The Logic of Design Process: Invention and Discovery in Light of the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce 9783839443774

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Tiago da Costa e Silva The Logic of Design Process

Design  | Volume 40

Tiago da Costa e Silva, born in 1978, researches design processes, semiotics, esthetics, and cultural techniques (Kulturtechniken) with special focus on form-giving processes, as well as on processes involving invention and discovery. A specialist in the field of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, he has been awarded the “Charles S. Peirce Young Scholar Award” for his publication on esthetic processes related to discovery. He is specialized in the fields of industrial design, visual communication, theory of communication, and semiotics as well as in theory and history of design. He is currently part of the research staff of the Cluster of Excellence Image Knowledge Gestaltung and of the Department of Cultural History and Theory (Institut für Kulturwissenschaft) at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany.

Tiago da Costa e Silva

The Logic of Design Process Invention and Discovery in Light of the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce

This publication was made possible by the Image Knowledge Gestaltung. An Interdisciplinary Laboratory Cluster of Excellence at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (sponsor number EXC 1027/1) with financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG – Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft) as a part of the Excellence Initiative.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de

© 2018 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld Cover layout: Maria Arndt, Bielefeld Cover illustration: © Tim Borgmann Proofread by Emily Pickerill Printed by Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar Print-ISBN 978-3-8376-4377-0 PDF-ISBN 978-3-8394-4377-4 https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839443774

Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements | 9 Introduction | 17

PART ONE FLOWING STREAMS AND UNFOLDING PROJECTIONS On the Intrinsic Processuality of Design Process | 29

Processuality and Logic of Events in Design Process | 29 Defining the Concept of Design Process of the Present Study | 35 The Theoretical Framework: Design Process and the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce | 37 From the Generation of Ideas to the Form-Giving Process: The Pragmatic Character of Design Process | 41 The Continuity of Design Process: Ideas, Concepts, Conceptualizations | 50 An Example of Design Process in the Context of Graphic Arts | 56 The Logic of Abduction and Idea-Generation | 61 Concepts, Conceptualizations, and Form-Giving Process | 63 Purpose, Conceptualizations, and Realization | 67 Research Methods Articulated in this Book | 68 An Overview of the Expected Contributions from the Manuscripts | 70 Research Problems and the main Hypothesis of the Present Inquiry | 73

Rigid Stage Process and the “Problem” of Problem Solving | 73 A Glimpse into the Concept of “Problem Solving” and “Heuristics” | 74 A Detailed View of the Paradigm of Rigid Stage Models of Creative and Projective Thought | 82 Rigid Stages and Psychological Processes: Widespread Views of Creative Thinking and Problem Solving | 89 Criticizing the Rigid Stage Model: Problem Solving as General Operations Research | 93 Traditional Views: Peirce, Semiotics, and Projective Activities | 102 The Main Hypothesis of Design Process in Light of Peirce’s Semiotics: From Rigid Stage Thinking to Processual Flowing Streams | 108

PART TWO A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A PROBLEMATIC TRADITION: THE PARADIGMATIC RIGIDITY ENCAPSULATED IN THE CURRENT DISCOURSES OF DESIGN PROCESS Psychological Foundations: Creativity, Invention, Association, and Problem Solving | 117

Towards a Critical Analysis of the Traditional Discourses of Design Process | 117 A View of the Principle of Discovery and Invention at Work within Design Process | 118 Early Beginnings: Association Psychology and the Mechanics of Thought | 120 The Development of the Associationist Psychology | 126 Early Experimental Psychology: Searching for the Mental Act | 132 Schematic Knowledge of Problem Solving and Stream of Thought | 138 The External Side of Problem Solving: Stage Oriented Creativity | 144 Stages of Creativity and the Positivistic Belief: The Fundament of the Problem Solving Tradition | 151 Creative Thinking and Problem Solving as Stratified Stages | 154 Critique on the Purviews of Gestalt Psychology and Behaviorism | 157 The Traditional Bases of Design Process: Invention, Discovery, and Creativity According to Modern Psychological Investigations | 159

The Cognitive Revolution and its Relevance for Design Process | 159 Psychological Background of Information Processing Theory | 162 Processing Creative Thinking: Simulating Human Problem Solving Behavior | 170 Paradigm of Information Processing Theory and the Operational Stages of Problem Solving Behavior | 177 Reassessing Design Process after Information Processing | 181 Inveterate Rigidity | 187

PART THREE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF SEMIOTICS: FROM THE PASTICHE OF SIGN THEORIES TO A CLARIFIED PROCESSUALITY OF DESIGN PROCESS IN LIGHT CHARLES S. PEIRCE’S SEMIOTICS A Problematic Tradition: Sign Theories in the Context of Design Process | 193

A Plethora of Sign Systems | 193 An Overview of the Most Influential Sign Theories | 195 Ferdinand de Saussure and a Plan for Semiology | 195 Louis Hjelmslev and Glossematics: Expanding Structural Linguistics to a General Structural Semiotics | 199 Discourse and Narrative: Algirdas Julien Greimas and Discourse Semiotics | 200 Roland Barthes and a Broader Semiotic Application | 203 Logical Positivism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism: Charles Morris’ Behavioral Semiotics | 206 Roman Jakobson: From Structural Linguistics to General Semiotics | 211 A Pastiche of Sign Theories: A Review of Criticisms | 216 Dismissing some Equivocal Notions of the Concept of Semiotics | 227 Avoiding Errors | 230 The Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce in the Context of a Philosophical Architecture | 233

A Philosophical Semiotics | 233 A Philosophical System | 234 The Manuscripts chosen for the Present Inquiry | 236 Architecture of Thought and Knowledge: Peirce’s Philosophical System in Architectural Tradition | 241 The Idea of Philosophical Architecture and the “Undoubtful” Base of Knowledge | 241 Peirce’s Antifoundationalism | 246 A Modern Version of Objective Idealism: Peirce’s Logical Idealism | 248 Peirce’s Architectonic System of Philosophy | 251 Peirce’s Ladder of Sciences | 252 Phaneroscopy and the Inventory of Categories | 257 Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness: Categories of Phenomenological Experience | 258

A Detailed Review of Peirce’s Semiotics: Semiosis, Interpretation, and Pragmatic Operation | 267

The Triadic Process: Sign and Semiosis | 267 Semiotics in the Normative Sciences | 273 The Internal Structure of Semiotics | 279 The First Branch of Semiotics: Speculative Grammar | 279 The Second Branch of Semiotics: Logical Critics | 283 The Third Branch of Semiotics: Methodeutic | 286 The Maxim of Pragmatism | 288 Design Process in Light of Semiotics: Symbiotic Operations Inherent to the Semiosis of Design Process | 295

A Return to Phaneroscopy: Transitional Point between Phaneron and Semeion | 295 A Daring Attitude of Mind: Relation between Esthetic Principles and Abductive Process | 307 What is then the Logic of Design Process in Light of the Semiotics of Peirce? | 314 Reassessing the Thesis: Design Process in Light of the Semiotics of Peirce | 316 Design Process and the Development of the Sendai Mediatheque | 323 List of Figures | 343 Bibliographical References | 345

A. References of the Work of Charles S. Peirce | 345 B. General Bibliographical References | 346

Preface and Acknowledgements

AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY Poesie und Kunst also sind wie die zwei Einheiten: Poesie das, wodurch ein Ding Leben und Realität in sich selbst hat, Kunst das, wodurch es in dem Hervorbringenden ist. F. W. J. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, Abt. I, Bd. 5, 1859: 461 The present study on the logic of design process in light of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce is the result, or one of the results, of an adventurous journey that started many years ago, while I was still a bachelor student, wondering about the secrets of ingenuity, inventiveness, and the conditions of possibilities for discovery that take place in every form of artistic, intellectual, creative, and projective activities. As a student of industrial design, I was trying to understand the dynamic processes through which new ideas come into play, enter existence being graphed in a certain medium and gaining articulation in a certain language, becoming thus endowed with the potential to generate more fruitful inspirations in the form of signs, interpretations, and poetic effects, once the generated message is realized and exposed so it can be for others a matter of experience. At that point, I was curious to understand the bases of poetic phenomena, the poeticity that can be encountered in many mediatic manifestations, such as in graphic novels, animations, films, posters, in works of theater, in photography and scenography, in games, in model making, in a detailed diorama, in computer models, and in so many more distinct forms of languages and media. Under these circumstances, I was not only seeking for theoretical instruments to decipher these poetic phenomena, but also – and, at that point much more important for me – to try to understand these phenomena and to replicate them whenever needed, pouring the discerned knowledge into a new project somehow pro-

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grammed to produce poetic effects. Thus, as a student in this highly creative discipline, understanding the dynamics of certain events and poetic phenomena consisted in both comprehending these with certain theoretical knowledge that helped to access these dynamics as well as interiorizing these newly gained knowledge in order to articulate them in a given future project. At least, this was my immediate and pressing goal. From the poeticity and from poetic experience, these interests have led me to further inquiry in more abstract and theoretical domains, were poeticity was philosophically studied, and this soon made room for curiosity about the philosophical considerations on the possibility of poeticity. From this moment onwards, I was intensely intrigued by the philosophical disciplines of esthetics and semiotics. But because these themes demand much time, devotion, and disciplined study, I started entering a highly theoretical field of inquiry and became more and more distanced from the practical realm of media and languages, of poeticity and practical poetical experience, until a long hiatus in such activities settled in. But this I could not have imagined: during these long years in which I did not develop any substantial design, visual, or artistic project, the very motors that fueled my theoretical inquiries about esthetics and semiotics, of poetic and poeticity, of creativity and inventiveness were the very same impulses to project and develop design and artistic projects, such as graphics, animations, films, photography, model making, scenography, among many others that I intended to carry into execution and that alerted me to the occurrences of poetic experience in the very first place. Along with the important knowledge discoveries and productions that this research unveiled – and I really hope that this can be a valid contribution to various fields, especially to the field of theory of design as well as to the field of semiotics – the most important knowledge that I, the author, have gained, is this: these projects that I intended to carry out, that helped to define who I am as well as to define the course of my intellectual life for a long time, have kept my perception and my sensibility for poetic and esthetic processes lively, awake, for these projects, themselves, have been – and still are – begging me to make them concrete, to transform their mere potentiality into concrete poeticity, allowing them to enter the realm of existence, of concretion. To the extent that these potentialities become concrete, sprouting and spreading their esthetic and poetic fruits, these projects will be given not only a “local habitation and a name”, but real poetic life. And, in so doing – and this was part of this knowledge that still needs to be pursued – I would close this long cycle of learning about esthetics and poetics and experience poeticity for myself, no longer as an analyst, but as a creator – a creator that does not try to dominate the creation, but allows

Preface and Acknowledgements | 11

the creation to be received in the mind, dialog with this mind, the creator becoming thus a vessel though which all these creative manifestations flow, appearing from the depths of the imagination, being poured into concrete esthetic experiences, experiments, manifestations, assuming many forms, spreading the freedom of such creations, molding them, transforming these manifestations into inventions, sharing their freedom, and giving them parts of my intellect by nourishing them into existence. With this realization came the recognition as well that the more I wanted to participate in the creative process, the more sensibility and humility I needed to cultivate in order to perceive the richness of poetic and esthetic phenomena that surrounds everything. And that – alone – is a life’s work. The research project, upon which the present book is based, started officially in June 2013 when I became a PhD candidate under Prof. Susanne Hauser at the Department for History and Theory of Design, that is, the Institut für Geschichte und Theorie der Gestaltung, of the Faculty of Gestaltung of the Universität der Künste in Berlin while working at the graduate college Das Wissen der Künste at this university. The doctoral dissertation has been concluded on the 10th of April 2017, when I delivered it to the PhD committee of the Faculty of Gestaltung of the UdK-Berlin and has been defended on the 13th of February 2018. With the edition of the present book, this process reaches its culmination. In this particular investigation, I depart from a broader question related to the logic of design process. What is this logic? How does it become articulated within a particular process within a given projective activity? Based upon the framework of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, the book reveals the main characteristics of design process as a continuous and serendipitous activity hallmarked by the interplay of processes of esthetic experience, of defining rules, and of manifesting forms; and it concludes, furthermore, that invention and discovery are intrinsic to every development in any given design context. The story of this research process is rather long and it would take many pages to write it down and depict all its efforts, its conflicts, its transformations, the growths of the main ideas guiding the thesis, as well as the researcher’s own personal difficulties, both cultural and linguistic, as well as his resolutions and decisions. Therefore, I offer the reader a description of the process in a rather different, and surely more esthetic manner: this particular research process is similar to Franz Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody no. 2, with all its conflicts, tensions, adventures, developments, inspirations, calmness, melancholic moments, thrilling moments, its decisiveness and strengths, its lightness and gentleness, and its fulfilling resolution at the end. These denominations, however, too vague a symbolic sign to denote what I here intend to express, need to be experienced as the mu-

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sical qualities within the very unfolding of the musical piece. Only the experience of this musical piece in toto could offer, in the pure realms of experienced qualities, the similarities with the referred research process. I am deeply grateful to the members, professors, coordinators, post-docs, and colleagues of the graduate college Das Wissen der Künste of the UdK-Berlin, my first academic Zuhause in Germany: Prof. Barbara Gronau, Prof. Kathrin Peters, Prof. Kathrin Busch, Prof. Susanne Hauser, Prof. Ulrike Hentschel, Prof. Tanja Michalsky, Prof. Martina Dobbe, Prof. Dörte Schmidt, Prof. Christoph Gegnagel, Dr. Sandra Soltau, Dr. Nina Wiedemeyer, Dr. Marcel Finke, Heide Barrenechea, Hans-Georg Bauer, Anastasia Dittmann, Christina Dörfling, Dr. Daniela Fugellie, Marion Haak-Schulenburg, Marina Gerber, Dr. Anne Keller, Constance Krüger, Jens Meinrenken, Dr. Johann Honnens, Moritz Schumm, Svenja Rokitta, Judith Wilking, Benjamin Schneider, and Johanna Hayne. For the support of my colleagues from the Cluster of Excellence Image Knowledge Gestaltung: An Interdisciplinary Laboratory of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, I am also thankful. Especially for the fruitful discussions about philosophy and arts with Prof. Horst Bredekamp, for the important discussions about the frontiers of research and theory of inquiry with Prof. Wolfgang Schäffner, for the discussion about interdisciplinary research and exchanges on methods of experimentation in engineering research and in design process with Prof. Peter Fratzl, for the important discussions and exchange of ideas about science, design, arts, and crafts, and, most importantly, about Luigi Pareyson’s philosophy of formativity with Prof. Patricia Ribault, for the discussions about material culture and media sciences with Prof. Elodie Roy and for the important discussions about knowledge transfer between humanities and natural sciences with Dr. Stefan Zieme. I am also grateful for the inspiring conversations related to knowledge acquisition and creative processes with Dr. Or Ettlinger, Dr. Kashayar Razghandi, and with Mohammad F. Gholami and also for the possibility of further interdisciplinary work with, amongst others, Tom Lilge and Dr. Christian Stein of the gamelab.berlin. I also express my gratitude to Dr. Kerstin Germer, to Maja Stark, and to Franziska Wegener of the department of publication of the Cluster of Excellence for their mentoring and support regarding the publication of this book, as well for their invitation to participate in several fruitful and interesting projects with them. I also express my gratitude to all other colleagues and co-workers at the Cluster of Excellence, and, in special, to Amaya Steinhilber, Kathrin Bauer, Sandra Bauer, Rahel Killisch, Amelie Hartschuh, Deborah Zehnder, Claudia L. Cornejo, Anna Arbuzova, Tim Kawalun, Anne Hattwich, Carolin Ott, Elisabeth Obermeier, and many other colleagues for their

Preface and Acknowledgements | 13

support, encouragement, and patience: this has without a doubt contributed to the development and completion of this book. I also thank the professors, co-workers, and colleagues of the Department of Cultural History and Theory, that is, the Institut für Kulturwissenschaft of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin for the productive exchange of ideas and for the possibilities of conducing further research at this institution. In particular, I thank Prof. Christian Kassung, Christiane Gaedicke, Dr. Holger Brohm, Christiane Schneider, Yvonne Kult, Nadia Shamsan, Sophia Gräfe, Susanne Jany, Laurens Schlicht, Sebastian Döring, Martin Müller, and Birgit Lettmann. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Katholischer Akademischer Ausländerdienst – KAAD, and especially thank Renate Flügel, Dr. Thomas Krüggeler, Dorit Raderschatt, and Dr. Hermann Weber for the doctoral scholarship that supported the very first stages of this research in Germany, and without which the present work would not have been possible at all. I wish also to express my gratitude to Prof. Helmut Pape from the OttoFriedrich Universität Bamberg for his important help and guidance at the earliest stages of my more mature studies of philosophical theory of inquiries and also with the research work with the digitalized manuscripts of Charles S. Peirce. Also, my thanks to Prof. Christian Illies, to Prof. Christian Schäfer, to Dr. Fabian Geier, to Dr. Marko Fuchs, and to Sandra Frey also from the Bamberger University to whom I am grateful for the fruitful and necessary advices, discussions, and theoretical support that helped to propel and develop the early philosophical and theoretical ideas in the present work. The access to Charles S. Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts, which was made possible through the Peirce Edition Project at the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), enabled me to acquire a more accurate understanding of Peirce’s philosophical system and also, more specifically, of his research in general semiotics, pragmatism, the theory of discovery, qualia theory, and the theory of interpretants. Since the late seventies, the Peirce Edition Project has been organizing Peirce’s manuscripts in order to prepare these to be edited in chronological sequence and rendering Peirce’s entire philosophical system more comprehensible and available, thus allowing a more global understanding of what was before experienced only as bits and pieces of fragmented philosophical ideas. Tasked primarily with the edition of Peirce’s texts in a chronological sequence of volumes, the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, the Peirce Edition Project is faced with challenges related to the interdisciplinary nature of Peirce’s works extending over different fields of knowledge, as well as with the problems of reconstructing Peirce’s thoughts extending over a vast amount of undated or unidentified manuscripts. In fact, the

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reconstruction of some of Peirce’s texts, especially those concerning his later philosophy, involves a sort of detective work, in which the scholar must find, among a myriad of numbered papers, the right sequence to be able to reconstruct the totality of the manuscript. In most cases, the old numeric organization implies incomplete sequences of manuscripts. It is, therefore, necessary to examine virtually the entire corpus of Peirce’s production in order to identify the parts and variants of a given manuscript and to bring it into an editable sequence. Thanks to the Peirce Edition Project, which I visited for the first time in November 2014 and for a second time in April 2017, I was able to locate and study the four manuscripts upon which this research is based. The order of these four manuscripts had been already determined by a preliminary editorial process at the Peirce Project, which organized the raw manuscripts not only with respect to page numbering, but also included discarded versions or alternative constructions of the same document, so as to enable a reconstruction not only of the written ideas, but also of the developmental process of concepts and ideas Peirce underwent. For this access and for the fruitful and important exchange of ideas, as well as for the confidence vested in the research work I was developing at the time of my visit, I express my deepest gratitude to Prof. André De Tienne, director of the Peirce Edition Project, to Martha Rujuwa, to Megan Liu Lizarme, and to Dr. Marianne Wokeck, director of the Institute for American Thought of the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). I would also like to express my gratitude to Laurie Schwarz for her patient and careful proofreading of the early version of the text that composed the doctoral dissertation. And I wish also to express my gratitude to Emily Pickerill, who proofread the text of the present book. Because of their diligent work of proofreading, the text has achieved the necessary clarity and proficiency the author wanted to transmit in English. For conceding me the rights of the image in the book cover for the present edition, I am grateful to Tim Borgmann, the author of the image. I have chosen this image, named flow_strct02a (15/08) #7, for it expresses visually the kind of unfolding process and interweaving flowing streams that I imagine when considering design process as conceived from the scope of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce. This particular image, I believe, enables the readership a more relational reading of the forms of processes that will be encountered in the book. And, finally, I wish to express my deepest and sincere gratitude to Prof. Jürgen Schulz, the chairperson of my PhD committee and also, especially, to Prof. Susanne Hauser, to Prof. Judith Sigmund, and to Prof. Jörg Gleiter for their patience in letting this research grow, for having discussed, cherished and helped me to nurture and to cultivate the ideas expressed in this work, and for have be-

Preface and Acknowledgements | 15

lieved that the ideas here presented can contribute to deeper theoretical discussions about design. While researching intensively the concepts of discovery, invention, design process, as well as semiotics, logic of relations, and pragmatism, I realized how important the community of researchers is in order to encourage and to promote further research questions, thus propelling science and research in a very open and honest manner. In this sense, for it has been, indeed, an intellectual journey – and with all due respect and admiration –, I wish to repeat these wise words: if I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. This book is dedicated to those who accompanied me throughout this intellectual journey, and, in particular to my beloved wife, Alexandra, and to my dear family. And also to all those who have spiritually enlightened this research process, for they all believe that education and research are powerful means to contribute with the growth of concrete reasonableness in the world. Here is a small token of what I have learned and now wish to share with you: THESEUS The poet’s eye, in fine frenzy rolling, Doth glance from heaven to Earth, from Earth to heaven; And, as imagination bodies forth The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing A local habitation and a name. Such tricks hath strong imagination That, if it would but apprehend some joy, It comprehends some bringer of that joy; Or in the night, imagining some fear, How easy is a bush supposed a bear! HIPPOLYTA But all the story of the night told over, And all their minds transfigur’d so together, More witnesseth than fancy’s images And grows to something of great constancy; But, howsoever, strange and admirable. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act 5, Scene 1 Tiago da Costa e Silva Berlin, 24th of August 2018

Introduction

What is the logic at work in design process? Departing from this question, the present book proposes an inquiry into the logic of design process, that is, the logic present in every manifestation of projective activities, such as those that are more prominent in – but not exclusive to – the fields of architecture, design, engineering design, and also the arts. Hence, the object of study of the present inquiry is the logic of the purposeful, projective action of design process and its consequent performance in carrying out a projected content in the field of disciplines that are generally related to the creative, the inventive, which, in their turn throughout this process, bring about novelty, both technically and culturally. The main objective of this work is to inquire into the logic of design process while focusing on invention, discovery, and form-giving processes in light of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce. This specific study of semiotics has been chosen because of its capability to examine dynamic processes by which articulation novelty arises, becomes embodied, and can be integrated into wider systemic contexts. Stated otherwise, Peirce’s semiotics is able to cope with the processuality of projective activities, which are a characteristic feature of design process in a general sense. The leading thesis of the book is that the logic of design process is characterized by a logic of events exhibiting symbiotic operations of invention, discovery, form-giving, and rule-finding processes. As the book will show in detail, this logic of events, in its phaneronic, or phenomenal, semiotic, and pragmatic dimensions, is the most predominant characteristic feature of design process. The concept of design process is here understood as equivalent to the German concept of Entwerfen, which, in general terms, describes the allencompassing projective activity that includes the formulation of new mental concepts out of newly structured ideas, the production of further conceptualizations, and the subsequent unfolding of possibilities for the realizations of these

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concepts in mediative supports, articulated with a possible or with an already established given language. In answering the stated research question, that is, “what is the logic at work in design process?” and inquiring into the processuality of design process in light of semiotics, this book aims at overcoming two major problematic views present in the vast majority of the contemporary design theories. The first is the problematic tradition of psychologically-based rigid stage models injudiciously articulated to substantiate cognitive processes in design process. The vast majority of the theoretical accounts make use of rigid stage cognitive models either based mainly upon behaviorist operations research or upon information processing theory and describe design process as consisting in discrete, deterministic, and highly mechanic stages of operations. In this rather stratified view of the process, the occurrence of synthesis is neither fully explained nor comprehended. The second problematic view is the theoretical confusion that involves diverse sign theories and sign systems in relation to the study of projective activities in general and design process specifically. Diverse sign theories, sign systems, and varieties of semiologies and semiotics, including fragments of Peirce’s own semiotics, have been used to provide the foundation of studies in the fields where design process is operative. However, the inadvertent admixtures of different sign theories originated a great conceptual confusion, resulting in a significant scepticism toward the validity of these sign theories in general, and of the semiotics of Peirce specifically, as worthy theoretical frameworks of research. The research methods articulated in the present inquiry are of two kinds. The first one is the hypothetico-deductive method, and the second is the inductive method. The first describes the proposal of a new thesis to explain a certain state of things. The consequences of the stated hypothesis are then drawn. This method is appropriate for a theoretical and theorematical inquiry, such as the one here proposed. The second is related to the reconstruction of the theoretical framework of Peirce’s semiotics. The bases of this reconstruction are the four manuscripts1 selected as grounds for this theoretical framework in what relates to dis-

1

As indicated in the bibliographical references, whenever a manuscript from Peirce’s work is mentioned, the numbers following are referring to the Charles S. Peirce Papers Microfilm Edition (Harvard University Library, Photographic Service, 1966). References employ the numbering system for manuscripts (MS#) developed by R. S. Robin in his Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967), as supplemented by Robin in “The Peirce Papers: A Supplementary Catalogue,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, vol.

Introduction | 19

covery and invention, to the logic of events, to the pragmatic process, and to the logic of abduction. Therefore, these four chosen manuscripts are relevant to the present inquiry upon design process, for they furnish the main theoretical background with which the logic of design process can be tackled. The first selected manuscript, numbered MS 693, entitled “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery wherein Logic is conceived as Semeiotic” was written in 1904. It contains an important formulation of semiotics as logic, in which Peirce emphasizes his later theory of inquiry and theory of discovery, especially from a systemic standpoint, which mobilizes mathematics, phaneroscopy, and semiotics. Here, Peirce also emphasizes the active role of imagination and thought while performing a task that will eventually lead to the process of discovery. The second manuscript is composed of three segments denominated, respectively, MS 940, 941, and 942. This composite manuscript was written in 1898 as a preparation for the eight conferences Peirce delivered that same year in Cambridge. The first segment bears the title “Logic of Events”. The second segment is entitled “Notes for Eight Lectures”. The third, and largest, is entitled “Abstracts of 8 Lectures”. The first two segments of the manuscript develop the concept of logic of events based on Peirce’s hypothesis of formation and qualia and also on the continuity of qualias. The third, the longest and most complex segment of the manuscript, MS 942, elaborates further on the hypothesis of the formation of qualia-dimensions, which subsequently further defines sets of events within a formative process. Peirce’s theorem of the formation process has a mathematical, or rather a topological form, and is very abstract in its content. It is, however, an idea, a general concept, not restricted to mathematics. Mathematics helps to comprehend the ideas of formation, or, as he defines it, the logic of events, described in the manuscript in a theorematic manner. The importance of the present manuscript is specifically the model of formation inherent to the logic of events, the models of growth, affectability of ideas and evolution of mind. The third manuscript, MS 283 entitled “The Basis of Pragmaticism”, presents the main elements that characterize his maxim of pragmatism – here redenominated pragmaticism2, in order to differentiate it from other more popular

7, no. 1, 1971, pp. 37-57. For example, MS 649.2, 1910 indicates Robin’s catalogue manuscript number 659, page 2, followed by the year of the writing. 2

Peirce introduces this denomination in his 1905 article “What Pragmatism Is” for the Journal The Monist. Defending this position, in order to clarify his pragmatism as a maxim of logic, he contends: “So then, the writer, finding his bantling ‘pragmatism’ so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its high-

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and disseminated variants of pragmatism. As Peirce contends in this manuscript, the bases of the maxim of pragmaticism are located in the normative sciences, that is, in the most theoretical of the positive philosophical disciplines. The articulation of these sciences is what renders pragmaticism operational and useful as a general scientific method. Peirce focuses upon semiotics as the key science from which a proof of pragmaticism can be demonstrated. This highly intricate manuscript also reveals more specific details about the composition of a sign as well as of the sign process, or semiosis. For example, the concept of quasi-mind inherent to the sign, which represents a potential of the sign to be interpreted as another sign and so propelling semiosis. Peirce proposes that the act of interpretation within a semiosis is a form of translation. Therefore, according to him, semiosis is the process of a sign being interpreted – or translated – into other more developed signs, as well as into habits of action. The fourth selected manuscript, the highly complex and multi-layered MS 318, entitled simply “Pragmatism”, was written in 1907. The extant manuscript is composed of several formulations on the proof of pragmatism. This manuscript puts forward important developments in the field of semiotics, especially with reference to the concept of the interpretant. Peirce completed his theory of interpretants in this manuscript. Searching for the proof of his pragmatism, Peirce saw the need to further develop his concepts of logic and semiotics. The object of study in this manuscript is the cognitive operation. According to the formulation in the manuscript, intellectual concepts are the only types of signs that can produce a newly identified type of interpretant, that is, the logical interpretant. The logical interpretant consists not merely in an actual interpretation, but in the self-controlled production of a new habit, that is, in Peirce’s terms, the predisposition to act in a certain way according to the interpretant generated. Peirce reveals in this manuscript that only the meanings of intellectual concepts are pragmatically ascertainable, because they are the only types of signs that carry implications concerning general behavior. This newly introduced improvement upon his previous notion of semiosis sheds new light on the concept of

er destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word ‘pragmaticism’, which is ugly enough to be safe of kidnappers.” (PEIRCE, 1905b: 166). Despite this change, Peirce will still use the concept pragmatism in the following years as to mean his version of it; the denomination pragmaticism, although important to accentuate the important distinction between Peirce’s original and scientific maxim of logic from the myriad of variants – especially from the utilitarian and from the psychology-based variants – that appeared afterwards, will be short-lived.

Introduction | 21

pragmatism, connecting it with the theory of interpretants. With the introduction of the concept of the logical interpretant, that is, an interpretant that carries within it a formulation, such as in a plan to conceive and form new habits of conduct, pragmatism can be understood as a principle of inquiry that requires the medium of purposeful action. For it is only through this medium of purposeful action that intellectual concepts in general can overcome their self-reference, reaching new objects and relationships. It does also happen even if only a potential action for a possible purpose is devised, for it has also the power to change conduct. Based upon the knowledge produced in these four manuscripts, the present book shows that design process – in light of Peircean semiotics – is revealed as a generative, continuous process promoting the unfolding of further form-giving processes executed under a given set of circumstances, thus allowing innumerable manners with which relations can be accessed, grasped, and captured. Design process becomes understood as a flowing stream3 of semiotic processes, which integrates processes of inventing, discovering, form giving, rule finding, and experimenting. It is capable of continually replenishing the projective context with originality and freshness again and again; because these formed projected relations gain their own reality and existence, they feed back to the mind as an esthetic and pragmatic dialog. Furthermore, this inquiry reveals that, while engaging in design process, the projecting mind forms purposeful conceptual projections, which lead to a mindset to imagine, to combine, to discover, as well as to guide actions connected to the mindset in order to carry a particular plan into execution. And, in so doing, there will always be an experimental aspect connected to this conceptual projection. The logic of events observable in every act of invention and discovery, hereby circumscribed by the Peircean framework of semiotics, amounts to the most predominant characteristic feature of design process in its phaneronic or phenomenal, semiotic, and pragmatic dimensions. In this realm, the technical and the practical are not separate from the mental. They are all forms of mental processes and are, therefore, still connected. This inquiry unveils as well the dynamics connecting the appearance of a new idea to the perceiving mind as a result of an abductive process with the flowing stream of semiosis in the form of conceptions and further embodiments. It unveils, furthermore, the esthetic atti-

3

I am using the term flowing stream based upon André de Tienne’s article “The Flowing Stream that carries Pragmatism: James, Peirce, Royce” (DE TIENNE, 2007: 45-68). This concept along with its implied relation to design process will become clearer in the development of the first part of the book. A comprehensive treatment of the concept of semiotic flowing stream is developed in the fourth part of the book.

22 | The Logic of Design Process

tude of mind and the close relation between abduction and esthetic principles, for this relation influences the occurrences of further syntheses within design process. It also reveals the pragmatic aspect inherent to design process, especially because, in the course of the process, newly discovered relations and elements will be brought into a more global context of design system. As a generative process, design process reveals itself as a pragmatic action that proposes the differentiation of the newly discovered elements and relations and their modes of operation into different levels of semiotic interpretations, opening thus possibilities for further discoveries and realizations. The modalization and interpretational processes unveil the potentiality to engage with new differentiated discoveries. Furthermore, these subsequent discoveries offer the heuristic possibility to integrate these newly found elements and relations into the major design context again and again, thus further propelling a given project. Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism is embedded with the logic of abduction. Now, the logic of abduction implies the synthesis of state of things or relations never conceived before, but concomitantly requires further inferential modes in order to set a given plan of experimentation. I use the terms idea, concept, and conceptualization to imply here distinct kinds of operations within the logic of design process. Idea means here a process describing the generation of a new idea that appears to the perceiving mind through an abductive process. Concept means here the initial mediatization or representation of the idea in a more defined manner – for instance, something captured in a sketch on a paper or on canvas to serve as a registration of the first imprints and relations emerging in the mind. Conceptualization here refers to the further development aiming at a determined realization of certain purposes drawn from the idea and from concepts, and yet being constantly contrasted with the initial idea. In this context, concepts and conceptualizations are characterized by percolations of processes of form-giving and rule-finding triggered by – and reciprocally enabling the growth of – a given idea. Invention, in light of semiotics, takes the shape of a process of hypostatization, in which something newly discovered insinuates itself persistently to the perceiving mind, although still ephemeral. As a result, it must be formulated in the perceiving mind in a more intelligible manner. It is important to reiterate that abductive processes will continuously appear within the formulations and executions of concepts and conceptualizations, for inventions and discoveries pervade every form of development in the process. Aiming at a valid contribution to the field of theory of design, the book reintroduces, according to the selected manuscripts, a newly restructured and opera-

Introduction | 23

tive conception of Peircean semiotics into the mainstream of the theoretical investigation as a valid framework in order to study and to comprehend intricate, delicate, and subtle relations in generative, interpretative, and highly processual dynamics, such as the relations and the logic of events at work in design process. The present book enables, therefore, a more solid understanding of the logic of design process – in the broad sense of the term, thus contributing to the theoretical studies of processuality in design. This work also contributes to other fields, such as semiotics, esthetics, phenomenology, psychology, engineering, and arts since it proposes a context, in which these themes can be studied reciprocally within the definite processual field of design process. In order to proceed with the proposed research and address the thematized problems, let me introduce a structure for the present work. This book is divided into three major parts. Part one, entitled “Flowing Stream of Unfolding Projections. On the Intrinsic Processuality and Projectuality of Design Process” introduces design process as an object of inquiry of the present work. Design process is here defined as a projective activity with pragmatic character; that is to say, it renders perceivable effects from ideas and engages with a form-giving process. The pragmatic character that underpins design process lies in its processuality as an operation that connects conjectures with a driving impulse to exteriorize and connects also the mental, intellectual, and intentional with the material, with the perceivable, and with a self-controlled action. Furthermore, design process, as an analogue to the German term Entwerfen, bears a broader meaning and is endowed with a type of processuality that cannot be decomposed into stages, since it its operation is characterized as a flowing stream of processes of invention and discovery that simultaneously unfolds along the effectuation of a given projective activity. Here, I also discuss the characteristic logic of events that unfolds within design process. Originating from the projection of given states of things, this logic comprises the effort of projecting these into existence by the elaboration of a form of plan and then, systematically, while confronting each of these newly achieved embodiments and contrasting these with the mentally proposed state of things, elaborating manners with which these projected states of thing could be carried out into execution until a given fulfillment or purpose is sufficiently achieved. In this part, I also revisit the methods of the present research and discuss in a more detailed manner the proposed reconstruction of the framework of semiotics from the selected manuscripts. Anticipating the content of the third part of the book, I discuss in more detail, with the aid of examples, the contributions gained from this reconstruction. This first part also introduces the major problems relative to the two problematic traditions, that is, the tradition of psy-

24 | The Logic of Design Process

chology-based paradigms attached to the current discourses of design process, and the tradition of using sign theories and sign systems as theoretical bases for inquiring into design process. This part introduces the discussion of the current state of affairs related to the concepts of invention and discovery within design process, concluding with the need for critical analysis of the so-called rigidstages, upon which the current notion of design process is based. Part two, entitled, “A Critical Analysis of a Problematic Tradition. The Paradigmatic Rigidity Encapsulated in the Current Discourses of Design Process”, addresses the problem of the theoretical bases that underpin the predominant current notions of design process extracted from – or mostly influenced by – models drawn from psychology. Because the discussions about problem solving, creativity, invention, and discovery are predominantly based on psychological theories and methods, this part focuses, therefore, on the paradigmatic antecedents of such theories by providing an overview of early psychological positions such as associationism, early twentieth century experimental psychologies based on introspective methods, schematism related to the Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, and also information processing theory. This critical analysis also provides an overview of the influences originating from these early psychological positions, which have been imputed into design process with special emphasis upon the critical reading of the common – but injudicious – usages of concepts such as that of psychological creative problem solving. Considered from the perspective of such psychological purviews, these concepts become understood as rather stratified progressions of sequences in the form of rigid stages. This part of the book analyses the general tendency to reduce the whole of design process to a rigid stage version of problem solving. The present inquiry concludes with a critical analysis of the limitations of this specific psychological scope as a solid foundation for design process for the reason that these psychological paradigms are still based upon rigidly stratified models of “operational” creativity. This analysis opens the pathway to discuss design process, invention, and discovery from a philosophical and semiotical perspective. Part three, entitled “A Detailed Account of Semiotics. From the Pastiche of Sign Theories to a Clarified Processuality of Design Process in Light of the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce” first addresses the problem of the complicated tradition between sign theories, sign systems, diverse semiotics and design process. In order to understand the problematic traditional relationships between diverse sign theories and design process, the present part presents an overview of the most significative sign theories that have had some bearing upon and are still present in the discourses connected with design process. As an attempt to shed light upon the myriad of sign theories correlated with design process, the chapter

Introduction | 25

presents a brief overview of the underpinning paradigms of the most significant sign theories, sign systems, semiologies and semiotics. Moreover, this part thematizes the pastiche of sign theories within design process and sets out to dismiss some equivocal points that impel the current skepticism toward the efficiency of semiotics in general, casting doubts upon its value as an instrument of analysis. After that, this part presents in detail Peirce’s semiotics within his system of thought. Here, I discuss how Peirce devised his own architectonic system of philosophy. Based upon the precept of principle and data dependency, the present analysis concludes that semiotics will always rely on the results of the phenomenological analysis of experience. Following this development, I present semiotics among the normative sciences of esthetics and ethics, and discuss their function within the system by showing how semiotics draws its principles from the more abstract and theoretical sciences, such as phaneroscopy and mathematics, and studies its objects in three branches. The first branch, speculative grammar, studies its objects in light of the types of signs produced within a given semiotic process. The second branch, logical critic, studies its objects in light of logical inferences proposed by a given semiotical operation. The third branch, methodeutic, studies its objects in a broader way, proposing general procedures of inquiry and suggesting courses of action for guided experimentations according to the nature of its objects of study. It is in this third branch of semiotics that the maxim of pragmatism becomes operative as a principle of logic. Based upon the logic of abduction, the maxim of pragmatism proposes the formulation of plans for certain courses of action. The logic of abduction is exactly the logic of the formulation of a synthesis that shall enable the formation and development of concepts. Logic of abduction calls for experiments and conceptualizations, which further enables the discovery and differentiation of new ideas, as well as the systematic integration of such new ideas into the form-giving process. This general open-ended inquiry proposed by methodeutics as well as the logic of abduction at the core of the maxim of pragmatism, are the most important aspects relative to the study of the logic of design process. The characteristic feature of abduction as an inference that underpins invention and discovery is of prime relevance for design process. Furthermore, this part of the book explores design process in light of the concepts of semiotics developed from the previous parts and from the selected manuscripts. In order to grasp design process as semiosis, this part revises and reassesses the thesis on design process considering it in its phaneronic, or phenomenic, semiotical, and pragmatic dimensions. With the aid of Peirce’s concept of abduction – here understood both as a logical inference and as a living principle of the mind – I propose a semiotical account of invention, discovery, and

26 | The Logic of Design Process

formation. Here, it is shown that these are inherent processes within every form of design process. Emphasizing the principles that propel the specific type of synthesis, abduction is here discussed at length and considered thereby as an inferential and esthetic principle by which every process of invention and every form of discovery comes into play. In order to define design process as semiosis, I reassess the logic of events intrinsic to this process and discuss the logic of events of perceiving a new idea, of formulating conceptions and conceptualizations based on the perceived new idea, and of embodying these concepts in different mediative supports with different techniques and languages. For that reason, this part retrieves Peirce’s phaneroscopy and theory of perception, for it is important to discuss, at this point, the transitional point between phaneron as appearance and sign as representation. Moreover, this section stresses as well the dynamics connecting the appearance of a new idea to the perceiving mind as a result of an abductive process with the flowing stream of semiosis in the form of conceptions and further embodiments. It describes, furthermore, the esthetic attitude of mind and the all-important close relation between abductive procedures and esthetic principles, for this relation influences the occurrences of further syntheses within design process. The chapter also thematizes the pragmatic aspect inherent to design process, especially because, in the course of the process, newly discovered elements will be brought into a more global context of design system. It presents, as well, a sketch of the iconoscopy pervading design process. There is a certain regulative conduct that tends to adjust the relation between the generated idea, the conceptualizations, and the subsequent formative processes. In close connection to iconoscopy within design process, the chapter presents a thorough description of the process of form-giving, or formativity, as a process of growth that accompanies the development of every design process.

PART ONE Flowing Streams and Unfolding Projections

On the Intrinsic Processuality of Design Process

PROCESSUALITY AND LOGIC OF EVENTS IN DESIGN PROCESS The present book sets forth an inquiry into design process, its inherent processuality and its characteristic logic of events. The main objective here is to inquire into the main logic of events at work in design process, focusing upon discovery and invention. According to the main thesis of the book, the present investigation, through the theoretical framework of the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, characterizes design process as a continuous and serendipitous interplay of processes of esthetic experience, of defining rules, and of form-giving processes, that is, processes through which forms become manifested. Observed from this perspective, invention and discovery become intrinsic to every articulation of design process and are at work in every development in any given design context. This logic of events within design process is, more commonly, but not exclusively, observable in the broad fields of architecture, design, in the engineering sciences, and in the arts, for instance. Though each one of these fields operates with its own distinct procedures, methods, materialities, and aims at distinct and specific results, they have a point in common. Their common point is the allencompassing, purposeful activity whose logic of events comprises, first, the elaboration of a certain mental state of things to create something, to solve some problem or to implement or improve something; second, the effort of projecting these states of things into a given future context, as in the elaboration of a plan or in the drawing of an initial sketch; third, then enabling the projection of these states of things to become visualized or operational, assuming thus the character of a diagram, a blueprint or a plan; fourth, the effort of carrying the plan into execution by operating with the projected state of things and with materiality, giving thus a form to the projected state of things; and fifth, the constant inspection of the “fitting” between the proposed plan and the actual execution of the plan; the form-giving process, and the possible ways to achieve it in consonance with

30 | The Logic of Design Process

the initial “sketching” of the imagined plan. Stated another way, the object of study here is the logic of the processuality, that is, the general evolution and growth of design process, which is characterized by its quality as an operation that draws upon and devises forms from principles, creates systems, and also establishes rules. In order to introduce the notion of logic of events, I present a practical example from a generative perspective, that is, from the perspective of forming and developing processually an action of projecting and materializing something from a formed plan. As a designer, wishing to engage with a new graphic project and in need of working on a proper drawing space, I set to develop a larger drawing table4 with different functionalities. I have a certain working space in my office, and I wish to plan the construction of this table to fit in this space. As the designer of this table, and engaging with this type of projective activity, I must first have an idea of what is going to be projected. What are the main purposes of such a table? Will it be mainly for drawing and painting? Will it be sturdy enough to assume different functions, like a table for constructing scale models as well? Will it be large enough to accommodate larger sizes of paper, such as blueprints of any kind? Will its surface be even, or can it be rougher? Will it be fixed, or will it inclinable? All these questions will help me to define the type of multifunctional table I am setting out to construct. Pursuing the answers to these questions, I set out to investigate which materials I will use to build the table. All these points of contention must be taken into consideration, especially with reference to the weight, mobility, variability of positions, and versatility of the table. If the whole structure is too heavy, some of these variables might be affected. If it is too light in construction, the table might be too unstable, and therefore other variables of the project will be affected. Now, the best way of launching such a project is to bear in mind the dimensions and, according to those, to start sketching the table on a piece of paper. Let us suppose that I intend to have a table with a greater stability, constructed with heavier pieces of wood. I will have to bear in mind that the transportation of it, if necessary in the future, might be difficult. However, for that purpose I guarantee

4

The example of a table, in order to help the readership to visualize the relations involved in this type of projective activity, was suggested by Jörg Gleiter in his report to the doctoral dissertation, of which the present book is a further development. Here, I wish to express my gratitude to his support in rendering a highly abstract thesis clearer to the reader. Indeed, as an author, I must follow a basic principle, if I want to achieve this degree of clarity. As Charles S. Peirce says, “the best maxim in writing, perhaps, is really to love your reader for his own sake” (W1: 9, 17).

On the Intrinsic Processuality of Design Process | 31

some more functions, as I have intended. Supposing that the table must be sturdy and stable enough to accommodate the planned functions: drawing and painting, construction of scale models with wood and aluminum, and therefore work with heavier construction tools. Since the table must also support miniature sets of dioramas, constructed as scenarios in order to be photographed, the table must be of a very stable and sturdy wooden construction. The table top must be also sturdy, but as flat and polished as possible, possibly with some sort of glass plate on top of it, and the part for the moving table for drawing and painting must be a different surface cut inside the larger plate. Now, this visualization of the whole thing is already a bit more revealing. However, at this point, they are still very ephemeral conjectures of the type of a “may be”, of a mere possibility of being embodied into a more consistent representation. Though the conjecture has in itself the majority of the characteristics that the table shall exhibit when it is realized – at least potentially –, the representation of it in a form of concept is not yet visible. As for the concept, which is, accordingly, the next development of the project, it is, in fact, an established strategy for the visualization of newly proposed products or ideas. It seeks to render an ephemeral set of ideas more tangible in which it, the concept presents the idea in a more revealing manner. It has been a constant in the field of engineering, arts, architecture, and more contemporary, of design, in what refers to the presentation of an intellectual, projective concept. This concept embodies the features of the main ideas for the table and communicates it in a form of expressing a set of information for the future actions and thoughts of the project. What is communicated are forms of the nature of instructions of how to interpret these forms when formulating a more detailed – and perhaps more technical – conceptualization of such relations established in this first produced visual concept. Over the course the project, it acts as a communicating channel, through which the main original ideas and premises are checked, represented, and also communicated in a more defined conceptualization which still lies ahead. A further conceptualization of such a plan leads to the definition of dimensions and the material, with which the table will gain shape. These dimensions are estimations of the type of work that will be conducted with the table: while sitting, the table must have a certain height to allow a comfortable position – thus maybe a certain chair must be also already included in the project, for instance. And while standing, how the table could be constructed so as to offer a comfortable working platform as well. Perhaps the tabletop has to be higher than planned so I can achieve a middle value to work either sitting (with the help of a higher chair) or standing. Defining these points means researching the qualities of the material, how it will be joined together, and how these parts

32 | The Logic of Design Process

will be in a specific relationship of stability. After selecting these materials, and provided that the testing of those was proven to be successful, the operation with the wood starts. Supposing I have had help in working with wood, since my knowledge of carpentry is very basic, the main components of the table start to gain shape. Then I set out to check every component again against the indicated measurements of the conceptualization that embodies the technical drawings with the dimensions and imagined relations between parts. And after that, I check the installation of the metal parts, which will guarantee the stability of the construction. After that, the whole table is assembled and tested. By testing the stability, I come to the conclusion that the project works as a whole: the table top is even, the legs are stable enough, the inclining board functions smoothly; the position of the table top is appropriate for working in the standing position as well as sitting, with a higher chair. But one issue arises: the floor upon which the table was planned to stand is uneven and interferes with the stability. Though not a deficiency of the project itself, this issue requires attention, for it interferes with the functionality of the table. Now, in order to correct this misalignment, the height of one of the legs must be increased by a couple of millimeters. This can be accomplished by simply installing a piece of wood underneath, and after that, by checking the overall balance of the table. If this is successful, the project has been accomplished successfully – at least the development of this first version of it. It is possible and probable that other table projects will take the results of this first finished drawing table project and will reframe them with different scopes and functions, improving upon and modifying future projects of drawing tables, if further refinements will be suggested by the experience with this prototype, that is, the first constructed table. Now, it is important to note that the logic of events circumscribes the whole of the process and cannot be broken down into stages or phases: the fact that there are developments in which transformatorial processes take place and through which objects will gain shape, become more complex – such as, in this case, the specific development of the project of the table until its realization –, does not mean that the logic of events must become a method of construction and assembly or a pure portrayal of the construction process alone. No application of methods of construction or a direct methodologization, as if the projective activity could be reduced to a kit of the process, which commands already pre-defined actions to build something, will ever incapsulate the logic of events here described. This logic of events refers to the relations inherent to every form of projective activity and therefore inherent to design process. Some of these relations, in the form of effects, are, indeed, directly perceivable, because the pro-

On the Intrinsic Processuality of Design Process | 33

jective activity, when it is carried out, takes the form of generating “content” produced upon certain media – from a sheet of paper to a prototype, a model, or another form of established product. Other relations, however, are not directly perceivable as being related to a single, discrete action. They can be perceived as well but only in the context of the development of a given project, especially in the relation between the original ideas or initial parameters and the subsequent developments. That is to say, they, these relations, can be only mediately perceived in contrast with the course of a given project development. Among these mediately perceivable relations are those closely related to the generation of ideas and to the generation of contents, as well as to the mental relations in connection with the actions taken to perform a given task within a given design context. Exactly those relations are of interest here, especially in what refers to the mental activities and formative processes that lead to invention and to discovery. These relations of projective and creative processes are embedded in the inventive mental activities such as the projection of a newly formed concept, its exteriorizations, and the mental continuity between all the inferential kinds and the relative, connected action involved in the process. Now, because these relations are only mediately tangible, these configure the most difficult issues to tackle while inquiring into the logic of design process. Are these mental relations of projecting entirely cognizable? If yes, how far? Are they rather discrete, that is, discontinuous points in a chain of events? Is the embodied construct from a projective action part of the projected or is it something completely different from it, and thus not connected with the mental action? Where does the projective action begin and where does it end? Is the creative process a matter of a singular, psychological mind? Can it be part of a broader process? Is it part of a cognitive process, or is it something else? Could all kinds of projective thinking be subjacent to logical forms? Are invention and formation cognizable processes at all? All those questions, which refer to some more or less defined aspect of the projective activity – seen through different viewpoints – can be summarized into one broader question. With this question, I believe, it is possible to broach the issue of processuality by taking the questioning to a more holistic level, and yet still be able to determine important kinds of logical operations involved in the design process as a continuous flowing of semiosis. Now, presupposing that invention, discovery, and the processes that lead to form-giving are inherent to this logic of events and that an inquiry upon this logic of events should disclose the types of generative processes that are unfolding while one or more actors are engaging with design process in general, the central question I propose to address in this book runs as follows: what is the logic at work in design process?

34 | The Logic of Design Process

In attempting to answer this question, the inquiry is guided by the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce as the theoretical framework. I believe that Peirce made significant inroads into achieving a better understanding of the realms of discovery, invention, generative processes, and the subsequent engendering of the new. One of the most important contributions of Peircean philosophy, especially from his semiotics, to the present inquiry into the logic of design process comes, I infer, from his deep understanding of the processes of differentiation, integration and continuity, as well as of form-giving. A theory of inquiry, understood as an openended process in which the operation of abduction, i.e., the process by which novelty arises and through which the latter is included within a more systemic design or projective context, underlies Peirce’s semiotics. A generative process, such as that implied in design process, which takes place in an invention, can be thereby accounted for. These newly generated elements are then integrated within the actual design system being developed. Thus, Peirce’s semiotics can account for the differentiation of the newly found element and can also account for the integration of this element in the design process in a more holistic manner. The relevance of this research lies in the new way of considering the dynamics and the processuality of the present object of study – design process and projective activities in general – in light of Peircean semiotics. Whereas there have been various studies of design process and projective activities as a whole, intending to understand it in its processuality and seeking to comprehend processes that will lead to invention and to discovery, there is no account of design process studied through the scope of Peirce’s semiotics, especially articulated through the theoretical framework of the third branch of semiotics, called methodeutics, of which Peirce’s pragmatism is a component. The vast majority of such studies have made use of psychological frameworks as well as of diverse sign systems and sign theories to account for the high degree of processuality embedded in such dynamic systems. These encountered a myriad of theoretical positions and admixtures between these theories that caused a grave confusion. The framework of Peirce’s semiotics reveals the intricate relational logic of events at work in design process. While engaging in such projective activity, the projecting mind forms purposive conceptual projections, which lead to a mindset of imagining, combining, discovering, as well as guiding actions in order to carry a given plan into execution. In this realm, the technical and the practical are not separate from the mental. They are all forms of mental processes and are, therefore, still connected. In light of this, the conception of the term design process is thus broadened by what I call symbiotic articulation of inferences of abduction, deduction, and induction. How this relationship of the inferences and

On the Intrinsic Processuality of Design Process | 35

their systematic functioning within the process is articulated is one of the main issues that shall be thoroughly studied within this book. Defining the Concept of Design Process of the Present Study In order to better define the object of this study and to better clarify the concept of design process, I present at this point the main terms to be developed in the present work. I use the term design process here in the sense that adheres closely to the all-encompassing German concept of Entwerfen. I hold the latter to be better qualified to describe, in a very general sense, a purposive action and its subsequent embodiments within the scope of a certain project as well as its subsequent materializations. Entwerfen, in its turn, bears the meaning of a process during which, in the activity of projecting and designing, a first conception is generated from a new idea. This first conception, upon being projected, develops itself into certain forms, which unfold as possibilities for realizations. During the course of design process, these become better defined. These realizations will, in the course of further development, take the shape of mediated phenomena, i.e., will be embodied in different mediative supports. As such, they will be, potentially at least, articulated with language, through which the realizations will be given a certain Gestalt – a shape, a form. This is equivalent to saying that they will be given, progressively, forms and shapes related to their actual projectual contexts in architecture, in design, in the engineering sciences, and in the arts, for instance. Comprehended as Entwerfen, the concept of design process as I use it here encompasses this general procedure. In relation to Entwerfen and its connection with the projective activity and design process, it is important to take a look at the multifaceted spectrum of meanings presented by this concept. The concept Entwerfen, which in the past may have denoted the tossing movement of a ship on the high seas, became aggregated with the meaning of the word projet, derived from the French (cf. WITTMANN, 2012: 135-136), thus acquiring a more symbolic meaning of projecting as an intellectual and artistical act. In its turn, the French concept of projet gained, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the meaning of plan, draft, schema. The French projet is a derivative of the Latin verb proicere, which, in classical times, meant literally “throwing something forth”– from “pro”, forward and “iacere”, past participle form of “iactus”, to throw. The modern word jet has been derived from the latter. Thus, the idea of mentally and intellectually projecting has been embedded in the general concept of Entwerfen.

36 | The Logic of Design Process

The German dictionary of the Grimm brothers5 has an entry on Entwerfen. This concept, here, connected to the concept of project, is affirmed to have included the meanings of two Latin concepts normally used in the architectural context: adumbratio, which means contour, profile, outline, and also sketch; the entry simultaneously refers to the word informatio, which means the action of the production of an image in the mind, coming from a first input. Further definitions enrich the term Entwerfen. For example, the Ancient Greek terms of diagraphice and diagraphé, i.e., the projective work of and with geometrical constructions, have also been articulated within the contexts of architecture, arts, and engineering. Goethe had probably those conceptions in mind when he formulated another name related to the project maker, or Entwerfer: the skizzisten, i.e., the agent that graphically translates ideas into form-conceptions (cf. PIRCHER, 2009: 103). Similar to the modern concepts of Disegno and Dessin, the concept of Entwerfen began, in an analogous manner, to denote the conceptual arrangement of an idea which will lead to the realization of it, relating both to artistic and technical processes – a sort of animo concipere, i.e., to plan something in the mind and accordingly to carry it to execution. To reiterate: this is, in general terms, the definition of what I here refer to as design process. It is also very important to consider another characteristic feature that is also present in design process. I mean here the meaning imparted to the term design process from the German term Gestalt. Gestalt, commonly translated into English as “form” or “shape”, has a deeper level of meaning, which is its inherent act of formgivenness in the sense of the outdated German verb “gestellen”. This old German verb, according to the Deutsches Wörterbuch6 of the Grimm Brothers, bears, among other definitions, the meaning of “an einen Platz schaffen”, that is, to create, to conceive something in a given place; “herbeischaffen”, that is, to gather something from different, distant places and bring the gathered to the same place; “ins Werk setzen” or “bewerkstelligen”, that is, to carry out or to put to work; “in Stand setzen”, that is, to repair or to give a proper order; “beilegen”, that is, to settle, to resolve. But perhaps the most revealing connection between the word Gestalt7 and the processuality inherent to design process is the specific

5

Compare with Jacob and Wilhelm GRIMM: Deutsches Wörterbuch, Band 3, Leipzig 1862 (Nachdruck München, 1984), Sp. 655f.

6

Compare with Jacob and Wilhelm GRIMM: Deutsches Wörterbuch, Band 5, Leipzig 1862 (Nachdruck München, 1984), Sp. 4178-4179.

7

As Dagmar Buchwald contends, Gestalt is a difficult term to translate, for in German it already conveys the type of processuality implied in its mode of action. The translation of it into English, for example, requires a number of different qualifications to

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meaning of the old verb “gestellen” as a reinforcement for another verb “stellen”: in this case, as mentioned, “gestellen” conveyed the meaning to create in a given place (cf. FIGAL, 1985: 133-134; cf. BUCHWALD, 2009: 821). These meanings comprise the conveyed ideas through the occurrence of Gestalt, of form-giving process, as being characterized by its ability of becoming perceived through sense perception, and also by its ability to denote its genesis, to be comprehended as the perception of a virtual execution of a form-giving process. These specific meanings can transmit as well the dynamic governing the appearance of forms, which, from the outside, assert the inner consistence of this formgivenness as a result of a characteristic process of becoming, as well as its characteristic performance as a formed conception and as a future-oriented conceptualization (cf. BUCHWALD, 2010: 821). In summary, design process, as here understood, is analogous to the German term Entwerfen and also of Gestalt, for the concept of design process bears a broader meaning regarding the projective activity and is furthermore endowed with a type of processuality that cannot be broken down into stages. The operation of design process is characterized as a continuous stream of processes of invention, discovery, and form giving, which simultaneously unfolds into the effectuation of a given projective activity. The Theoretical Framework: Design Process and the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce Based upon the theoretical framework of the semiotics of Peirce, I formulate the guiding thesis of the book: in the very moment of engagement in design process, the projecting mind forms purposive conceptual projections, which lead to a mindset of imagining, of combining, of discovering, as well as of guiding actions connected to this mindset in order to carry a particular plan into execution. And, in so doing, there will always be an experimental aspect connected to this con-

emphasize the generative, the creative, the existential, and the pragmatic aspects contained in a single word. As she affirms: “Einer Gestalt wird man nicht nur in Sinnlicher Wahrnehmung ansichtig, sie wird auch in ihrer Genese ein-sichtig, d.h. aus ihrem Ent-stehen ver-stehbar. Dieser Aspekt ist es wohl, der den deutschen Begriff so unübersetzbar macht, auch wenn in den lateinischen Äquivalenten collocatio und situs Feldcharakter und Positioniertheit angesprochen werden. Das Aussehen von Gestalten simuliert zur Physiognomik, die aus dem Äußeren die innere Gestalteheit als Ergebnis eines charakteristischen Werdeprozesses ebenso zu ersehen behauptet wie die Disposition zu bestimmten Verhalten” (BUCHWALD, 2009: 821).

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ceptual projection. The logic of events observable in every act of invention and discovery, hereby circumscribed by the Peircean framework of semiotics, amounts to the most predominant characteristic feature of design process in its phenomenal, semiotic, and pragmatic dimensions. In this realm, the technical and the practical are not separate from the mental. They are all forms of mental processes and are, therefore, still connected. The scope of design process is thus broadened by the symbiotic articulation of inferences of abduction, deduction and induction, that is to say, from the perspective of projective activities, articulated through processes of inventing and discovering, form-giving, rule-finding, and experimenting. Moreover, the whole design process is viewed not as one having discrete stages but as one that is continuous. It is this continuity, a sort of “flowing stream”, which characterizes design process. Assuming that there is a logic in the processuality of design process, a logic that accounts for the entirety of projective activities including the dynamics of discovery and creation, perception and the embodiment of forms and ideas, as well as the formulation of these into concepts, their structure as mental forms, their embodiments in an external medium, and also their articulation as both potential or already articulated languages, it follows that the whole process involves a certain kind of cognitive conduct, that is, one which is understandable cognitively. The object of study of this inquiry is, therefore, the specific logic of the purposive projective action of design process and its consequent performance in carrying out a projected content in the field of disciplines that are generally related to the creative, the inventive, which, in their turn, bring about novelty, both technically and culturally. Based upon the theoretical background of Peirce’s semiotics, in this book I will develop the thesis that something new, not previously conceived, can be born from a specific projective context involving a specific projective purpose. In this adventurous attitude of mind, which allows the dynamics of serendipity to come into play, a process of invention of new elements, of invention of new concepts, and the formation of new systems becomes operative. This is presented to the perceiving mind, becoming defined as a first generated idea, as it persistently insinuates itself into this mind. This generated idea invades the conscience, thereby setting off further potential mental procedures toward the definitions of conceptions and conceptualizations. Some of the conceptions will be, then, selected as courses of action. The ones selected will, in their turn, guide conduct and action by carrying the projected design, project, or artifact into performance, with the realization of this particular projective process, which has been driven by the first conceived idea as its aim. The effectuation of the design process takes place in a series of embodiments, that is, in at-

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tempts at conceptualizing and exteriorizing forms and sequences of this projected and first outlined conception, i.e., the first conception inscribed into different mediative supports, with different materiality, and also codified with language or thereby developing the potential to create new languages. Parenthetically, I must point out that whenever I am speaking about languages, I am not referring only to well-codified systems, such as the verbal spoken and written. The term language, in the context of this work, will be considered in its broadest sense, meaning not only the codified verbal languages but also general forms of non-verbal, visual, auditory, and audiovisual languages, amongst others, with different degrees of codification. Being in the world, surrounded by an intricate net of languages, signs, and phenomena, forces the interpreting minds to interact and to communicate with these languages, signs, and phenomena through the act of reading, decodifying, and interpreting as well as producing signs and forms with some technique in some medium, that is, codifying in a certain way. The production of forms in these interactions, interpretations, and articulations are, in their vast majority, of the nature of codifications and of proto-codifications of non-verbal languages, such as noises, images, visual signs, acoustic signs, odors, gestures, facial and corporal expressions, social movements, clothes, costumes, cultural aspects and also the interpretation and assimilation of natural signs. Here, the production of such forms involves necessarily the technological means of enabling the support for a message, that is to say, specific forms of “writing” a deliberate message or content. This “writing” clearly does not refer only to the verbal written language, but includes any form of codification, of developing a message in a medium with a certain language. In this context, I propose to use here the Greek term γράφειν (gráphein), which refers to the act of writing, of codification in a medium with any given language. It is through the act of graphein that the vast set of non-verbal signs can be rearranged and re-signified, and the successive iterations of replications and successive embodiments through associative acts of translating and of interpreting contents in distinct contexts is what possibly sparks new articulations of syncretistic language, through which new forms and arrangements of languages can grow. Through this series of successive embodiments and replications that carry the projective process further, the first generated idea is refined and improved. Through the entire process, the concept of invention also plays a central role. Invention, however, does not only take place at the beginning of a projective process, but appears in every step of the whole process. It is a form of invention in the making, whereby the creative, the inventive, and the procedures of embodying, of testing, occur pari passu, i.e., simultaneously. By simultaneously, I mean here neither a dilution of the intellectual, intentional aspects of projective activi-

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ties nor the rarefaction of the activity of construction and operations with materials, methods, procedures, and so on. As mentioned previously, each field in which projective activities are operative have their own set of procedures and methods, and some of them require more time in some operations, applications of procedures, and so on after a thorough planning, whereas in some other cases, such as in the arts, this time can be significantly reduced. Such are the examples, for instance, of engineering design and industrial procedures, especially when the project involves a high degree of technical development, precision in the production, and a complex form of industrial realization. In the arts, for instance, this mediative time regarding the intellectual planning and the work with the materiality can be, sometimes, reduced to such an extent that this time is barely felt and the simultaneity seems to be rather a complete fusion of both. However, the consideration that there is a complete termination of thinking process in detriment to an automatized action, or, on the contrary, a termination of the articulated action detrimental to an overly dominant thinking process is rather an illusion. What is operative in this simultaneity is the dialog intrinsic to every form of projective action. And this dialog is much more perceivable in moments in which a learning process is involved, even in the arts or in other fields of knowledge, where this time seems sometimes imperceptible. For instance, when the abstract painter Jackson Pollock discovered his new technique of letting strong diluted paint flow from his brush onto the canvas on the floor and chose this form of painting as the type of expression of qualities and feelings he was seeking – in this case a discovery while operating with the materiality of painting techniques – he sought to improve upon this technique. What follows is a unique visual style and visual expression through a singular relation between diluted, flowing, and falling paint over canvas on the floor. Even if this specific relation seems to have been a random discovery and been “invented” as a visual style right away – which would then be erroneously interpreted as an annulation between the processes of intellectual and intentional projecting and the operation with materiality – there is here an operative dialog between the intentional, the material, the connection between both in the form of a reflection, and the unfolding of possibilities involving this simultaneity of projecting, experiencing, and learning. Although the time, the mediation of this process is felt as just as an insignificant instant, it is there, present and at work. This time of experiencing, of mediation, of reflection, and of learning is of the nature of logical relations mediating between signs and objects, in the sense of the framework of the present book. In this case, the materiality is also of key importance for the unfolding of every form of project. A projection, in this sense, has a nature of future oriented sets of communicated forms that aim at a certain translation and further de-

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velopment of these very communicated forms. Therefore, whenever a project is carried out, this “future orientedness” is accomplished in the generation of these translations in similar media, but with improved features, or in the translation of such forms in different media, in which the embodiment of such forms is a much more developed representation than the initial forms. From the perspective of the materiality in relation to the formative context of design process, matter resists more in order to suggest and to evoke possibilities of forming than to prevent or be a hindrance to the development of a given project. Due to the dialog between the projective, the intellectual and immaterial, and the materiality, through which the project will be unfolded and become more developed, formative intention will transform the resistances of materiality into fertile starting points and heuristic occasions, that is to say, in occasions in which discoveries and inventions may take place, and this through the mediation of the ongoing dialog. In this case, the actor or actors taking part in the project will be able to dialog with the process in a way as to provide it with the ductility that the main goal of the project requires (cf. PAREYSON, 2007: 62)8. From the Generation of Ideas to the Form-Giving Process: The Pragmatic Character of Design Process Let me introduce an example at this juncture. In the case of aeronautical engineering, despite the complexity and the far greater number of separate steps in the production and the number of agents involved in the process, this specific design process undergoes, in general terms, the same development as the construction of a drawing table, or the creation of an abstract painting, or the creation of a film. It is clear that the specific methods articulated within this particular project will be very different, but these will be selected according to the nature of the project. In this sense, these methods will be actually born from the project itself, as definitions of it, of its nature and of its content. Because the final goal of a given aeronautic engineering project is the production of a complex flying machine that operates within specified requirements, for which the aircraft has been designed, designers must precise requirements and specifications as their starting

8

As the philosopher and esthetician, author of the theory of the formativity (teoria de la formatività) Luigi Pareyson wrote: “[…] la matière résiste plus pour suggérer et évoquer que pour empêcher et entraver, puisqu’en devenant matière d’art l’intention formative transforme ces résistances en points de départ féconds et in heureuses occasions ; si bien que plus l’artiste sait devoir se mesurer durement à lui donner la ductilité que son but requiert” (PAREYSON, 2007: 62).

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point. For instance, the aircraft is being designed to operate in a given flight envelope, that is, the optimum environment for operational environment in the atmosphere, with a certain speed, at a certain height. These are some of the starting points of the whole project. In this case, because the requirements and specifications must be given at the outset, the whole process of conception will be developed based on these initial project parameters. The first conceptualizations of the planned aircraft will be developed with the intention to propose specific configurations that can most accurately match these requirements and specifications. The most basic specifications in the case of aeronautics are, for instance, the payload the aircraft will be able to carry, the range it is planned to have, the speed with which the aircraft will cover a given distance, the structural requirements, the type of function the aircraft is going to have, and so on. From these first modalizations drawn from the requirements, more concrete specifications can be devised. These specifications, the technical mandatory backbone that will lead and propel the course of the specific design project are “rational statements of what is wanted in an aeroplane so that it may best satisfy the requirements in terms of what is possible at the time” (STINTON, 1998: 37). In general, the specifications, which are the “yardstick against which the resultant is measured” (ibid), are pre-established by the customer or contractor prior to any step of planning; but, because of constant changes in industrial technology and production, there has been an increasing tendency to keep some parameters of the specifications flexible during the various necessary states of the aircraft construction. One of the actual problems is, for instance, the development of fuselage components with mixed materials in experimental or more modern aircraft: given the requirements of the aircraft, that of undergoing extreme speeds which increases heat in the fuselage and increases the stress on the structure, a significant problem arises as different heat-resistant materials must be glued in place using different methods instead of joining them by the applications of rivets. The material composition of the glue must be also heat-resistant and must not lose its intended properties when exposed to constant heat and structural stressing. This is an example that shows the kind of modalization the project has to undergo. This issue must be – or, in this case, planned to be – tackled with the available technology through the employment of foreseeable technology in the near future. Now, this is a matter of conceptualizations of the project, that is, new concepts must be proposed, elaborated, and accomplished. In so doing, new elements, new details not yet unveiled in the previous conception, reveal themselves and will demand to be dealt with. From a more general conception of an aircraft, new conceptualizations arise with ever-growing degrees of complexity until the manufacturing process can be undertaken. Generally stated, even though the de-

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grees of complexity and precision are much higher than in the in the field of graphic arts and design, the articulation of design process is still the same: from certain premises, new concepts will be drawn and in every new materialization, new discoveries and new inventions will take place – that is to say, the whole process is, again, pervaded by abductive processes that will increasingly demand exteriorizations, through which the newly synthesized and conceived elements can be put into effect (cf. JENKINSON and MARCHMAN III, 2003: 10-13). Let me provide another example to emphasize the processes of invention and discovery at work in design process. A model maker has a particular inclination for modeling a specific aircraft she or he admires most. The model maker intends to construct this specific aircraft as a scale model in the most accurate manner possible using mostly aluminum as medium. The main goal of this model maker is to construct the aircraft on a specific scale, say, 1:6, that is to say, six times smaller than the original. In this scale, most of the finest details, such as riveting and stressed aluminum skin, provoked when the aircraft is sustaining relatively heavier loads on its surface, are very characteristic and visible. They appear in the real aircraft and must be also constructed in the model, for the sake of the accuracy of the representation of the aircraft in this scale. Other details, such as the plexiglas used in the cockpit and in the windows must be modeled according to the real aircraft. Now, the first thing she or he must to come up with to start the process is to have the most accurate available plans of the aircraft. The best ways to ensure that the project will have this degree of accuracy is to find, if possible, the original factory drawings stored in a museum archive or in the archives of some manufacturer. If these plans are not available for some reason, such as, for example, these plans have been lost or are incomplete because the aircraft has not been chosen for serial production or because only few exemplars of it have been constructed, or because the aircraft was very experimental, then the model maker will have to trust the available information on the subject and start inferring from additional data, such as, for instance, photos or diagrams from other sources, and piece together the dimensions of the aircraft in order to have a clear plan of how to proceed with the construction of the model, inferring from this material the probable measurements and the estimated dimensions. But in the case of the availability of a complete set of engineering drawings, the work becomes easier in terms of initial information. The particular aim of this specific design process is to produce an accurate scale model of the original aircraft. This general aim is a very definite one in terms of its original premises, for it has a precise starting point and a very definite expected result. For this example, given the complexity of this particular de-

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sign process, I concentrate on the initial premises and on the specific consequences of these premises of this process. This will imply, here, the interpretation of the data available in the plans and the specific first step in accurately transforming the information of the plans into a tridimensional structure shaped with aluminum. The main purpose here, the leading idea of the process, is already defined. What is requested from this leading idea is that the further conceptions drawn from the idea must obey the specific measurements depicted by the technical drawings. The model maker must acquire the ability to translate the bidimensional information into a tridimensional structure of the scale replica with the appropriate accuracy. The first level of interpretation of the plan requires the ability to read the technical drawings and to understand the specific content of it. The purpose of this specific language is to guide the construction of the plane in a manufacturing environment, that is, to communicate specific information showing the conventions for representing curves, angles, cuts, sections, and general dimensions. That is to say, the technical drawings of the aircraft, the plans, convey the necessary information to technicians and constructers that will translate these signs into tridimensional forms by operating with the material, aluminum, to form it, to cut aluminum sheets and give them the proper shape with pressure machines, drill holes for riveting, and so on. The model maker must be able to grasp this first level of interpretation – a sort of engineering drawings’ syntax – in order to replicate the construction of the aircraft. The technical drawings have, here, the nature of a plan, that is to say, they have the nature of signs that convey intentional forms that need to be interpreted as intentional and will, in so doing, modify a certain habit of thought and conduct. The Italian art historian Giulio Carlo Argan has expressed this aspect of the plan, a sort of a project, when he wrote that, apparently, every project, in the sense of a plan, is a drawing in the same manner that every drawing is, at least potentially, itself a plan (cf. ARGAN, 1993: 156). In this sense, every technical drawing is a plan that will lead to an interpretant whose essence is one of translating the forms shown in the drawings into newly shaped, exteriorized forms. Now, what is implied here is not only that the plan will be followed and the scale model of the aircraft will be accordingly construed. The process of interpretation is a process through which a formative habit of action will be developed and through successive translations, forms will be shaped with the specific material, and this material will be then the embodying medium of these forms and shapes. This expression seems, at a first glance, to be tautological. However, it is needed to say that the habit of reading such a plan and thinking in accordance with the information thereby expressed must be

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formed, along with the subsequent interpreting habits, that is, the habits of transforming drawings into existing, modeled shapes. Before the actual work commences, these habits of translating forms must be acquired. Stated otherwise, the habit of thinking and producing mental forms with the aim of shaping them into existence must be thoroughly conceived. Along with that, there must be also the development of a mental habit of working with the specific medium chosen for the task. The model maker needs to achieve a given fluency in translating visual, bidimensional forms and specific technical codes, conventions, and parameters into aluminum forms shaped with accuracy. In order to achieve this fluency, the model maker must acquire the interpretative habit of seeing a certain drawing and mentally shaping it in the tridimensional space. The conduct attached to it will be developed within a formative process of developing self-control upon self-control, that is to say, of practicing these procedures several times, until an acceptable result is achieved. This result is, then, the fluent shaping abilities, molding pieces with determinate techniques using mostly sheets of aluminum. Here, it is possible to perceive the predominating habit of mind as well as of conduct in the field of design process that needs to be cultivated: there must be a strong connection between the mental work of projecting and the projective activity. This connection demands a certain degree of training, both intellectually as well as practically, for this connection and this type of activity cannot be only exclusively mental or exclusively practical. There is no such separation. There is a reciprocal relationship between the type of mental action that leads to invention and the practical models of production of something within a given projective or design context. This very connection between both mental and practical realms is of a pragmatic nature – and pragmatic in the sense of the semiotics of Peirce. In a very close sense, stated in the field of the theory of formativity of the Italian scholar and esthetician Luigi Pareyson, The productive force and the inventive capacity are therefore required by thought and by action, since speculative and practical operations are constituted by a formative activity, which, in the concerned field, executes and produces works at the same time as it invents the very manner in which these works will be carried out. (PAREYSON 2007: 37. My translation)9

9

In his theory of formativity, which proposes the inseparability of production and invention, Luigi Pareyson contends: “La force productive et la capacité inventive sont donc requises par la pensée et par l’action, puisque les opérations spéculatives et pra-

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Now, this idea of formativity in Pareyson’s theory gains utmost importance in the context of design process and semiotics because it reinforces the mode of conveying meaning from an earlier development of a concept towards the development of subsequent, more defined, improved, and refined developed conceptions, thus rendering a sense of sequentiality to the project as well as guaranteeing the continuity of its logical development. The continuity between antecedent and subsequent developments convey, as already stated, a given formation of habits of thought and conduct linked together with the aim of carrying out the intended plan. The most important feature of Pareyson’s quote about the specificity of a formative process is that it integrates, in the form-translating process, the heuristic moment, the inventive process, for, as he states, the productive force and the capacity of invention, the ingenuity implied in and pervading all of the process, are then requirements displayed by thought and conduct. In this case, whenever thought and conduct are articulated in a self-controlled manner to achieve a general purpose, speculative operations and practical articulations are pervaded by formative principles, which, within the scope of the specific project, forces the production and the execution of certain shapes simultaneously with the invention of the manner with which these shapes are being produced. This idea of formativity is in accordance with Peirce’s operation of the maxim of pragmatism, especially in relation to its guiding logic of abduction, as I will discuss in detail. Let me refine this train of thought with a more concrete example related to the making of a scale aircraft. Let me suppose that the model maker is assembling the general frame of the fuselage. The fuselage of this particular aircraft has a more rectangular shape, round on the vertices and slightly curved on the sides, but neither completely round nor oval (Fig. 1.1 and Fig. 1.2.). The aircraft has several sections mounted along the longitudinal axis of the fuselage, denominated stations, and each of these stations determine, through its bulkhead, the shape the aircraft possesses. But, in order to construct these shapes with aluminum and achieving the degree of accuracy, which is here a predominant parameter of the project, the model maker is required to somehow calculate the exact form of these curves in order to reproduce the shape in the station made for the scale model. Supposing that the model maker is not acquainted with the specific calculation required to do so, the modeling process comes to a halt. Without this specific knowledge of transporting the exact shape into the

tiques sont constituées par une activité formatrice qui, dans le domaine concerné, exécute et produit les œuvres en même temps qu’elle invente la manière dont elles vont être faites” (PAREYSON, 2007: 37).

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scale model with the required accuracy, it becomes difficult to proceed with the development of the basic forms of the model. Fig. 1.1: Three views and focus on the general assembly of the fuselage of the aircraft in question, a later model of the North American B-25 Mitchel, model J.

Microfilms of the North American B-25 Mitchel, EDM 47. Courtesy of the Archive of the Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center, National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institute.

Since one of the main parameters, because of the nature of this project, is to consider the mathematical accuracy to transpose shapes to the model, the model maker is required then to acquire extra knowledge, both in mathematical as well as in geometrical fields to tackle the subject. Moreover, since this aircraft has been produced many years ago, it is necessary to revise the methods for calculating dimensions that were in use for manufacturing aircraft present in the notations and engineering conventions of the technical drawings. This impairment of the modeling process has the nature of an obstacle, something that objects, that is, it is something that refuses to be known. One could also say that this obstacle poses a problem and now this issue must be tackled. A thorough analysis of the mathematical methods for dealing with such curves will reveal that this specific obstacle can be overcome with means both from algebraic functions as well as with geometrical methods of constructing curves. The specific type of curves formed by the sections of the aircraft reveal a peculiar shape, which is one of the known types of second-degree curves or degenerate conic sections. These curves are derived from procedures of cutting of a

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cone, that is to say, second-degree curves are derivations of a cone submitted to certain cuttings. Depending on the cut, the section obtained can be a circle, if the cut performed is perfectly parallel to the base of the cone; a parabola, if the cut is performed from above and carried out more or less inclined toward the base of the cone; or a hyperbola, if the cut is performed orthogonally in relation to the base of the cone near its central axis. The curves derived from these sections have distinct shapes and properties, which are mathematically and geometrically describable. Moreover, these complex curves are extensively used in technical drawings particularly because they convey the precise information of which kind of curve is to be constructed. The idea here is to discover how to calculate these shapes and how to reconstruct their specific shapes in the sections of the model. Now, the aircraft’s sections are constructed separately and then attached together by the longerons and stringers, that is, by longitudinal structures connecting the sections of the aircraft. This structural arrangement conveys the specific form of the particular aircraft in question. Overcoming the obstacle of how to convey the correct shape to the model of the aircraft means that these specific calculations need to be performed. Fig. 1.2: Detail of the front-view of the technical drawing showing the general assembly of the aircraft. Note the shape of the fuselage and its characteristic curves.

Microfilms of the North American B-25 Mitchel, EDM 47. Courtesy of the Archive of the Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center, National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institute.

The aforementioned idea of formativity, which, as I said, is based upon the maxim of pragmatism of Peirce, has the ability to differentiate and reintegrate newly discovered aspects of the signs in question. It can, therefore, enable a whole series of discoveries that will lead to the correct course of action for the task at hand. A thorough pragmatic analysis of these graphic and mathematic signs will

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eventually reveal that the sought curve is, in this case, a hyperbola. All the model maker has to do is to learn how to calculate and how to draw hyperboles according to the plans of the aircraft and recreating these hyperboles in the scale the aircraft will have. Thus, new plans leading to new possible courses of action are formed. Further analysis, with the aid of this experimental thinking and practicing, will reveal two specific methods of dealing with hyperboles, either algebraically or geometrically. Semiosis, in this case of the model making, especially regarding the processes involved in dealing with the correct shape of the fuselage, has been halted because of the obstacle. Restoring this stream of semiosis, that is, the further advancements in the making of the model, is here regarded as a matter of logical relations being constituted to produce further interpretants through the discovery of a missing link that bridges the last interpretant generated with further semiotic processes. Related to the context of design process, and specifically related to this particular design process, Peirce states that: […] in order to perform the reflections necessary to the straightening out the thread of thought and laying them orderly and parallel will consist mainly or at least first of all in defining to ourselves when the purpose is a purpose to bring about and what use, theoretical or practical, it is designed to subserve and that is Pragmatism. (MS 478, 1903: alternative sequence, page 20. Italics are mine)

The experimental methods and the dynamics of formativity, read logically in the perspective of Peirce’s semiotics, and especially pragmatism, becomes an important tool that helps transposing obstacles and helps to make newly discovered or differentiated local properties to become available to be reintegrated anew into the whole design process. As Peirce contends, “if pragmatism is the doctrine that every conception is a conception of conceivable practical effects, it makes conception reach far beyond the practical” (EP 2: 235), wherein pragmatism allows any sort of flight of imagination as long as the imagination propelled eventually renders practical bearings and effects. About the close relationship between the speculative and the practical operations, I must also contend, in light of Peirce’s pragmatism, that the speculative and the practical operations are not opposed instances that are forced to coexist; they are in a symbiotic relationship, in which the productive force, that is, all effort in exteriorizing ideas and producing are contributing and also participating in the speculative thinking in the same proportion in which the speculative thinking is unfolding itself aided by the productive force. This symbiotic manner of functioning is a further aspect of the dialogic character. But one very important reason why this symbiotic operation

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within formative processes is predominant is because the speculative character of the process enables heuristic attitudes of the mind, in which abductive inferences come more frequently and more actively into play. As Peirce, on this matter contends, “[…] speculative thought, […] is the greatest of locomotives for advancing upon the road of truth. Indeed, it is the extreme cases which alone, teach you anything new” (RLT, 192-193). In order to clarify the logic of events within the design process, I propose here to analyze more closely the logic of events inherent to design process. It is necessary to understand the process of generation of an idea as an act of abduction and its relationship with the process that generates new ideas, and also, by the same token, it is necessary to understand how new conceptualizations can be drawn from this generated content and from its appearance in the mind. How can the generation of new ideas and their mental appearances arouse a whole new series of semiotical processes? And, concomitantly, how can this semiotic process elicit embodied conceptions and realization? The Continuity of Design Process: Ideas, Concepts, Conceptualizations Projects and designs do not come into being in a pre-established, completed form as an automatized translation of the generated idea. They, the projects and designs, are normally products of an organized effort that occurs over a significant period of time, a period of mediation, that involves preliminary conceptualizations, a myriad of translations, definitions, subsequent embodiments of the concepts, corrections and improvements, until the concept becomes mature and can thereby be developed into the shape it was conceived to have (cf. HAUSER, 2013: 364). Generally stated, the whole procedure that engenders invention and discoveries is described – and circumscribed – by design process. This process introduces something not previously given. Even if the premises of a certain project are well established, the subsequent unfolding of a conception is neither controllable nor fully predictable. When a design, a project, is being developed, new aspects appear, at least partially; these new aspects can reveal and determine new directions for the whole process or can potentially reshape the course of development, by calling for a whole new procedure or new sets of procedures. The dynamic characteristic of design process clearly demonstrates that the process it-

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self will demand adjustments and adaptations regarding the procedures employed for the further development of the project.10 The newly formulated conceptions will unfold the projections into new forms and into new contexts: these conceptions will demand to be carried into execution with distinct materiality, occupying a mediatic space, delineated by certain forms and articulated with specific languages. The conceptions that gave impetus to this process will then be embodied in some media with the chosen materiality. Materiality as well as the specific mediatic and language articulations, in their turn, will act as defining instances given the fact that their possibilities and limitations will require specific actions in order to establish a dialog. In this case, design process assumes the character of a dialog, as already proposed: the interactors must deal with properties of materiality, media, techniques, languages, and technology, so that the concept will be thereby embodied. As already mentioned, this embodiment is a result of this dialog. The act of projecting unfolds as a dialog, in which the conceptions created are shaped, are translated into a more developed concept, are embodied in distinct and specific media, and are articulated in distinct actual or potential languages. Design process is, therefore, a dialogical process, for it takes into account the activities and agencies of the involved plans, elements, and material instances. Dialog is here understood as a concept that functions in relational terms within design process. That is to say, the projective activity driven by a mind needs to dialog with the active and relational characters of the materiality, the active and relational aspects of techniques and technology, as well as with whatever fields of knowledge may be related to the design process, in order to carry the project’s conception into execution. From the perspective of the theoretical framework here proposed to comprehend the phenomenon of design process, this dialog that pervades the entire design process can also be called semiosis. Semiosis, in Peirce’s terms, is the translation of a sign into another, more developed sign, called the interpretant of the sign. It is a developmental process, a process of

10

Observe, for instance, Susanne Hauser’s article “Verfahren des Überschreitens: Entwerfen als Kulturtechnik”. In this text, the author thematizes, from the perspective of cultural studies and techniques, what I call here in the present inquiry the logic of events inherent to design process. Hauser affirms: “Entwürfe weisen in eine Zukunft voraus, die in vielen Hinsichten nur imaginiert werden kann. [...] Während zahllose Möglichkeiten für seine Entwicklung offen sind, solange ein Entwurf entsteht, werden diese im Prozess des Entwerfens in Teilen ausgeschieden und abgewiesen, während eine komplexe Möglichkeit bis zur Realisierung konkretisiert wird” (HAUSER, 2013: 364).

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translation, in which the concept represented by the sign grows. Design process involves, thus, a specific mental procedure on the part of an agent – a designer, a project maker, or a skizzisten. With the concept mind, I do not mean an embodied brain-like mind, but an agent with the ability to interact and dialog with as well as to draw generalizations and to learn from this interaction with the project. So, in this view, the agent, the generalizing mind, can be just one physical person, a she or he who projects, but can also be a team of individuals acting together, in the same physical space or connected with some other means; as such, they act thus as one mind in order to carry the project into execution. This agent, or generalizing, learning mind, is situated in a peculiar state of uncertainty, for she or he operates in an epistemological in-betweenness, that is, exactly at the threshold between the unknown, the unsecure place with unknown order, and the already established, well-accepted knowledge. Her or his position marks directly the transition between critical predicament and an undecidedly – still to be formed – future and the task consists in stating in futuro the unthinkable in order to render something feasible. This epistemological in-betweenness has the power to constitute a room for playing, a space for intellectual freedom, where experiments of thought can take place, proposing the testing of conceptions, the assembling of elements of these conceptions and the conflating of parts of ideas, as well as separating elements of ideas in order to better perceive their particularities and specific nuances. In this context, plans for the specific courses of actions can be drawn from these experiments of thought and their embodiments into mediative supports (cf. HAUSER, 2013: 364-365; cf. KRAJEWSKI, 2008: 24; cf. PICHLER, 2009: 35). What is the status of the new mentally produced ideas and concepts while one is engaging in design process? I have already stated that new ideas are generated through an abductive process, in which ideas become hypostatized, that is, new elements are created by an act of serendipity of mental affections. Supposing that there are mental elements in a given consciousness that is totally or partially engaged in a given design process or a more general projective activity, it is possible to say that it is by acquiring and gathering experiences in this particular immediate context of design process, as well as by gathering experience from any other context of life, be it closely connected with such design context or from diametrally opposed realms of experience, that there will be in this consciousness an uncontrolled abduction of elements into new forms of synthesized ideas. This process generates new ideas – and here the adjective new indicates something that was neither previously in this particular consciousness nor was assembled by definable and identifiable parts of the contents already in the consciousness, as if it would be possible to decompose a new idea into its “assembled parts”. That is

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to say, the new idea is not an aggregate of discrete elements jostled together. The new idea, instead, is a whole new element not previously accounted for in the consciousness. The new means, therefore, that this synthesis is a new fusion of perceived and mental elements into something different, fresh, unique, in relation to the original context in which – and through which – it has been put forward by the abductive inference. This new idea appears in the mind and forces itself upon the internal perception. As it will be discussed in detail in the third part of the book, this internal perception insists on being recognized and, because of its attractive nature relative to the context in which it has been generated, this new idea, as perception, invades the consciousness in a rather qualitative manner comparable to a particular perfume or a musical piece that, qualitatively, that is to say, in what refers to the quality of feeling of such perceptions when they are deeply and completely felt in the consciousness, takes hold of the whole consciousness. The description of this logic of events, related to a given design context or any given projective activity, is accurately identified by John Dewey as well, when he, in his book Art as Experience, describes that: […] artist and perceiver alike begin with what may be called a total seizure, an inclusive qualitative whole not yet articulated, not distinguished into members. Speaking of the origin of his poems, Schiller said: “With me the perception is at first without a clear and definite object. This takes shape later. What precedes is a peculiar musical mood of mind. Afterwards comes the poetical ideas”11. I interpret this saying to mean something of the

11

Dewey quotes a passage of a letter written by Schiller to Goethe. In the original letter, dated from the 18th of March 1796, Schiller asks Goethe how Goethe’s generative process of creation comes into play: “Ich möchte wißen wie Sie in solchen Fällen zu Werk gegangen sind. Bei mir ist die Empfindung anfangs ohne bestimmten und klaren Gegenstand; dieser bildet sich erst später. Eine gewiße musikalische Gemüthsstimmung geht vorher, und auf diese folgt bei mir erst die poetische Idee.” Schiller emphasizes the adjective poetisch in this edition of the letters exchange. Cf. Friedrich SCHILLER, Johann Wolfgang GOETHE. Der Briefwechsel. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, Band 1. Stuttgart, Phillip Reclam, 2009, p. 180. There is a publication of the letters exchange between Schiller and Goethe in English translated by George H. Calvert and published in 1845 (New York and London, Wiley and Putnam) with the title Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, from 1794 to 1805. In Calvert’s translation, this specific message reads: “I should like to know how you go to work in such cases. With me the conception has at first no decided or distinct body: this forms itself only later. A certain musical mood arises first in my mind, and only after this follows the poetical idea”.

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kind just stated. Moreover, not only does the “mood” come first, but it persists as the substantiation after distinctions emerge; in fact they emerge as its distinctions. (DEWEY, 2005: 199. Italics are Dewey’s)

The uncontrollably produced qualities of feeling that have invaded the whole consciousness for a while eventually fade away and give room to the typical analytical powers of the self-controlled thinking. However, these newly formed ideas leave traces and, because they are still present in the form of subsequent interpretations of these imprints of qualities in different modes of meaning, force the cognitive powers to interpret it. The interpretations of it will demand new organizations of the whole context in which this new idea appeared. The consequence of this reorganization is that the subsequent interpretations of the idea will force themselves in a way as to propose a formulation of courses of action to render these ideas understandable, clearer, and, in the case of a projective action, executable. And from there, these mental formulations will be connected to the subsequent courses of action these plan-like mental-practical determinations will produce. Summarizing, the reorganization of the mental context present in the mind which comes into play because of this newly formed idea, is what is here meant by hypostatization. The status of the new calls here for a radical understanding of the generative powers of the mind in its logical aspects; abduction, as a living principle and also as an inference, plays here an important role as an element in the formative powers. Following this, and for the clarity of the exposed theory, I use the term idea in order to indicate the described process of generation of a new idea that appears to the perceiving mind through an abductive process. The term concept means here the initial mediatization or representation of the idea in a more defined manner – for instance, something captured in a sketch on paper or on canvas to serve as a registration of the first imprints and relations emerging in the mind. The concept of a car, or of a new configuration for an aircraft, a sketch of a project for architecture, or the concept for a new film, or the concept for a digital game. These are examples of early registrations drawn from their respective ideas, carrying with their mediatic manifestations in whichever materiality they are graphed or constructed. The term conceptualization here refers to the further development aiming at a determined realization of certain purposes drawn from the idea and from concepts, and yet being constantly contrasted with the initial idea. Conceptualization, as a process, brings with itself, therefore, the notion of continuity related to the project. Linked to the specific operation of conceptualization is the notion of

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iconoscopy12. This concept, as proposed by André de Tienne, here refers to the operation of a very broad observation from a certain distance of an unfolding pattern in the conduct and gauging it against an expected result. This type of dialog is an active part within every form of design process, for it acts as a regulator between the guiding purposes, general parameters, and the subsequent development of these purposes and parameters in the form of semiotic processes. This aspect is rendered clearer in semiotic terms, as Peirce points out: We think in signs; and indeed meditation takes the form of a dialogue in which one makes constant appeal to his self of a subsequent moment for ratification of his meaning in respect to his thought = signs really representing the objects they profess to represent. Logic therefore is almost a branch of ethics, being the theory of the control of signs in respect to their relation to their objects. (NEM 3/2: 886, 1908)

Conceptions and the conceptualizations, as I here employ the terms, bring about a very peculiar idea similar to the concept of the German term Gestalt, that is, the idea of a spreading form-giving process triggered by and reciprocally enabling the growth of an idea. In a close manner with which I am here considering the term, Maurice Merleau-Ponty considers Gestalt to involve general principles of distribution that become integrated in a constellation that spans space and time (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1968: 204-205). Gestalt is, in his sense, something general manifesting itself in several objective fragments, or embodiments within several media. The entirety of the form-giving principle that characterizes Gestalt cannot be reduced to the sum of its generated parts. There is a dialog between the phenomena of Gestalt, the principles that trigger them, and the actor or subject interacting with them. In this interaction, neither the objective realm of the things outside, the fragments, nor the subjectivity of an individual actor is primary (cf. MERLEAU-PONTY, 1979: 255; cf. ROWE, 1987: 76-77). Accordingly, a sort of “involvement in circumstances” occurs in such an environment in which the individual actor becomes totally absorbed. Through this, the individual actor is able to relate to this environment with a different understanding and exactly this allows a myriad of heuristic moments to appear (cf. MERLEAU-PONTY, 1968:

12

André de Tienne points out that the suffix “scopy”, from the Greek σκοπεῖν (skopein), which means “to observe from a certain distance, from above, or from a higher ground” related to the concept Iconoscopy, which de Tienne coined, denotes the study of something that has a character of an image, an appearance, and required to be seen from a broader perspective instead of a particularized form of analysing (cf. DE TIENNE, 2013: 27).

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205; cf. MALLIN, 1979: 12; cf. ROWE, 1987: 77). This is the main characteristic that conceptualization, as I here use the term, shares with the German Gestalt. In contrast with idea, in which only the quality of the appearance, or the visible mental imagery becomes emphasized, the term Gestalt implies the manner in which conceptualization not only becomes apprehended in sense-perception, but is considered also in its processual genesis, that is to say, as something that has been generated and carries this endowed power of conveying meaning along with it in its physical embodiment (cf. BUCHWALD, 2009: 821). The logic of design process here presented, though very synthetic in its presentation, demand a clearer example with a more defined and understandable context. Let me now introduce a more defined example based on a theorematic and speculative experiment of thought. This example, which brings to the foreground the formation of an idea and of its subsequent conceptualizations, will help to visualize the processes of abduction, of hypostatization, and of formation, as it goes. An Example of Design Process in the Context of Graphic Arts A graphic artist has discovered his inclination for conceiving sequential images and sets to conceive a plan to produce a graphic novel. The graphic artist has perceived that sequential images have the potential to tell a story, for sequential images have the power to acquire a certain narrative potential, which unfolds in space and time, that is to say, spaces with usual information that suggest sequential modifications of sense within a certain sequentiality and this sequentiality is characterized by temporality. The story for the graphic novel is underway, but the designer is struggling to define an important character for his story. This example focuses on the development of this character for the story both in what refers to the narrative as well as to the graphic portrayal of the character. This graphic artist has a certain tendency to develop his graphic works with more realistic figures and details, such as the visual representations found in neoclassical works of art of Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres and Jacques-Louis David (Fig. 1.3, Fig. 1.4.). The graphic artist has, however, not yet achieved the point of developing this realistic style with painting techniques and has not yet acquired a given fluency to articulate a complex story with this technique. He possesses, however, a certain mental impulse of pursuing this specific imagetic development and carrying on this chosen visual style into a fluent personal technique. And yet, the plan guiding this implementation seems to be too faint and remains for the moment as only a general purpose.

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Fig. 1.3: Excerpt of Jacques-Louis David’s (1748-1825) Leonidas at Thermopylae. Circa 1814. Black Chalk – Squared Black Chalk (40,6 x 54,9 cm).

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Fig. 1.4: Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867). Madame Edmond Cavé (Marie-Élisabeth Blavot, born 1810). 1818. Oil on Canvas, (40,6 x 32,7 cm).

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

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There are, up to this moment, loose ideas of possibilities of how the story, which should be articulated with visual techniques, could unfold. There are maybe some isolated scenes as well as some mental operations in which some short sequences of actions can be visualized. Some mentally sketched character can be visualized as well as some situation becomes more or less identifiable in this rather misty mental environment. Apart from that, however, there is nothing else that draws these ideas together with a major impulse to start outlining it in a more defined manner. These ideas are similar to a dream, in which only some points of it are intelligible with more or less defined happenings; the rest is an aggregation of loose apparitions, forms without a defined permanence, which bear no further connectivity with each other. Up to this time, however, one of the most important ideas will tend to become more defined in a gradual transition because of the very nature of this possible project: the idea of a narrative. This idea would be, if properly developed, the core of the project. It has the potential to attract other ideas, because of its potential of telling a story. If carried out and developed further, it would unfold the whole narrative of the story, that is, the story would be made concrete if this idea would be developed. And yet it is, in this very moment, just as possible an idea as the others. Other ideas related to the conduct of the characters have the same importance of telling a story because of the actions of these characters also help to propel the storytelling. These are other relevant parameters of this specific storytelling. However, if they remain only possible and undetermined in the mind, they remain only a possible idea as any other possible ideas, indefinitely. As a consequence, these potential ideas, if these are not developed and do not enter the flow of development, may be annulled by their own idleness. As Peirce states in relation the possibilities, “the logic of events would require these new determinations to specify themselves, to insert themselves” (MS 942, 1898: 48, alternate sequence). He contends, furthermore that: […] it is […] the essential nature of Purpose that it cannot be directed toward itself but develops itself in creating. The representation is directed toward its object. In the course of bringing that object into rationalization, making a statue out of a stone, the thought accomplishes itself. (MS 478, 1903: 20)

Some of these ideas will vanish if they are not further developed. Others will stay undeveloped until conditions arise in the mind, so as to cultivate them into a certain determination in which these ideas will become intelligible and will bear fruits in the form of important conceptualizations for the whole project. These

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conceptualizations will, in their turn, act as the basis for the concrete implementation of conduct through which the project gradually takes shape. Certain ideas will merge with others because of certain conditions, say, because of the similarity of temporality, which is, as already mentioned, a characteristic of storytelling, and the conduct of individual characters. For instance, both ideas, the undefined general principle for storytelling and the one that presents some undefined characters and their actions tend to be in a certain relation to one another. Thus far, however, there has not been yet any modification in the mind, at least in perceptual terms, that would increase the intensity of the ideas as to reach a form of strong volition in order to implement the design process. As Peirce contends, this type of potentiality does not immediately result in actuality. It will mediately, perhaps. However, what immediately was that unbounded potentiality, becomes a potentiality of this or that sort, – that is, of some possiblepotential quality (cf. MS 940, 1898: 11). Although at this point the idea of telling a story, as already mentioned, is as non-intense as the other potential ideas, it holds the general premise that, if sufficiently nourished and developed, it would eventually lead to an actual story. It is important to note that by expressing that an idea of storytelling would lead to an actual telling of a story, I am revealing the pragmatic dimension related to design process in the specific context of this example. It is important to mention that, in Peirce’s philosophical context and also in consonance with his semiotics, ideas have the potential to create physical effects: this process, as I shall discuss in detail later in the book, unfolds as a process of semiosis. It is also important to mention that, although I am describing the development of an idea hypothetically within a particular mind of a graphic artist, this line of argumentation is by no means a fall back to any introspective or cognitive psychological theory. The discussion remains in the field of logic and describes, circumscribed by this particular example, what normally happens to any trained perceiving mind engaged in a given design process.13

13

To reinforce the concept of logic in this study, I quote a passage from Peirce, which reinforces the sense in which logic as semiotics is being considered in this book: “Logic includes a study of reasoning, it is true, and reasoning may be regarded, – not quite correctly, but we may waive that point, – as a psychical process. If we are to admit that, however, we must say that logic is not an all-round study of reasoning, but only of the conditions of reasoning being bad or good, and if good to what degree, and in what application. Now good reasoning is reasoning which attains its purpose. Its purpose is to supply a guide for conduct, – and thinking, being an active operation, is a species of conduct, – in case no percept from which a judgment could have been di-

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All these mentioned ideas are only potential – although some of them appear to the mind and can have a certain “illustrative permanence” – as in this case, when the graphic designer expresses them with a proposition, with which he may verbally express her or his wishes to develop this or that graphic work, develop a graphic novel based on this or that idea, or develop a storyboard – which is also a sequential form of imagery that tells a story – aiming at some form of audiovisual production. These expressions – more resembling whishes – are connected with these ideas and function as indications for the ideas. But these ideas do not currently possess a significative permanence as an idea that insists on being perceived. This can be demonstrated by analyzing the type of the fruits produced by these ideas, that is to say, what appears in connection with this indexical sign of the verbal proposition: if the indication points out the idea only a few times, without repeating itself regularly, it is possible to perceive that there is no sufficient permanence of the idea as a consolidated habitualization that will guide the process of the production of further conceptualizations departing from this idea. The repetition of the regularity, which, in this case, indicates the permanence of the idea, reflects the formation of conceptions being produced from the idea, from which a series of conceptualizations is occurring. Now, let us suppose in this particular line of argument representing the graphic artist and his search for developing a graphic story, that the graphic artist, while watching a film, perceives a determinate character that attracts her or his attention. In a previous moment, the graphic artist had been previously struggling to imagine and to draw visualizations from his imagination of the characters of his story, for, as it is in the other ideas, the ideas for the characters are still very incipient and he could only rarely glimpse them. One of his preoccupations with the characters of his story is the development and definition of a certain character that will have a rather important role in the development of the story. By seeing a quite random character in a film, new perceptive information will flow into the imagination of the graphic artist. The character of the film possesses some characteristics, both physical and psychical, that strongly resemble some of the characteristic features the graphic artist imagines his character to possess. The characteristics of the character of the graphic artist’s story, until the very moment of watching the film, were mere ephemeral considerations. The artist could not yet have decided which physical and psychical appearance the character would possess – which eye color, which body characteristics, which hair color; and also, how this character will behave, what would the character

rectly formed, is at hand. Its object is to say what the reasoner either will think when that percept occurs, or what he would think if it did occur” (EP 2: 386-387).

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think or what kind of conduct would the character have in such and such situations. But now, seeing the film has introduced new information that, because of those similarities, will force a deliberate definition of the character. And then, something happens. From the blurry, ephemeral idea of a character, a newly synthesized idea is formed, bringing about a new appearance to the graphic artist’s mind. This new internal appearance, that is to say, an internal act of perception invades and persistently forces itself into the graphic artist’s consciousness in such a way that he cannot perceive otherwise but to reckon what is in front of his mental eyes. This new appearance is a new phaneron, a new synthesis, brought about by an abductive process. As a product of abduction, the new idea is not simply a derivative idea of what was already in the graphic artist’s mind summed up with the new information acquired by watching the film. Nor is the appearance of the new idea of the character a “copy” of the film’s character. The new idea of this character is the product of a synthesis from which a whole new idea is generated and emerges by putting elements together that have never been even conceived before and creating an utterly new – and different – idea. But most importantly, this idea has a strong persistence and will force itself to be recognized. As Peirce says regarding abduction, the mind seeks to bring the facts, which were modified by the newly made discovery or invention, into order. And, from this hypostatization, the mind tends to form a general conception in the light of the new discovery (cf. EP 2: 286). This new synthesis is the result of an abductive process. This abductive process is, however, only one among a myriad of many others that will follow within this specific design process. The Logic of Abduction and Idea-Generation This specific abduction of the example introduces the definition of one of the characters of the designer’s story. In order to render this abductive process clearer, I will slow it down and revise its most significative relational aspects. With this, I wish to furnish an account of how the results of the abductive process became embodied in the form of an elaborated mental conception. Let me recapitulate: prior to this specific abduction, this specific character of the graphic artist’s story had no definite characteristic features and, as such, was only present by the effect of a very ephemeral idea of potentially possessing some characteristics. This means that the character would appear, in some aspect – though in all respects very ephemerally – with a certain set of physical characteristics. This appearance will, however, vary from imagination to imagination, for

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the idea of this character possesses no persistence. This variability of appearance is an indication of the undefinability of the idea. The graphic artist might try to represent the character in some form of visuality, say, by producing a drawing on a sketchbook or even producing a realistic painting on a canvas with more elaborated techniques. No matter how much the designer tries to force a definition of this character and detail this specific representation of the character down to its more realistic aspects, the idea that elicits mediately the sketch or the painting is not yet defined, and, in some respect, this undefinability will be somehow detectable. It is a matter of feeling of the graphic artist: for instance, she or he will not accept the newly produced representation as a faithful representation of her or his idea of the character. There will be a certain disparity between both the idea and the produced representation. The chosen conduct of sketching or painting will be eventually dismissed as not matching. Therefore, the disparity between idea and the subsequently produced graphic works are mismatches between the expected parameters drawn from the generated idea and the present conduct gauged against the idea. In this sense: […] a particular conduct is being mapped or gauged against a general formula, patterns will be matched against antecedent patterns, until a final diagnosis emerges that states whether a particular conduct or activity managed to inscribe itself within the larger set of pattern-compliant conducts. (DE TIENNE, 2013: 31)

Any form of representation of the character in visual terms can be made. But, unless the idea is more specifically defined, there are no criteria for deciding for this specific representation or for another specific representation, or for a third one. Since the guiding idea of the character is still undefined, any form of representation of the character is just as possible as any other. But the specific abduction in question, in this case, introduces the required definition by presenting to the mind this specific synthesis of new forms related to the character in question. It is important to say that the abductive process only happened because the mind was surrounded by such ideas, which, although vague and non-intense, helped to furnish certain information to the inference. The synthesis, I reiterate, is not a sum of the information aggregated and summed up with the new information from the film. The synthesis is the creation of a new form – a new paradigm for the purpose of defining the referred character of the story. The result of the spontaneous abductive process of formulating this new synthesis comes in the form of a whole new perception in the mind. This internal perception forces itself to the mind as mentioned previously and, in this case, it becomes so intensely present in the mind that it cannot be ig-

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nored. This insistence of the perception of this new form demanding to be recognized by the mind such as it appears, demands as well further conceptions to be formulated by the mind according to this perception in its presentness. There is, however, a certain perceptive dynamic involved in this process that commences with this intense presentness and subsequently proposes the formulation of conceptions according to the perception. The perception of this intense presentness of the new synthesis, what I have been denominating generated idea, has a phenomenological nature, for it is not yet a component of the semiotical process, but tends to set off a myriad of semioses. Concepts, Conceptualizations, and Form-Giving Process With this rather detailed account of this particular design process, it is possible to draw three important conclusions. The first refers to the kind of definition that abduction introduces into the idea of the referred character: henceforth, this character cannot be conceived differently, for the definition of the idea that took place with the insistent perception of the newly synthesized idea, demands that all subsequent conceptualizations be formed according to this new definition. The effect upon the perceiving mind is that of proposing conceptions of the character with these specific characteristics, because the mind, driven by the insistence of the perception, cannot conceive the character otherwise. Second, it is important to note that the abductive process took place only after the graphic artist’s mind had been surrounded by and immersed in conjectures and possible ideas about this specific character or about the story in some respect. This leads to the third, and perhaps more important conclusion: although abductions are spontaneous acts of the mind, through which new ideas are synthesized and this spontaneous act is an uncontrolled inference – that is to say, it is not consciously controlled, but rather a free act of serendipity –, abductive processes can be stimulated and trained to take place within some definite conditions. This particular abduction regarding the development of a character for a graphic story is but only one of a myriad of other abductions that take place within the design process implied in this specific project. However, some of these abductive processes will mark the design process with more intensity than others. After this specific definition through the abductive process, the appearance of the idea will demand a certain consolidation of the subsequent conceptions. The new information synthesized comes with a powerful – and yet vague – appear-

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ance. As such, this new mental phaneron14, or phenomenon, although persistent and definite – demands extensive conceptualizations, tests, executions, experimentation, and further embodiments. Without these subsequent conceptualizations and externalizations, the appearance of this idea would remain a mere mental appearance and would be only a possibility. And by remaining a possibility, it could annul itself and vanish because of the lack of development, as aforementioned. The further conceptions drawn from the phaneral content of the generated idea will range from thought experiments to sketches, written notes, and crude indications made on paper, up to more elaborated graphic embodiments, such as more definite and technically elaborated illustrations of the specific character in question. These illustrations will tend to include, in these representations, the probable conduct of the character within the novel, as well as some of the character’s psychological features. In order to express exactly that – a sort of personal identity of the character, not only physical, but also especially describing the type of person this character must be – further procedures and methods for the visual representation with this aim will present themselves. For example, in order to guarantee the realistic type of drawing the designer wishes to include into the visuality of his graphic novel, she or he may have a model, whose bodily appearance is similar to what she or he conceives the character to possess, posing for the designer while she or he photographs this model. These photographic studies will be the basis for the realistic representation of the character. These representations will, in turn, be made with the chosen painting techniques based on the visual reality achieved by the photographic study. After defining this aspect of the conceptualization, the next step is to develop the psychological aspects of the character in question, in order to define how this character will behave within the planned framework of the story. This particular, first abduction, demands further embodiments to guarantee the continuity and the development of the generated idea. The definition of the character, the character’s appearance, how the character will behave, how the graphic representations will be made in order to communicate all these aspects, which kinds of graphic studies and techniques, with which materiality – all these

14

Phaneron, from the Greek word φανερός (phanerós), is a coined word proposed by Peirce to mean something manifested in the mind in any form, and means the same as phenomenon. As Peirce explains, “the word φανερός (phanerós) is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifestation […]. There can be no question that φανερός (phanerós) means primarily brought to light, open to public inspection throughout […]” (MS 337, 1904: 4-5).

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definitions that are part of the subsequent conceptualizations are forms of successive inferences and experiments taking place in this particular design process. This rule-finding process functions by extracting the practical bearings from the conceptualizations formulated as necessary consequences and by promoting the development of representations that will embody these specific set of features required, as in a form of finding an identity of a proposed graphic representation or finding rules for these graphic representations. For instance, if the story takes place on an island in the South Pacific, and the graphic representation chosen for the story is more of the realistic kind, then the colors chosen, the type of painting, the techniques employed will tend to reflect realism by revealing the intrinsic characteristics of an island in the colors, the type of stroke of the brush, the quality of the light, or the quality of the bluish-green colors used to represent the water, or what kind of specific painting technique will be used in order to represent the ocean within the representational framing required for the realism of the story. The representations will tend, then, to follow the established graphic rules that will, in turn, be the visual identity of this particular graphic novel. And all the forms of testing these definitions and of developing them into more consolidated forms of graphic expression in accordance with the definition introduced by abduction are of the nature of inductive inferences becoming operative within design process. Every formative operation within design process – here is the example regarding the formation of the character of the graphic novel – has an inductive and experimental aspect as well. While engaging in such a formative process, the signs produced, that is, the conceptualizations drawn from the idea, are analyzed, decomposed, and further explored. There is a series of discoveries being made in each execution and these form a gradual set of specific information which can be called subdeterminations of the sign, in accordance with the category theory reading on pragmatism. In the third part of the book, I will discuss this concept in detail. Each experiment that is carried out unveils new knowledge that was still undefined in the previous experiments and embodiments. An example of this can be seen in the following series relative to the definition of the character in question. In order to achieve the type of expression that this character will have within the story, it is necessary to develop, within the graphic context, the required composition with which this character will communicate mediated by visual signs, since the visuality here is of utmost importance. This refers to how the character will be drawn, how drawing and painting materials will be used to develop the required intentionality and communicative potential for the expressivity of the character in order to transmit this to the reader of the graphic story. With each further experimentation and actual development of the signs in question, that is to say, the graphic works being

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composed, practical determinations related to these successive discoveries take place successively and these will assume the nature of ‘practical consequences’ being collected from the definitions of the discovered elements. Once the design process achieves an acceptable degree of experimentation in relation to the generated idea, the conceptualizations of the character will be then accordingly constituted. These constituted conceptualizations of the character will carry in themselves the potential to communicate the intended forms that they have been designed to transmit. This endows the several representations of the character of the story to embody certain modalizations of meanings, which, within a range of possible communicative potentials, can set off a range of interpretations. This is the effect experienced, for instance, by a reader of an image of a person, say a neoclassic painting from Ingres: there is a myriad of possible interpretations that can be achieved by the reader. However, these interpretations have a certain motif expressed by the forms embodied in this painting, which will demand that these motifs will be accordingly interpreted. A whole series of interpretations can be made from the painting; however, in what refers to the communicative forms offered by this specific painting, these forms cannot be arbitrarily interpreted as being, for example, non-figurative or being abstract in the sense of the modern abstract expressionism. As already pointed out, these various motifs must be guided by the logical interpretants transmitted by the image, which tend to guide the reading and the interpreting of the image respecting it as it presents itself and respecting the forms communicated by it. It does not mean a “fixation” of meanings nor a reduction of the communicative potential of the image, but it requires that the forms communicated must be read as they present themselves first, before more explorative conjectures can be made. This is valid as well for sequential images, such as in the present example of the graphic novel. There must be, here, another factor to be reckoned with, as aforementioned: the temporality implied in the sequences of images, from which a sense of storytelling can be drawn. While developing the character in its graphical aspects, and correlating the discovered information unveiled in the respective graphic experimentations, some of these discoveries will be included in the mainstream of conceptualizations thus far formed. For instance, to achieve a certain expressivity or a determinate tension within a given part of the story, the character needs to be visualized from a certain angle, as if the “camera” has been placed above the character, as in a plongé, or high-angle shot. This requires that the graphic artist must include – in order for the sequence to achieve the expression she or he wants it to

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have – all his achieved knowledge and hitherto discovered elements within this specific design process. With this example, it is possible to perceive the pragmatic character of integration of modalizations operative in this design process. That is to say, pragmatism’s capacity to integrate or reintegrate anew the discovered elements within a major context. This thus forms a larger systemic context, which is, in this case, the articulation of the image-conceptualizations into the visual narrative, or the temporal structure of the graphic novel. Purpose, Conceptualizations, and Realization As I pointed out, the core idea of this whole graphic project is the graphic novel and the core of a graphic novel, as it is in every novel, is the storytelling. The sequentiality of images assumes the main function of telling a story. This is the purpose of the whole project. Guided by the main purpose of telling a story, the highest priority that presses the matter is the integration of the newly developed character, as it, the character, has been discovered by the formative process, into the system of the narrative already formed. I say discovered based on the maxim of pragmatism and its capacity of modalization, through which new knowledge about the sign within a given semiosis will be differentiated. With this process of differentiation, new properties will be unveiled and will be articulated as new knowledge, which will then be transposed into other contexts, hence the also pragmatic operation of knowledge transfer. For example, supposing that there will be a moment in which the character will face a difficult situation, and with it a certain suspense will appear, the graphic artist is challenged with the graphical expression of this new psychological state presented by the character in the moment of suspense. There are plenty of ways the graphic artist might compose this specific scene and communicate it in a certain way as to provoke in the reader a certain set of possible interpretations, specifically how the character of the story acts and feels while facing a specific challenging situation. The graphic artist could, for instance, rely on the interaction between the narrative power of sequenced images and text that, in connection with each other, perform in a similar manner as that of most comics and graphic novels. With the text, the graphic artist could inform the reader about her state of mind and her feelings while the images would show a given sequence. This would be a rather conservative approach, albeit a possible manner to express the situation with clarity. Another possibility is to rely more heavily on the narrative power of sequential images, showing with vivid graphic expressions how the sequentiality would, rhythmically, reveal its aspects, unfolding the nar-

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rative in forms of indices. And, at the end, the sequenced images would suggest the climax by use of indices and visual rhythm caused by the manners in which sequenced images have been put together. Another possibility is to make use solely of the chosen technique used to paint the character and the scenes and using variations of visual techniques to transport the feeling, sentiments, and impressions that the character is currently subjected to the way the character is formally presented to the reader. Moreover, text can be also articulated in a way, but not to explain the character’s state of mind and the character’s feelings, but in a poetical or metaphorical manner, as to create some other tension. Since sequential images work within a certain formal framing that separates each individual image, these boundaries between the images could also be used – or transformed – into imagetic interferences that, because of the disorganizing, can create the sought visual tension at the character’s psychological level. After this more detailed exhibition of the formative process, it is possible to submit that the pragmatic character underpinning design process lies in the specific processuality of formativity as an operation that connects conjectures with a driving impulse to exteriorize and connects also the mental, intellectual, and intentional, with the material, the perceivable, and with a self-controlled action. And from that it is possible to draw an important conclusion as well. In every process of determination, in every form of seeking a more clarified and specified embodiment of the leading idea through the development of subsequent conceptions, there will be a myriad of several accompanying processes of discovery: the sought properties need to be, indeed, discovered. They need to become experienced in the process of making. These newly found properties, a process at work in the modalization of the maxim of pragmatism, are then matter of further abductions taking place simultaneously with the formative process. Moreover, this process of discovery is always occurring pari passu, that is to say, concomitantly with a specific form-giving process.

RESEARCH METHODS ARTICULATED IN THIS BOOK As already stated, in order to support this theoretical argument, two research methods will come into play in this inquiry. The first is the hypotheticodeductive method. In general terms, this method describes the proposal of a new hypothesis to explain a certain state of things. In accordance with the hypothetico-deductive method, the consequences of the stated hypothesis are proposed. From this, the scaffold of the research is developed. In more specific terms, I have stated that, based upon the framework of Peirce’s semiotics, design process

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unfolds guided by the logic of events of a mental nature, in which conceptual thinking and purposive conduct are connected by a principle of continuity. Design process has, in this framework, a semiotic nature; it is as well an open-ended process that enables creation, invention, and discovery. The consequences of this thesis, which here functions as the leading hypothesis, will be then drawn and explored. The following argumentative line will then assume this thesis to be true and argument logically in its favor, leading to a logical conclusion that has the following configuration: assuming the aforementioned hypothesis to be true, the reader should expect to encounter in every phenomenon of design process the drawn consequences of the hypothesis that guides this study. This is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method. The second research method is the inductive method. Although this method does not inform the present research as strongly as the first, it can nevertheless be perceived in the form of the reconstruction of the theoretical framework of Peirce’s theory of inquiry. In so doing, the main aspects of Peirce’s theory of discovery, with special regard to abductive inferences are brought into a new, more systematic, light. The reconstruction of Peirce’s specific theories I have undertaken can be found in the manuscripts chosen to support the thesis. Exactly this reconstruction characterizes the inductive reasoning understood here as a method of research. The present inquiry is based upon the themes of four important manuscripts of the later philosophy of Peirce. These manuscripts on semiotics, pragmatism, normative sciences, and theory of inquiry, written between 1898 and 1907, provide the most important theoretical contexts supporting the main claim of this work. While some of these manuscripts have been partially published, a more detailed investigation of the full breadth of these texts reveals arguments that focus on the theoretical discussion of theory of discovery, abductive, and formative processes Peirce sought to tackle. While the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce will be thoroughly and systematically discussed in the third part of this book, I chose to advance this discussion in the present part in order to provide the readership with the main theories and insights that can be drawn from the selected manuscripts. In this section, I will not go into the details of the complex philosophical theories surrounding semiotics. The aim here is to present the manuscripts, their particular contexts, such as their date of production and the type of project Peirce was working on, the philosophical problems Peirce was tackling when he wrote them, as well as to present the relevant subjects for the present research problem contained in each of them. By anticipating this, I intend here, as aforementioned, to provide the readership also with an overview of the main issues of the possibility and conditions of discovery, the processes involved in invention, the conception of continuity and the

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ideas of flowing stream, communication of forms and interpretation, and the idea of future-orientedness inherent to every form of projective activity. Moreover, the semiotic and pragmatic character of design process, as well as the allpervading logic of abduction, is based upon the matters treated in these manuscripts. An Overview of the Expected Contributions from the Manuscripts As already stated in the introduction, the present reconstruction is based upon four manuscripts written by Peirce between 1898 and 1907. The relevance of these manuscripts for the present inquiry into design process in light of semiotics is that they provide the study with the main theoretical frameworks of invention, discovery, form-giving, rule-finding and experimenting. The framework drawn from Peirce’s philosophy reveals itself as an open-ended theory of inquiry of phaneroscopic, or phenomenologic, semiotical, pragmatic, and abductive nature. All those main systematic aspects pertaining to the theory of design process are furnished to the present inquiry by the manuscripts. A thoroughgoing formulation of the generation of an idea is, for instance, provided by the manuscript written in 1898 and formed by three segments, MS 940, 941, and 942. This manuscript approaches the fundamental problem of generation and of formation from a highly theorematic and mathematico-topological standpoint. Though highly general, hypothetical, and abstract, this manuscript has the advantage of a theorematic exposition with a modalization of the process of genesis, of creation, as well as of the process of formation and growth, which can be used to support theoretically the reflection upon the engendering of the new, upon the emergence of new ideas and concepts from a certain context. Therefore, this manuscript contributes to the present inquiry in what refers to the theoretical and theorematic description of the general processes of creation and evolution of ideas within a mind or mental contexts. The modalizations, ranging from the possible, through the existent, and to the development of regularities and habit, which is provided by the theorematic approach, also supports the proposition of a powerful hypothesis of the formation of ideas based on relations and formative processes encompassing thus the apparition of possibilities in the mind to the recurring events leading to the formation of mental habits and the habit of proposing courses of action. Though quite general in regard to its lines of arguments and not only limited to the realm of the mental, but also expanded to a formalization of growth processes in cosmological realms, the model of generation and of growth of ideas, and of formation of habits of performing generalizations, when combined with the theory of logic relations of the later theories of semiotics, is

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able to furnish the basis for a theory of generation of ideas through abduction, hypostatization of forms, of discovery and invention. The main contribution from the manuscript 283, entitled “The Basis of Pragmaticism”, written in 1906, lies in the formulation of the communicability of purposes, the growth of ideas through semiosis, and the highest ideals of pragmatism, which connects purposes with formation of habits of action. In this manuscript, Peirce develops further the interconnection between his normative sciences, esthetics, ethics, and semiotics, contending that semiotics is the basis that would prove the maxim of pragmatism. In this text, Peirce uses the formulation of pragmaticism, as he indicated in his 1905 article “What Pragmatism Is”. According to him, pragmaticism is a word “ugly enough to be safe of kidnappers” (Peirce, 1905b: 166). But as already indicated in the introduction of the book, this modification is short lived, for one year later he drops this name in favor of the original term. The MS 283, though highly intricate, reveals the logic of sign process, especially focusing on the process of translation of forms and purposes. Here, Peirce emphasizes that it is only through successive semioses, that is through the successive translation of signs into other more developed signs, that ideas can grow, become embodied, diversified. Moreover, semiosis can also lead to the transformation of habits of action depending on the type of process involved in the specific semiosis. The immediate implication of this manuscript for design process is the linkage of concepts of intercommunication of purposes and growth of ideas related to the logic of relations within semiotics. In this case, semiosis functions in a way of enabling a given purpose to be attained by transforming signs and producing changes of habits of action. Semiosis, logic of relations, and interpretation are then connected in a theory that proposes the growth of ideas by imparting to them the principle of continuity and of sequentiality. Considering, for instance, any example given in this book thus far, it is possible to understand the kinds of development within design process as a succession of mediatic manifestations oriented by the main purpose and contrasted constantly with the generated idea until a certain satisfactory aim or result is achieved. The third chosen manuscript, the lengthy and multilayered MS 318, entitled simply “Pragmatism”, contributes to the present inquiry with a further development of semiotics by connecting the concept of interpretant, that is, the more developed sign formed by the mediation of a first sign, with the maxim of pragmatism. Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism is the theory that states that the whole meaning of an intellectual concept – which has a similar nature of a plan of experimentation – lies in its capacity to produce certain kinds of events under given experiential circumstances. Experimentation, in light of pragmatism, becomes

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a medium of purposeful action, through which a plan is put to action and semiosis unfolds. This theory complements the semiotical theory developed in the MS 283 by connecting the experimental character of pragmatism with the ability of perform translations of semiotics in a more synthetic manner. This manuscript presents a functional formulation of pragmatism and its connection with specific types of signs that function with a similar nature of a “plan”, which draws successive courses of action from a given general purpose and proposes distinct courses of action according to this purpose, thereby becoming a fully blown, functional theoretical feature that successfully encompasses the processuality expressed in design process. Otherwise stated, design process can be described by a functional semiotical theory that does not make the differentiation between theoretical, mental, on the one side, and practical, material on the other: semiotics and pragmatism comprehend the symbiotic relationship of the principles of formativity at work in design process. The fourth selected manuscript, MS 693, “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery wherein Logic is conceived as Semeiotic”, written in 1904, contributes to the investigation of this book by presenting the interdependence between semiotics and the other disciplines and their specific inquiries within Peirce’s philosophical architectonic. Central to the theory of inquiry of which semiotics is at the core and assumes a hinging function, is the active imagination playing a central role in discovery. From a systemic perspective, abduction is in this manuscript understood not only as an inference, but also as a living principle functioning here by drawing principles from other theoretical disciplines of the philosophical systems, such as mathematics, phenomenology or phaneroscopy, esthetics, and ethics. Abduction performs discoveries by bringing different elements, contexts, and semiotical bundles in specific relations to generate new syntheses. The systemic relational and multidisciplinary functioning of abduction confer important knowledge to Peirce’s theory of inquiry: abduction possesses a close connection to phenomenology and to esthetics and requires, in order to perform syntheses, which will lead to discoveries in distinct contexts, a specific phenomenologic and also esthetic training. In the specific context of sign process, it is possible to conclude that this training is present in the form of more sensible and sensitive forms of perceiving relations, signs, and semiotical contexts, as well as in the mental ability of connecting relations together. As I shall discuss in the third part of the book, this is the most important feature for the generative aspect of design process, one that requires cultivation and constant training.

Research Problems and the main Hypothesis of the Present Inquiry

RIGID STAGE PROCESS AND THE “PROBLEM” OF PROBLEM SOLVING The first problematic view to be addressed in this work is the uncriticized theoretical discourse that frames design process as far too rigid a process, as well as this rigidity’s relation to invention and to discovery. These investigations have been articulated within a strict psychological context based on methodologically rigid stages of development. The rather traditional discourses exhibit logical inconsistencies regarding both the logical articulations of design process, as well as the use of methods applied for a given projective action within a specific design process. The vast majority of works heretofore published on creativity, projective thinking, and inventive mindset, all emphasize the plasticity of mental acts of creation and invention, stating also that the main objective of such projective activities and creative thought is to create new states of things. Paradoxically, however, the process itself is portrayed as a series of methodologically discrete – or rigid – stages that are markedly deterministic, mechanistic, and positivistic. Most of the significant investigations hitherto published in the area of design process that thematize implicit logical operations are grounded on the discussion upon psychological arguments, mostly upon discourses and trains of thought derived from more deterministic and mechanistic psychological definitions of problem solving. The “logical” account is, then, bound to be restricted by what William James, at the end of the nineteenth century, called the “psychologists’ fallacy”. This fallacy means that the observer mistakenly claims that her or his subjective experience amounts to the entirety of the phenomena or events observed, thereby reducing the entirety of the experience to its immediate subjective result. This can be extended to contemporary descriptions of design process. These widespread views, especially regarding invention and discovery as well as the repre-

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sentation of the logical procedures of design, are still based upon inherited notions derived mostly from schools of psychology such as Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, behavioral research, and information processing theory. These views of discrete stages render certain phases of design process accountable, observable, discriminable, measurable, and controllable. These phases or stages, however, are not apt to account for the process of invention and discovery itself. Every form of creative or inventive experience that cannot be allocated to one of these pre-established – and, so to speak, predicted a priori – stages is totally disregarded, probably not even perceived. By applying these traditional psychological principles to the theoretical field of design process and not subjecting these principles to the scrutiny of critical inquiries, the subtleties of creativity, discovery, and invention within design process are then disregarded as non-observable, as non-measurable, and as incomprehensible, thus falling by the wayside. A Glimpse into the Concepts of “Problem Solving” and “Heuristics” Paramount importance has been attributed to the concept of problem solving as one of the most prominent characteristic features of design process. It has been acknowledged to such a great extent that it has become synonymous with design process itself, as seen in Morris Asimow’s definition of it. Indeed, problem solving research has long been at the core of modern discussions about the ability of mind and the logical and psychological processes employed to overcome difficult situations in a creative way. Reflecting upon the problem and transforming environmental conditions to best rearrange the state-of-things in order to mentally adapt to the perceived situation to be dealt with, searching for solutions, relating different contexts, and taking the mental leap toward the most appropriate solution are what generally characterizes creative, inventive and problem solving processes. In the past few decades, the whole discussion about design process has been related to a matter of “problem solving”. The general idea of problem is, in most cases, understood as something that impairs, or provokes certain resistance to the process of a given activity. This sort of “obstacle” must be first overcome in order to reinstate the given procedure. It seems strange, though, to reduce all creative potential – for instance, the potential of creation that has impelled and produced the most influential and artistically significant works of art as well as other significant works in many fields of human production – to a matter of “problem solving”. It is even stranger to borrow a term from a defined field of psychological research and extrapolate it to realms where generalized empirical observations clearly do not deal with the act

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of creation. The whole ideal of “problem solving” comes across as though based upon a reductionist view of invention processes, where it is merely a defined, contingent moment. In his book Design Thinking, Peter Rowe attempts to outline a general framework of the kind of cognitive actions that unfold while designers are at work seeking out the purposes of inventing and creating buildings and urban artifacts (cf. ROWE, 1987: 1-2). Rowe focuses characteristically upon the design activity on the part of architects while drawing a thorough background on the theoretical framework that could help to comprehend this specific kind of thinking he denoted design thinking. That is to say, he focuses upon the special kind of activity of thought directed toward the projections, towards the mental procedures bound to bear fruit in the future in the form of accomplished architectonic projects. Rowe analyzes some of the most characteristic points related to this projective activity. He denominates design as the projective activity articulated in the fields of architecture, design, engineering design, and also in arts in general. First, in addressing the more general theoretical backgrounds of problem solving and decision making, Rowe seeks to offer a bigger picture of available theories and approaches, with which to tackle the characteristically bounded rationality of design procedures. With “bounded rationality”, he refers to the intellectual conditions of problem solvers and their relation to a certain project, affirming, thereby, that “problem solvers are rarely in a position to identify all possible solutions to the problem at hand” (ROWE, 1987: 39). The impossibility of obtaining an immediate view of the whole procedure forces the problem solver to search for choices that could satisfy some pre-determined project parameter, which he calls the “solution properties of a problem” (ibid). Rowe adopts the term problem solving as a concept to mean the ability to overcome obstacles. By this token, he relates the term to every projective activity in which choices have to be made, ways of doing the project need to be found, and solutions to the problem need to be produced. A problem, he argues, arises “if an organism wants something but the actions necessary to obtain it are not immediately obvious” (ibid). Rowe’s claim is based upon earlier theoreticians of problem solving in the fields of Gestalt psychology and of behaviorism, learningstudies, and experimental psychology. In this specific context, it is possible to find allusions, in Rowe’s argument, respectively, to Karl Dunker and to Edward L. Thorndike. Dunker affirms, for instance: Ein „Problem“ entsteht z.B. dann, wenn ein Lebewesen ein Ziel hat und nicht „weiß“, wie es dieses Ziel erreichen soll. Wo immer der gegebene Zustand sich nicht durch bloßes

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Handeln (Ausführen selbstverständlicher Operationen) in den erstrebten Zustand überführen lässt, wird das Denken auf den Plan gerufen. Ihm liegt es ob, ein vermittelndes handeln allererst zu konzipieren. Die „Lösung“ eines solchen praktischen Problems hat somit zwei Förderungen zu genügen: ihre Verwirklichung (Umsetzung in die Praxis) muss erstens die Verwirklichung des erstrebten Zustandes zur Folge haben und zweitens vom gegebenen Zustand aus durch „bloßes Handeln“ erreichbar sein. (DUNCKER, 1935: 1)

Thorndike, one of the psychologists that markedly emphasized observable behaviorist methods, states that there is a joint mobilization of many connections and tendencies, all set in motion by the particular mindset of purposive thinking, and in problem solving. Triggered by the mindset, an observable determinate set of actions becomes apparent. As these are regulated by the purposefulness of the mindset, some behavioral tendencies will be restrained, some others will be reinforced. All this happens simultaneously, and, as described by Thorndike’s point of view, the mindset will be reflected in the intentional, goal-oriented conduct, the distinctive behavior, or sets of behaviors, of the subject, while this subject moves through a chain-like, task-oriented course of some kind. In his wellknown book Human Learning, Thorndike writes: In much of human behavior, especially in purposive thinking and problem solving, there is a cöoperative action of many connections. Under the guidance of some mental set, many tendencies start working; some of the responses produced thereby are discarded altogether; some are put aside to be given influence later; some are used together to determine the next step. (THORNDIKE, 1931: 147)

This psychological point of view, which seems to form a great deal of the theoretical base of problem solving, reveals a “step-like inference-action” structure, or, in other words, a specific behavioristic form of “input-process-output”, in which purposeful thinking unfolds in a certain pattern of conduct activated by some mental setting. Furthermore, the principles of problem solving that are derived from this behaviorist position reveal a more restrictive conception, namely, that this mental and behavioral mobilization is originated in a conflicting situation that requires a solution. It is suggested that this mobilization reveals itself in what is called task-environment, in which the subject’s behavior exhibits the mindset of problem solving in the very moment of performing goal-oriented tasks in a confined or contingent setting. The psychological-behaviorist position will exert the largest amount of influence on the widespread notion of problem solving. This can be realized in the usages of the concept at different times. In the following part of the book, I will

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show that the concept of problem solving is mostly derived from methodological aspects of behaviorism. This concept of problem solving, though discussed extensively from the 1960s and 1970s up to the contemporary discussions of design process and creative thought, has not been critically analyzed and it still bears practically the same meaning as it had in the 1930s. And because it has not been critically revised, it still carries its traditional meaning of an observable and measurable process akin to behavioristic views. Therefore, the concept of problem solving is apt to describe measurable and observable aspects of the process of solving a problem but is mostly not apt to describe what happens in the mind during a creative process. All further discussions about creative thought, creative problem solving, are, for this reason, treated from the perspective of borrowed psychological views. The biggest problem of all is that the concept of problem solving is extensively repeated throughout the literature of design process as a self-evident and self-explanatory concept, which takes its methodological grounds for granted. As a part of the so-called “mechanism” for creative thinking, and creativity in general, problem solving is one of the aspects that accounts for invention and discovery in the realm of design process. This realm of invention and discovery is identified as heuristics, that is, as a set of methodological and technical skills that can provide original solutions to problems inherent to a given design process. Heuristics, however, is the least thematized of the so-called techniques and methods for achieving the “meta-level” of invention and discovery. Now, what is the meaning of the term “heuristics”? The term heuristics has its roots in the Ancient Greek verb εὑρίσκω, (heurískō) meaning “to find”, “to discover”, and also “to happen upon by chance to find out, to discover”. The Ancient Greek adjective εὑρετικός, (heuretikós) which means “inventive”, “ingenious”, is usually used to attribute to any creative operation, accounting thus for processes by which the novelty is achieved in a certain context. This term, heuristics, has been traditionally famous by the sudden association made by Archimedes, which, upon the discovery, so it is said, has exclaimed “εὑρηκα!” This episode is recorded in the ninth book of the Ancient Roman work De Architectura Libri Decem of the Roman Marcus Vitruvius Pullo. Vitruvius recalls the event that must have occurred in the third century BC in Syracusa. According to him, this event amounts to the one of most extraordinary discoveries performed by Archimedes. The account runs as follows: The new ruler of Syracuse, Hiero II commissioned Archimedes to investigate a matter involving the pure gold votive crown that the ruler ordered as an offer to the gods. Upon its completion, Hiero II heard rumors that the goldsmith had mixed the gold with silver to manufacture the crown in order to steal some of the pure gold of the king. Furious with

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this deceit, but at the same time unaware of the measures to be taken to disclose the trick, Hiero II ordered to Archimedes to investigate the matter. In the Vitruvian account, Archimedes, intellectually burdened with this proposition in his mind of how he should ascertain the purity of the gold of the votive crown, went by chance to the public baths and entered in the tub. By emerging his body in the tub, he realized that a certain quantity of water would spill out of the side of it. As he realized in a sudden association of ideas linking the problem of the quantity of gold with the body of water being dislocated by the immersion of his own body in the bath tub, Archimedes stood up and ran home naked, exclaiming loudly on his way that he had found it. By the Vitruvian account, then: [Archimedes], while the case was still on his mind, happened to go to the bath, and on getting into a tub observed that the more his body sank into it the more water ran out over the tub. As this pointed out the way to explain the case in question, without a moment’s delay, and transported with joy, he jumped out of the tub and rushed home naked, crying with a loud voice that he had found out what he was seeking; for as he ran he shouted εὑρηκα, εὑρηκα. (VITRUVIUS, Book IX, Paragraph 1015)

Having perceived the generation of this idea, Archimedes developed a method from it, with which he would put the resulting new theory to the test. The method Archimedes devised was simple. First, he needed a vessel full of water to the brim. Second, he needed a lump of silver weighing exactly the same as the crown in question. He also needed a lump of gold and another lump of silver, both with the same weight as the crown. He also needed the crown itself. He performed three experiments. The first consisted in immersing the lump of silver in the vessel with water. A certain quantity of water spilled over the sides of the vessel. To create a measure, Archimedes marked the level of remaining water, after the

15

There are many available translations of Vitruvius’ work On Architecture. The English text used here comes from the work entitled The Ten Books on Architecture translated and edited by Morris Hicky Morgan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1914. The original passage, according to an 1867 reprint of De Architectura organized by Valentinus Rose and Herman Müller-Strübing, Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, is the following (Liber IX): “tunc is cum haberet eius rei curam, casu venit in balineum ibique cum in solium descenderet, animadvertit quantum corporis sui in eo insideret tantum aquae extra solium effluere. idque cum eius rei rationem explicationis ostendisset, non est moratus sed exsiluit gaudio motus de solio et nudus vadens domum versus significabat clara voce invenisse quod quaereret. nam currens identidem graece clamabat ευρηκα ευρηκα”.

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lump of silver was removed. He then made the same for the lump of gold. The same weight in gold was immersed in the water provoking also a certain quantity of water to spill over. He then marked the level of remaining water in the vessel and realized that the level of water was a bit higher, meaning that gold dislocates less water. He concluded that this specific weight in silver dislocates more water than the specific weight in gold. The third experiment consisted in immersing the crown itself in the water. If the crown had been made of pure gold, the quantity of water displaced would be the same as the second experiment, regardless of the different shapes of the gold objects. The crown displaced a certain quantity of water, and Archimedes measured the level of the remaining water in the vessel. He realized that the crown displaced more water than the lump of gold. Since the same weight of silver displaces more water and gold less, Archimedes concluded that the crown had been mixed with silver. Regardless of the anecdotal form with which this discovery has been passed from generation to generation through the works of commentators of Antiquity, this principle has been acknowledged as Archimedes’ Principle. Archimedes systematized this knowledge in his book On Floating Bodies, in Greek Περὶ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων σωμάτων (Peri ton Epipleónton Somáton), one of the few of his surviving works. In the sixth and seventh propositions of this work, Archimedes states: If a solid lighter than a fluid be forcibly immersed in it, the solid will be driven upwards by a force equal to the difference between its weight and the weight of the fluid displaced. A solid heavier than a fluid will, if placed in it, descend to the bottom of the fluid, and the solid will, when weighted in the fluid, be lighter than its true weight by the weight of the fluid displaced. (ARCHIMEDES, 1897: 257-258)

The term εὑρηκα (heureka) thus became famous through this specific Archimedean discovery, which entered the tradition as one of the most amazing mental acts of perceiving and mentally associating two very different things to come up with a functional method to solve a difficult proposed question. The concept of heuristics bears this kind of ingenuity, and yet, it has not yet received a proper theorization. Heuristics is currently used to describe, without much theoretical refinement, any principle, procedure, technique or method, as well as any device that can contribute to narrowing the search for a satisfactory solution to a given problem (cf. NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1958: 155-162; cf. ROWE, 1987: 51). Although the connotation of the name heuristics with certain procedures for practical discoveries could evoke the association with a philosophical realm that investigates the

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ars inveniendi, for instance, the current usage of heuristics is hitherto restricted to a psychological purview. This search for a solution shows clearly that the term heuristics is still being considered as an auxiliary device to the established psychological notion of problem solving. As David Perkins affirms, “a heuristic is a rule of thumb that often helps in solving a certain class of problems, but makes no guarantees” (PERKINS, 1981: 192). “A rule of thumb” is a term employed to describe a broad application of a given principle, which is neither reliable nor accurate. As Perkins states, it is an application of a principle that does not offer any guarantees, being a little better than a wild guess (cf. ibid). The notion behind a “rule of thumb” reveals, traditionally at least, an idea that is diametrically opposed to the “security” of deductive thought. In performing a certain mental operation or in developing some project, one is confronted with uncertainty of how to proceed from an earlier moment of the developmental process to the next. Once the security of knowing how to handle the encountered situation is interrupted, the conduct is also automatically suspended. Action must be taken in order to reestablish the continuous rational reasoning and conduct, which will lead to the accomplishment of the activity being currently carried out. In this general view, rational security is traditionally represented by rationality founded upon causality that generates deductive parameters, which, in their turn, generate with deductive certainty the next steps of a certain activity. The whole structure of problem solving as rigid-stage is based on this premise. But causal-deductive thought and actions cannot generate the missing element once the security of knowing how to perform a task is, by the emergence of a surprising phenomenon, broken. But something must be done to regain control of the derivation process, in which the results of one stage feeds the need of the next. If deductive reasoning is inapt to performing this task, there must be some other form of creative thinking that, allegedly at least, will help to regain control. It is commonly accepted that heuristic thinking is the required step and through its articulation, some incidental result can be reached, without, however, being supported by traditional, rational thinking. This opposition to rational thinking, that of being “irrational”, is also considered to be in the realm of guessing. Now, the ability of guessing would be, in this view, the weakest and most doubtful tool that could be articulated to overcome the state of indecision. In the seventeenth century, the puritan writer James Durham wrote in his book Heaven upon Earth in a Serene and Smiling Good Conscience the following passage about rules of thumb. This picture helps to propel the discussion at hand by showing exactly the contrast between the insecure or “foolish” notion of rule of thumb and the secure, rational reasoning:

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I will not say, but there may be some sickernesse, and solidity in the profession of some, but it is to be feared, that many others are but building castles in the air, castles of come down when the rain shall descend, the winds blow, and the floods beat, having much more show then substance, and solid work; and the way to make it sicker, sure and solid work, that will abide the tryal, is to lay it to the Rule, and to try it thereby; many profest Christians are like to foolish builders, who build by guess, and by rule of thumb, (as we use to speak) and not by Square and Rule. (DURHAM, 1685: 329. Italics are mine)

There is a tension accompanying the term heuristics and its applications. On the one hand, the term is considered to be similar in function to an auxiliary construction, a Hilfsmittel, which is articulated relative to a main cognitive and rational line of thought. Whatever the contribution of heuristics may be, its results must help this main line of thought to find a secure and applicable solution to the problem. The “rule of thumb” character of heuristics renders it secondary to the rational process of problem solving. Rule of thumb is then the denomination of a weak tool that might be articulated and that might in some measure help in finding a proper solution. In this context, heuristics, as an amalgam of such sets of “rules of thumb”, is subordinated to the structure of problem solving as rigidstages method. Heuristics’ functioning is still viewed as doubtful in many ways, for it does not match the secure deductive reasoning. The results of heuristics are considered to be valid only in so far as they can be directly applied to the stages of problem solving, in order to reduce the number of variables among which the possible results that effectively solve the problem may appear. On the other hand, there is a general mistrust regarding the validity of heuristic results. Since heuristics offers no guarantees, it seems that its results within a given problem solving process are often regarded as spurious. Why invest in heuristic reasoning if there is no array of success that is necessarily deduced from it? Perkins, in regard to the psychological position of problem solving, states that heuristics is “hit or miss, hopefully helping but promising nothing” (PERKINS, 1981: 192). In general, heuristics is said to be a collection of “any principle, procedure, or device that contributes to reduction in the search for a satisfactory solution” (NEWELL, SHAW, and SIMON, 1967: 78, SIMON, 1969: 80). And yet, I reiterate: although it reappears constantly in the literature about design process in general, heuristics has not received a thorough theoretical consideration (cf. HAUSER, 2011: 371; cf. ROWE 1987: 76). Up to this moment, with very few exceptions, heuristics largely consists of a chain of diffuse and very distinct discourses, mostly derived from psychological purviews or from established discussions about inventive and innovative techniques. These techniques for innovation are, however, mostly derived from practical knowledge. As Rowe puts it, heuristics is a term

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“applied to specific problem structuring devices ranging from explicit decision rules […] to a wide variety of analogies, analogs, and models. It is also applied to general kinds of procedures for guiding the search for solutions” (ROWE, 1987: 75). This “aggregate” of methods and techniques has not been properly developed into a coherent field of knowledge, or, at least, not as a theory encompassing a more general view of heuristics. Peter Rowe affirms: So far, however, it is an area in which no general theory seems to exist. In fact, there is considerable disagreement about the emphasis of human problem solving, particularly with reference to what is known as ‘heuristic technology’ – the development of procedures that are superior to those routinely used. Skeptics assert that the broad organization of problem solving behavior almost takes care of itself, once a person masters the contributing performances that are required. Knowing various techniques for solving layout problems, for example, more or less guarantees that the overall approach to this type of problem will unfold appropriately. (ROWE, 1987: 75-76)

In order to better understand and critically analyze predominant key concepts present in the literature of design process such as problem-solving, creative thinking, rigid-stage models, heuristics, information-process theory, for instance, I will present, in the second part of the book, the historical background of the psychological paradigms from which most of the aforementioned concepts have been derived. Often, these concepts are still connected through the historical paradigms from which they originated. Thus, theoretical connections and influences between creative problem solving processes and these early psychological positions, especially psychological theories of association, between reflex-arc theories, Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, as well as cognitive-behavioral research, and the psychological purview of information process theory will exist. A Detailed View of the Paradigm of Rigid Stage Models of Creative and Projective Thought In his 1926 book The Art of Thought, Graham Wallas sought to understand the dynamics of creative thought and to thereby better delineate relevant psychological events with special regard to the formation of a new thought or a new invention. He was interested in surveying the mind’s ability to synthesize, i.e., the genuine ability of the human psyche to form a new thought of which it was not previously conscious. Otherwise stated, his main interest was in the creative powers of thought, or the poetic expression of consciousness, that is, the formation of a new synthesis of thought by inquiring upon “what stages in thought process the

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thinker should bring the conscious and voluntary effort of his art (of thinking creatively) to bear” (WALLAS, 2014: 37)16. In order to study these aspects of creative thought, Wallas surveyed the writings of the physician and physicist Hermann von Helmholtz, the mathematician Henri Poincaré, as well as the works of several poets (cf. SADLER-SMITH, 2015: 342). During the course of his investigation, Wallas noted a series of characteristic features that would appear in a certain repetitive pattern. Wallas affirms that he was able to “dissect out a continuous process, with a beginning and a middle and an end of its own” in the “making of a new generalization of a new idea” (WALLAS, 2014: 37). The “repeating patterns”, which he stumbled upon were interpreted by him to be “stages in the formation of a new thought” (ibid). He states that: The first in time I shall call Preparation, the stage during which the problem was ‘investigated in all directions’; the second is the stage during which he was not consciously thinking about the problem, which I shall call Incubation; the third, consisting of the appearance of the ‘happy idea’ together with the psychological events which immediately preceded and accompanies that appearance, I shall call Illumination. And I shall call a fourth stage, of Verification, […] in which both the validity of the idea [is] tested, and the idea itself [is] reduced to exact form. (WALLAS, 2014: 38).

Wallas asserted, furthermore, that these four steps are valid not only for the natural sciences and mathematics, where the basic idea of a “solution to a problem” is more pronounced (cf. ibid, 39), but are also discernible in the fields of art, literature, and poetry. He thereby concludes that “even when success in thought means the creation of something felt to be beautiful and true rather than the solution of a prescribed problem, the four stages of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and the Verification of the final result can generally be distinguished from each other” (ibid). Eugene Saddler-Smith, in his article “Wallas’ Four-Stage Model of the Creative Process: More Than Meets the Eye?”, argues that there is a fifth stage embedded between the stages of incubation and illumination, connecting both through a “fringe” of consciousness that surrounds “focal” consciousness (cf. ibid: 47). He calls this connecting stage “intimation”. Wallas’ psychological theory is mostly based on the traditional purview of psychological associationism, which, as I will later discuss in detail, is related to

16

The present book was published for the first time in 1926. The edition referenced here is a 2014 reprint by Solis Press, as indicated in the bibliographical reference.

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the American tradition of empiricism through behaviorism. He incorporates some of Aristotle’s views of association, but draws most of his principles of association from one of the most prominent proponents of associationism of the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes. Associationism postulated streams of thought to be composed of a series of discrete ideas in chronological succession. Alexander Bain, for instance, contended that the “stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series of distinct ideas, more or less rapid in succession; the rapidity being measurable by the number that pass through the mind in a given time” (BAIN, 1875: 29). This conception of stream of thought, as being formed by atomic ideas, which are similar to myriads of discrete perceptive inputs, was the basic assumption of the psychology of associationism. And, at the early twentieth century, this became the predominant view, especially with the emergence of behaviorism. Wallas makes use of this notion of association when he alludes to seventeenth century associationism. But the fact that he also adopts William James’ conception of “fringes” of consciousness seems to mitigate in a way the strictly mechanistic and deterministic notions of streams of thought, for James rejects the notion of succession of consciousness based on a hypothesis of atomicity of thought. In opposition to the predominant view of atomistic associationism, James argues that “in talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life” (JAMES, 1890: 239. Italics are James’). With this, he introduced an important concept into the study of psychology, namely, that element of a continuous flow of conscience. Though James was certainly not the first to propose such a notion, he was one of the most influential proponents of this view of consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to him, streams of thought “flow” at different speeds, sometimes fast, allowing the subject to hover above relations, passages of thought, transitions from one state of thought to the next. Or the flow of thought can be slowed down, and, as such, deeper aspects of thought can be contemplated. However detailed or sketchy, streams of thought, in keeping with James’ view of psychology, are always continuous, without “breach, crack, or division” (ibid: 237). The discreteness of thought is, therefore, merely apparent. James suggests designating fast-moving thinking as the “transitive part” of thought, and slow-moving thinking as the “substantive part” (ibid: 243). Thus, according to him: When rapid, we are aware of a passage, a relation, a transition from it, or between it and something else. As we take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different pace of its parts. (ibid)

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Both types of streams of thought, the transitive or the substantive, are perceived or experienced in a given manner that is never totally apparent. These streams tend to dissolve, continuously merging into one another (cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 48). However, James escapes a complete “fluidic relativism” by maintaining that the main dynamic of consciousness is teleological, in which the transitive parts lead to substantive parts such as in the dynamic of departing from premises to reach a conclusion (cf. JAMES, 1890: 243; cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 48-49). In this flowing stream of consciousness, it is not possible to discern dualities. Even if some thought processes seem to be more vivid and livid than others, this discrete appearance is only an illusion. These are the “fringes” of consciousness, which are structures “inherited from the transitional continuum they emerged from” (DE TIENNE, 2007: 49). In James’ conception of stream of thought, there is no sharp dual distinction. He posits, then, that “whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset as a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind” (JAMES, 1890: 278). One example can shed some light upon James’ view of a flowing stream of consciousness. For example, if someone is reasoning, according to this hypothesis, the object of this reasoning is already embedded in the first expression of the thought. According to James, the stream of thought flows in order to develop its own content. And exactly this initial impulse generates – and circumscribes – the entire stream of thought, which flows “in a unitary undivided way” (JAMES, 1890: 279; cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 49). In short, the more the expression of thought gains form and becomes more defined, the more the content of the object of thought becomes more developed. The streams of thought “magnify or emphasize in turn different components, at times more substantive, at times more transitive, of the overall meaning while the latter, in and as totality, is busy transitioning or flowing through their stream” (DE TIENNE, 2007: 49). The stream is, thus, formed by what James calls “mind-stuff”. The words uttered and the meanings they convey toward forming further representations of an object of thought are composed of the same “mind-stuff”. James’ notion of “mind-stuff” is the prime matter for this notion of the idea of “pure experience”. Pure experience is, according to James, a notion that everything is in reality connected relationally and continually. It is a succession of events without breaches. Further analysis of William James’ psychological and metaphysical accounts of “mind-stuff” and “pure experience” is beyond the scope of the present work, especially because these definitions, as James made use of them, are too metaphorical. But it is important to consider this notion of flowing stream, for this conception is operative in Wallas’ considerations of associative trains of thought, which is based on James’ conception that “fringe” is a notion denoting “the influence of a faint-brain process upon

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our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived” (JAMES, 1890: 258). Or, as Wallas puts it, “the ‘fringe-consciousness’ of a human being may sometimes indicate that the activity of the main centre of his consciousness is being accompanied by the imperfectly co-ordinated activity of other factors in his organism” (WALLAS, 2014: 47). The concept of “fringe of consciousness” is articulated within the main idea of thought association, in order to indicate an upcoming associative train of thought, which precedes a looming state of consciousness. Graham Wallas also makes use of stages in John Dewey’s peculiar theory of inquiry that are evoked by “a more or less vague feeling of the unexpected of something queer, strange, funny, or disconcerting” (ibid: 49). Dewey theorizes that there are some basic characteristic steps or stages that characterize inquiry as a process of going from a state of not knowing and uncertainty to a stage of knowing and predicting the behavior of a certain object. These stages concern cases of reflection upon difficulties encountered in a certain situation. A solution is required. In carrying out the reflection that might resolve the situation, according to Dewey, certain definable stages appear in thought. These are “(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observations and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief” (DEWEY, 1910: 72)17. But in this regard, Wallas seems to force a line of argumentation in which he forcibly instrumentalizes the much more general logical maxim proposed by Dewey. Whereas Dewey has formulated his logical theory of inquiry as logical proposition for science that underlies every form of logical inquiry, in a similar way as early pragmatists had done, Wallas adopts this general model and rearranges it as fixed psychological stages of creative thought. In so doing, the model for a theory of inquiry loses its original generality, for it is used by Wallas as a psychological model that is characterized in the context of creative thought with emphasis on provoking a synthesis. Moreover, the general logical proposition that originally involves general procedures of science becomes a more mechanized model with which, if the sequences are repeated in the correct order, the synthesis will necessarily be produced. Here it is

17

John Dewey’s formulations of the stages of inquiry are reformulated in his book Logic: The Theory of Inquiry of 1938. At this point, Dewey reworks his steps of inquiry and adds a further stage. The stages of inquiry are, then: i) the indeterminate situation; ii) institution of a problem; iii) the determination of a problem solution; iv) reasoning; v) the original character of facts-meaning; vi) common sense and scientific inquiry. (cf. DEWEY, 1938: 105-116).

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possible to perceive the clear influence of positivistic and behavioristic propositions. Wallas’ conclusion about creative thought was that preparation and verification are conscious processes that can be achieved with self-controlled and selfconscious effort. The process of incubation, however, was identified by him to be a non-controllable process, that is, an unconscious process. The transitional stage, called by Wallas intimation, is the one that takes place on the threshold of consciousness, linking incubation with illumination. Because of this more transitory character, Wallas concluded that intimation is a partially conscious process, and, as such being only partially amenable to conscious influences (cf. WALLAS, 2014: 18; SADLER-SMITH, 2015: 347). The idea of problem solving derived from stage-like development based on behavioral research is as accepted today as it was at the time in which Wallas proposed his model of creative thought in variably four or five basic steps. The diagram describes the steps involved in Wallas’ concept of creative thinking (Fig. 1.5). Fig. 1.5: Sadler-Smith’s interpretation of Graham Wallas’ stages of creative thought.

Consciousness

Preparation

Fringe Consciousness

NonConsciousness

Illumination

Verification

Intimation

Incubation

This pattern of stages appears throughout the literature on problem solving and design process. Despite exhibiting from time to time new variations in the forms and manners of how they are represented, the internal principles that render the elements in the diagram discrete and derivable remain unchanged. Almost every theoretician working with procedures and methods in design from the 1930s onward would associate design process, the process through which some new element is generated, with the psychological model of problem solving. Therefore, in order to produce something innovative, the steps to be taken would always be similar, despite variations in name or number, to these four (or five) stages of creative thought described by Wallas. Preparation, Incubation, Il-

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lumination, and Verification, would, then, become the stages – something like immutable paradigms – within certain task-oriented and creative thought. This would become the backbone of every conceptualization of design process. Joseph Rossman, for instance, in his 1931 book The Psychology of the Inventor states that: A moment’s reflection will show that ‘the leap across a logical chasm’ is nothing else but the formulation of a successful solution accomplished by the neural activity initiated in the inventor after he has felt a want and seeks to satisfy it. (ROSSMAN, 1931: 233)

According to this rather behavioristic model of design process, the moment of “finding a solution” was already prepared in the first phase, assessment or preparation, and in the second, incubation. The injudiciously so-called “discovery” presupposed by illumination means that from the choice previously made, the new solution is “derived” as a response from previous “environmental” stimuli. The last phase is simply the further execution of the pre-established chain of events. Rossman formulates an experiment, suggesting that in order to determine the actual steps taken by an inventor in the act of producing an invention, the necessary step to be taken would be to place the inventor in a laboratory and thoroughly observe her or his behavior in acting (ROSSMAN, 1931: 56). The laboratorial environment mentioned by Rossman would furnish the experiment with the needed controlled environment for the required observations, measurements, evaluations, and subsequent generalization of the stages of the activity of inventing. Rossman, however, in perceiving that the proposed laboratorial experimentation collides with innumerous logistical and observational problems, which render this more direct experiment unfeasible, suggests an alternative. In order to scrutinize both the inventor’s frame of mind and the subsequent stages of action, Rossman proposed and actually implemented a different test. This test consisted of the elaboration of a questionnaire inquiring into the methods used by the inventor during the process of inventing. This questionnaire has been developed and, after having been filled out by 710 subjects, the answers were collected and evaluated. This evaluation, so states Rossman, after having been analyzed, exhibited a limited number of recurrent patterns, which could be delineated as follows: 1. Observation of a need or difficulty. 2. Analysis of the need. 3. A survey of all available information.

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4. A formulation of all objective solutions. 5. A critical analysis of these solutions for their advantages and disadvantages. 6. The birth of the new idea, the invention. 7. Experimentation to test out the most promising solution, and the selection and perfection of the final embodiment by some or all of the previous steps. (ROSSMAN, 1931: 57)

Rossman’s quantitative analysis is relevant for the purpose of the present critical analysis, for it reveals the exact tendency in considering the stages of the inventive process identified by the questioned inventors as topics. It is important here to point out once again to James’ psychologists’ fallacy. This fallacy relates to the belief that the perceived and represented object is the whole of the object of experience. James has thematized this fallacy to criticize certain methodological aspects of the psychological practices of the nineteenth century. John Dewey, following James’ critics, has analyzed and criticized the reflex-arc theory and its premises, which would consider the stimulus and responses as separated events, that is, as occurrences that do not present the character of a system. More about Dewey’s critique on the views of reflex-art theory will follow in the second part of the book. In the case of Rossman’s position about the topics of invention, he has perceived the results as steps that the inventors go through to perform their works of creation. Rossman, based upon the widespread view of topics for creative thinking and inventing, which have been fueled by popularized notions of problem solving, sees the topics identified in the process of inventing as the process itself. Following James’ line of argumentation, it is possible to extend the fallacy from the realm of experimental psychology to the realm of design process, where the notion of problem solving became established. The fallacy will consist, then, in the belief that the perceived topics identifiable in the process, that is, what is represented from the process, are one and the same as the whole of the real process. From the early 1930s until nowadays, it will be, therefore, not uncommon to come across theoretical positions stating that design process is fundamentally reducible to processes of problem solving, or, as it is also the case, to describe design process as being one and the same with problem solving. Rigid Stages and Psychological Processes: Widespread Views of Creative Thinking and Problem Solving One of the early 1960s proponents of this notion within the discipline of design, Harold Buhl, in his book Creative Engineering Design, confirms this position: he

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affirms that, in order to be able to invent, all creative work must be built upon a firm groundwork of a method of solving problems. When this is mastered, then “it will only be necessary to increase the solver’s proficiency in each phase in order to improve its integrity” (BUHL, 1960: 15). These stages may be understood as factors that regulate the design process. According to Buhl, it is therefore necessary to understand all of the factors and their functioning that propel or retard each progression from a previous stage to the next. The main objective of this progression being, according to Buhl, to enable the possibility of generating an “unusual answer” (ibid), that is, something new. Morris Asimow also focuses on the notion of design process and problem solving in his 1962 book Introduction to Design. In this specific case, however, Asimow equates design process with the psychological notion of problem solving. He believed that this notion would guarantee the progression mentioned by Buhl, and, that by iterating the results – almost automatically – a new result would be reached. Central to Morris Asimow’s consideration about design process lies the proposition that problem-solving behavior inevitably coincides with the very notion of design process. Asimow suggests six stages in design process. I believe that Asimow presents a very innovative notion of design morphology, by amplifying the field of design as a discipline to encompass product design, architecture, visual arts, and the engineering sciences. He devises a comprehensive and useful operational notion of design morphology relative to the design process. In his book Introduction to Design, Asimow sets out to establish “principles and concepts that are of the greatest generality, consistent with usefulness” (ASIMOW, 1962: 3-4). He aims at a broader concept of design implying here its markedly processual nature. Asimow’s conceptualizes design as comprising, as he maintains: […] three major parts, namely, a set of consistent principles and their logical derivatives, an operational discipline which leads to action, and finally a critical feedback apparatus which measures the advantages, detects shortcomings, and illuminates the directions of improvement. (ibid: 4-5)

Design morphology, according to Asimow, presupposes a certain progression from a more abstract and more potential state of things to the more concrete, embodied and functional processes and artifacts. According to him, this provides a sort of “skeleton around which the design project could be planned, organized, and solved” (ibid: 43). For Asimow, on the other hand, design process unfolds as an iterative process of problem solving, in which concrete methods and proce-

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dures are at work. According to him, design process, as a counterpart of design morphology, is developed throughout the morphological development. He distinguishes two main structures in the process: “a vertical structure involving a sequential phasing of activities, and a horizontal structure in the form of a decision-making cycle common to all phases” (ROWE, 1987: 47). His version of design process is also subdivided into distinct steps that run iteratively through the entire vertical structure, that is, through the whole morphology. It runs down this structure from the feasibility studies until the very last stage for planning for retirement. The main characteristic of this horizontal structure is that it, too, possesses its own iterative operational sequence. For Asimow, design process has not only the same nature of problem solving behavior, but it is problem solving behavior per se, for according to him “engineering design is a specialized process of problem solving”. Despite its specialization, adapted to function within the technical and technological specificities of engineering design process, “its process resembles that of problem solving in general” (ibid: 42. Italics are mine). According to him: Drawing together the comments about problem solving, we see that there is some consensus that the process includes at least three stages: the first is an analysis of the situation in which the problem is embedded; the second is the synthesis of possible solutions; the third is an evaluation of the solutions at hand and, if there are acceptable ones, a decision on which one is best. To these three may be added a fourth stage: revision, which improves the chosen situation. (ibid: 43)

Asimow claims that design process is distinctively a process for solving problems of engineering design, “just as a scientific method is a process for solving problems of research” (ibid). He clearly affirms, at this point, that design process equals the traditional views of problem solving statements. Even if he circumscribes the process within the realm of engineering design, which has, it is true, its own specifications, the very restricted concept of problem solving is the general concept that is being repeated in almost every instance of creative and projective activities. Even though Asimow takes the concept of problem solving for granted, and thereby the concept remains uncriticized, he does relate it closely to the concrete aspects of engineering design. In considering design process in the capacity of problem solving, which, in its turn is operated throughout the morphological structure of a project, Asimow introduces a new component, that is, the notion of operations research connected to design process. This implies, thus, that an eventual synthesis of provided information of a given designed object – implying also the circulation of this information from earlier stages to the more

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defined, subsequent stages – follows with certainty a process that starts from an analysis of the encountered immediate problem, or problem situation, linked with the pre-established performance criteria. When the problem at hand is defined, and the performance criteria is also at hand, the sought solution or sets of solutions would be, then, made directly accessible. In many ways this is also a prevalent view in ‘operations-research’ circles, in which problem solving activity is defined through the application of technical procedures, largely of a mathematical kind, that have been developed to solve general classes of problems. (ROWE, 1987: 48)

This means that he, Asimow, considers the process both morphologically as well as procedurally as an iterative series of steps, in which the operations research circles are articulated. That is to say, given the complex phenomenon of design process within engineering design, there are a series of iterations that need to be performed in order to tackle this complexity. The result is the derivation of the solution from the first articulations at the earliest stages and implementation of the solution in more concrete stages. More than a traditional, simplistic view of methodological applications of a set of given stages for arriving at a solution for a problem, as the steps for invention and creative thought were described in the 1920s and 1930s, Asimow’s proposal for design process is innovative because it places operation research circles at the core of the morphological stages, which connects design process with an intricate operation-management process. Furthermore, according to Asimow, design process deals firstly with gathering, handling, and organizing information relevant to the problem solution, and, secondly, is tasked to prescribe derived decisions which are then optimized, communicated, and tested, as well as evaluated (cf. ASIMOW, 1962: 44). The process has an active, iterative character, especially because, following the progression of Asimow’s conception of design process, “new information becomes available or new insights are gained which require the repetition of earlier operations” (ibid). He affirms, furthermore, that “for the most part the techniques associated with each operation in the design process are of such great generality that their usefulness is not limited to any particular step” (ibid). The conceptual advances proposed by Asimow both in the realm of design process – regardless of the specificity of engineering design – as well as in the realm of problem solving behavior appear in Asimow’s accurate insights about the “flow” of derived information, which renders design process adaptable regarding the interaction man-project and the methods employed in order for a given project to come into being. Nevertheless, even enabling design process to

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achieve a higher degree of flexibility and adaptability by proposing an iterative interaction between design morphology and design process, equating design process with stage-process problem solving behavior renders the innovation highly deterministic, positivistic, and mechanistic. According to Asimow, then: The design process resembles the general process of problem solving in the main features, but it uses sharper, and for the most part, more analytical tools, which have been especially shaped and sharpened for the problems of engineering design. It carries the process through analysis, synthesis, and evaluation and decision, and extends it into the realms of optimization, revision, and implementation. (ibid)

Asimow divides design process into six rigid stages that run through the horizontal iterative process of design morphology. As already pointed out, the whole sequential process advances from an abstract realm of need and preliminary design conceptions to more concrete and particular design conceptions. In the process a series of “feedback loops” – or the iterative process, that is, “relationships between phases along which information about the design situation was seen to flow” (ROWE, 1987: 47, cf. ASIMOW, 1962: 63) – are an integral part of the whole design process and through this it is possible to backtrack the process in order to operate according to the gathering of new information as well as to deal with new difficulties. As Rowe points out, Asimow’s proposition of design process resembles the “iconic models”, that is, diagrams that present the whole design process and the management system in a schematic way (cf. ROWE, 1987: 47). Criticizing the Rigid Stage Model: Problem Solving as General Operations Research The rigid stage model of design process as problem solving reveals the deeper intricacies enclosed in the stratified rigid stage consideration of creative and inventive thought. The present critical analysis reveals also the main characteristic of this type of operationalization of rigid stage concepts. Also called operations research, this model has been established as the ultimate model for operative creativity that would describe and also exemplify design process in its entirety (cf. ROWE, 1987: 110-111; cf. CROSS, 1993: 16-17; cf. BAYAZIT, 2004: 18-19). However, the propositions of operations research in attempting to describe and to exemplify the general procedures of design process are too simplistic for the task at hand. The reason for this is that operations research as problem solving, and design process being reduced to problem solving is based on stratified rigid stages mainly of behavioristic extraction. Horst Rittel, a design theoretician of the 1970s

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has denominated operations research and its derivative notion of problem solving as a “first generation of design methods” (cf. RITTEL, 1973: 391-392; cf. RITTEL, 2012: 42-43). Given that two of the most important proponents of this specific methodological position were Morris Asimow and Bruce Archer, I intend to present here some aspects of the theories proposed by both, focusing, however, the argumentation on Asimow’s detailed conception of operations research. According to Asimow’s conception, as aforementioned, design process is divided into six stages which function in a given sequence so as to solve the problem at hand. Because he equates design process with problem-solving behavior, the first stage is the assessment of the problem, whereas the last stage is the implementation of the fitter solution found in the process to solve the initial problem. The six stages of his notion of problem solving, integrant to design process are, as mentioned before, analysis, synthesis, evaluation and decision, optimization, revision, and, finally, implementation. Concretely stated, the first stage is the analysis of the problem situation. As Asimow accurately proposes, it is rarely the case that a problem in design process reveals itself in a defined manner, being totally recognizable as the problem to be dealt with. Definite problems are rare. The vast majority of problem situations exhibit a myriad of factors that require a cautious analysis in order to render a problem “identifiable”. According to Asimow, then, problem solvers, in this case project makers and designers, must construct a clear picture of the problem. Therefore, he proposes the denomination of “problem-situation”, that is, “a situation which may have many perplexing elements interrelated in complicated and obscure patterns” (ASIMOW, 1962: 44). The stage of analysis of a problem situation uncovers the difficulties that obscure or impede reaching a certain goal. Difficulties are, according to Asimow, “obstructing elements observable in the situation and problems are the questions asked upon reflecting on how to overcome the difficulties” (ibid). The analysis of the problems will render the difficulties understandable. Understanding the problem means, thus, the comprehension of a complicated relationship between the difficulties in a given design situation, the problems that can be identified, and their specific relations to the goals of the distinct unfolding design process within the length of design morphology. After this stage, it is possible to arrive at a clear statement of the problem. Consequently, the goals to be achieved and what shall take to overcome the difficulties and reach the calculated objectives are thereby defined. Connected to this definition through the clarifying analysis of the problem situation is also, according to Asimow, a clear notion of the resources necessary for executing the project. It is important as well to bear in

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mind what kind of constraints should be embedded in every solution devised, and what kind of criteria for judging possible solutions can be drawn (ibid, 45). The following diagram exhibits the iterative aspects of Asimow’s conception of design process qua problem solving, which is, in many aspects, similar to the iconic models with its feedback loops (Fig. 1.6). Fig. 1.6: Iterative model of feedback loops related to the six-stage problem solving model.

According to Asimow, this is the articulation of the of design process. Design process functions by programmatically running the problem solving stages. This model of problem solving with feedback loops appears also in several other models, such as in Ronald D. Watts’ iconic model (cf. WATTS, 1966: 85; cf. ROWE, 1987: 48).

Exactly this claim appears to be the most discrete point in Asimow’s theory. A clear statement is needed regarding whether the problem brings about a better view of the whole situation problem, from which new solutions can be drawn. A solution, so affirms Asimow, “is a synthesis of component elements which hurdles the obstructing difficulties” (ibid). Similar to many approaches from the field of design process to the synthesis, Asimow draws his conclusions from psychological perspectives, as already stressed. He affirms that the elements of such synthesis may be ideas or physical things. He dismisses, however, any exploration within the “process of synthesizing” itself, to which he justifies:

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[…| what enables us to draw from the warehouse of our experience just the right set of elements, and to put them together into just the right combination, so that they have a sense of fitting the situation, we do not know, since no definite formula exists. (ibid, 45-46)

Despite of his dismissal of the process of synthesizing a solution by the construction of a new idea, Asimow leaves the important hint that, from a given openness to a problem-situation, a solution might suggest itself. As I shall present in the third part of the book, this dynamic of the rise of a new solution does indeed appear from a state-of-things that comprises what he denominated “problem situation”. Also maintaining feedback loops between stages is a clear requirement in order to provide a foundation for the operation of projecting, having then the previous stage as a causal deductive basis for the next one. So affirms J. Christopher Jones in his article “A Method of Systematic Design” that “the purpose of all the previous stages is to make possible a very clear statement of the problem. This work will in itself suggest many ideas and solutions […]” (JONES, 1963: 64. Italics are mine). After collecting the solutions that might have presented themselves from this (allegedly) synthetical process, it is necessary to examine these in order to prove their compatibility with the multidimensional situations of design context that exhibit a myriad of variables, much of which is still undisclosed to the interactors of the process. Asimow suggests that in order to best intellectually consider the fitting of a solution to the design problem, it is necessary to scrutinize the solution in a representable way, that is, to represent it in a symbolic-mathematical manner. As he affirms, the designers and project makers “can test the solution in the abstract against the spectrum of requirements in the situation and thereby arrive at an evaluation” (ibid, 46). This account is one of the most accurate accounts for evaluative purposes, for it deductively contrasts the practical consequences of an intellectual solution, which exhibits up to this moment in the process the form of a hypothesis, with the necessary steps of the present design process. Deducing these consequences and representing them with specific languages will allow the participants to understand and externalize the characteristics and properties of the solution. The visualization enables, therefore, that these shown properties can be intellectually predicted and fitted in to the required step of the current context of design process, which enables, on the part of designers and interactors, a better basis for decision-making. According to Asimow: […] a rational decision rule is to select that design concept from among the proffered alternative solutions, that at once has the most favorable list of expected advantages and is

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judged to be reasonably certain of physical realizability. [It is needed to] explore the significance of the qualifying word, reasonable, as used in the above rule. (ibid, 62)

Involving a certain refinement of the solution just visualized, the phase of optimization commences. It consists in refining the achieved solution by using mathematical parameters. Asimow proposes three constituent elements as general parameters for optimization, to wit: i) a criterion function related to the present design, which functions by seeking to bring a certain maximal value or minimum value corresponding to an “optimum” value, that is, the highest value that can be achieved; ii) a formalization of the “functional constraints”, and this formalization constitutes the mathematical-archetypical description of the proposed design, and iii) a determination of the “regional constraints”, that is, the admissible limits of the design parameters or of derived groups of parameters, which represent more convoluted facets of the proposed design (cf. ASIMOW, 1962: 86). After this stage, the stage of revision can commence. The three general parametrical constituents have produced a great deal of data, which allows “data projections and predictions about the quality of the solution to be inferred and these may indicate other possible flaws” (ibid). The proposed solutions, if required, can be revised in a proper sequence, regarding the necessary step-sequences. In that case the process is continuously iterated until the uncovered optimization is sufficiently reduced. According to Asimow, this “iterative character of design work should be noted. After the revisions have been made in the redesign step, construction of new prototypes and subsequent testing may follow, again leading to further revisions” (ibid, 41-42). The most important aspect of the revision is to assess that the revised design is able to reach its projected goals. Notwithstanding, Asimow also states that “a successful project is, however, highly convergent so that only a few iterations are required to reach a found solution. The high rate of convergence stems from the high confidence levels which are required in critical decisions” (ibid, 42). Following the successful optimization and revision stages, the proposed solution is, then, finally implemented. For Asimow, the stage of implementation is a delicate moment, in which a proper system of communication makes a great difference. The implementation needs to be accomplished through communicative systems. The traditional claim – by now a common place – resembles the early problem solving models, which are based upon behavioristic lines of psychology. In fact, the problem of taking a particular concept for granted and leaving it logically uncriticized render Asimow’s imagined functional fluidity off design all too rigid, extremely positivist, mechanistic, and deterministic, even if Asimow’s intention is to develop this notion further by making it an integral part of his no-

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tion of design process connected to his conception design morphology. The negative effect of the adopted rigid-stage formulae and the emphasis on behaviorist and on schematic traditions renders this notion of design process too restrict a tool to use in a global context. The following diagram exemplifies the principle of such model (Fig.1.7). Fig. 1.7: An operation model of design process. Training

Analytical Phase

Briefing

Programing

Experience

Observation Measurement

Data Collection

Analysis

Creative Phase Synthesis

Inductive Reasoning Evaluation Judgement Deductive Reasoning Decision

Development Description

Executive Phase

Solution

Communication

Translation Transmission

An operation model of design process as proposed by Bruce Archer around 1964. Also called the iconic representation of the operation, the model shows diagrammatically how the data is processed. At the end of the process, the newly developed idea becomes fully operational and is ready to be applied or communicated. The diagram shows the rigid relations between stages and emphasizes the “analytical phase”, the “creative phase”, and the “executive phase”. The separation of phases and the idea of a “progression” derived from the preceding stages to the latter ones are also perceivable in the model.

A recurrent conception from the late 1950s onwards, this specific kind of schematic representation became predominant in the realm of design process. The predominance of the schematic views of design process is supported by the belief that, by means of such schematization, it is possible, and even necessary, to identify the discrete and fixed stages of projective activities because the discrete phases of the stage process constitute a necessary knowledge to a fuller comprehension of design process itself (cf. ibid).

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With some variation and difference in the number of stages, the diagrams representing rigid stage systems applied to design, and equated with problem solving behavior, can be represented as this operational research model designed by Bruce Archer18 around 1964 (cf. ROWE, 1987: 50). The main problem is that the vast majority of the proponents of operations research as equivalent to problem solving believed that the behavioristic notion of design process could account for the novelty. This belief stumbles, however, on a methodological difficulty. As most of the proponents of this first generation of problem solving, the operation of the human mind while performing the task of finding a solution to a problem is rather difficult to grasp and, as it is repeated throughout the literature on problem solving, little is known of what goes on in the mind during the moment in which invention or creative thought occurs (cf. BUHL, 1960: 91; cf. JONES, 1963: 64). Curiously enough, although from the 1970s onwards there has been a great deal of resistance against this almost naïve belief of the “first generation”, this position still finds resonance in contemporary movements. The so-called “design thinking method”, a variant of human-centered design, as it is conceived by IDEO in the USA as well as by the Hasso-Plattner-Institut (HPI) in Potsdam, Germany, is based mainly upon the premises of problem solving behavior and on the rigid stages of operations research. It is often called by its authors a “systematic method for innovation”, which can be applied to every aspect of human life. It is also said to be a heuristic method, that is, a method for invention and innovation that prescribes quite definite procedural steps in order to complete a given project. This “heuristic method” is a practical application, which will develop its potential within a certain project, when operated under optimal, multidisciplinary circumstances. Accordingly, so affirm the authors of the method, a wide “range of success”, that is, Erfolgsspektrum, is also said to be, under these conditions, fully articulated, and, consequently achieved (cf. PLATTNER, MEINEL, WEINBERG, 2009: 103; cf. HOFMANN, 2014: 33-47).

18

There is a great deal of different diagrams proposed with the same basic intention, that of better representing creative or inventive operations within a given general design process. It would go beyond the scope of this research to revisit all of these diagrams and this is not the main goal of this work. Further reading about such diagrams and the representatives of the so-called first generation of design methods can be found, for instance, in MAREIS, 2016; MAREIS, 2014; PLATTNER, MEINEL, WEINBERG, 2009; FEZER, 2009; BAYAZIT, 2004; CROSS, 1993; ALTSCHULLER, 1984; RITTEL, 1973; MOORE, 1970; BROADBENT and WARD, 1969; GREGORY, 1966.

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The main operative thesis of this contemporary version of design thinking, according to this applicable heuristic method, is that while the “creative process” takes place mostly at an unconscious level, and because spontaneity cannot be forced to arise, the process of “design thinking” leads mandatorily to useful and suitable results in the diverse single steps. These latter results allow the progress of the project, especially because they all lead to a form of an “insight”, of an “idea”, or of a “solution” directly applicable to the task at hand. These phases, or single steps of this markedly rigid-stage model, are considered as maturation phases, leading necessarily to the final instance of an application, which is the stage of testing or implementing (cf. PLATTNER, MEINEL, WEINBERG, 2009: 103). Specifically, the design thinking process is divided into a sequence of several coordinated phases of work, at the end of which a useful result for the formulated problem appears (ibid: 113)19. However, this certainty proposed by the operations research in the context of design process started to be questioned. The rigid stage models offer a visualization of how this data is processed, but the aims of the proponents, as mentioned previously, was even higher. The representation of the process should also account for future processes. These models were, therefore, also methods of application. In every stage there is a programmatic operation, which, if appropriately developed, leads necessarily to the sought synthesis, that is, to a form of bright idea, which, in its turn, solves the problem identified in the first stage. These methods would account for the new element, innovation, and its implementation into a given system of design. But, on the other hand, the rigid stage model is not

19

It is more than coincidence that the method articulated by the contemporary proponents of “design thinking” has been compared with the method found in behavior group therapy. In an article entitled “What can Design Thinking Learn from Behavior Group Therapy?” (THIENEN et al., 2012) the authors claim that behavioral research purview presents strikingly similar methods as those employed by design thinking. This claim is based on the fact that both methods operate with goal-oriented problem solving procedures. For instance, the process of behavioristic group therapy comprises a number of specified stages, and each stage is build up upon another. In order to solve a given problem, the group must tackle one of each phase in a given order, according to the sequence of tasks. In the case that a certain task is not sufficiently solved, it is possible to return to the previous task and proceed with the problem solving activity again (cf. THIENEN et al., 2012: 286). Here, the rigid stages of design thinking are literally equalized with those found in behavior group therapy (cf. FIEDLER, 2005: 30; cf. PLATTNER, MEINEL, WEINBERG, 2009: 103; cf. HOFMANN, 2014: 33-47).

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able, at least not operating within the behavioristic framework, to give exact preestablished guidance to account for either the problem in its entirety, nor to propose automatically a given synthesis for this problem. Otherwise stated, the “very maintenance of distinct phases of activity, with a beginning and an end, and with feedback loops among them, requires that objective performance criteria can be explicitly stated in a manner that fundamentally guides the procedure” (ROWE, 1987: 47-48). Moreover, the question about an explanation of the passage from the unknown to the formation of syntheses arises with full force, but remain unanswered. What is it about a definite progression of activities that automatically results in a specific, further activity? Through what mechanism, or means, do we advance from the analysis to synthesis? How it is that unique solutions are often rendered to problems, when the information processing that takes place seems straightforward? As far as they go, stagedprocess models do illuminate certain commonly observable features of design activity; yet the illumination is at a comparatively low level. (ROWE, 1987: 50-51. Italics are mine)

The idea of illumination, or, to use the contemporary vocabulary of design thinking method, the stage of ideation, is a sort of “processual byproduct”, that is, something that emerges once the steps are correctly performed. As already discussed, operations research applied to problem solving as a general tool, which is, in its turn, applied into other areas of inquiry, such as architecture, design process, engineering design, and so on, has received harsh criticism since the late 1960s onwards mostly because of its characteristic rigidity. This processual rigidity is a typical heritage coming from psychological views proposed by Gestalt psychology, behaviorism or behavioral research and generated, therefore, a specific “methodolatry”, which has been harshly criticized since its early propositions. It is important here to note that this extreme rigid stage models bring with themselves an inherent notion of determinism and mechanism, which seems to contradict the very purpose with which these models have been conceived in the first place. A detailed account of the main paradigm that lead to these rigid stage model will be tackled in the second part of the book.

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TRADITIONAL VIEWS: PEIRCE, SEMIOTICS, AND PROJECTIVE ACTIVITIES The second problem I extensively discuss in the book is related to the broad use of diverse sign theories and sign systems to both theoretically and methodologically ground design process. Diverse sciences of signs and sign theories have been widely used as a theoretical instrument to study design process, as well as creative and projective activities in general. The present inquiry upon design process based on the specific semiotics of Charles S. Peirce will demand a different approach to cope with the intrinsic processuality of design process, rather than being based on the common approach of semiological and behavioristsemiotical classificatory traditions. For the most part, theories based on semiotics of linguistic, semiological, or behavioristic extractions used to frame design process tend to frame phenomena of these fields of creativity by means of strictly codified and conventional language functions in a rather hardened dualistic form of signification. These frameworks lead to a form of atomization and subdivision of conventionalized systems of language into verifiable structures and minimal subcodes. Moreover, the extreme mixing of different types of sign theories that took place between the 1950s and the 1980s has greatly contributed to a pastiche of sign theories that were no longer functional as valuable research instruments. When referred to the context of creative operations, semiotics – the concept of which is nowadays used to describe all kinds of sign theories at once and indifferently – became synonym to hermetic, empty, and useless discourses. Without harking too far back into the past of such diverse theories and systems of signs, I will rather concentrate upon the critical analysis and reflection upon those theories that bore and still bear influence on projective activities, in general, and on design process, as here understood, specifically. I must say also, however, that in the third part of the book, I will describe briefly some aspects of the origins of the name and the type of function semiotics had in antiquity, as well in philosophy, especially in the writings of John Locke and in the works of Charles S. Peirce. But this critical analysis will be undertaken in order to counter, and thus dismiss misleading ideas, specifically completely incorrect statements included in a significative textbook about design. The studies of structuralism, linguistics, information theory, and cybernetics flourished from the 1950s through the 1970s. Concepts such as “sign”, “icon”, “symbol”, “reference”, “significant”, and “meaning” were brought from their original, textual-semiological contexts, as well as from areas of semantics and diverse sign theories into other areas of knowledge, especially into those where non-verbal forms of communication processes were more pronounced and op-

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erational. New readings on various derivatives of pragmatism, both North American and European, and also of behaviorism attached to theories of signs, as in the case of Charles Morris’ semiotics, for instance, also permeated other areas of knowledge. Suddenly, in many places, researchers were trying to integrate these new paradigms and methodological approaches into varied disciplines and fields of inquiry. The most successful of these attempts took place, mostly, in the areas of linguistics, theories of communication, social sciences, cultural studies, and the arts (cf. DRYER, 2009: 180). However, instead of closing theoretical and epistemological gaps, the excessive admixtures and overstretching of theories, now being used as applicable methodological models, created many more complications. In this context, the first branch of Peirce’s semiotics, known as speculative grammar, that is, the level of semiotics that studies types of signs, has been widely used by many theoreticians to define new paradigms in design, in architecture, and in the arts, for example, both theoretically as well as practically. These bits and pieces of Peirce’s theory have often been mixed with other sign theories, semiologies, experimental psychology, behaviorism, cognitivism, semanticism, information theory, cognitive sciences, and cybernetics (cf. BETTS, 1998: 78f, cf. DRYER, 2009: 180-182). As already pointed out, the inquiry upon design process with the theoretical framework of Peircean semiotics, which I propose for this book, demands a new and different approach, distinct from the common approach of the semiotical and semiological traditions. The traditional approach utilizing sign theories and semiologies based on structural linguistics and structuralism are not up to the task at hand for two main reasons. In the first place, they are, for the most part, limited to the scope of codified, i.e., already conventionally formed languages. Their applied methodology requires the atomization and subdivision of a conventional language system into verifiable structures and subcodes. Methodologically, this becomes “a technical means to designate different objects in a homogeneous way”, because the verifiable “structures” are models “constituted according to operators of simplification which allow the unification of different phenomena from a single point of view” (cf. ECO, 1968: 63). This results in the theories of this purview tending to explain everything as codified and conventional language functions. In its very core, Peirce’s semiotics contradicts these forms of dualistic, structuralist sign theories, for its theoretical scope and explanatory powers are not limited to the realm of conventional significations and linguistic structures. If a given object of study escapes the high degree of typically structuralist formalization as well as the character of already defined languages as sign systems, as is the case of design process in general, a mainly structuralist approach

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becomes difficult. To account for such dynamic, formative systems, the structuralist approach must rely on building analogies with a theory – for instance, to explain certain dynamic processes in the arts, design, or architecture as “multilayered, polysemic textual messages” so as to use the theory in a certain way that will enable a specific phenomenon to be contained by the theory. The problem here is not so much to consider a given work of art, be it an oil painting, or a film, or the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, as evoking “multilayered and polysemic” meanings. The problem is to attribute such characteristic features of textual language systems, e.g., multilayered, polysemic textual structure, to other nonverbal and non-linguistic areas based on theories constructed upon analogies. Analogies, approximations, and metaphors devised to understand different fields as a form of “text” in order to fit the structuralist methods came into use to analyze, decompose, and explain diverse phenomena. It is typical of structuralist methods, for example, to explain a complex work of art by imposing upon it textual-structural categories and forcing decompositions of the “textual” forms, such as subdividing it into syntactical, semantic, lexical “unities”, and types of “discourses”. Such analogical approximations became widely disseminated in the late 1950s throughout the 1970s. Referring to exactly this point, Johannes Ehrat, in his account of narration and representation in cinema from a Peircean perspective, affirms: Theory suffers when we adopt methods used for other objects on a metaphorical or analogical basis. This is because we constantly risk overstretching the principle of analogy, the metaphorical point of comparison between two objects. Interpretations based on those analogies in fact jump to conclusions – sometimes even a leap – and they cannot but falter once their metaphorical basis is shaken. (EHRAT, 2005: 4)

In the second place, because structuralist sign theories are based upon a dichotomic notion of sign that separates everything into two parts, that is, the signified and the signifier – which is actually derived from structural linguistic methodology (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 46) – everything that is considered to be a sign must reflect these two elements. The problem is that these two elements are made into two absolute ideal values, the signifier as signalized part, a mark, and the signified, or the idea that is evoked. Everything else that does not fit into this framework will be disregarded as not being able to function as a sign for something. This is precisely what renders dichotomic semiological theories inapt for the task at hand in this work. For example, specific phenomena, such as unique bluish-metallic marks on a piece of pure titanium, or the particular quality of brush strokes in a work of Monet, the sound of an acoustic contrabass, or a spontaneous social

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movement in an urban environment of 1960s New York City would not be considered by many semiologies as potential signs in themselves. As one of the representatives of structuralist semiology, Yuri Lotman, states, for instance, that the same object “may be studied from a semiotical and from a non-semiotical point of view” (cf. LOTMAN, 1990: 4-5). This statement reveals the clear duality within structural semiologies and sign theories and their tendency to be reductionist in the sense that a sign system is for the most part related to an already highly codified referential system. Thus, these theories grasp only very specific elements as relevant signs, and disregard the rest as being non-signs. Semiologies and sign theories based on structuralism and linguistics fail to grasp the phenomenologically qualitative and indicative aspects of reality in its ubiquitous multiplicity that impose themselves upon the senses (cf. EHRAT, 2005: 6). Exactly these latter qualitative aspects of phenomena – such as the qualities present in the piece of titanium, the qualities of brush strokes on canvas, the dynamic characteristics of a social movement, or the characteristic sound of an acoustic contrabass – may be presented as qualities of some unique sign, and possible qualities of phenomenological forms that can be semiotically organized into a potential system of language. These “hidden” qualitative aspects can play a fundamental role in a developmental, formative process, for they are qualities that may turn into repetitions of qualities that, in their turn, start forming a new regularity on the verge of becoming something else, as I will demonstrate as follows: An artist experiments with forms produced by oil paint on canvas. He seeks to develop a new visual construction, a new formal pattern in order to create a new visual identity. Upon testing many techniques, he stumbles upon a certain characteristic of paint being distributed on canvas by means of hitting the surface with the brush differently. He realizes that the effect caused by this movement, the quality of paint, the quantity of solvent and oil, creates a certain visual effect. He finds it interesting and sets out to improve upon it. In doing so, that which seemed not to be relevant from one perspective, indeed, insignificant, becomes the center of new semiosis, or semiotic processes – in Peircean terms. As I demonstrate further in this work, exactly this process is of utmost importance for those areas where design process is operative. It is important to state that apart from Peircean semiotics, the different sign theories and semiologies each have a degree of specialization and a more defined range of application. As theories applied to already codified language, to textual contexts – “textual” here indicating verbal-written languages, which were originally the object of study of structural linguistics – they are, as such, already wellspecialized sciences. Even if some theories consider broader sign systems, such as the cultural semiotics of Yuri Lotman or the psychological behaviorist semiotics

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of Charles Morris, these sciences refer to an already defined, applicable framework. As sciences of the phenomena of language, of communication, of text, of structures – often extended to other fields such as the social or cinematographic, for instance – they have their respective functions and precise applications. They are, for the most part, highly specified sciences, and as such, require a specific theoretical framework in order to operate in an optimal way. Overstretching a highly specified theory onto other fields usually leads to a poor representation of phenomena. Now, I do not mean to disregard other sign systems by affirming, on the one hand, that they are completely ill-suited to being articulated within the context of design process and, on the other, by maintaining that Peirce’s semiotics is the only theory that can explain design process. I do mean here, however, that, for the objectives of the present study, Peirce’s semiotics offers both a set of general theoretical principles and a characteristic processual openness that enables it to consider design process in the most optimal manner. I have already argued that within the traditional context of design process and semiotics, certain aspects of Peirce’s semiotics – mostly aspects of his widely known sign typology or sign classification – became popularized and found their way into a wide variety of theories of design, architecture, and the arts. In most cases, the appropriation of sign theories and their implementation in these fields was intended to enable new paradigmatic and methodological levels for design process in general. The first level of Peirce’s semiotic is the widely known signclassification, which works with concepts such as icon, index, and symbol. This particular appropriation of a fragment of a theoretical framework was distinguished by the fact that it explicitly makes the semantic, pragmatic, and hermeneutical dimensions of sign articulation the subject of discussion. By doing so, the foundations for a sort of “verbalization” or “language codification”, for a sort of “visualization” and “esthetization, that is, the stress upon the apparent in opposition to the wholeness, as well as a sort of “esthetization” of architecture have been laid (cf. DRYER, 2009: 182). By “esthetization” I do not mean the attribute of being esthetic in the sense of being beautiful or attractive, but in the sense of architecture as being considered a “text”. This “text” can be presented, decomposed into grammatical units, which can be analyzed and rearranged. It is a paradigm based on structuralism that proposes the subdivision of grammatical units in order to decompose and then “rewrite” the semantic information in different ways, proposing thereby a new architectural context. In this case, for instance, the aspect of the “language” of architecture, and also of design and the arts reduces the whole content to structural, operable parts. As such, the “esthetization” relates,

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in the context of design, to the “presentable”, to the “visible” and “perceivable” aspects of a given design. Yet this “esthetic” part – and “esthetic” here means something highly metaphorical and unrelated to the fruitful disciplines of philosophy – is considered to be only as a matter of communication, and not as the actual, or, for that matter, as constitutive of the whole design process. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of such admixtures of theories is Max Bense’s study in the fields of design and the arts using the first level of Peirce’s semiotics, speculative grammar, but here mixed with structuralism, cybernetics, information theory, hermeneutics, and behaviorism (cf. DRYER, 2009: 179-202; cf. MAREIS, 2014: 115-120; BETTS, 1998: 78). This is most clearly evident, for instance, in Max Bense’s work on the theory of signs and its connection to design and architecture (cf. BENSE, 1975: 125-130; BENSE 1971: 27-28). Bense employed the theory of signs in the contexts of design and architecture within an extremely narrow and compartmentalized framework. For example, he considered the discipline of design as only either Werbetechnik, i.e., advertising technique, or the development of products, that is, product design, which he considered equal to industrial design. Furthermore, he separated the realms of design and architectural practice from their communicative process, the latter being the semiotic, communicative, programmed part, which was separated from “actual” design or architectural procedures. Due to the fact that he mixed sign classifications with other semantic sign theories, as for instance, with the behavioristic model of Charles Morris, as well as with some core principles of cybernetics, Bense’s attempt to achieve novel systematic understanding of projective activities was limited to a cluster of classifications that intended to represent several sign functions. But the compartmentalization of information fell short of the expectations of a truly systemic semiotic model. This tendency to consider semiotics as a merely “communicative” tool have, since then, remained a paradigm. Very often it is said that projective activities, in this case, more specifically, design, produce not only “material reality” but also fulfill determinate pre-programmed “communicative functions” (BÜRDEK, 1999: 230-231). This shows that the separation of the “realm of esthetics”, that is the realm of external, appellative appearances, from the realm of the real design is still a contemporary problem. The third part of the book dedicated to an in-depth study of semiotics, specifically Peirce’s semiotics, in light of which design process is here focused upon.

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THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS OF DESIGN PROCESS IN LIGHT OF PEIRCE’S SEMIOTICS: FROM RIGID STAGE THINKING TO PROCESSUAL FLOWING STREAMS The main hypothesis that guides this inquiry, as it has been discussed at length in this first part, seeks to overcome, firstly, the equivocal notions of rigid-stage models of operations research used to describe design process, which are based predominantly upon the psychological frameworks of behaviorism or information processing theory. And, secondly, within the framework of semiotics, the inquiry aims at the dismissal of the equivocal notions of semiotics as considered as a rather confused field of linguistic and structuralist, or behavioral psychological based sign systems that are too vague and inapt to yield any usable referential when employed as theoretical background for studies in the fields where design process is operative. In the rather unsystematic purview of rigid stage models of design process, the moment of discovery of new states of things, as well as the mind’s operations leading to inventions are considered in a very dim light, that is, that of being for the most part instrumental to the whole design process only inasmuch as it can immediately generate new content and new options in a given design context, but as being detrimental to the type of secure type of thinking that should pervade the deductive steps from earlier to later stages of the process. The derivative models of such purviews are based on rigid stage forms of performing operations and retain from these purviews the aspect of mechanic and deterministic processes. This leads to an impoverished conception of synthesis, the so-called a-ha moment, which is, in most cases, only explained ex negativo. Another problem emerging from these purviews is the consideration of mind. Mind here, as the operational entity capable of performing inferences, is considered only after strict psychological models as being a single human mind, a brain-like thinking mind. This causes the understanding of mind to be reduced to the conception of a single thinking individual, thus further reducing the spectrum of complex processuality within dynamic operations and relationships involving a larger number of actors to their psychological, individual cognitive abilities. As already pointed out, this point of the consideration of mind and logic must be addressed in this book given the fact that an inquiry upon the logic of design process should be based upon the inquiry into the conditions of possibility of such events to take place and not upon what a particular mind should particularly think about the process. Against the common and highly disseminated views of creativity based on psychological models and of instrumentalized rigid stages methods for coming up with innovation – these rigid stages consisting of discrete

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steps for the deterministic achievement of a “mental leap” of novelty, and the most common of which, as already discussed – is the method of problem solving, vastly based upon early associationist and behaviorist doctrines as well as based upon information processing paradigms, this final chapter argues for the continuity of design process in its phenomenic, semiotic, and pragmatic dimensions. As to the second point, the problematic tradition between sign systems, sign theories and design process, I will demonstrate in the third part of the book that there exist diverse sign theories and each has its own specific potentialities and ranges of application as theoretical frameworks. In order to clarify the matter, I propose a short survey of the sign systems that have influenced and still bear importance in the field of projective activities and design process. As I will also expound upon in the third part of the book, the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce is a rather distinct type of semiotics, for it is not based upon linguistic, structuralist, or psychological-behaviorist frameworks, but it is Peirce’s discipline of logic within his architectonic of philosophy. Although this thorough and more detailed exposition of the semiotics of Peirce is yet to follow, it is possible to draw here some conclusions of what has been gained as knowledge production of the logic of design process, as circumscribed by the theoretical framework of semiotics. The projective act of the mind in the context of design process, while performing purposive conceptions, leads to a specific mindset of invention and discovery. Simultaneously, this mindset guides selected courses of action in order to effectuate a certain project. Thus, the mental act within design process is always connected with plans for possible and actual experimentations and externalizations. There is, therefore, no separation between the mental act from the technical and practical realms, for the mindset of design process always requires the possibility for the execution of a given plan. The specified course of action has been selected by the mindset and the results of the experimentalization feed back into the initial plan, which governs the course of action. The proposed semiotic reading considers, thus, the whole process as a flowing stream of semiotic processes, which integrates processes of inventing, discovering, form giving, rule-finding, and experimenting in a continuous unfolding process. Invention is, in the present context, understood from the perspective of an abductive process, which is the process that introduces a new element into a given cognitive context. From a certain projective context that involves a given purpose, a new element is born. This is the daring attitude of mind, which enables the invention and the discovery of newly formed elements in a given perceiving mind, thereby also enabling the formation of a myriad of subsequent conceptions. As already pointed out, invention takes the shape of a general process of

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hypostatization, in which something newly formed, a new idea, becomes attractive and insinuates itself persistently to the perceiving mind. This newly formed, perceptive idea is, however, still rather ephemeral. Thence, it must be suggested to the perceiving mind in a more intelligible and clearer manner as to allow it to bear its fruits. What is firstly perceived, this new generated idea, is an emerging first. As aforementioned, it persistently insinuates itself to the mind, invading its consciousness. For a moment, there is, in this perceiving mind, only this current perception – one could say that there is only this specific qualitative consciousness. After a moment of contemplation, the vividness of this dominating qualitative consciousness fades away and gives way to the mind’s analytical powers. The impressions of this invading consciousness can be analyzed, selected, focused upon. A series of conceptualizations start arising and taking shape. The logic of abduction requires, as aforementioned, that these conceptualizations must be put to the test by experimentation. Some of the mental procedures set off by abduction will be selected as the most appropriate conceptions, which, in turn will define specific courses of action and guide specific devised experimentations. The formed conceptualizations, by guiding conduct and experiment, carry thereby specific and projected designs into performance. Conversely, it is possible to say that a given projective process has been driven by the first generated idea, which is the purpose guiding the further development of the whole subsequent development of said project. In this context, the effectuation of design process arises and takes shape in a succession of embodiments, that is to say, in successive endeavors to conceptualize and exteriorize forms and sequences of the projected first outlined conception. Otherwise stated, the first conception, which was provoked by the first emerging idea, will be inscribed into different mediative supports, being shaped with different materiality and also will be articulated within a certain language or thereby develop the potential to create new languages. The successive embodiments and replications guided by the conceptions developed carry the projective process further. The first conception, developed from the first generated idea as already mentioned, becomes thus refined and improved in the subsequent conceptions and conceptualizations. Invention, as a vital component of design process, does not take place only at the beginning of a given projective activity. It is present and operative in every step of the whole design process and possesses a formative character, for invention and the procedures of embodying new conceptions and conducting experimentations are occurring simultaneously to the whole projectual development. The formulation of this thesis requires, however, further clarification in order to

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better enlighten the logic of events unfolding within design process. At first glance, the present formulation fulfills its function of presenting a broader and more detailed operation of the projective action in a synthetic manner, in what refers to the continuity of events, its pronounced non-linearity and simultaneity of operations, as well as the abductive processes that commences new futureoriented sign operations and purpose-oriented experimentation. There have been several attempts to employ significative fragments of Peirce’s semiotics and theory of inquiry as methods for problem solving while engaging a given design process. Peter Rowe, in his already mentioned book Design Thinking, contends, for instance, that Peirce’s logic critics, the second branch of semiotics, has been used as an applicable method called “endjustification” (cf. ROWE, 1987: 102). Now, end-justification is a methodological principle of problem solving with the following form: by encountering a given problem, an appropriate action should be taken under a certain array of conditions, or, as Rowe states, “if problem x is encountered, then take action y under conditions z” (ibid: 96). And as aforementioned, bits and pieces of Peirce’s theory of inquiry have been articulated to yield a variety of models for problem solving in the specific context of design. The main aim of these models in the field of design process was to generate a proposition for a logical form in order to unify all aspects of problem solving into an articulable and applicable general method. Based on these general models of finding a solution to a problem under certain circumstances, these fragments of Peirce’s theory of inquiry have been explored and applied as well as a model for heuristic reasoning in the context of problem solving. The intention of proposing such appropriation, similar to Wallas’s proposal of a similar appropriation of John Dewey’s theory of inquiry for his rigid stage model of creativity, was to employ a general method of problem solving that would define the problem and, almost simultaneously, would propose the solution for the stated problem. The solution, in this case, would be “adduced” in the same way in which, from the observation of events, an explicative natural law would be “adduced”. The most important aspect of such a heuristic thinking is that this logical appropriation must exhibit a given certainty in facilitating the problem definition and, more importantly, the almost concomitant solution for the problem (ibid: 103). But as I have thematized early in this first part, when I discussed the inadvertently adoption of logical theories of inquiry to be directly “applied” into a practical matter as a method – which causes considerably dilution of the heuristic powers of the theories – I showed that Peirce’s logic critic had been also “applied” directly into methods as a functional practical rule of thumb. As I have already pointed out, Peirce’s logic is not apt to be “applied”: it will not give a result, it will not present the inquirer with an applicable method,

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nor will it make a chess player play better chess. Peirce’s logic will rather furnish the inquiry with the theoretical means to elaborate experiments to put a certain proposed hypothesis to the test and will propose the formulation of plans and courses of action. Now, the very idea of problem solving must be reconsidered. Problem solving is still a powerful tool in every process in which a solution to a certain circumstance is required. However, problem solving is a local strategy instead of a global one. Problem solving can be equalized neither with creativity nor with invention or discovery itself. Creation and invention are occurrences characterized by a highly abductive process through which a synthesis comes into play, and, through the suggestion of which new concepts are drawn from this synthesis, while the whole form of conceiving of the generated idea is reframed in light of this synthesis. The abductive process, as I will later thoroughly argue, cannot be instrumentalized as a “promising” strategy of finding a solution to a problem. Furthermore, read from the perspective of pragmatism, problem solving is a local heuristic tool that can be used to act in the gaps of already clearly determined propositions, even if the problem situation is still not clearly defined. There is no point in calling it “problem solving” if there is no interruption of a certain pragmatic process, that is, if there is no obstruction to the process that involves the self-controlled interplay of both cognition and conduct. Now, conduct and thinking are self-controlled if they are being used according to a plan or according to the pursuit of a purpose. Thought and conduct become interrupted if there is an obstacle that breaches the continuity of the procedure. In summary, the book introduces the abductive process as the key element and suggests, furthermore, that invention and discovery are not singular occurrences, but may occur in virtually every new unfolding of a given design process. Perhaps the most important knowledge production gained thus far within the framework of semiotics is the knowledge related to the intimate relationship between the perception and the effect caused in the mind when an idea is generated, the specific design context in which the mind was immersed at the time in which the abductive process took place, and, most importantly, the recognition that the mental habit of enabling abductions to happen can be trained. It means that, despite the fact that abductions are serendipitous, uncontrolled acts of synthesis, and therefore the content of a specific abduction cannot be volitionally provoked or forced, the habit of enabling abductive occurrences can be trained and stimulated under certain conditions. Thus, discovery and invention, as results of abductive processes, are what set off the flowing stream of semioses within a given design process. Creativity, as here thus defined, is a property described by the potential occurrences of abduc-

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tive processes within a general design process or projective activity. According to this line of argumentation, the property of creativity is, therefore, an ingredient of a broader logical process, a process that initiates further processes, and, at the same time, promotes the unfolding of formative, that is, form-giving processes that may be carried further under a given set of circumstances. Concomitant with the initial abduction are, at least potentially, the possible manners in which the forming process will take place. The first abduction reveals a very general purpose that will guide the whole design process, but this general process cannot set the definitions of each successive logical determination. It is only by being subjected to this flowing stream of semiosis that design process will grow and become more delineated until finally achieving a determinate consolidation. This introduces a formative activity into the process, which arises in the specific domain of design process and nurtures the production of shapes concomitantly with the manner with which these forms will be carried into execution, respectively. The psychological ingredient has been dismissed here because it is not an essential ingredient for abductions to take place. It may be that there are psychological ingredients that also contribute to particular sets of creative features in certain psychological contexts. But they are not essential and are, in this work, as already pointed out, disregarded. As already explained, the difference between inquiring upon the logic of design process in light of logic and not from any psychological perspective consists in investigating what is relevant to the unfolding logic of events exhibited by the phenomenon of design process when read through a certain theoretical framework – and not what a single, particular human mind thinks about this phenomenon. Moreover, when the logic of events of a certain process starts unfolding, the creation of new elements that will be embodied in subsequent conceptions of the process influences the development of the process itself in the specific manner that the new introduced ideas propose new conceptions, which, in their turn, introduce new logical perspectives to the whole design process. That is to say, these newly formed conceptions carry their own logic into the whole process with them, and, for that reason, demand specific ways of dealing with them. Reiterating this specific epistemological position, Peirce maintains: “ideas really influence the physical world, and in doing so carry their logic with them […]” (NEM 4: 31). Having presented the main hypothesis guiding this work and also having discussed the main contributions from the framework of semiotics claiming that in light of it, the reading of design process is rendered clearer and is understood in a more processual way, I will, in the second part of the book, focus upon the critical analysis of the main paradigms at the core of the rigid stage type of thinking

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that became synonymous to design process. The short presentation discussing the issues of problem solving and the stratification of creative thinking has revealed how those paradigms become embedded into design process and also into any form of creative or procedural discourse involving problem solving, decision making, operations research, creative thinking, and any other form of projective activity. Analyzing critically these paradigms and understanding their psychological bases is of paramount importance in order to have a clearer and unbiased understanding of design process, as is the intention of this book.

PART TWO A Critical Analysis of a Problematic Tradition The Paradigmatic Rigidity Encapsulated in the Current Discourses of Design Process

Psychological Foundations Creativity, Invention, Association, and Problem Solving

TOWARDS A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL DISCOURSES OF DESIGN PROCESS The primary aim of this second part is to critically analyse the main psychological paradigms that have had and still have a direct influence upon the theories of design process in general. As already mentioned in the first part of the book, the current and more traditional discourses of design process framing the dynamics and the articulation of such projective processes and activities consider design process as being composed of rigid stages. These denominations of such processuality seek to describe or to encapsulate the whole of the projective activities, namely the whole of design process, as being composed of definite, finite, mechanistic, and deterministic stages, which, when operated in the correct sequence will enable necessarily the execution of a given project with the deductively determined outcome as a result of the articulation of such rigid stages. Moreover, design process has been considered to be a local operation of problem solving and this prescribed equivalence has led – especially in the 1960s – to the consideration of design process as being composed only by rigid and definable stages. Any definable iterative repetition of such stages would automatically lead to any problem being solved. This understanding of design process as composed of such stages is so deeply rooted in the theoretical consideration of projective activities and creative processes attached to the description of design process that it becomes difficult to inquire into how the design process functions as a flowing stream and its relationships between invention and discovery. In order to render the semiotic understanding of design process as well as of invention and discovery much clearer, this part of the book sets to critically analyse this problematic tradition of rigid stages. The manner, in which I chose to do this in this book, was to look for the most fundamental paradigms at the core of the most promi-

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nent sets of discourses of rigid stages. The disclosure of such paradigms will help the advancement of the argumentation of the book in shifting the attention from a strictly psychological-based consideration of design process to a semiotic one. As I will argue here, the consideration of design process in light of the semiotics of Peirce will enable the readership to understand the processual nature inherent to design process independently from a specific psychological interpretation, that is to say, design process, in its logic, will be understood in a much broader manner, independently of one particular human observer. The concept of mind in light of semiotics of Charles S. Peirce also gains a broader meaning, for it is related to anything that has the power to generalize from a perceived state of things, and from these generalizations, to create inferences and operate intellectually upon it. This semiotical description of mind, or better stated, the concept of mind as seen in light of semiotics, becomes independent of a brain-like understanding of mind. Therefore, the psychological views of mind, at least the most traditional considerations, are not consistent with the considerations of mind in light of semiotics. As mentioned before, Peirce’s semiotics is his philosophical logic and therefore independent of any study of psychology. This point will be thoroughly studied, as indicated, in the third part the book. In the present part, the book presents a critical analysis of the main paradigms stemming from psychology and cognitive sciences that rendered design process a matter of problem solving to be understood as a rigid stage operation. In this bundle of many psychological premises, invention and discovery are seen in a rather instrumentalized light, that is to say, in detriment to the more secure forms of cognition. And although the term heuristics will be articulated in the such purviews of design process, their functional characteristics will be of that of instrumentalizing dominant cognition in order to come up with something original. After it appears and results in a possible solution, heuristics ceases to be considered as pertaining to the whole structure, for it is neither an integral part nor it is not relevant to the project, for the reason that it is not, rationally at least, totally controllable. A View of the Principles of Discovery and Invention at Work within Design Process The dynamics of carrying a project into execution as in a self-controlled act derived from a pre-established plan have, for a long time, been the subject of philosophical and, later, of psychological inquiry. This process received special attention at the time of the Renaissance, a time in which the human thought was deemed to be the primary intellectual force that can disclose the secrets of na-

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ture, can create knowledge and control thereby natural processes. Furthermore during the Age of Enlightenment, scientific and technological purviews became the predominant, driving force behind ideas of culture and progress that were tightly connected with that of epistemology. One of the main questions of the time was that of answering the question of how ideas are formed and what happens in the mind that brings ideas together. The genesis of ideas, especially in regard to the mechanics of thought, intention, learning, and forming new ideas became the central interest of new psychological studies that flourished at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Based on rationalist purviews that characterized science in modern times, new research in psychology began to appear, the main objective of which was to answer questions about the mechanics of formation and association of ideas and its relation to the perceived sense data. Following this, psychology transformed itself into in an independent and specialized science that inquired into the functioning of the human mind, and thus devised its own methods of experimentation. As a science that made use of a range of experimental methods, psychology evolved in the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, and was able to shed some light upon important principles related to the general functioning of the human mind. In order to survey what happens in the mind, two main methods were put in practice. Methods of introspection, to survey how the mental phenomena can be grasped, either by the inquirer himself by observing his or her own mental phenomena, or methods to observe the behavior of the subject, in order to see the connection between consciousness and conduct. One of the most important aspects discovered by early twentieth century psychoanalysis was Sigmund Freud’s realization that the rational, self-controlled dimension of the human psyche is, after all, not selfsufficient and, indeed, not the predominant aspect of the whole psychological sphere, for, as he wrote: “das Ich nicht Herr sei in seinem eigenen Haus”, that is, the ego is not master in its own house (FREUD, 1917: 7). With these developments, with the development of many schools of thought and with different lines of investigation, psychology, as the science of the human mind, set the standards for inquiring into special aspects of its functioning. Questions about creative thinking and task-driven functions of the mind soon arose, especially because experimental methods were introduced, which involved interviews investigating the association of ideas, as well as special observations of the performance and conduct of test subjects when undertaking a given task. Intending to tackle these questions, a new paradigm appeared in psychology, one which has since become a widespread concept used in design process. This is the concept of problem solving, which in its conceptual structure presented ele-

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ments from earlier views of psychology and was closely connected with design process because of certain similarities of mind operation and subject operation related to both fields. It is a concept that cannot be ignored, since it is always present, even in contemporary discourse about design process. In this part, various relevant approaches to the functioning of the mind are presented in a thematic approach from a psychological perspective. To the extent that these are related to problem solving activities, I will take into account the early basic assumptions of the association of ideas, focusing on the beginnings of experimental psychology, the theoretical basis for the rigid state models of creative thought – models which are still in use as a paradigmatic and methodological model for creative and problem solving activity – and, finally, will enter into the still non-systemized discourse of heuristics in design process, that is, the discourse of creativity, invention, and discovery related to design process, which is mostly a pastiche of methods directed at finding a solution to a given immediate problem. Without the intention of exhausting this specific thematic, for it would go beyond of the scope of the present work, I will first discuss briefly the complex and yet inconsistent concept of problem solving and present its main characteristics as well as its psychological bases. This psychological basis is albeit very complex and has developed over a long span of time. In order to comprehend the origins of the psychological perspectives which later on became the theoretical basis for the concept of problem solving in particular, and operative in design process in general, I present a more detailed historical account of the developments of the main paradigms of the mind’s functioning in psychology. As aforementioned, I will focus on the immediate areas that have some bearing upon the modern assumptions related to design process. From the results of these contributions, a complex scenario, in which problem solving as a discourse of – and sometimes equivalent to – design process itself, can be perceived. The objective here is to reveal the relevant foundations of the predominant paradigms of problem solving, which by now are taken for granted in design discourse, and which have thereby remained a concept neither subject to revision nor open to critical analysis. Early Beginnings: Association Psychology and the Mechanics of Thought At the end of the nineteenth century, an influential school of psychological thought was developed and consolidated. Known as associationism, this school of thought had been seeking to answer some questions concerned with theoretical

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speculation about the problem of association and the generation of ideas, as well as with the problem of learning. At that time, problem solving had not yet been coined as a term, and the principles of associationism hinged on learning problems. Associationism was based on the premise that the principal mechanism, if not the only one, of human learning consisted in the permanent association of impressions that are constantly appearing in combination to the senses. These constantly appearing external sense perceptions would be the prime material for associations. Now, what does association mean here? According to Howard Warren’s work, A History of the Association Psychology, the term association started appearing within the studies of psychology of British researchers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has been primarily applied to the sequences occurring in trains of memory, imagination, or thought. The task of these earlier psychologists was to formulate the principles of mental association involved in these sequences. He affirms, thus: These early psychologists usually adopted the explicative theory – that of associations –, according to which one such experience would follow another experience in accordance with obeying certain definite relationships. Thus one idea may occur and will, for the main reason that governs these relationships, recall another which resembles the first idea or which was contiguous to it in former experiences. (WARREN, 1921: 6)

The explanation based on the principle of contiguous experience is the most elementary concept of association, conceived in this purview as the mechanic of thought that connects trains of thought together. All proponents of this school of thought shared more or less the same ideas that characterize associationism, that is, that the laws of contiguity, similarity, and analogy are the laws by which new ideas are formed. But the majority of the proponents emphasized mostly principles of contiguity and the laws of antecedent-consequent. For them, all ideas are caused either by sense perception, i.e., by perceptions of exterior objects that stimulate consciousness, or are caused by association with other ideas. Either way the main law governing the association of ideas in consciousness is the law of contiguity. All maintain that the rise of sensations depends upon something else outside of consciousness, or – at least – on something external that marks the individual human experience (cf. ibid: 7). The theory of successive associations holds that the antecedent of a given idea may be either a sensation or a previous idea. The term idea was in this context broadly understood as any mental manifestation brought about by any form of sensation, including mental representations. Based on causal relations, associationists thought that the learning process was formed by a chain of such causal

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relations of contiguity and similarities of ideas being formed in the consciousness. There have been some variations regarding the main laws governing the dynamics of association in the human mind as well as the principles upon which association of particular ideas come about. For instance, some representatives of the school believed that the associative laws would hold equally well for sensations and ideas while others would confine these laws to the mechanisms of the union of ideas with either external sensations or internal, subsequent ideas. Still others would even limit the extent of the laws of association to the welding of ideas into a more complex idea, thus broadening the very concept of idea and sometimes also including other mental phenomena such as representation, memory or imagination (cf. ibid). Two theories that govern the association of ideas, however, became more prominent and began to be held as the major laws of how ideas are associated together. These two laws of associations actually outlived the psychology of associationism itself and have been thematized in many different psychological and philosophical theories. These have also been adopted as hypotheses for mental associations by different psychological and linguistic positions during the nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries. The same holds true for much of modern semiotics and semiologies, for instance. These laws, formulated at the early stages of the psychology of association, were the law of similarity (or resemblance) and the law of contiguity. Similarity is, then, the description of a law that clusters ideas together by virtue of the fact that they are similar or share some likeness to the elements of reality grasped by the senses, denominated also as senseperception. The likeness could occur as well between ideas, for a newly formed idea can resemble a previous idea. Contiguity is the law of association, through which subsequent ideas are associated with previous ideas or sense perception by the force of contiguous experiences. While the law of contiguity is accepted in a general manner without much variation in its formulation by the community of associationist psychologists, the law of similarity or resemblance has been criticized as being a weaker form of association. Although similarity had been explained as the law of association between ideas, due to the resemblances ideas may exhibit between each other, its principles were never fully understood. What exactly is the motor that provokes such a clustering of ideas by the principle of similarity? While contiguity was based upon causal-deductive principles of association, similarity seemed not to have a logical representative that would logically ground its principles. This difficulty has opened up a discussion as to whether or not similarity could be reduced to a weaker form of contiguity or if similarity was actually more than one principle of association that was not yet fully understood.

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Moreover, some proponents of the law of similarity would dwell upon terminological aspects between similarity or resemblance as a better description of this law. In the aforementioned book, A History of the Association Psychology, Howard Warren suggests that both terms could be applied interchangeably to the law of association. Although the majority of psychologists at the time would consider them synonymous, thus representing the same mental law, Warren points out, however, that some representatives of the school of associationism thematized the differences between them, or even preferred one formulation over the other. Considering the etymological characteristics of the concepts similarity and resemblance, it is possible to pinpoint the differences between similarity and resemblance. Similarity seems to imply a likeness between what he calls “coordinate factors” – what I would call relational aspects – between two given things. Resemblance, on the other hand, implies a likeness of one thing to another. As an example, he states, based on a purely etymological analysis, two men may be of similar appearance, while a son may resemble his father and, in like manner, the father may be resembled by his son. By examining this particular distinction, we may discover further functions of the concepts hidden from actual common usage. For instance, resemble has been commonly used in English since the fourteenth century; it stems from the old French resembler, meaning “to be like”. The particular spelling of the French word, which had been in use in France around the twelfth century, is constructed by a prefix, re, and a suffix, sembler, which means “to appear”, “to seem”, or “to be like”. Sembler, in its turn, stems from the Latin simulare, that is ‘to copy’; Now, the term similar, which in modern times means “something that shares characteristics in common with something else”, and which is the actual concept used as one of the principles of association from the eighteenth century onward, had its origin in the French word similaire. Similaire, on its turn, stems from extended forms of the Medieval Latin similis and similāris, which mean “alike, like or resembling”. Similaire, however, also stems from the Ancient Latin semol, which means “together”, where its root sem means “one” or “as one, together with”. Around 1650 the word similarly, carrying these root meanings, entered use as an adverb to denote “that which is similar”. This particular etymological characteristic shows that the differentiation often made between similarity and resemblance is relevant and plays a decidedly central role in the later versions of associationist theories. Contiguity and similarity are conceived by many associationists as the main principles that regulate the laws the association of ideas. An external perception that comes to the mind through the senses, a sensation, or an idea either can

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evoke another idea that resembles it, or a sensation or idea that has formerly been experienced and is closely connected with it either temporally or spatially. In more radical views of associationism, similarity is reduced to contiguity as a special type of association. The similar consists of two associated experiences that are indeed identical, leaving only “dissimilar” contents in the new experience to be accounted for. By this token, association ideas are explained solely by the principle of contiguity. The principle of association by similarity is, in this view, but one special case (cf. WARREN, 1921: 8). On the other hand, some theorists and advocates of associationism consider association by similarity to be the predominant law of association, thereby relegating the principle of contiguity as a special case of similarity. One experience introduces another only by the force of their similarity, whereas the apparently contiguous contents are held to be essential elements of the experience of resemblance. Another variant of associationism subordinates the laws of contiguity and similarity to a single predominant law referred to as redintegration or reinstatement. This position holds that a past experience is invariably associated with a present experience through association, although the operational principles of association – be it through likenesses or through contiguous relations – are considered subsidiary issues. Variations of the same thematic aspects of the mental laws of association have been discussed – for instance, the proposition that besides the two major laws of association, that is, contiguity and similarity, a third law called analogy plays a role in the association of ideas. This third law would account for associations of ideas that bear some loosely formed relation with its antecedent. This associational form is neither contiguous nor similar, but rather a parallelism between forms or states of things. Further suggestions made by some proponents of associationism would also suggest that association of ideas may be articulated based on the principle of unlikenesses, while others would dismiss it as being the negative side of the operations of the already two consolidated forms of associative laws. An important detail of the associationist perspective is the determination of the strength of associations. The concept of strength describes the likelihood of further occurrences of associations in any particular circumstance. The strength of any association is related to its repetition and to its intensity in the consciousness, that is, how often these occurrences may take place and with which vividness such occurrence may have produced in the consciousness. The frequent repetition of a given experience may increase the likelihood of its revival by association, while the repetition of an association increases the possibility of it occurring. And an experience of great intensity is more likely revived through further associations than a less intense experience. Still, repetition and intensity were

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commonly held to be, in general, integral parts of the general laws of association (cf. ibid: 9). The associationist purview, especially related directly to learning, to creative instances, to intentional thought, and to conduct toward a problem is regarded as highly atomistic in the very sense that it postulates that ideas produced in the mind take the same shape as discrete elements such as perceived external objects through the organs of the senses. These discrete elements would eventually be linked together to form a chain of discrete ideas, thus forming more complex ideas – and so on. Insights into problems thus obey the laws of association of ideas. By the same principle, this purview is very mechanistic in the sense that the predominant laws of contiguity, which would organize trains of thoughts as chains of many discrete thoughts, would be used to account for the associations of elements to form thoughts. The thoughts thus associated in order to overcome a determinate problem bear the mark of a chain of thoughts deterministically constructed, by means of reducing “mental functions to elementary, mechanistic neural events” (NEWELL, SIMON, SHAW, 1957: 163). That is to say, based upon this doctrine, the thoughts conceived to solve a problem have been reduced to a conditional approach to a multitude of discrete streams of associations, the latter itself created from streams of mechanically associated discrete thoughts. New associations would eventually produce new successive discrete attachments to a given strain of thought and this would amass more ideas or thoughts about the task at hand in order to solve a given problem. Experience of the environment external to the mind would provide these new sources of consecutive associations; the position of associationism embodies, therefore, a strong empiricist view of the mind, whereas experience, and the production of ideas forcefully represents the mind as a sort of tabula rasa upon which association is to be constantly recorded and grouped into ideas and thought by means of the discrete contents of sense-perception. Even an analysis of the operation of thought based on the internal sense of how thoughts articulate must correspond to this mechanism of association. Every bit of the thinking process would have to be divided into two forms of explaining its origins, and so on, successively, until one final last regression. To Rowe (1987: 42), according to the associationist position, creative thinking as well as the idea of problem solving was seen, in the final analysis, to be manifestly a matter of random results, or happenstance, brought about by mechanic associative laws. In order to understand more precisely how these early conceptions of learning have contributed to the development of psychological investigations in the realm of human mind and its ability to learn and perform articulated thought, and how the latter has also entered the field of projective activities, it is necessary

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to discuss how the doctrine of associationism opened the way to a school of psychological thought. Warren (1921: 15) offers an outline of association psychology, in which he identifies the development of the associationism doctrine in four major periods. The Development of the Associationist Psychology The first period of the associationist psychology marks the transition of principles transferred from epistemological frameworks into the more or less definite core of psychological interests. This preliminary period was marked by the recurring influence of the Ancient Greek philosophers, mainly of Aristotle, for he has thematized the subject of mental associations in his work On Memory20. However, due to the fact that these early studies only vaguely explain reproductions of representations in the mind though a form of association, which emphasized mainly memories and recollections, the modern psychologists sought to explain all phenomena of mental apprehensions as well as more complex processes, such as learning and inventing, through the theory of association of ideas. Thinkers such as John Locke, George Berkeley, and Thomas Hobbes began inquiries into the subject in modern times, providing thus the epistemological bases required to found new theories of psychology. Their interests, related to logic, psychology of mind, and epistemology, have renewed the interest of philosophers and early psychologists in mental associations and the problem of learning as a subject of psychological domain. It is possible to affirm that John Locke’s work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his treaty on logic, was of seminal importance for the definition and development of these early psychological studies, as it is possible to conclude from the following passage:

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The original text, Περὶ µνήµης καὶ ἀναµνήσεως (Peri Mnémes kai Anamnéseos), or in Latin, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, is often published as a part of the work Περὶ Ψυχῆς (Perí Psychḗs), or De Anima. Aristotle thematizes the subject of reminiscence and memory as an act of the mind that produces a consequent, or a further representation of a certain state of things by being recalled through an intrinsic habit of the mind. This act of reminiscence, affirms Aristotle, “takes place in virtue of that constitution of our mind, whereby each mental movement (modification) is determined to arise as the sequel of a certain other […]. When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive moments, until we arrive at a moment on which the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent” (Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, quoted from MAHER, 1982: 201).

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§3. The objects of sensation: one source of ideas – First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities, which, when I say, the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they, from external objects, convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION. §4. The operations of our minds: the other source of them – Secondly, the other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are, perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas, every man has wholly in himself; and though it not be sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense, But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION. (LOCKE, 1825: 51)

This first period of the psychology of associationism ends with the considerations and thoughts on the association of ideas thematized by David Hume. Hume is, no doubt, another important philosopher that contributed to the formation of the present school of thought, although he himself was not directly one of the developers of the new doctrine. His importance to its development, so affirms Warren (1921: 15-16), consisted in having studied some psychological principles – especially the principles of the association of ideas – as a basis to formulate his own theory of knowledge. The precursor of the whole movement, however, is widely recognized to be David Hartley. Hartley’s Observations on Man: His Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations from 1749 marked not only the birth of the doctrine, but also a new epoch regarding the studies of the human psyche, which assumed the status of a school of the psychology of association in Great Britain. Hartley, based upon observational experiments, concluded that all intellectual ideas, or higher classes of ideas, are formed by parts of simpler ideas clustered together by association in the mind. Hartley, following the epistemological framework of the British empiricism, considers ideas as mental representations that share the same constitution of perceived things. That is to say, ideas

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are considered, from this perspective, the same thing as discrete sensations, visual perceptions, parts of haptic perceptions that enter the mind through experience and are put together according to the laws of associations until they, by association, coalesce together into complex ideas. He makes it clear by stating: All compound impressions A+B+C+D, etc., after sufficient repetitions leave compound miniatures a+b+c+d, etc. which recur every now and then from slight causes, as well as such as depend on association, as some which are different from it. Now, in these recurrencies of compound miniatures, the parts are farther associated, and approach perpetually nearer to each other […]. And, upon the whole, it may appear to the reader, that the simple ideas of sensation must run into clusters and combinations of associations; and that each of these will, at last, coalesce into one complex idea, by the approach and commixture of the several compounding parts. It appears also from observation, that many of our intellectual ideas, such as those that belong to the heads of beauty, honor, moral qualities, etc. are, in fact, thus composed of parts, which, by degrees, coalesce into one complex idea. (HARTLEY, 1801: 74-75)

The second period consists in the early developmental stages of the psychology of association, with which David Hartley and others sought to provide explanations of all human mental phenomena through the perspective of associationism. However, due to the still very rudimentary state of the young discipline of psychology, along with the rudimentary forms of physiology and anthropology of the eighteenth century, proper scientific development of the psychology of association has been hampered and, because of this, progressed at a much slower pace. The third stage in the evolution of this school consisted in the general acknowledgement of the principles of association psychology. Better knowledge of physiology – especially with reference to the functioning of the human nervous system –, as well as an improved knowledge of human development consolidated associationist paradigms in psychology. By this time, James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind had appeared, followed by the works of John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain. In agreement with David Hartley’s thesis that all instances of association could be explained by the principle of contiguity alone, James Mill wrote: […] our ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which sensations existed, of which they are copies. This is the general law of ‘Association of Ideas’; by which terms, let it be re-

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membered, nothing is here meant to be expressed but the order of occurrence. (MILL, 1878: 78)

Thus, according to the main hypothesis guiding the theory of association of ideas, the bulk of all mental activity is reducible to the two main laws that will arrange and organize the particular, atomic, and discrete perceptive impressions, feelings, and ideas. The faculty of association is what eventually brings these discrete and unconnected elements into a unity. According to Alexander Bain, the faculty of contiguity is a faculty that arranges discrete elements that are presented to the mind at the same time, conforming thus a contiguity of events. He contends that: […] actions, sensations and states of feeling, occurring together or in close connection, tend to grow together, or cohere in such a way, when any of them afterwards present to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea. (BAIN, 1855: 327)

The law of association by similarity is, according to Bain’s description, the second fundamental property of the intellect, in which the unity is achieved not by the simultaneity of the occurrence of some aggregation of discrete elements in the mind, but because “sensation, thoughts, or emotions tend to revive their like among previous impressions or states” (ibid: 457). Similarity is, here, understood as a property of mind responsible for the “mental reproduction” of ideas by means of “recovering past mental states” (ibid). Finally, the fourth stage of development of associationist psychology is marked by the publication of Herbert Spencer’s The Principles of Psychology in 1855. In this work, Spencer relates his empirical psychology with his theory of evolution in psychology and with Darwinian biological evolution. His particular contribution enables an extension of the theory of association, in which the individual experience has been transferred to an experience of the species. The underlying principle of Spencer’s thoughts can be perceived in the following passage: With equal clearness does Mind display the further trait of Evolution – increase of definiteness. Both the centrally-initiated feelings and the internal peripherally-initiated feelings, which play so secondary a part in what we understand as Mind, we found to be very vague – very imperfectly limited by one another. Contrariwise, it was shown that the mutual limitations are decided among those peripherally-initiated feelings, which arising on the outer surface, enter largely into our intellective operations; and that the visual feelings, which enter by far the most largely into our intellectual operations, are not only by far the

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sharpest in their mutual limitations, but form aggregates that are much more definitely circumscribed than any others, and aggregates between which there exist relations much more definite than those entered into by other aggregates. (SPENCER, 1870: 188-189)

Spencer’s view on the matter of mind, ideas, and associations had already been transformed into an evolutionary theory. Spencer describes mental development as a complex relation between mind content and perception. The process of formation of ideas is still explained by means of associationist theories. Spencer adds, however, the element of feeling, whose aggregation in the mind is also responsible for the formation of ideas. Mental development is propelled by perception, which being either from the own body or from the surrounding environment, affects the senses and the mind. The main characteristic of the school of associationism is still present in Spencer’s theory, which renders the hypothesis of associations of ideas as a rather deterministic process. For him it is not possible to conceive consciousness without some material entity that enters into the thought as sense perceptions from exterior objects and environment. From the hard substance, as he calls it, all of the attributes of reality and life are abstracted from perceptual experience, that is, from the experience that an individual may have, all the perceptions of exteriority she or he may gather in a long run. He affirms, thus, that it is not possible to conceive a notion of mind and of mental processes, or conceive of “consciousness as either being changed one into another or as being replaced by another in the Mind” (cf. SPENCER, 1890: 626-627), without the rule of causation or aggregation of exterior data, which is forced into the sense-perception. Another important further development of Spencer’s purview of associationism is related to his psychological theory of the evolution of the mind and species. The particular applications of mental associations in individual experience were rendered subordinate to “inherited” associations. The origins of such associations of species could be tracked back to earlier stages of evolution and rudimentary types of organisms. Spencer, with an emphasis on continual biological evolution, states: […] beginning with the low life of plants and of rudimentary animals, the progress of life of higher and higher kinds essentially consists in a continual improvement of the adaptation between organic processes which environ the organism. (ibid, 294)

Spencer emphasizes that the biological complexification is related to the broader conception of mental phenomena and mental development. Although being based on a rather mechanical view of the process, as well as on a more materialis-

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tic conception of brain and nervous function, which should account for mental articulations, Spencer’s better understanding of biological and mental processes has propelled psychological, physiological, and anatomical research; neighboring areas will increasingly exchange knowledge and empirical data to support each other’s discoveries and developments. A better understanding of the functions of the nervous system as well as a better understanding of anatomical properties, comparative analysis of species, and further research in the realm of biological evolution in light of the science of the nineteenth century have provided psychology with much needed empirical and theoretical data. The latter, in turn, allowed a thorough reconstruction of the rudimentary first notions of mental structure and function, of the primordial principles of association (cf. WARREN, 1921: 15-17). The later application of mathematical methods to psychological research disclosed new aspects of mental processes, altering thereby some basic concepts of the associative process itself. The new developments furnished the school with new problems and the old introspective associationism began losing its earlier influence. As Warren states, the “problems which it sought to solve have given place to others” (WARREN, 1921: 17). Yet two major problems remained unsolved and still burden associationist psychological theories. The founding premises of associationist psychology were based on highly atomistic and mechanic conceptions of mind (cf. ROWE, 1978: 42). This is due to the fact that the leading principles of association have been, firstly, based on causal-deductive principles of the mental association of ideas. Secondly, the term idea, this term being based on John Locke’s conception of idea, has been incorporated into the underlying thesis of associationist psychology. This conception, as already mentioned, includes a major logical blunder. Locke’s conception of idea, one that was widespread in philosophy and also in psychology, is based upon an error in the logical consideration of mental processes. He equates ideas – general conceptions, mental images – with perceived pictures, that is, discrete pictures, such as the ones captured in sense-perception, and thereby reifies the logical concept of idea. Since the time of John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, the concept of idea has been generally understood as referring to internal discrete pictures, which are made up of discrete, syncretic elements, that is, visual, acoustic, haptic elements. Therefore, idea for Locke, for instance, shares the same characteristics as the perceived objects that come to consciousness through the senses, that is, an idea is a sort of an exact “copy” of the perceived thing, that is to say, being also discrete, a copy of the perceived object in the mind. This equating of images, pictures, ideas, and sense perception resulted in the equally widespread and preposterous notion that ideas are

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merged in the reproduction of sense perception (cf. PAPE, 2012: 350, cf. SHORT, 2007: 4)21. In the first volume of his book Principles of Psychology, William James summarizes the theoretical position lying at the core of associationism, in which he criticizes this position. He claims: Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, is between THINGS THOUGHT OF – it is THINGS,

not ideas, which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk about association of

objects, not of association of ideas. And so far as association stands for a cause, it is between processes in the brain – it is these which, by being associated in certain ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought. (JAMES, 1905: 554)

Early Experimental Psychology: Searching for the Mental Act By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the ever-growing field of experimental psychology kept generating new questions on mental representations and on the conduct of the mind. Two leading experimental psychologists developed different psychological positions, which became of paramount importance for the areas of learning, creativity, and that of problem solving. One of these psychologists was Wilhelm Wundt. Considered as one of the most influential experimental psychologists and one of the most important precursors of modern psychology, Wundt introduced experimental methods in order to grasp the complex nature of consciousness. He set out to deconstruct some of these peculiar qualities of consciousness by means of describing the identifiable, separate, and produced qualities of that consciousness. He states, for instance: All objects of experience have this peculiarity, namely, that we cannot really define them but only point to them, and if they are of complex nature analyze them into their separate qualities. Such an analysis we call description. (WUNDT, 1912: 2)

21

It is important to note that Peirce criticizes also the theoretical grounds of the associationism in general, especially in what is referred to its tendency to “sensationalism” and to “nominalism”. He criticizes, for instance, as aforementioned, the widespread notion claiming that all though and perception would, in this purview of associationism, consist in sensations and in reproductions of sensations – these reproductions being equalizes to the notion of ‘ideas’ (cf. WILSON, 2016: 114). Moreover, Peirce claims that “Hume’s phenomenalism and Hartley’s associationism […] contain the fundamental positions of the current English ‘positivism’” (CP 8.37).

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By performing experiments in psychology, Wundt identified relationships of some elements either appearing from some forms of attention or as elements appearing from the wider “field of consciousness”, as he called it. He termed the entrance into the larger field of consciousness apprehension, and the mental focusing, as deliberately focusing upon some aspect of consciousness, apperception (cf. WUNDT, 1912: 35). It is noteworthy to state that Wundt used these concepts purely in an empirical and psychological sense, thus diverging from the philosophical context of Leibniz’ theory of monads, where these terms were originally used. “The apprehended content”, as Wundt thus affirms from an empirical and psychological standpoint, “is that which we are more or less darkly aware; it is always there, however, above the threshold of consciousness”. On the other hand, the apperceived content is characteristically that “of which we are clearly aware, or, keeping to the figure of speech of a threshold, that which lies above the narrower threshold of attention” (cf. WUNDT, 1912: 35-36). By means of his empirical research, Wundt introduced into the field of experimental psychology the notion of “psychical compounds”, that is, a composite form of psychical response caused by the experience of perception (cf. WUNDT, 1897: 90). The compounds, so he states, consist of psychical elements, pure sensations and pure feelings, clustered together. He concluded, then, that these sensations and feelings, of which mental imagery is an integral part, are essential constituents of human understanding and learning (cf. WUNDT, 1897: 90, cf. ROWE, 1987: 42). This framework of the “presentational” psychology is based on Wundt’s working hypothesis that humans perceive the world and react to it through the medium of presentations, that is, through sense perceptions, feelings, and images. For instance, in order to produce a voluntary act, say, of closing a hand, some sort of “presentation of movement” – or an idea of movement – must first take place in the mind of the subject-actor (cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 3032). The theory of mental action through images and feelings, however outdated and rather problematic, brought important contributions to psychology, such as the examination of the power of focused, willingly produced thought. The main problem, however, with such a purview is that separating thinking and mental conduct from its context of action causes many of the theories and working hypotheses to remain experimentally unaccounted for. Another representative of the new research in the field of psychology was Franz Brentano. Brentano’s contributions to the fields of psychology, philosophy, and phenomenology were remarkable, especially in reference to the studies of mental phenomena. He thereby influenced further research, especially in the field of phenomenology by his disciple Edmund Husserl. Brentano identified a certain mental act, a certain mode of being of the mind and of the “mental”. In

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his inquiries into the phenomena of mind, as many psychologists of the time, he exhibits characteristics of introspectionism due to his first person approach. Still, he is considered to have contributed to the field of psychology with the view that philosophy and psychology should be developed with the same scientific rigor that characterizes the scientific methods of the natural sciences. His most influential work in the realm of psychology was his concept of “act of mind” and “intentionality”. The latter is formulated in his famous book Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte from 1874: Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das characterisirt, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir obwohl nicht ganz unzweideutig ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse, gehasst, in dem Begehren begehrt u.s.w.). Diese intentionale Inexistenz ist den psychischen Phänomenen ausschließlich eingenthümlich. Kein psychisches Phänomen zeigt etwas Aehnliches. Und somit können wir die psychischen Phänomene definieren, in dem wir sagen, sie seien solche Phänomene, welche intentional einen Gegenstand in sich enthalten. (BRENTANO, 1874: 115-116; cf. KAPPNER, 2004)22

His famous quote about intentional inexistence is by no means unequivocal, especially because many points remain unclear. Brentano does not reveal by it explicitly what he meant about the characteristics of the act of the mind. One famous hypothesis states that Brentano, when speaking about the general mental characteristic and intentional inexistence, which is the mode of functioning of mind, was trying to establish new grounds for psychological research. Brentano responded by saying that psychological phenomena cannot be grasped by empirical or observational methods imported from other natural sciences. With his thesis about intentionality, Brentano points out two major implicit theses regarding the mental act, i.e., the mode of functioning of the human mind. He claims that intentionality is a mental function, something characteristic of the mental. The second thesis states that the nature of that which is characterized as “mental”

22

I consciously chose to quote this passage from Brentano’s book without correcting the old orthography, keeping the original spelling as Brentano wrote it. Thus the passage contains the word characterisirt instead of “charakterisiert”, eigenthümliches instead of “eigentümliches”, and Aehnliches, instead of “Ähnliches”.

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is very different from the physical and, as such, does not fit into methods of investigation devised for inquiries into the realm of the physical but requires a proper scientific approach to deal with the realm of the mental. The mental, thus, must be seen as a research object of the specialized science of psychology. Brentano devised a specific psychological observation to tackle the problem of internal perception. He called the science descriptive psychology, which he normally referred to as phenomenology. This science was tasked with the description of consciousness from a first person perspective in order to fully represent the most basic and general ingredients that pervade all mental articulations and also to investigate in which ways these ingredients are connected with each other. Thomas Short suggests that “the dichotomy Brentano discerned between the physical and the psychical is a methodological variant of Descartes’ ontological dualism of mind and body” (SHORT, 2007: 8).23 Brentano postulated that mental phenomena, the act of mind, are exclusive objects of mental, or inner perception. Moreover, this mental act appears as a unity in consciousness and is, as such, always directed toward something, to some “immaterial reference”. Brentano’s main idea was to identify characteristic specificities of the mental, dismissing previous inaccurate hypotheses such as those held by associationism. Furthermore, Brentano introduces another important concept into the realm of experimental psychology – the concept of intentionality. He stressed the active role of mental intentional acts such as intending and focusing the attention, as in an act of mental “stretching” toward a particular aspect of the mental representation, which cannot be found in exterior explanations (cf. ROWE, 1987: 42). Mental life shows a certain flexibility and freedom different from early associationist purviews. But perhaps the most important aspect Brentano sought to clarify is that the experience captured by the senses and represented in the mind and the act of the mind as such are two different things. For experimental psychology, this is of paramount importance. Especially because the vast majority of psychologists and schools of psychological thought confound the subjective experience from a given observation with the totality of the studied external phenomena. By identifying the intentional mode of mind as a characteristic mental mode independent of the exterior phenomena, he pointed also automatically to what William James referred to some years later as the “psychologists’ fallacy”. As already pointed out, James stresses that this fallacy occurs whenever the psycholo-

23

For a more complete discussion on possible readings of Brentano’s theses on the psychological “mental act” and the concept of “intentional inexistence” cf. MÜNCH, 1993: 35-80 and KAPPNER, 2004: 3-46.

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gist as observer takes what he believes the phenomenon to be and describes it by only taking into account her or his subjective impression of the phenomenon, dismissing therefore further observation. Another school of psychology that made important contributions to experimental psychology by investigating the purposiveness of thought was the famous Würzburger School. This school of thought made important contributions to psychology in general by helping to devise a new experimental branch, Denkpsychologie, that is, the psychology of thought. The psychology of thought in its experimental dimension involves task oriented, problem solving empirical research, through which logical reasoning and the formation of concepts of subjects are surveyed. These particular methods seek to acquire knowledge about mental events, mental processes, as well as states of consciousness. Their main objective is to survey one’s mind, as well as what happens in it. Because they are based mainly upon the interior aspects of mind and consciousness, it is accepted to call these methods introspective methods, although the particular method employed to survey a subject’s mind may vary according to the school of thought and according to the epoch in which the methods were devised and credited as valid. Following at first the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, the Würzburger School, represented mainly by Oswald Külpe in cooperation with Narziß Kaspar Ach and Karl Bühle, started replacing the old doctrine of associationism as the primary theoretical background of psychology. Particularly interested in experimental fields of psychology especially related to the areas of development and formation of concepts, the group worked with introspective methods. This school of psychology is credited with drawing up a doctrine stating that human thinking, at its most basic, consists of psychical processes which contain no signs of any sensory or imaginal contents, thus distancing itself from Wundt’s theories. This realization shifted the attention of the school from the imaginal content, which was closer to Wundt’s framework, to the adoption of a modified version of associationism. The adoption of an associationist psychological framework as a mechanism of thinking gave rise to the theory of the qualitative investigation of associations, which proposed to establish a psychological classification by means of strictly controlled procedures of introspection. This introspection, so stated the group, was a variant of association psychology, but with a further ingredient: the Aufgabe, or task. This ingredient, the task, was a sort of a trigger to a controlled situation presented to the subject, upon which the whole experiment would hinge. The task consisted of the presentation of something that would serve as a stimulus – be it a word, or an image on a card –, which would evoke some associations. The subject of the analysis was required then to report either

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verbally or in writing all of the elicited associations. Sometimes further questions would be added to the experiment, so as to disclose further mental associative answers. For instance, upon being shown a card with some image, the subject would then be asked to suggest a class of things, which the shown image could belong to, as well as to actively think about an example of a concrete element of this class of things, followed by the denomination of further examples of classes parallel to the one shown, and so on (cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 64-68). This special type of self-observation opened up newer areas of psychological research, such as judgment, knowing, understanding, and interpreting of introspective methods. The discoveries of the Würzburger School of psychology are deemed important for the development of the psychological theories of the twentieth century both historically and paradigmatically. Historically speaking, it put earlier theories such as associationism and presentationism (i.e., Wundt’s line of thought, which states that thought takes place through imagery, senseperception, and feelings as the most important ingredients of thought) to the empirical test. Paradigmatically, Würzburger School researchers, Oswald Külpke, Karl Marke, Narziß Ach, Karl Bühle, and Otto Selz, have demonstrated the great importance of unconscious factors for mental life; especially important for the present discussion was the discovery that non-associational factors have the power to influence perception. The most important contribution to experimental psychology, however, was the disclosure of the fact, which could be shown in the experimental environment of a psychological laboratory, that the process of thinking was directed, controlled, at least at a certain extent, and determined by mechanisms of psychic nature largely unknown to the test subject. They were the first psychologists to examine motive under the controlled environment of the laboratory and were successful in being the first to relate it to the nature of thought.24 The Aufgabe, that is, the task, would be one of the determining instances that could give a certain direction to thought by constraining some relations and stimulating others. Consequently, their greatest contribution to later problem solving psychological investigations was the point that, to a certain extent, creative problem solving was mostly regarded as a purposive, self-controlled mental act (cf. ROWE, 1987: 43; cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 104-105).

24

As Humphrey remarks: “[…] the aspect of awareness has become a characteristic of something contained in the only real thinking activity, namely the thought-element. At the same time the thought-element retains the aspect of impalpableness, of imagelessness, which so much struck the earlier workers in their observations of singular processes” (HUMPHREY, 1951: 63).

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Schematic Knowledge of Problem Solving and Stream of Thought The well-known Gestalt movement in psychology expanded upon some of the concepts of creative problem solving from the Würzburger School, especially with regard to their main theory of task-oriented thought and directed behavior. Instead of proposing task-oriented tests with a singular focus, representatives of the Gestalt movement began to include more variables into the test, for they believed that a real situation of task-oriented activity is composed of a complex situation. An experiment surveying task-oriented tests, through a controlled survey in the environment of a laboratory that seeks to survey the psychological parameters of the mind during the test, should be conceived so as to include such variables. These variables, in real task-situations, can influence the outcome of decisions, mental operations and controlled behavior acting as peripheral data perceived during the task. This new conception would eventually enrich the contemporary concept of problem solving. The idea of surveying the problem at the beginning of a goal-oriented activity comes from the notion of task-situation, which has been largely examined. A further theory that the Gestalt movement introduced was the conception of a mental mechanism known as “schemata”, which describes “organizational frameworks for structuring information”, which is a valuable concept for problem solving (cf. ROWE, 1987: 44). Now, the concept of “scheme” – here the plural form of the substantive, that is, “schemata” is being used –, a word derived from the Ancient Greek σχήμα (skhēma), meaning shape or, in most cases also plan, designates, within a psychological context, especially that of learning and problem solving, the basic organizational form of human knowledge. In a general description by Norbert Seel (2012: 2933), a schema is said to represent the generic and abstract forms of knowledge acquired during the course of experience with events, situations, social interactions, and objects, to name a few. Schemes organize knowledge about specific stimuli, stimulus domains, and act as a sort of guidance for the informational process of new experience as well as for the retrieval of stored information derived from past experiences. In general, Gestalt psychology rejects many of the conventional aspects of earlier theories such as the sensation and association theories, the latter two being rejected on the basis that they imply “atomic collocations of mental states which are essentially unchanged by the co-existence of other mental states with which they are experienced (associations)” (HUMPHREY, 1951: 150). According to the most general definition of Gestalt, the processes of learning, of reproduction, of striving, of emotional attitudes, of thinking, acting, and so on, may be included as the subject matter of Gestalt theories, insofar as they do not consist of abso-

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lute and isolated elementary psychological elements, but are studied, identified, and interacted with as a whole in a situational environment (cf. KÖHLER, 1929: 193; cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 150-151). The goal was to understand how purposive thinking in a more complex context works. It was not enough to consider separate experiments with simpler goal-oriented tasks. To see the bigger picture and to understand how thought and conduct are functioning in terms of psychology, it was necessary to survey thinking processes and conduct observations on how complex goal-oriented tasks are solved. Gestalt theory, thus, sought to explain experimentally how a myriad of stimuli, mental relations, perceptions, are psychologically metabolized into goal-oriented mental processes, decision making, and self-controlled conduct. For the Gestalt psychology, this works within a theoretical framework that does not separate consciousness, thought, and conduct, although the principles of solving a problem are also not made explicit. The process of goal-oriented task is triggered by an initial stimulus from a given situation. This gives rise to a nexus of perceptual processes of psycho-neural nature. These perceptions, once they are captured by the consciousness, will interact with other perceptions as well as with elements already available in consciousness. This causes the first perceptual processes to become rearranged. At this level of rearrangement, the subject is apt to see the problem or formulate the problem. The psycho-neural process remains mainly at the perceptual level. Since this first level of perceptive dynamic interaction causes the original perceptive material to be transformed somewhat, this stage is said to be provisional, which is equivalent to saying that the step of seeing the problem is only one of the steps toward the solution. From this provisional psycho-neural process of seeing the problem a new series of events starts unfolding, which, within this psychological framework is called thinking. According to Gestalt theory, thinking is aroused by the mutual interaction of the inherent factors of a problem, as they are perceived, with mnemonic traces. The strains of subsequently produced thoughts eventually lead from the perceived problem to the solution. One of the representatives of the experimental psychology of Gestalt, Max Wertheimer, defines this process as follows: Denkvorgänge, Vorgänge bei originärer Lösung eines Problems, Vorgänge beim Erfassen und Begreifen (im prägnanten Sinn dieser Worte; etwa im grundlegenden Übergang vom Unbegriffenen zum Begriffenen), Vorgänge beim sehen eines Problems – lösen sich ab von bloßen Gedächtnisvorgängen, mit denen sie „als Vorstellungsablauf“ unrettbar verquickt haben; lösen sich ab von Vorgängen im Sinn stückhafter Generalisation, stückhaft subtraktiver Abstraktion, Kombination, usw.; erweisen sich in ihrem Wesentlichen als konkret-charakteristische, bestimmt geartete Gestaltsprozesse (die ihre Analogien einerseits in

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Wahrnehmungsprozessen finden, andererseits in Gefühls-, in Willensvorgängen). (WERTHEIMER, 1921: 56)

This explanation of thinking processes and problem solving procedures is, in this particular “schematic” perspective, analogous to phenomena of visual perception and the strain of thought that forms continuity as in the case of perceived motion of a point that moves in discrete appearances. Let’s take, for instance, the visual effect created by animation. Animation consists of the creation of successive frames that, in a certain frequency of projections, create the illusion of fluid movement. Let’s imagine that a point is drawn over a sheet of paper. Another point, in a slightly different position, say, a bit in front of the previous position where the previous point has been drawn, is drawn over a different sheet of paper. And another point is drawn in a slightly different position. All sheets of paper show points in different positions. If someone photographs the sheets in the order they were made and, with the help of a projector projects the photographed sheets of paper in rapid successions, the visual effect will be of the point moving. Per analogy, such a visual trick with stop-motion technique shows what the main premises of the Gestalt psychology were. The discrepancy between perception and discrete appearances, as well as perceptions of situations and goaloriented task in order to solve a problem, were cleared up by the processes of “forming” or “shaping” – gestaltend – of the thought, which produces a continuous, fluid movement, or a “successful, ever-flowing train of thought” (cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 150-155)25. The continuous process of thought is here regarded as a process of forming, of shape-giving – in the more general sense of Gestalt –, set off by the continuous inflow of sense information, but also forming itself through innumerous interactions between sense information and other streams of thought in motion. An important contribution from the psychology of Gestalt to problem solving is the notion that thought process is considered a unitary process, in which the perceived problem is resolved by the agency of its own internal stresses. It is a “unitary process”, as Humphrey (1951: 155) states, because the seeming discontinuity of the moment of problem perception is fluidly, i.e., without discontinuities, converted into a solution. The theory states, therefore, that perception and thinking are subject to practically the same basic principles, with only one major difference between them.

25

Humphrey claims, furthermore: “The whole series of events, from seen-problem to solution, is then unitary. It is the series of events leading from one state to another of a self-regulating system under stress” (ibid: 154).

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Karl Duncker, for instance, another important exponent of the Gestalt psychology, has closely studied aspects of psychology of problem solving. His findings in the field reinforce the general position of the Gestalt psychology described hitherto. In his 1935 book Zur Psychologie des Produktiven Denkens, he contends that the process that leads to a solution has its genetic origins in the analysis and in the development of the problem. The levels of organizations of properties, which are encountered in a thorough series of analysis of the problem, are genetically significative for the process of finding a solution, since the analysis of the problem, which is done by means of protocols and further descriptions and representations, reformulates the problem. This reformulation has the potential to bring about in a systematized manner potential characters that will eventually lead to the solution. Duncker defends the notion that from these characters, which were unveiled by further representations of the problem, a manageable solution for it arises. When the reformulations of the problem are sharper and made thereby more specific, the new unveiled characters sum up to the solution-properties. Therefore, according to Duncker, the problem solving process is characterized as the development of the solution or as the development of the problem (cf. DUNCKER, 1935: 10). Each one of these solution-characters found in the process of redefining the problem sharpens the problem’s characteristics, and, in so doing, this sharpening will contribute with more elements to prepare the ground for the solution. Duncker states, therefore, that the final form of a solution will be achieved by way of mediating phases.26 Furthermore, he states that what is really performed in the process of finding a solution to a problem consists in the reformulation of the main problem in a more productive manner (ibid). These phases are made explicit by representations in a phase-diagram, which Dunker calls Lösungsstammbau, or family tree. The problem’s characters, now represented graphically in this diagram, render the solution characters accessible as phases. Although these phases are not so rigid as those described by means of behaviorist methods, the description by means of the family tree renders the solution-finding process mechanistic in the sense that, according to Duncker’s theory, a solution derives automatically from the initial properties of the given problem. Duncker writes, for instance:

26

Duncker points the role of the mediating phases explicitly by saying: “Die Endform einer Lösung wird typisch auf dem Wege über vermittelnde Prozeßphasen erreicht, deren jede nach rückwärts Lösungscharackter, nach vorwärts Problemcharakter besitzt” (DUNCKER, 1935: 10).

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Die Endgestalt des einzelnen Lösungsvorschlags wird im allgemeinen nicht in einem einzigen Schritt von der ursprünglichen Problemstellung her erreicht, sondern typisch entsteht zunächst das Prinzip, der Funktionalwert der Lösung und erst in sukzessiver Konkretisierung (Verkörperung) dieses Prinzips entwickelt sich die Endgestalt der betreffenden Lösung. M. a. W. die allgemeinen „wesentlichen“ Eigenschaften einer Lösung gehen den speziellen Eigenschaften genetisch voraus, diese organisieren sich von jenen her. (DUNCKER, 1935: 9)

The process of thinking is considered to have a higher degree of plasticity due to the fact that it is not directly exposed to the external world with the same intensity as perception. Human thinking and learning, as well as problem solving processes in general, as considered by Gestalt theory, operate in relative independence of the rigid models of external stimuli. From within a similar psychological point of view, further developments in the so-called “schematism” derived from Gestalt psychology and related to research of creative problem solving stands out. One of these is Arthur Koestler’s model of bissociation of matrices. This concept, according to Rowe (1987: 46), harks back to the Gestaltist concept of “schemata” for it is based on the proposition of connecting two mutually incompatible contexts from different situations into a single, connected context. Koestler’s main thesis is that, psychologically, normal thought proceeds within a definite frame of references, associative contexts, within a circumscribed type of logic. During the course of normal operations of thought, that is, in a purely rational sense, when inferences are consciously controlled, a subject operates within several such frames of reference, but accessing each of them at different times. Koestler’s claim is that, in terms of creative conduct, the subject relates to each other two or more independent frames of reference, which he calls bissociation of matrices (cf. KOESTLER, 1964: 49). In contrast to the term association, which implies the articulation of matrices in a linear form, that is, without “crossing references”, the term bissociation is, thus: […] meant to point to the independent, autonomous character of the matrices, which were brought into contact in the creative act, whereas associative thought operates among members of a single, pre-existing matrix. (KOESTLER, 1964: 656)

Koestler defines the bissociation of matrices based on his theory that a train of thought is like a line that dislocates the two-dimensional space of a plane from a point A to a point B. These points would be the referential associative contexts. This is what he calls the “routine skills of thinking on a single ‘plane’” (cf.

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KOESTLER, 1964: 35). The difference is that the act always operates on more than “one plane”. Bissociation is a dislocation of many different intersecting planes, wherein transferences of contexts from one plane to another occur. It is, thus “a double minded, transitory state of unstable equilibrium when the balance of both emotion and thought is disturbed” (ibid, 35). In contrast with what Koestler affirms to be “normal thought”, which is articulated within a single “frame of reference”, or “associative contexts”, which makes one type of articulation of thought, bissociation of matrixes articulates at least two matrixes or frames of reference. This is, for Koestler, the explanation for the act of creativity: a psychological state of mind that operates with associative types of thought that are interrelated simultaneously and act constantly to rearrange the combinatorial patchwork of references within the mind. Koestler mentioned the planar articulation of thought, whereas the bissociative articulation of several trains of thought is not planar, but multidimensional, according to his view. There are, however, some problems with this theory that conflates mental ability with mental faculty. Koestler considers that for creation or for the creative act there must be an extra mental process or mental faculty. He separates the “normal” rational processes from the bissocial ones. More modern theories have debated whether or not this kind of “extrapolation” of processes or of “individualization of mental faculties” is completely valid. Arguing against Koestler’s position that there is no need to posit special mental faculties to account for creative or problem solving processes, David Perkins states, in his book The Mind’s Best Work (PERKINS, 1981: 91-93) that Koestler’s conception of bissociation fails to clarify major aspects of the “act of creation”. According to Perkins, Koestler should be able to demonstrate and characterize a distinctive psychological process – a process that, in its turn – is operative across all acts of creation, and still distinguishable from all other mental-psychological processes. Perkins argues, furthermore, that this is not the case. Koestler’s generalizations with respect to the process he termed “bissociation” are founded in the terms of its products. That is to say, bissociation is never specified as the inner characters of a distinctive mental process, but is simply proffered as a process of “whatever it may be and however it may vary, which yields a bissociative outcome” (ibid: 93). What Koestler named as the bissociation of independent matrices, according to Perkins, only describes diverse creative achievements (ibid: 9394). Though he points out interesting mental operations tangential to creative operations of mind, Koestler’s theory seems to fail to uncover what he himself calls bissociative.

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Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett, a known advocate of the theory of “schematics”, proposes to explain the schematic ways of thinking with his theory in the line of thought of “schematism”. Bartlett sought in the late 1960’s to explain the principles of creative and problem solving thought through the articulation of his version of “schemata”. In his version of the theory of “schemata”, which is an extension of the Gestalt theoretical framework, Bartlett suggests the existence of certain fixed arrangements in the structure of the human brain, which are, in their turn, associated with past responses to certain general kinds of stimuli or to general cognitive experiences. In this theory, the act of imagination, the creative insight into a problem, consisted of spontaneous or free constructions on these fixed “schemata”. Bartlett argues in his book Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology that the human mind possesses a fundamental structure of “schematic” organization. The range of operations of the “schemata”, according to him, continually overlap upon experience, which normally tend to interconnect with other “schemata”, organize together, and produce thereby an order of predominance among themselves. This overlapping of organizational levels becomes more prominent by virtue of the fact that the active factors of “schematic” organization change, display motion, condensation, elaboration, simplification, and all other alterations (cf. BARTLETT, 1997: 212). This theory, taking some of the valuable discoveries of the Würzburger School and of Gestalt psychology a step further, with special regard to the concept of problem solving and directed behavior toward the fulfillment of a task, became largely generalized into the realm of prior experience, on the one hand, and on the other, still portrayed some inconsistencies related to the more mechanistic and mentalistic positions. This inconsistency presents itself in the theorization of mechanisms of the mind to adapt, to learn, and to solve problems, which, in their turn, were based upon deductive-causal inferences inherited from older psychological positions. Although less deterministic than earlier associationists, the “schemata” theories are still based on a more mechanistic view. The External Side of Problem Solving: Stage Oriented Creativity Parallel to the development of the experimental schools of psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially as a reaction to the extreme “mentalism” of the earlier doctrines of psychology, in which the predominant view was the introspectionism, a new approach based on the close examination of concrete evidence, that is, by means of observable, measurable, evaluable, and replicable patters of human behavior, gained momentum. William James accurately described the meaning of “introspective” in the first volume of his monumental

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work Principles of Psychology. “Introspective observation”, writes James, “is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always”. By this he meant a specific method of observation based on the introspectivism of “looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover. Everyone agrees that we there discover states of consciousness” (JAMES, 1890: 185). The psychologists that would seek for positive evidence for mental phenomena and would therefore dissociate themselves from the predominant introspectionism of the time deemed introspective methods, in general, as vague, subjective instead of objective, not open to direct study. In short, introspective methods conflict with the later scientific developments. If psychologists want to perform scientific investigations, they must rely on empirical evidence that can be observable, measurable, and repeatable. Against the more mentalistic approach in psychology, a new order of thinkers appeared. Their main critique towards introspective methods was that “introspectivism forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness” (WATSON, 1913: 158). Countering the psychological views based on introspectivism, new methods for investigating psychological events were proposed, which could legitimize the universal validity of the observations and the experiments performed in psychology. That is to say, the new employed method for psychological investigations should confirm “its hypotheses about psychological events in terms of behavioral criteria” (cf. SELLARS, 1963: 22. Italics are mine). The new approach to study human mental phenomena, required the mental phenomena to be translatable into some perceptible form of conduct. Once the link is made between a given form of mental activity and a given act of behavior, the observed aspects should disclose the inner aspects of the mind as a particular form of external behavior. This proposition suggests, furthermore, that certain mental states can be provoked according to a certain form of stimulus exercised on the subject. Regarding this newly proposed methodology for psychological inquiries, Wilfrid Sellars states that: It has no anxieties about the concepts of sensation, image, feeling, conscious or unconscious thought, all of which belong to the manifest framework; but requires that the occurrence of a feeling of pain, for example, be asserted only on behavioral grounds. (SELLARS, 1963: 22)

As a result of the claim that mental concepts are linked to behavioral tendencies and as such must be translatable into conduct, that is, behavior, this new position of experimental psychology was named behaviorism.

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John Watson, an American experimental psychologist and founder of this new school of psychological thought, states that behaviorism is based upon the claim that the subject matter of psychology is the behavior or activities of the human being (cf. WATSON, 1930: 3. Italics are mine). He opposes former as well as current introspective theories of psychology that generally hold “consciousness” to be the subject matter of psychology. At the time of the first formulations of behaviorism, the scenario of psychological experimentalism was predominantly introspectionist, especially because of the influence of Wundt and of the Würzburger School, but also, especially in the USA, because of the influence of the experimental psychology of William James, which was based mostly upon introspective observational methods, as previously discussed. The behaviorist psychological approach rejects every form of “mentalism” on the justification that mental processes per se are neither measurable nor verifiable. On this account, the concept of “consciousness” was also dismissed as indefinable and unusable a concept, as being only another word referring to “soul”, “spirit”, or “anima”, from older theories (cf. WATSON: 1930: 3). Watson stresses this point of transition from the early methods of introspectionism toward concrete evidence of psychical behavior. He claims, for instance: You will soon find that instead of self-observations being the easiest and most natural way of studying psychology, it is an impossible one; you can observe in yourselves only the most elementary forms of response. You will find, on the other hand, that you begin to study what your neighbor is doing. You will rapidly become proficient in giving a reason for his behavior and in setting situations, (presenting stimuli) that will make him behave in a predictable manner. (ibid: 10-11)

Thus, behaviorism, according to Watson’s formulation, is considered as a “natural science that takes the whole field of human adjustments as its own” (ibid: 11). The interest of the behaviorist in man’s doings is more than the interest of the spectator. He wants to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. (ibid)

Interestingly, behaviorism has definite historical roots in the classical associationist movements based on the epistemological foundations of the British empiricists, such as those of John Locke and David Hume. As I discussed at the beginning of this second part, this epistemological basis gave rise to the British school of the psychology of association. The basis of association that underpins both the psychological movement of the early psychological associationism and

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modern behavioral psychology is the belief that the process of association precipitates a certain conduct because associations between perceptual experiences on the one hand and the ideas formed or thoughts produced on the other enables the individual to acquire knowledge and to act intelligently. To recall the position of associationism, according to its framework of the eighteenth century, it is only through this process of association, either by contiguity or by similarity, that the causal structure of the environment can be inferred. The classical associationist position contends that the human mind functions by a mechanism of association through which knowledge of the relations between different elements can be achieved. Behaviorism, as a psychological purview, required a refinement of these classical associationist presuppositions. This involved determining behaviorism of mental associations by first evaluating what kind of behavior the association produces, and, second, by observing certain patterns of behavior, provoked by a certain stimulus, to try to determine the kind of mental association that is connected with the behavior. Behaviorism is, therefore, tasked to discover the causal regularities of functional relations governing the process of association in order to predict how a particular behavior will be produced. Stated differently, knowing what kind of behavioral pattern is caused by a linked association is the same as predicting how the organism will behave under certain conditions, when receiving certain stimuli. This is the very basis of behaviorism. According to John Watson, the task of behavioral research is “to predict, given the stimulus, what reaction will take place; or, given the reaction, state what the situation or stimulus is that has caused the reaction” (WATSON, 1930: 11). Stated more directly, “Psychology as a behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction of control of behavior” (WATSON, 1913: 158). It is also important to refer to the other two identifiable influences that also found their ways into behaviorism. The first of these influences consists of the early stimulus-response methods of ascertaining behavior and the famous reflexarc theory. The second influence is what is referred to in science as logical positivism. In early research on stimulus-response, the type of association by contiguity was once again laid down as the basic foundation for the reflex-arc hypothesis. According to the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, the fundamental prerequisite for the reflex to occur is that any external stimulus should coincide at a point in time with the action of an unconditioned stimulus. The external stimulus will then become the signal of a conditional reflex. In his book entitled Conditional Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cor-

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tex, Pavlov seeks to establish his hypothesis of conditional reflex by studying aspects of the behavior of an organism linked to what was previously called “associative”. The method employed, however, entirely disregards subjective answers, focusing on the observable and measurable results that can provide sufficient evidence of the link between stimulus and response. Therefore, he sets out to ascertain the exact controlled external conditions that under certain circumstances would produce some observable effects. From this, he developed the concept of “conditioned reflex”. Pavlov, upon carrying out a series of experiments, concluded that the objects of experimentation would not only react to the physical stimulus, but would also react to a signal of the approaching physical stimulus. The physical stimulus provokes a certain reaction in the subject. However, conditioning the test-subject to react in a certain way demands a series of stimuli. Pavlov discovered that the signalization of stimuli instead of the physical application of stimuli produces a similar effect on test subjects (cf. PAVLOV, 1927: 30-32; cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 5-6). This late nineteenth and early twentieth century approach to reflex theories has revealed some important details about the reactions of organisms in general given a certain external stimulus. In accordance with the associationist hypothesis that the clustering of simpler stimuli results in a more complex form of response, early physiologists and psychologists believed that surveying the most basic nervous functions could reveal the basic mechanical functions of the neural systems that govern stimulus-response relations. They hoped to survey the learning abilities of an organism based on the investigation of the minimal structures of nervous reactivity of an organism. In a more popular form of this theory, behavior is understood as analyzable into conditioned reflexes – the reflexes being the result of a simple or elementary stimulation sensed by an organ or organism. This view implies that each behavior, or response to the stimulus, is understood as a unit and, because the events of stimulus and those of responses are comprehended as discrete events, not being connected with other events, the concept of behavior as unit is considered to remain unaffected by the interference of other series of stimuli and responses. As Humphrey describes it, “the situation to which reaction is made can be considered as composed of elements the effect of each of which the organism is unaltered by the presence of other elements” (HUMPHREY, 1951: 17). The whole idea of stimulus-response in this context, which became a rather predominant view in the early behaviorism, is considered to be a linear sum of discrete and isolated occurrences. Pavlov affirms, in this sense, that a stimulus “appears to be connected of necessity with a definite response, as cause with effect. It seems obvious that the whole activity of the organism should conform to definite laws” (PAVLOV, 1927: 7). The most important aspect of this exposition is, however, to

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point out the link that connects early theories of associationism with the subsequent behaviorism of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The modern stimulus-response conception is, in general terms, an embodiment of the objective theory of association (cf. HUMPHREY, 1951: 18). In some studies, scientists discovered that certain animals displayed an increasing learning ability. If a series of similar experiments were repeated long enough, the animal, as a test subject, would start responding not only to the given physical stimulus. It would also react on a sign of the physical stimulus before it was given. Reflex based empirical research furnished valuable research principles to the new theoretical framework of behaviorism, which, in its turn, would develop this framework radically further, coming to ultimately embrace in its paradigms the concept of behavior modification. A precursor theory of the conditional reflex theory is the reflex-arc theory, which is based on experiments with the most automatic form of reflex behavior, such as the automatic reflections of an organism’s parasympathetic nervous system, that is, the kind of simple physiological-motor reflex independent of the intellect. John Dewey, in his famous article “The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology”, summarizes this position in physiology and psychology contending that the concept, as it was employed, assumes sensory and motor stimulus followed by a subsequent motor response to be separate events. Stimulus and response were, in this view, treated as purely mechanical responses and, as such, were held to be isolated occurrences, without relation to each other. Dewey criticizes the theorizations based on atomistic views that used the concept to base more complex responses upon the same mechanism of stimulus-response. This concept, says Dewey, refers to nothing more than a series of mechanical “jerks”, the origin of “jerks” being sought in the perceptive experience itself, in either “an external pressure of ‘environment’, or else in an unaccountable spontaneous variation from within the ‘soul’ of the ‘organism’” (DEWEY, 1896: 360-361). Supporting the claim of this early influence, Humphrey affirms: “the progress towards objectivity of statement had its culmination in the behaviorist school, when the term association was replaced by that of ‘conditioned reflex’” (HUMPHREY, 1951: 3). The American psychologist Clark Leonard Hull summarizes the psychological behaviorist paradigm as follows: During the two and one-half centuries since the beginning of the English association movement, there has been a slow but fairly constant tendency for associationism to stress more and more the aspect of physical reaction. This has reached its logical limit in the behaviouristic psychology of America, which, despite its migration to another continent, and

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its general repudiation by present-day English psychologists, is a genuine and perfectly natural evolution of English associationism. (HULL, 1934: 382)

The second influence, that of logical positivism, is manifest in the very proposition of behaviorism as “a purely objective experimental branch of natural science”, as Watson stated. Logical positivism states, in a general way, that the meaning of scientific propositions and assertions need to be understood in terms of empirical or experiential observable conditions. These conditions allow the inquirer to assert the truth of the given scientific proposition or assertion through direct verification. The doctrine related to logical positivism is called “verificationism”. Rudolf Carnap states, for instance, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax: The psychological questions here concern the procedure of knowledge, that is, the mental events by which we come to know something. If we surrender these questions to the psychologist for his empirical investigation, there remains the logical analysis of knowledge; or more precisely, the logical analysis of the examination and verification of assertions, because knowledge consists of positively verified assertions. (CARNAP, 1935: 83. Italics are mine)

Behaviorism reached its apogee around 1930 in the works of Burrhus Frederic Skinner, among others. By this time, certain popularized concepts became prominent, such as the idea that behavioral malfunctions and pathologies could be cured by appropriate modifications of the environment (cf. ROWE, 1987: 45). More recent views of behaviorism contend that the hard positivistic assumptions of stimulus-response methods, without complementary cognitive models to support the observations, are no longer valid. There is an agreement in contemporary psychology claiming that behavioral research must take into account some cognitive background that accounts for mental processes and for the link between mental, internal articulation, and external, observable behavioral articulation. In other words, measurements and observations are not efficient if not connected with theories that seek to explain internal cognitive processes. And still, the early behaviorism – especially conceptual analytical behaviorism, or radical behaviorism, which were markedly positivistic, based on atomistic concepts of stimulus-response models – became the predominant and more popularized version. One of the most famous claims of this popular behaviorism is that “an organism behaves as it does because of its current structure” (SKINNER, 1974: 217). Radical behaviorism is more accepting of cognitive processes, considering some form of mental or introspective events to play a certain

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role regarding the behavior of an organism. Mental processes may play a role but are by no means a predominant characteristic.27 Radical behaviorist positions toward human behavior are still markedly atomistic, deterministic, and mechanistic in the sense that human complex behavior patterns are still explained either in terms of individual responses to different stimuli or in terms of “reinforcing forms of behavior”, which is a different formulation for a dual relationship between stimulus and response. Exactly this understanding of behaviorism, accompanied by the widespread idea of conditioning through stimulus-response models became the dominant view and influenced other fields of knowledge, especially in the fields of task-oriented and projective activities.

STAGES OF CREATIVITY AND THE POSITIVISTIC BELIEF: THE FUNDAMENT OF THE PROBLEM SOLVING TRADITION Behaviorism, as a school of thought, developed a strong core based on experimental models in psychology. Models of stimulus-response, the so-called S-R model, as well as, in later variants, environmental conditioning, are held as behaviorist methods per se. However, if on the one hand, there is this common point that identifies specific approaches to behavioral psychology, there has also been, on the other, a great deal of difference from one author to another, as well as conceptual differences from one decade to another. For present research purposes, it is sufficient to say that despite strong positivistic claims and empirical tendencies, the environmental conditions and particular methods for devising experiments and the scope of experiments have changed. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Eduard Thorndike, one of the proponents of behaviorism in the 1930s, sought to explain conduct and learning processes through the purview of behaviorist theories. More importantly, he explained the processes that lead to problem solving behavior through the scope of behaviorism. Exactly this view became the theoretical basis for the concept of problem solving. This position, as mentioned earlier, is still in use. Thorndike contends:

27

Skinner affirms, for instance: “Radical behaviorism, however, […] does not deny the possibility of self-observation or self-knowledge or its possible usefulness, but it questions the nature of what is felt or observed and hence known. It restores introspection but not what philosophers and introspective psychologists had believed they were “specting”, and it raises the question of how much of one’s body one can actually observe” (SKINNER, 1974: 217).

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There is thus a mixture of chains of connections of the reflex type and varied reactions with trial and selection by success in even the routines of life, many of these routine connections being, as stated, from a situation to an order to attain a certain goal, rather than from a situation to one particular movement or idea or series of such. (THORNDIKE, 1931: 92)

As discussed in the first part of the book, the characteristic behavior positions triggered – or at any rate supported – the development of phase-oriented, or rigid-state models of problem solving behavior. The supporting behavioristic background remains identifiable in such stage-process models. For instance, Rowe states that “the aim behind these models was to identify and describe each phase and the sequence of phases” that would be produced (ROWE, 1987: 45-46). In this behavioristic purview, the problem-solving process consists of distinct and discrete, that is, discontinuous phases of activity. In one revealing passage, Brewster Ghiselin, in his book The Creative Process: A Symposium, states: By no means all the creative process is primarily a spontaneous development. Two important stages in it are predominantly conscious and critical, and in these the will properly functions. It is of use in that preliminary labor, or sometimes less burdensome preparation, without which there can be no significant creative activity, and in the works of verification, correction, or revision that ordinarily follows the more radical inventive activity and completes or refines the product. (GHISELIN, 1954: 17)

Upon having surveyed this large and rich field of psychological theories and its bearing upon specific theoretical problem solving areas, in which the factor creativity is thematized and becomes a key term, it is possible to summarize the basic characteristic points of the rigid-state models, which turned out to be the main course of action and influenced the theoretical fields of design, architecture, engineering, and the arts, especially in the United States. In its feeble attempt to venture into the realm of mental processes, this theoretical position of behaviorism is characterized by methodical observations of human behavior within a typical environment of problem solving situations. Rowe observes that: Although a number of variations were developed, each model in one way or another incorporated four fundamental steps, or discriminable phases of activity. They were (1) preparations for the task or situation at hand, (2) incubation, (3) illumination or inspiration, and (4) verification, involving the testing of proposed solutions. (ROWE, 1987: 45)

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The basic concept behind this model creation is one of observable, measurable, and, most importantly, repeatable states that surround and characterize invention, that is, the creation of a new element which will fit the problem description and solve it. The series of steps, beginning with preparation, passing through incubation, then going to illumination or inspiration, and finishing in the verification are summarized by Rowe, but their interior relationships and their references to the influence of behaviorism are not made explicit. The behaviorist influence is what characterizes this sort of stage model as a chain-like form of event that resembles discrete stimulus-response stages in a certain order. Otherwise expressed, the most important character of the stage model is that it exhibits a form of causal-deductive automatism beginning with the initial stimulus passed down to the other steps. The initial data, the stage of preparation, characterizes the initial situation in which the “organism” is confronted with a “problem”. This problem is a barrier, an obstacle, that impairs the proper function and decision-making of the organism. In order to be solved, the problem requires a thorough assessment. The input-output characteristic of this initial phase represents the assessment of the problem. A better understanding of the problem reveals new elements that will generate the needed information – which also follow the form of stimulus-response – for the subsequent series of stimulus and their respective responses. The second stage, incubation, constrains the “organism” to choose one of the possible paths that were made clear in the previous stage. Upon choosing a certain path, the organism sets about to assess a certain method of conduct or of behavior to undertake this chosen path. These two first phases, so it is believed, lead automatically to the third, that is, to the phase of illumination, from which a solution for the initial problem is proposed. Thus, this view became the predominant notion attached to the psychology bases of problem solving and human creativity throughout the twentieth century, as indicated in the first part of the book. At this point it is necessary to make an observation. Similarly to Thorndike and other behaviorists, George Herbert Mead’s theory of action is, as I shall briefly present in the third part of the book, one of the main bases for Charles Morris’ behaviorist-psychological semiotics. Mead proposes also a theory of action describing four main stages of purposeful action and interaction of an organism with its environment. Mead theorizes that an action is triggered by some stimulus, which occurs in the form of a certain situation that might pose some problem to the organism. For Mead, the concept of situation defines the relation of any organic individual to his environment or world. This problem provokes a response from the organism. This response or reaction consists in the organism’s assessment of the problem-situation. The last stage consists in the purpose-

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oriented reaction of the organism to reestablish its equilibrium within its environment by taking a given decision. However, despite the terminological similarities that can be found in the vocabularies of Mead and of Thorndike or other behaviorists, their theoretical positions are very different and they do not share the same epistemological framework. The main difference between behaviorism and Mead’s theory of action is the consideration of stimulus and response. Whereas for the classical behaviorism stimulus and reaction are atomistic and materialistic notions, as clarified previously, for Mead the conception of stimulus and response from a given organism is considered from a pragmatistic view, consisting thereby in a cooperation of conscience, intellectual work, and purposeful action. Creative Thinking and Problem Solving as Stratified Stages Earlier, in this second part, I demonstrated that the paradigms lying at the core of problem-solving behavior and inventive thinking can be, for the most part, traced directly from Anglo-American empiricism, especially in the form of early twentieth century American behaviorism, and from Gestalt psychology. These influences gave impetus to or, at least, helped to propel the development of rigid stage models of creative thinking and problem-solving behavior. As Peter Rowe affirms, “such behavior was widely acknowledged as conforming to an episodic process consisting of distinct and almost discontinuous phases of activity” (ROWE, 1987: 45). The main objective of such a strict sequence of stages derived one from another was to make possible the identification and the description of each one of the stages, as well as of their chronological and causal development. The central idea behind the sequencing of these discrete stages is the belief that a solution to a problem is derived automatically from this fixed schematic stage process. Otherwise stated, there is a strong belief that the operationalization of stage processing enables methods of analysis of information, which can be adapted to simulate steps of synthesis. This involves a utilitarian view of the parameter analysis of stages, which, whenever articulated, tends to render the next stage possible by enabling the extraction of requisite parameters for the subsequent stages. The steps of identification, analysis, and synthesis are thereby examined and dealt with systematically at each stage. Thus, as previously discussed, creative problem solving and creative processes in general at work in design processes have been described as an iterative chain of discrete and causal activities taking place within a given project. In what is regarded as the clear influence of a methodological approach drawn from behaviorist paradigms (cf. ROWE, 1987: 47), design process became,

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consequently, an operation consisting of stratified and superordinate stages characterized by predominant and manifestly determined forms of activity organized in a causal chain of events repeated throughout the whole design process. This chain-like process leads to a highly mechanical and deterministic comprehension of problem solving, the operation of which, when successfully developed, will lead necessarily to the production of a synthesis ready to be implemented and consequently will solve the problem at hand. With this predominantly behavioristic approach to stage-oriented activity, the rigid stage models employed in problem solving operate on the basis of analyzing a given problem in a certain manner, “so that the concepts involved are clearly defined and capable of being brought into use, with due regard to their interrelations, in the subsequent stages of synthesis” (FARRADANE, 1966: 97). Or, as Rowe asserts, “the steps in the process could be repeated until the aspects of the problem at hand were addressed. Within the model’s structure, however, the progressive relationship among the steps remained immutable” (ROWE, 1987: 45). As already demonstrated, especially with the concrete example of Morris Asimow, problem solving became equal to every process involving creativity of some kind. Moreover, problem solving has been adopted as a synonym for invention and production in general and specifically as a synonym for design process. The problem of invention, of discovery, and of creative processes of thought became reducible to a formula of problem solving with a cognitive-behavioral psychological basis. It is important to note that the vast majority of thinkers who have thematized design process and creative problem solving have not described the concept of synthesis, although this term is constantly being bandied about throughout the literature. Synthesis represents the moment in which a set of solutions are discovered and revealed. However, the process of finding a solution is, in light of rigid stage models, never adequately explained. The appearance of a novelty, an innovative thought, or of a solution for a problem must rely on the “possibility that the methods of analysis of information may be adaptable to simulating steps of synthesis” (FARRADANE, 1966: 103). Otherwise stated, previous stages enable the posterior stage of synthesis of a new idea by means of causal derivations. The rational factor, whose chief fundamental principle is the deductive inference, is predominant in rigid stage models. Therefore, the internal-structural operations at work in rigid stage models remains immutable, which is characterized by an inveterate mechanic determinism, regardless of the variation in the number of stages or in the number of representations proposed within a particular scheme or diagram. As I will discuss later, the vast majority of models to describe general projective activities or creative operations derived from these predominant views

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of psychology will exhibit, in different degrees but in a similar manner, a systematic mode of operation based upon stratified and discrete stages of episodic processes, as if these stages only existed to “enact” a given synthesis, to solve a specific problem within a specific context. The so-called second generation of design methods with its proposed idea of collaborative and participative design is a form to mitigate the extreme rigidity of earlier models of design process by shifting the focus from the autocracy of the one designer to a more participative and collaborative environment, thus proposing a more intense interdisciplinarity for design research. In this context, the proposed notion of participative and collaborative design shifted its focus from the more deterministic aspects of design methods, characterized here by the identification of a problem, toward the study and recognition of satisfactory and appropriate solutions to a problem situation. Within this proposed design process, designers are partners of sorts with problem “owners” as well as with “users” (cf. RITTEL, 1973: 391-394; cf. CROSS, 1993: 17; cf. BAYAZIT, 2004: 21-22). And yet, even while supported by the elaborated theoretical framework of information processing theory, which helped to propel the empirical research about creative thought and the psychology of problem solving behavior, design disciplines still could not explain the so-called creative leap. As it happened with the preceding generation of design methods, elaborated visual descriptions of cognitive models, despite their complexities were not up to the task of describing the intricacies of what happens within synthesis. No matter how it is called, whether “synthesis”, “illumination”, “creative leap”, “black box”, “ideation”, the moment of spontaneity, the cognitive freedom of creation, could not be grasped by a deterministic cognitive scheme, even if these models were a tad less deterministic than the ones proposed by the first generation. The systemic explanations will appeal to the cognitive models of recombinations of parameters, knowledge and motivation on the one hand and, on the other, the notion of stochastic procedures as the leading explanation for recombinations and rearrangements of a given problem situation or initial situation toward a proper problem solution could shed some light upon cognitive and psychological processes in general, as in the empirical research of behavioral research. However, the very act of serendipity, the daring attitude of mind that proposes a new state of things which is not composed by recombination of pre-existing data in a mind, could not be grasped. Moreover, as Peter Rowe affirms, “in almost all cases the step beyond description into normative realm in which process became pursued as an end in itself resulted in abject failure” (ROWE, 1987: 111).

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Critique on the Purviews of Gestalt Psychology and Behaviorism The most characteristic aspect of the early experimental psychology, so affirms Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his book Le Visible et L’Invisible (cf. MERLEAUPONTY, 1964: 37-38), was that of a blind faith in scientism. Most schools of thought and lines of research, especially Gestalt psychology and behaviorism, believed firmly to have found their definitive foundation where they could, as scientific disciplines, draw conclusions about the functioning of the human mind and its connections to goal-oriented activities, problem solving, and creative situations. These specific approaches in psychology sought to accumulate empirical data to provide its generalizations with an all-encompassing validity, which would legitimize the chosen objective and positivistic scientific methods. This tendency has become, furthermore, a cultural habit believing […] that human mental activity simply dominated nature, either as in the case of positivism, by knowing it directly in such way that that we could simply manipulate ideas and environment. (ANDERSON, 2005: 12)

Henceforth, Gestalt and behaviorist psychologists sought to secure psychology as an observational natural science. Later on, it became clear, however, as some of the early psychologists, such as Franz Brentano and William James realized, that the grounds of experimentation upon which the conclusions of the psychological schools were based could not support some of the explanations that were being drawn. The collected empirical data could not form the “first stratum” of explanations of creative thinking and problem solving. These explanations are partial results obtained under artificial, controlled, and established conditions. The generalizations made upon such collected partial observations have the character of a colage of discrete elements, which, in their turn, cannot be clustered together to become a determinate context of the psyche. The sum of empirical data cannot represent the qualitative experience outside of the prepared environment of a laboratory. Therefore, generalizations about the realm of the “mental” arrived at through observations of behavior within the environment of a goal-oriented type of experiment, such as in problem solving, have very limited explicative force for detecting mental processes of purposive thinking, creative thinking, and the complex relationships involving thought and conduct as linked processes. According to the results of observations from many of these schools of psychology, with special emphasis on Gestalt psychology and behaviorism which are clearly more related to task-oriented and problem solving experiments, the “mental” is identified and described not as a flowing stream in a broader sense, but remains

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in the realm of elementary causalities. The representations of observed phenomena have predominantly the character of heterogeneous and discontinuous structures. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty has observed while critically reading the predominant psychological purviews that have greatly influenced the discussions about psychological aspects of creativity, invention, projective thinking and problem solving behavior, there is a much deeper problem related to such psychological views. As a result, there will be a sort of stratification – not only metaphorically, but conceptual – in what relates to the operation and operationalization of human creativity. Despite significant advances in the fields of descriptive psychology, introspective analysis, as well as experimental psychology and psychology of behavior, the psychological framework held to be sufficient to explain phenomena of projecting, associating, and creating is still inapt to reach the depths and, so to speak, to describe the intricacies of human creativity. These predominant psychological purviews that seek to explain creativity are still, for the most part, based on mechanistic and deterministic views. And yet, these purviews of psychology became the mainframe of scientific explanations for creativity, projective activities, and of powers of mental association. The kind of artistic power, associative mindsets, projective thinking, as well as the inventive properties of the mind became reduced to atomistic explanations of discrete processes, in which inputs and outputs will be mechanically and deterministically accounted for. As in the old tradition of reflex-arc theory, the creative will be explained behavioristically and physiobiologically – and later will be, as I shall discuss – further simulated via programs and digital computers. The stimulus-response model of behavioral psychology will become the predominant model at work in every form of creative procedures. The stratification indicated by Merleau-Ponty in his critique toward dominant views, especially toward the widespread Gestalt psychology and behavioristic approaches, has shaped the general consideration of creative thought and projective activities. Because of this, the creative, the inventive, and projective thought and conduct will be interpreted through the lenses of the models constructed by these psychological purviews. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, modeling the creative according to these psychological theories will force the dynamics of creativity and its serendipity to be conformed to a mechanical – and stratified – model of rigid stages.

The Traditional Bases of Design Process Invention, Discovery, and Creativity According to Modern Psychological Investigations

THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR DESIGN PROCESS As George Miller, one of the founders of the modern cognitive studies affirmed, there has been a counterrevolution in the field of experimental psychology. It was a response against the predominant view of behaviorism as the leading paradigm for experimental psychology. Miller, recalling this counterrevolution, quotes a statement attributed to Noam Chomsky: “defining psychology as the science of the behavior was like defining physics as the science of meter reading” (G. MILLER, 2003: 142). By the mid-1950s the field of experimental psychology was in for a change. In 1956 Jerome Seymour Brunner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin published the groundbreaking book A Study of Thinking. This publication introduced the main frame of empirical studies that would culminate in the field of information processing theory. And two years later, Allen Newell, John Clifford Shaw, and Herbert Simon wrote their seminal article “Elements for a Theory of Problem Solving”, in which they articulated and helped improve upon the psychological paradigms of information processing by means of discussing electronic simulations of human problem solving as programs ran through a digital computer. The development of information processing theory reframed problem solving behavior and also the cognitive operations of searching for creative solutions in an environment of problem solving. Thus, heuristics was also reframed. This new position is characterized by the study of the flow of information running in a certain cognitive system. Beginning with a certain stimulus, or input into a human information processing system, this psychological position seeks to ana-

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lyze how the information is processed, how it is transformed into mental imagery, into representations, how information is compared with already stored information, or how information is used to formulate a response, a behavior, a decision of some kind, such as the articulation of a speech (cf. P. H. MILLER, 1983: 249). The information process view in psychology helped to shed some light upon the cognitive features implied in problem solving behavior and, consequently, upon everything else connected with the problem of discovery and invention, decision making, and heuristics. The introduction of this new psychological line of research has had, from the late 1950s onwards, an important impact on the consideration about taskoriented problem solving, about decision-making theory. And, because of the seminal book The Sciences of the Artificial published in 1969 by Herbert Simon, design process and design theory began to be considered in light of this new psychological paradigm. The new approach opened up novel avenues of inquiry and new fields of investigation were established, such as, for instance, cognitive behavioral research and research on artificial intelligence. The new line of research still has the form of a broader behavioral research, which, although it still operates with behavioristic hypotheses of stimulus-response, allows for a better observation of possible cognitive operations that guide specific sets of actions in an experimental environment. Thus, cognition began to be reconsidered as an important element that helps shape observable behavior and can, furthermore, be inferred from the series of decisions taken by the subject. In accordance with this new line of psychological research, especially with respect to creative problem solving and decision-making, the relevance of heuristics and heuristic reasoning became explicit. The main advantage of information processing was the possibility of description and analysis of processes in human cognition. The objective was to explain observable activities by means of the analysis of cognitive processes. This approach also introduced the hypothesis of similarity between human cognitive processes and computer information processing. This main hypothesis is based on the similarity of the dynamics of information processing. Both the human mind and the computer operate by taking information, performing certain operations, and storing the information. Moreover, both information processes make use of symbols, transforming, thus, input into output (cf. P. H. MILLER, 1983: 249; cf. ROWE, 1987: 51; cf. HAYES, 1981: 51-57). Summarizing the importance and the innovations brought about by this new psychological approach to the cognitive and behavioral studies, Herbert Simon affirms in the introduction of his book Models of Thought:

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The information processing revolution that has occurred during these years has completely changed the face of cognitive psychology. It has introduced computer programming languages as formal (‘mathematical’) languages for expressing theories of human mental processes; and it has introduced the computers themselves to simulate these processes and thereby make behavioral predictions for testing the theories. These new methodologies have enabled us to describe human cognitive processes with precision in terms of a small number of basic mechanisms organized into programs (strategies) and to use these descriptions to explain a wide range of phenomena that have been observed in the psychological laboratory. (SIMON, 1979: ix)

Seen from this perspective, the operation of problem solving within information processing is considered as a subdivision of a bigger problem, which cannot be dealt with at once, into a finite and small number of basic information, which could be easily managed by a given system. This finite information could be arranged as strategies – or “programs” in the sense of a computer environment – which allow the resolution of much larger and complex problems. For instance, given the restrictions of memory availability of the human mind, large sets of information, such as the sequence of numbers 14921776196119171500 is virtually impossible to be memorized as it is. But if the recipient of such information breaks down this number into groups of four numbers in order to relate these groups to certain already retained information, the sequence becomes recognizable and operable: 1492 relates to the discovery of America; 1776 relates to the declaration of independence of the United States of America from the British Empire; 1961 relates to the first manned orbital flight, the Vostok 1; 1917 relates to the Russian revolution; 1500 relates to the official date of the discovery of Brazil. Now the five groups of the whole sequence are attached to memory information and, whenever they must be articulated, these relations of memory and associative constructions can reproduce them. Further arrangements reinforce the mnemonic relation by arranging the groups of dates in a chronological manner. A certain timeline arranges the numbers in the form of memorable events. These relations become then available and easy to access, because they have been divided into smaller relations, protocols, and operations. The sequence of twenty numbers becomes then strikingly familiar: 1492 1500 1776 1917 1961.

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Another example is the sequence of integer numbers discovered by Fibonacci. The sequence runs as follows: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144… At the first glance the whole information, how it appears, the sequence itself, and the possible principles underlying the sequence, seem to be much too complex to be immediately registered. However, a closer look reveals a certain pattern of organization articulated within the numeric expression. A formulation of it is expressible in the form of a recurrence relation28: Fn = Fn-1 + Fn-2, and so on. The reducibility of information to a set of operable parameters can allow the operator to tackle much larger sequences because of the rationalization and factorization of principles that is contained in a small portion of memory. The correspondence between human cognitive processes and a computer information process allows a broader vision of information processing as a systemic operation independent of the hardware. That is to say, regardless of the brain structure or of a certain piece of computer hardware. This approximation brain-computer will serve as a valuable heuristic tool for the development of this psychological line of cognitive-behavioral research. This line of psychological research has helped to propel a variety of further research, from laboratory research on memory to computer simulations of problem solving. This framework also helped to develop the ever-growing field of artificial intelligence (cf. P. H. MILLER, 1983: 254). Information processing theory found resonance as well in the field of design research and soon entered the mainstream of design theory. The so-called “second generation of design methods”, for instance, has been largely framed by this psychological theory because of its breadth and precision related to behavioral research in problem solving and cognitive contexts (cf. ROWE, 1987: 91). However, before I present design process, reconsidered within the scope of information processing theory, it is necessary to revisit the psychological position of behavioral studies upon which all further developments will be based. Psychological Background of Information Processing Theory First published in 1956, the seminal book A Study of Thinking introduced a new proposal for cognitive research regarding human thought with special emphasis on how concepts are attained, that is, how individuals are able to learn from ex-

28

A recurrence relation is that which defines a certain sequence or pattern of values through recursive principles whenever an initial term is available.

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periences and how human thought can generalize from experience. The book offers an overview of cognitive and behavioral research. Regarding the human cognitive abilities, the authors inquire into the learning capabilities, as well as with the mental adaptability of test subjects, which, despite limited perception, attention, and memory, are able to generate new solutions for problems encountered within a certain experimental task. The starting point of this research is exactly a formulation of the stages of creativity proposed by Graham Wallas, as already previously shown in the first part. A form of mental generalization unifies experience into an understandable and coherent unity. To say, as Graham Wallas (1926) did a generation ago, that thinking or invention is divided into the four stages of ‘preparation’, ‘incubation’, ‘illumination’, and ‘verification’ is helpful only in so far as it serves to indicate that while the experience of ‘grasping’ (illumination or insight) is sudden, it is imbedded in a longer process – still to be described in analytic terms. We do well to heed the lesson of history and look to sources of data additional to the report of direct experience as a basis for understanding what is the process of concept attainment. (BRUNER, GOODNOW, AUSTIN, 1990: 50-51)

In this book, Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin thematize the conditions under which the scientific study of human thinking should be concentrated. Based on the results of several psychological experiments discussed in the book, the authors were able to show that human cognition tends to group experiences together in form of clusters that are initially disconnected from one another. This “clustering” together is, according to the authors, psychological categorizations, that is, mental constructions of concepts. For the authors, cognitive activity depends upon a “prior placing of events in terms of their category membership” (BRUNER, GOODNOW, AUSTIN, 1990: 231). A category represents, in this context of information processing theory, all the “discriminably different events that are treated as if equivalents” (ibid). This concentration upon a generalized meaning is one of the reasons human cognition can form a coherent and manageable regulation of external experience. Instead of being based on the behaviorist tradition of stimulus-response, and without relying on philosophical speculations about concept formation, the experiments show a deeper correlation between experience, cognitive processes, and controlled conduct on a psychological level. Therefore, the term category is considered here from a purely experiential and cognitive perspective. Their objective is to establish a set of cognitive identifiable criteria that attributes meanings to experience (cf. ibid). Following this line of thought, the psychologists remark that these constructions create psychological patterns that can be connected with respective sets of con-

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duct. They affirm, for instance, that “the class of prime numbers, animal species, the huge range of colors dumped into the category ‘blue, squares and circles’” (ibid) are human inventions, thought categories that form constructed categories to render the world meaningful. In this purview, these exterior events are not “discoveries”, but mental constructions. The theoretical framework in this investigation, category formation, is derived from the basic assumption that “categories are developed in response to events, as when a generalization continuum emerges in response to a specific stimulus” (ibid. Italics are mine). Although the authors draw their conclusions from empirical studies concerning problem solving related to concept formation, they propose that these conclusions can be extended to “any phenomenon where an organism is faced with the task of identifying and placing events into classes on the basis of using certain critical cues and ignoring others” (ibid). That is to say, the psychologists have generalized the fundamental point of their investigation into problemsolving behavior as related to concept formation to include every activity in which decision-making behavior is involved. Three major questions guide the empirical research in question. These are: How do people achieve the information necessary for isolating and learning a concept? How do they retain the information gained from encounters with possible relevant events so that it may be useful later? How is retained information transformed so that it may be rendered useful for testing hypotheses still unborn at the moment of first encountering new information? (BRUNER, GOODNOW, AUSTIN, 1990: 51)

In order to investigate the intricate realm of concept attainment, the researchers focused on the process of learning through experimental tasks. In accordance with the main premise of behavioral research, which demands that the psychological aspect under scrutiny must be externalized in order to be observed, the researchers set out to devise task-oriented experiments which could render aspects of the learning process observable at the cognitive level. Concept attainment, as already suggested, is, according to this psychological line of investigation, an important component of the general learning process. According to the psychologists, the tasks should be carried out in six basic steps, to wit: 1. There is an array of instances to be tested, and from this testing is to come the attainment of the concept. The instances can be characterized in terms of their attributes, e.g., color, weight per volume, and in terms of values, the particular color, the particular weight per volume, etc.

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2. With each instance, or at least most of them once the task is under ways, a person makes a tentative prediction or decision […], and before he is through with this task there will be a series of such decisions to be made. 3. Any given decision will be found to be correct, incorrect, or varyingly indeterminate; […]. We refer to this a validation of a decision, the major source of information about the relevance of cues exhibited by an instance for its category membership. 4. Each decision-and-test may be regarded as providing potential information by limiting the number of attributes and attribute values that can be considered predicative […]. 5. The sequence of decisions made by the person en route to attaining the concept, i.e., en route to the discovery of more or less valid cues, may be regarded as a strategy embodying certain objectives. These objectives may be various in kind but in general one may distinguish three kinds of objectives: a. to maximize the information gained from each decision and test of an instance; b. to keep the cognitive strain involved in the task within manageable limits and certainly within the limits imposed by one’s cognitive capacity; c. to regulate the risk of failing to attain the concept within a specifiable time or energy limit and to regulate any other forms of risk consequent to making a decision and testing it. A sequence of decisions or strategy may be evaluated in the light of the objectives whether the subject ‘intends’ these as his objectives consciously or not. Strategies are here considered as conscious or deliberate behavior sequences. Whether or not the subject is conscious of the strategy he is employing and can tell you its objectives is an interesting but not an essential datum. 6. Any decision about the nature of an instance may be regarded as having consequences for the decision-maker. […]. The set of consequences following upon such decision and each outcome we refer to as the payoff matrix of a decision, and the relevant consequences reflect the objectives of the strategy and the over-all task. (BRUNER, GOODNOW, AUSTIN, 1990: 233-234)

With these steps, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin believe that the strategies of concept attainment can be isolated and described according to an analysis of categorization. They consider, furthermore, that such strategies of concept attainment will be systematically subjected to the variations of information, risk characteristics, and how strategies are carried out. The authors also affirm that it is precisely the maintenance of balance of these variations of information related to concept attainment, which is the primary concern of their investigations (cf. ibid: 234). In this context, the concept strategy is a term used to describe specific patterns of decisions “in the acquisition, retention, and utilization of information that serves to meet certain objectives, i.e., to insure certain forms of outcomes and to insure against certain others” (ibid).

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Assuming that “a strategy is inferred from the pattern of decisions one observes in a problem-solver seeking to attain a concept” (ibid: 55), it becomes possible to analyze the strategies from the perspective of the objectives stated for the task or from the perspective of the steps taken in order to complete the task and achieve the objectives. The objectives that define a specific strategy function are described as follows: a.

To insure that the concept will be attained after the minimum number of encounters with relevant instances.

b. To insure that a concept will be attained with certainty, regardless of the number of instances one must test en route to attainment. c.

To minimize the amount of strain on inference and memory capacity while at the same time ensuring that a concept will be attained.

d. To minimize the number of wrong conceptualizations prior to attaining a concept. (ibid: 54)

As the authors define, “what is required is that one constructs an ideal strategy or a set of ideal strategies that have the formal properties necessary to meet certain demands or objectives with ‘maximum rationality’” (ibid: 55). They affirm, furthermore: […] strategies as employed by people are not fixed things. They alter with the nature of the concept being sought, with the kinds of pressures that exist in the situation, with the consequences of behavior, etc. And this is of essence. For what is most creative about conceptattainment behavior is that the patterning of decisions does indeed reflect the demands of the situations in which the person finds himself. We do not know how strategies are learned, and the matter does not concern us for the present. Presumably they are learned. ‘What’ is learned, however, is not of the order of a set of simple responses. For the systematic behavior of subjects attaining concepts is a highly patterned, skilled performance. If contemporaries of learning are to deal with such performances, it is our feeling that the unit of analysis now called the ‘response’ will have to be broadened considerably to encompass the long contingent sequence of acts that, more properly speaking, can only be called a performance. (ibid: 55-56)

It is important to remark that, because the focus of study is located in the learning process through task-oriented activities, the researchers sought to ensure that the cognitive operation of generalizing is activated and a category is created. That is to say, the subject must produce a category within the task, so that the link between perception, cognition, and conduct can be ascertained. Points “a” and “b”

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therefore reinforce the cognitive objectives of concept attainment. It would be of no use to the research if the concept were partially disclosed or not formed. The generalization, that is, the cognitive act of “comprehending”, that of uniting in the mind several perceived elements and instances of a problem situation and creating thereby a new concept, is one of the key elements of the research. According to the authors, the psychologists’ “aha experience” happens as a “shock of recognition”. As they affirm, “something happens quickly and one thinks one has found something” (ibid: 50). The objectives “a” and “b” insure that this happens so it can be part of the task-oriented process. The objectives “c” and “d” also function in order to enable the subject to perform the “mental leaps” in order to be able to complete a given task. Since the mental leap as an act of the mind is, for the authors, unanschaulich, as they have put it using the vocabulary of the Würzburger school, that is, “impalpable” (ibid), the unfolding of subsequent small changes in conduct and attitude will render the mental leap observable in the sudden chance of attitude, as in an “heureka moment”. As stated by Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, “our effort is directed to locating strategies for dealing with information and trying to understand the manner in which they reflect the person’s adjustments to the complex environment on which they must move” (ibid: 56). Now, seen from the perspective of the steps needed to be undertaken in order to tackle the task and reach the objectives, the strategy, and the pattern of decision-making may vary according to some factors. In order to reach the stated objectives, it is important to assess these factors. The first assessment is related to the definition of the task. What does the subject hold to be the objective of her or his behavior? Or, more generally stated, the subject is required to consider what she or he thinks or believes she or he is supposed to do within the task. The second assessment is related to the nature of the instances encountered. The test subject needs to survey the characteristics within a certain task. These characteristics are also called instances of the task. An analysis of these instances will reveal what is the problem – or what part of the problem – should be tackled. The importance of this assessment is to determine the attributes of these instances, what will help to formulate the problem-situation. The subject is also required to assess how many and in which form these instances can contribute potentially to the successful solving of the task at hand and how many of the instances encountered are “noisy”, that is, do not immediately convey positive information that would help to solve the problem. The subject also needs to survey the manner in which these instances are encountered, for these instances can be displayed randomly, or in an ordered fashion. Moreover, she or he will have to assess if there is the possibility to control the order in which instances will be encountered and interacted with. And finally, the subject needs to determine if the

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instances encountered possess sufficient data for fully grasping the concept. The third assessment is related to the nature of validation. Validation here refers to the verification of the categorization, that is, the formation of a psychological concept, according to the instances encountered. The fourth assessment requires from the subject an assessment of the consequences of specific categorizations. Within the task environment, the subject needs to assess the consequences of rightly or wrongly creating a given concept, or category, to a given encountered instance. Furthermore, the subject needs to assess the conditions, rewards, or prizes related to the categorizations. For instance: is there a certain prize attached to a successful solution to a problem? Or is there a penalty? In the fifth assessment, the subject is required to gauge the nature of the imposed restrictions. He or she must, for instance, assess the problem solving conditions, such as tasks with time limit, or tasks that suddenly demand a different approach and demand short-term decisions from the subjects. Returning to the six phases or stages proposed by this school of thought, the subject is thus required to perform a certain task, and first survey the characteristics of the task at hand, or, as it has been denominated, the instances and its attributes. Second, having assessed this initial level of information, and taking into account the strategic objectives and the steps required to accomplish the task, the subject chooses from among a series of tentative predictions or decisions. Third, the subject is required to validate her or his decision, that is, by assessing the information potential of a decision taken within a task. Fourth, the subject narrows down the variables with which the subject can solve the task according to the information achieved. Fifth, narrowing down the variables means that the subject makes, within the task environment, a series of decisions to reach an objective or to attain a concept. A more or less definable set of rules to guide the actions, as I have shown, is called a strategy, which is chosen because it embodies a valid objective. The strategy has three specific criteria in order to be valid as research data. First, the strategy must present a certain pattern for maximization of the gained information. This information will be articulated in posterior moments of the problem solving task. Second, cognitive strains must be kept within manageable limits, that is, must be articulated within the frame of the task. Third, there must be a relation between the time limit imposed by the task and the time elapsed in each decision made. And finally, the last stage reveals the payoff matrix, which is the set of consequences that follows each decision and each outcome. These consequences reflect, in their turn, the objectives of the strategy and the overall task. The researchers affirm, “it is possible to demonstrate the effect of relevant conditions upon measurable aspects of categorizing strategies” (ibid: 236).

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[…] we were struck by the notable flexibility and intelligence of our subjects in adapting their strategies to the information, capacity, and risk requirements we have imposed upon them. They have altered their strategies to take into account the increased difficulty of the problems being tackled, choosing methods of information gathering what were abstractly less than ideal but lightened pressures imposed on them by the tasks set them. They have changed safe-but-slow to risk-but-fast strategies in the light of the number of moves allowed them. They have shown themselves able to adapt to cues that were less than perfect in validity and have shown good judgment in dealing with various kinds of payoff matrices. They have shown an ability to combine partially valid cues and to resolve conflicting cues. (ibid: 238)

The authors also perceived the general tendency of the test subjects of abandoning commonly accepted notions in problem solving and gathering as much as information as possible to move the task forward. Change becomes analogous to progression, and, therefore, the behavior of “making use of every resource of information when the going gets rough even though such eclecticism overwhelms limited capacity” (ibid). This study of problem solving behavior, although it does not account for creativity in the strict sense, has unveiled invaluable psychological behavioral patterns related to creativity in an indirect manner. By studying problem solving behavior, the authors could formulate the hypothesis that creative behavior is accounted for in the learning process, in the intelligent adaptation of cognitive processes, with special regard to concept attaining processes, and to their accompanying respective behavioral patterns. The most important aspect of this psychological investigation is observable behavior. In order to understand intelligent and adaptive behavior, it is necessary to consider larger and sequential portions of behavior rather than a single, isolated response as units of behavior. To comprehend adaptive behavior, it is also necessary to appreciate “the unfolding interplay between successive responses in reaction to prior consequences” (ibid: 242-243). The most important aspect revealed by this study, however, is the analysis of sequences of behavior in connection with the inventive and generative processes of thought with special emphasis on creative problem solving. Inventive and creative thought, however, need to be observable. Therefore, it is also necessary to externalize the main components of decision making in order for the observer to grasp the processes of thought that are articulated while learning or generalizing a certain state-of-things, that is, the so-called concept attainment. Thus, some cognitive relevant mindsets are immediately apprehended via observable patterns of behavior connected with the mindset while the test subject

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is engaged in a problem solving task. And this poses a problem to this psychological framework in reference to the inquiry into discovery and invention alike: The so-called ‘eureka’ problems in which the subject is given all the elements out of which a solution must be fashioned are peculiarly unsuited to the requirements of getting behavior observably externalized, unless the problem is such that successive, attempted solutions can be observed. (ibid: 243. Italics are mine)

The study of thought articulation, cognitive processes, and the formation of conceptions from the perspective of behavioral research in light of information processing theory present a problem if the experiment does not reflect the processuality that is involved. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin affirm: “if behavior is to be viewed as strategy, the task analysis can only be accomplished by devising experiments that can set a lot of sequentially linked behavior out of the organism where it can be observed” (ibid). Processing Creative Thinking: Simulating Human Problem Solving Behavior Directly related to problem solving behavior are the innovative propositions for a new theory of human problem solving articulated with the principles of information processing theory. As already mentioned, the 1958 article “Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving” written by Allen Newell, John Clifford Shaw, and Herbert Simon proposes a specific approach to explain problem solving behavior by means of studying basic information processes. With respect to information processing theory, they state that it is possible to achieve an account of cognitive processes, these processes being translated into observable behavior, by means of a simulation programmed into a computer. This simulation of behavior is programmed to run with decomposable basic information, which, when articulated, should explain more complex levels of behavior. Running the program and observing the way in which the cognitive operation is performed by the machine can unveil valid information related to strategies of action and thereby to cognitive operations that trigger the action. It must be remembered that the term strategy, according to the proponents of information processing theory, is related to decision-making, referring thereby to a certain pattern of decisions in the acquisition, retention, and utilization of information to meet certain objectives, that is to say, to ensure that certain forms of outcomes are bestowed upon and certain others are suppressed (cf. BRUNER, GOODNOW, AUSTIN, 1990: 54).

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Newell, Shaw, and Simon consider problem solving behavior to be explained by reconstructing basic cognitive steps of problem solving procedures by articulating principles of information processing. They affirm that “if one considers the organism to consist of effectors, receptors, and control systems for joining these, then this theory is mostly a theory of the control system” (NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1958: 151). The main thesis presented in the article posits that an explanation of observed actions and behavior of a given organism can be provided by a simulating program of primitive information processes, which, in its turn, sets off observable behavior (Fig. 2.1). Fig. 2.1: Diagram representing the memory system and main components at work in cognitive process. Response output

Response Generator

LONG-TERM STORE Rehearsal buffer Stimulus input

SHORT-TERM STORE Memory bank subject to rapid decay

Self-addressable memory bank not subject to decay

Control Processes - Stimulus analyzer programs - Alter biases of sensory channels - Activate rehearsal mechanism - Modify information flow from SR to STS - Code and transfer information from STS to LTS - Initiate or modify search of LTS - Heuristic operations on stored information - Set decision criteria - Initiate response generator

The terms indicated in the field of Control Processes, SR, STS, LTS refer to, respectively, sensory register (SR), short-term store (STS), and long-term store (LTS). The present model of a flowchart representing the dynamics of memory system has been based on the article “Storage and Retrieval Processes in Long-Term Memory” of SHIFFRIN and ATKINSON (1969: 180) and also on Patricia H. Miller’s book Theories of Developmental Psychology (P.H. MILLER, 1983: 255).

According to the authors, the information processing theory used to study problem solving behavior postulates three major claims at the outset that shall guide the research. The first claim postulates a control system, which consists of a cer-

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tain amount of memories. These memories contain symbolized information and are themselves connected with each other by a series of relations. The diagram (Fig. 2.1) exemplifies information processing theory and the functioning of memories within the cognitive and behavioral process. In a very general manner, given that information processing theory is not a single psychological line of investigation, but is formed by several approaches with similar theoretical frameworks, this line of research in psychology aims at the investigation of how human cognition and behavioral processes including symbol-manipulation and problem solving processes work. In this view, some of the proponents of information processing views use computer simulations in order to construct models for cognitive operations and problem solving behavior. Psychologists within this field consider human beings as self-modifying and active self-organizing systems. In this case, as it is possible to see in the diagram, human cognition is regarded as an operational system that proceeds to process the information received. Upon receiving a certain stimulus, an input, the cognitive apparatus is set in motion in order to produce an answer, an output. The stimulus provokes changes in representation, storage of memories, both short term and long term memories, and also provokes changes in the sector of combining and recombining information. These changes are the results of decisionmaking, which modifies the organization as result of this cognitive mobilization and also as a result of feedback. Human cognition is seen here as a system with a limited capacity of memory storage and information processing. The main lines of information processing theory investigate how the production of knowledge is connected with memory capacity and with processing capacity. It is believed that the development of higher cognitive operations and memory capacity are connected with each other. Information processing theory has the strength to investigate and to express some aspects of the complexity of human cognition, especially when referring to memory, representation, and problem solving behavior (cf. P. H. MILLER, 1983: 290-299). Corroborating this statement, Herbert Simon, one of the main proponents of the paradigm of information processing theory, wrote that: […] the experiments tell us that human beings do not have sufficient means for storing information in memory to enable them to apply the efficient strategy unless the presentation of stimuli is greatly slowed down, or unless the subjects are permitted external memory aids, or both. Since we know from other evidence that human beings have virtually unlimited semi permanent storage (as indicated by their ability to continue to store odd facts in memory over most of a lifetime), the bottleneck in the experiment must lie in the small amount of rapid-access storage (so-called short-term memory) available and the time re-

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quired to move items from the limited short-term store to the large-scale long-term store. (SIMON, 1969: 33-34)

The authors explain, however, that the information processing theory is not concerned with the physical or physiological structures, such as the piece of hardware of a computer that runs the program or a human brain. That is to say, the theory does not presuppose the existence of a material or biological structure as a pre-requisite to understanding the symbolization or the properties of the memories and symbol articulations implied in the information processing theory. As Herbert Simon argues further in his book The Sciences of the Artificial (199629: 82-83), one of the main characteristics of information processing theory is that in order to account for cognitive processes, it is not necessary to presuppose a brain. This apparently contradictory claim that dismisses the “hardware” of physiological accounts is justified by the fact that, according to Simon, “both computers and brains, when engaged in thought, are adaptive systems, seeking to mold themselves to the shape of the task environment” (ibid, 83). The second claim states that a certain number of primitive information processes operate upon the information contained in the memories. It is important to state that each primitive process is a perfectly definite operation. The third claim is that there is a perfectly definite set of rules, which combine these primitive processes into whole programs of processing. The authors state that from the programs it is thereby possible to “deduce unequivocally what externally observable behavior will be generated” (NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1958: 151). It means, in their terms, that A program viewed as a theory of behavior is highly specific: it describes one organism in a particular class of situations. When either the situation or the organism is changed, the program must be modified. The program can be used as a theory – that is, as a predicator of behavior […]. (ibid)

There is a specific relation being proposed here. This relation functions in two ways. The program can, firstly, give precise predictions, and these can be tested in detail in relation to the field of behavior in which it has been designed to operate. Secondly, the authors presuppose that there will be strong similarities among the programs used by an organism in different and varied situations. An example

29

Herbert Simon’s famous book The Sciences of the Artificial was published for the first time in 1969. The reference for the book mentioned here is the third edition, published in 1996.

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of these similarities is the simulations of program-operations that a human subject exhibits while solving a mathematical problem or making a decision in a game of chess (cf. ibid, 152). The authors affirm, then, that “the program one subject uses for any such task will resemble the programs used by other subjects possessing similar training and abilities”30 (ibid). The authors seek to show in the aforementioned paper that processes composing the written program exhibit a striking familiarity with everyday life experience as well as with problem solving. They are referring, here, to the ability to search for possible solutions in a given task, the generation of possibilities out of other elements, and the evaluation of partial solutions and cues. But what purpose does this simulation of human problem solving behavior serve? The authors affirm that it is possible with this theory to predict certain aspects of human problem solving behavior. According to them, psychological studies in the line of information processing theory have gathered a great deal of experiential data. For the purpose of validating experiential data with digital simulated means, the authors claim that the program simulating problem solving behavior can unveil in a very accurate manner the pattern of human problem solving behavior. The development of such a program requires the integration of a self-organizing principle, which renders the program apt to solve the problem at hand by itself. The authors also infer that information processing theory helps to shed light upon the question of “how sequences of simple processes could account for the successful solution of complex-problems” (ibid). The theory dismisses the mystery related to problem solving dynamics and shows that “nothing more needs to be added to the constitution of a successful problem solver” (ibid). But how should this simulation be achieved? The authors rely on the ability of digital computers to process the programming. Digital computers – a novelty in the late 1950s – could accurately infer the behavior pattern previously programmed onto them. That is to say, information processes relative to some aspects of human behavior are coded in a specific language of computers. Newell, Shaw, and Simon explain the process in the following manner: […] each primitive information process is coded to be a separate computer routine, and a ‘master’ routine is written that allows these primitive processes to be assembled into any

30

Newell, Shaw, and Simon presuppose that “if there were no such similarities, if each subject and each task were completely idiosyncratic, there could be no theory of problem solving. Moreover, there is some positive evidence, as we shall see, that such similarities and some general characteristics of problem solving do exist” (NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1958: 152).

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system we wish to specify. Once this has been done, we can find out exactly what behavior the purported theory predicts by having the computer ‘simulate’ the system. (ibid: 153)

It is important to highlight the authors’ position in relation to such a simulation involving digital processing. The process is neither related to crude analogies to a particular organism’s behavior, nor for that matter used as an analogy to the functions of a particular brain. The authors’ aim here is to describe a given process of problem solving behavior in terms of information processing operations programmed onto the computer. Stated otherwise, it is a matter of analyzing the behavior of a given organism taking into account how it would behave under different circumstances in its environment. The observation of a simulation will reveal certain patterns of behavior should the organism be required to perform a certain set of tasks. The computer will run the program and according to the simulation, the behavior is observed in “terms of certain elementary information processes it is capable of performing” (ibid). These programs for simulating problem solving behavior could be written independently of the existence of digital computers. In fact, Newell, Shaw, and Simon affirm that a program, in the sense they use the word, is exactly an “analogy to the behavior of an organism than is a differential equation to the behavior of the electrical circuit it describes” (ibid). Now, the great advantage proposed by the new technology of digital computers is that these machines can perform similar sequences of information processes to those that a human being would execute while solving problems. When a machine is properly programmed, so the authors affirm, the program will induce the proper problem solving operations required to perform a certain task. The authors conclude, moreover, that at the level of information processing theory, both humans and machines perform problem solving operations which are describable by the written programs. According to Newell, Shaw, and Simon, then: […] we have in fact a machine that behaves in the way prescribed by the program. Similarly, for concreteness, we will often talk as if our theory of problem solving consisted of statements about the ability of a computer to do certain things. (ibid)

In fact, the authors have written some programs with different capabilities, which can be used to simulate problem solving behavior while carrying out a certain task. For instance, they have listed some significant programs that operate certain aspects of problem solving (cf. NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1962: 67-69). These are The Logic Theorist, which is a computer program capable of searching for and discovering proofs for theorems in the field of elementary symbolic logic;

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The Chess Player, which is a program that simulates the behavior of a chess player according to the programed rules and the possibilities of the game31; and Musical Composition, which is a computer program that composes music employing specific rules of counterpoint. This specific program to solve problems in the field of musical counterpoint has been written and ran on the Illinois Automatic Computer, the ILLIAC. And some of its compositions, as the authors state, have been performed by a string quartet and type-recorded (ibid: 67-68). Another significant digital computer program indicated by the authors is the program called Design of Electric Motors. This program, which has a great potential to be employed in the industrial context of electric motors design, functions by taking as inputs certain design specifications given by the customer. The program establishes the manufacturing specifications through which the initial input can be manufactured. These results are then a sort of “computational” short cut in the design process, for these calculations are not only performed to go from the input. The program seeks to solve the problem by a set of decisions previously programmed. These programs perform problem solving operations to a certain extent so as to share with design engineers the ability of decision making in the calculation process. It is possible to conclude that the program for motor design has been created with the clear objective of simulating human problem solving behavior insofar as these processes could embrace decision-making capabilities inherent to a given industrial context. The effective problem solving routines could render the manufacturing process more economically effective (ibid: 68). The authors also mention the program called Visual Pattern Recognition. This program has been designed with the objective of learning to recognize twodimensional patterns, simple drawn forms, such as letters or simple forms. Although the success of this program was minimal in the 1950s, the attempt has been considered as an important step toward the use of computers simulation as a tool to probe the field of human cognition and perceptive functions. From the entire list of pioneering computer programs that were able to be run on digital computers devised in the 1950s, the program The Logic Theorist written by Newell, Shaw, and Simon specifically was the most advanced at that time. This program was conceived to put the simulations according to information processing theory to the test. As already explained, the programs are not

31

According to the authors, “two programs besides ours have been written that play chess. Although both of these proceed in a way that is fundamentally different from the ways humans play chess, some of their features provide illuminating comparisons” (NEWELL, SHAW, SIMON, 1962: 68).

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meant to simply repeat the problem solving operations previously recorded from a human context. The operations of the programs in simulating problem solving resemble the techniques and processes that a human problem solver would execute while performing a certain task (cf. ibid: 67). Paradigm of Information Processing Theory and the Operational Stages of Problem Solving Behavior The Logic Theorist is a program capable of seeking solutions and solving problems by discovering proofs in the domain of elementary symbolic logic. The authors assert that “the behavior of this program, when stimulus consists of the instruction that it prove a particular theorem, can be used to predict the behavior of (certain) humans when they are faced with the same problem in symbolic logic” (NEWELL, SIMON, SHAW, 1958: 153-154). This program was written in order to tackle theorems in the field of symbolic logic using a certain set of strategies. Its intent is to simulate the articulations of strategies in case one would encounter certain problems to be solved in a specific environment. The program simulates, therefore, the information processing required for articulating the strategies in order to complete a given task. For that purpose, the authors wrote the program by including a set of possible processes that may be articulated in order to solve the problem. Human problem solvers use these possibilities as well; however, all that is required to write the program is the inclusion of the set of primitive processes that tend to be articulated in information processing. These primitive processes are sufficient to describe highest and more complex cognitive processes in the field of symbolic logic32. The Logic Theorist functions in the following manner. In the computer’s memory, a specific program is stored. The specific programs will interpret the specifications of The Logic Theorist. The authors affirm that this specific program can be considered as a set of already gathered and ordered techniques for discovering proofs. This set of techniques previously written in The Logic Theorist encompasses basic information on how to interpret and to write an expression in symbolic logic as well as on how to formulate general schemes in order to find a proof (ibid: 154). When this programming is done, the computer is set to perform a given task.

32

The authors note: “For those readers who are not familiar with symbolic logic, we may remark that problems in the sentential calculus are at about the same level of difficulty and have somewhat the same ‘flavor’ as problems in high school geometry” (NEWELL, SIMON, SHAW, 1958: 154).

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The computer is instructed to discover a proof for the entered expression. The given task and the pre-programing define the future behavior of the Logic Theorist. The Logic Theorist seeks to find a proof by searching and combining variants of the techniques previously given. It is programmed to select the more applicable of those techniques. If the Logic Theorist finds it and thereby solves the given problem, the result is printed on a “long strip of paper” (ibid: 155). There is, however, no guarantee that the program will find a solution to the given problem. If not, the computer disengages and stops processing. There have been three major experiments with the Logic Theorist. The first experiment was performed by storing the axioms of Principia Mathematica of Alfred North Whitehead into the computer’s memory. The Logic Theorist has been given 52 theorems from the Principia and set the machine to solve them. The Logic Theorist searched in its databanks for the previously programmed technical knowledge on how to furnish a proof to the theorems. 38 of these problems have been solved at different rates of time. Some required less than a minute, while some required over 45 minutes. In the second experiment, the Logic Theorist was reset to its initial conditions. The results obtained in the previous experiment have been removed. With this specific step, the aim of the researchers was to test the behavior of a new subject “who know how to solve problems in logic”, remembering that the Logic Theorist had been pre-programmed with all basic knowledge of symbolic logic required to perform any of such operations, “but was unfamiliar with the particular problem to be used in the experiment” (ibid). For the next experiment, the Logic Theorist was given data for a particular theorem of the Principia, which has been stored in its memory prior to the task. The task of this third experiment required from the Logic Theorist the solution of another theorem of the Principia, which had a higher degree of difficulty. Being previously given the data of a previous theorem, the Logic Theorist could find the proof for the more complex theorem by using information previously given. Although the proof could be given in fifteen minutes, the Logic Theorist sought to combine the given data and, searching for alternatives, discovered a logical path to present the proof of it. These three experiments rendered important results for information processing theory using computer simulations. It has been proven that the computer program, which runs symbolic logical protocols, is able to search for and to find out proofs for required theorems. The researchers concluded then that a computer program such as the Logic Theorist could be used as a simulator for human problem solving behavior. The idea behind it is that “its program incorporates a sufficient set of elementary processes arranged in a sufficient effective strategy to produce this result” (ibid). It is important to note that similar functioning does

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not necessarily imply a similar process, that is, the program running on a computer and the mental abilities of a human problem solver do not share similar information processing features. Still, the aim of the researchers was to show that specifying […] a set of mechanisms sufficient to produce observed behavior is strong confirmatory evidence for the theory embodying these mechanisms, especially when it is contrasted with theories that cannot establish their sufficiency. (ibid: 155-156)

That is to say, by replicating some specific sets of results in the form of observable behavior, which is obtained by the input of certain programmed process, these tests in the field of information processing theory were able to confirm inductively the empirical tests made in laboratory regarding human problem solving behavior. The second, and perhaps the most important fact regarding the concept of discovery in light of information processing theory, is that the Logic Theorist’s functioning and the rate of success in solving these problems are highly dependent upon the chronological order of presented problems. Considering that the more elementary theorems will appear first, enabling thus a progressive development of complexity, it becomes clear that by skipping some important developments, the Logical Theorist may not have the adequate input to work with when faced with more complex theorems. These experiments, especially the third one, revealed an important detail as well: the idea of “discovery” encompasses notion of a “hint”, or of some basic information that, whenever it appears, may help solve the problem. The second experiment has shown that without further basic information, the program could not solve a certain specific theorem. But the third attempt, because the computer’s operative memory had been programed with the result of a previous theorem of the Principia, the Logic Theorist, in its search for combinatorial solutions, used this pre-programed information as a stepping-stone for the solution of a more complex theorem. This is important because this experiential result points to certain cognitive process that does occur in the human mind but are hitherto widely ignored as hard evidence. I mean here the cognitive process that really leads to a discovery. The experiment with the Logic Theorist revealed that a previously given “hint” may enable the computer to perform a task of higher complexity. As stated before, the process of the computer simulates certain conditions in which the behavior of a problem solver can be explained. The program can be represented by a previous cognitive process already stored in the memory of a human problem solver. It may also represent the moment in which, by certain heuristic principles, this information is ad-

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duced in the mind and appears as relevant and useful data to help to solve the task at hand. Following this line of thought, one can ask if the computer program could perform creative operations. And if it could, to what extent? It is important to recall that the simulations of problem solving behavior with digital computers seek to establish the truth of a psychological theory for behavior and cognition. As such there are limitations related to the scope of heuristic thinking. It is, however, important to point out that the empirical evidence suggests traces of a vicarious trial and error processing that lead to a “sudden” solution “in the sense of employing heuristics to keep the total trial and error within reasonable bounds” (ibid: 162). The example of the experiments performed with digital computer, in which the program of the Logic Theorist has been operated, helped to define the theoretical position of information processing as a major line of inquiry for problem solving in general, including creative problem solving. The main theories emerging from these early computational experiments that describe and analyze human problem solving behavior can be summarized in the following manner. In a certain environment, there is a given problem space. The problem space is comprised of knowledge states. Some of these knowledge states may represent the solutions to the problem. In order to search for the right solutions, there must be a generative process, also called operations in this context, which will enable the problem solver to acquire knowledge states as a starting point – or as input to the system. By processing it, the aim is to produce new knowledge states as an outcome of the process, or, as it is here called, as output. Stated otherwise, the problem space is transformed in the course of the events that characterize the search for a solution within a given problem solving process. The knowledge states that compose the problem space are articulated and serve as “stepping-stones” to discover the more adequate solution for the problem. One of these knowledge states is the triggering input and the other subsequent ones are then articulated in the process. Here, a series of test procedures will occur, and knowledge stages will be compared with specifications of the solution state. The test procedures also compare different knowledge states and seek for differences in them. All these processes provide data that enable the problem solver to decide, first, what kind of generative tests can be properly employed, and, second, which test procedures are required to be undertaken. The latter is based on the available information contained in the knowledge states of a problem space (cf. NEWELL, SIMON, SHAW, 1962: 63-75; cf. ROWE, 1987: 52-53). I have chosen to explore the cognitive model proposed by information processing theory in a rather detailed manner, for it has had a visible and significant impact upon the consideration of design process as well as upon the considera-

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tion of methods devised to be directly employed in design disciplines, with special emphasis on problem solving behavior and the conception of creativity.33 The general notion drawn from information processing theory that I could present here provides important information regarding the further development of rigid stage models that were pursued by design disciplines in general. Understanding this specific psychological cognitive model helps to investigate in what sense the concepts of creativity, novelty, invention, and discovery in the realm of design disciplines, as far as they have been influenced by this psychological model, have been articulated and deployed. Although the cognitive model drawn from information processing theory mitigates the hard, deterministic stratification and fixation of stage models of the early twentieth century, the cognitive model just presented poses a strict rigidity. Furthermore, the very act of invention, of discovering, the act of creative serendipity leading to a novelty is, according to this position, only partially accounted for as being composed of combinations of parts of previously available information and as stochastic processes that lead to further combinations. This proposal does propel the investigation on stochastic systems studied through the perspective of information processing theory, such as artificial intelligence. But this position cannot explain the qualitative growth of ideas observable in the varied design disciplines other than by the increase of random variables and its combinations. Reassessing Design Process after Information Processing Herbert Simon, in his groundbreaking book The Sciences of the Artificial, proposed to expand the boundaries of design theory by claiming that design is a science that produces the “artificial”. Artificial means, in this context, contrary to the more widespread notions of unreal, counterfeit, or bogus, something that can produce intelligently a system capable of producing new forms of behavior based on the system’s adaptability by bearing certain goals, or functional purposes. According to Herbert Simon, design is characterized by its futureorientedness that envisages and devises future realities not yet embodied. He suggests that, through the action of design, adaptive systems can be proposed, whose main characteristics are their competence of triggering purposive actions

33

A technical presentation of the subject of information processing theory in its full breadth, taking into account the majority of its proponents, and understanding the consequences of this vast field of psychological inquiry, is beyond the scope of the proposed discussion of this work.

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and becoming molded by an outer environment by dialectically reforming their inner environment to meet the requisites of the outer environment. An example of this could be presented in the form of the project of an aircraft. The so-called outer environment is the atmosphere with all of its variables and possibilities and the inner environment is the proposed structures for the aircraft. The latter must be in a certain dialectic relation and must respond to the demands of the former. Thus, design as a general discipline of the artificial produces adaptive-operative systems that can optimize its functionalities through its abilities of conforming itself and, consequently, its functioning to the outer environment. Since it was first released in 1969, Simon’s proposition of design as the science of the artificial has been an important textbook for inquires in a variety of fields, such as information processing theory and correlated areas of psychology that investigate human cognition, as well as the – then embryonic – field of artificial intelligence. As Herbert Simon states: The artificial world is centered precisely on this interface between the inner and outer environments; it is conceived with attaining goals by adapting the former to the latter. The proper study of those who are concerned with the artificial is the way in which that adaptation of means to environment is brought about – and central to design process itself. (SIMON, 1996: 113)

In this context, a theory of design should aim at broadening specific processes of inquiry upon projective action gathering for that purpose, the help from computer processing as well as referring to the fields of operations research and artificial intelligence. Design is, in this sense, tasked with the development of artifacts to attain goals, for, generally speaking, the aim of design is to discover how things ought to be (cf. ibid: 114). For the purpose of developing an articulated theory of design that accounts for all disciplines in which design is operative, it is necessary, according to Simon, to find out what kind of logic designers make use of while engaged in a given design process. He states: We are importing and exporting from one intellectual discipline to another ideas about how a serially organized information-processing system like a human being – or a computer, or a complex of men and women and computers in organized cooperation – solves problems and achieves goals in outer environments of great complexity. (SIMON, 1996: 138)

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It is necessary to understand this specific logic, and, for that, it is necessary to somehow observe, or for that matter simulate, the behavior of designers “when they are being careful with their reasoning” (cf. ibid: 115). With the aim of improving upon the inferential and logical use on the part of designers, Herbert Simon also suggests that design’s practice should be put closer to the specific domain of optimization methods, which is an area already developed in the fields of statistical theory and management science. These areas could contribute by applying the rigor and methods drawn from theories of probability and utility. In this sense, and in accordance with Herbert Simon’s theoretical framework of information processing theory related to the science of the artificial, that is, to his conception of design science, design activity should be guided by a form of declarative logic, also known as declarative programming or programming paradigm. Drawing from the results of his research in the field of simulation of problem solving behavior of the late 1950s, Simon proposes to frame a given design problem as the functions in declarative logic. Generally stated, the paradigm of declarative logic supposes a given “programming” of the design activity, describing hereby what and how the processing should be carried out. This programming should be written with a language close to logico-mathematical expressions. When applying the notion of optimization of cognitive processes to the field of design activity and articulating it with declarative logic, the design problem becomes representable in the form of mathematical variables in distinct domains. Here, outer environment, which is one of the parameters of Simon’s theory of the artificial, becomes representable by a given set of parameters. These are either definite or only ascertained through probabilities. The inner environment is represented by a set of alternatives for taking a specific action. Following Simon’s conception of adaptability of systems, in this specific context of using declarative logic to simulate a certain cognitive process while engaging in a given design process, the coefficient between outer and inner environments – especially the adaptability of the inner relative to the outer environment – is given by a certain utility function involving certain parameters complemented by a determinate number of constraints. The theoretical approach of optimization methods furnishes the design system with the basic operational elements to solve a systemic problem. In this case, the operation of maximizing a given function is articulated by employing deductive inferences that draw conclusions from the parameters when related to their specific set of constraints. The method of optimization works well when the design problem is fairly known and can be formalized as parameters related to the inner environment,

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which will need to adapt according to the nature of the outer environment. However, a major difficulty arises when the so-called problem is diffuse, being only fragmentarily known – or sometimes not identifiable at all. The major critique that has been levied at the so-called first generation of design methods and operations research concerned precisely the naïve understanding of the concept of design problem. In the first generation, the proponents would simply state that the problem should be simply “understood” as it was described with the first stage of “preparation”. However, this definite form of a problem is, in most cases, not available and the problem must be, first of all, pieced together through a painstaking research process. The second generation of design methods and operations research was generally better equipped to treat this kind of cognitive issue involving complex structures. In this sense, information processing theory presented design theoreticians with this specific framework to develop a more powerful basis to deal with the matter of diffuse or vague problem situations. In the specific fields of design disciplines, there are three major definitions of problems. The first one is the well-defined problem. These are problems whose parameters are distinct and clear. Solving these problems would only require that the parameters of the problem be fulfilled with the appropriate means of overcoming it (cf. ROWE, 1987: 40; cf. RITTEL, 1972: 392). The second class of problems is the so-called ill-defined problems. This class of problem lacks definition of both ends and means. To arrive at a solution to the problem, one engaged in the process of solving it must define and reframe the problem several times in order to piece its parameters together and have a better picture of the available fragments. Moreover, these parameters may change within the design process because new parameters may appear that will influence the further development of the current stage of design process. As Rowe states to exemplify ill-defined problems, “most architecture and urban design problems are of this type” (ROWE, 1987: 40). And the third form of design problem is the socalled wicked problem. The difficulty presented by this problem – which amounts for the vast majority of design problems – is that there is neither certainty regarding a definition nor for a sufficient formulation of it. Solving a problem like this demands constant reformulations and reframings throughout the design process. The vague and undefined character of this type of design problem can produce many more variables than the design process can handle. Finding a solution in this kind of environment is a difficult task that requires a different approach. In order to tackle this difficulty, one must engage in a research process in order to be able to formulate a problem in an effective manner, so any form of design process is possible. Proposing alternatives while developing the design process is one of the possible courses of action while working with wicked prob-

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lems. Herbert Simon coined a term to represent this kind of alternative-finding process. A “satisficing” property should define the alternative devised to satisfy some discovered parameter of the design problem in question (cf. SIMON, 1969: 69). Without venturing too far in the realm of design process in light of information processing theory and probabilities, I will focus on one type of strategy for design process that became predominant, given that it became largely documented throughout the literature of design disciplines. The strategy here is called “generate-and-test procedure”. Within this strategy, the designer seeks to find a solution to a problem by employing the method of trial-and-error, that is, by randomly performing specific chosen actions and gathering the results obtained from these trials. These results will then guide subsequent procedures of testing. The main idea here is to generate enough tests and to be able to define parts of the problem that can be, at this point of the design process, dealt with. In so doing, the designer has systematically generated a specific set of alternative decision rules with which distinct forms of problem solving situations can be met. This specific process, which is also referred to as “means-ends analysis”, comprises three components. First, it is necessary to devise a prescribed set of actions; second, it is necessary to define a prescribed set of goals; and third, it is necessary to have devised a set of specific decision rules. This strategy demands that ends, the set of goals, and means, the set of actions, as well as the analytical framework, should be devised by the decision rules, which connect means and ends together (cf. ROWE, 1987: 61-62). According to Herbert Simon, the proposal for a science of design should be subdivided in seven major topics that cover certain stages of the process. The starting point should be a form of evaluative strategy, which would comprise analysis of the situation presented with the help of optimization strategies to suggest distinct courses of action. After this stage has been performed, the second main stage of generating alternatives commences. Here is important to note that the term heuristics is used for both activities: for searching for alternatives and for the factorization within the method of means-ends-analysis. The term heuristics, as it is used here in the context of information processing theory, and in particular in the context of Herbert Simon’s theory of design, refers to a process of problem solving that is characterized by its vagueness, that is, the process may or may not yield the solution sought. This specific problem solving process must involve special mechanisms for discovering correlations and fragments of the problem situation, since there is no guarantee of finding a solution until sufficient steps have been carried out. But the idea of discovery here is the idea of probabilistic and random variability between sets of information jostled

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together in a given information process. Heuristics has been thematized, but it is not yet an acknowledged method for proposing discovery. It relates paradoxically much more to stochastic procedures involving random bits and pieces of information than to the inferential realm of design process. As Peter Rowe affirms, “heuristic reasoning is part and parcel of most solution generation strategies, [and it] may be characteristic of an individual problem solver, and guides the overall organization of search through a problem space” (ROWE, 1987: 75). The following scheme exemplifies Herbert Simon’s proposal for a theory of design in seven functional topics (cf. Simon, 1996: 134)34. THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS 1. Theory of Evaluation: utility theory, statistical decision theory 2. Computational Methods: a. Algorithms for choosing optimal alternatives such as linear programming computations, control theory, dynamic programming b. Algorithms and heuristics for choosing satisfactory35 alternatives

34

Following the tradition of design thinking and rigid stage models for solving creative problem, the proponents of the contemporary “design thinking method” proposed that despite the differences in the number of stages to be followed in order to come up with a solution, there is basically no difference between different systems. This statement is, however, false. As mentioned above, there have been differences in principles between rigid stage models based mainly on behaviorist methods and rigid stage models based on information processing theory. Despite terminological similarities, the principles can be very different as to involve, in the case of Herbert Simon’s theory, declarative logic and principles of programming to reconsider the structure of wicked problems. In order to avoid theoretical confusions, it is necessary to know the basic framework of each one of the rigid stage models of problem solving. The passage proposing the undifferentiated similarity is the following. “In der Literatur wird der Design-Thinking-Prozess manchmal nur in drei Schritte zerlegt: Beobachten, Brainstorming und Prototyping, [...], oder auch in sieben Schritte, wie beispielsweise bei Herbert Simon. Dabei gibt es kaum prinzipielle Unterschiede, sondern nur unterschiedliche Beschreibungen hinsichtlich des Gesamtprozesses” (PLATTNER, MEINEL, WEINBERG, 2009: 113).

35

As already mentioned, in the first edition of the book The Sciences of the Artificial published in 1969, Herbert Simon coined the word satisficing instead of satisfying probably as a manner to indicate the necessity of seeking for alternatives of solving the problem while constantly reframing the design problem, since it is rarely presented in a well-defined form.

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3. THE FORMAL LOGIC OF DESIGN: imperative and declarative logics THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 4. Heuristic search: factorization and means-ends-analysis 5. Allocations of resources of search 6. THEORY OF STRUCTURE AND DESIGN ORGANIZATION: hierarchic systems 7. REPRESENTATION OF DESIGN PROBLEMS Inveterate Rigidity Despite the scientific departure of experiments with groundbreaking principles and also despite the openness towards a fresh start while considering the linkage between cognitive operations – especially the ones which demand original thinking and innovative sets of decisions that need to be made in certain situations and the respective courses of action – the cognitive models stemming from the purview of information processing theories are still rather limited concerning serendipitous processes and the inherent forms of inferences and states of mind accompanying these inferences. Furthermore, despite the departure from the hard dualism of behavioristic models, cognitive models based upon information processing theories still demand a direct or a more direct observation of sets of behavior within a definite situation in order to properly study the possible cognitive state that has triggered the sets of behavior in question. Therefore, the model is still limited to sets of observations and conclusions within a definite and rather simple frame of laboratory experiments. The understanding of design process in this perspective is still operational in the sense that stages, boxes, and linkages between behavior and states of mind are understood rather as stage-like events. The predominant view of rigid stage models for creativity and problem solving behavior is like an observer who peers through a crack in a wooden fence to observe some cats walking by on the other side of the fence. Because the line of sight is very narrow, the observer is able to see, at first, whiskers, which are then followed by tails. Seeing that tails always follow whiskers, the conclusion of the observer is that whiskers causes tails. This anecdote stems from Alan Watts’ 1973 book On the Taboo Against Knowing Who you Are (WATTS, 1973: 72). In this book, Watts criticizes exactly this narrowness with which psychological phenomena are treated and how conclusions are obtained. Watts argues that this distinction between atomistic stimulus and response or reaction is still a paradigmatic form of viewing and explaining phenomena by applying mechanical laws – something like Newton’s billiards – to deal with processes that are much

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more complex than any mechanic description. This narrowed view cannot cope with the dynamics of mental phenomena or with more spontaneous processes. Which specific mental process leads to discovery, creation, invention, problem solving, and pervades the unfolding of design process is, in the light of the rigid stage models, neither explained nor further developed. These rigid stage models reveal themselves as extremely atomistic and deterministic in the consideration of key functions, which remain without a proper treatment or a proper explanation of the synthesis. The methods proposed by information processing theory, despite its advancements in comparison with models originated from the Gestalt psychology and from behaviorism, are still inapt to cover the very issue of invention and discovery at a more fundamental level of operations of the mind. Fig. 2.2: A diagram exhibiting a scheme based on the cognitive functioning of human mind according to the mainstream of information processing theory.

Knowledge

Motivation

Procedural

Intrinsic

Declarative

Extrinsic

Problem Finding

Ideation

Evaluation

Here is possible to perceive the still predominant rigidity of the model (Fig. 2.2). Not as rigid as the early ones, the model based on information processing theory still categorizes the cognitive functioning of the mind while the mind performs some creative operation. In the diagram, it is possible to see the segmentation between mental processes of problem finding, ideation, and evaluation. Above these main activities, there are subdivisions indicating knowledge and motivation. The former are important components that will interact, and in the case of creative thinking, will influence the production of a new idea. The diagram also shows the flow of relations established between these items. But in this context, these cognitive components and processes are taken for granted as the functioning of the mind (cf. RUNCO, CHAND, 1995: 244-245). The assessment of heuristics

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in the light of information processing theory has enabled a better understanding of certain aspects of the dynamics of creative thought, decision-making, habit formation, and problem solving skills from a psychological perspective. However, heuristics, if considered only through this scope, remains an auxiliary tool set, often being considered from a more metaphorical or analogical standpoint. Heuristics, therefore, has not yet been considered through a more theoretical scope. Better understood than simply “rules of thumb”, heuristics is still a collection of techniques and methods applicable in concrete fields where a breakthrough is required. It is articulated in the hope that it will render a problem situation solvable by enabling the discovery of certain characteristics, from which a new solution can be developed. Despite significative advances in cognitive research that have been made possible by the information processing theory, the conception of heuristics is still seen from the perspective of experimental psychology. And through this perspective, a proper hypothesis, which not only justifies but also explains the process of synthesis within creative processes has not yet been proposed. Finally, it is important to revisit the research question guiding this work: what is the logic at work in design process? Certainly, it is not a logic imposed from a subject’s particular way of thinking based on psychological-cognitive models. There is a more fundamental logic that underlies every form of psychological inquiries, but it is independent of a particular way of human thinking. By asking the question “what is the logic within design process?”, this research proposes to go beyond psychological models that formalize and conceptualize the type of thinking that should take place in someone’s mind. The question about the logic of design process requires, in this sense, a wider look within the processes considering, while contemplating it, what this specific dynamic that invades the mind is – not a psychological one, but any potential mind able to perceive, to interpret signs, and to interact with the logic of events taking place and revealing itself to the perceiving minds. The vivid phenomena force the mind to perceive them as they offer themselves to this mind, bringing with them their modes of appearing, offering thereby to the mind their modes of connection and of arrangement, and, in doing so, these phenomena force the perceiving mind to interact with them. In what follows, I will approach the matter in light of Peirce’s semiotics, arguing that design process, rather than a stage-like process in which deductive cognitive processes are predominant, can be characterized as a continuous process, a flowing stream type of process, and can involve much more serendipitous and spontaneous processes than traditionally considered.

PART THREE A Detailed Account of Semiotics From the Pastiche of Sign Theories to a Clarified Processuality of Design Process in Light of Charles S. Peirce’s Semiotics

A Problematic Tradition Sign Theories in the Context of Design Process

A PLETHORA OF SIGN SYSTEMS In order to fully appreciate the importance of Peirce’s semiotics for the discussion of this work, it is necessary to present a detailed account of the philosophical discipline semiotics within the context of his system of philosophy. Peirce’s semiotics, his logic, is not a science derived from specific language studies, nor is it a science of signs of a cognitive-psychological kind. It is a philosophical discipline, or, as Peirce calls it, a normative science that operates within a dynamic, ever-growing, philosophical theory of knowledge. But before I present a detailed account of the theoretical and philosophical background of Peirce’s semiotics, I will first address some issues closely related to the traditional understanding of semiotics as applied to design process. One aspect that made semiotic and semiological systems so attractive to be used as a theoretical background in order to explain and study design process in general was their potential to grasp certain sign articulations within the processuality of projective activities. The possibility of understanding these multilayered articulations of structural elements intrinsic to each language promised to unveil the inner core of structures and processes that could not be otherwise described. Myriad sign systems are based upon different theoretical backgrounds, each exhibiting a more or less specific framework regarding their functioning as analytical systems. All of these systems, despite their differences and idiosyncrasies, are capable of surveying many aspects of “communication and information exchange among human beings, animals, plants, internal systems of organism, and machines”, as Roland Posner points out (cf. POSNER, 1987: ix). Therefore, bringing certain theories of signs, semiologies, and semiotics to bear to analyze certain aspects of design process is by now no novelty. There is, in fact, a long tradition of sign theories being used and employed as theoretical frameworks, as well as methods in the fields of architecture, design, and the arts,

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for instance. This traditional point of view is, however, a rather problematic one and several issues arise, such as the theoretical fragility generated by the constant admixtures of theories. In this context, Peirce’s semiotics has been mixed with other sign systems, as well as with other theories derived, for example, from hermeneutics, cognitive sciences, and semiotical behaviorism. This has provoked a great deal of skepticism regarding the legitimacy of semiotic and semiological currents as theoretical bases. One of my particular objectives in the present section of the book is to present and examine the most significative and influential sign theories in order to be able to dismiss equivocal notions that accompany the employment of theories of semiotics and semiologies in the field of design process. It is widely known that the broad application of mixed sign theories, that is, when these theories are mixed within themselves, combined with the tendency of extending them to areas of knowledge they may only inaptly cover, has caused serious skepticism regarding the continued use of sign theories. A particular difficulty directly involves Peirce’s semiotics. Because his semiotics is a very flexible and versatile theory of signs, it has found its way into processual, non-verbal fields of knowledge. However, since Peirce himself did not systematize his philosophy, having left behind only manuscripts that would be examined and organized by future generations, his theory of semiotics, before it can be applied to a certain field of knowledge, must first be reconstructed from the manuscripts and systematized in a consistent manner. Parts of his semiotics, such as the wellknown sign typology, have been separated from a more global philosophical context, mixed with other sign theories, and then reinterpreted more locally according to current theoretical and methodological needs at hand. Indeed, these fragmentations have given rise to misunderstandings, distortions, and, in many cases, to the ultimate dismissal of Peirce’s semiotics as a valuable sign theory. I would like to emphasize that I do not intend, in this chapter, to make a complete exegesis of the themes of structuralism, of structural linguistics, of semiology, and of behavioral semiotics. My aim here is to better define the most characteristic paradigms of structural linguistics, of semiology, and of other models of semiotics. Furthermore, the study presented in this chapter does not by any means intend to ignore the heuristic potentialities of structural linguistics and semiology, nor of other sign theories. Therefore, a more complete account of structural semiology and linguistics, as well as behavioral semiotics, will not be presented in this text, as it would go beyond the scope of the book.

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An Overview of the Most Influential Sign Theories I will here briefly present the most characteristic and influential aspects of structural linguistics and semiology as they have developed and expanded to be applied methodologically in other fields of knowledge as well as in the cultural and artistic realms. Although these theories will not be further articulated in the book, it is valuable to observe their main theoretical characteristics, so as to differentiate them from Peircean semiotics, which is the focus of this work. Here, I will give special emphasis to presenting the main paradigms of these specific structuralist systems, as well as the main paradigm of Morris’ behavioral semiotics and the accounts derived from them, so as to pinpoint the principal differences between these systems and Peirce’s semiotics. I hope, with a systematic presentation of some of the most influential sign systems that have been employed to study design process, to clear up some of the confusion caused by the mixing of these systems. To begin with, I will present the development of structural linguistics and the subsequent semiological background formulated in the early twentieth century by Ferdinand de Saussure. For the purpose of clarifying the differences between the defining paradigms of structural linguistics and semiology from the paradigms of Peirce’s philosophical semiotics, which will be fully developed later in this third part, I will propose a more detailed analysis of the basic conceptions of linguistics, structural semiology, and also of the paradigm of structuralism. My intention here is to provide a scaffolding for these theories in order to demonstrate their scope and the context for which they were meant to be employed. In addition to the semiological research initiated by Saussure, it is also important also to consider the semiological and semiotical contributions of Roman Jakobson and Charles Morris. They played a key role in the development of the semiotic tradition related to design process, even if the thinkers themselves did not write about design process directly, as did Roland Barthes. Max Bense, for instance, brought the pragmatic-behaviorist ideas of Charles Morris into the discussion about design process as a theoretical framework. And Roman Jakobson, because of his general theory of communication, has contributed significantly to the fields of communication, architecture, arts, and especially to esthetic processes and the poetic function of language. Ferdinand de Saussure and a Plan for a Semiology Commensurate with literature on sign-theories, Ferdinand de Saussure formulated the basis for what would be modern structuralist linguistics. In the posthumously published work Cours de Linguistique Générale which was based on a

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series of lectures delivered at the University of Geneva between 1907 and 1911, and edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, Saussure proposes a general science of language, which he was ultimately never able to finish or completely formalize (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 71). This science of language, a theory of signs, was to be developed as a future project. He used the name “semiology” as the study of the “semeion”, or sign, in its capacity to convey a certain intelligible meaning within a certain system of language. Saussure defended the idea that language (langue) is a highly organized system of signs used to express ideas (cf. SAUSSURE, 2013: 82). According to Saussure, semiology should be the foundation of a general theory of signs that studies the life of signs within social spaces (SAUSSURE, 2013: 84; cf. NÖTH, 2000: 72; cf. KRAMPEN, 1981: 63). As such, he imagined that the science of semiology was a definite and specific science of language and of sign function within language systems. Moreover, he laid the basis for a linguistic model of language organization36 which, he hoped, could be articulated in a more general way in semiology. According to Winfried Nöth (2000: 73), Saussure thus intended to apply the characteristic model of linguistics, which was far more developed at the time, to the newly conceived and as yet undefined science of structural semiology. Saussure also appreciated the fact that linguistics is a specialized science that studies language as a sign system. Language, for him, was unquestionably an integral element of semiological investigation. Given the fact that language is but one type of sign system among many others, semiology should be a general branch that encompasses linguistics. As Saussure stated: On peut donc concevoir une science qui étudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale; elle formerait une partie de la psychologie sociale, et par conséquent de la psychologie générale; nous la nommerons sémiologie (du grec sēmeĩon, « signe »). Elle nous apprendrait en quoi consistent les signes, quelles lois les régissent. Puisqu’elle n’existe pas encore, on ne peut dire qu’elle sera; mais elle a droit à l’existence, sa place est déterminée d’avance. La linguistique n’est qu’une partie de cette science générale, les lois que découvrira la sémiologie seront applicables à la linguistique, et celle-ci se trouvera ainsi rattachée à un domaine bien défini dans l’ensemble des faits humains. (SAUSSURE, 2013: 84. Italics are mine)

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Saussure states his idea for his science of linguistics, which would lay the primary foundations of semiology, in the following manner: “La matière de la linguistique est constituée d’abord par toutes les manifestations du langage humain, qu’il s’agisse des peuples sauvages ou des nations civilisées, des époques archaïques, classiques ou de décadence, en tenant compte, dans chaque période, non seulement du langage correct et du « bon langage », mais de tous les formes d’expression” (SAUSSURE, 2013: 68).

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However, considering the degree of codification and specialization of linguistics, and because this groundwork could be extended to other codified sign systems, it has become a widespread notion of semiology that language is the absolute center of sign systems and, per extension, that semiology is the science of organized and codified sign systems (cf. SAUSSURE, 2013: 83). Nöth stresses three important points that placed semiology closer to structural linguistics. The first point is the general agreement claiming that language is the most important and characteristically more developed among sign systems. The second point, which is supported by scientific development in the field, proposes that linguistics, because it is the most developed of all sign systems, furnishes the newly conceived science of semiology with its acquired theoretical principles. And the third argument proposes that language is the most able of the sign systems to render the nature of the semiological sign system understandable. Therefore, linguistics receives most attention as a fully functional science of codified sign systems that, subsequently, can effectively explain the raison d’être of the newly formulated semiology, even if the principles of semiology were more general than those of linguistics (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 73). Saussure formulates his semiology in the following manner: Quand la sémiologie sera organisée, elle devra se demander si les modes d’expression qui reposent des signes entièrement naturels – comme la pantomime – lui reviennent de droit. En supposant qu’elle les accueille, son principal objet n’en sera pas moins l’ensemble des systèmes fondés sur l’arbitraire du signe. En effet tout moyen d’expression reçu dans une société repose en principe sur une habitude collective, ou ce qui revient au même, sur la convention. […] On peut donc dire que les signes entièrement arbitraires réalisent mieux que les autres l’idéal du procédé sémiologique; c’est pourquoi la langue, le plus complexe et le plus répandu des systèmes d’expression, est aussi le plus caractéristique de tous ; en ce sens la linguistique peut devenir le patron général de toute sémiologie, bien que la langue ne soit qu’un système particulier. (SAUSSURE, 2013 : 172)

But since Saussure based his semiology upon the foundations of the more specialized science of linguistics – even if this should be understood as provisional – it is no surprise that his sign system became synonymous with language systems. Saussure’s proposal for a more general theory of signs can, however, be applied to study other forms of languages, not only verbal, but also visual and musical languages. Still, Saussure’s semiology is highly specific to languages as sign systems and deals with codified language articulation, language here understood as a language system. As such, semiology is able to tackle sign processes and semiological operations of meaning in the realm of visual language, for instance, pro-

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vided, however, that the sign system being studied by semiology is in some measure codified. Within a system, signs function as signs only by virtue of their specific, distinctive characters and functions as components of a system (KRAMPEN, 1981: 65). Saussure’s semiological model is based upon a dualistic notion of sign, or, as he affirms, upon a “dual psychological entity”. This psychological entity consists in the sign, which Saussure calls signifier, and an “idea”, which he calls the signified, that is, the meaning of the sign (SAUSSURE, 2013: 168, NÖTH 2000: 74, KRAMPEN, 1981: 65). Language, or better stated, language system, is hereby understood as an abstract sign system “at the basis of concrete expression” (KRAMPEN, 1981: 64). It is articulated in the manner in which language signs will be produced in the consciousness of the subject as associations between acoustic images of received exterior sounds and the codified concept, that is, the mental images, mentally produced signs, of whatever is denoted by the perceived sound. Fig. 3.1: Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept of sign.

Concept Image acoustique

In his essay “Ferdinand de Saussure and the Development of Semiology”, Martin Krampen suggests that the dyadic dynamic between “the images of speech sounds, the signifying part (signifier), and meaning, (signified), form an indivisible unity”, which is called “the sign” (cf. KRAMPEN, 1981: 65). This aspect already suggests the principal derivative issue that characterizes the term “structural” and will later become the methodological foundation of “structuralism”. “Structural”, related to linguistics, means the scaffold of semiology based on structural linguistics, which implies the methodological investigation of languages that have expression as sign systems. Structuralism also means the expansion of methods of linguistics and its aprioristic application into more general and perhaps less codified realms of non-linguistic signs, as well as into broader semiological sign systems not necessarily compatible with the fundament of linguistics. Although Saussure’s general semiology in his Cours de Linguistique Générale has been only indicated, but not thoroughly formulated, as Winfried Nöth (2000: 77) points out, the subsequent development of his ideas contributed to the de-

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velopment of new research in the field of linguistics, semiology, and semiotics. His theoretical insights and observations regarding sign systems and language systems also found their way into respective investigations in the areas of sign systems, theories of communication, as well as into systems of communication, in which the systemic character of sign articulation and sign systems have a special emphasis. Louis Hjelmslev and Glossematics: Expanding Structural Linguistics to a General Structural Semiotics Using Saussure’s ideas as a springboard, many theoreticians from the field of language as well as from semiology took his lead and continued research into structuralism. One of them was Louis Hjelmslev, a Danish linguist, who set out to improve upon Saussure’s earlier theory. Based on the theoretical framework of structural linguistics, Hjelmslev developed his theory of “glossematics” – from the Greek γλῶσσα, (glóssa), that is, language – as an autonomous structural science of language, which should encompass not only linguistic systems, but also non-linguistic systems. Hjelmslev’s main hypothesis was to consider language as an absolute entity, that is to say, to account for language, first, as an absolute and self-sufficient language system, and secondly, to account for its independent structure as an independent field of research (cf. HJELMSLEV, 1968: 9). His glossematics is a programmatic theory circumscribing, in a coherent form, the notion of linguistics, which considers language systems and the linguistic fundament as a scientific field (cf. BARTH, 1974: ix). Hjelmslev’s ideas gave more depth to the early Saussurrean concepts especially in relation to the development of a consistent metalanguage, which contributes to the delimitation of linguistics as an object of study that is not to be relativized by descriptive language itself. This unity of the language system as an autonomous, complex system can provide a new theoretical basis for the development of sign theories that could overcome the stark duality imposed by structural linguistics (cf. HARRAS, 1974: xxiii). His most noted contribution was to have influenced other researchers in semiology, especially by developing an allencompassing concept of language that is not reduced solely to the domain of the verbal written. Hjelmslev tried to develop a general theory of linguistics by using Saussure’s theories as a starting point. However, he neither focused his efforts on the development of a linguistic science or “linguistic language”, nor on the development of a science to research the realm of “natural language”. He strove to develop “a science of signs, a science of general semiotic structure” (TRABANT, 1987: 90). Despite valuable insights, his concept of glossematics, given its complexity and difficulty, was not thoroughly developed, and, as a consequence, his

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major project of framing a general theory of structural semiotics was never accomplished. As Umberto Eco stated, Hjelmslev could have devised a complex and grand theoretical framework for contemporary semiology and linguistics. This general theory of structural semiotics could have been an autonomous, allencompassing theory of signs, as he had envisioned. But due to the fact that his theory was highly abstract, his examples taken from other semiological and semiotical theories too narrow, and his terminology impenetrable, his theory did not find resonance and was therefore not further pursued (cf. ECO, 1977: 41, cf. NÖTH, 2000: 78-79). Still, with his research and further development of structuralist linguistics and semiology, Hjelmslev has influenced several thinkers working on more general conceptions of sign systems and language systems. Christian Metz, for example, developed his semiological theories in the field of cinema based upon Hjelmslev’s expansion of structuralist conceptions. Hjelmslev also influenced prominent thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century such as Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco and Algirdas Julien Greimas. Discourse and Narrative: Algirdas Julien Greimas and Discourse Semiotics Based on the work of his predecessors, Saussure and Hjelmslev, Algirdas Julien Greimas developed his own version of semiotics, known as discourse semiotics. This was a formal structural semiotics of text and discourse, unfolding the meaning of a text while operating within a “narrative” context. This highly specific theory of signs was the point of departure for a new and original development of sign theory. According to the basic assumption of Greimas, textual semiotics accounts not only for general narrative structures, but also for all other forms of “texts” (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 112). This peculiar notion expands the conceptions of narrative and projects them from the fictional or narrative-textual fields into the realm of all representations of social and cultural fields. These fields are, according to Greimas, better understood if studied in light of “discourse semiotics” (ibid). Discourse semiotics is the definition of Greimas’ version of textual semiotics. This specialized semiotic theory is based on the concept that the basic methods of structural linguistics, of phonology, of semantics, and of syntax, could be superposed on the discourse elements at the level of “texts”. His definition of semiotics is also somewhat curious. Greimas uses the more general term “semiotics” with a very restricted function, and defines it as being mostly a “theory of meaning”. His concept of sign, although based upon structural linguistic principles, takes the form of a decomposition of semantic levels and seeks to analyze semantic components in a more formal way. After deconstructing these semantic unities through analysis, the semantic systems reveal subsystems of se-

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mantic unities denominated seme, which are not signs themselves, but only parts of signs within a textual context (ibid: 113). Greimas explains his theory of discourse semiotics as follows: Semiotic theory must be presented, first, for what it is, i.e., as a theory of signification. Its first concern, therefore, is to render explicit the conditions for the apprehension and production of meaning; this is to be done in the form of a conceptual construction. Thus, by being situated in the Saussurian and Hjemslevian tradition (according to which signification is the creation and/or apprehension of ‘differences’), it will have to bring together all those concepts that, while being themselves undefinable, are necessary in order to establish the definition of the elementary structure of signification. This conceptual explication then gives rise to a formal expression of the concepts retained by the theory. Considering structure as a network of relations, semiotic theory will have to formulate a semiotic axiomatics that will be presented essentially as a typology of relations (presuppositions, contradictions, etc.). This axiomatics will permit the constitution of a stock of formal definitions, such as, for example, semantic category (minimal unit) and semiotics itself (maximal unit). The latter includes, following Hjelmslev, the logical definitions of system (the ‘either ... or’ relation) and of process (‘both ... and’), or content and expression, of form and substance, etc. The next step consists in setting up a minimal formal language. (GREIMAS, 1982: 292)

Greimas posits that language articulation is characterized by the operation of structural signs being articulated within a certain language system. Complementing the form of language articulation is the semantic operation that characterizes the substance of this articulation. Therefore, there are two results of the semiotical analysis. One is formal, regarding the analysis of the minimal units that constitute the sign, and the other is semantic, which he also denominates as substantial (cf. GREIMAS, 1971: 20-21). This structuralist stance revealed itself as astonishingly ambitious, though, for it tended to encompass and analyze the domain of human meaning, including the “immanent” and the “manifest” orders of separation and the micro and macro universes of human articulation (cf. DAVIS, 1984: 1212). The whole structuralist program was to account for a text’s “literariness”. It was a sort of grand and fascinating “semantic scaffolding” that was being proposed and Greimas was one of the representatives of the structuralism to implement it. Within the specific realm of his “discourse semiotics’, the structural view would account for several layers of signification hidden within the textual structure, which would afterward be made explicit. Taking for instance the “lexeme”, or “lexical item” head, as a minimal element, it is possible to connect it to several

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micro-contents, such as “head of department”, “head of a person”, “head of the line” (cf. GREIMAS, 1971: 20-21; cf. DAVIS, 1984: 1212). Sememes, a term Greimas used to define a special organization of semes – which are, in their turn, the minimal elements of meaning – constitute the aforementioned articulations of meaning. When the sememes are grouped into larger aggregates they form a special, more complex combination of lexical items denominated nuclear semes (cf. GREIMAS, 1971: 40-42). The contextual variants that formally restrain the structure throughout a text are denominated classemes (ibid: 42). Language, then, is conceived as being formed by minimal structures, which form more complex lexical structures and then semantical structures. The sememes form longer patterns, which Greimas denominates isotopies. Isotopies are sign or parts of signs throughout semantic levels that establish textual coherence (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 117). Greimas understands this coherence, or internal textual logic, in terms of an algorithm known as the “semiotic square” or “Greimas’ square”. Markedly structural and dichotomic, the analysis of meaning runs through the analysis of several binary structures with a focus on the various constitutive relationships (cf. GREIMAS, 1971: 157ff; DAVIS, 1984: 1212-1213). The deep structural character of the algorithm reveals, in the universe of discourse, lexical elements that do not have verbal correlations. By making use of this analytical method, it is possible to disclose deeper semantic levels, which were previously hidden in the text structure. These semantic levels are implicitly perceived, and were not, for the most part, able to be verbalized (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 117). After an analysis of semantic features, which includes an investigation into the grammar that supposedly exhausts the possibilities of narrative contents, a phase of studying the characteristic features of a given text follows (cf. DAVIS, 1984: 1213). The examination of internal textual coherence and homogeneity, which Greimas called isotopies, the text appears, then, as a meaningful whole of semic operations (cf. GREIMAS, 1971: 109; cf. NÖTH, 2000: 117-118; cf. DAVIS, 1984: 1213). The socalled “algorithm logic” of the analytic procedure governing the semantic movement between micro and macro levels of significance, involving semes and isotopies, requires these levels to display a certain constancy of meaning in order for the effects of meanings to be predicted. This, according to Greimas, guarantees the production of meaning. This perhaps exaggerated rationalist-structuralist view demands the whole analytical operation, therefore, to be a causal process, which results in a sort of a mechanical analysis within language operation. The latter would be understood in semantic terms as the result of causes that are formulable as semantic “rules” accompanied by lexical and transformational restraints (cf. DAVIS, 1984: 1213).

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Greimas’ theory of discourse semiotic is a useful instrument for studying the structure of textual constructions, with special emphasis on the iterative significations of signs. With this analytical procedure, the operations have the main characteristic of being repeatable, imitable, and, more importantly, isolated from temporal modifications. This means that the minimal structures need to have a constant, immutable meaning, as if there were no temporal disjunction or temporal modification. Umberto Eco criticizes the intricacies and the overly complex, sometimes unclear, terminology of Greimas’ semiotics, especially with respect to the temporal fixation of minimal elements. Eco says: Unfortunately, as soon as the semantic universals are reduced in number and made more comprehensive (of Greimas’ semic analysis using categories such as ‘verticality’) they become unable to mark the difference between different Sememes. And as soon as their number is augmented and their capacity for individuation grows, they become ad hoc definitions, like the distinguishers. The real problem is that every semantic unit used in order to analyse a sememe is in its turn a sememe to be analyzed. (ECO, 1979: 121)

Roland Barthes and a Broader Semiotic Application An important heir to Saussure’s structural linguistics and semiology, and to Hjelmslev’s glossematics was Roland Barthes. According to Winfried Nöth (2000: 71), around the year 1960, interest in structuralist linguistics, semiology, and semiotics was revitalized. Saussure’s approach to linguistics and the methods he devised to study languages became an attractive model for research into other cultural sign systems. These theoretical and methodological approaches have strongly influenced later linguistic and structural based sign systems, reaching into other fields of knowledge, including cultural, artistic, architectonic areas, as aforementioned. On the one hand structuralism was again en vogue, on the other hand, counter-movements started criticizing the long-held position of structuralism, which, as previously stated, implied the application of structural linguistics to practically every human realm. The counter-movement, known as poststructuralism, criticized structuralism’s basic assumption of a dualistic character transferred from a particular and specialized field of language structures to more dynamic realms. The structuralist framework forces the object of study to be considered from a dualistic point of view. In this case, in a sort of twofold epistemology, it means that for every object to which structural methods have been applied, there is a realm of signifiers and a realm of represented phenomena. During the 1960s, Roland Barthes contributed to studies of semiology and semiotics by expanding semiotic and semiological research to other fields, including visual communication, cinema, photography, and also fashion. Barthes

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expresses this intellectual transition in three distinct phases, which reflect his interest in different periods. In a publication entitled L’Aventure Sémiotique, Barthes analyzes his own interests, especially those which had motivated him to study semiology and semiotics more closely. The first phase was his enchantment with discourse. Here he made little use of linguistics and semiology and focused his attention on critics on ideology. For that purpose, Barthes worked in thematic fields such as mythology and literature. The second phase was marked by his interest in science and extensive studies in semiotics (cf. BARTHES, 1985: 10; cf. NÖTH, 2000: 107). In order to better understand the functioning of diverse sign systems, he studied the methods of linguistics and structural sign theories (cf. BARTHES, 1985: 11). Based upon the works of Hjelmslev and Greimas, Barthes extended “text” semiotics, such as semiology applied to cinema, as explored by Christian Metz. With regard to this extensive research in semiotics and semiology, Barthes affirms: [… ] dans sa phase scientifique, la sémiologie fut pour moi cette ivresse: je reconstituais, je bricolais (en donnant uns sens élevé à cette expression) des systèmes, des jeux. (BARTHES, 1985: 11)

The next phase of his intellectual production was concentrated on text semiotics, but he also continued to investigate photography, image, problems of visuality, and music. Nöth (2000: 107) affirms that Barthes began to systematically dissociate himself from some principles of structuralism as a general method, though he maintained a semiological approach. More specifically, with regard to semiology and sign systems, Barthes understood that everything that conveys some form of meaning becomes a sign. A group of signs may function as sign systems, even if there is no intention to communicate. Everything that acts as a sign or as a sign system thus attains, for Barthes, the status of language and is thus in the domain of semiological occurrences. This is an appropriation of an idea previously developed by Hjelmslev, that is, that of proposing an all-encompassing, general structural semiotics, which Barthes assimilated into his studies. As Martin Krampen notes, “a whole host of social practices suddenly became languages” (KRAMPEN, 1987: 80). Surprisingly, however, even having taken into account the sort of semantical amplitude that Barthes proposed, he overlooks Saussure’s original subordination of structural linguistics to semiology and states that “c’est la sémiologie qui est une partie de la linguistique” (BARTHES, 1964: 11; cf. BARTHES, 1967: 9; cf. KRAMPEN: 81). In so doing, Barthes attributes a general semiotic function to linguistics. Instead of conventional signs of communication within the defined

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scope of a linguistic sign system, Barthes tries to study, with the theoretical instruments of structural semiology, indices of sociological phenomena, such as, for example, manners of preparing food, clothing attire, styles of furniture, car models, and so on. As Krampen points out, Barthes is not interested in the specific communicational process within the linguistic field, but in the “social phenomenon presumably standing behind the signs” (KRAMPEN, 1987: 81). Even in his studies of cinema and photography, the focus of his attention is not the specific semiological investigation of communicational processes in these medias, but most probably what lies beyond the convention that can function as a sign of certain social patterns. The problem with this specific approach of Barthes is that these symptoms of social behavior become synonymous with conventional sign systems and language. As Krampen affirms, “a certain kind of food preparation becomes quickly a ‘language of the menu’ and finally a ‘rhetoric of the menu’, without any proof that a meal is actually (and regularly) a communicative message” (cf. ibid). A kind of “semiological inflation” takes place whereby every sign becomes a rhetorical aspect of social reality. Ultimately, the meaning of such a sign is regarded as a “fragment of ideology” and the signifier becomes “rhetoric”, both then being systematized through meta-language into a real system (cf. ibid: 80). In this particular view of semiology with an emphasis on the signification of indices, “one would have to demonstrate to begin with the systematic character of the indices of social circumstances. And even if such system could be found, the indices would not be that token become signs, i.e. signs of communication” (ibid: 81). Despite this semiological inflation, Roland Barthes’ semiological analyses in the cultural, literary, cinematographic, photographic and general visual areas, allowed a certain expansion of semiotic concepts and discourses that aided the understanding of how contemporary mediatic messages function and how phenomenological content can thereby be interpreted. Algirdas Julien Greimas understands this semiological and semiotical tendency by stating that “its methodological experience has made possible new reflections on the theory of signification and has opened the way to semiotics” (GREIMAS, 1982: 272). As was typical of the 1960s, the euphoria of structuralism, which was believed to be an all-encompassing theory of language and culture, along with the tendency to mix sign systems of different origins with each other, rendered the terms semiology and semiotics, structuralism and sign processes extremely opaque, mostly because of the amount of impenetrable, specialized terminologies, and unclear applications and boundaries. This not only resulted in the current hodge-podge of sign systems but also contributed to the actual prevailing skepticism toward the general idea of semiotics employed in other, more dynamic,

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contexts. Structuralist methods have been generally employed to study cultural phenomena at the level of significance and ideology on the one hand. On the other hand, however, it was clear that a narrowing of both the objects of study and the ambition of the project was required. As Greimas argues: […] the great illusion of the 1960s – i.e., the possibility of providing linguistics with the necessary means for an exhaustive analysis of the content plane of natural languages – had to be abandoned, since linguistics had gotten engaged, often without realizing it, in the extraordinary project of a complete description of all cultures, even embracing all of humanity. (GREIMAS, 1982: 273)

Logical Positivism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism: Charles Morris’ Behavioral Semiotics Charles Morris’ behavioral sign theory, which is characterized by its syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions, was an important basis for the semiotical studies on design from the 1950s until the 1970s. The semiotic discourse on architecture, design, and the arts, for instance, is grounded in the broad conception of sign theory as defined by Morris. Max Bense, for instance, was one of many semioticians who included notions of semiosis as derived from Charles Morris in his study on design. While the behavioristic elements of Morris’ theory are nowadays regarded as important only insofar as they are relevant for the historical development of semiotics in general, his theory of signs found its way into diverse fields of knowledge, such as behavioral psychology. And, because Morris considered semiotics to include signs “in all forms and manifestations, whether in animals or men, whether normal or pathological, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic, whether personal or social” (MORRIS, 1964: 1), his semiotics gave impetus to the development of new branches, such as biosemiotics and zoosemiotics (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 88-89). As Morris affirms, “semiotics is thus an interdisciplinary enterprise” (ibid), its interdisciplinarity formed not only by philosophers and linguists, but also by “psychologists, psychiatrists, estheticians, sociologians, and anthropologists” (cf. MORRIS, 1964: 1). Just as Peirce, Morris considers semiotics to include all forms of signs, as well as all areas of inquiry in which sign processes are involved. The most striking resemblance between the two can be found in the idea of a threefold semiotic functioning, which resembles Peirce’s well-known triadic relation. Yet, as I will show in detail, the correspondences of Morris’ semiotics with that of Peirce are only superficial. Peirce’s semiotics is conceived as a normative science, that is, as a highly theoretical philosophical discipline. Peirce’s conception of sign process is

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based upon a hypothesis of an objective logic that overcomes the traditional duality of mind and matter. Semiosis, that is, the process through which a sign is interpreted into another more developed sign, is also understood by Peirce to be a logical relation that is characteristic not only of human intelligence, but is found in every form of life and nature (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 89). Charles Morris, on the other hand, despite the initial similarities, conceives semiotics to be a general theory of signs as a tool to study signs of behavior. For Morris, a well-founded theory of signs could form the framework of such a science of behavior that would mediate experience and behavior through the observation of signs. Morris’ semiotics is characterized by a threefold relation that he calls syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. In order to better understand this triadic dimension, it is necessary to examine the theoretical framework of Morris’ semiotic model and its functioning. Morris’ theory of signs represented a synthesis of three main philosophical and scientific movements of the early twentieth century. In an article entitled “Charles Morris and the Behavioral Formation of Semiotics”, Roland Posner asserts that Morris, upon studying individual disciplines and currents of thought, had recognized a possible interplay between the American tradition of pragmatism, the Anglo-American tradition of empiricism, and the European tradition of logical positivism (cf. POSNER, 1987: 24). Morris’ main interest was psychology and behavior. He became a student of the famous social psychologist George Herbert Mead and, recognizing the importance of sign theories for evaluation and analysis, set out to define a framework that could combine these three main philosophical positions. Morris also realized the compatibility of sign theory with behavioral psychology, in particular with regard to social psychology. According to Posner (1987: 24), Morris’ goal was to synthesize the three positions: the American tradition of pragmatism, with special emphasis on biology and social sciences; the Anglo-American tradition of empiricism, with emphasis on scientific empiricism, as represented by the British tradition that took place between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, as well as by American behaviorism; and the European tradition of logical positivism of the early twentieth century, as defended by the Vienna Circle (cf. COFFA, 1991: 285f). Morris considered these approaches to be similar and complementary, and, despite their differences, not contradictory to each other. For instance, Morris understood empiricism and pragmatism to be compatible theoretical approaches. According to him, both currents of thought study the conditions of knowledge in both social and psychological realms. By the same token, he proposed a similar connecting point between pragmatism and positivism, both of which had as a general aim to “clarify and solve philosophical problems

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through the analysis of meaning” (POSNER, 1987: 25). The most important aspect that enabled these three approaches to be brought together was the fact that the three were considered “scientific” because none of them required a transcendental argument, being totally based on scientific verification and validation. For Morris, empiricism is ascertained by the formal structure of the language employed, and pragmatism is ascertained by the social conventions of communication (cf. MORRIS, 1935: 273-277; cf. MORRIS, 1934: 551-552; POSNER, 1987: 25). Morris proposes the following diagram to help illustrate his conception of sign process (Fig. 3.2). Fig. 3.2: Concept of sign process according to Charles Morris. SEMIOSIS

DESIGNATUM DENOTANDUM

OTHER SIGN VEHICLES

SIGN VEHICLE

INTERPRETANT INTERPRETER SEMIOTIC

SYNTACTICS

SEMANTICS

PRAGMATICS

The function of the sign in Morris’ semiotics may relate “to a person or persons, to objects, and to other symbols” (POSNER, 1987: 25). Later on, he developed a characteristic terminology for the sign function that would be employed in various fields of knowledge, that is, syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. Morris states, for instance: The relations of sign vehicles to what is designated or denoted may be called the semantical dimension of semiosis, and the study of this dimension semantics; the relations of signvehicles to interpreters may be called the pragmatical dimension of semiosis, and the study of this dimension pragmatics; the remaining semiotically relevant relations of sign vehicles to other signs may be called the syntactical dimension of semiosis, and its study syntactics. Semiotics, as the general science of signs, thus contains the subordinate sciences of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. (MORRIS, 1939: 133)

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With this definition of sign function, Morris developed the idea of semiosis, which is, for him, the “specification of such relations in concrete cases” (ibid). In other words, according to his understanding of semiosis, “a sign is exclusively analyzed when its relations to other signs, to what it develops or can denote, and to its interpreters are specified” (ibid). According to Posner (1987: 26), the behavioral characteristics Morris’ semiotics must be carefully differentiated from the American behaviorist movement in psychology, especially as exemplified by John Watson. For Charles Morris, behavior can be defined as any change of conduct of a given organism. Morris’ understanding of behavior is rather more fluid and open in comparison to classical behaviorist psychology based upon conditional reflex and stimulus-response theories. In the previous part of the book, I discussed the major characteristics that forms the basis of American psychological behaviorism, especially the paradigms upon which theoretical assumptions of behaviorism are based, such as the early theories of the association of ideas, conditional reflex theory, and the model of stimulus-response. This recognition is especially important, I reiterate, because behaviorism and its influences have had, and still have, a strong methodological impact on design process in general. Although classical behaviorist psychology and the behavioral semiotics of Morris are based on traditional empiricism and on logical positivism, they differ in the duration of behavior. While American behaviorism considers behavior in a more atomistic way, with stimuli and responses considered as isolated and independent from each other, for Morris, the concept of behavior encompasses all types of conduct continually made by an organism, from its birth to the moment of its death. Every movement, choice, expression, is considered a behavior. Furthermore, Morris defines the behavior of an organism according to its purposefulness of acting to reach a goal determined by an impulse (cf. MORRIS, 1955: 55; cf. POSNER, 1987: 26). Morris bases his views on George Herbert Mead’s conception of stages of action, which is divided into four parts of a sequence that comprises purposive action. In his 1938 book The Philosophy of Act, Mead describes act as the element, which determines “the relation between the individual and the environment” (MEAD, 1938: 364). Mead affirms, furthermore, that “an act is an ongoing event that consists of stimulation and response and the results of response” (ibid). These four stages can be systematized as follows, according to the “general analysis of knowledge and the act” (ibid: 3). The first stage of an act is the stage of impulse, which characterizes the organism’s experience of a situation that may present some problem. This problem, now seen as a stimulus, provokes a response from the organism (ibid: 3-8). For Mead, reality is defined as a field of situations. The concept of situation is, according to him, characterized “by the

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relation of an organic individual to his environment or world. The world, things, and the individual are what they are because of this relation” (ibid: 215), that is, the relation between the individual organism and its environment or world. The second stage is that of perception, which is characterized by the organism’s assessment of the problematic situation introduced. This assessment defines the problem, which enables the organism to search for alternative responses (ibid: 816). The third stage is that of manipulation, which immediately follows the stage of problem assessment. Mead characterized this stage of action as the response action taken in accordance with the organism’s perceptive evaluation (ibid, 1623). The fourth stage is that of consummation, which is characterized by the successful solution of the problematic situation. The organism is once again back in a comfort zone and can reestablish its ordinary routines (MEAD, 1938: 23-25; cf. POSNER, 1987: 26). Based on Mead’s theory, Morris establishes three phases of action instead of the original four. He characterizes them as orientation, manipulation, and consummation. The latter phases, manipulation and consummation, are similar to Mead’s stages, but the first two, Mead’s impulse and perception, were combined by Morris into one, the orientation stage, probably because he recognized a degree of similarity between these two phases which, in semiotic terms, could be thought of as a unity. Morris’ phases are, respectively, determined by “impulsecontrolled perception, preparation of the impulse-satisfying object, and satisfaction or suppression of the impulse” (POSNER, 1987: 26-27). Following this lead, Morris constructed his sign theory on these specific stages of action. Morris’ concept of sign, according to this specific behaviorist view of sign process, equals a stimulus, which is captured by the organism’s senses in the first phase of action, that is, orientation. The denotandum or significandum of a sign, as Morris affirms, corresponds to the impulse of achieving a certain need or satisfaction. It is characterized by several consummation properties, which are perceived via the organism’s senses. The interpretant is the disposition of the organism or actor to take steps and eliminate this impulse by acting in accordance with the denotandum (cf. POSNER, 1987: 28). According to Morris: […] signs in general serve to control behavior in the way something else would exercise control if it were present. To attain its goals the organism must take account of the environment in which it operates, select for its concern certain features of this environment, respond by response-sequences which will attain an environment suitable to its needs, and organize its sign-provoked responses into some pattern or other. (MORRIS, 1955: 95)

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Corresponding to the stages or phases of action described above, it is possible to distinguish, according to Morris, three further sign articulations. It is possible to articulate signs so as to enable the interpreter to grasp the orientation properties of the identified object. This is called the informative use of signs. Signs can also be used to enable the interpreter to increase the manipulation properties of the identified object in a certain manner. This is called the incitive use of signs. Signs can be used to enable the interpreter to perform a certain valuation of the consummation properties of the identified object. This is called the valuative use of signs (cf. ibid: 97-105). This type of behaviorist semiotics is founded, as are the other sign systems, on psychology, implying human interaction. In most cases, human interaction will occur in the form of interpretation and evaluation. Morris’ notion of semiotics is a very peculiar one, however. For one, its foundations are not as stable as he wanted them to be. There is no homogeneous field of a “general pragmatism”, as there is no homogeneous general empiricism or a perfectly homogeneous general logical positivism. Because of this, as Posner affirms, “it is necessary to construct the unity of the world by appropriately organizing the many perspectives” (POSNER, 1987: 46). Morris was well aware of the fact that his semiotic construction was a “special scientific action, which itself implies a certain way of looking at things” (ibid). Roman Jakobson: From Structural Linguistics to General Semiotics One of the most important linguists and semioticists of the twentieth century was Roman Osipovich Jakobson. Though he referred to himself humbly as a philologist from Russian language, Jakobson was a polymath, who contributed to the research of language, semiotics, and semiology. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jakobson was one of the founders of the linguistic circle of Moscow and an influential participant of the poetry group Opoyaz, an acronym formed by the initial letters of the Russian words for the “society for the study of poetic language”. During his early career at the beginning of the twentieth century, he focused on the research of language from a purely formalistic point of view. At this point in time, Russian formalism was not yet a semiotic current; it dealt with questions of esthetics and the theory of literature. Jakobson later became a member of the linguistic circle of Prague and in making use of structuralist principles, contributed significantly to the field of textual semiotics and esthetics. Although the name of this school of thought implied the predominance of linguistics, the linguistic circle of Prague also embraced phonology, the function of speech sounds, as well as textual linguistics (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 100). The results achieved, however, led the group to supersede disciplinary barriers and to include other

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theories, especially those originating in other sign systems. For instance, the discovery of distinctive characteristics of the phoneme as a sort of “minimal particle” or “atom” of language, combined with the principles of phonological analysis, helped to create models of analysis able to function and to be articulated with other models of sign systems (cf. ibid). Within this prolific environment, Jakobson helped to contribute with his research in the fields of the semiotics of esthetics, in literature, in poetics and poetical processes, and in the semiotics of style and stylistics. Based upon the theoretical scaffoldings of structuralism, especially upon the basic principles of Saussure and Hjelmslev, the linguistic circle of Prague aimed at the research of language processes within the act of communication, that is, the research of language and its elements within the dynamic context of communication. In other words, the objective was to study language as it functions and in its production of meaning, both synchronically, that is, the functioning of a language as it is, and diachronically, that is, to understand the functioning of a language as it changes. In this new approach, language was seen and studied as a dynamic, functional system. Jakobson perceived that it is not possible to consider communication without taking into account other interconnected realms such as, for instance, the social environment (cf. ECO, 1977: 43; cf. NÖTH, 2000: 103). He says: […] the question of relations between the word and the world concerns not only verbal art but actually all kinds of discourse. Linguistics is likely to explore all possible problems of relation between discourse and the ‘universe of discourse’: what of this universe is verbalized by a given discourse and how it is verbalized – to say with the logicians – ‘extralinguistic entities’, obviously exceed the bounds of poetics and linguistics in general. (JAKOBSON, 1960: 351)

With regard to Jakobson’s research in semiotics, it is known that he sought to overcome the hard dualism at the core of structural linguistics and semiology. The theoretical models he devised as a means to solve this difficulty led him to include other systemic relations that are revealed by the communicational act. He devised a general model that represents the dynamics of communication by indicating the essential elements articulated in such an act, as well as the subsequent language functions that are derived from it. This model, though focused on the dynamics of speech, can be extended and articulated in non-verbal communicational models as well. The addresser sends a message to an addressee. In order for this to work, the message needs to have a context, or referent. The context must be comprehensible and structured in a certain form so as to be properly understood. Further-

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more, there must be a code, which has to be at least partially or totally common to both, addresser and addressee, in order for the message to be encoded and/or decoded. The process of communication is made possible by the category of contact, which is, according to Jakobson, a physical channel and a psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee through which the communication can be supported (cf. JAKOBSON, 1960: 353; NÖTH, 2000: 105). According to Jakobson, the model can be described as follows (Fig. 3.3). Fig. 3.3: Roman Jakobson’s diagram representing the communicational process.

CONTEXT ADDRESSER

MESSAGE

ADDRESSEE

CONTACT CODE

From these six elements that comprise the dynamics of the communication act, that is, the addresser, the addressee, the context, the message, the contact, and the code, six functions of language emerge, each of which refers to the predominance of one of the aforementioned six elements. The particular emphasis defines what kind of language function is being articulated. An act of communication can exhibit more than one language function, but only one of them is predominant at each act of the communication process. This is referred to as the principle of dominance. The predominant language function forces the others into the background. All six functions, however, are essential to the process. According to this dynamic of the act of communication, if the process is adjusted to focus on the referent, or context, the referential function will be predominant. The referent or context is that which is indicated by the message. Nöth (2000: 105) affirms, for instance, that this language function predominates in descriptive texts as well as in reports or descriptions. The expressive (or emotive) function is predominant whenever the message is directed toward the addresser, but not necessarily focused on the contexts of the message. Examples of this are forms of expression in which exclamations or euphoric forms are common (ibid). The appellative or conative function is predominant in the process of communication whenever the message is directed toward the addressee. Vocative and imperative expressions, as well as gesticulations with a pointed finger toward someone are examples of this. The conative function is also the main form of communication used in advertising, for instance.

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The next language function is the phatic. Jakobson took the concept of phatic from the Polish anthropologist Bronisław Kasper Malinowski, who considered this specific act of communication as a simple exchange of words or even sounds, by means of which social relations can be produced, without the need of a determinate content (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 105). Jakobson appropriated this concept and used it to describe acts of communication that function to establish a contact, to prolong an act of communication, or to interrupt a given act. Examples of this are communication processes in which greetings and polite forms of addressing someone are uttered in order to establish an act of communication. Sentences of the type “Hello? Do you hear me?” are also types of phatic functions of language, for they act to establish, re-establish, or to assure the continuity of an act of communication (cf. JAKOBSON, 1960: 335). The metalinguistic function is predominant whenever the focus of the act of communication is the language and act of communication itself. According to Nöth (2000: 106), Jakobson determined that logical semantics possesses two levels. The first level is the objective language, which is language articulation directed toward extra-linguistic references, that is, to use the language to discuss something else. The other level of logical semantics is that of meta-language, which is language articulation that refers to language itself. For instance, all forms of discourse about grammar, lexicography, etymology, terminology, orthographic rules, and definitions, are always related to the level of metalanguage. It is possible to encounter such functions in most everyday life situations. Whenever one expresses “What do you mean?” or “I’m not following you”, the predominance of the function within the act of communication is metalinguistic. The sixth language function is the poetic function of language. Whenever the act of communication is directed to the message itself, poeticity is predominant. According to Jakobson, the poetical function, or poeticity of an act of communication, appears whenever some special combination comes into being. When an element, say a noun, is selected and inserted into a different context, a certain semantic tension is created between these two substantives that cannot act separately, but only within the new context and only by being structured in a sequence. This forces the semantic dimension to imply other significations than the one firstly implied, thus expanding the level of paradigms, the meaning of the two nouns, into this new combination. There is a tension between the separated strata of a paradigmatic act of communication and the newly formed combination. This requires a semantic extension of the new combination. The semantic articulation triggers operations of similarity, which thereby create a kind of “lu-

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dic game” and allow the new combination to acquire multiple and multi-layered possible significations. Taking for instance the phrase Juliet is the sun, the interlocutor is confronted with a myriad of possible interpretations because the message becomes centered in itself, that is, it refers to its own content, both in its structural elements as well as in its global setting as message. Thus, it is clear that a semantic tension is created, for there is no definitorial rationale for understanding this sentence other than to face the tension itself. Juliet is a feminine name, whereas the sun is another substantive here used as a predicate of the name. So, the semantic operation proposed by the sentence forces the reader or interlocutor to interact with this tension and allow it to be the producer of associative meanings. No rational explanation will totally disclose the poetical meaning intrinsic to this sentence. Thus, Juliet is the sun provokes multi-layered and polysemic effects that occur through the semantic tension of forcing new combinations of selected paradigmatic structures (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 450; cf. DA COSTA E SILVA, 2016: 68-72). This tension provokes new semiotic operations – not only semantic ones – because the forced similarities created by the initial tension pervade all forms of operations of similarities in processes of thought as well as in perceptive comparisons. Suddenly, all semiotic processes, linguistic and non-linguistic alike, are affected by the poetic expression. Poeticity eludes linguistic definition and frees the senses and semiotic processes. Perhaps these considerations led Jakobson to consider poeticity as a factor in the act of communication that is more open to the realm of semiotics – here considered as a general theory of all types of signs and sign processes. As Umberto Eco states in his article “Roman Jakobson and the Development of Semiotics”: […] in every sign exchange there are not only isolated items: semiotics must, as does contemporary linguistics, shift from a theory of single terms and ‘phrases’ to a co-text and context theory. This also means that semiotics should incorporate not only syntactics and semantics but also pragmatics. (ECO, 1987: 122)

In this case, I believe, Roman Jakobson suggests this need of overcoming the dyadic boundaries of the scaffolding of structural based semiology and semiotics (cf. DA COSTA E SILVA, 2018b). Jakobson affirms then: In short, many poetic features belong not only to the science of language but to the whole theory of signs, that is, to general semiotics. This statement, however, is valid not only for verbal art but also for all varieties of language since language shares many properties with

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some other systems of signs or even with all of them (pansemiotic features). (JAKOBSON, 1960: 351)

A PASTICHE OF SIGN THEORIES: A REVIEW OF CRITICISMS In his paper entitled “Drawing, Design, Semiotics”, Clive Ashwin gives a definition of sign and sign process by mixing all of the elements of almost every theory of signs – linguistic-structuralist semiologies and diverse forms of semiotics alike – as if all of these theories were one and the same. He says: A sign may be construed as composed of two ingredients, a signifier and a signified. The function of the sign is to communicate a message, and in purposive communication, the process requires two participants, an emitter and a receiver. The message is embedded in a medium and subsists in a set of conventions or code. The sign is encoded by the emitter and decoded by the receiver or interpretant. (ASHWIN, 1984: 43)

Ashwin’s claim may function within most forms of structural semiologies, in which there is a dual relation of signifier and signified. Moreover, in his definition of sign, he includes the six functions of language as delineated by Roman Jakobson, which are based on the six components of the communication process, i.e., emitter, receiver, message, code, contact, referent. This leads to the misleading conception that a sign is predominantly a component of the highly codified human communicational process that emphasizes verbal languages. Jakobson’s system is, as aforementioned, a powerful instrument for studying language systems, but it is still a very specific theoretical construction and must not be inserted to the definition of sign as concept. Although in the context of most sign systems, every process of interpretation of a sign into another sign entails translation, the definition of a sign per se does not necessarily include codified communication processes. Another critical point must be made clear here. As stated before, there are many kinds of semiotics, sign systems, and semiologies. Given the fact that all of these different sciences and disciplines have a concept in common, that is, the concept of sign, it is easy to perceive that a great deal of misunderstanding related to the terminology can occur. Theoreticians not familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the semiological and semiotic fields may confound the concepts and the systems to which the concepts belong. Based on the brief review of the most characteristic sign systems provided here, it is possible to determine, upon closer observation, that the concept Ashwin makes use of is derived from structuralism

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in the tradition of Saussure’s semiology and linguistics. Still, the mixture he proposes as the absolute meaning of the concept of sign is very misleading. There is a bright point in Ashwin’s definition though, when he states that a message is embedded in a medium. In this way, he recognizes the importance of the embedding and interpretation of a sign in another sign within the same or another embodied form. He considers only a “coded” form of message as a process of purposive communication – as if the message were ready to be interpreted in its entirety automatically, disregarding other contexts, in which the receiver would need to decode fragments of the received message in order to interpret it. The receiver is not reducible to one person. Rather, a network form of interpreting signs is a constant requirement in the fields of design and architecture, for instance. The following example describes the interpreting process in design process: no “message” is completely absolute, since many other semiotic processes are required for the understanding of the message within a context of design process. For instance, let’s consider the transmitted message to be a blueprint or a plan, say, of a small building. The plan shows how the building should be constructed; the “decodification” of this message of the blueprint, however, encompasses the whole process of construction, divided into parts, and requiring skill, knowledge, materials, and effort to be accomplished. This shows that the interpretation process of this message is instead composed of whole new sets of semiotic processes, interspersed among many interactors (cf. GLEITER, 2014: 152155). Perhaps the biggest mistake of Ashwin’s definition of sign lies in the claim that the receiver and the interpretant are one and the same. While receiver is the denomination for the agents – I emphasize: mostly a network or a community of decoding agents – which receives and decodes the message in Jakobson’s theory of communication, interpretant – and not interpreter – is a term coined by Peirce to indicate an interpreted sign within semiosis, that is, within the action during which a sign is interpreted in another sign, more precisely defined and developed than the first sign. This operation refers to the potential that the sign bears for being interpreted; as such, it is not a receiver, but a potential of the intentionality of the sign to activate a new semiosis. Therefore, an interpretant is itself also a sign that may actually be interpreted, conveying thus its intentional purport of meaning. But the most characteristic aspect of an interpretant, in Peircean terms, is that it is by no means restricted to just one concrete interpretation, but points to new series of possible interpretations. An interpretant is, in this sense, always an esse in futuro. A comprehensive description of interpretant and sign process in the context of Peirce’s philosophy will be discussed later in this part. It was perhaps this confusion, provoked by the pastiche of semiological and semiotic theories and systems, their admixtures, as well as the subsequent over-

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stretching of sign system theories and their methods, that lead Klaus Krippendorff, in his book The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design (2006), to dissociate his semantic theory from “the one discipline semiotics”. He justifies his dissociation as follows: Semiotics probably is the one discipline that is most frequently confused with what the semantic turn seeks to accomplish. For those who have been exposed to semiotics, the adjective semantic – etymologically ‘relating to meaning’ – tends to put an elaborated vocabulary in charge of their thinking, which defines semiotics as the study of the signs and divides that effort into three branches: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics […]. When applied to design, semiotic theories divert attention from the meaning of artifacts to the relations between signs and their referents, between signifiers and the signified, a move that unwittingly imports epistemological assumptions into discussions of meaning, which are alien to design and generally untenable. (KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 273. Italics are mine)

His statement can be understood as a protest against the “untenable discussions of meaning” that are imported into design. These discussions are untenable, affirms Krippendorff, because they divert relations of reference, signifiers, and signified things from the meanings of artifacts. Krippendorff asserts that there is an enormous gap between the epistemological field of semiotics and the practice of design as a projective activity that brings about real artifacts. On the other hand, his statement is unjustified with regard to his claim that every theory of signs is useless in the field of design because they fail to reach a level of real and purposive interaction with the designed artifact. He claims, for example, that “the idea that there exists a world of signs and a world of referents, a world of signifiers and a world of signified objects, or a world of sign vehicles and a world of the contents they supposedly convey”, serves as a proof that semiotics is grounded in a two-fold epistemological model (cf. KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 273), and is thereby of no use either as an instrument for creativity or as an analytical instrument through which the design process can be explored in its processual character. His criticisms are directed, in fact, toward the state of confusion provoked by the subsequent overstretching and misplacement of semiotic and semiological theories within different fields. This protest is, furthermore, actually more a symptom than a real critique of semiotics itself. It is not the problem of semiotics or semiology that they are related to a “twofold ontology”, as Krippendorff states, that is, to a “world of signifiers and a world of things signified”. The problem is the skepticism provoked by the constant and inadvertently mixing of diverse sign

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theories, for this pastiche of diverse sign theories in use led to such a degree of confusion. It is important, however, to come to terms with Krippendorff’s points, because his criticism of semiotics is tendentious. Krippendorff actually casts strong aspersions upon semiotics by affirming, for instance, that those who have been “exposed” to semiotics realize that the “one discipline” tends to “put an elaborated vocabulary in charge of their thinking” (cf. KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 273). He then exhibits some arguments for this dissociation from the “one discipline” semiotics. I propose to closely discuss these arguments and point out the equivocal assumptions about semiotics and semiology that Krippendorff takes for granted. The first point that would justify the proposed dissociation for Krippendorff is the fact that, for him, semiotics – as a whole – is grounded in a “two-fold ontology”, that is, is based on the conception that “there exist a world of signs and a world of referents, a world of signifiers and a world of signified objects, or a world of sign vehicles and a world of contents they supposedly convey” (ibid). Furthermore, he affirms that this “ontology” was fundamental to Peirce’s conception of semiotics, to Saussure’s semiology, and to Morris’ behavioral semiotics (ibid). Krippendorff claims that this “twofold ontology” failed to integrate theories of logic, scientific conduct, literature, and human behavior into one unified science. This argument is actually a giant leap that involves assumptions and theoretical positions regarding different systems of semiotics, semiologies, and the respective scientific views of their specific contexts. As I have shown, poststructuralism was a response to the increasing tendency of the structuralist purview to consider every phenomenon through the scope of strict dualism. Classic American pragmatism characterized mostly by the more popular theories of William James and John Dewey was somewhat compatible with some aspects of empiricism and positivism. However, scientific discussions in the second half of the twentieth century rejected some assertions made at the beginning of that century. The fact that these scientific, philosophical, and linguistic views could never be unified does not necessarily imply that the sign theories based on such positions cannot be further studied and developed. As to the assertion about a “twofold ontology”, Krippendorff is by no means clear on this point. He argues that there exist a world of signs and a world of referents, which would be the entire raison d’être of the whole of semiotics. More than disregarding the different sign theories that have different theoretical backgrounds, with this assertion, he disregards the very meaning of epistemology and ontology because he disregards the fundamental difference between the representation of a thing and the thing in itself. Even if he dissociates his position on semantics from semiotics, he can-

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not dismiss the fact that human thought distinguishes itself by the ability of articulated thought, emotional states, complex abstract thinking, as well as images created, crafted in the creative operations of mind. All of these occurrences are not “existent”. They are mental occurrences, but not hard facts, as existing objects. The very concept of existence, a concept formed by the Latin particles ex meaning “forth” and sistere – a reduplication from the root stare, “to stand”, or “be firm” –, meaning “cause to stand”, has become a synonym of an existing object or a thing which is external and reacts with the perceiving consciousness, forcing itself into this consciousness through the senses. The idea of an artifact, in Krippendorff’s sense, is the idea of an existing thing, that is, a thing, which is constructed to become alter, or other than consciousness. Epistemology deals with the theory of knowledge and, as such, deals necessarily with fields of knowledge, which are not made up of existing things, but of mental representations, generalizations, and classes of things. That much is indisputable. And one thing needs to be clarified. The very essence of any model of epistemology is that no knowledge is acquired immediately. Every form of inquiry unfolds in time for the simple reason that the studied thing or states-ofthings cannot be grasped at once. Ontology, on the other hand, is the theory of being as being, and not as representation. It is the theory of a proven state of things, which has already been ascertained or consistently proven. Krippendorff seems to ignore these widely accepted definitions of epistemology and ontology by stating that the representation of a thing is a type of parallel reality – he insists in using the concept of ontology – and therefore considering this parallel world as a real existing one. He does not, however, explain what he really means by twofold ontology. Now, it is possible to understand ontology in Krippendorff’s sense as being either a sort of metaphor, in which the duality of structuralist semiology is implied, or a critique of the chaotic pastiche of sign theories applied to design, which imputed the methodological view of structuralism into discourses of design. It is understandable that Krippendorff criticizes structural methods as well as behavioral models of sign theories because they are more analytical instruments than creative ones. However, to call it a “twofold ontology” does not make much sense. Not philosophically or scientifically, at least. The remaining hypothesis for the justification of this term would be that “twofold ontology” is more like an approximation, a metaphor for a dualistic methodology. This is by no means made clear in Krippendorff’s argumentation. In any event, he states that the “two-world ontology remains the backbone of contemporary semiotics”. He affirms, moreover, that:

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[…] the French versions of semiotics […] have developed the material or objective part of this two-world ontology privileging representations instead, and theorizing what representations do in society, including representations – without overcoming the ontological schizophrenia of semiotics, however. (KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 274)

Otherwise stated, it is a clear reference to the structuralist point of view and to the structuralist reception and appropriation of the 1960s and 1970s. Krippendorff states that if designers would conceptualize meanings in semiotic terms, they would be led to artifacts as representations of something else” (ibid: 274). This is known to invite “pretentious semiotizations”, deception of the users of artifacts regarding their nature: creating forms that make a product appear more valuable than it is; using hard-to-distinguish but cheaper substitutes, for example vinyl for leather, printed Formica for rare woods, plastic for chrome, or anodized aluminum for precious materials; or suggesting functionalities that do not exist, such as inoperative push buttons on telephones or impressive sound indicators on amplifiers without functionality. The practice of conveying the interior mechanisms of artifacts with skins that suggest something else or using verbal instructions to override uninformative or misleading forms speak to the same phenomenon. (ibid)

Now, despite the confounding term “twofold ontology” that Krippendorff uses, this statement sheds a bit more light on his argument. Apart from his criticism of the hard dualism derived from linguistic structuralism, his critique is directed toward the character of “appearance” and “presentation” of a certain artifact. He argues that if semiotics is the discipline that imposes an overly complex vocabulary, as he affirms it does, and this vocabulary takes charge of thinking, then the conceptualizations in the field of design “exposed” to semiotics will have the character of fallacies. Krippendorff’s position requires a closer analysis. It is a matter of fact that design is sometimes confounded with the “embellishment”, or “ornament” of a product to make it more attractive. This aspect, often attributed to design, however, is of no concern, if design is considered a process, instead of a product. Krippendorff, however, uses this aspect of “appearance” as separated from the “project” itself and connects “appearance” with sign process. In doing so, he seems to ignore the development of design and what it meant for industrialization, how design as discipline interacted with industry, and how this symbiotic relationship has unfolded since the late nineteenth century. It is true that the dimensions of design were, in the second half of the twentieth century, expanded as a practice or as a completed product in a post-modern realm of excessive ap-

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pearances (cf. HIRDINA, 2010: 61). And yet, Krippendorff attributes this “dysfunction” of design to semiotics. Post-modern tendencies in the realm of design, architecture, literature, and arts in general during the 1960s and 1970s, and semiotics and semiology also propelled the post-modernistic claims of relativity, fluidity, and aversion to substantialism. But Krippendorff seems to ignore all of this; he maintains that semiotics is the theoretical discipline that diverts design from its strict functionality. Design becomes deception. He uses the term deception as a synonym for lie, that is, in the sense that the “real meaning” of an artifact will never be revealed if the conception of the artifact is based upon semiotics. To support this claim, Krippendorff uses an argument of Umberto Eco, from his 1976 book A Theory of Semiotics. In this book, Eco states that “semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used to lie” (ECO, 1976:7). In my opinion this is a very unfortunate declaration, because it gives room to pronouncements such as that of Krippendorff’s. Eco’s position about this subject is, however, rather a metaphoric one. Eco refers to a “lie”, but his argument leads in a different direction from what Krippendorff gives to understand. According to Eco: Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as sign. A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used ‘to tell’ at all. I think that the definition of a ‘theory of lie’ should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics. (ibid)

What Umberto Eco affirms in this context is that the general function of a sign is as something that stands for something else, and that this something else, the object or the reference of the sign’s function, does not necessarily need to be present in order for the sign to function as a sign. This is true for a lie, in which someone states that the weather outside is good, whereas in reality it is raining furiously, the sign being the person’s claim of good weather, whereas its reference is not present and reality demonstrates the opposite. And this is also true for fiction, works of art, and literature. For instance, there is no real giant white cachalot that was named Moby Dick by a certain Captain Ahab, that is, there is no such real cetacean, just as there is no real mad Hamlet. But there is a Moby Dick, a Captain Ahab, and Hamlet in fiction. They do not exist in reality but are represented in literature. The signs Moby Dick, Captain Ahab, and Hamlet are

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not lies. They are inventions. They are fictional constructions that do not have a real object or real reference. They do not need to have one. Their semiotic nature is that of a fictional element that constructs its own reference. Exactly how this works will be presented later. This was what Eco probably had in mind by stating, “the definition of a ‘theory of lie’ should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics” (ibid). Now, what impels Krippendorff to criticize the apparent “fallacious” character of semiotics, as he puts it, is his focus on other definitions of “meaning”. With his semantic turn, he is pointing toward a type of design process in which artifacts are “self-evident to their users and supportive of natural, obvious, and reliable human interfaces” (KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 274). He intends to approach this by “not separating artifacts from what they mean”, because a semantic turn “pursues a nonrepresentational concept of meaning” (ibid). Another important point to be contended with here, however, is that in his claim, Krippendorff preposterously affirms that semiotics can exclude human agency. He states: Peirce and virtually all semioticians after him recognize that the relation between signs and referents are found in nature, as for indices; based on existing similarities, as for icons; or established conventions, as for symbols. Accordingly, what makes something a sign is attributed to conditions not controlled by the sign users. (ibid)

Here, I believe, Krippendorff is forcing a line of argumentation that leads nowhere. It is rather like “beating a dead horse”. He seeks to disqualify semiotics as a theoretical instrument by stating that it is separate – or runs independently – from human interaction. He claims, furthermore, that semioticians “not only deny their own agency but also the agency of the sign users” (ibid: 275), by claiming that semiotics constructs “a reality in which humans do not exist or are not allowed to enter” (ibid). In order to analyze this point, it is necessary to observe the following argumentation very closely. According to Krippendorff, the subdivisions syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics encompass all of the standard definitions of semiotics. Here, he wants to say that the “one discipline semiotic” in general is characterized by only one model of semiotics, that is, Charles Morris’ model of behavior-based semiotics. I have already discussed this point previously, so the reader is aware of the characteristics Morris introduces in his conception of theory of signs. Structural semiology, behavioral based semiology, as well as linguistic sign systems are very different sign systems, conceived to be articulated in different theoretical realms, such as, for instance, media and languages, theories of communication, poetics and esthetics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, theoretical logic in Peirce’s case, and so on. It is not possible, in Krippen-

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dorff’s case, to try to subsume all sign theories to one particular format, that of Morris, because Morris’ semiotical model is very specific. That said, I must counter Krippendorff’s claim that semiotics denies human interaction or dismisses human agency. This is a false statement without theoretical basis. The reader will remember that Saussure’s theory of signs is based on a dual psychological entity consisting of the sign, the signifier, and an idea, which is the signified, the sign’s meaning provoked within a consciousness. And Morris’ behavioristic theory of signs is based on George Mead’s theory of action, which is for the most part a psychological theory. It extends to every form of organism that acts, but does not exclude human interaction. The main basis of Morris’ behavioristic semiotics is logical positivism, which reinforces the need for direct verification of an experiment’s result by a group of scientists and observers. In choosing Morris’s model of semiotics to represent all sign theories, Krippendorff has stumbled upon a conceptual mistake, which in fact dismantles his own argument. I intend to take this discussion further, however. The critical point is that, as shown above, Krippendorff seeks to disqualify semiotics, for, as he insists, semiotics allows for a form of reality in which the human agency is either deemed unnecessary or is not allowed to interact. He gives examples, stating that “geometry, grammar, harmony, symmetry, proportion, character sequences, and natural laws post relations among signs that are either true or not and provide no place for those who recognize such syntactic relationships” (KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 275). Now, this assertion is absolutely false. My point here is not to defend semiotics or to counter Krippendorff merely because he dismisses Saussure’s semiology, Morris’ or Peirce’s semiotics. My point here is to counter the pronouncement that in these realms, no human agency is allowed. An example will shed some light upon this argument. Let us recall, for a moment, Leonardo Bonacci, widely known as Fibonacci, an Italian mathematician of the twelfth century. He discovered the integer sequence of numbers, the main characteristic of which is that each number in this sequence is formed by the sum of the two preceding numbers, as in: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, … When these numbers are translated into geometry, it is possible to determine a pattern related to the sum of preceding numbers. If squares are formed with the numbers of the Fibonacci sequence, a pattern emerges. Related to the sum of the preceding numbers, the subsequent numbers form bigger squares in a proportional form. It did not take long for attentive observers to realize the form of the pattern and the main character it revealed within the growing areas of the squares. A spiral form could be drawn (Fig. 3.4).

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Fig. 3.4: A spiral formed by drawing in the squares quarter-circle areas, which are encountered in squares of integer sides. The Golden Spiral, which is very similar to this spiral based on Fibonacci’s numbers, is a logarithmic spiral.

Suddenly, from this highly abstract field of mathematical and geometrical thought, this pattern began to be identified in nature, such as, for instance, in the branding of some trees, in the sprouts of a pineapple, in the forms of a flowering artichoke, in a pine cone’s bracts, in the arrangements of the seeds of a sunflower, in the patterns of the shell of a nautilus, and later, in some forms of spiral galaxies. The proportions and harmonies that many patterns reveal have fascinated thinkers from ancient to contemporary times. Not only mathematicians and philosophers felt compelled to understand this appealing pattern. Some centuries later, closer to the Renaissance, a similar spiral form received a mathematical formulation. This gave origin to the number phi (in Greek φ), which represents the growth factor of the spiral curve. This relation came to be known as the Golden Ratio. While Fibonacci’s spiral is formed by drawing circular arcs connecting the opposite corners of squares in the Fibonacci series, the so-called Golden Spiral is a logarithmic spiral. Both forms, however, present a striking resemblance with forms that constantly appear in nature. The Golden Ratio played an important role in arts of the Renaissance, especially in architecture, painting, and sculpture. Still today, it is an esthetic factor in visual arts and visual communication in general, as well as in photography, cinematography, and also in music. This proportion has been at the core of the artistic, scientific, and philosophical production of Western cultures since Ancient times. As Mario Livio states in his book The Golden Ratio: The Story of Phi, the World’s Most Astonishing Number:

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[…] biologists, artists, musicians, historians, architects, psychologists, and even mystics have pondered and debated the basis of its ubiquity and appeal. In fact, it is probably fair to say that the Golden Ratio has inspired thinkers of all disciplines like no other number in the history of mathematics. (LIVIO, 2003: 6)

The Golden Ratio as a factor governing relationships in musical harmony, geometry, mathematics, in art philosophy, and engineering, continues to reveal ever new insights. But how does one achieve this knowledge? It is possible to say that this knowledge comes in the form of signs that are perceived in nature and in geometrical relations. These particular signs are signals that indicate a much broader view. By perceiving these signs and relating them, it is possible to perceive the bigger picture. These signals leave traces, fuel the imagination, inspire new production, which in turn sets off new signs, new aspects, new knowledge, new relations, and so on. In other words, it is a semiotic process, provided one understands perception, thought, inspirations, prime matter, and production as sign processes. As such, it requires articulation, thought, interpretation, and experimentation. Hence, Krippendorff’s assertion that semiotics excludes human interaction is absurd. So is Krippendorff’s erroneous assertion that semiotics “constructs a reality that exists independent of sign users’ conceptual participation” (KRIPPENDORFF, 2006: 275). One last problem with Krippendorff’s assumptions about semiotics is that he offers false statements. He claims, for instance, that “in Peirce’s semiotics, the three ‘interpretants’, causality, similarity, and convention, are factual and must be learned before use” (ibid, 276). There are, however, no such three forms of interpretants in Peirce’s semiotics. The assertion Krippendorff presents could possibly be based on admixtures of theories of signs, although he also quotes the wrong source. While Peirce does indeed delineate three forms of interpretants, these are not “causality”, “similarity”, or “convention”. Thus, Krippendorff’s claim is patently false in its premise. It is important to say, to conclude this argumentation, that Klaus Krippendorff’s rejection of semiotics is an indication of the skepticism created by the extensive admixtures of sign theories and the posterior confusion created by the inappropriate employment of sign theories to describe the design process. An exemplification of this conclusion can be found in the following quote: This is a grim picture. The vocabularies of the three branches of semiotics derive from ontological assumptions that reduce the images of human beings to a farce. They amount to a closed system of explanations, which provides no space for alternative conceptions. This

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kind of semiotics has little to contribute to what human-centered designers seek to accomplish: proposing artifacts that offer its stakeholders possibilities of interfacing with them in individually meaningful ways. (ibid, 276)

DISMISSING SOME EQUIVOCAL NOTIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF SEMIOTICS Most problematic in Krippendorff’s particular critique of semiotics, however, is the very misleading remark regarding the definition of the concept semiotics itself. He states, quite erroneously by the way, that this duality is already expressed in the word “semi-otics”, formed by the prefix “semi” = “half”, which, according to him, has roots in the Greek root “sema”37 (ibid, 273). This suggests, according to Krippendorff, that a sign is the accessible “half” of a relationship between it and something else. Following this statement, he presents unfounded speculation that the Greek word originated in the ancient custom of “breaking a coin in half when two friends part, each carrying one half in the hope that this would bring them back together”. Thus conceived, he concludes, “a theory of signs should be built on metonymy, part-whole relationships, not reference” (ibid). While Klaus Krippendorff’s aforementioned critique regarding epistemological models of semiotics and semiology based on structuralist theories can be understood as a symptom of a complicated tradition, his definition of the concept of “semiotics” cannot. This misleading reference on the etymological origin and development of the concept of an established science, written in a book that is an important reference for design process, needs to be addressed and criticized. Even if the Greek roots once really meant – and were represented by – a custom such as that of “breaking a coin upon departure” in ancient times, it does not necessarily follow that a form of hard duality or that the duality of the broken coins will be maintained and will metamorphose into a metaphorical translation of a two-fold ontology of the “world of signs and world of things signified” (ibid: 273). Winfried Nöth, in his Handbook of Semiotics (2000), in which he presents a very broad view of different sign systems and their geneses, posits a very different origin for the roots and sets of meanings that resulted in the modern concept of semiotics.

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The Greek sema means actually “a mark”, “a sign of uncertain derivation”, and also “token, by which anything is known or can be thereby distinguished”. In the Greek New Testament, it is possible to find a late derivative of sema, that is, semaino, which means “to give a sign”, “to indicate”, “to make known”.

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I propose, therefore, to take a few steps back to present evidential support for the origin, use, and evolution, especially within a philosophical context, of the term semiotics. Semiotics – as the concept is contemporarily framed - has its etymological roots in two Greek words, σημα, (sema), which means “signal”, “sign”, and σημεῖον, (sēmeĩon), which means “a sign”, “a mark”, and also “token, by which anything is known or can thereby be distinguished”. The noun, that is, σημειωτική, (sémeiötiké), from the ancient Greek σημειωτικός, (sēmeiōtikos), which means “observant of signs or signals”, began to appear around the fourth century BC in medicinal contexts. Since late antiquity, it was referred to as μέρος σημειοτικόν, (méros semeioticon), that is, the semiotic part (cf. NÖTH, 2000: 1). In antiquity, semiotics probably consisted in study of symptoms of sicknesses, which, when properly identified, would suggest a better treatment. Corroborating evidence for this hypothesis of the medicinal origins of the modern term semiotics is manifest in the extant works of Κλαύδιος Γαληνός, (Klaudios Galenós), known also as Galen of Pergamon, who lived from approximately 129 until circa 200 or 216 AD. It is believed that only one third of his extensive writings, some of which have been translated into Latin, still survive. It was from these Latin sources that John Redman Coxe, in his work The Writings of Hippocrates and Galen (1846), presented an organized form of the main doctrines of Galen of Pergamon, in which the doctrine of semiotics plays an important role as the “observance of signs and symptoms” (COXE, 1846: 487f). The classification of disciplines in Galen’s theory of medicine is thus presented as follows: Its division is into five parts, viz.: 1. The contemplation of natural things, constituting physiology. 2. A Consideration of affections, and of a knowledge of their causes, giving rise to pathology and aetiology38. 3. The rationale of preserving health, or hygiene. 4. Of the observance of signs and symptoms, or semiotics. 5. Of the mode of cure, or therapeutics. (COXE, 1846: 487; italics are mine)

In Coxe’s work, it is possible to trace the concepts even further back into early antiquity, going as far as the time of Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Κῷος, that is, Hippocrates of Kos, who lived from around 460 to circa 370 BC. Very little remains of Hippoc-

38

Aetiology is the study of causes that provoke some effect. The term derives from the ancient Greek αἰτιολογία, (aitiologia), which literally means “to give a reason for something”. It has played a major role as an important medicinal concept since antiquity and is part of the study of causes of diseases.

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rates’ research and writings. Notwithstanding, it is known that, in his surviving texts, the term Σημειωτική, (sémeiötiké), as well as σημείωσις, (semeiosis), and σημιολογία, (semiologia), already appeared in doctrines of prognostics (cf. COXE, 1846: 85, cf. NÖTH, 2000: 1-2). These extant documents, denominated the “Hippocratic Collection”, form part of a collection of sixty ancient Greek works on medicine attributed to the teachings of Hippocrates of Kos, although none of the texts, which were written mainly in ancient Ionic Greek, are believed to have been written by Hippocrates himself. In one of these texts there is a “Book of Prognostics”, which, according to John Redman Coxe (1846: 85), has been translated from ancient Greek into Latin, describes the part of medicine that studies the symptoms of diseases39 under the heading of Σημειωτική. In the same context, semeiosis is denominated as the branch of medicine that deals with the meaning of symptoms, notation and discourse. Under this heading, diagnostics and prognostics are comprehended as the part of medicine that studies the doctrines of signs to perform diagnostics and prognostics. It is called semiotics, but is also better known as “semiologia”, for it includes the study of symptoms as signs of diseases and how they should be treated.40 In summary, the etymological background reveals the origins of a science of interpreting signs, in order to arrive at the knowledge of what the causes of these signs are, in order to proceed with a treatment, which will, in its turn, render real results. What is noteworthy here, is that there is no historical or etymological reference whatsoever to “semi” (half) as being the root for the modern concept of semiotics, as erroneously claimed by Krippendorff. In order to illustrate this, and to emphasize the definition’s importance to this inquiry, I submit two examples from modern philosophy to reinforce my claim as to the origin and to the broader meaning of semiotics. John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding from 1690, uses the Greek concept written with Greek letters Σημειωτική, that is, sémeiötiké. The context of his usage of sémeiötiké is his understanding of the division of sciences. Locke proposes a classification of the sciences into three principles that should encompass the whole of human understanding (cf. LOCKE, 1825: 549-550). He contends that the knowledge of things as they are in themselves, as well as in their manner of operation should occupy the

39

“[...] pars medicinae quae signa morborum dijucat” (COXE, 1846: 85).

40

“[...] significatio, notatio, dictur. Comprehendit sub se Dignotionem et Prenotionem: et pars medicinae doctrinam signorum diagnosticorum et prognosticorum comprehendens, vocatur Semeiotics, rectius Semiologia, estque pars medicinae, signorum omnium differens et vires expendens [...]” (ibid).

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first branch. The second branch should comprise human voluntary and rational conduct. The third branch, as he states it, […] may be called Σημειωτική (sémeiötiké), or the doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also λογική, logic; the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For since the things the mind contemplates, are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. (LOCKE, 1825: 550)

Peirce, in his turn, referred to this science not as semiotic, as it is framed contemporarily, but as semeiotic, which clearly shows that he was aware of the original meanings of semeion and sémeiötiké, most probably referring to the Greek form as framed by Locke, as also suggested by Nöth (2000: 3). This point of view will be clear in the following passage, in which Peirce states: The term ‘logic’ is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs being signs […], also of the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another […]. (CP 1.444, italics are mine)

Avoiding Errors In the beginning of the present part of the book, I have presented the most significant theories of signs. I intentionally left Peirce’s semiotics aside to be investigated in the upcoming section. My aim here, though, was to review various theories of signs, which had – and still have – an important impact on current theories of design process. As I have shown, the constant mixing of sign theories with each other has caused, indeed, a significant rejection of employing them in studies in architecture, design, and arts in general. I have also shown, with concrete examples from Ashwin (1984) and Krippendorff (2006), how skepticism toward semiotics, fueled by the theoretical confusion marked by the excessive admixtures of sign systems, is still present. My decision for showing these theories of signs has the purpose of enabling the reader to understand their inherent charac-

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teristics and idiosyncrasies. By reviewing the major theoretical characteristics, possibilities, and limitations of the different sign systems, the reader is able thus to perceive in Krippendorff’s argument the confusion lying at the core of his argument. I have also critically discussed the significant points of Krippendorff’s argumentation and pointed out what I have found problematic, not only with regard to his dismissal of semiotics, but also with special regard to his position toward epistemology itself. The last point I addressed in this section was Krippendorff’s erroneous description with respect to the etymological origin as well as the contemporary meaning of the word semiotics. I took the opportunity to argue these points so as to introduce the origin and the meaning of semiotics based on historical evidence. And based upon such evidence, I have introduced the concept of semiotics as it relates to modern philosophy, with special regard to John Locke and Charles S. Peirce. The brief definition Peirce gives to his semiotics at the end of this exposition introduces the reader to the theoretical framework that will be articulated in this work. I will avail myself of this to discuss Peirce’s semiotics in detail in the following sections of the book.

The Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce in the Context of a Philosophical Architecture

A PHILOSOPHICAL SEMIOTICS In order to provide a detailed survey of Peirce’s semiotics, it is deemed necessary to expound his system of philosophy, which is arranged in an architectonic manner. In light of this exposition it will be possible to understand Peirce’s semiotics within his philosophical architectonic. The concept of philosophical architectonic describes a system of philosophy in which the fields of knowledge are connected with each other, thus forming an intricate system. The theory of knowledge is, in these philosophical systems, organized in accordance with the philosophical doctrines and sciences that are part of the whole construction; hence the word architectonic. The object of study of a philosophical architectonic is the structure of all conceivable human knowledge, or at least the totality of the knowledge that is currently available in its most general terms. An architectonic scheme of philosophy has as its main purpose the classification of varied types of knowledge. This classification furnishes explanations for the variety of relationships connecting several aspects of the knowledge classified. With the differentiation of sign systems, such as discussed in the second chapter, it is possible to propose a detailed survey of Peirce’s philosophical semiotics, the nature of which is very different when compared to other sign systems. All of these systems, as previously discussed in the second chapter, are highly specialized sign systems and therefore likely to describe to a limited extent the phenomena in different fields of knowledge in order to properly function as analytical theories. As I have shown, overstretching a highly specialized science over several different realms of phenomena can cause the theory to falter. The same applies to the methods derived from these theories. Since the methods tend to construct the object that they analyze, overstretching causes them to operate on a blurry metaphorical basis, which causes the theoretical background to collapse. A detailed presentation of the most characteristic types of sign theories was provid-

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ed with the objective of showing their characteristics and particular scopes. Peirce’s semiotics is not a sign system of structural linguistic or of behavioristic psychological origins. It is the discipline of logic within Peirce’s philosophical system. His semiotics deals not only with ways to attain truth, but also with the nature of thought, how thought is articulated and sent from one mind to another and from one state of mind to another. Since Peirce maintains that there can neither be thought nor mental process without signs, every sign process, as every thought process, is articulated in the form of signs. In its broader sense, logic is the theory of evolution of signs, of how signs function, and of how this articulation functions in the realm of reason with the ultimate aim of finding the truth. Thus, semiotics, for Peirce, is a broader, all-encompassing philosophical discipline of logic. Here, I present semiotics in its philosophical context, as a normative science of logic within Peirce’s architectonic system. Therefore, I also present the idea of the architectonic system as connected with philosophy and will discuss Peirce’s philosophical positioning as a thinker that proposes a philosophical architectonic. In doing this, I believe it is possible to support a more holistic view of semiotics and its branches, which include sign typology, logical arguments, and speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic, from which pragmatism, the theory of methods that underlies every form of scientific inquiry, is operational. According to Peirce, then, logic, conceived as semiotics […] will not undertake to inform you what kind of experiments you ought to make in order to best determinate the acceleration of gravity, or the value of the Ohm; but it will tell you how to proceed to form a plan of experimentation. (CP 7.59. Italics are mine)

A Philosophical System Peirce was a thinker who developed an architectonic system of thought. In the early years of the twentieth century, in contrast to the tendency of the time toward a scientification and fragmentation of disciplines, which would eventually lead to movements such as logical positivism and logical empiricism, he devised the principles and structure for the development of an architectonic system of philosophy. Peirce never actually finished this project, and there are surely aspects of his ideas that require further attention in order for the philosophical system to coherently function as such. In many places, Peirce only indicates how the system should be further developed, thereby leaving it open for future generations to improve upon. This is the case, for instance, with Peirce’s esthetics, the first of the normative sciences. His esthetics assumed an important function in

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his theory of inquiry, but he never ventured beyond minimal systemic indications of how this discipline should work. Two general positions surround Peirce’s philosophical writings. The first position considers Peirce’s work to consist of a set of interesting and more or less independent ideas, which, though some of them are functional in themselves, do not form a consolidated architecture when compared to that of Kant or Hegel. According to this group’s opinion, no matter how energetically Peirce might have pleaded for an architectonic system, his work was but an amalgam of fragmented philosophical and scientific investigations and interests. This position can perhaps best be represented by a famous quote of an early Peirce scholar, Murray G. Murphey, who asserts, regarding the completeness and coherence of Peirce’s system, that: […] this is an illusion – Peirce’s Illusion: the grand design was never fulfilled. The reason is that Peirce was never able to find a way to utilize the continuum concept effectively. The magnificent synthesis which the theory of continuity seemed to promise somehow always eluded him, and the shining vision of the great system always remained a castle in the air. (MURPHEY, 1961: 407)

The other group of scholars considers Peirce’s philosophy as a coherent philosophical system, regardless of the gaps in his unfinished architecture. It is well known that Peirce has not finished his philosophical system and many parts of the architecture remain slightly above the level of a projection. There are, however, a variety of considerations of how coherent his philosophical system is, that is to say, to what degree Peirce’s philosophical system is actually functional. Some of these scholars go as far as to take the whole systemic formulation for granted, that is, that Peirce’s system is fully functional and closed in itself, i.e., that the system proves itself both logically and metaphysically. There are scholars who consider Peirce’s philosophical system to be consistent, but not fully functional. The unfinished parts of the system require, in some cases, a thorough reconstruction, to match actual standards in order to allow the system to function. Such is the case, for instance, with Peirce’s aforementioned esthetics; another example refers to Peirce’s concept of continuity and mathematical topology. A third example is the case of semiotics itself, which, although it is by now one of the most developed disciplines of Peirce’s architecture, is still in an ongoing process of development, especially in relation to the latest advancements of the operation of existential graphs, research in the field of logic of relatives in general,

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as well as regarding the actual category-theoretic41 readings on pragmatism. Despite the lacunae, I assume at the outset the hypothesis of an architectural philosophy. Peirce, I believe, developed a powerful system of philosophy, structured upon principles that allow the system to be adaptable and to evolve. Peirce’s philosophy has received ever-growing attention from scholars in recent years. Furthermore, what ensures Peirce’s importance as a systemic and original thinker is that his system continues to furnish important insights into new fields of knowledge. For example, the rapidly expanding field of artificial intelligence has focused on logical processes, which were anticipated by Peirce in the form of a semiotical account of mind and thought processes. Of great interest for artificial intelligence, also in the context of logic, is the representation of cognitive action in the form of specific logical processes, such as depicted by Peirce’s logical conception of existential graphs (cf. PIETARINEN, 2006: 107). The Manuscripts chosen for the Present Inquiry The present inquiry, as stated in the introduction, is based on research in unpublished or partially published manuscripts, in which Peirce, from his philosophical standpoint, thematizes and carefully discusses the problem of invention and discovery, in addition to processes of formation. As already mentioned, four main manuscripts were chosen to provide the theoretical background of the present inquiry. The first manuscript, MS 693, entitled “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery wherein Logic is conceived as Semeiotic” was written in 1904 and contains Peirce’s later philosophy. Originally conceived to be a book, Peirce emphasizes in this particular manuscript his later theory of inquiry and theory of discovery, especially from a mathematical, phenomenological, and semiotic standpoint. In it, Peirce also presents to the reader a detailed, albeit unfinished, sketch of his existential graphs as part of his investigations into semiotics. Here, Peirce presents an important systemic connection between mathematics, phaneroscopy or phenomenology, and semiotics, by emphasizing the active role of imagination and thought while performing a task that will eventually lead to the process of discovery. The most important feature of this manuscript is the conception of a systemic philosophical architecture and

41

Category-theory is a mathematical concept developed from studies in algebraic topology. It is a formalization of mathematical structures that functions with the ability to construct associations and identities of abstract mathematical objects. As such, category-theory formalizes high-level abstractions, such as sets, collections, rings, and groups. For more detailed information about category-theory, cf. AWODEY, 2010; cf. ZALAMEA, 2010: 203-233; cf. ZALAMEA, 2012.

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the development of the logical process that involves discovery. Semiotics is, in this text, consolidated as Peirce’s logic, for all performances in the search for truth are of a semiotic nature. From the imagination of the mathematician, passing through the study of phaneroscopy, semiotics deals with the rules of transformations of signs in order to attain the truth. For Peirce, semiotics is, therefore, his philosophical and scientific logic. As such, the role of logic is not only to attain the truth, but also to study the semiotical operations required in order to perform accurate inferences. In order to discover, semiotics encompasses living process of thought that can generate original, newly formed connections, bringing different bundles of sign processes into relation with each other. That is to say, different elements which were never considered before, are connected together due to an abductive inference, thus forming an original bundle of semiotical process. A further development of Peirce’s considerations is the experimental character of his theory of inquiry connected to the notion that it also contains practical branches. Peirce affirms in the manuscript: “practical science, or the theory of the arts, is that science which is selected, arranged and further investigated in detail as a guide to the practice of art” (MS 693, 1904: 80). Especially important for this study is Peirce’s thesis, which states, “there is a practical science of discovery. It is an adjunct of logic, and has sometimes been treated by itself” (ibid: 124). The second manuscript upon which the ideas of formativity and growth discussed in this book are be based, is comprised of three segments, MS 940, 941, and 942. The manuscript was written in 1898 as a preparation for the eight conferences Peirce delivered that same year in Cambridge. The first segment bears the title “Logic of Events”. The second segment is entitled “Notes for Eight Lectures”. The third, and largest, is entitled “Abstracts of 8 Lectures”. The first two segments of the manuscript deal with the logic of events based on Peirce’s hypothesis of qualia and also on the continuity of qualias. Qualia means here ontology of qualities.42 In this context, Peirce considers qualia as a component of

42

Helmut Pape states the actuality of the inquiry upon the concept of Qualia and also describes an important problematic related to its actual philosophical discussion: “Der hier erstmals konzipierte Begriff der Qualia (über C. I. Lewis kam er unter diesem Namen in die Diskussionen über Theorien des Geistes in der analytischen Philosophie) markiert heute in der Philosophie des Geistes einen irritierenden Problembestand, der sich materialistischen und anderen theoretischen Erklärungen und Reduktionen entzieht. Es ist deshalb von systematischem Interesse, zu verfolgen, wie Qualia die Grundlage für Peirces spätidealistischen Monismus dadurch bilden sollen, dass sie

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reality, and, as such, this ontology of qualities is hereby described through mathematical and logical conditions, which apply both to mind and matter (cf. DLU: 363). The third segment of the manuscript deals with the hypothesis of the formation of dimensions, which subsequently renders sets of events within a formative process more defined. Peirce’s theorem of the formation process has a mathematical, or rather a topological form. It is, however, an idea, a general concept not restricted to mathematics. Mathematics helps to comprehend the ideas of formation, or, as he defines it, the logic of events, described in the manuscript. Dealing with questions of origin, growth, diversification, and evolution, Peirce develops a highly theorematic hypothesis concerning the logical steps attached to this process of emergence, development, individuation, differentiation, and integration, in which pure possibilities – understood here in a highly ontological sense of qualities before any form of existence – are rendered possible through logical processes of devising breaches in the quali-consciousness of the pure ontological continuum. These breaches determine distinct, more determined multitudinous dimensions, in which the possible possibilities start to become more possible in certain environments than in others, until it comes into being as a more discrete element in the particular dimension. Existence, as it is understood, as something here and now, an actual happening, eventually comes into being when the extant fragments of possibilities are embodied and form something alter, that is, other-than the specific quali-consciousness. This highly abstract theorem, which is based on Peirce’s understanding and usage of topological conceptions then in current use, is also a hypothesis of the formation of cosmos inasmuch as it can be considered to represent an analogical formation of mind. I believe that the theorem contained in the manuscript also represents, in a broader sense, a semiotic account of the formation of ideas and mental processes. This theoretical framework, supported by topological concepts, is essential for the description of processes of generation of ideas, of becoming, in which transformatorial and formative processes predominate. The third manuscript, MS 283, entitled “The Basis of Pragmaticism”, written in early 1906, is but just one of a series of manuscript sets developed by Peirce to establish a very detailed account of pragmatism as a maxim of logic, which, by then, he called pragmaticism, in order to differentiate his logical maxim from the numerous behavioristic, psychologistic, and utilitarian interpretations of pragmatism which were emerging at the time. A shortened version of this text was

selbst mit zu den ontologischen Bausteinen der Wirklichkeit gerechnet werden [...]” (DLU, 363).

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published as an article in the journal The Monist in 1906.43 A more complete version of the manuscript, copyedited with the title “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences”, has been published in The Essential Peirce, volume 2 (EP 2: 371-397). The full body of the manuscript focuses on developing the concept of pragmatism as a scientific method. The basis of pragmaticism, as Peirce contends, is located in the normative sciences, that is, in the most theoretical of the positive philosophical disciplines. The articulation of these sciences is what renders pragmaticism articulable and useful as a scientific method. Peirce focuses on semiotics as the key element from which a proof of pragmaticism can be demonstrated. This highly intricate manuscript also reveals more specific details about the composition of a sign, for example, the concept of quasi-mind inherent to the sign, which represents a potential of the sign to be interpreted as another sign and so propelling the semiosis. From the perspective of normative sciences, Peirce proposes that the act of interpretation within a semiosis is a translation. Therefore, according to him, semiosis is the process of a sign being interpreted – or translated – into other more developed signs, and also into habits of action. In this manuscript, Peirce argues that semiosis is the process through which the potentiality of an idea can grow, become embodied and diversified (MS 283, 1906: 103). According to him, thus: […] a sign as ordinarily understood is an implement of intercommunication; and the essence of an implement lies in its functions, that is, in its purpose together with the general idea, – not, however, the plan – of the means of attaining that purpose. (ibid: 106-107)

The fourth manuscript, MS 318, highly complex and multi-layered, was written in 1907. Entitled simply “Pragmatism”, Peirce attempted to publish a version of it, but the text was never accepted for publication. The extant manuscript is composed of several formulations of the proof of pragmatism. Peirce seems to have dropped the differentiation he proposed two years earlier, that is, to refer to his version of the method as “pragmaticism” instead of “pragmatism”. This manuscript puts forward important developments in the field of semiotics, especially with reference to the concept of the interpretant. Peirce completed his theory of interpretants in this manuscript. Searching for the proof of his pragmatism, Peirce saw the need to further develop his concepts of logic and semiotics.

43

All articles that Peirce wrote for The Monist have been integrally reprinted in the 2009 book The Logic of Interdisciplinarity. The Monist-Series. Elize Bisanz (Org.). Berlin, Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2009. A facsimile of the then published article “The Basis of Pragmaticism” is located in this publication on pages 259-286.

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Here, Peirce concludes that pragmatism, which has appeared in many earlier logical maxims, has a similar shape to the well-known proposition “by their fruits ye shall know them” (MS 318, 1907: 9). Peirce states, for instance: “I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only what I call ‘intellectual concepts’, that is to say, of those upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge” (ibid: 10). The main subject in this manuscript is the cognitive operation. According to this reformulation, intellectual concepts are the only types of signs that can produce a newly identified type of interpretant, that is, the logical interpretant. The logical interpretant consists not merely in an actual interpretation, but in the self-controlled production of a new habit, that is, in Peirce’s terms, the predisposition to act in a certain way according to the sign generated (cf. SHORT, 2007: 56). Peirce reveals in this manuscript that only the meanings of intellectual concepts are pragmatically ascertainable, because they are the only types of signs that carry implications concerning general behavior. As Peirce states in a simplified manner, “the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen […] under certain kinds of existential circumstances” (MS 318, 1907: 12, alternative sequence). The introduced improvement upon his previous notion of semiosis sheds new light on the concept of pragmatism, connecting it with the theory of interpretants. With the introduction of the concept of the logical interpretant, that is, an interpretant that carries within it a formulation, such as in a plan to conceive and form new habits of conduct, pragmatism can be understood as a principle of inquiry that requires the medium of purposeful action. For it is only through this medium of purposeful action that intellectual concepts in general can overcome their self-reference, reaching new objects and relationships. It also occurs even if only a potential action for a possible purpose is devised, for it has also the power to change conduct (cf. SHORT, 2007: 59). These four chosen manuscripts are relevant to the present inquiry upon design process, for they furnish the main theoretical background with which the logic of design process can be tackled. I have already mentioned that the logic of events described by Peirce is a characteristic feature of design process in its phaneronic, or phenomenological, semiotic and pragmatic dimensions. The specific set of information that can be extracted from the manuscripts supports the consideration of the semiotical differentiation of a new element and the integration of this element into a system within the logic of design process. Thus, the processes of invention, of discovery, of generation, and formation inherent to design process – now seen as a semiosis – can be more thoroughly described and analyzed. But before the specific theoretical background can be used to read the

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phenomenon of design process, it is important to contextualize Peirce’s semiotics within his philosophical architectonic.

ARCHITECTURE OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE: PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM IN ARCHITECTURAL TRADITION The idea of architecture in philosophy, i.e., to erect a system of thought as in an architectural project, harks back to earlier philosophers who understood thought and knowledge in an organized and interconnected manner. Without venturing too far back into the past, I will provide a brief survey of the idea of architectural philosophy, especially that which has influenced Peirce’s thought. It is however necessary to establish at the outset important distinctions regarding the principles pervading the construction of such an architectonic system. As already mentioned, Peirce was one of the last philosophers of the twentieth century to conceive of an architectonic system of thought. Although he followed the tradition of philosophical systems, having been greatly influenced by Immanuel Kant, Peirce rejected the cornerstone of transcendentalism and adopted an original, more scientific position based on a broad conception of scientific inquiry, which he sought to introduce into philosophy. The Idea of Philosophical Architecture and the “Undoubtful” Base of Knowledge The idea of the architectonic refers to the manners of conceiving a system of knowledge and a system of science based on a conception or on an idea of the entire scientific scheme as a whole. It refers to the principles of organization of a given philosophical system, whose basis is the ontological knowledge upon which the fundament of this system of thought would be erected. It is important here to reiterate that predominant views in the vast majority of Western philosophical systems are based on a cornerstone of the absolute knowledge, or indubitable knowledge, upon which traditional epistemology is based. Thus, the “cornerstone of knowledge”, the basic, indubitable one, serves as a unity for the whole system. The concept of “architecture” and “architectonic” in philosophy has been widely used in the philosophical context since Kant, as he formalized this topic in his main work, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Here, he combines Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s concept of metaphysical architecture – as it is conceived in Baumgarten’s work Metaphysica of 1739 – with Johann Heinrich Lambert’s more

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methodological approach. Lambert treats the organization of the system as a building-like structure, such as it is described in his 1771 book Anlage zur Architectonic, oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniß. Following the tradition of Western philosophy, Baumgarten affirms that metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human knowledge. Also commonly denominated as philosophia prima, metaphysics, according to him, is comprised of other fundamental disciplines such as ontology, i.e., the science of being, in addition to cosmology, psychology, and natural theology. Furthermore, he contends that metaphysics is useful within a system of thought because, firstly, it allows the construction of abstract concepts; secondly, because it is the foundation of the subsequent determination and ascertainment of first propositions, that is, self-evident propositions that do not require empirical examination; and thirdly, because it assures the continuation and the certainty of demonstrations (BAUMGARTEN, 1766: 1-2, §1-3). Within this systemic framework of metaphysics, ontology plays a central role. Also denominated by Baumgarten as “ontosophia”, the knowledge of the being, “metaphysica universalis”, or “architectonica”, ontology is the science of the most general or most abstract predicates of things. The main characteristic of this primordial science is that it comprises übersinnliche, that is, in a certain sense, “transcendental” concepts (ibid, §3, §4). Johann Heinrich Lambert presents a more refined concept of ontological and scientific organization. In order to explain his system of knowledge, Lambert adopts the word “architectonic”, which has been used by Baumgarten to qualify the architectural exposition of metaphysics. In this sense, Lambert states the concept of the architectonic as an abstractum of the art of building, of architecture – in Lambert’s words, “Baukunst”. This analogy furnishes a meaningful metaphor of a building of human knowledge, which is constructed from knowledge gathered from all available sciences and disciplines systemically arranged. The figuration refers especially to the construction of the groundwork, the foundation, and then the installation of the first structures upon it, the materials used and the material preparation for the construction, as well as the general organization of the building. When figuratively presented within the context of the first principles of philosophy, an architectonic organization of philosophy is the systemic organization of connected philosophical disciplines to be constructed from the ontological foundations towards the epistemological inquiry (cf. LAMBERT, 1771: XXVIII-XXIX). In his words: Über den Titel des Werkes habe ich nur das zu bemerken, daß ich das Wort Architectonic aus Baumgartens Metaphysic genommen [habe]. Es ist in so fern ein Abstractum von der

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Baukunst, und hat in Absicht auf das Gebäude der menschlichen Erkenntniß eine ganz ähnliche Bedeutung, zumal, wenn es auf die ersten Fundamente, auf die erste Anlage, auf die Materialien und ihre Zubereitung und Anordnung überhaupt, und so bezogen wird, daß man sich vorsetzt daraus ein zweckmäßiges Ganzes zu machen. (ibid)

In the section of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft entitled “Architektonik der reinen Vernunft”, Kant contends that a system of philosophy is a sort of network of principles and data that is not simply accumulated and piled one on top of the other, but articulated in an organized manner. An architectonic system of philosophy follows the main premise that reason and scientific principles furnish the system with the required parameters, according to which every part of the system is interwoven and thereby connected. According to Kant: Ich verstehe unter einer Architektonik die Kunst der Systeme. Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige ist, was gemeine Erkenntnis allererst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloßen Aggregat derselben ein System macht, so ist Architektonik die Lehre des Szientifischen in unserer Erkenntnis überhaupt, und sie gehört also notwendig zur Methodenlehre. (K.d.r.V. B 860/A 833)

Kant was also the proponent of a critical interpretation of the metaphysical tradition and, according to him, metaphysics should not be the base of the theory of knowledge. By asking the famous question, “how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?”, Kant shifted the attention from a metaphysical basis of knowledge to a logical one. Especially in the section of “Die transzendentale Analytik”, entitled “Von dem Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriffe”, Kant demonstrates deductively his categories in order to establish the possibility of all knowledge and experience. He affirms, thus: […] die transzendentale Logik [hat] ein Mannigfaltiges der Sinnlichkeit a priori vor sich liegen, welches die transzendentale Ästhetik ihr darbietet, um zu den reinen Verstandesbegriffen einen Stoff zu geben. (K.d.r.V. B 102/A 76 – B-103/A 77)

For Kant, all knowledge is obtained either as an intuition or as a concept. Intuitions are, according to him, affections of the sensibility. As such, they relate to some object, but only insofar as it is immediately represented. Concepts, on the other hand, mediate representations of an object. According to Kant, the function of a concept is to bring a myriad of representations under a general representation (K.d.r.V. B 93/A 68). Otherwise stated, it is the act of collecting a myriad of representations of a given object and unifying these under a general con-

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cept in the understanding that enables knowledge of that object (cf. PARKER, 1998: 3). Kant differentiates two basic forms of knowledge, one empirical, and the other a priori. The a priori type of knowledge is applicable to any object of experience and to any representations of a possible object of experience (cf. ibid). The empirical type of knowledge is characterized by the distinct structure and nature of the object. The a priori type of knowledge comprises pure forms of intuition, that is, space and time, and pure concepts of the understanding (K.d.r.V. B 163). In order to construct a system of thought that can cope with the empirical experience, Kant relies on a principle of totality of a priori experience. Only this principle can afford an exact classification of concepts, which, in their turn, compose the idea of the total (Idee des Ganzen) of the knowledge a priori. Through this, the concepts will exhibit their interconnectedness within a system44 (K.d.r.V. B 89/A 65). However, even with this modification, all possibility of knowledge is, for Kant, still based on transcendental arguments. The unity of knowledge for Kant is still the unity of the “I think”, similar to the unity of thought proposed by Descartes. Although Peirce was greatly influenced by Kant’s thought, notably his compelling idea of an architectural philosophy as well as his Erkenntnistheorie, Peirce ultimately criticizes Kant in reference to the transcendental argument and to the Cartesian unity of thought, because it implies a whole tradition based upon metaphysical grounds, a position which, to a certain extent, remained uncriticized by more modern thinkers. This promise of a foundation for epistemology is similar to what is known in philosophy as the “chain metaphor” or “Archimedean point”. This metaphor implies a parallel that Descartes describes in his Meditationes involving an analogy of the primordial truth of philosophy with an Archimedean invention. The primordial truth, which should be the very fundament of a philosophical system, is comparable to a fixation point that would physically allow Archimedes to move the terrestrial globe to some other place. According to Descartes:

44

Kant elucidates the relatedness of the a priori within a system in the following manner: “Nun kann diese Vollständigkeit einer Wissenschaft nicht auf den Überschlag, eines bloß durch Versuch zu Stande gebrachten Aggregats, mit Zuverlässigkeit angenommen werden; daher ist sie nur vermittels einer I d e e d e s G a n z e n der Verstandeserkenntnis a priori und durch die daraus bestimmte Abteilung der Begriffe, welche sie ausmachen, mithin durch ihren Z u s a m m e n h a n g i n e i n e m S y s t e m möglich” (K.d.r.V. B 89/A 65).

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Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demands only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing which is certain and indubitable. (DESCARTES, 1979: 149. Italics are mine)

This approximation consists in searching for the foundation of knowledge. That is, to search for the one thing which is “certain and indubitable”, which would be a basic, immutable truth. Or as Wilfrid Sellars puts it: the indubitable truth is a self-authenticating episode. As Sellars affirms in his book Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: These self-authenticating episodes would constitute the tortoise on which stands the elephant on which rests the edifice of empirical knowledge. The essence of the view is the same whether these intrinsically authoritative episodes are such items as the awareness that a certain sense content is green or such items as the awareness that a certain physical object looks to oneself to be green. (SELLARS, 1997: 73)

In his book, The Pragmatic Turn, Richard Bernstein argues that this type of epistemological foundation functions by systematically constructing a chain of inferences with which it would be possible to conceive “a solid edifice of knowledge” (BERNSTEIN, 2010: 38). For Peirce this metaphorical argument of an indubitable knowledge, upon which the whole epistemological inquiry is to be erected, is a very misleading conception of philosophical system. If a philosophical system is constructed upon unassailable premises, the whole edification will collapse once the weak link in the chain of inferences is found, or, to put in other terms, if the certainty of the foundational argument becomes questionable (cf. EP1: 11-27; cf. BERNSTEIN, 2010: 38). One example of the weak link that can compromise such systems of philosophy is, according to Bernstein, Descartes’ argumentation based on the unassailable “truth” of the I think, therefore I am, and, at the last instance, the “truth” of presenting a major proof, the proof of God’s existence based only upon the intuition of a “clear and distinct idea” of God (cf. BERNSTEIN, 2010: 38). Since the architectonic tradition is strongly based on the transcendental aspect of thought, which seeks the element which is “certain and indubitable”, Peirce criticizes this position and proposes new arguments for an architectonic system of philosophy of his own without the need of such grounding in ontological foundations. Let me further develop this argumentation in the next section.

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Peirce’s Antifoundationalism In criticizing these epistemological notions, Peirce challenges the profoundly misleading, deeply rooted, and yet current conception of a philosophical system such as that of Descartes, which proceeds from presumably unassailable premises and builds a system through a chain of reasoning, because it fails to recognize how the sciences function, i.e. that an argument cannot prove itself as being certain and indubitable (cf. BERNSTEIN, 2010: 37-39). There will always be some aspects of knowledge that will require a fresh treatment whenever some new detail involving this knowledge is discovered. In a text written in 1868 for the Journal of Speculative Philosophy entitled “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Peirce challenges exactly this aspect of Western philosophy. He writes: Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation. Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable. (EP 1: 29)

Peirce raises three major points of concern, which coincide with an argumentation against the foundationalism of Cartesian-like thinking (cf. EP 1: 30, cf. SANTAELLA, 2004: 29-76). He argues, first, that the interpreting mind has no power of intuition – in the Cartesian sense, such as having the definitive proof of God’s existence only because of our clear and distinct idea of God; every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions. Secondly, Peirce states that the interpreting mind has no power of thinking without signs, which reinforces the first statement. Third, Peirce argues that we have no power of introspection – in the sense of having clear and distinct ideas about something immediately and definitively true – because all knowledge of the internal world is derived from hypothetical thinking from our knowledge and experiences of external facts. This proposition also stresses the importance of knowing how to be observant of phenomena and signs, thus training perception, as well as training oneself in order to conduct experiments. Peirce ultimately rejects the Cartesian traditional form of transcendentalism that bases all knowledge on “intuition” as the indubitable starting point of every process of attaining knowledge (cf. SANTAELLA, 2004: 47). According to Peirce, there is no theoretical limit to knowledge, to invention, and to discovery: thus, it is impossible to consider something absolutely incognizable. These are perhaps the most important points in Peirce’s critique of Cartesianism.

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For Peirce, knowledge and thought are dependent upon the cognitive ability to bring into unity the acquired experience. Through processes of semiosis, this cognitive ability allows new emergent elements to come into play. This is especially valuable for Peirce’s open-ended theory of inquiry, for every new thought, every discovery and every invention enters knowledge through abduction. Abduction, Peirce asserts, is the only logical operation that can introduce any new idea (cf. CP 5.171, 1903). This is important because the theory of inquiry distinguishes itself through its openness and a certain indeterminacy, which is part of the process from the early stages of the formulation of an idea, the draft and the first conceptions, until the designation of more complex levels of experimentation guided by inferences. This process is not based on unassailable things in themselves, which, per definition, are not opened to experience. On the contrary, it reveals itself in the process, as it becomes translated into something else. The process implies the becoming, requiring translators, participants, interactors, and experiments the more the inquiry is developed. Peirce finds, therefore, impossible to accept a self-contradictory argument, such as Kant’s Ding an sich, that is, “the thing in itself”. Now, generally stated, the hypothesis of an a priori idea must function as a possible logical explanation for future events, that is, before all possible experience. Considering the explanatory function of a hypothesis, it is perceivable that its function is to try to explain a surprising phenomenon by discovering the possible causes of this phenomenon, according to which said phenomenon would be a natural expectation. But if there is a hypothesis that explains the phenomenon of a transcendental object by stating that it is something unreachable or something in itself and therefore totally incognizable, impossible to be scientifically ascertained in the long run, the argument of this hypothesis then presents a logical inconsistency: something can be explained as not being capable of being explained at all. This particular phenomenon results in being blocked and not able to be inquired into because it is completely cut off from the possibility of knowledge. In his “first rule of logic”, Peirce summarizes his philosophical position by stating: Do not block the way of inquiry (MS 825, 1898: 1, cf. RLT: 178; cf. EP 2: 48). Peirce’s first formulation of what would come to be known as the pragmatic maxim reinforces his anti-transcendentalism, for he argues, firstly, that one thing is being, another is being represented, and secondly, that whatever that can be represented to have being, has its being in the practical effects that it can produce in the mind (cf. PARKER, 1998: 17, cf. SHORT, 2007: 57-59). Furthermore, Peirce attaches to his concept of pragmatism the value of a general method of inquiry based on the general idea of evolution of knowledge, a continuous form of inquiry having its télos in some ideal final state of a given process of inquiry, which,

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if held long enough, should asymptotically reach the truth. He often calls this the third grade of clearness, which “consists in such a representation of the idea that fruitful reasoning can be made to turn upon it, and that it can be applied to the resolution of difficult practical problems” (PEIRCE, 1897: 162). This is, indeed, the essence of his logical maxim of pragmatism, in which Peirce originally stated45: “consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (EP 1: 132). A more detailed account of it will be discussed in a moment. The complete rejection of any apriori argument led Peirce early in his career to identify the fundamental importance of a principle of continuity as well as to regard the cognitive process as a series of brief infinitesimal real events that would be set in motion through a continuous semiosis, which is regulated by a logical principle of continuity. This logical principle is, according to Peirce “that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity” (CP 6.193). Peirce calls this principle synechism, from the Greek συνεχισμός, (sinechismós), from συνεχές, (synechés), that is, continuous, meaning hereby the “tendency to regard everything as continuous” (EP 2: 1). A Modern Version of Objective Idealism: Peirce’s Logical Idealism Peirce’s mature philosophy led him to believe that the only plausible metaphysical hypothesis that would comprise an evolutionary form of cosmology would be some form of objective idealism, which holds that matter is but a specialization of mind, or, in his terms, effete mind, and that mind is older than matter. In other words: the inner world, which is mind, is older than the outer, in which matter, as a special configuration of mind, has been defined and specialized. In one particular passage from the text “Law of Mind” from 1892, it is possible to comprehend why he said that he wouldn’t “take it hard”, in the event that his philosophy were to be identified as a variant of Schellingism, that is, a variant of the objective idealism proposed by the German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Peirce writes:

45

This article, entitled “How to Make our Ideas Clear”, was originally printed in the Popular Science Monthly of January 1878, vol. 12, pp. 286-302.

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I may mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord, – I mean Cambridge, – at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere in Cambridge held many an antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations. (W8: 135. Italics are mine)

Peirce developed a specific form of objective idealism, also called logical idealism, as the only feasible and tenable philosophical position to allow the development of an evolutionary principle, without which it would be impossible to conceive an intelligible theory of the universe or a sound philosophy. He declares: “the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (W8: 106). In this particular case, Peirce maintains that logical idealism, now structured as a variation of the wider objective idealism, consists of the conception of mind as a process which has been thoroughly and deeply modified through mathematical and logical concepts, especially those derived from the logic of relatives, thus modifying and renewing the old tradition through modern scientific developments that render it possible to be thought of generally in terms of an architectural and evolutionary philosophy (cf. EP 1: 312; cf. PAPE, 2004: 7-16). Objective idealism is a philosophical position that characterized some of the most important proponents of German Idealism. A more detailed discussion regarding the concept and its origins of this concept within German Idealism is beyond the scope of this work. Here, I discuss, however, one important aspect that differentiates the traditional concept of objective idealism from Peirce’s own version of it.46 It is important to mention, for instance, in his Identitätsphiloso-

46

In his application for the Carnegie Institute, which he submitted in 1902, Peirce elucidates his position regarding the traditional objective idealism. With this exposition, he reinforces his version of theory of inquiry based on scientific notions, thereby stressing the importance of objective logic within the process of inquiry. He states, then: “The term ‘objective logic’ is Hegel’s; but since I reject Absolute Idealism as false, “objective logic” necessarily means more for me than it did for him. Let me explain. In saying that to be and to be represented were the same, Hegel ignored the category of Reaction (that is, he imagined he reduced it to a mode of being represented) thus

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phie, or philosophy of identity, Schelling proposes the connaturality of mind and matter. For Schelling, matter shares the same origin as mind, which would necessarily imply a genetic identity between them. As a result, Schelling places the identity of subject and object, mind and matter, at the origin of creation, which will accompany the process of inquiry as a metaphysical certainty from its very beginning (cf. PAPE, 1989: 361). As aforementioned, Peirce affirms, on the other hand, that “the one intelligible theory of universe is that of objective idealism, the matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (EP 1: 293). The major difference between the Schellingian form of objective idealism and Peirce’s own version consists in regarding the problem of identity of mind and matter from a logical perspective. Although mind and matter should logically share the same origin and thus the same nature, the inquirer or the group of inquirers cannot assume, at the beginning of a process of inquiry, that this metaphysical assumption is the correct one, as something already granted, or as an already ascertained proposition, even though it is necessary to put up with a certain degree of imprecision and error at the beginning of an inquiry. According to Peirce, “every attempt to understand anything, – every research, – supposes, or at least hopes, that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ” (RLT: 257). Since Peirce does not accept any kind of transcendental argument, it becomes necessary to hold that the proposed connaturality of mind and matter may be, in the process of inquiry, ascertainable. If the hypothesis of the connaturality of mind and matter should be held as a sound one that explains events – for example, our ability to guess the secrets of nature, the security of general forms of instinct, the connaturality of natural processes, and processes of the human mind. The community of inquiry must verify it in the long run in order to ascertain it scientifically – with a sound method of inquiry – and then to be able to hold this hypothesis as a reality of nature. Concerning this point, Helmut Pape affirms: Obwohl Peirce also mit Schelling und Hegel die These teilt, dass Geist und Materie identisch sind, so unterscheidet sich sein Idealismus vom absoluten Idealismus in der Beurteilung der Bedingungen, unter denen diese Identitätsaussage sich als wahr zu erweisen hat.

failing to do justice to being, and at the same time he was obliged to strain the nature of thought, and failed to do justice to that side also. Having thus distorted both sides of the truth, it was a small thing for him to say that Begriffe were concrete and had their part of activity of the world; since that activity, for him, was merely represented activity. […] I give objective logic a waking life which was absent from Hegel’s dreamland” (NEM 4: 30-31).

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[…] Von Schelling […] unterscheidet Peirce sich genau dadurch, dass er die notwendige Identität von Geist und Materie nicht als Voraussetzung an den Anfang stellt, sondern an das Ende eines Evolutionsprozesses. (PAPE, 1989: 361)

Peirce’s Architectonic System of Philosophy It is already a matter of fact that Peirce’s unpublished writings, especially the ones pertaining to his later philosophy, contain numerous attempts to provide proof for the correctness of his theories as well as attempts to formalize his philosophical thought as a well-structured architectonic system, in which his theories would be connected systemically in a coherent manner. Yet, unfortunately, these attempts were sometimes feeble, and in many cases left unfinished. Nevertheless, a closer study of these very manuscripts pertaining to his later philosophy reveals Peirce’s system as an authentic philosophical architectonic. This consideration is based upon the fact that his philosophical architecture does not have a fundament – fundament here understood in the sense of an ontological cornerstone of indubitable knowledge. The whole architecture of Peirce’s philosophical system is imbued with a great plasticity, which accounts for its ability to evolve and to adapt according to experience and according to the constant exchange of principles and data between sciences. Peirce’s architecture is organized according to a precept of principle and data dependency, in which the most theoretical sciences furnish less theoretical sciences with principles. The less theoretical sciences, on the other hand, provide the more theoretical ones with empirical data, results and problems. Considered from this perspective, the whole architecture of Peirce’s philosophy is outlined by its characteristic open-endedness and its constant search for more, and yet unknown, relationships (cf. PAPE, 2011: 67). Returning to the previously cited quote of Murphey (1961: 407), in which he states that Peirce’s “grand plan” remains a “shining vision”, a “castle in the air”, it can be argued, for instance, that Murphey, with this appraisal, has missed the point regarding the characteristics of Peirce’s philosophical innovations. As Zalamea has affirmed, it is possible to call Peirce’s architectural philosophy a “castle in the air” “without thereby casting aspersions on the solidity and rigor that are required for its erection” (ZALAMEA, 2010: 204). What Murphey possibly had in mind as measure for criticizing Peirce’s system was a typically traditional Western philosophical system, that is, a form of finished system of philosophy based on deep foundations of ontological certainties. But even though Peirce did not formulate his system in the same manner, Murphey nevertheless judged Peirce’s architectural structure by comparing it with other traditional systems. It is possible to counter the negative connotations of Murphey’s criticism by bearing in

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mind that Peirce’s architectural system is a castle in the air, translucent and without foundation, supported by “transverse horizontal bundles like Toyo Ito’s Sendai Mediatheque” (ibid), being thereby a fully functional, flexible and openended philosophical architectonic. Peirce’s Ladder of Sciences Peirce’s architectonic system of philosophy can best be perceived in the form of his proposed organization and classification of sciences. He called this classification a ladder of sciences. Peirce’s ladder is not a closed system, in which the sciences identified within it are fixed in position and to which the objects of experience need to conform. On the contrary, Peirce’s ladder of sciences is a logicalobjective map that provides systemic connections and establishes intrinsic relationships to the sciences. The ladder of sciences is oriented toward objective logic and to Peirce’s three categories. According to Lucia Santaella (1999b: 11), this means that “their combinations constitute a nonlinear sequence of multidimensional relations”. Furthermore, the positioning and relatedness of each science in relation to the whole ladder “are indications of a web of pragmatic meanings and conceivable effects of each science” (ibid). The relations between the sciences are governed by the precept of principle and data dependency. This specific dynamic describes the interrelatedness between the sciences and their logical grounds in relation to objective logic. Within this dynamic, the more theoretical sciences provide the less abstract ones with theoretical principles, as well as with conceptual tools. And, reciprocally, the less theoretical – i.e., the more specialized sciences – provide the more theoretical ones with empirical data and new problems (SANTAELLA, 1999b: 11, KENT, 1987: 84-86). In corroboration of this statement, Peirce affirms: Accordingly, when I say that the furnishing by one science of a datum for another science was the most ordinary kind of help rendered by one science to another, I did not mean that the total number of cases of this kind of help would in the long run be greater than any other kind. For the science which receives the fact, when it has performed its generalization of that fact, will return to the science which furnished that fact an explanation of it […]. (MS 693, 1904: 374-346)

The dynamics of the precept of principle and data dependability is one of the visible effects of the principles that govern the whole ladder of sciences. This is already implicit in the very idea of science. For Peirce, “science” means the body of the concrete activities of scientists in their quest for the truth in their specific

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fields. This quest, “highly worthy of life-long devotion”, and pursued utilizing the most adequate and critically chosen methods of inquiry, includes all the help from other disciplines it can get. This help – which may be general, as for instance, in the form of theoretical principles, definitions, and concepts; or specific, which may encompass, for example, empirical data, specialized observations, and particular experimental results obtained by well-devised concrete experiments – furnishes “one another’s information and reflection” (cf. EP2: 372). Peirce posits that this classification of the ladder of sciences is a natural one, “natural” here understood by him as in a “purely experiential sense” (CP 1.204, 1902; cf. KENT, 1987: 85; cf. SANTAELLA, 1999b: 11). According to Peirce, the purpose of the classification is to “embody the chief facts of relationship between the sciences so far as they present themselves to scientific and observational study” (MS 1334, 1905: 9-10). Peirce affirms, furthermore: Every class is constituted and held together by a concept or idea expressed in its definition. Every arrangement of ideas is itself an idea. Consequently, every classification whatever is governed by an idea, however loose and inconspicuous it may be. A natural classification, that is to say, a birth-all classification, is a classification whose governing idea coincides with the idea which determinates the things classified to exist. An idea, so far as it has any relation to life, is a possible purpose. (MS 1334, 1905: 11-12)

From this quote it is possible to infer that Peirce understands the process of making science as a living process, which evolves and grows. If science itself is based on the logical foundation of objective idealism (or in Peirce’s case, a variant of it called logical idealism), it is possible to infer that the structure of the ladder of sciences cannot be static. It adapts, grows, subdivides, deploys new branches, and closes ill-suited ones. The logic of relations behind the ladder suggests that the sciences are in constant movement, in constant evolution. This dynamic process constantly modifies not only the general organization and deployment of the specific sciences, but their internal structure as well. Even if Peirce’s classification now seems outdated and appears to exhibit the typical characteristics of systematic knowledge as it was considered in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his concept of science, in connection with his understanding of open-ended inquiry and its relatedness to the ladder of sciences, allow future generations to further develop the ladder by opening and establishing new branches, new areas and disciplines, as well as unfolding other sub-branches from the previous ones. This means that the ladder of sciences will never be fully completely determined nor finished. Instead, it will be in a constant state of modification in accordance with the scientific development that en-

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ters the system through positive experience as well as through the formulation of new mathematical and logico-mathematical hypothesis. In the manuscript “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery” (MS 693, 1904), Peirce provides a detailed view of the ladder of sciences47. Here, Peirce sets out to provide a description of the main functioning parts of the ladder, which is divided into three major branches, A, B, and C. Branch A is the branch of the sciences of discovery, or heuretic sciences. Peirce uses “heuretic” here in the sense of “discovery”. He takes the word from the Ancient Greek adjective εὑρετικός, (heuretikós), a concept which, as already mentioned in the first part, means “inventive”, “ingenious”. It is important to remember that the verb εὑρίσκω, (heurískō), means “to find”, “to discover”, and also “to happen upon by chance to find out, to discover”. In this philosophical context, the meaning of the Greek word heuretic describes the raison d’être of scientific inquiry. Accordingly, the sciences of discovery endeavor to find out the truth “regardless of what is to be done with the knowledge” (MS 693, 1904: 78). Branch B, the sciences of review, refers to the set of sciences tasked “to form a systematized digest of the whole and some part of human knowledge” (ibid), using of any information the first set of sciences has discovered by filling in the gaps and articulating the information in whatever form required. The last branch, marked with the letter C, practical sciences, has been only indicated by Peirce, but has been not developed as his first branch, the sciences of discovery. With regard to this branch of practical sciences, Peirce states, for instance, that it concerns “the theory of the arts, thus that science which is selected, arranged, and further investigated in detail as a guide to the practice of art” (ibid). Now, Peirce is probably not referring to the concept of art, as it is understood nowadays. Rather, it makes more sense to interpret this as technical or practical knowledge, as a form of “know how”. A full discussion of points B and C of the diagram would extend beyond the scope of the present inquiry and will therefore not be further pursued. And yet some important points regarding the practical sciences of discovery that appear in MS 693 will be explored later in this section.

47

Whereas posterior formulations of the ladder of sciences exist, my choice to choose a manuscript from 1904 is based on the fact that Peirce did not subsequently alter the basic principles of the ladder, although he improved upon some of the conceptions involving the classification and distribution of already existent sciences. The guiding logical principles, upon which the ladder of sciences is based, were, as Helmut Pape (1989: 38) agrees, already established from 1903 onward, after Peirce wrote his “Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic” (EP 2: 258-299), as an addendum to the 1903 Lowell Lectures.

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It is important to say, however, that the sciences of review and practical sciences have not been developed beyond the projectual stage. Peirce concentrated all of his efforts in developing the theoretical and philosophical principles of his sciences of discovery, for these are what form the theoretical framework for his theory of knowledge. As indicated in the ladder of sciences as depicted in the MS 693 “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery wherein Logic is conceived as Semeiotic” of 1904, the sciences are organized in the following manner: A. HEURETIC SCIENCES or SCIENCES OF DISCOVERY, embracing: I. MATHEMATICS II. PHILOSOPHY, embracing: a. Phaneroscopy, or Phenomenology b. Normative Science, consisting of i. Esthetics ii. Ethics iii. Logic (or Semeiotic), composed of 1. Speculative Grammar, 2. Speculative Critics (or Logic Critic), 3. Methodeutic c. Metaphysics III. IDIOSCOPY (or SPECIAL SCIENCES) a. Psychical Sciences b. Physical Sciences B. SCIENCES OF REVIEW C. PRACTICAL SCIENCES

The sciences of discovery are divided into: I. Mathematics, II. Philosophy, and III. Idioscopy, or special sciences. Mathematics, in very general terms, involves the “study of what is or is not logically possible, without undertaking to ascertain what actually exists” (MS 693, 1904: 80). It is the science of pure logical hypothesis, without being constrained by existence. Philosophy is a branch of the sciences of discovery that “limits itself to finding out what it can from ordinary every-

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day experience, without making any special observations” (ibid). It is the branch that deals with positive experience, which is open to every perceiver, a sort of “lookout upon the common” (EP 2: 373), as Peirce defines it. And finally, idioscopy is the branch of the sciences of discovery that occupies itself with “making new observations and which uses these to find out what further it can by inference” (ibid). Idioscopy includes the body of what is today acknowledged as science. It is the realm of special sciences, that is, sciences that have a very distinct area of inquiry. Physics, psychology, chemistry, biology, astronomy, linguistics, anthropology, paleontology, are examples of special sciences. Peirce proposes a subdivision of the idioscopic, that is, the special sciences, into two major groups: the III. a) psychical special sciences, and the III. b) physical special sciences. The former involves a greater degree of mental processes, as, is for instance in, psychology or linguistics. The latter involves more law-like processes, for they normally concern the laws of nature, which, as mentioned earlier, share the same nature with mind but became laws by force of habit. Physics, astronomy, chemistry are typical examples of the special physical sciences. An observation: the diverse sign theories presented in the second chapter of this book can be located in Peirce’s ladder of sciences. As highly specialized sciences, they belong to the branch of idioscopy, because they are all, without exception, special sciences. Philosophy, the branch of the sciences of discovery upon which the present inquiry is focused, has three branches: a) phaneroscopy or phenomenology b) normative sciences, and c) metaphysics. Of these three sciences of discovery, metaphysics will not be expounded upon in the present study. It is important, however, to locate this science as a branch within Peirce’s philosophy. For Peirce, the science of metaphysics, as classified among the sciences of discovery, must avail itself of the same methods of inquiry as the other more theoretical sciences. Its inquiry involves the acceptance of the general results of logical principles not merely as hypothetical, but as theories of being, of the real, that is, “what has anything true of it regardless of whether anybody thinks it is true or not” (MS 693, 1904: 84). Accordingly, it can be assumed that the universe has an explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is to unify the gathered experience. The metaphysical inquiry provides theoretical bases for the special sciences, even if this explanation is provisional. According to Fann (1970: 29), Peirce sought to establish a scientific framework for his concept of logic and metaphysics in a systemic way. Peirce contends: If we only had at our command at this moment a really scientific logic and metaphysics, which might serve as guides in the choice of a hypothesis, such a doctrine might at this time be of the utmost service to science. (CP 8.109)

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Phaneroscopy and the Inventory of Categories Phaneroscopy48 makes up the first branch of philosophy. According to Peirce, the task of phaneroscopy is to perform a sort of inventory of phenomena, identifying in them the distinct and indecomposable universal elements of experience that may be expected to be present in the phenomenon. It is a science that collects from experience the universal categories that present themselves in every phenomenon. Peirce uses the term phenomenon, derived from the Ancient Greek φαινόμενον, (phainomenon), but also sometimes phaneron, also derived from Ancient Greek φανερός, (phanerós), which means “manifestation”, “visible”, or “perceivable through the senses”, to represent that element which appears in an interpretative mind in any form. Peirce’s version of phenomenology, his phaneroscopy, is also very different from the contemporary conception of phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl. It is a general science – sometimes also called a quasi-science – that surveys experience and traces the three universal and indecomposable characters of experience in collected phenomena. Phaneroscopy doesn’t make any assertions, but is tasked with perceiving and differentiating the characters drawn out by experience. Peirce contends: What phenomenology does is to distinguish certain very general elements of phenomena, render them distinct, and study their possible modes. It does not need particularly to insist upon their universality, since this is evident to everybody, who knows by his own portion of human experience something of what human experience generally is like. The work of discovery of the phenomenologist, and most difficult work it is, consists in disentangling, or drawing out, from human thought, certain threads that run through it, and in showing what marks each has that distinguishes it from every other. (MS 693, 1904: 116-118)

What one needs to do in order to be a student of phaneroscopy, Peirce says, is to open one’s mental eyes and see the phenomenon as it presents itself and look for characteristics that are never wanting in it, whether the phenomenon is “something that outward experience forces upon our attention, or whether it be the wildest of dreams, or whether it be the most abstract and general of the conclu-

48

In order to avoid confusion with well-known theories of phenomenology, such as Hegel’s philosophical theory of phenomenology as well as Brentano’s and Husserl’s theories of psychological phenomenology, I prefer to use the term phaneroscopy. Phaneroscopy is another name coined by Peirce to describe his first positive science or quasi-science of making the inventory of the phaneron, or phenomenon. That is to say, phaneroscopy is Peirce’s phenomenology.

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sions of science” (EP 2: 147). The first faculty required for this is the trained observation skills of an artist who knows how to differentiate the qualities of color as they present themselves and not as they are usually thought to be. In other words, to make a comparison, it is the quality of seeing the colors such as they are, such as when they are captured by an impressionist painting. The color represented on canvas is the specific color perceived in the landscape with a certain particular color intensity, captured in a certain hour, receiving the sun’s light with a certain incidence. “This is the faculty”, affirms Peirce, “of an artist who sees for example the apparent colors of nature as they appear” (ibid). Monet, for instance, in order to exactly capture the impression of the color, say, of a real flower, on a certain day, in the evening, with sunset approaching, which makes everything more yellowish and orange-colored, needed to see the phenomenon as it is, that is, as Peirce would say, to see the phenomenon in its suchness. The second faculty is that of “resolute discrimination”, to identify the particular feature chosen to be studied, and to pursue this particular detail “wherever it may lurk, and detect it beneath all its disguises” (ibid). The third faculty required to perform the study of phaneroscopy is to develop the generalizing power of the mathematician “who produces the abstract formula that comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination purified from all admixture of extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments” (ibid: 147-148). These three observational faculties are required to identify, for instance, more qualitative aspects of a given phenomenon, which can only be tackled by an observational power like that of the artist, and also to describe different forms of appearances and identify an appearance as it occurs. And lastly, the third faculty refers to the special ability to recognize phenomenological patterns, that is, to recognize patterns in apparitions that bring about an element of regularity. Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness: Categories of Phenomenological Experience These observations describe three categories, under which every element of experience can be ordered. The first category is that which is first in itself, thus, its denomination as Firstness. Peirce affirms, “firstness is the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything else. That is to say, it is a Quality of Feeling” (cf. EP 2: 160). The second category, Secondness, is the “Idea of that which is such as it is as being Second to some First, regardless of anything else and in particular regardless of any law […]. That is to say, it is a Reaction as an element of the Phenomenon” (cf. ibid).

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The third category, Thirdness, is the “Idea of that which is such as it is as being a Third, or Medium, between a Second and a First. That is to say, it is Representation as an element of the Phenomenon” (cf. ibid: 161). One crucial observation needs to be made. These definitions of the categories that Peirce formulates are Ideas49 both in a formal, or natural sense, as well as in the sense of their characteristic feature as irreducible and indecomposable elements of thought. They allow the mind to unify the collected experience of phenomena (cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 13). Now, I have shown that Peirce rejects all forms of transcendental arguments. However, I have just stated that, according to Peirce, the three categories are “expected” to be encountered as the three indecomposable elements of the phenomenon. Is this a logical contradiction? The answer is simple and requires a brief sketch of how Peirce derives his three categories from a logical field of mathematics. As I have previously shown, mathematics is a highly abstract science of logical forms that draws logical conclusions from pure hypothesis. The hypothetical world of mathematics is a purely imaginary one and need not be bounded by existence. Therefore, mathematics does not provide positive, but only hypothetical experience. Earlier in his career as a logician and mathematician, Peirce connected his research in formal logic, including his conception logic of relatives, with mathematics. With mathematical and relational logic instruments, he strove to discover the fundamental characteristics of the repeating patterns of the three categories he believed he had experientially observed. Pursuing this inquiry since 1867, it was not until 1885 that Peirce devised a formal logico-mathematical formulation for the categories. A thorough examination of this logico-mathematical development of the categories is beyond the scope of the present research.50 It is important, however, to present Peirce’s logico-mathematical concept of the triadic relations at which he arrived hypothetically. Through logical analysis, Peirce discovered that a triadic relation shows the mediative factor, the aspect of thirdness. The form “A gives B to C” is, according to the logic of relatives in mathematics, indecomposable. A triad is a genuine mediative logical relation. It cannot be dismantled into two parts of A-B and B-C without losing its triadic character. A-B and B-C are, however, two dyads, that is, two relations of pairs. Just one el-

49

Peirce hints at his understanding of the word. “Idea”, as Peirce affirms, “is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk” (EP 2: 273).

50

Thorough accounts on the development of Peirce’s theory of categories, both logicomathematically as well as phenomenologically, can be found in KENT, 1987; PARKER, 1998; ROSA, 2003; SANTAELLA, 1992; SANTAELLA, 2004; SHORT, 2007.

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ement, if taken away from the dyad and analyzed as it is, say the A of the previous relation, would be held to be a monad. These elementary conclusions, that of the monadic aspect, dyadic reaction, and triadic relation are fundamental generalizations achieved by logical analysis through logico-mathematical instruments. Now, these conclusions are purely hypothetical. This logical analysis at the mathematical level consists, therefore, in a hypothetical – and not a transcendental – argument for the categories. Phaneroscopy, as already discussed, will undertake an inquiry into making an inventory of the three indecomposable elements expected to be found in the phenomenon. This inquiry is based on positive experience, which will attest, phenomenologically at first, to the validity of the hypothesis of the categories. In fact, according to Peirce, the categories do appear in positive experience and will go on to form the basic structure of his whole architecture of philosophy. In this sense, phaneroscopy will enable the observer to describe the specific general structure of phenomena and which monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations must be revealed with it. Although mathematics can hypothesize the general characteristics of triadic relations prior to the actual phenomenological experience, it is only through the constant pouring in of experience open to everyone that the phenomenological monadic, dyadic, and triadic structure reveals itself. The hypothetico-mathematical analysis that precedes experience means very little in comparison with the structural analysis of phenomena a posteriori. The study of phenomena requires arduous labor in order to be able to “place in the system the conceptions to which experience has led us”, as Peirce contends (cf. EP 2: 289). Peirce considers the categories to be not only relative to the mind, but relative to reality as well. Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are by no means exclusive elements of human thought alone. The categories are coextensive with every form of the perceiving and interpreting mind, and, more importantly, they are real constituents of phenomena. Seen from the perspective of real events, thought, as we know it, was naturally impressed upon us by real occurrences over a certain time span. The three categories are real constituents of phenomena themselves, and, as such, the categories are, in Peirce’s sense, real and operative in both nature and thought (cf. EP 2: 179-195; cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 14). Peirce affirms, thus: First is the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about. A thing considered in itself is a unit. A thing considered as a correlative or dependent, or as an effect, is second to something else.

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A thing which in any way brings one thing into relation with another is a third or medium between the two. (EP 1: 280)

It is important to point out here, as Helmut Pape ascertains in his book Erfahrung und Wirklichkeit als Zeichenprozess, that, in his theory of categories, and especially with regard to thirdness, Peirce breaks with an old dogma of platonic tradition which holds that only particular things – and not universals – can be apprehended through positive experience. According to Pape, this is a crucial philosophical development that Peirce brings to phaneroscopy and consequently to semiotics and ontology (cf. PAPE, 1989: 21). One interesting way to perceive how categories are present in a given phenomenon is suggested by Daniel Campos (2005: 13) with an experiment. Although he only suggested this as a thought experiment, I will perform the experiment here. I invite the reader to take a look at the figure below, which depicts a drawn image of a triangle (Fig. 3.5). Fig.3.5: The triangle as an experiment.

The figure shows a triangle drawn with a sort of dark ink on a yellowish paper as printed in the book. Upon observing the image as a whole form for some moments (this image is the proposed phenomenon of the experiment); it is possible to start observing certain distinctive aspects. It is possible to perceive, if the phenomenon is focused attentively to the qualitative aspects, how the ink is unevenly distributed in a certain area, sometimes thinner, sometimes thicker, the line sometimes almost straight, sometimes sloppy. The quality of the paper, as a support on which the ink has been used, also affects the appearance of the lines. Qualitatively, it is possible to see the coarseness resulting from the constitution of the paper now marked by the ink. The surface of the paper exhibits a wide range of many tonalities due to the fact that the incident light reflects unevenly and produces innumerable shades and gradations of many colors, which are also qualities of the drawing. The triangular shape also signifies its quality as a geometrical form. All of these elements are qualities: the observed blackness, yellow-

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ness, thickness or thinness of the drawn lines, the smoothness or coarseness of the paper, the color variations of the reflected light in the sheet of paper, the quality of the paper itself, the triangular form. All of these elements are examples of experienced qualities of appearance. The drawing, as a physical object, forcing itself as a perceived object into the observer’s senses, is an example of the second category. Another example of secondness, subtler though, is the actual perception of the drawn figure, as second to the active presence of the figure. The category of the third is present in that which relates to the mind’s interpretation of the drawn figure comprehending this drawing as representing the general mathematical idea of a triangle – the drawn one being one occurrence of a more general mathematical definition. Stated otherwise, the comprehension of the drawn triangle as representing the mathematical concept of a triangle reveals the character of the third category (cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 14-15). By summarizing these observations, it is possible to suggest a systematization regarding the occurrences of the categories in the proposed phenomenon. The first of the three irreducible aspects of a phenomenon is the aspect of feeling, or experiencing the phenomenon as possessing an intrinsic and independent quality which is felt; then reaction, or experiencing the phenomenon as being reactive; first, toward perception, while the phenomenon forces itself into perception, and also in relation to other aspects of the same phenomenon or to other phenomena; and finally representation, or experiencing the phenomenon as a medium between a first and a second, that is, a medium that stands for something else, which is evoked by it as a series of references to the signalizations of the mediative aspect of the phenomenon (cf. ibid: 13). Now, firstness is a category that involves nothing but itself. Every event under this category will exhibit pure spontaneity, unbounded and free. The first is the very first occurrence of an “originality”, which is not driven by something else. The occurrence of a second is, however, a reaction, which presupposes some type of dyadic event. It has always the dual character of action-reaction. An effect is a typical aspect of an occurrence in the second category, insofar as it is, as a dual relation, a reaction to some cause. The phenomenological occurrence of events in the third category is highlighted by the appearance of the mediating element. One of the most common examples of this aspect of thirdness is the idea of law as well as the idea of regularity. For instance, in the seventeenth century, many experiments were performed to observe whether or not two falling objects with different weights would reach the ground at the same time. It seemed to be true that they would reach the ground at the same moment. But with the naked eye, because of the speed and the lack of better observational equipment, a conclusion free from vagueness, based only in vision, could not be drawn. Galileo

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was one of the scientists who devised an experiment to slow down the “observable” phenomenon of falling. He devised an inclined plane and, after having conducted tests, he verified that there was an implicit – and now observable and thereby measurable – relationship between speed, time, and acceleration. By defining one unit of time, he sought to define a special relationship. When a ball was allowed to roll down from the top of the inclined plan and to cover a certain distance in the interval of one unit of time, he defined a corresponding unit of space. When the ball was allowed to cover a greater distance, the ball, in one unit of time, after passing the mark of one unit of space, covered three units of space. Repeating the cycle, after the ball passed the mark of three units of space, in one unit of time, the ball covered five units of space. Carrying the experiment further, after the ball passed the mark of five units of space, the ball covered seven units of space in one unit of time. What Galileo was able to perceive by means of this experiment was a law of nature, which makes physical events conform to this law. These results of his experiment on the motions of objects, which turned out to be one of the main cornerstones of modern investigations in the physical world, were published in his 1638 work Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences. The following diagram shows visually the specific relation observed by him (Fig. 3.6). Fig. 3.6: Galileo’s inclined plane showing the time and space proportions identified by him with the experiment on the motion of objects published in the 1638 book Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences, that is, in original, Discorsi e Dimostrazioni Matematiche Intorno a Due Nuove Scienze.

1 3 5 7

Later on, Isaac Newton would accurately calculate Galileo’s empirical conclusions. The relationship he observed, which compels every physical object to obey its law, the force of gravitation, is expressed to be proportional to the product of the masses of two objects and inversely proportional to the square of the distance separating the objects; or mathematically stated:

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Fgrav ∝ (m1) (m2) d2

Therefore, gravity, as a “habitual” or lawful relation between any two objects, is an example of the third (cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 15). One last remark about the categories, which will also be of relevance for semiotics, regards their “degenerated” character. “Degenerated”51 is perhaps too harsh a word to be used in this context, but it is the word Peirce uses to describe the degree to which the third category implies the second and the first, the second implies the first, and the first, being a category of spontaneity, implies nothing but itself. Regarding the first category, Peirce states that, it “may have manifold varieties, or rather arbitrariness and variety is its essence, but it is absolute and unsusceptible of differences of degree. It may be more or less, but it has no different orders of complication” (EP 1: 280). The category of second, on the other hand, because of its characteristic duality, the character of action-reaction, does imply a certain genuineness and degeneracy. The genuine occurrence of secondness always yields a dual relation, that is, an actual dynamic connection between reacting objects or events (CAMPOS, 2005: 16). Peirce further explains that the genuine aspect of secondness is present in volition, that is, in an act of striving. Seen from a human perspective, the reactivity of ego and non-ego within such an act of volition emphasizes the aspect of secondness. The degenerate form of secondness consists in relations involving a weaker form of duality. The duality that characterizes events under the second category is, however, there. The degenerate form of secondness thus defines perception. As Peirce puts it, it seems that inherent in perception is secondness without striving; this reactivity is normally regarded as an effect belonging to the external object (EP 2: 268). Thirdness admits two forms or orders of degeneracy. The genuine occurrence of thirdness consists in the “vital” connection between three elements of a triad, that is, as Peirce affirms it, in the form of “A gives B to C” (EP 2: 269-271; cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 16). In this genuine form of mediation, all three elements are connected to one other by a certain “relation which subsists by virtue of the third term, and each has a character which belongs to it only so long as the others really influence it” (EP 1: 281). Peirce argues, furthermore, that it is a matter of vitality, “for wherever there is life, generation, growth, development, there and there alone is such genuine thirdness” (ibid. Italics are mine). The two orders of

51

Peirce explains that he borrowed this term from the geometrical description of a pair of coplanar rays, which are called “degenerate conic”. According to him the “idea of their being a conic is unnecessary imported” (EP 2: 268).

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degeneracy of thirdness can be expressed as a sort of “categorical simplification” of the triadic relationship. The first degenerated form of thirdness takes place whenever two of the three terms are identical. In this peculiar relation, the third element of the triad mediates between two aspects of the same object. Another example: this form of degeneracy occurs when only dynamic relations between two pairs of elements are observable, that is, either between A and B and between B and C in such a form that a dynamical reaction – but not a genuine relation – occurs between A and C. The second and lowest form of degenerated thirdness occurs whenever the three terms of the triadic relation are identical. In this case, no dynamic connection is possible, only relations through similarities (cf. CAMPOS, 2005: 17). In short, for the purpose of revealing the architectonic character of Peirce’s philosophy, I have presented the concept of architectonic as it relates to philosophical systems. I have pointed out, within this context, that Peirce’s philosophical system, despite its gaps and its character of incompleteness, constitutes a consistent architectonic of philosophy, one that is distinguished by its openendedness and for its constant search for new relationships. As already discussed, the ladder of sciences within Peirce’s philosophy exhibits this character by indicating the specific web of pragmatic relationships between the sciences. Each science is related to the other through the architectonic criteria of principle and data dependability. Every theoretical science provides the less theoretical and more practical sciences with principles, whereas the latter sciences provide the more theoretical ones with data and concrete results. Describing this process in a more precise manner, semiotics, as a normative science, derives its principles from mathematics and from phaneroscopy, and passes its discoveries to metaphysics, to the idioscopic sciences, and to the more practical sciences. In their turn, these latter sciences provide semiotics with concrete data and results. In the seventh chapter, phaneroscopy will be revisited and closely studied along with Peirce’s theory of perception within the context of the logic of design process and especially in connection with the emergence of ideas as in an abductive process. Based upon the preliminary study of this section, the upcoming section will provide a thorough description of the internal structure of Peirce’s semiotics.

A Detailed Review of Peirce’s Semiotics Semiosis, Interpretation, and Pragmatic Operation

THE TRIADIC PROCESS: SIGN AND SEMIOSIS The element of mediation appears in the category of thirdness. It is, as already pointed out, the element of the phenomenon that connects facts together, in the same manner as the law of gravitation regulates actual events. A law of nature is a good example of the category of thirdness. But the hallmark of thirdness is not only the law-like governing character, but the very idea of mediation. The simplest element of mediation is, then, what characterizes the third category. Now, Peirce indicates also that whatever aspects of thought, mediation, growth, learning, and evolution are present, the third category is also present. What characterizes thirdness is the very idea of thought and growth. Peirce contends that thought is something which human consciousness will conform to, such as writing may conform to thought. Here, it is indispensable to leave the old Cartesianlike notions of thought behind, as something supposed to be located in consciousness. Thought, as Peirce contends, is of the nature of habit, “which determines the suchness of that which may come into existence, when it does come into existence” (EP 2: 271). Stated otherwise, the nature of a habit is what makes the events conform to it. According to Peirce, the ideas of purpose, law, thought, are a clear indication of thirdness. A more vital idea – to recall Peirce’s use of the term “vital” as meaning the genuine triadic relation – is the idea of life-giving process. Thirdness “consists in the formation of a habit” (EP 2: 271). Peirce contends, furthermore: It is better worthwhile to remark upon the conception of Life, that Thirdness essentially involves the production of effects in the world of existence; – not by furnishing energy, but by the gradual development of Laws. For it can be said, without dispute, that no sign ever acts as such without producing a physical replica or interpretant sign. (ibid)

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With this, the notion of sign as a mediative element is introduced. For Peirce a sign is the elementary conception of an element of mediation generated by thirdness. Sign, as a general concept, appears in a genuine triadic relation with the general and indecomposable relational form of “A gives B to C”, as already mentioned. In Peirce’s terms, a sign is a first in the triadic relation. According to him: I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person’s mind, that this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. (CP 8.343, 1908)

The sign is determined by its object and, upon having received this determination, the sign intents to represent its object to an interpretant, which is an improved sign. The object is, thus, in relation to the interpretant of the sign, the former determining the latter through the mediative powers of the sign. It is important, however, to understand the meaning of object used here by Peirce as a component of the triadic relation. The common meaning of object as denoting only some existing thing in the sense of Gegenstand, something that reacts against something else, is not correct. According to him, the noun objectum has been coined around the thirteenth century as a term of psychology meaning, primarily, as Peirce states, “that creation in the mind in its reaction with a more or less real something, which creation becomes that upon which cognition is directed”, and, secondarily “an object is that upon which an exertion acts; also what which a purpose seeks to bring about” (MS 693, 1904: 60). In this context, objectum can mean as well something, which any sign corresponds to and also that, which has been put in a relation to some other element and becomes so represented as a member of the relation. It is in this sense that Peirce uses the concept of object as a component in his conception of semiosis. The sign, therefore, determines the interpretant. It is important, however, to note that, in relation to its object, the sign is passive, that is to say, the correspondence of the sign to the object is determined by its effect on the sign, whereas the object itself remains unaffected. In Peirce’s terms, the unaffectedness of the object by its sign is a “circumstance otherwise expressed by saying that the object is real” (MS 792, 1906: 1-2). In relation to its interpretant, however, the sign is active, for it determines the interpretant without being itself affected by the relation of determination. Now, the determination of the sign by its object as well as the determination of the interpretant by the object through the mediative

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power of the sign – determined by the object – results in the communication of a form. That is to say, it is not by any means an existent, but it “is a power, [it] is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions” (MS 792, 1906: 3-4). The form communicated is really embodied in the object, which means that “the conditional relation which constitutes the form is true of the form as it is in the object” (ibid). In the sign, however, because of the determination of the sign by its object, the form is embodied only in a “representative sense”. This representative sense means that, because of the modification, the sign becomes endowed with a power of communication of the form to an interpretant. The representative sense of the form may take place in a more direct manner, “as it is in the object, or it may be in the interpretant dynamically as behavior of the interpretant” (ibid). This formulation is clarified through the careful examination of the following diagram (Fig. 3.7). Fig. 3.7: A graphic representation of Peirce’s semiosis SIGN representamen Quali Sin Legi quasi-mind

quasi-mind (utter)

Immediate Object

(interpreter)

Immediate Interpretant

Dynamic Object

Dynamic Interpretant

The diagram schematically depicts the process of semiosis. As such, it should be understood as an ongoing process. As Thomas Short affirms, the basic concept of semiotics is not that of sign nor that of the sign’s relation to an object and of an interpretant, but that of “semiosis, the process of sign-interpretation” (SHORT, 1982: 286), as in a sort of “flowing stream” of semiosis. In this regard, Peirce affirms: By semiosis I mean […] an action, or influence, which is, or involves, the cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. Σημείωσις (semeiosis) in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero’s time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a sign. (MS 318, 1907: 49-50, alternative sequence; italics are mine)

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Now, in order for semiosis to take place and for the sign to function as a medium that communicates a form, it is necessary that two elements be present. These two elements are quasi-minds, that is, logical elements “capable of varied determinations as the forms of the kind being communicated” (MS 792, 1906: 1). These quasi-minds, Peirce explains, are repositories of thought. The sign mediates between an utterer and an interpreter by conveying meaning from the utterer to the interpreter. The sign is molded, as Peirce explicitly writes in the manuscript, so as to have the meaning in the quasi-mind that utters its meaning. The uttering quasi-mind already contains an ingredient of thought within it, which is, an ingredient of thirdness (MS 318, 1907: 18). The meaning of such a molded sign is conveyed to its quasi-mind interpreter, thus becoming the thought in this quasi-mind interpreter. And as such, following the principle of sequentiality suggested by semiosis, this new quasi-mind interpreter becomes thereby the utterer of the newly endowed thought sign (ibid). In this rather complicated formulation, Peirce identifies the logical aspects necessary for semiosis to take place, that is, for a sign to convey its meaning to another, more developed sign, as determined by an object. A close observation of the diagram (Fig. 3.7) will reveal the indispensable elements of semiosis that must be present in order for the triadic logic action of mediation to come about. The utterer of the sign is its dynamic object. Peirce uses the designation dynamic object to denote the “external” object, that is, that which causes perception, that which is real and determines the sign without itself being modified. Therefore, the dynamic object is what Peirce calls reality, which is what it is without being modified by what is asserted about it. This external part of reality, the dynamic object, determines the sign, imprinting upon it – or to use Peirce’s terms, molds into it – its determination. This determination is now part of the sign, and has potential to convey this meaning. The potentiality inherent in the sign, the imprint, is the quasi-mind “utterer”, which creates a potentiality to be interpreted. The potentiality to be interpreted, to convey meaning to an interpreter is the quasi-mind “interpreter”. In the event that this potentiality is actually interpreted, the sign then conveys its imprinted or molded determination to an interpretant. If the interpretation occurs, a new sign is generated, determined by the first. This new sign, which receives the first sign’s determination, is the dynamic interpretant. Both quasi-minds within the sign, the “uttering” quasi-mind and the “interpreting” quasi-mind, are, in fact, potentialities within the sign. The first quasimind is the imprint of the dynamic object. The potentiality is conveyed to the second quasi-mind, the “interpreter”, as the potential to be interpreted. The first

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quasi-mind, the imprinted or molded potentiality, is the immediate object of the sign. The second quasi-mind, the potentiality to be interpreted, is the immediate interpretant. To reiterate, both the immediate object and the immediate interpretant are part of the sign, that is, contained within the form of the first mold or imprint of the dynamic object, and as a potential to be interpreted. When the sign determines an interpretant, the latter of which results in another sign, more developed than the first, the potentiality becomes an act of interpretation. If this actuality does not come about, the internal potentiality of the sign, its immediate interpretant, remains potential. One example can elucidate this proposition. For instance, before Jean-François Champollion successfully deciphered the system of hieroglyphs, these were believed to be only signs without a connection to a spoken or articulated language. There had been much speculation, largely unfounded, and, in general, no serious attempt was made to decipher these engravings. The engraved signs were perceived, but not decoded. Semiotically speaking, the marks on the stone are signs and as such bear the potential to convey meaning to an interpretant – as long as the potential is actually conveyed to another sign. However, as happens when one is not versed in a certain language system, this actualization, that is, the actual conveying of the meaning from the quasi-mind “interpreter” to a new molded sign, that is, to the dynamic interpretant, does not take place. When Champollion finally deciphered the hieroglyphic system, the whole written and phonetic ancient language system became open to interpretation. That is to say, the potentiality of the quasi-mind “interpreter” began to convey the meaning as “utterer” for the current thought sign, the dynamic interpretant. The potential meaning was thus translated into actual conveyed meaning. The dynamic interpretant is a second formed sign, determined by the first sign, and more precisely, by the dynamic object of the first sign, even though the determination of the dynamic interpretant by the dynamic object occurs mediately via sign. There is another form of interpretant in Peirce’s concept of semiotics. This form of interpretant is actually a concept representing whole new processes of semiosis connected to the originating mediative process just described. Peirce denominated this the final or normal interpretant. The final interpretant is a potential that embraces all of the interpretative results, which every interpretative act should achieve if the semiotic process is carried far enough. It is the potential future interpretation of all dynamic interpretants of a given semiosis. As such, this form of interpretant is not actually achieved, but is rather an ideal state-ofthings in futuro, to be potentially achieved. That is to say, this type of interpretant is equivalent to the maximum limit of actual realizations of an interpretant

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within a given semiotical process (cf. SANTAELLA, 2000: 76). The conception of such an interpretant is that of “scientific inquiry, conceived by Peirce as an indefinitely extended community of inquirers, all of whom have the same ultimate purpose” (SHORT, 2007: 190). Summarizing this explanation, then: The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any possible mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. The Dynamic Interpretant is just what is drawn from the Sign by a given Individual Interpreter. The Immediate Interpretant is the interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. (MS 339, 1906: 276r52)

But depending upon how the sign is molded by its dynamic object, there can be different forms of interpretants. This new subdivision is formed by three elements that characterize an interpretant: emotional, energetic, and logical. According to Peirce, these are regarded, respectively, as feelings, efforts, and change of habits. This classification of interpretants is based on the effect produced by the sign, which in turn produces the interpretant. The first form, the emotional interpretant, which is connected with the first category, firstness, is an effect of feeling produced by the sign, which, according to Peirce, is a “feeling, which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight” (MS 318, 1907: 32, alternative sequence). Let me give an example. If one considers a piece of concert music, say the eighteenth variation of Sergei Rachmaninoff’s “Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini” to be a sign which conveys the musical information, the composer’s musical ideas, as well as the musical execution in the actual form it is phenomenologically experienced, the interpretant is the series of feelings produced by the music in the time it is being played, i.e., the sign, during the course of the musical presentation. This interpretant is called the emotional interpretant (ibid).

52

The page number of the manuscript 339 is here marked differently in comparison with the other manuscripts. Here the number is accompanied with a lowercase “r”. The present manuscript was probably part of a notebook on logic, upon which Peirce constantly wrote since 1867 or earlier. The pages of the notebook were scattered in different folders containing different manuscripts. The later entries in the notebook contain Peirce’s later studies on logic of relatives and on semiotics.

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But if the sign conveys meaning in the form of action-reaction, the effect produced will have the character of an effort. Peirce calls this the energetic interpretant. This interpretant may have the form of an automatic reaction to something or it can also have the character of an effort as reaction, as in volition. It is, however, characterized by its single-actedness, that is, its being as a single actual occurrence, and thus, the designation energetic. However, if the sign possesses an element of the third category, then the interpretant produced may also have the character of a mediative element, a third, which mediates between a first and a second. Peirce affirms that every intellectual concept is a sort of mental sign required in producing an interpretant with the same character. However, the main characteristic of a logical interpretant, as already suggested in the first part of the book and also earlier in this part, where I presented the categories, is not only in conveying an intellectual concept, but in conveying a change of habit. By a habit change, Peirce means a “modification of a person's tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause” (ibid). Because of the degree of generality that is characteristic of thirdness produced by the sign and because the sign conveys this meaning to the interpretant, the generality has an effect on the production of the interpretant so as to determine it as a species of the future tense of the interpretant, as Peirce calls it. This qualifies the logical interpretant to act in a conditional mode as a would be (MS 318, 1907: 12, alternative sequence; cf. EP 2: 410). We recall that the main characteristic of thirdness, as already demonstrated, is that thirdness essentially involves the production of effects in the real external world through the gradual development of laws, regularities or habit-taking actions. This second division of the interpretant is interwoven with the first. Peirce realized that the immediate interpretant, the dynamic interpretant, and the final or normal interpretant, vary as well according to the sign’s determination. Semiotics in the Normative Sciences As I have already demonstrated, the framework of Peirce’s semiotics is rooted in philosophical phaneroscopy. Phaneroscopy is, thus, the point of entrance of positive experience. All these phenomena will furnish semiotical investigation and, because the phenomenological experience is open, the semiotical experience will share its openness. Moreover, semiotics ranks highly in Peirce’s philosophy as a normative science. Within the context of Peircean philosophy, a normative science, as mentioned above, is a theoretical science that prescribes a course of action regarding

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determinate aims. Phaneroscopy is the study of phenomena as perceived, the qualitative experience then passed to the normative sciences. Normative sciences, in their turn, inquire into possible responses and study the interactions with the positive experience drawn from phaneroscopy, and thus prescribe guides of conduct based on that experience. Esthetics, ethics, and semiotics study phenomena in their interactions with the perceiver and reasoner. They are tasked with studying the norms of how these phenomena interact with the reasoner and how the reasoner should interact with these phenomena. They are, as normative sciences, highly theoretical and, as such, do not have a practical application on a philosophical level. The interplay of the normative sciences, esthetics, ethics, and logic, or semiotics, seeks to define “how Feeling, Conduct, and Thought, ought to be controlled supposing them to be subject in a measure, and only in a measure, to self-control, exercised by means of self-criticism, and the purposive formation of habit, as common sense tells us they are in a measure controllable” (MS 655, 1910: 24; cf. KENT, 1987: 148). As to the first of the normative sciences, Peirce regarded the concept of esthetics as the English equivalent of aesthetica, the science founded in the eighteenth century by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Baumgarten had taken his lead from Leibniz, and this new philosophical discipline was “supposed to do for sensate knowledge what logic does for rational demonstrative knowledge” (cf. BARNOUW, 1994: 155-156). From 1902 onward, Peirce placed his version of esthetics at the center of his theory of knowledge. Thus, the original counterpart of traditional logic regarding “sense-knowledge” was given the highest importance within the theory of knowledge: drawing on principles from the highly abstract knowledge of mathematics as well as on phaneroscopy, which studies phenomenological or positive experience, esthetics is tasked to discover two important philosophical components. First, esthetics must discover the most ideal state of things, which could possibly have a practical bearing on human conduct. Second, esthetics must develop a theory “of the deliberate formation of habits of feeling through a series of self-criticisms and hetero-criticisms” (CP 1.574, 1906). That is to say, there is a movement, perhaps better said, an intention: the esthetic experience is drawn from the perception that forces itself upon us. This esthetic experience prompts the receiver to somehow reevaluate and to reformulate what should be sought and pursued as one’s highest ideal. The kind of intentionality that ought to be fostered by esthetics, as Peirce puts it, is: […] meditation, ponderings, day-dreams (under due control), concerning ideals – oh, no, no, no! “ideals” is far too cold a word! I mean rather passionate admiring aspirations after

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an inward state that anybody may hope to attain or to approach, but whatever more specific completion may enchant the dreamer. (MS 675, 1911: 16)

This ideal, then, tends to prompt an analysis and reorganization of the receiver’s conduct. In endeavoring to conform one’s actions to an ideal, it becomes necessary to develop a form of self-control that conforms to that ideal. In the case of logic, for example, a thought process is a specific determinant of this self-control, because thinking about something with logical correctness is also a matter of self-control. In brief, a sort of sensibility accompanies the esthetic experience; a further attendant factor is the reorganization of inner emotion, of our habits of feeling, and our sensibility toward this or that goal. We identify this process of self-modification as an asymptotic approach to an ideal, i.e., as a habit of feeling modification. Now, it is most important to understand what is meant here by ideal. Maybe this word – which was possibly first introduced into the modern Western philosophers’ vocabulary by the Italian scholar and Catholic priest Francesco Lana de Terzi, and which, although derived from the Latin word “idealis”, acquired a new meaning around 1650, when it came to be used not only to describe “perfection” but more pertinently, the process of achieving more developed, more perfected, ideal states, that is Ideals, can be considered as the most abstract form of a selfcontrolled “project”. It is in this sense that the word ideal is understood by Peirce in relation to his concept of esthetics: it is not an aim crystallized in itself but rather a developmental process, a kind of living principle. And the perception of this living principle that moves us forward, that propels human development, is an investigative impulse triggered by esthetics. To feel more sensibly in light of a mature purpose, to act in accordance with this purpose, to think and act in a selfcontrolled way in accordance with this purpose, seeking to embody the highest ideals not for individual purposes, but to be part of the general embodiment of reasonableness, is what Peirce chose to denominate reasonable. According to the guiding principle of the ladder of sciences, esthetics discovers principles that have practical bearings upon human conduct. These principles are passed on to the less abstract and less theoretical sciences, while these less theoretical and less abstract sciences provide the more abstract sciences with data, results, and problems. As the first of the normative sciences in Peirce’s ladder, esthetics furnishes principles to ethics, which is the theoretical normative science tasked with, first, the formulation of a theory of formation of habits of conduct according to an esthetic ideal, that is, something so admirable that recommends itself without ulterior reason. And, second, how these newly found habits of conduct must be con-

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sistent with the ethical ideal, the latter being a special designation of the esthetic ideal (MS 693, 1904: 86; MS 478, 1903: 35). While esthetics is tasked, in general, with the theory of the deliberate formation of habits of feeling and ethics, drawing on the ideals discovered by esthetics, inquires how the ideal should be pursued and in doing so, determines what should be deliberately avoided as nonesthetic and non-ethic. The interplay of esthetics and ethics reveals a character of duality manifest in the normative sciences. A genuine secondness of the nature of volition characterizes the struggle action-reaction, the main characteristic of self-control. Self-control presupposes an ideal, on the one hand, and on the other, presupposes the effort to deliberately avoid what is not in conformity with the chosen ideal. The interplay of both esthetics and ethics provides semiotics with its main characteristic of normative logic, which is to differentiate correct thinking from incorrect thinking in order to arrive at the truth. It was perhaps with the idea of normative science in mind that Peirce wrote the following famous passage regarding human individuality reaching toward a broader sweep of humanity as a community through reasonableness. He writes: As for the ultimate purpose of thought, which must be the purpose of everything, it is beyond human comprehension; but according to the stage of approach which my thought has made to it […] it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon self-control that the vir53 is begotten, and by action, through thought, he grows an esthetic ideal not for the behoof of his own poor noodle merely, but as the share which God permits him to have in the work of creation. This ideal, by modifying the rules of self-control, modifies action, and so experience too, – both the man’s own and that of others, and this centrifugal movement thus rebounds in a new centripetal movement, and so on. (MS 290, 1905: 3637. Italic and emphasis are mine)

Peirce, as a logician, concentrated his efforts on conceiving and developing his semiotics within the scope of his system of thought. As a consequence, he did not develop his esthetics and ethics very extensively. Peirce’s conception of esthetics and ethics are different from the more traditional views of these philosophical disciplines. While ethics, from a more traditional perspective, is often regarded as a discipline in the realm of practical philosophy, occupying itself with practical questions of morality, the traditional views of esthetics hinge upon either a philo53

The word vir, from the Ancient Latin, means literally “male”, “man in contrast to woman” (or a “husband”, “a family man”), “lover”, “soldier”, and a “true man”. I think that Peirce, by choosing this word, intended to mean in a more jocose manner the whole of humanity, or, at least, the human individuals who want to strive toward what Peirce calls reasonableness.

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sophical study of the fine arts, in which the critical reading of a certain artistic movement or of a certain work of art is in play, or upon the judgements of sentiments of good taste. As I have demonstrated, Peirce does not consider these two philosophical disciplines from the traditional perspective. A deeper investigation of these two normative sciences, which would require research projects of their own, is beyond the scope of this work.54 However, as I soon will discuss with reference to Peirce’s ladder of sciences, esthetics has a practical branch within the practical sciences, and, as such, has a more practical functionality when connected with abductive inferences. In this case, esthetics and abduction, when connected, function both as an ampliative inference and as the creative act itself. This knowledge about abduction is crucial for the discussion about design process. The goal of semiotics is the self-controlled articulation of signs toward the truth. However, this articulation of thoughts implies an inquiry into the necessary laws of thought, since, according to Peirce, all thought is in signs. Within this context, Peirce’s semiotics is his logic in the sense that the search for the laws of thought and its relation to seeking out the truth occur within the broader scope of a general semiotic. This is because semiotics, in order to seek out and find the truth as the most apt course of thought action that one might take deliberately, that is, as a matter of self-control, must consider the general condition of signs as signs. Furthermore, because of the dynamic aspect of thought, semiotics inquires as well into the laws of the evolution of thought, for the dynamic of the evolution of thought coincides with the study of the conditions under which the meaning of signs are transmitted from mind to mind and from one state of mind to another (cf. CP 1.444). Peirce writes, for instance, [if] it is conceivable that the secret should be disclosed to human intelligence, it will be something that thought can compass. Now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out – the right

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For a deeper understanding of Peirce’s first two normative sciences, that is, esthetics and ethics, I recommend, for instance, the following works: ERNY, 2005; KENT, 1997; SANTAELLA, 1994; POTTER, 1997; BISANZ (Org.) 2009. I have also conducted a more thorough inquiry into Peirce’s esthetics in an article entitled “What is the Esthetics of Charles S. Peirce for? Inquiry into the Theoretical Framework of Esthetics for a Theory of Discovery”. The article is a chapter of the anthology Peirce Studies Volume X. Charles S. Peirce: Bridging the Disciplinary Boundaries of Natural and Sciences and Humanities. Berlin, Peter Lang Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften. Here identified as DA COSTA E SILVA 2018a.

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thinking of transforming signs – then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method could ultimately carry us. (CP 5.553, 1905)

In the sense of Peirce’s semiotics, then, every thought is a continuation of a previous one leading to new series of thoughts. Thinking is a dialog. Semiosis, or the action of a sign to be interpreted in some way as another sign, discloses in the process new significant aspects brought by the first sign, which will be represented by a future sign. As Peirce states, “thought is an operation and a creative operation” (MS 478, 1903: 17-19, alternative sequence). As stressed earlier in the book, Peirce’s concept of mind is also very broad. It goes beyond the traditional notion that mind belongs to a particular thinking brain, the latter being the primary component of intelligence of a human being as a thinking entity. Instead of an exclusive psychological understanding of mind or a Cartesian-like notion of particular, embodied unities of thought described by the abilities of a singular human brain, Peirce’s conception of mind – designed to connect ideas, mental diagrams, and pictures in mental processes that generate propositions, meaning, and interpretations – attains a broader character to include many conceptions of intelligence. In this purview, everything, every process, which is able to perform certain processes and to carry these processes into some form of exteriorization with a projected given purpose, includes thought and purpose, intelligence and mind. Thinking is, thus, a synonym for intelligence, mind, growth, learning, and life (cf. SANTAELLA, 2000: 9, cf. SHORT, 2007: 285). As a philosophical logic, Peirce’s semiotics is therefore founded neither on psychology nor on language. As Peirce explains, logic or semiotics is […] the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind may compel man to think is not the question; and the appeal to language appears to me to be no better than an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic. (EP 2: 309)

One of the most relevant characteristic features of Peirce’s semiotics, in connection with his broad conception of mind and mental processes, is that both logical-processual relations and the material qualities of individual signs or sign systems are required to be present for the semiotic process and need to be embodied semiotically.

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THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF SEMIOTICS The responsibility of the first branch of semiotics, speculative grammar, is to study the available phenomenological inventory and classify the types of signs thereby produced. According to Peirce, speculative grammar imparts the “readiness in employing and in interpretatively applying the notion, idea, or other Sign to which it relates” (MS 649, 1909: 2). This is what Peirce denominates first grade of clearness. The second branch, speculative critics or logical critics, classifies the forms of arguments discovered in the first branch and relates them to the inferential process within a certain scientific inquiry. Logical critics, according to Peirce, imparts distinctness, that is, an analytic understanding with regard to what constitutes the essence of the meaning unveiled and rendered clear by the study of speculative grammar (ibid). Precisely that is what Peirce denominates the second grade of clearness. The openness of phenomenological experience is traversed by suppositions, confirmations, and conclusions. Every supposition regarding a certain object is analog to an innovative abductive inference. Every confirmation about a given object corresponds to an inductive inference, and every consequence or conclusion about an object corresponds to a deduction (cf. PAPE, 1989: 21). The third branch, methodeutic, classifies the possible scientific procedures formed by the inferential processes discovered in the second branch. These scientific procedures are very general in their character and their activity is, as already stated, not to promote a particular definitive procedure to a given problem, but to furnish procedural means to tackle a possible problem by forming a plan for experimentation. The First Branch of Semiotics: Speculative Grammar As I have already pointed out, a given phenomenon brings about three indecomposable elements that are inventoried by phaneroscopy. This phenomenological inventory becomes available for analysis by semiotics. This first study, the classification of the types of signs, marks the beginning of the studies performed by speculative grammar. Peirce’s concept of semiosis, as already stated, is characterized by a predominant processuality. In order to understand this processuality better, I present here the three triads of the sign in relation, first, to its ground, that is to the determination molded in the sign by its dynamic object, second in relation to its dynamic object, and third, in relation to its dynamic interpretant. The sign, depending upon how it has been determined by its dynamic object, is endowed with the power to act either as a qualisign, a sinsign, or as a legisign. A qualisign is a quality that acts as a sign. It needs, however, to be embodied as an

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occurrence, or replica, to be able to act. A replica is, in semiotic terms, an occurrence, a penetrating event that invades perception and brings about the quality. The sense of having perceived a perfume, a quality that invades for an instant the whole consciousness, or better stated, produces a consciousness of this one quality is an example of a qualisign. The sign can function as a sinsign. A sinsign that which characterizes the replica. It is a penetrating occurrence, something that invades perception as something here and now. For the formulation of this concept, sinsign, Peirce took the syllable sin as meaning “being only once”. That is to say, it “is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign” (EP 2: 291). An example of sinsign can be the powerful blow of a note on a trumpet, where the powerful sonority of the instrument brings the quality into perception and at the same time makes itself vividly present. A major mark of the sinsign is its reactivity, for this type of sign function falls in the category of secondness. A sign can also act as a legisign. A legisign is a type of logical relation that introduces some element of sequentiality of thought. It is the ground of the law, of the convention. But it is also the function of the sign that brings about intentionality and planning. […] legisigns only exist in order to be used – that is, to signify through replication – and that presupposes the existence of creatures prone to interpret those replicas according to the rules associated with the legisigns replicated. Conversely, the interpretation of something as the replica of legisigns presupposes that it was produced in order to be interpreted as a replica of that legisigns. (SHORT, 1982: 292)

In his text “Life among Legisigns”, Thomas Short (1982: 292-294) suggests the following situation. Imagine, for instance, the difference between a pile of small stones lying on the side of a fork in the road and a pile of stones intentionally placed on one of the sides with the intention to mark the right path to be followed. It is possible to presume that the pile intentionally placed there marks or signifies something and is related to the path. This replica, that is, this occurrence of the legisign is so interpreted as effectively being a mark for the path intentionally left there. Legisigns and their replicas, contends Short, are essentially different from the other two kinds of signs. The main characteristic that makes legisigns of particular importance for the purposes of the present inquiry is the fact that they are the only kind of ground of sign that are intentionally goaloriented. This is, according to Short, the essence of legisigns. Interpreters of legisigns would not interpret the legisigns’ replicas if these replicas weren’t produced with the express intention of eliciting specific interpreters (cf. SHORT, 2007: 208-209; cf. SANTAELLA, 2000: 101-107). It is important to note, however, that legisigns also must be embodied in some form of happening, here and now.

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That is, legisigns require replicas in order to produce their intended sequentiality. The example of the stones shows that the legisign is embodied in the deliberate act of piling the stones intentionally, and their appearance as such endows the legisign with the power to communicate. The sign, in relation not to its ground, but to the dynamic object itself, can function as an icon, as an index, or as a symbol. The icon appears whenever the dynamic object is also a quality. Being a quality, the determination of the sign by the dynamic object can only assume the nature of a quality. It is an “image” of the determining quality. It does not mean that images in a broader sense are icons. The best example of an icon can be found not in the realm of images, because images almost always presuppose a distinct figurative act, but in the realm of sounds, sonorities, tonalities, and music. A person hears the beginning of Tchaikovsky’s Trepak, one of the dances of The Nutcracker. The qualisigns perceived leave a form in the perception made by rhythms and tones of different instruments. The joy of this imprinted qualisignical form is felt as a continuous quality. When the person has this imprint in his conscience, say, by remembering it, and solfeges of the same form, this solfeged form is an icon, that is, an “image” of the perceived phenomenon. The icon is the only type of sign that can create its own dynamic object. Since icons are the relation of the ground of the sign with its dynamic object, they only present a qualitative aspect of the object. If the iconic sign is, however, a spot of watercolor over a paper, its object will be anything that can be presented by the spot of paint. Hence, there is no need for an icon to have an actual dynamic object. The icon can, in this case, create the dynamic object. A sign can also signify by means of indicating something. Again, there is the dominating aspect of sinsign, of replica, of happening in the here and now. The index is the sign function with the determination of an occurrence. Its dynamic object is something connected with a real occurrence or has a predominant level of reactivity that makes it indicate something. One of the best examples is the occurrence of smoke as the indicative sign of fire. Mostly, an index is physically connected with the object that has produced it. A sign can also function as a symbol. Symbols are signs that, relative to their dynamic objects, have the power to determine their interpretants, that is, they can determine the interpretant and endow it with its significative power by its creating sequences of interpretative processes. Its ground as sign is the legisign. It conveys to its interpretant its general meaning on the one hand, and, on the other, also conveys also its principle of sequentiality insofar as this symbol may be part of the nature of an intellectual concept. Peirce provides an example of this in the following passage:

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A man walking with a child points his arm up into the air and says, “There is a balloon”. The pointing arm is an essential part of the Symbol without which the latter would convey no information. But if the child asks, “What is a balloon?” and the man replies, “It is something like a great big soap bubble”, he makes the image a part of the Symbol. Thus, while the complete Object of a Symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine Symbol is a Symbol that has a general meaning. (EP 2: 275)

In accordance with the third trichotomy, that is, with the relationship of the ground of the sign with its dynamic interpretant, the sign can function as a rheme, as a dicisign, or as an argument. A rheme signifies a qualitative possibility for its interpretant. According to Peirce, the rheme is understood as something that represents a certain kind of possible object (cf. EP 2: 292). It is the interpretant of a qualisign and, as such, is itself a quality. I have already mentioned earlier in this chapter that the icon can create its own dynamic object. That is why the rheme is the interpretant of a possible object. As an interpretation of an icon, the rheme can afford some more information, but given that it is an interpretation of a quality, it may be interpreted as signalizing only qualitative possibilities. The essence of a rheme is that of being merely a substitute for a qualitative aspect of its dynamic object, in the same manner as an icon (cf. CP 5.472, 1908). A dicisign, or proposition, signifies an actual existence for its interpretant. According to Peirce, a rheme is a part of the dicisign. But, since a dicisign involves an interpretation of a sinsign, it involves the actuality marked by the second category, that is, the instance of an event that occurs here and now, and its physical connectedness with its dynamic object. Hence, the dicisign has the form of an actual event (EP 2: 292). The essence of the dicisign is that of having an existential relation to its dynamic object in the same manner as an index, so the assertion involved in interpreting the proposition shall be regarded as an evidence of the fact (cf. CP 5.472, 1908). An argument or deloma signifies a sign of law to its interpretant. It represents the dynamic object in the character of a sign, that is, in its character of being within a process of semiosis, during which the aspect of the third category is more prominent. As an interpretant of a legisign, an argument involves a rheme, for it represents the dynamic object in its characters, and a dicisign, for it represents the dynamic object in respect to its actual existence. The argument is the interpretation of an object and therefore it has the character of a general law or type. The essence of the argument is that of belonging to “a general class of analogous arguments, which class, as a whole, tends toward the truth” (EP 2: 297).

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Peirce classifies three types of arguments, which are, according to their triadic relationships, abductions, deductions, and inductions. The Second Branch of Semiotics: Logical Critics The classification of the arguments characterizes the next branch of semiotics, logical critics. By logical critic, Peirce means “the theory of kinds and degrees of assurance that can be afforded by the different ways of reasoning” (EP 2: 453). Deduction is the best-known inference of logic. It proceeds to produce a general rule from a certain state of things or from a hypothesis by extracting its necessary practical consequences. Deduction possesses the highest degree of assurance of correct reasoning. This happens because of the degree of necessity of this inference in arriving at a conclusion, thus proving it to be true or false. The famous syllogistic form demonstrates a typical form of deduction: every man is mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore – and necessarily – Socrates is mortal. This form of inference is commonly related to the realm of sciences, being especially regarded as the methodological fundament of scientific thought and logical cognition. Nevertheless, deduction also appears as an argument in the realm of the arts. It becomes effective, for instance, as a derivation of arrangements of techniques and esthetic choices from a given artistic discourse. According to Peirce, deduction “produces […] predictions as to what would be found true in experience in case that conclusion were realized” (EP 2: 287-288). As an argument, deduction has, therefore, the character of a demonstration. Induction, on the other hand, is an argument with a character of confirmation and evaluation. The function of the inductive argument consists in evaluating the hypothesis and testing the deductions made from a hypothesis (cf. SANTAELLA, 2004: 167-168). A series of experiments will be made and their results will be contrasted with the deductive result. The results of the experiment and the deductive expectation will be then compared. If these experimental results closely resemble the expectations anticipated by deduction, the hypothesis that explains a given state of things is then confirmed. If there are deviations, the hypothesis must be reassessed and reformulated. In the case of a complete divergence between the experiential results and the expectations predicted by deduction, the hypothesis will very likely be abandoned and a new hypothesis must be sought. Peirce differentiates at least three forms of inductive arguments related to his theory of inquiry. The first type is called direct inductive argument; the second and third types are called, respectively, gradual qualitative induction and gradual quantitative, or statistic, induction (MS 841, 1908: 44-47; cf. KAPPNER, 2004: 223-

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225). The first type of inductive argument consists of generalizations of past experiences and observations. In this case, the experiences can be “expected” to happen in the future. According to Peirce, this type of direct inductive argument is that which Francis Bacon describes as inductio illa quae procedit per enumerationem simplicem55, that is, induction is that which occurs by simple enumeration. Peirce affirms: “for an enumeration of instances it is not essential to the argument that, for example, there are no such things as fairies, or no such events as miracles” (MS 841, 1908: 44-47). This type of induction is the weakest of the inductive arguments, and, for this reason, Peirce calls it crude induction. It is weak because it can be destroyed as soon as further observation and experience proves the generalizations to be flawed. The second type, the gradual qualitative induction is comprised of a series of estimates, of which it is not known if these will hold true in the case of a comparison between the estimate and the observed facts. Depending upon the results of the comparison between estimate and observed facts, the generalization proposed by the hypothesis will be confirmed; or, if there are deviations shown by the comparison between estimate and observed facts, the hypothesis will require adjustments. In the case of a complete mismatch, the hypothesis will be rejected as wrong. The gradual induction makes estimations of the “proportions of truth in the hypothesis with every new instance” (ibid). The third form of inductive argument, the quantitative, or statistical argument is connected with the theory of probabilities, which play an important role regarding the extraction of procedures of a state of things, as well as how these predictions will be tested experimentally. The results of the test, which will lead to a comparison between estimates and observed facts, are also subjected to statistical considerations.56

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For a more detailed review of Francis Bacon’s concept of induction, the reader is advised to consult the book Works of Francis Bacon, Translations of the Philosophical Works, Vol I. James Speeding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath (Eds.). Boston: Houghton, Mufflin, and Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1898.

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Peirce describes the peculiarities of the third type of induction, that is, the quantitative or statistic inductive argument in the MS 841, 1908: 46-47: “This Stage has three parts. For it must begin with Classification, which is an Inductive Non-Argumentational kind of Argument, by which general Ideals are attached to the objects of Experience; or rather by which the latter are subordinated to the former. Following this, will come the testing-argumentations, the Probations; and the whole inquiry will be wound up with the Sentential part of the Third Stage, which, by Inductive reasonings, appraises the different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-

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Deduction and induction are, as pointed out, well-known logical arguments. However, Peirce introduces a third logical inference, which he names abduction or retroduction57. Abduction is the logical inference through which a new hypothesis comes into play. According to Peirce, the formation of a hypothesis is an act of creation in the sense that some new element appears to the inquiring mind. This process is not completely self-controlled, though. There is an origin, a moment of serendipity, of surprise, in which, from a certain context in mind, a new element is formed. In this moment of formation, no logical criticism is possible. The moment of creation of a new element, its synthesis, is purely spontaneous. This new element suggests itself strongly to the perceiving mind and assumes the nature of a very attractive new conjecture or a new idea with regard to the context of inquiry present in this mind. This new conjecture or this new idea are, however, very uncertain and must be put to the logical test. For Peirce, abduction is not only a logical inference, but also, and more importantly, is itself a living process of creation, an insight, that takes place in every form of thought, wherever a mind is capable of growing and generalizing58 (cf. EP 2: 217-218; cf. ANDERSON, 1987: 33). According to Peirce, then,

appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgement on the whole result”. 57

MS 318, 1907: 21-22, alternative sequence. Peirce explains the concept of retroduction as a different name for abduction in the following manner: “I have also called it Abduction, because I hold that it is necessary to make an emendation to the text of the 25th Chapter of the Second Prior Analytics, the effect of which is to identify this mode of inference with the ἀπαγωγή (ápagogé) of that chapter. To avoid dispute about that, I now use the term retroduction.”

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Peirce explains this double aspect of abduction in a detailed manner in the following passage: “However man may have acquired his faculty of divining the ways of Nature, it has certainly not been by a self-controlled and critical logic. Even now he cannot give any exact reason for his best guesses. It appears to me that the cleanest statement we can make of the logical situation, - the freest from all questionable admixture, - is to say that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdness, the general elements, of Nature. An Insight, I call it, because it is to be referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive Judgements belong. This faculty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the instincts of the animals in so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to error; for though it

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The whole operation of reasoning begins with Abduction […]. Its occasion is a surprise. That is, some belief, active or passive, formulated or unformulated, has just been broken up. It may be in real experience or it may equally be in pure mathematics, which has its marvels, as nature has. The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing them. In some cases, it does this by an act of generalization. In other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will ‘explain’ the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. (EP 2: 286. Italics and emphasis are mine)

The Third Branch of Semiotics: Methodeutic Before the activity of the third branch of semiotics, methodeutic, can begin, semiotics must have performed, first, a thorough examination of all of the forms in which thought can be expressed. Since, for Peirce, there is no thought without signs, because thought is embodied in signs, the first branch of semiotics, speculative grammar, investigates the structure of signs. This enables an investigation into the types of arguments. By studying the different classes of arguments and also the properties of those arguments in light of their power in leading to the truth, which is the second branch of semiotics, the logical critics, the third branch of semiotics, methodeutic, comes into play. Methodeutic, according to Peirce, encompasses the “theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kinds” (EP 2: 256), or, otherwise stated, methodeutic studies “the modes that ought to be pressed in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth” (ibid: 260). The quest for the truth starts with a surprising phenomenon that interrupts knowledge. The surprising phenomenon, because it is unknown, will defy the ability to represent it, for it is not possible, at that specific moment, to predict its nature. It is necessary to devise an explanation for this surprising phenomenon. The emergence of an explicative hypothesis would render this surprising phenomenon predictable and knowable. Speculative grammar, in its role as the branch of semiotics that gathers, classifies, and studies the types of signs generated by the study of a phenomenon, enables the branch of logical critics to perform a study of the logical inferences drawn from the examination of the previously

goes wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with which it is right is on the whole the most wonderful thing in our constitution” (EP 2: 217-218).

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performed study of signs. At least one explanatory inference will be formulated and will recommend itself as the correct explanation for the phenomenon, although at this point only provisionally. This inference must be tested; it must be evaluated and proved as correct. Otherwise it is just a mere guess. The process of formulation and adoption of a hypothesis is, as mentioned previously, an abduction. The hypothesis can be considered valuable as an explanation, but it requires extensive evaluation and proof. It is only after the predictions of the hypothesis have been systematically verified through deduction and induction, that is, through the extraction of the necessary consequences of the formulated hypothesis and through the evaluation of factual samples, that the hypothesis can be said to fully explain the surprising phenomenon. The interplay between these three inferential arguments, the formulation and adoption of a hypothesis, the extraction of the hypothesis’ necessary consequences, and the experimental evaluation of samples, comparing the predictions extracted from the hypothesis with the observational facts of performed experiments – otherwise stated, the interplay between abduction, deduction, and induction, in this order – is what characterizes methodeutic. And the specific functions of each of the inferences are what Peirce denominated as the modes that should be arranged and mobilized for the investigation, for the exposition, and for the application of truth. Thus, this third branch of semiotics studies the general conditions that enable the systematic operations of relationships revealed by the second branch, logical critics. In other words, methodeutic studies the appropriate procedures that underlie any form of inquiry (cf. KENT, 1987: 177-180; cf. SANTAELLA, 2004: 210). This is what Peirce denominates as the third grade of clearness, which consists of the given representation that fruitful reasoning can be employed in order to solve difficult conceptual and practical problems (cf. PEIRCE, 1897: 162). Because of this, the third grade of clearness has a future-oriented character. Indeed, Peirce affirms that this grade of clearness, which he also calls pragmatistic adequacy, which is unveiled by methodeutic, imparts what “ought to be the substance, or meaning, of the concept or other symbol in quotation, in order that its true usefulness may be fulfilled” (MS 649, 1909: 2). It should be noted that the grades of clearness involved in the three branches of semiotics are not stages, “as if one were done with before the next began” (ibid: 3). Peirce prefers to call them kinds because they are always present, even in the third branch of semiotics, methodeutic. This is an aspect of the precept of principle of data dependency in Peirce’s system articulated in semiotics: new principles and new data can always enter semiosis and the results obtained in a first study can be modified or en-

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riched by a subsequent one because details not included or not disclosed in the previous observations will be available in subsequent ones. The Maxim of Pragmatism Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism is an operative method of inquiry of methodeutic, and methodeutic, as I have already shown, studies the appropriate procedures that underlie any form of inquiry. Throughout his philosophical development, Peirce sought to clarify his definition of pragmatism, making clear that his maxim is quite different from the more popularized versions of pragmatism.59 Peirce worked out his maxim of pragmatism throughout his mature philosophical writings, although he always referred directly to his first formulation, which, as I have already shown, was published in 1878. In subsequent formulations of the maxim, Peirce would include new developments in his philosophical system, especially with regard to his semiotics. This becomes clear in the analysis of some of the most relevant formulations of his maxim of pragmatism. Let me quote five of these formulations of pragmatism, written between 1878 and 1907. Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (EP 1: 132) Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood. (EP 2: 134-135, CP 5.18, 1903) Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your

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William James, another proponent of the classical American pragmatism, considers pragmatism to be a method with which a metaphysical dispute should be settled, thus considering the method of pragmatism in a very different manner if compared with the logical maxim underlying every form of inquiry ascertained by Peirce. James states, for instance: “the pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many? – fated or free? – material or spiritual? – here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes in such case is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences” (JAMES, 1907: 45. Italics are mine).

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conception of the object. […] The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue the acceptance of the symbol. (PEIRCE, 1905a: 481) Consider what effects it might be conceivably be the practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have: then the general mental habit that consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of your concept. (MS 318, 1907, alternate sequence of the manuscript, p. 22) Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, – especially in modifying habits or as implying capacities, – you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your (interpretational) conception of these effects is the whole (meaning of) your conception of the object. (MS 322, 1907: 11-12)

These various examples of the formulations of pragmatism reveal how Peirce sought to specify the modalizations proposed by the maxim. This can be seen, for instance, in the first formulation, in which Peirce makes use of the words “conceivably”, “conceive”, “conception”. The expression of the maxim, as indicated in the passage of 1903, exhibits an improvement upon the earlier formulations of the modalization. In this case, Peirce contends that the meaning of an indicative mood lies in the tendency to implement a reciprocal practical maxim, which is expressible in a conditional mode as a necessity. The theoretical judgment within the actual mode of interpretation can only be specified by subsequent distinct practical bearings correlated to the theoretical judgment (cf. EP 2: 134-135; cf. ZALAMEA, 2010: 205). In his article “Issues of Pragmaticism” published in The Monist in 1905, Peirce returns to the first formulation of the maxim and reinforces the relationships expressed therein. But at this point, he focuses on the clarification of the maxim by specifying the “general modes of rational conduct” as well as the “possible different circumstances”. Using these distinct expressions, Peirce complements earlier formulations of the maxim by making explicit the intellectual purport of a symbol, which has the power to generate a logical interpretant. As I have shown, logical interpretants have the character of a plan, not only to furnish parameters for experimentation, but also to produce new habits of conduct. This aspect of “would be” of a logical interpretant becomes an integrative factor in pragmatism, for it can articulate these two modalities, that is, the general modes, and the possible different conceivable circumstances that would arise under specific experiential conditions. The example represented by the formulation of the

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maxim in the MS 318, written in 1907, reinforces this mode of conditionality incorporated into pragmatism. Special attention has been given to the role of logical interpretants in developing arguments to create a plan of conduct for future inquiries. The whole meaning of a concept, Peirce contends, is the general mental habit that consists in the production of these effects, that is, of the effects that might conceivably have practical bearings. The formulation expressed in MS 322, written around 1907, clarifies Peirce’s intention: the effects that might conceivably have practical bearings – the possible contexts of possible different circumstances, which Peirce designates as “modifying habits or implying capacities” are related to the whole meaning of the conception of the object. The whole meaning is the interpretational conception of these effects. The formalization of the maxim is still multi-faceted, for it entails many of the important theoretical aspects encompassed by all three branches of semiotics in all three branches, i.e., theory of inquiry, abduction, logical interpretant, intellectual concept, and legisign. But the 1907 definitions of the maxim of pragmatism help to disclose the modalities implied by the fully functional maxim of pragmatism. Fernando Zalamea, in his article “A Category-Theoretic Reading of Peirce’s System”, contends that there are three complex webs through which the maxim of pragmatism filters positive experience: a modal web, a representational web, and a relational web. Through these three webs, pragmatism is able to “differentiate the one in the many” and, more importantly, to “integrate the many in the one” (ZALAMEA, 2010: 205). A symbol, which can potentially generate a logical interpretant, runs through the various contexts of representation able to interpret the sign. These various contexts of representation are related to the context of the possible. Within each context, it is necessary to disclose the practical consequents related to each representation. This study configures the imperative or necessary aspect of the maxim, as explicated by Peirce in his formulation of 1903. By examining these two studies in the contingencies of possible contexts and necessary contexts, potential relations between them become evident and relevant. Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism, as his semiotics, reveals that knowledge is eminently contextual and not absolute; relational, and not substantial; modal, and not determinate; and synthetic, and not analytic (cf. ibid). These aspects of transference, linkage, and co-relationality that characterize Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism can be rendered more precise through the theoretical background of category-theory. Moreover, this theoretical background can also clarify the aspect of pragmatism as understood as a differential and integral abstract calculus. A given sign, say, an intellectual concept, enters the process of semiosis. This sign will be represented in several forms – which can also be called subdetermi-

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nations – in possible contexts of interpretations. The necessary action-reactions involved in such interpretations enable the partial disclosure of some aspects of the sign, for it involves the deduction of practical consequences once a possibility of interpretation is rendered clearer. Furthermore, these aspects of the sign, while being interpreted in a myriad of possible contexts, contribute to what Zalamea calls the process of differentiation (ibid: 206). The diagram (Fig. 3.8) expresses this process by the terms “pragmatic differentials” and “modalizations”. As Zalamea explains, this process indicates the possible variations of interpretation of a main leitmotif, that is, how the same motif “can be extensively changed throughout the development of a musical composition” (ibid), and yet the motif is still identifiable by its basic characteristics. Within this process of differentiation, the representation of a sign into another, more developed sign, implies subcategories such as fidelity, distance, reflexivity, and partiality: this characterizes the process of differentiation. This peculiar aspect of semiosis implies the interpretation of an intellectual concept, while this process is dispersed through multiple languages and multiple general modes of interpretation, as well as dispersed through a myriad of guidelines as to how information about these interpretants ought to be organized and stratified. The diagram (Fig. 3.8) shows the fully modalized operation of pragmatism according to category-theory. Fig. 3.8: A topological modalization of the maxim of pragmatism in accordance with category theory. This diagrammatic exposition was presented in ZALAMEA, 2010: 206 and ZALAMEA, 2012: 55. sign subdetermination context i

correlations

Representation context j

gluings

Sign &

(ACTUAL) modalizations modalities

∂ pragmatic differentials

(POSSIBLE)

context k

action-reaction (NECESSARY)

transfers

∫ pragmatic integral

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However, the most important aspect of Peirce’s pragmatism is its capacity to propose the integration or reintegration of a new isolated or discovered element. After the sign in question has entered the process of semiosis, and after it has been broken down into fragments in the myriad of possible interpretational contexts, these fragments become free to be correlated with each other and with other subfragments from previous logical analyses. The integrative character of methodeutic enables these correlations to take place, and this in turn, enables systemic linkages between fragments to arise, which then unveil potential new forms of knowledge. These new forms of knowledge were hidden in the first steps of the first representational process and could only have been enabled through connections of possible correlations by means of the discovery of analogies and transferences of structural layers. These become perceivable after the differentiation process has taken place (ibid). The diagram (Fig. 3.8) exhibits this unique characteristic feature of Peircean pragmatism by identifying it as a pragmatic integral, which enables these correlations, gluings of fragments, and transfers to become semiotically relevant. In short, the maxim of pragmatism is able to disclose the importance of local interpretation. But its most important characteristic feature is the reconstruction of local interpretations through the operations of gluing and transferring differentiated representations, and integrating the differentiated fragments within new semiotic systems (ibid: 221). According to this and especially taking into account the type of future orientation made explicit by the maxim of pragmatism, it is possible to perceive why Peirce emphasized the idea of experiment, discovery and invention, and the formation of habits that would bring feeling, thought, and conduct in relationship with one another. For Peirce, all branches of semiotics are traversed by abduction, from the evaluation of signs until the formulation of an experiment to clarify a difficult intellectual concept. In this sense, Peirce affirms that pragmatism is the very logic of abduction (EP 2: 226-241). It then would follow that pragmatism, seen strictly as a logical maxim, should be tasked with the formulation of a sound hypothesis that indeed explains phenomena. A newly formulated and accepted hypothesis must, however, pass through the logical investigation as proposed by methodeutic so that the chosen hypothesis can be accepted as evaluated and proven. Peirce emphasizes the thesis that pragmatism is the logic of abduction, by showing the role that hypotheses have within a scientific inquiry. He also points out the goodness of a hypothesis. According to him, this argument runs as follows: the goodness of anything is “whether that thing fulfills its end” (EP 2: 235). Any given accepted hypothesis must, according to its end, be subjected to experiment. For Peirce, then, “any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible […]

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provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification” (ibid). With this assertion, Peirce stresses the two main functions pragmatism should perform.60 Pragmatism should, firstly, rapidly dismiss all unclear ideas. Secondly, the maxim of pragmatism should support and render distinct all ideas that are clear but difficult to apprehend. Both of these functions expected from pragmatism should, according to Peirce, “take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of Thirdness” (EP 2: 239). The logic of abduction suggested by Peirce is, then, the main logical form that propels experimentation, growth of knowledge, and reasonableness. The process of abduction, not only regarded as an inference, but also as a living process of the mind, synthesizes a new idea or conception. This new synthesis, according to Peirce, is what the mind is compelled to perform in order to render anything intelligible. In so doing, the mind abducts, that is to say, the mind brings together or synthesizes a new idea or concept. This new idea or concept presents to the mind connections between data. The connectivity thus rendered possible by abduction allows the mind to synthesize relations between elements which were never thought to have been related to one another. Abduction, in this sense, initiates the process of hypostatization of relations, that is to say, the process in which something newly formed – highly suggestive and attractive to the mind, and yet very ephemeral – can be strongly suggested to the mind in a more intelligible and clearer way, even if the newly formed idea is still very abstract or vague. Stated otherwise, abduction is the process through which a newly perceived idea is given a “local habitation and a name”61. The conduct of a perceiving individual whose mind has perceived this emerging new idea may change in the event that this new element reveals itself as powerful enough to be further developed. This further development, which modifies conduct, is related to a modification of habit of feeling, of action, and of thought. Each abduction produces, or at least has the potential to produce, a change of habit of conduct. But the further pursuit of an idea formed by abduction implies some sort of testing and proving, even if the context is not a purely scientific one. Pursuing the de-

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Peirce states, in case his theory of pragmatism is proven to be either wrong or incomplete: “[…] or, if not pragmatism, whatever the true doctrine of the Logic of Abduction may be ought to do these two services” (EP 2: 239. Italics are mine).

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This passage “a local habitation and a name” is a reference to Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, as discussed in the first chapter of this book. In relation to the Shakespearean quote, the new idea is presented with a more definite form and developed into a concept through the replication of this idea into some medium and through the articulation of a given language.

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velopment of a newly formed idea or concept is related, in the context of pragmatism, with experiment. Every experiment must propel the hypostatization proposed by abduction to the mind in some other form, embodied in some other medium. Generally stated, by developing a new idea or a new concept and making it grow through successive tests, experiments, and further embodiments – regardless of the particular context of action – one engages in a pragmatic action.

Design Process in Light of Semiotics Symbiotic Operations Inherent to the Semiosis of Design Process

A RETURN TO PHANEROSCOPY: TRANSITIONAL POINT BETWEEN PHANERON AND SEMEION As already discussed in the first part of the book in relation to the discovery of a new element that comes into play through abduction, I reiterate that a myriad of successive conceptualizations will originate as well, characterizing the flowing stream of semiosis within design process. However, the synthesized new idea, when it appears to the perceiving mind, has the nature of a phaneron and it is itself not yet of a semiotic nature, but, because it will set off semiosis, the idea will act within this process as a leading principle. This phaneronic leading principle will give rise to the regularities of the conceptualizations and the semiosis will take the shape of an unfolding plan until the developed parameters of the project will become definite and will be accomplished. At the end of the nineteenth century, Peirce had considerably improved his philosophy, spurred by the advances he had made in the study of the logic of relatives, in his theory of categories and the subsequent refinement of the hypothesis of the homology of the categories between mind and world, in the development of a full blown evolutionary cosmological hypothesis, as well as in the study of probability theory and topology (cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 53). It is true that Peirce made significant suggestions valid for the field of psychology as he developed these subjects in his writings, especially in his article “A Guess at the Riddle” of 1887 (EP 1: 245-279). In this text, and also in similar ones of this period of his philosophy, Peirce mentions psychology and proposes to investigate how the categories appear in the mind and how the mind should work according to the fundamental law of growth characterized by events under the third category. These studies are, however, not psychological studies as William James has proposed and executed, but phaneroscopic-semiotical studies undertaken in the

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field of Peirce’s earlier formulations of a theory of mind. On many occasions, Peirce wrote that the human mind is similar to a laboratory in which the operations of the categories, the operations of signs, as well as the operations of inferences can be observed and studied. For Peirce, mind is neither necessarily synonymous with human mind nor with psychological, brain-related reasoning (MS 693, 1904: 172-174). With this important knowledge as a theoretical basis for his later improvements upon his theory of inquiry, Peirce revisited the earliest versions of his theory of mind. At this point in his philosophy, between 1891 and 1893, Peirce wrote his well-known series of articles for The Monist, the so-called “Monist metaphysical project” (W8: 84-207; EP 1: 285-372). Among these articles is “The Law of Mind” (W8: 135-157), in which Peirce employs his theory of logic of relations and the latest developments in mathematics, especially in what refers to the mathematical formulations to describe true continuity, to study the law of mind. From this specific perspective, and employing these theoretical frameworks to analyze and read the functioning of mind in logical terms, Peirce theorized that ideas are not composed of discontinuous flashes, but are lasting events, that is to say ideas are continuous. And, with this theoretical framework, he formulated a law governing mental events, which runs as follows: Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas. (W8: 136; PM: 144)

In order for this thesis to work, Peirce conceived ideas as forms of “episodes” of immediate consciousness that would comprise in themselves infinitesimal intervals of time, which should be immediately perceived as a sequence of instants and which merge into the subsequent overlapping intervals. The perceiving mind registers each interval immediately, but the relations between these intervals is perceived only mediately through inferential processes. Because of its continuous nature, and because the mediate perception included in its representations the totality of relations obtained in a sequence of instants, the mediate or inferred perception of ideas has to regard the continuity of ideas as “spread out” covering the entire sequence and also, concomitantly, as being present in the last interval of the given perceived sequence. This hypothesis guarantees that the whole series of perceived intervals merged with each other is included in the last interval,

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which is on the verge of becoming not the end of the series but the middle for a new series of perceived ideas. Peirce affirms, then: […] the sum of the two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal, so that it is immediately perceived. It is immediately perceived in the whole interval; but only mediately perceived in the last two thirds of the interval. Now, let there be an infinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception; and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series. (W8: 138)

Moreover, the hypothesis of continuity of ideas, as Peirce formulated it using the argument of infinitesimals to justify this welding together in consciousness and to describe the real continuity of ideas, that is to say, to justify continuity both subjectively and objectively, presupposes that past ideas do not vanish entirely with the passing of time because a past idea is still infinitesimally present in the infinitesimal sequence of perceived ideas that have been welded together through mediation. Here, Peirce seeks to account for these welded instants by means of a theory of infinitesimals, which, in his account, is based on a mathematical conception of infinitesimal whose major characteristics is to “act” as a gluing agent between points or discrete entities, which forces these entities to lose their individuality and to become thereby fused into a real continuum, as in a synthetic idea of a line which cannot be thought anymore of as a composition of infinite points. According to André De Tienne, this recourse to the mathematical notion of infinitesimal62 of the nineteenth century could furnish Peirce’s hypothesis of a true and objective – that is, real – continuity with a pragmatic justification for this explanation. That is to say, the use of this specific theory of infinitesimal, even though this idea was outdated, provided a certain degree of intelligibility for this hypothesis, thus rendering the hypothesis and its consequences conceivable (cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 55). At this point in his philosophical development, Peirce assumes that feelings arise as perceived, but still non-generalized ideas that can be spread out and associated with other feelings. Thus, the perception of ideas are felt in the consciousness and, according to the law of mind that affirms that ideas tend to spread continuously and affect certain others in a given relation of affectability,

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Because this specific subject of infinitesimal and Peirce’s conception of a true continuum go beyond the scope of this dissertation, I indicate here further references on the subject: PM: 141-144; ZALAMEA, 2012; MOORE, 2010: 323-362; HAVENEL, 2010: 283-322; EHRLICH, 2010: 235- 282; KAUFFMANN, 2001: 79-110.

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the connectedness between feelings in the mind forms communities of feelings, which are essential conditions for the relationship and communication of ideas between minds or between different states of minds (cf. W8: 137-156; cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 54-55)63. In this context, feelings become welded together into general ideas. According to Peirce’s thesis, general ideas are continua of living feelings. In a given continuum, ideas become modified, become shaped into other ideas. Therefore, the law of mind has a teleological character, for it presupposes that ideas will influence and be influenced by one another, will affect each other according to their predisposition of becoming associated with each other, and will tend, according to this affectability and changes, to determine future acts. A thorough study of Peirce’s cosmological thesis of the law of mind cannot be further pursued here. It is, however, important to introduce it in this work, for the law of mind is one of the bases that has led Peirce to a more mature formulation on perception and representation and consequently to a more mature formulation of his phaneroscopy, his semiotics, and their relationship within Peirce’s theory of inquiry. And yet it is important to note here that the law of mind, that is, the tendency of the ideas to spread continuously and to affect certain others in a given relation of affectability and, in this process of growth and formation, ideas gain in generality and become welded with other ideas, is a pragmatic formulation of the semiotic concept of mind, for it explains with mathematical formulations how conceptions are able to produce effects (cf. DE TIENNE, 2007: 56). In his later philosophy, Peirce reframed the thesis of the law of mind and developed it further according to his mature studies of the logic of relations – now within a fully blown theory of semiotics – and also according to the newest discoveries related to phaneroscopy. It follows that the law of mind can be reframed in phaneroscopic and semiotic terms, especially because it can be considered that the initial hypothesis of law of mind that implies perception of ideas, the perception of feelings and also the perception of generalization and representation of these ideas and feelings in a continual form as to generate habits forming predispositions to cause physical effects.

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In this phase of Peirce’s philosophical development, he makes use of a version of a theory of association of ideas, although not based on psychological views. On this subject Peirce states: “The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. Yet I can but pronounce English sensationalism to be entirely destitute of any solid bottom” (CP 1.5).

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Now, this later development demands for a more thorough exposition of the relation between phaneron and semeion, that is, between the appearance, i.e., of what appears to a perceiving mind in some form, and the representation of this appearance in different forms of mediation. This study is important for the present research on design process because it lies at the core of the process of invention and discovery. As stated previously, I am using the term first generated idea to mean the mental apparition that sets off a new series of conceptions and conceptualizations. The term conception is used here to mean the representation or conceptions drawn from this first generated idea. And the term conceptualization is here used to mean the production of more complex sets of conceptions being articulated in a more global manner within design process. It is, therefore, important here to understand the passage from the appearance of the idea to the conceptualizations set off by it. As already discussed, semiotics comprises the study of signs and therefore of the modes of representation articulated in a given sign process. According to the precept of principle and data dependability at work within Peirce’s architectonic of philosophy, semiotics requires the results of phaneroscopy, of the other two normative sciences, and the principles of mathematics to undertake the specific study of sign processes and how signs convey meaning and represent forms to other minds or to different states of consciousness in the same mind. The inventory of the phaneron performed by phaneroscopy reveal the phaneronic content, that is, the three modes of presentness in a given phaneron, which will be scrutinized by semiotics. However, this transitional point between phaneroscopy and semiotics has been interpreted in different ways throughout the literature about semiotics. Joseph Ransdell, for instance, one of the leading researchers in the field of semiotics, has contended that “the idea of a sign is the idea of manifestation, that is, the idea of appearance. The world appears or manifests itself to us through signs: for Peirce, it is a mere tautology to say this. For that is what is meant by a sign, viz. that through which the world manifests itself” (RANSDELL, 1966: 3-4; cf. DE TIENNE, 1999: 419-420). This position, although clear, reinforces the role of semiotics of being a general science that can cope with every form of manifested signs. But this statement, which is sometimes the predominant opinion related to semiotics, overshadows an important detail by the exaggerated upheaval of the function of semiotics within Peirce’s ladder of sciences. Firstly, the specific function of phaneroscopy and the disciplinary boundary between phaneroscopy and semiotics is no longer clear. And, secondly, the statement seems to imply that semiotics substitutes the delicate investigation of phaneroscopy, especially when Ransdell states that “the world appears through signs”, and, therefore, appear-

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ance is “that through which the world manifests itself”. A closer look at this statement reveals that, here, semiotics took over the function of phaneroscopy, for sign includes hereby the appearance of the world. Stated otherwise, this claim, taken literally, virtually equalizes appearance and representation. But the phaneroscopic appearance, that is, the appearance of a phaneron is not the same as a sign, even if the sign is an iconic sign that presents its dynamic object. This presentness is not the same as the presentness of a phaneron, for an iconic sign is already a relation, that is: a sign that already mediates something, that is, it acts as a sign for a quality of feeling. As already discussed, semiotics requires the results of the study undertaken by phaneroscopy and undertakes the study of the forms of signs produced by a given set of phaneronic content under scrutiny. This means that the grounds of the signs are not phanera but studied and analyzed elements already modified by the studies of both sciences phaneroscopy and semiotics. The idea of sign is already the idea of thirdness, which implies mediation, in-betweenness, representation, conception, growth, whereas the phaneronic appearance implies the phaneroscopic study of what presents itself to the sense perception of a mind in some form at a given moment. As already stated before, Peirce maintains that: The word φανερός (phanerós) is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifestation […]. There can be no question that φανερός (phanerós) means primarily brought to light, open to public inspection throughout […]. I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. (MS 337, 1904: 4-5, 7)

According to this statement and also based on the logic that pervades the organization of the sciences and disciplines in Peirce’s ladder of sciences, it becomes more or less clear that equalizing appearance with representation proposes a dramatic reduction to the processes of perception and mediation. In his paper “Phenomenon vs. Sign, Appearance vs. Representation”, André de Tienne (1999: 419-431) addresses this specific problem and points out that phaneral appearance and representation or mediation, as investigations of different fields of study, which are undertaken by different sciences within Peirce’s architectonic, are matters of distinct forms of observation and require, therefore, very distinct procedural approaches. According to André de Tienne, semiotics studies the phaneron in its secondness, that is to say, semiotics studies the phaneron that has been taken out of the study of phaneroscopy and has been separated and analyzed in such way that it has lost its character as a first, as a phaneronic appearance. By phaneroscopy, Peirce means “the study of whether conscious-

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ness puts into one’s immediate and complete possession, or in other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself”. And by becoming aware of such phaneron, one is not aware of a sign of the phaneron, nor a substitute of it, “nor any sort of proxy, vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it”, but one is facing the phaneron “facie ad faciem” (MS 645, 1909: 3-5).64 If the phaneroscopic study is the study of phanera in their firstness, that is, the study of that which presents itself to a perceiving mind in a certain manner at a given moment, and in this study phaneroscopy will separate the studied phanera from the flowing stream of continual phaneronic experience by objectifying it, the focus of semiotics is the study of these already objectified phanera, which has been subjected to analysis and generalizations, separations and precisions. Now, the study of the phaneron, as the students of phaneroscopy should undertake pursuant to the example given earlier, implies an effort to objectify a determinate phaneron, creating thus a certain objective distance between the perceiving mind and the phaneron. In this process, the objectified phaneron – now an object of study of phaneroscopy – becomes the object of an abstract mental scrutiny. This study requires from the phaneroscopist the ability to mentally detach the phaneron from the continuous stream of phaneral manifestations (cf. DE TIENNE, 1999: 423). This objectified phaneron is, however, not yet mediated in semiotical sense, although the objectified and detached phaneron is no longer part of the continuous flow of phaneronic experience. In this sense, the objectified phaneron, as I stated above, is an object of study on the verge of becoming something else, but not a phaneron anymore. Based on another paper from André de Tienne, “Iconoscopy between Phaneroscopy and Semiotic” (DE TIENNE, 2013: 19-26), I suggest calling this “verge of becoming” the transitional point between phaneroscopy and semiotics, for this objectified phaneron is an object of study that is still part of the phaneroscopic investigation but will soon become the object of study of a different science and, as such, will become a different object of study. It is here important to note that semiotics does not study the phaneron from a different angle or perspective. The previous separation of it from its phaneral continuum and the subsequent analyses and abstractions, have transformed the phaneron under scrutiny into a whole different object of study. In this sense, presentness is the main characteristic of a phaneron, that is, that which partakes the quality of being spontaneous, uncontrollable, inescapable,

64

In this manuscript, MS 645, 1909, Peirce coins another term, prebit, to represent the phaneron while it presents itself, that is, in the very moment of fusion between the continuous phaneral experience and the perceiving mind.

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and immediate. Anything present to the perceiving mind, which has this simple character of a positive first, or that which is positive, present such as it is, regardless of anything else, regardless of past or future, is seen in its presentness, such as it is. Presentness as a characteristic of the phaneron also allows a certain connection between phaneral experience and perceiving mind, creating a form of inbetweenness, a certain point of fusion between the flowing of phaneral experience and perceiving mind, whereby both the flowing of phaneral experience and the perceiving mind coalesce in the presence of each other (cf. DE TIENNE, 1999: 424-425). Taking into account that Peirce’s conception of phaneron includes the idea of a ceaseless, continual flowing stream of phaneral experience that inevitably accompanies all forms of awareness from its first emergence to its fading away, the presentness of the phaneron is characterized by the fusion between perceiving mind and phaneral experience, or, otherwise stated, there is no sense, in logical terms, of duality, ego/non-ego, but only a form of coalescence of both poles. Phaneral experience and its characteristic presentness becomes, in this sense, a flowing stream, the first continuous stream that “carries continuously all thought, all segments of experience, all sensations, emotions, dreams, illusions, errors, actions, calculations, efforts, intentions, etc.” (DE TIENNE, 2007: 37). For the present inquiry, this conception of phaneron is of great importance, for it explains the background of phaneral experience, the presentness of such experience, the specific field of study of phaneroscopy, as well as the point of connection between the phaneral continuum of experience and the subsequent continuum of semiotic processes. Moreover, with the concept of phaneron and the delimitation of the boundaries between phaneroscopy and semiotics, it is possible to grasp with more definiteness the process of abduction that sets off a myriad of processes of invention and discovery within a given design process. Assuming that the abductive process puts forth a new synthesis, which appears insistently to the perceiving mind, and also assuming that from this appearance new semiotic processes in the form of conceptions and conceptualizations within a given design process will be drawn from the generated idea, it is rather advantageous to understand how new semiotic processes appear from the phaneral experience. As it is the case with the constant occurrences of new syntheses that first appear as a phaneron to the perceiving mind engaged in design process, the epistemological bridge explaining the emergence of conceptions from syntheses becomes indispensable. With the framework of phaneroscopy, it is possible to thematize the perennial, continuous flowing stream of phaneral experience constantly invading the mind’s sense perception, an inflow of phanera with no clear boundaries of be-

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ginning or end. It is from this phaneral flowing stream that endless processes of semioses may emerge and, in so doing, will force objectivation and the consequent separation between perceiving mind and phaneron, creating thus the optimal logical conditions to commence with the process of mediation. From the continual flowing stream of phanera, new forms of continuity, which take the shape of mediations, will take place. The separations between perceiving mind and phaneral experience are, however, never a radical severing of these two, for the inflow of phaneral experiences feeds the continuous processes of semioses. With these forced separations, or polarizations, a consciousness of ego/non-ego settles in, and, along with it, the otherness, which, in a posterior moment, will give rise to the logical relation between sign and object (cf. DE TIENNE, 2013: 24; DE TIENNE, 2007: 57). In proposing the first required faculty to the student of phaneroscopy, that of observing the phaneron as it is in its nature, Peirce was calling attention to the special type of scrutiny of phanera such as they present themselves, observing them specifically in the same manner as an impressionist painter gazes at the specific light and colors of a landscape at a certain time of the day in preparing to extract from the scrutiny of these visual qualities the required qualitative grounds to start his painting. When the phanera in question set off a certain semiosis, several degrees of mediation appear. In the moment in which mediation takes place, presentness vanishes and makes way for the observance of logical relations abstracted and generalized from the constant observation of the objectified phanera. Semiotics, therefore, undertakes a different study of the specific object as already pointed out; and comparing this study with the previous study undertook by phaneroscopy, semiotics focuses on the main constituents of the phaneron. Because representation implies several layers of mediation, semiotical investigation focuses upon the logical relations abstracted from the objectified phanera. Otherwise stated, the study of semiotics implies a higher degree of otherness, or of alterity in its study, for it interrupts presentness by interrupting the suchness65 of the phaneron from the perceiving mind, rendering it detached from the continual inflow of phenomenic experience. However, the otherness does not imply a complete severing between these two poles, otherwise the specific connectedness between both sciences would be completely interrupted. To explain this, it is necessary to sketch briefly Peirce’s theory of perception. In the manuscript 693, “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery, whereas Logic is conceived as Semeiotic”, Peirce presents

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As aforementioned, the word suchness is a term coined by Peirce and means the presentness of a phaneron, that is to say, that which is such as it is.

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some important ideas for the development of a theory of perception. Here, Peirce also thematizes, although not in detail, the transitioning point between phaneron to semeion. This specific theory of perception is still in a rather embryonic stage and given the fact that Peirce himself has not formulated it in a more definite manner, as he has done with semiotics, for instance, this theory of perception requires, in order to be fully functional, a thorough study dedicated only for the purpose of defining it. Therefore, I will not engage in such attempt of laying down the whole theory here because it requires a whole new study and also because such discussion would go far beyond the scope of the present book. But some information Peirce provides in this manuscript in conjunction with other writings around the same period of his mature philosophy provides a better understanding of the dynamics of perception as well as the systemic correlation connecting the studies undertook by phaneroscopy and by semiotics. For this purpose, Peirce coins new terms, with which he circumscribes the specific transitioning point. From medieval psychology, Peirce coins the term percept, from the Latin res percepta, with which he means the manner in which an object is perceived, in so far as it forces itself onto a perceiving mind and becomes perceived as it is, that is, in its suchness (cf. CP 7.619; cf. DE TIENNE, 1999: 435; cf. DE TIENNE, 2013: 21). A percept is an image: it is the “strictest literalness” that contains absolutely no fact (MS 693, 1904: 372). The term image, however, does not mean the same as in semiotic terms, such as, for example, an imagetic relation of similarity. The term image here, in the context of the percept and the description of the dynamics of perception, has to be understood as an imprint that occurs in the senses of perception. This form of imprint-image, as I may suggest calling it, carries no discrete facts, for it is still in the continual inflow of phaneral experience, and, as such, is only present to the perceiving mind as an appearance in its suchness. As Peirce thematizes it, […] there is either a continual flow of66 perception, or, as I ought perhaps to believe, so rapid a succession of thoughts of perception, that the effect upon my distinct conscious-

66

Although I transcribed the manuscript literally, without changing or correcting any parts of Peirce’s formulation at first, I did change the formulation here. The sentence “a continual flow of perception”, as I consider here, instead of “a continual flow or perception”, as it is written in the manuscript, would have made more sense within the context of the present discussion. It is highly probable that Peirce made a simple spelling mistake when writing “or” instead of “of”, and, following his argumentation, wrote an “or” just after the comma. Other scholars that worked with this manuscript

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ness (which is limited to so much of my feeling as I can almost absolutely control) is that of a continuous flow. (MS 693, 1904: 378)

The percept is the phaneral presentness, or, as Peirce puts it, it is “the object perceived in a single act of perceiving” (ibid). According to Peirce’s definition, the percept acts as an immediate object, but the object is simply presented, and not yet mediated. At this point, it is not possible to state that this immediate object is part of a communicating sign, for there is not yet a mediating instance following the presentness of the percept. However, as Peirce puts it, every form of knowledge arises from the percept and the only way to describe a percept or a series of percepts is to engage in a comparative study by describing a perception through the consideration of distinguished percepts by their superior vividness (cf. ibid). But how does this process unfold? In the following quote, Peirce exemplifies this dynamic. I will suppose that previous to the perception, my ideas have been running on in a train controlled chiefly by their own natural affinities and by the habit of thought which have grown up under my experience. Suddenly, at an instant characterized by a strong sense of nowness, in which I seem to detect something corresponding to an indivisibility and an isolation of this now, though this may be illusory, I experience a constraining force (implying a sense of resistance thereto), and a change of my habits of feeling is brought instantly about with an […] image of extraordinary detail and positiveness. (MS 693, 1904: 378-380)

This “image of extraordinary detail and positiveness”, which I have suggested calling the imprint-image, forces itself in a certain manner such that it interferes with the previously formed habit of feeling connected with previous perceptions. When this insistent perception ceases, what is left is the image, or something which Peirce calls “memory of the percept”. The percept is not knowledge, but it is a starting point for knowledge. In this starting point, percepts are then selected and “marked up into propositions” (ibid: 380). There are other elements within the dynamics of perception that will also lead to knowledge. In many accounts from 1903 onwards, Peirce attributes several denominations to these elements, but, because he has not given a more definite terminology for them and because a more complex study of this kind, as already mentioned, would be impossible to

have indicated the same opinion. See, for instance, the remarks Helmut Pape made in the second volume of his edition Semiotische Schriften. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2000, p. 421, foonote 56.

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be completed here, I will use only some of Peirce’s conceptions related to his theory of perception which have a direct relevance to the points articulated here. Along with the percept, that is the object as it has been presented itself to the perceiving mind, there are other elements that resemble percepts in the character of imprints, images, but they are, as opposed to the percept, not as insistent nor as definite. Peirce calls these other elements “modified reproductions of the percepts […] each mostly a reproduction of many percepts, somewhat analogous to composite photographs, although a pretty broad analogy” (ibid). The constant repetition of percepts, that is, the repetition of specific “awarenesses” already detached from the continual flow of phanera that have made their way into the perceptive senses will lead to what Peirce called facts of observation. A fact of observation already contains a proposition concerning the content of the “images”, “imprints”, and “composite photographs”. No fact of observation is isolated, just as no percept is isolated either. This is equivalent to affirming that the constant and insisting repetition of propositions made from each detailed, vivid, and positive imprint and image will lead to the pronunciation of perceptual judgements, that is, the formulation asserting “in propositional form what a character of a percept directly present to the mind is” (EP 2: 155). The formulation of such a perceptual judgment is compulsory as well, they are “utterly beyond our control and will go on whether we are pleased with them or not” (ibid). Perceptual judgements will, however, start revealing certain characters of the percepts that keep inflowing and coalescing in the perceiving mind. By acts of abstractions and generalizations caused by the insistent repetitions of images, imprints, and reproductions of percepts, the perceptive judgements will start reformulating the characters of these appearances in a propositional form, however in a rather highly hypothetical form, and therefore, very fallible. In fact, in formulating a certain proposition about the presentness that has just forced itself insistently onto the perceiving mind, the perceptual judgment engages in an abductive inference “nearly approximating it to necessary inference” (CP 4.541; cf. DE TIENNE, 2013: 22). Peirce has identified some important principles at work in the act of perception in accordance with this phaneroscopy and his semiotics, taking into account as well their positioning within his ladder of sciences. What is important here in this section, however, is to have a theoretical framework with which the abductive process of invention, discovery, creation, and also of formation can be properly explained. In the direct context of this inquiry, Peirce’s theory of perception in consonance with phaneroscopy and semiotics helps to shed an important light upon the generation of an idea, how the mind perceives it, and how, from this generated idea, successive conceptions and conceptualizations towards the realization of a given project are drawn. Therefore, the most

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important idea here is to verify that, according to Peirce, “abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them” (EP 2: 227). That is to say, firstly, that every form of abductive process produces a new synthesis and this new synthesis first emerges in the mind as an internal, powerful perception. Otherwise stated, the act of spontaneity, of serendipity, appears like a flash, as in an insight, and synthesizes “what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation” (ibid). This flashing before our contemplation is equivalent to stating, as I rephrase the terminology here in this work, that the synthesis appears, becomes a presentness that insists on being acknowledged by the perceiving mind which this flash has just occurred to. This theoretical position related to perception and abduction is of fundamental importance, especially because it thematizes that abductions are pervading processes within every act of perception, and also because it is implies that every process of invention, discovery, formation, as components of every design process, is pervaded by myriads of abductive process both in what refers to the perception while engaged in a given process and in what refers to the very formation of a leading idea that will set off myriads of subsequent processes. This is an important distinction from the more widespread notions that have related abduction, or as commonly used, “adduction”, to the any form of design process as a subordinate stage for heuristic thinking, as discussed in the first part of the book. Countering this widespread but equivocal view, based on a broader comprehension of abductive process and perceptive process drawn from Peirce’s architectonic of philosophy, it is possible to conclude that abduction, the leading logical, that is to say, semiotical inference – which characterizes and pervades as well the entirety of the maxim of pragmatism – pervades every form of manifestations of creation, of invention, of discovery, and also of formation.

A DARING ATTITUDE OF MIND: RELATION BETWEEN ESTHETIC PRINCIPLES AND ABDUCTIVE PROCESS I will now focus more closely on abduction and its connection to principles drawn from esthetics. This study will, however, take into account esthetic articulations within practical realms and its relationship with abductive inferences as living processes occurring within these practical realms, as, for instance, while one is engaging in design process of some definite kind. This will necessitate shifting the focus away from the normative sciences, and, especially, from nor-

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mative esthetics for, as I discussed earlier, normative esthetics is a highly theoretical science and has little to do with practical tasks. As Peirce points out in his manuscript 693, “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery, whereas Logic is conceived as Semeiotic”, practical articulations of semiotics as well as esthetics exist which are related to more concrete practical fields. These practical disciplines, as already mentioned, were not completely spelled out, but were indicated by Peirce in the manuscript. It is possible, for instance, to conceive of a science of invention and discovery that deals with creative, inventive, and formative processes, with matters of discovery within a certain circumscribed field, such as engineering, architecture, design, arts, and so on. Although this practical science does not have a defined name, at least yet, it is certainly operative in practical activities concerning invention, creativity, and discovery. The essence of this practical science, according to the precept of principle and data dependency of Peirce’s ladder of sciences, is based on normative esthetics and normative semiotics. It can be inferred from Peirce’s manuscript that the practical science in question gives expression to the theoretical principles of the normative sciences through activities and transactions within its more defined fields of activity. Obeying the dynamic principle of the ladder of sciences as well, it may be supposed that the practical science in question furnishes the normative sciences with data, results of experiments, and with concrete problems. Now, I have concluded thus far that, whenever invention and discovery occur, there is an abductive process. Peirce states that abductive reasoning is at work both in science and in arts, and further, that there are similarities between these fields of knowledge. Peirce reiterates this position with the following quote that corroborates the results hitherto achieved: The work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind. The geometer draws a diagram, which if not exactly a fiction, is at least a creation, and by means of observation of that diagram he is able to synthesize and show relations between elements which before seemed to have no necessary connection. (CP 1.383, 1890)

In an article entitled “The Esthetic Dimension of Abduction”, Douglas Anderson (2005: 9-10) addresses exactly this point. Here, Anderson argues that because abduction is a form of reasoning through which the reasoner can establish fruitful habits and because abduction involves a transaction between factual data, ideas, perceptions, and an inquirer, there is a close relation between abduction

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and esthetic principles that pervades abductive reasoning whenever it occurs in practical activities. Anderson extends the term esthetic in Peirce’s philosophy, allowing it to be simultaneously related to the most theoretical realms of esthetics as a normative science as well as encompassing the creation, invention, and discovery in fine arts and other projective activities. He justifies this by claiming that, for Peirce, “the ambiguity is synthesized precisely because artists are those for whom feeling and perceiving are critical” (ANDERSON, 2005: 9-10). As for the term abduction, Anderson proposes to understand the term in a broader perspective, claiming abduction to be a form of active synthetic principle of the mind and a form of reasoning that encompasses all operations through which theories are brought about (ANDERSON, 2005: 10; cf. CP 5.590). In so doing, he understands abductive reasoning not only as a logical inference belonging to normative semiotics, but also as a living process, which abductive reasoning, while being performed, gives expression to. By making the connection with the abductive reasoning that takes place in practical transactions, Anderson argues that abduction is especially endowed with the principle of self-control. As already pointed out, self-control is a hallmark of the normative sciences because the sense of effort – of volition especially – related to the striving toward an ideal and deliberately avoiding that which does not belong to the attainment of this ideal is vividly present in the formation of habits of self-control. This is an important aspect to bear in mind, because abduction, viewed as a living process, involves a mental disposition that requires development and constant training. A large portion of this training consists in further developing the three proposed faculties required to perform the study of phaneroscopy. As already stressed, one engaged in the study of phaneroscopy, or let me say, the phaneroscopist, must open his or her mental eyes, gaze at the phaneron “and say what are the characteristics that are never wanting in it, whether that phenomenon be something that outward experience forces upon our attention, or whether it be the wildest of dreams, or whether it be the most abstract and general conclusions of science” (EP 2: 147). The three faculties that specify this study, according to Peirce, comprise the ability to stare at the phaneron as it presents itself to the perceiving mind, such as the phaneron is, “unreplaced by any interpretation” and “unsophisticated by any allowance for this or that supposed modifying circumstance” (ibid); that is to say, to gaze at the phaneron as it is in its presentness, such as it is, or, in its suchness. The second faculty is that of the adamant discrimination, which tightens itself upon the particular characteristic feature under scrutiny, localizes it wherever it manifests itself, and can find this feature wherever it may possibly appear. And the third faculty, that which im-

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plies the generalizing power of the mathematician, requires the ability of producing an abstract mental formula comprehending the basic characteristics of the component under scrutiny while separating from it the “admixtures od extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments” (cf. ibid: 147-148). According to Anderson, it is possible to train this ability of the mind to perform abductive reasonings. This form of reasoning is not consciously controllable. This observational and relational training cannot control the reasoning itself in what refers to the synthesized content of abductive reasoning. But the training can cultivate a mental disposition to allow abductive reasonings to occur under certain conditions. Anderson suggests that the student interested in training this mental ability should focus on three main points. First, the student must develop the habit of perceiving the presentness of phanera. Second, the student must develop the habit of communicating ideas. And third, the student must focus on the habit of thinking in a certain manner, in which interactions with a factual environment, ideas and inquiries can yield a unification related to the synthesizing character of abduction (cf. ANDERSON, 2005: 10-11). These three aspects can be trained and developed into a form of self-control toward abductive reasonings. The point of connection between abductive inference and esthetic principles is the synthesizing capabilities present in the study of esthetics of creating new elements, new forms of perceiving and conceiving because esthetics proposes the formation of new habits of feeling. Abductive inference, in its firstness, acts as a living principle that synthesizes again and anew newly formed elements. Normative esthetics, as mentioned previously, is tasked with the theory of formation of habits of feeling on the one hand, and, on the other, disclosing the highest ideal perceivable by humans in order to be able to interact with positive experience in accordance with this disclosed esthetic ideal. The very notion of ideal implies that the inquirer must, at any rate, be receptive to this new ideal in order to adopt it as an esthetic one. Furthermore, the perceived ideal must be realized and developed so as to form a theory of deliberate formation of habits of feeling. This requires specific self-control at the level of qualities of feeling. This self-control is formed by an interpolation of sensibility towards feelings and sensibility toward perceptions, which implies the ability to seek different approaches and interfaces with inner and outer perceived feelings. These establish new perceptive habits related to dimensions of feeling. Once a new perceptive dimension is trained, a particular feature of an esthetic ideal is selected and the deliberation upon this habitualization begins. The effort of striving toward a definition of habit-formation calls for self-control. Self-control is, as discussed, not an imposed control, for it does not dominate feeling, conduct, and reasoning, but makes these conform to newly-formed habits.

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Abduction assumes these principles from esthetics directly. The latter furnishes the power to operate by synthesizing facts and ideas on the one hand, and, on the other, to perceive newly formed ideas that impose themselves upon the inquirer’s mind. Abductive inference, as Anderson affirms, reveals several esthetic dimensions. It is closely related to the realm of feeling, emotion, and perception (cf. ibid). Peirce undoubtedly recognized the esthetic qualities of abduction, for it is a sensuous living process as well as creative experience that generates ideas, concepts, objects, signs. Its esthetic character consists in abductive reasoning that appears like a flash, a synthesis, in the same manner as esthetic perception and sudden revelation, bestowing sensibility toward perception, insight, and ideal (cf. SPINKS. 1983: 199; cf. SANTAELLA, 2004: 116). In this regard, Anderson concurs: Abductive self-control must have additional means besides a formal, logical structure, and strict rules of strategy. There is an aspect of inquiry, underwritten by an esthetic attitude that reveals both control and receptivity. (ANDERSON, 2005: 13)

From this perspective, abduction can be considered an operative mode of reasoning in a variety of practical fields, with special emphasis on the arts, technology, engineering, architecture and design. What characterizes these fields is the creative attitude with which projects and designs are developed and expanded. In these fields, the esthetic attitude impels openness toward the abductive generation of the new. This being the case, that esthetics and abduction are not confined to a purely theoretical realm but are seen as operative in concrete transactions among facts, ideas, signs, perceptions, and inquirers, supported by Peirce’s indication in the MS 693 “Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of Discovery, wherein Logic is Conceived as Semeiotic”, corroborates the thesis here proposed, that abduction, in its connectedness with esthetic principles, is the main semiotical articulation – as a living process – through which invention and discovery, as well as form-giving processes take place in the specific context of design process. In the aforementioned manuscript, Peirce affirms that there is a practical science of esthetics and another of logic that are explicitly operative in areas where creativity, invention and discovery are predominant. My particular guess – but this remains here a hypothesis, for this would demand research of its own – is that practical esthetics and its connection to abduction as an inferential living process in fact structures the basis of a theory of invention that can elevate the discussion of esthetics as related to creativity, discovery, and invention to new, not yet established, but potentially very fruitful theoretical dimensions. This hypothesis of

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mine can be reinforced as a plausible one by taking into account the position Anderson assumes when he affirms that it is possible to “address the notion of an esthetic attitude by examining the reasoner’s relations to the world, to herself, and to ideas” (ANDERSON, 2005: 14). Furthermore, Anderson points out that Peirce makes a careful distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences, as exemplified in MS 693. Though Peirce did not work out the practical sciences, he has nonetheless left behind descriptions on how they operate. Based on these, Anderson was able to differentiate some of Peirce’s descriptions of abduction in which the practical esthetic attitude, in relation to the role of normative esthetics, plays a major role. This is of paramount importance for any creative process, especially when involving invention and discovery. Moreover, it is possible to state, at this point, that these abductive procedures connected with the esthetic attitude are operative in every process involving the emergence of a new state of things. There exists, thus, as Peirce affirmed in his MS 693, a practical science of discovery (MS 693, 1904: 80). Anderson concludes, then: The importance of attention to the abductive process is that it permits the inquirer to establish the surprising facts of experience that generate ampliative reasoning and it enables the reasoner to ask relevant questions. Seeing well – seeing esthetically – is an initial conditioning feature of the strategy for good abductive reasoning. (ANDERSON, 2005: 16. Italics are mine)

Accordingly, there are three major focal points of interest related to semiotics in general and to esthetics and abduction as practical matters in particular. It is possible to relate these points concretely to design process. The three points are, first, adaptability in perception, second, creative imagination, and third, receptivity to the insistence of ideas (cf. ANDERSON, 2005: 14; cf. FERRARA, 2004: 5357). Observational powers related to the abductive process prompt the reasoner’s abductive powers as articulations of thought. The suggested articulation is related to what Peirce mentioned as the play of musement, in which the mind can let the thoughts roam free. This free roaming allows ideas to freely interact with other ideas, perceptions, and feelings, for instance. It is an open play with some issue, wonder, ideas, projects – whatever there is that attracts the attention of the “muser” (cf. EP 2, 436). It is important to stress once again that the self-control attached to the esthetic attitude and to abductive reasoning is not that of a complete thought control of mental facts, that is, the self-control is not exercised in the free roaming of musement. Abductive self-control is the exercise of one’s creative thoughts and

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inventive skills in order to develop the habit, first, of perceiving the qualities of the phenomenon, second, of perceiving the qualities of a certain new idea generated by abductive reasoning and, third, of becoming more accustomed and open to abductive reasoning, which increases the receptivity of new ideas and new articulations of ideas whenever they appear. Thus, the abductive powers of thought-articulation become more sensibilized, more receptive, more esthetic. As Anderson states, being imaginative and training this faculty along with the sensibilization of perception through exercise is a “condition of the creativity that generates ampliative reasoning” (ANDERSON, 2005: 17, cf. EP 2, 437). The free play and free roaming of ideas represents a more exploratory and experimental character of this play of musement. Along with a trained perception toward qualities that is introduced with phenomenological experience, the reasoner’s receptivity to ideas characterizes the esthetic attitude of abductive inferences. The free roaming of ideas, or the play of musement, allows the reasoner to uncover new ways of reasoning, new ways of combining ideas and mentally testing them, exploring hypothetical possible consequences, mentally forming shapes, seeking for a pattern, or simply playing with random forms of ideas. Anderson affirms: […] an inflexible reasoner who wishes to dominate ideas in solving problems will in general be an inferior reasoner because he will be in the habit of closing avenues of inquiry before they can be explored. (ANDERSON, 2005: 18-19)

As I have reinforced in this work, according to Peirce’s theoretical framework of semiotics, ideas do not inhabit one’s thinking conscience. Thought is everywhere and the mind needs to allow these thoughts to be embodied whenever the mind is ready to perceive them. This is an important aspect of Peirce’s logical-idealism, which stresses the reality of ideas as being independent of a particular mind. Ideas, whenever perceived, can act as constraints upon an actual thinking process. Peirce makes this explicit in the following passage. [Experience] is that which we are constrained to be conscious of by an occult force residing in an object which we contemplate. The act of observation is the deliberate yielding of ourselves to that force majeure – an early surrender at discretion, due to our foreseeing that we must in whatever we do be borne down by that power at last. Now the surrender which we make in Retroduction, is a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea. (MS 442, 1905: 12. Italics are mine)

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In summary, the interplay between an esthetic attitude in the practical sense and abductive reasoning, hinges on three “moments”: the observational, the imaginative, and the receptive. Following Peirce, I refer to these “moments” as “kinds” to avoid thinking about them in terms of “stages” or as methods for the “right abducting”. They are not hierarchically superordinate. They must be thought of as processual kinds that occur simultaneously. Supporting this claim, Peirce contends that “there is no necessity for supposing that the process of thought, as it takes place in the mind, is always cut up in distinct arguments” (CP 2.27). These three moments or kinds of esthetic attitude are transactional and integral interplays related to the self-controlled habit of enabling, through the deliberate formation of habits of feeling, the mind’s openness toward abductive reasoning. In accordance with this broader view of abductive process in relation to esthetic principles, Luigi Pareyson affirms that the predominance of the esthetically interpretable – or, in a Peircean pragmatic sense: conceivable through abductive process – allows innumerable ways with which things can be accessed, grasped, and captured. This multiplicity of ways of accessing, grasping, or capturing things does not imply a sort of sensual relativism or a skepticism, but rather denotes the inexhaustibility of all that which is spiritual, that is, of the nature of mind. This kind of active heuristic dialog, which is capable of awakening further processes and to provoke a myriad of semiotic processes, is open to every trained mind engaging in this interpretative process and establishes this form of dialog capable of continually replenishing oneself with originality and freshness again and anew while engaging in an act of formation, of exteriorization of concepts and conceptualizations that, because they gain their own reality and existence, feed back to the mind as in an active form of pragmatic, and, in this context, also esthetic, dialog (cf. PAREYSON, 1992: 129130).

WHAT IS THEN THE LOGIC OF DESIGN PROCESS IN LIGHT OF THE SEMIOTICS OF PEIRCE? As the present inquiry draws to a close, I intend to summarize, in the following section, the main observations concerning the theory of design process developed in light of Charles Peirce’s semiotics. However, there are two more issues I wish to explore before concluding the present book. In order to provide an answer to the research question stated at the beginning of this study, that is, the question concerning the logic of design process in light of semiotics, it is necessary to reassess the thesis of design process while taking into account the the-

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oretical frameworks heretofore studied. These theoretical frameworks have been drawn from semiotics and from other philosophical disciplines, such as esthetics and phaneroscopy, which are systemically connected with semiotics, providing semiotics with principles that lead to symbiotic articulations of discovery and invention, form-giving, and rule finding. The very last articulation I propose here is to observe a design process of a concrete project, which took place and rendered real results, that is to say, the project has been finished and the projected object has been constructed. In this last exposition of the book, I will base my observation on important points of the well-documented specific design process of the architectonic project of the Sendai Mediatheque. My intention is to gauge the thesis guiding this work against this concrete design process and observe, in very general terms – that is, by performing an iconoscopic investigation –, the symmetry between them, if there is any to find. I have presented, at the beginning of this third part of the book, an analogy between the architecture of the philosophical system of Charles S. Peirce and a type of building that presents a more dynamic and prototypical type of construction and function, being not contained in an immobile volume on a strict fundament. This analogy was suggested by Fernando Zalamea in his article “A Category-Theoretic Reading of Peirce’s System: Pragmaticism, Continuity, and the Existential Graphs”, and ran as follows: The Peircean system [of philosophy] deserves to be understood not as a construction with deep vertical foundations […], but rather as a typical early 21st century structure, full of transverse horizontal bundles like Toyo Ito’s Sendai Mediatheque, a ‘castle in the air’ translucent and without foundations (ZALAMEA, 2010: 204)

Zalamea pointed out in the analogy that, in comparison with earlier transcendental-based philosophical systems, which necessarily need to be supported by a deep vertical foundation of a metaphysical immobile, immutable, and unshakable truth, Peirce’s system of philosophy is characterized by a dynamic, ever-growing structure, which is not dependent on one “fundamental principle” of metaphysical nature and beyond the reach of the possible experience, but is formed by the interaction with hypothetic and positive experience from which the whole philosophical architectonic represented by the ladder of sciences comes into existence. I believe the analogy between Peirce’s philosophical system and the dynamic project and realization of Toyo Ito’s Sendai Mediatheque can be further explored. I also think that this correlation can be fruitful for the exposition of this book in connection with design process in light of Peirce’s semiotics.

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Whereas the first mention of the Sendai Mediatheque in this study was based upon an parallelism pointing out determined correlations between the conceptual structure of the architectonic project and Peirce’s project for a philosophical system, the upcoming exposition upon design process focuses on concrete and well-documented projectual developments, concepts and conceptualizations of it involving drawings, plans, models, as well as written testimonials from some of the architects and engineers involved in the project. In short, the present exposition will take into account the specific reports and the sign-processes that have contributed and ultimately led to the realization of the Mediatheque. It is important to notice that neither I will make an architectural analysis of the whole process but will point out specific moments of the documentation so as to show the correlation between the concrete and already effectuated project and the general theory of design process in semiotic terms nor make an analysis of the particular signs of this process as in the first branch of semiotics, but I will focus on this specific design process in its dynamics and logic. Also noteworthy is the character of this analysis: the previous examples and analyses, specifically those concentrated in the first part of the book, had a more theorematic and speculative character. With these first examples, design process was observed within possible scenarios, speculating through the theoretical framework of semiotics on the pragmatical consequences that would appear in any of the fields of knowledge production in which the specific projective activities would take place. Now, the challenge shifts to the observation of this specific design process that was fully developed and realized. But before observing the particular project of the Sendai Mediatheque, I propose to go back to the thesis that guides this work and recall it in light of the framework of semiotics as discussed in the previous sections of this third part. Reassessing the Thesis: Design Process in Light of the Semiotics of Peirce Design process, here characterized as a general procedure of a projecting mind, encompasses the specific mindset of proposing projections, creating strategies to conceptualize and to execute them, thus concretizing the mental projected forms. This is the more general aspect of the German term Entwerfen: as I have already pointed out, I prefer to work with this concept, given that I hold it to be better qualified to describe what I have here defined as design process. I also stated that this specific mindset, which is characteristic of design process, is perceivable in the realm of the arts, architecture, engineering design, as well as in a myriad of

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other fields in which projective activities, form-giving processes, and design processes can arise. According to the thesis guiding this work, it is possible to perceive the unfolding logic of events within design process. This logic of events has been already announced in the maxim of pragmatism, for the maxim is expressed by the logic of abduction, which requires that every new element enters semiosis through an abductive process. It also requires, consequently, that, from this abduction, sets of experiments must be devised in order to test this newly generated idea, thus opening a space for the principle of sequentiality and to the tendency of developing new habits of action connected with the given projective context in which the process unfolds. It is also important to reiterate that the first generated idea will not be simply “copied” into conceptions and articulated as an exact copy in subsequent conceptions and the further conceptualizations. As I have discussed at length in the previous sections of the third part of this book when inquiring into the relation between phaneral flow and the flow of semiosis, the first generated idea is of the nature of a phaneron, and, as such, is not suitable to be grasped in its totality in semiotical terms. This grasping of the phaneron demands experience and time for accounting for the passage from the phaneronic experience to the mediative experience of semiosis. The insistence of this specific phaneron, that is, what I call generated idea, reveals a certain purpose and this purpose will be subsequently developed further by the interplay of semiotical actions. In accordance to the logic of abduction pervading the whole of the pragmatic process that unfolds within design process, I collect the main points of the theoretical framework that emerges from this study related to both the generation of the main idea through an abductive process and to the possible subsequent developmental processes that might come into play in the form of projective activities and experimental procedures. In this respect, Peirce claims that: The realities compel us to put some things into very close relation and others less so, in a highly complicated, and in the [to] sense itself unintelligible manner; but it is the genius of the mind that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and shows them in intelligible form in the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. […] The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently. (CP 1.383, 1890)

That is to say, the logic of abduction at work within the pragmatic and symbiotic operations enables a formative process that includes the dialog inherent to every

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design process that shapes the materiality according to this purpose – and, reciprocally, the further development that is being unfolded within semiosis, the more the first generated idea itself becomes developed. Here, it is possible to realize how the plan, the purpose, and the further development of this purpose are semiotically functioning in a simultaneous and symbiotic manner. The sign-action drives the formative process toward new processes, toward the accomplishment of what the first sign has been molded to represent. The further representations, the conceptualizations, take the function of interpretants within semiosis. And the first generated idea has the semiotic nature of the dynamic object, that is, as already discussed in the previous sections, the function of an event external to the sign but that determines the sign process as well as the interpretants mediately via sign. In order to support this line of argumentation, I have presented a detailed account of Peirce’s semiotics in its philosophical dimension. As I have described, Peirce’s semiotics is a philosophical component, that is, semiotics is the discipline of normative logic within Peirce’s philosophical architectonic. This specific exposition was necessary to disclose the philosophical character of his semiotics and how it functions. Differently from linguistic structural semiologies and from the semiotics of psychological behavioristic extraction, Peirce’s semiotics is a logical discipline that derives its theoretical principles from phaneroscopy and mathematics, classifies the types of signs according to phenomenological contents, analyses arguments that originate from the first analysis, and, finally, proceeds to form a plan for experimentation. Following the lines of argumentation presented earlier in the book, that of the four manuscripts selected for the semiotical inquiry in this research, I have presented and discussed in detail the three branches of semiotics, namely, speculative grammar, logical critic, and methodeutic. Starting with the concept of sign and the function of sign, which is an element of the third category, that is, an element that mediates between two terms of a logical relation, I focused on presenting the classifications of sign typology according to the phenomenological categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Of special importance for this section is the notion of legisign, symbol, and logical interpretant because of their role in producing pragmatic meaning, that is, their role in generating a specific logical argument focused on a given inquiry. The second branch of semiotics, logical critic, deals with the classification of such arguments. The arguments are either deductions, inductions or abductions, according to the logical role they are able to perform within the given inquiry. I then proceeded to present the third branch of semiotics, methodeutics, which consists of the theory of advancement of all types of knowledge and the general modes that are to be articulated in the

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investigation, exposition, and in the application of the truth. Peirce denominates the third grade of clearness in methodeutic, which is the employment of the procedures extracted from fruitful reasoning in solving conceptual or practical problems. This branch of semiotics is also characterized by the operation of the maxim of pragmatism. According to Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism, effects that could conceivably have practical bearings are directly related to the whole intellectual – that is, interpretational – meaning of the given object of study. The most important aspect of semiotics for the present inquiry into the logic of design is, however, the semiotic capability of modalization. Semiotics can isolate, on the one hand, the details and the remarkable aspects of any given new element that enters a semiotical process, studying it through the modal webs of necessity and possibility – and representing this new element according to the different contexts of interpretation. On the other hand, Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism is able to reintegrate this differentiated new element, as well as the particularities discovered through the specific inquiries of differentiation and modalization as well as integration into a global semiotical relation. These two aspects of semiotical investigation, that is, differentiation and integration, which become operative within methodeutic and are articulated by the maxim of pragmatism, are the most valuable theoretical characteristics brought to light in a deeper study of Peirce’s semiotics. As an articulation of an open-ended theory of inquiry, according to Peirce, pragmatism is driven by the logic of abduction, because every newly discovered or invented element that enters a semiotical process, and thereby possesses the character of a hypothesis, should be capable of entering the process of experimentation as well. Here, I reiterate that pragmatism, according to Peirce, should dismiss all unclear ideas and should as well support and render distinct all clear but difficult ideas. Abduction, as a living process of discovery, introduces a new given element into semiosis through the hypostatization of relations, that is to say, by the process of rendering a highly suggestive and yet vague new idea more clear and distinct to the perceiving mind, thus allowing conceptions and conceptualizations to be formed. Here, it is important to note that this aspect of abduction connected to pragmatism’s capability of integration and differentiation is of paramount importance for any manifestation of design process. Countering the disseminated purviews of creative thought, problem solving, and decision making in creative context based upon traditional models of psychology and of instrumentalized rigid stage for a methodical and rational articulation of “innovation”, the last of which is a necessary product of deterministic and mechanic processes, design process in light of semiotics behaves much more like a continual flowing stream in its phaneronic (or phenomenic), semiotic, es-

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thetic, and pragmatic dimensions. While performing purposive conceptions in the context of design process, the mindset leads to invention and discovery at the same time as it selects determinate possible courses of actions in order to effectuate the kinds of successive tasks at hand in relation to the generated idea. Thus, the mental act within a semiotical design process is always connected with the plans for possible and actual experimentations and externalizations. It follows, therefore, that there is no breach between the mental act from the technical and practical realms, for the mindset of design process always calls for the possibility of execution of a given plan, no matter how ephemeral or how concrete it may be. And if distinct courses of action have indeed been selected, the results coming from the subsequent experimentations will eventually feed back into the created system within the given design context. The courses of action will be gauged against the initial idea and also against its earlier developments, thus enabling changes of courses of action and planning in order to best achieve the expected results. This iconoscopy will not interrupt the flowing stream of semiotic and phaneronic processes – that is, processes of interpretations and perceptions, respectively, because these will be happening alongside the development of the given design process. This iconoscopy, that is, this constant gauging the developmental courses of the design process against the generated idea and antecedent developments in order to access possible future developments, is a constant process accompanying the formation of conceptions and conceptualizations, as mentioned in the first part of the book. Therefore, in light of the semiotics of Peirce, the whole of design process is rather considered as a continual flowing stream integrating and enabling further processes of inventing and discovering, and also, because of the nature of such developmental process set in futuro, design process also enables form giving, rule finding, and experimental processes in a form of ever-growing symbiotic operations of abduction, deduction, and induction. In this sense, the effectuation of design process takes the shape of successive embodiments, endeavors to conceptualize and render perceptible and communicative a given form and its respective possible sequences of realization of the project. The earliest conceptions and conceptualizations carry the idea further, being inscribed and graphed in different materialities and with potential, actual, experimental or non-idiosyncratic, and also syncretistic, more elaborated languages. Moreover, as also stated in the first part of the book, the successive replications and exteriorizations guided by the conceptions carry the projective process further, in which these conceptions and conceptualizations give rise to further conceptualizations, thus reciprocally refining and improving the first generated idea.

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In short, concomitant with the initial abduction that generates the very first idea connected with the purpose that sets off a given project or design process, the possible manners with which the formative process will take shape, at least potentially, arise. The very general and potential purpose is communicated throughout the development carrying the design process and becomes progressively more developed, growing and becoming more delineated, until the design process achieves a given consolidation and realization. Therefore, design process is also characterized by a formative principle, which arises in the specific domain of a given design context and nurtures the production of shapes, in accordance with the original idea, concomitantly with the discovery of manners with which these forms will be systematically carried into execution. As to the status of invention and discovery as studied through the framework of Peirce’s semiotics, it is important to reiterate that both processes, invention and discovery, are directly linked to abduction. As already pointed out, abduction in its firstness acts as a living principle that synthesizes newly formed elements again and again and has a strong connection with normative esthetics within Peirce’s ladder of sciences. The exact point of connection between abductive inference and esthetics lies in the principles that lead to the synthesis. Now, abduction is itself an esthetic occurrence, an esthetic living principle appearing to a perceptive mind. From the perspective of Peirce’s semiotics, abduction is the logical inference through which a new hypothesis comes into play. According to Peirce, the formation of a hypothesis is an act of creation in the sense that some new element appears to the inquiring mind. However, this process is not completely self-controlled. There is an origin, a moment of serendipity, of surprise, in which, from a certain mental context, a new element is formed. In this moment of formation, no logical criticism is possible. As an occurrence, as a living principle, the moment of creation of a new element, its synthesis, abduction, when endowed or connected with esthetic elements, is a purely spontaneous esthetic phaneron that enters perception and sets off the inquiry of the normative sciences involving admirable, new forms, ideals, conduct, and thought. This new element suggests itself strongly to the perceiving mind and assumes the nature of a very attractive new conjecture or a new idea with regard to the context of inquiry present in this mind. These new conjectures or ideas are, however, very uncertain and must be put to the logical test. To reiterate: for Peirce, abduction is not only a logical inference, but also, and more importantly, is itself a living process of creation, an insight, that takes place in every form of thought, wherever a mind is capable of growing and generalizing. I here contend that abductions pervade all processes within every act of perception. Every process of discovery, invention and formation, as components of every creative process, is pervaded by myriads

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of abductive process both in what refers to the perception while engaged in a given process and in what refers to the very formation of a leading idea that will set off myriads of subsequent form-giving processes. Normative esthetics, as previously stated, is tasked with the theory of the formation of habits of feeling and with the disclosure of the highest ideal perceivable by humans in order to be able to interact with positive experience in relation to this disclosed, or discovered, esthetic ideal. This implies the need to be receptive to this new ideal in order to perceive it, interact with it, and finally to adopt it as an esthetic one. And, reciprocally, the perceiver must develop this ideal so as to form a plan to develop further habits of feeling. This process is therefore connected with the process of discovery, for it involves much more a given perceptive training and ability than reading distinct processes, catalyzing situations, appearing phanera, and qualities of feeling. Discovery, in the context of design process involves, therefore, a form of learning how to see and how to interact with esthetic appearances. It may be that the perceiving mind is trained enough to propose intentional discoveries, which would be much closer to the invention, for invention requires a higher degree of intentionality. Discovery is, however, non-intentional in the sense that it escapes the willing of self-controlled thinking. There can be a form of intentionality appearing with the whole project, as described in the first part with the project of conceiving a graphic novel or of the conception of a new aircraft, though carrying out the project involves discovering the manners in which the project has to be articulated. As Peirce states, the surrender, which we make while the abductive process is taking place, is a surrender to the insistence of an idea. A process through which discovery takes place resembles much more the generative idea in the case of design process: it appears in the mind as in a flash of perception and will conduce the development of distinct forms of semiotic processes later on. But in itself, discovery is much closer to a phaneronic appearance – and therefore partially out of reach of articulated thought – than an invention. Invention, on the other hand, is also related to abduction and catalyzes a myriad of semiotic processes within a given design context. And, because it also relates to abduction, invention also possesses a certain independence of rational thought, being operable, as a projective activity, only after the abductive process is over and has revealed new features to be included in the creative development of a given design context. There is a more present willing that delineates the involved intentionality. However, serendipity is operative in both, invention and discovery alike, even though the degree in which it appears and how self-controlled the process can be might be very different. A brief analysis of the relation between abduction as a living principle and esthetic principles has revealed three key elements that are of paramount im-

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portance for any discussion of discovery. It follows from this study that the term discovery is here being used more openly to describe the process of coming upon something, discovering, finding, contriving. As already mentioned, these three key elements are, first, the perceptive sensibility required by the esthetic inquiry; second, the esthetic receptiveness toward that which is admirable in itself; and third, the ability to reasonably interact with these appearing forms and simultaneously conform to them, thereby engendering and translating these newly constituted forms into reality through concrete, self-controlled conduct. In this case, the status of invention and discovery, in the context of design process in light of semiotics, pledge for a very open-ended heuristic dialog enabling further processes to take place and thus provoking a myriad of symbiotic operations of abduction, deduction, and induction. And these symbiotic relationships lead to form-giving, rule-finding, and experimental processes while the dialogical process takes place and agents, minds, and communities engage with form-giving processes as well as with the exteriorization of concepts and conceptualizations within this dialogical process. Design Process and the Development of the Sendai Mediatheque The project of the Sendai Mediatheque, in its earliest developmental process, was conceived as an amalgamation of distinct sets of functionalities. According to Eishi Katsura, library and information specialist and member of the project studies committee, the Mediatheque should accommodate three basic principles, to wit: it should, first, function within a compact area of 4000 m2 at the heart of the city and present, in an architectonic way, the required multifunctionality it should embody. Second, the Mediatheque should accommodate and integrate in its facilities the Sendai Civic Gallery, which was functioning prior to the construction of the Mediatheque, in a rented space within a department store; the Mediatheque should improve upon the facilities of the Sendai Public Library as well as the Sendai Audiovisual Learning Center by offering integrated library and audiovisual services and should furthermore present better possibilities of integration and accessibility of the audiovisually impaired. Third, the Mediatheque should accommodate new media and the demands of an upcoming digital era appearing with the rapid development of the internet (cf. ITO, 2003: 31-33). Because of these functionalities, the project could be conceived, as Toyo Ito mentioned, as the development of a “place for searching out information” (ibid. 7). Architectonically, it should propel the integration of operations by an intelligent arrangement of available space and also by reducing compartmentalization. In short, the present project could be defined as the search for:

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[…] the image of a new urban function space for a new age, which together with collectively amassing and providing sensual media such as art, intellectual media, such as books and other data sources, as well a new media such as electronic audiovisuals that are a fusion of these, will also support each individual citizen in realizing his or her imaginative potential to communicate. (ITO, 2003: 9)

Thus, this project that involves a new concept of integration by reconceptualising services and space interactions, was no less than a search for a new building typology and also for an “archetype” with an outspoken transparency and openness of the composition itself (cf. ibid: 7). Though not completely without precedents67, the approach chosen by the architect and his team to develop the conception for this building gave the concept Mediatheque a whole new meaning. Its earliest conceptions, and this would be explored in the subsequent conceptualizations, was set to give the form to: […] a facility whose infrastructure of present day information technology composes a sum (of) intellectual mass […]. [it shall be] a critic facility aimed at promoting arts and culture and lifelong learning, not by present standards of service, but by supporting participatory, self-expressing activities. (ibid: 9)

With these guidelines, the design competition for the project of the Sendai Mediatheque focused upon the design excellency which embodies the main premises of the project and should enable, above all, the “production of an original archetype that will respond to the requirements of the new media” (ibid: 10). This sought archetype for the Mediatheque consisted in a very general set of vague and ephemeral notions. Through this, the team of architects should find – or discover for that matter – a given design for the concept and from there set to materialize the complex facility that should include an art gallery, a public library, audiovisual and media services, including the potentially new forms of communication enabled by the emerging internet. These frameworks should be integrated and function in parallel, but not segment the functioning or the interactive spac-

67

Toyo Ito mentions here some of the precedents for the Mediatheque, which have some similarities with the initial propositions of its functioning. Noteworthy are the German model, the ZKM, Zentrum für Kunst und Medien in Karlsruhe, Germany, which is dedicated to research in arts and digital technology and focuses on the cultivation of media artists. He also mentions the French model, the Carré d’Art in Nîmes, which focuses on the more traditional library functions but aims at the integration of art and data media (cf. ITO, 2003: 9).

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es. Segmentation would mean here a space, where the users receive the information in a rather passive manner. On the contrary, the conceptual goal was to render possible and viable the development of a building whose main function is to create openness and proper conditions for the interchangeability of knowledge and information, forms of communications and users, as well as to render possible the connections between the traditional and new media. From the chosen design, it was expected that the project should propel “the meeting and information exchange amongst citizens” and should also “be open to the city” (ibid: 10). These were the main premises to be taken into consideration. They are, however, not yet the generated idea. This idea for the Sendai Mediatheque appeared through an abductive process after Toyo Ito and his team had been working on forms for bringing these separate frameworks into a certain unity of architectural form. Prior to the public contest, however, Toyo Ito and his architecture office conducted studies based upon more abstracted, “prototypic” forms of buildings constructed of tubes and plates and conceiving these arrangements as models for further architectural studies within this framework, though in a very conceptual manner. According to Toyo Ito, these studies consisted in exercises in “how to maintain the prototypical image even while adding on elements” (ibid: 11). These studies were based upon two main premises that have originated with modern architecture, especially in what refers to more synthetic and abstracted spatial and constructive-material relations. Two architects can be mentioned here, who have put forth concepts that formally helped to propel the study of prototypical spaces: Ludwig Mies van der Rohe with his notion of “universal spaces” and Le Corbusier with this notion of “domino systems”. Universal spaces can be here roughly defined as a space composed by a given arrangement of beams, posts, and connected surfaces in different planes along the height of the posts. This gives the construction an appearance of a “spatial honeycomb” for instance. This type of construction has been widely explored and used in the architecture of offices, factories, and other such facilities, especially those in which the internal space can be rearranged in different manners depending upon the functions – a sort of tectonic definition of space, whose constructive structure is also open to experience and is a component of the functional space. The second base for Toyo Ito’s “prototypical” construction is the “domino system” of Le Corbusier. This type of architectonic model consists of columns and flat slabs without beams, functioning thus independently of the floor plans, eliminating thus the need of load-beaming walls, as well as eliminating the need for supporting beams for the superstructure. This project was conceived to provide maximal freedom for the inner design as a functional space. The proposal, however, worked much more as

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a new type of concept for architectural building typology, rather than as an applicable urban model. As Toyo Ito and his team proposed a configuration for the Sendai Mediatheque, bearing in mind the parameters that should be included in the project, especially that of a media facility for receiving and transmitting information, and also having had the specific experiences of the studies with abstract models and propositions from Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier, the first generated idea was a special fusion carrying a typological and prototypical structure in its more fundamental elements. The idea gave rise to a building type of prototypical character, which is, according to Toyo Ito, a “system capable of meeting any and all programmatic conditions that might arise”, embodying thus such a flexibility of a ‘universal space’ of the twentieth century (cf. ibid: 11). How and under which specific circumstances the very first idea that brought these elements together came into play cannot be pinpointed at the outset. What can be inferred, though, is that this first abductive inference that produced the first idea gave birth to a series of subsequent concepts – and these are well documented. Feeding on this generative idea, and reciprocally propelling the first idea further, the concepts and further conceptualizations in the forms of drawings, conceptual studies, and models reveal the striking synthetic force of this first generated idea; and because this idea is very persistent, it enforces and carries its main unity and purposes through further mediatic manifestations of it. The signs produced within this specific design context function by producing indications of possible use for themselves within semiotic processes, whereby it requires the interpretation of the character for the corresponding use of a previous act. This is what renders them, even if they function in their indicativerelational mode, intellectual concepts, apt to function as legisigns, enabling thus the production of logical interpretants. For design process and especially in the projective activity of architecture, this means specifically that the projective action is always a process of producing signs as indicated manifestations for later developments, in which the idea of wholeness can be grasped and can be further pursued. As Toyo Ito states: In the Sendai Mediatheque, […] from the its very first conception, we pursued a structural system […] of only plates (floor slabs), and tubes (columns). This shows quite plainly in the early sketches. Even in the competition-stage model, the proposed building was highly abstract, which all these three elements [plates (floors), tubes (columns), and skin (facade/exterior walls)] pared away. (ibid: 11)

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The conceptualizations of the project for the Mediatheque functioned as partial plans for the whole by means of connecting past formulations with future ones, indicated in a special way of seeing and interpreting these plans into new realizations. From the first drafts (Fig. 3.9) that would inform on how to deal with the earliest conceptions of plate, tube, and skin, and how to give this prototypic space a more defined formalization, the generative aspect of design process operates within the framework of pragmatism, that is, in the manner of discovering new elements, properties, and possibilities along with their integration into this particular architectural context. Fig. 3.9: One of the earliest concepts for the structure of the Sendai Mediatheque manifested in a draft. Composed in 1995 by Toyo Ito in the competition phase, the inscriptions of the image read as follows: 1. Complete flat slab, seaweed-like columns, screen façade, express only these three elements in the purest way, study each element structurally, and simplify them as much as possible, all the rest is left as a void; 2. Crossed steel pipe, or punch-holes on steel plate; 3. Include circulation cores or fitting; 4. Front – gradation – back content of the columns varies from void to dense; 5. Thinnest slab, random floor height; 6. Screen façade has only horizontal strips (with transparent, translucid film) (cf. ITO, 2003: 12; cf. CECILIA and LAVENE, 2005: 46).

The conceptualization of these structures that would eventually form the Sendai Mediatheque took the shape of “honeycomb slabs”, formed by twin steel plates with ribbing spaces in between. This arrangement enables a broader span in comparison with concrete. The conception of the columns took the shape of hollow bundles of steel pipes with different shapes and diameters varying between two and nine meters. Whereas each of these bundles of tubes is circular in shape,

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their arrangement within a floor changes, creating thereby a variable and modifying spatial structure and interaction, which tends to propose a space with diversified and individualized expressions and calling for differentiated interactions (Fig. 3.10). This almost “random” placement of the bundle of tubes creates an effect of varying heights of each floor. The conceptual intent here was to invite to this specific type of heuristic interaction with the space, for the configuration of the construction creates a “site-specific uniqueness” in which the distribution of force is not uniform throughout the slabs, but creates distinct spaces with distinct dynamics, a non-uniform spatial relationship with ripple effect bringing in the foreground a heuristic fluidity to the spaces (cf. ibid: 15). As Toyo Ito explains: Our greatest hope for a multilevel scheme such as Sendai [Mediatheque], is to create ‘differentiated spatialities’. Designating ‘room’ spaces specific to isolated functions is to limit free action, whereas human actions are originally complex in nature and should not be specified one particular action to one particular space […]. With the Sendai Mediatheque, we do not unilaterally assign ‘room’ spaces or specify particular uses; rather, we want the building to allow users to discover new places and uses for themselves. Shouldn’t a new public building truly invite discovery and a little creativity? Our efforts to make each tube different properly aspired to creating an architecture that would allow such ‘discovery of places’. (ibid: 15)

Fig. 3.10: A different early sketch of the structure of the Sendai Mediatheque that reveals one of the conceptualizations of the project. This sketch was made by Mutsuro Sasaki, one of the structural engineers working with Toyo Ito’s team as a study of the geometry of the tubes in the competition phase (cf. ITO, 2003: 46).

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From the earliest sketches to the more defined conceptualizations revealing the characteristics of the construction, the signs produced aim at a futureorientedness of embodying the chosen paradigms of the planned “prototypelike” project, an open-ended space that would become fully functional when the building is completed, translating its prototype-ness from the drawings and models to the real interactions within the usages of the building. And these premises that were envisioned by the presentness of the first generated idea should still be perceivable, transformed at this point into myriads of externalizations, drawings, indications, diagrams, and other forms of modelization that will reach farther into the project: “future” here being the aim of the whole endeavor, that is, the whole project becoming an architectonic structure, functioning as a place of manifested learning and developmental processes – but above all, a place to exchange ideas through communicative processes. As to the special form of conveying meaning through diagrammatic means, Peirce reinforces that: […] one can make exact experiments upon uniform diagrams; and when one does so, one must keep a bright lookout for unintended and unexpected changes thereby brought about in the relations of different significant parts of the diagram to one another. Such operations upon diagrams, whether external or imaginary, take the place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in chemical and physical research. Chemists have ere now, I need not say, described experimentation as the putting of questions to Nature. Just so, experiments upon diagrams are questions put to the Nature of the relations concerned. (PEIRCE, 1906: 493. Italics are mine)

Here, the projective activity requires the effort of combining the architectural drawing as a sign, its materiality, and its character as a medium – that is, everything that has to do with the way it is expressed in terms of its specific characters – with the situational connection, so that the function can be displayed on the one hand and engaged with performatively on the other. In the successive interpretations integrated in this future-oriented process, the act of semiosis is by no means limited to the cognitive-intellectual level of the reception of architecture. It concerns the whole range of human experience and thus all sign-graphed and interpretation-specific states, processes and phenomena. That is to say, on the cognitive rational, the emotional psychological and the phenomenal performative levels of experience with architectural objects (cf. GLEITER, 2014: 8; cf. ABEL, 2004: 13-19). Moreover, it can also be stated that the specific signs produced within the context of design process are genuinely manifested signs with a relational specificity of an internal indexicality both in relation to the whole project as well as in

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relation to the external set of signs produced, although this is often difficult to realize from a fixed point of observation due to the manifold shifts within the relationality of signs and sign processes in the context of the generative semiosis. Some degree of relational indexicality hallmarks the projective action within design process with the dimension of time (cf. GLEITER, 2004: 19). Starting from the presence of the mediated signs and indicated, regular made and habitualised relations, a time factor opens into the past by showing oneself the test of the past, and by displaying possible performative realization of sign meanings and relations, a time vector opens into the future. The time vector of future-orientedness is present in the design process of the Sendai Mediatheque in an explicit way, for all sign-manifestations indicate a point in mediated-time that points to subsequent interpretations of the information contained in the mediation. The concept of mediation implies this time vector of interpretability. Reiterating that the nature of a plan is that of conveying the necessary information to carry the represented features into a future execution, mediation thus takes the responsibility of conveying forms and information into the nearest conceivable future through communicative processes. It is only through this mediative aspect of an antecedent to a consequent within semiosis, that is, from the first sign to its generated series of logical interpretants, that new information can be drawn and concomitantly the generated idea can grow in a symbiotic relationship. The intrinsic communicative and mediative aspects of drawings and models within a given design process and their relationship to future conceptualizations and planned actions also includes different forms of discoveries, for new relations and new knowledge can emerge from the exteriorized contents articulated in distinct languages and media. Design process includes, then, an in-built process of selfreferentiality and recognition which leads to new forms of discovery within a given design context. In the architectural case, Toyo Ito states that sketches and models are common design productions used for the communication with oneself or with other participants, architects, engineers, artists, and so on. Producing this type of communicative element – drawings, models, sketches, and concepts, for instance – compels the creator to express some form or space in a given manner. But the exteriorization of such mediated forms becomes a different entity, and is no longer part of the creator (Fig. 3.11). These productions become autonomous, a foreign body through the process of expression, which stands in opposition and independent to the creator. However, these newly exteriorized communicative products render evaluation and observation possible and, for that matter, the discovery of new relations and new elements that can help to propel the whole design context (cf. ITO, SCHNEIDER, FEUSTEL, 1999: 154). As Toyo Ito points out, and this is possible to perceive in the model (Fig. 3.11), the

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Mediatheque was conceived with a very limited number of closed-off “rooms” in the traditional sense, in order to best embody the main premise of the project, that is, that of being an open space in which the exchange of knowledge, information, and ideas can flow without barriers. To achieve the architectonic and projectual openness, he and his team drew innumerous variations on floor plans depicting the types of conceived and possible activities that would take place in each of them. These drawings were conceived in a rather more abstracted manner: in the square-framed diagrams representing the floor plans, the architects depicted mobilities, flows, and activities with a highly symbolic notation, which, at the end of the projective process, resembled in many aspects game boards, which indicated a planned function in a rather free manner in comparison with more constrained plans of common buildings. “Whether or not the game will continue past the completion of the building”, stated Toyo Ito at this point of the developmental process of the Mediatheque, “is anyone’s guess” (ITO, 2003: 17). Fig. 3.11: Strategies of visualization: one of the models of the Sendai Mediatheque (cf. CECILIA and LAVENE, 2005: 46).

Through this specific relationality unfolding within design process and, in particular, the indexicality of the produced architectural signs, the great characteristic of design process emerges: the sense of continuity and the temporality. With the indicative relationality between sign-processes of being made and being used, design process gains, in general, especially within the present architectonic context of the Sendai Mediatheque, its own double time horizon inscribed as the

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most mobile and expressive of all cultural techniques (cf. GLEITER, 2004: 18-19; cf. HAUSER, 2013: 366-370). As it is possible to perceive from the images, the semiotic operation involved in this sign-manifestation reveals an important operation that articulates any form of languages and forms of graphing: the relational, system building aspect of these manifestations, which are relatively and continuously connected by the principles of sequentiality and intentional manifestation, which in its turn, characterizes the functionality of legisigns, of symbols, of argumentative inferences, and of the formation of habits – especially interpretative habits and habits of action (Fig. 3.12). Fig. 3.12: The graphic notation used by Toyo Ito and his team for the development of the symbolic articulation of the human interactions in each floor resembling gameboards. The inscriptions of each symbolic designation read as follows: 1F. Permanent exhibition of contemporary art (barrier free) by means of light, sound, video (image of ripples); 2F. Workshop, terrace, office, entrance hall, shop, cafe, information, toilet; 3F. General/children openstack reading-room, reference room for newspapers and magazines, image of water flow (media stream), terrace, synapse; 4F. Bookshelves and reading room facing outside, strong light suggests directions, memory; 5F. Audiovisual meeting space, video media, library, processing and sending, ripples of information, sit at the terminals, island, devices; 6F. Art program exhibition room, storage, service, circulation, random pattern; 7F. Complete free space, installation, platform (cf. CECILIA and LAVENE, 2005: 55; cf. ITO, 2003: 19).

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In the present case of the project of the Sendai Mediatheque, the characteristic logic of design process unfolds in specific manners, in which the limits of previous projective and construction techniques, procedures and media as well as possibilities of exceeding these limits are evinced. In this concrete example of design process, the possibility of new inventions and discoveries, as well as the constant overhaul of outdated techniques, rules and practices of projective activities that have set off the process and have first given shape to it, becomes thus evident (cf. ITO, 2003: 13-25; cf. HAUSER, 2013: 366). It follows that the articulation of the design process, especially in this architectural case, unveils a double epistemological level. Architectural projects always have a visible result of a given set of knowledge, on the one hand a knowledge of being made, in the sense of being produced, designed within the specific correlate projective activities, and, on the other hand a knowledge of being used, meaning here the conception and the possible translations at the interactive level that the project will enable when it reaches its realization through the specific projective activities (cf. GLEITER, 2004: 19). A special potential of projective activities and design processes in general, and also present in this particular design process, lies in its peculiarity to reformulate simultaneously projections and manners of carrying their specific concepts and conceptualizations independently by articulating different design strategies and techniques alike. Their diversity enables the development of openended processes, principally the endeavor in propelling incomplete design practices that partially, outside of a larger systemic design context, would not be able to determine their own continuation. This characteristic logic of design process is based on the continual symbiotic interpolations of techniques, procedures, rules, processes and practices of projective activities. In this respect, because of the influence of the German term Entwerfen in its generality, as I am using the term here, design process can also be understood as an articulation of cultural technique, through which previous methods of projective activities and developmental processes of given projects are carried out. Seen from this perspective of a set of cultural techniques that combines the creativity potential of humans with notation and image techniques, more generally with technical, esthetic and symbolic practices, design process is conceived as a heterogeneous, syncretisticarticulated projective activity aiming at the conception of imaginary worlds, in which cultural and social projections articulate. Understood from this perspective, design process can also be considered as a basic cultural technique for shaping the future (cf. HAUSER and GETHMANN, 2009: 10-11; cf. GLEITER, 2014: 19). The meaning of this brief digression into the interesting field of cultural technique and cultural studies in relation to design process, as suggested by Su-

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sanne Hauser in her text “Verfahren des Überschreitens: Entwerfen als Kulturtechnik” (HAUSER, 2013: 362-379), is to point out that there are possible confluences, intersecting points of studies as well as strategies of inquiries.68 The term cultural technique (from the German Kulturtechnik) promises at this point a reflexive return to cultural practices, from which the technical apparatus, instruments and artifacts of culture have emerged. Not only can scripture, pictures, and numbers be traced back to basic operations, writing, graphing, drawing, and calculating, but in general it can be said that media and the arts themselves are, in more complex sets of relations, specific manifestations of cultural techniques (cf. MAYE, 2010: 122). It is important to reiterate, however – and this can be of help in better determining the still uncertain and undetermined field of studies of cultural techniques – that the thesis of design process in light of semiotics guiding this inquiry pledges for a certain continuity and connectivity that relationally pervades each form of medial manifestation and signification. These sign-manifestations have the power to communicate forms and convey certain modes of interpretations to propel a principle of sequentiality. As already expounded upon, the form communicated by the sign produces another sign, its interpretant, affecting it by its power to convey meaning. The interpretant, that is, the sign produced by the first sign’s conveying of meaning, is thus a subsequent result of this principle of sequentiality initiated by earlier sign representations. The object of such representations is an external form, though not yet thoroughly defined. As Peirce wrote, it is important to keep in mind that using the word “object” meaning a thing, in the sense of something existent, “is altogether incorrect”. The philosophical concept of object, derived from the Medieval Latin concept of “objectum” means:

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At this point, it is important to recognize the value of the research of sign manifestations in the field of cultural techniques for both the semiotic and pragmatic inquiries of a certain series of signs forming a certain sequence as traces of a given significative design process, such as the process that has led to the conceptualization and realization of the project of the Sendai Mediatheque, present a certain confluence. However, whereas the field of semiotics is rather better positioned to undertake this research, the field of cultural technique is, at the present moment, struggling to delineate its field of operation and study in a better manner. For this reason, although the concept of cultural technique (Kulturtechnik) can be fruitful for future inquiries into theory of design process in connection with semiotics, the perspective of cultural technique demands a thorough study at first, in order to be articulated in the same depth as the semiotics being articulated for this inquiry.

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[…| primarily that creation of the mind in its reaction with a more or less real something, which creation becomes that upon which cognition is directed; and secondarily, an object is that upon which an exertion acts; also that which a purpose seeks to bring about; also, that which is coupled with something else in a relation, and more especially is represented as so coupled; also, that to which any sign corresponds. (MS 693, 1904: 33)

As it is in any act of creation, the first created signs, that is, those signs, which will propel the earliest concepts, have as objects the mere presentness or some present general quality of the first generated idea (Fig. 3.13). As I have previously discussed, these qualitative pieces of objects of the idea, when translated into forms, will tend to disclose their utter interpretant by the means of sequentiality, which is of the nature of the regularities. Now, these regularities are themselves of the nature of acquired habits, which become progressively disclosed along their successive sign-manifestations having, at their point of origin, these fragments of the idea-like objects and tending to disclose and unfold their utter manifestations at an ideal endpoint of the semiosis. Fig. 3.13: A digital conceptualization of the main structure of the Sendai Mediatheque as a further development of this specific architectonic design process (cf. ITO, 2003: 46).

To complete the envisaged project, Toyo Ito and his team projected an external “skin”, which was conceived from a large size screen over the surfaces of the construction. This skin happened to function as a form of “membrane”, in order to suggest “subtle visual effects between the exterior and interior and change the

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appearance of the building continuously throughout the day, as light reflects or passes through the three layers of glass” (ITO, 2003: 17). As to the rooftop and the other sides of the building, these are covered with metal-louvered screens resembling lightweight screen or other forms of membranes that seem to be not attached to the building itself, appearing rather to be floating off the structure. And to complete these planned aspects of the interchangeable architecture through the proposed permeability between internal space and external urban structures, the east and north sides of the Mediatheque are composed of a variety of materials, in which the spaces between slabs are filled with transparent and semi-transparent glass structures or metal. These structures and their particular dispositions of materiality in connection with the whole main premises of the project, give rise to expressions of the treatment of the interior’s extended outside, seeming to directly expose the internal constructions and dispositions of the skin in relation to the rest of the architectural structure (Fig. 3.14). Fig. 3.14: Section of the Sendai Mediatheque (cf. ITO, BUNTROCK, IGARASHI et al., 2009: 142).

And this also gives rise to the all-important interpretant related to the permeability of the whole structure. The various skins-surfacings do not present the Mediatheque as a single-volumetric expression of self-containment, but reveal it as a complex, multilayered, and interactive structure, whose cross section and therefore the whole human domains taking place inside becomes exposed to the outside. This specificity of an open-ended prototypic architectonic structure – and at this point it is possible to comprehend the term prototypic as a form of open-

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endedness of certain build-typologies – is much more than a common space within an urban plan. It is a translucid place that vehemently suggests a barrierfree architectonic relationship. The whole project involves and thematizes the “blurring” barriers69 of architectonic constructions, attempting a more radical notation of openness and looser ambiguity between dimensions, especially between insideness and outsideness. In [the] Sendai [Mediatheque] we had tubes penetrating the floors. Where in an ordinary office building there would be no relationships between up and down, the introduction of tubes gives a visual information of other floors as well as serving as mutually connecting vertical traffic spaces. They make for a degree of interpenetrability between floors, what we might term a ‘blurring’ of levels. (ITO, 2003: 25)

As to the aspect of materiality of the project of the Mediatheque, it is recorded that, alongside the clear drawn principles and clean-cut models, there was paradoxically a rather infuriated battle to shape the steel metal tubes in a proper manner on the construction site. Ito’s team recorded over a year of working with the metal tubes that would, in their turn, give shape to the bundles of tubes supporting the floor slabs. On the one hand, these beams of tubes were being constructed with a great deal of brute force, shaping the metal and interacting with its very properties to enable it, architectonically at least, to perform their lightness and fluidity, keeping the whole structure together and yet mobile in a projectual sense. As Toyo Ito recounts: The labors of working the thick, heavy metal, applying the heat of welding torches, beating bent steel plates, cutting and stripping and welding again, iron that should stop at nothing until it was covered with scars: virtually a time lapse history of primitive civilization since the Iron Age in its fights with physical matter. Matter can be never more than matter, almost pitiable for its very strength. (ITO, 2003: 27)

This work with the materiality is, in the sense it is being understood here, much more of a nature of a dialog than a form of struggle. Toyo Ito refers to it as a struggle probably because of the brutality and levels of strength and energy re-

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As Toyo Ito mentions, “blurring” is the term used in the title of his exhibition, Blurring Architecture, that took place between the autumn 1999 and the early year 2000, being held simultaneously in Aachen, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, as well as in Antwerp, Belgium, and at the Louisiana Museum of Modern Art near Copenhagen, Denmark.

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quired in order to shape the metal to have it assume the form the project required. Seen from this perspective, the project requires that this dialog with the materiality must take place in order for the project to assume an advanced formative and constructive character within the systemic developments of the complex architectonic project. These dialogs, that is, these parallel bundles of semiotic operations running alongside and delineating several complex layers of graphing, codification, and decodification, covering the whole project, indicate the natural tendency of design process as a future-oriented, projective activity, as mentioned previously. Fig. 3.15: Excerpt of the Blurring Architecture: As for the exhibition, Toyo Ito states: “In both exhibition spaces, computer simulations of Sendai [Mediatheque] were shown in four large-screen video projections. These black and white CG images were ‘collages’ of plans we’ve drawn up for the last few years in the process of realizing the building, running studies that changed minutely over repetition, forming a series of overlapping floor plans that could be projected sequentially. The study process was thus compressed in time and displayed as a kind of graphic sign notation. The forest of tubes, cut into cross-section and elevation, appeared in the video projection to flow endlessly in both vertical and horizontal directions. All were abstractions of the special experience of the building, depicting the Sendai Mediatheque free of spatial and temporal thresholds, yet another sense of ‘blurring’” (ITO, 2007: 27, 29).

From the earliest conceptual notations, through more conceptualized presentations of the project, up to the cooperation with structural engineers that would

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contribute to the project by enabling the structural conditions for the consolidation of the project, there have been multi-layered semiotical operations of generating signs and interpretants, of dialoging, and of transmitting ideas from one mind set to others throughout the whole developmental process. These transmissions, translations, exchange of ideas and dialogs take the form of semiotical operations in the shape of notations, image-techniques, symbolic practices within a heterogeneous symbiotic of an esthetic-symbolic-technical projective activity, as aforementioned. As already pointed out, every sketch, model, plan, technical or CAD70 drawing bear in themselves a heuristic power that can potentially set off new discoveries, for they can bring about new manners of looking at the whole process and therefore can propose new reorganizations of distinct parts of the projective activities or even suggest a radical change of conduct within a given design context. Moreover, the specific semiosis, that is the process of translation of one sign into a different, more developed sign – the interpretant of the first sign in terms of Peirce’s semiotics – bears this same heuristic power. No translation happens automatically or by means of deductive processes only. For the most part, a translation – say, of a two dimensional drawing into a three dimensional model, or from a three dimensional model made of plastic into a three dimensional digital model in order to simulate some digital parameters – demand active processes of experimenting, of generating abductions and including lines of inquiries to test the proposed abductive inferences – hence including here the heuristic powers of the logic of abduction inherent to every pragmatic operation, so as to convey the forms announced of the antecedent sign into the next embodiment of this specific conception, the produced interpretant. In the concrete case of the architectural design process of the Sendai Mediatheque, it is possible to put the thesis to the test and confirm it: in order to translate a specific sign, that is, its forms from one medium graphed with a given language into another, improved and more defined sign, a myriad of experimentations and heuristic processes must come into play, in order to guarantee the quality of the translation. One example of the heuristic process of translating forms can be perceived in the accounts of Mutsuro Sasaki, one of the structural engineers that worked with the team of Toyo Ito in the project. Here, it was necessary to sort out misconceptions that appeared due to the difficulty of translat-

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The abbreviation CAD stands, very generally, for computer aided design and is applied in the actuality in a myriad of fields of knowledge production, where design process is active, such as in architecture, design in general, engineering design, arts, and so on.

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ing and communicating ideas – even if varied media had been used to articulate these idea transmissions. As Sasaki recollects: When I first saw Toyo Ito’s shocking sketch, I had an intuitive structural idea on how to make the building; it was not easy to think about how to ‘build’ it in terms of methods of construction, the materials, etc. But to tell the truth, I found that my image of this project and his image of it were completely different. (ITO, 2003: 47)

For Sasaki, as a structural engineer, despite the conceptualizations of Toyo Ito, affirming that the building bore some strong resemblances to a “Dom-Ino” type of construction – related, as aforementioned, to the proposed architectural type of Le Corbusier – for Sasaki, the project was more of the nature of the heritage of an admixture of styles derived strongly from Mies van der Rohe’s “universal spaces” and Gaudi jostled together. What possibly defines the semiotic operations, especially in what refers to the communication of ideas, implied in this specific design process is the affirmation of Sasaki stating: “it could be that the singularity of this building comes from this [conceptual] difference” (ibid: 49). And yet, the semiosis that unfolded within the project and involved a great deal of agents – of minds for that matter – gave rise to a productive dialog, as Sasaki affirms: “But now I see that if our ways of thinking had to be balanced, we could not have merged. It was only possible to unite because we were different, even though we did not intend to be” (ibid). The inquiry upon the specific semioses that have unfolded from any design process can reciprocally render the knowledge available not only for concrete projective activities, in which the thought, the pragmatical bearings of the generated ideas and their conceptions become progressively embodied, but also for the reshaping and re-establishing of the methods available, or creating, for that matter, new methods for upcoming tasks (cf. HAUSER, 2013: 367). Even though there could have been discrepancies and some misunderstandings at a certain point of the developmental process of the design of the Mediatheque, at the end of the whole project, the main idea was embodied, realized as an architectural project and was opened to the public. As Toyo Ito recounts, the Sendai Mediatheque had been, as a project, at the very beginning of the projective activities, conceived as a processual space in which these two completely distinct and sometimes opposed trends of interpretations coexisted: the first is the smooth and slowly flowing, abstracted sign-spaces of the project of dialoging surfaces, levels and dimensions, beams of tubes, membranes and permeability embodied in some drawings and CAD plans, as well as in some models. And the

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second is the construction site, marked by the brutality and resistance of the materiality, hallmarked by the intense effort-laden working with the steel tubes. The study of the evolution of a project and its inherent transformatorial processes taking place in a complex process of selection, translation, integration and interpretation of knowledge forms drawn from almost all areas of knowledge reveals the symbiotic operations of generating new ideas, of formativity, of rulefinding, and of experimenting, as long as they meet the goals and requirements that define the particular design task and its possible outcomes and courses of action. The main task undertaken in this research, be it from a rather speculative perspective, or be it within the framework of a concrete and well-documented design process, was to observe the developmental and transformatorial signprocesses and examine the syntheses, that is, the abductive processes emerging from the systematic incorporation and articulation of different communication and, above all, the integrative processes led by the articulation of pragmatism. The building of the Sendai Mediatheque took its final architectural shape. And, even though the building has opened its doors to the public and become a part of the urban landscape as well as a part of society, this opening is, in the opinion of Toyo Ito, a mere point of passage of the whole conception. The main conceptualization, that is, one of the main cultivated plans of the project, is carried into the project and should therefore function according to the planned openness, “for it [the Mediatheque] still must continue being created, it must go on changing”. The Sendai Mediatheque, so affirms its creator, “must remain under construction” (ITO, 2003: 27), in order to function as the sign-bearer of the whole initial and powerful initial abduction, that is, the prototypical construction that, although realized as a building, has a projective and a prototype character of enabling and inviting active participation in the flow of knowledge production, flow of information, and in the growth of culture, maximizing connective potentials and workflows as well as eliminating barriers and helping to blur imposed disciplinary delimitations in the fields of knowledge production, thus integrating all users in an ever-growing community of culture production. Concluding this exposition, and in the sense of the admirable projectual and prototypic design process of the Sendai Mediatheque just presented, and also in accordance with the theoretical framework developed from the semiotics as well from other disciplines that form the theory of inquiry of Charles S. Peirce, it is possible to conclude that a reading of design process with this framework enables a broader comprehension of this type of projectivity and formative processes reaching as far back to the generation of a first idea itself and also stretching well into the future delineated by the process, even if this delineation is still ephemer-

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al, allowing thus a comprehension of the relations at work in this formative and also highly abductive projective activities unfolding within design process. In light of semiotics, design process, as a mental activity, reveals itself as an admirable process through which ideas, concepts, forms, new arrangements and new systems come into play and become meaningful, spreading thus their formgiving potential into newly created contexts and therefore enabling new manifestations of Gestalt. Perhaps it is exactly this flexibility and plasticity typical of design process as a medium of convergence of myriads of flowing streams and percolations of forms, ideas, and concepts that renders it, design process, a prototypical process, that is to say, a process which is never completed, never finished nor completely defined, but set to operate with possible worlds and imaginations, vague ideas and ephemeral constructions, rendering the unknown knowable, pragmatically giving to things unknown a local habitation and a name, filled with the freshness of discoveries and inventions throughout. I believe that such an approach supported by the theoretical framework of Peirce’s philosophical semiotics can help to mitigate the aforementioned theoretical difficulties currently present in the field of design process, and, at the same time, it puts forward valid contributions from the perspective of Peirce’s philosophy to the theoretical inquiry upon design process, wherever applicable.

List of Figures

The following is a complete list of the diagrams and images presented in each part of the book. Part I

Fig. 1.1. Three views and focus on the general assembly of the North American B-25 Mitchell, model J. Fig. 1.2. Detail of the front-view of the technical drawing showing the shape of the fuselage curves of the B-25 Mitchell. Fig. 1.3. Excerpt of Jacques Louis David’s (1748-1825) Leonidas at Thermopylae, circa 1814. Fig. 1.4. Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867). Madame Edmond Cavé (Marie-Élisabeth Blavot, born 1810). Circa 1818. Fig. 1.5. Eugene Saddler-Smith’s interpretation of Graham Walla’s stages of creative thought. Fig. 1.6. Iterative model of feedback loops related to the six-stage problem solving model as described by Morris Asimow, circa 1962. Fig. 1.7. Operation model of design process as proposed by Bruce Archer, circa 1964.

Part II

Fig. 2.1. Diagram of a representation of the memory system and main components at work in cognitive process after information processing theory. Fig. 2.2. A diagram exhibiting a construction based on the cognitive functioning of human mind according to the mainstream of in formation processing theory.

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Part III

Fig. 3.1. Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept of sign. Fig. 3.2. Concept of sign process according to Charles Morris. Fig. 3.3. Roman Jakobson’s diagram representing the communication process. Fig. 3.4. A diagram representing the spiral formed by square quartercircle areas. Fig. 3.5. A triangle as object of phenomenological study. Fig. 3.6. Galileo Galilei’s inclined plane showing the time and space proportions of his experiment on the motions of objects. Fig. 3.7. A graphic representation of Peirce’s semiosis. Fig. 3.8. A topological modalization of the maxim of pragmatism in accordance with category-theory. Fig. 3.9. One of Toyo Ito’s earliest sketches for the structural concept of the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.10. Mutsuro Sasaki’s sketch of the interpretation of Toyo Ito’s structural conception for the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.11. Strategies of visualization: one of the models of the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.12. The graphic notation used by Toyo Ito and his team representing the human interactions planned for the functioning of the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.13. A digital conceptualization of the main structure of the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.14. Section of the Sendai Mediatheque. Fig. 3.15. Excerpt of the images composed of the computer-generated plans of the Sendai Mediatheque projected at the exhibition Blurring Architecture.

Bibliographical References

A. References of the Works of Charles S. Peirce The following abbreviations indicate the source of Peirce’s writings consulted in this book. CP

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 1958. References are abbreviated as “CP” followed by volume and paragraph number.

DLU

Das Denken und die Logik des Universums. Die Vorlesungen der Cambridge Conferences von 1898. Edited by Helmut Pape. Frankfurt am main, Suhrkamp, 2002. References are abbreviated as “DLU” followed by page numbers.

EP

The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. N. Houser et al., two volumes, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992 (vol. 1) and 1998 (vol. 2). References are abbreviated as “EP” followed by volume and page numbers.

MS

The Charles S. Peirce Papers microfilm edition (Harvard University Library, Photographic Service, 1966). References employ the numbering system for manuscripts (MS#) developed by R. S. Robin in his Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967), as supplemented by Robin in “The Peirce Papers: A Supplementary Catalogue,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, vol. 7, no. 1, 1971, pp. 37-57. For example MS 649.2, 1910 indicates Robin’s catalogue manuscript number 659, page 2, followed by the year of the writing.

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NEM

The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce. Edited by Carolyn Eisele. Volume 1. Arithmetic; volume 2. Algebra and Geometry; volume 3/1. mathematical miscellanea 1; volume 3/2. mathematical miscellanea 2; volume 4. mathematical philosophy. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, Humanity Press, 1976. NEM indicates the work, followed by the volume number and by the page number of the respective volume.

PM

Philosophy of Mathematics. Selected Writings. Edited by Matthew E. Moore. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2010. References are abbreviated as “PM” followed by page number.

RLT

Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conference Lectures of 1898. Kenneth Laine Ketner, Ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. References are abbreviated as “RLT” followed by page number.

W

Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, ed. M. Fisch et al., six volumes now completed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982-. References are abbreviated as “W,” followed by volume and page numbers.

B. General Bibliographical References ABEL, Günter (2004). Zeichen der Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. ADAMS, Colin and FRANZOSA, Robert (2008). Introduction to Topology: Pure and Applied. New Jersey, Pearson, Prentice Hill. AKIN, Ömer, AKIN, Cem (1998). “On the Process of Creativity in Puzzles, Inventions, and Designs”. In: Automation in Construction, 7, pp. 123-138. AMMON, Sabine, FROSCHAUER, Eva Maria (Hrsg.) (2013). Wissenschaft Entwerfen. Vom forschenden Entwerfen zur Entwurfsforschung der Architektur. München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag. ANDERSON, Douglas R. (1987). Creativity and the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers – a member of Kluwer Academic Publishers Group. APEL, Karl-Otto (1975). Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce. Eine Einführung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. ARCHER, Bruce (1979). “Design as Discipline”. In: Design Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 17-20. ARCHER, Bruce (1969). “The Structure of the Design Process”. In: Design Methods in Architecture. Geoffrey Broadbent and Anthony Ward (eds.). London, Lund Humphries Publishers Limited, pp. 76-102.

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ARCHIMEDES OF SYRACUSE (1897). The Works of Archimedes. Edition in modern Notation with introductory chapters. T. L. Heath, Sc.D. (Ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ARGAN, Giulio Carlo (1993). “A História na Metodologia do Projeto”. In: Revista Caramelo, vol. 6, pp. 156-170. ASHWIN, Clive (1984). “Drawing, Design, Semiotics”. In: Design Issues. Vol.1, No. 2, pp. 42-52. ASIMOW, Morris (1962). Introduction to Design. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc. AWODEY, Steve (2010). Category Theory. Oxford Logic Guides. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. BACON, Francis (1898). Works of Francis Bacon. Translations of the Philosophical Works, Vol I. James Speeding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath (Eds.). Boston, Houghton, Mufflin, and Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. BAIN, Alexander (1855). The Senses and the Intellect. London, John W. Parker and Son, West Strand. BAIN, Alexander (1875). The Emotions and the Will. London, Longmans, Green, and CO. BARNOUW, Jeffrey (1994). “The Place of Peirce’s ‘Esthetics’ in his Thought and in the Tradition of Aesthetics”. In: Peirce and Value Theory. On Peircean Ethics and Esthetics. Parett, Herman (ed.). Amsterdam and Philadelphia, John Benjamin Publishing CO., pp 155-178. BARNOUW, Jeffrey (1988). “Aesthetics for Peirce and Schiller. A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism”. In: Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 607632. BARTH, Erhard (1974). “Zur Sprachtheorie von Louis Hjelmslev”. In: Louis Hjelmslev. Aufsätze zur Sprachwissenschaft. Erhard Barth (ed.). Stuttgart, Ernst Klett Verlag, pp. v-xx. BARTHES, Roland (1985). L’Aventure Sémiotique. Paris, Éditions de Seuil. BARTHES, Roland (1967). Système de la Mode. Paris, Éditions de Seuil. BARTHES, Roland (1964). “Elements of Semiology”. In: Communications, 4, pp. 91-135. BARTLETT, Sir Frederic Charles (1997). Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. BAUMGARTEN, Alexander Gottlieb (1766). Metaphysik. Halle in Magdeburgischen, verlegt von Carl Hermann Hemmerde. BAYAZIT, Nigan (2004). “Investigating Design: A Review of Forty Years of Design Research”. In: Design Issues, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 16-29.

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BENSE, Max (1975). Semiotische Prozesse und Systeme in Wissenschaftstheorie und Design, Ästhetik und Mathematik. Baden-Baden, Aegis Verlag. BENSE, Max (1971). Zeichen und Design: Semiotische Ästhetik. Baden-Baden, Aegis Verlag. BENTLEY, Arthur F. (1947). “The New ‘Semiotic’”. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8, no.1, pp- 107-132. BERNSTEIN, Richard J. (2010). The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Polity Press. BETTS, Paul (1988). “Science, Semiotics and Society: The Ulm Hochschule für Gestaltung in Retrospect”. In: Design Issues, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 67-82. BLACK, Max (1947). “The Limitations of a Behavioristic Semiotic”. The Philosophical Review. Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 258-272. BOOKER, Peter Jeffrey (1963). A History of Engineering Drawing. London, Chatto & Windus. BORING, Edwin G. (1930). “The ‘Gestalt’ Psychology and the ‘Gestalt’ Movement”. The American Journal of Psychology, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 308-315. BRANDES, Uta, ERLHOFF, Michael, SCHEMMANN, Nadine (Hrsg.) (2009). Designtheorie und Designforschung. Paderborn, W. Fink Verlag. BRENTANO, Franz (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot. BROADBENT, Geoffrey, WARD, Anthony (1969). Design Methods in Architecture. Bedford Square London, Lund Humphries Publishers Limited. BRUNER, Jerome S. (1962). “The Conditions of Creativity”. In: Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking: A Symposium Held at the University of Colorado. Howard E. Gruber, Glenn Terrell, Michael Wertheimer (eds.). New York, Atherton Press, pp. 1-20. BRUNER, Jerome S. (1961). “The Act of Discovery”. In: Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 31, pp. 21-32. BRUNER, Jerome S., GOODNOW, Jacqueline J., AUSTIN, George (1990). A Study of Thinking. New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers. BUCHWALD, Dagmar (2001). “Gestalt”. In: Ästhetische Grundbegriffe – Historisches Wörterbuch in Sieben Bänden. Band 2. Karlheinz Barck (ed.). Stuttgart und Weimar, Verlag J. B. Metzler, pp. 820-862. BÜRDEK, Bernhard E. (2005). Design: Geschichte, Theorie und Praxis der Produktgestaltung. Basel, Boston, Berlin, Birkhäuser – Verlag für Architektur. CAMPOS, Daniel G. (2009). “Imagination, Concentration, and Generalization: Peirce on the Reasoning Abilities of the Mathematician”. In: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 135-156.

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