The Long March to Power; a History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 [1 ed.]

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The Long March to Power

PRAEGER LIBRARY OF CHINESE AFFAIRS General Editor: Donald W . Klein, Columbia University

China is one of the world’s oldest civilizations and one of the least known or understood. Its rich history has much to contribute to our understanding of man; its experiences i n modernization are relevant to other developing nations; i t s crucial role i n A s i a n and world politics makes imperative a fuller

comprehension of the Chinese past and present. The volumes i n this multidisciplinary series explore central issues of China’s political, social, and economic structure, its foreign relations, its philosophy and thought, and its history, civilization, and culture. The contributors to the series represent a wide variety of approaches and attitudes, and all are specialists i n their respective fields. Included i n the series are the following works: Ralph C. Croizier, ed., China’s Cultural Legacy and Communism (1970) Alexander Eckstein, ed., China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy (1971)

Donald G. Gillin, History of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-50 ( 1 9 7 3*) James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (1972)

L i Jui, Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Early Revolutionary Activities, trans. by Anthony W . Sariti, with an introduction by Stuart R. Schram ( 1 9 7 3*) John M . H . Lindbeck, Understanding China: A n Assessment o f American

Scholarly Resources (1971) Michel Oksenberg and Frederick C. Teiwes, eds., The Chinese Communist Bureaucracy at Work (1973) * Lucian W . Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (1971)

Theodore Shabad, China’s Changing Map: National and Regional Development, 1949-71, rev. ed. (1972) William W . Whitson, w i t h Chen-hsia Huang, The Chinese High Command:

A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (1972) * Title and publication date are not yet final.

The Long March to Power

A H i s t o r y OF T H E CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1 9 2 1 - 7 2

James Pinckney Harrison

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS New York Washington

BOOKS THAT MATTER Published i n the U n i t e d States o f America i n 1972

b y Praeger Publishers, Inc. 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N . Y . 10003 © 1972 b y Praeger Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved This is one i n a series of publications sponsored by the Program on Asian Studies, Social Science Division, Hunter College, City University of N e w York

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:

Printed i n the United States o f America

77-168338

T o M y Three Graces

CONTENTS

pb

Preface

xiii

. Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

uN

. The Founding of the Party The First United Front

42

The Emergence of the Red Army

118

The Failure of Urban Revolution

148

The L i Li-san Line

166

Growth of the Rural Soviets

189

The Destruction of Communism in the South

218

The Revolution Splits

238

. Toward the Second United Front

260

. The Early Years of the Anti-Japanese W a r

271

. The Party and Wartime Expansion

290

. Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

309

UE WE

AN

- “VE

A

OE

=

6

9

348

. The Third Revolutionary Civil War Begins

366

. The Party and the North China Land Revolution

394

. Military Victory

421

. The Rectification Movement

. The Lines Are Drawn

8

[SE

323

© ®

= GE

91

. The Long March

=

SE

© ® No uA

75

©

. Nationalist Conquest of the South

18

11)

Contents

21. The Party in Power: Political and Social Organization

432

22. The Party and Permanent Revolution

464

23. The Maoist Quest and Chinese Realities

489

24. Conclusion

512

Notes

516

Bibliographical References

622

Selected Bibliography

624

Index

635 A S E C T I O N O F P H O T O G R A P H S F O L L O W S PAGE 2 9 8 .

CHARTS AND TABLES

1.1 Occupational Distribution, 1933

10

Table 5.1 Party Membership i n April, 1927

99

Table Chart

5.1 Party Organization at Fifth Congress, April-May, 1927 101

Chart

7.1 Party Organization After Sixth Congress, June, 1928

Chart 10.1 Party Organization i n Early 1930’s

157

223

Chart 10.2 Party, Government, and Military Relationships i n Early 1930’s Chart 14.1 Party Organization During Early Sino-Japanese W a r

225 293

Table 14.1 Wartime Expansion of Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies

294

Chart 14.2 Organization of Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies

296

Table 14.2 American Estimates of Communist Force Levels, 1944

297

Table 15.1 Membership in Mass Organizations i n North, Northeast, and Northwest China Base Areas, 1943

314

Table 15.2 Military Recruitment and Wartime Mobilization Levels 315 Table 19.1 Growth of Communist Party During Civil War

395

Table 19.2 Growth of Communist Armies During Civil War

396

Chart 19.1 Party Organization i n Late 1940’s

397

Chart 21.1 Government of People’s Republic of China

Before 1966

440

Chart 21.2 Organization of People’s Liberation Army i n 1950’s

and 1960’s

443

Charts and Tables

x

Chart 21.3 Central Party Organization (Elective Structure) Before 1966

444

Chart 21.4 Central Party Organization (Operational Structure)

Before 1966

448

Chart 21.5 Regional and Local Party Organization Before 1966

449

Table 21.1 Party Membership, 1921-71

454

Table 21.2 Generational Analysis of Local Government Cadres,

1962-65

456

Table 21.3 Social and Occupational Backgrounds of Party Members, 1956-57

459

Table 21.4 Growth of Party and Youth League Branches, 1949-71

460

Table 21.5 Party Membership by Province, 1956

462

Table 21.6 Natives and Outsiders i n Various Provinces

463

Chart 23.1 Party Organization at Ninth Congress, April, 1969

508

~

Physical Features of China

NBN

MAPS

China in the Warlord Era Principal Soviet Bases, Early 1930’s

So 0 B

Routes of the Long March Wartime Communist Bases, 1 9 4 4 - 4 5

. Political Divisions of China

44-45 190 240-41 291 490-91

PREFACE

I n its first half-century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had

weathered more crises i n a more complex environment than any other such organization i n history.* Because of these complexities, gaps i n available records and studies, and limitations of the author, this narration,

tentative as i t is, could not have been undertaken at all without several recent breakthroughs i n the study of the history of the Party. The first has come i n biographical work. The unfailing help of Donald W . Klein in tracing the careers of Communist leaders has contributed the greatest single source of information and guidance for the study, and his Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965 (written with

Ann B. Clark) is the leading reference work on the Chinese Communist movement. Footnotes to i t do not give page numbers, as the work is

alphabetically organized. Also indispensable, especially for information on non-Communist personalities, has been the Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, ably edited and expounded upon by Howard L . Boorman, with Richard C. Howard and others. Professor Boorman gave invalu-

able help in the early stages of this book. Other biographical works published in Hong Kong and Taiwan have also been utilized. The most important of the Chinese Communist leaders for thirty years, of course, has been Mao Tse-tung. H i s biographers, especially Stuart

Schram and Jerome Ch’en, have brilliantly pioneered efforts to obtain a clearer picture of the still somewhat inscrutable Chinese leader. This book,

however, has sought to put Mao’s enormous achievements into historical context and to stress the contributions of other leaders, who at least prior to 1935 were equally o r more prominent. These included most notably

Party founders Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, early leaders Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, L i Li-san, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Shao-yii, Chang Wen-t’ien,

Ch’in Pang-hsien, Liu Shao-ch’i, K’ang Sheng, Lin Piao, and many others. * The factional struggles i n the early history of the Bolshevik movement were not quite so complicated by external pressure, nor were those i n the shorter history of the Nazi movement or of the radical groups i n the French Revolution.

xiv

Preface

Next to the biographical studies, some words should be said about the other most important sources for this book. The writings of Mao Tse-tung himself and the footnotes to his Selected Works provide the most “official” guide to Party history and are especially valuable for the 1930’s and 1940’s. More detailed are the Memoirs of Chang Kuo-t’ao ( W o t i Hui-yi),

the first part of which has been published i n English as The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927: The Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t’ao. Prior to his flight from the Party i n 1938, Chang was among the top half-dozen senior leaders of the Party, and his autobiography supplies valuable firsthand reminiscences on Party history from 1921 to 1938. As

I have read Chang’s autobiography i n various forms and locations, footnotes generally refer only to the relevant chapter of the manuscript. I have

also consulted memoirs by Madame Chang Kuo-t’ao, Kung Ch’u, and others and various “semiofficial”’ Party histories such as those of Ho Kan-chih, H u Hua, and H u Ch’iao-mu and some Russian equivalents edited by A. S. Perevertailo, L . P. Delyusin, and others.

After the biographical studies, and the works of Mao and Chang Kuot’ao, the most important sources for Party history have recently been published in Taiwan by Wang Chien-min and Warren Kuo (Kuo Hualun), the latter i n both Chinese and English. Mr. Wang’s three-volume Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang Shih-kao (Draft History of the Party) was the

first thorough effort to analyze the vast collection of Communist documents captured b y the Nationalists before 1949 and stored i n Taiwan. Some of these documents are included i n the work. M r . Kuo’s work Chung K u o Kung-ch’an-tang Shih-lun (Analytical History of the Chinese Communist

Party), presently i n four volumes, supplements these sources with other documents and w i t h detailed reminiscences of former Communists, especially one Ch’en Jan ( K u o Chien) (see p . 569, note 23, and p . 593, note 9 ) . Despite occasional predictable polemics, M r . Kuo supplies extremely valuable new information, especially for the 1930’s.

I n addition to these most important general sources, I have tried to consult leading monographs and studies of particular periods. Of these, special mention should be made of the works of Professor C. Martin Wilbur and Julie How on the 1920’s, of Hsiao Tso-liang and William W. Whitson on the post-1927 period, and of recent dissertations b y Bernadette L i , Roy Hofheinz, William Dorrill, Richard Kagan, Ilpyong K i m , Derek Waller, Mark Selden, Jane Price, T’ien-wei W u , and Peter Seybolt, among others,

without which I could not have advanced significantly on earlier studies. For other works and guides consulted, see the Notes and Bibliography.

For such a general work as this, extensive firsthand work with primary sources has not been attempted, b u t I have done some reading i n pri-

mary sources of every period covered, to fill i n gaps not covered elsewhere and also to check and enrich the secondary sources on which I have mainly relied. I believe this approach generally reliable and the only practical one at the moment, i n view of the nature and unavailability of most primary materials. For example, while the historiographical problems i n evaluating

Chinese sources are at least as difficult as those i n the field of Soviet history, the relatively complete records of Party congresses and other sources

utilized skillfully by Leonard Schapiro and other students of the history

Preface

x0

of the Soviet Communist Party are almost entirely lacking for the CCP.*

Such lacunae i n source materials for the history of the CCP reflect the vicissitudes of Party history prior to 1949, such as the Long March, and also Party policy during many periods, which allowed revelation of only part of the record.

I n addition to sources cited, I would like to acknowledge the generous personal help given by, among others, Professors C. Martin Wilbur, Te-kong Tong, Maurice Valency, K a r l A . Wittfogel, T’ien-wei W u , William W . Whitson, James C. Hsiung, Richard Sorich, Howard Boorman, Michel Oksenberg, Roy Hofheinz, David Wilson, Carol Andrews, Chang-tu Hu, Chiin-tu Hsiieh, S. T . Leong, Steve Andors, John Lindbeck, A . Doak Barnett, Lois Hager, Jane Price, Arnold D o l i n , Susan Horsey, Frederick Teiwes, Harriet Mills, Frederick Praeger, Dae-sook Suh, Chao Cheng-sun, Derek Waller, John K . Fairbank, Benjamin Schwartz, Julie H o w , Tetsuya Kataoka, and others. I n addition, numerous students at Hunter College

and Columbia University have given valuable criticism and inspiration. Betty Austin retyped the entire manuscript as d i d many others various parts and manifestations of i t , including Patricia Poulos, Dale Anderson, I d a Sullivan, Elizabeth Blair, Gayle Klement, Charlotte Pecelli, and others.

My wife, Joy, has encouraged the entire project and helped with many problems of wording, typing, and daily life. My daughters, Constance, Claire, and Eve, have offered more inspiration than they knew b y their humor, charm, and hope for the future. The same and more has been rendered by my mother and by the memory of m y father, who died while

the work was in progress. Institutional help has been generously given by Hunter College of CUNY, the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, and Columbia University. Special thanks is due also Praeger Publishers, which commissioned this work i n 1966 and generously supported i t thereafter. My editor, Mervyn Adams, has done her usual splendid job of sorting out errors and offering guidance. Remaining problems, of course, are my responsibility.

New York, August 1, 1972 Note on Organizational Terms

I n view of ambiguities and frequent changes i n terminology, we have used the following terms for Party and military organizations throughout this book. These terms accord w i t h available information but for the sake of consistency sometimes vary slightly from literal translations, where the term i n question is not the most commonly used one. For example, we call

the Chiin-shih Wei-yiian-hui the Military Affairs Committee, but other Central Committee organizations are called ‘‘departments” ( p u ) , even i f the Chinese varies. Similarly the same Chinese character (ch’ii) i n * The only stenographic record of a National Party Congress of whose existence I am aware is the Russian record of the Sixth CCP Congress held i n Moscow i n June, 1928 (see Chapter 7 ) , although at least partial documentation exists for many congresses, notably the Eighth, held i n Peking i n 1956 (see chapters 21 and 22).

xv

Preface

different combinations is used at various levels of Party organization i n different periods, but we render areas larger than the province as “ r e g i o n ” (ch’ii, chih-hsing ch’ii, or hsing-cheng ch’ii), the level below the province as ‘‘special district” (chuan-ch’ii o r t’e-pieh ch’ii), and the level below the county as “ d i s t r i c t ” (the same ch’ii). I n the early history of the Red Army, sometimes the term “ a r m y ” (chiin) was used for units smaller than a ““corps” (chiin t’'uan), but, where possible, we have added informa-

tion to show its relative size. The following table gives some common usages: Party Central

Military

C e n t r a l Committee Political Bureau

Front or Field Army

Secretariat Departments Regional Bureaus Provincial Committees Special District Committees County (or town) Committees District Committees Subdistrict Committees (or administrative village or township)

Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion Company

B r a n c h ( o r cell)

Platoon

Small Group

Squad

Note o n Chinese Names

The Romanization of Chinese names employed is the commonly used Wade-Giles system with a few modifications, as yi for i. But the reader is warned of the quirks of this system according to which unaspirated initial consonants, for example, ch, j , k , p , t , and ts, i n the Wade-Giles system

should be pronounced j, r , g, b, d, and ds, respectively. The following chart may be useful: Wade-Giles Initial

Rough English Equivalent and Examples

Ch Chk’

J (Chi=]ee) C h (Ch’i=Chee)

J K

R (Jou=Ro) G (Kai=Guy)

K’ P P’

K (K’ao=Cow) B (Po=Bo) P (P’ai=Pie)

T T

D (Tao=Dow) T (T’u=Too)

Ts

D z (Tsao=Dzao)

Ts’

Tz (Ts’ao=Tsao)

Tz Tz’

D z (Tzu=Dzuh) T z (TzZ’u=Tzuh)

Using this or a similar chart, i t is hoped that the non—Chinese-speaking reader can deduce that Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Lin Piao, and Jen-min Jih-pao (People’s Daily), for example, should be pronounced rather like Chen Du-hsiu, M a o Dz-dung, Jo En-lai, Ju Duh,

Preface

XV

Lin Biao, and Ren-min Ri-bao. Other names, for example, K’ang Sheng and Huang Hua are pronounced more or less as they look, with a broad a. The Romanization of Chiang Kai-shek’s name (pronounced Jiang Kaishek) illustrates the current disarray i n Western transcriptions of Chinese names. The surname, Chiang, is accorded its Mandarin pronunciation (Jiang), but the given name, Kai-shek, is transcribed according to its Cantonese pronunciation and would read Chieh-shih (Jieh-shih) i n Man-

darin. I n Chinese style, the surname is always first, but, where the author has

written originally i n a Western language, the Western style of given name first is used. For example, we cite Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai: China’s Gray

Eminence, but Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works.

The Long March to Power

What is the lesson of the revolution of the last fifty or more years? Fundamentally, i t is a lesson of “arousing the masses of the people.” —Mao TSE-TUNG, M a y 4, 1939

The Long March to Power

LL Balkhash

Ta gh ..

TIBETAN

1. Physical Features of China

\ eto,

Reprinted from Theodore Shabad, China’s Changing M a p : N a t i o n a l a n d Regional Development 1949-71, r e v . ed., 1972. © 1956, 1972 b y Theodore Shabad. Reprinted b y permission o f t h e p u b lishers, Praeger Publishers, I n c . , a n d M e t h u e n& C o . L t d .

MODERN CHINA A N D REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

I t is one of the most extraordinary stories in all history that one of the dozen men who founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at Shanghai i n July, 1921, would live to rule the world’s largest nation.

No outsider could have foreseen it, and only the boldest act of faith could have sustained belief i n the inevitable victory of Communism that Marxist dogma proclaimed, at least for a very long time in the future. The odds were overwhelming. Mao Tse-tung was fortunate to survive, as illustrated by the executions of a wife and sister (both in 1930) and a brother (1943) and the deaths of another brother in battle (1935) and of a son i n the Korean war. About half of the fifty-odd Communists

in 1921 who remained active in the movement thereafter met violent deaths,’ and the rate of attrition was probably greater for lower-level activists, especially i n the decade after 1926. Party membership dropped catastrophically from 57,000 i n early 1927 to 10,000 o r less later i n that year, and from some 300,000 i n 1934 to perhaps 30,000 i n 1936. I f not all those lost to the Party were killed, i t is certain very many non-Party leftists and Red Army men, not included i n the above figures, also died violently? H o w then can the Communist triumph i n this seemingly most unlikely

of countries be explained? The toughness and skill of Communist survivors was only one factor i n explaining their eventual victory, which

was by no means inevitable. Any number of turns i n the flow of history

might have altered the outcome. Yet the question remains: How was the CCP able to ride out the enormous pressures applied to i t and take

advantage of the opportunities that finally did come its way? The explanation that i n a time of troubles such as beset China i t is easier to destroy

than to build is inadequate. The resources the national government had at its disposal should have been enough to offset the admittedly staggering problems i t faced. I n any event, the Communists also governed consid-

erable parts of China for two decades before they came to power and hence encountered some of the same problems of construction that the Nationalists faced.

6

The Long March to Power

Still less was the victory of Communism i n China due to the inevitable triumph of the working class, as Marxist ideology would have it. Although, i n 1927, more than half of the CCP membership was consid-

ered proletarian i n origin, by 1930, this figure had dropped to less than 10 per cent, and i t did not rise substantially above that before 1949.

Rather, Communist leaders in China were predominantly intellectuals, as was the case elsewhere. Although they claimed to represent the proletariat and the peasantry, their social backgrounds were not strikingly different from those of their archrivals, the Chinese Nationalists.?

More important than their social characteristics in explaining the ultimate triumph of the CCP was the Communist ability to organize the

Chinese masses by appealing to their ambitions and demands. There is no doubt that the Chinese Communists were far more successful than the Nationalists i n this task, and, i n a time of extreme stress, such as China

lived through in the first half of the twentieth century, this talent ultimately proved the key to victory. Communist techniques of mass organization, later known as the “mass l i n e , ” harnessed the dynamics of both the

national revolution against foreign enemies and the social revolution, which called for fundamental changes in Chinese society. Moreover, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology fostered Communist aware-

ness of and ability to channel popular energies. Dialectical materialism, with its stress on economic and class causes and on the processes and evolution of history, helped Communists to see key problems, even if its panaceas obscured other problems. I t provided a focus and a lens for analyzing problems that other, less ideological groups i n China lacked. Communist ideology also helped to unify Party organization, which of course was the intent of Lenin’s statement, ceaselessly repeated by the Chinese Communists, that “without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolution.” Y e t the content of Communist ideology, i f not the commitment to an all-embracing creed, is foreign to China. The doctrines of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat are antithetical to the Confucian

tradition of moderation and social harmony,” although the fact that many Chinese d i d not know just how foreign such concepts were facili-

tated basic adaptations of Marxism. For example, the Chinese for “Communism” is “common propertyism” and “proletariat” is rendered “propertyless class.” Such vague terms are obviously susceptible to manipulation, and their very translation is a Sinification of Marxism. Moreover, an

important, i f minority, egalitarian opposition to Confucian conservatism i n traditional China, as in the great T’aip’ing (1851-64) and other peasant rebellions, formed an important bridge between Chinese tradition and Communist doctrine. The bureaucratic tradition formed another. The orga-

nizational form of a Leninist Party had obvious appeal to the heirs of the imperial system, as d i d the universality of an all-embracing ideology.

Thus, the roots of Communist mass politics go back not only to the Western revolutionary tradition (from Rousseau to Hegel to Marx to

Lenin to Mao), but to the secret societies, mass peasant movements, and imperial efforts to control them, which played such an enormous role in the dynastic era of Chinese history. I n many ways, the CCP was uniquely

[Chap. 1 ]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

7

suited to combine the Western revolutionary intellectual tradition with mass politics, Chinese style. I t s leaders inherited the traditional genius for

organization and mass control. The Chinese empire was the most developed and sustained political organization created prior to the twentieth century, but its collapse and the added burdens of modernization of a vastly expanded population of a half-billion people meant that twentiethcentury Chinese had to learn the hard way h o w to apply many of the

secrets of Western revolutionary politics to their nation. The staggering disruptions and demands of the twentieth century made

moderate efforts to govern China difficult to sustain. The extraordinarily harsh conditions of its modern history, including all the classic problems

of modernizing an immense, overcrowded land, were compounded by foreign invasion, and it is n o t surprising that many young Chinese radicals from the 1920’s through the 1940’s turned to an ideology that professed to explain the causes of all problems and to an organization that promised a way out. Moreover, the quasi-religious dedication of many Communists,

the loftiness of their propaganda, and the often cruel suppression of dissidents seemed to justify the totalitarian demands of their organization. That Chinese militants adopted Communism is a commentary on the measures they thought necessary to “save China” and not on their lack of patriotism.®

What then were the conditions i n early twentieth-century China that seemed to defy moderate solutions?

Internal Conditions During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at least four major

revolutions have been proceeding simultaneously i n China. I t is as i f the intellectual, political, economic, and social changes that took centuries to

occur i n the West had been compressed into several decades i n China.

The development of these forces helps to explain both the incredible complexity of modern Chinese history and the contrast between its war and

bloodshed and previous simplistic images of a pacific, harmonious people. The intellectual revolution began with the first demonstrations of Western military superiority i n the Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60. I t was compounded b y the agonies of China’s monumental indigenous problems, manifested at the beginning i n the greatest preindustrial social

upheaval i n history, the T’aip’ing, secret society, and minority rebellions of the 1850’s and 1860’s, costing tens of millions of lives, and by continued humiliations at the hands of the foreign powers. Increasing numbers of Chinese literati became convinced that China must learn the military

and economic techniques of Western power. Their first moderate efforts at Westernization failed to prevent the defeat b y previously scorned Japan i n 1894-95 or the Boxer Rebellion fiasco of 1900. The nineteenth-century reformers also failed to institutionalize their ideas—notably i n the collapse

of the reform movement of 1898. With the realization of the need for profound intellectual revolution, the stage was set for the launching of the second great revolution, the

political. Yet the subsequent overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the

8

The Long March to Power

replacement of the 2,000-year-old imperial system by a republican form of government in 1911-12 raised more questions than they answered. The additional confusions and hardships of the warlord period followed. Until 1928, and to a lesser extent until 1949, China was fragmented into

as many as ten areas of competing power: Manchuria, the Northwest, the north China plain below Peking (the nominal seat of government), the lower Yangtze River, the middle Yangtze, the upper Yangtze, the southeast coast, the Pearl River delta around Canton, the Southwest, and, finally,

port cities, such as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Canton, all a mélange of foreign influence and Chinese poverty. This kaleidoscope of warlord and foreign-power centers produced bewildering, almost constant, war-

fare, onerous and multiple taxation, growing militarization,” and, perhaps most important, further grounds for the conviction that only the most basic revolution offered a way out of the morass. I n its third revolution, the economic, China was advancing from its

immemorial pattern of relatively self-sufficient small peasant farms to modern patterns of commercial agriculture, village industries, and the beginnings of industrialization, especially i n the Yangtze valley, the port cities, and later in Manchuria. Actually, China had long had a relatively

advanced economy; some commercialization had already appeared by the time of Confucius in the middle of the first millennium before Christ and had developed significantly from the Sung dynasty (about A.D. 1000)

onward. The growth of commerce, leading to the opulence that so impressed such visitors as Marco Polo, is the basis for the questionable Chinese Communist thesis that China would eventually have become

capitalist and then Communist even without the coming of the West. There was native industry before the late nineteenth century, b u t i t was

scattered and mostly done in the home or in small shops. Only in the nineteenth century did more modern enterprises begin to appear. By 1894, there were more than 40 modern enterprises, and more than 166 existed b y 1913, b u t as late as 1933, “modern industry” still accounted for only

2.2 per cent of China’s economy.? More important, the prevalence of commerce i n China over the cen-

turies contributed to the cyclical land crises that coincided with the dynastic cycle i n Chinese history. As merchants purchased and resold grain according to seasonal fluctuations, only the most successful farmers

could survive, and they i n turn often participated in such profitable activities, as d i d the father of M a o Tse-tung. The unsuccessful o r unlucky farmer, b y contrast, had to turn to usurers, paying perhaps 30 per cent annual interest on loans, and often was forced into tenancy, or had to

flee the land altogether, joining the army of “wandering people” and “local bandits.” These people formed ready recruits for the numerous peasant rebellions i n Chinese history, and the numbers of rural unemployed and wandering people increased further i n the twentieth century with the

effects of growing commercialization on rural life. According to Mao, more than half o f the Red Army i n its early days was drawn from the vagrant population o f some 20 million.® Hence, economic revolution contributed to social revolution, the fourth

major revolution of twentieth-century China. The convulsions in the

[Chap. 1 ]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

9

lives of individuals and families were beyond reckoning, and nowhere more so than among the rural dispossessed who migrated to the cities i n

ever growing numbers. Cities with populations of up to a million also existed i n imperial China, but, even i n the 1920’s, only an estimated

6 per cent of the population of about 450 million lived in cities of more than 50,000, while another 6 per cent lived in towns of from 10,000 to 50,000. Even i n 1949, only 57.6 million and, i n 1957, 92 million, o r less

than 15 per cent of the population, lived in “cities” of more than 2,000 people. There were an estimated 660,000 full-time factory workers b y 1913, b u t only a little more than 1 million i n 1919 and as late as 1933. Another 2 million or so worked i n mining, utilities, and construction, and much larger numbers, more than 10 million and 12 million, respectively, i n transportation and handicrafts. Some 5 million farmers also worked parttime i n industry, trade, and other subsidiary occupations, as Table 1.1 shows.? All urban workers, however, remained closely tied to the countryside

and purchased land when they could, while new workers could always be recruited from impoverished rural areas. The constant availability of labor from an immense population and the political chaos and helplessness of China meant that labor could be exploited to the limits of human endurance. Conditions were as bad as or worse than those i n the worst days of

Western sweatshops a century before. I n Shanghai in the early 1920’s the twelve-hour day was the norm; many worked eighteen hours a day, with

one day off every other week and on the several biggest annual holidays, while salaries were as low as a quarter or fifty cents a day, or even less. Child laborers, some as young as six, and women earned even less. This new Chinese proletariat was concentrated in Shanghai, a city of about 2 million i n 1919 (and 3 million i n 1928), of whom perhaps half

lived in the French and International settlements. There, 300,000 workers made up perhaps 20 per cent of the work force, although nationwide the proletariat formed only 0.5 per cent of the population. Other concentrations of workers included 200,000 i n the Canton-Hong Kong area and

100,000 in Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi provinces, mostly in the Wuhan cities, in Changsha, and at the Hanyehp’ing and Anyiian mines. Smaller numbers labored in industrial centers in Hopeh and Manchuria, and almost half (44 per cent) of the fledgling Chinese proletariat worked in foreign-controlled enterprises. Another several hundred thousand Chinese workers went to France and Russia during and after World War I , most of them subsequently returning to their homeland. Despite their growing numbers, because of the constant turnover of peasants going to and from the countryside and the consequent persistence of old attitudes and forms of organization (secret and mutual aid socie-

ties) , the proletariat was difficult to organize. There were only 152 strikes i n the two decades before 1919, and the first political strikes arose only after the May Fourth Movement i n 1919, and these were led characteristically b y intellectuals.!? There were also growing numbers of merchants, with more than 13 million persons engaged i n trade b y 1933. They, too, had long existed i n imperial China, but their number and influence greatly increased with the

10

The Long March to Power T A B L E 1.1 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, 1933

Type of Occupation Total population

Population (millions)

Per Cent of Total Population

500.00

100.00

Agricultural population Working population, age 7-64 Agriculture only Joint agriculture and subsidiary occupations Agriculture Industry® Trade’ Transportation Other nonagricultural occupations® Children under 7 Students, age 7 and over Age 65 and over Unemployed o r idle, age 7-64°¢

365.00 212.30 118.78 93.52 86.13 3.61 1.66 1.14 0.98 71.21 5.13 10.99 65.36

73.00 42.46 23.76 18.70 17.23 0.72 0.33 0.23 0.20 14.24 1.02 2.20 13.07

Nonagricultural population Working population, age 7-64 Factories Handicrafts Mining Utilities Construction Trade Transportation Other nonagricultural occupations Children Under 7 Under 12 Students Age 7 and over Age 12 and over Age 65 and over Unemployed or idle® Age 7-64 Age 12-64

135.00 46.91 1.13 12.13 0.77 0.04 1.55 13.22 10.16 7.91

27.00 9.38 0.23 243 0.15 0.01 0.31 2.64 2.03 1.58

26.33 43.86

5.26 8.77

5.74 0.60 4.08

1.15 0.12 0.82

51.94 39.56

10.39 7.91

* Manufacturing, home industries, m i n i n g , utilities, a n d construction. ® Professional a n d public service, etc.

Including housewives. * Actual age of the working nonagricultural population falls mostly within the range 12-64; age seven is taken as the lower l i m i t merely for the convenience of grouping on the same basis as the agricultural working population. Source: Liu and Yeh, Economy, pp. 185, 188. ¢

economic changes of the new century. Almost half of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party i n the 1920’s were

sons of merchants, and the merchants themselves played some political role, as i n the first modern boycott of 1905 i n the struggle against the exclusionist immigration policies of the United States. Their role increased further i n subsequent nationalist movements, leading Communist strategists to place relatively great stress o n the ‘‘national bourgeoisie’ i n the ‘“bourgeois-democratic revolution’ against imperialism and feudalism.”

[Chap.1]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

11

The intellectual, political, economic, and social revolutions, intensifying

from the late nineteenth century, accelerated changes in the pattern of the family, the linchpin of Confucian society. The old ideal of the patriarchal and extended family seemed anachronistic to increasing numbers of youth. Sons, including Mao, refused to accept arranged marriages, to live with their parents and grandparents, or to be told what profession to follow. Daughters demanded unheard-of freedoms and adopted foreign dress and manners. The impact of rapid change on the individual is easily perceived i n the family revolution, which affected millions of homes.

Unfilial behavior reached a climax with Party-induced denunciations of fathers by sons after 1949, an anathema without precedent to the heirs of Confucius. The reason for such extreme behavior was the felt necessity

to break the deeply entrenched hold of the family on the individual, lest i t impede “progress” or, later, the totalitarian controls required by the Party. The Chinese Communists, however, have never entirely denounced

the unitary family as did the Bolsheviks i n the free-love period of early Soviet history. China remains an overwhelmingly rural country. I n its some 2,100

rural counties and million-odd villages live more than three-quarters of the population, producing some two-thirds of the national income, proportions that have changed little over the decades. According to a 1927 survey, some 45 per cent of the peasantry throughout China owned their land, but, of these, 44 per cent possessed less than 10 mou (about 1.7 acres), or less

than the minimum considered necessary to support an average family of about five. Close to 30 per cent of the rural population owned no land at all, and another 25 per cent, part of their land. Thus more than one-half of all Chinese peasants, ranging from less than 10 per cent in some areas to 9 0 per cent i n others, were either partial o r full tenants, paying u p to

half or more of their produce as rent, or were agricultural laborers, receiving irregular and minimal pay. Another survey, taken i n 1936,

stated that the number of rural households owning less than 10 mou had increased from the 44 per cent of the 1927 survey to some 60 per cent.' A decade later, Mao Tse-tung claimed that the wealthiest 8 per cent of rural landowners owned from 70 to 80 per cent of all arable land, leaving only one-quarter for all the rest.!® Conditions of land tenure varied widely from section to section, however, and there is still lively debate as to the effects o f tenancy, commercialization, attitudes to land, and other agrarian conditions on peasant movements. Tenancy and commercialization were both low and high i n some areas that developed into Communist bases but were still higher i n

other sections that did n o t have strong Communist ties. Such variation occurred from district to district within regions, as well as among

regions. I n many parts of the poorer and disaster-prone North, where the Communists achieved their decisive breakthrough in building political and military power after 1936, inadequate production and high taxation and interest rates, often running more than 30 per cent per year, were

generally greater problems than the more even distribution of wealth, which was the greater concern i n richer southern areas saddled with high tenancy rates.’

Whatever the regional variation and reliability of available statistics,

12

The Long March to Power

i t is evident that three-quarters of the rural population either had no land or too little land to support itself without additional sources of income through handicrafts or other pursuits.'® Moreover, while relatively more Chinese farmed their o w n land than was the case i n many agrarian

societies, the great majority of Chinese owner-cultivators faced unusually uncertain weather conditions, immense population pressure, archaic and oppressive rent, tax, and credit arrangements, and constant warfare and

disruptions. Although some recent studies argue that the alleged decline i n rural economic and social conditions has been overstated,'® i t is certain

that even the average Chinese peasant required unrelenting effort and a modicum of good luck to sustain life at all. Despite the national scope of these severe problems, local interests

dominated peasant concerns i n China, as i n rural communities everywhere. This was all the more true under the low levels of literacy prevailing i n the first half of the century, and, as recent studies have shown, the spread

of literacy and of communications generally is an essential and important aspect of modern revolutions.” O n the other hand, the literate i n China,

who slowly increased from perhaps 5 to 10 per cent of the population i n the early part o f the century to a good proportion of school-age children

after 1949, at least could read of national and international events i n a common language, although i n the South spoken dialects were as different from each other as are the Latin languages of Europe. North of the Yangtze River, all spoke a variation of Mandarin, the lingua franca of educated Chinese, which has been universally taught b y the Communists since

1949. Others spoke the language of Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, Turks, Chuang, Miao, and others of the fifty minorities who make up about 6 per cent of the population.

I n contrast to rapid changes in the cities, traditional attitudes persisted i n the countryside. T o some extent, this is still the case, partly explaining

Communist attacks on traditions such as Mencius’s dictum that “Those who labor w i t h their minds govern others, those who labor with their

strength are governed by others.”?' The persistence of such attitudes, symbolized by the long fingernails and bound feet of the rural gentry of old China, was n o doubt one reason why early Communist leaders tended to come from urban-oriented intellectual groups and, until 1927, to devote most o f t h e i r efforts t o the l a b o r movement rather than to the peasants.

Most Communist leaders studied i n the new “modern schools” established after the abolition of the 1,300-year-old examination system i n 1905. By 1909, some 1.6 million students were enrolled i n 57,000 of these schools, and, at about the same time, as many as 10,000 more studied in Japan, w i t h another 500 to 600 i n Europe. Later, still more went abroad, and, i n all, at least 30,000 Chinese studied i n Japan and 20,000 i n the United States, while 6,000 students were i n France i n the year 1920

alone.?” I n China, by World War I , the number of “modern” students had increased to about 5 million. They—or at least those who went o n to

higher studies and became concerned with the problems besetting the country, that is to say, “ t h e intellectuals’’—felt the full weight of all the changes and forces of the twentieth century. As a group, they were united

in the conviction that a “new China” must emerge from the chaos of the

[Chap. 1 ]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

13

old, though they came to differ profoundly o n the type of intellectual, political, economic, and social order to be initiated.

Revolutionary Nationalism and Anti-imperialism I n the early twentieth century, most Chinese, of course, continued the age-old patterns of their lives, but, b y the second half of the second

decade—when Mao was finishing his studies in Hunan, Chiang Kai-shek was seeking a living i n Shanghai, and Sun Yat-sen was again i n and out of exile—anti-imperialism alternated w i t h antiwarlordism as the dominant concern of Chinese intellectuals. Sun Yat-sen termed China a “hypo-

colony,” one that was worse off than a colony because Chinese were not the ‘‘slaves of one country, but of all,”’*® while Chiang, as late as 1944, called the “unequal treaties” of 1842, 1844, 1858, 1860, 1895, 1897-98,

1901, and 1915 ““China’s national humiliation” and ‘‘the main cause of our failure to build a nation.”?* As a boy, Mao Tse-tung stated that it was the “ d u t y of all the people to help save China,” and, i n 1924, he allegedly noted w i t h bitterness the infamous sign over the entrance to a

park i n Shanghai: “Chinese and dogs not allowed.”’?® There was indeed cause for concern. Until the early 1930’s, there were

thirty-three foreign concessions i n China; foreigners were subject to foreign, not national, l a w ; China’s import tax was limited to 5 per cent; and foreign powers held control over much of the country’s economy and transport and patrolled key transportation routes. Not u n t i l 1942 and 1943,

a full 100 years after the end of the first Opium War, were the “unequal treaties” finally abandoned by the United States and England. They then temporarily called China “ a great power,” recognizing that i t was capable of administering justice and the dozen or so foreign concessions still nominally i n existence, though at the time, of course, these were under Japanese occupation.

These admissions came a bit late, to say the least. During the previous century of the unequal treaties, the effects of imperialism had been

immediate and direct. The wealth of the Western powers i n the port cities unbalanced the economy and society of parts of the country. Foreigners controlled much o f the economy, sent their ships at w i l l u p Chinese rivers and their troops to its cities, and encouraged the development and persistence o f warlordism i n order to divide and rule. The galling facts of discrimination i n favor of foreigners were everywhere evident. O f course, many individual foreigners—missionaries, teachers, professionals, and

businessmen—performed valuable services and offered much-needed help where they could,?® but their efforts often only dramatized the evils they tried to alleviate and the part of their governments i n perpetuating them.

I n the second decade of the century, the spreading realization of the crisis confronting China was manifested i n growing protest movements, notably against the signing of a part of Japan’s infamous ‘“Twenty-One Demands’ i n 1915 and, above all, i n the May Fourth Movement, which started i n 1919 as a demonstration against the Versailles Treaty’s

awarding of German holdings in Shantung Province to Japan instead of returning them to China. The May Fourth Movement created conditions for the rapid spread of Marxist ideas in China. More than 100,000 people

14

The Long March to Power

in sixteen of the twenty-one provinces of the time* actively responded to the demonstration of some 5,000 students i n Peking on May 4, 1919. For the first time o n a national scale, the anger of the intellectuals, born of

despair at the plight of China, significantly reached other sections of the population—professional people, merchants, and even certain segments

of labor and the peasantry. I n the wake of spreading publicity about the evils of imperialism, many began to pay new attention to the Russian revolutions of 1917 and to Bolshevik propaganda. The revolutionary nationalism of the May Fourth period, when radical Chinese first began the serious study of Marxism, dramatizes a central paradox of twentieth-century China and of large areas of the world. How could Communism, an antinationalist doctrine b y origin, triumph in a country where nationalism was the dominant belief of the age? The

answer lies not only in the changes i n Marxism made by Lenin and others to sanction national revolutions against imperialism but also i n the nature

of revolutions in the developing world. A small but significant number of Chinese intellectuals came to feel, through successive humiliations and frustrations, that only a revolution as profound as the one promised by Communism could provide solutions for China’s huge problems. I n 1922, a manifesto of the new Chinese Communist Party made this attitude official: “ I n the process of the struggle, the Chinese popular masses learned the truth that the country’s defense from foreign enslavement was impos-

sible without a change of the entire political system of the country.” The real founder of Chinese Communism, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, more than

any other Chinese, prepared the way for this radical understanding of the crisis facing China. I n the first years of the century, Ch’en’s famous predecessor, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (1873-1929), set the stage for revolutionary nationalism intellectually, as Sun Yat-sen did politically, b y arguing persuasively that Chinese could save themselves only b y “renewing” them-

selves along more liberal and aggressive lines. I n the pages of the journal N e w Youth, which he founded i n 1915, Ch’en Tu-hsiu went further, urg-

ing a wholesale adoption of Western values, especially the competitive outlook by which one seeks to improve rather than adapt to one’s environment. He criticized traditional Chinese values of complacency, familism, and formality, advocating instead struggle, individualism, and utilitarian-

ism. He posed a question that must have seemed unanswerable to his more radical listeners: “Eastern peoples may think the continuous struggles [ o f the West] madness, but i f we possessed one thousandth of their

spirit, would the peace-loving Eastern peoples be where they are now?’ I n short, the Chinese people would have to refashion their very minds in order to survive i n the modern world, regardless of the consequences this would entail for their age-old values. Not only future Communists, but leading writers of diverse beliefs, such as China’s most famous modern literary figure, L u Hsiin ( 1 8 8 1 1936), and the American-educated H u Shih (1891-1962), came to believe that the old, even i f Chinese, would have to be destroyed to make way

for a new China. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, born in Anhwei Province in 1879 of a relatively well-known literati family, was educated i n the classics as well * There are now twenty-nine.

[Chap.1]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

15

as abroad. I n different times, he doubtless would have become the typical scholar he looked. H e had taken first place i n his home countylevel exams for the Mandarinate i n 1896, b u t i n 1915 he wrote i n the first issue of N e w Youth, “ I would rather see the r u i n of our national heritage than the extinction of our race. because of its inability to survive.” I n practice, this meant the destruction o f Confucianism, w i t h all that

implied, in order to pave the way for the acceptance of a new all-embracing ideology. As Ch’en put i t elsewhere: I n regard to Confucianism, which is incompatible with a new society, a new nation, a new faith, we must have a complete awakening and determination. Unless the [ o l d ] one i s demolished, the [ n e w ] one w i l l n o t arise.?®

L i Ta-chao, next to Ch’en i n importance to the early history of the CCP and ten years Ch’en’s junior, wrote similarly: Our nation has gone through an extremely long history and the accumulated dust of the past is heavily weighing i t down. By fettering its life, [the past] has brought our nation to a state of extreme decay. What we must prove to the world is not that the old China is not dead but that a new youthful China is i n the process of being b o r n3° .

I n this atmosphere, Chinese intellectuals understandably interpreted the Bolshevik revolution as a new sign of hope. I n the first extended Chinese comment o n the Russian Revolution, L i Ta-chao wrote: Let us think carefully as small citizens of the world: to whom does the present victory belong?

The victory o f Bolshevism

. is the victory

of the spirit of common awakening i n the heart of each individual among mankind in the twentieth century.?!

As they moved from advocacy of “rugged individualism,” democracy, and science to the adoption of Marxism-Leninism at the time of the May Fourth Movement, Ch’en, L i , and like-minded radicals varied i n the

degree to which they decried a narrow sense of nationalism, but they clearly shared the leading ideal of the day, expressed i n the slogan to

“save the country.”®” Nationalism would be the principal vehicle of the Communist revolution, and the withering of state boundaries would have

to await utopia. Meanwhile, class struggle could be fostered not only against reactionaries at home but equally against foreign powers and their native collaborators. I n addition to seeming to resolve the contradiction between simultaneous needs for national and social revolution, the Bolsheviks seemed to

demonstrate how to reorganize a backward country i n the face of foreign opposition. Indeed, decisive i n the long run for the rise of Communism on

Chinese soil was the ability of Communist organization to reap where other radical groups had sown. This was, of course, most significant in comparison with the Kuomintang, which, i t should be remembered, also started as a revolutionary and socialist party. I t was also true of other early socialist groups, especially of the anarchists, who were numerically

16

The Long March to Power

stronger and more radical than the Communists until the early 1920’, but who were ineffectual in the struggle against Chinese warlordism and imperialism. By contrast, Leninist organization proved remarkably effective in molding varied groups of intellectuals, workers, and peasants into a highly militant movement. Organized i n a hierarchy, ascending

from cell to county, provincial, regional, and central committees, the Communists achieved a potent mixture of disciplined execution of orders and enthusiasm for arduous and dangerous work. Although the Nationalists had similar Party organization on paper, their lack of ideological dynamism vitiated their numerical superiority, while revolutionary commitment enabled the CCP to replace its repeated heavy losses with newly recruited activists. Hence, two major components of the Bolshevik revolution, antiimperialism and mass organization, influenced all politically conscious

Chinese for better or worse. Although Nationalists denounced the Communists for subordinating Chinese to Russian interests, early Communist leaders thought of their actions rather as helping to bring the Chinese people to a position of equality with the most advanced of the world’s

peoples. Nationalism was still the great arbiter, even when i t was denounced as a goal in itself. These attitudes did much to favor the growth of certain Communist ideals and also to foster the conditions

leading to the first united front between the Nationalists and Communists in the mid-1920’s. During the first two decades of the century, however, the most important groups i n propagating radical Western doctrines were the monarchist reformers led by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, the republican revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen, and the anarchists. They and their allies preached a varied mixture of republicanism, socialism, anarchism, and liberalism. Liang was

for a reformed constitutional monarchy i n the manner of Meiji Japan, and Sun Yat-sen advocated an American-style republic. Neither proposal

proved possible in the conditions of the time. Farthest to the left and more numerous than Communists until perhaps

1925 were the Chinese anarchists who flourished among those who had studied overseas, especially in France and Japan. Anarchist journals such as the New Century (1907-10) were influential i n radical circles and propagated the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and others.

Anarchists established various organizations i n China i n the early days of the Republic, the most significant of which was the Anarchist Communist Society, founded i n Shanghai i n July, 1914. By 1919, there were more than twenty anarchist groups. Other anarchist leaders fostered the work-study movement i n Europe, which during and after World W a r I

sent a large number of students to France, including many future leaders of the CCP.3? Among other groups were those who organized the first Chinese Socialist Party late i n 1911, which claimed 20,000 members before its suppression several years later. Still others i n the Workers’ Party were said to have created the first effective national labor organization between 1911 and 1913.2* Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, w h o had done so much to launch

Chinese radicalism after the turn of the century but who became increasingly conservative, formed a Progressive Party that helped prepare the

[Chap. 1 ]

Modern China and Revolutionary Nationalism

17

way for a more modern political structure, but that also worked with the hated Yiian Shih-k’ai (1859-1916), first President of the Republic, and his successors i n Peking. Later known as the Research Clique, the followers of Liang became important moderate opponents of the Communists. By the early 1920’s, more conservative members of the Young China

Association, founded i n 1918, also moved t o oppose the Communists, although some Communists had participated i n the Association’s earlier activities.’® I n addition, many prominent intellectuals, such as H u Shih, played an active role i n undermining the old order, while becoming increasingly critical of Communist alternatives. But, as with the Western Enlightenment a century and a half before, cultural iconoclasm and early

reform efforts paved the way for fundamental revolution. The first translations of Marxist works appeared as a product of interest in European, Russian, and developing Japanese radicalism, although substantial materials were not available u n t i l the 1920’s. Earlier, the Confucian reformer K’ang Yu-wei (1858-1927), occasionally referred to Western socialism, and his disciple, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, spoke of Marx i n an

essay written in 1902. Books based on Japanese sources appeared in 1903 stressing the need for socialism as a means of avoiding revolution. The first translations of excerpts from the Communist Manifesto appeared in Chinese i n 1906 and 1908, and excerpts from the writings of Engels in 1907 and 1912. Not until 1919 were there more extensive translations of a part of Das Kapital and other Marxist classics. * ®

I n 1920, the significance of the emerging Chinese groups of radical intellectuals,

constitutional

conservatives,

Westernizing

intellectuals,

anarchists, and Marxists was obscured first of all by the vast, dense, and backward hinterland of China and secondly by warlord politics. The more ambitious leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen, sought strange allies in their efforts to create bases for reform and revolution. Sun worked with southern warlords i n Canton i n 1917-18 and 1920-22, but predictable

differences precluded effective progress along these lines. I n the North, the situation was even worse, as warlords marched and countermarched,

with W u P’ei-fu (1874-1939) emerging triumphant i n Peking i n 1920. I n Hunan, the local warlord bloodied the heads of fractious youths,

including Mao Tse-tung. Elsewhere, even more complicated processions of warlords, secret societies, and politicians traded power, while the

peasant millions were forced to meet ever increasing demands for taxes and military recruits.

I n this situation, summed up i n the Chinese proverb “Seven turmoils and eight disasters,” i t is hardly surprising that increasing numbers of young intellectuals became convinced of the need for revolution. The search of Chinese radicals for new solutions to staggering problems took on more urgency with the failures of the Republic, increased fighting among dozens of warlords, and new evidence of the injustices of imperialism. The desperate longing for new solutions was expressed i n

the pages of New Youth and elsewhere, and i t is not surprising that Bolshevik successes i n Russia generated increasing interest in Commun-

ism among the more radical. Accordingly, in the aftermath of disillusionment with Western democracy, there sprang u p a profusion of Marxist

study circles out of which eventually emerged the CCP.

T H E FOUNDING OF T H E PARTY

The first Chinese Marxists faced even more immense obstacles to the realization of Communism i n their homeland than did the Russians in 1902 when Lenin wrote What Is To Be Done? the earliest classic of the Bolshevik movement. A t the time, Russian revolutionaries faced the

inertia of most of the population, fractious disputes with other conspiratorial groups, and above all the unyielding and repressive nature of the Czarist government. Therefore, i t was understandable that the founder of twentieth-century Communism should stress the necessity for an elite

vanguard to guide the revolution out of such difficulties. I n 1920, the Chinese “vanguard” must have wondered still more “what is to be done.” As all Marxists knew, capitalism had to supersede feudal-

ism before there could be Communism. Yet, while the “bourgeois revolution” against “feudalism” had been under way i n Russia a generation before the turn of the century, such far-reaching change had yet to begin i n China i n any meaningful sense by the time of the October Revolution.* Nor d i d the early Chinese Communists have a Lenin. U n t i l his death i n 1924, Lenin guided from Moscow the twin efforts to form and

strengthen a Chinese Communist Party and the bourgeois revolution against the landlords, warlords, and imperialists. But early Chinese Communists were primarily inexperienced intellectuals, seeking a way to “save China,” and could not yet be decisive revolutionary leaders. They

““close themselves i n their rooms to study Marx and Lenin as they formerly studied Confucius,” a Comintern leader complained i n 1922."

The initial task of the first Chinese Communists was somehow simultaneously to establish personal commitment to the new religion and to forge sources of political power. The first goal meant study and intragroup organization and the second the development of alliances, with rising non-Communist leaders and middle-class, proletarian, and peasant groups.

* Lenin’s

coup occurred o n November 7 , 1917, b u t , according t o the old Russian

calendar, this was October 25, 1917. Hence, Bolsheviks spoke of the “October Revolution.”

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

19

From the perspective of the young people, mostly i n their early

twenties, who dedicated themselves to the imponderable work of the bolshevization of China, each of these steps would prove long and tor-

tuous, and some of them mutually contradictory. Sometimes they were disastrously so, as at the end of the first period of Chinese Communism in 1927, when the Party was very nearly destroyed i n the process of trying to reconcile mass social revolution with the national revolution against

the warlords. From the perspective of history, i t is amazing that the few dozen converts to Marxism-Leninism as of 1921 were able to establish the organizational roots for one of history’s greatest revolutions. The story is all the more fantastic, given the intellectual, tenuous, and often conten-

tious organizational origins of the Chinese Communists. Some of these men, however, soon began to learn the crucial lessons of

mass organization that would enable them to merge the intellectual and mass movements, always an essential prerequisite for revolutionary takeoff. Popular and intellectual dissatisfactions had long been increasing but previously were largely isolated from each other and relatively unorgan-

ized. When the decisive joining of the intellectual and mass revolutions did occur, the revolutionary process i n China moved from one typical of chaotic third-world countries to one ranking i n intensity and implications with the classic French and Russian revolutions, b u t this stage did not materialize on a national scale u n t i l the mid-1920’s. The beginnings o f the Chinese Communist movement were humbler, at first resembling

some kind of postgraduate student discussion movement.

Early Chinese Communist Groups The first Marxist cells, founded in 1920-21, grew o u t of study groups and still reflected the eclectic and uncertain attitudes of their members. Leninist organizational commitment emerged only slowly. Until mid-1920, “democracy and science,” not dialectical materialism, were the watchwords of most progressive intellectuals, as could be seen i n the leading radical journal, N e w Youth. With the M a y Day, 1919, issue, this journal was the first Chinese

periodical to devote its pages specifically to a discussion of Marxism, but most contributors were highly critical of Marxist theories such as class struggle. As late as December, 1919, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, the editor of N e w

Youth and principal founder of the CCP, advocated local self-government and a guild system, not soviets, as ‘“‘the basis for the realization of democracy i n China.” Ch’en stated further that, “ i n implementing democracy, we must follow the British and American models,” and he doubted the

significance of capitalism as a force i n China.’ Nonetheless, as his and China’s frustrations continued, Ch’en Tu-hsiu became more politically active. Appointed Dean of the School of Letters of Peking University, China’s most prestigious university, in early 1917, he continued to write influential articles and editorials for N e w Youth and, after December, 1918, for the Weekly Critic. As a consequence o f

these writings and his increasing activities before and during the May Fourth Movement, Ch’en was imprisoned for eighty-three days during the summer of 1919 o n charges of “Bolshevism.” After his release, he moved

20

The Long March to Power

to Shanghai, and his views shifted sharply to the political left. By mid1920, Ch’en had announced his conversion to Marxism, and, i n November,

he dismissed the gradualist democratic programs he had previously advocated as ‘““a tool that the bourgeoisie formerly used to overthrow the feudal system and which they presently use as a device to swindle mankind i n order to maintain political power.””® Hence, in the wake of the M a y Fourth Movement, one of the most famous intellectuals i n China

turned to advocacy of the most radical of Western doctrines. His founding of the CCP showed the degree to which Leninism had become intellectually respectable among radicals. Although, as we shall see, Communism was first formally organized in Shanghai, i t was first studied systematically i n Peking. There, L i Ta-chao

played the greatest part in the formation of study groups, and he is now hailed as the real founder o f the Party because of Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s alleged responsibility for the disaster of 1927, the same year i n which L i was

martyred. Li’s influence was exerted more quietly, and his conversion to Marxism was less total than Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s, but the fact that he was the first early Communist to begin the study of Marxism is reflected in his writings after mid-1918. Born i n 1888 o f a peasant family i n a rural community of eastern

Hopeh Province and orphaned at an early age, Li was nonetheless able to study at Peiyang College o f L a w and Political Science and, from 1914

to 1916, at Waseda University i n Tokyo. After working with one of the leaders of the conservative Progressive Party, he became head of the library of Peking University i n February, 1918, at Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s suggestion. A studious-looking b u t amiable young man, L i was the first Chinese to endorse the October Revolution. Writing i n the July 1, 1918, issue of

New Youth, he praised the October Revolution as a ‘“manisfestation of the general psychological transformation of twentieth-century humanity” and as superior to the French Revolution, since i t represented international

humanism rather than bourgeois nationalism.* I n the May 1, 1919, issue of the same journal, L i was the lone enthusiastic advocate of Marxism. H i s article, “ M y Marxist Views,” sum-

marized his understanding of Marxism, based on his readings of Japanese translations o f the Communist Manifesto, Poverty of Philosophy, the preface to the Critique of Political Economy, and a part o f Das Kapital.

Even L i , however, was far from uncritical of his new faith and in the same article stated, “ T o speak frankly, Marx’s theory was really a product

of a certain age; i n Marx’s time i t truly was the greatest of discoveries. But today of course we cannot take the theory that was created in the environment of one period and use i t to explain all of history, nor apply the whole of the theory to our existing society.” Obviously, i f Marxism was suitable only for advanced societies and economies, i t could be of little use to China. This is why Communism

attracted so little attention in China prior to its triumph in Russia, also a

* Curiously, while Ch’en Tu-hsiu and L i Ta-chao early praised the anti-Tsarist February Revolution, nationalist leaders were quicker to hail the October Revolution.’

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

21

backward country. After the M a y Fourth Movement, L i , like Lenin, real-

ized that, i f class struggle was the “locomotive of history,” in Marx’s phrase, i t could speed up economic processes and drive history forward to Communism without awaiting natural developments. Hence, Marxism need not “rely upon material change alone,” for class struggle, led by a disciplined vanguard, could bring Communism even to backward areas.®

Nonetheless, because the theory of class struggle was diametrically opposed to all that traditional China stood for, even Chinese revolution-

aries willing to overthrow the old political order were loath to turn their backs so completely on Chinese civilization. Therefore Sun Yat-sen, Nationalist leaders, and anarchists, among others, favored mutual aid and

cooperation, not class struggle, as the key to progress. Li Ta-chao, at first, also called for class cooperation rather than struggle as, incidentally, did M a o Tse-tung i n mid-1919 i n his first important article, “ T h e Great Union o f the Popular Masses.””” However, the revelations of continued

warlordism and imperialism soon brought L i , Mao, and other radicals to a fuller acceptance of the proposition that only through struggle and

Bolshevik organization was there a way out for China. Meanwhile, Li Tachao sought to overcome Chinese psychological barriers to the theory of class struggle, by offering hope that one final struggle would lead to a Confucian “great unity’: I n the present world, tyranny has reached an extreme point. . We must make a fundamental change . . wash clean the previous world of class struggle and. . . bring forth a glorious new world of cooperation.® Even later i n their careers, L i and Mao remained surprisingly close to

Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese Nationalists in calling for a struggle between nations as well as between classes. Li called for a “class war against other nations of the world,” and Sun Yat-sen stated, “ W e must

aid the weaker and smaller peoples and oppose the great powers of the world.””® By late 1918, Li’s library office, soon known as the “Red Chamber,” had become the center of radical activities »* Peking University. I n discussion societies, the Weekly Critic, and other writings, L i expounded his ideas o n Bolshevism as the salvation for China and mankind. I n the autumn of 1918, he organized the Marxist Research Society, and future Communists, including briefly M a o Tse-tung, attended its meetings.} L i painted a gloomy picture for his students and spoke only of “ a tiny ray

of light i n this dark China and this dead and silent Peking of ours.” “Except for our youth the whole nation is i n darkness,” he said, admitting

that “even the most advanced discussions in our country are separated from [ r e a l ] Bolshevism b y thousands o f miles.”’® Even among Li’s

sympathetic students, the great majority eventually turned either to work with more moderate political and intellectual leaders or to the anarchists. I n order to broaden their influence and make their work more prac* After China’s great eighteenth-century novel The Dream of the Red Chamber. + Mao worked under L i at the library for several months in late 1918.

22

The Long March to Power

tical, Li and some of his leading disciples sought to organize the masses much i n the manner of earlier Russian radicals. From March, 1919, they

organized the ‘‘mass-education speaking corps” i n working-class sections of Peking, Tientsin, and neighboring areas. At the time of the May Fourth Movement, Li Ta-chao played a leading role as adviser to student activists and also sought to spread his Marxist study movement to other parts of China. Simultaneously, L i moved closer to orthodox Marxism, stressing

economic and practical as well as his usual spiritual and intellectual concerns. Among the Peking student groups that emerged from the May Fourth Movement, and from which came many future Communists, as well as

anarchists, were the Renaissance Society, the National Students’ Association, the Women’s Rights Movement Alliance, the Social Welfare Society,

the New People’s Society, the Young Socialist Group, the Marxist Club, and various labor clubs. I n 1919, the first translations of Marxist works since 1912 also began to appear, including part of Das Kapital, the first full translation of the Communist Manifesto, Karl Kautsky’s Das Erfurter

Programm, and Thomas Kirkup’s History of Socialism. These naturally influenced many students, and Mao Tse-tung later said that the last ““three books especially deeply carved my mind, and built up i n me a faith i n Marxism, from which, once I had accepted i t as the correct interpretation of history, I d i d not afterwards waver.”"!

I n December, 1919, a Society for the Study of Socialism was founded i n Peking to supersede L i Ta-chao’s year-old Marxist Research Society. The new group soon claimed 110 members, but most of them were anarchists, syndicalists, and guild socialists, and the society soon frag-

mented. Serious students of Communism i n the Peking area, of whom even i n 1921 there were still no more than a dozen, regrouped in March, 1920, as the Marxist Theory Research Society.

The most important of several other significant groups of radicals in North China was i n Tientsin. There, Chou En-lai, born of an official family i n Kiangsu i n 1898 b u t a student i n the northern city since 1912,

his future wife, Teng Ying-ch’ao and others formed a political discussion society i n September, 1919, and then a Marxist Research Society, i n

which several local Russians participated. These groups remained primarily anarchist, however, even after the arrest of Chou En-lai and other

students and their imprisonment for five months i n early 1920 for antiJapanese activities. Chang T’ai-lei, another important early Communist

who, as early as February, 1919, had founded a Society for Socialist Reconstruction while a university student i n Tientsin, returned to organize a more disciplined branch of the Socialist Youth League i n October, 1 9 2 0 . " I n the latter month, Chou En-lai set out for France i n one of the last groups to participate i n an eight-year-old “work-study” program. I n Paris, i n February, 1921, radicals among the several thousand students then i n this program, led b y Mao’s Hunan friend, Ts’ai Ho-sen, future Party leader L i Li-san, and others, established a Youth Socialist

Study Group. As many as forty radical groups in all were formed by Chinese students i n Paris, Lyon, Montargis, Grenoble, Charleroi (Belgium), and other cities. Eventually, a tightly knit Communist Party was

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

23

formed i n Paris, which became a branch of the CCP about July, 1922.* Surprisingly, almost one-quarter of the top Chinese leaders of the 1950’s

had been i n France during this period.” Meanwhile, other Chinese, including Chu Teh, the future leader of the Red Army, had gone to Germany, and a branch of the Socialist Youth League was established there in the autumn of 1922. Still more Chinese studied i n the Soviet Union, including many of those in France who gravitated eastward after 1922. Mao Tse-tung was among those preparing to go to France when he went to Peking i n the autumn of 1918. H e decided to remain i n China, however, and i n fact never left the country u n t i l his late-1949 trip to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 w i t h Stalin. Born i n 1893 of a

“mid-to-rich” peasant family and educated i n Hunan Province i n SouthCentral China, Mao was very much a product of rural China, unlike some

of his more sophisticated peers. Prior to the May Fourth Movement, his heroes were such diverse figures as a seventeenth-century anti-Manchu nationalist and George Washington, and even suppressors o f revolution,

such as Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-72) and Napoleon. Such attitudes no doubt reflected the almost constant warfare and chaos that afflicted so much of China i n the decades after 1911, but as M a o became active i n student

organizations he moved left i n a typical pattern. Childhood conflict with his father no doubt also influenced a growing belief i n the efficacy of rebellion. H e was an avid reader, wrote well, was considered a model student,

and, from 1915 to 1917, was a leader of the student association of his school, First Normal of Changsha. This was one of the leading “modern”

schools of the area, and Mao supplemented its curriculum by reading New Youth and other materials, making “every effort to learn from the West.” After graduation, he went to Peking for several months i n late 1918, where,

as noted, he was given a library job by L i Ta-chao. Back i n Changsha at the time of the May Fourth Movement, Mao organized several nationalist associations and established a weekly journal, the Hsiang River Review, i n which he published his first influential article i n July, 1 9 1 9 . ’ I n this article, Mao indicated his later inclination to stress the united front and the

“mass line.” The decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme. To be sure, among the methods of improvement and reform, education, industrialization, strenuous efforts, creation, destruction, and construction are all right, but there is a method more fundamental than these, which is that of the great union of the popular masses.’

I n late 1919, after leading a student strike against a notorious Hunan warlord, Mao returned to Peking and began the serious study of Marxist works. I n the spring of 1920, he traveled to Shanghai and talked with

Ch’en Tu-hsiu, who influenced him “perhaps more than anyone else.”*® He returned to Changsha i n the summer. Then, at the age of twenty-six, he obtained his first good job as principal of a primary school. I t enabled him, among other things, to marry his first love, the daughter of an influential early teacher, his family-proposed marriage never having been

24

The Long March to Power

consummated. From this time on, Mao claimed to have become a Marxist

“ i n theory and to some extent i n action.” He commenced agitation among laborers and intensified the study and dissemination of Marxism as urged b y Ch’en Tu-hsiu.'®

Hence, not only i n Shanghai and Peking but also i n Changsha, Wuchang, Tientsin, and other cities, small groups of radical intellectuals were exploring the relevance of Marxism for China. This was the situation i n the spring of 1920 when the Comintern made its first concerted effort to organize these diverse groups into a disciplined Leninist party. The existence of these groups, inexperienced as they were, showed that Communism could grow i n China, but the Communist International undoubt-

edly accelerated its organization. The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution

The Bolsheviks had been looking toward China for more than a year. Most believed their revolution could only be protected by its spread to Central and Western Europe, the bastion of capitalism and hence of counterrevolution. As Lenin p u t i t with characteristic force i n 1920, “ A s long as capitalism and socialism last, we cannot live in peace; i n the end,

one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.” However, i n order to weaken capitalism, the Bolsheviks soon came to stress the importance also

of striking i n the East, which according to theory supplied imperialism with labor, raw materials, markets, and an outlet for surplus capital. China, as the largest country of Asia, naturally assumed great importance i n the new strategy.

The Russian Communist Party established a Chinese section of its Peoples of the East Bureau in November, 1918, while as many as 40,000 to 50,000 of some several hundred thousand Chinese i n Russia were said to have fought for the Red Armies during the period of War Communism.?' I n December, 1918, a pro-Bolshevik “Union of Chinese Workers” was formed i n Moscow, and, o n July 1, 1920, the Central Committee of

the Russian Communist Party founded a Central Organization Bureau for Chinese Communists i n Russia. Other early revolutionary work i n Asia

was carried out under the direction of the Party’s Siberian Regional Bureau, and a Russian Communist Party branch was established in Harbin i n 1917. The Third or Communist International (Comintern) of course assumed over-all direction of efforts for world revolution after its founding i n March, 1919. A special bureau of its Far Eastern Secretariat founded i n Irkutsk the following year (also called the Far Eastern, Asian, o r Irkutsk Bureau) was responsible for fostering revolution i n Asia,* and i t was * The Far Eastern Bureau had branches for China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan. I n the spring of 1926, the Soviet Party Central also created a Chinese Commission o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( E C C I ) , which

superseded other Comintern organizations and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs i n directing China policy. From the late 1920’s until mid-1931, the C o m i n t e r n F a r Eastern Bureau b r a n c h i n V l a d i v o s t o k (earlier i n Khabarovsk) and a

branch i n Shanghai also played an important role i n directing Moscow’s Asian policies.”

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

25

from there that the spring, 1920, mission led b y Grigory Voitinsky set out to organize a Chinese Communist Party.?> A year later the Far Eastern

Secretariat created a Chinese section with the help of Chang T’ai-lei, who went to the Soviet Union i n the spring of 1921 to represent the Chinese Communists.

Even in Russia, from the very beginning, there apparently existed some of the differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communists that would so bedevil their later relations. Thus, prior to the veto of the idea i n 1922, some Chinese i n the Bolshevik Party pressed for the Soviet Red Army to carry the revolution b y force to China, with one proposal for an

invasion via Sinkiang and Manchuria to overthrow the reactionary Peking government and link up with secret societies in the North and with revolutionary forces i n South China. The dangers of these proposals understandably alarmed Soviet leaders, who promptly denounced them.?* Various Russian and international Communist groups established schools for the education of revolutionaries and sought to bring promising young radicals to Russia for training. The most important of these for China was the University of the Toilers of the East, founded in April, 1921. More than sixty Chinese, among them Liu Shao-ch’i, Chairman of

the People’s Republic i n the early 1960’s, were in its first class of 800. Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, who would succeed Ch’en Tu-hsiu as the second leader of the CCP, had already been i n Moscow as a journalist since October, 1920, and served as an interpreter and instructor. A few years later, the Lenin School, founded i n September, 1925, also began to educate large numbers of Chinese Communists, whose travel and living expenses were mostly paid b y their Soviet hosts.?®

A factor that must be kept firmly i n mind i n understanding the relations between the Chinese and Russian Communist movements or between them and other Communist parties, is the tension between their leaders’ Marxism-Leninism and their nationalism. From the moment Communist leaders came to power i n Russia, as was also the case in China, they were confronted with the demands not only of the socialist but also of the

national revolution. To ensure the victory of Communism, i t was also necessary to defend Russia, and, conversely, the prosperity of a Com-

munist Russia would further the cause of world revolution. I t is true that for several years the cause of world revolution seemed uppermost i n the minds of Bolshevik leaders, but, as time went on, the reconstruction of Russia assumed equal or greater importance.

The dealings of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, representing Russia i n China, showed very well this transition from a diplomacy for world revolution to a diplomacy for what looked more and more like the great-power interests of Russia. A t first, Soviet spokesmen stressed a revolutionary break w i t h the diplomacy of the Czarist era, hoping to

inspire the Orient with the example of the Russian Revolution. I n July, 1918, Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, renounced all rights won by the Czarist government i n China, while the famous Karakhan Manifesto

a year later promised the return of the Chinese Eastern Railroad to China without compensation. The latter news, particularly, caused a storm of excitement when i t was released i n China i n March, 1920, and Russian

26

The Long March to Power

diplomats fostered contacts with Chinese intellectuals thereafter. However, as the Bolshevik position i n the civil war improved, Russian spokesmen

omitted references to the return of the railway.?® Furthermore, in order to check Japan i n East Asia and Britain in the Middle East, the Foreign Commissariat began to seek more orthodox ways to strengthen its position i n China as elsewhere. These more conservative Russian policies

were pursued even when they caused difficulties for Chinese Communists, as was the case in the 1920’s when the Russians supported even northern warlords like W u P’ei-fu and Feng Yii-hsiang. The conflict between the national and social revolutions became especially acute in 1926-27, when Soviet aid to the Nationalists began to be turned against the Communists. The dilemma of whom to support was implicit i n Communist theory,

which held that there would have to be a bourgeois revolution before there could be a socialist revolution. The parallels that dominated the thinking o f Lenin and Stalin were the Russian revolutions of 1905 and

1917. There had t o be a bourgeois revolution to overthrow feudalism and permit the growth of the proletariat, which alone could carry out the socialist revolution. The 1917 revolution also showed that the formal

bourgeois stage could be shortened even to a matter of months, as between the February and October revolutions, i f there was proper Communist direction. The revolution from feudalism through a brief bourgeois stage into Communism could be telescoped, b u t , for a crucial period, the

fledgling Communist parties still would have to ally with the bourgeois parties to overthrow feudalism before they could take power from the bourgeoisie and guide the revolution into Communism. Lenin elaborated

on the guidelines for this procedure on the basis of the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905, insisting that, while “the bourgeois revolution is i n the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat,” the proletariat must on no account allow the leadership of the revolution to be assumed by the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary must “fight for the revolution to its completion.” He continued, “From the democratic revolution we shall immediately pass o n . . . toward the socialist revolution. We are for the uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half way.”*’ The most important discussion of these ideas about the Communist role i n Asian revolutions was held at the Second Congress of the Communist International at Petrograd (later Leningrad) i n mid-1920. The Congress’s “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions” would dominate Moscow’s theory of revolution in the East for many years to

come. Many at the Second Comintern Congress did not accept Lenin’s argument for a united front between Communist and bourgeois parties, and numerous arguments were advanced that would come back to haunt the Comintern a few years later with Nationalist blows against the Communists. The Indian Communist M . N . Roy, who was one of the key participants i n the tragedy of 1927, argued i n 1920 that Lenin was conceding

too much to the Asian bourgeoisie in granting them leadership of the current stage of revolution i n Asia. H e maintained, and events in China

would prove him right, that i t would be impossible for the Communists to maintain their independence under bourgeois leadership. I n the early

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

27

1920’s, many Comintern and Labor International (Profintern) spokesmen, as well as most Chinese Communist leaders, followed Roy’s “leftist”

criticism of the “two-stage” (bourgeois and then Communist) revolution. Russian Foreign Commissariat policies, o n the other hand, i n aiding conservative groups and even warlords i n China, eventually moved i n a

direction opposite to that intended i n Lenin’s theses. The confusion inherent i n Communist united-front strategy arose not only from the complexities of the arguments and the conditions they sought to analyze, but also from the variety of interests represented in various Russian organizations. The Party, the Comintern, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and also such semi-independent organizations as the Profintern all pressed their own interpretations of current Russian policy, reflecting their role i n the revolutionary or state apparatus. The profusion of Russian voices in China in the early years helps to explain subsequent confusion over Soviet intentions. There were always at least two Soviet goals i n China: to strengthen China against Japan, England,

and later the United States; and to foster revolution. These goals were often in conflict, and i t was some years before Stalin created the type of monolithic organization that could partially disguise such discrepancies. The personalities of Soviet leaders also affected the policies they tried to execute. Thus, of the first two important Soviet representatives i n China, Chinese often considered Maring ( H . Sneevliet), the Dutchman

who i n 1922-23 played such an important role in guiding the Party into the first united front w i t h the Nationalists, an overbearing and harsh

personality, while Grigory Voitinsky, the first important Comintern delegate, was apparently well-liked, affable, and respectful toward his Chinese comrades. So, too, was M i k h a i l Borodin, who, after 1923, as representa-

tive of the Russian Communist Party, took precedence over Comintern agents Voitinsky and Maring, as well as over Russian military and labor delegates to China. Then, i n 1927, Roy had a chance to see for himself

in the Chinese matrix the difficulties of acting either on Lenin’s 1920 theses or on his own criticisms of them. The Development of Chinese Communist Groups Voitinsky, as a representative of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat, arrived i n North China i n A p r i l , 1920, accompanied b y his wife, by I . K . Mamaev, and by a Chinese interpreter named Yang Ming-chai.?* H e contacted another Russian, a professor i n the Russian department of Peking University,*® who put Voitinsky i n touch w i t h his colleague, L i

Ta-chao. L i , i n turn, recommended that Voitinsky proceed to Shanghai for discussions with Ch’en Tu-hsiu. According to some, the Comintern had already sent Koreans and funds to Shanghai i n 1920 to organize a Communist Party, b u t i t is not clear what effect the effort had o n the earliest

development of the CCP.* Arriving in Shanghai about May, the Voitinsky mission found a wideopen situation. Anarchism and the national-socialist ideology of Sun * Korean Communists were active i n Shanghai for several years after August, 1919, however, and held a Congress of the Korean Communist Party there in May, 1921."

28

The Long March to Power

Yat-sen were the most popular radical ideologies, but the intellectual

atmosphere was still in great flux. Meetings of diverse groups of journalists, teachers, students, and politicians discussed virtually all proposals for the future of China. The eclectic and electric atmosphere of the time is illustrated by the fact that Ch’en Tu-hsiu invited more anarchists and even conservatives than future Communists to meet Voitinsky at Ch’en’s new home in the French Concession. Together with Li Ta-chao’s “Red Chamber” i n Peking, this house at 2 Y u Yang Lane, off Avenue Joffre, was the first site of concentrated Marxist activity i n China. However,

of the eighteen men known to have attended discussions there in early 1920, only several remained i n Communist organizations for more than a few years, and Ch’en Tu-hsiu himself was denounced i n 1927 and

expelled from the Party in 1929.32 I n discussions at Ch’en’s home, Voitinsky argued persuasively that, i n view of the complexity of conditions and the confusion of ideologies,

the overwhelming need for Chinese radicals was to organize a Chinese Communist Party that could unify study and work. Ch’en Tu-hsiu and others agreed, b u t many, including some future Communist leaders, proposed that there must first be further study.

The earliest step taken to organize the Party was the establishment in May, 1920, of a Provisional Central Committee, which met usually at

Ch’en’s home to direct propaganda and organizational work.?® I n some respects, this marked the real founding of the CCP, but, because none of the members survived as orthodox leaders, little has been made of this

initial organization. I n August, 1920, the provisional organization decided to proceed to the formal organization of a Party—it was hoped, within a year’s time.

The expansion of propaganda was the first order of business. Although Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s prestigious New Youth was increasingly dedicated to the propagation of Marxism, a more specialized journal was considered desirable. Accordingly, o n the third anniversary o f the Bolshevik Revolution, November 7, the Provisional Central Committee inaugurated a new

Party magazine, the Communist. Seven issues were published, but the journal ceased to appear after the formal founding of the Party i n July, 1921. Other journals were quickly established i n connection with the labor, youth, and women’s movements, and various printing facilities were developed.?* Understandably, the primary goal of the intensification of Party propaganda i n 1920 was to recruit youth for Party organization. Soon, two new channels were opened with this end i n mind. I n August, Ch’en Tu-hsiu,

Chang T’ai-lei, and others established a Socialist Youth League for those from fifteen to twenty-eight (later twenty-five) years of age with eight and

then thirty members. Secondly, a foreign-languages school was set up to train students for study i n Russia. Voitinsky’s wife and interpreter were leading instructors, and many future Communist leaders studied there.?® Enrollment varied from one to several dozen, and some, including Liu

Shao-ch’i, went on to study i n Moscow. A Sino-Soviet Information Agency was also established in late 1920 to spread word of the Russian Revolution, and some Shanghai activists began to organize leftists in nearby areas, as in

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

29

Hangchow, where a Socialist Youth League was formed in October, 1920. These early activities, and especially those i n the labor movement, to be discussed shortly, initially produced about seventy activists i n the Shang-

hai area, but, with Voitinsky’s temporary absence i n Russia and Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s departure for Canton i n November (for reasons to be explained b e l o w ) , and that of other activists to various areas later i n 1920, only

L i Han-chiin, who became acting coordinator i n Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s absence, and about eight others remained active there i n late 1920 and early 1921. Because of the varied views of anarchist, socialist, and Communist mem-

bers, the Socialist Youth League had to be disbanded i n May, 1921, and i t was reconstituted along more Leninist lines only in November of that year.” I n late 1920 and early 1921, therefore, attention shifted to the establishment of Party branches i n other cities and to efforts to unify and

consolidate diverse groups of leftists, breaking with anarchists and others where necessary.?” I n North China, where new fighting i n 1920 brought warlords W u P’ei-fu and the Manchurian Chang Tso-lin to power i n Peking, activities were launched or stepped u p i n various communities. Despite the con-

tinuation or intensification of grievances at warlord rule and despite the activities of L i Ta-chao, anarchists still far outnumbered Communists in the northern capital at this time. However, by the end of 1920, there was

a nucleus of about a dozen young Communists i n Peking®® and another half-a-dozen or so each i n Tientsin and i n Tsinan, Shantung. These activists organized youth and labor groups i n their areas and began to dispatch people for similar work i n Shansi, Shensi, and Inner Mongolia,

although no formal Party branches were established north or west of Peking for several years. I n South China i n 1920, the anarchists also formed the leading radical groups. They had been strong for two decades i n Canton and were instru-

mental i n getting Ch’en Tu-hsiu invited there to be minister of education i n a relatively promising new warlord government established by Ch’en Chiung-ming i n November, 1920.** Ch’en Tu-hsiu presumably accepted

the post i n order to spread his new gospel and, by the end of the year, despite initial opposition of the anarchists, was able with local activists to organize i n Canton a branch of both the Party and the Socialist Youth League.”® A nucleus of more than a half-dozen young Communists soon emerged, although there was much dissatisfaction with Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s

leadership and with quick signs of the failure of the efforts by Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Sun Yat-sen ( w h o was titular President of the government from late 1920 u n t i l June, 1922) to cooperate w i t h this latest “progressive”” warlord.

The Wuhan area of Central China was the home of many early Communist leaders, including Party elder Tung Pi-wu, Shanghai activist

L i Han-chiin, Youth League leader Yiin Tai-ying, and two cousins of the later army leader Lin Piao.*’ I n accord with plans to establish Party branches prior to setting up a formal organization as discussed in Shanghai i n the summer, L i Han-chiin visited Tung Pi-wu and other leaders of the radical Social Welfare Society, which had been established in Wuhan the year before. A Party branch was established in Wuchang,

30

The Long March to Power

one of the three cities making up Wuhan, on September 9, 1920. Later that year, Voitinsky’s assistant Mamaev, the latter’s wife, and others held

a long conference i n Wuchang. I t was “long” i n part because the conversation had to be conducted, with the help of dictionaries, in English, of which both sides had an inadequate knowledge.*> Mamaev urged greater attention to ideology and discipline, which was understandable since, as elsewhere, leading local Communists were strongly influenced by anarchism. This pattern of the emergence of small Communist nuclei out of a larger number o f anarchists, nationalists, and assorted believers, was

repeated i n Hunan. I n July, 1920, on his return to Changsha from Peking and Shanghai, Mao Tse-tung set up a radical bookstore, ironically on property rented from Yale-in-China; i n August, he organized a Russian

Research Society to prepare for a work-study program in Russia; and i n September, he formed a Marxist Research Society. I n December, he

helped to organize a Socialist Youth League, and, shortly thereafter, a Changsha branch of the Party was founded.*®* The diary of a student in contact with Mao at the time contains a glimpse of his proselytizing techniques: Met Tse-tung at the Popular Education Galleries, who told me that he would go to Liling to inspect schools. He again advised me to look for true comrades and said that this must be regarded as the principal objective of the Youth League at this stage. He thinks that we should proceed slowly but steadily. Thus, at least six groups emerged as Communist cells i n China i n 1920, i n Shanghai, Peking, Wuhan, Changsha, Canton, Tsinan, and elsewhere.

A seventh important cell was constituted in Paris in February, 1921, and other future Communist leaders studied i n Germany, Russia, and Japan.*° Although considerably outnumbered even among revolutionaries b y anar-

chists on the left and nationalists on the right, from the very beginning, these groups made their presence felt out of all relation to their numbers.

The fledgling groups of Chinese Communists were especially active and effective in propaganda, youth, and labor work. Marxism-Leninism reinforced their natural activism and initially directed i t toward work among

the masses, especially the urban proletariat, the only class without property and hence supposedly most revolutionary. As “outsiders” and intellectuals,

most Chinese Communist leaders understandably experienced great difficulties i n this work, and initial progress was slow. But, for a long time, they were the only elite group trying to organize the masses. I n a China just breaking with the tradition that long fingernails and bound feet were signs of prestige precisely because they showed that one did not do manual work, Ch’en Tu-hsiu signaled a striking revolution i n Chinese political thought when, on M a y Day, 1920, he reversed the dictum of Mencius and said, “Those who exercise the m i n d should be governed, those who

perform physical labor should govern.’’*¢ The real start of practical work among the Shanghai proletariat came in August when the Provisional Central Committee began publication of

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

31

Labor Circles, a journal advocating class consciousness, the labor theory of value, and other Marxist concepts. Indicative of the flexible and tolerant atmosphere of 1920, however, i n contrast to 1921 and later, was

the fact that Ch’en Tu-hsiu sought understanding not only with diverse groups of radicals but even w i t h certain progressive Shanghai industri-

alists. With them, he helped found a Shanghai Worker-Merchant Friendship Society, which published a journal beginning i n October, calling for the union of all exploited classes i n order to end the class system and establish a new order. That same month, in more orthodox fashion, the

Provisional Central organized its first industrial union, the Shanghai Mechanical Workers’ Union. Some seventy to eighty men showed up at the initial meeting held at the Communist-sponsored Foreign Language Institute, and later the union claimed almost 400 members and published a journal. Local Communists also assisted i n the formation i n December of a printers’ union w i t h more than 1,500 members. I n January, 1921,

they established a Committee of the Workers’ Movement in Shanghai and about the same time began a workers’ school in a suburb.* Elsewhere, labor activities followed immediately on the recruitment of Party members. I n Peking, Li Ta-chao and his disciples Teng Chung-hsia and Chang Kuo-t’ao began to publish the Sound of Labor i n October, 1920, and, i n subsequent months, Chang and others began a school and

clubs for workers nearby. I n the South, labor agitation was begun on the Canton-Hankow Railroad and at the Anyiian mines in Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh. I n Canton, the newly formed Party nucleus published the Voice of Labor and Labor and Women after February, 1921. I n Hunan, Mao cooperated w i t h local anarchists i n the early work of the Hunan

Workers’ Association. Organized i n late 1920, this group soon claimed 2,000 members and began a workers’ school.*®* Mao subsequently helped direct the new branch of the Socialist Youth League into labor work, founding branches at workers’ centers in the mines of Anyiian, P’inghsiang, and elsewhere. I n Hong Kong, i n early 1921, radicals organized the Chinese Seamen’s Union, which a year later would launch the first really militant national strike. Hence, b y the early 1920’s, the fusion of intellec-

tual and worker movements began to produce the first true “proletarian movements,” especially i n Shanghai, Canton, and Hunan.*®

The Founding of the CCP By the spring of 1921, in spite of, or perhaps because of, an obvious diversity of radical activities, activists felt that the time had arrived for

formal organization. Ts’ai Ho-sen from France and others had argued for this initiative since the previous summer, and the fate of the youth organization, which fell apart in M a y and was not reconstituted until November,

showed what might happen i f too many differences of opinion were allowed to continue. The movement had n o w grown to include some fifty-odd Communists i n addition to several hundred activists formerly i n the Youth League.’® Some form of tighter direction was obviously essential, although most Communists, including Ch’en Tu-hsiu and L i Tachao, as well as those with anarchist leanings, wished to avoid an overly

centralized and disciplined organization at the beginning.

The Long March to Power

32

Leading Communists called a March meeting of delegates from various areas, which sought to tighten organizational controls, expelling anarchists where necessary.’’ I n the spring, Party branches intensified their discussions looking toward formal Party organization, and delegates were chosen for a conference to be held i n Shanghai i n July, which would later

be designated the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Paradoxically, neither Ch’en Tu-hsiu nor L i Ta-chao, the two leading figures of the youthful movement, attended this meeting, although there were

reports of their participation i n earlier planning conferences. Ch’en, who was still occupied in Canton, though he was preparing to return to Shanghai, sent along a draft “Party platform” outlining his ideas and proposals. Li Ta-chao, who was i n Shanghai in May and returned to North China via Szechwan, sent Chang Kuo-t’ao and another delegate to represent the Peking branch i n his place. The absence of Ch’en and Li may reflect the lack of expectation of lasting results at this time, plagued as the movement was by organizational problems, especially those arising from continuing anarchist influences. Nonetheless, the July conference

was the first formally scheduled national gathering of those Chinese who called themselves Communists. Two delegates were invited to attend the Congress from each of the six branches in China and from Japan, although only one attended from the latter, and Mao Tse-tung’s Hunan associate, H o Shu-heng, returned

home before the Congress began.’? Together with the city each one represented, they included: Li Han-chiin, Li Ta Chang Kuo-t’ao, L i u Jen-ch’ing Ch’en Kung-po, Pao Hui-seng Tung Pi-wu, Ch’en T’an-ch’iu Mao Tse-tung, H o Shu-heng Wang Chin-mei, Teng En-ming Chou Fo-hai

Shanghai Peking Canton Wuhan Changsha Tsinan Japan

I n addition, two Russian delegates, of whom one was Maring, represented the Comintern. A Chinese Youth League leader reportedly also took part i n some discussions.’® Many historical problems arise concerning the First Congress, begin-

ing with the date of the meetings. The official date is July 1, 1921, but careful studies of the seven reminiscences of participants and other data

conclude that the second half of July was the most likely starting date among leading possibilities advanced: May, July 1, or later i n July.* I n any case, the Congress was held some time i n July and, most sources

now concur, embraced some five sessions extending over ten days or so. Another problem concerns the location of the Congress, since its discussions were held at several places. The first session, at least, was held i n the Po W e n Girls School o n the then Rue Bourgeat i n the French Concession, where some of the delegates stayed, but later sessions, possibly including the three others i n Shanghai, were held nearby at L i Han-chiin’s flat. I n part because L i , as a “social democrat,” soon thereafter broke with the Party, most accounts do not mention Li’s home as the site of

part of the First Congress."*

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

33

As the fourth meeting was about to get under way, a suspicious char-

acter blundered into the room saying he was looking for someone. The alerted delegates, taking no chances, picked u p incriminating documents

and fled, with the exception of L i Han-chiin and one other delegate. Although the police found only legal Marxist literature and made no arrests, the other delegates decided to hold the final meeting on a boat i n South Lake, Chekiang, about an hour out of Shanghai. More important than such problems, o f course, were the issues dis-

cussed at the First Congress. According to official histories, the agenda called for discussion of the c u r r e n t political situation, the basic tasks of the Party, a Party constitution, and organizational problems.

Regarding the latter, i t was decided that a formal executive committee would not be necessary until membership had increased to about 500. Accordingly, a three-man Central Bureau was selected to carry on Party

business pending further expansion. The delegates chose Ch’en Tu-hsiu general secretary i n absentia and Chang Kuo-t’ao, chairman of the organization department.”® A student leader at Peking University during the May Fourth period, Chang served as chairman of the meeting, and Mao Tse-tung was a recording secretary.’”

Outside of Shanghai, cells were to be established wherever there were five members, and a provincial executive committee was to be named

wherever there were more than thirty members. Members had to be recommended, but there were no qualifications as to sex or nationality. The Congress formally adopted the name Chinese Communist Party. Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s draft program, which was taken as the basis for discussion, emphasized education, training, and discipline of Party members, as well as democratic discussion and decision-making. The meeting endorsed this approach and selected five committees to draft a platform, program, and manifesto based on Ch’en’s guidelines and the discussion.’

But some delegates felt that even these mild suggestions were premature. Thus, Li Han-chiin argued that further study was required to understand the relative merits of the German democratic model of revolution, as against the Russian authoritarian model, and others opposed all political and organizational work until they had strengthened their comprehension of Marxism. I n his draft, Ch’en Tu-hsiu also stressed the preparatory nature of the early stages of organization and the obvious corollary that seizure of state power was a long way off. There was considerable animosity toward Maring’s allegedly “authoritarian” style, but discussion at the First Congress, i n contrast to some later ones, was said to be cour-

teous. Nonetheless, most delegates were i n a radical and impatient frame of mind, feeling that the crises of warlordism and imperialism required immediate and radical action. As the most complete memoirs* of the First

Congress put it, * By Ch’en Kung-po, who left the CCP i n 1922 and i n 1923 came to the United States, where he enrolled as a graduate student i n history at Columbia University. His

1924 Master’s Essay, The Communist Movement in China, was rediscovered accidentally more than thirty years later. I n the last years of World War I I , Ch’en became head of the Japanese puppet government i n Nanking and was executed by the Nationalists as a traitor i n 1946.

34

The Long March to Power

Under such conditions of oppression i t seemed not only to the radicals but to the moderate intellectuals that there was no other way for them to emancipate China from internal and external oppression except through an immediate social revolution. As a result all the members attending the conference advocated that the policy of “no compromise” should be adopted.®®

This radical approach, led by Chang Kuo-t’ao and the other Peking delegate, won the day but only after heated arguments. The most serious splits between the moderates and radicals arose over the question of participation in established institutions and over the related question of the proper attitude to take toward Sun Yat-sen. The moderates felt that the

provision of the Party program forbidding members to participate at high levels of any other organization, in government assemblies, or to accept state appointments as school principals, was too strongly worded and should be amended at least to allow for educational work. Nevertheless, while many, including Ch’en Tu-hsiu, L i Ta-chao, and M a o Tse-tung,

continued to cooperate with non-Communist organizations and although the united front became official policy within a year, the First Congress discussions, b y contrast, favored a “closed-door policy.” Apparently fear-

ing the disruptive organizational and psychological effects of compromise o n a still very immature Party, the Congress called for doctrinaire opposi-

tion to capitalist economics and politics. Its program proposed to “‘overthrow the capitalist classes [and] all private ownership” and to treat existing political parties with ‘““an attitude of independent aggression and exclusion.’’®° Similar problems arose over the proper attitude to take toward Sun Yat-sen and the government he agreed to head under the Canton warlord Ch’en Chiung-ming i n late 1920. Despite the fact that Ch’en Tu-hsiu was still disentangling himself from association with this regime, a majority of delegates to the First Congress called for opposition to it. A minority argued, as would the Comintern a year later, that Sun should be supported, since the merits of his nationalism outweighed other defects of his ideology, but most agreed with a Canton delegate that the “attitude toward Sun Yat-sen must be the same as that toward militarists and even

still

more negative, since he confused the masses by his demagogy.’’®* I n the end, a compromise was accepted by which the Communists would rebuke Sun Yat-sen, but in milder language than that applied to the northern warlords. After Sun Yat-sen was forced out of Canton again in June, 1922, there was a similar divergence of Communist attitudes between the majority, who blamed the warlord for adverse developments i n Canton, and a small minority, especially i n Canton, who felt that Sun Yat-sen was equally to blame. Later, Party historians rewrote the record of these debates at the First Congress, attempting to hide divergences beneath a later united-front policy.®? Only two documents survive from the First Congress, the rather doc-

trinaire program, calling for a “dictatorship of the proletariat in order to complete the end of class struggle,” and the “First Decision as to the Object of the CCP.” The latter stressed labor organization as ‘the chief aim of the Party.” I t also called for propaganda work, for workers’

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

35

schools, and for sending reports and representatives to the Third International.®? The First Congress settled few problems, either in terms of organization o r o f program. Ch’en Tu-hsiu was able to return to Shanghai only i n September and then found divisions as bad as or worse than before.

Ch’en evidently shared the resentment of many at the high-handed ways of Maring. This intensified when Maring sent Chang T’ai-lei, just back from Moscow, to Japan to recruit for the proposed Congress of Toilers of the East. Ch’en felt the Chinese organization should have been consulted about the assignment of one of its members. He became even angrier at Maring’s alleged complaints about the ivory-tower attitudes and ineffectiveness of the Chinese comrades. Maring reportedly sent a letter to Ch’en Tu-hsiu charging that, “ i f he were a real Communist, he would obey the orders of t h e Communist International” and sounded out Chang Kuo-t’ao as to the possibility of Chang’s replacing Ch’en as Party leader.®* The impasse resulting from mutual recriminations over such matters was broken only with the arrest of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, his wife, and several leading activists after a police raid on Ch’en’s home, which still served as Party headquarters. Although released the next day, Ch’en and the others now felt a new sense of urgency. They attempted to smooth out dissensions, weed out recalcitrants and anarchists, recruit new members,

and step up study, propaganda, and, above all, labor work. H o w were these programs to be financed? The Party’s first program

stated only that the Central Bureau should ‘supervise and direct’ the “finances, publications, and policies of local organizations.” I t is certain that the Communist International contributed funds to early Party work but equally certain that these contributions have been exaggerated. Appatrently, the ‘Comintern spent something over 6,000 yiian, o r about U.S.

$3,000 a month i n Shanghai in the summer of 1921. I t is known to have given money for the Foreign Language Institute, the Labor Secretariat,

bail for jailed comrades, and personal and other expenses. These expenditures seem to have declined temporarily but were put on a regular basis starting in September, 1921. The Comintern was to contribute about U.S. $1,000 per month, most of i t to go toward pay of about U.S. $25 (or $45, according to another account) per month for the several dozen Partyemployed activists. I n the 1920’s, as later, most Party members held other jobs and only the professionals received Party salaries. Nor did any Chinese Communists live extravagantly; salaries were supposed to be paid only to those who could not survive without Party funds. As the movement grew, Comintern funds for the Chinese Communists increased substantially, but i t is important to note h o w small they were compared with

Soviet aid for weapons and other programs given to the Nationalists and other governments. After the late 1920’s, the Comintern paid a still smaller share of the Communist expenses, as Chinese soviets i n base areas became

able to collect taxes and to confiscate considerable sums.®® Early Labor Activities

I n mid-summer, 1921, the Party established a Labor Secretariat i n

Shanghai on Chengtu Road near the Soochow River and also rented two

36

The Long March to Power

houses nearby for office space. The Secretariat published its own journal, the Labor Weekly, from August until its suppression the following June and at first concentrated on economic issues and on organization.®® I t fostered a number of strikes for improved conditions, beginning with that of October 24, 1921, against the British-American Tobacco Company i n Shanghai. A considerable part of the early Communist effort to organize

labor had to be directed against the power of notorious indigenous labor organizations, such as the Green Gang, which has been compared to the Mafia, and against traditional habits of mind.¢’

Branches of the Labor Secretariat were founded at Wuhan, Tsinan, Canton, Changsha, and Peking. I n the Peking-Tientsin area, a school for railroad workers, founded i n early 1921, continued to be the center of

labor agitation. Activists led May Day and other demonstrations there and at other North China labor centers and helped organize railroad strikes i n November, at times even i n cooperation with a Taoist secret society. They established workers’ schools and organizations at railroads and mines o n both sides o f Peking, and, to the south, i n Chengchow, Wuhan, Canton, Shanghai, and other areas. There were Communist-led strikes at Wuhan i n October and December, 1921, while i n Hunan and

at the Anyiian mines on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, future Party leaders Li Li-san, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch’i, and others stepped up their activities. Mao cooperated with the anarchist-oriented Workers’ Association of Hunan, which, however, was brutally crushed, and its leaders were executed, as the result of a strike at the Changsha cotton plant i n January,

1922.98 Future Communist labor leaders, such as Su Chao-cheng, were also

active in the first strike with national significance and a well-defined class orientation, that of the Chinese Seamen’s Union, beginning o n Janu-

ary 13, 1922, at Hong Kong. Other workers i n Hong Kong and Canton soon came to the support of the 10,000-man Union, as d i d Sun Yat-sen,

to the anger of the British. I n Shanghai and elsewhere, labor supported the strike, which by February involved some 100,000 men. Hong Kong was virtually paralyzed, and i n March the British were forced to concede the

continued existence of the Union and grant substantial wage increases. I n the words of a Communist historian, this was ‘ t h e Chinese people’s

first victory in a century of anti-imperialist struggle.”’®® On the heels of this strike, a First Congress of what later became the National General Labor Union was called i n Canton b y the Communist-

led Labor Secretariat i n order to coordinate future labor activities. Convening o n M a y 1, 1922, some 160 delegates, from twelve cities in all

but mostly from Canton, claimed to represent 100 unions and 200,000 to 300,000 of China’s 1.5 million workers. The Congress advocated Communist-influenced slogans for an eight-hour work day, mutual aid, and the overthrow of imperialists and warlords, and Communists dom-

inated a newly elected Secretariat, with Teng Chung-hsia becoming its head and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Liu Shao-ch’i, and others serving as members.

Other Communists headed branches of the Secretariat at Canton, Shanghai, Wuhan, Tsinan, and Changsha, the last-named by Mao Tse-tung. Teng Chung-hsia soon moved the headquarters of the Secretariat to

[Chap. 2]

The Founding o f the Party

37

Peking, where he and others had been active i n labor work for several

years. Nationalists were also well represented at the Congress, a close friend of Sun Yat-sen chairing the meetings, and anarchists were particularly influential among delegates from the Canton and Hunan areas, but i t is evident that, by mid-1922, Communists were influential in the Chinese labor movement far beyond their numbers. Although anarchists remained strong until 1923 or 1924 and the Communists did not achieve really effective control of radical workers until 1925, the Communists

made notable progress i n labor agitation and organization. Undoubtedly, the labor movement was the first to feel the impact of Communist organization i n China.

I n the year following the Hong Kong—Canton strike of 1922, Communists reportedly led some 150,000 workers in more than 100 strikes i n major cities and industries, including textile mills i n Shanghai, i n coal mines at Anyiian and K’ailan, at the Hanyang ironworks, and along the

Peking-Hankow Railroad.” The most significant ones were the successful mid-September strike, led by Liu Shao-ch’i and Li Li-san at the Anyiian coal mines, and strikes of railway workers in the North. The climax of this first wave of strikes came with the crushing of the Peking-Hankow Railroad strike by Wu P’ei-fu in what became known as the “February 7 Massacre” of 1923. This development shattered a tentative alliance between the Communists and the northern warlord and was even more significant in shattering early Communist illusions of rapid progress. I t marked the end of the first stage of development of the Chinese labor movement. The February 7 incident also showed the skill and limits of Communist agitation and i n disconcerting ways foreshadowed the larger disaster of

1927. I n both cases, initial gains through cooperation with potential enemies came to little once the stronger partners i n the alliance decided they no longer needed the Communists. W u P’ei-fu, who had defeated his archrival, Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, i n the spring of 1922,

was anxious to improve his popular following. Accordingly, he proclaimed a policy o f “protection of labor” and sought cooperation with the Com-

munist leadership in order to prevent a comeback by Chang Tso-lin and his allies. Li Ta-chao, usually a champion of the broadest possible alliance and supported b y Soviet diplomats who looked with favor o n W u , agreed, although most lower-ranking Communists i n the North opposed this deci-

sion. Local Communists, under the pretext of helping W u P’ei-fu against Chang Tso-lin, naturally also continued to organize railroad workers on their own. They soon came to control the work force on perhaps half of the eighteen railroads of China, with some sixteen Communist-influenced

unions, formed along the Peking-Hankow line and elsewhere in North China. The Communist leadership decided to consolidate these into a national union and called a conference for this purpose to open in Chengchow, o n February 1, 1923, under the direction of, among others, the future Kiangsi Soviet leader Hsiang Ying. A t the end of the previous year, however, W u P’ei-fu had decided to check further Communist

advances. He forbade and then broke up the early February meetings. On February 4, a general strike was staged in protest, and supporting

38

The Long March to Power

strikes occurred at Hankow and other places, with more than 10,000

workers participating. Wu, allegedly backed by the British, struck back ferociously on February 7, when his men fired on the strikers at various stations north of Wuhan, killing some thirty-six in the Wuhan area and at least ten i n the Peking area, wounding more than 300, and later dismissing thousands from their jobs.” This disaster staggered the radical labor movement, and for some time its leaders could only ponder new approaches. Early Party Organization

Aside from its activities i n the labor movement, the Party endeavored to expand its propaganda, youth, and organizational work in late 1921 and 1922. I n September, 1922, Guide Weekly superseded New Youth as the official Party youth publication, although the latter continued to appear u n t i l 1926. Communist-dominated labor and youth organizations

and Party branches also produced their own publications from the very first, seeking to spread the new faith, discuss current problems, and publicize important decisions. The Socialist Youth League, which had been dissolved in May, 1921, was reconstituted i n Shanghai in November, 1921, supposedly purged of non-Leninist elements. By the following spring, i t claimed branches in seventeen areas and thousands of members. A t its First National Congress, held i n Canton, May 5 - 1 0 , 1922, some twenty-five delegates, representing some fifteen organizations and 2,000 members, chose an Executive Com-

mittee including Shih Ts’un-t’ung, Chang T’ai-lei, Teng Chung-hsia, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and others.” Until 1925, the Socialist Youth League often overshadowed its parent Party, although i t was intended to serve only as a

reserve force and recruiting ground. I n October, 1922, Ch’en Tu-hsiu admitted that the League had “much greater influence’ than the regular Party and that i t often took the initiative in labor and peasant work.” I t s Second Congress was held i n Canton, August, 1923, with thirty delegates representing six thousand youth. From January, 1922, to August, 1923, i t published twenty-five issues of the Pioneer, and began to publish

Chinese Youth i n October, 1923."* Youth League members also were active i n many schools.

The beginnings of Communist work in the countryside also came at this time. However, this work, which would prove the key to victory a quarter-century later, lagged far behind efforts to organize the urban proletariat because of the urban orientation both o f Marxism and of the young Chinese intellectuals who became Communists i n the early 1920’s.

The Party did not give priority to the organization of the vast rural population until the collapse of the urban mass movements i n 1927 and

afterwards. P’eng P’ai, at least three years ahead of Mao Tse-tung, was the first to undertake peasant work. A wealthy landlord’s son, whose family controlled 1,500 peasants, P’eng, fresh from three years at Waseda Uni-

versity i n Japan, got an appointment as director of education in his native district up the coast from Canton in mid-1921. Soon dismissed because of his radical views, he began agitation among the peasants in

[Chap. 2]

The Founding of the Party

39

Haifeng County, and i n adjoining Lufeng County, usually known collectively as Hailufeng. I n January, 1923, the Haifeng County Peasant Union

was established, claiming 20,000 members. The Union soon gained enormous prestige b y winning rent reductions and performing cooperative services for its members, but this and similar activities in a few other

places obviously represented only the merest beginnings.” Meanwhile, the Party was working to extend its organization farther across the vast country. By mid-1922, some 120 Communists i n eighteen

provinces were i n touch with the national Party, a minute fraction of the vast mass of Chinese but, as events would increasingly show, a force to be reckoned with. After the First Congress, regional secretaries were appointed and Party branches and committees were established in at least ten provinces: Kwangtung, Hunan, Kiangsu, Hupeh, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Szechwan, Hsiinchih (an old name for Chihli, roughly modern H o p e i ) , and Fengt’ien (a name for one of the three provinces formerly making u p Manchuria).’® Some of these organizations were founded b y the simple expedient of sending Communists to other cities. I n late 1920

and 1921, for example, Communists from the Wuhan cities taught and organized i n the major cities of Szechwan, as d i d activists from Shanghai

in Hangchow, Nanking, and elsewhere and from Peking and Tientsin in Shensi, Shansi, Shantung, Inner Mongolia, and other North China areas. Work committees and youth organizations were established, but formally

constituted Party branches i n most of these areas did not materialize until 1923 or 1924." According to a leading account,* Party work progressed more rapidly i n 1922 i n Peking, Wuhan, Changsha, and other areas than

in Shanghai, where government surveillance and repression were more efficient. I n Shanghai, work had to be carried on with the utmost secrecy, and all arrangements were made indirectly through third parties. These experiences, continued study and work, and some guidance by Soviet advisers enabled the young Party to tighten its organization

considerably i n the year after the First Congress. The Second Congress in July, 1922, passed a resolution on Party organization that reflected much greater understanding and commitment to Leninist principles of organization than was evident in the program of the First Congress. The Second Congress will be discussed i n the next chapter, but i t seems fitting to conclude this section with an analysis of the organizational principles of the Party at the end of its first year o f formal existence. N o

other formal organizational statutes appeared until 1928. The “Organization of the C C P ” adopted at the Second Congress evidently was modeled on, but was not an exact copy o f , the Rules of the Russian Communist Party adopted at its Eighth Congress i n March, 1919.

Communist ‘“‘democratic centralism” was far more central than democratic, w i t h the four levels (branch, local, regional, and central committees) of organization strictly obedient to their respective superior levels. Cells o r branches, formed where there were three to five (later more than three) Communists i n villages, factories, mines, schools, military units, and * By Chang Kuo-t’ao, who left the CCP i n 1938 and whose memoirs constitute an important source for early Party history.

40

The Long March to Power

surrounding communities, made up the base of the Party organizational pyramid. Above the cells were local and regional administrative committees. A t the apex stood the Central Executive Committee ( i n 1927,

shortened to Central Committee, the term used throughout this book). This hierarchy of organization was retained through later revisions of Party organization, but committee levels were redefined and added until there were about eight or nine levels within the CCP. The Central Committee, at first consisting of five members and three alternates, was elected by the Party’s National Congress, and delegates to the Congress in turn were elected by the lower committees. The Congress was to meet every year and i n theory constituted the highest authority in the Party. However, between congresses, and there was only one between 1928 and 1956, the Central Committee spoke for the Party.” There was “democratic” discussion of issues and election of delegates before votes were taken, but, after decisions were reached, under the

principle of “centralism,” there could be no public dissent. Decisions could be protested only to superiors and taken to the Central Committee only through the National Congress. The 1922 organizational rules declared ‘“all the policies of the Party are decided upon by majority vote and such policies must be absolutely obeyed even b y the minority who may have voted against them.””® The Central Committee could and did

dissolve lower-level organizations that did not carry out its wishes, and this manipulation of the sense of duty and ambitions of Party members, together with ideological indoctrination, was always the Party’s greatest weapon in enforcing organizational discipline. As another Second Congress document put i t : Every comrade should be trained by the Party to almost military discipline i n his actions. Every comrade should not only express his Communist ideals i n his speech, but i t is important for him to show that he is a Communist by his actions. Every comrade should sacrifice his own opinions, feelings, and advancement to protect the unity of the Party. N o matter i n what place or at what time his speech should be the Party’s speech, his actions such as would be prescribed by the Party. He should not possess any individual interest apart from the party.8°

Moreover, “Communists are not utopians or revolutionary [political] candidates but are the Party [sic] which at any time stand for indefatigable work.’’®!

Similarly, an instruction manual drawn up by the Moscow branch of the CCP about this time shows the same sense of dedication and makes extremely severe demands. I t demanded that Communists systematize thought and study—oppose romanticism . . cultivate a pure revolutionary philosophy of life and self-conscious training. . Discipline action—absolutely oppose anarchist tendencies. I f we oppose iron discipline, we would be negatively helping the bourgeoisie to destroy the proletariat’s revolutionary organization. . . We must strive to eliminate the bad habits of the intelligentsia—the bad habits of university students and the entire

[Chap. 2] petty bourgeoisie.

41

The Founding of the Party

W e must cultivate the habit of perseverance—Com-

munists are always willing to “lie on faggots and taste gall” in order to struggle for the interest of the proletariat. The organization’s interest is the individual’s interest. We must not obstruct the organization’s advance . There is absolutely no such thing as because of individual interest. individual life or individual free will. We must strictly criticize our comrades’ errors and humbly accept our comrades” criticism criticism is a tool to train us to become iron-like Communist members. Express through work our loyalty to the organization. Aside from revolution, Communist members have no other profession—we are professional revolutionaries. The organization’s work is our only work. Aside from the organization’s work there is no so-called individual work—true Communists never show off their accomplishments, fear hardship, o r long for ease.??

Despite the harshness of Communist discipline, growing numbers of youths were attracted to the Party because i t offered not only discipline and hardship but also excitement and personal advancement. No doubt equally important, more and more Chinese, even those attracted to Western ideals, came to feel that “individualism offered n o way out” of

China’s impasse. As Mao would put i t in 1949, “All other ways have been tried and failed.’’%? The Second Congress also decided formally to join the Third International, thereby accepting the twenty-one regulations required of member Parties, which had been adopted by the Comintern’s Second Congress in 1920. These demanded revolutionary and underground activity in military, economic, and political affairs, complete centralization within the

Party concerned, and its complete submission to the Comintern. “Decisions not only of the world congresses but even of the Executive Committee of the Communist International [ E C C I ] overrule decisions of the

national parties.”’®* But, if Moscow was the final arbiter of decisions reached b y the CCP, i t was also a distant one. I n the 1920’s especially,

its decisions and representatives in China were very important in many events, but these events could only be carried out by the Chinese. The Russians could offer money and arms, but, as they learned to their sorrow

in 1927 and later, there was no way for them to enforce their views unless the Chinese, both conservative and revolutionary, agreed to adopt them. |

T H E FIRST UNITED FRONT

From the scattered groups that had emerged by 1922, the Chinese Communists created i n the next three years a militant, tightly organized mass party i n several key areas of China. The CCP remained far inferior i n power and prestige to the Kuomintang (National People’s Party) dur-

ing these years and was barely able to survive the Nationalists’ attacks on i t in 1927, but Communists were able to play a significant role in many of the developments of the time. The dominant events of 1922-26 were the creation of the first united front with the Nationalists and rapid

Communist expansion under its aegis, especially after the eruption of a new phase of militant anti-imperialism in mid-1925. China in 1922 was i n as confused a state as any country has ever been in, and observers understandably were baffled by the shifting kaleidoscope of events in the world’s largest human community. Warlordism continued rampant, even as i t began to give way to new forces. At least half a dozen major figures, and dozens of minor ones, paraded as the “strong man” of the moment, and i t took a brave reporter to predict future events. The burdens of warlordism continued to rise, with military expenses quadru-

pling between 1916 and 1925, when there were close to 2 million men under arms.’ Communist strategists in Moscow and elsewhere sought to apply their principles to this chaotic scene. Convinced that they understood the laws

of history and represented the dominant forces of the future, the Communists were able to make some astute generalizations, predicting from

the 1920s on, for example, new wars in the Pacific. But they often proved helpless in applying these insights to bring about the results they desired. The crucial immediate question for the Communists was how to maximize their role i n the unification of the country i n order to speed the

national and bourgeois revolution against foreign imperialists and ‘‘feudal reactionaries.” Some kind of alliance with bourgeois nationalists seemed to offer the best hope for both these nationalist and socialist goals. This i n turn ultimately meant an alliance with Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang, b u t

for a while Soviet strategists also played with the idea of a united front

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

43

with supposedly enlightened warlords such as W u P’ei-fu, Ch’en Chiung-

ming, and, later, Feng Yii-hsiang. Even after W u P’ei-fu had crushed the Communist-led labor movement along the Peking-Hankow Railroad in February, 1923, Soviet diplomats continued to work with Wu’s Peking government. The Moscow-Peking treaty, finally worked out i n May, 1924,

remained the document governing relations between the Soviet Union and China until 1945, when Stalin signed a new treaty with the Nationalists, then a far more formidable enemy of the Communists than W u P’ei-fu had been. The formation of a united front between the Kuomintang and CCP turned out to be far more important than Soviet relations with other nonCommunist groups. Voitinsky had already met with Sun Yat-sen in the spring of 1920 even as he was helping Ch’en Tu-hsiu to found the Communist Party. Late i n the following year, Maring met Sun i n Kweilin,

where Sun learned among other things of Lenin’s New Economic Policy. According to Sun, “The spirit of this [policy] coincides with the Principle of People’s Livelihood which I advocate. I am very glad that Soviet Russia

has embarked on a policy which corresponds to my principle, and am strengthened i n the belief that my principle can be entirely realized and must ultimately succeed.’ Always interested i n the Bolshevik revolution and n o w also beginning to toy w i t h the idea of an alliance with Russia, Sun decided to send delegates to the Congress o f the Toilers of the East, which finally commenced i n Moscow i n January, 1922. Fourteen Communists and eleven

members of the Youth League were among the forty-two or forty-three Chinese delegates. The manifesto of the Congress castigated the just concluded Washington Conference held by the United States, England, France, and Japan and offered a fair sample of the way in which the Comintern appealed to Asian anti-imperialism: For many years you have been suffering from the Toilers of the East robberies and the savage club law of the European, American, and Japanese vultures. The Japanese oppressors have bespattered Korea with blood from end to end. The Japanese, American, French, and English robbers are

and are building their own plundering and tearing to pieces China . welfare on the blood and tears of the Chinese people. They do not look upon the representatives of the oppressed nations as human beings. . Chinese and Koreans are not allowed to enter the gardens and other public [they are] on a par with dogs. . . The places in the foreign quarters most oppressed and brow-beaten slave of the rich of the world, the Chinese coolie, works for these parasites to a state of deadly exhaustion. The Chinese peasant toils beyond his strength sixteen and eighteen hours a day at a stretch, only to see his labor enrich the foreign moneylenders and bloodsuckers and their mercenary lackeys. . . . 3

Soviet spokesmen at the Congress followed up such propaganda with efforts to bolster bourgeois nationalist movements and, i n China, to secure cooperation between the most promising of these, Sun Yat-sen’s, and the incipient Communist Party. But radicals in Moscow and most Chinese Communists would agree to such cooperation with potential enemies only

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opposed the alliance with the Nationalists for fear of losing their identity, of becoming known, and hence vulnerable to counteraction. These concerns proved all too well-founded i n 1927 when the additional problems o f the timing of the transition from the national to the social revolution and the realities of power overwhelmed the Party. Still, the Communists were able to retain their Party membership and to operate as a disciplined

“fraction” within the Kuomintang rather than simply as individuals. Hence, the agreement for a ‘ b l o c w i t h i n ” authorized b y the August plenum represented i n effect a compromise between the wishes of the Communists for absolute independence o f action and Sun’s insistence that the Kuomintang dominate any alliance.

The Third CCP Congress A new political era began i n China w i t h the implementation of the first united front. Following the August, 1922, plenum, Communists began

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

51

to enter the Kuomintang—first Li Ta-chao, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and Chang T’ai-lei, who were soon followed b y many others. These men

and others who had had long associations with the Nationalists were active i n establishing Nationalist as well as Communist Party branches i n major cities. Even i n Europe, Chinese Communists, including Chou

En-lai and Chu Teh, joined the Kuomintang and helped open Nationalist offices in Paris and Berlin. So close was the rapport between Nationalists and Communists i n France that the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the Chinese Communists i n Paris as the “left wing of the Kuomintang.’’*°

O n September 4 , 1922, i n Shanghai, Sun Yat-sen announced his inten-

tion to reorganize the Kuomintang. Ch’en Tu-hsiu served on the reorganization commission, which announced its plans the following January. Sun’s simultaneous negotiations with Soviet diplomats for closer working relations with the Soviet Union culminated i n the Sun-Joffe agreement of January, 1923. I n this momentous document, the Russians acceded to

Sun Yat-sen’s belief that conditions were not appropriate for Communisin in China and asserted that the Soviet Union would support the “completion of national unification and the attainment of full national independence.’’*!

Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen was able to regain his revolutionary base, this time for good, when allies i n some southwestern armies drove out Canton warlord Ch’en Chiung-ming and Sun returned there i n triumph i n February, 1923. Soon thereafter, he began to b u i l d an obviously needed inde-

pendent Nationalist-controlled army, sending Chiang Kai-shek to Russia i n the summer and autumn of 1923 to obtain arms and to study Soviet

military organization.* The arrival i n Canton in October, 1923, of the sometime Chicago teacher and experienced revolutionary organizer, Mikhail Borodin, as the “permanent and responsible representative’ of the Soviet Government cemented the U.S.S.R.-Nationalist alliance and ensured the reorganization of the Kuomintang along Soviet lines. Borodin supervised this reorganization and remained the most powerful of the Russian advisers, whose numbers had increased to perhaps several hundred by 1926. While these developments were under way, Ch’en Tu-hsiu and other Chinese delegates journeyed to Moscow for the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, November 5-December 5, 1922. This Congress

insisted i n the strongest terms yet on the formation of united fronts with Asian nationalists. As a Chinese delegate to the Congress put it, The reason for [ t h e u n i t e d f r o n t ] i s twofold. I n the first place, w e w a n t to

propagandize many organized workers i n the national revolutionary party and to win them over for us. I n the second place, we can only fight imperialism i f we combine our forces, the forces of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. We intend to compete with this party i n regard to the * This was Chiang Kai-shek’s first noteworthy assignment i n the Nationalist movement. Chang T’ai-lei and another Communist accompanied Chiang, who left on August 16 and returned December 15. Chiang’s real views of the Soviet Union at the time are something of a mystery. They were probably more favorable than he later claimed.

52

The Long March to Power

winning of the masses by means of organization and propaganda. I f we do not join this party we shall remain isolated. . [ I f we d o ] we shall be able to gather the masses around us and split the Kuomintang.2?

I n January, 1923, the Comintern passed a resolution on the “expected attitude” of the CCP toward the Kuomintang, confirming arguments for the united front, and i n M a y a directive to the same effect was sent to the

Third CCP Congress.?* Nonetheless, opposition to the “bloc within” continued, and discussion of the united front continued to dominate CCP politics.

The Third National Congress of the CCP was held June 10-20, 1923, i n the Tungshan residential area of Canton, the new work location of

many Communists who had joined the Kuomintang. Party headquarters remained i n Shanghai,* but, under the protection of their new allies,

“secure” Canton now became a second Party center, and leading personnel made frequent trips between the two cities. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, M a o Tse-tung, Chang T’ai-lei, Ts’ai Ho-sen, L i Li-san, and others were

among the twenty-seven voting delegates who claimed to represent 432 Communists. Maring and several nonvoting delegates were also present. The Congress agenda included discussion of the united front, a draft of the Party goals, and the election of new officers. The new Central Com-

mittee of nine included for the first time Mao Tse-tung and Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, as well as the five continued from the Second Congress and five alternates. The Congress re-elected Ch’en Tu-hsiu General Secretary and Ch’ii

Ch’iu-pai head of propaganda,®® and, shortly after the Congress, Mao replaced Chang Kuo-t’ao as head of organization.* A leading participant at the Congress relates that the ubiquitous Maring bore Comintern instructions to (1) emphasize the national revolution, (2) recognize the Kuomintang as leader of this stage of the revolution, (3) maintain Communist independence within the united front, and (4) stress the labor movement. Maring stated that the Party would be weak for at least five years and must therefore temporarily work within the Kuomintang. These recommendations not unnaturally produced new heated arguments, with Maring reportedly brusquely demanding official confirmation of the “bloc within” policy, which he had pushed through the August plenum the year before. L i Ta-chao, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chang

T’ai-lei, and Teng Chung-hsia apparently sided with Maring in favor of the “bloc w i t h i n . ” Ch’en Tu-hsiu attempted to mediate, and Chang

Kuo-t’ao, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and others continued to argue against too ready an acceptance of the “bloc within” type of united front. Ch’en Tu-hsiu agreed that there would have to be cooperation with non-Communist groups against feudalism and imperialism but warned that the Party * Except for a brief period from the a u t u m n o f 1922 t o early 1923, when harassment

in Shanghai dictated a move to Peking. Maring and Borodin later proposed unsuccessfully that headquarters be moved to Canton.* + Other sources speak of 420 or 300 Party members, and a recent Russian source states that there were only 230 Communists i n China at the time of the Third Congress and that the number was reduced by November, 1923, to about 100, before growing again to 950 by January, 1925. Similarly, the Youth League dropped from an estimated 4,000 in August, 1923, to 2,500 a little later.”

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

53

should not overestimate the revolutionary commitment of the Nationalists,

as the Comintern seemed to be doing. Chang Kuo-t’ao also softened his resistance somewhat but still insisted on maximum independence within the front. Supported by L i Li-san, he continued to express his fear that

the “bloc within” would mean loss of independence and initiative for the Communists. At a minimum, Chang and Li fought to exempt the labor movement from acceptance of the principle of Nationalist leadership and, i n practice, Communists d i d continue to lead more radical

sections of the workers’ movement.?®

Maoist historiographers have tried to simplify these issues and subsequent debate into the usual left-right dichotomy, arguing that Chang Kuo-t’ao led the “leftist,” “closed door” deviation of sectarianism, while Ch’en Tu-hsiu led the “rightist deviation” of capitulation to the Kuomintang. Quite the contrary, i t was the Comintern that insisted on meeting Sun Yat-sen’s terms, and Maoist heroes L i Ta-chao, Chang T’ai-lei, Teng

Chung-hsia, and Ch’i Ch’iu-pai supported Maring’s argument for the “bloc w i t h i n . ” Since the latter four were all martyrs to Nationalist

reaction in 1927-35, Maoist historiographers do not mention their early support for cooperation with the Kuomintang, while they blame the unfortunate Ch’en Tu-hsiu for the disaster of the iirst united front even though he accepted i t largely because of Communist discipline. I n fact, since as early as 1905, Ch’en had often opposed Sun Yat-sen’s leadership, and, equally ironically, Chang Kuo-t’ao was later accused of the opposite

“right capitulationist” deviation with regard to the second united front i n 1937 and 1938. Mao, of course, is said to have guided the Party

between these left and right deviations at the Third Congress and ever after. I n reality, on the crucial question of control of the labor movement, at the Third Congress, Mao shifted his vote from opposition to support for joint Nationalist-Communist control of labor work. This was possibly

the reason why Mao briefly was given the key post of head of the Central Committee organization department. Mao’s shift was the first i n a series of steps that later caused l e f t i s t ” L i Li-san to rebuke his excessive cooperation w i t h the Kuomintang and to dub h i m “secretary to H u Han-

min,” a conservative Nationalist leader. I t is clear that, at least from 1923 through 1926, Mao belonged to the Communist ‘“‘right.’’%° Despite continuing opposition, at the demand of Maring, the Third Congress of the CCP gave formal Party-wide sanction to forming a “bloc

within” the Kuomintang. The Congress manifesto stated that “the Kuomintang should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership.” I t went on to criticize the Kuomintang’s dependence o n foreign support and military action to the exclusion of mass work. Thereby, the Communists announced their intention to try to drive the Nationalists to the left and to deepen the national revolution by mass work, fusing the national and social revolutions. “ O u r mission is to liberate the oppressed Chinese nation b y a national revolution and

to advance to the world revolution.”’*° The second major document of the Congress, “ T h e Tasks of the CCP,” stressed attention to anti-imperialism and militarism and called for a fun-

damental political, economic, and legal restructuring of society. This document was in line with the May Comintern directive regarding the

o4

The Long March to Power

united front but was later criticized for inadequately reflecting the directive’s call for a land revolution. Where the “Tasks” called for the reduction of rent and limitation of landholdings, the Moscow directive had spoken of the “confiscation of landlords’ lands, confiscation of monastery

and church land, and the passing of this land to the peasants without compensation.” The Moscow directive did state more strongly than before that “ t h e peasant problem becomes the central point of the entire policy

[ o f the CCP],” but i t also stated that the agrarian revolution will “necessarily” follow the creation of a national revolution and an anti-imperialist front. That is, first the united front was to be created and then agrarian revolution would follow.?’ Unfortunately for this argument, as the dis-

astrous events of 1927 made clear, the united front precluded completion of the agrarian revolution and brought the near destruction of Chinese Communism. The clash between the goals of the social and national revolutions proved the fundamental flaw for the Communists i n the first united

front. A second resolution on the current situation was published in July, 1923, which called attention to the latest imbroglios among the militarists and to the menace of imperialism.*? I n August, 1923, shortly after the Third Party Congress the Socialist

Youth League held a Second National Congress in Canton (its first Congress was i n May, 1922), with some thirty delegates representing several thousand members.** I t chose as secretary Chang T’ai-lei, who had represented the League at the Second Congress of Youth International as well as at the Congress of Toilers of the East i n Moscow. Yiin Tai-ying, Teng Chung-hsia, and others remained active members o f the League’s Execu-

tive Committee. The Congress confirmed decisions of the August, 1922, plenum and the CCP Third Congress i n favor of the “bloc within” but directed that Our League members who have joined the Kuomintang should obey the directives given by the executive committees of the League at various levels. The various executive committees should i n turn obey the directives given by the CCP central authority our League members who have joined the Kuomintang should support the stands taken by CCP members . and maintain the strict and independent organization of our League.34

This and similar statements soon came to the attention of conservative Nationalists who used them to show Communist “insincerity’’ and hence to raise doubts about the wisdom of the united front. Moreover, many Communists, especially i n Shanghai, Peking, Hunan, and Hupeh, continued to oppose the united front and d i d not enter the Kuomintang for a year

or so. Disputes over the united front after the Third Congress led to a considerable sense of crisis and reportedly to a temporary halving of Party

membership and were the subject of emergency meetings, such as an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee on November 24-25, 1923.3° Communist Gains Under the United Front

I n the autumn of 1923, however, the dominant section of the Kuomintang, under the direction of Sun Yat-sen, moved decisively to cement the

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

55

“three great policies’ of alliance w i t h the Soviet Union, with the Com-

munists, and with the masses against imperialism and warlordism. Plans for reorganization of the Nationalist Party, initiated a year earlier,

gathered momentum and were taken i n hand by Borodin after his arrival in October. Voitinsky also arrived to replace Maring as chief Comintern representative i n November. Although Voitinsky may have joined the

Communist left at times in arguing for independence within the Kuomintang, his instructions were to correct ‘‘separatist’”’ opposition to the united front.** As was the case with Borodin, who worked primarily with the Nationalists, Voitinsky’s superior relations with Chinese Communist leaders helped to smooth passage toward implementation of the united front.

I n December, 1923, there erupted a new manifestation of the sharpening climate of anti-imperialism. The previous September, Sun Yat-sen, hard-pressed for funds, had demanded that portion of the maritime customs that he believed was due to the part of South China he claimed to rule. The maritime customs was still administered by the Western powers as a consequence of the unequal treaties, and the United States, which

sent the largest contingent of ships, and other powers promptly showed the flag i n Canton harbor. Stung by this rebuke, Sun backed down b u t

retorted, “We no longer look to the Western powers. Our faces are turned toward Russia.”’*’ The shift to the left by the Kuomintang was accentuated at its First National Congress in January, 1924. The Congress manifesto stressed anti-imperialism and antimilitarism and called for far-reaching economic, social, and political reforms. A party constitution prepared by a nineteenman committee, which included L i Ta-chao, Mao Tse-tung, and Borodin, who wrote the preliminary draft i n English, centralized the Kuomintang

along the lines of the Soviet Community Party. An ascending hierarchy of five levels of organization pyramided i n the Central Executive Com-

mittee, which was elected by the National Congress. Not only was this reorganization of the Nationalist Party carried out along Communist lines, but Communists were strikingly represented i n key organizations. L i Ta-chao was one of four members appointed by Sun to the presidium of the Congress, while about a dozen of the 165 delegates to the Congress were Communists.”® Their prominence was

shown i n the election of three, including L i Ta-chao and the Cantonese Communist T’an P’ing-shan, to the twenty-four-man Central Executive Committee, and of six, among sixteen alternates, including Party elder L i n Po-ch’i ( L i n Tsu-han), Mao Tse-tung, C h ’ Ch’iu-pai, and Chang Kuo-t’ao.”” The left wing of the Kuomintang controlled the Political Council, created at Borodin’s suggestion i n July, 1924 .*° Even more impressive was Communist control of Nationalist administrative bureaus. T’an P’ing-shan was on the eight-man standing commit-

tee of the Central Executive Committee with two leftists. Communists headed two of the eight Kuomintang central bureaus, including the allimportant organization bureau also headed by T’an P’ing-shan and, later i n 1924, by another Communist. According to one account, Communists held twenty-six of twenty-nine positions i n the Nationalist organization bureau.*’ L i n Po-ch’li, a long-time associate o f Sun Yat-sen who had

o6

The Long March to Power

introduced Sun to Maring i n late 1921, headed the peasant bureau briefly and was assisted by one o f two Communist bureau secretaries, P’eng P’ai.

The other Communist secretary*? virtually ran the labor bureau, nominally under the overworked leftist leader, Liao Chung-k’ai. The importance of the Communists i n the new coalition was also evident i n their role in the new Military Academy established in the spring o f 1924 at Whampoa (Huangp’u) ten miles south of Canton. Chiang Kai-shek, then thirty-six, directed the Academy’s military and Liao Chung-k’ai its political affairs. The Soviet Union supplied most of the

financial aid, part of some 2.5 million rubles i t had sent Sun’s government by the end of 1925, and a core of military advisers.** Chou En-lai, on his return from France i n late 1924, and Yiin Tai-ying served as deputy heads

of political instruction. I n 1924-27, among other important future Communist leaders, Lin Po-ch’li, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, and Ch’en Y i were instructors there, and Lin Piao was among its 7,399 graduates. More than eighty of the Academy’s first class of 460 were members of the

Party or Socialist Youth League, and some future Vietnamese Communist leaders also enrolled in Whampoa, as well as i n the CCP, on the advice of H o C h i M i n h , who assisted Borodin i n Canton i n 1925 and 1926.* By

1925, eight of the nine regimental political commissars of Chiang’s First Army were Communists, headed by Chou En-lai. However, as later proved crucial, Communists were unable to penetrate the Kuomintang

Military Council or to obtain in the military field the kinds of senior roles they had among Kuomintang political advisers.*® Understandably, more conservative Nationalists were alarmed at the inroads o f Communists, who still claimed a separate political affiliation,

into their party’s organization. As early as November, 1923, i n a foretaste of future crises, some Kuomintang members protested the united front, inducing Sun Yat-sen to reply the following month: “ T h e reason that the Russian revolution succeeded but ours did not is because our Party members still do not understand the ‘Three People’s Principles.” Essentially

there is really no difference between the Principle of People’s Livelihood and Communism.” Sun went on to proclaim his conviction that he could control the Communists. “ I f Russia wants to cooperate with China, she must cooperate w i t h our party and not with Ch’en Tu-hsiu. I f Ch’en

disobeys our party, he will be ousted.”’*¢ When the issue of the united front was again raised at the First Kuomintang Congress, a caucus of the Communist faction directed Li Ta-chao to prepare a statement defending Communist participation i n the Kuomintang. I n it, Li claimed the united front would benefit both sides i n the struggle against warlordism and imperialism, and he pleaded for an end to doubt and suspicion on the matter. Speaking with respect for his ‘senior comrades,” L i said, among other things,

. . the Kuomintang is the only revolutionary party which has history, principles, and leadership. .The victory of this party’s program will be our victory. We have joined the party to accept its program and not to make i t accept the Communist programs. . . 47

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

57

A CCP Central Committee resolution of the same period directed the Party in this spirit to . . act i n the name of the Kuomintang i n the work of propaganda, publication, popular organization, and other practical movements that concern the National Revolution. This will enable us ( 1 ) to save manpower and money, ( 2 ) to expedite Kuomintang development, and ( 3 ) to increase and coordi-

nate the various efforts with better reputation and efficiency. But in matters which we consider necessary but which the Kuomintang is unwilling to carry out under its name, our Party shall act independently.8

The Communists strove with mixed success to preserve independent organization and to play on the divisions between proponents and opponents of the united front within the Nationalist Party. Fractions, or Communist groups, which had formed within the Kuomintang from the

beginning, were to be the organizational key to its manipulation. Borodin and Voitinsky instructed the Chinese Communists in the proper use of this technique. According to one account, Borodin told us that i n strategy i t was important to divide the Kuomintang into left and right groups. . Our mission was to instigate quarrels . thus offering Communists a chance to take over control. Besides we were asked to make use of Kuomintang leaders—praising those who were willing to be used and slandering those who were unwilling. . Those civic organizations which could not be subjected to our control would be wrecked. *®

I n this situation, i t is not surprising that suspicions persisted, despite the appeals of Communists, such as Li Ta-chao and Borodin, and of leading Nationalists, especially Sun Yat-sen, Liao Chung-k’ai, and Wang

Ching-wei. I n April, 1924, a Nationalist who had joined the Socialist Youth League showed an issue of its journal to senior associates. They expressed alarm at such statements as “ W e must find ways to guide Kuomintang meetings and w o r k , ” and three of the five members of the Kuomintang

Central Supervisory Committee argued for a formal impeachment of the Communists.’® Reportedly influenced by Borodin’s threat to switch support to the Peking government i f there were not a lessening of anti-Communist

sentiment, Sun Yat-sen and the left wing of his party defeated this first major offensive b y Nationalist conservatives to end the united front. Borodin’s threat took on added force after the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the Peking government on May 30, 1924, which continued the

Soviet position as co-manager of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and affirmed its gains i n Outer Mongolia despite its promises to renounce all such provisions of earlier ‘“‘unequal treaties.” Many Nationalists, and probably Communists as well, were privately dismayed.

I n the course of Nationalist discussions on the proposal for impeachment of the Communists, there were some revealing admissions. I n urging the Communists to give u p their ‘‘dual membership,” one Nationalist

leader implied that most Communists were more energetic and “capable

58

The Long March to Power

of struggle” than most members of the Kuomintang, while Sun Yat-sen

extravagantly reported that the “majority of youth favor Communism and their zeal is very want to see the methods of Marx adopted i n China good.. . ” Borodin frankly explained Russian awareness that the united front might “cause the death of the Kuomintang, b u t this is not the result

hoped for. We hope that struggles of the Right and Left factions will produce a Center Faction which will become the heart of the Party.”® Borodin also allowed that Nationalist principles could govern China for 100 years, but he was unable to explain why, i f the Communist revolution was inevitable, the Communists should insist on the integrity of their own organization. As we shall see, Nationalist conservatives continued to oppose the Communist alliance and, after Sun Yat-sen’s death from cancer i n

March, 1925, and the assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai the following August, gradually increased their power within central Kuomintang councils. Despite this shift of power behind the scenes to Nationalist conservatives, from 1924 to 1926, Communists continued to make impressive gains

both in the country at large and in the visible structure of the Kuomintang. Problems of the United Front and the Fourth CCP Congress Labor remained the focus o f Communist attention, although work was slowed b y the shock o f W u P’ei-fu’s massacre of railroad workers on

February 7, 1923, and by the requirements of the united front. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang sought to direct the efforts of labor toward nationalism and against imperialism rather than against other classes. As Sun put it, “The great issue is not struggle between Chinese labor and capital but the political question, which will be solved by upholding the Three Principles and joining my revolution.”””? Most Communists tended to go along, at least publicly, w i t h the stress on national revolution. After the “February 7 massacre,” Ch’en Tu-hsiu doubted the efficacy of pushing

class struggle for the moment and advocated cooperation with the bourgeoisie, leading some to charge that Ch’en and conservative Communists neglected the labor movement entirely for about a year after the Febru-

ary 7 incident. Ch’en did concede that the bourgeoisie should be the leading class o f the bourgeois democratic revolution, but this was the Comintern line and was also argued b y later critics of Ch’en, such as

Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai. Moreover, at other times, Ch’en and some of his associates contended that only the proletariat could lead the Chinese revolution to ultimate victory.>®

An enlarged plenum of the CCP Central Committee, which met in Shanghai from May 10-15, 1924, helped clear the air of such resentment against Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s alleged pessimism and ‘‘capitulationism’ at this time and of other muted doubts about united front policies. The crucial questions were whether o r not Communist labor work should be organ-

ized under and credited to the Nationalists, and the extent to which Communists were neglecting their o w n work i n efforts to maintain the united front. The plenum adopted a compromise to the effect that some

Communists should continue i n the Kuomintang but should only work for the Nationalists i n the mass movements and should stop performing routine jobs for them. Mass and labor work was to be stepped up, and

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

59

more, rather than less, attention was to be given to preserving independent

Communist organization i n the face of conservative demands. The plenum formally adopted the key tactic of distinguishing among the left, right, and center of the Kuomintang in order to try to isolate and neutralize the conservatives.’ The Comintern, a recent Soviet source has revealed, considered these

1924 Chinese Communist efforts to achieve independence within the united front as-directly opposed to its line of “help for the Kuomintang i n all things.” I t branded Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and Mao Tse-tung*

leaders of a “leftist opposition to the Comintern line” and credited Li Tachao, T’an P’ing-shan, Ch’li Ch’iu-pai, and the entire Canton Party organ-

ization with upholding the work of Borodin and Voitinsky.* I n the summer and autumn of 1924, Ch’en Tu-hsiu wrote Voitinsky and

others that they ‘““should support only those few activities which are in the hands of leftists, for otherwise we are supporting our enemies.” On July 21, the Central Committee directed all Party organizations to prepare for a possible break with the Kuomintang, and, in October, a Central

Committee meeting criticized Borodin’s support of Nationalist military activities as weakening the left. The Communists also increased their efforts to penetrate the labor bureaus of the Kuomintang regional committees, which had been set u p

by the first National Congress i n January, 1924. They succeeded i n many areas, as at Nanchang, where five of the seven members of the labor bureau were Communists. I n Peking, after a year of participation in the united front, Nationalist membership rose to about 1,000, one-third of whom were Communists or members of the Youth League.”® However,

Communist opposition to the united front i n North China increased when Chang Kuo-t’ao was imprisoned by local authorities during the summer and fall of 1924. A late November meeting of the Peking Communists voted overwhelmingly to censure Sun Yat-sen’s methods of dealing with the warlords. The brief lull i n mass agitation following the February 7, 1923, incident, during which procedural questions of the united front took precedence, had come to an end by late 1924. Continuing inflation, rampant taxes and

warlordism, and increased foreign penetration of China all contributed to a new surge o f mass discontent, culminating i n the great anti-imperialist and antiwarlord movements of 1925-27. A t times, Communists and

Nationalists cooperated closely. The Kuomintang labor bureau, under joint party direction, took an active part i n a month-long strike against British-imposed police controls at Shameen Island adjoining Canton from July 15 to August 20, 1924, and Nationalists supported the strike at Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company i n Shanghai later in the year.’” The Communists, meanwhile, sponsored the creation of the National Railroad Union o n the first anniversary of the February 7 incident and i n July, 1924, of a Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference. A t the latter, which * M a o w a s included as a n anti-Comintern “ l e f t i s t , ” presumably for reasons o f Sino-

Soviet polemics, but most information places Mao among the “rightists,” i f anything, until 1927.

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was called b y the Labor International o r Profintern, Voitinsky and most

Chinese speakers supported the idea of a united front, but other Chinese delegates opposed the Kuomintang as not sufficiently revolutionary. A further victory for the Kuomintang left resulted from the defeat of the Canton Merchants Corps. This group of possibly 50,000, sponsored by the Canton Chamber of Commerce and reportedly by Great Britain and some conservative Nationalists, decided to organize opposition to the radical direction of Kuomintang policies and to the higher taxes required b y Sun’s military ambitions. I n October, 1924, however, Sun moved

first and, with the help of cadets from the newly founded Whampoa Academy, was able to suppress this new threat to the national revolution.®® Almost simultaneously, Nationalist hopes received another great, i f premature, boost from developments i n North China. W a r between rival warlord factions broadened significantly i n October when Feng Yii-hsiang

turned on his superior Wu P’ei-fu and, with the help of Chang Tso-lin, drove Wu from Peking. An uneasy alliance resulted for about a year between Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, with his Peking supporters,

and the “Christian General” Feng Yii-hsiang. They invited Sun Yat-sen north to discuss the situation. During this trip, Sun became ill of cancer and died i n March, 1925. Even while he was still alive, however, the talks o n unification came to nothing, as the northern conservatives were opposed to Sun’s proposal for a national conference. The Communists divided

sharply over the wisdom of Sun’s trip north and over support for the national conference. They officially supported both, but many were appalled at the possibility of cooperation with reactionary warlords. Their attitude was revealed i n the Party’s third and fourth manifestos “on the current situation” o f September 10 and November 19, 1924, which

demanded a more radical composition for Sun’s proposed national conference. Other writings denounced Sun’s vacillation, lest a compromise leave the radicals i n the lurch.?”® They need not have worried.

The country was divided among at least six power groups i n 1925, and conflicting interests and pockets of hostile and foreign interests precluded the peaceful unification of China. Shortly before Sun’s death, plans proceeded for unification by force, resulting initially i n the two Eastern Expeditions of 1925 against remaining enemies i n South China and then i n the long-awaited Northern Expedition to the Yangtze Valley, which began in mid-1926. These developments dominated the discussions of the Fourth National Congress of the CCP, held i n Shanghai January 11-22, 1925. I t s manifesto, the only surviving document o f the Congress, as i f with fore-

knowledge of future horror, stressed the dangers of imperialism, which can turn “ o u r l a n d . . i n t o desert and our cities and countryside into

graveyards.” But i t predicted ““. . the struggle of the workers and peasants against imperialist and capitalist oppression is i m m i n e n t . . . ” and urged, “ Y o u must quickly organize large-scale demonstrations against the foreign warships that are sailing i n our territory and demand abrogation of the extraterritorial rights i n our country.”®® Within six months, the latter instructions would be realized but more because of developing nationalism than Communist plans.

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61

Resolutions of the Congress concerned the labor, peasant, youth, and

women’s movements and the united front and national revolutions. The latter two resolutions renewed emphasis on manipulating the left and center of the Kuomintang against its right, and they discussed errors of right and left i n the Communist approach to the united front. The Congress called for attention to the “economic struggle” as well as to antimilitarism and anti-imperialism a n d attacked “leftist deviations,” including proposals to keep the labor movement free of Kuomintang influence and alleged plans

to foment riots to delay Nationalist military expeditions. Ch’en Tu-hsiu and others, however, continued to criticize excessive subservience to the Kuomintang i n the united front.

Most significantly, the Fourth National Congress emphasized the need to shift from what was still a narrowly based, primarily intellectual Party to a mass Party of the proletariat. Accordingly, i t called for wider recruitment and more lenient admissions policies to draw i n urban and rural

workers. The resolutions on the mass movements stressed the organization of

trade unions and labor work generally but also spoke of the importance of the agrarian revolution i n vague terms, without proposing a concrete

agrarian program.®* The Party also slightly amended the Party Constitution adopted at the Second Congress, but the far-reaching organizational changes that followed were mainly determined by rapid Party growth stemming from new recruitment policies and the eruption of the May Thirtieth Movement. The some twenty delegates attending this Congress claimed to represent about 950 members,®® one-tenth of the number that would be claimed b y the end of the year. The Congress re-elected Ch’en Tu-hsiu general secretary and expanded the Central Committee to about nine.** M a o was

conspicuously absent, having temporarily relinquished his duties with the organization department ostensibly because of illness but possibly also because of Party dissatisfaction with his allegedly overcordial relations with some Nationalists. Mao returned to Hunan i n late 1924 for six months,

serving briefly as Party secretary for Hunan and Hupeh. About this time or a little later, two students just back from Toilers of the East University i n Moscow, Ch’en Yen-nien, elder son of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, and L o Yi-nung, a fellow villager of Mao Tse-tung, became secretaries respectively of the important Kwangtung-Kwangsi and Chekiang-Kiangsu Party committees centered at Canton and Shanghai. Both would lose their lives i n the

turmoil of 1927 and 1928. Chang Kuo-t’ao continued to serve from Peking as Secretary of the Hopeh Party Committee. Also about January, 1925, the Socialist Youth League held its T h i r d

Congress i n Shanghai and decided to adopt the name Communist Youth League. I t re-elected Chang T’ai-lei general secretary; Jen Pi-shih, his suc-

cessor i n 1927 as head of the Youth League, was named director of organization; and a Central Committee composed of the nine department and area chairmen was also chosen.? Before this time, the Youth League had always been several times as large as its parent organization, but, w i t h the dramatic developments i n the mass movements later i n 1925 and w i t h the adoption of more

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expansive CCP membership policies, the Party soon surpassed the Youth League in size. The latter claimed 2,900 members in early 1925, 9,000 members i n September, 1925, and 35,000 i n April, 1927, while b y the

latter date the CCP had grown to almost 58,000 members. The organization and programs of the Youth League remained similar to those of the CCP and the Comintern, on which they were based, and there was a liaison committee of ten to twenty persons to coordinate activities. But many differences between the two Chinese organizations also developed.

The younger organization often tended to be more radical. As the mass movements of 1925 and 1926 developed, the Party accused the Youth League of lagging in popularity and, i n July, 1926, took over direction of the student movement. Nevertheless, the Youth League remained the principal organizational ally of the CCP.*¢ The May Thirtieth Movement For Chinese Nationalists and revolutionaries, 1925 was a pivotal year. Together with the death of Sun Yat-sen and the further consolidation of

the Kuomintang’s southern base, the great events were the labor and anti-imperialist movements culminating in the May Thirtieth Movement. These, i n turn, precipitated the first great period of Party expansion. Strikes, such as those against twenty-two Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai i n February and in Tsingtao in April, had already evidenced the rising tide of anger over obvious economic grievances, continued inflation, militarism, and imperialism.®’

The strikes revealed conspicuous Communist influence and activity, o n the rise again after the lull of 1923. The labor and women’s departments,®® both formally created by the Fourth National Congress, were

active i n promoting Marxism among Shanghai workers. Communist influence continued strong i n the National Railroad Union, which held its

second congress in Chengchow i n February, 1925, and increased further i n the Hong Kong-based Chinese Seamen’s Union, most of whose leaders joined the CCP about this time.

I n early May, these two unions, joined by the Canton Workers’ Delegates Association and the Hanyehp’ing Workers’ Union, sponsored the Second National Labor Congress, which met in Canton. This Congress established the National General Labor Union, replacing the Labor Secretariat, which had been less and less active since 1922, and the Union formed ties with the Labor International. Communists were active i n all four sponsoring organizations and were well represented among the 281 delegates to the Congress. A Communist headed the twenty-five-man executive committee, and L i Li-san, Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Chung-hsia, and others were active members.®® W i t h some justice, they could claim considerable

influence over the 540,000 members in the 166 unions represented at the Congress. This compared with Communist influence over perhaps 125,000 to 150,000 workers at the height of the first labor movement i n 1922, and

with the almost 1.25 and 3 million the Party claimed to represent by mid1926 and 1927, respectively. Communist-led organized workers represented a significant proportion of the Chinese working class of the time, but, compared with the number of laborers “influenced,” actual membership in

[Chap. 3]

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63

the National General Labor Union was much smaller. Thus, i n Shanghai, the Union claimed to influence some 218,000 workers i n July, 1925, but

there were only 43,000 actual members of the Shanghai General Labor Union i n June, 1926, and 76,000 i n January, 1927.7 Nor d i d radicals enjoy complete control of labor i n these years, as moderates also set u p rival organizations, but the force of events continued to drive the Chinese revo-

lution to the left. Shortly after the Second Labor Congress, the May Thirtieth Movement

erupted. On May 15, a factory guard killed one of the strikers i n the protests (which had been going on since February) against Japanese-

owned textile mills in Shanghai. Many others were wounded and arrested i n this and other incidents, as demonstrations gathered momentum and spread to other cities. The CCP Central Committee, meeting i n

Shanghai on May 28, and other groups called for coordinated demonstrations o n May 3 0 . ” O n that afternoon, as thousands of demonstrators

gathered on Nanking Road to protest the arrest of student agitators, International Settlement police under a British officer opened fire, killing about ten and wounding and arresting scores. Radicals responded with calls for still greater demonstrations. Another Central Committee meeting that night called a general strike for June 1 and established a Shanghai General Labor Union directed b y L i Li-san, Ts’ai Ho-sen, L i u Shao-ch’i, Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, Hsiang Ying, Ch’en Yiin, and local Communist directors o f the influential West Shanghai Workers Club.”? Merchants and students associations soon joined the general strike and established a Shanghai

association of workers, merchants, and students. A steady procession of publications and manifestos issued forth, and the Shanghai General Labor

Union claimed great increases i n membership.” Meanwhile, the foreign powers showed the flag, and authorities undertook repressive actions and tried to split the merchants and discourage them from supporting the movement. The latter resumed some business after June 25 but continued

to support other aspects of the struggle. Shanghai workers and students remained militant through July, but soon thereafter the Communists decided to soften their stand i n order to reduce the growing isolation of

the radicals. The strike movement in Shanghai continued to flare i n succeeding months, but all factories had resumed operations by midSeptember.”

The May Thirtieth Movement spread quickly to more than a dozen other cities, reaching a climax i n the great Hong Kong-Canton strike. The directors of the National General Labor Union called a strike to begin

i n Hong Kong on June 19. A large supporting demonstration was held i n Canton on June 23. As i t passed Shakee Street opposite the foreign concession on Shameen Island, British and French troops opened fire, killing fifty-two and wounding more than 100. Previously hesitant moderates joined the intensifying response, which soon involved several hundred thousand workers i n the two cities, most of them under Communist leadership. A crippling boycott of Hong Kong was enforced. This strike, the longest i n Chinese history, lasted u n t i l October, 1926, a full sixteen

months. Communist control of the labor movement increased further, and the National General Labor Union claimed to double its influence in the

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year after M a y 30, 1925. A Party statement of July, 1926, did not exaggerate much when i t said, “From its inception to the present day, the Chinese labor movement has been under the direction of our Party.”?

The May Thirtieth Movement swept up the Chinese People to an unprecedented degree. Not only d i d i t manifest and carry forward an

ever deepening revolutionary sentiment, at least among China’s urban population, but also i t had enormous implications for the organization and policies of the Chinese Communists. Party leaders felt the power of

mass movements more than ever before and would never afterward relinquish their faith i n the power of the Chinese millions. This growing sense of confidence helped betray them two years later, but i t also sustained those who did survive that and subsequent disasters. Expansion of the Party

I n the months following May 30, 1925, the Party pressed ahead in many fields of endeavor. The Communist-dominated National General

Labor Union, the Hong Kong—Canton Strike Committee, peasant associations, and other Party-influenced mass organizations coordinated the upsurge of labor, youth, women’s, and peasant movements. Behind the scenes, the Party also was expanding its organization with unprecedented rapidity. Thus, Party membership in Shanghai increased from 200 to 800 i n the single month of June, 1925.7 The expansion was both overt and covert. As one document explained, “ W e should simultaneously build u p a clandestine organization and exert every effort to engage openly i n the

political movement.” Another boasted that the Party had “succeeded in centralizing i n itself the power of directing the revolutionary movement.”"” Party growth i n late 1925 and 1926 was the product not only of deepening revolutionary fervor i n the wake o f the M a y Thirtieth Move-

ment but of the relaxation of membership standards decreed by the Fourth National Congress. Subsequent Party statements until mid-1926 (when i t was decided to tighten up) urged “making our Party a Party of the masses” and steps to encourage workers and peasants to join, such

as requiring only a one-month probation period for them as against three months for “intellectuals.” A Party resolution i n the autumn of 1925 even

stated, “Many of our responsible comrades. . entertain the erroneous idea that every Communist member should understand Marxism and

possess a high capacity for work. ... T h i s

erroneous conception is a

unique obstacle to making our Party a Party o f the Masses.”’”®

The result of the new policies, together with the burgeoning radical movement, was a meteoric rise i n Party membership, from about 1,000

i n early 1925 to 6,000 i n October to 10,000 by the end of the year and to perhaps 30,000 by July, 1 9 2 6 . ” The desired effect of increasing the proportion of workers was partially achieved. Where only 30 per cent of the approximately 1,000 Party members and 9,000 Youth League members i n 1925 were workers, almost 54 per cent (or even two-thirds according to another estimate) o f the Party members and 4 1 per cent of the Youth League members were considered proletarian b y early spring, 1927.%° I n contrast to the situation after 1927, very few peasants joined the Party i n 1925, reportedly only some 100, almost all in Kwangtung.®!

[Chap. 3]

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65

This rapid growth, however, created new problems, especially i n organization. The Party i n 1926 acknowledged that a decline i n quality had accompanied the increase i n membership: “ I t is clear that no good would result i f the Party continues growing at the same rapid speed, since

the work of direction definitely will not be able to keep pace with such growth,” and “ I f we want to lead the revolution, we must first have good

Party organization.””®> Accordingly, the Party undertook far-reaching organizational adjustments, although i t continued its basic principles of “democratic centralism.” Propaganda, always a foremost concern, was to be increased and popularized, w i t h special emphasis on the daily concerns o f the masses,

the role of youth, women, and other aggrieved groups.®® An enlarged plenum of the Party Central Committee, meeting i n Peking in October, 1925, to consider the effects of the mass movements, stated the new emphasis on popularization o f the Party’s message: “ T o be effective i n our

work of agitation, we must enable the masses, even the most backward workers and ricksha coolies, to understand our propaganda. Hence, only

the most popular Janguage and writing should be used.” Another document of December also foreshadowed Mao’s famous Yenan instructions o n propaganda, ‘“Make sure that all our slogans are adapted to the demands

of the masses. I n our practical work, we must always get hold of the progressive elements among the masses. Only by so doing can we avoid isolating ourselves. . . .””®* T o accomplish these ends, Party workers were to

discuss specific problems and events, expand the movement of workers’ clubs, and, within the Party, ‘encourage the entire membership from bottom up to participate i n positive political life.” The Party was directed to expand its one to three months’ training courses for agitators.

A second enlarged plenum of the Fourth Central Committee, which met i n Shanghai from July 12 to 18, 1926, complained that not even 1 or

2 per cent of these proposals for popularization had been carried out and that “our Party’s regular periodicals have had one common defect— either the writing was too complicated and difficult or the discussions were abstract and vague, not based on reality.” The July, 1926, plenum elaborated further on what would become the first principle of the mass line: “ I n our propaganda work, we must know and examine the opinion of the masses, which is necessary i n guiding them.” Revealing a sophisti-

cated awareness of propaganda needs, the plenum called for publicity, research, organizational and public-opinion work teams, and the publica-

tion of textbooks on the Chinese revolution and on the “ABC’s of Communism.”’®* Nonetheless, understandably and for years, propagandists

were hard-pressed to explain Marxist theories i n terms the masses could understand. The Party called for the expansion and reorganization of Party journals. These included, i n addition to N e w Youth, which ceased publication later i n 1926: Guide Weekly, the principal Party journal from its founding i n 1922 until its suspension i n July, 1927; and a theoretical monthly, Vanguard, founded i n July, 1923. There were also journals of the affiliated organizations, Chinese Youth of the Youth League, founded October 20, 1923, the Chinese Worker of the National General Labor Union, founded in late 1924, and Chinese Women, of the Federation of Women. Guide

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Weekly reportedly increased its circulation from 7,000 to 50,000 between 1925 and 1927. Many other unions, workers clubs, and local Party organizations published o n an ephemeral basis, and the July, 1926, plenum

called for the establishment of a permanent journal for the masses that would help to coordinate these publications. The principal outlet for Party-sponsored publications was the Shanghai Bookstore on Min Kuo Road, established soon after the Third Congress. Other bookstores had been or were soon opened in most of the provinces of China and even in Vladivostok.®¢ The development of leftist schools was crucial to Party propaganda

and to educational and recruitment policies. Despite the new emphasis on popularization, the Chinese Communists decried ideological shortcomings and decreed continued intensive ideological training. Within the Party, “educational propagandists” were termed the ‘‘central elements in Party cells,” while, outside the Party, they were to “politicize ideas: oppose the hatred of politics i n the minds of intellectuals and scholars. . .

cultivate the proletarian revolutionary philosophy of life. . . .””* Cadres were trained in both general and advanced Party schools. The former, set u p primarily for workers under local or regional committees, gave a course of two to four weeks i n agitational techniques and theory, while the latter stressed revolutionary history and theory i n a three

months’ course. Additional training schools for workers were ordered in mid-1926. The curriculum of these schools stressed basic knowledge of Marxism, class struggle, capitalism, economic crises, imperialism and its

connection with the Chinese warlords, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.®® The most promising students from Party schools were sent to the Soviet Union for training, at first at the University of the Toilers of the East, which formed a Chinese section i n 1923 with Lo Yi-nung as secretary and another Hunanese, the future Youth League leader Jen Pi-shih, and others among its students. These men had returned to China by the time of the M a y Thirtieth Movement, but others continued to study at the

Lenin School, founded i n 1924, and especially at Sun Yat-sen University, which, after its founding i n Moscow i n September, 1925, became the main center for Chinese students, while other Asians attended the University

of the Toilers of the East. Some four-fifths of the first class at Sun Yat-sen University were sponsored by the Kuomintang, but about 600 Chinese students remained there after the Nationalist-Communist split i n 1927.%°

I n China, Party-sponsored schools included the Shanghai Masses Girls’ School, founded i n early 1922, and Shanghai University, founded the next year. Although Shanghai University also received Nationalist support, i t was a center o f Marxist activity, prior to its closure b y local authorities o n June 4, 1925, as a result o f the May Thirtieth Movement. Ch’ii Ch’iu-

pai headed its social science department, Teng Chung-hsia was dean of students, and Yiin Tai-ying, Chang T’ai-lei, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Hsiang Ching-yii,

and others taught there. Naturally, many of its students joined the Communist movement. The Communists established other schools i n Shanghai

and maintained them underground for a few years after the disasters of 1927.

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

67

The Development of Party Organization

The organization of the Party developed with the CCP’s expansion. A Political Bureau, the center of decision-making i n a mature Communist Party, is not known to have come into existence prior to 1927, but such an inner group functioned informally within the Central Committee from about 1925 o n . ” I t s members, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ts’ai

Ho-sen, and Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai met regularly at the home of Voitinsky and at other Shanghai residences. These gatherings discussed matters of highest policy regarding the mass movements, problems of the united front, and

the development of the Party. A second larger type of meeting occurred when the Central Committee was i n session. A t these, chairmen of the

Party’s functional departments gave their reports and discussed routine tasks and activities. Voitinsky and ‘several assistants” served as liaison with Moscow, and, i n consultation w i t h Ch’en Tu-hsiu, made crucial

decisions and handled the Comintern’s financial contributions, at the time the principal source of income for the Chinese Communists. Outside of the Party, however, Voitinsky, as the representative of the Communist International, had less influence than either Borodin i n the South or Leo Karakhan (the Soviet representative i n Peking u n t i l 1925) i n the North;

as the latter were representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rather than of the Comintern and, paradoxically, were also accred-

ited t o the established governments of Canton and Peking. Because of his greater influence, by 1927, Borodin was described as the “dictator of the Party,” even as General Secretary Ch’en Tu-hsiu was called the “patriarch.”’?? A Central Committee Secretariat also came into existence about this

time, with Ch’en Tu-hsiu handling its duties at first. Later in 1925, Wang Jo-fei, a returned student from France and the University of the Toilers of the East i n Moscow, became its secretary (mi-shu chang). This position should not be confused w i t h the General Secretary (tsung shu-chi), the ranking Party position until its abolition i n late 1937, a few years before

Mao Tse-tung assumed the new title of Party Chairman (chu-hsi). The Secretariat primarily handled the Party’s paperwork and had sections for

documents, finance, publications, and communications. Within the CCP, i t never approached the power that Stalin’s Secretariat enjoyed over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* The oldest and perhaps most important Central Committee department was organization, which Ch’en Tu-hsiu also appears to have managed

after Mao Tse-tung’s departure for Hunan in late 1924. I t then had three sections, for investigation, distribution of work assignments, and training of Party members. The other original department of the Party was propaganda, headed during most of the mid-1920’s b y Ch’en’s disciple, P’eng

Shu-chih. The Fourth National Congress had established a Central Committee women’s department,”® and the October, 1925, plenum called for the establishment of formal (as against earlier a d hoc) labor, peasant, and military affairs departments. L i Li-san, M a o Tse-tung, and Chang Kuo-t’ao (later, Chou En-lai), respectively, headed these when they were created

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The Long March to Power

about this time or soon thereafter. Hence, i t appears that Party Central established organization and propaganda departments in 1921, a women’s department and a Secretariat i n 1925, and labor and peasant departments and the Military Affairs Committee about 1926.%*

Aside from the problems of the united front and the mass movements, the principal question under discussion by Chinese Communist leaders in 1925 was the perennial one of what degree of centralization or decentralization was most desirable. The discussion was complicated by intensi-

fying dissension between the ‘‘practical workers” and the central administrators and ideologues. This conflict, analogous to the dispute between the “reds” and the “experts” thirty years later, nearly wrecked the Party after 1927, but i t was evident from the very beginning. I n 1925, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, altering his early views on Party organization and now backed b y many of the “returned students” from Russia and France,

advocated greater authority for the inner circle of leaders at Shanghai. The centralizers were especially unhappy with the powerful North China and Kwangtung bureaus, which often acted on their own. The former opposed and at times obstructed the united front, and the latter was accused first of participating i n the Kuomintang without safeguarding Communist organization and later of obstructing the united front. Comrades i n the South and North were also rebuked for by-passing the

Central Committee and Voitinsky i n Shanghai in order to talk directly with Borodin in Canton or with Karakhan i n Peking. I n the mid-1920’s, not only the powerful bureaus but most “practical workers,” including Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Chii Ch’iu-pai, Teng Chung-hsia, and,

above all, Li Li-san,* opposed further centralization. They favored maximum latitude for local initiative in order to take advantage of widely varying conditions i n other areas and i n the mass movements, and they charged that Ch’en Tu-hsiu was trying to run the Party as i f i t were his family. However, the centralizers apparently won the initial stages of this argument, and the October, 1925, Central Committee plenum and other meetings ordered special commissioners to direct the regional and local com-

mittees, while allowing for local initiative in Kwangtung and elsewhere.*® Below the Central Committee at this time, the hierarchy of Party control extended to the regional or special city committees, to sectional and provincial committees within the regions and cities, and finally to local Party branches and cells. Prior to about 1926, there was no developed organization and hierarchy w i t h i n these subdivisions, b u t i n February of that year, the Central Committee called for the establishment of city, county, and district Party sections, and i n July for subcommittees, “defined b y area,” to be formed under the next higher committee. Wherever there were five or more city or county sections, a provincial Party section was also to be organized between the regional and local levels. The committees were elected by lower-level organizations, b u t their chairmen were subject to

appointment and/or approval by higher committees. * L i i n 1930, b y contrast, became t h e Party’s foremost centralizer, i n a reversal

reminiscent of Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s shift on questions of centralization from the early to mid-1920s, and of Mao’s at various stages after 1949. Arguments on this question seemed to depend very much o n the advocate’s position and duties.

[Chap. 3]

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69

I n short, by 1927, Party hierarchy embraced i n theory, though with

variations and often only on paper, the following nine levels: (1) central; (2) regional or special city (e.g., Shanghai); (3) provincial; (4) sectional, special district or border region; (5) county or town; (6) district; (7) subdistrict, township, or administrative village; (8) branch or cell (at village, school, and factory levels); and (9) small group or cell subgroup. These divisions basically persist to the present but of course with considerable vari-

ation over time and i n terminology.’® I n practice, especially in earlier years, there was generally a simpler structure of central, provincial or metropolitan, county or town, local levels and cells, as some of the levels were

omitted or operated i n parallel fashion rather than in a strict chain of command. Thus, regional, sectional, and district committees often gave way to provincial, county, and town committees and vice versa, but, as the

Party developed, an increasing number of levels, corresponding to traditional and Nationalist usage, came into use. Above the cell and branch,

various-level congresses were to elect executive committees of from three to nine men. By the middle 1920’s, there were three major geographical divisions in Party w o r k : the northern, which had four subdivisions, and the central and the southern, which had six subdivisions each. Another report spoke

of four or five great regional divisions in Party organization by early 1927, headquartered at Wuhan for Hunan-Hupeh under Chang Kuo-t’ao, at Canton for Kwangtung-Kwangsi under Ch’en Yen-nien, at Shanghai for Chekiang-Kiangsu under Lo Yi-nung, and at Peking for Hopeh and surrounding areas under Li Ta-chao.®’ The southern, usually called the Kwangtung Bureau, under Chou En-lai i n 1924, and Ch’en Yen-nien, from 1925 to April, 1927, was the largest of the regional bureaus u n t i l late 1926. Centered i n Canton, many of the approximately 200 Communists i n the city who were under its jurisdiction held important positions i n the Nationalist Party. I n 1925, i t had six departments, more than the Central Committee then had, for organization, propaganda, military, labor, peasants, and women. I n addition, i t ran its

own school and published a People’s Weekly. Despite the high degree of organization of the Kwangtung Bureau on paper, Party Central* accused i t of failing to consolidate its influence either in the Kuomintang or the mass movements and of working individually rather than as a Party. The Kwangtung Bureau also worked closely with Borodin, who reportedly urged the transfer of Communist headquarters to Canton and frequently used his authority to by-pass Party Central i n Shanghai.®® I n the North, a Party regional bureau, at different times under L i Tachao and Chang Kuo-t’ao, supervised work i n Hopeh, Shansi, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and worked closely with the Peking Municipal * That i s , the Central Committee o r i t s top echelons, later the Political Bureau a n d

its Standing Committee. + The first Mongols entered the Party in 1923-24 and, by 1925, were working i n Suiteh and i n various areas of Inner Mongolia. However, their number, like that of other non-Han Chinese i n the CCP, remained small. The first Party organization i n Manchuria was a workers’ union formed in Dairen in 1923, which led to the formation of a Dairen City Committee in 1926 and of a Provincial Committee in 1928 located in Mukden.”

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The Long March to Power

Committee. Both committees were under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Committee, and its October, 1925, and July, 1926, plenums criticized the North China Bureau for failure to expand the M a y Thirtieth

Movement to its area and for its neglect of the women’s and youth movements. Under the North China Bureau, a Honan-Shensi Committee, estab-

lished in May, 1926, had special opportunities and problems resulting from the rising fortunes of the “Christian general,” Feng Yii-hsiang. Many Party and Youth League branches were established i n Suiteh in northern Shensi and elsewhere as early as the spring of 1924, and many later prominent Communists, including the Shensi Soviet leader Liu Chih-tan, future head of the Secretariat Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others, served as political advisers i n Feng’s National People’s Army after its organization i n

October, 1924. Feng preached nationalist and vaguely reformist bromides and received considerable financial and military aid from the Soviet Union,

in amounts exceeding those given the Nationalists in the year following the death of Sun Yat-sen.'®® Work with Feng presented the same problems for the Communists as did work with the Nationalists, with whom Feng allied in late 1926. I n the spring of 1927, a Shensi-Kansu Bureau was organized to serve the Northwest, and for a time there was also a Party organization for the Northeast centered at Harbin. For all its growth after the May Thirtieth Movement, the Party organizational network still d i d not cover all the cities, let alone the countryside of China. The July, 1926, plenum revealed that “barely” 120 persons were working full-time for the Party, mostly i n Shanghai, Kwangtung, and

Hunan, while current needs called for at least “35 persons for regional work; 160 persons for local and sectional committee work; 160 persons for special or Party cell work, totaling 355 persons.” Aside from the hundred-odd full-time Party regulars and the few Communists who were employed by the Nationalists, most Party members, of whom there were more than 50,000 i n early 1927, continued to make

their living as best they could. Many of the intellectuals, who then made up 22 per cent of the Party, were teachers, while half or so of Party members were factory workers. Only 5 per cent were peasants and 2 per cent soldiers, proportions that would reverse after 1927.12 The new Chinese proletariat, however, was only one o r at most two generations removed

from the countryside, and parents of Party leaders i n the 1920’s, as later, came overwhelmingly from rural backgrounds. There were significant

numbers of female Communists only in Shanghai and Hunan. The basic unit of local Party organization was the cell. I t was “the nucleus of our Party i n various factories, mines, schools or areas,” from

which the hierarchy of committees ascended. The October and July Central Committee plenums criticized the fact that Party work was run primarily through the local and higher committees, rather than through the cells, and stated that, i n the future, “ W e must build the foundation of our Party o n the cells.” Cells were to be of two types, those grouped b y

function in factories, schools, and the like, and those grouped by area, i n villages, streets, and districts of the larger cities.'®® They were to be

formed wherever there were three to five Party members, according to

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

71

the rules of the Comintern and of the Party constitution adopted at the Second Congress of the CCP. Larger cells or branches of perhaps several

dozen members elected their own executive committees and subdivided into small groups, each charged with specific work.*** “Each cell should carry on the activities of the entire Party (such as the labor and peasant movements, cooperatives, relief associations, the women’s movement, the youth movement, distribution of books and magazines, introduction of members, intelligence reports, communication of messages, etc.) i n accord-

ance with the condition, membership, and the needs of each cell.”**® Another report stated, I n short the significance of the cell is as follows: (a) i t is the basic organ a n d organizational u n i t o f the Party; ( b ) i t i s the school o f the Party for education and propaganda; (c) i t is the kernel o f the Party among the

masses; (d) i t is the instrument for development of the Party; (e) i t is the center of life of the Party; (f) i t is the Party’s weapon of struggle.

The cell was to meet once a week to hear reports and discuss implementation of Party policies.’®® I n theory, cell discussions were to be communi-

cated up the hierarchy prior to the execution of key decisions. There was nothing i n the Party rules to ensure this, however, and the content of

“democratic centralism” depended on circumstances. I f the cell was the basic unit of Party organization, the “fraction,” or informal organization of Communists within other groups, offered the basic means o f expanding influence outside the Party. I n the operation

of the united front, i t was especially crucial to the manipulation of other groups for Communist goals. Although fractions had been formed within

the Kuomintang three months after the initiation of the “bloc within,” the July, 1926, Central Committee plenum admitted defects i n this work

and even in the understanding of fractions. As the plenum explained their function: “ T h e work of Party fractions is to represent collectively the

opinion of the Party i n carrying through the Party’s policies. Independent opinion on the part of an individual is not allowed. . . . ” ' * " I t was precisely this preservation of Communist discipline and ideas, of course, that alarmed many Nationalists.

Early Work with Peasants I n contrast w i t h its development i n the cities, i n the mid-1920’s, Com-

munist organization had only begun to penetrate to China’s hundreds of millions who lived i n the countryside. I f i t is a truism that the triumph of Chinese Communism was based on harnessing the dynamics of peasant discontent, i t is also true that i n the 1920’s Communist efforts and successes i n the villages were the exception rather than the rule. The July, 1926, plenum admitted, “We have not devoted a great deal of time to work i n the peasant movement, and w i t h the exception of Kwangtung, we

have only just begun this work. . . . ” * ® Where the Communists did begin to organize the peasants, their work immediately jeopardized the maintenance of the united front because

conservative Nationalists feared many implications of the social revolu-

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The Long March to Power

tion. Although the Third International stated from 1920 that revolutions in the East must be based on the action of the peasant masses and, as early as May, 1923, had explicitly instructed the Chinese Communists to

stress the peasant movement and carry out radical land slogans, i t also demanded priority for the united front w i t h the Kuomintang, which it

saw as the leader of a bourgeois land reform against the old feudal landowners. Yet, since many of its officers came from landed families, the Nationalist Party could only be alarmed at Comintern demands, such as those of 1923 and 1926, for land confiscation without compensation and for making ‘‘the fundamental problem of the Chinese national liberation movement . .

the peasant p r o b l e m . ” ' ” Hence, the Comintern also

approved the CCP’s Fourth National Congress ruling that ‘peasants should not be allowed to decide recklessly on the reduce-rent movement” and other problems and the July, 1926, Central Committee plenum state-

ment that the ‘peasant movement has developed the disease of left deviation everywhere.”’*'°

I t is evident that Chinese Communist land policy became more conservative i n 1926, i n contrast to Comintern pronouncements and to its

own earlier statements. I n part, this shift no doubt reflected the antipeasant bias of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, which had traditional roots and was reinforced by Marxism. I n August, 1923, Ch’en stated, “ T h e main force of the Communist movement must consist of industrial workers. I n a country

such as China, over half the farmers are petit bourgeois landed farmers who adhere firmly to notions of private property. H o w can they accept Communism?”’''" But, at its root, the more conservative Chinese Com-

munist land policy of 1926 was forced by the growing conservatism of most Nationalists, to whom the Communists were bound by the Cominternimposed united front. Land reform could not be allowed to jeopardize this. While stating that a “complete peasant political platform” should await

the Party’s Fifth Congress, a mid-1926 Party resolution on the peasant movement asked only for a limiting of land rent to 50 per cent of the crop, as against normal rents i n South China of two-thirds of the crop or more, and for other moderate economic and political demands. Where the October, 1925, plenum and previous statements had treated all landlords as oppressors of the peasantry, the July, 1926, Central Committee plenum excluded only large absentee landowners and notorious usurers in calling for a broad-based united front of “self-cultivating peasants, hired farm laborers, tenant farmers, and middle and small landlords.” Rural teachers and even secret societies, such as the Red Spears i n North China and other admittedly backward groups, were to be utilized where possible,

and i t was stated that “peasant organizations need not reflect the coloring of a political party,” nor was i t necessary to bring up the term “peasant class.’’'*? I n spite of these policy ambiguities, which contained the seeds of future tragedy, there was no question that the Communists virtually monopolized peasant work within the Kuomintang, but this monopoly could not be translated into real power because of other limitations o n Communist strength imposed by the united front, including limits o n ultimate decisionmaking and especially o n military power.''* W e will return to this compli-

[Chap. 3]

The First United Front

73

cated question of Communist land policy and the united front in the next chapter, but here we should outline the impressive achievements of the Communists i n organizing the peasants i n the mid-1920’s, even if this organization was to a large extent at the mercy of anti-Communist generals

until after 1927. The first effective Communist-led peasant movement in China, that in Hailufeng led b y P’eng P’ai mentioned above, was bloodily suppressed

in March, 1924. But by then the just-reorganized Kuomintang had established a peasant bureau headed by a Communist, Lin Po-ch’ii, and, when P’eng P’ai fled to Canton, P’eng, along w i t h several other early Communist

peasant leaders, became a secretary of the bureau.''* I n addition, the Nationalists established a central committee in charge of the farmers’ movement, with T’an P’ing-shan as one of its three members. The Nationalists not only recommended the establishment of peasant associations and cooperative societies but also founded a school, the Peasant

Training Institute, to train cadres for work among the farmers. P’eng P’ai became director of the Institute’s first class in the summer of 1924, and other Communists headed subsequent classes, as did Mao Tse-tung its sixth, largest (318 graduates), and last i n Canton in the summer of 1926. Peasant associations soon burgeoned in Kwangtung, reviving i n Hailufeng and springing u p i n Kuangning and other counties. They reportedly

contributed to the Nationalist crushing of the Merchants Corps in the autumn of 1924, to the two Eastern and the Southern Expeditions of 1925, and to the military expeditions of 1 9 2 6 . " However, the inner contradiction between agrarian revolution and more limited Nationalist aims was also evident from the beginning. Sun Yat-sen rejected Borodin’s proposals for land redistribution as premature and called rather for reducing land rents by an amount fixed in 1926 at one-quarter. The Kuomintang directed peasants to pay the taxes needed for the military unification of the country and spoke of Sun’s “land to the tiller” policy as a long-range goal. Before 1927, therefore, the Communists could and did push the agrarian revolution only where special conditions existed, as i n Kuangning,

Haifeng, and Lufeng counties in Kwangtung.''® I n the Hailufeng area, P’eng P’ai demanded revenge for seventy murdered comrades and presaged future storms when o n October 25, 1926, he said, “ ‘Benevolence’ to the enemy is cruelty to the revolutionary side. From now on we must

go forward following the tracks of the martyrs’ blood and must exterminate our enemy to the last.”’''? I n early May, 1925, the Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Association was

formed, claiming to speak for several hundred thousand peasants in some twenty counties, a figure that grew to about 700,000 i n seventy-three counties b y mid-1927. Next to and eventually surpassing Kwangtung in peasant organization was Hunan, and representatives from there, Kwangtung, and nine other provinces convened the Second Kwangtung Provincial Congress of Peasant Associations i n Canton o n May 1, 1926. By June of that year, the peasant associations claimed 981,442 members i n 5,353

peasant organizations throughout China and a year later more than 9 million members in sixteen provinces.''® I n the mid-1920’s, the Communists helped to stir u p and organize the

74

The Long March to Power

peasantry, b u t there is n o question, as M a o Tse-tung emphasized in early

1927, that the peasant movement had a dynamism of its own, independent of outside agitators. I n fact, there were only 600 Communist activists working i n more than 6,000 village peasant organizations in Kwangtung in mid-1926,'*° and literature of the time repeatedly speaks of uprisings proceeding without Communist direction, i n the millennial tradition of Chinese peasant rebellions. I n 1927, o n the contrary, as will be seen, the

Communists had to try to rein i n the peasants lest agrarian revolution disrupt the united front. Whatever the exaggeration or lack of meaning in the membership claims of the peasant associations, i t is certain that the rapid growth of mass organizations i n the countryside, as i n the cities, greatly accelerated

Party growth. This ability to attract and organize militant activists proved the greatest strength of the Communists. I n Hailufeng, where there were 700 Communists i n December, 1926, there were 4,000 b y March, 1927,

and Communist cells existed i n 330 of the 850 villages where peasant associations existed.'*® The beginnings of the Communist movement in the vast hinterland were under way, although most Communists continued to direct their attention primarily toward the cities.

NATIONALIST CONQUEST OF T H E SOUTH

The first united front attained its optimum development in early 1926, even as the Nationalist armies prepared to drive north against the warlords. I n this period the Communists came to the threshold of power, but not yet all the way to power, as they very painfully learned a year later.

I f the primary practical question of the united front for the Communists was one of timing—how to get maximum benefit from an alliance and get out of i t before causing excessive conservative reaction—then 1926 was the logical year to end i t . This, of course, is much easier to see

from hindsight, and exactly when i n 1926, or early 1927, the Communists should have terminated the united front i n order to retain maximum gains is difficult to say. The most outstanding event of 1926 b y far, the successful Nationalist conquest of much of South-Central China, was helped, not hindered, b y the collaboration. Furthermore, vested interests i n the united

front had increased to the point where Chinese Communist and especially Soviet leaders appeared unwilling and unable to disentangle from the Nationalist alliance until forced to do so by the disasters of mid-1927.

Within the Kuomintang, the split between proponents and opponents of the united front had intensified i n 1925, w i t h the former gaining an apparent victory. I n the process, however, a conservative reaction was generated, which, together w i t h other developments, overwhelmed the radicals two years later. Still, in 1925 and 1926, events favored the

Communists as the Nationalists became convinced that unification of the country could come only through force, and the May Thirtieth Movement had dramatized the part the Communists and the masses they led might play i n that unification. Despite challenges to the prevailing interpretations o f the united front, caused b y the death of Sun Yat-sen i n March, 1925, the assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai i n August, and the formation i n November of a “Western

Hills” faction of the Kuomintang, which sought t o expel the Communists from the “ b l o c w i t h i n , ” the Nationalist left (led by Wang Ching-wei and,

i t was thought at the time, by Chiang Kai-shek) appeared to strengthen its hold on the Kuomintang." I n July, the newly proclaimed national

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The Long March to Power

government chose the attractive but temperamental Wang as its first chairman, and subsequently Chiang Kai-shek for the first time emerged as a principal political as well as military leader. Ironically, until 1927, Chiang was known i n the Western and Russian press as a “ r e d general,”

who spoke much of anti-imperialism and of the need for nationalist revolution. Actually, he was representative of the center of Kuomintang politics and, with the dominant Nationalist and Comintern leadership, continued for the moment to favor existing policies.

Nevertheless, the situation was extremely complex and subject to rapid change. I n Central and North China, there was severe repression under

the warlords, and most Communists were greatly concerned over the hardening of conservative opposition to the united front within the southern government. I n August, the Party retreated from its maximum demands of the May Thirtieth Movement, publicly toning down “slogans

on big issues and concentrating instead on daily problems,” and Ch’en Tu-hsiu sent a letter to the leader of the Nationalist right, Tai Chi-t’ao, defending the Communist position. Ch’en later claimed that i n private he had proposed beginning “immediate preparations for a withdrawal from the Kuomintang” but had been overruled by a majority of his Central Committee and b y the Comintern delegate.? I n any case, the

October, 1925, Central Committee plenum i n Peking, at which Ch’en’s alleged proposal was made, took a relatively hard line o n united front questions.

The Communist leadership decided to maintain the alliance but to strengthen the Communist position by increasing its help for the Nationalist left and by stressing independent organization within the Kuomintang. I t rebuked the alleged failure o f more conservative Communists,

especially in the Kwangtung Bureau, to maintain a clear distinction between the Communists and the Nationalists.®* The plenum sought to guide Party operations through the maze of Kuomintang factions by defining more precisely the Nationalist left, right, and center, according to their respective policies toward the Soviet Union, the CCP, mass movements, imperialism, militarism, and the reactionaries. Finally, i t directed

the Communists to establish mass movements on their own i n areas where they were weak and to ‘““cooperate earnestly” but “oppose the [Kuomintang] right wing and unite with the left w i n g , ” where both parties were

strong.* The Second K M T Congress and the March Twentieth Incident of 1926

I n the short run, the tightening of united front policies seemed well founded, as the Kuomintang rebuked its Western Hills faction and rewarded the Communists with new positions at its Second National Congress held i n Canton i n January, 1926. More than 100 of the 256 Congress delegates were Communists. Seven of them were elected to the Central Executive Committee o f thirty-five, including L i n Po-ch’li, T’an P’ing-shan, and L i Ta-chao, and seven more, including Mao Tse-tung, were

among the twenty alternates.’ The Communists dominated key organizations even more conspicu-

ously than before. All but three of the twenty-nine-man staff of the

[Chap. 4]

Nationalist Conquest o f the South

77

Nationalist organization bureau under T’an P’ing-shan were said to be Communists, while Mao Tse-tung controlled the propaganda bureau, nominally under Wang Ching-wei, as its secretary, and Lin Po-ch’ii was again director of the peasant bureau. There were, i n addition, Communist secretaries of the bureaus for labor, youth, overseas Chinese, women, and even merchants, while a Communist was chief secretary of the Kuomintang’s Central Party Headquarters. Communists were also well represented i n the political sections of various training institutes, including the Peasant

and Women’s Training institutes, in the political sections of some military units, and i n the Kuomintang’s o w n Political Training Class, where Mao, Lin Po-ch’i, L i Fu-ch’un, another returned student from France, and others taught. Their teaching stressed revolutionary history and theory. Nonetheless, real power i n such organizations as the Central Supervisory Committee, and especially i n the military, continued to be held b y potential enemies of the Communists. Despite rebukes for their anti-Communist activities, rightists retained places on key Nationalist councils.®

The Kuomintang’s Second National Congress confirmed the position of Chiang Kai-shek as second only to Wang Ching-wei in the new leadership of the Nationalist Pary. Chiang was elected to the Central Executive Committee for the first time, tying Wang and two others for the largest number of votes. This could only have occurred with Communist backing, which is not surprising in view of the context of the times and Chiang’s apparent political neutrality or even leftism. Nevertheless, not

long after he had been quoted as saying, “the realization of the Three People’s Principles means the realization of Communism,” Chiang moved

to the right and was being looked to by many as a balance between Nationalist conservatives and radicals.’ B y January, 1926, signs of Chiang’s discontent with the Soviet advisers and with at least some of the Communists began to appear. H i s diary

spoke of “deceit,” and he was especially unhappy with the brusque ways of Soviet adviser Kisanka.* H e was also angry at Russian opposition to

his early proposals for the long-awaited Northern Expedition to unify the country. I n February, Chiang moved to restrict the operations of Soviet advisers and, on March 8, he told Wang Ching-wei “ . we must draw a line somewhere. I n no circumstances should we forfeit [ t h e ] freedom of making our own decisions.” O n subsequent days, his diary showed more concern with leftist activities and, at a meeting on March 9 , Chiang

reportedly planned actions to deal with the Communists.® I n circumstances that are still obscure, on March 20, Chiang declared

martial law, claiming that a Communist-officered gunboat, the Chungshan, was planning to kidnap him and deport him to Russia, as he had helped to deport conservative leader H u Han-min a half-year before.'® Whether or not there was a Communist plot, Communists were profoundly affected by the affair and its consequences. Initially, Chiang * N . V . Kuibyshev, the brother o f Bolshevik hero V . V . Kuibyshev. K i s a n k a h a d

replaced Vasily Bliukher (Galin) as head of the Soviet military mission i n Canton in the summer of 1925, but Galin returned after these troubles at Chiang’s request.’ Borodin, w h o might have been able t o smooth over some o f the difficulties, h a d left

Canton for discussions with Feng Yii-hsiang in North China.

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The Long March to Power

arrested about fifty Communists, placed the Soviet advisers under house arrest, and moved to limit sharply Communist power within the Kuomintang. While maintaining that his action was directed only against the

persons involved in the alleged plot and not against the alliance with the U.S.S.R. and the Communists as such, Chiang proposed, and the Central Executive Committee accepted with minor revisions on M a y 17, the

following major limitations on Communist operations within the Nationalist Party: (1) The Communists were to “modify their expressions and attitude toward the Kuomintang,” showing proper respect to Sun Yat-sen and his principles; (2) the CCP was to provide the Nationalists with a

“complete list of its members” in the Kuomintang ‘for safekeeping’’; (3) Communists could no longer serve as heads of bureaus i n Nationalist headquarters; (4) and (5) the Communists should not have separate

organizations within the Kuomintang nor call meetings or act separately without “specific permission” from the KMT; (6) the CCP should send no directives to its own members without the permission of a joint conference o f the two parties; (7) Nationalists could no longer become

Communists without permission; and (8) all who disregarded these instructions were to be deprived of membership and subject to penalty. Furthermore, the Central Executive Committee decided that Communists might not hold more than one-third of the seats on executive committees

at central, municipal, and district levels. Simultaneously with these directives, Chiang moved to consolidate his organizational control of the party, which was facilitated b y Wang Ching-wei’s withdrawal from the struggle

to take one of his frequent “rest cures” i n Europe. Chiang took over the all-powerful organization bureau vacated by T’an P’ing-shan, and Communists were removed from control of their other bureaus in accordance with the new instructions. Communist Reactions

Obviously, these developments posed the gravest challenge to Communist policy, but regional and personal differences, the obscurity of events, the interference o f Moscow, and the basic contradictions i n united

front policy all made very difficult a unified Communist response. The Kwangtung Committee of the CCP, many of whose members were

immediately affected by the March Twentieth Incident and perhaps stung by criticism of previous passivity, reacted first and called for an immediate counterattack against Chiang. They would not abandon the united front but, on the contrary, would try to take over the Nationalist Party from within, superseding the now obviously weak left wing. I n Shanghai and

Peking, a minority favored the opposite extreme of complete withdrawal from the Kuomintang, and some comrades in Shanghai had previously urged a boycott o f the Second Nationalist Congress i n January. Most

Communists i n Shanghai, however, apparently backed Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s call for more independence but refused to attempt a countercoup. I n June, the Central Committee decided on a compromise formula to deal w i t h the new situation; i t would continue the united front i n the interests

of the national revolution but advised withdrawing from the Kuomintang and cooperating as a separate party. I n other words, Party Central

[Chap. 4]

Nationalist Conquest of the South

79

advised shifting from the “bloc within” to the ‘bloc without” strategy.!? However, according to Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his leading assistant, P’eng Shu-chih, the Comintern rejected this and other proposals for greater independence as posing too great a threat to the united front.!* The Soviet Union appeared increasingly more concerned with the threat posed by Japan and England than with Chiang Kai-shek. On March 25, a special meeting of a newly created Chinese committee of the Soviet

Party’s Political Bureau had taken up the question of a possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and decided, among other things, to appease Japan at China’s expense by recognizing Japanese interests i n

southern Manchuria. For his part, Chiang badly needed Russian arms and support, i n view of the proposed Northern Expedition against the warlords. Accordingly, he did all he could to make i t appear that his actions were not aimed at breaking the alliance with the Soviet Union, but only at certain objectionable Soviet advisers and Chinese Communists. Chiang apolo-

gized, denied responsibility for the whole episode, and allowed Chou En-lai to reinstate many of the purged Communists at

the

Whampoa Acad-

emy. Reaffirming support for the Communist International, he stated, “Both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang are fighting against imperialism, and i f the Kuomintang [abandoned] the Communist Party, not only would the Communist revolution not succeed b u t the Kuomintang

revolution would also be a failure.”'* More importantly, Chiang agreed to take steps against the Nationalist right as a balance to the previous moves against the left. The crucial question remained Chiang himself. Shortly after the March Twentieth Incident, a Soviet military adviser reported that the Communists could use Chiang’s “lust for glory and power and craving to be a hero” but also warned that “we know that attacks on us are inevitable sooner or later.” Still, he concluded that “there is no doubt but that we should, in the light of the over-all program, utilize him by all means to carry on the revolutionary struggle.” On April 8, a journal of the Communist International asserted that prospects “were never so favorable [for the Chinese revolution] as they are now,” and, i n May, the Soviet Communist Party adopted proposals drawn up by Voitinsky, which spoke of the “possibility of a certain separation of functions” and of outright separation “ i n case o f emergency.”*® A Soviet report of June 3 explained the

decision to continue the “bloc within’: Thus we were confronted with two alternatives: (1) accept Chiang’s demands i n order to avoid a catastrophe which would otherwise be inevitable, (2) . form an anti-Chiang alliance and by the pressure of this alliance force Chiang not to yield to the demands of the anti-Communist faction i n the Kuomintang. . The problem was solved by adopting a policy to satisfy Chiang and yield to his demands.”

I n other words, Comintern representatives were conscious of the choice and chose to bet o n Chiang Kai-shek, even though they were aware that

his actions might be “intended to deceive his opponents for a second move.’’*®

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Borodin, who had returned to Canton from North China in April, elaborated on the reasons for continuing the “bloc within” and for reversing his own initial support for a countercoup: “ W e could have seized power i n Canton, but we could not have held i t . W e should have gone

down in a sea of blood. We would have tried i t if we had had a 25 per cent chance of surviving the coup for one year.”*®* H e reportedly further

advised that “the present period is one in which the Communists should do coolie service for the Kuomintang.” Borodin and Voitinsky also rejected proposed Chinese Communist efforts to “train independent military forces” or to arm Kwangtung peasants as means of bringing pressure

to bear,?® but the proposals of other Russian advisers to meet Chiang’s demand that “complete lists of Communist members be handed over to the respective commanders” were not adopted. I n return for all these concessions, Chiang Kai-shek promised, and to some extent placed, restrictions on the Nationalist right wing. I n short, in the crucial period after the March Twentieth Incident, when there were important indications of the growing conservatism of the Kuomintang and of Chiang Kai-shek i n particular, the Russians “revised” the Chinese Communist inclination to try to reorganize the united front and instead directed its continuation on Nationalist terms. I t is true that the Northern Expedition to unify the country was the dominant concern of all revolutionary groups in 1926, and this greatly strengthened the hand of Chiang Kai-shek as Nationalist military commander, but the importance of the Communists had also increased immeasurably since 1922, when Moscow had similarly directed complete acceptance of Sun Yat-sen’s terms for the united front. I f , for the Russians, Chiang Kai-shek

seemed to have the best chance of successfully completing the Northern Expedition despite his actions i n the spring of 1926, i t was also true that, by the end of the year, after the first stages of that military drive, Chiang Kai-shek was perhaps too strong to be stopped. Hindsight suggests, therefore, that the Communists would have done better to have shifted to cooperation “ f r o m without”’—or, i f the form of the united front was to be unchanged, to have insisted o n the leadership of a more pliable figure—

than to await Chiang Kai-shek’s bloody termination of the alliance in 1927. Soviet statements of May and June ruled against efforts to take over the Kuomintang from within, as urged by the Kwangtung Bureau, against any abandonment of the united front, as favored b y sections of the

Shanghai and Peking committees, and even against a shift from the “bloc w i t h i n ” to the “ b l o c without,” the compromise formula devised b y the

Central Committee in early June. The final push in this series of Comintern directives came when Stalin vetoed a draft, adopted at the July plenum of the CCP Central Committee, calling for a thorough reorganiza-

tion of the Nationalist Party as the price for continuing the “bloc within.”?' Instead, the Comintern would only allow a restatement in slightly stronger language, but without any organizational guarantees, of the old insistence on independence within the united front. The Communist monopoly of mass organizations was still supposed to be a sufficient lever to manipulate the Kuomintang. O n no account should the Com-

munists openly “expand the CCP and grab complete control over every-

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thing everywhere.” I n the past, this had only “alienated the Kuomintang and . .. aroused jealousy. . ” As i f a principle of Bolshevik organization

were the yielding of positions, a Soviet adviser i n April complained, “Comrades i n the CCP seem to have the same habit of monopolizing power typical of Chinese officials and generals who take on their own cliques and good friends as soon as they obtain high office.”’?? I n accordance w i t h these instructions, the July plenum condemned both extremes of trying to take over the Kuomintang or of withdrawing from it.

The plenum, which convened on July 12, acknowledged that the CCP had failed to build up the organization of the Nationalist left wing and that i t had antagonized its center and right wings by excessive demands and shows of power. Now i t would try to force the ‘“new right wing” or center to attack the more conservative “old right wing” as a means of strengthening the Kuomintang left. “ A t the same time, we guard against the rise of the center [i.e., Chiang Kai-shek] and force i t to turn the left

against the right. . Our duty therefore is to expand and strengthen the force of the workers and peasants, hold the petty bourgeoisie and fight the big bourgeoisie for leadership of the national movement.” The plenum explained, for the time being, we must still utilize the bourgeoisie. The reason is that, i f attacked too severely, the bourgeoisie would

be drawn completely into the imperialist camp. . . . ” ’ ? ® Despite this attempt to put the best face on their situation, the Chinese Communists must have had few illusions about recent developments. The plenum’s resolutions began w i t h a reference to the “coup d’état” of

March 20 and stated, “The armed center is now i n power in Kwangtung: The anti-Red movement of the Right Wing prevails throughout the country. They are all taking the offensive against the Communist Party.” Even

some of the Soviet advisers saw the realities of the situation. One went so far as to state that, “ a t the moment, the Kuomintang left is absolutely empty. Not only has i t no leaders, i t has n o masses. I t is difficult to say h o w the instructions [ o f the Comintern to strengthen the left wing] can be carried out.”’** Nonetheless, a way had to be found, as Moscow stub-

bornly clung to its ideas on the perpetuation of the united front. Another primary cause of dissension among the Communists i n 1926 and 1927 concerned the question o f the advisability of encouraging the Northern Expedition at that time and of its relation to the mass move-

ments. The problem was phrased aptly i n early 1927 i n terms of whether priority should be given to extending or to deepening the revolution. Communists oriented toward the national revolution tended to go along

with Chiang’s plans i n 1926 to press military unification and the consequent enlargement of the scope of revolution. Those oriented toward the social revolution, o n the other hand, feared dissipation of the revolution i f i t expanded too much before i t had completed its tasks i n the base area,

and they feared the compromises the search for military “allies” would require. Therefore, they favored postponing further military expeditions

until basic portions of the land and labor revolutions had been carried out in the areas under their control. As Ch’en Tu-hsiu put i t as early as 1924: [ The Kuomintang] has been founded entirely on the strength of reactionary

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I t will reach a [dead end] if it troops, bureaucrats, and merchants. overstretches itself to rely on various counterrevolutionary elements to push forward its military action. . . . 2 5

One of the major causes of Chiang’s moves against the Communists in March, 1926, had been their opposition to his proposals for a Northern Expedition. As late as March, the Soviets were still opposed, but within

a month this policy was altered at top levels as part of the Russian decision to conciliate Chiang. Despite continuing Chinese Communist reservations, in May, Borodin finally granted Russian support for the Northern Expedition as a price for continued cooperation with the “revolutionary general,” and, in June, the Kuomintang authorized final plans for the Northern Expedition to begin early i n July. The July plenum of the CCP Central

Committee decided to adopt a passive wait-and-see attitude, and emergency meetings of Party Central i n the late summer and early autumn

continued to debate what attitude the Communists should adopt toward the Northern Expedition.?®

The Northern Expedition The continuing deterioration of the situation i n North and Central China i n mid-1926 gave the Nationalists both additional cause and opportunity to open their drive against the northern warlords. The widely feared Chang Tso-lin was feuding w i t h his erstwhile ally, Feng Yii-hsiang, and early i n 1926 drove Feng’s last allies from the Peking area to the

northwest. I n the spring, Chang reached a limited agreement for concerted action to stop the “red menace” with W u P’ei-fu, who had staged

a comeback and controlled the area between the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. Finally, another powerful warlord, Sun Ch’uan-fang, was boss of

much of East and Southeast China. I n all these regions, suppression of the mass movements was severe, although radical work went on, especially i n areas under Feng Yii-hsiang’s control. However, Feng’s hands were far from clean. His men failed to stop the Peking government of old warlord Tuan Ch’i-jui from briefly arresting Li Ta-chao and killing some forty others during the suppression of an anti-imperialist demonstration on March 18, 1926. Although Feng was absent at the time, many Communists and Soviet advisers demanded an end to support for the “Christian general.” But, as in the case of Chiang Kai-shek and the March Twentieth Incident i n Canton, the Rus-

sians decided that the lesser evil would be to continue cooperation with Feng, to whose army they had already given some 6 million rubles (about $3 million) of military hardware. After his defeat by Chang Tso-lin, Feng entered the Kuomintang in September, 1926.*" I n March, 1926, W u P’ei-fu struck closer to the home of revolutionaries when he drove another rebellious former subordinate, T’ang Sheng-chih,

into southern Hunan. From there, T’ang’s appeal to the Nationalists for help against Wu provided the pretext for the start of the Northern Expedition. I n mid-1926 then, the Kuomintang controlled Kwangtung and Kwangsi, while groups of warlords, hostile to the national revolution in varying

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83

degrees, controlled all the rest of the country. The Nationalists were able to gain provisional support from other military men, first from such southwestern generals as L i Chi-shen, L i Tsung-jen, and Pai Ch’ung-hsi and

later from Feng Yii-hsiang i n the Northwest and T’ang Sheng-chih in Hunan. The Nationalist armies i n the South, five of which were of warlord origin, totaled some 80,000 to 100,000 men, while Feng Yii-hsiang

fielded several hundred thousand troops in the Northwest. Against these were poised the much larger but less united and disciplined armies of Chang Tso-lin i n Manchuria and the Northeast, of Sun Ch’uan-fang i n

East and Southeast China, and of W u P’ei-fu in North and Central China, and their numerous allies. Together, hostile warlords controlled more than 500,000 men, far outnumbering the Nationalists.

The Northern Expedition was officially launched i n early July, 1926, although some units went north earlier. The plan was to tackle first W u P’ei-fu to the north, then Sun Ch’uan-fang to the east, and finally Chang Tso-lin to the northeast, moving north from Kwangtung i n several major

columns.?® The geographical disposition of the Nationalist armies proved fateful, and the western and eastern columns, respectively, tended to move left and right politically as well as on the map. The Nationalist armies, especially on the western flank, made rapid progress primarily because of superior organization and leadership and also because of rapidly increas-

ing popular support for the national revolution against the warlords. Although pushed out of some crucial positions i n the Nationalist ranks after the March Twentieth Incident, the Communists played their customary leading role i n propaganda and mass agitation. Kuo Mo-jo, the future head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, headed the political propaganda sections o f several Nationalist armies, and Communists were especially active i n the Second, Fourth, and Sixth armies o n the western

flank and in the accelerating labor, youth, women’s, and peasant’s movements.?® The western columns, allied with T’ang Sheng-chih, took Changsha o n

July 10, points controlling the central Yangtze Valley by the end of August, and the Wuhan cities before the end of October. They “liberated” large areas of Central-South China from more than a decade of warlord rule. Armies o n the eastern flank, which were more closely allied with Chiang Kai-shek, especially the First, started later and made slower going against Sun Ch’uan-fang’s forces, at least until the end of October. Kiangsi,

Fukien, parts of Kiangsu, and Chekiang were taken by the end of the year, but Chiang Kai-shek’s prestige declined because of the relatively slower

progress of his units. Accordingly, enemies of Chiang, both Communist and non-Communist, pressed efforts to undermine or replace him, but again Russian advisers came to his support.?° During the first months of the Northern Expedition, the Chinese Com-

munists intensified their efforts to bolster the Nationalist left and simultaneously to deepen the revolution b y strengthening the mass movements.

I n contrast to Comintern policy, they attacked Chiang’s position by calling for the ouster o f some of his allies, who were pressing efforts to purge Communists from key bureaus, and they sought to recall Wang Ching-wei

from abroad as a more tractable ally to head the Nationalist left. At a

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joint conference on strategy with the Kuomintang held in Canton, October 15-28, the Communists raised slogans of “Down with personal dictatorship” and “Democracy within the party,” and they succeeded in passing a resolution to recall Wang Ching-wei. They denied that this move was intended to undercut Chiang’s position, but they clearly favored building u p the left, which they maintained was “ n o t yet dead,” as some had

argued. Chiang Kai-shek, then absent at the front, expressed new anger at what h e regarded as continued Communist intrigues.?!

The Developing Mass Movements and Communist Dilemmas The other line of Communist activity was increased attention to the mass movements. As the Nationalist armies moved north, Communist

agitators fanned out through the countryside to take advantage of the many new opportunities. Over vast areas of South and Central China, the masses were already in ferment, angered by enormous grievances against taxes, usury, land tenure, and conditions generally, and aroused to action

by the vacuum of authority resulting from the overthrow of warlord armies. I n many places, i n the tradition of innumerable revolts over the

centuries of Chinese history, peasants operated on their own to open granaries, seize fields and property, and discipline or kill those who opposed them. This was particularly true i n areas of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Hunan. I n Hunan, according to Mao Tse-tung, the “peasants’ organization was their organization, the revolution was their revolution.” As he related four decades later, “ W e organized the peasant movement,

we did not create it.”’*? Nonetheless, Communist agitators played a considerable role i n accelerating the peasant movement, although they did not learn how to translate peasant organization into military power until after 1927. Describing what he had seen of the peasant movement i n Hunan i n

early 1927, Mao Tse-tung eloquently pleaded for and defended peasant actions in his first important statement of revolutionary theory: doing fancy needlework; i t cannot be A revolution is not the same as A revolution is an uprising, an anything so refined, so calm and gentle. act o f violence whereby one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is

a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the authority of the feudal I f the peasants do not use the maximum of their landlord class. strength, they can never overthrow the authority of the landlords which has been deeply rooted for thousands of years. . [Therefore] all actions To put it labeled as “going too far” had a revolutionary significance. bluntly, i t was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror i n every rural area: Otherwise one could never suppress the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry. T o right a wrong, i t is necessary to exceed the proper limits, and the wrong cannot be righted without the proper limits being exceeded.??

He predicted further ferment i n an equally famous passage: “ I n a very short time . several hundred million peasants will rise like a tornado o r tempest, a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no power

however great will be able to suppress it.”’** I n part, this was the rhetoric

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Nationalist Conquest of the South

of a man who once declared of his bitter childhood,

85 I learned that

when I defended my rights by open rebellion my father relented, but when I remained meek and submissive he only cursed and beat me the more.””®® But he also prophesied. with poetic license the future of China. The growth of the peasant associations was spectacular, even i f one does not accept Communist statistics. According to the latter, membership in Hunan rose from a third of a million i n mid-1926 to 2 million b y the end of the year and to 4.5 million i n forty-one counties by June, 1927. I n

Hupeh, membership rose to 2.5 million by the latter date. There were 705,000 members i n Shensi, about the same number i n Kwangtung, 382,000 i n Kiangsi, 254,000 i n Honan, and lesser numbers elsewhere. By June, 1927, at their height, the peasant associations claimed more than

9 million numbers i n sixteen provinces. They were especially militant in Kwangtung and Hunan . ? ® The problem, of course, lay i n how to consolidate the gains that the peasant associations had made and, so long as the united front was i n

force, to keep peasant demands acceptable to both the Communists and Nationalists. The joint Nationalist-Communist conference of October,

1926, supposedly adopted a resolution to grant political power to the mass organizations i n accord with the Communist slogan, “ A l l political power to the peasant associations.” But there was considerable difference of opinion about the uses to which that power should be put. Where peasant associations moved, i n Mao’s phrase, to “overthrow the power o f

the landlords and to foster the growth of the power of the peasants,” there was an understandable reaction from conservative Nationalists, especially i n Kwangtung and Hunan.?” The July, 1926, CCP Central Com-

mittee plenum urged struggle only against “bad” and ‘‘reactionary, big” landlords, but the more militant peasant associations defined their enemies far more broadly.?® Thus, b y the spring of 1927, the Communists were i n

the incongruous position of having t o restrain the peasant movement they had helped to stir up. The needs of the national revolution made a mockery of Mao’s plea: To march at their head and lead them, or to follow at their rear, gesticulating at them and criticizing them? O r to face them as opponents? Every Chinese is free to choose among the three alternatives, but circumstances demand that a quick choice be made.?®

Yet, as of the end o f 1926, the Nationalists, and the Communists still allied

with them, had only authorized demands for a 25 per cent rent reduction and elimination of the worst legal and financial inequalities. To unleash the full revolutionary energies of the peasants would surely wreck the united front, whose existence the Communists were directed to uphold. Accordingly, as we shall see, the Communists equivocated o n this fundamental question o f h o w to reconcile a revolutionary peasant movement with the united front u n t i l the contradiction very nearly destroyed them.

Similar problems arose i n the labor movement, which had also surged rapidly ahead. I n Hunan, membership i n labor unions was said to have risen from 60,000 to 400,000 between 1926 and the spring of 1927, and

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to about the latter figure i n Hupeh where there were 341 separate unions, three-quarters of them in Wuhan. Communists continued to dominate the leadership of labor organizations i n both provinces and also of the National General and Shanghai General Labor Unions and the Chinese Seamen’s Union organizations in Canton and Hong Kong. Over all, the Communists claimed to influence some 1.2 million workers at the time of the Third Congress of the National General Labor Union held in Canton i n May, 1926, and close to 3 million workers b y the time of the Fourth

Congress held in Wuhan i n June, 1927, although, as mentioned, actual membership, at least of industrial workers, was much smaller.*

The labor unions assisted the progress of the Northern Expedition substantially, its members serving as pickets i n support of advancing troops and sabotaging the economy o f opposing warlords, as they did i n disrupting railroad traffic around Wuhan. However, once installed i n Central China b y the end of 1926, the Nationalists limited labor activity i n areas

under their control i n order to prevent disruption of production needed for the war effort. They ordered the disarming of some of the more militant labor pickets, and the Communists complied in the interests of the united front. The Canton—-Hong Kong strike, which had begun i n June, 1925, was finally called off i n part for similar reasons and without major gains

i n October, 1926. The dilemma of weighing the benefits of continuing the united front against the dangers posed by increasing evidence that the Nationalist Party was becoming more and more conservative confronted Communist strategists very clearly by the fall of 1926. I n October, the Kremlin sent a telegram demanding that the Central Committee restrain “peasant excesses” i n order to avoid antagonizing Nationalist generals.*® Later, Stalin admitted that this telegram had been a mistake and claimed that i t was withdrawn

within a month and hence not characteristic of Comintern policy. But the Comintern continued to demand that the Communists work through the Kuomintang. I t reversed the orders of the CCP Central Committee of December 2 that Communists should refuse to serve as magistrates i n newly conquered areas of Kiangsi and those of January that workers should not join the Kuomintang. Some Chinese comrades feared that association with the Nationalists would hamper their revolutionary work, especially as the Kuomintang increased its restrictions o n the mass movements. Moscow, o n the contrary, stressed the necessity and feasibility of carrying out land revolution through the Nationalist Party** at the time * There were only 76,000 “actual” members of the Shanghai General Labor Union in early 1927, but one estimate a few months later claimed Communist leadership of 800,000 workers i n Shanghai, 400,000 each i n Kwangtung and Hupeh, 250,000 each i n H o n g K o n g a n d H u n a n , 300,000 i n C h e k i a n g , 200,000 i n K i a n g s i , 45,000 i n Szechw a n , a n d lesser numbers i n H o p e h , H o n a n , S h a n t u n g , Shensi, a n d M a n c h u r i a . This

source speaks of Communist influence over 2 million artisans and about 1 million “ t r u e proletarians,” o f w h o m 180,000 were c o t t o n workers, 160,000 seamen, 150,000

coolies and porters, 120,000 silk workers, 60,000 miners and 60,000 rickshaw-pullers, 50,000 printers, and 35,000 railroad men.” Another source states that 1.6 million of China’s 2.1 million industrial workers and 1.2 million of its 12 million artisans comprised the 2.8 million under the control of the National General Labor Union i n the spring of 1927.”

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when the K M T was reneging on promises to press for reductions i n rent. Thus, the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ( E C C I ) , meeting i n Moscow from November 22 to Decem-

ber 16, 1926, incomprehensibly argued that the “fear that the aggravation of the class struggle in the countryside will weaken the united antiimperialist front is baseless.” O n the contrary, its theses stated, “The

machinery of the national revolutionary government provides a very effective way to reach the peasantry. The Communist Party must use this machinery.”*® This proved to be one of the Comintern’s more ironic statements. While Nationalist policy called for exempting from redistribution land belonging to Nationalist officers and to small landowners, Comintern

strategists argued that other Kuomintang policies would foster agrarian revolution. The Communists were to convince the petty bourgeoisie of the desirability of confiscating larger holdings belonging to ‘reactionaries’ and of carrying out other measures of rent reduction and legal, tax, and credit improvements. They maintained that such an attack on ‘“feudal-

ism” would benefit the urban petty bourgeoisie through lower prices and better market conditions. The Russians, of course, and not for the first time, were looking o n the

Chinese revolution i n terms of their own. They tried to see in the Kuomintang a Chinese version of the Russian Social Revolutionary Party, and

even Trotsky called i t “the peasants’ own party.” Chinese conditions were far different; the Nationalists wanted national unity, not social revolution.

The peasants did not distinguish between the land of Nationalist families and warlord land, and virtually every property-owner quickly supported the Nationalists as their success became evident. So, i f Nationalist land was exempted, there could be little rural reform. A t the Comintern’s Seventh Plenum, T’an P’ing-shan noted the Chinese Communist dilemma:

“ W e must safeguard the interests of the peasantry, but on the other hand we must maintain and solidify the united front of the national revolutionary movement. I n so contradictory a situation i t is far from easy to maintain a correct tactical line.*° The theses o f the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, the most important for China since those o f the Second Comintern Congress i n 1920, therefore confused further the difficult issue of the link between the national and social revolutions and their relationship to the united front. The theses

were based on the false assumption that, “for a certain period,” the Communists could simultaneously maintain the united front, intensify mass

demands, and see to i t that the “leadership of the [revolutionary] movement passes more and more into the hands of the proletariat.”’*” Specific orders from Moscow and from Comintern delegates on the spot, especially Borodin and Voitinsky, often recognized these contradictions b u t invariably placed priority o n maintaining the united front regardless of the conse-

quences for the social revolution. Developing Splits in the Nationalist Movement

While the Comintern discussions were going on, an already complex situation was becoming more complicated in China as the split in the

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Nationalist forces grew wider. By December, 1926, the Kuomintang left,

with Communists on key committees, was in increasingly acrimonious rivalry with Chiang Kai-shek’s headquarters to the east at Nanchang.

Disputes concerned the release of funds for the military, the desirability of pressing toward Shanghai, as Chiang favored, or toward Peking, as the Wuhan group favored, and, finally, the location of the new national capital.

As there was no resolution of the last problem, a geographical, as well as an increasingly evident ideological, split developed within the Nationalist camp between the left, located i n Wuhan, and the right, located i n Nan-

chang and later Nanking. Differences i n style and approach, accentuated by Chiang’s increasing concern about the Communist alliance, developed further i n the aftermath of the spreading mass movements.*® Chinese Communist discussions in late 1926 and 1927 were understandably dominated by these issues of the polarization between left and right within the Nationalist Party and by the contradictions between the needs of the mass movements and the continuation of the united front. I n December, Party Central felt obliged to restrain further the mass movements in order to prevent disruption of the united front. A special conference of the Central Committee, meeting at Hankow o n December 13,

1926, declared: The greatest danger is that the mass movement is developing toward the left, while the political and military authorities, seeing the swift growth of the mass movement are seized with panic, and begin to incline to the right. Should these extreme tendencies continue to develop i n the future, the cleavage between the masses and the government will deepen and i n the end the Red united front will be demolished and the whole national movement will be endangered. . . I n the practical struggle of the workers and peasants, we must avoid illusions (exorbitant demands of the artisans and the workers, participation of the workers’ guard i n administrative affairs, seizure o f land b y the peasants, etc.), so as to eradicate the infantile

disease of leftism.*®

Seeing no alternatives, the conference declared the continuation of the policy of working with the Nationalist left against the conservatives. I t defined the left as representing the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and those who continued the “three policies of . alliance with Russia, alliance with Communists, and support of workers and peasants. Those who are opposed are the right. .

.”’°° More realistically, the Conference

expressed doubt i n regard to the Comintern’s bland confidence in the feasibility of carrying out agrarian revolution through the Nationalist left. Accordingly, i t counseled setting aside the problem of land confiscation and concentrating on reducing rent, interest, and taxes and improving the lot o f the peasants.®’

Worries about the realities of the united front also may have dictated the relative lack of response on the part of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and others to the anti-British demonstrations of December 26 and January 3 and 6 at Hankow and Kiukiang.’? The largest of these, o n January 3 , involved

more than 100,000 demonstrators and was naturally seen as a great boost for the left. L i Li-san, Liu Shao-ch’i, and others in Wuhan played active

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roles i n the demonstrations, but the party delayed public reaction for several weeks, probably fearing a dangerous “alliance o f foreign imperial-

ism and the Kuomintang right wing.” This was understandable i n the light of continuing imperialist shows of force, such as the earlier shelling of

Wanhsien, Szechwan, on September 26, 1926, and suppression of the January 3 demonstration, both causing dozens of casualties.®? Other reports of the time confirm the bewilderment and consequent

caution of Party Central. A political report of January 8 noted the dangers inherent i n the mass movements in Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, where

“Assassinations of local bullies and the bad gentry continue to occur without end. The current social movement of the people is much more far reaching than during the revolution of 1911 or the May Fourth Movement.

. . A violent reaction would ensue should there be a military

setback.””* Another report, dated January 28, reveals growing Communist paralysis i n the face o f the irreconcilable conflict between the needs of the

national and social revolutions: The right wing of the Kuomintang is daily becoming more powerful. There is currently an extremely strong tendency to oppose Soviet Russia, the Communist Party, a n d the l a b o r a n d peasant movements. The

tendency toward the right is due first to the belief of Chiang Kai-shek that only one party should exist i n the country, that all classes should cooperate, that class struggle should be prohibited, and that there is no need of a Communist Party. The second reason is their idea that the national revolution will soon succeed . , and that the greatest enemy at present is not imperialism or militarism but the Communist Party. . The third reason is jealousy and fear . . [ o f the growing power o f ] the CCP. For these reasons, a great anti-Communist tide has developed within the Kuomintang. Personal conflict is negligible. These three factors stem from a common source, the class problem, for the interests of the bourgeoisie are naturally diametrically opposed to ours.5°

Given the Comintern-imposed priority for maintaining the united front, the conclusion of what to do about the growing anti-Communist tide was quite logical, even i f “unrevolutionary”’; namely, to try to reduce the fear of the conservatives b y restraining the masses. As the report continued, “ W e must allay the Kuomintang fear of the CCP (fear based o n the belief that the CCP is close to the masses and opposed to the National Government, and that very soon there will be a Communist revolution). . .”°°

Accordingly, the Central Committee approved continued heavy Nationalist taxes for military and other expenditures.®” The Central Committee was not completely passive about the dilemma

posed by the united front and intensified its efforts to strengthen the Nationalist left in February and March, 1927. I t backed the Wuhan government against Nanchang and pressed its demand for Wang Chingwei’s recall from Europe. I n January, i t somewhat naively called the

“problem of reconciliation between Wang and Chiang [Kai-shek] and , but a among other leaders as the most important of all problems month later began an increasing propaganda attack on Chiang. Since the March Twentieth Incident of 1926, the Communists had

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attacked Chiang indirectly, denouncing “personal dictatorship” and some of his more anti-Communist aides.”® Now they accused Chiang, though still not by name, of negotiating secretly with the Japanese and with Chang Tso-lin and of hostility to Russia, the Communists, and the masses. I n articles i n Guide Weekly i n March, Ch’en Tu-hsiu denounced most Nationalists for abandoning Sun Yat-sen’s policies, and anti-Chiang posters

began to appear in Wuhan. The Chekiang-Kiangsu Bureau in Shanghai denied that the petty bourgeoisie could lead the revolution and revealingly

noted, “ I n past intra-KMT struggles, we let the left wing handle the situation, we merely [suggested] things at the rear. However, we should be the vanguard, leading the left to advance.””*® For his part, Chiang began again to stress Communist disruption and tyranny and, on March 7 , de-

manded the recall of some Russian advisers, although his position was far from invulnerable prior to his capture of Shanghai and Nanking in March and April. He had many political enemies and could by no means count on the loyalty of all of the armed forces. T’ang Sheng-chih had had considerable success i n winning the support of some of the Nationalist armies, which totaled perhaps 260,000 i n December and 500,000 later in the spring of 1927. Only perhaps three of the nine principal components of the army were considered completely loyal to Chiang i n early March.® The Third Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, held in Wuhan March 10-17, 1927, consolidated the recent gains made by the left and stripped Chiang Kai-shek of many of the posts he had secured since the March Twentieth Incident, although leaving him as commander i n chief of the National Revolutionary Army. The plenum abolished Chiang’s position as chairman o f the Central Executive Commit-

tee and established a seven-man Presidium of the Political Council, which included Communist T’an P’ing-shan, as the supreme Party authority. Chiang was not elected to the latter, though he was still a member of the Central Executive Committee’s nine-man Standing Committee, as were

two Communists, and though he retained other posts. Furthermore, the plenum declared invalid much of the party reorganization engineered by Chiang since the March Twentieth Incident, but, o f course, these verbal

declarations had little bearing on Chiang Kai-shek’s real power over the military. Although the Kuomintang still barred Communists from heading

its party bureaus, i t appointed T’an P’ing-shan and Su Chao-cheng as ministers of agriculture and labor, respectively, i n the Wuhan government. The Communists, i n effect, became partners i n a coalition government as well as an important section of the Nationalist Party.

These apparent political victories by the left and the Communists in the spring of 1927 ignored military realities, as Chiang’s antileftist coups in April soon showed. Wuhan’s rebukes of Chiang drove the latter to the right, and reaction against the left and the Communists soon followed i n

such key areas as Kwangtung. As Chiang Kai-shek, T’ang Sheng-chih, Feng Yii-hsiang, and other generals turned on them i n successive months in the spring of 1927, the left’s house of cards rapidly tumbled down.

T H E REVOLUTION SPLITS

I n seemingly inevitable stages in the spring and early summer of 1927, the tragedy of the “first revolutionary civil war” played itself out. The “cleansing of the party,” as the Nationalists euphemistically speak of their purge o f the Communists, ruthlessly solved certain immediate problems of the national revolution b u t led to the deaths o f hundreds of thousands

of leftists and beyond that opened the floodgates to two more decades of fratricidal war.

The Shanghai Insurrection and Chiang’s April 12 Coup Events i n Shanghai gave the first sign and most dramatic symbol of the violent rupture of the first united front. They pitted the Communistdominated Shanghai General Labor Union against a variety of warlords, local authorities and industrialists, the foreign powers, and finally the conservative Nationalists. Despite increased repression of labor agitation by military and foreign overlords, the Union led a new series of strikes i n

the autumn and winter of 1926-27. Following the retreat from the political demands of the May Thirtieth Movement, early strikes were motivated primarily b y economic grievances and continued inflation. Then, as the

success of the Northern Expedition weakened the hold of Sun Ch’uan-fang over East China, the labor movement again flowed into political channels.’ I n October, 1926, the Shanghai General Labor Union, i n coordination

with Lo Yi-nung, Chou En-lai, and others of the Party’s Kiangsu Committee, decided to try to overthrow militarist rule i n Shanghai b y taking

advantage of Sun Ch’uan-fang’s preoccupations with a rebellious subordinate i n Chekiang and with the progress of the Nationalist armies into Kiangsi. Nationalist delegates i n Shanghai at first backed these plans but failed to participate at the last minute, and the demonstration of October 24, later known as the first Shanghai insurrection, was quickly quelled b y Sun, with more than 100 arrests.

Later i n the year, Shanghai labor pressed its part i n the movement for the independence of the three provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi

from Sun Ch’uan-fang’s control. There were mass demonstrations on

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The Long March to Power

November 28 and December 12, and the Shanghai General Labor Union maintained and expanded further its control of the labor force. The number of Communists also increased, and a Party document of December

spoke of 2,963 Party members i n Shanghai, up from several hundred eighteen months before. The largest proportion of these, some 1,592, were said to be textile workers, 151 were students, 351 were workers in city government, 10 merchants, 1 a soldier, and the rest worked i n assorted

enterprises.>

As Chiang Kai-shek’s armies advanced on Shanghai in February, 1927, the Communist leadership planned new demonstrations and disruptions to assist Nationalist capture of the city. Despite the misgivings of many Chinese Communists and some of the Russians about Chiang, the policy of the united front and Communist assistance for Nationalist military

unification still prevailed. I n the final analysis, this policy was decreed by Stalin. On April 6, just a week before Chiang’s bloody anti-Communist coup, w i t h supreme irony and most unfortunate timing, Stalin again

refuted the idea of a break even with conservative Nationalists: Why drive away the right, when we have the majority and when the right When the right is of no more use to us, we will drive it listens to us? away. A t present we need the right. I t has capable people who still direct the army and lead i t against the imperialists. Chiang Kai-shek has perhaps no sympathy for the revolution, but he is leading the army and cannot do otherwise than lead i t against the imperialists. Besides this the people of and understand very well the right have relations with the generals how to demoralize them and to induce them to pass over to the side of the revolution. Also they have connections with the rich merchants and can raise money from them. So they have to be utilized to the end, squeezed out like a lemon and then flung away.?

Chiang also played out his part of the charade. On March 17, he declared, “ I have never taken the view that I cannot cooperate with the Communists. As a matter of fact, I may rightly claim the credit for bringing the Communists into the fold of the Kuomintang. But I have also made i t clear that while I was opposed to oppression of the Communists, I would check their influence as soon as they grew too powerful.” That would be very soon, and most would say the ‘“check’ far exceeded the “oppression.” Stalin to the contrary, the Communists themselves were “squeezed out like a lemon and then flung away.”

The problem, of course, for those who wished to stop Chiang Kai-shek was how to do so. Apparently some Communists, including key Soviet advisers Galin and Borodin, believed that Chiang would ‘‘gag o n Shanghai’

and hence should be encouraged to enter the city. Others favored a mass takeover of the city, thereby denying i t to Chiang. I n the end, the Communist leadership advised trying to do both, that is, have the General Labor

Union first take over Shanghai and then welcome Chiang Kai-shek.’ Thus, when Chiang’s troops reached Hangchow and beyond on February 18, the Shanghai General Labor Union called for a general strike on the next day to assist the Nationalist “liberation.” Several hundred thou-

sand workers obeyed, paralyzing the city and posting slogans proclaiming

[Chap. 5]

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93

“Hail the Northern Expedition” and “ H a i l Chiang Kai-shek.” Chiang’s men, however, held back some 25 o r more miles outside the city, according

to hostile sources, i n order to let Sun Ch’uan-fang’s men destroy the mass movement. Severe repression i n fact ensued, w i t h at least twenty public

decapitations, with the heads mounted on stakes for public edification, and hundreds of arrests. Street fighting continued until February 24, ending then in part because of confusion among the labor leadership. After sending the workers into the streets, the Communists debated further steps and allowed the initiative to pass to their opponents. I n a “Letter from Shanghai,” dated March 17, three young Comintern agents con-

demned the indecision of the Communist leaders as a betrayal of the revolution, but without noting the Comintern’s role i n creating that indecision. They accused the CCP and Voitinsky of negotiating with the Shanghai bourgeoisie and even of denying responsibility for the demonstrations instead of leading the workers. “Power lay i n the streets, but the Party did not know how to take it. Worse yet, i t didn’t want to take it; i t was afraid t o . ” Nonetheless, the Shanghai labor organizations remained intact and laid plans for further action. When the Nationalist armies finally resumed their march toward Shanghai, the General Labor Union again called for strikes and demonstrations. O n March 21, an estimated 600,000 o r more

workers left their jobs or demonstrated for the overthrow of the militarist authorities i n Shanghai. This time, the Communist and labor leadership called for a showdown and directed an armed workers’ militia of several thousand to take over key sections of the city.” Some 3,000 men under

Chiang’s subordinates entered Shanghai on March 22, but the leftists were already in control and established a “provisional municipal government of Shanghai.” Five Communists, including L o Yi-nung, secretary of the

Party’s Chekiang-Kiangsu Bureau, and Wang Shou-hua, chairman of the Shanghai General Labor Union, were among nineteen members of the governing council, and, o n March 27, a mass meeting elected Wang Shou-hua

chairman of the executive committee of the new workers’ government. Chou En-lai, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, and Wang Jo-fei, as well as Ch’en Tu-hsiu,

P’eng Shu-chih and other members of Party Central also were in Shanghai at this time.®! The provisional government called for improved working conditions and the abrogation o f the unequal treaties. However, i n line

with fears of imperialist intervention and the demands of the united front, the Shanghai radicals later agreed to leave negotiations to terminate the unequal treaties to the newly established Nationalist government at

Wuhan. I n addition to reflecting Comintern advice, the latter concession n o

doubt reflected fear of intervention by some 30,000 foreign troops and numerous gunboats i n the Shanghai area. Communists i n Canton had warned on February 27 that, “ i n the fight for the possession of Shanghai a direct clash between the armed forces of international imperialism and the National Revolutionary Army is inevitable,” and the Nanking Inci-

dent of March 24 must have confirmed these fears. On that date, as Nationalist troops occupied Nanking, several foreign officials and missionaries were killed, according to various reports, either b y retreating north-

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The Long March to Power

ern soldiers, Nationalists, or Communists. Foreign gunboats retaliated by shelling parts of the city, killing a half-dozen Chinese. Chiang Kai-shek blamed the incident on Communist efforts to embarrass his position and

provoke imperialist intervention.’ Elsewhere, i n areas under the control of Chiang or of other conservative Nationalists, as well as i n areas still controlled b y warlords, attacks o n

radicals were occurring with ever greater frequency. There were antiCommunist incidents i n early and mid-March i n Nanchang, Kiukiang,

Anking, and other Central China cities, and later in the month in Chungking, Hangchow, and elsewhere.!* On April 6 in Peking, the forces of Chang Tso-lin, who had steadily intensified repression of radicals, broke into the Soviet Embassy compound after consultation with Western and Japanese diplomats, seized important documents,* and arrested thirtyeight men. Among them was Party cofounder L i Ta-chao, who was executed with nineteen others b y strangulation on April 28. Meanwhile, Chiang arrived in Shanghai o n March 26 and immediately

conferred with Nationalist comrades, Shanghai commercial circles, and, according to hostile sources, the Shanghai underworld. H e reportedly

received loans of tens of millions of Shanghai dollars in return for promises to destroy the radicals. The Shanghai Kuomintang and Chiang’s military units had already clashed with the Communists over the composi-

tion and authority of the new provisional government in Shanghai and over the arming of labor pickets. The Nationalists sought to limit the latter o n March 24 and, i n early April, established a rival municipal govern-

ment and rival labor organizations. Nationalist leaders conferred on March 27 and April 2 and decided to move. Chiang sanctioned the arming of units from the notorious Green Gang and other Shanghai secret

societies in preparation for what was now seen as an inevitable showdown between the conservatives and the radical labor organizations. There were skirmishes between rival groups i n early April; arrests began on April 5 ; and, on April 7 , a secret report of the International Settlement police reported preparations for an attack o n the Communist organiza-

tions." Despite these rumblings, the Comintern continued to dismiss rising

doubts and to insist on efforts to maintain the united front. A French member of a Profintern delegation then in China later admitted that “we knew from [ t h e time o f the anti-Communist incidents i n March] . . well before the split—that the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the Chinese

working class would take on the bloody forms i t has since assumed.’ Similarly, a month later, the Party acknowledged that, “ b y the murder of

labor leaders back in Kiangsi [ i n March], Chiang Kai-shek had already demonstrated his hatred of the working class and peasant movement.”*® Yet, Stalin and his Soviet colleagues still advised defensive measures only. On March 31, the ECCI directed the Shanghai Communists to “launch a campaign among the masses against the coup which is being prepared and a campaign against the right wing. I n view of the prevailing exceed* These documents are among the most important sources of information o n the Communists in the 1920’s.”

[Chap. 5]

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95

ingly disadvantageous correlation of forces [on the other hand, the Communists were not to] rush into an open battle. The arms must not be surrendered and i f necessary must be concealed.”'® I n other words, though the crisis was foreseen, the Communists were told to lay low and hope it would blow over. Local leaders understandably interpreted this as an

order to hide their weapons and refrain from fighting. Under no circumstances could there be “withdrawal from the Kuomintang,” which would be “equivalent to preaching liquidation of the Chinese revolution.””"” Soviet leaders professed still to believe that ‘“‘the revolutionary pressure

from below is so strong that Chiang Kai-shek is compelled to submit himself to the leadership of the mass party of the Kuomintang.” Stalin, as noted, repeated these arguments i n even more foolish language less than a week before Chiang struck. The Chinese Communists appear to have learned the priority for maintaining the united front only too well and accordingly were more and more paralyzed i n handling the mass movements. Later, Ch’en Tu-hsiu

and P’eng Shu-chih claimed that they, Lo Yi-nung, Chou En-lai, and other comrades in Shanghai had urged a direct struggle for power against Chiang Kai-shek but had felt they must first clear such an important step with the Comintern representatives i n Wuhan. P’eng Shu-chih proceeded westward for this purpose, arriving i n Nanking on April 1 and i n Hankow o n April 10. Forces loyal to the leftists in Wuhan had already rushed to

Nanking, seeking to deny the city to Chiang Kai-shek, and Communist leaders there felt that the left could keep Chiang Kai-shek isolated to the east. Wuhan comrades were not so sure, and Borodin, Roy, T’an

P’ing-shan, and others favored alternative policies that might leave lines open for conciliation i f Chiang Kai-shek proved too strong to stop. Meanwhile, another Comintern telegram arrived, warning against pre-

mature initiatives and, according to Ch’en Tu-hsiu, infuriating much of the Shanghai leadership, especially regional secretary Lo Yi-nung. Hence, chances of beating Chiang to the punch, or at least of going into hiding, were hampered or made impossible by intra-Party divisions and by Comintern instructions. Voitinsky, C h ’

Ch’iu-pai, and others repeated old

arguments, holding that, even i f Chiang Kai-shek transferred his allegiance to the big bourgeoisie, the Communists could still utilize the petty bourgeoisie, meaning the Kuomintang without Chiang Kai-shek. But under no

circumstances should the Communists initiate the break." The Communist leadership appeared almost totally unprepared for what followed. The April 6 issue of Guide Weekly warned of the fragile character of the victories so far won b y Shanghai labor and of danger from the Nationalist right, which had begun new crackdowns o n leftists i n Hangchow, Foochow, and elsewhere i n early A p r i l . Yet, o n March 31, the Shanghai General Labor Union denied the possibility o f a clash and

workers continued to repeat slogans of “welcome to Chiang Kai-shek” and to applaud his speeches. The Communists gave special training and arms to some 2,700 worker pickets, but unnecessary provocations were avoided, the pickets concealed their weapons as instructed, and they failed to act o n a reported offer by one of Chiang’s more ambitious subordinates,

subsequently transferred out of the city, to oppose Chiang on behalf of

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The Long March to Power

the workers. O f course, i t is not at all clear h o w the Communists might

have stopped Chiang’s superior forces, even i f they had moved first. The time to have done that probably had already passed. But now their necks were on the block, and their enemies knew it.?° Finally, at 4:00 A . M . on April 12, guard units led by Nationalist soldiers disguised as workers and by members of the Green Gang moved against a dozen-odd labor strong points. Catching most leftists off guard and overcoming heavy resistance at eight locations, they were able to break up some seventy Communist units and round up many radical leaders, including Wang Shou-hua and Chou En-lai,* killing Wang and several hundred others.?* At a stroke, the Shanghai radical movement was crushed. The Communists could only appeal to the Wuhan government and call for new demonstrations. The latter soon subsided following the shooting of an estimated several hundred of more than 50,000 demonstrators on April 13. The Communist leadership fled inland or went underground, and many were captured and executed in succeeding months, including the elder son of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his successor as secretary of the leading local Party Committee.?? Shortly after the events i n Shanghai, the axe struck successive heavy

blows elsewhere. At Nanking, which forces loyal to Chiang had taken on April 9, leftists were also rounded u p o n A p r i l 12, and three days later

Li Chi-shen completed the turn of the screw against the Communists i n Canton, arresting some 2,000 and killing more than 100. Only thirty of some 500 labor organizations were allowed to continue to function i n

Canton, and a planned counterattack by the peasant associations never came off.?* O n April 18, Chiang declared the formation o f a new national

government at Nanking. For the Communists, a chasm had opened. A “Simplified” United Front

What effects did the April catastrophes have on Communist policy? Astonishingly few, as top leaders apparently saw n o alternatives to the

continuation of the united front with those Nationalists whose hands had not yet been bloodied, and as the Comintern insisted on maintaining old policies with only minor adjustments. W i t h Trotsky’s mounting criticisms of recent developments obviously i n mind,?* Stalinists n o w blandly

explained that only a part of the Kuomintang had deserted the revolution. They, but presumably few of their Chinese comrades, took comfort in the fact that some passages of the Seventh ECCI Plenum theses had predicted a “serious realignment o f social forces,” naturally ignoring other Comintern instructions that had paralyzed Communist ability to deal w i t h this realignment. According ta. Pravda, despite power shifts, the united front

could be maintained and more easily than before now that Chiang Kaishek had “torn off his mask.” I f Chiang had “become the . . focal point of the national counterrevolution,” the Communists could now ‘stand

closer than ever to the side of the revolutionary Kuomintang

without

* Chou En-lai, the reputed model for Kyo Gisors in André Malraux’s great novel Man’s Fate, either escaped after his arrest or was released from prison through the intercession of former Nationalist associates.

[Chap. 5]

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97

Chiang Kai-shek.””?* A similar statement explained the disasters b y stating that the Communists “ d i d not wish to force events the Party’s strategic

line lay i n abstaining from the fight with the bourgeoisie until sufficient forces were accumulated and the organization of the working class and the peasantry [ w a s ] consolidated.”*® Prior to Chiang’s formal establish-

ment of a conservative national government at Nanking on April 18, Moscow had even hinted at the possibility of working with Chiang again i f restitution were made—as i f the legal defiance of establishing a rival government was a greater offense than the shedding of so much blood. With Chiang i n open opposition, the stage was set for a second equally confusing and calamitous scene, the collapse o f the united front w i t h the

Kuomintang left. Now Communists were to try to work with the Wuhan “revolutionaries,” especially Wang Ching-wei, who had returned from his self-imposed exile on April 1. As the March 17 Letter from Comintern agents i n Shanghai had stated, “All talk of the left . leads i n the end to Wang Ching-wei,” and so the Communists eagerly welcomed Wang as their best hope of maintaining appearances.?” I n a joint statement issued at Shanghai A p r i l 5, even as events there were moving to their final

dénouement, Wang and Ch’en Tu-hsiu reaffirmed the necessity and desirability of the united front. For their part, t h e Communists denied that they had ever “entertained the idea of beating down” the Nationalists, or that they were then working for the maximum program of a proletarian dictatorship as realized i n Russia, “

i n view o f different political and

economic circumstances i n colonial and semicolonial countries.” For the moment, China needed a “democratic dictatorship of all oppressed classes

to deal with the counterrevolution, not a proletarian revolution.” The Kuomintang, for its part, the statement naively declared a week before Chiang’s coup, “has demonstrated to the whole world that i t does not have the slightest intention to expel [the CCP] . and suppress labor unions.” Finally, the joint statement showed highly misplaced confidence

when i t asserted that ‘“‘the military leaders i n Shanghai have announced their obedience to the . central authorities. Even i f there existed some differences and misunderstanding, they will be resolved i n the end.

7728

To complete the scenario, Chiang Kai-shek was quoted by Pravda on April 6 as having stated, “Wang Ching-wei is my teacher and friend. . All problems must be settled under the guidance of Chairman Wang

Ching-wei.’’*® Thus, according to Comintern double talk, Chiang’s April 12 coup showed that the “social forces” of the Chinese revolution had shifted, but not enough to end the united front. O n the contrary, the front was n o w

purer and hence stronger. The four-class alliance had become a three-class alliance of proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie; the other sections

of the bourgeoisie had joined the fuedal-imperialist alliance i n counterrevolution. The Indian revolutionary, M . N . Roy, a leading member of the ECCI, who arrived i n China in February to try to explain and guide the execution o f Comintern policies, admitted contradictions i n the formula

but argued that they could be overcome i f properly handled. I n a speech on April 30, he acknowledged that i n recent events even the “petty

bourgeoisie began to waver, then i t became frightened and finally it

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The Long March to Power

joined the side of the bourgeoisie when the latter openly declared war.” Yet, incomprehensibly, he went on to insist that the petty bourgeoisie, utilizing “ t h e revolutionary energies of the peasantry,” must lead the

national revolution.®’ One naturally asks why the Chinese Communists continued to listen to such cant. As we shall see in greater detail, i t was because (1) the Comintern, still enjoying enormous prestige as the headquarters of world revolution and dispensing key, i f relatively small, financial aid, continued to insist o n absolute obedience, and (2) there seemed to be n o realistic

alternatives. The mass movements, which lacked military backing, were no match for the Nationalists. Therefore, bound to the discipline of the Communist International, divided among themselves, and seeing no easy solutions, the Chinese Communist leadership drifted on along the old track, striving to increase their leverage within what was left of the Nationalist alliance b u t not daring to break it.

The CCP and Its Fifth National Congress Following the disasters i n Shanghai and elsewhere, most of the central Communist leadership made its way to Wuhan, as i t long had been urged to do by some comrades and Comintern representatives. Party headquarters was established i n Hankow, one of the three Wuhan cities, and intense discussions continued concerning the crisis of the Party and preparations

for the Fifth National Congress of the CCP, scheduled to begin later i n April. An inner circle of top leaders and Comintern representatives unsuccessfully sought to clarify policies, and Borodin argued that i n such critical times they should not air differences too openly over how to proceed.?’

Discussions were heated nonetheless, and we will return to them, but first the Congress and Party organization at the time must be outlined briefly. The Fifth National Congress of the CCP opened April 27 i n an elementary school i n Hankow. Some eighty delegates and about the same number of visitors, including delegations from the Comintern and Profin-

tern, attended the sessions, which lasted through the first week of May.?* The delegates claimed to represent more than 50,000 members, a figure later fixed at 57,967, while the Communist Youth League, which met for its Fourth National Congress o n May 10, claimed some 35,000 members. I n addition, there were an estimated 120,000 Young Pioneers under the

age of fifteen. What can be said of Party membership at this time? One source lists its provincial breakdown, together with its approximate percentage of the population and suggested increases for Party membership made by Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n late 1926 (see Table 5.1) .*3 Other available information about Party membership i n early 1927 includes the following: Among 120 top Party leaders i n early 1927, the largest number came from Hunan, 29; followed b y Kwangtung, 16; Hupeh, 15; Szechwan, 8 ; Kiangsu, 7 ; Chekiang, 5 ; Chihli (Hopeh), 4 ;

Anhwei, 4; Kiangsi, 4; and others from eight more provinces. These figures give place o f origin, rather than o f work as i n Table 5.1, and show that Communists tended to come from the interior o f Central-South China,

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T A B L E 5.1 PARTY MEMBERSHIP I N APRIL, 1927

Party Members"

Hupeh Hunan Chekiang-Kiangsu Kiangsi Kwangtung-Kwangsi Chihli (Hopeh)-ShansiInner Mongolia Honan

Shantung Shensi-Kansu Anhwei Southern Manchuria Northern Manchuria Fukien Szechwan Yiinnan-Kweichow

A s of April, 1927

Percentage of Population®

Suggested Increases®

13,000 13,000 13,000 3,000 9,027

0.047 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.017

4,000 7,000 7,000 2,000 10,000

3,109

0.005

3,000

1,300

0.003

1,025 388 323 308 137 168 200 — 57,9851

0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005 —

1,000 2,000 500 500 500 2,500 200 40,200

* By place of work, rather than place of origin. O n basis of 1953 census, unadjusted. ° Called for by Ch’en Tu-hsiu at a Party meeting i n Shanghai o n October 17, 1926. “ There is no explanation for the small discrepancy between this figure and the more generally accepted total of 57,967. ®

Sources: H o f h e i n z B a r n e t t

( e d . ) , Politics, p . 4 8 , a n d Chung-Kuo Kung-ch’an-

tang chih t'ou-shih (An Exposé of the CCP) (Taipeh, 1962), pp. 78-79.

whereas other elites i n modern Chinese history have tended to come from the coastal provinces. The top leadership as well as the rank and file were very young. I n 1927, 80 per cent of the top leaders were under thirty-

five, and their median age was just under thirty. Ch’en Tu-hsiu was the Party elder at forty-eight, and L i Ta-chao was thirty-nine at his execution

on April 28, 1927. Only five of the 120 were women, and Party member-

ship i n 1927 was predominantly proletarian for the only time i n its history, with more than one half of the membership composed of workers. However, as some Comintern delegates were quick to point out, practically n o proletarians were given important positions i n the Party hierarchy, which were held almost exclusively b y “petty bourgeois” intellectuals. The March 17, 1927, Letter from Shanghai complained that, although 70

per cent of the Shanghai CCP organization consisted of workers, an executive committee of sixteen elected i n mid-February did not include a single proletarian. A Central Committee member supposedly explained that “workers cannot read, cannot write, cannot speak, and cannot understand

anything.” By 1930, i n contrast, the proportion of Party members coming from proletarian backgrounds had dropped to 8 per cent, but several held top positions.>*

The Party claimed even greater influence than suggested by its impressive growth in membership, and i t was true that Communists dominated many areas and fields of activity. This was the case with the mass move-

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The Long March to Power

ments where they claimed to lead organizations totaling 2.5 million workers and 10 million peasants. And it was true in those areas where Communist fractions were able to dominate political activity even though they were far outnumbered b y Nationalists.3®

The Fifth Congress elected a Central Committee of twenty-nine with eleven alternates, who in turn elected for the first time a Political Bureau of about nine. The latter included Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t’ao, L i Weihan ( L o Mai) , * Ts’ai Ho-sen, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chou En-lai,} L i Li-san,

T’an P’ing-shan, and Su Chao-cheng, with the first three and later, depending on absences, the first six or seven, serving as a Standing Committee.? The Central Committee re-elected Ch’en Tu-hsiu General Secretary, and

Ch’en continued to dominate the inner workings of the Party, also heading the organization department, although criticism of his role i n the

unfolding drama mounted rapidly with each passing month. Chou En-lai, w h o also was director of the Military Affairs Committee, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and Teng Chung-hsia, all served briefly i n the Secretariat at this time. L i Li-san

or Su Chao-cheng headed the labor department, and Ch’i Ch’iu-pai took over the peasant department from Mao Tse-tung.®” Ts’ai Ho-sen, just back from a year i n Moscow, replaced P’eng Shu-chih as director of the propaganda department, possibly i n part because of lingering Party anger over P’eng’s affair i n late 1925 with Ts’ai’s wife, Hsiang Ching-yii. Hsiang

presumably resumed directorship of the women’s department upon her return from the Soviet Union. Because of the illnesses of Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and others, transfers, trips, and the constant preoccupations during these hectic months, the Political Bureau, its Standing Committee, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee departments were able to

function only with the greatest difficulty.’® (See Chart 5.1.) Intra-Party Politics

The Fifth Congress was preoccupied with the questions of the day: the advisability of further military expeditions, questions of the mass movements, and, central to both of these, Communist relations w i t h the

petty bourgeoisie and the Nationalist left i n Wuhan. As usual, different accounts tell different stories of who favored what in the discussion of these overriding problems. The Fifth Congress heard a large number of reports, both because of the dramatic nature of recent developments and because of the presence of additional observers, including delegations from the Comintern and Profintern. Furthermore, not one but two Comintern

lines were presented, reflecting the conservative Stalinist approaches of Borodin and Voitinsky and the verbally more aggressive interpretations of

Roy and others, which were closer to Trotskyist arguments about this time.*® These complexities do not mar the pages of later Stalinist and

Maoist accounts of the Fifth Congress, which make Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s “right opportunist, capitulationist leadership’ the scapegoat for all past and * Another Hunanese who became a Communist while in the work-study program in France in the early 1920s. + A skillful diplomat and shrewd politician, Chou is the only Chinese Communist who has held his position on the Political Bureau continuously since the 1920’s.

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C H A R T 5.1 P A R T Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N A T F I F T H CONGRESS, A P R I L - M A Y , 1 9 2 7

Central Committee (twenty-nine members, eleven alternates) Political Bureau ( C h ’ e n T u - h s i u , * Ch’ti C h ’ i u - p a i , T s ’ a i Ho-sen, C h a n g Kuo-t’ao, C h o u E n - l a i , L i Li-san, T ’ a n P’ing-shan, Li-Wei-han, S u Chao-cheng)

Secretariat Central Committee Departments Organization

Ch’en Tu-hsiu

Propaganda

T s ’ a i Ho-sen (earlier, P’eng Shu-chih)

Military Affairs Labor Women Peasants

Chou En-lai Su Chao-cheng Hsiang Ching-yii Ch'’ii Ch’iu-pai (earlier, Mao Tse-tung)

* General Secretary of the Party, 1921-27, replaced by Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai after August 7, 1927. Sources: Wang Chien-min, Draft History, 1:388, 483, citing Hatano Kenichi and Ts’ai Ho-sen; Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chung-Kuo Ko-ming yii Kung-ch’an-tang (The Chinese R e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e CCP)

( M o s c o w , 1 9 2 8 ) , p . 5 2 ; K u o , History, v o l . 1 , passim;

Klein and Clark, Dictionary, passim; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, Chapter 12.

future disasters and responsible for the muffling of correct ideas of the moment. I n the broader context of Communist intra-Party politics in the winter and spring, the March 17 “Letter from Shanghai” was probably more accurate i n placing “ O l d Man” Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n the center of the political spectrum of the central Chinese leadership, with Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai said to lead the Party’s left wing and one Petrov, possibly P’eng Shu-chih, the

right.*® The powerful Borodin also generally stood to the right of Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n arguing for maximum emphasis on maintaining the united front, but others attacked with equal heat the policy of concessions to maintain the alliance. Certainly, old divisions continued, primarily between those who wished to save the united front by making further concessions to the right and those who wished, o n the contrary, to save i t b y forcing the Nationalists

to the left. Those favoring the latter course, led inconsistently and with

frequent and confusing changes of view according to the exigencies and ambiguities of the moment b y Roy, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, and others, now accused Ch’en Tu-hsiu, P’eng Shu-chih, Voitinsky, and especially, though

not always naming him, Borodin, of maintaining their illusions despite the severe jolts of previous weeks. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, on the contrary, later argued persuasively that he had led the fight for more independence w i t h i n the united front both before and after the Congress. The truth seems to be that, under the pressure of cascading events and conflicting instructions, the militants gave i n to the arguments of Borodin, which after all were those of Stalin, that the united front must be continued at all

costs. For all its drawbacks, Stalin’s stubborn insistence on the priority of the Nationalist alliance must have seemed the only consistent thread.

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I n the midst of counterarguments,* there seems superior evidence to support Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s claim that his policies derived from Comintern insistence o n the united front and that therefore all talk of left and right

deviations only obscured the central contradiction between the national and social revolutions and Moscow’s role in creating this impossible situation. I n his December, 1929, “Letter to All Comrades,” Ch’en stated

that he had urged independent action or withdrawal from the Kuomintang in the late spring of 1927 and cited four previous occasions on which he had maintained the same position: i n resisting the formation of the alliance i n the first place i n 1922; i n October, 1925; after the March Twentieth

Incident of 1926; and during and after Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist coup of April 12, 1927. Ch’en stated that o n every occasion his desires were overruled b y the Communist International .**

After the April disasters i n Shanghai and elsewhere, i t may well be that Ch’en Tu-hsiu acquiesced and simply went along with Comintern insistence on hoping for the best from continuance of old policies, but i t is not hard to understand why he would try to “bend with the wind” and “waver” in these disputes. After all, even Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, his “leftist” successor, while criticizing excessive concessions to the Nationalists, was equally adamant about upholding the contradictory policy of maintaining the united front and, several months after this, compromised Communist peasant policies i n order to do so. Still more emphatically, Roy, the Comintern spokesman i n China most given to urging independent action, began a speech to the Political Bureau o n M a y 24 with a statement ruling out any thought of a break w i t h the Nationalists:

There is no need of raising an alarm about the danger of a break each time we discuss the relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. There is no question of a break now. Therefore we will set this question aside i n the present discussion. I t is impossible to discuss our relations with the Kuomintang i n an unprejudiced manner if one is at all times influenced by the thought of a break. A t the present our relations with the Kuomintang must be determined by the necessity of remaining i n the Kuomintang. Any proposal for withdrawing from the Kuomintang i n the immediate future [although the CCP should apply more pressure on the must be rejected . Kuomintang to drive i t to the left ].*2

Lest any of the Chinese comrades contemplate ignoring this Comintern advice, Roy insisted two weeks later that, i n a critical situation such as this, the directives o f the international must b e

followed strictly. N o time can be lost on discussion. The Comintern deter* Because of the nuances of Party discipline and politics, i t is virtually impossible to sort out the conflicting stories of who took what position when on questions of responsibility for the disasters of 1927. The most likely explanation is that Ch’en Tu-hsiu, his successor Ch’li Ch’iu-pai, and others, including certainly Mao Tse-tung, shifted their arguments at various periods, thereby explaining part of the confusion o f conflicting accounts. Because o f a l l this, Ch’en seems t o have been blamed, under-

standably but unfairly, both for acting as a dictatorial “patriarch of the Party” and for being an indecisive “petty bourgeois intellectual.”

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mines—the—actions—of-its—-natienal-seetions-not-only onthe

103 -basis—of its

appraisals of the internal conditions of any given country, but also from the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the w o r l d situation. T h e CCP, as a member o f the world proletarian Party, must act i n accordance w i t h the directives o f the Comintern.43

I n other words, i t was up to the Chinese Communists to make the united front work, willy-nilly.

I n these circumstances, one can only sympathize with Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s December, 1929, “Letter to A l l Comrades,” which bitterly blamed the Comintern for the disasters of 1927 but also criticized himself for not speaking u p :

The Party’s central authorities [that is, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai i n the latter part of 1927 and L i Li-san from mid-1928 to 1930] say that we are trying to dodge responsibility by heaping the blame on the Comintern. That is simply ridiculous. N o man should, just because he himself has embraced opportunism, abandon his right to criticize his superior’s opportunist policy and return to Marxism-Leninism. A t the same time, no man could, when an opportunist policy has been imposed on him by his superiors, be allowed to evade the responsibility to carry out that policy. Ch’en continued: I t is true that the opportunist policy came from the Comintern. But why did the CCP leaders faithfully carry out the policy instead of protesting against the Comintern? Who after all should bear the responsibility? We should frankly and objectively admit that the opportunist policy originated with the Comintern, and the Comintern should be responsible for that. The young immature CCP still cannot form its own theory and decide its own policy. However, the leading C C P organ should b e [ h e l d ] responsible for

blindly following the Comintern’s opportunist line without the slightest understanding and protest.**

Contemporary and subsequent accounts basically support this analysis. According to P’eng Shu-chih, one of the closest allies of Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n these years, writing forty years later, “ T h e Chinese Communists were too trusting i n the Comintern and lacked the experience to resist” its leadership, which was based on “illusions” about the Nationalist-Communist united front. Chang Kuo-t’ao agrees and recalls that many Chinese Communists at the time, including himself, felt “the International does not understand Chinese conditions.”*® I n the circumstances, the March 17 “Letter from Shanghai’ considered that the responsibility for the erroneous policies of the time “lies equally w i t h the right wing of the leadership and the representative of the E C C I , ” meaning probably P’eng Shu-chih and Voitinsky, w i t h Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n the m i d d l e . * Given the Comintern pressure for maintaining the united front, the Chinese Communists understandably argued more about how far they could press the land and military problems and still keep the Nationalist

alliance than they did about ending the alliance. Nonetheless, Roy’s speech cited above and other testimony make i t clear that outright withdrawal

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from the Kuomintang was also discussed, and bitterly. There were reports that Ch’en Tu-hsiu had hoped to postpone the Fifth Congress because of an awareness of the “growth of opposition [ t o the continuance of old policies] within the local organizations and among some important leaders, united under the leadership of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t’ao,” while Li Li-san singled out members of the Kwangtung faction as leading opponents of Party Central’s ‘“capitulationism.’’*

Party reaction to developments after the Fifth Congress, as well as theoretical criticisms of the bourgeois class by Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his allies,*® also support Ch’en’s case that the responsibility for the gathering disaster was far from his alone. According to Ts’ai Ho-sen’s 1928 “History of Opportunism,” C h ’ Ch’iu-pai, the supposed leader of the left wing, argued both against Ts’ai’s and Li Li-san’s proposal for military action to deal with more serious anti-Communist incidents, which occurred i n May,

and also against Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s objections to Borodin’s then conservative land policy. Ch’ii and Roy argued that relations with the Nationalist left must take precedence over possibly rash military countermoves. Ch’ii went further and now agreed with Borodin that the Communists must restrain “peasant excesses’’ i n order to prevent a complete rupture of the united front, although he also supported Roy i n arguing that the Communists could and should concentrate on driving the Kuomintang further left.** Ts’ai Ho-sen further states that Ch’en Tu-hsiu favored an offensive policy ‘““as the only way o u t ” after the anti-Communist coups of May, but that

Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, on the contrary, argued as late as July 1 that land confiscation would have to await the Party’s acquisition of greater power. Earlier,

Borodin, i n the words of Mao Tse-tung, had “completely reversed his position, favoring a radical land redistribution in 1926, but strongly opposing i t i n 1927.”°° A n d n o w Ch’ii, the Party’s new director o f the peasant department, reportedly condemned the ‘“crudeness” of the peasant movements, although continuing to argue i n principle for greater power to the

peasant associations.’ Finally, Ch’en Tu-hsiu quoted Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai as having stated i n June, “ I would rather let the Kuomintang expel us than

withdraw on our own initiative,” while Chou En-lai argued that withdrawal would greatly harm military operations. According to Ch’en, only Youth League leader Jen Pi-shih unequivocally argued for withdrawal at Party meetings later in the spring.®* Therefore, i t seems evident that subsequent efforts to divide the Chinese Communist leadership i n the first half of 1927 into a sharply defined left

and right were artificial and vastly oversimplified, if not completely false. The orthodox view has been tailored to the needs of Party politics rather than to the facts. The evidence suggests that the so-called capitulationists, led b y Ch’en Tu-hsiu, favored independence within the Kuomintang or even outright withdrawal at least as much as did the supposed ‘“left opposi-

tion.” The explanation for this discrepancy of opinions, aside from distortion for political reasons, lies i n the fact that nearly all top leaders argued

for withdrawal from the Kuomintang at one time or another and hence could later cite appropriate quotes, b u t when i t came to translating radical talk into practical action, neither Chinese nor Russian leaders could see

an appropriate alternative to continuing the Nationalist alliance.

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105

I n this situation, Stalin’s formulas, however contradictory, easily prevailed i n Party councils. They meant continuation of the status quo, always easier than charting an uncertain new course, and they carried the

authority of Comintern discipline. They were at least consistent in demanding priority for the national revolution, whatever the implications for the social revolution, and this meant curbing the latter i n the interest of the

former. I n this sense, all t h e Communist leaders were ‘“opportunists,” though they no doubt varied considerably in the extent to which they expressed verbal reservations about the united front policy.

Fifth Congress Debates How were these problems discussed at the Fifth Congress? I t is not surprising that the Chinese leadership insisted on hearing the views of Comintern representatives, notably Roy, before presenting their own. Roy’s speeches survive, as do the three major documents adopted by the Congress, but none of the texts of speeches by Chinese leaders are available.

The documents are “Theses on the Political Situation and the Tasks of the CCP,” “Resolution on the Agrarian Question,” and the Fifth Congress “Manifesto.”’”* I n general, these tried to obtain the best of all worlds, disregarding various contradictory statements, as d i d the Comintern

itself. Hence, Chiang’s April 12 coup was treated not as a setback, but rather as clarifying the class composition of the Kuomintang, following withdrawal of the big bourgeoisie from the four-class alliance. Now, as the revolution entered its “third stage,” after a first stage led-by the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals and a second marked b y the entrance of the

proletariat onto the scene, i t was supposed to be possible for the proletariat —that is, the Communists—to win hegemony of a more ‘‘revolutionary bloc of the proletariat, peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie.’”*” The question of future military action was the most immediate concern of the Congress, both because of Chiang’s actions and because the Wuhan government had decided on April 12 to send forces north to join Feng

Yii-hsiang i n a drive on Peking. The Congress decided to support the new expedition, which was well underway at the time, i n order to bolster T’ang Sheng-chih’s position for a future struggle with Chiang Kai-shek.

Borodin had supported this course against the arguments of Roy, who favored delaying further ‘ e x p a n s i o n ’ until the revolution had been “deepened” i n Hunan and Hupeh. Earlier, the Chinese Communists had reversed without explanation, possibly because o f Comintern orders, a resolution of April 16, describing an expedition against Peking as undesirable and

“harmful to the revolution.” At another point, Borodin and Ch’en Tu-hsiu spoke of the desirability of the Party’s moving to the Northwest to attain greater security, possibly in alliance with Feng Yii-hsiang, but the Fifth Congress condemned this first proposal for a “Long March” as ‘“defeatist.” Later in May and June, arguments regarding the priority of further military expeditions changed with developments. Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Borodin, supported b y Galin, C h ’ i Ch’iu-pai, and L i Li-san, argued for an eastern

expedition to defeat Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking before proceeding north against Chang Tso-lin. T’an P’ing-shan, n o w joined b y Roy, favored a

southern expedition against Li Chi-shen to reverse the counterrevolution

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there, while Ts’ai Ho-sen favored strengthening the revolution in Hunan and Hupeh before undertaking further military action. The Fifth Congress, i n any case, approved the expedition already under way against the northern warlords, with Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chang T’ai-lei, and others following Borodin’s lead at that time. As a sop to the objections raised b y Roy, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and others, however, the Congress also

inveighed against the “tendency to abandon or weaken the existing base under the pretext of expansion.’’*® As before, the most crucial question for the Communists was that of policies toward the mass movements, especially the peasant movement, and the Nationalist reaction to these policies. The Comintern’s December theses had stated i n stronger terms than previously the centrality of the agrarian revolution but at the same time had insisted on the priority of maintaining the united front. The Chinese Communists, guided by the conservative interpretations of Borodin, Voitinsky, and other Russian advisers, emphasized the latter and further moderated their agrarian proposals in December and thereafter. The peasant movement, meanwhile, had developed its own momentum with the help of local activists and grew rapidly i n size and militancy i n early 1927. A t the same time, increasing

peasant seizures of land, without regard for the politics of the landlord, caused “considerable embarrassment i n government circles,” especially i n

Hailufeng, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh. Earlier, a prominent member of the Wuhan government had termed the peasant upsurge ‘““a movement of vandals, scoundrels, and idle peasants.’ Nonetheless the theses of the Fifth Congress called for the simultaneous intensification of the social revolution and further military action against the surviving warlords and Chiang Kai-shek. The revolution was to be “achieved by carrying out a program of radical agrarian reform and b y the establishment of revolutionary democratic power i n the village.” The

proletariat would lead the agrarian revolution, since the bourgeoisie, “due to its organic ties with feudal relations, . . cannot accomplish the task.” The Party would increase its power w i t h i n the Nationalist Party and at

the same time achieve “closer ties” with key Kuomintang leaders. This breathtaking accomplishment would be achieved (despite the by then all-too-evident lack of enthusiasm for an agrarian revolution on the part of the Kuomintang left), because “at the present stage the national revolution coincides with the agrarian revolution.”””® Roy told the Fifth Congress that the Nationalists could be convinced of the necessity for agrarian revolution even though he admitted that “ t h e petty bourgeoisie has become frightened b y this critical period of the revolution. I t does not want to carry out agrarian reforms.”

When Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Chang T’ai-lei, and others pointed out that Comintern efforts to stress agrarian revolution at this late date would

mean the end of the united front, Roy answered that the Party should be able to show the petty bourgeoisie the advantages of a thorough agrarian

revolution i n which land reform would bring about increased production, eliminate usury and market manipulation, and hence lower prices and stimulate trade.” The problem w i t h this, even from the Marxist point of view, was that neither T’ang Sheng-chih and his officers nor Wang

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Ching-Wei and his circle could be considered petty bourgeois i n any

realistic sense. I n any case, Marxists were supposed to distrust both petty

and big bourgeois.*° I n all, three views of the land problem were argued at the Fifth Congress. The first held that there should be “political confiscation,” that is, of land belonging to enemies of the Kuomintang; the second, that land belonging to small landlords as well as revolutionary officers should be exempt; and, the third, that there should be confiscation of a l l land with-

out restriction. Peasant leaders from Kwangtung, Hupeh, and Hunan, including P’eng P’ai and Mao Tse-tung, and some of the Russian advisers reportedly argued for the third and most radical solution.®* But, i n the

end, the Fifth Congress adopted the most conservative proposal, which exempted from confiscation not only the lands belonging to friends or relatives of leaders of the Nationalist armies but also those belonging to small landlords.®® The principal reason for this was again the necessity of maintaining the united front, although of course this purpose was not achieved, in part because the peasants continued to confiscate land in Hunan and elsewhere without making such distinctions. Accordingly, the Communists got the worst of both worlds, antagonizing both radicals and conservatives. While Ch’en Tu-hsiu and others were willing to acknowledge the inadequacies of past land programs, i t proved impossible to reconcile the contradictions between a radical agrarian policy and the continuation of the Nationalist alliance. The Eighth Plenum of the ECCI meeting in Moscow, May 8-30, once again made this contradiction crystal clear. While paying l i p service to the agrarian revolution as the “fundamental inner socio-economic content

of the new stage of the Chinese revolution,” the plenum “resolutely rejects all demands that t h e Communist Party leave the Kuomintang or take up a position which would lead to its leaving. .

The present moment demands

that the proletarian Party shall secure the leading role of the proletariat w i t h i n the Kuomintang.”’** The plenum again served notice that i t “regards

as incorrect the view which underestimates the Wuhan government and denies its great revolutionary role.

. ” O n the contrary, withdrawal from

the “revolutionary Kuomintang” would mean “ t o abandon the battlefield and to leave i n the lurch . . allies i n the Kuomintang, to the joy of the enemies of the revolution.”* Therefore, i n the end, not only Ch’en Tu-hsiu but later critics, including Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai and Mao, joined Borodin i n arguing for a land policy that would exclude from confiscation not only land of “revolutionary” officers and their families but also small holdings. Similarly, the Party overruled

Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s objection that Borodin’s proposal to “curb” the excessive demands o f “commercial employees’ would mean yielding “hegemony” to Nationalist decision-makers.** The CCP Fifth National Congress thus finally agreed to a land program

that would confiscate larger holdings of counterrevolutionaries, absentee landlords, and religious and company-owned land but would exempt land of revolutionaries and small owners. The priority of the united front was

maintained as these provisions basically conformed to the regulations drawn up a little earlier by the five-man Central Land Committee, includ-

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ing T’an P’ing-shan and Mao Tse-tung, established by the Wuhan government on April 2. The definition of ‘“small”’ was crucial, of course. Mao

tentatively proposed that the Land Committee fix the limit at 30 mou (about 5 acres), a little more than had been owned by his own father and twice the average family holding for South China, but did not press the case, while T’an P’ing-shan wavered on the question. Finally, a Nationalist “Draft Resolution on the Land Question” recommended, and the Communist Fifth Congress acquiesced in, limiting the maximum size of irrigated land holdings to 50 m o u (about 8 acres) of good land or 100 m o u of bad

land per person.®’ The Communists apparently also went along with Kuomintang recom-

mendations for fixing the maximum land rent at 40 per cent of the crop, in some ways a retreat from the earlier demand for a 25 per cent rent reduction from norms of one-half to two-thirds of the crop. Nor did the Communists effectively protest the Nationalist failure to carry out even these relatively moderate policies. Trotsky called Communist admissions of past inadequacy of Chinese Communist land policies, and by implication of the program of the Fifth Congress, ‘the harshest condemnation of the whole past line of the CCP and the Comintern as well,”’®® while a Stalinist later admitted that the Chinese Communist land program was “consistent” with Moscow's advice.®® The May, 1927, Anti-Communist Incidents

The Fifth Congress program neither ensured proletarian hegemony nor appeased the officer corps of T’ang Sheng-chih, who, along with Feng Yiihsiang, was the only remaining high-ranking ‘‘revolutionary general” still ostensibly favorable to the Communists. As had been the case earlier i n South and East China, military officers were increasingly alarmed at the “excesses” of the mass movements. I n mid-June, Ch’en Tu-hsiu acknowledged this “kiss of death” for the united front, writing that “most

of the officers come from the class of middle and petty landholders and are therefore antagonistic to the agrarian revolution.”’’® The Nationalists therefore never publicized, let alone executed, their April land revolution. Instead, Wuhan’s generals, one after the other, followed Chiang Kaishek’s pattern of dealing with “leftist excesses.” On May 18, while the main body of T’ang Sheng-chih’s army was pressing northward through Honan against Chang Tso-lin, one of T’ang’s division commanders marched o n Wuhan with the announced intention to ‘“save China from Communism.””' The Communists were able to round u p sufficient men to

stop this threat after a week’s fight, but even before this right-wing rebellion had been quelled a more serious one occurred i n Hunan. There, orders had already gone out for the arrest of M a o Tse-tung as the secretary of the Party’s Hunan Committee and for the dissolution of the peasant unions, which had pressed ahead with their land confiscations “from below,” especially i n areas around Changsha. Another leading

Wuhan general transferred his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and simultaneously ordered his subordinate i n Changsha to break u p the peasant unions b y force. This was done o n M a y 21, with hundreds of peasant

leaders and Communists killed in the process. The “Horse D a y ’ (as May

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109

2 1 was called) massacre, and Wuhan’s tolerance of i t , led Roy to say, “ T h e Kuomintang has become reactionary,” a n d L i Li-san to retort, “ F o r

Comrade Roy to say this is tantamount to sending the CCP a coffin.”"?

Obviously, what was left of the Communist conception of the united front was coming apart at the seams. The Political Bureau, which according to one of its members was trying a more aggressive approach toward the Nationalists, became even more paralyzed after these new setbacks

than i t had been before. The Party center’s “spirit was chaotic and unstable, and everyone was extremely gloomy as i f they had lost their way and had doubts o n every question.””® Stalin, however, revealed n o such doubts publicly and pressed single-mindedly the priority o f maintaining the united front for the national revolution. I n Moscow, as word came of developments i n China, the Chinese Commission of the E C C I

met i n urgent session. Stalin, Bukharin, and Palmiro Togliatti argued that the “peasant excesses’ frightened the Wuhan government. “ I f we do not curb the agrarian movement, we will lose our left allies and i t will have become impossible to win a majority in the Kuomintang By curbing it, we will enlarge our influence i n i t , and when we will have become more

powerful, we will go beyond our present allies.” “To fight,” as some members of the Comintern and the CCP insisted should be done, “means

certain defeat,” Stalin added. “ I propose to send instructions to Borodin to oppose the confiscation and division of land belonging to members of the Kuomintang o r the officers o f the Nationalist Army. W e possess

sufficient authority over the Chinese masses to make them accept our decision.”’’* The emperor had spoken. Nonetheless, despite the repetition of such sentiments at the Eighth Plenum of the E C C I i n May, along with the usual contradictory demand

for agrarian revolution throughout “the territory of the Wuhan government,””® many Chinese comrades urged an immediate severance of relations with the Wuhan government after the May anti-Communist actions. According to leading participants, the Political Bureau took a generally more aggressive attitude, and all Chinese leaders “considered that to pro-

pose to the Kuomintang at that time the slogan of expropriating the land was like ‘playing a lute to entertain an ox.” ” ’ * ® As so often occurred, as initial plans for more aggressive action proceeded, there were second thoughts about what repercussions the new efforts for a more militant line might have upon the future of the united

front. Thus, proposals of Ts’ai Ho-sen and Li Li-san for increased efforts to build military forces to deal with anti-Communist incidents were overruled, as Borodin, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, T’an P’ing-shan, and even Roy favored instead new efforts to strengthen ties with the Nationalists as a means of preventing hostile actions. Thus, Party Central reversed earlier support of plans, drawn u p b y the Party’s five-man Hunan Committee, for several

hundred thousand peasants to march on Changsha i n retaliation for the May 2 1 massacre. Although i t sent “ m a n y ” cadres to Hunan to help foment rebellion

against conservative Nationalists there, Party Central decided at the last minute to call off the march. Borodin reportedly refused to release funds for the demonstration, and T’an P’ing-shan, the Wuhan government’s

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newly inaugurated minister of agriculture, refused to issue the necessary authorization. The Party dissolved the Hunan “special committee” set up to direct the uprising and to help call i t off assigned none other than Mao Tse-tung i n his capacity as director of the National Peasant Association.

Nonetheless, thousands of peasants from the P’ingchiang and Liuyang regions did march on Changsha, being turned back on May 31 with great loss of life. But, i n the end, the Party followed Borodin’s insistence that

the Wuhan government be allowed to handle the disciplining of those responsible for the May 21 incident, and there was additional talk of “peasant excesses.” L i Wei-han, who had just succeeded Mao as secretary

of the Hunan Committee, condemned the proposal as ‘“child’s play” and decreed that, “as long as the Wuhan government exists, we must ask it to end the insurrection by lawful means.”’”” Accordingly, the Political Bureau asked the peasants “ t o be patient and wait for the government officials i n order to avoid further friction.” There were proposals to resubmit the whole land problem to study, and, on June 1 and 14, Party circulars called for renewed efforts “ t o correct the careless acts committed i n the past.””® Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, the new director

of the Central Committee peasant department, Mao Tse-tung as a member of the Nationalist Central Land Committee and executive committee of the National Peasant Association, and Chou En-lai as director of the Central

Committee Military Affairs Committee, as well as Ch’en Tu-hsiu and T’an P’ing-shan, on whom this was blamed, all had a large and often specific part in counseling restraint on the part of the peasant movements, their future biographers to the contrary.” The contradiction between maintaining the united front and pushing

the mass movements was ever clearer. The joint Nationalist-Communist investigation of the May 21 massacre declared on June 26 that the peasants, under the misguidance of their leaders, have broken loose from control and precipitated a reign of terror upon the people. I n defiance of the explicit orders of the Central Government for the protection of the revolutionary soldiers’ families, they have everywhere extorted taxes and fines, abused people and even murdered people. . . . 8 °

Murder by the armed forces was clearly different from “murder” by civilians, and local peasant leaders complained bitterly that the ‘“‘reactionaries’ killed far more peasants than vice versa, yet accused the peasants of excesses. According to one, “What can we do? The reactionaries

recognize no law, they kill as they wish. But we must recognize the law, for we are a responsible union. Yet the law cannot help us and only forbids us to help ourselves... We won the confidence of the peasants by promising relief from bad conditions. . . . This is not carried out. . . . ” The result was that, as another local leader put i t , the “unions have gradually lost the confidence and support of the peasant because what the peasants get from their struggle is often nothing but trouble o r massacre.’’®! Such contemporary statements revealed the cruel dilemmas of Com-

munist policy. “ [ We] were then in a quandary. On the one hand, we had

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111

to fight against the feudal forces of local bullies and bad gentry and the

bourgeoisie; on the other, we had to cooperate with the Kuomintang, which represented them. ...””®> As a leading writer o n the period neatly put it,

the result was that “Moscow had imposesd a formula which canceled itself out: victory was impossible without the agrarian revolution: victory was also impossible without the cooperation of the left Kuomintang. But

. . . under the leadership of the left Kuomintang i t was impossible to have the agrarian revolution. Hence, o n Moscow’s terms, victory was impos-

sible.”’8? A n appeal to Moscow by Roy for a way out of all this elicited a famous telegram from Stalin, which was received in Wuhan o n June 1. I t only

dramatized the contradiction by stating, “The scoundrels [who oppress the people] must be punished.” But by whom? By ‘ a revolutionary tribunal headed by prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists.” I t repeated the demands for the elusive agrarian revolution while stating, ‘“Excesses must be combatted—not, however, with the help of troops, b u t through the peasant unions’—that is, voluntarily. The Communists were to reor-

ganize the left, throwing reactionary leaders “into discard,” and most important, were to make concrete previous general pleas for a “revolutionary army,” although the latter would still be under Nationalist leadership. The telegram stated, I t is necessary to liquidate the dependence upon unreliable generals immediately. Mobilize about 20,000 Communists a n d about 50,000 revolutionary

workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several new army corps, utilize the students of the school for military commanders, and organize your own reliable army before i t is too late.3+

Borodin and the Chinese Party Central understandably considered these new instructions “ludicrous,” and a Political Bureau meeting decided to wire back only “orders received. Shall obey as soon as we can do so.” A month later, Borodin elaborated, “ S t a l i n . . i s right i n his policy of

agrarian revolution. B u t . .they did not tell us to arm the workers and peasants in preparation for a rupture with the bourgeoisie. For this reason, the present Stalin line can hardly be put into practice.” Ch’en Tu-hsiu wondered how to “discard” Nationalist reactionaries and asked sarcastically from whom were they to get so many arms.*® Perhaps from Wang Ching-wei. Roy apparently believed just that and showed the telegram to

Wang to the dismay of all the other Communists. Wang Ching-wei i n turn showed the telegram to the Nationalist generals,

telling T’ang Sheng-chih that the Communists planned t o eliminate their party. The ‘revolutionary Nationalists’ naturally decided to throw the Communists “into discard” rather than the other way round, although all sides delayed action until mid-July. Generals i n Kiangsi and elsewhere had already followed the now well-set precedent of suppressing the mass movements and Communists. Wang himself put the matter with brutal frankness: The Communists propose to us to go together with the masses, but where are the masses? Where are the highly praised forces of Shanghai workers

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or the Kwangtung or Hunan peasants? There are no such forces. You see, Chiang Kai-shek maintains himself quite strongly without the masses. To go with the masses means to go against the army. No, we had better go without the masses but together with the army.%®

I t remained for Feng Yii-hsiang, and finally T’ang Sheng-chih and Wang Ching-wei, to shatter remaining illusions about the united front. Master of Honan after further defeats of Chang Tso-lin, Feng met leaders of the Wuhan government at Chengchow from June 10 to 12 and dictated his terms for further cooperation against remaining ‘‘reactionary” warlords. Feng demanded recognition of his newly expanded power in North China and an end to the “oppression of the merchants and other members of the gentry” and the “despotism” of the Communists. Feng also resolved

to mediate the dispute between Wuhan and Nanking now that all agreed on the need to check radicalism. After meeting Chiang Kai-shek at Hsiichow on June 20-21, Feng wired Wuhan to advise that Borodin return to Russia and that the left settle the split, more or less, o n Nanking’s terms.®’

Meanwhile, i n early June, although i t had just called off the May 31 march on Changsha, Party Central stiffened its demands for dealing with

such anti-Communism. I t discussed a “Resolution on Hupeh and Hunan,” calling for mobilization against the counterrevolution, but in the end only sent an open letter on June 3 to the Nationalists, which followed Roy’s arguments that, although “certain elements i n the army are opposed to agrarian reform,” lower officers and enlisted men could be educated to support land revolution: “ T h e Kuomintang must not hesitate for a

minute in choosing its path. The path of agrarian reform is the path of the revolution. The path of the reactionary militarist elements is the path of the counterrevolution. The Kuomintang now stands at the crossroads. . . . ” ® ® According to Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Borodin now privately agreed that the Communists should free themselves of the straitjacket of the alliance but refused to sanction this action, as “Moscow will never permit i t . ” The priority for the united front remained, and Borodin rebuked the Central Committee for its June 3 open letter, declaring i t was impossible to talk

of agrarian revolution when the united front hung by a “thin thread.””®® H e urged, instead, concentrating on military work, n o w directed against

Chiang Kai-shek, rather than Chang Tso-lin. This shift i n tactics was necessitated b y Feng Yii-hsiang’s evident switch to Chiang’s side, and Borodin purported to believe that the Communists could persuade their sole remaining military ally, T’ang Sheng-chih, to undertake such an eastern expedition against Nanking. Despite the anti-Communist actions

of his subordinates, T’ang’s continuing need for Soviet arms led Borodin to say, “There is still food i n our box: H e is hungry and therefore he will not run away.’’®’ The End of the First United Front

The steadily worsening crisis was discussed feverishly at several enlarged meetings of Party Central later i n June and i n early July and at

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virtually continuous meetings at Party offices and homes i n Hankow and then in Wuchang. I n addition, many Party members attended the Fourth Congress of the National General Labor Union, held in Hankow o n June

19-28, at which Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch’i gave key reports.®® An enlarged conference of Party Central about June 20 passed an elevenpoint resolution reviewing relations with the Nationalists. I t repeated the tired formula that “the Kuomintang ...should naturally assume leadership of the national revolution,” but i t stated that Communists “now working for the government may take leave as a way to minimize political

strife” and that “demands arising from the worker and peasant movement should be handled according to the proclaimed law of the government.’”®? I n accord with these principles, Su Chao-cheng and T’an P’ing-shan withdrew from their positions i n the Wuhan government as ministers of labor and agriculture. T’an apologized on June 30 for his failure “to put the peasant movement on the right track,” and the Hupeh General Labor Union, headed by future CCP General Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa, turned over several thousand arms of its pickets to the government in late June, declaring, “We have petitioned the government for protection i n order to show our sincere intention to support i t . . . . ” ? ® The conference thus

served notice that i t intended to have Communists withdraw from the Wuhan government but equally clearly upheld the primacy of the united front and the leadership of the Kuomintang. I t was belatedly moving toward a “bloc without” but at the cost of what later writers called a “program of retreat’ that would completely subjugate the mass movements to Nationalist leadership.** Party Central discussions at this time were further complicated b y an intensification of dissension among the Russian advisers, with two dele-

gates, one described as a ‘“hunchbacked foreigner” and the other as a young Comintern representative, joining Roy’s longstanding feud with Borodin. The two newcomers denounced a Borodin statement for implying inconsistency i n the Comintern policy of simultaneously demanding con-

tinuation of the united front and intensification of the mass movements, and Borodin replied ominously that his challengers reflected the views of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition.?® One thing only remained constant— Stalin’s dogged adherence to the united front with the Nationalists. O n June 30, Bukharin, at the time still an ally and an equal of Stalin’s, reaffirmed the policy of the united front, asserting disingenuously that relations with the Nationalists were no worse than those with Chang

Tso-lin, or with Mussolini for that matter. He claimed that revolution from below could continue, since ‘“‘state relations” were entirely separate from the “revolutionary” activities of the Comintern, blandly ignoring the degree to which such a “state alliance” i n China greatly reduced Communist ability to organize revolution from below. Equally unbelievably, on July 7, Bukharin declared i t a “well-known fact” that the Communists were free to operate i n Wuhan-controlled territories, while the Comintern

denounced “false rumors” about the “defeat of the Chinese revolution.”®® Small wonder, as Roy later noted, that some Chinese Communists feared

that the Comintern based its instructions on “false information.”’?” The Manifesto of the Fourth Congress of the National General Labor Union

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declared more realistically at the end of June: ‘“Counterrevolution is gaining strength every day. . . t h e labor movement can only be conducted openly at Wuhan. . . . We are now in a reign of white terror.’’®® Similarly, an enlarged conference of Party Central about July 1 declared, “ W e should be prepared for the day to come when the petty bourgeois left leaves us. A t that time, we should be able to call the masses and local forces to oppose the present Kuomintang leadership and government.’ But few, i f any, preparations were made for this eventuality.

Finally, on July 14, the Comintern publicly, if anticlimactically, announced, “The revolutionary role of the Wuhan government is played out: I t is becoming a counterrevolutionary force.” Therefore, participation

i n it, which had been correct before, “becomes fundamentally wrong in the moment at which the Wuhan government capitulates to the enemies of the revolution.”'® But the break with the government, as was true i n the Chinese Party Central’s resolution of June 20, still d i d not mean

that the Chinese Communists should leave the ‘revolutionary Kuomintang.” Even now, they “should remain in the Kuomintang i n spite of the campaign carried on by its leaders for the expulsion of the Communists.” They should, however, increase their efforts to demand ‘the removal of

the present leaders. .”’'™ This move could only cost the Communists their lives; the Comintern also asked for their souls. “ T h e E C C I considers i t its revolutionary duty

to call upon the members of the CCP openly to fight against the opportunism o f the Central Committee . . . and disavow those leaders who vio-

lated the international discipline of the Communist International.”*°> Had not Ch’en Tu-hsiu, even i f i n complete accord with Borodin, wired that

i t was impossible to carry out “ i n a short time” Comintern instructions of June 1 calling for the reorganization of the Nationalists and for the creation of a really revolutionary army? Already Bukharin had hinted of the impending reorganization of the CCP, stating that its “leadership has i n recent times sabotaged the decisions of the Comintern.”’**® I n short, the Ch’en Tu-hsiu leadership would be made to bear the burden of Moscow's failure. I n the circumstances, i t must have been true, as M a o later put it, that

Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s “wavering opportunism deprived the Party of decisive leadership.”!°* Yet, as Trotsky had noted more than a month before, the Chinese Communists were “bound hand and foot by the false leadership of the representatives of the Comintern.”'*® Ts’ai Ho-sen agreed a year

later that “the Communist International was responsible for the defeat of the Chinese Revolution” because there were two contradictory Comintern policies and the dominant one was “reformist” and “opportunist” before that of the Chinese Communists was.'°® I n his December, 1929, “Letter to A l l Comrades,” Ch’en Tu-hsiu, who lost one son as well as his job i n the tragedies of 1927 and another son i n 1928, bitterly explained it this way: Lacking thorough knowledge, failing to carry out my convictions, indecisive and at the time steeped in opportunism, I faithfully carried out the Comin-

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tern’s opportunist policies and unwittingly served as Stalin’s instrument. . . . I have had enough of training by the International i n opportunism, and I formerly committed many errors because of listening to Comintern i d e a s . ! O n July 13, the day before the Comintern made public its reversal of

opinion on the ‘revolutionary role” of the Wuhan government, Party Central issued a manifesto explaining its resolution ‘“‘to recall its representatives” from the Wuhan government. Since ‘‘thousands of Communists have fallen in the struggle,” the Party could now ‘clearly see” that the policy of the “majority of the top leadership . . . i n the Nationalist government is disastrous for the revolution.” Furthermore, “ T h e Kuomin-

tang has allied itself with the feudal class and the bourgeoisie a coup d’état is being prepared . . . t h e CCP will be forever for the people and is not responsible for the present policy” of the Nationalists. Simultaneously, the Party ordered its members to “establish secret nuclei within

the Kuomintang and to utilize every opportunity to ‘incite disorders to discredit and destroy the [Nationalist] Party.’ ”’ Nevertheless, the Party also expressed the hope, as d i d Moscow, that the Nationalists would see

the light and “put into effect [ o u r ] sort of revolutionary policy.”’**® I t was too late. O n and after July 15, the Wuhan Political and Military

Councils, respectively, ordered all Communists i n the Kuomintang to renounce their Communist affiliations or suffer the consequences. Sporadic strikes called to protest the latest turn of events were broken up, and Communist Party leaders went underground or left Wuhan.*® On July 14, Ch’en Tu-hsiu went into hiding and, on the next day, resigned his position as General Secretary of the Party, stating i n part, “The International on the one hand wants us to execute our own policies, b u t o n the other will not allow us to leave the Kuomintang. There is really n o way out and I

cannot continue my work.”’*'° Late o n July 13, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Borodin had left for the resort of

Lushan, ostensibly for a rest but in fact for Borodin to review the crisis and to plan the reorganization of Party Central. Chang Kuo-t’ao states that in the Wuhan area only he and Chou En-lai, of senior leaders, remained

active, now working underground in Wuchang, while other important cadres had left, mostly for Nanchang, Shanghai, or the provinces, or were killed.'** Back from Lushan, Borodin was escorted to the railroad station

as an “honored guest” on July 27 and returned to the Soviet Union with other Russian advisers, Madame Sun Yat-sen, and fellow travelers, and, about the same time, Roy also went to Moscow. I n effect, the period of the first united front had ended, though for a few weeks more the Communists still spoke of working with the now minuscule group of “ r e a l revolutionaries’’ among the Nationalists. What of the post-mortems? Incredibly, Moscow for a while longer still insisted on some form of united front policy and ‘rightly condemned the withdrawal from the Kuomintang, which was a mass organization, under conditions [which would have been] tantamount to delivering [ i t ] . . . i n t o [ t h e ] hands of

its right wing and isolating the Communists from the masses of Kuomin-

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tang supporters.” According to the same Soviet statement of August 9,

the “severe defeat” of the Chinese Communists i n the spring and summer of 1927 occurred, first, because of,

the alignment of class forces both i n China and internationally; second, because the masses have not yet had time to organize forces powerful enough. . . ; finally, because the working class is not yet strong enough to form a strongly organized mass Communist Party. Moreover, the leaders of the CCP, i n systematically rejecting the instructions of the Comintern, bear partial responsibility for the defeat of the Chinese working class and peasantry.112

Roy later reflected that the disaster was due to the fact that the Communist Party could not understand the necessity to convert the Nationalist

Party “into an organ of democratic dictatorship under the hegemony of the proletariat. . for collaboration they substituted capitulation.”''®* But, on June 9 , Roy had told the Political Bureau, “ I t would be a mistake to call

the present

Kuomintang leftist. A general attack on the workers’ and

peasants’ movement is now the basic feature of its policy.””*'* Moreover, as Roy frequently observed, the Kuomintang, which the CCP was supposed to manipulate, was actually i n the hands of conservatives, while the insistence

on the united front deprived the Communists of an adequate underground organization, the only weapon the Party might have had at the time. O n the other hand, he argued,

Our Party is very young. Organizationally i t is weak. I t does not have an illegal machinery. I f i t suddenly goes underground, without putting up a fight [within the united front] i t w i l l be virtually destroyed. . There is only one course, we must fight and win. This is not a tactic of desperation. The Kuomintang must be reorganized. The Communist Party may only continue to collaborate with a reorganized Kuomintang.'!? Exactly, but i t was also not a winning tactic, for who could reorganize

the Nationalists? The contradictions i n the united front policy could scarcely have been better put. I n truth, the situation was so difficult and complicated as to block

success for the Communists at this stage. The contradictory nature of Comintern policy and the arguments among Moscow’s representatives in China helped to create conditions that enabled Maoist orthodoxy to

reduce the causes of defeat i n 1927 to a personal level. Almost a decade later, a leading reporter summarized Mao’s belief that “ R o y had been a fool, Borodin a blunderer, and Ch’en an unconscious traitor.”’**¢ A final irony resides i n the fact that, several years earlier, the Commun-

ists had succeeded only too well i n reorganizing the Kuomintang—so well that they could not reorganize i t a second time. Both parties had become infinitely stronger, but, i n subordinating themselves to the Nationalists, as Sun Yat-sen and the Comintern had demanded, Chinese Communists were deprived of the opportunity to develop the “illegal machinery” with which

they might have challenged their superiors. Beyond such considerations, i n the 1920’s the Kuomintang counted for

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far more than did the Communists among those who controlled military force and hence the political direction of a country so often torn by warfare, Even for the intellectuals, Marxism was still too “new and foreign” in the 1920’s to claim dominant loyalties. I t was an age of revolutionary nation-

alism, but for most that still meant war against the warlords and imperialists, not against Chinese society itself. Hence, the first united front, itself

a product of surging nationalism, broke down over the ultimate question of the sort of country China was to be.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE R E D A R M Y

The partial success of Nationalist unification clarified the Chinese political scene somewhat after 1927, b u t the Communist movement

became even more complex as the Party climbed back from its intended grave and factional disputes intensified i n both Moscow and China. While

Communists struggled desperately t o maintain their work i n the cities, Party organization developed i n scattered areas of the immense countryside. For the next several years, these pockets were isolated from the outside world for months at a time; yet from them emerged political and military forces that would change the face of China. I n organizational terms, there was now a Communist triangle, each of whose three corners—Moscow, Shanghai, and the rural soviet areas—was

split into several factions, interacted i n complex ways with the other parts, and responded differently to the vast and shifting mosaic of Chinese and world developments. I n 1931-32, when Party Central finally moved to what became the best-known of the rural soviets, i n southern Kiangsi Province, there were still more than a half-dozen major Com-

munist groups, although only a few thousand Communists survived i n the cities. Among the Nationalists, factionalism and warlordism also continued but progress toward unification was evident. After maneuvering between rightist, centrist, and leftist Nationalists i n m i d and late 1927, Chiang Kaishek was able to return from a brief exile i n Japan to take over more and more of the direction of the Nationalist government, now firmly established i n Nanking.* Many of the generals who had joined i n the Northern Expedition later split w i t h and, on occasion, fought Nanking, but, after 1928, there was a national government for the first time i n more than a

decade. The Kuomintang was able to expand its membership, however inadequately, from perhaps 150,000 i n January, 1926, to more than

300,000 in 1929 to more than 800,000 in 1933 and to 1.7 million several * The new Nationalist government for the period of “tutelage” i n democracy was inaugurated i n the “southern capital” of Nanking i n October, 1928, after which the “northern capital” of Peking officially became known as Peiping or “northern peace.”

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years later.! I n sharp contrast, the Chinese Communists were hard hit by the savage attacks o n them from the spring of 1927 on, and b y their o w n

reckless responses to the drastically changed circumstances. Party membership fell catastrophically, from almost 58,000 i n April, to less than 25,000

a few months later to “ a little more than 10,000” by November. At the same time, Youth League membership fell from 35,000 in the late spring to 15,000 b y August.

Moreover, perhaps less than half of these survivors remained active.? Many Communists must simply have withdrawn from the Party, but many others were among hundreds of thousands killed i n the “white terror” after April, 1927.2 To some extent, an organizational weeding out of the Party would have been necessary i n any case i n order to ensure quality i n

the membership after the rapid growth of the previous two years, but the trauma of the Nationalist repression had profound repercussions. The already extreme youth of Communist leaders became still more marked, with their average age falling from 30.3 i n April, 1927, to 26.3 years of age i n 1 9 2 8 . Only the toughest survived, and they tended to become more radical, even as more conservative men took over the Kuomintang. I n the

cities, leaders attempted to operate underground but were forced to take extreme precautions, staying in contact with only a few other comrades and living i n constant fear o f betrayal, arrest, and execution. I n the countryside,

Communists were able to develop armed ‘“peasant-worker’ groups, but their principal job much of the time was simply to survive, both i n terms of procuring the necessities of life and i n defending themselves against

frequent government ‘“‘mopping-up’’ operations. Until the early 1930s, the Communists had n o radios and could contact Party Central and other base

areas only by courier. Whatever unity the Communists managed to maintain during these years was due primarily to a common state of mind, which for many was religious i n its fervor and idealism. This meant an almost Confucian dedi-

cation to serve “the people” against the government, in the belief that the overthrow of the ruling class would end all oppression and misery. Others simply felt that their own well-being and that of China required a fundamental revolution that only the Communists could bring about. There is no denying that this high sense of commitment, together with effective organization, d i d far more to hold the Communist cause together after 1927

than did Comintern money or plans. However, the same semi-religious fervor that kept the Communists going against overwhelming odds also sharpened the dogmatism of many leaders to the point of fanaticism, and perhaps only the ruthlessness of government suppression and Communist countermeasures prevented an irrevocable splintering o f the Communist

movement in China. For the committed, i t was too dangerous to “go it alone.”

The fall of the top leadership of the CCP after the collapse of the united front in the spring and summer of 1927 was probably inevitable. There had been increasing dissatisfaction with the Nationalist alliance at all levels of the CCP, even before the disasters of the spring and summer, and i t was natural that ambitious members of the Party would resent

Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s failure to guide events. Many Chinese Communists, includ-

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ing, most vociferously, Ch’en, P’eng Shu-chih, and Chang Kuo-t’ao, also understandably deplored the Comintern role i n the setbacks of previous months. After all, Moscow had insisted o n a united front that favored the

Nationalists and yet now was accusing the Chinese leadership of opportunism for its inability to control this impossible situation. I t was equally understandable that the Communist International should want to disguise its own part in the catastrophe, and i t had the means to do so. I n the first place, Moscow, being far distant, issued general pronouncements, leaving most specific orders to local organization, and then, when policies failed, blamed the local Party for faulty understanding and execution of Moscow’s theories. And, of course, i f policy succeeded,

the Comintern could take credit for it. I n the second place, so long as it enjoyed the tremendous prestige of being the center of revolution and was able to give needed aid at crucial times, Moscow continued to be able to

manipulate the leadership of the various Communist parties. I n mid-July, several developments precipitated a thorough reshuffling

of Party Central, as well as the final break with the Nationalists. When Ch’en Tu-hsiu resigned o n July 15, 1927, Borodin was already working

to ensure the succession of his “favorite,” Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, the twenty-eightyear-old son of an impoverished Kiangsu gentry family. Ch’li was a natural choice of the Russians, since he knew their language and theory well from his study of Russian literature and several years i n the Soviet Union. Equally important, Ch’ii had usually supported the often inconsistent arguments of Comintern representatives during previous hectic months.’ Returning to Wuhan from Lushan about July 21, Ch’ii reported Borodin’s view that, for the sake of the world revolution, the Communist

International could not be held responsible for the disasters in China and that Ch’en Tu-hsiu should be blamed instead and replaced by a new leadership. Some Communists understandably objected to this blatant juggling of history, but Ch’ii, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chou En-lai, and others agreed that, i n view of the critical times and Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s recent passiv-

ity, a new provisional leadership should be set up. I t included themselves, as well as L i Li-san, Chang T’ai-lei, and L i Wei-han, who were closely

associated with the new Comintern representative, a twenty-eight-year-old Georgian named Besso Lominadze, who arrived o n July 23. Lominadze

had full powers to “correct all past mistakes and to direct the work of the Chinese Party Central” and to a large extent d i d so, despite some resent-

ment at his and the Comintern’s arrogant pretensions. These men decided to schedule an emergency conference for the near future and eventually to

move Party Central back to Shanghai. There were about 3,000 Communists i n the Wuhan cities i n late July, a number that declined to less than 2,000 in August and to several hundred by several years later.®

The Nanchang Uprising Before the Party could be formally reorganized, some of its members revived long-delayed plans for the Communists to take the offensive, and

out of them came an even more important development, the creation of a Red Army, which would bring Communist victory twenty-two years

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later. Following the new anti-Party actions of May, radicals, including

Ts’ai Ho-sen and Li Li-san, had already proposed plans to link the military and mass uprisings. Stalin’s June 1 telegram calling for the Communists to “mobilize about 20,000 Communists and about 50,000 revolutionary workers and peasants” had encouraged Party Central to draw u p a “Reso-

lution on Hupeh and Hunan” in early June. But, as we have seen, later in the month, the Comintern representatives, joined by Ch’en Tu-hsiu, decided once again to restrain such radical plans, pending a final effort to retain the good will of the Wuhan government.’ As relations with the Wuhan government moved toward a rupture in mid-July, plans for insurrection, which had been discussed at least since May, began to take specific shape, with rebellions projected for Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung and within Nationalist army units. Among Communists, a growing impatience to test the vaunted revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses was accompanied b y a n increasing realiza-

tion that their greatest organizational failure had been not to infiltrate or win over larger units of the Nationalist military forces.® Therefore, i t was logical to think of trying to combine i n some fashion mass uprisings with rebellions i n military units.

The Communists were strongest in the Nationalist Fourth Army, which shortly after its return to Wuhan i n about July from battles with northern warlords i n Honan, was transferred eastward to northern Kiangsi to try

to block further moves by Chiang Kai-shek. I n i t and closely associated military units were H o Lung, a Hunan militarist turned revolutionary,

who was then Commander of the Twentieth Army; Yeh T’ing, a man with close Nationalist connections who was then Commander of the Twentyfourth Division; future Red Army Chief Chu Teh, a ruggedly amiable

Szechwan military man who had become head of the bureau of political security of the Kiangsi provincial government, and many other future

leaders of the Red Army, including a regiment commander, Chou Shih-ti, Ch’en Y i , Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch’eng, and Lin Piao,

who was then only twenty years old. Many other Communist leaders, including L i Li-san, T’an P’ing-shan, P’eng P’ai, Yiin Tai-ying, and, b y

about July 22, Chou En-lai, also moved to the vicinity of Nanchang and decided that conditions there were favorable enough for the long-awaited chance to strike back with an uprising of local military units.? They moved ahead with plans but also felt they would have to seek approval from Party leaders and Comintern representatives i n Wuhan.

A meeting of the few active leaders still in the Wuhan cities was called for July 26 to consider these plans. Lominadze reported that Moscow had wired instructions forbidding the Russians to participate i n any uprising, stating that few funds were available to help, and advising the Chinese not to proceed ‘ i f there is n o chance at all of victory.”’® H e placed priority o n the reorganization of

Party Central so as to end its “opportunism,” while the ranking Soviet military adviser, Galin, proposed that the Communists delay the revolt

until Chang Fa-k’uei’s army had returned to Kwangtung as planned, since i t would then be easier to reach Hailufeng. The meeting decided to send Chang Kuo-t’ao to Kiukiang and Nanchang to report on the Wuhan dis-

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cussions, but there is dispute about Chang’s instructions. According to Chang, prior to the July 26 meeting Galin and Lominadze had counseled delay, or at least utmost caution; but later critics charged that Chang Kuo-t’ao had distorted the discussions and the import of the Comintern telegrams. According to them, the Comintern and Wuhan comrades had

urged only careful planning, not a delay or cancelation of the revolt, as Chang argued.’ I n any case, Moscow had once again issued ambiguous

directives and waited to see the results, leaving the execution of plans and the responsibility for their failure to the Chinese. Chang Kuo-t’ao reached Kiukiang on July 27 and at discussions there and two days later in Nanchang urged that the uprising be delayed. However, in the first reasonably documented case of Chinese rejection of Comintern instructions, an ad hoc Nanchang Front Committee, consisting of Chou En-lai, Liu Po-ch’eng, Yeh T’ing, H o Lung, Chu Teh, L i Li-san,

and others, which was responsible for directing the uprising, refused to postpone i t . They argued that plans were too far advanced and that the uprising, originally scheduled for July 28, had already been postponed

once and should not be delayed again i n view of the fact that Wang Ching-wei was conferring with leading generals in the area on ways to complete the purge of Communists. Furthermore, the deployment of Nationalist troops was now at its most favorable, as units of forces under

Yeh T’ing, Ho Lung, and Chu Teh had all converged on Nanchang by July 27. Reportedly, only Yeh T’ing was sympathetic to Chang Kuo-t’ao’s arguments for delay, but Chou En-lai, L i Li-san, and Yiin Tai-ying were

determined to follow the current timetable for the uprising. They asked how the Comintern could now advise calling off the revolt when i t was at the same time condemning Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s unwillingness to fight the

Nationalists. The Nanchang Front Committee intimated that for the first time the Chinese would proceed with their plans regardless of the attitude of the Comintern. Chang Kuo-t’ao eventually gave i n to their arguments, and plans for the revolt actually were accelerated after an intelligence leak to local authorities. A t this time, there were some 1,000 Communisits i n

the Nanchang area, including about 180 of around 260 leaders of the insurrection. About two dozen of them played especially important roles in the uprising, while other activists presumably were radical Nationalists. Oddly enough, as we shall see, the Comintern continued to counsel some kind of cooperation with ‘revolutionary Nationalists.” According to

another participant, the great majority of rebel leaders were leftist Nationalists and only about 1 per cent of the military officers in the area were Communists or Youth League members.'? From these unlikely materials,

and after repeatedly coming close to being destroyed, the Red Army emerged. The rebels struck Nanchang before dawn on the morning of August 1, 1927, a date now celebrated as the founding date of the Chinese Red Army, because so many of its future leaders took part. Some seven groups,

numbering perhaps 20,000, disarmed the 5,000 men loyal to the Nationalists and quickly took over the city.'® The Front Committee continued to operate behind the scenes but, in

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line with efforts to maintain a semblance of the united front, appointed a

“Revolutionary Committee” of the Kuomintang as the ostensible executive body of the uprising. The Revolutionary Committee included left-wing Nationalists such as Madame Sun Yat-sen, then on her way to Moscow with Borodin, and even the commanding general in the area, Chang Fa-k’uei, but Communists held real power. T’an P’ing-shan chaired the Revolutionary Committee, and Chou En-lai, L i Li-san, Lin Po-ch’ii, Chang

Kuo-t’ao, Wu Yii-chang, and Kuo Mo-jo headed key subcommittees. Still more decisive, of course, was a military directorate composed of Ho Lung, chairman, Yeh T’ing, vice-chairman, and Liu Po-ch’eng, chief of staff.

The new attempt at cooperation with leftist Nationalists proved as abortive as did hopes for a mass uprising. A t first, lacking a well-

constructed program beyond the usual anti-imperialist and antimilitarist slogans and unable to make adequate preparations, the Communists could attract only several hundred new recruits, while General Chang Fa-k’uei

quickly mobilized his forces to retake the town. Few if any of the other Nationalists on the Revolutionary Committee took any part in the insurrection.

By August 5, the rebels had withdrawn in the face of these developments, taking with them $100,000 (Chinese) and confiscated supplies and, as earlier agreed, proceeded to the Hailufeng area of Kwangtung. They passed through areas of future Communist bases i n Kiangsi and western

Fukien before reaching the Swatow region in late September. Inadequately organized, divided as to the best course, facing frequent encounters with hostile forces, and finding the peasantry apathetic, the future “glorious” Red Army almost disintegrated, losing a third of its strength in the first few days and completing the march with only about 2,000 soldiers. By October, about half of these, under H o Lung and Yeh

T’ing, made their way to Hailufeng after being forced out of their provisional capital, Swatow, which they held for about a week after September

24. The other major group, under Chu Teh, eventually circled back to Hunan, where i t joined forces with Mao Tse-tung in the spring of 1928. We shall come back to this southern “long march” after Nanchang in connection with Communist agrarian policies and the growth of other military groups, but first we must discuss developments in Wuhan. The August 7 Emergency Conference

I n Wuhan, a new leadership had emerged to replace Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s “rightist opportunism.” Because a good portion of Party Central, including L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, T’an P’ing-shan, Yiin Tai-ying,

and P’eng P’ai, had traveled south with the Nanchang rebels, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Lominadze, and others convened the August 7 Emergency

Conference in Hankow.* I t has been charged that many top Communists * Many sources give Kiukiang as the site of this conference, but, among other reasons, i t does not seem likely that the conference would have been held there after Chang Fa-k’uei’s attitude to the rebellion had become known, and most members who d i d attend the Conference, including, of course, those from the Hupeh cadres’ conference, were then i n the Wuhan area.” Some of the confusion possibly arises from the many planning sessions for the Nanchang uprising of August 1, which were held in Kiukiang on and after July 19.

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were assigned to the Nanchang Uprising precisely in order to smooth the way for the accession of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and the censure of Ch’en Tu-hsiu. Moreover, the meeting was called over the objection of many comrades in the north. Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Ts’ai Ho-sen later claimed that Lominadze had insisted that, i f they did not call a conference of the Party Central,

with or without a quorum, he would do so. A quorum was obtained by transforming a Hupeh cadres’ conference into the August 7 Emergency Conference, and, i n subsequent years, there were many accusations that the meeting had been illegal.*® I n all, some twenty-two Communists, including

a dozen members and three alternates of the Fifth Central Committee and five members of the Youth League Central Committee, attended.® The Conference elected Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai to head a new provisional Political Bureau of nine, with seven alternates, Ch’ii having received key support

from the Russian advisers and evidently from Li Wei-han, Hsiang Chung-fa, and others. Members of the provisional Political Bureau, besides C h ’ , L i , and Hsiang, included Su Chao-cheng, Hsiang Ying, Chang T’ai-lei, L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, M a o Tse-tung and Liu

Shao-ch’i, the last five or six possibly as alternates. Jen Pi-shih, secretary of the Youth League, whose members had “proved themselves recently to be politically stronger than the Central Committee of the CCP,” and others also participated in important discussions at this time.” Li Wei-han and perhaps initially Chou En-lai headed the all-important organization department, which, according to a November Party resolution, supervised virtually all Party sections at the time, then including also propaganda, documents, publications, military affairs, special affairs,* labor, and

women. The new leadership, which Maoists later dubbed the “first left opportunist l i n e , ” must have seemed small improvement over Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s

“right opportunism,” as new calamities befell the Party in rapid succession. Like other early Party leaders, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai was an intellectual and,

moreover, a student of Buddhism and literature. He later claimed that he had concentrated on theoretical matters in late 1927 and had left the practical execution of policy to lower levels. However, unlike the Comintern, Ch’ii was too close to developments to be able to avoid censure. Writing from a Nationalist prison before his execution in June, 1935, Ch’ii further stated that he had regretted his selection as Party leader,

because i t was due to a ‘historical misunderstanding,” and admitted his weak leadership. H e stated, “ I have wavered and vacillated o n every

question and always hoped to have something else to rely on.’’*® The “Resolution on Organization” adopted by the August 7 Conference decreed that the Central Committee was to remain i n Wuhan for several months, although i t actually returned to Shanghai sometime i n late Sep-

tember.’ The resolution called for expansion of the work of the South China Bureau, then coterminous with the Party’s regional committee i n

Kwangtung, which was later headed by Chang T’ai-lei and was supposed to include two other members o r alternates of the Political Bureau. I t , the * The special affairs department, which was i n charge of security, retained this name until 1938, when i t became the social affairs department.

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Yangtze Bureau, the Shunchih (Hopeh) Committee, and the Shanghai

Committee, together with Party Central, i n effect functioned as regional headquarters, especially i n planning the distribution of propaganda and organization. The Youth League also continued to work closely with the Party and held a meeting in Wuhan on August 12 to coordinate its activi-

ties with the new policies. During these months, there was a rather desperate effort to “Bolshevize”

the shaken and battered CCP. Both the August resolution and a similar one on organization passed by the November plenum called for the “formation of solid hard-fighting secret Party organs” and stressed the need to combat opportunism by strengthening proletarian leadership, by mastering underground operations, and by carrying out actions in “strict adherence to Party discipline.” The November resolution termed the underrepresentation of proletarians and the overrepresentation of “petty bourgeois intellectuals” the “principal shortcoming of the CCP organizationally” and stated that the Party’s “most important organizational task’ was to replace “nonproletarian intellectuals .

w i t h elements of the workers and peas-

ants.” I t established a roving inspection system to ‘assure vigorous implementation” of the Bolshevization of the Party. The November resolution also condemned the weaknesses of Party cells, “particularly i n the villages and armed units.” I t even admitted, “Strictly speaking, there is almost n o Party organization i n the villages.””?® Nor was there any i n

the cities, where by November very few of the perhaps 10,000 Communist survivors were still located. There were said to be only seven i n Hang-

chow, for example. There were also efforts to streamline and tighten Party organization.

Activists were to promote formation of Party cells of five to eight men, especially i n the trade unions, and these cells were to be strictly obedient to Party subdistrict committees, of which they were a part. Above the small groups, cells o r branches, and subdistricts, district, county, municipal, and provincial level committees were to elect standing committees of three to eight men, which would take over more o f the executive func-

tions formerly performed by more bureaucratic Party branch organizations. Although the August resolution criticized Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s allegedly dictatorial methods of running the Party, i t also stated,

i n our present secret phase of operation, the centralization of authority to the greatest extent is imperative. But the centralization of authority does not mean the elimination of democracy within the Party. The recent opportunist errors committed by the Party should be discussed i n detail and brought before the masses for scrutiny.2? The August 7 Emergency Conference also passed resolutions o n “The Most Recent Peasant Struggles,” o n the “Workers’ Movement,” o n the

“Political Mission and Strategy of the CCP,” and a “Circular Letter .

to

All Party Members.” Comintern considerations dominated the drafting of

these letters, and the circular letter, i f not the others also, probably was drafted by the Russian advisers prior to being translated into Chinese by Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai. The circular letter even stated that ‘“the resolutions of the

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ECCI on the Chinese Question (July, 1927) and this letter should form the

basis of discussion’ for Party policy.* At this time, Comintern policy shifted to advocate greater militancy on the part o f the Chinese Communists, but i t still sought to maintain con-

tinuity with past policy, as much for reasons of Stalin’s struggle against Trotsky and the prestige of the International as for the realities of China. Hence, Stalin, on August 1, stressed that the Comintern had foreseen the

then painful stage of the Chinese revolution, but that, whatever happened, the united front must be maintained because of the threat of imperialism to China. The semicolonial nature of the country made the role of the bour-

geoisie both more important and longer lasting than had been the case in Russia. Therefore, as prescribed in Stalin’s June 1 telegram and other Comintern statements and as had been the case at Nanchang, the Communists must still give a leading role to those revolutionary Nationalists

now willing to renounce Wuhan as well as Nanking. Nevertheless, the Comintern was preparing the way for a progression to more radical policies,

as can be seen in a Soviet Communist Party Resolution of August 9: Should the Communist Party’s efforts to revolutionize the Kuomintang not meet with success, and should i t be found impossible to convert the Kuomintang into a broad mass organization of the workers and peasants, and i f at such time the revolution is i n the upsurge, then i t is the time to make the propagandist slogan of soviets a slogan of direct struggle and to proceed at once to the organization of workers’, peasants’, and artisans’ soviets.2* As early as July 25, the Comintern reversed its opposition to the idea

of soviets, or locally organized Communist power, which Trotsky had been calling for at least since March. But the further shift to formal

authorization of soviets, as against “propaganda for soviets,” did not come until September. Comintern views were incorporated into the August 7 Emergency Conference documents, especially the circular letter and the resolution o n the

“Political Mission and Strategy of the CCP.” The circular letter noted with consternation: The ECCI called on the entire Party to criticize itself thoroughly and correct . . . the grievously opportunist line carried out by the leadership of our Party. I f this opportunist line is not abandoned and i f the past mistakes remain uncorrected, then, o f course, the future tasks o f the Party cannot b e

correctly formulated and there will be even less chance of carrying on the revolutionary struggle and meeting the stupendous duties now facing us. I n order to correct these mistakes, however, we must know how these errors were committed so that every Party member will learn the lessons of the past. . . . 2 6

I t was too much to expect an honest self-scrutiny. Both documents condemned the ‘“‘capitulationism” of the Party Central, which before and “particularly” after April, 1927, had “abandoned the mass movements.”

But naturally neither document discussed the role played in this opportunism by the Comintern, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, and Chou En-lai as directors of the

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peasant department and military affairs committee, L i Wei-han as secretary of the Hunan Committee (until perhaps July, 1927), Hsiang Chung-fa, Liu

Shao-ch’i, and Su Chao-cheng as directors of the Hupeh and National General Labor Unions and ministers of labor i n the Wuhan government, o r

Mao Tse-tung, a member of the Standing Committee of the National Peasant Association. The circular letter criticized b y name only Ch’en Tu-

hsiu and T’an P’ing-shan, respectively, the Party’s general secretary and Wuhan’s minister of agriculture, because they ‘‘stubbornly refused to sup-

port the agrarian revolution and attempted to harness the peasant movement as a branch of bourgeois reformism.”’?” Actions attributed by others to Ts’ai Ho-sen, Hsiang Chung-fa, and L i Wei-han were condemned, but n o names were mentioned. Ironically, at the time of the Emergency Con-

ference, T’an P’ing-shan was even then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the fleeing Nanchang rebels, and Communists among them did not even learn of the August 7 Conference, much less of its decisions,

until they reached Swatow on September 24. Nor did the new Central Committee know of the whereabouts of the Nanchang rebels for weeks at a time.?®

The Conference spoke of four major goals of the Chinese revolution: complete liberation from ‘““the oppression of foreign capital”; the creation of a national market by uniting the country and overthrowing militarism; the liquidation of “feudal” conditions, especially landlordism; and the improvement of living conditions.?® I t proposed a moderate labor program whose “demands are objectively tenable in the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution,” to include an eight-hour workday, wage increases, and greater freedom and security, the latter requiring Communist support

for the arming of worker groups i n contrast to the past policy of disarming them.** Somehow, the proletariat was now to assert its hegemony over a “democratic dictatorship” but could only ally with part of the urban petty bourgeoisie, with lower-ranking Nationalists, and above all with the peasantry. The resolution o n the “Political Mission and Strategy of the C C P ” stated, “ O n the shoulders of the workers’ and peasants’ movement

has now fallen the entire task of achieving China’s national liberation and the democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie. Only through the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants can this task be accomplished.” Yet, the Conference went on to state, although the “national bourgeoisie

has already become a reactionary force, the Chinese revolution at this present stage is still the democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie, opposing not only the remnants of the feudalistic system, but also domination of China by international imperialists.’’*? I n contrast to past and continuing policies, the Conference stressed a radical agrarian program that it called the ‘“‘crux of the bourgeois democratic revolution i n China” and professed to believe that, despite severe repressions, the “foundation of the peasants’ movement still remains intact”

i n Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Shensi, and Honan.?®* While its documents claimed that the Comintern had consistently advocated land revolution, i t did not note, but must have been fully aware of, the contradictions inher-

ent in earlier Comintern statements on the agrarian question. Certainly, the comrades fleeing south with the Nanchang rebels were acutely aware

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of the problem of trying to balance agrarian revolution with some form of cooperation with Nationalists, ‘‘revolutionary” or not. Although primarily interested in the capture of cities, the Nanchang rebels argued about the land question even at planning sessions before August 1, and there had been wide differences of opinion. Some proposed not mentioning the land problem at all; others urged a policy of confiscating only enormous estates of 300 or 500 mou (about 50-80 acres) or more. Some proposed the confiscation of all land without restriction, and

others favored following the recommendations worked out with the Wuhan Nationalists i n April, namely to confiscate estates of more than 50 m o u

(about 8 acres) of good irrigated land or of 100 mou of poor irrigated land. Out of all this came a compromise absolute maximum land limit of 200 m o u (about 32 acres), with calls for rent reductions to 3 0 per cent of

the crop. Such backtracking even from previous policy presumably showed fear of precluding all forms of the united front and suggested that many Chinese Communists still felt their earlier defeats had come from overly

radical rather than overly conservative policies. By the time the rebels had reached southern Kiangsi on August 19, peasant apathy toward the restraints on expropriation and “wanton killing and looting” had induced the Nanchang Front Committee to change the directive from “expropriate the land of big landlords with more than 200 mou” to ‘“ ‘expropriate the land’ without adding a limit to the amount.” Still later, the then majority who advocated complete land expropriation again were forced to retreat to a maximum limit of 50 mou, after arguments by Chang Kuo-t’ao and others, and after discovering that the Party in Kwangtung where they were headed was holding to the 30 o r 50 mou

maximum. Problems of financing these operations predictably also produced heated arguments as to the advisability of traditional or revolutionary approaches, of taking from all, or only from the rich. The rebels mostly continued the traditional methods of using the gentry to collect taxes and killed “ a few dozen” counterrevolutionaries on the march. There were even reports of peasant hostility to the rebels i n Hailufeng.?*

The August 7 Emergency Conference, with increasing Comintern backing, had more ambitious plans—for more militant land policies and for launching rural insurrection on the basis of those policies. I t stated, Agrarian revolution consists of confiscation and nationalization of land. The main thing at present is to employ “mass type” revolutionary methods to solve the land problem [and allow] the tens of millions of peasants to solve this problem by rising from below. . . . We should take advantage of the harvesting period this year to intensify the class struggle i n the villages. The slogan of these peasant insurrections should be the transfer of political power i n the villages into the hands of the peasant associations. The land of large and middle landlords should be confiscated and distributed to poor peasants. Small landlords should be forced to lower their rents.. . I f our program of agrarian revolution is carried out within a fixed period, we may proceed to the universal slogan o f “ l a n d to the tillers,” carry o u t the

nationalization of land, and proceed to the redistribution of land.35

The Party would move toward a “complete redistribution” of land in

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the future. Other slogans would disarm the opposition groups in the village, who even then were intensifying their demands for compensation

for past “outrages,” and would arm the village poor, who were to be the main force of the peasant movement and the center of the peasant associations.?® The Conference blamed a previous “lack of revolutionary leadership of the peasant masses” for the setbacks of the spring and proposed to

rectify this defect by calling for systematic preparations for a general peasant insurrection at the time of the autumn harvest. Contrary to later

criticisms, the Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai leadership stressed the need for caution but at the same time revealed its determination to carry out a revolutionary counterattack: Insurrection is an art, and not something that one can play with, and should be carried out with the greatest of care with preparations—technically, organizationally, and politically—well made beforehand. Since i t has been decided that insurrection i t must be, there is absolutely no half-way abandonment of such a plan; insurrections must be led to the very end to overthrow the political regime of the bourgeoisie and to set up a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants.”

There were the seeds of “permanent revolution” i n all of this, and a Party resolution stated, “There is n o clearcut demarcation between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and socialism.”

The Autumn Harvest Uprisings Thus, the August 7 Emergency Conference hinted of very revolutionary plans, plans so overly ambitious that they would contribute to a depress-

ing succession of severe new setbacks. But these plans for the “Autumn Harvest Uprisings,” as they came to be known collectively, were not lightly entered into, and they came to have profound significance as harbingers of powerful new forces in China. The August 1 Nanchang Uprising formed a part of the general conception and aimed to secure for the revolution the services of Communist-led military forces. These units had fled with great losses and confusion to the South, but plans for uprisings elsewhere proceeded. Local activists drew up a “detailed plan” for peasant rebellions, and, about the middle of August, Party Central passed a “Resolution on a Plan for Insurrection in Hupeh and H u n a n . ” The resolution dropped for the moment consideration of further uprisings i n Kiangsi and Kwangtung because of uncertainty o f

the whereabouts and intentions of the Nanchang rebels, but called for a , kill “thorough agrarian revolution” that would “confiscate all land all village bullies, bad gentry, and reactionaries, confiscate their property,

give all power i n the village to the peasant associations and in the towns to elected revolutionary governments, and disarm all except the workers

and peasants.”®® The immediate goal of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings would be to “overthrow the government of Wuhan and T’ang Sheng-chih and establish a genuine revolutionary government of the common people.”

Declaring that the optimum time for the insurrection may have already

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slipped by, the resolution directed that the uprising begin no later than September 10.3° After the August 7 Conference, Party Central sent Mao Tse-tung and others back to Hunan to direct planned uprisings there. According to Mao’s letter to Party Central of August 20, he and most of the Hunan Committee, at a meeting o n August 18, had proposed changes from the Central

Committee’s resolution. The changes would involve the abandonment of the Kuomintang flag as a cover, the adoption of a more radical agrarian program, the immediate establishment of soviets, and advancing the date

of the insurrection to August 30. Instinctive differences of interpretation arose here between Mao and Party Central—and not for the last time. On all these points, Mao was in advance of the official line and hence “leftist,” but on the key question of more direct reliance on military force, the Central Committee accused Mao of rightist “military opportunism’ for relying more on available military forces than on the enthusiasm o f the masses. Mao, i n turn, ten days later accused Party leaders, w i t h some reason, of a “contradictory

policy consisting i n neglecting military affairs and at the same time desiri n g an armed insurrection of the popular m a s s e s . ” While the major reason for the Central Committee’s November suspen-

sion of Mao as an alternate member of the Politburo was the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings and his alleged reluctance to follow Central Committee orders i n all details, i t is interesting to note that, i n 1927, and

indeed into the 1930’s, Party Central was more concerned than Mao was w i t h the appearances, i f not the reality, of mass action. M a o may have

stressed ‘peasant armies,” but Party Central, to some extent following Comintern ideas, stressed peasants as ‘“‘the people” more than did Mao. The axiom that “the people’s movement had to be changed into the uninterrupted struggle of a people’s a r m y ’ became the basis of Maoism, b u t the “three leftist lines” of 1927-35 should receive more credit, at least for working out the propaganda of the “mass l i n e . ” The Central Commit-

tee rebuked Mao for insufficient attention to this propaganda, both in 1927 and later.*® Hence, the Ch’li Ch’iu-pai leadership elaborated, well before Mao, the

beginnings of a strategy of guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. The mid-August and subsequent plans provide the first concrete examples i n Party history for what has become known as the “Maoist” strategy for rural revolution, i n which insurrections i n the countryside would be fostered i n order eventually to choke off the cities of China. I t is true that

the central leadership did n o t stress the painstaking building of rural bases with the use of military force as much as Mao d i d later, b u t more than M a o d i d at first, i t stressed the necessity of popular support and the

development of “mass line” propaganda. Differences between Mao and Party Central over the peasant question concerned specific matters and not * Similarly, i n terms of intraparty politics, Mao was conservative i n his interpretation of the united front and generally favored compromise w i t h the Nationalists until early 1927. Only after that did Mao argue for a more aggressive policy, which included the use of armed peasants, but which, according to the Central Committee, gave insufficient attention to mass agitation.

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the principle of the desirability of peasant insurrection, as M a o later

implied. About August 23, the Central Committee shifted further left toward urging a policy of general revolution. I n a letter to Mao, i t insisted that the Hunan Committee follow its original plan for uprisings in the southern part of the province as well as around Changsha. I t should carry out an agrarian revolution destroying all “bad” village authorities and establishing the power of the peasant associations but should not yet openly advocate total land confiscation or the establishment of soviets. The letter accused Mao of “relying on military force from outside to seize Changsha. This sort of overstress on military force appears to reveal a lack of faith in the revolutionary strength of the masses, and its result will be a kind of military adventurism.” As the Central Committee’s “Resolution on a Plan for Insurrection i n Hupeh and Hunan” had instructed, “The agrarian revolution must rely on the true mass strength of the peasants. Troops and the bandits are merely a subsidiary force for agrarian revolution. This then is not insurrection, but a kind of military adventure. . ” Mao retorted to these accusations on August 30 that ‘neither your facts nor your theories are correct,” and certainly there was a difference i n emphasis, for Party Central stressed the use of “peasant military forces” and insisted that the peasantry must be the “main force army. Regular military units and bandits are mere auxiliaries, which are not 100 per cent reliable.”’*?

This dispute over the proportions to be allotted military action, as against mass uprisings, and the relationship between the two, became the most crucial issue of Party politics, even more so during and after Li Li-san’s efforts to renew the revolution in 1930. On September 5, the Central Committee directed that the “Hunan Provincial Committee must absolutely execute the resolutions of Central. There cannot be the slightest hesitation.””** Final plans, however, followed Central Committee instructions only i n part. The area of uprising was narrowed to seven counties i n eastern Hunan and six i n southern Hupeh,

as against the twenty-four and thirty-eight, respectively, called for in the original plan. The uprisings were to begin September 8 or 9, with Chang-

sha to be taken from within and without on September 15. Hupeh forces were to converge o n Yochow,* an important center of transportation between Wuhan and Changsha.

The plans for Hupeh had even less success than those for Hunan, despite the claim of local Communists that mass enthusiasm to strike back at the intensifying counterrevolution made i t “impossible not to propose

insurrection.””** Largely because of the strength of the opposition and the shift of key Communist forces eastward to Nanchang, the Hupeh Committee and “special [revolutionary] committees’ decided to concentrate their efforts to the south of Wuhan. There were only about 200 Communists active i n this area, and the Hupeh Committee under L o Yi-nung purged some of these as unreliable i n the hectic days preceding the revolt.t * N o w generally called Yoyang, i t has also been known as Yiiehchow and Yiiehyang. + Less than half of the 400 cadres assigned to direct the uprisings i n Hupeh ever reported to duty.

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The Southern Hupeh Special Committee complained of its problems and of the lack of support by Communists elsewhere but dutifully began its insurrection on September 8 by ambushing a train and seizing weapons and some $34,000 (Chinese). But the Communists were unable to take

the local county seats on the following day and retreated to the mountains. There, a week before Mao made a similar attempt in Hunan, they established a revolutionary government in T’ungshan County. However, a final desperate military effort failed, and the Southern Hupeh Special

Committee and its forces broke up and made their way back to Hankow and elsewhere. Other units assigned to converge for the attack on Yochow failed to appear.*® I n northern and northeastern Hupeh, there were also uprisings or attempted uprisings, as i n Huangan County, under important

future leaders Hsii Hai-tung and Li Hsien-nien, which marked the beginning of a major soviet area on the Honan-Anhwei border. I n Hunan, military developments and the failure of mass uprisings proved almost as disappointing, despite extravagant later claims for the Autumn Harvest Uprising there. There were only two small spontaneous uprisings i n designated areas near Changsha, while the four available military units (supposedly totaling about 8,000 men with 3,000 arms) met first with mixed success and then disaster. On September 12, a genuine “worker-peasant army’ composed of miners and peasants from Anyiian, Kiangsi, and surrounding areas took Liling to the southeast and set u p the only really revolutionary program of the insurrection, calling for the restoration of the labor and peasant unions, which had been dissolved after the conservative coups i n May, and for land confiscation. But, on September 15, the best-armed of the Communist units, composed o f elements of a former Wuhan guard unit, several hundred miners (a

hundred Communists among them), and two other groups, defected or abandoned their assigned attacks. Only the regiment that had taken Liling performed as expected and, after withdrawing from there, briefly captured two neighboring towns. However, by September 17, i t , too, had been defeated and only about 1,000 survivors from all these units were able to

make their way to a mountain town i n Liuyang County, near the Kiangsi border.*¢ There, for the first time, they were joined by Mao Tse-tung. But this meeting barely came off for still other reasons. Mao had been captured by local militia as he sought to make his way from Changsha to reach his assigned group and was able to escape (according to some by bribing his

captors) only several hundred yards before reaching the place where he expected to be executed.*” ‘As with similar releases and escapes of Lenin, Trotsky, and others, one wonders h o w different modern history might have

been but for this lapse of local security i n an obscure area of Central China. Although i n late August, Mao, like the Central Committee, had stressed the l i n k between the urban and rural revolutions and stated that the capture of Changsha, where there were still an estimated 1,000 of Hunan’s surviving 5,000 Communists, was essential to the success of the “ l a n d revolution,” he now readily agreed w i t h the September 15 decision of the Party’s Hunan Committee to call off the planned attack.® A t a meeting o n

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September 19, Mao and the Hunan Front Committee* overrode the objections of defenders of Central Committee orders and confirmed the decision not to attack Changsha but to march east and then south, a march that would lead them to the Chingkang Mountains (Chingkangshan) on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, the initial staging area for the growth of the Red Army. Party Central, then moving from Wuhan back to Shanghai, understandably did not immediately appreciate the significance of the flight from Changsha. Its meeting on September 19 finally authorized the establishment of soviets, as sanctioned b y the Comintern o n August 9 , b u t

expected them to be centered i n Changsha or Canton, after success in the rebellions planned there. A resolution stated that “the soviet system should be established first i n such central localities as Canton and Chang-

sha but not in any small counties or towns” where peasants’ associations were to remain the supreme authority.*° Yet Mao’s straggling, ragtag group, which made its way with difficulty to several “small counties and towns” in Chingkangshan together with similar groups elsewhere, soon became the dominant force of the Chinese revolution. On arriving at the village of Sanwan, Yunghsin County, Kiangsi, Mao reorganized surviving forces, now reduced to less than 1,000 men, into an important nucleus of the future rulers of China.’ The now famous ‘“Sanwan reorganization” established measures to increase Party control over the army, with a cell i n each squad, a branch in each company, and a Party committee in each battalion or regiment. Later, the goal was to have about one-third of the armed forces be Party members,

although this goal, of course, was not achieved over night. Over all these

“soldiers’ committees”’ was the Party’s Hunan Front Committee, which Mao headed.t Equally important, Communists began to attack old warlord customs by developing more egalitarian principles of command and stressing good behavior within the military and especially toward the local populace, on whose support the guerrillas depended for supplies, intelligence, and recruits. I n addition to beginning to develop these revolutionary principles of a “people’s army,” Mao began to experiment with the techniques of guerrilla warfare for which he became famous, such as keeping

open the option of when to fight, retreating before a superior force, and attacking smaller units from ambush. I n October, Mao’s men advanced further into Chingkangshan and,

after augmenting their forces in part by an alliance with two former bandits, proclaimed a Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Government in November. Following additional battles, including a near fatal defeat and an impressive victory at Hsingch’eng in late January, they were able to * A n ad hoc provincial-level committe that coordinated the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in Hunan. + As will be seen, Party Central harshly rebuked Mao for calling off the Changsha uprising and shortly dropped him as an alternate member of the Political Bureau. Mao, then fleeing southward, did not even learn of his latest rebuke or of subsequent Central Committee decisions until months later.” 1 T h e Party’s H u n a n Front C o m m i t t e e , w h i c h , i n April, 1930, became the General

Front Committee, was an ad hoc subcommittee of the Party Central Committee.

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establish a degree of security in an area known as the “five big and small wells.”5?

Other Uprisings and the November Plenum Meanwhile, several hundred miles to the south, remnants of the Nan-

chang rebels under Yeh T’ing and Ho Lung were making their way to the Hailufeng area of Kwangtung after defeats at Swatow and elsewhere in late September. As a result of the earlier work there of P’eng P’ai and others, these two counties, during the 1920’s, boasted China’s most consistently militant peasant movement.

Earlier in the year, following the mid-April anti-Communist coups in Shanghai, Kwangtung, and elsewhere, the Party’s Hailufeng Committee had established an East River Special Committee and sponsored an uprising on May 1, 1927, which succeeded in capturing and holding the town of Haifeng for a week. The radical movement remained strong, and, o n

September 8, inspired by reports of the Nanchang rebellion and peasant anger at the reinstitution of land rent and other developments, a Communist-led peasant movement seized the town of Lufeng. Haifeng was

recaptured on September 17, although both towns were given up September 25. Before losing the towns, the Communists established a revolutionary

“worker-peasant dictatorship’ that could properly claim to have been the first Chinese soviet, although i t did not adopt the name until after receiving Party Central’s authorization o n November 7, 1927. I t advocated the most

militant program in China at this time, including the “extermination of counterrevolutionaries’’ and total land confiscation.®®

Only about 800 demoralized remnants of the Nanchang rebels reached the Hailufeng area i n October, but P’eng P’ai was among them. Local Communists again recaptured the towns of Haifeng and Lufeng in early November and kept control of the area until late February, 1928,* after which some were driven back into the mountains and others, including P’eng P’ai, to Shanghai; P’eng was arrested there and executed more than a year later.

There were also lesser uprisings in the autumn of 1927 in other counties of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, and Hopeh, and in Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Hopeh, Honan, Shensi, and elsewhere i n early 1928.%°

The outbreak of warfare between the Nanking authorities and dissident General T’ang Sheng-chih i n Wuhan in late October and early November nearly led to a major uprising there on the heels of the unsuccessful Autumn Harvest revolts. About October 25, the Hupeh Committee, at the

urging of radical Youth League leaders, called for a general strike to be followed b y the establishment of a soviet government i n Wuhan, where there were perhaps 1,000 Communists, about one-half as many as in early

August. However, opposition to these plans by Yangtze Bureau secretary Lo Yi-nung and several representatives of the Communist International led to vacillation and delay. Despite the favorable conditions for insur-

rection created by the defeat of T’ang Sheng-chih and his withdrawal from * Their number reportedly fluctuated from 4,000 in March of 1927 to several hundred t o 5,000 the following f a l l a n d winter a n d b a c k t o several hundred thereafter.™

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Wuhan o n November 9 , a half-hearted uprising on November 13 was quickly suppressed, and the Nationalists regained full control o n November 16. I n the aftermath, Party Central reprimanded all sides and reorgan-

ized the Hupeh Committee and the Yangtze Bureau.>® The Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai leadership, which had encouraged if not ordered such uprisings, blamed their varying degrees of failure on continuing “opportunism” b y Party committees. A t a special enlarged plenum of the

provisional Political Bureau i n Shanghai on November 9 and 10, Party leaders and Comintern representatives reviewed recent developments and passed important resolutions on organization, on current tasks, on political discipline, on the labor movement, and a draft program on the agrarian problem. An additional resolution called for holding the Sixth Congress the following spring. The Central Committee of the Communist Youth League also held a plenary session i n November to support Party policy. Regarding the failure o f the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings,

the November resolution on political discipline condemned “serious mistakes” in the uprisings, including lack of attention to the mass line, an insufficiently radical program of land distribution, and failure to use terror to destroy village authority. The Nanchang rebels, and particularly T’an P’ing-shan, who had already been singled out by the August 7 resolutions, bore the brunt of these rebukes. The resolution charged them

with tactical military mistakes but especially with failing to carry out an adequate land revolution as they had traveled through Kiangsi, Fukien, and Kwangtung. The resolution also reorganized the South China Bureau and the Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, and Northern Hupeh special committees and criticized various individuals for “distrust of the strength of the masses and lack of will i n mobilizing the peasants.”®” Only the Southern Hupeh Special Committee, among those charged with instigating major uprisings, escaped censure. The November plenum charged that the Hunan Committee, meaning

Mao Tse-tung even more than its secretary, P’eng Kung-ta, who had at least “reluctantly accepted the Central Committee’s viewpoint” had . . . o p e n l y defied the Central Committee’s instruction; . i t regarded the uprising as a simple military operation. I t merely made contacts with local bandits and a handful of motley troops and failed to arouse the rural masses into joining the insurrection; . . . no platform with regard to agrarian revolution and political power was announced. So the peasants thought the Communists were creating troubles. The Provincial Committee even doubted the peasants’ need for land and opposed [establishing for labor] the eighthour work system. The Red Army failed to carry out [necessary] burning and killing policy i n coping with the village bosses. Thus, i t was taken by the peasants as a transient [rather than a revolutionary] army.’®

As punishment, the Political Bureau expelled T’an P’ing-shan from the Party because of his conservative attitudes during the spring and summer and even more because of his subsequent actions in forming one of the ephemeral third parties that fell politically between the Nationalists and

Communists. I t condemned Chang Kuo-t’ao for alleged distortions of Central Committee instructions and opposition to radical land reform and

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suspended him as an alternate member of the Political Bureau.* I t also

suspended Mao Tse-tung and P’eng Kung-ta from the same position and from the Hunan Committee, as well as Wang Jo-fei and others from the Central Committee. I n December, the Hupeh Committee was reorganized, with criticism of dissension between the Party and Youth League and the demotion of L o Yi-nung and Ch’en Ch’iao-nien, the youngest son of Ch’en Tu-hsiu. Both Lo and Ch’en Ch’iao-nien were captured and executed i n succeeding months.®® As so often i n Party history, Chou En-lai, most prominent

among those responsible for the rebellions, largely escaped such reprisals. The November plenum, as indicated b y these criticisms, intensified the

leftward shift of policy begun after mid-July. I n glaring contrast to Mao’s alliance with prominent ex-bandits,’* i t demanded that the Party adopt a more proletarian social composition and outlook and made official the decision of September 19 to drop all pretense of an alliance with even the most revolutionary Nationalists. Calling instead for the establishment of soviets, where even ‘ a firm victory of insurrection was assured,” it

advocated “permanent revolution” with “no clear demarcation between the democratic and the socialist revolution.”®? On agrarian policy, Party Central now insisted on dropping the former maximum limit i n land holdings of 30 or 50 mou, not to speak of the Nanchang rebels’ first program

of 200 mou, and declared that ‘““all privately owned land shall be given completely for the use of the organizations and soviets of the common working people.”’®’ I n short, there was a call for general intensification of revolutionary policy, though within certain limits: A t present the general strategy of the Chinese Communist Party is three fold: (1) to organize formerly spontaneous revolutionary struggles of the masses; . . . (2) to combine the sporadic and scattered peasant uprisings into a large-scale one; and (3) to coordinate the worker uprisings with peasant uprisings. . . . I f no large-scale victory i n the combined insurrection is i n sight, the Party should turn i t into guerrilla warfare.. The responsibility of the Party is to lead workers i n their daily struggle, to build up the revolutionary tide of the broad masses, to organize uprisings to provide leadership i n armed struggles, and to make cities the guiding centers of spontaneous peasant insurrections.®* Although the cities were to be the “guiding centers,” insurrection would

have to begin i n the countryside in the form of guerrilla warfare, then could spread to the cities only when there was support for the revolution by the urban workers, the prospect of the collapse of the ruling class, and adequate preparation on the part of the revolutionaries. I n other words, there should be both rural and urban insurrections, as circumstances permitted.®® These principles, with variations, guided Party policy directly through 1930 and, to an extent, u p to 1949. * Chang Kuo-t’ao has described his disgust at these developments and his life underground i n Shanghai between O c t o b e r , 1927, a n d M a y , 1928. H e took almost n o

part i n Party work between that time and his return from the Soviet Union i n early 1931.7

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Shortly after the November plenum, Party Central published a report that summarized its work as ‘‘continuing the efforts of the August 7 Conference to purge opportunism, thoroughly reform the Party, and intensify the line of revolutionary Bolshevik struggle.” Only now, there were a “little more than 10,000” Party members available to accomplish these tasks, as against about 58,000 just six months before. The Canton Commune

The most striking result of the policy of intensified insurrection was the bloodbath of December 11-13, 1927, known as the Canton Commune.

Earlier, the Kwangtung Committee had formulated plans for uprisings to coincide with the arrival of the Nanchang rebels, but Party Central condemned these plans, as i t d i d those of the Hunan Committee, for their overreliance o n military force. After the defeat of the rebels i n Swatow

on October 12, the Political Bureau canceled plans for an uprising in Canton, while on October 29, the Yangtze Bureau declared that the Party’s main task was to expand guerrilla warfare. Though in the process they might seize several counties and county towns as base areas, as yet

there was no prospect of taking a major city. The November plenum’s “Resolution on Current Tasks” recognized that victory could not be won

overnight but would be a “matter of years” and stressed guerrilla tactics, mass organization, and preparation for uprising rather than immediate new rebellions.®” This more cautious tactical approach was confirmed by Lominadze on November 2. But, at the same time, the Party affirmed the strategy of ‘“‘permanent revolution,” and the possibility of more drastic action therefore remained. O n September 30, Pravda stated that “as revo-

lution spreads to industrial centers i t will be possible to create there soviets,””*® and other statements showed impatience for results, with little

sense of the painstaking process that would be required to build revolutionary bases and a proper revolutionary army. The November plenum argued that uprisings i n the countryside would have to be followed by urban revolution. Thus, although the November plenum specified conditions for successful urban i n s u r r e c t i o n , m a n y C o m m u n i s t leaders inter-

preted the situation with unwarranted optimism. The first condition for a successful general uprising, the collapse of the ruling class i n an important city, seemed to occur when forces still loyal to Chang Fa-k’uei took over Canton from Li Chi-shen in a coup among southern generals staged on November 17. I n apparent anticipation of this development, on the same day, the Political Bureau i n Shanghai

decided to take advantage of the vacuum of power to promote insurrections i n Canton as well as i n other areas of Kwangtung. Perhaps Party Central was sensitive to the criticisms that i t had allowed a similar favorable opportunity to pass when T’ang Sheng-chih was driven from Wuhan on November 9. Immediately after Chang Fa-k’uei’s coup, Party Central instructed the Kwangtung Committee that The worker-peasant masses of Kwangtung have only one way out; that is to utilize the opportunity of the civil w a r . to expand the uprisings i n the cities and villages... to agitate among the soldiers, to stage mutinies and

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revolts, and in the time of war swiftly to link such uprisings into a general uprising for the establishment of soviets.5?

On November 26, the Kwangtung Committee discussed recent developments, accepted proposals of Central, and, to carry them out, appointed a five-man Revolutionary Committee, chaired by Chang T’ai-lei, who also headed the Party’s Kwangtung Committee and South China Bureau. The twenty-six-year-old German Communist, Heinz Neumann, w h o reached

China in October and became the most prominent Comintern representative with the departure of Lominadze and others, also made his way to Canton about this time. He carried Comintern funds and, with Chang T’ai-lei, became one of the “direct leaders” of the Canton Commune. Throughout this period, there is some dispute about the role of the Comintern in these developments. Reportedly, all proceedings of the Political Bureau were “completely based on the instructions of the Communist International and its representatives,””' and, while there is evi-

dence of the cautious approach of the Comintern representatives in the late summer and early autumn, there is more evidence of a sharp turn to the left i n Comintern recommendations a little later. Lominadze returned to Moscow for the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) i n December, but Neumann obviously continued to enjoy the confidence and authority of the Comintern. Roy

described him as “the most enthusiastic advocate of the idea of insurrection. H e was its prime mover.””> The Soviet consulate i n Canton

became one of the centers of the uprising, with unfortunate diplomatic results, as some five or more Russians were killed, and all Soviet offices

in Nationalist territory were closed as a result of the uprising. Therefore, although there is only circumstantial evidence for Trotsky’s later charge that the Canton Commune was ordered for the celebration of the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU, i t seems evident that the Comintern sponsored the general plans for insurrection and must have been aware of specific possibilities. According to one questionable source, Moscow sent almost daily telegrams urging a dramatic revolt and Ch’i Ch’iu-pai accordingly ordered a reluctant Chang T’ai-lei to push ahead with plans regardless of their chances of success.”? Lominadze also

suggested that the Soviet Party’s Fifteenth Congress should expect imminent “great revolutionary action” in Kwangtung. There is stronger evidence, on the other hand, that not only Moscow

but also Party Central in Shanghai were uninformed of the exact timetable of the insurrection and learned of i t only from the newspapers.” Thus, the Comintern later spoke of ‘“‘the complete ignorance of the national Party center of the Canton events.” As was the case with the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings, and as would be the case in 1930 and on other occasions, the nature of communications i n China and the secrecy

of Communist work dictated considerable local initiative for specific actions. Thus Communist headquarters i n both Moscow and Shanghai drew

up general policy, giving varying degrees of specific instructions, but exact planning necessarily was performed on the spot. I n Canton, i t is evident that Chang T’ai-lei and Neumann, representing, but distant from, Shanghai

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and Moscow, were most responsible for the precise formulation of events. A meeting of the Kwangtung Committee on December 7 made final plans for an uprising on December 13. Then, because Chang Fa-k’uei

was moving to disarm a Communist-infiltrated cadet regiment of 1,200, which included Red Army veterans Yeh Chien-ying, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and

others, local leaders moved the date up to the early morning of December 11. The cadet regiment and a newly created red guard of 2,000 workers “voted” to participate and, at the appointed hour, quickly moved to take over the city.” The Communists created a Canton Soviet Council, freed political prisoners, and proclaimed a radical political program, calling for the nationalization of banks, factories, land, and bourgeois property in general, and for an eight-hour workday and wage increases. The celebrated Canton Commune had begun, but i t soon met an inglorious and bloody

end. The forces of Chang Fa-k’uei counterattacked almost immediately, and foreign gunboats shelled the city. A “red terror” was instituted to combat the “white terror,” but predictably the whites were better equipped for this task, as shown by the executions of possibly several hundred antiCommunists, as against at least several thousand leftists. The uprising was completely and ruthlessly crushed on December 13, though perhaps 1,500 Communists and sympathizers, including most leaders, were able to escape to Hong Kong or Hailufeng. The rebellion’s moving spirit, however, Chang T’ai-lei, had been killed on the 12th, and an estimated 200 Communists were among the thousands of victims of the repression, many of them struck down allegedly on the basis of the short haircuts of “radical” women or of red stains left by identifying armbands.’® I n the aftermath of this new calamity, the Party blamed the failure at Canton on the strength of enemy forces, on vacillating leadership by Communists on the spot, and on inadequate preparations, mass organization, and use of counterterror. There was almost no coordination with Hailufeng and other centers of the peasant movement, although the Hailufeng area claimed to contribute $20,000 (Chinese) for the use of the rebels, and there were some reports of peasant groups entering the c i t y . ” Most damaging of all to the Communist cause was the apathy or

hostility of the masses. Aside from perhaps 4,000 men in the cadet, red guard, and other detachments who participated directly i n the uprising, probably not more than 20,000 residents of Canton showed any sympathy

for the revolution, as compared with the hundreds of thousands participating in the great strikes of previous years. Only about 300 gathered at a “mass meeting” to hear the proclamation of the new soviet government, and there was no time to organize strikes. A leading Communist

participant later reported the abysmal lack of popular support for the Canton Commune: The masses took no part i n the insurrection. A l l shops were closed, and the employees showed no desire to support us. Most of the soldiers we disarmed dispersed i n the city. . . . The workers of Canton and Hong Kong as well as

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the sailors did not dare join the combatants. The river sailors placed themselves shamefully at the service of the whites. The railway workers of the Hong Kong and Canton—-Hong Kong line transmitted the telegrams of the enemy and transported their soldiers. The peasants did not help us by destroying the tracks and did not try to prevent the enemy from attacking Canton. The workers of Hong Kong didn’t display the least sympathy for the insurrection.”®

Such were some of the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to insurrection in China as of late 1927. The evident collapse of the policy of general revolt, signaled by the successive defeats of the Nanchang, Hupeh, Hunan, and Canton rebellions, clearly necessitated a change of

approach. But the changes spoken of in early and mid-1928 concerned greater emphasis on preparations, mass organization, and guerrilla activities, not a basic re-evaluation of the Chinese revolution. Communist strategists i n Moscow and China looked on the developments of late 1927 as a necessarily painful period of adjustment away from former policies of collaboration with the Nationalists and toward a policy of Communist-led revolution. The sudden swing of the pendulum in mid1927 had carried the Communists from ‘rightist opportunism” to “leftist adventurism.” Now i t was necessary i n the new stage of the revolution to find the proper balance between the national revolution against imperialism and the social revolution against semifeudalism and semicapitalism. The problem of a proper definition of the stage of the Chinese revolution and of the balance between bourgeois democracy and socialist revolution preoccupied Communist strategists for years after 1927. Early Development of Class Warfare and the Red Army From late 1927 on, however, a new factor of utmost significance

emerged out of the abortive rebellions—namely, Communist-led peasant armies. These were finally able to give substance to the agrarian part of the Communist concept of the bourgeois democratic revolution. More important, in terms of the savage game of survival in the Chinese revolution, they gave the Communists real power for the first time, at least in those areas that the Red Armies controlled. The recruitment and organization of the Red Armies were closely linked to the intensification of class warfare and mobilization of mass organization i n the villages. I n many respects, as seen, the prototype of this kind of Communist power i n remote rural areas w i t h a new commitment to

““counterterror,” had been developed i n Haifeng and Lufeng counties up the coast of Kwangtung from Hong Kong. There, i n late 1927, following five years of radical activities begun by P’eng P’ai, the Communist-led soviet government came closest to carrying out the provisional Political Bureau’s instructions for agrarian revolution and “red terror.” I n September, after its ‘second insurrection” of 1927, the local Communist leadership declared, “ I n contrast to the former people’s government, we have estab-

lished a workers’-peasants’ dictatorship, which government has as its sole [immediate] task the extermination o f counterrevolutionaries.” Although the new government admitted that “ o u r comrades i n the Party

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have been too fond of fighting and arresting reactionaries, and we have been lax i n discipline within the Party itself,” one of its representatives argued i n typical fashion, Class justice is not personal but a necessary measure of civil war. We must k i l l more not less, i n case o f doubt. Y o u don’t k n o w the cruelty i n Hailufeng

under the landlords. I f you had seen what I have you would ask me no questions. The peasants are a hundred times less cruel than the landlords and they have killed very very few i n comparison. The peasants know what is necessary for self-defense; i f they do not destroy their class enemies, they will lose morale and have doubt of the success of the revolution. This is their duty and yours.”®

Thus, the Hailufeng government decreed, As the result of our experience with several previous struggles, we realized that gentle treatment of the antirevolutionary elements is futile. [ Therefore], we often warned “don’t let one slip away from the net, even i f some be killed on false charge.” Antirevolutionary houses and villages were all to be destroyed or burned. All the lands were confiscated and were reallocated through the peasant union to peasants who had no land. All the properties of antirevolutionaries ... w e r e confiscated. Military expenses were levied from all the merchants and wealthy. As we effected a land revolution and established a government of a workers’-peasants’ dictatorship, we classified small landowners and merchants as reactionaries.

The fact that many did not understand these policies was blamed on the lack of adequate propaganda and agitation. “Some of the peasants of Lufeng, seeing the extremes of our levies, executions, and burnings and our recommendations to them for violence, have said, “ i f you go to

extremes the peasant union will fail.” Our major defect is our lack of skill i n agitation.” I n a few months, Communist-led tribunals executed

close to 2,000 “reactionaries” out of a population of a half-million or so i n the two counties.®"

Showing its approval of such “revolutionary terror,” Party Central’s November plenum accused Mao’s Hunan rebels of failing “to carry out the burning and killing policy i n coping with the village bosses and bad gentry . ” and the Nanchang rebels of failing “ t o confiscate property. . . i n order to solve financial problems. They still followed the warlords’ practice of allowing the village bosses and bad gentry to procure money

for them by exploiting the proletariat and toiling masses.””®* Li Li-san, who had set u p an office for political security o n the expedition south

from Nanchang, advocated a ruthless policy against counterrevolutionaries b u t stated that i t was difficult to carry i t out because the “village

bosses and bad gentry” fled before the arrival of the rebels, because “some comrades” did not understand the necessity for selective killing, or because there were no peasant associations to supply requisite infor-

mation and manpower. Nevertheless, the rebels executed about four dozen ‘‘reactionaries” i n the two months of their march.®® Similarly,

there were reports of Communist terror i n Hunan and Hupeh, despite Party Central’s complaint of excessively lenient policies. Such strong meas-

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ures were deemed necessary to recruit and protect men and supplies. I n late February, 1928, Nationalist forces succeeded i n driving several

thousand Communist-led troops from the Hailufeng area back into the mountains near the Fukien border, where remnants led by veteran Kwangtung peasant leaders K u Ta-ts’un and Fang Fang continued guerrilla operations. Others, including P’eng P’ai, escaped to Shanghai; and still others made their way to join remnant groups such as those led by Chu Teh, Ch’en Yi, L i n Piao, and others, then i n southern Hunan.®* Late i n 1927, Chu Teh, the future commander i n chief of the Red Armies, had

led about 1,000 of the remaining Nanchang rebels to northeastern Kwangtung, where he temporarily allied with a former Nationalist colleague, before moving westward into southern Hunan around January. A letter from the Party Central to Chu Teh, dated December 21, reveals

the difficulties of communication at the time and the interrelations between Party Central and Communists i n the field. The letter complained that there had been no contact with Chu’s men for almost three months. “None of the local messengers [ we sent] has succeeded i n catching up with you and your men. W e found out your present whereabouts only from news-

paper reports and by word of mouth.”® A new courier was dispatched to inform Chu of current strategy, with a message that again reveals the extent to which Party Central as well as Mao and others helped develop

the concept of fighting from guerrilla bases: The prerequisite of the new policy for military campaigns

. i s to establish

a soviet regime through armed worker-peasant uprisings, and this regime is

based on the principle of advancing from land reform toward social revolution. For the sake of expanding the worker-peasant armed force i n secret under the reactionary militarist r u l e , w e have t o organize secret military

training for worker-peasant masses as well as Party members. We have to organize red terror units to counter pressure of the white terror. . . 8 ¢

The Party instructed Chu’s men to intensify work i n disrupting and winning over Nationalist military units but directed that the new military

forces could only provide “some auxiliary support for our workerpeasant armed forces. W e must not let the armed forces become roving bands harmful to our insurrection. Right now [ y o u r ] mission... is just to provide this auxiliary support to the worker-peasant uprisings.” The letter elaborated that “there must be a propaganda campaign to call u p the peasant masses so that the significance of all uprisings can be grasped b y the peasants. . . Otherwise the armed forces are used merely i n the place of the masses before the latter become active.” As these mistakes had been committed i n the past, Chu was instructed to make his troops avoid “these errors. Attention must always be given to mobilizing and winning over

more masses and agitating the masses enslaved by the enemy.”’”®” The letter confirmed the policy of uprisings but did so in flexible terms, emphasizing both rural and urban insurrections. The situation for insurrection depends on local circumstances. I f i t is feasible to begin from the villages, then the job must be done intensively and extensively i n the rural areas without any hurry to attack cities. But i f the

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attacks on cities can produce a far greater influence and bring more masses into action, then you may go ahead with such attacks. I t is worthwhile to do so even i f we could only hold a city against the enemy for but a few days. Though i t is ideal to plan simultaneous uprisings i n both rural and urban areas, there is no need to have those i n one area wait for those i n the other. The uprisings i n rural areas must be [started] whenever possible so long as the masses can be . .. mobilized.*8 The rebels would have to operate on their own. The letter stated, “The provisions for your troops must be requisitioned from the local despots, gentry, bureaucrats, capitalists, and landlords. Don’t entertain any hope for subsidies from the Party.”®® The letter instructed Chu to contact M a o

Tse-tung’s group i n the Chingkangshan area, though i t could not say if either group was still in its last reported location: We don’t know i f you have made contact [ w i t h Mao]. These peasant units also once made the mistake of heroic adventures i n uprisings without mobilizing the masses. . . . I f they still remain i n the said localities, you must establish firm contacts with them and work out with them a common plan for mobilizing the masses. Thus, a l l these u n i t s c a n work together to create

a base for insurrection and set up . . . a soviet regime. This is considered an urgent task at present because Hunan is considered to have a vacuum of enemy influence.?° T o compound the confusion, another letter a week later ordered Chu

Teh’s men to contact the Kwangtung Committee and the North River Special Committee, “which is probably located at Shaokuan,” and to proceed to the latter area. I t is likely that the Kwangtung Committee earlier had ordered Chu Teh to come south to participate in the Canton Commune. Whether o r not Chu received the last letter, he did break

with the Nationalist general but headed north, rather than south, to the border of central Hunan and Kiangsi. There, about April, Chu Teh joined forces with Mao Tse-tung, who had been ordered to take part in an ill-fated expedition to the south of Chingkangshan. Their combined forces, including new recruits, soon totaled at least 2,000 armed men, and they were able to retake areas of the Chingkangshan base lost i n previous months.?*

During these months, Mao personally did not fare well politically or militarily. The November, 1927, plenum of the provisional Political Bureau had suspended him as an alternate member. The following March, Party Central demanded the reorganization of the Party i n Hunan to

correct its lack of discipline and alleged ‘deviations,” especially the “military opportunism” of the border area committees. Accordingly, Mao’s Hunan Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as a “divisional committee’ and, i n July as a new “special committee,” with representatives from the Southern Hunan Special Committee and the Hunan Committee replacing Mao as the leading Party representative i n the Hunan-Kiangsi border area.®® Not until September, 1928, was M a o to regain a measure of political control over the border region. As at other times i n his career, Mao d i d this

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by taking advantage of the ineptness of his replacements on the Party committees and of subsequent military reverses arising from their policies to purge many of his opponents. A new Nationalist expedition to root out the Chingkangshan base i n May had failed, but i n July and August captured part of the base area, while Chu Teh was temporarily absent on

another unsuccessful southern expedition. By October, Mao had regained political control in the area and the Communist armies had reassembled. Though down to less than 10,000 men, they were able to retake some

of the ground lost to the Nationalists and achieved a degree of security i n the 100-kilometer stretch between Lienhua in the north and Yunghsin, Ningkang, Chingkang, and Suich’uan to the south.?? I n 1928, the position of the Party went through interesting ups and

downs in this new base of Communist power on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. A n expansion drive i n June supposedly gave the Party more than 10,000 members i n the border area, b u t this figure probably included many local peasants and soldiers who withdrew or were purged i n suc-

ceeding months of military defeats and Maoist maneuvers. By the autumn, the number of Party men i n the area was far smaller, perhaps several thousand.’* I n February, 1928, Party county committees existed i n Ningkang, Yunghsin, Ch’aling, and Suich’uan counties and a “special district committee” was established i n L i n g County, Hunan. Other work was

done i n Lienhua i n the north and Wangan in the east. Below the county committees were some special district committees and Party branches and cells. Government affairs were handled through Party-controlled committees of workers, peasants, and soldiers deputies, usually called “people’s committees’ and occasionally ““soviets.” Mao’s most distinctive contribution at this time was i n the development of political and ideological controls i n the army. Already i n October, 1927, Mao had instituted the soldiers committees at various levels of the army. However, the Central Committee and the Hunan Committee contin-

ued to stress the dominance of Party representatives i n the army: As in the July reorganization of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the

higher authorities no doubt feared the anarchist implications of fostering too much low-level discussion i n the army. But M a o won considerable

support for his soldiers committees at the First Party Congress of the Border Area at Maop’ing, Ningkang County, on May 20, 1928, and was able to re-emphasize them temporarily i n the autumn. They were again abolished a year or so later, then re-established i n 1947, and highly praised by the Maoists i n the military thereafter, especially during the

Cultural Revolution.” Each company of 150 men was to choose a soldiers committee of five to nine men, and there were also supposed to be about five propagandists i n each company. Each battalion, composed of four companies, was to choose an executive committee of about a dozen men. Three battalions of

about 600 men each made up a regiment, and, i n the border area armies, there were first six, and then, after the defeats of July, four, regiments. Later, several Red Armies made u p an army corps, and later still several army corps made u p a Front Army, but during these years there were many

confusing changes i n terminology and unit designation. The group of

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which Mao was Party representative and Chu Teh commander in chief was first formally designated the Fourth Red Army* at Ningkang o n August 1, 1928. Ch’en Y i was secretary of the border area Party military

affairs committee. Through the soldiers committees and the political representatives i n the army, the Party was able greatly to increase its control over “the gun,” as

Mao insisted would always be the case, and morale improved with better relations between officers and men. There also was progress toward the goals of giving soldiers a “proletarian education” and of having one-third of military personnel be Party members. Reportedly, already i n 1928, one

i n four was.*® I n 1929, the guerrilla leaders gave more attention to ideological matters, with Mao reportedly giving the first clear expression of principles of militarized Party-building at the now famous Kut’ien Con-

ference of the Red Army in December, 1929. I n his address “ O n the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas i n the Party,” M a o stressed the need and

possibility of giving “ a proletarian education” to Red Army recruits, whose numbers included more “wandering people” i n the Chinese term than peasants.’ Another development of the time was the application of Mao’s famous “three major disciplines” and ‘eight-point rules” emphasizing absolute discipline, correctness, and kindness i n the soldiers’ dealings with the

people.®® These measures led to relations between the military and the people that were unprecedentedly good, certainly for China, although of course there was much variation and trial and error i n their application.

Terror was frequently used, but i t was selective terror against hated local enemies, which was intended to increase the popularity of the Red Army while neutralizing potential enemies. I f the local population could be involved i n the terror, recruits for the Communist mass organizations and armies were assured.®® Undoubtedly, these carrot-and-stick policies increased Communist success at an extremely difficult time, facilitating the “mass line,” which later became the single most important key to Red Army success. Under the mass line, Party activists led the creation of village militia, red

guards, youth vanguards, and women’s organizations. They also worked with local secret societies and other groups and, to varying degrees, were able to secure from the local population food, supplies, intelligence, and other forms of aid. A leading participant i n the Red Army at this time

states that, politically, these policies were based on the six principles of Party Central instructions to ‘‘organize a Red Army, mobilize village struggles, carry out land reform, establish soviet governments, arm the masses, * Became the I Corps i n June, 1930, and later the First Front Army. + Marx termed the European equivalent of such social strata “lumpenproletarians” and described them as the “scum of the working class.” H e had an even lower estimation of them than he did of peasants. t The red guards of the time were composed of men from twenty-one to forty, i n contrast to the younger red guards of Cultural Revolution fame, the latter being more comparable i n age to the youth vanguards of 1928, composed of youngsters aged fifteen to twenty-one. The CCP and Youth League held authority over these parallel mass organizations.

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and destroy the Nationalist government.”’® Militarily, the famous guerrilla tactics worked out by Mao and others were beginning to achieve results. Essentially, i t sought to constantly harass and wear down the enemy while choosing the time of battle so as to gain maximum advantage and to use this military strength to develop the mass line. Yet, army- and Party-building i n remote rural areas was a slow, dan-

gerous, and onerous process. Considering Communist inferiority in num-

bers and arms, the confusion of Party factional struggles and policies, the Communists’ overwhelmingly urban student background and rural conservatism their ability to survive at all was an extraordinary achievement. At any number of points, they might, like Che Guevara in Bolivia forty years later, have been destroyed on some mountain range, martyrs of a revolution whose time had not yet come. Many were, of course, but not all. A rugged terrain and divisions among the enemy, especially i n the

border areas where rival generals and warlords from different provinces faced each other, also helped the Communist cause. But the Party’s devel-

opment of an army undoubtedly was the most important factor, for, above all, i t provided some degree of military protection for the construction and execution of Communist programs. These programs, in turn, helped to bring in new recruits and ensure a much greater degree of support and strength for the Communist cause. Naturally, policies for the emerging rural bases were very much in flux i n the late 1920’s, but they included first of all a more equal distribution of land, improved working

conditions, and a reduction of taxes and rent. Progressive taxes were to range from 5 to 15 per cent, supplemented by extra exactions and confiscations from landlords and rich peasants. At first, Mao stressed a radical land policy in keeping with high-level policies. He admitted that “the agrarian revolution had not yet deepened,” but he generally opposed landownership by poor and middle peasants, not just rich peasants and landlords, and encouraged peasant uprisings that would “massacre the landlords.” As we shall see, he modified these policies after 1928.'%

I n 1928, the Red Armies faced an uphill struggle. The fundamental problem was survival i n the face of unrelenting enemy pressure and, equally important, the overcoming of peasant apathy and fatalism. The latter was a tremendously difficult job, as might be imagined. Propaganda work had to proceed very slowly and be expressed in the simplest, most concrete terms in order to persuade the peasants of anything. The

Chinese Communists, who alone among Chinese leaderships eventually succeeded i n this task, did n o t easily develop techniques for it. A halfdozen years later, Chang Kuo-t’ao reported their continuing difficulties and the necessity to reduce propaganda for the peasants to something like the following: “ A Communist Party is a political party of the poor. A proletarian is one who is so poor that he has nothing. Every poor man will be distributed a piece of land, and this is Communism.”’*** I n November, 1928, Mao confessed that, “wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after p u r propaganda do they slowly move into action. . . . We have an acute sense of our isolation which we keep hoping

will e n d . ” ’ 1 % 3

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Military problems were also formidable, and renewed Nationalist

attacks on the Chingkangshan base, together with the continued coolness on the part of the masses, forced Mao, Chu Teh, and m o s t of their comrades to leave for southern and eastern Kiangsi early in 1929. Hence, later Maoist claims that the heart of Communist strength in

Chingkangshan lay in the development of mass orgarfization was an obvious effort to read later successes back into the origins of the Red

Army. But i t is also true that at Chingkangshan in 1928 Communist leaders began to develop the techniques of the mass line that would later prove to be their most distinctive achievement. Aside from the Chingkangshan base, there were the beginnings of other rural soviets and ‘‘worker-peasant armies” i n several areas. I n northeastern Kiangsi, two pioneer developers of guerrilla bases, Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-p’ing, were able to establish a small revolutionary base i n their native county of Yiyang in May, 1928. I n southwestern Hupeh, Tuan Teh-ch’ang began guerrilla operations and was soon joined by Chou Yi-ch’lin after Chou’s participation i n the Nanchang rebellion. Similarly, Ho Lung returned to his native Sangchih County i n northwestern Hunan and linked with Tuan and Chou for guerrilla operations o n both sides of the Yangtze i n early 1928, when their forces reportedly numbered about 3,000 men.'** T o the northeast of Wuhan, the founda-

tions of the future Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei (Oyiiwan) border-area soviet base also were laid by the spring of 1928. Hsii Hai-tung and others succeeded i n taking part of Huangan and other counties of northeastern Hupeh but soon retreated into the neighboring Tapieh Mountains, after the deaths of several other early leaders. Finally, P’eng Teh-huai, next to Chu Teh the most important Communist commander through the 1950’s, joined the Communists about this time, leading a rebellion against the Nationalists at P’ingchiang, Hunan, in July, 1928, and taking part of his forces to Mao’s Chingkangshan base i n October.'®®> These efforts marked only the merest beginnings, of course, and the scattered forces of the fledgling

Red Army did not make their presence felt i n dramatic fashion until 1930. But, from late 1927 on, their potential became an important factor

in the Chinese revolution.

T H E FAILURE OF URBAN REVOLUTION

The savage struggles of 1927 and succeeding years left a profound impression o n the character of Chinese Communism. Reduced b y execu-

tions and desertions at the end of the year to less than one-fifth of the almost 58,000 members claimed i n April, 1927, the Party’s principal task must have seemed simple survival. Although membership supposedly increased again to 40,000 b y the middle of 1928 and to 100,000 later i n

the year, these figures were certainly padded, and there were probably still only 10,000 Communist activists i n 1929 and several times that

number i n 1930." Only toward 1930 did the Party begin to gain recruits much more rapidly than i t lost them, and this was primarily due to the expansion of the Red Armies, one-quarter to one-third of whose soldiers the Party sought to enroll. Moreover, by the early 1930’s, less than 10 per cent of the members of the CCP were able to work outside militarily

controlled soviet areas. A predictable result was the shift i n the social base of the Party from

proletarian to peasant, although, throughout its first fifty years, most leaders were i n fact “intellectuals.” While proletarians held certain leadership positions after 1927, the proportion of Party members who were of worker background fell from more than half i n early 1927 to no more than 8 per cent i n 1930, of whom less than 2 per cent were factory workers. Figures for the Red Army were similar.? Hence, to the extent that the CCP could maintain “proletarian leadership,” i t did so b y promoting “proletarian goals,” not because i t was a “Party of the proletariat,” as its propaganda proclaimed.

More important to the future of the Party after 1927 than the social background of Communist leaders was the type of man who survived the double ravages of ‘““white terror” and intra-Party struggles. Only the

toughest came through these ordeals. By 1936, at least 34 of 121 top Communist leaders as of April, 1927, had been executed by the authorities or died i n battle. Another 34 were still active in 1936, but the fate

of most of the remaining 53 is unknown.’ Generally, the survivors were still idealistic and ambitious, both for

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themselves and China, but increasingly cynical about individual values

and more willing to sacrifice or compromise means for ends. As one participant put it, I have seen much of class hatred, of racial hatred, of personal hatred, of hatred between nations—so much that cruelty no longer has any meaning for me as a moral value. I am stirred by victories and roused by defeats, but the cruelty by means of which these are achieved I take for granted. I would be greatly stirred by some historic change without cruelty, but this would be like the realization of a beautiful dream. Long ago I lost all the utopian fancies of my youth.*

Understandably, such feelings made the Communists increasingly introverted and suspicious. Those who were able, and decided to stick i t out, developed through their commitment and rationalizations an extreme

esprit de corps, i f not fanaticism. After years of violent struggle, a sense of guilt at their own survival, and a felt necessity to justify all the sacrifices, must have emerged.’ Activists remained ambitious, energetic, and capable but became personally more difficult, combative, and tough. The effects of years of hiding, suspicion, and violence on the CCP cannot be overestimated. The terror increased the value of the rural soviets, which faced tasks in many ways as difficult as those i n the cities, but which had much more room to maneuver and found a population

more receptive to their propaganda. The extraordinary difficulties of the time increased the number of defectors from the Party, though these remained surprisingly few i n the circumstances. Most noticeably, the extreme

conditions increased the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and recriminations. Factionalism, already a problem under Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s leadership,

increased until i t became almost as great a threat to the Party as the “white terror.” The two reinforced each other, as immense pressures from

both without and within the Communist movement forced splits i n Party ranks. The exhortations and interference of the Communist International also exacerbated differences of opinion as rival groups vied for support and presented rival interpretations of Comintern directives. Moreover,

the Comintern played leaders off against each other and, i n fostering attacks o n Ch’en Tu-hsiu, had already sown the seeds of future disputes and personal vendettas. This situation, of course, was a bitter problem

for the idealists among the Communists. All must have had second thoughts about the Party, and many of the ‘“tender-hearted”’ did not continue.®

The increasing conservatism of the Nationalists and the increasing radicalism of the Communists during these years led some Chinese to strive for a middle ground between the two from which they could press for reform more vigorously than did the Nanking government but avoid the extremes of the CCP. Members of the Kuomintang left, joined by T’an P’ing-shan and other former Communists,” tried to form a “ T h i r d Party”

with this end i n mind. Others, notably Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his followers, and to some extent Chang Kuo-t’ao and others, tried from within to steer

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the Party back from the extreme left. But all these efforts to create

moderate reform movements failed, adding yet another layer of frustration. The reasons for such failure are, of course, legion and must be traced to Chinese traditions as well as to many other factors, including the political indifference, born of economic necessity, of the great majority

of the Chinese millions. Yet, the most important reason for the failure of moderate reform and the corollary development of extremism was surely the immensity of the tasks confronting Chinese political groups. Tasks of the extremity faced by China may require extreme solutions, at least i f there is not powerful outside aid. For China, there was instead outside interference b y the

foreign powers i n general and outright invasion by Japan after 1931. The economic needs of the country staggered the imagination, with millions of new mouths to feed each year in a country always prone to economic disasters. There were major natural disasters and famines i n the late 1920’s and again i n the mid-1930’s, causing millions of deaths, with mass migrations, the sale of children, and other desperate acts becoming common-

place in some areas. The social and economic changes under way were, of course, inadequate to cope with such problems and did not go nearly fast or far enough for the radicals. I n any case, the Nationalists effectively controlled only about five provinces i n the lower Yangtze valley. Elsewhere, various generals and coalitions challenged Nationalist rule, and armed rebellions erupted yearly from 1929 to 1931. Thus, even i n 1928 and increasingly thereafter, many were convinced that more decisive action was required to deal with China’s problems than could be expected of the Nationalists. The latter, for their part, in the tradition of Chinese governments for two millennia, would brook no dissent n o w that they were i n the driver’s seat. Hence, insofar as they

could i n their areas, they obstructed the formation of potential rival groups, whether formed by leftist Nationalists or Western-oriented liberals, let alone by the Communists. Any dissent was disloyal, and the Kuomintang aimed to enforce loyalty by whatever means were necessary. For example, i t executed a well-known leader of the ephemeral “Third Party,” Teng Yen-ta, in November, 1931. Nanking by no means restricted its forceful suppression of non-Nationalist groups to the Communists, but i t directed its efforts primarily at the Communists, as did ruling figures in other areas of the vast land. Communist Factions

I n this situation, the Communists attempted to counter force with force as well as with propaganda and tended to become more and more radical i n their understanding of what was required for the CCP and hence more and more bound to Communist organization. True believers i n revolutionary nationalism before 1927, many top leaders became increasingly embittered thereafter and i n the process sometimes lost touch

with reality. One all-important reality some overlooked was that, aside from the most radical intellectuals, prior to the 1930’s, the great majority

of politically alert Chinese supported the Nationalists, who had just led the defeat of the warlords and whose greatest failings did not appear until later.

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I t is perhaps not surprising that some Communist leaders, frequently isolated from the masses and from each other and living in constant danger, became more and more fanatical and at times turned their

fanaticism against each other. As i n the history of religion, rising frustration due to the difficulties of fulfilling demanding ideals led to increasing differences of approach and eventually to schism. By 1928, there were at least five major groups within the Chinese Communist movement i n addition to those who had already left the CCP. There was the Central Committee faction, including Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, L i Lisan, Chou En-lai, and L i Wei-han; a “real work” faction, composed

mostly of middle-ranking leaders i n the labor movement, such as Ho Meng-hsiung and Lo Chang-lung from Li Ta-chao’s original Peking group, at times supported by Ts’ai Ho-sen and Chang Kuo-t’ao; a Youth League faction led by Jen Pi-shih and others; the Red Army leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, P’eng Teh-huai, H o Lung, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and others; and finally the so-called Trotskyist opposition, composed of at least three factions of former students i n Russia, as well

as of the group led by Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih after their expulsion from the Party i n November, 1929.2 After 1930, another group

emerged that included forty or fifty men and women i n their midtwenties, who had just completed studies i n the Soviet Union. At first called the ‘Russian returned students” or ‘twenty-eight Bolsheviks,”* they took over the Party i n 1931 and merged with the Central Committee faction, then becoming known also as the “Internationalists.” With Comintern support, they dominated the Party from 1931 until Mao’s

ascendancy after the Long March of 1934-36. At all times, many of these groups were split several ways and there were reports of friction between Chou En-lai and L i Li-san, Chu Teh and M a o Tse-tung, and of many other alignments and disputes.’

Bitter struggles within and among these groups became a feature of Chinese Communism. Intra-Party disputes had existed before and characterize all extremist parties, but they were most severe in the CCP i n the years after 1927. Nationalist liquidation of some of the groups that had split off from the Party, together with Central Committee and Red Army purges and, finally, Mao’s ascendancy from 1935 on, gradually brought factionalism under control, b u t i t continued to exist as dramatized b y

the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960’s. This dogmatism and factionalism is a product both of contemporary conditions and of the ‘totalitarian personalities” who dominated the party after 1927. T o a large extent also, intra-Party struggle has been fostered as a conscious organizational

tool, out of a belief in the efficacy of struggle as a means of advancing one’s goals. Yet, the Party enjoyed one enormous advantage over its opponents between 1927 and 1949. Because of superior discipline, it

largely succeeded i n hiding internal struggles for control of the Party, although i t could not conceal its feuding with rival radical groups outside the Party.

* After a group o f twenty-eight w h o returned t o C h i n a i n 1930, b u t a t least another

dozen can be identified.

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The Nationalist Decade By contrast, the cliques within the Kuomintang were common subjects of discussion and speculation; their existence greatly impaired the image and effectiveness of the Nationalist government. Moreover, the Nationalists, as the governors o f a vast land, faced difficulties even more com-

plex, i f less dangerous, than those confronting the Communists. The Kuomintang had been able to mobilize the sentiment of nationalism to defeat the “ o l d warlords” between 1926 and 1928, but i t was unable to

fulfill the demands of that nationalism, either i n coping with problems of economic and social development and internal peace and order, or with the still more pressing threat of invasion by Japan.*® I n 1928, the Nationalist government, officially reconstituted at Nanking i n October, began its decade of greatest hope and, as i t turned out, its only period of real opportunity. Following successive adjustments among

the Nanking, Wuhan, and other factions of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek re-emerged as the pre-eminent Nationalist leader in January, 1928, and remained so thereafter, with the exception of brief “retire-

ments” i n 1932 and 1949. But Chiang was even less able to resolve the military divisions besetting China than he was Nationalist political divisions, and both China and the Kuomintang remained divided. The final defeat of the “ o l d ” northern warlords was achieved in the spring of 1928, but the armies that allied with Chiang Kai-shek to end “old warlordism” did not intend to give up their autonomy. The “new warlords”’—including the Kwangsi group of L i Tsung-jen, Pai Ch’ung-hsi, and L i Chi-shen; the northerners Feng Yii-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan (the ruler of Shansi Province from 1916 to 1949); and the young marshal of Manchuria, Chang Hsiieh-liang (who succeeded to his father’s position after the latter’s assassination by the Japanese i n June, 1928)—now refused to agree to cither a substantial reduction of their armies of

several hundred thousand men each or the integration of their armies with the some 420,000 men loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.'* Chiang’s pressures to achieve these goals conflicted with the personal ambitions, alliances, or mutual antagonisms of many warlords and resulted on at least four occasions in open warfare. Chiang won an initial showdown with the Kwangsi clique i n the early spring of 1929 and about the same time consolidated his political position at the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang. But, i n the fall o f 1929, new fighting erupted with Feng

Yii-hsiang i n the North and i n mid-1930 with both southern and northern dissidents. I n 1930, Wang Ching-wei returned from abroad to lead the new coalition that briefly allied the southwestern group with northerners Feng Yii-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. Serious battles, involving several hundred thousand soldiers, erupted in Hunan in the spring and in Shantung and elsewhere i n North China i n the summer. As had happened two years earlier, Chiang was saved b y the disunity of his opponents.

Chang Hsiieh-liang sided with Chiang i n September, 1930, to defeat this most serious domestic military challenge to Nationalist rule of the 1930’s.

Political and military dissent continued to boil below the surface, spilling over again into open opposition i n 1932 and 1933. After that, only the

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graver threat from Japan, and eventually from the Communists, kept the lid on domestic pressures. After 1928, the Nationalists made progress i n many fields, as i n establishing new legal and financial systems, i n ending foreign-imposed tariff controls, and winning the return of about half of the thirty-three foreign concessions i n the cities of China. But the despised system of extraterritoriality, or foreign law for foreigners i n China, and many of the

foreign concessions and other grievances remained. Anti-imperialism therefore continued to be an important theme, and anti-Japanese sentiment of course intensified after September, 1931, following Japan's seizure

of Manchuria. The Western powers did not give up their essential privileges under the unequal treaties, and, a decade later, Chiang Kai-shek could still call the unequal treaties ‘“China’s national humiliation” and “the main cause for our failure to build a nation.”’*? Most important, the Nationalist government d i d not make sufficient

headway i n tackling the social problems that had to be resolved if Chinese nationalism were to be fulfilled. Although a land reform bill was passed i n 1930, i t was never enforced, and one-half or more of the

Nationalist budget was allocated to military expenses. Aside from the Communists, many, and especially the more radical members of the Kuomintang and other organizations, felt that the conservatism of the Nationalist government after 1928 betrayed the principles of Sun Yat-sen,

and accordingly the CCP continued to be able to attract some of the best youth of China.’® Nevertheless, for all its feuding and failures, the Nationalist government dominated China after 1928, and i t was with it, above all, that the Communists had to deal.

The Ninth Plenum of the ECCI and the CCP For at least several years after 1927, the Chinese Communists were still

closely bound to the Communist International. The first provision of the new Party constitution passed by the Sixth Congress i n mid-1928 stated, “The Chinese Communist Party is a branch of the Communist International,” and the CCP was therefore subject to the discipline of the Comintern, whose Executive Committee was theoretically the CCP’s

highest authority. There must have been a natural tendency to look for outside guidance i n dealing w i t h the enormous and complex problems

facing the Communists, a tendency encouraged by the militant, Westernizing outlook and youth of most Chinese Communist leaders, whose median age i n 1928 was not quite twenty-seven.'* More tangibly, Comintern funds for China, said to be $15,000 (U.S.) a month i n 1931, were a principal source o f revenue, especially prior to the development of the soviet areas.’ A n d more Communists n o w depended o n Party funds for their livelihood as well as for organizational expenses, although the Party

urged its members, where possible, to engage i n labor i n order to “share the life of the masses.”’*® The Chinese Communist Party sent representatives, at times as many as six, to the Communist International, which i n turn kept agents i n China. After the departure of Lominadze and Neumann i n the winter of 1927-28, however, the movements of Comintern agents are harder to

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trace. The Comintern maintained offices i n Shanghai of the Far Eastern Bureau (Dalburo) and the Pan-Pacific Trade Union. The Union was headed about 1928 by the American Earl Browder,* and the Dalburo in 1929 and 1930 by two Germans, whom some Chinese Communists branded ‘rightist conciliators.” The Germans had little influence o n the new L i Li-san leadership.'” Pavel M i f ( M . A . Fortus), who was i n China

during the winter of 1930-31, on the other hand, was a leading Soviet China expert and was instrumental i n reorganizing the CCP in January, 1931. A Swiss (?) couple, known as the Noulens, ran the Far Eastern

Bureau in Shanghai i n 1930-31 but were arrested in mid-1931. Following M i f ’ s departure i n early 1931, another German, Otto Braun ( L i T e h ) ,

is known to have worked closely with the central Red Armies from 1933 to the late 1930’s. There may have been other Comintern agents in China, but their names are not known.® I n the wake of the failures of the Autumn Harvest, Nanchang, and Canton revolts, new shifts i n Comintern leadership and policies compli-

cated already complex problems. At the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union i n December, 1927, Lominadze had defended recent uprisings and hailed news of the Canton Commune as the “beginning of a new upsurge of the Chinese Revolution.”{ But Bukharin, then allied with Stalin against Trotsky, who was finally defeated at this Congress, criticized these “leftist” views and stated that China was still “feudal” and therefore still required a “bourgeois democratic revolution.” Neumann and Ch’i Ch’iu-pai generally supported Lominadze, while Chang Kuo-t’ao and others, now joined by Ch’en Tu-hsiu and even Trotsky, paradoxically sided with Bukharin i n arguing that the developments of 1927 meant a prolonged setback for the revolution and dictated more cautious policies. During subsequent months, L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, and most of the Chinese Communist leaders supported Stalin’s centrist position, as interpreted by Pavel Mif, then director of Sun Yat-sen University and Stalin’s

leading China expert. The Stalinists steered a middle course between the hopes of Lominadze and C h ’ Ch’iu-pai for “permanent revolution” and instant socialism, and Bukharin’s pessimistic view that the Chinese revo-

lution was i n for a prolonged period of quiescence, a view that Trotsky n o w shared, though for different reasons. I n essence, the Stalinists argued

that the Chinese revolution would come sooner rather than later but would require much additional organizational work by the Party. Tactically, this meant a continued shift from the earlier “united front from

above” with parts of the ruling classes to a ‘“‘united front from below” with the masses against all i n authority. Early i n 1928, the force of Soviet tactics for China was to correct

the leftist excesses of the previous autumn. The important “Resolution on the Chinese Question” of the Ninth Plenum of the E C C I i n February, * A founder and sometime General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States. + Believing Chinese society was an ‘““Asiatic” type, Lominadze argued that the Chinese bourgeoisie was very weak and that therefore China should move directly into socialism through “permanent revolution.”

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1928, reaffirmed scattered earlier criticisms of Chinese “excesses.” I t stated that the Canton Commune d i d not represent the ‘beginning of a new upsurge” as Lominadze had told the Fifteenth Congress, but a ‘heavy defeat.”’*® Nevertheless, while the resolution held that A t the present time there is still no mighty upsurge of the revolutionary mass movement on a national scale...certain symptoms show that the workers’ and peasants’ revolution is on the way to precisely such an upsurge. This is shown not only by the heroic insurrection of the Canton workers, but primarily by the development of the peasant movement in several districts.2°

But the new upsurge would develop with “extreme irregularity.” I n this situation, “the Party must prepare itself for the broad upsurge of a new revolutionary wave” but must not allow the masses to “run far ahead” of the revolutionary situation and so strike prematurely, as by implication had been done at Canton and elsewhere. Therefore, the main task was mass organization, while awaiting favorable opportunities and an upswing in the revolutionary tide. This work was to be done both in the countryside and in the cities, since, i f conditions were more favorable i n the

rural areas, the mass movement must eventually spread to the cities if it was to succeed. As the resolution put it, While leading the spontaneous guerrilla actions of the peasants i n various provinces, the Party must recognize that these actions can be transformed into the takeoff point of a victorious national uprising only i f they are linked up with a new upsurge of the revolutionary wave i n the proletarian centers. Here also the Party must see its main task i n preparing general and coordinated actions i n the villages and towns of a number of neighboring provinces, actions prepared and organized on a broad scale. I n this connection, i t is necessary to combat being enthusiastic about scattered and uncoordinated guerrilla actions [as Mao had been?], which are doomed to failure . . . [although] the ECCI considers that the main task of the Party i n the sovietized peasant districts is to carry out the agrarian revolution and otherwise organize R e d A r m y detachments [ s o ] that these detachments will then

be gradually unified into one general all-Chinese Red Army.2?

The ECCI called for a further strengthening of the CCP’s organization and outlook. I t noted progress in eliminating opportunism but criticized additional mistakes committed in late 1927, particularly lack of organizational work and an “underestimation of the danger of putschism,” terrorist methods of struggle in the trade unions, and overenthusiasm for guerrilla warfare i n the rural districts. Rather, there were to be coordinated activities i n villages, towns, and proletarian centers, and not just i n one o r the other. This “Resolution o n the Chinese Question,” co-authored by Stalin, served

as the basis for much of the discussion at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and was appended to the political resolution of that Congress. The Sixth Congress’s resolutions i n turn guided Communist

work in China for years.

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The Sixth National Congress of the CCP The Party’s Sixth Congress, originally scheduled for March, was held, not in China, but at a village outside Moscow from June 18 to July 11,

1928. The site of the Congress testifies to the influence of the Comintern i n Chinese Communist affairs as well as to the extremely dangerous con-

ditions the Communists faced in most cities of China. I n Shanghai, for example, conditions became particularly alarming following the arrest and execution in early 1928 of Lo Yi-nung, who had just been reassigned as secretary of the Party’s Regional Bureau there. During these months, many of the top regional bureaus saw their leaders executed, often in

horrifying succession.* Proposals to hold the Congress in Moscow must have been under discussion for some time after the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI, and final

orders for leading comrades to proceed to Moscow were issued in May.? A surprising number of Chinese Communists went to Moscow, including most top leaders, with the exception of Mao, Chu Teh,?** Fang Chih-min,

and others in inaccessible areas. Some were not invited or were screened out for political reasons, while still others, notably Ch’en Tu-hsiu, were

invited but refused to go. I n all, eighty-four voting delegates and thirtyfour nonvoting delegates and other visitors are said to have attended, as

well as sizable contingents from the Comintern and from Sun Yat-sen University. Delegates claimed to represent 40,000 members of the CCP.? The Congress elected twenty-three members and thirteen alternates to the Central Committee, which at its first plenum, immediately after the Congress, elected a Political Bureau of seven, headed b y Hsiang Chung-fa as General Secretary (see Chart 7 . 1 ) . The other members were Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and

Hsiang Ying, with the first three considered more radical and supposedly chosen b y Bukharin and the last three considered more conservative and

chosen by Stalin.*® Hsiang Chung-fa was a forty-year-old Hupeh laborer who had become director of the Hupeh General Labor Union in 1927 and supported Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Lominadze, and now Mif i n the reorganization of the Party. By all accounts a man of little talent, Hsiang’s principal

qualification, other than loyalty, was his proletarian background and the fact that he belonged to neither the right nor the left wing. Real power i n the Party Central shortly passed to L i Li-san as director of propaganda, to

Chou En-lai, chief of the Central Committee’s military affairs committee, to L i Wei-han, director of organization, and others.?” C h ’ Ch’iu-pai, who soon became a member of the Presidium and Secretariat of the ECCI,

Chang Kuo-t’ao, and others remained in Moscow as representatives to the Comintern, joined in 1929 by Ts’ai Ho-sen. The Congress passed resolutions on the organization of soviets, the * L o Yi-nung’s predecessor i n Shanghai, C h ’ e n Yen-nien, h a d been executed i n

June, 1927. I n Canton, Chang T’ai-lei had been a victim of the Canton Commune. I n late 1931, Ts’ai Ho-sen i n turn was captured and executed i n Canton. Earlier, Ts’ai had replaced briefly L i Ta-chao, the cofounder of the Party and then North China Bureau secretary, who was executed in Peking i n April, 1927. Additional regional secretaries, including Teng Chung-hsia ( 1 9 3 3 ) , H s i a n g Y i n g ( 1 9 4 1 ) , a n d others fell

in later incidents.”

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C H A R T 7.1 PARTY ORGANIZATION AFTER SIXTH CONGRESS, JUNE, 1928* Central Committee (twenty-three members, t h i r t e e n alternates) Political Bureau ( H s i a n g Chung-fa, L i Li-san, Ch’ti C h ’ i u - p a i , C h o u E n - l a i , T s ’ a i H o -

sen, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Hsiang Ying) Secretariat Key Central Committee Departments Propaganda Organization Military Affairs Special Affairs ( l a t e r , Social Affairs

or Political Security) Women

Labor Peasants

L i Li-san L i Wei-han Chou En-lai C h o u E n - l a i ( l a t e r , K u Shun-chang a n d a f t e r June, 1931, K ’ a n g Sheng)

Teng Ying-ch’ao (Mme. Chou En-lai) Hsiang Ying P’eng P’ai (from August, 1929, L o Ch’i-yiian)

* See also note 27 of this chapter for changes during 1928-30. Sources: Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, Chapter 14; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 6 4 ff.; H s i a o Tso-liang, Power Relations, passim; W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History,

vol. 2, pp. 2ff.; Kuo, History, vol. 2, pp. 45 ff.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary.

land revolution, the peasant question, military work, and, most impor-

tantly, a political resolution, which i n effect summed up the others. I t also adopted a new Party constitution, which would guide Party work until the “Maoist” constitution of 1945. I n fifty-three articles, the constitution

elaborated earlier Party rules of democratic centralism for the hierarchy of committees and initiated the establishment of investigation committees and other measures to tighten discipline and efficiency.?® The Sixth Congress resolutions must be discussed at some length

because of their importance for future events. The political resolution repeated the ECCI’s N i n t h Plenum disavowal of Lominadze’s and Ch’ii

Ch’iu-pai’s “permanent revolution.” I t stated, “The nature of the present stage . . . is bourgeois democratic,” i n the sense that its main force was supplied by the petty bourgeois peasants and intellectuals. China was ‘““semicolonial and semifeudal” and, u n t i l the 1950’s, its tasks would remain those of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, b u t somehow these would have to be led without the “ b i g ” bourgeoisie i n the Nationalist Party, which had betrayed the revolution. Rather, “ t h e sole source of

power [ o f the Chinese revolution] lies. . i n the Chinese proletariat and peasantry.” The resolution also followed the Comintern i n placing China

i n the context of world revolution, tracing the latter through the first stage of the Bolshevik revolution i n 1917 to the second stage of the temporary

stabilization of capitalism i n the early 1920’s to the “third stage,” when there would be renewed revolutionary advance i n the West and ‘“‘uprisings of tens of millions i n the Eastern c o l o n i e s . . . against imperialism.” The Chinese revolution w i l l be the “Prelude to the victory of the world

proletarian dictatorship.’’*® I n this situation, the major tasks of the revolution, which the resolution stated at extreme length, included “stupendous organizational work” for

the next effort “ t o drive out the imperialists and to accomplish the real

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unification of China; and to abolish completely. . . the private landownership system of the landlord class. . . . ” Ten “great demands” or slogans

would symbolize these goals: The Chinese people were called upon first to overthrow imperialism and then the Kuomintang; to unify China;

establish soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers deputies; confiscate the enterprises of foreign imperialism; establish the eight-hour workday with higher wages and social security; replace the old tax system with a progressive tax; confiscate landlord land and give i t to the peasants and soldiers; improve the livelihood of soldiers; and unite with the Soviet

Union and the world proletariat.®° to expand the The political resolution also stressed Party goals regular army of the revolution and to consolidate the Party’s leadership of the army,” and to make ‘‘guerrilla warfare the chief instrument of struggle.” The Party’s major tasks, therefore, were, “first, the immediate realization of the slogans of the agrarian struggle, such as the confiscation of land of the landlords for distribution among the peasants, killing of oppressive landlords, setting u p . . . [ o f ] soviets...; second, the setting up of the Red A r m y . . . ; third, weakening the strength of the reactionary 1 All of this added up to more stress than before on elements. agrarian revolution, b u t the new leadership also continued to insist, as did

the Comintern, on the priority of the urban revolution. Hence, Party documents stated: “Activities in the village should not be ignored. Relatively speaking, however, greater emphasis must be placed on urban activities,” and “the consolidation of working class leadership among the peasantry is a prerequisite to the success of the agrarian revolution. . . the

main task of the village Party headquarters is to consolidate the leading role of the working class i n the peasant movement.”’?? Party organization

was to be expanded among the rural proletariat and semiproletariat, including handicraftsmen, hired farm hands, and poor peasants. The Congress also condemned the weaknesses of peasant ideology, thus supplying the basis for Mao’s famous document of December, 1929, “ O n the

Rectification of Incorrect Ideas i n the Party.” I f the dominant theme of the CCP’s Sixth Congress, as of Comintern pronouncements of the period, was organization and preparation, its corollary was the conviction of an eventual “inevitable” improvement

in revolutionary fortunes, expressed i n the “wave” theory of revolutionary ebb and flow. Thus, an analysis of the setbacks of 1927 led the Sixth Congress, following the resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI, t o conclude that China was then i n a trough between two revolutionary

waves; the first of 1926 and early 1927 had crested, but “ a new revolutionary rising tide is inevitable,” since all the old contradictions still had to be resolved. Hence, the “new rising tide of the future requires still more preparations for armed insurrections, and even actual insurrections

as immediate practical tasks for the P a r t y . . . [and] armed insurrection on a national scale remains for the time being a propaganda slogan.” Premature attempts without adequate “day by day economic and political preparations” would constitute only putsches b y a “few Party men”

without the support of the masses.>® Finally, foreshadowing the “ L i Li-san line” of two years later, the Congress stated that, because of the uneven-

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ness of the revolution and of the strength of the reaction, a “new rising

tide may succeed first i n one or more provinces. At present, there is no revolutionary rising tide, and no such successes are possible; but such a prospect is possible,” and then the power of the masses led b y the

Party will be decisive. The question was when this tide would arrive. The arrival of the “third stage” with the world economic depression, the rise of fascism, and the revival of militarist wars in China in 1929 and 1930 dictated another premature set of revolutionary attempts by the Chinese Communists.

Immediately after the close of the Sixth Congress, the new Central Committee held its first plenary session in Moscow, and about half of its number remained for congresses of the Chinese Communist Youth League and the Communist International; the rest returned to China. The Youth League, holding its Fifth Congress i n late July, elected Kuan Hsiang-ying

to succeed Jen Pi-shih as general secretary. I t claimed more than 70,000 members.** The Sixth Congress of the Communist International met the last two weeks of August and, as expected, approved and reconfirmed the main points of the resolutions just passed by its Chinese ‘“hranch.”

The L i Li-san Leadership Back i n China, the newly elected Chinese Communist leadership faced extraordinary difficulties in late 1928 and thereafter. Although the world economic crisis and new conflicts i n China presented additional oppor-

tunities, a stronger and increasingly repressive Kuomintang, as well as internal Communist feuds both i n Russia and China, ensured continuing danger and drama for the Party. Li Li-san, one of the most important Communist labor leaders in the 1920’s, soon emerged as its dominant figure and gave his name to this period of Party history through 1930. A great orator and reportedly even more impetuous and stubborn than other Hunanese compatriots, Li had the support at first of Military Affairs Director Chou En-lai, of Li Wei-han as head of the Organization Department, and of other key personnel, although nominally he was only

Director of the Central Propaganda Department under General Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa. Ts’ai Ho-sen, after controversy with L i over the operation of the North China Bureau and agrarian policy, went to Moscow i n

1929, where he joined Chang Kuo-t’ao in opposing L i Li-san’s policies, as d i d Chou En-lai i n 1930.*®* However, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Teng Chung-

hsia, who also were representatives there, generally supported L i . Moreover, other Comintern policies were militant and considered consistent

with L i Li-san’s, at least until mid-1930. L i also assigned high-ranking opponents of his policies i n China to lower-level Party work. Thus,

Hsiang Ying, who with Ts’ai Ho-sen and Chang Kuo-t’ao was the third opponent of Li Li-san on the new Political Bureau of seven, was assigned to replace the just executed L o Yi-nung as secretary of the Party’s regional bureau i n Shanghai. H o Meng-hsiung, L o Chang-lung, Yiin Tai-

ying, and other opponents allegedly were also assigned to lower-level Party committees. Therefore, top leaders either were favorable to Li’s ideas or were transferred away from the center of decision-making, and most lower-level cadres had no choice but to support Li.**

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I n accord with the call of the Sixth Congress for “stupendous organizational work,” L i Li-san consistently sought to centralize and ‘“‘Bolshevize” top Party leadership, believing that this must precede and accompany mass

organization at the grass-roots level. Whereas in the mid-1920°’s Li had argued against the efforts of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih to cen-

tralize Party work, he now vigorously pressed for greater Party authority. Central Committee statements of October and November, 1928, criticized

“extreme democratism and egalitarianism” and reprimanded unspecified examples of disobedience, noting that there had even been protests b y Party branches against the issuance of circulars without prior consultation.*” Li’s aggressive approach and strong-arm methods for asserting central control over lower levels, both i n the cities and rural soviets, not unnaturally involved h i m i n continuing and intensifying conflicts. The Party’s security police, established i n 1927, and its red squad, under Chou En-lai and K u Shun-chang,* increased activities at this time to combat white terror w i t h red terror and to use a l l means necessary, including

executions, to restore discipline. L i Li-san used these and other organizations to strengthen his position within the Party.>® The important Kiangsu Committee, whose headquarters, like that of the Central Committee, the regional bureau, and the local city committee, was i n Shanghai, became an early target of Li’s efforts to strengthen

central direction. At a joint meeting of the Kiangsu Committee and the Political Bureau, L i first tried t o enlarge the provincial committee with his supporters and to establish two inspection committees to look into the problems of organization and the labor movement. Party Central was to

establish general guide lines but leave “direction” of specific work to the provincial committee. When the provincial Party secretary balked at these efforts to enlarge the committee, Li called a plenum of the provincial committee i n November to force the issue b u t was i n turn accused of poor

leadership and erroneous policies. Finally, i n February, 1929, Party Central reorganized the committee by sending a delegation to take i t over, while key members, such as future secret service chief K’ang Sheng,

switched to support Li’s centralization.?® L i also reorganized the Shunchih (Hopeh) and Shunt’ien (Liaoning) committees, dismissing two more

members of the Central Committee i n the process and rebuking Ts’ai Ho-sen for his previous work as secretary of the North China Bureau. Chou En-lai reported i n April, 1929, that members of the Shunchih Committee had demanded “ t h e right to discuss all questions with superior

organs a n d. .that the leading cadres be elected by the masses.””*® Subsequently, these committees were replaced by provincial committees for Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, Jehol, and for the Northeast (Manchuria) , which from the spring of 1930 o n were all placed under the juris-

diction of the North China Bureau.* The Second Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, meeting i n Shanghai i n June, 1929, consolidated for the time being Li’s hold over the central apparatus of the Party. Most of the Central Committee and six * K u Shun-chang, a “proletarian” member of the Central Committee, betrayed the Party with disastrous results in April, 1931.

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other Communists met for six days and ‘“‘endorsed without reservation the Central Committee principles for settling [organizational] problems... i n certain provinces.” The plenum called for the “purge of oppositionists,” “reorganizationists,” and “liquidationist” followers of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and other opponents of Li Li-san.*?

Problems of Urban Organization Li Li-san had far less success in building mass organizations in the cities than he did i n controlling urban Communist committees. Although Li also stressed the peasant movement and, like Mao, rebuked “neglect of the revolutionary nature of peasants,” he firmly believed that the urban proletariat must lead the revolution. As he had put i t in November,

1928, The Communist Party acknowledges that the peasantry is an ally of the revolution. A t the same time, i t recognizes that the peasantry is petty bourgeois and cannot have correct ideas regarding socialism, that its conservatism is particularly strong, and that i t lacks organizational ability. Only a proletarian mentality can lead us onto the correct revolutionary road.3 Also i n November, 1928, the Central Committee asserted that, once the

Party became really “proletarian,” rectified its mistakes, and fulfilled its tasks, “the masses will rally around the Party by the hundreds of thousands to bring about a rising tide of the Revolution for the overthrow of reactionary rule.

.” But, b y late 1928, three-quarters of Party members

already had peasant origins, a fact that would make the rectification of ideological errors impossible according to orthodox theory. Consequently,

the Central Committee adopted as its first priority the ‘‘consolidation of the foundation of the proletarian party—we have to join industrial workers in order to establish strong Party cells in factories and plants and to increase the number of workers i n the Party. . . . ” * *

The Communist-dominated National General Labor Union continued to function, but just barely. Holding its Fifth Congress secretly i n Shanghai i n November, 1929, i t claimed to represent 60,000 or 70,000 workers and 15 to 20 per cent of all unionists but admitted that about 60 per cent of the 60,000 o r so were i n rural soviet areas. Even other estimates of

32,000 members of the Union must have been padded, since, in the leading cities, members totaled less than 6,000 and possibly only 3,000 by 1931.%°

According to others, i n 1930, there were 2,100 members of the General Labor Union i n Shanghai, less than 200 i n Wuhan, 23 i n Sian, 900 i n Hong Kong, 500 i n Tientsin, and 840 i n T’angshan. There were still fewer Party

members in the industrial centers, totaling less than 4,000 in 1929, when there were said to be 1,300 i n Shanghai and 600 in Hong Kong. Another source says the Communists i n Shanghai were reduced from 3,000 to 700 i n 1930, while still another says that, i n 1930, when Party membership supposedly had increased to 122,318, there were only 2,000 members i n Shanghai, 1,000 (actually less than 200 by midyear) i n Wuhan, and 500 i n Tientsin. According to still another source, i n early 1931, there were

reportedly some 6,000 Communists i n Nationalist-held areas, 500 of

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whom were in Shanghai.*®* The Communists claimed the red unions led about one-third of the 118 strikes i n Shanghai i n 1928, but contemporary records admitted that the “yellow” unions fostered b y the Kuomintang and

by “reformist” groups after 1927 were far more influential. I n 1928, the Nationalists claimed 1,773,998 workers i n 1,117 unions. While their fig-

ures were certainly inflated and dropped to 576,250 members in 741 unions i n 1936, i t is clear that domination of the urban labor movement passed to the Nationalists after 1927.*" I n spite o f , or because of, abysmal

urban living conditions, economic, not political, improvements were the first goals of Chinese workers in the 1930’s. Although the white terror also played a role in damping down the fires of the labor movement, the unreality of Communist demands was perhaps

equally important. The Comintern and Li Li-san insisted on often artificial political demands and demonstrations. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Trotsky, and the “real work” faction within the CCP attacked these policies and argued for a more moderate and realistic approach, but the Central Committee condemned such an approach as ‘‘economism’ or “legalism.” I t called dangerous the widespread argument that, because “the [Sixth] Congress has for propaganda, not direct action [while awaiting the new ruled wave], we should develop the Party organization through lawful means and give up armed struggle, the guerrilla wars i n rural areas, and so .”*® But Communist caution i n 1928-29 meant a delay, not an end, on. to action. Indeed, as L i Li-san increased his control over the Central

Committee i n 1929 and 1930, Party pronouncements placed relatively greater stress on speeding u p the revolution i n the cities i n the face of the apathy of the worker movement. This new shift to the left within the CCP

was i n step with, and to a great extent caused by, shifts in the Comintern view of the world situation, particularly after the worldwide economic crash and the renewal of fighting i n China i n late 1929 and 1930. The L i Li-san Political Bureau at first took a relatively balanced view of the key problems of priorities and timing for the revolution. Organization and ‘“‘Bolshevization continued t o be the principal concerns. The Central Committee i n October, 1928, condemned policies that had resulted i n the low number of proletarians in the Party and the “isolation of Party cells from the masses.” I t also complained of the low level of Party discipline, and particularly of increasing defections to the Nationalists. Central Committee circulars of November, 1928, A p r i l , 1929, and the Second Plenum o f June, 1929, condemned both right and left extremists, the right

for wishing to conduct only “peaceful” struggle, and the left for opposing “all open organization and lawful struggle.” But the Party termed antirightism “ i t s major policy’’ and stressed that essential “open’’ and economic struggle should lead to more political and, i f necessary, illegal work. I t

likewise criticized extreme democratization and egalitarianism, liquidationism, bureaucratism, softness i n dealing with ‘“‘reformism,” and the practice of making personal “unprincipled attacks,” which contributed to faction-

alism. The November circular noted the mutual resentment between workers and intellectuals and especially the overrepresentation of peasants

and underrepresentation of the proletariat within the Party.*? Most importantly, the Central Committee sought to strike a balance both

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o n the question of urban and rural work and o n that of the timing of the

expected new revolutionary upsurge. The exact timing of the new upsurge could not be judged. The November circular criticized “the illusion about a quick advent o f the rising tide of the revolution. Persons having such an

illusion* are not ready to work hard among the masses,” because they do not conceive of the need for a protracted struggle. The Sixth Congress had stated that “ t h e armed insurrection o n a national scale should be a propaganda slogan and not a slogan for direct action. N o w work among the

masses must be stepped up to win over the broad masses and prepare them for taking part i n uprisings. When the new rising tide appears, the propaganda slogan for armed insurrection can at once be turned into a slogan

of action.”"? While giving first attention to rebuilding the proletarian base of the Party and condemning alleged errors deriving from “petty bourgeois peasand mentality,”’t the Central Committee also condemned neglect of the peasant movement. As a November, 1928, letter put i t , “ i n view of the

poor performance of the Party in urban areas, the Congress has emphasized in particular the importance of the trade union movement. This has given rise to a wrong notion that the scattered struggles i n rural areas can be disregarded.” Rather, the ‘revolution is [ t o b e ] carried out b y W e must lead guerrilla warfare, peasants under proletarian leadership. . [ a n d , ] i n leading expand the Soviet areas, and organize the Red Army

the guerrilla warfare, we must turn i t into an organized mass based action.””®? Similarly, the June, 1929, plenum stated, “There has been a

lack of positive direction from the Central Committee. We must strengthen our leadership of the peasant movement and carry on our activities in a well planned w a y , ” and “ W e must increase our leadership i n the agrarian

revolution.’’®?

Expansion of the Red Armies The rise of the Red Armies, of course, was the most significant develop-

ment of these years, though Party leaders i n Shanghai did not always appear to recognize this fact. By the end of 1929, at least a dozen armed Communist groups had come into existence i n seven provinces of Central and South China. These were constantly reorganized, but, between mid1930 and 1931, the most important ones, with some of their leaders, were: the I Corps i n southern Kiangsi and western Fukien under Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh; the I I Corps i n northern Hunan and southern Hupeh under H o Lung, Chou Yi-ch’iin, and Tuan Teh-ch’ang; the I I I Corps i n western

Kiangsi, under P’eng Teh-huai and T’eng Tai-yiian; and the I V Corps i n the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, under Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien and, later, Chang Kuo-t’ao. Various other contingents, such as those under Lo Ping-hui, Huang Kung-liieh, Lin Piao, Hsiao K’0, and others were generally affiliated with one of these forces. Other relatively important Communist

armed forces existed or soon came into being in northeastern Kiangsi and * A t the time including Mao, who stated i n January, 1930, that “ t h e revolutionary upsurge in China will arise s o o n . ” + Described as disorganized thinking, which at times was conservative, at times putschist, egalitarian, aimless, a n d the like.

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Chekiang under Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-p’ing, and i n two neighboring areas of Kwangsi just above the Vietnam border, under Chang Yiin-yi, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others.” The Red Armies, taken together, grew i n size from less than 10,000 i n 1928 to 22,000 i n 1929, to 60,000 or 70,000 b y April, 1930. But, until

late 1929 especially, conditions were extremely difficult. The arrival of troops under P’eng Teh-huai at Chingkangshan late in 1928 boosted morale, but supplies remained scarce. O n January 14, 1929, under pressure

of a third Nationalist offensive against the base area and suffering from isolation, hunger, and cold, Mao and Chu Teh left P’eng Teh-huai with only some 100 rifles to defend that base and moved southeast through

southern Kiangsi to western Fukien, and then back to the area around Juichin, the future capital of the Central Soviet area. I n late March, P’eng Teh-huai, with 800 men from Chingkangshan, joined forces with the 2,000 survivors under Mao and Chu in south-central Kiangsi, where they were able to establish a new base around T’ungku and Hsingkuo. Later in 1929, the armies of Mao, Chu, and P’eng Teh-huai began to make much more rapid progress i n the expansion of mass organizations, base areas, and the number of their men. Party Central clearly welcomed the rapid growth of the Red Armies i n

late 1929 and early 1930 but felt tighter controls over them would be necessary. I t also began considering the possibility of using the Red Armies as an external force to accelerate the urban revolution, inasmuch as only some 4,000 to 5,000 Communists had been able to survive i n the

cities, as against supposedly more than 100,000 members of the Party working i n soviet areas, backed by Red Armies of 60,000 to 70,000 men. I t was only logical, therefore, to think of bringing the rural revolutionary

forces to the cities. Li Li-san, however, resisted sole use of the Red Armies as the “midwife” of the revolution, insisting they could only be a supplementary force for local insurrections. I n February, 1929, the Central Committee even instructed Mao Tse-tung to disperse his and Chu Teh’s men for guerrilla warfare. I t argued that the smaller units would facilitate mobilization of the masses and, in an obvious effort to keep an eye on the rising Red Army leaders, directed M a o and Chu to release their men for temporary

assignments elsewhere under the direction of centrally controlled Party committees.’® Mao replied in April that the military units should be kept together lest the enemy destroy them. Eventually, though times had been hard, M a o continued, ‘‘the masses will certainly come over to u s ” because

only the Chinese Communist Party could genuinely arouse the masses. Here Mao used for the first time the famous metaphor of “sending fish [ Communists] to water [masses]’’®” and seemed at least as enthusiastic about prospects for revolution as L i Li-san. H e argued that Party Central had been “too pessimistic’ about the necessity of temporarily abandoning

the Chingkangshan base, because ‘“‘the revolution will rapidly develop, and i n making propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings a positive attitude should be adopted.” Mao even hoped to take over all of Kiangsi Province within a year.’®

I n 1929, Mao further developed his system of political and ideological

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controls over the army. H e made his first systematic attack o n ‘incorrect

ideas in the Party” at the famous Kut’ien Conference of the then Fourth Red Army, December, 1929, attributing admittedly prevalent ‘‘nonproletarian ideas” to “the fact that the Party’s organizational basis is largely made up of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin’ and to the Party’s failure to pay adequate attention to the correction of such errors as militarism, excessive egalitarianism, subjectivism, individualism, anarchism, hedonism, and adventurism. But the significance of Mao’s remarks was not the confession of these errors but the emphatic statement that they could be corrected by Party emphasis on a fusion of political and military work, democratic centralism, reliance on the masses, and above all “proletarian education.””®® I n 1928, Mao had also favored a

more radical land policy than had L i Li-san, calling for expropriation of all land. I n April, 1929, however, he altered his position to favor confiscation only of “landlord l a n d . ” Meanwhile, the Comintern and Chinese such

as Ts’ai Ho-sen criticized Li Li-san’s toleration of rich peasants, although others, even Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, cautioned against excessively radical agrarian policies. Earlier, L i had called for the broadest possible front i n the villages while awaiting the new upsurge i n the cities; but, i n 1930, when he came to believe the revolution had begun, he switched to an ultraleft

policy, calling for the nationalization of all land.®° Even as these intra-Party debates over agrarian policy continued i n late 1929 and 1930, the growth of the Chinese Communist movement acceler-

ated once more. But now this growth came primarily i n the countryside among the peasantry who began to volunteer i n increasing numbers for the Red Armies and other Communist organizations.

T H E L I LI-SAN LINE

The acceleration of growth of the Red Armies and Communist power in Kiangsi and elsewhere from late 1929 on was a factor of utmost importance

for the revolution. Its significance was highlighted by a series of crises both in China and the world and the combination of Communist expansion with the difficulties of their enemies introduced a new note of optimism in Chinese Communism. Developments included disputes among Chinese generals and politicians, economic collapse and unrest i n the “capitalist” world, the challenge of Trotsky from exile, together with the struggle against Bukharin and the Kulaks and for the First Five-Year Plan i n Russia, and the Soviet inter-

vention i n Manchuria to protect its interests i n the Chinese Eastern Railway. All of these pressured the L i Li-san leadership to try to take

advantage of the anticipated ‘revolutionary upsurge.” I n renewed fighting over the leadership of the Nationalist Republic, Chiang Kai-shek had defeated Feng Yii-hsiang i n skirmishes in North China i n October and November, 1929, b u t Feng joined forces with Yen

Hsi-shan and the Kwangsi warlords and Wang Ching-wei i n mid-1930 to pose a more formidable challenge. Similarly, i n the world beyond China, the economic crisis of autumn, 1929, seemed a sure sign to Communist theorists of the imminence of capitalist collapse. Finally, i n July, 1929, a year after their ostensible unifi-

cation of the country, Nationalist officers serving under the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsiieh-liang seized complete control of the U.S.S.R.Chinese-managed Chinese Eastern Railway connecting Siberia with Vladivostok by way of Manchuria. Despite alleged Soviet promises in 1919 to renounce all imperialist gains i n China, Stalin would not n o w tolerate the loss of such an important asset. I n November, a Soviet force under Galin,

who only two years earlier as the ranking U.S.S.R. military adviser i n China had been a foremost exponent of Chinese nationalism, invaded Manchuria, quickly restoring Soviet control over the railway and forcing the Nationalist Manchurian government to sign, i n December, the Khabarovsk Protocol,

which guaranteed continuance of Soviet positions in the Northeast.

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This crisis posed a grave dilemma for the Chinese Communists, who as members of the Communist International were duty-bound to support the

Soviet side of the dispute but who as Chinese nationalists could only wince at Stalin’s actions. However, the dominant ‘‘proletarian internation-

alism” of the Political Bureau led L i Li-san to back fully Stalin’s moves, the leading slogan of the day becoming “defend the Soviet Union.” Li’s position brought to a head the long intensifying dispute with Ch’en Tu-hsiu over the direction of the Party. Ch’en charged that Li Li-san’s slogan made the Communists completely vulnerable to the Nationalist accusation that the Communists were only a “tool” of the Soviet Union. Ch’en bitterly attacked the Political Bureau for its reaction to the Soviet

invasion and later broadened his attack to include condemnation of all Chinese and U.S.S.R. Communist policies since the mid-1920’s. Finally, o n November 15, the Chinese Communists expelled Ch’en from the Party; he quickly became the major leader of the Chinese Trotskyist movement,

sharing as he did many of Trotsky’s beliefs, especially i n the necessity for “proletarian” and intellectual leadership. As the real founder of the CCP, and from mid-1930 o n blessed as “absolutely correct” b y Trotsky himself, Ch’en continued to enjoy great

prestige, but he was unable to form an effective opposition in succeeding years. He, P’eng Shu-chih, and others partially unified at least three other major Chinese Trotskyist groups, which originally had been formed by students at Sun Yat-sen University i n August, 1928. But they never over-

came factionalism and disparate views nor achieved a formula for survival in the ruthless world of Chinese politics. After 1930, the Communists stepped up their attacks on alleged Chinese Trotskyists i n all soviet bases, and, i n October, 1932, the Nationalists arrested Ch’en, P’eng, and others,

and the Chinese Trotskyist movement became further fragmented." Ch’en was finally released in 1937 and died a broken and lonely man in 1942, a symbol of these tragic decades. The Chinese Eastern Railway crisis not only drove the Chinese Communists temporarily closer to the Comintern but caused the Russians to step up their demands on the CCP. A Comintern letter to the Chinese Political Bureau of October 26, 1929, called for accelerated preparations to take advantage of China’s “deep national crisis’ and to forestall “adventurous anti-Soviet policy regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway affair.”

The letter spoke of “actively developing and daily expanding the revolutionary forms of the class conflict (mass political strikes, revolutionary demonstrations, guerrilla warfare and so f o r t h ) . ” Though not yet stating that China was i n a “direct revolutionary situation,” the Comintern accused

the CCP of ““still lagging behind the growth of mass discontent and revolutionary power. . The Party has n o t yet become the skirmisher, the organizer, the leader i n the immediate revolutionary struggle of the broad masses.”’? Thus, while the Comintern at times may have sought to restrain Li Li-san’s radicalism (for example, by sending i n mid-1929 two relatively conservative Germans to represent the Communist International i n China),

i t also created conditions that encouraged greater radicalism. Li Li-san was to do more, not less:

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I t is necessary to utilize i n every way the warlord war which has already begun i n order to develop further the independent mass revolutionary movement. . . . The slogans “transform militarist war into class, civil war” and “overthrow the power of the bourgeois landlord bloc” should become the basic current slogans of the Party... The Party should pay special attention to the workers’ strike movement. . . . [ I t m u s t ] strengthen and extend guer-

rilla warfare, especially i n . . . Manchuria.. . . Avoiding a recurrence of the putschist mistakes, which on the whole have already been overcome, the Party must encourage and accentuate class conflicts i n every w a y .. . trans-

forming the revolutionary struggle to an even higher stage of development.®

There still was not a “direct revolutionary situation,” but where a February, 1929, Comintern letter had said that i t would be ‘revolutionary idiocy” to predict a new high tide i n the “very near future” and that the “maturation of a new revolutionary upsurge proceeds very slowly,” the October Comintern letter was more optimistic. Influenced b y renewed

fighting among the generals i n China and by the Chinese Eastern Railway crisis, i t spoke of the ‘“‘streams of the revolutionary movement, which i n

the future will become the powerful high tide of the nationwide revolutionary movement.’

Reacting to this letter, Party Central began to formulate what would become known as the “ L i Li-san l i n e . ” I n accordance with Comintern instructions, a Central Circular (no. 60) o f December 7, 1929, called for stepped-up activities i n both city and countryside but went beyond the instructions i n advocating concentration of Red Army units for the specific purpose of linking the peasant movement w i t h the lagging workers’ movement. I n February, 1929, L i Li-san had ordered the dispersal of Red Army units; now, for the first time since late 1927, the Chinese Communist Party

talked of using the Red Army to take big cities. The former strategy of avoiding to take important large cities must be The we must attack important cities and even occupy them. changed Red Army’s execution of this strategy must be coordinated with the nationwide workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ struggle to bring closer the great revolutionary tide.

This circular was the first specific intimation of the dramatic actions of mid-1930. T o increase Party control over the Red Armies, an essential element i n these operations, the circular ordered Party provincial com-

mittees to supervise military commanders i n controlling the various Red Armies. I n January, 1930, the Political Bureau formally accepted the contents of the Comintern letter o f October and proposed ‘‘aggressively

initiating and enlarging the revolutionary methods of class struggle’ not only for the communization of China b u t “ f o r the armed defense of the

Soviet Union.”’® I n early February, 1930, Party Central took new steps toward the “ L i

Li-san line.” I t stated that the growing Chinese crisis meant that the CCP must “unite the soviet areas of the whole nation with the Red Army .

under the leadership of the working class’ and “under the unified direction” of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.” T o this end,

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i t called for a National Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas to convene on May 1 to “unify leadership” and plan for future steps.* Red Army units were ordered to deploy northward. On February 26, another directive made the drift of Li’s policies even clearer and marked the definite emergence o f the “ L i Li-san l i n e , ” more than three months before the June 11 resolution, which was later said to mark its commencement. Claiming that the Party had made great strides forward i n recruiting 1,300 workers into the Party, doubling the number o f industrial cells, and

expanding the Red Armies, the February 26 directive demanded that the Party “concentrate its forces and a t t a c k : ” Only under the general line of concentration and attack ~~ will the revolution be able to obtain a nationwide victory, first winning an initial victory i n one or several provinces. From the development of the current revolutionary situation, a future victory i n one or several provinces can be seen, especially i n the Wuhan area and its surrounding provinces.?

More modestly, the Political Bureau directed that priority should go to organizing factory, city, province, and national political strikes, to be

followed by an ‘““all-industry general strike.” Next, guerrilla warfare was to be linked with the urban strikes. The agrarian revolution should be deepened and led by the guerrilla units. The Party must oppose ‘‘peasant mentality” as expressed i n ‘“flightism,” ‘““‘defensism,” and “dispersal tactics,” and i t must thoroughly purge Trotskyist, liquidationist, and rightist influences. The Red Army should “develop toward communications, main

roads, and key cities,” and “must push toward key cities and major transportation lines to wreck the enemy’s vital positions.” The February 26 directive rebuked Mao and other military leaders for resisting these orders, asserting that The Red Army’s concentrate and attack [strategy] has had definite success i n some places (such as i n eastern Hupeh, northeastern Hupeh, and in southwestern Kiangsi) but i n the important Red Armies of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and i n western Hupeh [ H o Lung’s area] the former hideand-disperse view still persists.”

Organization for the Li Li-san Line Hence, b y late February, 1930, L i Li-san had already set into motion

the main elements of his “line” for coordinated attacks and uprisings in various cities and provinces centered o n Wuhan, which i t was hoped would trigger nationwide revolution. The later effort to restrict the “Li Li-san l i n e ” to the period from June to September, 1930, apparently was

an effort to conceal the deliberate development of these policies after their obvious failure. But, i n the spring of 1930, Li’s most pressing task was to secure firmer control of the Red Armies, which, because of the lag i n the

labor movement, would have t o bear the brunt of the struggle. A letter of April 3 directed Mao’s and Chu Teh’s units to regroup, join those of * See below. The Congress eventually convened on May 31.

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P’eng Teh-huai, and “thrust into the lower reaches of the Kan River, occupying Kiukiang, so as to guarantee victory in Wuhan.” “ I n a coordiinitial victory i n Hunan, Hupeh, nated action, [these forces] can win

and Kiangsi, which will be the first step toward a nationwide victory.”’ To ensure compliance with these goals, Party Central ordered Mao to attend the National Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas, which the Political Bureau wished to hold as soon as possible. Mao apparently had other ideas, however, and never attended the M a y Congress.

Much has been written about the differences between Mao and Li Li-san in 1930, but these differences, like those between L i Li-san and the Comin-

tern, concerned emphasis rather than principles. I n 1929, Mao had been even more optimistic than Li Li-san i n predicting the conquest of Kiangsi Province in one year, and, i n early 1930, while admitting that this prediction had been overly optimistic, he argued that i f the Communists had been weakened since 1927 so had the counterrevolutionary forces, and it should soon be possible to take advantage of enemy weaknesses. I n early 1930, he told Lin Piao, The revolution will [arise soon,] and i n making propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings, a positive attitude should be adopted.. . How to interpret the two words “arise soon” is a common question among many comrades. A Marxist is not a fortune teller. . . . M y statement that the revolutionary upsurge i n China will arise soon emphatically does not refer to something utterly devoid of significance for action, to a tantalizing phantom, which i n the words of some people “may arise.” Rather, i t definitely will arise.!!

Regarding the critical question of the relative priority of an urban as compared to a peasant movement, the differences between M a o and L i were again of emphasis and not of k i n d . I n the same document, M a o wrote,

Proletarian leadership is the sole key to the victory of the revolution. . I t is therefore a mistake to abandon the struggle i n the cities, and in our opinion i t is also a mistake for any of our Party members to fear the development of the power of the peasants lest i t become stronger than that of the workers and hence detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution i n semicolonial China will fail only i f the peasant struggle is deprived of the leadership of the workers, and i t w i l l never suffer just because the peasants through their struggle become more powerful than the workers.12

The last two sentences contrast with L i Li-san’s statement of March, 1930:

Simply to rely on the Red Army to take one or several provinces i n order to set up a national revolutionary regime would be a most serious error. Not only is such an idea preposterous, but i t might even lead us to neglect our most vital activity, the organization of the workers’ struggle and the organization of political strikes by armed worker units. The villages are the limbs of the ruling class. The cities are their brains and heart.!3

But, at their root, differences between Mao and Li on this crucial question of maintaining “proletarian leadership” concerned principles of education.

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L i , like most Communists o f the time, feared that, i f the Red Armies con-

tined to grow rapidly without a corresponding growth i n the cities—and if peasants continued to overwhelm workers in the Party by a ratio of seven or eight to one—there would be no way to maintain correct Communist ideology.* Mao, on the contrary, felt that the idea of “proletarian leadership” could be maintained through proper educational techniques even if the Communist Party were cut off for a prolonged period from the sources of its ideology i n the cities. That their differences did not preclude at least initial military cooperation for taking key cities, a feature of the “ L i Li-san l i n e , ” can be seen from another statement by M a o i n January, 1930: The positive reason for concentrating our troops is this: only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy the cities. Only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying the cities can we arouse the masses on a large scale and build up a unified political power over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we arouse the attention of the people far and near . . a n d make a material contribution toward accelerating the revolutionary upsurge.. This is the general principle. I n the spring and summer o f 1930, however, as L i Li-san moved to do just this under pressure from the Comintern and sought to take advantage

of the developing civil war between dissident generals and Chiang Kaishek, he had to make concrete plans that began to alarm first M a o and

later Moscow. As Li’s sense of urgency deepened during the spring and summer of 1930, he reportedly came to fear that the gradualist side of Mao’s tactics of “expanding political power by advancing i n a series of waves’ from soviet bases would take so long that “our hair will be white before the revolution is victorious.”’® Thus, L i started w i t h the general support of both Moscow and the Red Armies but, i n his haste to try to take advantage of the new ‘revolutionary upsurge,” increasingly antagonized various groups.

Within the Political Bureau, objections to Li’s leadership also increased. Ts’ai Ho-sen, who had worked closely w i t h L i i n the crucial events of 1925 and 1927, from 1928 on opposed h i m on various issues and, after

publishing an attack on Li’s “rich peasant line,” left for Moscow in early 1929 to try to force changes i n the Chinese leadership. After the Second Plenum i n June, 1929, Chou En-lai also began to quarrel more and more with L i and he too left for Moscow i n the early spring of 1930.

Outside the Political Bureau, from mid-1930 on, Ho Meng-hsiung and the ‘“real-work” faction began publicly to criticize Li’s leadership, while, i n Moscow, Pavel Mif, director of the ECCI’s Chinese Commission, deputy director of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat, and president of Sun Yat-sen University, encouraged students who later became leading opponents of L i Li-san. From late 1929 on, some of these students returned to China and, a year later, were able to take over leadership of the * Significantly, Soviet polemics still stress this argument, criticizing alleged “petty bourgeois” and peasant deviations i n the “thought of Mao Tse-tung.”

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Party. I n the late spring of 1930, however, the attitudes of all these groups toward L i Li-san, like that of the Comintern itself, and of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and others i n Moscow, was equivocal.® A principal reason for ambivalence i n the attitudes of key figures toward

what became known as the Li Li-san line was the general trend of Comintern policy, which, i n reaction to world, Soviet, and Chinese developments, greatly encouraged the radicalization of Communist politics i n China. For

two years, the Comintern had talked continually of the inevitable renewal of revolution in China, in large part to refute Trotsky’s claim that there would be a long delay before the next revolutionary wave. As Li Li-san moved to formulate concrete plans for revolution, however, the danger of this course became all too apparent—not only for the workers who were to spearhead the urban insurrections and the Red Armies who would lead attacks on the cities but even more dramatically for the Soviet Union— because, i f the reports are true, in August L i demanded that Soviet troops be sent through Mongolia and Manchuria to force the Chinese ‘“‘revolution.”'” I f General Galin had invaded Manchuria i n 1929 to secure Soviet interests on the Chinese Eastern Railway, perhaps the Soviet Union would do the same i n the interests of the Chinese revolution. Understandably, members of the Comintern, increasingly worried about Japan, had different priorities. The t w o German directors of the Shanghai

branch of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau i n 1929-30 sought to restrain L i Li-san, but L i was able to reduce their influence by stressing

that they were admitted supporters of the right wing of the German Communist Party. The Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern reportedly began

to oppose Li’s policies in February, 1930, and invited Chou En-lai to Moscow, perhaps i n the hope that he could be groomed as a more effective and realistic replacement for L i Li-san. Chou arrived there about April, 1930, and was given an unprecedented welcome by Soviet leaders. However, together w i t h Ch’li Ch’iu-pai, he continued to be equivocal about opposing L i Li-san.” I n any case, supporters of relatively radical ap-

proaches to the problems of Communism held the upper hand i n most spheres o f policy-making i n the Soviet Union. W i t h i n the Comintern,

Mif advocated a more radical land program i n China, calling for sharper attacks on the rich peasants, and other Comintern spokesmen gave full

public support to L i Li-san’s arguments. Thus, Dmitri Manuilsky, soon to become its de facto leader, stated i n March, The CCP must not forget that i t represents a factor i n the revolution. I t cannot merely look on at the movement. . I t must utilize the decline of the Nanking government and not permit itself to become the staff of the partisan movement and nothing else, for the peasant movement can only be successful under the conditions given by energetic action on the part of the working class i n the industrial centers. .1* Similarly, a correspondent of the Comintern wrote at the same time, “ T h e

Party also knows that i t is its duty to place itself at the head of the fight of the peasants .

and to connect the peasants’ war—that is the next task—

with the fight of the working class.

.’%%

Finally, i n late June, “old

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Bolshevik” V. M . Molotov told the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU that, “supported by the districts under the influence of the Red Army, the

soviets i n China can communicate with the great industrial centers and form a soviet government of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the Communist Party.”’** I f these statements do not show that the Comintern ordered the Li Li-san line, they do not show that Moscow disagreed with i t either. Hence, despite the sometime opposition of some representatives of the Comintern to his plans, Li’s principal worry was not Comintern approval but Red Army obedience. As the June 11 Central Committee resolution that formally launched the “ L i Li-san l i n e ” p u t i t , “ T h e most serious obstacle to the accomplishment of this task [ a nationwide insurrection] is the guerrilla concept of the past which [advocates] attacking instead of occupying

cities. This is a reflection of the peasant mentality and has nothing in common with [ o u r ] present line.”’?? This statement undoubtedly referred at least in part to Mao, as can be seen from some of his writings,?® while others, such as his poems of June and July, seem to show continuing support for key ideas of the “ L i Li-san line.”’?* But Mao resisted Party Central efforts to change his then more moderate land policy and to take over control of his military units. Mao’s consolidation of control of the Red Armies i n southern Kiangsi brought him into increasing conflict with L i Li-san, more for reasons of power and allocation of responsibilities than because of policy differences. At a February 7 , 1930, conference of delegates from the Southwestern Kiangsi Special Committee and from local Red Army units, M a o succeeded i n

passing his land law for the equal distribution of land and i n establishing the Southwestern Kiangsi Soviet,* which enabled h i m to continue his con-

trol of the Red Army as a provincial Party officer despite Li’s earlier order that control of the Red Armies pass to the provincial committees. I n April, the Central Committee created a “General Front Committee’?

superseding its former Front Committee headed by Mao and ordered him to Shanghai to attend the National Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas originally scheduled for May 1. Mao refused to go, though until September he generally followed the “ L i Li-san line.” The Congress was delayed until May 31, when i t finally met for five days just outside Shanghai with forty-seven delegates. Designed to “work out a joint program of uniform tactics for the struggle,” i t passed a provi-

sional land law that was both more radical and more moderate than Mao’s February 7 law, inasmuch as Li Li-san would exempt land farmed by rich farmers but spoke of the imminent nationalization of land held by richer landlords. The Congress also passed a labor law, a special resolution for the defense of the Soviet Union, and a manifesto calling for the holding

of a First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic on November 7 , 1930, a date that was subsequently postponed one year.>® A t the May— June Congress, L i Li-san won approval of his policies from the most

important rural and military leaders. The Congress decided on attacks on key cities b y the Red Army, to be coordinated with local insurrections and * See M a p 3.

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troop mutinies and to be followed by the establishment of a central soviet government, i f possible at Wuhan, or at least at Changsha or Nanchang or in some urban location.?” The V I I and V I I I Corps were ordered from Kwangsi back to Kiangsu and Hunan, arriving, however, only later in the year. Equally important, L i Li-san continued to centralize his control over the Party apparatus, and, after the departure of Chou En-lai for Moscow i n

April, there was little overt opposition to these moves at the center. Li placed supporters i n key positions®® and, starting i n March, began to establish action committees to coordinate the activities of all Communist groups. These action committees took over increasing direction of affairs, and, in

the late spring and summer, L i merged “Party and youth and mass organit o lead the struggle during into one organizational system zations . times of emergency.” He ordered every provincial committee to establish action committees. Then, on August 1, L i proclaimed the formation of a General Action Committee. After the success of the revolution, the Youth League, labor, and other organizations were to be restored and the action committees abolished, although as i t turned out, of course, this was done

instead after the failure and condemnation of the “ L i Li-san l i n e . ” The Execution of the L i Li-san Line

Thus, in the first days of June, 1930, the stage was set for the execution of the Li Li-san line. The full pronouncement of Li’s program was given i n the June 11 resolution of the Central Committee, “ T h e N e w Revolutionary Rising Tide and Preliminary Successes i n One or More Provinces.”

Seeking to justify and elaborate its exhortation ‘‘to prepare actively from n o w on for armed insurrection,” the document spoke of the ‘basic eco-

nomic and political crisis i n China” and then presented its main theme, the fusing of all available power, “peasant uprisings, soldiers’ mutinies, powerful assaults of the Red Army, and a whole combination of various

revolutionary forces” to seize revolutionary victory. Victory would still ‘““be unattainable, i f one of the above four revolutionary forces is lacking.” Placing the Chinese revolution i n a favorable world setting, the resolution noted the world economic depression and spoke of the possibility that China might be the weakest link i n the chain of world imperialism, and that a revolt i n China might set off a worldwide class war.’ Later, Li Li-san hinted at expectations of Soviet military intervention on behalf of the Chinese revolution. Soviet backing, however, was less important for the success or failure of the Chinese Communists than was the support of the Chinese people. The Communist leaders had seriously overestimated the extent of their popular support i n 1927, and they continued to misjudge i t i n 1930,

although they now regarded i t as essential for their success. The June resolution emphasizing the economic and political disruptions of 1930, stated, “The masses said long ago: ‘Whenever the insurrection comes, notify us [and] we will come.” The Party should now boldly tell the masses: ‘The time for insurrection is approaching. Let all of you organize.” ’ '

While i t was recognized that Communist strength i n some areas

lagged behind that in others, i t was felt that strenuous organizational work

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and preliminary successes i n certain areas would spark a nationwide

conflagration. Therefore, L i reportedly issued ‘‘daily orders,” which were sent by courier and required three days to reach the soviet areas of Kiangsi and Hunan from Party headquarters i n Shanghai. They included such exhortations as “The White Army will collapse soon anyway. I f we fight hard this will occur all the sooner—work quickly.””*?> I n rural areas, the Party directed ‘‘creation of peasant committees, peasant unions, and committees of struggle . . . ” and i n the cities “militarized organizations” of armed workers led b y the action committees. These groups first were to lead

demonstrations on July 16 and August 1 and “prepare to obtain the first victory i n Wuhan and vicinity. ..”’** Once that occurred, further uprisings

would “turn the militarist war into civil war” and connect the Chinese and world revolutions. Chinese Communist euphoria can be seen i n the report that when the call “The time for insurrection has come! Organize yourselves!” was issued in Shanghai, only 125 workers enlisted i n the red guards.** Moreover, i t was later revealed that there were only 200 Party members and

fewer than 200 members of the red trade unions i n the three Wuhan cities. Yet, reportedly, i n August, Party Central made the fantastic claim to Comintern that some 30 million were involved i n various revolutionary organizations.?® The performance of the Red Armies would be crucial to the execution of Li’s plans. Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and other military leaders always

insisted on the subordination of the military to the political leadership, and, in any case, their differences with the central leadership were not great enough to induce defiance until after the obvious failures of the

summer. Chu Teh admitted as much some seven years later when he criticized the Li Li-san line: Mao and I were very skeptical about the whole plan, but we had been isolated i n the interior for years and such information as we had about the national and international situation was incomplete. We therefore had to accept the analysis of such conditions sent us by our Central Committee that the country was on the eve of a nationwide upheaval. . [ w e ] felt our army and, insofar as we knew of them, the other Red Armies, were still weak and poorly armed. Even i f we succeeded i n capturing a few industrial cities, w e doubted o u r ability t o h o l d them w i t h the help o f the industrial

workers . . . [ b u t ] , apart from Mao and myself, there was very little opposition . . .[and] we had no choice but to accept.**

Thus, i n June and July, whatever their private reservations, Chu, Mao,

and other soviet leaders signed orders for the plan of attack and assured Party Central that, “according to the decision of the [National Congress of the Delegates from Soviet Areas], and i n order to complete its revolu-

tionary duty, the [ I Corps] will be led against Nanchang and the [II and I I I Corps] against Wuhan [so that] i n Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi the preliminary victory may be attained and the wave of revolution spread

over the country.” According to this plan, the I Corps, numbering about 20,000 men i n

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southern Kiangsi and western Fukien, was to concentrate near Chian i n

south-central Kiangsi for the march north to Nanchang, the capital of the province. I t was projected that, after Nanchang had been taken, the Chu-

Mao forces would link up with P’eng Teh-huai’s I I I Corps troops following their capture of Changsha and with Fang Chih-min’s forces, which would have attacked Kiukiang from northeastern Kiangsi. The combined armies would then proceed to Wuhan, the real objective for “preliminary

victory.” On the other side of Wuhan, the I I and I V Corps would threaten from the northeast and southwest. Military activities did increase during July and August, and Ho Lung’s men and some other groups engaged i n heavy fighting but with few results. O f all these units, only P’eng Teh-huai’s, then designated the I I I Corps,

delivered according to plans for the “ L i Li-san line.” Consisting of some 10,000 men with perhaps 7,000 guns and seasoned by some fifty engagements along the Hunan-Kiangsi border i n late 1929 and early 1930, the I I I Corps moved to take Yochow, i n northern Hunan, on July 5 and held it long enough (three days) for the accidental drowning of an American

sailor to be charged t o the Communists.?® These preliminary moves became possible because of the intensification of the latest non-Communist threat to Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. To meet its needs i n the war with the northern coalition headed by Feng Yii-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Wang Ching-wei, Nanking withdrew more and more

troops from Central China, leaving only some 8,000 for the defense of Changsha. The situation seemed to be developing, as L i Li-san had pre-

dicted. About this time, important but still ambiguous instructions came from the Comintern in the form of a resolution of the Political Section of the ECCI, dated June by the Comintern but July 23 by Chinese sources— presumably because of delays i n communication of u p to several weeks between Shanghai and Moscow.* The resolution stated that the new rising tide of the Chinese revolutionary movement has become an indisputable fact, but i t has. . a weakness i n the initial stage; the struggling masses cannot occupy industrial centers at the outset . we do not have for the moment an all-China objective revolutionary situation [but only i n certain areas]. . . . According to the trend of recent events, the revolutionary situation can cover a few major provinces, i f not the whole country. Much will depend on whether the Communist Party has a correct strategy and, above all, whether it is able to lead and develop the soviet movement. ... T h e Red Army must be organized and strengthened i n order that i t may be able to take one or more key cities i n the future according to political and military circumstances.*° * A recent Soviet source makes clear the importance of this time lag, asserting that the Comintern did not even become informed of the contents of the CCP June 11 resolution until early July, that they replied only on July 28 to a request for an appraisal by L i Li-san of July 18, and that the Comintern d i d not come out decisively against the “ L i Li-san l i n e ” u n t i l August. I n other words, the ECCI July 23 telegram resolution was talking about Chinese Communist policies of the spring, and the Comintern did not evaluate the June 11 resolution until late July and August.”

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Despite the cautious notes of “ a certain weakness” and “ i n the future,”

Li Li-san and, two months later, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chou En-lai, seem justified i n interpreting the ECCI resolution as generally in line with Li’s plans.* Li, too, spoke of a ‘victory first i n one or several provinces,” although he did hope that an ‘““all-China objective revolutionary situation” would emerge from the preliminary victories. I n any case, b y late July, plans were already i n motion and would have been difficult, i f not impos-

sible, to cancel. On July 25, P’eng Teh-huai’s I I I Corps began a forced march on Changsha by three separate routes, entering the largely undefended town on July 27, but attempts to organize the city, as elsewhere i n 1930, met with little success. Despite claims that, “ w i t h i n three days, 50,000 workers

were organized into trade unions” and boasts of the largest mass meeting ever held in Changsha, with 100,000 of its half million inhabitants said to have assembled, i t was revealed later that only a few more than 3,000

had attended an August 1 celebration.** Thus, while i t was reported that animosity to the Communists came only from the well-to-do, as at Canton

two and one-half years before, the masses evidently were no more than curious observers. The lack of mass support was especially damaging because the nature and extent of the popular reception given to the Red Army obviously was fundamental to any such efforts to take over the country. Cities the size of Changsha could not be held b y the few soldiers available, and the

administration of the captured cities would clearly have to be staffed from within. Attempting to gain necessary popular support, the Communists established a provisional government i n Changsha o n July 30, consisting of

500 members with P’eng Teh-huai the temporary chairman, and, on August 1, i t proclaimed a soviet government of Hunan, Hupeh, and

Kiangsi, with Li Li-san absentee chairman. The program of the Changsha Soviet was printed i n the first issue of a hastily published local Red Flag Daily. Its ten principal points included measures to end the unequal international status of China, confiscation of foreign property, redistribution

of landlord land, destruction of the Kuomintang government and the establishment of a soviet government, improved working conditions for labor and soldiers, and solidarity with the world proletariat and the Soviet Union.*? I n 1930, i n the absence of a continuing military presence, such measures were insufficient to secure “power to the people,” and, in the face of continuing confusion and debate over future actions, P’eng Teh-huai’s men withdrew partially almost immediately and altogether in the face of Nationalist counterattacks on August 5. Their principal gain was about 3,000 new recruits. The Soviet Union had at first proclaimed the capture of Changsha as ‘““a great step forward i n the soviet movement,” b u t i t later strongly con* Therefore, there seems little reason to doubt statements by Ch’ii and Chou i n September, 1930, and later ones by Chang Kuo-t’ao and others, that there were few “differences i n line” between L i Li-san and the Comintern, at least u n t i l August or so.”

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demned the withdrawal. I n contrast to Mao’s later assessment that the attack on Changsha should have been only a “temporary action,” the Comintern deplored the fact that ‘ t h e army was impregnated with the strategy of the peasant partisans. I t s position was not consolidated. N o

city power was organized.”** Such statements reveal that Li’s strongest critics after the failure of Changsha would have been the first to hail him had the results been different, but they also point out the basic ambiguity of a policy based so largely on the imaginary support of the masses. Since Changsha was soon abandoned by P’eng Teh-huai, possibly without the knowledge of the Central Committee, one can speculate that Mao and Chu actually pressed P’eng to leave. Supporting this hypothesis are Mao’s later statements and charges by others that Chu Teh’s and Mao’s forces could and should have come to the assistance of the I I I Corps in Changsha.*®* Both Chu Teh and a member of P’eng’s forces later went to some lengths to point out that the reason for the lack of coordination between the two armies was the lack of any means of communication, for they acquired their first radios only shortly thereafter. However, Chu states that he and Mao had heard of the capture of Changsha by July 29, a date that would have given them time to reach the Hunan capital had they really desired to do so. I n any case, according to Li’s plans, Changsha was only a station on the way to Wuhan, and so the failure of the armies to link up at that stage was not against orders. Moreover, Party Central instructed the Red Armies to place maximum priority on preserving and strengthening their forces. The unwillingness of Mao and Chu to commit themselves to more than one twenty-four-hour attack on Nanchang was probably a more serious lapse in the eyes of the Central Committee. I n fact, judging by press reports, which several times reported that Nanchang had already fallen to ‘‘greatly superior troops,” the capital of Kiangsi might have been taken by concerted attacks. Chu Teh admitted that “the enemy’ at Nanchang was weak, and P’eng Teh-huai later confirmed Mao’s “correct opposition’ to attacks on Nanchang.* Mao was even less interested i n an attack on Wuhan and later asserted,

“This failure [Changsha] helped to destroy the L i Li-san line, and saved the Red Army from what would have been a catastrophic attack on Wuhan, which L i was demanding.”’*” Nor would M a o yield control of his peasant partisans. I n the June reorganization, L i required that all partisans be incorporated into the army for the march to the cities. Mao d i d so, but only o n paper, i n fact leaving them where they were as guards i n the

Kiangsi Soviet areas.*® Thus, Mao was willing to go along verbally with the Central Committee, but, when i t came to carrying out orders that he

considered dangerous or unwise, he took only the minimum steps. Nevertheless, neither Mao, Chu, nor P’eng had yet come to the point of open defiance of the Central Committee. Attacks had been made on Changsha and Nanchang, and orders would continue to be obeyed at least nominally

for another month. I n mid-August, the I and I I I Corps, together numbering about 30,000 men, met i n Liuyang County i n eastern Hunan, fought some new engagements there and to the north, and “held a conference to debate L i Li-san’s

orders

[ f o r ] the reoccupation of Changsha and taking the Wuhan

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cities against which the [ I I and I V ] Corps [ o f H o Lung and Hsii Hsiang-

ch’ien] were already converging.”’*° The first attack on Changsha had made some sense i n the light of government preoccupation elsewhere, but the second attack is explicable only in terms of unresolvable conflicts between the shifting sides of the Moscow—Chinese Central Committee—partisan triangle. Prospects were dim

for the recapture of Changsha, where defenses had been tightened, and repression increased, leading to the execution of Mao’s wife and sister,

among others. The Nationalist government, after victories over the northern coalition generals i n August and sufficiently alarmed b y the first cap-

ture of Changsha, had sent significant reinforcements south. A still more fundamental factor arguing against a continuation of “the line” was the now proven passivity of the urban population. Nevertheless, many Communist leaders stuck by predictions that, given a proper chance, the masses would rally to the revolution. I n retrospect, i t is difficult to believe that

such optimism was genuine in the face of continued defeats since 1927. Yet, a Bolshevik ideal held that: I t will be essential among other things to show by concrete examples the necessity of unshakable firmness. Once the insurrection has begun i t must be developed without stopping at any obstacle, however difficult i t may seem. H o w many times would the October revolution have perished i f the Communist Party had yielded. . . . 7 °

I f the chances of retaking Changsha were poor, prospects were still worse i n Wuhan, where the few Party members were surrounded b y 6,000 Nationalist troops and a severe repression of all suspects was under

way. A U.S. consul reported forty beheadings in one week with the bodies allowed to remain on public view.’* One of Chiang Kai-shek’s most trusted officers, Ho Ying-ch’in, was placed i n charge of the defense of Wuhan, and a “merchants’ volunteer corps” was added to bolster the

existing “peace preservation corps.” I n addition, the Japanese had sent some troops inland, and eleven foreign warships were in Wuhan harbor.’? Thus, i t may have seemed more prudent to tackle Changsha again than to proceed to the even more hopeless task of capturing Wuhan, as called for by the original plans. Therefore, i t is likely that the second attack o n Changsha by the I and I I I Corps i n early September was ordered to bring about the establishment of a soviet government there, since i t was now realized that this could

not be done i n Wuhan and since many leaders were unwilling to establish the expected soviet government “ i n the mountains,” as suggested b y some.

Moscow had hailed the first capture of Changsha and continued to speak of i t as the revolutionary base long after i t had been abandoned, presumably because of the lag i n communications. The Comintern also continued to press for the establishment of soviet administration i n ‘‘already

conquered areas,” a line that may well have been taken as encouragement to recapture Changsha. When i t learned of the abandonment of Changsha, Moscow denounced the failure to organize “ c i t y power,” and, during his

confession in Moscow i n December, Li Li-san was quoted to the effect that “the Comintern was right in saying that we could not stage uprisings

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in Shanghai and Wuhan but could take Changsha and organize a soviet government.” Ch’en Shao-yii later charged that Li had hidden an order from the Comintern saying not to attack, but Ch’en also denounced the “ridiculous idea” that a soviet government might be established “ i n the mountains’ before the capture of Wuhan.*® Most leaders believed such a government could only be established i n a city of some size, which was at least a partial explanation for hopeless Communist attacks o n cities

from the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927 into the early 1930’s. Certainly, Li Li-san worked hard to prepare the ground for the establishment of a “National Soviet Government,” calling the May-June Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas and i n July establishing a Central Preparatory Committee to organize the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The First Congress was to be held on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, November 7 , presumably i n one of

the major cities Li Li-san hoped to control. Military setbacks forced the postponement of the Congress, first to December 11, the anniversary of the Canton Commune, and ultimately to November 7 , 1931, when i t opened

in Juichin, Kiangsi."* From August 1 to 3, 1930, the Political Bureau met to evaluate the

course of the “ L i Li-san line.” Li stressed the possibility that events in China would trigger the world revolution with the entrance of Japanese, English, Russian, and Mongolian forces into China and, i n an August statement known as the “twenty-nine points,” reaffirmed the tenets of the June 11 resolution. Contrary to later Soviet claims, which emphasized Li’s

subsequent statements that “the Comintern does not understand the situation i n C h i n a ’ and that ‘““our line was correct, the Comintern’s incorrect,”

i n August, L i Li-san continued to seek Comintern approval of his actions. I n communications of July 18 and August 5 to Moscow, he sought instructions and declared his ‘“faithfulness to the Comintern.”

The Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau branch (Dalburo) i n Shanghai, which had criticized the L i Li-san leadership on and after February, 1930 and denounced the June 11 resolution i n letters of June 20 and August 5 ,

held a joint session on August 6 with the Chinese Political Bureau to discuss its criticisms. I t subsequently stepped up its attacks on the “ L i Li-san line,” especially i n reports to Moscow of August 12-13 after a fact-finding

trip to Wuhan, Li’s proposed capital. The Comintern later seized on these Dalburo criticisms to claim its consistent opposition to the “ L i Li-san line.” But L i to some extent had neutralized this criticism b y charging the two

German heads of the Dalburo with “right opportunism,” and the Comintern’s position was b y n o means clear, at least until late i n the summer.>® The Third Plenum

Meanwhile, the Comintern sent Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chou En-lai back to China in late August, ostensibly to correct the “ L i Li-san line,” but they in fact continued to support i t into the autumn.* Therefore, whatever the * This was hardly surprising, since, as L i later confessed, i n many respects the “ L i Li-san line” was a continuation of Ch’li Ch’iu-pai’s policies of more than two years before. Ch’ii stayed on the Politicdl Bureau although remaining i n Moscow from mid1928 t o mid-1930. Moreover, neither C h a n g Kuo-t’ao n o r T s ’ a i Ho-sen, well-known

critics of the L i Li-san line, was sent back at this time.

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181

inside story of the “ L i Li-san l i n e , ” i t is small wonder that L i continued

his efforts to attain ‘‘victory first in one or several provinces.” When the Comintern learned of the failure of the second attempt to take Changsha, i t charged the CCP with having confused its order to strengthen the revolutionary base with the “Trotskyite notion that a soviet could only be established i n a c i t y , ” but, as seen above, there were many contradictory

statements on this issue.’® Despite such ambiguities and the increasing doubts of Red Army leaders, Chu Teh acknowledged that “ a l l [negative] arguments were voted down,

. and the second attack on Changsha began in the first week of September and lasted until the evening of September 1 3 . ” However, Mao, Chu, and other partisan leaders claimed to begin a purge of Central Committee loyalists who were demanding continuance of the second attack on Changsha and simultaneous assault on the Wuhan cities, and, after a siege of over a week, reportedly at last “repudiated the Li Li-san line and ordered their troops to withdraw from Changsha.” This decision was not unanimously obeyed, and Chu Teh later admitted that some troops had

“even denounced” Mao and himself for this action.’® Inasmuch as Mao’s and Chu Teh’s section of the Red Army went on to take the town of Chian o n October 3 and, according to some, considered new attacks o n Nanchang and Kiukiang and, as late as October 14, affirmed the June 1 1

Resolution and Li’s August ‘twenty-nine points,” i t is evident that there was no sudden break with Party Central, but there were undoubtedly increasing tensions.’® The crisis i n the deeply split Red Army climaxed i n December when the newly designated X X Corps arrested officers of the southern Kiangsi Central Soviet who, according to Mao, had “attacked us politically o n the basis of the L i Li-san line.””®® This dispute, known as

the Fut’ien revolt, will be discussed in the next chapter. Despite their military importance, Mao, Chu, and the other partisan leaders d i d not dominate the Chinese Communist Party i n the autumn of

1930. I n fact, they did not even form the dominant political opposition to the policies of L i Li-san. That honor fell to the “Russian returned students” group, led by former university students i n Moscow, including Ch’en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po K u ) , Chang Wen-t’ien ( L o F u ) , Shen Tse-min, and others. O f course, not all of these were united against L i Li-san, a n d the p o s i t i o n o f L i ’ s immediate successor, Ch’en Shao-

yii, was also ambiguous. Although he opposed some of L i Li-san’s policies i n the early summer and was reprimanded for this, Ch’en wrote several

months later that there had never been a question of whether or not there should be armed uprisings, but only of the way in which they would be carried out. Ch’en seems to have referred specifically to Chu and M a o when he condemned the defeatism of giving u p the attack o n Changsha:

Some thought the fact that the victory of Changsha could not be long protected proved the Comintern resolution which stated “the new high tide of revolution can already be seen [ b u t ] under the blows of imperialism and the Chinese counterrevolution, there is the possibility of partial failure and retreats”. . . however, this is the most dangerous kind of opportunistic distortion of the Comintern resolution.é!

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Because of such an attitude, i t is understandable that, under the ‘“Rus-

sian returned students’ ” leadership of the early 1930s, there was a recurrence of attacks o n various towns, showing their view that L i Li-san’s

errors had been ones of timing and tactics, not of principle. Significantly also, since the late 1930’s, the Maoists have viewed the “third leftist line” under the nominal leadership of Ch’en and his successor Ch’in Panghsien as more deviant and ‘“‘even more sectarian’ than that of Li Li-san. We are told by Maoists that the “third leftist line” continued the ideological basis of the “ L i Li-san line”’ and ‘““was erroneously afraid to accept the Red Army movement as a peasant movement led b y the proletariat; i t . . .

opposed the so-called ‘peculiar revolutionary character of the peasants.’ ’ ’ % * Actually, i t was neither the partisan leaders nor the ‘Russian returned students” (who replaced Li Li-san only with the Comintern’s help), but the moderate labor faction led by Ho Meng-hsiung and later Lo Changlung that formed the strongest opposition to the leadership among the Party rank and file i n 1930. As with the partisan leaders, Ho’s “real work”

faction did not rebel against Li’s plans until continuing demands for action jeopardized its very existence. I n early September, the Li Li-san leadership moved to l i m i t the influence o f H o and the “real work” faction, which

had become increasingly vocal i n August, as opposition toward Li’s policies intensified and the extent of Party losses over the summer became clear. Some thirty cadres led by H o petitioned Moscow about this time for the recall of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ts’ai Ho-sen i n order to reorganize Party

leadership.®® However, Ho’s policies backfired because, for the moment, the challenge posed by his “real work” faction temporarily brought about an alliance between Li Li-san and some of his opponents, later including even Pavel Mif. Following the September criticisms of his “opportunism,” Ho retracted some of his charges, including the accusation that L i Li-san had defied the Comintern.’ Therefore, the T h i r d Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, called i n late September, continued to uphold the “ L i

Li-san line,” making only minor criticisms of mistakes i n timing and rescinding some of Li’s organizational innovations, such as the action committees. Meeting at Lushan, Kiangsi, September 24-28, fourteen members of the Central Committee and others present elected seven new members,

including for the first time Chu Teh, bringing the total membership of the Central Committee to twenty-three, two of whom were not present, plus at least seven alternates.®® The plenum admitted that the Chinese Communist Party had “made exaggerated and incorrect evaluations of the speed

and degree of development of the revolution and sporadic practical mistakes [ h a d ] occurred. This is what the Communist International wants to correct.” Moreover,

The Central Committee has had some mechanical conceptions, thinking that the Central [ S o v i e t ] government h a d to b e established in W u h a n , o r at

least i n Changsha or Nanchang. O f course, i t would be better to get established i n the bigger cities than i n the smaller ones, but this is a secondary question.. . . % 6

The plenum also admitted that the Central Committee had ignored regional

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differences between the North and the South i n the development of the revolution and that i t had been wrong to assume that “once the industrial cities were won the revolution would immediately take on a socialistic character.” The worldwide economic crisis and the need for political strikes were held to have been judged correctly. According to the Third Plenum, the attack on Changsha was perhaps ill-timed but pointed to better things in the future. I n short, contrary to what the Comintern later claimed to have intended when i t sent Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chou En-lai back to China in August, Chou concluded to the Third Plenum: There is no difference i n line . [ O u r ] objectives do not differ i n the slightest from the instructions of the Comintern with which there is complete harmony. Only because of an overestimation i n degree and i n speed of the present revolutionary development, the Central Committee made sporadic tactical mistakes.. . . 6 7

Therefore, the Third Plenum upheld Li’s general policy and again affirmed that, once Party power had been built up, the big cities could be captured, although i t conceded that, for the time being, “There is still

not sufficient Red Army strength.” This was to be attained by ‘‘consolidating the existing soviet areas , strengthening the leadership of the Red Army, mobilizing even more peasant masses, and establishing a Central [Soviet] Government to advance toward the key industrial cities.” According to Chou En-lai, the Comintern had also affirmed that “ t h e new rising

tide in the Chinese revolution has undoubtedly become a fact” and that, while “ t h e situation has not yet [ripened] to [ t h e point o f ] armed insurrections o n a national scale, nevertheless, the Comintern is not of the view that this is simply a prospect i n the remote future. .”’*®I n other words,

there would be a delay i n the execution of Li’s policies but no fundamental change i n them.®® The Fall of L i Li-san

Moscow decided to end its vacillation, however, as i t became increas-

ingly aware of the extent of turbulence in China. As with the sacking of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the assignment to Moscow of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, the Comintern realized that L i Li-san would have to be removed from power as much for reasons of Comintern prestige as for changes i n its policy.

The Comintern later tried to show that i t had been opposed to Li’s alleged errors from the beginning and that C h ’ Ch’iu-pai and Chou En-lai had been instructed to censure Li completely rather than admit mere mistakes of timing. I n any case, i t recalled L i Li-san to Moscow i n

late October, leaving Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chou En-lai as the acting leaders of the CCP.” The final coup de grice to the “ L i Li-san line” came in a Comintern |

letter of October, 1930, which is usually dated November 16, the date of its receipt i n China. This document attacked Li’s denial of the unevenness of the world and Chinese revolutions, his failure to organize a soviet base or Red Army under the complete control of the CCP, and his adven-

turist policies, which ignored the daily struggles of the workers. The

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Comintern letter especially attacked the Third Plenum for continuing the Li Li-san line and for stating that that line did not differ in principle from the International line. The letter called for a new program, based on the development of a more effective ‘“‘peasant-worker Red Army,” for the

establishment of a strong soviet government, and for more mass organization for political, anti-imperialist, and economic work. I t spoke of developwith a ring of peasant ing partisan warfare to “surround the cities uprisings,” phrases later made famous by Mao and Lin Piao.™ The Communist International, however, d i d not look on its new shift

of line as a “retreat but as an offensive. The line of the insurrection is fixed,” i t declared. Nevertheless, having badly burned its hands in China for the second time, there were shifts i n emphasis in its China policy. A member of the Comintern stated,

H o w miserable and capitulating are the conceptions . . t h a t the soviet power must first originate and gain strength i n the large industrial centers. . . . What is true for an industrially advanced Germany is bound i n practice to be wrong for a country where, as Lenin foresaw, the revolution will produce more peculiarities than i n Russia.. . 7 2

For his part, L i Li-san seems to have won something of a reputation for his cowering confessions after the events of 1930. I n December, he confessed w i t h such readiness to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International that Manuilski stated, Just because L i has abandoned his concepts [so readily]. . my forebodings are aroused . . . i f

[ h e ] h a d brought o u t the causes o f his theories, w e o f

course would have discussed them and moreover argued about them with [ h i m ] . . . b u t h e d i d not mention these problems.”3

Apparently, L i astounded the Comintern by not offering any excuse, even when i t was openly admitted that there were “causes of his theories,” most of which had of course originated with his audience. He did state, as he would once more a quarter-century later,* despite fifteen years of further “education” i n Moscow, that,

I cannot deeply believe that I have already completely understood my mistakes, that I may not again repeat them. I do not dare say this. But I will summon my courage and use all my strength to correct them and oppose incorrect tendencies i n the Chinese revolution under the directives of the Comintern.”

Li confessed to the following: (1) failure t o understand the difference between workers and peasants i n the Chinese revolution; (2) sacrificing the economic interests o f the workers to political interests; (3) incorrect

organization of the Red Army; (4) misunderstanding the relationship * L i returned from Moscow to Manchuria i n 1945 and made a similar confession i n 1956 following criticisms of his term as minister of labor from 1949 to 1954.

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between the Chinese and world revolutions and his erroneous belief that, in support of the Chinese revolution, “the Soviet Union would adopt a policy of attack o n international imperialism”; (5) stating that there could

be immediate passage from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution; (6) an incorrect land policy of alliance with the rich peasants; (7) failure to correct his errors at the Third Plenum; (8) organizational errors i n combining the Communist youth and labor organizations with the Party into a “militarized organization” (the action committees); and ( 9 ) , the most serious o f all, promoting sectarianism by

advocating incorrect policies and stifling criticism.” Li stated that there were basically four interrelated splits within the Party. These were (1) between his supporters and opponents; (2) the

remnants of the split, partially healed at the Sixth Congress, between rightist followers of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the ‘“‘adventurists” of late 1927; (3) the most fundamental, between labor and partisan leaders, who advo-

cated relatively moderate policies for their areas and backers of more extreme policies; and (4) between “those comrades i n China who distrust

the views of their comrades i n Moscow as some comrades in Moscow distrust the actual worker comrades in China” and the more docile followers of Comintern directives. L i admitted, “ I think the bringing about of these divisions is my greatest mistake.” Regarding the fourth point, i t is interesting to note Li’s statement during his confession that “the Comintern did not understand conditions i n China . and that loyalty to the Comintern was one thing and loyalty to the Chinese revolution quite

another.”’"® At an urgent enlarged conference of November 22-26, the Central Committee, reacting to the October ECCI letter and recall of Li Li-san, declared complete agreement with the views of the Comintern and dismissed Li Li-san from all his posts. This session, attended by Hsiang Chung-fa, Chou En-lai, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, and others, admitted mistakes i n

the work of the Third Plenum, but denied the charge of Comintern spokesmen, n o w joined b y Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Shen Tse-min, and

others, that Party Central had violated the Comintern line. The enlarged conference rebuked the “Russian returned students” for this allegation but admitted that the Third Plenum leadership had failed to ‘expose thoroughly the semi-Trotskyite nature of Comrade L i Li-san’s line, which is contradictory to the International l i n e . ” But not until a series of meet-

ings and writings in December did the Party leadership unequivocally denounce not only L i Li-san’s errors but those of the Third Plenum.” A n urgent Party Central circular of about December 23 demanded ‘““adoption of emergency measures to work out i n secret a new political resolution to supersede all resolutions of the Third Plenum.”"® The Construction of a N e w Leadership

These developments owed much to the arrival about this time™ in Shanghai of Pavel Mif, director of the ECCI’s Chinese Commission and deputy director of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat. H e promptly set about preparing for the calling of a new plenum of the Central Com-

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mittee in order to change leaders once again. Mif had been president of Sun Yat-sen University from mid-1927 to mid-1929, and i t was natural for him to sponsor his former students, notably Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch'in Pang-

hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, Shen Tse-min, and others. Despite their extreme youth—Ch’en and Ch’in were i n their mid-twenties i n 1930—they at least

knew Marxist theory and could be expected to be faithful to the Comintern. All other factions of the CCP seemed to have been compromised, either by participation in the now denounced Third Plenum (Ch’i Ch’iu-pai, Chou En-lai), through active involvement in the Li Li-san leadership (Hsiang Chung-fa, Li Wei-han), allegedly erroneous opposition to it (Ho Menghsiung, Lo Chang-lung), or by charges of complicity in Trotskyism and factionalism (Ch’en Tu-hsiu and others in China and supposedly Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chang Wen-t’ien, and others while in Russia).

The first step for Mif and his followers was to improve the stature of the “Russian returned students”* and to place them insofar as possible in key positions. The Political Bureau was induced to rescind the disciplinary measures that Li Li-san had imposed on Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and others for their sometime opposition the previous summer, and Ch’en replaced L i Wei-han as director of the important Kiangsu Committee. This move i n turn infuriated Ho Meng-hsiung, who had expected to take over the Kiangsu Committee and thereby set the stage for a further intensification of factional struggles. These disputes reached a climax over the calling of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in January, 1931. At a December 14 meeting of the Political Bureau, Pavel M i f had been able to get Party Central to agree to the holding of the Fourth Plenum i n Shanghai in order formally to repudiate the L i Li-san line. The followers of H o Meng-hsiung’s “real work” faction, however, as the earliest and most experienced oppo-

nents of L i Li-san, were not willing to cede leadership to the “Russian returned students.” They wanted an emergency conference similar to that of August 7, 1927, which would be open to groups outside the Central Committee and could therefore not only overturn the “ L i Li-san line” but also prevent Mif from packing the new leadership with his followers. Many, i f not most, lower-ranking Party members favored the “real work” faction’s position, and, in late December, Ho Meng-hsiung, Lo Chang-lung,

* Some of these were also known as the “twenty-eight Bolsheviks” after the group of students at Sun Yat-sen University i n Moscow who had most consistently supported Stalin, Pavel M i f , and other Comintern “Eastern experts” against Trotsky and other oppositionists, and at times i n the late 1920’s against senior Party leaders such as Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t’ao, who were then i n Moscow. More than a dozen other Chinese Communists also studied at Sun Yat-sen or other Soviet universities i n the late 1920’s and therefore are referred to here by the more comprehensive phrase “Russian returned students.” + This was a classic illustration both of Soviet tactics and of the Chinese parable of the fisherman picking u p a clam and snipe while the two were locked i n combat. With Russian encouragement, Party Central sought to w i n over Ch’en Shao-yii and others in the parallel struggle against H o Meng-hsiung, only to be taken over i n turn a few weeks later by Ch’en’s “Russian returned students.””®

[Chap. 8]

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and others established a new independent organization with an executive committee of twenty-seven that continued to lobby for an emergency

conference.’ However, the dissident organization did not achieve any of its objectives, as Ch’i Ch’iu-pai, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa, and others of the central group decided to support M i f and the “Russian returned students,” just as at the Third Plenum they had supported Li Li-san against the opposition of the “real work” faction. The collaboration between key members of the old Party Central leadership with Mif and the ‘Russian returned students” assured the defeat of H o Menghsiung and his followers.

The Fourth Plenum was finally called about January 7.22% The ‘real work” faction was invited but not told of the nature of the meeting. When

they discovered that i t was to be the Fourth Plenum, Lo Chang-lung and others demanded a postponement and preparations for an emergency conference instead. Mif overruled them and proceeded with the meeting, which he chaired. About three dozen delegates were present, more than half of them supporters of M i f or of the old Party Central. I n fact, only

about seven delegates present had not been involved i n the “ L i Li-san line,” although i t was clear that the formal denunciation of the “line” was the meeting’s principal aim, along with leadership reorganization. Hsiang Chung-fa, Chou En-lai, and others confessed their errors but

retained leading positions. A new Political Bureau of sixteen, including alternates, was elected,®® with Hsiang Chung-fa continuing as general secretary and Chou En-lai as director of the Military Affairs Committee. Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, the third important holdover, however, retained his post

on the Political Bureau for only a few days. “Russian returned students” and ‘“Internationalists’ (as they and those who cooperated with them became known) took over most other key Party positions. I n addition to the above, these included the organization

department, headed by K’ang Sheng and others; the propaganda department, headed b y Shen Tse-min, then Chang Wen-t’ien; and the women’s

department, headed by Meng Ch’ing-shu, the wife of Ch’en Shao-yii, and later Teng Ying-ch’ao. Following Hsiang Chung-fa’s arrest and execution in the spring of 1931, the precocious Ch’en Shao-yii moved up from his position on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to become the new ‘“‘head of the Party,” and was succeeded i n turn b y fellow “returned

student” Ch’in Pang-hsien, after Ch’en left for Moscow i n September, 1931.34 Meanwhile, the “ r e a l w o r k ” faction decided to bring into the open its fight with the ‘““Internationalists’” i n the new ruling coalition. O n Janu-

ary 17, Ho Meng-hsiung organized a second Kiangsu Committee to rival the one headed b y Ch’en Shao-yii, and demanded a new Party conference and the recall o f Pavel M i f . The very next day, however, i n one of the

more controversial and tragic episodes i n the history of the Party, British police arrested H o , L i n Yii-nan (a first cousin of L i n Piao), and several dozen others, including five leftist writers, and turned them over to Nation-

alist authorities. They were executed on February 7. Bitter debate surrounds this event, as charges were made that the ‘‘Internationalists’’ had

informed British police of the meeting place of these men, while Ch’en

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Shao-yii and others countered that the dissidents’ own propaganda had inadvertently led to the arrests.* Whatever the truth of these charges, i t is certain that the dissidents posed the gravest challenge to Party Central authority and that the latter went over to the offensive, reprimanding suspect Party members and moving to cut off their financial support. I t reportedly won back the allegiance o f 80 per cent of the dissident cells i n Shanghai, but not all

Party members came around, and Lo Chang-lung emerged as the new leader of the dissidents. After his expulsion from the Party on January 31, L o established a rival central committee, which had branches in half a

dozen provinces of eastern and northern China, but collapsed with the Nationalist arrest o f L o i n April, 1933.%¢

While the ‘““Internationalists’ were able to use their superior knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the support of the Comintern to consolidate their leadership, Party morale i n the cities sank to a new low. Continuing purges and factional disputes, which are discussed below, reportedly led to the expulsion of up to one-quarter of Party members of the time.*’ This, together with increased Nationalist pressure on Communist urban organizations and growing Communist success i n the countryside, understandably induced a good part of the Party Central leadership to transfer to various soviet areas i n subsequent months. We must now examine these rural soviets, where a new stage of the Chinese revolution was under way, before returning to the struggle in the

cities and the final move of Party headquarters to the Central Soviet area in Kiangsi i n the winter of 1932-33.

* C h a n g Kuo-t’ao,

w h o returned from Russia several weeks after the arrests, feels

that i t is “hard to say” about the truth of this incident. H e relates that Chou En-lai felt L o Chang-lung had “mistakenly” charged that the arrests were due to a “ t i p ” by the ‘“Internationalists,” and Chang seems to doubt that the Ch’en Shao-yii group “betrayed” H o Meng-hsiung, though elsewere he blames the entire affair on the “cruel struggle” launched by M i f and Ch’en Shao-yii. Other sources are divided on the question.®

GROWTH OF T H E RURAL SOVIETS

After the failure of the 1930 efforts to match the growth of the Red Armies with urban insurrection, the Chinese Communist movement completed its historic shift from the cities to the countryside. Nineteen years later, rural bases a thousand miles to the north provided the springboard for a triumphant Communist return to the cities. But, i n the early 1930’s,

the Party continued to experience dizzying new ups and downs, only narrowly escaping destruction in 1934 at the end of its first period of successful rural revolution. The building of the Red Armies and soviet areas in the teeth of overwhelming opposition gave impetus and wide publicity to the Communist movement, b u t behind the scenes bitter fac-

tional struggles, and then greatly increased Nationalist pressure, threatened to destroy the Party from within and without. I n 1931, after months of struggle, the “Internationalists,” led by the “Russian returned students,” won control of upper levels of the Party, but only through a series of purges of alleged supporters of the “ L i Li-san line,” of Lo Chang-lung’s “real work” faction, and of the “Trotskyist” Ch’en Tu-hsiu and “ T h i r d Party” factions. A t the same time, i n the

soviet areas, Mao Tse-tung and his followers purged thousands, accusing them of similar crimes and of membership i n a so-called anti-Bolshevik league. Then, as Party Central began to transfer i n stages from Shanghai to the Central Soviet i n southern Kiangsi, M a o and the “Internationalists”

contested for control of Party policy. Mao’s position was strong i n 1931 but, contrary to common opinion, weakened during the next several years relative to that of the centrists. I t was not u n t i l 1935 and later that

Mao emerged as the Party’s dominant leader. More important at the time than these intra-Party struggles were developments i n Nationalist and Japanese policies. The Japanese intensified their incursions, initiating the conquest of Manchuria i n September, 1931, and other areas of North China thereafter. The Nationalists, thinking they could only stall for time against superior Japanese power, placed priority o n consolidating their still shaky control of the country, beginning with a series of campaigns against the Communists. I n the cities, more

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3. Principal Soviet Bases, Early 1930’s

Principal Soviet Bases, Early 1930’s The map above shows the approximate areas of the major Chinese Communist bases in the early 1930s. They are: 1. Central Soviet (southern Kiangsi and western Fukien [Min-Yiieh-Kan], administered separately after 1 9 3 1 ) . bh WN

. Northeast Kiangsi Soviet (Kan-Min-Wan) . Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet (Hsiang-Kan)

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. West Hunan-Hupeh (Hsiang-O-Hsi) . Hung Lake Soviet (Hung H u )

SOURCES:

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 2, map facing p . 186, and passim; Kuo, History,

v o l . 2, passim; Tso-liang Hsiao, Power Relations, passim; H o Kan-chih, History, passim; Sovety v Kitae, passim; Yurev, R e d Army, passim, a n d Perevertailo, et a l . , eds., Outline, maps i n appendix.

[Chap. 9]

Growth of the Rural Soviets

191

effective Nationalist repression, combined with Communist factionalism and declining morale, nearly destroyed the Party’s urban apparatus and forced most of i t to move to the soviet areas during and after 1931. A series of “surround and destroy” campaigns launched from late 1930 through 1934 against the five most important soviet bases, located along the borders of southern, western, and eastern Kiangsi and of southern and northeastern Hupeh, forced the temporary evacuation of the latter two areas i n late 1932 and of the Kiangsi soviet bases by October, 1934.

The resulting “Long March” to Shensi in the Northwest saved the nucleus of Communist strength but produced even more catastrophic losses than those suffered by the Party i n 1927-28. Party membership, which had risen from 10,000 i n late 1927 to an alleged 300,000 i n 1933,* fell to perhaps 20,000 b y 1936 and was still only 40,000 i n 1937 at the start

of the Sino-Japanese War.! I n the early 1930’s, however, conditions favored Communist expan-

sion. The Nationalist government made some, but far from sufficient, progress i n tackling problems o f economic, legal, and social development

and of “new” warlordism and ‘““factionalism.” Shansi Province and most of the southwestern, northwestern, northeastern, and northern border

areas remained beyond government control, the last increasingly under the Japanese and the rest under various generals and semi-independent

rulers. I n these areas, shifting coalitions of generals and politicians posed challenges to Chiang Kai-shek’s rule every year from 1930 through 1933. But the rise of Japanese militarism, a severe problem since the late nineteenth century, soon overshadowed all other Nationalist concerns. O n September 18, 1931, the notorious Mukden Incident signaled the first largescale Japanese occupation of Chinese territory. By 1932, the Japanese had completed their conquest of Manchuria and had fought a two-month battle around Shanghai to break a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods.

I n 1933, Japan pressed further west into Inner Mongolia and, by 1934, had made plain its intention to establish a protectorate over much, i f not all, of China. From 1932 on, the Chinese Communists voiced popular opposition to the Japanese incursions—both to save China and to gain

mass support and strengthen their position. Although they “declared war” on Japan i n April, 1932, from a distance of several thousand miles, they did not work out a realistic program for a united front against Japan until

1935.2 Chiang Kai-shek’s response to Japanese aggression was characteristic and inadequate. The Nationalists would oppose Japan but only after first controlling internal rebellion. True to Confucius’s dictum that he who would rule the country must first rule his family, Chiang’s priorities were, first,

control of the Kuomintang; second, control of developments within China; and, finally, repulsion of foreign threats. Chiang was correct in thinking that China alone could not stop Japan. He therefore appealed to the League of Nations. A t the same time, he realized that China must give * But probably not much more than 150,000 i f one totals the membership of the base areas and takes account of Communist admissions of weakness outside soviet areas. See below in this chapter.

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The Long March to Power

first priority to strengthening Nationalist military power and achieving internal unity. But the goals proved contradictory; the Nationalist “surround and destroy” campaigns launched under the slogan “first pacification, then resistance” could only unify the country if they succeeded quickly, before they came to stand in the way of defense against Japan. I n retrospect, a wiser course for the Nationalists might have been to give first priority to nation-building, including essential social revolution and, especially, land reform, as the best defense against both Japan and

the Communists. Or, conceivably, they, as did the Communists, might have tackled both Japan and nation-building, giving up territory but maintaining revolutionary momentum. Instead, the Nationalists rarely conceived of “reform while fighting.” As it was, three-quarters or more of a very limited national budget went to military expenses and, prior to 1937, most of these resources were allocated to the struggle against the Communists and not to defense against the Japanese. Chiang’s lack of suffi-

cient authority within the Kuomintang to realign national priorities is a comment on the nature of the formerly revolutionary Nationalists.? I n the autumn of 1930, as he prepared to follow up his defeat of Feng Yii-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Wang Ching-wei by turning against the Communists, Chiang boasted, not for the last time, that the “country should be rid of all Communist bandits within three or six months at the most.” The first Nationalist “surround and destroy’ campaign was launched against Communist bases i n southern Kiangsi in November and December, 1930. Despite the purges then being carried out, Mao and Chu Teh’s 40,000 men were able to turn back the Nationalist forces of 100,000 b y

January, 1931. Reduced by 10,000, Kiangsi Communists also defeated the second campaign of February to June, 1931,* though 200,000 Nationalist troops invaded deep into the Communist territory. During the third campaign i n the summer of 1931, when Chiang Kai-shek personally

led 300,000 men against the central area, Mao and Chu Teh again employed effectively the mobile principles of “luring the enemy in deep” i n order to ambush isolated units. The Mukden Incident i n September

and its aftermath gave the Communists a brief respite before the fourth “extermination campaign’’{ succeeded in partially dislodging the HupehHunan and the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border soviets after mid-1932. I n

early 1933, the Central Soviet in Kiangsi defeated the part of the fourth campaign that had been launched against i t i n 1932. Finally, the fifth

campaign, fielding some 750,000 Nationalist troops with aircraft and German military advisers, was launched i n October, 1933, and forced the central Red Army, previously grown to more than 100,000 men, to evacuate Kiangsi a year later.®

The Hsiang-O-Hsi, Oyiiwan, and Other Soviet Bases This was the background for the dramas of the ‘“Kiangsi period,” as Party history from 1931 to 1934 came to be known. The Central Soviet i n * Nationalist sources date this campaign more precisely from April to May 26, 1931, and also distinguish among campaigns against the various soviet bases.’ I n general, the Communist terminology and dating for the campaigns is followed here. + Another name for “surround and destroy”; also called “encirclement.”

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193

southern Kiangsi, which gave the period its name, was the most successful and largest of about a half-dozen important Communist base areas in the early 1930’s, but i t was not the first to be developed. Accordingly, we may discuss other areas first, and then the Central Soviet and development of the Red Armies, before analyzing the achievements of the “mass

line” on which the existence of the Party and bases depended, and finally some intra-Party disputes of the period. Far to the north of the Kiangsi and other bases to be discussed shortly, a few Communists i n Shensi and i n parts of Shansi and Hopeh worked to organize guerrilla detachments. I n the late 1920’s, Communist-sponsored uprisings occurred i n northern Honan, and, i n 1930, Party and Youth

League branches were formed i n the Nankung-Weihsien area of southern Hopeh and western Shantung, claiming several thousand members by the mid-1930’s. I n July, 1931, about 1,000 soldiers guarding the Cheng-

T’ai Railroad i n Shansi revolted to form the X X I V Corps, which moved into Foup’ing County, Hopeh, establishing there the first soviet in North China, in an area that later became an important Communist wartime base. The mutiny was suppressed, however, the following month.’ I n Shensi, L i u Chih-tan, Kao Kang, and others formed the far more significant X X V I Corps from remnants of uprisings i n the spring of 1928 and after. A t that time, there were some 800 Communists i n Shensi. I n June, 1932, they were able to set u p a Shensi soviet i n three counties just north of Sian, and the number of Communists i n Shensi reportedly grew to roughly 3,000 a year later. Shortly thereafter, however, the X X V I

Corps and its newly founded soviet were destroyed. The Communist movement in Shensi revived i n 1934 but now was centered 150 miles to the north i n the remote and mountainous Paoan area, to which would come remnants of the Long March a year or so later.®

Japanese aggression greatly increased the importance of guerrilla operations i n Manchuria, where there had been Korean and Chinese Communist activity since 1921 and 1923, respectively, and a Manchurian Committee of the CCP at Fengtien since November, 1928.* A t other times, the Manchurian Committee was first located i n Mukden and from 1932 on i n Harbin, having established subcommittees for eastern, northern, south-

ern and southwestern Manchuria, with three special committees, twelve county committees, and seventeen city branches i n Harbin, Mukden, Dairen, and elsewhere. There was also a special Party organization for Korean Communists, who prior to 1930 had been more active i n Manchuria

than the Chinese Communists. I n 1928 and 1930, the Korean Communist Party urged its members to join the Manchurian Committee of the CCP in a ‘bloc within” preparatory to Korean reorganization. Not all Korean Communists did, and there were continued dissatisfaction and tensions w i t h i n the alliance between the Chinese and Koreans. Together w i t h severe Japanese repression, these difficulties led to an almost complete cessation of Communist activities in Manchuria by 1937. The Party suffered especially sharp setbacks i n intra-Party feuds i n 1933 * L i u Shao-ch’i headed the Manchurian Committee about 1929. According to criticisms of the late 1960’s, having been arrested i n August of that year by Chang Hsiiehliang, he won his release by divulging details on more than a dozen lower-level organizations i n the area.’

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The Long March to Power

and mass arrests i n 1935 and 1937. Nonetheless, units of what became

known in 1936 as the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army (the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army until 1936) were formed and conducted guerrilla operations against the Japanese.'® About 1933, there were said to be more than 10,000 Communist-led guerrillas in it and, in 1934, about 1,700 Communists and 1,469 members of the Youth League in all of Manchuria. Many of the future younger generation of Korean Communist leaders, including Kim Il-sung, worked with the Chinese Communists there in the 1930’s and later.™* I n the extreme south of China, Communist groups of the early 1930’s included one under Feng Pai-chii on Hainan Island, whose poorly armed forces may have numbered several thousand at times. Some of them held

out in fantastic isolation in the mountains of this remote area until after 1949, when Feng became an official of the Communist government. Similarly, a survivor of the Hailufeng Soviet, K u Ta-ts’un, organized an X I Corps, which claimed 5,000 men i n 1930 operating o n the Kwangtung-

Fukien border.'? Many of these armies roamed widely, but most of the soldiers who survived were incorporated by 1931 into one of the future three front armies. There were also reports of efforts to organize Chinese Communists in Taiwan, which had been tightly under Japanese control since 1895, and even in the Philippines and Thailand. Some contacts were made with the Vietnamese Communist Party, which H o Chi Minh had

founded i n Hong Kong in 1 9 3 0 . The remnants of the “Left and Right River” soviets founded in late 1929 and early 1930 i n Kwangsi above the Vietnam border were absorbed into P’eng Teh-huai’s army and the Central Soviet, after Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Chang Yiin-yi, and other leaders'* were ordered east to participate i n the “ L i Li-san l i n e ” i n mid-1930. The 21st Division, left to guard

the more northerly Right River base in northwestern Kwangsi, was annihilated by Nationalist forces i n October, 1932. I n Central China, on both sides of the Yangtze River i n northern Hunan and southern Hupeh, to the west of Wuhan (the future Hsiang-O-

Hsi Soviet), Ho Lung, Chou Yi-ch’iin, and others developed a guerrilla movement following their transfer there i n the wake of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings. I n the spring of 1928 i n Sangchih, Shihmen, and Tayung counties, they established a Western Hunan Revolutionary Military Council and the nucleus of what became i n 1934, after many changes, the Second Front Army. I n 1929, they moved east to link with guerrilla

forces led by Tuan Teh-ch’ang in Kungan County, southern Hupeh, and later farther east to the area around Hung Lake (Hung Hu, as this soviet is also known) about 80 miles southwest of Wuhan, where Communists had been active since 1925. I n 1930, Ho Lung’s men marched toward Wuhan and Changsha i n accordance with the “ L i Li-san line” but suffered heavy losses, being reduced from 15,000 to 3,000 men. Returning to the Hunan-Hupeh border region around Hung H u , they built back their area of control from two to three to seven o r more counties and had

recruited 5,000 to 10,000 men by 1931. Defeated i n the first Nationalist “extermination campaign,” they were again reduced to about 600 rifles but once more rebuilt to 10,000 i n 1932. Then they established the

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195

West Hunan-Hupeh (Hsiang-O-Hsi) Special Committee and a little later transformed i t into a soviet government. Party membership figures as of

1932 for a dozen counties in the area were estimated at 18,034, with the largest number, 4,468, working i n Chienli County, then headquarters of the soviet.

I n the winter of 1930-31, Party Central sent Teng Chung-hsia and, in March, 1931, Hsia Hsi, Mao’s old associate who went on to become one

of the “twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” to the Hsiang-O-Hsi Soviet, where they became the ranking political officers.* Hsia established a local sub-bureau of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas i n March, 1931, but, later i n the

year, Party Central criticized Teng Chung-hsia, and by implication Hsia,

for defeatism and other errors. I n 1932, Kuan Hsiang-ying became political commissar, replacing Teng, who was transferred back to Shanghai or to western Fukien where he was arrested and executed by the Nationalists i n 1933. Hsia, too, was killed about the time of the Long March,

after accusations that he had indiscriminately purged all who disagreed with him. According to later Maoist accounts, there was constant friction between the “correct leadership” of Ho Lung and the policies of the “leftists,” who apparently included just about everyone prior to the arrival of Jen Pi-shih, who replaced Hsia H s i as secretary of the subbureau i n October, 1934.1"

While these changes were occurring i n the political area, Ho Lung had his hands f u l l w i t h military problems. Chiang Kai-shek’s fourth extermination campaign, concentrating at first on the western Hunan-Hupeh and Oyiiwan bases, checked H o Lung’s expansion, which had been rapid i n 1932, reaching almost to Wuhan, and drove his men out of the Hung H u

area i n the autumn. I n a preliminary version of the Long March, Ho led his men, now down from 30,000 to about 5,000, i n a circle through

northwestern Hupeh, to the Honan-Shensi border and then through eastern Szechwan back to western Hunan i n early 1933. Six months later, they were again driven out of the Sangchih area and moved southwest to establish a new base i n four counties of northeastern Kweichow. There, in October, 1934, they were joined by the forces of Hsiao K’o and Jen Pi-shih, who had left western Kiangsi in advance of the main units of the forces of Chu Teh and Mao. The merged forces, now called the Second F r o n t A r m y , r e t u r n e d t o n o r t h w e s t e r n H u n a n once more i n the

winter to establish a Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan-Kweichow border area before leaving for the Northwest late in 1935, a year after the First Front Army had left Kiangsi. The beginnings of what became the Fourth Front Army and the soviet area next i n size to the Central Soviet went back to the upsurge of peasant

associations in northeastern Hupeh in 1926. After the break with the Nationalists, there had been a series of uprisings i n the mountainous areas of Huangan and Mach’eng, Hupeh, i n late 1927 and early 1928,

and, i n 1929 i n Shangch’eng, southeastern Honan, and Liuan, south* Teng replaced as political commissar Chou Yi-ch’lin, who, i n 1931, was killed, as was, i n 1933, partisan leader Tuan Teh-ch’ang. Both Chou and Tuan may have been victims of one or another of the frequent Communist purges i n the area.

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The Long March to Power

western Anhwei. The participants in these uprisings, including Hsii Haitung, Li Hsien-nien, and Cheng Wei-san and, after their arrival in 1928 and June, 1929, respectively, Whampoa graduates Hsii Chi-shen and

Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, formed a base controlling about eleven counties on the borders of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei. A t first centered in three distinct

areas of the Tapieh Mountains, corresponding to the sites of the uprising mentioned above, a united Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Special Region (Oyiiwan for short) was established i n early 1930 and a little later

transformed into the Oyiiwan Soviet. Most of the time headquarters was located in Chinchiachai, Anhwei (recaptured i n December, 1930), which was about 175 miles from another area of strength near Hsinchi, Honan.'®

The several thousand troops from Oyiliwan failed to threaten Wuhan from the northeast, as intended b y the “ L i Li-san line,” but succeeded i n turn-

ing back the parts of the extermination campaigns thrown at them from December, 1930, to mid-1931. Growing from 1,000 men i n 1929 to 5,000

men i n five groups i n 1930, to about 30,000. i n late 1931, and possibly 60,000 men early in 1932, they were organized into the Fourth Front Army b y 1931. The Oyiiwan Soviet was said to have 7,000 members of the CCP and 4,000 of the Youth League i n early 1931, 10,000 Communists i n November, 1931, and possibly 40,000 a little later.” I n line with efforts to tighten control over the soviet areas, i n April,

1931, Party Central sent Chang Kuo-t’ao, just back from three years in the Soviet Union, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao and Shen Tse-min, leading “Russian returned students,” to the Oyiliwan base, where they opened, i n Chinchiachai, a sub-bureau of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas. Chang headed this sub-bureau; Shen Tse-min became secretary to the Anhwei Committee and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, secretary of the Youth League and political commissar of the Fourth Front Army. With Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien

and other military leaders, these men convened two congresses of the Oyiiwan Soviet Government i n July and November, 1931. At the first, some 900 delegates, claiming to represent 1 million people, spent three weeks discussing military, organizational, and policy problems. At the second, meeting simultaneously with the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Juichin, to which Oyiiwan could not send delegates because of the Nationalist blockade, some 397 delegates estab-

lished a soviet government and claimed to represent 1.7 million and later 2 million people, though i t was admitted that only one-third were in secure areas.'®

Little is known about the inner history of the Oyiiwan Soviet, but it is evident that, as will be seen i n other areas, there was a bitter power struggle as well as constant fighting with the Nationalists. A t a Party delegates conference i n June and July, 1931, there was considerable argument over guerrilla tactics, land reform, and other matters between

political leaders Shen Tse-min and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao and military leaders such as Hsii Chi-shen. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, after the confer-

ence, subordinates in Hsii Chi-shen’s Eleventh Division, encouraged by open grumbling of local military men against the “outsiders,” began preparing a rebellion against the Party sub-bureau leadership, which was to be coordinated with possible plans for army units to cross to the south of

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197

the Yangtze. I n the process of arguing against this military plan, the

Party sub-bureau, i f one follows Chang Kuo-t’ao’s later account, dis-

covered the plot and moved decisively to break i t up. On September 13, Ch’en Ch’ang-hao announced the smashing of an alleged ‘anti-Bolshevik” plot, led by long-time Oyiiwan leader Hsii Chi-shen and some of his assistants, and proceeded to arrest at least 600, execute about thirty, and sentence about 100 to various punishments. Others give higher figures, speaking of the arrest of several thousand in this affair.® As i n the West Hunan-Hupeh (or Hsiang-O-Hsi) Soviet, the political vic-

tory of the ‘“Internationalists’ proved hollow in the face of Nationalist military pressure. The fourth Nationalist “encirclement” campaign i n the

summer and fall of 1932 concentrated on Oyiiwan and forced the Fourth Front Army, which had been reduced to less than 20,000 men, to abandon the area. Local leaders made the decision to leave, which Party Central i n Kiangsi later sharply criticized,?® but, ironically, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Hsii

Hsiang-ch’ien, Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, and others successfully created a new base i n northern Szechwan and, b y 1935, were much stronger than those who had had to abandon the Kiangsi Central Soviet area i n October, 1934. H s u Hai-tung, Shen Tse-min, and others, w i t h about 1,000 men, were able

to return to the northern part of Oyiliwan in 1933 after a diversion toward Hsiichow. There they rebuilt an army of 8,000 men before Shen’s death i n

1934. Later i n the year, Hsii Hai-tung, Cheng Wei-san, and others led several thousand men into northern Shensi some weeks ahead of Mao Tsetung’s group. A few guerrillas held out in the old Oyiliwan area until the Sino-Japanese War.?! I n the late summer of 1932, the Fourth Front Army of about 16,000

men under Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao had moved west and north via northern Hupeh and Honan to southern Shensi and, i n mid-November with about 9,000 men, into northeastern Szechwan. I n December, they established there a new Szechwan-Shensi (Ch’uan-

Shen) base centered on the T’ungchiang-Nanchiang area with its capital in Pachou, Szechwan. Seeking a respite, they adopted moderate “rent reduction” and other policies u n t i l the arrival of a cable from Party Central, which insisted on a return to radicalism. Their forces grew again to 50,000 men b y mid-1933 and to 70,000 or so by 1935 when Mao Tse-

tung’s and Chu Teh’s bloodied veterans of the Long March reached Szechwan. By early 1934, this base claimed control of twenty counties

and 9 million people.?? The Kiangsi Soviet Bases I n the early 1930’s, o n the fringes of the Central Soviet area i n southern Kiangsi, there existed several other soviet bases. I n the area of the former Chingkangshan border region, there was the Hunan-Kiangsi (HsiangKan) base. I t centered o n thirteen counties around Yunghsin and Lienhua

and merged on the north with a second western Kiangsi soviet area, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi

(Hsiang-O-Kan)

base,

stretching

toward

the

Yangtze. After the withdrawal from Changsha in September, 1930, P’eng Teh-huai’s units re-established control of the area to the east of P’ing-

chiang, Hunan, where P’eng, T’eng Tai-yiian, and Huang Kung-liieh had

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led a revolt from the Nationalist Army in July, 1928. Later, in 1930, P’eng’s forces moved south into the Central Soviet, replaced a little later by units from Hupeh and elsewhere under Hsiao K’o and Wang Chen. I n late 1931, there were supposed to be about 10,000 Party members in western Kiangsi. These sponsored a Soviet Congress i n June, 1932, and i n May,

1933, Jen Pi-shih was appointed provincial Party secretary for the region.*® I n northeastern Kiangsi, Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-p’ing resumed mass work in the autumn of 1927 in Yiyang and Hengfeng counties and expanded their movement into eight counties along the borders of Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, and Anhwei. Fanig and Shao established a revolutionary government i n November, 1928, and, after successive reorganizations,

in March, 1931, i t finally grew into the Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet Government (also called Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei [Kan-Min-Wan]) and later the Fukien-Kiangsi (Min-Kan) or Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi (MinChe-Kan) Soviet. Fang was also commander of the X Corps, which increased to 30,000 to 40,000 m e n b y late 1930, with Shao as its political commissar. A t times, Fang’s government claimed to control sixteen coun-

ties and close to 500,000 people, but, by 1932, i t had some degree of security i n only about five o r six counties with an army of 3,000 men. There were reportedly 5,000 members of the CCP i n northeastern Kiangsi, and, i n September, 1931, they organized i n a provincial commit-

tee, later a sub-bureau, under the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas i n Juichin. Party Central sent representatives to the area in the spring of 1931, and, as in the Oyiiwan and Hsiang-O-Hsi bases, efforts to tighten organization and control, with purges, followed. Yet some 17,375 new Communists were recruited i n 1931-33, and Party

members formed a very high proportion of the population, 4.2 per cent i n certain districts i n the area. About 1932, there were 678 Party branches i n rural areas, 10 i n factories, 160 i n military units, 123 i n government agencies, and 1 i n a school .?*

After abandoning Chingkangshan i n early 1929 and beginning development of the Central Soviet i n southern Kiangsi, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh established a soviet area to the east in western Fukien with the help of local guerrilla forces under Chang Ting-ch’eng and others. Called the Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi (Min-Yiieh-Kan) Soviet, i t was centered i n

the area around Shanghang and Wup’ing counties, western Fukien. Lo Ping-hui’s X I I Red Army Corps of about 2,000 men, w i t h important future

leaders T’an Cheng and T’an Chen-lin as political officers, was the dominant military force i n the area and formed an eastern wing of Lin Piao’s I Red Army Corps, itself a part of Chu Teh’s future First Front Army.** All these areas i n western and northeastern Kiangsi, Fukien, and northern Kwangtung were subject to the authority of Party organizations i n the

Central Soviet, notably the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas i n Juichin. The core area of the Central Soviet i n southern Kiangsi in 1932 and 1933 stretched from Ch’angt’ing (Tingchow) and Shanghang i n western Fukien on the east to Hsinfeng, Kanhsien, and Wanan i n the west of Kiangsi, and from the border of Kwangtung i n the south to just below Chian and Nanchang in central Kiangsi. This area was about 100 miles

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199

across and 150 miles deep and embraced some two, and at times three, dozen counties, centered on Juichin, Kiangsi.? After 1931, the southeastern portion of the Central Soviet was admin-

istered separately as the Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi (Min-Yiieh-Kan) border area, sometimes called the Western Fukien Soviet, and, i n August, 1933, the southern part of the Central Soviet split off as the KwangtungKiangsi (Yiieh-Kan) Soviet. T o the north of the Central Soviet, the Southwestern Kiangsi Soviet (Hsiang-Kan) on the Hunan-Kiangsi border,

in the area of the former Chingkangshan base, was usually included in the administration of the Central Soviet as was the Western Fukien Soviet, but the two other Kiangsi soviets, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi

Soviet (Hsiang-O-Kan) in northwestern Kiangsi and the Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet (Min-Che-Kan), were administered separately. All four Kiangsi border soviets had closer relations with the Central Soviet than did the more distant Hsiang-O-Hsi and Oyiiwan soviets. I n all, then, there were seven important soviets that enjoyed some degree of continuity from 1931 to 1934. Besides those on the borders of southwestern (Hsiang-O-Hsi) and northeastern (Oyiiwan) Hupeh, five were i n

Kiangsi: the Central Soviet and smaller soviets on the southeast, southwest, northwest, and northeast borders of the province. The population under Communist control i n these bases was estimated by Mao Tse-tung at

9 million, but this figure was composed by taking the maximum figure for each Communist area i n 1932-34, so that at any one time the real total was probably less than half that, o r between 2 and 5 million, according to

differing estimates. Mao broke down the totals as follows: 2.5 or 3 million i n the Central Soviet i n southern Kiangsi (including western Fukien i n 1933) ; 2 million o n the northeastern Hupeh border (Oyiiwan), before the soviet’s leaders were driven west to northeastern Szechwan ( i n late 1932),

where they claimed again to build control over a sizable area and 1 million people; 1 million each i n the western (the old Chingkangshan base), northwestern (Hsiang-O-Kan), and northeastern Kiangsi (Min-Che-Kan)

bases; and 1 million i n the western Hunan-Hupeh bases (Hsiang-O-Hsi). I n area, the soviets claimed to control several hundred thousand square miles i n u p to 300 counties,* an area larger than many countries of Europe, as the Comintern never tired of boasting.?” The Growth of the Red Armies

The key to Communist power after 1927, as to its limitations before 1927, was certainly the Red Army, which alone could provide the necessary security and muscle for the enforcement of ambitious Communist policies. Given the collapse of the urban radical movement, there was n o longer any quarrel with the statement that the “ R e d Armies were the ‘main force’ of the revolution,””?® although, as i n the L i Li-san period, there continued to be disputes over the composition, uses, and tactics of the Red Army. The various Red Armies, of which there were about a half-dozen prin* The area of the Communist bases was probably closer to sixty counties i n the early 1930s.

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cipal groups and more than a dozen i n all, supposedly grew from less than 10,000 i n 1928 to 22,000 i n 1929 to 66,000 i n the spring of 1930 to

something more than 100,000 by early 1931. Estimates of total strength in 1932 ranged from 92,900 to 200,800, to possibly as many as 300,000 men in all groups by late 1933. Much of the time, about half or more of these forces were associated with Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, who had more than 100,000 men by mid-1933. A t that point, the Chinese

Communists called for expansion to a colossal army of 1 million men, but, contrary to these hopes, the fifth Nationalist ‘‘extermination’” campaign soon reduced the Red Armies to less than 200,000, with about

one-half of them i n southern Kiangsi before the Long March, another 70,000 to 80,000 i n Szechwan, and about 20,000 i n western Hunan by

1935. Less than 40,000 of all these groups survived the various routes of the Long March to reach Shensi Province between 1935 and 1937. I n the late 1920’s, about one-third of the Red Army troops were armed,

a proportion that rose to two-thirds after 1935.* The rest were used as support troops or fought w i t h hand weapons. A militia of u p to 600,000,

including several hundred thousand red guards, youth vanguards, and others i n various mass organizations, performed supply, intelligence, and other functions. The designations of the Red Armies changed many times between 1928 and 1931. Among the most important groups i n 1931 were the Red Armies centered i n southern Kiangsi under the command of Chu Teh, w i t h Mao Tse-tung serving as political commissar. This central group had

been designated the Fourth Red Army between 1928 and 1930 but was reorganized i n June, 1930, as the I Corps and then as the First Front Army. I t grew from 30,000 to 40,000 men i n 1931 to more than 100,000

i n 1933, swollen by units that revolted against the Nationalists at Ningtu i n December, 1931, and by new recruits.

The second strongest group of Red Armies in the early 1930’s were those i n the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei (Oyiiwan) border area, led b y , among others, Hsii Hai-tung, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and, from 1931 on, Chang Kuot’ao. Called the First Red Army i n 1928-30, i t was reorganized as the I V Corps, and then as the Fourth Front Army by 1931, supposedly w i t h u p to 60,000 men early i n 1932. I t rebuilt to more than that figure after regrouping i n northern Szechwan i n 1934-35.

A third important group of from 5,000 to 10,000 men operating during 1931-32 around H u n g H u and later i n southwestern Hupeh and northwestern Hunan (Hsiang-O-Hsi) was formally designated the Second Front

ArmyT i n 1934. I t was led by Ho Lung. The fourth most important group, usually closely associated with the forces of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, had been designated the Fifth Red Army after its development out of an anti-Kuomintang rebellion at P’ingchiang, Hunan, i n July, 1928, and was reorganized as the I I I Corps i n mid-1930. Led by P’eng Teh-huai, i n 1931, its 10,000 men, included * A c c o r d i n g t o o n e account, b y a b o u t 1931, 3 0 p e r cent o f Communist arms were

obtained by capture or desertion from the Nationalists, 25 per cent purchased, 20 per cent confiscated, 10 per cent locally manufactured, and 15 per cent other.” + Previously the I I Corps.

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201

in the above figures, were placed under the over-all command of Chu Teh’s and Mao’s First Front Army. So also in 1932 were the I Corps of Lin Piao and Lo Jung-huan and the X Corps of several thousand in northern Kiangsi led by Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-p’ing. Other units under Chang Yiin-yi, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others were absorbed directly into the I I I Corps after their transfer from the ‘Right River” and “Left River” soviets in Kwangsi i n 1930. Other famous leaders, including

Ch’en Yi, Lo Ping-hui, Li Fu-ch’un, Nieh Jung-chen, Huang Kung-liieh, Liu Po-ch’eng, T’eng Tai-yiian, Hsiao Ching-kuang, Hsiao K ’ o , and

many others, were also associated with the First Front Army i n various capacities.®* Thus, b y 1932, the main units of the Red Armies, numbering well

over 100,000, were grouped into what were or soon became known as the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies i n areas bordering o n either Kiangsi o r Hupeh. Hereafter, we will follow these designations until the

further changes of the Sino-Japanese war period, but in all there were as many as twenty armed Communist groups.’’ Most of them were incorporated into the three front armies, but, as seen, others included

smaller detachments from Shensi and Manchuria i n the North to Hainan Island in the extreme South. The social and political characteristics of the members of the Red Army were similar to those for the CCP, and early i n 1934, 28 per cent of Red Army men were Party members, and another 16.6 per cent were members of the Communist Youth League. Thus, about 45 per cent of all Red Army men and a higher proportion of its officers (about 55 per cent)

were in the CCP or its youth affiliate. Only 4 per cent of army men were over thirty-nine; 44 per cent were from twenty-three to thirty-nine; 51 per cent were fifteen to twenty-two; and 1 per cent were under fifteen.

Their class backgrounds were supposedly 30 per cent worker (apparently including 20 per cent “agricultural laborers”) and 68 per cent peasant; about 1 per cent were former government employees and 1 per cent “other.” Another survey, of 1932, reported proportions of 57.5 per cent of the Red Armies peasant, 28 per cent (formerly Nationalist or warlord) soldier, 8.75 per cent ‘vagabond and bandit,” and 5.75 per cent worker. The composition of the Fourth Front Army in Szechwan by 1934 was said to be 10 per cent worker, 30 per cent former soldier, and 60 per cent peasantry. The source of recruitment of the Red Armies was 77 per cent from ‘revolutionary bases,” 12 per cent from Kuomintang areas, 4

per cent defected from Kuomintang armies, and 7 per cent converted prisoners of war.?? The Party, the Red Armies, and the Soviet Areas Ever larger proportions of the “Party of the proletariat” than of the Red Armies came from peasant backgrounds. I n 1930, at least 70 per cent

of the 122,318 members of the CCP were said to be peasants, and by 1933 a still greater proportion. Moreover, many Communists, especially at higher levels of the Party, were of landlord and rich peasant, not the favored poor peasant, background. O f the one-quarter to one-third of the 241 members of the Kiangsi Soviet executive committee elected i n 1931

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The Long March to Power

and 1934 for whom information is available, 49.2 per cent were children o f landlord o r official families, 8.5 per cent of merchants, 20.3 per cent

of peasants, 10.2 per cent of workers, 3.4 per cent each of military and professional, and 5.1 per cent of “other.” Only 15 per cent of them were over thirty-nine, and some 37.7 per cent worked i n the Party apparatus,

21.7 per cent as political officers i n the army, 33 per cent in the military or police, and 7.5 per cent i n educational and youth work. Most came from central-southern provinces, especially Hunan (25 per cent) .**

As noted, the overwhelming majority of Party members worked i n the rural soviet areas.’ I n January, 1931, the number of Party men reported working i n all non-Communist territory was less than 6,000, with 3,000 i n Kiangsu, including perhaps 500 i n Shanghai, some 1,200 i n Hupeh, and 1,000 (and 1,700 i n 1934) i n Manchuria. I n 1932, the Party claimed some

30,000 members i n such “white” areas and 60,000 the following year, but only half of them were dues-paying members. By contrast, there were some 97,000 Communists i n Kiangsi i n mid-1933, possibly including the 5,000 and 10,000 members said to be i n the northeast and west of the province as of 1931. There were reportedly another 10,000 Communists

i n northeastern Hupeh (Oyiiwan) as of 1931 and supposedly 40,000 a little later, and u p to 18,000 i n 1932 i n soviet areas west of Wuhan (the Hsiang-O-Hsi or Hung H u base) .*¢

Party controls over both the Red Armies and the soviet areas they dominated would be crucial to Communist plans, of course. They were extensive but by no means complete, as subsequent purges showed. Beginning i n 1931, Party Central and its Military Affairs Committee (under Chou En-lai) put into operation a Central Bureau for Soviet Areas

(under Hsiang Ying and then Chou En-lai), a Central Soviet Government Revolutionary Military Council (under Chu T e h ) , a political commissar system, w i t h Chou En-lai replacing Mao Tse-tung as its chief during the first half of 1932, and a General Political Department (under M a o and then, after mid-1931, Wang Chia-hsiang), the latter two organizations operating at army, division, and regiment levels.* These superseded the earlier system of Party representatives i n the Red Armies and Mao Tsetung’s General Front Committee and soldiers’ committees. Hence, the CCP Central Committee Military Affairs Committee (headed mostly by

Chou En-lai from 1926 until early 1935, when Mao Tse-tung took i t over) held ultimate authority over military affairs at all levels. The Party exercised civil authority through its Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, the highest authority both for all Party branches i n the rural bases and for the Provisional Central Soviet Government founded i n November, 1931. Proposed i n September, 1930, the Central Bureau for-

* At lower levels of the army, the political commissar and the head of the political department often were the same person, but, i n larger units, the head of the political department generally worked under the political commissar i n the Party’s military chain of command. A t headquarters level, after the Long March, the director of the Party’s Military Affairs Committee served as the top political commissar, assisted by the head of the General Political Department. Thus, at army headquarters, there was the Party Military Affairs Committee and the army’s General Political Department and at intermediate levels both political commissars and directors of the political department.

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mally began operations after the Fourth Plenum of January, 1931, w i t h

Chou En-lai heading its nine members, though Hsiang Ying, as its secretary, and Mao Tse-tung dominated it prior to Chou’s arrival* in the autumn. The Central Bureau for Soviet Areas i n Kiangsi had sub-bureaus i n the Oyiliwan and Hsiang-O-Hsi bases.

I n areas controlled by units of the Red Army, soviet-style local governments were established. Party branches worked to strengthen or establish unions of hired farm hands and poor peasants and through them to supervise the formation of these local governments. As the soviets pro-

liferated after 1929-30, Communist leaders sought to group them into a national soviet government. Toward that end, Mao Tse-tung’s forces created a Southwestern Kiangsi Soviet Government on February 7, 1930,

and shortly thereafter the Comintern and L i Li-san proposed the establishment of a “central” soviet government. L i took the first steps with May and July, 1930, congresses of delegates from the soviet areas and with

the establishment i n July of a Central Preparatory Committee to work for the formation of a national soviet government, at first scheduled for November 7, 1930. After the failure to take Wuhan o r hold Changsha, the Party established a provincial soviet government following Mao’s occupation of Chian, Kiangsi, for several weeks i n October, 1930. O n August 26, 1931, the Comintern again urged that “ a central soviet government

should be formed in the shortest possible time, i n the most secure areas,” and the Chinese Communists on September 1 ordered the leaders of soviet areas to comply. Elections for delegates to direct its formation

proceeded during September and October at the various levels of organization and i n various areas.*”

The First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic finally convened November 7, 1931, the anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, at Juichin, Kiangsi. More than 600 delegates represented Red Army units, the National General Labor Union, and the major soviet areas, except Oyliwan, where the Oyiiwan Soviet Government was simultaneously holding its Second Congress. The National Congress established a Provisional Central Soviet Government at Juichin and elected

an executive committee of sixty-three men as the supreme authority between sessions of the national soviet congresses, which were to be held every two years. The executive committee i n turn elected Mao Tse-tung as its chairman and Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t’ao (then absent as the ranking leader of the Oyiiwan Soviet) vice-chairmen. A Council of People’s Commissars, headed by the same three men, was created as the top government body. Its other officers included Chu Teh, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council; Hsiang Ying (later Ch’en Yiin?), commissar of labor; Teng Tzu-hui (later L i n Po-ch’ii), commissar of finance; Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, commissar of education; H o Shu-heng, commissar

of the procuracy; and Wang Chia-hsiang, commissar of foreign affairs. Mao and his followers controlled this administration, as they had controlled the elections to the First Congress, but the ‘‘Internationalists™

gradually assumed more and more control over governmental and mili* Reportedly disguised as a Catholic priest with a five-inch beard.

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The Long March to Power

tary, as well as Party, affairs i n the soviet areas. From 1931 on, the

Party’s Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, together with the government Council of People’s Commissars, exercised real power in the area. The Congress confirmed the existence of a government bureau of political security under Teng Fa, which functioned as a secret police bureau in coordination with the procuracy and other agencies. There were also commissars of land, interior, and the judiciary, and a secretariat for

the preparation of documents. Lower-level organizations frequently had sections for propaganda, finance, youth and women’s affairs, land, inspec-

tion, prosecution, political security, and other departments.?®* The First Congress adopted a constitution for the soviet government, and resolutions o n the land question, Red Armies, and labor and economic policies.

These will be discussed later in connection with intra-Party politics of the time. Below the national soviet government were provincial, county, district,

and administrative or ‘“‘natural village” soviet governments. About nine of the latter, which were the lowest, basic levels of administration, with populations of less than 5,000 each, would form a district soviet, and

every fifteen districts would form a county soviet. By 1932, some sixty counties were said to have formed soviet governments, some twenty-one with a population of 2.5 million i n the Central Soviet area. According to various sources, another one may have existed elsewhere i n Kiangsi, five or ten i n Fukien, seven i n eastern Hunan, five i n northern Kwang-

tung, and up to ten each i n the Oyliwan and western Hupeh-Hunan bases.’ At one time or another, “provincial” governments were established at Ningtu for Kiangsi, Ch’angt’ing for Fukien, Chienning for the Fukien-Kiangsi border, Huich’ang for the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border, Hengfeng for northeastern Kiangsi, Lienhua for western Kiangsi, and Hunghsin for the Hunan-Kiangsi border. There were also provincial soviets for the western Hupeh-Hunan and Oyiiwan border areas, the former less well-organized and constantly on the move, and the latter located at Chinchiachai, on the Anhwei-Honan border.*® Slight adjustments were made i n the organization of lower-level soviet governments

in 1933, and there were obviously great fluctuations i n their duties and operations outside a few relatively stable soviet bases. Yet, the Communists claim that some fourteen separate soviets i n eight provinces in South and Central China continued to exist even after the forced withdrawal of the bulk of the Red Armies on the Long March.*! The Development of the Mass Line Despite the extensive development of the soviet bases, and their governmental, military, and mass organizations, i t has usually been argued that the Kiangsi period represented one of the least successful chapters in the history of the Party. Yet, the wonder is that the Communist movement made as many gains as i t d i d i n the early 1930’s and that i t was able to survive the Nationalist encirclements and the Long March, faced as it

was with intense military pressure, the hostility of the ruling classes, and bitter factional disputes within the CCP. Indeed, the 40,000 or fewer survivors of the defeats of the mid-1930’s were able to come to power

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205

fifteen years later in large part because of the achievements and lessons of the early 1930s. Their experiences i n those years formed the basis for later Communist successes not only in China, but i n Vietnam and elsewhere. The most important of the lessons learned was the need for a disciplined Party organization and for mass support. I n Kiangsi and at other bases, Party leaders first came to grips i n a systematic way with the interrelated processes of organizing a Party and a mass following. They developed a set of techniques for arousing the masses, later summed up as the “mass l i n e , ” and learned h o w to cultivate cadres from among the

masses. I n the difficult processes of deciding which social groups to foster and which to combat, while simultaneously tightening and developing the Party’s own organization, great tensions developed among classes and among central, regional, and local Party leaders. But, especially in Kiangsi, the Party succeeded in building the essential infrastructure of organization and the facilities for training newly recruited activists that would carry i t through the arduous struggles ahead. Crucial to this success was the gradual mastery of techniques, both Chinese and Leninist, for winning mass support and recruiting activists. A 1943 resolution of Party Central described this “mass line” as follows: I n all practical work of our party, correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of “from the masses to the masses.” This means summing up (i.e., coordinating and systematizing after careful study) the views of the masses (i.e., views scattered and unsystematic) then taking the resulting

ideas back to the masses, explaining them and popularizing them until the masses embrace [ t h e s e ] ideas as their own, stand u p for them, and translate

them into action by way of testing their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to sum up the views of the masses and once again take the resulting ideas back to the masses so that the masses give them their wholehearted support . . . and so on over and over again.*?

The idea is to see what issues, especially regarding land redistribution and opportunities for education and advancement, can mobilize the peasants, and then to manage these issues so as to suit Party purposes and have the “masses embrace the ideas as their own.” The working out of these techniques has been a continuing process and

a constant challenge to every cadre throughout the history of the Chinese Communist movement. But the Kiangsi period saw particularly great strides toward developing a “mass line” and the first systematic indoctrination and training on this question.*? The conservatism and political passivity of the peasantry, despite periodic outbursts, have been legendary i n every country. I n late 1927, Party Central had complained that, ‘strictly speaking, there is almost n o

Party organization to speak of in the villages. . . . This is largely due to the inability o n the part of the political party of the proletariat to function as ‘organizer of the masses’ i n the midst of the peasants.”’** A year later,

Mao was forced to note, “Few of the peasants i n the border areas are willing to serve as soldiers,” and “wherever the Red Army goes, i t finds the masses cold and reserved. Only after propaganda and agitation do

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they slowly rouse themselves.” A Party report of September, 1929, could still state, “The masses completely failed to understand what the Red Army was. I n many places, i t was even attacked, like a bandit gang. . . . The Red Army had n o support from the masses. There were great diffi-

culties in finding encampments, carrying on military operations, and securing information. ...”*® Even i n 1933, a presumed ally of Mao, L o

Ming, then the target of a rectification campaign, was quoted as saying, I don’t think we can thoroughly change the mood of the masses even i f we ask our best leader Chairman M a o o r Chairman Hsiang Y i n g [ o f the Military Affairs C o m m i t t e e ] , Comrade Chou En-lai, Comrade Jen Pi-shih, o r

go to the Soviet Union to ask Comrade Stalin or bring Lenin back to life and ask them all to come to upper or lower Chinan or some other place to address the masses three days and nights to step up political propaganda.+¢

Nor could the Communists expect the support of existing local organizations, which traditionally opposed all “outside” forces of whatever persuasion. Thus, despite their rebellious tradition, secret societies more often than not were hostile to the Communists. There were numerous clashes with the Big Sword Society i n Kiangsi, for example, although, on occasion, especially during the Long March and i n the later 1930’s, the Communists were able to work out alliances with the Elder Brother Society and other groups.*’ Yet, the Chinese Communists, especially after 1929, achieved more and more success in mass mobilization and the recruitment of local activists into youth, Party, and military organizations. This proved their most significant achievement and the key to all other work. Alone, i t was not enough, primarily because of military imbalances, but, after the abandon-

ment of the southern soviet areas, when the invasion of Japan deflected Nationalist pressure, these same techniques provided the new life blood that carried the Communists to victory i n the late 1940’s. Already from mid-1930 on, the CCP claimed to have organized several million peasants, 1.6 million i n youth organizations, and 800,000 i n mutual aid organizations.*® I f these figures were obvious exaggerations of the “ L i Li-san line,” i t was still true that, by the early 1930s, the Communists had organized for their purposes activists among perhaps

several million people i n about a half-dozen areas. I n some districts, as many as 8 0 per cent of the eligible youth joined Communist-sponsored organizations,*® and a’ very high percentage of the population i n soviet areas was mobilized for military and mass organizations. As much as 4 per cent of the total population o f the Central Soviet, o r 97,451 members, were

enrolled i n the Party i n 1933, while the corresponding figures for the soviet areas i n northeastern Hupeh ( w i t h 40,000 members) and southwestern Hupeh (about 18,000) were 2 per cent and less than 1 per cent, respectively. I n the wartime North China bases, the proportion o f recruits to local population was generally smaller, and, even after 1949, Party membership was less than 3 per cent of the population.®

The leading mass organizations of the time were the red guards (for ages sixteen to f o r t y ) , youth vanguards (for ages fifteen to twenty-one),

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children’s corps, women’s corps, poor peasants associations, and labor

unions. There was also a network of elementary schools enrolling perhaps 60 per cent of the younger children i n the various Kiangsi Soviet areas; there were reading, sewing, discussion, and other types of groups.” They all focused o n activities helpful to the Communists, from supply, medical, and intelligence work directly related to continuing warfare, to

political education. The techniques of mobilization, of course, had local variations, b u t the

first step was to send a team from a Party or military unit i n the area to investigate local hopes and grievances and, on the basis of these, to

attempt to recruit and organize activists. I f local enthusiasm, or more likely the Red Army, was able to prevent immediate suppression of these activities b y Nationalist and local authorities, then the activists formed

poor peasant associations, red guards, youth and women’s organizations, discussion circles, elementary schools, propaganda teams, and finally a township soviet government to initiate land and other reforms. Mass

meetings and trials were held, and the property of condemned landlords and rich peasants was turned over to the poor, with confiscated cash to the new local governments. Bureaus of political security supervised the search for counterrevolutionaries and the use of ‘‘selective terror” against them. Most important, activists were drawn into cadre training programs for

Party, military, and government organizations, and the opportunities for advancement and service provided by these programs were an important link i n the development of youthful activists. A number of cadre-training institutes were formed i n Kiangsi, starting around 1930, including about three military schools, notably the Red Army Academy, as i t became known

in 1931, and at least three cadre schools, one for organizing guerrilla work and one each for administrative and ideological work. The latter (first called the Marxist-Communist School at its founding i n March, 1933,

under Tung Pi-wu) was the predecessor of the all-important Central Party School, while the administrative school trained cadres for district-,

county-, and provincial-level soviet governments. Some cadre schools also operated i n other areas, as i n Oyiiwan. A t least several thousand of the

most promising recruits and older cadres were involved i n these formal courses at any one time, and there was continual political indoctrination i n all Party and military units, as one can see from a perusal of writings

of the time.*? Such recruitment and training enabled the Chinese Communist movement to continue against overwhelming odds, despite heavy

losses, by keeping generally capable men i n key positions at all levels of the Communist infrastructure—that is, at the village, district, county, border region (sectional), provincial, and national levels of the soviet

government, the CCP, and Red Armies. All these programs resulted in a high degree of participation i n “people’s democracy,” where the number of activists recruited counted for far more

than the mass popularity Western analysts look for when they think of elections. These techniques should be credited not only to Mao and rural soviet leaders, who had to work them out i n practice, b u t also to the Party Central leadership, which stressed mass-line propaganda during this period. Indeed, i n 1931 and 1932, as i t had after the Autumn Harvest

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Uprisings, Party Central criticized Mao specifically for failing to pay adequate attention to mass work and for overreliance on military methods and force instead of on propaganda agitation.’ I n the key debates over military strategy, Mao’s advocacy of the “lure the enemy in deep” tactics clearly involved a greater sacrifice of the local population than did the Party Central’s early 1934 advocacy of “surrender no inch of soviet territory.” Mao stressed military factors of mobility and preservation of the Red Army over the security of the population. Furthermore, within the Party, the “Internationalists” sought to broaden and democratize Party leadership with genuine committee discussion of policies, i n place of the more authoritarian ‘family system” of Party

operation, practiced by earlier leaders, especially Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san. Instead of having the secretary at each level of the Party hierarchy simply order obedience to directives, there was supposed to be “collective leadership’ on all committees and an inspection system down to the county level to oversee this. The leadership in the early 1930’s also began the first systematic education of Party cadres—in Marxist theory for the practical workers and in mass organization for the intellectuals— which was to ensure progress i n the democratization, standardization, and

effectiveness of mass organization. Therefore, the question of who in the history of the Party should get credit for the origins of the all-important “mass line” is not easily resolved. L i Ta-chao and P’eng P’ai in the 1920’s had made their contributions, and, after 1927, Party Central as much as, i f not more than, Mao, Fang Chih-min, and other soviet leaders, developed key aspects of the “mass line.””** Yet, although Mao may have had much less to do with the origins of the concept of the “mass line” than his hagiographers would have one believe, there is no question that he developed i t in practice and devised many of the techniques of mass agitation. Mao understood better that most the necessity of providing military protection in the takeoff stage of mass organization, and, in the building of local political machinery, he stressed the development of channels for mass

organization.’ The importance of these emphases on the military and organizational aspects of the mass line cannot be overestimated. More-

over, Mao’s land program offered greater protection to the middle and rich peasants than did the more doctrinaire poor peasant line of the Party Central during these years. Then, after the mid-1930’s, Mao became one of the most enthusiastic exponents of mass work, i n part because, as

his power increased, he was more and more i n a position to link these policies with his own.

From 1933-34 on, Mao publicly championed the ‘““mass line” in a way he had hinted at i n his Hunan report of early 1927, arguing i n June and August, 1933, that “the mass line is the only guarantee of the class line” and that the Party must “mobilize the masses through their organization . . . chiefly the trade unions and poor peasant leagues. . . . ” ’ ° ® The following January, he made crucial concrete proposals as well as an impassioned, i f overoptimistic, assertion of faith in “people’s war’: As the revolutionary war is a war of the masses, we can carry out the war

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only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them.. . [ T o do this] I earnestly suggest . . . that we take a deep interest i n problems of the living conditions of the masses, from their land and labor to their fuel, rice, cooking oil, and salt. . . . We should make the broad masses realize that we represent their interests, that our life and theirs are intimately interwoven. We should make them understand on the basis of these matters the tasks of a higher order which we propose, namely, the tasks of the revolutionary war, so that they will support the revolution and spread i t throughout the country, and respond to our political appeals and struggle to the last for the victory of the revolution. . . . We must go among the masses; arouse them to activity, concern ourselves w i t h their weal and w o e ; a n d work earnestly and sin-

cerely i n their interests. . . . I f we do so the broad masses will certainly give us support and regard the revolution as their very life and their most glorious banner. . . . The masses, the millions upon millions o f the masses w h o

sincerely and earnestly support the revolution, . . . are a wall of bronze and iron which no force can break down... . By rallying millions upon millions of the masses around the revolutionary government and by expanding the revolutionary war, we shall be able to wipe out any counterrevolution and take over the whole of China.” I n 1939, Mao placed the mass line i n an unmistakably central position. H e asked, “What is the lesson of the revolution i n the last fifty or more years? Fundamentally, i t is a lesson of ‘arousing the mass o f the people.’ ” H e warned the intellectuals, “ I n the movement of the Chinese democratic

revolution, the intellectuals were the first section of people to be awakened . . . but i f the intellectuals do not become one with the masses of the workers and peasants, then they will accomplish nothing.” A year later, he wrote, “The Chinese revolution is virtually the peasants’ revolution,” and, i n 1941, “ I t must be understood that the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often ridiculously childish, and unless we grasp

this point we shall never be able to acquire even elementary knowledge.” I n 1948, Mao sought to date the real origin of the mass line from his own attainment of power within the Party, though he acknowledged that such work had begun i n the 1920’s.%®

The Communist Land Program in the Kiangsi Period The land program undoubtedly was most crucial to mass mobilization, together with general opportunities for education and advancement. As M a o put i t i n January, 1934, “ I t is only after we distributed land to the

peasants and promoted and encouraged the peasants’ production that the labor enthusiasm of the peasant masses has burst forth and great victories i n production have been achieved. . . .””*® Reports stressed the neces-

sity for propaganda, mass meetings, and organization, and emphasized that “almost always, peasant uprisings, or arrival of the Red Army and formation of soviets, signify first of all confiscation of landlord land . .

and its distribution to peasants.’’®° I n general, from 1927 to 1937, the Communists called for a radical

“bourgeois democratic” land program, with the continuation of private land but the confiscation and redistribution o f large estates in accord with the slogan “land to the tiller.” However, controversy continued over the

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maximum permissible size of holdings, over definitions of rural classes, and over techniques of land reform. Prior to 1931 especially, the execution of land policies varied considerably over time and place. This was not surprising, due to the variety of proposals ranging from the Li Li-san land law of May, 1930 (which nationalized landlords’ land and protected those who worked their o w n l a n d ) , to Mao’s land law of February, 1930,

which called for “equal land” for all who worked their land, including rich peasants. These were the first significant efforts to unify land policies, but the variations were somewhat contradictory, and little standardization was achieved until after the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November, 1931. The basic land law of the Kiangsi period,

founded on Comintern instructions, reversed parts of Li Li-san’s law as contrary to the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution and also criti-

cized Mao’s law for, among other things, providing too much protection for the wealthy peasants, whose counterparts in the Soviet Union, the kulaks, were then being destroyed.®

Accordingly, the land law of the First National Congress of the Chinese Republic proposed, in November, 1931, the “principle of equal distribution of l a n d , ” and stated, “ A l l the lands of the feudal landlords, local tyrants, gentry, militarists, and other big private landowners, shall

be subject to confiscation without any compensation whatever, irrespective of whether they themselves work their lands or rent them out o n lease.

The soviets will distribute the confiscated lands among the poor and middle peasants . . . a n d Red Army men.”’*® While “the former owners of confiscated lands [i.e., of big and reactionary landlords] shall not be entitled to receive any land allotment,” rich peasants might receive an equal share of “poor” land, provided they worked the land themselves and did not engage in counterrevolutionary activity. Moreover, “the local soviet governments shall on no account carry out this measure by [ b u t ] only with the direct support and at the desire of the basic force masses of the peasantry. Thus if the majority of the middle peasants so desire, they may [be allowed] not to participate in the redistribution [ o f land].”’®® Distribution was to be carried out according to the number

of consumers and their ability to work in a way that would favor poor and middle peasants. The primary Communist considerations i n determining class status in the 1930’s, in contrast to the classical Marxist stress on ownership of property, were to be the use of labor over the previous three years and the number of persons involved. Thus, a landlord was defined as an

owner who did not work his land, the rich peasant as one usually deriving more than 15 per cent (in the late 1940’s, more than 25 per cent) of his income from the labor of others (though at times the “new” rich peasant might not hire labor but would instead make his o w n surplus),

the middle peasant, as one deriving less than 15 per cent of his income from the labor of others, and the poor peasant as one owning some land but having to sell part of his labor i n order to survive. Part of the poor

peasants supposedly were farm laborers who sold all their labor; others were workers in other rural occupations, or coolies, or simply “wandering people” without any rural occupation.®* I n 1932, Party Central, influenced

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by Stalin’s campaigns against the kulaks, tightened policies toward rich peasants somewhat, expropriating all land of “exploiting” rich peasants.

The land investigation drive of 1933 sought t o implement this policy, but, as will be seen, Mao and other soviet leaders partially prevented execution of the new policies. Nonetheless, there was a hardening of land and class policies i n 1932-34, and M a o explained i n 1933, “Our... tactic i n

the struggle in the villages consists in relying upon the poor peasants, allying ourselves firmly with the middle peasants, and making hired farm hands play the role of vanguards, thus uniting all revolutionary forces to annihilate the landlord class and oppose the rich peasants.” I f these policies of the Kiangsi period were quite radical, many leftists continued to recommend still more radical ones. I n short, Communist agrarian policies i n the early 1930’s called for

the confiscation of all large holdings and their redistribution to the poor and to military personnel, with only poor land given to previously rich peasants, for the cancellation of peasant debts, with a ceiling on new interest rates of 1 per cent per month instead of the former 30 per cent a year or more, and for unified progressive taxes of from 3 per cent to 22 per cent and later of 6 to 42 per cent. Other measures would increase production and irrigation and improve working conditions. The land laws were to be carried out through village or township land committees of a half-dozen o r dozen members, assisted b y land confisca-

tion and investigation committees and by poor peasant associations, tenant farmer unions, and other mass organizations, backed up by the Red Army. The first step, a land survey, was carried out by the confiscation committee, followed b y redistribution b y the land committees i n coordination

with the county and soviet governments and under the supervision of the soviet land commissariat. The poor peasant associations and the tenant farmer unions were to mobilize mass support for the three stages of confiscation and distribution, classification (checking o n the first), and

land improvement.®® I n 1930, there were still reports of fixing maximum landholdings as high as 50 m o u (about 8 acres), but, b y the early 1930’s,

the minimum share of land for poor peasants varied from 3 mou (about .5 acres) i n northeastern Kiangsi, to 5 for adults and 2.5 or 3 for children

in northeastern Hopeh. I n southwestern Hopeh and northwestern Hunan, there is virtually n o information o n the application o f land reform, while, in Kiangsi, at times classes were defined a b i t differently and at other

times distribution was determined by yield, rather than by acreage, with each adult to receive 5 piculs of rice per year. Each district maintained another 20 to 30 m o u for the use o f the Red Army.*’

The prevalent serious agrarian problems must have made these dispensations extremely attractive to peasants i n many areas. According to Mao, a survey showed severe class tensions i n a typical central Kiangsi county (Hsingkuo). There, he said, landlords composed only 1 per cent of the population but controlled 40 per cent of the land, as well as another 10 per cent of public land; rich peasants made u p 5 per cent o f the

population but controlled another 30 per cent of the land; and middle peasants, who made up 20 per cent of the population, controlled another 15 per cent of the land. By contrast, some 60 per cent of the population

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were poor peasants who owned only 5 per cent of the land, or were farm laborers, 1 per cent; idlers, 2 per cent; artisans, 7 per cent; or small shopowners, 3 per cent, w h o owned n o land at all.®® Other documents of the

period spoke of the landlords and rich peasants (10 per cent of the population) generally controlling 70 per cent of the land in Kiangsi (landlords, 30 per cent of i t ; rich peasants, 20 per cent; and public land, 20 per cent), while the middle peasants controlled only 15 per cent of the land, and the poor peasants, 10 to 15 per cent. Moreover, land rent reached 50 to 80 per cent of the crop and usury 30 to 40 per cent per year.®?

There were, of course, many shortcomings in carrying out the land policies* and controversies over their suitability, reliability, and accuracy

of statistics. Mao later charged that their excessive harshness had alienated middle and rich peasants unnecessarily.” But, in general and especially in Kiangsi, the various applications of Communist land laws were successful and played a great role in facilitating the mass line and bringing about the growth of the Red Armies and the consolidation of soviet bases. Whatever the attitudes of the majority of the peasantry toward these policies and their Communist sponsors, i t is evident that the Party was able to recruit large numbers of activists, especially among the youth, into the Red Army and the mass organizations. Mao Tse-tung and the Fut’ien Incident Two leading problems of interpretation during the Kiangsi period concern the relations between M a o Tse-tung (with his supporters) and Party Central, o n the one hand, and between then intermediate leaders, such as M a o , and local activists i n Kiangsi, o n the other. Tensions i n the latter

relationship lay behind the important Fut’ien Incident and related purges, and these i n turn complicated Mao’s relations with Party headquarters first i n Shanghai and by 1933 in Kiangsi. I n the early 1930’s, the “Russian returned students” used the pronouncements of the Sixth Party Congress and the Comintern and the support of key figures, such as Pavel Mif, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Li Wei-han, Hsiang Ying, and others, to tighten Party controls over the Soviet areas and over Mao himself.”? From 1931 to 1934, M a o progressively lost key positions i n the Party’s military apparatus and,

i n 1934, in the Central Soviet Government as well. Only after the military setbacks of 1934 was Mao able to reverse this decline to become a dominant leader o f the Party.

The struggle between Mao and the “Internationalist” faction, which dominated Party Central after January, 1931, was carried o n well beneath

the surface and hence is extremely difficult to trace. One certainly cannot rely on subsequent Maoist accounts of the period, because they portray the “third left line’’ as the most erroneous i n the history of the Party and claim that M a o consistently fought its incorrect policies. The latter claim

is far from the truth, although there undoubtedly were differences of

* In

June, 1933, Party Central admitted t h a t even i n the C e n t r a l S o v i e t , more than

three-quarters of the area had not yet completed land reform.™

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emphasis. Mao’s approach at the time probably was less doctrinaire,

stressing a broad united front against class enemies, attention to living conditions and economic production, and a more realistic military policy

that would advocate retreat before a superior force rather than continual offensives. By contrast, the “Russian returned students” stressed a more radical class line, advocating opposition to a l l property-owners and

“reformers” and a more aggressive military policy of ‘attacking key cities,” i n the manner of the “ L i Li-san line.” They came to advocate yielding “ n o inch of soviet territory” instead of Mao’s guerrilla policy

of “luring the enemy i n deep.” Nevertheless, Mao’s statements between 1928 and 1935 on the “ L i Li-san line,” the Fut’ien purges, the campaign against Lo Ming, the Fukien rebellion of late 1933 and early 1934,* and the soviet congresses, all were much closer to the line of the day than his later criticism admitted. I n the course of the Long March, M a o under-

standably spoke of military errors committed by the ‘‘Internationalists,” but he still generally agreed with the political line of the Kiangsi period and did not rebuke its leaders by name until about 1944. Hence, much of the discussion of the struggle between Mao and the “Russian returned students’ came only later.” I n 1928, Mao had had a difficult time maintaining his position of leadership i n the fledgling Red Army, losing power i n the summer to representatives of the Hunan Committee who were acting on the authority of Party Central. Mao’s removal i n September, 1928, of these and other opponents in the Chingkangshan area was his first major power play and gave him full authority over the then Fourth Red Army. However, his differences with supporters of Party Central and w i t h local opponents led to a far more serious struggle i n late 1930, which, Mao later said, convinced many that ‘ t h e fate of the revolution depended o n [ t h e struggle’s] outcome.” This affair, known as the “Fut’ien Incident,” strengthened Mao’s position i n southern Kiangsi for the short run b u t also

later provided Party Central with the opportunity to condemn Mao’s harsh actions against his opponents as ‘‘un-Bolshevik” i n their excesses and as harmful to the revolution.” The background of the Fut’ien incident lay i n the triangular struggle involving L i Li-san, Mao, and local soviet organizations for control of the Party and over agrarian and military policy. After Li’s failure, Mao Tsetung sought to l i n k his opponents w i t h i n the Kiangsi Party organizations to Li’s discredited policies and still more implausibly to local anti-

Communists, collectively said to belong to the ‘““‘anti-Bolshevik league,” which conservative Nationalists had formed several years before. A more

likely story is that Mao decided to take the opportunity provided by Li’s downfall to try to complete his control of operations i n Kiangsi. His opponents included not only Li’s followers but, as was the case elsewhere,

local Communists who resented his strong-arm methods of taking over local Party organizations. Thus, there seems to have been a three-cornered struggle involving Mao’s machine, Party Central, and local southern Kiangsi Communists and Youth League members. * See Chapter 10.

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During their occupation of Chian, Kiangsi, in October, 1930, Mao and Chu Teh claimed to have found evidence of the existence of counterrevolutionaries in the Red Army and also of ‘“‘determined followers of Li Li-san.””® As the Red Army left Chian i n mid-November for the Southeast i n the face of preparations for the first Nationalist encirclement campaign, Mao’s forces proceeded to arrest some 4,400 members of the X X Corps, then i n Yungfeng County, and all b u t two members of the L i Li-san provincial action committees at Fut’ien, allegedly for having connections with the ‘“anti-Bolshevik league.” I n fact, most were local activists, who,

at least i n part, were simply resisting high-handed orders from “outsiders.” Reacting to this chain of events about December 8, a political commissar of a battalion of the X X Corps, presumably acting to avenge his arrested comrades and trying to assure his own safety, led several hundred follow-

ers at neighboring T’ungku into rebellion against Maoist authority in the area. They attacked Maoist forces i n Fut’ien, killing more than several

score and freeing most of the local leaders whom Mao had jailed there. Overturning the Southwestern Kiangsi Soviet, they fled to Yungyang to the west of the Kan River and established a rival soviet government.”® Mao naturally counterattacked against this grave threat to his authority, reportedly with widespread executions, but did not suppress the rebellion for several months. Although the affair did not prevent decisive Red Army victories over invading Nationalist troops, Mao admitted that in some areas ‘inhabitants, misled by the anti-Bolshevik group, had as yet no faith i n the Red Army and were even opposed to i t . ” By the spring, however, he claimed that opponents “had been cleaned up and the entire population o f the base area supported the Red A r m y ’ i n defeating the second

and third Nationalist encirclement campaigns i n the spring and summer of 1931.7" Still, while the military struggle against the Nationalists necessarily took precedence, further purges, polemics, and appeals continued throughout the year. I n late December, 1930, the remnants of the Kiangsi Action Committee, which had only two supporters of Mao, sought to divide Red Army leaders by denouncing Mao and praising Chu Teh, P’eng Teh-huai, Huang Kung-liieh, and T’eng Tai-ylian. They charged that the anti-Bolshevik plot had been a fabrication and accused Mao of unnecessary ruthlessness i n the conduct of the struggle.”® However, the Red Army leaders, who were then in the middle of the action against the first Nationalist campaign, stated that, i n view of the circumstances and of the alleged anti-Bolshevik plot, Mao’s actions had been correct. The newly established Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, although including only Mao, Chu Teh, and Tseng Shan among Kiangsi leaders, initially also supported Mao, although i t abolished Mao’s Front Committee as well as L i Li-san’s Kiangsi Action Committee.

This whole affair provides a striking, i f still little understood, example

of Chinese Communist leadership skills and problems. Mao’s superior organizational preparations, especially the establishment of counterreac-

tion committees, which successfully infiltrated and compromised hostile organizations, provided an early example of his use of secret police

techniques. About October, 1930, Mao had helped create an anti-

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counterrevolutionary committee, initially under the Red Army, and subsequently, Party, governmental, and military counterreaction work was greatly stepped up. Equally characteristic were the mass trials Mao staged from May to July, 1931, to convict the alleged leaders of the ‘‘antiBolshevik league” and win mass support for his side of the affair.” These measures, together with key support from the generals, Tseng Shan, and others, enabled M a o to w i n the initial round of the Fut’ien incident and

to secure more complete control of the Kiangsi Party and military organization. But i t also aroused widespread fear. Arrests of ‘‘anti-Bolsheviks” spread to other areas and continued for several years, showing understandable worry about subversion but also revealing the extent to which Party leaders, and M a o i n particular, used such worries to further their

own ends. There were charges that all “comrades became uneasy” over the Fut’ien incident, and, while initially backing Mao, the Central Bureau

decided to order an investigation of the whole affair. I n February, 1931, i t acknowledged that, while there had been provocations, Mao had overreacted: I n the struggle against the Fut’ien incident, certain Party branches i n soviet areas were found to have behaved i n speeches and actions i n a manner not befitting a Bolshevik Party. This sort of behavior was by no means accidental. Unfortunately i t has been found i n places close to this bureau. This bureau has resolved that “the Fut’ien incident was i n fact indisputably an anti-Party counterrevolutionary action” [ i n support of Mao’s arguments but]... f o u n d

i t hard to support the subjective conclusion that the

incident was an anti-Bolshevik and liquidationist revolt. . Without further proof, the incident was arbitrarily used to incriminate “anyone as an antiBolshevik liquidationist.’’8°

Even a month before this, the Central Bureau had admitted that the

Fut’ien incident ‘resulted from unprincipled factional struggles, . . . [was] putschist, unprincipled, . . . and resulted i n indiscriminate killing.”’®

The early efforts by Party Central to mediate the dispute, necessary during the struggle against the first three Nationalist extermination campaigns and against lingering support for L i Li-san, L o Chang-lung, and

other oppositionists, gave way to more open criticism of Mao after September, 1931. A September 1, 1931, Central Committee directive to the soviet areas rebuked Mao for thinking that “ a l l crime could be blamed o n the anti-Bolsheviks” and for ‘ t h e mistaken and harmful theory of

treating the counterreaction as a central task.”®* I t also criticized Mao’s land, military, and other policies, and, following the First National Con-

gress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November and Chou En-lai’s assumption of leadership of the Central Bureau about December, made

direct attacks on Mao’s handling of the Fut’ien incident. Even supposed Maoist supporters Chu Teh and Kiangsi bureau of political security chief Teng Fa condemned Mao for sending many Communists to their deaths, and late i n the year the First conference of Party Branches i n Soviet Areas

condemned Mao’s excessive use of force.®?

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A Central Bureau resolution of January, 1932, elaborated o n such

errors and, in stronger terms than those used after the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, criticized Mao’s failure to follow a correct “mass l i n e . ” I t

denounced the dangerous practice of treating suppression of counterrevolutionaries as a central task. I n fighting the anti-Bolsheviks, the indiscriminate use o f pris-

oners’ confessions and of physical torture has made counterreaction work a subjective proposition; ... consequently, many revolutionary organizations and offices have been destroyed i n the fight against the anti-Bolsheviks. . . . N o effort has been made to mobilize, educate, and w i n over the masses. O n

the contrary,.a reign of terror has been created among the masses, permitting them to be utilized by counterrevolutionaries. . . . The method of fighting the anti-Bolsheviks and social democrats has not only been oversimplified but also has degenerated. For instance,unchecked confessions have been depended upon as the sole evidence to arrest suspects, especially workers and peasants; physical torture has become the means to exact confessions, and capital punishment has been meted out without

discretion. The most serious problem is a fear within the Party that makes comrades suspicious of each other. Even the leading organizations have been implicated.. . . 8 ¢

The Central Bureau was condemning here the adverse effects of the reports of torture and other errors rather than their morality, but of course such charges represent the opposite of the Maoist interpretation of events of these years.

By the time of the Fut’ien incident Mao had created a special anticounterrevolutionary committee, which, with other similar organizations, developed into the Chinese Soviet Republic’s state Bureau of Political Security, which was formally established i n November, 1931, with Teng

Fa as director. There were also political security bureaus directly under lower-level committees, as well as inspection and prosecution committees,

and courts and police. As i n other revolutions, many of the executioners who headed these organizations were themselves struck down at later stages, often condemned for similar organizational ties with ‘“antiBolsheviks,” social democrats, and Trotskyists.®’* M a o , of course, was

only one of many who directed the handling of the Fut’ien and other purges, but, at the time, he stood out as a foremost exponent of toughness

in dealing with problems of Party discipline and control. I n the other soviet areas, the decision-making and handling of contemporary purges varied considerably. Common elements were Party Central’s efforts to tighten controls over the base areas, the efforts of leaders o f the next echelon, like Mao, to tighten their controls over specific areas,

and the resistance of local activists to both groups of “outsiders” trying to “Bolshevize’ the Party i n their areas.

I n addition to those already mentioned in the Oyiliwan and Hung H u soviets o n the borders of Hupeh, other Party purges of the early 1930’s

took place in western and northeastern Kiangsi and i n Fukien. I n the old Chingkangshan base o n the Hunan border, there were reports of ‘““anti-

Bolshevik’ and “‘reorganizationist’ (social democrats and “Third Party’)

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Growth of the Rural Soviets

217

activities i n 1931. Late i n that year, i t was stated that, “ i n the past, the soviet political power i n western Kiangsi was completely under anti-

Bolshevik control.” Further north, i n the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Soviet and in the Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet, purges were also reported i n 1931-32, although there is less information on them. I n western Fukien, i t was said, the “situation was [the] worst.” There, supposedly, some 8 per cent of the Youth League, with virtually all its leadership, as well as “most Red Army officers were social democrats.” The reality apparently i n part was a power struggle b y senior local leader F u Po-ts’ui, w h o set

up a rival soviet near Shanghang. Chang Ting-ch’eng and Communists loyal to Party Central defeated this effort, quelled an anti-Communist rebellion, and arrested Fu and up to 1,500 people i n the area as ‘“‘social democrats.’’%¢

The struggle against followers of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and other Chinese “Trotskyists’’ and oppositionists also figured i n all of these purges, though this struggle was more important i n the cities. When some 1,000 “leftist”

intellectuals and theatrical people toured soviet areas i n mid-1932, many, including, briefly, future propaganda director L u Ting-yi, were accused of “Trotskyism,” apparently on the basis of the literature produced by their theatrical society.?’ There were understandable reactions against these purges i n general, as well as against the excesses of Mao, Teng Fa, Hsia H s i , and others i n

handling them. Thus, the Bureau of Political Security was played down later in the Kiangsi period and was not listed among government agencies at the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic i n January, 1934, although the related commissariats for the judiciary, interior,

and worker-peasant inspection®* were. There were numerous criticisms and shakeups of security personnel in various bases, and control boards were established to hear complaints. Nevertheless, until the eve of the Long March, leaders still urged “no mercy for class enemies,” and a large security apparatus continued i n operation. I n all, i t seems that many thousands were purged b y the Communists i n the early 1930’s, including

some senior leaders and larger numbers of ‘“‘counterrevolutionaries” and class enemies. Yet, still more continued to fall i n battle or at the hands

of enemy executioners.®® I t is evident that, i n the early 1930’s, as so often i n the history of the Communist movement, struggle against powerful external enemies served

to intensify intra-Party struggle. Yet the Communists managed to survive, as Leninist discipline and organizational techniques were able to combine war against the outside with a toughening of internal organization. I n the cities, to which we must n o w briefly return, the Communists d i d

not survive, despite their even earlier and tougher counterreaction measures. * Developed into the People’s Procuracy after 1949.

10 T H E DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM I N T H E SOUTH

Officially, Party Central remained i n Shanghai until January, 1933, although conditions there, as i n most cities, became ever more impossible

and many top leaders left for the Soviet areas i n 1931. During most of this difficult period, a boyishly personable but intense “Russian returned student” in his mid-twenties, Ch’in Pang-hsien,* was the effective head of the Party. The nominal General Secretary of the CCP, Hsiang Chung-fa, had been arrested and executed i n Shanghai i n June, 1931, and, three months later, for reasons that are not clear, Ch’en Shao-yii (Wang Ming)

—also i n his mid-twenties, the “Bolshevik” to whom the “third leftist line” of this period is usually attributed—returned to Moscow as repre-

sentative to the Communist International. Thereafter through 1934, the “provisional” Central Committee, under Ch’in Pang-hsien, his slightly older comrade Chang Wen-t’ien ( L o F u ) , Chou En-lai, and others, made

maximum efforts to try to ‘““Bolshevize” Party organization and save it from renewed Nationalist attacks. As the new leadership moved to tighten its controls over the expanding

rural soviets and Red Armies,{ long-standing differences with the rural soviet leaders naturally intensified—over united front and land questions, over the desirability of promoting new attacks o n “ k e y cities,” and especially over the nature and extent of Party controls. Such questions of policy and of the relations between Party Central and

soviet leaders dominated the proceedings of the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, which, as seen, had opened i n Juichin, Kiangsi, o n November 7 , 1931. The Congress approved compromise views

on most issues affecting local leaders and Party Central, but neither Ch’in Pang-hsien nor Chang Wen-t’ien, the two top-ranking ‘“‘Russian returned * Also called P o K u , C h ' i n was the son o f a M a n c h u Dynasty county magistrate from Wubhsi, K i a n g s u . H e d i e d i n a n a i r p l a n e crash i n M a r c h , 1946.

+ T o which, i n 1931, were dispatched senior leaders, including Hsiang Ying, Jen Pishih, and Chou En-lai to Kiangsi; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Shen Tse-min, and Ch’en Ch’anghao to Oyiiwan; Teng Chung-hsia, Hsia Hsi, and later Kuan Hsiang-ying to Hsiang-OHsi, and others to Manchuria and elsewere.

[Chap. 10]

The Destruction of Communism in the South

219

students” then i n China, was elected to the Executive Committee chosen b y the Congress.! The reasons for their omission are not clear, but their exclusion suggests that they were resented as too young and inexperienced

and also that they were assigned to concentrate on Party affairs i n Shanghai. The Congress chose Mao as chairman of the Executive Committee and Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t’ao as vice chairmen.? Hence, Mao’s

soviet leaders and the older members of the new Party Central clearly dominated the Executive Committee, but not for long.

Before returning to the question of relations between Party Central and Mao Tse-tung, which naturally were affected by Party Central’s shift to southern Kiangsi during 1931 and 1932, urban conditions must be noted. Urban Conditions and Secret Service Work

Once i t had broken with the Chinese Communist Party i n the spring and summer of 1927, the Kuomintang placed highest priority on completely smashing Communism i n China. I n the countryside, this led to the “extermination campaigns” that began i n late 1930, but, long before attention was centered o n the rural soviets, the Nationalists concentrated

on rooting the Communists out of the cities. With increasing efficiency, Kuomintang security forces infiltrated Communist organizations and arrested tens of thousands, converting many to the Nationalist cause by persuasion, bribery, o r torture and executing those who would not submit. From 1927 to the end of 1930, among those killed were Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s

two sons and P’eng P’ai, Lo Yi-nung, and many others. The situation became far worse i n 1931 after the arrests of the director of the Party’s security police, K u Shun-chang, and CCP General Secretary Hsiang

Chung-fa. I n 1928, the Party had established its secret service patterned after the Soviet Union’s Bureau of Political Security. I n 1941, Liu Shao-ch’i stressed its importance for China: Fighting enemy agents is a special task that requires matching wits i n secrecy. I t is a task on which hangs the triumph over counterrevolutionaries— an indispensable factor i n winning the revolution. . .. Without this bureau, the victory of the Soviet revolution could not have been made secure... . Lenin described i t as his “right hand” to show its importance. Therefore, we must devote our full effort to this task without which victory would become impossible. A good Communist Party member should take up [the] hardest and most difficult missions. H e should treat protection work as a most glorious mission.?

K u Shun-chang, a former bodyguard of Borodin, a Shanghai labor leader, and an alternate on the Political Bureau of the Sixth Central Committee, became the first effective director of the CCP security police, though i n theory he was responsible to General Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa and to Chou En-lai as director of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Committee. After the arrest o f K u and Hsiang i n the spring of 1931, the security police was renamed the special affairs department,* to be distinguished * After 1938, the special affairs department became the social affairs department.

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from the state Bureau of Political Security and other organizations in Kiangsi that had similar functions but came under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Central Soviet government, instead of directly under Party Central.*

The capture of K u Shun-chang in April, 1931, was almost fatal to what was left of the Party’s urban apparatus, coming as i t did soon after the arrest in January, 1931, and execution i n February of H o Meng-hsiung

and some twenty other members of the opposition to the Fourth Plenum leadership. As head of the security police, K u left Shanghai for Hankow to arrange the transfer of funds for Party work from the western soviet areas to Shanghai. Although disguised as a magician, K u was recognized

by a former colleague then working for the Nationalists and was arrested in April. The Nationalists persuaded K u to inform on vital parts of the Communist organization, and his information led to the arrests of Hsiang [ Chung-fa, of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias the Noulens couple, S w i s s?] agents of the Comintern in Shanghai) , and many others.* Most of the leading members of Party Central were able to escape the Nationalist dragnet, and Kuan Hsiang-ying, L i n Po-ch’i, W u Yii-chang,

and others arrested i n August were later released, reportedly for a large bribe. But many did not escape. According to Nationalist sources, some 4,700 Communists were arrested i n 1931 and still more i n succeeding years, including Ts’ai Ho-sen, Teng Chung-hsai (both executed), three

successive secretaries after 1933 of the Central Bureau for “white” areas work i n Shanghai, the secretary of the Party’s Shantung Committee, the chiefs of the organization bureaus of the Kiangsu and Hupeh committees, and “Trotskyists’’ Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih. Between mid-1927 and the formation of the second united front in 1937, the Nationalists claimed to have arrested as many as 24,000 Communists and 155,525 “red masses” or radicals, while the Communists charged the Nationalists with “butchering” more than 300,000 “progressive youths.” The Nationalists claimed to have converted most prisoners to their cause and to have used their information to break up most Communist urban cells. They later said that they had “controlled” about one-third of the 300 o r so Com-

munists still i n Shanghai i n the mid-1930’s.” The Communists not unnaturally used all means at their disposal to counter these blows to their organization and morale. A Party Central circular of October 17, 1928, asked “people inside and outside the Party to p u t to death any Party rebels and turncoats,” o r others ‘ i f demanded

by the masses,” and the Party’s security police formed red squads and “sudden strike corps’ to end a l l leaks threatening the Party. I n some

areas, these organizations instituted a ‘““red terror” to counter the “white terror.” For example, the entire family of K u Shun-chang was reportedly murdered after his betrayal of the Party. Naturally, these developments * Chou En-lai, K’ang Sheng (until his departure for Moscow i n 1933), Ch’en Yiin, and two others served as the executive committee of the special affairs department, w i t h K’ang and Ch’en succeeding K u Shun-chang as effective directors of the organization after the spring of 1931. Chou En-lai oversaw its operations throughout the Kiangsi period, while Wang Shou-tao, K’ang Sheng (on his return from Russia i n 1937), and L i K’o-nung headed i t during the later 1930’s and 1940’s.

[Chap. 10]

The Destruction of Communism in the South

221

posed severe problems for morale and organization and led to the near collapse of many branches, including the North China Bureau in Tientsin.® The sporadic effectiveness of Nationalist labor policies in combining some relatively moderate improvements i n abysmal wages and conditions

with repression of radicals prevented any significant Communist headway i n mass organization i n the cities. The number of strikers supposedly

increased to more than 1 million i n 1932 and went up sharply again in 1933, but there was little sign of any effective Communist role in this activity. I n 1930, the Communists had claimed 114,525 members of the Communist-dominated National General Labor Union, but more than half

of these were i n the soviet areas and hence not so much “proletarians” as rural laborers or ‘‘semiproletarians,” i n the Chinese phrase. This was even more the case i n early 1934, when more than 200,000, or some 90

per cent of all “workers” i n soviet areas, were organized into three trade unions, for agricultural laborers, shop hands or artisans, and coolies. I n the larger cities, however, ‘“proletarians”” who actively supported the Communists in the 1930’s numbered only a few thousand at most.’ Ironically for Communist doctrine, but not surprisingly given conditions in China, although CCP efforts to sustain urban labor organization failed after 1927, the Party continued to make inroads into another urban community, the intellectuals. Progress i n this task was uneven and due as much to the Japanese menace as to Communist skill, b u t i t continued. Students remained highly interested i n the Communist movement, b u t

Nationalist activities, together with the militancy and exclusiveness of the “united front from below’ policy (which sought to unite only leftist elements against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan), prevented the close liaison between the students and the Party that had characterized the 1920’s and would reappear after 1935.% The persistence of catastrophic economic and social problems, combined with the prospect of Japanese invasion and the passivity of an increasingly conservative government, drove many of China’s leading literary figures further and further left after 1927. But, as i n the student movement, militant policies during the period of the “ t h i r d left l i n e ” pre-

vented the Communists from gaining much profit from this trend for a while. Prominent writers, including L u Hsiin, whose literature satirizing the old China had done so much to radicalize Chinese youth, joined the Communist-sponsored League of Left-Wing Writers after its founding i n March, 1930. But they also resisted efforts b y K u o Mo-jo, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, and, after 1934, Chou Yang* to centralize Communist control of the

League. Still other groups of leftist writers and artists, who strongly attacked the Nationalists but also resisted Communist discipline, were labeled ‘“Trotskyists’’ or followers of the “third road.””® Nevertheless, the impact of Marxist ideas continued to spread, and * Ironically, i n the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s, the Maoists posthumously praised L u Hsiin’s struggle against Chou Yang’s efforts to establish Communist control over the League i n the 1930’s. They omitted key details, of course, i n their attacks on Chou, who had become a deputy director of the Central Committee propaganda department i n 1949.

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many scholars argue that the majority of Chinese intellectuals adopted Marxist approaches during and after the late 1920’s. Their contention exaggerates the matter, since other estimates show that at most a quarter

or so of students were oriented toward Marxism as of the mid-1930’s. Radicals organized “front groups” such as a “League Against Imperialism,” a Japan-China Struggle League, and International Red Relief, but many who were attracted to the Marxist world view were not ready to join the Party or the Communist Youth League, because of the dangers involved.*® I n addition to the terror and lack of significant progress in urban organization, the expense of maintaining an extensive urban apparatus became prohibitive in the early 1930’s. Monthly Comintern funds of perhaps $15,000 (U.S.) were irregular and insufficient, and i t was hard to

transfer taxes and confiscated money from the soviet areas to Shanghai. Thus, most members of Party Central went to the soviet areas i n 1931, although a skeleton headquarters remained i n Shanghai. Chang Kuo-t’ao speaks of an April, 1931, decision to move Party Central to soviet areas, and Chang immediately set out for the Oyiiwan base. He states that Chou En-lai, who left for Juichin i n the autumn, was a principal proponent of these moves and advocated allotting 40 per cent of Party members to the Kiangsi bases, 30 per cent to Oyiliwan, and 30 per cent to-all other areas. While Ch’in Pang-hsien, “ t h e head of the Party’s provisional leadership

in Shanghai,” Chang Wen-t’ien, K’ang Sheng, Ch’en Yiin—members of the Political Bureau’s Standing Committee—and Liu Shao-ch’i and others were in Shanghai i n 1932, there could not have been a normal quorum there of either the Central Committee or the Political Bureau. These men (except for K’ang Sheng, who went to Russia) also traveled separately to Juichin* between October, 1932, and January, 1933, where Party Central’s

formal as well as practical operations then were located. What was left of the Party apparatus i n Shanghai came under the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau for “White” Areas Work established there i n 1 9 3 3 . Party Organization in the Early 1930’s

Because of the frequent changes enforced by military and political developments, i t is difficult to obtain a clear picture of Party organization

in the Kiangsi period, but the over-all structure of the Party between 1931 and 1934 was generally as shown in Chart 10.1. At the top stood the Sixth Central Committee of about twenty.f Within this group, real power was exercised through the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The Fourth Plenum i n January, 1931, elected a Political Bureau of sixteen members, but purges and arrests reduced these b y almost half. After the September, 1931, reorganization, the Political Bureau was headed by Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, Hsiang Ying, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Yiin, Jen

Pi-shih, Wang Chia-hsiang, and K’ang Sheng. The first five men formed the * Although there was even a Japanese report that forty members of Central, headed by Chou En-lai, Chang Wen-t’ien, and others set u p operations i n Vladivostok about this time.” + Almost another two dozen members or alternates died or were purged between 1928 and 1931.

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223

C H A R T 10.1 PARTY ORGANIZATION I N EARLY 1930’s

Central Committee (about twenty members plus alternates) Political Bureau Hsiang Chung-fa* (General Secretary, executed June, 1931) Ch’en Shao-yii* ( i n Moscow after September, 1931) Ch’in Pang-hsien* (effective “head of Party” from September, 1931 to January, 1935) Chang Wen-t’ien* (elected General Secretary i n January, 1935) C h o u En-lai,* H s i a n g Y i n g , * Ch’en Yiin,* K ’ a n g Sheng* ( t o M o s c o w i n 1 9 3 3 ) , Jen Pi-shih, W a n g Chia-hsiang, M a o Tse-tung (elected t o Political Bureau i n January, 1935) Secretariat ( n i n e m e n i n 1934)

Key Central Committee Departmentst Organization: K’ang Sheng ( i n Shanghai circa 1931-32) Propaganda: Shen Tse-min (until spring, 1931), then Chang Wen-t’ien, Yang Shang-k’un Military Affairs Committee: Chou En-lai (Hsiang Ying briefly circa 1932) Work i n “White” Areas: Ch’en Yiin Party Affairs: Tung Pi-wu (later developed into Control Commission) Labor: Liu Shao-ch’i Youth: K’ai Feng Women: Teng Ying-ch’ao Special Affairs: K’ang Sheng (later called Social Affairs) Central Bureau for Soviet Areas i n J u i c h i n , K i a n g s i : H s i a n g Y i n g ( 1 9 3 1 ) , Chou En-lai

(1932) (Functions assumed by Party Central i n 1933 when Central Committee arrived i n Kiangsi)

Oyiiwan Sub-bureau for Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei: Chang Kuo-t’ao Hsiang-O-Hsi Sub-bureau for western Hunan-Hupeh: Hsia Hsi, Kuan Hsiang-ying Central Bureau for “White” Areas: L i Chu-sheng and others. ( i n Shanghai from 1933 o n )

CCP Regional Bureaus centered i n Wuhan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tientsin, and, at times, Harbin CCP Provincial Committees * Designates members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. 1 There is no information on the existence of a Party peasant department i n the 1930’s, probably because this crucial work was handled under the soviet governments, of course supervised by the Party. There were twelve departments i n all, according to some Nationalist sources.” Sources: K u o , History, v o l . 2 , p p . 202 ff; W a n g C h i e n : m i n , Draft History, v o l . 2 ,

pp. 81 ff; 503 ff; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chapters 16 and 17; Klein and C l a r k , Dictionary;

and T’ien-wei W u , “ T h e

T s u n y i Conference R e i n t e r p r e t e d ”

(unpublished paper, 1972).

Standing Committee, and the first four were also on the Party Secretariat (of nine men i n 1934), which began to take over more functions, especially for Nationalist-controlled areas, where i n 1933 only some 3 per cent of the allegedly 300,000 members of the CCP worked.'® The Secretariat, then, was virtually synonymous w i t h the Standing Committee and for the first time i n

the history of the CCP, there was a real collective leadership, after the more direct rule of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and L i Li-san.

The elaboration of the Secretariat and the establishment of a control and inspection system were two important organizational developments of the

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The Long March to Power

period. The 1928 Party constitution (Article Eleven), called for inspection

work, and, i n the early 1930’s, Party Central made concerted efforts to develop as well as to improve control of dissidents, financial practices,

communications, and discipline among Party organizations. By January, 1934, a central Party affairs department was supervising central Party work, while provincial, county, and even district-level committees maintained sizable numbers of cadres in inspection work.” Key Central Committee departments included organization, headed by K’ang Sheng in Shanghai until 1932, then by Chou En-lai and Li Weihan i n Juichin; the Military Affairs Committee, headed at first b y Hsiang Ying, later Chou En-lai; work i n “ w h i t e ” areas, Ch’en Yiin; propaganda,

headed first by Shen Tse-min and Chang Wen-t’ien, then Yang Shang-k’un (another “Russian returned student’ and future director of Party affairs); labor, under L i n Shao-ch’i; and women, led by Chou En-lai’s wife, Teng

Ying-ch’ao. Jen Pi-shih headed the Secretariat, and K’ang Sheng special affairs, after the arrest of K u Shun-chang.® The Communist Youth League Central Committee also worked closely with the CCP Central Committee. Kuan Hsiang-ying headed i t until the spring of 1931, followed briefly by Ch’in Pang-hsien, then K’ai Feng (Ho K’o-ch’iian, another “returned student’’) , and, from about 1936, Feng Wen-

pin, among others. I t held its Sixth through Tenth congresses during these years and its Eleventh Congress in July, 1936. There were said to be 60,000 members of the Youth League i n 1933 and 100,000 i n 1934, with another 400,000 each i n teen-age and children’s groups.'® Below the Central Committee, changes i n organization were even more frequent. I n 1933, Party Central, after its arrival i n Kiangsi, assumed the functions of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, which had been headed b y Hsiang Ying i n 1931, then Chou En-lai, and maintained contact w i t h

the Central Sub-Bureaus for Oyiliwan under Chang Kuo-t’ao and for Hsiang-O-Hsi under Hsia Hsi and Kuan Hsiang-ying. I t also established a new Central Bureau in Shanghai, which henceforth assumed responsibility for most ‘“white’’ areas work. Below these organizations were various regional Party bureaus, then having the following names: Yangtze South ( i n Shanghai), Yangtze (in W u h a n ) , South China ( i n Hong Kong) ; North China ( i n Tientsin w i t h branches i n Peiping and T’angshan), and, at times,

Manchuria (in Harbin). As of the spring of 1931, provincial committees existed i n Honan, Kwangtung (including Kwangsi), Kiangsi (with northeast, southwest, and northwest subcommittees), and Kiangsu. Below these, special district, county, o r other Party committees reportedly existed i n Manchuria, Hopeh, Chekiang, Anhwei, Shensi, Szechwan, Yiinnan, Hunan,

Hupeh, Fukien, and Kiangsi,?>* and, below them, local branches and cells. The hierarchy then, as before, descended from central to regional and Red Army committees, and then to provincial and local levels. I n view of conditions of the time, however, large-scale work could be carried o n only

in areas governed from headquarters i n Juichin and Shanghai, and i n the Oyiiwan and Hsiang-O-Hsi bases. Communications a n d Publications

The terrible problems of holding this organization together i n the face of enemy efforts to destroy i t and of intra-Party strife must have been

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compounded by the primitive communications in China. The special affairs department had authority for communications between Party Central and the soviet areas, indicating the dangerous and critical nature of the problem, which prior to 1931 or so had to be handled almost entirely by courier. Men and materials sometimes traveled from Shanghai by sea to Swatow and thence to western Fukien and Kiangsi, or moved west and southeast via Hupeh and Hunan. Whereas, i n 1927-28, Central Committee directives sometimes took six months to reach the soviet areas* b y 1930,

the lag was reduced somewhat but continued to be a critical problem. Chu Teh claimed that his forces maintained adequate contact with the Central Committee from 1929 on, b u t a participant i n P’eng Teh-huai’s

army reported that “1930 was the first year the Fifth Red Army established direct connection with the Central Committee.’’* There were also frequent lags of months or more between Moscow and China after 1927, even though there were also reports of telecommunications via Mongolia, Sinkiang, Vladivostok, and Shanghai, and thence to

the soviet areas. A dramatic demonstration of the poor communications and information available in outlying areas at the time was the obituary of M a o Tse-tung i n the Soviet press i n March, 1930. M a o was said to have died o f consumption, and the writer was not a Russian b u t apparently

Mao’s long-time colleague, Teng Chung-hsia.?? To overcome some of these problems, the Party began to train radio operators as early as 1928 and established a transmitter i n Shanghai i n 1930, which was i n touch with the South China, Yangtze, and North China bureaus. But, i n the soviet areas, the first radios were not acquired

until about 1930, and even then Chu Teh reported, “We could not use them as we had no operators.” Later i n that year, orders went out to procure radio sets wherever possible, and about January, 1931, the First Front Army established a Signal Communications Branch.?® By the spring of 1931, many major Red Army units i n southern Kiangsi were using radios, b u t even there communications remained difficult, and i n north-

western Kiangsi radios were acquired only after 1932. I n Oyiiwan, the first radios went into operation i n late 1931, but Chang Kuo-ta’o complained that there were no adequate communications with other bases and reported receiving the first reliable information from Party Central i n the spring of 1932 after a lapse of more than a year. After their

departure from the Oyiiwan base, Chang’s men had still greater difficulty, as they lost the secret code worked out w i t h Communist groups i n the

South and did n o t re-establish effective communications until they reached their new base i n northern Szechwan. I n late 1934, they were i n close

touch with Mao’s group of the Long March but were unable to contact Ho Lung’s group or northern Shensi.?* The Party published a great many more journals during the Kiangsi period than i t had before and developed extensive mimeographed publications for local propaganda. Seventy-seven periodicals are mentioned i n the archives captured by the Nationalists during these years. By 1934,

* A s w a s t h e case w i t h n e w s o f M a o ’ s dismissal from t h e P o l i t i c a l Bureau a t t h e November, 1927, P l e n u m .

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227

there were thirty-four publications i n the Central Soviet area alone, and others were published elsewhere, as for instance seven i n the Szechwan-

Shensi Soviet in 1935.2° After the Fourth Plenum i n January, 1931, the direct influence of the

Comintern on the CCP abruptly declined. Mif soon returned to Moscow, leaving a Polish Communist* as Moscow’s representative. During the latter part of the Kiangsi period, however, the only important Comintern agent in China was the German Otto Braun, known as L i Teh i n Chinese

and also called Albert List or Richter, who had had military experience in World War I and who worked closely with the Red Armies. He arrived in Kiangsi i n about 1933 from Shanghai, to which he may have come in 1932. Two other agents reportedly were unable to reach the soviet areas, but Otto Braun played an important role and, according to some, dominated military decision-making of the period. Comintern financial support for the Chinese Communists virtually ended after the arrest of Hsiang Chung-fa and the Noulens couple i n June, 1931.%

The principal reason for the decline of Comintern activity i n China was Stalin’s preoccupation w i t h Russian problems and with the rise of aggressive governments, especially i n Germany and Japan. T o strengthen its hand against Japan, i n 1932, the Soviet Union restored relations with the

Nationalist government after a lapse of five years. Yet, Soviet influence on the Chinese Communist movement by no means ended. Indirect influence through Bolshevik doctrine increased, because of the high status of the “Russian returned students,” which was primarily due to their knowledge of Marxist theory and to the support of Mif and other Comintern leaders. The Comintern’s view of the Chinese revolution, as laid down at its Executive Committee’s Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth plenums i n April, 1931, September, 1932, and December, 1933, respectively, continued

to stress that China must undergo a “bourgeois democratic revolution” in which the proletariat—meaning the CCP—would assume hegemony over a united front from below. The Party, joining with the masses and “progressive petty bourgeoisie” (poor and middle peasants, artisans, and intellectuals), would lead an agrarian revolution against feudalism and a national revolution against imperialism. These elements are, of course, associated with the Maoist revolutionary model, and the Comintern held Mao i n as high regard as any other Communist leader during this period,

but Moscow also continued to emphasize the need for proletarian leadership of the revolution. As had been the case under L i Li-san’s leadership, Comintern pronouncements encouraged the ‘returned students” to con-

tinue to stress the need for urban uprisings and for the Red Army, on certain occasions (especially i n 1932), to help this process b y capturing

larger towns and cities. However, as the threat of Japanese invasion became more pronounced, there was also more and more stress o n antiimperialism i n Comintern statements, and the earlier emphasis o n “agrarian revolution,” implying harsher class struggle, had been dropped almost * After an argument w i t h this man, Chang Kuo-t’ao reportedly stated, “Every representative the Comintern sends to China is worse than the previous one.’

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entirely by the time of the adoption of the second united front policy during and after 1935.28

Military and Agrarian Questions Differences over these questions, over land, and especially over military policy between Mao Tse-tung and Party Central sharpened in 1932-34. Basically, Mao’s more cautious guerrilla tactics were followed i n turning

back the first three Nationalist extermination campaigns in 1930-31, while the more aggressive policies of the “Internationalists” were used against the fourth and fifth campaigns from 1932 to 1934, with success in the fourth but disaster in the fifth. The Red Armies were expanding rapidly during these years. After defeating the first three extermination campaigns from the late fall of 1930 through the summer of 1931 and while enjoying a respite in the fall of 1931 due to the Mukden Incident, the Communist military received

a boost just after the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic when the Nationalist Twenty-sixth Route Army revolted i n the Ningtu area o n December 14, 1931, with some 20,000 joining Communist

ranks.?® Understandably, Party Central now recognized the Red Army as the “main force” of the revolution, but there was increasing controversy over the military tactics to be followed.

Well into 1930, M a o had advocted policies as aggressive as anyone’s, but, from at least mid-1931 on, modifications i n his ideas brought him into increasing conflict with Party Central. He later claimed that the “concentration o f forces we advocate [after 1930, i n contrast to the

policy of the “third left line’’] is based on the principle of guaranteeing an absolute or relative superiority for operations on the battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to conduct operations o n a front of vital importance, we must have an absolutely superior force. . . ” Therefore,

Mao argued that “our strategy is ‘to pit one against ten,” while our tactic is ‘to pit ten against one’. . .”*° A Maoist document of 1944 described his famous principle of guerrilla warfare as follows: The Red Army must carry out the following strategic and tactical principles: “disperse the forces among the masses to arouse them and concentrate the forces to deal w i t h the e n e m y ” ; “enemy advances, w e retreat; enemy halts, when purw e harass; enemy tires, w e attack; enemy retreats, w e pursue;

sued by a powerful enemy, we adopt the policy of circling around i n a whirling motion”; “luring the enemy to penetrate deep” and ‘“‘amass superior forces to attack the enemy’s weak spots so that we can assuredly eliminate a part, small or large, of the enemy forces by picking them off one at a time.” But the same document criticized the fact that Militarily, the “ l e f t ” l i n e [ a t first]

resorted to reckless actions which

consequently separated the Red Army from the masses of the people.... [Later,] opposing the Army’s sound guerrilla character and calling i t a manifestation of “guerrillaism,” . . . rejecting the premise that the enemy was strong and we were weak, the third “ l e f t ” called for positional warfare; . . .

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for a strategy of a war of quick decision; . . . a n d for an “attack on all fronts.”’31

Whatever Mao’s exaggerations, i t is true that the “Russian returned students” ordered the adoption of a “forward and offensive line” rather than the defensive guerrilla tactics advocated by Mao and others i n early 1931 that had helped defeat the first three Nationalist campaigns. Already on September 1, 1931, and more insistently during the winter of 1931-32, Party Central called for opposition to all non-Communist groups and

advocated, i n the rhetoric used by Li Li-san, “taking urban centers so as to achieve preliminary successes i n one or more provinces.””*? Noting the

mounting economic crisis i n the capitalist world and China, successes against the Nationalist campaigns, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931 Party documents called for general offensives by the Red Armies and, i n 1932, specified attacks on Kanchou, Nanchang, and Kiukiang i n Kiangsi, and o n Changchow, Fuchow, and Amoy i n Fukien.

Mao’s opposition to these proposals brought a showdown with Chou En-lai, who i n 1932 was the top-ranking political officer in Kiangsi as chairman of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas. A t a February military affairs conference, Chou argued down Mao’s insistence o n mobile guerrilla tactics, contending that a decisive phase of the ‘struggle between two

roads” was approaching.®® Later that month and i n early March, attacks were launched on Kanchou and other areas along the Kan River. These attacks failed, though farther east Red Army units captured Changchou in April and other counties along the Fukien border i n the autumn and in the spring of 1933. Party Central accused the Central Bureau in Juichin of lagging i n the execution of these tasks. I n April, the Central Bureau opposed a plan, sponsored b y Mao, among others, for increased efforts i n northeastern Kiangsi. I n May, 1932, Chou En-lai charged Kiangsi leaders

with procrastination i n carrying o u t the Party line and reaffirmed the call for “expanding soviet territory swiftly, engaging the enemy on Kuomintang territory, bringing Kiangsi and its neighboring soviet areas together by force, taking key cities in the Kan valley, including Nanchang, Chian, Kanchou, and P’inghsiang, so as to achieve preliminary successes in one or more provinces.’’?* Problems i n the execution of the Party’s program and emergency preparations for the Nationalists’ fourth campaign, which began i n June,

1932, led to the holding of the important Ningtu Conference of the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas in southern Kiangsi i n August, 1932. Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Wang Chia-hsiang, Jen Pi-shih, Chu Teh, P’eng Tehhuai, Liu Po-ch’eng, and Ch’en Y i all argued for the “forward and offen-

sive line” and criticized directly or indirectly Mao’s conservatism and skepticism. As early as August, 1931, Wang Chia-hsiang had already replaced Mao as chairman of the Red Army’s General Political Department, and Chou En-lai became acting Political Commissar of the Red Army in October, 1931; the Ningtu Conference confirmed these decisions. Sub-

sequently, even i n the Central Soviet Government, whose Council of People’s Commissars Mao still chaired, Mao reportedly yielded real power to vice-chairman Hsiang Ying and others.3°

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Comintern adviser Otto Braun, however, regards these stories of Mao’s loss of power as grossly exaggerated, since he believes that M a o continued

influential through Chu Teh’s Central Soviet Government Revolutionary Military Council, even i f Mao’s Party role and aspects of his policies undeniably did come under attack during these years.*® Certainly, there were criticisms of Mao’s “ r i c h peasant l i n e ” and other policies, and Mao later said, “ A t the Ningtu Conference, Chang Wen-t’ien [ a n d others]

wanted to dismiss me, but Chou En-lai and others disagreed.””*” I n an article published on August 1, 1932, Liu Po-ch’eng denounced Mao, as well as weaknesses of the Red Army, in thinly disguised terms: Many comrades have failed to use modern strategy and tactics flexibly. . They have insisted on using the [ancient classic] Romance of the Three Kingdoms as tactical guidance and Sun Tzu’s A r t of War as strategic guidance i n modern times. Some comrades, conceited i n being erudite, treated the half-century-old Collected Works of Tseng Kuo-fan as a typical military code. . . . Certain hard-core units of the Red Army still show the weakness of “fearing casualties,” “fighting tricky battles,”. . . refusing “hot pursuit” and [ “luring the enemy i n deep.” ]38

The Ningtu Conference instructed the Red Armies “ t o score speedy victories for the purpose of seizing Kanchou, Chian, Changchou, Nanchang, and Kiukiang, i n coordination w i t h actions i n the presently sepa-

rated soviet areas. Then victory can be won first in Kiangsi Province. . . .””** Party Central apparently believed that the Red Armies were strong enough to take the offensive outside soviet areas and need n o longer limit

themselves to the Maoist strategy of “luring the enemy i n deep” as the best way to ambush and destroy the enemy piecemeal .*° Meanwhile, the Nationalist fourth campaign followed up its successes against the Hsiang-O-Hsi and Oyiiwan soviets by turning against the Central Soviet. Despite evidence of low morale due to Nationalist pressures,

class struggle, and differences of opinion among Communist leaders, the Central Soviet was able to turn back the fourth Nationalist extermination campaign i n bitter fighting i n the winter of 1932-33. Mao at the time, i n contrast to his later statements, credited this success to the “correct line

of the Party leadership.” After formally moving its work to Juichin i n January, 1933, the Central

Committee, i n line with the resolutions of the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI, called for a further intensification of the revolution and stepped u p

its attacks on Mao, accusing him of “persistent and serious errors of right opportunism,” guerrillaism, sectarianism, monopolism, peasant mentality, conservatism, and narrow empiricism.*? Beginning i n February, 1933, the criticisms of these errors became the basis for the most extensive public purge of the period, the campaign against the “ L o M i n g L i n e . ” L o , the acting secretary of the Fukien Committee, was accused o f ‘luring the

enemy i n deep” and evacuating residents of Shanghang, Yungting, and nearby areas, rather than “ h i t t i n g the enemy beyond the gate.” L o also

supposedly resisted the idea of merging the Fukien and Kiangsi soviet areas, on the grounds that they had different problems, and took a pessimistic view of mass organization. Subsequently, Party Central dismissed

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or reprimanded for similar reasons not only L o Ming but also Mao’s

brother, Mao Tse-t’an, who was accused of following traditional Chinese guerrilla tactics; Mao’s secretary, K u Pai; and veteran Communists Ch’en

T’an-ch’iu, Ho Shu-heng, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Teng Tzu-hui, T’an Chen-lin, Hsiao Ching-kuang, and others.*® As a result, the Fukien and Kiangsi committees and youth organizations had to be reorganized. Other criticisms of work i n the soviet areas at this time reflected continued concern for “proletarian” leadership, mass organization, and political work i n general.**

A second phase of the anti—-Lo Ming line in the Central Soviet appears to have been the land investigation movement of the summer of 1933,

which sought to verify and extend the land reform carried out after the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic. I t s goals were to

complete the land revolution i n the 80 per cent of soviet areas where it was admittedly not complete and simultaneously to suppress counterrevolutionaries, recruit 80,000 new soldiers, and raise $800,000 (Chinese) i n cash and $3 million (Chinese) i n bonds. While Mao stressed that the

land investigation drive provided the “best opportunity to launch an ideological struggle, to oppose bureaucratism, corruption, and passive sabotage, and to clear the soviets of heretical elements,” Party Central criticized Mao’s “equalization” policies as too lenient for rich peasants and landlords* and stressed the organization of tenants and poor and middle peasants.*®

Subsequently, some 13,000 rich peasants and landlords i n the Central Soviet were denounced and their lands redistributed. Some (a dozen in one district) were executed, but Mao apparently sought to protect the middle peasants and, i n October, issued new decrees that formally rede-

fined criteria for rich, middle, and poor peasants. Mao’s revisions sought to ensure a place for all who would work and was more or less i n line with his earlier policy of “taking from those who have a surplus.” The “returned students’ condemned both sets of policies as too moderate, since they allowed an equal instead of an inferior share for the formerly rich landowners. The land investigation drive had virtually halted by November, 1933, i n part because of these policy differences and i n part because of the fifth Nationalist campaign, then tightening its net. But, i n March,

1934, a month after Chang Wen-t’ien had replaced Mao as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, the soviet leadership resumed its drive on the rich peasants.*’ The Fukien Rebellion and the United Front

I n the long run, differences over another important policy, the tactics of the united front, were most crucial to the relationship between Mao * I n an interesting reversal of the situation i n which Mao’s enemies sought to control and limit the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s, Mao may have sought to take over and limit the effects of the land investigation movement i n 1933. As can be seen i n t w o documents drawn u p b y M a o i n O c t o b e r , 1 9 3 3 , ” h e b l u r r e d P a r t y Central’s

rigid distinctions between laborers and managers, middle and rich peasants. I n allowing the rich peasants and landlords to keep as much land as they could till, Mao generally emphasized production i n contrast to Party Central’s emphasis on class struggle.

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and the “Internationalists” as well as to future relations between China and the Soviet Union. Mao later claimed that he had favored a broader united front with “intermediate elements” during the Kiangsi period, including inducements to rich peasants and progressive landlords and bourgeoisie, but that the “left deviationists”’ invariably underestimated the decisive role of the anti-feudal struggle of the peasants in the Chinese revolution and invariably stood for a fight against the bourgeoisie as a whole.. . . Especially after the [Mukden] incident of September 18, 1931, an obvious momentous change took place i n the class relations in China, but far from taking this into consideration, the third “left” line passed the verdict “the most dangerous enemy” on the intermediate groups that were i n conflict with the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang and were taking positive action.?$ But Mao’s real views of the time, i n contrast to this statement of 1944,

are far from clear. Hence, in the first important practical test of united front policy, when the possibility of a profitable alliance between the Communists and an anti-Nationalist group arose during the Fukien rebellion against the Kuomintang i n the fall and winter of 1933-34, Mao supported, at least i n public, the same hard line against the “third road” rebels that he would denounce a decade later. The development i n China of what can be called the “second united front policy” between the Communists and the Nationalists was gradual and tortuous. As early as 1929, the Comintern had vaguely called for a

“united front from below’ as against the united front from above of the mid-1920’s, but there was little stress on cooperation with anyone other than the most radical elements until after the Mukden Incident of Sep-

tember, 1931. The Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI in September, 1932, urged the Chinese Communist Party to use ‘‘the tactic of the united front from below in the anti-imperialist struggle in Kuomintang China, organizing the masses under the slogan of a revolutionary national liberation war for the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of China against all imperialists, for the overthrow of the agent of imperialism—the Kuomintang.””*®* The important point here, i n contrast to the united front policy as interpreted both before 1927 and after 1935, is the call for the overthrow of the

Nationalist government as the prerequisite for effective opposition to Japan. Paradoxically, if characteristically, i n 1932, the Soviet Union also resumed

diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government, which had been broken off some five years before. The Central Soviet Government, mean-

while, declared war on Japan on April 15, 1932, but at first there was no sign of Chinese Communist willingness to cooperate with non-Communist organizations i n that struggle. Then, i n January, 1933, the Central Soviet

Government declared its desire to “enter into a fighting alliance” with any military group that would meet three conditions: that i t halt any participa-

tion in the fourth Nationalist offensive then in progress against the soviet areas; that there be an immediate guarantee of democratic rights and freedoms; and immediate arming of the masses for war against Japan. Even then, the struggle was still to be directed first against the Kuomintang

and then against Japan.®®

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O n the basis of this and similar statements, the Communists influenced

the founding of the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army, and possibly also Feng Yii-hsiang’s People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army. More important, they reached a preliminary agreement on October 26, 1933, with representatives of the Nationalist Nineteenth Route Army, who set u p a “People’s Revolutionary Government” i n Foochow in November. Leaders of this

army had gained fame for their stubborn defense of Shanghai against the Japanese in early 1932 and were clearly unhappy with Nanking’s policy of “first pacification, then resistance.” As early as the spring of 1933, they began to negotiate with the Communists for the formation of a united front

against both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, and the October preliminary agreement called for a cessation of warfare and an improvement of economic and other relations between the two groups. The Fukien government was to release all political prisoners and support revolutionary actions and opposition to the Nationalists and Japan.®! However, the agreement was not binding, and the Fukien government

charged continuing Communist hostility and took no major steps to carry out reforms or to fight Chiang Kai-shek and Japan. On December 5, the Chinese Communists denounced the rebels for failing to fulfill their promises and charged that The Fukien People’s Revolutionary Government i n its present state could not distinguish itself from any counterrevolutionary government of the Kuomintang. . . . its activities can amount to nothing more than a decoy to hoodwink the people... . Before the Chinese people are two roads; one is the road of the imperialist Kuomintang colony and the other is the road to a resolute liberation of the Chinese nation from the imperialists and the Kuomintang. . . . There is no middle road. . . 7 2 Although the CCP sent the First Front Army’s I I I , V , and V I I Corps east to prepare to assist, they stopped i n western Fukien and did not press

to the aid of the rebels, who were besieged almost immediately by other Nationalist troops advancing from northern Fukien after being diverted from the fifth campaign against the Communists. The Nationalists pressed steadily ahead, and the rebels surrendered on January 23, 1934. This episode marked the last organized Nationalist military and political resistance to the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.* I n the eyes of M a o Tse-tung, according to his 1944 rewriting of Party history, this Communist failure to support the Fukien rebels at that critical

juncture early i n the fifth Nationalist encirclement campaign also constituted one of the two gravest errors of the “third left line,” along with allegedly faulty military tactics of the Party Central leadership. Mao later claimed that he had favored effective help for the rebels and such measures as sending the Red Army eastward to take advantage of the * Previously, Chiang had emerged politically stronger after the failure of H u Hanm i n and Wang Ching-wei to rule effectively during Chiang’s second enforced resignation from office from late 1931 into the first half of 1932. The revolt of some southwestern generals i n June, 1936, and the imprisonment of Chiang i n the famous Sian i n c i d e n t , D e c e m b e r , 1936, were more i m p o r t a n t as maneuvers t h a n as organized

political opposition.

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new military situation.’® But Mao’s real attitude at the time is by no means clear. With Chu Teh, he signed a telegram on December 20 on behalf of the Central Soviet, repeating the arguments of the Central Committee in forceful terms. Central Soviet leaders promised to send effective military support but only i f they received evidence of results from rebel promises for revolutionary action. I n late January, 1934, after the failure of the Fukien rebels, M a o denounced them:

A certain comrade held the view that the Fukien People’s Revolutionary Government is more or less revolutionary i n nature and not entirely counterrevolutionary. This view is w r o n g . . . . I t is a new device to deceive the people; . . . now, facts have proved that i t did not have the slightest revolutionary significance.>*

I t seems likely that Mao was sincere in this rebuke, whether or not he was the “certain comrade” he referred to as supporting the rebels, and although, a year later, he allegedly reversed this statement to rebuke a certain Comrade X X (Ch’in Pang-hsien, alias Po Ku) for blocking aid to the rebels and, i n December, 1935, began to praise the Fukien rebellion as “ a n act bene-

ficial to the revolution.””” But much evidence, including public speeches of the time and eyewitness accounts,’® suggests that Mao was as responsible as anyone for this early failure to form a new united front.

I t is understandable that Party Central was divided on the question of the Fukien rebels, since many of the Fukien leaders had been principal opponents of the Communists since the mid-1920’s.°” Moreover, the disposition of some major Nationalist forces to their north meant that the

Communists could simply step aside and hope to see the two Nationalist groups destroy each other. Whatever the intra-Party politics of this

debate, i t is certain that the leadership divided sharply on the issue and that Mao’s position i n the Party declined further at two important meet-

ings of the Party. Party Debate and the Loss of Kiangsi

The Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee and the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic were both held in Juichin i n January, 1934. At the Plenum, delegates from Party Central and the Provincial committees elected a new Central Committee of twentynine, including thirteen survivors of the Sixth Central Committee and six w h o had been added at the Fourth Plenum three years earlier. The new Central Committee i n turn elected a Political Bureau of fourteen. I t did

not include Mao Tse-tung. Only Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, and Hsiang Ying on the new Politburo were relatively neutral i n the disputes between Mao and Party Central. M a o was retained o n the Central Committee, b u t so were L i Wei-han and others, who had been criticized more sharply. The

Politburo re-elected Ch’in Pang-hsien General Secretary and named a Standing Committee of five: Ch’in, Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, and Ch’en Yiin. I n addition, the Plenum created a new Party affairs department o f seven, headed by Tung Pi-wu, while an expanded Secre-

tariat, headed by Ch’in Pang-hsien, continued to take over more functions

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of the old Politburo. Chou En-lai again became director of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Committee, replacing Hsiang Ying, while the position of political commissar of the Red Armies, which Chou had formally taken over from M a o the previous May, was temporarily sus-

pended.®® I n content as well as organization, the Fifth Plenum continued or intensified the aggressive line of the “returned students.”®® Ch’in Panghsien delivered a speech on the “Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party,” stating that China faced an ‘“‘acute revolutionary situation.” Going beyond statements of the Twelfth and Thirteenth plenums of the ECCI, Ch’in intensified demands for a “forward and offensive policy” against internal “rightists” and external enemies during the transition to a “third period of war and revolution,” i n the Comintern phrase. H e called for utmost exertion to smash the Nationalists’ fifth offensive, which even then was pressing i n o n Juichin, and repeated demands to swell the Red Army

to 1 million men. The other principal speeches to the Plenum, by Chang Wen-t’ien on the soviet movement and by Ch’en Yiin on work in the “white” areas, repeated these themes and criticized by implication the work of Mao and others with the peasantry and of Liu Shao-ch’i and others with urban labor.®° The Plenum intensified attacks on military conservatism, especially the “tradition of guerrillaism,” and called for the “education of our military

cadres in the new strategy.” Instead of luring the enemy i n deep as favored b y Mao, L o Ming, and others, the Red Armies were instructed not to let

“the enemy occupy an inch of our soviet territory.” The Plenum defined “rightism” as the main danger, held i t responsible for setbacks suffered up to that time, and warned against “going the way of traitors.” At this time, Mao Tse-tung also credited Communist successes to the Central Committee’s “correct l i n e , ” i n marked contrast to his later re-evaluation

of Party history.®! Chang Wen-t’ien, reportedly in order to meet Mao’s criticisms, proposed a review of outstanding questions by the new Party affairs department, and later Tung Pi-wu, as its chairman, reported that there was n o evidence to tie M a o to the sins of L o M i n g , Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Hsiao Ching-kuang,

and others. These discussions, together with Ch’en Yiin’s and Teng Ying-ch’ao’s criticisms of the labor department, then headed b y Liu

Shao-ch’i, laid possible grounds for Mao’s and Liu’s later coalition against the “returned students” and were supported b y Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Tung Pi-wu, and others.

All of these arguments and maneuvers set the stage for the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, held i n Juichin, January 22 to February 1, 1934. This meeting had been called b y the Central

Soviet executive committee the previous June and was originally scheduled for late 1933 in line with the requirement for a congress every two years. Military developments forced its delay to January and also forced the closing date to be moved up from February 7 to February 1. I n contrast to the situation at the First National Congress, the “Russian returned

students” controlled the elections, which were held at township,

district,

county, and provincial levels. The principal business of the Congress con-

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sisted of reports by Mao on the work of the executive committee of the Central Soviet Government since 1931, by Chu Teh on the Red Army, by Lin Po-ch’ii on the economy, and by W u Liang-p’ing on soviet construction; the adoption of a slightly revised constitution; and the election of a new government.®® The changes in the constitution and other laws of the soviet were minor, but there were major changes in the make-up of the government. Some 693 delegates, 83 alternates, and 1,500 guests from as far away as Manchuria, Korea, and Indochina attended and elected a new Central Soviet executive committee of 175, with thirty-six alternates.®* The new

executive committee included only thirty-two of the much smaller body of sixty-three elected at the First National Congress and added 143 new members, including Ch’in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t’ien. Mao Tse-tung was re-elected chairman of the executive committee and Chang Kuo-t’ao (then i n Szechwan) and Hsiang Ying vice-chairmen, b u t Mao’s authority

was diluted with the creation for the first time of a presidium of seventeen members. More significantly, the Council of People’s Commissars, the executive arm of the executive committee, was completely reshuffled with Chang Wen-t’ien replacing Mao as its chairman and with only three of the former commissars or chairmen continuing in their posts, namely Wang Chia-hsiang for foreign affairs, Chu Teh for the Revolutionary Military Council, and C h ’ Ch’iu-pai for education. Several new commissariats were instituted.®® Although Mao’s speech was the most important of those made to the Second National Congress, i t is evident that his actual power within the soviet had been sharply reduced. His speech generally followed the Party Central line of the Fifth Plenum. I n contrast to his later evaluation of the period, he followed Party Central statements i n saying that ‘ t h e revolutionary situation i n China has taken a more acute t u r n , ” i n denying that

there was a “third road” when “the crucial factor i n the present Chinese situation is .

a life and death struggle between revolution and counter-

revolution,” and in crediting soviet victories to the correct line of the Party.?® All these points are omitted from Mao’s Selected Works. On the other hand, Mao did stress that the socialist revolution could not be achieved until after the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution over all China, i n contrast to theories approaching that of ‘“‘permanent revolution” propounded by the ‘returned students.” Finally, Mao gave more attention to such practical matters as the living conditions of the

masses and emphasized a more gradual approach to revolution than did the “returned students.” Whether because of these differences, a recurrent case of malaria, or other reasons, after the January meeting Mao’s power continued to decline for another six months. Military developments made many of these intra-party disputes largely

academic. After the suppression of the Fukien rebellion, the Nationalists’ fifth encirclement campaign, which had begun the previous autumn, rolled into high gear against the Central Soviet and began to make serious inroads into Communist defenses. This time, the 500,000 or so Nationalist

troops followed a slower but surer policy worked out by Chiang Kai-shek and his German adviser, Hans von Seeckt. The Nationalist troops con-

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237

solidated their positions with a series of pillboxes as they advanced, instead of pressing rapidly ahead, as i n the earlier campaigns. They were also more successful i n organizing the local population against the Communists and i n tightening their blockade of the Central Soviet, where salt and other necessities were i n desperately short supply. After crushing the Fukien rebellion, the Nationalists mounted heavy

attacks on the Central Soviet from the east, taking the strategic town of Kuangch’ang late i n April despite extraordinary Communist efforts to hold it. A t this point, an emergency Party Central conference i n early May

decided on preliminary moves and contingency plans to break through the tightening noose. I n mid-July, i t ordered the X and a part of the V I I Corps under Fang Chih-min and Su Yii to march east and northeast; i n

August, i t directed the V I Corps under Jen Pi-shih and Hsiao K’o, to break through to Hunan on the west and link up with the forces under Ho Lung; and, i n September, i t ordered the X X V Corps under Hsii Hai-tung

to leave the Oyiliwan base for the Northwest. These diversions would relieve pressure o n the central armies of Mao and Chu Teh, advance propa-

ganda claims of Communist eagerness to fight Japan, and prepare the way for the departure of the central armies i f necessary. The central armies would depart i f a line north of Ningtu and Shihch’eng, Kiangsi, could not be held.®* Therefore, the first steps of what became known as the Long March were prepared as early as May, 1934, and indeed must have been considered at least since the departure of the Fourth Front Army for

Szechwan in October, 1932.%® Finally, i n mid-1934, the supporting armies in eastern and western Kiangsi were ordered to break through Nationalist lines, and contingency plans for the evacuation of the Central Soviet were drawn up. Nevertheless, the dominant group i n Party Central still hoped to hold the southern Kiangsi base, b y then reduced to about six counties.

Spokesmen for Party Central further criticized pessimism and conservatism and demanded a crash program of Red Army recruitment under the slogan “victory or death.” At the emergency conference i n early May, Hsiang Ying, Otto Braun, and others argued down parts of Mao’s purported proposal for dividing the remaining Red Army forces into four groups and sending most of them i n diversionary marches toward the east. Instead, Party Central called for concentrating the remaining forces for a last-ditch stand to hold the Central S o v i e t . When this, too, failed later i n the summer, preparations for the “ L o n g March” began i n earnest.

11 THE LONG MARCH

A symbol of long years of hardship and a harbinger of future triumph, the Long March forms one of the great dividing lines i n the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Even more than the founding of the Party in 1921, the break with the Nationalists i n 1927, the rectification movement

of 1942-43, the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Hundred Flowers and Great Leap Forward campaigns of 1957-59, or the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s, i t was the watershed of one of history’s greatest revolutionary movements. Tens of thousands of Chinese Communists d i d not survive to begin i t , and tens of thousands more did

not complete it. But, of the fewer than 40,000 Party and army men who did reach northern Shensi, many went o n to rule the world’s most populous state.

Two months after completing his portion of the great trek, during the course of which he began his ascendancy to Party leadership, Mao Tsetung declared . . . the Long March is the first of its kind ever recorded i n history. . . For twelve months, we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the air by scores of planes; we were encircled, pursued, obstructed, and intercepted on the ground by a big force of several hundred thousand men; we encountered untold difficulties and great obstacles on the way, but by keeping our two feet going, we swept across a distance of more than 20,000 l i [more than 6,600 miles] through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. . . . The Long March is also a manifesto. I t proclaims to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, and the imperialists and their jackals, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are perfect nonentities. I t announces the bankruptcy of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction, and interception attempted by the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek. The Long March is also an agitation corps. I t declares to the approximately 200 million people of eleven provinces that only the road of the Red Army leads to their liberation. . . . 1

I n fact, of course, the Long March was a great retreat. Only about onetenth of those w h o started out survived i t and the other battles of 1933-36,

[Chap. 11]

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239

and, after i t , the Communists were still o n the verge of total annihilation—

saved as much by unrelenting Japanese pressure on China as by the achievement of the Long March. Nonetheless, this great retreat was unquestionably an epic of military history. Crossing mountain passes of 16,000

feet and more, far above the snow line, where “we kept reaching down to pull men to their feet only to find they were already dead” of cold and exhaustion, and wading through swamps where men ‘““had to sleep standing i n pairs or groups of four, back to back’ to prevent drowning i n mud, the Communists pressed on. Mao’s group marched 235 days and 18 nights, averaging about 17 miles a day for the year (or 26 i f rest periods, especially in Szechwan, are excluded), fought numerous pitched battles and continual skirmishes, and crossed 18 mountain ranges and 24 rivers i n 11 provinces.” Other forces led by Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung traversed equally terrible terrain and d i d not arrive i n Shensi u n t i l late 1936, a year

after Mao. For survivors, the Long March was a triumph symbolizing their indestructibility, but, however one evaluates i t , there was n o alternative

to it, for most of the top leaders left behind were soon killed or captured. Pressed back into an area of five o r six counties i n south-central Kiangsi,

the central Communist armies were i n imminent danger of complete destruction by the summer of 1934. Despite crash recruitment programs, Communist forces i n Kiangsi, including political activists, had been

reduced to less than 150,000, perhaps half their previous peak. Frantic efforts to procure new recruits and supplies only increased tensions between the Party and the long-suffering populace of Kiangsi and led to rising desertions and renewed purges and terror.® Nevertheless, the Communists remained able to draw on the energies o f many local activists, even i f one typical Communist account exaggerated i n stating We fought the blockade for six months. Our army had been born and nurtured i n this area. I t was much loved by the people, who supported us with food and money, enabling us to hold out a long time. Every single young man in the area helped the Red Army . carrying guns, food, letters, and information.*

I t seems clear that the Communist failure i n Kiangsi was due far more to unrelenting and overwhelming enemy pressure than to ‘ l e f t i s t ’ mistakes or alienation of the populace. I n 1933-34, the Nationalists employed some 750,000 men against the Communists i n Kiangsi, several hundred thousand more against other Communist bases, 150 airplanes, an improved military strategy that gradually tightened the net around soviet bases, and

a more sophisticated propaganda campaign under Chiang Kai-shek’s new slogan stating that the suppression of the Communists required efforts

that were “ 3 0 per cent military and 70 per cent political.” The Nationalists organized the local population through the traditional pao chia system* into anti-Communist militia. These measures ensured the eventual success o f the fifth encirclement campaign, and decisive Nationalist victories at * T h e d i v i s i o n o f peasant families i n t o groups o f 10, 100, a n d 1,000 families for tax

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242

The Long March to Power

Kuangch’ang in April, 1934, and at Yich’ien in July forced the final Communist decision to evacuate the Kiangsi bases. I n this predicament, the Party leadership stressed the need for a united front against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan and prepared diversionary moves and attempts to break through the encirclement. The May emergency conference had already drawn up contingency plans, and, i n July, Party Central directed the X and V I I Corps to break through Nationalist lines to the east and northeast and the V I Corps to move west to join Ho Lung’s forces.® Party documents sought to put the best face on these movements by pointing out that departing troops were vanguard units of the main Red Army seeking to move north to fight the Japanese. Mao apparently also favored placing his and Chu Teh’s First Front Army i n these drives, not so much to attack the Japanese as to throw the Nationalists off balance. The X Corps broke through the Nationalist lines in northeastern Kiangsi i n late July” and reached south-central Anhwei Province later in the year. However, i t suffered heavy losses i n the early autumn, and its commander, Fang Chih-min, was captured in early 1935, exhibited in a cage in Nanchang, and then executed. Only about 800 survivors under Su Y i were able to return south to the old Min-Che-Kan base area. They

held out there in contact with several thousand guerrillas still farther south, under Chang Ting-ch’eng and later Teng Tzu-hui, T’an Chen-lin, and K u Ta-ts’un, until their incorporation into the New Fourth Army in 1938. The V I Corps broke westward from the Chingkang Mountains area through Hunan after August 8, and its 1,000 or so survivors of the formerly 7,000-man force merged into Ho Lung’s Second Front Army in late October in the Szechwan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kweichow border region. I n September, the X X V Corps under Hsii Hai-tung left the Oyiiwan area, headed

west into Hupeh, and then north, becoming, i n September, 1935, the first major southern group to arrive in northern Shensi, the eventual target of the Long March. The final momentous decision that the main armies should leave the Central Soviet for the west was reached about b y August, 1934, but under-

standably plans were kept secret until well after their departure in midOctober.® The deception worked, for, despite hints in some Party writings in September and October, the Nationalists did not realize the extent of Communist activities u n t i l mid-November, although there were reports that Moscow had advised withdrawal from Kiangsi to the North about this

time. I n September, mobilization of porters and soldiers and the procurement of clothing, arms, and provisions were speeded up. Party Central, which that month moved 12 miles outside o f Juichin,® called for intensified

guerrilla warfare by the populace both to protect the base areas and to provide cover for the departure of most of the First Front Army. I t was

determined to leave perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 activists, including about 15,000 soldiers, to carry on the struggle i n the South. Local inhabitants, those with the most severe wounds, and, one suspects, those with heterodox views,!® were to remain behind. I n all, some fourteen bases i n eight prov-

inces south of the Yangtze were said to have continued i n existence after

[Chap. 11]

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243

the departure of the main units of the Red Army.* The most important ones were i n western Fukien under Su Y i , i n southwestern Fukien under

Chang Ting-ch’eng and Teng Tzu-hui, and i n the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border area under Ch’en Y i , Hsiang Ying, and others. Additional units of

from several hundred to several thousand men held out i n Hainan Island under Feng Pai-chii and i n other remote spots, although government mopping-up operations i n late 1934 and 1935-36 destroyed most of them.

A branch of the Political Bureau was set up to direct those who would remain i n the bases south of the Yangtze, with Hsiang Ying as secretary and Ch’en Yi as director of military affairs. Most other members of the Political Bureau branch in Kiangsi were killed in subsequent months,*? as were Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, H o Shu-heng, L i u Po-chien, and Mao’s brother, M a o Tse-t’an.

The First Front Army also organized for the trials ahead. The Central Soviet’s Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Chu Teh, with Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-hsiang as vice-chairmen (Wang was soon wounded i n a bombing attack), formed the highest military authority. Liu Po-ch’eng was chief of staff under Chu Teh, commander i n chief of the Red Army,

and Li Fu-ch’un directed the army’s General Political Department, while Wang Chia-hsiang recovered from his wounds.’®* Chou En-lai, as director of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Committee, was designated to lead a column of some 7,000 political workers, including Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, and Ch’en Yiin of the Political Bureau, and Mao Tsetung, Tung Pi-wu, and other senior leaders.

Initial Stages of the Long March I n October, some 70,000 soldiers and 15,000 staff and porters, together

with the 7,000 political activists, including ‘“‘boy nurses” and thirty-five women—about 90,000 people i n all—grouped i n the Yiitu region of Kiangsi, poised for an unknown future.” They made up the I , I I I , V , V I I I , and I X Corps of the First Front Army. I n mid-October, probably

on the 16th, the First Front Army moved southwest. Between October 21 and late November, they broke through four successive Nationalist cordons i n southwestern Kiangsi, southern Hunan and northern Kwangtung.* Most of the time, the I and I I I Corps under Lin Piao and P’eng Tehhuai, respectively, headed the line of march. The column of political workers was i n the center, and the V , V I I I , and I X Corps guarded the

flanks and rear. Understandably, the battle order changed frequently, and the main army soon split into left or southern and right o r northern

columns, with most of the top leadership traveling with the right column as they crossed southern Hunan. During the first week, the armies marched only at night, i n order to avoid bombing attacks, and thereafter i n shifts of four hours’ marching and four hours’ rest day and night.*®

As i t became evident that there would be no quick or easy conclusion to the march, the armies jettisoned more and more heavy equipment and weapons, many historical records, and large radio transmitters, with the result that the First Front Army lost direct contact with the Comintern

for almost a year, although smaller radios were used to maintain some

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contact with other units in China.* The many wounded had to be left in homes along the way, and presumably this was the case with an infant of Mao’s second wife, born during the march. Intense efforts were made to take care of the political cadres, often carrying them by stretcher i f necessary. M a o Tse-tung, then recovering from malaria, was carried at least

part of the way, as was Chou En-lai. This special treatment also suited their work habits, as they were accustomed to sleeping during the day and holding late-night conferences and Chou had primary responsibility for the evaluation of intelligence reports, which were usually received at night. A t other times, Mao, Chou, and other leaders rode o n horseback. However,

leaders as well as the rank and file underwent unprecedented hardships, and stories of the selflessness of Party leaders, their customary willingness to forgo special treatment and share shoes, clothing, and other supplies

with their comrades, also abound. Mao reportedly carried only two blankets, a sheet, some cloth, a worn overcoat, an umbrella, and books.®

Stretching for several miles, the Red Army columns frequently traveled only a mile o r so a day b u t forced the pace to more than thirty miles a day at other times.'® Narrow mountain paths, steep climbs, marsh, stream, and

river crossings, as well as numerous battles against pursuing Nationalist and local troops, turned many sections of the Long March into nightmares. That any survived is a remarkable testament to the dedication, persever-

ance, and courage, as well as the desperation, of many Chinese Communists. The first goal of the First Front Army was to link u p with H o Lung’s

Second Front Army, then in northwestern Hunan, following the route of the V I Corps under Hsiao K’o and Jen Pi-shih, whose 1,000 or so survivors had joined Ho Lung’s forces i n late October. Ho’s forces, which had n o w expanded from some 6,000 to 10,000 men, took diversionary action. However, by mid-November, Chiang Kai-shek realized Communist

intentions and moved troops into Hunan to prevent the union of the First and Second Front armies. The Red Army troops crossed the Hsiang River from November 26 to 30 but suffered extremely heavy losses in the process. Reduced to about onethird of their former strength as casualties and desertions mounted, the remaining 30,000 troops and 5,000 political cadres still found their route

blocked by enemy forces five or six times their strength. There seemed no alternative but to continue west to more weakly defended areas of Kwei-

chow Province. After the capture there of Lip’ing on December 14, a Political Bureau conference decided against proposals to drive immediately northeast to join Ho’s Second Front Army, or northwest i n Szechwan to join Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Fourth Front Army, or south into Yiinnan, but decided instead to continue west-northwest to the relatively poorly defended

area of north-central Kweichow. Once there, the Communists could either establish a new base or again try to l i n k with the armies of H o Lung or Chang Kuo-t’ao. O n N e w Year’s Day, 1935, some men of Lin Piao’s I Corps crossed the W u River under fire to take key enemy strong points. * Communications remained extremely bad, and i t took more than a year for details o f the Comintern Seventh Congress i n mid-1935 t o reach Party C e n t r a l , t h e n i n

northern Shensi.”

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The First Front Army, now about 30,000 strong, moved quickly to capture

Tsunyi on January 5, with advance units disguised i n captured Nationalist uniforms.?° The Tsunyi Conference

At Tsunyi, one of the most important meetings i n the history of the Party was held, and Mao Tse-tung took an important step toward gaining complete control of the Party. That this step was possible despite Mao’s weak political position within the CCP during the late Kiangsi period may have been due to the growing belief of Red Army leaders that faulty leadership, as well as enemy pressure, had been responsible for the setbacks of previous months. The situation was n o w one of life and death

for every Communist. Furthermore, morale problems were heightened by the stringent secrecy requirements concerning Red Army movements,

which prevented adequate explanations and communication between officers and troops. Thus, military exigencies and increasing distrust of the “Russian returned student” leadership partly explain how Mao Tse-tung, in virtual eclipse after the Fifth Plenum i n January, 1934, was able to improve his situation so dramatically at the enlarged conference of the Political Bureau, held i n Tsunyi from January 6 to 8, 1935.2! Leaders attending the Tsunyi Conference included Political Bureau members and alternates Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Yiin, Chu Teh, and K ’ a i Feng; Central Committee members Mao, Liu Shao-ch’i, L i Wei-han, and P’eng Teh-huai; alternates L i u Po-ch’eng, Lin Piao, and L i Fu-ch’un and at least six others.?? Comintern military

adviser Otto Braun attended as an observer, while Chang Kuo-t’ao radioed his views from northern Szechwan. Ch’in Pang-hsien, until then General Secretary of the Party, was chairman of the meeting, and Chou En-lai, as director of the Party’s Military

Affairs Committee, delivered the first and key report. Immediately, critics of the Fifth Plenum leadership seized on Chou’s allusions to recent military setbacks to launch a wholesale attack on the ‘““internationalist faction.” P’eng Teh-huai first criticized the leadership of the Long March, especially the effort to carry so much equipment that slowed the march.?® Mao Tse-tung then broadened the attack to include Communist tactics against the fifth Nationalist encirclement campaign, and during the Long March. But, contrary to later hagiographers, Mao concentrated on alleged military errors of the recent past, while sanctioning the “ t h i r d left l i n e . ” H e stated, “ T h e enlarged conference of the Political Bureau regards the military line

of pure defense as a concrete manifestation of right opportunism,’** not of “leftism’’ as later claimed. Liu Shao-ch’i extended the criticisms to “white” area policies, which had been so “leftist” as to make urban work impossible, and demanded a general policy review. Ch’in Pang-hsien stressed the positive, noting

Party achievement prior to mid-1934; Ch’en Yiin asserted that Liu’s criticisms ignored the realities of the “white terror”’; and Otto Braun, who had

had as much to do with the military strategies of the past two years as anyone, defended his concepts as appropriate for the circumstances o f the

time. However, when Chief of Staff Liu Po-ch’eng reversed his earlier

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The Long March to Power

stand to support criticisms made by P’eng Teh-huai, Mao, and Liu Shaoch’i, and when Chou En-lai admitted his participation in many errors of judgment, i t became possible for Chang Wen-t’ien and others to promote a compromise solution.” With Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, Liu Po-ch’eng, and presumably Chu Teh and other leaders neutral, some of the criticisms made by Mao, P’eng, and Liu* were incorporated into a

resolution subtitled “A Review of the Military Errors of Comrades Po Ku [Ch’in Pang-hsien], Chou En-lai, and L i Teh [ O t t o B r a u n ] . ” The resolu-

tion criticized the neglect of the unevenness of the Chinese revolution and the changed situation brought about by continuing Japanese aggression as well as errors of military line—the latter a reference to occasional mis-

taken offensives,.the more general policies of passive defense and dispersal of troops during the fifth encirclement campaign, and faulty efforts to carry too much equipment and to try to join Ho Lung during the Long March. However, in contrast to later Maoist writings, the Tsunyi Conference judged the general political line of the Party to be basically correct. For the future, the conference decided to rest briefly i n the Tsunyi area, to try to build up the Red Army, and then to drive northwest into Szechwan for a juncture with forces under Chang Kuo-t’ao. Accordingly, Chang was radioed to take appropriate responsive action, and a new slogan, “ G o north to fight the Japanese,” was adopted. Even more important, the Tsunyi Conference reorganized CCP leadership, giving Mao the key position of director of the Central Committee Military Affairs Committee, replacing Chou En-lai. Mao was also elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, as a “secretary of the central Secretariat,” and continued as chairman of the government executive committee, though he had relinquished chairmanship of the Council of People’s Commissars to Chang Wen-t’ien a year earlier. The date of Mao’s pre-eminence is obviously a problem.?® Maoist historiography and

Moscow documents, beginning with Ch’en Shao-yii’s “Speech to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern” on August 1, 1935, listed Mao first. Subsequently, most sources have stated—incorrectly—that Mao became chairman of the Political Bureau at the Tsunyi Conference. Mao may have been the Party’s dominant personality thereafter, but he d i d not

have the desire or power to take over the Party outright until the early 1940’s. After Tsunyi, Mao should probably be thought of as first among equals in a collective leadership but not yet the official leader of the party. I n an apparent compromise between Mao’s group and the ‘‘Russian returned students,” Chang Wen-t’ien, w h o had been neutral i n preceding Party debates, replaced Ch’in Pang-shien as General Secretary. Nom-

inally, this was still the Party’s highest post, although, in the circumstances, Mao’s Military Affairs Committee undoubtedly held most power. Ch’in Pang-hsien was dropped to the lesser, but still important, post of chairman of the First Front Army’s political department, assisted by Li Wei-han and K’ai Feng. Ch’en Yiin was sent to report to the Com-

* One wonders if the predominance of this triumvirate in the 1950’s possibly stemmed in part from this alliance.

[Chap. 11]

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munist International on all these developments and, posing as a merchant, was able to make his way via Hong Kong to Moscow?’ The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau remained substantially

the same: Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, and Ch’en Yiin, with Mao Tse-tung replacing Hsiang Ying as the fifth member.? Chou En-lai continued to direct much of the political-military planning, and Liu Po-ch’eng took on more direction of military operations as Ch’u Teh’s chief of staff. After several weeks’ rest i n the Tsunyi area, Chu Teh’s and Mao’s First Front Army sought to move north into Szechwan but, finding the way blocked by enemy troops, turned west and circled back to Tsunyi, then south, and again west. T o the north at this time, Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Fourth Front Army was

moving farther west to the Moukung area of western Szechwan, but apparently the Tsunyi leadership was still considering the establishment

of a new soviet area i n Kweichow. The First Front Army continued to fight and maneuver i n dizzying

circles i n the province for several months, suffering heavy casualties i n numerous battles, including, according to one false report, Chu Teh himself. I t was also able to gain some recruits but could not consolidate control of any base area. Finally, after crossing south and west into Yiinnan o n April 24 i n three columns, the army turned north again,

crossing the portion of the Yangtze known as the Golden Sand River into what is n o w western Szechwan Province (then Sikang) i n the first

week of May.?® During much of this and subsequent treks, the Communists had a new element to contend with, namely the hostility of minority tribes, such as the Y i ( L o l o ) , Miao, Fan, and Tibetans of the western mountain regions.*°

As a result, the Communist armies had to resort to force more often than they would have liked in order to procure supplies i n these sparsely populated areas, but the problem was partly solved b y alliances with various groups.

Continuing north along the eastern edge of the Himalayan massif, just east of a 25,000-foot peak, they reached the Yangtze tributary known as the Tatu River, where the most dramatic adventure of the Long March took place. There, i n 1864, the 100,000-man army of the famous T’aip’ing

General Shih Ta-k’ai had been prevented from crossing the river and was trapped and destroyed. N o w , o n May 25, part of the Red Army was able

to cross near Anshunch’ang after suicide squads had stormed key enemy emplacements. But rising water and fear of enemy reinforcements forced the main body of troops to continue north along the precipitous west bank for another 100 miles to the Luting Bridge, the last possible crossing before

Tibet. This was a suspension bridge of thirteen iron chains from which enemy troops had removed the planking and lay i n wait for anyone foolhardy enough to try to cross. Somehow, most of some twenty-two volun-

teers crawled across high above the raging torrent i n the face of enemy fire and put to flight the defenders even before the arrival of a Communist column advancing u p the right bank. The columns o n both sides of the river had had to fight their way against imposing man-made and natural

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obstacles and now were able to secure the crossing of the main body of the army in defiance of a few attacking enemy aircraft. Continuing north i n early June after the Tatu crossing, the First Front Army ascended portions of the Great Snow Mountains, whose highest passes were above 13,000 feet. This, too, was a great ordeal for the lightly clothed and exhausted soldiers, many more of whom perished i n the

mountain snows. Finally, descending into a high valley i n the Moukung, Lihsien area, the First Front Army met detachments of Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Fourth Front Army i n mid-June.*! The Meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies After leaving the Oyiliwan base area i n October, 1932, most of the Fourth Front Army had driven west to within 25 miles of Sian i n Shensi and then, i n early 1933, into northeastern Szechwan. There, Chang Kuot’ao, Hsli Hsiang-ch’ien, and their 3,000 to 4,000 surviving armed followers had established a new Szechwan-Shensi base (Ch’uan-Shen), also known as the T’ung-Nan-Pa Soviet after its three principal towns. Chang Kuo-t’ao was its chairman, as well as chairman of the newly established Northwest Revolutionary Military Council, while Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien con-

tinued as military commander and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao as political commissar of the Fourth Front Army. Despite setbacks i n early and late 1933, by the spring of 1934, the Fourth Front Army had built back to 40,000 (25,000 armed) and then to possibly 80,000 men ( i n 5 divisions) and claimed

control of 20 counties and 9 million people i n much of northern Szechwan. They kept in touch with other Communist units by portable wireless sets.” Presumably i n coordination with the First Front Army, which had radioed i t after the Tsunyi Conference, the Fourth Front Army began to move west from the T’ungchiang area about early 1935, defeating a warlord army, crossing the Chialing River later i n the month, and reaching Moukung i n early June. Despite some 10,000 casualties i n crossing Szechwan, i t still totaled more than 40,000 men, or probably four times

as many as the First Front Army when they met about June 16, a fact that undoubtedly influenced subsequent disputes between the two groups.

After brief rest and provisioning, the First Front Army moved north from Moukung beyond Fupien, where they met the main contingents of the Fourth Front Army and called an important Political Bureau conference.* During what Chu Teh later described as a “ s t o r m y ” session, there erupted the first i n the series o f clashes between M a o Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t’ao that would dominate Chinese Communist Party politics for the

next several years.** The disproportion in the strength of the two armies, and the political underreptesentation of the Fourth Front Army, set the stage for this political struggle. Leading members of the Political Bureau— Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, and Chu Teh—were a l l w i t h the exhausted First Front Army, while only Chang Kuo-t’ao o n the Political Bureau, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, * Called the Fupien Conference by Chang Kuo-t’ao after a neighboring village, i t is also called the Lianghok’ou Conference, and is not to be confused w i t h the initial, briefer meetings at Moukung, about thirty miles to the south, or w i t h the later meeting at Maoerhkai.

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and L i Hsien-nien, among senior cadres, were with the much larger, betterequipped, and more rested Fourth Front Army. Accordingly, Ch’en and

Hsii attended the conference as observers and demanded greater representation for their forces. I n view of the superiority of Chang Kuo-t’ao’s military forces and his objections to past policies, i t was understandable that he should take an aloof attitude toward representatives of the First Front Army at this time, but, i n view of the later destruction of much of Chang’s army, his relative political isolation, and subsequent criticisms of Communist policies, i t was also understandable that Mao and his followers would, some

time after this, condemn Chang for warlordism and other errors. Acquaintances since 1918, Chang and Mao had worked together often i n the 1920’s, but Chang had held the more important positions i n the Party. He had worked closely with labor and intellectual movements and, in contrast to Mao’s praise of the revolutionary qualities of the Chinese peasantry, had declared i n 1922, The peasants take no interest i n politics. This is common throughout the whole world but is particularly true i n China, for most of the Chinese peasants are smallholders. . . . A l l they care about is having a true Son of

Heaven to rule them and a peaceful bumper year.3®

Chang later charged also that he and subsequent opponents of Mao, such as Liu Shao-ch’i, had been pragmatists and organizers and were bound to come into conflict with dogmatic theorists, such as most early leaders of the Party and Mao.*® I t is clear that, by the mid-1930’s, Chang

Kuo-t’ao had become convinced of the excessive leftism of past Party policies with respect to both the national and social revolutions. He had radioed the Tsunyi Conference criticizing the whole soviet program of the early 1930’s as premature and ineffective, a charge that he later pressed.’ Then, i n late June, 1935, at the Lianghok’ou Conference, Chang and

Ch’en Ch’ang-hao challenged the legality of the reorganization effected by the Tsunyi Conference, since only a plenary session of the Central Committee was supposed to have that authority and since, i n any case, only about half the Political Bureau (but all members of the Standing Committee except Hsiang Ying) had been present at Tsunyi. However, when Chang criticized past soviet policies and condemned the Long

March as a failure and when Ch’en Ch’ang-hao proposed that Chang Kuo-t’ao should become Party general secretary, Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh sided with Mao to argue down most of Chang’s proposals.®® However, i t can be argued that Chang as political leader of the largest Communist military force for the next year,

in effect, was briefly the pre-eminent Party leader. A further important dispute arose at the Lianghok’ou Conference concerning the ultimate destination of the Long March. Mao and the majority favored continuing north to Shensi, where they could link with the small

soviet base already there, possibly secure support from the Soviet Union through Mongolia, and lend credence to their propaganda that they were advancing north to fight Japan. Chang Kuo-t’ao, however, argued that

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Nationalist troops would block such a move and that i t would be far safer to remain in northwestern Szechwan and Sikang. The Communist armies would then dominate the heights above the rich Chengtu plain, with the possibility of building a new base area, or, if necessary, could move farther northwest into Tibet o r Sinkiang, where the Soviet Union had established close ties the year before with the new Sinkiang warlord, General Sheng

Shih-ts’ai.3® The conference decided, after the mediation of Chu Teh and others,

to delay a final decision on destination, resting and regrouping for the time being in and to the immediate north of their present area. Regarding Chang Kuo-t’ao’s criticism of soviet-style government organization, a

compromise authorized temporary revolutionary committees and people’s governments in place of soviets. Finally, pending instructions from the Communist International, the Tsunyi Party reorganization was to continue in effect, although concessions were made to representatives of the Fourth Front Army. Chang Kuo-t’ao was appointed political commissar of the Red Army, and eight leaders of the Fourth Front Army were co-opted on to the Sixth Central Committee.*® Despite these compromises, the tension between the leaderships of the First and Fourth Front armies continued, with each side suspecting the other of bad faith and efforts to exclude i t from power. There were also charges that the Fourth Front Army had assigned under-strength and inferior units to the First Front Army in carrying out efforts to equalize the strength of the two armies. The Maoerhkai Conference and Its Aftermath

After several weeks’ rest and a further move 100 miles to the north of Lianghok’ou, on August 5, the CCP Political Bureau convened a new

conference i n the outer pavilion of a Lamaist temple at Shawo outside Maoerhkai to discuss the destination of the Long March, the united front, and other questions. The Maoerhkai (or Shawo) Conference was marked by further splits between Mao and Chang Kuo-t’ao over their proper destination. The discussions took on added urgency as Nationalist troops again closed i n o n the Communist forces from the north, east, and south.

Once again, Mao and the majority favored breaking through to the north, and once again Chang Kuo-t’ao, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao argued that Nationalist defenses were too strong in that direction. They favored heading south against weaker Szechwan troops and either threatening the fertile Chengtu plain or, i f that proved impossible, moving west into Sikang or Sinkiang. The conference, attended b y Mao, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chu Teh, Ch’in

Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t’ien, with Teng Fa and K’ai Feng as observers,* compromised the opposing views of Mao and Chang Kuo-t’ao by deciding to continue the northward direction of march, but only as far as southern Kansu, in order to replenish dwindling supplies and to divide existing forces into a right or eastern column and a left or western * According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-hsiang of the Political Bureau were unable to attend for reasons of i l l health, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao and other Fourth Front Army representatives were not allowed to attend.

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column. As i n similar circumstances i n 1947, the decision to divide the top leadership no doubt was intended also to ensure survival, should one

group be destroyed. Units of the First and Fourth Front armies were assigned to each column, w i t h the bulk of the western column made u p

of units of the Fourth Front Army, accompanied by the V and I X Corps of the First Front Army. The eastern column was comprised of the I and IIT Corps of the First Front Army, supporting the I V and X X X Corps of the Fourth Front Army. For reasons never adequately explained by those attributing Mao’s ascendancy to the support of key military leaders, Commander i n Chief Chu Teh and Chief of Staff Liu Po-ch’eng accompanied army political Commissar Chang Kuo-t’ao and the western column. Presumably, Chu Teh simply led those units that supplied the bulk of the troops, some 40,000 or more men being i n Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Fourth Front Army, while Chu Teh’s First Front Army had been reduced to about 10,000. I t was therefore logical that Chu, as a military man basically neutral i n Party politics, should lead the working out of the crucial compromises agreed to at Lianghok’ou and Maoerhkai, namely that they would proceed north, but under a joint command, with Chu Teh as com-

mander in chief of the Red Army, Chang Kuo-t’ao as its political commissar, and Liu Po-ch’eng as chief of staff. But this dispensation does not square with later Maoist writings, which condemned Chang Kuo-t’ao’s errors, especially as Chang’s former chief associates Hsili Hsiang-ch’ien and

Ch’en Ch’ang-hao temporarily led the eastern column, in which were Lin Piao, P’eng Teh-huai, and most of the political leadership, including M a o Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chang Wen-t’ien, and Ch’in Pang-hsien.*!

Despite the continuing appellation “Chu-Mao” for the leadership of the Red Army, there must have been tension between the leaders of the two columns. There had already been rumors of dissension during and after

1928 and firmer evidence of criticisms of Mao by Chu Teh’s subordinates, including Liu Po-ch’eng, during the Kiangsi period. Later, Cultural Revolution criticisms of the “warlordism” of Chu Teh failed to shed light on

the physical division between Mao and Chu Teh during the latter stages of the Long March, while Chu Teh’s 1937 account that he had been “kidnaped” by Chang Kuo-t’ao only adds to the confusion, as does the subsequent Maoist explanation that Chu Teh and L i u Po-ch’eng accompanied Chang Kuo-t’ao to “keep an eye on him.”’*? I n any event, as the two columns continued their march on diverging routes northwest and northeast i n late August, 1935, new disputes erupted, which b u t for subsequent Nationalist victories over Chang Kuo-t’ao’s western column might have led to an irreversible split i n the Chinese Communist movement. After the western column had crossed a part of the

Grasslands, a swamp notorious for its treacherous quicksand and lack of food, and had reached Apa, to the northwest of Maoerhkai, Chang Kuot’ao radioed leaders of the eastern column that his forces could n o longer continue north because floods had made i t impossible to cross a tributary

of the Yellow River. At this point, according to Chang Kuo-t’ao, news arrived from Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao that Mao and the central column of political workers, protected by forces under L i n Piao and P’eng Teh-huai, had already broken through from Pasi, where a brief

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conference was held, to the north, not only without cordinating their movements with the western column but without even informing the other units of the eastern column under Hsii and Ch’en whom Mao’s units allegedly had left to bear the brunt of fighting against Nationalist troops north of Maoerhkai. According to the Maoists, on the contrary, Chang Kuo-t’ao’s decision to return south from Apa revealed Chang’s long-standing intention to remain in Szechwan and betray the Maoerhkai compromise.*?

I t is entirely possible that, after having suffered heavy losses in crossing its portion of the Grasslands and fighting hostile tribesmen and enemy troops, Mao’s section of the eastern column decided to take advantage of an opening north of Pasi, cleared by victories of Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and push north as Mao had wished to do since early in the year. The key questions are: Did the central column act unilaterally without informing Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, and whose changes of plans were transmitted first? News of the western column’s decision to turn back to the south may have crossed a communication from the eastern column about its decision to go

north. Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien’s men, the greater part of the eastern column, who Mao claimed had gotten lost, may also have been out of touch with Mao’s central column. I n any case, Mao’s forces, then about 6,000 strong, continued northeast

in three sections, led respectively by Lin Piao, P’eng Teh-huai, and Yeh Chien-ying. From Pasi, these armies fought their way to the strategic

pass of Latzuk’ou by mid-September and crossed into southern Kansu to the south of Lanchow.** From southern Kansu, Mao’s forces, n o w reduced to only several thousand men, moved into northern Shensi toward Paoan, meeting at Wuch’ichen on October 20, 1935, detachments of the

X V Corps, consisting of Hsii Hai-tung’s old X X V Corps, which had arrived the previous month, and Liu Chih-tan’s Shensi troops. Thus, Mao’s forces were the second major group of the Long March to reach Shensi. The Second and Fourth Front Armies’ Routes

The split between Mao and Chang Kuo-t’ao widened politically as it widened geographically, soon creating what has been called “the most critical moment in the history of Mao’s rise to supremacy.”*®* Chang Kuo-t’ao’s and Chu Teh’s western column crossed back from Apa to Chok’ochi, southwest of Maoerhkai, where i t rejoined Hsii Hsiangch’ien’s and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao’s men. N o w said to be 60,000 strong i n

early September, they established what amounted to a rival Central Committee headed b y Chang Kuo-t’ao and including Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, Chu Teh, Liu Po-ch’eng, Shao Shih-p’ing, and ten others.** Continuing south past Moukung, the western column i n mid-November captured several towns that were near Yaan and only slightly northwest of the famous Luting Bridge crossed by Mao’s forces almost six months before. There,

they began to organize a base overlooking the Chengtu plain with revolutionary committees replacing the old soviet organizations, i n line with

the ideas of Chang Kuo-t’ao. Some progress was made, but their success i n threatening Yaan and Chengtu led to immediate Nationalist counteractions. The latter helped to clear the way for Mao’s successful thrust

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into Shensi, as substantial numbers of Nationalist troops pursued the

western column southward. I n a series of battles in the Yaan area from December through February, Nationalist units under General Hsiieh Yiieh, aided by airpower, inflicted heavy losses and drove the Communist forces from the area. N o w reduced to fewer than 40,000 troops, the western column reversed course once again and headed northwest toward Tibet, arriving near Kantzu i n Sikang, i n early March.*’

I n this inhospitable region i n the spring of 1936, the mixed Communist force sought w i t h limited success to establish a new soviet base. They organized a provincial committee, centered first at Luho, then Kantzu,

with Shao Shih-p’ing as secretary, and got some support from an organization of Tibetan tribes, but significant success proved impossible in terrain more than 10,000 feet high with sparse resources and a small population consisting mostly of hostile tribes.'® Nevertheless, the western column was

soon joined in its remote base by Ho Lung’s Second Front Army, and these two forces were the third major group of the Long March to reach Shensi. H o Lung’s Second Front Army had left its then ‘““Szechwan-Hupeh-

Hunan-Kweichow Soviet” near old Hsiang-O-Hsi base areas i n northwestern Hunan, about early November, 1935.* Its 20,000 o r so men,

composed of units from Ho’s and Kuan Hsiang-ying’s old I I Corps and Hsiao K’0’s and Jen Pi-shih’s V I Corps, now struck south and west i n the general direction taken the year before by the First Front Army, remnants of which had now reached Shensi. However, i n a generally successful effort to avoid contact w i t h Nationalist and warlord troops, H o Lung led his men still farther west than the First Front Army had gone, well into Yiinnan by the spring, passing close to Kunming before turning north about

April, 1936. Following just east of the Sikang-Tibet border, the Second Front Army, at times divided into two columns, was reduced to about 3,000 men. About late May, i t reached the Kantzu area, joining forces w i t h the western column of the Fourth and First Front Armies.*® The combined Second and Fourth Front armies were now more than 40,000 strong, but their position i n the Kantzu area was precarious.

According to Maoist accounts, directives from Party Central i n Shensi and the arguments of Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, H o Lung, Liu Po Ch’eng, Kuan Hsiang-ying, and others finally convinced Chang Kuo-t’ao, Hsii Hsiangch’ien, and Ch’en Ch’ang-hao to give u p plans of creating a separate soviet base i n the high western plateau and to resume their march toward northern

Shensi. Bitter conditions in the barren mountainous region, the continuing hostility of local tribesmen, and Nationalist attacks must have been even

more persuasive. Already i n April at a conference at Luho, Chu Teh and Liu Po-ch’eng had supposedly pressed for a resumption of the march to the northeast, and preparations for this were begun, although Chang Kuot’ao insisted o n waiting for the arrival of the Second Front Army."° The Comintern also may have played a role i n the decision for the * Probably the decision for the Second Front A r m y to attempt t o join the First

and Fourth Front armies was reached at the Maoerhkai Conference, w i t h the Second Front Army complying several months later after additional pressure from surrounding Hupeh and Hunan Nationalist troops. However, very little contact with H o Lung was possible.

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western column to continue belatedly toward Shensi. I n the spring of 1936, Chang Kuo-t’ao asked L i n Yii-ying (Chang Hao, a cousin of Lin

Piao), who had returned from Moscow the previous December with instructions for a more positive united front policy, to mediate Chang Kuo-t’ao’s dispute with Mao Tse-tung.’ I n June, following the arrival of the Second Front Army at Kantzu, Lin cabled that he had been authorized by the Comintern to direct the following compromise settlement of the dispute between Mao and Chang. The present organization of both Party Central leaderships was to be suspended and reorganized as the Northwest and Southwest China bureaus of the Party, with the latter to include

representatives from both the Second and Fourth Front armies. The Fourth Front Army was to resume its march north toward Kansu and Ninghsia, and subsequent differences were to be ironed out i n accord

with the new united front policies of the Comintern. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Moscow also urged that part of his Fourth Front Army go west to establish a base in Sinkiang and that Ho Lung’s Second Front Army establish another base between Chang i n the west and Mao’s Shensi base in the east.” About June, Chang Kuo-t’ao, as its secretary, convened a conference of the Party’s newly designated Southwest China Bureau, composed mostly of the old parallel Central Committee. Counting Chang, there were ten representatives of the Fourth Front Army, while H o Lung, Jen Pi-

shih, Kuan Hsiang-ying, Hsiao K’0o, and Kan Szu-ch’i represented the Second Front Army. There were also five representatives of the First Front

Army, including Chu Teh, L i u Po-ch’eng, and Shao Shih-p’ing.’® The conference agreed to accept the Comintern’s mediation and to move north as soon as supplies could be obtained. The combined armies departed from Kantzu i n July, overriding Chang Kuo-t’ao’s arguments to remain in the far west a little longer. New Japanese advances, rising nationalist sentiment, and the rebellion against the Nationalist government by southwestern General L i Tsung-jen and others all lessened the capacity of the

Nationalists to block the northward march of the western columns. Recrossing the formidable Great Snow Mountains, high plateaus, and Grasslands to Apa, the western column then followed the route taken by the First Front Army to the vicinity of Minhsien, southern Kansu, which they attacked without success i n mid-August. Dividing into two groups, units made up predominantly of the Fourth Front Army struck north to a point about 50 miles east of Lanchow, cutting the town’s rail-

way connections with Sian, while the Second Front Army struck east toward Fenghsien, Shensi, before turning north into Kansu i n October.

The two columns rejoined later i n the month and marched north to Huining, where they met advance units of the First Front Army,** sent

to lead them to northern Shensi. Chang Kuo-t’ao, however, again sent units loyal to h i m westward.

Claiming to discover that Mao had not reorganized the Central Committee into a Northwest China Bureau i n accord with the Comintern plan and arguing that military security demanded a dispersal of manpower into several bases, Chang Kuo-t’ao decided again to press to the northwest and attempt to establish bases west o f the Yellow River to complement those

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i n northern Shensi. I n December, only about two-thirds of his men were

able to cross the Yellow River about 50 miles northeast of Lanchow, and Chang ordered them to strike west into the Kansu corridor toward Sinkiang

and Tsinghai. Those who crossed the Yellow River and headed west included the old I X and X I I I Corps of the Fourth Front Army under Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, L i Hsien-nien, and others, and the

V Corps of the First Front Army. These troops were almost completely destroyed b y Muslim and Nationalist troops i n another fantastic series of

battles before they reached Chiuch’iian (Suchow), some 400 miles northwest of Lanchow. The V Corps had been wiped out at Kulang, its commander Tung Chen-t’ang killed, and nothing came of Communist efforts to form a regional Muslim soviet.®* Subsequently, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, L o Ping-hui, and some of the 2,000 survivors turned back, while L i Hsien-nien, political commissar of the X X X Corps, led the remainder, soon reduced to 700

men in two columns, another several hundred miles to the Sinkiang border. About May, 1937, they were met there by Ch’en Yiin and T’eng Tai-yiian, who had been assigned w i t h Teng Fa and later Ch’en T’an-ch’iu, to orga-

nize Communist activity i n Sinkiang under the then pro-Soviet General Sheng Shih-ts’ai. They were trucked back to Tihwa (Urumchi) and eventually back to northern Shensi, all that was left of a substantial part of

Chang Kuo-t’ao’s once elite army.*® Meanwhile, i n November, 1936, the 15,000 Second and Fourth Front

army troops remaining after the departure of Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien’s men* had continued north under Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung toward southern Ninghsia, where they met P’eng Teh-huai and Chou En-lai. Reaching T’unghsin, Ninghsia, i n what must have been a dramatic moment, they

met Mao Tse-tung for the first time i n more than a year. Chang Kuo-t’ao continued to argue for the establishment of a western base in the Kansu Corridor or Sinkiang. However, Mao, as director of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Committee, refused to support Chang’s plans

or to send reinforcements that might have saved Hsii’s beleaguered Western Route Army. Meanwhile, Nationalist troops surrounded T’ung-

hsin and forced both Mao’s and Chang’s troops eastward.’” As northern Shensi was also threatened, Communist leaders drew up contingency plans for dispersal from the Paoan area into Shansi and southern Shensi.

The newly reunited Red Army now consisted of some 22,000 men, of whom about 10,000 were generally associated with the Fourth Front Army, several thousand with the Second Front Army, and about 10,000

with the First Front Army. Much of the First Front Army was now made up of local Shensi troops and of men recruited after Mao’s eastern column had arrived i n October, 1935. Party and army strengths overlapped, since about one-fifth of Red Army men were Party members. I n addition, the army had several thousand political cadres and cadets, 3,000 of whom were w i t h the Fourth Front Army.”® A few thousand Communist soldiers

and cadres were also precariously holding out i n the South, especially in * Also known as the Western Route Army because these forces moved toward Sinkiang.

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the Kiangsi-Hunan-Kwangtung border regions and in western Fukien, and several thousand others were fighting among the partisans in Manchuria and in the “white” areas. At the time of the Long March, Chiang Kai-shek might well have succeeded i n destroying most of these survivors, who numbered no more than 40,000 in all parts of China, had the Nationalists and local generals coordinated their efforts. Instead, i n late 1936, rising

demands for a more active united front against Japan culminated in the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek i n December, 1936, and won the hard-

pressed Red Armies a crucial respite. Without this respite and the ensuing outbreak of full-scale war w i t h Japan, the CCP and the Red Armies would

have been hard put to survive at all. Before we trace these developments and the extraordinary growth of Communist forces after 1937, we must

back-track i n time to developments i n Shensi from the mid-1930’s on, the arrival of Communist troops from the South i n late 1935, and the evolution of Communist united front policy. The Shensi Base

I n 1934, after the near destruction of

the

Communist movement i n the

area just north of Sian the previous year, the focus of Communist activi-

ties had shifted 150 miles to the north to the Paoan area of northern Shensi and neighboring Kansu. I n February, 1934, a Shensi-Kansu Border Region Committee was established i n Ch’ingyang County, Kansu, and Party work developed there and i n neighboring Hoshui County and to the northeast i n Paoan County, Shensi. I n these remote, mountainous areas, famous for centuries as bandit territory,* the Communists found

many local grievances to exploit and, equally important, met little effective opposition. The morale and leadership of ill-paid government troops were poor, and Communist leaders were able to recruit defectors and win some cooperation from local bandit groups and secret societies, such as

the Elder Brother Society. Communist programs of land distribution and attacks on the paying of rents and usurious interest rates naturally

appealed to the peasantry of an impoverished area, with relatively high rates of tenancy, taxation, and usury. By mid-1934, the strength of local guerrilla forces had grown to an estimated 3,000 men with 1,000 weapons i n four areas, organized into units of the X X V I and X X V I I Corps. Sev-

eral thousand peasants had also been organized into peasant associations, red guards, and other support units.*® I n June, 1934, local activists formed a northern Shensi revolutionary base area centered at Ant’ing, north o f Yenan and, following the defeat

of the first Nationalist encirclement campaign against Shensi i n the autumn of 1934, convened a North Shensi Soviet Congress i n January,

1935. The Congress established a provisional soviet government, a Northwest Work Committee and a Revolutionary Military Council with Kuo Hung-t’ao, Liu Chih-tan, and Kao Kang holding key positions. I n the spring, the Shensi guerrillas were able to defeat a second Nationalist campaign, direct land redistribution i n twenty districts, and take and hold * The rebellion that overthrew the M i n g dynasty originated i n this area i n the 1630’s.

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six county capitals and parts of more than twelve other counties. They were in contact with other units b y radio, and their success became a key

element in Mao Tse-tung’s decision to make northern Shensi the destination of the Long March. As i n Kiangsi earlier i n the 1930’s, military successes were accompanied

by intense factional struggles and purges. As elsewhere, left and right deviations alternated i n the Communist politics of the region. The rightist deviation that replaced L i Li-sanism in 1932-33 supposedly gave way to leftist policies in 1934-35. Long-standing disputes between more pragmatic partisan leaders, represented by Liu Chih-tan and Kao Kang, and more theoretically inclined men like Kuo Hung-t’ao, who became representatives of the leftist Party leadership, came to a head in a series of conferences i n mid-1935. One Chu Li-chih, who had recently arrived as

representative of Party Central, sided with Kuo Hung-t’ao, the representative of the Party’s North China Bureau, i n condemning the alleged right-

ism and guerrilla mentality of sections of the local leadership. Kao Kang and others in turn accused Chu and Kuo, and by implication Party Central, of advocating unrealistically aggressive land and military policies, which i n the manner of the “ t h i r d left line” would “attack everywhere

and not allow the enemy to enter a single foot of soviet territory.”’¢° I n terms of policy, these disputes in Shensi were reminiscent of those in Kiangsi over the Lo Ming line and the tactics against the fourth and fifth Nationalist encirclement campaigns. I n terms of control of local organizations, they were reminiscent of the Fut’ien and other purges by which Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi, Chang Kuo-t’ao in the Oyiliwan base, and others sought to remove local leaders who were accused of guer-

rillaism and ““unproletarian” backgrounds and policies, but whose real crime was probably opposition to the imposition of Party control over an indigenous partisan movement. When Mao arrived i n northern Shensi i n October, 1935, he moved

to mediate the disputes within the Shensi leadership, giving more, but not exclusive, power to the local moderates Liu Chih-tan and Kao Kang. A month or so earlier, however, other units from the South, under the

command of Hsii Hai-tung, had arrived and temporarily thrown their support to radical Party representatives Chu Li-chih and K u o Hung-t’ao.

This situation precipitated the severest split yet in the northern Shensi Communist movement, supposedly with many executions and the arrest of Liu Chih-tan and Kao Kang. Before returning to the resolution of this conflict, we must trace the movements of Hsii Hai-tung’s men, who had

been the first of the four groups on the Long March to arrive in northern Shensi from the south.

The X X V Corps and the Party in Shensi I n September, 1934, Hsii Hai-tung’s X X V Corps had struck westward

from Oyiiwan, in coordination with the X Corps’s drive to the north, the V I Corps’s march west to join H o Lung, and the imminent departure of the First Front Army o n the Long March. Leaving behind a small group, they marched west and northwest through Honan into southeastern Shensi

and sought in early 1935 to establish a new base area along the borders

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of Hupeh and Hunan. However, about July, after continued harassment b y

government troops and after reading a newspaper account of the progress of the Long March, Hsii Hai-tung decided to press westward to try to join

the First or Fourth Front armies. Leaving a part of their forces in the southeastern Shensi border area, Hsii’s men reached Kansu i n August but

were unable to locate other units of the Long March. Thereupon, the X X V Corps decided to turn northeast toward the northern Shensi base, arriving there with about 3,000 survivors i n September, 1 9 3 5 . Combined Communist forces i n northern Shensi at that time totaled about 7,000 to 8,000 men and were reorganized from units of Hsii’s X X V and the local X X V I and X X V I I Corps into the X V Corps, with Hsii

Hai-tung commander, Liu Chih-tan deputy commander, Kao Kang head of the political department, and Ch’eng Tzu-hua political commissar. The Shensi partisans had been able to defeat a third government encircle-

ment campaign in early 1936, but the political infighting between the partisan and Party leaders i n northern Shensi intensified after the arrival

of the X X V Corps. Hsii Hai-tung, and especially Ch’eng Tzu-hua as a representative of the old Kiangsi Party center, supported Chu Li-chih’s and K u o Hung-t’ao’s criticisms of guerrillaism and, i n September, renewed attacks o n ‘“‘rightism”’ led to the purge of L i u Chih-tan, Kao Kang, and

many lesser figures. O n October 20, 1935, Mao’s western column, which had left Pasi on September 2 and was reduced to several thousand men, including the

majority of the Party’s political leadership, reached northern Shensi, where i t joined units of the X V Corps. After hearing both sides of the local Party dispute, Mao Tse-tung, Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, and other leaders decided to reverse the purges of Liu Chih-tan, Kao Kang, Hsi Chung-hsiin, and others, presumably to use their talents i n further building Communist forces i n northern Shensi. They rebuked extremist spokesmen of the leftist line but temporarily retained Kuo Hung-t’ao as secretary of the northern Shensi (or Shensi-Kansu) Committee, and the positions of other enemies of L i u Chih-tan and Kao Kang. L i u Chih-tan was killed i n early 1936, and, not u n t i l 1938, after the transfer of Chu Li-chih to Honan

and Kuo Hung-t’ao to Shantung, did relations among local Shensi leaders improve.®> W i t h the death and departure o f the other leaders, Kao Kang became secretary o f the Party’s Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Bureau and the most prominent of the Shensi leaders i n the top echelon of Communist

leadership. Later i n 1935 i n its new setting, the central leadership sought to reorganize its authority over a l l echelons of the Party, about half of which were i n northern Shensi. During the Long March, affairs had been directed through the Red Army political departments and local party work committees, but

Party and government apparatus was gradually reactivated with the arrival of the central leadership in Wayaopao, Ant’ing County, about 50 miles north of Yenan and northeast of Paoan. I n June, 1936, after govern-

ment attacks on Wayaopao, most Communist headquarters units moved to Paoan and remained there through the year. The Communists then controlled only about 400,000 people i n parts of four counties b u t greatly expanded their power thereafter.

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The Central Committee essentially retained its Tsunyi organization, w i t h Chang Wen-t’ien, as General Secretary, directing ‘‘day-to-day work of the Central Committee,” Mao Tse-tung, director of the Military Affairs Com-

mittee; Chou En-lai, director of work among Nationalist troops; Li Weihan, director of organization, succeeded i n turn from 1937 on by Ch’in Pang-hsien, L i Fu-ch’'un and Ch’en Yiin; Liu Shao-ch’i, secretary of the

labor department® until the spring of 1936 when he became secretary of the CCP North China Bureau (later succeeded b y P’eng Chen); W u Liangp’ing, director of propaganda, succeeded by K ’ a i Feng b y 1937; and Ts’ai Ch’ang (a sister of Ts’ai Ho-sen and wife o f L i Fu-ch’un), director o f the

women’s department. K’ai Feng had headed the Communist Youth League u n t i l replaced b y Feng Wen-pin at its Eleventh Congress i n late July, 1936,

while Wang Shou-tao replaced Teng Fa as director of the state Bureau of Political Security. M a o Tse-tung, for the moment, was still chairman of the government

executive committee, and Chang Wen-t’ien headed the Council of People’s Commissars. Because the Council had taken over the leading government functions at the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic i n January, 1934, and because L i n Po’ch’li became chairman and Chang

Kuo-t’ao vice-chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government established i n 1937,} Mao still d i d not hold either the top Party or govern-

ment positions. But his control of the Party Military Affairs Committee and hence of the army soon enabled h i m to dominate the Communist movement. I n the eyes of the Comintern and of such early foreign observers as Edgar Snow, as well as of later writers, Mao was already pre-eminent among Communist leaders, although he d i d not achieve complete supremacy until

the early 1940’s.°¢ Mao also served as acting chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, pending the arrival of Chu Teh later i n 1936, while Yeh Chien-ying acted as chief of staff for Liu Po-ch’eng, and Li Fu-ch’un served as chairman of the army’s General Political Department while Wang Chia-hsiang recuperated i n Moscow from his wounds. L i n Piao and P’eng Teh-huai continued to command the I and I I I Corps, respectively, after

their arrival i n northern Shensi, with Nieh Jung-chen and Yang Shang-k’un as their political commissars. These men, with Chou En-lai and other senior figures, soon became the acting leaders of the Chinese Communist movement. * Also known during this period as the trade union movement department. + Prior to that, governmental functions i n the area were exercised by the northwest office, a government body headed by Ch’in Pang-hsien.*

12 TOWARD T H E SECOND UNITED FRONT

Even before the Chinese Communists had completed the Long March and consolidated their power i n northern Shensi, decisions fundamental to

the world Communist movement were being reached in Moscow. Following the Mukden Incident of September, 1931, the Comintern increasingly stressed the importance for China of a “united front from below’ that would unite all “genuine” nationalists against Chiang Kai-shek as well as

against Japan. I n April, 1932, the Chinese Communist Party had declared war on Japan from its remote Kiangsi base. Then, i n January, 1933, in response to the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI of the previous September, which had first dramatized the “united front from below’ policy, the Party called for natural mobilization against Japan conditional on the immediate cessation of the campaigns against the Communists, the immediate guarantee of popular rights and freedoms, and the arming of the masses for defense against Japan. This declaration influenced certain nationalist groups, most importantly the leaders of the Fukien rebellion, but the CCP still clearly stressed the need for the overthrow of Chiang

Kai-shek and moderate nationalists as a prerequisite for effective resistance to Japan.

I n the spring and summer of 1934, simultaneously with preparations for the Long March, the CCP issued further appeals for the formation of “an anti-imperialist united front, irrespective of political inclination, occupa-

tion, or sex, to fight Japan and other imperialists." However, other statements and actions made i t clear that, until after mid-1935, i n contrast to the united front policy of the 1920’s, the CCP stressed the “ f r o m below” o r mass and antigovernment nature of its united front policy. Thus, a June

15, 1935, declaration called for “settling accounts with this watchdog of Japanese imperialism [ Chiang K a i - s h e k ] . World Communist strategy, as well as the precariousness of Chinese Communist existence, however, dictated further broadening i n united front policy i n 1935. As the nature of Hitler’s regime and of Japanese militarism became clear, the Comintern and Western Communist Parties

began to explore the possibility of a return to the “united front from

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above,” i n cooperation w i t h various ruling “bourgeois nationalist groups.” The Seventh and last Congress of the Communist International, meeting i n

Moscow July 25 to August 20, 1935, confirmed the adoption of this policy, which had already been in effect for a year in France, Spain, and elsewhere. The Comintern Seventh Congress highly praised the importance and achievements of the Chinese Communists and elected Ch’en Shao-yii, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and M a o Tse-tung to the ECCI, with Ch’in Pang-

hsien and K’ang Sheng as alternates. All but the first and last were elected i n absentia, but only Russia had an equal number of delegates. Ch’en also became one of nineteen members of the E C C I Presidium and, o n August 7 , gave the most important of nine speeches b y Chinese delegates. H e emphasized the importance of the united front and blamed the errors of the

CCP, as well as the perfidy of the Kuomintang, on the failure to realize an effective united front against Japan. Other Chinese spokesmen criticized Communist organizational failures, especially i n the “ w h i t e ” areas, b u t stressed Nationalist betrayals. Even Soviet spokesmen d i d not yet unequiv-

ocally include the Kuomintang as partners i n the proposed united front. Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist who became the Secretary General of the Communist International at the Seventh Congress, for example, condemned the ‘“unexampled, infamous, national treachery of the Kuomintang.””> Not until several months later d i d even the Comintern

make the crucial hint of including Chiang Kai-shek and the conservative Nationalists in the united front. O n August 1, 1935, the CCP, then i n the midst of the Long March i n the vicinity of Maoerhkai, issued a new statement entitled “Appeal to Fellow Countrymen Concerning Resistance to Japan and National Salvation.”

While still condemning the Nanking Leaders, this statement, like those made i n Moscow b y Dimitrov o n August 2 and b y Ch’en Shao-yii on August

7 (whose details presumably were not known to the CCP), hinted of a new flexibility and the inclusion of a broader spectrum of the population i n the united front. Unlike the January, 1933, and similar declarations, i t d i d

not demand “immediate democracy” or the arming of the masses, but only a cessation of hostilities between the Nationalists and Communists. According to a later Comintern report, i t even spoke of the possibility of joining with Nationalist units i n war against Japan.* The December Ninth Movement and the CCP

The later stages of the Long March and the Party reorganization in Shensi were accompanied by further developments i n united front policy, especially in December, 1935, and throughout 1936. These developments reflected not only shifts i n the Comintern line as communications between * There is disagreement about when contact with Moscow was resumed during these m o n t h s , b u t m o s t observers agree t h a t there c o u l d n o t have been conscious

coordination of united front policy between Moscow and the CCP by August 1. The apparent similarity of statements seems to have been due rather to a basic similarity of approach and conditions rather than to specific instructions." There were some communications with Moscow through Sinkiang and, from 1936 on, some form of radio and telegraph contact between Northern Shensi and Moscow, but no detailed communications were possible until after 1945. I t is possible, however, that parts of the CCP August 1 statement were worked out by Communists i n Shanghai or elsewhere who were in contact with Moscow and were then issued from Maoerhkai.

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Shensi and Moscow were established but also the rapid development of Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment.* Following far-reaching government concessions to Japan, culminating i n the Ho-Umetsu agreement

of June, 1935, and new Japanese demands for control over all North China, the most significant demonstrations since the May Fourth Movement of 1919 erupted in Peiping on December 9 and 16, 1935. Up to 7,000 students took to the streets in defiance of local authorities to demand “an end to the civil war,” and ‘““union against Japan.” The demonstrations symbolized and furthered the hardening of Chinese opinion and led to the mushrooming of patriotic groups all over the country. I n the spring of 1936, earlier groups, such as Madame Sun Yat-sen’s League for Armed Resistance Against Japan, founded in 1934, and many local “salvation” groups, which were formed in the wake of the student movement, coalesced to form a National Student Union and a National Salvation Association, both centered in Shanghai. The former claimed to represent some 200,000 students, and the latter included many prominent personalities i n various professions.’ The Communists did not lead these largely spontaneous manifestations of patriotism but quickly moved to take advantage of them. I n Peiping, future Maoist ideologue Ch’en Po-ta, at the time said to have been teaching at China College, K’0o Ch’ing-shih, and others were active i n the student demonstrations, and Liu Shao-ch’i, as new head of the Party’s North China

Bureau, arrived in the area in early 1936 to direct operations. On December 20, a Communist Youth League statement gave the first official Communist

praise for the December student movements, i n the process declaring that the Communist Youth League was reorganizing itself i n order to embrace all patriotic youths for resistance against Japan. The decision to broaden the Party’s youth work i n order to take advantage of growing student activism had already been reached i n November,

1935. Therefore, the Youth League assumed a variety of forms and names before re-emerging as the New Democratic Youth League in the late 1940’s and as t h e Communist Youth League again after 1957. I n late 1935, the League renamed itself the National Salvation Youth League, and the Party was involved i n the formation of the National Liberation Vanguard in February, 1936. I n May, 1936, a Central Committee “decision” required

Youth League members to apply for admission to the CCP in order to ensure tighter control. The Communists also controlled the strongest student group i n North China, the Peiping Student National Salvation Union. I n April, 1937, the Communists formed a Northwest National Salvation Asso-

ciation of Youth with Feng Wen-pin as chairman, and later in that year a Joint Office of China Youth Organizations for National Salvation to coordinate activities of all Communist-led youth groups. By 1940, these were said to have a membership of 1 million in Communist areas, with an estimated 200,000 i n Shen-Kan-ning already b y 1937.® Feng Wen-pin became the

* Tens of thousands of students had demonstrated against Japan in late 1931, but police suppression and propaganda to “save the nation through study,” together with the unreality of Communist policies, had cooled student militancy from 1932 to 1934.

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Party’s principal youth leader during these years,* together with Li Ch’ang, chairman of the National Liberation Vanguard, and others. Policies of Party Central naturally reflected the rising spirit of patriotism

i n late 1935 and 1936. I n November, 1935, writing from Moscow, Ch’en Shao-yii had first spoken specifically of the Communists’ renewing their alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, “ i f he truly stops fighting the Red Army and turns his guns against the Japanese imperialists.” I n contrast to the Party’s August 1, 1935, and earlier declarations, Wang also indicated the

conservative shift of Communist policy by stating ‘the most important of our errors and shortcomings all assume the nature of left exclusionism.’” The CCP Political Bureau formally adopted this more flexible approach to the united front at a conference at Wayaopao, which began on Christmas day, 1935. The editors of Mao’s Selected Works call this conference ‘one

of the most important ever held” by the Party, possibly because Mao further advanced his leadership and because of acceptance of a broader united front policy. The conference called for the ‘broadest national united front,” and M a o elaborated o n December 27: We believe that i n the new situation, when China is threatened with being reduced to a colony, the attitude of . sections of the national bourgeoisie can change. . . . What w i l l be the extent of the change? Its general feature will be vacillation. But at certain stages of our struggle, one section of i t (the left wing) can take part i n the struggle. And the other section can pass from vacillation to neutrality.8

These statements are the forerunners of Mao’s later crucial emphasis on the role of the national bourgeoisie i n building a “New Democracy,”t in a continuation of the four-class alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, and proletariat. Mao noted that the Communists enjoyed a far stronger position than they had i n the united front of the 1920’s, since

“there are already a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, as well as the base areas of the Red Army.””® I n any case, neither Mao nor other Communist leaders, either i n Shensi or Moscow, yet authorized

full cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek and the “big bourgeoisie and feudalists.” According to Mao, “the big local bullies and bad gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradores . have said and are still saying that revolution (of whatever k i n d ) is after all worse than * Little is known about the Youth League’s Sixth to Tenth congresses between 1928 and 1936. Feng Wen-pin succeeded K’ai Feng as Youth League leader at the Eleventh Congress i n July, 1936, and the First Congress of Representatives of Youth i n the Northwest i n April, 1937, attended by some 300 delegates, was said to be the largest since the Youth League’s Fifth Congress held i n Moscow just after the CCP Sixth Congress July, 1928. A Second Congress of the Northwest National Salvation Association of Youth was held i n Yenan i n October, 1937. A Twelfth Youth League Congress w a s h e l d i n H a n k o w i n 1938 a n d a T h i r t e e n t h i n Shanghai i n June, 1947. T h e n , t h e

First Congress of the N e w Democratic Youth League convened i n Peking i n April, 1949, which, since 1922, actually would have been the Youth League’s Fourteenth Congress, or Sixteenth i f one counts the two northwest congresses of 1937. + F r o m the t i t l e o f M a o ’ s w o r k o f January, 1940. T h e n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie w e r e

supposed to be incensed at their loss of markets to imperialists during the “bourgeoisdemocratic” revolution.

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imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors

. . and their interests

are inseparable from those of imperialism; and their chief of chiefs is none other than Chiang Kai-shek.”'® Mao was clearly trying to split the Kuomintang i n order to take fullest advantage of China’s deepening crisis and stated,

“The national bourgeoisie is not the same as the landlord and compradore classes [the “Chiang Kai-shek b l o c ” ] . . The Kuomintang camp will split up when the national crisis reaches its critical point.”** But, while still excluding Chiang Kai-shek, Mao now argued for a broader anti-imperialist coalition, since the ‘‘Japanese invasion has altered the class relations i n

China and i t is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but also for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle.”’'? Following Ch’en Shao-yii’s Moscow statement of November and the December Political Bureau resolution to the effect that “exclusionism poses [t h e ] main danger to the Party,” Mao declared ‘“‘the present situation demands

that we boldly give up closed-door sectarianism, form a broad united Those who insist upon the tactic of closedfront, and curb adventurism. door sectarianism are merely spreading a series of . . infantile disorders. The path of revolution, like the road of every activity i n the world, is

always tortuous, never straight. . . . ” " ? Other important indications i n December, 1935, of Party efforts to make

the united front workable were the adoption of a new name for the Communist government, the “Soviet People’s Republic,” and a December 6 resolution, softening. the land l a w to ensure that rich, as well as middle and

poor, peasants should have the right to land. Both measures aimed to broaden the Party’s appeal by toning down the radicalism of earlier soviet policies, as Mao sought to show “our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation.”’'* Further concessions® became necessary i n 1936 and 1937 because of the continuing precariousness of the Communist military situation, after the western column o f the Long March had suffered heavy losses i n 1936 and after the Communist armies i n Shensi found both stiff resistance and popular response on an expedition

eastward into Shansi i n the late winter and early spring of 1936. The Invasion

of Shansi

The invasion of Shansi i n early 1936 forms a little-known or understood

episode between the Long March and the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan. I n a statement issued on February 21, the Communist high command announced that i t had begun its invasion of Shansi the day before i n order to take concrete measures to carry out the united front b y dramatizing its demands and b y going farther east toward the front lines with Japan. The real reasons for the expedition were more likely the need for supplies, which were desperately short i n northern Shensi, and the need to break

through the tightening Nationalist encirclement into a more favorable area. O n the night o f February 20, 1936, virtually all the Communist military forces, including the I , I I I , and X V Corps under L i n Piao, P’eng

Teh-huai, and Hsii Hai-tung, respectively, and Liu Chih-tan’s partisans, * Such as the July instructions protecting the rich peasants and the August change of the government’s name from a “Soviet People’s” to a “Democratic” Republic. 1 A recent Soviet publication denounces the unreality and errors of the decision to invade Shansi and blames the expedition on Mao’s ambitions.”

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struck eastward across the frozen Yellow River into Shansi Province. Apparently, the Communists had expected to make easy progress in semi-

autonomous Shansi, where the Nationalists had long been at odds with the de facto ruler of the province, warlord Yen Hsi-shan. Yet, progress was anything but easy. After February 20, the main body of Communist troops thrust southeast as far as the vicinity of Hsiaoyi b u t were blocked there b y local troops between March 8 and 11. Thereafter, the Communist forces split into several groups, busily searching for food and provisions and spreading propaganda i n favor of pushing both the national and social revolutions. They apparently enjoyed considerable success, with numerous reports of

the enthusiastic reception of Communist programs. Despite the vigorous and often brutal efforts of Yen Hsi-shan to suppress radicalism, infiltrators had already penetrated several districts of western Shansi in late 1935 and the Communist armies were able to roam through a third of Yen’s territory.’

I n addition to procuring valuable food and supplies and making a generally favorable impression on Shansi peasants and students, the Red Armies recruited perhaps as many as 8,000 soldiers.'®* However, they also suffered heavy losses, especially on the arrival of Nationalist reinforcements after March 20. I n late March, units under Liu Chih-tan were trapped

while attempting to cross the Yellow River and suffered heavy losses, including the fatal wounding of Liu Chih-tan himself. Following other reverses i n April, the Communists were forced to retreat back into Shensi,

the last groups departing May 2 and 3. Pacification or Resistance

This latest example of the Communist armies’ attaining initial successes and popular response b u t being forced to retreat i n the fact of overwhelming enemy pressure, must have encouraged the adoption o f a workable

united front policy. Only such a policy could deflect Nationalist pressure toward Japan and enable the Communists to capitalize on the demonstrated appeal of some of their programs. But the key to the adoption of such a policy more and more seemed to center on the inclusion of Chiang

Kai-shek as leader of a national united front against Japan, a step obviously distasteful to many. O n March 14, the Comintern published an interview

with Mao i n which he spoke for the first time of the possibility that, “ i f Chiang Kai-shek ceases his attack on the Red Army, the Chinese Red Army will also suspend all military action and start a war with Japan i n order

to meet the needs of the people.””*® O n April 25, the CCP Central Committee appealed i n the strongest terms yet for a ‘‘national government of all parties and groups” to fight Japan, and on May 5 the Red Army sent a telegram to the Nanking govern-

ment, somewhat disingenuously claiming patriotic reasons for its withdrawal from Shansi.?* These and other statements showed what Party commentators later explained was a shift from a policy of trying to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek i n order to resist Japan to a “policy of forcing

Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan.”’?! Ever more fearful of the rising menace of fascism, even before Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the anti-Comintern pact on November 25, 1936,

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Moscow naturally took a still more favorable approach to the inclusion of Chiang Kai-shek in the united front. Chiang—for all his enmity to the Communists—seemed to the Russians to be the only leader capable of uniting China in the immediate future. The Chinese Communists naturally moved much more slowly,?? although they also reached the same conclusion. The different pace of progress toward a common program for a united front under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was revealed by the different attitudes toward the rebellion of southwestern generals Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch’ung-hsi, and Ch’en Chi-t’ang, who in June, 1936, announced that they were marching northward to fight Japan, impatient with the failure of the Nanking government to do so. Defections from the southerners’

forces doomed this uprising in early July, but Mao, in a statement of August 10, praised the effort. Moscow, on the contrary, condemned the uprising

from the outset as an intolerable attempt to split the nationalist movement in its hour of greatest need.?® I n moves that typified the dichotomy in Russian policy, the Soviet Union had restored diplomatic relations with Nanking i n December, 1932, but had sold its share of the Chinese Eastern

Railroad to Japan in 1935. Still, Stalin built up his Far Eastern armies and signed a mutual assistance pact with the Mongolian People’s Republic in March, 1936, which ensured continuing hostility between the Soviet Union and Japan. From mid-1936 on, Moscow was exploring the possibility of a treaty of mutual assistance with Nanking and, o n August 21, 1937, signed

a treaty of nonaggression with Nanking. Throughout 1936, the Central Committee, lower Party organizations such as the North China Bureau, and activists i n the various patriotic organizations produced a steady flow of statements attempting to sway public opinion i n favor of an effective united front. Special encouragement was given to the patriotic and student organizations, and, o n March 29,

Mao stated, “the Chinese Soviet Government has decided to render all possible assistance to the student movement i n Shanghai and in other parts

of China.

.’%®

I n his August 10 letter to the National Salvation Asso-

ciation, Mao again urged increased cooperation between such groups and

the Communists in the newly proposed ‘“Democratic’” Republic, as did a Political Bureau resolution of September 17.2°® Party documents adopted

a more respectful tone toward Chiang Kai-shek on August 25, for the first time addressing him as “Generalissimo.” After further Japanese incursions into Suiylian and elsewhere i n the autumn of 1936, the CCP took a more direct hand than previously i n forming patriotic groups, including some

in Sian that played an important role i n the subsequent Sian Incident. The Communists also appealed to such groups as forces under General Sung Che-yiian, and to the secret Elder Brother Society?” and claimed to lead anti-Japanese strikes i n Shanghai and Tsingtao i n November and December. Communist and left-wing theorists and writers, especially i n Shanghai,

demanded more action against Japan and denounced as “red herrings” accusations of collusion with the Communists. Still more important, of course, and partially successful i n the December, 1936, Sian Incident, were Party efforts to establish direct contacts with Nationalist authorities.?® From December, 1935, on, the Chinese Communists sought to confer with representatives of the Nationalist government i n Hong Kong, Shanghai,

and elsewhere, but without verifiable results.?® Closer to their Shensi base,

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the Chinese Communist leadership similarly sought to establish better relations with Yen Hsi-shan, whose territory i n Shansi they had recently

invaded. Despite intensified repressions of Communist sympathizers, Yen came to fear Japanese incursions into Suiyiian to his north even more than the Communists and, b y late 1936, had initiated limited cooperation with

them. There may have been a secret agreement as early as June, and in September Yen backed the founding of a Sacrifice League for National Salvation and allowed Communist Po Yi-po and others to pursue their work in Shansi.?* The first dramatic payoff for Communist efforts and propaganda “ t o fight the Japanese instead of the Communists” came from the Nationalist Northeast and Northwest armies, which had been assigned to blockade the Communists from the south and southwest. A t the start o f 1936, Party

Central had established a committee for work among “white” troops, under Chou En-lai and i n May a subcommittee for work among the

Nationalists on the northern front.?' As early as January 25, the Red Army appealed to the Northeast Army that as Chinese they should not fight other Chinese but should unite with the Communists against the common enemy, Japan. This and subsequent appeals,’ indoctrination, and contacts must have been especially enticing to these men, most of whom came from Manchuria, as did their commander, Chang Hsiieh-liang, the son of warlord Chang Tso-lin. Furthermore, i t was widely rumored and not implausible that Chiang Kai-shek had assigned the Northeast and Northwest armies to the campaign against the Communists largely i n the hope of seeing both sides destroyed. By the summer, these arguments

resulted i n an informal truce between the Communists and the “bandit suppression headquarters” i n Sian, under the nominal leadership of Chang

Hsiieh-liang and Yang Hu-ch’eng, commander of the Northwest Army. Virtually the last Nationalist attack against Wayaopao came in June and led to the moving of Communist headquarters to Paoan. I n August, Chang Hsiieh-liang reportedly conferred with Communist leaders, and, from about

this time on, Communist liaison officers were assigned to the Northeast and Northwest armies.? To deal with the challenge to his authority posed by the independent attitudes of Chang Hsiieh-liang and Yang Hu-ch’eng and to plan further operations to finish off the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek flew into Sian i n late October and again o n December 4. After the first conference i n

November, not only did Chang and Yang refuse to attack the Communists,

but another Nationalist general, H u Tsung-nan, who did attack the Shensi base from the west through Kansu, was disastrously defeated. The Red Armies, soon bolstered b y the arrival of the western column of the Long

March, promptly expanded their territory. Also working against Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence on “pacification first, then resistance” was the intensification o f anti-Japanese sentiment i n

November. Public opinion was inflamed by continuing demonstrations of proliferating patriotic societies (including several incidents i n Sian), b y open fighting against forces allied with the Japanese i n Suiyilian, and b y continuing government repression of what i t regarded as excessively

radical nationalism. There was virtually universal outrage, for example, at the government arrest of “seven gentlemen,” prominent leaders of the

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National Salvation Association in Shanghai, November 22. These events and pressures combined to create the conditions for the celebrated kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek in Sian in December. The Sian Incident

At a conference on December 7 three days after his arrival in Sian, Chiang Kai-shek refused the urgent requests of Chang Hsiieh-liang and Yang Hu-ch’eng for more aggressive anti-Japanese actions and again demanded efforts finally to destroy the Communists. On December 10, Chiang announced plans for a new anti-Communist campaign to begin two days later and said that Chang Hsiieh-liang would be replaced as commander of the “bandit suppression headquarters.” But Chiang’s moves flew in the face of public opinion. Thousands of Sian students had just taken to the streets on the occasion of the first anniversary of the December 9 Peiping student movement to demand “united resistance to Japan.”

What followed these pressures and counterpressures does not seem so surprising i n retrospect, b u t i t astonished China and an interested world

at the time. Before dawn on December 12, members of Chang Hsiieh-liang’s bodyguard surrounded the quarters of Chiang Kai-shek. After a brief scuffle not far from the site of the residences of Chinese emperors more than a thousand years before, Chang’s men arrested the chief of state, who had

scrambled up a hill i n his nightclothes, reportedly losing his false teeth in the process. The forces of Chang Hsiieh-liang and Yang Hu-ch’eng held Chiang captive from December 12 to December 25, all the while guaranteeing his safety but presenting eight demands, calling essentially for the organization of a more representative government, the cessation of the war against the Communists, release of political prisoners such as the “seven gentlemen,” and the convocation of a national salvation conference. O n December 14, the insurgents declared the formation of a

united anti-Japanese army composed of the Northeast, Northwest, and Communist armies and released all political prisoners i n Sian, including some 300 Communists.>* The Nanking government naturally reacted to this crisis w i t h confusion.

Some wished to bomb Sian and invade the Northwest, regardless of the risk for Chiang Kai-shek; others advocated a “wait and see” policy; and still others favored concessions and active negotiations to appease the rebels and secure the Generalissimo’s release. Parts of all three approaches were undertaken and, together with conciliatory attitudes held b y Chiang, Chang Hsiieh-liang, some Chinese Communists, and the Comintern, resulted

i n the release of Chiang Kai-shek on Christmas Day, 1936. Although Chiang denied having made any promises and later treated the whole incident as a somewhat isolated affair,®® he probably agreed orally and i n private to carry out key parts of the insurgents’ demands. I n any case,

their realization i n subsequent months ensured the working out of a basic formula for the second united front i n 1937. Communist attitudes toward the Sian kidnaping are clouded by controversy and speculation about differences between Moscow and the Chinese Communists. The only certainty is that all groups concerned were

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divided as to the proper course of action. The Chinese Communists were i n close touch with the Northeastern and Northwestern armies both before and after the incident, but the actual planning and execution of the plot was carried out without direct Communist participation. At Chang Hsiiehliang’s request, high-ranking Communists were invited to join i n the dis-

cussions of what to do with their famous prisoner and, i n a few days,?® Chou En-lai and Ch’in Pang-hsien flew into Sian, joining Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Fa, and other Communists already there. N o Chinese Communist

statement on the incident was made public until December 19,” but many must have agreed with Chiang Kai-shek’s later assessment that the “Communists would seize upon this rare opportunity either to force me to accept [ t h e i r ] demands or to k i l l me. For to the Communists this meant

life or death.”®® According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, who had arrived in Paoan on December 2 , most Communists, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh,

and himself, were indeed jubilant and favored strong measures to include Chiang’s immediate execution, a public trial, or at least his indefinite

detention as a hostage. But they soon realized that the ultimate decision did n o t belong to them, but to Chang Hsiieh-liang and, to a lesser extent, to the Soviet Union, whose aid all Chinese groups then coveted.?® Unlike the Chinese Communists, Moscow commented publicly on the incident almost immediately, with press comments appearing on December 14.° Although Comintern publications gave varying views of the incident, they were unanimous i n recommending the release of Chiang Kai-shek on condition that he adopt a more forceful policy against Japan. This surprising attitude was due to the fact that, as i n 1926-27, the Soviet Union

had concluded that only with Chiang’s leadership was there a good possibility for an effective united front against Japan i n the near future. At the time, Russia was about to begin the negotiations that culminated in the Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 21, 1937.% As their first euphoria wore off, the Chinese Communists, urged by Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Wang Chia-hsiang, decided to cable Moscow for advice, and Mao Tse-tung drafted Party Central’s explanation of the situation. The Comintern replied a day or two later*? to the effect that the Sian kidnaping was a gross mistake brought on by Japanese intrigues to block the unification of China, which only Chiang Kai-shek could effectively lead. The Chinese Communists therefore should work for the peaceful release of the Generalissimo, preferably after extracting concessions. This unexpected response brought disagreements w i t h i n the Chinese Communist leadership to a head. Mao apparently was among those who favored strong action against Chiang and recommended bringing h i m to Paoan for a public trial to settle the “ b l o o d debts’ he owed the Communists.*® ‘“Internationalists’ such as Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien,

and probably Chou En-lai, on the other hand, favored a peaceful settlement o f the affair i n line w i t h Comintern recommendations. The Party’s North China Bureau, then headed b y Liu Shao-ch’i, stated two weeks later,

“from the start we did not approve of the measures adopted by Chang [ Hsiieh-liang] and Yang [Hu-ch’eng] i n the Sian Incident, and we believe

that this was a most unfortunate affair for China,” since i t could lead to

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civil war and ‘““distintegration in China.”’** Certainly, there were many reasons for the Communists to favor the release of Chiang. As summarized by a recent study of the affair, these included the possibility that they could not prevent his release; the risk that an attempt to eliminate Chiang would cause a split in Sian without producing a favorable result in Nanking; the apparent increase in the power of proJapanese, anti-Communist elements i n Nanking, w h o could b e controlled

only by Chiang, and Chiang’s probable willingness to consider a rapprochement with the CCP if i t recognized his leadership.. . .*°

Yet, in view of Chiang’s actions i n the previous decade, Mao’s and others’ anger and desire for revenge for the slaying of untold thousands of their comrades were also understandable. Hence, i t was hardly sur-

prising that Chou En-lai later stated that “we didn’t sleep for a week, trying to decide. . . . I t was the most difficult decision of our whole lives.’*® The Chinese Communist statement of December 19, proposing an imme-

diate end to the civil war but delaying a final solution of the Sian Incident pending further discussion, clearly showed CP reluctance to follow imme-

diately Moscow’s instructions. Contrary to most Comintern statements, which spoke of Chang Hsiieh-liang and Yang Hu-ch’eng as ‘rascals’ and “traitors,” the December 19 statement praised the leaders of the Northeast and Northwest armies as acting “from patriotic sincerity and zeal, wishing quickly to formulate a national policy of immediate resistance to Japan.”*’ Evidently, therefore, the Party d i d not make u p its mind for some time,

and this may still have been the case when Chang Hsiieh-liang decided to release Chiang on December 25, taking “the Communist delegation i n

Sian completely by surprise.”’*®* Chang Hsiieh-liang, who i t is said had also been angered b y Moscow’s advice to release the Generalissimo,

accompanied Chiang back to Nanking,* reportedly to prevent Chang’s more militant subordinates from shooting down the plane, as threatened.

Chang Hsiieh-liang’s return to Nanking threw the Northeast and Northwest armies into confusion, and many of his younger officers angrily denounced Chou En-lai and other Communists for betraying their leader.*® Whatever the inside story, the importance of the Sian Incident lay in its effect o n the development of the united front, a basis for which was

realized i n the next few months. The Northeast Army still ostensibly blockaded the Communists but withdrew south toward Sian, and, i n January, the Communist leadership moved its headquarters from Paoan to Yenan, the world-famous wartime capital o f the Communists.’® The Communist armies, n o w numbering only some 22,000 with the arrival i n

December of the western column of the Long March under Chang Kuo-t’ao, Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, Ho Lung, Jen Pi-shih, and other leaders, together with another 20,000 or so Party members and political activists, moved to expand and consolidate Communist territory throughout northern Shensi

just south of the Great Wall. These favorable developments of December and January laid the foundations for the most dramatic expansion of a revolutionary movement in all history, especially after the beginning of the war with Japan six months later. * Chang Hsiieh-liang was promptly arrested for “treason” and remained under house arrest into the 1970’s, having been taken to Taiwan i n 1949.

13 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE ANTI-JAPENESE WAR

After the outbreak of open warfare with Japan in 1937, the expansion of Communist power i n China outpaced all expectations. The Party climbed from perhaps 20,000 strong i n 1936' to 40,000 i n 1937, to more than 200,000 i n 1938* and, incredibly, to 800,000 by 1940.) Membership fluctuated around the 800,000 level i n the early 1940’s as the Party sought

to consolidate its gains and as Mao carried out the first large-scale rectification campaign i n Party history.* Then i t expanded again, reaching

1,211,128 by the Party’s Seventh Congress i n April, 1945.° The Red Army, including many Party members i n its ranks, similarly

grew from some 22,000 survivors of the Long March and the early Shensi campaigns to more than twice that figure in 1937, to over 180,000 by late 1938. and to 500,000 i n 1940.° After heavy losses i n intensified fighting with both the Japanese and Nationalists i n 1940-41 and organizational retrenchment u n t i l 1944, the Red Army resumed expansion, reaching 880,000 i n March, 1945, and more than 1 million later i n the year.’ Hence, a Party and army total of some 40,000 as o f 1936 multiplied to 1 million political and military activists (including overlapping memberships) i n four years, and to more than 2 million w i t h i n ten years. Never before i n history had a revolutionary movement grown so rapidly.

Expansion of mass and front organizations of peasants, youth, women, militia, and the like was equally impressive, and the Communists claimed fantastic increases i n the numbers of people under their control, from 1.5 to 2 million i n 1936 to 96 m i l l i o n by 1945 i n 19 bases and 638 counties. The militia similarly expanded from 500,000 or so early i n the war to more than 2 million by 1945.2 The Chinese Communist movement, i n imminent danger of extinction or at least of reduction to a fragmented

guerrilla or exile group i n 1936, emerged from the war a strong contender for national power. Reasons for Wartime Growth of Communist Power

How was this spectacular breakthrough possible? Undoubtedly, Japan’s invasion of China, i n part justified as an effort

to “save China from Communism,” did more than any other single thing

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to bring about this astounding growth. But the expansion of the Chinese Communist movement ultimately depended on the astute leadership, unremitting work, carefully planned programs, and, above all, organizational abilities of its leaders. There has been considerable debate in recent scholarship as to whether nationalism or demands for social revolution played the greater role in the wartime growth of Chinese Communism.” The argument is analogous to the debate about the relative importance of the Communist and Chinese elements i n Chinese Communism after 1949, and the answer in each case

is that of course both elements have always been present but their importance i n relation to each other has varied according to person, time, and place. A t any rate, the real key to Communist success was neither nationalism nor social revolution, o r even both of them, b u t rather the Communists’ ability to organize the Chinese people o n the basis o f both themes. Every man, woman, and child in Communist areas was involved

to some degree i n their varied programs. Certainly, Japan’s invasion greatly dramatized the problems of Chinese nationalism and hence led to an adjustment in Communist policies and appeals b u t not to the exclusion of demands for social revolution. Com-

munist programs were toned down i n the interests of the united front, but i t was still clear that Party calls for interest and rent reduction, rather than forcible redistribution of land, for proportional political representation and the like, whatever their sincerity and intellectual origins, implied far more

radical social change than did Nationalist policies and actions.*® As always, of course, local conditions determined priorities and successes and failures. I n some areas, Communists continued to recruit cadres and sympathy primarily through social revolution, while, i n other areas, as during the mid-1920’s, they attempted to mobilize primarily through the appeals of nationalism. Nationalism was usually the more popular cause i n the more populous Communist areas behind Japanese lines, which

furnished the bulk of new recruits, but recruits i n the original Shensi base and top Party leaders continued to be primarily committed to the

social revolution as the only effective way of “saving the nation.” According to a leading historian, “ I n northern Shensi, the peasants first reacted powerfully and positively to the Communist-led agrarian revolution during 1935-36,” o r well before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. For

example, a 1939 Party survey of a township near Yench’uan, about 50 miles northeast of Yenan, stated that only one of the 134 Party members who had joined the Party between 1927 and 1939 had done so primarily to fight Japan, while the rest had joined chiefly to push the land revolution

i n the township.} * I n t h i s respect, Communist w a r t i m e m o d e r a t i o n w a s more t h a n offset b y t h e

growing conservatism of the Kuomintang, which used the familiar argument that they could not simultaneously fight a war and lead a revolution. The Communists d i d just that, using the war as a powerful additional weapon i n their continuing organizational and revolutionary work. As Mao continually said, nationalism and revolution, organization and goals, were inseparably intertwined. + Three cadres had joined from 1927 to 1934, 11 from January to March, 1935, 47 from April t o D e c e m b e r , 1935, w h e n t h e l a n d r e v o l u t i o n w a s begun there, 4 1 i n 1936, 2 4 i n 1937, 7 i n 1938, a n d 1 i n 1939. T h e 134 P a r t y members i n t h i s t o w n s h i p con-

stituted 7 per cent of the population, a much higher proportion than the average 1 per cent i n other “ r e d ” areas.”

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The land revolution was toned down i n April and July, 1936, and, by January, 1937, calls for violent land revolution had been terminated i n northern Shensi. By then, however, land redistribution had been completed i n ten of twelve Communist-held districts and parts of another dozen dis-

tricts, while about three-quarters of the local population i n some areas received new land. Redistribution i n turn produced a new middle class and a “rich-peasant question.” As late as 1943, a resolution o n political work

in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region similarly stated that 90 per cent of the Communist cadres at the subdistrict and township levels were the products of peasant revolutionary struggles.'' Part of this “revolutionary struggle” was against Japan, of course, and the Yenan area, from which the above

samples were drawn, was west of the areas of farthest Japanese penetration. To the east, behind Japanese lines, the struggle against Japan understandably was far more important as an inducement to recruitment, and i t was i n these areas that most early wartime Party expansion took place.

Other statistics from western Hopeh and northern Kiangsu showed that more than three-quarters of Party members joined after 1937. Many students i n Peiping and other cities also joined the Party and associated youth groups at this time essentially for nationalistic reasons.'* But these wartime nationalistic recruits, w i t h a few exceptions, rarely made i t to the top of

the Party hierarchy and were far more vulnerable to later rectification campaigns, i n contrast to the Long March generation and North China peasant struggle cadres. Another factor contributing to rapid Communist growth i n all areas was the further development of the uniquely effective “popular style” of the Red Army. Strict regulation of military-civil relations, barring pillage of the confiscations from the poor and stressing propaganda, entet-

tainment, and participation i n farming, helped to forge close ties with the masses. One must therefore distinguish among Communist base areas during the war, as each had its distinctive problems and policies. Nevertheless, one can generalize that both the national and social revolutions continued to demand attention, w i t h the themes of nationalism receiving greater atten-

tion than ever before i n the early war years and especially in the East China bases behind Japanese lines. Communist leaders limited open class struggle to that against “traitors” b u t continued to insist that effective national mobilization could only be realized through the struggle for a more egalitarian society, which they sought to achieve through progressive taxation and drives to reduce rent and interest.

The Communist commitment to both social and national revolution and their growing stress o n the latter during the early war years can be seen i n Party pronouncements on the united front. I n May, 1937, M a o stated, China has long been riddled by two kinds of intense and basic contradictions—the contradiction between imperialism and China and that between The situation since the feudalism and the great masses of the people. . [Mukden] Incident of September 18, 1931, and especially since the series of events in North China i n 1935, has brought about the following changes The contradiction between China and imperiali n these contradictions. ism i n general gave way to a particularly sharp one between China and The contradiction between China and Japan has Japanese imperialism. brought about a change i n the class relations at home! [so that now] the

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contradiction between China and Japan has become the primary one and China’s internal contradictions a secondary and subordinate one.

I t followed that, as Mao put i t a year and a half later, “the interests of the class struggle must not conflict w i t h , b u t b e subordinated to the interests of the war of resistance. B u t , ” he went on, ‘ t h e classes and the class struggle do exist The theory which attempts to deny the existence

of the class struggle is utterly erroneous. We do not deny the class struggle but adjust it.”’*® As he said i n 1938, “ t h e class struggle assumes the form of

national struggle,””*® and, in 1941, those “who fail to understand the unity between national struggle and the class struggle” will not be able to carry out Party policies correctly. “ T h e united front policy is the class policy,

and the two are inseparable; one will not be clear about many problems unless one is clear about this point.”** I n terms of classes, as he had stated as early as December, 1935, and would stress particularly i n “ O n N e w Democracy” i n January, 1940, Mao envisaged a return to an even broader class alliance than had characterized

the united front of the 1920’s, with cooperation among the ‘proletariat, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and all persons i n the

country who agree to undertake a national and democratic revolution. . ” ’ ' ® Some big landlords and big bourgeoisie, Mao noted, had collaborated or would collaborate with the Japanese to protect their economic interests, but some could cooperate with an anti-Japanese united front of “ a l l parties and groups of people i n all walks of life.” The peasantry and petty bourgeoisie would still be the primary allies of the Party of the proletariat, but, even i n the 1920’s, the Communists had never gone so far as to talk of cooperation with “ a l l who agree.” However, i n his report o f May, 1937, M a o declared that the history of the 1920’s “should not be repeated,”

because now the proletariat and its Party were i n a position, by virtue of the Communist bases and Red Army, to avoid becoming “politically the tail of the bourgeoisie’ as had happened in 1927." Therefore, Mao asserted, “there are limits to the concessions [ t h e Party would make]. T o preserve

the Communist Party’s leadership i n the special region [Shen-Kan-Ning] and the Red Army and to preserve the Communist Party’s independence

and freedom of criticism i n its relations with the Koumintang

such

are the limits of the concessions beyond which i t is impermissible to go.”’*°

The Communists did press the Nationalist Party to reform itself and adopt a more vigorous attitude toward the united front. Although the Communists dropped the. demand for democratic reforms as a condition for the united front, they continued to call for the creation of a more representative government. I n August, 1937, Mao argued that the Kuomintang has not changed its policies at all i n matters like arousing the masses to action and making political reforms: Basically, the Kuomintang is still unwilling to unleash the people’s anti-Japanese movement, is

still unwilling to make fundamental changes i n the government apparatus, still has no plans for improving the people’s living conditions, and is still not sincere enough i n its cooperation with the Communist Party. M a o went o n to push maximum Communist efforts to expand at the expense

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The Early Years of the Anti-Japanese War

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of both the Nationalists and the Japanese. Thus, there were adjustments i n emphasis of Communist policies, with commitment to the national revolution temporarily becoming paramount over commitment to the social revolution, but the latter was not to be dropped. Rather, both elements were complementary.

Because of the shift i n emphasis to primarily anti-Japanese and ‘“democratic’ propaganda, many observers came to believe that M a o and other

Chinese Communists were mainly nationalists and were closer in their economic and social ideas to ‘agrarian reformers” than to Soviet-style Communists.?® These views clearly derived from ignorance, and i t is obvious that, from the Communist point of view, changes i n propaganda

and policies were due primarily to the altered circumstances arising after the Japanese invasion. O f course, the moderation of Communist wartime

policies happened to be good politics, both for the Communist movement as a whole and for Mao personally, as he was still competing with the “Russian returned students,” the leading exponents of the stress on social revolution during the early 1930’s. But ultimate objectives had not changed. I n March, 1937, Mao explained, “The CCP will never forgo its socialist and Communist ideals, which will be realized b y the transition from the

bourgeois democratic stage of the revolution [ t o the socialist stage].”’?® A June, 1938, propaganda outline stated: “Only a Communist society will completely realize the final liberation o f the Chinese nation and the

Chinese people,” a theme stressed even more i n the 1939 works by Liu Shao-ch’i and Ch’en Yiin on the training of Communists.>* I n 1940, Mao made the matter crystal clear by distinguishing between the Party’s maximum and minimum programs: “Everybody knows that, as regards the social system, the Communist Party has its present program and its future program, or its minimum program and its maximum program. For the present, N e w Democracy, and for the future, socialism—these are two parts of

an organic whole, guided by one and the same Communist ideology.’’** On the other hand, the Communists undoubtedly foresaw a long period of cooperation with the “bourgeoisie,” first against Japan and then for the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Indeed, as late as late 1946, Mao repeatedly spoke of the necessity for a twenty-year struggle

before final victory, while early i n the war Mao was quoted as stating, “The interests of the Kuomintang and of the CCP are identical.”’?® I n October, 1938, M a o went so far as to say, ‘ o n e can foresee a brilliant future for the Kuomintang.”’?” Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek quoted Lin Piao to the effect that “ i t is the expectation of the Chinese Communists that a solid founda-

tion for final victory will be laid under your [Chiang’s] leadership.”’?® Hence, i n view of general ignorance about the Chinese Communists and their own surprise at the rapidity with which they were able to move from the bourgeois-democratic to the socialist revolution, wartime confusion about their long-range goals was understandable. Nevertheless, even during

the Yenan period, t h e Communists’ two-sided approach, stressing nationalism but tying i t to continual social and economic improvements, was clearly

effective. By 1945, this combination of an effective program and skillful leadership had completely transformed the power relationships within China i n favor of the Communists.

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The Early War Period On January 6, 1937, in the aftermath of the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek, the national movement abolished the ‘ b a n d i t suppression head-

quarters” i n Sian, although anti-Communist troops continued their blockade, i f less conscientiously than before. On February 10, on the eve of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee’s Third Plenum, Communist

Party Central sent a telegram to the Nationalists declaring that, if the Nationalists finally ended their war against the Communists and undertook progressive reforms and active resistance to Japan, the CCP would agree

“ ( 1 ) to cease all efforts to overthrow the national government; (2) to rename the Chinese Communist government as the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China. . . and to designate the Red Army as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army . ; (3) to put into effect i n the special region a democratic system based on universal suffrage .; (4) and [ t o ] abolish confiscation of landlords’ land.””?® O n February 21, the Kuomintang plenum made no public commitments but demanded concessions similar to the above from the Communists, especially an end to the

“class struggle . [which] divides people into opposing groups and sets them hating and killing one another. 3 The CCP then launched a campaign to persuade those Communists who favored continued struggle

with the Nationalists of the necessity for further compromises and, on April 15, declared the concessions of February ‘necessary because without them the anti-Japanese united front cannot be organized.”’?* They justified their tactical retreat on social questions as necessary because of the new primacy

of national contradiction over social contradictions and declared their willingness t o follow Sun Yat-sen’s three principles of nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood. Thus began a period—aptly termed the struggle on two fronts—against both Japan and native reaction.??

The Sino-Japanese War began more than four years before the Japanese attack o n Pearl Harbor w i t h the flare-up on July 7 , 1937, of fighting

between Japanese and Chinese troops outside of Peiping at Marco Polo Bridge. Although both Nanking and Tokyo initially temporized and sought to localize the conflict, o n July 17, Chiang Kai-shek declared he would

make no further concessions to Japan and sent reinforcements into Hopeh, while the Japanese military, as i t had for years, forced the hand of its government.

As sporadic fighting continued i n the North, a Japanese expeditionary

force landed in the Shanghai area on August 13 to avenge the deaths of several navy men o n August 9. Later i n the month, a Japanese force invaded through the Nank’ou Pass northwest of Peiping and, in midSeptember, began a general advance southward, conquering most of Hopeh Province i n October. Despite the first great Chinese victory of the war i n

late September at P’inghsing Pass on the Hopeh-Shansi border, i n which Communist units under L i n Piao played a decisive role, other Japanese forces were able to take Taiyiian, the capital of Shansi, in early November.

To the south, following fierce fighting i n the Shanghai area from August 13 to November 12, the Japanese advanced westward to launch the infamous ‘rape of Nanking” o n December 13. After the Japanese capture

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of Hangchow on December 24, the focus of fighting again shifted to the north. There, Nationalist forces under Sun Lien-chung and L i Tsung-jen defeated the Japanese at T’aierchuang i n southern Shantung from April

1 to 5, 1938, but the Japanese were able to take southern Shantung and link with other Japanese forces pushing north from the Yangtze valley. A desperate Nationalist diversion of the Yellow River from the north to the south of Shantung failed to halt the Japanese advance but inundated vast areas and displaced millions of Chinese, many of whom died i n the floods. From mid-1938 on, the Japanese resumed their drive i n the Yangtze valley and naval expeditions took Canton and other principal coastal

cities. By late October, Japanese forces had pushed the Nationalists out of the Wuhan cities, where they had established headquarters after the fall of Nanking, and forced the Nationalist government to move to its famous wartime capital, Chungking. Thus, by the end of 1938, the Japanese controlled the more developed areas of North and East China. Their superior power was obvious, b u t the Nationalists, led b y Chiang Kai-shek, continued to reject surrender terms that would have reduced China to the status of a Japanese colony. The Chinese traded space for time and, as d i d the Russians several years later, used the vastness of their country and the patri-

otism of millions to foil the plans of superior invading armies. The Chinese were able to move, much as Mao had forecast i n May, 1938, from a period

of retreat and defense i n 1937-38 to a period of stalemate i n 1939-44, to a counteroffensive i n 1945. M a o claimed the Red Army tied down the

bulk of Japanese troops and bore the brunt of fighting from 1940 to 1944, b u t the Nationalists, of course, and some Japanese sources dispute this contention.®® The Japanese sought w i t h limited success to establish puppet govern-

ments ruled by Chinese but responsive to Japanese wishes. The first of these was Manchukuo, established i n Manchuria under the last Manchu emperor i n 1932. After the outbreak of full-scale war, three governments, under the control of Japanese military units, were established at Kalgan,

Inner Mongolia, on September 4, 1937, at Peiping on December 14, 1937, and at Nanking on March 28, 1938. I n March, 1940, the Japanese induced Wang Ching-wei, an heir apparent to Sun Yat-sen, a longstanding rival to Chiang Kai-shek, and, after the defeats o f 1937-38, a proponent of a settlement with Japan, to form a new ‘ n a t i o n a l government” at Nanking. I t

“substituted an anti-Western oriented Asian nationalism for an antiJapanese oriented Chinese nationalism’ and managed to w i n the support of some influential Chinese, including former Communists Chou Fo-hai,

Ch’en Kung-po, and others. But Wang Ching-wei’s government failed to procure a favorable peace settlement, was a l l too obviously at the mercy of the Japanese armies, and hence failed to w i n over any important segment of Chinese nationalist opinion, the dominant force of the time.** Thus, after 1938, at the end of the first phase of the war, there were

four major forces i n China.*® The Japanese controlled most of North and East China, all the port cities and main transportation lines, and were content to await the expected, b u t never realized, Chinese surrender. They

launched no further major military drives against the Nationalists until

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1944. Secondly, there were the puppet forces, which served as auxiliaries of the Japanese and, with the defection of Wang Ching-wei in 1940, had some prestigious leaders.

The Nationalists, however, enjoyed far greater support than these two groups and still controlled the rich Szechwan plain and other areas of

Southwest China, including the major cities of Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming. Their only access to Western supplies was through Indochina and Burma (from 1941 on, mostly by air) and to Soviet supplies and contacts was through Sinkiang. The Soviet Union, in fact, was the only country to aid China during the early years of the war. I t signed a treaty of nonaggression o n August 21, 1937, sent aid of about $300 million (U.S.) to the Nationalists, and stationed as many as 500 Soviet military advisers

and pilots with them, though none with the Communists, so far as is known. All this aid reportedly led M a o to query i n December, 1937, “ I f so much

could be given to Chiang Kai-shek, why could not we get a small share?’’®¢ Finally, among leading wartime groups were the Communist guerrilla forces, at first isolated in the Northwest but soon expanding, at an accelerating rate, behind and between Japanese lines in North China, and, with greater difficulty, i n East and South China. After about 1940, there were

three types of territory i n North and East China, Japanese controlled, Communist controlled, and no-man’s land.

The Second United Front The Communist version of the wartime united front, embracing open struggle against Japan and at first “peaceful competition’ with the Nation-

alists, worked most smoothly in 1937-38. On July 8, 1937, the day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Communists telegraphed the Nationalists their pledge to “closely cooperate and resist new Japanese attacks,’’®” and,

the following day, they requested reorganization and assignment of the Red Army. O n July 15, the Communists delivered a ‘“Manifesto o n Kuo-

mintang-CCP Cooperation” to the Nationalist government, which, however, was not made public until September 22.*® The manifesto reiterated the substance of the Communist concessions of February 10 and elaborated that the Party would “strive for the realization of Sun Yat-sen’s Three

People’s Principles,

. abandon its policies of armed revolt, sovietization,

and forcible confiscation of land, . . . abolish the present soviet government, and abolish the term ‘Red Army’ and place Communist troops under

government command.’’*® I n August, at an important Party conference at Loch’uan, Shensi, to which we shall return, the Communists worked out the basis of their political program for the war, known as the “ten-point program” or ‘ t e n great

policies.” I n line with the concept of the struggle on two fronts, only two of the ten policies were directly anti-Japanese, while the rest called for

internal reform to make “mass mobilization” effective, including political, economic, and educational reforms.*° The crucial question in the formation of the second united front, of course, had always been the disposition of the Communist armies, which the Kuomintang insisted must be integrated with Nationalist armies and

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placed under their control. O n August 22, Nanking took the first step

toward this goal by appointing Chu Teh and P’eng Teh-huai commander and deputy commander, respectively, of Communist units, newly designated as the famous Eighth Route Army.* The units remained Communist but

adopted Nationalist uniforms and standards, posted pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and received some weapons and supplies from the Nationalists. On August 25, Chu Teh and P’eng Teh-huai pledged “our sincere support to Generalissimo Chiang . . . ” * The Eighth Route Army was supposed to be limited to 45,000 men but, ignoring this formality, expanded to 400,000 men by 1940. O n October 12,

the Nationalists further authorized Communist units i n South China numbering perhaps 12,000 men to be designated the New Fourth Army, which grew to perhaps 100,000 men b y 1940. I n September, Nationalists had tacitly recognized the existence of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region*? and, on January 30, 1938, sanctioned the formation of a second Communist area, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin-

Ch’a-Chi) Border Region, these being the only two of sixteen or so eventual Communist bases that were officially acknowledged by the government. During the early years of the war, the Nationalist government furnished

$100,000 (Chinese) per month for the operations of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and u p to another $500,000 (Chinese) monthly for the Eighth Route Army. I n 1940, the Nationalist government reportedly gave $10.4 million (Chinese) to the Communists, b u t this subsidy ended after that year.*®* The government invited Chu Teh and Chou En-lai to sit i n o n meetings of the Supreme National Defense Council i n August, 1937, and

early the following year announced the creation of a People’s Political Council, which met i n July, 1938, w i t h seven Communist representatives,

twenty-three representatives of small parties, twenty independents, and 150 members of the Kuomintang.** The Nationalists also authorized the publication of a Communist newspaper, the New China Daily, after March, 1938, in Hankow and from late 1938 on i n Chungking. Despite these concessions, the Nationalists had no intention of giving the Communists free rein and, o n the contrary, restricted Communist efforts to organize and propagandize

in Nationalist areas, harassing or closing bookstores, publications, and youth organizations. Briefly in mid-1937, and again i n the autumn of 1938, the Communists advocated infiltration b y individuals into the Kuomintang, but, i n contrast to Communist policy i n the first united front period, entry into the Nation-

alist Party was subsequently forbidden. According to Mao i n October, 1938, the Communists were willing to enter either a united front from within, with Communists i n the Kuomintang “ i n an open manner,” or a united front from without, but i n the absence of Kuomintang permission * Later, Jen Pi-shih became director of the political department, and Yeh Chienying chief-of-staff. I n January, 1938, the Nationalists changed the Red Army’s designation to Eighteenth Army Group, but we shall continue to use the more common appellation, Eighth Route Army. + See Chart 14.2 below for component units of Eighth Route and New Fourth armies.

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for either policy, had to cooperate i n a more limited way.** Chou En-lai,

who was by far the most conspicuous Communist to participate in Nationalist affairs during the war, became one of seventeen members of the presidium of the Extraordinary National Conference of the Kuomintang in March, 1938, and was appointed vice-minister of the political training board of the Military Council, holding that post u n t i l 1940.*¢ United front policy also vitally affected Communist relations with Yen

Hsi-shan, warlord of Shansi Province. When the Communists invaded Shansi in early 1936, they went primarily i n search of supplies but justified the movement as an effort to go east to fight the Japanese and experimented with united front propaganda. Despite such provocations, the intensification of the Japanese threat induced Yen Hsi-shan to cooperate with the Communists i n the formation of the Sacrifice League for National Salvation and subsequently of popular military forces, such as the “dare to die corps,” under the command of Po Yi-po and other Communists. However, following the loss of Taiyiian and most of Yen’s territory to the Japanese i n late 1937, reactions to increased Communist activities b y Shansi conservatives led to the complete breakdown of the united front i n Shansi b y

late 1939. Communist-led Shansi popular organizations joined neighboring Red Army units—often clashing w i t h conservative forces i n the process*"— and together formed at least three major Communist bases i n the province.

The Chin-Ch’a-Chi base had already been established i n northeastern Shansi i n 1938, and i n the southeast there developed the important Shansi-HopehShantung-Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii) base, which was formally organized i n July, 1941. Northwestern Shansi was dominated b y Communist forces centered i n what became the Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui) base. Yen Hsishan was forced back into southwestern Shansi and Shensi, controlling only about one-eighth of the former, while the Communists acquired most of the territory not occupied b y the Japanese.*® The split i n Shansi, and renewed fighting w i t h the Nationalists i n north-

ern Shensi climaxed what the Communists call the “first anti-Communist upsurge” o f late 1939 and early 1940.** Clashes between Communists and Nationalist units had occurred as early as 1938, and i n July the Nationalists

moved against Communist-dominated mass organizations i n the Wuhan cities. I n the autumn of 1938, the Nationalists ordered the dissolution of the Communist organizations i n southern Hopeh, and after the middle of 1939, the Nationalists employed as many as 200,000 and later u p to 500,000 troops to enforce a blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning region. I n April, 1939, following a Kuomintang call i n January for action against Communist expansion, clashes i n Shantung between Communist and Nationalist forces at times involved hundreds of casualties. Other clashes occurred thereafter i n Hopeh, Honan, Anhwei, Shansi, Shantung, Hupeh, and Hunan.*® I n

December, 1939, Nationalist troops occupied five formerly Communist areas in Shensi.

A “second anti-Communist upsurge,” including clashes in southern Shansi i n the spring of 1940 and climaxed b y the January, 1941, incident i n which the Nationalists tried to destroy the N e w Fourth Army because

of alleged insubordination, virtually ended wartime cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists, although some contacts were maintained.

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Party Conferences and Disputes in 1937-38 These developments i n the united front naturally led to severe debates within the CCP over a proper course of action. A t a series of crucial meet-

ings i n 1937-38, some party members “on the left,” we are told, continued to oppose any real cooperation with the Nationalists, while others “ o n the right” allegedly favored unprincipled capitulation to the government and,

in Mao’s words, seemed “honored on receiving appointments from the Kuomintang (i.e., to become officials) .””** O n at least “one occasion,” there

were even advocates within the Party of capitulation to Japan. Mao claimed to lead a middle course between the two extremes of intransigence and surrender to the KMT, working for a form of cooperation that would maximize both Chinese resistance to Japan and chances for Communist expansion. I f , as we have seen, he appeared to have opposed working with the Fukien rebels i n 1933-34 and i n December, 1936, opposed the release of Chiang Kai-shek after the Sian Incident, Mao must have been associated with the “left” on many specific questions of the united front. However, when not dealing directly with unpalatable Nationalist leaders, M a o argued for a generally broader conception of the united front and “against closed-door sectarianism and adventurism,” as at the Wayaopao Conference i n December, 1935, and more definitely b y the spring of 1 9 3 7 . Then, b y November, 1937, he came to feel that the Party had

moved too far to the “right” and was i n danger of repeating the mistakes of the first united front, as ‘“the main danger within the Party is n o longer ‘left’ closed-door sectarianism but right opportunism, i.e., capitulationism. . .”’"* The Comintern, as i n the 1920’s, and such Chinese leaders as Ch’en Shao-yii continued to argue that the main danger to the Party was from the

“left” and that therefore the Communists as well as the Nationalists were responsible for any failure of the united front.*® According to Mao, i n 1937 and 1938, the principal advocates of rightist

deviation in united front policy were Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ch’en Shao-yii. I n fact, Chang and Ch’en seem to have been indicted more for their opposition to Mao Tse-tung than for differences i n interpretation over the united front. This conclusion is suggested not only by the admittedly ambiguous documentary record but by the fact that a third leader, Liu Shao-ch’i, then secretary of the Party’s North China Bureau, who seems to have made the strongest case of all for following the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, was shortly rewarded rather than rebuked. This was because M a o

decided to cooperate with Liu against Ch’en Shao-yii and others, overlooking presumably genuine differences over the interpretation o f the united

front. Mao may also have feared an alliance between Liu Shao-ch’i and Chang Kuo-t’ao, as Chang suggested thirty years later."® I n March, 1937, at Yenan, Party Central, still led b y a coalition o f Chang Wen-t’ien as General Secretary, M a o Tse-tung as director of the Military Affairs Committee, K ’ a i Feng as director of the Central Commit-

tee’s propaganda department, L i Fu-ch’un, director of the organization department, Li Wei-han, director of the Central Party School, Chu Teh as commander i n chief of the Red Army, future head of the Shen-Kan-Ning government Lin Po-ch’li, and others, launched a major campaign against

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alleged vacillation and defiance of Party Central by Chang Kuo-t’ao. Criticisms were inevitable after Chang’s actions during the latter part of the Long March and the destruction of most of his units i n the western column

in the winter of 1936-37. Local conferences to “liquidate the errors of Chang Kuo-t’ao” were held in March, and in April a meeting,” attended by forty persons, met formally to censure him. Party Central accused Chang of errors dating back to his leadership of the Oyiliwan Soviet, including the overly harsh suppression of counterrevolutionaries; political, organizational,

and military errors; neglect of the mass line; and, particularly, his creation of a central leadership in western Szechwan and Sikang parallel to that i n northern Shensi. K’ai Feng, P’eng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, and others, reportedly at the urging of Chang Wen-t’ien and Mao, denounced Chang for

turning into a “bandit and warlord,” for indiscriminate use of torture in punishing counterrevolutionaries, and even for sanctioning sex orgies for his troops.®®

Chang naturally refused to admit justification for these charges, and some

of his old Fourth Front Army followers plotted to break away from Yenan and establish a separate base area. The plot, i f real, was suppressed with the arrest of some forty persons, although Mao, Chang Wen-t’ien, Lin Po-

ch’li, and Tung Pi-wu temporarily mediated the dispute by releasing some w h o had been arrested and inducing Chang to give a partial confession of “right opportunism, retreatism, and warlordism.”’*® From M a y 3 to May 20, 1937, Party leaders held another important meeting i n Yenan, later called a National Conference o f Party Delegates,

attended by a hundred of the most important leaders i n North China. Its presidium included Chang Wen-t’ien, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Ch’in Panghsien, L i n Po-ch’ii, and L i n Piao. Mao’s report “ T h e Tasks of the CCP i n

the Period of Resistance to Japan” gave the orthodox interpretation of the united front, as had been outlined i n the February 10 telegram to the Kuomintang, but also stressed the struggle for “democracy” and for an independent role for the CCP. Mao’s report was the subject of much of the

business of the conference, but a second report caused a furor that in effect upstaged Mao’s talk, although nothing has been said officially about this episode. The controversial document, written by Liu Shao-ch’i, reportedly attacked “leftist” Communist policies as far back as those of Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n the 1920’s and pleaded for a more moderate line and an honest effort to make the united front work.®® As he had done at the Tsunyi Con-

ference, Liu condemned previous Communist urban policies for preventing open legal activity and, hence, effective work among labor and youth i n

“white” areas. According to revelations during the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shao-ch’i allegedly committed another rightist error i n 1936 and 1937 when he authorized imprisoned Communists to confess as a means of securing their release. Wang Jo-fei i n Taiyiian, Po Yi-po and A n Tzu-wen i n Peiping, and many others supposedly won their freedom i n this way. But this policy of

freedom through confession must have been approved, i f not initiated, by Communist echelons superior to Liu Shao-ch’i’s North China Bureau.* Liu’s alleged denunciation at the M a y conference of virtually the entire

past leadership of the CCP naturally provoked counterdenunciations by

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Chang Wen-t’ien, Ka’i Feng, and others. The conference declared Liu’s report unacceptable and invalid and instead adopted Chang Wen-t’ien’s alternate report, “ T h e CCP i n the Past Decade.” This document stressed accomplishments and blamed “white” terror and Nationalist military pressure as well as “Trotskyism,” but not Party policies, for the setbacks o f

the early and mid-1930’s. After the May conference, Liu Shao-ch’i was transferred to Yenan from his post as secretary of the Party’s North China Bureau. His retention of important jobs and subsequent elevation to the Political Bureau were said to be due to Mao’s backing because of Mao’s decision to use Liu Shao-ch’i’s arguments against the ‘“Russian returned students’ and Chang Kuo-t’ao. A third important Party meeting of 1937 was convened on August 25 in a village near Loch’uan, then headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, about

50 miles south of Yenan. This enlarged Political Bureau conference, attended b y about twenty, worked out some concrete questions of the united front and approved three key documents for united front work, the “Ten-

Point National Salvation Program,” which had been distributed on August 15 by the propaganda department, the organization department’s August 12 “Directive on Principles for Local Work During the War of Resistance,” and a “Resolution of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and the Party’s Task.”’¢® Once again, there was heated debate over interpretation and implementation of the united front, especially as i t related to the operations o f the

Red Army. Regarding the latter’s reorganization and integration with Nationalist armies, Chu Teh, supported by Chou En-lai and others, favored acceptance of a Kuomintang proposal that Nationalist staff officers work with the Eighth Route Army and that the Communist and Nationalist armies fight alongside each other against the Japanese i n certain areas. Mao Tsetung, supported b y Jen Pi-shih and others, argued that acceptance of Nationalist officers and restrictions would fatally weaken Communist military organization and that the Communists should continue to fight separately and i n their own style. I n the end, the conference agreed to a compromise proposal, worked out b y Chang Wen-t’ien, which would formally accept Nationalist military organization and a suspension of the

political commissar system, but would keep real control under the Communists b y strengthening Party cells and assigning former political com-

missars as deputies or directors of political departments at various levels of the army. I n the matter of military expansion, Chang Wen-t’ien proposed and won approval for, first, following Nationalist orders in Shansi and assigned areas in order to gain Nationalist confidence and popular approval but, then, expanding into other areas, using guerrilla tactics as circumstances and greater Communist strength permitted.®* The most heated debate at the conference concerned the over-all strategy

of the united front, with Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t’ao taking opposite positions. Chang later summarized the dispute as between his policy of “victory for all,” Nationalists and Communists, and Mao’s proposal of “defeat for all,” Nationalists and Japanese. According to his own account, Chang, supported by Chou En-lai and others, advocated sincere cooperation with the Nationalists, i n the interests of jointly defeating Japan, but Mao,

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supported by Ch’in Pang-hsien and others, argued for defeat first of Japan and then of the Nationalists. M a o held that the CCP could take advantage

of Nationalist preoccupation with Japan and differences of opinion within the Kuomintang over how to prosecute the war i n order to expand Communist power at the expense of both Japan and the Nationalists. Conversely, Chang Kuo-t’ao argued that effective resistance to Japan could only be achieved through genuine cooperation and that the Communists could force the Nationalists to adopt more satisfactory domestic programs. I n September, Mao supposedly summarized his policy under a formula advocating that 70 per cent of Communist efforts be devoted to expansion, 20 per cent to dealing with the Nationalists, and only 10 per cent directly to fighting Japan.®’ The temporary result of the Loch’uan Conference debates, therefore, was a more aggressive interpretation of the united front than had been prevalent earlier i n 1937. However, the conference reaffirmed the “ten-

point program’ with its substantial concessions to the Nationalists in terms of propaganda and land reform, which would henceforth stress nationalism and rent and interest reduction, respectively, rather than class

struggle. But there were subsequent shifts i n Party policies on these questions. Debates over united front policy and maneuverings within what was still essentially a collective leadership continued to dominate the CCP later in the year and i n 1938. During this period, Mao seems to have played on splits over interpretations of the united front and w i t h i n the formerly

dominant “Internationalist” group to enhance his position further. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Mao gained more and more control over military

matters, and, with the help of Chang Wen-t’ien and others, also over communications and Party work. O n November 12, 1937, after the Japanese

conquest of Shanghai, Taiylian, and other key points, at a conference of Party activists, he sought to dramatize his position b y asking, “Should we

raise the Kuomintang to the level of the ten-point program . . advocated by the Communist Party, or should we lower the Communist Party to the level

of the Kuomintang’s dictatorship of the landlord class and bourgeoisie and its partial resistance?’’®® A t the urging of Mao and others, the Red Army’s political commissar

system, which had been suspended i n August to facilitate the united front, was restored while Mao boasted of “carrying on independently and on our o w n initiative guerrilla warfare i n the mountain regions.

> But, i n

December, as i n August, he had agreed to the Party’s reaffirmation that “the resistance against Japan. is of paramount importance and everything must be subordinated to its needs.” Mao’s pre-eminence in the Party became more evident even as he temporarily yielded on questions of the united front in late 1937 and 1938. His concessions resulted i n what the editors of Mao’s Selected Works described as continuing ‘rightist deviation’ o n this question u n t i l October, 1938. Paradoxically, the improvement i n Mao’s position w i t h i n the Party was made possible b y the arrival i n Yenan of Ch’en Shao-yii, a long-time rival. I n late 1937, a Soviet plane brought Ch’en, Ch’en Yiin, K’ang Sheng, and

others from Moscow via Sinkiang, along with a large radio transmitter, anti-

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aircraft guns, and other supplies.®® Ch’en Shao-yii, who had been i n Russia for ten of the past twelve years as a member of the Executive Committee,

Presidium, and Secretariat of the Communist International, reportedly carried important instructions from Stalin and the Comintern.* These were

said to call for close cooperation with the Nationalists, for the removal of Chang Wen-t'ien as General Secretary because of alleged Trotskyist connections while a student i n Russia i n the late 1920’s, for the tempering of

criticisms of Chang Kuo-t’ao because of his long leadership, and finally for both criticism and support of Mao Tse-tung. The Comintern allegedly criticized Mao for his theoretical “ignorance of Marxism-Leninism, lack of internationalist outlook, and uses of narrow empiricism in settling problems . but acknowledged that Mao was the foremost leader of the Chinese revolution and directed Russian-trained colleagues to assist Mao to overcome his ideological shortcomings. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ch’en Shao-yii .”

proposed at this time a new Political Bureau of sixteen members and alter-

nates, headed by Mao Tse-tung, with Chou En-lai and Chang Kuo-t’ao i n second and third positions, himself i n the third position, and Chang Wen-

t’ien demoted to seventh. Ch’en Shao-yii may have expected to replace Chang Wen-t’ien as General Secretary of the CCP, just as Chang had replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien (the third leading “returned student’) at the Tsunyi Conference, but, whether because of opposition from Mao or because of the new split between the three senior “returned students’ o r for other reasons, the Party leadership

decided instead on a more decisive step. I t soon abolished the position of General Secretary altogether,} although retaining and strengthening a collective Secretariat, thereby fortifying Mao’s position as the dominant personality o f the Political Bureau and director of the all-important Military

Affairs Committee. This development came at the fourth important Party meeting of 1937. Almost the entire surviving Political Bureau,® consisting of Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Yiin, K’ang Sheng, Ch’en Shao-yii, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, K ’ a i Feng, Kuan Hsiangying, and L i u Shao-ch’i, met with other leaders i n Yenan from December 9 to 13, 1937. The first four men continued to make u p the Standing Com-

mittee of the Political Bureau, together with Mao Tse-tung, who had joined that elite group at the Tsunyi Conference. Hsiang Ying, whom Mao had replaced o n the Standing Committee at Tsunyi but who remained on the Political Bureau, also came to Yenan for the December conference from Tayi i n Southwestern Kiangsi.™ The conference’s main topic was an appraisal of the war situation and the Party’s role i n the united front. Guided b y Ch’en Shao-yii’s speech, “ T h e Current Situation and Tasks i n the W a r of Resistance,” the conference affirmed relatively cooperative attitudes toward the united front, * T h e last C o m i n t e r n representative, O t t o B r a u n , w a s s t i l l i n Y e n a n i n June, 1937, a n d p r o b a b l y returned t o Moscow i n 1939, b u t there are n o f u r t h e r references

to him.% + I t was restored for a decade after 1956. + With the exception of Wang Chia-hsiang, who was still i n Russia recuperating from wounds suffered on the Long March.

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overruling Mao’s arguments for more aggressive tactics. As the Party’s “Manifesto on the Current Situation” issued two weeks later on December 25 stated, “The CCP is not only sincere in standing together with the Kuomintang for national salvation during the war of resistance but also is determined to cooperate for national reconstruction after the successful conclusion of the war. . . . ” " ? T o direct Party united front work, the conference decided to establish a united front work department, headed during most of the war b y Chou

En-lai,”® and to have i t and the CCP delegation to the People’s Political Council in Hankow, headed by Ch’en Shao-yii, Lin Po-ch’ii, and Ch’in Pang-hsien, work to dispel lingering Nationalist mistrust of Communist efforts. I t also directed stress on the nationalism of the Chinese Communists and toward that end the establishment of the N e w China Daily in Hankow

and later Chungking. The conference also set up a department to coordinate youth activities and to broaden the Party’s youth work and directed closer liaison with Nationalist military units. Parallel to united front efforts, however, work was to be accelerated to

expand Party organization and guerrilla activity, both behind Japanese lines and i n Nationalist territory. About this time, the Party also established or re-established regional bureaus, for the Yangtze valley, with headquarters temporarily at Hankow; for Southeast China, with headquarters temporarily at Nanchang; for the Central Plains, with headquarters in Honan; and for North China, with headquarters i n Peiping and later Sian.

Finally, the conference created a twenty-five man committee, headed by Mao Tse-tung, w i t h Ch’en Shao-yii, secretary, to direct preparations for the Party’s Seventh National Conference, scheduled for 1938 but not held until 1945. The Party’s next Political Bureau conference, i n early March, 1938,

directed further preparations for the Seventh Congress and new efforts to force the Kuomintang into policies favorable to the Communists. A Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, to be discussed below, was held

later in the year in place of a National Congress, which, according to official sources, the pressures of war prevented. Additional and probably equally important reasons for the failure to hold a Seventh Congress i n 1938 were the defection of Chang Kuo-t’ao in the spring and the intensifying struggle between Ch’en Shao-yii and Mao Tse-tung for leadership and over the interpretation of the united front.” The Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ch’en Tu-hsiu Cases I n early April, Chang Kuo-t’ao, still ostensibly the holder of a high position within the Party as a member of the Political Bureau, left Yenan on

united front business as representative of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government, of which he was vice-chairman, to attend memorial services near Sian for the legendary national ancestor, the Yellow Emperor. After this ceremony, ironic for a leading “Internationalist,” b u t reflecting consistent patriotism, Chang proceeded to Sian and Wuhan, where i n part he

intended to work for greater Communist compliance with the Nationalists out of sincere desire for a genuine united front. However, conversations with Chou En-lai, Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and others only con-

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firmed his growing disillusionment, both with Communist policies and with his own treatment by the Party. Party Central decided to move first and announced Chang’s expulsion i n an article published i n the New China Daily of April 20, accusing him of anti-Party activities over the previous three years and of desertion from his duties at Yenan, and a flood of polem-

ics and controversy followed from all sides.” Thereafter, Chang, one of the founders of the CCP, remained i n Nationalist areas until 1949, when

he moved to Hong Kong. The only Communist who had been clearly superior to Chang Kuo-t’ao i n the first years of Party history also came under renewed attack i n early

1938. Following his expulsion from the Party i n 1929 and confinement i n a Nationalist prison from 1932 to August, 1937, Ch’en Tu-hsiu was i n

Wuhan at this time, writing and lecturing and possibly hoping to rejoin the Party. As a result of indirect discussion among old comrades, Mao and most of the Chinese leadership reportedly were receptive to Ch’en’s re-entry because “ t h e Trotskyites of China were not the same as those o f the Soviet

Union,” but Chang Kuo-t’ao states that Ch’en Shao-yii vetoed further approaches as inconceivable i n the light of Stalin’s attitudes. Accordingly, the Party not only refused to accept Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s initiative b u t also decided to brand him a Japanese spy and traitor.”®* I n March, Communist

authors, including K’ang Sheng, renewed attacks on Ch’en’s alleged Trotskyism and “bourgeois” opportunism and even accused him of receiving Japanese support for his “splittist” activities. Ch’en replied i n a letter

published March 20 that these “slanders’” were only efforts to blackmail him into denouncing Chinese Trotskyists. Bitterly denying Party accusations, Ch’en declared, This is not an era of anarchy... The situation of irresponsible mutual accusations of treason as a propaganda means i n a political struggle cannot be tolerated. After a long imprisonment and because of the weakness of wartime communication, I don’t know i f any Trotskyite organization still

exists i n China. . . . I refuse to go into unnecessary things about the Trotskyite problem. You have attempted to use an unfounded treason charge to force me into doing something unnecessary so that I would become a member of your accusing squad. You are dead wrong! As always, you try to adopt any means i n disregard of factual truth. So long as anyone can be led to go along with you, he can be a fighter. Anyone opposing you will be a traitor. Is this the ethics of human b e h a v i o??7 r!

Communist leaders replied that Ch’en had wanted to rejoin the CCP and was showing his guilt by overreacting to their conditions that he first renounce his Trotskyist connections and former “errors.” After this painful episode, Ch’en quietly lived out his remaining years i n

declining health and political isolation i n Nationalist-held areas. He wrote of his growing doubts about the totalitarian nature of Communism, b u t affirmed his commitment to socialism and democracy, his advocacy of

which twenty stormy years before had done so much to set China on its revolutionary path.”® Ch’en Tu-hsiu, a symbol of much of the tragedy of twentieth-century China, died on May 13, 1942, i n a small village 45 miles

from Chungking. From the seeds of his advocacy of “rugged individualism”

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and struggle had grown the bitter fruit of totalitarian direction of mass

struggle. Yet Ch’en Tu-hsiu, more than anyone, must have realized the impotence of isolated ‘““democracy” i n a situation where unfortunately political power did grow “ o u t of the barrel of a gun.””®

The Sixth Plenum

The dispute between Mao and Ch’en Shao-yii over the united front and over leadership of the Party came to a head at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee held in Yenan from September 28 to November 6 , 1938. The sessions were attended b y thirty-eight Party leaders. There, Mao opposed the slogan “Everything through the United F r o n t , ” which was later said to sum u p Ch’en Shao-yii’s ““capitulationist, right opportun-

ist” line. According to the Maoists, Ch’en’s line would “deny class distinctions i n the war and fail to distinguish between [ t h e Kuomintang] left,

. and subordinate under Nationalist leadership all center, and right Communist programs.’’®° Contrary to official historiography, however, i t seems that Mao i n fact achieved a compromise between the militant and the soft views toward the united front, as he had at the December, 1937, Political Bureau conference.

As so often, an examination of the original documents, rather than of the Maoist versions of them, casts a very different light on the real positions of M a o and his alleged opposites. Even the official version o f Mao’s report to

the Sixth Plenum reads, “ T o subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle to resist Japan—that is the fundamental principle of the

united front,” a principle that obviously could justify conservative interpretations of the problem. More significantly, the official version of Mao’s speeches to the Sixth Plenum contains only Chapter Seven, or about oneeighth, of a long report titled “ O n the N e w Stage,” many passages of which give a much less militant interpretation of the united front than Mao would n o w like revealed. A t one point, M a o even stated, “ T h e Kuomintang occupies the position of leader [ i n the war effort, a n d ] . one can foresee a brilliant future” for it,®' and i n September and November he sent

pledges of support for Chiang’s leadership.®? At the time, Mao also minimized intra-Party differences over these questions and went on to speculate about the possibility of the CCP’s entering a united front with the Nationalists either “from within” or “from without.” I n the former case, “the Communists would join the Kuomintang i n an open manner, and name lists of these Communists would be submitted to . leading organizations.””®* M a o noted that, “unfortunately,” the Nationalists would not agree to have the Communists either enter their Party (the “ b l o c w i t h i n ’ ) or join a formal alliance of various political parties (the “ b l o c w i t h o u t ” ) . Therefore, the CCP could only continue a third type of united front, one

based on no formal agreements but on “consultation i n settling whatever problems occur between the two parties,” despite dissatisfaction w i t h such

a loose arrangement. M a o vigorously argued that the policies he advocated would not repeat

the errors of the first united front of the 1920’s because the Chinese Communists could maintain their independence, thanks to the existence of the revolutionary bases and the Red Army, whereas the policies recommended

[Chap. 13]

The Early Years of the Anti-Japanese War

289

b y Chang Kuo-t’ao earlier and at the Sixth Plenum b y Ch’en Shao-yii

would sacrifice that independence. But i t is clear from the original text of “ O n the New Stage” that Mao conceded far more to the Kuomintang in 1938 than he now cares to admit. I f Mao argued for independence within the united front, he nonetheless clearly had moved several notches to the right from his earlier intransigent opposition to cooperation with the Fukien rebels i n 1934 and with Chiang Kai-shek in December, 1936. Moreover, at this time, Mao seems to have cemented his alliance w i t h L i u Shao-ch’i, who, i n May, 1937, had mounted the harsh attack o n leftism

in the Party, implying some support for the “rightist” policies then allegedly advocated b y Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ch’en Shao-yii. Mao evidently used Liu’s

attacks® to strengthen his own position, especially against the “Russian returned students,” headed by Ch’en Shao-yii, and i n the process greatly modified his earlier opposition to a united front with Chiang Kai-shek. Both Mao and Liu adjusted their arguments toward the center and consequently advanced their own positions, all the more noticeably in view of the flight of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Party rebukes of Ch’en Shao-yii. The Sixth Plenum, therefore, marked an important step toward Mao’s achievement of full hegemony within the CCP, although this process would not be completed until after the rectification movement of the early 1940’s.

14 T H E PARTY A N D WARTIME EXPANSION

The Party expanded its organization during the early war years, although

not rapidly enough to keep pace with the unprecedented explosion of Party membership to more than three-quarters of a million by 1940. A decision of the Sixth Plenum spelled out the organizational structure of Party Committees for the early war period. The committees in descending order were: the Central Committee, regional bureaus, local committees

(a designation usually used for provincial and special district and district committees during the w a r ) , county and town committees (included sub-

district levels and sometimes any level below the region), and finally the Party branch organization or cell and small group.’ I n theory, above the Party branch, each committee was elected by the Party committee below it, but choices had to be approved by higher levels, which usually appointed those who filled key executive positions. These appointments were confirmed by the relevant committees, which were elected where possible by

Party congresses of the appropriate level. The most important appointed positions below Party Central were for the four or five wartime, later six, regional bureaus of the Party. These were the North China Bureau, headquartered successively i n Peiping, Taiyiian, Linfen, and after 1938 i n Sian, and headed successively by,

among others, Liu Shao-ch’i, P’eng Chen, Yang Shang-k’un, and Po Yi-Po; the Northwest China Bureau i n Yenan, formed i n 1941 from the ShenKan-Ning Bureau of the Party and headed during the war b y Kao Kang; the Yangtze Bureau, located in Wuhan and, after October, 1938, i n Chungk i n g (where i t was renamed the South China Bureau i n 1939) under Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and others; the Central Plains Bureau, created i n April, 1939, and located i n Chukouchen, Chiiehshan County, Honan, under L i u Shao-ch’i; and finally the Southeast China Bureau, elevated from a sub-bureau to a bureau i n late 1938, located i n Nanchang and later

southern Kiangsi, under Hsiang Ying prior to his death in the New Fourth Army Incident of January, 1941. After this the Southeast China Bureau merged with the Central Plains Bureau at Yench’eng, northern Kiangsu, to

form the Central China Bureau, while the continuing underground activities

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The Long March to Power

b y an estimated 60,000 cadres i n South China and Hong Kong came under

the jurisdiction of the newly established South China Work Committee located near Tap’u, northern Kwangtung.? Branch bureaus were established under the North China Bureau i n Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin-Ch’a-Chi) in 1939 under Nieh Jung-chen; Shantung i n 1940 under Chu Jui until 1943 and then L o Jung-huan; Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui) i n 1941 under Kuan

Hsiang-ying until 1942 and then Lin Feng, and the T’aihang Mountains and central plains of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan base area under Teng Hsiao-p’ing and others, which merged into the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii Bureau in 1945.2 I n late 1945, a Northeast China Bureau was re-established over the Manchurian Committee and i n effect formed a sixth regional bureau, the same number maintained after 1949, except during 1954-61. A t times, the

regional bureaus seem to have been intended to be the executive boards of elected regional committees, having somewhat the same relationship to regional committees as the Political Bureau had to the Central Committee,

but i n practice regional committees were seldom mentioned, and only the bureaus seemed to function at the regional level. Therefore, appointed

Party bureaus generally acted at regional levels, while committees, theoretically elected b y appropriate-level congresses, served at provincial and

lower levels.* The Sixth Plenum directed the regional bureaus to establish or reestablish control boards to supervise Party committees below the region and to rule on membership and disciplinary questions. Committees at and above county level were directed to have a secretariat, organization, propaganda, united front, investigation, and research offices, and wartime mobilization departments, and, o n August 25, 1939, a l l levels were instructed to

establish cadre departments to help screen and educate the vastly expanded Party. I n addition, provincial committees that had not already done so were

to establish social affairs departments from late 1938 on to oversee the security and counterespionage work of the state bureaus of political security.

These agents at times were said to be organized i n the manner of “bandit gangs” to extract funds and discipline cadres by force, robbery, and chi-

canery. The Sixth Plenum also initiated a new campaign to weed out subversives, directing Party members to strengthen attention to problems of discipline and vigilance, keeping their membership as secret as possible, depending o n the nature of their work.” During the war, as at other times,

Party control over diverse personnel and operations was achieved by overlapping assignment w i t h much joint holding of Party administrative and military positions.® A t the top of this Party structure stood Mao, his position as first among equals much strengthened w i t h Ch’en Shao-yii’s eclipse after the Sixth Plenum. With the termination of the position of General Secretary i n

late 1937, Party Central was dominated more than ever by its Political Bureau and Standing Committee, the latter including Mao Tse-tung, Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, and Ch’en Yiin. The Party’s new

collective secretariat, whose members more and more formed the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, included the above, with the addition of Ch’en Shao-yii (until around 1939), Jen Pi-shih (after 1940), Chu Teh,

and K’ang Sheng, and dominated the operations of many Central Committee

[Chap. 14]

The Party and Wartime Expansion

293

C H A R T 14.1 PARTY ORGANIZATION DURING EARLY SINO-JAPANESE WAR

Central Committee Political Bureau Mao Tse-tung, Chang Wen-t’ien," Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Yiin, and others. Secretariat Political Bureau members listed by name, plus Jen Pi-shih, Chu Teh, and K’ang Sheng (later, Liu Shao-ch’i, and others). Key Central Committee Departments Military Affairs Mao Tse-tung Organization® Ch’en Yiin (later, P’eng Chen, about 1943-44)

Propaganda United Front Work Enemy Occupied Areas Work

K ’ a i Feng Chou En-lai ( L i Wei-han after about 1944) Chou En-lai (concurrent, also K’ang Sheng,

Cadre Education Social Affairs

Liu Shao-ch’i (later, L i Wei-han) K’ang Sheng (later, Chou Hsing and L i

L i u Shao-ch’i, and others)

K’0-nung)

Popular Movements Ch’en Yiin Labor® Ch’en Yiin (concurrent) Women Ts’ai Ch’ang Youth Feng Wen-pin Press Chang Wen-t’ien Regional Bureaus: North China, Northwest China, Yangtze (after 1938, called South China Bureau), Central Plains, Southeast China (the latter two merged in 1941 to form the Central China Bureau), and, after 1945, Northeast China Sub-Bureaus (or Branch B u r e a u s ) : Chin-Ch’a-Chi,

Shantung, Chin-Sui

and

South-

eastern Shansi (part of Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii) Lower-Level Committees: Province where applicable, county, town, district, and subdistrict * General Secretary, January, 1935, until suspension of post in December, 1937. O n his return from the Soviet Union i n late 1937, Ch’en Shao-yii presumably served on the Political Bureau and Secretariat for a year or so. Chang Kuo-t’ao was also on i t but was effectively excluded from its deliberations prior to his departure from Yenan i n April, 1938. While not holding crucial Party posts, senior leaders Lin Po-ch’ii, L i Wei-han, W a n g Jo-fei, a n d others were also influential i n Yenan during the war. * C h ’ i n Pang-hsien, L i Fu-ch’'un, a n d Jen Pi-shih are also mentioned as directors o f

organization early i n the war, and probably many high-ranking leaders were involved in this crucial work. There is no information on a peasant department at this time. See Chart 10.1. ©

Known as the trade union movement department at this time.

Sources: Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 20, 21; Chung-kung chih Tsu-chih (Chinese Communist Organization) in Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms, Reel 1 1 ; K u o , History, v o l . I11, p p . 340-41, 499, a n d i n I S (February,

1970), pp. 62, 68, 77.

departments.” Key Central Committee departments at this time appear on Chart 14.1. By September, 1940, Party Central also had established a working com-

mittee for enemy occupied areas to lead and direct operations in hostile urban areas, under Chou En-lai in Chungking, with K’ang Sheng, his deputy, i n Yenan, and a department for work among overseas Chinese, especially in Southeast Asia.®

The Long March to Power

294

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies

The phenomenal growth of Party organization and membership during the early war years was accompanied and, of course, facilitated b y the equally rapid expansion of the Red Army. Only about one-fourth of Com-

munist strength was concentrated i n the Shen-Kan-Ning base in North China, although Communist headquarters was located i n Yenan until 1947. The Red Army fought no major battles for more than two years after late 1937, and its most rapid growth came during this period of relative calm, with the recruitment of up to 400,000 men into the Eighth Route Army and 100,000 into the New Fourth Army by 1940. Whatever the truth of Mao’s alleged formula o f the early autumn of 1937, calling for 70 per cent o f

Communist efforts for expansion, 20 per cent for defense, and only 10 per cent for fighting the Japanese, i t is evident that the Communists put great efforts into the expansion of their armed forces.® Large numbers of former Nationalist troops and North China peasants were the most likely recruits, although some students and others also joined both Communist armies. During the early 1940’s, after the Japanese had h i t back against the Com-

munist Hundred Regiments Campaign of late 1940, recruitment declined temporarily, especially i n Shansi.

According to the most likely statistics, regular and guerrilla forces in the Red Army grew as follows during the war period: *° TABLE 14.1 WARTIME EXPANSION OF EIGHTH ROUTE AND NEW FOURTH ARMIES

1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Eighth Route Army

N e w Fourth Army

Total

80,000 156,700 270,000 400,000 305,000 340,000 339,000 320,800 600,000

12,000 25,000 50,000 100,000 135,000* 110,960 125,892 153,676 260,000

92,000 181,700 320,000 500,000 440,000 450,960 464,892 474.476 860,000

* Prior to the January 4, 1941, New Fourth Army Incident. + As o f March, 1945. T h i s figure does n o t i n c l u d e a n estimated a d d i t i o n a l 20,000 guerrillas w h o were active i n South C h i n a , w h i c h would b r i n g the total t o 880,000.

I n 1936, Communist forces may have numbered less than 30,000 and gov-

ernment sources for 1937 give somewhat smaller figures than those above: 54,000 i n the Eighth Route Army and 10,000 i n the N e w Fourth Army, and a total figure of 320,000 i n the entire Red Army as of early 1 9 4 5 , " but,

even i f one accepts these statistics, Communist growth was spectacular. I n 1937, Nanking had requested the organization of the Red Army into only three divisions of 15,000 men each, b u t six years later the Communists demanded recognition of twelve and then sixteen divisions. These forces were divided into a hierarchy of small teams of three to five men, three teams to a squad, three squads to a platoon, three platoons to a company,

[Chap. 14]

The Party and Wartime Expansion

295

three companies to a battalion, three battalions to a regiment, three or four regiments to a division, and three divisions to an army.'? Contrasting

with the smaller but better organized and led Communist forces, as of 1937, there were perhaps 500,000 troops i n Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Armies, another million men i n other Nationalist armies, and about 600,000 Japanese soldiers i n China. By 1941, these had swollen to some 5.7 million

Nationalist and 1.2 million Japanese troops, while by the end of the war the Nationalists still had at least 2.5 million soldiers.!? The above figures for the Communist armies refer to full-time soldiers, both “regulars” or field forces and local guerrillas, the distinction being that the regular field forces were uniformed and relatively well-equipped mobile units, while guerrilla units were assigned to particular areas and fought i n

civilian clothes with generally inferior equipment. I n North China i n early 1938, among the Eighth Route Army’s 156,700 troops, an estimated 100,000 were “guerrillas,” while i n 1944 at least one-third o f the 475,000

men in the Red Army were local partisans, and in the late 1940’s their ratio with regular soldiers became even.'* Third and fourth major categories of Communist military forces not included i n the above figures were the militia (about 2.2 million i n 1945) and the people’s self-defense corps (up to 10 million i n 1945), with “crack members” of the latter forming the

militia. Both groups performed police, intelligence, and transport duties along with their regular jobs. The Communists sought to enroll all men aged eighteen to forty-five into militia or self-defense groups of twelve men

each, and these units provided useful reserves for the full-time forces.' After 1939-40, with the imposition of the Nationalist blockade on Communist areas and increased Japanese pressure, the Communist leadership chose to reduce their full-time forces and increase the militia so as to strengthen civilian organization and production. According to Japanese sources, there were 500,000 to 600,000 i n the militia in Communist areas of North China b y late 1939. That number increased to 2.13 million b y

June, 1944, slightly dropped later i n the year as regular forces were expanded, and then rose again to 2.2 million and 2,687,698 i n April and

late 1945, respectively.’® I n addition, the Japanese estimated that 7.5 million were enlisted i n the People’s Self-Defense Corps. During these years, the Communists recruited men from very diverse sources, including former “ b a n d i t , ” Nationalist, and puppet forces. As before, Party controls over the army were crucial. There were only 3,000 to 4,000 Party members i n a Red Army of less than 30,000 men i n 1936,'” but the ratio increased

toward the desired one-quarter to one-third later i n the war. I n September, 1942, the Central Committee sought further to consolidate Party control by subordinating former military committees and political departments to “unified” local Party committees, whose secretary served simultaneously as political commissar.'® The Communist regular forces were organized into the 115th, 120th, and

129th Divisions of the Eighth Route Army i n North China and into the N e w Fourth Army i n Central, East, and South China. Chu Teh was commander i n chief of the Red Army, although i n some respects he was a figurehead, with real direction i n the hands o f his subordinates, P’eng Tehhuai, Yeh Chien-ying, and Jen Pi-shih, and their division commanders.

These units and their commanders are given i n Chart 14.2.%°

The Long March to Power

296

C H A R T 14.2 ORGANIZATION OF EIGHTH ROUTE AND NEW FOURTH ARMIES Eighth Route Army Headquarters (Yenan) Commander Chu Teh Deputy Commander P’eng Teh-huai Chief of Staff Yeh Chien-ying Director, Political Department

W a n g Chia-hsiang (Jen Pi-shih, 1937-38)

115th Division (former First Front Army, Chin-Ch’a-Chi) Commander Lin Piao Deputy Commander Nieh Jung-chen (acting commander from 1938 on, after the wounding of Lin and his trip to the Soviet Union) Political Commissar L o Jung-huan 343d Brigade Ch’en Kuang 344th Brigade Hsii Hai-tung 120th Division (former Second Front Army, Chin-Sui) Commander H o Lung Deputy Commander Hsiao K’o Political Commissar Kuan Hsiang-ying 358th Brigade Hsiao K’o 359th Brigade Wang Chen 129th Division (former Fourth Front Army, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii) Commander L i u Po-ch’eng Deputy Commander Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien Teng Hsiao-p’ing Political Commissar 358th Brigade Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien Ch’en Keng 386th Brigade New Fourth Army Headquarters (former X Corps and other units left i n the South a f t e r t h e Long M a r c h , southern A n h w e i , K i a n g s u , a n d pockets i n other provinces)

Commander

Y e h T ’ i n g ( a f t e r 1941, C h ’ e n Yi)

Deputy Commander

Hsiang Ying (after 1941, Chang Yiin-yi)

Director, Political

Department Political Commissar

Yiian Kuo-p’ing (after 1941, Teng Tzu-hui) Hsiang Ying (after 1941, Liu Shao-ch’i)

Deputy Political Commissar

Jao Shu-shih

A t the start of the war, there were about six detachments i n Central and East China under the N e w Fourth Army, led by Ch’en Y i , Chang Yiin-yi,

Su Yii, L i Hsien-nien, T’an Chen-lin, Chang Ting-ch’eng, and others.?’ I n addition, there were small guerrilla groups i n the East River areas o f

Kwangtung Province and on Hainan Island i n the South. I n North China, by late 1939, the Japanese estimated the strength of various Communist regular units at 800,000, controlling some 130 counties, divided as follows: “24,000 men i n the 115th Division, 26,300 men i n the 120th Division, and 30,600 men i n the 129th Division (a total of 80,900 regulars) ; 7,100 men i n regular units controlled b y the Eighth Route

Army; 31,700 men in the Chin-Ch’a-Chi guerrilla army; 20,000 men in units of the Shensi base; 110,000 full-time guerrillas i n Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, and Mengchiang (a Japanese puppet state i n Inner Mongolia) ; and 500,000 to 600,000 villagers i n the rural people’s self-defense corps.’’?!

As of 1944, American military intelligence estimated that there were

[Chap. 14]

The Party and Wartime Expansion

297

346,000 Communist regulars, 129,000 guerrillas ( w i t h 282,000 rifles for regular and guerrilla units) , and 2.13 million militia, divided then as follows: 2 2 T A B L E 14.2 AMERICAN ESTIMATES OF COMMUNIST FORCE LEVELS, 1944 Location

Regulars (field ferces)

Guerrillas (local forces)

Militia®

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia (Shen-Kan-Ning) Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui)

50,000" 26,000

Shansi-Chahar-Hope h (Chin-Ch’a-Chi)

35,000

29,000

Shantung

42,000

28,000

500,000

Shansi-Hopeh-Honan (Chin-Chi-Yii)

50,000

25,000

320,000

Hopeh-Shantung-Honan (Chi-Lu-Yii) Total Eighth Route Army Northern Kiangsu Central Kiangsu Southern Kiangsu

17,000 220,000 23,000 19,000 6,000

11,000 98,000

80,000 1,804,355 85,000 130,000 25,000

Northern Huai Southern Huai

18,000 21,000

Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei

22,000

Central Anhwei

Eastern Chekiang Total, New Fourth Army

— 5,000

East R i v e r (Kwangtung) Hainan Island (Kwangtung)

3,000 5,000

Total, Other

8,000

630,000

70,000* 55,000*

5,000

4,000 118,000

224 355% 50,000

25,000

31,000

10,000 400,000

* Figures marked with asterisk are in Hofheinz i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51, and reflect where the recruits were mobilized as against where they were stationed. ® 80,000 according to Selden, Revolution, pp. 145 fl. Other figures vary with other estimates. See Hofheinz in Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51. Source: Adapted from The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 180.

The revolutionary base areas both resulted from and contributed to the Red Army. There were said to be more than sixteen such base areas b y the

end of 1944, which controlled all or part of some 635 countries. These can now be traced first i n the North and then in Central and South China, leaving discussion of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and Communist headquarters to the next chapter. The North China Wartime Bases

The Communist armies expanded particularly rapidly, both numerically and geographically, into vacuums left i n the wake of Japanese offensives,

as in Shansi in 1937-38 and in many other sections of North and Central China throughout the war. The Communists also fared well when they were

able to ally with local anti-Japanese guerrilla movements, as they did in the more populous areas of Hopeh and Shantung, in parts of East, Central, and South China, and i n other areas only partly defended by puppet troops.

I n the early autumn of 1937, units of the Eighth Route Army moved eastward from their northern Shensi base, simultaneously positioning them-

selves for defense against Japan and for expansion into vast new areas left

298

The Long March to Power

relatively undefended as the main Japanese forces pushed further south. I n September, the 115th Division under Lin Piao and Nieh Jung-chen advanced to the Wut’ai Mountain area of northeastern Shansi, famous for its sacred mountain, while Ho Lung’s 120th Division and Liu Po-ch’eng’s 129th Division moved into the northwest and southeast of the province,

respectively. After Japanese columns had defeated Yen Hsi-shan’s armies in Shansi and other Nationalist groups elsewhere i n North China, units of these Communist divisions became the nuclei of important revolutionary bases. Although there was, of course, much shifting of military units i n mobile and guerrilla warfare, the three areas of northwestern, northeastern,

and southeastern Shansi and neighboring provinces, guarded respectively b y parts of the 120th, 115th, and 129th divisions, became the next most

important Communist bases after the one in northern Shensi.

The Formation of Chin-Sui After a number of battles with the Japanese i n northern Shansi, parts of

the 120th Division moved into seven counties in the northwest of the province.* There they quickly tripled i n number, prepared formation of an anti-Japanese base, and i n August, 1938, expanded into southern Suiyiian. I n late 1939, Nationalist forces commanded b y H u Tsung-nan sought to prevent further Communist expansion and imposed a blockade of

northwestern Shansi. The conflict between the “New Shansi Army” of indigenous leftists and the more conservative “ O l d Shansi Army” loyal to

Yen Hsi-shan also came to a head at this time as part of the general breakdown of the united front between the Communists and Yen Hsi-shan.?* The Communists and their sympathizers were able to survive these pres-

sures in northwestern Shansi and southern Suiyiian, but in part because of them they made much slower progress with mass mobilization than was the case i n other bases. I n January or February, 1940, a Northwestern Shansi Administrative Committee was established and, b y October, 1942, a

Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui) Border Region Administrative Committee had come into being. The North China Bureau established a branch for Chin-

Sui i n 1941 under Kuan Hsiang-ying, and after 1942 under Lin Feng, while L i Cheng-ts’ao became its military commander i n 1943 when Ho Lung was transferred to Yenan. Special conditions in the Chin-Sui area were its barrenness, poverty and relatively small population. Even at the peak of border region strength i n 1945, the Communists claimed control of only several million people. Nevertheless, the area was strategically important, since i t controlled communications and defense between Shen-Kan-Ning and Chin-Ch’a-Chi, the northeastern Shansi base.?®

The Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region I n the Wut’ai Mountain area of northeastern Shansi and western Hopeh, about halfway between Taiyiian and Peiping, a part of L i n Piao’s 115th

Division helped organize the first, and i n many ways most successful, of * Hsiao K’0’s 358th Brigade and Wang Chen’s 359th, originally important parts of the 120th Division, fought also i n Hopeh to the east and west of Peiping, respectively, w i t h Wang Chen’s later withdrawing to northern Shensi.

[Chap. 14]

The Party and Wartime Expansion

299

the Communist bases behind Japanese lines, the Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border

Region. A detachment of perhaps 2,000 men under Nieh Jung-chen, Yang Ch’eng-wu, Huang Yung-sheng (both future chiefs of staff of the People’s Liberation Army [ P L A ] ) , later P’eng Chen, and others, retreated to the

Shansi, Chahar, and Hopeh border area after Lin Piao’s celebrated victory at P’inghsing Pass i n September. There they established “general mobilization committees” with natives of the area sympathetic to their anti-

Japanese propaganda and effectively stepped into the breach left by the departure of local and Nationalist officials.?® Japanese units, after passing through the area, naturally were concentrating on more populous areas farther east and south, and i n any case lacked sufficient personnel to garrison effectively such remote mountainous areas. On November 7, 1937, two days before the fall of Taiyiian, Shansi’s capital, the Eighth Route Army announced the formation of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin-Ch’aChi) military zone. I n January, Communist and non-Communist activists from the Shansi

Sacrifice League and its “dare to die corps,” which had been organized the year before, created a government for the Chin-Ch’a-Chi border area, formally establishing i t at the Foup’ing Conference, held i n western Hopeh,

January 9-15, 1938. Attending the conference were some 148 delegates from thirty-nine counties, mostly from Communist-sponsored mass organizations but including representatives from the Kuomintang and CCP and already claiming to represent some 12 million people.’ The Nationalist government approved this organization on January 30, and for a while the Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region government became a model example of Communist-Nationalist cooperation. Despite the fears of some that its creation would jeopardize the united front, the Nationalists really had no choice b u t to recognize i t , inasmuch as all their troops had been withdrawn

from the area. I n any case, the border region government was representative of the local population, with Nieh Jung-chen and Sung Shao-wen its only ranking Communists while a Nationalist and independents made u p the rest

of its administrative committee. By early 1938, the Communists claimed complete control of a dozen counties i n the Chin-Ch’a-Chi area and influence i n another two dozen, and there were Communist magistrates i n 60 of 105 Shansi counties. I n the spring o f 1939, influence had spread to some 72 counties i n three provinces, of which about 27 counties were relatively secure. After 1939, increased friction between the Communists and Yen Hsi-shan and other Nationalists

complicated operations i n Chin-Ch’a-Chi as elsewhere. Nonetheless, the border region government succeeded i n strengthening its forces enough to

provoke a series of Japanese “mopping u p ’ campaigns, beginning in March, 1938. The Japanese burned Foup’ing to the ground, and the border

government was forced to move its headquarters five times during the next two years.?® As early as 1938, some 40,000 to 50,000 people i n various counties were reportedly organized i n people’s self-defense corps and into worker, women, and peasant salvation associations, the latter with 570,000 members i n May, 1939. The following year, Communist armed strength i n the area had reached 50,000 men, and three years later the Chin-Ch’a-Chi area sup-

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posedly embraced an area of 30,000 square miles, 108 counties, and b y

1945 a population of some 18 million. The region was divided into four subsections, although the first two of these, t h e Wut’ai Mountain and central Hopeh areas, were b y far the most important, the other two, to the

northeast and north of Peping, remained relatively obscure until after the war. The Party established a branch bureau for Chin-Ch’a-Chi in 1939 under Nieh Jung-chen, while Sung Shao-wen headed the government’s

administrative committee.? Especially significant was the great success in mass mobilization attained i n the area, with the formation of numerous youth, women’s, self-defense, and other groups; of educational, medical,

and publishing facilities; and of ‘“democratic’’ government based on the “three-thirds’’ system, which allotted one-third or fewer of government posts to Communists and two-thirds or more to Nationalists and Inde-

pendents. I f the Wut’ai Mountain area developed primarily through the efforts of Nieh Jung-chen’s military units, assisted by activists of the Shansi Sacrifice League, the development of the central Hopeh zone of the Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region was an example of Communist expansion primarily through conversion of local Nationalists and guerrilla leaders, assisted b y the

arrival of Red Army units. I n the central Hopeh zone, the role of the Red Army was secondary, as the Red Army relied on, and later recruited, local

military and political activists. The leader of anti-Japanese mobilization in central Hopeh was Lii Cheng-ts’ao, a Nationalist military commander, originally from Manchuria. Disobeying orders to retreat southward after the fall of Paoting to the Japanese, Lii united w i t h local militia in Ankuo

County to establish a people’s self-defense corps. Representatives of Nieh Jung-chen contacted Lii, and i n December, 1937, Lii Cheng-ts’ao’s men were ““voluntarily” incorporated into the Eighth Route Army, with Lii as

commander of the Central Hopeh (Chi-Chung) Military District of the Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region, and Ch’eng Tzu-hua as political commissar. Anti-Japanese operations in the central Hopeh area had to be carried out i n flat terrain without as much cover as existed in the Wut’ai Mountains and also in greater proximity to Japanese troops. Further military difficulties arose for the Communists i n 1939 as Nationalist commanders sought to

regain control of central Hopeh for Chungking, and a three-cornered struggle developed. Units of Ho Lung’s 120th Division were transferred to the aid of Lii Cheng-ts’ao i n 1938-39, helping Lii’s guerrilla forces to hold their ground. The Nationalists had little success against either the Communists o r the Japanese and after 1941 were almost completely driven out of this and other parts of North China. The Communists, b y contrast, continued their expansion to some 28,000 troops i n central Hopeh b y late

1940.%° Units from Chin-Ch’a-Chi supplied an important part of the four-monthlong Hundred Regiments Campaign involving some 400,000 Communist-led men, which commenced on August 20, 1940. This was the greatest Communist offensive of the war, and many important battles were fought in central Hopeh and other areas of the Chin-Ch’a-Chi base. I n response, from the spring of 1941 into the autumn of 1942, the Japanese conducted their infamous “Three-All Campaign” (kill all, burn all, destroy all) i n order to

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“drain the water” from the Communist fish.*' The Hundred Regiments

Campaign clearly violated Mao’s principle of not fighting “unless we are sure of victory,” repeated only four months before, but the politics of this decision, later blamed by Maoists on Chu Teh and P’eng Teh-huai, is not clear.’ Losses incurred during the Communist and Japanese offensives and after the Japanese adoption of more successful blockade methods of combat reduced Communist strength i n Chin-Ch’a-Chi and elsewhere by about a third over-all and by more than half in Hopeh. The eastern Hopeh (ChiTung) Military District, north of Peiping, for example, was virtually destroyed, and outside of Shensi the Communists were reduced to one

county capital by 1943 before expanding to hold more than forty by the end of 1944. Nevertheless, determined efforts, including tunneling and

other guerrilla techniques, as well as continued effective political action, led to renewed Communist expansion in the area in 1943-4433

Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii A fourth major Communist base area i n North China, after Shen-KanNing, Chin-Sui, and Chin-Ch’a-Chi, was established i n the T’aihang and T’aiyiieh mountains of southeastern Shansi. Some 6,000 men of the 129th

Division under Liu Po-ch’eng, the “one-eyed dragon,” and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, drove into the east and then southeast of the province. At about the same time i n the early autumn of 1937, the 120th and 115th Divisions moved

northwest and northeast. After the Japanese capture of Taiyiian on November 9, they moved further into the rugged area around Hoshun, where Po Yi-po’s “dare to die corps” of the Shansi Sacrifice League had already settled. Working with a “few local” activists to establish peasant associations, self-defense corps, and mutual help teams, the Communists soon

expanded into neighboring counties and into northern Honan, western Shantung, and southern Hopeh. Progress i n mass and military mobilization accelerated following a Japanese excursion into Hoshun i n the spring of 1938, and the Communists

were soon reinforced by units from the 115th and 129th Divisions (the 668th, 769th, 771st regiments) under Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien and others. I n southern Hopeh, where there had been Communist activity since the mid1920’s, forces linked with local guerrillas and expanded eastward into

Shantung and southward into Honan. A Southern Hopeh Administrative District, including six subdistricts, was established o n August 4, 1938,

under Yang Hsiu-feng, a former history professor at National Teachers College i n Peiping, with Sung Jen-ch’iung his deputy. Increasing Nationalist opposition to Communist expansion from southeastern Shansi was

nullified by a Japanese invasion that drove the Nationalists out of most of that province in May and June, 1941.%* Meanwhile, the Communists held local elections i n 1938 and 1939, and, i n August, 1940, established an executive committee for southern Hopeh and southeastern Shansi, coordinating activities concentrated i n the three

areas of the T’aihang and T’aiylieh mountains and southern Hopeh. Communist troops i n the area then reportedly grew from some 10,000 to

100,000, and despite heavy Japanese attacks i n 1941-42, i n July, 1941,

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the Party created a government for border areas linking Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-Yi), w i t h Yang Hsiu-feng, chairman, and Po Yi-po a vice-chairman. The Party, as well as its supporting organizations i n the area, increased from several hundred to several tens of

thousands i n many counties of southern Shansi and neighboring provinces under the T’aihang, T’aiyiieh, Shansi-Honan, Hopeh-Shantung-Honan, and other ‘special administrative committees,” which held a First Party Rep-

resentatives’ Conference i n September, 1939. Regional sub-bureaus were established for the T’aihang Mountains and the Central Plains i n 1942 and 1943 and merged into a Central Bureau for Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii i n 1945. By

1945, the area was said to embrace some 15 million people i n about 197 counties, divided into four or five special administrative and two military districts.®® Shantung The final important North China guerrilla area, Shantung, exemplified

the combined Communist use of military force and alliances with local rebels to expand Communist influence during the war. A Party work committee under Chao Chien-min was re-established i n Shantung i n 1936, after a three-year lapse, and numerous bands of anti-Japanese guerrillas emerged i n the wake of the Japanese invasion of Shantung, the precipi-

tous withdrawal of notorious Nationalist governor Han Fu-chii,* and subsequent social and political turmoil. One group operating from the famous old bandit lair known as Liangshan Moorf at times grew to as many as 7,000, but were nearly destroyed when their commander, a former Nationalist official, was killed in November, 1938. However, remnants of this and other groups joined units sent from the North under L o Jung-huan, Ch’en Keng, Hsiao Hua, and others to create five Communist subregions,

claiming control i n 1943 of some 15 million people with 500,000 in the militia i n about half of Shantung.?* Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang

Besides the five major bases i n the North—Shen-Kan-Ning, Chin-Sui, Chin-Ch’a-Chi, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, and Shantung—there were Communist activities i n Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. I n 1936, the Party i n Harbin had attempted to reactivate its Manchurian Committee, but, after

some initial successes, massive arrests by the Japanese had virtually eliminated the CCP i n the region by mid-1937. However, Yang Ching-yii, Chou Pao-chung, and other Communists continued to lead important military units. I n 1936, elements of the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army, founded i n 1933-34, merged w i t h other forces under Yang Ching-yii as commander. I n contrast to the destruction of the Party apparatus i n Manchuria, from 1937 to 1940, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army, as this

force was now called, rose to its peak strength of 300,000 men, perhaps 45,000 o f them Communist-controlled. However, Yang Ching-yii was * Executed by the Nationalists i n January, 1938, for his “traitorous” abandonment of the province. 1 The locale of half a dozen major rebellions i n Chinese history, including those of the famous novel Water Margin.

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killed in 1940, and continued Japanese pressure greatly reduced their number and influence to perhaps only several hundred men.®” Forces under Chou Pao-chung, Kim Il-sung, and others were able to flee into Soviet Far Eastern territories, from which they returned, together with Russian troops, i n August, 1945, with Chou commanding what was then called the Northeast Self-Defense Army i n Manchuria,* and K i m soon emerging as the

leader of North Korea. Inner Mongolia, surrounded by Russian-dominated Outer Mongolia, China, and Japanese-controlled areas, presented special circumstances for the Communists. Following the Soviet-sponsored establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic i n 1921, Communism had special attractions for Mongolian nationalists on both sides of the border. Some wanted a pan-Mongolian union with Outer Mongolia, but others hoped to achieve autonomy within a Chinese federation. However, anti-Chinese sentiment

prevented much Chinese Communist penetration of Inner Mongolia until after the Sino-Japanese War. Then, of course, the Red Army was decisive, but its expansion into Inner Mongolia was facilitated by the work of Mongolian Communists such as Ulanfu and by increasingly sophisticated nationalities policies worked out i n Yenan. At the beginning of the war, Ulanfu and other Communists served in a Mongolian Peace Preservation Corps i n Suiyiian and, i n September, 1941, helped establish a Nationalities

Institute i n Yenan under Kao Kang. Ulanfu also headed the nationalities affairs committee of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and a Mongolian Cultural Association. I n 1944, he helped organize a Communist base among Mongols i n Suiyiian, prior to the founding of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association i n November, 1945.%®

I n Sinkiang, Chinese Communist efforts were subject to the shifting balance that warlord Sheng Shih-ts’ai maintained among the minority groups there, the Soviet Union, and the Nationalist government. I n the

1930’s, Sheng had sought Russian support against his many rivals and accordingly tolerated o r , i n his words, even “welcomed” Chinese Com-

munist activities in Sinkiang. I n later phases of the Long March, Chang Kuo-t’ao favored Sinkiang as the location for new Communist bases, and although Party Central rejected this idea, i t sent a high-level mission to Urumchi (Tihwa) to open a staff office of the Eighth Route Army, headed first b y Teng Fa and after 1938 b y Ch’en T’an-ch’iu, assisted b y Mao’s brother, Mao Tse-min, and T’eng Tai-yiian, among others. I n the early years of the war, the Communists obtained military aid from General

Sheng Shih-ts’ai, such as the training of a first group of forty-three Chinese Communist pilots i n early 1938. However, the cessation of Soviet military aid to Sheng and his growing mistrust of all Communists led him to switch his alliance from Moscow to Chungking i n the spring of 1942. That sum-

mer, Sheng arrested more than 600 Communists in Sinkiang and the following year executed many, including Ch’en T’an-ch’iu and M a o Tse-min.

Thereafter, Communist influence i n Sinkiang was developed by such minority leaders as Saifudin, who participated i n revolts against Sheng and * Renamed the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army after 1936, the Northeast Self-Defense Army about 1945, and the Northeast Democratic Allied Army i n 1946.

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the Nationalists in 1944 and later and set up short-lived governments, some of them Soviet-backed, such as the Republic of East Turkestan in 1944.%° New Fourth Army Bases in East-Central and South China T o the south, small Communist units, scattered i n rural areas from

Wuhan to Shanghai and south to Hainan Island, operated in parts of eight provinces. Probably totaling less than 10,000 men at the beginning of the war, until late 1937, they had seen fierce and almost continuous fighting

with Nationalist troops. Their leaders were the survivors of perhaps 20,000 military and political activists who remained behind in some fourteen separate pockets when the main forces of the Red Army embarked on the Long March. Others had made their way back south after the defeat of such groups as the X Corps i n southern Anhwei i n early 1935, or had been

recruited locally. Before 1937, the principal Communist groups in Central and South China were about 2,000 men in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi (Min-CheKan) Border Region, under Chang Ting-ch’eng, Teng Tzu-hui, T’an Chenlin, Su Y i , and others, another 1,500 or so i n the Kwangtung-Kiangsi

(Yiieh-Kan) border area under Hsiang Ying, Ch’en Yi, and others, and several thousand just north of the Yangtze. Other pockets existed i n Hunan and as far away as the East River area of Kwangtung and Hainan Island. All units were forced to keep always on the alert and constantly on the move so that there was little coordination or communication among them,

let alone with the Central Committee in the North. Even some top leaders were out of touch with Yenan for more than two years.*® Hsiang Ying was i n over-all command of the groups that remained in the South after the Long March, with Ch’en Y i as political commissar. The Nationalists continued pressure on the Communist pockets in the South right u p to the outbreak of open warfare with Japan, reportedly

sending 250,000 men to wipe out the group on the Fukien-Chekiang border as late as April, 1937. I n October, however, as part of the united

front agreements, the national government approved the existence of a New Fourth Army of up to 12,000 men i n Central and South China. At first, both the Party’s Southeast China Bureau and the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army were located i n Nanchang, nominally under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Third Area W a r Commander, b u t both later were forced to move several times.*

From 1938 on, three detachments of the New Fourth Army were operating i n southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, and northern Kiangsi to the south o f the Yangtze and a fourth detachment operated i n northeastern Hupeh and later i n northern Anhwei, north of the river. I n late 1938, the

4th Detachment was joined by two others, Eighth Route Army cadres, who had traveled from Shansi into eastern Honan and later northern Anhwei, * By 1940, the New Fourth Army Headquarters had relocated to Chinghsien, about 50 miles south of Wuhu, Anhwei. The rear headquarters of the New Fourth Army and the Kiangsi Committee moved to Chian after the fall of Nanchang i n late March, 1939, and late i n the spring moved further west to Shangyao, while units of the Kiangsi Committee and other Communist units dispersed into mountain bases i n the border areas of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh."

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and i n mid-1939 by another detachment that had formed i n May o n the

Anhwei-Kiangsu border, north of Nanking. In November, 1939, a South Yangtze Command under Ch’en Y i and a North Yangtze Command under Chang Yiin-yi were established to coordinate activities south and north of the Yangtze. As o f January, 1940, the 1st, 2d, and 3 d detachments, under

Ch’en Yi, Chang Ting-ch’eng, and T’an Chen-lin, respectively, made up the South Yangtze Command of the N e w Fourth Army, while the 4th, 5th,

and 6th detachments under Tai Chi-ying, Lo Ping-hui, and P’eng Hsiiehfeng, respectively, made u p the North Yangtze Command.*?

I n addition, other important guerrilla groups fought under the direction of the N e w Fourth Army. One of these was L i Hsien-nien’s Honan-Hupeh

Volunteer Column, operating north of Wuhan i n the old Oyiiwan area, which was incorporated into the N e w Fourth Army after January, 1941,

when i t became the largest contingent of the New Fourth Army. Other groups affiliated with the New Fourth Army operated north of the old Chingkangshan base i n the mountains along the Kiangsi-Honan-Hupeh borders, and units at P’ingchiang, Hunan, were involved i n the earliest publicized armed clash w i t h the Nationalists on June 12, 1939. I n southern Kiangsu, between Nanking, Shanghai, and Hangchow, various other patriotic groups formed and allied i n varying degrees w i t h the N e w Fourth Army.*3

I n late 1939-40, tensions between the Nationalists and Communists i n Central and East China markedly increased as a result of Nationalist mis-

givings at the rapid expansion and aggressive movements of Communist units. I n late July, 1939, after the P’ingchiang incident of June 12, the South China Bureau i n Chungking ordered subordinate committees to go underground and tighten organization i n preparation for intensified Nationalist repression. Later that year, clashes occurred i n six provinces and then more seriously i n areas of Kiangsu north of the Yangtze, as Party

Central directed expansion “beyond the limits allowed by the Kuomintang.””** The Communists had had little indigenous strength i n northern Kiangsi prior to the Japanese invasion, and even i n the first years of the

war Nationalist units predominated there. I n late 1939, however, units of the New Fourth Army’s North Yangtze Command, especially Lo Ping-hui’s 5th Detachment, began to move into Kiangsu from Anhwei, and a few

months later Ch’en Yi’s and Chang Ting-ch’eng’s 1st and 2d detachments crossed to the north of the river from their old headquarters at Maoshan, near Wubhsi. There, i n coordination with local guerrilla forces, the 1st and 2 d detachments bested Nationalist troops i n the summer and early autumn of 1940 and established headuarters at Yench’eng. A t about the same time, some 15,000 men of the Eighth Route Army i n Shantung under Huang K’o-ch’eng moved south to northern Kiangsu where, together w i t h

Lo Ping-hui, they defeated remaining Nationalist units i n the area.* The N e w Fourth A r m y Incident

By October, 1940, the N e w Fourth Army held all of Kiangsu north of

the Yangtze and east of the Grand Canal, as well as sizable areas to the west i n Anhwei and Hupeh, and pockets to the south of the Yangtze. The

Nationalists responded to these Communist advances with proposals that

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all Communist units should move out of the Yangtze valley entirely, shifting i n stages to the north of the Yellow River. After discussion in June in

Chungking, i t was agreed that all territory north of the Yellow River would be recognized as Communist, except for Yen Hsi-shan’s area in southwestern Shansi, and that Communist strength could be increased from three

to eight divisions, but in return the New Fourth Army was to withdraw from Central and East China. Units of the South Yangtze Command under Ch’en Y i had already moved north of the Yangtze i n early 1940, and other units d i d so later i n the year, but o n October 19 and other occasions the

Nationalists ordered all Communist units to complete this process and continue to the north of the Yellow River. However, new Fourth Army

headquarters under Yeh T’ing and Hsiang Ying, with about 4,000 troops, 2,000 wounded, and 3,000 political and medical workers, and other small

Communist groups remained south of the River, and, on December 9, the Nationalists set a final deadline of the end of the year for all N e w Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army units to be north of the Yangtze and Yellow

Rivers, respectively. For reasons that remain obscure, N e w Fourth Army Headquarters did not comply with Nationalist orders b u t instead, on December 31, moved

southwesterly from their headquarters at Chinghsien, Anhwei, possibly on their way into Kiangsi. O n January 4 , according to Nationalist accounts, their troops surrounded o r counterattacked i n self-defense the head-

quarters group at Maolin, and a bitter ten-day battle erupted i n which the Communist unit was very nearly annihilated. Only about 1,000 men broke

through the Nationalist encirclement, and Hsiang Ying and many other high-ranking personnel were killed. Yeh T’ing was taken prisoner while discussing terms with a Nationalist commander. The N e w Fourth Army (or South Anhwei) Incident climaxed the steady

deterioration of the second united front. On January 17, 1941, Chungking, which had begun to blockade Yenan in early 1939 and had outlawed most Communist activities i n its territories i n mid-1939, announced the dissolution of the N e w Fourth Army and charged continued provocations.*®

Thereafter, the united front was marked only by the continuance of a Communist mission and newspaper i n Chungking. The Communists, of course, charged that they had been betrayed and attacked while loyally trying to carry out their mission of active defense against Japan and generally got the best of the incident i n subsequent propaganda. The real

explanation was that the very effectiveness and popularity of the Communists i n East China leit no room for any other Chinese government and

hence made their clash with the Nationalists as predictable as i t was tragic. * Later Maoist accounts blamed the errors of Hsiang Ying partly for this disaster. I n addition to claims that the route and timing demanded by the Nationalists were impossible, there was talk of Hsiang’s opposition to Party Central orders as early as May, 1938, to transfer north of the Yangtze. Some believe Hsiang wished to remain i n the s o u t h , t o try t o b u i l d a “ s e c o n d Y e n a n ” i n Yiinling, southern A n h w e i , a n d others

charged h i m w i t h cowardice i n trying to protect his own escape. I n July, 1940, the Party Secretariat had directed military units to “refrain from any operations i n the Kuomintang ruled areas liable to cause conflict,” but t h e New Fourth Army was operating in a ‘“no-man’s l a n d . ”

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After the N e w Fourth Army Incident, some 90,000 men i n Communist units, mostly north of the Yangtze, remained intact, and, o n January 22, Yenan appointed a new command staff and confirmed the reorganization of

the New Fourth Army that had already been worked out in part by Ch’en Y i i n late 1940. Headquarters centered at Yench’eng, northern Kiangsu, and included Commander Ch’en Yi, Deputy Commander Chang Yiin-yi, Political Commissar L i u Shao-ch’i and Chief of Political Department Teng

Tzu-hui. There were now seven major units, called divisions, operating under the following commanders i n the following areas, given with their strength i n regulars as of 1944: 1st, Central Kiangsu (Su-Chung) Military Region (19,000), Su Yii; 2d, South H u a i (Huai-Nan) Military Region (21,000), Chang Yiin-yi ( w i t h L o Ping-hui as political commissar); 3d, North Kiangsu (Su-Pei) Military Region (23,000), Huang K’o-cheng; 4th, North H u a i (Huai-Pei) Military Region (18,000), P’eng Hsiieh-feng; 5th, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei (Oyiiwan) Military Region (22,000), L i Hsiennien; 6th, South Kiangsu (Su-Nan) Military Region (6,000), T’an Chen-lin;

7th, Central Anhwei (Wan-Chung) Military Region (5,000), Chang Tingch’eng. I n addition, there was an East Chekiang (Che-Tung) Column of

some 4,000.*° The area north of the Yangtze was under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains Bureau of the Party, at first located at Chukouchen, Honan, under the protection of the 8th Regiment of the 4th Detachment of the New Fourth Army. I n November, 1940, the Bureau led the establishment o f a

Northern Kiangsu Special Administrative Committee, a government structure similar to those i n North China and w i t h functions that paralleled those o f the Party and army. After the N e w Fourth Army Incident, the area

south of the Yangtze came under the new Central China Bureau in Yench’eng, w i t h L i u Shao-ch’i secretary, Jao Shu-shih deputy secretary, Tseng

Shan as director of organization, and Ch’en Y i i n charge of military affairs. Despite Japanese pacification efforts, especially i n February and July, 1941,

when most Communists were forced to withdraw temporarily from Kiangsu, the Communists held most of these areas until the end of the war, when they became crucial components of c i v i l war strategy.®® I n extreme South China, scattered small Communist bases also existed,

their Party organizations under the jurisdiction of the South China Work Committee established after January, 1941, eventually at Tap’u, northern Kwangtung. The oldest group had operated i n the mountains of Hainan

Island since the late 1920’s under Feng Pai-chii. Only several hundred strong i n 1937, Feng’s unit expanded early i n the war b u t again had to

retreat into northeastern Hainan after the Japanese invasion of the island i n February, 1939. By the end of the war, there were five battalions and 3,000 men i n Feng’s Hainan Column, and i t held out u n t i l the arrival of

forces under Lin Piao i n April, 1950. Another Communist-led force emerged i n Kwangtung Province after the Japanese invasion of Canton i n October, 1938. After many ups and downs i n 1941, the East River Column,

composed of many seamen from Hong Kong and Canton, was formed, under the leadership of Tseng Sheng, and others. Operating i n Huiyang and Paoan counties and later i n the Hailufeng area, this column fought off

a Nationalist campaign in late April, 1942, and claimed 10,000 men by

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1944, although other estimates put the figure closer to 2,000. Many of the column were evacuated by sea to Shantung in 1946, but some returned later as the Civil War engulfed South China.** Far to the north i n Shensi, developments occurred more central to the Communist movement and, as i t turned out, decisive for the future o f China. T o these we must n o w return.

15 YENAN A N D THE SHEN-KAN-NING BASE

The nerve center of wartime Communism i n China was Yenan. There and in surrounding areas of northern Shensi a small but battle-hardened group of Communist leaders used their first relative security, after a decade of

bitter struggle, to work out the strategies and techniques that carried them to success a decade later. While the most rapid Communist growth of the war years occurred in more turbulent and dangerous base areas to the east and south behind Japanese lines, the Party leadership largely groomed itself for power in the smaller and poorer but quieter northern Shensi base. The Japanese threatened and sometimes bombed the area, and the Nationalists

renewed their blockade with occasional attacks after mid-1939.' But in northern Shensi, to a greater degree than elsewhere, the Communists had the opportunity to begin i n earnest the task of completing the ‘bourgeois

democratic revolution’ and preparing ‘the transition to socialism,” with all that that entailed in mass organization, establishment of government machinery, and development of the economy. Equally important, i t was i n Shensi that the Party launched its first

systematic rectification campaign i n the early 1940’s, at once disciplining and streamlining the CCP and leading to Mao’s consolidation of control over i t . Hence i t was i n northern Shensi, to a greater extent than had been

the case earlier in Kiangsi or than was the case i n the other wartime bases, that the Communists shifted their strategy from the revolution from below against the ruling authorities to the revolution from above for the building of “people’s democracy” and later of socialism. Here, the revolutionaries

became the ruling authorities and had to use their power to build a new order. Their experiences in these tasks, a vital part of the Chinese Communist heritage, have been immortalized as the “Yenan legacy.” Yenan itself, though not far from the ancient capitals of the great H a n

and T’ang dynasties, seemed a highly unlikely site for the headquarters of what would soon become the government of the most populous nation on earth. A tall pagoda of the ancient town, then of about 40,000 people, was a well-known landmark among the neighboring loess hills, but the remoteness and poverty of the city and region were evident. Many residents,

310

The Long March to Power

including most Party leaders, lived i n caves carved out of the surrounding cliffs and arranged in ascending terraces. The extreme conditions in the area, which had been devastated most during the Muslim rebellions of the

1860’s and 1870’s, are partially revealed by such 1920’s and 1930’s statistics as an estimated 60 per cent infant mortality rate, 1 per cent literacy

rate, the death of up to 2.5 million people (one-third of the provincial population), and the migration of another half million i n the catastrophic

famine of 1927-30. Nevertheless, northern Shensi enjoyed a highly strategic position; many dynasties from the Chou o n had used the area as a base of power, and rebels from this area had overthrown the Ming Dynasty i n the mid-seventeenth century. As of 1930, there were an estimated 1.3 million people i n the area of the border region and 223,243 i n Yenan County. Party Central, the government, and military offices moved to Yenan i n January, 1937, following the Sian Incident of December and the move i n

mid-1936 from Wayaopao to Paoan. I n Yenan, Mao gradually transformed a basically collective leadership into one that he dominated, becoming

chairman of the Party after about 1943. Most senior Party leaders were in Yenan throughout the war (see Chart 14.1), while still others, such as

Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu in Chungking (although with numerous trips to Shensi) and Hsiang Ying, Liu Shao-ch’i, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing behind the Japanese lines, were also, of course, important members of the leader-

ship but could not participate in day-to-day decision-making i n Yenan. Among indigenous Party leaders i n the Northwest, Kao Kang emerged as

the most important, taking over as secretary of the Party’s Northern Shensi (Shensi-Kansu) Committee from K u o Hung-t’ao i n 1938 (which later

developed into the Party’s Shen-Kan-Ning Bureau and in 1941 into the Northwest China Bureau). The Eighth Route Army headquarters, headed by Chu Teh, commander i n chief; P’eng Teh-huai, deputy commander; and Yeh Chien-ying, chief of staff, was also located i n northern Shensi.?

The government of the Shen-Kan-Ning (Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia) Border Region was formally announced on September 6, 1937, b u t effective Communist organization i n the area went back to at least 1934. Following the

arrival of Mao Tse-tung’s column of the Long March i n Shensi i n October, 1935, the Party established a northwest office of the old Kiangsi Soviet Government apparatus in Wayaopao, headed by Ch’in Pang-hsien. Mao remained chairman of the executive committee of the Central Soviet Government with Chang Kuo-t’ao and the absent Hsiang Ying serving as vicechairmen, b u t real power i n the government had been transferred i n January, 1934, to the Council of People’s Commissars, headed b y Chang Wen-t’ien. I n 1937, i n connection w i t h the negotiation of the united front and possibly w i t h Mao’s maneuvers at the expense of the “Russian returned students’ and Chang Kuo-t’ao, the old Central Soviet Government offices were abolished, their functions devolving onto the various border area governments.* I n May, 1937, i n order to establish new political authority i n Shensi,

Communist leaders initiated a second mass campaign, after the land revolution, calling for the creation of a ‘““democratic” system w i t h elective,

representative government to supersede military rule. As i n the land revolution, activists were sent into the villages to explore conditions, propagan-

[Chap. 15]

Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

311

dize, recruit new activists, and form “revolutionary committees” to prepare the election of “democratic councils.” Only now, i n accord w i t h the united front, the Communists stressed “ n e w democracy,” based on Sun Yat-sen’s

“three principles of the people,” which the Communists said were compatible with their “minimum” or short-term program. The basic units of local administration were the village and township (or administrative village, hsiang) councils, which were elected by village congresses and which, subject to approval of county governments, chose a village chief, a deputy, and seven to ten assistants. Elections for councils

were held i n the summer and early a u t u m n , supposedly with effective universal suffrage, at the levels of township (where one representative was to be chosen for each twenty constituents), of subdistrict ( w i t h one represen-

tative for every fifty people), and of county (with one representative for 200 people) . ® Finally, a regional assembly was to have been chosen w i t h

one representative for every 1,500 people i n the border region, but the war and other problems limited the 1937 election campaign to ten counties, and the assembly did not meet until January-February, 1939, a year after the holding of a comparable assembly at Foup’ing for the Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region.” The 1939 Shen-Kan-Ning assembly, chaired by Kao Kang, elected Lin Po-ch’ii chairman of the border area government and re-elected Lin at the second border area assembly in November—December, 1941. After March, 1940, another “ n e w democratic” feature of local government was

made formal i n Shen-Kan-Ning and other Communist areas. This was the “three-thirds” system by which Communists were to hold no more than

one-third of government positions, and often as few as one-fifth, thus sharing control w i t h Nationalists and non-Communist leftists or indepen-

dents. A t the start of the war i n mid-1937, the Communists completely controlled fifteen counties and parts o f another ten around Yenan. The border

region fluctuated somewhat i n size, growing i n 1938 to about two dozen counties, contracting to about eighteen counties from 1939 to 1941 (twelve i n Shensi, five i n Kansu, and one i n Ninghsia), and expanding again thereafter to twenty-nine counties, 266 districts, and 1,549 administrative villages (hsiang) i n an area about the size of Ohio, inhabited by 1.5 million

people.® The Nationalists tacitly recognized Communist control of at least eighteen counties but expected their further expansion to be blocked to the north b y the governor of Suiyiian, F u Tso-yi, to the west by Muslim generals i n Ninghsia, and to the east and south b y Yen Hsi-shan, other Nation-

alists, and Japanese. For administrative purposes, the area was first subdivided into the four regions of northern Shensi, Shensi-Kansu border, Kuanchung, and Shenfu to the southwest and northeast of Yenan and, i n 1941, into five areas, Yenan and other directly administered cities and counties, Suiteh ( i n the northeast), Kuanchung ( i n the south), Sanpien ( i n the n o r t h ) , and Lungtung ( i n the west) . ? The Mass Line in Northern Shensi

After the reinstitution of the Kuomintang blockade and intensification of Japanese pressure on the Communists i n mid-1939, the foremost concern

of the Party and government i n northern Shensi was further to tighten

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The Long March to Power

organization of the population for purposes of taxation and recruitment, for dealing with shortages and possible attack, and for increasing production. Organizational efforts were closely connected with the military situation and the use of the Red Army for construction and economic tasks, the further development of mass line techniques, and the rectification of the Party.

There were five types of military forces i n Shensi: A t the district level, there were regulars of the Eighth Route Army, both mobile field forces ( “ m a i n forces’) and local guerrillas (“regional f o r c e s ’ ) ; while, at the village level, there were self-defense forces, militia, and supposedly some

150 to 200 in the public security forces i n each county.'® The Nationalists estimated that there were some 18,000 members of the Eighth Route Army, i n addition to 224,355 self-defense forces i n Shen-Kan-Ning as of about

1941, while other sources placed the number of regulars stationed i n the area a little later as high as 80,000. Some 10,000 were recruited from

Yenan County (population 223,243 in 1930) for self-defense forces, along w i t h 6,000 youth vanguards. Some 46,358 soldiers i n the area helped with

cultivation i n 1938, as did 63,797 i n 1939." The Communists, however, unlike the Nationalists (and i t proved a

crucial distinction), did not confine their efforts to military organization. Rather, they linked military units closely w i t h civilian organization, with

each form of organization closely supporting the other. Building on their earlier experiences, the Party elaborated the justly celebrated mass line,

and the techniques of recruiting activists, and using them to build mass organizations became the strongest weapon of the Communists. As a November, 1939, Central Committee decision put it, Party members should go deeply among the masses and lead the mass movement to fight for their own welfare and gradually organize the large majority of the masses into unions, peasant associations, women’s leagues, youth corps, children’s leagues, and people’s militia, self-defense armies, youth vanguards, to fight against Japan as well as to effect the improvement of living conditions and the enhancement of cultural standards....A Party cell must make these mass activities the foundation of all its activities and each cell should be the nucleus of the masses i n every village or town, as well as the propagandist, organizer and leader of all mass movements and mass struggles.!?

Mass organizations had emerged i n this area during Communist landredistribution campaigns i n 1935-36 i n a dozen counties and parts of another ten o r so, although these local associations were not always responsive to the Communist command structure. I n fact, i n Shensi, as i n

all other Communist bases throughout the history of the movement, revolutionary committees, peasant associations, poor-peasant organizations, women’s, youth, and other associations, when left on their own, frequently pursued policies quite different from the Party line and resented the directions of “outsiders,” whatever their politics. Furthermore, at first, there were not enough local cadres. Nonetheless, during and after 1936, the Communists made rapid progress i n harnessing and directing into more nationalistic and constructive channels the revolutionary energies stirred u p by the land revolution, an achievement that proved as important as i t had

[Chap. 15]

Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

313

been difficult. I n line with united front policies, the terminology and ideology of Communism was played down, and local activists concentrated on the formation of various ‘“anti-Japanese national salvation associations,” which, however, were gradually brought under Communist control. The Communists claim to have organized some twenty-five mass organizations in the Shen-Kan-Ning area and to have united them in an “antiJapanese rear support association.” Already in 1938, the border region labor association claimed 45,000 members, its national youth association claimed 168,000 members, and its women’s federation, 173,800 members.

Even with overlapping membership, it is evident that the Communists were able to mobilize much of the local population and Lin Po-ch’ii claimed that every mature resident of the area belonged to at least one mass organization. I n some townships, as many as 7 per cent of the total popula-

tion performed in government or related jobs and another fifth in the army or militia. For instance, 321 cadres were recruited for various functions out of a population of 819 i n one district east of Yenan. I n other bases of North

and East China, enormous enrollments in mass organizations were achieved, though because of the much higher population there, their rate of recruitment generally was below that of Shen-Kan-Ning or of Kiangsi in the early 1930’s.' Membership figures for mass organizations in four North China guerrilla bases as of about 1943 and for Shen-Kan-Ning as of 1938 are shown i n Table 15.1. The variations i n and questionable reliability of these statistics make them suggestive at best, but they confirm Communist claims of impressive achievements i n mass organization during the war. Table 15.2 shows the percentage of the total population of given areas that was recruited into the militia and regular army. Surprisingly, except

for northern Shensi, these ratios were not nearly as high as the 3 per cent

recruitment reckoned for the early 1930’s, when a Red Army of 300,000 at its height was drawn from a population of no more than 9 million in the three major Communist bases existing before the Long March.'® But the very large populations of the wartime bases permitted an unprecedented explosion of Communist organizations. Moreover, during the war additional mobilization was achieved by the first systematic application of a later feature of Chinese Communist operations, the “transfer downward” of outside activists into local areas. I n July, 1941, the Party began a ‘“‘to-the-village” (hsia-hsiang, later hsia-fang) campaign, accelerating i t i n mid-1942 i n connection with the Party recti-

fication campaign and with parallel efforts to penetrate and mobilize remote areas for production and defense. These achievements were discussed at

important meetings during the winter of 1942-43 and summed up i n the Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, written b y Mao, “ O n

Methods of Leadership.”’*¢ Government and Economic Developments Communist success i n Shan-Kan-Ning i n turn created new problems, especially the growth of the age-old scourge of bureaucratism. This

affected both Party and government and was complicated by friction among

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[Chap. 15]

Yenan a n d the Shen-Kan -Ning Base

315

T A B L E 15.2 MILITARY RECRUITMENT? AND WARTIME MOBILIZATION LEVELS

( i n percentage of total population of area)

Area

Population (in millions)

Militia

Percentage

Regular Army

Percentage

North China Bases (1943—44) (Eighth Route Army) Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia (Shen-Kan-N ing)

1.4

224,355

16.0

80,000

6.0

5.7

320,000

5.3

40,000

0.7

19.0

630,000

3.3

45,000

0.2

18.0

500,000

Shansi-Suiyiian 2.0 (Chin-Su i) Central China Bases (1943—44)" (New Fourth Army) North Kiangsu 3.5 Central Kiangsu 8.1 South Kiangsu 2.7

2.8

30,000

0.1

50,000

25

?

?

85,000 130,000 25,000

2.4 1.6 0.9

? ? ?

? ? ?

70,000

1.3

55,000

0.2

Shansi-Hopeh-Honan (Chin-Chi -Yii, a part of Chin-Chi-L u-Yii) Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin-Ch’a-Chi) Shantung Guerrilla Area

(Kiangsu-Che kiang)

North Huai (Anhwei)

5.5

Central A n h w e i

1.6

25,000

1.6

?

South Huai (Anhwei) East Chekiang

?

2.8

55,000

2.0

?

?

2.0

10,000

0.5

?

?

“The discrepancies between these figures and those i n Table 14.2, and elsewhere are due to the differences between recruits mobilized and those stationed i n the area, and to varying estimates i n different sources. * The New Fourth Army had liberated 13 million people by 1940, according to Chu T e h , O n the Battlefronts o f the Liberated Areas ( P e k i n g , 1952), p . 21.

Source: Hofheinz in Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51.

local activists, Long March veterans, and the many refugees streaming into

Yenan from other areas of wartime China. After the first regional assembly of January-February 1939, the border region government had eight departments and as many as thirty-five auxiliary agencies, employing representatives down to the level of the 1,500-0dd townships. I n late 1941, after the second border region assembly

i n November and December, i t was estimated that there were 7,900 fulltime, paid government officials, of whom 1,000 were employed at the regional level, 4,021 between the regional and township level and 2,879 at the township level. There were also 1,000 self-defense army leaders and 1,100 mass organization activists. About one-third of these were supposed

to be Communists under the “three-thirds system” promulgated after March, 1940, to accord with united front policies. Another third of position-holders i n the border region were to be non-Party leftists, and a final third, middle-of-the-roaders o r Nationalists. I n some places during the 1941 election, as few as 20 per cent of the elected seats went to Communists, with as many as 59 per cent of positions i n some organizations

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The Long March to Power

going to Nationalists." However, as intended, the Party and army ensured

the leadership of the Communists in the organs of political power. Bureaucratization also developed elsewhere, resulting, for example, from the elections of lower committees and later of regional assemblies in the southeastern and northeastern Shansi bases i n 1941 and 1943, respectively.

The proliferation of Party, military, government, and mass activists not only placed a strain on existing resources in impoverished northern Shensi but led to increased Nationalist and Japanese military pressure as both watched the Communist build-up with rising apprehension. The Japanese response to the Hundred Regiments Campaign of August-December, 1940,

i n Shansi, Hopeh, and other areas to the east was only indirectly felt in Shen-Kan-Ning, as the “Three All Campaign’ was directed mainly against Communist bases behind Japanese lines, but i t exacerbated the severe difficulties faced by the northern Shensi base i n 1941-42. The Communist

offensive had accomplished its primary aim of bolstering morale, inflicting losses on Japan, and refuting Nationalist charges that the Communists had ceased fighting Japan, but these gains had proved short-lived and losses had been heavy. The Eighth Route Army was reduced from 400,000 to 300,000 men, and the population controlled by the Communists from 44 million to 25 million. Consequently, the Party leadership must have feared new reverses and, above all, open or tacit cooperation of the Nationalists

and the Japanese against the Communist bases. Accordingly, after 1940, the Communists reverted to more cautious tactics for the remainder of the war.'® Nationalist efforts to block aggressive Communist expansion had greater economic and political than military effects o n the Shen-Kan-Ning base.

After the reimposition of the blockade of the region i n mid-1939, the Nationalists reoccupied five of the eighteen Communist counties, but, b y 1941, the Communists had expanded their control to twenty-nine counties,

and more or less held these later in the war, although blockaded by perhaps 500,000 Nationalist troops."® However, the economic effects of the blockade were much harder to deal with, especially when compounded by bad weather, the needs of other bases, growing bureaucracy, and other problems. Suspension of the Nationalist subsidy of some $100,000 (Chinese) per month after 1940 also

hurt, and the Communists consequently were forced to increase taxation, especially of the peasants who had been virtually exempt from taxes early i n the war. The poor had paid as little as 1 to 5 per cent of their crop as

tax in the 1930’s, but this increased to about 13 per cent i n Shen-Kan-Ning by 1941, leveling off at about 10 per cent thereafter. I n Chin-Ch’a-Chi, taxes rates on land and later income varied from about 5 per cent for poor peasants up to about 50 per cent for landlords.*° For these and other reasons, i n 1942 and 1943, inflation i n the northern

Shensi base was worse than that in Nationalist areas, then running at 160 per cent per year. Shen-Kan-Ning prices rose almost 1,400 per cent i n 1942, and about 700 per cent i n the following year, b u t thereafter they were

brought under control, in sharp contrast to inflation i n Nationalist areas where prices were increasing by more than 1,000 per cent per year by the late 1940’s.?' There was less inflation i n the Shansi and Shantung Com-

[Chap. 15]

Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

317

munist bases, and a largely barter economy reduced its impact. Nevertheless, these hardships led Mao Tse-tung to state, The greatest difficulty arose i n the years 1940 and 1941 when the Kuomintang’s two anti-Communist drives took place. For a while we were reduced almost to the state o f h a v i n g n o clothes to wear, n o o i l to cook w i t h , n o paper, n o vegetables, n o footwear for the soldiers, and, i n winter, n o bed-

ding for the civilian personnel.22 As will be seen, these conditions were an important factor i n the

launching of the rectification movement after 1941, but the primary economic response of the Communists was a drive to increase production and to tighten further the rest of the region’s operations, especially the bureaucracy. I n coordination w i t h the Party rectification movement, a drive under the slogan “better troops and simplified administration,” designed to reduce the number of full-time cadres by one-fifth, from 7,900 to 6,300, was launched i n December, 1941. However, i n early 1943, the number of government employees actually increased to 8,200.%* Despite such failures, at least the Communists tried to deal with the

problems of bureaucratization, again i n contrast to the Nationalists, and in August, 1944, Mao stated with some justification, O f course we do not pretend that we are perfect. We still face problems of bureaucracy and corruption. But we do face them and we are beating them. We welcome observation and criticism—by the Americans, by the Kuomintang, or by anyone else. We are constantly criticizing ourselves and revising our policies toward greater efficiency and effectiveness.2* Efforts to organize and increase production i n 1943, with military units

playing a considerable role, had more success than the attempts to reduce bureaucracy. A senior cadres conference i n Yenan from October 19, 1942,

to January 14, 1943, which discussed problems of production and rectification, led to increased efforts to improve the economy. The development of formerly barren Nanniwan south of Yenan by Wang Chen’s 359th Brigade was the most famous of many efforts to use the army i n production,

and, by 1944, Mao claimed that army and government agencies i n ShenKan-Ning were producing about 40 per cent o f their needs with the remainder being paid for b y taxes. The slogan “ u n i t y of work and arms”

symbolized this effort to achieve self-sufficiency for public agencies. Production i n the Shen-Kan-Ning area reportedly doubled as a result of such measures, although in most Communist bases i t fell as a result of the war. There were also model labor campaigns and other measures to stimulate production, but undoubtedly the most important aspect of the production

drive was the movement to form mutual aid cooperatives from late 1942 to 1944. As early as 1936, there had been abortive efforts to form consumer and transport cooperatives i n Shen-Kan-Ning, as there had been Nation-

alist efforts along these lines since the 1920’s. But the Shensi campaign for labor cooperatives, or mutual aid teams, was much more far-reaching, involving two-thirds of the area’s work force of 600,000 (one-half of which was only a part-time work force). The mutual aid cooperatives were used

318

The Long March to Power

primarily in the countryside for planting, irrigation, harvesting, and the like, and accordingly were deeply affected by Communist land policies.?® The Party reaffirmed its moderate wartime land policies in directives of July 7 and December 25, 1940, and of January 28, 1942. The 1942 docu-

ment served notice that the Party intended to carry out its “minimum program” of land to the tiller and hence presaged the tougher agrarian policies adopted after the war. But the wartime policy only called for the

reduction of rents by 25 per cent to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of primary crops and 45 per cent of subsidiary crops and of interest to a

maximum of 1.5 per cent per month or 15 per cent per year. Ironically, these provisions basically conformed to the Nationalist land law of June,

1930, which was never implemented. As the Kuomintang became more conservative, the Communists carried out the Nationalists’ ‘“bourgeois-

democratic’ land program with special vigor i n 1940, 1942, and during the winter of 1944-45. They termed the agrarian movement the best way “to mobilize the broad masses... for the struggle against the Japanese [ a n d ] for the struggle for production.”’?¢ The January, 1942, directive linked the social and national revolutions, stating that, i n areas where the land policy had not been carried out

correctly, ‘“‘the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be developed and consequently they cannot be effectively organized . . . against the Japanese.” I t also explained that, for the moment, the Party would “encourage capitalist production. . a n d ally with the rich peasants, o n the condition

that proper improvements are made in the living conditions of the worker,” and i t acknowledged that many areas had not even carried out rent and interest reductions. Despite such limitations, an estimated 10 to 20 per cent of land i n the Shen-Kan-Ning base was redistributed during the war, most of i t taken from “traitors” who had fled the area, since those landlords who stayed o n to support the war effort were protected. As a consequence, the number of poor peasants and farm laborers, as well as landlords, decreased

from about one-third of the total population to as little as 12 per cent in some areas, with subsequent increases in the number of middle and rich peasants.>® Propaganda and Education As always, an important component of Party and mass mobilization was the establishment of propaganda outlets. These increased rapidly, and, as of the spring of 1940, there were at least fifty-one newspapers and journals i n Communist areas. I n Central China bases of the N e w

Fourth Army, Japanese intelligence estimated there were six Communist newspapers in 1940, eighteen in 1941, and forty-three by 1944, including the organs of the N e w Fourth Army headquarters at Yench’eng, the Yangtze and Huai Daily and Party Life. I n Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin-Ch’aC h i ) , as early as 1938, the Party published some 2,500 copies of Resist-

ance, and there were publications in Shantung, Hopeh, and many other areas. I n the bases behind enemy lines, regular publications often were superseded by posters, mimeographed and temporary editions of various kinds, and everywhere the written word was supplemented b y dramatic

[Chap. 15]

Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

319

presentations and popular opera and dance, especially the Yangko dance. All forms of propaganda were pushed. I n Hankow in 1938 and thereafter i n Chungking, the New China Daily, with a circulation of about 25,000 in 1940, presented the Communist line i n Nationalist-held areas, as did

Masses, from 1937 to 1949, though irregularly.?® A larger number of Communist publications could be published i n

northern Shensi, relative to the local population, and, of course, the most authoritative journals were printed in Yenan. The New China News was established i n 1936 i n Shensi, replacing Red China of the Kiangsi period as the outlet of the government, while the leading Party publication was Liberation. I t appeared periodically, from 1937 to 1941, and as a daily after May 16, 1941. Early in the war, i t had a staff of fourteen and circulation of 8,000 copies. I n October, 1939, the Communist, with an

introduction by Mao Tse-tung, was launched as an intra-Party journal, the successor of Guide Weekly and Struggle and the predecessor of Red Flag as the voice of the Party. Mao also introduced the Chinese Worker in February, 1940. Other leading publications in Shensi were Chinese Youth, Chinese Women, Eighth Route Army Military and Political Affairs Magazine, and many others. Various literary magazines also flourished after the arrival i n Yenan of large numbers of intellectuals. The Party’s official press agency also became more active during the war. I n September, 1937, the New China News Agency superseded the Red China News Agency and attempted to coordinate the release of Party information and publications. I t distributed documents and information on the Communist bases both through the press and by radio. At first, i t had only three receiving sets and a hundred-watt transmitter, but i t greatly increased its reception and transmission of news during the war.?® Radio communications

in

general assumed an ever more important

role. Although there were no private receiving sets in Yenan, the Party established a Yenan Radio Station ( X N C R ) to broadcast to more distant

areas, confidential messages being transmitted in code. For example, the Party’s South China Work Committee exchanged secret messages with both Yenan and Chungking from a mountain transmitter in northern Kwangtung. By 1946, there were 10,000 miles of telephone lines i n Communist areas, and by the late 1940’s, radio and telephone communications were reported excellent. There is virtually n o information on communications between Yenan and Moscow during these years, b u t the last Comintern adviser, Otto Braun, claims that radio contact was established

with the help of a Soviet technical mission i n mid-1936.%' Despite the increasing use of technical communications, the primary

form of Communist propaganda remained face-to-face discussion of experiences and of study materials, including many of the above publications.

As the war and production allowed, Party members and population alike were urged ceaselessly to participate in intensive lectures and discussion sessions, sponsored b y Party, army, and mass organizations. A saying reported i n southeastern Shansi must have reflected typical popular reac-

tions to the Communists through much of their history, namely that the Communists were often the lesser evil i n the Chinese situation, but that

most of all the people wished to be left alone. The saying went, “The

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Japanese kill too much, the Kuomintang taxes too much, the Communists

meet too much.’ Communist-sponsored education assumed still greater importance and still closer ties to politics during the Yenan period. Japanese intelligence estimated that about 100 schools had been established in Communist bases as of 1941, of which more than twenty were middle schools. There were impressive increases in the number of students attending primary

school, although the Communist areas fell far short of universal schooling. I n Shen-Kan-Ning, for instance, where only 1 per cent o f the popu-

lace was literate in the 1920’s and early 1930’s, the number of primary school students quintupled between 1937 and 1944, reaching 29,500 in 1944, but this was still less than one-fifth of the school-age children in the area. Other bases, notably Chin-Ch’a-Chi, claimed greater proportions of

youth were receiving Communist education but also admitted deficiencies. To increase student enrollments and to make their education more suitable for local conditions and Communist purposes, the Party devised new guidelines for primary, secondary, and social (part-time and adult) education, especially at the senior cadres conference i n Yenan i n late 1942early 1943. These and other discussions condemned the elitism and unsuit-

ability of “standardized” education and called for more popular and practical education. I n coordination with other aspects of the 1941-44 rectification movement, the reform of overly academic curricula and the

infusion of new personnel greatly improved the effectiveness of Communist education i n Yenan and other areas i n 1943-44. Many new part-

time, night, and ‘“people’s” schools were instituted and cadre training and adult education received new emphasis.** More significant in the short run for Communist plans than popular and lower-level education were higher-level military-political training schools for the Communist elite. More than half of the Communist-run schools in the early part of the war were in this category. Among them were K’ang-Ta (the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy) and the Central Party School described below; the Central Research Institute

(before 1941 called the Academy for Marxist-Leninist Studies) , * which was in charge of theoretical training for high-level cadres, headed from 1940 o n b y Chang Wen-t’ien, assisted b y L i Wei-han, Ch’en Po-ta, and others; and several other important academies and institutes, such as the North Shensi Public School (founded i n September, 1937); the Yenan Chinese Women’s University (founded i n July, 1939); the M a o Tse-tung

Young Cadre School (founded i n May, 1940) with 1,000 to 2,000 students; a foreign language school, the Administrative Academy (founded i n July, 1940), the Natural Sciences Academy (founded in May, 1939), the North China United University (founded July, 1939, later moved to

Chin-Ch’a-Chi), a medical college, a workers’ university, and the famous L u Hsiin Academy of Art and Literature. The latter enrolled 200 students

when it was founded in April, 1938, and by about 1941 maintained a branch in northern Kiangsu under the New Fourth Army. The North Shensi Public School, the Young Cadre School, and the Women’s Uni-

* Not

t o b e confused w i t h the Marx-Lenin Research Association (see b e l o w ) .

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Yenan and the Shen-Kan-Ning Base

321

versity merged administratively i n mid-1941 to form Yenan University,

headed by Chou Yang (which was reorganized i n 1943 and 1944), and a Nationalities Institute was also established i n 1941 i n Yenan. By 1942, there were more than twenty full-time cadre training institutes in Yenan City alone. Although some of them, such as K’ang-Ta and the Central Party School, accepted only Communists, most accepted many non-Communist students i n their capacity as “united front” schools. There were also a number of Communists at these schools from Japan, Korea,

and Vietnam, who later became important leaders of their parties.** By far the most important training institutes were the Central Party School and K’ang-Ta. Eventually, K’ang-Ta had ten or more branches in addition to the main institute i n Yenan, which was headed b y Lin Piao,

and later in the war by Wang Chia-hsiang and Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien, with Lo Jui-ch’ing deputy and dean of studies. I t was technically under the jurisdiction of the Party’s Central Military Affairs Academy but i n effect served as a center of Party authority during the war. Constantly cited as a model of later Maoist political education, i t had been reorganized in June, 1936, from the Red Army Academy and its branches of the Kiangsi period. I t had followed Party headquarters from Wayaopao to Paoan to Yenan in the last half of 1936 and later the principal school moved with some others to Suiteh and then farther east into the Chin-Ch’a-Chi area. Enrollment grew from 300 to several thousand at the central school and at an equal pace elsewhere as branches were established, including important ones in Shansi, Hopeh, and northern Kiangsu, the latter with some 1,200 students under Liu Shao-ch’i, Ch’en Y i , and others. I n all, some 100,000 “choice students’ were trained i n these mostly political courses, which lasted for

six to eight months per class. Many, if not most, future leaders of the Party studied o r taught there, and many of the Party’s most valued edu-

cational techniques were worked out there.* The Central Party School, with its branches i n Central China and elsewhere, had about 300 students i n 1937, 500 i n 1938, 1,000 in 1941, and 5,000 b y 1944. Headed successively b y Tung Pi-wu (about 1934-36), L i Wei-han, Teng Fa (about 1940-43), P’eng Chen, about 1 9 4 3 - 7 ) ,

and others, i t directed the study of higher Party cadres, sought to control the standards of Party leaders who came there in rotation from various bases, and played a crucial role i n the rectification movement of the early

1940’s. Teng Fa, who had been in charge of security during the Kiangsi period, was supposed to be a supporter of Mao but, with Li Wei-han and K’ai Feng, was one of only three living members of the Sixth Central

Committee not re-elected i n 1945. Teng’s successor as head of the Central Party School, P’eng Chen, had returned to Yenan from northeastern

Shansi about 1941 to head political education at the school, as did Lin Piao, who directed military work after February, 1942, upon his return

from three years i n the Soviet Union.?® The school was reorganized at least twice because of the rectification movement, i n early 1942, shortly after the beginning of the rectification

movement and a little later, when the movement’s progress was deemed inadequate. Thereafter a Central Party School Committee, led by Mao Tse-tung, K’ang Sheng, and others, assumed real direction?” There was

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also a Border Region Party School (founded 1937, later becoming the Northwest Party School under Kao Kang’s Northwest China Bureau of the Party), which trained lower-level CCP members, about 500 at a time.

Both of these Party schools had extended their curriculum from about three months to two years by the early 1940’s. They stressed practical applications of Communist ideology for middle- and higher-level cadres, while the Central Research Institute primarily functioned to elevate the theoretical knowledge of Party leaders.*® Other local Party schools trained cadres i n eastern Kansu, Suiteh, Shensi, and elsewhere.

I n addition to these high-level training and supervisory institutions—the Central Party School, Central Research Institute, Central Military Affairs Academy, K’ang-Ta, Yenan University, and the like—there were at least

five research associations i n charge of producing study materials for top cadres, under the general direction of the propaganda department. The largest of these was the ‘“Party-Building Research Association” with some 100 associates working under Chang Wen-t’ien and Ch’en Yiin. Called the “best of a l l the research associations,” i n one Communist book i n 1941, i t

directed the study of twelve topics—Party rules, membership, organization, cadres, work with branches, intra-Party struggle, methods of leadership, mass work, public and secret work, Party consolidation, education in the

Party, and problems of imprisoned cadres. There was also a Marx-Lenin Research Association (founded i n April, 1939, with twenty-three associates

under Ch’en Shao-yii and W u Liang-p’ing), a Political Economics Theory Research Association (merged with the former by 1941), a Philosophical Research Association and a Chinese Problems Association.®® The “real” education of Party members, of course, came in the processes of Party-building and the myriad other forms of “struggle” in which they were constantly involved, but during the war there was increasing stress o n “study” and thought “reform,” and o n problems of mass education. Then, i n 1942-44, the most significant “Party education’ cam-

paign in the history of the movement, which consolidated and “educated” the Maoist leadership and became the model for countless future campaigns, was unfolded by Mao and his associates. This was the famous Cheng-feng ( o r rectification) Movement, literally “correct the w i n d , ” short

for “Cheng-tun San-feng Yiin-tung,” or movement to rectify the “three styles’ of bad Party work: sectarianism in political work, dogmatism and empiricism stemming from subjectivism in education, and formalism i n propaganda.

16 T H E RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT

The origins of the Cheng-feng or Rectification Movement, at a time of growing enemy economic and military pressure, lay simultaneously i n rising awareness of the need of the rapidly growing and physically frag-

mented Party for common and improved education and standards, i n increased efforts to deal with subversion and local opposition to Party leadership, and i n the continuing struggle for dominance between Mao Tse-tung and other groups i n the central leadership, especially the ‘“Russian returned students.”

The problem of unifying and educating a fragmented Party needs little elaboration, i f one recalls the six major and twelve minor Communist base

areas existing during the war and the fact that, as of the early 1940’s, 90 per cent of the 700,000 to 800,000 members of the newly expanded “Party of the proletariat” were of “petty bourgeois’ origin, mostly peasant or intellectual." As a Political Bureau “Decision on the Consolidation of the Party,” adopted on August 25, 1939, put it, Because . . . the Party has been expanded too rapidly within too short a period, the Party organizations are not fully consolidated; . . . many mediocre anti-Japanese elements or temporary fellow-travelers have joined the Party.2

Consequently, after 1939, the Political Bureau ruled that the Party should

suspend its “storm membership drives’ of the previous two years, review and educate members, and tighten and discipline the Party. Such problems as the “unity of old and new comrades” and security against saboteurs and enemy infiltration were to receive special attention. There was mounting concern over security and even “Trotskyism” as early as 193738, and the Party was increasingly troubled b y the growing discrepancy

among the “three Communist Parties,” of the urban underground, the radical intellectuals, and the peasant movement. By 1943, the rectification

campaign had been extended to lower Party levels and beyond to workers i n education, journalism, and other fields.’

Undoubtedly, the need to overcome low and diverse standards was ini-

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tially most important, and the rectification movement began with most

Party leaders agreeing that a primary objective must be to strengthen unity by standardizing ideology, always a central Chinese concern. However, the Maoists judged these early educational efforts inadequate and increasingly erroneous. As time went on, Maoists also blamed these failings on the ‘“‘Russian returned students,” although until about 1944 semantics obscured such intra-Party criticisms. But i t was no accident that the years of preparation and execution o f the rectification movement also saw Mao’s final consolidation of power within the Party. Characteristically, later

Maoist histories linked the two concerns of Party education and politics by blaming the ostensible targets of the movement—formalism, dogmatism, and factionalism—on the “remnants of the ‘three left lines’”” which had allegedly prevailed i n the Party from 1927 to 1935, as well as o n the “petty bourgeois mentality’ of new recruits.*

Mao had strengthened his position relative to the “internationalist” faction of the “Russian returned students’ and their allies with his election as director o f the Party’s Military Affairs Committee i n January, 1935, the abolition i n December, 1937, of the post of Party General Secretary, then held by Chang Wen-t’ien, and the attacks on Ch’en Shaoyii’s (and the Comintern’s) united front policies, notably at the Sixth

Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, from September 28 to November 6, 1938. After about 1940, Ch’en never again held an important position i n the Party, but, in Mao’s eyes, his remaining influence seems to have been the principal personal target of the rectification.” However, other

“Russian returned students’ still held many key positions i n the Party, including most of those i n the propaganda apparatus. Either Mao was not strong enough to replace them, or he d i d not yet wish to do so. I n seeming contrast to the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s, when

the Maoists made control of the propaganda machinery their first order of priority, during the Cheng-feng Movement, the ‘“internationalists,” alleged

anti-Maoists, controlled most propaganda outlets until the last stages of the campaign.’ Thus, u n t i l 1943-44, the director of the Central Committee propaganda department, which after August, 1939, controlled the “edu-

cation” of cadres, as well as the distribution and composition of study materials, was K ’ a i Feng, one of the so-called “twenty-eight Bolsheviks.” The leader of most of the “ t h i r d left l i n e ” from late 1931 through 1934, Ch’in Pang-hsien, became director i n 1941 of the N e w China News Agency and was editor-in-chief of the leading Party newspaper Liberation Daily.

After Ch’en Shao-yii and Ch’in Pang-hsien, the third most prominent “Russian returned student” was Chang Wen-t’ien, the secretary of another crucial propaganda organization, the Central Committee’s Press Committee. Chang also headed the Central Research Institute’ and assisted with cadre education work, as d i d L i Wei-han. Even after the Cheng-feng

Movement, “white area” cadres held many important propaganda positions.® The Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region (later, Northwest China) Bureau of

the Party, headed by Kao Kang, with Wang Jo-fei as propaganda director, also played a significant role i n the Cheng-feng Movement. I t s second Congress, November 15-December 10, 1939, called for stepped-up and

reformed study and for further “screening of Party membership,” and its

[Chap. 16]

The Rectification Movement

325

senior cadres conference from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943,

established the guidelines for later stages of the rectification i n the Northwest. About April, 1942, Party Central established a “General Study Com-

mittee,” under Mao Tse-tung, with K’ang Sheng as his leading deputy. I n addition to helping lead the General Study Committee and the secret police as director of the Social Affairs Department, K’ang Sheng wrote

two of the twenty-two primary study documents, gave crucial speeches, and is said to have “managed cadre training i n Yenan.” Under the General Study Committee, there were important rectification committees: for Party organizations under K’ang Sheng and L i Fu-ch’un, for military organiza-

tions under Wang Chia-hsiang and Ch’en Yiin, for K’ang-Ta under Lin Piao, for the Central Party School under P’eng Chen, for the Northwest

China Bureau under Jen Pi-shih and Kao Kang, and for government organizations under L i n Po-ch’ii. L i Wei-han, who succeeded L i u Shao-ch’i as

head of the Central Committee’s cadre education department from about 1940 on, Yang Shang-k’un, as head of the North China Bureau, Ch’en

Po-ta and Chou Yang i n educational and cultural work, and others presumably also played important but ill-defined roles i n the rectification movement.’ Finally, among political leaders important to the Cheng-feng campaign, Liu Shao-ch’i’s role appears critical. As before, Liu’s position is ambiguous, although by mid-1943, he had become a principal supporter of Mao in intra-Party politics. I n July of that year, he called Mao “ a strong and great revolutionary,” and the Party’s “own leader,”’® and the alliance between the two men was confirmed i n 1945, when Liu became Mao’s presumed successor. Already evident i n the united front discussions of

1937-38, the Mao-Liu alliance brought together the ideologically inclined leader of the guerrilla movement and the organizationally inclined leader of the “other Party” that had operated underground behind Japanese and Nationalist lines. The “Resolution o n Some Questions i n the History of

Our Party,” adopted at the Seventh Congress, makes clear this link between L i u Shao-ch’i’s “white” areas Party and Mao’s “base” area

Party.!* Their cooperation served both men well, but the contradiction between their two styles also continued and broke into the open w i t h a vengeance two decades later. I n any case, having been director of the North China Bureau u n t i l 1937, briefly of the Central Committee cadre

education department, then after 1939 of the Party’s Central Plains Bureau, and after January, 1941, political commissar of the N e w Fourth

Army, Liu brought important support to Mao when he returned to Yenan i n early 1943. Many of his younger supporters, such as P’eng Chen, A n Tzu-wen, Yang Shang-k’un, L u Ting-yi, and Po Yi-po took over key Party

posts, especially in organization and propaganda work, after the rectification movement and held them until the Cultural Revolution. I n addition, beginning i n 1939, at two-year intervals, L i u Shao-ch’i wrote three of the most important works used i n the Cheng-feng Movement, “Training of

the Communist Party Member”* of August 7, 1939, “ O n the Intra-Party * This speech to the Academy for Marxist-Leninist Studies was entitled “ H o w to Be a Good Communist” when the second edition was published i n 1949.

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Struggle” of July 2, 1941, and “Liquidation of Menshevist Thought in the Party,” July, 1943.** From all of this, i t is evident that, at the start of the Cheng-feng Move-

ment in 1941-42, key positions in the Party were held by men of diverse backgrounds and loyalties and that previous interpretations that Mao’s rectification was directed almost entirely against the “Russian returned students” are oversimplified. Among such prominent “internationalists” and presumed opponents of Mao Tse-tung as K’ai Feng, Chang Wen-t’ien, and Ch’in Pang-hsien, only K’ai was dropped from the Seventh Central Committee elected i n April, 1945, while Chang, Ch’in, and other leading

“internationalists’ retained at least nominal positions under the emerging “Maoist” leadership. Even Ch’en Shao-yii retained a seat on the new Central Committee.

Equally decisive, of course, for Mao’s ability to launch and direct the rectification movement was his control of the Central Committee Military

Affairs Committee. Ch’en Shao-yii later charged that Mao used ‘“‘the military power he usurped i n the Party and the difficult international situation . . . ” i n order to purge his rivals.’® Most leading military men must have

supported Mao, but this was not always the case. Thus, the high command may have overruled his opposition to the Hundred Regiments Campaign launched i n the late summer and autumn of 1940, and, not until October,

1943, did Mao claim to have “fundamentally curbed” the army’s ““tendencies toward warlordism,” of which he had complained earlier i n the

war.

The Cheng-feng Movement, then, was necessarily the product of many hands, although Mao Tse-tung undoubtedly became its driving force. Among other things, the collaboration of diverse leaders at early stages of the campaign and other factors show that its primary motivation was more the positive one of revolutionizing ideology than the negative one of purging anti-Maoists. But, as i n Mao’s “second revolution” a quarter of a

century later, both aspects were inextricably linked, especially after 1942. Origins of the Cheng-feng Movement The Party’s first great rectification moved through three general periods. I t began primarily as an ideological education movement seeking to discipline and unify the greatly expanded Party for the struggle against Japan and the Nationalists, and all Party leaders agreed upon the necessity for this, but the movement later took o n more of the aspects of a purge against the “remnants of the three left lines,” which allegedly had domi-

nated the Party from 1927 to 1935, as well as against spies and “hidden counterrevolutionaries.”’ First, i n 1938, there was a generally “correct” early war period, stressing cadre recruitment and education. Then, from

1939 through 1941, efforts to “regularize’ this education, according to the Maoists, led to the separation of theory from practice and other problems that caused “extremely great h a r m . ” Finally, from 1942 on, the Maoists

turned the cadre education movement into an intensified ideological revolution, which in turn developed during the next two years into an extensive purge of Communist organizations. This climactic period, 1942-44, ad-

vanced through substages lasting up to six months each and reportedly

[Chap. 16]

The Rectification Movement

327

involved “two great struggles, over the direction of study and the investigation of cadres.” Later stages of the movement also stressed ‘“‘antisubversion” work against non-Party personnel, and the merging of these “extra-Party”’ and “intra-Party” struggles.” As early as the Sixth Plenum of the CCP Sixth Central Committee

(September 28 to November 6, 1938), the Party had decided on a program of increased education and training for Party members under the slogan “for ourselves, be insatiable i n learning, toward others, be tireless

in teaching.” There, Mao spoke of the need for this education movement i n the section of his “ O n the N e w Stage,” entitled “Studies,” calling for

the study of . . . the theory o f M a r x , Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the history o f our nation

and the circumstances and trends of the present movement; . . . w e must organize education for Party members whose cultural level is relatively low; . . . members of the Central Committee and senior cadres should especially intensify their study. I t is impossible for a party to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory i f i t has no knowledge of revolutionary theory, no knowledge of history and no profound understanding of the actual movement . . . o u r Party has now a better grasp of Marxism-Leninism than i n the past, but its knowledge is still far from being wide and deep.!® Here, as i n his 1937 works “ O n Practice,” “ O n Contradiction,” and

“Combat Liberalism,” Mao particularly stressed the necessity for “unity of theory and practice” and for the adaptation of Marxist theory to Chinese conditions. He attacked the ‘“‘empty abstraction” of those who talk ‘““of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities’ and conditions and who “write eight-legged essays on foreign models.” Rather, Mao argued that Chinese Communists must “discard our dogmatism and replace i t by a new and vital Chinese style and manner. . . . To separate internationalist content from Nationalist form is the way o f those who understand nothing of

internationalism; we must link the two inseparably.”’” After the Sixth Plenum, the Party established or reconstituted the Central Committee cadre education department and the cadre and Party schools mentioned above. All of these directed an increase i n and systematization of Marxist education, and, from the winter of 1938-39, all Party, government, and educational units were directed to establish “central small groups’ to

direct the study of required readings and discussion. A March, 1938, directive complained of errors in rapidly expanding the Party without sufficient standards, and later the Communists distinguished three types of Party organization for raising cadre standards. Regular Party commit-

tees were to handle the education of about three-quarters of the cadres, while security agencies (Party social affairs departments and government

bureaus of political security) handled the “education” of the most difficult 10 per cent, and such schools as the North Shensi Public School “edu-

cated” the next most difficult 10 per cent. I n March, 1939, the Central Committee announced a “temporary plan

for Yenan in-service cadre education’ and created an educational bureau under the cadre education department, which began new study programs in June. I n August, the educational movement was put under control of

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the propaganda department, which worked with its corresponding organization i n the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government and Eighth Route Army further to step up study. Every cadre in Yenan, and later in other areas, was directed to study Marxist materials for an average of at least two hours a day and to attend special classes where possible. I n 1939-40, some 4,000 cadres in the Yenan area were involved in study groups to reduce the influence of “bourgeois thought,” and, i n March, 1940, Party

Central directed the extension of cadre education to the rest of Shen-KanNing and other areas and ordered traveling instructors and classes to visit outlying areas. Study movements and limited purges took place in ChinChi-Lu-Yii and elsewhere. Parallel to study, rectification proceeded. As early as November 6 , 1938,

the Sixth Plenum passed a resolution calling for the Party “ t o heighten its revolutionary vigilance and keep a sharp lookout for the plots of Japanese and their running dogs—Trotskyites, traitors and anti-Communists. . . . " ’ ? ° Antisubversive work proceeded rapidly, with Party and government committees at county level and above establishing social affairs departments i n 1938. Rural district committees and cells also assigned individual cadres to security work, and already b y January, 1939, i n the Shen-Kan-Ning area, supposedly some 100,000, or more than one i n every twenty people, had been organized into some 9,000 antisubversive groups under 700 “traitor-suppression”’ committees. A t the Second Party Congress of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region i n November-December, 1939,* attention

to study was stressed, and Kao Kang spoke of the “weeding out from the Party” i n the previous two and one-half years of “large numbers... o f capitulationists, speculators, and backward elements” and complained of

continued errors by a small number of Party members i n the area.? Directives of August, 1939, and mid-1940 stressed the simultaneous “screening, examination, and education of cadres” as important tasks for

Party consolidation. The 1940 directive explained that the cadre sections at various levels of the Party and army were to step up investigations of the history and conditions of personnel, organizations, and areas, and, in September, 1940, the social affairs department directed increasing attention to “anti-traitor problems.” Interestingly, these instructions distinguished among Party cadres “long associated with the Party underground” i n “white” areas, whose relations with enemy and traitorous personnel and with persons with prison records were to be carefully checked, and “cadres [ w h o ] emerged from the land revolution,” whose ideological training and family connections should be investigated, and finally “ n e w

cadres of intellectual background,” whose past relations and attitudes were to receive special attention.?? Earlier directives distinguished among

veteran cadres in leadership positions (type A cadres), recent recruits of “high cultural level” (type B cadres), and recent recruits of relatively low political-cultural level (type C cadres). Study materials and objectives

naturally varied for each group, with relatively more study of theory for the first two groups and relatively more study of “Chinese problems” for the third group. All were to concentrate on problems of Party-building, * I t s first congress took place in May, 1937.

[Chap. 1 6 ]

The Rectification

Movement

329

correct attitudes toward intellectuals and peasants, and the like. Despite these measures, prior to about 1943, Party organizations were directed to conduct necessary screening and education o f members, but “ n o t . . . a

widespread purge of the Party.” Thus, there were extensive efforts to “educate” Party members and cadres from 1938 on, but i t was equally clear that these efforts were far from adequate for the tasks Mao and other leaders had in mind. The further development of cadre education was complicated also from 1940 on by debate about the intent and results of the “regularization” movement, whose defects Maoists blamed on the “internationalists.” Li Weihan, a temporary victim of the period, described some of these efforts i n

the late summer of 1939 and called for still greater efforts.?* Yet, an important survey entitled Study Life, written i n late 1940, complained

that even in northern Shensi, progress had been limited: “ I n three years of peaceful conditions Shen-Kan-Ning in-service cadre education should be an outstanding success. But, aside from the purge of some border area leading organs and some local committees, there has been little success.””?®

Various meetings criticized Party education; a Party resolution of December 25, 1940, called for the strengthening of educational and Party work, and another of February 17, 1941, reorganized cadre schools i n Yenan.

I n February, 1942, at the time of Mao’s elevating the rectification movement to a new stage, K’ang Sheng complained that there still were “no results” from efforts since the Sixth Plenum to overcome shortcomings i n

Party and literary work.?® Not only was there general dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in study, but there were important differences of opinion over theoretical and practical aspects of cadre education. I t was suggestive of future tensions that, before 1940, there were said to have been “many controver-

sies”’ between members of Chang Wen-t’ien’s Academy for Marxist-Leninist Studies and L i n Piao’s K’ang-Ta over the theory of Marxist stages of

development and other problems.?” Therefore, the Cheng-feng Movement clearly grew out of extensive efforts i n cadre education and Party screening since 1938. Only from about 1941 o n did Mao turn an existing

educational movement into more politically sensitive channels with consequent intensification of rectification and “antisubversion work” as well as of study. Documents of the Rectification Movement

Before discussing the development of the Cheng-feng Movement in the early 1940’s, something more should be said about the study materials in use at the time. The writings of Mao mentioned above, Ch’en Yiin’s “How to Be a Communist Party Member” (May 30, 1939), Liu Shao-ch’i’s “Training of the Communist Party Member,” K’ang Sheng’s speeches, publications i n Liberation Daily, the Communist, and other Party journals, and translations from Soviet theoretical works, formed the leading documents. A t first, eighteen and later twenty-two of these were designated primary materials

of the Cheng-feng Movement. The declining stature of the “Russian returned students,” who had made

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the most thorough study of Marxism, is revealed by the exclusion of their works from the educational materials of the period. I n March, 1940, Ch’en Shao-yii reissued his February, 1931, tract against the “ L i Li-san Line,” The T w o Battle Lines, but neither this nor other works b y ‘“‘internationalists” circulated widely. Stalin’s Short Course o n the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), o n the other hand, was held u p b y Mao as the “best synthesis [ o f ] . . . a n d a model” for the study of

the “world Communist movement of the past hundred years.”’?® Nonetheless, Mao’s stress on the ““Sinification” of Marxism i n China was obviously

an extremely significant part of the Cheng-feng Movement. I t made Marxism-Leninism more comprehensible to the masses and helped strengthen the independence and nationalism of the Chinese Communists. I t also, of course, worked to heighten the authority of Mao Tse-tung as probably the most “Chinese” of the Chinese Communist leaders, especially

i n comparison with the “Russian returned students.” Ch’en Yiin’s and Liu Shao-ch’i’s statements of the qualifications, goals, and methods of being a proper Communist were especially important for their systematic presentation of ideal Communist behavior at this time. Liu Shao-ch’i acknowledged that “ i t is impossible to expect many to have a penetrating understanding of Communism, the Party program, and Party

regulations before joining the Party. For just this reason we have demanded only acceptance of the Party program and Party regulations [i.e., of the Party line and discipline] as the condition for joining the Party,” but he went on to insist that “the Communist Party member should possess all of the greatest and highest human virtues. . . . ” ? * According to Ch’en Yin, The Communist Party is. . . fighting for the complete liberation of mankind as well as for Communism and its proletarian mission. Therefore, a Communist Party member who is willing to dedicate himself to the Communist cause must not only fight for Communism but also formulate a revolutionary view of life which will lead him to fight relentlessly for the realization of Communism.. . . Every member of the CCP should thoroughly understand that the Chinese revolution is a long hazardous task, . must be prepared for prolonged hardship and setbacks, [and] must also be prepared at a critical moment to sacrifice his very life, as have tens of thousands of sterling Party members.3°

I f one were over eighteen (or sixteen on probation), whether of proletarian, peasant, petty bourgeois, o r even of national bourgeois background,

accepted “the Party program,” and obtained at least one sponsor, Liu and Ch’en continued, he or she could then join the “great and glorious” ranks of the CCP. Liu Shao-ch’i stressed “ t h e interests of the Party above a l l ” and made

it clear that, i n the case of conflict between the interests of the individual and the Party, ‘“‘the Party member [ m u s t ] unconditionally sacrifice his

individual interests,” although, as Cultural Revolution criticism of the 1960’s noted, Liu also insisted that the Party look out for the interests, even the ‘material interest,” of its members. T w o years later, Liu ex-

pressed a concept that must always have been understood but for which he was later criticized: ‘After majority decisions have been made, minor-

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ity comrades who still hold different views have the right to maintain these views under the condition that they follow the majority strictly i n

matters of organization and action.”’® I n view of the Liu-Mao clash twenty-five years later, one wonders i f some of Liu Shao-ch’i’s criticisms of Party members may have been aimed at M a o and his associates. For instance, L i u stated, ‘some Party members

and cadres . . . do not measure up to these standards and still retain various incorrect ideological concepts. . . . F o r example, we have some former comrades who consider ‘striking the local bullies and distributing land [i.e., simple peasant rebellion]’ as the meaning of Communism.”** I n mid-1941, he also lamented the small “number of members of the CCP who can read the works of Marx and Lenin i n European languages,” a

number that included himself and the “returned students,” but not M a o . I n the Cultural Revolution, Maoists charged that Liu’s criticisms of the deviations of L i Li-san and Chang Kuo-t’ao were oblique criticisms of Mao and that the second edition of Liu’s “How to Be a Good Communist” i n 1949 substituted for Chang Kuo-t’ao and Li Li-san the phrase “such persons who regard themselves as ‘China’s Marx or Lenin.” ” Yet, Liu clearly was a crucial supporter of Mao at the time and, in mid-1943, praised Mao as a “strong and great revolutionary, completely versed i n MarxistLeninist strategy and tactics, and possessing unlimited loyalty to the Chinese

working class and the mission of Chinese national liberation.’’** Mao’s writings formed about one-third of the study documents used i n the Cheng-feng Movement and eloquently dramatize its major themes.’ As early as 1929, M a o had stressed Marxist-Leninist education to overcome ‘“‘subjectivism,” “individualism,” and other errors rooted i n ‘petty

bourgeois” thought of the then fledgling Red Army. I n September, 1937, he again discussed these themes under the title “Combat Liberalism” and listed eleven bad manifestations of “liberalism,” centering o n the placing

of individual interests ahead of those of the Party and the failure to unite with the masses.®* H e developed the latter theme a year and a half later i n two pieces on the twentieth anniversary o f the May Fourth Movement of 1919, stating, “ T h e intellectuals were the first section of people to be awakened . . , b u t i f the intellectuals do not become one w i t h the masses

of workers and peasants then they will accomplish nothing.””?” Stressing what continued to be the touchstone of all Party work, he called the greatest lesson of the Chinese revolution “arousing the masses o f the people” and stated that the ability to do so was the only criterion for determining whether a man is a ‘““false Marxist or a true one . ” ’ % ® Late i n 1939, M a o also stressed the need to recruit intellectuals into the Party

but warned: We should undoubtedly take extreme care not to admit those intellectuals who are sent by the enemy or the bourgeois political parties and those who are disloyal. We should sternly reject these people. [ a n d ] clear them out resolutely but discriminatingly;

.

we must not o n that account suspect

intellectuals who are relatively loyal. We must vigilantly guard against false accusations.3?

Mao again spoke of major themes of the Cheng-feng Movement in March,

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1941, stressing the importance of the masses, the need for investigation and study in order to “link theory with practice,” and the criticism of dogmatism and commandism. He blamed commandism especially on the “imperial envoys,” ‘“who, the moment they take office, noisily speechify

and criticize, picking faults right and left.”* Mao’s first major work directly tied to the rectification movement, which probably marked his decision to intensify the movement, was ‘Reform Our Study,” a speech given to a cadres’ meeting o n May 5 , 1941. This

document made more specific his analysis of the origins and characteristics of “the petty bourgeois ideology and style of work.” He criticized deficiencies i n “first the study of the contemporary situation, . . . secondly, the study of history, . . . [ a n d ] finally, the study of international revolutionary experiences and of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism.” These

defects, especially noticeable i n the “many who have studied abroad ., violate the basic principle repeatedly enjoined by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin: the unity of theory and practice.” Moreover, ‘many Party members are completely i n the dark about Chinese history, either of the

last one hundred years or of ancient times. = They can quote words and phrases from Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but they do not know how to adopt their stand, viewpoint, and method i n the concrete study of

China’s present and past or i n the concrete analysis and solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution.””*’ By March, 1941, Mao’s Rural Survey, a collection of articles written between 1927 and 1934, had already

been reissued as a guide to proper study methods. The next major documents of the rectification movement were issued

by the Central Committee in Yenan and by Liu Shao-ch’i i n Central China. The Central Committee resolution of July 1, 1941, o n ‘“Strengthening the Party Spirit,” continued some of the themes raised b y M a o but stressed Party unity and discipline. The resolution began by demanding

“that members of the entire Party and all the Party’s organizational units consolidate with united will, united action, and unified discipline to become an organized whole. Without a Party thus strengthened, unified, and centralized we will be unable to face the protracted, ruthless, and complex struggle i n the course of the revolution.”*? The tasks o f unity and discipline were made all the harder, the resolution continued, b y the

“agrarian environment, . . . dispersed, independent guerrilla warfare, . . . [and the relatively high proportion o f ] small producers and intelligentsia i n the Party. . . . ” These factors made i t “easy for certain Party members to develop individualism, heroism, antiorganizational attitudes, independence, anticentralism, and other tendencies counter to the Party spirit.” I n addition to stress o n Party spirit and education, the Central Committee

“demanded [that] the individual must obey the organization; the minority must obey the majority; lower echelons must obey higher echelons;

and the entire Party must obey the basic principles of the Central Committee.’’*? Referring to this resolution on the following day, Liu Shao-ch’i delivered his important speech, on “The Intra-Party Struggle,” to the Central China branch of the Central Party School. Elaborating on themes he had advanced two years before about the necessity for and effectiveness of

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“intra-Party struggle,” L i u insisted that “rigorous self-criticism” and ‘“‘con-

tinuous inner struggle on two fronts” against right and left opportunism could purify and strengthen the Party. Liu claimed that “the highest leading organs of the Party have already corrected their errors, [ b u t ] . . . cer-

tain middle and lower-level or individual organizations” still yield to the “three deviations . . i n intra-Party struggle . . . o f (1) liberalism and cen-

trism, (2) a mechanical and excessive intra-Party struggle, expressed as ‘left’ opportunism i n Party organization and i n the struggle itself, and (3) unprincipled dispute and conflict within the Party.””** “The object of the “intra-Party struggle,” according to Liu, “is the education of the Party and the education of those comrades who commit errors. Therefore, the intraParty struggle is basically an indispensable type of Party education, and Party education is an aspect of the intra-Party struggle, though comparatively mild i n form.”’*

Mao later elaborated on the “mildness” of Chinese Communist rectification, stating a famous theme in February, 1942, “ .

we must begin by

administering a shock and shouting at the patient, ‘you are ill!” so that he is frightened into a sweat, and then we tell him gently that he needs

treatment.” “ I n treating a case of ideological or political illness, we should never resort to violence, but should adopt the attitude of ‘treating the illness i n order to save the man,” which alone is the correct and effective method [ o f rectification].”’**

Fifteen years later Mao recalled, I n 1942, we worked out the formula ‘“unity-criticism-unity”’* to describe this democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people. To elaborate, this means to start off with a desire for unity and resolve contradictions through criticism or struggle so as to achieve a new unity on a new basis. . . . The essential thing is to start with a desire for unity. Without this subjective desire for unity, once the struggle starts i t is liable to get out of hand.*”

Starting with these principles, Party members and all involved i n the henceforth ceaseless rectifications met i n small groups to discuss their study of relevant documents and to hear rigorous and often emotional “self-criticisms” of past errors and future promises. Reminiscent of Bible Belt fundamentalism, these procedures proved tremendously effective i n

“thought reform and the psychology of totalism,” as a leading authority has termed it.** Such intense discipline contributed most, along with related aspects of the mass line, to the unique organizational and morale achievements of the Chinese Communists during these and later years. O n August 1, 1941, a Central Committee resolution entitled “ O n Inves-

tigation and Research’ gave further indication of growing Party concern for the ideological soundness of Party members. Claiming advances i n Party research and knowledge, the resolution complained that subjectivist and formalistic tendencies—roughly finished work, failure to seek * The Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s later adopted the formula, “criticism, struggle, transformation.”

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a detailed understanding, self-satisfaction—are still seriously prevalent i n the Party. . . . A majority of the comrades who come to Yenan...lack systematic and thorough understanding of the internal and external conditions A great many comrades i n the of the region where they do their work. Party still do not understand that without investigation and research you have no right to speak.

The resolution even stated that ‘‘the Kuomintang’s understanding of domestic and foreign conditions is a great deal richer than ours.” I t called for the gathering of materials and discussion of land, labor, and vagrancy problems, of secret societies and of the relations of the merchant, ‘“landlord, rich, ... m i d d l e , poor peasant, tenant, artisan, and vagrant classes,” and finally, demanded the writing of biographical sketches of leading persons of all regions by “organs at all levels of the entire Party, army, and government.”’** The resolution directed the Central Committee, regional bureaus, sub-bureaus, district and provincial committees, and military and

administrative organizations of all base areas to establish investigation and research offices to direct this work. Then, i n December, 1941, the Party issued a resolution “ O n Education i n Yenan Cadres Schools,” which led to significant reorganizations. But the following February, as noted, K’ang Sheng could still complain that,

even though Mao had “stressed the shortcomings’ of practical work, Party and literary style at the Sixth Plenum more than three years before, “there were [ s t i l l ] no results” i n rectification of the “three bad styles.”’*°

Early Stages of the Cheng-feng Movement

The resolutions of the Central Committee propaganda department since July, 1941, and Mao’s speeches of May, 1941, and February, 1942, calling as they d i d for specific steps to ensure the reform of study, mark the real

beginning of the Cheng-feng Movement. The Central Committee resolution “ O n Investigation and Research” of August 1 repeated these complaints and called for specific steps to strengthen study. Continued preparation was necessary, however, and, after an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau i n September, 1941, which “reviewed the Party’s political lines

in the past,” some 100 higher cadres began a new course of study. Virtually nothing is known of the September Political Bureau meeting, but i t probably made the formal decision to escalate the cadre education

movement into the much more intense and politically oriented rectification campaign. This seems a fair assessment of the statement that the meeting

attained ‘“‘great significance” in examining the problems of “the keys to successes and failures i n the Chinese revolution” and that i t directed the “development o f an all-Party ideological revolution’ to overcome problems o f organization and separation of theory and practice.®* Military affairs, the setbacks following the Hundred Regiments Campaign, the N e w Fourth Army Incident, the Nationalist blockade, and,

above all, the drive to reduce bureaucratization, which was launched in December, 1941, were also linked with the rectification campaign. Indeed, the 1944 “Resolution on Some Questions i n the History of Our Party”

listed bureaucratism first among evils in the Party, followed by “patriarchal despotism, misuse of disciplinary measures, authoritarianism, individualist

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heroism, semi-anarchism, liberalism, extreme democratization, the asser-

tion of independence, the guild spirit, the sentiment of the mountain stronghold, favoritism toward [fellow] townsmen and schoolmates, fac-

tional struggle, and rascally tricks.” A deep-seated concern for the evils of bureaucratism, shaped by two millennia of imperial past, thus was a feature of this, as of all subsequent, Maoist rectifications. The movement was publicized and broadened by Mao’s two important speeches of February 1 and 8 , 1942, and Mao later was said to date the Cheng-feng Movement from 1942 to mid-1945.7® The first speech, ‘“Rectify the Party’s Style i n W o r k , ” given to about 1,000 cadres of the newly reorganized Central Party School, developed the themes of Mao’s earlier “Reform O u r Study” and other works. I n the February 1 address, he

spoke of the “three evil winds” of ‘“‘subjectivism in study,” “sectarianism” i n Party work, and “formalism” in propaganda and literary work, symbolized b y the stereotyped writing of “Party eight-legged essays.” While Mao again noted the need for revolutionary intellectuals to join the Com-

munist movement, he stressed that the only important “kinds of knowledge . . . concern the struggle for production. .and the class struggle.” Therefore, “many so-called intellectuals are relatively least knowledgeable,

while the workers and peasants are on occasion more knowledgeable.” I n a moment of modesty, Mao even conceded that, “as to knowledge of local

conditions and contact with the people here, I lag far behind many of the native cadres [such as Kao K a n g ] . ” T o overcome such limitations, intellec-

tuals would have to make “detailed investigation and research i n the midst of practical struggles, form various generalizations, and then verify them again in practical struggle.”’** According to Mao, there were two kinds o f subjectivism—the dogma-

tism or doctrinairism of the intellectuals and the empiricism of more practical-minded workers—and ‘‘doctrinairism constitutes at present the greater danger i n our Party.” Mao traced these failings to the “vestiges of

the evil ideology of the old society, namely, remnants of petty bourgeois individualism” b u t maintained that, “through education, through steeling

in the revolution, these defects can be gradually removed.” Therefore, he argued, further education and rectification were essential and old cadres must lead the way for new and reformed cadres. I n seeming contrast with later actions of his followers, Mao stressed the pragmatism of his commitment to Marxism-Leninism, stating, Our comrades must understand that we study Marxism-Leninism not for ornament, not because i t is a mystery, b u t because i t is a science w h i c h will

lead the proletarian revolution to victory. U p to now there are still many who regard certain words or phrases i n Marxist-Leninist works as a sort of patent panacea which, once acquired, can cure all maladies. . . . T h i s i s sheer

infantile ignorance, and to such people we must give some elementary education. . . . [ O u r ] theory is not a dogma but a guide to action.. . . 5 5

M a o said that sectarianism had been basically overcome b y the early

1940’s but that remnants of i t in the form of assertions of independence survived. Therefore, “ t h e Communist Party needs not only democracy but

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even more urgently centralization. . . . ” Tensions would continue to exist within the Party “between the part and the whole, between the individual and the Party, between native cadres and cadres from the outside, between cadres i n army service and cadres i n civilian work, between different military units, localities, and departments, and between old and new

cadres,” but these tensions and the three evils of “subjectivism, sectarianism, and [formalism]” could be kept under control if the Party kept in mind “two principles: first, ‘learn from past experiences in order to avoid future mistakes’; and, secondly, ‘treat the illness in order to save

the man. . . . ’ % Mao’s February 8 speech, “Oppose the Party ‘Eight-Legged Essay,’ ” given to a cadres meeting, was his most specific attack on the ‘“foreign-

ness” of Chinese Communist dogmatism and seemed directly aimed at the “Russian returned students,” although no names were given. Mao stated that “The Party ‘eight-legged essay’ is a brand of foreign ‘eight-legged essay’ . . . a n d has a long history i n our Party, and, especially during the

agrarian revolution [ 1927-36], it became sometimes even quite rampant.” The “Party eight-legged essay” was a modern version of the stylized and often stereotyped traditional examination essays, which had prevailed for centuries prior to the fall of Imperial China. According to Mao, its defects were manifested i n empty long-windedness, pretentiousness, poor style, lack of popularization, and general irresponsibility. Noting that the Sixth Plenum had already attacked this type of writing, Mao complained, “But some comrades have been obstinately keeping on with it.”*’ O n February 28, the Central Committee passed a resolution “ O n the Education of Cadres i n Service,” which stressed the need for ‘‘professional, political, cultural, and theoretical education” for the 90 per cent

of all cadres who “are at their posts” and would not be able to enroll full-time in a Party school. The resolution noted that the Party had called attention to the need for such education since 1938 but that “ i n some localities and departments not even a start has been made.” I t called for five fields of study—investigation of local conditions and research on policies, experiences of departments concerned, and o n the history and development of scientific knowledge relevant to Party work. I t also urged

political education for all, with appropriate cultural and theoretical work. The resolution designated the Central Committee propaganda department, still under K’ai Feng, to devise procedures for Party, military, and political organizations to ‘“‘carry out education of cadres o n the job.”’*®

On February 11 and March 6, 1942, K’ang Sheng gave important speeches to 2,200 and 3,000 cadres, respectively, at the Eighth Route Army

Auditorium, explaining and expounding on Mao’s and the Party’s rectification documents. K’ang argued that, while the latter “contained many

criticisms, [the Party recognized that] most who committed errors were very good comrades w h o erred unconsciously. The target of the criticisms therefore was bad activity, not people.” Both echoing and foreshadowing

Mao, K’ang also spoke of seven ‘“‘internal contradictions” affecting Party work: between the individual and the Party, branches and the center, leaders and led, outsiders a n d natives, military men and civilians, old and

new cadres, and different organizations within the Party. Finally, K’ang

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called for four stages of study: research, discussion, investigation, and realization."® The rectification movement up to this time had mainly concerned higher cadres in Yenan and at leading bases, but, in the spring of 1942, the Party sought to broaden the scope of rectification to apply to personnel throughout the Party. According to Nationalist sources, some 30,000 of around 750,000 Communists actively took part in the rectification movement, and some Communists later conceded that only higher cadres had been directly affected.®® Nevertheless, more than 10,000 participated in the Cheng-feng Movement in Yenan alone, and larger numbers of military and mass activists took part i n antisubversion drives i n various Communist bases.

A report on the Cheng-feng Movement of April 3, 1942, issued by the propaganda department, moved the campaign to a new and more systematic stage by calling for precise timetables and organization of study. I t directed “ a l l organs and schools” to study, debate, and report on the recti-

fication documents designated by the Party. This was to be done i n three stages. The first, beginning on April 20, was to last two to three months but was later extended to five months of research and study of some twenty-two documents.®’ I t was to be followed by a second period of investigation, criticism, and self-criticism, and a third period of conclu-

sions, reports, and recommendations. Though the over-all campaign lasted considerably longer than anticipated, the first stage, as planned, stressed education; a second period i n 1943 focused on cadre investigation; and a final period, mostly i n 1944, concentrated o n the rewriting o f Party his-

tory. Interestingly, the propaganda department resolution stressed the primary role of the Central Committee, the Northwest China Bureau, and

the Political Bureau more than i t did the works and role of Mao.?®> Nonetheless, b y mid-1943, Mao’s power certainly had increased, and L i u Shao-

ch’i praised him as the Party’s “own leader.” Meanwhile K’ai Feng was eased out as director of propaganda, and other personnel changes apparently reflected a compromise by which some of the “returned students,” especially Ch’en Shao-yii and K ’ a i Feng, lost authority, and others, notably

Ch’in Pang-hsien, who was still said to be “ i n charge of propaganda” i n

1944, and Chang Wen-t’ien, partially retained theirs. Liu Shao-ch’i, K’ang Sheng, Lin Piao, P’eng Chen, and others moved firmly to support Mao T'setung.®?

O n September 1, 1942, a Central Committee resolution “ O n the Unifi-

cation of Leadership in the Anti-Japanese War Bases” revealed new organizational measures to overcome ‘“‘subjectivism and sectarianism’ and, significantly, the insubordination of local units, which “interferes w i t h the

maintenance and establishment of the anti-Japanese war bases a n d . . . with our Party’s progress in Bolshevization.”” The resolution reaffirmed the supremacy of the Party over the army and abolished or subordinated to local Party committees the military-dominated administrative committees, which controlled expanded Communist areas early i n the war. These moves bolstered the authority of local Party committees over the ad hoc government, mass organization, and military committees, which had sprung

up with rapid Communist expansion. To ensure the permanence of Party authority, the secretary of the local Party committee was to serve simul-

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taneously as political commissar of local military units. These and other measures were deemed necessary, because “ i n certain war bases... the comrades leading the main armed forces. .have not had a correct and integrated understanding of the establishment and maintenance of their war base.” Although the earlier arrangements were deemed correct for the early period of base-building, the new measures were to ensure ‘“‘unified leadership of all Party committees [regional bureaus, sub-bureaus, and county and local Party committees] i n every base area.” This resolution, like many others of the period, makes clear the generally successful Party effort to allow for local initiatives and to assure

“unified, consistent action.” This proved yet another crucial organizational achievement, facilitating local leadership in the far-flung Party,* while ensuring consistent performance on the basis of a common ideology. Unified leadership was to be accomplished primarily through education, or, as the resolution put it, “ i n order to unify leadership i n the war bases and i n order to improve relations between Party, government, army or mass [organizations], the three tendencies must be reformed and the

poison of subjectivism and sectarianism wiped out.”’** Literature and A r t in the Rectification Movement

Another important aspect of the rectification movement involved the Party’s relations w i t h the liberal intellectuals and writers, large numbers

of whom came to Yenan and served i n various propaganda functions or enrolled i n the L u Hsiin Academy of Literature and A r t or other schools.

The best-known writers and intellectuals came from Shanghai, where some had been involved i n Party front organizations for years, such as the League of Left-Wing Writers, founded i n 1930. As throughout the history of the Communist movement, there was both strong attraction and repulsion beween the Party and leftist intellectuals and writers. For example, L u Hsiin, the best-known o f all twentieth-century Chinese writers, alternately supported and resisted the Party between the late 1920’s and his death i n 1936. After the outbreak of the war i n 1937, the Party’s literary

impresario, Chou Yang, as well as celebrated leftist writers like Ting Ling, Hsiao Chiin, A i Ch’ing, H o Ch’i-fang, and many others, came to

Yenan. H u Feng, Feng Hsiieh-feng, and other writers who tended also to be political radicals, but who had frequently quarreled w i t h the former

group, followed the Nationalists to West China, as did the more orthodox K u o Mo-jo, M a o T u n , and others.%® T w o major issues divided the leftist writers among themselves and from

the Party. The first, concerning the degree of Westernization desirable in literature, had been a dominant theme since the May Fourth Movement. Some Communist writers, such as Feng Hsiieh-feng and H u Feng, then i n Chungking, and their followers i n Yenan, gave priority to the moderniza-

tion of the Chinese language, including widespread efforts to popularize the Romanization of Chinese characters, but others charged that this

would be tantamount to complete Westernization. The latter criticism, * Even i n Hainan Island below Canton, Feng Pai-chii claimed to be able to follow “ M a o Tse-tung’s thought,” despite complete loss of contact for years at a time.”

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which had been championed by Party leaders Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chou Yang, and others and was now taken up by Mao in his attack on the ‘““foreign eight-legged essay,” naturally won the day, but this issue was far less controversial than the second. The latter concerned the degree and type of realism the Party would tolerate i n writings about Communist-

controlled areas. I t was one thing for writers to attack conditions in Japanese or Nationalist areas but quite another to criticize conditions in Communist areas, o r even to present them as they “really were.” This question came to the fore i n March, 1942, when, no doubt encouraged b y

Mao’s February speeches in a manner analogous to the Hundred Flowers Movement i n 1957, Ting Ling, Hsiao Chiin, and others revealed their disillusionment with conditions i n Yenan. The most outspoken critic was

Wang Shih-wei, who, fifteen years before Djilas did so i n Yugoslavia, attacked the inequities perpetrated i n Yenan by the “new class.”®’ These criticisms and the developing rectification movement led the Party to call the famous Yenan Forum o n A r t and Literature, to which

they invited 200 people. There, “scores” took part in discussions clearly designed for the wider audience of more than 10,000 literate cadres i n

Yenan and for the Chinese masses throughout the country. Mao addressed the opening session on May 2, 1942, and called for discussion of five topics, the writer’s standpoint and attitude, his audience, his understanding of life, and the study of Marxism-Leninism and of society.®® I n Mao’s

view, literature must be proletarian and class- and mass-oriented. Three weeks later, he developed these themes further, calling for the “popularization” and ‘elevation’ of literature. According to Mao, “our problems are basically those of working for the masses and of how to work for them.” I t followed that there was “no such thing as art for art’s sake,” since “art and literature are subordinate to politics and since China’s first and foremost political problem today is resistance to Japan.” Thus, writers should present things as they should be and not as they are—that is,

with “socialist realism.” Mao conceded that “ a l l dark forces which endanger the masses of the people must be exposed, while all revolutionary struggles of the masses must be praised, . . . ” but the writer must under-

stand the great difficulties faced by the Communists and therefore ‘“‘distinguish clearly between our revolutionary base areas and Kuomintangcontrolled areas. .. Arriving at our bases means coming under a regime

of the broad masses of the people, a regime unprecedented in the thousands of years of Chinese history.” Thus, “coming from the garrets [ o f Shanghai] . from one historical . . . to the revolutionary base areas [means coming] epoch to another,” that is, from semicolonialism and semifeudalism to socialism.®® I n June, the Party launched an attack on the writers who were critical, and i t induced confessions, i f not compliance, from all well-known authors except Wang Shih-wei and Hsiao Chiin. Wang was denounced, as Hsiao

would be i n 1948, for Trotskyist views and an unproletarian approach. Wang was accused of stating that many youth were disillusioned ‘“‘because they come to Yenan i n search of warmth and beauty, [ b u t ] they cannot help complaining when they see its ugliness and coldness.””® According to a Cultural Revolution document, M a o later admitted Wang Shih-wei had

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been persecuted and executed “by the security organs” and claimed that the Central Committee criticized this action and “thought the execution was uncalled for.”"* Accusations against the intellectuals were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that many had been under the influence of the “Russian returned students’ and “Trotskyites” i n Nationalist areas before coming to Yenan. I n the aftermath of the Party counterattack and in anticipation of things to come, many writers and intellectuals were sent down to villages, factories, and battle areas to “learn from the masses.”

Communism understandably attracted twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, but its logical outcome, the dictatorship of the proletariat, presented equally obvious difficulties. From 1943 on, Mao’s principal ideas on literature also were circulated and discussed in Chungking and other “white” areas. Although less systematic, the Party rectification campaign among the writers i n Nationalist areas led to similar debates in which the Party advocates of Marxist materialism, led b y Chou Yang, Ch’en Po-ta, and others, criticized leftist ideal-

ists such as H u Feng, Feng Hsiieh-feng, and their followers, who argued for the writer's freedom to express his deepest emotions without Party control.” Intensification

of the Cheng-feng Movement

Throughout 1942, the Cheng-feng Movement gathered momentum i n northern Shensi, spread to other bases, and took o n more of the aspects

of a purge, especially after Mao stressed the need for vigilance “against spies” at a July meeting of the General Study Committee. A September 1

Central Committee resolution “ O n the Unification of Leadership i n the Anti-Japanese Base Areas” further spelled out measures to strengthen Party organization and education i n all areas.” More important was the conference o f some 267 senior cadres, convened by the Northwest China Bureau, which met i n Yenan from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943, and made further recommendations for the progress of the rectification, education, and production movements as well as other important concerns. Every important Party leader spoke, with the significant exception of any ‘Russian returned student.” Besides Mao’s, the most important speeches were those of L i n Po-ch’ii, who

reported as chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government and as chairman of the government’s study committee, consisting of Kao Kang, Jen Pi-shih, and L i u Shao-ch’i, who was recalled to Yenan about

this time.” Along with the rectification campaign, which was discussed under seven headings, an important aim o f the conference was to strengthen the authority of Kao Kang’s Northwest China Bureau. Kao convened the meeting and generally played an increasing role i n the rectification, production, and other movements vital to the Party at this time. Many of some seventy self-criticisms expressed i n conjunction w i t h these ses-

sions affirmed Kao Kang’s version of the history of the northwest Communist areas, over that o f his former rivals, Chu Li-chih, K u o Hung-t’ao,

and others, namely that indigenous guerrilla leaders led by Liu Chih-tan and Kao had been responsible for successes i n the earlier Shensi peasant movements b u t had been obstructed b y Chu, Kuo, and the “returned stu-

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dent” leadership they represented. Kao Kang’s reinterpretation of history prefigures further attacks by the Maoists on the practitioners of the “three left lines,” and i t is thus clear that Kao’s consolidation of authority as the

pre-eminent indigenous leader in Shensi was related to Mao’s consolidation of authority in the Party as a whole.” I n 1943, the Cheng-feng Movement became increasingly concerned with rectification and with the antisubversive movement. I n the spring, the Party acted on Party Central directions issued i n December to intensify the “investigation of cadres’ histories” and later i n the year and i n 1944 turned

to the study of the history of the Party. There is little evidence of the “liquidation” of high Party members, b u t , i n 1943, the Central Party

School and other Party organizations led a “broad mass movement to fight spies,” w h o supposedly had been sent into the border region by the

Japanese and Nationalists “ t o use the three-thirds system [ o f government] to destroy the three-thirds system.” The Kuomintang launched a “third anti-Communist upsurge,” which included threatening moves against northern Shensi i n the summer of 1943 and was called off only because of the alleged “opposition of public opinion, domestic and foreign.” The Nationalists also used a “red flag” program to set up fake Communist organizations and infiltrate some of their members into Yenan and other areas.’ The Communists reacted predictably to these perceived threats. I n the words of Lin Po-ch’ii i n a January, 1944, speech, “ F o r more than half a year, tireless struggles against hidden spies have been carried out b y the

Party, government, and army and the people and the struggle has now turned into a “Voluntary Confession Movement.’””” An April, 1943, conference of Yenan cadres attended by 20,000 heard addresses b y K’ang

Sheng, Jen Pi-shih, and others attesting to the seriousness of the problem, and in the spring and summer intensified efforts led to hundreds of “confessions” i n a new self-criticism movement. Party, security, and ‘“‘self-

examination” units directed some 140,000 people and 20,000 cadres i n these activities, which reached a peak i n northern Shensi i n July and August. “An absolute majority” of security risks who had been ‘““uncovered” supposedly “confessed and showed repentance to the Party.” U p to 10 per cent of these, by the Party’s own reckoning, really had been spies

or “renegades,” the rest being cadres with undesirable past affiliations or who had committed lesser errors i n their work. I n some institutions, such as the Administrative Academy and Yenan University, about one-quarter

or more of the personnel were criticized. The Party, therefore, clearly linked ‘‘cadre-screening” w i t h the rectification movement, as can be seen i n the Central Committee “Decision on the Screening of Cadres” of August, 1943, which directed that both cam-

paigns “last until 1944.” According to this “Decision,” some 2,000 “Nationalist agents” and other hostile elements so far had been investigated i n cadre-screening i n Yenan and 4,000 i n the entire Shen-Kan-Ning

base. As of mid-1943, supposedly few or none of these had been killed, but some were executed later. Reports of widespread use of force to extract confessions were partly confirmed by K’ang Sheng’s criticism of the policy of “applying torture, extracting confessions, and then accepting them as true.” Later Party documents admitted the persecution of

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“some good comrades,” while praising over-all success. Other documents criticized the apparently widespread use of torture b y security forces and directed regular Party organizations henceforth to handle most of their

personnel problems, passing on only the worst 10 per cent to security organizations. But all Party committees were directed to increase their

surveillance and cadre-screening and t o “investigate . . . the history of each and every person’ under their jurisdiction, maintaining dossiers o n loyal as well as potentially troublesome people. Some 10 to 20 per cent of all Party members, several thousand i n Yenan alone, were to be trained i n

“cadre screening” and procedures of “investigation, research, detention, interrogation, and examination.”"® Ch’en Shao-yii charged later that M a o Tse-tung compelled all [his opponents] to admit that they were either dogmatists, or empiricists, that is captives and assistants o f the dogmatists, a n d that, o f

course, all without exception carried out the above-mentioned so-called left o r r i g h t l i n e o f Ch’en Shao-yii. Moreover, b y similar methods and similar torture, h e compelled a considerable p a r t o f the Communists a n d [ C o m munist Y o u t h ] League members t o confess that they were traitors, counterrevolutionaries, spies o f the K u o m i n t a n g , the imperialists, a n d the Soviet Union.”®

However, although many Communists and leftists were criticized, purged, and o n occasion tortured and executed, among eminent Party leaders, only Ch’en Shao-yii and K ’ a i Feng suffered immediate eclipse, and, i n sharp contrast to the situation i n the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under

Stalin, Ch’en not only survived physically but even retained a nominal seat o n the Seventh Central Committee i n 1945, as d i d other surviving leaders of the “three left lines,” L i Li-san, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t’ien.

Rewriting Party History

The movement to restudy and eventually rewrite Party history was, of course, crucial to Mao’s control of the Party, as well as to the elimination of vestiges of the “three left lines.” I n 1912, Lenin had stated, “ A class . hates the past and knows how to discard its that is i n the ascendancy .”’®°The justification deadening decay which strangles every living thing.

of history was all the more important i n China where the tradition of the “mandate o f heaven’ had been a basic principle of leadership for thou-

sands of years. Later Maoist history to the contrary, Mao did not begin to condemn entirely the “third left line” of Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t’ien until the Cheng-feng Movement. When he criticized military errors of that leadership at the Tsunyi Conference i n January, 1935, he attributed these to ‘ r i g h t i s t ’ rather than “ l e f t i s t ” errors, although early i n the war he began to make vague general attacks on excessive radicalism. I n October, 1938, during the Sixth Plenum, he charged that the “ n e w leftism” of the early 1930’s, “though nominally combating political ‘left opportunism’ [i.e., L i Li-san] really committed anew the mistake of ‘left opportunism.’”” I n mid-1940, Mao noted “many ultra-left policies of the latter period of the agrarian revolution” and called the left the main

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danger to the Party i n trying to work out the united front, while the Sep-

tember, 1941, Politburo meeting ‘reviewed the Party’s political lines in the past.”® I t was not until 1943 that these criticisms of the ‘third left line” picked up momentum in the Party, undoubtedly as a result of Mao’s new more centrist political views and steady acquisition of power. According to the editors of Mao’s Selected Works o f 1954, The CCP’s central leading body and senior cadres held during 1942-44 discussions on the Party’s history, especially the period from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934, which helped greatly to bring about within the Party ideological unity on a Marxist-Leninist basis . . . many cadres failed to understand. thoroughly the nature of the erroneous line of the past. I n order to promote the cadres’ understanding of Marxism-Leninism, the .. . Political

Bureau held during 1942-43 several discussions on the Party’s history, and then directed the Party’s senior cadres to hold similar discussions during 1943-44. These discussions constituted an important preparatory step for the Seventh National Congress of the Party. . . . 8 2

I n July, 1943, immediately after giving his first publicized praise of Mao, Liu Shao-ch’i went on to state, “Only i f our Party members can correctly understand our Party’s historical experience can they raise their faith and valor . . . a n d . . . avoid a great many errors which have been committed i n the past....”% Mao explained in April, 1944, “Since last winter the Party’s senior cadres have studied the problem of the two lines i n the Party’s history. This study has raised considerably the political level of large numbers of senior cadres. ...”’®* The later stages of the study move-

ment thus focused on the rectification of Party history and culminated i n the “Resolution on Some Questions i n the History of Our Party,”* which was adopted by the Seventh Congress in April, 1945, and included in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung without date, but coming between works dated April and September, 1944. The resolution for the first time named Ch’en Shao-yii and Ch’in Pang-hsien, as well as L i Li-san and others, as leaders of the “left lines.””®® The resolution was obviously an important step in Mao’s consolidation of power within the Party, and its timing seems to confirm the impression that the Cheng-feng Movement began more as a collective educational enterprise and that its transformation after 1941 into a Maoist rectification of the Party was a gradual one.

Two later comments by important Party leaders, though biased in their respective ways, raise interesting questions o n the significance of the

Cheng-feng Movement and on its relation to Mao’s consolidation of power. According to a Red Guard paper of November 29, 1967, Chou En-lai minimized the scope and effectiveness of the movement. He reportedly stated, * During the Cultural Revolution, this document was dropped from the 1967 printing of Mao’s Selected Works (Peking ed., vol. I I I ) and the official commemoration of the Party’s fiftieth anniversary linked L i u Shao-ch’i’s errors with those of Ch’en Tuhsiu and Ch’en Shao-yii as causing “gravest harm to the Party.”

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The rectification campaign was carried out during wartime and could be carried out only among the cadres of higher levels. Moreover, at that time, not many of the cadres of higher levels were able to hoist high the great red flag of Mao Tse-tung’s thought; n o t many seriously studied Chairman Mao’s writings and implemented Chairman Mao’s idea. Therefore, i t was necessary for these leading comrades to realize their mistakes and correct them.86

Chou’s purpose i n saying this, o f course, was to explain the reasons for the Cultural Revolution, which should not have been necessary i f the Cheng-feng Movement had accomplished all i t was said to have, and to

explain how Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and other targets of the Cultural Revolution could have risen so high over a long period of time within Mao’s Party. Chou implied that Liu, Teng, and others had sincerely cooperated with the Cheng-feng Movement and at the time were “relatively free of mistakes or even completely free of mistakes” and only developed more serious errors later. Even more revealingly, Chou went o n to state

that, because both Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing opposed and had been attacked b y the “ t h i r d left l i n e , ” “after the Seventh Party Congress, these two had to be trusted.” I n other words, there was an alliance uniting

Mao, Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others against their common rivals, the “Russian returned students.””®” Chou En-lai, who had arrived i n

Yenan from Chungking i n June, 1943, apparently was once again i n the middle of these disputes between factions of the Central Committee. A quarter-century later, Ch’en Shao-yii, i n his own words the “principal

foe of Maoism i n the CCP” and the main target of the 1941-44 criticisms, launched a bitter attack on Mao’s handling of the Cheng-feng Movement i n the course of a Russian-sponsored polemic against Mao’s Cultural

Revolution. Quoting Mao’s description of Ch’en as the “main representative of Russian Marxism and the line of the Comintern in the CCP,” he stressed Mao’s alleged megalomania and responsibility for the rectification movement:

Mao Tse-tung himself repeatedly said that by carrying out the campaign he wanted to achieve three aims: (1) to replace Leninism by Maoism; (2) to write the history of the CCP as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone; and (3) to elevate the personality of Mao Tse-tung above the Central Committee and the entire P a r t y . . . [ i n order] to capture the chief leading place i n the Party leadership and all power i n the Party i n his own hands.®®

According to Ch’en, Mao further charged that Russian M a r x i s m [ w a s ] suitable o n l y for leading the Russian revolution and

unsuitable for leading the world and the Chinese revolution, . that the leadership and assistance of the Communist International to the CCP was entirely wrong . [ a n d ] not only “invalid” and “ineffective” but even “ h a r m f u l . ” [ M a o f u r t h e r ] accused the entire Party o f ‘“‘nonrecognition o f

Maoism” and of “loyalty to Leninism and the Communist International. . . . ”

Ch’en went on to charge that Mao felt “ i t was particularly necessary to deny the services rendered by Ch’li Ch’iu-pai i n the struggle against right

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opportunist Ch’en Tu-hsiu . [ a n d ] b y Wang Ming [Ch’en Shao-yii] i n the struggle against the left adventurist line of L i Li-san . . . [ a n d later

i n debates over] the anti-Japanese national united front. . . . According to Ch’en, Mao’s purposes in rewriting Party history were to ensure ‘“‘the high and unshakable place of Mao Tse-tung in the CCP,” and he quoted Mao to the effect that, “ i f the services of other persons i n the history of the CCP and the Chinese revolution were recognized, then ‘there would be no Maoism.’ *’%® Hyperbole aside, Ch’en’s charges raise very fundamental questions about the history of the Chinese Communist movement i n recent decades. Obvi-

ously, he oversimplified and distorted t o the detriment of Mao, but, equally obviously, Mao often distorted the views of his opponents and the history of his o w n views and actions. One is also reminded of Mao’s encomium on Stalin’s sixtieth birthday, December 21, 1939: Both the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary fronts must have someone to act as their leader, someone to serve as their commander. Who is the commander of the counterrevolutionary front? I t is imperialism, i t is Chamberlain. Who is the commander of the revolutionary front? I t is socialism, i t is Stalin. Comrade Stalin is the leader of the world revolution. Because he is there, i t is easier to get things done. As you know, Marx is dead, and Engels and Lenin too are dead. I f we did not have a Stalin, who would give the orders ?9°

By the early 1940’s, Ch’en Shao-yii was i n no position to challenge seriously Mao’s efforts to “give the orders.” I n March, 1940, Ch’en had tried

to defend his position in the Party by reissuing his February, 1931, antiLi Li-san polemic, The Two Battle Lines. I n his new preface to this work, he sought to defend himself against ever-mounting criticisms: All human thoughts or historical facts, having progressed forward, are a part in the process of over-all development. I t is relatively much easier for people to comment on facts and theories that have occurred i n the past, . [ b u t ] i t is unfair to think all that was right then becomes wrong now or vice v e r s a . . . . A l l things, definable i n terms of time and space must be judged by the concrete conditions and circumstances then and there... . 9 1 But neither the merits o f such an argument, and Mao often used similar

ones, nor whatever support he had from such ‘“‘internationalists” as Ch’in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t’ien, who still enjoyed positions of power in the Party, saved Ch’en from exclusion from Party leadership, as the most

obvious victim of the Cheng-feng Movement. Mao’s Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, prefiguring Cultural Revolution statements twenty-five years later, such as that of Chou En-lai cited above, sought

to explain leadership changes within the Party: I n the process of any great struggle, the leading nucleus i n the initial, intermediate, and final stages should not be, and cannot be, entirely the same; activists (heroes) i n the struggle must be constantly recruited to replace those elements which were originally part of the nucleus, but which have been found wanting on closer inspection, or have degenerated. . . . 2

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Mao also stated that the Party would “adopt a lenient attitude” toward “those who had committed mistakes in the past,” even if “they have not fully realized their mistakes” but “no longer persist in them.”?® But it was evident, especially in the early 1940’s and late 1960’s, that only “the leader” could interpret who had “fully realized their mistakes.” Although Mao claimed that “the campaigns of rectifying the style of work in three fields and developing production have yielded substantial results, thereby making our Party invincible both ideologically and materially,” he was also

forced to admit “such evils may arise again.”’** As the “Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party’ put it, the entire membership should realize that i t still requires a long and continuous struggle to overcome erroneous ideas before the Party can completely achieve its Marxist-Leninist ideological unity, i n view of the existing social roots of petty bourgeoisie ideology i n the Party and the fact that the Party has been for a long time fighting a decentralized guerrilla war i n the countryside, i n view of the existing remnant of doctrinairism and empiricism and especially the scanty criticism leveled against the latter, and i n view of the fact that the sectarian sentiment of the mountain stronghold is quite widespread, although the more serious kind of sectarianism i n the Party has been basically eliminated.®?

Rectification and the Mass Line

A final important aspect of the Cheng-feng Movement was elaboration and indoctrination of the principles of the “mass line.” Whatever the origins of the theory of the mass line, and as seen the ‘“internationalists’ first

stressed its propaganda value from the late Kiangsi period on, Mao became its principal spokesman, especially i n his constant emphasis on the necessity for the intellectuals to ‘“‘unite with the masses.” Undoubtedly, this new Maoist emphasis also had a double aim: to teach a Maoist truth, and

to undermine the authority of Party intellectuals, especially the “returned students.” On May 4, 1939, Mao reiterated a constant theme of the relation between the mass line and Party rectification: to “judge whether [ a person] . . . is a false Marxist or a true one, we need only to find out about

his relations with the broad masses of workers and peasants.”®® He later stressed that “ i t was during the war of resistance against Japan that we began to formulate the Party’s mass line and a series of specific policies appropriate to the s i t u a t i o n . ” Toward these ends, the senior cadres con-

ference convened by the Party’s Northwest China Bureau from October, 1942, to January, 1943, devoted considerable attention to questions of the “mass l i n e ” and its relation to the rectification movement. According to

K’ang Sheng, “the adoption of the mass line is the most precious achievement we have made i n the year-long antisubversion struggle.” H e explained that this was true because some 160,000 people i n Shen-Kan-Ning had

been involved i n the movement and therefore ‘‘the reliance on a handful of security personnel has been changed to reliance on the masses. . . . ” ® Certainly, i n this respect at least, the rectification of the early 1940’s, as of the late 1960’s, differed markedly from the Stalinist model and from some earlier Chinese Communist practices.

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Mao’s important Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, “ O n

Methods of Leadership,” gave the official Party explanation of this crucial policy and its application to general problems of leadership. Already cited in part above, i t also stated,

I t is essential that within each unit a leading group should be formed comprising a small number of active workers united around the head of the given unit and that this group should maintain close contact with the masses taking part i n the campaign. = The masses i n all cases are by and large composed of three groups of people: the active, the relatively passive, and those who are betwixt and between. The leadership must therefore be skilled in drawing the small number of active individuals into the leading group and i n relying on them to enhance the activity of the betwixt and between and draw the passive into the work.%®

After defining the principle of “from the masses to the masses”’— whereby Party activists find out what the masses want and do not want,

reformulate these desires and dislikes into a program, and then on the basis of this program recruit activists and mobilize the population—Mao complained, “Many comrades neither care nor know how to rally active

people to form a leading group, nor do they care or know how to link such a leading group closely with the broad masses; as a result their leadership becomes bureaucratic and divorced from the masses.”’*°® Similarly, in November, 1943, Mao stated, “Whether i t is bureaucracy i n civil-

ian work or warlordism i n army work, the evils are of the same nature, namely isolation from the masses.” He also complained of isolation from the masses within the Party itself, where some leaders failed to relate to

lower-level Party workers.'®* Communist success i n applying the “mass line”’ was already observable i n organizational work with urban labor i n the 1920’s and was increasingly

evident i n the organization of the peasantry after the mid-1920’s. By the early war period, i t constituted an unprecedented achievement, with the

mobilization of tens of millions in Communist bases behind Japanese lines. Ironically, however, although greater attention to the mass line grew out of the Cheng-feng Movement, some later inside accounts criticized this rectification movement as being carried out “from the top down” (that is, b y Mao) and asserted that true mass reform of the Party d i d not come

until the Party purification and land reform movements of 1946-48. Only then was the “mass line” said to have been applied to Party rectification with “mass criticism” of cadre errors and shortcomings.®?

17 THE LINES ARE DRAWN

The great strides in mass organization during the war, together with Nationalist failures, provided the ultimate keys to Communist victory. Behind Japanese lines, techniques for mass organization naturally had to be linked more closely to military power. As described by a leading Chinese Communist historian,

The strategy employed was to penetrate deep behind the enemy lines as he advanced. The armed work teams [ w o r k i n g closely w i t h militia]

broke

through the cordon of enemy troops and operated in the enemy-occupied areas. The teams were organized on the ‘three i n one” principle—they were to fight as. . . troops, to do political work on behalf of the government but to act like the common people i n ordinary times. Military and political struggles thus went hand i n hand. . . . The armed work teams would appear or disappear unexpectedly i n the very heart of the enemy occupied areas. Their whereabouts were known to the people all the time, but the enemy could never find them. Thus, besides the vast anti-Japanese base areas, there

were many small scattered anti-Japanese positions behind the enemy lines.?

I n Nationalist areas, different techniques had to be used, in part because Communist programs had less appeal where other legitimate, if less effective, channels for popular mobilization existed and in part because of Nationalist repression of the Communist movement i n “ w h i t e ” areas. But, i f

there could be no similarly spectacular build-up of Communist organizations i n the Southwest, knowledge of successes i n mass organization in North and East China helped the Communists consolidate an underground Party i n Nationalist areas, attract activist youth to Yenan and other anti-Japanese bases, and strengthen their hand i n negotiations with Chungking. More and more people came to realize that the “mass line” was the real secret weapon of the Communists and one that only the Communists seemed able to master. Still, for the time being, i n the South and West, the principal concern of the Communists had to be secret organization and infiltration

of Nationalist political and military units and the effort to negotiate political advantages from the Nationalists.

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The Chinese Communists stressed both secret and open operations i n

Nationalist-held areas; the former increased after 1939 as the united front broke down. Above all, they sought to be flexible and cautious and to avoid the errors of excessive leftism and dogmatism, which supposedly marred

the “second revolutionary civil war period” of 1927-36. A November, 1939, Central Committee directive summarized guiding principles of wartime work in Nationalist areas: I n Kuomintang areas the mass activities of the Party must be carried on by using every possibility of public and legal activity i n order to make progress and obtain results; at the same time organizational work of the Party should be kept strictly secret for only thus can i t be preserved and consolidated. I t is necessary to differentiate strictly between the public and the secret work of the Party and there should be adequate coordination between the two i n order to avoid a repetition of the failure of work i n the white areas during the civil war days [before 1937].2 Similarly, a March, 1940, directive instructed, “ i n the Kuomintang areas,

our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time and to avoid rashness and exposure,

.”” while documents of September, 1940, stressed Party

efforts to “correct the errors of neglecting and abandoning the enemyoccupied cities.’”® The “Resolution on Some Questions i n the History of O u r Party,” adopted i n A p r i l , 1945, praised L i u Shao-ch’i for working out techniques for the cities, as i t d i d Mao for the rural base areas, and stated that L i u had properly avoided “ f o r the time being decisive engagements w i t h the enemy, when the circumstances are unfavorable to us, i n order to pre-

pare for revolutionary attacks and decisive engagements i n the future.” Similarly, the resolution praised Liu’s proposal for “slogans, demands, and forms of struggle of a limited nature that are acceptable to the masses in order to arouse them into action and then on the basis of the changes

brought about thereby, either gradually push the fight to a higher stage or call a halt at the right moment and conclude i t temporarily to prepare for greater and more advanced struggle i n the future.”* Liu’s cautious proposals were condemned a quarter-century later as indicative of opportun-

ism, but, at the time, Party Central clearly linked Liu’s “correct line i n the white areas’ with Mao’s i n the rural bases. I n October, 1939, L i u Shao-ch’i, secretary of the Central Plains Bureau founded i n April, 1939, recommended a shift to more covert and illegal Party work i n “white” areas, as relations w i t h the Nationalists deteriorated.

Risks were to be avoided by maintenance of secrecy, timely transfers, and flight, i f necessary, b u t there was n o question that L i u was working for a

tightly organized underground Party, which could be as militant as the Party line required. As for Mao’s position, i n April, 1945, he called for a

continuation of liberal united-front policies i n Nationalist areas and stated, “To fight for the common cause we should cooperate with anybody who is not opposing us today even though he did so only yesterday.’” Communist efforts i n Nationalist areas were, of course, greatly facilitated

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b y the united front agreements early i n the war, which for the first time

since the 1920’s gave the Communists a certain amount of freedom of operation. I n 1937 and 1938, when relations with the Nationalists were

relatively good, the Party had sought to avoid unnecessary provocation and had concentrated on overt, legal activities i n establishing patriotic groups, mutual aid societies, and the like. After the Nationalists promised freedom of speech and assoctation in April, 1938, as part of their efforts to create

effective unified resistance to Japan, Communist activists stepped up their work with popular organizations. For example, they helped form a “Wuhan Defense Committee” to coordinate the activities of some sixteen mass organizations i n that temporary Nationalist capital. However, i n August

and October, 1938, earlier pledges to the contrary, the Nationalists decided the Communists were pushing too far, too fast and closed down various

Communist-oriented youth groups.® Until the end of 1938, the Communists experimented with efforts to infiltrate or win over sizable numbers of sympathizers within the Kuomintang and its affiliated organizations. Some Party members did infiltrate Kuomintang political organizations, winning Nationalist sympathizers, but they were generally isolated and for the moment served mainly i n intelligence work, their presence becoming more directly useful to the Party only later. Communists continued to devote special efforts, with mixed results, to

infiltrating and subverting Nationalist military units.’ After the first year or so of the war, the struggle between the two parties intensified again. The Nationalists claimed success i n breaking u p many Communist organizations and “inducing” defections of some 5,000 to

10,000 of an estimated 100,000 Communists operating i n Nationalist areas but admitted their failure to win over any higher-ranking Communists, with the exception of Chang Kuo-t’ao. They d i d capture certain provincial

leaders i n Kiangsi and Chekiang, together with 2,500 Chekiang cadres during the early 1940’s. I n the process, the Nationalists used the full

range of espionage weapons, including bribes, double agents, family hostages, and reprisals. Cloak-and-dagger stories of these episodes have generally been neglected in the larger carnage of the revolution but- are nonetheless fascinating. During this period, the Nationalists usually dis-

covered secret Communist cells and meeting places only with difficulty, after the painstaking narrowing of interlocking circles, often beginning

with the capture and defection of a courier or other low-ranking cadre. Only gradually and under special conditions could cadres from higher-level Communist organizations be discovered, since they were known solely to a

few experienced organizers.® Most Party organization i n Nationalist areas i n the West and South was

directed by the Yangtze Bureau, which was renamed the South China Bureau in January, 1939, after its move from Wuhan to Chungking, while the Southeast China Bureau (until 1941) and the Central Plains Bureau directed most work in Japanese-held areas to the east, south, and north of the lower Yangtze Valley. Ch’en Shao-yii headed the Yangtze Bureau early

i n the war and was succeeded by Ch’in Pang-hsien, until Ch’in’s departure for Yenan i n late 1940. Thereafter, Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu were the

highest-ranking Communists i n Chungking, while the South China Work

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Committee in northern Kwangtung under Fang Fang and others coordinated activities in the southern coastal provinces and Kiangsi.’ Chou En-lai’s work with the Nationalists and independents in some ways was as important as Mao’s work i n guiding the building of the base areas and Red Armies or as Liu Shao-ch’i’s i n building the Party in the “white” areas of East and North China. I n 1939, Mao explicitly linked these three aspects of Party work, as the keys to Communist victory, stating, “The united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental problems of our Party in the Chinese revolution.”*° Chou’s high-ranking assistants under the Central Committee united front work department, established i n December, 1937, were Ch’en Shao-yii

until about 1939; Tung Pi-wu, who occasionally replaced Chou as the senior Communist i n Chungking, as when Chou took a trip to Yenan i n June, 1943; Lin Po-ch’ii, chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government, who from mid-1938 to 1941 shuttled back and forth between Yenan and Nationalist cities; and, later i n the war, Wang Jo-fei. Yeh

Chien-ying carried on talks regarding military aspects of the united front early in the war, as did Lin Piao in 1942 and early 1943. Teng Ying-ch’ao (Madame Chou En-Lai) in Chungking, Li K’o-nung in Kweilin, and Liao Ch’eng-chih i n Hong Kong also played important roles in Communist work in the South during the war.’* Also i n these years, both the Communists and, paradoxically, the Kuomintang at various times gave support to

Vietnamese Communists, including Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and others, i n Yenan, Southwest China, and northern Viet-

nam.'? Overt Communist activities were confined to Chungking after the first years of the united front, but there was considerable work, especially among students, i n Kunming, Kweilin, and other wartime university centers. The N e w China Daily, with a circulation of about 25,000 i n 1940, the

Masses, and other Communist publications were important outlets for propaganda and fronts for other activities. The former and its parent N e w

China News Agency established offices i n Chengtu and other cities and actively supported numerous leftist bookstores. The South China Bureau operated a radio station i n Chungking to communicate with Communist

units i n Kweilin, Changsha, the Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi (Min-YiiehKan) border area, and elsewhere, and high-ranking Communists occasionally made distant inspection trips, like that of Chou En-lai to Kiangsi and Chekiang i n the spring of 1939. Other Communist headquarters in the South were Eighth Route Army rear offices i n Chungking, Kweilin, Kweiyang, Changsha, southern Kiangsi, P’ingchiang (Hunan), and Chukoucheng, Honan.'?

N e w Tensions in the United Front

The most important aspects of Communist work i n Nationalist areas, of course, were the efforts to establish contacts and sympathy at higher levels

of the Kuomintang government and military organization, to influence public opinion, and to translate these influences into legislation and agree-

ments favorable to the Communist struggle for power. Such work had already paid off handsomely i n the Sian Incident and i n the creation of

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the second united front and had won the Communists the grudging confidence of Nationalist leaders during the first two years of the war. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek claimed that i n 1937 he had “really believed that the Chinese Communists had repented and were sincere i n their expressed readiness to join the rest of the nation in the fight against aggression.”* I n August, 1937, the Nationalists invited Chu Teh and Chou En-lai to

sit in on the meetings of the Supreme National Defense Council, and in March, 1938, they announced the establishment of a national consultative assembly, the People’s Political Council. I n June, they invited seven Communists to participate i n People’s Political Council meetings: M a o Tse-tung (who never attended), L i n Po-ch’ii, W u Yii-chang, Tung Pi-wu, Ch’en

Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Teng Ying-ch’ao. The Communists thereby gained a high-level forum, first in Wuhan and after 1938 i n Chungking,

where they could present their views and demands to the 150 Nationalist delegates and forty-odd representatives of smaller parties and independents, and beyond them, of course, the Chinese people. After 1938, growing

political and military friction over the crucial issues of control of East and North China steadily increased the tension between the Communists and Nationalists i n the People’s Political Council and elsewhere. I n November, 1939, the People’s Political Council encouraged the for-

mation of the first of a series of alliances of independent parties, the United National Construction League, composed of delegates of the China Youth Party, the National Salvation Association, the T h i r d Party, the Vocational Educational Group, and the Rural Reconstructionists.’” This development

later greatly benefited the Communists, for these and subsequent parties and leagues, such as the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties (founded i n March, 1941) and its successor, the Democratic League (founded i n Octo-

ber, 1944), consistently sought to mediate disputes between the Communists and Nationalists and generally argued i n favor of more “liberal” views than either the CCP or the K M T on questions of various freedoms and representative democracy.

I n May, 1936, i n accord with previous pledges, the Nationalists promulgated a draft constitution, signifying their intent to progress from the transitional stage of “tutelage” to Sun Yat-sen’s third stage of ‘‘constitutional democracy.”’'® But, i n view of the war and divided opinion within the Kuomintang, confirmation was delayed, and rising demands for ‘“democ-

racy” placed the Nationalist government i n a sharp dilemma. I t could, and retrospectively i t is easy to say i t should, have taken the lead i n this and other reforms, but instead i t used the excuse of the war to intensify its authoritarian conservative rule. Increasingly critical of the government, the

People’s Political Council i n September, 1939, and other groups at other times, stepped u p demands for constitutional rule and helped induce the government to announce plans i n November, 1940, for a national constituent assembly to ratify the draft constitution. However, the Communists

and others challenged the provisions of the proposed constitution and the composition of the ratifying assembly. There were even “liberal” factions within the Kuomintang who on occasion spoke up for more “democracy” and concessions to the Communists and other groups.” Hence, during the war, the Communists found increasing numbers of

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allies against the dominant Nationalist ruling groups, particularly against the alleged Kuomintang monopoly of government and its restrictions on the rights of other groups. The Communists could only profit from controversy over such issues. Growing Kuomintang suppression of “independents” as “fellow travelers” also further polarized Chinese politics, thereby often leaving the issue of “progress” to the Communists by default.* Chiang Kai-shek’s alleged statement of 1941 that “The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart,”'® accurately indicated prevailing attitudes. Both sides were biding their time i n the war with Japan and, after Pearl Harbor, concentrated primarily on

preparations for the increasingly likely showdown with each other. The N e w Fourth Army Incident of January, 1941, virtually ended cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists, although sporadic negotiations sought to resolve many conflicting complaints and demands. T o protest the N e w Fourth Army Incident, the Communists boycotted the People’s Political Council sessions o f March, 1941, and presented instead a list of twenty-four demands that would have to be met i f cooperation

were to continue. Important among these were oft-repeated demands for the abolition of “one-Party Kuomintang dictatorship’ and the introduction of “democracy and freedom” along the lines of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles, to be supervised by a council consisting of various political parties, under the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship, respectively, o f Nationalist and Communist delegates.”

Although Chiang Kai-shek always expressed his desire for national unity and his willingness to follow the People’s Political Council i n the “settlement of all outstanding questions” and denied any idea of ‘““again taking u p arms to ‘suppress the Communists,” ”’ neither he nor other conservative

Nationalist generals and politicians would tolerate an erosion of the authority of the national government. Whatever Chiang may have meant when he told the Nationalist Central Executive Committee i n September, 1943, that “ T h e Communist problem is a purely political problem and

should be solved by political means,” he always affirmed his intention to keep the “power of ultimate decision,” and, i n mid-1943, he “reinforced”

the blockade of northern Shensi.?° The core issue i n KMT-CCP relations, of course, was the disposition of Communist military forces. Thus, later i n the war, Chiang Kai-shek main-

tained that he would recognize the Communists as ‘‘a legal party” but only after the integration of Communist forces into the national army. Just as adamantly and understandably, the Communists always refused to turn over the command o f their troops before the “one-party rule of the Kuomintang” had given way to a national coalition government that they could trust. Furthermore, the Communists demanded the authorization of increases i n their armies from the three divisions of 15,000 men each of * One of the great questions of modern Chinese history is why these third-force groups were unable to provide a more effective alternative to the Nationalists and Communists. Their diversity, inexperience, and lack of military power are no doubt among the principal answers.

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1937 to twelve divisions b y 1942, and sixteen divisions by mid-1944.?* By

the latter date, the Communist armies had grown to about 500,000 regulars, or more than double their requested authorization for sixteen divisions, which in any case was refused. Hence, such negotiations as there were turned o n Nationalist demands for genuine unity, with the integration of the Communist Armies into the national army as a test of Communist

sincerity, and on Communist counterdemands for recognition, legality, an end to Nationalist dictatorship, and political and personal freedoms. Direct KMT-CCP negotiations, conducted on the Communist side by

Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying, were suspended for about two years following the New Fourth Army Incident. Then, i n late March, 1943, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao presented four demands to the Nationalist chief of staff, Ho Ying-ch’in, calling for recognition of their expanded forces and reorganization of Communist political and military units.” The Nationalists rejected these terms but agreed to resume discussion of outstanding issues, and i n November, L i n Piao negotiated for the Communists i n Chungking o n the reorganization of the Communist armies, without result. Mao com-

plained at about this time that the “danger of civil war has never been so great.”’*? Nonetheless, after 1943, more meaningful negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists got under way. That year constituted a turning point i n World War 11, and both Chinese sides were profoundly affected

by such events as the Allied victories at Stalingrad, in North Africa, and the South Pacific; important diplomatic developments at the Cairo and

Teheran conferences and elsewhere, where the Western powers finally ended a century of unequal treaties and declared China one of the five great powers; the Soviet dissolution of the Communist International i n order to popularize “national Communism” for the war effort; and finally the publication o f Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny, which blamed imperialism as

“the main cause of our failure to build a nation.”’** I n May, 1944, a new set of negotiations between the two sides began i n

Sian, with Lin Po-ch’i representing the Communists, but after ten days shifted to Chungking and continued there through much of the year. During these discussions, Lin formally presented Communist demands for recognition, guarantees, and a coalition government, broadening earlier demands for representation i n government councils. Summarizing his dis-

cussions for a session of the People’s Political Council on September 15, L i n demanded authorization for sixteen army divisions, recognition of the

Communist bases, and “ a democratic form of government even during the w a r ’ based on the Three People’s Principles and the Nationalist and Communist pledges made at the beginning of the w a r . *

As intended, these Communist proposals, especially those calling for greater freedom and democracy, evoked favorable responses from inde-

pendent groups i n Nationalist areas. I n 1943-44, i n order to offset growing criticism at home and abroad of its “dictatorial practices,” the Nationalists eased restrictions on the independents and revived talk of constitutional government to replace the period of tutelage, which had continued almost ten years beyond its supposed duration of six years. Accordingly, the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties became more active and i n

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September, 1944, decided to reorganize into what it was hoped would be a more effective “third force.” The reorganization resulted i n the founding of the Democratic League on October 10, 1944, which was dedicated to the prevention of civil war and the creation of a united and democratic gov-

ernment, either a constitutional type all could agree to or, failing that, a coalition government.

As a first step, the League called for the convening of a truly representative national assembly to consider these questions and issued a manifesto in favor of coalition government in January. Harassment by the Nationalists and the frustrations of China’s situation drove the Democratic League

steadily leftward, and i t maintained frequent contact with Communist representatives. The Communists reportedly subsidized the league and obviously profited from its demands for constitutional government and greater freedom. But there is no evidence o f Communist control of this or

other independent groups. The United States Tries to Mediate

From the middle of 1944 on and with mounting frustration, the United States became increasingly involved i n Chinese affairs, initially out of con-

cern for the prosecution of the war against Japan. Although Allied leaders early decided to place priority on the defeat of the Nazis and only subsequently to press the war against Japan through the Pacific Islands rather than through China,* the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of war was

still of vital importance. Despite the relative quiescence of the Chinese front after 1938, i n comparison to 1937, the majority of Japanese troops were tied down i n China and i t seemed obvious that i f the Nationalists and Communists, each of whom faced large numbers of Japanese troops, could cooperate instead of expending most of their energies against each other,

the war effort would be greatly advanced.’ Adding to American concern after May 1944, was the greatest Japanese offensive since 1938, Operation Ichigo, which took strategic territory i n Central and Southwest China and

threatened to disintegrate the Nationalists. This situation was especially worrisome since the United States had just begun to bomb Japan from Chinese bases, and the offensive opened up possible Japanese routes from Manchuria to Indochina. I n order to strengthen China’s unity and war effort, President Franklin Roosevelt sent Vice-President Henry A . Wallace to Chungking i n June, 1944, to offer U.S. mediation of Nationalist-Communist disputes. Chiang

Kai-shek accepted the offer, allowed an American military observer team to go to Yenan,} and agreed i n principle to what would have been a crucial step, the reorganization of all Chinese armies under the direction of

General Joseph Stilwell. The American Commander of the CBI theater was appointed Chief of General Staff to the Chinese armies and awaited Chiang’s

instructions to begin his mission. However, the two men got on together * T h i s w a s a f a t e f u l decision since, h a d the U n i t e d States i n v a d e d Japanese-occupied

China, i t would obviously have committed the United States to a far greater involvement i n postwar China than actually occurred. + The origin of the famous U.S. army observation group, headed by Col. David D . Barrett and accompanied by John Stuart Service and others.”

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about as well as the Nationalists and Communists did and, by September, Chiang Kai-shek was insisting on Stilwell’s recall.* Although this affair, combined with Chinese demands for aid and other matters, disturbed Presi-

dent Roosevelt, American support of the Nationalists continued, and, in October, General Albert Wedemeyer, in whom Chiang Kai-shek had far more confidence, replaced Stilwell.° I n August, 1944, President Roosevelt appointed Major General Patrick Hurley as his personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek, with the mission of unifying and strengthening the Chinese war effort. On his way to China, Hurley stopped off i n Moscow where Molotov reportedly told him, with supreme irony, that the Chinese were ‘ r a d i s h ’ Communists, red o n the outside, white o n the inside, and that their beliefs were “related to Communism i n no way at all. I t was merely a way of expressing dissatis-

faction with their economic condition and they would forget this political inclination when their economic condition improved.”?* Later in the year, after passing this assurance on to Chiang Kai-shek, along with his own belief that the Chinese Communists were merely a democratic opposition

party, like the “Oklahoma Republicans’ in his home state, Hurley claimed, in an equally astonishing statement, that Chiang Kai-shek had come to believe “that the Communist Party i n China is not an agent of the Soviet government . [ a n d ] that he [Chiang] can reach a settlement w i t h the Communist Party as a Chinese political party without foreign entangle-

ments.’’*? O n November 7, after two months of talks i n Chungking, Hurley, who shortly became ambassador, flew to Yenan i n the company of Lin Po-ch’ii

and returned three days later with Chou En-lai and a “five-point document” signed by Mao Tse-tung. This Communist proposal pledged to integrate “all anti-Japanese forces” into the national army as soon as a democratic coalition government practicing basic freedoms and recognizing the legality of

the CCP and other parties had been established. The Nationalists predictably countered with a three-point plan that would recognize the legality of the Communist Party and undertake other reforms but only after the reorganization and submission of Communist armed forces to the authority

of the Nationalist government.’® On hearing these Nationalist counterdemands, Yenan decided to suspend talks temporarily. Hurley reaped the ire of both sides for his initiative, as the Communists claimed that his sig-

nature upon their five points, even though only as an “observer,” should have been binding upon the United States and its Nationalist allies. This setback silenced intriguing indications since mid-1944 of Communist interest i n the possibility of relations with the United States, including requests for

military aid and cooperation with expected American military initiatives against Japan, and even a suggestion that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai

might travel to Washington for high-level talks. The Liberation Daily of * The United States, of course, would have become far more heavily involved had Chiang accepted Stilwell’s mission. However, as has been vividly described i n a recent study, the latter’s nickname of “Vinegar Joe” aptly described his diplomatic qualifications for such a job, while Stilwell revealed his opinion of the Generalissimo by calling him “ p e a n u t . ” + Succeeding Clarence Gauss.

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July 4, 1944, likened Communist efforts i n China to those of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln i n America.

Chou En-lai agreed to return to Chungking i n late January to receive new Nationalist proposals, which called for a “war cabinet” of representatives from all sides, reorganization of the army under a committee consisting of a Nationalist, a Communist, and an American, and other measures. Although

some Communists would participate in such initiatives, i t was obvious that supreme power would remain with the Nationalists, and the Communists retorted that they would never submit their armies to the national government until its “one-party dictatorship” was reorganized as a democratic coalition. Yenan was more receptive to a Nationalist proposal of February 3, 1945, for a “political consultative conference” to work out the transition from ‘tutelage’ to a constitutional movement of genuine unity and to subsequent talk of a national assembly to “inaugurate constitutional government.” On March 9, however, a week after Chiang Kai-shek had linked several measures, including the calling of a national assembly in November, and an invitation to “other parties, including the Communists .to participate in the government,” to the maintenance of the Kuomintang’s ‘power of ultimate decision and final responsibility,” pending the convocation of the national assembly, Chou En-lai replied in the name of Party Central that “the Kuomintang government is obstinately insisting on having their own way alone.

. ” According to Chou’s letter, instead of inaugurating a

coalition government, the “Kuomintang government is preparing to call on November 12

that one-party—controlled, deceitful, China-splitting

so-called national assembly, based on conditions i n which the people have no freedom [ a n d ] political parties and groups [ h a v e ] n o legal status.” Therefore, Chou concluded, the CCP Central Committee n o longer saw any

need to draft a reply to the Kuomintang proposals of February. The Communists were also increasingly cool toward American mediation efforts, especially as Ambassador Hurley rejected requests for aid and, i n contrast to his earlier views, became more convinced of the need for com-

plete support of the Nationalists. On April 2, 1945, he declared that there could be n o further U.S. cooperation with the CCP.*¢ While increasingly skeptical of the United States, Chou En-lai’s letter of March 9 also reported that the CCP Central Committee proposed to send Chou, Tung Pi-

wu, and Ch’in Pang-hsien to the inaugural meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco.* But the effect of other sections of this letter was to break off negotiations with the Nationalist government.®” There, the delicate and vastly complicated negotiations over the reorganization of the Communist and Nationalist governments and military rested, pending the convening of the Chinese Communist Party’s Seventh National Congress i n April and of the Kuomintang’s Sixth National Congress i n May.

The Seventh Party Congress The stage for the Seventh Party Congress was set by various regional conferences i n early 1945, such as a forty-day North China Work Confer* O f these three, only Tung Pi-wu went to San Francisco.

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ence®® and, most importantly, by the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. The Plenum adopted the already discussed “Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party” on April 20, just three days before the opening of the Seventh Congress. The resolution praised Mao Tse-tung’s “integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution” and confirmed that, “ I n

the course of the struggles [against right and left opportunism], Comrade Mao Tse-tung [had] emerged from the Party as its leader.”’* At the Seventh Congress, the glorification of Mao reached the first of many heights. Every major speaker, including Jen Pi-shih, whose speech opened the Congress, Chou En-lai, Lin Po-ch’i, Chu Teh, and above all

Liu Shao-ch’i, praised Mao to the skies*® and i n effect began the cult of Mao. Thus, Liu Shao-ch’i told the Congress, “ T h e principal task at present

is to mobilize the entire Party to study the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, propagandize i t and use i t to arm our Party members and revolutionary people.”*! The rise of Mao to absolute pre-eminence within the Party was confirmed* by his election to the newly created position of chairman of the Central Committee at the First Plenum of the new Seventh Central Committee, meeting just after the close of the Congress in June, 1945. Mao’s position since January, 1935, as chairman of the Party’s Military Affairs

Committee already had made him first among equals, a status that was strengthened by the Cheng-feng Movement, but i t was left to the First Plenum of the Seventh Congress to make formal and publicize Mao’s supremacy. The new leadership elected by the Congress also confirmed the fact that Mao’s dominance was consolidated by an alliance between the “two parties’ of the “white” areas and the rural bases and another between most military men and some ‘‘internationalists’ against the previously dominant “Russian returned students.” The “Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party” had already indicated this alignment by its attacks on the “third left line’ and the linking of Liu Shao-ch’i’s “correct line” in “white areas work” w i t h Mao’s i n the rural base areas. A n analysis of the

fifteen-man Congress presidium and Seventh Central Committee of fortyfour members and thirty-three alternates also makes this clear. Among

about twenty surviving members of the Sixth Central Committee of the early 1930’s, more than half were ‘“internationalists.”’ They held most key

Party positions until the early 1940’s, when they relinquished them to the leaders of the revolutionary bases and ‘“white’’ areas. Most o f the “internationalists’’t were re-elected to the Seventh Central Committee but n o longer

held important positions, with the partial exception of Chang Wen-t’ien.*? The predominance of military men resulting from more than fifteen years of constant warfare was evident. Generals constituted at least onefourth of the full Central Committee, and, of necessity, most Party leaders

had served much of their careers as political officers i n military units. The careers of some 39 per cent of the Seventh Central Committee had been * Mao may have become Chairman of the Party as early as March, 1943, but the First Plenum formally confirmed this.” + Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, L i Li-san, and others.

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primarily military, while 45 per cent had been primarily Party organizers.

The rest had supposedly been full-time laborers or peasants at one time, and most of the Central Committee had studied abroad (about 60 per cent i n

Russia and 29 per cent i n France). Among the military men, Mao’s and Chu Teh’s old First Front Army was better represented than the former Second and Fourth Front armies.** Army Commander i n Chief Chu Teh was ranked after Mao Tse-tung among leaders of the new Central Committee, and Liu Shao-ch’i, Jen Pi-shih, L i n Po-ch’ii, L i n Piao, and Tung

Pi-wu followed i n order.’ The First Plenum of the new Central Committee chose its Political Bureau, which closely reflected the balance of leadership. I t seems to have included Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Liu Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Ch’en Yiin, Lin Po-ch’li, and K’ang Sheng.* The Political Bureau, i n turn, chose a Secretariat consisting o f Mao, Chu Teh, L i u Shao-ch’i, Jen Pi-shih, and Chou En-lai, with Ch’en Yiin, an alternate, replacing Jen Pi-shih o n his

death i n October, 1950. As decreed by the Party constitution, Mao, as chairman of the Central Committee, also served as chairman of the Political Bureau, “ t h e central directing organ of the Party,” and of the Secretariat,

which “shall perform the routine functions of the Central Committee under the Political Bureau.” The Seventh Congress, hailed as one “ o f solidarity and victory,” met i n

Yenan from April 23 to June 11, 1945. Some 544 delegates and 208 alternates, claiming to represent 1.21 million Party members, heard reports, elected a new Central Committee, and adopted a new Party constitution. There were twenty-two separate plenary sessions, as well as numerous meetings of smaller groups, and more than two dozen speeches by Chinese

leaders, as well as by representatives of the Japanese and Korean Communist movements. Major reports included Chu Teh’s on military affairs given o n M a y 25, Liu Shao-ch’i’s on the revision of the Party constitution given M a y 14-15, and Mao’s “ O n Coalition Government” given A p r i l 24.*"

Resolutions were passed approving the political and military reports, and the Congress approved a new Party constitution.

Chu Teh’s speech summarized the wartime achievements of the Eighth Route Army and N e w Fourth Army, which “under the leadership o f com-

rade Mao Tse-tung

start from the interests of the people and serve

the people.” Consonant w i t h Communist policy for a coalition government, Chu demanded that “ t h e supreme command, n o w under the one-party

dictatorship of the Kuomintang, be reorganized and replaced by a joint supreme command capable of exercising unified command, and based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s principle of democracy.” ‘“Regardless of Kuomintang actions,” Chu continued, “ t h e Communist armies w i l l go on w i t h the

Chinese people to defeat the Japanese invaders, to conquer all obstacles which prevent China from becoming an independent, free, democratic, united, and prosperous nation.’’*® * I t may also have included then or later Tung Pi-wu, P’eng Chen, Kao Kang, and P’eng Teh-huai. Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and probably Chang Wen-t’ien had been dropped from the Political Bureau at the Sixth Plenum i n 1938, as was the case with Wang Chia-hsiang, who became an alternate member of the Seventh Central Committee. See Chart 19.1.

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Liu Shao-ch’i went furthest of all i n stressing Mao’s achievement in uniting Marxist theory with Chinese realities and practice, especially in the development of the theory and techniques of the mass line. Liu explained that these features of the “unity of theory and practice,” “ t h e mass line,”

and the dominance of Mao’s thought had been written into the Party constitution so as to prevent mistakes of left and right opportunism i n the future. According to Liu, Using Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese revolution as the guide i n all its work, our Party has formulated a revolutionary program and revolutionary policies fully representing the interests of the Chinese nation and people. . . . Moreover, at the time, i t was Liu’s turn to assert the truism that would be used against h i m twenty years later: “Numerous historical events i n the past have shown that whenever the revolution was under the leadership of

Mao Tse-tung and his theory of the Chinese revolution, i t succeeded and developed; but whenever i t departed from that leadership, i t failed or had to retreat. . O u r comrade Mao Tse-tung,” L i u said, “ i s not only the greatest revolutionary statesman i n Chinese history, but also its greatest

theoretician and scientist.” This was not only true for China, but “Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese revolution . which has guided and is guiding the people to achieve complete emancipation . . will make great and useful contributions to the struggle for the emancipation of the peoples of all countries i n gen-

eral and of the peoples of the East i n particular.””*’ I n the same report, Liu attacked dogmatic “ l e f t ” opportunism, which emphasized “ n o compromise whatsoever,” and mechanical discipline and

organization, but he also appealed for stricter discipline and standards and condemned the ‘““liberalist line pursued by certain comrades who attempted

to turn our Party into a party of petty bourgeois liberalism,” by “enrolling Party members en masse and without distinction” and by excessive tolerance of organizational and ideological errors. Mao’s thought, now the basis of the new constitution, would prevent such errors i n the future: The general program of the Party constitution stipulates that Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the constitution shall guide all work of our Party. The constitution itself provides that i t is the duty of every Party member to endeavor to understand the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese revolution.5° T H E 1 9 4 5 PARTY CONSTITUTION

The 1945 Party constitution adopted by the Seventh Congress super-

seded the one passed by the Sixth Congress i n 1928. I t continued the Leninist principles of hierarchical organization and democratic centralism, with elections and discussion of issues at all levels but with absolute obedience of lower to upper levels once decisions had been reached. Three new sections, not contained i n the 1928 constitution of fifty-three articles, were

added, and others were subdivided to make up the seventy articles of the

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1945 constitution. The three concerned the duties of members, rights and

privileges of members, and underground Party organizations.* The Seventh Congress constitution, compared w i t h the earlier one, stressed both greater centralization, culminating i n the post of Central Committee chairman (i.e., Mao) and greater democracy with more chan-

nels of appeal for aggrieved Party members. I t also placed more emphasis on the rural nature of the Party, talking less of proletarian leadership and counting “workers, coolies, hired farm hands, poor peasants, urban paupers, and revolutionary soldiers’’ as the most desirable recruits. Similarly, i t

sanctioned the creation of more large cells or branches, called “principal Party cells,” in villages having fifty or more regular or probationary members and i n factories and schools having 100 members. The term principal Party cell, which was not mentioned i n the 1928 regulations, was inserted

between the “basic organizations” (formed wherever there were three or more members) and the county committee. The 1945 constitution, unlike

that of 1928, does not mention the Communist International or the Communist Youth League; the former had been dissolved by Stalin in 1943, and, from 1936 to 1948, the latter was replaced by a variety of front organizations. Nevertheless, the constitution pledged efforts to unite with the world proletariat.’’** The most striking feature of the 1945 constitution passed by the Seventh Congress, as of the 1969 constitution passed b y the N i n t h Congress, but

not of that passed by the Eighth in 1956, was the Party’s adoption of “the thought of Mao Tse-tung” and the theories of Marxism-Leninism from which i t was derived “as the guiding principles of all its work.”*®* With the help of these theories the Party would triumph, but it still faced “especially The Chinese revolupowerful obstacles along the revolutionary path. tionary struggle is complicated, and i t must, for a very long time, find pri-

mary expression in armed struggle.”’ The preamble of the constitution, from which these quotes are taken, went on to describe the basic tasks of the Party i n coming years, stressing the “mass line”’ and “self-criticism.” Before the victory of the revolution i n the key cities, i t w i l l be pre-eminently important to consolidate the villages as a revolutionary base, and i t will also be necessary for the Party to undergo a long period of patient work among the popular masses. . . I n its revolutionary mass organizations must wage an uncompromising but [ a n d ] within its ranks, the CCP effective struggle within the Party against opportunists, surrenderists, and adventurists, and must expel from Party membership all those who are obstinate i n their errors. . The CCP should not conceal its own mistakes; . i t should use the methods of criticism and self-criticism constantly to rectify its own mistakes . . . and should educate its own Party members. CCP members must possess the spirit of whole-hearted and undivided workers, peasants, and other revolutionary elements.. .Every Party member must realize the harmony of interests between the masses, and the Party. . . must b e determined to learn from the masses, w h i l e at the same time tire-

lessly educating them. . . . The CCP asks that every Party member carry on his work positively, i n the spirit of self-sacrifice. ...%* Under the constitution, membership was open to all over eighteen years

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of age, upon the recommendation of two regular Party members and six

months’ to two years’ probation, depending on the desirability of the recruit’s social background.”® The constitution reaffirmed the Party hierarchy of Central Committee, border area and regional bureaus, provincial committee, county committee, municipal or district committee; added the “principal Party cell” described above; and retained the basic cell wherever there were more than three Party members. A basic cell with more

than seven members would hold plenary meetings to choose branch committees. Congresses were to be held every three years on the national level and every two years o n lower levels to elect the Party committee of that level and to discuss current issues. Between congresses, conferences of

representatives from committees at various levels might meet to discuss special questions. Municipal, district, and county committees, i n turn, were

to hold plenary sessions at least every three months, while plenums of provincial and border region committees and the Central Committee were to meet every six months."° I n practice, however, these schedules were rarely met, as committees

could invoke the clause “ i n special circumstances [ a committee] may either postpone . [ a congress or plenum] or call i t i n advance.” Thus, there were few plenary sessions o f the Central Committee prior to 1949,

and the Eighth and Ninth Party congresses, like the Sixth and Seventh, were held more than ten years apart. I n addition to specifying the hier-

archy of Party congresses and committees, the constitution confirmed the authority of the special bureaus and committees that had developed since the early 1930s. I n terms reminiscent of the first united front, the constitution also elaborated on the role of “fractions,” or nuclei of Communists, i n non-Party organizations.’” MAO ‘““ON COALITION GOVERNMENT’ AND PARTY POLICY

I f the constitution reaffirmed the organizational framework of the Party, Mao’s speech “ O n Coalition Government” of April 24 outlined Party policy for the period. I t remains one of his most important addresses. General awareness of past catastrophes, triumphs, and recent gains gave added credibility to Mao’s convictions that, in China, only the Communist Party could claim to represent the people and that “ I t is the people, and the people alone, that are the motivating force i n the history of the w o r l d . ” By

contrast, the Nationalist “ruling clique,” said Mao, only “represents the interests of China’s big landlords, big bankers, and big compradores.”

Eight years of war with Japan had “enhanced the awakening and unity of the Chinese people to a degree unequaled i n all their struggles i n the last hundred years” and, therefore, made them all the more aware of the

contrast between “the two lines” of Communist performance and promise and Nationalist hypocrisy, ineptness, and bankruptcy.”® Developing the

theme of his opening remarks to the congress the day before, Mao posed two damning questions for Chungking: First, what exactly has made t h e . . . government abandon so vast a territory . and population? Can i t be anything else than the policy of . passive resistance to Japan and the domestic policy of opposing the people that the Kuomintang government has adopted?

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Second, what exactly has enabled China’s liberated areas to repulse successfully the ruthless attacks of the Japanese and puppet forces over a long period, to recover such vast territories and liberate such an immense population? . . . Can i t be anything else than the correct line o f a people’s war?>?

I n an age of nationalism, such a challenge was difficult to answer. Mao claimed that Communist forces had grown to 1.21 million Party members, 910,000 army regulars, and 2.2 million i n the militia, who super-

vised the administration of 95.5 million people i n nineteen separate base areas from North China to Hainan Island. By contrast, he charged that the Nationalists had retreated to the Southwest and had only wasted far

greater resources through profiteering, corruption and continuing aggression against the Communists. I n contrast to 1938, when Mao had linked

Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen as “two great leaders i n succession,””®’ he now sardonically denounced “ D r . Sun’s unworthy successors” for their betrayal of the revolution and asked, ‘Should not the Chinese people congratulate themselves for their ‘disobedience’ to the repressive and reactionary demands of the government?’’ I t was not the “people’”’ and the CCP but “the Kuomintang government that has, on indisputable evidence, undermined the Chinese people’s resistance and endangered their state.” Therefore, Mao asked, “ C a n there be any patriotic and conscientious Chinese who will listen to them?” For the Communists on the contrary,

“Through twenty-four years’ struggle for the cause of the Chinese people’s liberation, the CCP has attained such a position that i t will be a grievous error and will lead to a foredoomed failure for any political party or social

group, any Chinese or foreigner, to disregard [ i t s ] opinions

on ques-

tions of China.Ӣ! Nevertheless, for a l l his denunciations of the Nationalists, Mao hoped to

attract support from them as well as from anti-government independents. H e stated, “ F a r from being a close-knit body, this reactionary clique is divided into several factions fighting against one another,” and later, “even

within the Kuomintang many people

have become dissatisfied with the

policies of their o w n leading body . . and are therefore demanding democratic reforms.”’*? Still more promising i n Mao’s view, of course, were

the “many democratic people” in the Democratic League and elsewhere who were unanimous i n their demands for greater freedom and would support many of the Communist attacks on the government. The heart of Mao’s speech, therefore, as its title indicates, and of Com-

munist policy until mid-1946, consisted of demands for the reorganization of the Nationalist government and the creation of a “democratic coalition government.” After repeating the theory of the “two-stage revolution,” according to which the Communists would lead the evolution to socialism

after possibly another “several decades” of bourgeois democratic revolution, Mao asserted that, at the present stage, the Communists would strive

only for their minimum program of a “New Democracy” “based on the overwhelming majority of the people under the leadership of the working class.”’®® This program was to be accomplished i n two steps in cooperation with “democrats” throughout China: first, through the establishment of a

“provisional coalition government

of the representatives of all parties

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and people without party affiliation”; and second, ‘through free and unre-

stricted elections to convene a national assembly which will form a proper coalition government.” The recently announced Nationalist agreement to

call a national assembly before the creation of a provisional government was “dishonest” since “ a few dozen Kuomintang members” would control the elections and hence the coalition government. The Communists would agree to resume negotiations with the Kuomintang, which had been broken

off in March, only if the Nationalists announced their “willingness to renounce their erroneous policies and . . . [ i n s t i t u t e] democratic reforms.”

Mao described the Party’s “specific program,” which he then listed under ten headings: the war, coalition government, people’s freedom, unity, military, agrarian, industrial, cultural, minority nationalities, and foreign policy

problems. He discussed these points i n moderate terms, as was appropriate i n implementing principles of the minimum program. Notably, i n discussing

economic questions, he said, “Under the new democratic state system, measures will be adopted to adjust the interests of labor and capital’ to ““safeguard the rights of both.” At the present stage,* policy should not be “to abolish private property but to protect it.””®> Stating a fundamental Marxist tenet, but with a directness that must have given h i m pause later, Mao asserted, “ t h e effect, good or bad, great or small, which the policy or practice of any Chinese political party produces o n the Chinese people, depends i n the last analysis o n whether i t fetters or liberates their productive forces. . ” ’ ® ® H e emphasized the importance of the peasantry to the revolution and to the country as a whole and

reaffirmed for the time being the Party’s wartime agrarian policy of “reducing rent and interest,” though he noted Kuomintang opposition to even so modest a program, and stressed that the appropriate line for the bourgeois democratic stage should be Sun Yat-sen’s “land to the tillers” policy. About May, 1946, Communist policy shifted to a more radical, though still “bourgeois,” land policy. Nevertheless, the socialization of land remained distant, and, at the Seventh Congress, Mao merely noted that, “Though the working class will ultimately be able to accumulate enough

strength to lead China toward socialism, there will be a long period for the regulated development of capitalism.”’®” Understandably, Mao gave little indication of any plans for the eventual cooperativization of land. The section of Mao’s address on foreign policy called for a prosperous, powerful, and independent China; for the “liberation” of Korea and the “independence” of the Southeast Asian countries; and for strengthened

relations with the Soviet Union. Mao declared Communist support for the 1924 Kuomintang promise of “equality of all nationalities i n China.” He also hailed the founding session of the United Nations i n San Francisco i n June, where Tung Pi-wu would “express the w i l l of the Chinese people” as one of the ten-member Chinese delegation. The final section of “ O n Coalition Government’ declared that the Party

would continue to steel itself for the tasks of the revolution, through stress * By contrast, L i u Shao-ch’i’s statements four or five years later on the necessity for protecting capital were condemned as “revisionist” during the Cultural Revolution.”

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on the “pivotal links” of the mass line, ideological education, and selfcriticism—the most distinctive traits of the CCP. I n conclusion, Mao pledged that the Party would continue the work of fallen comrades: “Thousands upon thousands of martyrs have heroically laid down their lives for the interests of the people; let us hold their banners high and march along the path crimson with their blood! A new democratic China will soon be born; let us hail that great day!’’¢® On June 11, Mao closed the Seventh Congress with one of his “three constantly read works,” “How Yii Kung Removed the Mountains.”* I t is a parable deeply symbolic o f the entire Chinese Communist revolution i n its stress o n the immensity of the task and the power of the people: [There was] an old man i n North China i n ancient times, by the name of Y i Kung [foolish old m a n ] o f the North M o u n t a i n . H i s house faced south

and its doorway was obstructed by two big mountains, T’aihang and Wangwu. With great determination he led his sons to dig up the mountains with pickaxes. Another old man, Chih Sou [wise old man], witnessed their attempts and laughed, saying: “What fools you are to attempt beyond your capacity.” Y i Kung replied: “When I die, there are my sons, and so on to infinity. As to these two mountains, high as they are, they cannot become higher but on the contrary, with every bit dug away, they will become lower and lower. Why can’t we dig them away?” Mr. Yii Kung refuted M r . Chih Sou’s erroneous view and went on digging at the mountains day after day without interruption. God’s heart was touched by such a perseverance and he sent two celestial beings down to earth to carry away the mountains on their backs. N o w there are also two big mountains lying like dead weight on the Chinese people: imperialism and feudalism. The CCP long ago made up its mind to remove them. We must work persistently, work ceaselessly, and we too may be able to touch God’s heart. This God is no other than the masses of the people throughout China. And i f they rise and dig together with us why can’t we dig these two mountains up?¢® I n terms of Mao’s logic, the statement is irrefutable, and, as of the late

1940’s at least, whatever one’s politics, the extraordinary perseverance and achievements o f the Chinese Communists could not be gainsaid and

seemed truly comparable to the leveling of mountains with pickaxes. Yet, in view of the staggering tribulations of the Communist struggle, one could well ask Mao an equally logical question: Why not move the house rather than the mountains? Could China not be saved i n some easier way

than that proposed by the Communists? For the Chinese Communists, the answer was a ringing no, since they would not, of course, accept the premises of the question. Yet, several million strong by 1945, they also wished for the easiest possible completion

of their task, and some of their top leaders did propose compromises in subsequent years. As the Cultural Revolution later made clear, these became

the topic of major intra-Party debates, along with the perennial problems of the mass line, the agrarian revolution, and military strategy.

* A n o t h e r common translation o f the t i t l e i s “ T h e Foolish O l d M a n W h o Removed the Mountains.”

13 THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR BEGINS

The Communist defeat of the Nationalists w i t h i n four years after the surrender of Japan was the climax of one of the great stories of history. A

drama involving hundreds of millions of people, the script was further enlivened by the maneuvering of Nationalist and Communist leaders and their foreign supporters, by the extraordinary hardships, endurance, and dignity of the Chinese people, and finally by the “last great battles of the classic type before the nuclear age.’”! Ultimately, the roots of Communist victory in 1949 lie deep i n the concentric rings of Chinese history, from the evolution of the dynastic cycles of two millennia, to the past century of intensifying intellectual, social, economic, and political revolution, to two decades of contention between the

Nationalist and Communist parties. The behavior of foreign powers, especially Japan u n t i l 1945, was also important but secondary to internal factors. Among the latter were problems as great as any ever faced b y a major country and the profound longing for peace of the Chinese people, and an

increasing feeling that any change would be for the better so long as it brought peace. Yet, i f history set the stage for the drama of the Communist conquest, the performance depended on the actors. After their narrow escape from annihilation less than a decade before,

the Chinese Communist victory was far from assured i n 1945. Nearly all observers still placed their bets on the Nationalists, and even Communist leaders foresaw victory only after at least another ten to twenty years of struggle.* Despite the spectacular growth of the Chinese Communist movement from perhaps 40,000 political and military activists i n 1936° to at least 1.5 million by the end of the war, their mortal enemies still heavily

outnumbered and outgunned them. Heavy recruitment enabled the Nationalists to offset staggering losses sustained during the war* and to keep their strength above 2.5 million * Although a few prescient observers and the Communists themselves foresaw ultimate victory, none saw i t so quickly. Communist leaders spoke of ten or twenty years of struggle and, even as late as mid-1948, of another three or four years of battle.’ Thus, most observers still regarded the Communists as a “problem” to be solved rather than as potential leaders of the world’s largest nation.

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regulars in 1945, as against less than 1 million front-line Communist troops. Therefore, most observers estimated the Nationalist advantage over the Communists at almost three-to-one i n fighting men and at least five-toone in arms. Furthermore, the Nationalists enjoyed a monopoly of air and naval forces.” This, i t was thought i n the era before the Vietnam war, would preclude Nationalist defeat. As General Albert Wedemeyer, then Commander of U.S. forces i n China, told American officials on October 17,

1945, “The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] has sufficient power to cope with the Chinese Communists provided they do not receive greatly increased aid from Russia. At present the Chinese Communists are not strong militarily as they have no air or artillery and no competent military advisers.”

The Communists soon proved just how competent their “military advisers” were, and more important, their superior organizational strength was translated into military power through the discipline and morale of their front-line troops and through mobilization behind the lines i n support organizations, most obviously i n the militia, which was 2.2 million strong i n the spring of 1945. I n the end, of course, mass political strength, plus

the brilliant generalship of Communist strategists and tacticians, proved decisive. As Mao stated i n 1945, “All the necessary conditions are present” for Communist victory.” But conditions do not automatically bring results, and, until about 1948, the Communists were still very much the underdogs.

Nationalist Strengths and Weaknesses The Nationalists, after all, were the government, w i t h all that that

implied in financial, propaganda, and organizational resources and international recognition. The latter seemed especially important to the Nationalists, who had just won an end to the unequal treaties of the preceding century and acknowledgment, however unrealistic, as a great power, and who counted on U.S. aid for reconstruction and, of course, for “pacification” of the Communists. However, every Chinese knew that all of these

government advantages depended on the ‘“mandate of Heaven” and that this mandate would continue only so long as government leaders understood “the Way.” Had not many dynasties from the Ch’in to the Ch’ing— no matter how powerful—Ilost their mandate before the wrath of the people? As an apt Chinese saying puts it, “The losers become bandits, the victors, kings.”’ The Nationalists also knew Chinese history, but different groups within

the Kuomintang read i t i n different ways. One major section of the party since the 1930’s, i n the manner of mandarins for two millennia, believed that only a return to ancient principles could save the party and the nation from internal decay and consequent domestic rebellion and foreign aggression.® Led b y the brothers Ch’en Kuo-fu and Ch’en Li-fu and known as the “ C C Clique,” this group had launched the abortive “ N e w Life Movement” i n 1934, stressing a return to Confucian virtues as the answer to Communist ideology. The CC Clique was dominant i n the Kuomintang during much of the Sino-Japanese war and postwar period and continued to preach an essentially Confucian view that the Communist movement was not only a “rebellion” against the lawful government but also a moral heresy, totally alien to Chinese ways. Hence, many people believed that the Communists were not a credible threat to China because the Chinese were “ t o o sensible”

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to accept central Maoist principles, especially that of class struggle.’ The natural corollary to these beliefs that Communism represented foreign interests and the Kuomintang the real China was the argument that growing Nationalist reverses were due to foreign interference, both on the part of bumbling friends, notably the United States, and enemies, notably the Soviet Union.

An equally important conservative group i n the Nationalist movement was as much an extended family as a political group. Its members were the famous Soongs, offspring of a wealthy Shanghai banker, who i n various ways played exceptional roles i n modern Chinese history, beginning with

the time-honored method of marrying into the ruling elite. The second of three sisters, Soong Ching-ling, became Sun Yat-sen’s second wife but soon diverged from the politics of the rest of her family. After Sun’s death in 1925, she remained consistently leftist and became a vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China after 1949. The youngest sister, Soong Mei-ling, married Chiang Kai-shek i n 1927 and played an important role i n Nationalist affairs thereafter. The eldest sister, Ai-ling, married into another

famous banking family, the K’ungs from Shansi, who claimed descent from Confucius. H e r husband, H . H . K’ung, held many positions i n the Nationalist government, including that of minister of finance, as d i d the brother of

the three famous sisters, T. V. Soong. According to the Communists, the “ f o u r big families’ of Chiang Kai-shek, the Soongs, K’ungs, and the Ch’en

brothers “ r a n ” China as a private ‘“‘fiefdom,” after the war especially, taking over vast shares of the nation’s wealth.” Sun Fo, a son of Sun Yat-sen

by his first marriage and a Nationalist leader i n his own right, was relatively independent of the “four families” but was naturally bound to them i n many ways.

The Whampoa generals, who had been Chiang Kai-shek’s closest colleagues since the founding of the famous military academy i n 1924, under-

standably formed a third important part of the Kuomintang during the long years of war and, according to most observers, held most major military

commands, more by virtue of their loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek than by their

talents.!! Besides the “CC Clique,” the “Soong dynasty,” and the Whampoa generals, there were several other identifiable sections of the Kuomintang.

Another military group, rival of the dominant Whampoa clique since 1927, was that of the southwestern generals, led by Kwangsi men L i Tsung-jen and Pai Ch’ung-hsi. Basically conservative, they frequently sided with such “liberal opposition” as there was to oppose the ruling factions of the Kuomintang. They had openly rebelled against Chiang Kai-shek i n 1929 and 1930 and again i n 1936. Therefore, though their group included some

of the ablest Nationalist generals, they were never trusted and, on several critical occasions i n the civil war, lost their commands to confidants of the Generalissimo. N o more trusted by dominant Kuomintang leaders was the

“Political Science Group” of relatively liberal, professional people. With the support of the United States, they sought to shift Kuomintang policies leftward and did manage to influence the belated “liberal coalition governm e n t ” formed i n April, 1947. But, even then, they were thwarted b y conservatives who dominated most sections of the Nationalist Party.'?

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This diverse Kuomintang coterie was held together, to the extent that i t was, by the common cause of nationalism and by the force of Chiang Kaishek’s personality. That somehow the Generalissimo was the lynch pin of the entire Nationalist structure seemed revealed by the helpless drift of the government whenever he “retired” from the scene, as he did i n late 1927, 1932, and 1949.'® Paradoxically, and for similar reasons, i t is as hard to give an accurate portrayal of Chiang Kai-shek as i t is of Mao Tse-

tung. A man of unquestioned dedication to the cause of China, Chiang nonetheless suffered from fatal defects, and to many he often seemed a century or two out of step with the times.* More important, Chiang Kai-shek mainly held the Nationalist coalition together b y playing off one group

against another and by relying on trusted subordinates, all too often drawn from the “four big families” or from the “Whampoa clique.” Besides these factions, which were more or less under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, there were other men who generally took the Nationalist side i n disputes with the Communists but who tried to preserve their independence. Various warlords were implacably opposed to the Communists but carried out Nationalist orders only when i t suited them to do so. Such were Yen Hsi-shan, warlord of Shansi Province for thirty years, the Muslim generals of the Northwest, and others i n Szechwan and the Southwest. Still other generals, including L i Chi-shen, who formed a ‘““revolutionary Kuomintang” i n 1948, Feng Yii-hsiang, who died i n Russia the same year, Lung Yiin of Yiinnan, and many others, made their peace with

the Communists when they saw which way the wind was blowing.'® At the opposite end of the political spectrum from the independent military men were the intellectuals and professional people, grouped into the Democratic League, the National Construction Association, Chiu San Society, Association for Protecting Democracy, and other “ t h i r d force” groups.'” Although generally anti-Communist, they often supported Communist attacks on the Nationalists’ paternalistic style of government. I n -

creasingly heavy-handed Nationalist repression of these groups, including seeming involvement i n occasional assassinations and harsh repressions of student demonstrations, drove most o f these groups further and further left. However, only the several thousand members o f the Democratic League

maintained close cooperation with the Communists. The Democratic League was finally closed down by the Nationalists on October 27, 1947, as a Communist “front organization.” Members of the league denied that they “believed i n Marxism,” but many came to agree with one member that “Communism, w i t h all the possible criticism that might be piled upon it, is . Another reason why we need at least very much better than fascism. not be afraid of the CCP is that, while they believe that Communism would be the ultimate outcome of world order, they have no intention of introinto China at the present stage, nor for a generaducing Communism

tion to come.”*® Given the diversity and limitations of all the Nationalist groups and the * O n his 1923 visit to Russia and some sites of Napoleon's 1812 invasion, Chiang allegedly likened himself to the great French general." + September Third Society—the date of the formal Japanese surrender i n 1945.

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problems they faced, i t is perhaps understandable that no effective Nationalist government could be realized in China after the war. Many individuals i n the Kuomintang and the independent groups were extremely able, but they were not backed by effective organization. Ironically, the best organized groups, such as the CC Clique, seemed to offer the least hope of meet-

ing China’s needs and to have expended their greatest efforts in working against other sections of the Nationalist movement.'® There were also staggering problems of inflation and corruption. The latter problem, which spread far and wide i n Nationalist areas, stemmed

in part both from the breakdown of the social order and the resulting demoralization, and from administrative traditions, especially the practice of “squeeze,” which Confucianists regarded as a legitimate means of establishing proper rapport between officials and people. Corruption was also tied to catastrophic inflation i n Nationalist areas, where prices rose more than 1,000 per cent a year i n the late 1940’s and where salaried government

employees were under enormous pressure to take extreme measures. Prices i n August, 1948, were 5.5 million times those of 1937, and the sight of bags

of money at the markets and other anomalies of hyperinflation became commonplace.?® The inflation resulted not only from continued warfare— military expenses took about three-quarters of the government budget—but also from government mismanagement. Inflationary effects were compounded b y policies that amounted to extortion, such as forcing the people to exchange their Japanese money for Nationalist currency at unfair rates, and b y what was generally agreed to be “one of the biggest carpetbagging oper-

ations i n history,” conducted by many Nationalist officials andbusinessmen, who returned to East China from Southwest China after the war.? The importance of such financial and organizational weaknesses i n damaging the Nationalist cause i n the next few years cannot be overestimated, especially when contrasted w i t h greater Communist success i n

dealing with these problems. The Nationalist economy was i n reasonably sound shape i n mid-1945, w i t h large reserves of foreign exchange and even a temporary halt i n inflation.?? But, by the end of 1945, inflation and the general deterioration of the Nationalist economy and administration

resumed with a vengeance. Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed unprecedented popularity at the end

of the war as the leader of one of the five “great powers’ on the victorious side but soon reaped the whirlwind of his continued failure to make any headway w i t h China’s enormous problems. A l l the Nationalist advantages became dust i n the short space of four years, and, as early as 1947, some impartial observers concluded that the game was already lost for the Nationalists. Even many Nationalist leaders became pessimistic, and, i n

late 1947, Chiang Kai-shek was reported to have said that the Communists “had shown themselves to be more eager and dedicated to the welfare of China” than the Kuomintang.? Communist Bases i n 1 9 4 5

The central fact of 1945, of course, was the end of the war. Attention naturally focused on military developments, as further negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists awaited the outcome of the Kuomintang

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and CCP national congresses and as both sides planned offensives to bring their forces into favorable position for the expected Japanese capitulation. But both sides were surprised, as was the rest of the world, by the early Japanese surrender, M a o having spoken i n January of “ t w o to three years”

before the final defeat of Japan.2* The formal surrender announcement on August 14, 1945, precipitated a

momentous scramble to take over as much territory and as many Japanese arms as possible. The Communists, concentrated i n the North and East,

had the geographical advantage and seem to have had more advanced plans than the Nationalists for the takeover of Japanese territory and arms. They launched a “spring offensive,” and, on July 7 , the Central Committee

ordered an acceleration of military action to “expand into enemy occupied areas and enlarge the liberated areas.”’?® O n August 9 , the day after the

Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Mao Tse-tung repeated the call to “launch extensive offensives” and “expand our liberated areas,” especially concen-

trating on the “wrecking of the enemy’s communication lines.””?® The formal Japanese surrender took place on August 14. Immediately after an initial local Japanese request for peace on August 10, Chu Teh, as commander i n chief, ordered all Communist units to ‘‘take

over and occupy any city, town or communication line held by the enemy and the puppets,” to compel Japanese and puppet forces “ t o hand over all

their arms to our fighting forces within a given time,” and to “cooperate with the units of the [Soviet] Red Army operating on the territory of China.” On August 11, the Nationalists promptly countermanded this order and instructed all units to remain i n position pending Nationalist acceptance of the Japanese surrender. The Communists protested against this effort to “steal the fruits of victory” from ‘the people,” who had fought Japan the hardest, and reaffirmed their o w n orders. Similar ex-

changes of protests between the two sides continued throughout the month. The Nationalists, however, were i n a position to w i n this first round of

the renewed struggle, with American aid to the “legal government of China” proving temporarily decisive. On August 15, the Nationalists ordered Japanese commanders to stand fast against “bandits” and unauthorized troops, and Japanese troops continued to clash with the Communists for some months.?®* From Tokyo, General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) i n Japan, issued General Order No.

1, directing Japanese troops in China and those north of the sixteenth parallel i n Vietnam to surrender only to the Chinese Nationalists, and those i n Manchuria only to the Soviet Union. American transportation of u p to 500,000 Nationalist troops to North and East China enabled the Nationalists to procure the great bulk of Japanese arms. By its own admis-

sion, the Nationalist government disarmed more than 1.25 million Japanese troops within China, while the Communists disarmed only 30,000 within

China proper, although the Communists undoubtedly received many of the arms held by the 500,000 Japanese soldiers i n Manchuria.* Even as the Nationalists benefited from their return to North and East China, the Chinese Communists strengthened their position. This was to be expected in view of their alleged strength i n 678 of the 914 counties that Japan had occupied during the war. As of the spring of 1945, the

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Communists claimed an army of 910,000, a militia of 2.22 million, and a

self-defense corps of 10 million in nineteen liberated areas. These areas were located in as many provinces, covering 950,000 square kilometers (one-tenth of the country), and were inhabited by a population of 95.5 million people.*° There were seven liberated base areas in North China: Shensi-KansuNinghsia (Shen-Kan-Ning), Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh (Chin Ch’a-Chi), ShansiHopeh-Honan (usually with a section of of Shantung included as Chin-ChiLu-Yii), Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui), Shantung,®* a new area that developed

toward the end of the war as Communist troops moved toward Manchuria, Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning, and, immediately after its conquest, Manchuria. Central China had the ten smaller bases of northern Kiangsu, central Kiangsu, Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei (sometimes given as southern Kiangsu), eastern Chekiang, northern Anhwei (Huai-Pei), southern Anhwei (Huai-Nan), central Anhwei, Honan, Hunan-Hupeh, and HupehHonan-Anhwei (Oyiliwan). Finally, in South China were the two bases of

the East River valley of Kwangtung and the mountains of Hainan Island.*? I n accord with Mao’s early civil war policy of “temporary abandonment of certain places or cities” in order to preserve and expand mobile armed forces, the Chinese Communists offered to withdraw in late 1945 from as

many as eight of these areas in Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh, and southern Honan.** I n the year after the end of the war, some of the remaining Communist bases were linked together, while army units evacuated most of the areas mentioned above, as well as some N e w Fourth Army bases along the

Yangtze, others to the north of Kiangsu and Anhwei, and north of the Lung-Hai Railroad between Sian, Kaifeng, and the sea. Most dramatically,

in 1946, units under Tseng Sheng traveled by sea from the East River base in Kwangtung to Chefoo, Shantung. By early November, 1945, Communist main force units had evacuated eastern Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, central and southern Anhwei and Hunan. Thus, guerrillas remained behind in much of South China, but the Communists concentrated their main force

units well north of the Yangtze, especially i n northern Shensi, Jehol, Chahar, Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, Suiyiian, Honan, and the northern

areas of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Hupeh.?** Although there were frequent shifts in the map of areas under Communist control, expansion was continuous, especially in manpower, but also in territory, as gains i n Manchuria and elsewhere more than offset Communist withdrawals from exposed areas. From January to May, 1945, the Communists claimed to liberate an additional twenty-two counties and

5 million people and, in the two weeks after the Japanese surrender, to capture some fifty-nine towns, bringing their total towns to 175. Later i n

1945, they supposedly added another 18 million people to their control in 190-odd towns and thousands of villages, with especially large gains i n Shantung and north of Peiping. I n all, by the end of the year, the Communists claimed control of 149 million people in about one-quarter of the populated area of the country.?® By the end of 1946, the Communists had evacuated, altered, and regrouped their remaining liberated areas into seven basic theaters of war,

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which generally also served as administrative regions. These were (1) Shansi-Kansu-Ninghsia (Shen-Kan-Ning); (2) Shensi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui), both under the future First (Northwest) Field Army of P’eng Teh-huai and H o Lung; (3) Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii); (4) East China (former bases i n Shantung, Kiangsu, and Anhwei) ; (5) ShansiChahar-Hopeh (Chin-Ch’a-Chi); (6) Central Plains (Hupeh and H o n a n ) , the last four under the future Second, T h i r d and Fourth (Central Plains, East China, and Chin-Ch’a-Chi [later Fifth or North China]) field armies of L i u Po-ch’eng, Ch’en Y i , and Nieh Jung-chen, respectively; and finally the Northeast (Manchuria), under L i n Piao’s future Fourth (Northeast) Field

Army. By 1948, these regions were further simplified into the geographical areas of Northwest China (Shen-Kan-Ning and Chin-Sui, with a population of 7 m i l l i o n ) , Northeast China (Manchuria, w i t h 12 million inhabitants), North China (Chin-Ch’a-Chi and Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, w i t h 44 million inhabitants), East China (Shantung, northern Kiangsu, and northern Anhwei, w i t h 43 million inhabitants), and the Central Plains, w i t h as many

as 30 million inhabitants in various and shifting areas from the old Oyiiwan base northeast of Wuhan, to the northern parts of Honan and Anhwei.?®

Before discussing the postwar growth and history of the Party in Communist and Nationalist areas, we must outline the complicated pattern of

negotiations and warfare between the two protagonists, on which Party policies and growth depended. Communist-Nationalist Relations i n 1 9 4 5

Communist policies naturally varied during these years i n order to

take advantage of political and military opportunities, but there is no doubt, as Mao’s speech to the Seventh CCP Congress had shown, that the dominant leaders of the Party n o w felt that the time for a final showdown w i t h the Nationalists was at hand. Hence, most Chinese Communist statements and

policies throughout the late 1940’s were confidently assertive to the point of belligerence. Nonetheless, the needs of the united front and, as the

Cultural Revolution later revealed, the doubts of more cautious leaders tempered Communist intransigence. Therefore, Party statements oscillated i n tone, from the belligerence of immediate postwar statements, to more conciliatory remarks i n connection w i t h the September, 1945, negotiations, to tougher language i n the aftermath of the October 10 agreement, to more hopeful statements again prior to the January, 1946 agreement, and once

more to a harder line in the spring. Following the brief June ceasefire came the rhetoric o f open warfare. A n August 13, 1945, editorial i n Liberation Daily described what was to come: ‘ A t this turning point i n history, our Chinese people should clearly recognize that the urgent present task is firmly and undeviatingly

to press on to the objective of their liberation.””*” Mao’s speech of the same day and other statements of the period were equally unequivocal. Noting the demand of the Chinese people for peace, Mao argued that, i f civil war came, i t would not be the fault of the Communists b u t of the Kuomintang, because, “as Chiang Kai-shek is now sharpening his swords, we must sharpen ours too.””?® H e acknowledged that the Communists could have

peace, i f they followed Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, but the Communists

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would fight for “new democracy,” not a “dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.” According to Mao, “the people want liberation and therefore entrust power to those who can represent them and work faithfully for them, that is to us Communists.” H e charged that “the trinity

of dictatorship, civil war, and selling out the country has always been the basis” of Nationalist policy and asked rhetorically, “What about the Kuomintang? Look at its past and you can tell its present, look at its past and present and you can tell its future.’’3® The Communist answer in 1945 was clear. Mao called on his supporters not to allow the Nationalists who were ‘passive in resisting Japan but active in anti-Communism” to grab the spoils of war. Rather, “The victory of the war of resistance has been won by the people with bloodshed and sacrifice, i t should be the victory of the people, and i t is to the people that the fruits of the war of resistance should go.” Mao argued that the Communists would contest control of the “medium and small towns,” although he acknowledged that, with American aid, the Nationalists would be able

to take over most of the large cities. While the Communists would give u p certain areas for tactical advantage, Mao warned, “ O u r policy is to give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land; we will never let the

Kuomintang easily seize our land and kill our people.”*° I n other writings of mid-August, Mao was especially critical of Nationalist orders to prevent Communist efforts to accept the Japanese surrender and arms. O n August 13, he charged that ‘““China’s fascist ringleader,

autocrat, and traitor to the people had the audacity to ‘order’ the antiJapanese armed forces i n the liberated areas to ‘stay where they are, pending further orders,’ that is, to tie their own hands and let the enemy attack them.” O n the contrary, “ O n l y the anti-Japanese armed forces of

the liberated areas have the right to accept the surrender of the enemy and puppet troops,” at least o f the majority of them who had fought the Communists. “ A s for Chiang Kai-shek, his policy has been to look o n with folded arms and sit around and wait for victory; indeed he has n o

right at all to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppets.”’** On August 16, Mao addressed a telegram to the Generalissimo, “on behalf of all the anti-Japanese armed forces and all the 260 million people i n China’s liberated areas and Japanese-occupied areas,” in which he asserted the rightful place of the Communists in accepting the Japanese surrender and preventing “civil w a r ’ and demanded that China immediately “abolish the one-Party dictatorship, call a conference o f all parties to set u p a democratic

coalition government, dismiss corrupt officials and all reactionaries from their posts, punish the traitors, abolish the secret services, [ a n d ] recognize the legal status of the various parties. . . ” * ? I n another statement on the

same day, Mao declared that, i n view of Kuomintang actions, “Civil war is touch and go,” and Nationalist propaganda that attempts to blame the Communists for i t “flies in the face of all the facts of modern Chinese history.”’*3 Mao, of course, did not publicize intra-Party circulars in which he stated that the Communists were girding for war, not only i n self-defense but also in the hope of seizing power. Communist military orders of August 10 and 11 directed North China armed forces to “march on Inner

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Mongolia and the Northeast” and ‘“‘the armed forces o f a l l the liberated

areas

to launch vigorous offensives on all the main communication

routes.

J™% O n August 26, M a o wrote a circular for the CCP Central

Committee declaring that: i n northern China we should still fight hard, fight with all our might to take all we can I n the coming period we should continue the offensive and do our best to capture [various railways]. We should gain control of whatever we can, even though temporarily. [Then] .after another period of offensive operations, i t w i l l be possible for our Party to control most of the areas north of the lower Yangtze River and the Huai River, most of Shantung, Hopeh, Shansi, and Suiyiian Province, a l l o f Jehol and Chahar Prov-

ince, and a part of Liaoning Province. But if the Communist drive for final power had begun, neither Mao nor any other Communist leaders were under the illusion that the struggle could be easily or very quickly won. Therefore, i n addition to striving for

the maximum physical advantages of territory, people, and arms, the Communists continued their wartime strategy of negotiations with the Nationalists, both to gain time for expansion and organization and to w i n friends for their concept of the united front. Thus, o n August 30, the Party spoke

of civil war as likely but expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement could be worked out. Meanwhile, i t continued to push its two-pronged policy, summarized in the Chinese phrase, “Fight, fight, talk, talk.””** Until mid-1946, the primary Communist goal i n the negotiations was the formation of a coalition government that would work for changes favorable to the Communist side.” The Communist leadership looked o n

negotiations as a means to bring about the communization of China, but some were uncertain as to h o w much trust to put i n the negotiations. Thus, Cultural Revolution criticisms of the late 1960’s alleged that, as early as August, 1945, L i u Shao-ch’i had cherished the “sweet dream of

peaceful transition,” believing that the Nationalists would grant ‘““peace and democracy.”*® I n his August 13 speech, Mao complained that ‘some of

our comrades put their faith only i n political influence, fancying that problems can be solved merely by influence.”* I n his confessions of 1966-67, L i u admitted having entertained ‘illusions of peace” i n the postwar period but spoke of them i n connection w i t h the January, 1946, ceasefire, which

he stressed had been agreed to by the entire Party leadership.” Other major developments of August, 1945, must have sharpened

intra-Party debate. One was the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan. As early as August 13, Mao enunciated the now well-known theme that “ a t o m bombs could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggles waged by the people [ a n d the entry of the Soviet Union into the w a r ] atom bombs

by themselves would be of no avail.” However, complained Mao, “some of our comrades, too, believe that the atom bomb is all-powerful; that is a

big mistake.” The second major issue was the role of the foreign powers i n China, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. Foreshadowing his “paper tiger” thesis of 1946, i n the August 13 speech, Mao declared that

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“United States imperialism while outwardly strong is inwardly weak,” and argued then and later that the United States was not strong enough to wage a new world war to stop the spread of revolution. Others, including Stalin and probably Liu Shao-ch’i, were not so sure and advised caution to avoid such dangers. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance that the Soviet Union signed with the Nationalist government on August 14* must have been even more disconcerting for Chinese Communists who were less confident than Mao. M a o had always stressed self-reliance, and, on August 13, he stated that Communist efforts “should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one’s o w n efforts. W e are not alone; all the countries

and people in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless, we stress regeneration through our own efforts.”** But, while Mao publicly praised the entry of Soviet troops into Manchuria as having created a “favorable position’ for the Communists, privately he must have

agreed with the author of an August 30 document who wrote that “we do not understand actual Russian policy.”””® A delegation from Manchuria,

headed by Kao Kang and Liu Shao-ch’i, reportedly traveled to the Soviet Union in 1945, presumably to discuss such questions, and the Soviet Communist Party maintained contacts with the Northeast China Bureau of the

CCP throughout the late 1940’s.%¢ Whatever the facts of intra-Party debate concerning the value of negotiations, the significance of the atomic bomb, and Soviet and U.S.

policy i n Asia, Party Central adopted a more moderate line after midAugust, 1945, and on August 24, Mao accepted Chiang Kai-shek’s invitation to reopen negotiations with the Nationalists in Chungking.} O n August 25, the Central Committee formally set the new line of “peace, democracy, and u n i t y ” i n its “Declaration o n the Current Situa-

tion,” which stated that “the important task confronting the whole nation is to consolidate unity i n the country, safeguard domestic peace, bring

about democracy and improve the people’s livelihood so as, on the basis of peace, democracy, and unity, to achieve national unification and build a new China, independent, free, prosperous, and powerful.”’*®

Mao’s writings also reflected this change. Where earlier in August he criticized those who “put their faith only i n political influence,” and those who “believe the atom bomb is all powerful,””*® on August 26, he explained his agreement to resume negotiations as a necessary political maneuver. H e defended the necessity for some compromises, such as reducing the

number of liberated areas in the South, where they were exposed to attack, and demobilizing expendable army units, but he warned that such con-

cessions could be made only “so long as they do not damage the fundamental interests of the people.” Now, according to Mao, i f the Communists

could build their strength and present their casé well enough, i t should * I n August, 1939, there had also been considerable dismay within the Party about the signing of the treaty of nonaggresion between Germany and the Soviet Union, even though Mao praised it as a “victory of Soviet peace policy.” + I n June, the Kuomintang had appointed a committee of seven to try to resume negotiations and, i n mid-August, even as they mutually denounced each other and raced for advantage, Chiang issued three invitations to Mao to come to Chungking for new negotiations.”

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be possible to negotiate an advantageous truce with the Kuomintang. M a o

argued that a policy of “unity through struggle” could “explode the Kuomintang’s civil war plot, . . gain the political initiative, . win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders within the country, [ a n d ] obtain i n exchange legal status for our Party and a state

of peace.” Nevertheless, even in these explanations, Mao’s ultimate intent was evident in his warning that “we must at all times firmly adhere to and never forget these principles, unity, struggle, unity through struggle, to wage struggles with good reason, with advantage, and with restraint; and to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our

enemies one by one.” He concluded that the Party “must definitely not rely on the negotiations, must definitely not hope that the Kuomintang will be kind-hearted, because i t never will be kind-hearted.””*® The CCP must rely

on its own strength. On August 28, Mao flew to Chungking, accompanied by Chou En-lai, Wang Jo-fei, and Ambassador Patrick Hurley. I t was his first flight and his only meeting with Chiang Kai-shek after 1927. Liu Shao-ch’i remained behind as the highest authority in Yenan, showing that he enjoyed the full confidence of the Central Committee, and presumably of Mao, despite the charges of the Cultural Revolution twenty years later.

From the end of August, when Mao astonishingly gave the toast “Long live Chiang Kai-shek” a t a welcoming banquet, until October 10, the

Nationalist and Communist negotiators bargained over the outstanding questions of political representation, the ‘nationalization’ of all armies, the appointment of local officials, the Communist base areas, and other

matters.®® After some five working sessions, an agreement was produced that seemed hopeful, even to Mao, who reported that the ‘Kuomintang

has accepted the principles of peace and unity.” The October 10 agreement proposed the convening of a Political Consultative Conference, which

would represent all groups, to discuss questions of the “democratic” reorganization of government, and approve a new constitution for the Republic. The agreement also provided for a “committee of three,” composed of a Nationalist, a Communist, and an American, to supervise mili-

tary reorganization. I f these provisions represented Nationalist political concessions to the

demands of other groups for representation, the Communists made corresponding military concessions, at least o n paper, that may have reflected

new Communist doubts about their prospects i n view of the recently demonstrated Nationalist ability, with the help of the United States, to send large forces into formerly Communist areas, and i n view of the Soviet

treaty with the Nationalist government i n August. Thus, the Communists agreed to withdraw from eight of their bases i n Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, southern Hunan. Hupeh, and southern Honan.* The Communists also agreed to reduce their military forces from forty-nine to forty-three divisions and then to twenty* I n early and mid-1945, Communist troops had bested Nationalist forces south of N a n k i n g a n d i n l a n d from Shanghai, b u t , w i t h the n e w agreements, the Nationalists

reoccupied former Communist areas i n eastern Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern and central Anhwei, and Hunan.”

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four or twenty divisions, i n accordance with Nationalist reductions, in order to keep a seven-to-one (later five-to-one) ratio of Nationalist to Communist

troops.®® However, in noting the weakness of these eight bases and in insisting that “the arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must

all be kept, must not be handed over” to the Nationalists, Mao made it clear that such formal military reductions would not diminish over-all effectiveness and that the Communists would fight to retain key ‘liberated areas.’’®* Nevertheless, M a o had to admit, “Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight liberated areas,” but he contended that the

concession of areas ‘right by their beds” i n Nanking was necessary to “explode” Nationalist propaganda about Communist intransigence. The Communists for the time being also dropped demands for the immediate formation of a coalition government, consenting instead to leave political recommendations to the Political Consultative Conference and to a representative state council of thirty-seven (later forty) members, to be formed

by the government.®® Therefore, i n October, the Communists and Nationalists reached tenta-

tive agreement on the reorganization of the government and the Communist army. A third major issue of these conferences, however, was deadlocked. I f the Communists agreed to the demobilization of some of their army divisions and the abandonment of several bases and temporarily

shelved talk of organization of a coalition government, they insisted unequivocally on keeping local political control of the remaining ‘““liberated areas.” Chiang Kai-shek, o n the other hand, understandably maintained

that, after the surrender of Japan, there could be no such thing as “liberated areas’’—liberated from whom? he asked—and insisted on the appointment of his own officials above the county level. The Communists claimed to have tried to resolve this impasse b y making

four different proposals: first, that the government recognize the legality of the existing administration of the Communist bases; then, that Communist

Party administrative appointees at least be accepted for the eleven provinces i n which they had the most power; third, that there be local elections i n

these eleven areas; and, finally, that the status quo be maintained until a new constitution had been adopted and was i n operation. Chou En-lai later stated that this question of the administration of the liberated areas was the only one unresolved b y the September discussions and was par-

ticularly troublesome for the provinces of Hopeh, Shantung, and Chahar.®® Continuing disagreement and military maneuvering b y both sides even-

tually wrecked the whole October 10 agreement. Even as Mao claimed to hope that Communist strength and domestic and international pressure for peace were “bound to make Chiang Kai-shek have misgivings” about

undermining the October agreements, he also maintained that, throughout the talks, fighting had continued i n Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Shantung, the Northeast, and elsewhere.®’ The Struggle for the Northeast, 1945-46 The situation in Manchuria was especially critical, and, as a result of the Yalta agreement i n February and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, i t became especially controversial. As agreed at Yalta, the Russian

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Army invaded Manchuria on August 9, just before the Japanese surrender,* but, i n line with the August Treaty, the Soviet Union acknowledged

“Chinese sovereignty’ there and later agreed to withdraw its troops by December 3. However, the reality of Soviet policy was extremely harsh. Among other things, the Russians regarded Manchurian industry as “war booty,” removing some $858,000 (U.S.) worth of equipment, most of i t b y

the end of the year.® Hardly the act of an ally of either the Communists or the Nationalists, this episode recalls Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. But Moscow’s relations with the Chinese Communists were even murkier than its relations with the “fraternal Parties” of Europe. The Russians had the military capability to set the Chinese Communists u p i n Manchuria but did not do so. Perhaps, as later events showed, the fact that the Chinese

Communists were totally unwilling to become Soviet satellites is sufficient explanation for the lack of coordination between the two Communist

Parties at this time.%® The crucial questions between the Russians and the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, of course, concerned military aid and political control of territory. The Soviet Union d i d allow and probably could not have stopped

Chinese Communist military forces from infiltrating the Northeast, and from taking over Japanese arms, variously estimated at 300,000 to 750,000

Japanese rifles and other miscellaneous equipment. Hence, while Soviet propaganda predictably later claimed that Russian support was decisive for the Communist victory in the Northeast, the realities of the struggle for Manchuria show that, even there, the Chinese Communists received little

direct Soviet aid.” The August 14 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union stated that both countries “undertake not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party” and ‘agree to work together i n close and friendly collaboration . and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of noninterference

in the internal affairs of the other contracting Party.” Such language must have embittered Chinese Communists insofar as i t seemed to pledge Soviet support for the Nationalist government, and the treaty probably served to restrain Yenan’s demands o n the Nationalists in Manchuria, at least until the early spring of 1946. Nonetheless, although the Russians allowed the Nationalists to estab-

lish offices in Changchun and elsewhere by September, 1945, they delayed the arrival of Nationalist troops.” On October 5, they informed Nanking that they would refuse to allow Nationalist troops to land at Dairen, while the Chinese Communists prevented Nationalist landings at the only other feasible Manchurian ports, Hulutao and Yingk’ou. Finally, i n early

November, the Nationalists had to debark just south of Manchuria at Ch’inhuangtao, then held by U.S. Marines. Thereafter, the Russians allowed Nationalist troops to enter the province by train and air. * I n February, 1945, o f course, i t h a d been expected that Russian troops would b e

needed for a long war of attrition against Japan, and little thought was given to the longer-run implications of their entry into Manchuria and Korea.

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The Soviet decision to allow Nationalist troops to enter Manchuria after November may have been related to fear of U.S. counteraction or may even have been due to agreement with General Wedemeyer and others that the Nationalists were dangerously overextending themselves by trying to take over Manchuria.”® Chiang Kai-shek, however, adamantly insisted

on the full restoration of Chinese sovereignty i n Manchuria, as elsewhere, and, by mid-January, his troops had pushed as far north as Mukden.

Ironically, the Nationalists twice requested that the Soviet Union delay withdrawal of its troops for a month beyond the end of November, because the Nationalists needed more time to organize their takeover of the Northeast. I n fact, i f Soviet troops had departed on schedule, the Chinese Communists, who were i n a better position than the Nationalists, might have taken the Northeast even more rapidly. Still, when the Russians

delayed their departure even beyond the new deadline of February 1, 1946, the Nationalists, who were then ready to move, protested and staged antiSoviet demonstrations. The Russians finally withdrew i n April, and, after

a month of heavy fighting, the Nationalists were able to take over nearly a l l of the major cities from the Chinese Communists, who had entered them as the Russians departed.” By this time, however, Chinese Communists were firmly entrenched i n the countryside throughout Manchuria, especially to the north o f the Sungari River, where they continued to hold

Harbin®* and other cities. These developments and the acquisition of Japanese small arms in Manchuria, enormously boosted over-all Communist strength i n China, but the relation of Soviet aid to these gains obviously is far from clear. Chinese Communist forces began to push northward into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria immediately after the war. Thus, the August 11 order for a

general offensive included directives to parts of the armed forces of northwestern and northeastern Shansi and northeastern Hopeh to “march on Inner Mongolia and the Northeast.”’*”

As Soviet-led forces from Outer Mongolia and Siberia pushed south after August 9, a Chinese Communist contingent, which had been centered along the Great Wall about 50 miles southwest of Chengte, moved into

Liaoning and Kirin,’ while other Chinese Communist units drove into southern Chahar, taking the provincial capital of Kalgan (Changchiak’ou) on August 23 and, n o t long after, Chengte, capital of Jehol.”” Thus, well before the entry of sizable Communist forces into Manchuria i n the autumn, and crucial for the success of that entry, the Chin-Ch’a-Chi base area had expanded north, securing routes for Communist forces to move

from southwest to northeast through Suiyiian, Chahar, and Jehol into the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. Astute political work among the Mongols,

to whom the Communists promised autonomy, helped pave the way as Ulanfu and other minority leaders stepped u p Communist activities i n Suiyilian and neighboring areas i n 1944 and 1945. I n November, 1945, the Communists had helped form an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement * H a d the Chinese Communists been w i l l i n g t o accept Soviet d o m i n a t i o n , they m i g h t h a v e moved t h e i r c a p i t a l t o H a r b i n , o r elsewhere, a t least a f t e r they l o s t Yenan i n March, 1947.

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Association, and they held conferences of area leftists i n January and April,

1946, i n Chengte and elsewhere.’ Meanwhile, i n the late summer and early autmun of 1945, tens of thousands of other troops under Lin Piao moved directly into Manchuria along the Peiping-Mukden Railroad, while other forces under Lo Jung-huan came by sea from Shantung on August 19-20. There, they found as many as 150,000 Communist-led guerrillas under Chou Pao-chung and others. Chou had re-entered the province with Soviet troops from Siberia. A t the end of the year, L i n Piao became the director of Communist military and, later, political operations i n the area, w i t h L o Jung-huan and Chou

Pao-chung among his important military deputies.” Indicative of the importance the Party assigned t o Manchuria, as well as of the fact of the virtual destruction of the Party i n the Northeast after 1940, was the dispatch there of many top political cadres, including almost one-fourth of the Central Committee. Besides Lin and Lo, these included Ch’en Yiin, P’eng Chen, Chang Wen-t’ien, L i Fu-ch’un, L i Li-san, Kao Kang, and L i n Feng, and alternates K u Ta-ts’'un, Hsiao Ching-kuang, L i Cheng-ts’ao, and later Wang Chia-hsiang. I n all, some 50,000 political

cadres were transferred to Manchuria.®® By late 1945, the Party had established a Northeast China Bureau i n

Mukden, which lated moved to Harbin, first under P’eng Chen and from mid-1946 to 1949 under L i n Piao, succeeded i n the latter year b y Kao Kang, w i t h L i Fu-ch’un, Chang Wen-t’ien, and others as deputies. The

Suiyiian-Jehol-Liaoning Party Sub-Bureau expanded its work toward the Northeast, and, on August 17, the Manchurian Committee was reactivated in Harbin, and district and city committees were established shortly thereafter in Mukden, Dairen, Port Arthur, Chinchou, and other cities.®

The Communists developed considerable mass support and formed many organizations i n the Northeast, with special success i n the three bases i n eastern, northern, and western Manchuria. The Communists held most of

the territory north of the Sungari River throughout the civil war and also made inroads i n the South, but the latter area naturally was considerably

less secure because of Nationalist military operations there. I n December, 1945, the Party organized a provincial government for Kirin i n eastern Manchuria under Chou Pao-chung and subsequently i n Heilungkiang and other areas. By the end of 1946, Communist governments had been established i n the five northeastern districts of Sungkiang (capital at Harbin), Hokiang (Chiamussu), Heilungkiang (Lungchen), Nunkiang (Tsitsihar),

and Hsingan (Hailar). I n 1946, the Party set up a Northeast Administrative Committee (NEAC) under L i n Feng, a native of Heilungkiang, who

was assisted by a brother of Chang Hsiieh-liang and by Ch’en Yiin and others, to coordinate government work i n the region. By 1947, the N E A C had developed an extensive organization.

Mass work, following principles enunciated by the Jehol Committee in December, 1945, and endorsed b y Mao, produced formidable results, w i t h 1.6 million peasants recruited into the Communist armies i n Manchuria i n

the late 1940’s, about 500,000 of them i n the first year or so after the arrival of Communist forces from the South. Communist sources also claimed that some 4 million Manchurians volunteered for support duties

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with the Communist armies from mid-1946 to mid-1947. Manchuria thus offered another and all-important example of Communist success at mass organization. I n contrast, the Nationalists reportedly alienated millions in

Manchuria by inept and discriminatory policies, often treating northeasterners en masse as ‘‘collaborators.”’®? Because of geography and history, the key to Manchuria, even more than to the rest of China, was military power. Although the Party was virtually destroyed there by the Japanese in the early 1940’s, some 150,000 Communist-led guerrillas emerged i n Manchuria at the end of the war, while many of about 300,000 former puppet troops and others were rapidly recruited into the Communist forces. According to various estimates, there were reportedly 100,000 Communist regulars i n the Northeast i n October, 1945, 130,000 to 195,000 by November, and 300,000 b y the

end of the year.®* According to Mao, the Communists sent more than 100,000 of their best troops from North China to the Northeast and inducted into the regular army “more than 200,000” guerrillas, former puppet troops, militia, and other groups. These men moved through Chahar, Jehol, and Liaoning, and by sea from Shantung, while from the other direction the Northeast Self-Defense Army, under Chou Pao-chung, secured control of vital areas,

presumably i n coordination with Soviet troops. Following the arrival of Lin Piao i n October, Communist military forces i n Manchuria were organized into the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, w i t h L i n Piao as commander,

P’eng Chen political commissar, Lo Jung-huan director of the political department, and Chou Pao-chung, Hsiao Ching-kuang, and Lii Cheng-ts’ao as deputy commanders.?° Until mid-February, 1946, the Chinese Communists were very cautious

in their public statements on Manchuria. Although orders were given in August to march o n the Northeast, and M a o hailed the advance of Soviet troops as creating a ‘favorable position” for the Chinese Communists, Communist propaganda made little fuss over Manchuria u n t i l 1946. I n

contrast to Nationalist propaganda, the Communists did not stress clashes between the two sides i n Manchuria i n late 1945. The October 10 agree-

ment listed Jehol and Chahar among six areas of greatest Communist influence, along with Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, and Shensi, but placed the

northeastern provinces, that is, Manchuria proper, last among areas of Communist influence, after Suiyiian, Honan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh, Kwangtung and Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Shanghai.®¢

I n the provisions of the January 10, 1946, ceasefire, the Communists agreed to the movement of Nationalist troops into and within Manchuria for the restoration of “Chinese sovereignty,” and i t was not until midFebruary that the Chinese Communists claimed the right to a greater share of political control in Manchuria. Even then, i n the February 25 military

agreement, they tentatively acknowledged the right of the Nationalists eventually to station fourteen divisions i n Manchuria to their one, i n June raising their demand to five Communist divisions to the Nationalists’

fourteen .®” I t seems apparent, therefore, that the CCP position on Manchuria hardened during the early spring of 1946, as did that of the Nationalists.

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By April, as the Russians finally withdrew, the Chinese Communists were firmly entrenched i n the Northeast, especially i n the northern half, and competed ever more aggressively w i t h the Nationalists for its control.

The evolution of Chinese Communist policy in Manchuria, of course, was linked to the progress of their struggle elsewhere, both politically and militarily, and undoubtedly to relations with Russia, even as Soviet policies for China were linked to its policies toward Japan, Europe, and elsewhere. There were frictions between the Chinese Communists and the Russians in Manchuria, stemming from Chinese expectations of more Soviet aid, the Soviet stripping of the Manchurian economy, and Soviet diplomatic support for the Nationalists. There were also personal frictions, and, almost twenty years later, the Russians accused P’eng Chen, L i n Feng, and others of having fostered anti-Soviet attitudes i n the Northeast after the war. The

Russians claimed that Party Central had condemned these “mistakes” in July, 1946, but had not followed up on them and that continued friction led the Northeast China Bureau in 1949 “formally” to criticize such ‘“antiSoviet” attitudes. There is no corroboration of these charges, nor can i t be determined how such problems may have been related to Lin Piao’s replacement of P’eng as secretary of the Northeast China Bureau i n 1946 and Kao Kang’s succession to that position in 1949.%®¢ However, in view of later developments, both in relations with the Soviet Union and within the CCP, the Russian complaints were grounded i n reality. Another development of this time that led to widespread speculation about Soviet intentions and Chinese Communist reactions was the return

to Manchuria i n 1945 of Li Li-san after fifteen years i n “exile’”’ in Moscow. There was widespread talk of Li as the Soviet hope for a pliable Chinese Communist leader, who might direct what would become a new Asian satellite of the Soviet Union. However much this may have been Stalin’s hope, there was little i n L i Li-san’s activities i n labor work and as an

assistant to Lin Piao in Harbin to give this speculation any substance. There is not much evidence of direct Soviet-Chinese Communist relations of any kind at this time. I n part, the lack of close contacts was a natural development following the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, by which the Soviet Union sought to stress the national aspects of the

various Communist movements. According to Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin told the Nationalists that the Russians had not only withdrawn their representative from Yenan (Otto Braun, 1939?) but affirmed that they would recognize and give aid only to the Nationalists. Although Stalin reportedly

expressed the hope that the Kuomintang would “make more concessions to meet the Chinese Communists’ demands” and “compete in peace,” at the time, the Russians claimed that they would not even tolerate “ t h e Chinese Communists sending troops* into Manchuria.””®® For their part, as Chou * The Russians said nothing about barring “civilians,” however, and this distinction may partly explain Stalin’s comment. One later Soviet account noted the “turning over [ o f ] the administration of the region of northern Chinchou (near the Gulf of Liaotung) to the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people,” while another source stated, “When the Red Army, having fulfilled its liberation mission, left Manchuria i n 1946 i t had already distributed significant arms of [ t h e ] former Manchukuo army and disarmed Japanese officers and m e n . ”

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En-lai put i t i n September, 1946, the Chinese Communists were no longer bound to the Russians, who had “made too many mistakes for us in the early days.””®? Many may have understated Chinese Communist relations with the Soviet Union i n the 1940’s, but i t is also true that the Russians went much

further in denying connections with the Chinese Communists than they did with any other Communist movement. Although Soviet actions in Manchuria, especially allowing Chinese Communists to take over the countryside and Japanese arms, provided valuable i f indirect support in the civil war period, i t is also certain that the Soviet Union did far less

for their Chinese comrades than they might have done. I n any case, they could not have prevented Chinese Communist control of the countryside in the Northeast. The basis of Soviet “coolness” toward the Chinese Communists at that time, in addition to probable suspicion of Mao’s “chauvinism” and “petty bourgeois ideology,” was a glaring underestimation of Chinese Communist

prospects. This partly explains why the Soviet press lagged behind the Western press i n according coverage to the Chinese Communists later in the war, and presumably why the Russians signed the treaty with the Nationalists on August 14, 1945. They expected Nanking to be the government of China for the foreseeable future and hence placed their main effort o n seeking the best possible arrangement w i t h i t . I n accord with this estima-

tion of the situation i n China, they surreptitiously removed “war booty” from Manchuria, while acquiescing in the Nationalist reassertion of authority there, as they had done two years earlier i n Sinkiang. At the same time, the Russians bargained with the Nationalists for control of what was left of Manchurian industry and transport. Elsewhere, they refused

to recognize Nationalist claims i n Outer Mongolia and, i n 1944, annexed its tiny neighbor of Tannu Tuva, also claimed by China.** Reminiscences of Yugoslav conversations with Stalin i n early 1948 and revelations of the Cultural Revolution support the conclusion that the Soviet leader mistrusted and underestimated the Chinese Communists. Tito’s biographer quoted Stalin’s admission of pessimism about Chinese Communist prospects and consequent counseling of caution: After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation i n China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising i n China had no prospect and that the Chinese comrades should seek a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek, that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the view of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted quite otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized their armies and now as we see they are beating Chiang Kai-shek’s army. N o w in the case of China we admit we were wrong.?3

I n October, 1962, Mao reportedly confirmed this report: I n 1945 Stalin refused to permit China’s carrying out a revolution and said to us: “ D o not have a civil war! Collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. Other-

wise, the Republic of China will collapse.” However, we did not obey him and the revolution succeeded.

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Even after the success o f the revolution, Stalin feared that China might

degenerate into another Yugoslavia and that I might become a second Tito. I later went to Moscow and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty Alliance. Stalin did not wish to sign the treaty; he finally signed i t after two months of negotiations. I t was only after our resistance to America and support for Korea that Stalin came to trust us.?*

I n the 1960’s, other leading Chinese Communists confirmed these differences and reported that Stalin and others apparently recommended “that we should be content with separate regimes in North and South China and should not provoke the intervention of imperialism, especially of American imperialism.”’?® I n the years after 1945-46, there continued to be many indirect signs of Moscow’s overtly distant relations with the Chinese Communists. The Russians d i d not invite the Chinese Communists to attend the founding session of the Communist Information Service, or Cominform, i n Sep-

tember, 1947, indicating at least that neither Party was ready to publicize their international links.’® Moreover, even after the Communists had conquered all of North China, the Russians continued to comply with diplomatic protocol, following the Nationalist government i n its withdrawal to

Canton, i n glaring contrast to other diplomatic staffs, including that of the United States, which stayed on in Nanking, presumably awaiting negotiations with the victorious Communists. As late as May, 1949, the Russians

were still negotiating with the Nationalist governor of Sinkiang, and, in July, they concluded a separate trade agreement with Communist Manchuria, as i f the Communists still might not take over the whole country.* Despite the uncertainties, i t seemed clear that Moscow and Yenan would basically support each other after the civil war, i f only because of a power-

ful common enemy, the United States. Thus, after 1945, the Chinese Communist and Soviet Communist parties differed profoundly i n their relations with the Nationalist government, but primarily this was due to their

vastly different positions, the one struggling for power, the other seeking to buttress its position as a great power. I n this situation, the Nationalists were mortal enemies of the CCP but not of the Russians, while both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union were basically hostile to the

United States, which might try to block their respective ambitions in China and Europe.

The Marshall Mission and 1946 Accords and Tensions

From 1945 on, the United States was crucially involved i n the developing impasse i n China. O n the one hand, i t sought to mediate between the two sides but, o n the other, recognized, supplied, and transported Nationalist * Conceivably, they may have wished to encourage Manchurian separatism. However, after Mao’s declaration of support for the Communist camp i n July, 1949, and the proclamation of the People’s Republic on October 1, the Soviet Union was among the first countries to recognize Peking and, on October 3, for the first time, Chinese C o m m u n i s m m a d e front-page news i n Pravda.” E v e n so, t h e Soviet U n i o n hung o n

to its rights i n Manchuria and Sinkiang until the mid-1950’s.

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troops, a contradiction noted not only by the Communists but by many of the American diplomatic staff in China. I n addition to providing ships and planes for the transport of about 500,000 Nationalist soldiers, at one time

during the winter of 1945-46, the United States had some 113,000 troops stationed in China, including 53,000 marines who held key positions in the North. Understandably, i n view of the complexities, American attitudes remained extremely confused and underrated both the strength and commit-

ment of the Chinese Communists. After some intriguing overtures to the United States prior to July, 1945, the Communists increasingly protested American involvement but, until mid-1946, d i d not close the door o n a

possible shift to better relations.®® O n November 26, 1945, General Patrick Hurley resigned as American Ambassador to China after the October 10 agreement, which he had been

instrumental in bringing about, had broken down. Continuing hostilities and the dispute over appointment of local officials i n “liberated areas” prevented further progress i n the negotiations between the two sides, and in addition Hurley charged, in a preview of McCarthy era accusations, that his efforts had been sabotaged by a section of the American foreign service personnel in China who ‘sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy i t was to keep China divided against herself.” Therefore, according to Hurley,

“American foreign policy announced by the highest authority is rendered ineffective by another section of diplomatic officials.’’* The day after the resignation of the controversial Hurley, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as his “special representative to China,” the post of ambassador remaining vacant until the appointment of J. Leighton Stuart,* the following July. The increasing U.S.

involvement i n the late autumn of 1945, signified by greater commitments

to transport Nationalist troops and by the appointment of one of America’s most brilliant generals, coincided w i t h , and undoubtedly was related to, more receptive Chinese Communist and Soviet attitudes toward negotia-

tions with the Nationalists and the unification of the country. I n the last days of November and early December, high Chinese Communist officials began to speak of the Nationalists i n a far more conciliatory tone than they had used for some m o n t h s . ’ O n December 3 , a CCP

spokesman informed the press in Chungking that the Communists had decided to take part i n the Political Consultative Conference agreed to i n principle the previous October. Later i n December, the Nationalists scheduled i t to begin early i n January. Where i n the summer the Communists had denounced the United States for hostile actions i n its handling of the Amerasia caset and other matters, they now welcomed the arrival

of General Marshall and President Truman’s policy statement of December 15, 1945, calling for a ‘“‘strong, united, democratic China,” implying as i t * A former president of Peking’s prestigious Yenching University. I t was hoped that his half-century of experience i n China would facilitate the ambassador’s work. Yet, i n 1957, Stuart could still wonder i f “China w i t h so rich a cultural heritage could be ruled by Bolshevism too long.” '* t Involving the arrest of J. S. Service i n June, 1945, for allegedly turning over classified government materials to the editor of that journal.”

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d i d support for the Communist demand for coalition government. About

December 20, Chou En-lai proposed a general ceasefire for the duration of the sessions of the Political Consultative Conference. Through the mediation o f General Marshall, the Nationalists agreed to this step on January 10,

the ceasefire to take effect on January 13. The ceasefire agreement also called for a halt to troop movements, except south of the Yangtze, and,

significantly, in Manchuria, so that the Nationalists could complete their “restoration of Chinese sovereignty” there. A n executive headquarters to

supervise the ceasefire was to be established i n Peiping on the basis of the “committee of three” formula worked out i n October.’®® O n January 10, the day the ceasefire was announced, the Political Consultative Conference began, w i t h seven Communists, headed by Chou En-lai, i n attendance. There were three major aspects to the agreements worked out by the Communists and Nationalists i n the course of these

talks in January and February, namely provisions for the cessation of hostilities, agreements on the reorganization of the government and revision of the constitution, and, finally, agreement on the reorganization of

the armies. I n general, many of the political agreements would have favored the Communists, and hence were obstructed by the Nationalists, while the military accords would have favored the Nationalists and were obstructed by the Communists. I n retrospect, i t is evident that both sides were stalling for time and bargaining for advantage, but, at the time,

observers were hopeful that these agreements would work, although everyone realized the test would come i n their fulfillment. The Political Consultative Conference, which met throughout January,

passed five resolutions. Most importantly, both sides agreed to the convening of a National Assembly on May 5, w i t h 700 new delegates to be chosen

from various parties, i n addition to the Nationalists selected i n 1936. The Assembly was to revise the 1936 provisional constitution and prepare for the reorganization of the government under a state council of forty. The council would be chosen b y the President of the Republic, who was fairly certain to control i t , since his veto of a measure could be overridden only by three-fifths of the councilors, one-half of whom were to be members o f

the Kuomintang and one-half to be drawn from other parties. Although this provision favored the Nationalists and led to Communist demands for its revision later i n the year, the Communists won Nationalist agree-

ment to their demand that local officials up to and including provincial governors be chosen by popular election. Finally, the Conference directed the “committee of three,” which had been appointed i n January, to draw u p plans for military reorganization. This task, accomplished o n February 25, o n paper provided b y far the most concrete and seemingly hopeful agreement of all. I t called for the reduction of government divisions from 394 to ninety and of Communist divisions from a total the Communists had

not disclosed to eighteen within the first year, and for further reductions six months later to fifty Nationalist and ten Communist divisions. I n addition, each province was to have a peace preservation corps of 15,000. Each army division was to consist of 14,000 men. Hence, there would eventually be 840,000 Nationalist and 140,000 Communist troops, having a five-to-one ratio over-all. They were to be distributed as follows:

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388 Area

Government Divisions

Communist Divisions

Northeast Northwest North

14 9 11

1 0 7

Central South

10 6

2 0

Each side was to hand over to the other lists of the divisions it would abolish or retain, a requirement with which the Communists never complied. Conversely, within a few weeks after February 25, the Nationalists

turned in their military lists but placed reservations on, and then undertook actions that vitiated, the political agreements.

Thus, the January and February agreements, like the October 10, 1945, accord, proved completely illusory because of the intense mutual distrust of the two sides. A year later, in summarizing his frustrating experience in China, Marshall blamed the failure of these and other negotiations on the dominant reactionary group i n the government and the irreconcilable Com. The reactionaries i n the government have evidently counted munists. on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise i n the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications—regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people.103

Marshall further charged that “groups within the Kuomintang interested in the preservation of their o w n feudal control of China evidently had n o

real intention of implementing” the January and February agreements. While the Communists continued to express support for the political terms of the agreements,'*® i t is doubtful that they ever intended to carry out the

key military and territorial provisions, such as accepting military reorganization or allowing the Nationalists to restore China sovereignty in Manchuria. Certainly, they would not do so until reorganization had produced a more sympathetic government, while the Nationalists refused, until late 1946, to

reorganize the government until the Communists had accepted their leadership. Both positions were understandable but made i t impossible to imple-

ment negotiated agreements. I n mid-February, the Communists made public the fact, claimed confidentially b y M a o in December, that they had 300,000 troops i n Manchuria,

thereby asserting their claim to a share i n the control of the Northeast, in clear violation of the spirit of the recent accords. On the Nationalist side, conservatives publicly opposed concessions i n the agreements and organized

thinly disguised demonstrations against them and the Russian presence i n Manchuria. I n March, conservatives criticized the government handling of the January-February agreements at a plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and forced the government to hedge its endorsement

of the accords. The Communists seized on these reservations to attack the

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good faith of the government and the CCP Central Committee canceled its o w n plenum of March 31, which had been scheduled to pass o n the agreements, very likely because of divisions within the Party.*®”

I t seems clear that the CCP was sharply split i n early 1946 over how to interpret its prospects. There are no selections in Mao’s works on the domestic situation i n the critical first half of 1946 and few authoritative

Party pronouncements either on the status of relations with the Nationalists or on the land question, which, as we shall see, was probably then under intensive debate. A document of March 1, 1946, attributed to Liu Shao-ch’i,

comments hopefully on the January accords and on a “new stage of peace and democracy,” but it is difficult to determine the authenticity of such views or how widely they were held. Even i f they were authentic, i t seems clear that most Communist leaders did not agree with Liu Shao-ch’i’s purported arguments that t h e Communists should make extensive changes to satisfy the Nationalists, including nationalization of military forces in accord with hoped-for new “legal” conditions of peaceful competition with the Nationalists.* I n fact, the Communists continued to refuse to send i n the list of their divisions scheduled for demobilization, as they had

agreed to do on February 25, and boycotted planning sessions for constitutional revision and for the M a y 5 National Assembly.

Hardening attitudes on both sides led to the postponement of the Assembly, which was finally convened unilaterally by the Nationalists in November. Meanwhile, the Nationalists first delayed u n t i l late March and then

obstructed the dispatch and functioning of ‘three-man teams” to investigate clashes i n Manchuria.’ On April 1, Chiang Kai-shek told the first meeting of the People’s Political Council since 1938 that he would make no further

concessions to the Communists until the “complete restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria,” and thereafter the Communists escalated their propaganda attacks on the government. Communist appeals for an “antifeudal” o r “ n e w democratic’ united front n o w seemed definitely to exclude the Kuomintang, o r at least its dominant sections.’ As i n the previous autumn, the most decisive aspect of heightening

tensions between the two protagonists came i n Manchuria. The Nationalists demanded fulfillment of Soviet and Chinese Communist pledges of August, 1945, and January, 1946, respectively, to honor government restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, while the Chinese Com-

munists now emphasized their February demand for joint control of the Northeast and the authorization of increases i n Communist troop allot-

ments there from one to five divisions. Chiang Kai-shek later agreed to authorize three Communist divisions i n the Northeast, but this of course still fell far short of Communist claims to have more than 300,000 troops

there. Yenan proclaimed people’s governments in Kirin and Heilungkiang and later i n other provinces, and, as Russian troops withdrew to the north from mid-March through April, fighting intensified in Manchuria. Chinese Communist troops moving i n behind their Russian comrades in * The Party’s fiftieth anniversary article i n 1971 spoke of Liu Shao-ch’i’s statement at this time as a third “capitulationist line,” following those of Ch’en Tu-hsiu in the mid 1920’s and Ch’en Shao-yii i n the late 1930’s.'®

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“flagrant violation” of the January 10 ceasefire, entered Mukden (March 1 2 ) , Changchun (April 1 8 ) , Harbin (April 2 5 ) , and other areas, but

advancing Nationalist troops had driven them out of all but Harbin by the end of May. While the Nationalists made these gains in southern and central Manchuria, Communist forces counterattacked elsewhere, making important gains i n much of Jehol and Shantung.'*? O n M a y 24, the day after the Nationalist capture of Changchun, Chiang

Kai-shek yielded to American pressure and proposed a new two-week ceasefire, which was worked out with Chou En-lai and Communist negotiators b y June 7 and later extended to the end of the month. The June truce

followed the by now familiar pattern. Ephemeral Nationalist victories and American pressure produced the agreement, but i t soon was violated by the continuing maneuvering by both sides for propaganda and military advantage. The fighting never really stopped. As their price for continuing the ceasefire, the Nationalists made the impossible demand that the Communists withdraw from all key points i n Manchuria lying south of Hsingan, Heilungkiang, and Nunkiang i n the far North, and from Jehol, Chahar,

Shantung, and northern Kiangsu.** The Communists, for their part, refused to make significant military concessions of any kind until the government carried out the political concessions i t had agreed to early i n the year.

Although both sides claimed at the end of June, as the ceasefire expired, that they would fight only i n self-defense and not initiate offensive action,

Nationalist conservatives had already come to the conclusion that they could solve “the Communist problem” by force and had initiated largescale action. I n late June, Nationalist armies went on the offensive i n the Central Plains, and, i n July, there was intense fighting i n Shantung and

northern Kiangsu.''* Meanwhile, the Nationalist police took increasingly repressive action against middle-of-the-road groups and were reportedly implicated i n the assassination of two well-known members of the Demo-

cratic League, one of them the classical scholar, Wen Yi-to.'**

The Fighting Intensifies The collapse of the June truce undoubtedly marked the last chance for negotiated peace i n China, and both sides now moved to the final showdown i n what the Communists call the ‘ t h i r d revolutionary civil w a r , ”

following the struggles of 1925-27 and 1927-37. However, political as well as military maneuvering continued until early 1947. The Communists remained confident after the start of the Nationalist

offensives of mid-1946 and declared general mobilization i n the “liberated areas” on August 19. They rationalized their “temporary abandonment of certain places or cities” as a strategy of letting “the fly invade the cobweb” and predicted “final victory,” later setting the date for its attainment in about 1951.''¢ The Nationalist offensive, however, took Chengte o n August 28, moving six weeks later into Kalgan, and began drives o n Antung i n southern Manchuria and Chefoo i n Shantung. The

Nationalists cleared Communist troops out of most of South China, Hupeh, southern Honan, and parts of Shantung and Hopeh, b u t the Communists remained strong i n much of North China and Manchuria, posing

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particular threats to communication lines. Throughout the c i v i l war, the Communists securely held northern Manchuria above a line running from

Hailar i n the west to Tsitsihar, Harbin, and Mutanchiang i n the southeast." The United States, meanwhile, increasingly convinced of the failure of its mediation efforts, but unwilling to give up with so few results, again tried new tactics to halt the spreading c i v i l war. I n August, shortly after his appointment as Ambassador, J. Leighton Stuart recommended with General Marshall that a five-man committee be formed to organize the

state council, which had been agreed to i n principle i n January as a means of breaking the impasse. Although the Nationalists agreed to participate in discussions for the organization of a state council, the Communists refused to do so, demanding first an end to the Nationalist offensive. Also i n August, because of the

pressing of Nationalist offensives i n disregard of Marshall’s repeated appeals and warnings, the United States suspended portions of its military aid to the Nationalists, a policy that remained i n effect u n t i l the spring

of 1947. Earlier, the U.S. Congress had delayed the release of further economic aid i n view of the Nationalists’ evident inability to control inflation, but, i n August, although the U.S. Government was suspending military and economic aid, i t agreed to sell an estimated $1 billion worth of surplus

World War I I equipment to the Nationalists. Understandably, none of these “American compromises’ brought any quick end to the Nationalist offensive, although Marshall continued to warn that further military efforts would only exacerbate Chinese economic and political conditions, since the Communists were too strong to be destroyed militarily, while inflation and other Nationalist weaknesses were fed by war. Some 70 per

cent of the Nationalist budget was still going to military expenses, and, by the end of 1946, the government had lost one-half of its gold reserves. During the same year, prices rose 7 0 0 p e r cent.''®

From July, 1946 on, the Communists stepped up their attacks on the United States, apparently now convinced of the inevitability of a fight to the finish and of U.S. inability to determine the outcome. Later that month, the Chinese Communists ambushed a U.S. Marine—escorted motor convoy,

killing three Americans.* I n September, a “GI’s Leave China’ movement commenced, and i n December, 1946, and January, 1947, Communists helped stir u p student unrest, involving young people, after the alleged rape o f a Chinese girl by an American marine. The Communists denounced the “commercial treaty” between Washington and Nanking, signed i n November, 1946, as a ‘‘notorious and treasonable” sellout to American imperialism.'*? I n October, 1946 after Marshall’s threat to resign, the Nationalists proposed new and somewhat more generous terms to the Communists. They * More publicity was later given to the death on August 25, 1945, of John Birch,™ after whom the right-wing society was named. He apparently was killed by Communist soldiers i n a village a b o u t 50 m i l e s west o f Hsiichow. A f t e r t h e l a t e July, 1946,

ambush, the Communists criticized the August sale of U.S. surplus property to the Nationalists (at the same time that regular American military supplies to China were suspended). The number of U.S. troops was reduced i n 1946, and, by early 1947, American troops were withdrawn except for a “guard contingent” at Tsingtao.

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offered to submit military questions to the ‘committee of three” and political questions to a reorganized state council. The Communists, however, insisted on a ‘“‘third” cease-fire before they would resume negotiations. But, once more, conditions attached by both sides and continuing military action b y the Nationalists, who took Antung i n mid-October, made

i t difficult to reach even temporary agreements, despite the efforts of third parties and Nationalist political concessions. Following the government capture o f Kalgan on October 10, 1946, the Nationalists announced they would convene the long-delayed National Assembly on November 12 (later postponed until November 1 5 ) . Since i t had been agreed that this step would be taken only i n consultation with other parties, the Democratic

League supported, and other minority parties talked of doing so, the subsequent Communist refusal to name delegates to this body.'*! On November 11, Chiang Kai-shek made his “final appeal” to the Communists, basically repeating the terms he had outlined on October 16,

which called on them to name delegates to the Assembly and to submit military questions to the “committee of three’ and political questions to the newly organized state council. I n return, the government promised that,

six months after the National Assembly, i t would hold free elections that would be open to all parties, and i t ordered ‘‘its troops both north and south o f the Great Wall to cease ail military actions except when it is

necessary to defend their present positions.” However, Chiang stated privately that, among the Nationalists, only he still believed i n the possible success of negotiations and that there was now ‘“a complete unanimity of

opinion that a policy of force was the only course to follow.” Hence, this “ t h i r d ” ceasefire of 1946 was even less effective than its predecessors i n January and June.'??

The Communists not only refused to take part i n the National Assembly b u t made clearly unacceptable demands that i t first be postponed and

later dismissed and that military positions revert t o those of the previous January w i t h a permanent ceasefire. Meanwhile, they pressed anti-

American propaganda, stepped up the withdrawal of their representatives from the various “committees of three,” from the executive headquarters

of the ceasefire at Peiping, and from Nanking, Shanghai, Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming, with about 400 Communists being flown from the last three cities to Yenan, ironically mostly i n American aircraft. Chou

En-lai charged that the Kuomintang’s unilateral calling of a National Assembly meant a “definite s p l i t ” and that the door to negotiations had

been ‘“‘slammed,” while Mao drafted a statement for the Central Committee, dated November 18, which stated that ‘“the opening day o f that

assembly marked the beginning of the self-destruction of the Chiang Kaishek clique.” A t this time, the Communists also charged, correctly as it

turned out, that the Nationalists were preparing to attack Yenan, an action that General Marshall agreed “would mean the end of all hope for a negotiated peace’ and the conclusion of his mission. Chou En-lai left for

Yenan on November 19, virtually finishing off negotiations between the two sides, although some lower-ranking representatives remained in Nanking and Chungking until early March, generally going underground after the Nationalists requested their recall.’

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393

The National Assembly met anyway from November 15 to December 25, despite the boycott by the Communists and the Democratic League. Although the Assembly was overwhelmingly dominated by the Nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek and the “liberals” worked out what U.S. officials called

a “constitution of democratic character i n reasonable accord with the Political Consultative Conference resolutions.” However, the Communists

dismissed i t as ‘“a veiled fascist constitution” and also described the supposedly liberal government reorganization of the following March as designed only to raise “ a loan from the American reactionaries.”’'** O n January 8 , Marshall left China and issued his statement, cited above,

that “the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the CCP and Kuomintang regard each other.”*** O n January 7, President Truman had named General Marshall

the new Secretary of State, assuring, as Marshall had frequently warned, that the United States would not bail the Nationalists out of their predicament. Nevertheless, under Marshall, the arms embargo was ended and

some additional aid was given, though not nearly enough to satisfy the Nationalists. Thus, i n October, 1947, Chiang Kai-shek stated ‘ t h a t i f the Government were finally defeated i t would not be because of Russia or the Chinese Communists, b u t because the United States had failed to give

promised assistance at a time of desperate need.”'*® I t would take another tragedy, the Vietnam war, to disabuse Washington of the idea that material aid was the key to bolstering a weak regime against Communist insurgents. Thus, the last of the political and diplomatic maneuvers had failed by early 1947. Not until July of that year did the Kuomintang declare the Communists i n “rebellion,” b u t the “ t h i r d revolutionary c i v i l w a r , ” i n the Communist phrase, had begun at least a year earlier. Indeed, the fighting between the Nationalists and Communists had been virtually continuous since the Japanese surrender i n August, 1945, i f not since 1927. After the beginning of open warfare i n July, 1946, the military situation largely

conformed to the three stages of dispersal, stalemate, and counterattack foreseen by Mao, though they were abbreviated by unexpected Communist strength and Nationalist weakness.'?" I n the first stage, roughly mid-1946 to mid-1947, the Nationalists appeared to justify their overoptimistic claims of strength, pressing the

offensive and taking well-known Communist areas, including Yenan i n March, 1947, Chefoo i n October, 1947, and. other cities thereafter. But the Communists conserved their strength by avoiding battle wherever circumstances were unfavorable and tired and overextended the Nationalists while awaiting the collapse of the enemy’s economy and morale. Thus, on leaving Yenan, M a o reportedly predicted that he would be i n Peiping i n several

years.'?® I n the second phase of the renewed civil war, starting in mid-1947, the Communist armies stabilized their military lines and slowly went over

to the offensive. Finally, the Nationalists’ house of cards collapsed rapidly during the third stage, which began in mid-1948. Indeed, within three years, “ t h e losers had become bandits, the victors, kings.” Before tracing

the military highlights of this time, we will explore further some sources of Communist strength and the Party history of this period.

19 THE PARTY A N D THE NORTH CHINA L A N D REVOLUTION

I f Communist military strength, together with Nationalist blunders, proved to be decisive factors of the civil war, the ability to mobilize and

organize the population was the essential condition for Communist military success. This was the meaning of the term ‘“people’s war,” which, according to Mao, only the Communists could fight, because “ n o army opposed to the people,” such as the Nationalist o r American, whatever their efforts,

““can use our strategy and tactics.’

Reliance on activists among the people for recruits, supplies, intelligence, and general support had been a basic feature of Communist strategy since

the mid-1920’s, but the propaganda, organizational, and military techniques for “people’s w a r ” that had been worked out over two decades really bore fruit i n the “ t h i r d revolutionary c i v i l w a r . ” Naturally, they d i d so unevenly and primarily i n certain areas where the Communists were able to consolidate their support. I n most of the country, traditional practical concerns continued to prevail,? b u t i n crucial areas i n the late 1940’s, especially i n North China and Manchuria, the Communists were able to use the “mass l i n e ” as a decisive weapon. While astute Communist

diplomacy and propaganda took advantage of Nationalist political divisions and ineptness, activists mobilized millions of North China peasants into a

variety of support organizations and defense forces and recruited the most able and highly motivated youth into political and military organizations.

Communist success both partly caused and was greatly helped by the collapse of Nationalist authority. The highly disciplined Communist forces, though outmanned and outgunned until late 1948, usually outmaneuvered and outfought the Nationalist armies, and clearly this and other domestic

factors, rather than the policies of the United States or the Soviet Union,* were the primary reasons for Communist victory i n 1949. The superiority of Communist morale and organization and the popularity of the Communist armies with the peasantry, especially i n contrast to the Nationalists,

* As Nationalist propaganda would have it.

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were acknowledged with virtual unanimity by dozens of foreign and

thousands of Chinese observers. Even the director of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group would say in early 1949: I t might be expected that the Communists, being Chinese themselves, would also suffer from these faulty Nationalist traits [defensive military mentality, cliqueism, etc.] and to a certain extent they do, but they have wisely subordinated them and made their ideology of Communism almost a fetish. By means of political commissars within their armed forces, they maintain loyalty to the established order. Their leaders are men of proven ability who invariably out-general the Nationalist commanders. The morale and fighting spirit of the troops is very high because they are winning.*

The Party During the Civil War Rising Communist strength was revealed in the continued growth of the Party (see Table 19.1) and the army and the even more rapid expansion T A B L E 19.1 GROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY DURING C I v i L WAR ( i n millions)

Party members

April, 1945

1946

mid-1947

1948

1.21

1.35

2.8

3.1

1949 4.5%

1950 5.8

* Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking (Peking, 1954), p. 71, gives this figure for mid-year, others for December. See also Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p. 166. Sources: Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, 1968), p . 129, and Lewis, Leadership, p . 110.

of the militia and mass movements especially during the land reform movement. O f the 2.8 million Communists i n 1947, some 800,000 were located

in Chin-Ch’a-Chi, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh “liberated area,” and 600,000 in Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan base.” Despite efforts to recruit proletarians, Party members were overwhelmingly poor peasant in origin, including virtually all cadres at village level, two-thirds at district level, and one-third at county level.® Whatever the class origins of new members, Party expansion was too rapid for some senior leaders who feared consequent organizational problems and ideological impurities.

As will be seen, this was an important reason for linking a Party purification movement with the later stages of the land reform i n the North i n 1948.7 The Communist armies expanded at an impressive pace, from almost 1.28 million i n June, 1946, to 5 million i n 1950 (see Table 19.2). The militia grew similarly from 2.69 million i n late 1945 to more than 5 million b y the end of 1949, i n addition to “many more millions” i n the People’s Self-Defense Corps, from which the militia was selected. Military recruits were drawn “only partly from old liberated areas,” and heavily

from former puppet and Nationalist troops.® Therefore, the size of the Communist political and military organiza-

tions, about 1.3 million each i n mid-1946, had at least quadrupled by the

396

The Long March to Power T A B L E 19.2 GROWTH OF COMMUNIST ARMIES DURING CIVIL WAR ( i n millions) June, 1946

June, 1947

June, 1948

June, 1949

1950

612 .665 1.277

1.00 95 1.95

1.49 1.31 2.80

2.1 1.9 4.0

— — 5.0

Regulars Guerrillas Total

Sources: Gittings, Role, pp. 60, 205, 304, and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 145, 272.

time of t h e Communist triumph in 1949. Before considering the sources of this growth, and the parallel expansion of the labor, women’s, youth, and above all, peasant movements, we must outline the military and Party leadership structure during these momentous years.

The Party streamlined its hierarchical organization during the late 1940’s. The degree of centralization is indicated by the small number of men who continued to direct the affairs of a Party of more than several million members, which soon came to rule the most populous nation on earth. According to one Communist leader, only some 600 people directed the “ c i v i l government, army headquarters and voluntary associations” for 3 1 million people i n the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii area as of 1946, with about

200 men in army headquarters.” Similarly small numbers of veteran leaders in Party, government, and military organizations presumably also controlled the other liberated areas. The composition of Party Central, the Political Bureau, and the Secterariat, the probable leadership of key Central Committee departments and regional bureaus, and the hierarchy o f Party committees is shown o n

Chart 19.1.*° I n 1948, the Party launched a concerted drive to make its committee organization more effective. The effort sought to ensure better communications between Party Central and local committees and better Party Central

guidance than had existed during the long years of warfare. Party Central issued at least ten directives for these purposes. As Mao wrote on October 10, 1948, Because our Party and our army were long i n a position i n which we were cut apart by the enemy, were waging guerrilla warfare, and were i n the rural areas, we allowed very considerable autonomy to the leading organs of the Party and army i n the different areas. This enabled the Party organizations and armed forces to bring their initiative and enthusiasm into play and to come through long periods of grave difficulties, but at the same time i t gave rise to certain phenomena of indiscipline and anarchy, localism and guerrillaism, which were harmful to the cause of the revolution.

I n order to correct such “localism,” Mao continued, the present situation demands that our Party should do its utmost to overcome these phenomena of indiscipline and anarchy, localism and guerrillaism and centralize all the powers that can and must be concentrated i n the hands

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C H A R T 19.1 PARTY ORGANIZATION I N LATE 1940’s Seventh Central Committee (forty-four m e m b e r s a n d thirty-three alternates elected

April, 1945)* Political Bureau ( M a o Tse-tung, C h u T e h , L i u Shao-ch’i, Jen Pi-shih, C h o u En-lai,

Ch’en Yiin, K’ang Sheng, L i n Po-ch’ii. Also, or added by 1949, P’eng Chen, Tung Pi-wu, a n d K a o Kang) Secretariat ( M a o Tse-tung, C h u T e h , L i u Shao-ch’i, C h o u E n - l a i , Jen Pi-shih [ s u c ceeded b y Ch’en Yiin i n 1 9 5 0 ] )

Central Committee Departments Military Affairs Committee

Mao Tse-tung (Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, vice-chairmen; P’eng Teh-huai, L i u Po-ch’eng, H o L u n g , L i n Piao,

Work Committee (March, 1947-

Yeh Chien-ying, Ch’en Y i , members) L i u Shao-ch’i

May, 1948)

Organization”

P’eng Chen ( A n Tzu-wen, deputy director; L i u Shao-ch’i and Jen Pi-shih, advisers)

Propaganda

L u Ting-yi (Hsii T ’ e h - l i , C h ’ e n Po-ta,

Press Secretarial (mi-shu ch’u,

H u Ch’iao-mu, and Wang Chia-hsiang, deputy directors) Mao Tse-tung Jen Pi-shih

to be distinguished from Secretariat or shu-chi ch’u) Social Affairs Cadre Education® United Front Work Finance and Economics Youth Women

Urban Work Labor Minorities Work Land Reform (at other times, called rural work or peasants department) Regional Bureaus Northeast China North China* Northwest China Central China®

East China Central-South China’ Southwest China (established

K’ang Sheng ( L i K’o-nung after about 1950) L i u Shao-ch’i L i Wei-han (Chou En-lai, adviser) L i Fu-ch’un Feng Wen-pin Ts’ai Ch’ang K’ang Sheng Ch’i Hua (pseudonym?) Ch’en Yiin L i u Shao-ch’i

P’eng C h e n ( 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 ) , L i n P i a o (194649),

Kao Kang (1949-54) Po Yi-po H s i Chung-hsiin Teng Tzu-hui Jao Shu-shih Lin Piao Teng Hsiao-p’ing

i n 1949)

Regional Sub-Bureaus Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh

P’eng Chen (1946-48)

(Chin-Ch’a-Chi)

Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-Y1ii)

Sung Jen-ch’iung, Po Yi-po

Shansi-Suiyiian (Chin-Sui)

L i Ching-ch’iian L i Yii? (K’ang Sheng after 1949)

Shantung (with two work committees) Inner Mongolia Central China

Ulanfu Cheng Wei-san ( a b o u t 1 9 4 5 ) , (Teng Tzu-

South China

hui about 1946-48) Fang Fang

(continued)

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The Long March to Power

CHART 19.1 (continued) Provincial Committees County and Town Committees District and Subdistrict Committees Branches and Cells * The Party lost four leading members, Wang Jo-fei, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Yeh T’ing, and Teng Fa, on April 8, 1946, when an aircraft, piloted by an American, crashed on its way from Chungking to Yenan. A popular movement commemorating the four men was organized i n Yenan and elsewhere after this incident (see “Ssu-pa” pei-nan lieh-shih chi-nien ts’e [ I n Memory of the Martyrs Who Died on April 8 ] [Chungking, 19461). Alternates Liao Ch’eng-chih, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Ch’en Po-ta became members of the Central Committee, succeeding Wang and Ch’in, and Ch’en T’an-

ch’iu, who had already been executed in Sinkiang in 1943, considerably before his election ( i n ignorance of his death) i n April, 1945. Yeh T’ing and Teng Fa had long been prominent Party members but were not elected to the Seventh Central Committee (Klein and Clark, Dictionary). P A n was director i n 1945-46 and 1955-66, while Jao Shu-shih was director in 1953-54. P’eng C h e n seems t o have b e e n d i r e c t o r o t h e r w i s e , from a r o u n d 1943 t o

1949, after serving as secretary of the Northeast China Bureau i n 1945-46. Nationalist intelligence believed L i u Shao-ch’i was director, or possibly Jen Pi-shih, but there has never been direct evidence that either man held the job during the civil war, although, as former directors L i u and Jen undoubtedly worked closely with P’eng, A n , a n d Jao. See K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary.

Cadre education possibly came under the organization department at various times, explaining its omission from some lists of departments. 4 I n 1948, the Chin-Ch’a-Chi and Chin-Chi-Lu-Yi Sub-Bureaus, which had also functioned as regional bureaus for a while after the war, were merged and placed under the North China Bureau. * Created about 1941 from merger of Central Plains and Southeast China Bureaus. A t times i n the late 1940's, i t reverted to the sub-bureau level. I n 1949, the South China and other sub-bureaus were incorporated into the Central-South China Bureau. Sources: Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, pp. 17 fI.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Wei ©

Ch’un-chieh, p . 6 4 ; S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 339; D a v i d a n d I s a b e l C r o o k , Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten-mile I n n (hereafter, C r o o k , T e n Mile I n n ) ( L o n d o n ,

1959), p . 135; and Red Guard Report of May, 1967, i n CB, no. 834, pp. 9-11.

of the Central Committee and its agencies so as to bring about the transition in the form of the war from guerrilla to regular warfare.! I n September, 1948, Party Central stressed a committee system that

would ensure “collective leadership’ and prevent “exclusive control by any individual,” as was still the case “ i n a small number of Party organizations.”'? From January, 1948, on, a consistent theme of efforts to strengthen

committee work was the call for more frequent and concise communication between Party Central and subordinate bureaus and committees. Every other month, each bureau and sub-bureau was to submit a 1,000- o r 2,000-word report of its work to the Central Committee, with similar

written reports by each field army political department and military region leader to the Central Committee Military Affairs Committee.’® The bureaus and sub-bureaus, in turn, were to keep in contact with provincial, sectional, municipal, county, district, subdistrict, and branch committees with all available means, including radio, telegraph, telephone, post, courier, small meetings, joint county conferences, personal talks, inspection tours, and

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399

news media.'* I n the army, after fifteen years of almost total reliance on political commissars,* the Party restored the committee system at the brigade and military district level and soldiers committees at the company level. One suspects that with this new stress on “democracy” and ‘““centralism” came a marked increase of the inevitable red tape that bedevils organization. But, for a few more years, at least, advances i n organization

far outweighed problems of bureaucratism. This strengthening of the Party was a principal topic of the September, 1948, meeting of the Political Bureau, at Hsipaip’o village, near Shihchiachuang i n western Hopeh.t Mao claimed there that ‘‘since the Party’s

Seventh National Congress i n April, 1945, the Central Committee and the leading cadres of the whole Party have displayed even greater unity than during the war of resistance against Japan.”'® But he went to to criticize various errors i n Party work, setting the tone i n a Political Bureau resolu-

tion, “ O n the Convening of Congresses and Conferences of the Party at Various Levels.” The resolution noted the failure to comply with provi-

sions of the 1945 Party constitution for frequent discussion of issues at regularly scheduled Party conferences. I t urged the “broadening and building of regular democratic life within the Party’ as a principal means of “strengthening the Party committee system.””’” M a o was critical of the oneman monopoly of committee work i n some areas and proposed more

frequent discussions among committee members prior to the promulgation of decisions by Party, military, and governmental committees.'® Six months later, he stressed a dozen rules for effective work of the Party committees,

which were likened to ten- to twenty-men ‘‘squads” of the army i n their need for discipline, intelligence, and coordination.® Central Committee work, as well as that of lower levels, was, of course, greatly hampered b y the war. When Nationalist troops captured Yenan i n

March, 1947, members of Party Central split into two groups and fled. Mao, Chou En-lai, and Jen Pi-shih of the Secretariat, and L u Ting-yi

and other leaders remained i n northern Shensi, eluding Nationalist troops b y rapid movement as they had been forced to do so often i n the past.

They zigzagged north to Wangchiaping, east to Tsaolink’ou, then westnorthwest to Wangchiawan i n April and Hsiaoho about July, turning eastnortheast to Suiteh, and north to Chukuanchai i n September and Shenchuanpao i n October, before turning south again to Yangchiak’ou, where they remained from December, 1947 to March, 1948. From there, Mao’s group moved eastward through northwestern Shansi into western Hopeh i n the Chin-Ch’a-Chi liberated area near Shihchiachuang, where

the other group of Party leaders had arrived almost a year earlier.* After the fall of Yenan, L i u Shao-ch’i, who had been working i n northwestern Shansi, was designated the leader o f an alternate leadership group,

known as the working committee of the Central Committee. Joined by * The Party and company committees had been used i n 1927-32 and the political commissar system had been i n use continuously i n conjunction with these committees and existing political departments.” + Discussed here because of its concentration on Party committee problems, but not to be confused with the national land conference held there a year earlier and other earlier meetings discussed below.

400

The Long March to Power

Chu Teh and others, the work committee moved eastward to Hsipaip’o

village. When Mao’s group arrived there in May, 1948, Liu’s work committee was dissolved and the reunited Central Committee resumed more

normal functions.? A striking feature of Party history during these momentous years was the paucity of high-level meetings. I n part, o f course, this was due to mili-

tary demands and the physical separation of many Party leaders i n various “liberated areas,” but no doubt i t was also due to Mao’s preference for “ideological” rather than “organizational” controls and to relatively great unanimity among Central Committee members, at least on the purely

military aspects of the war. While Mao may have argued for strengthening “democratic discussion’ i n Party committees and criticized ‘‘the habitual practice for one individual to monopolize the conduct of affairs and decide important problems” i n some areas, he called few high-level meetings so

far as one can judge from the record, and the Military Affairs Committee, which he headed, decided the most important questions of the period. M a o wanted “discussions” when i t suited h i m , but, as the subsequent

record showed, he tried to force through his decisions on all essential questions. There was no full-fledged Central Committee meeting between the First Plenum i n mid-1945 and Second Plenum i n early 1949. Moreover, the first important Party conference after the Seventh Congress seems not to have been held u n t i l December 25-28, 1947, at Yangchiak’ou i n northern Shensi. Because of the separation of the two Central Committee groups after the

fall of Yenan, only Mao’s group attended, but there were also delegates from Shen-Kan-Ning and Chin-Sui. The next crucial Party meeting was

the Political Bureau meeting of September, 1948, following the May reunion o f most members of the Central Committee at Hsipaip’o village.

More high-ranking Party leaders, including seven members of the Political Bureau, fourteen other members of the Central Committee, and ten other cadres, attended this meeting than any other since the Seventh Party Congress.”” I n addition to these meetings, only one other session of Party-wide import was publicized during these years, namely the national land confer-

ence of September, 1947, to be discussed below. Intra-Party Disputes During the Civil War

I n part because of the few meetings held between 1945 and 1949 and i n part because o f sensitivity to the fact that Mao was now supposedly the

undisputed Party leader, very little information is available on inner Party politics during the c i v i l war period. I n contrast, there are great quantities

of material on the diplomatic and military history of the period and some also on the land reform. The Cultural Revolution yielded only a few

glimpses of factional struggles and arguments over crucial policies during this period. According to Mao, at this time, the Party concentrated on evolving correct policies for the five problems of ‘ w a r , Party consolidation, land reform,

industry and commerce, and the suppression of counterrevolution.””** On all of these questions, there must have been substantial intra-Party discussion, but the politics of the war and the land questions and their rela-

[Chap. 19]

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401

tion to the united front, Party reform, and the suppression of dissidents elicited the most dispute. Militarily, the Communist leadership apparently largely followed the formulations of the Party’s Military Affairs Committee,

chaired by Mao, and the success of Communist operations prevented the kind of intra-Party criticism that had followed the military setbacks of the late Kiangsi and Long March periods. Party consolidation also proceeded mostly along the principles worked out by Mao during the Cheng-feng Movement but w i t h greater emphasis on criticism by the masses, especially i n connection w i t h the land reform. Aside from land reform, the Party’s economic policies were moderate and relatively non-controversial

during this period, when, in accordance with the needs of the “New Democratic revolution,” bourgeois industry and commerce were to be protected, even as the “monopoly capital” of the “four families” was to be confiscated. As always, Party theorists saw disputes over the five problems and other questions i n terms of “ r i g h t and l e f t ” deviations. I n early 1948, Mao significantly termed the left deviation as the main danger because the history of our Party shows that right deviations are likely to occur i n periods when our Party has formed a united front with the Kuomintang and that “ l e f t ” deviations are likely to occur i n periods when our Party has broken with the Kuomintang.?? I n elaborating on “ l e f t deviations,” i n contrast to later hagiography, Mao

placed himself to the right, or at least in the center, of Party leadership at this time. His principal concern i n so doing was to correct errors in land reform. For example, i n March, 1948, he listed ‘ l e f t deviations” that allegedly abused middle peasants and precluded alliances w i t h “enlightened gentry” and others. The “ r i g h t deviations,” which received less space,

were said to stem from fear of the enemy and lack of confidence i n the masses. Mao then said that these errors of right and left should be relatively easy to overcome and claimed that “ i n recent months” the Party

had corrected and was correcting deviations i n “the war, i n land reform, i n Party consolidation, i n ideological education i n the army, i n building new liberated areas, and i n winning over the democratic parties. . .”*° I n comparison w i t h earlier periods, Party pronouncements of the late 1940’s furnished few details on the content of “ l e f t and right deviations,”

but relations with the Kuomintang undoubtedly constituted one area of dispute. I n August, 1945, Mao had spoken out against “some comrades”

who “put their faith only in political influence,” but he later had to defend his agreement of October 10, 1945, to cede some eight Communist areas i n

the South and to accept matching reductions in Communist armed forces.’ Nor is there conclusive evidence to support later Maoist charges that Liu Shao-ch’i and his followers, any more than other sections o f the Party, had “cherished the sweet dream of ‘peaceful transition’ ”’ and of cooperation w i t h the Nationalists after the defeat of Japan.*®

Other differences between Mao and Liu Shao-ch’i i n the late 1940’s may possibly have arisen during the land reform. O n April 1, 1948, M a o

criticized as ‘“‘ultra-left” Liu Shao-ch’i’s efforts of 1947 to begin “land

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The Long March to Power

reform and Party consolidation in earnest” i n the Shansi-Suiyilian area, but he also stated that Liu’s work, and that of K’ang Sheng nearby, had “thoroughly exposed” past errors of “right deviation” and had been generally successful. Thus, one should not read too much into these

alleged differences nor stress unduly the split between Mao’s and Liu Shao-ch’i’s sections of the Central Committee i n 1947-48. Physical separation may have contributed to differences between the two leaders at that

time but did not cause them. Even more than i n 1935-36, when Chu Teh left Mao to travel with an alternate group of the Central Committee led by Chang Kuo-t’ao, military exigencies were the primary reason for the division of Party Central into two groups. Other causes of intra-Party debate concerned the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the civil war. I n August, 1945, Mao had criticized those who believed in the omnipotence of the atom bomb, and he argued that a new world war was not likely as some feared. But L u Ting-yi and others reportedly privately agreed with Stalin’s fears that excessive Communist boldness in China might precipitate a third world war. According to charges of the Cultural Revolution, L u Ting-yi only half-heartedly refuted fear of a wider war at Mao’s insistence i n a well-known January, 1947, article on the world situation.?* According to other reports at the time, during the summer of 1948, even though Communist armies held almost all of Manchuria and much of Shantung, Shansi, and Honan, and

the Nationalists were suffering from rising inflation and unrest and deteriorating morale, Liu Shao-ch’i had nevertheless supported Stalin’s position that the Communists should refrain from pushing for military victory in China for fear of provoking American intervention and a new world war at a time when tensions were already very high because of the Berlin blockade. According to these reports, Chou En-lai backed Mao and countered that i t would be stupid to let excessive timidity prevent the Communists from seizing the fruits of their long struggle.?’ Still other information, however, places Chou En-lai on the side of those dismayed

about Chinese Communist intransigence over Manchuria and other questions.’ I n any case, though one cannot say with certainty who stood where on the critical question of war, the record indicates that most ranking Chinese Communists, whatever their private fears, decided i n 1946 to press an open military struggle for victory. The refusal to submit the lists of their armies scheduled for disbandment, under the terms of their February 25, 1946, accord with the Nationalists and the radicalization of land policy i n May, 1946, were undeniable signs of this decision.

I n short, although the Chinese Communist leaders argued over questions relating to the most effective ways to support the war, the united front,

Party consolidation, and especially land reform, the general impression of the “third revolutionary civil war” period was one of a highly unified Communist leadership. The contrast between apparent Communist unity and Nationalist factionalism was, i n fact, one of the decisive causes of

Communist victory. Although differences of opinion were inevitable among Communist leaders dealing with complex problems, they proved less impor-

tant than might have been expected because of the consistent effort to iron them out through criticism and self-criticism as well as through the cult of

Mao and other means.

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The Organization of Labor, Women, Youth, and Intellectuals

Subsidiary organizations grew even more rapidly than the CCP and the army and, of course, supplied most of their recruits. Three pivotal organizations of the Chinese revolution, for labor, women, and youth, were

reorganized under Communist leadership in the late 1940’s after a decade or more of preoccupation with military matters and with the organization

of the peasantry. LABOR

By 1947, the Communists claimed to have organized some 1.5 million workers i n North China liberated areas, about 410,000 o f them i n the

Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh area, up from 550,000 i n all areas and 234,000 in Chin-Ch’a-Chi i n about 1943.32 I n Nationalist areas, Communist labor work continued to lag, b u t strikes and demonstrations increased i n scope and

intensity, although, i n contrast to the 1920’s, they received far less publicity than the inflation and other disruptions. I n the autumn of 1946, the violent suppression of thousands of Shanghai street vendors, who were protesting

working conditions, led to widespread sympathy strikes throughout the city. I n 1947-48, as changed circumstances and continuing ideological commitment dictated, the Communists began to stress the revival of the urban labor movement. I n August, 1948, i n Harbin, they convened the Sixth

Congress of the National General Labor Union, following an almost twenty-year lapse since the Fifth Congress i n Shanghai, i n November, 1929. Ch’en Yiin became chairman of the reconstituted Labor Union, with Liu Shao-ch’i as honorary chairman, and L i Li-san and L i u Ning-yi, vice-

chairmen.?® During much of the civil war, the Communists claimed control of more than 500 small, medium, and large cities and, b y 1949, began to speak of the shift i n the “center of gravity of the Party’s work from

the village to the city.””%® WOMEN

I n the late 1940’s, the Communists also stepped up their work among women, who, along with peasantry and youth, constituted one of the three most revolutionary social forces i n Chinese politics and were far more revolutionary than the proletariat the Communist Party claimed to represent.®’ The Chinese feminist movement had been gathering momentum since the inception of the M a y Fourth Movement i n 1919 and reached a violent

climax in the later years of the civil war. Communist organizers and military forces backed rising protests against arranged marriages, remaining footbinding practices, and tyrannical in-laws and husbands, all of which symbolized the historically harsh lot of women i n China. As activists backed by the army attacked the traditional power structure, millions of peasant women sympathized w i t h , and increasingly supported, the Com-

munist movement. Women’s leagues were formed to work against abuses of women’s rights, not only i n politics b u t also i n the home. Countless families saw previously private struggles between husband and wife, parents and children, and in-laws and wives break into the open as militant

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women’s associations publicized various wrongs and organized to prevent their continuation. Millions of women’s activists joined Communist organizations in large part as a result of the struggle for women’s rights. After the establishment of various preparatory committees in 1948, in the spring of 1949, the Communists convened the First Congress of the National Democratic Women’s Federation i n Peking to provide a national framework for the network of women’s associations. Ts’ai Ch’ang, wife of Li Fu-ch’'un and director of the Central Committee’s women’s department,

became chairman, with Teng Ying-ch’ao (Madame Chou En-lai) a vicechairman.®® YOUTH

The importance of youth work as a component of the Communist triumph in China was second only to the organization of the peasants. An initial “high tide” of student protest against blatant government suppression of radicalism occurred in the Southwest in November and December, 1945. I n 1946, the Communists claimed that more than 500,000 students i n some sixty cities had protested against the government and the United States under the slogans “Food, Peace, Freedom” and ‘“Combat Hunger, Civil War, and Persecution.” Student demonstrations intensified i n midand late 1946 after the killing of several teachers and students in Kunming and other cities and the alleged rape of a Peking University girl by an American marine. They reached a peak i n the ‘“anti-hunger, anti—civil war movement” o f May and June, 1947, despite stringent government

countermeasures, including the virtual imposition of martial law on May

18. A year later, in May, 1948, another wave of student protest broke out against the alleged remilitarization of Japan and Kuomintang and American policies.?® I n this revolutionary ferment, the Party acted to organize youth. I n September, 1946, the Central Committee directed the establishment of a New Democratic Youth League to replace the more loosely organized and varied wartime National Salvation Association youth organizations. I n subsequent

months, youth associations were established or reorganized at the local level in both Communist and Nationalist areas, with the words “liberated areas youth” appearing i n organizational titles. The Liberated Areas Youth

Federation became a member of the Moscow-sponsored World Federation of Democratic Youth, which backed a variety of peace and freedom movements through the world. I n mid-1947, the Chinese Communists held a youth work conference

and further tightened coordination of Youth League activities across the nation.* By 1948, they were ready to move toward consolidation of the youth movement and, i n the middle of the year, established a Preparatory Com-

mittee of Alliances of Democratic Youth of Liberated Areas looking to the establishment of a national youth league. I n December, 1948, the Party * They also stepped u p educational efforts, founding such colleges as Northern University and North China Associated University, which i n 1948 merged as North China University, with W u Yii-chang, president, and Fan Wen-lan, vice-president.

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recommenced publication of the well-known journal Chinese Youth and, finally, i n early 1949, formally established several parallel national youth organizations. A relatively loosely organized National Federation of Democratic Youth, headed by Liao Ch’eng-chih, embraced a similarly flexible National Federation of Students, as well as the most important of the youth organizations, the New Democratic Youth League. The League was the successor of the Communist Youth League of the 1920’s and 1930’s and the predecessor of the reorganized Communist Youth League of 1957. The First Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, held i n April, 1949, elected as honorary chairman Jen Pi-shih, the senior surviving Youth League leader of the 1920’s and a confidant o f Mao Tse-tung. Feng Wen-

pin, the director of the Central Committee youth department, continued to head youth work as he had done during the war against Japan. Feng became secretary of the N e w Democratic Youth League, with Liao Ch’engchih and Chiang Nan-hsiang, deputies. Where i n 1940 there were an esti-

mated 1 million members of various youth organizations, the National Federation of Youth, including the New Democratic Youth League and the National Federation of Students, claimed 4.5 million members by late 1 9 4 94°. INTELLECTUALS

Skillful united front work by the Communists, together with Nationalist repression and military defeats, induced more and more independent intellectuals and their organizations, such as the Democratic League, to align with the Communists. But when victory seemed assured the Communists turned on the intellectuals and “middle” groups to force them into complete compliance with their programs. Thus, a Communist-sponsored rectification of intellectuals and writers unfolded in 1948, centered on criticism of the well-known novelist Hsiao Chiin i n Manchuria. Hsiao, who had been one of the lesser targets of criticism i n Yenan i n 1942, returned to his native Manchuria after the

war and established the journal Cultural News in Harbin. Although the journal received Communist support, i t criticized Party policies, including the lack of freedom for writers, and Soviet policies in Manchuria. From January, 1948 on, the CCP intensified its countercriticism of intellectuals, especially i n the Northeast where the Communists still controlled large

areas. The rectification movement climaxed i n the late summer and autumn of 1948 with the resolution of the Party’s Northeast China Bureau on the “Problem of Hsiao Chiin” and i n criticisms of well-known writers i n Shanghai, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.*' Although they presaged the harsh conditions o f future cultural life, these criticisms d i d not seriously impede the Party’s wooing of intellectuals and they were offset i n part b y the praise of Mao and others for the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the intellectuals i n general.**

Still, far from a majority of China’s youth and intellectuals, embittered * The establishment of several organizations, instead of one, was typical of a generally cautious approach at this time, presumably intended to help maintain a wide united front.

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as they were by Chinese conditions, were ready yet for total Communist

victory. Thus fewer than 5 per cent of two student groups polled i n 1948 favored complete Communist rule of China, although most favored Communist participation i n a coalition government and the vast majority were dissatisfied with the Nationalist government.*3 The Agrarian Reform Movement

The land reform movement of the late 1940’s was second in importance only to military strategy as a component of Communist victory i n the civil

war because successful united front policy, Party-building, and especially mass support hinged upon it. Mao declared with considerable truth that “the peasants stood with our Party and our army against the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek’s troops [wherever] . the land problem was solved radically and thoroughly,”** and he reported i n October, 1948, that some 1.6 million

peasants who had obtained land had joined the army. Some two-thirds of the recruits of 1946-48 were said to be peasants, the other third were captured Nationalist troops. I n addition, i n 1946-47, the land reform helped

enlist almost 4 million support workers for the army i n Manchuria and, i n 1948, another 700,000 and 500,000 i n the southeastern and northeastern

Shansi border regions, respectively.'” As Nieh Jung-chen put i t in late 1947, “land reform supports the war and the war is basically for land reform.” Thus, as had been the case since the 1920’s, the “mass line”’ depended on the Communist land program to convince the peasants of the desirability of revolution. I t was clear that, without the support of the peasants, there

would be no Communist revolution i n China. As one American writer put i t on the basis of his extended observations i n 1948, The crux of the matter lay i n the land question. With land i n their own hands the peasants could be counted on to volunteer for service i n the regular armed forces by the hundreds of thousands, to support the front with transport columns and stretcher brigades, and to organize irregular fighting units i n every corner of the liberated areas. Landownership was capable of inspiring both at the front and i n the rear the kind of determination among the rank and file that no terror could shake and no reverses deter. . . .*7

On the other side, the failure of the Nationalists to learn this lesson was undoubtedly their single greatest mistake.* Certainly there was good cause for land reform. According to Communist Party estimates, landlords and rich peasants, who constituted only 8 per cent of the population i n newly liberated areas, held three-quarters * I t is hard to see what they could have done so long as they placed a priority on stability. As a conservative American said, Since [the Kuomintang] does not promote class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue. . . [Therefore] the Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, land destitution, usury and rural despotism—because i t found these i n existence and was preoccupied w i t h building a Nationalist government, a modern army, adequate finances, and with eradicating some of the worst evils such as o p i u m , b a n d i t s , a n d Communists

.*

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of the land while 92 per cent of the population were landless, or were poor o r middle peasants and were bound to favor far-reaching change.*®

Of the 90-odd per cent from whom the Communists expected sympathy, 20 per cent were middle peasants and 70 per cent were poor and landless peasants.’® Most non-Communist observers present a less severe picture of agrarian conditions i n the 1940’s, especially i n North China.’* But they also agree that peasants had to cope with severe problems of climate, credit, and taxation, even where acute landlordism did not exist. Furthermore, landlordism was severe i n large parts o f Manchuria, Shensi, and other North China Communist base areas. Moreover, i n areas where landlords returned after

the war to reclaim their property, “the once tranquil countryside became a battleground of land grabbing.”’’* Thus, variations i n local conditions and infertility of land i n some areas largely explain the discrepancy between the Communist estimate that less than one-tenth of the population were landlords and rich peasants and other estimates that at least a third o f North

China peasants were fairly well off i n terms of land.

Even under the most optimistic assessment of agrarian conditions in North China, the poverty of many areas, the high incidence of drought, flood, and famine, onerous usury, and irregular and heavy taxation still

created revolutionary conditions.* Thus, depending on the area and local class structure, Communist land policies, both the m i l d wartime “rent and

interest reduction” and the more radical land distribution policies of the late 1940’s, could produce revolutionary results and therefore were used alternately. Despite diverse conditions and far greater tenancy problems i n

the South, where the Communists had lost the struggle i n the 1930’s, than in the North, where they won a decade later, general agrarian conditions i n North China still called for revolution. More important, the Communists

were now far better prepared to exploit the opportunity than they had been in the 1920’s and 1930s. Until 1946, then, the Communists continued their moderate wartime

land policy. This policy called for rent to be reduced to 37.5 per cent of the annual crop and interest rates to be lowered to 15 per cent a year, but i t also guaranteed the lands and rents of the “ p a t r i o t i c ” landlords. During 1945, however, there were indications of the coming shift to a more

radical program. I n his report “ O n Coalition Government” to the Seventh Party Congress o n April 24, 1945, Mao had spoken of a “long period for

the regulated development of capitalism,” in which private land would be protected, and predicted a continuation of the moderate policy of rent and interest reduction. However, he warned that, i n due time, the Party * One observer estimated that the tax burden i n the late 1940’s on the peasantry i n Nationalist areas generally was four times the average per capita burden i n the United States, while interest rates commonly ran to 30 per cent or more a year. Interest rates were relatively lighter and taxes more progressive in Communist areas, but taxes on peasant incomes increased from about 10 per cent i n the early 1940’s to 20 to 30 per cent later i n the decade, although they were not supposed to exceed 15 per cent. I n 1950, peasants paid an estimated total of 32 per cent of their income to the new Communist authorities, of which 15 per cent went for local needs, and 17 per cent to the central government, while the rich paid a total of 60 to 80 per cent of their income i n taxes to local and central authorities.”

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would return to its more radical, i f still bourgeois, demand for “land to the

tillers.’ Then, in November of that year, he called for stepped-up efforts for land reform and drives to increase production; b u t land reform still meant “ a

large-scale rent reduction campaign,” even i f excesses could hardly be avoided in a campaign that really was a conscious struggle of the masses. A Central Committee directive of late 1945 incorporated Mao’s instruc-

tions that “all areas must launch movements in 1946 for the reduction of rent and interest.”’®® Moderate land reform, however, led inexorably to more radical steps.

Even under the “rent and interest reduction’ campaigns of the anti-Japanese war, the Party had authorized the seizure of the land of “stubbornly unrepentant traitors’ who collaborated with the Japanese, while the peasants frequently went on to seize the holdings of absentee landlords, disregarding Party policy.” After 1945, i n the “liberated areas,” the peasants increasingly took over the lands they tilled, regardless of the wartime status of the

owners, and thereby spontaneously, though often with the support of local Communists, accelerated Party Central’s timetable for moving to the more

radical “land to the tiller” policy. Postwar land seizures began naturally enough on the lands of former collaborators. Thus, i n Manchuria, as much as one-third to one-half of

cultivated land was former Japanese-controlled “public land” and was soon expropriated.’” I n December, 1945, a directive of the Jehol Committee, “ O n Arousing the Masses,” which called for a mass campaign of

“accusation and retribution to settle accounts with traitors and secret agents,” obviously encouraged more radical land struggle.’® This was also the effect of the Party’s “calling back local cadres” for discussions and of local Party conferences, such as the one i n Shantung, which, i n March, 1946, called for a “great expansion’ of Party-building in conjunction with stepped-up work i n the mass movements against traitors and for land

reform.>® One of the most valuable accounts of the period* eloquently describes the intensification of the land revolution i n Lucheng County, Shansi, near the ancient capital and archaeological site of Anyang, and southwest of Hantan, headquarters of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii region. What had begun in late 1945 as a chaotic but intense “anti-traitor movement” to ‘settle accounts” with Japanese collaborators of all classes,®® soon developed into a concentrated attack o n the entire landlord class. Local Communists and peasants therefore seemed far more radical than the Central Committee,

which still called for “rent and interest reduction,” although “demands for land kept coming from below.” As had been the case with the Northern Expedition i n 1926, war had revolutionized the peasantry of North China:

The arming of the people for resistance had placed the peasants i n a position to challenge the landlords and usurers i n the countryside, and not even the tremendous prestige of the Communist Party or the critical situation of the * By William Hinton, who accompanied a Communist work team to the fifth district of Lucheng County in 1948.

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country and the world could prevent this challenge from breaking out i n one form or another and carrying with i t many lower echelon cadres and Party committees. This increasingly explosive force was channeled for a time into forms of attack that did not formally violate the provisions of “double reduction,” yet nevertheless transferred land from the gentry to the peasants.. . Now the peasants demanded not only the correction of abuses but also the repayment of overcharges and the restoration of lands and property seized i n default of debts. . . . When the grievances were totaled up, the charges almost always mounted up to more than most gentry families could pay, and everything they owned was expropriated for distribution . . . 5 !

Shift to More Radical Land Policies, Spring 1946 Thus, i n the spring of 1946, responding to pressures from below, the Party decided to return to its more radical land policies of the 1927-36 period. Although private landownership would be maintained in conformity with the Party’s minimum program for the “New Democratic” bourgeois revolution, a much more radical policy of “land to the tiller” was instituted. I n the next three years, some 178 million peasants in Communist areas obtained land under the new dispensation, about two-thirds of

them between mid-1947 and mid-1948, while the proportion of middle peasants rose from about 20 per cent of the peasant population before land reform to 50 per cent or more afterwards.®* As was the case with the transition to “socialist” collectivization of agriculture after 1949, the 1946— 47 shift to more radical agrarian policies seems to have come earlier and gone further than some leaders thought wise. There are troublesome questions concerning the timing and politics of the Party’s adoption of more radical land policies. The shift must have been closely related to the decision to push for all-out victory in the civil war, because a harsher policy would produce more popular support from the poor peasants, which was essential for ‘“people’s war,” while milder policies would obviously be more likely to attract moderates to the support of a “coalition government,” which remained official Communist policy until

mid-1946. Intra-Party politics on the land issue are obscure and confusing. Thus, according to later Maoist writers, Mao, the supposed apostle of an all-out

drive for victory after 1945, published little on the land problem in 1946, and, i n late 1947 and 1948, his first articles to deal substantively with the postwar agrarian question focused o n criticism o f leftist excesses i n the execution of land reform. Conversely, i n early 1948, Mao accused Liu

Shao-ch’i, the supposed advocate of a “new period of ‘peaceful transition’ ”’ under temporary Nationalist leadership, of having fostered “leftist” excesses i n the land reform o f 1947. Hence, the positions of the two top Party leaders at the time seem almost the reverse o f what Mao charged. Although the likely explanation for this apparent anomaly is that Mao’s stress on the

united front necessitated repeated warnings against “leftist excesses,” i t is also clear that, i n 1945, Mao was thinking i n terms of rent reduction and not of the land redistribution that developed i n 1946.

Hence, by the spring of 1946, popular pressure, abetted by some key

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local Party organizations, set the stage for an official shift toward a more radical “land to the tiller” policy. I t came i n the Central Committee’s May 4 directive of 1946. Although i t concluded with the call for “ a complete land revolution,” even this directive was m i l d i n tone and full

of warnings not to violate the interests of the middle peasants or even of those rich landowners who supported the Communists. The directive, almost apologetically, attributed the shift to the left to the initiative of

the peasants: According to the latest reports from comrades i n various liberated areas i n Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and Central China [note omission of Manchuria], i n the processes of struggle of the broad masses against traitors to reduce rents and interest, [the peasants] have been directly seizing land from landlords, carrying out i n practice “land to the tiller.” Mass feelings are very intense, and where mass movements are well developed [the peasants have already] basically solved the l a n d p r o b l e m , i n places resulting even i n an

equal land system, with everyone [including landlords] obtaining three mou [one-half acre] of land. I n places, some traitors, evil gentry, and landlords have fled to cities and there curse the mass movement i n the liberated areas.. . . [Therefore] some ignorant men have doubts, and i n the Party also, a few fear the mass movement has gone too far. I n these circumstances, our Party must have a firm policy to protect the masses and lead the movement to carry out land reform . . , thereby allowing the Party committees i n various places to place themselves at the front of the broad mass movement. We need not fear changes i n land relations... or retributions by the landlords.83

I n the spring of 1946, therefore, the Party stressed that “ t o solve the land problem i n the liberated areas is the most fundamental l i n k i n all our present activities,”’** b u t i t is clear that the Party was uncertain how radical a program i t should undertake. I t appears that, as i n 1926-27 and

i n the Bolshevik revolution, the Communists would n o t have adopted radical policies so soon had they not been forced to do so by the revolution from below. The May 4 directive retained limits on peasant action, warned against excesses and assured landlords and rich peasants that they would retain a larger than average share of land. The directive especially sought to protect the positions of rich and middle peasants and all types of production and commerce and urged that attacks be restricted to ‘“‘traitors, bad gentry and local tyrants, isolating them and seizing their l a n d . ” I f repentant, even these people should be “allowed enough land to live o n . ” The directive recommended leniency i n “settling accounts,” proper allowance for those who had contributed to the war effort, and the execution of the worst local tyrants only when demanded b y the masses and recommended b y “people’s courts.” I n an obvious b i d to tie land reform to recruitment,

the May 4 directive also stressed the need to give the benefits of the land struggle to ‘““anti-Japanese warriors, cadres, and their families.” Finally, it

warned local Party committees to overcome “right and left tendencies on the land problem.”’** But i t is difficult to see how the directive could have helped avoid right o r left deviations, inasmuch as there were obvious ambi-

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guities i n the simultaneous exhortations to lead the aroused masses and to

prevent disruption. This dilemma had plagued the “first” revolution of 1926-27, when the Comintern dictated simultaneous support for the alliance with the Kuomintang, although the Nationalists insisted on social stability, and for the land revolution demanded by the peasants of Central and South China. Because of the ambiguities and intra-Party debates associated with the May 4 directive, very little publicity was given to it and initiative for land reform continued to come from lower levels. Thus, various liberated area Party and government organizations issued their own interpretations of policy, beginning with those of the Central China Bureau on June 9 . ° Subsequent high-level Party references to land policy continued to be ambiguous. Mao’s first mention of the May 4 directive, i n a July 20 statement, suggests that he was worried about offending the middle peasants and

thereby disrupting agricultural production, the error of the “second leftist line” of the early 1930’s: When solving the land problem, we should distinguish the ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords from the traitors, b a d gentry, and

local tyrants. We should be more strict i n our treatment of the traitors, bad gentry, and local tyrants, and more lenient i n our treatment of the rich peasants and middle and small landlords .%7

Similarly, three months later, Mao stressed the importance of land reform for popular support, but only after calling for military expansion and development of production.®® I n 1947, he again linked land reform w i t h the war and economic production. I n February, he warned that i t was ‘““absolutely impermissible to encroach on the interests of the middle peasants, including the well-to-do middle peasants,” and, i n September, he asserted, “ w e must resolutely carry through the land reform (which is the most

fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning countrywide victory), develop production, practice economy, and strengthen the building of war industry—all for victory at the front.”*® Thus, Mao certainly realized and stressed the importance of land reform, but one is struck by the fact that he links i t t o efforts to increase production and by his frequent warnings against excesses.

Therefore, i t seems that during most of this period, as i n the 1930’s, and in contrast to Mao’s ringing statements i n his 1927 report on the Hunan peasant movement and later Maoist historiography, Mao was the proponent of a relatively cautious land policy that stressed the importance of the middle and even the rich peasants. Nevertheless, many, apparently at times including supposed Party conservatives L i u Shao-ch’i and P’eng C h e n , ” emphasized the interests of the rural laborers and poor peasants. The cautious progress of Mao and the Party toward the ‘land-to-thetiller” policy, is revealed by the m i l d nature o f the December 21, 1946, Draft L a w for Government Purchase of Land. issued by the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. This law was more generous to the landlords and rich peasants than the May 4 directive, which had merely “guaranteed

land tilled by the owner,” while the December draft law promised land-

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lords 50 per cent per capita more land than that owned by middle peasants in the same locality and 100 per cent more i f landlords had contributed to the anti-Japanese war.” Beyond these limits, the draft law provided that the government would purchase landlords’ additional holdings with ten-year bonds at prices to be worked out by local authorities. Rich peasant land would be protected, while landless and poor peasants could buy surplus

land at 50 per cent of the price paid by the government in installments spread out over ten years. I n certain cases, they were exempted from any payment for new lands. Nevertheless, by October, 1946, tens of millions of North China peasants had already seized millions of fields, and, by February, 1947, some 60 million poor peasants were said to have received land, ranging from six

mou (one acre) i n northeastern Shansi border areas and Manchuria to two mou in Shantung.”? As Liu Shao-ch’i admitted four years later, Between July, 1946 and October, 1947, the masses o f peasants and our rural

cadres in many areas were unable to follow the directions issued by [Party] Central on May 4, 1946, to leave [alone] rich peasants’ land and property. . . . They followed their own will and confiscated the land and property o f rich peasants as well as that o f the landlords. This is understandable [because of war conditions and inexperience of c a d r e s ] .

According to some observers, Liu Shao-ch’i, as director of the Central Committee land reform department, must have had some responsibility for

these “excesses.” I n late 1946, he had gone to northwestern Shansi to work on Party problems and the land reform and, in the spring and summer of 1947, had held a series of conferences o n the land problem there. Mao

later singled out the work of Liu and K’ang Sheng, of the Chin-Sui Party Sub-Bureau under L i Ching-ch’iian, and particularly a June, 1947, conference of border region cadres, as examples of success i n eliminating “right

deviations” in land reform. But he noted that the failure of these efforts “to allow for differences i n local conditions” had thereby encouraged ‘“‘an

ultra-left policy’ of wrongly classifying well-to-do peasants as rich peasants and of “doing everything as the masses want it d o n e . ” Whatever Party policies were at the time, the peasantry land seizures

moved with a momentum of their own. I n February, 1947, Mao complained that the May 4 directive had been carried out in only “about two-thirds of the territory i n each liberated area” and that even there land reform was

“not thorough,” “mainly because the masses were not fully aroused.” But Mao also continued to warn against excesses and wrote that the land reform in many areas was “more than ever charged with emotion and marred by excessive violence.””® I n late 1946, in parts of Shansi and elsewhere for example, activists, supported b y local Communists i f not always b y their superiors, moved to “cut off the feudal tails” not only of the few rich, but also of their more

numerous relatives and even the present-day descendants of formerly rich but no longer prosperous families.” Such differences of emphasis in the land reform depended on local conditions and the effects of war. The political bias of various observers must also be taken into account. I n prac-

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tice, because of the fluidity of battle lines, only the northern parts of Shansi and Manchuria, the mountainous parts of Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung, and widely scattered areas i n Central and South China had the time and security for land reform. But i n these areas, land revolution reached new

levels of intensity by the winter of 1946-47.

High Tide of the Land Reform I n the wake of spreading warfare in 1947 and the developing agrarian revolution from below, the Party was forced further left i n its handling of

land reform. Because of the continued discrepancies between mass action and Party policies, the Central Committee decided to hold a National Land

Conference in September, 1947, to draw up and approve a new land reform law. On September 1, Mao reaffirmed the necessity for land reform as “the most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning country-wide victory.”” The National Land Conference, attended b y some 1,000 delegates, met

in Hsipaip’o village to discuss and conduct “detailed research into conditions of the Chinese agrarian system and experience of the land reform.” On September 13, the conference adopted the Outline Land Law but did not publish i t until October 10. No explanation was given, but the delay was probably due to continuing debate and the need to consult with Mao’s group, which was still in northern Shensi, and with groups in other liberated areas. Mao later spoke of Party Central and lower-level criticisms of “rightist ideas,” although he appeared more concerned with ‘“ultra-left” interpretations himself.” Following this conference, ‘practically all the

liberated areas’ held “large conferences of cadres” during the autumn to discuss the National Land Conference and its Outline Law. Thus, some 1,700 activists from the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan area met i n October at Yehtao, and others i n Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia, Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh,

and Manchuria held meetings in November and December 8° The October 10 Outline Land Law was considerably more detailed and more radical than the May 4 , 1946, directive. The introduction called China’s disastrous land conditions the “root of our country’s being the victim of aggression, poverty, backwardness and the basic obstacle to our country’s democratization, industrialization, independence, unity, strength, and prosperity.” The first four articles of the law declared a sweeping

abolition of “the agrarian system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation,” the “landownership rights of all landlords . ancestral temples, monasteries, schools, institutions, and organizations’ and decreed the cancellation

of all debts. The village peasant associations, poor peasant leagues, peasant congresses, and subsidiary organizations were to manage the takeover of land and to see to its “equal distribution among the entire rural population, regardless of sex or age.””®' The law guaranteed land “equivalent to that of the peasants” to Communist and Nationalist soldiers and landlords alike, but not to ‘“‘national traitors, collaborators, and civil war criminals.” Surplus property and tools were also to be distributed, and woods, waterways, and communal sites were to be divided o r administered b y local authorities.

Finally, the law called for the establishment of people’s courts to decide disputes arising out of the land reform, while peasant associations were to

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keep order “ i n accord with the will and interests of the overwhelming

majority of the people.’’®? While the October law and supplementary explanations provided the most comprehensive document on ‘‘bourgeois” land reform ever issued b y the Communists, many problems and inconsistencies remained. Class

definition was.particularly troublesome, and, to help standardize it, the Party reissued i n December Mao’s 1933 articles “ H o w to Analyze the

Classes in Rural Areas” and “Decision on Some Problems in the Land Struggle.”’®® From late 1947 on, M a o repeatedly complained of mistakes in

class analysis, especially the “leftist” error of bracketing well-to-do middle peasants with the rich peasants as objects of struggle. He explained that there were three levels of middle peasant, well-to-do, average, and poor,

with the holdings of the average middle peasant as the goal for the whole population. I n January, he specified that a farmer should be considered a middle peasant i f only 25 per cent or less of his income was derived from the exploitation of others’ labor,* and as a rich peasant i f i t exceeded that.?*

During an important meeting of December 25-28, 1947, in Yangchiak’ou in northeastern Shensi, Mao’s group of the Central Committee discussed the progress of land reform and other matters. I n his report on “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” M a o generally praised the land reform movement, which, during the separation of the Central Committee, had been

directed mainly by Liu Shao-ch’i’s work committee far to the east in Hopeh, but once more warned of “leftist” excesses. Tracing the evolution of Party policy from the wartime “double reduction’ of taxes and interest through the May 4 , 1946, directive, when ‘‘the peasants urgently demanded

land,” to the September conference and Outline Land Law, Mao went on to explain, “Our policy is to rely on the poor peasants and unite solidly with the middle peasants to abolish the feudal and semi-feudal system of exploitation by the landlord class and by the old-type rich peasants.””®’ Although he stated that the present policy of “equal distribution of land [for rich peasants and landlords as well] fully meets the demands of the broad masses of China’s peasants,” he continued to fear that “leftist excesses’ threatened initial successes and interfered with the war effort. As on other occasions, he therefore turned his attention to the equally sig-

nificant problem of Party reform. The Party Purification Movement, 1947-48 Land reform meant not only sanctioning and belatedly encouraging class struggle i n the villages but also, to a greater extent than ever before, stressing Party reorganization and purification. I n December, 1947, Mao ex-

pressed particular concern with deficiencies and deviations that the rigors of land reform had revealed in local Party organization: To carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly and to consolidate the rear areas of the People’s Liberation Army, i t is necessary to educate and reorganize the ranks of our Party. O n the whole, the rectification move* That is, if he paid workers the going rate to produce one-quarter of his income on Crops.

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ment inside the Party during the W a r o f Resistance Against Japan was suc-

cessful. . . . However, in the Party’s local organizations, the problem of impurities in the class composition of our ranks and i n our style of work is still unresolved.8¢

Mao explained that the extraordinary growth of the Party from “several tens of thousands to 2.7 million” enabled “many landlords, rich peasants, and riffraff . . . to sneak into our Party.”* I n the rural areas they control a number of Party, government, and people’s organizations, tyrannically abuse their power, ride roughshod over the people, distort the Party’s policies, and thus alienate these organizations from the masses [ a n d ] prevent the land reform from being thorough. T h i s grave

situation sets us the task of educating and reorganizing the ranks of our Party.88

Mao revealed that the September National Land Conference had “discussed this problem of Party composition and organization thoroughly and laid down the proper measures and methods.” These are now being resolutely applied everywhere. First and foremost comes the unfolding of criticism and self-criticism within the Party and the thorough exposure of mistaken ideas and serious situations i n the local organizations, which are departures from the Party line. All Party members must realize that a decisive link i n the solution of the land problem and for the support of the long drawn-out war is the removal of impurities from Party organizations and the education and reorganization of the Party’s ranks . . . 8 9

Even well before this, Party publications had been calling for an intensification of Party purification to follow up the Cheng-feng Movement of the early 1940’s. One directive of November, 1946, for instance, stressed the

need for general reforms in Party organization, ideology, and work style and demanded specific increases in the numbers of poor peasants i n positions of leadership, in proletarian education, and in a democratic, “Maoist” style of work. Cadres were to be judged by their social origins, class standpoint, and relations with the masses.”® Following the late 1947 demands for simultaneous land reform and Party purification and the generally improved military situation after mid1947, the various liberated areas greatly accelerated their efforts to improve local Party organization and style. I n Central China, hundreds of cadres had been rebuked b y late 1947, and, i n the Shansi-Suiyiian area and else-

where, publications stressed the urgency of Party reform.** I n the winter of 1947-48, an additional drastic step ensured real reform by inviting non-Communists to sit in on Party meetings and criticize cadres, who in turn engaged i n self-criticism. Observers testified to the further tensions and ordeals produced in the villages by these meetings but reported that such measures eventually led to better Party work and rela* Confirming this, i n Lucheng County, Shansi, Hinton revealed that 40 per cent of Communist cadres were of landlord or rich peasant origin.”

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tions with the masses.?? Thus, in one village, local Party members were accused of 55 incidents of “bad working style” involving excessive violence, beatings, and bullying; of 100 incidents of ‘personal selfishness and corrupt practices,” including “squeeze, illegal seizures, outright theft, and favoritism in the distribution of the ‘fruits’ [ o f revolution],” of 17 inci-

dents of illicit sex offenses; and of 11 incidents of protecting or collaborating with landlords and ‘forgetting one’s class.”®®* On the basis of such information, the Kuomintang hopefully pointed to five damaging contradictions within the CCP—namely, factionalism; organizational problems, such as bureaucratism; the nonproletarian origins of the Party of the proletariat; individual failings, such as an exaggerated sense of heroism and commandism; and, finally, alleged contradictions between the Communists and masses and between old and new cadres.®* However, one can only

conclude that the Communists faced up to these problems more effectively than did their enemies. According to some Party commentators at the time, i n possible oblique rebuke of Mao, the 1947-48 Party purification movement was even more

significant than the Cheng-feng Movement and previous Party reforms had been, because “ i n the past [these movements] had been the efforts of factions or individuals operating from the top down.” Yet, “only i f the masses

were brought into play,” as i n the land reform movement, could there be a “real democratic movement, thoroughly overturning the landlord class, and purifying the Party.” Parallel to the Party purification movement was the Party effort to

tighten the discipline and enhance the ideological training and morale of the army. This effort concentrated on the three techniques of “pouring out grievances’ suffered by laboring people i n the old society, the “three checkups [on class origin, performance of duty, and will to fight], and mass training [officers teaching soldiers, soldiers teaching officers, and soldiers teaching each o t h e r ] . ” I n the course of this “democratic movement” i n the army, the Party also restored its committee system at various levels of the army and the soldier’s committees at company level.

According to Mao: By these methods we developed high revolutionary enthusiasm among the commanders and fighters of the whole army; reformed or weeded out the landlords, rich peasants, and bad elements found i n some army units; heightened discipline; clearly explained various policies i n the land reform and the policies concerning industry and commerce and the intellectuals; developed the democratic style of work in the army; and raised the level of our military technique and tactics.?¢

The Return to More Moderate Policies, 1948

The land reform, however, and its close relationship to the war were the focus of Party work and discussion i n 1947 and 1948, as had been the question of negotiations with the Nationalists in late 1945 and 1946. I f a more radical program was necessary to build mass enthusiasm for the Communists in the early stages of the new civil war, by 1948, most Party leaders had come to fear that continued excessively radical land reform would

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cause more losses than gains. N o w more than ever, as they planned to

establish a new government, the Communists needed the cooperation of the upper strata of rural society and of the urban intelligentsia and independent political groups, who by blood and upbringing were closely tied to the rural power structure. The Party naturally continued to stress its support for the “broad masses,” who supplied most of their recruits. But, b y the winter of 1947-48, as the war swung i n their favor and as the Party

purification and army education campaigns proceeded, there was a noticeable shift away from the radical implementation of the land program in late 1947.* Where Communist discussions of the land problem i n 1947 had focused on criticizing “rightist” deviations (lack of thoroughness and excessive toleration of landlords and rich peasants), by early 1948, growing criticism of such leftist “errors” as attacking too broad a spectrum of the former rural elite and excessive violence marked a swing of the pendulum of Party policy back to the center. The December, 1947, northern Shensi conference decided o n this shift of emphasis, and, within several months, most

areas had begun to reflect the new line. Mao’s fear of repeating the “leftist” errors of 1931-34 appears to have been the decisive factor in this shift. On April 1, 1948, he defined three “left” deviations that had appeared in course of the land reform: First, in a number of places, i n the process of identifying class status a number of working people were wrongly classified as landlords or rich peasants. . . . N o w this deviation has been corrected a n d . . . people are very much reassured Secondly, i n the land reform w o r k , the industrial and commercial enterprises o f landlords and rich peasants were encroached upon.. . .

Thirdly, in the fierce struggles i n the land reform of the past year, the Shansi-Suiyiian Party organization failed to adhere unequivocally to the Party’s policy of strictly forbidding beating and killing without discrimination. As a result in certain places some landlords and rich peasants were needlessly put to death, and the bad elements i n the rural areas were able to exploit the situation to take revenge and foully murdered a number of working people. Mao explained the Party’s policy of “revolutionary justice’ at this stage

and claimed that the principal errors of the land reform had been corrected: We consider i t absolutely necessary and proper to sentence to death, through the people’s courts and the democratic governments, those major criminals who have actively and desperately opposed the people’s democratic revolution and sabotaged the land reform, that is the heinous counterrevolutionaries and local tyrants. I f this were not done democratic order could not be established. We must, however, forbid the killing without discrimination * Besides the war, an additional reason for moderating land reform policies was the need to take account of the economic and social changes already wrought by reform, such as increasing numbers of middle peasants. The new stress on broadening the united front i n rural areas was shown by the 1948 slogan “depend on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, and join u p with all anti-feudal elements to eradicate the feudal system.”

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of ordinary personnel on the Kuomintang side, the common run of landlords all these deviations have Now and rich peasants and lesser offenders. been corrected in earnest. . . .%*

I n this talk, Mao also criticized the Shansi-Suiyiian Party leadership, then under L i Ching-ch’iian, and L i u Shao-ch’i and K’ang Sheng for having encouraged these “leftist errors” i n northwestern Shansi. But i t is obvious

that the excesses resulted primarily from the passions of one of the great social revolutions of all history, and only secondarily from the enthusiasm and lapses of a few Party leaders. O n February 3 , 1948, while still i n northern Shensi, Mao spelled out his

earlier cautions about the handling of land reform to the east. I n the execution o f the land l a w , he demanded careful discrimination among three types of areas: the “ o l d liberated areas,” which he defined as those controlled b y the Communists as of mid-1945; the ‘“semi-old liberated areas,”

those taken over between 1945 and mid-1947; and the “new liberated areas,” those captured in Communist offensives since the summer of 1947.%

I n the old areas, only a few adjustments of land conditions should be necesshould center on educating and consolidating the ranks sary and “work of the Party and solving the contradictions between the Party and the

masses by combining the efforts of Party and non-Party people. . ” I n the ““semi-old” areas, which Mao regarded as the largest category, the military situation had changed rapidly and widely during these years. He noted that “there has been a preliminary solution of the land problem, but the land problem is n o t yet thoroughly solved. [ Therefore] the distribution of I n these areas, the middle land should be universal and thorough. peasants [still] are a minority and are taking a wait-and-see attitude. The poor peasants are the majority and are eagerly demanding land. Poor peasant leagues must therefore be organized and their leading position

established. . . . ” I n the new areas, Mao continued, We should not try to enforce the Land Law all at once but should do i t i n two stages. The first stage .

further subdivided i n t o several steps, [ i s ]

namely, propaganda, preliminary organization, distribution of the moveable property o f the b i g landlords, distribution o f the l a n d o f b i g and small

landlords, and finally the distribution of the land [ i n general] of the landlord class. The second stage is to distribute the land rented out by the rich peasants, their surplus land and part of their other property.1°° A little later, i n response to continuing urgent military needs, Mao i n effect added a fourth category of area where land reform was to be still

more moderate i n order to avoid disruption of the war effort. This was the “guerrilla zone” o r ‘‘areas bordering on enemy territory and new liberated areas,” as he described them in May. Here, work was to be confined “ t o propaganda, covert organizational work, and the distribution of a certain amount of moveable property. Mass organizations should not be openly set u p , and land reform should not be carried out, lest the enemy

. persecute the masses.” I n February, Mao again criticized excessively leftist propaganda on the land reform because i t “one-sidedly” advocated the exclusion of middle

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peasants from leadership and encouraged ‘“‘rashness’ and neglect of industry and commerce.’®? O n the 15th, he directed the Central Committee to

slow the pace of land reform so as to complete i t i n two or three years

instead of in a few months, and to do so i n stages and without excessive violence. He wrote, “reactionaries must be suppressed, but killing without discrimination is strictly forbidden; the fewer killings the better.”’*®* On March 20, Mao took note of some “right deviations” but warned that leftist deviations were now the main danger. On April 1, he warned that ‘“absolute egalitarianism’ was harmful to the economy and went so far as to state, “the development of agricultural production is the immediate aim of the land reform. Only by abolishing the feudal system can the conditions for such development be created.”’*°* Finally, on May 25, Mao stated that land reform should not be attempted at all, unless three conditions existed, namely: a. All the enemy armed forces must have been wiped out and conditions must have become stable; i t must not b e a n unstable guerrilla zone.

b . The overwhelming majority of the basic masses (the farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants), not just a minority, must already b e

demanding the distribution of land. c. Party cadres must be adequate both i n numbers and i n quality to grasp the work of land reform and must not leave i t to the spontaneous activity of the masses.105

I n accord with the new more cautious policies, further land redistribution was called off in some areas'®® and Party publications stressed the need for adequate preparation before new efforts were made. Local Party organizations were instructed to retreat to the policy of recommending only rent and interest reduction until ‘“‘the peasants . possess a high

degree of political consciousness and confidence in the success of the revolution.” “Only after the People’s Liberation Army has arrived at a place and worked there for a considerable time will i t be possible to speak of solving the land problem in earnest.” From mid-1948 on, therefore, rent- and interest-reduction campaigns again became the focus of Communist land reform, especially i n areas where their military control was not yet assured.’ Thus, just short o f final victory, the CCP stressed the organizational aspects of the “mass l i n e . ” I f mass support was the key to victory, i t also

had to be keyed to victory, and the masses were allowed free rein only where the Party needed to arouse increased peasant support. Nonetheless, even as the Party sought to moderate the land reform after 1947, Communist activities i n the countryside persisted o n an impressive scale. I n the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan area, simultaneous campaigns

to “adjust landholdings” and to “purify and reorganize the Party” proceeded throughout the first half of 1 9 4 8 . 1 Adjustments of landholdings and past injustices continued, and many local cadres were called to account for earlier excesses. Nevertheless, such limits as had been placed o n the land reform were temporary and had been imposed primarily to facilitate

military strategy and only secondarily to adjust to the new economic and

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social conditions created by land reform. Land reform would resume both in old liberated areas and throughout the country i n 1950 after military victory, but its over-all results i n North China in the late 1940’s were

already impressive. By 1948, about 100 million of the 168 million people in liberated areas had supposedly received land allotments, and, by April, 1950, land distribution was said to have been completed in the Northeast and in about three-quarters of Shansi, Chahar, Hopeh, and other northern provinces. Communist military successes, of course, overshadowed the land reform

and all other activities of the late 1940’s. These successes were based on the mass movements and especially on mobilization of the peasantry through land reform, but they made i t possible for the Communist revolution to advance to a new stage of development.

20 MILITARY VICTORY

Military victory was close at hand for the Chinese Communists. The army units that achieved victory were reorganized several times during

the late 1940’s. At first, they were formed i n columns of about 25,000 men each, but, i n July, 1946, units from the Eighth Route Army, N e w Fourth

Army, and Northeast Democratic Allied Army had collectively taken the title by which they would henceforth be known, the People’s Liberation Army ( P L A ) . By November, 1948, Party Central had reclassified these

forces, now 3 million strong, into field, regional, and guerrilla forces and designated field armies b y area. I n February, 1949, the area field armies were given numerical designations:

Northwest (later First) Field Army, P’eng Teh-huai, commander (but i n effect primarily occupied as deputy commander of the General Headquarters of the Communist armies under Chu Teh and M a o ) , H o Lung, deputy

commander, and Hsi Chung-hsiin, political commissar; Central Plains (later Second) Field Army, Liu Po-ch’eng, commander, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, political commissar; East China (later Third) Field Army, Ch’en Y i , commander, Su Yi, deputy commander, and Jao Shu-shih, political commissar; Northeast China (later Fourth) Field Army, L i n Piao, commander, Hsiao

Ching-kuang, deputy commander, and. Lo Jung-huan, political commissar; and North China (later often called the Fifth) Field Army, Nieh Jung-chen,

commander, Hsli Hsiang-ch’ien, deputy commander, Po Yi-po, political commissar.

The North China (Fifth) Field Army later was placed under the direct

command of the General Headquarters of the Communist armies of which Chu Teh was commander i n chief, P’eng Teh-huai, deputy commander, and Yeh Chien-ying, chief of staff.

Following the resumption of full-scale civil war in July, 1946, and a year of mobile and largely defensive warfare against the Nationalists. Commun-

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ist forces had moved over to the offensive. Early i n 1947, Communist

seizures of areas i n Manchuria, Hopeh, and Shantung had already more than offset ephemeral Nationalist victories of Yenan, Shantung, and else-

where. The Communists controlled four-fifths of Shansi, linked those areas with others i t controlled in neighboring Hopeh, and, by June, 1947, had pushed their line of control i n Manchuria 150 miles to the south. From mid-1947 on, Communists began to push forward into important

new areas, completely altering the military chess board. Matching its military aggressiveness, in October, 1947, the army defiantly dictated terms for Nationalist surrender that were virtually the same as those imposed on the government a year and a half later.® In Manchuria, after mid-September, 1947, Lin Piao’s forces drove further south, cut important railroads, and increasingly isolated Nationalist garrisons. I n the summer of 1947, some 50,000 men under L i u Po-ch’eng and 20,000 under his subordinate, Ch’en Keng, moved southward at a pace of

up to thirty miles a day across the great Central China plain and the Yellow River to re-establish and enlarge bases i n the Tapieh mountains of southern Honan-Anhwei and northern Hupeh, near the site of the old Oyiiwan base, northeast of Wuhan. Ch’en Yi’s East China forces mean-

while traded places with Liu Po-ch’eng’s Central Plains troops in southern Hopeh, while Ch’en’s subordinate, Su Yii, remained i n those areas of Shantung still controlled by the Communists. Next, Nieh Jung-chen’s North China forces took Shihchiachuang on November 12, 1947, the first impor-

tant city south of the Great Wall to be captured after the Nationalist offensives of 1946 and an important railroad junction between Peiping and Taiylian. I t was also just southeast of the headquarters of Liu Shaoch’i’s work committee at Hsipaip’o village, and of the Central Committee from May, 1948 until the early spring of 1949. Further west, the Northwest armies of P’eng Teh-huai and H o Lung, which had tried unsuccessfully to defend Yenan the year before w i t h 20,000 troops, regrouped, maneuvered, and recaptured Yenan i n April, 1948.° As the military situation of the Nationalists deteriorated sharply i n

1947, Nanking stepped up its efforts to acquire additional American aid. At the same time, pressure rose within the United States for a reappraisal of the increasingly alarming situation, and, i n July, 1947, President Truman entrusted General Albert Wedemeyer with this task. During and after his

mission i n August and September, the General spoke out strongly for what he believed to be the only possible course of action, but his recommendations tended to cancel each other out. He demanded decisive Nationalist reforms both of personnel and of policy, but, because he was convinced, as were most conservative observers, that there was n o alternative to Chiang Kai-shek, Wedemeyer also argued for increased aid to the Nationalists, irrespective of whether or not there were any reforms.* Wedemeyer’s pro* H e also proposed other measures, including a “five power guardianship” for Manchuria. The U.S. State Department estimated that i t gave or lent China about $1.5 billion prior to August, 1945, and almost $2.5 billion from then through 1949. O t h e r estimates range from $110 m i l l i o n , w h i c h t h e Chinese Nationalists a n d some

Americans claimed was the real aid given the Nationalists, to Communist estimates of $5.9 billion. There were also United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ( U N R R A ) f u n d s . T h e last A m e r i c a n f u n d s , some $400,000, were voted b y

Congress in April, 1948.°

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posals were rejected by both the Nationalists, who instead of reforming,

became more fixed i n their ways, and the State Department, which at the time was more concerned over the fate of Europe. As Secretary of State Marshall put i t in October, 1948, To achieve the objective of reducing the Chinese Communists to a completely negligible factor i n China i n the immediate future, i t would be necessary for the United States to take over the Chinese Government and administer its economic, military, and governmental affairs [ a n impossible

task]. . . . Present developments make i t unlikely that any amount of United States military or economic aid could make the present Chinese Government capable of reestablishing and then maintaining its control throughout all China. . . . Despite American aid . . . t h e present regime has lost the confidence o f the people, [ a s ] reflected i n the refusal o f soldiers t o fight a n d the

refusal of the people to cooperate i n economic reforms

Hence, by mid-1948, with the continued decline of the Nationalists and further massive American assistance, the stage was set for the final Communist military push. I n the North, for the first time, Communist forces had attained parity w i t h the Nationalists, with more than 2 m i l l i o n effectives® on each side, and the Communists soon surpassed their enemy i n numbers as well as i n morale and discipline. Even i n the South, following a lapse

of more than a decade, Communist guerrillas i n significant numbers began to re-emerge i n border areas of Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi, Hunan-Kwang-

tung-Kiangsi, Kwangtung-Kwangsi, Kwangsi-Yiinnan, Hainan Island, and Anhwei-Chekiang-Kiangsi. By October, 1948, Mao claimed some 30,000 guerrillas were fighting the Nationalists i n those areas.’ I n North China and Manchuria, 1948 saw the military climax of more than a quarter-century of struggle for power between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. I n the spring, Communist forces employed largescale positional warfare for the first time, when troops under Ch’en Keng

and Ch’en Y i took the ancient imperial capitals of Loyang and Kaifeng, although the latter was soon relinquished. I n September, moving east into the homeland of Confucius, Ch’en Y i took Tsinan, the capital of Shantung,

with the help of the defection of an important Nationalist general. I n the West, Ho Lung and P’eng Teh-huai, although suffering occasional defeats, consolidated their gains in northern Shensi and even made thrusts into northern Szechwan. Armageddon for the Nationalists n o w came i n three great campaigns i n the autumn and early winter of 1948-49. The first was i n Manchuria, where 600,000 men of Lin Piao’s Northeast China Field Army, n o w outnumbering the beleaguered Nationalists i n the area, administered the coup de grdce to those who continued to fight. I n mid-October, the important rail junction of Chinchou was captured, and, on October 19, Changchun, a former capital of the Northeast, fell. O n November 2 , following the defec-

tion of many defending troops, Mukden (Shenyang) was taken, and the last Nationalist holdouts in the Northeast at Yingk’ou and Hulutao were captured several days later.’ Not only had Manchuria been lost to the Nationalists, but as General Wedemeyer and others had warned, its futile

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defense had cost the Nationalists some 400,000 of their best troops and weapons. * The next and perhaps most decisive battle of all, was the Huai-Hai

Campaign for Hsiichou, which lay midway between K’aifeng and the sea and was the most important remaining Nationalist military enclave north of the Yangtze. Some 600,000 men of the East China and Central Plains Field Armies surrounded an equal number of Nationalist troops in a vast area north of the Huai River, centered o n Hslichou. Despite heavy Nationalist aerial bombardment, the forces of Ch’en Y i , Liu Po-ch’eng, and Ch’en Keng

slowly closed their net around the Nationalists, cutting Nationalist lines of communication and chopping them up into small groups to be despatched one by one. The great sixty-five-day battle, from November 6 to January 10, cost the Nationalists another 500,000 of their best troops, including

327,000 taken prisoner. A third decisive battle, for the Peiping-Tientsin area, commenced in December, 1948, as armies under L i n Piao, L o Jung-huan, and Nieh Jung-

chen converged, taking Chengte on November 12, T’angshan a month later, and Kalgan on December 24. Tientsin fell on January 15, and a “compromise” agreement reached between Lin Piao and Fu Tso-yi on January 22 largely saved the magnificent once and future Chinese capital from the ravages of war. Communist troops triumphantly entered the city at the end of January, and, later i n the year, Peiping, o r “northern peace,”

once more became the “northern capital” of Peking, the North China People’s Government} and the Central Committee having moved there in February and March, respectively. This final military disaster cost the Nationalists another 500,000 men, further accelerated the collapse of

Nationalist authority, and strengthened the feeling of most of the Chinese millions that “any change would be for the better.” I n the previous four months, the Nationalists had lost almost 1.5 million

men, and only an equal number, mostly support and second-line troops, remained. Between mid-1946 and the end of 1948, according to Communist sources, Nationalist losses reached the staggering figure of 4.9 million, three-quarters of them defectors or prisoners of war. Equally devastating, some 105 of 869 Nationalist generals defected to the Communists.** North of the Yangtze, only pockets around Sian, Taiyiian, and parts of Suiyiian and the far West and Southwest were not yet in Communist hands.

The Fall

of the Nationalists

The trouncing of the Nationalist armies i n late 1948 led the Chinese Communist leadership to predict victory by the end of 1949, rather than in 1951, as had been estimated the previous spring.’* As of November, 1948, the Communists still claimed to control only a quarter of China’s territory and a third of its people, but there was now no doubt of the rapid acceleration of trends favorable to the Communists. I n order further to ease their remaining tasks, in early 1949, the Com* O n e third o f which were made i n the U n i t e d States, which M a o said was the

Communists’ chief supplier.” + Established in August, 1948. See below.

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munists decided the time was ripe for the negotiation of a final settlement. Warning that the “enemy will not perish of himself,” M a o agreed to

negotiate with those “Kuomintang factions which favor peace,” if they would accept Communist terms “ i n their entirety.””*® This, of course, meant surrender, and on January 14, Mao spelled out the severe Communist terms in “‘eight points,” beginning with the punishment of leading “war criminals.” Already named, they included Chiang Kai-shek, the Ch’en

brothers, T. V. Soong, Minister of Defense Ho Ying-ch’in, former Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, Shanghai Mayor W u Kuo-chen, and others.” Seven other almost equally unacceptable terms called for the abolition of the Nationalist constitution and also the government, reorganization of all troops under the Communists, confiscation of “bureaucratic capital,” land reform, abrogation of unequal treaties, and the convening of a new People’s Political Consultative Conference to form a democratic coalition government. Most of these terms,* with somewhat different wording, had been proposed b y Mao o n behalf of the army i n October, 1947, but n o w conditions were obviously different. O n N e w Year’s Day, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to con-

cede government willingness to discuss the “means to end the war” with the former “bandits,” but he presented very different terms for peace, including the preservation of the country’s “integrity,” “sacred constitut i o n , ” armed force, and “free way of life.”*®* O n January 21, following Mao’s scornful rejection o f these terms as “hypocritical” and “reactionary,”

further military setbacks, and the failure of the Western powers to accept a final Nationalist plea for assistance and mediation, Chiang Kai-shek resigned the Presidency to his vice-president and long-time rival Kwangsi General Li Tsung-jen.?° On the following day came the announcement of Peiping’s surrender and of L i Tsung-jen’s willingness to discuss the Communist “eight points,” followed o n January 24 b y the ending of martial law. Finally, o n April 1, after endless further charges and countercharges, a Nationalist delegation arrived i n Peiping to negotiate an ‘Agreement on

Internal Peace,” basically reaffirming the eight points of January 14. On April 20, the Nanking government rejected the agreement, and, the very next day, Mao and Chu Teh signed the “Order to the Army for Countrywide Advance” across the Yangtze and to the northwest and west. The delay i n the further advance o f the Communist armies had been

caused by the need for regroupment and planning, as well as by efforts to minimize the fighting. On December, 30, 1948, Mao had forecast the crossing of the Yangtze and, i n A p r i l , he demanded acceptance of “ t h e eight terms i n their entirety and . n o bargaining.”’?’ N o w the Communist armies had rested, trained, regrouped, and renamed themselves the First, Second, T h i r d , Fourth, and North China (Fifth) Field Armies, while

leftists poured south among hordes of refugees and, with local underground organizations, also moved to facilitate the final Communist push. * The 1947 terms also included a promise of “equality and autonomy” for the minority races, which made u p 6 per cent of the population, that the January terms omitted, possibly in the belief that the Communists n o longer needed to- foreclose their options i n dealing with the nationalities.”

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On April 21, Liu Po-ch’eng’s Second and Ch’en Yi’s Third Field Armies crossed the Yangtze on a 300-mile-wide front and took Nanking on April 23, Hangchow on May 3, Nanchang on May 22, Shanghai on May 27, Foochow o n August 17, and Amoy o n October 17. O n May 16-17, Lin

Piao’s Fourth Field Army captured the Wuhan cities and moved south, taking Changsha o n August 5 , Canton o n October 14, Kweilin o n November 22, Nanning o n December 4 , and, finally, i n April, 1950, Hainan Island,

which since the 1920’s had been partly controlled for the Communists by Feng Pai-chii. I n the North, Nieh Jung-chen’s and Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien’s North China (Fifth) Field Army captured Taiyiian on April 24, 1949, which was defended to the last by warlord Yen Hsi-shan with the help of some Japanese mercenaries. I n the West, P’eng Teh-huai’s First Field Army took Sian on May 20, Lanchow on August 26, and Yinch’uan on September 23. Units of the First and Second Field Armies moved into the Southwest, taking

Kweiyang on November 15 and Chungking on November 30. I n September, the Nationalist rulers of Sinkiang announced their alle-

giance to the new order, as did the governors of Yiinnan and Sikang in December. Other former Nationalists soon ceased to fight and worked out whatever arrangement they could with the holders of the new “Mandate of Heaven.” Even bitter enemies of twenty years before, such as Generals Li Chi-shen and T’ang Sheng-chih, whose forces had helped to destroy the first united front i n 1927, found a place in the new order as holders of various nominal positions. Throughout these dramatic campaigns, the

Communist armies comported themselves with impressive discipline and courtesy, greatly facilitating the Communist takeover.?? The Nationalists retreated i n naturally greater disarray. L i Tsung-jen’s

government fled from Nanking to Canton i n late April and from there, i n stages, to Szechwan. Chiang Kai-shek, who refused to support Li Tsungjen’s faltering efforts t o salvage part of the mainland for the Nationalists, established offices i n Taipei, Taiwan on August 1, 1949, and then, after stops i n Korea and the Philippines, flew to Canton and Chungking before deciding that the “beautiful island,” Formosa, or Taiwan, offered his best

refuge. He took with him remaining reserves of $300 million (U.S.), some 500,000 surviving troops, and even a considerable store of art treasures. I n all, some 2 million mainlanders fled to Taiwan, while L i Tsung-jen, T . V .

Soong, the two Ch’en brothers, and other leaders sought refuge in the United States and elsewhere.

Final ironies marked the behavior of the great powers. The Soviet Union, obeying formal protocol to the last, accompanied the Nationalist government to Canton and negotiated for advantages i n Sinkiang and Manchuria,

while U.S. representatives lingered i n Nanking, i n apparent hope of dialogue with the Communists. Meanwhile, the arrival of a new era was dramatized b y the fact that, for the first time i n a century, the Chinese successfully frustrated the military actions of a foreign power. Com-

munist gunners fired on four British warships and captured one, after they had been sent up the Yangtze in April. Not only would there be no British retaliation as urged by “warmonger Churchill,” declared Mao, but henceforth the “Chinese people ment b y foreign governments.’’?

absolutely w i l l not permit encroach-

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The Establishment of Communist Administration The arduous military struggle had virtually ended b y the late spring of

1949, a victory without parallel i n the history of revolutionary movements. Yet, no one could gainsay, especially i n the light of what was to come, Mao Tse-tung’s famous statement that the Party so far had made “only the first

step i n a long march of 10,000 l i . ” The construction of socialism would require an effort n o less enormous and many different talents and procedures. I n March, M a o warned, With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party—arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. I t has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed i n our ranks. ... W e must guard against such a situation. To win country-wide victory is only the first step i n a long march of 10,000 l i . Even i f this step is worthy of pride, i t is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come.

Mao had no illusion that his long-time prediction that “the Chinese people . will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries” would be realized very soon. The struggles so far had been only the “prologue to a long drama” of future tasks: After several decades, the victory of the Chinese people’s democratic revolution, viewed i n retrospect, will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama begins with a prologue, but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear now i n the Party. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness i n their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle.

Mao was obviously aware of the dangers of overconfidence so often illustrated i n the history of Chinese rebellions, as when the late M i n g rebel L i Tzu-ch’eng had captured Peking only to lose i t almost immediately to

the Manchus and their Chinese collaborators. The Communists have had to live with the fear of a repetition of this story, with the United States and the Kuomintang i n the role of the alien Manchus and their conservative Chinese allies.? Mao delivered these warnings to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee i n March, 1949. Some thirty-four members and nineteen alternates of the Seventh Central Committee met at Hsipaip’o village from March 5 to March 13, 1949, just prior to Party Central’s victorious transfer to Peiping.?® They endorsed Mao’s “eight points” for peace and

called for the convening of a “new People’s Political Consultative Conference” to establish the democratic coalition government that had allegedly been blocked by the Kuomintang since the January, 1946, People’s Political Consultative Conference. I n June, 1949, some 134 delegates, representing twenty-three “democratic organizations,” met i n Peiping as a “preparatory

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committee” to elect a standing committee, headed by Mao, and to adopt “rules and provisions” for the convention in September of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, which would found the new state o n

October 1.7" The major issues at the Second Plenum, and undoubtedly the most

significant aspects of the Party’s work in 1949, were, first, the establishment of government authority behind the advancing Communist armies, and second, and related to the first, the necessary shift of the focus of Party work from the countryside to the cities. As early as the spring of 1947, Mao had called for the “establishment of a peaceful, democratic, and independent new China.” A year later, he

declared that conditions were not yet ripe for a ‘“central People’s government,”’?® but on May 1, 1948, the Party put forth a slogan urging a “new People’s Political Consultative Conference” to establish a democratic coali-

tion government. The new government would be a “People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” which would “embrace all who are willing to join the revolutionary cause at the present stage.” Marching confidently toward these goals, by the end of 1948, the Party had called for the establishment, consecutively, of a new People’s Political Consultative Conference, a People’s Republic of China, and a Central People’s Government of that republic.?® The Communists, of course, had been preparing t o govern all of China for many years, but the organizational structure for this herculean task was far from complete, although, significantly, they had had far more

political experience than the Bolsheviks had had when they came to power i n 1917. Nonetheless, vast areas of rural China, especially i n the South, had virtually n o Communist infrastructure and the Party’s weakness in cities

everywhere was especially critical. Most Chinese Communist leaders had grown u p i n an urban environment, had worked i n the cities i n the 1920’s,

and had issued directives since at least 1940 to increase their efforts and strength i n the metropolitan areas,®® but, in 1949, the Party was still obviously far from able easily to assume urban administration. They did so only with the help of numerous former Nationalist and bourgeois function-

aries, and even the radical labor movement showed few signs of organizational strength until after 1948.* The revolutionary bases, however, had made an important start at

political institution-building and, by late 1948, claimed to govern some 168 million people and 586 cities and towns. The most complete Communist-

dominated government apparatus to date had been established in mid-1948 in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan bases, after their merger in May to form the North China Liberated Area, containing some 44 million people. The North China Bureau of the Party and the North China Military Region, under Po Yi-po and Nieh Jung-chen,

respectively, were the controlling organizations, but, in August, 1948, the North China Joint Administration Committee transformed itself into a full-fledged government, called the North China People’s Government.

Some 541 delegates from the regional people’s assemblies of the two former base areas met at Shihchiachuang in August and elected a twentyseven-member Government Council, headed b y Tung Pi-wu, with Po Yi-po

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and Nieh Jung-chen vice-chairmen. Nine of twenty-seven members were Communists. I t was stated that the meeting would be a prototype for a national congress to be called a year later to form the People’s Republic. Such Communist-dominated government structures obviously could succeed only with the cooperation, i f not active support, of “the people.” Who were “‘the people”? According to Mao, the proletariat, the peasantry, and

the petty and national bourgeoisie made up “the people,” as had been the case for twenty-five years i n the four-class alliance of the “ n e w democratic

revolution.”*®* Although the four-class alliance was supposed to be under the hegemony of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party,

the striking thing about the formula, of course, is that for three-fourths of the Party’s existence, 90 per cent of Party work, by force of circumstance, had been with the peasantry. Thus, Mao stated i n 1940, “ t h e Chinese revo-

lution is virtually the peasants’ revolution.””®* But Mao always insisted on “proletarian [i.e. CCP] leadership” of the peasantry. I n one of his most detailed statements of the idea of class structure in the Communist-led united front, he declared i n January, 1948,

I n the villages i t is the farm laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants, and other working people, united together under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, who conquer the country and should rule the country, and i t is not the poor peasants and farm laborers alone... . I n the country as a whole, i t is the workers, peasants [including the new rich peasants],

small independent craftsmen and traders, middle and small capitalists, oppressed and injured by the reactionary forces, the students, teachers, professors, and ordinary government employee, oppressed minority nationalities and overseas Chinese, a l l united together u n d e r the leadership o f the work-

ing class [through the Communist Party], who conquer the country and should rule the country. . . . 3 °

But n o w M a o decreed to the Second Plenum, From 1927 to the present the center of gravity of our work has been i n the villages—gathering strength i n the villages i n order to surround the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method of work has now ended. The period of “from the city to the village” and of the city leading the village has now begun.3¢

As early as September, 1940, the Central Secretariat similarly had called for a great increase in Party work in the big cities, urging that, in preparation for the “moment of strike,” “ w e must n o w rely on the countryside to

push into the cities and unfold our work there. The Party separation from the big cities should be terminated. . .”’*" The famous formula “surround the cities with the countryside,” which was soon applied to the world at large,®® n o w had its corollary: The proletarian party would regain its

urban roots. Although warning of the need to maintain a proper balance between urban and rural work, Mao went o n to caution, ‘Nevertheless, the center of gravity of the work of the Party and the army must be i n the

cities; we must do our utmost to learn how to administer and build the cities. J)’88

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How could Communists master China’s intractable urban problems in view of the Party’s inadequate urban experience? Even seven years later, despite “proletarian recruitment,” Party composition was more or less what

i t had been since the mid-1920’s, its only really proletarian period. By 1956, still only 14 per cent of Party members were of proletarian origin, 11.7 per

cent were intellectuals, and 69.1 per cent peasants.’* Hence, the Party’s lack o f affinity w i t h the proletarian class had to be solved by continued

efforts to “think like a proletarian,” regardless of one’s class background, and by effective united-front policies i n the cities. The need for cadres with skills i n urban administration was obvious, as i n the call for 53,000 political workers* to accompany the drive south, where ‘“‘the People’s Liberation Army will occupy first the cities and then the villages.””*?> The army would have to bear much of the burden i n “taking over and administering the large cities,” and preparations for this work were under way early i n 1949. Mao simultaneously sought to encourage a

strict class approach and a wide united front i n urban work. He criticized the idea of simply allying with the urban poor, let alone with the bourgeoisie, as advocated by some. Rather, “ w e must wholeheartedly rely o n the

working class, unite with the rest of the laboring masses, win over the intellectuals

.

[ a n d ] as many as possible of the national bourgeois ele-

ments and their representatives who can cooperate with us—or neutralize . ” Such a policy would mean “developing a group of non-Party them. democrats who have prestige and can cooperate with us”** and avoiding the earlier left and right extremes of excessive exclusion or toleration. Therefore, i n addition to using the political cadres developed i n the base areas to administer new areas.

We must also pay attention to enrolling cadres from the big cities controlled by the Kuomintang. I n the big cities in Kuomintang areas, there are many workers and intellectuals who can take part i n our work and who have, generally speaking, a higher cultural level than the workers and peasants i n the old liberated areas. We should make use of large numbers of working personnel from the Kuomintang’s economic, financial, cultural, and educational institutions, excluding the reactionary elements. . .

.44

Mao claimed that the Party had already “won over to the side of our Party the broad masses of workers, students, teachers, professors, cultural workers, ordinary residents, and national capitalists, as well as all the democratic parties and people’s organizations’ i n the cities.*” Indeed, there were

numerous reports of Communist infiltration even at high levels of the Kuomintang. Certainly also, the students, intellectuals i n general, and all salaried employees h i t b y inflation were increasingly restive.*® Still, the

Party was very cautious in taking over new cities, as at Loyang, where Mao warned against “haste” i n advancing the social revolution, at least until the

national revolution had been completed.* Finally, the Party stressed again and again the need to maintain and increase production both for the final war effort and for the “central task

* In

O c t o b e r , 1948, some 30,000 t o 40,000 political cadres were called t o administer

newly liberated areas i n the North with 50 to 100 million inhabitants.”

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[ o f ] production and construction” for the new China.*® Such steps were necessary to complete the “bourgeois democratic revolution.” Accordingly,

“for a fairly long time to come,” private ownership, both i n the rural areas and in the cities, would be protected with the socialization only of “bureaucrat capital” and big industry. The socialist revolution, with its complete overturn and reconstruction of Chinese society, was yet to come. Nonetheless, i t was crystal clear that

China’s new rulers would accept nothing less and were devoting increasing energies to building the institutions essential for that task. But, for the world’s largest nation, and one of the poorest, the job would be stupendous. No wonder that, on the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Party i n 1949, M a o would repeat his warning of four months before:

“Our past work is only the first step in a long march of 10,000 li.”*°

21 THE PARTY I N POWER: POLITICAL A N D SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

O n October 1, 1949, standing atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace with his

back to Peking’s ancient Forbidden City, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the formation of the Chinese People’s Republic. I t had been twenty-eight years and three months since Mao and a dozen others had gathered in Shanghai to found the Party that gave birth to the new state, and the contrast between past and present could not have been greater. I n 1921, Mao

and his comrades had been hunted outlaws whom the police very nearly arrested before the Party was a week old; i n 1949, they were triumphant conquerors on the occasion of the century’s “second October.”

Their new tasks as rulers of the world’s most populous country would prove as arduous, although less dangerous, and much more complicated than was the previous quarter-century of bitterly difficult struggle. Even the minimum goals sought by all Chinese Communists, regardless of their differences of experience and outlook, would demand enormous efforts.

These goals were first of all to restore China to its traditional preeminence i n the world by strengthening its government, army, and economy and simultaneously to nationalize the economy and make the society “Communist,” however that was to be defined. A recent study details these all-embracing goals i n the following manner: Since 1949, the Chinese Communists have sought (1) to reorient ideological values and patterns of behavior, through a ceaseless process of indoctrination, re-education, and acculturation, thereby creating a new Marxist ethos stressing especially

the values of “struggle,” “labor,” and “public spirit’; (2) to restructure Chinese society b y creating a new system of authority, new institutions, new roles, and a new hierarchy of relationships conducive to desired social and political goals; (3) to create a new political order of the ‘“‘people’s

democratic dictatorship’ i n which all citizens are mobilized into various mass organizations; (4) to transfer loyalty and associational sentiments

from traditional primary groups (essentially family-oriented) to the nationstate, the Party, and new work-related groups; (5) to form a new ‘“pro-

letarian’’ identity, both national and personal; (6) to improve skills through selective adoption of traditional and modern methods; (7) to

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socialize the economy i n order to spur rapid development by collective means; and (8) to build a powerful modern nation free of real or

imagined foreign domination or intimidation.’ As Mao said in mid-1957, “Our aim is to create a political situation which is centralist and yet democratic, disciplined and yet free, ideologically united and yet individually content, and dynamic and lively. . . . ” ? I n short, the Chinese Communists have sought virtually total revolution for their country, to bring i t from among the last to the first i n the eyes of the world and completely to reorder its traditional society and ethos. They

have succeeded in a surprising number of these grandiose ambitions, but the road has been difficult and the final Maoist destination remains far in the future. Naturally, all sorts of men were engaged i n the gigantic endeavors to realize these goals. Therefore, i f Communist leaders basically agreed on

ends, the diversity of opinion among them over the means to use i n making the “new China’ was almost as marked as i t was between them and their nationalist allies of the past quarter-century. But the Communists, unlike their predecessors during the previous hundred years, were organized for these tasks. Even more important, i n long years of struggle, they

had learned how to organize others, a formidable weapon i n the age of mass society. Without that ability for mass organization, which was the hallmark o f their rise to power, the Chinese Communists could never have

weathered the unending crises that beset the People’s Republic, from the Korean War and the hostility of all the major powers, to the far more complex demands of not only ruling but revolutionizing three-quarters of a billion hard-pressed and largely impoverished people, with all that that entailed i n economic, intellectual, social, and political spheres. As the heirs of a hundred years of revolution, the Communists were swept up in a raging tide. But, as dedicated revolutionaries, i n contrast to their Nationalist predecessors, they have sought, despite its overwhelming turbulence, to drive the tide forward. Whatever their faults and short-

comings, the Chinese Communists have never lacked boldness and drive, and, after victory as before it, most have given all their energy to continued struggle to realize their goals. Many would argue, indeed, that they have often tried too impatiently and hard to b u i l d the “ n e w China,” con-

stantly stirring up new difficulties to add to the staggering problems facing any rulers of so populous a country. Undoubtedly, their pride added new dimensions of challenge, as, for example, i n exporting food i n the late 1950’s and early 1960’s to pay off debts and to foster revolution in the Third World, despite the threat of mass starvation at home. This revolutionary impetuosity i n the name of Communist ideology and its social complement, the organization of every man, woman, and child under a

totalitarian state, have made the new order very different from previous great Chinese dynasties and i n many respects different from any other

society in history. A t the same time, as able political leaders and heirs of the world’s

longest bureaucratic tradition, the Chinese Communist rulers have recognized the need to ease the pressure for change at critical moments, thereby preserving their “mandate of Heaven.” As Mao stated i n 1959, “We must

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have both tensions and relaxations.” Accordingly, “liberation” was followed by a year or so of relative moderation, as leaders and people caught their breath before plunging, i n late 1950, into a period of radical policies at home and abroad. Then from 1953 to 1957, except for the collectivization of agriculture, the Party relaxed pressure at certain key points,

especially in urban life and foreign policy, before intensifying efforts again on all fronts i n the Great Leap Forward and antirightist periods of 1957-59. Economic realities, the break with the Soviet Union, and other

factors necessitated another more moderate period from 1960 to 1965, followed in turn by the greatest post-1949 struggle of all, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. T o some extent, as the Maoists tried to argue i n the Cultural Revolution, these turns of policy were a product of differences among the leadership, but, to a much greater degree, they were the products of the awareness of all Communist leaders that the people

and country could stand only so much stress at any one time. Yet, overshadowing the oscillations of Party policy and variations in the pace of change, has been the progress and turmoil of the greatest social revolution in history, with far-reaching changes i n the lives of one-quarter of mankind. While the years since 1949 have brought even more rapid change to the Chinese millions than the previous decades had seen, Party structure,

which now directed the revolution from above as well as from below, continued essentially unchanged. The CCP remained a highly motivated, disciplined, and organized vanguard for revolution, obviously the country’s political elite. Membership perforce took on new qualities and multiplied many times as the Party assumed control of the country, its organizations

parallel to key positions i n government, army, and mass organizations, with top leaders in one sphere often holding overlapping positions in the others. This is not the place for an adequate account of the problems facing China after 1949 or of the response to them of the Chinese Communist leadership.* But a brief survey of major periods and problems may be useful before summarizing information on the social background and role of the Party in this chapter. The concluding chapters will review the history of the Party from 1949 to 1971 i n terms of what is known of principal Party meetings, debates, and rectification campaigns.

The Challenges of the 1950’s and 1960’s The first order of business for the new rulers naturally was the com-

pletion of the conquest of the country, with the capture or surrender of the West and Southwest i n late 1949, Hainan Island i n April, 1950, and finally

Tibet in October, 1950.* About the same time as the conquest of Tibet, * Tibet had been conquered by the Manchus i n the eighteenth century, following 1,000 years of intermittent hostilities and cultural relations between China and Tibet. With the collapse of the Manchus i n 1911, Tibet became independent until the Communist invasion of 1950. A l l Chinese consider Tibet an integral part of their country, although the Tibetans have traditionally resisted Chinese domination, most recently with force in 1959. A n inexact but suggestive parallel for Sino-Tibetan relations might b e the relations between dominant Americans o r Russians, o n the one h a n d , a n d

indigenous tribes of Indians or Siberians, o n the other.

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Chinese “volunteers” entered the Korean W a r i n force and were fully

engaged there militarily until the truce of July, 1953.° I n China proper, understandably, there also had to be essentially military rule at first. Working with military control committees to establish order and administration for newly conquered areas, the Party began to create and transform local bureaucracies. Between 1949 and 1954, the military and Party were organized into six regions for the Northeast, North, Northwest, East, Southwest, and Central-South, each subdivided into provincial and subprovincial levels. The six regions formed the major focus of government for the first five years of the new order. While they were establishing relative military and administrative security, the Communists also pushed to complete the “bourgeois democratic” economic and social revolution. By the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan i n 1953, with the help of Soviet aid,* inflation was halted and the economy was largely restored to its best prewar levels. Until the mid-1950’s,

the economy continued as a mixture of capitalist-run small enterprises, with state control of strategic transportation and industries. Most central to an overwhelmingly agrarian country, some three-

quarters of whose 1953 population of 583 million lived i n the countryside o n annual earnings of about $100 (U.S.) o r so, was the development of

agriculture. Not only did China have to increase its food production by 2 per cent per year just to hold even against the annual increment of more than 15 million people,f but the country’s leaders were determined to “end feudalism,” first by spreading land reform from the old base areas to the rest of the country and then b y embarking o n the still greater challenge of the socialization of agriculture. I n June, 1950, the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee approved the “agrarian reform

law,” which was milder than the laws of 1946-48 in guaranteeing protection of “rich peasants” but went far beyond the pre-1946 and 1948-49 rent and interest reductions systematically to attack and ultimately destroy landlords across the face of China.* Gathering momentum with the Korean W a r i n late 1950, the new land

reform reached a peak i n 1951 and was basically completed by 1952. I t constituted the bloodiest stage of the “revolution from above” and the leading moral test of the Communist government by traditional ethical standards of means and ends. Revolutionary social and economic change in an established society could not have been achieved without some violence,

but the Chinese Communists committed their greatest excesses in the land reform. I n 1957, Mao admitted the execution i n the early 1950’s of some 750,000 counterrevolutionaries, meaning basically landlords, an average

of about one per village, though naturally with great variations across the vast land. Some claim the figures are much higher ( 2 million might be a

fair guess), and, i n addition, many thousands undoubtedly starved to * Between 1949 and mid-1960, when Soviet aid to China ended, i t had totaled about $1.5 billion (U.S.), or only a portion of the $4 or $5 billion i n economic and military aid the United States gave to the Nationalist government on Taiwan i n 1949-65. + The Communists have succeeded i n this task except for the depression years of 1960-61, but a greater achievement has been a far more even distribution of goods than was ever carried out previously i n Chinese history.

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death and tens of millions were sent into forced labor.” But one must put these tragic developments in the context of China’s long history of devastating famines and wars, and of the Soviet Union under Stalin, when tens of

millions lost their lives i n the upheavals of the 1930s. I n China, far more than in the Soviet Union, because of the extraordinary degree of mass organization, Communist “forced labor” has been “among the people,”

that is, the product of “downward transfers” to villages and migrations to frontier regions, rather than of enforced servitude i n labor camps. Moreover, much depended on what individual Chinese had to lose or gain. For the vast majority, there were invaluable achievements in the spreading and equalization of education, health care, and existing material benefits. I f distressing numbers of intellectuals and others lost their “freedom’ and “counterrevolutionaries” lost their lives, hundreds of millions gained far greater material security than they had ever known before, although most remained very poor. A man’s outlook depended on his values and on what changes had occurred i n his life. Determined to avoid the disasters of Soviet collectivization twenty years

before, the Chinese Communists did not allow the peasants to enjoy for long the often promised period of “land to the tiller” but pressed almost immediately for collectivization and then communization of agriculture. Mutual Aid Teams for the pooling of labor were introduced by 1951, almost simultaneously with the redistribution of land. From about 1952

on, lower-stage Agricultural Producer Cooperatives (APC) began to be established, with the pooling of labor, tools, and some land i n “joint

ownership.” I n 1955, at Mao’s direction, more complete types of cooperativization were organized, with the formation of higher-stage APC’s, where most tools and land were held i n common ownership. This stage was 90 per cent complete by the end of 1956. During 1955-56, the urban economy was also socialized, with the state taking control of more than 90 per cent of all industry. However, again in contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s and 1930’s, willing members of the bourgeoisie were allowed to cooperate and the bourgeoisie was not liquidated as a class. The contrast between Communist urban policies and their rural policies of liquidating the gentry in land reform was even more striking. Primarily because of the need to utilize all available economic skills, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, as

against the “big and more reactionary” bourgeoisie and the landlords, was allowed to continue as a kind of state-controlled managerial class, at least into the 1960’s. Many kept their former jobs as factory managers and the like and, at least until the Cultural Revolution, were paid interest of u p

to 5 per cent or so on their capital, which the state had expropriated. Hence, for some fifteen years after 1949, the basic principle of linking the

proletariat, peasantry, and petty and national bourgeoisie in a united front remained in effect. Some businessmen even continued to live i n Shanghai and elsewhere o n a scale not too different from the one they had enjoyed before “liberation,” with servants, chauffeurs, and the rest. Moreover, according to charges of the Cultural Revolution, bourgeois children continued to dominate educational and cultural life. Nonetheless, the bour-

geoisie, like everyone else i n China, was subjected to an unending series of campaigns to enforce its total obedience and subservience to the state,

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beginning w i t h the “three- and five-anti” campaigns (against waste, cor-

ruption, bureaucratism, and other evils) of 1951. The “petty bourgeois” intellectuals, particularly the social scientists and creative writers, were embroiled i n a relentless series of thought-reform campaigns. These began i n 1951 w i t h criticisms of current commentaries o n a movie about the life of W u Hsiin and o n the novel The Dream of the

Red Chamber, moved on to campaigns against prominent writers H u Feng, H u Shih, Liang Shu-ming, and Feng Yu-lan in the early 1950’s, to the Hundred Flowers and antirightist campaigns of 1956-58, and finally, i n the late 1960’s, to the Cultural Revolution. I n 1956, the 100,000 “higher intellectuals” (that is, those w i t h the equivalent of a college education and working i n ‘scientific research, education, engineering,

public health work, education, and the arts’) were said to be about 45 per cent “progressive” and favorably disposed toward the Communist Party, 40 per cent neutral and more than 10 per cent “backward” and hostile to the new order.® They and the then 3.75 million “lower intellectuals” (those with the equivalent of a high school education) were expected to master the essentials of Marxism and the “thought of M a o

Tse-tung” in their schools, i n special training classes, and on their own. Constant discussion of current policies and problems at meetings, perhaps averaging once a week but much more often for certain groups, and i n the numerous thought reform campaigns tested the understanding of this study. Moreover, together w i t h students of all ages, millions were ‘‘trans-

ferred downward” to participate i n labor, simultaneously learn “working class ideology,” and impart knowledge to rural and remote areas of the country. The adoption of a new national constitution at the first session of the National People’s Congress on September 20, 1954, replacing the Common Program and “Organic Laws’ of 1949, meant the ending of military regional rule, which had prevailed up to that time, and, together with the progress of the First Five-Year Plan and plans for the socialization of the

economy, signaled the start of the “period of the general line for the transition to socialism.” The completion of cooperativization by 1957, well ahead of schedule, meant an advance to the further stage of “building socialism.” Many i n China, “dizzy with success’ i n Stalin’s phrase deriding excesses i n Soviet collectivization a quarter-century earlier, n o w felt

ready for the further jump of “building Communism” and, i n 1958, launched the inordinately ambitious Great Leap Forward and people’s communes movements. Staggering problems, especially the extreme difficulty of achieving rapid agricultural development and the disappointingly low level of Soviet aid,

forced the decision to vault to a new stage of still greater mass mobilization. The communes were designed to build capital by utilizing China’s vast manpower i n projects ranging from backyard steel furnaces to the building of more irrigation projects than had been constructed in all of Chinese history—this i n the land of the Great Wall and the Grand Canal. The approximately 74,000 communes* were designed to provide basically * Initially, some 750,000 collectives were consolidated into 24,000 communes and then reorganized into about 74,000.

438

The Long March to Power

self-sufficient units for the better mobilization of China’s half-billion peasants. On the average, there were first about twelve, then about thirtyseven communes, though with much variation, i n each of China’s counties.

The hopes of 1958 were premature, to say the least, and 1959 saw a sharp curtailment of the more grandiose aspects of the Great Leap Forward. As revelations of the Cultural Revolution made clear, retrenchment

was due both to sharp intra-Party criticism of the unreality of Maoist rhetoric and to intractable economic problems caused by the overburdening of available transportation and human endurance. The abrupt cessation of Soviet aid in August, 1960, and the worst weather conditions since 1949 i n 1960-61* further increased the strain. By 1963, gradual recovery had resumed, with the economy attaining its early 1959 peak b y 1966,}

but, throughout the early 1960’s, the Party did not undertake major new economic and social initiatives comparable to those of the 1950’s. About 5 per cent of farm land was restored to private ownership after the total nationalization of 1958, and the communes were decentralized. Real authority passed back to the old cooperative level, now called the “production brigade,” of which there were about 700,000 i n the early 1960s, and,

within the brigades, to some 4.5 million production teams. Intellectuals spoke w i t h greater freedom than at any time since 1957, and, compared with previous years, the country was relatively quiescent, except for con-

stant drives for “socialist education.” I t was the calm before the storm, and the reasons for this partial relaxation are now clear. Economic realities, the

brush with mass starvation, the growing split with the Soviet Union, which had begun in 1956 and gathered intensity through the 1960’s, the continuing hostility between the mainland and Taiwan, growing U.S. involvement i n Southeast Asia, and border skirmishes w i t h India, especially i n 1959 and 1962—all restrained new internal initiatives. Above all, as the Cultural

Revolution made clear, the Party was increasingly divided as to the proper course of action for the third decade of Communist rule i n China. The CCP Establishes a State Structure

Through all of these developments prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party, backed by the People’s Liberation Army, was the country’s indisputable center of authority. At times, as during the First Five-Year Plan of the mid-1950’s, the Party remained in the background, but, at other times, as during the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950’s, i t took command of virtually a l l activities from the village up.

Under the slogan “Politics Takes Command,” i t dominated decisionmaking in all aspects of Chinese life. As Mao put it, “The Party leads everything’ i n the “seven fields of industry, agriculture, trade, education, military affairs, the government, and the Party.”’® The Party’s Political Bureau, Central Committee, and Military Affairs Committee made all strategic decisions, while Party leaders oversaw tactical implementation of those decisions i n their various functional capacities i n the government, * There h a d also been serious n a t u r a l disasters i n 1953-54 a n d 1956-57, w i t h more

than one-tenth of the land affected by floods and drought. + China’s gross national product i n 1966 was about 67 per cent above that of 1952, the year when the economy had reached or surpassed its pre-1949 peak.’

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

439

army, and mass organizations. The Party was the brain and nervous system of these interlocking systems. Thus, Mao, the Chairman of the Party, was also the head of state until

1959, when L i u Shao-ch’i, then the Party’s Vice-Chairman , became Chairman of the Republic. As chief of state until 1959, M a o also headed the

leading advisory groups for defense and the state, the National Defense Council and Supreme State Conference, and, until 1954, the Central People’s Government Council, the functions of the latter subsequently being

assumed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, headed b y L i u Shao-ch’i i n 1954-59 and Chu Teh after 1959. The other

most important positions of power in the country also are held exclusively by long-time Communist leaders. L i n Piao, who i n 1966 temporarily re-

placed Liu Shao-ch’i as Mao’s presumed heir and as sole Vice-Chairman of the Party, had been de facto director of the Military Affairs Committee since 1959, when he replaced P’eng Teh-huai as minister of defense. Yeh Chien-ying assumed many of these positions after Lin’s disappearance i n

1971. I n the trinity of Party, military, and state power, Chou En-lai, whose experience in the history of the Party is the equal of Mao’s, has been the most conspicuous government figure. As the second- or third-ranking leader, both before and after the Cultural Revolution, Chou has headed since 1949 the “highest organ” of executive authority under the Standing Committee

of the National People’s Congress. This organ, the cabinet, was called the Government Administration Council from 1949 to 1954 and the State Council thereafter.

Similarly, senior Party leaders have held the most important positions in government ministries, i n the people’s courts, People’s Liberation Army, Communist Youth League, and in organizations for women’s, labor, and other influential groups in China. The only nominal exceptions to this pattern prior to the Cultural Revolution occurred in some largely ceremonial jobs, such as vice-chairman of the Republic (Madame Sun Yat-

sen, Soong Ching-ling), and i n the eight “other” parties, such as the Democratic League and Revolutionary Kuomintang. The Communists also sought to mobilize non-Communists i n support of the government through various “united front” measures. For example, only 16 of 662 delegates to the People’s Political Consultative Conference of September, 1949, and about one-third of the delegates to the first session of the National People’s Congress elected i n 1954 were Communists, while i n 1949, probably 11 of 24, and i n 1962, 12 of 39 ministries were headed b y non-Communists.'’ A t lower levels, i t was still more necessary to use the skills of non-Com-

munists in many economic and political functions, but usually Party men supervised their work and loyalty, and i n n o case prior to the Cultural Revolution d i d the Party tolerate threats to its power. Then, starting i n the 1960’s, numerous token non-Communist ceremonial positions were phased

out, although the army took over many or most positions i n the late 1960’s as the Party was profoundly chastened by the Cultural Revolution.

I n all, by the later 1950s, “over 50,000 members of the Communist Party” were said to be serving “ i n the organs of the central government,” while the Cultural Revolution supposedly reduced their number, temporarily at least, to about 10,000. These men naturally developed loyal-

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[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

441

ties not only to the Party but also to their occupations in the central bureaucracies, as did Communists scattered throughout the “functional systems” in military, legal, cultural, educational, financial, trade, industry, communications, agricultural, water control, forestry, mass organization, and other types of work.’® The Cultural Revolution and other purges

attacked the tendency for such functional specialization to fragment Party loyalties, but paradoxically i t was far easier for non-Party, than for Party, functionaries to survive the purges, at least initially. Since the locus of

power was clearly in the Party, the Party had to be rectified first. The Army and the Party A major bulwark of the Party’s power was, of course, the People’s

Liberation Army, virtually an arm of the CCP, as i t had been since 1927. Party control of the military is exercised from the top through the Military Affairs Committee and its standing committee and, to a lesser extent, through the state’s National Defense Council and Ministry of Defense. M a o is probably chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, with P’eng

Teh-huai serving as de facto head from 1954 to 1959 and concurrently as minister of defense. Lin Piao replaced Liu Shao-ch’i in 1959 and served as de facto chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and minister of defense until 1971. The role of the military, important since 1927, increased still further in the Cultural Revolution. After the Party’s Ninth Congress in 1969, close to twelve of the twenty-one full members of the Political Bureau were military men, as against about half that many i n the previous congress.* Similarly, about 45 per cent of the 279 members and alternates of the Ninth Central Committee are military men, as against about one-third of the Eighth Central Committee, and, by 1970, some 40 of 102 heads of government departments and ministries were military men. But, for the most part, these men were newly prominent, while military members of the Eighth Central Committee were purged in the Cultural Revolution at about the same rate as their civilian counterparts.'® I n the ranks, Party and Youth League were increasingly represented within the army. By 1953, about one-third of the P L A , or 1.2 o f its 3.5

million men, were Communists, and up to 60 per cent were either in the Youth League or were Communists. I n the mid-1950’s, as the army was reduced i n size to a low of about 2.5 million men, before growing again i n the late 1960’s to about 3.3 million, more than three-quarters of demobi-

lized soldiers were members of either the Party or Youth League. By the early 1960’s, Communist cells existed i n all companies and more than half * O f the dozen, about one-half, and of the Central Committee, about one-third had been associated with Lin Piao’s Fourth Field Army of the late 1940’s, while about four had also been i n Chang Kuo-t’ao’s and Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien’s Fourth Front Army in the 1930’s. A t least twenty of the twenty-nine chairmen of provincial revolutionary committees of the Cultural Revolution were military men, eight of them from Lin Piao’s First Front A r m y o f the 1930’s, w h i l e five o f t h i r t e e n commanders

of military regions had fought with Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Fourth Front Army." + By contrast, prior to the Cultural Revolution, younger members of the Party elite had had progressively less experience with the military.”

442

The Long March to Power

of all squads; Mao’s pre-1949 formula by which about one-third of the fighting force would be members of the CCP had clearly been exceeded. Similar high proportions of Party members prevailed i n the security and police forces, with the Party controlling not only their commands but also, together with the Youth League, a substantial majority of their membership. During the Cultural Revolution, the security system, like most spheres of Chinese life, came more directly under the control of the mili-

tary than i n preceding years.’ Behind the Party control committees stood the security forces of the Party, army, and state. For understandable reasons, even less information

is available on them and on police activities in general than on other aspects of life. I t is estimated that, from the late 1950’s on, there were

some 1.7 million people working under the Ministry of Public Security (headed by Lo Jui-ch’ing in 1949-58, and Hsieh Fu-chih from 1958 until his death in 1972), some of whom may have also been members of the PLA’s public security system.'® The millions of members of the people’s militia, and to a lesser extent every member of a mass organization, which is to say virtually every citizen of China, are also involved i n maintaining public security i n a country that, throughout its recent history, has been

on a war footing i n struggles against counterrevolution, foreign enemies, and even nature. The structure of the People’s Liberation Army is shown in Chart 21.2. The Central Party Structure Prior to 1966

As before 1949, supreme authority within the Party theoretically stemmed from its National Congress, which was supposed t o meet every three years according to the 1945 constitution and every year according

to the 1956 constitution, but which after 1945 met only in 1956, 1958 (Eighth Party Congress, first and second sessions), and 1969 (Ninth

Party Congress). According to the Ninth Party Congress constitution (article 8 ) , the National Congress is to meet every five years, unless advanced or postponed due to ‘special circumstances.” Delegates to the National Congress, who are elected by lower Party committees, elect a Central Committee, which i n turn elects its Chairman, Political Bureau, Political Bureau Standing Committee, and, prior to 1969, Secretariat and

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of the Ninth Central Committee, were listed only by the stroke order of their surnames, the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order.

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The Long March to Power CHART 21.3 CENTRAL PARTY ORGANIZATION (ELECTIVE STRUCTURE) BEFORE 1966

Chairman

Mao Tse-tung

Vice-Chairmen

Liu Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch’en Yiin, Lin Piao

General Secretary

Teng Hsiao-p’ing

Political Bureau Standing

M a o Tse-tung, L i u Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, C h u

Committee

Political Bureau (full members)

Teh, Ch’en Yiin, and, after May, 1958, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p’ing 1949: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch’i, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Ch’en Yiin, Chang Wen-t’ien, K’ang Sheng, L i n Po-ch’ii, T u n g Pi-wu, K a o K a n g , P’eng Chen,

Jen Pi-shih; added later: P’eng Teh-huai (1953), L i n P i a o ( 1 9 5 5 ) , Teng Hsiao-p’ing ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; added i n October, 1956: L i Fu-ch’un, L i Hsien-nien,

Ch’en Y i , H o Lung, Liu Po-ch’eng, L o Jung-huan; added in May, 1958: K’o Ch’ing-shih, L i Chingch’iian, T’an Chen-lin (deletions, demotions, deaths)

Purged: Kao Kang (1953-54); demoted to alternates: Chang Wen-t’ien and K’ang Sheng (1956); inactive: P’eng Teh-huai and possibly Ch’en Yiin ( a f t e r J u l y , 1 9 5 9 ) ; deaths: Jen Pi-shih ( 1 9 5 0 ) , L i n Po-ch’ii ( 1 9 6 0 ) , L o Jung-huan ( 1 9 6 3 ) , K ’ o Ch’ing-

shih (1965)

Secretariat

Teng Hsiao-p’ing, P’eng Chen, Wang Chia-hsiang, T’an Chen-lin, T’an Cheng, Huang K’o-ch’eng, L i Hsiieh-feng, L i Fu-ch’un, L i Hsien-nien, L u Tingyi, K’ang Sheng, L o Jui-ch’ing

Central Control Committee

Tung Pi-wu

Central Committee

1945: 4 4 m e m b e r s a n d 33 alternates 1956: 9 7 members a n d 73 alternates (1958: 25 additional alternates)

National Party Congress

More than 1,000 representatives elected by lower Party committees

Sources: Adapted from Griffith, Army, Appendix; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 140 ft; Lewis, Leadership, p p . 120 fI.; Peter T a n g , Communist China Today: Domestic a n d

Foreign Policies, rev. ed., vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 129 ff.; Franklin W . Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism (hereafter, Houn, History) (Englew o o d Cliffs, N . J . , 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 8 2 fI.; a n d K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary.

I n about 1949, the Political Bureau had been composed of a dozen men (see Chart 21.3). I n 1953, P’eng Teh-huai, back from command of the

PLA i n the Korean War, was included, as in 1955, a year after the purge of Kao Kang, were Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p’ing. The Eighth Party Congress i n October, 1956, expanded the Political Bureau, adding Li Fuch’un, L i Hsien-nien, and P L A marshals Ch’en Y i , H o Lung, L i u Poch’eng, and L o Jung-huan, and naming six alternates: Ulanfu, Chang

Wen-t’ien, L u Ting-yi, Ch’en Po-ta, K’ang Sheng, and Po Yi-po, two of whom, Chang and K’ang, had dropped from full to alternate status. With the purge of Kao Kang, there were seventeen full members of the Political

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

445

Bureau i n late 1956. The Eighth Central Committee’s Fifth Plenum in May, 1958, added K’o Ch’ing-shih, Li Ching-ch’iian,'® and T’an Chen-lin, but, after July, 1959, P’eng Teh-huai, Chang Wen-t’ien, and possibly Ch’en Yiin ceased active participation i n the Political Bureau due to intra-

Party politics. Three full members of the Political Bureau died in the early 1960’s, Lin Po-ch’ii, Lo Jung-huan, and K’0o Ch’ing-shih. Then, from 1966 on, of course, the Cultural Revolution and its after-

math completely transformed the Political Bureau, purging eight of the eleven members who had been most active as of 1965. The size of the Political Bureau, however, twenty-one full members and four alternates, remained substantially the same, and, i f one extends the leadership group to include the Central Committee, there is surprising continuity, with some two-thirds of the surviving full members of the 1945 Central Committee re-elected i n 1969.2° The Secretariat, which from its reorganization i n December, 1937, to

1956 included the most influential members of the Political Bureau, was de-emphasized by the Eighth National Congress and was not even mentioned by the 1969 Party Constitution. Although superseded in 1956 by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Secretariat continued to be charged with attending ‘ t o the daily work of the Central Committee under the direction of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.”’*! Of its members, only Teng Hsiao-p’ing, as General Secretary until his downfall i n 1966, was also o n the Standing Committee of the Political

Bureau, but all were members of the Central Committee. Members of the Secretariat are shown i n Chart 21.3. Among Secretariat members, only K’ang Sheng and L i Hsien-nien fared well i n the Cultural Revolution. L i Fu-ch’un and L i Hsilieh-feng also survived, but, for a period after 1966, the new ad hoc central Cultural Revolution Group took over the functions o f the Secretariat. The Party’s General (or Administrative or Staff) Office and, until 1956 (when the post was absorbed), its director (as against General Secretary

of the Secretariat) assisted the Secretariat i n handling the daily affairs of the Party and also aided the organization department i n the crucial assignment a n d control o f personnel. T h e Secretariat, General Office, and organi-

zation department all worked closely together i n the daily operations of the Party, and their three chiefs, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Yang Shang-k’un, and A n Tzu-wen, respectively, were all prominent and key victims of the Cul-

tural Revolution. The positions and functions of these offices after 1966 are obscure, and none are mentioned i n the N i n t h Party Constitution, nor is the Party’s Central Control Committee (discussed below) . 2 The 1956 constitution, however, stressed the functions of the Party control committees “ t o examine and deal w i t h cases of violation of the Party constitution, Party discipline, Communist ethics, and state l a w s ” (article 53) and directed their establishment on a regular basis at all levels down to the county. Since the early 1930’s, the Party had employed “control committees’ to investigate certain problems and, in November, 1949, established a discipline inspection committee. After the purge of

Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih i n 1953-54*, Party Central urged some * See Chapter 22.

446

The Long March to Power

stronger mechanism to enforce discipline, and toward that end the National Party Conference of March, 1955, established a control committee under Tung Pi-wu (who also handled this work i n the late Kiangsi period), n o w assisted b y five deputies. By 1956, some 40,000 Communists

in state organs, and at least several hundred thousand cadres i n all, were concerned with control work overseeing every aspect of public life.* There were also the Communist Youth League and state ministries of control exerting important checks on all activities. Prior to the early 1950’s at least, the Party’s secret police, euphemisti-

cally called the social affairs department under K’ang Sheng and Li K’onung, directed more specialized forms of security work, but, after the early years of the new order, the Party’s role in this was rarely mentioned. The control committees handled most intra-Party discipline and security problems and passed the most serious offenders along to the state and military security forces, both supervised by the Military Affairs Committee. The state Ministry of Supervision* was abolished in 1959, but the Party control committees became still more active in the early 1960’s prior to being purged and downgraded in the Cultural Revolution. Even in the 1950’s, to a far greater degree than was the case throughout Soviet history, there was a shift from external and vertical controls by Party and state organizations to internal lateral controls and to controls using Maoist techniques of self-criticism and endless meetings and discussions.?* Until the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, China was among the most internally secure states i n history. Police i n the usual sense were hardly

necessary, as all activists were policemen, monitoring themselves, their neighbors, and even their thoughts. The parent body for the Political Bureau, Secretariat, Military Affairs, and control committees, of course, was the Central Committee.t Elections to i t were supposedly openly worked out by the Political Bureau, department heads, and representatives of delegations to the National Congress, but, prior to the Cultural Revolution at least, the Political Bureau basically

determined its size and composition.?® While charged by the 1956 constitution (article 34) to “direct the entire work o f the Party, . set u p various Party organs and direct their activities, take charge and allocate Party

cadres,” the Central Committee i n fact largely gives recognition for service to the Party, rather than directs its work. Actual direction is performed by departments and agencies directly under the Central Committee and Secretariat and b y lower-level Party committees. The directors of all of

these organizations are rewarded with membership in the Central Committee and report on and discuss their work at Central Committee hearings. Alternates can discuss but not vote on questions before the Central Committee. As before 1949, the most important Central Committee departments

were those for organization and propaganda. The General Office and committees for Party and state organizations also worked closely with * The Ministry of Supervision presumably had a role i n supervising internal discipline of state organizations, whereas matters of internal order and police functions were assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. + See Chart 21.3.

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

447

the organization department at the center of Party life i n assigning and training personnel. Also very important, but less central to the Party, were at least a dozen other Central Committee departments, commonly called work departments, for the major economic, cultural, and organizational divisions (see Chart 21.4). During the Cultural Revolution, the trinity of Party, state, and military continued to dominate decision-making i n Chinese life, b u t of course

interrelationships and at times forms of organizations were greatly altered. From 1967 to about 1970, real power flowed from Mao’s Cultural Revolution Group ( w i t h Ch’en Po-ta and K’ang Sheng), from L i n Piao’s Military Affairs Committee, and from Chou En-lai’s State Council. These five men

emerged as the Standing Committee of the new Political Bureau chosen b y the N i n t h Central Committee i n April, 1969.

Regional and Local Party Structure Prior to 1966 The regional and local structure of the Party prior to 1966 is shown in Chart 21.5 and Table 21.5. Committees at the provincial, special district, county o r town, and district or urban ward levels were organized i n the fashion o f the Central Committee, only w i t h fewer departments and with special organizations for special problems, as, for example, animal hus-

bandry i n Inner Mongolia. Administrative secretariats, organization departments, and control committees directed basic intra-Party work, while functional departments for propaganda, united front, rural, industrial, financial, cultural, and educational work and for youth, women, and other mass movements directed extra-Party activities. Party fractions existed i n all local govern-

ment and economic offices.?® According to the 1956 Party constitution, provincial- and county-level congresses were supposed to meet once a year and elect committees for their level. The latter sat for three- and two-year terms and were to meet three and four times a year, respectively. There

is evidence that, at least i n the mid-1950’s, the provincial congresses did meet on the order of once a year.*” Party Personnel Policies

Prior to the late 1960’s, various Central Committee departments, generally under the direction of the Secretariat, assigned Party members to work throughout the bureaucratic apparatus.* The Party established a

committee for Party organizations operating parallel to the organization department under the direction of the Political Bureau and Secretariat to

work out the staffing of the Party’s central departments, in close coordination with the Secretariat’s General Office and the organization department. The organization department was responsible for managing cadres * There is little information specifying which departments directed the staffing of which sections of the Party and government, and therefore the following reconstruction is only suggestive. + P r i o r t o the Cultural R e v o l u t i o n , Y a n g Shang-k’un headed b o t h the General

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and Party members and for recruitment and assignment at lower levels. I t was directed “ t o mobilize the strength of the entire Party and People and, according to the principle of democratic centralism in Party life, to strengthen the Party i n ideology, politics, organization, and spirit of struggle. . . . ” ’ % ® Every larger office i n China keeps a table of ranks, specifying salary, promotion, and particulars of assignment. Cadre rank is utilized by the Party i n making assignments and is crucially important in terms of prestige, advancement, and salary, although there is no exact correspondence between job rank and salary. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there were two dozen or more salary levels for Party and government cadres, with each job generally open to three salary levels. The lowest-ranking salary i n one ministry studied was forty-five yiian (about $20 U.S.) a month, while the highest earned by the minister (salary grade 6 ) , was nine times as much, some 400 yiian. I n other areas, the ratio between the lowest and highest was perhaps one to four.” Over and above their modest salaries, however, cadres had better access to free medical care, low-cost housing, and other benefits than ordinary citizens. There were similar sharp dis-

tinctions i n the Party, especially i n terms of the importance of the committee and job to which a member was assigned and the prestige accorded seniority. The core of the Party’s organization was staffed by less than 5 per cent

of the membership who worked full time for the Party. Thus, the Party reportedly had an administrative staff of 220,000 i n 1949 (almost 5 per cent of 4.5 million), while, i n 1956, more than 300,000 of the Party’s 10.7 million members worked at and above the level of county committee.

A Nationalist source estimated that there were some 1.8 million “professionals” serving the Party and Youth League i n the early 1960’s, on the

basis of earlier averages of 5 per cent of the Party and 2 per cent of the Youth League serving their organizations full time.** I n comparison to the Party, the Youth League, at least i n the 1950’s, maintained a smaller percentage of full-time workers, 16,000 out of 3 million i n 1950 and 80,000 out of some 20 million i n 1956, or 1 i n 188 and 1 i n 250, respec-

tively.>* These men were paid directly by the Party, which now had access to national wealth as well as to Party dues.* The much larger number of Party members who held jobs elsewhere i n the state, military, and agricul-

tural bureaucracies were paid by their places of employment.** I n the assignment and supervision of personnel, the Party relied )

heavily o n the organization departments and archives offices maintained

by all but the lowest Party committees and on the personnel bureaus of many non-Party organizations. The archives offices maintained detailed dossiers on all cadres both i n and out of the Party, and the Party’s General Office also maintained a secret documents section. The dossier included a summary of the personal history, social relations, family background, and

* Party dues, together w i t h income from Party-directed enterprises and “contributions” from non-Communists (i.e., taxes), were the pre-1949 sources of Party income (1945 Party constitution, article 69).

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

451

ideological development of the person i n question. References, reports, and relevant documents were attached. Each cadre’s dossier was forwarded to his or her place of work and Party committee and was updated in every ideological campaign and by annual year-end reports. At Party meetings, reports of the progress or problems of members were discussed and the member was rated according to his performance and ideology. Consciousness of the importance of these ratings and reports and a sense of insecurity as to what information on personal relations and activities had been recorded i n the dossiers kept all Chinese, but especially Party and Youth League members, forever alert.?® Party Discipline Besides unceasing hard work for “building socialism,” what did the Party expect of its members? Mastery of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of the “thought of Mao Tse-tung”* has always been considered one of the principal duties of the Communist Party member, along with serving the masses of the

people. For more than four decades, Party documents had placed equal stress on the observance of Communist discipline,®® but the 1969 Party constitution conspicuously mentions Party discipline separately from other and prior Communist duties. Three of its five requirements stress relations with the masses as against one of four and two of ten duties listed i n the 1945 and 1956 constitutions, respectively. The 1956 and 1969 Party rules stress the practice of constant “criticism and self-criticism’ and continuous

political education to ensure the strength of the Party. The five duties and other stipulations of the much more concise 1969 constitutionf are

designed to “maintain close ties with the masses, constantly listen to their opinions and demands and wage an active ideological struggle in the Party so as to keep Party life vigorous, . . ” while the Party member is ““to propagate and carry out the policies of the Party, implement its deci-

sions and fulfill every task assigned by the Party and the state.” As the concluding article of the 1969 Party constitution put i t , “Party organiza-

tions must hold high the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism—Mao Tsetung Thought, give prominence to proletarian politics, and develop a style of integrating theory with practice, maintaining close ties with the masses of the people and practicing criticism and self-criticism.’’*® The Party has used several different systems since 1949 to ensure ade-

quate “study,” ties with the masses, and participation in productive labor i n the midst of heavy work loads. One, called the two-five system, provided that Party members spend two days a week at their desks for study and administrative duties and five days participating in and supervising work under their jurisdiction. Variants for different time spans and conditions were the three-four and three-three systems, while another was the three-two-one-one system, with three days a week o n the job, two days * According to L i n Piao, “ T h e Thought of Mao Tse-tung is Marxism-Leninism of the era i n which imperialism is heading for total collapse, and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory.””* + Twelve articles, as against seventy i n 1945 and sixty i n 1956.

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The Long March to Power

of study and discussion o f work, one day for theoretical study, and one for

rest. Alternatively, especially at county and lower levels, cadres were required to spend at least thirty days a year in productive labor as scheduled by their Party or organizational unit. Where more uniform daily schedules were desirable, one hour i n the morning and two hours every

evening were to be given over to study and discussion, with the rest of the time devoted to normal Party and production work. I n addition, Party committees at all levels, but especially the basic level branches and “small groups” of three to fifteen people, constantly encouraged and checked on “study.” At times, especially during the numerous campaigns, lowerlevel committees held daily two- or three-hour discussion sessions on current ideological problems. At other times, as in the early 1960’s, these “meetings,” often reminiscent of Bible-belt fundamentalism, were held more sporadically.?” Besides these Party-centered and directed activities, various organizations set aside periods for “study” by all their cadres. I n one government ministry, a half-day, usually Saturday afternoons, was set aside for study

under supervision of the ministry’s Party committee and the ministry’s propaganda department, while employees were divided into higher (mostly college graduates), middle, and lower study groups.*® Propaganda, in addition to study, was constant, of course, through Party-run newspapers, journals, bulletin boards, posters, loud-speakers, and discussion. Printed propaganda, especially the works of M a r x , Lenin, Mao, and articles i n People’s Daily (founded i n 1948), Study (1949-58), and Red Flag (founded i n 1958), and a variety of books and pamphlets, formed basic

study texts. Aside from Mao’s Selected Works, many Soviet writings were used i n the 1950’s and early 1960’s, but, with the Cultural Revolution, of

course, Mao’s pronouncements, especially as distilled i n the “little Red Book” (Quotations from Chairman M a o Tse-tung), became the primary

nontechnical materials for education. Social Aspects of Party Organization As of 1956, the 10.7 million Party members formed only 1.74 per cent of the more than 600 million Chinese, and, i n 1961, 17 million members (2.5 per cent of the population) represented some 650 million. But, i n the

early 1960’s, about one in six of all Chinese over the age of eighteen were either Communists or Youth League members.* Over all, in the 1960’s, the approximately 50 million Communists and Youth League members

formed more than 6 per cent of the population and, of course, were backed b y the P L A , public security forces, and women’s, labor, and other

mass organizations. With the further growth of China’s vast population, the ratio of Party members to population will continue to be lower than that of other ruling Parties. For example, i n the 1960’s, the Soviet Communist Party had 9,176,000 members and candidates (4.2 per cent of the 218 million population), while the North Korean Party had 1.3 million members (15.5 per cent of the 8.43 million population), the highest ratio of Party members to population among Communist countries. O n the other * See Table 21.5 below for provincial variations i n Party structure.

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

453

hand, late imperial China was ruled by less than 1 per cent of the population i f one considers the gentry trained under the civil service examination system as the ruling class.?* What can be said of the political and social characteristics of the Party i n the 1950’s and 1960s? One of the 1955 charges against Kao Kang was that he had “invented the utterly absurd ‘theory’ that our Party consisted of two Parties—one, the so-called Party of the revolutionary bases and the army, the other, the so-called Party of the white areas and that the Party was created by the army. H e himself claimed to be the representative of the so-called Party

of the revolutionary bases and the army, and thus entitled to hold the major authority.”*® This revelation showed, of course, the competition

between men like Kao Kang, whose experience had mainly been in organizing peasant revolution, and L i u Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, and others whose

fame was gained largely from organizational work in non-Communist “white” areas. The Cultural Revolution added more evidence of such tension, with the purge of Liu Shao-ch’i, P’eng Chen, Yang Shang-k’un, A n Tzu-wen, and other former members of the wartime North China

“white” areas. While some competition between largely urban-oriented and largely peasant-oriented Communists existed from 1927 on, the “two-Party”

theory obviously overstates the case. Divisions within groups were often as severe as those between the urban-oriented and peasant-oriented Communists. Thus, Kao Kang’s foremost associate in the alleged anti-Party plot of 1953-54 was Jao Shu-shih, also a prominent member of the Party

underground during the war. More than a decade later Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Lo Jui-ch’ing, and other victims of the Cultural Revolution were as much products of the “revolutionary bases and army” as Mao and his leading associates. Nor was there any clear division between ‘“hards’ and “softs,” in the 1950’s and 1960’s, for, i n both domestic and foreign policy, Liu Shao-ch’i and P’eng Chen were as “hard” as such survivors of the Cultural Revolution as Teng Tzu-hui and others. A more basic split divided the old revolutionary Party members and the much larger number of young Communists who joined the Party after 1949. Grown from a few dozen members i n 1921 to 4.5 million by October, 1949, after near destruction i n 1927 and again i n 1934-35, the Party quadrupled again to 17 million by mid-1961. Only fragmentary information is available o n the effects of the Cultural Revolution on Party membership (see Table 21.1). But, i f one accepts the Maoist references to 95

per cent of the Party being still “comparatively good,” and assumes continuing recruitment, then a figure of about 20 million members seems a reasonable estimate also for the early 1970’s. After the reconstruction i n

the last years of the Cultural Revolution, the Youth League reportedly had 30 million members. However, the central government apparatus reportedly was reduced drastically, from ninety to twenty-six departments and from

60,000 to about 10,000 “administrative personnel,” and i t is possible that the Party, at least its professional staff, has also been streamlined. But probably only about 1 per cent of the Party was “permanently” purged i n

the late 1960’s.*!

The Long March to Power T A B L E 21.1 PARTY MEMBERSHIP, 1921-71

Year

Members

Year

Members*®

1921 1922 (July) 1923 (June)

57 123 432

1948 (year end) 1949 (October) 1949 (year end)

3,065,533 4,488,080 4,500,000

1925 (early) 1927 (April) 1927 (later)

950 57,967 10,000

1950 (midyear) 1950 (year end) 1951 (midyear)

5,000,000 5,821,604 5,800,000

1928 1930 1933 1934 1937 1940 1941 1942 1944 1945 (April) 1946 1947 (January)

40,000 122,318 300,000 300,000 40,000 800,000 763,447 736,151 853,420 1,211,128 1,348,320 2,200,000

1951 (year end) 1952 (year end) 1953 (midyear) 1953 (year end) 1954 (early part) 1954 (year end) 1955 (year end) 1956 (midyear) 1957 (midyear) 1959 (midyear) 1960 (October) 1961 (midyear)

5,762,293 6,001,698 6,000,000 6,612,254 6,500,000 7,859,473 9,393,394 10,734,384 12,720,000 13,960,000 13,000,000" 17,000,000

1947 (year end)

2,759,456

1965 (estimate) ©

20,000,000

1948 (midyear)

3,000,000

1971 (estimate) ©

20,000,000

* Party membership figures generally do not include “probationary” members, who could not participate i n elections until their full acceptance into the Party. I t is not clear how accurate this figure is. I f accurate, i t may indicate a purge of almost 1 million as a consequence of the antirightist campaign. ° T h e Nationalists (Facts a n d Figures, November 27, 1968) stated t h a t there were

17 million Communists i n 1966, while Soviet sources on October 4, 1968, said that 10 million Maoists had joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution and another 10 million had been criticized or purged. Source: Schurmann, Ideology, p . 129. Cf. Lewis, Leadership, pp. 110-11; Houn, History, p . 108; and Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (New York, 1961), p p . 344-45.

Minimum age for entry into the Party i n the late 1950’s was eighteen (raised from sixteen i n 1945). As of 1960, some 41 per cent of all Chinese were under seventeen. By age i n 1956, 24.83 per cent of Party members were twenty-five or younger, 67.54 per cent were between twenty-six and forty-five, and 7.63 per cent were over forty-six. And 40 per cent of all Communists recruited i n early 1950, and an even higher proportion later, had been members of the N e w Democratic Youth League, o r the Communist Youth League as i t was renamed i n 1 9 5 7 . The Youth League clearly served as a kind of testing ground for entry into the Party. Youth League membership grew from about 200,000 i n April, 1949, to 3 million b y the end of 1950, to 9 million i n 1953, 20 million i n 1956,

25 million i n 1959, and 35 million in 1964 (see Table 21.4). These figures included perhaps one-fifth of all eligible Chinese youth (those aged fifteen to twenty-five o r 13 per cent of rural youth i n the early 1 9 6 0 ’ ,

60 per cent of the PLA, and half or more of the youth i n certain factories,

schools, and organizations), although as much as 10 per cent of the membership of the Youth League consisted of ‘“over-aged’ professionals. Many of the older Youth League members were also members of the CCP (from

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

455

the county level up, Youth League secretaries had to be members of the CCP), and Party members also generally monopolized key leadership positions i n the Youth League. Other Youth League members were among

the 1.2 million instructors of the Young Pioneers, the Communist organization for ages nine to fifteen, which had an estimated 18 million members i n 1954, 15 million i n 1960, and 100 million i n 1966.*3

Although increasing numbers of younger people entered the Party after 1949, positions of authority continued to be held by the pre-1949 generations of Party leaders. By mid-1956, some 90 per cent of the 10.7 million

Party members had joined since 1945, 60 per cent between 1949 and 1956; and, by 1961, 80 per cent, 70 per cent, and 40 per cent of the Party had joined since 1949, 1953, and 1957, respectively. More striking still, according to a Party survey of about 1961, some 700 or 800 survivors of the Party of the 1920’s held a l l important CCP positions. These and

other survivors of the 20,000 Long March Party cadres of 1936 represented less than 0.5 per cent of the CCP’s 1961 membership but held all the decision-making posts and virtually all of the administrative positions as well.** For example, more than 80 per cent of the ninety-odd members

of the Central Committee as of 1962 were over forty-nine years of age, as against less than 8 per cent of the Party membership as a whole. The average provincial secretary was in his fifties, and even “responsible cadres at lower levels were generally over forty.””*°

A vivid sense of the correlation between age and authority in the Party after 1949 is given by a study of some 353 local leaders (both Communist and non-Communist cadres) from various parts of China i n the early

1960’s. Eight types are described: old cadres who worked for the Communists before 1949, subdivided according to their revolutionary seniority and experience; land reform cadres recruited i n the early 1950’s; collectivization cadres recruited during and after 1955; demobilized army veterans; young graduates of middle schools; cadres sent down from higher levels; prestigious non-Communist leaders of the old regime; and

retired informal leaders. Not including the last three categories, who either overlapped with the others or played roles largely outside the bureaucracy, the proportions of the other five types serving the Party at and below county level are shown i n Table 21.2. Another source gives somewhat different rankings: Long March cadres, 1938 cadres, anti-Japanese war cadres, liberation war (1946-49) cadres, and uprising cadres (those who switched from the Nationalists to the

Communists in the later 1940’s).* The proportion of Party leaders who had joined the movement before 1949 was even higher than that of cadres. Among the local cadres interviewed, the proportion of Party men ranged

from 60 per cent at the subvillage level to 100 per cent at district and county levels. The average ages b y 1962 were thirty-four at the village level, forty at the district level, and forty-five at the county level.* * Although these last two groups joined the Communists during the same period, the liberation war cadres came from “clean” backgrounds, while the “uprising” cadres were former Nationalists.

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456

TABLE 21.2 GENERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF LocAL GOVERNMENT CADRES, 1962-65

Land

Young MiddleSchool

Collectivization and Post-1955

Gradu-

old

Reform

Peasant

Ex-PLA

Number

Cadres

Cadres

Recruits

Cadres

37 35

57% 20

19% 46

14% 14

5% 11

Multivillage

35

14

11

31

26

17%

Village Subvillage

88 45

9 0

14 0

36 56

9 7

31* 38*

Level County District (township)

ates 5% 9

* Percentages do not total 100, pehaps because of rounding. Source: Michel Oksenberg, “Local Leaders in Rural China,” i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 175.

Many of the younger Party members were able and ambitious, but, although they were naturally respectful of the revolutionary experiences of their elders, they felt that their advancement was blocked. Monopoly of key positions by Party veterans was understandable. Communists were not allowed conspicuous wealth, and their duties and constant “education” prevented an easy life, to say the least. Other than fulfilling an ideal of service, the only rewards for an exacting and dangerous career were power, prestige, and the perquisites of office. There was enormous upward mobility after 1949 but not into the top several hundred or even several thousand jobs held by veteran Communists. Chinese youth generally were eager to enter the Party for personal and public reasons, and their frustration at being unable to rise very high i n the Party undoubtedly was an important factor in their enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, i n education, there was a glaring contrast between the diver-

sity and relatively high level of education for the elite and the lower level of education and more Chinese-oriented studies for lower-level members. More than 85 per cent or eighty-three of ninety-seven full members of the Eighth Central Committee had been educated in middle or higher schools, and forty of them were educated abroad (twenty-five in the Soviet Union, nine i n France, five i n Japan, and one i n Germany, with

some studying i n several countries). But fewer than one i n five of the general Party membership had received higher education of any kind, much less abroad. O f the younger Central Committee members and alternates

elected i n 1956, only about a third and, of the Central Committee alternates elected i n 1958, only 12 per cent had been educated abroad, and less than 20 per cent of the entire Eighth Central Committee had traveled

to Third World areas. The educational levels of the new Ninth Central Committee men are certainly lower and were mostly attained i n Party

or army schools.*’ Nevertheless, the need for cadres skilled in administration and economics led to the recruitment of large numbers of college graduates for government jobs and, from the mid-1950’s on, directly into the Party.

Thus, the number of “intellectuals” in the Party, including also many middle-school graduates, increased from 1.2 million out of almost 11

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

457

million i n 1956 to 1.8 million out of almost 13 million i n 1957, and to

approximately 2.5 million out of roughly 13 million by 1960.* I n late 1952, the director of the Central Committee organization department, An Tzu-wen, cited the “old intelligentsia” trained before 1949 and recent graduates of middle and higher schools as two of the greatest sources of Party recruits, along with worker and peasant activists.*® At that time, of 2.75 million cadres, 66,000 were graduates of regular universities, 100,000 of “people’s revolution universities,” and more than 1.1 million of various rotating training courses.” Yet, many of these “intellectuals” were of worker or peasant background, and Party rhetoric always stressed the need for workers and peasants i n the “Party of the proletariat,” especially in periods such as the early 1950’s and late 1960’s. Understandably, for a country like China, the poor, whether rural o r urban, furnish by far the

largest number of Party recruits. The Party maintained its own school system but also relied on graduates of the regular educational system. As in the Yenan period, there were various types of schools both at national and provincial levels and for younger activists as well as for senior cadres. The leading Party undergraduate university was People’s University i n Peking. Similarly, the Higher Party Schoolt directed advanced theoretical and administrative training for promising young Communists. I n the Great Leap Forward espe-

cially, numerous short-term and part-time training schools were sponsored with much mandated participation (at least a month a year) i n productive labor and relevant mass activities. A portion of cadres were to be rotated

into various schools and would also participate in constant ‘in-service education.” As for regional backgrounds, leaders of the Long March generation came predominantly from the central Yangtze provinces, but, after the 1940’s, most Communists, including the younger elite, came from North China. Some 34 per cent of Eighth Central Committee members and alternates i n 1956 had been born i n North China and 66 per cent i n

South China, as against some 86 per cent of the Seventh Central Committee core leadership elected in 1945 who came from Central and South C h i n a . Moreover, o f the twenty-three Central Committee alternates elected i n 1958 o n whom information was available, 62 per cent came from North China (eight of them were from Hopeh). Over all, by the late

1950’s, eight provinces of North China, with one-third of China’s population, supplied about half the Party membership. Thus, prior to the Cultural Revolution, younger members of the top elite were more apt to be from North China and less apt to have been educated abroad o r to have participated i n pre-Long March and military activities. However, the Cultural Revolution purged virtually all Seventh and Eighth Central Committee men from North China who had not served extensively i n the South and * There was a total of about 800,000 graduates of universities and higher technical schools by 1961 and about 1.3 million of middle and technical schools by 1958.* + Directed successively by Yang Hsien-chen (to 1959), Wang Ts’ung-wu (about 1960-63), and L i n Feng (1963-667). I t was formerly called the Central Party School. I Eleven of the top thirty-six leaders and thirty of ninety-odd Eighth Central Committee members came from Hunan, Mao’s home province.

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The Long March to Power

made the Long March. Of the Ninth Central Committee men whose origins are known, more than half continued to come from the West-Central provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Szechwan.” About 4 per cent of the Eighth and 8 per cent of the Ninth Central committees were women, although women constituted about 10 per cent

of the total Party membership before the Cultural Revolution. Party members from non-Han minorities formed about 0.84 per cent of the Party i n 1956, although, by about 1960, o f the 43 million non-Han

peoples (6 per cent of China’s total population), about 6 per cent had become Party members. For example, i n Sinkiang, i n 1950, only 12,841

non-Han cadres had been recruited out of a provincial population of some 5 million, much of i t Turkish or Mongol i n origin. By 1955, there were only 36,000 native cadres in all, although, by the following year, some 28,000 of the 68,000 Communists i n Sinkiang were from thirteen different minority nationalities. I n 1957, 41 per cent of Sinkiang Party committees above the county level were dominated by minority races, and, by 1959, the proportion had reached about 50 per cent. Aside from a few recruited

during the Long March, the first Tibetans did not join the CCP until 1 9 5 6 . I n social background, of the more than half of the Seventh Central Committee elected i n 1945 on whom evidence is available, the fathers of

about 30 per cent had been landlords, 43 per cent had been peasants (more o r less evenly divided between rich and p o o r ) , and the fathers of about 27 per cent had lived i n urban areas (fairly evenly divided among

scholars or officials, merchants, and proletarians). Of eighty-one members of the Eighth Central Committee on whom information is available, twenty-eight were sons of landlords, twenty-three of rich peasants, four of poor peasants, ten of merchants, seven of laborers, five of officials, and

four of teachers. The Cultural Revolution’s stress on the leadership of the proletariat and peasantry has certainly meant a reduction i n the number of intellectuals in the Party, and one estimate placed the proportion of genuine workers (factory hands and peasants) on the N i n t h Central Com-

mittee at up to one-quarter, which would make i t the most “proletarian” i n history, although, for the moment, top positions obviously continue to

be held by a skilled elite." Comprehensive figures on the social backgrounds and current occupations of Party members were released only during and after the Eighth Party Congress i n 1956 and 1957. They are summarized in Table 21.3. Other scattered statistics shed additional light on relations between the structure of the Party and the structure of Chinese society. After the

1920’s, when they had supplied half or more of the Party membership, workers never formed more than 15 per cent of the “Party of the proletariat,” b u t their percentage grew from less than 5 i n 1949 to 6.3 i n 1951, 7.2 i n 1952, 14 i n 1956, and 15 i n 1961. A n estimated 18 per cent o f all factory workers i n 1956 (1.5 million) and more i n 1961 (when there were some 2.5 million workers i n the CCP) were Party members. I n addition, there were 2 1 million members of industrial trade unions and another 19 million i n nonindustrial unions i n 1 9 6 1 . ” O n the other hand,

up to half of the nation’s higher and lower “intellectuals,” 1.2 million i n 1956, 1.8 million i n 1957, and 2.5 million about 1960 (there were 3.8

[Chap. 21]

459

Political and Social Organization T A B L E 21.3

SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF PARTY MEMBERS, 1956-57

Social Background Total membership

1956

1957

10,734,384

12,720,000

Workers ( p e r cent o f total) Peasants

1,502,814 (14.0) 7,417,459

1,740,000 (13.7) 8,500,000

(per cent of total) Intellectuals

(69.1) 1,255,923

(66.8) 1,880,000

( p e r cent o f total)

Other (per cent of total)

(11.7)

(14.8)

558,188 (5.2)

600,000 (4.7)

Occupational Background, June, 1956

Number

Industry Communication and transportation

1,121,283 233,631

10.45 2.18

Agriculture

6,212,703

57.88

532,462

4.96

416,196 1,039,419

3.87 9.68

1,178,690 10,734,384

10.98 100.00

Finance and trade Culture a n d education Organs

Others Total

Per Cent

Sources: Adapted from Lewis, Leadership, p . 108, and Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 132-33.

million “intellectuals” i n China i n 1956) were members of the Party,

while, i n 1957, 8.8 per cent of students i n higher education were Party members and another 57.3 per cent were i n the Communist Youth League. Therefore, the urban sector of China (only about 20 per cent of the country) has received more representation proportionately i n the Party (about one-third) than the rural sector (about two-thirds of the Party but over 75 per cent of the population), i f one assumes that most ‘“‘intel-

lectuals” and “workers” lived i n cities. Furthermore, prior to the Cultural Revolution, Party representation was clearly shifting toward the urban sector. The peasantry supplied about 80 per cent of Party membership i n 1949 and then declined to about two-thirds during and after the mid1950°’s. Only about 1.4 per cent of all peasants were Party members i n

1956, as against some 1.74 per cent of all Chinese. CCP Organization: Functional and Geographic Aspects

Where were Party members assigned to work? Very roughly, before 1966, about half worked i n government, military, education, or other state institutions, and these were about evenly split between the People’s Liberation Army and other state institutions. Party members probably formed about one-third to one-half of all cadres, the term used for those * T h u s , i n late 1951, some 2.7 million o f 5.7 million Communists worked i n army

and governmental organizations, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing claimed that a majority did so i n 1956. I n 1949, 1 million army members were Communists; i n late 1953, 1.2 million of 6.6 million Party members were i n the P L A , while more than a third of the army were Party members.

460

The Long March to Power

“ w h o hold any post as a functionary i n the bureaucratic hierarchies” or

“ a formal leadership position i n an organization.” There were said to be some 720,000 cadres i n 1949, about 3 million i n September, 1952, 5.27

million in 1955, and 7.92 million i n 1958.57 I n the early 1950s, at least several thousand Communist cadres worked

at the Party and government center i n Peking,®® while i n 1956 some 300,000 Party cadres were working at and above the level of county Party committees. I n 1955, some 4 million of almost 9.5 million Communists

worked i n rural areas, and i t is evident that most of them served below the county level. I n 1950, the Party had branches i n only 7 per cent o f the country’s townships (or subdistricts); i n 1955, i n more than threequarters (170,000 of the then 220,000 districts); and, i n 1956, i n more

than 90 per cent of them.” The Youth League had generally attained the 90 per cent level by 1955 i n such provinces as Inner Mongolia and Liaoning. I n the Soviet U n i o n by contrast, as late as 1939, the Party had

not established “primary organizations’ on even one-tenth of the collective farms after two decades o f power. I n 1924, there had been only an

average of one Communist for every ten villages i n Smolensk Province.

Table 21.4 shows the rise in the number of Party and Youth League branches under the county committees between 1949 and 1971. According to the 1956 constitution, when a branch had more than fifty members, i t could form a general branch committee. I f the general branch committee had more than 100 members, i t could elect a primary Party committee, usually of about seven members. Nationally, the 2,200-odd

county and municipal committees had, on the average, about 600 branches of one to two dozen members each and about forty to fifty general branch committees per county. Some 200 to 400 of the up to 10,000 Communists per average county were employed i n bureaucratic offices, with most of TABLE 214 GROWTH OF PARTY AND YOUTH LEAGUE BRANCHES, 1949-71

Year 1949 1951 1953 1955 1956 1959 1961 1964 1965 1966 1971

Cccp 4,500,000 5,800,000 6,000,000 9,300,000 10,734,384 13,960,000 17,000,000 — 20,000,000* —_ 20,000,000*

Branches 250,000 250,000 — — 538,000 1,060,000 1,300,000* —_ 1,500,000* —_ —

Average Membership 18 23 — — 19.9 13 13 — 13 — —_—

Youth League 200,000 — 9,000,000 14,000,000 20,000,000 25,000,000 — 35,000,000 — 50,000,000* 30,000,000*

Branches — —_

300,000 620,000 700,000 1,000,000 — 1,300,000 — —_

—

* Estimates. Sources: Adapted from Schurmann, Ideology, p . 155; Lewis, Leadership, pp. 11516; Victor Funnell, “ T h e Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949-1966,” in CQ, no. 42, pp. 105-30; Peter Tang and J. M . Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene, 1949-1967 (hereafter, T a n g a n d M a l o n e y , Communist China) ( S o u t h Orange,

N.J., 1967), p . 196; and Wang Hsiieh-wen i n IS, November, 1970, p . 38.

[Chap. 21]

Political and Social Organization

461

the rest working full-time i n production and other local activities. However, there were wide variations from the average, as i n one county along

the South China coast, where the number of Communists grew from several hundred i n 1949 to some 6,000 by 1962, organized into only 110 branches, under 6 general branches and 11 commune Party committees. There were 8,000 members of the Young Communist League i n that county, i n addition to the members of the Party, Young Pioneers, and other organizations. I n Kwangtung as a whole, Party membership grew from some 20,000 members i n 2,000 cells before 1949 to some 740,000 members by September, 1959, of whom some 60,000 i n 3,000 branches were i n Canton.’' I n minority areas, variations from the national average were still greater.

There were also sizable variations in Party recruitment rates across China, as is indicated in Table 21.5, which ranks provinces according to available information on the ratio between the number of Party members i n a province and the provincial population as of mid-1956. The use of large numbers of “outsiders” at county and district levels

and return visits by “old cadres’ assumed great importance i n integrating the vast land and human mass of China, as can be see i n Table 21.6. I n Kwangtung Province, some 6,000 northerners* displaced indigenous cadres in order to minimize local prejudices in the land reform of the early 1950’s. “Outsiders,” such as T’ao Chu (from H u n a n ) , also replaced

provincial Party leaders, such as Fang Fang, and ‘“‘localists” were purged periodically, as i n 1952 and 1957. However, the great majority of local cadres (below the county level), and some long-time local leaders, such as Ch’en Yii and Feng Pai-chii, were Kwangtung men. Moreover, a study

of some 346 provincial secretaries found that about 30 per cent of Party first secretaries served i n their home province, and that two-thirds of second secretaries and governors did. The proportion of all secretaries serving i n their native province dropped from 46 to 34 per cent between 1957 and 1965. Over the decade prior to 1966, about 40 per cent served i n their own province and another 18 per cent i n a neighboring province or provinces. The over-all pattern, w i t h obvious continuities from Chinese

history, was for a native to be balanced by an outsider at provincial and regional levels.®* These social, geographical, and functional characteristics of the Party i n

its first decade and half of power of course greatly influenced the Party rectification campaigns and intra-party politics, which are the subject of the next two chapters. Regional and educational differences among Party members created evident differences of style. But more important were the gaps between rural-oriented and urban-oriented Party members. Still more, the imbalances caused b y the monopoly of most important positions by a small

elite of older cadres caused many of the tensions that exploded in some of the rectification campaigns of the 1950’s and especially in the Cultural Revolution after 1965. * As inhabitants of extreme South China call those from the Yangtze valley and above.

The Long March to Power

462

T A B L E 21.5 PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY PROVINCE, 1956 Rank by Per Cent of Population in CCP, Mid-1956

Province

Region

Per Cent of Population i n CCP, CCP Membership, Mid-1956 Mid-1956 2.98 2.93 2.15

1 2 3

Hopeh Shansi Shantung

NC NC EC

1.28 million 450,000 1.12 million

4

Kansu

NW

216,400

1.77

5

Liaoning

NE

400,000

1.76

6

Inner Mongolia

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Kirin Kiangsi Heilungkung Kiangsu Sinkiang Shensi Honan Fukien Tsinghai

16

Yiinnan

Kweichow 17 Anhwei 18 Kwangtung 19 Kwangsi 20 Hunan 21 Chekiang 22 Hupeh 23 Szechwan 24 25 Ninghsia H u i Tibet 26 Metropolitan Areas Peking Tientsin (after 1967) Shanghai

NC

151,700

1.69

NE CS/EC NE EC NW NW CS EC NW

195,700 250,000 190,000 600,000 68,000 200,000 509,500 150,000 20,000

1.61 1.39 1.38 1.36" 1.26 1.15 1.08 1.06 1.05

SW

182,000

98

SW EC CS CS CS EC CS SW

139,000 270,000 300,000 160,000 282,000 190,000 230,000 500,000

.86 83 81 81 .80° 78 77 1

(no information)

NC

140,000

05

NC EC

120,000 150,000

4.04 2.04

* Immediately after the Eighth Congress of 1956, there were intensive recruiting drives i n many provinces, as i n Kiangsu and Hunan, where there were reportedly 700,000 Party members i n 31,465 branches by September, 1956, and 385,000 Communists by early 1957, respectively—in both cases increases of 100,000 i n a few m o n t h s (NCNA, P e k i n g , September 14, 1956, a n d February 2 5 , 1957). ® Y e t , as n o t e d above, H u n a n C o m m u n i s t s m a d e u p close t o a quarter o f the

Eighth Central Committee. © Abolished as a province i n September, 1954; recreated as an autonomous region i n March, 1958. Sources: Based o n F r e d e r i c k C . T e i w e s , “ G o v e r n m e n t a n d Politics i n t h e Provinces o f C h i n a , ” i n John M . H . L i n d b e c k , ed., China: Management o f a Revolutionary Society (hereafter, L i n d b e c k , Management) (Seattle, W a s h . , 1 9 7 1 ) ; L i n d b e c k i n T r e a d g o l d , ed., C o m m u n i s m , p . 9 0 ; S c h u r m a n n , Ideology, p . 136; a n d E z r a Vogel,

Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 19491966 (hereafter, Vogel, Canton) (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p . 371.

463

Political and Social Organization

[Chap. 21]

TABLE 21.6 NATIVES AND OUTSIDERS IN VARIOUS PROVINCES

By Government Level

Level County District Multivillage Village Subvillage

OutN u m b e r N a t i v e sider 27 35 21 99 60

41% 58 86 70 93

59% 42 14 29 7

By Function at Various Levels Political Officers Administrators OutN u m b e r Native sider 20 14 10 16 8

40% 50 80 74 100

OutN u m b e r N a t i v e sider

60% 50 20 26 0

Source: Adapted from Oksenberg i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 178.

10 16 3 26 27

60% 75 100 88 93

40% 25 0 12 7

22 THE P A R T Y A N D PERMANENT REVOLUTION

After 1949, the Party continued its Promethean drive for utopia, imposing unrelenting new demands on its members and on society at large. This

chapter will survey Party history since 1949 i n terms of these demands and the periodic rectification campaigns that marked the first decades of Communist power i n China.

Mao and other leaders explained the necessity for rectification movements both i n terms of their own concepts of intra-Party struggle and in terms of their relative inexperience in “building socialism.” I n the throes of the Cultural Revolution i n 1966, M a o stated, The democratic revolutionary struggle lasted twenty-eight years (1921-49). I n the beginning, nobody knew how to engage i n democratic revolution and what kind of struggle should be waged. I t was only afterward that we groped our w a y t o some experiences, and the road emerged from practice—step b y

step. Socialism has been launched for seventeen years. Therefore, we cannot expect the comrades to understand i t that well. . . . 1

The protracted, uninterrupted or permanent revolution, therefore, would require not only total commitment to one’s work but also willingness to undergo ceaseless self-criticism and ideological struggle i n all phases of life. For the Maoists, struggle is the only guarantee of progress. As L i n Piao stated during the Cultural Revolution, Our Communist Party is a proletarian, political Party. Its vigor, its incorruptibility and its resistance to decay are all due to the fact that our ideological method is that of struggle. . . . When there are shortcomings we struggle with them. The principle of life for our Party is that, when there are contradictions, they must be struggled with; struggle is the only way that we Therefore our comrades should not will be able to correct anything. fear struggle.?

A decade earlier, Mao had reportedly said, “ I n the future we will con-

[Chap. 22]

The Party and Permanent Revolution

duct once a year, or every two years, a rectification campaign.

465 .””*Sim-

ilarly, a high Party official stated i n 1961, “ T h e uninterrupted revolution

in society calls for uninterrupted revolution in the thought of the individual. I t is completely wrong to think that one or several rectification campaigns will settle things for good.” There was even talk of staging

periodic Cultural Revolutions.* I n short, the assumption of power i n 1949 was to mean no lessening of struggle for the Chinese Communists. Given these conceptions and the doubling and tripling of Party membership after 1949, the numerous new campaigns to “rectify and educate” Party ranks were seen as necessary corollaries to the perpetual “self-education,” vigilance, and regular Party instruction and surveillance mentioned i n previous chapters. Normally, rectification movements hit

lower-level Party members with greater force than more important officials, who often continued their work after self-criticism.’ But, at other times, notably during the Cultural Revolution, the situation was reversed, with the purges and “re-education” of top Party officials receiving by far the most attention.

The many Party rectification campaigns after 1949 were generally related to the equally numerous ideological reform movements for the general population and for the cadres from whom Party members were drawn. These campaigns included especially agrarian reform; the criticisms of “bourgeois interpretations’ of Chinese literature, culture, philosophy, and history of the early 1950’s; the Hundred Flowers and antirightist movements of 1956-58; the Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960’s;

and above all the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, of course, revealed not only the utopian

qualities of the Maoist vision but also the incompleteness of previous rectification campaigns. The constant campaigns suggest that the Chinese Communists, like their ancestors, well know h o w to “conform on the out-

side but preserve their inner beliefs.” Yet, i f some ideological aspects of the rectification campaigns seemed unreal in terms of expectations and accusations, their results were concrete enough; over the years, as many as 5 per

cent of Party members at a time were temporarily purged. As early as 1956, Mao had even talked of “cuts” of up to two-thirds of all Party and government bureaucracies, although he held that only a “minority of 1, 2 , 3 , 4 , or

5 per cent” of Communists were really “antisocialist” and even that only 1 to 3 per cent of some 4.5 million intellectuals were anti-Marxist.””® One

scholar has estimated that 3.4 of the 4.5 million Communists in 1949 were still in the Party in 1961, that about half of the 1.1 million pre-1949 Communists who were no longer in the Party in 1961 had died natural deaths, and that another half-million must have been purged during those years, giving a general attrition rate of almost 2 per cent annually.’

Other studies show average annual purge rates of from 1 to 10 per cent of government and Party cadres. I n one South China county, for example, an average of perhaps 1 per cent of the Party membership was expelled

each year and another 5 per cent received lesser criticism and punishment during the 1950’s and early 1960’s, figures that may have risen to 3 and

7 per cent, respectively, in various campaigns? I n Canton, during the antirightist campaign of 1957-58, Party and government units were

466

The Long March to Power

instructed to make 5 per cent of cadres “targets” for criticism, and, i n

some areas, up to 10 per cent were rebuked. I n Yiinnan at that time, some 3.6 per cent of Party members were condemned.’ I n the Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960’s, about 2 per cent of cadres were scheduled to be disciplined.'® Even i n the Cultural Revolution, the Party described the great majority of cadres, sometimes specified as 95 per cent, as ‘“good and comparatively good,” although, according to Nationalist and Soviet sources, more than 10 million, or half of the total Party membership, were purged o r sent to labor reform i n the late 1960’s i n order to

“transform” themselves. The proportion who were “permanently” purged, however, reportedly was much smaller—somewhere between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, according to various estimates." Another study estimates that about 10 per cent of provincial secretaries (34 of 346) were purged between 1956 and 1966. I t found little evidence of regional ties as a major factor in purges, but some evidence of a link between purges and functional ties within bureaucracies. Roughly 60 per cent of the provincial

leaderships were basically stable during the decade before the Cultural Revolution, with only minor changes of leadership. The remaining 30 per cent were neither permanently purged nor entirely stable.'®

I t should be stressed that, for the most part, purges have involved jobs and above all ideological struggle, n o t lives. Mao’s rectification campaigns have meant “treating the illness to save the man” far more frequently than was the case i n the Soviet Union under Stalin, where there was extensive liquidation of supposed enemies. Chinese Communist methods reversed the traditional dictum “Scholars can be killed b u t not humiliated.” Many

Chinese who were criticized or temporarily removed from their jobs were later re-educated and reinstated, but, nevertheless, the pressures to conform with the new ethos have remained overwhelming. Of the various ideological and rectification campaigns, the Party has been most affected by the three- and five-anti campaigns of 1952; the

purges of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and associates, and the Su-fan Campaign against counterrevolutionaries during 1954 and 1955; the antirightist campaign of 1957-58; the Socialist Education and “four cleanups” movement of 1962-65; and, of course, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. Rectification Movements of the Early 1950’s

I n June, 1950, the T h i r d Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee called for a new rectification movement and instructed Party organizations to work against bureaucratism and commandism, the principal problems of the Party, and for a better understanding and use of the mass line, its

principal tool i n carrying out the “revolution from above.” I n the “largescale ideological remolding’ that followed. Party membership dropped briefly by some 59,000.'* Next, the three- and five-anti campaigns, decided o n b y Political Bureau conferences of December, 1951, and January, 1952, aimed primarily at “corruption, waste, and bureaucratism’'* on the

part of government cadres and businessmen. But they also led to review and reorganization of much of the newly expanded Party, under the policy

of “Party rectification, Party construction.” Up to 10.5 per cent of the Party membership were expelled in the three-anti movement, 3.5 per cent

[Chap. 22]

The Party and Permanent Revolution

467

as “alien elements” and some 5 to 7 percent for “lacking the qualifica-

tions required of a Communist.’’*® Just as the Cheng-feng Movement of the early 1940’s had been necessitated by the explosive growth of the Party from 1938 to 1940, so these early campaigns aimed to rectify the three out of every four members who had joined the CCP in the late 1940’s, as the Party grew from 1.2 million members in 1945 to about 6 million by 1952. Similarly, the New Democratic Youth League (renamed the Communist Youth League at its Eighth National Congress i n May, 1957) grew from 200,000 at the time of its Sixth National Congress i n A p r i l , 1949, to some 9 million i n June, 1953,

at the time of its Seventh Congress.'® The need to ‘educate through struggle” after rapid expansion was also a factor i n the antirightist movement of 1957-58 after the Party had doubled again from 6.5 million members i n 1954 to almost 13 million i n mid-1957. Thus, on March 5,

1957, i n an article commemorating the fifteenth-anniversary year of the Cheng-feng Movement, Propaganda Director L u Ting-yi stated that 60 per cent of Party members had joined after 1949 and, i n the intervening years, had “not been ideologically transformed by the Party’s rectification movement of 1 9 4 2 . 7 I n July, 1952, i n the course of the three- and five-anti movements, A n Tzu-wen, de facto head of the organization department, explained on the

occasion of the Party’s thirty-first anniversary that “ a considerable number of Party members

[ a f t e r ] the success o f the revolution

have come

under the influence of the bourgeois class and thereby given themselves to corruption, waste and bureaucratism.

. ” H e distinguished three types of

fallen comrades: those who “do n o t understand that the assumption of political power only marks the beginning of the revolution” and not its end; those who have adopted “bourgeois attitudes of individualism, liberalism, seeking fame, seeking position, doing everything out of motives of selfinterest, [ have developed a ] bureaucratic work style, and are

divorced

. from the masses”’; and those who “give lip service to Communism, but actually pursue the course of capitalism’ w i t h investments i n private enter-

prises in the cities and in individual farming i n the countryside “ i n order to amass wealth.” To remedy these errors, An publicized the recently adopted “eight requirements” for Communists, which clarified the “ f o u r duties” of the

1945 Party constitution and stressed Party discipline and ideological rectification. He proposed a new “movement for the overhauling of the i n organizations i n the rural Party,” beginning i n the “fall of 1952 areas.””’® I n 1952, also, many high-ranking cadres, who had been working

i n the provinces to assert control, were transferred to Peking to consolidate and centralize the new state and the party.’ There was simultaneous stress on ideological training, and, from July, 1953, on, the Party’s committees

for Party and state organizations directed a national campaign for study of a Stalinist history of Russia and other documents.

I n 1953-55, higher echelons of the Party were shaken by the first important intra-Party threat to Mao’s dominance of Party Central since the departure of Chang Kuo-t’ao i n 1938 and the rectification campaign

against Ch’en Shao-yii and others in the early 1940’s. This was the Kao

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Kang-Jao Shu-shih ‘‘anti-Party alliance.” Kao, the leading surviving

indigenous Communist of the Yenan area, had been secretary of the Party’s Northeast China Bureau since the late 1940’s, while Jao, political commissar of the N e w Fourth Army i n 1945, had served as secretary of the Party’s East China Bureau u n t i l 1952, when he briefly became director

of the organization department i n Peking. The two apparently contested the positions of Liu Shao-ch’i and Chou En-lai more than those of Mao, but they allegedly expected Mao to relinquish either his state or Party chairmanship and to give them greater leeway i n their work.?® I n contrast to other ‘“anti-Party” episodes, here Party Central stressed that Kao and Jao conspired secretly, rather than openly, for power, and secrecy made

the Kao-Jao affair especially dangerous to the Party. Kao, who had been appointed chairman of the State Planning Commission i n Peking (succeeded by L i Fu-ch’un) on its establishment in November, 1952, and Jao were accused of “carrying on conspirational activities aimed at seizing

leadership in the revolution and the state,” “opposing leading members of the Central Committee,” and regarding “the region or department under their leadership as their personal property or independent kingdom.” Moreover, Kao was said to have sought the positions of “General Secretary o r Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party and of

Premier of the State Council” as a leading representative of the “Party of the revolutionary bases.”’*! I t is impossible to ascertain the truth of these charges, but i t is certain that many issues were at stake, including “ a personal struggle between

Mao Tse-tung and Kao Kang,

. disagreement over basic economic

strategy, over methods of administration, over allocation of resources, over

control of the Party apparatus” and over Soviet-style “one-man management” of industry, i n place of Party-dominated industrial management, which Kao had used in Manchuria and advocated for all China.?® I t is likely that the transfer of Kao and Jao to jobs at the Party center in Peking and the subsequent breakup i n 1954-55 of the six regional bureaus, of which they had controlled two, were related to efforts to break their hold over the Party i n Northeast and East China, b u t these moves also

brought their challenge to the center of the power structure.? M a o stressed the necessity for Party unity at a Political Bureau meeting

on December 24, 1953, and shortly thereafter Kao and Jao dropped from public view. The Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, which met from February 6 to 10, 1954, and was attended by thirty-five members and twenty-six alternates, adopted a “Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity” and heard Liu Shao-ch’i warn of the errors of “certain high-ranking cadres [unnamed until the following year].”’?* Liu gave the principal report, for M a o was ‘““on leave” and possibly seriously ill, and he did

not appear i n public for several months. The implications of Liu’s remarks were not revealed u n t i l a national Party conference i n March, 1955, named Kao and Jao for the first time as the leaders of the ‘“antiParty faction’ and called for the establishment of central and local control committees to prevent the recurrence of such challenges.? The conference, attended not only b y sixty-two members and alternates

of the Seventh Central Committee but also “packed” with 257 representa-

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469

tives of lower-level Party committees, i n addition belatedly approved the

draft of the First Five-Year Plan for 1953-57, some two years after its start.?® O n April 4 , the Fifth Plenum o f the Seventh Central Committee

approved the resolutions of the Party conference and elevated Teng Hsiaop’ing and Lin Piao to the Political Bureau. I n 1955, following the announcement of the purge of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and their followers, and growing out of the ideological campaign against long-time leftist writer H u Feng, the Su-fan (Purge Counterrevolutionaries) Movement attacked government bureaucratism but also led to accusations against thousands of lower-level Party members. (A criticism of May, 1957, complained that 720,000 persons had been wrongly condemned i n the Su-fan Movement.) The movement led also to greater Party

attention to public security work and to vigilance to forestall the creation of “independent kingdoms” i n sensitive areas, such as the Northeast, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Kwangtung. Up to 5 per cent of Party and government cadres were purged i n Kwangtung at this time.?” Intra-Party Debate of the Mid-1950’s

Following the purge of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and their followers, most observers concluded that the Party has resumed its pattern since the early 1940’s of maintaining the most stable leadership in the Communist world. However, i n the 1950’s and 1960’s, as before, there naturally were disagreements over what to do about various difficult problems. After the founding of the People’s Republic, there was debate on a variety of questions, including entry into the Korean War,?® reliance o n the Soviet

Union for economic and military aid (as revealed i n the Hundred Flowers Campaign and later episodes), treatment o f the intellectuals and bour-

geoisie, and education. Undoubtedly, the greatest debates have concerned agriculture and the peasant question, as might be expected in an overwhelmingly agrarian country. As land reform was extended over the country and intensified from

mid-1950 on, Party debates continued, as they had during the civil war, on such questions as the desired speed and violence of implementation

and the duration of the period of private ownership under the “land to the tillers” policy, before the nationalization of land. I n contrast to caution i n handling the urban economy, the Party pushed land reform, both to speed the socialization of agriculture and to destroy the landlord class. But not all Party leaders were happy w i t h the pace and depth of the reform, and, i n A p r i l , 1956, Mao revealed that “ a school of thought” regarded the 1951-52 suppression of counterrevolutionaries and destruction of the landlords as ‘““unnecessary.”’*’

The problem of the socialization of agriculture, industry, and trade precipitated new and deeper divisions i n the Party’s top ranks. There is evidence that L i u Shao-ch’i favored more militant agrarian policies than Mao i n 1947-48 and again at times i n the early 1960’s,*® b u t that Liu, Teng Tzu-hui, and others favored a slower course to collectivization and communization during the 1950’s than d i d Mao. Already, o n May 7 , 1951, at a national conference on propaganda w o r k , L i u had criticized “utopian

agrarian socialism’ for seeking to establish cooperativization before the

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realization of improvements i n material conditions, the supply of agricultural tools, mechanization, and the like. Nevertheless, a Political Bureau

conference on February 15, 1953, resolved to press for Mutual Aid Teams and lower-stage Agricultural Producers Cooperatives, and another Political

Bureau conference i n October, 1954, called for speedier collectivization. At this point, however, differences deepened as opposition to faster collectivization increased. I n the spring of 1953, there were efforts to slow the formation of Mutual A i d Teams, and, i n May, 1955, a Central Com-

mittee work conference approved a plan to reduce the proposed 1.3 million cooperatives by 200,000, although the proposed total of more than 1 million cooperatives represented an increase over earlier plans. Maoists later blamed these and other allegedly obstructive moves on the director of the Central Committee’s rural work department,* Teng Tzu-hui, and his supporters i n the Party structure. Mao called 1955 “ t h e year of decision

i n the struggle between socialism and capitalism’ i n China because of this developing debate and, on July 31, delivered to a conference of provincial and municipal Party secretaries a scathing attack o n the “women with

bound feet” who feared to march rapidly into socialism.?* According to a remark b y Ch’en Y i i n November, 1955, this speech “settled the debate

of the past three years,” and subsequently Ch’en Po-ta, who was appointed a deputy director in the rural work department about this time, and others pushed through the Maoist program. The Sixth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of October 4-11, 1955, attended by thirty-eight members, twenty-five alternates, and 388 lower Party officials, approved a further acceleration i n the formation of cooperatives and their transformation to a higher stage. By mid-1957, the

number of cooperatives i n operation had risen to 750,000, and the proportion of rural households i n them had grown from 14 per cent in 1955 (when almost two-thirds of the peasant population were already in Mutual Aid Teams) to almost 92 per cent in 1956, and 97 per cent i n mid-1957. By contrast, the First Five-Year Plan, approved i n 1955, had stated that only “ a third of all the peasant households i n the country will have joined the present elementary form of cooperatives [APC’s] within the period covered by the plan,” 1953-57.32 Nevertheless, Mao pressed ahead i n January, 1956, with a proposal for a twelve-year plan for agriculture, and, i n his important report “ O n the Ten Great Relationships’ delivered to the Political Bureau i n April, 1956, he continued to argue for ‘‘greater, faster, better and more economical results.’’*®* Nonetheless, as one would expect, “ r i g h t i s t ” opposition to Mao’s

drastic speed-up of collectivization continued, with arguments centering on the relation of collectivization to the rate of mechanization and to improvements i n farm tools and on the parallel acceleration in 1956 of the socialization of industry.f After 1956, as debate on agrarian policy continued, new issues arose * As the peasant department of earlier decades was now called. + The socialization of industry was basically completed by late 1956, w i t h former owners being compensated at the annual rate of 5 per cent interest on the original value of their property.

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or came to a head. Among the most important were developments in the Soviet bloc, the timing of the Eighth Party Congress (scheduled for September, 1956), and the Hundred Flowers and subsequent antirightist campaigns of 1957-58. At a Political Bureau conference from December, 1955, to January, 1956, Mao pressed for continued implementation of his radical agrarian program by urging adoption of the twelve-year agricultural program (which was done January 23). His advocacy of greater utilization and “education” of the intellectuals i n building socialism became the leading motivation for the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Chou En-lai gave an important address “ O n the Question of the Intellectuals” to some 1,279 Party officials i n January. On May 2, Mao first used the slogan “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” and expressed his hopes for greater participation of intellectuals in politics. But opposition to Mao’s agrarian plans, which were temporarily slowed by a Political Bureau conference of late March and early April and developments i n the Soviet bloc, delayed the start of the Hundred Flowers Cam-

paign. Those who were skeptical about Mao’s grandiose plans apparently used Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin i n February to urge a slower

pace of economic change, safeguards for “collective leadership” and the “mass line,” and measures against the “elevation of oneself and individualist heroism.””** Concern for avoiding or minimizing a “cult of personality” i n China led the Party’s Eighth National Congress to delete the phrase “guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung” from the 1956 Party constitution.>®

The Eighth National Congress o f the CCP, the first i n eleven momentous years, met in Peking from September 15 to 27, 1956, some ten days after the preparatory Seventh Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee. I n all,

1,026 delegates and 107 alternates, claiming to represent 10.73 million members, heard numerous speeches, adopted the new Party constitution and the Second Five-Year Plan, and elected a new Central Committee of

ninety-seven members and seventy-three alternates. The Eighth Central Committee i n turn elected the Political Bureau, Standing Committee, Secre-

tariat, and Control Committee at its First Plenum on September 28. The

delegates and an impressive array of foreign visitors, including Anastas Mikoyan, Jacques Duclos, and D . N . Aidit of the Soviet, French, and Indonesian Communist parties, gave high praise to Mao Tse-tung and his part in guiding the Chinese revolution. But, i n many ways, the Eighth Congress was dominated b y the Party apparatus headed b y Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, w h o gave the principal reports. Both men stressed what Maoists later condemned as the ‘revisionist’ ideas that “ t h e question of who

will win in the struggle between socialism and capitalism i n our country has now been decided’’*® and that the “former classification of social status has lost or is losing its original meaning [as] the difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of division of labor within the same class.

.”’®"

According to one account, Liu’s report mentioned Mao

only four times as against 105 times in his report to the Seventh Congress in 1945, when Liu emerged as the second-ranking Party leader after Mao.*® More important, at the Eighth Congress, Mao yielded increased organizational control over daily operations of the Party to the Party apparatus.

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Although there had long been some division of Party work into what Mao called the “first and second lines” (operational and theoretical)—a neces-

sary division in wartime, though Mao at times dated i t to 1949—the distinction sharpened i n 1956. I n that year, the post of General Secretary (abolished i n December, 1937) was restored and assigned to Teng Hsiao-

p’ing, who took control of the Secretariat, previously headed by Mao as concurrent Chairman of the Central Committee, Political Bureau, and Secretariat. During the Cultural Revolution, M a o admitted his responsibility for the decision to restore the post of General Secretary but regretted his

loss of control over Party and state operations.?® I n the late 1950s, these organizational changes and the deletion of the reference to the “thought

of Mao Tse--tung” from the Party constitution appeared to have proceeded smoothly, but, i n view of the delay i n the Hundred Flowers Campaign, developments in the Soviet bloc, and later disputes within the CCP, it is clear that there was extensive debate and maneuvering i n higher echelons of the Party in 1956.*° The Hundred Flowers and Antirightist Movements The eruption of rebellion against Stalinist Communism in Poland and Hungary i n the autumn and the conclusion of the Eighth Congress set the stage for the revival of controversy within the Party over the Hundred Flowers Campaign and other matters. This campaign and the Hungarian and Suez crises dominated the new Central Committee’s Second Plenum, from November 10 to 15, which was attended by eighty-four members, sixty-five alternates, and 147 other Party officials. These issues were also

debated at an enlarged Political Bureau conference i n late December and a conference of Party secretaries i n January, 1957. After these Party meetings, Mao chose a non-Party forum, the enlarged Eleventh Supreme State Conference of February 27, to refocus attention on the Hundred Flowers Campaign with his address “ O n the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.” The document, the most important delivered b y M a o since “ O n the Dictatorship of People’s Democracy” i n mid-1949, stressed the continuation of contradictions

under socialism, although he recognized that these were primarily “nonantagonistic’’ and “among the people” i n contrast to those of the period before 1949, when they were primarily ‘antagonistic’ ones between the people and “our enemies.” Mao stated that “Our people’s government is a government that truly represents the interests o f the people and serves the people, yet certain contradictions do exist between the government

and the masses,. led. . . . ” "

between those i n positions of leadership and the

I n a later section of the speech, Mao argued for “letting a

hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” as the best means of bringing out and utilizing ‘contradictions among the people” and avoiding what had happened in Poland and Hungary. I n contrast to L i u Shao-ch’i’s and Teng Hsiao-p’ing’s speeches to the Eighth Party Congress i n September, 1956, Mao argued, “ I t w i l l take a con-

siderable time to decide the issue i n the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism i n our country [and] failure to grasp this .can lead to the gravest mistakes—to ignoring the necessity of waging.

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473

ideological struggle.” He maintained that, “as a scientific truth, Marxism fears no criticism’ and that Marxists should suppress bourgeois tendencies not by force but by argument under the slogan “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.””*> Mao repeated these themes at a conference of intellectuals and propagandists on March 12 and other occasions. Similarly, i n 1962, he stated, “ .

when we let others talk, the sky does not

fall and neither will we collapse. I f we do not let others talk, then some day we will inevitably collapse.”*? I n addition to their apparent belief that the great majority of Chinese accepted the basic tenets o f Communism and would give constructive

criticism i n helping to build socialism, Maoists appear to have wanted to use an outside force, the intellectuals, to “educate” Party organization

men on the need for flexibility i n forging close ties with the masses and avoiding dogmatism. I n this sense, there were obvious similarities between the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and there is good evidence that Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and P’eng Chen, the three major targets of the Cultural Revolution, resisted Maoist pressure for outside criticism of the Party i n 1957, arguing instead for tight Party

control over criticism.” I n stressing the need for extra-Party forces i n building socialism, continuing struggle, and carrying out ‘‘uninterrupted revolution,” M a o understandably alarmed more conservative and bureaucratically inclined men, who were at least as tough as M a o i n working for Communism but wished to establish i t i n a more controlled fashion, relying on the proven organization of the CCP. L i k e the Soviet “revisionists,” the more conservative bureaucrats argued at times that class struggle had largely ended by the mid-1950’s. Thus, they sought to control national

affairs from the top through the Party. I n May, 1958, for example, Liu Shao-ch’i described the Hundred Flowers Campaign as a trap to let “poisonous weeds” grow so they could later be uprooted.*® By contrast, i n virtual anarchist fashion, Maoists argued the necessity for spontaneous action b y the masses, guided, but not necessarily controlled, b y the Party, and they proclaimed the existence and desirability o f continued struggle

even under socialism. After Mao’s speeches of February and March, 1957, and increasing appeals and publicity for the Hundred Flowers Campaign, there was an

unprecedented outpouring of public discussion of national issues at forums and i n the press i n the spring o f 1957. Criticisms concerned means more than ends, but, b y late May, even Mao had become dubious about con-

tinuing to allow free expression for long pent-up emotions, because i t had b y bourgeois rightists led to “poisonous weeds’ and “frantic attacks on the Party and socialism.”*®* O n May 25, Mao proposed a change of

policy to a session of the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Starting about two weeks later, a series of People’s Daily editorials and other Party communications signaled an abrupt change of policy, with mounting condemnation of ‘“‘rightist criticisms’ of the Party.*” Clear signs of the new

restraints were the additions and deletions made i n the publication on June 18 of Mao’s “ O n the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the

People.” The revised text included “six criteria” that would have to be followed in all future criticisms in the People’s Republic. The most

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important condition was that any criticism must “tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party.” The others

were that all criticisms must “unite the people of our various nationalities, and not divide them,” be “beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction,” “help to consolidate, not undermine or

weaken, democratic dictatorship,” strengthen “democratic centralism,” and, finally, be “beneficial, not harmful, to international solidarity. . .."”*8 The antirightist aftermath of the Hundred Flowers Campaign began with attacks o n non-Party intellectuals, at least 20,000 of whom were

criticized,*® and then in August, 1957, shifted to an ideological campaign in the countryside. A new stage began after the enlarged Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee i n September decided to extend the antirightist campaign into the Party itself. Between June and October, 1957, even before the extension of the antirightist campaign to the Party, some 5,000 “counterrevolutionary’”’ Party members, 220 from central government offices, had been “exposed,” along with 65,000 non-Party “counterrevolutionaries.”” Some 3 million persons assisted i n the investigations o f some 1.7 million people for anti-Party activities, and, of the 1.7 million, 100,000 were convicted.®°

I n the antirightist campaign from late 1957 through 1958, up to 1 million Communists were rebuked, dropped, or put on probation. Charges against 26,000 of these were later reversed, but at least several thousand

were purged.’’ The revamping and purge of a dozen provincial Party organizations began i n December, 1957, reaching a climax i n early 1958, before the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress, and again i n

the late summer and early autumn with the purge of almost the entire Party leadership of Liaoning Province and renewed purges i n Shantung and elsewhere.?” I n all, four Central Committee alternates, a provincial first secretary,

five other provincial secretaries, eighteen members of provincial committee standing committees, four governors, ten vice-governors, and about twenty-

five other provincial leaders were purged. The four Central Committee alternates were Kwangtung’s long-time local leaders, K u Ta-ts’'un and Feng Pai-chii, Honan’s First Secretary P’an Fu-sheng, and Shantung governor Chao Chien-min. Basic charges against them included resistance to Party Central directives, especially o n the collectivization of land.

Thousands of lower-level cadres also were purged—for example, some 2,000 i n Szechwan. Prior to these wholesale provincial purges of 1958,

a number of county- and lower-level committees had been purged in the early 1950’s under provisions of the 1945 Party constitution (articles 44, 6 4 - 6 8 ) , which were deleted i n the 1956 and 1969 constitutions.®?

A basic aspect of the antirightist campaign was a vast “sending down” (hsia fang) of cadres and intellectuals to participate in productive labor and live among the masses i n the countryside. A feature of Party rectification at least since the early 1940’s, the practice was elevated to a new

scale in 1957-58, when almost 1.3 million cadres were “sent down for participation i n physical labor by rotation.” According to Nationalist

sources, as many as 40 million students i n all were “sent down” in China between 1949 and 1965 and another 10 million between 1965 and 1 9 6 8 .

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475

By the 1960’s, all Communists were expected to spend about a month a year, or its equivalent, i n manual labor.

I f Mao’s original plan for the Hundred Flowers Campaign was reversed, or at least transformed after the spring of 1957, his radical plans for agriculture, put forth again at the Tsingtao Conference of Party secretaries i n late July, 1957, and at a national conference o n rural work i n early Sep-

tember, continued to gather support in intra-Party debates. The Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee from September 21 to October 9, 1957, which was attended by 91 members, 62 alternates, and 416 other Party officials, not only extended the antirightist campaign to the Party but also adopted Mao’s twelve-year agricultural program, foreshadowing the drastic efforts of the commune movement and the Great Leap Forward. The Communist Youth League, recently expanded to 23 million members under H u Yao-pang, played an active role as usual i n implementing these Party directives. The Great Leap Forward and the Communes After mid-1957, the People’s Republic crossed its Rubicon into an essentially uncharted territory of national experience where a huge but backward nation sought t o modernize and communize itself overnight. Prior to 1958, the Central Committee largely followed the Soviet model of building socialism, concentrating at home on a carefully planned economy that emphasized heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture, and, for its foreign relations, relying heavily on membership in the Soviet bloc and on the Soviet nuclear shield. Manifestly dramatic successes were achieved i n this period with the destruction of the landlord class, the halting of U.S. advances i n Korea, the socialization of agriculture, and high growth rates i n industry, where over-all production probably increased 7 per cent a year i n the 1950’s and 5 per cent annually i n the 1960s. But

staggering problems remained, especially i n the persistence of “bourgeois ideology,” as revealed i n the Hundred Flowers Campaign; i n agriculture, because its growth during the First Five-Year Plan lagged behind that i n industry, and the population was growing at an annual rate of more than 15 million people; and i n international relations. because only 100 miles off the southeast coast Chiang Kai-shek still had extensive recognition as the rightful ruler o f all China. Faced w i t h the magnitude o f these prob-

lems, Soviet unwillingness to become overly involved i n their solution, and, above all, the utopian impatience of Mao and his followers, i n the last half of 1957 and i n 1958, the Party made fundamental decisions to accelerate its programs-at home and abroad. The drastic character of many of these decisions, however, aroused opposition within the Party. After the late 1950’s, varying policies tended to reflect shifts i n the top leader-

ship rather than the consensus on the need to experiment and alternate carrot-and-stick policies that had characterized Party policies of earlier years.”® The resistance of Party stalwarts—first P’eng Teh-huai and critics of the Great Leap Forward and people’s communes during and after 1958 and finally the Party apparatus generally i n the early 1960’s—and their attempts to stem Maoist demands led directly to the Cultural Revolution.®®

The radical Maoist decisions in agriculture, developed at the Tsingtao

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The Long March to Power

Conference of Party secretaries in July and at the Political Bureau and Central Committee meetings i n September—October, 1957,°” envisaged further consolidation of collective units and greater reliance on exhortation and mass labor. The progress of various plans, such as i n water conservancy and irrigation, and a new series of conferences set the stage for

the official adoption in early 1958 of the “three great banners,” as Maoists called the new program for building socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the people’s communes. The Hangchow, Nanning, and Chengtu conferences of the Political Bureau and Party secretaries i n early and late January and i n March, respectively, carried forward the debate about the

necessity for new departures to shatter remaining ““fetters” on productive forces. A February 19 report, “Sixty Points on Working Methods,” spelled out some of the new plans, and the Fifth Session of the First

National People’s Congress of that month began to publicize the “Great Leap Forward.” Then, the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee on M a y 2 and the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress of M a y 5-23 approved a revised version of M a o ’ s twelve-year agricultural plan and

heard Liu Shao-ch’i’s political report outlining plans for the Great Leap Forward and “catching up with Britain i n fifteen years.”’*® Repeating Mao’s call of early 1956 for “greater, faster, better and more economical results,” and citing Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Liu made a revealing statement of the Party’s commitment to permanent revolution: The watchword of the working class should be “uninterrupted revolution.” I n putting forward new revolutionary tasks i n good time, so that there is no halfway halt i n the revolutionary advance of the people, the revolutionary fervor of the masses will not subside with interruptions of the revolution, and Party and state functionaries will not rest content with the success won and grow arrogant or apathetic. . . . 5 °

Acknowledging, as he had not i n September, 1956, that the class struggle would continue for a long time to come and put forth ‘‘antisocialist poisonous weeds,”’®® Liu also demanded stronger Party leadership and tighter control of the “uninterrupted revolution.” While stressing, like Mao, that “the subjective initiative of the masses is a mighty driving force,” Liu also publicized the famous formula of “both red and expert,” insisting that Party members must lead not only with ideological conviction but also with “ a real understanding of their jobs and the necessary knowledge in science and technology to guide work properly.” Another crucial series o f meetings i n mid-1958 made key personnel

adjustments and led to the final decision to organize people’s communes. The Fifth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, meeting on May 25, immediately after the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, elected Lin Piao Vice-Chairman of the Party, joining Liu Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and Ch’en Yiin i n that capacity, and also elected Lin to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Lin’s increasing stature, already visible i n Party rankings of 1956, was n o w confirmed at a twomonth-long meeting of the Military Affairs Committee i n the late spring and early summer of 1958, where L i n , the second-ranking military m a n after

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477

the aging Chu Teh, outranked P’eng Teh-huai. There, L i n led an attack o n

China’s allegedly excessive reliance on the Soviet Union and on the policy of emphasizing arms over men and morale that had been associated with P’eng Teh-huai’s military leadership in the 1950’s. The Fifth Plenum also elevated K’o Ch’ing-shih, L i Ching-ch’iian, and T’an Chen-lin to the Political Bureau over the heads of the six alternates. Finally, and more important, an enlarged Political Bureau conference of August 17-30, also attended b y

provincial first secretaries and others at Peitaiho, adopted the “Resolution on the Establishment of People’s Communes i n Rural Areas.” Their action followed the successful experimental merging of twenty-seven cooperatives to form a commune i n Suip’ing, Honan, i n April, 1958, and led to the frenetic movement to merge some 750,000 cooperatives into 24,000

people’s communes in late 1958.52 Intra-Party Debate

The breakneck drive i n 1958 for industrial and agricultural development under the Great Leap Forward and people’s communes movements, however, seriously disrupted the economy and naturally intensified intraParty debate. Economic problems were again the focus of discussions among Political Bureau members and Party secretaries at the Chengchow and Wuchang conferences and most importantly at the Sixth Plenum, which was also held at Wuchang from November 28 to December 10, 1958. Some eighty-five members of the Eighth Central Committee, eightytwo alternates, and others discussed and adopted a “Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People’s Communes,” which eased restrictions on peasant ownership of private property,* scaled down the pace of communization, and reduced the size of communes. By the early 1960’s, the 24,000 communes of 1958 had been divided into 74,000 smaller ones.

The Sixth Plenum also approved Mao’s decision to retire as head of state, and, in April, 1959, the Second National People’s Congress transferred the position to Liu Shao-ch’i, with Chu Teh replacing Liu as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

Although Mao retained his far more important position of Chairman of the Party, he later declared that he was ‘“‘not satisfied with the Wuchang

Conference’®* and complained that he was henceforth treated like a ‘““dead man at his o w n funeral.” Problems w i t h the communes were also discussed at the enlarged Second Political Bureau Conference at Cheng-

chow i n late February and early March, 1959, which introduced the three-level system o f brigades and teams under the commune. Commune

problems remained an issue at a Political Bureau conference in Shanghai in late March, and at the Seventh Plenum, which was held in Shanghai from April 2 to 5 and was attended by eighty-one members and eighty alternates.

A common feature of all these debates was what Maoists later called * Between 1958 and 1964, peasant ownership of commune land rose from 1.4 per cent to 8.6 per cent.” 1 Brigades are roughly equivalent to the former higher-level cooperatives, and teams to the lower-level cooperatives.

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“the struggle between two lines” i n the countryside. I n oversimplified terms, Maoists argued that their form of communization could convert

China’s one great resource, the “poor and blank’ masses who “want revolution” and are like a “clean sheet of paper” on which the ‘“most beautiful pictures can be painted,”® into an effective means of building socialism, whereas ‘revisionists’ gave only lip service to the mass line, stressing instead more systematic planning, private ownership, capitalist incentives, and reliance o n Party organization and the Soviet Union.

Although virtually all Chinese leaders share many, i f not most, Maoist goals and have differed primarily on means, not ends, i t could be argued,

as Maoists do, that the “opposition” was unprincipled and shifted its stand according to superficial circumstances and that i t fell into two sometimes varying and overlapping groups: those who believed Mao’s pace of change unrealistically rapid and his faith i n the masses naive, as i n the collectiviza-

tion, communes, Great Leap Forward, and Hundred Flowers campaigns; and those who primarily stressed organizational over ideological means of control.” Thus, genuine issues were at stake, and Party upheavals were

not merely manifestations of Mao’s megalomania or power plays against potential rivals.. Nevertheless, the charismatic and impatient Mao was

always at the center of controversies, either initiating them or quickly becoming the leader of those wanting more rapid progress and greater ideological and mass involvement. I n the words of one perceptive observer, on most issues, Mao, as a prophet among priests, was usually able to use his charisma to impose his policies.®” Yet, as he had done since the mid1920’s, Mao occasionally changed his o w n opinions and style.

While much of the evidence on intra-Party debate comes from Maoist accusations i n the Cultural Revolution, the motivations for the purges of the late 1950’s seem to differ from those for the 1960’s. For example, Ch’en Yiin, Ch’en Y i , L i Hsien-nien, L i Fu-ch’un, and Teng Tzu-hui, among others who were re-elected to the Central Committee i n 1969, are known to have argued against Mao i n the 1950’s on the pace of socialization, the Great Leap Forward, and other crucial issues. Some not entirely

reliable evidence suggests that, in the mid-1950’s, Ch’en Yiin and Teng Tzu-hui were proponents of the supposedly revisionist arguments for a moderate pace and adequate planning i n industrial and agricultural development, while Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, P’eng Chen, Yang Shangk ’ u n , A n Tzu-wen, and other Party leaders offered different “revisionist” arguments that stressed the need for greater Party and organizational

control over the masses. The first group largely dropped out of sight with the initial triumph of Mao’s radical ideas i n 1958 ( L i Fu-ch’un and T’an

Chen-lin largely replaced Ch’en Yiin and Teng Tzu-hui, respectively), and the Party organization became even stronger i n the aftermath o f the

Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great Leap Forward. This situation, paradoxically, reversed w i t h Cultural Revolution attacks on the Party structure, when economic moderates L i Hsien-nien, L i Fu-

ch’un, and others were criticized but survived. Conversely, purges overthrew the organizational structure headed by Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiaop’ing, P’eng Chen, A n Tzu-wen, L u Ting-yi, Yang Shang-k’un, and others.*® I n 1959, however, i t was Minister of Defense P’eng Teh-huai who summed u p many arguments of both moderates and the Party apparatus,

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criticizing the “petty bourgeois fanaticism” of the Maoists for bringing on the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and commune movements. I n the process, P’eng posed the second great challenge, after Kao Kang, to Maoist leadership i n the 1950s. I n the summer of 1959, i n a series of statements, especially i n a “Letter of Opinion” of July 14, P’eng decried the “habit of exaggeration” and the “petty bourgeois fanaticism” that inclined the Party to “commit ‘left’ mistakes.” H e argued that, i n the absence o f concrete and sound planning,

the Maoist slogan “Politics in Command” provided insufficient guidance and that there should be greater “democracy” on Party committees. He also criticized other aspects o f recent leadership.®® While P’eng stopped

short of naming scapegoats, stating, “There should be no investigation of personal responsibility,” i t was clear that he was challenging Mao’s style of leadership, i f not his authority. Mao reacted sharply to these charges by his fellow Hunanese at a Central Committee work conference in July and at the Eighth Plenum of August 2-16. Both meetings were held in the mountain resort of Lushan, and the plenum was attended by seventy-five members of the Central Committee, seventy-four alternates, and fourteen others. I n a major, though informal, speech to the Conference on July 23, Mao disputed P’eng’s charge that, “divorced from reality, we failed to gain the support of the masses’ and averred that he “would go to the country-

side to lead the peasants to overthrow the government,” i f the situation was as bad as Party critics suggested.” Mao admitted the “ t w o crimes’ of

pushing unrealistic plans for backyard furnaces and communes but maintained that he was not as far left as some and was instead ‘ a middle-of-theroader’’ and that the Great Leap Forward was not like the loss of Kiangsi i n 1934, but only a “partial failure” that “enabled the people of the entire nation to learn a lesson.”’™’ No doubt many agreed with P’eng Teh-huai’s subsequent statement to the Eighth Plenum that “pressure was so great at the Lushan meeting,

that one could mention only good things, not bad things, and that meetings of the Political Bureau were only large-scale briefing meetings without any collective discussion.””? They may very well have also agreed with the following alleged exchange about Mao Tse-tung. According to P’eng Teh-huai, Chang Wen-t’ien had told him, “Comrade Mao Tse-tung was very brilliant and also very strong-handed in rectifying people... like Stalin i n his late years. At that time shortly after July 20,” P’eng continued, “ I assumed an attitude of sympathy and told [Chang] that Comrade Mao

Tse-tung was more familiar with Chinese history than any other comrade i n the Party and that the first emperor of any dynasty i n the past was always strong-handed and brilliant. . ” ’ " ® Whatever their private thoughts, and subsequent events indicate widespread dissatisfaction, the Party refused to follow P’eng Teh-huai’s lead. O n the contrary, the Eighth Plenum adopted a resolution condemning

“the anti-Party clique headed by P’eng Teh-huai,” which included Chief of Staff Huang K’o-ch’eng, former Ambassador to Moscow and “leftist” leader of the 1930’s Chang Wen-t’ien, Hunan First Secretary Chou Hsiaochou, and a handful of others.” Reportedly, Chu Teh defended P’eng Teh-

huai, and Liu Shao-ch’i and other leaders remained largely neutral. I n any case, Lin Piao soon succeeded to P’eng’s position as minister of defense and

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became de facto head of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Committee, while Lo Jui-ch’ing had already replaced Huang K’o-ch’eng as chief of staff and Hsieh Fu-chih had taken over Lo’s job as minister of public security.”

Questions about the management of the People’s Liberation Army involving P’eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao, and others were not among the fore-

most issues at the Lushan plenum showdown but formed an essential part of the background of the purge of P’eng Teh-huai and subsequent events. Under P’eng Teh-huai’s leadership until 1959, the army had paid great attention to ideological training, as well as to modernization along Soviet lines, but many on the controlling Military Affairs Committee, certainly including M a o and Lin Piao, felt that still greater efforts had to be made

to preserve the army’s now legendary guerrilla traditions and to stress the strength of the masses, organized into the people’s militia. Accordingly, the Maoists accused P’eng of repeating Kao Kang’s heresies that “the Party was created by the army,” that the “army [comes] before the Party,” that modernization precedes ‘‘revolutionization,” and that the Party should rely o n ‘“one-man leadership,” arms and techniques, and the Soviet Union,

instead of on Lin Piao’s “four-firsts’” of man over weapons, political work over other work, ideological work over routine work, and living ideology over bookish study. I n short, P’eng Teh-huai, Lo Jui-ch’ing, and others were accused of advocating greater specialization and “professionalism” and of neglecting “revolutionary spirit.”’"® Under Lin Piao’s command after 1959, the army concentrated on a variety of programs to make the PLA a ‘school of Mao Tse-tung’s thought” and to create a model for emulation during the Cultural Revolution. Efforts included stress on the militia, through the “every man a soldier’ campaigns, increased political indoctrination in the armed forces, an “officers to the ranks’ movement,” the abolition of ranks i n 1965,* and greater Party controls over the military. By the early 1960’s, Party cells

existed in all PLA companies, i n more than 80 per cent of the platoons, and more than half of the squads. Some 229,000 Party members were recruited from the army into the CCP, mostly i n 1960, and there were

“hundreds of thousands’ more in 1965.”® Expertise also continued to be stressed, as shown b y the startlingly successful development of nuclear

technology in China, but, especially in the PLA, politics came first. The Sino-Soviet Split

I t is clear that relations with the Soviet Union also figured prominently in the P’eng Teh-huai affair, as they did i n all internal and external developments. There had been always constant strains i n relations between the Soviet and Chinese Communists, and, even after “liberation,” there were

persistent border tensions. Moreover, the Soviet Union delayed until 1952 and 1955 the return to full Chinese control of Port Arthur, Dairen, and

joint Soviet-Chinese stock companies i n Manchuria and Sinkiang. Then came new tensions with Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin i n February, 1956, which the Chinese feared would undermine the “dictatorship of the

* Ranks had been introduced i n 1955 to make the army more “professional.”

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proletariat” and weaken bloc unity. I n the late 1950’s, the Chinese became increasingly impatient with Soviet global strategy, which they felt was over-

cautious, especially after the launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile and an earth satellite i n August and October, 1957, respectively. The Chinese believed, as Mao put i t at the fortieth-anniversary celebrations

of the Bolshevik Revolution i n Moscow in November: “The east wind prevails over the west wind.”’”® The crux of Chinese discontent, of course, was that the Soviet Union

was relatively happy with the world status quo and unwilling to take risks to back China’s demands for change, especially i n regard to regaining Taiwan. Soviet reluctance to give Peking full support seemed confirmed when Khrushchev failed to back China’s August-September, 1958, efforts to take the Nationalist offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu or to back China in its clashes with India, especially in 1959 and 1962. Mao’s personal animosity toward Khrushchev and his successors, the decision to press long-standing border claims,* and other factors also led China to challenge Soviet leadership of the Communist world, particularly after the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties i n 1960 and the Twenty-second

Congress of the CPSU i n October, 1961. During the mid-1950’s, P’eng Teh-huai is thought to have been associated with those, including probably Chang Wen-t’ien, who favored extensive reliance on the arms, methods, and nuclear shield of the Soviet Union. P’eng was present i n Moscow, along with Mao, soon after the signing of the pact for New Technology for National Defense in October, 1957, which reportedly involved the supply of a sample nuclear weapon and information on its construction. However, continued negotiations o n further aid

and on the coordination and integration of Chinese and Soviet defense forces, combined with obvious Soviet reluctance to back Chinese initiatives toward Taiwan and India, led to cancellation of this agreement on June 20,

1959, just days after P’eng’s return from a new tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and just days before the Lushan showdown. Thus, i t is likely that Moscow acquiesced in, i f i t did not encourage, P’eng’s challenge of Mao in the summer of 1959.%° I n the wake of Moscow’s reluctance to back China’s foreign policies, especially toward Taiwan and India, its cancellation of the 1957 nuclear arms pact, and its apparent involvement i n the P’eng Teh-huai affair, relations between the two Communist giants regressed from the warm rela-

tions of the early 1950’s to mutual suspicion and finally outright hostility in the 1960’s. From then until the early 1970’s, China faced all the world’s powers alone. The Retrenchment of the Early 1960’s

Continuing domestic crisis and mounting intra-Party criticism, together with the developing Sino-Soviet dispute and Indochina war, formed the background for the unprecedented Cultural Revolution of the late 1960’s. * Especially over the Soviet Far East, which Russia had taken from the helpless Manchus i n the “unequal treaties” of 1858 and 1860. Serious armed clashes occurred along the Ussuri River and i n Sinkiang in the spring of 1969.

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The overstrains of the Great Leap Forward of 1958, a succession of natural disasters i n 1959-61, and the sudden withdrawal of all Soviet

experts in August, 1960, brought China to the brink of collapse. During the economic nadir of 1960-61, China avoided widespread starvation only by distributing available foods more evenly than had ever been done before and by Draconian belt-tightening.®* I n this situation, the Party accelerated the retreat from the “three great banners” of 1958 and renewed its mid-1950’s call for help from experts and intellectuals. This meant further decentralization of the communes into brigades and teams, the expansion of private plots, and more freedom and incentives for production and trade. Of necessity, production, not the politics of Mao’s formula, was in command. These measures and improvement in the weather after 1961 led to much better living conditions, but the nightmares of complete breakdown and a return to past cycles of natural and human disasters understandably put the fear of heaven into Chinese leaders, both Maoist

and non-Maoist. Accordingly, agrarian policy, even after the Cultural Revolution, basically has, with variations, continued the three-tier system of communes, brigades, and teams, with about 5 per cent of arable acreage privately held and with toleration of some private trade.®?> Any return to full communization will probably await more decisive improvements i n agriculture.

The need for greater stress on ‘‘expertness’ in the early 1960’s meant a corresponding decline i n the power of the political specialists or “red professionals.” The latter, ubiquitous at all levels of Chinese society after “liberation,” moved to new pinnacles of power in 1958-59, as the Great Leap and commune movements decreed more active Party management

of the society and economy. The corresponding jump in Party membership from the 12.7 million members of mid-1957 to the 17 million of mid-1961 was the greatest in the Party’s history but was far from sufficient to meet the new demands for control of more and more leadership positions. As bad harvests and mounting transportation and industrial bottlenecks produced the intense crisis of 1960-61, economic and social

plans were adjusted and leaders again appealed for infusions of ‘““intellectuals” and “experts,” ranging from nuclear physicists to old peasants, both into the Party and into non-Party positions of leadership in government, schools, factories, and communes. As always before in Party history, great influxes of new members, especially from nonproletarian strata, meant new problems of control and new rectification movements. Even as the Party loosened its grip on society in general, from the spring of 1960 into 1961, i t launched a new purge of its greatly expanded membership, primarily at lower levels. Where the Party had rebuked “backsliding’ i n the antirightist campaign of late 1957 and 1958, it now blamed the overenthusiasm and ineptness of local cadres for many of the problems of the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath. Accordingly, even as the new purge intensified, many Party members who had been criticized i n 1958 were reinstated under the new guidelines. A November 3 , 1960,

“Urgent Directive on Rural Work” criticized excessive zeal of local cadres in implementing directives from above, i n demanding general use of the communal mess halls, i n overrestricting private property and trade, in

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falsifying statistics, and i n general for ‘“commandism” and mocking the mass line.** Movements for cadres to “learn from the Party constitution” and to spend more time i n productive labor were launched, and in 1961, organization men pressed hard to consolidate their control over Party members. I n other words, i n the early 1960’s, the Party Organization placed much of the blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward on excessive zeal and consequent neglect of planning and expertise.

But there was another Party interpretation of what had gone wrong. Even as the CCP apparatus renewed stress on internal controls, Lin Piao’s campaign to revolutionize the ideology of the military “according to the thought of Mao Tse-tung” and the “four-firsts” moved into high gear with adoption by the Military Affairs Committee on October 20, 1960, of a “Resolution on Strengthening Indoctrination Work in Troop Units.” Underlying this approach was the theory that ideological indoctrination should enable men to overcome all obstacles. Similarly, there were new

efforts from the autumn of 1960 on to emphasize the education of youth in the Party’s revolutionary traditions and ideals and a series of campaigns to

emulate youth heroes. These two approaches, the organizational and the ideological, proceeded simultaneously i n the early 1960’s, before diverging

into another period of “struggle between two lines” that culminated in the Cultural Revolution. While seeking to strengthen and discipline its ranks in the early 1960’s, the Party took simultaneous steps to reorganize its central headquarters, and to increase the size and power of its control committees. I t also assigned senior provincial secretaries as political commissars of PLA units and sent other Party leaders down to localities to strengthen the work of Party branches. Probably the most important measure to tighten controls over the Party apparatus was the decision to reinstate the six regional bureaus, which had been abolished i n 1954-55 i n the wake of the Kao-Jao affair. A Central Committee work conference at Peitaiho in July—August, 1960, decided on this move and, i n mid-January, 1961, the Ninth Plenum

of the Eighth Central Committee announced it. The six bureaus and their secretaries were Central-South China, T’ao Chu; East China, K’0 Ch’ingshih; North China, L i Hsiieh-feng; Northeast China, Sung Jen-ch’iung; Northwest China, L i u Lan-t’ao; and Southwest China, L i Ching-ch’iian.®*

The Ninth Plenum, attended by eighty-three members of the Eighth Central Committee, eighty-seven alternates, and twenty-three others, also formally decreed a shift to place emphasis o n “agriculture as the foundation” of the national economy, with industry i n second place, a reversal

of the priorities of the 1950’s.%° A new version of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, already hinted at i n 1959, gathered momentum i n 1961-62 i n cultural circles, with important

political repercussions. Although restricted by Mao’s criteria that all criticisms contribute to national and Party unity, writers and speakers expressed themselves with greater freedom than at any time since the

spring of 1957. The new critical and artistic expression revealed triangular tensions among Maoists, Party bureaucrats, and independent-minded

intellectuals, while some writings produced in 1961 foreshadowed the bitter charges of the Cultural Revolution. Foremost among the politically

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charged works of these years were the plays of W u Han and T’ien Han and essays by Wu, Teng T’o, and others. Wu Han, a famous historian and a vice-mayor of Peking under the Peking Party’s First Secretary and Mayor, P’eng Chen, had already written “ H a i Jui Scolds the Emperor” for People’s Daily, on June 16, 1959, just before the final showdown between Mao and P’eng Teh-huai. W u pointedly revealed his sympathy for P’eng Teh-huai’s criticisms of Mao and the communes, quoting the Ming dynasty official Hai Jui’s criticism of Emperor Chia Ching about A . p . 1570: Present taxes and labor levies are abnormally high. These ten years or more have been chaotic. . . . I n earlier years, you did quite a few good things, but . all officials in and out of the capital know that your mind is not right, that you are too arbitrary, too perverse. You think you alone are right, you refuse to accept criticism and your mistakes are many. This is the most serious problem i n the country.8¢

As i f this example of lése majesté were not clear enough, highly trained Chinese sensibilities were well aware that W u was the leading biographer of Mao’s most comparable predecessor in Chinese history, Chu Yiianchang, the peasant rebel who had founded the M i n g dynasty i n 1368. The

title of Wu’s full-fledged historical drama The Dismissal of Hai Jui, produced i n early 1961, made still clearer Wu’s criticism of the “injustice” of Mao’s dismissal of P’eng Teh-huai, on the grounds that P’eng had only protested the hard lot of the peasants i n time-honored Chinese fashion. Another famous playwright, T’ien Han, developed a similar theme in a play about a lady at the court of Empress W u of the T’ang dynasty, who

about

A.D.

700 denounced the estrangement of a once popular ruler from

the people. Finally, i n the autumn of 1961, Teng T’o, the editor of People’s

Daily in the 1950’s and since 1959 propaganda director of the Peking Committee, began a series of still more blunt attacks o n recent policies. Others spoke u p on a variety of issues centering o n the new contradictions

between “socialist ideological leadership and the actual needs of the peasants.’’®? Maoist counterattacks, beginning i n late 1962, however, inhibited further jibes at Mao and the relatively free expression of opinion in general. This was what Maoists called the “fifth great ideological campaign” after 1949,* and i t concentrated on Mao’s October, 1962, injunction: “Never forget class struggle.” During the campaign, Maoists also employed historical analogies, especially i n the new ‘revolutionary’ historical dramas pro-

duced after 1963 by Mao’s wife, Chiang Ch’ing. I n 1963, for example, Mao ordered an attack on the formerly praised Taiping hero L i Hsiu-

ch’eng for not having maintained his revolutionary heroism to death and for having confessed the error of his ways under torture b y a Ch’ing dynasty official i n 1864.88 The attack on L i Hsiu-ch’eng was, b y analogy, a condemnation of Liu Shao-ch’i’s alleged authorization i n 1936, as head

* T h e first four

campaigns were the attacks o n t h e movie W u Hsiin i n 1951, o n H u

Shih i n 1954, on H u Feng i n 1955, and the antirightist campaign of 1957-58.

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of the Party’s North China Bureau, of confessions by Communists in Nationalist jails i n order to gain their release. More crucial than these academic debates were continuing criticisms in upper echelons of the Party of Mao’s initiatives, as occurred at four highlevel Party conferences i n 1961* and, even more importantly, at a series

of meetings i n 1962. Mao later singled out the “deviations” of 1962 and 1964 as crucial i n forming his decision to launch a wholesale attack on the Party apparatus. Already i n December, 1961, Political Bureau member, Peking First Secretary, and Mayor P’eng Chen had convened a secret conference to review “problems” and “mistakes” i n Party work since 1958. One speaker at this conference reportedly expressed the hope that

“Chairman Mao would calm down and examine himself.” The “struggle between two lines” sharpened at two enlarged Party and Central Committee work conferences, attended by the enormous number of 7,000 Party officials, i n January-February, 1962. I n an important speech

to the first conference, Mao spoke at length of his and everyone’s inexperience i n “building socialism.” Despite such modesty and tolerant statements about dissent, this speech, foreshadowing Mao’s attack on the Party four years later, warned that even the Party majority could go astray: The minority may keep their dissenting opinions, as long as they obey resolutions and decisions adopted by the majority. I t is to our advantage to allow the minority to hold their opinions, within and without the Party. When the opinions are wrong. they may keep them for the time being and correct them i n the future. The minority’s opinions often are correct. This has happened frequently i n history. At first the truth is not i n the hands of the majority, but i n those of the minority. For a long period, Lenin was also i n the minority. O u r Party h a d similar experience, [ a s ] under Ch’en

Tu-hsiu’s control and during the period under “leftist” control.

90

Possibly stung by criticisms of himself, Mao also warned of the necessity for continued “protracted, complex and at times. . violent class strug-

gles” because of the persistence of bourgeois ideology, and cautioned vigilance against a “capitalist restoration’ i n China, such as was occurring

in the Soviet Union. At both work conferences, also foreshadowing later developments, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai apparently backed Mao’s ideological approach and called for the study of ‘“Mao’s thought as the soul and very life of all work.” Liu Shao-ch’i, on the other hand, contrasted the “very favorable. .

political situation” pictured by Mao with the “very unfavorable” economic situation and called for greater democracy within the Party and the right of dissent i n intra-Party discussions.’’ I n line with this argument, Liu, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others increased their efforts partially to “reverse the verdicts” of the antirightist struggle and the Great Leap Forward,

restoring Party positions to many, but not to those who had “maintained illicit relations with foreign countries,” presumably P’eng Teh-huai. The second of the two Central Committee work conferences, which took place * Three Central Committee working conferences i n March, May-June, and September and a conference of Party secretaries engaged in industrial work in December.

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from February 21 to 26, heard further criticisms of economic problems stemming from the Great Leap Forward, notably by Ch’en Yiin, as well as Liu Shao-ch’i’s “erroneous”®® conclusion that the economic situation con-

stituted a national “emergency.” Both work conferences were important milestones on the road to the Cultural Revolution.

The Socialist Education Movement Mao began his counterattack at Central Committee work conferences at Peitaiho in August, at Peking in September, and at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, September 24-27, 1962. At the two earlier meetings, Mao criticized recent economic retreats, naming as their advocates Ch’en Yiin, L i Fu-ch’un, L i Hsien-nien, Po Yi-po, and Teng Tzuh u i . Teng was dropped out at this time as director of the Central Com-

mittee’s rural work department, though T’an Chen-lin had already assumed control o f rural work i n 1958. A t the Tenth Plenum,* attended b y eighty-

two members, eighty-eight alternates, and thirty-three others, Mao won the adoption of resolutions halting the further decentralization and liberalization of the communes. More importantly, he warned that class struggle was still very much the order of the day and induced the plenum to adopt plans for a new rectification campaign embracing a Socialist Education Movement i n the villages, further attacks on intellectuals, and a new five-anti

campaign for all cadres. At this and other meetings, Mao warned increasingly against Soviet-style revisionism and of the necessity to train “revolutionary successors”

among youth, two themes that would become important motivations for the Cultural Revolution. Thus, in 1964, he stated, I n order to guarantee that our Party and country do not change their color [from red to white, that is to capitalism], w e must not only have a correct

line and correct policies but must train and bring up millions of successors Successors to the who will carry on the cause of proletarian revolution. revolutionary cause of the proletariat come forward in mass struggles and are tempered i n the great storms of revolution. I t is essential to test and judge cadres and choose and train successors in the long course of mass struggle.®s

The Socialist Education Movement proceeded i n several stages before being engulfed in the Cultural Revolution. The phrase came to be used for simultaneous efforts to rectify ‘bourgeois’ practices and habits of

local cadres, peasants, intellectuals, and urban residents—in short, of the entire country. I n the first stage, from the winter of 1962-63 to mid-1964, the Party attacked errors i n commune operations, particularly alleged rises in corrupt practices by basic-level cadres, the neglect of the mass line, and * The Tenth Plenum was the last formal Party meeting until August, 1966. During the interim, Mao pressed his arguments at a series of ad hoc work conferences, another sign of intra-Party tensions.” + Mao’s hostility to “revisionism” was expressed i n the escalating polemics with the Soviet Union and particularly i n a series of lengthy letters to the Soviet Communist Party in 1963-64.

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ineptness in handling the local contradictions arising from the combination of three years of dislocation and privation with the easing of restrictions on private property, trade, and communal organization. The stress in this first period was on education and indoctrination, supposedly conducted

with moderation and patience, “like a mild breeze and gentle rain.” This stage saw a gradual introduction at “key points” of the “four cleanups” campaign to rectify politics, ideology, organization, and economy. After late 1963, the “four cleanups” campaign was tied i n with Lin Piao’s campaign for the “whole country to learn from the People’s Liberation Army.” Three Central Committee work conferences i n February, May, and September, 1963, reviewed the Socialist Education Movement. The M a y conference. adopted a draft resolution o n ‘ r u r a l work,” known as the

“first ten points,” which reportedly conformed to Mao’s stress on leadership by “poor and lower-middle” peasant associations, but the September conference revised these rules to emphasize lower-level Party leadership

and material incentives, reportedly under Liu Shao-ch’i’s lead, and these became known as the “later ten points.” The first stage of the Socialist Education Movement seems to have grown out of a tacit agreement between Maoists and the Party apparatus, led by Liu Shao-ch’i, that the relaxations of the post—Great Leap Forward period had gone too far, producing widespread confusion, especially i n the villages, and that “revolutionary leadership’ had to be strengthened. The primary problem, i t was felt, was to recover control and confidence of the masses both in the Party and i n society as a whole. According to the “first ten points,” some 95 per cent of lower-level cadres were “good or

comparatively good,” but the 5 per cent who were not had to be weeded out and control of the general population by local cadres had to be improved. As the simultaneous movements to rectify lower levels of the Party and strengthen their relations with the masses proceeded, the divergence that had grown during the Hundred Flowers, Great Leap, and commune movements, again widened.’® I n general, Mao favored more mass mobilization

“from below” through the peasant associations for the handling of outstanding problems, while Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and the Party structure again tended to rely more heavily o n Party organization. Thus, the “later ten p o i n t s ’ of September, 1963, which put the peasant associations and all local activities under the control of local Party organizations, was confirmed b y the June, 1964, “Organizational Rules of Poor and

Lower-Middle Peasant Associations.” This led to attempts by county-level committees to tighten control of all activities and to increasing resistance by many non-Communist and opposition Party cadres.®” Judging by its subsequent fate, the Communist Youth League, around 35 million strong at the time of its N i n t h National Congress i n June, 1964, must have sided

with the Party apparatus. Moreover, some Party and non-Party local committees resisted the “work teams’ and control committees sent by Party Central to supervise lower levels. Local cadres also must have resented

growing military involvement i n many activities in the ‘learn from the People’s Liberation Army’ campaign, which led to the establishment, starting in the spring of 1964, of a political commissar system in all

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economic and government departments and to growing numbers of military representatives at all levels of Party organization. Thus, the second stage of the Socialist Education Movement in the autumn of 1964 saw what Mao called an “apparently left” but actually “rightist’’ deviation, w i t h an increasing use of Party work teams sent from above to lead mass activities, remold discipline, and rebuild Party power

at grass-roots levels. However, i t is difficult to characterize the divergent styles of leadership of Maoist and Party-centered groups, both because later efforts sought to make i t appear that all “good” cadres backed Mao’s concept o f the mass line against that of the “ b a d ” Party bureaucrats and

because, even i f one accepts the claim that various groups advocated basically divergent work styles, each group frequently employed tactics associated with other groups. Thus, all groups used “work team” methods and talked expansively of the wonders of the mass line. I n late 1964, in fact, Party work teams belatedly (according to Maoists) stressed organiza-

tion of peasant associations and militant actions against local authorities i n accord w i t h Mao’s instructions to emphasize a resurgence of class strug-

gle in the villages. A t another important Central Committee work conference from December, 1964, to January, 1965, Mao’s “twenty-three points” criticized the

Party’s handling of the Socialist Education Movement for having moved from overly bureaucratic to overly stringent methods and for misinterpreting Mao’s techniques of “investigation” and the mass line. The conference directed a reversion to milder but more spontaneous education and “basic construction” i n place of the “four cleanups.” Judging by these maneuvers, one scholar concluded that Liu Shao-ch’i was fearful of Mao’s stress on mass spontaneity and ideology, while Mao was fearful of overreliance on

the Party apparatus.”® Also, i n 1964, Mao’s increasing concern to halt “revisionism and capitalist restoration’ resulted in attacks on the theory of “two into one” advocated by Yang Hsien-chen, director of the prestigious Central (or Higher) Party School, and argued instead for the theory of “one into two’ with obvious implications for policy toward the internal class struggle and the split with the Soviet Union.* I n 1965-66, the Socialist Education Movement merged into and was overwhelmed by the eruption of the Cultural Revolution. By then, Maoists had concluded that the failure of 1965 efforts to revolutionize the Party

and its work teams necessitated open class struggle. The Socialist Education Movement for lower-level cadres and the rural population ended finally late i n 1966 as the Party apparatus that had directed i t was overturned.®® The Maoists had decided that the Party would have to be transformed fundamentally i n order to continue the revolution. * Mao’s stress on “one into t w o ’ meant that struggle should take precedence over unity in all relationships.

23 THE MAOIST QUEST A N D CHINESE REALITIES

I n the late 1960’s, Mao Tse-tung and his followers made their most

ambitious attempt to impose their Communist vision on Chinese life and society. Even before the Cultural Revolution, the history of the People’s Republic had seemed a ceaseless revolution. Although there had been considerable variation i n the pace of change, i t was almost as i f the Communist leaders, who had endured so much, could neither stand still themselves nor let the Chinese millions catch their breath, lest a pause permit questions about the future to arise. I n the Cultural Revolution, Maoists charged that the ‘capitalist roaders” of the Party, headed by Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, P’eng Chen, and others had proposed just such a relaxation with their talk of the dying out of the class struggle and the slowing of the pace of revolutionary change.* I n purging much of the top Party leadership i n the late 1960’s, Maoists

claimed to be seeking to prevent a loss of revolutionary fervor and to forestall the emergence of completely institutionalized, bureaucratic, and hence conservative structures, as had occurred i n the once revolutionary

Kuomintang after the mid-1920’s and, as they maintained, had occurred with the emergence of revisionism i n the Soviet and other Communist parties. The Cultural Revolution shook the Party as i t had not been shaken

since 1927 and the days of the Long March, and perhaps even more traumatically, inasmuch as the CCP was attacked b y its o w n with the purge or criticism of u p to half o r more o f veteran Communist leaders. The bitterness of Party cadres whose life work was condemned b y long-time comrades must have been as painful i n many respects as would have been the spilling of their blood by mortal enemies, but the Chinese “ o l d Bolshe-

viks,”” unlike their Soviet counterparts under Stalin, so far as is known, were not physically liquidated but, rather, were humiliated and removed from office. This process was severe enough, and there were even periods

during 1966-67 when observers speculated about the demise of the Party, whose place would seemingly be taken by other organizational forms. But * Change, however, had also obviously proceeded with dizzying rapidity at times in the 1950’s and early 1960’s, when the “revisionists” were supposedly in charge.

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R e p r i n t e d f r o m Theodore Shabad, China’s Changing M a p : N a t i o n a l a n d Regional Development, 1949-71, r e v . ed., 1972. © 1956, 1972 b y Theodore Shabad. Reprinted b y permission o f t h e p u b lishers, Praeger Publishers, I n c . , a n d M e t h u e n & C o . Ltd.

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i t is clear that Mao and his followers very much intend the Party to continue its domination of Chinese life. Only Maoists insisted o n subjecting

the Party as well as all of society to permanent revolution and ceaseless “struggle, criticism, transformation,” until some utopian future when all governing organizations may disappear.

Thus, despite the wholesale attacks on the Party during the Cultural Revolution, Maoists wanted not to jettison but to “revolutionize” the Party by restoring its emphasis on the ‘“mass-line” style of work in the face of the increasing bureaucratization and specialization that had set i n after 1949. As a Shanghai newspaper put i t i n November, 1967, “The purpose of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is to carry out rectification of the Party, state, and the [Communist Youth] League, with the rectification of the Party as the central issue.”' Implicit i n the vision of a new Party

were the utopian Maoist goals of ‘smashing revisionism,” sponsoring “revolutionary successors,” completing the ideological renovation of the Chinese people, and further stimulating the country’s production and strength.? How had i t come about that the instrument of revolution of the past forty-five years could n o w be seen as a bar to revolution? Maoists simply

concluded that the Party apparatus, by the mid-1960’s, was more interested i n consolidating its power than i n continuing the revolution. The December, 1964—January, 1965, Central Committee work conference had revealed more clearly than before that Mao intended to force a

showdown with the Party apparatus. Maoists denounced as “not MarxistLeninist” those views known to be advocated by Liu Shao-ch’i and others and for the first time stated, “ T h e main target [ o f the Socialist Education

Movement] is those within the Party who are i n authority and are taking the capitalist road.” Moreover, i n private, Mao apparently expressed his

“disappointment” with Liu Shao-ch’i and reportedly made an irrevocable decision at this time to force out Liu and other Party stalwarts.® As early as the Tenth Plenum of 1962, Mao had tried to recover the ‘ f i r s t line” of operational control of the Party, but the takeover of the Socialist Education

Movement by the Party apparatus demonstrated his failure to do so. The Secretariat controlled the Party structure, and i t was headed b y Teng Hsiao-p’ing, w h o Mao said kept him completely i n the dark about Party operations after 1959 and ‘relied only o n P’eng Chen,” whose Peking

Party organization also completely shut out the Maoists. Moreover, Liu Shao-ch’i, as head of government, controlled many state activities.* T o change this situation, Maoists would have to rely on others, notably

on those leaders, including Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, K’ang Sheng, and Ch’en Po-ta, who shared enough of Mao’s views to support him, and on the masses, whom they hoped to mobilize, not through the Party but ‘“spontaneously” through the semireligious mystique of Mao’s name and ideology. I t is important to remember that Mao’s then supporters were important

leaders of the Party, with additional responsibilities in military, state, security, o r ideological work, and hence could both lead intra-Party struggles for a “Maoist Party’ and mobilize their respective organizations

for the struggle against other parts of the Party apparatus under Liu Shaoch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing. Therefore, many struggles of the Cultural Revo-

[Chap. 23]

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493

lution did not simply pit the army or state against the Party but often cast

factions of the Party against other factions. The Maoists would also rely on the cult of their leader. The cult of Mao obviously led to gross excesses but no doubt looked far less absurd to the million villages of China than to the world outside.* I t also played an enormously important role i n forging tighter national unity. As a Maoist

statement put i t , “ I f a nation of 700 million people does not possess a uniform ideology, then i t will be [as Sun Yat-sen had put i t ] .

. scattered

sand. The ideologies of the entire populace can only be unified with the power of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.”” Also, in considering the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, i t is essential to remember the voluntarist character of Maoist thought, the belief that Promethean struggle, whatever turmoil i t may bring, is the surest way to create conditions for further advance, not only i n training “revolutionary successors,” b u t i n the economy and society as a whole. Under socialism,

Maoists argued, “Class struggle does not ‘die out,” but gets sharper, more acute, more concealed, more complicated.”

On the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Party i n mid-1971, Maoists explained that the simple method of “dismissing” Liu Shao-ch’i and others could not solve the problem. Only by arousing the broad masses to expose dark aspects openly, in an all-round way and from below would i t be possible to clean out the Liu Shao-ch’i renegade clique, temper hundreds o f

millions of people i n class struggle, educate them i n the struggle against revisionism and enable them to gain experience i n seizing back that portion of power which had been usurped by a handful of capitalist roaders.®

During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao expressed once again Maoist faith in the two principles of “struggle” and of basing struggle on “the people.” He asked “comrades especially i n military units not to fear struggle’ and said, Our Communist Party has one principle which states that contradiction can When we want to change something only be resolved through struggle. vigor, incorwe have to rely upon struggle. Our Communist Party’s ruptibility and resistance to decay are all due to the fact that our ideological method is that of struggle. . . . 7

There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between Chinese Communist “politics of struggle” as stated here and Western-style “consensus politics” based on compromise. Elsewhere, Lin complained that “many of our comrades are afraid of the students, the masses” but argued that “disturbances” were bound to be

more helpful than harmful in “unmasking’ reactionaries and that only * The cult of Mao and his thought has played a historical role i n creating national unity and inculcating ideology that is perhaps comparable to the roles played earlier by the cults of Louis X I V , the Russian Tsars, and the Japanese Emperor i n forging French, Russian, a n d Japanese nationalism.

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“the masses are the motive force” for historical progress.® As events would soon show, the masses of China would struggle to an unprecedented degree. Long-repressed tensions and efforts to escape the straitjacket of a

uniquely regimented society, when sparked by such appeals from above, would ignite a society repeatedly taught that “only through struggle can there be progress.” Two additional problems i n understanding the Cultural Revolution are to determine i f Mao was i n charge throughout, and, i f so, whether he and his supporters had a full picture of the revolution’s course when they

began it, or whether the Cultural Revolution, gathering its own momentum, moved onto wholly uncharted grounds.’ Despite doubts about Mao’s health i n 1966, i t seems certain that Mao was i n control of the Cultural Revolution through its first half, which bore a l l the earmarks of Maoist rectification.

I n 1967, however, he had to change some of his views and was forced to rely more and more on the military. Thus, there is little doubt that he was

the dominant figure behind the early Cultural Revolution, as he had been i n a l l major developments i n the Party for thirty years, b u t there is much

less certainty that he had a good idea of where the Cultural Revolution would lead. Although the evidence is limited, the most likely explanation for the discrepancy between his dominant role i n launching the movement and his lack of control over its development seems to be that Maoists directed the movement i n generally intelligible stages but were surprised at its intensity, rapid acceleration, and zigzag course, and were no doubt disappointed that many of the problems of economy, society, and bureaucratism remained or even worsened i n its aftermath. I t seems certain that new developments frequently altered or speeded u p Maoist plans, per-

haps making explicit what had only been implicit i n the drives for change and power."’

The Beginning of the Cultural Revolution The first step was taken at the crucial December, 1964—January, 1965,

work conference, which criticized Liu Shao-ch’i’s handling of the Socialist Education Movement and also appointed a Group of Five to work out plans for a new Cultural Revolution. Headed by P’eng Chen, the group included K’ang Sheng, Propaganda Director L u Ting-yi, General Office Director Yang Shang-k’un, and Editor-in-Chief of People’s Daily and Director of the New China News Agency W u Leng-hsi. As i n the Cheng-feng Movement of the early 1940s, i t is hard to explain

why so many prominent figures at early stages of the Cultural Revolution later became its victims, unless one assumes that Mao and a few trusted associates planned to proceed by stages, using potential enemies to dispose of other enemies and then turning on many of the “executioners.” This tactic is implicit i n the Maoist slogan “ W i n over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one b y one.”* I n any case, in April-May, * One is reminded of Stalin’s use of Bukharin against Trotsky before he turned on Bukharin and eventually most old Bolsheviks. Perhaps P’eng Chen, Liu Shao-ch’i, and others realized what was going on i n the early stages of the Cultural Revolution but were powerless to prevent the Maoists from dismissing them.

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495

1966, P’eng Chen was one of the first prominent Party members to be

purged, and, within a few months, among the powerful original Group of Five, only K’ang Sheng remained in the Party’s top leadership. The expansion of the Indochina war after the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam i n February, 1965, especially in conjunction with the severe strains i n Sino-Soviet relations, introduced a new note of urgency into domestic preoccupations and the dissension among Chinese Communist leaders. I t is likely that the escalation of the Vietnam war played a prominent role i n the purge of army Chief of Staff and former Public Security

Director Lo Jui-ch’ing, who disappeared from view after attacks on him at a Political Bureau Standing Committee Meeting in December, 1965. Lo was thus the first very prominent figure to come under attack, although his purge was not announced until the following spring’s campaign against Party leaders P’eng Chen, L u Ting-yi, and Yang Shang-k’un, with whom Lo was linked. Lo is believed to have been a leading spokesman for “greater professionalism” i n the army, as against Lin Piao’s arguments for a more politically oriented ‘“people’s army.” Lo’s security connections and role i n the army at a time of great military danger also set his case apart. I n the spring of 1965, L o had argued for a more forceful Chinese response

to the bombing of Vietnam and probably for the necessity, under the circumstances, of improving relations with the Soviet Union. Maoists, however, placed first priority on the settling of domestic issues and asserted that class struggle could not be exported but could only be fought out by the people of a given country. Self-reliance was the theme of Lin Piao’s celebrated “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” published on September 3 , 1965, the twentieth anniversary of Japan’s formal surrender. I n effect, L i n told the Vietnamese Communists that they would have to win the war basically o n their own, as had the Chinese Communists. China would supply material aid, but, unless North Vietnam were invaded,

Peking would not intervene directly as i t had done in Korea, and as Lo Jui-ch’ing and others may have wished.’ The first concrete indications of the nature of the Cultural Revolution came when Mao pressed to intensify ideological rectification at a September—October, 1965, Central Committee work conference, attended b y the

Political Bureau Standing Committee and by ‘leading comrades” of the six regional bureaus. Peking Party leaders P’eng Chen, L u Ting-yi, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and others countered that Mao’s proposals were unrealistic. Their objections were understandable, because rectification meant new

turmoil i n areas under their jurisdiction. Mao thereupon turned to the Shanghai Committee for support. H e directed young Shanghai propagandist Yao Wen-yiian, his alleged son-in-law, to initiate the Cultural Revolution

with an attack i n the Shanghai press on November 10 on historian and Peking Vice-Mayor W u Han. Wu’s play The Dismissal of Hai Jui, with its

obvious, i f oblique, criticisms of Mao’s handling of the P’eng Teh-huai affair, offered a ready-made target, while criticisms of Wu and subsequently of Teng T’o and other Peking writers would serve to weaken the Party apparatus there. P’eng Chen evidently recognized this and refused to publish Yao’s article i n the Peking press until forced to do so several weeks after its publication in Shanghai.'®

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The Long March to Power

The campaign against the writings of Wu Han begun by Yao Wen-yiian’s November 10 article spread in the spring of 1966 to saturate the national press and included attacks o n other members of P’eng Chen’s Peking

Committee and the propaganda apparatus, notably the Peking Committee’s propaganda director, Teng T’0, and his group. However, the central Party apparatus, at a Political Bureau meeting i n early February, which was chaired b y L i u Shao-ch’i in Mao’s absence, once again attempted to slow and control these criticisms, as was revealed i n the February 12 report

prepared by P’eng Chen’s Group of Five. “Behind the backs of K’ang Sheng” and others, as a Maoist charge later put it, this report “covered up the serious political nature of the struggle” against W u H a n b y arguing that criticisms “should not be confined to [ t h e ] political questions

involved.” I n other words, P’eng Chen was seeking to keep criticisms of W u Han as academic as possible.*® I n April and May editorials, primarily in the Liberation Army Daily, and at a series of Political Bureau Standing Committee conferences in Hangchow, Maoists counterattacked, criticizing P’eng Chen’s handling of the Cultural Revolution. The “May 16, 1966, Circular,” approved by an enlarged session o f the Political Bureau, ominously denounced ‘those rep-

resentatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various cultural circles, [including] some [ w h o ]

are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev, for example, who are nestling beside u s , ” the latter a clear indication of L i u Shao-ch’i’s intended fate. The circular dissolved P’eng’s

Group of Five, and appointed a Cultural Revolution Group, headed by Ch’en Po-ta and Chiang Ch’ing and retaining only K’ang Sheng of the original Group of Five. Party leaders who were targets of this first stage of the Cultural Revolution, besides P’eng Chen, included much of the Party apparatus below

Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-P’ing, notably Propaganda Director L u Ting-yi and his deputy Chou Yang, General Office and Party Affairs Director Yang Shang-K’un, Organization Director A n Tzu-wen, Youth League

Director H u Yao-pang, and many lesser figures. The dismissal of Lo Juich’ing from all his posts was also announced, and Lo was bracketed with P’eng Chen, L u Ting-yi, and Yang Shang-k’un as the “four-family store.” These men were accused of attempting to by-pass Mao by using their control of Party organization and propaganda. Yang Shang-k’un supposedly went so far as to tape-record Mao’s conversations i n efforts to defend

others against Maoist accusations. The removal of P’eng Chen from his position as the Peking Committee’s First Secretary was revealed on June 3, 1966, with the announcement of a new metropolitan committee headed b y L i Hsiieh-feng, and, i n early July, T’ao Chu was named to replace L u Ting-yi as propaganda director. Before the year was out, T’ao was also denounced, w i t h Mao somewhat illogically blaming his rise on the erroneous

recommendations of Teng Hsiao-p’ing.'* However, as with the appointment of P’eng Chen to head the Group of Five, either T’ao was appointed in

good faith by Maoists, but, like P’eng, backed the efforts of Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing to slow the Cultural Revolution, or T’ao and P’eng were appointed with the expectation that they would falter on the job.

[Chap. 23]

The Maoist Quest and Chinese Realities

497

I n the late spring and early summer of 1966, what was left of the Party

apparatus, notably Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and lower-level committees, most of which were still loyal to them, made another effort, as they had with the Socialist Education Movement i n 1964, to steer Mao’s

activities into more manageable channels. Their method consisted primarily of sending out work teams i n June and July to “ b a n the masses from going

out in the streets” to propagandize for the Cultural Revolution. While these maneuvers occupied the highest levels of the Party, wholesale criticisms of lower-level cadres were temporarily suspended in early 1966 as the country awaited further developments. Lower-level purges

would resume with a vengeance later in the year, but would be imposed from outside the Party by Red Guards and other Maoist groups.'®

The initial hesitation in the provinces must have been partly due to the fact that Mao’s position was very much in doubt throughout the first half of 1966. Often rumored ill, especially during several months’ absence in 1954, since 1964 at least, Mao had often spoken of his preparations ‘ t o

see God very soon.”'” Health problems may have been partly responsible for his absence from public view from November, 1965, to May 10, 1966, and even from the M a y Day celebrations, but the need to plan strategy

for the Cultural Revolution was probably the primary reason for his absence.'® H e was again out of sight i n June and early July, reappearing literally with a splash o n July 16, amid fantastic publicity about his incredible swim of some ten miles i n a little more than an hour i n the Yangtze currents near Wuchang.” Nor did Mao often deliver speeches i n public,

although he did on a few notable occasions, such as at the Party’s Ninth Congress in April, 1969. Some argue that Mao’s failure to do so was due to his reluctance to speak in his heavy Hunan accent or otherwise risk tarnishing his image, but his silence contributed to speculation that he was ill or paralyzed.* As for his lack of support during this period, Mao reportedly later confessed, “Most people at that time thought my views outdated. At one point, I was the only supporter of my opinion. Later, when this spirit was taken to the Eleventh Session of the Eighth Central Committee, I gained support

by a simple majority.”’?° But this majority was as fictitious as that attained by Lenin’s Bolsheviks in 1903 and was attained only by packing the Eleventh Plenum with Maoists not on the Central Committee. I n the provinces, Maoists were usually even more outnumbered, at least i n organ-

izational terms. Furthermore, i f Maoists partially took control at the Eleventh Plenum i n August, 1966, they were subsequently thrown off

balance many times i n the zigzags of the new revolution. According to some reports, Maoists were able to hold the Eleventh Plenum only after the military intervention of Lin Piao’s troops to force compliance in the Peking area.*!

* The well-known story of how an ambitious minister and a eunuch had concealed the death of the first emperor of the Ch’in dynasty about 210 B.c. for their own purposes perhaps contributed to the spate of speculations that Mao was dead and that Lin Piao and others were manipulating his double to advance their own cause.

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The Long March to Power

The Second Stage Preparations for the Eleventh Plenum were completed at a Central Committee work conference of July 20-23, where Mao, w h o had just

returned to Peking, attacked Liu’s and Teng’s handling of the Cultural Revolution up to that point and recalled their work teams. The Eleventh Plenum launched a second and much more turbulent phase of the Cultural Revolution, which saw the elevation of Lin Piao to be Mao’s successor, the demotion and eventual purging of Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiaop’ing, and later i n the year T’ao Chu, and the unleashing of the Red Guards, and ultimately the army, to overcome the substantial resistance of

Party members at all levels to Maoist efforts to revolutionize their organizations.

The plenum was attended by some forty-seven members and thirty-three alternates or less than half of the Eighth Central Committee (forty-four members and fifty-seven alternates were absent) and b y ‘“‘comrades from

the People’s Liberation Army,” and “revolutionary cadres.”’?* This enlarged group gave Mao his “bare majority” to reorder the Political Bureau rankings, with Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and T’ao Chu following Mao, and with

Teng Hsiao-p’ing and Liu Shao-ch’i demoted to sixth and eighth positions, respectively. The plenum also approved a “Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” the sixteen points of which sought to define the nature and rules of the next stages of the revolution. This document

called on the Chinese people to destroy the ‘“four-olds’ (ideas, culture, customs, and habits) i n order to “change the mental outlook of the whole

of society”; to rely on the masses, class line, and Mao’s thought; to “grasp revolution and stimulate production”; and to promote fundamental organi-

zational and personnel changes. Scientists and technicians capable of “contributions” were to be handled with care,* and they and the peasants were the only sections of Chinese society to escape the brunt of this new and much more violent phase of the Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards* above all served as the organizational instrument of

Maoist attacks on the Party apparatus. Under the slogans “There can be n o construction without destruction” and “ T o rebel is justified,”’** revolutionary youths, mostly of high school age, stormed across the country,

seemingly overturning all i n their path, much in the manner of the wondrous monkey king of traditional China’s most popular novel, Monkey.?®

Only too glad to obey Mao’s appeals for personal and ideological reasons,

they propagandized for the Cultural Revolution through the ubiquitous “big character posters.” These were a major source of foreign information on

the Cultural Revolution, especially as conveyed by Japanese correspondents in Peking.?® Posters had been appearing in Peking since May and increasingly concerned Red Guard struggles with work teams and more conservative youth, many of whom were the sons and daughters of high Party cadres. From mid-August, 1966, to the end of the year, M a o and Lin Piao reviewed parades of an estimated 11 million revolutionary youth on

eight occasions. Red Guards could travel freely on trains and buses but

* Hung wei-ping, to be distinguished from red guards of pre-1949 struggles, ch’ih wei tui.

[Chap. 23]

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The Maoist Quest and Chinese Realities

were urged to undertake their own “Long Marches,” and an estimated 50 million youths traveled i n the year after August, 1966.

Concern for the continuing ideological revolution of youth against the “four-olds” and for the training of ‘‘revolutionary successors’ was cettainly one of the prime features of the Cultural Revolution, along with high-level policy debates and struggles for power. I n the belief that “revolutionary successors” could only be tested in struggle, the youth of the late 1960’s, most of whom had been born after “liberation,” were sent out to tackle the Party’s “cattle, ghosts, snakes, and spirits,” who were supposedly blocking realization of the Maoist vision. Their targets i n late 1966 were primarily members of lower-level Party committees, nearly all of whom had been trained with readings from Liu Shao-ch’i’s “How to Be a Good Communist” and appointed by Teng Hsiao-p’ing’s Secretariat. However, these early moves “ t o storm the Party headquarters” b

understandably brought strong countermeasures from many, i f not most,

local cadres, who mobilized their own supporters to fight back. The consequent pitched battles and beatings became endemic i n China for at least the next two years. Lower-level Communist committees organized their own Red Guard groups, producing an extraordinary profusion and confusion of activity, as competing factions struggled for hegemony i n all the structures built u p during fifteen years of unprecedented mass organi-

zation.?’ As Mao seems to have intended, few guidelines were given for the struggle, except for the general instructions of the sixteen points of August,

1966, and the even more general “thought of Mao Tse-tung,” the “red, red sun i n our hearts.” Everyone carried, of course, the Little Red Book of Quotations from Chairman Mao, early versions of which were used b y Lin Piao i n the P L A from May, 1964, on, and talked of the “three con-

stantly read articles”: “Serve the People,” “How the Foolish Old Man Removed the Mountains,” and “ I n Memory of Norman Bethune.” They also read record-breaking numbers of Mao’s works, hundreds of millions of

copies of which rolled off the press amid charges that the Party apparatus had previously restricted their publication.*®

The Maoists were staking their life’s work on the proposition that “worthy successors” would interpret ambiguous or even contradictory instructions i n a properly revolutionary manner, as they had done, during a quarter-century of revolutionary warfare. T o make matters even more confusing, such cryptic directives as there were often mixed with counterinstructions issued b y parts of the old apparatus still loyal to “per-

sons in authority taking the capitalist road.”{ Nor did all subordinates of Lin Piao and Chou En-lai i n the military and state bureaucracies go along

with these efforts to turn everything upside down. There is evidence in * Some 150 million copies of the Selected Works were distributed from 1966 to 1968, and the Nationalists estimated that u p to 4 billion copies of all categories of Mao’s writings had been published by 1970. By comparison, i t is estimated that about 60 million copies of the Bible were sold during the 1 9 6 0 s . + There were also accounts of Nationalist efforts to get into the act, i n one case faking a Communist broadcast to spread the rumor that part of Lin Piao’s forces had rebelled.

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addition that Lin, Chou, and very likely Mao at times acquiesced in or issued instructions to slow the pace and lessen the consequences of events. Obviously, they were only partially successful. But no matter the confusion, others thought; out of i t would emerge progress. As Lin Piao argued, “Frequently one comes to the conclusion that struggle will bring problems, [ b u t ] the truth is, not only will struggle not bring problems, but i t will resolve problems.’’?* After the Eleventh Plenum, i t was decreed that schools should remain

closed so that students could “make revolution” and the Communist Youth League was disbanded temporarily so that full attention could be given to the Red Guards. Red Guard rampages to ‘“drag out” and humiliate ‘“‘rightists” and a merciless barrage of criticism of “top power-holders taking the capitalist road” gradually eroded the authority of Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and their followers, although the two leaders were not named

until early 1967, in the next stage of more open struggle. Liu and Teng made self-criticisms at a Central Committee work conference of October 8-25, 1966," confessing that they had opposed and ineptly administered Mao’s plans. A special committee later reported on the “three big crimes” that Liu Shao-ch’i had supposedly committed against the Party in 1925, 1927, and 1929 and on others of 1936 and 1945-1950—but did so with obvious bias and inconsistencies.’’ Ceaseless propaganda from 1967 on tried to detail his erroneous actions and policies in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Above all, Maoists denounced the “problems” newly discovered in the previously standard text, written by Liu i n 1939 and later revised, “ H o w to

Be a Good Communist.” I n this document and on other occasions, Liu had supposedly advocated ‘‘six theories” of revisionist ideology. He was charged with having encouraged new recruits to enter the Party in order to become “officials,” with recommending that Party members make small sacrifices i n order to gain much, and with urging them to become ‘docile tools’ of the Party. Liu had also allegedly proclaimed the dying out of the class struggle under socialism, thereby calling for inner Party peace. Finally, Liu was accused of scorning the masses for their backwardness. By contrast, Maoist ideology supposedly advocated another ‘six theories,” stressing the perpetualness of antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions, the persistence of class struggle under socialism, the necessity for dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in culture, continued struggle with the bourgeoisie’s representatives i n positions of authority, the centrality of the mass line, and finally the struggle against selfishness and revisionism. But neither the differences between the “ t w o lines” nor the superiority of one over the other was clear, and certainly not i n 1966.%2

By late 1966, i t was also evident that neither Maoist polemics and maneuvers at the top nor Red Guard rampages below were accomplishing the desired shakeup and reconstruction of the Party. Lower-level organizations especially had been resisting Maoist inroads with substantial success, n o doubt motivated, i n the words of Ch’en Po-ta, b y the fear “ o f losing

their positions and prestige [and therefore] instigating workers and peasants to fight against the students.’’*®* Many remained loyal to Liu Shaoch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, whose confessions had not gone far enough beyond normal self-criticism to preclude their continued authority. More-

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over, according to the Maoists, who, starting i n the autumn of 1966,

seemed increasingly to take their lead from Mao’s wife, Chiang Ch’ing, the new propaganda apparatus under T’ao Chu still vacillated on important issues. A former Shanghai actress, then called Lan P’ing, Chiang had mar-

ried Mao in northern Shensi in 1937, reportedly over the objections of other leaders, who, failing to prevent the marriage, are said to have insisted that she at least stay out of politics. From the winter of 1966-67 on, Chiang Ch’ing and others attacked T’ao Chu as a counterrevolutionaty, bracketing him with Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing and accusing all of them of consistent opposition to Mao and of seeking to abort the second stage of the Cultural Revolution.

The Third Stage The third major stage of the Cultural Revolution, beginning in late 1966, saw fierce Maoist efforts to complete the reorganization of the Party and those of others to reverse or stop this phase. I n December, 1966, the Cultural Revolution Group called on the “revolutionary left” to win over labor, and, i n January, 1967, the Military Affairs Committee ordered the P L A to support the “revolutionary masses of the left” i n penetrating all levels of society, to ‘storm Party headquarters,” and to ‘“‘seize power’

from “capitalist roaders” throughout the country. This appeal marks the beginning of the “three-way alliances” uniting the revolutionary masses, the military, and “revolutionary old cadres” and the end of Red Guard monopoly of revolutionary action, although the Red Guards remained the most conspicuous group in the Cultural Revolution through 1967. The three forces were to form revolutionary committees

as the new centers of power at all levels. At the very top, according to Chou En-lai, “the central Military Affairs Committee of the CCP is the general headquarters of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, with the Central Cultural Revolutionary Committee as its general staff and the State Council as its executive agency.”’®® Below, Red Guard bands and

other “revolutionary organizations” denounced and often took into custody provincial and local Party leaders, including regional leaders Liu Lan-t’ao, L i Ching-ch’iian, and Sung Jen-ch’iung, and strove to establish ‘‘revolutionary rebel” groups i n Party, government, industrial, and mining centers and, to a lesser extent, i n the communes.

I n 1967, the Party ceased to function in many areas, and public humiliation of Party leaders reached an initial climax. Rebel groups denounced “reactionaries,” forcing many leading figures to don dunce caps, shoving them through taunting crowds, and generally subjecting them to humiliat-

ing criticism. Factionalism and inexperience among the left and continuing opposition from many sections of society made these early efforts to build a new order far more difficult than the destruction of the old.*®* For example, the frenetic and quixotic efforts to form a model revolutionary

government of the masses i n Shanghai, based on the Paris commune of 1871, were abandoned, allegedly as a result of Mao’s advice to Chang

Ch’un-ch’iao, Yao Wen-yiian, and other Shanghai leaders. The Shanghai proletariat supposedly had been lured into opposition b y false promises of profit and b y ‘“economism,” and the Maoists were forced to retreat. I n

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the end, the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee could not be set up until February 5, 1967, and then only with military support.®’ Between January and April, 1967, only six areas (Heilungkiang,

Shanghai, Kweichow, Shantung, Shansi, and Peking) were able to form even shaky revolutionary committees. One problem, as might have been expected, was that the military was far from united in backing Mao’s and L i n Piao’s maximum goals, and, i n any case, until about September, 1967, i t was enjoined from using force to gain adherence to these goals, in accord

with Lin’s instructions not to fear struggle among the people. After initially backing, or at least being neutral toward, the “revolutionary left” in the early winter, from February on, more and more military units threw their support to relatively conservative groups and increasingly supported “law and order.” I n many provinces, especially on the northern and western borders, including Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, military and Party leaders apparently joined together to block the Maoists, often with force.®® This effort was later termed the “February adverse current” and blamed on Ho Lung. According to some, up to seventy higher officers of Ho Lung’s former Second Front Army were purged in the Cultural Revolution.?® Thus, groups in Shanghai, Hunan, Kwangtung, and elsewhere denounced the intervention of the military and the old cadres in the three-way alliance and tried to insist that only the revolutionary masses were genuinely Maoist.*

Differences of opinion understandably intensified in the wake of continued conflict within and among elements of the three-way coalition forming the new central leadership—the Cultural Revolution Group, the military, and ‘revolutionary cadres.” The first, and especially its far left, apparently led by Chiang Ch’ing and radical young propagandists such as Yao Wen-Yiian, mounted new efforts, starting i n April, 1967, to keep the Cultural Revolution at a fever pitch. Backed by sizable numbers of local supporters who, like sections of the new left in the Western world, took some of Mao’s anarchist statements at face value, the left argued for and usually got the support of Mao and of K’ang Sheng and Ch’en Po-ta, for

new revolutionary action and demands. Mao stated at one point that he was only “ a middle-of-the-roader,” well to the “right” of some Chinese

groups.*' Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, the leaders of the other two principal forces, the military and state bureaucracies, at times were willing to

support the far left but had a more difficult time persuading other members of their hierarchies to go along. Such reluctance became more and more evident as mass warfare between contending factions of youth and mass

organizations intensified in mid-1967. Tension between the various groups was revealed especially i n the so-called Wuhan incident of July 20, when the local military commander forcibly detained representatives of the

central Cultural Revolution Group who had expressed support for the more radical of contending forces i n that area. Local authorities sponsored

rival demonstrations by more conservative groups in the Wuhan cities and retreated from what K’ang Sheng termed their “mutinous act” only after the personal intervention of Chou En-lai. Meanwhile, new appeals by Mao, Lin Piao, Chiang Ch’ing, and others encouraged continued ‘upheavals’ and chaos in order to “expose” the reactionaries, and even urged the left

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to “take up arms” to defend its positions.*” This incitement led to many clashes and to virtual civil war across the country i n the late summer of 1967.

The Fourth Stage By September, i t was evident that the Cultural Revolution had reached a crucial point where i t would have to be controlled, because, i f pressed to realize maximum Maoist goals, i t would probably force irremediable

anarchy and disintegration on the country. Faced with this prospect, the decision was reached to rein i n the Cultural Revolution. Even leading Maoists now changed course, presumably reflecting growing pressure from more conservative leaders. The halt of the slide to the left was signaled by a sudden attack on the ‘“‘ultra-left” by Madame Mao and b y a new

emphasis on the roles assigned to the PLA. Chiang Ch’ing’s September 5 speech initiated what Ch’en Po-ta called a fourth and more conciliatory stage of the Cultural Revolution.*® I n i t , she defended the central leader-

ship and the formation of revolutionary committees according to the principle of “three-way alliances” and denounced the “creating of chaos” b y

indiscriminate fighting between mass organizations and assaults on the PLA. Chiang also signaled an attack on leftist Cultural Revolution Group members Wang L i , Kuan Feng, Ch’i Pen-yii, and others for an alleged plot of the “May 16 Corps,” which supposedly aimed to reverse the policy of “three-way alliances” and have the ‘revolutionary masses” alone take complete control of the Cultural Revolution.** I n September, 1967, Mao announced his “great strategic p l a n ” to disci-

pline the revolutionaries and embarked on a tour of several provinces to show his continuing concern for the welfare of the country. Lest there be any doubts on that score, he declared somewhat ritualistically from this time o n that the ‘situation had never been better.” But, henceforth, the Maoists had to proceed w i t h greater caution, relying on the P L A and a balance of power between opposing factions. Thus, the Maoist Thermidor of late 1967 saw the purge of the “ultra-

left” and the imposition of much more control of the Cultural Revolution from above, especially by the military, which was instructed to use force i n keeping order. The army assumed administrative functions, purged the secret police, and established military control committees to keep watch.*” The Red Guards, on the contrary, were ordered to return to their proper

groups or to work i n rural areas and were forbidden to seize arms or use force to impose their views. There were further shakeups i n the Cultural Revolution Group and the editorial board of Red Flag and other journals, and new rectification campaigns were undertaken i n all groups. Even i n the P L A , at least several hundred officers were purged at central, regional,

and provincial levels. Simultaneously, new efforts were made, especially by military units, to tighten control of the public security apparatus, parts o f

which allegedly remained loyal to Lo Jui-ch’ing.*° The Fifth Stage There was still one more major gyration i n the Cultural Revolution,

which Maoists called its fifth stage. I t began in late March, 1968, with the

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dismissal of acting military Chief of Staff Yang Ch’eng-wu and several others. The fall of Yang (who had replaced Lo Jui-ch’ing) signaled new efforts to radicalize and speed up the formation of the revolutionary committees, although, ironically, Yang’s successor and former wartime col-

league, Huang Yung-sheng, had been the target of leftist attacks a year earlier as commander of the military region around Canton.*” I n any case, April saw new attacks on ‘“‘right opportunism” and ‘““splittism,” and there were shifts termed “reversals of verdict” and calls for “full play to the role of the revolutionary mass organizations,” which in turn led to local clashes between rival groups from May to July, 1968. However, despite apparently widespread sentiment for further radicalism, these activities represented a last fling for the revolutionary left. In late July, Mao, reportedly tearfully, told representatives of five leading

revolutionary mass organizations, “You have let me down and disappointed the workers, peasants and army men of China.”’*® He again ordered a strengthening of discipline and the restoration of order, to be assisted by a speedup in the reopening of schools and other measures. I n August, Yao Wen-yiian, whose attack on W u Han had opened the public phase of the Cultural Revolution, marked its end with an article in Red Flag calling for “working class leadership” of all future activities. “Proletarian” work teams, backed by the PLA, subsequently were dispatched to schools and mass organizations to restore order. I n November, Party Central repub-

lished with fanfare Mao’s March, 1949, report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, which stressed the proper means of uniting disparate groups to build a new order. The parallel was obvious. Mao’s “second” revolution was over, but, as twenty years before, the demands of building a new order would be as arduous as those of making revolution. A final push was made to complete the formation of the twenty-nine new provincial and metropolitan revolutionary committees. Progress toward this end had been slow in 1967, when only nine revolutionary committees had been formed, beginning with those i n Heilungkiang on January 31 and Shanghai o n February 5. Then, during the first five months of 1968,

fifteen new revolutionary committees were formed, with the help of PLA representatives, who chaired all but three of them. Finally, provincial revolutionary committees were established i n the remaining five sensitive border areas in August and September, 1968, almost all headed by military men.*° The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution

China and the world had not stood still during the Cultural Revolution’s three years of turmoil. China continued to progress i n certain fields of endeavor, especially i n scientific activities. O n June 17, 1967, near the

peak of factional struggles, Peking exploded its first hydrogen bomb, requiring less time between the testing of nuclear fission in October, 1964, and its use than any other nuclear power. Less dramatic but still impres-

sive results were achieved i n other fields, from medicine to agriculture, and were invariably credited to reliance on the “thought of Mao Tse-tung.” But the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution strained the economy

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and damaged China’s relations with other nations just when the United States was greatly expanding the Indochina war on China’s doorstep. By 1970, the economy had resumed its growth under the slogan “Grasp

revolution and promote production,” and China was moving to mend its diplomatic fences. A new diplomatic era began in 1971 when Peking invited President Richard M . Nixon to visit China i n February, 1972. I n

October, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to expel Taiwan and admit the People’s Republic, and Peking’s delegates were seated i n the Assembly and Security Council. The rebuilding of the shattered Party structure after three years of turmoil seems to have been almost as difficult as achieving economic growth and national security—and was at leasi equally important. The magnitude of recovery necessary is suggested by the fact that more than half of the Party’s top revolutionary veterans who were still active i n 1965 were purged or heavily criticized i n the Cultural Revolution, although, at lower

levels at least, many who were criticized have either resumed Party work or are expected eventually to do so. The Eleventh Plenum’s “Decision o n the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” of August 8 , 1966, had divided

Communist cadres into four categories: the good, the comparatively good, those who were mistaken but capable of reform, and those who were “anti-Party, antisocialist rightists,” often with “anti-Mao” tacked on to form a “three-anti”’ category. The last two groups supposedly totaled only about 5 per cent of Party membership throughout the country, but, in some central organizations, a majority was categorized as ‘“‘three-anti.”

Thus, up to two-thirds of the Eighth Central Committee and Political Bureau were not re-elected to the Ninth Central Committee in 1969, and nearly all of the regional and provincial secretaries active in 1965 appear to have been purged at least temporarily.*°

Government and military officials who were not Party members fared noticeably better i n the Cultural Revolution than d i d Party administrators,

especially at first. Still, about half of the top leaders of the forty-odd ministries of the mid-1960’s were heavily criticized and presumably purged, many of their places being taken by military men. I n all, according to one estimate, 1 per cent received criminal punishment, 5 per cent were expelled, and only 20 per cent were judged adequately ‘“Maoist.’’** Communist leaders particularly hard h i t b y the Cultural Revolution were those who had worked i n the 1930’s and 1940’s i n “ w h i t e ” areas

under Liu Shao-ch’i and in the Northwest under Kao Kang, P’eng Teh-huai, and Ho Lung. The “white” areas group included especially the cadres of the December 9, 1935, student movement and those who had been arrested by the Nationalists about that time and were released from jail partly because of “false confessions” supposedly authorized in 1936 by Liu Shao-ch’i, who was then secretary of the Party’s North China Bureau.

The Northwest group included both those who had worked in northern Shensi with Kao Kang in the 1930’s and those who had served throughout the Northwest under P’eng Teh-huai and Ho Lung in the 1940’s. North China leaders who had not worked i n the South and not made the Long March were ‘systematically eliminated.”’? Much less is known about

Cultural Revolution purges on lower echelons of the Party, except that

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they led to still greater cadre participation in “productive labor” and “study.” For several years after early 1967, Party committees at all levels ceased to function, some of their duties passing to mass organizations, representatives of the P L A , and eventually the revolutionary committees. But, as

the revolutionary committees began to fill vacuums of authority, a new cycle set i n with increasing talk of Party reconstruction. By late 1967,

“Party-building”” had already begun to be stressed, officials were being referred to again by their Party titles, and there was talk of a Ninth National Congress of the CCP.” Throughout the Cultural Revolution, Maoists continued to issue directives and hold conferences in the name of the Central Committee and Political Bureau, the Cultural Revolution Group, the Military Affairs Committee, or simply Party Central.’* Pronouncements from January 1, 1968, o n made clear that increasing attention

would be given to the restoration of authority i n general and the construction of a new Maoist Party i n particular. “Revolutionary cadres” were to

increase their participation as the “core and backbone’ of revolutionary committees, although i t was clear that Party members who also happened to be military men dominated most revolutionary committees. Under the new slogan “Struggle, criticism, transformation,”’?® Party members, whether

military men or not, sought to form “nucleuses’ or “core groups” to lead the revolutionary committees. There were more references than before to reconstituted Party branches at local levels, to the dispatch of leading Party members for crucial tasks, and to “revolutionary leading groups” of higher-level Party committees.”® But these new nucleuses were composed

of varied elements, especially after millions of urban cadres, professionals, teachers, and students had been. “sent d o w n ’ to local levels under new

educational and other programs unveiled i n the autumn of 1968. Thus, the tasks of Party-building merged with Mao’s utopian efforts to wipe out distinctions between mental and physical labor, and between countryside and city, and with the efforts to reduce bureaucracy to an absolute minimum.®’ Yet the crucial first step for the “transformation” of the country after its years of struggle and criticism would have to be the reconstruction of the Party. Although the Party, like any other organizational instrument, was

corruptible by bureaucracy and ‘‘revisionism,” i t still seemed the most effective means of organizing revolution discovered in a half-century of combat. As M a o had said i n 1957, “ T h e CCP is the nucleus.

Without

i t the socialist cause cannot prevail.””*® The problem, as the Maoists saw i t , was how to revitalize the Party’s revolutionary heritage. T o this end, a new campaign was launched i n 1968

to “get rid of the stale and take in the fresh,” to “eliminate waste,” and “absorb fresh blood from the proletariat.” On August 4, 1968, a People’s Daily editorial launched an important campaign against a ‘so-called theory of ‘many centers’ ”’ of the Party—in other words, against complete decentralization and continued quasi-anarchy. The editorial argued, “The proletarian headquarters, w i t h Chairman Mao as the leader and Vice-Chairman L i n Piao as the deputy leader, is the one and sole leading center for the whole Party, for the nation, and all the revolutionary masses.” Moreover, “ t h e force at the core leading our cause forward is the Chinese

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Communist Party.”*® Under these slogans were scheduled the first important all-Party conferences since the Eleventh Plenum of August, 1966.

The Ninth Party Congress The Ninth National Congress of the Party, which began to be called for in 1967-68, was to signify the completion of Maoist reconstruction in a “congress of unity and a congress of victory.” To complete preparations for i t , the enlarged Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee met i n Peking from October 13 to 31, 1968. I n contrast to the situation at the Eleventh Plenum, where they had been only observers, “revolutionary

cadres” and “principal responsible comrades’ of revolutionary committees had voting rights equivalent to those of surviving members of the Eighth

Central Committee. The plenum therefore assured the predominance of Cultural Revolution and PLA groups. I t reviewed the work of the Cultural Revolution, formally expelled Liu Shao-ch’i as a “renegade traitor and scab,” discussed the new draft Party constitution, and said i t would con-

vene the Ninth Party Congress “at an appropriate time.” Subsequently, provincial Party congresses were held during the winter in order to stress the point that “ t h e power of the Party is the nucleus of political power,

the highest of all powers.” The Ninth Congress met from April 1 to April 24, 1969, in Peking. More than 1,500 delegates issued three communiqués and heard two short speeches b y Mao, Lin Piao’s political report, and statements b y nine other

delegates. I t approved a new Party constitution and elected a new Central Committee.

Because delegates to the Ninth Congress were selected or at least screened “from the top downward,” they and the Central Committee they selected conformed more or less, though with the dominance of the military, to the principles of the ‘three-way alliance.” O f the 170 members and 109 alternates of the Ninth Central Committee, about 45 per cent (74

members and 55 alternates) * were representatives of the PLA; about 28 per cent were ‘revolutionary cadres” (58 members and 19 alternates), and about 27 per cent (38 members and 35 alternates) were representatives of the ‘revolutionary masses.” Some 125 men (more than 70 of them military) were representatives of the provincial revolutionary committees, and at least 64 (some 34 military and 30 civil) came from central offices i n

Peking. About 53 (48 members and 5 alternates) or about one-third of the Eighth Central Committee were re-elected, while more than twice that

many or about two-thirds (54 members and 62 alternates) were dropped.®* The Ninth Central Committee elected a new Political Bureau of 2 1

members and 4 alternates and the Party Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who were, as expected, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.®> The membership of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee is shown i n Chart 23.1. Only 9 men had been on the Political Bureau before the outbreak of

the Cultural Revolution. Almost a dozen members of the pre-1966 Political Bureau had been purged, and another 5 were demoted to membership i n

the Central Committee alone. Another 3 or more had died. Of the new * As compared to about 27 percent of the Eighth Central Committee who were military leaders. The comparable figure i n the Soviet Union at this time was 8 per cent.

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Political Bureau, 11 members, including 6 generals, the wives of M a o and Lin, and all 4 alternates, had never been o n the Political Bureau before. About half of the 25 members and alternates were active members of the

military, and all of these were also members of the Military Affairs Committee, which included perhaps 17 men.*® C H A R T 23.1 PARTY ORGANIZATION AT N I N T H CONGRESS, APRIL, 1969

National Party Congress 1,512 delegates

Central Committee 170 members, 109 alternates Departments, Military Affairs Committee Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao,* Chou En-lai, Political Bureau Ch’en Po-ta,* K’ang Sheng,* Yeh Ch’lin* (Mme. Lin Piao), Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch’eng, Chiang Ch’ing, Chu Teh, Hsii Shih-yu, Ch’en Hsi-lien, L i Hsien-nien, L i Tso-p’eng,* W u Fa-hsien,* Chang Ch’un-ch’iao, Ch’iu Hui-tso,* Yao Wenyian, Huang Yung-sheng,* Tung Pi-wu, and Hsieh Fu-chih; alternates: Chi Tengk’uei, L i Hsiieh-feng,* L i Teh-sheng, and Wang Tung-hsing Political Bureau Standing Committee Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao,* Chou En-lai, Ch’en Po-ta,* and K’ang Sheng* Six regional Party committees Twenty-nine provincial and metropolitan revolutionary and Party committees About 150 to 200 special district revolutionary and Party committees (throughout t h e country)

About 2,300 county and municipal revolutionary and Party committees About 74,000 commune and about 1,600 town revolutionary and Party committees Brigade and village revolutionary and Party committees Team and local revolutionary and Party committees About 1.5 million Party branches

* Dropped from view i n 1971. K’ang Sheng, however, was mentioned favorably i n 1972. After Mao and L i n , Political Bureau members were listed in the stroke order of their names and not by rank. Hsieh Fu-chih died March 26, 1972. Sources: Based on Winberg Chai, “The Reorganization of the Chinese Communist P a r t y , 1966-68,” i n Asian Survey, November, 1968, p . 903; Ralph Powell, “ T h e Party, the G o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h e G u n , ” i n Asian Survey, June, 1970, p p . 400-63; a n d K l e i n

and Clark, Dictionary, appendix.

The other half of the Political Bureau was split between the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group, including Ch’en Po-ta, K’ang Sheng, Chiang

Ch’ing, Chang Ch’un-ch’iao, Yao Wen-yiian, Li Hsiieh-feng, and Chi Teng-k’uei, and administrators, including Chou En-lai, L i Hsien-nien, and

Hsieh Fu-chih. Tung Pi-wu, acting head of state, and Chu Teh performed largely ceremonial functions as Party elders, pending the Fourth National People’s Congress. Fourteen of the twenty-five members of the Political

Bureau also were members of Mao’s “proletarian headquarters,” a new group either paralleling or enlarging the Cultural Revolution Group. This

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group supervised civil affairs, while the Party Military Affairs Committee

had jurisdiction over the PLA. I n contrast to the new Central Committee, where regional leaders predominated, the Political Bureau was dominated by Peking officials, both

civil and military. I t is important to remember that, although the “threeway alliance” of the military, revolutionary cadres, and administrators reasonably reflected the balance of power, many members of one group had concurrent affiliations to one or both of the others.®* I t would be a mistake to see these groups as mutually hostile, although they undoubtedly had divergent interests. At the Ninth Congress, Lin Piao gave the principal address, stressing the leadership of Chairman Mao (whom he mentioned 148 times), the

necessity for continued dictatorship of the proletariat at home, and the support of some nine revolutionary struggles abroad. Special attention was given both to the threat of the United States, especially i n Indochina and the Taiwan Strait, and to the dangers of “social fascism,” as practiced b y

the Soviet “revisionist renegade clique,” which had invaded Czechoslovakia i n August, 1968, and with whom Chinese had had grave clashes on the Manchurian border just weeks before. The Chinese had begun a nationwide campaign for “preparations against war’ even before clashes with Soviet troops o n the Ussuri River i n March, 1969. Mao reportedly decreed

“with regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities; one is that war will give rise to revolution, and the other is that revolution will prevent war.”’®® Lin Piao also cited Mao’s October, 1968, prediction of further decades o f struggle:

We have won a great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle.. . . Therefore we cannot speak of final victory. Not even for decades. We must not lose our vigilance. According to the Leninist viewpoint, the final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people at home, but also involves the victory of world revolution and the abolition of exploitation of man by man on the whole globe.s¢

As had the Bolsheviks fifty years before, Maoists predicted an acceleration of world revolution. L i n , citing Chairman Mao i n 1962, said;

will be a great era of radical change i n the The next 50 to 100 years . social system throughout the world, an earthshaking era without equal i n This magnificent prospect . . illuminates any previous historical period! our path. . . Let the whole Party unite, let the whole nation unite, hold high the great red banner o f M a o Tse-tung thought, b e resolute, fear n o sacrifice

and surmount every difficulty to win victory. . .

.%7

The new constitution also predictably praised Mao to the skies. I t was much shorter than its predecessors, but its general program attempted to summarize cardinal beliefs about the “socialist era” prior to the “realization of Communism.” During the “fairly long historical period” of socialist society,” i t said, there are ‘‘classes, class contradictions and class

struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration and there is the threat of subversion and

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aggression b y imperialism and modern revisionism. These contradictions

can be resolved only by depending on the Marxist theory of continued revolution.

. . ” I n this situation, the Party must depend on ‘“Marxism-

Leninism and on Mao Tse-Tung thought.” The latter is Marxism-Leninism of the era i n which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. For half a century now, i n leading China’s great struggle . Comrade Mao Tse-tung has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice o f revolution; [ h a s ] inherited, defended a n d developed Marxism-Leninism

and has brought i t to a higher and completely new stage.s8 The constitution called for continued central direction of staffing and

operations of lower-level committees and of elections “through democratic consultation’ rather than secret ballot but talked of assuring greater

democracy within committees. I t dropped the references in earlier drafts of the constitution to Lin Piao’s “four-firsts’’ and ‘‘three-eight work style”* but, for the first time, a supposedly Marxist constitution named the man

who would succeed Mao.” The reference praised Lin Piao as the person who “has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade L i n Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s close comrade i n arms and successor.”

Yet, i n mid-1971, Lin Piao dropped out of sight.} I t is evident that Mao’s latest and greatest task to “smash revisionism,” train selfless and dedicated “revolutionary successors,” and create a new, uniquely undifferentiated

and public-spirited society remains incomplete. As Lin, citing Mao at the Ninth Congress, said: I n the past, we fought north and south; i t was easy to fight such wars. For the enemy was obvious. The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is much more difficult than that kind of war. The problem is that those who commit ideological errors are mixed up with those whose contradiction with us is one between ourselves and the enemy, and for a time i t is hard to sort them out.”

After the Ninth Party Congress, lawlessness and general malaise reportedly surfaced in the wake of years of chaos, requiring new rounds of mass trials and other tough measures b y the military to restore order i n C h i n a . ” The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, August 23

* The “four-firsts” called for stress on people, politics, ideology, and liveliness; and the “three-eight work style” consisted of three phrases and eight characters emphasizing correct political and military tactics. + According to newspaper reports on July 28, 1972, Mao had allegedly revealed to Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaraneike, Ceylon’s Prime Minister, and French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann during their recent visits to China that Lin Piao was one of those killed i n the mysterious crash of a Chinese plane i n Mongolia in September, 1971. During late 1971 and 1972, there had been rumors that Lin and other military leaders were killed while attempting to flee to the Soviet Union after the failure of an attempted coup d’état against Mao.

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The Maoist Quest and Chinese Realities

511

to September 6 , 1970, attended b y 255 members and alternates, had already discussed such problems, but with little success, as shown b y subsequent

developments and the delay i n fulfilling the plenum’s call for the convening of the Fourth National People’s Congress “at an appropriate time” to approve a new state constitution and elect L i u Shao-ch’i’s successor as head of state.” But, b y 1971 and 1972, when the first Americans i n more than twenty years, including President Nixon, traveled to China, order and

dedication were everywhere remarked. This achievement, as well as such diplomatic gains as entry into the United Nations i n October, 1971,

seemingly came at the expense of many previously announced goals of the Cultural Revolution and was overseen by many leaders who had been denounced in the late 1960’s. I n terms of the future of the Party, there is much that is unclear, especially after new changes i n the top leadership with the apparent purge

i n 1970 of Ch’en Po-ta and other “leftists,” the subsequent disappearance of Lin Piao and other top military men in September, 1971, and the increased prominence of Chou En-lai. Maoists proclaim their belief that “our Party will certainly be built into a still greater, more glorious and more correct Party.”"® Nevertheless, after the Cultural Revolution, the first new county committee was not formed until late 1969, and, a year

later, only about 100 county committees and even fewer Youth League committees had been reconstituted i n a way satisfying enough to warrant publicity. The first provincial committee was officially reconstituted in Hunan i n December, 1970, and most other provinces had one by the time

of the fiftieth anniversary of the CCP on July 1, 1971." The last of these i n Szechwan, Heilungkiang, Tibet, and Ninghsia had been formed by late August, 1971, but tension obviously continued among the military, “revolutionary mass organizations,” old cadres, and local cadres, with the military

the dominant force at least until mid-1971. Thus, at least 20 of the heads of the 29 new provincial committees were career military men, and some 59.5 per cent of the 158 provincial secretaries were military men, 35.5 per cent were ‘‘revolutionary cadres,” and 5 per cent were representatives of mass organizations, as against some 27 per cent of the delegates to the Ninth Party Congress i n the third category. Moreover, at one time, more than two-thirds of the ministers on Chou En-lai’s State Council were mili-

tary men. But, from mid-1971 on, civilian Party and government leaders led by Chou En-lai apparently began to reduce the influence of military men, at least at top levels, and Lin Piao, Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, and A i r Force Commander W u Fa-hsien, Navy Political Commisar L i Tso-p’eng

and others dropped from view. New prominence was given to Partybuilding under a slogan stressing the “unified leadership of the Party.””” I n the early 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party, although still scarred b y the Cultural Revolution and seemingly dependent o n the military and

the enormous prestige of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, was again the dominant organization of the world’s most populous country—in Mao’s words, ‘“the force at the core leading our cause forward” and the “core of

leadership of the whole Chinese people.”’"®

24 CONCLUSION

Two interlocking themes have dominated the complex history of Chinese Communism over the past half-century. The first has been the ability of the Communists to appropriate the spirit of revolutionary nationalism that has permeated twentieth-century Chinese life. The second has been their ability to organize the people through the “mass line” for both the national revolution against warlords and foreign powers and the social revolution to create a ‘“‘new’’ socialist China. I n the first decades of the century, Chinese patriots became increasingly committed to “saving the country” and progressively disillusioned first with the Manchus, then with Yian Shih-k’ai and the warlords, and finally with the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek. The way thus became open for

many of these patriots to pursue the Communist path to salvation. I n 1949, Mao was oversimplifying history when he said “all other ways have been tried and failed,”* but, for Communist leaders, the remark seemed unde-

niably true.

To “save” China in the twentieth century, however, appeared to necessitate fundamental revolution. The question on which the Communists split from the Nationalists and others was the kind and degree of revolution necessary. The Nationalists supported ‘national revolution’ against warlords and imperialists but balked at “social revolution” to overturn

the old order. The Communists have preached virtually total revolution of ideology, politics, economy, and society throughout most of their history, although they varied their propaganda according to circumstances. From the founding of the Party b y Ch’en Tu-hsiu and L i Ta-chao through Mao’s

Cultural Revolution, they have insisted that only with fundamental changes i n traditional Chinese habits, as well as i n the government, economy, and

society, would a genuinely “new” and strong China emerge. I n addition to socialist control of the economy since 1949, there has been even more stress than i n Soviet history o n efforts to create a “new man” and a new

ethos. I f all modern Chinese have been driven by nationalism and if many

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Conclusion

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became convinced of the need for social revolution as well, i t was still necessary to mobilize the masses o n behalf of revolutionary nationalism.

The Chinese Communists gradually learned to do this through the set of principles known as the “mass l i n e . ” I n May, 1939, M a o accurately sum-

marized its importance: “What is the lesson of the revolution in the last fifty or more years? Fundamentally, i t is a lesson of ‘arousing the masses of the people.’

*’?

Certainly, the ability of the Chinese Communists to mobilize

the masses for the Party’s programs and needs was their most characteristic achievement and the basic key to their success i n the face of overwhelming odds. Essentially a process of recruiting activists into the Party and army and then having these activists organize their own villages, neighborhoods, and offices into supporting organizations, the mass line was not easily realized. Vast differences of background and situation and even in the languages spoken b y cadres made the task of arousing the Chinese millions formidably

difficult. Yet, starting i n the 1920’s, Communist activists gradually learned to communicate with villagers and to draw many youth into their move-

ment. After the near destruction of the Party in the cities in 1927 and thereafter and its flight and near annihilation i n 1934-36, survivors of the Long March succeeded i n using mass line techniques in North China during the anti-Japanese war to build mass and military organizations that became too strong to be stopped i n the 1940’s. I n the long process of organizing the masses, the Chinese Communists developed what a pioneering Western

scholar has called the five “essential features” of ‘Maoist strategy’: First, ‘ a peasant mass base won by a program of land reform designed to satisfy the basic grievances of the bulk of the peasantry’; second, the “existence of a strong [Leninist] Party”; third, the “existence of a strong Red Army”; fourth, “control of a strategically located territorial base’;

and, fifth, enough self-sufficiency ‘ t o maintain its population.’ Nationalist weaknesses and errors speeded the final outcome, but the Chinese Communist military triumph in 1949 owed most to the techniques of the mass line, followed in descending order of importance by the limitations of the Nationalists, the depredations of Japan, and last of all the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1949, the Chinese Communists have succeeded to an unprecedented degree i n mobilizing the masses throughout the land for an immense variety

of tasks. Although appearance may often be deceiving and although many among the seemingly enthusiastic masses may harbor opposition to Communist rule, appearances are still most impressive. I n view of the size of China’s population and the magnitude of its problems, none can gainsay the substantial political, material, educational, medical, and

technical achievements of the first decades of Communist rule. Harsh questions can be posed i n terms of the quality of individual life and the sacrifices and loss of individual freedom required to achieve Communist gains, but, for great numbers of China’s impoverished masses, who have known desperation and famine in the past, the new order must seem a welcome improvement. Moreover, the leadership’s ability to organize the populace, whether for demonstrations o r for medical and educational work, cannot be denied.

514

The Long March to Power

The dominant personality of the Chinese Communist movement, Mao Tse-tung, well understood that the twin pillars of Chinese Communism were revolutionary nationalism and the mass line. But he was not alone i n forging these principles into policies and programs. At least prior to the Cultural Revolution and to a greater extent than was the case with the mass movements led by Lenin, let alone by Mussolini and Hitler in the West, the Chinese Communists usually have had some form of collective leadership guided, but not completely dominated, by a single leader. Through the early 1920’s, Mao, like others of his generation, sharpened his revolutionary nationalism on the arguments of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, and others. Younger leaders who came to the fore after 1927, including “left deviationists’’ Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, L i Li-san, and Ch’en Shao-yii,

backed by the Comintern, played a perhaps initially decisive role after 1927 i n stressing the need to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, the achievement for which Mao is most famous. O n several occasions, they

rebuked Mao for relying too much on force and not enough on persuasion. But Mao understood better than most of his comrades the connection between armed force and mass enthusiasm and the need to concentrate on mobilizing the peasantry i n order to “surround the cities with the countryside.” I n wartorn China, political power did ‘“‘grow out of the barrel of a gun.””* The masses could be expected to carry out many dangerous tasks of the revolution only where they had some degree of armed protection. For millions of peasants, the Red Army supplied this protection. Hence, there is some truth, as well as much exaggeration, i n the Party’s official fiftieth-anniversary article: A review of the fighting course traversed by our Party over the past fifty years confirms this truth: When our Party departs from Chairman Mao’s leadership and goes against Mao Tsetung Thought and Chairman Mao’s l i n e , i t suffers setbacks a n d defeats; when o u r party closely follows Chairman

Mao, acts i n accordance with Mao Tsetung Thought and implements Chairman Mao’s line, i t advances and triumphs. . . .°

Since the mid-1930’s, Mao has indeed well orchestrated the strategic principles o f revolutionary nationalism and the mass line. Moreover, with

the help of Chou En-lai and others, he made correct judgments on basic tactics of the united front, of when to compromise with the Nationalists and other groups at home and abroad. At crucial periods, notably i n the late 1930’s and 1940’s, these choices, i n the first case for cooperation and

in the second case for war, proved decisive. Another set of themes stands out i n the history of the CCP. These relate to the organizational and ideological strengths of the Communist Party.

The Kuomintang was also organized on the model of the Russian Communist Party, so that Leninist organization by itself clearly is not a sufficient explanation of the Communist victory. But the ideological convictions of the Chinese Communists, which the Nationalists generally lacked, brought vitality and resilience to the CCP. Above all, their quasi-

religious ideology n o t only lent confidence but paradoxically ensured continual criticism and self-criticism of all failures to live u p to their

[Chap. 24]

Conclusion

515

commitments. Constant criticism and self-criticism fostered intra-Party

struggle but also ensured the dynamism of Party leadership, a related and important factor in the Communist triumph. Although revolutionary nationalism, the mass line, and the emphases

on the peasantry, ideology, and organization are major themes in the emergence of the Communist Party as the ruling party of China, the historian must be cautious in interpreting the reasons for the victory of such a vast movement operating under special conditions in a huge and diverse country during five decades of dizzying change. Nevertheless, the process by which the few Communists of 1921 and their successors built a mass party, w o n a civil war, and emerged to rule and reconstruct the world’s

most populous nation is among the most fascinating in history. I t is hoped that this book has provided a better understanding of the background of the primary instrument for that revolution, the Chinese Communist Party.

NOTES

(Each reference included in the Bibliography is cited in full the first time it appears in the Notes section. I n subsequent notes, the reference is abbreviated, but the first reference includes the abbreviation used. Some references not in the Bibliography may be cited several times in a single chapter. I n such cases, the abbreviation used in subsequent references within the chapter appears in the first reference, but the full citation is again given on first use in any later chapter.)

Chapter 1 1. About half of the early Communists soon broke with the Party or joined dissident groups, but about half of those who remained i n the Party were killed. Thus, of the thirteen delegates to the First National Congress i n July, 1921, some seven remained orthodox Communists and at least three of these ( H o Shu-heng, Ch’en T’an-ch’iu, and Teng En-ming) were killed, as was “legal Marxist” L i Han-chun. Wang Chin-mei was reported both executed and dead of “overwork.” Similar proportions of larger samples of early Communist leaders met violent deaths, and at least one-third died at the hands of enemies, although there are naturally many ambiguities and gaps i n available information. See Chen Pan-tsu (Ch’en T’an-ch’iu), “Reminiscences of the First Congress of the CCP,” The Communist International, vol, X I I I (October, 1936), p. 1361; Tung Pi-wu to N y m Wales i n Red Dust (hereafter, Wales, Red Dust) (Stanford, Calif., 1952), pp. 3 9 4 3 ; C. Martin Wilbur, “ T h e Influence of the Past: H o w the Early Years Helped to Shape the Future of the CCP,” i n John Lewis, ed., Party Leadership a n d Revolutionary P o w e r i n China (hereafter, L e w i s , ed., Party) ( N e w Y o r k ,

1970), pp. 49, 63-66, and i n China Quarterly (hereafter, C Q ) , no. 36, OctoberDecember, 1968, pp. 30-31, 42-44; and the tentative list of Chinese Communists as of 1921, i n Jerome Ch’en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (heteafter, Jerome Ch’en, Revolution) (London, 1965), p . 361. See Robert Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: M a o Tse-tung a n d the Chinese Cultural Revolution ( N e w York,

1968) , for reflection on some psychological effects i n the 1960’s of the high casualty rates among Communist leaders.

2. Chu Teh claimed the execution of half a million “progressive youth” between 1927 and 1945 (Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh [hereafter, Smedley, Great Road] [ N e w York, 1956], p . 429), while a later Communist source gave the same statistics for victims i n 1927 alone and spoke of 1 million victims of Nationalist repressions i n the single province of Kiangsi

Notes for Chapter 1

517

after 1927, including some 200,000 i n six counties (Survey of China Mainland News [hereafter, SCMP] 1578, p. 4, citing New China News Agency [hereafter, N C N A ] , Peking, July 6, 1957). Another source speaks of the execution of 140,000 leftists u p to 1931 (Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Communist Revolution [hereafter, Isaacs, Tragedy] [Stanford, Calif., 1951], p . 296), another of 3 million or even 9 million killed i n the Kiangsi period, 1931-34 (Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1956-1945 [hereafter, Snow, Random Notes] [Cambridge, Mass., 1957], p . 87; and The Chinese Communist Movement [hereafter, Chinese Communist Movement], a report of the U.S. War Department, Washington, D.C., July, 1945, reissued and edited by L . P. Van Slyke [Stanford, Calif., 1968], p . 31), another of some 200,000 killed b y the Nationalists i n the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet i n the early 1930’s (Chang Kuo-t’ao, W o t i Hui-yi [ M y Memoirs], p a r t l y translated as T h e Rise o f the

Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927: Volume One of the Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t'ao [hereafter, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography] [Lawrence, Kans., 1971], ch. 19), and still another, perhaps more realistically, of more than 300,000 killed i n 1927-35 ( H o Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution [hereafter, H o Kan-chih, History] [Peking, 1959], p . 257). Some of these sources may have exaggerated, but i t is evident that various stages of the Chinese revolution resulted i n staggering carnage. Moreover, many of the above figures d i d not include casualties on the battlefield. I n all, several hundred thousand leftists were apparently captured, many or most of them executed, and additional hundreds of thousands fell i n battles between the Communists and Nationalists from 1927 to 1936. . The first six CCP Central Committee Political Bureaus, of about a half-dozen to a dozen members each, were approximately half of upper- or middle-class background and one-quarter poor peasant or proletarian. About 37 per cent of the Seventh Central Committee, elected i n 1945, came from peasant backgrounds,

whereas less than 10 per cent of the top Kuomintang ( K M T ) leaders did. Some 20 per cent of both elites were sons of landlords, but almost half (47 per cent) of K M T leaders came from merchant backgrounds. Communist leaders were young, averaging from twenty-seven to thirty-three i n the 1920’s and about fortynine i n 1945, from several to fifteen years younger than their Nationalist counterparts. The Communists were relatively well-educated, about half the leaders of the 1940’s having received some education abroad, especially in Japan, France, and the Soviet Union. See Robert North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites (hereafter, North, Elites) (Stanford, Calif., 1952), especially pp. 46 fI., and C. Martin Wilbur, i n Lewis, ed., Party, pp. 43 ff. See also Pavel Mif, Heroic China, Fifteen Years o f the C C P (hereafter, M i f , Heroic China)

( N e w York,

1937), pp. 45-46, and Donald W . Klein and Anne B. Clark, Bibliographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism (hereafter, Klein and Clark, Dictionary) (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 7 1 ) .

. See James Chich Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (hereafter, H s i u n g , Ideology) ( N e w York, 1 9 7 1 ) .

. See J. P. Harrison, The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions (hereafter, Harrison, Rebellions) ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) , chs. 1 a n d 2 . . See J. P . H a r r i s o n , Modern Chinese Nationalism (hereafter, Harrison, Nationalism) ( N e w York, 1 9 7 0 ) .

. By 1920, there were about 1.2 million men under arms, or double the number i n 1910. See C. Martin Wilbur, “Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922-1937,” i n P . T . H o a n d T . T s o u , eds., China in Crisis (hereafter, H o a n d T s o u ,

eds.,

Crisis) (Chicago, 1968), vol. I , pp. 214 and 209 ff. For examples of the staggering tax burdens of the period, see O . Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York, 1964), p . 187; and James E . Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The

018

Notes for Chapter 1

Career of Feng Yii-hsiang (hereafter, Sheridan, Feng Yii-hsiang) (Stanford, Calif., 1966), p . 25. However, some recent studies argue that, bad as they were, economic conditions for the poor were probably little worse than they had been in earlier centuries, e.g., see Dwight Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (hereafter, Perkins, Agricultural Development) (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), and Ramon Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy (hereafter, Myers, Peasant Economy) (Cambridge, Mass., 1970). 8. Wang Shih et al., Chung-kuo kung-ch’an-tang li-shih chien-pien ( A Brief History of the CCP) (hereafter, Wang Shih et al., Brief History) (Shanghai, 1958), translated i n Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter, JPRS) 8756, August 16, 1961, pp. 3-4; and Albert Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, 1912-1949 (hereafter, Feuerwerker, Economy) (Ann Arbor, Mich., Paper on Chinese Studies no. 1, 1968), p . 17.

. See Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (hereafter, SW) (New York, 1954), vol. I , pp. 80, 105 ff., and Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of M a o Tse-tung (hereafter, Schram, Political Thought) (New York, 1963), pp. 176, 200. 10. Ta-chung L i u and Kung-chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959 (hereafter, Liu and Yeh, Economy) (Princeton, N.J., 1965), pp. 185, 188. These figures can be compared with an estimated 2.5 million proletarians said to exist in Russia in 1914 and with about 5 million i n India about 1920. The statistics cited i n the paragraph are taken from a variety of sources, including Jean Chesneaux, L e Mouvement QOuvrier Chinois de 1919 a 1927 (hereafter, Chesneaux, Mouvement

Ouvrier) (Paris, 1962), p . 7; Yi-chu Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949 (hereafter, Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals) (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966), p . 153; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 4; H u Hua, ed., Chung-kuo Hsin-minchu chu-yi Ko-ming Shih (History of the N e w Democratic Revolution in Communist China) (hereafter, H u Hua, History) (Peking, 1951), p . 23; Franz Schurman, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (hereafter, Schurman, Ideology) (Berkeley, Calif., 1968), p . 381; Allen Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (hereafter, Whiting, Soviet Policies) (New York, 1954), pp. 60 ff.; John S. Aird, The Size, Composition and Growth of the Population of Mainland China (Washington, D.C., 1961), p . 36; and Morris B. Ullman, Cities of Mainland China (hereafter, Ullman, Cities) (Washington, D.C., 1961). According to Ullman, p . 6, in 1953, some 77,257,282 people (13 per cent of the population) lived i n urban areas, 43.5 million of them in 164 municipalities of more than 100,000; 7.8 million in 256 cities of more than 20,000; and 24.7 million in 4,228 towns of from 2,000 to 20,000 people. 11. Most of the above information is based on Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 20, 78, 191, 205 ff.; and Feuerwerker, Economy, passim. 12. See C. F . Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Baltimore, 1933), passim; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, passim; Marie Claire Bergére, “ L e Mouvement d u 4 Mai, 1919, e n C h i n e , ” Revue Historique, April-June, 1969; Bergére, “ T h e Role o f

the Bourgeoisie,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 19001913 (hereafter, Mary Wright, ed., First Phase) (New Haven, Conn., 1968), pp. 229 ff.; and Rhoads Murphey, Shanghai: Key to Modern China (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 22 and 55. 13. See Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (hereafter, Lang, Family) (New Haven, Conn., 1946); Marion Levy, The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass., 1949); and S. Tretiakov, A Chinese Testament: The Autobiography o f T’an Shih-hua (hereafter, Tretiakov, Testament) ( N e w York, 1 9 3 4 ) .

14. Farms of 10 mou (about 1.67 acres) and under totaled only 6 per cent of all arable land, while the wealthiest 5 per cent of landowners owned on the average more than 100 mou and 43 per cent of arable land. See Ti-yi tz’u Kuo-nei

Notes for Chapter 1

519

Chan-cheng Shih-ch’i t i Nung-min Yiin-tung (The Peasant Movement During the First Revolutionary Civil War) (hereafter, Ti-yi tz’u Shih-ch’i ti Nung-min) (Peking, 1953), pp. 3-5; and Perkins, Agricultural Development, pp. 87 ff.

15. C i t e d i n Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p . 152; see also Barrington Moore, Social Orgins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966), pp. 199 ff.; and Robert North and Xenia Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission to China (hereafter, North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission) (Berkeley, Calif., 1963), p . 254, for Chinese Communist discussions i n 1927 on agrarian conditions; and Institute of Pacific Relations, ed., Agrarian China (Shanghai, 1938), p . xiii. 16. M a o Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I V (Peking, 1960) (hereafter, SW, Peking ed., vol. IV), p . 164. .Some idea of the wide regional variations i n agrarian conditions can be seen from estimates of two of the leading researchers into Chinese agriculture of the 1930°s. A 1945 general survey by the leading Chinese writer on agrarian conditions estimated that i n North China, 62 per cent of the population were poor peasants, owning 27 per cent of cultivated land; 25 per cent were middle peasants, owning 33 per cent o f cultivated l a n d ; 8 per cent were rich peasants,

owning 28 per cent of the arable land; and 5 per cent were landlords holding 12 per cent of the land. But, i n South China, the poorest 71 per cent owned less than 15 per cent of the land; the middle 20 per cent of the peasantry owned 20 per cent of the land; the richest 6 per cent of the peasants owned 17 per cent of the land; and the landlords, who formed only 3 per cent of the population, owned 47 per cent of the land. Ch’en Han-seng, The Chinese Peasant (Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, no. 33, 1945). The leading Western student of agrarian conditions estimated that, in China as a whole i n the 1930’s, some 46 per cent of the farmers owned their land, 25 per cent owned part of their land, and 29 per cent were tenants. However, in North China where the Communists achieved their most rapid success after 1937, only some 12 to 17 per cent of the land was rented to tenants, while in the Yangtze Valley region, where the Communists had been strongest i n the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, a b o u t 4 0 per cent o f the l a n d w a s r e n t e d . Nonetheless, some o f the wartime

North China bases suffered from abnormally high tenancy, tax, and interest rates comparable to those in areas of the South. See J. L . Buck, Land Utilization i n China ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , p . 195; a n d Myers, Peasant Economy, p p . 4 3 , 48, 234 ff.

18. I n Hopeh Province, 15 mou (about 2.5 acres) was generally considered necessary for minimum economic independence for the average family (Myers, Peasant Economy, p . 22). The average size of a Chinese farm, including the biggest i n the 1930’s, was about 3.3 acres, as against about 157 acres i n the United States. 19. See Perkins, Agricultural Development, pp. 87 ff.; Roy Hofheinz, “ T h e Ecology o f Chinese Communist Success,” i n A . D . Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist

Policies in Action (hereafter, Barnett, ed., Politics) (Seattle, 1969), pp. 57 fi.; Feuerwerker, Economy, especially pp. 35 ff.; and Carol C. Andrews, “ T h e Relationship between the CCP and the Peasant Movement” (hereafter, Andrews, “Peasant Movement’’) (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1964). Note especially the useful maps and tables in Perkins, pp. 88-90 and 101; i n Hofheinz, pp. 7 ff.; and i n Myers, Peasant Economy, passim. 20. For example, Karl W . Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). 21. James Legge, trans., The Four Books (hereafter, Legge, Four Books) (Shanghai, n.d.), p . 627. 22. Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p p . 8 6 , 110, 119. 23. Sun Yat-sen, San M i n Chu-yi: The Three Principles of the People, Frank W . Price, trans. (hereafter, Sun Yat-sen, San M i n Chu-yi) (Shanghai, 1 9 2 7 ) .

520

Notes for Chapter 2

24. Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny (New York, 1947), pp. 44 and 105. 25. See Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (hereafter, Snow, Red Star) (New York, 1938), p . 133; and Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (hereafter, Schram, M a o Tsetung) (New York, 1967). 26. See Jonathan Spence, T o Change China (Boston, 1969); and James Thomson, While China Faced West (hereafter, Thomson, While), (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). For contrasting Communist and conservative views of the effects of imperialism, see respectively H u Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (hereafter, H u Sheng, Imperialism) (Peking, 1955); and H o u Chi-ming, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

—

27. See C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. Fairbank, eds., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (hereafter, Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History) (London, 1952; U.S. ed., New York, 1966), pp. 54-55. 28. Hsin Ch’ing-nien, vol. 1, no. 4, cited i n Benjamin Schwartz, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West,” Journal of the History of Ideas, January, 1951, p . 66. 29. Cited i n Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p . 308. 30. Cited i n Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, 3rd ed. (hereafter, Schwartz, Rise of Mao) (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p . 12. 3 .Cited i n S. Y . Teng and J. K . Fairbank, eds., China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (hereafter, Teng and Fairbank, eds., Response) (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 246, 249. 32. O n this point, i n addition to the writings of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and L i Ta-chao, see the memoirs of such early Communists as Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography; and Chou Fo-hai, i n Ch’'un Ch’iu (Spring and Autumn), March, 1966, et seq. Even the head of the Nationalist secret police i n the 1930’s stated that members of the CCP had become Communists because of “dissatisfaction with their existing environment. A majority of them were patriots at heart.” U . T . Hsu, The Invisible Conflict (hereafter, U . T . Hsu, Conflict) (Hong Kong, 1962). 33. Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (hereafter, C h o w , M a y Fourth)

(Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 0 ) , p p . 36-37;

Martin Bernal, “The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism,” i n Mary Wright, ed., First Phase; Robert Scalapino a n d George Y u , T h e Chinese Anarchist Move-

ment (hereafter, Scalapino and Y u , Anarchist Movement)

(Berkeley, Calif.,

1961); Robert Scalapino and Harold Schiffren, “Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement,” Journal of Asian Studies (hereafter, JAS), vol. X V I I I , May, 1959, pp. 321 ff.; and Olga Lang, Pa Chin and His Writings (hereafter, Lang, Pa Chin) (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). 34. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 201, 203; and Chow, May Fourth, pp. 32-33. 35. Chow, May Fourth, pp. 251-52, 188, and 236-37; and Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 110. 36. See Chow, M a y Fourth, p p . 298-99; B e r n a l , i n Mary Wright, ed., First Phase, pp. 97 ff.; Maurice Meisner, L i Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (hereafter, Meisner, L i Ta-chao) (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 52-54; Chang

Ching-lu, ed., Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Ch’u-pan Shih-liao (Source Materials on Publishing in Contemporary China) (Peking, 1954-56), vol. I , pp. 442 ff.; and Tung Shou-ho et al., Vliyaniya Oktyabrskoi Revolutsii na Kitiya (The Influence of the October Revolution on China) (Moscow, 1959).

Chapter 2 1. Karl Radek, cited i n Helene Carrére d’Encausse e t Stuart Schram, L e Marxisme et ’Asie, 1853-1964 (hereafter, d’Encausse e t Schram, L e Marxisme)

1965), p . 265.

(Paris,

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521

2. See Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p. 311; Meisner, L i Ta-chao, p . 103; Chow, May Fourth, p. 23; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p. 20; Carl Wei, “The Founding of the CCP and Its First International Congress,” Issues and Studies (hereafter, I S ) , November and December, 1970. . C i t e d i n M e i s n e r , L i Ta-chao, p . 113; see also Schwartz, Rise o f Mao, p . 2 3 ; ~ N O Y On ph

Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p . 316. . Meisner, L i Tao-chao, p . 90. . Ibid., pp. 81-82. . Ibid., pp. 93-94. . Schram, Political Thought, p . 170; Meisner, L i Ta-chao, p . 224; and Harrison, Rebellions, c h . 2 .

. L i Ta-chao, L i Ta-chao Hsiian-chi (Selected Works of L i Ta-chao) (Peking, 1962), p . 224. . See Sun Yat-sen, San-min Chu-yi, p . 147; and L i Ta-chao, “ L a Question Raciale,” M a y , 1924, c i t e d i n d’Encausse e t Schram, L e Marxisme, p . 306.

10. Cited i n Meisner, L i Ta-chao, pp. 81, 95. Teng Chung-hsia, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ch’t Ch’iu-pai, H o Meng-hsiung, and L o Chang-lung were among other early important Communist leaders who participated i n Li’s study groups. 11. Cited i n Snow, Red Star, p. 139. 12. Meisner, L i Ta-chao, p. 116; M i f , Heroic China, p . 15; C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying H o w , eds., Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927 (hereafter, Wilbur and How, eds., Documents) ( N e w York, 1 9 5 6 ) , p . 50.

13. A . S. Perevertailo et al., eds., Ocherki Istorii Kitaya v Noveisheme Vremya ( O u t l i n e o f Chinese History i n Contemporary Times) (hereafter, Perevertailo

et al., eds., Outline). (Moscow, 1959), p. 61; Meisner, L i Ta-chao, p . 115; Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, p . 32; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 14. Conrad B r a n d t , T h e French-Returned Elite i n t h e Chinese Communist Party (Berkeley, Calif., 1 9 6 1 ); Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai: China’s Gray Eminence (New York, 1968), pp. 27 ff.; Yi-chu Wang, Intellectuals, pp. 105, 110; P i Shao-shuen, “Documents sur les Travailleurs Etudiants Chinois en France en 1920-1921,” Cahiers Franco-Chinois (Paris), June, 1960; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Whiting, Soviet Policies, p . 64. 15. They and their deceased comrades, besides those already mentioned, included Chao Shih-yen, Ch’en Yi, the two sons of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Hsiang Ching-yii, L i Fu-ch’un, L i Li-san, L i Wei-han, L o Hsiieh-tsan, Nieh Jung-chen, Teng Hsiaop’ing, Ts’ai Ch’ang, Wang Jo-fei, and W u Yii-chang. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 16. See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 21 fI., 45 ff.; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 62 ff.; and Snow, Red Star, pp. 115 fi. 17. Cited in Schram, Political Thought, p . 170. 18. Snow, R e d Star, p . 137. 19. L i Jui, Mao Tse-tung t’ung-chih t i ch’u-ch’i ko-ming huo-tung (Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Early Revolutionary Activities)

(hereafter, L i

Jui, M a o Tse-tung)

(Peking, 1957), pp. 153-55, 160; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 51; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 69-72. 20. Cited i n Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 19201927: A Documentary Survey (hereafter, E u d i n a n d N o r t h , Survey) (Stanford,

Calif., 1957), p . 15. 21. Ibid.; Peking Review, January 17, 1969, p . 11; Dae Sook Suh, Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948 (hereafter, Suh, Documents) (Princeton, N.J., 1970), pp. 505 fi. 22. See below, this chapter, and Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 84-87. The important Congress for “Peoples of the East” held at Baku i n 1920 dealt mainly with the Middle East, but after October of that year the Comintern’s Council for Propa-

522

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ganda and Action gave more attention to East Asia, establishing a center in Irkutsk while its headquarters for the Near East remained at Baku and a Middle Asia center was established at Tashkent. This Council, however, was soon abolished. The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs also had a Far Eastern Department in Irkutsk. 23. Eudin and North, Survey pp. 84 ff.; and Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (hereafter, Nollau, Communism) (New York, 1961), pp. 102, 141. 24, See M . A . Persits, “ E a s t e r n Internationalists i n R u s s i a , ” i n L . P . Delyusin ef al., eds., Comintern i vostok (The Comintern and the East) (hereafter, Delyusin eds., Comintern) (Moscow, 1969), pp. 77-78, 87-88; and i n Narody Azii i Afriki (hereafter, N A A ) , n o . 2 , 1970, p . 59. A m a n named A n Lung-ho ( A n g Neng-

khak) was said to head the Central Organization Bureau for Chinese Communist and to be the principal advocate of the plan to invade China. A n supposedly fought in the Boxer Rebellion in China and in the 1905 revolution i n Russia. 25. Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 77, 84-87; and Yu. M . Garushyants, “The Struggle of the Chinese Marxists for the Foundation of the CCP,” N A A , no. 3, 1961, pp. 81 ff. 26. Whiting, Soviet Policies, pp. 21, 28, 148. 27. Eudin and North, Survey, p . 37. 28. See Whiting, Soviet Policies, pp. 74, 82, 91, 129. 29. Voitinsky lived i n the United States from 1913 to 1918 and was thus able to communicate i n English w i t h some of his Chinese contacts. His interpreter, Yang Ming-chai, had spent more than ten years i n Russia after the migration of his family from Shantung and had joined the Russian Communist Party but he shortly dropped out of public view. Mamaev later became director of the Chinese section of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat and returned to China i n 1924, serving as a military adviser, first at the Whampoa Academy and then on the Northern Expedition. See Garushyants, in N A A , no. 3, 1961, pp. 81 ff.; Vidnye Sovetskiye Kommunisty: Uchastniki Kitaiskoi Revolutsii (Leading Soviet Communists, Participants in the Chinese Revolution) (Moscow, 1970), pp. 66 ff.; Meisner, L i Ta-chao, pp. 116-17; Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang Shih-kao (Draft History o f the CCP) (hereafter, W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History)

(Taipei, 1965), vol. I , p . 29. 30. This was Sergei Polevoy, who, although not a Party member, was apparently sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause and served as its representative i n Tientsin and Peking. H e helped to spread Marxism i n North China i n various ways: supplying literature, including N . I . Bukharin’s ABC of Communism, securing entry visas for students going to Russia, and the like. 31. Dae Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (hereafter, Suh, Korean Communist M o v e m e n t ) ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J., 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 4 ff.; S u h , Documents, pp. 5 fl., 506 fI.;. Conrad Brandt, Stalin’s Failure in China, 1924-1927 (hereafter, Brandt, Stalin’s Failure) ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 5 8 ) , p p . 20-21; C h a n g

Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2; Eudin and North, Survey, p . 90. There was also the report of an October, 1920, Conference of Asian Leftists i n China. Cheng Hsiieh-chia, Chung-kung Yii Wang Shih (History of the Rise and Fall of Chinese Communism) (hereafter, Cheng Hsiieh-chia, Chinese Communism) (Taipei, 1970), vol. I , p. 562. 32. Besides Ch’en Tu-hsiu, those attending discussions of Marxism i n Shanghai i n the s p r i n g o f 1920 i n c l u d e d f u t u r e Nationalist leaders T a i Chi-t’ao, Shen Ting-yi,

and Shao Li-tzu; Research Clique member and idealist philosopher Chang Tung-sun; the novelist Shen Yen-ping (Mao T u n ) ; anarchists Cheng Feng-kang and Yidan Chen-ying; a Korean, the man who first translated The Communist

Notes for Chapter 2

523

Manifesto into Chinese, but who soon left the Party, Ch’en Wang-tao; and early Communists Chou Fo-hai, L i Han-chiin, L i Ta, Yiian Hsiao-hsien, Shih Ts’unt'ung (Shih Fu-liang), and Yii Hsiu-sung. Many of these men, such as Tai Chi-t’ao, later became leading anti-Communists, and, of them all, only Yiian Hsiao-hsien and Yii Hsiu-sung remained active Communists into the 1930’. Yiian died ( i n battle?) i n 1935, and, according to Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Autobiography (ch. 21), Yii Hsiu-sung was executed by Party security workers in Sinkiang i n the late 1930’s as a “Trotskyist,” while early Communists Chou Fo-hai, Li Han-chiin, L i Ta, Shih Ts’un-t’ung, and Shen Ting-yi had all dropped out of the Party by 1927. Chang Kuo-t’ao was i n Shanghai at Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s home i n July and August. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, pp. 30 ff.; Cheng Hsiieh-chia, Chinese Communism, vol. 1, p . 686; Garushyants, i n NAA, no. 3, 1961; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2. 33. Some argue that the Provisional Central Committee was not formed until August, 1920 (Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 30; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 33), but most give May. See L i Jui, Mao Tse-tung, p. 149; Warren Kuo, Analytical History of the CCP (hereafter, Kuo, History) (Taipei, 1966), vol. I , p . 10; Chow, May Fourth, p . 248. One reminiscence states that Ch’en Tu-hsiu, L i Han-chiin, and Shen Ting-yi, soon joined by L i Ta, Y i Hsiu-sung, and Shih Ts’un-t’'ung, were the first in Shanghai to provide impetus for the organization of the Party (Kuo, History, pp. 339-41). Chou Fo-hai adds himself and the writer Shen Yen-ping to this list, and other sources (Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 491, 588) include Ch’en Wang-tao, Yang Mingchai, Chang T’ai-lei, and Tai Chi-t’ao. Chang Kuo-t’ao points out that, in contrast to Ch’en Tu-hsiu, L i Ta-chao i n Peking was among those arguing i n mid1920 for more study before organization. The provisional organization met at Ch’en’s h o m e , a n d a t L i Han-chiin’s residence a t N o . 30, M o T e h L i o n Pei L e

Road and soon rented a two-story house at N o . 6, New Y u Yang L i o n Avenue Joffre, all i n the French Concession of Shanghai. 34. Because he had access to the printing facilities of an anarchist society, the Huiming Hsiieh-she, one Cheng Feng-kang was designated to set u p a small printing shop. Voitinsky allegedly gave 2,000 yiian (about $1,000?) to finance initial publications. Later a Renewal Press was opened on L a P’ei Te Road, Ch’eng Y u L i , No. 12, which distributed Ch’en Wang-tao’s translation of The Communist Manifesto and other works. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 28; Chow Tse-tsung, Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement (hereafter, Chow, Guide) (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 35. I n c l u d i n g L i Ch’i-han ( L i S e n ) , P’eng Shu-chih, L o C h u e h (Lo, Y i - n u n g ) , Jen Pi-shih, and Hsiao Ching-kuang. The head of the Youth League from August, 1920, to its temporary dissolution i n May, 1921, was Y i Hsiu-sung. 36. See W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 148; W a n g Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 30 ff.; Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 339-41. 37. Working from the Shanghai area, Shen Ting-yi and Shih Ts’un-t’ung apparently with l i t t l e success sought t o establish ties i n Hangchow and i n Chekiang, as

did others i n Nanking and elsewhere. Similarly, Yii Hsiu-sung worked in Fukien, for a while w i t h Chiang Kai-shek himself. 38. Besides Li Ta-chao, the Peking group included Chang Kuo-t’ao, Teng Chunghsia, L o Chang-lung, Liu Jen-ch’ing, and H o Meng-hsiung. See Meisner, L i Tachao, p p . 116 ff.; W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 5 2 ; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 1 , 2 ; K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary.

39. This “progressive warloard” held Canton from 1920 through 1922. With Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s departure, L i Han-chiin became acting director of Communist activities i n Shanghai. Li advocated cautious and studious approaches, and was soon

524

Notes for Chapter 2 denounced as a “legal Marxist.” He worked with the left Kuomintang and was

executed i n 1927. 40. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 50, 52; Tung Shou-ho, Vliyaniya Oktyabrskoi Revolutsii na Kitiya (The Influence of the October Revolution on China) (Moscow, 1959), p. 74; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2. The Canton branch was headed by T’an P’ing-shan as Secretary, Ch’en Kung-po as head of organization, and T’an Chih-t’ang as director of propaganda. Pao Hui-seng, Yiian Hsiao-hsien, and several anarchists also participated. Among other future Communist leaders recruited in Canton at this time were Lin Tsu-han ( L i n Po-ch’ii), Liu Erh-sung, Yang P’ao-an, and L o Ch’i-yiian. There was much dissatisfaction with Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s leadership in Canton in early 1921. 41. Lin Yi-nan and L i n Yii-ying. Others included Ch’en T’an-ch’iu, Yiin Tai-ying, Hsiang Ying, L i Ch’iu-shih, Hsiao Ch’ii-nu, and Li Han-chiin. 42, Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 338. Later i n 1921, Yiin Tai-ying and Hsiao Ch’ii-nu went t o Luchow and Chungking, Szechwan, t o establish additional Communist

branches. I n Chengtu, W u Yii-chang, officially a long-standing member of the Kuomintang, had already organized radical discussion groups prior to his departure for France. 43. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 33; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 72; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 51, 55; L i Jui, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 144-45. Early Hunan activities included H o Shu-heng, Kuo Liang, Ch’en Ch’ang, Hsia Hsi, Mao’s wife Yang K’ai-hui, Hsiao Shu-fan, and others. 44. Cited i n Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 73. 4 5 , See above i n this chapter and Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 338; Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai, p . 34. Earlier, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Chou En-lai, Li Han-chiin, and L i Ta had studied i n Japan, and, i n 1920, Chou Fo-hai, Shih Ts’un-t’'ung, and P’eng P’ai were enrolled i n Japanese universities. The role of Japan as the center o f radical modern thought i n Asia was enormous for Chinese as for other

Asian Communists. According to one source, there were also Party organizations i n Tientsin, Nanking, and Hong Kong, as well as in Shanghai, Peking, Hankow, and Canton ( M . A . Persits, “Notes on the History of the CCP,” NAA, no. 4,

1 9 7 1p., 48n.). 46. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 11. 47. L i Ch’i-han ( L i Sen), Li Han-chiin, and Yii Hsiu-sung were most active. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 32; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 248.

48. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 253, 261; Meisner, L i Ta-chao, pp. 115, 118, 211; Kuo, History, vol. I , p. 13; Perevertailo et al. eds., Outline, p . 64; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 49. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 242, 250, 254. 50. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 2, 5, speaks of 350 members of the Youth League; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 361, lists fifty-two likely members of the CCP at the time of its founding. See also Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 71; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 56-57; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 52; Ch’en Kung-po, The Communist Movement in China, edited with an introduction by C. Martin Wilbur (hereafter, Ch’en Kung-po, Movement) (New York, 1960). 51. Persits, i n N A A , n o . 4 , 1971, p p . 49-50; a n d Garushyants, i n N A A , n o . 3 , 1961, p . 91. 52. According to some accounts, H o Shu-heng was sent back to Hunan because of his alleged ignorance of Marxism, giving a total of twelve delegates to the First Congress. Four of them originally came from Hunan, including representatives from Peking, Shanghai, and Japan as well as Changsha. The Tsinan delegates

Notes for Chapter 2

525

were high school students, and the others also knew little of Marxism, according to one account (Cheng Hsiieh-chia, Chinese Communism, p p . 686-87; see also

Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2 ) . O f these men, only Mao and Tung Pi-wu survived the Party’s first half-century as orthodox leaders. 53. See Dov Bing, “Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP,” in CQ, no. 48; and

in Issues and Studies (hereafter, IS), April, 1972, pp. 54 ff.; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 341; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 258. A representative of the Comintern Irkutsk Bureau, Nikolsky, assigned to Shanghai i n June, 1921, or, according to others, Voitinsky, was the second Comintern representative to the First Congress. Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 36. 54. See C. Martin Wilbur introduction to Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, pp. 18 fI.; and Carl Wei, “The Founding of the CCP and Its First National Congress,” December, 1970, pp. 48-49. These studies discuss the following sources: The first extant history of the Party, written i n 1926, states that the First Congress opened i n May, 1921; Mao told Edgar Snow in mid-1936 that he went to Shanghai in May, though he does not date the meetings; Tung Pi-wu told N y m Wales in mid1937 that the Congress was held in May, though, i n 1957 and 1961, Pao Huiseng repeated the official date of July 1, as did Li Ta in another 1961 interview; Chang Kuo-t’ao says that he arrived i n Shanghai in May and thinks the Congress began July 1; Ch’en T’an-ch’iu, writing i n 1936, places the Congress in the “second half of July”; Chou Fo-hai i n 1943 spoke of July as the date of the Congress; Ch’en Kung-po, both i n his 1924 essay, Movement, and i n 1943, dates the beginning of the Congress on July 20. A recent Soviet source states that the

Congress was scheduled for June 20 but, because of delays in arrivals of delegates, d i d n o t begin u n t i l about July 23 ( M . A . Persits in N A A , no. 4, 1971, p . 51n.).

55. For varying acccounts of the sites of the Congress and of street names of the locations in question, see Ta Kung Pao (Shanghai), September 28, 1951, trans. i n SCMP, 188, p . 17; C h o u Fo-hai, i n Ch’un Ch’iu, n o . 209, March, 1966, p . 6 ; K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 3 3 9 ; L i T a , Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien (Chinese Youth),

nos. 13-14, 1961, p . 16; L i Jui, Mao Tse-tung, p . 144; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 36; Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, pp. 18, 21; Robert C. North, Chinese Communism ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 6 ) , p . 28.

56. Another future dissident, L i Ta, who dropped out of active Party work after several years, was chairman of the propaganda department. 57. Chou Fo-hai was alternate to Ch’en Tu-hsiu, assisted by L i Han-chiin and Liu Jen-ching. See Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 103; Chou Fo-hai, in Ch’un Ch’iu, n o . 208, M a r c h 1 , 1966, p . 3 ; W a n g Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . 1, p . 3 8 ; Ch’en Pan-tsu (Ch’en T ’ a n - c h ’ i u ) , “Reminiscences o f the First Congress o f the

CCP,” The Communist International, X I I I , October, 1936, pp. 1361 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2. 58. Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 79. 59. Ibid, p p . 102, 105, 81. See also W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . 1, p . 3 7 ; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2. 60. See Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, pp. 102, 105, 81; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 37; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 2. 61. Robert C . N o r t h , Moscow a n d Chinese Communists (hereafter, North, Moscow) (Stanford, Calif., 1963), p . 59; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5. 62. F o r e x a m p l e , see Current Background (hereafter, C B ) , n o . 410, September 25, 1956, p . 27; and Julie L . Y . How, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership of the CCP o n the Kuomintang Issue, 1922-1924,” (hereafter, How, ‘“Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership”), unpublished paper at University of Connecticut Conference on the History of the CCP, March, 1971.

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63. See Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, pp. 102-5. The 1926 “Brief History of the C C P ” ( i n W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p p . 4 1 ff. a n d 6 0 ) ; Ch’en Pan-tsu

( i n The Communist International, October, 1936, pp. 1361 ff.); and Chang Kuo-t’ao (Autobiography, ch. 4) all deny that the First Congress reached any decision on the question of relations with the Comintern, but at this time Chang T’ai-lei and Yang Ho-te had been assigned as representatives to the Far Eastern Secretariat. They helped i t t o i n s t i t u t e a Chinese section a t I r k u t s k , a n d , a t the

time of the First Congress of the CCP, Chang was attending the Third Congress of the Communist International i n Moscow. See Ch’en, Movement, pp. 27-29; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 4. 64. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 3; and Chou Fo-hai, in Ch’'un Ch’iu, no. 209, March 16, 1966, p . 7. 65. Various reports have spoken of monthly Comintern contributions of $5,000 (U.S.) and others of $12,000 (U.S.). Chou Fo-hai reported Maring’s rebuke that the Party had little to show for some 200,000 yiian (the yiian or Chinese dollar was equal to 57 cents [U.S.] i n 1924) i t had spent in the previous year. I n September, 1921, Ch’en Tu-hsiu angrily replied that the Chinese Communists had spent only 12,000 yiian i n the two months since the First Congress, plus an undisclosed amount spent by the Chinese Labor Secretariat, founded in August, 1921. H e charged that the Comintern had wasted more than half the 200,000 yiian o n other projects, and i t is known, of course, that Moscow was also exploring non-Communist channels, from Sun Yat-sen to W u P’ei-fu, to advance its purposes in China. I n the early 1930’s, the Comintern allegedly spent $15,000 (U.S.) per month i n China. According to another source, that sum was spent for all of the Far East, while a third source gives $130,000 for the Far East. But the sums spent were certainly much greater i n the mid-1920’s when millions of rubles (a ruble was equal to about 50 cents [U.S.]) went to the armies of the Kuomintang, Feng Yii-hsiang, and others. Most of the information on finances is taken from Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, c h . 3 ; a n d from C h o u Fo-hai, as summarized i n W a n g

Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p. 43. See also Wang, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 163; Eudin and North, Survey, p. 39; Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 134; Snow, Red Star, p . 379; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 49; Suh, Documents, p . 9 , 2 1 , 4 0 , 5 0 7 ; Schwartz, Rise o f Mao, p . 3 9 ; K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 209;

T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (hereafter, T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing) (Shanghai, 1934), p . 72. I n 1925-26, the Comintern spent about $750,000 (U.S.) i n one six-month period for operating costs, b u t most

of this went to the Nationalists. Additional and larger sums were given to the Nationalists and Feng Yii-hsiang for military equipment. 66. The Secretariat was directed by Chang Kuo-t’ao until his departure for Russia in October, 1921, and then by one of the leaders and later victims of the 1927 insurrection, L i Ch’i-han ( L i S e n ) .

67. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 259; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 55; Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 344. 68. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p. 259-61; and H u Hua, History, p . 29. 69. See H o Kan-chih, History, p . 5 3 ; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 3 3 ; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 70. H o Kang-chih, History, pp. 53 ff.; and Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 64. 71. For the labor movement i n the early 1920’s, see Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 278, 269, 280-95, 300 ff.; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 64; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 2, 3, 5, 6; Wang Shih, et al., Brief History, p . 38; Teng Chung-hsia, Chung-kuo Chih-kung Yiin-tung chien-shih ( A Brief History of the Chinese Labor Movement), (hereafter, Teng Chung-hsia, Labor Movement)

(Peking, 1957 r e p r i n t ) , p p . 85 fI.; and Liu Li-k’ai and Wang Chen,

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527

Yi-chiu Yi-chiu chih Yi-chiu Erh-ch’i Nien ti Chung-kuo kung-jen yiin-tung (The Chinese Labor Movement from 1919 to 1927) (Peking, 1953), p . 30.

72, Shih Ts’un-t’ung, w h o went over t o the left Kuomintang i n M a y , 1927, was secretary of the Youth League until August, 1923. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 73. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 47. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 64, 84, speaks of several hundred members of the Socialist Youth League i n mid-1922, but Pervertailo, et al., eds., Outline, p . 82, says there were soon 5,000 members. See also Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 180; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography , ch. 5. 74. See Chow, Guide, p . 29. 75. Eto Shinkichi, “Hai-lu-feng, the First Chinese Soviet Government,” CQ, nos. 8 and 9; and P’eng P’ai, “Memoirs of a Chinese Communist,” The Living Age,

April, 1933, pp. 117 ff. 76. See Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 83; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 43. 77. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 2, 3, and 5. 78. The material for this discussion is taken primarily from Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p p . 39-40, 102-3, 131 ff.; and from Wang Chien-min, Draft History,

vol.

I , pp. 1, 51, and 357, and vol. I I , p . 27. See also this chapter below. 79 Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 134. 80 Ibid., p . 130. 81 Ibid., p . 120. 82 Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 135-37. 83 Mao Tse-tung, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 414. 84. Franz Borkenau, World Communism (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962), p . 198.

Chapter 3 1. See Wang Shih et al.,, Brief History, p. 49; Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 152; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 91 ff.; C. Martin Wilbur “Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922-1937,” i n H o and Tsou, Crisis, vol. 1, pp. 209 ff. . Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 27; Leng Shao-ch’uan and Norman D . Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism (New York, 1960), passim; and Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p p . 139-40, 201. . Cited in Eudin and North, Survey, p . 230; for the delegations to the Congress, see Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies, pp. 298-99. . Eudin and North, Survey, p . 227. . V . I . Glunin, “The Communist Movement i n China,” i n Delyusin et al., eds.; Comintern, p . 253; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 5 and 6. According to an article written seven years later by Boris Shumiatsky, head of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau i n Irkutsk in 1922-25, Chang T’ai-lei had already proposed this type of limited united front at the Third Congress of the Comintern in July, 1921, but at that early date the First CCP Congress rejected any cooperation with non-Communists (Eudin and North, Survey, p . 144). According to Dov Bing, i n IS, April, 1972, pp. 58 ff., Maring had already won basic acceptance for the n e w l i n e o n the u n i t e d front i n April, 1922. . T h e first twelve sources listed i n K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 50, believe that the

Congress was held i n Hangchow, but Ch’en Kung-po, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Mao Tse-tung, and more recent Party histories state i t was held in Shanghai. The confusion on this point probably stems from the fact that Party plenums were held in Hangchow i n April and August, 1922. Chang Kuo-t’ao, in an interview in Hong Kong o n August 21, 1968, was definite that the Second Congress was held in Shanghai. Some sources state that there were 195 Communists at the time, and others that there were from nine to twenty delegates. See Chang

528

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Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 35; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, p . 60; K u o , History, pp. 46-47; D o v Bing, “Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP,” CQ, no. 48, pp. 677-97; Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien (Chinese Youth), June 16, 1961, i n Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (hereafter, ECMM), no. 271. However, most believe a dozen delegates represented 123 members. Earlier histories also gave the Congress date as May, but internal evidence corroborates the July dating. See Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, pp. 31-32, 35-36. . The fifth member of the new executive committee was Kao Shang-teh (Kao Chiin-yli). Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5, lists only Ch’en Tu-hsiu, himself, and Ts’ai Ho-sen on the new Central Committee, but Ch’en Tu-hsiu (“Kao Ch’uan-tang T’ung-chih Shu,” December, 1929, in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 105) included also L i Ta-chao and Kao Chiin-yii. Later Party histories also list martyred Teng Chung-hsia and Hsiang Ching-yii, but this was probably a posthumous promotion (Klein and Clark, Dictionary). More likely they were among the three alternates rather than the five executive committee members called for by the new organizational rules. L i Ta had withdrawn from active Party work to teach i n Changsha; Ch’en Kung-po was in Canton, shortly to leave for New York; and Mao Tse-tung, Tung Pi-wu, and other surviving early Communists did not attend the Second Congress. . Both manifestoes stress the historical roots and past and present menace of imperialism to China, but otherwise they are rather different i n tone. Most of the June manifesto continues the “no-compromise and closed door” policy of the First Congress, stating that “democratic power can triumph i n China only through revolutionary seizure of power” and “ w e all want peace, but real peace rather than false peace. We welcome a war to achieve the triumph of democracy, to overthrow the military and the militarists, and to liberate the Chinese people” (Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 56 and 62). Nonetheless, while rejecting the possibility of progress through compromise, i n part because of further disillusionment w i t h developments i n Peking, the June manifesto now noted that the Kuomintang was relatively revolutionary and for the first time publicly conceived of the possibility of a temporary united front with the Nationalists:

Until such time as the Chinese proletariat is able to seize power in its own hands, considering the present political and economic conditions of China’s development and the historical processes now going on i n China, the proletariat’s urgent task is to act jointly w i t h the democratic party [the K M T ] to establish a united front of democratic revolution to struggle for the overthrow of the military and for the organization of a real democratic government.

Ibid., pp. 62 and 58. . Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 114. 10. I b i d . , p p . 115-16. 11. The decisions stated, “ W e join the Nationalists’ battle line so that the working class may secure political power at the outset, and therefore the construction of a Nationalist joint battle line is one of our policies.” (Ibid., p . 119.) The decisions even authorized and encouraged Communist participation in parliaments, i n marked contrast to statements of the First Congress and of later should rush into Parliament which is years. The decisions stated, “the CCP menaced by the feudal militarist party, and the Communist Party should fight against the political evils originating in the military power. . . . I n Parliament i t should not neglect to preach the idea of revolution and in the various assemblies should fight for all benefits that can be secured for the proletarian and poor peasant class.” ( I b i d . , p . 122.)

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12, Ibid., p . 120. 13. Ibid., p . 97. 14. How, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership,” p . 4. Cf. Maring’s somewhat different 1935 account t o H a r o l d Isaacs, i n C Q , n o . 45, p p . 100 ff.

15. G l u n i n , i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p p . 252, 272-75; and H o w , “ C h ’ e n Tu-hsiu’s Leadership.” 16. See North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 14. 17. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 105; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5. L i Ta-chao and Chang T’ai-lei evidently agreed with Maring i n arguing for the “bloc w i t h i n ” at the Hangchow plenum (also called West Lake plenum) but had to ram through agreement to this approach over the objections of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and Kao Chiin-yii. The 1926 “Brief History of the CCP” states that “ t h e resolution was adopted unanimously, although some individual comrades were opposed to i t . ” Maring claimed that a majority of the Chinese comrades, including Ch’en Tuhsiu, favored his proposal for the acceptance of a “bloc within.” O n questions of the size of the Kuomintang about this time, see Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 62 and 84; and C. Martin Wilbur’s forthcoming book on the national revolution i n China, 1922-28, (thereafter, Wilbur, “National Revolution”). 18. A 1926 source ( i n Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 84) speaks of 150,000 Nationalists, and Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 75, speaks of 300,000 i n the early 1920’s. However, a 1929 Nationalist source says that only 4,000 of about 187,000 Kuomintang members had joined before 1923. See Wilbur, i n H o and Tsou, Crisis, p . 224. Other sources claim there were more than 1 million members of the Kuomintang by 1926. See forthcoming study of the Kuomintang, 1927-37, by Lloyd Eastman, entitled China’s Abortive Revolution. 19. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 5; and Meisner, L i Ta-chao, p. 219. 20. C. Brandt, The French-Returned Elite in the CCP (Berkeley, Calif., 1961), passim; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 84, 88, 90. 21. See Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 70; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 141-43; Whiting, Soviet Policies, p . 203. 22. L i u Jen-ching, cited i n E u d i n a n d N o r t h , Survey, p . 151. 23. The directive was not received i n Shanghai until July 18, or almost two months later. Glunin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 262. 24. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 6. 25. Glunin in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 246 and 260; and How, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership,” p. 32. 26. Or, according t o some, T s ’ a i Ho-sen o r P ’ e n g Shu-chih. 27. See Kuo, History, v o l . 1, p . 8 7 ; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 6 6 ; H u H u a , History, p . 43; P e i T’ung, Current Background (hereafter, CB), no. 410, p . 31; and Ch’iin Wen, ECMM, no. 271, passim. Chang Kuo-t’ao was apparently dropped from the Central Committee because of his opposition to the united front. Chiin-tu Hsiieh, Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China (hereafter, Hsiieh, Leaders) ( N e w York, 1971), p . 434.

28. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 6. 29. See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 68-69; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 36-37; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 93 ff.; Snow, Red Star, pp. 142-43; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, pp. 42-46 ff.; and Kuo, History, vol. 1, pp. 90-100. 30. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 71-72. 31. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, pp. 80 fi.; and Eudin and North, Survey, p . 344. 32. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 84; and Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 104. 33. Most state that the Youth Congress was held in August, but some give July:

530

Notes for Chapter 3 e.g., Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 97. Official sources speak of 4,000 or 6,000 members of the Socialist Youth League, but Pavel Mif wrote in 1928 that there were 2,365 members about this time, increasing to 9,000 by September, 1925 ( W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 90).

34. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 390. 35. G l u n i n , i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 260; c f . also H o w , “ C h ’ e n Tuhsiu’s Leadership,” p. 32. 36. See Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 89-90; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 26. 37. Cited i n Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 122. 38. Chiang Kai-shek was not even a delegate, though he had returned from the Soviet Union and obviously enjoyed the confidence of Sun Yat-sen. 39. Lin Po-ch’ii was later elevated to full membership i n the Central Executive Committee. See Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 211, 149; and Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p. 95. 40. T’an P’ing-shan, soon replaced by Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, was the only Communist on the Council, but often T’an and Ch’ii were able to join leftists Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k’ai, and usually Sun Yat-sen, i n outvoting the more conservative H u Han-min and two others. 41. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, p . 217. Yang P’ao-an replaced T’an P’ingshan in 1924. 42, Feng Chu-po. 43. First headed by Vladimir Polyak and later by A . I . Cherepanov, who has left an informative account of the academy. See A . I . Cherepanov, “The Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution,” The New Times, March 15, 1967; and A . I . Cherepanov, Zapiski Voyennoga, Sovietnika v Kitaye (Notes of a Soviet Military Adviser in China) (Moscow, 1964). The Hankow Herald, October 4, 1925, stated that Moscow was dispensing 58,000 rubles a month to the Nationalists. See Wilbur, i n H o and Tsou, Crisis, p . 235, for the estimate of Soviet aid of 2.5 million rubles; and Julie H o w , ‘“Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership,” p . 20. 44. Jean Lacouture, H o Chi-Minh: A Political Biography (New York, 1968), pp. 49-50. 45. See Jerome C h ’ e n , Revolution, p . 9 6 ; W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 317; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 46. Cited i n Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 72. 47. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 391-92. 48. Ibid., p . 395. 49. Cited i n i b i d . , p . 112; a n d c f . W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 89. 50. Jerome C h ’ e n , Revolution, p . 97. 51. See Wilbur, “National Revolution.” Despite Sun Yat-sen’s claim, Communists still formed very much a minority of political activists i n the 1920’s, and even in the 1930’s the majority of university students were non-Communist. See Harrison, Rebellions, pp. 28 ff. I n a few areas, the conservatives were able to control almost entirely the infiltration of the Communists into the Kuomintang. I n the Nationalist youth bureau, veteran revolutionary Tsou L u forced the resignation of a Communist manager of the bureau and was able to prevent further infiltration until the end of 1925. Similarly, there was n o signficant activity i n the Nationalist women’s department until Madame Liao Chung-k’ai became director and instituted policies favorable to the Communists. 52. Ibid., p . 41. 53. See Teng Chung-hsia, Labor Movement, pp. 112-13; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 357, 365; Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 96-97; and Schwartz, Rise of Mao, pp. 41 fi. 54. The plenum, which was chaired by Shen Ting-yi and attended b y Ch’en Tu-

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531

hsiu, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Voitinsky, and others, some ten in all, also attacked Ch’en’s alleged tendency to act on his own as the

“patriarch” of the Party. Later, Ch’en Tu-hsiu was called “Emperor” and his assistant P’eng Shu-chih, “Confucius.” See Teng Chung-hsia, Labor Movement, p . 113; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 6; Glunin, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 268. 55. Glunin, i n Delyusin, et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 272-75, 298-99. This article supports Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s 1929 “Letter to A l l Comrades i n the Party” i n accusing Ch’en of calling, i n mid-1924 writings, for support only for the Kuomintang left and of preparing for a break i n the united front. Ch’en allegedly complained to Voitinsky that Borodin was strengthening the Nationalist right with his support for military action and called for opposition to the proposed expeditions against the militarists. See also Julie How, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership,” p . 44. 56. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 6, 7, 8; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 96; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 349, 359. 57. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 355-56, 337; and Wilbur, “National Revolution.” 58. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 154 fI,; and Wilbur, “National Revolution.” 59. See Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 133, 124; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 365; H o Kan-chih, History, p. 87; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 71; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 164. 60. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 403, 405. Cf. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, p . 87. 61. See Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 148; and Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 93. Despite these criticisms of “leftism,” a recent Soviet source condemns continuing “leftist” deviations of the Ch’en Tu-hsiu leadership in 1925. Glunin, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 276-78. 62. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 55-56; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 85-86; P ’ e i T’ung, i n CB, n o . 410, p . 3 2 ; W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds. Documents, p . 71.

63. Some sources give 980 or between 900 and 1,000 Communists as of January, 1925. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 86. 64. T’an P’ing-shan, P’eng Shu-chih, L o Chang-lung, and Hsiang Ying were added to the previous Central Committee of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, L i Tachao, Ts’ai Ho-sen and Chang Kuo-t’ao. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 9;

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 85-87, adds Su Chao-cheng, but Su had just entered the CCP; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 68-69; and Yu-ning L i , “ A Biography of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai: From Youth to Party Leadership,” (hereafter, Yu-ning L i , “Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai”’) (unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1 9 6 7 ) , p . 160, adds W a n g Ho-po.

65. See Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 103; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I, p . 180-81. 66. See Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 97; H . Schiiler, in International Press Correspondence (hereafter, Inprecor) (August 1, 1928), cited in Chinese Studies in History, Summer, 1971, pp. 24647; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 5, 9, 12. According t o C h a n g , Dalin, a representative o f the Communist organiza-

tion, Youth International, exerted a leftist influence on the Chinese organization. 67. Japanese control of spindles i n China allegedly rose from 13.6 per cent in 1913 to 45.3 per cent i n 1925, while at times Chinese workers received only about one-fifth the wages of foreigners for the same work in Hong Kong and elsewhere. H o Kan-chih, History, p . 89. 68. Headed respectively by Chang Kuo-t’ao and Hsiang Ching-yii, although the latter soon left for Russia. L i Li-san replaced Chang Kuo-t’ao as head of the labor department i n August, 1926. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 11; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary.

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Notes for Chapter 3

69. Lin Wei-min and Su Chao-cheng, leaders of the Chinese Seamen’s Union, who joined the CCP about this time, became heads of the new Federation of Labor i n 1925 and 1926, respectively. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 366-68 and 403; and Ti-yi-tzu Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng Shih-ch’i ti Kung-jen Yiintung (The Labor Movement in the Period o f the First Revolutionary Civil War)

(Peking, 1963), passim. 70. There are many variant statistics. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 473, 481, 381, 425; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 64, 285; N C N A (Peking), September 14, 1956; CB, no. 410, p . 19; and N y m Wales (Helen Snow), The Chinese L a b o r Movement (hereafter, Wales, Labor) ( N e w York, 1 9 4 5 ) , p p . 48,

54. By spring, 1927, the Communists were using a very loose definition of “proletarian,” as when they included some 2 million artisans among the 3 million represented b y t h e N a t i o n a l General L a b o r U n i o n . Chesneaux, Mouvement

Ouvrier, p . 481n.; American ed., pp. 269, 339, and 527-28. 71. Ts’ai Ho-sen reportedly had to overcome Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s reluctance to move ahead with these plans. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 372. 72. The directors of the latter were Liu Hua and Sun Liang-hui. 73. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p. 381. 74. Ibid., p . 396; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 275; and Wilbur, “National Revolution.” 75. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 288; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 387. 76. N y m Wales, Labor Movement, p . 46. 77. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 103-73. 78. Ibid., p . 102-3; Eudin and North, Survey, p. 350. 79. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 94 and 74. There are various other estimates as of ‘“about 4,000” Communists by the end of 1925 (Glunin in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p. 247), and some 20,000 by July, 1926 (Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 192). 80. Mif, Heroic China, pp. 24 and 49; North, Moscow, p . 131; North, Elites, pp. 32-33. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union attained a peak proportion of 48.6 per cent “proletarians” in 1930, according to T . H . Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-67 (Princeton, N.J., 1968), pp. 116, 162, 167, and 224.

81. Glunin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 247. 82. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 75, 276. 83. See also ibid., pp. 308 ff. The Central Executive Committee’s propaganda bureau maintained a three-room office in Shanghai, according to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 9. 84. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 122, 105-6. 85. Ibid., pp. 126-29, 290. 86. Ibid., pp. 125-26; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 102; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 85; Mif, Heroic China, pp. 39, 46; Ch’en Tu-hsiu, his young protégé P’eng Shu-chih, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Ts’ai Ho-sen, and Yiin Tai-ying were the principal contributors to the most important of these journals. 87. See Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 108, 105. 88. Ibid., pp. 98, 124, 130-34. 89. See Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 85-87; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 49. 90. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 9. 91. Ibid., chs. 6, 9-12; and North and Eudin, M . N Roy’s Mission, p . 108. 92. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 9; cf. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York, 1960), pp. 240, 610 ff. 93. The women’s department, under Hsiang Ching-yii, soon affiliated with Women International, established i n Moscow i n December, 1924. Women International

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533

eventually had branches i n Peking, Shanghai, and Canton. Eudin and North, Survey, p . 268. 94. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p. 101; Snow, Red Star, p . 144; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 9 and 11. The October, 1925, plenum also spoke of publications and distribution departments, which presumably were taken over by the Secretariat. 95. Ibid., ch. 9; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 96, 225-26, 281; Yu-ning L i , “Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai,” pp. 171 ff. 96. This discussion is based primarily on Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I, p p . 51, 357-60, 529-30, a n d v o l . I I , p . 2 7 ; a n d W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Docu-

ments, p p . 113-14. There is considerable confusion of terminology i n early Party o r g a n i z a t i o n , b o t h i n the Chinese a n d i n t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f translations. F o r

example, hsiao tsu (small group) was first used for cell, but apparently later became a subdivision of the Party branch or chih-pu. The term ch’ii at times was used f o r b o t h r e g i o n a l a n d district levels; ti-fang ( l o c a l ) w a s used for c i t y com-

mittees; and tang-pu and wei-yiian-hui were sometimes interchanged for Party committee. According to a Russian adviser, the more elaborate intermediate organizations were n o t established until after 1925, a n d then w i t h Comintern aid. N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 21.

97. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 357-58, Victor A . Yakhontof, The Chinese Soviets (New York, 1934), p . 73; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 11 and 12. The headquarters of the Chekiang-Kiangsu Bureau i n 1927 was on North Szechwan Road, 104 Heng Feng L i , Shanghai, while that of the HunanHupeh Bureau was in Wuchang, w i t h an office i n Hankow. 98. Chang Kuo-t’ao, ch. 10; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 93, 96, 102, 309; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p. 55. 99. Chi Ya-t’ai, “Comrade Li Ta-chao and the early stage of revolutionary activities i n Inner Mongolia,” Min-tsu T’uan-chieh, July 6, 1961, trans. i n ECMM, no. 281; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 100. Some 6 million rubles from April, 1925, to March, 1926. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, p . 333.

101. Ibid., p . 115; and North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 30-31. 102. North, Moscow, p . 131; Mif, Heroic China, pp. 24, 46; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 115, 310. 103. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 112-13. 104. Ch’en Kung-po, Movement, p . 131. 105. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 113, 289. 106. Ibid., pp. 105-6. 107. I b i d . , p p . 114, 89. 108. Ibid., pp. 301, 122. 109. E u d i n a n d N o r t h , Survey, p p . 233, 344, 349; a n d K e r m i t M c K e n z i e , T h e Comintern a n d World Revolution, 1928-1943 ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 5 0 ff.

110. Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien Pao (Chinese Youth Daily), September 8, 1956, i n CB, no. 410, p . 2 4 ; W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p p . 277, 298.

111. Cited i n Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 70. Cf. Harrison, Rebellions, pp. 45 ff.; and How, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Leadership,” p . 34. 112. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 297-98, 285-86, 300-305. 113. Ibid., p p . 258, 301. 114. Aside from P’eng P’ai, L o Ch’i-yilan and Yiian Hsiao-hsien were perhaps most active in Kwangtung peasant work i n 1922-26. 115. The Kuomintang allotted 18,000 Chinese dollars a month to peasant work i n 1926 and joined the Peasant International (Krestintern), as did the CCP. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Ti-yi-tz’u Shih-ch’i t i Nung-min, p . 8; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 6 3 ; K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 403.

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116. Roy Hofheinz, “ T h e Peasant Movement and Rural Revolution: Chinese Communists i n the Countryside 1923-1927,” (thereafter, Hofheinz, “Peasant Movement”) (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1966); Andrews, Peasant Movement; Wilbur, “National Revolution.” 117. Cited in Eto, i n CQ, no. 9, p . 156. 118. Ti-yi-tz’u Shih-ch’i ti Nung-min, pp. 17-19; Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 144. 119. C. M . Wilbur, “The Influence of the Past: H o w the Early Years Helped Shape the Future of the CCP,” i n Lewis, ed., Party, p . 44. 120. Eto, in CQ, no. 9, p . 157.

Chapter 4 1. The assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai, a leading advocate of the alliance with the Communists, galvanized Kuomintang leftists into further strengthening their organization. Among other things, they exiled to Moscow the increasingly conservative H u Han-min, who was suspected of association with the murderers of Liao. There, w i t h extraordinary irony, archnationalist H u proceeded t o lecture the Bolsheviks on the solidarity of the Chinese and Russian revolutions. “There is only one world revolution and the Chinese revolution is part of this world revolution. The slogan of our great leader, Sun Yat-sen, is identical with the slogan of Marxism and Leninism.” For neither the first nor the last time, the Russians chose to accept these protestations, and i t was reported that applause “punctuated nearly every sentence of the speaker.” H u was elected to the executive committee of the Peasant International, a long-robed Chinese scholar “representing the Chinese farmers.” See Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 86-87; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure p . 63. Hu’s bizarre trip strikingly revealed the extent to which intelligent Chinese, long steeped i n the tradition of elaborate protocol and double entendre, have been able to beguile and deceive, whether intentionally or not, otherwise perceptive Westerners. H u , i t w i l l be recalled, had been one of the first Chinese Marxists to combine Lenin’s theory of imperialism with Sun Yat-sen’s theory of nationalism to stress the struggle of poor nations against the rich. T o some extent, this ideal of a “national class struggle,” also prominent i n the thinking o f such Chinese Communists as L i Ta-chao a n d M a o Tse-tung, w a s a n i m -

portant contribution of the period of collaboration. But the Chinese Communists were nationalists who became Marxist-Leninists, rather than nationalist leaders who only toyed briefly with Marxism, an important distinction. With the departure of H u Han-min, Tai Chi-t’ao, another early Marxist turned Nationalist, emerged as a leader of the Nationalist right wing. I n an influential book, published i n the summer of 1925, Tai advocated the cessation of class struggle i n the interests of national revolution. Subsequently, the position of the Kuomintang right hardened further. A t a meeting i n the Western Hills of Peking from November 23 t o December 5 , 1925, r i g h t i s t leaders, i n c l u d i n g Tai

and ex-Communist Shen Ting-yi, formally declared an end to the “bloc w i t h i n ” with the expulsion of all Communists from the Kuomintang. However, they were willing to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union and with the Chinese Communists as a separate Party, and, in any case, their decision was not recognized by most members of the Kuomintang. See Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 165, 208. 2. Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 104 fi.; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 76, 92, 156, 207 ff.; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p. 59; Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 157, 176 fi. 3. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 93. Mao Tse-tung’s position was quite vulnerable on this score. I n contrast to his later propaganda, he was among those who advised lenient treatment of the Western Hills group and was

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535

generally cooperative w i t h Nationalist leaders. H e performed a conspicuous number of jobs for the Nationalists and held them as long as any other Communist. See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 75-78; and M . N . Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China (hereafter, Roy, Revolution) (Calcutta, 1946), p . 393.

oo

. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 236-37, 209. . See Wilbur, “National Revolution”; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 163; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 102n. Besides L i n , T’an, and L i , Yang P’ac-an (with Lin and T’an on the decisive nine-man Standing Committee), Yii Shu-te, W u Yii-chang, and Yiin Tai-ying made u p the Communist group on the Central Executive Committee. . Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 217-18; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 100-101. . See Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 90, 92. . Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 80. . Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York, 1957), p . 38; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 215, 217; A . 1. Cherepanov, Severny pokhod natsionalno revolutsionnoi armii kitaya, 1926-7 (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary A r m y i n China, 1926-27) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 6 8 ) , p p . 6 6 ff.

10. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 39 ff.; H s u Kai-yu, Chou En-lai, pp. 56, 244; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 218 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 11; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin (The Red Army and I) (Hong Kong, 1954), pp. 33 ff.; and T’ien-wei Wu, “Chiang Kai-shek’s March Twentieth Coup d’Etat of 1926,” JAS, May, 1968. According to Wu, there probably was a Communist plot, but i t was not scheduled until a little later. 11. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 40-41; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p p . 228-29.

12. P’eng Shu-chih states that he was sent to Canton and proposed switching to the “bloc without” at a special conference there (Ming Pao, no. 30, pp. 13 ff., 20; Chesneaux, M o u v e m e n t Ouvrier, p . 439n. W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents,

p . 226; and Wang Chien-min. Draft History, vol. I , pp. 106, 489. The June 9 issue of Guide Weekly (no. 57) spoke of Chiang Kai-shek as a “pillar of the revolution” and called for support of the Canton government, even acknowledging the possibility of Communist implication i n the gunboat incident, but the article also hinted strongly at a shift to the “bloc without,” stating, “Members of your party must obey your party, but organizations outside the Kuomintang do not have this obligation” (cited i n Brandt, Stalin’s Failure p . 76). Ch’en Tu-hsiu further proposed to shift to an alliance “from without,” i n a June letter t o t h e C o m i n t e r n a n d a t t h e J u l y p l e n u m . O r t h o d o x histories t r y t o show M a o

Tse-tung and Chou En-lai taking a stand i n favor of a break w i t h the Kuomintang after the March Twentieth Incident, but, on the contrary, they seemed to have been the foremost conciliators of the Nationalists at this time. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p. 441; Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai, p . 58; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 78 ff. 13. See Ch’en i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 106; and P’eng, i n Ming Pao, no. 30. 14. C i t e d B r a n d t , Stalin’s Failure, p p . 73-74 a n d 8 2 ; a n d Chang Kuo-t’ao, A u t o biography, ch. 11, 15. W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p p . 2 5 1 - 5 2 . 16. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p. 78; and Isaacs, Tragedy, p. 97. 17. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 267-68 and 259. 18. Ibid., p . 255. I n contrast to later Chinese reports, the Comintern writer claimed to have the support o f the Chinese Communists and o f Ch’en Tu-hsiu for his

appraisal. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 11.

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Notes for Chapter 4

19. C i t e d i n Jerome C h ’ e n , Revolution, p . 103. 20. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 76; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 226-27, 229-30, 254, 260; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p . 33; and Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 103. 21. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 82-83. 22. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 251, 259. 23. Ibid., p p . 274-175, 279. 24. Ibid., pp. 259, 278. 25. C i t e d i n K u o , History, vol. I , p p . 128-29. 26. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 215, 220, 230; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 81; and Jane Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents (hereafter, Degras, Documents), vol. I I (London, 1960), p . 276; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 11, 12. The Chinese Communists were still not sure. The July plenum and contemporary articles as usual denounced militarism and called for the overthrow of the warlords, but the plenum interpreted the proposed campaigns as defensive moves against W u P’ei-fu’s aggression and not as ““a real revolutionary Northern Expedition.” Once again, when forced to adopt a policy against their own judgment, the Chinese Communists presented i t i n a compromise form. Chang Kuo-t’ao identifies Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih as still the principal opponents of the Northern Expedition. The “Brief History of the CCP” written about September, 1926, acknowledged, . certain organs and comrades opposed the Expedition. This situation will of course be detrimental to the Party i f allowed to be prolonged.” I t went on to stress the advantages of the Northern Expedition, stating, “ T h e CCP has issued explicit directives for the organization of a campaign to support the Northern Expedition.” Wilbur and H o w , eds. Documents, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 , 231, 272; a n d Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 86.

27. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 329, 333-34. I n Moscow, not long after the March Eighteenth Massacre, Feng could still proclaim, “Long live Leninism. Long live the proletariat. Long live the World Revolution.” 28. I b i d . , p . 367. 29. Ibid., p . 369; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 120 fi. 30. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 368-70. 31. I b i d . , pp. 420, 371-72, 374. Another Soviet adviser noted the continued weakness of the left Kuomintang at this very time, while General Galin led efforts for leftists to support Chiang’s military campaigns i n the East. Later, i n 1926 and 1927, Borodin hoped to forge an alliance w i t h T’ang Sheng-chih against Chiang Kai-shek. General T’ang purported to favor the Communists until about June, 1927, recommending leftists for various posts and at one time even applying unsuccessfully for admission to the CCP. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 32. André Malraux, Antimémoires (Paris, 1967), p . 530. The above phrases of Mao have been altered i n the official version of his works to stress Communist Party leadership. See Harrison, Rebellions, p . 50. 33. Mao, SW, vol. I , p. 27. The Communists also claimed emphatically that far more peasants than landlords were killed i n the revolution of 1925-27. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 225. 34. Mao, SW, vol. I, pp. 21-22. 35. C i t e d i n S n o w , R e d Star, p . 115. 36. Mao, SW, vol. 1, p. 22. However, Ti-yi-tz’u Shih-ch’i t i Nung-min, p . 17, gives the much smaller figure of 38,150 members of the Hunan Peasant Association i n June, 1926. I f the families were i n c l u d e d for the 1927 figure, then the asso-

ciations could claim to control more than 40 million. According to Roy, the peasant associations were composed of 65 per cent tenants, 15 per cent peasant owners, 15 per cent landless paupers, and 5 per cent others. H e stated that the

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837

landless peasants were the motive force of the peasant movement. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 326. 37. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 372, 377; Mao, SW, vol. I , p . 35. 38. Peasant associations also d i d not spare relatives of Communists, executing the father of L i Li-san as a “ l a n d bully” and trying the grandfather of Chang Kuot ’ a o among others. Chun-tu Hsiieh, Leaders, p . 431.

39. M a o , S W , vol. I , p . 2 2 . 40. See Roy, Revolution, p . 3 9 4 ; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 4 8 6 ; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 115. 41. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p p . 473, 481, also p p . 424-25, 448, 450, 462, 483, 485, 497; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 112; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 153; North a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 279. S u Chao-cheng ( d i e d 1 9 2 9 ) , L i u Shao-

ch’i, Li Li-san, Teng Chung-hsia (executed 1933), and others continued to hold key positions within the National General Labor Union. Teng Fa, Liu Erhsung, and L i Ch’i-han i n the South, Sun Liang-hui, Wang Shou-hua (the last four all executed i n 1927) i n Shanghai, and Kuo Liang (killed 1930) in Hunan were among other important Communist leaders active i n the labor movement at this time. 42. Meng-Sui Fen-chii ed., Tang-shih Hsiieh-hsi Ts’an-k’ao Tz’u-liao (Reference Materials for Study of Party History) (Peking, 1952), pp. 181-82. There were 300,000 members of the Hupeh General Labor Union by the end of 1926. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 43. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 31; Eudin and North, Survey, p . 293, 378. Party Central i n September similarly issued orders to restrain the peasants. Chiin-tu Hsiieh, Leaders, p . 358. 44. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 94-95; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 60; Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (hereafter, Trotsky, Problems) (New York, 1966), pp. 400, 427; Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, p . 380. 45. C i t e d i n N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . R o y ’ s Mission, p p . 138, 140-41. C f . E u d i n a n d North, Survey, pp. 352-54, 361, 377, 381, 291; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 105, 217; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 86. 46. Cited i n North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 36, 338-39, 211, 251. Cf. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 67, 217; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 86; Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 120-21. 47. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 135. 48. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 381, 390. 49. Cited i n Trotsky, Problems, p . 398. Despite the decision of the Comintern and of the majority of the CCP Central Committee to l i m i t the mass movements for the sake of the united front, the Party Central and membership were widely split on the question. A t Central Committee meetings, allegedly, P’eng Shu-chih defended and Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai attacked the policy of concessions, arguing that this was or was not the intent of the Comintern line. As we have seen, i t was perfectly possible to argue either way, and so the frequent changes of opinion on this issue seem understandable. Thus, i n early 1927, Borodin, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, T’an P’ing-shan, Mao Tse-tung, and others came around to support priority for the united front at the expense of agrarian revolution, at least i n their actions i f not i n their statements. Others, especially i n the Party’s Hunan-Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Chekiang-Kiangsu bureaus, continued to argue for more radical land policies and for greater preparation for an inevitable struggle w i t h the Nationalists over the mass l i n e . North a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p p . 3 2 , 4 4 ; W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p p . 376-77, 393, 396.

50. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 378, 376, 381. 51. Ibid., p . 376.

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52. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 456-57; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 384. 53. A source hostile to Ch’en Tu-hsiu quoted Ch’en as saying in mid-January, “Why should we clamor over i t and what kind of agitation should we develop when the aggressors were not the English but the Chinese?” Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 126; Trotsky, Problems, p . 403; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 622; Klein and Clark, Dictionary, p . 618; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 428, 433; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 54. W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 428. 55. Ibid., pp. 432-33. 56. Ibid., p . 430. 57. Ibid., Actually, the Wuhan government received only about one-quarter of its military expenses from land taxes in Hunan. Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 106. 58. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, p . 429. Borodin complained of Communist dissatisfaction to Chiang’s face when Chiang came to Wuhan in January but later wondered i f he had been wise to do so. The Comintern also criticized Chiang i n February. Ibid., p. 384; Trotsky, Problems, p . 407; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 54. 59. Wilbur a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 397. 60. I b i d . , p p . 3 8 1 - 8 3 , 388-89, 391, 3 9 3 - 9 5 ; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 127; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 490; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. I n addition to T’ang Sheng-chih and Wang Ching-wei, Teng Yen-ta, T’an Yen-k’ai, Chu P’ei-teh, Hsiieh Yiieh, and other important Nationalist political and military leaders were thought hostile to Chiang Kai-shek in early 1927. 61. Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 397-400. L i n Po-ch’ii also worked with the minister of finance i n Wuhan, and W u Yii-chang was on the nine-man Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, with T’ang P’ingshan. According to Chiang Kai-shek, the Communists disregarded both the regulations concerning the prohibition on being Party department heads and the turning i n of membership lists to the Kuomintang. I t seems that, on the national level, the Communists d i d obey these injunctions, but, i n places such as Peking, although only one-third as numerous as Nationalists, they succeeded anyway i n effectively controlling local organization. Ibid., pp. 404-9; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 4 5 ; Howard B o o r m a n , ed., Biographical Dictionary o f Repub-

lican China (hereafter, Boorman, Biographical) (New York, 1967 et seq.).

Chapter 5 I . Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 471-76. 2. Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang chih T’ou-shih ( A n Exposé of the CCP) (hereafter, Chung-kuo T’ou-shih) (Taipei, 1962), pp. 80-82. The fifty-five “other” were perhaps Party professionals. . Cited in Trotsky, Problems, pp. 389-90; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, Bh

p . 57. . C i t e d i n N o r t h , Moscow, p . 94. . N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 5 2 ; Trotsky, Problems, p p . 409-10.

co NOY

. Cited i n Trotsky, Problems, pp. 411-12. See also Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 133. . Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 146; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 494 fi. . Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 497, 499, 502-3. Wang Shou-hua had been a student i n Russia and was later active i n trade union work in Vladivostok. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 9. Cited in North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 150; Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 428; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 147. 10. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 4647.

539

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Notes for Chapter 5

1 . Chiang Yung-ching, Pao-lo-t’ing yii Wuhan Cheng-ch’iian (Borodin and the Wuhan Government) (hereafter, Chiang Yung-ching, Borodin) (Taipei, 1963), pp. 164, 169 fI. 12. Some 300 of the 1,000-odd documents have been translated and annotated in Wilbur and How, eds., Documents. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao Autobiography, ch. 12, more than sixty were arrested. 13. Chiang Yung-ching, Borodin, pp. 158-59, 169; Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 504-6, 504-9; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 152. 14. Doriot, cited i n Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 158. . N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 270. Anti-Communist actions i n

[iy

Kiangsi included the assassination of the chairman of the Kanchow General Trade Union on March 11 and the closing of Communist offices i n Nanchang and Kiukiang on March 16 and 19. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 16. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 54, citing Pravda, July 16, 1927, pp. 2-3. 17. Ibid., pp. 55-56, citing Pravda, March 16, 1927. 18. These were Nanking Party secretary Hsieh Wen-chin and director of the political department of the Nationalist Second Army L i Fu-ch’un. Wuhan sent T . V . Soong to Shanghai to try to control its financial resources, but W u Chihhui and other senior Nationalist leaders, i n addition to Chiang Kai-shek, favored the break with the left. See T’ien-wei Wu, “Chiang Kai-shek’s April Twelfth Coup d’Etat of 1927,” unpublished mimeographed paper. 19. Ch’en Tu-hsiu i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 107; P’eng Shu-chih i n Ming Pao, no. 30, pp. 18-20. 20. See L i Yiin-han, Ts’ung Yung-kung tao Ch’ing-tang (From the Admission of Communists to Party Purification) (hereafter, L i Yiin-han, Ch’ing-tang) (Taipei, 1966), pp. 648, 654; Chiang Yung-ching, Borodin, p . 161; T’ien-wei Wu, “Chiang Kai-shek’s April Twelfth Coup d’Etat of 1927’; Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 164, 168-69, 177, 146, 170; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, pp. 171-72; Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 22, October, 1967; Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai, pp. 61, 63. 2 . Estimates of the number of victims of April 12-13 in Shanghai range from 300 to 700. See Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, pp. 513-14, Eudin and North, Survey, p . 365; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 177. Southwest General Pai Ch’ung-hsi and even Green Gang chief T u Yiieh-sheng reportedly entertained the idea of cooperating with the Communists against Chiang Kai-shek. 22, These were Ch’en Yen-nien ( i n June) and Chao Shih-yen ( i n July), L o Yinung’s successors to the post of Kiangsu Party secretary. L o Yi-nung, who was transferred first to become secretary of the Kiangsi Committee and was shifted again shortly thereafter to become the Hupeh Committee secretary, was captured and executed a year later after his return to Shanghai. Some estimate the number of demonstrators on April 13 at 50,000 (New York Times, April 13, 1927), most at 100,000. 23. Chesneaux, Mouvement Ouvrier, p . 515; Yakhontof, Soviets, p . 94. Labor leaders L i u Erh-sung a n d L i Ch’i-han ( L i Sen) were executed i n Canton a t

this

time. After a temporary respite in Kiangsi, on June 6, 1927, General Chu P’eiteh ordered all Communists expelled. 24. A t this time, Trotsky and his allies were using developments i n China to press their futile last-ditch effort to stop Stalin’s complete takeover of the Soviet Party. By midspring, Trotsky and those who agreed with h i m believed that the Communists must fight their enemies i n Wuhan, as they should have fought Chiang Kai-shek, before i t was too late. The basic means of doing this, according to Trotsky, would be through the establishment of peasant soviets to guide the agrarian revolution. Even Trotsky did not yet advocate a complete break with the Nationalists, but he would exert much more pressure to drive the

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Kuomintang to the left through the instrument of the peasant soviets. Stalin countered that “ t o organize the soviets of workers’ and peasants’ deputies now on the territory of the Wuhan government, would mean to prematurely launch a struggle to overthrow the Kuomintang left and form a new soviet authority i n China.” See Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 301-2, 369, 375; and North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 92. Recent Soviet sources attempt to stress the harmful influence of Trotskyism on Ch’en Tu-hsiu, P’eng Shu-chih, L i Li-san, Mao, and other Chinese leaders. Glunin, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 292-96. 25. Cited in Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 364-65. 26. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 66. 27. Trotsky, Problems, p . 426. 28. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 42446. 29. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 58. 30. Ibid., pp. 191-92. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao ( i n Ming Pao, no. 22, p . 91), who, with Ch’en Tu-hsiu and T’an P’ing-shan, sat i n on joint meetings with Wang Ching-wei and four other leftist Nationalist leaders at this time, even Wang became ever more conservative after reaching Wuhan about April 10 and complained of “excesses” i n the mass movements. Chang, then secretary of the CCP Hupeh Committee, later yielded the post to Chang T’ai-lei. Later i n June, the Party moved for a few days across the river to Wuchang before returning to Hankow. 31. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Jen Pi-shih, and others argued for full discussions and criticisms. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 32. Souces alternately give May 6 and May 9 as the closing date of the Congress. M i f , Heroic China, p . 46. See also W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 404;

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 360; vol. I I , p . 263; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 17. 33. There are evident inconsistencies i n these lists, such as the omission of YiinnanKweichow from the 1927 list, and the round figures are highly suspect. Nor is there any way of knowing the correlation of the two lists, except to say that many of Ch’en’s proposals for Party growth could not have been met. Nonetheless, the table gives a useful general idea of Party distribution and also of the regional and provincial committees at a time just before the near destruction of the Party. Other sources speak of 1,200 Communists and Youth League members i n Peking, o f several thousand each i n W u h a n a n d Shensi-Kansu, a n d o f 20,000 each i n the C a n t o n area a n d H u n a n . See W i l b u r a n d H o w , eds., Documents, p . 404; Pere-

vertailo et al., eds., Outline, p. 171; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p. 360; a n d v o l . I I , p . 263; S c h r a m , M a o Tse-tung, p . 112; B r a n d t e t a l . , eds., Docu-

mentary History, p . 120. 34. Wilbur, i n Lewis, ed., Party, pp. 45 ff.; North, Elites, pp. 32-33; Trotsky, Problems, p . 414. Those leaders who survived the repressions of the late 1920s and early 1930's were even younger, w i t h an average age i n 1928 of about twenty-four, and they were even more predominantly from central provinces, w i t h thirty-eight of 130 coming from Hunan. 35. A s i n P e k i n g , where some 1,200 C o m m u n i s t s a n d Y o u t h League members, although only one-third as numerous as registered members of the Kuomintang, were able to hold one-half to three-quarters of the executive positions i n local mass organizations and at district and municipal levels. See Wilbur and H o w , eds., Documents, pp. 404-5; and North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 243. 36. See H a t a n o K e n i c h i , “ H i s t o r y o f t h e C C P , ” c i t e d i n W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, vol. 1, p. 388, note 2; Ts’ai Ho-sen, “Chi-hui Chu-yi Shih” (“History of O p p o r t u n i s m , 1928”) (hereafter, T s ’ a i Ho-sen, “ H i s t o r y ” ) , i n W a n g Chien-min,

Draft History, vol. 1, pp. 483 ff., p . 494-95; Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Chung-kuo ke-ming

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541

yii kung-ch’an tang ( T h e Chinese Revolution a n d the CCP) (hereafter, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Revolution) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 2 8 ) , p . 52. According t o Chang K u o - t ’ a o ,

in Ming Pao, no. 22, p . 90, seven of the above, omitting Su Chao-cheng and L i Wei-han, formed the top policy-making group at the time and were frequently joined by Youth League Secretary Jen Pi-shih, Borodin, Voitinksy, and Roy. See also North, Elites, p . 111, and Jerome Ch’en i n Pacific Affairs, Winter, 1968-69, p. 584. Others add P’eng Shu-chih, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch’i, and Hsiang Chung-fa to the nine on the Politburo, possibly as alternates. L o Yinung, Chao Shih-yen, Ch’en Yen-nien, Jen Pi-shih, Teng Chung-hsia, P’eng P’ai, and Chang T’ai-lei were among the Central Committee members. 37. Mao was not elected to the Politburo and lost his position as director of the peasant department, possibly because of fear of his radical views on the peasant problem. The National Peasant Association, however, established just after the Fifth Party Congress, elected Mao to its standing committee. See Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 93, 99. 38. See Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, pp. 483, 495-96; and Chang Kuo-t'ao, in Ming Pao, no. 22, October, 1967, p . 90. 39. T s ’ a i Ho-sen, “ H i s t o r y , ” i n W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . 1, p p . 485, 488. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12, Borodin never attended the Fifth Congress but continued to hold crucial discussions in his home. 40. Trotsky, Problems, p . 432. Most have assumed Petrov was P’eng Shu-chih, but a recent Soviet source states that a Petrov was one F. F . Raskolnikov. Glunin i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 267; see also Eudin and North, Survey, p . 461; K u n g C h ’ u , W o yii H u n g Chiin, p p . 3 3 , 4 0 ; S n o w , R e d Star, p . 147;

Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 68. A n observer of the Fifth Congress states, more or less i n accord w i t h t h e orthodox histories, t h a t C h ’ e n Tu-hsiu, P’eng Shu-chih,

T’an P’ing-shan, and Su Chao-cheng fought to maintain the united front even a t t h e cost o f further concessions, w h i l e Ch’ti C h ’ i u - p a i , T s ’ a i Ho-sen, L i Li-san,

Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chang T’ai-lei, and especially Yiin Tai-ying (and later, according to others, especially Youth League secretary Jen Pi-shih), opposed a continuation of the alliance w i t h the Nationalists. However, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chang T’ai-lei, and Ts’ai Ho-sen reportedly softened their opposition to the policy of concessions in order to maintain the united front, enabling past policies to continue despite the mounting criticism. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I, p p . 360-62.

41. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “ K a o Ch’uan-tang T’ung-chih Shu” (“Letter to A l l Comrades i n the P a r t y ” ) ( D e c e m b e r , 1929)

(hereafter, C h ’ e n Tu-hsiu, “ L e t t e r ” ) , i n W a n g

Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 104 ff. A recent Soviet source verifies Ch’en’s opposition to the united front, especially during 1924. Glunin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p p . 252, 270 ff., 280.

42, Cited in North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 293. 43. Ibid., p . 332. 44. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 265-66. 45. P’eng Shu-chih, i n Ming Pao, no. 30, pp. 20, 22; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 24, pp. 90, 93. However, Chang harshly criticized P’eng Shu-chih’s part i n the events of 1925-27. 46. Trotsky, Problems, p . 430. 47. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 68. 48. Ibid., pp. 68-69. Cf. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, p . 381. Others, however, citing other passages, argue that Ch’en frequently praised the revolutionary qualities of the bourgeoisie. Perhaps, understandably, Ch’en argued various positions at various times. See this chapter below; and Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 63; Chiin-tu Hsilieh, The Chinese Communist Movement 1921-1949: A n Annotated Bibliography of Selected Materials in the Chinese Collection of the

542

Notes for Chapter 5 Hoover Institution (hereafter, C. T . Hsiiech, Bibliography), (Stanford, Calif., 1960), vol. I , p . 37; and Yii-ju Chih, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s Career and Ideas,” i n Chiin-tu Hsiieh, Leaders, p . 357.

49. Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 483, 48788, 494-96; K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 270.

50. Snow, R e d Star, p . 147. 51. Hsiao Tso-liang, Chinese Communism in 1927: City vs. Countryside (Hong Kong, 1970), pp. 31-32. A leading biographer of Ch’ii notes that, like Borodin, he “showed more restraint than previously” i n writings on the peasant question. Yu-ning L i , Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, p . 209. 52. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “Letter,” i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 105, 107. 53. See Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 270-71. 54. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 243, 274, 188; Hsiao Yi-p’ing and Chang Kung, i n CB, no. 410, p. 13, note that the Congress also passed resolutions on the labor movement and on the thesis of the Seventh ECCI Plenum. 55. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 244, 134. 56. Ts’ai in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 486, 490; Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, n o . 2 0 , A u g u s t , 1967, p . 9 4 , a n d i n Autobiography, c h . 1 2 ; North a n d

Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 62-63, 96, 176, 248; and Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, pp. 122-23. 57. See Chapman, H . O., The Chinese Revolution, 1926-27 (London, 1928), p . 75; and Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 197. 58. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 272, 248, 250, 258. 59. Roy also stressed the anti-imperialist, and hence temporary, nature of the alliance. Ibid., pp. 96, 193, 210-11, 232-33, 245. Reflecting such arguments, the thesis of the Fifth Congress stated, [ I n the past] the united front was much too broad. I t encompassed even the feudal patriarchal forces of reaction i n the village. The demands of the Kwangtung peasant movement, which was led by our Party, went no further than the organization of peasant unions and the reduction of rentals. The feudal-bourgeois bloc was already preparing to compromise and to liquidate t h e r e v o l u t i o n , w h i l e o u r P a r t y d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i t w a s necessary t o

strike at the very foundation of its power i n the village. The feudal bourgeois conspiracy against the revolution should have been answered b y intensifying the social base of the revolution. This was not done. I t was due to this very mistake that Kwangtung was so easily lost. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 245. 60. Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 22, October, 1967, p . 91; also i n Autobiography, ch. 12. Chang points out that i t would have been more realistic to consider the authorities of the Wuhan government “landlord capitalist” rather than petty bourgeois. 61. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 74; Hsiao Yi-p’ing and Chang Kung, in CB, n o . 410, September 25, 1956, p . 3 5 ; S h i n k i c h i E t o , “Hai-lu-feng, T h e

First Chinese Soviet Government,” CQ, no. 9, p . 162; Trotsky, Problems, p. 75. The Kwangtung peasant leader L o Ch’i-yiian was a prominent proponent of more radical land policies. 62. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 262; Chiang Yung-ching, Borodin, p . 307. 63. Others argued that Ch’en Tu-hsiu and other Chinese leaders were all too ready to abandon the interest of the masses because of their “petty bourgeois” intellectual biases. As the March 17 “Letter from Shanghai” had put i t , the dominant Chinese Communist view was to consider the peasantry “ a dull, dumb mass, unconscious and inactive.” However, i t was the Comintern that taught the

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Chinese leadership, as the Letter also put i t , to “consider the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois revolution from which nothing more than democratic liberties and a slight improvement i n the economic situation can be expected.” Trotsky, Problems, pp. 397, 415. 64. Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 371-73 (emphasis added—]J.H.). 65. Ibid., p . 302. 66. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 95, 284-85. 67. See ibid., pp. 262, 36, 74, 82; Chiang Yung-ching, Borodin, pp. 302, 306-7; T’ien-wei Wu, “ A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927,” JAS, November, 1969, pp. 129-31; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 15, 90; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 91, 110; Andrews, Peasant Movement, p . 80; J. L . Buck, Land Utilization in China (New York, 1964), p. 268: M . N . R o y , Revolution, p . 481n.; S n o w , R e d Star, p . 145; Isaacs, Tragedy,

p . 216. The last three sources speak of Nationalist and Communist limits fixed as high as 500 mou (83 acres), but possibly the latter figure was for an average family of five as against the Central Land Committee recommendation of 50 or 100 m o u per person. A s l a t e as t h e a u t u m n o f 1927, certain Chinese Communists

still spoke of as high a limit as 200 mou, or more than twice the earlier Nationalist limit. See C. Martin Wilbur, “The Ashes of Defeat,” CQ, no. 18, pp. 16, 41, 51. Maximum limits for landholding were purposely left vague i n most proposals because of regional differences, and the Communists often spoke of minimums necessary for self-support for the average rural family as the ideal standard for setting land policy. 68. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 216; Trotsky, Problems, p . 76. 69. Mif, Heroic China, p . 47. 70. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 338. 71. Ibid., pp. 99 and 287; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 120-21; and Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 101. The commander was Hsia Tou-yin and the Communist leader who defeated him, Yeh T’ing. 12. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 115; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p. 116; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 235; T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, November, 1969, p . 133. The Nationalist generals were H o Chien and Hsii K’o-hsiang. 73. Ts’ai Ho-sen, “ H i s t o r y , ” in W a n g Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 494. 74. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 90-91. 75. Ibid., pp. 299, 302; and Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 371-72. 76. Wilbur, in CQ, no. 18, p . 47. 77. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 106, 97-99, 102, 104-5; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 110-13; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I, pp. 484, 486-87, 494; Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 231 ff.; Roy Hofheinz, “The Autumn Harvest I n s u r r e c t i o n , ” C Q , n o . 3 2 , p . 3 9 ; a n d H s i a o , Chinese Communism i n

1927, pp. 32, 42. 78. Brandt e t al., eds., Documentary History, p . 111; a n d see C C P statements i n ibid., p . 113, and in Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 233-34, 236, 247-48; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p p . 357, 346; K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 237; a n d Kai-yu Hsu,

Chou En-lai, p . 71. 79. See Kuo, History, vol. 1, pp. 237-38, 243. Roy, Revolution, p . 615, says Mao represented the “extreme right wing” of the CCP in restraining excesses of peasants. 80. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 120. 81. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 231. 82. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 120. 83. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 220. 84. Eudin and North, Survey, p . 304; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 107. The Seventh ECCI Plenum had called for a “revolutionary army,” and

o44

Notes for Chapter 5

the Fifth Congress had stated, “The revolution must create its own army.” Ibid., p . 251. 85. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 107, 339; Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “Letter,” in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 109; Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 256, 258, 250; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 86. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 251. . Sheridan, Feng Yii-hsiang, pp. 225-29; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 256. Yen Hsi-shan also seemed a possible ally at one point, but nothing came out of i t at that time. Wilbur and How, eds., Documents, pp. 428-29. 88. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 315-16; and Hofheinz, in CQ, no. 32, p . 40. 89. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 117; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 265; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 107; Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 24, December, 1967, p . 90.

90. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 116; and T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, November, 1969, pp. 131 ff. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, L i Li-san, and Ch’i Ch’iu-pai were among Party leaders supporting priority for a military expedition against Chiang Kai-shek. Earlier, the Party had substituted a proposal for a demonstration in place of a general strike, as a means of forcing a launching of a “punitive expedition against Hsli K’o-hsiang in Hunan.” The Secretariat proposed another solution i n a June 23 letter to the Shanghai Committee, namely that the imperialists be provoked into intervening i n Shanghai and other important cities to

force closing of Nationalist ranks. Noting that further surrender on the land question w i l l mean the “liquidation of our forces,” while the same result will occur i f “ w e continue to insist on the confiscation of land” and break with the Kuomintang, the Secretariat declared, “ w e must find a new way”’—namely, “force the imperialists to occupy Nanking and Shanghai.” Ts’ai Ho-sen admits to putting forward this suggestion and claims Ch’en Tu-shiu and L i Li-san supported it, while Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai discussed i t at an all-day session. But Roy refuted the idea as a “dangerous” substitution of nationalism for the class struggle, one that would lead the Shanghai proletariat “ n o t to victory, but t o slaughter.” N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p p . 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 333, 361,

363-64, 368; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 494; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 271. 91. Four principal sources for this period, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Ch’i Ch’iu-pai, Ch’en Tu-

hsiu, and Chang Kuo-t’ao, speak of enlarged meetings of the Political Bureau about June 15, June 20, June 28, and July 1. However, orthodox histories speak also of a meeting on June 30, and others mention one on July 3, and it is not clear i f some of these dates refer to the same meeting. I t seems most likely that there were two enlarged meetings, respectively on June 20 and July 1. See Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 483 ff.; Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “ L e t t e r , ” i n W a n g Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . I I , p p . 107-9; Chang

Kuo-t’ao i n Ming Pao, no. 24, December, 1967, pp. 89-90; Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Revolution, pp. 60 fI.; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 115, 117; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 92; Roy, Revolution, p . 554; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p p . 323-30; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 263; and T’ien-wei W u , i n JAS, November, 1969, p . 138.

92. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 259. Mif cited a resolution to this effect dated July 13. N o r t h a n d E u d i n , M . N . Roy’s Mission, p p . 124-25; a n d see T’ien-wei W u , i n JAS, November, 1969, p . 136.

93. Cited i n Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 264-65. See also T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, November, 1969, pp. 127, 136; and N y m Wales, Red Dust (hereafter, Wales, Red Dust) (Stanford, Calif., 1952), p . 87. I n the Cultural Revolution, Maoists blamed Liu Shao-ch’i for this action, while others charged Ts’ai Ho-sen and Chou En-lai

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w i t h responsibility for i t . See IS, A u g u s t , 1971, p . 12; C Q , n o . 3 7 , p p . 176 ff;

and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 94. See Roy, Revolution, p . 554; Wang Shih, et al., Brief History, p . 92. 95. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 258, 261; and Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” in Wang Chienmin, Draft History, vol. I , p . 498. 96. Eudin and North, Survey, p . 376; North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p. 123; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 266; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 141. 97. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 332. 98. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 263; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 498. 99. T’ien-wei Wu, in JAS, November, 1969, pp. 137-38. 100. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 266. 101. Ibid., p . 267. 102. Ibid. 103. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p. 87; and T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, November, 1969, p. 138. 104. Cited i n Snow, Red Star, p. 147. 105. Trotsky, Problems, pp. 77-78.

106. Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p. 497. 107. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “Letter,” i n ibid., vol. I I , pp. 109-10, 115. O f Ch’en’s sons, Ch’en Yen-nien and Ch’en Ch’iao-nien were executed i n June, 1927, and January 1928, respectively. 108. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, pp. 124-25, 332; T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, November, 1969, p . 140; Wilbur, in CQ, no. 18, p . 47; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 263; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12, in Ming Pao, no. 24, p . 90. 109. However, the Wuhan government did not foreclose all forms of cooperation with its Communists until after August 1. O n July 22, the Kuomintang spoke of Communist participation i n its Fourth Central Executive Committee Plenum, planned for August 15. T’ien-wei W u , i n JAS, November, 1969, p . 14041; a n d

Wales, Red Dust, p . 87.

110. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, “Letter,” in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I l , p. 107. 111. C h a n g Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, c h . 1 2 ; a n d Wales, R e d Dust, p . 43.

112. Eudin and North, Survey, pp. 382-83. 113. North and Eudin, M . N . Roy’s Mission, p . 376. 114. Ibid., pp. 323, 330. Several years later, Roy still believed that “the Communist Party could not [have] broken with the Kuomintang, subjected as i t was to attack b y imperialism and native reaction. I t would have resulted i n confusion among the masses who still trusted the Kuomintang.” Ibid., p . 376. 115. Ibid., pp. 327-28. 116. Snow, R e d Star, p . 147.

Chapter 6 1. See forthcoming study of the Kuomintang, 1927-37, by Lloyd Eastman, entitled China’s Abortive Revolution. 2. The official figure for the CCP is 10,000, but other sources state that, of 20,000 nominal members, only about 4,000 were active. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 529; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 302; Roy, Revolution, p . 570; Chinese Studies in History, Summer, 1971, p . 247; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 101. 3.1bid., p . 100; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 112; Isaacs, Tragedy, pp. 114-15, 296; Wales, Labor, p . 72. L o Yi-nung said that, in Hupeh, some 90 per cent of the Communists had “fled” under Nationalist pressure, with many informing on their former comrades. H s i a o , Chinese Communism i n 1927, p . 127.

4. Wilbur, i n Lewis, ed., Party, pp. 47 and 68.

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5. A biographer of Ch’ii states that, at this time, he “was probably the most consistent and outspoken advocate” of the Comintern line. Yu-ning L i , Chil Ch’iu-pai, p . 153.

. Ch’i Ch’iu-pai, Revolution, pp. 65 ff.; Ts’ai Ho-sen, “History,” in Wang Chienmin, Draft History, vol. I , p . 498; Tso-liang Hsiao, “The Dispute over a Wuhan Insurrection i n 1927,” CQ, no. 33, p . 117; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 105; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 188; I s h i k a w a T a d a o , Chiigoku Kydsanto

shi kenkyii (Researches on the History of the CCP) (hereafter Ishikawa, Researches) (Tokyo, 1960), p . 110. Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 24, p . 94; North, Elites; and John Rue, M a o Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935 (hereafter, Rue, Mao-Tse-tung) (Stanford, Calif.,, 1966), p . 128, include Su Chao-cheng, P’eng P’ai, and Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) on the new Political Bureau. A recent Soviet source says Lominadze arrived i n China for the Party’s Fifth National Congress in April, 1927. A . M . Grigorev, “The Comintern and the Revolutionary Movement i n China Under the Slogan for Soviets,” i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 314. . Ts’ai Ho-sen i n Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, pp. 486-87; Roy Hofh e i n z , “ T h e A u t u m n H a r v e s t I n s u r r e c t i o n , ” C Q , n o . 3 2 , p . 40.

. As early as late 1926, there were proposals for a “revolutionary army.” Eudin and North, Survey, p . 292. . See Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, pp. 50-51; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 534; T’ien-wei W u , i n JAS, November, 1969, especially p . 139; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 10. Wilbur, in CQ, no. 18, p . 52. 11. I b i d . , pp. 35, 11, 46, 52; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12; Hsiieh, Leaders, pp. 441-42. There were similar reports of Lominadze canceling plans for insurrection i n Shanghai i n August. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 33, pp. 109 ff.; Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 83 fl. 12. Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p. 57; Wilbur, in CQ, no. 18, pp. 6, 22. I n late 1926, there were already about fifty Communists in Yeh Ting’s regiment. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12. 13. Reports of participants vary from 3,000 to 30,000, while some 5,000 under Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai broke with the rebels on reaching Chinhsien, Kiangsi. See Wilbur, i n CQ, no. 18, p . 33; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 12; Kuo, History, vol. I , p. 282; Brandt, Stalin’s Failure, p . 143; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 199-202; Jacques Guillermaz, Histoire d u Parti Communiste Chinois (hereafter, Guillermaz, Histoire) (Paris, 1968), pp. 152 ff.; and M . F. Yurev, Krasnaya armiya kitaya, 1927-1937 (The Chinese R e d Army) (hereafter, Yurev, Krasnaya armiya) (Mos-

cow, 1958), pp. 10 fi. 14. Leading proponents of the site as Hankow, although with ambiguities, are Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Revolution, pp. 66 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13; a n d B r a n d t , Stalin’s Failure, p . 150. For examples o f those stating K i u k i a n g ,

see H o Kan-chih, History, p . 183, and Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, p . 40. O n its fiftieth anniversary, the Party confirmed the site as Hankow. Peking Review, July 2, 1971, p . 7. 15. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13, i n Ming Pao, no. 27, p . 96; L i Ang, Hung-se wu-t'ai (Red Stage) (Chungking, 1942), pp. 19 f f . ; Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 33, pp. 108 ff.; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 110, 130. 16. A m o n g them were Ch’li Ch’iu-pai, T s ’ a i Ho-sen, L i Wei-han, Liu Shao-ch’i, Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Chung-fa, Wang Jo-fei, Teng Chung-hsia, and Su Chaocheng, the last two having returned from the Kiukiang-Nanchang area. P’eng Kung-ta and L o Yi-nung, secretaries, respectively, of the Hunan and Hupeh committees, and others who played important roles in future developments were also present.

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17. There is uncertainty over Ch’li’s exact title. Most describe him as general secretary, but official records do not give this designation. Ch’, Revolution, p. 65, says that, before the Conference, Chang Kuo-t’ao, L i Wei-han, L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, and Chang T’ai-lei had formed a provisional central committee. K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 287, says Ch’ii, L i W e i - h a n , a n d others organized a n

interim standing committee. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13, i n Ming Pao,

no. 27, p. 96, adds Lu Fu-t’an t o the new Politburo and says Su Chao-cheng became secretary before being replaced by Ch’li Ch’iu-pai because of illness. L i Ang, who is a doubtful source, says that L i u Shao-ch’i became secretary. Yu-ning Li, CRh’ii Ch’iu-pai, p. 244, includes also Ts’ai Ho-sen, L o Yi-nung, and P’eng P’ai. Jerome C h ’ e n , r e v i e w i n Pacific Affairs, W i n t e r , 1968-69, p . 585, gives a still d i f -

ferent list of the Political Bureau chosen at the August 7 conference, excluding L i Wei-han, L i Li-san, Chou En-lai, Chang T’ai-lei, Hsiang Ying, Mao Tsetung, and L i u Shao-ch’i, and including Ts’ai Ho-sen, Yang Chih-hua (Madame Ch’ii C h ’ i u - p a i ) , a n d Jen Pi-shih. There i s also c o n f u s i o n as t o which o f these m e n

were alternates and which were f u l l members. A recent study states that Chou En-lai was criticized and dropped from the Political Bureau until being restored at the November plenum. L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai (Taipei, 1971), p . 113. 18. See Ch’ii’s “Superfluous W o r d s , ” c i t e d i n K u o , History, v o l . I I I , p p . 5 4 fI.; cf.

Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, Revolution, passim; also Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p p . 503, 530, 533; a n d Tso-liang H s i a o , “Chinese C o m m u n i s m a n d t h e C a n t o n

Soviet of 1927,” CQ, no. 30, p . 53. 19. K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 458. 20. Ibid., pp. 458, 460, 468-70; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , p . 529. 21. Kai-yu Hsii, Chou En-lai, p. 77. 22, Kuo, History, vol. I , p. 462; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 529 ff. 23. Brandt, e t al., eds., Documentary History, p . 117. C f . E u d i n a n d North, Survey, pp. 380 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, ch. 13, and i n Ming Pao, no. 27, p . 96. 24, Eudin and North, Survey, p . 383. Cf. ibid., pp. 374, 377, 382. 25. Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 279; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 109, 114; Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 94; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 6-7. 26. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 102-3. 27. I b i d . , p . 114. C f . K u o , History, v o l . I , p . 469. 28. Ibid., p . 293; and Wilbur i n CQ, no. 18, p . 22. 29. Kuo, History, vol. 1, pp. 446-47. 30. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 106-9. 31. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 444, 452. 32. Ibid., p . 445. 33. Ibid., p . 449. 34. Wilbur, i n C Q , n o . 18, p p . 1 6 - 1 7 , 4 1 , 47, 50, 5 1 ; E t o , i n C Q , n o . 9 , p . 164; L i Ang, Red Stage, pp. 35-36; Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 47, 88 fi. 35. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 109, 122. 36. W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . I , p p . 5 2 6 - 2 8 ; a n d H s i a o , Chinese Communism in 1927, p . 44. 37. Kuo, History, v o l . I , p p . 450-51, 4 5 3 - 5 5 . C f . B r a n d t et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 122. 38. K u o , History, v o l . 1, p . 293; W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . 1, p . 554; Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, p . 46. 39. H s i a o , Chinese Communism i n 1927, passim; K u o , History, v o l . 1, p p . 4 6 2 - 6 7 ; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 192; Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 30, pp. 56, 62; Hofheinz, i n C Q , no. 32, p p . 4 1 4 2 .

40. Hofheinz, in CQ, no. 32, p . 66; Schram, “ O n the Nature of Mao Tse-tung’s ‘Deviation’ i n 1927,” CQ, no. 18, pp. 63-64; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 108 ff.; Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 48 ff.; Rue, Mao Tse-tung, p p . 77 ff.; Shanti

o48

Notes for Chapter 6

Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-1934 (London, 1966), p . 88. 41. Cf. Hsiao, “Chinese Communism and the Canton Soviet of 1927,” Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 109 ff. 42. Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 463; and Hofheinz, in CQ, no. 32, pp. 50, 65-66. 43. Hofheinz, in CQ, no. 32, pp. 66, 83. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., and pp. 51, 80; Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 62 ff. 46. Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 67 ff.; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, pp. 19, 21-22. 47. Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York, 1938), p . 150; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 132. 48. According to Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Mao was one of the Party leaders who most stressed the necessity for seizing cities. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 323, 480. See also Stuart Schram, “ O n the Nature of Mao Tse-tung’s Deviation in 1927,” CQ, no. 18, pp. 55 fl.; and his Mao Tse-tung, p . 112. 49. A certain Comrade Ma, probably a Russian assigned to assist with the uprising, promptly wrote to the Central Committee charging that only the “cowardice” of the Hunan Committee caused the September 15 cancellation of orders to attack Changsha. Party Central fired back a letter on September 19 ordering the continuation of attacks and the rebuke of Mao and others. The Hunan Committee, for its part, felt that Comrade M a was only a “bookish student [ w h o ] doesn’t understand anything about this,” while Central sent one Jen (Pi-shih?) to Hunan to look into the situation and execute its original plan. L u Te-ming’s deputy, Yii Shai-tu, and others on the Hunan Front Committee argued that Central’s wishes must be obeyed. See Hofheinz, in CQ, no. 32, pp. 6 7 ff., 7 6 , 7 8 ; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 114; Rue, M a o Tse-tung, p . 8 4 ; Snow,

Red Star, p . 150; Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 30, p . 57; and Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 72 fI. 50. Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 7 ff. 51. After a n ambush a t L u h s i , which resulted i n the death o f L u Te-ming, a n over-

praised hero of the uprising, and others, Mao’s unit was designated the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division, and later the 31st Regiment. Future chief of staff Huang Yung-sheng, L o Jung-huan, and H o Ch’ang-kung were among those who joined Mao’s group about this time. Hofheinz, i n CQ, no. 32, pp. 67 ff. 52. L i Wei, Chingkangshan (The Chingkang Mountains) (Shanghai, 1957), passim; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, p . 23; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p . 130. 53. See Chapter 3 and this chapter below; and Chin-tai-shih Tzu-liao (Materials on Modern History) (Peking, 1955), vol. I , pp. 179 fi. 54. Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, p . 25; Eto, in C Q , no. 9, passim; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p . 40. 55. Ch’ti Ch’iu-pai, “ T h e Past a n d Future o f the C C P , ” trans. i n Chinese Studies i n History, Fall, 1971, p p . 4 4 ff.; K u o , History, v o l . I , p p . 294, 475; Jerome C h ’ e n ,

ed., Mao, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969), p . 133; and L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 114.

56. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 33, pp. 108 ff.; and Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, p. 127. 57. Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 472 ff.; and vol. I I , pp. 58, 61; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 488; Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 33, p p . 108 ff.

58. Kuo, History, vol. 1, pp. 475-76, and Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, p . 79. P’eng Kung-ta was then secretary of the Hunan Committee. 59. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13, and in Ming Pao, no. 27, passim. 60. Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 123 fi. 61. Although such collaboration was authorized under certain conditions. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 30, p . 62.

Notes for Chapter 6

549

62. Ibid., p . 64; Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 300; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 281; Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 320.

63. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 532. 64. Kuo, History, vol. I , pp. 300-301. Cf. Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 112 ff. 65. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 33, pp. 114, 119, 122; Kuo, History, vol. I , p. 486. 66. Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 302; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 528. 67. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 30, pp. 60, 63-64; and in CQ, no. 33, p . 122; Wang Chienmin, Draft History, vol. 1, p . 528. 68. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 30, p . 61. 69. Roy, Revolution, p . 557. 70. H s i a o , i n C Q , n o . 3 0 , p p . 7 3 , 77. B o t h Lominadze a n d N e u m a n n h a d been leaders o f the Y o u t h International (founded 1919) and were victims o f the

Stalinist purges. 71. Ibid., no. 33, p . 109; Chang Kuo-t’ao, ch. 13, and in Ming Pao, no. 27, p . 97. Chang described Neumann as even more of a “madman” than Lominadze. 72. Roy, Revolution, p . 559. 73. L i Ang, Red Stage, pp. 42-44. Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 30, pp. 72, 74. 74. Hsiao, in CQ, no. 30, pp. 68-69. . Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 304; Isaacs, Tragedy, 285 fi.; Jerome Ch’en, M a o Tsetung, p . 137; Hsiao, i n C Q , no. 3 0 , passim.

76. Hsiao, i n CQ, no. 30, p . 70. The chairman of the Canton Soviet Council, Su Chaocheng, was still in Wuhan investigating the failure of the abortive Wuhan insurrection planned for November 13, and Yeh T’ing, who was supposed to be i n charge of rebel military forces, arrived only six hours before the insurrection began. P’eng P’ai also failed to arrive before December 13. Yiin Tai-ying, Teng Chung-hsia, Teng Fa, and Ch’en Yiin were among other participants in the affair. 77. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 562, 574; Ishikawa, Researches, p. 123; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 306. 78. Yeh T’ing, cited i n Roy, Revolution, p . 558. H o Kan-chih, History, p . 185, however, claimed the support of some 60,000 “volunteers,” 8,000 of whom were later killed in retaliation. 79. K i m San and N y m Wales, Song of Ariran: The Life Story of a Korean Rebel (hereafter, K i m San a n d Wales, Song) ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 1 ) , p . 107.

80. E t o , i n C Q , n o . 9 , p p . 169, 167. C f . C h a n g T’ai-lei statement cited b y Wilbur, i n CQ, no. 18, p . 37. 81. Eto, i n CQ, no. 9, p . 171; Kuo, History, vol. I , p . 296, and vol. I I , p . 297; Hsiao, i n C Q , no. 30, p . 94.

82. Kuo, History, vol. 1, pp. 474, 476. 83. Wilbur, i n CQ, no. 81, p. 19; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I , pp. 543-44; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 118-19. . I n Yichang County. . Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 481. Cf. Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, passim; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim. . K u o , History, v o l . 1, p . 483. . I b i d . , p p . 483-85.

.1bid., p . 486. . I b i d . , p . 487. . I b i d . , p . 485, and vol. 11, pp. 38-41; cf. Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, passim. .Rue, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 86-87; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, pp. 32-33; Kuo, History, vol. I l , pp. 11-12; C. T . Hsiieh and R . North, trans., “The Founding of the Chinese Red Army,” i n E . S. Kirby, ed., Contemporary China (Hong Kong, 1962-64), vol. VI, pp. 59 fi. 92. See Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 73, 97; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 120-21; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 141-43; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, pp. 149 ff.

530

Notes for Chapter 7

93. Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, p . 3 8 ; K u o , History, vol. I I , p . 2 0 ff.; Rue, M a o Tsetung, p p . 9 8 , 106.

94. Mao, SW, vol. 1, pp. 73, 96; Richard C. Thornton, “The Emergence of a New Comintern Strategy for China: 1928,” i n M . M . Drachkovitch and B. Lazitch, eds., The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Essays, Recollections, Documents (New York, 1966), pp. 80-81. 95. See Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 73, 81, 92, 305-6; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, pp. 38, 54; and Ch’en Ch’eng Collection, also called the Shih-sou Collection, (Taipei, 1960) (microfilmed for the Hoover Institution i n twenty-one reels; Stanford, Calif. 1966), Reel 8. See T’ien-wei Wu, “ T h e Kiangsi Soviet Period: A Bibliographical Review on the Ch’en Ch’eng Collection,” i n JAS, February, 1970, for analysis of the latter. 96. Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, p . 38. 97. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 105 ff. Cf. ibid., vol. 11, p . 272; Schram, Political Thought, pp. 268 fi.; and Harrison, Rebellions, pp. 221 fI. 98. Ibid., vol. I V (Peking ed.), p . 156; S. B. Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (hereafter, Griffith, Army) (New York, 1967), p . 30. 99. For an example of these techniques, see Yang Shang-kuei, The Red KiangsiKwangtung Border Region (hereafter, Border Region) (Peking, 1961); and see this chapter below and Chapter 9 below. 100. Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p . 132. 101. H s a i o Tso-liang, T h e L a n d Revolution i n China, 1930-34 (hereafter, Hsiao, Land Revolution) (Seattle, 1969), pp. 291-95; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 119,

125; and Mao, SW, vol. I , p. 73. 102. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 16. 103. M a o , S W , v o l . I , p . 99. 104. Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, pp. 85, 90-91; Robert McColl, “ T h e Oyiiwan Soviet Area, 1927-1932,” JAS, November, 1967, pp. 46 fi. 105. Maoist accounts of the Cultural Revolution i n the late 1960’s charged that P’eng had lagged behind and even opposed other Communists in initiating the P’ingchiang revolt. See Union Research Institute, ed., The Case of P’eng Tehhuai (hereafter, URI, ed., P’eng Teh-huai) (Hong Kong, 1968), p . 185.

[a]

Chapter 7 . Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 223; Yakhontof, Soviets, p . 78; Ch’en Ch’eng Collection, Reel 2. . Estimates of the percentage of proletarians among Party members varied from 2 per cent to 5.5 per cent to 8 per cent. See Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 206; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 125; North, Moscow, p . 132; Communism in China, Document A (no city given, 1932), p . 16. . Wilbur, i n Lewis, ed., Party, pp. 46 ff. O f the 121, 7 defected or went into opposition; 4 died a natural death; 1 was “exiled” to Moscow; and the fates of the remaining 41 as of 1936 are unknown. About half of the top Communist leaders came from the central Yangtze provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Szechwan, almost one-third from Mao’s province alone. But nearly all studied or taught i n the relatively modernized towns of Changsha, Wuhan, Shanghai, Peking, or abroad, and hence were “intellectuals.” Their median age in 1928 was slightly under twenty-seven. . K i m San and Wales, Song, p. 39. The Korean’s real role in China is unclear, but this statement is entirely believable. . Cf. Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 8 ) .

.See chapter on “Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai: The Making and Destruction of a TenderHearted Communist,” i n T . A . H s i a , T h e Gate o f Darkness (hereafter, Hsia,

Gate) (Seattle, 1968). Cf. Kuo, History, vol. II, pp. 95 fi.

Notes for Chapter 7

551

7. Including one of the Party’s founders, Ch’en Kung-po. 8. According to a recent study, about one-half of the more than 500 Chinese students i n Moscow about this time supported the Trotskyist opposition. Many of these returned to China during 1929-30, while many others remained i n Russia and were “persuaded” by various means, including jail terms, to renounce Trotskyism. See Richard Kagan, “ T h e Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch’en Tu-hsiu” (hereafter, Kagan, “Trotskyist Movement”) (unpublished University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. dissertation, 1969), p . 68; Yueh Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University i n Moscow a n d the Chinese R e v o l u t i o n : A Personal Account (hereafter,

Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University) (Lawrence, Kansas, 1972), pp. 164 ff. . Cf. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 2 and 100; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p p . 73 ff., 149 ff., 165, 187 ff., 218 ff., 233 ff., 276 ff.; C h a n g Kuo-t’ao A u t o -

Pomb

biography, passim; K l e i n and Clark, Dictionary. 10. Cf. The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department (Washington, D.C., July, 1945), reissued and edited by Lyman Van Slyke (Stanford, Calif., 1968), pp. 59 ff. 1 . See Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 140-66; and Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (hereafter, Ch’ien, Government) (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 5 0 ) , passim.

12. Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny, pp. 44, 105. 13. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 147; John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-37 (hereafter, Israel, Student) (Stanford, Calif., 1966), p . 103. 14. Wilbur, in Lewis ed., Party, pp. 50, 68. 15. Additional sources of revenue were plunder, ransom, and robberies. Hsiang Chung-fa, cited in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 162 ff. A Nationalist source commenting on the arrest i n 1931 of the Comintern agents known as the Noulens couple states that the Comintern was spending $130,000 (Chinese) a month for all of the Far East (Tang Leang-li, Suppressing, p . 72), while S n o w , R e d Star, p . 379, speaks o f expenses o f $15,000 (U.S.) for a l l o f the Orient. H s i a n g Chung-fa’s testimony o f $15,000 (U.S.) a m o n t h for C h i n a seems m o r e

likely. Chang Kuo-t’ao speaks of the importance of Comintern funds, stating that this was a principal consideration i n preventing his open break w i t h Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai in late 1927 when Chang threatened to form a rival “worker-peasant party.” Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13, in Ming Pao, no. 28, p . 74. See also Chapter 2 of this book. 16. Kuo, History, vol. 11, p p . 53, 101. 17. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 14, in Ming Pao, no. 33, p . 78, and interview i n Hong Kong, August 21, 1968. Chang identified the two Germans as A i W e i E r h T ’ e ( G e r h a r t Eisler?) a n d H e i K ’ o E r h T ’ e ( H e c k e r t ? ) . E i s l e r w a s

i n China at the time. See Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings Before the Committee o n the Judiciary o f the U.S. Senate (Washington, D . C . , 1 9 5 1 ) , Part

I , p . 256. 18. See Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 166; S n o w , R e d Star, p . 381; Charles McLane, Soviet Policy a n d the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946

(hereafter, McLane,

Soviet Policy) (New York, 1958), p . 10; URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, pp. 188-89; and Nollau, Communism, p . 142. 19. Thornton, i n Drachkovitch and Lazitch, eds., T h e Comintern, p p . 68 ff.; 84-85. 20. Xenia Eudin and R . M . Slusser, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents a n d Materials (hereafter, E u d i n a n d Slusser, Materials) (University Park,

Pa., 1967), p . 83. 21. Ibid., p . 86. 22. Klein a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; a n d Ch’en Po-ta, O n the T e n Year Civil War, 1927-1937 (Peking, 1966), pp. 97-99. 23. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 13, i n Ming Pao, no. 28, p . 74. 24. Chu Teh was not elected to the Central Committee until 1930. For a partial

532

Notes for Chapter 7 list of membership of the Sixth Central Committee, see Wang Chien-min, Draft

History, vol. 11, p. 3. 25. Among representatives from Sun Yat-sen University were, Ch’en Shao-yii (Wang M i n g ) , Shen Tse-min, and others of the “twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” who dominated the Central Committee i n the early 1930’s. I n late August, Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai told the Sixth Congress of the Communist International that there were more than 100,000 members, but this, like Mao’s claim of 10,000 in the Chingkangshan area about that time, must have resulted from simply adding all members of soviets into the Party. Ch’li admitted as much i n the same speech. See Thornton in Drachkovitch and Lazitch, eds., The Comintern, pp. 80-81; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 186 ff. 26. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 14, i n Ming Pao, no. 29, pp. 98-99; Tso-liang Hsiao, Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934 (hereafter, Hsiao, Power Relations) (Seattle, 1961), p . 61; and Richard C. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931 (hereafter, Thornton, Comintern) (Seattle, 1969), p . 64. 27. Hsiang Ying probably replaced L o Yi-nung as secretary of the regional bureau centered i n Shanghai. Some sources list L i Li-san as director of organization, Ts’ai Ho-sen as director of propaganda, and Hsiang Ying as director of labor. Japanese sources state t h a t C h o u En-lai was director o f organization, l a t e r

replaced by Li Wei-han; L i u Shao-ch’i was director of the Central Committee’s labor department; P’eng P’ai, later replaced by L o Ch’i-yiian, headed the peasant department. L o Teng-hsien, who according to some reports was added to the Political Bureau, later replaced Hsiang Ying as secretary of the regional bureau i n Shanghai. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 3; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 34-35. 28. For the Chinese text, see Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 28-35. For the English, see Paul Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek: A Political Study (hereafter, Linebarger, Chiang Kai-shek) (Boston, 1941), pp. 359-70. 29. B r a n d t e t al., eds., Documentary History, p p . 129, 130, 131. Later Maoist interpretations credited the Sixth Congress resolutions with being basically correct but criticized their inflexibility in dealing w i t h the bourgeoisie, a part of which might still have supported the revolution. But the Congress held out some hope of working w i t h a part of the petty bourgeoisie (ibid., p . 147). Similarly, where the Maoists later criticized the Congress’s failure to see the protracted nature of the struggle, which failure supposedly opened the way to renewed putschism i n 1930, the political resolution i n fact warned against excessive leftism and stressed the building of the Red Armies, guerrilla warfare, and rural soviets.

See Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 176 fl. 30. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 131-32, 143-44, 154. 31. Ibid., p p . 161-62. 32. Ibid., pp. 146, 148, 162, 126, 158, 140-48; and cf. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, pp. 128-29. 33. Brandt et al., eds. Documentary History, pp. 143-48. 34. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; International Press Correspondence (hereafter, Inprecor) (Moscow, August 18, 1928), cited in Chinese Studies in History, Summer, 1971, p . 247. 35. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 14, i n Ming Pao, no. 33, pp. 76, 78. From mid-1929 on, Chou En-lai supposedly also came to oppose L i and may have gone t o M o s c o w t o w a r d that e n d a b o u t April, 1930. I b i d . ; Hsiang Chung-fa, i n

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 159; and Grigorev, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 325. Yii Fei and Huang P’ing also opposed L i Li-san as representatives to the Comintern in these years.

Notes for Chapter 7

533

36. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 37, 159; and Thornton, Comintern, passim. 37. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 52, 96 ff. 38. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Su-wei-ai chih Chien-li chi Ch’i Peng-k’'uei (The Rise and Fall of the Kiangsi Soviet) (hereafter, Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet) (Taipei, 1969), pp. 395, 408. 39. The Kiangsu provincial secretary then was Central Committee man Hsii Hsik e n , n o w i n T a i w a n . See Thornton, Comintern, p p . 68-74.

40. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 132. 41. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, no. 35, p . 98; Jen-min Jih-pao (People’s Daily) (hereafter, M J P ) , June 28, 1961; and Hsii Kwan-san, “ L i u Shao-ch’i and Mao Tse-tung (1922-1947),” Chinese L a w and Government (hereafter, C L G ) , I I I , 2 and 3 (Summer-Fall, 1970), 214 ff. H o Ch’ang, Chang Chao-feng (executed October, 1930), and Ch’en Yiian-tao were successive directors of Party work i n North China. Liu Shao-ch’i worked briefly on the Hopeh a n d Manchurian committees, circa 1929-31.

42. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 166-67, 488; Kuo, History, vol. II, pp. 59-62; and Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 436. 43. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 137. 44. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 102, 96 fi. 45. Eudin and Slusser, Materials, p . 265; T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing, p . 73; Wales, Labor, p . 71, 165. 46. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 201; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 55, 118; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 85, 111-12; William Dorrill, “Transfer of Legitimacy i n the CCP: Origins of the Maoist Myth,” CQ, no. 36, pp. 49-50; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 206; Roy, Revolution, p . 567; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 148-49; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 223; M i f , Heroic China, p . 71; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 176 fl.; Ti-erh-tz’u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chancheng Shih-ch’i t i Kung-jen Yiin-tung (The Labor Movement in the Period of the Second Revolutionary War) (hereafter, Ti-erh-tz’u Shih-ch’i ti Kung-jen) (Peking, 1953) ; and Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (hereafter, V a n Slyke, Enemies) (Stanford, Calif.,

1967), p . 37. The National General Labor Union elected Hsiang Ying chairman at its Fifth Congress. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. There were only seven Communists in Hangchow i n early 1928 according to Li T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 114. 47. Wales, Labor, pp. 69, 71. 48. Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 97. Cf. Chang Kuo-t’ao, ch. 14, and in Ming Pao, no. 33, pp. 76 fi. 49. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 56, 95-102; and Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p p . 168-69, 172-73.

50. See Mao’s “ A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” originally a letter to the twenty-three-year-old Lin Piao, SW, vol. I , p . 128, and see this chapter below. 51. Kuo, History, vol. 11, p p . 96-97. 52. Ibid., p . 97; and Brandt et al. eds., Documentary History, pp. 172-73, 175-76. 53. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 167, 172; and Eudin and Slusser, Materials, p . 184.

54. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 55. C. T . Hsueh and Robert North, trans. “The Founding of the Chinese Red

Army,” in E. S. Kirby, ed., Contemporary China (Hong Kong; 1962-64), vol. VI, passim; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, passim; Mif, Heroic China, passim. 56. Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 127; Rue, Mao Tse-tung, p . 140 ff.; and Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 150. 57. Mao, SW, vol. I , p . 122.

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Notes for Chapter 8

58. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 129; Rue, Mao Tse-tung, p . 151; and URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 32. According to the latter, Party Central rejected Mao’s plan t o establish a n e w base i n northwestern Kiangsi.

59. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 105-15; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 130. 60. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 125, 127; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 213; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, ch. 14, and i n Ming Pao, no. 33, pp. 77-78.

Chapter 8

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XN

1. Kagan, “Trotskyist Movement,” passim; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 435 ff.; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 164 fi. . Cited in Thornton, Comintern, pp. 98, 99. . I b i d . , p . 100. . Ibid., pp. 82-83, 99; and Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 3-5. . Thornton, Comintern, p . 105. . North, Moscow, p . 132. . Thornton, Comintern, pp. 109 ff. . I b i d . , p . 112; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 109 ff.; Grigorev, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 328 fl. . Thornton, Comintern, pp. 112, 115; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 110-12, 10. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 112, 39-40. 11. M a o , S W , vol. I , p p . 122, 128. 12. Ibid., pp. 122-23. 13. Cited in Schwartz, Rise of Mao, p . 145. Cf. p . 137. 14. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 123-24. Later, Mao tried to distinguish his and Li’s policies (see ibid., pp. 240-41), but Soviet sources now argue also that Mao was a principal supporter of the Li Li-san line. See Grigorev in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p p . 325, 332-33.

15. Smedley, The Great Road, p . 274; Mao, SW, vol. I , p . 117. 16. Ch’en Shao-yii, (Wang M i n g ) , Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po K u ) , and others of the “Russian returned students” group later claimed they had opposed the June resolution of the Central Committee. According to a Japanese source, opponents centered within the propaganda and labor departments hastily convened a central workers’ conference in late June to criticize the L i Li-san leadership. Otsuka Reizo, Shina Kyosanto Shi (History of the CCP) (hereafter, Otsuka, History) (Tokyo, 1940), pp. 53 fI., states that Li was able to override this opposition through the support of Hsiang Chung-fa, Hsiang Ying, and others. However, in fact, Ch’en Shao-yii had urged a virtual replica of the “ L i Li-san line,” including the use of the Red Army, two years earlier (Schwartz, Rise of Mao, pp. 149-50), and just a month before the June resolution he had written, “Only those who are willing to protect the militarists, and the liquidationists who basically oppose armed uprisings can scold the CCP for preparing armed uprisings to seize power or term these actions adventurism....” I n Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o (Bolshevik), May 10, 1930, p . 93. I t is true that L i later admitted that he had kept Ch’en under surveillance during the summer and had exiled him from Shanghai i n the autumn, but, i n view of Ch’en’s earlier public statements and the subsequent policies of the “returned students,” Ch’en’s group can hardly have formed a consistent opposition. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, n o . 35, p p . 96-97; J. P . H a r r i s o n , “ T h e L i Li-san L i n e a n d the

CCP i n 1930,” CQ, nos. 14 and 15, passim; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 216 ff. 17. See L i Li-san i n Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o, M a y 10, 1931, p . 6 ; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 94; Yakhontof, Soviets, p . 422; Dimitri Manuilsky, The Communist Parties and the Crisis of Capitalism (Moscow, 1931), pp. 58 ff.; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 118 ff.; and Grigorev, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 330-31. Ac-

Notes for Chapter 8

5551

cording to this source, L i argued that i t would be good i f the Chinese revolution drew i n England and Japan as well, thereby igniting a world revolutionary holocaust. Chang Kuo-t’ao confirms Comintern alarm over this. Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, no. 35, p . 96. 18. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 14, i n Ming Pao, no. 33, pp. 78-79, and Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p p . 330-31. However, Grigorev

acknowledges that the Dalburo did not take decisive action against L i Li-san until after June 11. 19. Inprecor, vol. X , 1930, p . 294.

20. I b i d . , p . 348. 21. Ibid., p . 595. 22. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 197. 23. See Snow, Red Star, pp. 180-81. Mao’s attack on Chian i n early October also shows his willingness to attack towns. 24, See Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 329; and Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927, p . 59n. 25. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 207, 219. 26. Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 4 and 8 ff.; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 19. 27. Hsaio, Power Relations, p. 41. 28. Ibid., p . 132; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 159; and Thornton, Comintern, pp. 117 ff. L i sent one Ta Lin-p’i (pseudonym?) to the Yangtze Bureau, L i Wei-han to the regional bureau i n Shanghai, and H o Ch’ang to the North China Bureau. 29. Thornton, Comintern, pp. 165 fI.; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 94; Chang Kuot’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, in Ming Pao, no. 35, pp. 96-97. 30. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p p . 184 ff., 191; Ch’en Shao-yii ( W a n g M i n g ) , Liang-t’iao Chan-hsien ( T h e T w o Battle Lines) ( n o c i t y cited, 1 9 3 1 ) , p .

19; Snow, Random Notes, p . 16; Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 330 fi. 31. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 194-95. 32. Wales, Red Dust, pp. 123, 129; L i Ang, Red Stage, p. 93. Cf. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 141 ff, and i n JMJP, June 28, 1961. Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang chih T’ou-shih, pp. 132 and 217, states that Party membership i n Shanghai had fallen from 3,000 members to 700 as a result of the L i Li-san line and later to about 383 members. 33. T . Kara-Murza, ed., Strategiya i taktika v natsionalno kolonialnoi revolutsii na primere, kitaya (Strategy and Tactics in the National, Colonial Revolution: For Example, China)

(hereafter, Kara-Murza, Strategy)

(Moscow, 1 9 3 4 ) , p . 276;

Hatano Kenichi, Shina Kyosanto Shi (History of the CCP) (hereafter, Hatano, History) (Tokyo, 1 9 3 2 ) , p p . 509-10.

34. Roy, Revolution, p . 623. 35. Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 335 ff., 343; Kara-Murza, Strategy, pp. 285 ff.; cf. Chou En-lai’s report to the Third Plenum, i n Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 201.

36. Smedley, Great Road, p . 281. C f . M a o ’ s similar statement t o Snow, R e d Star, p . 178; a n d URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 32.

37. H a t a n o , History, p p . 5 1 0 - 1 1 ; N o r t h , Moscow, p . 137; a n d Grigorev, i n Delyus i n et al., eds., Comintern, p . 332.

38. T h e N e w York Times, July 6 , 1930. 39. P. Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 334-35. 40. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 25-26; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 168 ff.; Eudin a n d Slusser, Materials, p . 272.

41. See below this chapter; Chang Kuo-t’ao Autobiography, ch. 14, in Ming Pao, no. 33; Thornton, Comintern, p . 159n. 42. Smedley, Great Road, p . 151; L i Kuang, Chung-kuo Hsin-chiin-tui (China’s N e w

556

Notes for Chapter 8

Army) (hereafter, Li Kuang, N e w Army) (Soviet Union, 1936), p . 113; Pu-erhsai-wei-k’o, May 10, 1931, pp. 57 ff.; and Roy, Revolution, p . 625. 43. Agnes Smedley, China’s Red Army Marches (New York, 1934), pp. 151-52; Wales, Red Dust, p. 79. Wang Shou-tao was acting chairman of the HunanHupeh-Kiangsi Soviet government, and there were many reports that L i Li-san had left Shanghai to take u p his position as chairman. 44, Roy, Revolution, p . 623 ff.; Snow, Red Star, p . 161; and Inprecor, vol. X , 1930, p . 698. 45. The Communist International, October, 1931, p . 527. 46. Smedley, Great Road, p . 277; N y m Wales, Inside Red China (hereafter, Wales, Inside) (New York, 1939), p . 249; Snow, Red Star, p . 161. 47. Snow, Red Star, p . 161. 48. Ibid., pp. 159-60. 49. Smedley, Great Road, p . 278; and URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 32. 50. Heinz Neumann, Preface to The Armed Insurrection, dated 1931, trans. i n U.S. House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 2d sess., “The Communist Conspiracy, Strategy and Tactics of World Communism,” part 1, section D , House Report n o . 2243 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C , 1 9 5 6 ) .

51. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. 1, p . 167. 52. The New York Times, August 5, 1930. 53. Ch’en Shao-yii, Liang-t’iao Chan-hsien, pp. 62, 92; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 263; Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o, M a y 10, 1931, p . 3 4 ; a n d Grigorev, i n Delyusin e t al.,

eds.,

Comintern, p . 337. 54. See Derek Waller, “ T h e First and Second National Congresses of the Chinese Soviet R e p u b l i c , 1931 a n d 1934,” (hereafter, Waller, “Congresses”)

(unpub-

lished University of London Ph.D. dissertation, 1968); Hsiao, Power Relations, passim; and Land Revolution, passim. 55. Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al.,, eds., Comintern, pp. 334-38, 341-42; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 175 fi. 56. Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o, May 10, 1931, p. 57; cf. Thornton, Comintern, p . 178. 57. Smedley, Great Road, p . 279. 58. Ibid.; L i Kuang, New Army, pp. 119-20. 59. Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 332-33, 337, Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 134-35. But Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 99, etc., argues that Mao opposed the attack on Nanchang and Kiukiang. 60. Snow, R e d Star, p . 162. 61. Ch’en Shao-yii, Liang-t’iao Chan-hsien, pp. 82-83. A t least one “returned student” highly praised Li Li-san several years later. Wales, Red Dust, p . 84. Cf. Snow, Random Notes, p . 16, and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 228 fi. 62. M a o , S W , vol. I V , p p . 180, 192. 63. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, no. 35, p . 98; Thornton, Comintern, p p . 137, 147-48, 1 8 3 - 8 4 ; H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 5 0 fi.

64. H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 53, 56, 60-61, 6 5 ; C h a n g Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, no. 35, pp. 96-98. 65. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 58-59; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 58, 159. 66. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 202-3. 67. Ibid., p . 202. 68. Ibid., pp. 200 ff. 69. The Third Plenum obviously compromised over the “ L i Li-san line,” but there is controversy over just what this meant i n practice. Many scholars note a continuation of features of essential policies, notably the taking of Chian i n October. Others believe that the main elements of the L i Li-san line were ended at the Third Plenum, even though, on the surface, things were smoothed over.

Notes for Chapter 8

8557

Thus, the action committees were abolished, although this was not completed i n the provinces until early 1931, when the Central Bureau for Soviet Areas was established i n place of the Southwest Kiangsi Action Committee. The Third Plenum had already called for the establishment of the Central Bureau, however. Thus, the Third Plenum tried to have i t both ways, saying there was no conflict with the new Comintern policy (which the Comintern tried to make look like its old policy) but i n effect toned down Li’s policies both organizationally and i n terms of limiting attacks to more manageable targets, such as Chian. For the former views, see Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 134 ff., 180 ff., Rue, M a o Tse-tung, p p . 218 ff. F o r the l a t t e r , see H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 7 5 , 99,

170, etc.; Wang et al., Brief History, p. 132; and H o Kan-chih, History, p . 210. 70. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 76-77; Eudin and Slusser, Materials, pp. 59 fi.; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 124 ff.; and Grigorev, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 344.

71. Thornton, Comintern, pp. 200 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 14, i n Ming Pao, no. 33, p . 81. 72. The Communist International, March 1, 1931, p . 166. 73. I n Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o, M a y 10, 1931, p . 39. 74. Ibid., p . 14. For the 1956 quote, see Eighth National Congress of the CCP (Peking, 1956), vol. I , p. 410. Li remained nominally on the Central Committee until reportedly committing suicide during the Cultural Revolution. 75. I n Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o, May 10, 1931, pp. 3-11. 76. Ibid., pp. 11 and 56; cf. Ch’en Shao’yii (Wang M i n g ) , i n Revolutsionny Vostok (Revolutionary East), vols. I I I - I V (Soviet U n i o n , 1 9 3 2 ) , p . 158; H s i a o , Power

Relations, pp. 80, 86, 94; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 125 fi. 77. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 173 ff.; Thornton, Comintern, pp. 210 ff. There were also reports of attacks on Li by Shen Tse-min and others at a Party meeting on November 1. 78. K u o , History, vol. 11, p p . 178, 197. 79. Ibid., p . 178, Vidnye Sovetskiye Kommunisty, p . 93. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, in Ming Pao, no. 35, p . 97, and most other sources state incorrectly that M i f arrived i n China earlier, possibly by the middle of the year. 80. Thornton, Comintern, p . 201; H s i a o , Power Relations, p . 6 8 ; K u o , History, v o l . I I , pp. 194 ff.; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 216 ff. 81. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 178 ff., 203 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. II, p . 97; and Thornton, Comintern, pp. 213 fi. 82. Thornton, Comintern; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 204, 268—69n. 83. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 212 f . , 232 ff., 252 ff., Thornton, Comintern, pp. 213 fI.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 465; Rue, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 242 ff. L i Wei-han and Kuan Hsiang-ying were prominent supporters of Li Li-san who were temporarily dropped from the new Central Committee. See T’ien-wei Wu, “The Tsunyi Conference, Reinterpreted” (unpublished paper, 1972). 84. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 233 ff.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. . Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, in Ming Pao, no. 34, p . 81, and i n interview i n Hong Kong, August 23, 1968. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 213 ff., also appears to doubt such a “betrayal,” but prevalent rumors assumed that there had been ‘“betrayal.” See Yang Tzu-lieh, “Chang Kuo-t’ao Fu-jen Hui-yi L u ” (“Memoirs of Madame Chang Kuo-t’ao”) (hereafter, Yang Tzu-lieh, “Memoirs”), in Chan Wang (Outlook) (Hong Kong), no. 174, May 1, 1969, p . 32; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 128, 130; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 96, 99, 127; H s i a , Gate, p p . 163 ff.

86. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 219 ff.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. K’o Ch’ing-shih and Ch’en Yii were among important future leaders then in Shanghai who resumed support of Party Central.

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Notes for Chapter 9

87. Wellington Koo, “Memorandum on Communism i n China” (Peking, July, 1932), in Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission (hereafter, Koo, “Memor a n d u m ” ) ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 2 ) ; a n d K i m S a n a n d Wales, Song, passim.

Chapter 9 1. Some sources even speak of 410,600 Party members i n 1933-34. Ch’en Shao-yii (Wang Ming) and K’ang Sheng, Revolutionary China Today (New York, 1934), pp. 47, 90; and Chang Wen-t'ien in Snow, Random Notes, p . 87. But later Communists sources speak of 300,000, and the Nationalists of far fewer. The totals for the three main base areas come to around 155,000. See this chapter below. For the 1936 estimates, see Chapter 13.

. See Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 149 ff.; and Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 46 ff. . Cf. The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 59 fI.; and Israel, Student, pp. 94 ff. . U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1930), p . 51, cited i n Klein and Clark, Dictionary, p . 730. . William W . Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York, 1972), passim. . Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 194 fI.; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 225 fI.; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 222 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 566 ff. . C h ’ i Wu, Yi-ko Ko-ming Ken-chii t i Ch’eng-chang: K’ang-jih Chan-cheng Shihch’i t i Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii Pien-ch’'u Kai-k’uang (The Establishment and Growth of a Revolutionary Base: A General Account of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region During the Anti-Japanese War) (hereafter, Ch’i Wu, Chin-ChiLu-Yii) (Peking, 1957), p . 18; People’s Daily, June 28, 1961. . Selden, Yenan Way, pp. 38 ff.: Part one, “ T h e Guerrilla Movement in Northwest China: The Origins of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region,” CQ, no. 28, p. 79; Part two, i n CQ, no. 29, pp. 61, 65; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 563 ff. . “Report on Crimes of L i u Shao-ch’i, cited in IS, March, 1971, pp. 96-97. L o Teng-hsien was sent from Shanghai to head the Party i n Manchuria in 1931. 10. For example, Chou Pao-chung, who had been sent from Shanghai in 1931, led a group that, about 1940, fled into the Soviet Far East and re-entered Manchuria i n 1945. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 11. Suh, Korean Communist Movement, pp. 122, 161-63, 238-44; Suh, Documents, pp. 372 ff., 508, 513, 515. 12. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang tsai Chung-nan Tichoii Ling-tao Ko-ming Tou-cheng t i Li-shih Tzu-liao (Historical Materials o n

the Revolutionary Struggles Led by the CCP in Central South Areas) (hereafter, Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang tsai Chung-nan) (Hankow, 1951), pp. 135 ff. Before Feng’s ascendancy, the entire Hainan Party leadership had been arrested in the spring of 1929. 13. A “general section of the Communist Party of Taiwan’ was organized in Shanghai i n late 1928 but obviously achieved little. See Ts’ai Hsiao-ch’ien, Kiangsi Su-ch’ii: Hung Chiin Hsi-ts’uan Hui-yi (Recollections of the Kiangsi Soviet and Red Army Flight Westward) (hereafter, Ts’ai Hsiao-ch’ien, Recollections) (Taipei, 1970), pp. 1 fI.; Justus M . Van der Kroef, “Philippine Comm u n i s m a n d t h e C h i n e s e , ” C Q , n o . 30, p p . 117, 151; C . E . Black a n d Thomas P .

Thornton, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence (Princeton, N.J., 1965), p . 190; and Jean Lacouture, H o Chi Minh: A Political Biography (New York, 1968), passim. 14. Including L i Ming-jui, apparently killed by the Communist secret police in 1931, and Kung Ch’u, the author of Wo yii Hung Chiin, now in Hong Kong. Wei

Notes for Chapter 9

559

Pa-ch’iin, of the Chuang nationality, was the leader of the 21st Division. After the departure of most local military forces under Teng Hsiao-p’ing and Chang Yiin-yi, the Chuang peasant movement, on which the Right River Soviet was based, quickly collapsed and Wei Pa-ch’iin charged betrayal of the Chuang b y the Han Chinese Communists. See Diana Lary, “Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Some Notes on the Chuang Peasant Movement, 1921-31, CQ, no. 49, pp. 126 ff. 15. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 101, 238-39; Kuo, History, vol. II, p p . 3 0 5 - 6 , 428 fi., 489 ft.; People’s Daily, February 1, 1962, p . 5 ; H o f h e i n z , i n

Barnett, ed., Politics, p. 49; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 175; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Yang Tzu-lieh, “Memoirs,” Chan Wang, no. 176, p. 32. 16. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 16, i n Ming Pao, no. 40, pp. 95 ff.; Scott Colby, “ T h e Oyiiwan Soviet: A n Early Chinese Communist Rural Base” (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1969). 17. Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 48; Soviety v Kitae (The Soviets in China) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 3 3 ) , p . 396.

18. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 16, i n Ming Pao, no. 41, pp. 92-94. 19. I b i d . , p p . 9 0 fI., a n d c f . Ming Pao, n o . 39, p . 90. Chang’s account leaves m a n y questions unanswered. H e refers to a Party Central “purge policy” (Autobiography, ch. 16, in Ming Pao, no. 42, p . 93) but gives n o details and stresses the seemingly independent nature of the “ p l o t ” led by a young former Kuomintang “reorganizationist,” W u Tsan-mo, w i t h the acquiescence of his commander, Hsii Chi-shen. K’uang Chi-hsiin and Tseng Chung-sheng were among important leaders also accused of complicity. Chang Kuo-t’ao says that Party Central praised his handling of this purge i n Oyiliwan i n contrast to its criticism of Mao’s handling of the Fut’ien purge to be discussed below. Others give higher figures for the Oyiiwan purges, speaking of the arrest of more than 1,000 members of the Red Army and soviet, and of 1,600 “rich peasants.” T h e Nationalists state that t w o division commanders, eight regi-

mental commanders, and fifteen political officers were purged. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 190 ff., 561-62; Kuo, History, vol. I l , pp. 304-5, 422 ff.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 397. 20. Interview w i t h Chang Kuo-t’ao i n Hong Kong, August 21, 1968. 21. I n part under Kao Chiin-t’ing, a vice-chairman of the Oyiliwan Soviet in 193132, who was executed by the Communists for malpractices i n 1939. See Snow, Red Star, pp. 304 ff.; Soviety v Kitae, p . 23; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 212, 219; Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), pp. 318-19. 22. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 16 and 17, i n Ming Pao, no. 43, p . 93, and no. 45, p . 74; Kuo, History, vol. 11, p p . 66 fi. 23. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 249-56; Soviety v Kitae, p . 271; Waller, “Congresses,” p . 172; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 24. W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . 11, p p . 256 ff.; H o f h e i n z , i n Barnett, (ed., Politics, p. 48n.; Ilpyong K i m , “Communist Politics i n China, 1931-1934" (hereafter, K i m , “Communist’”’) (unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968), pp. 263 ff., 275; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 25. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 151; Waller, “Congresses,” p. 174; and interview with Kung Ch’u, Hong Kong, August 19, 1968. 26. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 151, 244; Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 70-71, 80, 96, 100, 198, 205, 210, 236, 242-43; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. II, p . 327; Rue, Mao Tse-tung; and Kung Ch’u, W o yii Hung Chiin, p . 261. 27. Snow, Red Star, p . 68; Snow, Random Notes, p . 87; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 348;

Wales, Inside, pp. 205 fi.; Hofheinz, in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 48; Ilpyong K i m , “Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of

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the Chinese Soviet Republic,” i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 79; and Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ang Sheng, China Today, passim. 28. Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 167. 29. Koo, “Memorandum,” p . 764. 30. Miao Ch’u-huang, Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang Chien-yao Li-shih (Brief History of the CCP) (Peking, 1956), p. 91; Waller, “Congresses,” p . 175; T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing, p . 75; Yakhontof, Soviets, p . 164; Soviety v Kitae, pp. 218, 107; Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 337; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. II, p . 580. 31. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, pp. 102 ff.; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, appendix. 32. T’ien-wei Wu, i h JAS, February, 1970, p . 401; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 151;

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p. 162. 33. Ti-erh-tz’u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng Shih-ch’i Shih-shih Lun-ts’ung (Accounts o f the Second Revolutionary Civil War) (hereafter, Ti-erh-tz’u Shih-ch’i

Shih-shih Lun-ts’ung) (Peking, 1956), pp. 63-64; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 603; Norman Hanwell, “The Chinese Red Army,” Asia, May, 1936, p . 320; and Wales, Inside, pp. 97 ff. Other reports speak of 10.6 per cent of the Red Army i n the Youth League, with 27 per cent and 20 per cent of the officers i n the Party and Youth League, respectively. See The Communist International, February, 1936, p . 161.

34. Derek Waller, “ T h e Chinese Communist Political Elite: Continuity and Innovation,” in forthcoming Robert Scalapino, ed., Chinese Communist Elites (hereafter, Scalapino, Elites).

35. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 119, 161; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p. 162; Thornton, Comintern, p . 85; and see Chapter 7 of this book. Ch’en Shao-yii claimed that the percentage of ‘“proletarians” i n the CCP rose from 15.2 i n 1932 to 25 to 30 i n 1933. Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ang Sheng, China Today, p . 47. Cf. URI, eds., The Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch’i (hereafter, URI, eds., Liu Shao-ch’i) (Hong Kong, 1968-69), vol. I , p . 8. 36. The exaggeration of many of these figures seems given away by, among other statements, K’ang Sheng’s report that, of the 110,000 additional recruits to the Party i n 1933-34, some 11,200 came from Shanghai, Hopeh, Szechwan, and Kiangsi, the latter two the only areas from which the bulk of new recruits could have come. But possibly the report contains misprints. Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ang Sheng, China Today, pp. 47-48, 90. For the other figures, see Hofheinz, in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 48-49; Soviety v Kitae, pp. 271, 396; Selden, i n CQ, nos. 28 and 29, passim; and Snow, Random Notes, p . 87. I n the latter book, Chang Wen-t'ien states that 150,000 of 400,000 Party members had been located i n Kiangsi and Fukien. 37. Waller, “Congresses,” pp. 70, 87, 93; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 140; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 41, 84, 170 fi. 38. The commissars for land and interior were Chang Ting-ch’eng and Chou Yi-lj, both criticized soon after 1931, while the absent Chang Kuo-t’ao headed the judiciary. See Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 172, 281; Klein and Clark, Dictionary, Appendix 47; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 558 ff.; Kung Ch’y,

Wu yii Hung Chiin, p. 429; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 349 ff., 381, 592-93; Waller, “Congresses,” pp. 146, 156, 302-7; Trygve Lotveit, “The Central Chinese Soviet A r e a , 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 3 4 ’ ( u n p u b l i s h e d University o f L o n d o n P h . D . dissertation,

1 9 6 9 ;) and Smedley, Great Road, p . 280. 39. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 17-18. Cf. the statements that there were thirteen county soviets i n Kiangsi i n early 1934 and four i n Fukien i n late 1932. Ch’en Ch’eng Collection, Reels 16 and 21. The Third Plenum i n September, 1930, had already claimed that soviet movements affected 300 counties and 50

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561

million people, but these figures are obviously grossly exaggerated. So probably were the estimates of the Nationalists of 181 Communist-controlled counties in 1930, of the Comintern of 162 county soviets in the spring of 1930, and Communist claims b y late 1933 of soviet administrations in 2,931 villages in an area twice as large as Holland and Belgium. See Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 201; Yakhontof, Soviets, pp. 90, 146; Koo, “Memorandum,” p . 773; Roy, Revolution, p. 629; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 180; Eudin and Slusser, Materials, p . 289; Inprecor, vol. X I V , pp. 977-78; Soviety v Kitae, p . 21; Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 70-71, 198; Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ang Sheng, China Today, p. 8; H o Kan-chih, History, p. 252; Mif, Heroic China, p . 72; Waller, “Congresses,” pp. 64, 122, etc. 40. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 327-28, 332, 339, 341. 41. Mao, S W , vol. 1, p . 316; Yakhontof, Soviets, p . 146. 42. M a o , S W , I V , p . 113. 43. See K i m , i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 78 ff. 44. Kuo, History, vol. 1, p . 472. 45. Schram, Political Thought, p . 196; Mao, SW, vol. I , p. 99; and Isaacs, Tragedy, p . 326.

46. Cited i n Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 234; cf. 1942 quote of Walter Judd, cited i n Chapter 18 of this book. 47. For example, Hsiao, Land Revolution, p. 236. 48. Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 155; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 200 ff., 206. 49. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 148-49. 50. Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 48 ff. 51. T’ien-wei W u , i n JAS, February, 1970, pp. 401, 403; Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 175 fi., 220, etc.; and Soviety v Kitae, pp. 218 ff. 52. Ilpyong K i m , “New Concept of Leadership and Cadre Education i n the Kiangsi Soviets” (unpublished paper for the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, April, 1970); Ilpyong K i m , “Communist,” passim; Wang Hsiieh-wen, “Chinese Communists’ Yenan Spirit and Educational Tradition,” IS, February, 1971, pp. 58-59; and also i n IS, February, 1972, p . 89; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and People’s China, April, 1957, p . 36. 53. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 153, 160, 166; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p. 194; and Kuo, History, vol. I l , pp. 358 ff. 54. Similarly, according t o some, L i u Shao-ch’i’s g r o u p stressed t h e “ m a s s l i n e ” more than Mao did i n the late 1930’s. See H . G . Schwarz, Liu Shao-ch’i and People’s War: A Report on the Creation of Base Areas in 1938 (hereafter, Schwarz, L i u Shao-ch’i) ( L a w r e n c e , K a n . , 1 9 6 9 ) , passim.

55. See Mao Tse-tung Chi (The Works of M a o Tse-tung), 10 vols. Takeuchi Minoru, et al., eds. (Tokyo, 1970), vol. I I I , pp. 251 ff., 255; Mao, SW, vol. 1, p . 134; and Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 215 ff. I n June, 1933, at a conference of 400 cadres a t t h e district level o f t h e soviet g o v e r n m e n t , for e x a m p l e , M a o

wrote conclusions of the conference on ways to use the land investigation movement and local soviet organizations to build mass organizations. See Mao Tsetung Chi, vol. I I I , pp. 251 fi.; and Ilpyong K i m , “Organizations Aspects of the Kiangsi Soviet Government” (unpublished paper, 1972). I n July, 1931, the Comintern had praised “ t h e positive experience of Comrade Mao Tse-tung i n » organizing training classes [ f o r captured] troops of the White Armies. See William Dorrill, “Party Reform and Structural Change Under the Returned Student Leadership” (unpublished paper, 1971), pp. 5 and 26. 56. Mao Tse-tung Chi, vol. I I I , p. 255; and Mao, SW, vol. I , p. 134. 57. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 147-50.

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58. Ibid., vol. I I I , pp. 16, 10, 137; vol. I V , pp. 8-9; vol. I V (Peking ed.), pp. 24142, 59. Ibid., vol. 1, p . 142. 60. Soviety v Kitae, p . 6 1 ; Yurev, Krasnaya Armiya, p . 5 8 ; Hsiao, Land Reform, pp. 213, 220-54. 61. Hsaio, Land Reform, pp. 39, 53, 164-65; Hsiao, Power Relations, p. 72; Eudin and Slusser, eds., Materials, pp. 273, 310; Rue, Mao Tse-tung, p . 228; T’ien-wei Wu, i n JAS, February, 1970, pp. 395 ff.; Bela Kun, Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic (New York, 1934), passim; and Ilpyong Kim, in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 82-83, 92, 97. 62. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 224. 63. Ibid., p . 225; cf. p . 235. 64. Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 42, 65, 112, 152-53, 176, 254 ff. 65. Ibid., p . 247 66. Ibid., pp. 14, 53, 135, 166, 292; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 7, 21, 71-72, 170, 174, 179; Eudin and Slusser, eds., Materials, pp. 273, 310; Swarup, Study, pp. 122, 124, 127, 138; Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy of the CCP, 1921-1959 (hereafter, Chao, Agrarian Policy) (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 22, 32; Ilpyong Kim, “Communist,” passim; and Ilpyong Kim, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 82 ff. 67. I l p y o n g K i m , i n B a r n e t t , ed., Politics, p . 8 7 ; E u d i n a n d Slusser, eds., Materials, p . 310; Soviety v Kitae, p . 65. 68. Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p. 30; and Hsiao, Land Revolution, p . 30. 69. Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 25, 136-37. Because of rounding, percentages do not quite total 100. 70. Ibid., pp. 34, 49, 293-95; Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 185, 191, and vol. I V (Peking ed.), pp. 181 ff., etc. 71. H s i a o , Land Revolution, p . 198. 72. See especially works by Tso-liang Hsiao, Wang Chien-min, Warren Kuo, and John Rue. Dieter Heinzig reports that Comintern adviser Otto Braun believes Mao maintained his power i n the early 1930’s, in the government and military i f not in the Party. See Dieter Heinzig, “ T h e Otto Braun Memoirs and Mao’s Rise to Power,” CQ, no. 46, pp. 280 fI. 73. The first references by Mao to errors of the “ t h i r d left line” came in 1935-36 but were not fully expressed u n t i l about 1944, when Mao came into fuller control of the Party. See this chapter below; and Dorrill, in CQ, no. 36, pp. 53 fi.; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 136 fI.; and Jerome Ch’en, “Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference,” CQ, no. 40, pp. 13 fi. 74. Snow, Red Star, pp. 162-63; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 336 ff., 358 fi. 75. Smedley, Great Road, p . 286. 76. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 102 ff.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 395 fi;

Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p. 529; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 298 ft; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p p . 138 ff.; R o n a l d Suleski, T h e Fu-t’ien Incident,

December, 1930 (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Papers i n Chinese Studies, no. 4, 1969). 77. M a o , S W , vol. I , p p . 227, 229. B u t K u o , History, i n IS, M a y , 1971, p p . 6 6 fi., gives a different picture. 78. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 298 fi., 328, 338 ff.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 224, 425 ff. L i u T i w a s t h e p o l i t i c a l commissar o f the X X A r m y , w h i c h revolted

i n early December; other leading opponents of Mao included Tuan Liang-pi. Mao especially praised P’eng Teh-huai for his support. Snow, Red Star, p . 162. 79. Suleski, Fu-t’ien Incident, pp. 12-14; Smedley, Great Road, p. 280; and Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 395 fI., 402 fI., 422 ff. According to a Soviet polemic, Mao executed more than 100 Communists i n the Fut’ien incident and others i n 1928 and 1930 purges. BBC Foreign Broadcast Files, June 5, 1969, and July 4,

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1969; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 365-67, 337, and in IS, May, 1971, p . 66. 80. Cited Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 338-39; cf. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 432; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 98-113; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. II, pp. 528-41; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p . 266. 81. Kuo, History, vol. I l , pp. 300-301; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 398, 419 fi.

82. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 458 fI.; and Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 331 fi. 83. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 336-37, 390 ff. 84. Ibid., pp. 358 ff., 396, 432; and L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 164. Cf. Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 285-86. 85. Such were the fates of security work leaders, L i Shao-chiu i n the Central Soviet, Ch’iieh Ch’ao-fang in western Fukien, and Lai Ju-ch’iao in northwestern Kiangsi. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 396-97, 401; Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 306. Previously prominent Communist leaders were probably purged in these years in various areas, including L i Ming-jui, Hsii Chi-shen, possibly Tuan Tehch’ang, and others. 86. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 433-35; Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 304; and O . E . Clubb, Communism in China (New York, 1968), p . 94. 87. Kuo, History, vol. I I , 508 ff.; and Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 438, 442. 88. Chang Wen-t’ien claimed i n 1936 that the Communists in the Kiangsi period “condemned and executed no more than 1,000 counterrevolutionaries” and 400 t o 500 “class enemies.” S n o w , R a n d o m Notes, p . 88. However, K u o , History,

vol. I I , p . 325, estimated that the Communists “liquidated” at least 50,000, and Nationalists in 1933 spoke of 186,000 liquidated i n Kiangsi and 72,000 in Oyiiwan (Koo, “Memorandum,” p . 780). Others charged that the reduction of population i n the single county of Juichin from 280,000 to 140,000 in these years was due to the “red terror” (Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 541, 528 fI.), but i t could obviously equally be blamed on “white terror.” Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19, claimed the Nationalists killed several hundred thousand in reprisals against Oyiiwan. Cf. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 16465; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 139; Rue, M a o Tse-tung, p p . 222, 231 f . , 235; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 98 ff.; The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 31; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 394; Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 592-93.

Chapter 10 1. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 380-81. According to Chang Kuo-t’ao both Ch’in and Chang left for Kiangsi i n August, 1931 (Autobiography, ch. 16, in Ming Pao, no. 41, p . 95), and possibly they attended the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November, but most speak of their remaining i n Shanghai into 1932 or so. Ch’in Pang-hsien and Ch’en Shao-yii had reputations for impatience and hot temper, as well as high intelligence. L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 237-38; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, passim and p . 246. 2. Following them in order were Chou En-lai, L u Fu-t’an (captured by the Nationalists i n Shanghai i n January, 1933), Chu Teh, Ch’i Ch’iu-pai, Chang Ting-ch’eng, and Teng Fa. The first “Russian returned student” on this list was Wang Chia-hsiang, ranked tenth (possibly because he was able to attend the Congress), while Ch’en Shao-yii, then i n Moscow, ranked thirteenth and Shen Tse-min i n Oyiliwan, twentieth. See also Chapter 9. 3. Cited in Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 284. Cf. Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 395, 408 fI., 414-15. 4. Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai, pp. 94-95; William Dorrill, “Party Reform and Structural Change Under the Returned Student Leadership” (hereafter, “Party Reform”) (unpublished paper, 1971), footnote 38; Nollau, Communism, p . 142; a n d Chalmers Johnson, A n Instance o f Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi a n d the Sorge

Spy Ring (hereafter, Johnson, Treason) (Stanford, Calif., 1964), p . 61.

564

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oo

5. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 311 ff.; U . T . Hsu, Conflict, pp. 86, 95, 127 (Hsu was a former chief of part of the Nationalist secret service). H o Kan-chih, History, p . 257, gives the Communist estimate of leftist victims in the early 1930’s. Cf. Chapter 1, footnotes 1 and 2, above. L o Ch’i-yiian, Yang P’ao-an (in Shanghai i n July), and Wang Jo-fei ( i n Paotou in October) were among others arrested i n 1931. The three secretaries of the Central Bureau for “White” Areas Work in Shanghai were L i Chu-sheng, Sheng Chung-liang (Sheng Yiieh), and Huang Wen-chieh, all “Russian returned students,” according to Yang Tzu-lieh, in Chan Wang, no. 177, p . 28; or L i Chu-sheng, L u Fu-t’an, and Wang Yiin-ch’eng, according to Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 480 ff.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 464; and Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 246 fi. Possibly some of these names are pseudonyms, or some were “acting” heads. Many defected to the Nationalists after their arrests. . Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 293, 296 fi.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 395 fI., 408 ff.; U . T . Hsu, Conflict, p . 63; L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 150 ff.; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, i n Ming Pao, no. 35, pp. 98-99. Chou En-lai is said to have organized the countermassacre of Ku’s family, while K u i n turn seems to have been killed by the Nationalists i n 1935 when they suspected that he might have reverted to the Communists. . URI, eds., Liu Shao-ch’i, vol. I , pp. 3-4, 7-9, 137; Swarup, Study, p . 157; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 264; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 10; Wales, Labor, pp. 71, 63 ff., 77; Guillermaz, Histoire, p. 223; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 248; M i f , Heroic China, pp. 64 ff.; O . Edmund Clubb, Communism in China as Reported from Hankow in 1932 (New York, 1968), p . 96. Liu Shao-ch’i headed the National General Labor Union in Shanghai until 1932 and in Juichin i n 1933 and 1934. . Israel, Student, pp. 85-86, 101-3. . T . A . Hsia, Gate, pp. 101 ff., 163 ff.; Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 9-12; Harriet Mills, “ L u Hsiin and the CCP,” CQ, no. 4, pp. 17 ff. 10. Harrison, Rebellions, p p . 2 8 fi.; Johnson, Treason, p p . 5 4 fi. 11. Information obtained after arrests of Hsiang Chung-fa and the Noulens couple. See also Chapter 2, above. 12. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 15 and 16, in Ming Pao, no. 36, p . 83, and n o . 41, p . 9 5 ; H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 1 6 1 - 6 2 ; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet,

pp. 464-65. 13. Suh, Korean Communist Movement, p . 242n. 14. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 185, 341; H u Hua et al, eds., Chung-kuo ko-ming Shih Chiang-yi (Lectures on the History of the Chinese Revolution) (hereafter, Lectures) (Peking, 1962), p . 282; and Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 480 ff. According to Kuo, about 1932, Chang Wen-t’ien, Wang Yiin-ch’eng, Wang Chia-hsiang, and L i Chu-sheng (as head of the Central Bureau for “White” Areas Work in Shanghai) were added to the Political Bureau, the first two to its Standing Committee. Wang Yiin-ch’eng and Li Chu-sheng were arrested in 1933 and 1934 respectively. 15. T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing, p . 70; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 99. 16. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 233 fI., 480 ff., 565 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 520-28; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, in Ming Pao, no. 36, p . 83. 17. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 235, 480 f . , 511, 564, 566. 18. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p . 160; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 466-67; T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing, p . 70; Dorrill, “Party Reform,” footnote 61. According to some sources, K ’ 0 Ch’ing-shih and L u Fu-t’an also were secretaries about this time. 19. Wales, Inside, pp. 97 fi.

Notes for Chapter 10 2 0 . W a n g Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . I I , p p . 101, 161-62; K u o , History,

565 vol.

II,

pp. 233 ff., 382, 465, 480 fI., 565 ff.; T’ang Leang-li, Suppressing, pp. 82-85; and Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 109, 150-51, 165, 224. Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang chih T’ou-shih, pp. 216 fI., gives information from Nationalist intelligence on Party organization i n various provinces. For instance, i n the early 1930’s there were said to be about 1,500 Communist i n Kiangsu, 1,171 i n Anhwei, 728 in Szechwan, 6,842 i n H o p e h , a b o u t 2,000 i n H o n a n , 150 i n Kwangtung, and 1,054

in Fukien. L i Fu-ch’un headed the Kiangsi Committee i n 1933-34. 21. Wales, Inside, p . 250; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 276, 388; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 57; and L i Kuang, New Army, p. 83. 22. McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 3 2 ; a n d N o r t h , Moscow, p . 164. 23. W a n g C h e n w a s i t s d i r e c t o r . See K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; Wales, R e d Dust, pp. 99-100; Wales, Inside, p . 255; and W u Ling Feng Yiin (Gathering Clouds on the W u Ling Mountains) (Hong Kong, 1961), pp. 54-55. 24. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 16, i n Ming Pao, no. 41, pp. 95 fi. 25. Leading publications included Red Flag, which i n 1930 had a circulation of 12,000 issues i n Shanghai alone; Struggle, which superseded Red Flag as the leading Party journal from its founding i n February, 1933, with Chang Wen-t’ien as editor a n d w i t h a circulation o f 27,000 i n 1934 a n d 8,000 i n 1936; R e d China,

the leading government journal, founded i n January, 1932, with a circulation of 40,000 i n 1934; Red Star, the army’s journal, w i t h a circulation of 17,300 i n 1933-34; True Words, w i t h a circulation o f 28,000 i n 1934; True Words of Youth, 1932-35, w i t h a circulation o f some 15,000; Soviet Workers, w i t h

3,000 to 4,000 subscribers i n 1933-35 (it later became Chinese Worker); and also Bolshevik Party Life (Party Life after 1 9 3 7 ) , Party Construction, R e d A r m y

Life, Lenin Weekly, and many others. The most important were Red Flag and Struggle, which succeeded the 1920’s Guide Weekly as the official outlets of the Central Committee. Liberation succeeded Struggle i n this capacity in turn after 1936, as d i d People’s Daily ( i n 1 9 4 8 ) , Study ( i n t h e early 1950’s), a n d R e d Flag

( i n 1958). Party Construction also played an important role i n the training and disciplining of the Party i n the early 1930’s. See Chiin-tu Hsiieh, The Chinese Communist Movement, 1921-1949, v o l . I ( S t a n f o r d , Calif., 1 9 6 0 ) , passim; T’ien-

wei Wu, i n JAS, February, 1970, pp. 395 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . I I , p . 235; S. S w a r u p , Study, p . 146; F . W . H o u n , T o Change a Nation: Propaganda a n d Indoctrination i n C o m m u n i s t China (hereafter, H o u n , Change) (Glencoe, I l l . , 1 9 6 1 ) , p p . 2 7 - 2 8 ; Frederick Y i , Mass Persuasion i n Communist

China (hereafter, Mass Persuasion) (New York, 1964), p . 161; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 243; Inprecor (1934), p . 978; Yakhontof, Soviets, pp. 184, 249, 275; Soviety v Kitae, p . 109; K i m , “Communist,” passim; a n d Hofheinz, i n Barnett, Politics, p . 41.

26. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 15, i n Ming Pao, no. 34, p . 81, and cf. Ming Pao, no. 36, p . 83. 27. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, pp. 160, 163; Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p p . 5 ff.; H s i a o , Power Relations, p . 221; S n o w , R e d Star, p . 381; McLane,

Soviet Policy, p . 12n; Chao T’ing-hua, Shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo Hung-Chiin (Ten Years o f the Chinese R e d A r m y ) (hereafter, T e n Years) ( H a n k o w , 1 9 3 8 ) , pp. 3 8 ff.; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 166. O t t o B r a u n ( L i T e h ) has written some

memoirs of his years (1932-39) i n China, which provide important new information but also leave unresolved many problems. See his “ V o n Schanghai bis Janan,” in Horizont (East Berlin), nos. 23-38, 1969. Dieter Heinzig has discussed these in terms of Mao Tse-tung and the Tsunyi Conference i n CQ, no. 4 6 a n d i n “Comment o n ‘ O t t o B r a u n a n d the Tsunyi C o n f e r e n c e , ’ ” C Q , n o . 4 2 ,

pp. 131-35. According to Sheng (Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 252 ff.), Braun d i d not leave Shanghai for Juichin until mid-1933.

566

Notes for Chapter 10

28. Eudin and Slusser, Materials, passim; McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 24 fI.; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 208. 29. This uprising reportedly was led by only ten Communists, among them Liu Po-chien and Tung Chen-t’ang. Wales, Red Dust, pp. 175-78; Hung-ch’i P’iaop’iao (Red Flag Flying) (Peking, 1957 et seq.), vol. X I I , pp. 118 fi. 30. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 241, 239; cf. Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 142-43. 31. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 203-4. 32. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 200, 161. 33. Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, p. 312; Kung Ch’u Preface to URI, eds., Peng Teh-huai; S w a r u p , Study, p . 179; William Dorrill,

“ M a o a n d the ‘Offensive

Line’: A Reconsideration,” Paper for the Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting, April, 1970; and Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 201-2. 34. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 208, 206, 209, 233. 35. Ibid., p . 211; URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 188; Hsii Kwan-san, “ L i n Shao-ch’i and Mao Tse-tung (1922-47),” CLG, Summer-Fall, 1970, pp. 220 ff.; Kuo, History, vol. 11, p p . 419, 444 ff.; K u n g Ch’u, W o yii Hung Chiin, p p . 310-14. Para-

doxically, i n view of these accounts, there are three seemingly authoritative reports of Mao’s election to the Political Bureau i n January, 1933. Otto Braun, according t o H e i n z i g , i n C Q , n o . 4 6 ; K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary;

and H u

Hua et al., eds., Lectures, p . 282. Lectures states that Mao “was elected to the Political Bureau, but [the ‘returned students’] squeezed out Mao’s leadership, especially from the Red A r m y . ” See also W u , “Tsunyi Conference.” 36. Heinzig, i n CQ, no. 46, pp. 280 ff. Braun also argues that Chou En-lai’s Central Committee Military Affairs Committee was not as influential as Chu Teh’s (and Mao’s) Central Soviet Revolutionary Military Council, and that one reason for the confusion about Mao’s position at the time stems from the fact that Mao spread the story that he had been under virtual house arrest i n 1934, i n order to discredit Ch’in Pang-hsien. 37. According to a Cultural Revolution document cited by Mao i n JPRS 49826, p. 11, and i n CLG, vol. I , no. 4, p . 97, and to interviews w i t h Kung Ch’u i n Hong Kong on August 19 and 20, 1968. Contrary to Mao’s alleged statement, Braun states that Chang Wen-t’ien, Wang Chia-hsiang, Chu Teh, and others generally supported Mao against Ch’in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai. See also this chapter below. 38. Cited in Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 439-40. Cf. L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 167. 39. Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 443. 40. Ibid., pp. 445 fI.; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 212; cf. Hsiao, Land Revolution, p . 289; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim. 41. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 222, 241; T’ien-wei Wu, in JAS, February, 1970, p . 410. 42. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 397 ff., 433 ff. 43. Ibid., pp. 486 ff; Li T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 170-71; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 230 ff. 44. E.g., criticisms of an alleged lack of labor work i n Kiangsi b y Teng Ying-ch’ao. See Swarup, Study, pp. 155, 160. 45. “ H o w to Analyze the Classes i n the Rural Areas,” which is included in Mao, S W , v o l . I , p p . 138-40, a n d e v e n more i n the “Decision o n Some Problems i n

the Land Struggle,” which is not. 46. Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 249, 79 f . , 87, 227-28; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, p . 413; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 528 ft., 533 ff.; Kim, in Barnett, Politics, pp. 94 ff.; and Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 152 fi. 47. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 531 ff.; Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 110, 236-37, 282. 48. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 191. 49. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 42; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 188.

Notes for Chapter 10

567

50. Hsiao, Power Relations, p p . 225, 292; Van Slyke, Enemies, p p . 43-44; North, Moscow, p . 161. 51. Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 554; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 249, 255-69; and William Dorrill, “The Fukien Rebellion and the CCP: A Case of Maoist Revisionism,” CQ, no. 37, pps 33 fl. Leaders of the rebellion were Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, L i Chi-shen, and especially Ch’en Ming-shu, a former governor of Kwangtung, who had a year earlier formed a Social Democratic Party among frustrated intellectuals in Shanghai. P’an Han-nien signed the October agreement for the Communists. 52. Cited in Kuo, History, vol. II, p. 555. 53. Dorrill, in CQ, no. 37, p . 50. 54. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 575. Kuo cites Red China, February 4, 1934, but similar remarks by Mao are also found i n that newspaper of January 31, 1934. 55. Jerome C h ’ e n , “ R e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e T s u n y i Conference,” C Q , n o . 40, p . 1 0 ; Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 156-57, 251; Dorrill, in CQ, no. 37, p . 46 ff.; Snow, Random Notes, p . 60; and Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 259-60. Significantly, Mao’s statements condemning the rebellion are not included i n the SW. 56. Accounts conflict as to Mao’s real attitude toward the Fukien rebellion. One former leader of the Red Army recalls that Chou En-lai, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t’ien all favored sending immediate help to the rebels but that Mao argued that the rebels must first prove themselves. H e suggested that the Nineteenth Route Army should do this by expelling a Nationalist general from northwestern Fukien and then join with the Red Army, which only then would render aid. Subsequently, according to this account, the Comintern investigated the question of relations between the soviet forces and the Fukien rebels and placed the entire blame for the failure of effective coordination on Mao, whom i t considered a “conservative” and a “guerrilla” i n contrast to the “more Bolshevik” “returned students.” Mao was reportedly stripped of his posts, placed under Party surveillance, and virtually exiled to the Yiitu area in August, 1934. There, Mao, who also had a recurrence of malaria i n mid-1934, complained to the narrator of this account that he had been expelled from Party Central three times and reprimanded eight times, while the dominant “Russian returned students” “ h a d n o experience of struggle and were only out for power.” Kung Ch’u, Wo yii Hung Chiin, pp. 397-99, 362-67; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 556-67; interview with Warren Kuo on August 23, 1968. However, another participant i n the Red Army states that Mao and Chu Teh favored aid to the rebels but were overruled by Ch’in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t’ien. Ts’ai Hsiao-ch’ien, Recollections, p p . 157-59. E v i d e n c e also conflicts as t o Comintern

attitudes toward Mao in the early 1930's. 57. “Returned student” K’ai Feng’s article i n the Central Committee journal, Struggle, February 23, 1934, which described statements of the Central Soviet Government about the rebellion, refuted the doubts expressed by “some comrades” about the desirability of concluding even the preliminary agreement w i t h the Fukien rebels and argued that, on occasion, there would have to be compromises with non-Communist groups. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 256-58. 58. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 565 ft.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , pp. 34, 519-20; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 572-73. 59. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 558 ff.; North, Moscow, pp. 162-64; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 69, 262, 282 ff., and 321. 60. Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 262-65. 61. Ibid., p . 287; K u o , History, v o l . I I , p p . 560 ff.; a n d C h i - h s i H u , “ H u a F u , T h e Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference,” CQ, no. 43, pp. 39 ff. ( H u argues that Hua F u is an alias of Otto Braun.)

Notes for Chapter 11

568

62. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 563-64. According to Otto Braun, “ a kind of balance of power” prevailed at this time between Maoists and Internationalists. Heinzig, i n C Q , no. 46.

63. Kuo, History, vol. I l , p . 5 6 8 ; H s i a o , Power Relations, p . 276. 64. One account spoke of 821 delegates, including 8 industrial workers, 122 agricultural workers, 53 coolies, 244 artisans, 303 poor peasants, and 32 merchants. H . H . Wetzel, L e Moine Rouge: Liu Shao-ch’i (Paris, 1961), pp. 164-65. 65. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 314 fi.; Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 559 and 592; Waller, “Congresses,” pp. 292 ff. The rankings of the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic executive committee were odd; i n order, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Ch’en Shao-yii, K’ai Feng, Liu Shao-ch’i, Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, etc., with Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, nos. 29 and 30, and Chang Wen-t’ien, no. 117. 66. Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 272. 67. Kuo, History, vol. I I , pp. 610 ff.; Li T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 182; Hsiao, Power Relations, p . 286.

68. Chao T’ing-hua, Ten Years, pp. 41-42. Ch’en Shao-yii’s statement in Moscow, in December, 1933, that the CCP had “waged and still wages a struggle against the right platform which speaks of the impossibility of armed action and of victory i n the northern and northwestern provinces,” like Borodin’s proposal of April, 1927, seems to confirm continued discussion of new Communist efforts i n the Northwest. Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ang Sheng, China Today, p . 51. 69. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 183; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 611; Kung Ch’y, Wo yii Hung Chiin, pp. 393 ff.; URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, pp. 32, 187-89.

Chapter 11 1. M a o , S W ,

vol. I ,

p . 161.

2. Smedley, Great Road, p. 326; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 194; Snow, Red Star, p . 194; a n d D i c k Wilson, T h e Long March, 1935: T h e Epic of Chinese Communism’s Survival (hereafter, W i l s o n , March) ( L o n d o n , 1 9 7 1 ) , passim.

. See Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 183; Wales, Red Dust, p . 100; Mao, SW, vol. I , p. 316; Kuo, History, vol. I I , p . 608, 614 ff., 634 ff., Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 529; H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 240, 285; K u n g C h ’ u , W o

yii Hung Chiin, p . 431; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 463 ff. Chou En-lai reportedly said that the Red Army had lost 60,000 men i n the fifth Nationalist campaign, a n d thousands o f c i v i l i a n s . I n a d d i t i o n t o deaths i n b a t t l e a n d from

hardships of the trek, which all participants stressed, desertions “reached an unprecedented rate.” Snow, Red Star, p . 174; Jerome Ch’en, in CQ, no. 40, p . 12.

. Wales, Red Dust, p . 100, citing Wang Chen. . Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, passim; Carl Wei, “ T h e Truth About the CCP Tsunyi Conference,” IS, February, 1969, p . 23. H s i a o , Power Relations, p p . 2 9 1 ff.; C a r l Wei, i n IS, February, 1969, p p . 2 1 - 2 2 .

. Carl Wei, i n IS, February, 1969, pp. 21 ff.; Ts’ao Po-yi, Kiangsi Soviet, pp. 559 fi. . Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 298, 301; Anthony Garavente, “The Long March,” CQ, no. 22, pp. 89 ff.; H o Kan-chih, History, p. 263; Wilson, March, p . 58; North, Moscow, p . 164. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 18, relates Mao’s claim of the late summer or early fall of 1934 that the Comintern had advised that the Red Army could move into Outer Mongolia i n case of extreme necessity, and according to Sheng (Sun Yat-sen University, pp. 254 ff.), Moscow had advised contingency plans for evacuation of the Kiangsi bases as early as the spring of 1934. 9. Robert Rinden a n d Roxane Witke, eds., T h e R e d Flag Waves: A Guide t o the Hung-ch’i P’iao-p’iao Collection (hereafter, Rinden and Witke, eds., Guide) (Berkeley, Calif., 1968), p . 82.

Notes for Chapter 11

569

10. According to Otto Braun, Hsiang Ying and Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai had opposed Mao strongly in the late Kiangsi period. Heinzig, in CQ, no. 46, p . 285. 11. Mao, SW, vol. 1, p. 316; and Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 1 ff. 12. I t was said that 1935 was the hardest year. See The Unquenchable Spark (Peking, 1963), p. 8; and Yang Shang-kuei, Border Region, p . 51. See also Smedley, Great Road, p . 309; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. H o Ch’ang and Yiian Hsiao-hsien of the Political Bureau branch in Kiangsi were killed in 1935, while Tseng Shan and Ch’en T’an-ch’iu were able to make their way from Kiangsi to Moscow. Kung Ch’u, a Kiangsi Party leader, whose book, W o yii Hung Chiin, is a primary source for the early 1930’s, was out of favor about this time and soon left the Communist movement, residing in Hong Kong after 1949. 13. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 5 fl.; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 248, has P’eng Tehhuai, commander of the I I I Corps, as second i n command to Chu Teh, with Yeh Chien-ying chief of staff of Chu’s headquarters. 14. Smedley, Great Road, p. 309; Wales, Inside, pp. 101 ff. Otto Braun maintains that only 45,000 soldiers and 15,000 noncombatants departed from Kiangsi. Horizont, no. 31 (1969), cited i n Wilson, March, p . 66. 15. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 2 ff. and 9 ff.; Garavente, in CQ, no. 22; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, pp. 163 ff.; Snow, Red Star, p . 178; The Long March: Eyewitness Accounts (Peking, 1963), pp. 202 fl., etc.; and Wilson, March, passim. 16. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, p . 649; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 11; Wales, Red Dust, pp. 126 ff. Ch’en Keng, Tung Chen-t’ang, and L o Ping-hui headed the Cadres Regiment, V and I X Corps, respectively. 17. Snow, R e d Star, p . 384; a n d K u o , History, vol. I I I , p p . 15-16, 72, 76. 18. O n the Long March with Chairman Mao (Peking, 1959), p . 22; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 25-27. 19. Snow, Red Star, p . 194. 20. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 187-88; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 166-67; Kuo,

History, vol. I I I , pp. 15 ff. 21. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 188. Less likely dates for the Conference of January 13, or January 1-3, are given i n Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 262; and Red Guard Document, i n Selections from China Mainland Magazines (hereafter, S C M M ) , no. 590, p . 15. The latter source also says that eighteen attended. Many opposed the calling of this conference. 22. Among them, W u Hsiu-ch’iian, who interpreted for Otto Braun. Red Guard Document, in SCMP, 4007, p . 4. Cf. Kuo K’ai, i n SCMM, May, 1967, no. 598, p . 15. There are differences of opinion over the number attending the conference. According t o D i e t e r H e i n z i g , i n C Q , n o . 42, p . 132, o n the 1969 memoirs

of Otto Braun, more than two-thirds of some thirty-six attending the conference were not members o f the Central Committee. I f true, this packing o f the con-

ference would explain Mao’s reversal of Party leadership at the time. However, Warren Kuo does not believe that many attended, or that the purported speech of Mao, translated by Jerome Ch’en, i n CQ, no. 40, is completely genuine. See Kuo, History, in IS, August, 1971, pp. 64 ff. 23. Most of this account and much of the above is based on the reminiscences of one Ch’en Jan (who, according to a Communist source, was captured and executed i n Chungking i n 1949). See Rinden and Witke, eds., Guide, p . 73. But Ch’en Jan may be an alias of Warren Kuo. (See also below, Chapter 17, footnote 9.) The reminiscences of Ch’en Jan on the Tsunyi Conference are described i n Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 16 ff. and vol. I V , Appendix. See also North, Moscow, p . 174; and Red Guard Document of April, 1967, in SCMM, no. 636, p . 24; and unpublished article on the Tsunyi Conference by T’ien-wei Wu. 24. See Jerome Ch’en’s translation of Mao’s alleged speech at Tsunyi, in CQ, no. 40, p . 13.

570

Notes for Chapter 11

25. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 19 ff.; Chi-hsi H u , in CQ, no. 43, pp. 44 ff. I n October, 1966, Mao allegedly acknowledged that Chang Wen-t’ien had “played a good role” at Tsunyi and that Liu Shao-ch’i and Nieh Jung-chen also had opposed critics of Mao. JPRS 49826, p . 11. Otto Braun states that Mao, Chang Wen-t'ien, and Wang Chia-hsiang (who Kuo believes was too injured to attend the Tsunyi Conference) had formed a “committee of three” by late 1934 to oppose Ch’in Pang-hsien and others. Heinzig, in CQ, no. 46. 26. T h e Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow, 1 9 5 4 ) , v o l . XXVI, p p . 244-48, states that the Tsunyi Conference elected a “new leadership of the Party, with Mao at the head as its secretary” but adds that Mao became chairman of the Central Committee Military Affairs Committee only “soon after’ his arrival in Shensi in October, 1935, and chairman of the Central Committee and Political Bureau i n March, 1943. The 1938 Encyclopedia had referred to Mao as “vozhd” (“chief,” the same word used for Stalin’s position) of the Party, and a biography Mao Tse-tung (Moscow, 1939), p . 8 listed Mao, Chu Teh, P’eng Teh-huai, H o Lung, Chou En-lai, and others as leaders. See also Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim, and Chang’s interview with Wang, in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I 1 , p . 727; Stories of the Long March (Peking, 1958), p . 5; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 328; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 167; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 27. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 23 ff.; Carl Wei, in IS, February, 1969; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 189; Rue, M a o Tse-tung, p p . 2 6 9 - 7 3 ; Schram, M a o Tse-tung, p . 167; a n d R e d G u a r d Document o f November, 1967, i n S C M M , n o . 590, p . 15.

28. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 23-24. But Otto Braun denies that Hsiang was dropped, although he states that Hsiang had opposed Mao. Heinzig, in CQ, no. 46, pp. 285 fi. 29. Garavente, i n CQ, no. 22, p . 119; Communist International, February, 1936, pp. 131-32; Smedley, Great Road, passim; and Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 28 fi. 30. K u o , History, vol. I I I , p . 7 5 ; Wales, R e d Dust, p p . 7 0 , 7 1 ; Snow, R e d Star, pp. 182-83; and Smedley, Great Road, pp. 318 ff. 31. For accounts of the Long March, see Snow, Red Star, pp. 117-96; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 307 ff.; The Long March: Eyewitness Accounts; and Wales, Red Dust. The exact date differs widely, but June 16 seems most likely. H o Wei’s I X Corps was the first unit of the Fourth Front Army to meet the First Front Army. 32. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 16 and 17; Wales, Red Dust, p . 72; Norman Hanwell, “ T h e Chinese Red Army,” Asia, May, 1936, p . 322; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 33. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 18; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 646 ff.; and Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 44, 71 ff., 75-76; Snow, Red Star, pp. 190-91; Snow, Random Notes, p . 100; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 328-29; and Wales, Red Dust, p . 160. Chang Kuo-t’ao asserts that his forces had 45,000 men, while Kuo gives the still larger figure of 70,000 for the Fourth Front Army. Although later accounts tried to show that the First and Fourth Front armies had equal strength of about 45,000 men each i n mid-1935, this was true only temporarily as a result of reapportionments for the continuing march. 34. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 18; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 329-30; Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 76 fl. 35. Cited in Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 193. 36. Chang Kuo-t’ao’s Introduction to U R I , eds., Liu Shao-ch’i, vol. 1, pp. 2-3, 8-9. 37. North, Moscow, p . 166. Chang Kuo-t’ao explains that he was not against the soviets in principle but felt the time was not yet ripe for them. Autobiography, c h . 15, i n Ming Pao, n o . 36, p . 82.

38. Kuo, History, v o l . I I I , p p . 77 fi.; Smedley, Great Road, p . 3 3 0 ; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim.

Notes for Chapter 11

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39. There was also confusion in Moscow over the destination of the Long March, and some talk of a new Szechwan soviet. See McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 56-57; Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 180; and Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (hereafter, Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang) (East Lansing, Mich., 1958), p . 54. 40. Kuo, History, vol. 111, p. 80; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 18. I n interviews with the author i n August, 1968, and September, 1970, Chang Kuo-t’ao

stressed Chu Teh’s efforts to “compromise” the views of Mao and himself, but Chang seemed reluctant to discuss thoroughly the subsequent split. Mao, SW, vol. I I , p . 256, states that the “fight against Chang Kuo-t’ao’s line began at the Pasi Conference” i n early September, 1935, indicating that the earlier disputes between Chang and Mao were muted until the renewed separation of the two

armies. 41. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 18, and interview with the author in August, 1968. A t the Maoerhkai Conference, Chang also renewed his attacks on the policy of soviets and claimed that the compromises followed his plan for the most part. 42. See Red Guard Document of February, 1967, i n CB, no. 822, March 23, 1967; Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 85 ff., 172-73; McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 59-60; Smedley, Great Road, pp. 330-31; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 18 and 19. 43. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 18 and 19; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p. 194; and URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 189. 44. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 86, 100 ff., 182 ff.; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 173; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim; and Ts’ai Hsiao-ch’ien, Recollections, pp. 372 fi. 45. Snow, Random Notes, p . 74. H o w e v e r , Chang Kuo-t’ao minimized the split i n one interview. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , p . 727. 46. Kuo, History, vol. I l l , pp. 86, 100 ff., 182 ff.; Liu Po-ch’eng, in The Long March: Eyewitness Accounts, pp. 221 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19. 47. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 187 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . I I , p p . 650-56; a n d Reizo O t s u k a , “Recent De-

velopments i n the Chinese Communist Movement,” i n W . L . Holland and Kate L . Mitchell, eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1936 (Chicago, 1937), pp. 343 fi. 48. See Smedley, Great Road, p . 336. 49. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 11, pp. 655-56; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 191 ff., 198 fi.; Chung-kuo Kung-nung Hung Chiin t i Ti-yi Fang-mien Chiin Ch’ang-cheng Chi (Records of the Long March of the Chinese Workers-Peasants First Front Army) (hereafter, Chung-kuo Kung-nung Hung Chiin) (Peking, 1958), pp. 464 fI.; and Whitson, High Command, passim. 50. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 190 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; and interview cited in Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 111, p . 727. 51. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 187, 195 ff.; North, Moscow, p . 175; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 157. 52. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 196 fl. 53. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 196 ft. 54. Under Nieh Jung-chen and others. See Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 196; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19, who includes Hsii Hai-tung. 55. Wales, Inside, pp. 148 ff. 56. L i T’ien-huan, i n Hsing-huo Liao-yuan ( A Single Spark C a n Start a Prairie Fire)

(Peking, 1960), pp. 437 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Klein and Clark, Dictionary.

572

Notes for Chapter 12

57. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 204 ff., 206-7; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 19 and 20. Chang, however, perhaps understandably, leaves many questions unanswered and states that they went directly to Paoan to see Mao. 58. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 100, 162, 212, 568-69, and in IS, October, 1969, p . 83. I n the Cultural Revolution, Mao reportedly confirmed that “something over 20,000” military men survived the Long March. JPRS 50792, pp. 4748. One Nationalist source even speaks of only 8,000 survivors. L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 209. Earlier accounts give somewhat higher figures, e.g., N y m Wales, “ M y Yenan Notebooks” (hereafter, “Notebooks,” unpublished manuscript, 1 9 6 1 ) , p . 4 0 ; S n o w , R e d Star, p . 386, a n d Random Notes, passim. C f . W a n g

Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 164, 186, 194; H u Ch’iao-mu, Thirty Years of the C C P (hereafter, H u Ch’iao-mu, Thirty

Years)

( P e k i n g , 1 9 5 2 ) , passim; and

Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p. 219. Whitson, High Command, passim, also gives slightly higher figures for most units, totaling perhaps 30,000. Despite the staggering losses, most political leaders survived, i n part because of the extraordinary efforts to protect them. Only K u Tso-lin of the important leaders died, while Wang Chia-hsiang was wounded. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 336. 59. Selden, i n CQ, no. 29, pp. 66-67; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 117 ff. and 564 fi.

60. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 117 ff. and 564 fi. 61. Ibid., pp. 121 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Whitson, High Command, passim; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. Ch’eng Tzu-hua had been sent from Kiangsi to help Hsii Hai-tung direct his troops to the north. Kao Lang-t’ing was left behind i n Oyiiwan, and Cheng Wei-san and others remained in the new southeastern Shensi base. 62. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 19; Selden, i n CQ, no. 29, pp. 75 ff.; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 572 ff.; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. III, p . 117. 63. Snow, Random Notes, pp. 87 and 61; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 568 ff. and 153; Mao, SW, vol. I V (Peking ed.), p . 25, footnote 22. 64. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim. 65. Selden, Yenan Way, pp. 105 fl. 66. The Communist International, February, 1936, gives a laudatory biography of Mao as a “legendary leader of the Chinese people.” See this chapter above and Chapter 15 for more discussion of Mao’s ascendancy.

Chapter 12 1. C i t e d i n H s i a o , Power Relations, p . 226. 2. McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 66 fI.; Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 155, 223-26, 258, 291-95; Swarup, Study, p . 199; North, Moscow, p. 160. 3. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 50-55; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 62; The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 38. Recent Soviet sources, however, try t o show that

the Comintern consistently argued for a broader united front i n the mid-1930’s and was opposed by many i n the CCP, including Mao. E.g., see K . V . Kykyshk i n , “The Comintern and Anti-Japanese United Front i n China,” in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p p . 353, 356-57; a n d unpublished study o f anti-Japanese

guerrilla warfare by Tetsuya Kataoka. . Chang Kuo-t’ao told one interviewer that communications with Moscow had been re-established (North, Moscow, pp. 160 ff.), but Kuo (History, vol. I I I , p. 9 7 ) , O t t o B r a u n , a n d others m a i n t a i n t h a t r a d i o contact w a s restored only i n

about mid-1936. See Heinzig, i n CQ, no. 46, pp. 284-85. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 56, concludes that i t is impossible to tell i f there was coordination or simple coincidence. See also McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 66-67; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 284.

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~~

5. Israel, Student, pp. 125 fI. 6. Ibid., pp. 129, 154, 159; Wales, Inside, pp. 97 ff.; Klaus H . Pringsheim, “The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth League (1920-1949),” CQ, no. 12, p . 83; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 66-67; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 285-86; Hsii Kwan-san, in CLG, Summer-Fall, 1970, pp. 224 ff.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. . Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 57, 49; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 139. There were also CCP statements on November 13 and 28. Wang Shih et al., eds., Brief History, p . 167.

. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 156, 153.

.Ibid., p. 169. 10. Ibid., p . 155. 11. I b i d . , pp. 155, 158. 12. Ibid., p . 170. 13. Ibid., pp. 165, 167. 14. Ibid., p . 170. Cf. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 145; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 287. 15. K y k y s h k i n , i n Delyusin e t al., eds., Comintern, p p . 359-60. 16. For the principal source on these and other developments i n Shensi, see Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 (hereafter, Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan) (Princeton, N.]J., 1967), pp. 220 ff. Nationalist sources spoke of some 30,000 Communists i n the invading forces, but Mao’s “ m a i n ” forces were said to number only some 6,000 in May, 1936. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, v o l . I I , p . 659-61;

vol. I I , p p . 53 ff. Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 642, says

the invasion started February 17. 17. Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 218-28; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I , p. 660. 18. A leading student of the period argues that the expedition was a success because of these gains. Mark Selden, “Yenan Communism: Revolution in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, 1927-1945” (hereafter, Selden, “Revolution”) (unpublished Yale University Ph.D. dissertation, 1967), p . 84. 19. Van Slyke, Enemies, p. 60. Cf. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 20. M a o , S W , v o l . I , p p . 330-31. 21. H o Kan-chih, History, p . 298; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 165 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 111, pp. 55-57, 172; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 60. 22. Kykyshkin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 353, 356-57, 360-61, claims that “ m a n y ” i n the CCP opposed the “ w i s e ” policies of the Comintern for broadening t h e u n i t e d f r o n t a n d t h a t a n e w “leftism” i n 1936 nearly wrecked

these plans. 23. Ibid., p . 361; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 64, 70; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 78. 24. McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 86. 25. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 69. 26. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 174 fi. 27. Schram, Political Thought, 1969 ed., pp. 260-61. 28. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 60, 72. 29. Ibid., pp. 60-61. 30. Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 231-32. 31. Ts’ai C h ’ i e n ( T s ’ a i Hsiao-ch’ien?) w a s secretary o f t h e latter. K u o , History, vol. I I I , p . 226. 32. Such as an August 25 “Open Letter to the Kuomintang,” and a September 17 statement. See Kykyshkin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 365. 33. Including Yeh Chien-ying and Wang Ping-nan; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 72; ’

M c L a n e , Soviet Policy, p . 8 0 ; K u o , History, v o l . 111, p p . 226 ff.; H o Kan-chih,

History, p . 296; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 34. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 78; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 291; and unpublished article on the Sian Incident by T’ien-wei Wu.

574

Notes for Chapter 13

35. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 75 ff.; and Shu Lin, “Chang Hsiieh-liang and the Record of the Sian Incident,” Ming Pao, nos. 32 and 33. 36. December 15, according to most, but December 13 according to Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 77, and December 17, according to Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 228. 37. December 15, according to Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 291. 38. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 74-75. 39. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 40. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 81. 41. The Russians later claimed credit for the release of Chiang. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (hereafter, U.S.-China White Paper) (Washington, D.C., 1949), republished as The China White Paper, Lyman Van Slyke, ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1967), p . 72.

42. There are again disagreements over dates. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 228 ff.; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 83; Snow, Random Notes, pp. 1 fi. 43. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 227-30. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20, stressed that Mao wanted to persuade Chang Hsiieh-liang to take the initiative i n dealing w i t h Chiang, while Chu Teh was for more direct and immediate action. The Party later charged that Chang Kuo-t’ao opposed a “peaceful settlement” of the Sian Incident (Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 402 ff.), but Chang states that he joined Mao and others i n ultimately arguing for a peaceful solution. Snow, Random Notes, pp. 1 f . , also reports the rage of Mao and others at receipt of the Moscow telegram instructing the release of Chiang, but, as noted above, Mao had already called for a united front with Chiang Kai-shek. See Van Slyke, Enemies, p. 64; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , p . 99; Karl A . Wittfogel, “ A Short H i s t o r y o f Chinese C o m m u n i s m ” (hereafter, Witt-

fogel, “Short History”) (unpublished paper, 1964), p. 49. According to Communists interviewed b y N y m Wales i n Y e n a n i n June, 1937, those w h o argued

against the release of Chiang Kai-shek were labeled “Trotskyists.” Wales, “Notebooks,” p . 187. 44. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 86-87. 45. Ibid., p . 85. 46. Snow, Random Notes, p . 3. 47. V a n S l y k e , Enemies, p p . 80-81; W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, v o l . I I I , pp. 101-2. See also unpublished article on the Sian Incident b y T’ien-wei Wu. 48. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 231 and 269, the latter citing interviews with Chou E n - l a i , Y e h Chien-ying, a n d L i K ’ o - n u n g ; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p .

292; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 49. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 50. As they had been invited to do at the time of the incident b y Chang Hsiiehliang. Ibid.

Chapter 13 1. The 1936 figure is an estimate. The army numbered less than 30,000, and there were only 3,000 to 4,000 Communists i n the army. Mao, i n JPRS 50792, pp.

47-48; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 164 and 194; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 209, 569. However, Chang Wen-t’ien spoke of 50,000 Communists (possibly including Youth League members?) i n North China by mid-1936, 40,000 of them i n soviet areas. Snow, Random Notes, p . 87. . According t o C h ’ i n Pang-hsien ( i n Snow, Random Notes, p . 2 3 ) , although Japanese sources estimated t h a t there were some 70,000 Communists i n the liberated

areas by 1938. Schurmann, Ideology, p . 417. 3. Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 129-30, and John Lewis, Leadership in Communist

Notes for Chapter 13

575

China (hereafter, Lewis, Leadership) (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), p . 110, citing official 1956 sources. However, i n early 1942, Mao still spoke of “several hundred thousand” Party members. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 28 (but cf. ibid, p . 162) and a Party Central directive of November 7, 1940, spoke of 600,000 Party members. Kuo, History, i n IS, March, 1970, p . 91. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 359, states that Party membership fell to 736,151 in 1942. Boyd Compton, Mao’s China (Seattle, 1952), p . xxviii, gives varying figures and points out that the Party waived any probation period for workers and hired farm hands i n order to achieve this growth. Cf. Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China (hereafter Tsou, America’s Failure) (Chicago, 1963), p . 416; Wang Shih et al.,, History, pp. 164, 186, 194. A Party directive i n Yenan of March 15, 1938, called for a “great expansion of the Party.” Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 416-17. . Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 270. A n interesting account of Party growth i n some counties o f southern Shansi, i n 193840, i s given i n Ch’i W u , Chin-Chi-

Lu-Yii, pp. 201 ff., 204. . Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien, in SCMM, no. 275, July 5, 1961, p . 6; and Hsiao Yip’ing and Chang Kung, i n JMJP, September 15, 1956, translated i n CB, no. 410, p . 39. . John Gittings, T h e R o l e o f the R e d A r m y (hereafter, G i t t i n g s , Role)

(New

York, 1967), pp. 51-59, 303; The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 177 fI.; Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (hereafter, Johnson, Peasant Nationalism) (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 73-74; Sin-ming Ch’iu, “ A History of the Chinese Communist Army” (unpublished University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. dissertation, 1958); and Whitson, High Command, passim. Variant estimates of Red Army strength for 1937 include 30,000 (Wang S h i h et al., Brief History, p . 1 8 6 ) , 42,000 ( H o K a n - c h i h , History, p . 3 2 6 ) , 50,000 (Wales, “ N o t e b o o k s , ” p . 4 0 ) , from 50,000 t o 90,000 (Johnson, Peasant Nation-

alism, passim). Nationalist sources estimated Red Army regulars at 64,000 i n 1937 and 320,000 i n September, 1945. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 321. . Gittings, Role, pp. 60, 204; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p . 76. . E.g. see Donald Gillin, “Review article of Chalmers Johnson, Peasant National-

ism and Communist Power,” i n JAS, February, 1964, pp. 269-89; Selden, “Revolution,” ch. 2; Peter Seybolt, “Yenan Education and the Chinese Revolution, 1937-1945,” (hereafter, Seybolt, “Yenan Education’) (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1969), and this chapter below. Seybolt concluded that i n the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, where there was very little contact with the Japanese, “patriotic appeals proved particularly ineffective.” The Communists were clearly flexible i n dealing w i t h different kinds of links between local elites a n d available firepower. See Patrick M a d d o x , “ A n Analysis

of Chinese Communist Takeover Tactics i n the Villages of North China, 19351949” (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1970). 10. Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 79, 85-87 fi., 100 ff., citing Kung-ch’an-tang-jen (The Communist), D e c e m b e r , 1939. See also Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p p .

49, 52. Hofheinz cites Ch’en Yiin to the effect that i t was more difficult to recruit Party members i n Shensi than i t had been in Kiangsi. Cf. also William Hinton, Fan Shen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (hereafter, W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen) ( N e w York, 1 9 6 6 ) .

11. Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 87 and 113, and this chapter below. 12. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 103 and 155; Klein and Clark, Dictionary, e.g., biography of L i Ch’ang. Intellectuals from “outside” areas made u p over two-thirds of the personnel of some levels of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region government. See Tetsuya Kataoka, review article in World Politics, April, 1972,

p . 426.

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Notes for Chapter 13

13. Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 258-59. 14. I b i d . , p . 258. 15. I b i d . , vol. 11, p . 250. 16. I b i d . , p . 264. 17. I b i d . , vol. I I I , p . 240; cf. pp. 194, 204-10, 216; and vol. I V , pp. 10-11. 18. I b i d . , vol. I , p . 267. 19. Ibid., pp. 269 and 272; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 100-101. 20. Mao, SW, vol. 1, p. 264. 21. Ibid., vol. I I , pp. 69 and 263. Cf. McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 111. 22. See Kenneth Shemaker, “ T h e ‘Agrarian Reformer’ Myth,” CQ, no. 34, pp. 66 ff.; Dorothy Borg, America and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (hereafter, Borg, Crisis) (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); Tsou, America’s Failure, pp. 177-235;

Snow, Random Notes, p. 81; Mao, SW, vol. I I I , p. 99 ff. 23. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 241. 24. Ibid., pp. 259, 322-45. 25. Mao, SW, vol. III, p. 131; cf. ibid., vol. I V , p. 274. 26. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 87. Cf. McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 110; Kuo, in IS, April, 1969, p . 36; and Wittfogel, “Short History,” p . 57. 27. Schram, Political Thought, p . 228-29. 28. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 97. 29. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 90. 30. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 247. 31. Ibid.; and Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 91. 32. See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, ch. 8 and pp. 183-84. 33. See Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 33 fl.; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 334, 314; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 324; a n d M a o , S W , v o l . I V , p p . 152-54, 258-59.

34. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 42-43. Wang Ching-wei, perhaps fortunately for him, died of illness i n 1944; while, i n 1946, founding members of the CCP Ch’en Kung-po and Chou Fo-hai were executed and sentenced to life imprisonment, respectively, for “betraying the country.” The Communists launched propa-

ganda attacks on Wang Ching-wei especially i n 1940-41, possibly because i t was admitted that “ o n one occasion capitulationist ideas appeared” also in the C C P . M a o , S W , v o l . 1 V , p . 214.

35. According to L i u Shao-ch’i, there were also many armed forces, including about a dozen i n Shansi, among them bandits, Red Spears, Black Spears, and the like. Schwarz, Liu Shao-ch’i, p . 18. 36. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21. 37. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 287. 38. Mao later claimed that i t had been written on July 4—that is, three days before the Marco Polo Bridge incident. See Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 248; M a o , S W , v o l . I I , p . 79. O n J u l y 17, C h o u E n - l a i , C h ’ i n Pang-hsien, a n d

L i n Po-ch’ii talked w i t h Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders at Lushan on problems of the united front, and, on September 23, Chiang Kai-shek praised the Communist manifesto as a “triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration.” Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 182; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 93.

39. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 92-93. 40. Ibid., pp. 103-4; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 185; H o Kan-chih, History, p. 323; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 289 ff., 296 fI. 41. Ibid., p. 288; The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 151, 198; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 108. 42. Mao complained that the Nationalists refused formally to recognize the ShenKan-Ning Border Region. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 143-44. 43. Selden, “ R e v o l u t i o n , ” p p . 140 a n d 202. However, M a o , S W , vol. I V , p . 2 1 ,

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577

denies any Nationalist aid to the Eighth Route Army. See also Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 93-94; The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 43, 130. 44. The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 70; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 227, 234. 45. Kuo, History, vol. 111, p. 456. Cf. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 185; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 163-64; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 228, 234. A September 25, 1937, Central Committee resolution forbade Communist entry into the Nanking government, but the Party’s Sixth Plenum proposed just this. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 465.

46. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 94; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 47. Kuo, History, i n IS, September, 1969, p . 87. 48. Ibid.; Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 271, 283; and this chapter below. 49. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 96. 50. Mao, SW, vol. I I I , pp. 161-62, 243, 253; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 203-4, 235-36; The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 67, 71; H o Kan-chih, History,

pp. 348-49; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p. 204; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 526 ff.; and Michael Lindsay, “China (1937-1945),” i n D . M . Condit et al., eds., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 1 (hereafter, Lindsay, in Condit et al., eds., Challenge) (Washington, D . C . , 1968), p . 154.

51. Mao, S W , vol. II, p . 111. 52. Ibid., vol. 1V, p . 214. 53. Ibid., vol. I , p . 272. A recent Soviet source accuses Mao of shifting from “left to right” opportunism on the question of the united front after the Sian Incident and of wishing to mute the class struggle, as i n a propaganda directive of October, 1937, a n d a t the S i x t h Plenum a year l a t e r . Kykyshkin, i n Delyusin

et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 372-73. 54. Mao, SW, vol. I I , p . 109. 55. McLane, Soviet Policy, p. 107; Kuo, History, in IS, February, 1970, pp. 58 ff. 56. Admittedly, the evidence for this interpretation is tenuous, but i t is Chang Kuot’ao’s subsequent reconstruction. See h i s Preface t o U R I , eds., Liu Shao-ch’i,

vol. I , pp. 6-8; and Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20 and 21. Cf. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 237 ff.; McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 118 ff.; and Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 106n. 57. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p. 239; Mao, SW, vol. I I , p. 109. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20, speaks of February, 1937, as a time of maximum pressure against him. 58. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20, and Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 239-40. 59. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. 60. Ibid.; and K u o , History, vol. I I I , pp. 254 ff. A n April 13, 1936, letter of Liu’s (under the pen name T’ao Shang-hsing) implicitly calls for an alliance even with Chiang Kai-shek, but a Cultural Revolution source states that Liu Shao-ch’i, in a letter to Chang Wen-t’ien dated March 4, 1937, praised the “third left line.” URI, eds., L i u Shao-ch’i, v o l . I , p p . 11 ff.; a n d R e d Guard document o f May,

1967, translated i n CB, no. 834, p . 4. 61. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 275 fI.; and Tsu-kuo Yi-chou (Motherland Weekly), April 16, 1967, p . 17. Chou En-lai was no doubt far more honest when he reportedly stated that Liu was considered a model for his work i n the “ w h i t e ” areas and that Liu’s errors and opposition to Mao began only later. See JPRS 44574, March 4, 1968, p. 28; and cf. Wang Kuang-mei’s (Madame Liu Shao-ch’i) confession of April, 1967, i n CB, no. 848, p . 10. Criticisms of L i u Shao-ch’i during the late 1960’s made little mention of his “rightist” arguments, either at the Tsunyi or May, 1937, conferences, presumably because of the implications such criticism might have for Mao’s alliance with Liu against the “rightism” of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ch’en Shao-yii. By contrast, Maoist critics

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freely attacked Liu’s alleged betrayals of the CCP i n 1925, 1927, and 1929, his policy of permitting confession under duress i n 1936, alleged negotiations with Japanese collaborators i n 1941, and his advocacy, a decade later, of a slower, more compromising approach to the civil war, with parliamentary methods rather than armed struggle, possibly because Liu’s connections with Mao in those years were less crucial to Mao’s career. See “ L i u Shao-ch’i’s Five Betrayals of the CCP,” trans. in CQ, no. 37, pp. 175-80. See also Facts and Features, January 22, 1969, pp. 6-8, 21-26; IS, April, 1969, pp. 11 ff.; and Chang Kuot’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20. N o copy of Liu’s 1937 report seems to be available, although a fragment of a letter from Liu to Chang Wen-t’ien, dated March 4, 1937, reportedly praised a Soviet statement that, “Without the help of the International, the Chinese Party could not lead the Chinese revolution,” and bemoaned the shortage of good leadership. Liu also is said to have stated, The Kuomintang is a mighty organization. We may even say that n o Party in the world has ever had such mighty power as i t does. I t holds great political power, has armed forces of 9 million men, and has legal status both at home I am of the opinion that and abroad. A l l these are realistically existing. the national revolution can be carried out more smoothly under the banner of the Kuomintang’s Three People’s Principles than under other flags. I t is so at least in the phase of democratic revolution. Cited by Wang Hsueh-wen, i n IS, September, 1968, p . 18. 62. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20; and Peking Review, July 2, 1971, p . 9. Yang Shang-k’un replaced Liu as secretary of the North China Bureau. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 63. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 20; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 286 ff., 296 fi. 64. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21. 65. Ibid.; North, Moscow, p . 180; Gittings, Role, p . 52; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. 111, p . 728; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 291 ff., 301 ff.; and in IS, November, 1969, pp. 73 ff. Although Chang Kuo-t’ao lost this argument, as all others after his arrival i n northern Shensi, and claimed he was shut out of most Party work i n 1937 by Mao and Chang Wen-t’ien, he retained considerable prestige and power in the CCP for another six months. H e was listed seventh of twenty-five members appointed in December, 1937, to prepare for the Party’s Seventh Congress, and continued as a vice-chairman of the Executive Committee of the government. 66. Mao, SW, vol. II, pp. 109-10. 67. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 330 ff. 68. Ibid., pp. 326 fI., states that the group arrived in October, while Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21, states i t was in December. 69. Wales, “Notebooks,” pp. 100-102. 70. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21. I n an interview with me and T’ien-wei W u (Toronto, September 4 , 1 9 7 0 ) , M r . Chang stressed that Stalin d i d n o t k n o w

Mao and hence hoped Mao would prove a proper leader of the CCP, but that Stalin “ d i d not like” Chang himself and probably would have opposed Chang’s leadership even had the Long March turned out differently. 71. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 336 ff. Liu Shao-ch’i was added to the Political Bureau in May, 1937, according to Chang Kuo-t’ao, or possibly earlier. See Klein

and Clark, Dictionary; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 20, 21. 72. Kuo, History, vol. 11, pp. 342, 368 fi. 73. Ibid., p . 341, and in IS, September, 1969, p . 85, states that Chou’s “committee

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579

for work with ‘white’ troops” was incorporated under the united front department. However, others argue that Ch’en Shao-yii headed the united front department. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 117; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 74. Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 372 ff.; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, chs. 20 and 21, complains often of the infrequency of meetings during the war years. 75. According to later Communist reports, Chang also talked with Chiang Kai-shek and Ch’en Tu-hsiu in Wuhan. Kuo, History, vol. 111, 402 f . , 406. Chang replied in a local newspaper (Sao Tang Pao, April 22) by accusing the CCP of insincerity i n its interpretation of the united front, of bad judgment in view of the impossibility of pursuing the class and national struggle simultaneously, and of bad faith in its dealings with him. H e declared that the Communist response to the Nationalists was “ n o t enough, and hence, I have demanded that the CCP central leadership give a more sincere response to the manifesto of the Kuomintang.” Ch’en Shao-yii, Ch'in Pang-hsien, and Chou En-lai, as the senior Party officials in Wuhan, gave their side of the dispute i n the N e w China Daily on April 29, and a flood of articles i n Party journals followed. I n his Autobiography (chs. 20 and 21), i n addition to expressing doubt about the Party’s united front policies i n the early war period, Chang Kuo-t’ao expresses anger at the unfair struggles against him after the split on the Long March and also at Ch’en Shao-yii’s report of anti-Trotskyist purges in both the U.S.S.R. and Sinkiang. Fear of his o w n implication i n spreading anti-Trotskyist activities may have been an important reason why Chang quit the Party, and he relates that Ch’en Shao-yii boasted about this time of the apprehension in Tihua, Sinkiang, of alleged Trotskyists L i T’e, Yii Hsiu-sung, and other former associates of Chang. There supposedly was increasing anti-Party “Trotskyist” activity i n China i n the late 1930’s (e.g., see Index to Hsiieh, Bibliography, vol. 11) and much talk of i t in Yenan i n the spring of 1937. See Wales, “Notebooks,” pp. 101 ff., 180 ff., 184, 187-88, etc.; also Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. III, pp. 119-30; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 106; Snow, Random Notes, pp. 78 fl.; and Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 358. 76. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21. A recent Soviet source confirms Mao’s receptiveness to Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s request to re-enter the CCP (Glunin, i n Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 2 9 6 ) , a n d another ascribes the i n i t i a t i v e f o r rein-

stating Ch’en to the Yenan leadership, which is said to have sent an emissary to Wuhan to talk w i t h Ch’en i n late 1937 (Kagan, Trotskyist Movement, p p . 15556).

77. Cited in Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 395-96. 78. See United States Information Service, trans., “ T h e Last Papers of Ch’en Tuhsiu (mimeographed; Hong Kong, 1969). Ch’en’s writings of the “ G o d that failed” genre are remarkable for their orientation toward events i n Europe and for Ch’en’s renewed concern about the roots and essentials of “democracy.” H e came to feel that “bourgeois democracy” would have to precede “people’s democracy” and that, for the moment, Western-style “democracy” offered more freedom than Soviet or German totalitarianism. 79. This phrase of Mao’s i s i n SW, vol. I I , p. 272. I t is sad to speculate that Stalin’s paranoia, encouraged i n the CCP i n the critical years of 1937-38 by Ch’en Shao-yii on his return from the Soviet Union, prevented at least a partial rehabilitation of the real founder of Chinese Communism. See Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21 and passim. Curiously, Chang portrays Mao as a shrewder manipulator of power than Stalin and reports that Mao criticized Stalin’s excesses and compromised many intra-Party disputes within the CCP, though always, i n Chang’s view, for his own ends. 80. See H u Hua et al., eds., Lectures, pp. 382 ff.; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 132-33. Mao argued,

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580

As the policy of the Kuomintang is to restrict our development, there is n o reason whatever for us to put forward such a slogan, which merely binds us hand and foot. A t present, there are things for which we should secure approval beforehand, such as changing the designations of three divisions into things which we should first turn into accomplished those of three armies facts and then inform the Kuomintang, such as expanding our troops to more still other things, like convening the Border Region than 200,000 strong Assembly, which we, believing that the Kuomintang will not give consent at also other present, shall for the moment do without asking for approval things which we will for the moment neither do nor ask for permission to do, e.g., things which, i f done, would jeopardize the whole situation. I n short, neither should we break u p the united front, nor should we bind ourselves hand and foot; hence the slogan of “everything through the united front” should not be put forward. Mao, S W ,

vol. II, p . 265.

81. The more complete text reads, The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are the foundation of the antiJapanese united front, but, of these two, i t is the Kuomintang that occupies first place. Without [ i t ] i t would be inconceivable to undertake and pursue the war of resistance. I n the course of its glorious history, the Kuomintang has been responsible [ f o r many achievements]. Today, i t is once more leading the great anti-Japanese war. I t enjoys the historic heritage of the Three People’s Principles; i t has had two great leaders in succession—Mr. Sun Yat-sen and M r . Chiang Kai-shek; i t has a great number of faithful and patriotic active members. I n carrying out the anti-Japanese war, and i n organizing the antiJapanese united front, the Kuomintang occupies the position of leader. Under the single great condition that i t support to the end the war of resistance and the united front, one can foresee a brilliant future for the Kuomintang. . . .

Schram, Political Thought, pp. 228-29. 82. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 505-8. According to Chiang Kai-shek, at the time of the Sixth Plenum, Chou En-lai made similar appeals for unity to him in Hankow. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 87-88. 83. Kuo, History, vol. I11, pp. 449 fI., 471 fI., 482, 491 fi. 84. Mao’s first reference to Liu Shao-ch’i i n SW is i n his concluding speech to the Sixth Plenum when he stated, “Comrade Liu Shao-ch’i rightly said that if ‘everything through’ simply meant ‘through’ Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, then that will only be the submission of one side [the Communists] to the other, and not at all ‘through the united f r o n t . ” Mao, SW, vol. I I , pp. 264-65. Such references to Liu Shao-ch’i presumably now will be censored, as passages on other topics have been. L i u , whom Mao praised in 1938 for attacking the “right,” is now condemned for “right opportunism” throughout his career. See also Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 351, and IS, December, 1969, pp. 79-82, and February, 1970, p . 8 6 ; a n d W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, vol. I I I , p . 132.

Chapter 14 1. Kuo, History, vol. 111, p p . 499 ff. For the Chinese o f these organizations, see the original i n Fei-ch’ing Yiieh-pao (Bandit Conditions Monthly), January, 1969, pp. 98 ff. Cf. Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 196 fI., and chapters 3 and 9 above. 2. About 1939, the South China Bureau had jurisdiction over Szechwan, Sikang, Kweichow, Yiinnan, western Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Hong

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581

Kong; the Southeast China Bureau over most of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, and Fukien; and the Central Plains Bureau over eastern Hupeh, Honan, northern Kiangsu, and southwestern Shantung. There were three district committees under the Central China Bureau, for Yenfu, central Kiangsu, and Huai-Hai. Liu Ying, Secretary of the Chekiang Committee, was captured and executed in February 1942, and u p to 2,500 cadres defected at about that time. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 499 fi., 515 fi., 563 fI., and i n IS, September, 1969, pp. 91-92; November, 1969, pp. 64, 66-67; June, 1970, p . 66; and August, 1970, p . 66; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. . Kuo, in IS, November, 1969, pp. 66-67. . See the “Decision on the Provisional Organizational Structure of Party Committees,” i n Kuo, History, vol. 111, pp. 499 ff. The 1922, 1928, 1945, 1956, and 1969 Party constitutions make n o mention of regional committees and congresses, but only of central, provincial, and local levels. . I b i d . , and in IS, December, 1969, pp. 77-78, 81; February, 1970, p . 68; June, 1970, pp. 70-71; and August, 1970, p . 63. The 1928 Constitution already had called for control committees. . E.g., Nieh Jung-chen i n northeastern Shansi, L o Jung-huan in Shantung, and Ch’en Y i i n Central China. Those cadres deemed unsuitable or unneeded for full-time Party tasks were directed to seek employment elsewhere or in some cases were recommended to Party Central for living allowances. Ibid., IS, June, 1970, pp. 70-71. . I b i d . , and i n IS, February, 1970, p . 62; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. The Sixth Plenum elected new members of the Central Committee, including Lin Po-ch’ii, Tung Pi-wu, and others. . Kuo, IS, February, 1970, pp. 62, 68, 77; August, 1970, p . 59; and December, 1970, p . 68; and Steve Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Perspectives on International Affairs, 1937-1941” (unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1 9 7 1 ) .

. Kuo, History, vol. 111, p. 292; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 157, 159; and see Chapter 13 above. 10. The table is from Gittings, Role, p . 303. See also Gittings, Role, pp. 51 fI., and 59; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 73 ff., 215; Lindsay, in Condit et al., eds., Challenge, p . 155; and Schwarz, Liu Shao-ch’i, pp. 35 and 41. Mao Tse-tung claimed 910,000 i n the Red Army i n April, 1945. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 253. 11. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 321. 12. Griffith, Army, p . 72. 13. F . F . Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (hereafter, Liu, Military History) (Princeton, N . J . , 1 9 5 6 ) , p p . 112, 136, 205, 209, 254; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 295.

14. The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 180; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p. 77; Schwarz, Liu Shao-ch’i, pp. 35 and 41; and Griffith, Army, p . 72. According t o Griffith, some two-thirds o f the Red Army i n 1943 were local guerrillas.

15. Gittings, Role, p . 204. 16. Ibid., pp. 60 and 204; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p . 76. 17. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 194. 18. Compton, Mao’s China, p . 163, 6; Gittings, Role, pp. 113-14. 19. See Griffith, Army, p . 61; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 300; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 20. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 128 and 144. 21. Ibid., p . 76. 22. I n addition t o the areas l i s t e d i n the table, other sources identify Communist bases b y 1944 in northeastern Hopeh, and later in other areas of Honan, Hunan, and Kiangsi. See maps i n Perevertailo ef al., eds., Outline, Appendix; Guillermaz,

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Histoire, pp. 306-7; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 114-15; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 187-88. 23. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 108 ff.; and Kuo, in IS, October, 1969, pp. 83 fl.

24. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 105-6; and Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 278 fI.; and this chapter above. 25. Gillin, Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 257 ff.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Mao, SW (Peking e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 227; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p p . 105-6; Kuo, i n IS,

November, 1969, p. 72; Guillermaz, Histoire, p. 308; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 188-89; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 364 ff; Hofheinz, in Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51; M u Hsin, Chin-Sui Chieh-fang-ch’ii Niao-k’an ( A Bird’s-Eye View of the Shansi-Suiyiian Liberated Area) (Hsinghsien, Shansi, 1946), passim; and K’ang-Jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch’i Chieh-fang-ch’ii Kaik’uang ( A General View of the Liberated Areas in the Anti-Japanese War) (hereafter, K’ang-Jih) (Peking, 1953), pp. 194 ff. 26. See K’ang-Jih, pp. 24 ff.; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 94-104, 34-35; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 302 ff.; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 187; H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 328, 339; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 333 ff.; and Kuo, i n IS, October, 1969, pp. 84 ff., and November, 1969, p . 67. 27. Schwarz, Liu Shao-ch’i, pp. 13 and 38. 28. Ibid., pp. 10 ff.; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p . 101; and Nieh Jung-chen, K’ang-Jih Mo-fan Ken-chu-ti: Chin-Ch’a-Chi Pien-ch’ii ( A Model Anti-Japanese Base: The Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region) (hereafter, Nieh Jung-chen, Chin-Ch’aChi) (no city given, 1939), passim. 29. Nieh Jung-chen, Chin-Ch’a-Chi, pp. 1, 19; K’ang-Jih, p. 24; The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 141; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 302; Hofheinz in Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 30. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 306; Kuo, i n IS, October, 1969, p . 85; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p. 108. 31. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 56 ff.; and Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 54 ff., 60 ff. 32. However, P’eng Teh-huai allegedly admitted to a major role i n the Hundred Regiments Campaign, along with Chu Teh, Yang Shang-k’un, P’eng Chen, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing. URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, pp. 33 and 192. Cf. Mao, SW, vol. I I I , pp. 193 and 199, and vol. I I , p . 275; Kuo, History, in IS, September, 1969, pp. 91-92; Red Guard Document of November, 1967, in CB, no. 851, p . 6; JPRS 49826, p . 10; Peking Review, September 1, 1967; and unpublished study of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare by Tetsuya Kataoka. According to Kataoka, there were also reports of pressure from Moscow for such an offensive. 33. Lindsay, i n Condit et al., eds., Challenge, p . 168; Kuo, in IS, December, 1970, p . 60; The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 141. Hofheinz, in Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 5 1 ; a n d K u o , i n IS, October, 1969, p . 8 6 , a n d November, 1969, p p .

73 ff. According to the latter, Communist tactics included the “revolutionary double-dealing policy of a Red essence under a white facade.” Such tactics involved “deals” with the enemy and puppet-style governments, which the Nationalists claimed amounted to Communist collaboration with Japan. 34. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 106-7; Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (hereafter, Belden, Shakes) (New York, 1949), pp. 50 ff.; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 304; Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 340-41; Kuo, in IS, November, 1969, pp. 64 fi.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; K’ang-Jih, pp. 77 ff; and Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 18 ff. According to Ch’i, there were several thousand Communist and Youth League activists in southern Hopeh in the mid1930s.

35. Belden, Shakes, pp. 50 ff.; Kuo, i n IS, November, 1969, pp. 64 ff.; Ch’i Wu,

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583

Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 47, 201 ff.; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 304-5. There were reports of u p to 30 million inhabitants of these areas, but Guillermaz believes that only about 5 million were effectively controlled by the Communists. I n the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region, there were 59 counties and between 4.2 and 6 or 7 million inhabitants, while the Hopeh-Shantung-Hunan Military Region, established i n March, 1939, had 118 counties and 10.8 million inhabitants. According to L i u Shao-ch’i, O n the Party, Peking, 1952, there were 15,000 Party cadres i n the T’aihang Military District i n early 1945. The ChinCh’a-Chi and Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii bases merged i n 1948. Ch’i W u , Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 202-3, speaks of Party members expanding from 400 i n March 1939, to 13,000 i n September and 30,397 i n February, 1940, i n one area of western Shantung. 36. Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 308-310; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Ch’i Wu, ChinChi-Lu-Yii, p . 203; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 111-12; Kuo, i n IS, November, 1969, p . 65; and K’ang-Jih Ken-chu-ti Lii Hsi-pei ch’ii ( A n AntiJapanese Base in Northwest Shantung) (no city given, 1939), passim. A branch headquarters of the Party was located at Chufan. Hsii Kwan-san, i n CLG, Summer, 1970, p . 222.

37. Suh, Korean Communist Movement, pp. 244, 246-47, 282, 285, 291; Suh, Documents, pp. 429 ff.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 38. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Paul Heyer and William Heaton, “ T h e Cultural Revolution i n Inner Mongolia,” CQ, no. 36, p. 115; and Wales, “Notebooks,” pp. 104— 6. According to Wales, before 1941, Communists of various nationalities studied a t t h e C e n t r a l P a r t y S c h o o l ; i n June, 1937, there were eleven Mongols, ten

Moslems, eight Lolos, and four Tibetans. 39. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, pp. 187 ff.; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and George Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili-Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 12-13. 40. Kuo, i n IS, March, 1970, p . 73; Yang Shang-kuei, Border Region, p. 132; The Unquenchable Spark, passim; Guillermaz, Histoire, p. 311; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 128-29; and Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , p . 371; a n d K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary.

41. Kuo, i n IS, November, 1968, pp. 40 fI.; December, 1968, p . 41; June, 1969, pp. 41 ff.; and March, 1970, pp. 73, 75, 83-84; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 74-75; and Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 310 ff. 42. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p. 128; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 355 ff., and i n IS, March, 1970, pp. 73 ff. According to the latter, Chang Yiin-yi and Cheng Pao-chen headed the 3d and 4th detachments. 43. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 526 ff.; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 311; and Whitson, High Command, passim. 44. M a o , S W , vol. III, p . 204-7, 161-62, 2 5 3 - 5 4 . 45. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p p . 132-36. A c c o r d i n g t o K u o , History, v o l . 111, p . 524, the Sixth Plenum of October, 1938, had directed the N e w Fourth Army to move into central and northern Kiangsu i n order to link u p with Eighth Route Army units i n Shantung. 46. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 132 fI.; and Kuo, i n IS, April, 1970, pp. 66 ff. 47. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 523 ff., and i n IS, February, 1970, p . 65; April, 1970, p . 75; Hsii Kuan-san, i n CLG, Summer, 1970, pp. 229 ff.; Mao, SW, vol. III, p . 204; Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), pp. 257-59; Whitson, High Command, passim; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 136-40, 143, 155; Paul H . Kreisberg, “The New Fourth Army Incident and the United Front i n China” (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1952), passim; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 251-52; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 9295; and H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 361 ff. Liu Shao-ch’i’s Central Plains Bureau

384

Notes for Chapter 15 was evidently heavily involved i n efforts to bring Hsiang Ying’s forces under

closer Party discipline. Yeh T’ing died in an air crash in April, 1946, on his way to Yenan after his release from prison. 48. The Nationalists claimed 395 Communist attacks on them from November, 1940, to October, 1941. Kuo, i n IS, October, 1969, p . 91, and November, 1969, p p . 73 fl.

49. Ibid., June, 1970, pp. 66-68; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 144-45; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 50. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 51. Ibid.; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 144 fI.; Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 3 4 8 ; Guillermaz, Histoire, p p . 3 1 5 - 1 6 ; W a n g Chien-min, Draft History,

vol.

I I I , p . 377; Kuo, in IS, October, 1969, p . 83; The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 180; and Feng Pai-chii, i n Chung-kuc Kung-ch’an-tang tsai Chung-nan, pp. 35 ff.

Chapter 15 1. There were continued shellings of fortifications, according to Mao, SW, vol. IV, p . 124, and heavy Japanese bombing i n 1938. Harrison Forman, Report from R e d China ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 5 ) , p . 4 6 ; c f . Selden, Yenan Way, c h . 4 .

2. According to Yung-ying Hsii, A Survey of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region (hereafter, Yung-ying Hsu, Survey) (New York, 1945), p . 20, there were 30,000 residents of Fushih (the old name of Yenan) i n 1930, whereas a Nationalist source states t h a t , i n t h e early 1940’s, there were 30,000 Communists a n d 10,000 residents o f t h e c i t y ( K u o , i n IS, A u g u s t , 1970, p . 7 3 ) . According t o other sources, there were 20,000 C o m m u n i s t cadres (i.e., w i t h Party o r government

jobs i n Shen-Kan-Ning i n 1943) (Kuo, i n IS, September, 1970, p . 48), and Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 66, stated that there were more than 10,000 “literate cadres” in Yenan. However, Mao later referred to only 7,000 residents of Yenan i n 1946— 47. John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967 (hereafter, Survey) (London, 1968), p. 84. The prevalence of old customs was indicated by the existence of more than 2,000 spirit mediums i n the border region, while, as late as 1946, there was still foot-binding i n the area despite Communist denunciations of the practice. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” ch. 6. For vivid descriptions of the famine of 1927-30, see Snow, Red Star, pp. 205 ff.

. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , especially ch. 33; and Selden, Yenan Way, chs. 2 and 5. . Selden, Yenan Way, ch. 4; K’ang-Jih, pp. 6-7; Shen-Kan-Ning Ts’an-yi Hui Wenhsien Hui-chi (Collected Documents of the Shen-Kan-Ning Assemblies), p . 74; Wales, Inside, pp. 342-43; and Kuo, History, vol. I11, p p . 558 ff. . Cf. Mao, SW, vol. I I I , p . 203. The term “new democracy” was i n widespread use after 1937, but Mao’s famous article of that name and recommendations for the three-thirds system were not publicized until early 1940. See this chapter below. . Selden, Yenan Way, p . 130. ~

. Chin-Ch’a-Chi, because of its much greater population, had only one representative for every 30,000 people. See Chinese Communist Movement, p . 135; Mao, SW, vol. I l l , pp. 191, 201; Selden, Yenan Way, p . 133; and Kuo-chun Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 48-49, 65-66. . Yung-ying Hsu, Survey, pp. 9-14. Hsu states that the Communist area comprised 32,685 square miles a n d that the Communists controlled sixteen counties

and parts of twenty others, which were reorganized into thirty new counties late i n the war. According to the Nationalists, the Communists controlled only about 400,000 people i n 1936 but almost 2 million people i n Shensi b y January, 1939. Kuo, History, vol. 111, p . 582. See also The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 141; a n d W a n g C h i e n - m i n , Draft History, vol. I I I , p . 216. According t o Wang, p .

218, there were twenty-six or twenty-seven counties under Communist control as

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Notes for Chapter 15

of July, 1941, nineteen i n Shensi (about one-quarter of the province), six i n Kansu, and one i n Ninghsia. . See Selden, Yenan Way, ch. 4; Snow, Random Notes, p . 87; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 262, 330; and Kuo, i n IS, July, 1968, p . 83. According to Yung-ying Hsu, Survey, pp. 17 ff., i n 1940, there were 1,347,111 people i n the Shen-Kan-Ning base, of whom 1,065,530 were i n Shensi, 252,686 i n K a n s u , 17,037 i n N i n g h s i a , a n d 11,858 i n Suiyiian. O n page 19, H s u

gives the 1930 population of the principal Communist divisions of its border area:

Divisions

Population

Suiteh Yenan Sanpien Kuanchung Lungtung

649,807 223,243 101,376 175,420 197,265

Persons per Square mile 121.1 223 13.7 92.9 24.6

10. Some of the public security forces may have been drawn from self-defense units; see L i n d s a y , i n Condit e t al., eds., Challenge, p . 156; M a o , S W , v o l . I V , p . 255;

Kuo, i n IS, July, 1969, p . 85, and August, 1970, pp. 72 ff. 11. Selden, Yenan Way, pp. 145-46, 154; Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 51. Another source estimated that late i n the war there were 60,000 Communist-led troops i n Shen-Kan-Ning, 665,000 i n other North China Communist bases, and 200,000 i n Central China areas. Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (hereafter, Stein, Challenge) (New York, 1945), p . 180. 12, Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 348; cf. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 111. 13. Selden, Yenan Way, p . 144; K’ang-Jih, p. 13; Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p . 73; Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 21. Many observers testified to Communist successes i n arousing all sections of the populace, from the “little devils” who served as messenger boys to grizzled oldsters i n various support groups. 14. See Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 50-52; James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (hereafter, Townsend, Participation) (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), p . 61; Selden, Yenan Way, p . 258; H o Kan-chi, History, p . 397. According to Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, p . 206, the Party directed that Party members should not exceed 1 or 5 per cent of a village (depending on its size). 15. Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, especially pp. 50-52. Cf. Snow, Random Notes, p . 87. 16. Mark Selden, “ T h e Yenan Legacy: Mass Line,” i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 111 ff.; and Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 11 ff. 17. Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 151-52, 154 fi.; Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 588 fi.; M a o , S W , vol. I I I , p p . 190, 200, 212, 219; a n d Kuo-chiin C h a o , Agrarian Policy,

pp. 65-66. 18. Morale problems were frequently severe, and i n some units desertion rates of 16 to 21 per cent were reported i n 1939. Tetsuya Kataoka, unpublished study of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. According to Japanese sources, cited by Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p . 58, the population of Communist areas i n North China fell from 44 million to 25 million i n 1941-42, although Mao and others speak of the population under the Communists falling from 100 million to 50 million and then rising again to 80 million. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 162-63; Chu Teh, O n the Battlefronts of the Liberated Areas (Peking, 1952), p . 23; Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 247; T h e Chinese Communist Movement, p . 75. H u H u a et al.,

eds., Lectures, p . 439, states that expansion began again i n late 1943.

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19. K’ang-Jih, p . 7; and Mao, SW, vol. I I I , p . 264; vol. I V , pp. 133-34, 138, 141-42. Later, Mao stated that 750,000 Nationalist troops blockaded all Communist bases (ibid., vol. I V , p . 224); but the U.S.-China White Paper, p . 160, fixed the figure at 330,000. 20. Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 203 ff.; and Michael Lindsay, “The Taxation System of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 1938-1945,” CQ, no. 42, pp. 2, 4, 9. Another report about Chin-Ch’a-Chi stated that the landlords paid 52 per cent of their income i n taxes, rich peasants 18 per cent, middle peasants 10 per cent, and poor peasants 4 to 5 per cent. Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 45, 54, 52-53, 82. I n the Kiangsi period, taxes generally ranged from 5 to 15 per cent.

Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 14, 135, 166, 292, and see this chapter above. 21. Selden, Yenan Way, p p . 201 ff.; Lindsay, i n C Q , n o . 4 2 , p . 4 ; Yung-ying, Hsu, Survey, passim; and Chapter 16 below. M a o stated that inflation was still a problem i n Communist areas i n 1948. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 275. For Nationalist areas, incredibly, some $5.5 million in 1937 had shrunk to only $1 in 1949. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, p . 294. 22. M a o , S W , vol. 1 V , p . 106. 23. See Selden, in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 112 ff.; and Selden, “Revolution,” p. 134. 24. Mao to John S. Service i n August, 1944, cited in Schram, “What Makes Mao a Maoist,” N e w York Times Magazine, March 8, 1970, pp. 36 fi. Communist cadres also lived frugally, being paid only about $50 (U.S.) per year. See Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p . 54. 25. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 231-32; Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 201 ff.; and in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 130 ff.; Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 60-61, 72; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 24, 140, 66; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 416 fi.; and Franklin H o , “Comments,” in Paul K . T . Sih, ed., The Strenuous Decade: Chinese Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937 (hereafter, Strenuous Decade) (New York, 1970), pp. 194 ff. 26. Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 38 ff., 43-44; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 276 fI.; Mao, SW, vol. I I I , pp. 220-21, and vol. IV, p . 7; and Chalmers Johnson, “Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period,” in H o and Tsou, eds., Crisis, vol. I , pp. 418 ff. The turn to more radical “bourgeois land redistribution policies” came during and after 1946. Within another ten years came socialist collectivization. 27. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 277-78, 280-81; and Kuo-chun Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 43-44 fi. 28. Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 51, 63-64; George Taylor, The Struggle for North China (New York, 1940), p. 112. 29. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 154-55; Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 41-42; Chiin-tu Hsiieh, ed., Bibliography, vol. I I ; Tokuda Noriyuki, “Chiikyoto shi Kankei Shiryo Mokuroku,” (“Bibliography of Materials Related to the CCP”) I Ho, 1967, nos. 9, 10; Tokuda Noriyuki, “Yenan Jiki N i Okeru Chitkyo Shuppan Zasshi Mokuroku,” (“Bibliography of Chinese Communist Publications of the

Yenan Period”), Ajia Kenkyu vol. X I I I , no. 2, October, 1966; Mao, SW, vol. IV, pp. 225-26; and Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 68-69. 30. Klein a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; Frederick Y u , Mass Persuasion, p . 162; Houn, Change, pp. 27 ff.; Wang Chia-hua, August 25, 1957, in SCMP, no. 1614, pp. 3 4 ; and Chang Ching-lu, ed., Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Ch’u-pan Shih-liao (Historical Materials on Contemporary Chinese Publishing) (Peking, 1954), pp. 243 fi., 248, 281, 296-97.

31. Heinzig, i n CQ, no. 46, pp. 284-85; Kykyshkin, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, p . 376; and Kuo, i n IS, June, 1970, pp. 64, 70.

Notes for Chapter 16

587

32. Quoted in a more literal version by Lindsay, in Condit et al., eds., Challenge, p . 151.

33. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” especially pp. 255-57; Hofheinz and Selden, in Barnett, ed,, Politics, pp. 44, 146; Kuo, in IS, July, 1969, p . 85; Seybolt, “The Yenan Revolution i n Mass Education,” unpublished paper given to the Association for Asian Studies, April, 1970, pp. 3, 45-46; Michael Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, 1941-47 (New York, 1950), passim; Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 68-69; Stein, Challenge, p . 260. A large conference on culture and education held i n Yenan from October 11 to November 18, 1944, discussed problems and successes achieved u p to that time. See Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” passim. 34. This information has been drawn from a variety of sources, most of them ambiguous if not conflicting. See Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 136, 149; Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 75-76; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 334-35; Snow, Random Notes, p . 2 4 ; K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; Hofheinz, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 4 4 ; a n d

Yenan Ta-hsiieh Kai-k’uang (General Information on Yenan University) (no city given, 1944). The Central Committee’s propaganda department was responsible for the education of Party members. See Kuo, in IS, August, 1968, pp. 41-42; February, 1970, p . 59; and June, 1970, p . 69. 35. See K’ang-Jih Chiin-cheng Ta-hsiieh (The Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy) (no city given, June, 1938), pp. 15 fI.; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” passim. The central school of K’ang-Ta is said to have moved as far east as Wuhsiang, Shansi, and later to Tz’uhsien, Hopeh. Others believe the central school was in Suiteh. See forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation on K’ang-Ta by Phyllis Andors, Columbia University. 36. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. Ch’en Shao-yii later listed Teng Fa with Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, P’eng Teh-huai, H o Lung, and others as supporters of the “internationalist group” of himself, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, Wang Chia-hsiang, K’ai Feng, Yang Shang-k’un, Chu Jui, and others. See Ch’en Shao-yii (Wang M i n g ) , China: Cultural Revolution or Counterrevolutionary Coup? (hereafter, Ch’en Shao-yii, Coup) (Moscow, 1969), pp. 46 ff. A Nationalist historian cites Teng Fa’s alleged errors i n handling Party affairs in Sinkiang early i n the war as a possible cause of Teng’s omission from the Seventh Central Committee. Wang Chia-hsiang was dropped from full to alternate membership of the Seventh Central Committee. Ch’en Ch’ang-hao was also out of favor but had not been on the Central Committee. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 166-67. 37. Kuo, History, i n IS, May, 1971, pp. 72 fi. 38. See Seybolt, “ Y e n a n E d u c a t i o n , ” passim; Wales, “Notebooks,” p . 104; W a n g Hsiieh-wen, in IS, February, 1972, pp. 93-94. 39. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 94-98 ff.; and Hsiieh-hsi Sheng-huo (Study Life) (no city given, 1941), pp. 15 fi.

Chapter 16 1. H u Hua, Lectures, p . 422; Chao Han, T’an-t’an Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tcng Cheng-feng Yiin-tung (Talks on the CCP Rectification Movement) (hereafter, Chao Han, T’an-t’an) (Peking, 1957), p . 21; and Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 160. . Kuo, History, i n IS, December, 1969, pp. 75, 88 fi. . I b i d . ; and i n IS, February, 1970, pp. 59, 77-78. Cf. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, passim. . H u Hua, Lectures, p p . 4 2 1 - 2 2 .

. From 1938 to 1940, Ch’en Shao-yii was secretary of the Party’s South China Bureau but thereafter served only temporarily as director of the Academy for Marxist-Leninist Studies and the Yenan Women’s University prior to returning

588

Notes for Chapter 16 to the Soviet Union i n the early 1940’s. H e apparently enjoyed great prestige in the late 1930’s, after his return from Moscow, i n part because of his membership o n the E C C I and close ties with the Comintern. Ch’en later stressed his leadership of the “internationalist” line as the “main representative of Russian Marx-

ism and the line of the Comintern in the CCP.” See Ch’en Shao-yii, Coup, especially p . 47. See also Tetsuya Kataoka, unpublished study of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. . The Cultural Revolution also began with some of its prominent later victims in charge of important tasks, such as P’eng Chen, who headed the first Cultural Revolution Group, and L u Ting-yi, director of the propaganda department, both of whom were purged i n the spring of 1966. But these men, as well as the still more prominent Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, had been ousted b y the end of the first year of the Cultural Revolution. . Wang Jo-fei, director of the propaganda department of the Northwest China Bureau, was i n charge of a different office with a similar name, the Party’s research office (Chung-yang yen-chiu shih, as against Chung-yang yen-chiu yiian), which studied specific problems, such as land reform, whereas the academies were primarily involved i n theoretical research and education. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary. . L u Ting-yi was another “Russian returned student” accused of Trotskyism in the early 1930’s and named as boss of the “revisionist” propaganda apparatus attacked so savagely i n 1966. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 82 ff., 87, 105, 129; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 572 ff.; and i n IS, June, 1971, p . 93.

9. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 129-32; Kuo Hua-lun (Warren) et al., eds. Chung-kung Tan-ming L u (Chinese Communist Who's Who) (hereafter, Kuo et al., eds., Who's Who) (Taipei, 1969), p . 458; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Compton, Mao’s China, p . 6. For reports of two of K’ang’s speeches in February and March, 1942, see Cheng-tun San-feng: Erh-shih-erh K e Wen-chien (Twentytwo Documents of the Three Rectification Movements) (Hong Kong, 1946), pp.

42 ff. 10. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 256-57, 263. 11. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 198-99 fi.; and cf. Hsiung, Ideology, pp. 194 fi., o n differences of style between Mao and Liu. 12. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and URI, eds., Liu Shao-ch’i, vol. 1, passim. 13. Ch’en Shao-yii, Coup, p . 46. Cf. L o Jui-ch’ing speech of December, 1942, cited in Kuo, History, i n IS, October, 1970, pp. 58 fi. 14. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 154-55. M a o later claimed he had not been informed of plans for the Hundred Regiments Campaign. JPRS 49826, p . 10; and cf. Chapter 14 of this book. Liu Shao-ch’i and others also attacked the insubordination of military men toward Party authority during the war. See Compton, Mao’s China, p . 151; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 3 2 1 ; a n d M a o , S W ,

vol.

I I , p p . 111, a n d

vol. I V , pp. 154-55. P’eng Teh-huai supposedly “confessed” i n 1959 to responsibility for the Hundred Regiments offensive and was also accused of having supported Ch’en Shao-yii’s “capitulationist line” of surrender to the Kuomintang i n the united front i n late 1937 and 1938. See Peking Review, no. 36, September 1, 1967, p . 13. Chu Teh was also blamed for the Hundred Regiments offensive, which clearly violated Mao’s principles of guerrilla warfare during the stage of “strategic stalemate.” See also Tetsuya Kataoka, unpublished study of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. 15. Yenan Ta-hsiieh Kai-k’'uang, pp. 2-3; Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms, Reels 11 and 12; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 82 ff. 16. Mao, S W , vol. I I , p p . 258-59, 261; Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 336; Compton, Mao’s China, p . 81.

Notes for Chapter 16

589

17. Schram, Political Thought, p . 172; Mao, SW, vol. I I , pp. 258 ff.; Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 253-54; Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 203 ff. According to some observers, Mao proved unable fully to master Marxist theory, as in the partly plagiarized and unsuccessful “ O n Dialectical Materialism,” written in the winter of 1939-40 but published only i n part and not included in the SW. A t the time, a Chinese Communist i n Sinkiang reportedly stated, “From the theoretical point of view, Mao’s ‘Dialectics’ is full or errors.” Chou En-lai in turn reportedly rebuked this critic, to the effect that “CCP members, especially topranking ones, should not criticize political or theoretical errors of Mao in public. They should first discuss the matter with Chairman Mao himself.” But Chou conceded, “Since Chairman Mao was too busy... a t the time, he might have missed some of the theoretical p o i n t s . . . . ” See Karl A . Wittfogel. “Some Remarks on Mao’s Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics,” Studies

in Soviet Thought, vol. I I I , no. 4, December, 1963, especially pp. 253 ff.; Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p . 230; and Arthur Cohen, The Communism of M a o Tse-tung (Chicago, 1964), passim. 18. Kuo, i n IS, August, 1970, p . 73; and February, 1970, p . 77; Ch’i Wu, Chin-ChiLu-yii, p . 204; and Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 190 ff. 19. Seybolt, Yenan Education, pp. 82 ff., 91; Selden, “Revolution,” p . 216; and Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 205 fI. 20. Kuo, History, i n IS, August, 1970, pp. 57 ff. 21. Kuo, i n IS, February, 1970, pp. 59, 77-80; and Kuo, History, vol. I 1 I , pp. 5747 5 , 606 ff.

22. Kuo, i n IS, February, 1970, pp. 59, 77-80; and Ch’i Wu, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 204-5. 23. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 84, 99-100; Hsiieh-hsi Sheng-huo (Study Life) (no city given, 1941), pp. 6-8; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , p . 606. 24. L o Mai ( L i Wei-han), “ H o w to Develop Yenan In-Service Cadre Study,” Chiehfang (Liberation), no. 86, October 10, 1939, pp. 19-21. 25. Hsiieh-hsi Sheng-huo, p . 53; cf. Yenan Ta-hsiieh Kai-k’uang, p . 2. 26. Mao, SW, vol. I I I , pp. 215 f . ; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” pp. 100 ff.; Chengtun San-feng, pp. 44, 46; and Wang Hsilieh-wen, in IS, February, 1972, p . 87. 27. Hsiieh-hsi Sheng-huo, pp. 15-16. 28. See Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 19-20. 29. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 232, 119. 30. Ibid., pp. 99-100, 105. 31. Ibid., p p . 114-17, 232. 32. Ibid., pp. 117-18. Liu went on to criticize the larger number of cadres who joined the CCP simply to fight Japan, or because they had n o other means of advancement or simply wanted popularity or security. Cf. the August, 1939, and other decisions t o “consolidate a n d screen the P a r t y . ” See K u o , History, i n IS, May, 1971, p . 66.

33. Stuart Schram, “ T h e Party i n Chinese Communist Ideology,” in CQ, no. 38, pp. 7 ff. Cf. Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” p . 111. 34. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 257, 263; and Red Guard Document of May, 1967, i n S C M M , no. 599, p . 23.

35. See the list of the twenty-two rectification documents i n Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 6-7. 36. Mao, SW, vol. I I , pp. 74-76, and vol. I , pp. 105 ff. The Kut’ien resolution of December, 1929, was used in Party education but was not included among the twenty-two documents of the Cheng-feng Movement. 37. I b i d . , vol. 111, p . 10. 38. Ibid., pp. 16 and 19. 39. Ibid., p . 70.

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40. Ibid., vol. I V , pp. 8-9; and Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 54 ff. 41. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 12 ff., 14-15; and Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” p . 100. 42. Compton, Mao’s China, p . 156. 43. Ibid., p p . 157, 159. 44. Ibid., pp. 215, 203, and 136 fi. 45. Ibid., p . 207. 46. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 49, 45. 47. Mao Tse-tung, O n the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, speech delivered February 27, 1957 (hereafter, Mao, Contradictions) (Peking, 1957, 1960), pp. 16-17. Cf. Richard Solomon, “Mao’s Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity,” i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 271 fi. 48. See Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform, passim, which deals with “thought reform” i n the 1950’s but reveals many of the processes also at work i n the Chengfeng Movement. 49. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 69-72. Cf. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 159. 50. Cheng-tun San-feng, pp. 46, 44; Kuo, History, i n IS, September, 1970, p . 47; and Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 74 ff. 51. Chao Han, T’an-t’an, p . 19; Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 1, 69 ff.; Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 160, 338. Chieh-fang Jih-pao (Liberation Daily) of September 2, 1941, complained of the lack of progress i n “Party education” and on September 8 carried the resolution on “Investigation of Research.” 52. Mao, S W , v o l . I V , p . 215. 53. Mao, i n JPRS 50792, p . 47. 54. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 28-29, 32, 34, 39. The “Party eight-legged essay” is the usual term, often, as here, translated as “formalism.” I n April, 1944, Mao elaborated on these themes. Ibid., p . 159. 55. Ibid., pp. 35-37, 41. 56. Ibid., pp. 49 fI., 37-38, 42. H o Kan-chih, History, p . 379. H o stresses the evils of “mountain-topism” deriving from the isolated nature of Party bases throughout much of its history. 57. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 46, 49, 62. Presumably, the last comment referred at least to Ch’en Shao-yii and K’ai Feng. 58. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 87, 80-81. 59. Cheng-tun San-feng, pp. 43-44. Cf. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, p . 42. 60. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 109; Kuo, History, in IS, June, 1971, pp. 94, 97; and July, 1971, p . 89. Mao implied the involvement of 10,000 literate cadres i n Yenan alone, but Chou En-lai reportedly said twenty-five years later that “ o n l y ” higher-level cadres took part. See also Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 66, and Chou En-lai, as cited i n a Cultural Revolution document trans. in JPRS 44574, March 4, 1968, p . 28. 61. The documents included Mao’s works, Central Committee resolutions, the works of L i u Shao-ch’i and Ch’en Yiin mentioned above, and five translations of Soviet works; see Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 1-8. 62. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 1, 6. 63. Kuo, History, i n IS, June, 1971, pp. 91 fI.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 64. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 162-63, 166, 173; Cheng-feng Wen-hsien (Rectification Documents) (Hong Kong, 1949), a later version of Cheng-tun San-feng, pp. 130-31; Gittings, Role, p . 113; and Kuo, History, in IS, June, 1971, pp. 101 ff. 65. I n Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang tsai Chung-nan, pp. 35 ff. 66. See Goldman, Literary Dissent, pp. 10 fI.; Hsia, Gate, pp. 121, 124, 141. Harriet Mills, “ L u Hsiin, 1927-36: The Years on the Left” (hereafter, Mills, “ L u Hsin”)

( u n p u b l i s h e d C o l u m b i a University P h . D . dissertation, 1 9 6 3 ) , passim;

and URI, eds., Liu Shao-ch’i, vol. I , pp. 23-26. L u Hsiin opposed Party concessions on the united front i n the last year of his life.

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67. G o l d m a n , Literary Dissent, p p . 1 5 - 1 7 , 25, 50. 68. Hsia, Gate, p . 241; and Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 63 fl. 69. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 69, 77-78, 82-83, 87-92. 70. Cited i n Frederick Y i , Mass Persuasion, p . 55. 71. JPRS 50792, p . 56; and Kuo, History, i n IS, August, 1970, p . 69; September, 1970, p . 55; a n d J u l y , 1971, p . 87.

72. Goldman, Literary Dissent, chs. 2, 3. Other writers actively involved were A i Szu-ch’i, Kuo Mo-jo, Mao Tun, and Ting Ling. Chou Yang, who since 1934 had led the hard-line Party approach to creative intellectuals and i n 1939 had founded the Chinese Writers’ Resistance Movement, played an especially active role i n these discussions and criticisms. Ibid., pp. 48-50; Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 73. Yenan Fang-chien ching-yen chieh-shao (Introduction to Anti-Traitor Experiences in Yenan) i n Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms, Reel 12. A n example of personnel purges at the time may have been Central Party School attacks on L i Kuo-hua and on W u Hsi-yu. W u was accused of being a Nationalist agent. K u o , History, i n IS, A u g u s t , 1970, p . 69.

74. Selden, “Revolution,” pp. 216 ff. 75. Ibid., pp. 226-29. 76. H u Hua, Lectures, p . 464; Kuo, History, i n IS, August, 1970, pp. 69-70, September, 1970, p . 47; Chao Han, T’an-t’an, passim; Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 118, 134, 143; a n d H o K a n - c h i h , History, p . 413.

77. Cited i n Stuart Gelder, The Chinese Communists (hereafter, Gelder, Communists) ( L o n d o n , 1946), p . 125.

78. I n April, 1941, L i u Shao-ch’i reportedly acknowledged the necessity to “kill some people i n order to plant ruling authority” and “sometimes. . . t o do things seemingly most d i r t y ” but defended such evil means as necessary for Communist ends. H e criticized the use of unnecessary force and urged leniency where possible, especially i n early efforts to w i n the confidence of local populations. Moscow radio polemics of 1969 and 1970 charged that Mao had “slaughtered” 20,000 or 40,000 or even 100,000 in the Cheng-feng Movement and estimated that 8 to 9 per cent of the Party and government staffs i n the Shen-Kan-Ning base had been purged. From available evidence, such figures seem wildly exaggerated, although such numbers may have been “educated” and u p to 8 per cent reportedly were purged i n the sense of losing their former jobs. Most of the information i n these paragraphs and this footnote is based on K u o , History, v o l . I l , p . 517; a n d i n IS, A u g u s t , 1970, p p . 70-72; September,

1970, pp. 47-48, 51-52, 54; and October, 1970, pp. 76-80. See also Chao Han, T’an-t’an, passim; a n d Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms, Reels 1 1 a n d 12. O n

August 17, 1961, a People’s Daily article (p. 7) spoke of more than 1 million Party members i n 1942, as against official figures of 736,151, and one wonders if the discrepancy between these figures could be partially due to efforts to obscure the magnitude of the purges of the early 1940s. See also Lewis, Leadership, pp. 110-11 and footnote. 79. Ch’en Shao-yii, Coup, p . 50. 80. C i t e d i n N a t h a n Leites, A Study o f Bolshevism (Glencoe, I l l . , 1 9 5 3 ) , p . 97. 81. Mao, SW, vol. I I , p. 274; vol. I I I , pp. 215, 219; vol. IV, pp. 160, 338; Jerome Ch’en, i n CQ, no. 40, p . 13; and Dorrill, i n CQ, no. 36, pp. 53 fl. 82. M a o , S W , vol. 1 V , p . 157. 83. Compton, Mao’s China, p . 257. 84. M a o , S W , vol. I V , p . 157. 85. Ibid., pp. 180 ff. A Japanese dispatch i n Sankei (Tokyo) o n April 13, 1967, quoted a Red Guard newspaper to the effect that H u Ch’iao-mu had drafted this resolution, and i t was dropped from the 1967 printing of Mao’s Selected Works. I n October, 1966, M a o favorably contrasted the pre-1949 “open’’ oppo-

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sition of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, L i Li-san, L o Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and Ch’en Shao-yii w i t h the “double-dealing tactics” of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and P’eng Teh-huai, and w i t h the “secret activities” of P’eng Chen, L o Jui-ch’ing, L u Ting-yi, and Yang Shang-k’un after 1949. Somewhat contradictorily, Mao also s a i d t h a t , i n t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , L i u Shao-ch’i a n d Teng Hsiao-p’ing,

unlike the last four, had been “open, not secret,” i n their opposition i n the 1950’s and 1960’s. See Mao i n JPRS 49826, p . 10; and i n CLG, vol. I , no. 4, pp. 34 and 82 fl. 86. Cited in JPRS 44574, p . 27. 87. Cf. ibid., and Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 194, 199. 88. Ch’en Shao-yii, Coup, pp. 4647. 89. Ibid., pp. 4849. 90. Cited in Schram, Political Thought, p . 427. 91. Cited i n Kuo, History, vol. 11, p . 264. 92. Cited i n Compton, Mao’s China, p . 178; c f . M a o , S W , vol. 1 V , p . 112.

93. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 157-58, 217. 94. Ibid., pp. 164, 156. 95. Ibid., p . 217. 96. Ibid., p . 19. 97. JPRS 50792, p . 48; and cf. Mao, SW, vol. I I I , p . 19. 98. Cited i n Kuo, History, i n IS, September, 1970, pp. 48 and 51. 99. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 111-12; Compton, Mao’s China, p . 176. 100. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, p . 114. 101. Ibid., pp. 155, 205. 102. See Wei Ch'un-chieh Tang t i Tsu-chih erh Tou-cheng (Struggle for the Purification of Party Organization) (hereafter, Wei Ch’un-chieh) (Hong Kong, 1948), pp. 33 fI.; Seybolt, “Yenan Education,” p . 146.

Chapter 17 1. Ho Kan-chih, History, pp. 390-91; cf. p . 400; and Ch’i W u , Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii, pp. 77 fi. 2 . B r a n d t et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 347.

3. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 165; Kuo, History, i n IS, January, 1970, p . 77; and February, 1970, pp. 74-77. 4. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 199, 194. 5. Ibid., p . 306; and Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 165-67. 6. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 160-63. 7.1bid., pp. 163-64, 124 ff.; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 144; and Kuo, History, i n IS, October, 1969, pp. 93-96. Communists i n Nationalist units remained under cover for the most part and, though i n touch w i t h higher Party organizations, rarely formed active cells. 8.Kuo, History, i n IS, September, 1970, pp. 57 ff.; and John Gardner, “The Wu-fan Campaign i n Shanghai,” i n Barnett, ed., Politics, p . 503. Liu Ying i n Chekiang and Hsieh Yu-tsai i n Kiangsi were among those captured, while Liu Hsiao, who was secretary of the Kiangsu Committee i n 1942 and of the Shanghai Committee by 1947, remained active. A n intriguing episode occurred i n the Swatow area when Yao Hua, former Party secretary of the Meihsien Special Committee and after February, 1941, secretary of the South China Work Committee, began to work for the Nationalists. I n April, 1943, fearing arrest by t h e Communists, Y a o r e t u r n e d t o the S w a t o w area a n d established a n ‘“extraor-

dinary CCP Kwangtung Committee,” which was said to have won the loyalty of eight county Party organizations in Kwangtung before Yao reportedly was assassinated by Communist agents i n October, 1943. The Nationalists’ “red

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flag” policy, which set u p fake Party organizations and had agents “pose as Communists for contacts” of course greatly complicated security questions. See Kuo, History, i n IS, October, 1970, pp. 54, 66. . Kuo, i n IS, June, 1970, pp. 64, 69-70. The South China Bureau had authority for work i n Szechwan (where L o Shih-wen was provincial Party secretary in 1 9 4 0 ) , Sikang, K w e i c h o w , Yiinnan, western H u p e h , H u n a n , K i a n g s i , Kwang-

tung, Kwangsi, Fukien, and Hong Kong, the last five i n effect handled b y the South China Work Committee. Kuo Chien (alias Ch’en Jan), who possibly is Warren Kuo (Kuo Hua-lun; see this book, ch. 11, footnote 23), became secretary of the Kiangsi Committee early i n the war and one of the secretaries of the South China Work Committee. A certain Ch’en Jan was captured by the Nationalists i n Chungking i n April, 1948, and reportedly executed. See Rinden and Witke, eds., Guide, p . 73; and Hung-ch’i P’iao-p’iao, no. 6, pp. 192-93.

10. M a o , S W , vol. III, p . 56. 11. Kuo, History, i n IS, June, 1970, pp. 66 ff.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. Hsii Ping and Wang Ping-nan also were important assistants i n united front work i n Chungking, as was P’an Tzu-nien, editor of N e w China Daily. Liao Ch’eng-chih is the son of Liao Chung-k’ai. 12. See Lacouture, H o Chi Minh, pp. 69 ff.; and King Ch’en, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954 ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . , 1 9 6 9 ) , passim.

13. Kuo, History, i n IS, May, 1969, p . 39. 14. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 82. 15. The Chinese Communist Movement, p . 85; Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 142; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 170; and U.S.-China White Paper, p . 53. 16. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 134-35. . Ibid., and pp. 61, 91; Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 112, 170 ff. 18. Cited i n Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 238. 19. The Chinese Communist Movement, pp. 85-86. 20. U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1944), vol. V I (China), pp. 399-400; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 54 and 83. 21. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 79-80 and 75. I n 1944, L i n Po-ch’ii stated that the Communists had demanded twelve divisions for “ t w o years,” although others date the request to 1943. I n 1944 also, the Nationalists requested reductions of the Communist armies to ten divisions, which Mao later said would have meant a four-fifths reduction. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 266, 289. 22, Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 107. 23. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, pp. 135-36; and U.S.-China White Paper, p . 54. 24. Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny, pp. 105, 44. 25. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 55, 544-45; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 115;

Mao, SW, vol. 1V, p. 267; and H o Kan-chih, History, p. 416. 26. V a n S l y k e , Enemies, p p . 177 ff., 1 8 2 - 8 3 ; C l u b b , Twentieth Century China, p. 243; and Ch’ien, Government, pp. 358 ff. 27. Even Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen and leader of a “liberal Nationalist faction” conceded this point, noting that at the time some 300,000 Nationalist troops were blockading the Communists. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 61, 91. Mao claims that u p to 750,000 Nationalist troops were so employed, and that from 5 6 t o 6 4 p e r cent o f Japanese troops a n d 95 p e r cent o f puppet troops

were deployed against them. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, p . 258; and cf. Chu Teh, Battlefronts, passim. 28. See David D . Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley, Calif., 1970), passim; and Tsou, America’s Failure, pp. 153 ff.

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29. See Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 hereafter, Tuchman, Stilwell) (New York, 1971), passim. 30. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 59-71. 31. Ibid., p . 72. 32. Ibid., p . 73. 33. Ibid., pp. 74-75. 34. Ibid., pp. 74 f . ; Gittings, Role, p . 13; and Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 208, 210. 35. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 83-86. 36. Ibid., pp. 86-92; Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 317-18, 324; cf. North, Moscow, p . 211. 37. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 74-86, 96; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 122-26; Tsou, America’s Failure, passim; and Herbert Feis, The China Tangle ( P r i n c e t o n , N.]., 1 9 5 3 ) , passim.

38. Among other things, according to Cultural Revolution documents, the conference criticized P’eng Teh-huai. Red Guard Document of November, 1967, in CB, no. 851, p . 7.

39. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 171. 40. See Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , pp. 161-66; and Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 289, 293. 41. Wang Chien-min, Draft History,. vol. 111, p . 164. Not all agreed, however, as it was later revealed that Chang Wen-t’ien and perhaps others admitted their “erroneous l i n e ” only “after a struggle at the Seventh Congress.” Mao, as cited in CLG, vol. 1, no. 4, p . 62. 42. See Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 422 ff., 432; and Ch’en Shao-yii Coup, p . 50. Among earlier references to Mao as Chairman of the Party, are Hurley’s of November, 1944 (U.S.-China White Paper, p . 74), while the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (May, 1954), vol. X X V I , pp. 244-48, states that Mao became C h a i r m a n o f t h e C C P i n M a r c h , 1943. See K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary;

Boorman, ed., Biographical. L i u Shao-ch’i reportedly said that there was “ n o leadership core” i n the CCP as of 1941. N C N A , September 23, 1967, trans. in CB, n o . 843, p . 4 .

43. C u r i o u s l y , a m o n g full m e m b e r s , L i Li-san w a s l i s t e d fifteenth, C h o u En-lai twenty-third, Chang Wen-t’ien twenty-sixth, Ch’en Shao-yii forty-third, and Ch’in Pang-hsien forty-fourth. See list i n Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 292, and cf. p . 287. The first seven men listed i n the new leadership, together w i t h Kao Kang, Wang Jo-fei, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Hsii T’eh-li, and others, were presumed supporters of Mao. Some of them, notably Wang Jo-fei and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, had also worked closely w i t h L i u Shao-ch’i as had some of the “internationalists” a n d r e l a t i v e newcomers s u c h as P ’ e n g C h e n , L u Ting-yi, P o

Yi-po, and Jao Shu-shih. L i u thus served as an important link between cadres of diverse backgrounds and Mao. Other important members of the Seventh Central Committee of presumably more “neutral” persuasion included Chou En-lai, K’ang Sheng, L i Fu-ch’un, L i u Po-ch’eng, Nieh Jung-chen, Ch’en Y i , Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, L i Hsien-nien, T’eng Tai-yiian, Chang Ting-ch’eng, Yeh Chienying, Chang Yiin-yi, Liao Ch’eng-chih, Lin Feng, T’an Chen-lin, Teng Tzu-hui, Ts’ai Ch’ang, Tseng Shan, and W u Yii-chang. 44, See Klein and Clark, Dictionary, Appendixes. K’ang Sheng was later credited with blocking Liu’s effort to make persons who had “confessed” ( i n order to be released from K M T jails) eligible for membership on the Central Committee. Cultural Revolution Document, trans. i n CB, no. 834, p . 9. Similarly, one delegate allegedly tried to block Ch’en Shao-yii’s supporters from the Central Committee, but Mao ruled against this, presumably to give reality to his methods of “re-education.” See Mao, as cited i n JPRS 49826, p . 11. 45. N o r t h , Elites, p p . 5 1 - 5 2 . F o u r m e n ( H o L u n g , Jen Pi-shih, K u a n Hsiang-ying, and alternate Wang Chen) had been with the Second Front Army, and five

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(Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, Li Hsien-nien, Cheng Wei-san, and alternates Wang Weichou and Ch’en Shao-min) with the Fourth Front Army. Wang Chien-min, Draft History, vol. I I I , p. 166. See also Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Whitson, High Command, passim. 46. See Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and North, Elites, p . 113, although North retains Wang Chia-hsiang as a member of the Political Bureau. One observer singles out the first seven men as the dominant Communist leaders of the late 1940’s. Boorman, Biographical, passim. 47. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 291, 293; P’ei T’ung, i n CB 410, pp. 5 ff.; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 239 ff.; Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 244-315. Chu Teh’s speech was reprinted i n 1952 as O n the Battlefronts of the Liberated Areas, and Liu Shao-ch’i’s as O n the Party, also i n 1952. For other reports to the Seventh Congress by Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, and others, see Ti-ch’i-tz’u Ch’iian-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui Yuan-shih Ts’ai-liao Hui-pien (Collected Original Documents of the Seventh National Congress) (no city or date given), available at Taipei, Bureau of Investigation Collection. 48. Chu Teh, Battlefronts, pp. 79, 43, 69. 49, Liu Shao-ch’i, O n the Party, pp. 22-23, 31. 50. Ibid., p . 28; cf. pp. 2 and 33. 51. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, pp. 419 ff. 52. Ibid., pp. 419-21; and Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 498 ff. 53. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 422. 54. Ibid., pp. 423-24. 55. Six months for the poorest, two years for those “ w i t h any other social background.” Ibid., pp. 425-26. 56. I b i d . , p p . 428, 431-36. 57.Ibid., p. 431. 58. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 246, 261, 247. 59. I b i d . , p . 265. 60. Schram, Political Thought (1969 ed.), p . 228. 61. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 287-88, 264, 266, 304. 62. Ibid., pp. 263, 289, 305. 63. Ibid., p p . 271, 274, 278. 64. Ibid., pp. 284-86. 65. Ibid., pp. 273-81, 291, 299. Cf. Ibid. (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 367-88. 66. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 296. 67. Kenneth Lieberthal, “ M a o Versus Liu? Policy Towards Industry and Commerce, 1946-1949,” CQ, no. 47, pp. 494 ff.; Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 291. 68. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 311-13, 315. 69.Ibid., p. 317.

Chapter 18 1. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 433. 2. See Gittings, Role, p p . 10 a n d 18. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p p . 115, 124, 138, 225, 288. See also Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (New York, 1949), pp. 43 ff.; and Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai, p . 176. 3. As seen, i n 1936, there were some 20,000 or so each i n the Party and Red Army i n a n d a r o u n d n o r t h e r n Shensi, a b o u t a fifth o f t h e military activists also b e i n g

Party members. Other activists struggled to survive i n other areas of China, giving a total of possibly 40,000. 4 . Guillermaz, Histoire, p p . 295, 370. C h i a n g Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 131.

5. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 254; Gittings, Role, p . 1; and Lionel R . Chassin, The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War (hereafter, Chassin, Conquest) ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 6 5 ) , p p . 4 4 a n d 177, a n d see

596

Notes for Chapter 18 this chapter below. However, these figures overestimated the Nationalist forces at 3 million effectives, a figure that some observers thought should be as low as 1.5 million, and underrated Communist forces at 600,000 regulars and 400,000 militia. I n all, a t the start o f the c i v i l w a r i n mid-1946, there were a n estimated

4.3 million government troops, including irregulars, and some Communist tories accept a ratio of 2.5-to-1 i n favor of the Nationalists at that time. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 265. But recent studies put Communist ulars i n 1945 as low as 880,000 poorly armed troops; Gittings, Role, p . 303. government still officially claimed 4.5 million men i n late 1947.

hisSee regThe

QO 0 0 J O

. Cited i n U.S. N e w s a n d World Report, January 2 5 , 1971, p . 40.

. Mao, SW, vol. 1V, p . 247. . See Harrison, Rebellions, pp. 80 fi. . Such views were widely shared, as shown by the now quaint statement made in 1942 by Walter Judd, a former American medical missionary i n China who later became one of the most prominent critics of the U.S. “loss of China”: You could persuade Herbert Hoover, J. P. Morgan and Winston Churchill to be Communists as easily as you could persuade a land-owning Chinese peasant, whose ancestors h a v e l i v e d o n strips o f l a n d for centuries, t o take

the only tangible thing he has and dump i t into a common pot just on the

premise that around the corner will be something better. Cited i n Tsou, America’s Failure, p. 225. 10. E.g., H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 410 ff.; and Ch’en Po-ta, Chung-kuo Ssu-ta-chiatsu (Four Great Chinese Families) ( H o n g K o n g , 1 9 4 7 ) , passim.

11. Chassin, Conquest, p . 202 fI.; and forthcoming history by Donald Gillin of the Chinese civil war. 12. John F . Melby, The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War: China, 19451949 (hereafter, Mandate) (Toronto, 1968), pp. 198 ff. 13. Cf. Chiang Kai-shek’s own observation on this i n his Soviet Russia, p . 188. 14. Chang Kuo-t’ao, Autobiography, ch. 11. See also Pichon P. Y . Loh, The Early Chiang Kai-shek: A Study o f His Personality a n d Politics, 1887-1924 ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) , passim.

15. See Tsou, America’s Failure, pp. 314, 377, 380, 387, 392. 16. C l u b b , Twentieth Century China, p . 310. 17. See Carsun C h a n g , T h e Third Force i n China ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 5 2 ) , passim; Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, Government, passim; a n d V a n S l y k e , Enemies, p . 190.

18. Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 192-96. 19. Melby, Mandate, pp. 179 f . , 302, etc. 20. For example, i n t h e first h a l f o f 1948, prices i n Nationalist areas rose more than 1,900 p e r c e n t , as against some 6 8 p e r cent i n Communist areas. Jerome C h ’ e n , Revolution, p p . 294-96; M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 275; a n d Chou Shun-hsin, T h e Chinese Inflation, 1937-1949 ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 3 ) , passim. 21. C l u b b , Twentieth Century China, p . 274; T s o u , America’s Failure, p p . 3 1 2 - 1 3 ;

and U.S.-China White Paper, p . 210. 22. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 127 fI. 23. Melby, Mandate, pp. 216, 247, 232. Again, one is reminded of many statements from Vietnam twenty years later. 24, Gittings, Role, pp. 2 and 13; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 368. 25. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p. 245; and Ti-san-tz’u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chancheng Ta-shih Yiieh-piac (Monthly Chronology of Great Events of the Third Revolutionary Civil War) (Peking, 1961), p . 1. 26. M a o , S W , v o l . 1 V , p . 331. 27. Ibid. (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 30; and Gittings, Survey, p . 38. }

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397

28. Some 80,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria continued to fight the Communists and others in order to guard U.S. bases into early 1946, and there are even reports that some Japanese fought for Yen Hsi-shan i n Taiyiian until its capture i n 1949. Melby, Mandate, p . 183; forthcoming history of the civil war by Donald Gillin; and Michael Lindsay i n Yuan-li Wu, ed., China: A Handbook (New York, 1972). 29. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 140, 163; Tsou, America’s Failure, pp. 301, 331; R . L . Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York, 1966), p . 175; and O . B. Borisov and B. T . Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, 1945-1970: Kratkii Ocherk ( A Brief Sketch of Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970) (hereafter, Borisov and Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia) (Moscow, 1971), pp. 28 ff. 30. H . McAleavy, The Modern History of China (New York, 1967), p . 317; Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 301; and Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 253-54. By 1947, Mao claimed control of 2.35 million square kilometers. 31. The Communists claimed control of 100 of 108 counties of Shantung i n late 1945 and 40 of 133 counties of Hopeh as of late 1946. Chassin, Conquest, p . 98; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 247; and H o Kan-chih, History, p . 434. 32. Several o f these areas, such as H o n a n , were n o t i n c l u d e d i n earlier listings a n d presumably developed toward the end of the war. See Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 35, 38, 30; and H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 424-26. Cf. maps i n The Chinese Communist Movement; and Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, appendix. 33. See M a o , S W (Peking e d . ) , v o l . I V , p p . 37, 89, 105-6, 114-15, 141, 144, 50, 56, 61; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 449; and Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 323. 34. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 61-62, 65. 35. Ibid., p . 47; Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 311; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 434; Wang Shih et al., Draft History, pp. 245, 247; and Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking (Peking, 1954), p . 9. Chiang Kai-shek maintained that the Communists controlled only seventy counties at the end of the war but had expanded into some 200 by the end of 1945, noting that t h e Communists also took as many as 200 cities i n the single month from September 11 to October 11, 1945; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 237, 141. The Communists i n turn charged the Nationalists with capture of some thirty-one towns i n their areas i n late 1945 and of another eighty-four i n early 1946. Liao, From Yenan to Peking, pp. 18 and 38. 36. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 91; Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 417; and H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 426, 498, 511-13. Central Plains d i d not become a formal administrative area until 1947 ( H o Kan-chih, History, p . 511). Organizational charts for all but the Shen-Kan-Ning and Manchurian regions are given i n Jihpen T’ou-hsiang H o u t i Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang (The CCP After Surrender of Japan) (hereafter, Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou) (no city given, 1947), passim. 37. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 255. 38. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 15 and 13. 39. Ibid., pp. 18, 16, 20, 11. Others, however, might have asked Mao a question he sardonically put to the Nationalists on the eve of their capitulation i n February, 1949—namely, should the personal ambitions of Party leaders (a reference to Chiang Kai-shek) come before the demands for peace of 450 million Chinese? Ibid., p . 349. 40. Ibid., pp. 15-17. But Mao also called for taking large cities where possible. Ibid., p . 43. 41. Ibid., pp. 27 and 29. 42. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 43. Ibid., p . 43. 44. Ibid., p . 30.

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45. Ibid., p 47. 46. See book of that title, Ta-ta T’an-t’an, by Valentin Chu (New York, 1963), passim; Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 187. 47. A t times, however, as i n October, 1945, the Communists refrained from pushing their demand for coalition government. Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 318. 48. Red Guard document of August, 1967, trans. in CB, no. 834, p . 9; and JPRS 44574, passim. 49, Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 19. 50. See L i u Shao-ch’i’s confession, translated in Atlas (April, 1967), p . 14; cf. Peking wall poster of July, 1967, cited i n CLG, Spring, 1968, p . 77; and W u Yii-chang in The Great Turning Point (Peking, 1962), p . 7. Opening sections of Liu Shao-ch’i’s address to the Eighth Party Congress i n 1956 refer favorably to Party efforts to avoid civil war. See Eighth National Congress of the CCP (Peking, 1956), vol. I , pp. 17-18. Warren Kuo stated that Mao had been expecting war in late 1945 and talked of concessions at Chungking and elsewhere mainly to gain time. I n early 1946, Mao joined Liu Shao-ch’i and others in putting more stress on peace negotiations, only swinging back to a more militant position later in the year and i n 1947. Kuo feels Liu Shao-ch’i had Mao’s full confidence in 1945-46, despite charges to the contrary during the Cultural Revolution. Interview with author in Taipei, December 19, 1970. 51. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 21. 52. Ibid., p . 20, and cf. pp. 59, 87-88, 117, 120, and this chapter below. 53. See Kuo, History, i n IS, December, 1969, pp. 72-73; and Steven Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Perspectives on International Affairs, 1937-41.” (Columb i a University P h . D . dissertation, 1 9 7 2 ) .

54. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 20. 55. I b i d . , p . 4 7 ; a n d V a n S l y k e , Enemies, p . 188. 56. Borisov and Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, pp. 28-29. This book gives n o sources or further details on the Kao Kang-Liu Shao-ch’i mission. 57. Jerome Ch’en, Revolution, pp. 289 ff.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 58. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p p . 50-51. 59. I b i d . , pp. 19, 21. . I b i d . , p . 50. 61. Chang Chiu-ju, Ho-t’an Fu-ch’e Tsai Chung-kuo (Twists and Turns of the Peace Talks in China) (Taipei, 1968), pp. 71 fI., 149 fi. 62. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 61, 56. 63. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 141; and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 57 and 61. 64. Ibid., pp. 50, 57, 54, 56. 65. Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 318; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 108 and 139. 66. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 61-62; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 221; and U.S.-China White Paper, p . 108. 67. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 53-54 and 66. Cf. Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 186. 68. McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 234-35. This material had a replacement value of $2 billion (U.S.). 69. A recent Soviet source decries the growth of “narrow nationalism” i n the CCP from the late 1930’s on. Kykyshkin, in Delyusin et al., eds., Comintern, pp. 376-77.

70. See forthcoming Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation by Steven Levine on the struggle for Manchuria after World War I I (hereafter, Levine Ph.D.). I n Octob e r , 1967, R a d i o Moscow claimed the Russians h a d given the Chinese Com-

munists some 740,000 rifles, 18,000 machine guns, 800 aircraft, 800 tanks, 4,000

Notes for Chapter 18 artillery pieces, a n d 600 armories

599

( I S , M a y , 1970, p . 3 5 ) . However, other

reports give smaller figures, since the Russians were stripping Manchurian industry, and there were even reports of Russian troops firing on Chinese Communists and destroying some ammunition dumps. Cf. Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 331; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 230n; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 142; U.S.-China White Paper, p. 150. I n neighboring North Korea, Russians disarmed Yenan-trained Korean Communists, while favoring Soviet-trained leaders, such as K i m I l Sung. See Alexander K i m in N e w York Times Magazine, February 25, 1968, p . 33. 71. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 586. 72. I n mid-November, however, the Soviets supported the installation of a Communist mayor and other officials i n Ch’angch’un and i n other local administrative posts, especially i n north Manchuria. See Levine Ph.D., ch. 4. 73. Lin Piao agreed. See Gittings, Role, p . 6n. 74. Chassin, Conquest, pp. 77-83; McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 21 ff., 226-31. According to a Soviet source, on November 20, 1945, M a o also asked P’eng Chen to request the Russians to delay the arrival of Nationalist troops. A . M . Dubinsky, Osvoboditelnaya Missiya Sovietskogo Soyuza N a Dalnem Vostokye (The Liberation Mission o f the Soviet Union i n the Far East)

(hereafter, Dubinsky,

Liberation Mission) (Moscow, 1966), p. 571. 75. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 30. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 129, adds the phrase “ i n coordination w i t h Soviet armies,” and this is hinted also in Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p. 246. I n late August, Stalin told U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman that Russian units had encountered n o Chinese Communist units i n Manchuria, nor were there any reports of Chinese Communist forces i n the Russian press for some time. See U.S.-China White Paper, p . 119; McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 198-99. But a U.S. military mission reported Chinese Communist troops in Mukden by September 10, and their units began to move into Manchuria, not only over land but also by sea from Shantung. Borisov and Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, provides n o significant details on these questions. 76. Dubinsky, Liberation Mission, pp. 558-59, speaks of troops under L i Yiinch’ang moving east from Kupeik’ou i n August, 1945. 77. Some Russian sources state that Chinese Communist and Soviet led units met at Kalgan as early as August 18. Levine Ph.D., ch. 4. 78. C h i a n g Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 144; a n d K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary. 79. Ironically, L i n Piao was reportedly taken part of the way i n U.S. aircraft. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. See also Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 303, and this chapter above. Chinese Communist military units reached Mukden by September 10. Levine Ph.D., ch. 4. 80. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Boorman, ed., Biographical, vol. I I , p . 376. 81. D u b i n s k y , Liberation Mission, p . 561; a n d D u b i n s k y , i n Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History), August, 1965, pp. 60-61; Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, pp. 18 and 66. 82. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 306n; Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chassin, Conquest, p p . 9 8 , 7 7 ; a n d Gittings, Role, p . 4 .

83. Gittings, Role, pp. 60, 63, 67; Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 81-85; and Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 275. 84. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 262, 266, and Levine Ph.D., passim; D u b i n s k y , Liberation Mission, p . 571 ( c f . p . 5 6 1 ) , gives the 195,000 figure. See

also Gittings, Role, p . 60, and this chapter above. 85. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 84. O n N o v e m b e r 2 0 , M a o h a d written P’eng Chen i n optimistic terms about Chinese Communist prospects in the

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Northeast (Dubinsky, Liberation Mission, pp. 571-72). However, Dubinsky never mentions Chou Pao-chung. See also Suh, Korean Communist Movement, p . 291; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 86. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 62 and 47. Cf. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 119. 87. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 137, 141, 625; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 245; and Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, p . 164. 88. Gittings, Survey, p. 41; “Translations on International Communist Developments, no. 605,” JPRS 24801, May 27, 1964; Melby, Mandate, passim; Klein a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; a n d Levine Ph.D., passim.

89. Gittings, Survey, p . 39; and Dubinsky, Liberation Mission, p . 572. 90. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 150-51. Cf. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 119. 91. Cited i n M a x Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951 (New York, 1953), pp. 50-51. Cf. Chou En-lai statement i n Gelder, Communists, pp. 173 ff.; and Borisov and Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, pp. 28 fi. 92. R . L . Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Relations (hereafter, Garthoff, Military) (New York, 1967), p . 74; Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (hereafter, Ulam, Expansion) (New York, 1968), p . 473; and Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 98-99. 93. Cited i n McLane, Soviet Policy, p. 264. Djilas reported substantially the same conversation. See Ulam, Expansion, p . 483. 94. Peking wall poster cited i n John Gittings, “ T h e Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy,” CQ, no. 39, pp. 43-44; cf. translation i n CLG, vol I , no. 4, pp. 88-89; Gittings, Survey, p . 42; and McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 254, 125n. 95. Kuo Mo-jo, as cited i n Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 228. I n 1960, Lin Piao made a similar but more disguised statement (Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 326), as did K’ang Sheng i n 1965 (JPRS 49826, p . 27).

96. Ulam, Expansion, p . 486. 97. Ibid., pp. 489-90, 492. 98. Tsou, America’s Failure, pp. 341, 365, 411; U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 180-81, 186; Schram, Political Thought, pp. 126-27; and Kenneth E . Shewmaker, “The Agrarian Reformer M y t h , ” CQ, no. 34. 99. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 582. I n May, 1946, Stalin reportedly invited Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow to discuss the Chinese situation. N e w York Times, May 25, 1972, p . 6 (report of U.S. State Department documents of 1946-47). See also John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.China Relations (Berkeley, Calif., 1971). 100. Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 226; and J. L . Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New York, 1954), passim. 101. McLane, Soviet Policy, pp. 223-24; but cf. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 7 5 fi.

102. Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 541; and Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p . 214. 103. Walter S. Robertson, Yeh Chien-ying, and Cheng K’ai-min represented the U n i t e d States, Communists, a n d Nationalists, respectively. M c L a n e , Soviet Pol-

icy, p. 224; U.S.-China White Paper, p . 137; and Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 376. 104. Guillermaz, Histoire, p . 377; Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 92-95; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 136 fI., 609, 626. 105. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 688. 106. Ibid., p . 185. 107. Ibid., pp. 142-44; McLane, Soviet Policy, p . 245; Melby, Mandate, passim; and this chapter above. 108. “ C h i Ho-p’ing Min-chu t i Hsin-chieh-tuan Pao-kao” (“Report on the N e w Stage of Peaceful Democracy”) (mimeographed material of the Cultural Revolution);

Notes for Chapter 19

601

and see Peking Review, June 30, 1967, p . 31, and July 2, 1971, p . 10; and Red Guard document of May, 1967, i n CB, no. 834, p . 9. According to Te-kong Tong (“Liu Shao-ch’i, the Liu Shao-ch’i Factions and Liu Shao-ch’i-ism,” Collected Documents of the First Sino-American Conference on Mainland China [Taipei, 1971], Liu did lead arguments for a peaceful settlement of the war, and Mao, as leader of the “ h a w k ” faction, feigned illness i n early 1946. Warren Kuo feels there were not wide differences between the two men i n 1945-46 and that M a o also wrote in support of negotiations i n early 1946 but did not publish these writings i n the Selected Works because o f their passive tone. Interview with

author in Taipei, December, 1970. 109. “Comments on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the CCP,” Peking Review, July 2, 1971, pp. 10-11. 110. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 144-49. 111. McLane, Soviet Policy, p. 247; and Van Slyke, Enemies, p . 189. 112. Chassin, Conquest, pp. 77-81, 134; Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 270; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 149, 165. 113. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 151-52, 160, 163-66; and Chassin, Conquest, pp. 77, 83, 86. 114. U.S.-China White Paper, p . 84; and H o Kan-chih, History, p . 476. 115. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 171-72; and Van Slyke, Enemies, pp. 194-95. 116. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 89, 225, 261. 117. Garthoff, Military, p . 78; Chassin, Conquest, p . 91. 118. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 209-10. 119. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 172-73, 196 fI., 219, 674-75; H o Kan-chih, History, p . 490; Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 121, 125-26; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 175-81; and see Chapter 19 below. I n addition to demanding a cease-fire and more democratic processes of government, the Communists at this time insisted on control of at least fourteen of the forty seats of the Political Council, whereas the government would grant them only thirteen seats, one more than the original twelve, including eight for the Communists, four for the Democratic League, and one other to be agreed upon. The Communists also demanded reorganization of the Executive Yiian. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 190, 201, 203. Until their position had been secured at the most important levels of a reorganized government, the Communists would not agree to constitutional revisions, elections, or the convening of a national assembly, arguing that all of these would still be controlled by the government. 120. Robert H . W . Welch, Jr., The Life of John Birch (1918-1945) (Boston, 1954), passim. 121. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 175-81; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 196 ff. 122. Ibid., pp. 674, 198, 205; and Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia, pp. 179, 180. 123. U.S.-China White Paper, p p . 200, 207-8, 212; M e l b y , Mandate, p p . 170, 193; L i

T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, p . 272; The Great Turning Point, pp. 30 ff., 36; and Hung-ch’i P’iao-p’iao, vol. V I , pp. 193 ff. Chou En-lai had been in Shanghai from September 16 to October 20. 124. H o Kan-chih, History, pp. 487-90; and U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 214, 206. 125. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 686, 217. 126. Ibid., p . 264; Melby, Mandate, p . 232. 127. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 89, 103 ff., 114, 141 ff. 128. See forthcoming history of the Chinese civil war by Donald Gillin.

Chapter 19 1. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 162. 2. I n parts of Szechwan, for example, as late as 1948, many had never heard of

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Notes for Chapter 19

Mao Tse-tung, just as fifteen years earlier few had heard of Chiang Kai-shek or Sun Yat-sen. See A . D . Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (hereafter, Barnett, Eve) (New York, 1963), p . 115. .E.g., see ibid., passim; Chassin, Conquest, passim; Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, Government, passim; Belden, Shakes, passim; Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China (New York, 1940), passim; David and Isabel Crook, Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn (hereafter, Crook, Ten Mile Inn) (London, 1959), passim; Theodore H . White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China (hereafter, White and Jacoby, Thunder) (New York, 1946), passim; W . Hinton, Fan Shen, passim; and Ting Ling, The Sun Shines over Sang Kan River (Peking, 1954), passim. One of the few sources claiming that Communist popularity was based solely o n terror is Raymond de Jaeger, The Enemy Within: A n Eyewitness Account of the Communist Conquest of China (New York, 1952), passim. . General David Barr, in U.S.-China White Paper, p . 338. . T’eng Tai-yiian, cited i n Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, p . 20. These two areas merged in the spring of 1948 into the North China Military Region, controlling some 50 million people i n about 280 counties. . I b i d . , p . 26, but not necessarily equating cadres with Communists, and other reports vary. T h u s , W . H i n t o n , Fan Shen, p p . 360-61, 490, states that, i n one

county, 40 per cent of the Communists were of landlord or rich peasant origin, while in another part of the same county, all but one of the twenty-eight Party members were poor peasants. O f these twenty-eight, b y far the largest number joined the Party to fight for “equal rights and freedom to speak.” . Thus, i n 1945, Liu Shao-ch’i had criticized excessively loose standards in wartime recruiting, and, i n late 1947 and on other occasions, Mao Tse-tung bemoaned the fact that “many landlords, rich peasants, and riffraff have seized the opportunity to sneak into our Party.” Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p. 166; and Liu Shao-ch’i, O n the Party, passim. . Gittings, Role, pp. 304, 60, 205; and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 145, 272. By 1948, Mao was hoping to recruit u p to 60 per cent of captured Nationalist troops. . P o Yi-po t o the author i n A n n a Louise Strong, Tomorrow’s China ( N e w York, 1 9 4 8 ) , passim.

10. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; and Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, p . 18. Even less information is available on the lower-level organs. Among provincial committees mentioned most often at this time were the Szechwan Committee, headed by W u Yii-chang and others, and the Chiaotung (part of Shantung) Committee. 11. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 273. 12. Teng Hsiao-p’ing, i n Eighth National Congress of the CCP, pp. 193-95, 189-90. 13. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 177-79. 14. Ibid., p p . 204 a n d 258. 15. Ibid., p . 271; and Gittings, Role, pp. 100 ff., 113. 16. M a o , S W (Peking e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 269. 17. Ibid., pp. 276-717. 18. Ibid., pp. 267-68. 19. Ibid., p p . 377-78. 20. Ibid., pp. 132, 142, 148, 158-59; L i T’ien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 273-74; and The Great Turning Point (Peking, 1962), pp. 58 ff., and map, p . 64. 21. Mao, S W (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 132n. 22. Ibid., p . 269. 23. Ibid., p . 204. 24. Ibid., pp. 167, 367-68. 25. Ibid., p . 219. 26. Ibid., pp. 219-20.

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603

27. I b i d . , p p . 19, 21, 56, 59, 87-88, 117, 120, 181; a n d Chapter 18 o f this book. 28. L u Ting-yi, Ch’en Yiin, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, P’eng Chen, Po Yi-po, A n Tzu-wen, Yang Shang-k’un, and L i Ching-ch’iian supposedly then were all supporters of Liu Shao-ch’i. E.g., see Red Guard Document of November, 1967, i n JPRS 44574, M a r c h 4 , 1968, p . 28.

29. Mao, Chou En-lai, and others even traveled incognito at this time under the aliases L i Teh-sheng (“attaining victory” L i ) and H u Pi-cheng (“must succeed” H u ) . Kai-yu Hsii, Chou En-lai, p . 188. 30. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 21; and Red Guard Document of November, 1967, i n JPRS 44574, pp. 28-29. 31. C. P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China (New York, 1966), pp. 104, 107, speaks o f a J u l y , 1948 ( m e a n i n g S e p t e m b e r ? ) , meeting a t w h i c h these issues

came up. See also Gittings, Survey, passim, and Chapter 15 above on the effects of the role of the Russians i n Manchuria on intra-Party politics i n the late 1940’s. 32. Kai-yu Hsii, Chou En-lai, pp. 174-76. 33. Po Yi-po, i n Strong, Tomorrow’s China, p . 69. 34. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 125; H o K a n - c h i h , History, p . 492; a n d V . P . Ilyushechkin and L i u Yii, eds., Rabocheye Dvijeniye Kitaye, 1945-1949 (The Chinese Workers’ Movement) (hereafter, Ilyushechkin and L i u , Workers’ Movem e n t ) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 6 9 ) , passim. According t o the l a t t e r , there were more t h a n

1,000 “workers’ conflicts” i n Shanghai i n the last half of 1945, demands of 150,000 workers i n Harbin i n June, 1946, and growing strikes and agitation. But the book gives little evidence of organized Communist labor activity prior to 1948. 35. The veteran L i Li-san and younger leaders, such as L a i Jo-yii, were the most active. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 36. Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, p . 9, says that 506 towns were under Communist control by the end of 1945, whereas, after losses i n 1946-47, Mao spoke of Communist control of 586 cities by October, 1948. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 270, 363, 259; and Ilyushechkin and Liu, eds., Workers’ Movement, passim. 37. E.g., see B e l d e n , Shakes, passim; a n d W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen, passim. 38. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 39. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 120, 125, 135, 138; C. T . Hsiieh, Bibliography, pp. 219 ff.; and Suzanne Pepper, “ T h e Student Movement and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949,” i n CQ, no. 48, pp. 698 ff. 40. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Pringsheim, in CQ, no. 12. 41. Goldman, Literary Dissent, pp. 67 ff.; and Frederick Yii, Mass Persuasion, pp. 61 fi. 42. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 207 ff., 241 fi. 43. Pepper, i n CQ, no. 48, pp. 733-34. 44. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p p . 116, 271. C f . H o Kan-chih, History, p . 502. 45. Gittings, Role, pp. 61, 67-68. A t first there were about five, and later two or three, support workers for every combat soldier. 46. Wei Ch’un-chieh, p. 24; cf. H u Hua, History, pp. 501-2. 47. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, p . 200. 48. Linebarger, Chiang Kai-shek, pp. 147-48. Similarly, i n 1936, George Taylor asserted that the fact that Communist policies had “achieved some measure of success for their redistribution of land i n Kiangsi has been accepted b y the Nanking government.” “The Reconstruction Movement in China,” in W m . Holland and Kate Mitchell, eds., Problems of the Pacific (Chicago, 1937), p . 392. The Communists’ wartime “rent and interest reduction” was based legally on the Nationalists’ law of 1930 calling for a 25 per cent reduction, but the Nationalists rarely, if ever, enforced this law until they reached Taiwan. 49. W . Hinton, F a n Shen, p . 615.

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Jk

50. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 283-84. These Communist figures for North China seem suspiciously similar to those used in the Kiangsi period. See Chapter 9 above; and Hsiao, The Land Revolution, pp. 136-37. 5 . The leading non-Communist study of agrarian conditions gave a more optimistic, though still somber, appraisal of tenancy. I t estimated that throughout China in the 1930’s some 46 per cent of the farmers owned land, 25 per cent owned part of their land, and 29 per cent were tenants. Conditions were much more severe in South than in North China. I n most of North China, some 12 to 17 per cent of the land was rented. J. L . Buck, Land Utilization in China (New York, 1964), p . 196. See also Ch’en Han-seng, The Chinese Peasant (Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, no. 33, 1945); Perkins, Agricultural Development; Myers, Peasant Economy, et al., discussed above in Chapter 1 and its footnotes. 52. D u n J. L i , The Ageless Chinese (New York, 1965), p . 503. 53. See Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policy, pp. 82, 87; Belden, Shakes, pp. 97 fi.; W . Hinton, Fan Shen, p. 595. Kuo, History, vol. I I I , pp. 595 ff., states that the Chinese Communists tolerated opium-growing for taxes during the war. 54. Mao, SW, vol. I V , pp. 291 and 293. 55. Ibid. (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 71-72, 76. 56. Brandt et al., eds., Documentary History, p . 278; and Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p . 51. 57. Kuo-chiin Chao Agrarian Policy, pp. 76-77. 58. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 85n. I n the single month of July, 1946, some 12,000 cadres were sent into the countryside of the Northeast to push the land struggle. Perevertailo et al., eds., Outline, p . 401. 59. See CCP “East China Bureau, “Kuan-yii Hsin-chieh-fang-ch’ii Ta-liang Fa-chan Tang t i Wen-t'i” ( “ O n Great Party Expansion i n Newly Liberated Areas’) (no city given, November, 1946), p . 1; and Belden, Shakes, p . 169. 60. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 124-27. 61. Ibid., pp. 130-31. I n nearby Shehsien, Hopeh, just northwest of Hantan, a study similar to William Hinton’s outlined the progress from the “black lands” and “fill the holes and level the tops” campaigns of the later stages of the double reduction movement, to the “land to the tiller” policy of 1946 and after. See Crook, Ten Mile Inn, passim. 62. Kuo-chiin C h a o , Agrarian Policy, p p . 4 5 , 98. 63. CCP Central Committee, “Kuan-yii T’u-ti Wen-ti ti chih-shih” (“Directive on the Land Problem”) (hereafter, May 4, 1946, CCP Central Committee “Directive”), i n Chien-fei Hsien-k’uang Hui-pien (Collected Documents on Current Conditions of the Traitor Bandits) (Taipei, September, 1950), p . 40. This document is not easily available, perhaps because of its manifestly conservative tone. I t is barely mentioned in Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, for example. 64. Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 268. 65. May 4, 1946, CCP Central Committee “Directive,” pp. 41-44. 66. Jane Price, “Chinese Communist Land Reform and Peasant Mobilization, 19474 8 ” (hereafter, Price, “ L a n d Reform”) (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1970), p . 16. 67. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), pp. 89-90. 68. I b i d . , pp. 113, 116. 69. Ibid., p . 145; a n d W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen, p . 200. 70. See Schurmann, Ideology, passim. 71. M a y 4 , 1946, C C P Central Committee “ D i r e c t i v e , ” items 3 a n d 5 ; a n d Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p . 77. 72. H u Hua, History, p . 503; and Price, “ L a n d Reform,” pp. 16-17. 73. Liu Shao-ch’i, The Agrarian Reform L a w (Peking, 1950); and Crook, Ten Mile

Inn, Appendix. Cf. Liu Shao-ch’i, “First Confession” of 1966, Atlas, April, 1967, p . 15.

Notes for Chapter 19

605

bh

74. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 229, 231-32; and Kuo Hua-lun et al., eds., Who's Who. 75. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 123; a n d H u Hua, History, p p . 535. 76. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 202-3, 206. Because of equal division of inheritance, the landholdings of wealthy families often fragmented after several generations. 77. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p. 145. Cf. p . 170. 78. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, p. 615; and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 174-75. 79. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 233-34, and this chapter above. The Communists stated that the September—October discussions “made u p for the lack of thoroughness” i n the May 4, 1946, directive, which “ h a d shown too much consideration for certain landlords.” Ibid., p . 174. 80. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, p . 263; Wei Ch’un-chieh, pp. 33 ff.; Crook, Ten Mile Inn, Appendix. 8 . M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p . 164; W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen, p p . 6 1 5 - 1 6 ; Kuochiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 78 fi. 82. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 617-18. 83. The first is i n Mao, SW, vol. I , pp. 138-40, but not the second. For i t , see Hsiao, Land Revolution, pp. 257 ff.; and H u Hua, History, pp. 537 ff. 84. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. 1V, pp. 165, 183, 193, 228-29, 232, 235; W . Hinton,

Fan Shen, p. 623; Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p. 79. Jen Pi-shih elaborated on these class distinctions i n an important speech of January 12, 1948. Landlords, according to Jen, owned much land but d i d not farm i t themselves, while rich peasants farmed a part of their land, but relied primarily on others’ labor. The poor peasants, by contrast, had inadequate land and tools and were often dependent on unfavorable conditions of tenancy, while the rural laborers had n o land or implements and worked for pitifully inadequate wages. Kuo-chiin C h a o , Agrarian Policy, p . 7 9 ; a n d text i n Mu-ch’ien Hsing-shih h o Wo-men-ti

Jen-wu (The Present Situation and Our Tasks) (Canton, 1949), pp. 42 fi. 85. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g ed.), v o l . I V , p p . 163-64. . Ibid., pp. 165-66; and Wang Shih et al., Brief History, pp. 278-79. 87. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 165-66. 88. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 490, 360-61. 89. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 166. 90. See “Directive on the Reform of Cadre Work,” in Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, pp. 22-24. 91. Ibid., p . 25; and Wei Ch’un-chieh, pp. 33 fl. 92. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 319 fI., especially pp. 321-22, 360-62; Wang Shih et al., Brief History, p . 279; and Frederick C. Teiwes, forthcoming Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation on intra-Party purges. 93. W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen, p p . 361-62. 94. Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang Hou, pp. 26-27. 95. Shansi-Suiyiian Daily, November 27, 1947, cited i n Wei Ch’un-chieh, pp. 33-38. 96. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 222. 97. W . H i n t o n , F a n Shen, p p . 490-91. 98. M a o , S W ( P e k i n g e d . ) , v o l . I V , p p . 228-29. 99. Ibid., pp. 193 ff. I n accord with the more moderate land policy of 1948, protection was afforded to middle peasants by granting them, among other devices, strong representation i n the peasant associations. Jen Pi-shih, who, together with Mao, apparently was primarily responsible for land reform policy i n northern Shensi u n t i l M a r c h , 1948, elaborated o n the n e w stress o n m i d d l e peasants i n

his speech of January 12. I n old liberated areas, according to Jen, u p to half the peasants had kept or gained the status of “middle peasant” through land reform, a n d , therefore, some “two-thirds o f the seats i n t h e village administration were a n d one third i n the n e w areas.” Kuo[ t o b e ] allotted t o middle peasants

Notes for Chapter 20

606

chiih Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 84, 75, 79; and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 197-220. I n an important directive of January 18, Mao explained, must be our first The interests of the poor peasants and farm laborers concern [ b u t ] this forward role consists i n forging unity with the middle The position of the middle peasants is especially important in peasants. the old liberated areas where the middle peasants are the majority and the poor peasants and farm laborers a minority. . . . We must avoid any adventurist policies toward the middle peasants.

Ibid., pp. 182-83, 203. 100. Ibid., p . 194. 101. Ibid., pp. 202, 257. 102. Ibid., pp. 197-99. 103. Ibid., pp. 201-2. 104. Ibid., pp. 219, 236-37. 105. I b i d .pp. , 254-55. 106. E.g., i n Honan P r o v i n c e . Chassin, Conquest, p . 3 8 ; Kuo-chiin C h a o , Agrarian Policy, pp. 76, 80-81. 107. W . Hinton, Fan Shen, pp. 402-4. I n the Northeast i n November, 1948, in East China i n September, 1949, and i n Central China i n October, 1949, Party authorities issued additional demands for rent and interest reductions. 108. Crook, Ten Mile Inn, p . 19. 109. Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, p. 86. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 270.

Chapter 20

on

1. Guillermaz, Histoire, p. 379; and Griffith, Army, p. 341. 2. Griffith, Army, p. 342; Gittings, Role, p . 307; Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol I V , p. 266; and Chassin, Conquest, pp. 181-82. According to William W . Whitson (“The Field Army i n Chinese Communist Military Politics,” CQ, no. 37, p. 10), there was remarkable continuity of assignment i n these armies, w i t h only sixty-eight of some 500 top officers having transferred from one to another of these military units between 1928 and 1948. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 150. Chassin, Conquest, pp. 133 ff.; and Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 394 fi. . Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 391 fI.; Mao, SW (Peking ed.), v o l . I V , pp. 130, 220, 362. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 758 ff., and 1043-44; Tsou, America’s Failure, p . 451; Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 273 fi.; Chassin, Conquest, pp. 14346, 201; a n d G u i l l e r m a z , Histoire, p p . 390-91. 0

. U.S.-China White Paper, pp. 281-82. . The Nationalists still claimed to have more troops than the Communists, but m a n y were support troops.

. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 271; Chassin, Conquest, pp. 178, 223. According to Chassin, by the spring of 1949, some 60,000 Communist-led men controlled one-third of Kwangtung. A forthcoming Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation by Gary Catron will discuss Communist activities of the period in Hong Kong. 10. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 295-96; Chassin, Conquest, p . 199; Guillermaz, Histoire, pp. 400-404; and Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 281, 297. 11. Chassin, Conquest, p . 191; Guillermaz, Histoire, p p . 394-97; M a o , S W ( P e k i n g ed.), vol. I V , pp. 261-65; and Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p . 290. 12. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 425; and Chassin, Conquest, p . 191. 13. See Derk Bodde, Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution (hereafter, Bodde, Peking Diary)

( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 5 0 ) , passim; a n d B a r n e t t , Eve, passim; for absorbing

descriptions of the mood of China i n these climactic days. Cf. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 363n, and 293.

Notes for Chapter 21

607

14. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 263, 300, 406; Chassin, Conquest, p . 208. 15 Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. 1V, pp. 225, 285, 288, 300. 16. Ibid., pp. 371-72. 17 Ibid., pp. 329-30. 18 Ibid., pp. 150, 318. 19 Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 317-18, 327, 331. 20. See forthcoming Reminiscences of General L i Tsung-jen, edited by Te-kong Tong, passim. 21. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 301, 306, 371, 266. 22, Ibid., pp. 388-89, 397-400; Barnett, Eve, passim; and Bodde, Peking Diary, passim. 23. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 401. 24, Ibid., p . 374; cf. Mao, as cited i n CLG, vol. I , no. 1, p . 9. 25. Mao revealed the Party’s decision i n 1944 to reprint Kuo Mo-jo’s tract, on the 300th anniversary of Li Tzu-ch’eng’s loss of Peking. Mao, SW, vol. I V , p . 169. Cf. L i n Piao’s 1966 speech, cited i n IS, February, 1970, pp. 81 ff. 26. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 362. Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien, July 5, 1961, cited in ECMM, no. 275, pp. 1 fi.; and Hsiao Yi-ping and Chang Kung in People’s Daily, September 15, 1956, trans. i n CB, no. 410, pp. 40-41. 217.Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 405-9. 28. Ibid., pp. 138, 221, cf. pp. 187, 276. 29. Ibid., pp. 302, 304, 306. 30. Kuo, History, i n IS, February, 1970, pp. 74-77; and cf. C. K . Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition (hereafter, Yang, Village) (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), passim. 31. Ilyushechkin and L i u , eds., Workers’ Movement, for example, could publish only two documents of the labor movement i n “liberated areas” from Manchuria i n 1946 and then none until 1948. 32. Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Chassin, Conquest, p . 202; and Mao, SW (Peking

ed.), vol. IV, p. 226. 33. Ibid., pp. 372, 407. 34. Mao, SW, vol. III, p . 317. 35. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 182-83. 36. I b i d . , p . 363. Italics added. As early as the spring of 1948 and specifically i n February, 1949, Mao had forecast this shift (ibid., pp. 247-49, 259, 274, 337), as had Party editorials since early 1948, e.g., see Mu-ch’ien Hsing-shih h o Women t i Jen-wu (The Present Situation and O u r Tasks) (Canton, 1949), pp. 142 fi. 37. Kuo, History, i n IS, February, 1970, p . 76. 38. Most famously by Liu Shao-ch’i i n the mid-1940’s and Lin Piao in 1965. 39. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 363-64. 40. Lewis, Leadership, p . 108. 41. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 274. 42. Ibid., pp. 337-39, 363. 43. Ibid., pp. 364 and 373. 44. Ibid., p . 274. 45. Ibid., p . 271. 46. Ibid., pp. 120, 135; Chassin, Conquest, p. 176; Barnett, Eve, passim. 47. Mao, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , pp. 274-79. 48. Ibid., p p . 365, 367. 49, Ibid., pp. 422, 374.

Chapter 2 1 1. Adapted from H s i u n g , Ideology, p p . 97-99; a n d Schwartz, “Modernization a n d the Maoist Vision,” CQ, no. 21, pp. 3 ff.

608

Notes for Chapter 21

. Cited i n Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography (hereafter, Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao Papers) (London, 1970), p . 56. Similarly, Mao’s peculiar style and goals have been summarized i n part as “ a n empirical style of work which applies national policy i n terms of local conditions thoroughly studied; a mass line technique of work which secures the mutual education of leaders and led, and which maintains the maximum participation of the majority of the population i n decision making at the local level.” Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism in Crisis (hereafter, Gray and Cavendish, Crisis) (New York, 1968), p . 67. . M a o , “ O n Dialectics” (1959), as cited i n JPRS 50792, p . 33.

For bibliography and discussion of the problems involved, see Michel C. Oksenberg et al. eds., A Bibliography of Secondary English Language Literature on Contemporary Chinese Politics (New York, 1970), passim; and Oksenberg; “Sources and Methodological Problems i n the Study of Contemporary China,” in Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 577 fi. . See Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, 1960). See Kuo-chiin Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 94 ff. For Mao’s statement on the execution of counterrevolutionaries, see Roderick Macfarquhar, ed., The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (hereafter, Macfarquhar, Hundred Flowers) (New York, 1960), p . 270 ff. This passage was deleted from the published version of Mao’s speech Contradictions (1957). See also Robert Loh, Escape from Red China (hereafter, Loh, Escape) (New York, 1962), p. 291. The Nationalists claim the Communists have killed u p to the fantastic figure of 66 million people, and an American study estimated that from 34,300,000 to 63,784,000 deaths, including those i n warfare, were caused by the Communists between 1927 and 1971. See Free China Weekly, August 11, 1968; and Richard Walker, ed., The Human Cost of Communism in China (Washington, D.C., 1971), passim, and i n IS, September, 1971, pp. 16 ff. Radio Moscow on April 7, 1969, charged that the Communists had executed 2.8 million people from 1949 t o 1952 ( a c c o r d i n g t o most, t h e bloodiest p e r i o d ) , 3.6 million from 1953

to 1957, 6.7 million from 1958 to 1960, and 13.3 million from 1961 to 1965, giving a total of more than 26 million. The more usual figures of 1.5 to 2 or 3 million executions, over all, would seem far more likely and evidence enough of Jacobinist tendencies among the Chinese Communists. See Peter Tang and J. M . Maloney, Communist China, pp. 311-20; and Edgar Snow, Other Side, pp. 352-54. For a comparison w i t h the Soviet Union, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (New York, 1968), passim. See Chou En-lai i n R . R . Bowie and J. K . Fairbank, eds., Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis (hereafter, Bowie and Fairbank, Documents) ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 131. See also Theodore H . E . C h ’ e n ,

Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (hereafter, Theodore Ch’en, Thought Reform) ( H o n g K o n g , 1 9 6 0 ) .

. See Frank King, A Concise Economic History of Modern China (1840-1961) (New York, 1969), pp. 175 and 181; R . M . Field, “Industrial Production in Communist China: 1957-1968,” CQ, no. 42, p . 47; Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, Economy, pp. 84 ff.; and Alexander Eckstein, Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (hereafter, Eckstein, Economic Growth) (New York, 1966), p . 302. 10. Mao’s address of January, 1962, as cited i n JPRS 50792, p . 53. 11. See Donald W . Klein, “ T h e ‘Next Generation’ of Chinese Leaders,” in CQ, no. 12, pp. 71-72; John Lindbeck, ed., Management, passim; and Snow, Red Star (1968 ed.), p . 451. Some of the approximately fifty ministries of the mid-1960’s were combined as a result of the Cultural Revolution. As of 1962, there had been sixty-seven different ministries at one time or another since 1949.

Notes for Chapter 21

609

12. N C N A (Peking) dispatch of April 30, 1957; People’s Daily, May 1, 1957; and Edgar Snow, “ T h e Open Door: Talks with Chou En-lai” (hereafter, Snow, “Open D o o r ” ) , The New Republic, March 27, 1971, p . 21. 13. A . D . Barnett, Cadres, pp. 6-8 fi. 14. Wang Yiin, “Maoist’ Revolutionary Committees,” IS, December, 1968, p . 8; W . A . C. Adie, “China’s Second Liberation i n Perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, eds., China After the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1969), p . 5 3 ; Parris C h a n g , i n Problems o f Communism, November, 1969, p p . 8 9 ; T i n g

Wang in CLG, Summer, 1970, p . 108; and Whitson, High Command, passim. 15. Klein, in CQ, no. 12, pp. 57 f . 16. Donald W . Klein and Lois B. Hager, “ T h e Ninth Central Committee,” CQ, no. 45, p . 52. 17. Schurmann, Ideology, p. 168; Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (hereafter, Joffe, Army) (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p . 139; and Victor Funnell, i n CQ, no. 42, p . 113. 18. Snow, Other Side, p . 350. However, a study of a Kwangtung County of some 500,000 people, estimated there were about 325 security personnel, virtually all i n the Party or Youth League, which would indicate a police-population ratio of about 1 for every 1,500 people. By contrast, i f one accepts the 1.7 million security men for an estimated 650 million population i n 1959, the police-population ratio for all China would be about 1 for every 400, as against 1 for every 200 i n New York City. The county Party secretary generally served as director of the county public security bureau. See Victor L i , i n John Lewis, ed., The City in Communist China (Stanford, Calif., 1971), pp. 61 fi. 19. K ’ o Ch’ing-shih and L i Ching-ch’ian were, respectively, mayor of Shanghai and Party leader of Szechwan and the Southwest, and the only two Political Bureau members who had not been elected to the Seventh Central Committee in 1945. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 20. I b i d . ; Charles Neuhauser, “ T h e Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the CCP Machine,” Asian Survey, June, 1968, p. 466; and Donald W . Klein and Lois B. Hager, i n CQ, no. 45, p . 39. 21. 1956 constitution (article 37). Cf. 1945 constitution, article 34. 22. For the Party’s central apparatus, see Klein and Clark, Dictionary; Schurmann, Ideology, passim; H o u n , History, passim; a n d Peter T a n g , Communist China

Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies (Washington, D.C., 1957), vol. I , passim. F o r t h e p e r i o d a f t e r the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , see W i n b e r g C h a i , “ T h e Reorgani-

zation of the CCP, 1966-1968,” Asian Survey, November, 1968, pp. 906 fi. 23. P a u l C o c k s , “ T h e R o l e o f t h e P a r t y C o n t r o l C o m m i t t e e i n Communist C h i n a , ” Harvard Papers o n China, v o l . 2 2 b (hereafter, C o c k s , “Role,” i n Harvard Papers

on China) (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 54 and 58. 24. See Schurmann, Ideology, especially p. 314. I n 1967, however, Mao was quoted to the effect that “ T h e Public Security Bureau is an instrument of the [prol e t a r i a n ] d i c t a t o r s h i p . ” Jerome C h ’ e n , ed., M a o Papers, p . 48.

25, L i Fu-ch’'un described the election of the Eighth Central Committee but i n rather vague terms. See CB, no. 426, citing N C N A , September 26, 1956. 26. Lindbeck, i n Treadgold, ed., Communism, p . 97. 27. Teiwes, i n Lindbeck, ed., Management, pp. 116-89. 28. Tang t i Tsu-chih Kung-tso Wen-ta (Questions a n d A n s w e r s o n t h e Organizational Work of the Party) (Peking, 1964), pp. 7-8. A n earlier edition (1958) of this work is translated i n JPRS 7273. See also Lindbeck, in Treadgold, ed., Communism, p. 95; and Lewis, Leadership, pp. 130-33. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, at least, the CCP largely followed the organizational pattern of the Soviet Communist Party. T o try to prevent the formation of cliques, the CPSU kept strict functional and geographic separation between each department and its staff assignments, according to the “nomenklatura” system of positions and

610

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ranks. Assignments were handled b y a different department usually from a different area. Thus, the Political Bureau assigned the top several hundred Party positions, the Secretariat’s Party organs section the next several thousand, including the several thousand district secretaries, while inspectors of the district organizations checked on lower-level personnel and organization. Interview with Severyn Bialer, at Columbia University, January 7, 1970; John Armstrong, Politics of Totalitarianism (New York, 1961), pp. 122 ff.; John Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union (New York, 1962), pp. 56-57, 73 fi.; Avtorkhanov, Apparatus, pp. 201, 206, 210; and Schapiro, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, passim. 29. See Barnett, Cadres, pp. 41-42, 190; and Schurmann, Ideology, p . 162. 30. Teng Hsiao-p’ing, i n Eighth National Congress of the CCP, p . 220; Lindbeck, i n Treadgold, ed., Communism, p . 90; and Liu Mou-an, in IS, October, 1968, p . 4. 31. Funnell, i n C Q , no. 42, p p . 113-14. 32. I n the CPSU, an estimated one i n twelve Party members were on Party payrolls, and all Party organizations of more than 100 members employed full-time Party secretaries. Schapiro, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp. 444-45. I t is not known i f a similar provision exists for the CCP. 33. See Barnett, Cadres, pp. 49-52. There is virtually no information o n the archives committee of the Party, which presumably is under the organization department. Cf. Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 71-72. Wang Hsiieh-wen, i n IS, November, 1970, p . 32, mentions a Youth League “secret documents section.” This type of continual surveillance and involvement raises the most unpleasant questions about life i n China, witness countless refugee reports and numerous books of those who left. E.g., Ching-wen Chou, Ten Years of Storm: The True Story of the Communist Regime in China (New York, 1960), passim; Loh, Escape, passim; Lifton, Thought Reform, passim. 34. L i n Piao address of 1966, cited i n JPRS 49826, p . 77. 35. I n three of six, two of four, and six of ten duties of Communists listed respectively i n Ch’en Yiin’s “ H o w to Be a Communist Party Member,” and i n the 1945 and 1956 Party constitutions. The “ t e n duties” of the 1956 constitution were an elaboration of the “eight criteria” for Party membership worked out by Liu Shao-ch’i, A n Tzu-wen, and others i n 1951 and adopted by the National Conference of Organization Work, i n March, 1951. See Lewis, Leadership, pp. 104-5. 36. After Mao’s death, the formulation may be changed officially to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. See the “Constitution of the CCP,” adopted April 14, 1969, i n Peking R e v i e w , n o . 18, April 3 0 , 1969. C f . writings o f M a o a n d L i n P i a o cited i n

JPRS 49826, pp. 16-17 and 62. 37. Lewis, Leadership, pp. 156-58; Barnett, Cadres, pp. 161, 174, 190. 38. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 39. Schurmann, Ideology, p . 138; Snow, Other Side, pp. 343-45; and Chang Chungli, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society (Seattle, 1955). I n a county o n t h e Southeast coast, however, Com-

munist and Youth League members formed only 3 per cent of the population. See B a r n e t t , Cadres, p . 184.

40. Documents of the National Conference of the CCP (Peking, 1955), p . 14. 41. Snow, “ O p e n D o o r , ” T h e N e w Republic, M a r c h 27, 1971, p . 2 1 ; R o b e r t Gillain, i n L e Monde, September 23, 1971, p . 5 ; W a n g Hsiieh-wen, i n IS, November, 1970,

p . 38; and cf. Jerome Ch’en, Mao Papers, p . 33. 42. See speeches of L i u Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, i n The Eighth Party Congress, pp. 95, 97, 216; and L i u Shao-ch’i, i n Peking Review, July 7, 1961, p . 10. A l s o Lewis, Leadership, p p . 112, 123, 144; Schurmann, Ideology, p . 133; and Tang and Maloney, Communist China, p . 145.

Notes for Chapter 21

611

43. See Funnell, i n CQ, no. 42, pp. 108 ff.; Houn, History, p . 132; Snow, Other Side, p . 345; Tang, Communist China Today, p . 198. 44. See Mao’s address of January, 1962, cited i n JPRS 50792, p . 53; and Snow, Other Side, pp. 331 ff. However, u p to one-third of the top Party leadership elected i n 1956 either did not participate i n or did not complete the Long March. Furthermore, more p r o v i n c i a l secretaries h a d served i n u n i t s t h a t later m a d e u p

the New Fourth Army i n South and Central China than had participated i n the Long March. See Henry Schwarz, “ T h e Nature of Leadership: The Central Committee, 1930-1945,” World Politics, July, 1970; and Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956-1966 (hereafter, Teiwes, Provincial) ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 1 1 a n d 7.

45. Schurmann, Ideology, p. 138; Snow, Other Side, p . 345; Tang, Communist China Today, p . 198. The latest to become a Communist probably was Yang Hsiu-feng, who may have joined as late as 1938. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 46. Barnett, Cadres, pp. 44-45; and Oksenberg, i n Barnett, ed., Politics, pp. 175 fl. 47. O f the more than half of the forty-four members of the Seventh Central Committee elected i n 1945 whose backgrounds were known, most had received educ a t i o n abroad (59.5 per cent i n the Soviet U n i o n , 28.6 i n F r a n c e , 11.9 i n Japan,

and 7.1 i n Germany—and one member, Chang Wen-t’ien, received some education in the United States). See Note 52, below. 48. Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 132-33, 167-71; and Snow, Other Side, p . 344. 49. A n Tzu-wen, “Party Reform,” People’s Daily, July 1, 1952, i n CB, no. 191, pp. 3-4. 50. Ezra Vogel, “ T h e ‘Regularization of Cadres,” ” CQ, no. 29, p . 45. 51. Lewis, Leadership, pp. 150 ff. Cf. Mao, cited in CLG, vol. I , no. 4, pp. 28 and 40. 52. The material i n these paragraphs is based on Kuo-chiin Chao, “Leadership i n the CCP,” The Annals of the American Academy, 1959, pp. 43 fi.; F . Houn, “The Eighth Central Committee of the CCP,” American Political Science Review, June, 1957, pp. 395 ff.; North, Elites, pp. 51, 64, etc.; Klein, i n CQ, no. 45, pp. 39 ff., 41, 46; Lindbeck, i n Treadgold, ed., Communism, pp. 88 fl.; Lewis, Leadership, p . 109; S n o w , O t h e r Side, p p . 344-45; a n d China N e w s Analysis,

no. 223; Wang Hsiieh-wen, i n IS, November, 1970, p . 38; and Snow, “Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution: Mao Tse-tung and the Cost of Living,” The N e w Republic, April 10, 1971, pp. 18-20. 53. George M o s e l e y , A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: T h e Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 31 ff.; A . Hasiotis, “ A Comparative Study of Russian Central Asia (1917-1934)” (unpublished Columbia University Master’s Essay, 1 9 6 5 ) ; K l e i n a n d C l a r k , Dictionary; a n d forthcoming studies o f

June Dryer and John Dolfin. 54. See Footnote 52. 55. See Paul Harper, “ T h e Party and the Unions i n Communist China,” CQ, no. 37, p. 111; Snow, Other Side, pp. 344-45; and Lindbeck, in Treadgold, ed., pp. 88 fi. 56. Teng Hsiao-p’ing, i n The Eighth National Congress of the CCP, p . 220; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 131, 133; A . D . Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955 (hereafter, B a r n e t t , Early Years)

(New York, 1964), p . 57;

and Vogel, Canton, pp. 150, 144. 57. S c h u r m a n n , Ideology, p . 162; V i c t o r F u n n e l l , “Bureaucracy a n d the Chinese Communist Party,” Current Scene, May, 7, 1971, p . 6; and Barnett, Cadres, pp. 39 ff. Barnett, pp. 24 and 153, states that one-third of the cadres i n ministry M a n d county X were Communists, while A n Tzu-wen revealed that one-third o f

the cadres above the county level were Communist or Youth League members. L i n d b e c k , i n Treadgold, ed., Communism, p . 86; Schurmann, Ideology, p . 135.

Estimates of the number of cadres vary from 720,000 i n 1949 and 2.7 million i n

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September 20, 1952, to 6 million or even 17 million b y 1960. There were 1 million in Kwangtung alone. Ezra Vogel, Canton, pp. 351-55; Houn, History, p . 130; Lewis, Leadership, pp. 186, 222; and Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 168.) 58. A 1957 drive to reduce bureaucratism ordered 1,000 higher and middle Party member cadres transferred from central Party and government organizations to educational and cultural institutions (Lindbeck, in Treadgold, ed., Communism, p . 95), while Mao even proposed at one point i n 1956 “ a cut of two-thirds of our Party and Government organizations.” Jerome Ch’en, Mao, p . 77. By comparison, i t was estimated there were 1,500 men working at the Soviet Party Central i n the 1960’s. A . Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (hereafter, Avtorkhanov, Apparatus) (Cleveland, 1968), p . 209. 59. Lindbeck, in Treadgold, ed., Communism, pp. 90 fi. 60. Schapiro, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p . 455; and Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 44. 61. Barnett, Cadres, pp. 125, 153, 157, 179, 184; Vogel, Canton, p . 371; and Lindbeck, in Treadgold, ed., Communism, pp. 93 and 96. 62. Teiwes, Provincial, pp. 16-17; Vogel, Canton, pp. 108, 345; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary.

Chapter 22 1. Mao (October 25, 1966), i n CLG, vol. I , no. 1, p . 9. Similarly, in 1962, Mao stated, “ W e truly are short of experience and a long-range plan. We suffered many setbacks i n [the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward].” Taking an even longer historical view, he went on to say, [ O n l y ] after 300 years d i d the productivity of capitalism reach the current state. By comparison with capitalism, socialism is much superior. The ecoI n China, hownomic development of our country w i l l be much faster. ever, the population is larger, the foundation weaker, and the economy backward. I f we are to have a large development i n productivity and if we are to catch u p w i t h and surpass the advanced capitalist countries in the world, I would say we will need at least 100 years. .. .

Nn

Cited in JPRS 50792, pp. 49-50. . Cited in JPRS 49826, p . 70. . Cheng Ssu-yiian article of August, 1958, in ECMM, no. 151, p . 19; and “Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the CCP,” Peking Review, July 2, 1971, p . 17. . Kung Tzu-jung, cited i n Tang and Maloney, Communist China, p . 189; and Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao Papers, pp. 139, 141. Cf. Lewis, Leadership, p . 173. . For a n interesting statement o n groups w h o could expect criticism, see A n Tzu-

wen’s article in People’s Daily, July 1, 1952, trans. in CB, no. 191, especially pp. 3-4.

. I n Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao, pp. 77, 41; CLG, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 81; and CB, no. 740, p . 10. . Lewis, Leadership, pp. 112-13. Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 5 5 ) ; a n d Robert Conquest, T h e Great Terror: Stalin's Purge o f the Thirties ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 8 ) , passim.

. Barnett, Cadres, p . 146; Barnett, Early Years, p . 55; and Schurmann, Ideology, p . 318. . Vogel, Canton, p . 136; and Frederick Teiwes, “The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1 9 5 7 - 5 8 , ” i n C Q , no. 2 7 , p . 25.

10. Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwes, Ssu-ch’ing: The Socialist Education Movement o f 1962-1966 (Berkeley, Calif., 1968), passim; and Cocks, “Role” i n Harvard

Papers on China, p . 78.

Notes for Chapter 22

613

bush

1 . See C e n t r a l Committee Decision, i n Peking R e v i e w , A u g u s t 12, 1966, p . 9 ; Mao, cited i n JPRS 50792, pp. 46-47; IS, August 1970, p. 14; Free China Weekly, October, 1968, p. 6; Tillman Durdin, in The New York Times, May 11, 1971; Robert Guillain i n L e Monde, September 23, 1971; and Charles Neuhauser, “ T h e CCP i n the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution,” CQ, no. 32, p . 11. 12. See Teiwes, Provincial, pp. 16-17, 30, 36, 56. Oddly enough, the most unstable provinces, Shantung and Kansu, had among the highest ratios of Party members to population. 13. Lewis, Leadership, p . 109; A n Tzu-wen, i n CB, no. 191, p . 3; URI, eds., Communist China, 1949-59 (Hong Kong, 1961), vol. I , pp. 35 ff. The latter source has a list of those purged, including Central Committee alternates L i Yii and L i u Tzu-chiu. Useful data on the June, 1950, plenum and subsequent meetings is found i n Parris Chang, “Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision i n the CCP,” CQ, no. 44, pp. 169 ff. 14. Bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government economic property, and theft of state economic secrets were the targets of the five-anti campaign, which aimed primarily at the national bourgeoisie and led to the investigation of some 450,000 enterprises. Peter Tang, Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies (Washington, D.C., 1961) vol. I , rev. ed., pp. 390 ff. 15. Barnett, Early Years, p . 55. 16. See P r i n g s h e i m , i n C Q , n o . 12, p . 9 1 ; a n d Funnell, i n C Q , n o . 4 2 , p . 113. 17. C i t e d i n SCMP, no. 1511, p . 36. 18. A n Tzu-wen i n People’s Daily, July 1, 1952, trans. i n CB, no. 191, pp. 3 4 . 19. URI, eds., Communist China, 1949-1959, p . 3 . 20. Chu Teh, T’an Chen-lin, who replaced Jao as secretary of the East China B u r e a u i n 1952, a n d others m a y have b a c k e d some o f these demands. See P . B r i d g h a m , ‘“Factionalism i n t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , ” i n L e w i s , ed., Party, p p .

205-6; Frederick Teiwes, “ T h e Evolution of Leadership Purges i n Communist China,” i n CQ, no. 41, pp. 122 ff.; and Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 21. “Resolution on the Anti-Party Bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih,” i n Documents of the National Conference o f the C C P (Peking, 1955), p p . 13-15.

22, See Schurmann, Ideology, 268; and Bridgham, i n Lewis, ed., Party, p . 209 ff. 23. Actually, nearly all “first grade cadres” transferred to Peking about 1952 i n connection w i t h the preparation of the new constitution and the more centralized state and Party structure. Whereas 120 of a sample of 171 top Party leaders worked i n the provinces and 51 i n Peking i n 1949-50, the figures were exactly reversed by 1962. See Klein, in CQ, no. 12, p . 67; and URI, eds, Communist China, 1949-59, p . 3. But after 1969 a majority of the new Central Committee again worked i n the provinces. Klein and Hager, i n CQ, no. 45; Klein and Clark, Dictionary (on Jao Shu-shih); Teiwes, i n CQ, no. 41, p . 125. 24. Documents of the National Conference of the CCP, pp. 13 fi. 25. The “Resolution on the Anti-Party Bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih” also approved the purges of alleged associates Hsiang Ming, Chang Hsiu-shan, Chang Ming-yiian, Chao Teh-tsun, M a Hung, Kuo Feng, and Ch’en Po-ts’un. Documents on the National Conference of the CCP, p . 17. Maoists later linked P’eng Teh-huai to Kao and Jao. See “Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the C C P , ” Peking Review, J u l y 2 , 1971, p . 12.

26. I n October, 1953, Political Bureau conference h a d already approved t h e “general line” for building socialism. U R I , eds., Communist China, 1949-1959, p . 11. 27. China News Analysis, no. 638, p . 4; Schurmann, Ideology, p . 34; Vogel, Canton, p . 136; Tang a n d M a l o n e y , Communist China, p . 188.

28. Opposed by L i u Po-ch’eng among others. Hsiung, Ideology, pp. 172, 176. 29. Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao, p . 79; and unpublished study on economic policy b y Richard Diao.

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30. Schurmann, Ideology, p . 540. 31. Hsiung, Ideology, pp. 180 fi.; and R . R . Bowie and J. K . Fairbank, eds., Communist China, 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis (hereafter, Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents) (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p . 3. 32. Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 65; and Schurmann, Ideology, p . 454. 33. According to Liu Shao-ch’i, as cited in Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 426. According to others, this opposition successfully stymied Mao’s plans, at least from the spring of 1956 to mid-1957. 34. “ O n the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 149.

35. P’eng Teh-huai later claimed to have instigated this change. Hsiung, Ideology, p . 213. 36. Liu Shao-ch’i, “The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CCP to the Eighth National Congress,” in Eighth National Congress of CCP, p . 37. 37. Teng Hsiao-p’ing, “Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the CCP,” in ibid., p . 213. 38. Harold C. Hinton, book review in JAS, May, 1970, p . 694. 39. Mao, cited i n C L G , v o l . I , n o . 1 , p . 7 ; c f . JPRS, n o . 49826, p . 8 ; a n d Jerome Ch’en, ed., M a o Papers, p . 44. 40. See forthcoming study by Roderick MacFarquhar on “The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: China, 1956-1965.” 41. Mao, Contradictions (1960), pp. 7 fi. Long before, as did K’ang Sheng on February 11, 1942, Party leaders spoke of contradictions between leaders and led, between the individual and the Party, outsiders and natives, military and civil, old and new cadres, as well as between organizations. See Cheng-tun San-feng, p . 43. 42. Mao Tse-tung, Contradictions (1957), pp. 9, 48 ff., 51, 52, and 57. The March 12 speech is translated in CB, no. 740. 43. Cited in JPRS 50792, p . 58. 44. Thus, the government Control Committee was heavily purged i n antirightist campaigns and abolished in 1959, eliminating an extra-Party source of control. Then, the Party’s Control Committee was purged i n turn in the Cultural Revolution. See Cocks, “Role,” i n Harvard Papers on China, pp. 60 ff.; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 353 f . , 364; and Richard Solomon, “ O n e Party and One Hundred

Schools,” Current Scene, October 1, 1969. 45. See Liu in Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 434. O f course, at other times Liu and others appeared to stress class struggle more than Mao, and Mao seemed to stress controls, but, over all, Maoists emphasized struggle from below. 46. Chung-kuo Ch’ing-nien, June 16, 1961, trans. in ECMM, no. 271, p . 48. 47. Solomon, i n Current Scene, October 1, 1969; MacFarquhar, ed., Hundred Flowers; Theodore Ch’en, Thought Reform, pp. 142 fI.; and Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 16. 48. Mao, Contradictions (1960), pp. 55-56; and Solomon, in Current Scene, footnote 58. 49. Chu-yuan Cheng, “The Power Struggle i n Red China,” Asian Survey, September, 1966, p . 47. According to M u Fu-sheng, The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: The Chinese Intellectuals Under Mao (New York, 1963), p . 173, there had been 300,000 rightists. Cf. Schurmann, Ideology, p . 354. 50. China News Analysis, nos. 214 and 638. 51. See Snow, Other Side, p . 344; Shinkichi Eto, “Communist China: Moderation and Reform i n the Chinese Revolution,” in James B . Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (New York, 1970), pp. 348, 353. 52. See Schurmann, Ideology, p . 215; Teiwes, i n CQ, no. 27, pp. 14 ff.; Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, pp. 37, 417.

Notes for Chapter 22

615

53. Teiwes, i n CQ, no. 27, pp. 14 ff.; Schurmann, Ideology, p . 215. See Tang and Maloney, Communist China, pp. 178-79; URI, eds., Communist China, 1949-59, vol. 1, no. 13, passim. 54. Lewis, Leadership, p . 224; Facts and Features, June 11, 1969, p . 12. The figures included 140,000 “experts,” Free China Weekly, February 9, 1969. 55. See G . W . Skinner and E. A . Winckler, “Compliance Succession i n Rural Communist China:

A Cyclical T h e o r y , ” i n A m i t a i E t z i o n i , ed., A

Sociological

Reader on Complex Organizations (New York, 1969), pp. 410 ff.; and Schurmann, Ideology, p . 579. 56. Mao recognized 1957 as the major dividing line after 1949. See Mao’s address of January, 1962, i n JPRS 50792, pp. 51-52. See also Hsiung, Ideology, pp. 223 ff.; Schurmann, Ideology, Appendix. 57. October-November, 1957, also saw Mao’s second (the first i n 1950) trip abroad to attend the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and conferences of Soviet and bloc leaders. 58. Vogel, Canton, pp. 241-42, sees Liu as trying to restrain the Maoists i n this speech w i t h condemnation of “empty talk and bluff,” but most observers interpret the speech as an endorsement of the Great Leap, whether willingly given or not, and argue that Liu’s effort to tone down Maoist excesses came only in 1959 and the early 1960's. 59. Liu Shao-ch’i, “ T h e Present Situation: the Party’s General Line for Socialist Construction and Its Future Tasks,” May 5, 1958, in Bowie and Fairbank, eds., Documents, p . 427.

60. This passage suggests Mao may have pushed the Hundred Flowers Campaign in order to show Liu Shao-ch’i, Teng Hsiao-p-ing, and others that class struggle had not ended. 61. Ibid., pp. 434 and 436. 62. Keith Buchanan, The Transformation of the Chinese Earth (New York, 1970), pp. 114 ff. 63. S. J. Burki, A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 35. 64. See Mao’s speech of October 24, 1966, cited in JPRS 49826, p . 10. 65. C i t e d i n Schram, Political Thought (1969 e d . ) , p . 352. 66. See Lewis, ed., Party, pp. 114 ff. I n August, 1966, Lin Piao divided cadres into “impatient and rash” and lackadaisical but popular “ d o nothings.” See JPRS 49826, p . 16. 67. Irwin J. Schulman, “ M a o as Prophet” i n Current Scene, July 7, 1970, pp. 1-10. 68. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. I n September, 1956, Teng Tzu-hui admitted having opposed the “ h i g h tide” of cooperativization. 69. URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p p . 10 ff.; a n d Frederick C . T e i w e s , “ T h e Evolution of Leadership Purges i n Communist China,” CQ, no. 41, pp. 122 ff. 70. Mao i n CLG, vol. I , no. 4 (Winter 1968-69), p . 35; and URI, eds., P’eng Tehhuai, p . 12.

71. I b i d . , p p . 37, 41-42. 72. For this reason, Mao and other leaders used a d hoc gatherings of a few trusted comrades to work out key policies well i n advance of formal Party meetings and Central Committee plenums. See Michel Oksenberg, “Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-1968: A n Overview,” i n Lindbeck, ed., Management, pp. 79-115; and Parris Chang, i n CQ, no. 44, pp. 169 ff. 73. URI, eds., P’eng Teh-huai, p . 36. 74. Franz Michael, “The New Revolution: I I I , The Struggle for Power,” Problems of Communism, May, 1967, p . 14; Bridgham, i n Lewis, ed., Party, p . 215. 75. The last two changes i n early 1959 and Lin Piao’s early promotion to the Political Bureau Standing Committee provide evidence that P’eng’s position

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probably had eroded long before the Lushan Plenum. See J. D . Simmonds, “P’eng Teh-huai: A Chronological Re-examination,” CQ, no. 37, pp. 120-38. Later, P’eng Teh-huai was allowed to “retire” to Hunan and eventually Szechwan. 76. Bridgham, i n Lewis, ed., Party, p . 216; and Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolut i o n : Origin a n d Development,” C Q , n o . 29, p . 5 .

77. Some 10,000 officers, including seventy generals, had already served a month or so in the ranks i n 1958. Joffe, Army, p . 134. 78. Ibid., p . 139. See also Gittings, in Lewis, ed., Party, p . 394; Griffith, Army, pp. 134 ff.; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 567 fi. 79. For two of the best studies of the Sino-Soviet conflict, see Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (hereafter, Zagoria, Conflict) (Princeton, N.J., 1962); and John Gittings, Survey. Despite the tensions, Mao was still quoted as saying in 1966, we must continue to “learn from” the “good people . . . and good experiences of the U.S.S.R.” Jerome Ch’en, M a o Papers, p . 39. 80. See David Charles, “ T h e Dismissal of Marshal P’eng Teh-huai,” CQ, no. 8, pp. 63 ff. Charles’s interpretation was confirmed by revelations of the Cultural Revolution. See also Bridgham, in Lewis, ed., Party, p . 225; and Gittings, Role, p . 231. Moreover, the Soviet press i n mid-1959 accused the CCP of intervening in Soviet affairs, a possible sign that Moscow may have been doing the same in China. 81. Still there was some starvation, and, i n a particular instance of national pride, China continued to export grain abroad to honor previous commitments. From 1961, China began to import grain, especially from Canada and Australia. See Alexander Eckstein, Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York, 1966), p p . 112-15, 132 ff.

82. There was experimentation at the end of the 1960’s with a “free supply system” of all basic services and, as i n the Great Leap period, talk of annual gains i n production of u p to 20 per cent. See Vogel, Canton, p . 279; P. Bridgham, ““Mao’s Cultural Revolution,” CQ, no. 41, pp. 9-10. 83. Vogel, Canton, pp. 277-78; Houn, History, passim; and Neuhauser in CQ, no. 32, pp. 9 and 16. 84. Klein and Clark, Dictionary. 85. Parris Chang, “Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party,” CQ, no. 44, p . 190. 86. Cited i n Merle Goldman, “Party Policies Toward the Intellectuals: The Unique Blooming and Contending of 1961-62,” in Lewis, ed., Party, p . 292. 87. Ibid., pp. 286, 294 ff. See also Gray and Cavendish, Crisis, pp. 69 ff. 88. Harrison, Rebellions, p . 249. 89. Bridgham, i n Lewis, ed., Party, p p . 220 a n d 222; a n d M a o , i n August, 1966, as cited in JPRS 50792, p . 37. 90. Mao’s address of January, 1962, as cited i n JPRS 50792, p . 55. . Bridgham, in Lewis, ed., Party, p . 224. 92. Liu Shao-ch’i’s “First Confession,” October, 1966, Atlas, April, 1967, p . 15. 93. James R . Townsend, Intra-Party Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One-Party System (Seattle, 1970), p . 293; Oksenberg, in Lindbeck, ed., Management, p p . 79 ff.; D o n a l d W . K l e i n , i n Current Scene, April 3 0 , 1967,

pp. 1-8; and Parris Chang, in CQ, no. 44, pp. 169 ff. 94. P. Bridgham, “ T h e Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development,” CQ, no. 29, p . 10; Neuhauser, in CQ, no. 32, p . 20; and Tang and Maloney, Communist China, p . 190. 95. Quoted i n “ O n Khrushchev’s Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World,” July 14, 1964, pp. 72-74, i n Quotations from Chairman M a o (the “ L i t t l e R e d B o o k ” ) ( P e k i n g , 1 9 6 6 ) , p p . 276, 279.

Notes for Chapter 23

617

96. Richard Baum, “Revolution and Reaction i n the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education M o v e m e n t i n C u l t u r a l Revolutionary Perspective,” C Q , no.

38, pp. 92 ff.; Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 536 fI., etc. One is also reminded here of developments i n Mao’s first rectification movement i n the early 1940’s. 97. This was revealed: i n important documents obtained from Fukien i n 1964. See J o h n L e w i s , b o o k review, i n C Q , no. 45, p p . 170-72; Neuhauser, i n C Q , n o . 3 2 ,

pp. 10-12; and W . A . C. Adie, i n Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, eds., China After the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1969), p . 41. Also see J. Chester Cheng, The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the P L A (Stanford, Calif., 1966), passim; and John Lewis, review article i n CQ, no. 18, pp. 68 fl. 98. Schurmann, Ideology, p . 542. 99. Maoists tried to say that the Socialist Education Movement ended i n May, 1966, to make i t look as i f their defeat of the Party apparatus had been decisive that early. Richard Baum, “Revolution and Reaction i n the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective,” CQ, no. 38, pp. 116 ff.

Chapter 23 1. Cited i n Powell, Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 441. According to K’ang Sheng in July, 1966, Party rectification would include the “transformation” of Party departments (pu) into sections (k’0), along with the already accomplished purging of the Group of Five, the Peking Committee, both headed b y P’eng Chen, and the central propaganda apparatus, headed by L u Ting-yi, Chou Yang, and others. Cited i n JPRS 49826, pp. 21 and 34. . Cf. P. Bridgham, “ T h e Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development,” CQ, no. 29, pp. 23-24. . Bridgham, i n Lewis, ed., Party, p . 229; Jen Chun, “Conscientiously Study Mao’s Thesis on the Party,” Peking Review, August 14, 1970, p . 12; and Edgar Snow, “Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution: Mao Tse-tung and the Cost of Living,” The New Republic, April 10, 1971, p . 19. . See Mao, i n CLG, vol. I , no. 1, p . 8; and in JPRS 49826, p . 12. . Cited i n JPRS 50792, p . 65. . H s i e h Sheng-wen, i n Peking R e v i e w , M a r c h 2 8 , 1969, p . 11; a n d “Commemorate

the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review, July 2, 1971, p . 16. . Cited in JPRS 49826, p . 70. . I b i d . , p . 60. . As i n Japanese reports that Mao had always envisioned a struggle of three years. Cf. Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution i n 1967,” CQ, no. 34, p . 34; a n d Powell, i n Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 442.

10. Cf. Mao’s address of October, 1966, i n JPRS 49826, p . 11; and Hsiung, Ideology, pp. 218 fi. 11. Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 555 ff.; and articles of U r i Ra’anan, Donald Zagoria, David Mozingo, and Thomas Robinson, on debates i n China over the Vietnam w a r a n d relations w i t h t h e Soviet U n i o n i n H o a n d T s o u , eds., Crisis, v o l . I I .

12. Tang and Maloney, Communist China, p. 107. 13. Central Committee “ M a y 16, 1966, Circular,” Peking Review, May 19, 1967, pp. 6 fl. 14. Ibid., p . 9. 15. Central Committee instruction of January 8, 1967, i n JPRS 49826, p . 16. 16. Neuhauser, i n Asian Survey, June, 1968, p . 469; a n d G r a y a n d C a v e n d i s h , Crisis, pp. 118 ff. 17. See Edgar Snow’s interview w i t h Mao, The New Republic, January, 1965, cited

618

Notes for Chapter 23

in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, The China Reader, vol. 1 I I (New York, 1967), p . 373; and Mao’s statements of October, 1966, quoted in JPRS 49826, p . 10. 18. H e was with Lin Piao in Shanghai, according to some reports. 19. A t better than world record time but presumably helped by current and wind. See Michael Freeberne, “The Great Splash Forward,” Problems of Communism, November, 1966, pp. 21-27. 20. Cited b y Wang Hsiieh-wen, in IS, September, 1968, p . 15. 21. See Gray and Cavendish, Crisis, p . 141. 22, Franz Michael, “The N e w Revolution, I I I : The Struggle for Power,” Problems of Communism, May, 1967, p . 19. 23. Cited in Peking Review, August 12, 1966, pp. 6 ff. 24, From Mao’s quote of 1939, “ I n the last analysis [Marxism] can all be summed u p i n one sentence: ‘ T o rebel is justified.” ” See Schram, Political Thought, pp. 107, 426-27. 25. See the novel Monkey, Arthur Waley, trans. (New York, 1943); and cf. stories i n the novel A l l Men Are Brothers (also called Water Margin), Pearl Buck, trans. (New York, 1957). Only 10 per cent of the Red Guards were of college age, according to C. S. Tsang, Society, Schools and Programs in China (New York, 1968), p . 247. 26. See Vogel, Canton, pp. 326 fI.; and Neuhauser, i n Asian Survey, June, 1968, pp. 477 fi.

27. Vogel, Canton, p. 330; Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution (hereafter, Hunter, Shanghai) (New York, 1969), passim; and G . Bennett and R . Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (hereafter, Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard) (New York, 1971), passim. 28. Peking Review, January 10, 1969; Yeh Hsiang-chih, Current Situation in Mainland China (Taipei, December, 1970), passim; and Time, August 17, 1970. 29. Cited in JPRS 49826, pp. 70-71. Cf. Jerome Ch’en, ed., M a o Papers, pp. 129 fi. 30. L i u ’ s i s i n Atlas, April, 1967; a n d Teng’s i n J P R S 49899, p p . 9 - 1 8 . 31. The report was not released until October 18, 1968. See text in CQ, no. 37, pp. 175-80, and i n Facts and Features, December 25, 1968, pp. 9 fi. 32. China News Analysis, no. 686, p . 5; and Mao’s address of October, 1966, cited in JPRS 49826, p . 11. 33. Bridgham, i n C Q , n o . 3 4 , p . 7 . 34. Cited i n CB, no. 852, p . 49. 35. Cited by Yeh Hsiang-chih, Current Situation in Mainland China, p . 11. I n the early 1970s, the three-way alliances were reinterpreted to stress cooperation of “old, middle age, and young cadres” i n an obvious relaxation of concepts of Party-building and reduction of emphasis on the “revolutionary masses.” 36. See Ting Wang, ed., Chung-kung Wen-hua Ta Ko-ming Tzu-liao Hui-pien (Collected Materials on the Chinese Communist Great Cultural Revolution) (hereafter, T i n g , ed., Materials) ( H o n g Kong, 1 9 6 7 ); Neuhauser, i n C Q , n o . 3 2 , p p . 7 ,

8, 12; IS, December, 1968, pp. 1 ff.; Neuhauser, i n Asian Survey, June, 1968, pp. 465 ff. 37. Hunter, Shanghai, p p . 2 2 1 ff., 244, 260. 38. Vogel, Canton, pp. 331-32. Wang En-mao, Ulanfu, and Chang Kuo-hua were the Party leaders of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, respectively. 39. Y e h H s i a n g - c h i h , Current Situation i n Mainland China, p . 15. 40. Vogel, Canton, pp. 329 fi.; and John Gittings, “Student Power i n China,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 27, 1968, pp. 648-50. 41. See M a o speech o f July 2 3 , 1959, cited i n C L G , vol. I , n o . 4 (Winter, 1968-69), p . 37.

Notes for Chapter 23

619

42, Bridgham, i n CQ, no. 34, pp. 25-26. Ch’en Tsai-tao was the Wuhan military commander, and Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang L i were the Cultural Revolution Group representatives i n the July 20 incident. 43. Cited i n SCMP, no. 4069; pp. 2 ff. Cf. Mao’s four stages, outlined i n CLG, vol. I I , no. 1 (Spring, 1969), pp. 4 fI.; and cf. L i n Piao’s “Five Victories and Five Setbacks,” detailed by Wang Hsiieh-wen, “The Nature and Development of the ‘Great Cultural Revolution,” ”” IS, September, 1968, pp. 11-21. 44. Bridgham, i n CQ, no. 34, pp. 27 fI. 45. Ralph Powell, “ T h e Party, the Government, and the Gun,” Asian Survey, June, 1970, pp. 441 fi. 46. Ibid.; Richard Hughes, “ M a o Makes the Trials Run on Time,” New York Times Magazine, August 23, 1970, p . 67; P. Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Seize Power,” CQ, no. 41, pp. 5 ff.; and Bennett and Montaperto, R e d Guard, p . 233.

47. Bridgham, i n CQ, no. 41, p. 16; and Vogel, Canton, pp. 322 and 332. W u Fahsien, Ch’iu Hui-tso, and L i Tso-p’eng, among other military men elected to the n e w Political B u r e a u , i n April, 1969, h a d also been attacked during the Cultural

Revolution. Nationalist sources accordingly speculated that Yang’s fall and Huang’s promotion showed a split between Madame Mao and radicals on one side, and L i n Piao, Chou En-lai, and moderates on the other. See Ting Chuy i a n , i n IS, July, 1968, pp. 1 ff. A t this and other times, air force political commissar Y i Li-chin, commander of the Peking military garrison F u Ch’ung-pi, the chief of staff of the navy, two deputy chiefs of staff of the army, and deputy directors of various military commissions were among several hundred military personnel purged. See Richard Hughes, in The New York Times Magazine, August 23, 1970, pp. 22-23. 48. Parris Chang, “Mao’s Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet,” Problems of Communism, March-April, 1969, p . 3; Bridgham, i n CQ, no. 41, p . 8. 49. For the date of formation of and information on the provincial revolutionary committees, see Winberg Chai, “ T h e Reorganization of the CCP, 1966-1968,” Asian Survey, N o v e m b e r , 1968, p . 906; a n d T i n g Chu-yiian, i n IS, April, 1968,

pp. 9 ff.; and Wang Yiin, i n IS, December, 1968, pp. 1 ff. I n only eight of the twenty-nine areas did the revolutionary committee chairman not initially become the provincial first secretary when the Party committees were re-established i n 1971. See Chu Wen-lin, i n IS, December, 1971, pp. 53 fi. 50. See Klein and Hager, i n CQ, no. 45, pp. 37 ff.; Neuhauser, i n Asian Survey, June, 1968, p. 466; Parris Chang, i n Problems of Communism, March-April, 1969, p p . 1 ff.; C h a n g C h i n g - w e n , i n IS, J u l y , 1969, p p . 3 1 ff.; Facts a n d Features, November 2 7 , 1968; Free China Weekly, August 6 , 1968; a n d Richard

Hughes, i n The New York Times Magazine, August 23, 1970, p . 67. 51. Robert Guillain i n L e Monde, September 23, 1971, p. 5; Donald Klein, “The State Council a n d t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , ” C Q , n o . 3 5 , p p . 8 6 ff.; Powell, i n Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 467; a n d Free China Weekly, June 2 1 , 1970, p p . ??.

52. Klein and Hager, i n CQ, no. 45, pp. 37 fi. 53. N e u h a u s e r , i n Asian Survey, June, 1968, p p . 483 ff.; Bridgham, i n C Q , n o . 41, p . 6; and Powell, i n Asian Survey, June, 1970, pp. 447 fi. 54. For example, six of the eight central-level meetings known to have been held between January and August, 1967, were called meetings of the Political B u r e a u , i t s S t a n d i n g Committee, o r Party Central. T h e other t w o 1967 meetings

were one each of the Military Affairs Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group. Michel Oksenberg, “Policy-Making Under Mao, 1949-1968: A n Overview,” i n Lindbeck, ed., Management, pp. 79 fi. 55. I n about 1967, this slogan replaced the previous formula “unity, criticism, unity.” 56. Powell, i n Asian Survey, June, 1970, pp. 441 ff.

620

Notes for Chapter 23

57. See Mao’s devastating attack on the “twenty manifestations of bureaucracy,” in JPRS 49826, pp. 40-43. 58. I n Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao Papers, p . 82. 59. Powell, in Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 450. 60. Ibid., pp. 451-52. 61. Ibid., pp. 455 fI., 460, 468; Klein and Hager, in CQ, no. 45, pp. 35 ff.; Ting Wang, in CLG, Summer, 1970, pp. 118-19; and Derek Waller, “The CCP Elite: Continuity and Innovation,” Scalapino, ed., Elites; Chang Ching-wen, in IS, July, 1969, pp. 31 ff.; and Bridgham, in CQ, no. 41, pp. 16 ff. 62. Chou En-lai was secretary general of the presidium of the Congress (see Peking Review, no. 14, April 4, 1969, p . 7 ) , as had been Teng Hsiao-p’ing at the Eighth Congress, but this does not mean that Chou is also the new General Secretary of the Party. I t is likely that the post has again been dropped, as i t was from late 1937 to 1956. Wang Tung-hsing has been listed as the director of the Party’s general office, replacing Yang Shang-k’un, as well as deputy director of public security under Hsieh Fu-chih (IS, October, 1970, p . 103). 63. Powell, in Asian Survey, June, 1970, pp. 450 ff.; Ting Wang, in CLG, Summer, 1970, pp. 108 fI.; and Free China Weekly, September 13, 1970. About six of the Political Bureau’s military men are usually grouped within Lin Piao’s old military units, but four also served with Chang Kuo-t’ao’s old Fourth Front Army. 64. Powell, in Asian Survey, June, 1970, pp. 461-62 ff.; Ting Wang, in CLG, Summer, 1970, pp. 101, 117 ff.; and Klein and Hager, in CQ, no. 45, pp. 35 fl. 65. L i n P i a o , cited i n Peking Review, April 3 0 , 1969, p . 2 8 . 66. Ibid. Cf. Mao’s similar quote of 1962, which has been cited with equal regularity, e.g., i n Peking Review, no. 33, August 14, 1970, pp. 11-12. 67. C i t e d i n Peking Review, April 3 0 , 1969, p . 35. 68. Cited in ibid., p . 36. 69. Powell, in Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 457. 70. Cited i n Peking Review, April 30, 1969, p . 23. 71. See Richard Hughes, in The New York Times Magazine, August 23, 1970. Certainly the Cultural Revolution forced many, like an Australian teacher of English i n Shanghai, “ t o admit that m y first impression of the city [Shanghai] had been superficial. Its people were not as united or enthusiastic as I had imagined. . . . ” See Hunter, Shanghai, p . 10. 72. See Peking Review, September 18, 1970, pp. 3 fi. 73.Jen Chun, i n Peking Review, no. 33, August 14, 1970, p . 12. Cf. Powell, in Asian Survey, June, 1970, p . 465; Peking Radio, May 19, 1970, cited in CQ, no. 43, pp. 173 ff.; Peking Review, no. 52, December 25, 1970, p . 4; and The N e w York Times, January 2 , 1971.

74. Peking Review, December 25, 1970; The N e w York Times, January 2, 1971; and Chu Wen-lin, i n IS, November and December, 1971. A Ninth Congress of the Youth League had been held in June, 1964. As of 1970, there was still very little information on the reconstitution of the Youth League, and it was not mentioned i n the 1969 Party constitution, although there was some talk of reviving i t from late 1967 on. The first county Youth League committee was reconstituted A p r i l , 1970. Neuhauser, Asian Survey, June, 1968, p . 485; and

Wang Hsiieh-wen, i n IS, November, 1970, pp. 29 ff. The first Party branch allegedly was also formally reconstituted i n Hunan i n December, 1968. CWL, in IS, February, 1971, p . 4. Cf. IS, August, 1970, p . 4; and L . L a Dany, “China: Period of Suspense,” Foreign Affairs, July, 1970, p . 707. 75. China N e w s Analysis, M a r c h 10, 1972. For information o n the n e w provincial Party committees, see Chu Wen-lin, in IS, November, 1971, pp. 47 ff.; and in IS, December, 1971, pp. 53 fi. For reports on the late 1971 shifts of top

Notes for Chapter 24

621

Party positions, see The New York Times, August 29, September 5, October 24, and November 29, 1971. See also Whitson, High Command, Epilogue. Despite the apparent purge of L i n Piao and others, as of February, 1972, the military still held dominant positions i n at least seventeen of the twenty-nine provincial Party committees. The New York Times, February 7, 1972. 76. “Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review, July 2, 1971, pp. 17 ff. This authoritative article restated Party goals to stress (1) ideology; (2) intra-Party struggle; (3) modesty; (4) a general rather than particular viewpoint; (5) the mass line; (6) democratic centralism; (7) the People’s Liberation Army; and (8) proletarian internationalism. See also Peking Review, December 10, 1971, pp. 4 ff.

Chapter 24 1. Mao Tse-tung, SW (Peking ed.), vol. I V , p . 414, 2. SW, vol. IV, p . 16. 3. Schwartz, Rise of Mao, pp. 189 ff. 4. Mao Tse-tung, SW, vol. 11, p . 272. 5. Peking Review, July 2, 1971, p . 17.

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____ .Modern Chinese Nationalism. New York, 1970. HATANO, K E N ’ I C H I . Shina Kyosanto Shi (History of the CCP). Tokyo, 1932. Reprinted i n Tokyo, 1961, with six later volumes, as Shiryo Shusei Chiigoku Kyosanto Shi (Collected Materials on the History of the CCP). HEINZIG, DIETER. “Comment on ‘Otto Braun and the Tsunyi Conference,”

China Quarterly, no. 42, pp. 131-35. . “The Otto Braun Memoirs and Mao’s Rise to Power,” China Quarterly, no. 46, pp. 280 ff. HiNTON, HAROLD. Communist China in World Politics. Boston, 1966. HINTON, WILLIAM. Fan Shen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York, 1966. Ho, P. T., and T . Tsou, eds. China in Crisis. 2 vols. Chicago, 1968. H o KAN-CHIH. A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution. Peking, 1959. HoFHEINZ, Roy. “ T h e Autumn Harvest Insurrection,” China Quarterly, no. 32, October-December, 1967.

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H s u YUNG-YING. A Survey of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. New York, 1945. HsUeH CHUN-TU, ed. Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China. New York, 1971. H s U E H , CHUN-TU, and R . NORTH, trans. “ T h e Founding o f the Chinese Red Army,” i n E . S. Kirby, ed., Contemporary China, vol. V I . Hong Kong,

1962-1964. Hsiieh-hsi Sheng-huo (Study Life). N o city given, 1941. H u CH’1a0-Mu. Thirty Years of the CCP. Peking, 1952. H u H u a . Chung-kuo Hsin-min-chu Chu-yi Ko-ming Shih (History of the New Democratic Revolution in China). Peking, 1951.

H u H u a et al., eds. Chung-kuo Hsin-min-chu Chu-yi Ko-ming Shih Ts’an-k’ao Tzu-liao (Reference Materials on the History of the New Democratic Revol u t i o n ) . Shanghai, 1951. __.

Chung-kuo Ko-ming Shih Chiang-yi (Lectures on the History of the

Chinese Revolution). Peking, 1962.

H u SHENG. Imperialism and Chinese Politics. Peking, 1955. Hung-ch’i P’iao-p’iao (Red Flag Flying). 16 vols. Peking, 1957 et seq. HUNTER, NEALE. Shanghai Journal: A n Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution. N e w York, 1969. ILYUSHECKIN,

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V . P.; and Liu, Yii, eds. Rabocheye Dvijeniye Kitaye, 1945-

1949 (The Chinese Workers’ Movement, 1945-49). Moscow, 1969. International Press Correspondence (Inprecor). Moscow, 1925-1935.

Isaacs, H A R O L D . The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. 2d rev. ed. Stanford, Calif., 1961. ISHIKAWA, T A p A o . Chiigoku Kyosanto shi Kenkyii (Researches on the History o f the C C P ) . Tokyo, 1960. ISRAEL, JOHN. Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937. Stanford, Calif., 1966.

Issues and Studies, ( I S ) . Taipei. Jen-min Jih-pao (JM]JP) (People’s Daily). Peking. Jih-pen T’ou-hsiang-hou t i Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang (The CCP After the Surrender o f Japan). N o city given, 1947.

JorfFE, ELLIS. Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964. Cambridge, Mass., 1965. JOHNSON, CHALMERS. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford,

Calif., 1962. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS). Washington, D . C . Journal o f Asian Studies ( J A S ) . A n n Arbor, Mich.

KAGAN, R i c H A R D . “The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch’en Tu-hsiu.” Philadelphia, unpublished University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. dissertation, 1969.

K’ang-jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch’i Chieh-fang-ch’ii Kai-k’'uang (A General View o f the Liberated Bases in the Anti-Japanese W a r ) . Peking, 1953. KARA-MURzZA,

T., ed. Strategiya i Taktika v Natsionalno Kolonianoi Revo-

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K i M , I L p Y o N G . “Communist Politics i n China, 1931-1934.” New York, unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968. . “Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed i n the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic,” i n Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action. K i m SAN and N y m WALES. Song of Ariran: The Life Story of a Korean Rebel. N e w Y o r k , 1941.

KLEIN, D o N A L D W . “The ‘Next Generation’ of Chinese Leaders,” China Quarterly, no. 12, October-December, 1962. and ANN B. CLARK. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.

and Lois HAGER. “The Ninth Central Committee,” China Quarterly, no. 45, January-March, 1971. Koo, W E L L I N G T O N . “Memorandum on Communism i n China” (Peiping, July, 1932), i n Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission. N e w York,

1932. K u n e CH’U. Wo yii Hung Chiin (The Red Army and I ) . Hong Kong, 1954. Kung-fei Huo-kuo Shih-liao Hui-pien (Materials o n the Country’s Bandit Dis-

asters). 4 vols. Taipei, no date. K u o , WARREN. Analytical History of the CCP. 4 vols. Taipei, 1966, et seq., and i n Issues a n d Studies, Taipei, 1965, et seq. Original i n Chinese: Chung-

kuo Kung-ch’an-tang Shih-lun. K u o HUA-LUN (WARREN K u o ) et al., eds. Chung-kung Tan-ming L u (Chinese Communist Who’s W h o ) . Taipei, 1969.

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LACOUTURE, JEAN. H o C h i M i n h : A Political Biography. N e w Y o r k , 1968.

LANG, O L G A . Chinese Family and Society. New Haven, Conn., 1946. . Pa Chin and His Writings. Cambridge, Mass., 1967. LEGGE, JAMES, trans. The Four Books. Shanghai, n o date. LEWIS, JOHN. Leadership in Communist China. Ithaca, N . Y . , 1963.

, ed. Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China. New York, 1970. L i ANG. Hung-se Wu-t’ai (Red Stage). Chungking, 1942. Lx Jui. Mao Tse-tung t'ung-chih t i Ch’u-ch’i Ko-ming Huo-tung (Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Early Revolutionary Activities). Peking, 1957. L1 KuaANG. Chung-kuo Hsin-chun-tui (China’s New Army). Soviet Union, 1936. L r TA-cHAo. L i Ta-chao Hsiian-chi (Selected W o r k s ) . Peking, 1962.

L I T’IEN-MIN. Chou En-lai. Taipei, 1971. L i Yu-NING. “ A Biography of Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai: From Youth to Party Leadership, 1899-1928.” New York, unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1967. L i YUN-HAN. Ts’ung Yung-kung tao Ch’ing-tang (From the Admission of Communists to Party Purification). Taipei, 1966. Liao K A I - L U N G . From Yenan to Peking. Peking, 1954. L 1 F T O N , R O B E R T J. Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism. New York, 1961.

LINDBECK, JOHN, ed. China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. Seattle, 1971. __.

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___.

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MEISNER, MAURICE. L i Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. Cambridge, Mass., 1967.

MELBY, JoHN F . The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War: China, 1945-1949. Toronto, 1968. M i r , PAveEL. Heroic China: Fifteen Years o f the CCP. N e w York, 1937.

MiLLs, HARRIET. “ L u Hsiin, 1927-36: The Years on the Left.” New York, unpublished Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1963. Ming Pao (Journal of Enlightenment). Hong Kong. M u Fu-sHENG. The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: The Chinese Intellectuals Under Mao. N e w York, 1963.

M u HsIN. Chin-Sui Chieh-fang-ch’ii Niao-k’an (A Bird’s Eye View of the Shansi-Suiyiian Base) Hsinghsien, Shansi, 1946.

MYERS, RAMON. The Chinese Peasant Economy. Cambridge, Mass., 1970. Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa). Moscow. N E U H A U S E R , CHARLES. “The CCP i n the 1960’s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly, no. 32, October-December, 1967. —.

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New China News Agency (NCNA). Peking. NIEH JUNG-CHEN. K’ang-jih Mo-fan Ken-chu-ti: Chin Ch’a Chi Pien-ch’ii (A Model Anti-Japanese Base: The Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region). N o city given, 1939. NoLLAU, GUNTHER. International Communism and World Revolution. N e w York, 1961.

NoRrTH, R O B E R T . Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites. Stanford, Calif., 1952.

. Moscow and Chinese Communists. Stanford, Calif, 1963. and XENIA E U D I N . M . N . Roy’s Mission to China. Berkeley, Calif., 1963. OJHA, I . Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair. Boston, 1969. O K S E N B E R G , M I C H E L . “Local Leaders in Rural China,” in A . D . Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in

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(Outline of Chinese History in Contemporary Times). Moscow, 1959. PERKINS, D w I G H T . Agricultural Development i n China, 1368-1968. Cambridge, Mass., 1970. PowELL, RALPH. “The Party, the Government, and the G u n , ” Asian Survey, June, 1970. PRICE, JANE. “Chinese Communist Land Reform and Peasant Mobilization,

1947-48.” New York, unpublished Columbia University Master's Essay, 1970. PRINGSHEIM, KLAUS H . “ T h e Functions o f the Chinese Communist Youth

League (1920-1949),” China Quarterly, no. 12, October-December, 1962. Problems of Communism. Washington, D.C. Pu-erh-sai-wei-k’o (Bolshevik), M a y 10, 1931.

PYE, LuciAN. Warlord Politics. New York, 1971. RoBINSON, T . W,, et al., eds. Cultural Revolution in China. Berkeley, Calif., 1971. Roy, M . N . Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China. Calcutta, 1946. RUE, JoHN. M a o Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-35. Stanford, Calif., 1966.

SCALAPINO, ROBERT, ed. Elites in Communist China. Seattle, 1972. Forthcoming. . The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966. Berkeley, Calif., 1967. and GEORGE YU. The Chinese Anarchist Movement. Berkeley, Calif, 1961. SCHAPIRO, LEONARD. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York, 1960. SCHRAM, STUART. Mao Tse-tung. New York, 1967. . The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York, 1963; rev. ed., 1969. SCHURMANN, FRANZ. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley, Calif., 1968.

SCHWARTZ, BENJAMIN. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. 3rd printing. Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

SCHWARZ, HENRY G . Liu Shao-ch’i and ‘People’s War’: A Report on the Creation o f Base Areas in 1938. Lawrence, Kans., 1969.

SELDEN, MARK. “The Guerrilla Movement in Northwest China: The Origins of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region,” China Quarterly, nos. 28 and 29, October-December, 1966, and January-March, 1967.

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SMEDLEY, AGNES. The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh. New York, 1956.

SNow, EDGAR. The Other Side of the River. New York, 1961. The revised edition (1970) is entitled Red China Today. . Random Notes o n R e d China, 1936-1945. Cambridge, Mass., 1957

and 1968. . Red Star Over China. New York, 1938. SOLOMON, R I C H A R D . “Mao’s Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity,” in A . D . Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action. Seattle, 1969. . Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. Berkeley, Calif., 1971. . “ O n e Party and O n e Hundred Schools,” Current Scene, October 1,

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N.J., 1970. . The Korean Communist Movement. 1918-1948. Princeton, N.]J., 1967. SULESKI, RoNALD. “ T h e Fu-t’ien Incident, December, 1930.” University o f M i c h i g a n Papers i n Chinese Studies, n o . 4 . A n n Arbor, 1969.

SUN Y A T - S E N . San-min Chu-yi: The Three Principles of the People. Translated by Frank W . Price. Shanghai, 1927. Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP). Published by U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong. SWARUP, S H A N T I . A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-34, London, 1966. TANG, PETER, and J. M . MALONEY. Communist China: T h e Domestic Scene,

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JAMES. While China Faced West. Cambridge, Mass., 1969. RICHARD C. The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928—

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TOWNSEND, JAMES. Political Participation in Communist China. Berkeley, Calif., 1967. T R E T I A K O V , S. A Chinese Testament: The Autobiography of T’an Shih-hua. N e w York, 1934.

LEON. Problems of the Chinese Revolution. New York, 1966. Ts’A1 Ho-seN. “Chi-hui Chu-yi Shih” (“History of Opportunism, 1928’), i n Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an tang Shih-kao, vol. 1. Ts’A1 Hs1ao-cH’IEN. Kiangsi Su-ch’ii Hung-chun Hsi-ts’'uan Hui-yi (Recollections of the Kiangsi Soviet and Red Army Flight Westward). Taipei, 1970. Ts’Ao0 Po-y1. Kiangsi Su-wei-ai Chih Chien-li chi ch’i Peng-k’uei. (The Rise and Fall of the Kiangsi Soviet). Taipei, 1969. TROTSKY,

T s o u , TANG. America’s Failure in China. Chicago, 1963.

TUCHMAN, B A R B A R A . Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 191145. New York, 1971. ULAM, ApAM B. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67. New York, 1968. ULLMAN, Morris B. Cities of Mainland China. Washington, D.C., 1961. Union Research Institute ( U R I ) , eds. The Case of P’eng Teh-huai. Hong Kong, 1968. . The Collected Works of L i u Shao-ch’i. 3 vols. Hong Kong, 1968-69.

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Issues and Studies, November-December, 1970. . “The Truth about the C C P Tsunyi Conference,” Issues a n d Studies,

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and SHENG SHIH-TS’AlI. Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot. East Lansing, Mich., 1958. WHITSON, WILLIAM. The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71. New York, 1972. WILBUR, C. MARTIN. “The Ashes of Defeat,” China Quarterly, no. 18, AprilJune, 1964.

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WiLsoN, D i c k . The Long March, 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism’s Survival. London, 1971. WITTFOGEL, KARL A . “ A Short History o f Chinese C o m m u n i s m . ” Unpublished paper, 1964. WRIGHT, MARY, ed. China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913. N e w Haven, Conn., 1968.

W u , T’iEN-wel. “The Kiangsi Soviet Period: A Bibliographical Review on the Ch’en Ch’eng Collection,” Journal o f Asian Studies, February, 1970.

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YAKHONTOF, VICTOR A . The Chinese Soviets. N e w York, 1934. YANG, C . K . A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition. Cambridge, Mass., 1959. S H A N G - K U E I . The Red Kiangsi-Kwangtung Border Region. Peking, 1961. YANG Tzu-LIEH, “Chang Kuo-t’ao Fu-jen Hui-yi L u ” (“Memoirs of Madame Chang Kuo-t’ao”), i n Chan Wang (Outlook). Hong Kong, 1968 et seq. Yenan Ta-hsiieh Kai-k’'uang (General Information on Yenan University). N o YANG

city given, 1944. Y U , FREDERICK. Mass Persuasion in Communist China. N e w York, 1964. YUREV, M . F . Krasnaya Armiya Kitaya, 1927-1937 (The Chinese R e d Army). Moscow, 1958.

. Revolyutsia 1925-1927 v Kitae (Revolution of 1925-1927 in China). Moscow, 1968.

Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms. Yu-kuan Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an Tang (Materials o n the C C P ) . 2 0 reels. Tokyo, 1970. ZAGORIA, DONALD. The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961. Princeton, N . ] . , 1962.

INDEX

Academy for Marxist-Leninist Studies, see Central Research Institute Administrative Academy, 320, 341 Agrarian revolution, 88, 106-9, 111-12, 127-31, 140, 146, 163, 169, 211, 227-34, 272, 275, 318, 336, 342, 365, 406-9, 413, 435, 465, 470-71, 475, 482, 519, 604; see also Land reform; Peasantry; Rural work Agricultural Producer Cooperatives ( A P C ) , 436, 470, 477 A i C h ’ i n g (ca. 1910—- ) , 338 A i d i t , D . N . , 471 Amerasia case, 386 A n Tzu-wen (ca. 1904— ) , 282, 325, 445, 447, 453, 459, 467, 478, 496, 603, 610-11 Anarchism, 1 5 - 1 6 , 21, 2 2 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 30, 37, 523-24 Anhwei, 39, 9 1 , 94, 9 9 , 132, 196, 198, 204, 224, 242, 280, 304-6, 315, 372-73, 377, 382, 422, 449, 462, 565, 581 ‘“Anti-Bolshevik league,’’ 213-15 Anti-British demonstrations (1926-27), 88-89 Anti-Comintern p a c t , 265 Anti-imperialism, see Imperialism Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, see K ’ a n g - T a Anti-Japanese W a r , 150, 152-53, 179, 189, 1 9 1 94, 197, 206, 221, 227, 229, 232, 239, 242, 246, 249, 254, 256, 260-89, 295, 298-99, 3 0 1 - 2 , 304, 325, 339, 346, 348, 350, 353, 355, 362, 393, 455, 512; and growth o f Communist power, 271-75 Anti-rightist campaign ( 1 9 5 7 - 5 8 ) , 434, 437, 465— 67, 471-78, 482, 484-85 Anti-subversive movement, 3 4 1 4 2 April 12 coup (1927), 105 Asian Bureau, see Comintern Association for Protecting Democracy, 369 August 7 Emergency Conference (CCP) (1927), 123-30, 135-36, 186 “Autumn Harvest Uprisings’’ (1927), 129-35, 138, 154, 194, 207-8, 216

Baku Conference ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 521 Bakunin, Michael, 16 Barrett, David D . , 355 Big Sword Society, 206 Birch, John, 391 Black Spears, 576 Bliukher, Vasily, 77 Bolshevik Party Life, 565

Bolsheviks, 11, 16, 179, 428, 481, 509; see also Russian Revolution Border Region Party School, 322 B o r o d i n , Mikhail, 2 7 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 55-59, 67-69, 73, 77, 80, 82, 87, 92, 9 5 , 9 8 , 100-101, 104-7, 1 0 9 12, 114-16, 120, 122, 219, 536-38, 541 Bourgeois democracy, 58, 140, 154, 157, 185, 209, 227, 236, 263, 275, 318, 363, 431, 435, 579 Bourgeoisie, 18, 26, 43-46, 48—49, 51, 58, 72, 81, 87, 89, 9 3 , 95, 97-98, 104-5, 107, 111, 115, 126, 128, 157, 168, 232, 273-75, 284, 328, 331, 364, 374, 424, 428, 430, 436, 473, 475, 485-86, 496, 500, 517; big bourgeoisie, 9 5 , 105, 107, 157; national bourgeoisie, 10, 49, 104, 127, 264, 330, 405, 429-30, 466, 613; petty bourgeoisie, 40-41, 49, 87-88, 95, 97-99, 105-7, 114, 125, 127, 156, 163, 165, 171, 227, 264, 323, 330-32, 429, 436-37, 542, 552 Boxer Rebellion, 7 B r a u n , O t t o ( L i T e h ) , 154, 227, 230, 237, 245-46, 285, 319, 383, 562, 565, 569-70 ‘“‘Broad mass m o v e m e n t ’ ’ ( t o fight spies), 341 Browder, E a r l , 154 “ B u i l d i n g C o m m u n i s m , ’ ’ 437 ‘ ‘ B u i l d i n g Socialism,’’ 437, 451, 464, 473, 475, 478, 485 B u k h a r i n , N i k o l a i , 109, 113-14, 154, 156, 166, 494 Bureau o f Political Security, 216-17, 220 ‘‘Bureaucratic capital,’’ 425, 431 Bureaucratism, 313, 316-17, 334-35, 347, 416, 437, 466-67, 469, 489, 492, 612 Cadres, 66, 73, 182, 205, 208, 235, 244, 249, 255, 273, 292, 317, 320, 322, 324-26, 332, 336, 339, 349, 395, 408, 412-13, 415-16, 419, 430, 451— 52, 455-60, 465-66, 468, 474, 482, 486, 489, 498, 594, 602, 604, 611-13, 618; i n Cultural Revolution, 494-507, 509, 511, 513; defined, 459-60; and education, 321, 323, 325, 327, 329, 347, 397 C a n t o n Chamber o f Commerce, 60 Canton Commune (1927), 137-40, 143, 154, 156, 180 Canton-Hankow Railroad, 3 1 Canton Merchants Corps, 60 Canton Soviet Council, 139, 549 Capitalist r o a d , 467, 470-71, 485, 488-89, 492, 499, 501, 509, 612 ‘‘Capitulationist l i n e , ’ ’ 389, 588

636

Index

“ C C Clique,’’ 367, 370 Cell, defined, 533 Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, 557 Central Bureau for ‘ ‘ W h i t e ’ ’ Areas Work, 222, 564 Central C h i n a , 315, 332, 410, 422 Central Land Committee, 107-8 Central Party School, 207, 281, 320-22, 325, 335, 341, 457, 488, 583, 591 Central Plains, 302, 373, 390 Central Plains Field Army, 373, 421-22, 424 Central Preparatory Committee, 203 Central Research I n s t i t u t e , 320, 322, 324, 329 Central Soviet ( K i a n g s i ) , 164, 181-83, 188-89, 192, 194-95, 197-99, 2 0 1 - 2 , 206, 212, 218-37, 242-43, 310, 563, 566 ‘““Centrism,”’” 333 Chahar, 160, 372, 375, 378, 380-81, 390, 420 Chang C h ’ u n - c h ’ i a o (ca. 1 9 1 5 - ) , 501, 508 Chang Fa-k’uei, 121-22, 137, 139 Chang H a o ( L i n Y u - y i n g ) (1896-1942), 254 Chang Hsiieh-liang, 152, 166, 193, 267-70, 381, 574 ) , 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 5 - 3 6 , 39, Chang K u o - t ’ a o ( 1 8 9 7 46, 50, 52-53, 55, 59, 61, 67-69, 100-101, 103— 146, 149, 151, 135-36, 128, 121-24, 115, 106, , 4 156, 159, 163, 172, 177, 180, 182, 186, 188, 196-97, 200, 203, 212, 218-19, 222, 224, 226— 27, 260, 269-70, 303, 310, 331, 350, 402, 441, 467, 521, 523, 525-29, 531, 536, 540—41, 544, 547, 550, 559-60, 571, 574, 577-79, 620; and Long March, 236, 239, 244, 246-55; purge of, 281-88 Chang T ’ a i - l e i (1898-1927), 22, 25, 28, 3 5 , 38, 46, 51-54, 61, 66, 106, 120, 124, 138, 156, 523, 526-27, 529, 541, 547 ) , 198, 217, Chang Ting-ch’eng (ca. 1898— 242-43, 296, 304-5, 307, 560, 563, 594 108, 112—105, , 4 9 90, Chang T s o - l i n , 29, 60, 82, 13, 267 ) , 181, Chang Wen-t’ien ( L o F u ) (ca. 1898186-87, 218, 222, 224, 230-31, 234-36, 243, 320, 310, 245-51, 258-59, 269, 281-85, 292, 322, 324, 329, 337, 342, 345, 358-59, 381, 444— 45, 479, 560, 563-65, 567, 570, 577-78, 594, 611 ) , 164, 194, 201, Chang Yiin-yi (ca. 1 8 9 1 296, 307, 559, 594 Changsha Soviet, 177 Chao C h i e n - m i n , (ca. 1910— ) , 521, 539, 541 Chao Shih-yen, 521, 539, 541 Chekiang, 33, 3 9 , 61, 69, 83, 86, 9 1 , 98-99, 134, 164, 198, 224, 350-51, 372, 377, 449, 462, 523, 581, 592 C h ’ e n brothers, 363, 367-68, 370, 425-26 C h ’ e n Ch’ang-hao ( c a . 1910- ) , 197, 218, 24853, 255 C h ’ e n Chi-t’ang, 266 C h ’ e n Ch’iao-nien ( 1 9 0 1 - 2 8 ) , 136 C h ’ e n Chiung-ming, 29, 34, 43, 51 C h ’ e n Keng (1904-61), 302, 422-24 C h ’ e n K u n g - p o (1892-1946), 3 2 , 33, 277, 524-25, 527-28, 551, 576 C h ’ e n K u o - f u , 367 C h ’ e n L i - f u , 367 C h ’ e n Po-ta (1904— ) , 262, 320, 325, 340, 444, 447, 470, 492, 496, 500, 5 0 2 - 3 , 508, 511 C h ’ e n Shao-yii ( W a n g M i n g ) (1904— ) , 18082, 185-88, 218, 261, 263-64, 281, 284-90, 292, 322, 324, 326, 330, 337, 342-45, 350-52, 3 5 8 59, 389, 467, 514, 552, 554, 558, 563, 568, 577, 579, 588, 592, 594 C h ’ e n T ’ a n - c h ’ i u (1896-1943), 32, 231, 255, 303, 516, 524-25, 569 C h ’ e n T u - h s i u (1879-1942), 25, 2 7 - 3 5 , 38, 119—27, 136, 149, 151, 156, 160-62, 167, 183, 1 8 5 86, 189, 208, 217, 219-20, 223, 282, 286-88,

343, 345, 389, 485, 512, 521-24, 526, 528-32, 535-36, 538, 540—41, 544, 548, 579, 592; early years o f , 14-15, 19, 23-24; and first united f r o n t , 43, 46, 49-53, 56, 58-59, 61, 67-68, 72, 76, 78-79, 81, 88, 90, 93, 95-108, 110-12, 114 C h ’ e n Yen-nien (1898-1927), 61, 69, 156, 539, 541 C h ’ e n Y i ( 1 9 0 1 - 7 2 ) , 56, 121, 142, 145, 201, 229, 243, 296, 304-7, 321, 373, 421-24, 426, 444, 470, 478, 594 C h ’ e n Yii (1902- ) , 461, 557 C h ’ e n Yiin (ca. 1900- ) , 63, 220, 222, 224, 233-35, 243, 245-47, 255, 259, 275, 284-85, 290-92, 304-6, 322, 325, 329-30, 359, 381, 445, 476, 478, 486, 549, 603, 610 Cheng-feng Movement, 308, 317, 320-47, 358, 401, 414-16, 467, 494, 589, 591; see also Rectification Cheng-T’ai R a i l r o a d (Shansi), 193 Ch’eng Tzu-hua (1904— ) , 258, 300, 572 Cheng Wei-san (ca. 1901— ) , 196-97, 572 Chengchow Conference (1958), 477 C h ’ i Pen-yii, 503 Chi-Teng-k’uei, 508 C h i a C h i n g , E m p e r o r , 484 Chiang C h ’ i n g (ca. 1915— ) , 484, 496, 5 0 1 - 2 , 508 ) , 13, 51, 56, 75-78, C h i a n g Kai-shek (188780-83, 88-97, 102, 105-6, 108, 112, 118, 121, 152, 166, 171, 176, 179, 191-92, 195, 221, 233, 236, 239, 242, 244, 256, 260, 263-66, 268-70, 276-79, 281, 289, 295, 352-57, 363, 367-70, 373-74, 376-78, 380, 383-84, 389-90, 392-93, 422, 425-26, 475, 512, 523, 530, 535-36, 538— 39, 544, 577, 580, 597, 602 C h i a n g Nan-hsiang (ca. 1 9 1 5 - ) , 405 Chiaotung Committee, 602 C h i c h e r i n , Georgiy Vasil’yevich, 25 C h i h l i , see Hopeh C h i l d r e n ’ s leagues, 312 (Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh) Border Chin-Ch’a-Chi Region, 279, 292, 296, 298-302, 311, 315-16, 318, 320-21, 342, 372-73, 380, 395, 397, 399, 403, 413, 428, 583 Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii (Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan) Border Region, 280, 292, 3 0 1 - 2 , 328, 372-73, 395-97, 408, 413, 419, 428, 583 C h ’ i n dynasty, 367, 497 C h ’ i n Pang-hsien ( P o K u ) (1907—46), 181-82, 185-87, 218, 222, 224, 234, 243, 245-51, 259, 261, 269, 282, 284-86, 290, 292, 310, 324, 337, 342-43, 345, 350, 352, 357-59, 554, 563, 566— 68, 579, 594 Chin-Sui (Shansi-Suiyiian) Border Region, 280, 292, 298, 301, 315, 372-73, 397, 400, 402, 412, 415, 417-18 C h i n a Y o u t h P a r t y , 352 C h i n a n , 206 Chinese Academy o f Sciences, 83 Chinese Communist Party ( C C P ) , 18, 2 7 - 3 5 , 40, 219, 246, 293, 324, 349, 359-62, 385-91, 445, 447, 450-60, 564, 614, 619; Central Committee, 40, 46, 52, 56, 5 8 - 5 9 , 61, 63, 6 7 - 7 0 , 76, 78, 86, 88-89, 100, 112, 114, 124, 132-33, 136, 144, 151, 156-58, 160-64, 173-74, 178-79, 181-82, 185-86, 215, 218, 222, 224, 226, 230, 234-35, 245, 250, 252, 259, 265-66, 288, 29293, 295, 313, 324, 326, 332-34, 336-37, 340, 342, 344-45, 347, 351, 357-59, 361-62, 371, 376-77, 381, 389, 392, 396-99, 400, 402, 408, 410, 412-14, 427, 435, 438, 441-45, 447-48, 455-59, 466, 468-72, 474-76, 478, 483, 48588, 492, 495, 497-98, 500, 504-11, 517, 531, 537, 541, 550, 552, 554, 557, 569, 581, 594, 609, 611, 613; Central Control Committee, 442, 444, 446, 448, 471; Central Party School, 281; i

Index c h a i r m a n , 67, 439, 442, 444, 448, 472, 477, 507; departments a n d offices, 100-101, 110, 126, 157, 202, 224, 229, 234-35, 243, 259, 286, 293, 325, 327, 445-48, 450, 470, 531, 579; general secretary, 67, 100-101, 159, 218-19, 234, 24546, 249, 259, 281, 285, 292, 442, 444-45, 468, 472, 620; membership, 5-6, 19, 39, 52, 54, 61-62, 64-71, 7 3 - 7 4 , 9 2 , 98-99, 118-19, 122, 137, 148, 161-62, 191, 195-96, 198, 201, 206, 213, 239, 271, 290, 292, 313, 322, 361, 366, 395, 415, 430, 434, 452-59, 466-67, 482, 533, 575, 611; Military Affairs Committee, 68, 100— 101, 110, 126, 156-57, 159, 187, 202, 206, 213, 224, 235, 243, 245-46, 255, 259, 281, 285, 293, 321-22, 324, 326, 358, 397-98, 400401, 43839, 441, 44647, 450, 483, 501, 508-9, 566, 570, 619; m u n i c i p a l committees, 69-70, 80, 125, 160, 484, 495-96, 592, 617; organization, 6-8, 18, 3840, 46, 50, 52, 6 5 , 6 7 - 7 1 , 100-101, 1 1 8 19, 121, 123-25, 156-60, 174, 182, 187, 195, 202-3, 205, 214, 218-20, 222-24, 234-36, 245, 259, 261, 271, 281, 290-308, 310, 313-18, 322, 325, 361, 394, 396-97, 400, 414-15, 434, 4 3 8 39, 442, 444-48, 450, 452-63, 471, 487, 496, 501, 506-11, 514-15, 552; organization department, 157, 159, 187, 224, 259, 281, 283, 293, 445-47, 457; Party Central, 69, 78-79, 8 2 , 88-89, 93, 101, 104, 109, 111-16, 118-20, 1 2 3 24, 126, 130, 133-38, 141-43, 160, 164, 168, 170, 173, 175, 178, 181, 185-89, 195-98, 202, 205, 208, 210, 212-13, 215-20, 222, 224-26, 228-30, 234, 236-37, 242, 253-54, 257, 262, 267, 269, 276, 281-82, 287, 292-93, 303, 305, 310, 325, 341, 349, 357, 376, 383, 396, 398-99, 413, 421, 427, 445, 467-68, 474, 504, 537, 548, 554, 557, 559, 581, 619; Political Bureau (Politburo), 100-102, 109-14, 116, 124, 130, 133, 136-38, 140, 143, 156-57, 159-60, 162, 167— 68, 170-71, 180, 186-87, 219, 222-23, 226, 234, 243, 263, 266, 283, 285-86, 288, 292-93, 323, 334, 337, 359, 396-97, 399-400, 438, 44142, 444-48, 466, 468-73, 476-77, 479, 485, 495-96, 498, 505-9, 517, 541, 547, 564, 566, 569-70, 595, 609, 615, 619-20; propaganda dep a r t m e n t , 100-101, 157, 159, 187, 224, 259, 281, 283, 293, 324, 334, 337, 44648, 467, 532; provincial committees, 3 9 , 70, 76-78, 80, 91, 104, 108-10, 124-39, 143-44, 160, 186-87, 193, 196, 213, 220, 224, 292, 302, 381; regional bureaus, 33, 35, 68-70, 90-93, 124-25, 134-35, 137-38, 156, 159-60, 193, 221, 224, 226, 229, 254, 257-59. 262, 266. 269, 273-74, 279-82, 286, 290, 292-94, 298, 302-3, 307, 310, 322-25, 328, 337, 340, 349-51. 363, 373, 381-83, 394, 397, 405, 411, 428, 435, 449, 468, 483, 485, 505, 533, 537, 555. 575. 581, 583, 613; secret a r i a t , 157, 234. 246, 285, 293, 359, 396-97, 429, 442, 444-48, 471-72, 544. 610: social affairs department, 293, 325, 328, 397; Soviet a n d Liberated Area bureaus. 195-96, 198, 202— 4 , 214-16, 220, 224, 292, 302; women’s departm e n t , 67, 100-101, 157, 187. 224, 259, 293, 532 Chinese Eastern R a i l w a y , 2 5 - 2 6 , 57, 166-68, 172, 266 Chinese Labor Secretariat, 526 Chinese Problems Association, 322 Chinese Seamen’s U n i o n , 31, 62, 86, 532; strike o f (1922), 36 Chinese Socialist P a r t y , 16 Chinese Soviet R e p u b l i c , 173, 180, 2 0 3 4 , 210, 215, 216, 228, 231, 235-36, 266, 563 Chinese Women, 65, 319 Chinese Worker, 65, 319, 565 Chinese Youth, 38, 65, 319, 405 Chingkang M o u n t a i n s , 133, 1 4 3 4 4 , 147, 164, 197-98, 216, 242, 305, 552

637

C h i u San (September T h i r d ) Society, 369 C h o u dynasty, 310 Chou E n - l a i (1898) , 22, 51, 56, 67, 69, 79, 91, 9 3 , 95-96, 100-101, 104, 110, 115, 120-24, 126, 136, 151, 154, 156, 159-60, 171-72, 174, 177, 180, 183, 185-88, 202-3, 206, 212, 215, 218, 220, 222, 224, 229, 234-35, 243-47, 24951, 255, 258-60, 267, 269-70, 279-80, 283, 285— 86, 292-93, 310, 343-45, 350-52, 354, 356-59, 377-78, 383-84, 387, 390, 392, 399, 402-3, 439, 442, 447, 453, 468, 471, 476, 485, 492, 498, 500-502, 508, 511, 514, 524, 544, 547, 552, 563-64, 566-68, 570, 577, 579-80, 594, 603, 619-20 Chou Fo-hai, 277, 523-26, 576 Chou Hsiao-chou (ca. 1912—- ) , 479 C h o u Pao-chung (1902-64), 302-3, 381-82, 558 Chou Shih-ti (ca. 1902—- ) , 121 Chou Yang (1908- ) , 221, 321, 325, 33840, 496, 591, 617 Chou Yi-ch’iin (ca. 1889-1931), 147, 163, 194-95 Ch’ii C h ’ i u - p a i (1899-1935), 25, 52-59, 6 3 , 66— 68, 9 3 , 95, 100-107, 109-10, 115, 120, 123-26, 128, 130, 135, 138, 151, 154, 156, 159, 165, 172, 177, 180, 183, 185, 187. 203, 212, 221, 236, 243, 339, 344, 514, 521, 530-32, 537, 541, 544, 546—47, 550, 552, 563, 569 C h u J u i ( 1 9 0 5 4 8 ) , 292 C h u Li-chih (1906— ) , 257-58, 340 C h u P’ei-teh, 538-39 C h u T e h (1886— ) , 23, 51, 121-23, 142-45, 147, 151, 156, 163-64, 169, 175-76, 178, 181— 82, 192, 195, 197-98, 200-203, 214-15, 226, 229-30, 234, 236-37, 242-43, 245-51, 253-54, 259, 269, 279, 281-83, 285, 292, 295, 301, 310, 352, 358, 371, 400, 402, 421, 425, 439, 476-77, 479, 508, 516, 550, 563, 566-71, 574, 582, 613 C h u Yiian-chang, 484 Ch’uan-Shen (Szechwan-Shensi) base, 197, 243 Chuang nationality, 12, 559 Chungshan gunboat, 77 Class struggle, 6 , 15, 21, 3 4 , 47, 58, 66, 87, 89, 128, 140, 167-68, 174, 227, 230, 273-74, 276, 284, 288, 335, 368, 414, 473, 476, 484, 486, 488-89, 493, 495, 500, 509, 544, 577, 579, 615 “ C o l l e c t i v e leadership,’’ 208, 471 Collectivization, 409, 434, 436, 455-56, 469-70, 474-75, 478 ‘““Combat L i b e r a l i s m , ’ ’ 331 Cominform, 385 Comintern (Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) , 24-25, 2 7 , 34-35, 41, 5 1 - 5 3 , 149, 153-54, 156-59, 162, 165, 250, 253-54, 259-61, 265, 268-70, 281, 285, 319, 324, 344, 354, 361, 383, 411, 521-22, 525-27, 535, 537-38, 542, 546, 550, 552, 5 5 5 57, 561-62, 567-68, 572, 588; Asian Bureau, 24-25; Dalburo ( F a r Eastern B u r e a u ) , 154, 180; E C C I (Executive Committee), 87, 94, 96— 97, 103. 107, 109, 114, 126, 153-55, 157-58, 171, 176-77, 230, 232, 235, 260-61; and first

united front, 43, 46, 48, 50, 55, 58-59, 62, 67, 70. 72, 76, 79-80, 83, 86-88, 93-99, 1 0 2 - 3 , 105-6, 108-9, 113-16, 119, 121-22, 124, 12628, 133-34, 138; and L i L i - s a n , 167-68, 170— 73, 175-77, 179-86, 188, 201, 210, 212, 218, 222, 230, 24344, 246 Commandism 332, 416, 466, 483 Committee for W o r k Among ‘ ‘ W h i t e ’ ’ Troops, 267 Committee o f the Workers’ Movement, Shanghai,

‘ C o m m i t t e e o f t h r e e , ’ ’ 387, 392 Common Program a n d ‘ ‘ O r g a n i c L a w s , ’ ’ 437 Communes, 436-38, 475-79, 482, 487 Communist, 28, 319. 329 Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l , see Comintern

638

Index

Communist Manifesto, 17, 20, 2 2 , 522 Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (CPSU), 24, 39-40, 67, 79, 138, 154, 173, 232, 342, 376, 452, 481, 486, 609 Communist Y o u t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 49 Communist Y o u t h League, 38, 54, 61-66, 70, 98, 104, 119, 122, 124-25, 134-36, 145, 151, 159, 174, 193-94, 196, 201, 213, 217, 222, 224, 259, 262-63, 342, 361, 404, 439, 4 4 1 4 2 , 446, 450— 54, 459-61, 467, 475, 487, 492, 500, 511, 523, 527, 540, 560, 582, 609-11, 620; see also N e w Democratic Youth League; Socialist Youth League Compradores, 49, 263 Confucianism, 6 , 11, 15, 119 Confucius, 191, 367-68, 423 Congress for ‘‘Peoples o f E a s t ’ ’ (1920), 521 Congress o f T o i l e r s o f East (1922), 35, 43, 54 Congresses o f Revolutionary Y o u t h o f F a r East, 47 Contradictions, 333, 416, 472, 487, 500 “ C o r r u p t i o n , waste a n d bureaucratism,’’ 466-67 Council o f People’s Commissars ( o f Central Sov i e t ) , 2 0 3 4 , 220, 229, 231, 236, 259, 310 Critique o f Political Economy, 20 Cultural News, 405 C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , 239, 251, 282, 324-25, 330— 31, 339, 343-45, 365, 373, 375, 377, 384, 400, 402, 434, 436-39, 441-42, 445, 447, 450, 453, 456, 458-59, 461, 464-66, 472, 478, 480-81, 483, 488-89, 492-512, 514, 544, 550, 592, 598, 614, 619-20 C u l t u r a l Revolution G r o u p , 445-47, 501, 503, 506, 508, 619 D a l b u r o , see Comintern Dalin, S. A . , 49 ‘““Dare t o d i e corps,’”’ 280, 299, 301 December N i n t h Movement (7935), 261-64, 268, 505 “ D e m o c r a t i c centralism,’”’ 39-40, 65, 71, 157, 165, 450, 474 Democratic dictatorship o f proletariat a n d peasants, 127, 129 Democratic League, 352, 355, 363, 369, 390-92, 439, 601 Democratic r e v o l u t i o n , 136, 274, 464 “ D i c t a t o r s h i p o f proletariat,’”’ 66, 340, 480-81, 509 D i m i t r o v , G e o r g i , 261 Dismissal o f H a i Jui, 484, 495 D j i l a s , M i l o v a n , 339 ‘““Double r e d u c t i o n , ’ ’ 409, 414 Dream o f the R e d Chamber, 437 Duclos, Jacques, 471 ;

East C h i n a Border Region, 373, 397 East C h i n a F i e l d Army, 421-22, 424 East R i v e r Special Committee, 134 East Turkestan, Republic o f , 304 Eastern Chekiang base area, 372 ECCI, see Comintern Education, 12, 20, 205, 318-22, 332, 340, 335, 456-57, 471, 483, 486-88, 504 ‘“‘Eight criteria,’’ 610 E i g h t h Party Congress (1956), 361-62, 442, 444— 46, 471-72, 620; second session o f (1958), 474; First P l e n u m (1956). 471; Second Plenum (1956), 472; T h i r d Plenum (1957), 474-75; Fourth P l e n u m (71958), 476; F i f t h Plenum (1958), 476-77; S i x t h P l e n u m (1958), 477; Seventh Plenum (1959), 477; Eighth Plenum (1959), 479-81; N i n t h P l e n u m (1961), 483; T e n t h Plenum (1962), 486, 492; Eleventh Plenum (1966), 497-98, 500, 505; Twelfth Plenum (1968), 507

Eighth R o u t e A r m y Military and Political Affairs Magazine, 319 Elder Brother Society, 206, 256, 266 ‘““Encirclement’’ campaigns, see K u o m i n t a n g , encirclement campaigns o f Engels, F r i e d r i c h , 17, 327, 332, 345, 476 F a n t r i b e , 247 F a n Wen-lan (1893-1971), 404 Fang C h i h - m i n (1899-1933), 147, 156, 164, 176, 198, 201, 208, 237, 242 Fang Fang (1904- ) , 142, 351, 461 ‘ ‘ F e b r u a r y adverse c u r r e n t , ’ ’ 502 February Seventh Massacre (1923), 3 7 - 3 8 , 50, 58 Federation o f Chinese Democratic Parties, 352, 354 Federation o f L a b o r , 532 Feng Hsiieh-feng, 338, 340 Feng Pai-chii (ca. 1901- ) , 194, 242, 307, 338, 426, 461, 474 Feng Wen-pin (ca. 1911—- ) , 224, 259, 262, 405 Feng Yii-hsiang, 26, 43, 60, 70, 77, 82-83, 90, 105, 108, 112, 156-166, 176, 182, 233, 369, 526 Feng Y u - l a n ( 1 8 9 5 ) , 437 Fifth Party Congress (1927), 72, 98-101, 104-8, 541, 546 F i r s t Conference o f Party Branches i n Soviet Areas (1931), 215, 218 F i r s t Five-Year P l a n ( 1 9 5 3 - 5 7 ) , 435, 437-38, 469-70, 475 “ F i r s t left opportunist l i n e , ’ ’ 124 First N a t i o n a l Congress o f the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931), 173, 180, 2 0 3 4 , 210, 215, 228, 231, 235-36 F i r s t Party Congress (1921), 3 2 - 3 5 , 39, 516, 5 2 4 28, 563 “ F i r s t revolutionary c i v i l w a r ’ ’ (1927), 91 ““Five-anti campaign’’ (1951), 437, 466, 486 ‘““Forced l a b o r , ’ ’ 436 Foreign Language I n s t i t u t e , 31, 35 Fortus, M . A . , see Mif, Pavel F o u p ’ i n g Conference (71938), 299 ‘““Four-class a l l i a n c e , ’ ’ 429 ‘“‘Four clean-ups’’ Movement (1962-65), 466, 487, 488 ““Four-family store,’’ 496 “Four-firsts,’’ 480, 483, 510 “ F o u r o l d s , ’ ’ 498 Fourth Party Congress (1925), 58-62, 64, 67, 72; October P l e n u m (1925), 65, 68, 70, 76; July P l e n u m (1926), 65, 70-72, 80-82 ““‘Fractions,’”’ 71, 100, 362 F u Po-ts’ui, 217 F u Tso-yi, 311, 424 F u k i e n , 83, 9 9 , 123, 135, 142, 163-64, 176, 194— 95, 198, 204, 216, 224, 226, 229, 230-34, 243, 449, 462, 560, 563, 565, 581, 593 Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Border Region, 242, 304 Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi border area. 3 5 1 4 2 3 Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet, 198-99 F u k i e n People’s Revolutionary G o v e r n m e n t , 233— 34 Fukien Rebellion (7933), 213, 231-34, 236-37, 260, 281, 289, 567 F u p i e n ( L i a n g h o k ’ o u ) Conference (1935), 248 F u t ’ i e n Incident (1930), 181, 212-17, 559, 562

Galin, General, 77, 92, 105, 121-22, 166, 172, 536 Gauss, Clarence, 356 General Front Committee, 133, 143, 173, 202, 548 ‘““General Study Committee,’’ 325 G e n t r y , 111, 128-29, 141, 210, 263, 401, 405, 409, 436 Germany, 13, 23, 30, 184, 227, 265, 376, 456, 611

Index G i a p , V o N g u y e n , 351 Government o f Special Region o f Republic o f C h i n a , 276 G r a n d Canal, 305, 437 Great Britain, 13, 43, 4 8 , 60, 63, 79, 88, 174, 180, 187 Great Leap Forward (1958), 258, 434, 437-39, 457, 475-79, 482-83, 486-87, 612, 615 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, see Cultural Revolution Green G a n g , 36, 9 4 , 9 6 , 539 Group o f F i v e , 494-96, 617 Guerrillas, 133, 136-37, 140, 142, 145-47, 155, 162-63, 167-69, 173, 193-94, 207, 213, 228-31, 235, 242, 256-57, 271, 278, 283-84, 294-98, 300-301, 312-14, 325, 332, 340, 346, 372, 3 8 1 82, 388, 396, 421, 423, 480, 552, 567 Guevara, C h e , 146 Guide Weekly, 38, 65, 90, 9 5 , 319, 565

Hai Jui, 484 ‘ “ H a i Jui Scolds the E m p e r o r , ’ ’ 484 Hailufeng County Peasant U n i o n , 39 Hailufeng Soviet, 194 H a i n a n C o l u m n , 307 H a n Fu-chii, 302 Hanyehp’ing Workers’ U n i o n , 62 Heavy industry, 475 Hegel, Georg W . F . , 6 H e i l u n g k i a n g , 381, 389-90, 449, 462, 502, 511 ‘“Higher intellectuals,’’ defined, 437 H i g h e r Party School, see Central Party School H i n t o n , W i l l i a m , 408, 415 Hitler, Adolf, 260 H o C h i Minh, 51, 56, 194, 351 H o K’o-ch’iian, see K ’ a i Feng ) , 121-22, 134, 147, 151, H o Lung (1896— 163, 169, 179, 194-95, 200, 226, 237, 239, 242, 244, 253-55, 270, 282, 298, 300, 373, 421-23, 444, 502, 505, 570 H o Meng-hsiung ( 1 9 0 3 - 3 1 ) , 151, 159, 171, 182, 186-88, 220, 521, 523 H o Shu-heng (1874-1935), 3 2 , 203, 231, 243, 516, 524 Ho-Umetsu Agreement (1935), 262 H o Y i n g - c h ’ i n , 179, 354, 425 H o n a n , 85, 9 9 , 108, 112, 121, 127, 132, 134, 1 9 5 9 6 , 204, 224, 257-58, 280, 286, 290, 3 0 1 - 2 , 305, 372, 377-78, 382, 390, 402, 422, 449, 462, 474, 565, 581, 597 Honan-Hupeh Volunteer Column, 305 H o n g Kong, 9 , 31, 3 6 , 62-63, 86, 139-40, 161, 194, 224, 247, 266, 287, 292, 351, 405, 524, 527, 531, 580, 593 Hong Kong—Canton Strike (1922), 37; (19252 6 ) , 63-64, 86 Hopeh, 9 , 86, 98-99, 139, 193, 211, 224, 300— 302, 316, 318, 321, 372, 375, 378, 380, 382, 390, 399, 410, 413-14, 420, 422, 449, 457, 462, 519, 560, 565, 581, 604 Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning base area, 372 ‘““Horse D a y ’ ’ massacre (1927), 108-9 H s i Chung-hsiin, 258, 421 Hsia-fang (‘‘sending d o w n ’ ’ ) , 313, 436-37, 474 H s i a H s i (ca. 1900—a. 1935), 195, 217-18, 224, 524 Hsiang Ching-yii (1895-1928), 47, 66, 100-101, 528, 531-32 Hsiang Chung-fa (ca. 1888-1931), 113, 124, 127, 156-57, 185, 218-20, 227, 541, 546, 554 Hsiang-O-Hsi ( H u n a n - H u p e h ) Soviet, 194-95, 197-200, 202-3, 218, 224, 230, 253 Hsiang-O-Kan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) base, 197, 199 Hsiang R i v e r Review, 23 Hsiang Ying (1898-1941), 3 7 , 63, 124, 156, 159,

639

202-3, 206, 212, 218-19, 222, 224, 229, 234-37, 243, 247, 249, 285, 290, 304, 306, 310, 524, 531, 547, 552, 554, 568, 584 Hsiao Ching-kuang (ca. 1902- ) , 201, 231i, 235, 381, 421, 523 H s i a o Chiin, 338-39, 405 Hsiao H u a ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 302 Hsiao K ’ 0 (1909- ) , 163, 195, 198, 201, 237, 244, 253-54, 298 H s i e h F u - c h i h (1898-1972), 442, 480, 508, 619-20 Hsii Chi-shen, 196-97, 559, 563 Hsii Hai-tung (1900— ) , 132, 147, 196-97, 200, 237, 242, 252, 257-58, 264, 572 Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien (1902- ) , 139, 151, 163, 179, 196-97, 200, 243-53, 255, 270, 301, 321, 421, 426, 441, 594 Hsiieh Yiieh, 253, 538 H u Feng, 338, 340, 437, 469, 484 H u H a n - m i n , 53, 77, 233, 530, 534 H u S h i h (1891-1962), 14, 17, 437, 484 H u Tsung-nan, 298 H u Yao-pang (ca. 1 9 1 3 - ) , 475, 496 H u a i R i v e r , 375, 424 Huang K’o-ch’eng (1902- ) , 305, 307, 479-80 Huang Kung-liieh (1898-1931), 163, 197, 201, 214 Huang Yung-sheng (ca. 1905- ) , 299, 504, 511, 548 H u n a n , 9 , 17, 30-31, 36-37, 39, 50, 54, 61, 6970, 73, 82-86, 89, 98-100, 105-8, 110-12, 121, 123, 127, 129-34, 140-43, 147, 152, 159, 163, 170, 174-78, 194, 197, 200-202, 204, 211, 216, 224, 226, 237, 243-44, 253, 258, 280, 372, 377, 449, 457-58, 462, 502, 511, 524, 537, 544, 546, 550, 580-81, 593 Hunan Front Committee, see General Front Committee Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi base, 197, 199 Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Soviet government, 556 Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan-Kweich ow border area, 195 H u n a n Peasant Association, 536 H u n a n Workers’ Association, 31 H u n d r e d Flowers Campaign (71957), 239, 339, 437, 465, 469, 471-75, 478, 483, 487, 615 H u n d r e d Regiments Campaign (1940), 294, 300, 316, 326, 334, 582, 588 H u n g Lake ( H u n g H u ) Soviet, 194, 200, 202, 216 H u p e h , 9 , 31, 39, 50, 54, 61, 69, 84-86, 89, 98— 99, 111-12, 121, 127, 129, 131-32, 134, 140-41, 147, 163, 169-70, 175, 177, 185-87, 191, 194, 196-201, 204, 206, 216, 224, 226, 242, 258, 273, 276, 280, 296-99, 301, 304, 372, 377-78, 382, 390, 422, 449, 458, 462, 546, 550, 580-81, 593 H u p e h General Labor U n i o n , 113, 127, 156 Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, 147, 163, 192, 307, 372; seé also Oyiliwan H u p e h - H u n a n Border Soviet, 192, 195 Hurley, P a t r i c k , 356-57, 377, 386 Ideological education, 365, 401 Ideological struggle, 464, 466—67, 469, 472-74 Ideology, 6 , 15-16, 25, 26, 28, 158, 164, 207, 2 7 1 75, 285, 322-47, 373-78, 395, 415, 433, 45052, 478, 480, 483-85, 487-88, 492-507, 512, 514—15; see also Cheng-feng Movement; C u l tural R e v o l u t i o n ; Mass L i n e ; Rectification I m p e r i a l i s m , 10, 13-17, 24, 33, 36, 4647, 49, 51, 5 3 - 5 6 , 58-60, 66, 76, 79, 82, 89, 93-94, 117, 123, 126, 153, 157-58, 174, 177, 180, 184— 85, 227, 232-33, 239, 260, 263-64, 273, 342, 354, 376, 385-86, 391, 427, 510, 512 “ I n d i v i d u a l i s m , ’ ’ 331, 467 I n d o c h i n a , 48, 236, 355, 495, 505, 509 I n n e r Mongolia, 39, 69, 99, 191, 277, 296, 302-4, 380, 397, 447, 449, 460, 462, 469, 502

640

Index

I n n e r Mongolian Autonomous Movement Associa t i o n , 303, 380-81 " Intellectuals, 6-7, 9 , 10, 14, 16, 18-19, 30, 40, 49, 70, 99, 105, 124-25, 146, 148, 157, 209, 221-22, 227, 249, 319, 323, 328-29, 331, 335, 338, 340, 346, 369, 405-6, 417, 436-38, 456-59, 465, 471, 473-74, 482, 486, 542, 550, 591 International R e d Relief, 222 ‘‘Internationalist f a c t i o n , ’ ’ 151, 187-89, 197, 203, 208, 212-13, 228, 232, 245, 269, 284, 286, 324, 326, 329, 345-46, 358, 588, 594; see also ‘‘Russian returned students’’ Jao Shu-shih (ca. 1901- ) , 307, 421, 445, 453, 466, 468-69, 592, 594 Japan, 7 , 12-13, 24, 30, 32, 35, 43, 48, 62-63, 79, 9 0 , 118, 172, 180, 229, 237, 316, 321, 326, 328, 359, 366, 371, 374, 379, 382-83, 404, 426, 465, 524, 531, 611 Japan-China Struggle League, 222 Jefferson, Thomas, 357 Jehol, 160, 372, 375, 380-82, 390 Jen Pi-shih (1904-50), 60, 66, 104, 124, 151, 159, 195, 198, 206, 218, 222, 224, 229, 234, 237, 244, 253-54, 270, 279, 283, 292, 295, 325, 34041, 358-59, 399, 405, 523, 541, 547, 605

K ’ a i Feng ( H o K’o-ch’iian) ( 1 9 0 7 - 5 5 ) , 224, 245—46, 250, 259, 263, 281-83, 285, 321, 324, 336— 37, 342, 423-24, 568 K a n - M i n - W a n Soviet, see Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet K a n Szu-ch’i (1904-64), 254 Kanchow General Trade U n i o n , 539 ) , 160, 187, 220, 222, 224, K ’ a n g Sheng (1899— 261, 284-85, 287, 291-92, 321, 325, 329, 334, 336, 341, 346, 359, 402, 412, 418, 44447, 494— 96, 502, 508, 558, 560, 594 K ’ a n g - T a , 320-22, 325, 329 K ’ a n g Y u - w e i (1858-1927), 17 K a n s u , 250-52, 254-56, 258, 311, 322, 449, 462, 540, 585 Kao-Jao affair, 483 K a o K a n g (ca. 1902—ca. 1954), 193, 256-57, 290, 303, 310-11, 322, 324-25, 328, 34041, 359, 376, 381, 383, 444-45, 453, 466-69, 479-80, 492, 505, 592, 594 K a o Shang-teh ( K a o Chiin-yii), 528-29 Karakhan, L e o , 67-68 Karakhan Manifesto, 25 K a u t s k y , Karl, 22 Khrushchev, N i k i t a , 471, 480-81, 496 K i a n g s i , 9 , 31, 36-37, 39, 61, 69, 83-86, 89, 91, 94, 98-99, 121, 128-29, 132-35, 143, 147, 1 6 3 64, 166, 169-70, 173-78, 180, 182, 188-89, 191— 93, 195, 197-201, 203-7, 212, 216, 218-20, 222, 224, 226-27, 229-31, 237, 239, 242-43, 245, 258, 260, 285, 290, 304-6, 313, 319, 321, 350— 51, 449, 458, 462, 479, 516, 539, 554, 560, 563, 569, 572, 575, 580-81, 592-93 K i a n g s i A c t i o n Committee, 214 Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei Soviet, see Northeastern K i a n g s i Soviet Kiangsi-Hunan-Kwangtung Border Region, 256 Kiangsi-Kwangtung border area, 243 ‘““Kiangsi P e r i o d , ’ ’ 189-217, 239-45, 346, 401, 446, 569 K i a n g s i Soviet, see Central Soviet K i a n g s u , 61, 69, 83, 91, 98, 111, 118, 120, 1 2 8 29, 135, 144, 174, 202, 224, 273, 290, 304-5, 307, 315, 320-21, 372-73, 377, 382, 449, 462, 539, 565, 581 Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei base area, 372 K i m Il-sung, 194, 303 Kiukiang-Nanchang area, 546

K ’ o Ch’ing-shih (1902-65), 262, 445, 477, 483, 557, 564, 609 Korea, 24, 27, 43, 193-94, 236, 321, 359, 364, 379, 385, 426, 475, 495 Korean war, 5 , 435, 444, 469 K u Shun-chang, 160, 219-20, 224 K u T a - t s ’ u n (1897-1966), 142, 194, 242, 381, 474 Kuan Hsiang-ying (1902—46), 159, 195, 218, 220, 224, 253-54, 285, 292, 298, 557 Kuangch’ang, 237, 242 Kung C h ’ u , 558, 569 K ’ u n g , H . H . , 368 K u o H u n g - t ’ a o , 256-58, 310, 340 Kuo Liang ( ~ 1 9 3 0 ) , 524, 537 K u o Mo-jo (1892—) , 83, 123, 221, 338, 591 Kuomintang ( K M T ) , 5-6, 10, 1 5 - 1 6 , 26, 37, 5 1 - 5 2 , 54-57, 59, 7 5 - 7 8 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 118-23, 126— 28, 135-36, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149-52, 158-59, 161-62, 167, 172, 176-77, 179, 187, 191, 195, 213, 233, 271-72, 274-76, 278-81, 286, 288-89, 294, 299-301, 303, 316, 325-26, 334, 339, 342, 353, 362-63, 393-95, 402, 406,

424, 428, 524, 526-28, 533-35, 538, 540-41, 54445, 561, 563, 567, 580; and civil war, 348— 57, 366-93, 401, 416, 418, 421-31, 512, 514; encirclement campaigns o f , 164, 189, 194, 196— 98, 200, 204, 206, 214, 218-40, 242, 244, 246, 250-52, 254-59, 280 K u t ’ i e n Conference o f R e d A r m y (1929), 145, 165, 589 Kwangsi, 82, 99, 164, 166, 174, 201, 224, 368, 593 Kwangsi Chuang, 449, 462 Kwangsi group ( w a r l o r d s ) , 152

Kwangtung, 39, 61, 64, 69-71, 73, 82, 84-86, 90, 98-99, 104, 106-7, 111, 121, 123-24, 127-29, 134-35, 137, 140, 142, 194, 199, 204, 224, 243, 292, 296, 304, 307, 372, 377, 382, 449, 461-62, 469, 474, 502, 533, 542, 565, 567, 580, 593 Kwangtung-Kiangsi border area, 304 Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet, 199 Kweichow, 244, 247, 449, 462, 502, 540, 580, 593 Labor a n d labor movement, 14, 29-31, 33, 35-38, 42, 47, 5 2 - 5 3 , 56, 58-59, 61-64, 66-68, 77, 83, 85-97, 89, 91, 93-96, 100, 124-25, 132, 151, 160, 162, 174, 177, 182, 185, 2034, 207, 221, 249, 259, 282, 299, 312-14, 317, 347, 359, 396— 9 7 , 403, 428, 439, 452, 458, 552, 554; see also Proletariat; Working class Labor and Women, 31 Labor Circles, 3 1 Labor International, see Profintern Labor Weekly, 36 Land reform, 8 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 54, 72-74, 86, 104, 107-8, 110, 128-29, 131-32, 135, 145, 153, 157-58, 165, 172-73, 185, 204-5, 207-12, 228-34, 256, 272-73, 276, 284, 310, 318, 334, 347, 364, 395, 397, 400402, 406, 408-20, 425, 435-36, 455-56, 461, 466, 469, 513, 519, 605; see also Agrarian revolution; Peasantry; Rural work ‘“‘Land t o tillers,’’ 408, 410-11, 436, 469, 604 Landlordism, 407 Landlords, 54, 85, 107, 128, 144, 146, 158, 165, 168, 177, 202, 207, 210-12, 231-32, 274, 276, 284, 316, 318, 334, 374, 408, 410-18, 435-36, 458, 469, 475, 517, 519, 602 ‘ ‘ L a t e r ten p o i n t s , ’ ’ 487 ‘“‘League Against I m p e r i a l i s m , ’ ’ 222 League for Armed Resistance Against Japan, 262 League o f Left-Wing Writers, 221, 338 League o f N a t i o n s , 191 ‘““Left a n d Right R i v e r ’ ’ soviets, 194, 201 Left deviation, 401, 410, 417, 419, 513 ‘ “ ‘ L e f t ’ o p p o r t u n i s m , ’ ’ 333, 577 ““‘Leftism,’’ 531

Index L e n i n , 6 , 14, 18, 24, 26-27, 43, 184, 327, 332, 345, 452, 476, 485 L e n i n School, 25, 66 Lenin Weekly, 565 L i C h ’ i - h a n , 523-24, 526, 537, 539 L i Chi-shen, 83, 9 6 , 105, 137, 152, 369, 426, 567 L i Ching-ch’iian ( c a . 1906— ) , 412, 418, 445, 477, 483, 501, 603, 609 ) , 77, 201, 243, 245, 259, L i F u - c h ’ u n (1899281, 325, 381, 404, 44445, 478, 486, 521, 539, 594 L i Hsien-nien (ca. 1907- ) , 132, 196, 249, 255, 296, 305, 307, 444-45, 478, 486, 508, 594 L i Hsiieh-feng (ca. 1906— ) , 445, 483, 508 L i K ’ o - n u n g (1898-1962), 220, 351, 446 ) , 22, 36-37, 5 2 - 5 3 , 62— L i Li-san (ca. 1899— 63, 6 7 - 6 8 , 88, 100-101, 1 0 3 - 5 , 109, 113, 12024, 131, 141, 151, 154, 156, 159-62, 164-65, 199, 203, 208, 210, 213-15, 223, 227, 229, 257, 331, 342, 345, 358, 381, 383, 403, 521, 531, 537, 541, 544, 547, 552, 554, 557, 592, 594, 603; leadership o f , 166—88 “ L i L i - s a n l i n e , ’ 158, 166-89, 194, 196, 206, 213, 330, 554, 556 L i M i n g - j u i , 558, 563 L i Sen, see L i C h ’ i - h a n L i T a (1890) , 32, 523-25, 528 L i Ta-chao (1888-1927), 15, 20, 22, 2 7 - 3 2 , 3 4 , 37, 46, 50-51, 53, 5 5 - 5 7 , 59, 69, 76, 82, 94, 99, 151, 156, 208, 512, 521, 523-24, 528-29, 531, 534 L i T e h , see B r a u n , O t t o L i Tsung-jen, 83, 152, 254, 266, 277, 368, 425-26 L i W e i - h a n (1897— ) , 100-101, 110, 120, 124, 127, 151, 156, 159, 186, 212, 224, 234, 245-46, 259, 281, 320-21, 324-25, 329, 521, 541, 546— 47, 555, 557 L i a n g C h ’ i - c h ’ a o (1873-1929), 14, 16-17 L i a n g h o k ’ o u (Fupien) Conference (1935) 248-52 Liao Ch’eng-chih (1908- ) , 351, 405, 594 L i a o C h u n g - k ’ a i (1878-1925), 56-58, 75, 530, 534 Liberated areas, 363, 371-72, 375, 378, 386, 390, 395, 400401, 403—4, 406, 408, 410, 412-13, 415, 418, 420, 430, 574, 605-6 Liberation, 319 Liberation D a i l y , 324, 329, 356, 373 L i n Feng (1906 ) , 292, 298, 381, 383, 457, 594 L i n Piao (1907-717), 29, 56, 142, 163, 170, 187, 198, 201, 2 4 3 4 5 , 251-52, 254, 259, 264, 2 7 5 76, 282, 298-99, 307, 321, 325, 329, 337, 351, 354, 359, 373, 381-83, 421-24, 426, 439, 44142, 444, 447, 464, 469, 476, 479-80, 483, 485, 487, 492-93, 607, 615, 618-19, 621; C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n a n d , 495, 497-500, 502, 506-7, 511 L i n Po-ch’ii (1886-1960), 55-56, 7 6 - 7 7 , 220, 236, 259, 281-82, 286, 311, 313, 325, 340-41, 351-52, 354, 356, 358-59, 445, 524, 530, 581, 593 L i s t , A l b e r t , see B r a u n , O t t o L i u C h i h - t a n (1902-36), 70, 193, 252, 257-58, 264-65, 340 L i u Erh-sung, 524, 537, 539 L i u Po-ch’eng ( 1 8 9 2 ) , 122-23, 201, 229, 243, 245-47, 251-54, 259, 298, 301, 373, 421, 424, 426, 444, 594, 613 L i u Shao-ch’i (1898) , 25, 28, 36-37, 62-88, 113, 124, 127, 193, 219, 222, 224, 235, 245-46, 249, 259, 262, 269, 275, 281-83, 285, 289-90, 307, 310, 321, 325, 329-33, 337, 340, 3 4 3 4 4 , 349, 351, 358-60, 375-77, 389, 399403, 409, 411-12, 414, 422, 439, 441, 453, 468-69, 4 7 1 73, 476-79, 484-89, 492-93, 537, 541, 544, 54647, 563, 568, 570, 577-78, 580, 583, 588— 92, 594, 598, 6 0 2 - 3 , 607, 609, 615; a n d Cultural

641

R e v o l u t i o n , 494, 496-501, 505, 507, 511 L o Chang-lung (1901—497?), 151, 159, 182, 186— 89, 215, 521, 523, 531, 592 L o Ch’i-yiian, 524, 533, 564 L o F u , see Chang Wen-t’ien L o Jui-ch’ing (ca. 1906— ) , 321, 442, 453, 480, 495-96, 5 0 3 4 , 592 L o Jung-huan (1902-63), 201, 302, 381-82, 424, 444-45, 548, 581 L o M i n g , 206, 213, 230-31, 234-35 L o P i n g - h u i (1897-1946), 163, 198, 201, 255, 305, 307, 569 L o Y i - n u n g (1901-28), 61, 66, 69, 9 1 , 93, 95, 131, 134, 136, 156, 159, 219, 523, 539, 541, 546-47, 552 L o c h ’ u a n Conference (1937), 283—84 Lolo t r i b e , 247, 583 Lominadze, Besso, 120-24, 137-38, 153-54, 156— 57, 546 L o n g M a r c h (1934-36), 105, 151, 191, 193, 195, 197, 200, 202, 204, 206, 213, 226, 237, 239-61, 264, 267, 270-71, 273, 282, 285, 303—4, 310-11, 313, 315, 401, 455, 457-58, 489, 499, 512, 570, 572, 578-79, 611 L i Cheng-ts’ao (ca. 1904— ) , 298, 300, 3 8 1 82 L u F u - t ’ a n , 547, 563-64 L u Hsiin (1881-1936), 14, 221, 338 L u Hsiin Academy o f A r t a n d L i t e r a t u r e , 320, 338 L u Ting-yi (ca. 1901- ) , 217, 325, 402, 444, 467, 478, 494-96, 592, 594, 603, 617 L u n g - H a i R a i l r o a d , 372 L u s h a n , 115, 120, 182, 479 L u t i n g Bridge, 247, 252 M a c A r t h u r , General Douglas, 371 Malraux, A n d r é , 96 Mamaeyv, I . K., 27, 30 Manchuria, 8 , 9 , 39, 47, 69, 79, 83, 86, 9 9 , 152, 160, 166, 172, 189, 191, 193, 201, 218, 224, 229, 236, 256, 267, 277, 292, 300, 3024, 355, 3 7 1 72, 375-76, 378, 381, 385, 388-91, 394, 402, 4 0 5 - 8 , 410, 422-23, 426, 468-69, 480, 509, 597, 604 Manchus, 7 , 12, 277, 427, 434, 481, 512 ‘‘Mandate o f heaven,’’ 342, 367, 426, 433 Manuilsky, Dmitri, 172, 184 M a o Tse-min (1895-1943), 303 M a o Tse-t’an (1905-35), 23043 ) , 5-6, 8 , 13, 17, 2 1 - 2 4 , M a o Tse-tung (1893— 30, 34, 36, 41, 151, 155-56, 158, 163-64, 2 8 1 88, 292, 301, 303, 396, 399, 4 0 1 - 2 , 405, 409, 413-14, 416, 432-36, 438-39, 441-42, 447, 45253, 525, 527-28, 534, 537, 541, 546-50, 552, 554—55, 562, 566-71, 574, 577, 580, 588-89, 592, 594, 598-99, 6 0 2 - 3 , 605-6, 612, 614-15, 617; a n d Cheng-feng M o v e m e n t , 323, 326, 330— 32, 335-37, 339-40, 342-47, 349-51; a n d cult o f , 493; a n d C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , 494-510, 512, 514; a n d first u n i t e d f r o n t , 5 2 - 5 3 , 55, 59, 61, 65, 67, 7 3 - 7 4 , 76-77, 84-85, 100-102, 104, 107-10, 116; i n K i a n g s i p e r i o d , 123-24, 127, 130-33, 135-36, 141-47, 189, 195, 197-203, 205-6, 208-17, 219, 226-32, 234-37; i n L i Li-san p e r i o d , 170-71, 173, 175-76, 178, 181-82; a n d L o n g M a r c h , 239, 242-48, 250-51, 254, 257-59; a n d ‘‘permanent r e v o l u t i o n , ’ ’ 464— 65, 468-72, 475-81, 483-89, 492; and second u n i t e d f r o n t , 261, 264, 266, 269-70, 274-75, 277-79; a n d Third Revolutionary W a r , 348-65, 369, 371-72, 374, 376-78, 381-82, 385, 388-92, 421, 423, 425, 429-30; and ‘ ‘ t h o u g h t ’ ’ of, 358, 360, 437, 451, 471-72, 483, 493, 499, 504, 509-10, 514; i n Y e n a n p e r i o d , 309, 317, 319, 321

642

Index

M a o Tse-tung Young Cadre School, 320 ) , 338, 522-23, 591 M a o T u n (1896— Maoerhkai (Shawo) Conference (1935), 250-53, 271 M a r c h Twentieth I n c i d e n t (1926), 76-83, 89-91, 102 Maring, 27, 33, 35, 43, 49-50, 5 2 - 5 3 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 526— 27, 529 Marshall, George C . , 385-93, 423 Marshall M i s s i o n (1945-46) 385-91 M a r x , Karl, 6 , 327, 332, 345, 476 M a r x - L e n i n Research Association, 322 Marxism, 5-6, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 31, 33, 38, 72, 117, 186, 208, 210, 327-28, 330, 360, 432, 437, 452, 473, 510, 522, 524-25, 534 M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m , 285, 327, 330-32, 335, 339, 346, 358, 360-61, 451, 492, 510 Marxist-Communist School, 207 Marxist Research Society, 2 1 - 2 2 , 30 M a r x i s t Study Movement, 22 Mass l i n e , 6 , 2 3 , 65, 130, 135, 145-47, 193, 204-9, 216, 311-13, 34648, 360-61, 365, 406, 419, 466, 471, 478, 483, 486, 488, 492, 500, 512-15, 537, 608 Mass movements a n d organizations, 6-7, 16, 19, 22, 46, 53, 55, 58-59, 61, 64-67, 72, 76, 80-90, 9 3 - 9 5 , 98-100, 106, 110-11, 113-16, 121, 123, 126, 128-32, 136, 139-40, 142-43, 145, 151, 154-55, 158-68, 171, 174, 177-79, 183-84, 198, 200, 2 0 5 - 7 , 209-11, 215, 220, 228, 232, 236, 260, 271, 273, 278, 280, 288, 298, 300-301, 30910, 312-16, 318-19, 322, 330-31, 337, 339-40, 347-48, 350-51, 361, 365, 367, 381-82, 394-95, 406, 408, 410, 412-13, 415-18, 420, 430, 4 3 2 33, 436-37, 447, 452, 457, 472-74, 478-80, 486-88, 492-94, 498, 500-7, 509, 511, 514, 540, 542, 545, 561; see also Intellectuals; Labor; Peasantry; Students; Women; Youth M a y Fourth Movement (1919), 1 3 - 1 5 , 1 9 - 2 3 , 89, 262, 331, 338, 403 ‘““May 16 C o r p s , ’ ’ 503 M a y T h i r t i e t h Movement (1925), 6 1 - 6 4 , 66, 70, 76, 91 M a y Twenty-first Massacre (1927), 108-12 Mencius, 12, 30 Merchants, 9-10, 14, 63, 73, 202 Merchants Corps, 73, 179 M i a o t r i b e , 12, 247 M i f , Pavel, 154, 156, 171-72, 182, 185-88, 212, 227, 530, 557 M i k o y a n , Anastas, 471 Militarism, 47, 49, 5 3 - 5 4 , 76, 89, 9 3 , 123, 165, 210 Military regions a n d districts, 300-301, 307, 372 Militia, 145, 200, 239, 271, 295, 297, 312-15, 348, 395, 480 M i n - C h e - K a n (Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) Border Region, 242, 304 M i n - C h e - K a n Soviet, 198-99 Min-Yiieh-Kan (Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi) border area, 351, 423 Min-Yiieh-Kan Soviet, 198-99 M i n g dynasty, 256, 310, 427, 484 M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c Security, 442 Minorities. 247, 397, 425, 429, 458 M o l o t o v , V . M . , 173, 356 Mongolia, 24, 47, 172, 180, 226, 249, 303, 375 M o n g o l i a n People’s R e p u b l i c , 266, 303 Mongols, 12, 380, 458, 583 M o s c o w C o n f e r e n c e o f Communist P a r t i e s (1960), 481 Moscow-Peking treaty (1924), 43 M o u k u n g meetings (1935), 248 M u k d e n I n c i d e n t (79371), 191-92, 228, 232, 261, 273 Muslims, 255, 310-11, 369

Mussolini, 113, 514 Mutual aid, 21, 36, 206, 301, 317, 350, 436, 470 Nanchang Front Committee, 122, 128 Nanchang Uprising (1927), 120-24, 126-27, 134— 38, 140-42, 147, 154, 180 N a n k i n g Incident (1927), 93-94 Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, 59 N a t i o n a l Conference o f Party Delegates (1937), 282 N a t i o n a l Congress o f Delegates from Soviet Areas, 169-70, 173, 175, 180 N a t i o n a l Construction Association, 369 N a t i o n a l General L a b o r U n i o n , 36-37, 62-65, 86, 113, 127, 161, 203, 221, 537 N a t i o n a l l a n d conference (September, 1947), 400, 413, 415 N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Vanguard, 262-63 N a t i o n a l Peasant Association, 110-27, 541 N a t i o n a l People’s Congress (1954), 437 National Railroad U n i o n , 59, 62 N a t i o n a l R e v o l u t i o n , 6 , 10, 13, 17, 42, 46, 50, 5 2 - 5 4 , 57-58, 60, 76, 8 1 - 8 3 , 87, 89-90, 93, 9 8 , 102, 105-6, 113, 117, 150, 152, 232, 249, 262, 265-66, 272-76, 288, 318, 430, 512, 515 N a t i o n a l Revolutionary A r m y , 90, 276 N a t i o n a l Salvation Association, 262, 266, 268, 313, 352, 404 N a t i o n a l Salvation Y o u t h League, 262 National Students’ Association, 22 Nationalists, see K u o m i n t a n g Nationalities I n s t i t u t e , 303, 321 N e u m a n n , H e i n z , 138, 153-54 N e w Century, 16 N e w China Daily, 279, 286-87, 319, 351 N e w China News, 319 N e w C h i n a N e w s Agency, 319, 324, 351, 494 N e w Democracy, 263, 274-75, 311, 363, 374, 389, 401, 409, 429, 584 N e w Democratic Youth League, 262-63, 404-5, 454, 467; see also Communist Y o u t h League N e w Fourth A r m y I n c i d e n t (71941), 290, 3 0 5 - 8 , 334, 353-54 ‘““New L i f e Movement,’’ 367 ‘‘New Shansi Army,’’ 298 N e w Technology for N a t i o n a l Defense Pact (1957), 481 N e w Youth, 14-15, 17, 19, 23, 28, 38, 65 N i e h Jung-chen ( 7 8 9 9 ) , 56, 121, 201, 259, 292, 298-300, 373, 406, 421-22, 424, 426, 42829, 521, 570, 581, 594 N i n g h s i a Hui, 449, 462, 511 N i n g t u Conference o f Central Bureau for Soviet Areas (1932), 229-30 N i n t h Party Congress (1969), 361-62, 441-42, 497, 506-11, 620 N i x o n , R i c h a r d M., 505, 511 N o r t h C h i n a Bureau ( C C P ) , 325, 363, 373, 394, 397, 428, 485, 505, 555 N o r t h C h i n a F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421-22, 425-26 N o r t h C h i n a People’s Government, 424, 428 N o r t h C h i n a W o r k Conference, 357 N o r t h R i v e r Special Committee, 143 N o r t h Shensi P u b l i c School, 320, 327 N o r t h Shensi Soviet Congress (1935), 256 N o r t h V i e t n a m , 495 Northeast C h i n a , 373, 381, 383, 397, 405, 435, 449, 468, 483; see also Manchuria Northeast C h i n a F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421, 423 Northeast Democratic Allied A r m y , 382, 421 Northeast People’s Revolutionary A r m y , 194, 233, 302 Northeast Self-Defense A r m y , 303, 382 Northeastern K i a n g s i Soviet, 198-99, 217 N o r t h e r n A n h w e i base area, 372

Index Northern E x p e d i t i o n (1926-27), 60, 77, 79-84, 86, 9 1 - 9 3 , 119, 408, 522, 536 Northwest C h i n a , 8 , 105, 237, 310, 322, 324-25, 337, 340, 348, 369, 373, 397, 435, 449, 483 Northwest C h i n a F i e l d A r m y , 421-22 Northwest N a t i o n a l Salvation Association o f Y o u t h , 262-63 Northwest Party School, 322 Noulens couple, 154, 220, 227, 551 ‘““Old Shansi A r m y , ’ ’ 298

Opium War, 7, 13 Outer Mongolia, 57, 303, 380, 384, 568 Overseas Chinese, 293, 429 Oyiiwan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei), 147, 163, 192, 195-200, 202—4, 207, 216, 218, 222, 224, 226, 230, 237, 242, 248, 257, 282, 305, 307, 372, 422, 559, 563, 572 Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference, 59 P a i Ch’ung-hsi, 83, 152, 266, 368, 539 P ’ a n Fu-sheng (1905— ) , 474 Pan-Pacific Trade U n i o n , 154 Pao Hui-seng, 3 2 , 524-25 Paris Commune, 501 ‘““Party-Building Research Association,’’ 322 Party Construction, 565 Party Life, 318, 565 ‘ ‘ P a r t y o f revolutionary bases,’’ 468 Party purification movement ( 1 9 4 7 4 8 ) , 347, 414, 416 Pearl Harbor, 276, 353 Peasant associations, 64, 73, 85, 96, 104, 125, 128-29, 131, 133, 141, 211, 256, 301, 312, 314, 487-88, 605 Peasant I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( K r e s t i n t e r n ) , 533 Peasant Salvation Association, 299 Peasant T r a i n i n g I n s t i t u t e , 73, 77 Peasantry, 6 , 10-11, 14, 16, 18, 38, 47, 49, 54, 56, 61, 67-68, 70-75, 77, 83-89, 97-98, 100— 101, 104-8, 110, 113, 116, 126-29, 132, 134, 136, 139-42, 146, 148, 155, 157-58, 161-63, 165, 168-70, 172-75, 178-79, 182-84, 185, 2 0 1 - 3 , 205, 207-12, 227, 230-32, 235, 249, 256, 263-65, 271, 273-74, 294, 312, 316, 318, 323, 329-31, 334-35, 340, 34647, 359, 361, 364, 394-97, 403-4, 406, 409-20, 429-30, 436, 438, 453, 456-59, 469-70, 477, 479, 482, 484, 486— 87, 498, 500. 504 513-15, 517, 519, 568, 602, 604—6; see also Agrarian revolution; L a n d reform; National Peasant Association; Rural work Peiping-Mukden Railroad, 381, 422, 424 Peitaiho, 477, 483, 486 Peking-Hankow Railroad, 37, 43 Peking University, 19, 27, 33, 404 P’eng Chen (ca. 1902- ) , 254, 290, 321, 325, 337, 359, 381-83, 411, 453, 473, 478, 484-85, 489, 494-96, 582, 592, 594, 599, 603, 617 P’eng Hsiieh-feng (1905-44), 305, 307 P’eng K u n g - t a , 135-36, 546 P’eng P ’ a i (1896-1929), 38-39, 56, 73, 107, 123, 134, 140, 142, 208, 219, 524, 533, 541, 547 ) , 79, 9 3 , 95, 100-101, P’eng Shu-chih (1896— 103, 120, 151, 160, 167, 220, 523, 529, 531-32, 535-37, 541 ) , 147, 151, 163-64, P’eng Teh-huai (1898170, 176-78, 194, 197, 200, 214, 226, 229, 243, 245-46, 251-52, 255, 259, 264, 279, 282, 295, 301, 310, 359, 373, 421-23, 426, 439, 441, 4 4 4 45, 475, 477, 480-81, 484-85, 495, 505, 562, 569-70, 582, 588, 592, 594, 614 ‘““People,’’ defined, 429 People’s Commissariat o f Foreign Affairs, 25-26, 522 People’s communes, see Communes

643

People’s D a i l y (Jen-min J i h - p a o ) , 452, 473, 484, 494, 506, 565 ‘“‘People’s democracy,’’ 207, 309, 579 ‘““People’s democratic d i c t a t o r s h i p , ’ ’ 432, 428 People’s Liberation A r m y ( P L A ) , 299, 414, 419, 421-31, 438-39, 441-42, 444, 452, 454, 456, 459, 480, 483, 487, 493; i n C u l t u r a l Revol u t i o n , 494-507, 509, 511; Fifth Field Army, 421-26; F i r s t F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421-22; Fourth F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421, 425-26, 441; Second F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421, 425-26; T h i r d F i e l d A r m y , 373, 421, 425-26; see also R e d A r m y People’s militia, 312 People’s Political Consultative Conference (1949), 425, 427-28, 439 People’s P o l i t i c a l Council, 279, 352, 354, 389 People’s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , 239, 368, 385, 42829, 432-514; structure o f , 4 3 8 4 1 People’s Self-Defense Corps, 295-96, 299, 395 “ P e o p l e ’ s war,’’ 409; defined, 394 People’s Weekly, 69 “Permanent r e v o l u t i o n , ’ ’ 129, 136-37, 157, 236, 464-88, 492 ‘“‘Petty bourgeois mentality,’ 324, 384, 479 Pioneer, 38 P o K u , see C h ’ i n Pang-hsien P o Y i - p o (1907- ) , 267, 280, 282, 290, 301, 325, 421, 426, 428, 444, 486, 594, 603 Political Consultative Conference, 377, 386-87, 393 ‘“‘Political Science G r o u p , ’ ’ 368 ‘‘Politics i n c o m m a n d , ’ ’ 438, 479 Port A r t h u r , 381, 480 Pravda, 96-97, 137, 385 Private p l o t s , 482 Production brigade, 438, 477, 482 Production team, 438 “Productive l a b o r , ’ ’ 452, 457, 474, 483, 506 Profintern ( L a b o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) , 27, 60, 62, 9 4 , 98, 100 Progressive P a r t y , 16-17 Proletariat, 9-10, 16, 18, 30-31, 34, 4647, 49, 51, 58, 61, 70, 86, 97, 99, 105, 125, 127, 136, 146, 148, 157, 161-65, 177, 182, 205, 221, 227, 231, 263, 323, 330, 339, 361, 395, 403, 416, 429-30, 432, 436, 458, 464, 517, 528, 532; dictatorship o f , 97; education o f , 145, 165, 415; leadership o f , 170-71; a n d r e c r u i t m e n t , 430; a n d revolution, 486; a n d revolutionary l i n e , 510; work teams o f , 504 Propaganda, 7 , 28, 30, 38, 50-52, 57. 65-66, 68, 77, 83, 100-101, 124-25, 130, 141-42, 146, 1 4 9 50, 162-64, 170, 187-88, 2 0 5 - 7 , 237, 259, 262, 265, 267, 275, 279, 284, 287, 311-12, 318-22, 324, 328, 346, 351, 358, 389-90, 392, 394, 397, 418, 448, 452, 469, 473, 484, 496, 500-501, 512, 552, 554, 577, 617 ‘“‘Public security forces,’’ 312, 452, 585 Purge Counterrevolutionaries Movement, see Sufan M o v e m e n t Purges, 323-47, 465-66, 478, 482, 489, 507, 559, 562; i n Cultural Revolution, 494-507

Quemoy a n d Matsu, 481 ‘ R e a l W o r k ’ f a c t i o n , 151, 162, 171, 182, 186-87, 189 Rectification, 239, 271, 273, 289, 309, 312, 325, 346, 405, 461, 464-69, 482, 486-88, 492, 495, 503; see also Cheng-feng Movement ‘“‘Red a n d expert,’’ 476, 482 Red Army. 5 , 8 , 264-65, 267, 271, 300, 3 0 3 4 , 312-13, 317, 331, 351, 513, 552, 554, 559-60, 566-69, 595; Eighth Route Army, 279, 282-83,

644

Index

R e d A r m y (cont.): 294-97, 299-300, 303, 310, 312, 3 1 5 - 1 6 , 328, 351, 395-96, 425, 583; emergence o f , 118-46; F i r s t Front A r m y , 145, 198, 200-201, 226, 237, 242-51, 253, 255, 257-58, 570; Fourth Front A r m y , 195-97, 201, 237, 244, 247-48, 250-58, 282, 359, 570, 620; i n Kiangsi Period, 148, 151, 155, 158, 163-66, 168-79, 181-84, 189, 192-94, 196, 198-204, 210-11, 213-15, 218, 224, 226— 30, 233, 236-37; i n Long M a r c h , 239-59; N e w Fourth A r m y , 242, 279-80, 294-97, 304-8, 315, 318, 320, 325, 372, 421, 583, 611; Second Front A r m y , 194-95, 200-201, 242, 244, 252-57, 359, 502; and social revolution, 273-74, 276-78, 280, 283-84, 288, 294-97; see also People’s Liberation A r m y Red Army Academy, 207, 321 ‘ ‘ R e d Chamber,” 21, 28 R e d China, 319, 565 R e d C h i n a News Agency, 319 R e d Flag (Hung C h ’ i ) , 319, 452, 503-4, 565 R e d Flag Daily, 177 R e d Guards, 145, 175, 200, 206-7, 256, 497-500 Red Spears, 72, 576 “ R e f o r m O u r S t u d y , ’ ’ 332 Research c l i q u e , 17, 522 ‘““‘Revisionism,’”’ 471, 473, 478, 486, 488-89, 500, 506, 510 Revolution o f 1911, 89 Revolutionary committees, 250, 252, 311, 5 0 1 - 2 , 504, 506-7 Revolutionary Kuomintang, 439 R i g h t deviation, 4 0 1 - 2 , 410, 412, 417, 419, 488, 500 ‘“‘Right o p p o r t u n i s m , ’ ’ 504, 577, 580 Right River Soviet, 559 Romance o f the Three Kingdoms, 230 Roosevelt, Franklin D . , 355-56 R o y , M . N . , 26-27, 49, 9 5 , 97-98, 100-102, 1 0 5 - 8 , 109, 111-13, 116, 531, 54445 Ruegg, P a u l a n d Gertrude, see Noulens couple Rural Reconstructionists, 352 Rural soviets, 149, 552; see also Soviets R u r a l Survey, 332 Rural w o r k , 130-31, 212, 221, 318, 397, 410-11, 419, 428, 448, 487, 605; see also Agrarian revol u t i o n ; L a n d reform; Peasantry Russia, 9 , 30, 359, 367, 369, 378-79, 383-84, 388, 393; see also Soviet U n i o n ‘‘Russian returned students,’’ 68, 151, 171-72, 181-82, 185-87, 189, 196, 212-13, 218-19, 224, 227-28, 231, 235-36, 245-46, 275, 283, 285, 289, 310, 323-24, 326, 329-31, 336-37, 340, 344, 346, 358, 554, 563-64, 567; see also ‘‘Internationalists’’ Russian Revolution (1905), 26; (1917), 15, 20, 26, 47, 179; see also Bolsheviks

Sacrifice League for N a t i o n a l Salvation, 267, 280 ‘ ‘ S a n w a n reorganization,’’ 133 ‘“Second anti-Communist upsurge,’’ 280 Second Five-Year P l a n , 471 “ S e c o n d leftist l i n e , ’ ’ 411 Second N a t i o n a l Congress o f Chinese Soviet Rep u b l i c (1934), 217, 234-36, 259, 568 Second N a t i o n a l Labor Congress (1925), 62-63 Second Party Congress (1922), 3941, 4647, 527-28; August (West Lake) Plenum (1922), 50, 529 Secret societies, 6-7, 72, 94, 145, 256, 266, 334 Seeckt, H a n s v o n , 236 ‘“Self-criticism,’’ 333, 361, 365, 464, 500, 514 Self-defense forces, 300-301, 312, 314, 585 ‘““‘Semi-old liberated areas,’’ 418 Service, John Stuart, 355, 386 ‘“Seven G e n t l e m e n , ’ ’ 267-68 Seventh Party Congress (1945), 271, 286, 325,

343-44, 357-65, 373, 399400, 407, 578, 594; First Plenum (1945), 358-59, 400; Second Plenum (7949), 400, 427-28,; Third Plenum (1950), 435, 466; Fourth Plenum (1954), 468; Fifth Plenum (1955), 469; Sixth Plenum (1955), 470; Seventh Plenum (71956), 471 Shanghai General Labor U n i o n , 63, 86, 9 1 - 9 3 , 95, 161 Shansi, 29, 69, 99, 152, 160, 191, 193, 264-65, 267, 280, 296-99, 3 0 1 - 2 , 306, 316, 321, 368— 69, 372, 375, 378, 380, 382, 399, 402, 406, 410, 412-13, 415, 420, 422, 449, 462, 576, 581 Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region, see C h i n C h ’ a - C h i Border Region Shansi-Hopeh-Honan base area, 315, 372, 583; see also Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region, see Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii Border Region Shansi Sacrifice League, 299-301 Shansi-Suiyiian Border Region, see Chin-Sui Border Region Shantung, 13, 29, 39, 86, 99, 152, 160, 193, 258, 280, 292-97, 3 0 1 - 2 , 307, 315- 18, 372-73, 375, 378, 381-82, 390, 397, 402, 408, 410, 412-13, 422-23, 449, 462, 474, 502, 581, 583, 597 Shao Shih-p’ing (1899-1965), 147, 164, 198, 201, 252-54 Shawo (Maoerhkai) Conference ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 250 Shen-Kan-Ning (Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia) base, 3 0 1 - 2 , 309-22, 324, 329, 341, 346, 372-73, 400, 413, 585, 591, 597 Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Bureau, 258-59, 262, 273-74, 279-81, 286, 290, 294, 297-98, 303, 310, 328, 340, 351, 373, 411, 575 Shen T i n g - y i , 522-23, 530 Shen Tse-min (1898-1934), 181, 1 8 5 - 8 7 , 196-97, 218, 224, 552, 563 Shen Yen-ping, see M a o T u n Sheng Shih-ts’ai, 255, 303 Shensi, 29, 39, 70, 83, 86, 99, 127, 134, 191, 193, 195, 197, 200-201, 224, 226, 238, 242, 244, 248-49, 252-64, 266, 270-72, 278, 280, 282-83, 294, 296-98, 301, 304, 307, 309-22, 329, 341, 353, 372, 382, 399-400, 407, 413-14, 417-18, 423, 449, 462, 502, 505, 540, 575, 578, 585, 595, 605 Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, see ShenKan-Ning Border Region S h i h T s ’ u n - t ’ u n g ( S h i h F u - l i a n g ) , 3 8 , 523-24, 527 Sian Incident (1936), 233, 256, 266, 268, 276, 281, 310, 351, 574 Sikang, 247, 250, 253, 282, 426, 580, 593 Sinkiang, 226, 250, 254-55, 261, 278, 284, 302—4, 384-85, 426, 523, 579, 589 Sinkiang Uighur, 449, 462, 469 Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 269 Sino-Soviet relations, 24-27, 385, 434-35, 438, 477, 480-82, 488, 495; see also Comintern Sino-Soviet Treaty (1945), 376, 378-79; (1950), 23, 385 S i x t h Party Congress (1928), 135, 153, 155-60, 162-63, 185, 212, 362, 552; F i r s t Plenum (1928), 159; Second P l e n u m (1929), 160-63, 171; T h i r d Plenum (71930), 182-87, 556-57, 560; Fourth Plenum (7931), 186-87, 203, 220, 222, 227, 234; Fifth P l e n u m (1934), 234-36, 245; S i x t h P l e n u m (1938), 286, 288-90, 292, Plenum (1945), 358 ‘“‘Smash revisionism,’’ 492 Sneevliet, H . , see M a r i n g S n o w , E d g a r , 259, 525 ‘‘Social fascism,’’ 509 Social revolution, 6 , 8 , 13, 15, 4647, 50, 53-54, 7 1 - 7 2 , 81, 87, 89, 102, 105-6, 130, 140, 232, 249, 265, 272-73, 275, 318, 430, 434-35

Index Social Revolutionary Party (Russia), 87 Social Welfare Society, 22, 29 Socialism, 309, 339, 345, 363-64, 409, 427, 437, 464, 469-73, 476, 493, 500, 612 Socialist Education Movement (1964), 438, 465— 66, 486-88, 492, 494, 497, 617 Socialist transformation, 474 Socialist Y o u t h League, 2 2 - 2 3 , 28-31, 38, 43, 49, 52, 5 4 , 56-57, 59, 61, 530; see also Communist Youth League Soldiers committees, 144 Soong A i - l i n g , 368 Soong Ching-ling (1892) , 115, 122, 262, 368, 439 Soong Mei-ling, 368 Soong, T . V . (1894— ) , 425-26, 539 Sound o f Labor, 31 South C h i n a Bureau, 350, 580, 593 South C h i n a W o r k Committee, 292, 307, 319, 350-51, 592-93 South Yangtze C o m m a n d , 305 Southeast Asia, 293, 364, 438 Southern Anhwei base area, 372 Southern Expedition, 73 Southern H u n a n Special Committee, 143, 144 Southern H u p e h Special Committee, 132, 135 Southwest C h i n a , 397, 435, 449, 483 Southwestern K i a n g s i Soviet, 173, 199, 203, 214, 557 Soviet b l o c , 471-72, 475, 481 ‘“‘Soviet People’s Republic,’’ 264 Soviet Workers, 565 Soviets, 118, 126, 131-34, 137, 142-43, 145, 158, 160-61, 163-64, 167-68, 171, 173-75, 177, 179, 181, 183-84, 188-219, 221, 226, 235, 239, 2 4 5 50, 252-53, 256-57, 539-40, 552, 559-61 Stalin, J. V . , 23, 26-27, 43, 67, 80, 9 2 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 101, 105, 109, 111, 113, 115, 121, 126, 132, 155-56, 166-67, 186, 206, 211, 227, 266, 287, 327, 330, 332, 342, 345, 361, 376, 383-85, 402, 437, 466, 471, 479-80, 489, 494, 539-40, 578 State P l a n n i n g Commission, 468 Stilwell, Joseph, 355-56 Struggle, 319 ‘“‘Struggle,’’ 322, 465, 467, 486, 493, 509-10, 565 “ S t r u g g l e , criticism, transformation,’’ 492, 506 “Struggle between t w o l i n e s , ’ ’ 478, 483, 485 Stuart, J. L e i g h t o n , 386, 391 Students, 22, 63, 221, 262, 265-66, 268, 294, 320, 351, 369, 391, 405-6, 429, 459, 474, 493, 500, 525; see also Intellectuals “ S t u d y , ’ ’ 322, 506 Study, 452, 565 Study Life, 329 Su Chao-cheng (1885-1929), 36, 90, 100-101, 113, 124, 127, 532, 541, 54647, 549 Su-fan Campaign (1954-55), 466, 469 S u Yii ( c a . 1908- ) , 237, 242-43, 296, 304, 307, 421-22 Sun Ch’uan-fang, 82-83, 9 1 , 93 Sun F o , 368, 593 Sun-Joffe agreement (1928), 51 Sun Liang-hui, 532, 537 Sun T z u , 230 Sun Yat-sen, 1 3 - 1 4 , 16-17, 21, 27-29, 34, 36-37, 277, 279, 363, 493, 526, 530, 534, 580, 593, 602; a n d first u n i t e d f r o n t , 42-43, 46, 48-51, 53, 55-60, 62, 73, 75, 78, 80, 90, 116, 153; and Three People’s Principles, 276, 278, 311, 352— 53, 359, 364, 580 Sun Yat-sen, M a d a m e , see Soong Ching-ling Sun Yat-sen University, 154, 156, 167, 171, 186, 552 Sung Jen-ch’iung (1904— ) , 301, 483, 501 Sung Shao-wen (1910— ) , 299-300 Supreme National Defense Council, 279, 352

645

Szechwan, 39, 86, 89, 9 8 - 9 9 , 195, 197, 199-200, 224, 226, 236, 239, 245-48, 250, 282, 369, 423, 426, 449, 458, 462, 474, 511, 524, 550, 560, 565, 580, 593, 601, 609 Szechwan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kweichow Border Reg i o n , 242, 253 Szechwan-Shensi base, 197, 227, 243 T a i C h i - t ’ a o , 76, 522-23, 534 T ’ a i p ’ i n g Rebellion, 6-7, 247 T a i w a n , 194, 270, 426, 438, 480, 505 T ’ a n C h e n - l i n (1902- ) , 198, 231, 242, 296, 3 0 4 - 5 , 445, 477-78, 486, 594, 613 T ’ a n P’ing-shan (1887-1956), 90, 95, 100-101, 105, 108-10, 113, 122-23, 127, 135, 149, 524, 530-31, 537, 54041 T ’ a n g dynasty, 309, 484 T ’ a n g Sheng-chih, 82-83, 90, 105-6, 108, 111, 129, 134, 137, 426, 538 T ’ a o C h u (ca. 1906— ) , 461, 483, 498, 501 Teheran Conference, 354 ‘““Ten-point p r o g r a m , ’ ’ 278-84 Teng Chung-hsia (1897-1933), 31, 36, 38, 50, 52, 54, 62, 66, 68, 156, 159, 195, 218, 220, 226, 521, 523, 528, 537, 541, 546, 549 T e n g E n - m i n g , 32, 516 T e n g F a (190646), 204, 216-17, 250, 255, 259, 269, 303, 321, 537, 549, 563 T e n g H s i a o - p ’ i n g (1904— ) , 70, 164, 194, 201, 231, 235, 292, 301, 344, 421, 444-45, 447, 453, 459, 469, 471-73, 478, 485, 487, 489, 495-501, 521, 559, 582, 592, 594, 603, 615, 620 T ’ e n g Tai-yiian (1905- ) , 163, 197, 201, 214, 225, 303, 594 T e n g T ’ o ( 1 9 1 1 - ) , 484, 495-96 ) , 203, 231, 242-43, Teng Tzu-hui (7895304, 307, 469, 478, 486, 594 T e n g Yen-ta, 150, 538 Teng Ying-ch’ao ( 1 9 0 3 ) , 187, 224, 235, 35152, 404 Theory a n d practice, 326, 329 “ T h i r d f o r c e , ’ ’ 369 T h i r d International, 35, 41, 72 “ T h i r d l e f t l i n e , ” ’ 182, 212, 218, 221, 228, 23233, 245, 257, 324, 326, 3 4 1 4 4 , 350, 562, 577 “ T h i r d P a r t y , ” ’ 149-50, 189, 352 T h i r d Party Congress (1923), 50-54, 66; Novemb e r Plenum (7923), 54; M a y P l e n u m (1924), 58-59 T h i r d Revolutionary C i v i l W a r , 348-94, 402 “ T h o u g h t r e f o r m , ’ ’ 322, 437 ““Three-All Campaign’’ (1942), 300, 316 ‘““Three-anti c a m p a i g n ’ ’ (19571), 437, 466, 505 “ T h r e e constantly read articles,’’ 499 ““Three-eight work s ty l e,’ ’ 510 “ T h r e e great banners,’’ 476—82 ‘““Three m a j o r disciplines a n d eight-point r u l e s , ’ ’ 145 ‘““Three-thirds’’ system, 300, 311, 315, 341 “Three-way alliances,’’ 501, 503, 507, 509 T i b e t , 47, 247, 250, 253, 434, 449, 462, 502, 511 Tibetans, 12, 247, 252, 458, 583 T ’ i e n H a n , 484 T i n g L i n g , 338-39, 591 T o g l i a t t i , P a l m i r o , 109 Trotsky, L e o n , 87, 9 6 , 108, 113-14, 126, 132, 138, 162, 166—67, 172, 494, 539 Trotskyism, 151, 169, 181, 185-86, 189, 216-17, 220-21, 283, 287-88, 323, 328, 33940, 523, 551, 579 True Words, 565 True Words o f Y o u t h , 565 T r u m a n , Harry S , 386, 393 T s ’ a i Ch’ang (1900- ) , 259, 404, 521, 594 T s ’ a i Ho-sen (1890—ca. 1931), 22, 31, 3 8 , 4647, 51-52, 59, 63, 66-68, 100-101, 104, 106, 109,

646

Index

Ts’ai-Ho-sen (cont.): 114, 121, 124, 127, 151, 156, 159-60, 165, 171, 180, 182, 220, 259, 528-29, 531-32, 541, 544, 546-47, 552 Tseng Kuo-fan, 23, 230 Tseng Shan (ca. 1 9 0 4 ) , 214-15, 569, 594 Tseng Sheng, 307, 372 Tsingtao Conference (1957), 475-76 T s u n y i Conference (1935), 245-50, 259, 282, 285, 342, 570 T u a n Teh-ch’ang, 147, 163, 194-95 Tung Chen-t’ang ( —1936), 255 T’ung-Nan-Pa Soviet, 243 ) , 29, 32, 207, 234-35, Tung Pi-wu (1886— 243, 282, 310, 321, 350-52, 357, 359, 364, 428, 446, 508, 525, 528, 581 Turkish minorities, 12, 458 “Twenty-eight Bolsheviks,’’ 186, 195, 324, 552; see also ‘‘Russian returned students’’ Twenty-one Demands, 13 “Two-stage r e v o l u t i o n , ’ ’ 363 Ulanfu, 303, 380, 444 “ U l t r a - l e f t , ” ’ 401, 413, 503 Unequal treaties, 13, 367, 425, 481 Uninterrupted revolution, see ‘Permanent revolution”’ U n i o n o f Soviet Socialist Republics, 11, 16, 23— 24, 39, 42, 49, 51, 55-57, 67-68, 70, 76-77, 79-80, 9 0 , 94-95, 100, 102, 107, 111, 115, 120— 21, 136, 138, 151, 158, 166-68, 172-73, 177, 179-80, 182-85, 188, 206, 218-19, 222, 242, 247, 249-50, 254, 260-63, 266, 269-70, 284-85, 287, 303, 321, 342, 364, 368, 371, 375-77, 38082, 386, 389, 394, 402, 426, 436-37, 456, 460, 466, 469, 473, 475, 480-81, 485, 509-10, 512— 13, 579, 588, 611; see also C o m i n t e r n ; SinoSoviet relations United f r o n t , 16, 23, 26-27, 3 4 , 373, 397, 4 0 1 - 2 , 405-6, 429-30, 439, 447-48, 514, 5 4 1 4 2 , 575, 579, 588; first, 42-117, 119, 122, 126, 128, 362; second, 191, 218, 220, 231-34, 242, 250, 254, 256, 260-70, 272-74, 276, 278-86, 288-89, 299, 311, 313, 315, 324-25, 345, 348-57; a n d ‘ ‘ b l o c w i t h i n , ” ’ 48, 53, 71, 75, 79, 529, 535; and ‘““bloc w i t h o u t , ’ ’ 4849, 79-80, 113; a n d ‘‘dual

membership,’’ 48-49, 57 “ U n i t e d front from above,’’ 154, 260-61 “ U n i t e d front from b e l o w , ” 154, 221, 227, 260 U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 357, 364, 391, 422, 505, 511 U n i t e d States, 10, 13, 43, 49, 176, 278, 355-57, 367-68, 371, 374, 376-77, 379-80 385-86, 39093, 395, 402, 404, 406, 422-24, 426-27, 438, 475, 495, 505, 509, 511, 513 “ “ U n i t y - c r i t i c i s m - u n i t y , ’ ’ 333, 619 “Unity o f theory a n d practice,’’ 327, 332, 360 University o f Toilers o f East, 25, 61, 66-67

Vanguard, 65 Versailles T r e a t y , 13 V i e t n a m , 51, 56, 164, 205, 321; w a r i n , 367, 393, 495 Vietnamese Communist P a r t y , 194, 351 Voice o f Labor, 31 Voitinsky, G r i g o r y . 25, 2 7 - 3 0 , 43, 55, 57, 59-60, 67-68, 79-80, 87, 9 3 , 95, 100-101, 103, 106, 522-23, 525, 531, 541 Wales, N y m , 525 W a n g Chen (1909- ) , 198, 298, 317 W a n g Chia-hsiang (1907- ) , 202-3, 222, 229, 236, 243, 250, 259, 269, 321, 325, 359, 381, 563-64, 570, 595 W a n g C h i n g - w e i , 57, 7 5 - 7 8 , 8 3 - 8 4 , 89, 97, 106-7, 111, 122, 152, 166, 176, 192, 233, 2 7 7 78, 530, 538, 540, 576

W a n g Jo-fei (1896-1946) 67, 93, 136, 282, 324, 351, 377, 521, 546, 564, 594 Wang M i n g , see C h ’ e n Shao-yii W a n g Shou-hua, 9 3 , 96, 537-38 Wang Shou-tao (1907— ) , 220, 556 Warlords, 8 , 13, 33, 42, 55-56, 59-60, 66, 76, 7 8 , 82, 86, 91, 94, 106, 117, 150, 152, 166, 168, 191, 201, 249, 251, 253, 263, 265, 280, 347, 512, 523, 536 Water Margin, 302 Wayaopao Conference (1935), 281 Wedemeyer, A l b e r t , 356, 367, 380, 422-23 Weekly Critic, 19 West H u n a n - H u p e h Soviet, see Hsiang-O-Hsi Soviet Western F u k i e n Soviet, see Fukien-KwangtungKiangsi Soviet “ W e s t e r n Hills’’ faction, 75-76 Western Hunan Revolutionary M i l i t a r y Council, 194 Whampoa Military Academy, 56, 60, 79, 196, 368, 522 “White t e r r o r , ’ ’ 119 W o m e n , 22, 47, 60, 62, 64-65, 67-68, 70, 77, 83, 100-101, 124, 145, 207, 259, 271, 299-300, 312—14, 396-97, 4 0 3 4 , 439, 44748, 452, 458, 532 Women’s U n i v e r s i t y , 320-21 Work teams, 348, 477, 482, 487-88, 497-98 Workers Party, 16 W o r k i n g class, 6 , 9 , 70, 88, 97, 111, 113, 116, 125-27, 129, 136, 138, 142, 158, 168-70, 1 7 2 73, 175, 177, 183, 2 0 1 - 2 , 208-9, 331, 335, 346, 363-64, 429-30, 437, 457, 459, 476, 500, 504, 568; see also L a b o r a n d l a b o r movement; Proletariat W u , Empress, 484 W u Fa-hsien, 511, 619 W u H a n (ca. 1908- ) , 484, 495-96, 504 W u Hsiin, 484 W u L i a n g - p ’ i n g , 236, 259 W u P ’ e i - f u (1874-1939), 17, 26, 29, 37-38, 43, 58, 60, 82-83, 526, 536 W u Yii-chang (1878-1966), 123, 220, 352, 404, 521, 535, 538, 594, 602 Wuchang Conference (1958), 477 W u h a n incident (1967), 502 W u h a n ‘‘revolutionaries,’’ 97

Yale-in-China, 30 Yalta agreement, 378 Y a n g Ch’eng-wu (ca. 1 9 1 2 - ) , 299, 504 Yang Ching-yi ( —1940), 302 Y a n g Hsien-chen (ca. 1899— ) , 457, 488 Y a n g Hsiu-feng (7898— ) , 301 Y a n g H u - c h ’ e n g , 267-70 Yang M i n g - c h a i , 27, 522-23 Y a n g P’ao-an ( —1931?), 524, 530, 535, 564 Y a n g Shang-k’un (ca. 1905- ) , 224, 259, 290, 325, 445, 447, 453, 478, 494-96, 582, 592, 603 Y a o Wen-yiian (ca. 1927- ) , 495-96, 5 0 1 - 2 , 504, 508 Yangtze a n d H u a i Daily, 318 Yangtze R i v e r , 194, 197, 242, 247, 304, 372, 375, 424-26, 497, 550 Y e h Chien-ying (1898— ) , 56, 121, 139, 252, 259, 269, 279, 295, 310, 351, 354, 421, 439, 569, 594 Y e h T ’ i n g (1897-1946), 121-23, 134, 306, 543, 584 Y e l l o w R i v e r , 251, 254-55, 265, 277, 306, 422 Y e n Hsi-shan, 152, 166, 176, 192, 265, 267, 280, 298-99, 306, 311, 369, 426, 580, 597 Yenan Forum o n A r t a n d L i t e r a t u r e , 339 ‘“Yenan legacy,’’ 309 Yenan R a d i o Station ( X N C R ) , 319 Yenan University, 321-22

Index Yenching University, 386 Y i t r i b e , 247 Young C h i n a Association, 17 Young Pioneers, 98, 314, 455, 461 Y o u t h , 22, 28-30, 3 8 - 3 9 , 41, 47, 61, 64-65, 70, 77, 83, 153, 185, 202, 206, 231, 262-63, 271, 279, 282, 300, 312-14, 320, 348, 394, 396-97, 403-6, 447-48, 454, 456, 483, 498-99; see also Communist Youth League; Students Youth International, 49, 54 Youth Vanguards, 145, 200, 206, 312, 314

647

Yii Hsiu-sung, 523-24, 579

Y u Kung, 365 Yiian Hsiao-hsien ( —ca. 1935), 523-24, 533, 569 Y i a n S h i h - k ’ a i , 17, 512 Yiieh-Kan (Kwangtung-Kiangsi) border area, 304 Yiieh-Kan Soviet, 199 Yiin T a i - y i n g (1895-1931), 29, 54, 56, 66, 1 2 1 23, 159, 524, 532, 541, 549 Yiinnan, 99, 224, 244, 247, 253, 369, 423, 426, 449, 462, 466, 540, 580, 593

China Pictorial, n o . 10, 1971.

Peking University students demonstrating i n the M a y Fourth Movement o f 1919.

Ch’en Tu-hsiu, a leader o f the M a y Fourth Movement and the first General Secretary o f the CCP, 1921-27. Blamed for the disasters o f 1927, Ch’en was expelled from the Party i n 1929 and died i n 1942.

Chiang Kai-shek and Soviet advisers

during the period of the first united

History Today, M a y , 1 9 6 2 .

front. General Galin is o n Chiang’s immediate right, and Borodin is o n the extreme left o f the picture. Whittlesey House. a

China Pictorial, n o . 10, 1971.

Sanwan Village today. I n September, 1927, M a o Tse-tung and survivors

of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan Province made their way to this village i n Yunghsin County, Kiangsi. During the following months, they formed a nucleus o f the Red A r m y i n adjoining areas o f the Chingkang Mountains.

The execution o f Communists and suspects after the Canton insurrection o f December, 1927.

J a y Calvin Huston Collection, courtesy the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

Ch’in Pang-hsien ( P o Ku), Chou En-lai, C h u Teh, and M a o Tse-tung, four

of the most prominent Chinese Communists of the 1930's, photographed b y Helen Snow in Yenan i n 1937.

A Shanghai policeman killing a Communist agent as Nationalist troops in the background look on. Magnum.

A unit o f the R e d Army, about the time o f the Long March. China Pictorial, n o . 10, 1971.

Magnum.

China Pictorial, no. 10, 1971.

M a s s meeting with

view o f Yenan,

photographed b y Helen Snow

in 1937.

M a o Tse-tung addressing the Seventh National Congress o f the CCP, spring, 1945. Chou En-lai is seated at Mao’s left.

Arunona bank during

a period of hyperinflation, Shanghai, 1948.

Henri Cartier-Bresson—Magnum.

Communist troops storming

a wall at Chinchou during the Civil War.

China Pictorial, n o . 10, 1971, Kuang-jung t i San-shih Nien, 1927-57 ( A Glorious Thirty Years) (Peking, 1 9 5 7 ) .

Communist guerrillas fording a stream during the Civil War.

Shanghai ( S h a n g h a i : People’s A r t Publishing C o . , n . d . ) .

Peasants burning the land deeds o f former landlords during the land reform o f 1951.

Kuang-jung t i San-shih Nien, 1927-57 ( A Glorious Thirty Years)

(Peking, 1957).

The Seventh Plenum o f the Eighth Central Committee o f the CCP. Seated from left t o right are Lin Piao, Ch’en Yiin, Chou En-lai, M a o Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch’i, C h u Teh, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing. Shanghai (Shanghai: People’s A r t C o . , n . d . ) .

M a o Tse-tung proclaiming the establishment o f the People’s

Republic of China, October 1, 1949. Standing beside h i m is Tung Pi-wu.

Camera Press L t d . , L o n d o n .

M a o Tse-tung and H o Chi Minh i n Peking, July, 1955.

I n a n evidently retouched

photograph, V . M . Molotov, Joseph Stalin, and M a o Tse-tung witnessing the signing in Moscow

of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance b y Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Y . Vishinsky, February 14, 1950. People’s China, Vol. 1 , n o . 1 (April 1 , 1 9 5 0 ) , p . 13.

Meeting o f President Nixon and Chairman M a o Tse-tung i n Peking, February, 1972. Looking o n are Premier Chou En-lai; Henry Kissinger, Assistant t o the P r e s i d e n t for N a t i o n a l

Security Affairs; and Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director o f the Protocol Department, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.

China Pictorial, n o . 4 , 1972,

Nationalis t recruits assembling i n the

Square of the Gate o f Heavenly Peace just before the surrender o f Peiping to the Communists, January, 1949,

Visitors to famous Buddhist caves at Henri Cartier-Bresson—Magnum.

Lungmen, 1964. M a r c Riboud—Magnum.

(continued from front flap)

and when to launch civil war also THE LONG MARCH TO POWER Nationalists proved crucial in the struggle to win power.

A History o f the Chinese Communist Party, 1 9 2 1 - 7 2

JAMES PINCKNEY HARRISON

Using

Chinese,

Soviet, and Western

sources, Professor Harrison begins his study with the first appearance of Marxists in China. H e examines the often disastrous influence of

Soviet policies on the early Chinese Communist movement and depicts the rise of the Red The saga of the rise of the Chinese Communist Army after 1927, Communist relations with Party is one of the extraordinary epics of histhe peasantry, and the consolidation of rural tory. Of the dozen men who gathered in base areas in the 1930s. He then describes Shanghai in 1921 to found the Party and the Nationalist pressures that forced the Comlaunch the revolution that swept the Commumunists to embark in 1934 on the incredible nists to power in 1949, two survived as orthoLong March from Kiangsi to Shensi, where dox leaders into the 1970’s: Mao Tse-tung, they established a base for their huge expanParty Chairman since the 1930s, and Tung sion during the Sino-Japanese War and their Pi-wu, acting head of state. The survival of conquest of the mainland. Turning finally to Mao and Tung, along with Premier Chou Entheir administration of state power since lai and other senior leaders, while hundreds of 1949, Harrison examines the Party’s unrethousands of Communists fell in insurreclenting struggle to transform China and anations, war, Nationalist prisons, and internal lyzes the internal debates surrounding such Party purges during the intervening decades, critical episodes as the Hundred Flowers seems almost miraculous. How their younger Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the successors carry forward their revolutionary

legacy poses one of the great questions of China’s future. Two themes illuminate James Pinckney Harrison’s brilliant portrayal of the vicissitudes of the Party’s long struggle to win power and transform China. First, he shows h o w the

Communists were able to appropriate the spirit of revolutionary nationalism that has permeated twentieth-century Chinese life. Second, he depicts their gradual success in organizing the masses both for the national revolution against the warlords and foreign powers who sought to divide and rule China and for the social revolution to create a new people and state. The Communists’ drive to

organize the masses derived much of its potency from their ability to reformulate Marxism-Leninism in the light of practical experience in urban and rural work in China. But correct strategic decisions by the Party leadership on when to cooperate with the (continued o n back flap)

Socialist Education Movement, and the Cul-

tural Revolution. Throughout the book, the structure of the

Party and its ideology, strategy, and tactics are carefully related to political, social, and

economic conditions in China. Only from this broad perspective is it possible to understand China’s recent history and its engine for social revolution: the Chinese Communist Party. JAMES

PINCKNEY

HARRISON

is

Associate

Professor of History at Hunter College. He received his Ph.D. degree in 1965 from Columbia University, where he has also taught. H e is the author of The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions ( 1 9 6 9 ) and Modern Chinese Nationalism (1970).

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS N e w York * Washington

PRAEGER LIBRARY O F CHINESE AFFAIRS General Editor: Donald W . Klein, Columbia University

China is one of the world’s oldest civilizations and one of the least known or understood. Its rich history has much to contribute to our understanding of man; its experiences in modernization are relevant to other developing nations; its crucial role in Asian and world politics makes imperative a fuller comprehension of the Chinese past and present. The volumes in this multidisciplinary series explore central issues of China’s political, social, and economic structure, its foreign relations, its philosophy and thought, and its history, civilization, and culture. The contributors to the series represent a wide variety of approaches and attitudes,

and all are specialists in their respective fields. Included in the series are the following works: Ralph C. Croizier, ed., China’s Cultural Legacy and Communism (1970) Alexander Eckstein, ed., China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy (1971)

Donald G. Gillin, History of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-50 (1973) * James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (1972)

L i Jui, Comrade M a o Tse-tung’s Early Revolutionary Activities, trans. b y Anthony W . Sariti, with an introduction by Stuart R . Schram (1973) * John M . H . Lindbeck, Understanding China: A n Assessment of American Scholarly Resources (1971) Michel Oksenberg and Frederick C. Teiwes, eds., The Chinese Communist Bureaucracy at Work (1973) * Lucian W . Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (1971) Theodore Shabad, China’s Changing Map: National and Regional Development, 1949-71, rev. ed. (1972) William W . Whitson, with Chen-hsia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (1972) *Title and publication date are not yet final.

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS New York * Washington