on the basis of common interests. Simultaneously, Soviet-North Korean relations became increasingly tenuous as the ideological and military ties that had once bonded the two neighbors together vanished. In late 1990 to 1991, Soviet Korean policy was characterized by an undisguised tilt toward Seoul, often at the expense of Pyongyang. Moscow's alliance relationship with Pyongyang became anachronistic under the changed circumstances. The complete severance of party-to-party ties between Moscow and Pyongyang during this period, which stemmed from the CPSU's fall from power as well as Seoul-Moscow normalization, transformed the Moscow-

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Pyongyang relationship from an alliance into a normal state-to-state relationship. Moscow reassessed its mutual alliance treaty with Pyongyang in order to reestablish its relations with the country on pragmatic grounds. During this period, Moscow's relations with Pyongyang degenerated rapidly.

RUSSIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian foreign policy community was split into two schools of thought concerning foreign policy goals and priorities, namely, Atlanticism and Eurasianism.2 Atlanticists are characterized by pro-Western policies and seek Russia's quick incorporation into the Western world. They consist mainly of liberal diplomats, including Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who pursued Russian foreign policy based on Gorbachev's new political thinking.3 The Atlanticist school of thought aims at Russia becoming part of the Group of Seven industrialized countries. It also seeks to strengthen cooperative ties between Russia and the major Western industrialized countries, in such international organizations as the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In contrast, the Eurasianists want Russia to pursue a neutral and independent foreign policy.4 Instead of trying to become an integral part of a "common European home," they argue that Russia should strive to join the booming Pacific Rim or the Middle East. The Eurasianists object to Russia's unconditional support for Western policy toward the Muslim world, China, and India. They point out that Western values, such as human rights, are perceived differently in the Muslim world and China. The Eurasianists do not view Russia's interests as always identical with those of the West in conflicts such as the Gulf War or the Tibetan struggle for independence. They think that Russia should not allow its relations with China and the Muslim world to deteriorate in the current transitional period. According to the Eurasianists, Russia should give up the goal of becoming a member of the West and turn instead toward the Asian countries and the South for cooperation. From August 1991 to mid-1992, Russian foreign policy goals and priorities were largely determined by the ideas of the Atlanticists. The most pressing task confronting the Russian Federation at that time was implementation of domestic reforms. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin pursued Westernoriented foreign policy, expecting that the West was ready to fully embrace Russia as an equal partner and generously provide it with economic coop-

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eration and aid. The Russian leadership also believed that Russia's security would be guaranteed by integration with the Western world. During this period, the Yeltsin government sought a close cooperative relationship with the West in arms control and regional issues, as well as in international forums such as the UN and the CSCE. It was a transitional period in which Yeltsin followed Gorbachev's new political thinking, if only because of momentum. While Yeltsin was trying to implement domestic reforms (political and economic integration of Russia into the West being critical to this), Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy fell under attack from the Eurasianist lobby and began moving in the direction of an independent and neutral foreign policy in the summer of 1992. The adoption of the "foreign policy concept" by the Yeltsin government in the spring of 1993 clearly indicates that Russian foreign policy was reorienting itself to the South and the Pacific Rim.5 It also meant that Russia would pursue an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests. The Russian political elite finally reached a consensus about the foreign policy concept after nearly two years of foreign policy dissonance.6 The foreign policy concept enunciated a set of foreign policy tasks and priorities as follows.7 First, Russia's vital interests lie in developing full-scale relations with the other ex-Soviet republics. Russia's relations with the CIS states ("near abroad"), and to a lesser extent with east-central Europe, became the focal point of Russia's foreign policy. At the same time, the reassertion of strategic hegemony (maintaining the sphere of influence) over these areas became the primary task of Russia's foreign policy. Second, another important task of Russia's foreign policy is to form a belt of stability and neighborliness along its eastern and southern borders. Thus, the new Russian foreign policy calls for closer relations with China and India, to ensure the stability of borders with these countries, and for the integration of the Russian Far East into the booming economy of the Asia Pacific region. Particularly, Russia came to perceive China as its chief partner.8 Kozyrev regarded the United States as Russia's "Eastern neighbor."9 With the adoption of the foreign policy concept, Russia's foreign policy began to move away from idealism and economic determinism, which focus on economic development, and began to move toward realpolitik and security determinism, which emphasize security considerations and national interests.

RUSSIA AND NORTHEAST ASIA

Gorbachev gave the economic and social needs of the Soviet Union top priority, and he gave increased priority to the Soviet Far Eastern region

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and the Soviet Pacific coast. The Soviet leader sought dialogue and cooperation with all states of the Pacific Rim region. Gorbachev endeavored to establish a new kind of relationship with the surrounding countries in East Asia by implanting the image of the Soviet Union as a reliable partner. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin made Russia's domestic needs the top priority. Thus, the primary tasks of Russia's policy in the region are to ensure a peaceful and stable environment for domestic reforms, to establish stable partnerships with the region's leading powers (the United States, China, Japan, South Korea), and to join the economic and political structures of the region as a full-fledged member.10 Particularly, Russian relations with Japan and South Korea assumed a new significance, and Russian Asia Pacific policy was "essentially a means of drawing economic support from those two countries."11 By summer 1992, Russia's foreign policy began to tilt toward Eurasianism as a result of the conservative-nationalist group's increased influence in Russian politics. As Yeltsin's alleged plan to make a territorial concession to Japan on the issue of the disputed Kuril Islands was revealed, his visit to Tokyo scheduled for September 1992 became the target of fierce attack from the conservatives. At the last minute, in the face of adverse public opinion, Yeltsin canceled his trip. Thereafter, the conservatives' impact on Russia's foreign policy became prominent.12 Under the circumstances, the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations through a compromise on the territorial issue became out of the question. Northeast Asia is undergoing a radical structural transformation in the post-Cold War era. The Russians believe that a power vacuum is being created in Northeast Asia, as U.S. military troops in the western Pacific are gradually pulled out and Russia's military presence in the Far East is reduced. They see regional security and stability as being threatened if the Japanese military buildup accelerates and China's military modernization is left unchecked. The Russian Federation is a regional power in decline. What is worse, Russia's foreign policy in Northeast Asia is greatly constrained by heightened domestic crises and shrinking military capability. As a natural corollary, the main goal of Russian foreign policy in Northeast Asia is to maintain the status quo. And Moscow seeks to achieve the status quo by a balance-of-power strategy utilizing two policy instruments: bilateral arrangements and a multinational conference. Russia pursues the role as "balancer" in the region in order to prevent any other country from achieving predominance. It is in Russia's interests to see that no country, particularly Japan or China, moves into the dominant power position in the region.13 Sergei Solodovnik, senior

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research fellow at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, advocates Russia's role as the regional balancer through bilateral ties in economic, political, and military spheres. A rough balance of economic power is essential for safeguarding longterm political stability in the region. This may be achieved if [the] Russian Far East ... were to be developed primarily by South Korea and Taiwanese business in the context of a strong Regina trend to integration and greater independence. In order to maintain the political balance, Russia should support centers of power independent of China. In that context every assistance to strengthen the political role of Japan would be very useful.... Multilateral strategic stability should pursue some aims of paramount importance to Russian national interests, that is to check China in its arms build-up and to prevent the rise of any new first-rate military power, whether it is Japan, united Korea or some other.14

China and South Korea assume greater importance for Russia as a means of counterbalancing Japan. Russia has seen remarkable improvements in its bilateral ties with Seoul and Beijing. In November 1992, Yeltsin paid an official visit to Seoul and signed three important documents, including the treaty on basic relations that laid the groundwork for a mutually complementary "partner" relationship. The first Russo-Chinese summit took place the following month and laid the foundation for intensive and equal cooperation of the two countries. The summit resulted in the Joint Declaration on the Principles of Mutual Relations, which included the basic principles and guidelines for promoting bilateral ties in the future and characterized the relationship of the two countries as "friendly nations."15 Russia's strategic calculations are partly responsible for the rapid improvements in Russo-Chinese relations. "A certain disillusion with the West together with a strengthening of conservatives in Moscow created interest in using 'the China card' for bolstering Russia's international stature."16 Russia's proposal for a collective security system in Asia Pacific is another means of maintaining the status quo in the region. Yeltsin's proposal for a multinational conference for the Asia Pacific region is not original. The program for an Asian collective security system was first enunciated by Leonid Brezhnev in 1969 and was intended to contain China's power and to counterbalance the nuclear and conventional forces of the United States in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.17 Gorbachev reintroduced the idea of a collective security system in Asia, variously referred to as "an all-embracing system of international security," "a Helsinki-like Pacific conference," or the "All Asian Forum."18 Gorbachev's proposal, unlike Brezhnev's, emphasized the need for Chinese and U.S. participation in the plan in order to not give the impression

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that it was intended to isolate the United States and to establish a coalition of states hostile to China.19 Yeltsin's proposal for multilateralism differs from Gorbachev's in range and scale. Gorbachev wanted to repeat the Helsinki process of Europe in the western Pacific region. And the multilateral conference was supposed to deal with global issues. In contrast, Yeltsin's multilateralism is geographically limited to Northeast Asia, and its major agenda concerns Russia's immediate security matters.20 During his official visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin proposed a mechanism of multinational negotiations beginning with expert-level consultations on security issues in the potentially conflictprone subregion of Northeast Asia. He also called for a crisis regulation system, including the creation of conflict prevention and strategic studies centers in the region. Specifically, Yeltsin's multinational negotiation mechanism emphasized military issues such as nuclear and missile nonproliferation.21 This mechanism was designed to develop into a collective security system in Asia, and it was especially designed to check Japan's ambition in Asia.22 During his visit to Beijing in May 1995, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev proposed a collective security system for the Asia Pacific region. As a first step in this direction, he suggested a subregional security system in Northeast Asia, which would include the United States, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and North Korea. Grachev further clarified that such a security system would serve as a regional forum to discuss "the safeguarding of peace by means of collective actions."23

RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARD SOUTH KOREA

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin government of the Russian Republic of the USSR promoted a cooperative relationship with Seoul.24 When the independence of major Soviet republics from the USSR became obvious, the South Korean government decided in early December 1991 to promote bilateral relations with Soviet republics including the Russian Federation, while maintaining existing relations with the Soviet Union.25 After Russia became the successor state to the Soviet Union in 1992, Russia needed to reestablish its relations with the two Koreas. Yeltsin initially followed his predecessor's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula with only minor adjustments. In early 1992, Russia continued to strengthen its ties with Seoul while further neglecting its ties with Pyongyang. Russia pursued three closely interrelated policies in its relations with Seoul. First, Moscow sought to play the "South Korean card"

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for its balancing act for the status quo in Northeast Asia and, in doing so, actively promoted bilateral ties in political, economic, and military areas. Second, Russia sought to muster Seoul's support and participation for its scheme of a collective security system in Northeast Asia. Third, Russia sought to be recognized as a full-fledged member of the Asia Pacific community and to incorporate its economy into the dynamic process of Asia Pacific with the help of South Korea. Complementary Partnership As Seoul and Moscow developed into cooperative partners, the revision of the 1961 Pyongyang-Moscow Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance emerged as a delicate issue. South Korea expressed strong misgivings about Article 1 of the treaty, which stipulated automatic military involvement of the parties in case of war.26 The automatic involvement clause has been considered a threat to the security of East Asia because inter-Korean conflicts were likely to escalate into international conflicts involving major powers. Russian officials concurred with the South Koreans that Article 1 should be reinterpreted in view of the changed circumstances of the relationship. To the surprise of the South Korean side, in July 1992 the Russian foreign ministry announced its intention to not repeal the PyongyangMoscow treaty and harshly criticized Seoul's pressure on Russia to rescind it.27 The Russian foreign ministry's announcement came in response to the South Korean defense ministry's demand in early July to abrogate the 1961 Moscow-Pyongyang treaty. The timing of this statement surprised the South Korean government: Yeltsin was scheduled to visit Seoul in six weeks. As Russia's foreign policy came under increasing domestic attack from the conservative-nationalist group in mid-1992, Russia's Korea policy showed some signs that it might be "righted" from its tilt toward Seoul in favor of a balanced relationship with the two Koreas.28 Despite this episode, Seoul-Moscow relations were developing into a cooperative partnership, and Pyongyang-Moscow relations remained estranged. By summer 1992, Yeltsin realized that there were too many obstacles to improving relations with Japan and that the territorial dispute between the two countries could not be resolved for the time being. Thus, he shifted his focus to developing relations with China and South Korea. Subsequently, the priorities of Russian foreign policy changed: Moscow's relations with Beijing and Seoul received the central attention, and Moscow-Tokyo relations became secondary. Moscow's tilt toward Seoul became evident with Yeltsin's official visit there in November 1992. During the visit, President Yeltsin signed

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the Treaty on Basic Relations, providing the legal basis for closer bilateral economic, political, scientific, and cultural cooperation.29 The basic treaty repudiated the use of force in settling disputes and committed the two countries to pursuing the common values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the market economy. The two presidents signed other agreements as well, including the Cultural Cooperation Agreement, the Avoidance of Double Taxation Convention, and the Customs Cooperation Agreement. Furthermore, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Military Exchanges.30 The primary motive behind Yeltsin's visit to Seoul was economic in nature. Yeltsin intended to improve Russia's ailing economy with South Korea's economic assistance and cooperation. In contrast, President Roh's main concern was to elicit Russia's support in connection with inter-Korean relations and North Korea's nuclear policy. Yeltsin expressed his support for bilateral nuclear inspections between Seoul and Pyongyang, promised to stop the supply of weapons and military technology for producing MiG-29s to North Korea, and expressed the intention to revise its mutual assistance treaty with Pyongyang. Yeltsin also handed Roh two black boxes from the doomed Korean Air Lines 007 as a gesture of goodwill. In return, Roh promised that his government would consider resuming the supply of the remaining $1.53 billion of the $3 billion aid package.31 During President Kim Young-sam's official visit to Moscow in June 1994, the complementary "partnership" between South Korea and the Russian Federation was reconfirmed. The complementary nature of the relationship was clearly shown in Yeltsin's support for South Korea's bid for nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council for 1996-1997 and in Kim Young-sam's reciprocal support for Russia's AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation membership in the future. The main goal of Kim's visit was to muster Russia's support for possible sanctions against North Korea for failing to abide by its obligations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia fully upheld South Korea's position on inter-Korean affairs and urged Pyongyang to renounce its suspected nuclear weapons program. Kim Young-sam, in turn, expressed his government's support for Russia's proposal for a multilateral conference on security and nuclear weapon free status of the Korean peninsula. In addition, the presidents agreed to maintain channels for bilateral consultations on Northeast Asia security dialogue issues and to install a hot line between the Kremlin and the Blue House.32 Yeltsin pleased his guest by revealing the Russian decision to not renew the Moscow-Pyongyang mutual assistance treaty in 1996.33 In another goodwill gesture, Yeltsin handed over to Kim Young-sam various documents on the Korean War.34 This act served to further alienate

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Russia's erstwhile ally, Pyongyang. Some differences notwithstanding, Russia and South Korea were developing cooperative relations.35 Increased Military Exchanges and Cooperation Bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in the military sphere has been remarkable as well. Military exchanges between the two countries started in late 1991.36 After the Seoul-Moscow normalization, both countries were groping with the possibility of military cooperation. The Seoul side, however, maintained a cautious attitude about this issue and preferred to maintain its current close military and security ties with Washington. Lieutenant General Yong Yong-Il, chief of South Korea's National Defense Ministry Intelligence Directorate, visited the Soviet Union in October 1991 and met with Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeni Shaposhnikov.The next month, the commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, Lieutenant General Viktor Novozhilov, visited Seoul to participate in a joint seminar on Asia Pacific security problems. Seoul sent a colonel as military attaché to Moscow on October 1, and four months later Moscow sent a two-star general in the same capacity to Seoul.37 Military cooperation and exchanges with Seoul have been high on Moscow's agenda. The Yeltsin government has not only shown a keen interest in military exchanges and cooperation with Seoul, but also considered South Korea as a potential ally.38 Russian ambassador to Seoul Aleksandr Panov, in an arrival news conference in Seoul, stated that the two countries could gradually increase bilateral military cooperation based on exchanges and contacts among military officials.39 The Russian version of the Seoul-Moscow Treaty on Basic Relations originally contained a clause on "mutual military cooperation." Seoul, however, wished to exclude this clause in the treaty in order to avoid conflict with the existing U.S.-South Korea security system.40 Although the final treaty did not include a military cooperation clause, the two sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Military Exchanges during Yeltsin's visit to Seoul in 1992. The memorandum resulted in exchanges of military personnel and information and cooperation in military technology. In 1993, South Korean and Russian navy squadrons exchanged visits, and the two sides decided to hold the first joint naval exercise in 1997.41 A four-member Russian military delegation, headed by Colonel General Boris Petrovich, first vice president of the Russian Military General Staff College, visited South Korea to observe the major military education and training system in July 1993.42 Moscow offered to repay its debts to Seoul by selling military weapons and military technology. The list of weapons and military equip-

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ment for sale included the MiG-29B, the SU-25 Frogfoot, the S-200 (SA5 Gammon) air defense missile system, and the BM-21 Grad 122-millimeter and BM-27 220-millimeter multiple barrel rocket launchers. Russia also offered the S-300PMU1 and the TOR air defense missile systems to South Korea in mid-1991 for licensed coproduction by a consortium of South Korean companies.43 The Debts Repayment Issue Repayment of the Soviet debts to South Korea has been a major obstacle to improved Seoul-Moscow relations. In exchange for granting diplomatic recognition to Seoul, the Soviet Union was promised $3 billion in loans by South Korea. Subsequently, Seoul provided $1,470 million worth of loans to the former Soviet Union by the end of 1991. In the wake of the aborted August coup, the prospect for repayment of Seoul's loans to the former USSR became uncertain. As a result of bilateral negotiations on loans in May 1992, Russia guaranteed that it would take on the former Soviet Union's debts to South Korea.44 The Russian government later proposed to pay half of the overdue interest payment in cash and sell its natural resources (such as uranium and coal) to pay the remainder.45 Moscow, however, repeatedly failed to make interest payments on the cash loans and the tied loans. Hong Soon-young, the South Korean deputy foreign minister, announced that his government decided to suspend the remaining loans ($1,530 million) indefinitely.46 By summer 1994, Russia was $400 million in arrears on repayment of its debts to South Korea.47 Negotiations on the debt issue reached an impasse because of different approaches to repayment methods: Moscow insisted on selling weapons and military equipment to Seoul to settle the debts, whereas Seoul demanded repayment in cash or in kind.48 In August 1994, the two sidesfinallyreached a compromise solution and agreed in principle that Russia should repay half the debts with military hardware and the remaining half with raw materials.49 In April 1995, Seoul agreed to accept $450 million worth of arms, raw materials, and civilian helicopters from Mosocw by 1998 as repayment for Russian debts. According to the agreement, Russia was to deliver to South Korea $171.5 million worth of raw materials and defense equipment in 1995.50 Limited Success in Economic Relations Economic transactions between the Soviet Union and South Korea were mostly in the form of trade; South Korea's investment in the Soviet

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Union was limited and increased slowly. Bilateral trade in 1990 totaled $889 million, up from $599 million in the previous year. In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to $1.2 billion, and Seoul recorded a $48 million trade surplus with the Soviet Union. 51 In 1994, bilateral trade reached $2.2 billion, approximately a 40 percent increase over the previous year and with a $300 million trade surplus in favor of Moscow. 52 South Korea's investment in the Soviet Union started in 1989, mostly in the services and electronic sectors and resource development. Initially, South Korean business firms were engaged in indirect investment through a third country, but beginning in 1990, indirect investment was replaced rapidly by direct investment. However, South Korean businesspeople took a cautious attitude toward investment in the Soviet Union because of political instability and economic uncertainty. Moscow's inability to repay its debts to Seoul has long constrained bilateral economic cooperation and trade. Russia's unforgiving tax laws and conflicting decrees, as well as the debt issue, continued to deter South Korea's massive investment in Russia. South Korean investment in Russia increased modestly from $11.7 million in 1990 5 3 to $26 million in 1994. 5 4 South Korea has expressed interest in several massive projects totaling $20-30 billion, including the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) to the Korean peninsula. South Korea's business conglomerates have been involved in the conversion of defense-related factories into consumer goods production in Russia. Bilateral trade continued to increase rapidly. It almost doubled to $1.6 billion in 1993, from $860 million the previous year. 55 The present terms of trade remain the same as they were in the Soviet era. The major items of Russia's export to South Korea are raw materials (steel, fish, timber, gas, and aluminum); Russia's imports from South Korea are mainly finished goods (consumer electronics, cars, and heavy machinery).

RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA Russian President Yeltsin, who emerged as a new leader after the August coup, completely ignored Kim Il-sung and kept distance from North Korea, considering it to be an uncomfortable regime with which he wanted to have no ties. After the coup attempt in August 1991, the Soviet Union ended the limited economic aid that it had continued to provide to North Korea even after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul. North Korean-Russian relations became even more tenuous after the disintegration of the USSR.

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In Search of a Normal State-to-State Relationship While strengthening a cooperative partnership with Seoul, the Yeltsin government was seeking to reestablish a normal state-to-state relationship with Pyongyang based on national interests. But during the transitional period between the August coup and summer 1992, PyongyangMoscow relations drifted farther apart. Russia's foreign policy shifted gears in the direction of realpolitik and power politics beginning in mid1992. Subsequently, Moscow made some attempts to patch things up with Pyongyang and forge evenhanded relations with the two Koreas. In January 1992, former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev visited Pyongyang as a special envoy of President Yeltsin and reached an understanding with the North Korean leadership about revising the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961, without repudiating its original principle. Rogachev also urged North Korea to hold an inter-Korean summit and to sign a nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA in accordance with its international obligations.56 In late January 1993, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze visited Pyongyang as a special representative of Yeltsin. The visit was intended to establish normal, good-neighborly relations between Pyongyang and Moscow. It was deemed necessary for Russia to maintain normal relations with both Koreas to maximize its national interests. Kunadze also reconfirmed that bilateral trade and economic cooperation would be on a purely commercial basis. The two sides agreed to continue contacts at the foreign ministerial level, to reopen parliamentary ties, and to reestablish the bilateral intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific-technical issues.57 Kunadze's Pyongyang trip was in accordance with the premise that Russia should maintain a normal state-to-state relationship with North Korea in order to play the role of balancer between the two Koreas and to enhance its diplomatic leverage in the Asia Pacific region.58 In September 1994, Aleksandr Panov visited Pyongyang in another attempt to end the uncomfortable relationship and to pave the way to normalization.59 In fact, the ultraconservative group blamed the Yeltsin government for abandoning the former allies of the Soviet Union, including North Korea. The conservatives warned that Russia's tough stance against North Korea's nuclear program might drive Pyongyang to deny Russia's transit rights, to forfeit its $3.6 billion debt to Moscow, and to obstruct the planned construction of a natural gas pipeline from Sakha through North Korea to South Korea.60 Nevertheless, the Pyongyang-Moscow relationship remained cool and uncomfortable. Russia's new foreign policy, characterized by realpolitik and independent, neutral policy, did not leave a visible mark on Russian foreign policy toward the two Koreas.

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A few factors contributed to the relative continuity and consistency. First, Seoul and Moscow had already developed interdependent and mutually beneficial economic ties. The Russian Federation badly needed Seoul's economic aid and cooperation for its sagging economy. Expansion of economic relations with Pyongyang would simply increase the burden on its economy. Second, unlike Russia's relationship with Japan, there are no salient issues between Russia and South Korea that might become a source of conflict, except North Korea's displeasure, which has been marginalized. Thus, Russian policy toward Seoul was hardly susceptible to domestic pressure from conservative and ultranationalist leaders. The cooperative and relatively stable relations between Moscow and Seoul during this period are in stark contrast to the friction and fluctuations in MoscowTokyo relations resulting from the increasingly formidable influence of conservative leaders and Russian nationalist groups who have constantly obstructed the Kremlin's efforts to reach a compromise on the Kuril Islands issue. Third, the gap between the Soviets and the North Koreans in terms of mutual attitudes and perceptions was widening, as Russian society democratized and adopted political pluralism while North Korean society stuck to a totalitarian, communist system. Furthermore, the traditional friendship that characterized Moscow-Pyongyang relations evaporated completely as the ideological unity and party-to-party connections between the two countries was no longer relevant after the collapse of the USSR. Fourth, Pyongyang's nuclear issue remained the major obstacle to the improvement of Pyongyang-Moscow relations. The prospects of nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula and the resultant military buildup and instability in Northeast Asia loomed large in Russia's strategic calculations. Stability and nuclear nonproliferation in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia became Russia's highest priority. Therefore, Russia's endeavor to reestablish a normal relationship with North Korea was overshadowed by the North Korean nuclear issue. Sharp Reductions in Economic Relations Economic relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea sharply declined in 1991 because of the economic difficulties confronting the two countries and the political differences separating them. North Korea's trade with the Soviet Union and China, North Korea's main trading partners, dropped sharply in 1991. Economic ties with North Korea were a drain on the Soviet economy. In the past, Pyongyang paid in Korean won or got credit for

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imports. From January 1991 on, however, the Soviet Union demanded payment in hard currency in accordance with a trade agreement signed between the two countries in November 1990. Consequently, Soviet deliveries of oil products, cotton, and steel at friendly, bargain prices ended in January 1991. 61 This seriously hurt North Korea's economy, as more than 50 percent of its total annual trade until 1991 was with the USSR. 62 The Soviet Union continued to send North Korea oil, despite an earlier decision to sell it for hard currency. In 1991, the Soviets put a moratorium on 500,000 tons of crude oil in view of North Korea's severe financial problem.63 North Korea's lack of hard currency resulted in rapid decline in bilateral trade in 1991. Bilateral trade between Pyongyang and Moscow sharply dropped from 1.34 billion rubles in 1990 to 400 million rubles in 1991, a much smaller figure than in the 1970s. 64 In the first half of 1994, bilateral trade dropped about 440 percent compared with the previous year. 65 It was not until late 1992 that the two countries began to create a "new foundation for trade and economic links, a foundation resting on the interests of market benefit and free prices."66 Moscow strongly demanded repayment of Pyongyang's $3.5 billion debt in 1993, and the debt repayment issue became another source of friction. North Korea's inhumane treatment of its workers in the Russian Far East also caused friction between the two countries. North Korea has sent some 30,000 woodcutters to the Khabarovsk area of the Russian Far East. The torture and executions of the lumberjacks by North Korean security agents aroused public outcries and further estranged the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang.

North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Russia's Position North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development program has lately been in the limelight of international society.67 North Korea's refusal to renounce its suspected nuclear weapons program has not only been the major obstacle to the peace process on the Korean peninsula, but it has also posed a real threat to peace and security in Northeast Asia. North Korea started its nuclear development program with Soviet help. North Korea's nuclear program depended heavily on technology and nuclear materials from the Soviets. North Korea joined the I A E A in 1977. The Soviets offered to supply North Korea nuclear technology and materials in exchange for the North's signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) At the urging of the United States and the Soviet Union, North Korea signed the NPT in December 1985. By doing so, Pyongyang pledged to not manufacture or acquire any nuclear weapons.

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After signing the NPT, North Korea delayed signing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for international inspection of its nuclear facilities and materials, disregarding its obligation to do so within eighteen months of signing the NPT. North Korea is developing its nuclear weapons in order to ensure the survival of its communist regime in an increasingly hostile international environment. While visiting Pyongyang in early September 1990 to inform the North Korean leadership of the immediate establishment of diplomatic ties with Seoul, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was told that if the Soviet Union normalized its diplomatic relations with the South, the North would develop its own nuclear weapons.68 North Korea accelerated its nuclear weapons development program independently after the Seoul-Moscow normalization. The Soviet Union cut its materials and technical support for the North's nuclear reactor development and stopped supplying nuclear fuels to the North in 1990.69 After relations between Seoul and Moscow were normalized and Pyongyang delayed signing the safeguards accord with the IAEA, the Soviet Union began to urge North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons program. Seoul has repeatedly asked the Kremlin's cooperation to abort Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. The Soviet Union used economic pressure to make North Korea sign the safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 70 Boris Pankin, Soviet foreign minister, revealed in October 1991 that the Soviet Union had urged North Korea to sign the nuclear safeguards accord at an earlier date during contacts at all levels and stated that it would continue to urge Pyongyang to do so.71 One of the main purposes of Russian special envoy Rogachev's visit to Pyongyang in January 1992 was to urge the North Korean leadership to accept international nuclear inspection by signing the safeguards agreement. Yielding to mounting international pressure, North Korea belatedly signed the safeguards agreement in January 1992, six years after signing the NPT. Differences over the issue of the IAEA inspection of two suspected nuclear waste sites in North Korea led to heightened tensions in Korea and in Northeast Asia in 1993. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993 (and later reversed this decision) and from the IAEA in 1994 in defiance of mounting international pressure to fully renounce its nuclear weapons program. Finally, U.S.-North Korea high-level talks in Geneva resulted in a compromise solution to North Korea's nuclear issue on October 21, 1994. Thereby, North Korea pledged to totally abandon its suspected nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic and technical assistance, including the construction of two nuclear light-water reactors

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(LWRs), and improved relations with the United States. The Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang allows the latter ten years to dismantle its nuclear program, and it will be implemented in three phases.72 The Russian government has shown a keen interest in nuclear nonproliferation in Korea. The prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea at Russia's Far Eastern border is terrifying to Russian leaders. Seoul and Moscow share a common interest in preventing a nuclear armed North Korea. During his visit to Seoul in March 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev expressed that his government would support Seoul in its effort to solve North Korea's nuclear problem in international arenas, including the United Nations.73 At the U.S.-Russian summit in Washington in June 1992, Bush and Yeltsin issued a joint statement urging North Korea to accept inter-Korean mutual nuclear inspection.74 Unlike the United States, Russia believes that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, nor weapons-grade plutonium needed to make a nuclear bomb. In a press conference held during his visit to Seoul in November 1992, in fact, Yeltsin directly stated that Pyongyang had neither the nuclear materials nor the required technology to manufacture nuclear bombs.75 Kozyrev, too, stated in an interview with Izvestiya in June 1994 that North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons and that it would take at least three to seven years before it could develop such weaponry.76 In an effort to enhance its international position as a mediator and defuse the tension surrounding North Korea's nuclear program, Russia proposed an eight-party multilateral conference that would include South Korea, North Korea, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the IAEA, and the UN Secretary-General as a forum to deal with the nuclear problem. The multilateral conference was to tackle two issues simultaneously: the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the improvement of Pyongyang's relations with Washington and Tokyo. The proposal suggested that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula should be implemented by the IAEA inspection of North Korean nuclear installations and by inter-Korean mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. According to the Russian proposal, economic sanctions against Pyongyang should be implemented only after diplomatic efforts through the multinational conference fail.77 The Russian proposal was neither original nor practical. It received a cool reception from other members of the UN Security Council, especially the United States, which preferred utilizing current channels of communication (i.e., WashingtonPyongyang, Seoul-Pyongyang, IAEA-Pyongyang, and the UN SecretaryGeneral-Pyongyang) to deal with the nuclear issue. Russia's pressure on North Korea over the nuclear issue has evoked only negative reactions from Pyongyang. Pyongyang considers Russia to

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be a pro-U.S. state that tries to isolate and "crush" North Korea.78 Pyongyang warned Moscow that if it continues to pressure North Korea over the nuclear problem, it would obstruct the project of constructing a natural gas pipeline from Sakhalin to the Korean peninsula and refuse to repay its $3.5 billion debt to Moscow.79 Russia simply does not have any leverage over North Korea anymore.80 Russia ceased to provide nuclear technology and materials, modern weapons, and the spare parts of weapons. Bilateral trade and economic cooperation are insignificant and are carried out on a commercial basis. Despite Moscow's desire to maintain a normal relationship with Pyongyang, bilateral ties remain tenuous and marginal. Consequently, Russia's ability to influence North Korea's nuclear program has been increasingly reduced. Russia is increasingly frustrated because of its inability to control North Korea's nuclear issue and its alienation in the process of North Korea's nuclear negotiations. On June 16, 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev refused to support a UN Security Council resolution drafted by the United States that would impose sanctions on North Korea. Kozyrev complained that the United States has neglected to consult adequately with Russia on the issue.81 Russia repeatedly warned against prematurely imposing sanctions against North Korea and emphasized exhausting all political means before turning to forceful means.82 Russia expressed complaints about the October 1994 nuclear agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. In accordance with the agreement, an international consortium, the Korea Energy Development Organization, was created to implement economic and technical assistance to North Korea. The international consortium led by the United States, South Korea, and Japan decided in principle to supply Pyongyang with two LWRs of a South Korean model. Russian commentators criticized the United States for not having consulted with Russia in forming the international consortium.83 Panov expressed Russia's misgivings about the U.S. treatment of Russia as a "junior partner" in the international consortium and even threatened to boycott the organization: "[Russia] may even refuse to join the organization which is being formed for this purpose by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, if it be only offered a secondary role in it."84 A Russian foreign ministry spokesperson, pointing out North Korea's interest in acquiring Russian-model LWRs rather than South Korean-model LWRs, stated that the Agreed Framework damaged Moscow's commercial interests in its former communist ally.85 The implementation of the U.S-North Korea Agreed Framework is in jeopardy over the model of the LWRs. South Korea, which will make the largest financial contribution for the LWRs, has maintained the position that the LWRs supplied to North Korea must be its own model and

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that Seoul must play a central role in the project. In contrast, North Korea has refused to accept the South Korean-model LWRs apparently to avoid dependence on the South. Russia repeatedly offered to provide one or two Russian-made nuclear reactors to North Korea as a solution to break the deadlock over the LWR issue.86 In fact, North Korea proposed that Russia deliver one of the two reactors and that the United States or Germany deliver the second reactor.87 CONCLUSION

Initially, the legacy of the Gorbachev era strongly circumscribed Yeltsin's foreign policy. Since the summer of 1992, however, Yeltsin's foreign policy increasingly took on the features of realpolitik, distancing itself from earlier idealistic tendencies. National interests and power politics became the main criteria for Russian foreign policy makers. Russia's status as a regional power is in decline, and the newly emerging power structure of Northeast Asia guides its foreign policy direction in Northeast Asia. Moscow places the highest priority on domestic reforms, and the success of these reforms depends on a peaceful and stable international environment. Russia, a status quo power in the region, pursues the goal of a regional balance of power and utilizes the policy instruments of bilateral arrangements and a multilateral conference. Russia's policy toward South Korea reflects Yeltsin's desire to strengthen bilateral ties for Russia's balancing act in the region, as well as its economic development and admittance into the dynamic Asia Pacific region. Yeltsin also seeks Seoul's support and active participation in its proposal for a multilateral negotiation mechanism and a collective security system in the region. The Russians think that South Korea, and eventually a unified Korea, can counterbalance Japan and China. There have been signs that the Kremlin was trying to use "the Korean card" in an attempt to isolate Japan as Seoul-Moscow relations turned into a cooperative partnership. The Kremlin is well aware that it needs to maintain an equal relationship with both Seoul and Pyongyang in order to enhance Russia's position as a mediator between North and South Korea. Thus, Moscow will pursue the maintenance of a normal state-to-state relationship with Pyongyang, while pursuing a cooperative partnership with Seoul.88 The Russian government has made efforts to restore a normal relationship with Pyongyang, and there are signs that the two neighbors are building up cooperative ties. Despite Moscow's professed desire to restore its relations with Pyongyang to a normal level, this bilateral relationship

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continues to be alienated. The distance between the two former allies is well manifested by the fact that President Yeltsin did not even send condolences to Pyongyang after Kim Il-sung's death.89 In the midst of heightened international tension on the Korean peninsula caused by Pyongyang's nuclear issue, Moscow has been preoccupied with nuclear nonproliferation in Korea and Northeast Asia. Substantial improvement in Moscow-Pyongyang relations to a normal level would be possible only after North Korea clears any international doubts concerning its suspected nuclear weapons program.

NOTES 1. For Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula, see SeungHo Joo, "Soviet Policy on Seoul-Moscow Normalization," Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 4 (October-December 1994): 421^37. Cf. Yang Seung-Hahm, "Rusiaui hanbando-chungchaek-ae kwanhan chungchikyungche-chug shigak" (Russian policy toward the Korean peninsula: A political economic perspective), Kukjaejungchi'nonchong, vol. 32, no. 2 (1992): 239-269. 2. Cf. Alexander Rahr, "'Atlantists' versus 'Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] Research Report, vol. 1, no. 22 (May 29, 1992): 17-22. The distinction between the Atlanticist and the Eurasianist school of thought was made by Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 28,1992). For the English translation, see Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," The National Interest, no. 28 (summer 1992): 47-55. Alexei Arbatov discusses four different schools of thought in the Russian foreign policy community: the pro-Western group, moderate liberals, centrist and moderate conservatives, and neocommunists and nationalists ("Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 [fall 1993]: 9-14). 3. Kozyrev's pro-Western inclination is well expressed in his following statement: "Russia's goal and interests demand ensuring that our international environment is not Asiaticism' but the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] area with its democratic standards and market rules, or all that is inherent in European political culture" ("What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue: A Forum," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 2 [February 1993]: 4). 4. Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich is a prominent advocate of Eurasianism. 5. The Russian foreign ministry began working on the foreign policy concept in March 1992, and the concept was approved at an enlarged meeting of the Foreign Policy Council under the foreign ministry at the end of 1992 For Russia's foreign policy concept, see "Russia's Foreign Policy Concept," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 1 (January 1993): 14-16. Cf. "Russia's Foreign Policy Agenda for 1993," International Affairs, Moscow (March 1993): 15-32. 6. Suzanne Crow, "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 50 (December 17,1993): 1. 7. In an interview, Kozyrev clearly revealed that the former Soviet republics constitute the first priority of the Russian foreign policy: "If you want a

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definition of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev strategy, it is the creation of good-neighborly relations with the newly created independent states—the former Soviet republics with as much political, economic, cultural, and human cooperation and integration as is feasible, both practically and politically" ("An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 28 [July 15,1994]: 37-38). 8. Cf. Natalya Narochnitskaya, "Russia Belongs to Neither the East nor the West," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 3 (January 1994): 38. 9. "What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue," p. 5. 10. In this context, Alexander N. Panov, the Russian ambassador to Seoul, remarked that Russia's major national interests in Asia and the Pacific included a stable balance of forces in the region, a stability in subregions close to its borders, and good relations with all countries of the region ("The Situation in Asia and the Pacific, and Russia-Korea Relations Towards the Twenty-first Century," Asian Perspective, vol. 16, no. 2 [fall-winter 1992]: 218-219). 11. Leszek Buszinski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," Pacific Affairs, vol. 65, no. 4 (winter 1992/93): 492. 12. The conservative group's criticism of Yeltsin's foreign policy was wideranging. Moscow's alienation of its traditional friends, such as Serbia, Libya, Iraq, Cuba, and North Korea, also became its target. In early 1993, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), which Yeltsin and George Bush signed in January 1993, was subject to a massive attack from the conservative group (Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 24-25). 13. Mahmut Gareyev, "Russia's Priority Interests," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 6 (June 1993): 7. 14. "Stability in Asia: A Priority for Russia," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 2 (February 1992): 65-68. 15. The two countries share common interests in a number of areas: (1) the successful implementation of their economic reforms at home; (2) the creation of a peaceful and stable external environment; (3) the stability in their border areas; and (4) the transformation of their mutual frontier into an area of peace and cooperation. Cf. Nikolai Solovyev, "Siberia and the APR [Asia Pacific Region]," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 4 (April 1993): 29. 16. Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, "Russia and Asia in 1992," Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 1 (January 1993): 95. 17. Osamu Miyoshi, "Soviet Collective Security Pacts," in Ray S. Cline et al., eds., Asia in Soviet Global Strategy (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 26. 18. Bilveer Singh, "The Soviet Asian Collective Security System: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev," Sino-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2 (summer 1988): 180. 19. Rajan Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," Problems of Communism (March-June 1989): 27. 20. Buszinski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," p. 500. 21. Solovyev, "Siberia and the APR," p. 26. 22. Cf. Stephen Blank, "Diplomacy at an Impasse: Russia and Japan in a New Asia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 5, no. 1 (summer 1993): 145. 23. Grigory Arslanov and Vyacheslav Tomilin, "Grachev Calls for Security System in Asia-Pacific Region," Itar-Tass, May 16,1995. 24. Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Russian Republic's Parliament, paid a three-day visit to Seoul in November 1991 and requested South Korea's participation in a project to develop natural resources

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in Russia (Korea Times, November 17,1991, p. 2, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-East Asia [FBIS-EAS], p. 16). 25. Yonhap, December 3,1991, in FBIS-EAS, p. 18. 26. Article 1 of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and North Korea stipulates: "Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." 27. The statement read: "Any attempts, from whatever quarter, to dictate to Russia how it should build its relations with other countries are unacceptable to us" (Izvestiya, July 31,1992, p. 6, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, September 2,1992, pp. 16-17. Cf. Chosun Ilbo [New York ed., July 30,1992], p. 28). 28. Cf. Bazhanov and Bazhanov, "Russia and Asia in 1992," p. 98. 29. During the Cheju summit in April 1991, President Gorbachev of the USSR and President Roh of South Korea agreed in principle to conclude a treaty on the basic relations. After the dissolution of the USSR in December 1992, the Russian Federation and South Korea continued working on the basic treaty. 30. For the full text of the basic treaty, see Korea Herald, November 20, 1992. For the joint statement issued by Presidents Roh and Yeltsin, see Korea Herald, November 21,1992. 31. Shim Jae Hoon and Ed Paisley, "Trade and Trade-Off," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), December 3,1992, pp. 15-16. 32. For the full text of the joint declaration at the Moscow summit, see Korea Herald, June 3,1994; and Chosun Ilbo, June 3,1994. 33. Chosun Ilbo, June 3,1994 34. Hanguk Ilbo, June 2,1994. 35. The two countries had different perspectives, for example, on the incident involving the Korean Airliner 007, which was shot down by a Soviet interceptor over Sakhalin in 1983. The South Korean side demanded that Russia provide a full and honest explanation of the unhappy incident, as well as partial material compensation for the victims' families. Russia's official position has been that Russia should not be held responsible for the incident because the aircraft violated Soviet territorial airspace and ignored warning signals from the Soviet interceptor. Moscow's demand for compensation for the former imperial Russian consulate land taken over in 1970, in the absence of diplomatic relations, also caused friction in bilateral relations. This issue was resolved when South Korea agreed to pay the equivalent price of the old consulate site, around U.S.$370 million (300 billion Korean won). 36. The Soviet government indicated early in 1991 (through unofficial channels) their intentions to sell not only the MiG-29 but also the MiG-31 aircraft to Seoul, with the revenues from the sales to be used to purchase Korean-made light industrial products (Kukmin Ilbo, April 4,1991, p. 1, in FBIS-EAS, April 8, 1991, p. 38). 37. Yonhap, October 17,1991, in FBIS-EAS, October 17,1991, p. 22; Krasnaya Zvezda, October 29, 1991, p. 3, in Foreign Broadcasting Service-Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV), November 5,1991, p. 7; Korea Herald, November 5,1991, p. 3; Yonhap, November 6,1991, in FBIS-EAS, November 8,1991, p. 28. 38. Hong Soon-young, the South Korean ambassador to Moscow, revealed in an interview that the Russian Federation was considering South Korea as a potential ally (Chosun Ilbo, March 12,1992). 39. Yonhap, June 17,1992, in FBIS-EAS, June 17,1992, p. 13.

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40. Chosun Ilbo, May 11,1992, p. 23. 41. Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, "Russia and Asia in 1993," Asian Survey, vol. 39, no. 1 (January 1994): 93. 42. Korea Times, July 3,1993, p. 3. 43. Edmond Dantes, "Changing Air Power Doctrines of Regional Military Powers," Asian Defence Journal, March 1993, p. 44. 44. Chosun Ilbo, May 26,1992, p. 23. 45. Ibid., p. 21. As of June 1992, the total overdue interest payment the CIS owed to South Korea was $38.85 million. 46. Chosun Ilbo, May 11,1992, p. 24. 47. Jeff Lilley, "What Is to Be Done?: South Korean Companies Find Russia a Quagmire," FEER, June 16,1994, p. 77. 48. During his visit to Seoul in August 1993, Aleksandr Shokhin, Russian deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers for External Economic Affairs, officially proposed the sale of Russian-made defensive weapons, including antiaircraft missile systems and jet fighters, to repay its debts to South Korea (Tong-A Ilbo, August 22,1993, p. 1, in FBIS-EAS, August 23,1993, p. 24). 49. Seoul will choose the items and their quantity from the weapons list provided by Moscow. The remaining half of the debts will be paid with machinery, copper, and other commodities (Chosun Ilbo, August 4, 1994; Hanguk Ilbo, August 4,1994). 50. The Russian hardware to be transferred to South Korea includes tanks, military vehicles, and small arms ("Seoul Accepts Russian Arms," New York Times, April 22,1995, p. A5). 51. Changjae Lee, Hanru kyungchehypryuk'ui hyonhwangkwa kwachae (The present situation and the tasks of Korea-Russia economic cooperation) (Seoul: Hanruch'insunhyup'uihoe, May 19, 1993), p. 3. In comparison, South Korea's trade deficit with China in 1991 was over $2 billion (Chosun Ilbo, January 27, 1992, p. 1). 52. Sergei Kudasov, "Bazaar Syndrome or How We Trade with South Korea," Rossiiskiye Vesti, February 7,1995, p. A3. 53. Korean Bank, cited from Sun-ok Kim, "Pukbang korey ilban," (South Korean relations with northern countries) Pukbang Kyungche, February 1991, p. 39. 54. Lilley, "What Is to Be Done?" p. 77. 55. Ibid. 56. "Major Events in Korea and World Affairs," Korea and World Affairs (spring 1992): 192-193; Yonhap, January 28,1992, in FBIS-EAS, January 30,1992, p. 33. 57. During this visit, the Russian envoy made an issue of North Korea's repayment of its debt to Moscow, notified its intention to revise the treaty of mutual assistance, and dealt with the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula (Alexandr Zhebin and Vadim Tkachenko, "Kunadze Flies to Pyongyang Via Beijing," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 17, p. 4, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 24,1993, pp. 13-14). 58. See, for example, Andre Krivtsov, "Russia and the Far East," International Affairs, Moscow, no. 1 (January 1993): 77; Vladimir Ivanov,"The Emerging National Security Doctrine of a New Russia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 5, no. 1 (summer 1993): 176. 59. Sergei Agafonov, "Korean Mysteries of Russian Diplomacy," Izvestiya, December 23,1994, p. Al.

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60. Yevgeny Aleksandrov, "Immoral Position: Russia and Nuclear Security in Korea," Pravda, May 7,1993, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, June 2, 1993, pp. 21-22. 61. Mark Clifford, "Caught in a Vice," FEER, November 29,1990, p. 30. 62. Sang-Woo Rhee, "North Korea in 1991," Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1992): 59. 63. Yonhap, in English, April 17,1991, in FBIS-EAS, April 18,1991, p. 32. 64. Nataliya Bazhanova, "Economic Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia Has Virtually Ceased," Kyunghyang Sinmun, January 25,1992, p. 4, in FBIS-EAS, pp. 41-42. Cf. FEER, October 10,1991, p. 75; FEER, May 9,1991, p. 15; Chosun llbo, December 1,1990. 65. "North Korean Economy Suffered Setback in First Half," Korea Herald, November 19,1994, p. 2. 66. Vasily Mikheev, "Reforms of the North Korean Economy: Requirements, Plans, and Hopes," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 5, no. 1 (summer 1990): 94. 67. For North Korea's nuclear issue, see Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Basic Issues in the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," paper delivered at the Thirty-fifth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 29-April 2,1994; Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo,"The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects," Arms Control, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1993): 65-92; Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, no. 83 (summer 1991): 87-104. 68. Moscow Television Service, October 1,1990, in FBIS-SOV, October 2, 1990, p. 19. 69. Seoul Shinmun, July 11,1991. 70. On the eve of the Roh-Gorbachev summit on Cheju Island in April 1991, Gorbachev's spokesperson, Vitaliy Ignatenko, revealed that the Soviet government had warned North Korea that the Soviet Union would end supplies to and cooperation with the North unless the North allowed the IAEA inspection (Yonhap, in English, April 18,1991, in FBIS-EAS, p. 32). 71. Chosun llbo, October 3,1991, p. 31. 72. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.-North Korea Accord Has a Ten-Year Timetable," and Alan Riding, "U.S. and N.K. Sign Atom Pact," New York Times, October 22,1994. 73. Chosun llbo, March 19,1992, p. 31. 74. Chosun llbo, June 19,1992, p. 32. The Russian side first proposed discussing North Korea's nuclear issue during the summit. In a conference held in Washington, D.C., in April 1992, Kunadze proposed to the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific that North Korea's nuclear status should be included in the joint statement of the upcoming summit (Chosun llbo, New York ed., June 18,1992, p. 30). 75. Yeltsin stated: "I do not think the North can develop nuclear arms without assistance from Russia. Russia has stopped supplying the North with nuclear materials and related technology, and I believe that the North has stopped developing nuclear arms" (Korea and World Affairs [winter 1992]: 754). 76. Chosun llbo, June 19, 1994. Kozyrev expressed the same view a week later (Korean Herald, June 25,1994). Two officials from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, one of whom headed construction at the Soviet-built nuclear facility in North Korea, said in June 1994 that North Korea has no nuclear weapons and possesses only a tiny fraction of the plutonium needed to make a

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viable nuclear device (ibid.). Georgy Kunadze, Russian ambassador to Seoul, also told a South Korean newspaper that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons (Chosun Ilbo, May 26,1994). However, an Izvestiya article quoted the text written by former Soviet KGB director Vladimir Kryuchkov in February 1990 as saying, "work has been completed on the creation of [North Korea's] first explosive nuclear device" (Korean Herald, June 25, 1994). Kozyrev later dismissed this report as "worthless." 77. Chosun Ilbo, June 18,1994. In June 1994, Aleksandr Panov revised the proposal in favor of a ten-party multinational conference by adding France and England (Chosun Ilbo, June 24,1994). 78. Cf. Rodong Shinmun, April 6,1993. 79. "Pyongyang Takes Tough Measures," Izvestiya, May 20,1993, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, June 16,1993, pp. 20-21. 80. Cf. "An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 28 (July 15,1994): 37. 81. Alessandra Stanley, "Moscow Is Miffed by U.S. Draft on Sanctions," New York Times, June 17,1994, p. A10. 82. Hanguk Ilbo, June 7,1994. 83. Valeriya Sycheva, "For Some TTiey Are Terrorists but for Others They Are Partners," Kommersant Daily, Moscow, January 10,1995, p. A4. 84. "Russia Wants Large Role in Reforming North Korean Nuclear Program," Itar-Tass, January 25,1995. 85. "Russia Unhappy over Geneva Nuclear Deal," Korea Herald, November 17,1994, p. 2. See also Boris Konovalov, "Russia Will Build Atomic Power Plant in Iran," Izvestiya, January 26,1995, p. A2. 86. Vladimir Solntsev, "Russia Insists on Delivering Nuclear Reactors to Pyongyang," Itar-Tass, April 25,1995. 87. Commersant Daily, Moscow, March 31,1995, p. A3. 88. Cf. South Korean ambassador to Moscow Kim Sok-kyu's newspaper article "Russo-Korean Relations" Dong-A Ilbo, November 18,1994. 89. However, Russia's prime minister did send condolences to North Korea (Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, "The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations," Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9 [September 1994]: 794).

U.S.-Northeast Asian Security Relations: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism Edward A. Olsen

U.S. security relations with its two Northeast Asian allies have been conducted predominantly on a bilateral basis throughout the post-World War II years. Now that the world is redefining the nature of post-Cold War security and economic relationships, various pressures exist to move toward a greater emphasis on multilateralism. This chapter will describe the scope of existing U.S. bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea and the proposed forms of multilateralism; each will be evaluated. Based on past and present experiences, I then assess the reasons why Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul are interested in expanding multilateralism and briefly appraise the options available to each. Bilateral U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea have been extensively studied.1 U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military ties with both countries are well developed. However, one may legitimately question how well they are understood and whether each set of ties with the United States is really comparable to the other as a basis for constructing a new multilateral arrangement. This issue is crucial because the concept of "bilateralism" is treated differently in each alliance. Since they are routinely described as the cornerstone of U.S.-Asia relations, U.S.-Japan ties shall be addressed first. This will, in turn, provide the context within which U.S.-South Korea ties are just as routinely considered part of the extended network based on U.S.-Japan ties. The U.S.-Japan relationship dates back to the Perry era and the role the United States played in drawing Japan out into a wider world. This, of course, started a process that led to modern Japanese national development and expansionism in an imperialist age that produced what in 131

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today's jargon could be described as regional multipolarity and rivalry among imperial states. By the early twentieth century, the United States and Japan were prominent contenders, simultaneously engaging in bilateral relations and multilateral relations. The latter were best exemplified by the successes of the 1921 Washington Conferences and the inadequacies of the League of Nations. Despite such multilateral efforts to preserve peace, the Asia Pacific region was on the path to war during the 1930s. Emphasis was placed on Western allied solidarity against the Axis powers during World War II (i.e., collective security against collective security), but when it came to the Pacific theater of that war there was little doubt that the two major antagonists were the United States and Japan. After Japan's defeat, the preponderant U.S. role in that victory yielded comparable U.S. dominance in the allied occupation of Japan. It quickly became a bilateral U.S.-Japan affair in which the United States tried to reshape Japan. Had the Cold War not disrupted that tutelage and had the period of U.S. occupation been prolonged, one can only speculate about how much more Japan might have been "Americanized." In fact, the reform efforts were foreshortened by the rise of a communist threat, and the occupation era U.S.-Japan relationship was redirected toward resurrecting Japan's strengths and harnessing them to a burgeoning system of global alliances designed to contain the "red menace." The Cold War's needs thereby established the roots of a U.S.-Japan bilateral partnership anchoring one outpost of the U.S. far-flung geopolitical interests. Space does not permit a detailed treatment of how that bilateral relationship evolved. For present purposes, it is more important to note broad themes in the relationship. Despite the contemporary scholarly debate about post-Cold War reevaluations of the origins of the Cold War and about who is to blame for what,2 when it comes to the U.S.-Japan relationship during the early Cold War years there is virtually no argument that the United States was in the driver's seat. On both sides of the Cold War, the central hegemonic state exerted enormous clout, but U.S. power was magnified in Asia and Europe by universal recognition that its strength dwarfed not only its key adversary, but also all of its allies. This sense of a hierarchy overwhelmingly dominated by the United States overshadowed and shaped the U.S.-Japan relationship for decades. Despite the "mutual security" label attached to the U.S.-Japan defense treaty and the repeated expressions by U.S. and Japanese leaders of common security interests reinforced by interdependent economic interests, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship has been long characterized by an excess of U.S. unilateralism. To some extent, this has been unavoidable. Japan has consciously rejected collective security. Soured

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by their wartime experiences, eager to reinforce their economic competitiveness by minimizing their defense expenditures, and more than willing to let the United States take the lead in risky geopolitical adventures in Asian defense, the Japanese people and their leaders adopted a low strategic profile throughout the Cold War years that persists largely intact in the post-Cold War era despite systemic pressures for change. Among the numerous examples of this adopted profile are Japan's reliance on Article 9 of its Constitution as a reason (or a pretext) not to do for itself what most countries do for themselves, Tokyo's use of its economics-first Yoshida Doctrine, its 1 percent of gross national product defense budget limitation, its Comprehensive Security Doctrine, and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles as self-imposed security policy constraints. These permitted Japan to seem to be doing something constructive for regional peace without actually taking substantial concrete actions. Such passive policies were in accord with Tokyo's reactive foreign policy tendencies. More important, however, they allowed Tokyo to act as the junior partner of Washington without obligating Japan to do anything for the United States or entangling Japan in the extended deterrence system maintained by the United States as part of its Asia policy. In short, Japan pursued a noninterventionist foreign and defense policy in conjunction with the United States during the Cold War by being what amounts to a passive silent partner of a unilateralist United States. To be sure, there were risks on Japan's part. In exchange for receiving U.S. protection and defense of regional security interests that served both Japan and the United States, Tokyo had to put Japan in danger of Soviet (and perhaps Chinese and North Korean) enmity because of the U.S. bases the Japanese had to host in order to defend themselves against these potential threats. In time, as Japan prospered economically under the U.S. security umbrella, Tokyo also was pressured by Washington to share the financial burdens for keeping U.S. forces in Japan, for bolstering Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and—during the Gulf War—for extraregional security expenses. In the wake of this last traumatic and embarrassing experience, Japan also entered into arrangements through the United Nations to contribute some SDF personnel to a peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, albeit under extraordinarily restricted rules of engagement. Despite all of these indicators of Tokyo's strategic growth over the years, the U.S.-Japan bilateral security relationship remains remarkably like it was in its formative stages: namely, a partnership dominated by U.S. unilateralism and one strikingly short of genuine reciprocity by Japan.3 Because of the peculiar qualities of the bilateral U.S.-Japan security relationship, it would be misleading to evaluate any ongoing evolution-

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ary process in this tie as part of a shift in U.S.-Asia security relations from mutually supportive bilateral ties toward interdependent multilateral ties. Japan's abstention from genuine collective security arrangements during the Cold War era's U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship remains intact now that the post-Cold War era's momentum seems to many to be leading toward strategic multilateralism. This is not to suggest that the Japanese government has abstained from the use of multilateralism as a policy instrument. In fact, at the July 1991 Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro surprised many (including the United States) by suggesting that ASEAN expand its horizons to include multilateral security discussions. That proposal initially was coolly received by ASEAN, but by the 1992 meeting of the ASEAN-PMC it had been endorsed.4 That effort was partially motivated by Japan's latest wave of public rethinking of its security agenda, this time driven by domestic pressure to do something visible as a response to the advent of the post-Cold War period in Asia. Some interpreted this move as a bold step. Actually, it was not bold at all. It should be perceived as being in harmony with Japan's preference for leaving the military aspects of security in the region to others, broadening the terms of reference about what security really means, and as yet one more effort by Japan to avoid responsibility by diffusing the distribution of obligations. This situation stands in sharp contrast to the U.S.-South Korea security relationship. Before moving on to that part of the Northeast Asian strategic situation, it is important to note two other aspects of the U.S.-Japan security relationship—broadly defined—that bear on both the comparison to the U.S.-South Korea ties and on the prospects for regional security multilateralism. First, one must note that to both the United States and Japan their bilateral military security ties are supportive of each other's economic security and regional peace and stability. Of course, neither Washington nor Tokyo explicitly speaks of linkages between commercial and military bilateral ties. Rather, each stresses its own separateness so that controversies in each realm are not permitted to contaminate perceived harmony in the other. Be that as it may, there are very clear bonds between the two sets of ties. Tokyo's comprehensive security policy is unequivocal about the important role that economic harmony and interdependency plays in Japan's national security. Washington's defense policies are more parochial in their scope, but all U.S. administrations have understood that the purpose behind providing Cold War military security for Japan and adjacent areas of Asia has been to enable their Asian allies to prosper economically and form a strategic bulwark against communism. So, in these terms of reference, the genuinely mutual bilateral economic ties

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between the United States and Japan can be treated as part of the security realm. Also, those U.S.-Japan bilateral commercial ties long ago made the partial transition to economic multilateralism through generic global interdependence and through regional and global economic institutions ranging from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. To the extent that these entities enhance regional security, they have added to the balance. Second, the U.S.-Japan bilateral military arrangements—despite all the distortions noted above—served other purposes that are usually left unsaid. Although the major and overt purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to contain the Soviet Union and its cohorts, it also was aimed at containing Japan's aspirations for greater power that might not be controllable by the United States via its strategic blueprint for Asia that did not encompass Japan. Early in the postwar period, one objective of U.S. policy was to prevent a resurgent imperial Japan. As the possibility of that threat faded and Japan gained economic strength of a superpower nature, Tokyo's potential geopolitical ambitions again became a factor to contemplate by U.S. strategists. Along with this form of "double containment," as Korea's potential for regional power became evident, the restraining influence the United States had over Japan became a form of U.S. leverage over Seoul as well—what can be considered "double containment squared."5 In a perverse way, this constituted an unexplicit form of security multilateralism that grew out of the milieu in which the two U.S. security alliances in Northeast Asia emerged. Although intriguing, these clearly are not the main contemporary forces driving a possible shift in regional security ties from bilateralism to multilateralism. Before moving on to those forces, it is necessary to assess the characteristics of U.S-South Korea bilateral security ties compared to what has prevailed in U.S.-Japan relations. Very much unlike that set of ties, the U.S.-South Korea security relationship has a long history of collectivity. However, it had a difficult start and hit some rough spots along the way. Prior to the Korean War, U.S. interest in Korean security was ambivalent at best. U.S. leaders were concerned about Korea's stability and interested in assisting the fledgling South Korea, which they helped propagate, but they were not deeply committed to South Korea. Although South Korea was a by-product of the then-evolving Cold War—along with its counterpart, North Korea—it took an attack by communist forces to entrench South Korea into the U.S.-led Western strategy. That war and the casualties suffered by South Korea and the United States (as well as other UN forces) created a shared combat experience and emotional bond that were never developed on the U.S.Japan side of the Northeast Asian strategic equation. Consequently, in

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the subsequent years there has been an undercurrent of mutual interest and collective security between the United States and South Korea that made their bilateral security relationship much more akin to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) type of connection than to anything experienced by the United States and Japan. This fostered a gap between the two Northeast Asian allies of the United States and, as important, between the characteristics of the alliances. Although there have been times when the U.S.-South Korea alliance appeared shaky—when Seoul was gripped by the South Korean Army's political machinations, in the wake of U.S. setbacks in Vietnam, and during the "Koreagate" period—on balance the alliance has been durable and has grown stronger. This was illustrated in the past by Seoul's readiness to send South Korean forces to South Vietnam to fight in a hot theater of the Cold War and its ideological enthusiasm for being a Cold War ally of the United States, and more recently, by its desire to shore up the U.S. strategic position in the western Pacific as a genuine ally—with no reservations about calling itself an ally—and its hope to join the U.S. evolving vision for an Asia Pacific strategy as a full-fledged partner. Some in the United States have been suspicious of such enthusiasm, and others have been skeptical about the wisdom of encouraging it; but there has been little doubt that the U.S.-South Korea bilateral security relationship was and is an authentic one. To be sure, this relationship also harbored elements of double containment—regarding Seoul's ambitions vis-à-vis North Korea and enforcing a leash on Japan. Both were understood, but not emphasized. Similarly, South Korea also moved by the 1970s and 1980s into a more interdependent global economic network that foreshadowed broader multilateralism. On balance, however, it was clear that Seoul wanted to cultivate its bilateral ties with the United States as long as it feasibly could. GROWTH OF MULTILATERALISM

The sorts of bilateral relationships just described between the United States and its two Northeast Asian allies sufficed for the Cold War. Had the Cold War not ended when and how it did, it is likely that those bilateral ties would persist largely unchallenged today. The processes of more intense burden sharing begun in the late Cold War years probably would have been sufficient to allow adaptation to evolving redistributions of relative power among the three countries. But the end of the Cold War brought about more than a rapid transformation of superpower tensions; it also spurred the sole remaining superpower to

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reassess its interests and purposes. This began with President Bush via a major strategic reappraisal6 and continued under President Clinton and U.S. Secretaries of Defense Aspin and Perry.7 The former administration tried, and the latter is still trying, to come to terms with domestic pressures for a "peace dividend" and to adapt what the United States has been doing strategically to post-Cold War circumstances in a safe and prudent way. This has caused more rapid shifts in the former European theater of the Cold War than it has in the Asian theater. The primary reason for this difference is the degree to which remnants of the old Cold War remain entrenched in Asia. The clearest example of this is the still-viable Korean version of the Cold War. Another example, albeit not as vivid, is the lingering friction between Japan and Russia over the so-called Northern Territories claimed by Tokyo. Each helps keep alive the rationales behind a U.S. bilateral security relationship with its Northeast Asian allies. Despite these echoes of the Cold War, no one can escape the reality that the Cold War is now over and that the Soviet Union no longer exists. Consequently, in Northeast Asia, too, there has emerged a need to restructure U.S. post-Cold War alliances to make them fit the times. As revision of the bilateral alliance relationships continues, there has been mounting interest in applying multilateral approaches to the region's issues. The Clinton administration may not have had a welldeveloped vision for what it wanted to do in the Asia Pacific region when it entered office, but it did seem to know how it wanted to deal with Asia: namely, by putting relatively greater emphasis within diplomacy and security on multilateral means than on bilateral venues. The administration's inspiration for this approach appears to stem from somewhat reluctant admiration for the ways Southeast Asian states have utilized multilateral techniques and for the successes enjoyed by fledgling economic organizations in Asia such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, and the APEC forum. 8 In any event, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord signaled the Clinton administration's intent at the start of Clinton's tenure to relax past U.S. objections to multilateralism by stating that one of the administration's ten major goals for the Asia Pacific region was "developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundation of our alliances."9 That objective was accentuated in the course of a sequence of ASEAN-based meetings in Brunei and Singapore, which included the ASEAN states plus the so-called dialogue partners (the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, and the European Community).10 President Clinton put more stress on the multilateral theme when he

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emphasized the phrase "a new Pacific community," speaking at Waseda University in Tokyo.11 This expression had been used earlier by Winston Lord, but Clinton placed it center stage internationally. In the wake of that surge of movement, the follow-up by the two U.S. Northeast Asian allies has been strikingly different. Partly because Tokyo has been preoccupied by domestic political turmoil and Japan's worst postwar economic recession, but mainly because the Japanese seem to be reluctant to let go of the well-known aspects of their bilateral security ties with the United States, there has not been as much enthusiasm in Tokyo for any serious shift away from the U.S. connection and toward greater strategic multilateralism.12 Reading between the lines of relative Japanese sluggishness, one also can sense that Japan is not yet ready to deal with troubling questions that are certain to arise if Tokyo is pressed to explain how its aversion to collective security (even vis-à-vis its sole strategic benefactor, the United States) might be made to mesh with any form of genuine multilateral security that would necessarily be collective. South Korea, in contrast, has produced many examples of apparently sincere governmental and scholarly interest in what multilateral security might do for Korea. The most prominent was the mid-1993 effort by the Kim Young-sam administration to follow in the path of the Clinton administration, both of which were relatively inexperienced in international affairs. In the immediate wake of the May 1993 ASEANPMC meetings focusing on the creation of a multilateral security forum, the South Korean government proposed a "mini-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) for Northeast Asia to be centered on the Korean peninsula.13 This idea borrowed loosely from President Roh Tae-woo's 1990 suggestion that a two-plus-four forum (the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) should try to address Korean security issues. This proposed transfer of the Palme Commission's CSCE security model from Europe to Asia was not an original thought by South Korean leaders, because Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans had taken the lead by pushing for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia counterpart to CSCE.14 South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo's innovation for the Kim administration was to try to focus this theme on Korea. Han pursued the idea of a Northeast Asian multilateral security form on several occasions during 1993. He raised the concept in Seoul meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and reported that some progress was made.15 Similarly, Han also urged support from the People's Republic of China (PRC) for the idea on the first anniversary of South Korea-PRC diplomatic normalization, saying "China and Korea can contribute to regional peace and prosperity through such multilat-

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eral mechanisms as well as promotion of bilateral relations." 16 By the end of 1993, Han expressed confidence that the Northeast Asian miniCSCE idea was gaining acceptance and that other multilateral successes, such as the Uruguay Round of GATT and the November 1993 Seattle summit of A P E C heads of state, cumulatively added momentum to the process of rallying support for a Northeast Asian regional security forum. 17 Foreign Minister Han asserted during a speech to the Asia Society in Hong Kong (en route to Beijing) that the augers were excellent, saying South Korea's notion of a subregional security forum in Northeast Asia is "an idea whose time has come." 18 That belief was echoed by a number of South Korean scholarly specialists in security affairs. One especially interesting example was an analysis by Dr. Song Young-sun, who, inter alia, compared U.S. and Japanese positions on strategic multilateralism and concluded that Tokyo is more committed to the concept than Washington. 19 Another innovative analysis was that of Professor Hwang Pyong-mu of South Korea's National Defense College, who concluded that South Korea's "security strategy for the early part of the twenty-first century should be aimed at drawing Japan and China into a multilateral Northeast Asian security cooperation mechanism while maintaining friendly and amicable relations with them, so that their power and potential as major military powers may be neutralized." 20 Both the Song and Hwang analyses described a process of maturation in South Korean strategic thinking. This is what Dr. Kim Choong-nam of the South Korean foreign ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security outlined as movement of the U.S.-South Korea relationship in the direction of "diversifying alliances."21 What does all this mean for the U.S.-South Korea security relationship? Is Seoul really ready to move in new strategic directions? Although anything is possible, it is far more likely that these levels of South Korean interest in multilateralism—while genuine—actually reflect Korean pragmatism. Faced with post-Cold War circumstances and with U.S. (and, in different respects, Japanese) experimentation with new concepts of security architectures, South Koreans have had two fundamental alternatives: They could be obstinate and insist that only bilateralism with the United States can suffice; or they could adapt to the times and learn new buzzwords. In the real world, Seoul and South Korean specialists in security affairs have not been forced to pick one or the other. Since many in the United States routinely perceive multilateral venues as a supplement to bilateral ties, it has been easy for South Korea to persist on an official bilateral track with the United States while "talking the talk" of multilateralism—both officially and on so-called second-track levels—as a way to hedge South Korean bets.

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In contrast to the skepticism expressed earlier in this analysis regarding Japan's ability to move from a form of pseudobilateralism with the United States (that is predicated on U.S. unilateralism and Japan's aversion to collective security) all the way to authentic multilateralism, thereby skipping over a phase of genuinely mutual bilateralism, the U.S.-South Korea relationship confronts nothing comparable. Despite a heavy dose of client statism in the early years of the alliance, during which South Korea was more vulnerable to U.S. unilateralist mandates than Japan ever was, that characteristic changed dramatically over the years. U.S.-South Korea security relations have been moving away, albeit sometimes fitfully, from dependency themes with their overtones of sadae jui (flunkyism) from a Korean perspective. South Korea has been progressing toward a genuine partnership with the United States as relations have matured. Unlike U.S.-Japan security ties, there has been no hothouselike artificiality in the maturing U.S.-South Korea security relationship and no arrested strategic development on the part of South Koreans comparable to that found among Japanese. As this has occurred, the United States has had to deal with a newly confident South Korea. Based on its economic strength and growing global interdependence, Seoul has, since the mid-1980s, pursued a sophisticated and nuanced foreign policy (one that is much more innovative than Japan's). Its foundation was composed of South Korea's nordpolitik and its Olympic diplomacy, which produced much broader horizons for Seoul.22 Precisely where Seoul's foreign policy may lead remains to be seen; but as of mid-1994, the Kim Young-sam administration's vaunted "New Diplomacy" was predicated on five themes: globalism, diversification, multidimensionalism, regional cooperation, and a future orientation.23 The last phrase is a catchall for inter-Korean developments, but the other four themes all reflect a broader perspective than was the norm under past U.S.-South Korea bilateralism. During 1995, the Kim administration accelerated the emphasis on globalism as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. This is a multifaceted policy. In the context of South Korean foreign relations, it represents Seoul's long-standing desire to diversify its interdependence, cultivating markets and friendly relations globally. As such, it is akin to Japan's past foreign policy initiatives that symbolized Japan's importance in international economic affairs without detracting from the importance of Tokyo-Washington bilateral ties. The moves by President Kim (and Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung) to push globalization are also part of Seoul's efforts to reduce the South Korean people's tendency to be ethnocentric by broadening their horizons and sensitizing them to other nations' cultures. This is similar to Japan's recent efforts to international-

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ize the Japanese people. Lastly, globalization also is an element in the Kim administration's domestic political agenda, burnishing its image as a player in world affairs.24 As South Korea shed its client statism, it adopted a more assertive style in its foreign and national security policies, displaying a willingness to differ with the United States when Seoul's perspectives deviate from those of Washington. As a consequence, the process of maturation in U.S.-South Korea relations is yielding a trend toward partial divergence, rather than convergence. Although this tends to put South Korea in the same position as Japan when it comes to a readiness to acknowledge and express differences with the United States, the focus of each country's differences with Washington necessarily differ because each country's national interests also differ. Perhaps the most important facet of this trend is that it reflects the ways in which U.S. post-Cold War relations with its two Northeast Asian allies are becoming less artificially constrained by the inhibitions imposed by the Cold War that reinforced U.S. unilateralist desires. The most glaring example of this gap is the fact that Washington and Seoul (and Tokyo, too) did not perceive the nuclear threat from North Korea in a like-minded manner. Despite their prudent efforts to maintain a united front against the North for Pyongyang's consumption and to emphasize the fundamentals upon which they do agree, there are strong signals that a gap exists. This was true prior to the signing of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear accord in October 1994 and remains true in its wake. For example, on the U.S. side, when the senior U.S. commander in Korea, General Gary Luck, testified before the U.S. Congress, he made it abundantly clear that he did not think the South Korean leadership was marching to the same drummer as the United States. General Luck was bluntly critical, saying he was "very troubled" by Seoul's uneven approach to dealing with North Korea.25 Hirning to South Korean examples on that issue, there is evidence that many in the country suspected U.S. hard-line policy advocates vis-à-vis North Korea—who urged either threats of military retaliation or economic sanctions to coerce improved behavior by Kim Il-sung—of being gratuitously provocative and too willing to risk a war in which mainly Koreans would suffer. Similarly, South Korean suspicions exist about U.S. commercial motives behind an effort to introduce Patriot missiles into their country and about U.S. willingness to strike a deal with North Korea that has not been cleared by Seoul.26 After the accord was signed, many South Koreans complained that U.S. people were naive and not sufficiently attuned to the needs and desires of their South Korean allies who felt they had not been adequately consulted.27 As these points suggest, U.S.-South Korea bilateralism is—at best—experiencing growing pains.

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THE PATH TO MULTILATERALISM

In a somewhat perverse manner, the frictions discussed thus far help point the way to what many see as the need for a multilateral forum for security discussions and cooperation. As the realities of the post-Cold War era become clearer, it is obvious that the once-familiar superpower dyad is no longer the structural core of international relations, and it is increasingly clear that there is little prospect anytime soon that a regulatory surrogate will materialize fulfilling the roles formerly played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, multipolarity will be a fact of life for the foreseeable future, thereby increasing the pressures to accept some form of multilateralism capable of managing the existing circumstances. The time seems right for advocates of this approach to seize the moment.28 Supplementing these pressures are additional factors that make continued bilateralism seem unsustainable and that strengthen the appeal of multilateralism. Bilateralism is being weakened by growing U.S. popular weariness with the burdens left over from the Cold War that linger in the guise of bilateral security arrangements. Increasingly, questions are being asked about why security treaties dating from the Cold War years, which were designed to meet specific conditions that no longer exist, need to be retained or reinvigorated for the post-Cold War years. The clearest arguments in that regard are heard vis-à-vis NATO. On balance, Northeast Asia has escaped most critiques of that sort.29 The persistence of Korean tensions deflects pressures for dramatic change in U.S. policy toward Korea and fosters a predisposition to be cautious regarding U.S. strategic options in Asia.30 As long as the Korean stalemate persists and Washington displays caution, gradualism will remain the hallmark of U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia. However, once the Korean dilemmas are resolved and that version of the Cold War enters the history books alongside the U.S.-USSR Cold War, the pressures within the United States to revise security arrangements in the region are likely to intensify. This prospect helps explain why existing U.S. weariness within the context of regional bilateralism is yielding interest among Asian and U.S. peoples in multilateralism as an alternative. Similarly, bilateralism with the United States chafes upon the pride and nationalism of both Japan and South Korea. Japanese nationalism was long stifled by the legacy of World War II, but Japan's economic successes stirred its nationalist soul. As much as Japan benefited from the budgetary economies and low strategic risks attendant to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, accusations of being a "free rider" in the Cold War and its virtual shirking of international duties during the Gulf War grated on the Japanese consciousness. This has encouraged the Japanese to

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explore alternative options that might supplement the U.S.-Japan security ties. These clearly include multilateralist options. "South Korean nationalism" is a bit of an oxymoron since the South is only half of the Korean nation. Nonetheless, South Koreans are often driven by nationalist sentiments. They seem to relish their escape from client-state status and its consequences, such as being on the road to an authentic partnership with the United States, and—most important here—they appear genuinely enthusiastic about multilateralism in security and economic matters as a vehicle for the Korean people to achieve parity with their neighbors and external major powers interested in Korea, notably the United States. Against this background and faced with the prospect of pressure to pursue multilateralism, it is worthwhile itemizing what the United States, Japan, and South Korea might gain from multilateralism: It would legitimize a diversified form of partnership; broaden each country's horizons; help divide costs, burdens, and decisions in ways that do not necessarily originate in Washington; and institutionalize forces capable of assuring regional peace and stability. These are the main goals that are easy to state overtly and publicly. There are other possible purposes for each participant that are not so candidly dealt with, however. For example, since both Japan and South Korea are concerned that the United States may yet waver in its commitment to the region, multilateral arrangements hold out the promise of perpetuating an entangling alliance system binding the United States in Asia. Despite that essentially shared view, Tokyo and Seoul also harbor reasons to desire multilateral arrangements with an entangled United States that are mirror opposites. Given Japan's anxieties about a divided Korea's instability and the potential dangers of a reunited Korea, Tokyo has reasons to see multilateralism as a way to keep a lid on Korea—preferably a U.S. lid. Similarly, South Korea (and North Korea, and a future possibly united Korea) have reasons to perceive multilateralism—with an entangled United States—as a way to contain Japan's potentials. Multilateral security mechanisms that would incorporate Japan promise to Asianize Japan the same way that NATO, the Western European Union, and the CSCE effectively Europeanized Germany. One must always bear in mind the reluctance of many in the Asia Pacific region to encourage Japan to harbor expanded strategic ambitions. This was expressed with particular pungency by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in 1990 when he reacted to a move by Malaysia's foreign minister to discuss Japan's possible regional security role by comparing it to being "like dragging a dead cat across the stage and plunking it down square in the middle of the conference table."31 In

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this context, any regional restraint on Japan, especially if it is sanctioned by the United States, serves Korean interests. Although these reasons may give some U.S. people cause to think twice about what they are getting into, the advantages seem to outweigh the risks for most U.S. analysts. Most important, the Clinton administration seems enamored of the benefits multilateralism may offer. The main criticism of U.S. governmental enthusiasm has come from the PRC. Various Chinese reactions have included complaints about U.S. "interventionism"32 and the decision by the leadership of the People's Liberation Army that U.S. actions in post-Cold War Asia cause them to view the United States as its main potential enemy.33 Similarly, PRC Central Military Commission Deputy Chairman Liu Huaqing views U.S. calls for multilateral cooperation as a surrogate for U.S. hegemonism and stated that the PRC "does not recognize [the] U.S. right to be [the] international policeman."34 Despite such Chinese suspicions, there is no sign that what the Clinton administration is pursuing amounts to a closet form of unilateralism designed to line up proxies to do U.S. bidding in a hegemonic manner. The prospects for Northeast Asian multilateralism are problematic. Much work will be required to reach a consensus on this approach. In the meantime, the region still has its existing bilateral venues. If and when a serious transition from bilateralism of the various sorts now in existence to some form of multilateralism occurs, all parties shall have to give serious consideration to whether it can be as, or more, effective. In practice, however, there may never be a noticeable transition from one mode to another. Instead, the region is more likely to experience the addition of added layers of multilateral cooperative arrangements on top of the various bilateral relationships. Rather than a clear-cut shift, we are more likely to live through an evolutionary process of plans, trial and error, and "muddling through." Leaders and policy analysts in Japan, Korea, and the United States must consider many nuances and contingencies as this complex situation evolves. At this point, it appears that the protagonists advocating multilateralism have the upper hand. If so, and if multilateralism can be made to work smoothly, perhaps we shall all be better off. As one who doubts the political and strategic efficacy of multilateral efforts and favors other options for the United States, it is perhaps best to conclude on a cautionary note. Lest the people of the United States, Japan, or South Korea become precipitously attached to multilateralism, they should recall Walter Lippman's warning about collective security: "Multilateralism can become the internationalism of the isolationist."35 That observation has multiple meanings for each country; but for the United States, it hints at subtleties within contemporary multilateralist efforts that can lead in boldly innovative directions.

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NOTES

1. For illustrative examples on Japan, see: I. M. Destler et al., Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 1976); John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World Leadership; A New Era for America and Japan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1989); Kataoka Tetsuya and Ramon Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); U. Alexis Johnson et al., The United States and Japan: Cooperative Leadership for Peace and Global Prosperity (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America and the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1990); and Francis Fukuyama and Oh Kong-dan, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1993). For comparable illustrative examples on South Korea, see: Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); Lee Man-woo, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Moon Chung-in, Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of South Korea-U.S. Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press and Kyungnam University Press, 1988); Harold Hinton et al., The U.S.-Korean Security Relationship: Prospects and Challenges for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); Robert Scalapino and Lee Hong-koo, eds., Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988); Nam Joo-hong, America's Commitment to South Korea (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Edward A. Olsen, U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (San Francisco and Boulder, Colo.: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview Press, 1988). 2. For a useful overview of that debate, see Karen J. Winkler, "Scholars Refight the Cold War," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 2,1994, pp. A8-9. 3.1 analyzed and criticized the overly one-way nature of the ties a decade ago in U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985). 4. For background on Nakayama's initiatives at the July 1991 ASEANPMC meeting, see Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), August 1,1991, p. 11, and an interview with Nakayama in Japan Times Weekly International Edition, January 14-20,1991, p. 7. For ASEAN's subsequent reactions, see FEER, April 29,1993, p. 26. 5. David Winterford and I examined those strategic dimensions more extensively in "Asian Multilateralism: Implications for U.S. Policy," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 6, no. 1 (summer 1994): 9-40. 6. For a mainstream treatment of that adjustment of U.S. priorities, see James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, eds., Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1992). 7. For surveys of the Clinton administration's defense policy shifts, see FEER, September 16,1993, pp. 12-13, and U.S. News and World Report, December 6,1993, pp. 30-32. 8. For analyses of these precedents, see Andrew Elek, "Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)," Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore and Boulder, Colo.: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies and Westview Press, 1991), pp. 33-48; and Stuart Harris, "Varieties of Pacific Economic Cooperation," Pacific Review, vol. 4, no. 4 (1991): 301-311.

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9. See Lord's testimony at his U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Policy." See also, "Ten Goals for the Future," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June-July 1993, p. 15. 10. For coverage of those meetings, see New York Times, May 23,1993, p. 9, and FEER, May 27,1993, p. 19. 11. Text (broadcast on the Cable News Network) from America Online, July 8,1993. 12. For a more upbeat assessment of Japanese attitudes toward multilateralism, see Soeya Yoshihide, "The Evolution of Japanese Thinking and Policies on Cooperative Security in the 1980s and 1990s," Australian Journal of International Affairs (May 1994). 13. Korea Herald, May 23,1993, pp. 1-2. 14. For background on these precedents, see Palme Commission, "Common Security: A Program for Disarmament," Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (London: Pan Books, 1982); and Stuart Harris, '"Architecture for a New Era' in Asia/Pacific," Pacific Research, May 1990, pp. 8-9. 15. Korea Herald, July 13,1993, p. 5. 16. Korea Herald, August 25,1993, p. 1. 17. Korea Herald, December 29,1993, p. 2. 18. Quoted in Frank Ching, "Securing Northeast Asia," FEER, November 11,1993, p. 42. 19. Song Young-sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (summer 1993): 185-206. 20. Hwang Pyong-mu, "Fears Renew Sino-Japan Military Rivalry," Wolgan Chungang, July 1993, pp. 518-529, in Foreign Broadcasting Information ServiceEast Asia, September 29,1993, pp. 28-33. 21. The Korea America Friendship Society's Pacific Bridge, July-August 1993, p. 3. 22.1 addressed these developments in greater detail in "An American Perspective on Evolving Russo-Korean Rapprochement," in Chung Il-yung, ed., Korea and Russia: Toward the Twenty-first Century (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1993); and "The Diplomatic Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation," in Sheldon Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). 23. Han Sung-joo, "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy: New Korea's Diplomacy Toward the World and the Future," Korea and World Affairs (summer 1993): 227-245. 24. For background on South Korea's globalization campaign, see Korea Herald, November 18,1994, p. 1, and coverage of President Kim's New Year's address in Korea Update, January 23,1995. 25. New York Times, March 3,1994, p. 3. 26. Wall Street Journal, March 7,1994, p. A9. 27. For sympathetic U.S. analyses of this matter, see the Heritage Foundation's Backgrounder, no. 236 (January 13, 1995), and Committee Brief, no. 9 (March 4,1995). 28. For insightful analyses of the prospects for these approaches, see Robert Scalapino, "Historical Perceptions and Current Realities Regarding Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation," York University, North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme (NPCSD), working paper no. 20, October 1992; and James T. H. Tang, "Multilateralism in Northeast Asian International

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Security: An Illusion or a Realistic Hope?" York University, NPCSD, working paper no. 26, April 1993. 29. For dissenting examples of new thinking regarding Asia, looking toward the post-Cold War era, see Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., Collective Defense or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the Future (Washington, D.C., and Lexington, Mass.: Cato Institute and Lexington Books, 1989); and Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1992). 30. Richard Ellings and I evaluated the array of options open to the United States in "A New Pacific Profile," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 116-136. 31. Quoted in Washington Post Weekly, August 13-19,1990, p. 18. 32. See, for example, Mei Zhenmin, "The United States Should Draw a Lesson from the Yinhe Incident," Liaowang, Beijing, September 13,1993, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-China (FBIS-China), September 21,1993, p. 8; and Sa Benwang, "The 'New Defense Project' Which Pursues a 'New Interdependenc Theory,'" Liaowang, overseas ed., September 27,1993, in FBIS-China, October 7,1993, p. 6. 33. New York Times, November 16,1993, p. A5. 34. Quoted in Chen Shao-pin, "China Does Not Yield to Hegemonism," Ching Pao, Hong Kong, July 5,1993, in FBIS-China, July 9,1993, p. 6. 35. Quoted in Michael Kramer, "Clinton's Feel Good Strategy," Time, May 17,1993, p. 36.

U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia: Handmaiden of Export Promotion? Thomas L. Wilborn

The United States entered the post-Cold War era with a security policy toward Northeast Asia widely accepted by most governments and also apparently successful in achieving the primary U.S. regional security objective: a relatively stable and tranquil region.1 The Clinton administration adopted the main features of this policy, which was fully compatible with its determination that foreign policy should support the number one national priority of fostering domestic economic growth and social cohesion. It also inherited in North Korea's nuclear weapons program its most serious regional security problems: an implicit threat to the security of the region (especially allies South Korea and Japan) and a serious challenge to a high-priority U.S. global interest, the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Although Washington under Clinton would prefer to concentrate exclusively on maintaining regional stability, it has in fact necessarily had to expend a great deal of energy and assume significant risks to deal with Pyongyang's nuclear challenge. The North Korean nuclear issue illustrates the difficulty for a global power such as the United States to reconcile conflicting regional and global security objectives in the post-Cold War, multipolar international system. Washington's attempt to do so in this case resulted in the Agreed Framework process, an innovative and unprecedented experiment to mobilize regional and international support for a program that, if it works, will preserve the NPT regime and establish procedures to resolve the fundamental barriers to stability on the Korean peninsula. The purpose of this chapter is to describe, analyze, and, to some degree, evaluate current U.S. security policy for Northeast Asia. Special 149

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attention is given to the North Korean nuclear weapons issue and the continuing North-South Korea confrontation, since they are the most critical regional security concerns for the United States and the central focus of this volume.

BROAD OUTLINES OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR NORTHEAST ASIA

Regional stability is the overarching long-term security objective of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, as it has been since the end of the Cold War.2 Presently, the main overt challenge to security comes from North Korea, which confronts the U.S.-South Korea alliance with the most robust security threat left over from the Cold War plus a more recently imposed North Korean regional and global threat to the NPT regime. Other challenges to stability are implicit in the nature of the still-evolving, relatively decentralized international system that has replaced the bipolar structure of the Cold War. North Korean Threats

Since 1953, the United States has been committed to deterring, or if necessary helping defeat, North Korean aggression against South Korea. This commitment has been consistently interpreted by U.S. officials as a matter directly involving U.S. security—a vital interest—and not only a formal commitment to support an ally under threat or to preserve tranquility to maintain a good business climate. The same number of U.S. troops—perhaps a few more—remain on the Korean peninsula as before Clinton's inauguration.3 A U.S. general still heads the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command.4 And President Clinton has expressed the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea at least as strongly as did any of his predecessors.5 North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its challenge to the NPT regime were the catalyst for the unusually strong reaffirmation by Washington of its commitment to South Korea. Should Pyongyang, which is testing missiles believed to have a range of 1,000 nautical miles, also acquire nuclear weapons, all of South Korea and Japan (plus large areas of China and Russia) would be vulnerable. It is an understatement to say that this is a threat to regional stability. Apart from reaffirming its alliance with Seoul and the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework discussed below, Washington's response within the region has included marginal improvements in its forces stationed in Korea, expressions of solidarity with Japan, extremely active diplomacy, and the announcement that the United States, in part as a direct response to the North Korean

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threat, would not reduce the strength of its military forces in Northeast Asia as previously planned.6 North Korea's nuclear weapons program is not just a regional issue; as noted above, it also involves a major U.S. global interest: nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, specifically, the integrity of the NPT. In negotiating the issue with North Korea, Washington continually had difficulty reconciling the regional objectives of supporting its ally, South Korea, and fostering regional stability, with the global objective of stopping Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and protecting the integrity of the NPT.7 Forceful action to prevent proliferation might have provoked conflict on the peninsula, or a conciliatory approach could conflict with the interests of South Korea and/or Japan. The same kinds of tensions have characterized, and will continue to characterize, implementation of the Agreed Framework. To make the agreement work in spite of these and other difficult problems, Washington accepted the responsibility of mediating between its longtime enemy, North Korea, and its longtime ally, South Korea. This is an unprecedented role for a major power, certainly for the United States.8 The formula adopted for preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons—furnishing relatively proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) to replace North Korea's relatively proliferation-prone graphite reactors—is also a unique solution. Impossible to imagine in a bipolar world, the U.S. role and the solution illustrate the opportunities for flexibility, as well as the uncertainties, in the emerging multipolar international system. Uncertainty in Post-Cold War International Politics

Generally speaking, regional stability seems to be challenged by the very nature of an evolving international system characterized by decentralization and diffusion of power.9 Uncertainty has replaced the more or less predictable patterns of behavior associated with the bipolar structure of the Cold War. That uncertainty is not only derived from the disintegration of the Soviet Union—once the supporter, ally, and restrainer of North Korea—but more noticeably from the widely held perception that the United States, fatigued from carrying the burdens of world leadership and plagued by unfavorable economic conditions at home, will disengage from the region. The priority placed on Asia by the Clinton administration has not yet reversed that perception. If the United States disengages, many regional leaders foresee the reemergence of old antagonisms and a greatly enhanced probability of conflict. More specifically, if the United States weakens its security relationship with Japan, they fear that a politically active Japan will pursue independent policies that

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will be increasingly enforced by an increasingly offensive military capability.10 Other regional observers (and often the same observers) believe that an assertive China will seek to fill the "vacuum" that will appear as U.S. forces are pulled back. To forestall this development (and to respond to strong U.S. pressure), the Japanese government is increasing its burden sharing to include all yen costs for U.S. forces stationed in Japan in fiscal year 1995, and Korea has also agreed to greater contributions.11 Even Chinese officials sometimes support the continued presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia as a guarantee of stability.12 Some of the observers, especially in China, also increasingly support greater military expenditures for their own nations in the uncertain conditions of the evolving world order.13 The United States continues to try to provide assurance that it will remain engaged in Northeast Asia through its security cooperation programs and forward military presence. Bilateral relationships between the United States and other nations in the region have been the principal basis for U.S. security policy since the 1950s. These include not only the formal mutual security alliances with Japan and South Korea, but also the less formal security relationships with China and Taiwan. During the Cold War, they provided an extremely effective way for the United States to optimally mobilize the very diverse nations of East Asia to advance U.S. security objectives, specifically the containment of the Soviet Union. These bilateral relationships are still mutually beneficial and provide the United States with the ability to influence regional events. Moreover, to precipitously eliminate or undermine these ties would be very destabilizing and would clearly not support U.S. regional objectives. As a matter of policy initiated by the present administration, the United States also seeks to work through multilateral arrangements. Forward military presence, the second principal strategic concept of U.S. security policy, is different from forward deployed forces (the terminology of the Cold War) in that the latter, as in Korea, have a specific mission of deterrence and defense against an identified enemy.14 Conversely, personnel that make up forward military presence, which account for most U.S. forces in the Pacific, have more ambiguous military missions designed to achieve the political objective of providing assurance of a stable regional order for friends and allies. These include contingency planning and training, often in combined exercises with the military of regional states, and other military-to-military contacts. At the same time, forward military presence forces must also have the capability to perform real combat missions that might be required in the region if they are to remain credible. If forward military presence in the region provides assurance that the region will remain relatively stable, then providing that assurance

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satisfies the broad objectives of the United States, as well as those of most governments in the region. A s U.S. government spokespeople frequently assert, military presence not only allows the United States to influence military balances and prevents resort to violence in some disputes, but more important, it permits the United States to be an "honest broker," 15 mediating among contestants to find acceptable solutions. Honest brokers will also be present to defend their own interest and gain intimate knowledge about regional developments that could influence their own objectives in the future. Honest brokers have access to decisionmaking centers within the region, still an objective of U.S. policy. The other security objectives that normally have been mentioned in the post-Cold War era are still goals of U.S. policy. They include defending U.S. territory, protecting U.S. citizens and property, assisting in the defense of allies, protecting sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs) important for international commerce, countering the proliferation of WMD, and restricting trade in narcotics. Except for these last two objectives, these goals are not now being challenged in Northeast Asia; if they were, they would be assigned high-priority status.

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION INNOVATIONS Focus on East Asia and the Pacific There have been three important innovations in Northeast Asia policy. First, along with the balance of the Pacific Rim, Northeast Asia has received far more attention from the Clinton administration than it received from the Bush, or any other previous, administration. A s a dynamic region experiencing the highest rates of economic growth in the world, Northeast Asia is critical to the expansion of U.S. exports and the rejuvenation of the U.S. economy. Through his visits to Tokyo and Seoul and by hosting the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, President Clinton dramatically and personally asserted the new priority on the Pacific early in his administration. The greatest significance of the "Pacific Community" concept, introduced by Assistant Secretary of State Lord and the president but never clearly defined, 16 may be to reinforce the message that Asia and the Pacific really matter to the United States:17 It is no longer a secondary region, important only if it contributes to the global geostrategic interests of the United States, as it was during the Cold War. And in a military sense, East Asia and the Pacific is also no longer an "economy of force" theater, as it was throughout the Cold War, except for the periods of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. U.S.

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forces in Europe and Asia are now about balanced, with approximately 100,000 stationed in each theater.18 Primacy of Economics over Security The second innovation of the Clinton administration's Northeast Asia policy, closely related to the first, is the primacy of economics over security and other aspects of foreign policy. To an important degree, the benchmark of domestic policy—jobs, jobs, and more jobs—is also the primary standard of foreign policy, especially in this region of mature and maturing economies that should be attractive markets for U.S. industry and sophisticated technology. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance is no longer primarily the linchpin of U.S. policy in the Pacific because of its contribution to the maintenance of peace and security (i.e., containment of the Soviet Union); it is primarily the linchpin of U.S. policy because Japan is the largest overseas market for U.S. exports and because its economy and that of the United States are connected by a complex pattern of interdependence that binds the economic fates of the two nations together. The pursuit of stability as the overarching security objective is no longer rationalized and justified primarily in terms of preserving a just international order, as it was during the Bush administration; stability is now most desirable to maintain the environment in which U.S. business can effectively compete and provide employment for workers in the United States. Economics was clearly an important factor in the approach of previous administrations also, but it was rarely articulated as the central focus of regional policy. U.S. economic policy per se will not be discussed in this chapter, but readers should be aware that economic issues are primary factors in U.S. relations with the nations of the region, especially Japan and China. In East Asia, the exception to the primacy of economics is in Korea, where traditional security concerns continue to dominate South Korea-U.S. relations. A casual reading of the Seoul press will demonstrate that economics is also important in these relations, however. The pursuit of economic objectives has not yet seriously interfered with other aspects of U.S. relations with Japan. In spite of a seemingly never-ending series of disputes over trade and economic issues, other bilateral activities seem to proceed unabated. Security cooperation, including a wide array of bilateral military programs, remains strong. Japan, which would be a probable target of a North Korean nuclear capability, has worked closely with the United States through the tortuous U.S.-North Korea negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework; participated fully in creating the Korea Energy Development Organiza-

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tion (KEDO), the international consortium that is to fund and oversee the construction of LWRs in North Korea; and provided political and financial support as Washington has attempted to implement the agreement. In spite of complaints by some of its citizens, Japan continues to make the largest contribution among U.S. allies for the maintenance of U.S. forces within its territory.19 However, it may be difficult to continue isolating U.S.-Japan security cooperation from contentious economic issues, particularly when negotiating positions and rhetoric become extremely heated, as in the dispute over access for U.S. automobile manufacturers to Japan's market. On both sides of the Pacific, legislators, media, and the public may demand linkage. In the case of U.S.-China relations, the issue of human rights has always been an obstacle to close ties, economic and otherwise. For the Clinton administration, placing a high priority on expanding both SinoU.S. economic ties and the practice of human rights, the dilemma is especially troublesome. The president issued an executive order requiring that Beijing improve its human rights record before most-favorednation (MFN) trading status would be recognized. Yet, with very little evidence of compliance, he did in fact extend MFN status to China in June 1994 and also delinked the two issues for the future. Renewal of MFN status for China is said to have involved 167,000 U.S. high-tech jobs.20 This dilemma is another classic example of the conflict of foreign policy objectives. Many analysts, including myself,21 had expected that there would be fewer such conflicts in the post—Cold War era. Without a global enemy, they believed that the United States would not be diverted from supporting democracy over dictatorship and respect for human rights over repression. That conclusion does not seem to be justified. The expansion of economic well-being may have replaced containment of the Soviet Union as the predominant foreign policy objective that trumps idealistic goals, especially the expansion of human rights. Yet the U.S. preoccupation with human rights interfered with the attainment of security objectives as well. The United States cannot begin to influence China to assume responsible regional roles or avoid activities that might disturb the stability of East Asia unless it has access to Chinese policymakers. That access is far less likely to occur, and U.S. arguments are far less likely to be persuasive, when there is confrontation over emotional, ideological issues such as human rights. Linking human rights and other aspects of U.S.-China relations may not improve conditions in China anyway. Many observers argue that human rights are likely to be recognized more broadly in China because of improvements in standards of living, rather than because of admonitions from any foreign power.22

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Priority on economics in U.S.-China relations does not exclude all other activities, of course. Besides the discussions and dissension on human rights (which continue to take place and continue to be rejected by Beijing), the United States and China are engaged in bilateral and multilateral contacts on a full range of regional issues, as well as the global issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Washington has sought, and presumably has received, assistance from Beijing, one of the few governments that may be able to influence Pyongyang, in its ongoing effort to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. In fact, Chinese officials seem willing to use their "North Korean card" as a way of gaining concessions in other areas of bilateral relations with the United States, although they would never admit to such a practice publicly. Bilateral security discussions and military-to-military contacts, suspended after the Tiananmen Square episode, are also beginning again. The United States and Taiwan both benefit from economic interchange. But economics is not the only basis for U.S.-Taiwan relations. There are at least three other reasons why Washington will retain its unofficial ties with Taipei: A robust Taiwan contributes to a stable balance of power in the region; security assistance is mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979; and Taiwan has many supporters in Congress and the public. Priority on economics has also provided a basis for marginally upgrading "unofficial" relations with Taiwan, the sixth largest trading partner with the United States. Washington permitted Taipei to change the name of its representative offices in the United States from the North American Coordination Council to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, relaxed some restrictions on contacts between U.S. and Taiwanese government officials, and permitted a cabinet-level official to visit Taipei in a private capacity. These largely symbolic steps may have benefited U.S.-Taiwan economic and other relations, but they also strained U.S. ties with the mainland.23 Beijing reacted to the decision to allow Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come to the United States in a private capacity to receive an honorary degree from Cornell University in June 1995 with particularly strong condemnation, even though State Department spokespeople reiterated that the United States recognizes only one Chinese government, the People's Republic of China (PRC). Similar protests against U.S. moves benefiting Taiwan have always been followed by some kind of retaliation, usually limited actions such as canceling high-level visits. Beijing's rhetoric in its protests over Lee's trip to the United States, which Chinese officials say was tantamount to recognizing "two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan," was much harsher and prolonged than previous criticisms, and the PRC ambassador in Washington was recalled for consultation.

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Support of Multilateralism The third innovation of the Clinton administration is the support for multilateral approaches in dealing with East Asia's security problems. In the previous administration, multilateralism was rejected in favor of reliance entirely on existing bilateral alliances. The best security structure for the region consisted of a fan "with its base in North America and radiating west across the Pacific."24 The Clinton administration has reaffirmed existing security alliances, but it has also called for "new machinery," multilateral in character, to supplement U.S. bilateral arrangements in dealing with existing and, more important, emerging security problems.25 Washington does not advocate developing new comprehensive agencies, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia or the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, in this context. Presumably, the multilateral agencies are to be constructed for specific problems and vary in membership and structure as required. According to President Clinton: The challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade ... is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements can function like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns.26

KEDO may illustrate this multilateral concept: It is the only new multilateral arrangement to emerge in Northeast Asia. It was created to meet a special need—the problem of providing North Korea with LWRs—and it includes a limited membership, namely, only those governments willing and able to contribute. The Clinton administration has rhetorically placed great emphasis on the two Asia Pacific forums, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) and the new ASEAN Regional Forum. They include China, Japan, and South Korea, but their membership is much broader, and they do not necessarily give priority to Northeast Asian concerns. The United States has also expressed willingness to participate in security dialogues or a security structure related to Korea after the nonproliferation issue has been resolved. However, it did not support the Russian initiative of March 1994 to form a multilateral forum to deal with the North Korea nuclear weapons problem.27 In the spirit of multilateralism or Pacific community, the Clinton administration has expressed a willingness to listen—to let nations of the region suggest the solutions to regional problems, rather than to dictate them from Washington.28 Whether the Clinton administration has acted, or will act, in accordance with these promises is still unclear.

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IS U.S. SECURITY POLICY SUCCESSFUL? I have argued in the past, mostly before the end of the Cold War, that U.S. security policy in Northeast Asia has been, on balance, successful. 29 That is, it has focused on the correct objectives, it used the right strategic concepts, and it did not require more resources than were reasonable given potential benefits. I tend to believe that this is still a correct assessment, although some aspects of current policy show cause for concern. The Absence of a Grand Conceptual Guide The preeminence of domestic economic health as the long-term overarching objective of U.S. policy, security and otherwise, is extremely unsatisfactory for many observers, particularly those, like myself, who were initiated into the community of defense intellectuals during the height of the Cold War. Some of us tend to idealize U.S. policy in the post-World War II era as an elegant structure of compatible parts constructed on the sure and solid foundation of containment. In reality, U.S. policy during the Cold War frequently had many ragged edges and questionable compromises, but it probably is true that the existence of a threat to survival and a relatively well-reasoned basis for action did provide an unusually effective set of standards for choosing among alternative courses of action and alternative objectives. Moreover, a consensus formed around containment that more or less lasted for some forty years. Finally, politics of the Cold War involved grand strategy and sweeping geopolitical concepts—the proper realms for great statespersons and their would-be advisers. The focus on economics, on the other hand, requires that statespersons and their advisers preoccupy themselves not with high politics, but with the concerns of merchants and traders. That may not be a step down, but many think it is. A t any rate, in a decentralized international system in which no actor threatens the survival of the United States and many U.S. values seem to have relatively widespread acceptance, it is futile to seek an elegant geopolitical theory to guide U.S. foreign policy. Unless the nation is to aspire to world hegemony, there seems to be no organizing concept—no one has suggested one—that can neatly structure and rationalize U.S. foreign policy. However, if an elegant conceptual scheme to guide foreign policy is unattainable, it still ought to be possible to develop actions and positions that, at least in the near term, have a fair degree of consistency and predictability. This may not always have been the case of Northeast Asian security policy in the post-Cold War era.

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Coordination of Elements of Foreign Policy While diplomats and generals lost their monopoly over the execution of foreign policy many decades ago, the U.S. emphasis on international economics has brought more and more diverse elements of the bureaucracy into the foreign policy process than were formerly there. This alone has made policy coordination more complex and cumbersome. Moreover, it is not merely a matter of numbers. The traditional U.S. foreign policy organizations, the Departments of Defense and State, although they certainly have different perspectives on the U.S. positions in the world, do share a set of norms and understandings that have evolved through close association in representing the United States abroad and executing foreign policy decisions. They are also both members of, and subject to, the National Security Council. The agencies given prominence by the priority on international economics, particularly the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, represent private constituencies and do not necessarily accept the orientation toward international politics of the Departments of State and Defense. They also bring to the table skills and styles developed in domestic bargaining among private concerns, as contrasted to the skills and styles of diplomats and military officers obtained in international negotiations. The United States will have increasing difficulty attaining its objectives in the security and other foreign policy arenas until better coordination of the diverse participants in the U.S. foreign policy process can be achieved, which may require revamping the interagency machinery or creating new coordinating bodies. Stability as a U.S. Security Objective In Northeast Asia The overarching regional security objective of assuring stability conforms to the desires of the governments in the region, and, in the near term at least, it is also clearly in the interests of the United States: A tranquil, secure Northeast Asia is obviously more desirable than a region that is full of tensions or torn by conflict. Stability and a secure regional environment are preconditions to fully achieving the preeminent objective of all U.S. foreign policy in the region: expanding U.S. exports. U.S. business competes best in mature markets where there is a demand for high-technology manufacturing and information products. This kind of market exists in Japan, the largest overseas market for U.S. exports, and is evolving in the rest of the region, as well as in Southeast Asia. But if there are threats to the regimes controlling these developing markets, the leaders may become distracted and resources reallocated from economic development. To the degree

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that this happens, the evolution of mature economies and profitable markets for U.S. exports is at least delayed, and perhaps precluded. In some nations that command strategic SLOCs, the lack of security can also impede the free transportation of commodities. In the long term, however, there is a fundamental problem in identification of U.S. policy with stability, a term never clearly defined in policy statements, but one that appears to mean maintaining the status quo.30 Supporting the status quo as a long-term policy is clearly unacceptable in principle, and it is also likely to be counterproductive in practice. Northeast Asia, like the rest of East Asia, is a highly dynamic region. Except for Japan, which is economically and politically "advanced" by most measures, states of the region are rapidly moving, unevenly and by different formulas, from relatively underdeveloped political and economic systems to relatively mature, modern ones. It is inevitable that there will be demands for changes in regional and international relationships and institutions, and many of these demands will probably be justified. Moreover, besides being potentially objectionable to regional nations, the status quo will not necessarily serve the national interests of the United States in the future. Stability must be redefined to incorporate orderly change. The U.S. commitment to assist in the defense of South Korea—and thereby hopefully to deter an attack from the North—goes beyond the concept of assuring stability: It is an obligation that can be honored only through the threat or use of force, so ends cannot be separated from means when considering this issue, even for analytical purposes. For forty years after the Korean War, most U.S. and South Korean analysts believed that a North Korean attack was deterred primarily by U.S. forces stationed in Korea and U.S. forces capable of reinforcing from other locations. Today, however, although North Korea has increased the lethality and numbers of its forces dramatically, South Korean armed forces have significantly improved and provide a very credible portion of the deterrent.31 They would probably be able to ultimately defeat a North Korean attack unassisted. But the casualties, especially among the civilian population of Seoul, could be devastating. Thus, the continued presence of U.S. forces still deters that very undesirable possibility. It can, and has been, argued that the United States no longer has a responsibility to deter because South Korea can (or should be able to) do so without help.32 My personal view is that the relationship between the United States and South Korea that has been maintained for over forty years should not be abandoned as long as North Korea poses a threat. After all, the United States does bear responsibility, with the Soviet Union, for the division of the peninsula.33 Moreover, conflict on the peninsula could—and almost surely would—have ramifications through-

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out the region, especially in Japan. This obligation is a Cold War relic that should continue to be honored. In the near term, with 37,000 U.S. troops deployed in South Korea, defense of U.S. personnel and defense of South Korea are indistinguishable. Moreover, because of North Korea's suspected nuclear capability, the objective of restraining proliferation of WMD is intertwined with the treaty commitment to the South. The Agreed Framework may lead to a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula, but it will not reduce the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the presence of U.S. forces unless North-South relations and the offensive deployments of North Korean forces fundamentally change. Strategic Concepts: The Ways of Security Policy The principal strategic concepts employed in Northeast Asia to assure stability are mutual security alliances with Japan and South Korea and forward military presence. Both of these approaches require the expenditure of significant sums of tax receipts, and both are accompanied by the risk that the United States may become involved in disputes that it would prefer to avoid, or that it may be required to engage in conflict on behalf of an ally. That is a clear and present danger in Korea today. It clearly would be desirable for the United States to achieve its regional objectives with less costs and fewer risks. But the alliances and forward military presence may be necessary operations if the United States is to influence events in the region. As unfortunate as it may be, East Asian leaders place an inordinately high value on the military role of the United States. The ties between Northeast Asia and the United States are not supported by common experiences and common values with deep historical roots. Indeed, for the most part, they are an outgrowth of the network of military alliances forged in over a four-decade span to prosecute the Cold War. Networks of business and professional relationships between the people of Northeast Asia and the United States, while they are developing rapidly, do not yet match similar ties between the United States and Europe. It is understandable, then, that in the perceptions of many Northeast Asian policymakers, U.S. engagement in the region means military engagement. Correspondingly, they believe that the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces will necessarily be the harbinger of complete disengagement from the region.34 Moreover, U.S. bilateral alliances still provide the only effective security structure for all of East Asia. ASEAN provides forums for security dialogue that include three of the governments of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea), but there is no framework for

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military cooperation, confidence-building measures, or arms control. For the United States to withdraw or diminish the credibility of any of its alliances in East Asia, particularly the two in Northeast Asia, could increase the already troubling sense of uncertainty and unpredictability. The alliance with Japan is especially important in assuring a stable regional environment. In the context of the alliance with the United States, leaders of the region can accept, perhaps even welcome, a relatively active role by Japan. The specter of Japan acting independently is one of the most pervasive fears in East Asia, however. The Clinton administration's idea, not yet a reality, of multilateral agencies to supplement U.S. bilateral relationships in providing a framework for security dialogue and cooperation offers the potential to redress the most troubling aspects of the current approaches to achieving security objectives in East Asia. A network of security structures could not only deal with the universe of common security concerns, as President Clinton suggested to the South Korean National Assembly, but it could itself provide a degree of assurance of regional stability, thus allowing a lower degree of direct involvement by the United States. Furthermore, the individual agencies would have the capacity to introduce and implement change into the regional system, operationalizing a definition of stability that is not identical to maintaining the status quo. In a more specific sense, the execution of U.S. policy within the context of a network of security organizations would promote regional security by enmeshing China and Japan in an array of organizations that could constrain their behavior and affect the perceptions of leaders of the region about their intentions. Resources and Risks of U.S. Security Policy In Northeast Asia Assuming the absence of conflict, the material costs of U.S. security policy in Northeast Asia are not outrageously high. Michael W. Chinworth and Dean Cheng estimated in 1991 that the costs of forward military presence in all of East Asia and the Pacific, including the now-closed bases in the Philippines, was $42 billion. That is a tidy sum, but not excessive if it provides the conditions "without which economic growth cannot occur."35 Without the Philippine bases, with somewhat smaller contingents in South Korea and Japan, and with Japan and South Korea assuming larger proportions of the cost of maintaining U.S. bases in their countries, the figure will be even less today. If a network of security organizations evolves in Northeast Asia, the United States may be able to achieve its regional objectives with less direct military involvement and the expenditure of fewer resources.

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The risks of future involvement in conflict, and the human costs if conflict occurs, cannot be calculated so easily. Are the benefits of U.S. security policy worth the risks and potential costs, particularly human costs? That is the question that the nation's highest political leaders must ultimately consider whenever the United States engages in international politics, in Asia or elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

The question posed in the title of this chapter has not yet been directly answered. Is U.S. security policy for Northeast Asia really primarily about exports? The Clinton administration has clearly emphasized international trade in its foreign policy and wants security policy to support U.S. economic goals by contributing to a stable region. However, as important as expanding exports may be, the pursuit of economic benefits has never been, and can never become, the single rationale for U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy must reflect U.S. values, which may incorporate the virtue of profit and commercial success, but which may also recognize security, democracy, and human rights as desirable political ends. Although the United States will always seek certain national goals, expansion of exports being the most prominent at this time, much foreign "policy" will consist of reactions to external events that offend U.S. values or threaten U.S. interests. Thus, in Northeast Asia, the United States almost endangered its economic position in China in order to support human rights and has led an international coalition to forestall the development of a nuclear capability by North Korea even though these actions have not directly advanced U.S. economic interests. Indeed, the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea signed in Geneva in October 1994 will very likely ultimately cost the United States a tremendous amount and has clearly complicated Washington's relations with a longtime ally, South Korea.36

NOTES

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 1. See Thomas L. Wilborn, How Northeast Asians View Their Security (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991); and almost all reporting on security matters in the New York Times and other national newspapers.

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2. One can argue that stability has been the main long-term security objective in Northeast Asia since the end of World War II; but while the Cold War raged, the principal objective was always conceptualized in terms of containment, first of international communism and later of the Soviet Union and North Korea. 3. Some 800 personnel in Patriot missile batteries are now being redeployed to South Korea. The previously planned limited reduction of personnel assigned to U.S. Forces Korea was suspended because of the North Korean nuclear program. 4. By virtue of an agreement ratified at the South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in 1994, armistice-period operational control of South Korean forces (exercised since 1950 by the U.S. Commander-in-Chief UN Command/Combined Forces Command [CINCUNC/CFC]) reverted to the South Korean chain of command. During wartime, operational control will revert to CINCUNC/CFC. 5. William J. Clinton, "Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community," address before the National Assembly of South Korea, Seoul, July 10, 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch (hereafter, Dispatch), vol. 4, no. 29 (July 19,1993): 509-513. 6. United States Security Strategy for the East Asian-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995), p. 32. 7. For accounts of the negotiations, see William E. Berry Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response," INSS Occasional Paper 3, Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, March 1995; Young Whan Kihl, "Confrontation or Compromise on the Korean Peninsula: The North Korean Nuclear Issue," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 6, no. 2 (winter 1994): 101-130; and Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, "North Korea's Nuclear Program," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 233-252. 8. For an elaboration of this point and its potential consequences for the United States, see Thomas L. Wilborn, Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995). 9. Wilborn, How Northeast Asians View Their Security, pp. 63-82. 10. See ibid., p. 50. 11. Details on the expenses to be borne by Japan are found in Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan: 1993, trans. Japan Times, Ltd. (Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd., 1993), pp. 75-76. For burden sharing by South Korea, see Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1993-1994 (Seoul: Korean Institute of Defense Analysis, Ministry of National Defense, 1994), pp. 121-122.

12. Beijing Review, vol. 35, no. 50 (December 14,1992): 31-32. During interviews on March 2 and 7,1995, several Chinese told me that a temporary U.S. military presence in the region was unnecessary but acceptable. 13. For details on military spending in the region, see Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The Military Build-up in Asia-Pacific," Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1992): 197-207. 14. See Thomas L. Wilborn, Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy for the Pacific (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), pp. 13-15, for a discussion of the concept of "forward presence."

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15. Charles R. Larson, "Uncertainties,Hirbulence Head Concerns," Defense 1992 (July-August 1992): 41; and James Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5 (winter 1991/92): 5. 16. See Winston Lord, "Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 31,1993," Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14 (April 5,1993): 216-218; and Clinton, "Fundamentals of Security." 17. In 1991, a Singapore scholar told me that during a briefing for foreign scholars at the State Department, the speaker asserted that Asia was not very important to the United States—certainly not as significant as Europe or Latin America. Whatever words the briefer actually used, today presumably care would be taken not to convey a similar impression. 18. See William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995), p. C2. 19. For example, see "DA to Cut Budget for U.S. Forces Expenses," Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17,1994, p. 1, and "'Limited Growth' of USFJ [United States Forces Japan] Costs Reviewed," Mainichi Shimbun, August 19, 1994, p. 28, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia, August 22,1994, pp. 5 and 6, respectively. 20. As stated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Beijing (Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Big Business Urges Renewal of China Trade Ties," New York Times, March 14,1994, p. A3). 21. Wilborn, Roles for the Army, p. 10. 22. For a comprehensive statement of this position, see William H. Overholt, "U.S. Economic Policy Toward China," paper prepared for presentation to U.S.-Japan Consultative Group on Policy Toward the People's Republic of China, Asia Society, New York, December 18-19,1991; revised February 7,1992. 23. The alterations were not always favorably received in Taiwan either. See Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Clinton's New Taiwan Policy—A Step Forward or Backward?" unpublished paper, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan, n.d. 24. Baker, "America in Asia," p. 5. 25. Winston Lord, "Statement Before the Senate," p. 220. 26. Clinton, "Fundamentals of Security," p. 511. 27. Russia proposed an international conference of both Koreas, China, Japan, and the United States to deal with North Korea's refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors full access to a reactor at Yongbyon. Assistant Secretary of State Lord, on the Public Broadcasting Service's Weekend Edition on March 16,1993, said that the United States was studying the proposal, but it was clear that he had serious objections. 28. Winston Lord, "Vision for a New Pacific Community," Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 36 (September 6,1993): 614. 29. Most recently in Thomas Wilborn, Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993). 30. For a more extensive discussion of the problems of a long-term policy based on the status quo, see Wilborn, Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy, pp. 4-7 and 21-24. 31. For discussions of the military balance on the peninsula, which are not in complete agreement, see William J. Taylor Jr., "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula: Trends, Linkages, and the Dangers of Premature Judgments," and Stephen D. Goose, "The Comparative Military Capabilities of North Korean

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and South Korean Forces," both in Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 17-36 and 37-58, respectively; and Oh Kwan-Chi, "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula," in William J. Taylor Jr., Cha Young-Koo, and John Q. Blodgett, eds., The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Arms Reduction Under Global Detente (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 91-104. 32. Dae-Sook Suh argues that the South's forces are now superior to those of the North ("Changes in Sino-Soviet Policies Toward Korea: Implications for the United States," in Bandow and Carpenter, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, p. 191). 33. At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the Korean peninsula at the thirty-eighth parallel for purposes of disarming and accepting the surrender of Japanese troops. Each zone became in essence an area of occupation and evolved into de facto separate states. For the most influential "revisionist" interpretation of these events, see Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 34. For a careful analysis of Japanese attitudes concerning the symbolic significance of the U.S. military presence, see Eugene Brown, Japan's Search for Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 25. 35. Michael W. Chinworth and Dean Cheng, "The United States and Asia in the Post-Cold War World," SAIS [School of Advanced International Studies] Review: A Journal of International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1 (winter-spring 1991): 82. 36. South Korea and Japan will provide most of the costs of providing two LWRs to North Korea, but presumably Washington will help pay for the heavy oil that Pyongyang will receive while the reactors are being built. The provisions of the agreement are outlined in David E. Sanger, "Who Won in the Korea Deal," New York Times, October 23,1994, p. E3.

Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and U.S. Policy Lawrence E. Grinter

East Asian countries are heavily armed. Whether they are poor countries, as in Indochina, or comparatively rich, as in Northeast Asia, weapons count for East Asian governments. And some of East Asia's more destabilizing weapons are produced indigenously—for example, China's M-ll and North Korea's Scud C and Nodong 1. China is a declared nuclear weapons state. The Russian Far East is a strategic weapons bastion. As will be shown, North Korea evidently joined the nuclear ranks between 1989 and 1993. Noncommunist countries with the technical capacity to build nuclear weapons are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In November-December 1993, U.S. intelligence assessments authoritatively concluded that North Korea had sufficient plutonium to fabricate nuclear devices. Hopefully, the October 21, 1994, WashingtonPyongyang Agreed Framework will prevent those devices from becoming weaponized and, indeed, will see them destroyed. Chinese missile and nuclear technology exports to developing countries also complicate U.S. policy. South Korea and Taiwan, closely tied to U.S. defense and scientific establishments, had begun and then quit building nuclear weapons after pressure from the United States. In Tokyo, conservatives point to Pyongyang's weapons program as justification for keeping Japan's nuclear options open. In short, Northeast Asian states are proliferating, or are capable of proliferating, nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What, then, should be the U.S. policy? This chapter surveys the incentives and patterns of Northeast Asian nuclear proliferation and examines how U.S. policy, unilaterally and in concert with those of other countries and organizations, has sought to influence the phenomena. Recommendations for flexible and realistic 167

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U.S. policies toward Northeast Asian nuclear proliferation, as part of larger counterproliferation efforts, conclude the chapter. Proliferation is defined here as the intent to acquire, or the possession of, WMD. The original five declared nuclear weapons states—the United States, the USSR/Russia, Great Britain, France, and China—are not considered proliferators, although some activities by these countries have promoted proliferation among various developing states, for example, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, and Iran.

ASIA AND GLOBAL PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of WMD obviously is not confined to East Asia. States are going for nuclear weapons in spite of export control regimes, nonproliferation treaties, international sanctions, and, indeed, preemptive strikes and air campaigns by adversaries. Three newly independent countries, the former Soviet Union's Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, became "instantaneous" proliferators when they inherited èlements of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. It is widely believed that Israel has several hundred nuclear weapons and that North Korea, while hiding within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), developed nuclear devices. Indian acquisition of Soviet/Russian rocket technology and New Delhi's threshold ability to quickly assemble nuclear devices is notable, as is fifteen years of failed U.S. policy efforts to preclude Pakistan from developing assemblable nuclear weapons. Nor is pursuit of the technology to make nuclear weapons a secret on the part of Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Algeria. Argentina and Brazil flirted with the effort, then called it off. South Africa states it has destroyed its nuclear devices. In South Asia, Pakistan joined the admitted nuclear ranks in 1992, eighteen years after India tested an atomic device and twenty-eight years after the first Chinese explosion. Regarding East Asia, in December 1993, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated that he believed North Korea could have one or two nuclear bombs.1 Subsequent monitoring of Pyongyang's activities convinced additional senior U.S. officials that Pyongyang probably diverted enough plutonium for four or five nuclear bombs.2 By the terms of the October 1994 Agreed Framework, although Pyongyang must dismantle its current nuclear facilities, it may be seven years before any inspections of the suspected waste sites are permitted. The Chinese have sold nuclear technology and/or related missile delivery components to a variety of developing countries including Iran, Pakistan, and Algeria. North Korea has sold advanced Scuds and may be entering into export arrangements for its first medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Nodong 1. Northeast Asia's nuclear proliféra-

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tors display many of the same kinds of incentives to acquire and perfect nuclear inventories as do proliferators in other regions. The principal incentives are insecurity, nationalism, prestige, and profit. When a government concludes that the incentives to acquire WMD outweigh the costs, risks, or disincentives, proliferation has begun.

MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES

Insecurity has been the principal factor driving Northeast Asian nuclear WMD proliferation. Regional proliferators border hostile countries or nuclear weapons countries, and sometimes both. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its fragmentation into a dozen independent countries, China has found itself bordering fifteen other countries with four, possibly five, of them nuclear armed. China's establishment of a nuclear capability in the 1960s, originally aided by a friendly Soviet Union, became protection against a hostile Moscow once the Sino-Soviet dispute developed. Continued modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has produced a rough triad of missiles, bombers, and submarines.3 China also sells nuclear and missile technology to various developing countries. North Korea and South Korea, although measurably reducing their diplomatic tensions recently, remain heavily armed and wary of each other. And North Korea's diplomatic cat-and-mouse game with its nuclear weapons program coincided with Pyongyang's insecurity as global bipolarity eroded, the North Korean economy moved toward possible collapse, and a robust, comparatively wealthy South Korea remained backed by the United States. South Korea and Taiwan also started efforts to build nuclear weapons. Both countries' programs commenced in the early to mid1970s, when U.S. military withdrawals from South Korea and the U.S. reconciliation with China prompted anxieties in Seoul and Taipei. In both cases, the clandestine efforts were discovered by the United States, and U.S. government pressure on South Korean and Taiwanese authorities succeeded in halting the efforts, at least until the mid-1980s, when more suspicions were aroused. Japan has also experienced insecurity in its relationship with the United States, and the overall security situation in Northeast Asia remains quite unpredictable. The Japanese Defense Agency draws attention to the continuing "menace" of Russia's very large conventional and nuclear deployments. North Korea's nuclear proliferation also worries Tokyo and has prompted some hawks to call for keeping Japan's nuclear options open. Nationalism also drives Northeast Asian nuclear proliferation. North Korea's nationalism and self-reliance are hallmarks of the

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Pyongyang regime; indeed, Kim Il-sung defined North Korea's foreign policy as juche, or self-reliance. Chinese troops left North Korea in 1958, but South Korea still has approximately 37,500 U.S. troops on its territory. Nuclear weapons carry status and influence. Pyongyang understands that and has consequently wielded what influence it can via its nuclear card. Judging from the October 1994 accord, the results appear to have been successful for Pyongyang. China's nationalism, reflecting its Sinocentrism, thoroughly colors Beijing's dealings with its neighbors. With over a dozen countries on China's borders, the country's foreign policy has the immediate challenge of border stabilization and minority pacification problems. With the exception of Pakistan, China does not export WMD material to countries on its borders. With Kazakhstan joining the nuclear club, and North Korea believed to have nuclear devices, China probably has five nuclear armed neighbors. By contrast, the United States has no nuclear neighbors. Prestige, and its contribution to domestic political morale and to foreign policy leverage, is another proliferation incentive in Northeast Asia. Following 150 years of instability and humiliation, when China finally stood up under Mao Zedong's revolutionary leadership in 1949, it soon developed atomic, then nuclear, weapons. Now it sells elements of the technology, arguing that developing countries have a right to "peaceful" nuclear technology. With South Korea's gross national product at ten to twelve times the size of North Korea's, and Seoul's nordpolitik to the communist world throwing Pyongyang off balance, North Korea sought to dramatically regain prestige and leverage. Led by the most secretive and ruthless Marxist-Leninist government (and family) left in the world, Pyongyang developed North Korea's nuclear devices covertly. As U.S. intelligence put together the emerging weapons picture and the world community reacted, Pyongyang, which had signed the NPT in 1985, was caught. For the four years prior to October 1994, North Korea played a cat-and-mouse game of diplomatic agreements with Seoul while denying meaningful facility inspection to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By summer 1994, the North Korean bomb program was proceeding under very restricted IAEA site inspections, and new plutonium diversion was assumed.4 As one senior U.S. military observer stated: "They are stonewalling us and slowballing us."5 Then came former President Carter's late June 1994 trip to Pyongyang, which placed the United States and North Korea on a negotiations track. The October 21,1994, Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang presumably ends North Korea's nuclear proliferation in return for massive energy and technical assistance. But we will not really know for years what the actual results of this agreement will be.

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Finally, there is the profit motive driving nuclear proliferation. Chinese arms sales on a global scale earn billions of dollars in foreign exchange. Indeed, designing and producing particular types of weapons for export is a factor in Chinese weapons proliferation. The transfer of CSS-2 MRBMs to Saudi Arabia may have earned China close to $3 billion.6 Reported nuclear technology sales to Algeria, Iran, and Syria also have earned large sums for China. Supplying both sides of the Iran-Iraq War was a Chinese moneymaker. Beijing's arms export empire is focused around two offices named "Poly Technologies" and "New Era," which evidently report directly to China's top leaders.7 Similarly, North Korea has gone into heavy production of the Scud C for export. Markets have included Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Severely strapped for hard currency, Pyongyang shows no reluctance to seek funds abroad by means of smuggling, narcotics dealing, and arms sales. Having test fired its 1,000-kilometer-range missile, the Nodong 1, into the Sea of Japan in May 1993, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) information indicates, North Korea intends to sell the Nodong 1 to Iran.8 Profit is also a factor in the calculations of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Each country is, or hopes to be, a nuclear supplier to other countries. Japan has been aiding China's fledgling nuclear power industry, having supplied a reactor pressure vessel to the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the 1980s. Japan also is developing a new generation of nuclear power units for markets in the United States and possibly Europe.9 However, Tokyo has been scrupulous in attaching conditions to these sales to prevent weapons-grade diversion. South Korea also aspires to become a nuclear supplier to the world nuclear market, but so far it has yet to export nuclear equipment or services.10 Seoul undoubtedly wants a share of the China market, as well as a central role in the building of future nuclear light-water reactors (LWRs) in North Korea. With ten nuclear reactors now on line or under construction, South Korea has a formidable nuclear complex for a newly industrialized country. Finally, Taiwan would undoubtedly like to emerge as a nuclear technology exporter. However, as long as its diplomatic status remains under a cloud, it will be difficult. The only major Taiwanese nuclear ventures to date involve purchases of uranium ore from South Africa, the United States, and elsewhere. Maintaining the stability of this fuel supply is a priority concern of Taipei.11 COSTS AND DISINCENTIVES

Although the incentives are powerful and have tipped some of the scales toward Asian nuclear proliferation, each WMD proliferator has also

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faced risks and disincentives. North Korea and Pakistan, for example, obviously chose to accept the risks, although each went about proliferation in different ways. Pakistan refused to sign the NPT or to deny that it wanted nuclear weapons. Legal and illegal means were used by Islamabad to get the technology. North Korea, however, signed the NPT in 1985 and then delayed agreeing to an inspection regime for seven years, permitting secret enhancement of its nuclear capabilities. In October 1994, it finally bargained a termination of its nuclear program for billions in alternative Western energy assistance. By contrast, proliferation incentives by South Korea and Taiwan, each with secure bilateral defense treaties with the United States (until the U.S.-Taiwan tie was abrogated on January 1,1979), were subordinated to U.S. pressures on several occasions. Both governments concluded that independent nuclear capabilities, although ultimately technically feasible, simply were not worth the political fallout.12 South Korea's and Taiwan's leaderships have been much more closely tied to the United States than has Pakistan's leadership. Seoul's and Taipei's military, scientific, and educational elites continue to be routinely educated and trained in the United States. But the Pressler Amendment stopped Pakistani officers from coming to the United States after 1990; indeed, almost all military-to-military contact has been frozen since that time. By contrast, Washington was able to influence Seoul's and Taipei's leaderships about U.S. nonproliferation desires, although not without favors granted in return. Mutual security treaties, security assistance, economic assistance, and sales of top-line fighter aircraft (even after formal security ties and diplomatic relations were broken with Taipei) have, so far, kept Taiwan and South Korea under U.S. security influence and out of nuclear WMD proliferation. Both North Korea and Pakistan had another disincentive to weigh: the risk of preemptive war by their enemies. India has several times made Pakistan very nervous with large conventional military exercises close to Pakistan's borders. In fact, in the spring of 1990, Pakistan might have been planning a preemptive nuclear strike against India out of fear. 13 The precedent clearly exists in international relations, in this case in the Middle East, for preemptive military strikes against nuclear facilities: Iran's 1980 and Israel's 1981 strikes against Iraq's Osirak reactor; Iraq's 1985 and 1987 attacks against Iran's Bushehr reactor; 14 and, of course, the U.S.-led coalition attack against Iraq in 1991, which, in addition to restoring Kuwait's independence, sought to destroy Iraq's WMD and missile programs. North Korea also undoubtedly weighed the risks in its nuclear weapons program. Would hawks in Seoul push the South Korean government into a preemptive strike against the Yongbyon reactor complex? Would the Soviets/Russians or Chinese cut off assistance or other-

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wise try to "leash" North Korea? Would the United States, fresh from Desert Storm, reorder Northeast Asian security by unilaterally destroying North Korea's nuclear complex? Obviously, Pyongyang, for all its rumored isolation and paranoia, concluded that the risks were manageable and proceeded with its nuclear weapons program. It has been very adroit at keeping the United States and the international community on a string, promising agreements and inspections, then objecting to details. In a sense, the 1994 Agreed Framework between Pyongyang and Washington was a multibillion-dollar "sale" of North Korean compliance with the NPT. This could set a very bad precedent. In summary, the proliferation incentives for North Korea and Pakistan, two countries without reliable or explicit alliances with larger countries and confronted by stronger enemies, propelled them to try to "even the playing field" with dramatic jumps in military capabilities via nuclear weapons. International concern and U.S. policies toward both countries failed to prevent initial nuclear WMD proliferation. But the similarities end there. Pakistan has been a good friend and previous ally of the United States. North Korea, until very recently, has been unremittingly hostile.

WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS

The North Korean nuclear program appears to have begun in the 1960s with the building by the Soviet Union of a small research reactor in Yongbyon. Personnel were trained in the USSR, China, and Pakistan.15 Seeing the South steadily overtake the North in economic growth, and concluding that the United States was stationing nuclear weapons on South Korean soil, "it can be argued," observed London's International Institute of Strategic Studies, "that North Korea had good cause to embark on a nuclear weapons programme."16 The North Korean nuclear program has been focused upon an operational 5-megawatt gas graphite power reactor, a near-completion 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon with a collocated plutonium reprocessing facility, and a planned 200megawatt reactor at Taechon.17 Until the October 21,1994, accord, the 50-megawatt installation was expected to be in operation in 1995, and the 200-megawatt reactor was to begin construction at Taechon—northwest of Yongbyon—and to be capable of producing 160 to 200 kilograms of plutonium, or sixteen to twenty bombs, per year.18 These two large reactors were to be of old design; they would use the gas graphite method, rather than the light-water approach with its safety features. They would both be very efficient at producing weapons-grade plutonium. Both the IAEA and U.S. intelligence officials believe that the 5-

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megawatt reactor at Yongbyon has already produced enough weaponsgrade plutonium to make one to three nuclear weapons.19 North Korea has stated that, in compliance with the nuclear agreement, it has halted all construction and plans on those two reactors and that it will shut down its 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessing facility.20 Subsequent U.S. information indicates the freeze is holding. In 1985, as the 5-megawatt gas graphite reactor went into operation, Pyongyang signed the NPT. However, in 1989, Pyongyang closed the reactor for 100 days, giving it sufficient time to remove spent fuel rods and reprocess them into weapons-grade plutonium.21 Throughout this period, North Korea stonewalled the IAEA, not permitting a safeguard agreement until September 1991 and delaying the actual first inspection until September 1992. In January 1993, new U.S. information confirmed that some nuclear fuel had been secretly diverted in the 1989 reactor shutdown.22 In March 1993, Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, giving the required ninety-day notice. After international pressure, North Korea "suspended" its withdrawal on June 11,1993, just a few days before the ninety-day date.23 Thereafter, Pyongyang permitted no IAEA inspections until March 1994, when it agreed in principle to a resumption of inspections and allowed inspectors in for two weeks, then prevented them from full inspections. In May 1994, inspectors were readmitted only to be stymied again. In June, former President Carter, sensing drift in the Clinton administration's policy, went to Pyongyang and, on the basis of "private" talks with Kim Il-sung, discarded what remained of the administration's sanctions policy in favor of more negotiations. Talks between the United States and North Korea resumed in July. Broken off by Kim Il-sung's death, talks resumed in early August and continued into October, whence came the denuclearization accord. In the nearly ten years from 1985, when the North Korean government signed the NPT, to the October 1994 accord, Pyongyang permitted only one year of nuclear site inspections and blocked conclusive inspections of fuel rod processing. This has set a precedent by which a nuclear proliferator can snub, then manipulate, the IAEA and the international community, while using the NPT as cover. Potential North Korean nuclear delivery systems naturally include its high-performance jet aircraft, such as MiG-23s and MiG-29s, as well as its surface-to-surface Scud B/C missiles.24 One of Pyongyang's advanced Scud missiles, what U.S. intelligence labels the Nodong 1, was disclosed in June 1993 as having been test fired over the Sea of Japan with a range of 620 miles (1,000 kilometers).25 With evident financing from Iran, North Korea is also reported to be developing a two-stage bal-

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listic missile called the Nodong 2, which would be capable of hitting numerous Japanese cities.26 In February 1994, North Korea and Iran participated in high-level air force talks. Additionally, Jane's Defense Weekly stated that two other ballistic missiles, called the Taepo-Dong series, are under development, one with a range of over 2,100 miles—capable of reaching all of Japan and Guam, the U.S. territory near the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific.27 The Chinese nuclear program began, of course, with Soviet assistance after the PRC government took control of mainland China in October 1949. Soviet nuclear technicians and material were provided to Mao's government. Once the Sino-Soviet rift broke out in 1959, Moscow withdrew its support. Nevertheless, going it alone, China's first nuclear test explosion occurred in 1964. Since then, the PRC has built up an arsenal of about 450 warheads with about 300 deployed into a modest triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), bombers, and at least one SSBN submarine with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The mainstay of the force is the ballistic missiles. China also has tactical nuclear warheads.28 Compared to Asia's other proliferators, Chinese delivery systems are sophisticated and extensive. The PRC has some sixty IRBMs, principally the CSS-2, which was the type of missile sold to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. China also has the 500-kilometer M-9 missile and the 125-kilometer M - l l missile, both of which it has exported for profit.29 China's modernization program, proceeding within the parameters of the existing number of warheads, includes converting the IRBMs to smaller, solidfueled, road-mobile, and electromagnetically protected launchers, thus promoting survivability and accuracy.30 Chinese aircraft include 120 H-6 "Badger" medium bombers, some of which are judged to be nuclear capable. Its potentially nuclear capable strike aircraft include 24 SU-27s and 100 J-8 fighters.31 A MiG-31 deal with the Russians is believed to be under negotiation. The Chinese will not acknowledge publicly, however, that they are seeking MiG-31s from Russia or that they have acquired the SU-27.32 Japan is substantially involved in peaceful nuclear activities—both in its civilian nuclear reactor energy generation and in nuclear energy trade. The country participates in a "net of agreements for nuclear cooperation with other countries, including the United States and other major suppliers as well as developing countries."33 Japan is a strong supporter of the NPT, which it signed in 1976, and of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including assistance to both nuclear weapons states (such as China) and other nonnuclear countries. Japan's own domestic energy consumption picture is indicative of this support—it relies on nuclear power reactors for over 30 percent of its generated electricity—having

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made the transition from uranium-powered nuclear fuel to plutonium as a way of reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.34 Given the sophistication of Japan's nuclear reactor industry, and the desire of many developing countries to increase electricity use, an export market looms for the Japanese in the small-to-medium reactor range (i.e., 50-300 megawatts). Over the years, Japan has generally followed the nonproliferation and nuclear supply policies of the United States, in spite of some resistance to U.S. attempts to control Japan's reprocessing of spent fuels that contain U.S.-supplied enriched uranium.35 And, of course, Japan has long been estimated to possess the technical capacity to build nuclear weapons if desired. Twenty years ago, experts were estimating that under a crash program Tokyo could have nuclear devices ready within six months to a year of a decision.36 By 1995, the time span was greatly shortened. Japan's space and nuclear industries, although completely civilian in complexion, are worrisome for some neighbors. There is a general consensus outside Japan that Tokyo has acquired the nuclear and launch capabilities that could readily be converted to military purposes. Japan's National Space Development Agency was established in 1969, and the first Japanese satellite was launched the following year. Since then, the space budget has averaged increases of about 8 percent yearly. A new launch site was completed in 1992 and is expected to be able to handle the requirements of the Ariane 5-type new H-2 rocket booster.37 As one of the world's major civilian nuclear energy producers, Japan imports large quantities of enriched uranium to fuel its civilian reactors. Its most important suppliers of enriched uranium have been the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. These arrangements have been implemented under tight nonproliferation controls. In 1992 and 1993, there was an uproar over Japan's policy of importing uranium ore from Europe and related plans to build a plutonium stockpile. A Japanese freighter, the Akatsuki-Maru, made international news as it crossed the oceans with uranium ore.38 Nuclear weaponry is naturally an extremely sensitive subject in Japan. Some of the standard Japanese arguments against going nuclear focus on the fact that Japan has made no overt preparations to go nuclear. Shigeki Nishimura's list of certain facts supports this claim: In Japan, there is no organization currently unifying the various technologies required to launch a nuclear weapons program; universities do not teach courses in nuclear strategy; "no military planners in Japan are thinking about going nuclear"; and the subject is officially so delicate that talking about it publicly is next to impossible39 (until Prime Minister

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Hata's comment on June 17,1994, that "Japan certainly has the ability [to make nuclear arms]").40 So how does Japan, which is surrounded by deployed nuclear weapons of other countries (Russia, China, and the United States) and a newly discovered proliferator (North Korea), view its nuclear security situation? Toward the Chinese military activities, Japanese attitudes present an interesting dichotomy: Tokyo is ringing the alarm bells about China's conventional military buildup, but seldom mentions the PRC's nuclear arsenal or its modernization. As Professor Takehiko Kamo stated, "Japan seems to [have been] by and large quite permissive towards the Chinese military buildup in the nuclear field for almost thirty years."41 It is, of course, understood throughout Northeast Asia that China's nuclear arsenal, if launched against Japan, could obliterate Japan's industrial structures and population centers within hours. Relaxation about China's nuclear capabilities contrasts sharply with Japanese expressions of concern about China's conventional arms buildup. "Japan's foreign policy community is uncommonly united in its alarm over Beijing's military buildup," according to Eugene Brown.42 There is a heightened sensitivity regarding Beijing's military power projection, with its emphasis on a change of strategy to speed, mobility, and lethality; double-digit growth of the defense budget; the military technology relationship with Russia; as well as pronouncements regarding Chinese ownership of the Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku Islands. The Chinese counter by stating that military modernization remains a low priority compared to economy development; that high inflation requires a rising defense budget; and that the military technology relationship with Russia has limitations.43 Toward Russia, the Japanese show considerable anxiety regarding both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. The Japanese Defense Agency refers in its 1992 White Paper to the "enormous stockpiles of rationalized and modernized [Russian] armed forces."44 The stepped-up purchase of former Soviet high-technology conventional weapons, such as SU-27s and MiG-31s, is often mentioned by the Japanese, as is concern that Russian nuclear material and expertise are becoming marketable items.45 Many Japanese feel that as long as Russian SSBNs continue to patrol in the northwestern Pacific adjacent to Japan, "the military structure of the Cold War will remain frozen."46 Moreover, Russia's periodic regional arms control proposals are seen as scarcely disguised Soviet proposals. Indeed, recent U.S. appraisals of Moscow's military policies in Northeast Asia see little difference between Yeltsin's military objectives and earlier Soviet objectives47—thus Tokyo's skepticism over Moscow's periodic proposals regarding the creation of a "strategic anti-submarine warfare-free zone" in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.

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Tokyo's concern about North Korea's emergent nuclear weapons capability, despite a degree of détente between the two Koreas, is pronounced. Japan is aware of U.S. intelligence estimates that Pyongyang could build between one and four nuclear explosive devices and that North Korean missiles now have the range to hit Japanese cities. PostHosokawa coalition government policies indicate Japan will continue to follow the U.S.-UN lead and "within the framework of her constitution, will be prepared for an emergency and will work closely and respond in cooperation with the United States and the Republic of [South] Korea on a bilateral basis."48 Accordingly, Japan has raised international concern about Pyongyang's activities; supported Washington in its attempts to bring North Korea into compliance with the NPT; and refused to provide official economic aid to North Korea. South Korea first affiliated with the IAEA as a nonmember state in 1957, just four years after the end of the Korean War. In 1975, Seoul ratified the NPT, and it has signed a variety of safeguard agreements with the IAEA 49 and its own nuclear suppliers: the United States, France, Canada, Germany, and Australia. However, it is believed that South Korea engaged in a secret effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology in the early 1970s. President Nixon's removal of the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division from Korea caused anxieties in South Korea, as did the continuing menace from the North. U.S. pressure stopped the effort in 1975.50 Then in 1978, and again in 1981, statements by South Korean leaders and displays of its modified Honest John and Nike Hercules missiles revived speculation that Seoul was keeping open a nuclear weapons option.51 Some evidence exists that South Korea may have continued "dual use" nuclear research and development. Its 250-kilometer-range Nike Hercules-Korea short-range ballistic missile has come under scrutiny.52 Moreover, writes Peter Hayes, "There is little doubt that South Korea still aspires to acquire [nuclear] reprocessing technology."53 Like South Korea, Taiwan is also believed to have begun nuclear weapons research in the early 1970s. It will be recalled that this was a period of severe diplomatic strain and energy supply uncertainty for Taiwan. In 1971, Taipei lost its seat on the UN Security Council. In 1972, it lost its membership in the IAEA. In 1973, the Arab oil embargo began. In 1975-1976, the United States detected the weapons effort and pressured Taiwan to stop.54 By the mid-1980s, Taiwan had, evidently, restarted the program. U.S. officials discovered that Taipei had begun construction of a small plutonium extraction facility and was planning to reprocess spent fuel from a 40-megawatt research reactor at Lung Tan. Pressure was again applied by Washington, and Taipei evidently agreed for a second time to abandon its nuclear weapons research.55

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Still, given Taipei's uncertain legal status and security future, it would not be surprising if it flirts again with a nuclear weapons option. U.S. sales of the F-16 jet fighter to Taiwan undoubtedly contain prohibitions on nuclear capable modifications.

EVOLUTION OF PROLIFERATION POLICY AND CRITERIA

U.S. policy toward the global proliferation of WMD has evolved along several lines over the years. This has not been a firmly designed or controlled policy evolution, but one of stops, starts, and bureaucratic shifts. U.S. nuclear counterproliferation policy operates in conjunction with a variety of international nonproliferation efforts—inspections, treaties, agreements, export controls—structured around the IAEA and the NPT. These efforts have had only mixed success. The IAEA is a Vienna-based international organization with over 150 member countries, established in 1957, and is designed to promote peaceful nuclear energy uses, controls, and on-site inspections—known as "safeguards"—that "verify that nuclear materials and facilities voluntarily submitted for such monitoring [are] not used for the development of nuclear arms."56 Signers of the NPT formally pledge not to manufacture, test, or transfer nuclear explosives, equipment, or material except under IAEA safeguards. IAEA safeguards inspections monitor nuclear material at about 900 declared nuclear facilities in over fifty countries. These inspections involve thorough verification efforts that rely upon detailed on-site inspections, materials accounting, containment, and various forms of surveillance that reinforce accuracy. In nonnuclear weapons states, these inspections are intended to expose civilian facilities being used for weapons purpose or to divert its nuclear material.57 A second approach to monitoring nuclear capabilities naturally involves intelligence and spying. Techniques used include communication intercepts, satellite photography, export monitoring, and, of course, human intelligence. When CIA director Robert Gates confronted Pakistan's government with information on its nuclear program in the spring of 1990, much of the information shown to the Pakistanis was U.S. originated.58 The nuclear weapons states are allowed to keep their arsenals and are exempted from IAEA inspections, but are bound to negotiate "in good faith" toward nuclear disarmament. France and China joined the NPT in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Kazakhstan and Belarus joined in 1993. Ukraine has not yet decided to join. The 1995 review of the NPT produced a total number of 170 nuclear and nonnuclear countries agree-

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ing to its indefinite extension. 59 However, problems continue to be evident: At least four signers of the NPT have been proven, or are assumed to be, violators—Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. And a second tier of de facto nuclear powers (except South Africa, which signed in 1991)— Israel, India, and Pakistan—have not signed the NPT. 60 Iraq is probably the most notable I A E A intelligence failure. It had a very large-scale WMD program in progress as revealed in the aftermath of Desert Storm. Underpinning U.S. proliferation policy is a variety of criteria, some competing with one another. In general, official U.S. policy has been that all nuclear proliferation is wrong and must be opposed. More recent Defense Department thinking on nonproliferation, which appears to be a kind of doctrine, is called "counterproliferation." It emphasizes countering actions along the entire spectrum of proliferation activity, from interest in acquiring WMD, to acquisition, to deployment, and, ultimately, to threatened or actual use of WMD. 61 Another school of thought, not antagonistic to counterproliferation but less ideological and more flexible, is risk/benefit, or risk/cost, analysis.62 Risk/benefit analysis argues that proliferation interests and costs constitute a kind of matrix. If, for example, vital U.S. or allied interests are involved—as in the 1990-1991 Gulf War against Iraq—and the risks or assumed results of a military response by the aggressor are judged to be tolerable, then the incentives to stop the aggressor are high, and the risks are manageable. At the other end of the spectrum—low interests and low risks as, for example, in the Argentine or Brazilian nuclear proliferation cases—only a minimal U.S. response is recommended. It is the two other extreme cases—high value, high risk and low value, high risk—where the more difficult U.S. responses will occur. For example, North Korean nuclear proliferation endangers vital U.S. and allied interests throughout the entire Northeast Asia region. By not attempting to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation, the United States would jeopardize its strategic interests. By contrast, the South Asian region is not vital to U.S. interests. Neither India nor Pakistan are current security allies of the United States. Neither is important, so far, to the U.S. economy. But the risks of war do periodically rise in South Asia. 63 Thus, Pakistani and Indian threats and counterthreats have for years prompted close U.S. intelligence scrutiny regarding the two countries' intentions. Indeed, a critical U.S. diplomatic and intelligence effort evidently occurred in spring 199Q to prevent what seemed like a possible conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad. Since then, Pakistani authorities have periodically warned about the dangers of a nuclear war in South Asia over Kashmir and other issues. The U.S. government considers the risks of another war—not necessarily nuclear—between India and Pakistan to be moderate to high.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST ASIAN PROLIFERATORS

The previous analysis implies that the United States needs more flexible and realistic proliferation policies toward different governments depending on their behavior. One policy does not fit all. Indeed, flexible U.S. proliferation policy is already in place—with Israel. Washington is essentially unconcerned about Tel Aviv's nuclear weapons program. Israel has not signed the NPT and is estimated to have between 75 and possibly 300 undeclared nuclear weapons.64 These facts have in no way jeopardized U.S. aid to Israel; the issue evidently never comes up. By contrast, Pakistan, also friendly to the United States and a previous formal partner of the United States in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, remains under punishment by a congressional law aimed solely at it for having become a nuclear power at least four and probably eight years ago. The disutility of this policy, indeed its harm to broader U.S. interests in Southwest Asia in the post-Cold War era (where Washington is looking again for regional stabilizers to handle regional threats), is pronounced. To add to the curiosity of U.S. nonproliferation policies, we have a situation where the major country of the former Soviet Union, Russia, has targeted thousands of nuclear weapons against the United States, but is considered so friendly, or needy, that Washington is aiding Russia, giving it most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, and paying to have its military officers attend U.S. military schools! Facts such as these do not square with a rational nuclear counterproliferation policy. What should be done? The answer is to shelve the public posturing about how all proliferation is by definition bad and, with the Israeli example in mind, differentiate between hostile and friendly proliferation, between those governments that are stable and those that are troublemakers, between those that are friendly to the United States and those that threaten its interests. From such a flexible and realistic counterproliferation framework, the United States would treat Asian proliferation on a country-by-country basis.

NORTH KOREA: A HOSTILE PROLIFERATOR

One has to give the North Korean government credit: For a supposedly isolated, paranoid, and outcast regime, it has managed an adroit nuclear diplomatic strategy designed to protect its nuclear weapons program from international inspection while extracting major concessions about such a program if it exists! North Korea has alarmed the international community, obtained direct talks with the United States (something Washington, on behalf of Seoul, refused to do for almost forty years),

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and concluded a massive energy assistance for compliance accord with Washington. Indeed, a former president of the United States went to Pyongyang, bringing back optimistic reports of Kim Il-sung's reasonableness. However, North Korea's actual behavior should caution anyone. During the first two weeks of March 1994, it let I A E A inspectors back in, but prevented the inspectors from taking the critical samples of radioactive material in the most important nuclear site.65 In May 1994, Pyongyang began diverting new spent nuclear fuel from reactor rods, stating it was a "safety precaution," but making it impossible to tell what was being done with the waste material. 66 Then in June, after former President Carter's trip to Pyongyang, North Korea agreed to freeze its uninspected program provided the United States not press for sanctions. The Clinton administration agreed. 67 Of course Pyongyang agreed to a freeze—the thousands of nuclear rods were sitting in a cooling pond, having been downloaded in May! Nevertheless, U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci's assumption that the North Korean leadership is interested in opening its doors to outside investment and political normalcy may prove true. Washington's strategy has been to use negotiations to bring North Korea into full compliance with the NPT in return for graduated energy assistance and diplomatic concessions. The current U.S. position, reflected in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, includes a pledge of nonaggression, opening of diplomatic interest offices, and U.S.-facilitated assistance in building safe civilian nuclear reactors in North Korea, provided that North Korea is in full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations.68 August and September 1994 saw detailed discussions on whether, when, and where the 8,000 plutonium-rich spent fuel rods in the cooling pond would be reprocessed. U.S. officials stated that if North Korea started unilaterally reprocessing the plutonium, it would be "a deal breaker—we could not tolerate that." 69 When the two-track talks resumed simultaneously in Berlin and Pyongyang in September 1994, the emerging technical package between the United States and North Korea was extensive: The United States wanted a complete end (with unhindered inspection) to all North Korean plutonium reprocessing, inspection of known waste dumps, and termination of any new reactor construction in return for two new nuclear LWRs valued at about $4 billion and constructed over a period of eight to ten years. 70 By mid-October, differences between the two sides had narrowed, and the Agreed Framework was signed on October 21. The Agreed Framework consists of three documents: the four-part document signed in Geneva on October 21; a confirming letter of October 20 from President Clinton to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il; and

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classified "Confidential Minutes," included at Pyongyang's insistence, detailing facilities, inspection schedules, and freeze/dismantlement particulars. The basic facets of the agreement are as follows. North Korea is obligated to freeze, and eventually dismantle, its capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium; to resume full membership in the NPT, including complete compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement; to implement the North-South joint denuclearization agreement; and to engage in North-South dialogue. The United States, in an international consortium principally with South Korea and Japan, is to make available two 1,000-megawatt LWR nuclear power plants to be on line in North Korea by the year 2003. In addition, the United States is to provide heavy oil, eventually up to 500,000 tons annually, to offset lost North Korean energy. Both Pyongyang and Washington are to cooperate in disposing the 8,000 downloaded reactor rods; to open liaison offices; and to reduce barriers to trade and communication.71 The critical sticking points are future inspections of suspected North Korean waste sites that contain diverted fissionable material and inclusion of South Korea in the future LWR project. The United States allowed North Korea to avoid future waste site inspections for five to seven years. But Washington is holding firm on South Korean inclusion in the consortium arrangements. And U.S. officials insist that North Korea will never be allowed to activate the LWRs until it permits IAEA special inspections of the nuclear waste sites.72 U.S.-North Korea talks resumed in Malaysia on May 22, 1995.73 Although the Clinton administration (and the ones that follow it) must implement the Agreed Framework with North Korea, as a precaution the United States should keep a sanctions option viable. The United States should resume the equivalent of the Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea while also providing sufficient Patriot antiballistic missile systems to South Korea unless North Korea destroys its missiles. Other force improvement measures need to be undertaken. Should Pyongyang ultimately torpedo the Agreed Framework, Washington should take a very hard line with North Korea, pressing the UN Security Council for sanctions while also pursuing a sanctions coalition against North Korean proliferation. Either North Korea finally comes into the civilized community of nations, or it strangles.

CHINA: A TROUBLESOME PROLIFERATOR

For all its potential to cause problems in Asia, Chinese export of nuclear technology and missile components in the region has been relatively restrained. However, Chinese exports of WMD material or missiles to

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other regions the United States sees as sensitive, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, have been troublesome. With one exception, Pakistan, the Chinese do not currently provide nuclear technology or missiles to countries on their borders. They are engaged in cooperation with Pakistan in ways they are not with other countries. But with the Middle East, there is evidence that China entered into a nuclear research reactor contract with Iran, as well as selling them Silkworm missiles. The Saudi buy was evidently a one-time purchase of CSS-2 MRBMs between 1986 and 1988, which probably irritated the Reagan/Bush administrations as much for being a surprise as it was a fact. Chinese M-9 missile launcher deliveries to Syria (but not the actual missiles, due to U.S. pressure) are believed to have ended. In 1988, the Chinese sold a potentially dangerous reactor to Algeria. However, plans to build a nuclear power plant for Iraq were canceled. 74 China's continued, if infrequent, nuclear testing puts it at odds with the self-proclaimed moratorium by the other nuclear powers. However, Beijing stated that it would cease testing once the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty went into effect.75 On the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Beijing states it abides by it, although U.S. authorities point out that Pakistan is an obvious exception. The Chinese counter by stating that MTCR rules keep changing. And, indeed, MTCR formulas are fluid—after all, if you lighten warheads, you can increase range. 76 When U.S. officials press the Chinese not to export WMD technology to sensitive areas like the Middle East, the Chinese respond in kind to describe U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. U.S. policy needs to continue its approach of engaging the Chinese on the whole spectrum of technology and weapons issues. An MTCR working group began discussions in Beijing in March 1994. This issue must not, however, be linked to MFN or human rights. That would only confuse the matter and reduce U.S. leverage, as proved by the Clinton administration's earlier linkage of trade and human rights.

JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN: POTENTIAL PROLIFERATORS

Neither Japan, nor South Korea, nor Taiwan, all U.S. allies or friends, has built nuclear weapons. That fact is quite remarkable given the riptides of insecurity that characterized the Cold War in East Asia. The key in each case has been the U.S. security guarantee, formal or informal, and the three governments' reliance on the credibility of this guarantee. The guarantee's credibility is built on two factors: perception of U.S. intent, and confidence in U.S. military presence. If the United States wants to ensure that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan refrain from building nuclear WMD, it must continue to guarantee those three countries' ultimate security.

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Obviously, any decision by Japan to "go nuclear" could only be triggered by a fundamental breakdown in the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Other extenuating circumstances might include major threats from China, Russia, or North Korea. But the key criteria in Tokyo's calculations would be its ability to rely on the United States. Thus the Japanese have a major stake in nuclear nonproliferation in Northeast Asia. Given that Tokyo is surrounded by nuclear equipped, or proliferating, countries, it is not surprising that its diplomats continuously work to prevent threatening nuclear trends in the area. The policy implications of this for the United States are clear: Keep the security tie with Japan intact and vigorous; carefully coordinate all counterproliferation and arms control proposals in Northeast Asia with Tokyo; continue to support Japan's scrupulous adherence to the NPT; and warn the other nuclear, or threshold nuclear, countries in East Asia about Japan's sensitivities and special position. Similar U.S. nuclear counterproliferation basics apply to South Korea and Taiwan. The United States must show both Seoul and Taipei that in the post-Cold War era the disincentives to proliferation far outweigh the incentives. Each case is unique. Seoul does not want to upset the painstakingly negotiated containment, and possible reversal, of North Korea's nuclear proliferation activities; thus, Washington is correct in trying to give South Korea as big a piece as possible of the implementation action. Toward Taiwan, whose relationship with mainland China conditions all of Taipei's policies, careful de facto buttressing of Taiwanese security (as in the F-16 sale) continues to be smart policy. A breakaway, or nuclear armed, Taiwan could be a disaster for Northeast Asia. In conclusion, U.S. policy toward Northeast Asian proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to discard the "one policy fits all" approach and apply a more flexible approach to the phenomenon. The United States needs to have ready a serious sanctions option against North Korea, a previously hostile and still-dangerous government, should Pyongyang wreck the denuclearization Agreed Framework implementation. It needs to continue rigorous discussions with China, whose government is generally friendly in spite of some WMD activities contrary to U.S. interests. And the United States needs to keep Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan assured of its commitments to their security and viability. Asia is the test bed for new, more flexible, and more realistic U.S. policies of countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

NOTES

1. Steven Engleberg with Michael R. Gordon, "Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb," New York Times, December 26,1993, p. 1.

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2. See the references to statements by former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey and current Secretary of Defense William Perry in The Military Balance, 1994-1995 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], October 1994), p. 260. 3. Peter Gordon, "The Politics of Implementing China's Nuclear Strategy, Part 2:1969-Present," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (summer 1989): 20. 4. Stewart Stogel, "Nuclear Officials Believe N[orth] Korea Took Reactor Fuel," Washington Times, May 19,1994, p. 1. 5. Private communication, March 1994. 6. R. Bates Gill, "Curbing Beijing's Arms Sales," Orbis (summer 1992): 392. 7. R. Bates Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the 1990s (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 31,1993), p. 21. 8. As cited in Robert Jastrow and Max M. Kampelman, "How to Meet the Third World Missile Threat," Wall Street Journal, November 19,1993, p. A14. 9. Stephanie Sharron and Warren H. Donnelly, "Japan," in William C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferative The Challenge of Emerging Suppliers (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 200-201. 10. Peter Hayes, "South Korea," in Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade, p. 296. 11. George H. Quester, "Taiwan," in Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade, p. 363. 12. "In the 1970s it was revealed that South Korea had an embryo nuclear program which was abandoned at U.S. insistence" (The Military Balance, 1993-1994 [London: IISS, September 1993], p. 232). 13. Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, March 29, 1993. The thrust of Hersh's argument is denied by U.S. Department of State South Asia specialists. 14. William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation, Studies in National Security No. 1, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1994, p. 27. 15. Ibid., p. 79. Also see, Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea, The Foundations of Military Strength, Washington, D.C., October 1991, p. 60 (unclassified). 16. The Military Balance, 1993-1994, p. 232. 17. Martel and Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence, pp. 79-80. 18. The Military Balance, 1993-1994, p. 232. Also see, Richard D. Fisher Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Threat Challenges the World and Tests America's Resolve," Asian Studies Backgrounder, no. 129 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, February 23,1994), p. 6. 19. Fisher, "North Korea's Nuclear Threat," p. 6. 20. Washington Times, November 4,1994, p. 16. Initial details of the unclassified elements of the accord are in Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute," New York Times, October 22, 1994, p. 5. Also see, "Pyongyang Triangle," Wall Street Journal, November 9,1994, p. 22. 21. Martel and Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence, p. 80. 22. Wall Street Journal, June 8,1994, p. Al. The most authoritative and scientific analysis that I have seen of how much plutonium North Korea probably diverted is David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (September-October 1994): 46-53.

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23. The Military Balance, 1993-1994, pp. 232-233. 24. The Military Balance, 1994-1995, p. 179. 25. Ibid., p. 260. 26. Washington Times, June 10,1994, p. 1. An appraisal of the Miyazawa government's handling of information on the firing of the North Korean missile is in Manichi Shimbun, morning ed., August 14,1994, p. 1. 27. Jane's Defense Weekly, as reported in Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 11, 1994, p. 1; and New York Times, June 1,1994, p. A6. 28. Richard Fieldhouse, "China's Mixed Signals on Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May 1991): 40; and Anonymous, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1993," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November 1993): 57. 29. The Military Balance, 1994-1995, pp. 170-171. 30. Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Weapons Program: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey vol. 34, no. 7 (July 1994): 665. 31. The Military Balance, 1994-1995, pp. 170-173. 32. Author's discussions with Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force officers in Beijing, February 1994. 33. Sharron and Donnelly, "Japan," p. 199. 34. Ibid., p. 214. 35. Ibid., p. 211. 36. Jay B. Sorenson, Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms (New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1975), p. 29; and John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 224. 37. Valerie Shimizu-Niquet, "Japan's New Strategy: A New Menace?" Pacific Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (1994): 167. 38. Wall Street Journal, April 9,1992, p. A l l ; and New York Times, August 3, 1992, p. A3. 39. Shigeki Nishimura, "Security Issues and Defense of Japan," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 6, no. 1 (summer 1994): 125. 40. Hata acknowledged the capability before the Diet Upper House Budget Committee and later repeated it to reporters (Japan Times Weekly International Edition, June 27-July 3,1994, p. 2). 41. Takehiko Kamo, "U.S.-Japan Security Policy Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific," paper delivered at the 1994 International Studies Association Convention, Washington, D.C., March 29,1994, p. 7. 42. Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War World: Perceptions and Strategic Options," Journal of East Asian Affairs (summer-fall 1994): 339. 43. Private communication, Chinese analysts, October 1994. 44. Brown, "Japanese Security Policy," pp. 332-333. 45. Ibid., pp. 334-335. 46. Nishimura, "Security Issues," p. 128. 47. As Stephen Blank has written, Russian objectives in event of war are still to control the waters around Russia; to destroy U.S. naval forces in the area; to maintain a nuclear launch capability against the United States; to deter China; and to gain control of regional sea-lanes of communication (Stephen J. Blank, The New Russia in the New Asia [Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 22,1994], p. 25. 48. Nishimura, "Security Issues," p. 127.

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49. Hayes, "South Korea," pp. 319-320. 50. Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 149. 51. Hayes, "South Korea," p. 321. 52. Klare, "Next Great Arms Race," p. 150. Also see, The Military Balance, 1994-1995, p. 180. 53. Hayes, "South Korea," p. 307. 54. Washington Post, August 29,1976, p. Al. 55. Klare, "Next Great Arms Race," p. 150. 56. Leonard S. Spector, "Deterring Regional Threats from Nuclear Proliferation" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 12,1992), p. 8. 57. Cited in David Albright, "India and Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Race." 58. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge." 59. New York Times, May 12,1995, pp. Al, A4. The Washington Post gives a later figure of 178 countries (May 16,1995, p. 1). 60. Spector, "Deterring Regional Threats," pp. 8-9. 61. The U.S. Defense Department defines "counterproliferation" as "a coherent strategy to prevent countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction through nonproliferation regimes, export controls, and political persuasion, or, should our efforts to prevent the acquisition of these weapons fail, to deter or destroy them prior to their use against our forces to reduce their military effectiveness should they be used" (U.S. Air Force/Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, National Security Negotiations Division briefing, "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation: Developing the Tools," fall 1992). In March 1994, Pentagon officials indicated that preemptive raids on nuclear sites were not part of U.S. plans {Los Angeles Times, March 12,1994, p. 8). 62. Spector, "Deterring Regional Threats." 63. Of interest is Lawrence E. Grinter, "The United States and Southeast Asia," Asian Affairs (summer 1993). 64. Spector, "Deterring Regional Threats," p. 23. 65. David E. Sanger, "North Korea Bars Taking of Samples from Nuclear Site," New York Times, March 16,1994, pp. Al, A4. 66. Stogel, "Nuclear Officials Believe," p. 1; Washington Post, June 6,1994, p. 1; Warren Strobel and Stewart Stogel, "Nuclear Clues Are Gone, Say Experts," Washington Times, June 7,1994, p. 1; and Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea Is Said to Have Nuclear Fuel," New York Times, June 8,1994, p. A4. 67. R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Debates Shift on North Korea: Carter's Visit Derails Sanctions Drive," Washington Post, June 21,1994, p. 1. 68. Washington Post, July 8,1994, p. 17; New York Times, August 3,1994, p. 3, and October 22,1994, p. 5. 69. New York Times, August 3,1994, p. 3. In late September, North Korean negotiators attempted to add more demands to their position—demands termed by Ambassador Gallucci as "ludicrous" (Washington Post, September 23,1994, p. 32). 70. Washington Post, August 16,1994, p. 15; and Washington Times, September 10,1994, p. 8. Also see Gallucci, as cited in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 9,1994, p. 12, and Gallucci's press statement, "U.S.-North Korea Talks on the Nuclear Issue," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, July 26,1993, pp. 535-536. 71. See the Agreed Framework, and the pros and cons, in Thomas L. Wilborn, Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement

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(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 1995). 72. Communication with U.S. government officials, May 25,1995. 73. New York Times, May 2,1995, p. 3. 74. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 333,342,392-394,397^00. 75. Washington Post, May 16,1995, pp. 1,13. 76. U.S. authorities to author, Beijing, February 16,1994.

North Korea's Nuclear Program and Its Impact on Northeast Asian Security Seong Whun Cheon

In the post-Cold War era, international efforts to ban the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have intensified. This has been demonstrated by the UN Security Council in its sanctions against Iraq, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its decision to strengthen its safeguards system, by the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and by the recent efforts to reinforce verification mechanisms of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Under the circumstances, North Korea's announcement to not live up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its wrangling with the IAEA must be an important challenge to international efforts to maintain and reinforce the nonproliferation regime. The international community has been suspicious of North Korea's nuclear program since Leonard Spector and Jacqueline Smith's article "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?" was published in the March 1991 edition of Arms Control Today. Of course, government authorities of South Korea and the United States had paid close attention to the North's nuclear activities, especially since the mid-1980s. But Spector and Smith's article paved the way for publicizing Pyongyang's dubious nuclear intention, thus drawing the concern of the international society. Since then, international efforts to ban the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula have been successful in some aspects and have stalled in other areas.1 The third round of the North Korea-U.S. talks started in August 1994. The talks had originally begun in July but were interrupted by the sudden death of North Korea's president, Kim Il-sung. In principle, the two sides agreed to establish diplomatic repre191

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sentatives in each other's capitals, the United States confirmed its readiness to provide light-water reactors (LWRs) to the North, and Pyongyang promised to remain a party to the NPT. Intense bilateral negotiations are being held in Geneva to put these principles into practice. As the two sides' positions are different in many aspects, the North Korean nuclear issue has reached an important juncture. If concerned parties maintain their patience and put more cooperative efforts into resolving the issue, the suspicions about Pyongyang's nuclear program would be reduced and tension on the Korean peninsula decreased. Otherwise, a catastrophic outcome that nobody wants in this nuclear game might become a reality. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to examine the major questions that have been raised thus far with respect to the North Korean nuclear issue. It is also timely to address broader regional security issues related to the North Korean nuclear problem. MAJOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR ISSUE

There are several major issues that deserve close attention. These questions have been points of contention among the players in North Korea's nuclear game, and there still exist divergent views on each issue. Was the Resumption of the 1993 Team Spirit Exercises a Good Decision?

Since its beginning in 1976, the annual Team Spirit (TS) South Korea-U.S. joint exercise program has been the major stumbling block to an inter-Korean dialogue. Ongoing negotiations stopped whenever the TS exercises were conducted. When Seoul and Washington decided to resume the 1993 TS exercises in October 1992, the South Koreans and the Bush administration seemed to conclude that further pressure on North Korea would be effective. Rather than yielding to pressure, however, North Korea strongly criticized the resumption of the TS exercises and stopped all NorthSouth Korean talks except those of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC). Pyongyang rejected the establishment of a hot line between the two Korean military authorities and revoked scheduled meetings of four joint commissions including the Joint Military Commission (JMC). At the subsequent JNCC meetings, the North continued to demand the cancellation of the TS exercises. When South Korea and the United States issued an official announcement that the 1993 TS exercises would

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be carried out as planned, North Korea even stopped JNCC meetings— the only inter-Korean communication channel remaining at that time. The necessity of the TS exercises has been questioned not only from military, but also from political, perspectives. The conventional military balance between the two Koreas has been shifting toward the South's favor. Pyongyang has spent more than 25 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on its oversized military, compared to Seoul's spending of approximately 5 percent of its GNP. However, the South Korean economy gives an advantage to Seoul, and the South's actual military spending reaches almost twice as much as that of the North. General Louis Menetrey, former commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, predicted in 1989 that "if [current] trends continue there should be stability on the peninsula without the United States being part of the equation in the mid-1990s."2 It is also reported that Pyongyang has scaled down its military exercises due to economic shortages. Under the circumstances, the TS exercises involving hundreds of thousands of troops and modern weapon systems would exacerbate tension, rather than stabilize military confrontation, on the Korean peninsula. Politically, the resumption of the TS exercises must undermine the position of pragmatists in the North Korean regime who are willing to make compromises with South Korea and gradually open their society. This has been confirmed by the events that followed October 1992. InterKorean relations have deteriorated, and North Korea's nuclear problem has not been resolved, but, in fact, it has worsened. Therefore, the TS exercises would be better if at least properly regulated, if they cannot be terminated at once. Restrictions on the exercises could be linked to inter-Korean arms control measures. The two Koreas already agreed not to use armed forces against each other and to resolve disputes peacefully. The JMC was formed on May 18,1992, to reduce tension between the two sides, build military confidence, and reduce arms. Once the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved and the inter-Korean talks resume, the JMC will begin its activities. In particular, the JMC will negotiate and oversee the implementation of: (1) mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises; (2) peaceful use of the demilitarized zone; (3) exchanges of military information and personnel; (4) phased arms reduction, including the elimination of WMD and surprise attack capabilities; and (5) verification of these measures. Was It Wise to Demand Special Inspections Prior to Verifying the 5-Megawatt Reactor Core? The IAEA concluded that there existed "significant inconsistencies" between Pyongyang's initial report to the IAEA and what the IAEA has

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actually found. In order to resolve them, on February 25,1993, the IAEA demanded special inspections of the two undeclared sites that were intended for nuclear waste. North Korea argued that the sites are military facilities that are not subject to the IAEA inspections. The North further stated that any request for special inspections infringed on its sovereignty and that the IAEA had lost its fairness. Was the IAEA's demand for special inspections a good decision? It is believed that the IAEA's request was a tactical mistake that provoked Pyongyang and consequently caused enormous difficulties in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. At least, the IAEA should have waited for its sampling of the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. North Korea promised to allow the IAEA to take samples from the reactor core in the spring of 1993. With a sampling of the reactor fuel rods, the IAEA would have had an easier and better assessment of the amount of plutonium the North had produced than it could obtain by inspecting the two undeclared sites. Why did the IAEA insist on special inspections before sampling the reactor core? Probably, the IAEA was under pressure not to permit another "Iraq program" under its nose. It is also possible that the IAEA did not fully understand how serious a situation North Korea was facing at that time, particularly when the 1993 TS exercise was being conducted. Both the resumption of the TS exercises and the request for special inspections were provocative decisions and reduced the possibility of peaceful resolution of the problem. What Was North Korea's Intention When It Withdrew from the NPT? When North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, the prevalent view was that the decision showed the North's firm determination to develop nuclear weapons. In time, however, this view proved to be unjustified. Close examination of the events that have occurred since North Korea's announcement leads to the conclusion that the North used the NPT withdrawal to realize improvement in North Korean-U.S. relations. After announcing its decision to withdraw from the NPT, North Korea made it clear that it would not preclude the possibility of negotiation. In the withdrawal statement, the North said that it would not change its attitudes until the U.S. nuclear threat ceased and the IAEA restored its impartiality. Since then, almost every statement issued by the North Korean authorities has emphasized settling the problem through negotiations with the United States. The North Korean ambassador in Geneva and the deputy ambassador in the UN, for instance, have listed

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the following conditions as a quid pro quo for returning to the NPT: (1) termination of the TS exercises; (2) inspection of the U.S. military bases in South Korea; (3) removal of the nuclear threat against North Korea; (4) no U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea; (5) respect for North Korean socialism; and (6) restoration of the IAEA's impartiality and neutrality.3 Although there is a possibility that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons as a last resort to sustain its regime, it is more likely that the North has used brinkmanship in order to get out of the deadlock caused by the TS exercises and the IAEA's special inspection request. Pyongyang's ultimate objective is to normalize relations with the United States and other Western countries, which would allow opportunities to escape from economic and political difficulties. North Korea's intention was demonstrated at the three rounds of the North Korean-U.S. talks. The bilateral talks have dealt with broader political issues, rather than specific technical ones, and thus, to some degree, the North's strategy has been successful. What Is the Assessment of Pyongyang's Nuclear Capability? There are various estimates on North Korea's nuclear capability. It has been reported that Pyongyang has extracted 90 grams to 21 kilograms of plutonium. A U.S. estimate on February 24,1993, by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director James Woolsey claimed that it is highly likely that the North produced enough fissile material for making at least one nuclear bomb.4 But Mr. Woolsey's estimate was thought to be based on worst-case assumptions by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and scholars such as Leonard Spector at the Carnegie Endowment.5 A more recent estimate by the CIA in December 1993 declared that there is a better-than-even chance that Pyongyang already possesses a nuclear bomb and that it could have produced as much as 12 kilograms of plutonium.6 However, the State Department did not agree with this calculation.7 Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin also said that there was no clear evidence indicating that Pyongyang had continued to develop nuclear weapons.8 Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency, reported in January 1993 that North Korea had no nuclear weapons but did possess quite advanced nuclear technology.9 Gennady Evstafiev, director general of the control bureau of WMD at the external intelligence office remarked that the North Korean nuclear program is frozen due to its enormous costs and international pressures and that the United States knows about the absence of nuclear weapons in the

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North.10 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev also argued that North Koreans do not have nuclear weapons and that it would take three to seven years for the country to develop them.11 South Korea's intelligence agency has estimated that North Korea could have extracted 7-22 kilograms of plutonium and may have possessed one to three nuclear weapons in 1994 or 1995.12 The other two important parties of the North Korean nuclear problem—China and Japan—have never stated their official estimates of the North's nuclear capability, but it seems that they do not regard Pyongyang's nuclear capability as a threat to their security. Despite various estimates and calculations, there has been no person or organization that can confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Pyongyang may have enough plutonium for one or two nuclear explosive devices, but there is no confirmation that North Koreans were successful in weaponizing these materials or, furthermore, in testing any nuclear explosive devices. At the moment, it seems highly likely that the North does not possess a complete nuclear weapon and that it has, at most, 8.5-12 kilograms of plutonium. Is the North Playing for Time to Develop Nuclear Weapons? Conservatives in South Korea and the United States have often argued that North Korea is playing for time to develop nuclear weapons. The following reasons, however, show that such criticisms do not represent a proper assessment of the situation. First, since nuclear facilities at Yongbyon are under the IAEA inspections, it would be impossible to make clandestine diversions of nuclear materials without being detected by the IAEA inspection system. The continuity of safeguards inspection was hampered in November 1993 when Pyongyang refused to accept the IAEA's ad hoc inspection. But subsequent IAEA inspections conducted in March and May 1994 confirmed the belief that there has been no illicit diversion of nuclear materials since the North first accepted an IAEA inspection in May 1992. Second, it would be difficult to move any of the materials stored at the two undeclared sites, which are targets of the IAEA special inspection. The materials are believed to be highly toxic, and it would be virtually impossible to remove them in a short period of time or without being detected by U.S. intelligence satellites. Third, although the United States has paid close attention to North Korea's nuclear program, the Clinton administration seems reluctant to push the North into a corner. For example, contrary to its strong desire for an immediate implementation of the special inspection in February 1993, the United States did not set a time limit for inspections of the two

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undeclared sites during the second round of the bilateral talks in July 1993. Such U.S. leeway could be based partly on the overall policy changes toward containing nonproliferation as manifested in dealing with Ukraine—policy changes that moved from pressures to partnership. Another important factor contributing to U.S. tolerance could be the confidence it accumulated during a series of bilateral meetings with North Korea that the North would not pursue its nuclear weapons option any further.13 Even if North Korea does not abandon its will to become a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang's present nuclear program seems to be frozen by economic and technical difficulties, by disclosure and surveillance of its nuclear activities by the IAEA, and by international pressures to give up the program. Current North Korean strategy seems to maximize the effectiveness of its nuclear card to achieve diplomatic ties with the United States and other Western countries. What Does North Korea's Request for LWRs Mean?

During the second round of the North Korea-U.S. talks, the former offered to convert its graphite reactors to LWRs, which are safer and more difficult to use to make fissile materials for nuclear bombs. The United States was in favor of the North's idea but hesitated to take immediate action by arguing that it would take a long time (about eight to ten years) and an enormous cost to construct LWRs. Pyongyang's LWR request could be based on the following five motivations. First and most important, North Korea is afraid that its acceptance of special inspections might make its nuclear card no longer effective, thus it would lose the most important bargaining leverage visà-vis the United States. Therefore, the North feels obliged to get some tangible benefits from the United States before it accepts the special inspection. Second, in order for the United States to help North Korea to convert its reactors, legal barriers and sanctions against Pyongyang currently imposed by Washington would be removed. Without normalizing bilateral relations, such U.S. assistance to the North is hardly possible. Thus, North Korea regards the conversion of its reactors as a shortcut to U.S.-North Korean diplomatic ties. Third, the North's eagerness for conversion of current reactors to LWRs would have the effect of demonstrating to the international community that it would not pursue a nuclear weapons program anymore. Fourth, it is also probable that Pyongyang, suffering from shortages of energy and electricity, may have decided to attempt to obtain Western technology and money to build modern nuclear reactors.

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Fifth, although North Koreans willingly abandoned graphite-moderated reactors originally from the Soviet Union, they do not want their efforts devoted to nuclear development, which has been regarded as an important national project for the past forty years, to be nullified. Therefore, North Koreans prefer LWRs to conventional power plants in order to keep and develop nuclear technology. The above motivations are not harmful at all to South Korea, the United States, and Japan. In addition, Western cooperation on North Korea's reactor conversion is an important supplementary measure to enhance the transparency of the North's nuclear activities and to deter the North from going nuclear. Therefore, the U.S. guarantee and the South's willingness to provide LWRs to the North are important steps for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. What Does It Mean to Disclose the Past Histoiy of the North Korean Nuclear Program? When former President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea in June 1994, President Kim Il-sung promised to freeze the North's present and future nuclear activities. Since then, disclosure of the past history of the North Korean nuclear program has become the issue of greatest concern. That is, how much plutonium had North Koreans extracted before May 1992 when they first accepted the IAEA inspection? According to the worstcase assessment, South Korea and the United States believe that the maximum amount of plutonium that could have been extracted by North Korea is 8.5-12 kilograms. The actual amount of plutonium Pyongyang possesses cannot exceed this figure because this estimate is based on the worst-case scenario that assumes all conditions favorable to the North. Therefore, the resolution of the past history issue would mean that an exact amount of plutonium is found between the 90 grams that North Korea reported to the IAEA and the 12 kilograms, which is the worstcase estimate. There are two different means to disclose the history of past nuclear activities: either by conducting special inspections or by analyzing the spent fuels taken from the 5-megawatt reactor. The IAEA requested a special inspection of the two undeclared sites in February 1993. Since North Korea has been resolutely opposed to the inspection, it seems inevitable that a compromise solution that saves the North's face must be found. In implementing the inspection, there exist three possible measures that could minimize North Korean embarrassment. First, environmental sampling and analysis can be conducted on the periphery of the two undeclared sites. An important shortcoming of this measure is that it may not fully disclose the past history.

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Second, the inspection can be performed normally, but the results need not be made public. Consequently, international pressures on North Korea may be reduced. Since the North Korean nuclear problem is an international concern, however, the IAEA will have to reveal the inspection results to a certain extent. Thus, the implementation of this measure has low feasibility. Third, the inspection could be performed in conjunction with the North-South reciprocal inspection. That is, the IAEA inspection and the reciprocal inspection of the two undeclared sites and the two U.S. bases in South Korea would be conducted simultaneously.14 In this case, the IAEA's determination to exercise its special inspection right will not be undermined. On the other hand, North Koreans could argue that they had allowed the IAEA officials only a visit15 and could give maximum publicity to their own inspection of U.S. bases. Hence, it is suggested that the inspection should be conducted according to this third method. The second way of disclosing the past history of the North Korean nuclear program is to analyze spent fuel rods and investigate the operation record of the 5-megawatt reactor. It will take enormous time and effort to inspect about 8,100 fuel rods, and North Korea may not provide a complete operations record. But, if realized, this method would produce a better assessment of the past history than would the special inspection.16

THE NORTH KOREA-U.S. AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THE SUBSEQUENT LWR TALKS The Agreed Framewoik

On October 21, 1994, North Korea and the United States signed the Agreed Framework that will eventually resolve North Korea's nuclear problem if faithfully implemented. After North Korean leader Kim IIsung's sudden death in July 1994, concerns were raised that Pyongyang might change its nuclear policy, which had aimed at a diplomatic resolution of the problem. However, it turned out that new leader Kim Jong-Il faithfully followed his father's policy and was more pragmatic to a certain extent, which apparently facilitated the conclusion of the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework consists of four major chapters. The first deals with North Korea freezing its nuclear activities and the U.S. provision of two LWRs to the North. North Korea will freeze its 5-megawatt (electrical) (MWe) research reactor, its 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, its radiochemical laboratory, and its nuclear fuel fabrication plant. The

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North will also accept the IAEA inspection to verify its freezing state and remain a party to the NPT. In return for this, the United States will make arrangements for the provision of an LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MWe by a target date of the year 2003. The United States will organize an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project. The United States will also make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors, pending completion of the first LWR. The second chapter addresses the normalization of the bilateral relations. North Korea and the United States agreed to reduce trade barriers including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions. Both sides will open a liaison office in the other's capital through expert-level discussions. They will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level as progress is made on issues of concern to each side. The third chapter focuses on peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula. The United States will provide formal assurance to North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In response to this, North Korea will take steps to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and engage in dialogue with South Korea. The fourth chapter is devoted to strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. North Korea will remain a party to the NPT and accept the IAEA inspection. When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed—but before delivery of key nuclear components—North Korea will take all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, which implies accepting the special inspection of the two undeclared facilities at Yongbyon. In order to implement the Agreed Framework, three sets of expertlevel talks on spent fuel, liaison offices, and LWRs were held. The two sides reached agreements in the first two expert-level talks, but the LWR talks failed due to significant differences of position on several contentious issues. The LWR Expert-Level Talks: Contentious Issues and Failure Although the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was officially launched on March 9,1995, the LWR project faced many difficulties from its beginning. The United States, representing KEDO, and North Korea held LWR expert-level talks from November 30,1994, to April 20,1995, but the talks were not successful. The most contentious issue was the choice of the reactor type to be supplied to North Korea. South Korea, willing to pay for a significant

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portion of the expenses for the LWR construction (approximately $40 billion), argued that two 1,000 MWe Korean standard nuclear power plants (SNPPs) had to be selected and that Seoul should play a central role in the construction. North Korea, on the other hand, strongly refused to accept the South Korean reactor. Pyongyang was worried about an aftermath that could be caused by accepting the South's reactor, the influence of visiting and residing South Korean technicians, and the possibility of the South's political exploitation of the LWR project. Instead of the South Korean reactor, North Korea wanted the CE-80type reactor constructed by the United States. Washington and Tokyo supported Seoul's position and maintained that there was no alternative to the Korean SNPP. The second key issue was whether South Korea's central role in the LWR project was guaranteed; that is, whether the North—worrying about the impact of South Korean technicians' visits and stays—would assure the South's active participation in the LWR construction. North Korea might have withdrawn its position on the reactor-type issue due to the fact that there was no country except South Korea that could pay for a significant portion of the LWR expenses. There was concern, however, that Pyongyang would take every step to minimize Seoul's participation in the LWR construction, especially in North Korean territories. The third key issue was how the expenses for the LWR construction were to be divided among the KEDO members. Immediately after the Agreed Framework was signed, South Korea said that it would pay for approximately 50 percent of the expenses. But as time passes, the South's portion seems to be increasing, for it recently said that it would pay for 70-80 percent of the expenses. A related issue was North Korea's request for additional aid applied to facilities such as a simulator for training technicians and infrastructure for LWR construction, which will cost approximately $1 billion. It was also not decided at the time who would pay for the heavy oil to be provided to North Korea as an alternative energy. North Korea-U.S.-Kuala Lumpur LWR Talks Concluding that these contentious issues should be resolved in the political dimension rather than in the technical one, Pyongyang and Washington began a higher level of LWR talks in Kuala Lumpur on May 19,1995. North Korean delegates were led by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyegwan and U.S. delegates by Thomas Hubbard, deputy assistant secretary of state. After lengthy negotiations, the two sides agreed on basic principles in providing LWRs to North Korea and issued a joint press statement on June 12,1995.

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During the Kuala Lumpur talks, Seoul and Washington kept close contacts. At the final stage of the talks, South Korea demanded more concrete expressions guaranteeing its type reactor and its central role in the LWR construction. The United States sent Robert Gallucci and Winston Lord, assistant secretaries of state, to Seoul in order to persuade the South Korean government. By moderating and incorporating South Korean positions into a provisional agreement, the joint press statement was successfully released. In the Kuala Lumpur talks, the following points were agreed upon. First of all, the two sides confirmed their political commitments to implement the Agreed Framework. That is, North Korea will keep freezing its nuclear activities and cooperate in disposal of the spent fuel. The United States, in turn, will be responsible for the LWR project and provision of heavy oil. Second, North Korea and the United States agreed on the basic principles of the LWR project. Although the South Korean-type reactor was not explicitly mentioned, there were expressions indicating the South's reactor. The second chapter of the joint statement, especially, indirectly but clearly points out the use of the SNPP: The LWR project will consist of two pressurized light water reactors with two coolant loops and a generating capacity of approximately 1,000 MWe each. The reactor model, selected by KEDO, will be the advanced version of U.S.-origin and technology currently under production.

From a technical perspective, there is no other LWR currently under production except the Korean SNPP that has two coolant loops with a generating capacity of 1,000 megawatts. From a legal viewpoint, KEDO, according to its statute, is an organization designed to provide the South Korean-type reactor to North Korea. In the third chapter of the joint statement, it is agreed that KEDO will select a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project. This implies that North Korea is not against a South Korean firm as a prime contractor that will play a central role in the project. Nevertheless, South Korea was worried that it would be isolated in the project despite its financial contributions. The United States allayed this concern by sending a letter from President Clinton to President Kim Young-sam assuring the central role of the South Korean reactor in the LWR project. President Clinton confirmed that an SNPP similar to the Uljin 3 and 4 reactors would be provided to North Korea and that the prime contractor responsible for the whole process of the LWR project would be a South Korean firm. The KEDO executive committee, consist-

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ing of South Korea, the United States, and Japan, also confirmed the two key principles. Third, it was agreed that any talks on the LWR project in the future will be held between North Korea and KEDO. In other words, there will be no more bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States on the LWR issue. Although led by U.S. citizens, South Korea and Japan will participate in the future LWR talks as members of KEDO.

BROADER REGIONAL SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES Overview of Regional Security With the end of the Cold War, bipolar conflicts centered on the United States and the Soviet Union disappeared. However, various regional disputes with long traditions that previously were overshadowed by the superpower competition have emerged as renewed threats to international peace and security. In the post-Cold War era, therefore, conflicts have been diversified in their nature and magnitude. In Northeast Asia, problems that had been discounted during the Cold War, for example, territorial disputes among the regional powers, became pending and important issues in the region after it. Traditional competition involving war memories and undisplayed hostilities have increased the potential for conflict, currently dominated mostly by economic fervor. There are signs of future instability. In particular, China and Japan with their economies booming have kept increasing their military expenditures. China, having the largest army in the region, increased its military budget, for example, by 12 percent in 1992. Although the Chinese cut their troops by one million in 1985-1987 and are planning further cuts to about two million over the next ten years, the reduction in number has been offset by qualitative improvements. A massive modernization program is being undertaken, including purchases of SU-27 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft from Russia, new destroyers and frigates, and the reported introduction of new classes of amphibious assault and supply ships with which long-range operations are possible.17 Japan's expansion of its conventional military capabilities and its pursuit of a more active role in international disputes are becoming particularly worrisome. Although the ratio of the increases in military expenditure is shrinking, Japan is increasing its defense budget. For instance, 1992's budget of U.S.$36.2 billion was the world's sixth largest.18 As part of its defense modernization program, Japan is planning to buy F-15s, ten destroyers, ninety tanks, five conventional sub-

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marines, and to develop advanced FSX fighter aircraft with the United States and improve its antisubmarine warfare capability.19 In addition, both houses of the Japanese Diet passed a bill to allow Japan's armed forces to participate in U N peacekeeping in 1992. China and the two Koreas are vocal opponents of any extension of Japanese overseas military activities. They express concern that peacekeeping operations mark the beginning of an inevitable resurgence of Japanese military might. With respect to Russia, there exist security concerns in the Northeast Asian region. In the last few months before the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe I Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had shipped tens of thousands of weapons beyond the Ural Mountains, where they need not be destroyed or even counted. According to one estimate, the total number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery withdrawn beyond the Urals is 57,300 pieces.20 Old equipment in the Far East could be replaced with the withdrawn materials, and new units could be formed and equipped with weapons moved from Europe. Compared with Europe, a significantly different geopolitical situation prevails in Northeast Asia. There exist diverse political systems and cultures, and considerable variations in the size of population, territory, and the degree of economic strength. Furthermore, there exist important interstate conflicts such as the North-South Korean confrontation and the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute. Security cooperation among the states is virtually nil, and a regional security forum like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) does not exist. A t the moment, regional players seem indifferent to, or at least not so anxious about, enhancing military stability in the region. Under the circumstances where the tendencies of regional powers are toward conventional military expansion and nuclear proliferation, the two Koreas' efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons would have little influence to curb the regional proliferation attempts. Given that the Denuclearization Declaration signed by the two Koreas must be a harbinger of things to come, the following measures can be taken by the regional powers to enhance security in Northeast Asia. Comprehensive Security Assurance There are two kinds of security assurances currently provided by nuclear weapons states: positive and negative security assurances. Nonnuclear weapons states have requested that the security assurances be improved. The Korean peninsula could be a model case for applying a firmer security assurance system encompassing both the positive and the negative.

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Positive security assurance. Just before signing the NPT, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain each declared to the UN Security Council its intention as a permanent member: to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.21

This positive security assurance was adopted by Security Council Resolution 255 on June 19,1968, just before the signing of the NPT. A number of non-nuclear weapons states have expressed their view that positive security assurance is nothing more than that already contained in the UN Charter. Furthermore, the statements made by the three nuclear powers amount to only their intentions and are subject to the right of veto in the Security Council.22 Negative security assurance. Since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, nuclear have-nots dissatisfied with the inadequacy of the positive security assurance have pressed for specific negative security assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.23 Thus far, four of the permanent members in the Security Council—not including China—have made unilateral declarations with conditions, limitations, and exceptions. The Soviet Union announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against those states that "renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories."24 Russia recently made a statement that it had backed away from its previous nofirst-use pledge. The Russian defense ministry confirmed that the Russian military doctrine adopted on November 2,1993, abandoned the old Soviet pledge against first use of nuclear weapons.25 The United States declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the NPT or any comparable international agreement that binds parties not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies by a non-nuclear weapons state "allied to" or "associated with" a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.26 A similar statement was made by Great Britain.27 The position of France was that it would give assurances of nonuse of nuclear weapons, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, to only those states that have "constituted among themselves non-

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nuclear zones."28 The decade-old negotiations conducted during the Conference on Disarmament have made no progress in removing the conditions contained in the four nuclear weapons states' negative security assurances.29 Only China has extended a nonuse guarantee in unqualified terms. Since 1964, the Chinese government has solemnly declared that at no time, and under no circumstances, would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear free zones. China strongly calls for a negotiation by all nuclear weapons states aimed at concluding an international convention on unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons and nonuse and nonthreat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear free zones, possibly in conjunction with the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).30 UN resolution of comprehensive security assurance to the Korean peninsula. In spite of China's firm commitment to negative security assurance, the Chinese government has never made positive security assurance. Nor has the French government taken any position on that issue. With the two remaining nuclear weapons states joining the NPT (China in March and France in August 1992), it is possible to strengthen positive security assurance. In particular, China's commitment to positive security assurance would act as pressure on North Korea to not develop and use nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a formula needs to be devised where the nuclear have-nots' concerns be addressed over the incompleteness of negative security assurance. The Korean peninsula could be a prototype for such purposes. Probably, China could lead the other four nuclear weapons states to make a UN Security Council resolution in which they promise to never use or threaten to use, under any circumstances, nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and to take immediate Security Council actions to provide support and assistance to the two Koreas in case they are threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons by the newly emerging nuclear weapons states. Regional Nuclear Nonproliferatlon Measures With a view to promoting regional cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, it is indispensable that nuclear testing should be prohibited in this region. China should take initiatives on the test ban issue as it did on the security assurance for the non-nuclear weapons states. The current Chinese position on the CTBT is that only after the CTBT is con-

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eluded and comes into effect will China abide by it and cease nuclear tests.31 Even before the CTBT is concluded, however, a regional test ban negotiation among China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas could be launched. In addition, military activities involving nuclear weapons should be limited, and the number of nuclear weapons deployed in this region should be minimized. Considering the ambiguities of differences between peaceful and military uses of fissile materials, regional powers' nuclear activities in both civilian and military fields should be more transparent. Creation of a regional mechanism to control fissile materials also needs to be taken into account. On the other hand, establishing a regional network of seismic stations to detect and identify nuclear test explosions could be an important confidence-building measure in the region. Such a regional seismic network could be developed into a regional monitoring agency for verifying compliance of regional and international arms control treaties in the future. Regional Arms Control and Disarmament Efforts

Regional cooperation for nuclear nonproliferation should be complemented by conventional military confidence building. Considering that bilateral relationships are far more developed than multilateral ones in Northeast Asia, bilateral security dialogues should be promoted that lead to the resolution of existing disputes. The two Koreas' signing of a nonaggression agreement and negotiating of confidence-building measures are important precedents. Similar developments need to be made in other bilateral relationships in the region. Bilateral efforts could be parallel with multilateral confidence-building endeavors. An Asian version of multilateral dialogues has been proposed by several nations: for example, President Gorbachev's proposal of an "All Asian Forum" in May 1985 and the Canadian proposal of a "North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue" in July 1990.32 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, which was launched in July 1994, indicates that multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region will be activated in the near future. A similar forum in Northeast Asia for the purpose of military confidence building could be created with a smaller number of countries and at a more limited zone of application—the eastern region of China, Japan, the two Koreas, and the Far Eastern region of Russia. South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sungjoo already proposed a mini-CSCE in Northeast Asia.33 This minisized security forum could be a stepping-stone for establishing a broader security framework in East Asia.34

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Regional Open Skies: A Measure to Enhance Transparency The Open Skies Treaty was signed on March 24, 1992, by a total of twenty-seven countries including all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. Treaty parties will conduct short-notice, unarmed observation overflights using aircraft equipped with sensors that have a twenty-four-hour, all-weather capability. All territory can be overflown, even sensitive military sites. The information from all Open Skies flights will be made available to all participants. Thus, cooperative aerial inspections will allow participants to see firsthand what their neighbors are up to, providing at once a confidencebuilding measure and a tool for use in crisis management, should tensions rise among Open Skies signatories. The objective of Open Skies is to bring greater stability to a region undergoing dramatic political, military, and economic changes. A similar aerial observation measure in Northeast Asia would promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities in the region.35 Open skies would allow participants to assess the status of opposing military forces while literally and figuratively maintaining a safe distance. An open skies agreement is not as intrusive as are inspections on the ground. Cooperative overflights need not interrupt normal patterns of military or civilian life. Indeed, unless otherwise told, citizens on the ground may not even be aware of flights taking place. Since the idea of open skies does require partial, but not total, transparency, it would be easily acceptable to countries such as North Korea, traditionally resistant to openness. If countries in Northeast Asia with no experience in arms control feel difficulties in negotiating a new regional open skies agreement, they could join the ready-made one in Europe. The Open Skies Treaty, six months after enforcement, is to make open accession by any state in the world, as long as the state is accepted by the Open Skies Consultative Commission, the implementation body of the treaty.36 Indeed, this is a case where an already existing regime can be exploited in the Northeast Asian region. CONCLUSION This analysis has investigated the North Korean nuclear program, focusing on three major areas of concern. The first part of the chapter addressed seven key questions raised in relation to the North's nuclear weapons development program. Resumption of the 1993 TS military

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exercises and the IAEA's request for a special inspection in February 1993 were too provocative to settle the nuclear issue in a mutually cooperative way. In spite of divergent estimates, Pyongyang is believed to have failed in developing a complete nuclear weapon, and its Sovietoriginated nuclear activities are effectively being frozen. Though not giving up its intention to go nuclear, the North's current nuclear strategy is to take advantage of the nuclear card for regime survival. This strategy has been successful enough to get the United States involved with North Korea and to begin a process of improving bilateral relations. Pyongyang's decision to convert its reactors to a light-water system should be interpreted in this context. Disclosure of the history of Pyongyang's nuclear program would reveal the exact amount of its obtained plutonium—between 90 grams (the reported figure to the IAEA) and 12 kilograms (the worst-case estimate). The North Korea-U.S. Agreed Framework was signed on October 21,1994. North Korea promised to freeze and eventually dismantle several key nuclear facilities, and the United States agreed to make arrangements for providing two 1,000-megawatt LWRs to North Korea. The two sides also agreed to improve political and economic relations step-bystep. The North consented to remain a party to the NPT, and the United States provided formal assurance to North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Despite many loopholes, the Agreed Framework was accepted as an important tool to eventually resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Since the Agreed Framework was signed, the number one issue has been the provision of two LWRs to Pyongyang. The North Korea-U.S. LWR talks failed due to several contentious issues. Most important was the choice of the reactor type and South Korea's role. South Korea maintained that two Korean SNPPs would be provided and that its central role in the whole process of the LWR project must be guaranteed. Not surprisingly, North Koreans had strong objections to these ideas. Pyongyang and Washington thus had to hold another round of meetings at Kuala Lumpur, and finally, the North abandoned its position on the two issues. For the purpose of carrying out the LWR project and delivering heavy oil as an alternative energy to the North, KEDO began to operate in New York in July 1995. As of October 1995, two rounds of the North Korea-KEDO meetings for the LWR supply contract had been held. It is quite uncertain when and under what terms the supply contract could be signed. One major stumbling block is that North Koreans have made additional demands, such as simulators and other infrastructures for the operation of the LWRs, which will cost $5-10 billion. Pyongyang and Washington are less anxious about the LWR project. There have been reports that

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North Korea wanted several conventional power plants because they could be provided more easily and quickly than LWRs. The U.S. position appears to be that the type of power plant does not really matter as long as North Korean nuclear activities are kept frozen. With the end of the Cold War, regional disputes previously overshadowed by superpower competition have emerged as renewed factors influencing regional stability. In Northeast Asia, traditional forms of competition—compounded by war memories—can become sources of potential conflict. In particular, China and Japan with their booming economies keep increasing their military expenditures and modernizing their weapons, which could be signs of future instability in the region. Under such circumstances, the two Koreas' solitary efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons would make little contribution to curbing regional proliferation. The following measures should be taken by the regional powers to enhance stability in Northeast Asia: (1) Provide more comprehensive and strong security assurance to the Korean peninsula through a UN resolution against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; (2) agree on and implement regional nonproliferation measures, such as a regional test ban agreement; (3) facilitate conventional arms control negotiations in the region; and (4) enhance regional transparency and openness in the military arena by signing an open skies agreement.

NOTES

The views expressed in this chapter are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Research Institute for National Unification or the National Unification Board. 1. For the history of the North Korean nuclear issue, see Seong Whun Cheon, "Regional Non-Nuclear Options from South Korea's Perspective," paper prepared for Conference on Peace and Security and the Nuclear Issue in Northeast Asia, cosponsored by the East-West Center and the Nautilus Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 18-19,1994;Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, "The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects," Arms Control: Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1993): 65-92. 2. Quoted in Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, no. 83 (summer 1991): 98. 3. Segye Times, March 16,1993; Mainichi Shimbun, March 17, and April 21,1993. 4. USIA Wireless File, United States Information Agency, March 2,1993, p. 23. 5. Seong Whun Cheon, "Analysis and Prospects of North Korea's Nuclear Problem," Proceedings of the Eighth RINU Seminar (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1993), p. 11, n. 16 (in Korean). 6. Stephen Engelberg and Michael Gordon, "North Korea Likely to Have Developed Own Atomic Bomb, CIA Tells President," New York Times, December 26,1993.

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7. Ibid. 8. Han-kyoreh Shinmun, December 10,1993. 9. Korea Herald, January 30,1993. 10. Dong-A Ilbo, January 15,1994; Korea Herald, January 16,1994. 11. Choson Ilbo, June 19,1994. 12. Choson Ilbo, March 18,1993. 13. Peter Hayes argued that "American decision-makers with access to classified information apparently have concluded that North Korea may be persuaded to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program. If U.S. Government officials had definitive intelligence to the contrary, they would not pursue a diplomatic course premised on the notion that North Korea may yet fulfill its NPT obligations" (Peter Hayes, "North Korea's Nuclear Gambits," in K. Bailey, ed., Director's Series on Proliferation [Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 7,1993], p. 30). 14. Seong Whun Cheon, "North Korea's Nuclear Problem: Current State and Future Prospects," Korean Journal of National Unification, vol. 2 (1993): 99-101. 15. Choi U-jin, the chairman of the northern side of the JNCC, distinguished on November 13,1992, the IAEA "officials' visits" from the IAEA "inspectors' inspection." Choi stated that the North had permitted visits to some of the undeclared sites in order to extend a spirit of cooperation to the IAEA (Peter Hayes, Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead? [Berkeley, Calif.: Nautilus Pacific Research, November 1992], p. 4). 16. Author's communication with Dr. Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, on July 19,1994. 17. Wendy Lambourne, "Asia/Pacific Security Backgrounder," Pacific Research, vol. 5, no. 3 (August 1992): 14. 18. Joong-ang Daily News, August 7,1992. 19. Lambourne, "Asia/Pacific Security Backgrounder," p. 14. 20. Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg, "CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms Control," International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 112. 21. In Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 43. 22. Aga Shahi, "Defense, Disarmament, and Collective Security," Nonoffensive Defense: A Global Perspective (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1990), p. 184. 23. William Epstein, The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Gunn and Hain Publishers, 1984), p. 30. 24. UN document A/S-10/PV.5. 25. Serge Schmemann, "Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms," New York Times, November 4,1993, p. A8. 26. UN document A/S-10/AC.1/30. 27. UN document A/S-10/PV.26. 28. UN document A/S-10/PV.27. 29. Shahi, "Defense, Disarmament, and Collective Security," p. 184. 30. "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Nuclear Testing," October 5,1993. 31. Ibid. 32. Former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro insisted on the necessities of a collective security system in Asia {Joong-ang Daily News, September 22,1992).

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33. Han Sung-joo, "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy: New Korea's Diplomacy Toward the World and the Future," speech delivered at a luncheon hosted by the Korean Council on Foreign Relations, May 31,1993. 34. The United States, having stationed its military forces, needs to be a participant, although its territory is not covered. 35. For the importance of an open skies agreement between North and South Korea, see Amy Smithson and Seong Whun Cheon, '"Open Skies' over the Korean Peninsula: Breaking the Impasse," Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1 (spring 1993): 57-77. 36. By December 15, 1993, twelve out of twenty-seven nations had deposited their instruments of ratification. The treaty was to enter into force after twenty states deposited instruments of ratification and after all signatories with passive quotas over eight ratify (Arms Control Reporter [Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1994], p. 409.A.l).

10

Basic Issues in the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula Tae-Hwan Kwak

The Korean peninsula has been divided into the two Korean states for almost half a century. Inter-Korean relations have been characterized by mutual distrust, animosity, lack of mutual cooperation, and conflicting ideologies. Deep-rooted inter-Korean mutual distrust is the core source of interKorean political conflicts. The South and the North maintain a devil mirror-image of each other. No matter how sincere one side has been in its proposals, the other would not take them seriously but, rather, simply dismissed them as propaganda ploys. Mutual suspicion and distrust originate from exclusively incompatible political, social, and economic systems. Kim Il-sung's juche ideology in the North is unacceptable to the South Korean authorities. In the eyes of South Korean leaders, juche is a basic obstacle to the Korean unification process. Many South Korean people still consider North Korea as a hostile enemy state. Mutual animosity resulting from the Korean War (1950-1953) will not easily go away. Under such hostile conditions, little can be achieved. Unless both sides make the utmost attempt to improve mutual hostile images and distrust, one cannot expect a sincere inter-Korean peacemaking process. The South can hardly accept North Korea's argument that realization of Korean reunification through the North Korean confederation formula could solve this problem. Thus, both sides need to work hard to build mutual trust before they seriously discuss inter-Korean unification procedures, although it will take a long time for them to change their mindsets and misperceptions of each other. Other sources of inter-Korean conflicts include: (1) conflicting unification formulas and different approaches to peace and Korean unification—both sides view the reunification issue from perspectives that are 213

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diametrically opposed to each other; (2) Pyongyang's unwillingness to open its closed society to the outside world—North Korea currently tightens its social control for fear of its regime's demise resulting from possible drastic changes and economic reform in North Korea; (3) North Korea's suspected nuclear development program, which has been a key obstacle to the peace process on the Korean peninsula; and (4) North Korea's consistent maintenance for propaganda purposes that the presence of U.S. troops is the basic obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue and Korean reunification. With the end of the Cold War, inter-Korean relations are slowly undergoing significant changes. The South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (hereafter, the Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (hereafter, the Denuclearization Declaration), if both are successfully implemented, will substantially contribute to the firm institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. Nevertheless, there are still basic issues to be resolved between the South and the North in order to create favorable conditions for a durable peace on the Korean peninsula. The purposes of this chapter are to reevaluate basic issues that still remain obstacles to the peace/unification processes on the Korean peninsula and to make several policy recommendations for creating favorable conditions for the peace process on the Korean peninsula. Let us take a closer look at three key issues identified as major obstacles to the peace process on the Korean peninsula: the implementation issue of the inter-Korean Basic Agreement; North Korea's nuclear issue, the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, and the issue of denuclearization on the peninsula; and the U.S. troop withdrawal issue.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT AND THE DENUCLEARIZATION DECLARATION: HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECTUATION

After the long, painful negotiations between South and North Korea, the prime ministers of both states, at the fifth round of their talks in Seoul on December 13, 1991, signed the historic Basic Agreement, the most important agreement between the two Koreas since the division of Korea in 1945. This agreement indeed represented a historic milestone and opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations. At the sixth interKorean prime ministers' talks in Pyongyang, this agreement went into effect on February 19,1992. The agreement includes the following provisions: (1) Both sides agree to respect each other's political and social systems, end slander and

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vilification, and pledge to not sabotage or subvert the other; (2) both sides agree to work toward a peace system to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement; (3) a South-North liaison office will be established at Panmunjom, on the border, within three months; (4) both sides agree to resolve disputes through dialogue; (5) a joint military committee and a telephone hot line will be established for the purpose of exchanging military information, giving prior notification of major troop movements, and working toward arms reduction, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (6) both sides agree to economic cooperation, including joint development of resources and joint industrial and commercial ventures; (7) both sides will carry out exchanges of scientific, cultural, news, and other information and will promote reunification of divided families and guarantee inter-Korean travel; and (8) both sides will reestablish severed rail and road connections, with postal and telecommunications links established.1 It is most significant that the two Koreas also agreed to work toward replacing the present armistice with a formal peace treaty. North Korea made a significant concession on this issue. At the Seoul talks, the nuclear issue arose as a key factor. In addition to North Korean Premier Yon repeating his earlier proposal for a nuclear free Korean peninsula, Prime Minister Won-shik Chung made a draft proposal for a Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, in which he reiterated President Roh's November 8, 1991, proposal. Some important points of South Korea's proposal included: Both sides will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; both sides will not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities; both sides will actively participate in international efforts for total elimination of chemical and biological weapons; and, separately from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of their nuclear facilities and materials, both sides will implement inspections of any military and civilian facility, material, and site in the South and the North in order to confirm compliance with the above items.2 On December 18,1991, President Roh Tae-woo announced that all U.S. atomic weapons in South Korea had been removed. President Roh said in a televised address, "There is no reason or excuse for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or refuse nuclear inspection."3 The removal of U.S. weapons gave South Korea strong leverage in its campaign to force North Korea to renounce its nuclear arms development. Roh's declaration satisfied one of North Korea's conditions for allowing international inspections of its nuclear research complex, thereby putting additional pressure on North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The South Korean government stated that it would still hold

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Team Spirit 1992 if North Korea did not allow international inspection of its nuclear program despite the signing of the Basic Agreement. The accord, however, did not deal directly with North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea's first official response to President Roh's declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula was favorable in a December 22,1991, foreign ministry statement. The North welcomed Roh's declaration. However, it stated that the North would sign a nuclear safeguards accord under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) only if the United Stated confirmed it had removed its nuclear weapons from the South.4 South and North delegates met together to discuss the denuclearization issue on December 26,28, and 31,1991. Both sides made a number of major concessions at the three-day talks. On December 26, the North put forth the draft declaration containing a key clause stating that it had no nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities and pledging that it would not own facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The North denied that it was developing nuclear weapons. Inspections of nuclear facilities and sites became the single most important issue. The North proposed that it should jointly verify with the South that all U.S. nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea before inspections, but dropped its demand that the United States itself confirm the absence of nuclear weapons in the South. The South proposed that the North sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA by January 15,1992, but the North rejected this. It said the signing was strictly a matter between North Korea and the IAEA, and no other nation could set a deadline. The North told the South that it had begun the process of signing the safeguards accord, paving the way for international inspections, and promised to sign it "at an early date." The North also made a concession on the U.S. nuclear protection issue, and it did not insist that the South abandon altogether the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Both sides had major differences over inspections of military bases. The North proposed that it be allowed into the South to verify the absence of nuclear weapons. The South, in turn, proposed reciprocal arrangements, where the North could check military bases in the South, including U.S. bases, while the South could check military bases and nuclear installations in the North. The mutual inspection issue remained unresolved. On December 31,1991, without resolving the issue of international inspection of nuclear facilities, North and South Korea initialed the Denuclearization Declaration, thereby banning nuclear arms from the Korean peninsula. The major features of the declaration include: The South and the North "will not test, manufacture, produce, receive (or

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accept), possess, store (or stockpile), deploy or use nuclear weapons"; the South and the North will use their nuclear energy programs solely for peaceful purposes; the South and the North "will not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment"; "in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the South and the North will conduct inspections of objects chosen by the other side and agreed to by both parties"; and these inspections will follow procedures determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). The declaration became effective on February 19,1992.5 The nonnuclear declaration certainly will pave a smooth way for peaceful Korean reunification if both sides will observe the declaration in good faith. However, the declaration contains no enforcement measures to ensure compliance. The South Korean government announced on January 7,1992, that the 1992 Team Spirit U.S.-South Korean military exercises would be canceled since North Korea agreed to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement. Primarily because of the unresolved nuclear issue, the North-South Basic Agreement and the Denuclearization Declaration have not been implemented.

PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING POLITICAL-MILITARY PROVISIONS IN THE NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AGREEMENT

As long as the North's nuclear issue is not resolved satisfactorily, the North-South Basic Agreement will not likely be implemented. Article 5 of the Basic Agreement, which also went into effect on February 19, 1992, is an important provision for establishing a durable peace system in Korea: The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27,1953) until such a state of peace has been realized.6

The most significant decision is that both sides agreed to work together toward replacing the present armistice with a formal peace agreement. Until this replacement occurs, the North and the South shall observe the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Hence, North Korea made a significant concession on this issue, but the question of how to implement this provision remains. This issue could be a top priority for both sides. In order to implement this provision, international cooperation is needed and desirable; that is, the United Nations can play an important

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role in converting the 1953 Armistice Agreement into a peace system. The real parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement are undoubtedly South and North Korea, the United States, and China. Since the agreement was signed on July 27,1953, under UN auspices, the UN needs to play some role in converting the present agreement into a peace system. Hence, I propose that a four-power conference involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China take place in New York under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General to discuss this critical issue. At such a fourpower conference, a peace system on the Korean peninsula replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement could be discussed. Other issues may also be discussed, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea, a peace treaty between China and South Korea, and a peace treaty between the United States and North Korea, formally ending the Korean War. Chapter 2 of the Basic Agreement, "South-North Nonaggression" (Articles 9-14), contains important provisions for North-South nonaggression. Nonaggression emerged as a major issue in the North-South high-level talks since the North always considered a nonaggression declaration between the two a top priority. Major contents related to nonaggression in the South-North Basic Agreement are: 1. No use of force and no armed aggression against the other side (Article 9). 2. Peaceful settlement of differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiation (Article 10). 3. Designation of the Military Demarcation Line in the 1953 Armistice Agreement as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression (Article 11). 4. Establishment and operation of a South-North Joint Military Commission (JMC) to implement and guarantee nonaggression along with confidence-building matters to be dealt with by the committee (Article 12). 5. Installation of a telephone hot line between the military authorities of both sides (Article 13). 6. Formation of a South-North Military Commission to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of military confrontation between the two (Article 14). Article 12 of Chapter 2 deserves special attention. The South-North JMC will play important roles in implementing this provision. The commission shall discuss and promote the implementation of military confidence-building and arms reduction measurements, including: the mutual

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notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises; the peaceful use of the demilitarized zone (DMZ); exchanges of military personnel and information; and the realization of phased arms reductions, including the elimination of WMD and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof. The North and the South earlier agreed that WMD included nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. At the seventh round of inter-Korean talks between the prime ministers on May 5-8,1992, in Pyongyang, the South and the North agreed to establish and operate the South-North JMC. Article 2 of the agreement spells out its detailed functions: The JMC, as an implementation body, shall discuss and act on the following matters: concrete and practical measures to implement the nonaggression provisions; preparation and implementation of an agreement to achieve, abide by, and guarantee nonaggression; implementation of agreed measures to dissolve military confrontation; and supervision and verification of the implementation of measures. Both sides also adopted and effectuated the agreement to establish a South-North Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation and a South-North Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation as implementation bodies of the Basic Agreement, and both agreed to establish South-North liaison offices.7 At the eighth round of inter-Korean talks on September 15-18,1992, in Pyongyang, South and North Korea signed and effectuated three auxiliary agreements for the implementation of, and compliance with, Chapter 1: "South-North Reconciliation"; Chapter 2: "South-North Nonaggression"; and Chapter 3: "South-North Exchanges and Cooperation"; and with the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the SouthNorth Joint Reconciliation Commission. The four South-North joint commissions (Reconciliation, Military, Economic Exchanges and Cooperation, and Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation) do not function because of the North's suspected nuclear issue, but they could be operated if North Korea will abandon its nuclear development program and/or if South Korea will give up its linkage politics between the North's nuclear issue and inter-Korean economic cooperation.8 The JMC was established in September 1992, but has not performed its functions to implement any provisions of the nonaggression agreement between the South and the North primarily because of the North's nuclear weapons development issue. Implementing the agreement will be a very painful process, but the North and the South need to work together to realize the nonaggression agreement. None of the military confidence-building and arms reduction issues can be solved easily between the two sides in view of different approaches to arms reduction and military confidence-building measures.

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Since the two Koreas agreed to implement the nonaggression agreement, I believe they should not insist on which provisions of the agreement should be implemented first. Nevertheless, I would propose that the North and the South need first to deal with less difficult issues in the nonaggression agreement. One less difficult issue is the installation and operation of direct telephone hot lines between the military authorities of both sides to prevent the outbreak of accidental armed conflicts. Still another easier issue to resolve involves the use of the DMZ for peaceful purposes and mutual exchange of military personnel. North Korea may be very sensitive to such issues as mutual exchange of information and verification problems. In order to effectively implement the Basic Agreement, both sides need to resolve the North's nuclear issue. Let us now turn to the most important issue between the two Korean states. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND THE U.S.-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK

The issue of North Korea's suspected nuclear arms development program is a key obstacle to the peace process on the Korean peninsula and to the implementation timetable proposed by the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) for U.S. troop reduction. North Korea has reportedly produced enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear bombs. Despite wide publicity on North Korea's nuclear capability, North Korea officially denies having the intention, need, or capability to produce nuclear arms. Nevertheless, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other UN members believe that North Korea is embarking on production of nuclear weapons.9 In December 1985, North Korea signed the NPT. Within eighteen months of this, North Korea should have signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Six years after signing the NPT, the North finally signed the latter agreement on January 30,1992. If it is true that, as North Korea says, it has neither the intention nor the capability to produce a nuclear bomb, why did the North delay signing a safeguards accord? In my view, North Korea was using the safeguards agreement as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the South and the United States, for only when the South and the United States removed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Korea did the North finally sign the safeguards agreement. After North Korea ratified the safeguards agreement with the IAEA in April 1992, the IAEA conducted six international inspections of seven declared nuclear facilities in North Korea

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in 1992-1993, and did not find clear evidence to support the case that North Korea was making nuclear arms. However, in February 1993, North Korea rebuffed the IAEA's request for inspecting two undeclared nuclear waste sites. Earlier tests of samples given to the IAEA proved that the plutonium and the waste did not match. The North reported only 90 grams of plutonium to the IAEA. However, Western intelligence estimated that North Korea in fact has the 7-12 kilograms of plutonium needed to make a bomb.10 In the meantime, the IAEA requested North Korea to open the two undeclared nuclear sites for its inspection by March 25,1993. In response to the IAEA's request, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT and from its safeguard agreement with the IAEA on March 12, 1993. The North's decision heightened tensions in interKorean relations and its relations with the United States, Japan, and other UN member states in the summer and fall of 1993. As North Korea wanted to hold high-level talks with the United States in order to resolve the nuclear issue, the two countries began their negotiations in New York in June 1993. After four rounds of high-level talks, the United States and North Korea finally issued a joint statement on June 11,1993, which stated that North Korea had decided "unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."11 Thus, North Korea suspended its withdrawal but did not consider itself a member of the NPT. The second stage of U.S.-North Korea high-level talks was held on July 14-19,1994, in Geneva. North Korea agreed to hold consultations with the IAEA on its obligations as a signatory of the NPT, and it also agreed to improve relations with the South. The United States, in return, promised to help North Korea replace its gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs).12 Presidents Clinton and Kim Young-sam at the November 1993 summit meeting in Washington jointly proposed to North Korea that the U.S. and South Korean governments would suspend Team Spirit 1994 joint military exercises if North Korea would renew the IAEA's routine inspections and agree on the exchange of South-North Korean envoys. As soon as North Korea accepted these two conditions, the third stage of U.S.-North Korea talks would be held to discuss U.S. economic and technical aid, including the LWR project and diplomatic normalization of relations between them, in return for the North's acceptance of special inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites.13 In December 1993, the United States and North Korea agreed to a one-time IAEA inspection of the seven declared sites. The North insisted that the inspections be held outside the NPT framework. After ten months

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of long, painful negotiations over the nuclear issue between the United States and North Korea and between the IAEA and North Korea, the United States and North Korea agreed to take the following four measures on March 1,1994: (1) The United States will announce its decision to discontinue the 1994 Team Spirit exercises; (2) IAEA inspections for ensuring the continuity of safeguards will begin according to the February 15,1994, agreement between the IAEA and North Korea; (3) "Workinglevel contact for the North-South exchange of special envoys will resume in Panmunjom;" and (4) North Korea and the United States will announce that the third stage of their talks will start on March 21,1994, in Geneva.14 In addition, the United States made clear that the exchange of envoys had to take place before negotiations would resume. As this condition was not placed in writing in the joint agreement, North Korea simply ignored it. This proved to be a great mistake on the part of the United States. North Korea finally allowed an IAEA inspection team to visit seven of its declared nuclear facilities in early March 1994. It also agreed to hold inter-Korean talks to discuss the exchange of special envoys between the South and the North. When the IAEA inspection team entered North Korea on March 1, the U.S. and South Korean governments announced the suspension of Team Spirit 1994 in accordance with the U.S.-North Korean agreement of February 25,1994. When North Korea blocked the IAEA inspection team's full access to the "radiochemical laboratory" suspected to be a nuclear reprocessing plant, its action again heightened tensions in Korea. For a resolution of the North's nuclear issue, one needs to clearly understand what North Korea wants from Pyongyang's perspective. What are the North's goals in this dangerous nuclear game? Does North Korea have a nuclear bomb or not? If North Korea can achieve its goals without having a bomb, will it give up producing nuclear weapons? These questions are certainly difficult to answer; but assuming that North Korea is a rational actor in international politics, it could be possible for North Korea to forgo its nuclear development program if three goals are achieved. Based on North Korea's official statements, the first goal is the survival of the North Korean regime. North Korea repeatedly argues that the United States has tried to stifle its system. The North wants the United States to guarantee no use of force against it. The second is that North Korea wants to achieve political-diplomatic normalization in its relations with the United States and Japan. The third is that North Korea wants to get economic assistance from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other Western countries to improve its stagnant economy. If North Korea achieves these goals, it stated it would give up its nuclear development program. Let us now take a closer look at North Korea's "package solution" proposal for resolving the nuclear issue.

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On November 11, 1993, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, head of the delegation to the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks, made a statement calling for a package solution to the nuclear issue.15 Kang stressed that a formula for the solution should be adopted: The nuclear problem will be solved smoothly if the United States takes a practical action of renouncing its nuclear threat and hostile policy toward us as soon as the formula for a package solution is agreed upon and we fully comply with the safeguards agreement, remaining as a member nation of the treaty.16

In mid-May 1994, North Korea finally allowed an IAEA inspection team to complete inspections of the radiochemical laboratory and to observe removal of spent fuel rods from the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor. If IAEA inspectors ensure the continuity of nuclear safeguards in North Korea, the third stage of U.S.-North Korea talks can address the package solution to the nuclear issue. The IAEA Board of Governors agreed to cut off technical assistance to North Korea because the latter failed to comply with its safeguards agreement. In response to IAEA action, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA on June 13,1994. In mid-June, the United States circulated a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling for phased sanctions against North Korea. Tensions on the Korean peninsula were rapidly escalating to a dangerous level. In the midst of rising tensions surrounding the North's nuclear problem, former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang on June 15-18,1994, to hold ten hours of talks with Kim Il-sung. The meetings resulted in renewed hopes for resolving the nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiation. Kim agreed to freeze the North Korean nuclear program if the North received LWR technology and a U.S. promise not to use nuclear weapons against it. Kim also proposed convening a first-ever summit of North and South leaders "at any time, anywhere, without conditions at an early date."17 Following Carter's visit to Pyongyang, the United States and North Korea agreed to resume the third stage of talks on July 8, and South and North Korea agreed to hold a summit meeting in Pyongyang on July 25-27,1994. But Kim Il-sung's sudden death on July 8 postponed the summit indefinitely. The third stage of U.S.-North Korea talks was started on July 8,1994, in Geneva, but Kim Il-sung died the same day and continuation of the meeting was postponed until August 5. The U.S. and North Korean delegations met in Geneva on August 5-12,1994, and reached a four-point joint agreement on August 12. The following elements in the agreement should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue: First, North Korea is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with 2,000-megawatt LWR power plants, and the United States is prepared to make arrange-

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ments for interim energy alternatives to the North's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances of these provisions, North Korea will freeze construction of the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal off the radiochemical laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA. Second, North Korea and the United States are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political-economic relations. Third, to help achieve peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula, the United States is prepared to provide the North with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States, and North Korea remains prepared to implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration. Fourth, North Korea is prepared to remain a party to the NPT and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty.18 The second round of the third stage of U.S.-North Korea high-level talks met in Geneva in late September and early October 1994 to carry out the August 12 joint agreement. North Korea made new demands and took a more hard-line stance. Pyongyang asked for $2 billion in compensation and rejected a U.S. plan under which South Korea would play a central role in financing and constructing the new LWRs. North Korea also rejected renewed demands from the IAEA that it open all of its military installations to international inspection.19 In early October 1994, both the United States and North Korea finally agreed to the framework for the resolution of the nuclear issue by making mutual concessions and compromises in their unresolved issues. Let us take a brief look at both sides' concessions and gains in the agreement, starting with those of the United States. First, the United States agreed to assure North Korea a steady supply of fuel oil during the interim period. The North would receive fuel oil in sufficient quantity to make up for the power that would have been generated by the three nuclear power plants it has agreed to abandon. The United States agreed to construct two 1,000-megawatt LWRs. Second, the United States agreed to defer, for five years, special inspections of two undeclared nuclear waste sites, which would provide information about North Korea's past production of weapons-grade plutonium. South Korea insisted that such an inspection is a prerequisite for the resolution of the nuclear issue. Third, the U.S. government backed down on key demands that North Korea send 8,100 spent nuclear fuel rods, enough to make four or five bombs, to a third country. Instead, North Korea would be allowed to keep them for five years and then send them to another country. As to North Korea's concessions, first, it agreed to permanently freeze operations of its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, then to eventually

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dismantle it. Second, it agreed to freeze the construction of 50- and 200megawatt gas-cooled, graphite nuclear reactors that would have given the North a far larger supply of weapons-grade plutonium in coming years. Third, North Korea agreed also to full regular inspections by the IAEA. Fourth, the North agreed to fully reenter as a party to the NPT. Fifth, North Korea agreed to Korean-type nuclear LWRs as the replacement for their graphite reactors. The LWRs would be financed and built by an international consortium. Sixth, North Korea agreed to resume the stalemated inter-Korean talks. The United States and North Korea finally signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994, in Geneva. The United States and South Korea eventually accepted the North's package deal, which they had previously rejected. It appears that the Agreed Framework will contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia, but positive effects of the agreement remain to be seen. If both sides implement the provisions of the agreement in good faith, as President Clinton indicated when he described this accord as "the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula," this agreement will provide a basic framework for peaceful relations among the United States and the two Koreas. The Agreed Framework allows a ten-year timetable in which steps will be taken by each side that will result in the complete dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program by the year 2003. The agreement is a three-phase plan, briefly summarized as follows.20 Phase 1 (1994-1998): North Korea's Nuclear Program Freeze and LWR Construction/Heavy Oil Supplies North Korea is to freeze its nuclear program. In return, the United States and its allies are to provide North Korea with heavy oil. North Korea agreed to not refuel the 5-megawatt graphite nuclear reactor and to stop building two larger reactors (50 and 200 megawatts). The North agreed to not reprocess 8,100 spent fuel rods already removed from the 5megawatt reactor and to keep them in special cans under regular IAEA inspections, eventually for shipment to a third country. In return for North Korea's nuclear freeze, the United States and its allies agreed to begin work on the first of two new LWRs at a cost of $4 billion, mostly financed by South Korea and Japan. To compensate North Korea for lost energy production from further operation of its existing reactors, the United States and its allies promised to supply North Korea with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the first three months, 150,000 tons in the first year of the agreement in 1995, and 500,000 tons annually thereafter for heating and electricity production until the new LWRs are oper-

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ational in 2003. At this stage, no key nuclear components of the new reactor are to be installed. Phase 2 (1999-2001): Special Inspections of Two Sites and Removal of Spent Fuel Rods North Korea agreed to allow IAEA special inspections of two undeclared nuclear waste sites after five years of the agreement and to begin sending 8,100 spent fuel rods to a third country. The removal of the fuel rods is scheduled to take three years. In return, during this phase, the United States and its allies are to complete the first LWR, and the reactor is to begin producing electricity. Phase 3 (2001-2003): Dismantling of Three Graphite Reactors and Completion of the Second LWR North Korea agreed to dismantle the 5-megawatt reactor and to tear down its partly constructed 50- and 200-megawatt reactors. It also agreed to dismantle its plutonium reprocessing installation and fuel fabrication plant. In return, the United States and its allies are to complete the construction of the second LWR. Is the Agreed Framework a good plan? If the agreement is sincerely implemented, all parties concerned will eventually gain benefits. If it works, President Clinton and Kim Jong-Il will be the big winners. This agreement also benefits South Korea, for it opens the way for South Korean business into North Korea.21 But the plan may face some problems in the process of implementation. North Korea continues to hold a nuclear card concerning spent fuel rods and special inspections for the next five years. South Korea, which will play a central role in building the two LWRs, may hold an economic card in dealing with North Korea. Both Koreas need to jointly cooperate to successfully carry out the Agreed Framework in the interests of resolving the nuclear issue and creating favorable conditions for implementing the Denuclearization Declaration for a nuclear free Korean peninsula.

PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION DECLARATION Let us turn to the problems of implementing the Joint Denuclearization Declaration, which went into effect on February 19,1992. In accordance with the declaration, both delegations met seven times from February 19

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to March 14,1992, to discuss and conclude the draft agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South JNCC, which went into effect on March 19 and was created to implement the Joint Denuclearization Declaration. The two Koreas agreed to prepare rules on mutual inspections by the end of May 1993, at the latest, and conduct mutual inspections within twenty days thereafter. After the first JNCC meeting on March 19,1992, thirteen commission meetings, nine commission chairmen's contacts, and commission members contacts were held in 1992, but they failed to produce a bilateral inspection regime. Why did they fail? Let us take a brief look at the three major issues over which both sides disagreed at the JNCC meetings in 1992.22 First, the South maintained that the JNCC's major task was to verify the implementation of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the South was to prepare rules on inter-Korean mutual inspections of nuclear facilities. In the meantime, North Korea demanded the priority discussion of an implementation agreement and raised again the idea of a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula calling for joint actions against an external nuclear threat and international guarantees for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the issues which they had previously withdrawn. The South argued that unless mutual inspections were conducted, there could be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations such as inter-Korean economic projects. Second, the South and the North asserted the different principles of inter-Korean nuclear inspections. The South maintained a "mutual-same number inspection principle." Specifically, this principle declares that the number of sites subject to nuclear inspections in the South and in the North should be based on a principle of reciprocity and that all suspected nuclear sites should be inspected regardless of whether they are civilian or military facilities. Conversely, North Korea argued for a "suspicions-simultaneous-elimination principle," under which the South could inspect the nuclear facilities of the Yongbyon area, and the North could inspect all nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons, and nuclear bases in the South at the same time. The North argued that since suspicion about the North's nuclear weapons development was completely dispelled through international inspections by the IAEA, inter-Korean nuclear inspections should be focused on nuclear weapons and bases in the South. The South, however, maintained that since nuclear facilities can exist anywhere in civilian and military areas—even in military facilities once suspected of having been linked to nuclear arms development—all should naturally be included for mutual inspection. The North insisted that ordinary military facilities are one thing and nuclear facilities are another, therefore, no military facilities could be included in those areas subject to mutual inspection.

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Third, the South proposed special inspections, or "challenge inspections," of military sites with twenty-four-hour notice whereby either of the two Koreas could inspect the places it designates at any time. The North strongly rejected this proposal, which violates Article 4 of the Denuclearization Declaration: "Inspections shall be conducted into places which the other side selects and on which both sides agree." As discussed above, South and North Korea want mutual nuclear inspections, but they proposed different formulas regarding them. What, then, should and can be done to achieve the nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula in accordance with the Denuclearization Declaration? Needless to say, it is essential for both Koreas to cooperate for the realization of denuclearization. A nuclear free zone in Korea could be realized first with the abandonment of the North's nuclear weapons development program, including nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. In the long run, South Korea also needs to abandon the U.S. nuclear umbrella protection and must eventually agree on the principle of nontransport of nuclear weapons into ports and air bases in South Korea. One can argue that the North's nuclear weapons development will not only accelerate the nuclear arms race between the two Koreas, but destabilize the security and peace in Northeast Asia as well. Therefore, it would be in the best interests of North Korea to abandon its nuclear development program. The United States could play an important role in the denuclearization process in cooperation with Russia, China, and Japan to induce North Korea to implement the safeguards agreement with the IAEA in good faith. To lay a basic framework for a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government needs to cooperate with the United States. In the long term, the United States, China, and Russia need to consider guaranteeing nonuse of their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. A Korean nuclear dilemma could be solved peacefully by Koreans themselves in cooperation with the four major powers concerned with the Korean problem. In the final analysis, I would like to propose a compromise formula for preparing inter-Korean nuclear inspection rules on the basis of both sides' principles, which I call the "step-by- step inspections for mutual suspicious areas formula." This formula is based on a principle under which, first of all, all civilian facilities be opened for mutual inspection, and, gradually, all military facilities be inspected. The formula contains three steps. Step 1: Mutual Inspection of Nonmllttary Nuclear Facilities In the North and In the South Both sides will open nonmilitary facilities and the areas of mutual suspicion to mutual inspection. South Korea needs to abandon the inter-

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Korean special inspections proposal, which was an obstacle to bilateral inspection regime talks. Mutual suspicion of nuclear arms development could be dispelled at this stage, which will be a foundation for the implementation of the peninsula's Denuclearization Declaration. Step I : South-North Korean Joint Development of Nuclear Energy Both sides will make a joint effort to develop nuclear energy for peaceful use. Through inter-Korean mutual cooperation in the area of nuclear energy, South and North Korea could verify the compliance of the Denuclearization Declaration and also verify the safety of North Korea's nuclear plants. In the long run, an inter-Korean nuclear energy development cooperation will contribute to the peaceful development of nuclear energy for a unified Korea in the twenty-first century. Step 3: Realization of Denuclearization in Korea Both sides will enter into the stage of "the South-North Commonwealth," where all military facilities will be open and inspected. South Korea will abandon the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States, China, and Russia will guarantee nonuse of their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. If South and North Korea accept this formula, they could reach an agreement on the bilateral nuclear inspection regime. There will be no significant development in inter-Korean relations without dispelling the North's suspicions of the nuclear arms development.

THE U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S. FORCE REDUCTION/WITHDRAWAL PLAN While North Korea argues that the presence of U.S. forces in Korea is an obstacle to the peace process on the Korean peninsula, South Korea maintains that U.S. forces in Korea provide a deterrent force by preventing another war on the Korean peninsula. What roles do U.S. forces in Korea play in the post-Cold War world? Does North Korea really want U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea? These questions will be discussed in this section. Let us take a brief look at the implementation process of the U.S. force reduction plan. The United States and South Korea agreed to a gradual, partial reduction of U.S. troops in Korea and a readjustment to U.S.-Korea security relations for the 1990s and beyond. The detailed agreements between the United States and South Korea were disclosed in a required report to the U.S. Congress in April

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1990. What is significant in this report is that the U.S. government decided on a gradual withdrawal from Korea in the 1990s in light of the changing international security environment and domestic conditions. The U.S. Department of Defense finally announced EASI's timetable for a planned U.S. troop reduction and withdrawal from Korea.23 The threephase plan for the restructuring of U.S. forces stationed in Korea during the 1990s is as follows. Phase 1: 1990-1992

The UNC must be retained, essentially in its present form. During this phase, the United States will reduce administrative overhead and phase out units whose mission can be assumed by the South Korean forces. By 1992, the United States will reduce by about 7,000 personnel, including 2,000 Air Force personnel and about 5,000 ground force personnel. These reductions are based on steady improvements in South Korean defense capabilities. Phase 2: 1993-1995

During phase 1, the United States would have reexamined the North Korean threat, evaluated effects of changes in phase 1, and established new objectives for phase 2. The restructuring of the U.S. Second Infantry Division will be considered at this point. An additional withdrawal of the Second Infantry will be considered in terms of the state of South-North relations and further improvements in South Korean military capabilities. According to the Department of Defense report presented in July 1992 to Congress entitled A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, which is a revision of the initial EASI prepared in April 1990, by the end of phase 2 in December 1995, U.S. forces in Korea would include, at a minimum, the Second Infantry Division, with a strength of one mechanized and one combat aviation brigade, and the U.S. Seventh Air Force, with an equivalent strength of one tactical fighter wing. Phase 3: 1996-2000

If the earlier phases were successfully completed, South Koreans should be ready to take the leading role in their own defense. During this phase, fewer U.S. forces would be required to maintain deterrence on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. government spelled out the following specific bilateral security objectives in the April 1990 report:24 to deter North Korean

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aggression, or defeat it if deterrence fails; to reduce political-military tensions on the Korean peninsula by encouraging inter-Korean talks and the institution of a confidence-building-measures regime; and to change the role of U.S. forces in Korea from a leading one to a supporting one, including some force reductions. These security objectives clearly indicate a firm U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea in the 1990s. An additional U.S. troop withdrawal during phase 3 will depend on the peace process on the Korean peninsula and improvements in South Korean military capabilities. It appears that U.S. forces in Korea will remain even after the year 2000 unless South and North Korea firmly establish a durable peace system. Now I will briefly summarize the implementation process of the EASI plan. At the Twenty-second Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the United States and South Korea held in Washington on November 13-15,1990, three important items were agreed upon. First, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. plan to reduce its military presence by 5,000 ground force and 2,000 Air Force personnel did not indicate any change in the close and long-standing security relationship between the two allies. Second, both sides agreed that Korean generals would take over the two posts of commander of the UNC's Ground Component Command and the role of top representative of the UNC's Military Armistice Commission by 1992. Third, both sides agreed that South Korea would increase its direct contribution to the cost of maintaining the U.S. forces stationed in Korea. Seoul would pay $150 million of 1991 's share of the defense burden, compared to the $70 million it contributed in 1990. In accordance with U.S-South Korea bilateral agreements, the United Nations Command appointed a South Korean army general as chief delegate at the Military Armistice Commission talks at Panmunjom in March 1991. North Korea refused to accept his credentials by arguing that he "cannot represent the UN Command," as the South refused to sign the 1953 Armistice Agreement.25 The United States, however, maintains that anyone appointed by the UNC can represent it. At the Twenty-third SCM between the United States and South Korea, held in Seoul in November 1991, both sides discussed a variety of important topics, including Team Spirit, the proposed cost sharing of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, North Korea's nuclear development, and future reduction of U.S. military presence in Korea. The North Korean nuclear development issue was a hot item at the meeting. Both governments agreed to postpone any further reduction of U.S. forces in phase 2, as long as North Korea refused to drop its nuclear arms program. In phase 1,7,000 out of 43,000 U.S. troops were scheduled to be

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pulled out by early 1993; and in phase 2,6,000 to 7,000 more U.S. troops were to be withdrawn from Korea between 1993 and 1995. Both governments signed the agreement of Wartime Host Nation Support. Each agreed that South Korea would provide $180 million to the maintenance of U.S. forces in fiscal year 1992, up $30 million from 1991's contribution to the total cost of $2.62 billion. Both sides also agreed that South Korea and the United States would maintain a military alliance after the year 2000, even in the event of eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. They also agreed to name a South Korean fourstar general to head the South Korean-U.S. Combined Forces Command's Ground Component command by late 1993.26 The Twenty-fourth SCM was held in Washington on October 7-8, 1992. Apart from readdressing the issues mentioned above, there were several significant developments at this meeting that can be noted: 1. The United States and South Korea agreed to continue to delay the second phase of U.S. troop reduction in Korea—by another 6,500 U.S. troops, originally scheduled for 1993-1995—until suspicions of North Korea's nuclear weapons development were disproved. 2. The United States reaffirmed that it would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea. 3. The two sides agreed that South Korea would take over peacetime operational control of the South Korean combat forces from the U.S. side before the end of 1994. 4. The issue of resumption of the South Korea-U.S. Team Spirit exercises for 1993 was not completely settled; however, both sides agreed to continue preparations for the conduct of Team Spirit 1993 in the absence of South-North bilateral nuclear inspections. 5. Both sides agreed that the "flexible deterrence option" (FDO) would be used at the point of war in Korea to deter a North Korean invasion. Flexible deterrence is a strategic concept that enables rapid deployment of combat forces, here centering on the U.S. Air Force and Navy to be dispatched if signs of a North attack are detected.27 6. South Korea agreed to increase its financial support for the U.S. troops in Korea to $220 million in 1993, up $40 million from 1992's contribution. South Korea also agreed to increase its defensesharing contribution to the level of one-third of the won-based costs of stationing U.S. forces in Korea by 1995. North Korea's response to Team Spirit 1993, which both the United States and South Korea "agreed in principle" to resume, was indeed hos-

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tile; the North's government sent to the South and the United States the fierce message that the resumption of Team Spirit 1993 "is a criminal act to intentionally create difficulties in the way of the implementation of the North-South agreement." 28 The Clinton administration reviewed U.S. military needs and defense strategy in the post-Cold War world for six months and finally unveiled a new defense plan in early September 1993 for cutting armed forces and for fighting new regional wars simultaneously. The new defense plan in the Report on the Bottom-Up Review would cut troop strengths to 1.4 million and perhaps lower, from a current total of 1.7 million, thereby keeping about 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 in Asia for the foreseeable future. 29 Defense Secretary Les Aspin and General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that to carry out the "win-win" strategy of fighting two nearly simultaneous nonnuclear conflicts with fewer forces, the Clinton administration planned to store enough weapons and equipment for several army brigades at several overseas locations for use in the Persian Gulf or in a conflict in Korea, to spend more money on precision-guided missiles and bombs, and to buy additional ships for transporting troops and equipment. 30 The United States would maintain the number of troops in Japan and South Korea at the current level of 100,000. Aspin also said in the report that our commitment to South Korea's security remains undiminished as demonstrated by the one U.S. Army division consisting of two brigades and one wing of U.S. Air Force combat aircraft we have stationed there. ... [I]n light of the continuing threat of aggression from North Korea, we have frozen our troop levels in South Korea and are modernizing South Korean and American forces on the peninsula.31

The Twenty-fifth SCM between South Korea and the United States was held on November 2-4,1993, in Seoul. The countries agreed on the transfer of peacetime operational control of the Korean Armed Forces, which now belongs to the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), to the Korean side by December 1,1994. In the future, the Korean military will take a greater initiative in ensuring security on the Korean peninsula, with U.S. forces in Korea playing a supporting role. Both sides reconfirmed that the FDO will be used in case of war in Korea to deter an invasion from North Korea. The South Korean government again agreed to increase its financial support for U.S. forces in Korea to $260 million in 1994, up another $40 million from the previous year. The Twenty-sixth SCM was held in Washington on October 6-7, 1994. Both sides reviewed the international strategic situation and the

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overall security environment on the Korean peninsula. Both reaffirmed that the security of the Korean peninsula is essential to the stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region, which in turn is vital to U.S. security and world peace. Each side expressed serious concern about North Korea's continuing military buildup of conventional offensive forces, as well as of WMD and long-range missiles. Some important items emerged from this meeting. First, the United States and South Korea reconfirmed the Twenty-fifth SCM agreement that the second phase drawdown of U.S. forces in Korea would be postponed until the North Korean nuclear issue was resolved. Second, both sides agreed that continued U.S.-South Korea combined military exercises are necessary for the maintenance of combined defense readiness. Third, both sides agreed that South Korea would provide $300 million to the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea in 1995, an increase of $40 million from 1994's contribution. Fourth, both sides agreed that progress in inter-Korean relations would contribute to the long-term security interests of the United States and South Korea and to the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region. Looking toward the twenty-first century, both sides reaffirmed that the U.S.-South Korea security relationship should be both comprehensive and complementary. They also shared the view that multilateral regional security dialogue can supplement their bilateral defense relations. At this SCM, the United States and South Korea signed an accord on the transfer of peacetime operational control of the Korean forces from the commander in chief of the South Korea-U.S. CFC to the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff effective December 1, 1994. The operational control of Korean troops now returned to the Korean side forty-four years after President Syngman Rhee transferred it to the commander of the UNC, a U.S. general, on July 14,1950, during the Korean War. Thus, Korean armed forces would have both a greater responsibility and an authority to exercise military operations in peacetime.32 Let us now turn to the U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations process. What is the U.S.-South Korean joint military strategy for repulsing North Korean forces in the event of a North attack on the South? Since the North's armed forces are deployed closer to the DMZ, the South Korean-U.S. CFC may have as little as twenty-four to seventy-six hours' warning of a North Korean attack. U.S. military authorities estimate that the North Korean military strategy in the event of a war would be to try to seize the entire South Korean territory before U.S. reinforcements arrive in Korea. The new operation plan for the defense of South Korea developed by General Robert W. Riscassi, the former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, and

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refined by his successor, General Gary E. Luck, emphasizes an aggressive counteroffensive strategy instead of static defenses.33 The fivephased operation plan is as follows: 1. The U.S.-South Korean combined forces would try to slow the North Korean ground attack north of Seoul. 2. The U.S.-South Korean combined forces would buy time while U.S. reinforcements are en route to Korea. 3. The U.S.-South Korean combined forces would repulse North Korean forces. 4. The U.S.-South Korean combined forces would cross the DMZ and march to Pyongyang after repelling the North Korean forces. 5. The U.S.-South Korean combined forces would occupy Pyongyang. The new plan provides for a counteroffensive strategy intended to seize Pyongyang and to overthrow the North Korean government in the event of a North Korean preemptive attack on the South. Under the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command Operation Plan 5027 (CFC OPLAN 5027),34 the combined forces would attempt to seize Pyongyang in two weeks in the event of war on the Korean peninsula. Does North Korea really want the United States to pull out its troops from Korea? Is the presence of U.S. forces in Korea an obstacle to the peace process as North Korea argues? These questions will now be discussed. North Korea has slowly been adjusting to a rapidly changing international security environment in the post-Cold War world. Pyongyang has reiterated time and again its desire for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea. Pyongyang's demand for withdrawal has not changed in principle: North Korea has officially and consistently maintained that the presence of U.S. troops is the basic obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue and Korean reunification. However, there have been significant signals of change in Pyongyang's perception of the role of U.S. forces in recent years. It is unlikely that the North would attempt to use military force against the South to unify the Korean peninsula as long as U.S. forces remain on Korean soil. In my opinion, South and North Korea have achieved a strategic equivalence on the peninsula.35 Under the strategic parity conditions, North Korea is unlikely to strike first at South Korea despite its empty propaganda, because the North's first strike will not work to its advantage. No rational military strategist in North Korea would suggest a preemptive attack on the South, knowing that the North cannot win a war.

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In the post-Cold War world, North Korea has changed its perception about the role of U.S. troops in Korea. It should be pointed out that North Korea also agreed on a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The North's May 31,1990, proposal for arms control and disarmament for peace on the Korean peninsula contains more realistic measures than its November 7, 1988, comprehensive peace plan.36 North Korea wants a step-by-step, but complete, withdrawal of U.S. forces to achieve national reunification. Kim Yong-sun, Korean Workers' Party secretary for international affairs, formally told the United States in January 1992 that North Korea would accept the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea and that it would also allow U.S. forces in Korea to be gradually withdrawn after the two Koreas were reunified. Why, then, did North Korea demand the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in past years? It appears that North Korea's demand was linked to two assumptions. First, the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces could contribute to the demise of the Seoul government, which would lead to a "South Korean revolution," thereby creating a sympathetic, friendly government in Seoul. Thus, the North argued that the presence of U.S. troops in Korea was the basic obstacle to Korean reunification. Second, North Korea believed that the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea's unification formula could be achieved with the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and then, Kim Il-sung's unification dream could be realized. If these assumptions were indeed correct, one can understand why the North has consistently insisted on complete U.S. troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, in reality, even if U.S. forces were to be withdrawn, North Korean leaders clearly understand that Korean reunification could not be achieved on North Korean terms within the present international environment. In the meantime, North Korea has been effectively using the U.S. troop withdrawal issue as a card for domestic and international propaganda purposes: Domestically, the Kim Il-sung regime used it for political stability and legitimacy of autocratic rule; internationally, the issue was also used as a policy instrument to enhance the president's status as "a leader of the anti-imperialist movement" in the Third World. In the South, Kim also appealed to some radical students and progressive forces as "an anti-American hero." Kim might have faced serious problems in justifying his autocratic rule and legitimacy as a "great leader" in North Korea if and when U.S. forces had completely withdrawn from Korea, because the presence of U.S. troops was used as a card and rationale for justifying his forty-fiveyear dictatorship. Kim might have lost this card with the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea. Furthermore, Kim was afraid of South Korea's possible use of force to unify the Korean peninsula by absorp-

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tion of North Korea, if U.S. troops in Korea were completely withdrawn from South Korea. If this analysis is accurate, then Kim's demand for U.S. troop withdrawal appeared to be nothing but political propaganda. Therefore, I strongly argue that the U.S. troop withdrawal issue continues to be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the North Korean regime in order to resolve pending issues, including the North's nuclear issue. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, North Korea may have been thinking about the necessity for the continued presence of U.S troops in Korea, because Kim Jong-Il may feel that U.S. withdrawal could pose a threat to the security of his regime in the long run. He wants domestic stability in the North and peaceful economic reform. Although the North Korean government officially favors the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea, Kim Jong-Il may have even concluded that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea would continue to serve his regime's best interests by contributing to the stability of his system in the late 1990s. In short, since it is not unreasonable to conclude that Kim Jong-Il's interests would be best served by the presence of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, in my opinion, Kim does not really want complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in the 1990s.

CONCLUSION

South and North Korea have basically conflicting approaches to the peace-building process on the Korean peninsula. North Korea argued, first of all, for the adoption of a nonaggression declaration. The North maintained that if a nonaggression declaration was adopted, military confrontation between the South and the North would be removed. In contrast, the South was unable to accept the North's argument because, they say, the North cannot be trusted. The South argued that there should first be an improvement in inter-Korean relations and confidence building through inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and then a nonaggression declaration could be adopted on the basis of mutual confidence building. Without such reciprocity, the South argued, the adoption of a nonaggression declaration might endanger national security. These different approaches were finally adjusted creatively through mutual concessions and compromises, which finally led to the signing and effectuation of the inter-Korean Basic Agreement containing a nonaggression declaration and the effectuation of a joint declaration for a nonnuclear Korean peninsula in February 1992, both of which pro-

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vided a basic framework for South-North Korean military confidence and peace building in Korea. However, these agreements have not been implemented because of the North Korean nuclear issue. Now that the United States and North Korea have signed the Agreed Framework to resolve the North's nuclear issue, the future of inter-Korean relations is cautiously optimistic. The United States and North Korea need to sincerely implement the framework. The two Koreas also need to implement both agreements in good faith. Now is the time for both South and North Korea to promote their interests by adopting a pragmatic approach to the Korean dilemma in the new international politicoeconomic environment. Both governments need to immediately stop vilifying each other. The mutual exchanges of hostile words and vilification are unproductive and even dangerous. South Korea needs to take "a policy of constructive engagement" based on a pragmatic approach to a solution of the Korean dilemma. It needs to maintain a consistent policy toward North Korea with some degree of flexibility. North Korea also needs to take a pragmatic policy toward the South. A summit meeting between Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-Il should be secretly arranged without any conditions as soon as possible. There are many hot issues yet to be discussed and resolved at a summit meeting. The Team Spirit program is incompatible with the successful progress of inter-Korean relations and the successful implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. Thus, the United States and South Korea need to consider permanently suspending their joint military exercises to create favorable conditions for a resolution of the nuclear issue and eventual achievement of Korean reunification. North and South Korea, first of all, need to implement a declaration of nonaggression between them, among other provisions in the Basic Agreement, in order to build mutual confidence, and they need to take into serious consideration the reduction of inter-Korean armed forces to a level of reasonable sufficiency. Both sides need to reduce their military force level for economic reasons. Both sides have yet to agree to an acceptable formula for arms reduction. Given the rapidly changing international security environment and positive developments in interKorean relations, I would argue that both sides need to consider at least a 50 percent cut in their military forces. Needless to say, each will maintain a credible, stable deterrence against each other with reduced troop levels and qualitative improvements in modern weapons systems. A realistic arms reduction program could better serve the common interests of South and North Korea. North Korea cannot afford over 20 percent of its gross national product for defense. South Korea spends about 30 percent of its annual budget on national defense. Both sides need military

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cooperation in order to achieve a durable peace system on the Korean peninsula. The new peace regime in Korea will emerge in the 1990s only by sincerely implementing the inter-Korean nonaggression and denuclearization agreements as discussed in this chapter. The two Koreas must work together to create essential conditions for achieving peace in Korea. It is my firm belief that the Korean problem will eventually be resolved by Koreans themselves, when the South Korean government takes the initiative to deal with the Korean dilemma in a more creative way, when North Korea proves its sincerity by abiding by the inter-Korean Basic Agreement, and when the two Koreas are willing to make mutual concessions and to work together for establishing a durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

NOTES

1. For further details, see Korea Newsreview, December 21,1991. For an official translation of the inter-Korean agreements, see Defense White Paper, 1992-1993 (Seoul: Korean Institute of Defense Analysis, Ministry of National Defense, 1993), pp. 219-246. 2. Choson Ilbo, December 12,1991; Korea Herald, December 12,1991. 3. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, December 19,1991; and the New York Times, December 19,1991. 4. Rodong Shinmun, December 23,1991. 5. For further details, see Choson Ilbo, Jung Ang Ilbo, and Hankuk Ilbo, December 26,28,31,1991, and January 1,1992; Washington Post and New York Times, December 27,1991, and January 1,1992. 6. For the full text in English translation, see An Era of Reconciliation and Cooperation Begins (Seoul: National Unification Board, South Korea, 1992), pp. 35-43. 7. For further details, see South-North Dialogue in Korea, no. 55 (Seoul: Office of the South-North Dialogue, July 1992), pp. 28-36. 8. For further details, see South-North Dialogue in Korea, no. 56 (Seoul: Office of the South-North Dialogue, October 1992), pp. 27-55. 9. For further details, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, "The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects," Arms Control, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1993): 65-92; Tae-Hwan Kwak, "North Korea's Nuclear Issue and Inter-Korean Relations," paper presented at the Fifth Korean-American University Professors Association Conference, Sheraton Century Center Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia, October 20-23,1994. 10. U.S. News and World Report, February 22,1993; New York rimes, February 11,1993; Stephen Engelberg and Michael Gordon, "North Korea Likely to Have Developed Own Atomic Bomb, CIA Tells President," New York Times, December 26,1993. 11. For further details, see South-North Dialogue in Korea, no. 58 (Seoul: Office of the South-North Dialogue, October 1993), pp. 69-74. 12. Ibid., pp. 79-85.

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13. For further details, see New York Times, November 24,1993; and Washington Post, November 23 and 24,1993. 14. Arms Control Reporter, 456.B. 228. 15. For details of the statement by Kang Sok-ju, see Rodong Shinmun, November 12,1993. 16. Ibid. 17. For further details, see New York Times and Washington Post, June 19 and 20,1994. 18. For details, see Korea Herald, August 14,1994. 19. Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Announce Pause in Talks, but No Progress," New York Times, September 30,1994. 20. For further details, see Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.-North Korea Accord Has a Ten-Year Timetable," New York Times, October 21, 1994; Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute," New York Times, October 22,1994; William Drozdiak,"N. Korea, U.S. Sign Broad Pact," Washington Post, October 22,1994; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Accord with North Korea May Open Country to Change," Washington Post, October 23,1994. 21. For further details, see David E. Sanger, "Who Won in the Korea Deal?" New York Times, October 23, 1994; Michael Kramer, "A Tough, Smart Deal," Time, October 31,1994; Steven Strasser et al., "Let the Moneymaking Begin," Newsweek, October 31,1994. 22. For further details, see South-North Dialogue in Korea, no. 55, pp. 87-96, and no. 56, pp. 91-102. 23. For further details, see U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the Twenty-first Century (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 18,1990), pp. 15-17. 24. Ibid., p. 15. For further details, see U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 1992), pp. 18-21. 25. Korea Herald, March 25,1991. 26. For further details, see Korea Newsreview, November 30,1991. 27. Korea Newsreview, October 17,1992; for joint communiqué of Twentyfourth S CM, see Korea Herald, October 9,1992. 28. Pyongyang Times, October 17,1992. 29. For further details, see Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, October 1993). 30. New York Times, September 2,1993. 31. Aspin, Report, p. 23. 32. For further details, see Korea Herald, October 7 and 9,1994. 33. For further details, see Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, "North Korea's Huge Military Spurs New Strategy in South," New York Times, February 6,1994. 34. For further details, see Joseph L. Galloway, "Korea: The Next War?" U.S. News and World Report, June 20,1994; and Kim Dang, "CFC OPLAN 5027," Sisa Journal, no. 218 (December 30,1993): 24-27. 35.1 argued in 1990 that South Korea enjoyed qualitative superiority over North Korea in military weapons systems and equipment although the latter had quantitative advantages. For a comparative analysis of the two Koreas' military capabilities, see Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Military Capabilities of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study," Asian Perspective, vol. 14, no. 1 (spring-summer, 1990): 113-166.

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36. For further details, see Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4 (winter 1988): 870-876. North Korea proposed four steps to guarantee peace: (1) phased withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea; (2) phased reduction of North and South Korean armed forces; (3) information and inspection of phases 1 and 2; and (4) tripartite talks involving North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.

11

Conclusion Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A Olsen

Although many U.S. observers of the international scene are reassured by the relative stability and predictability of Northeast Asia compared to more volatile parts of the world, the authors in this volume have demonstrated that Northeast Asia also is a dynamic region that warrants close attention. The North Korean nuclear dilemma has obviously been a serious matter since 1994 that jeopardizes the region's stability, but so are the questions posed by Korea's possible unification, China's and Japan's management of their regional policies, Russia's quest to play a viable role in a geopolitical context that differs radically from that known by Moscow for most of the century, and the U.S. adjustment to all these concerns, as well as its evolving sense of its appropriate role in the world. These factors also shape the environment for other Asia Pacific countries. As the post-Cold War era unfolds globally, the countries of the Asia Pacific region are anxious to join in that process. The divided Korean peninsula, in its Northeast Asian context, remains a hindrance to the larger region's ability to fully join the rest of the world. It is therefore the prime strategic dilemma in Asia and warrants the level of attention devoted to it by our authors. War and peace imply more to Koreans than a famous book's title. Each half of that divided nation every day maintains a tenuous balance by very costly military deterrence and very difficult diplomacy that is routinely threatened by political and economic uncertainties. Although all of the authors in this volume address the Korea question to some degree, two focus more specifically on it. The nuances of the Korean peace process may be arcane for many international affairs generalists, but they are crucial elements that will shape the region's future. So, too, is the long-term outcome of the North Korean nuclear problem a vital factor in determining the stability of the Korean peninsula and its environs. As important as Korea is to the future of Northeast Asia's role in overall Asia Pacific affairs, it must be kept in proper context. For example, during the Korean War, a pointed political cartoon ran in the U.S. 243

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press depicting President Truman and General MacArthur contemplating a cube-shaped globe of the world on which a map of Korea and Japan was prominent at the top. In the caption, President Truman cautioned General MacArthur that there was more to be concerned about than the immediate difficulty in those countries. This volume is cognizant of the importance of Northeast Asia's larger context and thus pays appropriate attention to the broader setting in which Japan and the two Korean states operate. The "changing world" in which Northeast Asia must function is no longer influenced as clearly by the United States, much less by its former adversary in the Cold War, now reconfigured simply as Russia. Accordingly, this volume presents perspectives on Japan and China first. Both countries are finding their way in a post-Cold War world order in which there is relatively little order. Japanese and Chinese efforts to come to grips with these circumstances are evolutionary in nature, adapting to change but also accentuating or exacerbating the process of change even as they react to it. In the course of all this, Asia is witnessing the reemergence of something that had been overshadowed (and buffered) by the Cold War, namely, a Sino-Japanese balance of power possessing political, economic, and military dimensions. The initial chapters of this volume provide insights into how Asia's two major powers perceive their regional roles and prospects. Although there are a number of Southeast Asian countries whose views of Northeast Asia clearly matter, in order to retain the Northeast Asia focus of this volume they were not included in favor of bypassing that subregion to include a perspective on Australia. Partly based on the role of Australian economic relations with Northeast Asia, but also because of Australia's changing strategic role in the Asia Pacific region, it seemed appropriate to include this analysis. It injects a contextual perspective on Northeast Asia from the oceanic and Southeast Asian subregions bordering Australia. The remaining analyses in this volume address countries and themes that dominated the Cold War years in Northeast Asia: the former Cold War protagonists, nuclear proliferation, and the two Koreas, which retain their remnants of the Cold War. Russo-Korean issues and policies are addressed by a Russian and a Korean, giving a useful binational flavor. Although the demise of the Soviet Union seemingly diminishes Moscow's role in Korea, our authors demonstrate the long-term nature of Russo-Korean mutual interests. They are neighbors and must cope with each other's presence indefinitely. While Russians' ability to play an active role in Korean affairs is likely to be constrained for the near term, neither Koreans nor Russians can safely assume such limitations will prevail in the long term. Consequently, these chapters provide insights

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into one of the key external relationships that will help shape Northeast Asia's worldview. The United States, as the sole remaining superpower, as a Pacific Basin country, and as an ally of South Korea, exerts major influence over today's Northeast Asia on many facets of the region's affairs. It clearly ranks as the first-priority foreign policy concern in Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang. Similarly, Northeast Asia ranks alongside only a handful of global subregions where the United States proclaims truly vital interests. Nonetheless, times change, and the post-Cold War era is subtly altering U.S. thinking about the Asia Pacific region. Washington confronts a range of issues and options that could effect—positively or negatively— the U.S. relationship with Northeast Asia in ways that two chapters in this volume address directly. There is a balance between U.S. security relations with Japan and South Korea that the post-Cold War era is modifying. Similarly, U.S. perceptions of, and concerns about, nuclear proliferation also loom large in the region. The sections of this volume that assess the broad and nuclear facets of U.S. interests in Northeast Asia provide insights into an ongoing evolution. The final chapters dwell on the most contentious issues in Northeast Asia, those dealing with the divided Korea. These chapters remind us of the dilemmas of the Korean question, how difficult a resolution may be, but also how important it is to seek a solution to Korea's problem. Only if that quest is realized can Northeast Asia fully join the rest of the world in the post-Cold War era. It is clear that North Korea's nuclear potentials and the policies devised by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo—in consultation with Pyongyang—to minimize the dangers will be the key dimension of Northeast Asian strategic stability throughout the late 1990s. Over the longer term, and as the nuclear conundrum is dealt with, the even more complex problems associated with putting Korea back together again must be addressed. Our two contributions on these topics provide insights into these important topics. To minimize the danger that international dynamism could quickly permit their evaluations to be overtaken by events, the authors have tried to strike a balance between policy issues of contemporary relevance and policy frameworks that promise to possess greater long-term value. Although the policy issues are essential to make the analyses presented here pertinent and to provide a transnational comparative context, it is the policy frameworks used by the authors that provide the intellectual glue uniting this volume. It is our hope that a reader who peruses this volume will discover many facts and insights of value for their contemporary relevance. We also trust that the core issues of lasting importance to Northeast Asia that the authors assess—inter-Korean geopolitical fundamentals, Sino-

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Japanese dynamics, and major power relationships within a regional balance of power—will prove sufficiently durable to allow a reader to still benefit from the authors' efforts for some time. Such a reader will already know the answers to many, if not all, of the questions we have raised and tried to answer here. Readers for whom the fate of post-Deng China and post-Yeltsin Russia are clear, who know how Japan reordered its domestic political house and coped with unsettling economic reversals, who know whether the Korea Energy Development Organization's arrangements lasted, and who know how the United States resolved its debate about its appropriate role in the post-Cold War world will know more than the authors gathered here could have known. Even such future readers, however, still will be confronted by some of the longer-range themes this volume addresses. We look forward to having our mid- to long-term judgments evaluated by future readers; we trust that our analyses and judgments vis-à-vis the answers that shall be known to future readers will stand the test of time well. As the twenty-first century commences, it is likely that the two Koreas will resolve many of their differences, that China and Japan will accommodate each other's growing wealth and power, and that the changes that will occur in Northeast Asia will have a tremendous impact upon all of Asia and upon Asia's relations with Europe, the Americas, and Australasia. As the century dawns, the vaunted "Pacific Century" will be upon us. The numerous pundits who have perceived, and in some cases have advocated, a shift away from the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical, economic, and cultural characteristics that have dominated international affairs for centuries toward an Asia Pacific realm are about to have their hypotheses tested in the real world. If such expectations are fulfilled, the changing world in which Northeast Asia will dwell will be an increasingly Asianized world. Whether Sinocentrism resurfaces or some version of a "Pax Nipponica" emerges, it is clear that Northeast Asia's place in this balance will be a central one. The viability of the Pacific century is dependent upon harmony and some degree of equilibrium in this key portion of the Asia Pacific region. It is possible that the coming decades will produce relatively little change and that many of the problems we raised for analysis will remain essentially intact for years to come—but we do not think this outcome is likely. The region and its problems will almost certainly evolve very profoundly. Nonetheless, the fundamentals that have been outlined here are likely to remain relatively constant because of geographic, cultural, and historical constraints. Against the background of that prospect, perhaps the most significant contribution made by the authors gathered together in this volume

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has been to assess the impact of the early post-Cold War era on the Northeast Asian region's adjustment processes and on the regional states' efforts to terminate the remnants of the Cold War that fester among them. In this sense, the ongoing efforts described and analyzed here point to the outlines of a regional equivalent of the post-Cold War era. As this new era unfolds for the regional states and interested outside parties, they shall be compelled to apply whatever lessons they have learned from the global post-Cold War adjustment process to the regional equivalent. This transfer of experiences may prove difficult because the regional states have been partially buffered from the global consequences of the end of the Cold War by the persistence of their remnants. Ending the local versions of the Cold War will force all the entities concerned to face some of the realities of a changing world that they have been able to avoid. As they confront these challenges (successfully or unsuccessfully), we are confident that the analyses and insights offered here shall prove useful to students, scholars, and all others concerned with the future of Northeast Asia.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Tsuneo Akaha is professor of international policy studies and director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California. He has received fellowships and grants from the Japan Foundation, the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and the U.S. Department of Education. Dora Alves previously held positions at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies before becoming director of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces' Security Studies Program for Southeast Asia, Australia, and the Philippines, and editor of the National Defense University's Pacific Symposia series. Alexei D. Bogaturov chairs the Department of the USA-Eurasian Studies, Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, and is an associate professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Seong Whun Cheon is a senior research fellow at the Research Institute for National Unification, a branch of the National Unification Board, South Korea. Lawrence E. Grinter is professor of international security affairs at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he teaches Asian and international security topics. Seung-Ho Joo is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota-Morris. Tae-Hwan Kwak is professor of international relations at Eastern Kentucky University and director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 249

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

Kyungnam University in Seoul. He served as vice president of the Association of Korean Political Studies in North America and was president of the Korean American University Professors Association. Edward A. Olsen is professor of national security affairs and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Fei-Ling Wang is assistant professor at the School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. Thomas L. Wilborn is a research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He served on a University of Kentucky educational assistance group working at the Institute Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia.

INDEX

Afghanistan, 87 Agreed Framework, 23-24,53,122, 123,149-151,154,161,163,167, 168,170,173,182-183,185, 199-202,209,214,220,225,226,238 Akashi, Yasushi, 32 Akatsuki-Maru (Japanese freighter), 176 Albania: China's policy toward, 56 Albright, David, 179 Albright, Madeline, 33 Algeria, 168,171,184 "All Asian Forum," 111, 207 Altai Mountains, 73 Amur River, 42,43,47,92 Anzac frigates, 75 Argentina, 168,180 Argun River, 92 Armistice Agreement (1953), 53,215, 217-218,231 Arms control, 72,109,193,207,208, 210,218-219,236,238 Arms Control Today, 191 Arms exports: from Australia, 75; from China, 171,175,184; from North Korea, 168,171; from Russia, 88, 91-92,114,115-116 Arms race, 9,75,228 Asai, Motofumi, 15 Asia Pacific: Australia's role in, 81; economies of, 9; multipolarity in, 44; in post-Cold War, 10,21,137; Russia's role in, 87-89,113,115, 118,124; strategic environment, 72, 83-87,143,234,243,245-246; in World War II, 132

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 70-71,74,76,77, 78,80,81,114,135,137; summit, 139,153 Asia-Pacific Security Mechanism (APSM), 48 Asia Society, 139 Asian Games, 76 Aspen Institute's Strategic Group, 15 Aspin, Les, 137,168,195,233 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 25,29,35,71, 77,86,137,161; Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), 134,138,157; Regional Forum (ARF), 25,70,71, 81,157,207 Atlanticism, 108-109 Australia, 34,88,89,137,244; Asian Australians, 75; and Asian economic development, 69-71,80; and China, 76-78; defense industries, 75; and Hong Kong, 77; importance of dialogue, 72-73,74,75,81; and Japan, 74-75; nuclear issues, 178; policy oifestina lente, 70; security policy, 69-82; Taiwanese immigrants to, 77 Australian Defence Force, 73 Avoidance of Double Taxation Convention (Russia-South Korea), 114 Baikal, Lake, 89,91,92 Balance of power, 21,69,85,244; China's role in, 41,43,46-47,60; Russia as "balancer," 110-111,113, 118,124

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252

INDEX

Ballistic missiles, 19,72,99,167,168, 171,174-175,178,184 Bandung conference (1955), 48 Beaumont, Alan, 73 Beihai (North Sea) Fleet, 42 Belarus, 168,179,208 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 191 Biological weapons, 219 Bismarck, Otto von, 84 Blue House, hot line to Kremlin, 114 Border disputes: Russia and China, 47,73,92; Soviet Union and China, 42. See also Territorial disputes Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 33,39n90 Brazil, 34,168,180 Brezhnev, Leonid, 111 Broken Hill Proprietory, 76 Brown, Eugene, 177 Brunei, 137 Burden sharing, 14-15,136 Buryat, 89 Bush, George, 122,137,153-154,184,192 Buzan, Barry, 84 Cairns Group, 70 Cambodia, 14; Japanese aid to, 29-30; peacekeeping mission in, 20,31,34, 74,133 Canada, 34,89,137,178,207 Caribbean: U.S. domination of, 60 Carter, Jimmy, 51,54,170,174,182, 198,223 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 171,179,195 Challenge inspections, 228 Chemical weapons, 72,219 Chemical Weapons Convention, 191 Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative, 72 Cheney, Dick, 14 Cheng, Dean, 162 Chile: Japanese aid to, 30 China: aircraft of, 175; and APEC, 76; Chinese "volunteers" in Korean War, 42,57; Confucian cultural legacy, 56; dongbei region, 42; exports, 18; foreign trade, 42-43, 71; Japanese aid to, 30,47; and Korean nuclear issues, 50-60; maintaining status quo, 41,43-44,

60-62; migration to Russia, 48,89, 92-93; military, 20,203; mostfavored-nation status, 21,49,55, 72,76,155,184; and North Korea, 156; path to socialist market economy, 9,76; policy on Korean reunification, 57-58,61; policy on nuclear proliferation, 61; relations with Japan, 18-21,75; relations with Taiwan, 45,48,78,86,93-94; and Russia, 73; reunification of, 41, 45,46,93; security policy, 35,41-68, 77-78,84-85; Sinocentrism of, 170, 246; and UN Security Council, 34; and Vietnam, 54,56 Chinese Communist Party (CCP),44, 48; Central Military Commission of, 49 Chinworth, Michael W., 162 Christopher, Warren, 19,138 Chung, Won-shik, 215 Clinton, Bill: and China, 49,155,163; economic interests, 149,153-156, 163; and Korea, 52,150,174,182, 196,202,221,225,226; multilateralism, 144,162; new defense plan, 233; policy in Asia, 90,137-138, 149,151,153-155,157,162-163 Cold War, 9,10,14,26,30,31,43,60, 106,132-137,142,153,158,177, 184,244 Collective security, 132,144; and China, 48; and Japan, 33,138,140; and Russia, 111-113 Combined Forces Command, 232,234; Operation Plan 5027 of, 235 Command, communications, and intelligence, 27 Committee for Sino-Japanese friendship, 44 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 9,29,105,109 Comprehensive Security Doctrine, 133 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 206-207 Conference on Disarmament, 206 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, 157,207 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 15,108, 109,138-139,143,204

INDEX

Confidence building, 207,218,219, 231,238 "Confidential Minutes," 183 Containment, 158 Cooper, Richard, 98 Cornell University, 156 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 71 Cuban Missile Crisis, 86 Cultural Cooperation Agreement (Russia-South Korea), 114 Curtin, John, 69 Customs Cooperation Agreement (Russia-South Korea), 114 Defence Export Programme, 75 Deng Xiaoping, 9,42,47,246 Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 42,219, 220,235 Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea, 236 Denuclearization, 51,55,72,122,174, 185,200,204 Desert Storm, 173,180. See also Gulf War Deterrence, 84,230-233,243 Disease, 72 Dongbei region, 42 Dongshan Island, 78 Double containment, 135,136 East Asia Economic Caucus, 48 East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), 220,230-231 East Timor, 30 Eastern Europe, 28-29,54,83,208 El Salvador: Japanese aid to, 30 Environmental issues, 18,20,72 Ethnic conflicts, 73,93 Etorofu, 16 Eurasia, 88 Eurasianism, 108-109 Europe, 83-85,100,109,143,204 European Community, 137 Evans, Gareth, 69,72,138,143 Evstafiev, Gennady, 195 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 55 Flexible deterrence option, 232,233 Foreign Policy (journal), 72

253

Formosa Strait, 86 Forward deployed forces, 14,152 Forward military presence, 152 France, 55,178,179,205,206 Fraser, Malcolm, 76 Fukuyama, Francis, 99 Gaddis, John Lewis, 83 Gaidar, Yegor, 17 Gallucci, Robert, 182,202 Garnaut, Ross, 69 Garver, John, 94 Gates, Robert, 179 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 19,71,76,135; Uruguay Round of, 139 Geneva talks, 53,79,121,221,222,223, 224,225 Georgia, 208 German model for reunification, 57, 80,93 Germany, 30,143,178 Gong Ro-myung, 140 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18,89,95,105, 106,107,108,109-110,111-112, 124,207 Grachev, Pavel, 92,112 Group of Seven (G7), 15,108 Guam, 175 Gulf War, 12,15,31,74,108,133,142, 172,180,237 Haiti: Japanese aid to, 30 Han dynasty, 42 Han Sung-joo, 25,138-139,207 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 13 Hata,Tsutomo, 176-177 Hawke, Bob, 69,76 Hayes, Peter, 178 Heavy oil, 183,201,202,209,224,225 Hegemonic policies of United States, 15,35,45,58-61,144; of China, 75; struggle among superpowers, 44—45,132 Holy Alliance, 84 Honest John missiles, 178 Hong Kong, 18,43,57,59,77,78,139; and APEC, 76 Hong Soon-young, 116 Hosokawa, Morihiro, 11,12-13,19,21, 22,23,26,27,34,178

254

INDEX

Hubbard, Thomas, 201 Human rights: Australia's policy on, 70,72,77; non-Western views of, 19,108; and trade with China, 72, 77,155,163,184; U.S. advocacy of, 46-47,48-49,58,60,61 Hwang Pyong-mu, 139 India, 108,109,168,172 Indian Ocean, 77, 111 Indochina, 29,88-89,167 Indonesia: Japanese aid to, 28,30 Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 139 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 20,23,50,53,54,96,97, 118,120-122,170,173-174, 178-180,182-183,191,193-200, 209,215-216,220-228 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), 49,173 International Monetary Fund, 15, 108 Internationalism, 144 Iran, 168,171,172,174-175,180; Bushehr reactor in, 172 Iraq, 31,88,168,171,172,180,184,191, 194; Osirak reactor in, 172 Isolationism, 144 Israel, 168,172,181 Izvestiya, 92,122 Japan: and "Asia card," 21; and China, 10,11,18-21,34-35,43,75; Constitution, 32-33,98,133; defense spending, 26-27; domestic politics, 10; global security role, 30-35; Kuril Islands, 73,99,110; Maritime Self-Defense Force, 25, 46; militarism, 45-46; military capabilities, 27,203-204; Ministry of Finance, 28; National Space Development Agency, 176; and North Korea, 22-25; and northern territories, 14,99-100; nuclear issues, 45,60,75; official development assistance (ODA), 17,19, 27-30; overcoming ethnocentrism, 11-13,35; and Russia, 10,11, 16-18,90,98-100,113,204; security alliance with United States,

10,13-15,34-35,46,74,88,89, 98-99; security policy, 9-40,134; Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 27,31, 75,98,133; and South Korea, 11, 21-22,25; technology, 14,176; Treaty of Annexation of Korea, 22; and United Nations, 30-35,74, 98; U.S. occupation of, 132 Japan, Sea of, 18,43,100,171,177 Japanese Defense Agency, 14,25,26,31, 32,169; White Paper, 16,25,26,177 Japanese Diet, 204 Jiang Zemin, 19,44,52,78 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 200, 214,215,216-217,224,226-229 Joint Declaration on the Principles of Mutual Relations, 111 Joint Military Commission (JMC), 192-193 Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC), 192-193 Juche (self-reliance), 170,213 Kamo,Takehiko, 177 Kang Sok-ju, 223 Kashmir, 180 Katzenstein, Peter, 15 Kazakhstan, 89,90,92,93,168,170, 179,208 Keating, Paul, 71,74,77,78,81 Kegley, Charles, 100 Kennedy, John F., 86 Kenya: Japanese aid to, 30 Khabarovsk, 120 Khrushchev, Nikita, 95 Kim Chong-nam, 139 Kim Chul-su, 81 Kim Il-sung, 25,51-52,53,56,57,95, 101,117,125,141,170,174,182, 191,198,199,213,223,236; as "great leader," 236 Kim Jong-Il, 52,53,80,97,182,199, 226,237,238 Kim Kye-gwan, 201 Kim Young-sam, 11,21,33,77,80,81, 114,138,140,202,221,238; "New Diplomacy" of, 140 Kirghiz, 93 Kissinger, Henry, 14 Kono,Yohei, 34

INDEX Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 23,53,123, 154-155,157,200-203,209,246 "Koreagate" period, 136 Korean Air Lines Flight 007,114, \21n35 Korean defense ministry, 25 Korean Military Armistice Committee, 53,57 Korean peninsula, 35,70,79-81,94, 123,243; arms control in, 193; interKorean relations, 213-214,225,231, 238-239; peace process in, 213-241; reunification of, 47,50,57,61,79, 80,81,96,143,213-214,232,236; Russia's policy toward, 105-130; summit between North and South Korea, 223,238. See also North Korea; South Korea Korean War, 24,42,114,135,153,213, 243 Korean Workers' Party (KWP), 22-23, 24,106 Kosaka, Masataka, 11 Kozyrev, Andrei, 108,109,122,123, 196 Kuala Lumpur talks, 201-203,209 Kunadze, Georgy, 95,118 Kunashiri, 16 Kuril Islands, 73,99,110 Kuriyama,Takakazu, 12 Kwangju massacre, 80 Kyrgyzstan, 92 League of Nations, 132 Lee Kuan-yew, 71 LeeTeng-Hui, 156 Li Peng, 19,53,77 Liaison offices, 183 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 12, 22,24,25,75 Libya, 168,180 Light-water reactors (LWRs), 23,52, 53-54,97,121-122,123-124,151, 155,157,171,182-183,192, 197-203,209-210,221,223-226. See also Nuclear reactors Lippman, Walter, 144 Liu Huaqing, 49,144 Lord, Winston, 137-138,153,202 Luck, Gary E., 141,235

255

M-ll, 167 Makeyev, V., 100 Malawi: Japanese aid to, 30 Malaysia, 48,88,143,183 Manchus, 42 Mao Zedong, 42,170 Mariana Islands, 175 Maritime Province, 92 Maritime Region Government, 48 Maritime Self-Defense Force, 25,146 Maritime surveillance, 72 Memorandum of Understanding for Military Exchanges (Russia-South Korea), 114,115 Menetrey, Louis, 193 Middle East, 108,184 Migration, 73 Military Demarcation Line, 218 Military-industrial complex, 56 Missile Technology Control Regime, 184 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 12,15,26,28,74 Mongolia, 89,90,92; and China, 41,43, 47; Japanese aid to, 30 Mongols, 42 Moscow Institute of International Relations, 111 Mount Channar (Western Australia): Sino-Australian venture, 76 Mozambique, 31,34 Mulin zhence (good neighbor policy), 46 Multilateralism, 21,35,100,112,122, 131-147,157,162,207,234 Multipolarity, 44,142 Murayama, Tomiichi, 13,22,34,74,75 Muslim world, 108; Chinese Muslims, 93 Muto, Kabun, 20 Nakanishi, Keisuke, 32 Nakayama, Taro, 134 Narcotics trade, 72,153 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), 14,26 National Security Council, 159 Nationalism, 73,93,143,169 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 93 Negative security assurance, 204-206 Netherlands, 34 New Zealand, 137

256

INDEX

Nicaragua: Japanese aid to, 30 Nike Hercules missiles, 178 Nishimura, Shigeki, 176 Nixon, Richard, 178 Nodong missiles, 167,168,171,174, 175 Nonaggression declaration, 237 North Africa, 184 North American Coordination Council, 156 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 83,108,136,142,143,208 North Korea, 43,90; brinkmanship of, 195; desire for economic assistance, 222; deterrence of attack from, 150, 160; inspection of nuclear facilities in, 97,170,172,174,181-183, 220-227; and Japan, 22-25; Korean peace process, 213-241; missiles, 178; nuclear issues, 20,23,41,43, 49-60,61,72,77,79,80,89,114,119, 120-124,141,149-151,163, 177-178,180,181-183,191-212; "one Korea" policy, 106; in post-Cold War, 235-236; sanctions against, 51-52,54,123,182197,223; stability of, 57-58. See also Korean peninsula North Korean People's Army, 53 North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 207 Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, 157 Northeast Asian Security Dialogue, 25 Northern Territories, 17 Novozhilov, Viktor, 115 Nuclear issues, 21,23,42,48,55,61, 73,88,89,90,168; China, 77,94, 168,175; Japan, 45,60,75,167,171, 175-177,184-185; nuclear umbrella, 195,216,228,229,232; pollution, 89; Russia, 93,168; South Korea, 178; testing, 55,184, 206-207 Nuclear nonproliferation, 55,112,122, 125,151,176,228,237. See also Denuclearization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 23,51,79,96,97,120-121, 149-151,168,170,172,174,178, 179-183,191-192,194-195,200,

205,209,216,220-221,224-225; Review Conference, 205 Nuclear proliferation, 167-189,191, 210 Nuclear reactors: 193-194,197-203, 209-210,221,223-226; Bushehr, 172; CE-80 type, 201; graphite reactors, 151,173-174,197-198,221, 224,225,226; Lung Tan, 178; Osirak, 172; standard nuclear power plants (SNPPs), 201,202; Taechon, 173; Uljin, 202; Yongbyon, 23,50,54,172,173,194,196, 227. See also Light-water reactors (LWRs) Nye, Joseph, 15,35 Obuchi, Keizo, 25 Offices for Chinese Affairs, 77 Official development assistance (ODA), 17,19-20,27-30 Okawara, Nobuo, 15 Okhotsk, Sea of, 18,99,177 "One China policy," 78 Open Skies Consultative Commission, 208 Open Skies Treaty, 208,210 Ozawa, Ichiro, 75 Pacific Basin Economic Council, 137 "Pacific Century," 246 "Pacific Community" concept, 138, 153,157 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 137 Pacific Rim, 110,153 Pakistan, 168,170,172-173,179-181, 184 Palme Commission, 138 Pamir Mountains, 92 Pankin, Boris, 121 Panmunjom, 215,222,231 Panov, Aleksandr, 115,118,123 Paracel Islands, 177 Patriot antiballistic missile system, 183 Pax Americana, 15 Pax Nipponica, 246 Peace dividend, 137 Peacekeeping, 31,32-33,34-35 People's Liberation Army (PLA), 42, 45,49,144; Navy, 49

INDEX

Perestroika, 18,91,95 Perry, William, 137 Persian Gulf, 233 Petrovich, Boris, 115 Philippines: U.S. bases in, 162 Pollution, 72,75,76,89 Population flows, 72,80,89,92-93 Port Arthur, 42 Positive security assurance, 205,206 Post-Cold War era: in Asia Pacific, 10, 21,35,100,110,185,203,210, 243-247; China's stability in, 44; Japan's role in, 33,46; North Korea's position in, 56,79,235-236; and nuclear nonproliferation, 191; and Russia, 18,105; UN role in, 31; U.S. position in, 131-132,137,142, 149-153,155,181 Powell, Colin, 233 Pressler Amendment, 172 Primakov, Yevgeny, 195 Pyongyang-Moscow Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 113,114 Qian Qichen, 20,21,46,52,57,78 Qing dynasty, 42 Qingdao, 42 Quemoy, 77 Raymond, Gregory, 100 Reagan administration, 184 Realpolitik, 56,109,118,124 Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 233 Returned Service League (Australian), 73 Rhee, Syngman, 234 Riscassi, Robert W., 234 Rockets, 176 Rogachev, Igor, 118,121 Roh Tae-woo, 21,114,138,215-216 Romania, 34 Russia, 9,16-18,29,34,35,42-43,46, 48,71,73-74,79,80,81,208; borders, 90,92-93,105,109; and China, 73,88,91-94,109, 111; czarist, 42; foreign policy of, 108-112; and Japan, 98-100,113; and Kuril Islands, 73,99,110; most-favorednation status, 181; naval forces, 61; and North Korea, 80,94-98,

257

117-125; policy toward North and South Korea, 105-130; policy toward South Korea, 112-117; Russo-Chinese summit, 92, 111; security policy, 83-103,108-109; Soviet foreign policy legacy, 105-108; territorial disputes, 92,99, 110; trade, 88,91-92; and U.S.-centered security framework, 90-91, 100 Russian Far East, 18,41,48,73-74,89, 91,109,120,167,207 Russian Federation, 87,95,105,108, 110,112,114,119 Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency, 195 Russo-Kazakhstan Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, 93 Russo-Korean Treaty on Principles of Relations, 96 Safeguards, 179,196,220 Sakha Republic (Yakutia), 117 Sakhalin, 123 Sakigake Reform Party, 75 San Francisco peace treaty, 24 Satellites, 76,176 Saudi Arabia, 171,184 Scowcroft, Brent, 195 Scud missiles, 167,168,171,174 Sea lanes of communications (SLOCs), 46,49,153,160 Search and rescue operations, 72 Security assurance, 210 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), 231-234 Segal, Gerald, 84 Seismic stations, 207 Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 27,31,75 Senkaku Islands, 47,177 Shalikashvili, John, 79 Shaposhnikov, Yevgeni, 115 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 95,121 Shikata, Toshiyuki, 100 Shinryaku senso (war of aggression), 11,13 Sihanouk, Prince, 56 Singapore, 137 Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 52

258

INDEX

Sinocentrism, 170,246 Smith, Jacqueline, 191 Social Democratic Party, 75 Solodovnik, Sergei, 110 Somali crisis: Japanese role in, 31 Song Young-sun, 139 South Africa, 168,171,180 South Asian region, 180 South China Sea, 49,70,77,94 South Korea: agreements with Russia, 114; and China, 43; "cross recognition" formula, 106; and Japan, 21-22,25; Korean defense ministry, 25; Korean peace process, 213-241; National Assembly, 162; nordpolitik of, 140,170; Olympic diplomacy of, 140; repayment of Soviet debts to, 115-116; and Soviet Union, 23; trade, 80-81; and United Nations, 114. See also Korean peninsula South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, 150 South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, 214-220,238-239 South-North Commonwealth, 229 South-North Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation, 219 South-North Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation, 219 South-North Joint Military Commission (JMC), 218-219 South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), 217,227 South-North Military Commission, 218 Southeast Asia, 70,88,89 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 181 Southwest Asia, 181 Soviet Union, 16,43,46,47,198,204; and China, 106,107,175; Communist Party of, 106,107; and Japan, 106; and North Korea, 106-108; and South Korea, 23,115-117 Spector, Leonard, 191,195 Spratly Islands, 77,177

Status quo, 61-62, 111, 113,124,160; Chinese policy of, 41,43; in Europe, 83 Submarines: Australian, 75; Chinese, 175; nuclear, 99 Sudan: Japanese aid to, 30 Syria, 88,171 Taepo-Dong missiles, 175 Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, 156 Taiwan, 18,46,47,48,49,61,77,78,93, 152,156,167,169,171,172,178, 184-185; and APEC, 76; nuclear issues, 178-179; sea lane, 49 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,156 Tajikistan, 92 Takemura, Masayoshi, 32 Team Spirit military exercises, 97,183, 192-195,208-209,217,221-222, 231,232-233,238 Technology, 9,14,18,76,114,115, 167-172,176,197 Territorial disputes, 73,203; between China and Japan, 47; between Russia and Japan, 73-74,86,99,101, 110,137. See also Border disputes Thailand, 30,88 Theater missile defense (TMD), 14, 27,36nl6 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 133 Tiananmen Square incident, 20,44,156 Tibet, 49,108 Trade liberalization, 76 Transcaucasia, 84 Treaty of Annexation of Korea, 22,24 Treaty on Basic Relations (Russia-South Korea), 114,115 Trilateral Commission, 93 Tselischev, Ivan, 98 Tumen River, 43,54 Two-plus-four forum, 138 Uigur, 93 Ukraine, 168,197,208 "Unilateral pacifism" (ikkoku heiwa shugi), 12 "Unilateral prosperity" (ikkoku han'ei shugi), 12 Unilateralism, 140

INDEX United Nations, 15,23,72-73,109,114, 122-123,135,178,194,205,206, 217-218; Charter, 205; Japan's role in, 30-35,98,133,178,204; sanctions against Iraq, 191; sanctions against North Korea, 51-52,54,60, 122-123,183,223 United Nations Command, 150,218, 230-231,234; Military Armistice Commission of, 231 United States: 35,84,97,122; and China, 58; Department of Commerce, 159; Department of Defense, 159,180,230; Department of State, 159,195; force reduction, 46,90,110, 229-238; economy, 153; exports, 153, 160,163; as "international policeman," 144; military-industrial complex, 56; and North Korea, 52,61,98, 150; nuclear proliferation and policy, 167-189; Office of Trade Representative, 159; Second Infantry Division, 230; security policy in Asia, 90, 111, 112,131-147,149-166,245; security relations with Japan, 10,34, 93,132,152,161,185; Seventh Air Force, 230; Seventh Infantry Division, 178; and South Korea, 89,152, 161; and Soviet Union, 9,86,90,106; as status quo power, 61 Ural Mountains, 204 U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, 13,46,74 Ussuri River, 42,43,47 Vietnam, 29,54,56,71,77,86,93 Vietnam War, 87,136,153 Vladivostok, 73 Voskresenski, Alexei, 91 Waltz, Kenneth, 83 Warsaw Pact, 83,208 Wartime Host Nation Support, 232 Waseda University, 138 Washington Conferences (1921), 132

259

Watanabe, Michio, 22 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 16,30,151,153,161, 167-173,179-180,183-185,191, 193,195,215,219,234 White, Hugh, 78 Whiting, Allen, 47 Whitlam, Gough, 76 Wilborn, Thomas, 86,87 "Win-win" strategy, 233 Woolsey, James, 195 World Bank, 108 World Trade Council, 81 World Trade Organization (WTO), 71, 76,135 World War II, 43,78,132,142 Xiamen, 77 Xinjiang, 89,93 Yalu River, 54,57 Yang Chenxu, 59 Yasukuni Shrine, 45 Yeltsin, Boris, 16,74,89,90,92,96,105, 108-109,110,112,113-114,117, 118,122,124-125,177,246 Yen: appreciation of, 26 Yon, North Korean Premier, 215 Yong Yong-Il, 115 Yongbyon nuclear reactor, 23,50,54, 172,173,194,196,227. See also Nuclear reactors Yoshida, Shigeru, 32 Yoshida Doctrine, 133 Yuan dynasty, 42 Yugoslavia, former, 32,84 Zagoria, Donald, 84 Zaire: Japan's role in, 30,74 Zambia: Japanese aid to, 30 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 17 Zhou Enlai, 48,55 Zilanov, Vyacheslab, 99 Zonghe guoli ("comprehensive national power"), 43-44

ABOUT THE BOOK

The remnants of Cold War politics—including the problems of the Korean peninsula—stand firmly in the way of Northeast Asia's adjustment to the realities of the post-Cold War era. This book examines the security policies of Japan, China, Russia, the United States, and Australia in the Northeast Asia region. The authors give special attention to efforts, both domestic and external, to reduce tensions in the region through reconciliation of the two Koreas. Tae-Hwan Kwak is professor of international relations at Eastern Kentucky University and director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul. His many books include In Search of Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula and Forty Years of U.S.Korean Relations. Edward A. Olsen is professor of national security affairs and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He has published extensively on U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-Korean, and regional strategic relations, including his books U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity and U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas.

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