The Limits of EUrope: Identities, Spaces, Values 9781529221817

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“This is an intriguing collection of essays on the European integration project and its crises. The wide range of perspectives included makes it a thought-provoking read.” Jocelyn Mawdsley, Newcastle University

The Limits of EUrope

The Limits of EUrope Identities, Spaces, Values

Jan Grzymski is Assistant Professor in the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw.

Is the European Union (EU) in a state of crisis? Over recent years, a series of systemic and spontaneous challenges, including Brexit, the rise of Euroscepticism and the Eurozone and refugee crises, have manifested in landmark moments for European integration. First published as a special issue of the journal Global Discourse, this edited collection investigates whether these crises are isolated phenomena or symptoms of a deeper malaise across the EU. Experts from across disciplines analyse and rethink the forces which pull Europeans together, as well as those which push them apart.

Edited by Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

Russell Foster is Lecturer in British and European Politics Education at King’s College London.

EDITED BY RUSSELL FOSTER AND JAN GRZYMSKI

ISBN 978-1-5292-2179-4

9 781529 221794

B R I S TO L

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

@policypress

THE LIMITS OF EUROPE



Global Discourse Books in the series were first published as special issues of our Global Discourse journal. The Global Discourse book series is an interdisciplinary, problemoriented series of applied contemporary thought operating at the intersection of politics, international relations, sociology and social policy. The series scope is broad, encouraging interrogation of current affairs with regard to core questions of distributive justice wellbeing, cultural diversity, autonomy, sovereignty, security and recognition. Authors are encouraged to explore the international dimensions and implications of their work.

Also available Reflections on Post-Marxism Laclau & Mouffe’s Project of Radical Democracy in the 21st Century Edited by Stuart Sim

Find out more at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/global-discourse

THE LIMITS OF EUROPE Identities, Spaces, Values Edited by Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-5292-2179-4 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-2180-0 ePub ISBN 978-1-5292-2181-7 ePdf The right of Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc, Bristol Front cover image: iStock/chaluk Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Tables Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements 1

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The Limits of EUrope Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

PART I  De-​Europeanisation Theory 2 De-​Europeanisation after Brexit: Narrowing and Shallowing William Outhwaite 3 Theorising the EU in Crisis: De-​Europeanisation as Disintegration Ben Rosamond 4 What Are the Driving Forces of Disintegration? A Response to Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite Christoph O. Meyer 5 European Disintegration: A Response to Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite Pierre Vimont 6 Response to William Outhwaite David Spence PART II  Limits to European Identity and Memory 7 ‘Cry God for Harry, England, and Saint George’: Europe and the Limits of Integrating Identity Russell Foster 8 Response to Russell Foster John Mills 9 What Does Self-​Determination Mean Today? The Resurgence of Nationalism and European Integration in Question Gerard Delanty 10 Response to Gerard Delanty Roger Casale v

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13 31

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91 95

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Victimhood as Victory: The Role of Memory Politics in the Process of De-​Europeanisation in East-​Central Europe Peter Vermeersch Response to Peter Vermeersch Martí Grau i Segú

PART III  Limits to European Space and Borders 13 Seeing Like a EUropean Border: The Limits of EUropean Borders and Space Jan Grzymski 14 Reflections on Borders, Boundaries and the Limits of EUrope Tobias Schumacher 15 Brexit: A Requiem for the Post-​National Society? Adrian Favell 16 Can a Post-​National Vision Better Tackle Racial Discrimination than a National One? A Response to Adrian Favell Omar Khan 17 Migration, Solidarity and the Limits of Europe Martina Tazzioli and William Walters 18 Response to Martina Tazzioli and William Walters Liz Fekete PART IV  Limits to Transformative and Normative Europe 19 Entering the ‘Post-​Shame Era’: The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Populism and Neo-​Authoritarianism in EUrope Ruth Wodak 20 Response to Ruth Wodak Heather Grabbe and Andreas Aktoudianakis 21 Opportunistic Legitimisation and De-​Europeanisation as a Reverse Effect of Europeanisation Spasimir Domaradzki 22 Response to Spasimir Domaradzki Krassen Stanchev 23 Is Homo Oeconomicus an Extinct Species and Does It Matter for EUropean Integration? Attitudes towards Free Trade and Populism Bogna Gawrońska-​Nowak

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183 201

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228 233

260 265

Contents

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The Decline of ‘Homo Oeconomicus’ and the Crisis of Liberal EUropean Integration: A Response to Bogna Gawrońska-​Nowak Federico Ottavio Reho

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Index287

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 8.1

Chained real effective exchange rates, China and the UK, 92 1975–​2016 19.1 Poster with Sebastian Kurz: ‘Now or never! ÖVP, Ballot 216 Sebastian Kurz, the new People’s Party. Movement for Austria!’ 21.1 Freedom House nations in transition democracy score, 2007–​17 251 21.2 Freedom House corruption score, 2007–​17 251 21.3 Freedom House judicial framework and independence score, 252 2007–​17 21.4 Freedom House electoral process score, 2007–​17 252 21.5 Freedom House independent media score, 2007–​17 253 21.6 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 253 2007–​11 21.7 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 254 2012–​17 21.8 BTI rule of law status, 2006–​18 254 21.9 BTI stability of democratic institutions, 2006–​18 255 21.10 BTI democracy status, 2006–​18 255

Tables 21.1 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4

CVM benchmarks Distribution of the EU28 respondents’ answers to question QA10 The distribution of the EU28 respondents’ answers to question Q18a.4 Socio-​demographic characteristics of the EU28, German and Polish respondents answering question Q18.5 Distribution of the respondents’ answers to question Q18.6

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238 273 274 276 277

List of Figures and Tables

23.5 23.6 23.7

Comments content structure with respect to subject relation and type of netizens’ knowledge The FTA keyword co-​occurrence matrix for articles and comments (within one case/​document) Focus area categories: occurrence in FTA-related responses

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277 278 278

Notes on Contributors Andreas Aktoudianakis is a policy analyst at the European Policy Centre. He covers areas such as the EU’s digital agenda, digital sovereignty, new technologies and Industry 4.0. Andreas previously worked as Special Adviser to the Director at the Open Society European Policy Institute and as Schuman Policy Analyst at the European Parliament’s DG EXPO Unit for Transatlantic Relations and the G7. Andreas’s work has been published by The Economist, the Political Studies Association and the World Congress of Philosophy, among others. Andreas has also taught EU politics, foreign policy analysis, international security, political theory and the history of political thought at the University of St Andrews and the University of Edinburgh. Roger Casale is an award-​winning civil rights activist and the founder of the New Europeans website. Prior to that he worked as Senior Parliamentary Affairs Advisor to Finmeccanica and Telespazio. From 1997–​2005 he was the Labour MP for Wimbledon, and also spent three years as Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Foreign Office (2002–​05). Gerard Delanty is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Sussex. An interdisciplinary sociologist with an interest in social theory and the cultural and historical analysis of social and political questions, he is especially interested in the comparative analysis of modernity in a global perspective and in social change in Europe. Most of his work concerns the implications of globalisation for the analysis of the social world. He has written 11 books and published over a hundred papers on various issues in social and political theory, European identities, globalisation, nationalism and the cultural and historical sociology of modernity. His research has helped push the European research and policy-​making agenda on European cultural heritage in a more critical direction by involving a broad range of stakeholders to give greater prominence to transnational aspects of European heritages. Spasimir Domaradzki is a researcher and lecturer in the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. He was a Wilbur Fellow Scholar in 2008 and has also been an election observer x

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for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) multiple times. Spasimir was an expert member in the ‘Laboratory of Ideas’ Presidential Expert Programme implemented by the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland (2013–​14), a member of the editorial team of Res Publica Nowa and a Visegrad Insight Fellow (2019–​20). He is a member of Team Europe at the Representation of the European Commission in Warsaw. His research focuses on European integration, with a particular emphasis on enlargement policy and its impact on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as human rights, Polish foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Adrian Favell is Chair in Sociology and Social Theory at the University of Leeds. An interdisciplinary sociologist with a background in human geography, political science, political philosophy and comparative literature, he has a strong interest in mixed methods (qualitative/​quantitative), research design and the philosophical foundations of social research. He currently directs the ESRC-​funded Northern Exposure project, looking at Brexit-​ related sources of political disaffection concerning race, nation, poverty and marginalisation in large towns and small cities across the north of England. Liz Fekete is Director of the Institute of Race Relations and head of its European Research Programme. Liz has worked at the IRR since 1982. She writes and speaks extensively on aspects of contemporary racism and fascism, refugee rights, EU counter-​radicalisation and anti-​terrorism policies and Islamophobia across Europe. She is author of A suitable enemy: racism, migration and Islamophobia in Europe (Pluto, 2009) and Europe’s fault lines: racism and the rise of the Right (Verso, 2018). Liz was part of the Campaign against Racism and Fascism (CARF) Collective and an expert witness at the Basso Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal on asylum and the World Tribunal on Iraq. She is currently an associate of the International State Crime Initiative at Queen Mary University of London and the Border Crossing Observatory at Monash University. Russell Foster is Lecturer in British and European Politics at King’s College London. In 2015–​16, Russell was Marie Skłodowska-​Curie International Fellow in the Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam, where he researched the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. In 2016–​19, Russell was Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, where he researched the relationship between nationalism, European identity and Brexit. He is a co-​leader of the UACES Research Network known as ‘The Limits of EUrope: Challenging the Crisis of European Integration’ (with Monika Brusenbauch Meislová and Jan Grzymski). Russell is currently xi

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researching cultural and fictional portrayals of Brexit; conspiracism and radicalisation in post-​Brexit and post-​COVID UK; the relationship between the radical right and LGBTQ+​communities; and the memory politics of the British Empire after Brexit. Bogna Gawrońska-​Nowak is Associate Professor at the Institute of Urban and Regional Development in Warsaw. She was a fellow and visiting researcher at the University of Padua and the University of Glasgow. She has expertise in using multidisciplinary quantitative research methods with a special focus on modelling instabilities and measuring policy effectiveness. She was a consultant on the macroeconomic aspects of implementing the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in Poland for the European Commission Representation. She has been a senior researcher and principal investigator in various research projects co-​financed by well-​ recognised institutions: the National Bank of Poland, the National Centre for Research and Development in Poland and the European Commission. Her current research agenda and her research-​led teaching focus on the study of public opinion dynamics and social representations, and the development of research methods based on the citizen science approach. Heather Grabbe is Director of the Open Society European Policy Institute, the EU policy arm of Open Society Foundations, which works to ensure that open society values are at the heart of EU policies and actions, both inside and outside its borders. From 2004 to 2009 she was Senior Advisor to Olli Rehn, then European Commissioner for Enlargement with responsibility for EU policy on the Balkans and Turkey. Previously, she was Deputy Director of the Centre for European Reform, where she wrote extensively on EU external policies and enlargement. She also conducted academic research at the European University Institute, Chatham House, the University of Oxford and the University of Birmingham, and taught at the London School of Economics. Martí Grau i Segú is a member of the Academic Team at the House of European History, an initiative of the European Parliament. Between 2009 and 2011, he was Visiting Professor at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. A former Member of the European Parliament, he served in the Foreign Affairs and Internal Market Committees, as well as in several parliamentary delegations for relations with foreign countries (including Canada, Japan and the South Caucasus countries). He was also a Member of the Euro-​Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. A graduate of SAIS-​Bologna and Pompeu Fabra University, he has worked at the European Institute for the Mediterranean in Barcelona and taught European Politics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He started his career as an archaeologist and director of several archaeological excavations. xii

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Jan Grzymski is Associate Researcher in the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw and Assistant Professor working on the two research projects about the securitisation and desecuritisation of migration and emergency mobility governance during the COVID-​19 pandemic. He is a co-​leader of the UACES Research Network known as ‘The Limits of EUrope: Challenging the Crisis of European Integration’ (with Russell Foster and Monika Brusenbauch Meislová). His research interests include the EU crisis, EU identity and EU borders and mobility. He received the Corbridge Trust Scholarship awarded by Robinson College, Cambridge University in 2015, 2018 and 2019. He was Lecturer in International Relations and European Studies at the University of Coventry and Lazarski University from 2011–​19. Omar Khan has been Director of Transforming Access and Student Outcomes in Higher Education (TASO) since June 2020. Previously, Omar was Director of the race equality think tank the Runnymede Trust from 2014. As Director, Omar grew the organisation and increased its profile. Prior to this, Omar was Head of Policy at the Runnymede Trust and led its financial inclusion programme. Omar holds several advisory positions, including Chair of Olmec, Chair of the Ethnicity Strand Advisory Group to Understanding Society, Chair of the advisory group of the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity at the University of Manchester, Commissioner on the Financial Inclusion Commission and a member of the 2021 REF and 2014 REF assessment. Omar was previously Governor of the University of East London and a 2012 Clore Social Leadership Fellow. Christoph O. Meyer is Full Professor of European and International Politics at King’s College London. He was the first head of the new Department of European and International Studies at King’s in 2012–​15 and served as the faculty’s first Vice-​Dean for Research between 2016 and 2020. He was elected as Fellow to the UK Academy of Social Sciences in 2020. Christoph works on security and defence policy, including conflict prevention; public communication and media coverage; and economic governance. He has contributed to debates about the European public sphere and political integration, European strategic culture and questions of forecasting, warning and prevention. Christoph has published in leading academic journals in international relations and European Union studies, edited two books, three special issues/​sections of journals as well as authored three research monographs. His book Warning about war (CUP, 2020) was voted Best Book by the International Communications section of the International Studies Association, with the judges describing it as ‘an exceptional project in the critical role of persuasion in foreign policy’. xiii

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John Mills is an entrepreneur and economist who has long been involved with political matters. He is Chairman of John Mills Limited (JML), which specialises in selling high-​volume consumer products using audio-​visual methods to promote their sale. His main interests as an economist are the relatively poor performance of Western economies compared with those in the East, and the UK’s relationship with the EU. He took a leading role in the 1975 and 2016 referendums on the UK’s EEC and EU membership. John was for many years a senior elected member of Camden Council, and he is the founder of Labour Leave. William Outhwaite is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Newcastle University. He studied at the Universities of Oxford and Sussex, where he taught for many years, and joined Newcastle as Professor of Sociology in 2007. He is the author of numerous groundbreaking books on social theory, including Understanding social life: the method called Verstehen (1975); Concept formation in social science (1983); New philosophies of social science: realism, hermeneutics and critical theory (1987); Habermas. A critical introduction (1994); The future of society (2006); European society (2008); Critical theory and contemporary Europe (2012); Social theory (2015); Europe since 1989 (2016); Contemporary Europe (2017); and Transregional Europe (2020). His research engages with social theory (particularly critical theory), the philosophy of social science, the history of social thought, political sociology and contemporary Europe. Federico Ottavio Reho works as Strategic Coordinator and Research Officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (WMCES), the official think tank and political foundation of the European People’s Party in Brussels. He is also a part-​time PhD candidate in history at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. Before joining the WMCES in 2015, he worked in the EU Institutions and Fora Division of the European Central Bank. He also worked as a trainee for a Member of the European Parliament, as well as in the political section of the US Diplomatic Mission to Italy. Besides his interests in the politics and the political economy of the EU, Federico Ottavio is passionate about the political and economic history of modern Europe with a specific attention to liberal and conservative movements and ideas. Ben Rosamond is Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, working on two broad areas of relevance to European politics. Within European political economy, he studies the role of ideas, discourses and knowledge in national and EU-​level political economy. He is also interested in the reorganisation or consolidation of European political–​economic space, questions of ethics, and governance and legitimacy as they apply to the political economy of contemporary Europe. Furthermore, his research xiv

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concerns the understanding of economic subjectivity in light of European integration/​globalisation/​neoliberalism, and the study of contemporary economic nationalism/​patriotism under conditions of globalisation and European integration. Ben’s second research area is European and regional integration. Here he focuses on the development of ideational/​discursive approaches to European integration; the exploration of forms of ‘integration theory’ past and present; and the possibility of temporal/​spatial comparison across cases of regionalism/​regional integration. He is principal investigator on ‘EuroChallenge’, a project funded by the University’s 2016 Excellence Programme for Interdisciplinary Research. Tobias Schumacher is Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University Institute of Lisbon and Chair of European Neighbourhood Policy at the College of Europe, Natolin campus. His research interests focus on the European neighbourhood policy, on European–​Mediterranean relations, on the politics of the Middle East and North Africa and the South Caucasus, respectively. He is the author of four books and numerous book chapters, research articles and policy papers. He has also edited several books, including The revised European neighbourhood policy: continuity and change in EU foreign policy (Palgrave, 2017). His Chair is also part of the Horizon 2020 research project MEDRESET, in which he leads a work package on EU and EU member states’ framing practices of the Mediterranean as a geopolitical space. David Spence is currently Visiting Fellow at the LSE European Institute, where in 2016 he was convenor of the LSE Commission on the Future of the UK in Europe. After leaving the European Commission in 2011, he was Dinam Research Fellow in the LSE International Relations Department, where he edited a book on the European External Action Service. He was a European Commission official between 1990 and 2011, where he was secretary of the task force for German unification, head of training for the Commission’s overseas delegations, then minister counsellor in the EU’s Geneva Delegation to the UN. In 2006 he was seconded as senior EU adviser to the UN Special Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire. He has published widely on EU issues. Krassen Stanchev teaches the history of economic ideas, public choice and the macroeconomic analysis of politics at the University of Sofia; he is also CEO of KC 2 and Board Chairman, Founder and former Executive Director of IME, Bulgaria’s first independent and free-​market think thank (1993). In addition, he is a former member and committee chairman of the Constitutional Assembly (1990–​91). He was a principal drafter of the reforms taking Bulgaria from central planning to a market economy and xv

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is one of the leaders of those reforms in Bulgaria and new Europe. After leaving IME in 2006, he worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and Russia and Egypt, leading teams and/​or being a subcontractor of EU, UN, USAID and World Bank programmes. He is a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, of the Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy and a regular participant in the annual meetings of the Transatlantic Law Forum. Martina Tazzioli is a lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London. Martina’s work explores the biopolitical mechanisms by which some subjects are racialised and governed as ‘migrants’, analysing the intertwining of modes of objectivation and subjectivities. More recently, she has investigated the technologisation of the border regime and how technologies constitute a battlefield for migrants, states and non-​state actors. She is also a member of the Euro-​African network Migreurop that produces reports on migration, border externalisation and human rights violations. Martina’s work is characterised by an interdisciplinary approach at the crossroad of political theory, migration and border studies, and political geography. She has published in highly ranked journals in the field of politics, critical security studies, human geography and migration. She has also published three monographs on migration and has co-​edited two books on the work and uses of Michel Foucault. Peter Vermeersch is Professor of Politics and Social Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and is the author of several books of literary non-​fiction. He teaches and carries out research on minority politics, nationalism, democracy and restorative justice. Most of his work is rooted in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans (he has a background in Slavic and Eastern European studies). Peter has worked on social movement formation around the plight of the Roma and writes about the perils of democratisation and the politics of reconciliation in fractured societies. Pierre Vimont is Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on the European neighbourhood policy, transatlantic relations and French foreign policy. From 2016 to 2017, Pierre served as the special envoy for the French initiative for a Middle East Peace Conference. Previously, he was nominated to be the personal envoy of the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, to lead preparations for the Valletta Conference between EU and African countries to tackle the causes of illegal migration and combat human smuggling and trafficking. Prior to joining Carnegie, Pierre was the first executive secretary-​general of the European External xvi

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Action Service (EEAS), from 2010 to 2015. During his 38-​year diplomatic career with the French foreign service, he served as ambassador to the United States from 2007 to 2010, ambassador to the European Union from 1999 to 2002, and chief of staff to three former French foreign ministers. He holds the title Ambassador of France, a title bestowed for life on only a few French career diplomats. He is a Knight of the French Order of Merit. William Walters is Professor of Politics in the Department of Political Science and the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and FPA Research Excellence Chair (2019–​22) at Carleton. He has published widely in the areas of political sociology, political geography, citizenship studies, security and insecurity, and Foucault studies. He is currently working on three projects: a SSHRC funded (2017–​22) collaborative study of air deportation which focuses on the role of civil aviation in the forced removals of illegalised or criminalised people in and from Europe; a co-​edited book (with Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani) called Viapolitics: borders, migration and the power of locomotion (forthcoming from Duke University Press); and A Handbook on Governmentality for Edward Elgar publishing, co-​edited with Martina Tazzioli and appearing in 2022. Ruth Wodak is Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Lancaster University. She is also affiliated to the University of Vienna where she was most recently Principal Investigator of a three-​year research project (2015–​18) on the ‘Discursive Construction of National Identity –​Austria 2015’. Ruth’s main research focus is the development of theoretical approaches in discourse studies (combining ethnography, argumentation theory, rhetoric, pragmatics and text linguistics); organisational communication; identity politics and politics of the past; language and/​in politics; racism, prejudice and discrimination. Ruth’s research interests focus on (critical) discourse studies, specifically on the discourse–​historical approach (while emphasising aspects of the integration of text and context); (national/​transnational/​European) identity politics; (national/​European) politics of the past (specifically related to World War II and the Holocaust); racism, antisemitism and xenophobia; and the complex dimensions of far-​r ight populism and exclusionary rhetoric. Currently, she is analysing the characteristics of crisis communication related to the COVID-​19 pandemic.

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Acknowledgements In addition to all of the contributors who very generously donated their expertise and very valuable time –​especially the responders –​we wish to thank the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) for its Small Event Grant, Lazarski University Warsaw, King’s College London, and the Leverhulme Trust and the Polish Association for European Studies, for their very generous financial contributions to a conference we held on the original special edition of Global Discourse on 1 and 2 October 2018. We are very grateful to Carlton House Terrace –​the current home of the British Academy and the former residence of George IV in the heart of London –​for hosting our EU conference in EUrope’s first secessionist member. Thanks go to the Corbridge Trust who generously hosted Jan Grzymski in London over the summer of 2018, and to Erasmus for facilitating Jan’s visit to King’s College London in November 2017, and Russell’s visit to Warsaw in May 2018. Thanks go to Vicky Cleaver and Toby Goode of Associated Press, for their superb insights and comments throughout the event. A medal should go to Marta Kołodziejczyk, without whose indefatigable work the conference, and arguably this edition, would be a fantasy. Great thanks go to Christoph Meyer for his continuing guidance and support as Russell’s mentor. Very special thanks go to Magnus Ryner, Head of Department at European and International Studies, King’s College London; to Juliusz Madej, President of Lazarski University Warsaw; and to Wojciech Bieņkowski, Łukasz Konopielko, Martin Dahl and Adrian Chojan for securing financial support for the conference. Across the Channel in Brexit Britain, equally special thanks go to Parth Dattani, Virginia Preston and Anthony Senior at King’s College London, and to Alina Boryca at Lazarski University, for their tireless help and invaluable expertise related to organising the conference. Very special thanks go to Matthew Johnson, Editor-​in-​Chief of Global Discourse, for his support and encouragement. Great gratitude goes to Edwina Thorn, Leonie Drake, Dave Worth and Julia Mortimer at Bristol University Press, for their technical expertise and superhuman patience. Last, but by no means least, Jan and Russell want to give their great gratitude to William Outhwaite. Without William, not a letter on these pages would exist.

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Finally, a very special thank you from Russell Foster to his co-​editor and co-​organiser Jan Grzymski. Over a machine coffee in a cold British office, on a rainy November day in 2017, Jan pioneered this project. During his Corbridge Trust visit to London in the summer of 2018, Jan ended up bearing an enormous administrative and logistical burden while Russell was recovering from an unexpected cybernetic upgrade. Jan’s professionalism, expert insights and tireless diligence were the driving forces that made this book and its conference happen. Even though the British are leaving Europe, this special edition demonstrates that for all our differences, the British and the Europeans still work well together. Long may that remain so. All chapters included in this collection were previously published as articles in the special issue The Limits of EUrope: Identities, Spaces, Values, guest edited by Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski, Volume 9, Number 1, January 2019. Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski London and Warsaw

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The Limits of EUrope Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

The boundaries of Europe are quite unknown. Herodotus Histories IV, xiv-​xvi, c.440 BC In his fifth-​century BCE chronicle of the Graeco-​Persian Wars, Herodotus describes a challenge that European scholars have faced for two and a half millennia (Drace-​Francis, 2013: 1). Since Antiquity, discussions of just what ‘Europe’ is, descriptively and normatively, have not been resolved and consensus has been reached that multiple ‘Europes’ exist. Recent events in Europe, though, suggest that while the boundaries of Europe are, and will forever remain, quite unknown, the boundaries of EUrope are becoming identifiable. ‘Europe’ has long been an unsatisfactory metonymic synecdoche for the post-​war European project, in the form of the ECSC, EEA, EC, EEC, and now EU. ‘EUrope’ distinguishes the specific political project, whose boundaries are not merely a question of academic curiosity or policy making but a source of significant discontent, anxiety and violence in contemporary Europe. This book has been drawn together to study the manifold aspects of how EUrope’s multiple boundaries are emerging. EUrope is changing. Partly in response to internal anxieties over rapid integration and expansion, as witnessed in the Dutch and French rejections of the proposed European Constitution in 2005, and partly in response to external pressures and responses by EU and national governments, namely the Great Recession, austerity and the migration crisis, EUrope’s changes are manifesting. The most visible manifestations have been Brexit; the rise of Euroscepticism and illiberal democracies; the eurozone crisis and economic disparities across the EU; the immigration and asylum crisis; and mounting perceptions of a democratic deficit and a legitimacy crisis of EU institutions. As this book argues, these have not just affected national and 1

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EU-​level statecraft. They are causing significant shifts in the discourse of Europeanisation, integration and dis-​integration of the EUropean project. Theories of de-​Europeanisation have been understudied. In 2014 Hans Vollaard questioned whether the EU’s own processes of integration are driving support for dis-​integration, even predicting that the British would leave the EU –​but not fully, due to an unclear exit process and the complexity of withdrawal. For Vollaard, a British exit might compel partial exits by other member states. Since 2016, predictions of a ‘domino effect’ of other Eurosceptic governments following Britain’s example have proved wrong, with even hard-​Eurosceptic government and parties changing their rhetoric and policies on withdrawing from the EU or even the eurozone, potentially because the British precisely illustrate the difficulties and internal factionalism that results from leaving. It remains to be seen to what extent the British represent a unique case, and whether dis-​integration in the form of other exits would be similar or different. This book examines theories of dis-​integration from Europhilic and Eurosceptic perspectives to question just what dis-​integration means, and how theories of de-​Europeanisation can help make sense of EUrope’s current condition –​and its future. Whether that future is one of stability or apocalypse, it is increasingly evident that future EUrope will be markedly different from the current, unsustainable model.

The end is nigh? While theories of de-​Europeanisation have received scant attention, in recent years predictions of collapse have proliferated. From Paul Krugman’s (2012) theory of Eurodämmerung triggered by a Greek financial collapse, to Douglas Murray’s (2017) analysis of The Strange Death of Europe caused by a Huntingtonian clash of Europe versus Islam, eschatological scenarios have become popular. Ivan Krastev’s (2014) After Europe, Giandomenico Majone’s (2014) Rethinking the union of Europe post-​crisis, James Kirchick’s (2017) The end of Europe, Walter Laqueur’s (2007) The last days of Europe and (2011) After the fall, Roger Bootle’s (2014) The trouble with €urope, Anthony Giddens’ (2014) Turbulent and mighty continent, and Jan Zielonka’s (2014) Is the EU doomed? differ markedly in their predictions and eschatological visions, but share a common trait –​a belief that the structures which propelled EUropean integration are now an active threat. The Four Freedoms of the European Union have become the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse; heralds of a coming, traumatic, change. While predictions have often been wrong, and scenarios differ, this shared realisation that EUrope in its current form is not working is found across academia, journalism and, significantly, national and EU-​level policy making, indicating a common awareness that today’s EUrope must end –​in either reform or collapse. 2

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While Euroscepticism was apparently defeated in the ‘Year of Elections’ in 2017, the more general potential crisis of EUrope is crucial in understanding the current challenges for the EU. The ability of Eurosceptics to influence political discourse on a domestic and EU-​wide level was made apparent in domestic leaders’ calls for slower European integration, or the adoption of new forms of European integration such as ‘two-​speed Europe’ or a scaling-​ back of sovereign power from Brussels. Despite apparent successes such as the PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) treaty and Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly empty and unheeded calls for reform and restructuring of the Union, the EU continues to face significantly larger structural and spontaneous problems which threaten the sustainability of the EUropean project in its current form, and which therefore necessitate new academic models of Europeanisation, European integration and EUrope itself. The EU’s own solutions are less than satisfactory. In Europe’s last chance (2017), Guy Verhofstadt argues that only more integration can save the Union. In Jean-​Claude Juncker’s (2017) white paper on the future of the EU by 2025, one of the five proposed scenarios, and arguably the least persuasive, is based on maintaining the status quo; four others are predicated on reversing, slowing, partially accelerating or fully accelerating integration. Four of five official scenarios indicate that the Commission is equally aware that EUrope is incapable of continuing in its current state; a reflection of Pope Francis’ (2014, 2017) descriptions of Europe as unstable, haggard, and decaying. Scenarios of acceleration or deceleration raise the question of what, regarding EUrope, is at stake. This book demonstrates that what is at stake is not the details of EUrope, but EUrope itself. We are living through an actual and potential crisis of EUrope, with its promise of democratic, peaceful, prosperous and open political union challenged. For the first time, those promises are the very cause of ongoing different crises and the foundations of EUrope may be the cause of EUrope’s fall. Employing rhetoric of ‘more integration’ has proved to be a cause of accelerating challenges. The promise of the free movement of people has led to securitisation of borders and migration; the rescuing of the common currency project generated severe austerity measures affecting many citizens across the EU; and, paradoxically, sticking to a democratic ethos of ‘the people’s choice’ urged the decision of the British government to host an EU membership referendum, in which the European value of ‘more democracy’ meant, in the end, a reversal of post-​ war EUropean integration. Inevitably, Brexit is a common topic for all contributors in this book. The Brexit process impacted British and European life in terms political, economic, social, cultural and intellectual. The extent to which Brexit has colonised discourse in Britain suggests that ‘Brexhaustion’ will continue long after Brexit Day. Most significantly for this book, Brexit illustrates 3

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the limits of EUrope in the present and the future for other EUropeans; not simply limits in political terms but at much more essential and fundamental levels. The British are arguably a unique society in the EU, a family of nations whose relationship with each other is in constant flux and whose membership within the EUropean project has always been ambivalent and lukewarm at best (Carl et al, 2018). There is no single ‘Euroscepticism’ and the British version, which resulted in Brexit, is not a template by which we can or should understand EUrope. Denmark has nearly as many EU opt-​outs as the United Kingdom, but there is no desire for a Danish exit. Brexit is popularly blamed on xenophobia, despite the UK having significantly fewer extreme parties than in many members of the EU, some of which have gained office and formed governments while others have nudged mainstream parties towards the right. Observers since 2016 have been quick to describe Brexit as an uprising of the ‘left-​ behinds’, the white working class that has borne the brunt of neoliberal deindustrialisation and national austerity treatments, but this fails to account for a Leave campaign led by the super-​rich and supported by wealthy Britons as much as by the post-​working class and the precariat. Meanwhile, narratives that Brexit was driven by racism fail to explain black and minority-​ethnic support for Leave. As the first incidence of a member state withdrawing from the Union, Brexit represents a nexus of Europe’s complicated political, legal, commercial, cultural, racial and demographic fluidity, as well as representing a stark reality –​for the first time, the European Union has been assigned a limit. Nowhere is this more evident than in the return of the very phenomenon which EUrope was designed to transcend –​nationalism. EUrope is undeniably experiencing a wave of nationalism and the return of ethnic nationalist discourses. More than economic disparity, migration, drum-​thumping ‘populist’ governments or external challenges from Moscow, Ankara, Washington or even Beijing, it is nationalism that poses the most significant threat to the European project. Various contributors to this book address the question of nationalism’s return. Is ethnic nationalism a direct threat to the EU, as Roger Casale argues? Is nationalism more of a threat to national governments but irrelevant to the EU institutions, as Gerard Delanty claims? Or, instead of a dichotomy between suppressing nationalism or allowing nationalism to destroy the EU, is Europeanness itself a nationalism, as Russell Foster argues, which reproduces the same hostilities, exclusionary rhetoric and violence as ethnic nationalism? Nationalism is, however, only one of several significant challenges facing EUrope, alongside a significant upswing of Eurosceptic and populist political forces in the EU, renewed levels of white (trans)nationalism and ethnicist discourses on ‘taking our country back’ across Europe. These inform our understanding of limits. 4

The limits of EUrope

The limits of EUrope This book looks at those current problems through highlighting the limits of EUrope as a project. There are conceptual limits as well as physical borders, in which EUrope will be confined and in which exclusions will be made from its imagined space, exercising democracy, peace and the four freedom. This is already being pioneered either by reactions to collective EU policy (such as neighbours of the EU, or non-​EU migrants) or by member states’ own policy choices (for example, Brexit in the UK, Euroscepticism in Austria and Italy, illiberal politics in Poland and Hungary). These limits are challenging many, previously optimistic, views of ‘ever-​closer Union’ and ‘Normative Europe’. As we see in the many contributions to this edition, the ultimate limits of EUrope lie where the practices of de-​ Europeanisation occur. Given ongoing changes within the EU, and the countdown to what is increasingly likely to be a traumatic and poorly-​managed Brexit, the EU (and European studies) must adapt a focus away from ‘crisis’ and towards ‘post-​crisis’, addressing how the EU is morphing and how it will operate in the years beyond Brexit, beyond Macron and Merkel, and beyond Putin and Erdogan. The very concept of ‘the limits of EUrope’ is therefore, potentially, one way to understand the current systemic challenges to EUropean integration in this imminent, perhaps already active, ‘post-​’ era. At the upper level of analysis, and as many chapters in this book show, the EU may be currently ‘pushing back’ problems, or ‘buying time’, to use Wolfgang Streeck’s phrase (2014), and in this way immersing itself into the illusion of being in a ‘post-​crisis’ situation. One can claim therefore that the EU has a significant adaptive potential, that is to say that EUrope acts as perpetuum mobile; permanently adaptable and permanently in flux, not necessarily doomed as ‘crisis’ is simply, as Pope Francis (2017) argues, ‘change’, and change/​crisis is the norm rather than the exception for EUrope. Hence, it may be the case that the EU does not acknowledge or even recognise the deeper, more systemic problems, that it faces. We therefore see the concept of the limits of EUrope as also going beyond Clause Offe’s metaphor of ‘entrapment’ (Offe, 2015), in which he recognised that poor agency and weak leadership is ‘entrapping’ EUrope in a currently unsustainable status quo, and in which EUrope can go neither backward nor forward. Following the conclusion of Brexit in 2021, we see that ‘reversing the irreversible’ is indeed possible –​even with increasingly inevitably negative consequences for the UK, regardless of how de-​Europeanisation is managed –​precisely as Vollaard (2014) predicted. As we observe in many contributions in this book, the major problems and challenges for EUrope lie at the very limits of its own promises. We refer here to Steven Hill’s (2010) term ‘Europe’s Promise’, by which EUrope, 5

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as an imagined space, is associated and constructed in popular discourse as providing promises of peace, democracy, the four freedoms, open borders, solidarity and economic prosperity. This is equally a promise for the EUropean people as well as being perceived as a promise to many non-​ EUropean people. Yet simultaneously, as this book examines, these promises of EUrope may now be the cause of EUrope’s termination. In the book the contributors identify EUrope’s different limits in terms of identity, memory, space, borders, and the normative and transformative impact of EUrope. The writers also see that reaching those limits often means an ignition of a ‘de-​ Europeanisation’ process; such as Brexit or the rise of illiberal democracies. We therefore identify three major types of limits. First, limits beyond which EUrope does not want to go any further (enlargement, political union). Second, limits beyond which EUrope may want to go further but cannot, at least at present (fiscal union, political union). Third and most significant –​as we argue that EUrope has overlooked such scenarios –​is what we identify as limits via which EUrope’s promises betray those same promises. Freedom of movement, for example, leads to closed borders. Closer financial union leads to rapid infection of financial markets. When EUrope tries to defend them it, in fact, turns against the very essence of those ‘promises’. We argue that it is this last limit which should be most studied, in order to move beyond the current political and intellectual impasse over EUrope.

Structure of the book This book addresses EUrope’s manifold challenges. Drawing together experts from a range of European studies fields, from various EU member states and from different career stages, this edition is additionally novel in offering a unique format. Each academic analysis is accompanied by a response from an expert in industry, policy making, commerce, diplomacy or analysis. The nature of EUrope’s systemic and spontaneous crises requires a multidisciplinary and extra-​disciplinary approach, with reflexive dialogue between academic and non-​academic specialists. Equally, our book draws together Eurosceptic and Europhilic voices. As events in Europe since 2008 have demonstrated, European studies and EU affairs are excessively dominated by pro-​EUropeans, integrationists and Remainers. To understand not only the causes of, but also the solutions to, EUrope’s problems, it is essential to move beyond ideological echo chambers to which the academy is far from immune, and engage with perspectives and voices with which we may fundamentally disagree. ‘Europe’ has always been nebulous, but it has been acknowledged since the writings of Herodotus that multiple ‘Europes’ exist. This has never been more true than today, and to preserve Europe –​whatever its definition may be or whichever Europe is being defended –​it is vital to open forums for dialogue and sharing insights from across 6

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the continent, across ages and career stages, across fields and specialisms, and across normative perspectives of what Europe should be, do and aspire to. Divided into four sections which reflect the four realms of EUrope’s challenges and limits, this book attempts to offer such a forum. In Part I, William Outhwaite and Ben Rosamond theorise different conceptions of de-​Europeanisation. David Spence, Christoph Meyer and Pierre Vimont respond with analytical and normative visions of what ‘de-​ Europeanisation’ does, and could, mean. Part II approaches EUrope’s limits in terms of identity and memory. Russell Foster examines the nature of identity politics in Brexit Britain, arguing that Brexit demonstrates the emergence of two hostile and mutually incompatible ‘European’ identities in the same space. Gerard Delanty examines the nature of self-​determination and nationalism within member states, arguing that nationalism is not a threat to the EU as ‘nationalism’ is changing. Peter Vermeersch analyses memory politics in the processes of de-​Europeanisation in eastern Europe, and how the EU fits into a narrative of victimhood. John Mills, Roger Casale, and Marti Grau í Segu lend their expert insights from industry, political activism, and policy making to link the contributors’ arguments to developments beyond the academy. Part III examines EUrope’s limits in space and borders. Jan Grzymski assesses the significance of blurred hard borders and whether the European Neighbourhood Policy has exacerbated bordering within EUrope, and between EUrope and its neighbours. Adrian Favell examines the role of re-​ nationalisation in Brexit Britain and how concepts of European citizenship disadvantage the already marginalised. William Walters and Martina Tazzioli review the role of solidarity in Europe, and how responses to migration necessitate new approaches to citizenship, borders, and the oft-​invoked but nebulous concept of ‘European values’. Tobias Schumacher, Omar Khan and Liz Fekete offer their specialist responses from border studies, civil advocacy and non-​governmental engagement to illustrate the territorial and ethnic limits of EUrope. Part IV analyses transformative and normative limits to EUrope. Ruth Wodak demonstrates the role of discourse in constructing and legitimising a ‘post-​shame era’ of illiberalism, populism, and the normalisation of incivility and hostility among European governments preoccupied with immigration and an elusive enemy in the form of the ‘EUropean’ elite. Spasimir Domaradzki unpacks de-​Europeanisation through diplomacy and the law, presenting the novel concept of ‘opportunistic legitimisation’ as a means of explaining how the EU’s own normative influence weakens EU integration. Bogna Gawrońska-​Nowak questions whether a EUrope defined by economic rationalism is now extinct, and argues that economic factors remain essential for understanding the normative and transformative power of an identity-​obsessed EUrope. Heather Grabbe, Andreas Aktoudianakis, 7

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Krassen Stanchev and Federico Ottavio Reho present informed responses from political, economic and institutional thinktanks to demonstrate the relationship between theories and practices of EUrope’s normative and transformative powers. Together, these chapters and their expert responses offer a transdisciplinary approach to the crisis of European integration and identity by approaching different, but synergistic, aspects of the European project’s systemic crisis, which highlight the conceptual, political and physical limits of EUrope. Herodotus’ claim that the boundaries of Europe are quite unknown remains as true as it was when Themistocles fought Xerxes. Given contemporary developments and the challenges which a post-COVID-19 Europe faces, there is little reason to expect that its boundaries will become clearer any time soon. But while Europe’s boundaries will forever be vague, EUrope’s boundaries are starting to form and become visible. And what can be seen can be managed –​and challenged. This book offers some first insights into this rapidly changing EUrope. Funding Russell Foster was funded by a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. Jan Grzymski’s visit at Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, July–​October 2018 was funded by Mary and Clifford Corbridge Trust, Robinson College, Cambridge University, UK. References Bootle, R. (2014) The trouble with €urope: why the EU isn’t working, how it can be reformed, what could take its place, London: Nicholas Brealey. Carl, N., Dennison, J. and Evans, G. (2018) ‘European but not European enough: an explanation for Brexit’, European Union Politics, https://​doi. org/​10.1177/​14651​1651​8802​361. Drace-​Francis, A. (2013) European identity: a historical reader, London: Palgrave. Francis, I. (2014) ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the European Parliament and to the Council of Europe’, Holy See, 25 November, http://​ w2.vati​can.va/​content/​francesco/​en/​speeches/​2014/​november/​documents/​ papa-​ francesco_​20141125_​strasburgo-​parlamento-​europeo.html Francis, I. (2017) ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in Italy for the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome’, Holy See, 24 March, http://​ w2.vatican.va/​content/​francesco/​en/​speeches/​2017/​march/​documents/​ papa-​francesco_​20170324_​capi-​unione-​europea.html Giddens, A. (2014) Turbulent and mighty continent: what future for Europe? Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

8

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Juncker, J.-​C. (2017) White Paper on the future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU 27 by 2025, European Commission, https://​ec.europa. eu/c​ ommission/s​ ites/b​ eta-p​ olitical/fi ​ les/w ​ hite_p​ aper_o ​ n_t​ he_f​ uture_o ​ f_ ​ europe_​en.pdf Hill, S. (2010) Europe’s promise. Why the European way is the best hope in an insecure age, London and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Kirchick, J. (2017) The end of Europe: dictators, demagogues and the coming dark age, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press. Krastev, I. (2017) After Europe, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Krugman, P. (2012) ‘Eurodämmerung’, New York Times, 13 May, https://​krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/​2012/​05/​13/​eurodammerung-​2/​ Laqueur, W. (2007) The last days of Europe: epitaph for an old continent, New York: St Martin’s Press. Laqueur, W. (2011) After the fall: the end of the European dream and the decline of a continent, New York: Thomas Dunne Books. Majone, G. (2014) Rethinking the union of Europe post-​crisis: has integration gone too far? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mody, A. (2018) EuroTragedy: a drama in nine acts, New York: Oxford University Press. Murray, D. (2017) The strange death of Europe, London: Bloomsbury. Offe, C. (2015) Europe entrapped, London: Polity Press. Streeck, W. (2014) Buying time. The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism, London and New York: Verso. Vollaard, H. (2014) ‘Explaining European disintegration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(5): 1142–​1159. Verhofstadt, G. (2017) Europe’s last chance: why the European states must form a more perfect union, New York: Basic Books. Zielonka, J. (2014) Is the EU doomed? Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

9

PART I

De-​Europeanisation Theory

2

De-​Europeanisation after Brexit: Narrowing and Shallowing1 William Outhwaite

One of the many misleading slogans repeated by the Brexiteers is that the UK is ‘leaving the European Union but not leaving Europe’. This is true in a geographical sense but occludes the prospect of the radical breaking of a whole set of practical and ideational ties with the rest of Europe.2 It should be remembered that Theresa May’s initial animus, while she was Home Secretary, was against the European Human Rights regime rather than the EU, and a shadow hangs over the UK’s adherence to this and other institutions which it helped to create in the post-​war years. The claim is made that the UK could sustain a respectable human rights regime without reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), just as it could run an economy with EU standards of product safety, consumer protection and so on without reference to the EU, but there is a similar failure to recognise the difference between collectively agreed and administered arrangements/​understandings and those which, like Stalinist parliaments, merely simulated them.3 The most chilling scenario was one in which the UK used its freedom to create an offshore economy with unilateral free trade and a reliance primarily on financial services. If this scenario seems unrealistic, it is worth remembering that it was used as a threat in the event of the UK’s failure to reach an agreement with the EU by Philip Hammond –​the economics minister in May’s cabinet –​usually seen as one of the saner members of the UK government. With wages plummeting, agriculture ceasing to exist on the territory of the UK and massive unemployment, the surplus population would have to be managed by increasingly authoritarian means, perhaps 13

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dressed up as a British version of national socialism. Something like this scenario still seems to be on the agenda of the illegally funded Conservative ‘Europe Research Group’.4 It is of course possible to conceive a cosier Brexit scenario of egalitarianism, superlative welfare provision and social tolerance, of the kind that would appeal to Jeremy Corbyn and perhaps to a majority of the electorate. There is however no prospect of this being economically viable in a UK/​England isolated from the global economy. The UK missed its chance of becoming something like Norway in the later 20th century when North Sea oil opened a window of opportunity. It opted instead for Thatcherism. Since my argument in this chapter is largely critical of the role played in the EU by the UK and, to some extent, other member states, it is appropriate to mention here an alternative analysis which would argue that it is in fact the EU that threatens national democracy and is substantially responsible for the current upsurge of populist politics in Europe. This line of argument carries particular weight in a state like the UK, which lacks a written constitution and is often described as an ‘elective dictatorship’ with few restraints on the powers of the Parliament (which in practice means the executive). (It can also of course be argued that this makes EU membership particularly valuable for a state like the UK.) Arguments framed in terms of sovereignty and (national) democracy have, however, a wider application and have been presumed, for example, by the German Constitutional Court in its ‘Solange II’ judgement of 1987 that ‘so long as the European Communities … generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights … the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation’.5 The case for taking sovereignty seriously has been well made by Stefan Auer (2017) in his contribution to a volume I edited on Brexit (Outhwaite, 2017; see also, on sovereignty in relation to Article 50, Dixon, 2018). The rather tiresome and self-​congratulatory discussion of ‘European values’ in much of the literature suggests that it is important to avoid an over-​normative conception of what is European or anti-​European, as in the parallel conception of the ‘(un)-​American’, overlain with the shadow of Senator McCarthy (Kuhn, 2011; Delhey et al, 2014). If capital punishment, for example, is un-​European, I would prefer to say that this is because it is excluded by the legal-​political institutions of European states rather than because it conflicts with some nebulous set of values, even if that was the basis of the original political decision to forbid it. Europeanisation, as it was rather problematically applied to post-​communist Europe (what else, if not European, were they before?), was however understood, for good reasons, to mean not just the acquis communautaire and related practices but a whole range of norms and practical understandings expected to prevail in the processes of transition and accession.6 How far this went has often been 14

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questioned: in politics, in particular, the Leninist conception of ‘kto kovo’ (who screws who) often persisted or was revived, as currently in Poland and Hungary.7 The Union’s inability or unwillingness to back its principles by legal means, in a complicated situation of a gradual step-​by-​step move towards authoritarianism (‘salami tactics’) by ruling parties, makes clear that Article 7 is not a guarantee of good practice (Ágh, 2017).8 Outside the framework of the EU and the ECHR, however, all bets are off, with the UN having much more egregious behaviour to concern itself with on a world scale. Europeanisation often refers, among other things, to the interaction of national institutions with European ones (vertical) or with equivalent institutions in other national states in a European context (horizontal). Vertical integration would include, for example, national ministers in the Council, national civil servants participating in policy making in the Commission and the other institutions, and judges and advocates-​general (and their staff) in the Court. There are more ad-​hoc arrangements for the interaction of parliamentarians, though for a long time it was common in some countries for politicians to be members of the European Parliament (EP) as well as their national parliaments (and sometimes mayors as well). There are of course formal arrangements for local scrutiny of legislation and other EU matters, such as the House of Lords Committees in the UK. Similarly, in the early years it was quite common for national courts to refer questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but as its case law has developed and become better known this became less common. Leaving the EU means breaking off all these vertical links and removes access to the structures that mediate horizontal interaction. For a ‘third country’ with no prospect of accession, dealings with the EU are basically a matter of foreign ministries. It is of course possible that in some areas the practice of a post-​Brexit UK would converge with that of the EU, as with, for example, the convergence of foreign and diplomatic services across Europe analysed (though of course in an EU frame) by Brian Hocking and David Spence (2005), but there would no longer be any expectation of this. The only exception would be what is explicitly prescribed for trade arrangements and possibly others to do with security. Europeanisation, for obvious reasons, has often been discussed in tandem with transnationalisation.9 It is therefore relevant to ask whether de-​ Europeanisation entails de-​transnationalisation, or what elements of the transnational persist outside the EU framework. First, it may be useful to distinguish between soft and hard de-​Europeanisation in relation to the EU. What I mean by the first is a process in which a member state diverges from the general European pattern, either through some agreed process of derogation, which may of course be justified as a way of improving flexibility and diversity (Chalmers et al, 2016: especially 6–​7), or through the gradual and possibly surreptitious unilateral abandonment of common European 15

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norms, practices or understandings. In the second case, a decision is taken to withdraw entirely from the EU or to abandon the path of accession. Examples of the first would be the UK’s emergency withdrawal in 1992 from the European Monetary System in an earlier collapse of the pound, or the gradual erosion of constitutional rule in Poland and Hungary in the middle of the present decade. Examples of the second case are the UK and Turkey –​both accompanied (to different degrees) with a shift towards state authoritarianism and increasingly shrill propaganda, some of it directed against the judiciary and academic and other institutions.10 The Nordic and Swiss cases are particularly interesting in this connection (see Nielsen, 2018). Greenland, like the UK, voted to leave what is now the EU, having a decade earlier voted not to join but been dragged in through its union with Denmark. It remains closely associated with the EU as an overseas territory, as its union with Denmark becomes ‘ever looser’ (Gad, 2017)11 Greenland’s rejection of EU membership was substantially driven by the desire to control its fishing, but this inevitably intersected with questions of sovereignty and national identity, the latter defined in opposition to distant Denmark. Greenland’s small population of just over 56,000 makes it a special case, but it is also one of four post-​Danish nations, along with the Faroes (also an autonomous region of Denmark), Norway and Iceland, which became independent in 1905 and 1944 respectively (Neumann, 2014; Jonsdottir, 2013). These longstanding concerns were already present in discussion of EFTA membership in 1970 and continued in relation to the European Economic Area. Iceland’s application for EU membership in 2009, after the collapse of its banks, was paused in 2013 and for the moment seems like a blip in an otherwise limited and transactional relationship. Norway’s membership applications in 1972 and again in 1994 confronted vigorous opposition movements, echoing much earlier opposition to Scandinavianist projects.12 Accounts of the 1972 referendum, such as the brilliant one by Iver Neumann (2002), could be easily read over into 2016 in the UK, with half-​hearted support for membership confronting a diffuse combination of anticapitalist egalitarianism and nativism (Pharo, 1993: 255–​ 256). Lene Hansen (2002: 222) notes that in both Norway and Denmark, it was argued that ‘ “objective” economic analysis should be considered part of an attempt to intimidate the voters’ –​again prefiguring the Brexit campaign. With Norway’s membership of the EEA, however, ‘Some claim that the Norwegian “No” campaigners won in 1994 but have lost a little every day since then’ (Eriksen, 2015: 77).13 Lene Hansen (2002: 221) suggests, however, that ‘The biggest difference in terms of the populations’ view of the EU runs … not between Norway and the rest of the Nordics, but between Finland on the one hand and the “reluctant three” on the other.’14 This suggests a possible future in which Finland continues to Europeanise, while Norway weakens its links with the EU and, in the middle, Denmark and Sweden 16

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resist further integration (assuming this takes place). Here the euro is likely to be the central concern, with Sweden committed in theory to adopt it sometime or other and Denmark having an indefinite opt-​out but currently pegging its krone to the euro.15 Switzerland has a longer history as an independent state. The diversity of this small country partly explains its reticence about joining the EEA in 1992, when the French-​speaking part of the country voted in favour and the German and Italian regions against. The EU has been ‘the most divisive issue in Switzerland and has helped to polarize and ideologize the Swiss party system in a way which has not happened in Norway’ (Church, 2007: 2).16 The result of the Swiss EEA referendum suggests the emergence of a familiar ‘Inglehartian’ polarisation between openness and tradition, with the yes campaign stressing on the one hand the ‘cultural’ issues to do with avoiding isolation and opening up to the new Europe, and on the other the economic advantages of the EEA. These arguments were reversed by those opposing membership. Fifteen years later, Lachat and Kriesi (2007) traced the broader pattern across Western European politics of ‘the transformation of the cultural dimension’. In the UK, as in Switzerland, free movement has become a sticking point, though neither country can do without very substantial migration flows, whatever the preferences of their more xenophobic citizens.17 Non-​membership in the Norwegian and Swiss cases does not in any case mean the absence of transnational regulation (Lavenex, 2011). For the rest of the world, or most of it, outside the Union, WTO regulations form another structure regulating the actions of national states. Although formally the WTO is intergovernmental, in practice it can better be understood as a weak form of transnationalism. The WTO has currently 164 members and an outer circle of observers; only Turkmenistan and North Korea remain outside. The world human rights regime centred on the United Nations is another external sphere, though only the European Court of Human Rights deals with actions brought by individuals as well as states. An important part of the background is what Anne-​Marie Slaughter (1997: 192) called the ‘nationalization of international law’, in which ‘Transgovernmental networks allow governments to benefit from the flexibility and decentralization of nonstate actors’ (p 195). The Brexit fantasy of independence is, then, just that, even in the extreme scenario of a ‘hard Brexit’ with no agreed arrangements with the EU. In the European case, of course, nationalisation tends to mean ‘spill-​back’ from Europe to member states. It is important not to fetishise the ‘community method’ and mistrust under all circumstances more intergovernmental approaches such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), or to assume that a European policy will in all cases be superior to one independently introduced by member (or for that matter non-​member) states. On the 17

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other hand, there are dangers in being too flexible. As Paul Cardwell (2018: 73) has argued in relation to migration, in a context of innovative and perhaps expedient approaches under the heading of ‘new governance’, which allow greater discretion in implementation, ‘there is a real risk that the values the EU upholds are undermined, in turn losing credibility both with populations in the member states, international organisations and third countries.’ A brake on Europeanisation or an experiment with de-​Europeanisation in this modest sense would have to be evaluated on a case-​by-​case basis. I shall concentrate here on more broadly-​based proposals for what has been called ‘de-​constitutionalisation’ of the EU. The term de-​constitutionalisation was used in a rather different sense by Barrus et al (2004), but its present use can be traced back to Ralf Dahrendorf ’s ‘Reflections on the revolution in Europe’, in which he warned post-​c ommunist societies against constitutionalising issues of, for example, economic management which should be discussed in a more open framework (Dahrendorf, 1990: 32). Dahrendorf wanted a constitution for what in 1973 he was already calling a ‘European Union’, but ‘a constitution for democrats’ (Dahrendorf, 1973: 209–​234). João Carlos Espada (2014) picked up the Dahrendorfian theme, and the Madisonian one which inspired Barrus et al (2004), to address what he called ‘The Missing Debate’ around the speed and direction of European integration.18 The constitutional identity of the EU was demonstrated by Joseph Weiler (1999) in the late 1990s and in a major book edited by Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2006). Dieter Grimm, in essays reprinted in Grimm (2016), repeatedly criticised the constitutionalisation of economic policy in the EU and the difficulty of mobilising resistance to it among member states. While not opposed in principle to constitutionalisation and even to a federal EU, he insists that the Treaties should be limited to setting an institutional framework, with policy issues dealt with in secondary law (Grimm, 2016: 45). Hauke Brunkhorst (2013) also addressed ‘the fatal simultaneity of constitutionalization and deconstitutionalization of the union’, a theme that he has pursued in subsequent work. Most recently, Fritz Scharpf (2017: 334), who had earlier coined the term ‘joint decision trap’ (Verflechtungsfalle), has argued that de-​constitutionalisation is the key to the further democratisation of multilevel governance in the EU and ‘loosening the stranglehold of constitutionalised neoliberalism’. In practical terms, he restates his earlier suggestion (Scharpf, 1999) of regularising the approval of opt-​outs for states that do not wish to participate in common policies, by majority votes in the Parliament and Council. This otherwise attractive proposal confronts an obstacle in the form of what Michael Zürn (2017: 280) has termed a ‘democratic paradox’ in which people trust independent bodies 18

De-Europeanisation after Brexit

such as constitutional courts more than parliaments: ‘while participatory democracy requires a constitutionalized system of rule in which especially the coordination of governance and the delegation of authorities is democratically controlled, the people who, in principle, are in favor of democracy trust especially non-​majoritarian institutions that are beyond the reach of majoritarian institutions’. In the background is the factual diversity of the EU itself: not in the sense of a happy interplay of linguistic and cultural differences but in persisting inequalities and polarisations that make a mockery of its cohesion policies. Magone et al (2016) point out in their concluding chapter that ‘In the EU of six, the only serious core-​periphery divide was the north-​south divide within Italy.’ This is perhaps an over-​statement, since many if not all of the original six had much less extreme forms of internal differentiation (though in Belgium and West Germany the regional relations of inequality were becoming reversed). The underlying point is however that the EU today remains unequal and divided in ways that were massively exacerbated by the 2008 economic crisis.19 There are many dimensions to this imperfect Europeanisation, but two are fundamental. The euro, which was intended inter alia to unite the peoples of Europe and in some ways has done so, also sharpened economic divisions, while over-​optimistic expectations for the further democratisation of the former communist states were dashed by more and more instances of ‘backsliding’, to which the Union has often turned a blind eye. This reality is too complex to be squeezed into a have/​have-​not or core/​ periphery model, and even Magone et al (2016: Conclusion) stress that ‘The character of the core-​periphery divide in the Union is multi-​layered and multi-​faceted.’ It remains the case, however, that on the whole the North-​ West is economically and politically in a reasonable state, while the South and East are more problematic. This picture has of course to be qualified with the Irish blip, the UK catastrophe and a certain shadow over Austria and France’s future, and also with impressive performance in pockets of the South and East. I turn now to discuss in more detail two concepts related to de-​ Europeanisation: ‘dis-​integration’ (using the hyphen to indicate the reverse or reversing of integration rather than something more catastrophic) and ‘differentiated integration’. Hans Vollaard (2018: 123), who has been one of the few people, along with Ben Rosamond, to address the issue of dis-​ integration, very creatively runs the Rokkan-​Bartolini model of state and EU formation in reverse, focusing in particular on the EU’s inability to hold its member states in check and the way in which, so far as it does manage this, it destabilises those states and stirs up resistance to the point of demands for exit in the political fringes or, in the UK, the mainstream right. Thus ‘the same factor can be both conducive to integration and disintegration’. He 19

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stresses, however, that dis-​integration does not necessarily mean reversion to independent national states (as the UK belatedly realised in 2016–​18) and there is a variety of partial exit options (p 150).20 Opt-​outs are one of the weakest forms of de-​Europeanisation or, better, multiple-​mode Europeanisation or ‘differentiated integration’, a term that has been in use on and off since the 1980s and was foreshadowed in the Tindemans Report of 1974 (Stubb, 1996; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leuffen et al, 2013; Winzen and Schimmelfennig, 2016). The relevant aspects here are not the temporal delays intentionally built into eurozone membership or free movement but opt-​outs from common policies and the more dramatic prospect, favoured by many German commentators, of a semi-​permanent division between a more integrated core and a less integrated periphery or set of peripheries. As John Erik Fossum (2015: 800) has pointed out, it would be better to speak of differentiation in cases where the intention is to avoid for the foreseeable future measures adopted by other member states. The most prominent examples of opt-​outs are perhaps Denmark and the UK, unless one includes the states that have rejected EU membership but arranged association through the EEA or related arrangements (Outhwaite, 2018). Briefly, opt-​outs seem to have worked reasonably well in Denmark but led in the UK to a drift into the Brexit catastrophe.21 It does not help, of course, that two of the most salient common policies, monetary union and Schengen, have turned out to be particularly contentious. Whatever one’s view of opt-​outs (and mine is shaped by the disastrous outcome in the UK; see also Brunkhorst, 2018), Scharpf is surely right that an agreed common policy in relation to them would be preferable to the ad-​hoc arrangements that have been seen so far, and that are to some extent constitutionalised in the OMC.22 Tanja Börzel (2018: 478), attempting to counter over-​pessimistic diagnoses of the future of the EU, argues that ‘differentiated integration should not be equated with disintegration’.23 This discussion followed something of a trend in the previous few years. Jan Zielonka (2014) asked ‘Is the EU doomed?’, suggesting that it might ‘muddle through’ in a mixed or ‘polyphonious’ series of uneven developments (see also Zielonka, 2017). Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2016: 43) suggested plausibly that the more the EU integrated what they called ‘core state powers’ such as ‘money and fiscal affairs, defence and foreign policy, migration, citizenship and internal security’, the more it intruded on the domain of state elites rather than the business elites affected by market integration.24 While the latter tended to welcome integration (as seen more recently in their response to the prospect of Brexit), the former tend to see the expansion of EU capacities as a threat to their domain of activity, in a logic described over a century ago by Otto Hintze and Max Weber, who stressed the corporate interest of state elites as a determinant of state 20

De-Europeanisation after Brexit

policy. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016: 55) conclude: ‘Perhaps ironically, the more involved the EU is in the exercise of core state powers, the less it looks like a state: more integration, less federation!’ Both Europeanisation and de-​Europeanisation may be seen to destabilise the existing constitutional arrangements of member states. Europeanisation offers opportunities for subnational entities to engage directly with transnational structures, bypassing or acting alongside their national governments. Macro-​regional planning, for example, has been perceived as a threat by several states in the Danube region, which has seen attempts to reassert national control (Ágh, 2016; Sielker, 2017). De-​Europeanisation, as in the prospective British case, has also raised issues about where the powers over, for example, agriculture, currently located at the EU level, should end up after the UK’s eventual (hopefully in the continental sense of possible rather than the English one) secession. At present much agricultural policy is devolved by the UK to the regional governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This may seem a purely UK problem but the British case has, here as elsewhere, a much more general significance, demonstrating the insuperable obstacles to disentangling the links formed by membership, even for a state outside the eurozone and the Schengen area (Wiener, 2017). Although it has not, or not yet, given a decisive impetus to Scottish independence, it has put the UK’s devolution arrangements under serious strain, and would probably have done so even without the spectacularly insensitive postures adopted by the Brexit government. It has also threatened to marginalise the UK Parliament and its judiciary –​in the latter case throwing up possible parallels with the situations in Poland and Hungary. The UK remains politically polarised on the issue in roughly equal proportions, resembling those in Poland, the US or Turkey. All this means that de-​Europeanisation à l’anglaise is likely to remain a negative example for other member states, as Vollaard (2014) anticipated. A more likely outcome is a further extension of policies that do not directly challenge the EU but attempt to evade or dilute its arrangements (Zhelyazkova, 2014). There are perhaps parallels with Colin Crouch’s conception of postdemocracy, in which democracy is not replaced in a Nazi-​style seizure of power (Machtergreifung) but is undermined in more surreptitious ways (Ágh, 2015). The kinds of accommodations and policy bargains discussed in the context of Europeanisation25 may also be relevant in relation to de-​Europeanisation. Strategies of this kind on the part of member states would complement a drift of the EU itself away from transnational approaches in a further development of the OMC and the ‘executive federalism’ to which Habermas drew attention earlier in this decade. As Attila Ágh (2017) has pointed out, the EU has also tended to focus increasingly on its own core, ignoring the fragmentation of its periphery.26 21

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Whether this softening is a permanent change of course for the European polity or merely part of the back-​and-​forth movement that it has always displayed, and which is a regular feature even of more consolidated federal systems, remains to be seen (see Kelemen, 2007; Bednar, 2009). Survey evidence suggests that European opinion tends to favour a more flexible and selective approach in which a less transnational EU, with more popular input through referendums, focuses mainly on peace and security issues as well as the promotion of economic growth rather than energy security or climate change27 (de Vries, 2018: 190-​193). de Vries differentiates usefully between four attitudes to the EU: loyalists, regime sceptics, policy sceptics and exit sceptics, and also between those in states with relatively good or poor economic conditions. (See also Otjes and Katsanidou, 2017.) There seems to be no support for the most dramatic form of narrowing: the return to a much smaller Europe of six or fifteen. Overall, however, it is hard to disagree with Philippe Huberdeau’s (2017) conclusion that European integration is not irreversible. The central issue will probably be the future development of the eurozone, which is widely agreed to require tighter coordination.28 In one scenario, then, this drives the EU as a whole (along with a couple of Nordic refuseniks and some laggards) in a more federal direction along the lines argued for by Anthony Giddens (2013) –​whether or not this is particularly welcome to European publics. Alternatively, the eurozone, if it survives, might constitute a permanent core of the Union, with a much larger and more fragmented outer circle. This second scenario might come to be seen as a realistic accommodation to political necessity, in a context increasingly dominated by nationalism and xenophobia, or as a seriously damaging de-​Europeanisation. European integration began at a time when this kind of nationalist politics had just wrecked the continent, and we have to confront the possibility that it may succumb to it again. As Gerard Delanty (2019: 426–​427) writes in the conclusion to the new edition of his Formations of European Modernity: ‘To defend Europe in this climate of uncertainty is to defend the social against the destructive forces of globalization and the dismantling of the institutions and structures of political community and solidarity that have been an integral part of European modernity.’ Notes 1

2

This title is a reference to the EU slogan of widening (enlargement) and deepening (integration). The current explosion of populism and political polarisation creates particular problems for the EU, which is largely based on argumentation, consensus and compromise. On the difference between the emergent polity of the EU and other forms of international cooperation, see for example Lavdas (2010).

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De-Europeanisation after Brexit 3

4

5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12 13

14

15

For a recent expert assessment, see Rogers (2018). Government statements later became a little more conciliatory (or resigned) on the issue of EU standards. On Europeanisation and human rights, see Schuldt (2018). www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/tory-ministers-taxpayer-cash-hard-Brexit-erg. More recently a police spokesman has admitted that ‘political sensitivities’ are delaying its investigation of criminality in the Leave campaign: www.opendemocracy. net/​uk/​brexitinc/​ james-​cusick-​adam-​ramsay/​met-​police-​stall-​brexit-​campaign-​ investigations-​claiming-​polit This was in fact a revision of the more negative judgement of 1974 known as Solange I. As Ernst Haas (1970: 611) repeated in his retrospective article, ‘I consider it [Europeanisation] a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms’ (my emphasis). For a useful overview, see Anders et al (2016). Jan Grzymski has pointed out that the veteran public intellectual Jadwiga Staniszkis coined the term ‘anti-​communist bolshevism’ with regard to the Law and Justice government in Poland; see https://d​ isco ​ vers​ ocie​ ty.org/​2016/​06/​01/​pol​and-​en-​route-​ to-​ authoritarianism/​. On the details of the Polish situation, see also Sanders and von Danwitz (2018). See also the related analysis, based on a comparison of Serbia and Bulgaria but of more general relevance, in Dawson 2014. In an interesting example of the intersection of two varieties of de-​Europeanisation, Ágh (2017: 9) notes that the UK was prominent in blocking the strengthening of the rule of law framework. This was repeated in June 2018 when UK Conservative MEPs voted against sanctioning Hungary. As a member of the civil liberties committee, Sophie in ‘t Veld, commented, ‘Voting with Orbán is the true Tory Brexit: the exit from European values.’ (www.theguardian.com/w ​ orld/2​ 018/j​ un/2​ 5/m ​ ep-​european-​ parliament-​vote-​eu-​ sanction-​hungary-​viktor-​orban). What Ágh (2016a) had earlier described as the ‘Rocky Road of Europeanization’ looks increasingly like a rocky horror show. The analysis by Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) remains relevant; see also Körtvélyesi and Majtényi (2017); Pazderski (2018). See for example Bruszt and Holzhacker (2009); Habermas (2017). In the UK, a court judgement requiring the government to consult Parliament on its Article 50 notification led to the judges being branded ‘enemies of the people’ in a newspaper article. The government has also been aiming to secure powers to revise legislation without reference to Parliament and to reconfigure the UK’s devolution arrangements. For an excellent discussion of the determinants of the UK’s Brexit negotiating position, see Martill and Steiger (2018). Since, at the time of writing, the outcome of the Brexit negotiations is still open and I have been criticised for over-​emphasising the ignorance, stupidity and wickedness of the UK government, it is worth stressing the extent of the damage which it has caused to the UK’s image. (In fairness I should admit that this is balanced by expressions of admiration in extreme right circles.) See also Gad (2017) and Adler-​Nissen and Gad (2013). The parallels with Scotland’s reverse situation of being prospectively dragged out of the EU by the UK have been explored in some detail by Gad (2017b), who has argued that ‘sovereignty games’ may open up options for Scotland short of full independence. Like Iceland, its emergence as an independent state is quite recent (1905). For a more positive recent official assessment see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). This contrasts interestingly with last century’s joke that in the 21st century, Europe would be made up of the following states: the European Union, the six republics of Yugoslavia, and Finland. The euro operates also as a form of weak Europeanisation in those parts of the Western Balkans and Northern Ireland where it circulates as a secondary currency.

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16

1 7

18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25 26

27

28

On the other hand, Sieglinde Gstöhl (2002: 214) suggests, in her comparison of the three countries, that ‘Norway and Switzerland had to cope with much stronger domestic constraints and more issues of national identity than did Sweden.’ On ‘Alpine’ political culture, see Caramani (2005). On Norway as a (probably unattainable) model for the UK, see Fossum and Graver (2018). For a Swiss overview, see ‘Switzerland and the European Union’: www.eda. admin.ch/​d am/​e da/​e n/​d ocuments/​p ublications/​E uropaeischeAngelegenheiten/​ Schweiz-​und-​E U_​e n.pdf. The proposed treaty between Switzerland and the EU now seems dead, since both major parties have come out against it: www.nzz.ch/​ schweiz/​d ie-​ europapolitik-​d er-​s chweiz-​d ie-​w ichtigsten-​a spekte-​i m-​u eberblick-​ ld.1358995 The EU is not alone in constitutionalising economic policy matters: Article 53 of the Italian constitution decrees that ‘the tax system shall be progressive’. For useful recent discussions of European inequalities, see the special issue of Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, No. 219, 2017; also Hugrée et al (2017). On dis-​integration, see also Eppler and Scheller (2013); Scheller and Eppler (2014). See Vimont (2018). Although the UK may have gained in the short term from opting out of the euro (since its economic management would probably have been no less incompetent than that of Ireland and had similar results) and Schengen (given its island location), these would have bound the population more closely into the EU and made the prospect of leaving it seem more consequential than abandoning an unused credit card or gym membership. Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016: 13) noted ‘the excessively high costs of defecting’ from monetary integration; Vollaard’s model also stresses this dimension. Christopher Lord (2015) pointed to the advantages of differentiation where the resulting negative externalities are relatively insignificant, and Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger (2017) defend differentiated integration in a Union of demoi. On dis-​integration, see Schmitter (2012), Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016), Rosamond (2016). Scharpf (2016), however, calls for the dis-​integration of the eurozone, pointing to ‘the costs of non-​disintegration’. Majone (2014) suggests that integration may have gone too far. On citizenship, see Seubert et al (2018). See for instance Taylor et al (2013). For an argument that the EU should intervene more vigorously in protecting the rule of law in its member states, ‘de-​fragmenting’ itself in the sense used of a computer disk, see Perju (2018). It is of course not clear how economic prosperity can be safeguarded without coordinated action on climate change, and the sort of social policy approach which the Union has largely failed to pursue (Walby, 2018). See, for instance, Rodrik (2018).

Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the University of Pannonia Summer School in Köszeg, Hungary and at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. I am grateful also for comments by David Spence and Pierre Vimont, and other participants at the London conference.

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Chalmers, D., Jachtenfuchs, M. and Joerges, C. (eds) (2016) The end of the Eurocrats’ dream. Adjusting to European diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Church, C.H. (ed) (2007) Switzerland and the European Union, London: Routledge. Dahrendorf, R. (1973) Plädoyer für die Europäische Union, Munich: Piper. Dahrendorf , R. (1990) Reflections on the revolution in Europe, New York: Times Books. Dawson, J. (2014) Cultures of democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How ideas shape politics, Farnham: Ashgate. de Vries, C. (2018) Euroscepticism and the future of the European Union, Oxford: OUP. Delanty, G. (2019) Formations of European modernity, (2nd edn) Basingstoke: Palgrave. Delhey, J., Deutschmann, E., Graf, T. and Richter, K. (2014) ‘Measuring the Europeanization of everyday life: Three new indices and an empirical application’, European Societies, 16(3): 355–​377. Dixon, D. (2018) ‘Article 50 and member state sovereignty’, German Law Journal, 19(4): 901–​940. Eppler, A. and Scheller, H. (eds) (2013) Zur Konzeptualisierung europäischer Desintgration. Zug-​und Gegenkräfte im europäischen Integrationsprozess, Baden-​ Baden: Nomos. Eriksen, E.O. (2015) ‘Despoiling Norwegian democracy’, in E. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum (eds) The European Union’s non-​members: Independence under hegemony, London: Routledge, pp 77–​100. Espada, J.C. (2014) ‘The Missing Debate’, Journal of Democracy, 25(4): 88–​95. Fossum, J.E. (2015) ‘Democracy and differentiation in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6): 799–​815. Fossum, J.E. and Graver, H.P. (2018) Squaring the circle on Brexit. Could the Norway model work? Bristol: Policy Press Gad, U.P. (2016) National identity politics and postcolonial sovereignty games: Greenland, Denmark, and the European Union, Chicago, IL: Museum Tusculanum. Gad, U.P. (2017) ‘What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for analyzing identity politics’, Politik, 20(3): 104-​120. Gad, U.P. (2017b) A Reverse Greenland? in J. Riddoch and E. Bort (eds) (2017) McSmörgåsbord: What post-​Brexit Scotland can learn from the Nordics, Edinburgh: Luath Press, pp 87-​98. Genschel, Philipp and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2016) ‘More integration, less federation: the European integration of core state powers’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1): 42–​59.

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Giddens, A. (2013) Turbulent and mighty continent: What future for Europe? Cambridge: Polity Grimm, D. (2016) Europa ja –​aber welches? Zur Verfassung der europäischen Demokratie, Munich: Beck. Translated as The Constitution of European Democracy (2017), Oxford: Oxford University Press Gstöhl, S. (2002) ‘Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the process of integration’, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Haas, E. (1970) ‘The study of regional integration: Reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorizing’, International Organization, 24(4): 607–​646. Habermas, J. (2017) ‘An exploration of the meaning of transnationalization of democracy, using the example of the European Union’, in P. Deutscher and C. Lafont (eds), Critical theory in critical times, New York: Columbia University Press, pp 3–​18. Hansen, L. (2002) ‘Conclusion’, in L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds) European integration and national identity: The challenge of the Nordic States, London: Routledge, pp 214–​225. Hocking, B. and Spence, D. (eds) (2005) Foreign ministries in the European Union: Integrating diplomats, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Holzinger, K. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2012) ‘Differentiated integration in the European Union: Many concepts, sparse theory, few data’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19(2): 292–​305. Huberdeau, P. (2017) La construction européenne est-​elle irréversible? Paris: La Documentation Française. Hugrée, C., Penissat, É. and Spire, A. (2017) Les classes sociales en Europe. Tableau des nouvelles inégalités sur le vieux continent, Marseille: Agone. Jonsdottir, J. (2013) Europeanization and the EEA. Iceland’s participation in the EU’s policy process, Abingdon: Routledge. Kelemen, R.D. (2007) ‘Built to Last? The Durability of EU Federalism’, in S. Meunier and K.R. McNamara (eds), Making history: European integration and institutional design at fifty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 51–​66. Körtvélyesi, Z. and Majtényi, B. (2017) ‘Game of values: The threat of exclusive constitutional identity, the EU and Hungary’, German Law Journal, 18(7): 1721–​1744. Kuhn, T. (2011) ‘Individual transnationalism, globalisation and euroscepticism: An empirical test of Deutsch’s transactionalist theory’, European Journal of Political Research, 50: 811–​837. Lachat, R. and Kriesi, H. (2007) ‘The impact of globalization on national party configurations in Western Europe’, Paper prepared for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12-​ 15, Chicago, http://​www. romain-​lachat.ch/​papers/​mpsa2007_​2.pdf Accessed 11.1.16.

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Lavdas, K.A. (2010) ‘Normative evolution in Europe: Small states and republican peace’, LSE ‘Europe in Question’ discussion paper series, 17/​ 2010, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, http://​ epri​nts.lse.ac.uk/​53308/​1/​Libfile_​repo​sito​r y_​C​onte​nt_​E​urop​ean%20Ins​ titu​te_​L​EQS%20Dis​cuss​ion%20 Papera_​LEQSPaper17.pdf Lavenex, S. (2011) ‘Concentric circles of flexible “European” integration: A typology of EU external governance relations’, Comparative European Politics, 9(4/​5): 3272–​3393. Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2013) Differentiated integration. Explaining variation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lord, C. (2015) ‘Utopia or dystopia? Towards a normative analysis of differentiated integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6): 783–​798. Magone, J., Laffan, B. and Schweiger, C. (eds) (2016) Core-​periphery relations in the European Union. Power and conflict in a dualist political economy, Abingdon: Routledge. Majone, G. (2014) Rethinking the future of Europe post-​crisis. Has integration gone too far? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martill, B. and Staiger, U. (2018) ‘Cultures of negotiation: Explaining Britain’s hard bargaining in the Brexit negotiations’, Dahrendorf Forum IV, Working paper No. 4. Neumann, I.B. (2002) ‘This little piggy stayed at home: Why Norway is not a member of the EU’, in L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds), European integration and national identity: The challenge of the Nordic states, London: Routledge, pp 88‒129. Neumann, I.B. (2014) ‘Imperializing Norden’, Cooperation & Conflict, 49(1): 119‒129. Nielsen, J.H. (2018) ‘The pragmatic Euroscepticism of Scandinavia’, in B. Leruth, N. Startin and S. Isherwood (eds), Routledge handbook of Euroscepticism, Abingdon: Routledge. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018) ‘Norway in Europe: The Norwegian Government’s strategy for cooperation with the EU 2018–​2021’, www.regjeringen.no/​globalassets/​departementene/​ud/​dokumenter/​eu/​ eu_​strategy.pdf Otjes, S. and Katsanidou, A. (2017) ‘Beyond Kriesiland: EU integration as a super issue after the Eurocrisis’, European Journal of Political Research, 56: 301–​119. Outhwaite, W. (ed.) (2017) Brexit. Sociological responses, London: Anthem. Outhwaite, W. (2019 forthcoming) ‘ “Auf Wiedersehen, Pets”: Rejecting a EUropean Identity?’. Pazderski, F. (2018) ‘Demokratische Skeptiker oder politisierte Aktivisten? Über die Zivilgesellschaft und die Beziehung zur Demokratie in Polen und den Visegrád-​Ländern’, Polen-​Analysen, Nr. 217, 02.05. 28

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Perju, V. (2018) ‘On the (de-​)fragmentation of statehood in Europe: Reflections on Ernst-​Wolfgang Böckenförde’s work on European integration’, German Law Journal, 19(2): 403–​434. Pharo, H. (1993) ‘Norway and the World since 1945’, in A.C Kiel (ed), Continuity and change: Aspects of contemporary Norway, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, pp 233–​261. Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (eds) (2006) Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg in den Verfassungsstaaz, Frankfurt: Campus. Rodrik, D. (2018) ‘How democratic is the Euro?’, Social Europe, 18 June, www.socialeurope.eu/​how-​democratic-​is-​the-​euro Rogers, I. (2018) ‘The real post-​Brexit options’, lecture at Policy Scotland, 23 May, policyscotland.gla.ac.uk/b​ log-s​ ir-i​ van-​rogers-​speech-​text-​in-​full/​ Rosamond, B. (2016) ‘Brexit and the problem of European disintegration’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12(4): 864–​871. Rupnik, J. and Zielonka, J. (2013) ‘Introduction: The state of democracy 20 Years on’, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 27(1): 3–​25. Sanders, A. and von Danwitz, L. (2018) ‘Selecting judges in Poland and Germany: challenges to the rule of law in Europe and propositions for a new approach to judicial legitimacy’, German Law Journal, 19(4): 769–​815. Scharpf, F. (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scharpf, F. (2016) ‘The costs of non-​disintegration: the case of the European Monetary Union’, in D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs and C. Joerges (eds), The end of the Eurocrats’ dream. Adjusting to European diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 29–​49. Scharpf, F. (2017) ‘De-​constitutionalisation and majority rule: A democratic vision for Europe’, European Law Journal, 23: 315–​334. Scheller, H. and Eppler, A. (2014) ‘European disintegration –​non-​existing phenomenon or a blind spot of European integration research?’ University of Vienna: Institute for European Integration Research, Working paper 02/​2014. Schmitter, P.C. (2012) ‘A way forward?’, Journal of Democracy, 23(4): 39–​46. Schmitter, P.C. and Lefkofridi, Z. (2016) ‘Neo-​functionalism as a theory of disintegration’, Chinese Political Science Review, 1(1): 1–​29. Schuldt, L. (2018) ‘Mixed signals of Europeanization: Revisiting the NPD decision in light of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence’, German Law Journal, 19(4): 817–​844. Seubert, S., Elbert, O. and van Waarden, F. (eds) (2018) Reconsidering EU citizenship: Contradictions and constraints, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

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Sielker, F. (2017) ‘Macro-​regional integration: new scales, spaces and governance for Europe?’ Doctoral thesis, Friedrich-​Alexander-​Universität Erlangen-​Nürnberg, https://​opus4.kobv.de/o ​ pus4-f​ au/f​ rontdoor/i​ ndex/​ index/​docId/​8517 Slaughter, A.-​M . (1997) ‘The new world order’, Foreign Affairs, 76(5): 183–​197. Stubb, A. (1996) ‘A categorization of differentiated integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(2): 283–​295. Taylor, A., Geddes, A. and Lees, C. (2013) The European Union and South East Europe: the dynamics of Europeanization and multilevel governance, Abingdon: Routledge. Vimont, P. (2018) ‘Flexibility is not Europe’s miracle solution’, Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 26 June. Vollaard, H. (2014) ‘Explaining European disintegration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(5): 1142–​1159. Vollaard, H. (2018) European disintegration. A search for explanations, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Walby, S. (2018) ‘The concept of inclusive economic growth’, Soundings, 68, Spring: 138–​154. Weiler, J.H.H. (1999) The constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” and other essays on European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wiener, A. (2017) ‘The impossibility of disintangling integration’, in W. Outhwaite (ed), Brexit: Sociological responses, London: Anthem, pp 139–​152. Winzen, T. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2016) ‘Explaining differentiation in European Union treaties’, European Union Politics, 17(4): 616–​647. Zhelyazkova, A. (2014) ‘From selective integration into selective implementation: The link between differentiated integration and conformity with EU laws’, European Journal of Political Research, 53: 727–​746. Zielonka, J. (2014) Is the EU doomed? Cambridge: Polity Press. Zielonka, J. (2017) ‘The Remaking of the EU’s Borders and the Images of European Architecture’, Journal of European Integration, 39(5): 641–​656. Zürn, M. (2017) ‘From constitutional rule to loosely coupled spheres of liquid authority: a reflexive approach’, International Theory, 9(2): 261–​285.

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3

Theorising the EU in Crisis: De-​Europeanisation as Disintegration Ben Rosamond

Introduction Brexit has prompted renewed calls for EU studies to take seriously the problem of European disintegration. In fact, ‘disintegration’ has been on the field’s agenda for some time. With the EU suffering a ‘perfect storm’ of crises, some of which are thought to be existential, it is perhaps unsurprising that there have been calls to theorise disintegration (Zielonka, 2014) as well as a few attempts to map out what a theory of disintegration might look like (Jones, 2018; Vollaard, 2014, 2018; Webber, 2014). Part of the turn to disintegration has involved thinking through how and whether standard theories of integration would cope with the unravelling of the EU (Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2016) or at least to posit ‘disintegration’ as an outcome that could follow from the interactive effects of several independent ‘crisis’ variables (Schimmelfennig, 2017). Meanwhile journalistic treatments, confronted by the eurozone and refugee crises along with the prospective exit of a key member state, often question the sustainability of the EU project. There is a clear logic at work here. Most simply, the idea that the real world of the EU is changing provokes calls for an appropriate response from those charged with generating systematic knowledge about the EU. The disintegration turn presumes, first and foremost, that there is empirical evidence of the EU suffering from severe tensions that, in turn, are likely to reverse some, if not all, of the key integration gains of the past seven decades.1 It follows that the field’s theoretical coordinates need to be reset in ways that presume the possibility of integrative collapse or decline. Analytically, and independently 31

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of any trends or events in the real world of the field’s object (the EU), there are strong grounds to suppose that any theory of integration must, as a matter of methodological principle, be able to explain disintegration as well as integration. These two stimuli are not necessarily incompatible, but they do emerge from quite distinctive concerns about why extant theory is lacking or flawed. In the first, theory needs to get its act together because the world it seeks to account for is changing in important ways. In the second, it has always been incumbent upon theorists to specify the conditions under which disintegration would occur; the absence of a theory of disintegration thus reflects poorly on established theories of integration. Despite this evidence of a new concern with disintegration, it is worth noting that the field of EU studies (or at least some portions of it) has for quite some time been less interested in ‘integration’ (and thus, by the logic suggested earlier in this chapter, ‘disintegration’) as a central defining problematique than it once was (Manners and Rosamond, 2018). At least this has been the longstanding and well-​established premise of scholars interested in treating the EU as a ‘normal’ polity with state-​like features (Hix, 2007; Kreppel, 2012). The supposed analytical gain here is well known: the EU becomes compatible with all other political systems and the sui generis problem –​the analytical inconvenience of there being only one case of the phenomenon under investigation –​is solved. That said, one question worth posing is whether the move away from ‘integration’ as subject matter has rendered the field less able to analyse disintegration? Or put a little more strongly, has the field of EU studies (especially in its political science mode) rendered itself incapable of analysing the possible collapse of its primary object? By focusing on a range of political system, governance and institutional processes, it could be argued that EU studies as a field tends towards a kind of inertia bias which blinds it to the importance of potentially disintegrative happenings/​outcomes and thereby leads scholarship, as a matter of course, to assume institutional continuity as near axiomatic rather than to posit radical institutional change as an immanent possibility. These questions are worth posing for what they have to say about the state of EU studies, but they also remind us of important broader critiques of political science, not least its problematic tendency to project future probabilities from recurrent sampling of the past record (Blyth, 2006). The cautionary tale of Soviet Studies, seemingly blindsided by the sudden collapse of the USSR, looms large here (Cox, 1998). The cautionary tale has two aspects. In the first, the claim is that Sovietology became so fixated on the mechanics of its object that it focused overwhelmingly on how the system reproduced itself. As such it was blinded to a series of exogenous and endogenous factors that together threatened sudden systemic collapse (and which were –​arguably –​hiding in plain sight). This might imply that all fields (whether disciplines, subfields or area specialisms) have an inherent 32

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tendency towards conservative interpretations of their object.2 The second aspect is related to the ways in which academic fields become more and more specialised over time (Becher and Trowler, 2001). As fields become sustainable communities of scholarship with professional circuits, academic norms and ‘literatures’ of their own, so they tend (inevitably) towards self-​referentialism. This can compound the fallacy of sampling from past experience to project future probabilities by ruling out pasts other than that ascribed by the field to the object in question. Taken together, it might be argued that these sociology of knowledge factors are generative of a kind of bias where scholars become incapable of anticipating or even recognising ‘black swan’ events. To return to our example, the damage done to Soviet Studies was not solely down to a failure to predict the collapse of the USSR ex ante. It was also because the field lacked the conceptual toolkit to properly understand what had happened to its object ex post. If we push this even further to argue that in some cases (like the EU) the object and knowledge about the object are potentially co-​constitutive (Adler-​Nissen and Kropp, 2015; Mudge and Vauchez, 2012; Rosamond, 2015; White, 2003), then the implications of not thinking through disintegration become more complex. For one thing, the collapse of the EU would no doubt sound the death knell of EU studies. More interestingly, disintegration might follow from the failure of key policy actors to grasp the gravity of the situation in which they find themselves. If aspects of EU studies form key parts of the road map of EU policy actors (particularly EU policy actors), then their understandings of relevant problem and solution sets are likely to have been skewed by the field’s inadequate grasp of disintegrative forces. This is very much the story related by White (2003) in his discussion of the Hallstein Commission’s internalisation of the conceptual vocabulary of (early) neofunctionalism. Because of this, argues White, Hallstein and his key officials completely failed to grasp the threat posed by De Gaulle and the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965–​66 for the simple reason that their collective mindset did not enable them to see the assertive manoeuvring of the French government as a crisis. This chapter is attentive to these concerns and represents a tentative exploration of how we might usefully think about disintegration in EU studies. In so doing, it explores how the field –​particularly in the phase of classical integration theory –​has conceptualised disintegration. That there is an old literature on disintegration may come as a surprise to those who have simply assumed that integration theorists of the past had relied upon normatively loaded, unidirectional models of integration that were only capable of correction by doses of intergovernmental scepticism. The argument developed here is not that we should mount a full-​scale intellectual recovery of neofunctionalism’s forgotten discussion of disintegration, but rather that in pursuit of an understanding of disintegrative dynamics and their systemic effects we should (a) appreciate –​as neofunctionalists 33

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ultimately did –​that the institutional expressions of European integration are embedded (and always have been) in a broader political economy and political sociology of Western Europe; (b) thus recognise that disintegration (or symptoms of disintegration) in the object of study (the EU) might be expressions of broader dynamics such as the breakdown of the democratic capitalist compact that emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II and (c) take much more seriously the relationship between knowledge production and policy practice in European integration.

Rethinking classical integration theory Discussions about disintegration very quickly run into two familiar issues. The first is the question of generalisability. The second follows from the first: the dependent variable problem. Generalisability means that the propositions of integration theory needed to apply to the entire universe of cases of regional integration and not just Europe. Given that Europe was the primary empirical site for the development of regional integration theory, the danger of sampling on the dependent variable was always high.3 Later scholars of comparative regionalism castigated classical integration theory for its Eurocentric biases, identifying in particular the neofunctionalist idea of ‘spill-​over’ as nothing more than a descriptive concept that only made sense in the spatial and temporal context of Western Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s. It followed that the dependent variable –​‘regional integration’ –​was defined in ways that wholly or mostly relied upon studies of the early European Communities. Integration in other regions of the world was thus benchmarked against the highly specific version that had been developed by ‘the Six’. Of course, this presumes that we are wedded methodologically to the idea that the results of knowledge production should be nomothetic rather than idiographic. And the question of methodological priors is as important to the formulation of theories of disintegration as it should have been to discussions of integration theory. In any case, following the generalisability and dependent variable problems through in light of the nomothetic logic just outlined suggests that theories of disintegration should be applicable across all prior, current and future cases and that the dynamics and/​or the telos of disintegration should not be defined out of ad-​hoc empirical observation of the European experience. This deduction raises a further crucial question, namely whether the best way to understand or even explain the present European predicament is via the theorisation of ‘disintegration’ in these terms. The dependent variable problem was well known to neofunctionalists. It is simply wrong to imply that the early integration theorists were unaware of the issue and/​or that crude Eurocentrism was at the heart of their enterprise. In his retrospective piece surveying the problems and prospects of regional 34

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integration theory after 15 years of collective scholarly endeavour, Ernst Haas offered this definition of the field’s dependent variable: The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. (Haas, 1971: 6) As Haas himself noted, the dependent variable here includes both a posited outcome and a set of processes. The outcome of integration is defined in such a way as to be consistent with a number of possible terminal conditions. In the same piece, Haas speaks of the dependent variable of integration theory being at best ‘putative’ (1971: 27). In some ways this is quite distinct from his earlier formulation of political integration as ‘the process whereby actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-​existing national states’ (Haas, 1968: 16). This definition owes rather an obvious debt to the inductive study of west European integration in the 1950s and early 1960s. It is also a product of a particular way of thinking analytically about the state and politics –​neofunctionalism’s very visible debt to the pluralist political science of the 1950s. What links both definitions is their interest in both integrative processes and integrative outcomes. Indeed, if outcomes are understood in purely teleological terms and require the positing of distinct possible ‘end states’, then it would be fair to say that the bulk of integration theory (particularly from the late 1950s though to the mid-​1970s) was interested in integration as a process. Using the case of the Communities (or any other previous case of regional integration or regional community building) to project prospective general end states would simply exacerbate the dependent variable problem and neglect the possibility that a wide range of integrative outcomes were possible. Most discussions of neofunctionalism fix on ‘spill-​over’ as the theory’s central preoccupation. There is much to be said for investigating: (a) the extent to which integrative momentum is acquired through the logic of functional linkage across distinct sectors; (b) how de facto and de jure processes of economic enmeshment might be generative of centralised regulatory and governance institutions; (c) whether the emergence of a regional supranational policy regime is enough to reorient the activities and organisational attributes of domestic producer groups; (d) the extent to which deeper integration might be the product of bold problem solving initiatives by elites; and (e) the extent to which these processes are the product of deliberate agency, automaticity or unintended consequences. 35

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Yet even the act of parsing these multiple forms of spill-​over fails to capture the wider concerns (or indeed the dynamism) of neofunctionalist integration theory. One key theme that has been systematically forgotten is the interest of early integration theorists in ‘background conditions’. In the Haas-​ Schmitter model (Haas and Schmitter, 1964) –​which, incidentally, is notable for successfully predicting the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Area in the 1960s –​the key question concerns the necessary and sufficient conditions for regional economic integration initiatives to spawn strong and durable institutional orders. Part of the explanation resides in governmental preferences and the powers ascribed to region-​level institutions at the moment when economic union is initiated, and ‘process conditions’ –​the emergent decision making style within the union, the adaptability of actors to the new regime of policy making, and the extent to which economic union is associated with a discernible growth in transactions among participating units –​are also floated as predictors of success. But Haas and Schmitter also maintained that the transformation of an economic integration initiative into a substantive supranational political order is also dependent upon the degree to which a set of conditions apply across participating nations. Haas and Schmitter’s model implied that similarly sized pluralistic societies with already high mutual cross-​border transactions and high degrees of elite complementarity would be the best candidates to form political communities out of the technical business of integrating economies. This facet of the neofunctionalist research programme continued to be revised and developed. By the turn of the decade, Nye (1971) had developed an account of ‘integrative potential’ that sought to uncover the set of conditions that could be associated with a positive institution-​ building response to various ‘integrative mechanisms’. The latter might be positively calibrated but, even so, in the absence of positive structural and (interestingly) perceptual background conditions, Nye maintained that integration would flounder. In passing, it is important to note the heavily sociological emphasis in this work, which in turn confirms the substantial intellectual debt owed by neofunctionalists to the contemporaneous ‘transactionalist’ approach of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues (Deutsch et al, 1957; Jacob and Toscano, 1964). If nothing else, this serves as a reminder that the particular integration project associated with the European Communities was embedded within Europe’s broader post-​war political economy and political sociology (see Rosamond, 2017). It follows that any ‘disintegration’ of the EU might have less to do with factors endogenous to the EU and more to do with significant changes to the underlying political economy/​sociology within which it has been nested. We will return to this point. 36

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Ways of thinking about disintegration We have already noted how scholars of regional integration were interested in cases where integration failed. Failure in such instances is defined as both the inability to develop or even maintain an economic integration initiative and, more fulsomely as the absence of political integration/​institutionalisation as an adjunct to a technical economic integration scheme. They also developed an interest in ‘disintegration’. There are only two index entries for ‘disintegration’ in Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1971) collection of papers from the 1969 conference attended by pretty much all of the key American neofunctionalist scholars, but the text is peppered with numerous references to the concept, suggesting that this was something of a hot topic as far as the participants were concerned at the time.4 The gathering had set itself an interesting set of objectives: ‘the development of a more sophisticated theory and methodology, the acceleration of comparative regional integration analysis and the exploration of inchoate links to the problems of nation-​ building and political change’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971: ix). The explicit linkage to the macro-​historical issue of nation-building was consistent with established currents of integration theory (Etzioni, 1965; Jacob and Toscano, 1964; De Vree, 1972) and, while it had the analytical merit of widening the universe of possible cases, it also promised to avoid the problem of subfield closure outlined earlier. Lindberg (1971: 56–​57) developed a list of ten variable properties that describe the extent to which a group of countries engage in collective decisions. Higher degrees of political integration would be associated with high or rising scores across the ten variables. Lindberg then maintained that if all variables decrease in value, then we would undoubtedly be witnessing political disintegration. Of course, as Lindberg acknowledged, the scores across the ten variables may exhibit a range of integrative and disintegrative features, hence his call for sophisticated multivariate analysis to determine the level and directionality of political integration. Lindberg was here building on his work with Scheingold (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970), while trying to strip it of its ‘EECentricity’.5 At the same time (and a full quarter of a century before the onset of the supposed ‘comparative politics turn’ in EU studies), Lindberg and Scheingold were working hard to analyse the EC as a political system, thereby pushing the field to consider the determinants of system stability and change. Chapter 4 of Europe’s would-​be polity developed a sophisticated Eastonian take on alternative models of (EC) system change. Lindberg and Scheingold posited three broad system outcomes: ‘fulfilment’, ‘retraction’ and ‘extension’. Of these, ‘retraction’ is of the most interest to current discussions of disintegration.6 ‘Retraction’ is subdivided into two further concepts: ‘output failure’ and ‘spill-​back’. The former describes a situation where the joint decision system is unable to develop policies 37

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consistent with the delivery of an agreed goal. Situations of ‘output failure’ can lead to a diminution of the system’s authority and of the scope of its policy coverage. It does not necessarily refer to the maintenance of the status quo ante. ‘Spill-​back’ (a concept developed by Schmitter, 1971) is associated with actor withdrawal from specific policy obligations: [Rules] are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope of community action and its institutional capacities decrease. Spill-​back may occur in an area that had once been in equilibrium or enjoyed forward linkages. While spill-​back does entail risks for the system as a whole, it is likely to be limited to the specific rules in question. (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 137) Schmitter’s (1971) discussion associates ‘spill-​back’ with deliberate agency. It is a disintegrative strategy with the explicit purpose of reducing centralised decisional authority in given issue areas as well as more generally. The concept survives into Schmitter’s most recent work where spill-​back is associated with at least four (EU-​related) phenomena: (a) a member state refusing to participate in a given supranational policy area; (b) enforced exit of a member state from a given aspect of the supranational regime; (c) the voluntary exit of a member state from the EU; and (d) the enactment of a range of right and left wing Eurosceptic policy preferences (Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2016: 2–​3). In his 1971 essay, Schmitter writes interestingly of actors developing disintegrative (spill-​back) strategies with the purpose of forcing the overall policy system into a state of ‘low risk entropy’. This is probably best understood as a kind of institutional equilibrium, albeit one deprived of the kind of dynamics that could take it forward towards deeper integration. Moreover, entropic systems are prone to the insertion of randomness and disorder. This would imply not only stasis and a lack of forward momentum, but also a situation of heightened uncertainty where systemic decay could be expected. Once again, there is no projected endpoint of integration (the moment when it would be possible to state categorically that disintegration has occurred). Rather Schmitter is interested in how stable systems such as the EU can be rendered unstable through disintegrative acts by purposive actors. Two points are worthy of note here. First, the emphasis on integration as system centralisation, and disintegration as partial or wholesale decentralisation resonates with the neofunctionalists’ interest in comparing regional integration to nation-​building or, put in Bartolini’s (2005) terms, ‘centre formation’. This idea is picked up by Vollaard (2014) as the most promising way of capturing what disintegration is all about. Second, even if we can specify particular phenomena as disintegrative, in so doing we do not necessarily specify an overall system-​level consequence (at least in terms 38

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of finality). For example, if Greece were to leave the euro, we can posit a range of possible consequences of that disintegrative moment, including deeper positive integration by the remaining eurozone countries. Much the same can be said of the effects of Brexit. Brexit is disintegrative, but its long-​term systemic consequences might be quite the opposite. Lindberg and Scheingold’s notion of ‘retraction’ does not suppose full-​scale system collapse. Indeed, ‘retraction’ should perhaps be thought of as compatible with what we now call ‘differentiated integration’ (Stubb, 2002; Warleigh, 2002; Leuffen et al, 2012; Adler-​Nissen, 2014). Of course, differentiation itself could be read as a systemic coping mechanism to prevent wholesale system collapse, which of course is the most obvious imaginary of disintegration. One interesting question raised directly by Brexit and other ongoing crises is whether the coping strategy of differentiation is able to cope with disintegrative shocks to the system.

The bigger picture: the contexts of disintegration To summarise, by the early 1970s, the neofunctionalists had the makings of an account of disintegration that was largely about the insertion of disruptive dynamics into the European Community system and which did not suppose a particular type of disintegrative end state. Disintegration might provoke decentralisation and the rolling back of previous integrative commitments, but the variegated effects of disintegrative dynamics would have indeterminate systemic consequences. Integration theorists had already developed theoretical accounts of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful accomplishment of economic integration goals and their transformation into meaningful and durable forms of post-​national political community. This, together with a developed interest in thinking about integration in terms of nation-​building and centre formation, had the potential to connect neofunctionalist thinkers to broader accounts of the macroeconomic and macro-​sociological context into which post-​war European integration was embedded and of which it was partly constitutive. To invoke context in this way is not the same as insisting, as neorealist International Relations scholars typically do, that post-​war European integration is an expression of prevailing power structures in world politics. Intensive cooperative arrangements, such as the EU, are possible (indeed rational) where the structuring principles of geopolitics (such as the Cold War) are permissive (Mearsheimer, 1990) or where the participant states have a common adversary (Rosato, 2011). Significant changes to the structures of power politics and/​or the removal of the threatening enemy profoundly weaken the rationale for cooperation, which –​in any case –​is likely over time to be beset by the destructive logic of relative gains. While this linkage of states’ rational (security) calculus to the guiding logic of 39

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geopolitical power structures makes a good deal of sense in its abstract and highly parsimonious modelling of world politics, neorealism has, in practice, struggled to explain the perseverance of European integration (Collard-​ Wexler, 2006). That neorealist work on the EU has re-​emerged of late is a sure sign that (a) European integration is perceived to be in trouble and (b) the configuration of power relations globally is thought to be in flux. In its crude form, neorealism simply predicts the disappearance of the EU. There might be some mileage (although this is dubious) that Brexit could be read as an instance of a state choosing to exit a cooperative arrangement because the UK saw the onset of relative gains as intolerable. But there is no reason to suppose that the exit of one state would generate a domino effect that effectively meant the wholesale and fairly rapid destruction of the EU. As such, despite its pessimistic credentials, neorealism would struggle to formulate credible hypothesis about the end state of integration. The logic (or perhaps more interestingly the widespread perception) of relative gains could be read as a disintegrative force, but as we have seen this would simply become one potential independent variable among many in pursuit of a dependent variable (disintegration) that is more of less impossible to define ex ante. In any case, liberal institutionalists have, for the most part, had a much more successful time with European integration. It is no accident that the most influential state-​centred theory of integration (liberal intergovernmentalism) emerges from the neoliberal institutionalist tradition of International Relations. Its principal advocate was on the record expressing confidence that Brexit will not happen (Moravcsik, 2016, 2017), in part because –​according to both the absolute gains logic of institutionalised bargaining and any reasonable evaluation of the UK’s commercial interests –​Brexit is completely irrational. Institutionalists of all hues tend to regard the EU as a classic case of institutional resilience. Institutional orders tend to develop self-​preserving logics (even when the imperatives that gave rise to their specific design have dissipated) and they can be sources of absolute (as opposed to relative) gains. Also, governments have a vested interest in maintaining the delegation of key aspects of policy making to non-​majoritarian supranational institutions, even if the performance of those supranational agents is (temporarily) suboptimal. In terms of change, the assumption of historical institutionalists is that conjunctural shifts (major crises) have the capacity to discredit extant institutional equilibria and thereby create the space for new institutional designs. In the most convincing versions of this type of argument, the shift from one institutional equilibrium is sociological rather than technical/​ scientific. Put another way, the collapse of an institutional equilibrium does not simply happen because established policy solutions are demonstrably failing. They change because: 40

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(a) there is widespread intersubjective agreement that they are failing; (b) their failure is understood in terms of a common understanding of the problems they are failing to solve (crises themselves are discursive constructions); and (c) there is an alternative solution set that is advantageously placed to define the successor institutional order (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002). Thus, if we think of disintegration in terms of the displacement of the EU institutional equilibrium (or parts of it) with something else (which almost certainly would not be the status quo ante), then the conspiracy of several disintegrative dynamics could not in and of itself bring about the change. The crisis or the constellation of crises would need to be widely understood among policy actors as existential in that established solution sets are no longer deemed viable so that there emerges significant momentum behind alternative imaginaries of post-​national political space in Europe. Thinking across current crises, there would seem to be significant evidence that many key actors understand ‘more Europe’ to be the solution, or more precisely ‘more of the same kind of Europe’ (see Ross, 2011). All of this is consistent with the more mundane version of what happens when disintegrative dynamics take hold in an institutional order –​Schmitter’s notion of ‘low risk entropy’. In other words, disintegration may be compatible with the preservation of the systemic order that is affected by disintegrative dynamics. It is not so much a case of whether the institutional order –​ in this case the EU –​ survives; it is more a matter of what it is capable of and whether, despite its continued existence, it can escape the cycle of what might be called, for want of a better phrase, perpetual disintegration. This is where the point about the broader political economy of European integration becomes significant.7 What may be collapsing is the broader democratic capitalist compact within which the EU is embedded (Streeck, 2014). For a relatively short period in the aftermath of World War II (roughly three decades), the consolidation and gradual expansion of market society was, in Western Europe at least, accomplished under the auspices of democratic politics, which itself was consolidated and strengthened. This delicate balance between the contradictory allocative principles of market and popular will was facilitated by economic, institutional and ideational factors, all of which have unravelled since the 1970s. Thus the unprecedented levels of economic growth that characterised les trente glorieuses have been displaced by an era of ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson, 2001). Once powerful centrist political parties, which used to act as effective mediators between societal will on the one hand and governing raison d’état on the other, have more or less internalised the logic of the latter, leading to the neglect of the former (Mair, 2013) and creating space for populist and nativist parties to become conduits for and managers of popular will. Finally, the re-​emergence of the ideology of the self-​regulating market and its institutional and policy 41

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enactment has effectively quashed the idea that markets should be subordinate to social purpose. European integration emerged as the same moment as this democratic capitalist compact. The factors that gave rise to the antecedents of the EU are well known, but its project of gradual market opening was for a time compatible with the allowance of domestic policy autonomy with the European capitalist democracies. As the economic, institutional and ideational supports of the democratic capitalist compact weakened, so the EU in turn was affected in complex ways. The onset of ‘permanent austerity’ as a feature of the domestic political economies of its member states meant that the EU was first cast as a solution to the crisis of growth and the dilemmas of globalisation. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the EU has increasingly been identified as a source of those problems. The dominance of market liberalism in various guises has been associated with both the delegation of authority to non-​majoritarian institutions and the internationalisation of some state functions. The EU has been a vehicle for both of these tendencies with the effect that it has become an object of contestation. Finally the breakdown of the broadly centrist politics that helped to give rise to the EU has meant that this contestation is more prone than ever to take a nationalist/​nativist form. Once again the long-​term aggregate effects of these disintegrative inputs into the EU system is unpredictable. But it is important to remember that what we observe as disintegration within the EU –​visible through the lens of EU studies –​may be telling us something about the broader instability of the underlying political economy of Europe. Notes 1

2

3

4

5 6

This is not entirely new. See, for example, Bideleux and Taylor (1996), a book whose bold sweep seeks to compare integration and disintegration dynamics in Western and Eastern Europe. The latter is the most obvious site of systematic ‘disintegration’, but (then) recent crises such as the Danish referendum result of June 1992 and the ERM crisis of September 1992 are presented as examples of how the standard conceptual vocabulary of European integration studies is poorly attuned to major integrative setbacks. A relatively recent example of note might be the tendency of mainstream electoral studies to assume that a series of ‘iron laws’ of UK general elections would deliver a handsome Conservative majority in June 2017. Sampling on the dependent variable is essentially the practice of assembling evidence from cases that are selected to support one’s theory. In the case of theories of integration, this would amount to selecting the European case on the basis of meeting a theoretical criterion and then use the case as evidence for that criterion. For example, in his contribution to the volume, the Africanist Fred Hayward (1971: 335) insisted that ‘we need to pay attention to the process of disintegration’. Haas’s word. Haas (1971) notes, in passing, that he reads ‘retraction’ as a synonym for ‘disintegration’.

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7

See Rosamond (2017, 2018) for more detailed elaborations of this argument, the latter specifically in the context of Brexit.

Acknowledgements An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 24th International Conference of Europeanists at University of Glasgow in July 2017. Its development has been aided by comments from Scott James, Antje Wiener, Jan Grzymski and Russell Foster. References Adler-​Nissen, R. (2014) Opting out of the European Union: Diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler-​Nissen, R. and Kropp, K. (2015) ‘A sociology of knowledge approach to European integration: four analytical principles’, Journal of European Integration, 37(2): 155–​173. Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe: centre formation, system building and political restructuring between the nation-​state and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Becher, T. and Trowler, P.R. (2001) Academic tribes and tendencies. Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines, Buckingham: Open University Press. Bideleux, R. and Taylor, R. (eds) (1996) European integration and disintegration: East and West, London: Routledge. Blyth, M. (2002) Great transformations. Economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blyth, M. (2006) ‘Great Punctuations: Prediction, Randomness and the Evolution of Comparative Political Science’, American Political Science Review, 100(4): 493–​498. Collard-​Wexler, S. (2006) ‘Integration under anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union’, European Journal of International Relations, 12(3): 397–​432. Cox, M. (ed.) (1998) Rethinking the Soviet collapse: Sovietology, the death of Communism and the new Russia , New York: Pinter. De Vree, J.K. (1972) Political integration: the formation of theory and its problem, The Hague: Moulton. Deutsch, K.W., Burrell, S.A., Kann, R.A., Lee, M., Lichterman, M., Lindgren, R.E., Loewenheim, F.L. and Van Wangeren, R.W. (1957) Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Etzioni, A. (1965) Political unification: a comparative study of leaders and forces, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Haas, E.B. (1968) The uniting of Europe. Political, social and economic forces, 1950–​57, second edition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Haas, E.B. (1971) ‘The study of regional integration. Reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorizing’, in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp 3–​42. Haas, E.B. and Schmitter, P.C. (1964) ‘Economics and differential patterns of political integration: projections about unity in Latin America’, International Organization, 18(4): 705–​737. Hall, P. (1993) ‘Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, 25(3): 275–​296. Hayward, F.M. (1971) ‘Continuities and discontinuities between studies of national and international political integration: some implications for future research efforts’, in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp 313–​337. Hix, S. (2007) ‘The EU as a Polity (I)’, in K.-​E. Jørgensen, M.A. Pollack, and B. Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union politics, London: Sage, pp 141–​158. Jacob, P.E. and Toscano, J.V. (eds) (1964) The integration of political communities, Philadelphia, PA: J.P. Lippencott & Co. Jones, E. (2018) ‘Towards a theory of disintegration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25(3): 440–​451. Kreppel, A. (2012) ‘The normalization of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5): 635–​645. Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2012) Differentiated integration; explaining variation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Lindberg, L.N. (1971) ‘Political integration as a multidimensional phenomenon requiring multivariate measurement’, in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp 45–​127. Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (1970) Europe’s would-​be polity. Patterns of change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (eds) (1971) Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mair, P. (2013) Ruling the void. The hollowing of Western democracy , London: Verso. Manners, I. and Rosamond, B. (2018) ‘A different Europe is possible: the professionalization of EU studies and the dilemmas of integration in the 21st century’, Journal of Common Market Studies –​Annual Review, 56(S1): 28–​38. Mearsheimer, J. (1990) ‘Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1): 5–​56. Moravcsik, A. (2016) ‘The great Brexit Kabuki –​a masterclass in political theatre’, Financial Times, 8 April. 44

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Moravcsik, A. (2017) ‘One year after the Brexit vote, Britain’s relationship with the EU is unlikely to change much. Here’s why’, Washington Post, Monkey Cage, 26 June, www.washingtonpost.com/​news/​monkey-​cage/​ wp/​2017/​06/​26/​one-​year-​after-​the-​brexit-​vote-​britains-​relationship-​ with-​the-​e-​u-​is-​unlikely-​to-​change-​much-​heres-​why/​ Mudge, S.L. and Vauchez, A. (2012) ‘Building Europe on a weak field: law, economics and scholarly avatars in transnational politics’, American Journal of Sociology, 118(2): 449–​492. Nye, J. (1971) ‘Comparing common markets: a revised neo-​functionalist model’, in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp 192–​231. Pierson, P. (2001) ‘Coping with permanent austerity: welfare state restructuring in affluent democracies’, in P. Pierson (ed.), The new politics of the welfare state, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 410–​456. Rosamond, B. (2015) ‘Performing theory/​theorizing performance in emergent supranational governance: the “live” knowledge archive of European integration and the early European Commission’, Journal of European Integration, 37(2), pp. 175–​191. Rosamond, B. (2017) ‘The political economy context of EU crises’, in D. Dinan, N. Nugent and W.E. Paterson (eds), The European Union in crisis, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 33–​53. Rosamond, B. (2018) ‘Brexit and the politics of UK growth models’, New Political Economy, https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13563467.2018.1484721 Rosato, S. (2011) Europe United: Power politics and the making of the European Community, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ross, G. (2011) The European Union and its crises. Through the eyes of the Brussels elite, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Schimmelfennig, F. (2017) ‘Theorizing Crisis in European Integration’, in D. Dinan, N. Nugent and W.E. Paterson (eds), The European Union in crisis, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 316–​335. Schmitter, P.C. (1971) ‘A revised theory of regional integration’, in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional integration: theory and research, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp 232–​264. Schmitter, P.C. and Lefkofridi, Z. (2016) ‘Neo-​functionalism as a theory of disintegration’, Chinese Political Science Review, 1(1): 1–​29. Streeck, W. (2014) Buying time. The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism, London: Verso. Stubb, A. (2002) Negotiating flexibility in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and beyond, Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Vollaard, H. (2014) ‘Explaining European Disintegration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(5): 1142–​1159. Vollaard, H. (2018) European disintegration: a search for explanations, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 45

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Warleigh, A. (2002) Flexible integration: Which model for the European Union?, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. Webber, D. (2014) ‘How likely is it the European Union will disintegrate? A critical analysis of competing theoretical perspectives’, European Journal of International Relations, 20(2): 341–​365. White, J.P.J. (2003) ‘Theory guiding practice: the neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission’, Journal of European Integration History, 9(1): 111–​131. Zielonka, J. (2014) Is the EU doomed? Cambridge: Polity Press.

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What Are the Driving Forces of Disintegration? A Response to Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite Christoph O. Meyer

The chapters by Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite stimulate new thinking about the causes, manifestations and trajectories of de-​ Europeanisation, differentiation and disintegration in Europe in different ways. While Rosamond focuses on what we can and cannot learn from (neofunctionalist) integration theories about the manifestations and causes of disintegration, Outhwaite draws our attention to the significant differences in how (member) states have related to Europe while also discussing key pathologies and problems of the Union’s constitutional order. Outhwaite’s piece returns frequently to the British case and the country’s elite’s relations to Europe, whereas Rosamond is more interested in exploring larger forces at play in the systemic weakening of the ‘democratic capitalism compact’ and ‘permanent austerity’. While neither of the pieces claims explicitly to advance recommendations on how to best respond to the increasing contestation of the European order, Rosamond appears to agree that more of the same kind of Europe should NOT be the answer. In contrast, Outhwaite expresses his worry that disintegration of the centre might means a resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia, being particularly critical of attempts to undermine liberal democracy in Poland and Hungary. He sees the consolidation of a strong eurozone core with a more loosely integrated circle of countries around it as possibly the most realistic option for stemming these forces. In the following I will present some, necessarily selective, responses to and excurses beyond the arguments presented by both authors. Rosamond rightly highlights that neofunctionalist writing in the 1960s and 1970s did engage with questions of disintegration (output failure, spill-​back, 47

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retraction) as well as some of the necessary scope conditions for integration to occur when comparing Europe with other regions, most notably Latin America. Neofunctionalism, despite being famously declared as obsolete by Ernst Haas during a period of stagnation and paralysis in integration, is still helpful for understanding how decisions to pool or delegate authority in one specific policy area can create strong functionalist pressures to go further in response to an unexpected problem. In this conception, problem-​solving crises rooted in design and coordination flaws are likely to be addressed by more rather than less integration –​as indeed we have seen in responses to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The question is whether these theories can also offer an account of disintegration either by looking at spill-​over mechanisms ‘in reverse’ or by focusing on member state agency. It is useful to focus here on what Rosamond calls perpetual disintegration, rather than individual member states wanting less involvement or asking to leave, except of course if those member states are systemically so important that their departure would cast a question on the overall edifice, such as France or Germany. Indeed, apart from more gradual processes of disintegration, it may also be time to consider a scenario of cataclysmic collapse of the EU order within a short space of time, similar to the imminent meltdown of the financial system in the immediate aftermath of the Lehmann Brothers collapse. Yet we are still lacking a clearer identification of the different causal forces behind disintegration. Neofunctionalists, and indeed integration theory more generally, are not very sophisticated in theorising why and when ‘less Europe’ is or is not a probable even if it might appear a functionally appropriate or even desirable response. It also does not explain well whether crises of existing arrangement are caused by unforeseen exogenous events and novel trends, or if they are self-​generated through integration in some areas generating inherently unstable policy designs that cannot be easily fixed as they hit hard constraints of solidarity (as in resistance on risk-​sharing through Eurobonds) or specific national identity constructions (as in the case of implementing migrant quotas in Eastern Europe). At the same time, voluntary disintegration by member states is not easily possible either even if no one doubts this would be a ‘functionally’ better solution for the country and perhaps even the other members in the longer term. For instance, the short-​to medium-​term costs for a country to drop out of the monetary union are prohibitively high economically, politically toxic and legally chaotic as the Greek government discovered. We need to be cautious of predictions of collapse or rapid disintegration. At the height of the eurozone crisis, there were plenty of forecasts about the imminent collapse unless all debt was mutualised and a full banking union achieved. However, the EU managed yet again to muddle through with solutions agreed in long nights among heads of state and EU institutions. Nonetheless, the current budgetary problems of Italy show that a truly 48

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sustainable solution has yet to be found. The next major surprise and indeed challenge for Europe came in the sudden surge in refugees and migrants in 2014–​15. In response to citizens’ concerns over porous borders and uncontrolled migration, EU leaders supported a range measures for ‘more Europe’ in the shape of reforming and better resourcing the border agency of Frontex (now the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and external migration policy by making deals with Turkey and other Southern Mediterranean countries. In contrast, attempts to enforce existing laws on the distribution of refugees by majority vote were strongly resisted by some member states and intra-​ European solidarity broke down. Both crises have affected citizens’ trust in authority generally and lowered support for EU institutions and integration as visible in Eurobarometer polling for the years 2011–​15. In the past, trust and support for the EU has tended to move in tandem with citizens’ satisfaction with and support for national politics, although we need to ask whether this remains true at a time when, as Rosamond rightly observes, centrist politics are under pressure in many European countries and extreme parties, particularly on the right, have scored some political successes. To understand why this may be case, I agree with Rosamond about the need to look for the big picture beyond integration, but I am less convinced than he is that political economy explanations offer a sufficient and maybe not even necessary explanation. ‘Europe’ is being blamed in some countries, rightly or more often wrongly, not just for ‘austerity’ in terms of cutting back on state spending and supply-​side reform, but also the hallmark of a much broader project of liberal elites. The new Eurosceptics are also ‘sceptical’ of international cooperation and compromise, expertise and rule-​based as problem solving, the promotion of human rights and post-​materialist values, as well as multi-​culturalism and liberal identity politics. The protection of national identity, ways of life and security against the ‘globalists’ is becoming the rallying point. Yet there are important differences between countries. The specific experience of being patronised during the enlargement and transition process, including resentment in Eastern Germany of Western German elites, created a sense that Brussels symbolised and closely aligned with those same national liberal elites who do not and cannot understand the mental outlook of ordinary people, their patriotism and religious beliefs, and their ‘ontological security’ concerns related to migration. Instinctively pro-​European Italy struggled much more than Portugal and Spain to recover from the fall-​out from the financial crisis, while also feeling misunderstood and unsupported by European partners in migration policy. Improving the EU’s output legitimacy through better economic and migration policy will on its own not ease the pressures of disintegration if the educational, political and business elites that have been most supportive of European integration so far do not manage to increase their ideational appeal and change some of their discourses. 49

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In fairness to European governance, we need to give due weight to the impact of surprising external events and forces of change that go far beyond European Studies. There is too much hindsight bias in blaming Europe, or indeed European Studies, for not anticipating these crises before they occurred as Rosamond appears to imply. We know from Philip Tetlock’s pathbreaking work (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016; Tetlock, 2005) on expert judgement that the most common forecasting errors come from ignoring historical baselines of the probable and advancing expectations of major change based on in-​depth knowledge of one particular area of expertise, be it country or issue-​specific. The hedgehogs of (international) political economy appear to see macroeconomic policy design and ideological crisis around every corner, whereas European Studies foxes would balance disintegrative pressures of, for instance, Economic and Monetary Union with those countervailing factors that help to sustain ideational, legal and functional glue, trust, informal rules and indeed solidarity between members and within institutions. They would also point out, as Outhwaite does, how member states’ different expectations towards the EU are rooted in national histories as well as their policy preferences and relationships to their neighbours. Being aware that Europe is typically a compromise between these interests and as such often slow to change is probably a good starting point. Coupling this insight with research on foresight in political science, I am not sure that a ‘tendency towards conservative interpretations of their object’ is necessarily a fallacy as Rosamond implies –​the key issue is to avoid the ‘assumption drag’ that comes as hidden baggage with many of our theories. Scepticism towards predictions of large scale changes seems to me an analytical virtue in European Union studies if one considers the history of integration. Yet, we may still learn from large N-​based studies of how ‘international organisations’ fail and die, such as those undertaken by Mette Eilstrup-​Sangiovanni (2018) and Hylke Dijkstra1. I believe Rosamond is too harsh in his criticism of Sovietologists for not anticipating the end of the Soviet Union as the factors were hiding in ‘plain sight’ only retrospectively and hardly anyone got this prediction right. However, we should expect that the concepts and theories developed in a field should have at least some retrospective explanatory power. I agree that integration theory, including neofunctionalism, has unjustly gone out of fashion in the field despite the insights it can still offer. At the same time, I fear that the Europeanists’ ideational sympathy for the European Union as a ‘project’ –​even if disagreeing with aspects of it to various degrees –​has created blind spots in terms of questions asked, methods used and factors investigated. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, this is entirely unsurprising and can be found in many other fields –​apart from Sovietology, one might take Middle Eastern Studies missing the rise of jihadist terrorism because of its intuitive defensiveness against any form of Islamophobia (Czwarno, 2006). 50

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Since a good deal of writing about the EU is produced by British scholars, scholars based in Britain or who have been trained at times of their career in British institutions, some strands and forms of Euroscepticism have been erroneously associated with and reduced to the exit scepticism of a particular strand of English nationalism, the Daily Mail and UKIP –​not to be taking seriously given that most of the English exit critique is widely perceived as blatantly self-​serving, identity-​based and primarily Westminster-​focused. More widely, there has been a tendency to misinterpret events and decisions in Europe to a British setting whereby the European Commission became a Thatcherite neoliberal entity imposing heartless austerity on Greece, while the British Right saw the same body as the source of overregulation, market distorting subsidies and socialism through the backdoor. In the context of these distorting party-​political lenses and the obvious mismanagement of the Article 50 negotiations by the UK government, I would agree with Outhwaite that Brexit tells us more about the UK than about European integration and will most probably have integrative rather than disintegrative effects. Neofunctionalists might even point to the case of the UK that constituencies are mobilising for Europe when the gains from the integration process are being threatened –​even if this mobilisation tends to occur often belatedly, as in other cases in Ireland and Denmark. However, this does not mean that the surprising Brexit vote was completely unaffected by developments in Europe or that pro-​Europeans can afford to ignore some of the driving forces behind Brexit. For instance, anti-​immigration sentiment is far from being an idiosyncratically British phenomenon if one looks at polling data from across Europe and is generally a strong predictor of anti-​EU votes in previous referendums such as in the Netherlands (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005). While it is true that the UK government voluntarily decided not to apply the labour movement transition controls for the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe, fears of levels of immigration in Britain were further accentuated by the fall-​out from the eurozone crisis, driving up also emigration from Southern European countries. The claim that the EU was a failing economic model could be substantiated by at least some data about the lagging economic performance of the EU against expectations and indeed historical baselines. Even though Britain was outside the disciplining framework of the monetary union, it feared being negatively affected by the eurozone caucus. The Cameron government thus wasted precious political capital on stopping the eurozone fiscal compact with a veto and achieving safeguards for the City against eurozone governance overreach even though this turned out to be a useless ‘win’ for supporting the Remain campaign. Even more importantly, concerns over the democratic quality of EU institutions and governance expressed in the Brexit campaign were hardly considered more seriously. Most scholars of the European Union would 51

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probably agree that the EU’s mechanisms for democratic participation can and should be improved (although they cannot agree how); they would reject the description of Europe being anti-​or undemocratic given various channels of democratic participation through the European Parliament elections, the representation of elected national ministers in the Council, administrative openness to consultations with interest groups and experts, and responsiveness to media scrutiny. Yet, they do not have a good answer to the frequently voiced expectation of there being a clear mechanism for how voters can throw the ‘rascals out’ given the ambiguity of the Spitzenkandidaten process and the election of Council representatives. Even though European leaders said after the Brexit vote that one could not continue with business as usual, deeper reflections on democratising the EU have gone nowhere yet –​and may even go backwards when French President Macron questions whether the European Parliament elections should determine the Commission President. In this context, Outhwaite rightly draws our attention to longstanding criticisms of the over-​constitutionalisation of the EU and Scharpf ’s joint-​decision-​trap. The issue is that integration appears to move only in one direction through the ratchet effect, while devolving authority downwards again appears legally very difficult, politically impossible and publicly invisible. As the mechanism of Treaty change has become politically so toxic and cumbersome, attempts to adapt the EU treaties to new circumstances, a changed geopolitical or economic environment, or indeed new demands from citizens for more or less action, become very difficult to implement within the existing legal structures. Orderly and constitutionally legitimatised disintegration in specific areas where Europeanisation has created more problems than it is solving would be beneficial not just from an output legitimacy perspective, but also to address public perceptions of European integration being one-​track and overly rigid. Greater differentiation between states can at best mitigate, but not solve, this problem as eurozone outs will continue to feel excluded in key areas and eurozone ins want greater flexibility on specific and especially non-​ economic policies. Allowing for some policy disintegration could forestall member states peeling of the project or forming inherently instable circles of differentiated integration. It might be also a necessary safety valve against cataclysmic system failures. Note 1

http://​www.nestior.eu/​

Acknowledgements I am grateful to the editor Russell Foster for involving me in this book.

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Funding The chapter draws in parts on findings from the FORESIGHT research project originally funded by the European Research Council (No 202022). More information can be found here –​https://​www.kcl.ac.uk/​sspp/​depa​ rtme​nts/​europ​ean-​stud​ies/​peo​ple/​staff/​ academic/​meyer/​foresight-​early-​ warning-​preventive-​policy.aspx References Czwarno, M. (2006) ‘Misjudging Islamic Terrorism: the academic community’s failure to predict 9/​11’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(7): 657–​678. de Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2005) ‘Projecting EU referendums: Fear of immigration and support for European integration’, European Union Politics, 6(1): 59–​82. Eilstrup-​Sangiovanni, M. (2018) ‘Death of international organizations: The organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–​2015’, The Review of International Organizations: 1-​32. Tetlock, P.E. and Gardner, D. (2016) Superforecasting: The art and science of prediction, Random House. Tetlock, P.E. (2005) Expert political judgement: How good is it? How can we know? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

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European Disintegration: A Response to Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite Pierre Vimont

Having read with great expectation and a certain dose of anxiety the two chapters written by Ben Rosamond and William Outhwaite, a non-​ academic and long-​time practitioner of European affairs can only rejoice at the multi-​layer analysis proposed to the reader as a tentative explanation of the multiple setbacks the EU integrative process is currently experiencing. For anyone dealing on a daily basis with the political challenges arising from the many unfolding crises, be it the migration inflows, the terrorist attacks, the eurozone fragilities or the growing internal divisions on foreign policy, a comprehensive interpretation about the unwinding of some of the key ingredients that allowed over past decades the European integration to successfully progress stands as a welcome assistance. It helps negotiators to understand the nature of the stalemate they face when they gather today helplessly in long and ineffective EU meetings. The emphasis put by both authors on the structural dimension of this potential European disintegration is timely. The sense of disheartened activity spinning around in circles with very little result enhances the negative feeling among European observers that a more fundamental flaw than the usual EU symptoms of low productivity and long protracted negotiations may be in motion here. To prophets of doom underlining the repetitive nature of the recent crises and questioning the sustainability of the project European, old hands are quick to resurrect the empty chair row initiated by de Gaulle or the hardly less conflicting issue of the UK financial contribution (‘I want my money back’) fought with perseverance by Margaret Thatcher for nearly five years. Yet both sides do recognise the unprecedented conjunction of 54

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disruptive behaviours leading to situations not seen before in European memories with such intensity. From blunt disregard for any minimal degree of solidarity on the migration challenge to the more fundamental undermining of the EU judiciary system by way of disconnecting national judges from the European Court of Justice as observed in the Polish case to open violation of common agreed positions in the foreign policy field with the abstaining votes of some Union members on the issue of Jerusalem at the UN General Assembly, this multiplication of misdemeanours signals the reversal of some of the most commonly agreed principles embodied in the Treaty and faultlessly respected up to now by all. Interestingly, this slow drift seems to find its most practical embodiment in the progressive obsolescence of the unwritten code of conduct that has driven until now the day-​to-​day activities of the multiple working groups operating in Brussels. The simple notion of a common obligation to reach agreements come what may (‘the obligation of result’, as the French like to say) has so far constituted the unmitigated bond among the EU negotiators based in Brussels. It is now gradually losing its clout and silently undermining the efforts of officials working in the EU institutions to find reasonable compromises over the entrenched instructions of national governments. Such a drift, which has gone largely unnoticed, is however steadily eroding the fabric of the EU negotiating process with the risk of progressively grinding it to a halt. Yet this shared assessment of an increasingly dysfunctional EU still leaves open the question about the precise nature of the threat itself on future developments of the European integration. Is the EU experiencing the first symptoms of its final demise or are the present setbacks the mere illustration of a more sophisticated Union overly exposed by the extension of its sphere of competences, its enlarged membership and the challenges imposed by the complexities of a more global world? Like the two authors’ own interrogations, EU policy makers when facing this ‘perfect storm’ tend to wander between superficial explanations (lack of leadership, scarcity of long-​term vision, loss of past experience, resistance towards innovation) and more deep rooted causes to try to understand the nature of the disintegrative dynamics at work in the EU process. In that respect, both chapters seem to agree that, on top of factors endogenous to the EU and related to the erosion of the Union’s principles, behaviours and institutional discipline, there have been over the past few decades significant changes to the geo-​political and economic environment of Europe that may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the present disintegrating process. Indeed for its first 40 years of existence, the EU heavily relied on two basic founding pillars: the Cold War confrontation that shaped the justification of the EU project itself in promoting the political, economic and security consolidation of Western Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet bloc; and the economic prosperity of the second half of the last century on which 55

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the Union thrived to complete some of its most notable achievements like the Single European Market and the eurozone. With ‘the breakdown of the democratic capitalist compact’ as referred to by Ben Rosamond, a more subdued economic growth is leading today’s Europe to persistent policies of public expenditure restrictions and a growing dysfunctional allocation of incomes between the different social groups. At the same time, the new post-​Cold War era deprives the EU of a large part of its original raison d’être and calls for a reinvention of its historical mission. With these two tectonic historical movements, the cornerstones of the EU project are unsurprisingly showing their age. For having differed the time of reckoning and the much needed reform of its dated institutional framework and, more broadly, for persistently wobbling in the promotion of a Union more attuned to the economic and geo-​political realities of the new multipolar world order, the EU is now confronted to an overall challenge that does not fit into its traditional working pattern. Arguably one could add another explanation stemming from the recent enlargements that have deeply transformed the nature of the relationship between the Union members. The Central and Eastern European nations which benefited from this last train of accessions have long complained about being perceived as second division partners in an unbalanced situation of supposedly equal nations. If there is a fair amount of truth in such criticism, these complaints miss a more fundamental point, which is deep rooted in the diverging historical legacy of European nations. The first EU members share a long familiar history of common policy making, long and arduous institutional debates, and a painful process of sovereignty transfers. Later on the following new members found their way into this mainstream Europe, some with resistance (UK, Denmark), others with great care (Finland, Sweden), others more enthusiastically (Spain, Portugal); yet the overall pattern in EU governance remained the same as with the founding members. The more recent member states have come with a different mindset. They cherish their restored sovereignty after past years of Soviet Union dominance and do not bear sovereign transfers lightly. More significantly, they do not share the common narrative of their predecessors, their long struggles over the role of the European Commission or the use of qualified majority. Central and Eastern Europeans are largely immune from the existential debates that dominated the birth of the then European Economic Community. Their introduction to European affairs is entrenched in the realities of the Lisbon Treaty provisions where predominance of member states influence, with the towering power of the European Council, the constant quest for consensus and the recourse to flexible solutions overriding the old fashioned ‘communautaire method’. This juxtaposition of two differing historical and institutional backgrounds overloads the daily practice of EU negotiations with a cultural mismatch that reinforces the ‘output failing’ syndrome underlined by both authors. 56

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Whatever explanation –​casual, structural or historical –​may be given for the present dysfunctionalities of the EU system, the trend towards progressive disintegration as described in the two chapters calls for a more comprehensive understanding of how this de-​Europeanisation process is going to unfold and what could then be the end result. From that perspective the only alternative left seems to balance between a soft option ‘through some agreed process of derogation … or the unilateral abandonment of common … norms’ (Outhwaite) and a hard option epitomised by the Brexit solution or the unilateral retreat from the accession process as in the Norway case. Yet one may argue that these different scenarios are over stretching the concept of disintegration. Is differentiated integration –​or flexibility as some observers call it –​part of the disintegrative process? Conversely, are these options representing new ways of considering the increasing diversity of the Union membership? The Schengen arrangement was launched with only a few of the member states and the decision to start the monetary union process was affected from the start by the derogations conceded to Denmark and the UK. Does it mean that the following integration steps cannot be considered as legitimate a progress as the ones which managed to get from the beginning all Union members on board? The reality of today’s EU, its constant balancing act between horizontal extension (the enlargement process) and vertical integration (the ever growing sphere of competence and action), its entrenched differences between member states in terms of geo-​political influence, economic performances and societal integration, makes it all the more difficult to elaborate uniform, one-​size-​fits-​all rules. New templates are urgently needed; new flexible formulas are to be tested with the common understanding that innovation must not be conducive to breakdowns or gradual deterioration. Where does this assessment of an existential deconstruction in the making leave us? As crucial elections for the European Parliament loom ahead with a feeling of political drama never seen in the past, the binary choice slowly emerging ahead of the competition is pitting relentless opponents to the EU against staunch supporters of European integration. The first group pictures the Union as the problem and calls for a complete reconfiguration if not a simple disappearance of the present organisation; the latter claims Europe to be the only credible solution for an enhanced protection of European citizens against a disruptive new global order. Neither of the two camps seems in the position of designing a full-​fledged vision of what the EU (or the non-​EU for that matter) could look like in the future. Yet this over simplification of the political debate smacks of the narrative that clouded previous referendums in Europe. It runs the risk of leading to a European Parliament with no clear coalition majority and to a European Commission fraught with a polarised composition. In other words, it might not be the full disintegration scenario foreseen by some but it could definitely entail a dysfunctional process rarely seen in the past. 57

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Faced with these prospective setbacks, policy makers may not have much choice but to try to reignite the flame of a more realistic approach out of these diverging political visions. In the old tradition of the functionalist approach, their best option may well be to propose the syncretic vision of an acceptable way forward, based upon a sober and realistic assessment of where the EU stands today. The assumptions to be proposed would be simple and straightforward. In spite of significant transfers of competence for the sake of integration, the EU has not delivered in recent years as much as expected for all good reasons. There is certainly ground for discontent, yet the withdrawal option from the Union remains an unrealistic solution as illustrated in no uncertain ways by the ongoing Brexit turmoil. Union members have therefore a legitimate claim to pursue their integrationist project, all the more so as European nations on their own do not stand much chance of success in a global world where economic and geo-​political influence is increasingly dependent on size and might. At the same time, the reality check of an integration process having reached its own limitations is there for all to see. It should be conducive to a progressive transformation of the EU model around some of the new fundamentals emerging from the practice of recent years. The objective should then be the redefinition of the relevant balance between intergovernmental input and Union processing, the mingling of increased solidarity and legitimate consideration of national interests, the mixing of uniformity and differentiation, and the introduction of a certain dose of hard power along the influence policy which remains EU’s most positive asset on the world stage. As underlined by the authors of these two chapters, the halt to the European deconstruction in the making relies on the capacity of policy actors to understand the existential nature of the present threats. It also implies the mobilisation of the necessary political will to change a negative and mostly out-​of-​control process into a positive transformation. A fundamental overhaul of the EU’s present institutional framework leading to a new architecture based on differentiated status of integration may well look like the only ambitious response to the threat of structural setbacks. Yet the call for more Europe in and of itself bears the risk of more divisions among Union members and could be conducive to the unravelling of the whole EU system. To re-​energise European dynamics, the (neo) functionalist course relying on the refoundation of an integration process and taking stock of the new features that progressively emerge from the daily EU functioning may be, in the end, a more secure path to a more serene Union.

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6

Response to William Outhwaite David Spence

William Outhwaite’s chapter is an intriguing piece of analysis of some of the terms involved in the disintegration field. It sits well beside Ben Rosamond’s chapter on (dis) integration theory. Several of the academic terms used are actually widely referenced in the practitioner community. Many are culled from Leon Lindberg’s and Stuart Scheingold’s Europe’s would-​be polity (1970), developing Ernst Haas’s neofunctionalist approach –​in the end the theory that practitioners mainly return to –​perhaps because in the 1970s that was the fashion, and it was then that they were ambitiously studying ‘Europe’. The key terms are: equilibrium, spill-​over, spill-​back, forward linkage, system failure and system transformation. But do they cover the issues persuasively? Hiatus in the integration process, what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 194) call equilibrium, was always the federalist fear. It involves achievement of sufficient integration in a given sector that no further integration to other functional areas (‘forward linkage’ in Lindberg and Scheingold terms) might seem possible, thus halting calls for further ‘deepening’ of integration. The relevant sectoral elites are content. ‘Equilibrium’ is achieved, and that is what they desired –​unless, that is, they have separate political ambitions, for example the achievement of a federal Europe. Equilibrium is, then, a pause in the integration bicycle ride. It is more positive than negative, because there is no identifiable spill-​back, and there are thus seemingly no hostages to European fortune. Supporters of the ‘bicycle theory’ of integration traditionally believed a pause in the bicycle ride automatically implied collapse. But, opt-​outs, a seeming setback for example, are always reversible later, so the integration process itself may not be fundamentally undermined by opt-​outs. Equilibrium thus has nothing to say or prove about the integration process itself: no spill-​back, no 59

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disintegration and thus no system failure. True, there would be no further integration (whether spill-​over or forward linkage) for a departing member, but it would not be the end of integration for the others, even if system transformation might now seem a far-​off goal. Stopping the bicycle ride for one member state, whether temporarily or permanently, would not mean everyone else falling off the enormous 28-​member-​ridden bicycle. The UK could elegantly dismount at a pit stop, leaving its seat to a newly enfranchised state (Macedonia?) while the others proceed smoothly, lighter, trouble free and in the hope that today’s opt-​outer might one day return to the Treaty’s commandments. As to Brexit, therefore, we need to note two important caveats: first, a seemingly frightful pause in integration can be without long-​term implications; and, second, even a clear reversal of the integration process itself in a given area might not imply disintegration overall. After all, the 27 might continue apace, and the cooperation arrangements between the UK and the EU might not turn out to be a hindrance to the process of integration for the 27. Of course, equilibrium might later mutate into a disintegrative process, which Lindberg and Scheingold call spill-b​ ack –​a decrease in sectoral scope or institutional capacities (1970: 1999) undermining the integration goal itself –​for example if other doubting Thomases get off at the next pit stop. This is a mild risk. Importantly, though, spill-​back by one member might actually foster deeper integration for the others. Britain’s ‘missed opportunities’ (Denman, 1997), a sorry outcome for the Brits, are simultaneously not missed opportunities for the other member states to engage in their own further deepening, their own spill-o​ ver, their own forward linkage and, indeed, their own system transformation. Ridding themselves of a turbulent partner in March 2019, the 27 might now be free to go their own integrative way, or at the very least make day-​ to-​day business simpler to manage. Thus, equilibrium by no means implies the destination itself becomes unobtainable. Is it the arrival rather than the journey that matters? There may be many a slip or blip in a journey where the arrival is foreseen, yet with no inescapable timing involved. Integration is clearly a process, not an end-​state. I hold, of course, two variables: other would-​be waverers thereby being encouraged, and current problem makers –​Hungary, Poland, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. Outhwaite helpfully notes the difference between horizontal and vertical interaction, asking whether de-​Europeanisation entails de-​transnationalisation. Significantly, he argues, the latter will exist even if the former occurs, for there is something inevitable involved in a) the globalised economy and b) post-​national governance structures. If ‘globalisation’, like ‘integration’ is a process, not an end-​state, for it to succeed, for it to be efficiently managed, for it to create a ‘level playing field’, it favours, indeed requires, a ‘globalised’ 60

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governance structure –​and by implication equivalent structures at continental Europe level. The nation states’ roles and functions, once suitable for 19th century capitalism, need replication at higher than nation-​state levels for the post-​modern, post-​Westphalian system itself. Of course, this is a long-​term view, predicated on an indisputable (and hardly reversible) trend to globalisation. Brexit, Trump and other nationalist/​religious movements all over the world might seem to prove the opposite, but this is a short-​term view, seemingly at odds with economic theories of all political persuasions. Outhwaite also argues that leaving the EU but not ‘Europe’ occludes the prospect of the radical breaking of practical and ideational ties with the rest of Europe. Of course, it does. But Outhwaite’s view similarly occludes the meta-​perspective implied in his notes on the structural constraints for governance of the European/​globalised economy. Is the EU ‘in the final analysis’ the gradual creation of a ‘superstructure’ (federal governance?) reflecting Europe’s evolving politico/​economic system in the longer term, at both European and international level? Maybe. A further issue is the realist International Relations view. It may be that some Brexiteers welcome disintegration of EU governance structures rather than their consolidation. Seen from a quasi-​federalist viewpoint, this politique du pire is in fact a pis aller; the enemy of the good rather than its ally. France and Germany, to name but two equally weighted member states, have much to gain from the UK’s absence. Yet, understanding why governance must exist at higher than member-​state levels is the point, not what ‘we’ may wish to do about it. My point is that there is an unspoken element, not of desire, but of necessity involved in the existence of the EU itself. In addition to the ‘practical and ideational’ ties Outhwaite alludes to, evolving governance needs to match the evolving economy. Not to realise this may prove foolhardy. EU governance ‘arrangements’ are the sine qua non of both Europeanisation and globalisation. Some states may prefer to reject the arrangements, but they are nonetheless ‘objectively’ constrained to create similar if not the same practical policy making ‘arrangements’ as part of the evolving overall system (the same rulebook). ‘Arrangements’ are unavoidable –​unless, that is, some form of ‘governance in one country’ is what a departing UK actually seeks. I don’t think so. True, UK Brexiteers have encouraged much of the return journey from integration. They doubt the arrangements and decry the proposed Euro-​ destination. From the EU point of view, the UK asks the EU to change the EU rules. In part because it does not like the Treaty-​based arrival point to which it previously agreed and in part because it dislikes these rules. The UK blames the EU for not agreeing to change its rules (re-​writing the EU constitution, its treaties). It thus blames the EU for the consequences of its own decision to leave, even though it thereby runs the risk of losing many of the rules it actually likes. 61

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Thus, the real issue is not about negotiations to achieve an agreeable Brexit, as we are told, but the nature of the regional economy/​global economy, from which the UK cannot leave. Even more important, if the UK later ‘sees sense’, realising that the globalised economy requires at least continent-​ sized governance, the terms of membership the UK currently enjoys are very unlikely to be on offer in future. Meanwhile, as Outhwaite’s chapter describes, the EU can put up with differentiated integration, and this as he argues should not be equated with disintegration. Of course, if only in terms of logic, the two cannot be classed as having the same integration effect. Differentiated integration assumes different approaches to the same policy areas. It has absolutely nothing to do with what may be a process of collapse or, at worst, the reversal of an already engaged integration process. Rather, opting out of a single policy area, as opposed to implying disintegration, might actually simply involve agreement not to undermine the integration process –​to allow others to go forward in the notional process of integration, leaving room for seemingly recalcitrant member states either to ‘join later’, or at best to accept that integration need not be to the same extent for all. Differentiated integration might resemble a tube train destined to stop rather than go the full available distance in terms of the rails. Lovers of London’s Northern line will remember that not all trains go to Morden. Some stop at Kennington for reasons of service efficiency. The line runs to Morden. The next train will probably go there. But it suits the organisers to manage a differentiated service, allowing those who have Morden as their end goal to get there fast, while others may disembark where it suits them, with no significant short-​term disruption, and without the end station being compromised for the others. Importantly, UK absence from the train as it heads on to Morden may not only help the overall integration benefits of other passengers. More ominously for ambitious Brits, France and Germany have much to gain from the UK’s absence, not because there is more room on the next train (from 60 years of personal use, I believe there obviously is not), but for three other reasons. First, without the UK, there is power to be grabbed by the remaining large states. Second, the UK’s policies (budget issues, rebates, opt-​ outs, and so on) have long since frustrated the more integration-​minded of member states. Third, and crucially, integrationists may hope for the UK to ‘see sense’ and rejoin at a later date. But, rejoining would probably presuppose readiness to accept no opt-​outs, no UK rebate and no hindrances to others’ intentions. The UK would be like a new applicant to the EU, having to sign up to the whole caboodle. There would be tabula rasa. Many a previous frustration of others would simply not be part of the new agenda for UK membership. The UK would probably wish for a ‘deal’, as it has when removing itself from the EU, but it could hardly expect the 62

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terms of its previous membership to be respected. The UK would, on this hypothesis, have removed itself from the EU core, placed itself distinctly in the periphery and thus suffer the consequences. Integration? Hardly affected. This would be about re-​arranging the arrangements, not disintegration –​to the UK’s disadvantage it would seem. References Denman, R. (1997) Missed chances: Britain and Europe in the twentieth century, Phoenix. Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (1970) Europe’s would-​be polity. Patterns of change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

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PART II

Limits to European Identity and Memory

7

‘Cry God for Harry, England, and Saint George’: Europe and the Limits of Integrating Identity Russell Foster

Introduction In a television interview on the morning of 24 June 2016, the morning of the Brexit referendum result, then-​leader of UKIP Nigel Farage stated that ‘I hope this is the first step towards a Europe of sovereign nation states, trading together, neighbours together, friends together –​but without flags, and anthems, and useless old unelected Presidents’. Proclaiming that ‘the EU is failing, the EU is dying’, Farage predicted that other member states would soon follow Britain in exiting the Union. In the second half of 2016 Farage’s prediction was shared by commentators and analysts across the political spectrum, accelerating in 2017 and 2018 as populist Eurosceptic movements took power in established and newcomer members of the Union, while performing sufficiently well in other elections to push mainstream parties into adopting much of their rhetoric and policy promises (Nulli, 2018; Foster, 2017a, 2017b; Galpin, 2017; Neuhold, 2017). The failure of these parties to gain power has altered predictions of a domino-​style collapse of the EU, but they remain a potent indicator of the most significant challenges to European integration and the limits of the EU. This chapter uses Brexit to illustrate four challenges. First, the upswing in popular support for Eurosceptic, anti-​establishment parties across Europe tessellates with a return of nationalist rhetoric in a post-​ austerity, post-​migration crisis shift towards anti-​establishment sentiment, and a rejection (or at least profound suspicion) of the status quo in which the EU serves as a convenient scapegoat for popular anger and anxiety. Second, the widespread support base of Eurosceptic movements and policies 67

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requires a reappraisal of neofunctionalism –​the dominant theory of European integration since the early 1950s –​which holds that nationalism is compatible with ‘Europeanness’, and that parochial nationalism will fade as economic success and political integration increases. Third, the predicted European identity which was to emerge from integration is indeed manifesting, but in a starkly different style. Instead of a civic and banal European nationalism, the strongest pan-​European identity emerging in Europe today is the hostile and politically turbulent phenomenon of Identitarianism, a new identity framed by nostalgia and ethnicity, which separates ‘Europe’ from ‘EUrope’, framing the former as an exclusionary civilisation distinct from, and opposed to, the European Union. Fourth, the EUropean identity exemplified by Britain’s Remainers demonstrates the same violent rhetoric, exclusion and Othering as ethnic nationalism. This chapter concludes that, in light of the events of 2016–2020, identity politics and nationalism must be accommodated alongside economic or institutional analyses as the main focus of European studies.

Beyond the Great Recession Following the Brexit vote, British politics have become characterised by three phenomena. First is the (admittedly contested) dominance of Leave or Remain as the division according to which British politics are split, with traditional factors such as party membership or affiliation, nationality, or socioeconomic or class status, superseded by the binary of Leave/​ Remain (Surridge, 2018). This binary itself split into three factions of Hard Brexiteers, Soft Brexiteers, and Remainers –​three mutually incompatible and mutually hostile groups (Foster, 2018b) –​which aligns with a split between wealthy metropolitan areas versus overlooked post-​industrial provinces, and degree education versus school education (Cowley, 2018). Second is the sacralisation of British politics in a toxic atmosphere of incivility and intolerance, in which citizens with different political views are seen not merely as misguided or wrong, but actively and consciously malevolent. Third, traditional political issues such as constitutional reform, economic performance and wealth distribution, and foreign policy, have been relegated by the dominance of identity politics around national and transnational identities –​although as this chapter argues, a ‘EUropean’ identity is not transnational, but simply national. In the new, poisonous political atmosphere of Brexit Britain, two nations inhabit the same space. These nations are EUropeans versus British (who, as this chapter argues, are overwhelmingly dominated by English identity). Both of these nations exhibit the traditional tropes of nationalism –​an imagined community, a whitewashed and selective version of history, a belief in a collective destiny, and a visible intolerance to outsiders. In Brexit Britain, the ‘outsider’ is not 68

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merely the EU or Islam, but the opposing nation of Leavers or Remainers, each of which is imagined to be incompatible with, and anathema to, the other, and thereby unwelcome in the same nation. The result is an intolerant climate in which two nationalisms (English/​British versus EUropean) struggle to neutralise the other, and as the contest is based not in the quantifiable realm of economics or policy but in the vague, fluid and amorphous realm of identity, the Manichean struggle between Leavers and Remainers cannot be won by either side. In response to a ‘combination of economic decline, high levels of inward immigration and record levels of dissatisfaction with mainstream politics’ (Hope Not Hate, 2018) and a sense of ‘status threat’ among economically disadvantaged, socially immobile post-​working class voters1 who feel abandoned and scorned by a metrocentric elite (McCann, 2018; Atkinson, 2018; Mutz, 2018), British and European politics has recently experienced a verrechtsing or ‘right turn’ (Mudde, 2013: 2). Part of this is a shift from economic issues towards identity as the prime focus of politics (Mutz, 2018). This is unlikely to change soon, and identity politics will continue to gain traction following Britain’s multi-​stage exit from the EU as a likely degree of delayed, long-​term economic uncertainty following Brexit (Foster, 2018b; Dunt, 2016: 161) will most significantly impact those post-​ industrial areas and precariat populations (Standing, 2016: 69–​104) already vulnerable to economic instability (Hope Not Hate, 2018) and sympathetic to nativist politics (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). In turn, this is likely to encourage anti-​immigrant, Eurosceptic, anti-​establishment politics (Goodhart, 2017: 231–​234; Clarke et al, 2017: 175–​229) from ‘populists’,2 and from mainstream parties seeking to reclaim support from populists by adopting rhetoric on preserving and practising ‘European’ identity (Foster and Bijsmans, 2018). This was illustrated in Europe’s ‘Year of Elections’ in 2017 in which substantial numbers of voters supported Eurosceptic nationalists, and resulted in establishment parties either being eviscerated or only holding onto power either by adopting the rhetoric of their newcomer rivals or because they were seen as the lesser of two evils against the most toxic elements of the nationalist surge. As John Mills correctly identifies in his response to this chapter, economic stagnation certainly was, and remains, a significant factor in the verrechtsing; yet an equally, if not more significant element, is the role of emotion and ethnicity. Existing research highlights the significance of emotions in shaping political action at the domestic and international levels (Åhäll, 2018; Solomon et al, 2017; Ross, 2014; Bleiker, 2012). In light of the events of 2014–​2018, this shift to emotions is likely to continue (Atkinson, 2018; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017) as five conditions for reproducing the emotions which give rise to nationalism are immanent to European (including British, and more specifically English) society. First is a systemic crisis of austerity and 69

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the ‘Great Disruption’ (Krastev, 2018) of mass migration and incomplete integration, which are increasingly imagined as the result of diktats imposed by out-​of-​touch politicians at the national and European levels (Leconte, 2010: 100–​134). Second is economic transformation, which has replaced industrial work with precarious and temporary service jobs or unemployment –​both of which disproportionately affect youth –​and the subsequent psychosocial impact on identity politics, particularly among young men (Kimmel, 2015; Robinson, 2005). Third is the acceleration of migration into and within Europe, increasing tensions between migrants and resident populations (Goodhart, 2017). Fourth is social media’s growing influence over traditional journalism, and subsequent declining resources for quality analysis (Raines et al, 2017). Fifth is a reactionist response to the rise of left-​wing or fringe identity politics in public discourse, and its association with an ostensibly metropolitan, out-​of-​touch, left-​leaning commentariat (Foster, 2018b). While there are significant and localised differences in the causes of populist events since 2016 and the rapid growth of Euroscepticism, a widespread narrative views such events as a single nativist reaction to civilisational decline (Krastev, 2017; Murray, 2017). The consequence is that Europe, and in particular the UK, is currently at a political event horizon; a point in space and time beyond which lies the unknown and the unknowable. In contrast to narratives which framed discourses of European integration from the 1950s to the early 2000s –​confident claims, underpinned by commercial prosperity and neofunctionalism that Europe was marching towards a predetermined destiny and the future was knowable –​narratives of the EU’s future beyond the mid-​2010s are much less confident. Crisis –​in terms political, economic, and social –​since the Great Recession; popular faith in Europe, as a political project, has been tarnished. This is reflected in Jean-​Claude Juncker’s assertion (Euronews, 2018) that the EU has ‘enlargement fatigue’, and will not expand in the immediate future. Europe is morphing from what Jacques Delors famously called an ‘unidentified political object’ into an even less recognisable entity. Despite the lack of academic consensus on what the Union actually is –​trading bloc, confederacy, proto-​state or even an empire –​consensus holds that the amorphous EU still faces existential crisis. Despite the apparent defeat of Eurosceptic populists in 2017, the EU continues to face a systemic crisis. Partly this is spontaneous –​the ongoing consequences of the Great Recession, the legacy of the migration crisis, and unamicable relations with Eastern neighbours. But it is also partly structural –​the consequence of priorities and policies which, with hindsight, failed to integrate different groups of European society to the same level. The Union increasingly faces pressures that encourage Europeans to reaffirm their national identity which, in contrast to the predictions of the early 2000s (Rosamond, 2005; Risse, 2005), is not 70

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necessarily compatible with a European (or, as argued in the penultimate section, an EUropean) identity. British Euroscepticism has long been dominated by concerns of the EU’s democratic deficit which undermines the EU’s legitimacy in sceptics’ eyes. While a distant, unelected technocracy was a broadly successful governance system for the European Economic Community from 1958–​1993, the rapid acceleration and expansion of the EU from 1993 onwards, in terms geopolitical, institutional, legal and commercial/​financial, has rendered technocratic governance obsolete. Holding the powers but not the legitimacy of a state, EU institutional responses to crises since 2008 –​such as exercising control of Greece’s economic powers and assigning refugee quotas –​have combined with widespread public perceptions of unelected EU officials interfering with British sovereign decisions in defiance of popular will. The reality of these claims is largely insignificant, as the next section argues, because the prevalence of emotion in contemporary politics –​the triumph of pathos over logos in what Pankaj Mishra (2017) calls ‘The Age of Anger’ –​ means that feelings hold more political influence than facts. The net result is a widespread disillusionment with the EU among the British (and Europeans more broadly) which, as demonstrated by the surge in left-​and right-​leaning Euroscepticism from 2016 onwards, is immanent and endemic to Europe. This relationship between Europeanness and political legitimacy has long been an issue. Prior to the Eastern enlargements and financial crisis, the EU enjoyed mainly procedural legitimacy resulting from its perception among member states’ governments as an efficient and progressive institution. However, the current democratic deficit highlights a growing divide. With citizens’ trust in the legitimacy of the Union shaken by recurrent problems, perceived political impotence to internal grievances and international insecurity, and the social impacts of austerity, the EU’s legitimacy is increasingly challenged,3 as demonstrated by successes of deeply Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections and an enormous swing to the right in the 2019 General Election, with popular discontent exacerbated by the withdrawal of the UK’s 73 MEPs in March 2019. In the aftermath of systemic and spontaneous crises at local, national and European levels, the narrative of Europe and European integration is shifting from a neofunctionalist theory that parochial identities would fade away, into a narrative which argues that not only is nationalism back, it is so powerful that it must be harnessed by mainstream politicians lest it become the preserve of the Eurosceptic right (Fukuyama, 2018b; Appiah, 2018; Hazony, 2018). Responses to this nationalist narrative have broadly been twofold. First is a continuing emphasis on the traditional assertion that European integration will neutralise nationalist identity politics. This is visible in ongoing discussions around ever-​closer Union between the EU27 and the greater pooling of resources and powers at a centralised, executive, even 71

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federalised level. This is not without merit, as greater pooling of economic and political powers would significantly ease member states’ concerns over debt burdens, refugee quotas, and anxieties over external security against state and non-​state threats. Yet regardless of this interpretation and the technical advantages of proposed implementations, transference of more powers to the European Commission and its associates is highly unlikely to appease Eurosceptic voters and is instead likely to only further enflame public anger. The linguistic violence in Britain around Theresa May’s thricerejected (and subsequently abandoned) deal, or the question of a second referendum, illustrated that attempting to ‘turn the clock back’ exacerbates, rather than neutralises, nationalist narratives. Even if these powers were not transferred directly to unelected executives but were managed under the eye of national governments, even the best scenario would be what Ulrich Beck (2014) terms ‘German Europe’; a system disproportionately controlled by the EU core with limited input from Eastern or Southern members. The same critique can be applied to Macron’s proposed ‘two-​ speed Europe’; technically sensible but politically a fig-​leaf for what Jacob Rees-​Mogg calls a ‘vassal state’ (Foster, 2018b). The second response to the narrative of nationalist reawakening, again illustrated by Brexit, is eschatological. This is exemplified by beliefs that nationalism –​especially ethnic nationalism –​is now a force of such potency that it represents a direct threat to the EU’s continued survival. The phenomenon which Claus Offe (2015) terms ‘Europe Entrapped’ –​unable to go back to the EEC and incapable of pooling resources at the level of a state –​encapsulates this view. Faced with a systematic crisis, such proponents argue, the Union is vulnerable that Jan Zielonka’s (2014) question ‘Is the European Union doomed?’ is answered in the affirmative. However, the British demonstrate that a third possibility exists. Rather than nationalism destroying the Union, the EU can adapt some of the tools and appeals of nationalism to encourage a greater citizen affiliation with ‘Europe’ not as a distant bureaucracy nor commercial bloc, but ‘Europe’ as a civilisation with a heritage, an identity, a soul (although as this chapter argues later, this European soul is not stainless). This may not be possible for the British, whose unique situation from 2016 onwards has resulted in such severe hostility between competing factions that two mutually exclusive nationalisms co-​exist; but it might yet be possible for Europe. Accomplishing this first requires the retirement of neofunctionalism.

The limits of neofunctionalism Since the end of the Second World War, the European project has been defined by neofunctionalism. This ‘lure of technocracy’ (Habermas, 2016) is frequently presented, particularly by Eurosceptics, as an elite-​driven, 72

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economic-​centred project. As a result the Union lacks the emotional appeal to citizens whose identity, in the face of EU activities and economic stagnation, is increasingly tied to nation states. The Union is not unfamiliar with this, and since the 1950s European policy makers have enacted policies to encourage Europeaness.4 But since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, this has been a minor element as the drive for European unity has been predicated in Ernst Haas’ neofunctionalist theory, stressing economic cooperation and assuming that a ‘supranational’ European identity would be formed from the ‘spill-​over’ of this integration. In Haas’ (1958) theory, post-​war Europe emerging from the violent ‘integration’ of Hitler’s New Order was an environment ill-​suited for rapid integration of the type promoted by early advocates of European federalism. Rather, Haas urged a staged integration. First, economic integration via mechanisms to facilitate trade and exchange. The consequences of this would, according to his theory, accelerate demands for common Europe-​ level political institutions to better manage the mechanisms of economic integration. With this political integration underway, the theory suggests, increased pooling of political powers would accelerate an eventual social, or psychological, spill-​over which, in turn, would result in Europeans identifying as ‘European’. This third stage would also benefit from increasing intra-​European communication not just between industrialists and statesmen, but between the citizens of European states. This encouraged the perception among academics that greater contact between Europeans would result in the lessening of parochialism while encouraging an identity as ‘European’. Europe is not new to Euroscepticism. The Franco-​Dutch rejection of the proposed Treaty for a European Constitution in 2005 gave indications of public unease at expansion, even at Europe’s economic height. The events of 2014 onwards, from the election of a broadly Eurosceptic European Parliament followed by impotence and inaction in the face of Russian military adventurism, internal dissent at austerity and the migration crisis, have demonstrated that neofunctionalism has not resulted in a strong European identity. Nevertheless, this ‘Gospel of Jean Monnet’ continues to form the basis of EU policy and its legacy remains potent in calls for ‘two-​speed Europe’ or greater European federalism. This may have been an astute stance during the nascence of unified Europe, but since the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and particularly since the introduction of a common currency alongside rapid expansion, Europe has developed from an economic community to a political union whose socio-​political impact is increasingly devoid of democratic legitimacy. Simultaneously, the expansion of communications technologies and the digital revolution has enhanced the ‘ocularisation’ (Rose, 2005) of Europe, constructing an imagined community5 whereby ‘Europe’ is no longer a distant and infrequently-​encountered concept as the EEC was (at least for the majority of British citizens), but an oft-​encountered, everyday concept. 73

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As a hybrid nation with a complex system of EU opt-​outs, the UK is perhaps a unique case in European identity, and Brexit is perhaps distinct from other potential withdrawals in terms of motivations and methods. But the British are not exclusively disillusioned by the transformation of European –​even Western –​society into what Jan Zielonka (2006) termed a ‘neo-​medieval empire’; a society in which wealthy, well-​educated, transnational elites in major cities identify more with their peers in foreign cities than with their working class fellows within the same nation. The proliferation of discussions on ‘elites’ and ‘left-​behinds’ from 2016 is testament to a perception, if not a reality, that European society is split. And this is far from unique to the UK. Eurosceptic politicians and parties in other EU member states have capitalised on this narrative of an existential division between an ostensibly downtrodden working class, whose identities and anxieties are dismissed and derided, versus an uncaring metropolitan elite who lack empathy for those less privileged than themselves. This narrative is powerfully seductive, and although Eurosceptics’ embrace of it has not been sufficiently successful to propel hard Eurosceptics into majority governments,6 its wide appeal forced mainstream establishment parties to shift their discourses and policies further towards nationalism. The result is that in contemporary Europe, and particularly in a contemporary Britain still severely divided on geographical, ethnic, racial, financial, ideological, religious and demographic lines, political debate based on rational logical must increasingly compete with political polarisation based on outrage and anger. Pathos has triumphed over logos, and its most visible manifestation is in the root cause of Brexit and, as the English demonstrate, of rising ethnic nationalism –​anger.

The age of anger In May 2014 when ‘Brexit’ was yet to enter the popular lexicon, events within and beyond the Union demonstrated the displacement of facts by feelings. Within the EU, the surprise election of Eurosceptic (and often vitriolically anti-​EU) parties to the European Parliament revealed the deep dissatisfaction of European citizens with the Union. Simultaneously, beyond the EU, pro-​and anti-​EU emotions sufficiently powerful enough to engender revolution, counter-​revolution and international war dominated Ukraine, the Crimea and the Russian Federation (Foster, 2018a). The events of 2014 demonstrated how citizen identification with the Union is not formed by top-​down institutional policies but is formed from the bottom up, through everyday performances; a phenomenon which accelerated through the Scottish independence referendum, Brexit and the 2017–​2018 elections in Europe.

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This is not entirely new, as political activity is never defined by purely rational thought. What is unique is that in contemporary Britain (and more broadly, Europe), political feelings attract greater trust than political facts. Since 2007 the hybrid legacy of globalisation and deindustrialisation, the Great Recession and the Age of Austerity, large-​scale immigration, and the rapid emergence of a digital, social media-​oriented news format disproportionately dominated (or perceived to be dominated) by a transnational, ideologically trendy elite (motivated by what Eric Kaufmann, 2018: 4, calls ‘left-​modernism’, an identity politics characterised by excessive political correctness and whose adherents are –​or are imagined to be –​contemptuous of the working or post-​working classes’ identities and anxieties) has thrust emotions to the forefront of debate. This left any British government, of any party, with the impossible task of trying to resolve Brexit through an agreement that could not satisfy at least two, possibly three (Foster, 2018b) fundamentally opposed groups. Years of Brexit arguments in Britain have intensified the toxicity of debate, with Leave and Remain no longer forming a merely constitutional binary, but instead generating two imagined communities which represent, to each other’s members, the worst elements of contemporary society, with the other faction imagined not as a mere constitutional opponent but as morally repugnant and ethically abhorrent. The increasing media communication which neofunctionalists believed would encourage Europeanness has not created a European nation. Rather, it has created two parallel societies in the form of a transnational elite and dispossessed local peasantries; Zielonka’s ‘neo-​medieval Europe’. In an age when public trust in professional politicians (Shipman, 2016) and traditional media has never been lower, this shift towards feelings over facts is understandable. Particularly in the case of the British. British politics has recently revealed the challenges that emotions, and their vehicle of nationalisms, pose to the status quo. The Scottish independence vote gave primary indications. The Scottish referendum campaign was dominated by raw emotion in which people denounced those who did not agree not simply as wrong, but as traitors (Foster, 2014). Ethnic nationalism, which neofunctionalists and modernists assumed would wane under the progressive march of multiculturalism and economic prosperity, reappeared as both sides denounced one another in emotional, not rational, terms.7 With national emotions unleashed, it is little surprise that the general election in 2015 was more bitter than in previous years, exacerbated by TV debates giving relatively tiny parties equal voice in order to criticise the status quo, and by extension the UK’s electoral system.8 The net result of 2014–​2015 in British politics was that emotion became not just a legitimate expression of politics but the most legitimate manifestation –​a manifestation mediated through rising nationalism from 2016.

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People are never purely rational actors, and in the case of the British (and the Europeans), voters’ relationship with the Union is not always defined by conscious and considered thought. This is especially so among voters whose socioeconomic status is more disadvantaged. For many Leavers the raison d’être of the EU, peace, is not a novelty but a fait accompli and thus they perceive the EU not as a dynamic engine for peace and prosperity but as the ‘fossilisation of social habitus’. The narrative of neofunctionalism has thus failed to manifest –​or at least, it has failed to manifest as predicted –​as it is not rational thought but arational emotions and performances which are resulting in the re-​emergence of nationalism, sub-​nationalism (Englishness), and a new ‘European’ nationalism in the form of ‘Europe’ as a civilisation distinct from, opposed to, and threatened by, the European Union. One consequence is the accretion of Zielonka’s neo-​medieval society. A pan-​ EUropean nation does exist, in the form of Remainers. This nation’s self-​ identified demos tend to be socioeconomically better off, university-​educated, and based in global cities,9 and seek to blend their national identities with EUrope, or reject national identities altogether.10 Yet while a pan-​EUropean nation is forming, a pan-​European nation is also emergent. Its self-​identified demos spans the socioeconomic spectrum (containing significant proportions of the ‘left-​behinds’), is predominantly located in post-​industrial areas hit hard by the Great Recession and subsequent coalition and Conservative cuts in spending,11 and expresses a national identity alongside a European (but not EUropean) identity that is hostile to the EU and identifies ‘Europe’ as a civilisation under siege from outsiders and its own elites. The EU currently faces a number of interrelated crises, and the emergence of a Eurosceptic, anti-​EU European identity as visible in the UK is an understudied one.

Identity crisis As commentators were swift to point out following David Cameron’s announcement of an EU membership referendum, and as pundits hastened to underline following the Brexit vote, referenda are alien to British politics. The previous national referendum of 2011 on Alternative Vote, one of only three in the history of the UK as a single constitutional state, drew a mere 42% turnout and received very little attention in British media; significantly less so than the 1975 European Communities referendum (Goodwin, 2017). The 2016 EU membership referendum, though, continued a dominant theme from the Scottish plebiscite through its colonisation of the airwaves, public discourse and political emotions which transformed a constitutional decision into a moral binary of Good versus Evil. Numerous analyses demonstrate that a major driving force of this was a sense of abandonment among the English who, devoid of their own assemblies or devolved powers, held widespread views that the Labour and Conservatives parties were (and 76

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are) excessively focused on London with little or no interest in the un-​ devolved English counties. Subsequently, ‘Remain’ became associated with cosmopolitans in major cities rather than the English nation, with discourse from 2016 onwards splitting the English nation in two based on a division of post-​industrial/​rural versus urban/​cosmopolitan. And it was in the English nation’s approach to Brexit that the unsustainability and irreversibility of the EUropean status quo, alongside the limits of integration and the limits of neofunctionalist spill-​over, were revealed. Remain campaigned on an economic rather than emotional basis, warning the public that leaving the EU would immediately destabilise the economy while oblivious to the perception, and reality, that in much of the post-​industrial country (especially England) outside of London and the south-​east, the economy has already been depressed and in decline for decades. Leave appealed to nativism, ethnonationalist myth, and imperial nostalgia, igniting the sentiments of people who feel isolated, overlooked and scorned by an imagined community of a rootless, metrocentric, xenocentric elite that is perceived to mock the values, identities and emotions of the English working class. The result is the emergence of two ‘European’ identities. The first, associated with Leave, imagines Europe as a civilisation; encapsulated in multiple Leave factions’ invocation of a discourse of ‘Love Europe, Hate the EU’. The second, associated with Remain, imagines EUrope as a specific institution, encapsulated in Remain factions’ invocations of discourses which specify the EU over ‘Europe’.12 These two collective identities –​European and EUropean –​are fundamentally incompatible with one another, and are saturated with increasingly vicious rhetoric used by both sides in an attempt to delegitimise the other, and defined by hostile emotions. The political significance of emotion and national consciousness is masked by the quotidian or ‘everyday’ contexts in which they are used. Existing research demonstrates that the resurgence of ethnic and parochial identities in Britain and in Europe is not state-​led but spontaneous, emerging from everyday practices, habits, and imaginations rather than because of state policies. Different schools in the social sciences and humanities, namely the Annales school and the work of Henri Lefebrve, Fernand Braudel, and Reinhart Kosselleck have, through their focus on ‘Alltagsgeschichte’ or ‘everyday narratives’, helped us to understand the ‘prosaic banalities’ of everyday practices which not only resonate with high politics, but indeed create politics at its very foundation. Nowhere was this more visible than in the English consciousness released by Brexit. Englishness has long been a subject of contention, manifested in a popular imagination that the identity of the UK’s dominant ethnic group has been ignored, or actively suppressed, in favour of promoting the identities of the non-​English nations and newcomers. Regardless of the veracity of this widely-​held belief, its very existence reinforces a belief that 77

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the manufactured establishment is indifferent to, or contemptuous of, the manufactured ‘majority’ which nationalist ideologies claim to represent (Wodak, 2015). This points to the significance of emotion not only in resurgent nationalism but in the irreversibility of Brexit. Attempts by the remains of Remain to reverse Brexit by calling for a second referendum, pointing out Brexit’s potential dangers, or simply revoking Article 50, paradoxically may increase support among Leave-​oriented voters whose motivation is driven by a perception that they are victimised. Leave won by appealing not to statistics and commercial data but to emotion and a sense of community; assuaging the longing for belonging so prevalent among post-​industrial English communities who feel abandoned and forgotten by a metrocentric, even xenocentric, establishment. Michael Gove’s infamous claim that people have had enough of experts is, in retrospect, more truthful than Remainers initially thought, as demonstrated by widespread rejection of statistical or constitutional arguments against Brexit. The alternative of appealing to emotion renders Brexit even less reversible. In the toxic atmosphere still lingering from 2016 and exacerbated by dragging negotiations, perceived incompetence, and open hostility, from Leavers and Remainers, and continuing beyond the resolution of Brexit, emotional and national appeals are charged with polarisation. By portraying Leavers as uneducated (at best) or racist (at worst), the remnants of the pro-​EU lobby achieve little more than confirming, for Leavers, the perceived gulf between Zielonka’s neo-​medieval transnational aristocracy and socioeconomically immobile peasantry. Resurgent nationalism and emotion not only aided Brexit, but have also rendered its reversibility null (Foster, 2018b). This is highlighted through the sacralisation of British politics. In contrast to pre-​Scottish referendum politics (or, arguably, pre-​Great Recession politics) and the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, the political atmosphere of post-​2016 Britain is not characterised by a divide between different opinions which are based in economic theories or party affiliation, and which are loosely tolerated (and seen as legitimate, if wrong) by those who disagree. In the atmosphere of Brexit Britain politics have become sacralised, shifting from the profane to the sacred. In this new atmosphere political opinions are not simply different –​they are righteous or evil. Political opponents are not merely misguided –​they are malevolent and motivated by prejudice and hatred. Part of this is due to the dominance of social media as a space for political communication and the echo chambers that are created (Raines et al, 2017); meanwhile, high-​profile ethnicist parties such as UKIP and the Scottish National Party, and the powerful emotions surrounding Jeremy Corbyn’s 2015 takeover of Labour, have contributed to moralistic divisions in which opponents are constructed as consciously evil. An outcome of this is not only that a strong EUropean 78

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identity has emerged in the EU’s traditionally most Eurosceptic member, but that this specific EU identity is defined by hostility, contempt, and the same narratives and mechanisms of Othering that are identifiable in traditional ethnic nationalism. The emergence of a new EUropean nationalism in the UK is increasingly defined not by tolerance and inclusivity, but by vocal Remainers exhibiting vitriolic contempt for Leavers. The anti-​Brexit protest marches on Parliament in 2016, 2017 and 2018 exemplified this, with public assertions that ‘Brexit is Racist’ and ‘Bollocks to Brexit’. As Ford and Sobolewska (2018) argued, demographic changes in the UK population (namely older, ostensibly pro-​Leave voters dying and younger, apparently pro-​Remain youths reaching voting age) would result in stronger opposition to Brexit by 2019; a phenomenon that resulted in public calls to delay Brexit until enough voters have died, so that a second referendum could return a slim majority for Remain (Kentish, 2018; Roberts, 2017; The Convention, 2017). Not only did this failed prediction falsely assume youth support for Brexit and a much higher youth turnout than in 2016, while again glossing over the ethical and constitutional questions raised by a second vote, this indicates the extent of Britain’s political toxicity, in which hopes for political salvation are moving from debate over a second referendum, to demands for Brexit to be unilaterally cancelled in defiance of the 2016 vote, to publicly looking forward to death quotas. In this thanatopolitical light, novelist Ian McEwan’s (Roberts, 2017) comment on the toxicity of Leavers and pro-​British/​English nationalism is now equally applicable to the toxicity of Remainers and pro-​ EUropean nationalism: ‘Truly, Brexit has stirred something not heroic or celebratory or generous in the nation, but instead has coaxed into the light from some dark, damp places the lowest human impulses, from the small-​ minded to the mean-​spirited to the murderous.’ By replicating the rhetoric, narratives, and technologies of ethnic nationalists, a hard core of Remainers delegitimise opposing views, transforming the division of Remain versus Leave into a Manichean binary of Good versus Evil, and construct their own national identity which is as defined by negativity and hostility as is the nation-​state nationalism they oppose. This has already happened in Ukraine –​another ‘outsider’ nation negotiating with its status as European but not EUropean (Foster, 2018a) –​and is accelerating in the UK. By demonising and delegitimising Leavers as uneducated, wilfully ignorant and motivated by consciously malevolent agendas, ‘Remainiacs’ (McTague, 2018) construct a reflexive binary in which the Self (Remain) is constructed through rejection of the Other (Leave), the essence of ethnogenesis and the formation of a nation. And like the nation states of Early Modern and Modern Europe, the new nations of Leavers and Remainers who coinhabit the UK are intolerant and hostile, and construct a myth of mutual incompatibility and a self-​appointed mission 79

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to defeat the other. By rejecting and delegitimising Leavers and nation-​state nationalists/​European transnationalists, Remainers and EUropean nationalists are contributing to the emergence of a less tolerant, more contemptuous and potentially violent political atmosphere. The Brexit vote was as much an English Revolution against the ostensibly uncaring elites of Westminster as it was a British Revolution against the unelected elites of Brussels (Shipman, 2016). By scorning the anxieties and identities of citizens who feel their identities are threatened, by opposing an English ethnic identity which returned to the forefront of British political consciousness through the 2018 World Cup (Crowley, 2018), or by asserting that Brexit’s toxic divisions, which have resulted from 50 years’ worth of complex social, economic, constitutional and cultural changes, can be quickly solved by the election of any government or by reversing the June 2016 plebiscite, advocates of EUropean identity worsen the situation. Either they drive English voters further into the arms of ethnic nationalists like the English Defence League, Democratic Football Lads’ Alliance (Morrow and Meadowcroft, 2018), or a resurgent UKIP (Goodwin, 2018); or ethnic transnationalists like Generation Identity, the fastest-​growing political movement in the UK (and to a lesser degree across Europe) (Bulman, 2018) who offer a vision of ‘Europe’ as a civilisation defined by contrast to the soulless forces of globalisation and an ostensibly xenocentric elite (Economist, 2012; Hellyer, 2018); a vision more sleek and seductive than mainstream parties’ economic focus, or EUrophiles’ neofunctionalism, can match. This is rendered more significant by the issue of race, and a popular imagination that ethnic white Britons (particularly the English) are threatened by non-​ white, non-​British cultures. This racialist fear, what Eric Kaufmann (2018) terms ‘whiteshift’, is far from unique to Britain and is arguably a driving factor in anti-​establishment anger across the Western world (Bhambra, 2018). What is significant about race in Brexit Britain is the apparent paradox that anti-​EU activism, which is partly based on a rejection of other cultures and ethnicities, constructs its own version of ‘Europe’ based on race. This is most notable in the rapid growth of Identitarian movements in Britain. The parallel of emergence of EUropean and European identities, the former characterised by elites supportive of the EU and the latter characterised by ordinary citizens who reject the EU and the importation of non-​European migrants and cultures, demonstrates the urgent need to address nationalism, rather than deriding or ignoring it. In contrast to EUropean identity, the accretion of a new European ethnos is characterised by a (European) Self rooted in a Romanticist imagination of a single ‘European’ identity, and is contrasted, in Identitarian imaginations, against an Other which is simultaneously the external, threatening Muslim and the internal, uncaring ‘elite’ (Bhambra, 2017; Guillaume, 2011: 11–​38). This connects ‘European’ identity with mainstream populist parties who focus on ‘the people’. Thus, 80

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Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) question of who ‘the people’ are is answered in two ways. For EUropeans, ‘the people’ are those who identify with the Union. For ‘Europeans’, ‘the people’ are ordinary Europeans weary of being told what identities they should and should not have. As Brexit demonstrates for the British, this results in a grinding impasse whereby government policies are doomed to disappoint and dissatisfy all factions. Thus, in order to manage social and political relations in this new and polarised atmosphere, it is not only necessary to abandon neofunctionalism but to embrace (some of) the tenets and themes of nationalism.

Love Europe, hate the EU? Can Britain reconcile its resurgent British and sub-​British nationalisms with hostile European versus EUropean supranationalisms? Possibly. In an era of disillusionment with traditional politics, social and psychological isolation, and a yearning for community nationalism offers a template for exploring and enhancing communal, civic identities before ethnic emotions and disenchantment drive citizens towards less savoury, racialised identities (Mondon and Winter, 2018; Fukuyama, 2018a, 2018b). Whether identity can help overcome Britain’s economic and commercial fluctuations beyond Brexit is another matter. Nationalism has returned to Europe, but its reappearance need not necessarily be a cause for alarm. Rosamond’s and Risse’s analyses of the core tenets of neofunctionalism remain valid –​it is possible to embrace a national and a European identity at the same time. But not in all parts of Europe, least of all Britain. In the present climate of British politics this is rarely heard, as political discourse has become so polarised and openly toxic that the idea of being British and EUropean (but not ‘European’) appears as bizarre as the concept of being a Leaver and a Remainer at the same time. For the British it will be a long time before holding both identities becomes commonplace, and regardless of whether Britain leaves with a deal, no deal, or remains, merging the two identities or British/​English/​European versus EUropean, or even witnessing them co-​existing, will not happen in the foreseeable future. But in other European nations or nations-​in-​waiting,13 a dual identity remains possible. EU policy makers continue to assume that a European identity will emerge as a consequence of functionalist spill-​over. But this belief in what Max Weber termed the ‘iron cage’ (stahlhartes Gehäuse) of rational, systematic political activity is no longer appropriate. Events from 2014 to 2018 have demonstrated –​just as events will continue to demonstrate –​that formal, rational politics cannot compete with the emotional, symbolic, fundamentally arational politics of identity, nationalism, nostalgia and emotions. The pan-​ European rather than pan-​EUropean question remains, and illuminates a 81

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necessary shift in European studies. As demonstrated by the rapid expansion, in cyberspace and everyday communication, of white transnationalist organisations such as PEGIDA, Generation Identity, and Identity Evropa, ethnic or nation-​state nationalisms are not incompatible with a collective identity. By delegitimising and scorning Leavers, EUropeans in Britain are constructing a hostile European nation.14 As such this chapter urges five actions. First is to revisit, revise and potentially abandon neofunctionalism as an epistemological tool. Ernst Haas’ 1957 model of successive spill-​overs clearly does not work. It is possible, as Ben Rosamond’s (2005) and Thomas Risse’s (2005) earlier studies argue, that neofunctionalism does still have some useful elements which allow us to understand and direct the European project. But in light of the events from 2014 onwards, the theory requires substantial and urgent revisiting. Second is to reconsider, as a growing shift in the social sciences indicates, nationalism based on the modern nation state (not the sub-​state nation such as Scotland or Catalonia) as a social solvent to help bind society together until the necessary economic and constitutional changes can be made to offset the negative consequences of 50 years of deindustrialisation, globalisation and the dominance of global cities over national communities (Fukuyama, 2018a, 2018b; Appiah, 2018; Hazony, 2018). Third, it is essential that the synecdoche of ‘Europe =​EU’ is abandoned. There is no single ‘European’ identity, and attempts to peg ‘European’ to the EU result in other European identities, which may be sceptical of or hostile towards the EU, becoming even more polarised.15 Fourth, European studies must focus more on political emotions and the Mythosdebatte. Rosamond’s chapter in this issue highlights the failure of Sovietologists and Kremlinologists to notice the immanent and inherent weaknesses in the Soviet system, with Sovietological studies obsessing over reproductions of political power in the USSR to the point that they failed utterly to predict the USSR’s collapse. This is not to suggest that the EU suffers from the same degree of built-​in weaknesses, inequalities and corrupted mechanisms as the Soviet Union, nor is it to suggest that the EU is on the brink of a violent and rapid collapse. Rather, it is to urge that EU studies must, as Rosamond suggests, examine the potential for the processes of EUrope to be reversed or redirected in response to the return of ethnic nationalism. Studying the processes of integration and stability is inadequate without studying the potential for disintegration and instability, and foremost among these potentials are emotions and signs of emotional distance between EU leaders and EU citizens. In the epistemological tradition of Ernst Cassirer, which approaches the irrational and arational as fundamental to understanding political imaginations, ‘the force and effect of these mediating signs would remain a mystery if they were not ultimately rooted in … the very essence of consciousness’ (Cassirer, 1953). Through a critical investigation of how identities and emotions are used and interpreted by EU citizens, and not simply what these identities are, reflexive knowledge 82

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can be attained of what Cassirer’s ‘very essence of consciousness’ is in Europe today. Fifth, and arguably most significant, European studies must prepare for much greater focus on the politics of the right. British political studies must prepare for a violent return of English nationalism. The Burkean ‘Old Right’ of traditional conservatism and the ‘far right’ of fascist nostalgia and neo-​Nazism are giving way to the ‘New Right’; an amorphous and embryonic philosophy which replicates many of the discourses and priorities of the traditional right or extreme right, but which borrows from the left and the centre, and which appeals to far broader demographics than traditional conservatism or fascism. Britain faces a New Right surge regardless of what happens with Brexit (Goodwin, 2018; Foster, 2018a), with UKIP rapidly transforming into an ethnicist, racialist party whose preoccupation with anti-​Islam discourses and an emphasis on English, rather than British, ethnicity, has prompted the resignation of its chairman, David Coburn, and even Nigel Farage (TalkRadio, 2018a, 2018b). Meanwhile, current events in France, Italy, Greece, Spain and perhaps even Germany indicate that the New Right is rising rapidly across Europe (Foster in Bond, 2018). Significantly, the New Right is opposed to the EU but not Europe (understood as a civilisation threatened by an imagined monolithic Islam and a an equally monolithic xenocentric, cosmopolitan elite), and as organisations such as Generation Identity demonstrate, the New Right’s vision of Europe is at least as and emotionally appealing, if not more so, than Remainers’ EUropean identity, in Britain’s toxic atmosphere. In conclusion, one of Brexit’s most significant consequences is the demonstration that multiple (and incompatible) ‘European’ identities exist, and that an EUropean identity which was imagined would transcend ethnic nationalism, is, as this chapter has argued, little more than what Mitrany predicted in 1963: not an extinction but an extension of ethnic nationalism. Nigel Farage’s speech on the morning of 24 June 2016 was simultaneously less and more prescient than he perhaps thought. Despite its ongoing systemic crisis, the EU after Brexit does not face the prospect of Quitaly, Outstria, EU Revoir or Czech-​out. For now. On that point Farage and so many commentators, this author included, were wrong. Brexit is not only a political first, it is also a political experiment. If it fails, it is unlikely other states will leave. If it succeeds, it may become a catalyst for other states to seriously question their membership. Of course, such an Anglocentric view does not account for regional and national developments in Europe elsewhere. Just as nobody predicted the events of 2014–​2020 accurately, it is reasonable to expect unforeseen occurrences into the 2020s and beyond. Yet in other ways, Farage’s prediction hinted in an unexpected direction: a Europe of peoples (if not states) who identify as members of the same civilisation while still performing their national identities. As optimistic as this development might sound, the history of European nationalism reminds us that it is a short step from finding common ground as a civilisation, to 83

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finding common opponents. Re-​evaluating the values and the very nature of nationalism is not merely academically desirable –​it is politically essential. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

It is notable, as van Gent et al (2013) and Bruter (2011) point out, that working class people are those among whom Euroscepticism (and subsequently, voting preference for anti-​EU parties) is strongest. See: van Gent et al, ‘Political reactions to the euro crisis’ (2013; and Bruter, Mapping Extreme Right (2011). While ‘populism’ is a contested term, this chapter adopts Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2015: 18) definition of populism: ‘a thin-​centred ideology in which society is separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” ’, who form one of two antagonists for modern populism (the other being Islam).This aligns with Wodak and Boukala’s (2017) distinction between ‘real Europeans’ and ‘outsiders’, in class and ethnic terms. For discussions of this point prior to the landmark Eurosceptic European Parliament elections in 2014, see van Gent et al (2013), Moisio et al (2013) and Bruter (2003, 2009). The iconography of euro banknotes exemplifies this problem. The fictional monuments on banknotes were designed to be recognisable to Europeans all across the Union, in the hope of appealing to an imagined European history. This is problematic as Europe did not experience a progressive history, the symbols ignore non-​Western/​Southern Europe, and the manufactured narrative embedded in currency iconography must compete with national iconographies, which have greater emotional appeal. A more plausible policy on euro iconography would be to represent actual symbols of Europeanness –​monuments, historical figures, landscapes –​chosen by European citizens, rather than what Fareed Zakaria terms ‘Money for Mars’. See Foster (2014). Indeed, this is acknowledged by EU policy makers who consequently call for greater symbolic communication between EU institutions and citizens in order to prevent EU citizens from voting according to emotions rather than rational thought. See Poettering (2006), Our Vision of Europe. Poland and Hungary being possible exceptions, depending on definitions of ‘hard Euroscepticism’. Although, as Ruth Wodak argues in this book, the definition of and distinction between ‘rational’ and ‘irrational/​arational’ is entirely subjective. While the Scottish National Party (SNP) secured 1 million votes and 52 seats at Westminster, UKIP secured 4 million votes and no seats. The erosion of public faith in the broader British political system did not begin with Brexit’s 48% versus 52%. Curiously, this EUropean identity seems to be strongest among people not in, or about to leave, the EU. Few people in the EU overtly wave the EU flag, paint their faces blue and gold, or conduct other performances of EUrope. But in western Ukraine and the UK (post-​June 2016), these symbolic performances of EUrope are overt and visible. Few people consciously identify with the Union –​until they find themselves on the outside. See Foster (2018a). Rejecting nationalism in order to identify as European is not universal, and remains subject to the same dichotomous ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ structures and imagined community as a nation-​state identity. By rejecting Englishness or Britishness to identify as European, one exclusionary, carefully-​patrolled identity is simply replaced by another. If the EU is to foster emotional identification among citizens, then its identity must be reformed to avoid David Mitrany’s 1963 prediction that ‘the regional concept is not the triumph of the new internationalism, but only an extension of the old nationalism’.

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12

13

14

15

However, Leave is not exclusively formed of the left-​behinds. The Brexit vote revealed how strong Euroscepticism is among middle-​and upper-​class Britons, suggesting that the Leave vote was motivated by other than economic concerns. This aligns with Ashcroft’s (2016) finding that the Leave vote was about ‘control’, rather than economic grievances, and Favell’s chapter in this issue on the black and minority-​ethnic vote for Leave. Exemplified in post-​June 2016 Remainer rhetoric such as ‘Never Gonna Give EU Up’, ‘All I Want for Christmas is EU’, and similar slogans which promote the specific identity of EUrope, not Europe. See Delanty’s contribution to this book on Catalonia as potentially having a double or even triple identity. Whether these protestations of Europeanness are genuine, or a political fig-​leaf for ethnic nationalism, is another matter. Entirely unconnected to these organisations, ideologically opposed groups such as UKIP, the Bruges Group, and networks such as Labour Leave in the UK demonstrate the same phenomenon –​that it is possible to ‘Love Europe, Hate the EU’. Olaf Cramme takes this further, arguing that ‘appealing to a culturally defined European identity would be like pouring oil on a fire’. Current elite-​driven attempts to construct a European identity symbolically stress that ‘we’ are essentially the same. Yet this does little, besides antagonising vocal Eurosceptics, as diversity is ignored in favour of imagined histories of unity. If a European identity does exist, it is defined not by unity but by diversity, which current invocations of ‘Europe’ do not convey (Cramme, 2009: 54).

Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank Dr Jan Grzymski for his excellent assistance, and to the two anonymous reviewers. Funding This chapter, the original special edition of Global Discourse, and the associated conference and research network were part of a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. References Åhäll, L. (2018) ‘Gender, popular culture, and (in)security’, in C.E. Gentrey, L.J. Shepherd and L. Sjoberg (eds) Routledge handbook on gender and security, London: Routledge. Appiah, K. (2018) The lies that bind, London: Profile. Atkinson, D. (2018) ‘Charlottesville and the alt-​right: A turning point?’, Politics, Groups, and Identities, 6(2): 309–​15. Beck, U. (2014) German Europe, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bhambra, G. (2017) ‘Brexit, Trump, and ‘methodological whiteness’’, The British Journal of Sociology, 68(S1): 212–​232. Bhambra, G. (2018) ‘Racial citizens and the complicity of social science’, paper at King’s College London, 2 May. Bleiker, R. (2012) ‘Aesthetics and world politics’, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bruter, M. (2011) Mapping extreme Right ideology: An empirical geography of the European extreme Right, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 85

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Bond, D. (2018) ‘Rightwing terror in Europe draws fuel from populism and xenophobia’, Financial Times, 9 October, www.ft.com/​content/​ 86f2645a-​c7a2-​11e8-​ba8f-​ee390057b8c9 Bulman, M. (2018) ‘White supremacists Generation Identity plan to hold a secret conference in London. Anti-​fascists aim to stop them’. Independent, 12 April, www.independent.co.uk/​news/​uk/​home-​news/​generation-​ identity-​racist-w ​ hite-s​ upremacists-c​ onference-l​ ondon-a​ ntifascist-n ​ etwork-​ a8301851.html Bruter, M. (2003) ‘On what citizens mean by feeling ‘European’: perceptions of news, symbols and borderless-​ness’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1): 21–​39. Bruter, M. (2009) ‘Time Bomb? The dynamic effect of news and symbols on the political identity of European citizens’, Comparative Political Studies, 42(12): 1498–​1536. Cassirer, E. (1953) The Philosophy of symbolic forms: Vol. I Language, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp 105–​06. Clarke, H., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P. (2017) Brexit: why Britain voted to leave the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cowley, J. (2018) ‘England in the age of Brexit: What the world cup reveals about English national identity’, New Statesman, 6-​12 July. Cramme, O. (ed) (2009) Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security, London: Policy Network Press Dunt, I. (2016) Brexit: What The hell happens now?, Kingston: Canbury Press. Economist (2012) ‘Europe’s far right: culture matters more’, Economist, 11 August, www.economist.com/​europe/​2012/​08/​11/​culture-​matters-​more Euronews (2018) ‘Jean-​C laude Juncker and EU ‘enlargement fatigue’’, 2 March, www. euronews.com/​2018/​03/​02/​jean-​claude​juncker-​and-​eu-​enlargement-​fatigue Ford, R. and Sobolewska, M. (2018) ‘Demographic trends will pull British public opinion in a pro-​European direction’, LSE Blogs, http://​blogs.lse. ac.uk/​brexit/​2018/​05/​01/​demographic-​trends-​will-​pull-​british-​public-​ opinion-​in-​a-​pro-​european-​direction/​ Foster, R. (2014) ‘Through a glass, darkly: the semiotics and symbols of European empire’, in H. Behr and Y. Stivachtis (eds) Revisiting Europe as empire, London: Routledge Foster, R. (2017a) ‘Why Macron’s Victory is a triumph for disillusionment and populism’, E-​International Relations, www.e-​ir.info/​2017/​05/​16/​ why-​macrons-​ victory-​is-​a-​triumph-​for-​disillusionment-​and-​populism/​ Foster, R. (2017b) ‘Populism marches on’, E-​International Relations, www.e-​ ir.info/​2017/​03/​28/​populism-​marches-​on/​ Foster, R. (2018a) ‘These are those that Faustus most desires: identity, iconography, and ‘Europe’ in the Crimea crisis’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 14(4): 253–​272. 86

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Foster, R. (2018b) ‘Notes from Airstrip One’, E-​International Relations, www.e-​ir.info/​2018/​11/​17/​notes-​from-​airstrip-​one/​ Foster, R. and Bijsmans, P. (2018) ‘Brexit: A European perspective’, E-​IR, http://​ www.e-​ir.info/​category/​blogs/​brexit-​european-​perspective/​. Fukuyama, F. (2018a) ‘Exploring contemporary identity politics and the struggle for recognition’, British Library, London, 12 October. Fukuyama, F. (2018b) Identity: the demand for dignity and the politics of resentment, London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Galpin, C. (2017) ‘The German election –​ What does it mean for Europe?’ E- ​ I nternational Relations, www.e- ​ i r.info/ ​ 2 017/ ​ 1 0/ ​ 0 4/​ the-​german-​election-​what-​ does-​it-​mean-​for-​europe/​ Goodhart, D. (2017) The road to somewhere: the populist revolt and the future of politics, London: Penguin. Goodwin, M. (2018) ‘The fury of the far right: can Europe’s populist surge be halted?’, New Statesman, 5 October. Goodwin, M. (2017) ‘In 2018, Europe’s populist challenges will continue’, Chatham House, 14 December, www.chathamhouse.org/​ e xpert/​ comment/​2018-​europe-​s-​populist-​challenges-​will-​continue Guillaume, X. (2011) International relations and identity: A dialogical approach, London: Routledge. Haas, E. (1958) The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Habermas, J. (2016) The crisis of the European Union: A response, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hazony, Y. (2018) The virtue of nationalism, London and New York: Basic Books. Hellyer, H. (2018) ‘Generation Identity: how far-​r ight groups are tapping into young idealists’ need to belong’, The National, 26 September, www.thenational.ae/​ o pinion/​ c omment/ ​ g eneration- ​ i dentity- ​ h ow​f ar-​r ight-​g roups-​are-​tapping-​ into-​young-​idealists-​need-​to-​belong-​ 1.774220 Hope Not Hate (2018) ‘Economic exclusion feeds Far Right’, https://​ www.hopenothate.org.uk/​research/​r ivers-​of-​blood/​ Kaufmann, E. (2018) Whiteshift: Populism, immigration, and the future of White majorities, London: Allen Lane. Kentish, B. (2018) ‘Leave voters dying and Remainers reaching voting age means majority will soon oppose Brexit, study finds’, Independent, 17 September, www.independent.co.uk/​news/​uk/​politics/​brexit-​leave-​eu-​ remain-​vote-​support-​ against-​poll-​uk-​europe-​final-​say-​yougov-​second-​ referendum-​peter-​a8541971.html Kimmel, M. (2015) Angry White men: American masculinity at the end of an era, New York: Nation Books.

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Krastev, I. (2017) After Europe. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Krastev, I. (2018) ‘Beyond the Great Disruption’, New Statesman, 2–​8 February, 24–​28. Laclau, E. (2005) On populist reason, London: Verso. Leconte, C. (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism, London: Palgrave. Lord Ashcroft (2016) ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why’, https://​ l ordashcroftpolls.com/ ​ 2 016/ ​ 0 6/ ​ h ow- ​ t he​united-​kingdom-​voted-​and-​why/​ Lubbers, M. and Coenders, M. (2017) ‘Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the right in Europe’, EU Politics, 18(1): 98–​118. McCann, D. (2018) ‘Alt-​Right v Alt-​Left: The challenge to identitarianism’, Quadrant, 61(3): 28–​31. McTague, T. (2018) ‘Britain’s middle-​class Brexit Anxiety Disorder’, Politico, www.politico.eu/​article/​brexit-​anxiety-​disorder-​britain-​middle-​class/​ Mishra, P. (2017) Age of anger: a history of the present, London: Allen Lane. Moisio, S., Bachmann, V., Bialasiewicz, L., dell’Agnese, E., Dittmer, E.J. and Mamadouh, V. (2013) ‘Mapping the political geographies of Europeanization: National discourses, external perceptions and the question of popular culture’, Progress in Human Geography, 37(6): 737–​61. Mondon, A. and Winter, A. (2018) ‘Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States’, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​1070289X.2018.1552440 Morrow, E. and Meadowcroft, J.J. (2018) ‘The Rise and Fall of the English Defence League: self-​governance, marginal members and the far right’, Political Studies, 65(2): 373–​390. Mudde, C. (2013) ‘Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?’, European Journal of Political Research, 52(1): 1–​19. Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. (2015) ‘Vox populi or vox masculini? Populism and gender in N. Europe’, Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-​2): 16-​36. Murray, D. (2017) The strange death of Europe: immigration, identity, Islam, London: Bloomsbury. Mutz, D. (2018) ‘Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, http://​ www.pnas.org/​cont​ent/​ pnas/​early/​2018/​04/​18/​1718155115.full.pdf Neuhold, C. (2017) ‘Austrian elections: a ‘shift to the right’ and a ‘mixed bag’ for Europe’, E-​International Relations, www.e-​ir.info/​2017/​10/​24/​ austrian-​elections-​a-​shift-​to-​the-​r ight-​and-​a-​mixed-​bag-​for-​europe/​ Nulli, M. (2018) ‘Deal or no deal? Europe and the Italian elections’, E-​ I nternational Relations, www.e-​ i r.info/​ 2 018/​ 0 4/​ 2 5/​ deal-​or-​no-​deal-​europe-​and-​the-​italian-​ elections/​ Offe, C. (2014) Europe entrapped, Cambridge: Polity Press. 88

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Poetter ing, H. (ed) (2006) Our vision of Europe in 2020, Brussels: European Parliament. Raines, T., Goodwin, M. and Cutts, D. (2017) ‘Europe’s political tribes’, Chatham House. Risse, T. (2005) ‘Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2): 291–​309. Roberts, D. (2017) ‘Death of ‘1.5m oldsters’ could swing second Brexit vote, says Ian McEwan’, Guardian, 12 May, www.theguardian.com/​politics/​ 2017/m ​ ay/1​ 2/​15m-​oldsters-​in-​their-​graves-​could-​swing-​second-​eu-​vote-​ says-​ian-​mcewan Robinson, S. (2005) Marked men: White masculinity in crisis, New York: Columbia University Press. Rosamond, B. (2005) ‘The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: Revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas’, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2): 237–​54. Rose, G. (2005) Visual methodologies, London: Sage. Ross, A. (2014) Mixed emotions: Beyond fear and hatred in international conflict, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shipman, T. (2016) All out war: the full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class, London: HarperCollins. Solomon, T., Koschut, S., Hall, T., Wolf, R., Hutchison, E. and Bleiker, R. (2017) ‘Discourse and emotions in IR’, International Studies Review, 19(3): 481–​508. Standing, G. (2016) The Precariat: The new dangerous class, London: Bloomsbury. Surridge, P. (2018) ‘Brexit, British politics, and the Left-​Right divide’, Political Insight, 9(4): 4–​7. TalkRadio (2018a) ‘UKIP chairman resigns over ‘increased English Nationalism’ in the party’, 7 December, https://​talkradio.co.uk/​news/​ukip-​ chairman-​resigns-o ​ ver-i​ ncreased-e​ nglish-n ​ ationalism-​party-​18120729120 TalkRadio (2018b) ‘Nigel Farage quits UKIP over Gerard Batten’s ‘obsession’ with Tommy Robinson’, 4 December, https://​ talkradio.co.uk/ ​ n ews/ ​ n igel- ​ f arage- ​ q uits-​ u kip-​ over-​ g erard-​ b attens-​ obsession-​ t ommy-​ r obinson-​ 1 8120429077#exxOz4ZyB3gG6 HiH.99 The Convention (2017) Post-​Brexit Britain as a new world, Event at Central Hall, Westminster, London, 12-​13 May 2017, http://w ​ ww.theconvention.co.uk/​ van Gent, W., Mamadouh, V. and van der Wusten, H. (2013) ‘Political reactions to the euro crisis: Cross-​national variations and rescaling issues in elections and popular protests’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 54(2): 135–​61.

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Response to Russell Foster John Mills Why did the EU referendum result in 2016 go the way it did? Why was Donald Trump shortly afterwards elected as President of the USA? Why are Eurosceptic political parties gaining traction all over the EU? These events are all clearly linked together. What has made all these developments materialise at broadly the same time? In my view, by far the most significant factor has been economic. It is not just that economies right cross the West have grown much more slowly since the 2008 crash than they did before, at the same time as we have seen the development of the type of populist politics we have experienced recently. It is that the result of our poor economic performance has been no increases in real incomes –​and often falls –​for vast swathes of the electorate –​certainly over 50% in the UK’s case.1 In London, real incomes have, on average, just about held their own but in Wales they have dropped over the past decade by about 10% and in the North East by only slightly less.2 The situation in other Western countries, often combined with much higher levels of unemployment than we have seen in the UK, has been as bad if not worse than ours. In the meantime, the wealth of those at the top has dramatically increased, while the incomes of the top 20% or so has held up much better than those further down the income scale.3 The poor economic performance across nearly all the Western world is not an accident. It flows directly from the huge change in economic sentiment there was in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Keynesian consensus, which had served the West so well during the period from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s, broke up in the face of mounting inflation. The response, over a relatively short period of time, was a radical switch towards monetarism which in turn morphed into neoliberalism. Fighting inflation became priority number one. Everything else was subordinated to this goal. Inflation was tamed –​though whether this was entirely due to monetarism or other factors is still debated. What is beyond doubt, however, is that the 91

newgenrtpdf

Figure 8.1: Chained real effective exchange rates, China and the UK, 1975–​2016

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92 Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks (2000, 2010, 2017) Note: Based in all cases on Relative Unit Labour Costs.

Response to Russell Foster

adoption of these new policies had a dramatic effect on the competitiveness of the West compared to the resurgent East as the sky-​high interest rates that monetarism required drove up the West’s exchange rates at the same time as many countries in the East devalued. Particularly in the UK’s case, this was followed by international financial liberalisation, which led to huge inflows of capital to the UK as vast swathes of UK assets were sold to foreign interests, all further pushing up the exchange rate. Figure 8.1 demonstrates what happened between sterling and the Chinese renminbi over this period, providing a reasonable proxy for exchange rate developments between all the Western and Eastern worlds. The consequence of the huge gap in competitiveness which thus developed was to render large swathes of manufacturing uneconomical in much, although not all, of the Western world. In the UK the proportion of GDP derived from manufacturing fell from just under one third in 1970 to less than 10% today.4 The UK’s scale of deindustrialisation has been at the extreme end of the spectrum, but not by much compared with the USA and France –​both down to about 12%. Other Western countries –​especially Germany and Switzerland –​did better, maintaining manufacturing at around 20% of GDP, but only by keeping their currencies competitive through very low levels of inflation.5 It is the impact of these misaligned exchange rates, caused by monetarism and neoliberalism, which, in my view, has much more to do with the rise of populist politics than anything else. They were directly responsible for the collapse in high quality blue collar manufacturing employment which has been such a feature across much of the West for the past 40 years. Austerity policies pursued in the 2010s led to far less financial support through the tax systems for those on relatively low incomes. Productivity stagnation, which deindustrialisation always produces, left large post-​industrial areas devoid of enough to sell to the rest of the world to enable them to pay their way, making them dependent on transfer payments, subsidies, grants and selling off assets to make ends meet. No wonder gross value added per employee in 2016 was £44,000 in London whereas in Wales it was only £18,000 and in the North East £19,000.6 Against this background, it is not difficult to see why trust in our political elite has nose-​dived, why organisations run by the metropolitan elite, including the EU, which are perceived as being part of the neoliberal consensus, are distrusted and unpopular. It then seems to me that these economic causes of the current discontents are so obviously strong and persuasive that they may overshadow other more sophisticated explanations of recent political and intellectual trends, although clearly there have been developments in the intellectual climate along the lines delineated in Russell Foster’s chapter. Evidently also technical changes, such as easy access to the internet and social media, have played a big part. So have various major 93

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political personalities. And, of course, the 2008 crash and its aftermath have significantly amplified trends which were already there. The big question, however, seems me to be how large a component of the drift towards populism has been caused by anything other than fairly obvious economic causes. Faced with their recent economic experience, large numbers of people in the UK and elsewhere feel disillusioned with globalisation, fed up with ‘experts’ who do not really seem to know the answers, and tired of being patronised, ignored and neglected by what they perceive as being an arrogant metropolitan elite. If we could get our economy to perform much better –​with growth running at 3% or 4% per annum on a sustainable basis, which I believe we could –​how quickly would trust in our political and intellectual leadership recover and the current manifestations of deep political discontent diminish? Reasonably rapidly, in my view. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

ONS NUTS Data. London, ONS, 2018 Ibid. ONS data on Income Distribution. London: ONS, 2017. Trading Economics website Data from the World Bank website ONS NUTS Data. London, ONS, 2018.

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9

What Does Self-​Determination Mean Today? The Resurgence of Nationalism and European Integration in Question Gerard Delanty

A characteristic of political movements today is the appeal to self-​ determination. It has entered the political discourse of populist politics and has given a new impetus to nationalism. Populist politics, broadly defined as anti-​establishment and nativistic, has become a new force in the world today and has changed the political context of Europeanisation. Populists are no longer outsiders; they are now part of the mainstream, though when they join the mainstream, they are no longer outsiders. While by no means entirely right-​wing, in Europe populism has been predominantly associated with right-​wing politics and has been successfully embraced by the extreme right for which it has become a convenient way of escaping the damaging label of fascism.1 The appeal to self-​determination has always exerted a powerful hold over the popular imagination. It has a resonance that is not easily matched by the established politics of the centre and many despair at what appears to be a crisis of liberal democracy. Populist movements have advanced their cause and increased their popularity through appealing to self-​determination.2 Minority groups of all kinds have also advanced their cause by appeal to self-​determination (Hilpold, 2017). But what does it mean and what is it really capable of achieving? Is liberal democracy and European integration really in peril? The idea of self-​determination in nationalist movements generally rests on the idea of an external source of domination that had to be removed, often by violence and at any cost. In this chapter, which is concerned with 95

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secessionist expressions of self-​determination, I argue that the idea of self-​ determination today has lost the meaning it once had, namely the voice of a dominated people. It has been forced to become democratised in a way that it was not before. In many of its expressions, it has undergone a shift in the direction of illiberal democracy, but it can also take a more pronounced call for more meaningful forms of democracy. Today in Europe the appeal to self-​determination has many different meanings, depending on whether the examples are Catalonia, Scotland, Ireland, Corsica, Flanders or Brexit. Although it has the capacity to bring about considerable de-​stablisation, it probably lacks sufficient scale to bring about a reversal of Europeanisation. Yet, all such movements draw on the legacy of nationalist self-​determination, but are unable to reconcile that inheritance with the political and social reality of contemporary societies, which nurture desires for collective self-​ determination and at the same time frustrate their realisation. Modern societies –​at least from the second half of the 20th century –​created a strong culture of personal self-​determination at a time when collective self-​ determinism waned: the ‘I’ triumphed over the ‘we’. This has now somewhat changed with a revival of collective self-​determination but under conditions that impede it realising itself in meaningful ways. The result is that self-​ determination loses any sense of a clear meaning and morphs into confused demands that serve many different political ends. I argue here that one of the problems that the politics of self-​determination, especially as expressed in populist politics, is that it runs up against the test of democracy: many movements seeking to advance self-​determination, ironically, are not democratic and are contrary to the demands of liberal democracy. It should of course be noted that illiberal democracy is itself a form of democracy.3 Some qualifications are in place: the civic nationalist movements of 1989 in former socialist countries embraced genuine democratic leanings. However, such movements existed in political cultures that were not democratic, so democracy was less of a constraint than an objective.4

The legacy of national self-​determination: a brief review To put my argument in context, I offer here a brief reconstruction of modern secessionist nationalism in Europe. I am not discussing the state nationalism of the established and older European states, such as Spain, Portugal, France and the UK. There were three main eras of nationalist movements advancing the cause of national self-​determination. The first was the period from the early 19th century to the immediate aftermath of the First World War, which saw the rise of nationalist movements seeking secession from the Ancien Regime. It was a predominately European and American phenomenon. 96

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Nationalist liberation movements, predominantly republican, sought independence from empires that had crumbled in the aftermath of the Great War. In North America and in Latin America, republican nationalism became a powerful force and drew on Enlightenment ideas of republicanism, such as Rousseau’s, as well as on the liberal political heritage. Notions of individual and collective autonomy shaped the politics of modernity throughout the American continent and gave to national minorities in Europe an inspiration for resistance to the Ancien Regime that in most cases persisted until 1918. Beginning with Greek nationalism in 1820s and Irish nationalism in the 1840s, the idea of national or collective self-​determination became a potent force of European politics. With the collapse of the major territorial empires in 1918 –​the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-​Hungarian, the German Reich –​the principle of self-​determination was the solution for the reorganisation of those empires. It was embraced by Woodrow Wilson in Point 10 of the Fourteen Points and followed by Lenin, and became the basis of the fragile post-​Versailles political order that saw the creation of numerous new national states in Europe. The second era was one of anti-​colonial liberation nationalism in the empires of the European colonial powers. The former Spanish colonies were forerunners, with figures such as Simón Bolívar advancing new republican and cosmopolitan ideas. Elsewhere anti-​colonial nationalism was mostly developed after 1945 and the trend was set by Indian nationalism. It reached its apogee in the 1970s with the creation of independent states throughout Asia and Africa, in most cases following bitter wars with the colonial states. A third era can be distinguished. In the 1970s Western Europe experienced the rise of a wave of secessionist nationalism. These were variously constitutional, cultural and violent. Prominent examples of violent republican nationalism include: Irish republican nationalism since the early 1970s when the IRA (Irish Republican Army) reorganised as a paramilitary force in Northern Ireland known as the Provisional IRA; Basque nationalism led by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or the Basque Homeland and Liberty Organisation); and in Corsica the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). Not all were violent movements. Welsh nationalism as represented by Plaid Cymru settled for regional government and recognition for the Welsh language while the Scottish National Party (SNP) oscillated between self-​government and independence. Such developments were for the greater part absent from the Warsaw Pact countries for the obvious reason that Soviet repression restricted national self-​determination, as Hungary discovered in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. This was also the case in Spain until the transition to democracy in 1980. However, in Central and Eastern Europe the politics of self-​determination could not be entirely silenced and it remained a latent force, which finally took on a political form with the Solidarity movement in Poland from 1980. Secessionist nationalism in 97

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Western Europe was very much a feature of the 1970s and 1980s and in many cases lost its momentum in the late 1990s due to declining popular support for organisations that were widely perceived to be terrorist as well as due to internal changes in the dynamics of the organisations and more generally as a result of a general shift towards cosmopolitanism. The IRA gave up the armed struggle in 2005, ETA in 2011 and FLNC in 2014. There was no common cause linking the cessation of the armed struggle, other than perhaps the domino effect. It can be also partly attributed to changes in internal organisation of the movements and the absence of popular support for violence. Public antipathy to war, especially since the Iraq war in 2003, did not of course stop the new and the old democracies from becoming illiberal, but it did mark a turn away from acceptance of violence to achieve political aspirations such as independence. The post 1989 context and the collapse of the USSR gave an entirely new meaning to the politics of self-​determination in Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, including the former Yugoslavia, pro-​democracy movements, which were also movements for self-​determination, brought about the greatest change to the political map of Europe since the end of the First World War. Throughout Europe, the course of European integration provided a new context for regional nationalism movements to pursue their projects. This was the age of the ‘new regionalism’. The period also witnessed wider public opposition to war and violence. Looking over these three eras, the idea of self-​determination in Europe was formed in the crucible of failed state formation or incomplete nation-​state formation, while in the rest of the world, in this period, it emerged against the legacy of empire.5 In many parts of Europe, both failed state formation and the collapse of empire was the context, as it also was with legacy of the Habsburg, Romanov, Hohenzollern and Ottoman empires. National minorities rebelled and went their separate ways where state formation failed to create an inclusive polity. While some regional nationalisms did reach an accommodation with the dominant national state, many did not. Many were republican, others were not (Scottish and Welsh), some were secular while others (Irish and Polish) had a strong link with Catholicism, some were peaceful and others violent (Serbian and Croat being examples) and antisemitic or Islamophobic. Not all nationalisms were secessionist (some were irredentist, such as Russia’s claim to the Crimea and Serbia’s claim to Kosovo) and the variety of types frequently morphed into each other. The late 20th century contained a plethora of various nationalist causes that reflected the diversity and complexity of the tumultuous history of Europe over the preceding two centuries. It was inevitable that some of these would not go quietly away in the way that the IRA, FLNC and ETA did. The idea of self-​determination that all these nationalist movements championed rested on the idea of an external source of domination that had to be removed, if 98

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necessary by violence and at any cost. A feature of nationalist movements is that they were only partially democratic and in many cases they were hostile to liberal democracy and to cultural pluralism. Indeed, this tension with cultural pluralism has become all too clear in Central and Eastern Europe where national autonomy did not lead to autonomy for minorities or recognition of cultural difference more generally. The notion of self-​ determination closely ties in with democracy, but it is different in that the idea of self-​determination does not need to be given a popular mandate (for example a super-​majority) since it generally seen to have an absolute and sacred validity. It is often enough that it has appeal to intellectual and political cadres who see themselves as the custodians of the nation. Nationalism emerged at a time when democracy was poorly established and in many cases absent. In liberal democracies, such as the UK, historically the demands for democracy were relatively weak. It therefore did not matter too much for the success of nationalist movements, for example the Irish republican movement, that they commanded only minority popular support. This is what has changed today: in what are now highly democratised societies, self-​ determination does not always easily pass the test of democracy. Democracy, while empowering collective actors, also restricts what they can achieve because the stakes have been increased as regards what counts as democratic self-​determination. Today, unlike in the pre-​1989 period, when nationalist movements emerged in largely pre-​democratic societies, it is less easy for nationalist movements to speak on behalf of a dominated people. Simply put, it is no longer evident who ‘the people’ are. In right-​wing populist politics, according to Mudde (2004, 2010), ‘the people’ are generally defined against the elite or establishment, but they, as Brubaker (2017) argues, are also defined horizontally by reference to outside groups and forces.

The changed circumstances of today The paradox of nationalism today in Europe is that while there is ever more demand and opportunities for nationalism it has become more divisive than ever before. Nationalism now divides the nation more than anything else. For this reason, its capacity to deliver its objective –​whether separatism or an exit from the EU –​is severely limited. As I have argued, the history of secessionist nationalism –​I am most concerned here with Europe –​reveals a history of internal conflicts and splits. Few nationalist movements succeeded in uniting for long the states they created. Civil war was frequently the result of independence. This is not least because nationalist movements are often a coalition of diverse elements that unravel once the aspiration of nationhood has been realised. Diverse groups can find common purpose in a single aim –​often a very vague one –​for very different reasons. However, there can be no denying the fact that nationalism –​whether aspirational or 99

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an accomplished reality –​has been relatively successful in gaining popular support. In many cases its popularity can be attributed to suppression of dissent and the perception that an external tyranny must be resisted in the name of self-​determination. Too often an internal minority has been identified with the external enemy and whose persecution has helped the national identification. My argument is that today there is an entirely new context for nationalism and the appeal to self-​determination is no longer able to achieve the same results. Why is this? There are at least three reasons. The first is that it is less easy today to point to an external source of domination than it was in the past two centuries. This is not because domination has ceased but because of a more complicated situation whereby domination is no longer seen as emanating from a single location and one external to the national community. Both in popular perceptions as well as in academic theory since Foucault, domination is multifarious; it is internal as well as external. For example, while Brexit was driven to a large degree by hostility to migrants and to the EU, the aftermath of the referendum turned attention to the internal enemies (those opposed or perceived to be opposed to Brexit). Internal enemies are easier to identify than external ones and can easily be disposed of, through for example expulsion or shaming. The liberator very quickly becomes a tyrant; the host becomes hostile, as in the stated objective of British government policy in Theresa May’s premiership ‘to create a hostile environment’ for migrants. But more generally, the self is the source of its own domination. It is less easy to combine the notions of the ‘self ’ and ‘determination’ in a straightforward notion of self-​determination since any kind of determination is inescapably bound up with a project of domination because the group that establishes its self-​determination will have to ensure that others accept its definition of the situation. What is emancipation for some is very likely to be domination for others. There are of course ever changing readings of history in any account of domination and emancipation. Second, nationalism, which invariably rests on some notion of nativism, has always had a difficult relationship with cultural pluralism, which is the contrary to nativism. The nation was posited as the source of all authority and the people an undifferentiated entity. The reality of almost every society today is widespread cultural pluralisation. Dominant cultures remain in many cases, but, especially in Western Europe, they have been considerably pluralised by more than four decades of cultural politics. In these circumstances, with the fragmentation of monolithic cultures, it is less easy for nationalist causes to appeal to a common self or a homogenous people. Democratisation has resulted in a situation in which it is more difficult to reach agreement on what the problem is as well as the proposed solution. This is what makes separatist nationalism more or less impossible: its main resource –​the idea 100

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of a single people –​has vanished. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, nationalism in the past did not have to face this problem since the demands of democracy were more limited and many such movements emerged in pre-​democratic (or only partially democratised) societies. In the past, the notion of collective self-​determination was not complicated in the way it is now by personal or individual self-​determination. Since the 1960s, it has been widely recognised, Western societies have been transformed by a new emphasis on the self and on personal fulfilment. This shift was accompanied by a weakening in the older forms of collective identity. Demands for personal self-​determination inevitably undermine collective self-​determination in that they are not easily satisfied within the confines of collective demands due to the context of cultural pluralism and more individuated life styles and values. This is more generally a problem for all politics of collective goals, which are always frustrated by the plurality of individual goals as well as the diversity of group-​based movements. Yet, personal self-​determination drives collective self-​determination in that it fuels the desire for self-​determination while at the same time frustrating its capacity to realise it. The result is that self-​determination loses meaning and can come to mean simply what it is declared to be, as in Brexit politicians proclaiming they are taking ‘back control’ while setting limits to what can be controlled. Taking back control does not mean much to those who see that many of their erstwhile rights have been abrogated. Taking back control can easily be amended to the control of some by others. In the end the elites retain power, as is quite obviously the case in the UK since 2016. Third, as result of societal complexity the reality today is that most societies are inextricably bound up in each other. They cannot be so easily separated in the way secessionist nationalism once believed possible. One hundred years ago it may have been possible for one region of a larger entity to remove itself and establish a new polity. This cannot be so easily achieved today. Globalisation has reached a level of intensity and complexity that all the major economies of the world are entangled in each other. Within the European context, circa seven decades of European integration have led to interlinked economies and polities that are so embedded in each other that it more less impossible to reverse the clock and exit in the way the British Brexiters are trying. The constitutionalisation of regional politics has also helped to make simple calls for separation realistic. Majorities are difficult to secure. However, it is the case this very interdependence is also a cause of increasing calls for self-​determination. The inability to extract oneself from an entangled globalised world is often the source of the very frustration that fuels demands for autonomy. Catalan nationalism is an interesting example of all of these trends. As with many nationalist movements, it is not a single movement but a collation of diverse factions that cut across the right and left divide. Catalan politics is 101

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dominated by the question of independence, with the pro-​independence parties forming the governing coalition. However, it is a fragile and volatile coalition of the centre right and various left wing parties. There is a further cleavage between support from urban and rural areas, with the two major cities in Catalonia, Barcelona and Tarragona, having more anti-​ independence voters (many of whom are Spanish speakers who moved to Catalonia from other parts of Spain in the course of the past four decades). The controversial referendum of 1 October 2017 led to greater division than before on the question of independence. While 90% voted for independence, the turnout was only 43% of the electorate and was held under fraught conditions (since it was in the eyes of the Spanish government illegal). In effect only those in favour of independence voted. While it is impossible to know what the outcome would be in the event of a legal referendum, it is reasonable to conclude on the basis of various polls that the country is split on the issue, with marginally more against independence than in favour. Under such circumstances it is difficult to envisage a situation in which a super-​majority could be secured. Indeed, the governing coalition declared that no matter what the outcome of the referendum, there would be a declaration of independence. The Catalan case illustrates more broadly the problem of political polarisation and the apparent impossibility for consensus. However, while consensus may be difficult if not impossible, such separatist movements can succeed in bringing ‘difference’ to the mainstream politics. The Catalan case is further complicated by the fact that Spain does not recognise the referendum and while the majority of voters in Catalonia appear to favour the union with Spain, a majority are in favour of a legally held referendum to resolve the issue and break what has now become an impasse. In Scotland, on the other hand, the referendum of 2014 was of course a legally constituted one, but like Catalonia led to a similar division. In this case the outcome of 55.3% opposed to independence and 44.7% in favour, while by any accounts decisive, reveals a deep fissure that was subsequently exacerbated by Brexit, which re-​opened the case for a new referendum. The outcome of the 2014 referendum was decisive but not sufficiently so to put an end for ever to the question of independence. It was decisive because it was a vote for the status quo, but if it had been a vote for independence, it would have led to the problems that have beset Brexit. Yet, it is difficult to see how Scottish independence can be a realistic political possibility. As with Catalonia there is the basic question of what independence consists. Scottish nationalism is decidedly unrepublican, in contrast to Catalan nationalism. The Scottish nationalists see Scotland as remaining under the British crown (at least for the time being) and retaining the British national currency (which is not compatible with membership of the EU if an independent state applied). This may be for pragmatic reasons, but to retain the head of state of the country from which you are seceding 102

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is a highly ambiguous kind of self-​determination, and especially so when the head of state is a hereditary monarch. Both Catalonia and Scotland have the same problems with the practical feasibility of independence. The systemic interdependence of Catalonia with Spain and Scotland with the UK makes independence extremely difficult, which is more or less impossible if the country from which the new state is seceding does not recognise the secession. Their major trading links are with the countries from which they want to secede. With some small exceptions, the entire institutional infrastructure of Catalonia –​the major transport arteries (motorways, airports, rail, ports), finances (taxation, customs), national communications (post, TV stations excluding regional ones), security, the main universities –​are all centralised. The process of state-​building is highly complicated, not least given the fact that the entire legal fabric of the society is now mediated by Europeanisation. It is clear that, in these circumstances, self-​determination cannot be achieved simply through a symbolic act of a declaration of independence. Self-​determination may be attractive as a vague goal to be achieved in a distant future, but bringing it about in contentious circumstances is a different matter. Many of these issues are reflected in Corsican nationalism. In December 2017 a pro-​independence coalition government was elected with 56.3% of the vote in an election that had a turnout of 54% of the electorate. The political reality of self-​determination has now been much reduced to securing greater autonomy than outright independence. Corsican nationalism is divided between those seeking independence and those seeking a more pragmatic kind of autonomy. Unlike Catalonia, which is the wealthiest part of Spain, Corsica, with its 330,000 population, is poor and depends heavily on subsidies from Paris. In contrast, Madrid is the net beneficiary from the Catalan economy, a situation that has given Catalan nationalism an economic impetus.6 The politics of self-​determination rests on the belief in an external source of domination. For Brexiters this is the EU. The myth of tyranny from Europe draws some popular support on the capacity of English nationalism to exploit the popular memory of the 1940s when Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany and eventually triumphed (though it was the USA and USSR that defeated Germany). Self-​determination needs to define itself against another that is the source of all ills. The outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016 was an accident in that many of those who campaigned to leave did not believe they would win (some of course did believe they could win). It is often the case that the attraction of independence is a kind of comforting illusion that can be pursued secure in the knowledge that it will not be possible. The UK is now waking up to the realisation that it is about to fall into the abyss, though at the time of writing there is some evidence to suggest parliament is beginning to assert itself. Scotland and Catalonia 103

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have held back from the brink, though the latter is trapped in that it cannot move forward but also cannot go back. In all these examples, the myth of an external source of domination is often difficult to sustain. That does not mean it has no reality. The intransigence of the Spanish government and the fact that the Catalan politicians are imprisoned or have fled to Brussels give some substance to the myth. The memory of the Franco dictatorship is strong, though for those born since the late 1970s the dictatorship is a distance past. Corruption is rife in Spanish politics, but this is also the case in Barcelona. But the concrete political reality is the absence of any consensus on the nature of the problem and therefore there can be no agreement on a solution or the means to achieve it. This is vividly reflected in Brexit, which has led to a situation of entrapment. The outcome was unfavourable and nothing will reverse the extreme polarisation that has taken developed since June 2016. Self-​determination in this instance has led to less control, not more, and the outcome will in all probability lead to an arrangement that will not end up looking very different from the current one except in the loss of economic and political advantage. There are of course significant differences between the different kinds of nationalism discussed here. Catalan and Scottish nationalism are not characterised by xenophobia, which is one of the distinguishing features of the English nationalism that is the driving force of Brexit. Scottish nationalism –​not withstanding increased Anglophobia –​has a strong civic tradition and is not beset with the problems of factionalism in Catalan nationalism. Catalan nationalists, using curious logic, endorse Brexit; yet they see the EU as their saviour. It is not the aim of this chapter to offer a detailed comparison but to highlight the problems that all movements seeking to advance collective self-​determination face. The reality of the political struggle today unlike until the relatively recent past –​perhaps until 1945, which may be taken as a watershed –​is social, economic and political fluidity. It is only in the past couple of decades that this has become less a trend than a reality. As argued earlier, all economies are intermeshed and societies have become post-​national in terms of their sociocultural character. The political field is ‘post-​sovereign’ in that power is no longer entirely located in national governments (this is especially the case with respect to the joint sovereignty over Northern Ireland and the special case of the border with the Republic). In these circumstances the politics of self-​determination easily loses impetus and flounders in a sea of multiple currents. So, then, why the pursuit of self-​determination? Catalan nationalism for a time appeared to be content to redefine itself in the context of Europeanisation. Many national identities found an accommodation within European integration. This has also been the case with the majority of European national states –​Scotland, Ireland, Germany and Italy, for example. Europeanisation offered a larger context to overcome the problems of the 104

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past. While Brexit has placed on the agenda the prospect of the unity of the island of Ireland, the cherished dream of Irish republicanism, it is not being seriously pursued. The Republic of Ireland has entered into what can be called a ‘post-​national’ phase in which national-​self-​determination –​once framed exclusively in terms of opposition to Britain regardless of the economic costs –​is no longer seen as something that can be pursued outside a larger political framework. The commitment to uphold the Good Friday Agreement of 10 April 1998 reveals an acceptance of shared sovereignty as a political fact. However, post-​national politics has not worked for all. It is clear that whatever the merits of Europeanisation, it does not provide a solution for everything and at a time when more and more demands are made in the name of democracy, it does not offer a provide ready-​made solution for problems that do not derive from European integration. The revival of calls for national self-​determination is a response to the search for a pure and absolute politics of self-​determination that is frustrated by the status quo. Neither the national state nor the EU is able to deliver democracy in this pristine form which is presented as a radical alternative to the status quo, which is associated with corruption, liberal elites out of touch, the perception of domination deriving from an outside force. Against the status quo is the authentic voice of ‘the people’. While many of these movements do not satisfy the demands of democracy, they can be more democratic than the nationalist movements of an older era. The Brexit cause, for example, despite all the problems it entails can claim at least have won the popular vote. Yet, none of these calls –​which can be from the left or the right –​can be sustained without a project. The current situation reveals problems in the creation of a project of self-​determination, but also major problems in defining the people. Thus, what emerges is a need for a constitutive moment.

Referendums: the illusion of a constitutive moment I have argued so far that in the past collective self-​determination was predicated on the presumption of a defined people who were resisting external domination and had the means –​which included violence –​to bring about a new polity, called a nation state. The world today has made this difficult, if not impossible. The British government is now discovering that after all Brexit cannot be delivered in a meaningful form. Catalan nationalism is also stuck as is Scottish independence. Corsica has moved forward but only by diminishing independence for pragmatic autonomy. Ireland has given up on national unity, despite the opportunity of Brexit. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the pursuit and allure of self-​ determination does not rescind and nationalists seek to find the constitutive moment that might give substance to their cause. This in part explains 105

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the popularity of referendums. Some reflection on this is needed in order to understand further the problems of the politics of self-​determination. It is simply the case that referendums on major directions of societal change cannot solve the problem they are charged with, namely defining a constitutive moment. Western democracies are primarily representative, or liberal, democracies whereby governments are elected on the basis of majorities. Democracies are rarely organised as plebiscitary, using direct instruments such as referendums whereby the electorate makes decisions. Liberal democracies are representative rather than plebiscitary in so far as they are organised around the election of representatives who are charged with making decisions. Countries that do use referendums generally do so for single-​issue matters and often on regional issues. In the UK there have been eleven referendums, of which seven were on regional devolution issues. There were only two on national issues prior to the 2016 referendum (the 1975 referendum on continued membership of the EC and in 2011 on changing the voting system). These referendums confirmed the status quo, while the 2016 referendum has plunged the country into crisis since the outcome was not what the government expected. It has instead allowed English nationalism –​defined by opposition to Europe –​the chance to redefine the nation in very fundamental ways. However, as we have seen, the referendum failed to secure only a slim majority (3.8%)7 and on the basis of a restricted franchise (which excluded 16 and 17 year olds and British citizens living abroad). The conundrum is that direct democracy has problems in securing super-​ majorities. This is a problem if a majority is secured for a controversial change to the status quo, as opposed to a confirmation, but falls long short of a super-​majority. If the Scottish referendum had produced a majority in favour of independence, the balance of probabilities is that it would be an equally slim majority, thus creating all the problems of Brexit, namely the legitimacy of major societal and constitutional change that does not command large support. The Catalan case is also a clear example of how difficult it is to secure a super-​majority. In the event of a referendum in Northern Ireland on joining the Republic we can expect a similar outcome. A qualification is in place: the post-​1989 context of the break-​up of the Soviet bloc and the later enlargement of the EU did have referendums with large turn-​ outs that produced clear majorities (for example, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia had referendums on independence in 1991 and Hungary, Poland and Slovakia held referendums in 2003 to join the EU). A different example, but illustrating a similar situation, was the referendum on independence in September 2017 in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 93% voted in favour. However, in these cases the transition to democracy had only recently taken place and the problems that beset these western European examples were largely absent. Moreover, as mentioned, in such cases there was a low 106

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degree of cultural pluralisation, making consensus on major national issues less controversial. In all cases, an external source of domination was more easily visible. The consequence of the difficulty in securing a compelling majority is that the post-​referendum situation leads to not only increased polarisation but to new calls for referendums. Thus, in the UK, calls for a second referendum are growing. This is an inevitable aspect of democracy, namely deliberation and reconsideration of choices and options as time progresses. However, such calls conflict with the rationale for referendums in the first place: to find a constitutive moment, a final decision that cannot be revoked. This aspiration distorts referendums into instruments of potential tyranny, as in a contract that cannot be reversed no matter what the consequences. Democracy is in the end poorly served and the result is pronounced trends towards illiberalism. The external enemy becomes an internal one as the society bifurcates around a new division that is driven by an augmented sense of oppression and betrayal. The problem is that referendums can easily produce –​where they concern complex opened questions such as independence –​a post-​factum interpretation of the result, as in the case of ‘leaving the EU’ or ‘independence, since the question posed does not necessarily contain an answer’.8 Moreover, such referendums can lead to the tyranny of the majority over the minorities and it is frequently the case that the majority is a false majority by dint of the franchise and turn out. This can happen in any electoral system, but the dangers are greater in the case of referendums since the outcomes are not easily reversed and can entail permanent changes to the foundations of a society. Governments elected on a narrow margin, in contrast, are constrained by coalition arrangements and by various constitutional requirements. The problem with referendums as exercises in direct or popular democracy is that in seeking to establish certainty, they in fact tend to lead to uncertainty and nurture anxiety, which thrives on uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty as to who is the subject (the nation as a whole or the region that seeks secession; who is entitled to vote in the referendum). Second, what is the goal to be achieved (such as how to define independence). Third, how is the decision to be made (is the referendum a legally binding one or consultative; is there to be a super-​majority, quorum; is voting mandatory, as it is in some countries). Four, how should the outcome be implemented (and whether it can be reversed through another referendum). All these issues are complicated furthermore when the state does not recognise the referendum, which, as in Catalonia, is consequently held illegally. In this case, the attempt to gain legitimacy is frustrated by the absence of legality. In such instances, those opposed to the cause of independence do not accept the rules by which the referendum was held and those who seek independence do not accept the legal framework of the state. The result is 107

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that unlike with regular elections there is no common normative order by which differences can be reconciled. The Brexit referendum is not exempt from these complications in that it was supposed to have been consultative –​and thus did not specify a qualifying majority –​but after the event was declared to decisive. A ruling of the Supreme Court in January 2017 decreed that the referendum outcome was not a decision and that parliament had to make the decision on implementation. In sum, referendums on major open-​ended questions such as independence can result in increasing uncertainty and thus contribute to the very forces that give rise to the need for the referendum in the first place. The quest for a constitutive moment in which the political community reinvents itself in a new form can easily become an act of destruction. It is worth remembering that there are very few examples of new nations being founded through peaceful means. Almost every new nation was born of violence, be it through the breakdown of the state (due to war or revolution), civil war or violent struggle. Some exceptions can be found, but they are few. Slovenian secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991 was fairly peaceful (if one ignores the wider decent in to violence that followed the break-​ up of the state); the creation of Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 1993 was also peaceful (though this was internal separation of the two parts of Czechoslovakia rather than a secession); the independence of Norway from Denmark in 1905 and the independence of Iceland from Denmark in 1918 were among the few historical examples of peaceful secessions. Today the spectre of a military repression is now ever present in the event of Catalan independence and a reminder of the violent origins of the modern Spanish national state. It should not be forgotten that the nation state is a territorial entity and the primary function of the state is the protection of its territory. States do not easily relinquish their territory. The Spanish constitution, while accommodating self-​government, explicitly states what is in many cases implicit, the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’.

Conclusion: Europeanisation and the resurgence of nationalism In light of the foregoing, is Europeanisation under threat from what appears to be the resurgence of varieties of secessionist nationalism, some atavistic? There can be no doubt that there is a European-​wide assertion of nationalism and that the radical right is now emboldened as a result of the election of Donald Trump in the USA and as a result of trends towards authoritarian democracy in Russia and Turkey. Within the countries of the EU, extreme right-​wing parties have enjoyed much success in recent years and right-​ wing populist parties have become governing parties, as reflected in the 108

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governments of Poland and Hungary. France, the country that invented left and right, has seen the political landscape redrawn since the presidential election in 2017, which saw a contest between Marine Le Pen and the centrist Macron. Prosperous Western countries such as Austria have seen the rise of the extreme right. This is not the place to review these trends (see Caiani et al, 2012). My overall conclusion is that the rise of nationalism is de-​stabilising for Europeanisation but does not endanger it or pose major dangers for liberal democracy. It does, however, suggest limits to the prospect of a European sense of peoplehood. If such a consciousness exists, it is more likely to be generational and related to the identities of young university educated people (Fligstein, 2008). If this is the case, the clash is within nations rather than between nations and Europe (Delanty, 2018, 2019). The first point is that all these assertions of national autonomy or identity are multifarious. There is no one big challenge and nor do they present an alternative. Brexit may quite well be a warning to others of the dangers that such exercises bring. Diminished politically and with long-​term economic downhill ahead, the future does not look positive for the UK. However, at the time of writing (May 2018) it is by no means self-​evident that the UK will leave the EU, as the final deal must be approved by parliament. Not all nationalist movements are led by the extreme right. The UK government is in thrall to a group of right-​wing politicians, but this is not true of all those in favour of Brexit, which in part is due to appealing to a diversity of right and left positions. Some two thirds of Labour Party voters voted Remain.9 Catalan separatism is a tenuous collation of right and left factions. Scottish nationalism is largely civic rather than ethnic and thus less divisive than linguistically based nationalisms. Flemish nationalism is based on a coalition of right-​wing parties. There is no pan European alliance of right-​wing nationalism. Catalan separatists are pro-​EU and seek EU approval for their goals. There is also the paradox that it is the EU through the European Parliament that creates some of the conditions that make Euro-​scepticism possible by giving it a platform to articulate its goals. Second, as argued, the politics of national self-​determination has great difficulty in achieving its goals. Many movements for self-​determination seek only greater autonomy, as in movements in Lombardy and Veneto. They do not have the capacity to bring about independence or pose major risks to the national state, still less to the EU. Third, one of my main arguments is the nationalist resurgence is more of a problem for the nation states in which it arises than for the EU. Many countries are experiencing extreme polarisation, a trend that is most evident in the UK since the referendum in June 2016 (see Delanty, 2017). Brexit is widely seen as increasing the problems that led to people to voting leave and this will increase polarisation. Catalan separatism poses a challenge to the unity of Spain, not to the unity of the EU, but as argued there is little to suggest that there will be a future Catalan national state. A more likely scenario is the end of Belgium if the Flemish nationalism gains 109

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further momentum. However, for the moment the constitutionalisation of Belgian politics has defused it of its capacity to bring about the interdependence of a Flemish nation from the French speaking Wallonia. Four, a more likely outcome than countries leaving the EU is re-​ positioning, for example becoming EEA members. This may quite well be the outcome of Brexit. It is evident, nonetheless, that European integration will not continue in a single direction. There will be rather different speeds and possibly different directions of travel. This will include a degree of de-​ Europeanisation, but this does not necessarily imply an end game or the return to an anterior point. As the experience of Brexit shows, the clock cannot be so easily put back and four decades of Europeanisation reversed by a Great Repeal Bill. In any case, the course of the post-​Second World War project of European integration was never one of a steady march to unity that is now experiencing discord. Yet, it is clear that current developments call into question the idea of a European people. European integration is not leading to the creation of a common European people. National identities are still strong and show no sign of vanishing. However, national identities are increasingly also unable to provide models or values that integrate increasingly diverse and fractured societies. As the examples of the UK and Catalonia show, in the wake of controversial and divisive referendums, the sense of a common people has lost its capacity to unite people. It is therefore hardly surprising that on the wider European level there is an absence of a strong sense of a European people. For those in search of a European people there is perhaps some comfort in the knowledge that there are clear trends towards a significant degree of European identification in the youth of Europe, in particular those with university education. The future may quite well lead to very different constructions of who are ‘the people’.10 Notes 1

2 3 4

5 6 7

8 9

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Filz (2015) has noted the tendency for populism in Europe to be predominately right-​ wing and exclusive in contrast to Latin America. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012), Mudde (2010), Müller (2016). See Brancati (2014) and Zakaria (1997). Moreover, there are a variety of different democratic traditions, not all of which are modelled on liberal democracy. See Blokker (2012). See O’Mahony and Delanty (1998) for an application to Ireland. This economic nationalism is also reflected in Flemish separatism. The 3.8% lead that Leave had over Remain was 1,269,501 votes. That means the swing vote was only 634,751. See Claus Offe’s incisive analysis (2017). The logistics were such that one third of Labour-​held constituencies voted Remain, thus trapping the pro-​EU Labour Party into a zero sum game. See for an exploration of radical concepts of ‘the people’ Badiou et al (2016).

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Acknowledgements I am grateful to William Outhwaite, Peter Wagner, Frederic Vandenberghe and the editors for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. References Badiou, A., Bourdieu, P., Butler, J., Didi-​Huberman, G., Khiari, S. and Rancière, J. (2016) What is a people? Translated by J. Gladding, New York: Columbia University Press. Blokker, P. (2012) Multiple democracies in Europe, London: Routledge. Brancati, D. (2014) ‘Democratic authoritarianism: origins and effects’, Annual Review of Political Science, 17(3): 313–​326. Brubaker, R. (2017) ‘Why Populism?’ Theory and Society, 46: 357–​385. Caiani, M. Della Porta, D. and Wagemann, C. (2012) Mobilizing for the extreme right, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Delanty, G. (2017) ‘A divided nation in a divided Europe: emerging cleavages and the crisis of European integration’ in W. Outhwaite (ed.), Brexit: sociological responses, London: Anthem Press. Delanty, G. (2018) The European heritage: a critical reinterpretation, London: Routledge. Delanty, G. (2019) Formations of European modernity: a historical and political sociology of Europe, 2nd edition, London: Palgrave. Filz, D. (2015) ‘Latin American inclusive and European exclusive populism: colonialism as an explanation’, Journal of Political Ideology, 20(3): 263–​283. Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash: the EU, European identity, and the future of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hilpold, P. (2017) ‘Self-​determination and autonomy: between secession and internal self-​determination’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 24: 302–​335. Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The populist zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4): 542–​563. Mudde, C. (2010) ‘The populist radical right: a pathological normalcy?’ West European Politics, 33(6). Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. (eds) (2012) Populism in Europe and the Americas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Müller, J.-​W. (2016) What is populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania University Press. O’Mahony, P. and Delanty, G. (1998) Rethinking Irish history: nationalism, identity and ideology, London: Macmillan. Offe, C. (2017) ‘Referendum vs. institutionalized deliberation: what democratic theorists can learn from the 2016 Brexit decision’, Daedalus, 146(3): 14–​27. Zakaria, F. (1997) ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76(6): 22–​43. 111

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Response to Gerard Delanty Roger Casale Gerard Delanty’s central thesis is that Europeans should not worry about the resurgence of nationalism. He distinguishes a new kind of nationalism exemplified by recent developments in Scotland and Catalonia and suggests these phenomena pose more of a threat to national polities than they do to the institutions of the EU. The rise of individualism, he argues, has undermined the appeal of collective identities including a collective European identity. He points to a new form of identification with a more cosmopolitan vision of Europe among young Europeans. In my response, I would like to set out three stages in the development of modern Europe to contrast with the three phases of development of nationalism that Gerard Delanty has described. I call Europe1 the Europe of post-​war reconstruction, the Europe of nations. The Europe of 1945 was a savage continent. Those who survived could not return to homes which had been destroyed by the occupation and by the war. If nations are defined by territory as Delanty asserts, then in many cases these nations had ceased to exist. Those who had no homeland to return to set out instead in search of a new country, a country called Europe. Europe was reborn in the European Coal and Steel Community, through the pooling of sovereignty, the removal of borders, the sharing of strategic industries –​the bedrock of peaceful coexistence in Europe. This Europe, Europe1, is not in question, despite the rise of nationalism. Marine Le Pen might take France out of the euro, but she will never take France out of the EU. Europe1 is of existential importance to all French people. Le Pen and her supporters know this very well. Ironically, the EU has just provided a platform for nationalists as Delanty points out. The EU can itself be seen as an expression of a new kind of nationalism –​one that

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recognises that the greatest national interest any member state can have is the preservation of peace. Europe2 emerges with the development of the single market. Not only would goods and services be traded freely but the factors of production, labour and capital now became mobile, too. The fall of the Berlin Wall was widely seen at the time as the ‘end of history’, the ideological defeat of communism. With hindsight, it can also be seen as the moment that accelerated neoliberal models of development based on market reforms at the expense of a more concerted approach to the pursuit of social justice. The EU has become the bastion of peace in Europe, and was rightly rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize. It has also come under attack as an instrument of globalisation, a threat to the European social model and way of life (despite the limited measures the EU has taken to promote social and regional cohesion). The perception that the EU is on the wrong side of the debate about globalisation is driving the resurgence of populism in Europe, a populism that wears a nationalist mask but which is in fact xenophobic, authoritarian and anti-​democratic. We see this on an alarming scale in Poland, Hungary, Austria, Sweden and Italy, for example, and to a lesser degree in Germany, France and the UK. Brexiters come in many shapes and forms but few of them can really be described as nationalists. They have no vision of the national interest. Brexit was driven by a populist backlash against meritocratic elites in favour of a hierarchical and profoundly undemocratic narrative about society. Their leaders’ sole aim is to put themselves ‘on top and in control’. For what purpose? To further exploit the very people who brought them to power. Fear and xenophobia are their weapons of choice. No wonder they hate the ‘experts’. We should not put Catalonian or Scottish ‘nationalism’ in the same category. We should speak instead of new forms of city or regionally based cosmopolitanism –​the attempt to find a more inclusive form of self-​ determination embedded in a European cultural identity. It is because of the heterogeneity of these movements, which Delanty rightly refers to, that such new forms of democracy are needed. A new, more cosmopolitan identity is also needed if the European Union is to withstand the strains it is under and maintain unity. The real tension in Europe today is not between nationalism and internationalism. It is between an increasingly authoritarian, exclusive form of populism and a more open, progressive, liberal form of popular democracy. This new Europe, or Europe3, a ‘Europe of Citizens’, is more closely within our grasp than some may realise. It requires a re-​awakening of the spirit of civic participation and local empowerment in Europe –​and there are signs this is happening in cities such as Naples and Barcelona for example, 113

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which draw on strong local identities that celebrate diversity. It also requires an equally strong framework of rights guaranteed at the European level. A re-​articulation of power between the regional, national and European levels is needed. Civil society organisations like New Europeans will have a key role to play. As identity politics and economic inequality increasingly fragment national politics, so civil society needs to take seriously its responsibility to be the crucible in which social consensus can be recast at a local level. That can only work within a framework of rights which should exactly be the point of the EU (Europe3). Nationalists attack the EU but in doing so they forget that they are disempowering local and regional institutions that depend not just on national legislative frameworks but also on a Europe that is committed to equality and human rights. It is time for Europe to embrace its own potential for transformational change in the face of global challenges. We should be wary of complacent, inward-​looking attempts to defend the status quo which are simply aimed at containing the rise of populists and extremists. It is time to trust the citizens of Europe not to fear them. It is time for a Europe of Citizens. Acknowledgements The classifications ‘Europe1, Europe2 and Europe3’ were set out in my TEDx Oxford “Is there such a thing as European identity?”, 4 March 2018.

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Victimhood as Victory: The Role of Memory Politics in the Process of De-​Europeanisation in East-​Central Europe Peter Vermeersch

Introduction Public debates on European integration may once have been the expression of a ‘permissive consensus’, but in recent elections and referendums the EU has become increasingly politicised (de Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Scholars now talk about a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), growing polarisation, and the emergence of opposing advocacy coalitions (De Wilde, 2011). This is true in long-​time EU countries as well as in the more recent member states in East-​Central Europe. What is striking about the more recent public debates in the latter region is the overwhelming presence of historical arguments, especially voiced by those who oppose (further) EU integration. In this region, longstanding themes of national history seem to have become an inexorable attribute of opposition talk against the EU (Ágh, 2016), a tendency that has become reinforced lately by more authoritarian styles of government (Tillman, 2013), government-​sponsored commemoration practices that celebrate events of national history pitting the nation against Europe (Milošević, 2017; Rupnik, 2007), and a surge of populist rhetoric surrounding those events. Obviously, revisionist history as a political strategy is not exclusive to East-​Central Europe. It is also found, to a degree, among Western Eurosceptics –​as has been the case in the rhetoric of the Brexit campaign, for example, which also pitted the nation against the EU. But the way in which such arguments have been used and resonate

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in East-​Central Europe tells us something about the specific functioning of anti-​EU rhetoric in this cultural realm of the EU. It is important to examine these specific renderings of Eurosceptic politics because its effects go beyond the realm of East-​Central European domestic politics; in fact, they reach into the arena of international relations in the EU. In October 2017, for example, Poland’s Minister of Culture Piotr Gliński, of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, accused the House of European History (HEH) –​the EU-​funded museum in Brussels that invites visitors to reflect on the history of Europe1 –​of not being fair to the national history of Poland. In a letter to the head of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, Gliņski complained that the museum did not devote sufficient attention to famous Poles and showed the country as complicit in the Holocaust (Rankin, 2018). This accusation came in the wake of other criticisms of the HEH by Polish politicians who –​like some critics of historical museums in Poland2 –​appeared less interested in ideas about the study of history, creative curatorship and the museum as a source of learning than in defending the national flag. In this essay, I want to examine this heightened political interest in the connection between national history, memory and EU membership. I focus primarily on governments in East-​Central Europe, and my prime case for empirical exploration will be Poland. I argue that certain (nationalist) politicians (from self-​declared mainstream parties) have deliberately brought talk about the EU onto the field of memory politics so as to make the normative overtones of debates about European integration more prominent. By doing so, they have attempted to flip the script of Europeanisation –​with ‘Europeanisation’ here understood not simply as the transfer of policies from the EU to the level of the member state but as the process (and ambition) of norm diffusion within the EU. Spreading ‘European norms’, which encompasses both political and cultural ‘encounters’ (Flockhart, 2010), has been a key strategy used by the EU to persuade candidate countries to adopt certain EU policies and practices (a strategy that has been explained and framed both in candidate member states and in the EU as a ‘return to Europe’). Now a political counter-​movement seems to have gained strength which highlights normative arguments too, but in this case as a means to oppose European integration without having to direct attention to the content (or usefulness, or desirability) of EU policies and practices. In other words, if Europeanisation in the context of EU enlargement led to a transfer of both policies and norms to the acceding EU member states, politicians in the latter countries, which in the meantime have become full-​fledged EU member states, now seem to engage in deliberate de-​Europeanisation; they actively oppose EU integration by relying on their own re-​telling of history and by using a normative background to accomplish this re-​telling. 116

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I argue that there is indeed something new to observe here: even though Euroscepticism and opposition against the EU integration is as old as the EU integration process itself, the grand underlying story of both economic and ethical progress was also always more or less the same. Opposing the EU did not mean questioning the story of the need for reconciliation and common prosperity. But now opposition against the EU has become an attempt to tell a competing story of what Europe is and should be –​a story that de-​emphasises the need for reconciliation and instead highlights the need to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. This is done in particular by connecting political debates about EU policies and practices to perennial sensitivities in discussions about national memory. As I will show, several internal and external factors are at play in the rise of such instrumentalisation of national memory politics. This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I begin with outlining a key development in East-​Central European political discourse around EU membership. I will highlight the effects of the conditionality politics on that discourse in the period before EU accession. I will then address some of the fundamental ways in which national political discourses on the EU (and the political mobilisations they have engendered) have changed since the EU’s eastward enlargement. In the second section I show how the theme of victimhood has come to occupy a prominent position in East-​Central European national political discourse about the EU, and how the reliance on that (traditional) trope is directly related to the emergence of a politics of ‘de-​Europeanisation’. In the third section I explore some of the main factors that have contributed to this particular form of de-​Europeanisation. These factors are to some extent related to the ways in which national politics has developed and evolved in the domestic political arenas of East-​Central Europe –​including the emergence of problems of democratic fatigue, democratic decline and the ‘enchantment of populism’ (Brubaker, 2017), which are not unique to this region. I also briefly go into other factors, including some factors related to historical repertoires of political mobilisation and issues related to the functioning of EU politics, structures and policies. I conclude with a few short remarks on the obstacles the EU is facing in trying to deal with the challenges of de-​Europeanisation in East-​Central Europe.

From using to abusing ‘Europe’ Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, many citizens and politicians in East-​Central Europe regarded EU membership as a unique opportunity for achieving economic advancement (Baldwin et al, 1997). But EU enlargement was, of course, more than that. In the candidate member states as well as within the EU, ideas on the spread of economic liberalism, active civil society 117

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and market prosperity were couched in a grander narrative of promoting democracy and freedom, European values and, ultimately, European unification. The EU not only proffered an institutional arrangement that supplemented, and potentially replaced, that of the independent national state, the discourses of EU accession also highlighted, and celebrated, the inherent international and globalised arrangements that came with the newly achieved market-​oriented and democratic institutions. Moreover, they actively brought into memory the broader sociocultural and historical background against which this EU turn could be read: Europe’s remarkable resilience at the end of a turbulent century and its ability to create internal reconciliation after violent conflict and cold war –​a narrative that politicians have sometimes presented in the form of an apology for the European failures and divisions of the past (Forchtner and Kølvraa, 2012). In short, EU enlargement was not only a political and economic plan, it was also framed and experienced as a moral imperative –​a return to peace and freedom that could simply be called a ‘return to Europe’. This tight coupling of specific political ambition and grand moral narrative resonated well in both existing and acceding member states. For existing member states it functioned as a powerful leverage to impact on national policies and structures in the candidate countries. Through accession conditionality, partnerships and negotiations, the EU gained a unique level of direct and indirect ‘transformative power’ (Grabbe, 2006), which it could apply to different policy areas to various degrees (ranging from specific demands on, for example, privatisation to broad requirements on, for example, respect for minorities and human rights). In the acceding countries the normative discourse was welcomed because it could be used to force the EU to deliver on its promises. As Schimmelfennig (2001: 68) has argued, East-​Central European countries invoked the larger (normative) ‘return to Europe’ narrative ‘to demonstrate that these values and norms obliged the EU to admit them and that failure to do so would be an act of disloyalty to the ideational foundations of the European international community.’ Of course, there existed some nationalist opposition against EU membership in the candidate countries –​the antagonistic narrative between the nation and ‘Europe’ obviously precedes the current crisis –​but important to note is that many nationalists at the time supported EU membership. In the early 2000s, certain nationalist movements in East-​Central Europe even brought the larger programmatic goals of European unification in line with their own political agendas. In the run-​up to the accession, the EU provided nationalist politicians in East-​Central Europe ‘not only the institutional context but also, in some ways, the discursive resources and even incentives for the reconfiguration of political space in national terms’ (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010: 329). This ‘nationalising’ of political space through Europeanisation happened most strikingly in Hungary, where Fidesz, the 118

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self-​proclaimed political voice of the Hungarian nation, began to campaign in favour of EU accession on the basis of the idea that such unification would provide the Hungarian nation across state borders a new (European) home. Similar narratives about symbolically uniting the nation through EU accession were also used in Poland. In the latter case, arguments in favour of EU membership were made as historical justifications for the redistribution of European funding to East-​Central Europe or the call for increased protection against threats from the East. Polish politicians saw independence mostly as independence from Russia, and EU membership could therefore be cast as a guarantee for that independence. In other words, EU membership was framed as an argument for more national security. Such arguments served a rhetoric that aligned well with the ambitions of the EU about political unity and economic collaboration. But it did not stop there. If this phase could be described as (nationalist) politicians ‘using Europe’, then what has followed is a time of politicians ‘abusing Europe’. Domestic debates about the EU have been actively connected to obsessions of national history that are more antithetical to the foundational principles of the EU. Of course, the political debate in East-​Central Europe had already seen the presence of both strategic and ideological arguments for opposing the EU, especially among radical parties (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002), but the impact on mainstream politics only grew considerably at the time of accession. Once membership was secured, the nationalists who previously (symbolically) supported some level of unification across state borders (a ‘Europe of the nations’) now diagnosed the EU itself as a main threat to the nation. In Poland, this shift was already visible at around the time of the accession and the first ascent of PiS.3 For example, one telling detail was the focus on the issue of land ownership. Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-​Betkiewicz (2004: 1052) point out that, although the topic was of secondary importance to the reality of EU accession, some Polish parties nevertheless kept mentioning it in their campaigns in the run-​up to the accession referendum. EU accession was, in this way, turned into a symbolic debate about who owns (or should own) ‘our’ land. Later on, various politicians argued that accession would provide an opportunity for Germans to buy land from the territories in the West of the country that had been ‘regained’ from Germany after the Second World War. It is remarkable how much the use of historical arguments in EU criticism and anti-​EU mobilisations gained traction in East-​Central Europe.4 In Hungary this happened after Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in 2010 managed to gain an unprecedented position in power –​what followed in the two years after those elections has been called an ‘illiberal turn’ (Orbán has on several occasions voiced his ambition to turn Hungary into an ‘illiberal democracy’) and a form of ‘constitutional capture’, which was accompanied by a political 119

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rhetoric that focuses on values, culture, and the rhetoric of ‘finishing the transition suspended in 1989’ (Pap, 2018: 38). Orbán re-​used the 1848 slogan ‘We will not be a colony!’ as a grandiose, somewhat elusive and highly malleable claim for more sovereignty, which could easily be applied to create resistance to a wide variety of EU policies. In Poland, a comparable power shift and reinforcement of the historical argument happened in 2015. Since then, history-​based criticism of the EU has arguably been even more common there than in Hungary; it even seems to have become the most prominent form of euro-​scepticism. This stance is reinforced through certain commemoration practices. Consider, for example, the ceremonies that were organised in August 2017 in Warsaw to commemorate the Battle of Warsaw (the decisive, unexpected and therefore often called ‘miraculous’ Polish victory during the 1920 Soviet-​Polish war). While this was ostensibly a military parade for the purpose of honouring the soldiers who had died during those fights, the political speeches delivered on the occasion framed the Polish losses as a sacrifice with implications for current European politics. In his speech, PiS Minister of the Interior Antoni Macierewicz proclaimed the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’ the single battle that saved European Christianity. ‘From this sacrifice grew a great victory,’ he said, ‘something that will not vanish from world history.’ He added that today ‘the Poles are once again standing on the eastern flank to defend Europe. This is not a return of history, it is a continuation of history.’5 Macierewicz relied on this historical continuity –​the violent deaths of the past that supposedly still can be called ‘our own’ –​to reinforce his political ideas on the need to build stronger and more outspoken ‘Christian national states’ in East-​Central Europe. Such nation-​building projects were needed to oppose what he called the three great threats to Europe: Russia, the bureaucracy of Brussels and terrorism by immigrants. Military commemorations and public holidays related to historical events are of course notoriously multi-​interpretable and open to various forms of meaning-​making. In fact, a story could be told about Polish commemorations that contrasts strongly with the political framings proffered by current politicians. I attended the 2017 ceremony for the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, and I was struck mostly by the fact that it was rather poorly attended and therefore not a success at all. And the military parade the day after, which did attract large crowds, looked to me mostly as a fun holiday outing for families with children who waved Polish and EU flags with equal enthusiasm. But through the channels of the state media and framed by political rhetoric, both events seemed massively attended ritualised performances of a form of Polishness that was irreconcilable with the project of European integration. It is important to add here that the deep links that Polish nationalist politicians and media have drawn between Polish nationalism, memory 120

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politics and criticism of EU integration are not necessarily self-​evident. In the 1990s, there were enough cases of pro-​EU nationalism. And even in more recent times, pro-​EU politics have occurred in nationalist electoral campaigns. In the pro-​EU framing of the Civic Platform (PO, Poland’s main liberal party), for example, EU membership has fairly consistently been portrayed as beneficial for the material wellbeing of the nation at home and the compatriots working abroad, as well as for the international standing of the country. But in a political context in which EU membership is accomplished and the traditional proponents of EU collaboration have been ousted from power, PiS has hardened its criticism of the EU, even in the face of domestic social unrest and harsh criticism from the European Commission. The gains in this domain have been consolidated (the country enjoys the benefits of a borderless Europe, can send workers abroad and finance national projects with EU funding), and nationalist governments can therefore more easily bite the hand that fed the country. They rely on campaigns that pit the nation against Brussels as one of its main enemies and one of its main external (and existential) threats. In this new narrative, the EU is an ally of external others of the nation as well as of the institutional elites (not the ‘people’) accused of working in the interest of more powerful EU states. Memory politics has come to serve not only the nationalism that is concerned with establishing the (symbolic) borders of the nation (as was the case with the nationalising of political space in the pre-​accession period, and the ‘excommunicating’ of certain (minority) populations from the nation) (Brubaker, 2017); now it also serves to cement (electoral) support against (European) elites.6 Such a tendency can be called de-​Europeanisation because it seeks to provide a direct response not so much to the specific policy ambitions of EU integration but to the normative discourses of Europeanisation, the narration of the ‘new’ Europe (Forchtner and Kølvraa, 2012) as an enlightened answer to the dark disorder of the violent past. In the view of those who criticise the EU, it is exactly this newer Europe that has created injustices for national states. In other words, de-​Europeanisation invokes moral issues and historical reasons to oppose EU integration. The moral and historical reasons are framed in such a way that they override specific policy concerns. At the same time, the objective is not a total dismantling of the EU –​far from it. De-​Europeanisation seems to rely on the (imaginary) view that it might be possible to roll back the EU’s powers –​and therefore reassert the primacy of the national governments and allow no limits on national sovereignty –​without losing the current (financial and political) benefits of EU membership. Such a view has been rightly diagnosed as contradictory, naïve and incoherent (Grabbe and Lehne, 2018), but without a successful political force that is able to come up with an alternative pro-​EU narrative that is broadly appealing, it will likely still function as an effective tool for electoral mobilisation against the EU. 121

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When victimhood politics becomes the politics of de-​Europeanisation What is particularly striking about the historical arguments that are now being used to voice criticism of the EU is how much they are built on the notion of victimhood. East-​Central European criticism of the EU, for example, is often expressed in the context of commemorations of wars, and even when those wars have resulted in a victory of the national state, it is the losses of the nation that receive much more attention. This happens in Poland as well as in other places in the wider region. Hungarian nationalists of all kinds perpetuate the cult of Trianon (the treaty ending the First World War that ‘dismembered’ Hungary), licking past wounds to justify future territorial claims. Schäuble (2014) has investigated the mythologies and images of victimisation that pervade contemporary Croatia. Živković (2011) has studied the resemblance between accounts of victimhood across the former Yugoslavia. In other countries, too, the politics of victimhood often coincides with nationalist resurgence and a demand for dealing with a past conflict (Baumann, 2013).7 In the case of Poland, the ‘we’ of nationalist memory politics has of lately often become a subject of moral character. Nationalism is not simply or only anymore about looking back, selecting glorious events, inventing a stable subject position, rewriting those events, forgetting the complexity of history and painting some sort of long-​gone idealised past. Indeed, the most remarkable fact about the current fault lines of belonging is that they are not solely a matter of historical simplification, and not even solely a question of reinforcing the alleged root components of national identity,8 but that they are drawn in terms of justice and responsibility. It is still an ‘imagined community’ but then imagined mostly as ‘victimised’ and therefore by definition ‘innocent’. The idea behind such victimhood nationalism is not only to forget to see the protagonists of history as complex beings; it actively portrays its protagonists as moral units, entirely good or bad. Therefore, the moral terms used in such simplified accounts, not only the concept of ‘victim’ but also that of ‘victimiser’, come to occupy a central position, even if not always literally mentioned. It is striking how, in current nationalist projects of forgetting in East-​Central Europe, victimhood is the prime concept that connects past to present, identity to strategic politics, and innocence to guilt. The nationalist ‘we’ is portrayed as a ‘we’ under threat by an identifiable external subject. In other words, the nation is framed as a minority (so always living in the shadow of some sort of majority). If the structure of victimhood politics is comparable to that of minority politics, the unspoken message is: Even if you seem to be a numerical majority in power now, remember that you once were a minority under threat and therefore you may still be a minority under threat, 122

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even if you are a majority today.9 Such nationalism, in other words, mobilises populations by making them minorities. Elections seem a key factor in the creation of feelings of such false minority identity –​precisely because the language of elections is the language of minorities against majorities. It is perhaps not surprising that the increasing popularity of such polarising moral politics happens at a time when there is an increasing push for authoritarianism. In other words, creating minorities serves as a way towards the creation of regimes that tend to absolutise electoral victory and seek to delegitimise all political opposition against the victors of these elections.10 Those in power call for extraordinary measures to protect the allegedly endangered national majority against the allegedly dangerous out-​g roups such as refugees or marginalised populations, which are presented in this story not as a population at risk needing protection but as a risky population posing a threat (Vermeersch and van Baar, 2017). In this way, memory work in nationalist movements subverts the original moral story of Europeanisation (of European integration as born out of reconciliation, stimulating diversity and providing protection for minorities) and uses it as the basis for a politics of backlash against the EU. Recent cases of national commemoration and remembrance practices have enabled not only the glorification of the national past but also the suppression of ‘heretical’ interpretations of specific traumatic historical episodes. As a result, the fault lines of national belonging are now used to eclipse stories of post-​war state reconciliation in Europe and focus directly on the allegedly victimised population. Such moral classification work easily permeates debates about a range of Europe-​wide topics: refugees, minority protection, same-​sex marriage, abortion, constitutional reform, economic policy, global geopolitics, and so on. In other words, nationalism in this context receives moral connotations and, vice versa, questions of morality brought to the fore through EU integration are seen now as questions of nationhood. The ‘we’ of this distinguishing work embodies a subject of immaculate historical innocence and victimhood; by extension, the ‘others’ always bear all the responsibility and guilt. This nationalist moral classification work changes and reframes the moral underpinnings of the EU enlargement.11 In the Polish case, contemporary victimhood politics includes such topics as the potential victimisation of Poles through ethnic heterogeneity and multiculturalism; the threat posed by Marxist multiculturalism and the EU for Catholic and Polish-​speaking identity, and the potential loss of sovereignty. Past episodes of victimhood have been invoked to provoke feelings of anxiety. In earlier versions of this discourse, Polish nationalist campaigning regularly pointed to Russia as a traditional threat. Electoral programmes suggested a Manichaean conception of the Polish political reality, which insinuated that some politicians had actively collaborated with Russia. In 2005, the 123

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PiS electoral programme read: ‘The Poles have the right to know who served Moscow, and who fought for an independent Fatherland. Who was an executioner, and who was a victim’ (PiS, Program, 2005: 18). Such statements add to a more general attempt to keep the old division of the communist ‘them’ versus the anti-​communist ‘us’ alive. Insinuations have been embedded in the larger idea of Poland as a suffering nation at the mercy of guilty foreign states. In 2015, for example, Waszczykowski (PiS), the then minister of foreign affairs, said in an interview with Bild that the former PO-​led (pro-​EU) government was ‘Marxist’ because it promoted vegetarianism, equal rights and sustainable energy politics. ‘This has nothing to do with traditional Polish values,’ he said, ‘which are awareness of history, patriotism, faith in God, and a normal family life between husband and wife’ (Rupnik, 2017, discusses the case (Vehlewald, 2016)). European integration in this framing is associated with abnormality and with loss of religion, values and patriotism. In recent times, Germany was often cast in the role of the main representative of the EU integration project as well as that of the most important historical enemy of the Polish nation. Examples are to be found in several recent commemorations and poster campaigns. Mention should be made here of the postcard campaign that ran throughout the summer of 2017, which invited citizens to send a postcard to veterans of the Warsaw uprising of 1944. The initiative was presented as an apolitical token of sympathy by the state and its citizens to be sent to the old heroes of the Second World War, but it would be difficult to see such action unrelated to campaigns that sought to accuse Germany for not having taken up responsibility for the destruction of Poland during the war. During the same summer, posters were visible in Warsaw that demanded Germany to pay reparations. Some proposals by PiS MPs added fuel to the fire, such as the idea to replace the plaques in Warsaw from the 1950s commemorating the ‘Polish patriots who died in the hands of the Nazis’ with memorials that would name the victimisers not Nazis but ‘Germans’ (Urzykowski, 2017). Recent electoral campaigns in Poland have not only seen a return of an obsession with particular episodes of history that have enabled a specific (nationalist) re-​telling of the past that could be connected to current politics; they have also rekindled an essentialised view of Polish (historical) national identity against cultural and religious ‘others’. The existence of these others is itself then seen as of potential harm to Polish national unity, integrity and solidarity. Following the example of Fidesz in Hungary, PiS has re-​engaged in a nationalist campaign on refugees. In 2015, Reuters (Goclowski et al, 2015) reported that Kaczyński promised to refuse refugees on the pretext that they might carry parasites and ‘diseases that are highly dangerous and have not been seen in Europe for a long time’. The previous PO-​led government was accused by PiS of being guilty of taking sides with Germany on the 124

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distribution of refugees. The ‘others’ in the rhetorics of PiS were, therefore, not only portrayed as the allies of a ‘new’ alleged threat (asylum seekers, who were now framed as non-​Catholic invaders and potential terrorists) but also put symbolically on the side of the ‘old’ victimiser (Germany). As is clear from these examples, de-​Europeanisation as a political stance and mobilising doctrine is less concerned with the concrete policies of the EU than with the norms and historical narratives that have become associated with the EU. Even when the government opposes specific EU policy decisions, it frames that opposition in a normative and polarising re-​telling of history.12

Internal and external factors Which factors need to be taken into account when trying to understand this rise of de-​Europeanisation as a political stance and mobilising doctrine? One way of structuring the exploration is by distinguishing between external and domestic factors. In the Polish case, party competition is an important internal factor (Stoyanov, 2017). The way party politics has developed since the end of communism has contributed to the importance of nationalist campaigning as well as to the continuous reappearing of history –​the divergent interpretation of key episodes and themes of the past –​as a dividing line of political competition. Krastev, for example, has argued that Polish liberal politicians at the beginning of the transition period ‘succeeded in marginalising and excluding anti-​capitalist discourse as a preventive measure, but at a cost: the opening of space for political mobilisation around symbolic and identity issues’ (Krastev, 2007). David Ost (2006) argued more or less along the same lines: nationalist political forces in Poland have represented a response to the anger of working-​class populations –​they have channelled, controlled and articulated labour discontent over the economic transformation by turning it into a radical nationalist discourse. The development of the Solidarność (Solidarity) labour movement has, in Ost’s view, been logically connected with the movement’s refusal to mobilise around class cleavages. Against this background of party competition around the ‘nation’ emerged fierce debate about how to deal with the heritage of the ‘round table agreement’ –​the compromise agreement in 1989 that united opposition leaders and communists and therefore de facto ended one-​party rule in Poland. Certain politicians successfully reintroduced the topic of the ‘round table as treason’ into more contemporary discussions. This was visible already in the first ascent to power of PiS. In a newspaper interview a few months before the presidential elections of 2005, Lech Kaczyński argued there was a hidden but abiding communist-​based power structure in Poland. He defined his own position as one of moral rebellion against that structure: ‘we differ 125

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precisely on the issue of moral values and on whether the system of interests that has dominated Poland since 1989 should be kept up’ (Kalukin, 2005). When, in 2015, PiS gained power over both the government and the presidency, there were a number of factors that facilitated the use of the victim-​victimiser frame as a central narrative code underpinning its victory. Discussions about how to deal with corruption scandals in which some of the former communist and former left-​wing anti-​communists had been involved made it possible to present the nationalist ‘we’ of PiS as the true inheritor of the non-​state (and ‘honest’) ‘we’ of Solidarity. In addition, the victimised ‘we’ was a convenient role to play in the context of continuing fuzziness over the facts of the Smolensk airplane crash –​and the continuous conspiracy theorising about it (Żukiewicz and Zimny, 2015), in which ‘they’ had deliberately caused the accident to ‘us’. The role of the external dominating power could easily be projected onto the EU since it was the political opponents of PiS (PO and other parties before) who had been responsible for negotiating EU membership. Apart from party politics, there is also a second domestic factor: moral categories have functioned as a longstanding discursive repertoire in Polish politics and they can therefore more easily be used to mobilise voters. There have been at least two times in the communist years when moral categories became part of the nationalist mobilisation. One example is the way in which in March 1968 Jewishness suddenly rose to the foreground as a factor establishing a new dividing line between ‘ours’ and ‘others’, pushing people not only within re-​defined ethnocultural categories but also in political camps. In March 1968, as the result of a blunt anti-​Semitic propaganda campaign, mainly led by one faction in the Polish communist party, thousands of people were dismissed from their jobs, mostly employees from government institutions, university professors and journalists, and thousands saw themselves forced to emigrate (Kunicki, 2005; Stola, 2000). The communist party mobilised its ‘own’ intellectuals and workers to protest against ‘the Zionists’ (newspeak for Poles with a Jewish background who were considered not really Poles), so as to give the impression that this was a policy move that was spontaneously embraced by large sections of the ‘ordinary’ Polish population. The campaign was meant to quell student protests and reinforced and gave meaning to an (newly imagined) ethnocultural boundary; it forced people to choose on which side of the ethnocultural divide they were –​a boundary that was simultaneously conceived as a political and moral divide. Anti-​Semitism was not only used to undermine student protests (by accusing protesters of acting in the interests of a homeland outside Poland) but also to cleanse the state institutions from liberal reform-​minded communists (who were seen and portrayed as external agents) and thereby shift the public’s attention away from intellectual demands for freedom of speech and democratisation. 126

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Another example are the protest movements of the 1980s, when there was a strong undercurrent of Catholic nationalism that mobilised large sections of the populations for Solidarity and against the communists. This was, of course, in the first place a civil society protest against communist dictatorship, but it was also a nationalist enterprise that pitted ‘we’ against ‘them’ in terms of ethnocultural identity (Poles against Soviets), religion (Catholics against secularists), and morality (good versus evil). This was a framing that even non-​believers could subscribe to because, as Adam Michnik formulated the matter, the people were ‘convinced that the system wasn’t run by Poles’ (Michnik, 1998: 268). The terms ‘we’ and ‘them’ thus acquired a specific ethnic and moral meaning that survived the 1980s and became revitalised in the current context. Like the striking visual symbols of the Solidarity movement (Weschler, 2006), the words ‘we’ and ‘them’ were widely readable and recognisable. And they have continued to function as symbols.13 These examples illustrate how current nationalism in Poland re-​uses the dichotomy of victimisers and victims. As Lim (2010) has suggested, victimhood becomes hereditary and consolidates national solidarity (and enmity) beyond generations. The third domestic factor that is worth considering here is the general rise of disappointment with democracy –​democratic fatigue –​which in itself interacts with and reinforced by populist mobilisations, especially in non-​urban areas. This creates a political context in which symbolic issues, such as nationhood, may move to the centre of political competition. This is especially the case when populist mobilisers can rally against an all-​ encompassing political consensus which is seen as a constraint to the public debate, such as, for example, the perception that there is ‘no alternative’ to radical economic liberalisation or to EU membership. As Grzymala-​Busse and Innes (2003: 66) have argued: ‘With so few choices in public policy to be had as a result, politicians in the region had little alternative to appeals to ‘who they are’ and their own credible skills rather than to substantive policy commitments when distinguishing themselves from their competitors.’ This could explain to some extent why mobilisers have been more likely to frame their campaigns in the rhetoric of exclusionary nationalism when they are faced with a field where all moderate parties more or less pursue similar policy proposals. In order to make the difference with competitors, symbolic position –​like the historical victim-​victimiser division –​is given more attention. Rising populism in East-​Central Europe goes hand in hand with democratic decline. The current Polish government has not only attempted to influence (and politicise) people’s understanding of history and EU integration, it has also redesigned a number of institutions and constitutional arrangements that strongly diminish the opportunities for the opposition (Krastev, 2018). PiS has, among other things, increased its grip over the 127

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country’s broadcasting system and pushed for the appointment sympathetic judges on the constitutional court. It is important to note that PiS’s attempt to cement its power in government, which could be described as an attempt at constitutional revolution, has met more popular resistance than that of, for example, Fidesz in Hungary. Not only have there been more protest demonstrations in Poland, the PiS majority in parliament has also been more limited than the one Fidesz had in 2010, so it has made constitutional capture harder to accomplish. External factors contributing to the popularisation of historical arguments and the victim-​victimiser frame include the depoliticised (and highly normative) narrative of European integration that usually accompanies a political defence of the EU. By having been both a depoliticised technocratic and bureaucratic project and acting simultaneously as moral agent in the enlargement process, some authors (for example, de Búrca, 2018) see the rise of technocratic institutions, and therefore the EU itself, as a contributor to the current problem. Through conditionality, the candidate countries were confronted with the hard constraints of accession, a list of things that needed fixing before they could join the European club. These constraints had the effect of flattening political differences that might otherwise have taken shape along a left/​r ight axis. In its place, the ‘nation’ and its history of victimhood re-​emerged as a convenient fulcrum for inter-​party contestation.

Concluding remarks What can EU institutions do about it? It is clear that these institutions are legally extremely limited in their action against those governments that do not uphold the values and principles of the EU. When opposition relies on countering the traditional historical narrative of EU integration, the scope for action is even more limited. Moreover, the political instrumentalisation of faulty or simplified historical images and narratives by nationalist politicians in the domestic realm is unlikely to be remedied by a competing political instrumentalisation of historical accounts by EU institutions. A victimhood attitude that dominates all political relations can most likely not be opposed directly by a negation of the victimhood frame. Such correction would most likely only be instrumentalised as further evidence for tendencies of victimisation from abroad. In addition, several EU institutions have relied on their own moral narratives to propagate integration, a strategy that might be turned against the EU’s own interests. Here the limits of EU-​rope become quite visible. As Forchtner and Kølvraa (2012: 398) write, ‘self-​critical narratives about a “bitter past” can become the foundation of European superiority expressed in ambitions to “teach the world”.’ This is indeed how the enlargement process has been experienced in East-​Central Europe. During their accession to the EU, candidate member states engaged in what Krastev and Holmes (2018) 128

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have called a game of imitation –​in terms of policies but also in terms of norms and readings of history –​and therefore created a backlash. They write: ‘the rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe has its roots not in political theory, but in political psychology. It reflects a deep-​seated disgust at the post-​1989 “imitation imperative,” with all its demeaning and humiliating implications’ (Krastev and Holmes, 2018: 118). Of course, some of the trouble might be countered by better education. It is the task of good historians –​and of good historical museums –​to break petrified clichés and correct (politically) accepted historical knowledge on the basis of facts. Such corrections are important not only because of what they correct but also because they can demonstrate that history is never fully finished and should therefore never be left unexamined. But an open and fair public inquiry into history is only possible in a democratic climate that is not suppressed by authoritarian tendencies. In other words, the argument for better historical knowledge and the strategies against ‘victimhood Olympics’ as a mode of political mobilisation will have to be also an argument for democracy and against democratic backsliding. And in this field, too, EU institutions are limited. As Schlipphak and Treib (2017) have argued, intervention from abroad against anti-​democratic political forces in the domestic realm might produce unwanted effects. ‘By criticizing the EU for illegitimately interfering with domestic affairs, the government may frame EU intervention as a threat from the outside and present itself as the only safeguard against this threat’ (Schlipphak and Treib, 2017: 352). More fruitful approaches may be found in separating the discussion about EU policies from the discussion about the worth of more general values of democracy, education and human rights. The successes of nationalist victimhood politics today are often connected to the failures of democracy. Put differently, the belief in an imagined nationalist past might be the result of the lack of a belief in a democratic future. One part of the solution therefore may be to rethink, adapt, change, and reform the ways in which ordinary citizens participate in democratic politics. The solution will not only be a matter of educating or reframing the past, it also lies in creating a new belief in democracy and moving away from the tyranny of the majority. This is an important task ahead. De-​Europeanisation through memory politics has already created real detrimental societal effects for democratic European societies, particularly for those who are already minorities such as many refugees and immigrants, who are now portrayed both as guilty and privileged subjects (because they are seen as allies of the EU, not of the ‘ordinary people’ of the nation). When nationalist ideas of victimhood are translated into a policy that seeks to establish both ethnocultural homogeneity and historical ‘justice’, certain target groups run the risk of becoming the subject of further oppression and exclusion. In other words, the political powerholders who think of themselves as representatives of a victimised majority seeking justice may become responsible 129

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for instigating new injustices themselves. Through their mobilisation of electoral support on the basis of the idea that the majority population consists of victims who are threatened, they themselves are increasingly becoming a threat to democracy. They may, in the end, become the ones who victimise. Notes 1 2

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For a discussion on the history of the HEH, see Kaiser (2017). In 2016, Gliński criticised the expansive approach of the new Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk and said it should focus more on the Polish experience (Donadio, 2016). The first time PiS gained power was following the elections in 2005, the second time in 2015. In 2005 as well as in 2015, Poles voted in both parliamentary and presidential elections. In the 2005 parliamentary poll, PiS gained 27% of the votes cast and became the largest party in the Sejm ahead of Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which gained 24%. In that same year Lech Kaczyński won the presidential election. The PiS-​led government only lasted until 2007 –​after early elections a new government was formed and led by PO. On 10 April 2010, President Kaczyński was killed, together with many members of the political elite, in the Smolensk air crash. In 2015, the parliamentary election was again won by PiS, which had been the largest opposition party (since 2011). It gained 37.6% of the vote against the governing PO, which achieved 24.1%. Earlier that year PiS candidate Andrzej Duda had received the greatest number of votes in the presidential elections (51,55%), followed by incumbent president Bronisław Komorowski (with 48,45%), who ran as an independent with the endorsement of PO. Wellings and Power (2016) argue that invoking and rejecting collective memories is also a much-​used strategy by those who defend European integration, which may be the opposite side of the same coin. Quoted from Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (Ministry of National Defence), http:// ​ m .mon.gov.pl/​ a ktu​ a lno​ s ci/​ a r ty​ k ul/​ n ajnow ​ s ze/ ​ p am ​ i ec- ​ o - ​ b oh ​ a ter​ ach-​bitwy-​ warszawskiej-​02017-​08-​14/​ Brubaker (2017) sees this as the ‘the tight discursive interweaving of the vertical opposition to those on top and the horizontal opposition to outside groups or forces. In both left and right variants of populism, economic, political, and cultural elites are represented as “outside” as well as “on top”.’ This combination of vertical anti-​elitarian views and horizontal opposition has detrimental effects on marginalised groups, such as many Roma (Vermeersch, 2017) who are seen as both on the side of the (transnational) elites and (non-​national) outsiders. Of course, this trend goes far beyond Eastern Europe and the Balkans: different experiences and remembrances of victimhood also continue to be a divisive force in, for example, Northern Ireland and South Africa, but there, of course, they are not connected to the European integration process. By which I mean the belief that a nation is the result of ancient origins and therefore produces particularly strong collective attachments. This is related to the socio-​political phenomenon of predatory identities that Appadurai (2006) described: ‘The discourse of these mobilized majorities often has within the idea that it could be itself turned into a minority unless another minority disappears, and for this reason predatory groups often use pseudo-​demographic arguments about rising birthrates among their targeted minority enemies.’ This is arguably also the reason why in times of rising populism winning elections seems to have become so extremely important, even more important than governing, and in Van Reybrouck’s poignant wording, ‘elections fever’ risks becoming a ‘chronic disorder’ (2018: 14). 130

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12

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This is not merely a matter of discourse but also of material culture, see for example Zubrzycki (2011). My reflections on victimhood nationalism here obviously leave large parts of the question out of the equation. My focus here is on the ‘supply side’ (van Kessel, 2013) of nationalist ideas. Conversely not on the side of the receivers –​including those citizens and organisations who are mobilised to support nationalist politicians and presumably to some extent co-​produce their discourse. There is sociological research about nationalist sentiments among European populations (Fomina, 2017; Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010), but the many questions that such empirical work brings up are far from solved. What explains people’s openness to it? What is the social psychology behind their self-​identification as victims of history? I cannot go into such questions here, but I want to signal my awareness of their complex nature as well as the continuing need to investigate them. See, for example, the book by Teresa Torańska (1987) about Polish communist leaders, simply titled “Them”.

Acknowledgements Previous versions of this chapter were presented as part of the panel ‘New politics of diversity in Europe? Perspectives from the margins of citizenship’, 25th International Conference of Europeanists (CES), Chicago, IL. March 28-​30, 2018, and as part of the conference ‘Limits of Europe’, October 1-​2, 2018, Carlton House Terrace, London (organized by King’s College London and Lazarski Unviersity Warsaw). I would like to thank Russell Foster, Jan Grzymski, Julija Sardelić and Martí Grau i Segú. References Ágh, A. (2016) ‘Cultural war and reinventing the past in Poland and Hungary’, Polish Political Science Yearbook, 45(1): 32–​44. Appadurai, A. (2006) Fear of small numbers, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Baldwin, R.E., Francois, J.F. and Portes, R. (1997) ‘The costs and benefits of Eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and Central Europe’, Economic Policy, 12(24): 125–​176. Baumann, M.M. (2013) ‘Critical memory studies and the politics of victimhood: reassessing the role of victimhood nationalism in Northern Ireland and South Africa’, in T. Bonacker and C. Safferling (eds), Victims of international crimes: an interdisciplinary discourse, The Hague, The Netherlands: T. M. C. Asser Press, pp 373–​393. Brubaker, R. (2017) ‘Why populism?’ Theory and Society (October 26): 1–​29. de Búrca, G. (2018) ‘Is EU supranational governance a challenge to liberal constitutionalism?’ The University of Chicago Law Review, 85(2): 337–​367. Donadio, R. (2016) ‘A museum becomes a battlefield over Poland’s history’, New York Times, 9 November, www.nytimes.com/​2016/​11/​10/​arts/​ design/​museum-​ of-​the-​second-​world-​war-​in-​poland-​debate.html

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Flockhart, T. (2010) ‘Europeanization or EU-​ization? The transfer of European norms across time and space’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(4): 787–​810. Fomina, J. (2017) ‘The unlikely Eurosceptics: the undercurrent anti-​ European attitudes among the young Poles and the role of the domestic context’, Polish Sociological Review, 2(198): 198. Forchtner, B., and Kølvraa, C. (2012) ‘Narrating a ‘new Europe’: from ‘bitter past’ to self-​r ighteousness?’ Discourse & Society, 23(4): 377–​400. Fox, J.E. and Vermeersch, P. (2010) ‘Backdoor nationalism’, Archives Europeennes de Sociologie /​ European Journal of Sociology /​ Europaisches Archiv Fur Soziologie, 51(2): 325–​357. Goclowski, M., Barteczko, A. and Koper, A. (2015) ‘Polish opposition warns refugees could spread infectious diseases’, Reuters, 15 October, www.reuters. com/​article/​ us-​europe-​migrants-​poland-​idUSKCN0S918B20151015 Grabbe, H. (2006) The EU’s transformative power: Europeanization through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Grabbe, H. and Lehne, S. (2018) ‘Could an Illiberal Europe Work?’ Carnegie Europe, https:// ​ c arnegieeurope.eu/​ 2 018/​ 1 0/​ 1 1/​ could-​illiberal-​europe-​work-​pub-​77463 Grzymala-​Busse, A. and Innes, A. (2003) ‘Great expectations: the EU and domestic political competition in East Central Europe’, Eastern European Politics and Societies, 17(1): 64–​73. Hjerm, M. and Schnabel, A. (2010) ‘Mobilizing nationalist sentiments: which factors affect nationalist sentiments in Europe?’ Social Science Research, 39(4): 527–​539. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science, 39(1): 1–​23. Jasiewicz, K. and Jasiewicz-​Betkiewicz, A. (2004) ‘Poland’, European Journal of Political Research, 43(7–​8): 1106–​1115. Kaiser, W. (2017) ‘Limits of cultural engineering: actors and narratives in the European Parliament’s House of European History project’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(3): 518–​534. Kalukin, R. (2005) ‘Kaczyņski: Chciałbym innej lewicy’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 June, http://​wyborcza.pl/​1,76842,2832883.html Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2002) ‘The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, 3(3): 297–​326. Krastev, I. (2018) ‘Eastern Europe’s illiberal revolution’, Foreign Affairs, 16 April, www.foreignaffairs.com/ ​ a rticles/​ h ungary/​ 2 018-​ 0 4-​ 1 6/​ eastern-​europes-​illiberal-​revolution Krastev, I. and Holmes, S. (2018) ‘Imitation and its discontents’, Journal of Democracy, 29(3): 117–​128. 132

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Kunicki, M. (2005) ‘The Red and the Brown: Bolesław Piasecki, the Polish Communists, and the anti-​Zionist campaign in Poland, 1967–​68’, Eastern European Politics and Societies, 19(2): 185–​225. Lim, J.-​H. (2010) ‘Victimhood nationalism and history reconciliation in East Asia’, History Compass, 8(1): 1–​10. Michnik, A. (1998) Letters from freedom: post-​cold war realities and perspectives, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Milošević, A. (2017) ‘Back to the future, forward to the past: Croatian politics of memory in the European Parliament’, Nationalities Papers, 45(5): 893–​909. Ost, D. (2006) The defeat of solidarity: anger and politics in postcommunist Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pap, A.L. (2018) Democratic decline in Hungary: law and society in an illiberal democracy, Abingdon: Routledge. PiS, Program (2005) http://​old.pis.org.pl/​dokumenty.php?s=​partia&id doc=​3 Rankin, J. (2018) ‘Brexit through the gift shop: museum of European history divides critics’, Guardian, 12 August, www.theguardian.com/​world/​2018/​ aug/​12/​museum-​past-​critics-​divided-​house-​european-​history Rupnik, J. (2007) ‘From democracy fatigue to populist backlash’, Journal of Democracy, 18(4): 17–​25. Rupnik, J. (2017) ‘La crise du libéralisme en Europe centrale’, Commentaire, 160(4): 797–​806. Schäuble, M. (2014) Narrating victimhood: gender, religion and the making of place in post-​war Croatia. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) ‘The community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action, and Eastern enlargement of European Union’, International Organization, 55(1): 47–​80. Schlipphak, B. and Treib, O. (2017) ‘Playing the blame game on Brussels: The domestic political effects of EU interventions against democratic backsliding’, Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3): 352–​365. Stola, D. (2000) ‘The anti-​Zionist campaign in Poland 1967–​1968’, Jewish Studies at the Central European University, 2, www.marxistsfr.org/​subject/​ jewish/​stola.pdf Stoyanov, D. (2017) ‘Central and East European Euroscepticism in 2014: domestic politics matter!’ in J. Hassing Nielsen and M.N. Franklin (eds), The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament elections: second order or second rate?, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 103–​124. Tillman, E.R. (2013) ‘Authoritarianism and citizen attitudes towards European integration’, European Union Politics, 14(4): 566–​589. Torańska, T. (1987) “Them”: Stalin’s Polish puppets, New York: Harper & Row.

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Urzykowski, T. (2017) ‘Z Tablicą Na Niemca. Kuriozalna Propozycja Posła PiS Arkadiusza Mularczyka’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 August, http://​warszawa. wyborcza.pl/​warszawa/​7,54420,22228677,z-​tablica-​na-​niemca.html Van Kessel, S. (2013) ‘A matter of supply and demand: the electoral performance of populist parties in three European countries’, Government and Opposition, 48(2): 175–​199. Van Reybrouck, D. (2018) Against elections, New York: Seven Stories Press. Vehlewald, H.-​J. (2016) ‘Haben die Polen einen Vogel? Bild-​Interview mit Polens Aussensminister’, Bild, 3 January 2016, https://​www.bild.de/​ politik/​ausland/​polen/​hat-​die-​regierung-​einen-​vogel-​44003034.bild.html Vermeersch, P. (2017) ‘How does the EU matter for the Roma? Problems of post-​Communism’, 64(5): 219–​227. Vermeersch, P. and van Baar, H. (2017) ‘The limits of operational representations: ways of seeing Roma beyond the recognition-​redistribution paradigm’, Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 3(4): 120–​139. Wellings, B. and Power, B. (2016) ‘Euro-​myth: nationalism, war and the legitimacy of the European Union’, National Identities, 18(2): 157–​177. Weschler, L. (2006) ‘The graphics of solidarity’, The Virginia Quarterly Review, 82(1): 111. de Wilde, P. (2011) ‘No polity for old politics? A framework for analyzing the politicization of European integration’, Journal of European Integration, 33(5): 559–​575. de Wilde, P. and Zürn, M. (2012) ‘Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 137–​153. Živković, M. (2011) Serbian dreambook: national imaginary in the time of Milošević, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Zubrzycki, G. (2011) ‘History and the National Sensorium: making sense of Polish mythology’, Qualitative Sociology, 34(1): 21–​57. Żukiewicz, P. and Zimny, R. (2015) ‘The Smolensk tragedy and its importance for political communication in Poland after 10th April, 2010 (Focusing on the political incidents in front of the Presidential Palace)’, Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, (1): 63–​82.

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Response to Peter Vermeersch Martí Grau i Segú Professor Peter Vermeersch analyses the efforts of some leading political groupings in East-​Central Europe countries to extend and perpetuate their domination in government and society by portraying the past as victimisation of the ‘nation’. He convincingly claims that the role of the politics of memory in this context is to turn the majority into a minority by agitating the fear of the ‘other’, an effective minority that works to undermine the majority for the benefit of an external agent, the EU. As a result, the region is going through a process of de-​Europeanisation, understood as disengagement from the norms and practices the EU introduced in the area in the run-​up to the 2004 enlargement and immediately after. The chapter refers to Poland, and to a lesser extent Hungary, with a number of specific examples from the former. The author tells us that, in Hungary, Fidesz has succeeded in the aforementioned purpose more significantly than PiS in Poland, this party having a slimmer majority and a more robust and vociferous opposition. Yet we learn, in the section about the internal factors explaining this dynamic, that moral categories penetrate definitions of identity, making it very difficult for those initially indifferent or mildly opposed to resist the pressure to, at least tacitly, abide by the same tenets. This is for me one of the capital points of the chapter. Linking moral categories to the definition of identities means giving up politics and seeking refuge in the eternal return of history, since politics entails the possibility of hope against what history might have told us time and again. I believe the crisis of a European and global forward-​looking storytelling, ongoing in the last decade, has facilitated such national retrenchment, with a heavy emphasis on values or morality hitherto ‘European’ or ‘universal’.

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The external factors, though less developed than the internal ones, contain another crucial aspect in the text: Vermeersch describes a current backlash, produced by the conditionality that was tied to a swift march towards EU accession for more than a decade, from 1993 to 2004. Vermeersch observes a flattening of domestic political differences during that period, such that repressed symbolic debates about past and identity erupted with force once accession was accomplished. In my view, this is part of a broader problem, which is hinted at in the conclusions regarding the ‘imitation imperative’ that was felt after 1989. On one hand, after 2004 (and even slightly earlier), within the new member states’ political cultures it was felt that, beyond some material gains, there was no symbolic reward at the end of the process: Europe’s grand narrative –​if there still was one –​continued to be built along the lines of a few national narratives in the West, and there was no merging of historical imagination to speak of. That was also perceived as an intolerable watering down of the region’s past sufferings, endured precisely in the defence of Europe as a whole (or of Christianity, or of civilisation tout court). On the other hand, on a more practical level, part of the current backlash stems from the perception that old member states do not always themselves comply with the obligations they require from new member states, especially in terms of enforcement of policies for the protection of diversity (minorities, schooling, multilingualism). I would like to add a few notes on some aspects that seem more problematic to me in the chapter. First, the scenario analysed is one of growing authoritarian tendencies. From that point of view, ‘nationalism’ –​a term widely used in the chapter –​is not what reveals those tendencies, but an instrument at their service. In general, I take issue with the use –​ certainly not exclusive to this chapter –​of ‘nationalism’ as a self-​explanatory term, because I think its meaning without adjectives and without ad-​hoc contextualisation becomes so vague as to make it of little use in scholarly analysis, and mercurial in societal communication. We simply lack the means to define a ‘non-​nationalist’ environment, something that would take distance at the same time from the embedded nationalism in the most respectable, well-​meaning state structures, and from aspirational movements, be those of the Mazzinian, humankind-​loving type or of the exclusionary types. As Philip Schlesinger (1992) put it at the onset of the post-​Cold war era, whereas proponents for postmodernity ‘have been apt to think that the old collectivities may no longer confer identities that command special attention’ and ‘have quite explicitly argued for the obsolescence of the nation-​state and heralded this as opening up potential new spaces of tolerance for the “stranger”, … the search for community goes on’. Second, in spite of the gravity of the constitutional takeover that is happening in Poland and Hungary, I think the tendency that is described in the chapter cannot be confined to East-​Central Europe. In that sense, are we 136

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here mostly confronted with a matter of acuteness, of conspicuousness, or is there something qualitatively specific unfolding in the region? The global rise of illiberalism (Trump, Putin, Erdogan) begs the question. Furthermore, historical narratives are on the rise in virtually every political culture in Europe, and whereas that does not necessarily presuppose an authoritarian or confrontational outlook, a close look at national political systems reveals a broad pattern of strain, fear, and sense of lack of direction. So we can speak of a continent-​wide tendency today –​with manifestations to many degrees, that is true –​in which state narratives are decoupling from an EU narrative. At the same time, one must admit that EU normativity has notably changed since year Y of Enlargement. Once, EU governance actively encouraged cross-​state identities or sub-​state identities as something consubstantial to European integration (a virtuous unravelling, up to a point, of the Westphalian state). Today, a shift in that discourse refers to the contours of the nation-​state in a more nitid, canonical way, and that can be interpreted as a retreat from the earlier promise for a supranational, patchwork Europe built on overlapping allegiances. And that leads me to my third point: we cannot consider the EU as a single-​ minded actor nor Europeanisation as the product of an immutable script. The EU is composed by many agents, and each one of them might have their own view, and their own priorities. Institutionalist theories highlight not only this pluralism within the EU, but the tendency of each institution to pursue an autonomous development, and possibly an autonomous agenda. If we turn our look to the Council, the state governments concerned are themselves the ‘EU’, so for European governance the challenge is not a centre (European institutions) versus periphery (unruly member states) one, but a challenge that lays at its core. On that account, it might be too early to say if the trend described is one of de-​Europeanisation, or one of Europeanisation taking a different, hazardous direction. May a wake-​up call spare us either. Reference Schlesinger, P. (1992) ‘Europeanness: A New Cultural Battlefield?’ Innovation, 5(1): 12.

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PART III

Limits to European Space and Borders

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Seeing Like a EUropean Border: The Limits of EUropean Borders and Space Jan Grzymski

Introduction: Who can and cannot enter EUropean space? The mobility of the non-​European Union population towards EU territory has recently dramatically redrawn the public’s attention to the problem of borders, both in the EU and in its neighbouring countries. Nearly three decades after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the triumph of normative vision of borderless EUrope, there have been many dramatic and mediatised attempts to cross the very border of the European Union, either through the Mediterranean Sea, the massively razor-​wired walls in the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta bordering Morocco (Saddiki, 2010), La Manche from the French city of Calais (Rigy and Schlembach, 2013; Reinisch, 2015), or attempting to come ashore Greek or Italian islands (Lendaro, 2016). This mobility has also increasingly affected the social and political life of the EU’s neighbours, as they become the last transit areas in journeys to EU territory, which –​in turn –​has resulted in othering people in motion by local populations (Andersson, 2010a, 2010b; Bachelet, 2018). At the same time, the populations of non-​EU countries, which are part of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), have been experiencing less mediatised border crossings for labour or educational purposes given visa restrictions. This crossing of the Schengen area border affects their professional and personal lives with the recurring need to peregrinate back and forth during their visas’ validity (Folis, 2012). Hence, the problem of borders is now in

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the limelight of politics of the EU as a whole and in the political and social life of many member states, as well as affecting neighbouring countries. Within the European Union, this is mostly seen as a problem of ‘effective protection’ of its external borders, not only by the EU border agency Frontex and national border guards, but also by engaging the EU’s neighbours, especially those in Northern Africa (Bialasiewicz, 2012). However, at the same time, this ‘effective protection’ of the external border is linked within the EU to both defending or opposing the liberal values and principles of EUrope, especially in the context of what is called the ‘migration crisis’.1 Donald Tusk –​the president of the European Council –​stated that the effective lack of control of the EU’s external borders would provoke a crisis of trust of our citizens in the liberal state and the European Union as a whole. Because people value freedom and openness only as long as they feel safe. … We cannot agree with an argument that the effective protection of the European border, of our territory and identity, means to defy the rules of liberal democracy. (Tusk, 2018a) In the same manner, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, said that ‘Europe should protect its borders but without becoming “some sort of fortress”. … Europe’s soul is humanity. And if we want to keep that soul, if Europe and its values want to succeed in the world, then it must not close itself off ’ (BBC News, 2018). On the opposing pole, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán justified his politics of ‘closing external borders’ as a way of defending the Christian values of Europe: ‘Christian democracy –​Orban says –​protects us from migration, defends the borders, supports the traditional family model of one man, one woman, considers the protection of our Christian culture as a natural thing’ (Reuters, 2018). For Orbán, open borders are linked to the normative project of the ‘open society’ and he sees it as endangering what he calls the traditional and Christian foundation of Europe. In response to Merkel’s reference that ‘Europe’s soul is humanity’, Orbán replied that ‘If we want to act humanely, then there must be no pull-​f actor. And there is only one solution: closing off the borders, and bringing the support over there. And not let those in who bring problems’ (BBC News, 2018). The issue of EUropean borders is, therefore, framed mostly in terms of efficacy of controlling non-​EU population movement, providing EUropean people with security, and a sense of identity. It is justified in terms of values that are seen as representing the essence of ‘Europe’, however conflicting and opposing are the values referred to by different EU leaders. Hence, the political problematisation of the European Union’s borders is considered mostly through the question of who can or cannot enter the territory of the EU. While this is of paramount importance, however, 142

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this is (only) the perspective of the given polity –​the European Union –​for which the prime focus is to manage population movement through control of its external borders. However, as David Newman indicates, ‘any border research agenda should also deal with the basic question of borders for whom?’ (Newman, 2003: 22). This –​in the case of the EU’s borders –​ultimately also refers to the various political visions of what kind of population should be ‘legitimately’ (in the legal perspective and in the normative view of the political leaders or the general public) inhabiting the space of the European Union. As Donald Tusk stated, ‘a precondition for a genuine EU migration policy is that Europeans effectively decide who enters European territory. Failure to achieve this goal would in fact be a manifestation of our weakness, and above all, it could create the impression that Europe does not have an external border’ (Tusk, 2018b). This firm emphasis by a leading EU official on the ‘external border’ indicates a crucial shift over the last few years in the EU’s border politics: from soft forms of bordering, in which the EU differentiates itself from its ‘neighbours’ but, at the same, engages with them in different forms of cooperation, promoting and disseminating EUropean values and norms in the area, called ‘Wider Europe’ (Prodi, 2002); to the politics of hard forms of bordering focusing on walling itself against the neighbours with simultaneous emphasis on the very selective mechanisms for allowing entrance to the EU’s territory, and focusing more on the exclusion of certain categories of non-​EU populations. This shift in EU politics is, of course, mostly driven by pressure from the rise of political forces in several EU governments which openly act against any form of migration towards the EU, such as Matteo Salvini –​Italy’s deputy prime minister and interior minister –​who boldly claimed that ‘in Italy we need to help people have more children, rather than bring in modern-​ day slaves (from Africa) to replace the children we’re not having’ (Squires, 2018). His justification of ‘closing borders’ is clearly rooted in his vision of who should ‘legitimately’ inhabit Italy. Moreover, as Salvini’s statement indicates, calls for hard forms of bordering have often been accompanied in recent years by a resurgence of discriminatory or openly racist language in some EU member states (Wodak, 2015: 46–​69), related to non-​EU migrating populations attempting to enter EU territory. This has been in stark contrast to the much-​celebrated freedom of movement of EUropean people, which has been one of the most important normative foundations of the European Union (Favell, 2008). Freedom of movement within the Schengen area was indeed based on the political and post-​national vision of non-​discrimination in national, economic and social terms (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Rumford, 2008). However, many have already pointed out that this mobility was also, from the beginning, exclusive and the very possibility of this freedom of movement was dependant on simultaneous 143

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securitisation of people’s mobility within the Schengen area (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Huysmans, 2006: 65–​67; Vaughan-​Williams, 2015: 18–​19), where ‘strengthening of border security has gradually become posited as the primary ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of ‘irregular’ ‘migration’ (Vaughan-​Williams, 2015: 19). Hence, hard forms of borders have been present in border politics of the EU since the inception of the Schengen area. Their persistence has dramatically manifested in recent years, in what Nick Vaughan-​Williams (2015) called ‘Europe’s border crisis’ with its ‘inherent ambiguity within EU border security and migration management policies and practices that (re) produce the migrant as potentially both a life to be protected and a security threat to protect against’ (Vaughan-​Williams, 2015: 3). In his view, EUropean border security practices have exposed ‘irregular’ migrants to dehumanisation and death, while aiming to protect them. Most importantly, these security practices were, in fact, very much anchored in the question of who can and who cannot enter EUropean space.

Critical Border Studies and EUrope The predominance of the political question of who can or cannot enter the territory of the EU leads, however, to many other salient issues related to the problem of borders and to their many crucial implications for the EUropean project. The most important one is what today constitutes a border of EUrope? In addressing this question, there is a need for more emphasis on the processes of bordering, not on borders as set things. This problem needs also to be located in the context of post-​Westphalian and neo-​imperial understandings of EUropean borders and EUrope itself (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Behr, 2007; Behr and Stivachtis, 2015; Foster, 2013, 2016; Zielonka, 2007), which are predominantly driven by various visions of global interconnectedness, decreasing significance of sovereign states, cross-​border post-​national regional forms of cooperation and –​most crucially –​the EU’s ability to ‘govern from a distance’ (Behr, 2015: 32) beyond its formal territories. It is within such a framework that many current calls for different forms of exclusionary migration policies should be discussed. This follows other questions. Where are these EUropean borders to be found? And who is performing EUropean bordering (borderwork)? In other words, what and where are the borders and what kind of function they do serve for EUrope? Where is ‘the external border’ that needs to be protected in the view of the EU and its leaders and public? And, most importantly, in the context of revisiting these questions, what kind of limits to the EUropean project could be exposed? Hence, this chapter contributes to Critical Border Studies (CBS), the research agenda of which indicates that there is no longer the 144

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traditionally-​perceived relation between inside and outside as delineated by a linear type of border (Agnew, 2009; Parker, Vaughan-​Williams et al, 2009: Parker and Vaughan-​Williams, 2012; Salter, 2012). In the context of studying EUropean borders, a CBS perspective could help to overcome the politicised opposition of closing and opening borders, which is shifting attention to an emphasis on how to manage population movements. CBS helps to shift the focus from the ‘tactics of bordering’ (de Genova, 2017) to the actual ‘borderwork’ of EUrope (Rumford, 2008). Chris Rumford’s conceptual perspective on borders will largely inform this chapter. Rumford’s borderwork frames Critical Borders Studies research around daily practices of people experiencing borders, those who are involved in constructing and contesting borders throughout Europe: creating borders which facilitate mobility for some while creating barriers to mobility for others; creating zones which can determine what types of economic activity can be conducted where; contesting the legitimacy of or undermining the borders imposed by others. (Rumford, 2008: 59) Borderwork perspectives can, hence, inform the study of EUropean borders and can contribute to a growing need to challenge the opposition of opening-​ closing borders. In this chapter, it will take a form of moving from ‘seeing like the EU’ perspective (the perspective of the EU as a polity interested in tactics and efficacy of its own border control) to ‘seeing like the EUropean border’ (the perspective from the border itself, of how different forms of borders –​set by the EU –​are being experienced through the various forms of mobilities, how they are imagined and constructed by political actors, and how they are being controlled, attempted to cross, resisted and adapted by different EU and non-​EU political and social actors). Apart from CBS, the proposed perspective of ‘seeing like a EUropean border’ can draw on a few other interrelated approaches: political anthropology (Scott, 1998), anthropology of the EU (Bellier and Wilson, 2000; Bottici and Challand, 2013), social constructivism (Christiansen et al, 2001), and governmentality studies (Burchell et al, 1991; Chamlian and Nabers, 2016; Foucault, 1991; Walters and Haahr, 2005; Walters, 2012). All these approaches could aid a more comprehensive examination at the problem of EUropean space and borders not through the prism of various EU policies, but through the actual bordering practices exercised by different actors. This chapter is mostly informed by political anthropology and ethnographic methods with the focus on ‘borderwork’ of the EU leaders, as well as the officials and professionals working for the European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS).2 As we have seen in Europe, when Donald Tusk links freedom, openness and sense of security with effective protection of external borders; when Angela 145

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Merkel calls not to close off borders to keep ‘Europe’s soul’ and to ensure that ‘Europe and its values’ could succeed in the world only without becoming ‘some sort of fortress’; and when they –​and many other EU politicians –​ persistently equate Europe with the European Union, assuming tacitly that there is a conflation, all of this affects the EUropean borderwork of so many political and social actors across EUrope and non-​EUrope. This borderwork is now happening at different bordersides both within EUropean space, at the formal EUropean borders as well as much beyond them. On the other hand, what also resonates when Orbán and many other EU leaders were saying that we need to ‘bring support over there’ is the more general idea that EUrope should be ‘acting there’, in order to keep safe itself, something which is not new in the political record of Europe’s relations with non-​ Europe. Leaving the long shadow of the European colonial past, we could say that there is still, presently, a clear ambiguity between cooperation with neighbours and securitisation of the mobility of those who are neighbouring EUrope, and even those much further afield in Central Africa or Middle East. That is clearly seen not only in Schengen practices, but also in the 15 years of ENP experiences. Seeing through a EUropean border could help us to expose how EUropean bordering practices are being entangled with tense relations between cooperation and security, which represents the ‘gated community syndrome’ of EUropean space.

What is the border of EUrope? ‘Gated community syndrome’ EUropean space and borders are not based on natural, permanent or on clear-​ cut divisions. William Walters argues that ‘we cannot point a place, state or continent called Europe which readily reveals its borders, edges or divisions to an impartial observer’ (Walters, 2009: 487). Many other border scholars have also already indicated that Europe’s borders are more like fuzzy zones, closer to frontiers and intermediary spaces of interactions, negotiations and exchanges of meaning (Bialasiewicz et al, 2009; Delanty, 1995, 2006; Diez, 2004, 2006; Eder, 2006; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Christiansen et al, 2000; Berezin and Schain, 2003; Delanty and Rumford, 2005, 2009; Kuus, 2004; Zielonka, 2006; Rumford, 2008; Balibar, 2009; Johnson et al, 2011). Etienne Balibar (2009) emphasised that borders do not have the same meaning for everyone. His idea that borders have a polysemic nature is of paramount importance, especially when we discuss how EUropean external borders contribute to many discriminatory practices towards the non-​EU population that is attempting to enter the EU territory. Borders allow easy passage for some while they create a barrier to the mobility for others. Similarly, EUropean borders are also ‘polysemic’ since they mean different things for different people. As Chris Rumford notes, they are ‘either barriers 146

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or gateways depending on who we are’ (Rumford, 2008: 41). But he also points out that ‘although a border may treat people in different ways it will still be recognised as a border by all concerned’ (Rumford, 2008: 41–​42). One EU Commission professional admits that “what is the border of Europe today is a political decision. … of course, there is still geography, which you can’t change. It is destiny.” In similar vein, in their excellent book Border as method, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) emphasise the symbolism of borders, stating that aside from its geographical, political, and juridical dimensions, the concept of the border has an important symbolic dimension, which has come to the fore today with the multiplication of the tensions that invest the classically modern configuration of the border as a separating line between sovereign state territories. (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 14) In this context, EUropean borders should be seen as symbolic constructions that have ‘polysemic meanings’ for different social and political actors who experience them. The very process of creating different forms of borders means that new type of space and various types of new identities are being imagined and constructed. Both the ENP and the Schengen area produce various types of spaces and identities. First, EUropean bordering practices produce the space of ‘neighbourhood’ through the instruments and policy tools of the ENP. Fillippo Celata and Raffaella Coletti argue that the ‘European Neighbourhood’ has been invented as a new geographical entity (Celata and Coletti, 2015: 4). The EUropean Neighbourhood has been imagined –​since its inception in 2003 –​as a buffer zone for EUrope to protect from security challenges emerging from post-​2004 EU enlargement. But at the same time, the EUropean Neighbourhood has been seen as a ‘sort of soft and mobile path toward closer integration with the EU’, but without the prospect of membership (Celata and Coletti, 2015: 3). As Celata and Coletti emphasise, the ENP was driven by the idea of a ‘wider Europe’ with blurred borders: a space of strengthened cooperation based on the recognition of common challenges, values and history, to create a common future of ‘friendship’ and ‘partnership’ with increased convergence, cooperation and integration. Most importantly, even though the ENP was discursively opposed to hard borders and the image of ‘Fortress Europe’, both it and Schengen were contributing to what Celata and Coletti (2015: 3) called a re-​bordering of EUrope –​that is, setting new functions for its external frontiers, establishing a new type of relations with the outside world and non-​EUrope. Being asked about the role of EU borders, one EU Commission professional says: ‘These days this has a bad connotation. I would like to see it in a more positive way. The border is a way of saying what kind of instruments 147

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we use. If you are within borders of the EU then you have different instruments to support people and develop the country. Whereas, if you are beyond the borders you have different tools. It is all about differentiation of interactions. …This is very much about what is happening on the other side of the border. In my view, it determines the relation [between the EU and its Neighbourhood]. Borders are to define these relations and to give instruments for the interactions.’ As a result, different interactions require different instruments, hence different types of EUropean borders. It indicates there are two kinds of border within EUropean space. Gerard Delanty (2006) emphasises that borders in Europe are simultaneously either hard or soft and either open or closed in forms. In the context of the relationship between EUrope and non-​EUrope, this means there we no longer see clearcut inside-​outside of EUropean space. The practices of bordering of EUrope produce an important new type of identity on the opposition of legality vs illegality of different categories of people attempting to cross the EU border. Hence, EUropean borders also represent the hard type of borders, which primarily aim at selective exclusion of non-​EUropeans from EUropean space in order to ensure the freedom of movement of people within the Schengen area. It is worth recalling that the original idea of free movement was premised on a non-​discrimination principle (Favell, 2008). Paradoxically, to achieve this goal EUrope has to restrict the mobility of the non-​EUropean population –​which could be seen by them, and most likely is, as a form of discrimination. And finally, to achieve genuinely free movement within EUrope, it needs to act across many non-​EUropean spaces and use non-​EUropean resources and instruments (Bialasiewicz, 2012). Hence, in their logic of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, both the ENP and Schengen represent hard and soft borders, which goes beyond the popular view of EUrope as a fortress. Ruben Zaiotti argues that both ENP and Schengen share the same rationale of internal security and are, therefore, both affected by gated community syndrome, which creates a very specific type of relation between EUrope and non-​EUrope. What lies outside the fence is a potential threat and thus should be treated with suspicion. At the same time, members of the community are keen to maintain friendly relations with their neighbours … partly from a sense of courtesy, and partly from the recognition that neighbours might be very helpful in managing (and possibly preventing) potential threats from getting to the community’s gates. (Zaiotti, 2007: 144)

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Hence, EUropean borders are presented within ENP to be soft –​partially open but never entirely open –​but much of hard border regime remains, such as visas, enhanced border controls and asylum regulations. This is clearly manifested in the recent Global Strategy of the European Union, published in 2016 as the response to the migration crisis and the geopolitical changes in the EU’s vicinity after the Arab Spring and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. It declares that ‘Europeans, working together with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves … Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions’ (EU HR/​VP, 2016: 14). As one EU Commission official says: “borders are set to be controlling who is in and who is out, but they also give a visual representation of Europe or the EU. Then borders are fluid and they can change for different people.” All this leads to dual type of borderwork at EUropean borders, when hard borders are experienced as traumatic and life-t​ hreating (McDonald-​Gibson, 2016) while soft borders are experienced as burdensome but desirable to cross in order to achieve better cooperation and opportunities (Folis, 2012). This interconnection has been dramatically manifested within ‘the migration crisis’ and preceding years of enhanced securitisation of borders and non-​EUropean mobility after the introduction of external Schengen borders. As Nicolas de Genova (2017: 3) points out, ‘for several years, the European Union has actively converted the Mediterranean Sea into a mass grave’ and it has turned the maritime borders of Europe into a ‘macabre deathscape’ (p 2). Correspondingly, as de Genova argues, the Mediterranean Sea became an epicentre of lethal border crossing with many dramatic scenes of shipwreck, capsizing ‘migrant boats’ or drowning, leading to many premature, horrific, unnatural deaths, often following protracted ordeals of hunger, thirst, exposure and abandonment on the high seas. People attempting to reach EUropean space face many other dangers via land routes with overcrowded transit by road or rail, for instance in unventilated shipping containers. As de Geneova (2017: 33) also refers to, roughly estimating, there has been 30,000 deaths of those attempting to cross EUropean borders.3 This is not to say that the EU could be blamed for this. It represents one of the most challenging limits of EUrope –​the more EUropean border guards are trying to protect EUrope from ‘illegal’ entrances, the more they are endangering the lives of those trying to cross its borders. At the same time, those EUropean border guards are set to rescue the lives of people from whom they are protecting EUropean populations. The paradox is that with increasing outsourcing of border control, EUrope emerges as helpless without non-​EUrope to protect itself against non-​EUrope, as shown with the example of several Mobility Partnerships (MPs) or the EU-​Turkey refugee agreement.

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Where is EUrope’s border? Outsourcing of bordering and the pre-​frontier In recent years, the European Union has started to export its border control much beyond its formal territory. As Rumford notices with his reading of Balibar’s work, borders which are decided upon in Europe –​as a result of EU enlargement, withdrawal from former colonies, or the break up of formerly sovereign entities –​become reproduced in or transmitted to other parts of the world whose ability to construct, shape, or relocate their own borders in a comparable fashion is thereby diminished. (Rumford, 2008: 47) Many have already discussed the (neo-​) imperial character of the relationship of the EU with those in its closer and further vicinity (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Behr and Stivachtis, 2015; Foster, 2017; Emerson et al, 2007; Kramsch, 2011; Zielonka, 2007). Hartmut Behr (2015: 32) argues that the defining element of ‘empire’ is ability of the imperial polity to ‘govern from a distance’. In this sense, outsourcing of bordering practices to the neighbouring countries, engaging them in the control of the mobility of the non-​EUropean population or conditional policies for political and economic relationships, could be seen as of ‘imperial’ character. Outsourcing of EUropean bordering is premised on pre-​empting the ‘irregular’ arrivals of people from outside the Schengen area. As Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship stated, ‘the migratory and security challenges do not stop at our external borders. Nor should we. A Europe that protects is a Europe that works together with partner countries in its neighbourhood and beyond’ (EU Commission, 2018). The ENP played an important role in this process alongside the renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) –​the EU framework for its external migration and asylum policy, which aims at organising legal migration, fostering mobility across Schengen borders, ‘preventing and combatting irregular migration’, and eradicating human trafficking, as well as highlighting the need for ‘well-​managed mobility of third countries nationals across the external EU border’ (EU Commission, 2014: 2). The European Union utilised the instruments of the ENP to establish a series of bilateral MPs with many neighbouring countries. This allowed the EU to exert a significant degree of control over the movement of people far beyond EUropean territory. MPs have been designed to promote ‘regular’ migration for some categories of population, mostly economic mobility between EUrope and its neighbours, while restricting 150

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other categories. This predominantly aims to meet the needs of the European labour market, mostly cheaper labour and filling the demographic gap in EU countries to sustain their welfare systems. The outsourcing of border control is accompanied by increasing militarisation of bordering. As Vaughan-​Williams (2015: 26) points out, ‘while Frontex has sought to characterise itself as a technocratic risk manager and mere coordinator of EUrope’s borders, its profile and the nature of many of its operations are now more akin to those of military-​style forces’. Frontex uses various military-​style aerial surveillance techniques (satellites, GPS, drones) to gain real-​time information. In 2018, it began testing the use of unmanned aircraft for border surveillance (Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, RPAS) in Greece, Italy and Portugal to monitor the European Union’s external borders (EMSA, 2018). This represents how border control has become a ‘battlefield’ between border security authorities and ‘irregular’ migrants. Frontex’s major tool is the ‘European Border Surveillance System’ (EUROSUR). EUROSUR is based on the concept of ‘pre-​frontier’. It manifests in a clear way how EUrope acts beyond the territorial limits of EU member states. Frontex maintains a ‘situational picture and common pre-​frontier intelligence picture’ that presents what happens at European borders and the pre-​frontier area. The pre-​frontier includes ‘selective monitoring of third countries ports and coasts identified through risk analysis’ (EU Commission, 2011: 9), allowing for unprecedented control of people’s mobility in the ‘pre-​frontier area’, which is defined by the EU as the ‘geographical area beyond the external border of the member state, which is not covered by a national border surveillance system’ (EU Commission, 2011: 9). Importantly, EUROSUR is seen not only as a tool to enhance ‘the control of the Schengen border’, but also as a ‘life saving instrument’, which is ‘crucial to … protecting lives at the EU’s external borders’ and ‘enabling more effective prevention of loss of life’ (EU Commission, 2013: 16–​17). Outsourcing of EUropean border control reflects offshoring of EUropean borders and its pre-​emptive purpose. Military-​style surveillance of ‘irregular’ migrants in the ‘pre-​frontier’ area enhances the possibility of ‘pre-​emptive’ push-​backs of non-​EU populations from entering EUropean space, with an overlapping securitisation and humanitarianism of EUropean borderwork. This represents an important limit of EUrope. EUrope first created the system of hard bordering control, which restricted the movement of people between EUrope and non-​EUrope and subsequently, in exchange for more economic and social mobility via visa liberalisation, EUrope is expecting non-​EUropean countries to take responsibility for policing ‘irregular’ migration at their own external borders. Hence, it is legitimate to ask to what degree the EUropean privilege of free mobility within the Schengen area is conditioned on enhancing the securitisation and militarisation of its borders, 151

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and becoming more dependent on the policing of its borders from those countries against whose populations this securitisation and militarisation of its own borders is maintained.

Who is bordering EUrope? Borderwork of the EUropean institutions Terminology and tools employed in the daily borderwork of EUropean institutions within the ENP or Schengen are not only a product of neutral technical solutions that were created by professional impartial expertise, but also as responses that are profoundly influenced by the specific contexts and spatialising practices of European Commission or Frontex professionals. Merje Kuus (2014: 114) argues that the European Union holds the power of conceptualization over the space of neighbourhood through ‘the capacity of the EU institutions to take the union’s immediate exterior as their object of management and turn that space into “neighbourhood” as a specific kind of place to be managed through a particular set of policy instruments’. Clark and Jones (2011: 291) call this process ‘elite spatialising political practices’ through which officials and professionals use different terms and spatial concepts (like ‘neighbourhood’) to achieve their political goals. The language and policy instruments of the ENP and Schengen are extremely technical and jargon-​based. Kuus (2014: 114) claims that the EU holds the power of contextualisation –​the capacity of EU institutions, and in our context, especially the European Commission or Frontex, to wield expert authority through their deep knowledge of inter-​state and inter-​ institutional power dynamics in Brussels or Warsaw. The EU institutions can allow other actors to use their concepts because they claim to know the interests and agendas of these actors. Concerning the ENP, this knowledge is based on and operates through EU professionals and officials. Merje Kuus emphasises the specific political, institutional and social contexts in which this occurs –​the setting of the European Commission and the social interactions through which the technical language of the ENP is created and maintained. This focus allows us to see how the ENP is actually a part of borderwork of policy professionals in Brussels. As Kuus emphasises, it is always important to note who does the writing in the Commission and how technical the writing is. As she claims, in fact, the Commission acts as the interpretative and conceptual centre of the EU –​for the EU and for its neighbours. ‘The Commission reports on the process, but these very reports then become the building blocks of policies. Reporting on policy is actually policy-​making.’ (Kuus, 2014: 124) Through its power of conceptualisation –​and in particular, the European Commission or Frontex’s experts and professionals –​the EU makes its neighbours knowable and governable by playing the concept of Europe’s borders. Neighbours’ political, social and 152

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economic positions are imagined through varying degrees of Europeanness with a blurred inside-​outside distinction, while at the same time EUrope maintains a hard external border regime.

Conclusions: Limits of the EUropean borders and space In addressing the leading theme of this book, I argue that the limit of EUropean borders and space lies in the contradictory nature of the EU’s power of attraction, both in terms of its values and standard of EUropean life. Paradoxically, this power of attraction is fuelling the current practices of walling, securitising and militarising of the EU external borders against those who want to enter EUropean space. As discussed, Frontex –​the EU’s border agency –​is significantly more reliant on outsourcing and militarising of bordering practices to its neighbouring countries, while the ENP has incentives for cooperation to facilitate the mobility of non-​ EUropeans. All this leads to the situation in which EUrope is an acting subject in the imagined space of the EUropean Neighbourhood, which –​in EUrope’s view –​needs to be governed by the specific tools and which needs to contribute (again in EUrope’s view) to EUrope’s goals, mostly its own security. This represents a paradox in which what is ‘attractive’ to non-​EUrope needs to be increasingly heavy protected, not only by EUrope itself but most importantly also by the EUropean Neighbourhood, which is governing itself for the purposes of EUrope. At the same time, when this normative attractiveness is increasingly protected then the EU’s ability to softly influence non-​EUrope fades away. Consequently, this paradox represents one of the most acute limits of Europe. It undermines the very normative vision of EUrope (Manners, 2002) as a space of democracy, rule of law, freedom of movement and human rights with its ability to disseminate those values in non-​EUropean space. Instead, it seems more like the relationship between EUrope and non-​EUrope is based on the duality between securitisation and cooperation and between humanitarianism and securitisation/​militarisation of EUropean borders with its paradox of a simultaneously declared intention to preserve and protect lives of those who are attempting to cross borders, and the ‘production’ of their death. Seeing like a EUropean border reveals that the EU as a polity is contributing to the problem, more than providing a solution to global inequality of human mobility. It turns mobility into a privilege for some and stigma for others. In this sense, unlike many claiming the EUropean borders constituted Fortress Europe, I argue –​by referring to Ruben Zaiotti –​that they contributed, and continue to contribute, to EUrope’s gated community syndrome. Nick Vaughan-​Williams (2015: 113) concludes that 153

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bordering practices of liberal democratic polities such as the EU have the potential to acquire a destructive logic –​both in terms of symbolic suicide of negating values supposedly at the heart of those societies, and by posing risks to the very lives that they are designed to protect, through increasingly aggressive degrees of combat. Hence, looking at the limits of EUropean space and borders leaves us with the question of whether the European Union is a community of values and norms, or a community that protects the interest of its own members and its populations against non-​EUrope. Notes 1

2

The term ‘migration crisis’ was widely used in the context of enhanced mobility of non-​EU population heading into EU territory from 2015 onwards. This population consisted of people with different legal statuses –​refugees and migrants. The terms have been used interchangeably in the public discourse, by some purposefully and by others without purpose. With both motivations, the term ‘migration crisis’ was used from the perspective of the given polity (the EU or member states) and strategically deployed as the crisis of a polity’s capacity to control movement of non-​EU people. Subsequently, it emerged as a ‘state of emergency’ for the EU or the member states’ bordering, police and asylum law enforcement. Hence, proposed solutions for the ‘migration crisis’ aimed to develop ‘better’ state capacities to control mobility. As Nicolas de Genova (2017: 6) argues, from the perspective of non-​EU populations, their mobility could be seen as their autonomous movement, where ‘it is important to underscore that such mobility has come to be pervasively constructed as migration only to the extent that it is understood to involve the crossing (or transgression) of one or another sort of state-​imposed border. If there were no borders, there would be no migration –​only mobility’. In his perspective, the EU and/​or member states’ bordering and securitisation of mobility is reactive to the original autonomy of people’s motivations and aspirations to be mobile. In other words, there is first an autonomous movement/​migration and then a response and reaction of the given polity and its tactics of bordering. This chapter is informed by the results of my fieldwork research conducted between December 2016 and June 2017 in the European Commission and EEAS. I conducted semi-​structured, individual in-​depth interviews with variously ranked staff responsible for the ENP and the EU’s external relations. That included interviews with officials and professionals working in the Cabinet of Commissioner for ENP and Enlargement Negotiations, Directorate-​General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and EEAS. My interviewees spoke on the condition of anonymity and their names are not revealed. In this chapter, they are presented by their position (‘official’ –​ those working as EU civil servants; or ‘professional’ –​those working as advisers to officials) and the institution they work in (the Commission or EEAS). They were advised about the purpose of the study and informed that their statements will not be presented as an official position of their institution. They were not asked about the factual information with regards to given policies, but about their individual perspective on borders of Europe and/​or the EU: its roles and functions, its relations to identity, values and how they are all linked –​in their views –​with the specific policy instruments. The interviews were aiming to contribute to a more ethnographic perspective on borderwork and EUropean borders as such. My purpose was to study the role of EU officials and professionals in 154

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3

bordering practices, which are often neglected due to their –​alleged –​politically neutral image of professionalism as well as technocratic and expert-​like positions. Hence, this research draws the attention of Critical Border Studies to the crucial role of EU officials in bordering practices and it puts emphasis on how they experience borders while working on the space of the ‘EUropean Neighbourhood’. This approach is widely inspired by research of Merje Kuus (2014). As always, there are limitations to ethnographic research, so as the same applied to this research. Most of my interviewees are very busy professionals with packed daily schedules. Most of the institutions –​even though acting as open and as transparent as possible –​are not easy to reach, especially the higher ranked officials and professionals. Hence, the original structure and selected types of positions of people to be interviewed were adapted to their availability and my research timetable. I am indebted with a solid gratitude to my home institution –​Lazarski University in Warsaw, Poland –​for generously granting me statuary research funds, which allowed me to conduct the fieldwork in Brussels, Belgium. This figure is especially striking when compared with the estimated 200 victims who attempted to cross the Berlin Wall during its 28 years of its existence. See www. berliner-​ mauer-​gedenkstaette.de/​en/​uploads/​todesopfer_​dokumente/​2017_​08_​08_​ hertle_​ nooke_​victims_​berlin_​wall.pdf

Acknowledgements This chapter was written during my research visit at Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, July–​October 2018. My stay was generously funded by Mary and Clifford Corbridge Trust awarded by Robinson College, Cambridge University, UK. I wish to thank William Outhwaite for his letter of reference in my Corbridge Trust application and his very kind support over the last few years. Finally, I wholeheartedly thank Russell Foster for inviting me to co-​edit this book as well as for his continuous trust, support and his genuine friendship. Dziękuję. I dedicate this work to the memory of my Grandmother, who passed away while I was working on this chapter and this volume, and who was always very supportive to me till the very end. References Agnew, J. (2009) ‘Making the strange familiar: geographical analogy in global geopolitics’, Geographical Review, 99(3): 426–​443. Andersson, R. (2010a) ‘Wild man at Europe’s gates: The crafting of clandestines in Spain’s Cayuco crisis’, Etnofoor, (22)2: 31–​49. Andersson, R. (2010b) ‘Hunter and prey: patrolling clandestine migration in the Euro-​A frican borderlands’, Anthropological Quarterly, (87)1: 119–​149. Bachelet, S. (2018) ‘‘Fighting against clandestine migration’: sub-​Saharan migrants’ political agency and uncertainty in Morocco’, PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, (41)2: 201–​215. Balibar, E. (2009) ‘Europe as borderland’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27(2): 190–​215. 155

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Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (2001) The social construction of Europe, London: SAGE. Clark, J.R.A. and Jones, A.R. (2011) ‘The spatialising politics of European political practice: transacting ‘Eastness’ in the European Union’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 29(2): 291–​308. de Genova, N. (2017) The borders of “Europe”. Autonomy of migration, tactics of bordering, Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press. Delanty, G. (1995) Inventing Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Delanty, G. (2006) ‘Borders in a changing Europe: dynamics of openness and closure’, Comparative European Politics, 4(2/​3): 183–​202. Delanty, G. and Rumford, C. (2005) Rethinking Europe: social theory and the implications of Europeanization, London: Routledge. Diez, T. (2004) ‘Europe’s others and the return of geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17(2): 319–​335. Diez, T. (2006) ‘The paradoxes of Europe’s borders’, Comparative European Politics, 4(2/​3): 235–​252. Eder, K. (2006) ‘Europe’s borders: the narrative construction of the boundaries of Europe’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2): 255–​271. Emerson, M., Noutcheva, G. and Popescu, N. (2007) ‘European neighbourhood policy two years on: time indeed for an ‘ENP plus’, CEPS Policy Briefs 126. EMSA (2018) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems enter into operation in Portugal for border surveillance, http://​www.emsa.eur​opa.eu/​news-​a-​ press-c​ ent​ re/p​ ress-r​ eleas​ es/i​ tem/3​ 366-r​ pas-e​ nter-​into-​operat​ion-​in-​portu​ gal-​for-​bor​der-​surve​illa​nce. html EU Commission (2011) Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM/​2011/​0873 final. EU Commission (2013) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean, COM/​ 2013/​0869 final EU Commission (2014) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Report on the Implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 2012–​13, COM(2014) 96 final EU Commission (2018) Border management: EU signs agreement with Albania on European Border and Coast Guard Agency cooperation, press release, 5 October. EU HR/​VP (2016) Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. A global strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy, June, https://​eeas.europa.eu/​ archives/​docs/​top_​stories/​pdf/​eugs_​review_​web.pdf Favell, A. (2008) Eurostars and Eurocities: free movement and mobility in an integrating Europe, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Folis, K. (2012) Building Fortress Europe. The Polish-​Ukrainian frontier, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 157

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Foster, R. (2013) ‘Tabula imperii Europae: a cartographic approach to the current debate on the European Union as empire’, Geopolitics, 18(2): 371–​402. Foster, R. (2017) Tabulae Imperii Europeai: mapping European empire, London: Routledge. Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Huysmans, J. (2006) The politics of insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, London and New York: Routledge. Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M. and Rumford, C. (2011) ‘Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies’, Political Geography, 30(2): 61–​69. Kramsch, O.T. (2011) ‘Along the Borgesian frontier: excavating the neighbourhood of “wider Europe”’, Geopolitics, 16(1): 193–​210. Kuus, M. (2004) ‘Europe’s eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-​Central Europe’, Progress in Human Geography, 28(4): 472–​489. Kuus, M. (2014) Geopolitics and expertise: knowledge and authority in European diplomacy, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Lendaro, A. (2016) ‘A ‘European Migrant Crisis’? Some Thoughts on Mediterranean Borders’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, (16)1: 148–​157. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2): 235–​258. McDonald-​Gibson, C. (2016) Cast away. Stories of survival from Europe’s refugee crisis, London: Portobello Books. Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013) Border as method, or, the multiplication of labor, Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press. Newman, D. (2003) ‘On borders and power: a theoretical framework’, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 18(1): 13–​25. Newman, D. and Paasi, A. (1998) ‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography’, Progress in Human Geography, 22(2): 186–​207. Parker, N. and Vaughan-​Williams, N. et al (2009) ‘Lines in the sand? Towards an agenda for Critical Border Studies’, Geopolitics, 14(3): 582–​587. Parker, N. and Vaughan-​W illiams, N. (2012) ‘Cr itical Border Studies: broadening and deepening the ‘lines in the sand’ agenda’, Geopolitics, 17(4): 727–​733. Prodi, R. (2002) ‘A wider Europe –​A proximity policy as the key to stability’, Speech 02-​619, Brussels, 5 December, http://​europa.eu/​rapid/​ press-​release_​SPEECH-​02-​619_​en.htm Reinisch, J. (2015) ‘‘Forever temporary’: migrants in Calais, then and now’, Political Quarterly, 86(4): 515–​522.

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Reuters (2018) ‘Hungary will defend traditional families, stop demographic decline, Orban says’, 25 May, www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​hungary-​orban/​ hungary-​will-​defend-​traditional-​f amilies-​stop-​demographic-​decline-​ orban-​says-​idUSKCN1IQ0V8 Rigy, J. and Schlembach, R. (2013) ‘Impossible protest: no borders in Calais’, Citizenship Studies, 17(2): 157–​172. Rumford, C. (2008) Cosmopolitan spaces: Europe, globalization, theory, New York: Routledge. Rumford, C. (2009) The SAGE handbook of European studies, London: SAGE Publications. Saddiki, S. (2010) ‘Ceuta and Melilla Fences: a EU multidimensional border’, Conference Proceedings, 82nd annual conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Concordia University, Montreal. Salter, M.B. (2012) ‘Theory of the /​: the suture and Critical Border Studies’, Geopolitics, 17(4): 734–​755. Scott, J. (1998) Seeing like a state. How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, New York: Yale University Press. Squires, N. (2018) ‘Italy’s Matteo Salvini provokes vulgar outburst from Luxembourg in fresh row over mig rants’, Telegraph, 1 4 S e p t e m b e r, w w w. t e l e g r a p h . c o. u k / ​n ew s / ​ 2 0 1 8 / ​ 0 9 / ​ 1 4 /​ italys-​matteo-​salvini-​fresh-​row-​migrants-​provoking-​outburst/​ Tu s k , D. ( 2 0 1 8 a ) S p e e c h by P r e s i d e n t D o n a l d Tu s k a t the EPP Helsinki summit 2018, 11 November, https:// ​ w ww. consilium.europa.eu/ ​ f r/ ​ p ress/ ​ p ress- ​ r eleases/ ​ 2 018/ ​ 1 1/ ​ 0 8/​ speech-​by-​president-​donald-​tusk-​at-​the-​epp-​helsinki-​summit-​2018/​ Tusk, D. (2018b) Invitation letter by President Donald Tusk to the members of the European Council ahead of their meetings on 28 and 29 June 2018, 27 June, https://​www.consil​ium.eur​opa.eu/​de/p​ ress/p​ ress-r​ eleas​ es/2​ 018/​ 06/2​ 7/i​ nvi​ tati​ on-​let​ter-​by-​presid​ent-​don​ald-​tusk-​to-​the-​memb​ers-​of-​the-​ europ​ean-​ council-​ahead-​of-​their-​meetings-​on-2​ 8-a​ nd-2​ 9-j​ une-2​ 018/p​ df Vaughan-​Williams, N. (2015) Europe’s border crisis. Biopolitical security and beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walters, W. (2009) ‘Europe’s Borders’, in C. Rumford (ed), The SAGE handbook of European studies, London: SAGE. Walters, W. (2012) Governmentality: critical encounters, New York: Routledge. Walters, W. and Haahr, J.H. (2005) Governing Europe: discourse, governmentality and European integration, New York: Routledge. Wodak, R. (2015) The politics of fear. What right-​wing populist discourses mean, London: Sage. Zaiotti, R. (2007) ‘Of friends and fences: Europe’s neighbourhood policy and the ‘gated community syndrome’’, European Integration, (29)2: 143–​162. Zielonka, J. (2007) Europe as empire: The nature of the enlarged European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 159

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Reflections on Borders, Boundaries and the Limits of EUrope Tobias Schumacher

The challenge of demarcating the physical and functional limits of EUrope predates the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993 and has frequently sparked recurring political and scholarly debates since the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957. The latter, in its Article 237, introduced the infamous stipulation that ‘any European state may apply to become a member of the Community’, thus leaving ample room for interpretation as to what and who is and is not ‘European’. It also contained a protocol regulating the Community’s relations with France’s (former) colonies Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which –​in spite of their (debatable) ‘non-​Europeanness’ –​ were offered to be temporarily treated like de facto member states as far as trade matters were concerned. Though this special treatment has to be understood against the backdrop of France’s multi-​layered relations privilégiées with its two former protectorates and overseas department respectively and be embedded in the wider decolonisation dynamics at the time, it already offered a foretaste of the EU’s continuous and rather perplexing inability to conceptualise and thereby define what constitutes the territorial, functional, political and cultural borders and boundaries of EUrope. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this was compounded, for example, by the Community’s Global Mediterranean Policy. The policy framework united non-​European countries from the Maghreb and Mashreq, but also European countries such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta, the latter two of which continued to be treated as ‘Mediterranean partner countries’ until 2004, when they became EU member states and changed their status accordingly. The rejection of Morocco’s EC membership bid in 1987 seemed to have offered some clarity as to where the limits of EUrope lie, given that Brussels for the first time ever rejected a country on the grounds of its geographical positioning. The 160

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official recognition of Turkey –​a predominantly Muslim country located mainly on the Asian continent –​as a candidate for full EU membership by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, in conjunction with the subsequent bickering in EU decision-​making circles over the country’s European credentials, however, laid bare the polysemy of ‘Europeanness’ and the diverging interpretations of the foundational underpinnings of EUrope, all of which continue to influence negatively how the EU relates to, and deals with, countries located at its current geographical periphery. Even though the territorial parameters of this space were defined by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2003/​2004, explicit criteria of what constitutes ‘neighbourhood’ and, therefore, the EU’s Other, were never drawn up by Brussels and EU member states. This omission is, first and foremost, reflected in the heterogeneous composition of the ENP itself, as it comprises non-​European countries from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as countries from Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, some of which (Jordan, Armenia, Azerbaijan) do not even share land, air or sea borders with individual EU member states and, thus, cannot even be considered to be ‘neighbours’ in the strictest sense of the word. As a matter of fact, terms such as ‘neighbours’ and ‘neighbourhood’ are EUropean creations and stand in the tradition of past EU framing practices that revolved around labels such as ‘Euro-​Arab’, ‘Euro-​Mediterranean’ and ‘post-​Soviet’, merely epitomising Brussels’ longstanding struggle to clearly demarcate the inside from the outside. Though the EU has, at least during the initial stages of the ENP, attempted to convince both itself and its ‘neighbours’ of the utility of the policy framework by euphemistically framing it as an approach that would allow the non-​EU Other to ‘reap the benefits of enlargement’, stakeholders in the EU’s ‘eastern and southern neighbourhood’ have come to understand that the alleged benefits do not entail a membership perspective and are limited in terms of scope, substance and co-​ownership. Sixteen years into the ENP, the underlying inside-​outside relationship is still characterised by centre-​periphery dynamics, whereby the centre –​the EU –​claims to know what is best for the periphery –​the ‘neighbours’ –​ and attempts to transpose its values, norms, rules and regulations regardless of whether these resonate with local, national and regional specificities at the receiving end. These supposedly normative power deliberations might have brought about blurred sectoral borders between the EU on one hand and ‘neighbours’ on the other, given that some of them are currently in the process of approximating with, and adopting and implementing mainly single market-​related EU rules and regulations. At the same time, however, this blurring practice cannot conceal that, after all, it is mainly destined to consolidate EUrope’s efforts to govern from a distance and cement, or create, new hard borders, the purpose of which are merely to secure the allegedly civilised Self from the insecure and unstable Other. 161

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Such practices have not (yet) impacted negatively on existing power relations between EUrope and at least some ‘neighbours’, as the latter find themselves in a position of multi-​layered dependency. Other ‘neighbours’, however, mainly as a result of changes in the post-​Cold War order, the discovery of their agency and the realisation that EU bordering practices are likely to be reinforced in the years to come, have become increasingly vocal and begun to look for alternative partners elsewhere. This gradual –​and in some cases even understandable –​shift away from EUrope is not without consequences, though. As far as the EU is concerned, it will inevitably have to come to terms with the understanding that, as a result of both its erratic bordering practices and its inability to define the limits of EUrope in a straightforward manner, it is inevitably losing its self-​proclaimed status as a normative power –​or rather what is left of it –​and see its attractiveness as a gravity centre for the Other erode dramatically. Obviously, such a development implies a decreased ability to project influence and power beyond its immediate borders, but –​provided there is a sufficient degree of self-​reflexivity on the part of EU decision makers –​also entails the chance that the EU might eventually engage in a rethink of the viability and appropriateness of its past discourses and practices and, therefore, even feel forced to address more constructively the meaning, nature and scope of EUrope eventually. In light of a seemingly ever fragmented EU and a blatant lack of political leadership, in conjunction with a multitude of intra-​and extra-​EUropean crises, it would be unrealistic to argue that the EU is currently in a position to address the territorial and functional limits of EUrope. Yet, regardless of how much it tries to reject such a debate, it cannot afford to postpone it much longer simply because what is at stake is not just its ability to exert influence beyond, but in fact its very legitimacy and mission civilisatrice.

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Brexit: A Requiem for the Post-​National Society? Adrian Favell

It might be argued that one of the limits of EUrope that has been revealed most starkly by Brexit is the EU’s ‘normative power’ claim to represent universalisable political values (Manners, 2002) –​that is, values beyond the nation state. Most leading EU scholars are of a generation and career formation which viewed the EU as the best likely vehicle of carrying forward what was left of the ‘enlightenment project’, amid the sharp breakdown in the 1970s and 1980s of belief in utopian teleologies, heralded by post-​modern and post-​colonial thought. The European ‘dream of the nineties’ (for that is what it was) was most famously articulated in the writings of Habermas and Beck on post-​national ideals and the cosmopolitan potential of the EU (Habermas, 1998; Beck and Grande, 2007; see also Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Delanty, 2009). Yet, the most potent ‘Leave’ arguments articulated in university debates around the UK before the referendum were those by agitated, internationalist-​minded left wing students: aware they might be losing the rights of European citizenship, but prepared to say that the EU’s regional protectionism had been a disaster for agriculture and other forms of domestic industry in the developing world, as well as for the graphically desperate migrants seeking to find a way through the heavily policed, security cordon in the Mediterranean imposed by EU agencies such as Frontex, and washing up on Greek, Italian and Spanish shores. What on Earth could be ‘post-​national’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ about such politics? In this essay, I acknowledge this critical question, while mounting a normative defence of the core ‘post-​national’ claim at the heart of the EU project: the idea of the ‘fourth freedom’, or the freedom of movement of persons (Favell, 2014). Little may be said perhaps in response to some of the EU’s neo-​colonial ‘empire’-​like effects on the development of the 163

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Global South, or the exclusionary drift of its North–​South border politics; but other plausible counterfactuals suggest far worse versions of Europe-​in-​ the-​world, as well as of other increasingly likely scenarios of international power politics. The return of an unashamed political nationalism in Europe, obviously, negates directly the validity of post-​national claims. But perhaps even more insidious are the effects of methodological nationalism –​the in-​built bias in most social science research to assume the nation state as the fundamental functional and normative unit of politics and society (Beck, 2000; Wimmer and Glick-​Schiller, 2002) –​in discussing progressive aspects of the European project. This was notably present even among cosmopolitan scholars –​in reified ideas of European identity and citizenship that projected nationally-​rooted conceptions to a supra-​national scale –​and is now again strongly present among progressive voices seeking a return to more notionally egalitarian national scale welfarist social democracies. The allure of these utopias has also facilitated the return of the national as the ‘natural’ horizon of normative power: the apparent triumph of conventional political demography inscribed in the claims of sovereignty and ‘people’s democracy’ that have carried Britain to the brink of Brexit, and the EU towards potential dissolution.

The EU and global inequalities The EU as ‘enlightenment project’ was clearly at risk if its impact on global inequalities could be seen as negative. As defined starkly in the work of World Bank economist Branko Milanovic (2010), the EU’s self-​sustaining protectionism (on agriculture, especially) and its approach to restraining South–​North migration look to be very much part of the problem not the solution, particularly as the liberal optimism of the 1990s about development went sour in the following decade (de Haas, 2008). There are now a plurality of political sociologists willing to argue that European integration has also in fact exacerbated inequality within European societies: the ‘Euroclash’ of the ‘winners and losers’ of globalisation at a regional scale (Fligstein, 2008; Kriesi et al, 2008; Emmenegger et al, 2012; Beckfield, 2019). This verdict may prove dangerously insular, if the point is only to affirm the equality claims of the (white, native) ‘left behind’ of the rich West as victims of ‘neo-​ liberalism’, with no cross-​reference to Milanovic’s rather mixed global big picture on global inequality since 1990, which partly emphasised the rise of new global middle classes –​in China, South-​East Asia, India, Turkey, Brazil, and so on. Perhaps the (alleged) angst of Euro-​American working classes (Gest, 2016) is that these (mostly) black and brown people around the world are now in fact catching them up? Should we really pity those white natives ‘left behind’ in their own rich, highly developed countries, while their own highly globalised elites made off with all the money? This 164

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rather provincially-​focused verdict appears to be the message of a wave of ‘anti-​liberal’ post-​Brexit analysts in the UK (Goodhart, 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Kaufmann, 2018), offering analytical apologetics for the frank neo-​fascism expressed by much of the new populist politics. Leaving aside this debate, the EU’s righteous ‘post-​national’ claims are certainly going to look self-​regarding and hypocritical, if it can be argued that the European project normatively was, in the end, only for Europeans and only about preserving European privilege –​as ‘Eurocentric’ as post-​colonial and decolonial critics have always charged the self-​regarding, abstract ideals of European modernity to be (Mignolo, 2011). To this charge, Brexit poses the potential of a counterfactual. Were any of the left wing idealists voting ‘Leave’ in the UK –​along, covertly, it is suspected, with long time anti-​EU Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn –​right in thinking that a vote for Brexit could help deliver a fairer, more globally-​ minded Europe? It is doubtful. Talk of Global Britain is for most of the politicians articulating this vision nothing but a cover for an ‘Empire 2.0’ operation, as nicely characterised by Kehinde Andrews (2017). But the strong suspicion that the EU was nothing but an updated replication of European colonial privilege in the world (along with its universaling ‘normative power’ pretentions), was surely not lost on the still unclear numbers of British BME voters who decided to vote with the Leave camp –​despite its often blatant white English St George iconography. When they did, they usually cited the blatant inequity of freedom of movement rights for EU citizens that had, they thought, locked out family and friends from the New Commonwealth via the ever more draconian anti-​immigration laws against non-​EU citizens, developed through the New Labour years to Theresa May’s ‘hostile environment’ of the 2010s (Ehsan, 2017). There is perhaps little to say in defence in the EU’s political economy of agriculture subsidies and its impact worldwide. Nor can there be much normative justification mustered to defend how the EU enabled police, military and state border agencies from coordinating laws and policy practices and utilising ever more advanced technologies in trying to secure the self-​ styled European fortress, amid the chaos of its response to the refugee crisis. But of course the counterfactual here has to be how a different Europe of uneasily independent sovereign nation states would have combined to enforce collective economic interests or preserve the privilege of its rich populations and territory in an unequal world. Would a Europe-​of-​the-​ nations put its exploitative, dominant position any less ‘first’ than Donald Trump’s nationalist America? If history is any guide, Europe’s track record in the world prior to its embrace of a cosmopolitan mission in the post-​World War Two era is a salutary reminder. The old Europe of industrial might and imperial power was hardly in a better place to deliver the enlightenment values of its philosophers than the ‘new old Europe’ of Community and 165

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Union (to echo, argumentatively, Anderson, 2011). Nor, in any credible political view, could it be imagined that a more democratic –​or even a plurally populist demoicratic (Nikolaidis, 2018) –​European Union, in which peoples and their national political parties were allowed to articulate more directly their preference on their global economic interests, population change, or the global redistribution of their historical wealth, would ever deliver a fairer, more equitable ‘post-​national’ arrangement, or be more likely to welcome asylum seekers and poverty migrants from the East or South with open arms. On these points, the attempt to build an enlightened, rational law, and bureaucracy based, collective governance of otherwise rapacious European sovereign economies surely offered more hope, however tepid a version of internationalist liberal capitalism it posed –​as I will argue in this chapter. For the time being, other hyper-​or anti-​capitalist alternatives beckon. A post-​EU Europe could resemble –​in its more successful North-​ Western parts –​the kind of offshore, unfettered dream of anarchist global libertarians: returning us to a sharply hierarchical world of imperial diversity and great power manoeuvring, run by elite castes. Or, if we are true believers, after the ‘neo-​liberal’ European Union has collapsed, we may wait for the rise of a re-​nationalised socialist Europe, in which Corbynista and Podemos style parties rise to power to implement a new internationalist globalism –​yet somehow minus the global institutions which sustained the evil order of global banking, finance and dependent development. If his Buying Time (2014) proves, as some think, the definitive Critique of Political Economy of our own troubled times, we may await statues of Wolfgang Streeck in proud national capitals, where once there were statues of Marx and Engels (a discussion pursued in Favell, 2014, and Parker, 2017).

European citizenship as social closure? Leaving aside this speculation, it does still need to be asked what claim can the EU make, such as it was, to have been in any sense a cosmopolitan project –​given the blatant Eurocentricity of its territorial membership? European citizenship –​attributed solely via national citizenship to its holders (Hansen, 1998) –​clearly negated the non-​membership of others who were not EU nationals; as do all formal citizenships as forms of ‘social closure’ (Brubaker, 1992). The EU for many years made a virtue of this membership as the foundation of a constitutional pan-​European identity that would transcend the bounded form of the national. Certainly, republican voices –​Habermas uppermost –​saw it so: as the foundation of some kind of grand European democratic superstate. Its cosmopolitan constitutional unity in diversity would anchor its normative power. A Europe of citizens, identifying with and sustaining a benign, enlightened federal power, driven by all inclusive, rational institutions, influencing the world as a benign, imperial exemplar. 166

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On the way towards some United Nations ... (only there already was a United Nations, with its own hubris about universalisable cosmopolitanism; see Mazower, 2013). European citizenship thus implied a teleology, and as such a ‘people’ of peoples, that could only be as diverse as its constituent populations. Internally, much was needed before any kind of ‘starting line’ on non-​ discrimination towards ethnic and racial minorities –​notably Europe’s very large constitutive Muslim population –​might be realisable (Niessen, 2000); many national member states’ very patchy track record on anti-​discrimination and treatment of minorities, and significant differences in campaign goals between representatives of different migrant and minority voices across the continent, held this back for years (Guiraudon, 2001). Meanwhile, ‘migration management’ to the exterior was instituted, and in the 1990s was also largely still dedicated to enlightened, ‘opening not closing’ ideas about porous, interactive, cooperative borders with neighbours, and ‘win-​win-​win’ mobility/​demography/​development goals. However, progress towards an equal inclusion of Third Country nationals –​post-​national rights for all on the basis of residence (Kostakopoulou, 2008) –​remained very slow. The EU remained a post-​national club paradoxically which required naturalisation to an EU member state nationality in order to access free movement benefits. The EU’s impact on global inequalities via a ‘post-​national’ redistribution of rights and opportunities in a more gently integrating global world economy was thus largely limited to its economic effects, not those that might have been extended via more extensive recognition of human rights protection for foreigners (Jacobson, 1996). Yet, the ideal of neighbourhood policies and (in particular) the Euro-​Mediterranean Partnership could be argued as mildly benevolent –​at least in comparison to the blatantly empire-​like exploitation of the planet’s population and productive resources pursued by the US (Hardt and Negri, 2000), or (in a different way) ‘Belt and Road’ China (Shambaugh, 2013). But any effects on global inequalities could only be incremental, as fast as the straight-​out-​of Adam Smith prescribed win-​win-​win development in the wealth of nations might allow, via foreign direct investment, fair trade, migrant remittances, brain circulation and rising middle classes, and assuming no distorting mercantilist exploitation or monopolisation –​and all this from enlightened peoples who only 200 years before had been shipping their black and brown colonials around the world as slaves (see especially Hansen and Johnsson, 2014, on the EU’s hidden history of ongoing colonialism). The liberal economic globalist prescription, anchored in (frankly unsustainable) growth models at a global scale, was as far as progressive thought got in the expansive, idealist 1990s (de Haas, 2008). It was the EU as an Economist editorial. Europe’s more convincing normative mission was instead trained internally: through the effects of the four freedoms, on 167

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inequality within and across the European territory. European integration was of course premised on the highly optimistic assumption of market equilibrium, functional distribution of labour/​production, and thereby inclusive, equalising, redistributive development across the currency area. Economists do believe in this kind of thing; an economic theory of regional integration has always driven the Commission’s ideas (Recchi, 2015). Miraculously, we might say, it worked in some cases, up to a point: the post-​ Franco case of the re-​integration and modernising trajectory of Spain (la movida) being the EU’s greatest vindication. Further eastward enlargements followed, and the defining geo-​political triumph of the EU as it was: to transcend the territorial division of the continent imposed by the Cold War. Again, only the cynical among those most critical to the European ‘empire’ being built (such as Böröcz and Kovacs, 2001) would deny the effects on the equality of peoples in Europe of this enlargement. The ‘fourth freedom’, as it deserves to be called, put people(s) on the move; and, if and when they were young people, seizing opportunity, and moving Europe transactionally, it can only be said that it was via these movements East to West that the greatest blow in a century to regional inequality –​physically, psychologically, ethnically –​was delivered. Even economically, until it went politically sour at both ends in the 2010s, Polish and Romanian pendular and transnational mobilities, and eastwards economic remittances and investment, worked very well according to the economic theory of regional integration. Was this ‘fourth freedom’ a zero-​sum loss for those not yet, or never to be, part of the European club –​the ‘non-​EU’ populations at the borders and beyond? This is not clear, but is worth debating. It is like discussing whether they were also a zero-​sum like cost to the supposedly ‘left behind’ native populations who faced the presence of EU free movement as a competition for jobs or social resources. That ‘competition’ with ‘natives’ can in a broad sense be shown to be generally false, although its spatial concentration can account for a part of the enmity which arose in some places in provincial England (see Portes, 2016; Vargas-​Silva, 2017). Generally though, the place of East European movers –​consisting also of significant numbers of young educated or skilled workers, and those highly entrepreneurial in nature –​was in fact a complementary relation. Its negative effects, relative to its transformative powers on the British economy and British society, were at least nowhere near any economic threshold by which the cosmopolitanism of, say, the British economy in the 1990s and 2000s could be argued to have been harmful. There may have been some sense of a relation of ‘white’ European demand-​driven migration replacing some of the global migrants –​and relatives of British BME citizens –​who might have been able to come had there not been Theresa May’s draconian hostile environment (Favell, 2008a). But overall, the fourth freedom was normatively extraordinary because it put something new in the world that in fact reinforced the deep, 168

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cosmopolitan tendencies embedded in anti-​racist, anti-​discriminatory norms that had shakily emerged in the European post-​war –​and most boldly in the UK’s policy and legislation in response to post-​colonial and then global new migrations. A case can be made then that the fourth freedom of movement of persons and the rights it gave –​packaged rather deceivingly under the rubric of ‘European citizenship’ –​were indeed the instituting of a very real, concrete form of ‘post-​national membership’ in the famous historical line of T.H. Marshall (1950); and extending rather further in their individualising rights-​ based properties than the fragmented ‘post-​national’ social rights of Third Country nationals (such as the Turkish in Germany), identified by Yasemin Soysal in her Limits of Citizenship (1994). The Marshallian logic was for the first time taken beyond the nation state, and rights attributed to individuals in ways that could not be limited by nationality (Soysal, 2012). In a country such as the UK, which favoured the economic benefits of a genuinely open labour market in most sectors and had heavily policed organisational and institutional norms of anti-​discrimination, the addition of non-​discrimination by nationality to these powers had an extraordinary impact. Anti-​discrimination law had always suggested this diasporic implication: that in legislating against race, gender, ethnic, religious or disability discrimination, it was protecting the individual qua individual against the privilege of normal, mainstream national society. In its extension to all those present in the territory legally, regardless of origin or length of stay –​dramatically making discrimination by nationality analogous to all other forms of discrimination –​it was a direct undermining of the nationalised privilege of citizenship as (passport carrying) membership. An argument comes full circle here to unify the claims of European non-​nationals in the UK, with those articulated famously (and tragically, in political terms) by the report on The Future of Multi-​Ethnic Britain (in 2000, known as the Parekh report), informed by Stuart Hall’s diasporic, post-​national vision of the post-​colonial. The UK in the 2000s was therefore on the cusp of becoming Europe’s first genuinely post-​national society –​ despite itself, certainly, in many ways –​and not only because, as documented (in)famously by the right wing demographer, David Coleman (2016), Britain would soon no longer be a majority ‘better white British’ society. When the Daily Telegraph led the vitriol against the Parekh report before its publication, it knew very well what it was fighting: its struggle against the diasporic, post-​national and cosmopolitan vision of multi-​ethnic Britain in 2000 was one and the same thing as its struggle against the post-​national and cosmopolitan consequences of EU freedom of movement 15 years later. New Labour panicked at the nationalist backlash; and a crucial progressive dimension was lost forever from its transformative vision. Officially, then, the party got cold feet over diasporic multiculturalism (Joppke and Morawska, 2003); instead the transformation took the form of open door migration 169

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policies that followed the East European accessions of 2004 and (with more restriction) 2007.

The triumph of political demography Britain as a migration country certainly was, on the ground, utterly transformed by the highly mobile, mostly youthful, and generally white, new European migrations of the 2000s. We are now seeing the consequences of undoing the post-​national rights that many of these migrants enjoyed –​as Brexit will do. Obviously, EU nationals in the UK will become outside ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreigners’ again, rendered unequal by definition to ‘nationals’, rejoining some laborious path to equal membership, at some unclear point in the future, if they accept and are able to ‘naturalise’. Until then, they will find their rights to equal treatment re-​differentiated by skills and education, ‘whiteness’, cultural proximity, South-​isms and East-​isms again: not treated as equal ‘citizens’, as they had been, as post-​national ‘free movers’. Even in some of the most sophisticated academic debates, these populations routinely and falsely have long been referred to as ‘immigrants’ or part of ‘immigration’ policy (see, for example, the public opinion analysts who have explained Brexit in terms of ‘EU immigration’: Evans and Mellon, 2015; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Favell and Barbulescu, 2018). The sovereign island nation has resolutely been unable to understand the porous, transient, transactional and transnational nature of the European mobilities its economy and society so openly welcomed. EU non-​nationals had already become ‘immigrants’ well before Nigel Farage plastered his infamous ‘breaking point’ image on a lorry in London –​the threatening hordes of Syrian male asylum seekers in Central Europe coming our way (a group also not, legally speaking, immigrants). This reflex of methodological nationalism –​ of seeing all actual and potential resident foreigners as ‘immigrants’ –​is overwhelming in public discourse. And the more visibly ‘Eastern’ or racially distinct the population was, the more they were said to be unwanted ‘immigration’. Even some supposedly progressive campaigns in their name (such as the misguided, progressively intended, ‘I am an immigrant’ campaign) fell into the same methodologically nationalist trap. Britain on all sides could only imagine discourse about international mobilities in nationalist terms: of ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreigners’ we could (still) welcome to this island nation. And so free movers living in this corner of Europe will after Brexit be just foreigners again, with no right to be on UK territory or claim equality of treatment, unless they accept to naturalise ‘British’ (if they are able –​which is far from given due to the rules and expense). In order to access and maintain the normative benefits of equal membership, they will be forced to ‘integrate’ as British citizens –​rather than the post-​ national European individuals they had been under freedom of movement 170

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laws. The default acceptance of methodological nationalism by all sides has rendered this notion reasonable to most people: EU non-​national residents after Brexit will just have to like it or lump it. It was no coincidence though that this enforcement of the nationalist basis of membership in British society should coincide with the surfacing of the Windrush scandal, in which children of the first waves of post-​war migration to the UK from the Caribbean discovered, amid recent new procedures for checking resident status, that they were lacking any proof of British citizenship. In many cases, they then faced deportation even though they had grown up and lived decades in the UK. Hundreds of second generation UK BME residents were thus left high and dry by this exposure of the thin-​ness of their British empire membership –​a direct consequence of the harshness of Theresa May’s bureaucratic ‘hostile environment’. BME British, bred and socialised on these shores, became visibly ‘immigrants’ again –​British citizens who never had passports being put through the indignity of proving their right to reside, alongside all the other ‘immigrants’ questioned about their documentation or told to ‘go home’. How quickly the proud veneer of multi-​ racial Britain was exposed. They were part of a post-​colonial ‘immigration’ who had so successfully become ‘Black British’ that it had been unacceptable (since the 1970s) to speak of them as ‘immigrants’ –​as so indignantly proven by the ascendant moral argument of Paul Gilroy’s There ain’t no black in the Union Jack (1987). Yet all it took was a bureaucratic enforcement of routine national documentation for their British-​ness to be exposed as less secure than the ‘true’ English people around them; the ones whose immaculately white British-​ness demographers and other influential commentators claim can be traced to ancient roots (Coleman, 2016; Collier, 2013). Once again an ‘immigration’ story of ‘foreigners’ crossing a border and settling on the island had to be imposed, even though they had all been born as subjects in the British empire, and the borders had in fact crossed them (Bhambra, 2016). Nearly 50 years of it being incorrect to talk about Commonwealth movers as ‘immigrants’ had been swiftly reversed; with pundits and politicians cementing the story by re-​imposing false progressive narratives –​of Britain being a selective immigrant settler nation just like Canada, or Australia, seeking a new middle way (Goodhart, 2017; Collier, 2013). The fate of the 3 million EU nationals in this conceptual trap is a sad one; but a bigger casualty surely is the still smouldering notion of Britain as a post-​national space of diasporas –​in which national origin is irrelevant, in which ‘being British’, as opposed to being generically non-​national something (whether ‘European’ or ‘Global’, or just ‘young’, ‘LGBT’, a ‘goth’, or an ‘Arsenal fan’, or whatever), is an indifferent or empty, open category. We all know the manifold post-​national identities and interactions of what is often called ‘super-​diversity’ exist (Vertovec, 2007): on the streets, in the city, anywhere in fact, where somehow the question ‘where are you from?’ 171

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is no longer important, or merely a designator of another ‘non-​national’ place. One can almost imagine or touch this place ethnographically, sitting on the tube in London or walking through Dalston market in East London (see Wessendorf, 2010). But these realities clearly are marginalised in the everyday world by the cognitive infrastructure of ‘democratic’ media and politics, in which membership of the discussion, is always national; of a ‘people’ and society, however diverse, constituted by national membership of an island territory. Ironically, for all kinds of reasons, the contemporary UK in the 1990s and 2000s, offshore from Europe, but the most Europeanised member state on these key dimensions, was the place in Europe where the true normative power of the EU as the harbinger of post-​national society was being realised. This was put to the ‘people’ –​gerrymandered, as the electorate was, to exclude resident ‘foreigners’ –​in June 2016, and the ‘people’ rejected it. They reasserted sovereignty over a society that was indeed, however unstably, partially, imperfectly, no longer theirs (as Nigel Farage correctly claimed) –​because it had become, in fact, everyone’s. Yet Leviathan spoke: the body politic asserted its exclusive unity over the notion of population, banishing the constructed foreign to its borders again –​the triumph of the political over transnational society and demography; or, to put it another way, vindicating the triumphant nation-​constituting power of political demography. Our requiem should not overstate the exclusive role of the UK vote on Brexit in killing the notion of non-​discrimination by nationality in Europe. Already other member states, notably Denmark and Germany, have moved to remove social rights of EU non-​nationals in their territories, in line with David Cameron’s negotiated opt outs for Britain –​and this despite Angela Merkel’s continual incantation of the inviolability of the four freedoms. European case law has turned away from expansive interpretations of EU citizens’ rights in recent years; Schengen open borders have frequently become optional whenever states needed or chose to impose borders again (on these shifts, see Pennings and Seeleib-​Kaiser, 2018). And, in any case, labour markets across most of Europe have always mostly been de facto discriminatory towards non-​nationals –​according to insider credentialism, unionised privileges, or simply cultural barriers –​which made the genuine openness of much of the British labour market in the 1900s and 2000s so remarkable (Favell, 2014). The offshore UK of these two decades was in fact an exemplar of Europeanisation in this respect, at the heart of EU values and regional integration (Gerhards, 2007), with London its capital (Favell, 2008b). That heart may already be moving to Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Berlin, rival cities that will reap the benefit of its unexpected, but very British, rejection. As I have argued, the British dilemma on immigration, as well as its violent attempt to de-​Europeanise itself with Brexit, reveals the limits of EUrope 172

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in several ways. In throwing away the fruits of the post-​national society that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, the ethno-​national origins of British (in fact: English) nationhood have been exposed: the ‘immigrant’ stigma of EU nationals and the Windrush generation being substantially the same fate of all diaspora populations in countries which impose complete national ‘integration’ as a condition of full membership. Britain’s failure also casts a sharp light on the limitations of a ‘European citizenship’, which has never been able to embrace the post-​national rights of resident non-​EU nationals, and the claims of global inequality beyond the bounds of Europe. Minus the UK, it is likely that other member states will drift back towards re-​nationalisation and further restriction on the remarkable post-​national mobilities enabled and extended by the ‘fourth freedom’: a requiem indeed will be called for. References Anderson, P. (2011) The new old Europe, London: Verso. Andrews, K. (2017) ‘Building Brexit on the myth of empire ignores our brutal history’, Guardian, 7 March, www.theguardian.com/​commentisfree/​2017/​ mar/0​ 7/b​ uilding-​brexit-​on-​myth-​of-​empire-i​ gnores-h ​ istory-a​ t-o ​ ur-p​ eril Beck, U. (2000) What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. and Grande, E. (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe, Cambridge: Polity Press. Beckfield, J. (2019) Unequal Europe: regional Europe and the rise of European inequality, New York: Oxford University Press. Bhambra, G. (2016) ‘Brexit, the Commonwealth, and exclusionary citizenship’, Open Democracy, 8 December, www.opendemocracy.net/​gurminder-​k-​ bhambra/​ brexit-​commonwealth-​and-​exclusionary-​citizenship Böröcz, J. and Kovacs, M. (eds) (2001) Empire’s new clothes: unveiling EU enlargement, New Brunswick, NJ: Central Europe Review. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Coleman, D. 2016. ‘Uncontrolled immigration means finis Britanniae’, Standpoint, June, www.standpointmag.co.uk/​node/​6525/​full Collier, P. (2013) Exodus: immigration and multiculturalism in the 21st century, London: Penguin Books. Commission on the Future of Multi-​ethnic Britain (2000) The future of multi-​ethnic Britain (The Parekh report) London: Runnymede Trust. de Haas, H. (2008) ‘Migration and development: a theoretical perspective’, International Migration Review, 44(1): 227–​264. Delanty, G. (2009) The cosmopolitan imagination: the renewal of critical social theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Delanty, G. and Rumford, C. (2005) Rethinking European: social theory and the implications of Europeanisation, London: Routledge. Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M. (2018) National populism: the revolt against liberal democracy, London: Pelican. 173

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Evans, G. and Mellon, J. (2015) ‘Immigration and Euroscepticism: the rising storm’, The UK in a Changing Europe, 18 December, http://​ukandeu. ac.uk/​immigration-​and-​euroscepticism-​the-​r ising-​storm/​ Ehsan, R. (2017) ‘Inside the British Asian vote –​and why it contains a few surprises’, The Conversation, 16 February, http://​theconversation.com/​ inside-t​ he-b​ ritish-a​ sian-b​ rexit-v​ ote-a​ nd-w ​ hy-i​ t-c​ ontains-a​ -f​ ew-s​ urprises-​ 72931 Emmenegger, P., Hausermann, S., Palier, B. and Seeleib-​Kaiser, M. (eds) (2012) The age of dualization: the changing face of inequality in deindustrialising societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Favell, A. (2008a) ‘The new face of East-​West migration in Europe’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(5): 701–​716. Favell, A. (2008b) Eurostars and Eurocities: free movement and mobility in an integrating Europe, Oxford: Blackwell. Favell, A. (2014) ‘The fourth freedom: theories of migration and mobilities in ‘neo-​liberal’ Europe’, European Journal of Social Theory, 17(3): 275–​289. Favell, A. and Barbulescu, R. (2018) ‘Brexit, ‘immigration’ and anti-​ discrimination’, in P. Diamond, P. Nedergaard and B. Rosamond (eds), The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit, London: Routledge, pp 118–​133. Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash: The EU, European identity, and the future of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gerhards, J. (2007) Cultural overstretch? Differences between the old and new member states of the EU and Turkey, London: Routledge. Gest, J. (2016) The new working class: white working class politics in an age of immigration and inequality, New York: Oxford University Press. Gilroy, P. (1987) There ain’t no black in the Union Jack, London: Routledge. Goodhart, D. (2017) The road to somewhere: the populist revolt and the future of politics, London: Hurst. Goodwin, M. and Milazzo, C. (2017) ‘Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3): 450–​464. Guiraudon, V. (2001) ‘Weak weapons of the weak? Transnational mobilization around migration in the European Union’, in D. Imig and S. Tarrow (eds) Contentious Europeans: protests and politics in an emerging polity, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 163–​187. Habermas, J. (1998) The postnational constellation: political essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hansen, P. and Johnsson, S. (2014) Eurafrica: the untold history of European integration and colonialism, London: Bloomsbury. Hansen, R. (1998) ‘European citizenship or a Europe of citizens?’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(4): 751–​768. Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 174

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Jacobson, D. (1996) Rights across borders: immigration and the decline of citizenship, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Joppke, C. and Morawska, E. (eds) (2003) Towards assimilation and citizenship: immigrants in liberal nation-​states, London: Palgrave. Kaufmann, E. (2018) White shift: populism, immigration and the future of white majorities, London: Penguin. Kostakopoulou, D. (2008) The future gover nance of citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S. and Frey, T. (2008) West European politics in the age of globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and social class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2): 235–​258. Mazower, M. (2013) No enchanted palace: the end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mignolo, W. (2011) The darker side of modernity: global futures, decolonial options, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Milanovic, B. (2010) The haves and the have-​nots, New York: Basic Books. Niessen, J. (2000) ‘The starting line and the promotion of EU anti-​ discrimination legislation: the role of policy oriented research’, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 1(4): 493–​503. Nikolaidis, K. (2018) ‘Sustainable integration in a democratic polity: a new (or not so new) ambition for the EU after Brexit’, in B. Martill and U. Staiger (eds) Brexit and beyond: rethinking the futures of Europe, London: UCL Press, pp 212–​221. Parker, O. (2017) ‘Critical political economy, free movement and Brexit: beyond the progressive’s dilemma’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3): 479–​496. Pennings, F. and Seeleib-​Kaiser, M. (eds) (2018) EU citizenship and social rights. Entitlements and impediments to accessing welfare, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Portes, J. (2016) ‘Immigration, free movement and the EU referendum’, National Institute Economic Review, 236 (1): 14–​22. Recchi, E. (2015) Mobile Europe: the theory and practice of free movement in the EU, London: Palgrave. Shambaugh, D. (2013) China goes global: partial power, New York: Oxford University Press. Soysal, Y.N. (1994) Limits of citizenship: migrants and post-​national membership in Europe, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Soysal, Y.N. (2012) ‘Citizenship, immigration and the European social project: rights and obligations of individuality’, British Journal of Sociology, 63(1): 1–​21. 175

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Streeck, W. (2014) Buying time: the delayed crisis of democratic capitalism, London: Verso. Vargas-​Silva, C. (2017) ‘The fiscal impact of immigration in the UK’, Migration Observatory Briefing, University of Oxford: COMPAS. Vertovec, S. (2007) ‘Super-​diversity and its implications’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(6): 1024–​1054. Wessendorf, S. (2010) Common-​place diversity: social relations in a super-​diverse context, London: Palgrave. Wimmer, A. and Glick-​Schiller, N. (2002) ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-​state building, migration and the social sciences’, Global Networks, 2(4): 301–​334.

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Can a Post-​National Vision Better Tackle Racial Discrimination than a National One? A Response to Adrian Favell Omar Khan I am broadly sympathetic to Adrian Favell’s chapter, both because I concur with his assessment of the evidence, and because I share his normative concerns about the dangers (and inaccuracy) of privileging of the ‘nation’ among human social or political groupings. In this brief response, I will instead focus on some areas of disagreement, or perhaps tensions in the argument, and the evidence on how far the EU has been able to fulfil Favell’s normative ideals in practice. My perspective here is as the director of a race equality think tank, the Runnymede Trust, based in London, but having done a significant amount of work across Europe, including in Brussels. Favell’s chapter does an excellent job of highlighting and weaving together how what he calls the ‘post-​national and cosmopolitan vision of multi-​ ethnic Britain’ relates to the ‘post-​national and cosmopolitan consequences of EU freedom of movement’. At the same time he honestly confronts the extent to which internal EU freedom of movement has gone hand in hand with vigorous and racially discriminatory border enforcement. I want to press Favell a bit more on: a) how far these related turns were implemented, whether as consistent normative claims, or in terms of policy developments; and b) how far the trends are related, or rather pull apart. I focus principally on questions of race, identity, immigration and citizenship, and have to sidestep the equally difficult challenge for Europe in terms of its economic policies, especially since the financial crisis.

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In our research report in advance of the EU referendum (Khan and Weekes-​Bernard, 2015), Runnymede found that black and minority ethnic British people were concerned about English nativism in the Leave campaign. At the same time, most of our research participants didn’t show much interest in the EU, whether as an identity, or in terms of conferring any rights or benefits. In particular, participants laughed at the idea of exercising ‘freedom of movement’, the key example at the heart of Favell’s chapter, by moving to, say, Spain, France or Poland. One way of putting this is that not everyone in Britain (or anywhere else in Europe) actually thought of freedom of movement as a right. While people don’t have to actually exercise a right to have that right (think of a right to a fair trial, exercised only when we are actually in a court of law), the problem isn’t just that people, especially BME (and lower-​income) people, didn’t exercise their right to free movement. More profoundly and problematically, they didn’t see themselves as even having that right in the first place. And by not even conceiving of freedom of movement as a thing –​never mind a right –​the normative ambitions of a post-​national identity were therefore far from realised for what was certainly a majority among BME Britons, probably among Britons generally, and likely among citizens of most European countries too. Conversely, the evidence suggests ethnic minorities from elsewhere in Europe were particularly likely to exercise freedom of movement by coming to the UK. According to the 2011 Census, for example, as many as one in ten (9.5%) of people born in EU countries living in Britain are not white, a larger percentage than the 8% of UK-​born people who are not white. This doesn’t include people who were born in say Brazil but have Portuguese nationality or born in Cameroon with French nationality. Compared to their white co-​nationals, then, it appears ethnic minority Europeans were more likely to take up freedom of movement, at least when moving to the UK. In a previous report on Francophone Cameroonians, Runnymede found that at least some minorities saw the UK as a less racist country, and also as offering greater job opportunities than elsewhere in Europe, including sometimes their country of birth (Sveinsson, 2007). At the same time, it’s hard to say British-​born ethnic minorities share the same sentiment, and it’s further unclear that this exercise of free movement by ethnic minority Europeans to the UK was underpinned or motivated by a post-​national sense of identity. We don’t have strong evidence. But it seems just as likely that ‘Black European’ identity, for example, is about sharing an experience of discrimination and colonisation with other Black European people, but not with European people generally (see also the report from FRA on Black people in Europe, EUAFR, 2018). In a sense the failure to translate the normative ideal of free movement, and the post-​national identity Favell urges, is of a piece with other unrealised normative ideals for ethnic minorities in the UK (and across Europe). 178

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Technically discrimination in the workplace has been banned for 50 years (since the 1968 Race Relations Act), yet people with Asian or African surnames still have to send in twice as many CVs just to get an interview, even when they have the same qualifications. Yet there is arguably a wider failure in the operation of the European post-​national policy enforcement of the norms of non-​discrimination in particular. Whether this is better or worse than at the national level seems to vary by country (with the UK arguably doing more and Hungary doing less). Although the race directive was a key development in the EU constitutional apparatus, and the defeat of Nazism, racism and ethno-​ nationalism at the heart of the European project, there are very few cases of the EU acting to enforce these values on member states. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to view ‘accession countries’ from Eastern Europe as being the primary or even unique transgressors of equality norms, even as the persecution of Roma people, discrimination against people of African descent and anti-​Muslim racism affect the politics and policies of ‘core’ or more ‘western’ European countries too. By failing to act against these injustices and transgressions in, say, France, the UK or the Netherlands, it has made it more difficult to avoid the charge of hypocrisy or supranational over-​reach when the European Commission has sought to criticise or sanction Hungary, Slovakia or Lithuania. Implementing the race directive and other equality policies is not just a question of sanctioning or punishing the worst transgressors. It is –​or should be –​about implementing positive policies that actually promote equality of opportunity, and tackle racism more directly. Here too European policy makers failed to implement the measures that would have made the universal values that are argued to define the European project a reality for Europe’s ethnic minorities. It might be argued that the barrier here was national governments. The European Commission has designed projects and programmes on positive action and on the labour market, but these have been resisted by national governments. Yet the idea that the European Commission could simply ‘force’ upon a national government a set of policies that had little bottom-​ up or other democratic pressure seems unlikely to have increased support for Europe as a post-​national idea or project. This raises the key point that real-​world politics matters, and not just in terms of democratic elections or national parliaments. While many point to the UK’s pioneering race relations legislation as a leading example of how it became more ‘open’ or less racist than some other European countries, that narrative leaves out the role of struggle or resistance, and the many decades that it has taken to even partly make the original race relations acts something of a reality for BME people in Britain. Elsewhere in Europe, and particularly in post communist states where civil society is still less developed, there has been little support for equality-​based social movements, whether in terms of anti-​racism or 179

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gay rights, and that has left arguments for those causes at the mercy of politicians (and sometimes technocrats), but without enough underpinning social support and pressure. To buttress Favell’s normative vision of a post-​national Europe, then, at least four developments are needed. First, a stronger commitment to enforcing the norms of anti-​discrimination, to make this a clearer defining feature of European identity as well as practice. Second, to develop those norms not simply defensively but proactively, by pursuing policies to tackle racism and promote equal opportunity more consistently. Third, to support civil society across Europe to build movements to challenge governments and promote the normative vision Favell outlines. The fourth challenge is perhaps deeper still, and is partly outlined in Favell’s piece, namely the need to build a politics of citizenship, or at least the clear exercise not just of post-​national political rights but also post-​national political mobilisation across a future post-​national Europe. This would need to involve ‘third country nationals’ who might be a productive pillar on which to build such a movement. But as the EU referendum in the UK showed, this movement would also need to be underpinned by, if not exactly a European ‘citizenship’, at least a more secure way for people to exercise their rights wherever they live, including of course the right to vote, as well as access to public services. Before turning to Britain, and considering if or how a Brexit Britain might reaffirm the post-​national moment Favell apprehends in the 1990s and 2000s, it is necessary to ask if or how a post-​national Europe might also be joined by a post-​national Asia, post-​national Africa, or indeed a ‘post-​national world’. Even if a truly post-​national identity –​and policies to affirm that identity –​emerged in the European Union, there has been too little thought into if or how to build on European free movement to Asian or African or global free movement. Favell clearly recognises and criticises the injustices of the current global trade regime, and of existing border checks, and his chapter already tackles a wide range of issues that flow from Brexit. At the same time, there is a need for a wider vision of if or how we move to a wider post-​national future, unencumbered by racial, economic or regional inequalities, as well as the more frequently asked question of what effective democratic governance could possibly look like at a global level, covering 8 billion people. Although it appears Favell is reluctant to use the term ‘citizenship’, correctly noting its ordinary use connection to the nation state, is it really possible to do away with citizenship completely? Can people exercise rights and participate in a political community with a clear guarantee that those rights will be protected in the place they reside –​that they will be able to vote in referendums, for example? What would this look like globally, and is it sensible to first think of various ‘regional’ or continental blocs on which to build? Or are those blocs themselves part of the problem, not least for 180

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imaging that Asia and Africa have a different history, identity, economy or politics from Europe? Obviously the post-​national circumstances being imagined are somewhat (or very) utopian, even more so globally than in Europe. But Favell is right to highlight that the post-​national is not simply a utopian fantasy, or one that has no analogue or predecessor. Throughout history humans were more commonly organised in what can properly be called ‘pre-​national’ spaces. Much more recently, Favell is correct to highlight the Windrush injustice that emerged in early 2018 was less a case of migration of Caribbean people, and more a case of the British unwinding of its Empire, and the reorganisation of rights across the post-​colonial British state and the newly independent states –​nation states –​in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. There was in fact a certain ambiguity –​perhaps multiple or diasporic ambiguity –​among many of the people born in the Caribbean with British passports, an ambiguity beautifully described in Stuart Hall’s recent biography (Hall, 2017). An ambiguity that post-​war British policy, and in particular the 1981 Nationality Act and multiple Immigration Acts over the 2000s and 2010s, sought to squash at the expense of a singular, definitive national identity. So the Windrush injustice can certainly be described as the policy and legal insistence of a uniform national identity over and above all others, with consequent effects on those who don’t perfectly fit the terms and form of national identity now affirmed in Britain. Similarly in Europe, Favell is right to skewer the rise of national populist projects, not least for their resonance with an ethno-​national intellectual and political heritage that caused so much harm and injustice just a few decades ago. There are other factors too that Favell doesn’t cite: the push towards data collection, of the state and private companies monitoring our behaviour and physical movements. The pressures towards uniformity, bounded identities and inequality are not merely driven by national populism, and are hardly limited to Europe. There are utopian –​or more accurately dystopian –​beliefs underpinning what are claimed as more ‘pragmatic’ responses to immigration and the movement of people, which will everywhere result in both discrimination and violence. It’s hard to see how tougher migration controls at the national level, especially where protecting a shrinking (in terms of relative wealth and population) Europe, represent a viable future for humanity. But can the post-​national succeed where the national fails? Perhaps, but only if it this normative ideal expands in various ways. Tackling historic and ongoing racial inequalities cannot be done only through crafting and defending a more diasporic identity. Favell is right to talk about universal rather than European values but the path to affirming those values globally within a post-​national identity is the only way to realise that universality. And the challenge isn’t just in terms of identity, but about institutions, in particular the state, or states, as the institutions through which citizens 181

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collective agree how to distribute benefits and burdens. Finally, there’s the role of civil society in calling those in power to account. Without providing voice to marginalised communities it’s hard to see how or why powerful institutions, whether state or non-​state, national or post-​national, will respond to their needs. Favell sadly seems right to apprehend a requiem for the most recent model of post-​national identities, but we can hopefully learn from this setback –​whether in Britain, Europe, or globally –​to ensure we better buttress that normative vision with the backbone it needs to succeed and sustain itself. Alternatively, we may need to be satisfied with second-​best local versions of that vision, by redeploying the pluralist account of nationality that Runnymede’s Multi-​ethnic Britain report provided (CFMEB, 2000). Whatever the answers, it’s hard not to share Favell’s pessimism about the prospects for and consequence of current models of the national, and to urge normative ambitions and policy developments to expand their horizons to the post-​national. References CFMEB (Commission on the Future of Multi-​ethnic Britain) (2000) The future of multi-​ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report, London: Profile Books. EUAFR (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) (2018) Being Black in the EU. Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, https://​fra. europa.eu/​en/​publication/​2018/​eumidis-​ii-​being-​black Hall, S. with Schwarz, B. (2017) Familiar stranger: A life between two islands, London: Penguin Books. Khan, O. and Weekes-​Bernard, D. (2015) This is still about us: Why ethnic minorities see immigration differently, London: Runnymede Trust. https://​ www.runnymedetrust.org/​uploads/​Race%20and%20Immigration%20 Report%20v2.pdf Sveinsson, K.P. (2007) Bievenue? –​Narratives of Francophone Cameroonians, London: Runnymede Trust, https://​www.run​nyme​detr​ust.org/​uplo​ads/​ publi​cati​ons/​pdfs/​ Bienvenue-​2007.pdf

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Migration, Solidarity and the Limits of Europe Martina Tazzioli and William Walters

Introduction The editors of a recent special edition of Citizenship Studies draw attention to the proliferation of grassroots migration political movements as a feature of migration politics today: ‘Over the past decade, we have witnessed an upsurge of political mobilisation by refugees, irregularised migrants, and migrant solidarity activists in the countries of the European Union, at its external borders … and in other parts of the world …’ (Ataç et al, 2016: 527–​528). In this essay we propose to examine aspects of this movement from the angle of one of its key political concepts: solidarity. The idea of solidarity offers a promising entry point for a critical analysis of the limits of EUrope precisely because it is hotly contested, both as a political value and a practice. From grassroots activists to EU officials, actors on many sides of Europe’s migration struggles act in the name of solidarity. But what do they mean by solidarity and how does it bring the question of limits into focus? Reference to solidarity has become widespread in migration scholarship in recent years (Rygiel, 2011; Millner, 2011; Johnson, 2015). But solidarity is also a common referent in EU studies. The notion of solidarity has represented one of the political backbones of the EU since its creation. For instance, the Schuman Declaration (1950) stresses that ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’.1 A critical appraisal of solidarity pushes us towards the limits of Europe. Indeed, in the current context of economic backlash, European solidarity appears also to be in a state of crisis. Nevertheless, even beyond the contingent situation, speaking about solidarity within and in relation to the EU is not 183

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a straightforward issue: is solidarity a state-​oriented activity or is it enacted towards citizens? What are the asymmetries –​among states, as well as between European citizens and states –​upon which solidarity is built? The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) illustrates a considerable range of meanings and inflections of solidarity, such as solidarity between member states, solidarity between women and men, solidarity between states around issues of migration, borders and asylum, as well as solidarity among generations.2 Therefore, on a EU level the fuzzy catchword of solidarity encapsulates a huge variety of practices and interventions, any one of which involves different configurations of power relations –​for example, the horizontal solidarity among citizens versus more hierarchical forms of solidarity (between rich and less-​wealthy EU member states, as well as state solidarity towards some minorities). As far as migration is concerned, the term ‘solidarity’ has a particular meaning in the EU political lexicon: burden-​sharing. The solidarity among member states to share the ‘refugee burden’ in a time of economic crisis has been in fact flagged as a cornerstone of the EU and, at the same time, a goal to be pursued. Yet, on an EU level the notion of solidarity has been fundamentally mobilised according to a state-​based logic and not directly towards migrants. For example, in the controversy ignited by the EU’s attempt to agree quotas for the resettlement of refugees, and the refusal of states like Poland and Hungary to acknowledge these quotas, it is solidarity as a relationship between member states that is primarily at stake (BBC, 2017). In this essay we speak in fact about the bordering of solidarity that the EU’s discourse on migration (considered largely as a burden to be shared) generates. In fact, over the past four years we have witnessed a remarkable shift in the use of the term ‘solidarity’. While in 2015 in some EU official documents the need to act in solidarity with the refugees was mentioned and some member states, like Germany, promoted for a few months a refugee welcome policy, from 2016 onwards, solidarity towards migrants was de facto expelled from the EU discourse and practices. But at the same time that solidarity is being expunged from official attitudes towards refugees the opposite is happening at the level of citizen initiatives. While there are clearly very powerful currents of anti-​immigrantism and xeno-​racism within European publics, and far-​right anti-​migrant social movements are palpably active, here we highlight citizen movements of support. We emphasise the multiplication of citizen initiatives that, in the name of migrant solidarity, build networks of support across Europe –​such as ‘Refugees Welcome’ –​to assist and host the refugees in transit. However, grassroots networks have been increasingly targeted by police measures, local decrees and national laws that have criminalised infrastructures and acts of solidarity towards migrants. It is this conjuncture that commentators and activists have recently given the name ‘crimes of solidarity’, a conjuncture in 184

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which individuals or groups who merely offer water, food, sleeping bags or a lift to migrants in transit face police harassment and sometimes prosecution on the grounds that they are ‘enabling’ irregular migration (Fekete, 2017: 2). There has been an explosion of debate on this topic, especially in France and Italy. The term stands not just for a narrowly legal but a wider movement on the part of governments and political movements to harass, deter, penalise and suppress support for migrants (Fekete, 2009, 2018; Carrera et al, 2016; Baudet, 2004; Tazzioli, 2018). In this chapter we propose to analyse solidarity in Europe in the specific context of these movements to criminalise solidarity practices. This enables us to pursue two goals. First, this conjuncture offers us an opportunity to deepen the analysis of solidarity within the context of European and migration politics. While reference to solidarity has become widespread in political life, it has a somewhat minor status within political theory compared with, say, justice, citizenship or equality (Carrebregu, 2016). Likewise, despite the ubiquitous talk of solidarity within EU political discourse, the term has rarely been critically examined by scholars of European integration (Greiner, 2017: 837). Solidarity tends to function as a placeholder: we think we all agree what it means. The first contribution of the chapter is therefore a fuller account of solidarity which we consider a useful end in itself. The second goal of the chapter is to use the analysis of the criminalisation of solidarity to reflect on certain limits of EUrope. Solidarity is claimed by the EU as one of its core values, as it is in some of its member states (Ross and Borgman-P ​ rebil, 2010). Yet within EU politics and EU studies it would seem that migration has put a particular notion of solidarity at stake: ‘Just as the debt crisis threatens to destroy the painstakingly cultured solidarity of the EU, the disintegrating state of its patchwork asylum regime could prove fatal to the principles of mutual trust and cooperation that theoretically bind its member states’ (Langford, 2013: 217). A number of policies and frameworks have been developed with the express aim of promoting European/​EU solidarity. Studying solidarity and its criminalisation within the migration field allows us immediately to expose the boundaries of these official invocations of solidarity. They reveal that solidarity in Europe’s migration field is in fact a highly contested concept and value. Solidarity with whom, for what ends, why? Is solidarity only something to be fostered among member states? Can solidarity operate on other scales, temporalities, vectors? Could it be the case that the crisis of EU solidarity in the area of asylum (Langford, 2013) is a crisis from the point of view of the member states but actually a time when solidarity movements –​other forms of solidarity –​are not waning but growing? Does the fact that solidarity movements are being actively suppressed suggest that European solidarity is not universal in its scope but a practice that is to be bounded and contained? Solidarity among European 185

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states and European citizens but not for others? Clearly then solidarity is a privileged point at which to investigate Europe and its limits. Our claim that solidarity represents a limit or a boundary where paradoxes in the very idea of a European project find acute expression can be illustrated if we consider a very recent EU initiative. In 2016 the European Commission launched the European Solidarity Corps, a framework that is to offer young people opportunities to work and volunteer on projects that might benefit communities and people across Europe. Read against the backdrop of the criminalisation of solidarity movements and acts one might see this Corps not so much as an expression of solidarity per se, but an attempt to appropriate, control, limit and even brand what forms of relationship, and what forms of affiliation are to count as solidarity, and what are to be negated and suppressed as something else (Pallister-​Wilkins, 2018: 13–​14). The rest of this chapter is organised into three sections. In the first section we sketch out an analytics of solidarity as a contribution to furthering theoretically-​informed empirical research on this topic. We highlight the three themes of the time–​space of solidarity, the work of solidarity, and the others of solidarity. We propose these analytics as a way to sharpen understanding of solidarity and migration politics. In the second section we introduce the idea of mobile commoning. We do this in order to highlight how solidarity practices enacted in certain places over time are shared and reactivated in the present. We build on literature on the mobile commons to question whether and how the political memory of struggles travels over time and is appropriated by locals. In our final section we play this analytics through a particular case study: the criminalisation of migrant solidarity practices at the French-​Italian border. We show how the increasing criminalisation of solidarity practices in support of the migrants in transit highlights the limits of Europe. We should stress from the outset that we do not regard solidarity in terms of an essential referent. For example, at particular times specific policies like social insurance have been associated with solidarity. But we do not regard these associations as fixed. Instead, building on Laclau, solidarity is better seen as a ‘floating signifier’. Offering food is in some cases a staple of humanitarian action. What happens when this becomes organised and identified as an act of solidarity? Do ‘crimes of solidarity’ provide an analytical lens for better defining solidarity practices as such?

An analytics of solidarity The genealogy of solidarity reveals it is important as a way to ‘imagine commonality in difference’ (Hunt-​Hendrix, 2018; see also Kelliher, 2018), affiliation under conditions of social asymmetry, and particular ways of relating to the other (Kelz, 2015: 10–​13). For this reason, we argue it 186

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deserves to be more closely examined. Within European political discourse, solidarity only really emerges in the mid-​1800s. Whereas older ideas of fraternity spoke in terms of bonds of brotherhood and blood, the appeal to solidarity found a resonance among labour movements as they grew beyond localities and single trades. Sociologists like Durkheim puzzled over the ties that held complex industrial societies together, and political movements as they sought to negotiate difference in heterogeneous struggles. Often solidarity occupied a space between the individualism of liberalism and the collectivism of communism, and found expression in policies like social insurance that sought to foster the social while simultaneously supporting (and indeed individualising) workers and families (Donzelot, 1991). As Hannah Hunt-​Hendrix (2018) has argued, in the 1970s and 1980s the idea of solidarity found a resonance in the context of independence and anti-​imperialist struggles. Here solidarity invited communities living in, say, Kansas, to take an interest and offer support to communities struggling for human rights in, say, El Salvador. The political logic of solidarity was that there existed elements of interconnection and responsibility across great distances and inequality of status and situation. In contemporary migration politics the idea of solidarity is once more activated and now finds new expressions. In today’s migration, struggles near and far have been scrambled. Solidarity and internationalism may be expressed not only through support for distant struggles but engagement with the human subjects of those struggles now they are much closer to home, for example crossing the borders of France and Italy. While it is important to grasp solidarity as a concept that emerges under specific conditions, and undergoes particular transformations, in order to better engage solidarity as a research object we propose three analytics.

1.  The time–​space of solidarity The idea of solidarity has always carried a strong temporal aspect. The legal scholar Stjernø (2011) points out that the term was for many centuries a legal concept denoting the common responsibility for debts borne by each member of a group of borrowers. Hence from the outset it carried an orientation to risk and the future. But at the end of the 18th century this notion of implicatedness and shared responsibility binding the individual to the group would shift into the social and political field. In the early 19th century utopians and social philosophers like Fourier would see it in relation to mutual sympathies and shared responsibilities among a community. Fourier was the first to associate solidarity with social policy: measures to share resources and govern need, such as family support and guaranteed minimum incomes. This connection between solidarity and the social, a bond outlined in the early sociology of Durkheim, would be strengthened 187

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and given institutional basis by the middle of the 20th century through mechanisms like social security (Donzelot, 1991). If we start by stressing temporality it is because we feel it is a neglected element in many discussions of migrant solidarity. We suggest that critical works on migrant solidarity have focused primarily on the spatial dimension of solidarity –​either speaking of solidarity across borders, or the enactment of solidarity through the production of spaces like the sanctuary and the camp (Millner, 2011). While scholars have certainly been attuned to the disruptive power of struggles –​that is, to the way in which solidarity can involve sudden political interruptions –​the wider field of temporality has been rather overlooked (Isin, 2012; Nyers and Rygiel, 2011; Rancière, 1999). In order to counter an exclusive spatialisation of solidarity as a concept, we want to reinsert temporality, analysing how the sedimented knowledges of political struggles as well as of solidarity practices have been inscribed in spaces over time. As Kelliher has suggested, more attention should be paid to collective memory of solidarity practices, in order to show ‘how history continues to shape contemporary practices of solidarity’ (Kelliher, 2018: 2). We do not want to treat time and space separately so we speak of the time–​space of solidarity.3 We argue that the idea of the time–​space of solidarity enables us to grasp practices of solidarity at the juncture between, on the one hand, the specificity and situatedness of the current solidarity acts and, on the other, a longstanding history of struggles which they in part draw upon and whose political memory they reactivate. As we will show later in the chapter, migrant solidarity practices enacted by locals in the Susa Valley and in the Roya Valley at the French-​Italian border represent a case in point: indeed, the networks of support for migrants that have been put into place in those valleys do not come out of thin air but draw on the practices, knowledges, understanding, ethos that have been sedimented over many decades, and which to some extent include and reflect the geography, and even the very geology of the space. More broadly, speaking of time–​space of solidarity also allows us to move beyond a focus on individual gestures of solidarity, highlighting the networks of practices, disputes and shared knowledges through and in light of which single acts are framed as solidarity practices. Nevertheless, the political memories of solidarity struggles are far from being a solid terrain; on the contrary, they have to be laboriously and actively awakened, reactivated into the present. The idea of a time–​space of solidarity also lends itself to analysis of the very forms of solidarity practice, capturing elements of its ‘morphology’ (Dijstelbloem, in press): the assistance offered to people ‘passing through’, the people ‘en route’, ‘on the road’, and in transit, just as it attunes us to

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the mediating presence of the natural environment –​mountains, sea and deserts –​and how these contour the practices and the strategies of solidarity. Finally, by foregrounding the time–​space of solidarity we can better identify the ephemeral nature of certain spaces of solidarity –​like a camp, or a room –​that seem to come and go.

2.  The work of solidarity Building on Chandra Mohanty’s analysis around ‘political solidarity’, we want to rescue solidarity from its liberal conceptualisation: this latter tends to neutralise both the political memory of solidarity movements and struggles that shaped the European space over time, and the ‘common differences’ (Mohanty, 2003: 518) at play in solidarity networks. In fact, the language of solidarity tends to be used in pro-​migrant discourses for flattening asymmetrical and racialised power relations in the name of an unconditional support to human beings whose survival, presence and social life in a space is under threat for disparate reasons (Mezzadra and Neumann, 2017). Instead, via Mohanty, we point to the need of re-​inscribing the notion of solidarity within the ‘fabric’ of social and political struggles. Such an analytical angle enables a perspective on current solidarity acts and networks in Europe less as gestures of hospitality towards the migrants than as the laborious and ongoing production of temporary common terrains and safe spaces. Indeed, the forging of horizontal alliances between undocumented people and local citizens is a quite difficult task. First, this is due to the discrepant temporalities of the struggles: if we consider solidarity practices at the internal borders of Europe, it is noticeable that migrants are there temporarily, ‘in transit’, and their goal is usually to move away from the border as soon as possible. Second, the question of ‘what is best for the migrants’ that people who act in solidarity tend to raise, in order not to do something which is counter-​productive for the migrants themselves, is by no means a straightforward one –​because of the constantly changing political situation, as well as the difficulty of ‘seeing like a migrant’. In other words, acting in solidarity with the migrants often confronts people with the dilemma between migrants’ self-​determination and the need to act in their best interest. This becomes particularly glaring in contexts where migrants’ risk of death is considerably high, due to border enforcement measures. This is the case of migrants who try to cross the Italian-​French border climbing the Alps: locals involved in migrant solidarity networks in the Italian villages of Bardonecchia and Claviere debated the question of bowing to migrants’ will to cross at any cost or discouraging such actions because of the risk of dying or getting lost in the snow.

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3.  The others of solidarity A fuller analysis of solidarity within migration struggles and movements requires us to clarify its others. It demands that we think solidarity in relation with the heterogenous sites and fields where solidarity practices are enacted. What fascinates us when we approach solidarity historically is that its appearance as a rallying cry, a social philosophy, or a practice, always happens in a field of struggle. What we call the work of solidarity is shaped and defined in part by the presence of other ways of relating. Whatever solidarity might mean at a particular moment is shaped by these antagonistic relationships of alterity. When solidarity was taken up by workers’ movements it was oriented by the danger of social fragmentation and atomisation, certainly, but also the models of charitable assistance, as well as the penal models of governing the poor which stood as alternative modes of governance. In this chapter we insist it is important to consider the others of migrant solidarity. Seen from this angle, ‘crimes of solidarity’ is given new intelligibility. The time–​space of migrant solidarity is a carving out and securing of safe space amid ongoing attempts to generalise a hostile environment; to govern migration through a combination of paternalistic humanitarianism, and repression. A solidaristic mode of action acquires some of its consistency from the way it opposes these other ways of acting. The field of tensions produced out of migrant solidarity practices has given rise to a politicisation of humanitarianism (Fassin, 2017; Tazzioli, 2018). In this regard, it is important to trace a distinction between solidarity and humanitarianism, which ultimately relies on the inequalities of lives that the latter is predicated upon, as well as on the asymmetrical, hierarchical power relations that humanitarian interventions entail and foster. Notably, solidarity practices that until recently had been discredited by activists as charity or humanitarian interventions are now considered unacceptable by the states and have become objects of controversy, as long as these solidarity practices have been put into place by independent organisations or individual citizens. However, speaking of a politicisation of humanitarianism does not mean positing humanitarianism as the opposite pole of state-​led interventions and of security measures (Fekete, 2017). On the contrary, what the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity practices has fostered is a multiple split of humanitarianism: independent and grassroots movements as well as individual acts are under attack, while established NGOs and IGOs take part more than ever in the governing of migration, reinforcing the entanglement between security and humanitarianism. The conflation of solidarity with humanitarianism, in this case strengthened by the kind of acts and gestures that people engage in (giving food, opening a temporary shelter, and so on) ultimately risks overshadowing the asymmetrical relationships that humanitarian interventions rely upon and enforce in contrast with the more horizontal alliances played out through solidarity practices (Fassin, 190

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2010). The partial overlapping of the ‘shrinking space of solidarity’4 and of the criminalisation of humanitarian acts is telling of the relational quality of solidarity: that is, far from being a neatly defined category, solidarity has to be historically grasped within the field of power relations.

Unstable mobile commoning Retracing a genealogy of solidarity practices enables us to move beyond the ‘containerisation’ of migration as a self-​standing field and to connect the history of migrant solidarity with a much wider and longer history of social struggles that shaped the European space. Relatedly, to reactivate the historical memory of solidarity practices and struggles, as partial it may be, allows the investigation of how certain practical knowledges have been transmitted over time and how they circulated across spaces. In particular, we draw attention to those specific places where solidarity acts and networks, and has been mobilised by exploring the political history of those spaces –​that is focusing on the struggles and political experiences that have shaped those spaces over time. In this way, we can look at the current migrant solidarity practices within the European Union as embedded within what can be called sedimented mobile commons. We borrow the concept of mobile commons from Papadopoulos and Tsianos, who coined the notion for designating ‘the shared knowledge, affective cooperation, mutual support and care between migrants when they are on the road’ (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013: 179; see also Trimikliniotis et al, 2014). ‘Mobile commons’ is introduced by these authors to account for spaces of sociability and the practical knowledges generated by migrant movements and fostered by migrants’ use of digital technologies: far from being just ephemeral moments, these spaces of sociability can be seen as ‘processes that define socialities of mobile commons generating alternative modes of livelihoods’ (Trimikliniotis et al, 2014: 16). In this way, ‘the precarious migratory praxis … becomes inscribed in the sociality it generates while in motion’ (p 15). Such a perspective on mobile commons constitutes a fruitful analytical angle for grasping how some practical knowledge gets sedimented, crystallised and can be potentially reactivated in the future. Mobile commons allows us to make sense not only of the constitutive mobility of migrant practices, but also of their deep instability and precariousness. However, the concept of mobile commons partially fails to capture, first, the temporal dimension and, second, the transversal alliances that solidarity practices strengthen. In order to counter an exclusive spatialisation of solidarity as a concept, we want to emphasise temporality as well, analysing how these shared knowledges have been inscribed in spaces over time. Indeed, if on the one hand these mobile commons are predicated upon 191

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a certain level of unpredictability and precariousness, on the other they get also sedimented in those spaces and get transmitted over time. On the point of traversal alliances, what interests us are precisely the ways in which migrant solidarity practices to some extent manage (although often only in a very temporary and precarious way) not only to create connections between migrants and citizens but also to build common terrains –​in terms of political claims and strategies. In this sense, building on Peter Linebaugh (2009), we can speak of unstable commoning generated through a certain complicity between migrants and citizens acting in solidarity; the use of the verb helps in giving a sense of the laborious work of translation across spaces of practical knowledges and of their reactivation over time. Unstable commoning is not produced by migrants’ practices alone but, rather, through transversal alliances of solidarity, which get adapted to the specific political moment, and partly reactivate the historical memory of struggles and shared knowledges that characterise some places.

Crimes of solidarity across the Alpine migrant passage The newspaper chronicles of the past year are characterised by the multiplication of ‘crimes of solidarity’ in particular at the French-​Italian border but also in Calais and in other locations in Europe. The case that became a prominent cover story in the media has been the one of Cedric Herrou, the French farmer from the Roya Valley accused by the French authorities of hosting migrants and of giving lifts to them across the border. Just to mention a different example of criminalised acts of solidarity, citizens in Calais who allowed the migrants to take a shower in their houses or to recharge their phones, or who gave food to them, have been subjected to fines. Also in the Roya Valley, a French ski patrol, Benoit Ducos, was accused in March of assisting a pregnant migrant woman who was crossing the Alps. Our geographical focus in this chapter is on the French-​Italian frontier, one of the zones in EUrope where locals extensively engaged in solidarity practices in support of the migrants in transit, and have come under attack for this both by the French and the Italian authorities. This space across the two side of the frontier has become a proper border-​zone over the last few years, due to France’s suspension of Schengen –​first in April 2011, and then again since May 2015. The Susa Valley, located in the Italian northern region of Piemonte, is one of the places through which migrants pass in their attempt to cross the French-​Italian border. Due to the implementation of police patrolling along the borders in the vicinity of the coastal city of Ventimiglia, migrants now have few alternatives to trying to cross further north, climbing the Alps. The Susa Valley is characterised by a longstanding history of struggles against different forms of occupation. During World War II, the inhabitants of the valley mobilised to liberate the territory 192

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from the German occupation, and the valley itself played a crucial role for the infrastructures that connected Italy to France. In the 1980s, repeated mobilisation and occupations of the main roads took place against the construction of highway. Then, in the early 1990s, the NoTav movement against the high-​speed train started and it is still very active.5 This movement, which is quite heterogenous in its composition, has deeply informed the political practices, shared knowledges and culture of the valley over the past 20 years, in terms of struggles against the violence of infrastructures and the dispossession from the territory. Very much grounded in the valley, the NoTav movement has however been supported by activists and movements from across the world; in turn, those involved in the NoTav have mobilised in solidarity with struggles and social movements taking place elsewhere, in particular those against the privatisation and militarisation of specific territories.6 Importantly, many of the people involved in the NoTav actions have also most recently mobilised in support of the migrants in transit. As one of the volunteers who mobilised to support the migrants in transit in the city of Bardonecchia highlighted: ‘in order to understand how the spontaneous migrant solidarity started in 2017 and how, little by little, it became more organised, we need to bring in mind the political culture that the NoTav experience contributed to create and spread in the valley over the last 20 years. The NoTav is by no means related to migration, but social justice claims have definitely driven the movement and are today also raised in relation to the migrants.’7 Similarly, the Roya Valley has an important history of resistances against infrastructures. Both valleys are today considered critical border-​zones by the migrants as well as by the police that obstruct their passage. The reactivation of the political memory of the struggles should not be seen as a mere transposition of crystallised tactics and practical knowledge into the field of migrant solidarity support. Indeed, the presence of illegalised migrants further complicates the way in which solidarity practices are enacted, due to the asymmetric relationships between migrants and locals –​such as in terms of legal status. In this sense, migration constitutes an analytical lens through which we can test and highlight the limits of EUrope. NoTav activists stressed that ‘the difficulty consists precisely in reinventing and readapting acquired practical knowledges in different spaces paying attention to the specificities of the different political contexts’.8 In fact, as Sandro Mezzadra has aptly noticed, ‘any kind of radical imagination of a new European space has to be rooted in the material fabric of these practices of mobility … as the result of an accumulation of struggles’, and it is precisely this latter that can constitute ‘an important weapon’ (in Fiedler, 2013). Which 193

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migrant solidarity practices have been mobilised in these valleys? And why have they faced criminalisation? The Alpine migrant passage was almost silenced and invisibilised until Autumn 2017. The migrants’ presence was quite scant in numbers at that time and, together with that, the ‘border spectacle’ (De Genova, 2013) was repeatedly produced in Ventimiglia, where migrants used to gather to try to cross along the coast. In 2017 the Alpine migrant passage was mediatised and, simultaneously, securitised: the French and the Italian police increased joint border patrolling activities in the snow and push back operations at the frontier became a daily routine. The securitisation of the border unsurprisingly meant the migrants took more dangerous and insecure passages. On the Italian side, the small towns of Claviere and Bardonecchia, located a few kilometres away from the border in the Susa Valley, have become the two main chokepoints for the migrants. From there, they try to cross at night, on foot, climbing the mountains. The municipality of Bardonecchia has adopted a non-​hostile politics towards migrants, in partial opposition to the Italian government, and allowed the NGO Rainbow for Africa to use a room next to the rail station to host the migrants in transit at night.9 The NGO is formed of doctors and medical personnel whose position about migration is different from the one of the NoTav activists: they do not claim for freedom of movement, they rather give temporary protection and medical assistance to the migrants in transit. However, what could have appeared as a mere humanitarian intervention and discourse in that context contributed to shape a non-​hostile environment. Importantly, the presence of a small and independent NGO has been perceived as an element of disturbance by the French authorities, which occasionally disrupted their activity. Solidarity practices at the French-​Italian border have been played out both in the form of mobile logistical support and as spatially fixed ones. As far as the mobile ones are concerned, it is worth mentioning the group of Guide Sans Frontières, formed by Alpine guides that decided to help migrants who were trying to climb the Alps, showing them the right path and conducting them through the border.10 In terms of spatially fixed support, in the small Italian city of Claviere, locals and NoTav activists occupied a big room inside the main church, despite the opposition of the priest, and strategically named it ‘Chez Jesus’ –​thus declaring it a sort of sanctuary space. In that place migrants also get legal support and organise themselves to cross the border. Notably, the occupation has been supported by a narrative that undermines the register of the ‘emergency’ and seeks to denaturalise the image of the Alps as a risky and deadly frontier for the migrants (Darnault, 2017): ‘the snow is not an emergency, the mountains are not the problem, the problem is the frontier that exists for some people only’. How has migrant solidarity been conceived and enacted in Claviere? Notably, the locals involved in the activities of Chez Jesus refused the vocabulary of ‘hospitality’,11 preferring 194

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to speak of a safe space opened and temporarily shared by migrants and by those who want to support their struggle for movement. The expression ‘crimes of solidarity’, an oxymoron, is not enshrined in any national law and it is rather used by activists and human rights organisations to designate the criminalisation of acts in support of the migrants that state authorities instigate on the basis of both national and European laws (Baudet and Carrere, 2004; Fekete, 2009). Both French and Italian governments refer to the 2002 EU Facilitation Directive which prevents and penalises ‘the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence’12 of migrants. The Directive includes a clause for exempting those who provide humanitarian assistance; however, the clause is non-​binding and therefore discretionary to member states if applying it or not (Carrera et al, 2016). In France, the article 662 of the Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right to Asylum (CESEDA) has been at the core of political and legal disputes.13 Notably, citizens who help migrants to cross national borders can be prosecuted in Italy under the same law that punishes smugglers –​people who make economic profit by asking money from the migrants who want to cross, inducing a sort of generalised ‘smugglerisation’ (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018) of people acting in solidarity with migrants. Nevertheless, we contend that the legal background of ‘crimes of solidarity’ should not be overstated. Instead, the ‘crimes’ in question concern an ethical and political dimension that exceeds the legal one: why do solidarity practices effectively disturb states’ politics and actions? What does the overused word ‘facilitation’ (‘facilitation of irregular migration’) overshadow? In other words, what is effectively criminalised and targeted? Taking into account the aforementioned experiences of solidarity, under attack are the mobile, ‘clandestine’ and precarious infrastructures deployed to support migrant movements –​helping them to cross the borders, giving them lifts; what the term ‘facilitation’ does not enable us to capture is the targeting of practices that more broadly de-​ securitise spaces and undo hostile environment policies. Indeed, the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity should be situated within state politics aimed not only at obstructing migrants’ movements but also ‘at creating a hostile environment both for would-​be refugees and for those supporting them’ (Webber, in Fekete, 2018: 68). In fact, the solidarity practices we illustrated do not just support movements, they also engage in opening safe spaces, as temporary and precarious they could be, or what migrants in Calais call lieux de vie (spaces of life). On the one hand the ambiguous and equivocal legal definition of ‘smuggler’14 paves the way for stretching the notion by de facto including people who support migrants without making economic profit; on the other, we cannot narrow the analysis on crimes of solidarity to the smuggling debate for two main reasons. First, this would reiterate the state-​based narrative on the criminalisation of smuggling, opposing the ‘good’ European 195

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citizens acting in solidarity with the wicked smugglers. Second, the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity practices in Europe concerns less the acts and gestures per se than the autonomous channels and logistics of support –​independent from state-​led humanitarianism –​that these small groups, spontaneous networks, like ‘Refugees Welcome’, and individual citizens put into place. The criminalised solidarity practices escape the codification within the register of state-​led humanitarianism. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis on the criminalisation of ‘popular illegalisms’ (Foucault, 2016), we suggest that a similar methodological sensibility should be mobilised in this case in a way that engages with the limits of EUrope: instead of relying on a juridical approach that analyses the legal basis upon which European citizens have been accused of facilitating ‘illegal’ immigration, we interrogate how in a specific political context some gestures and acts started to be criminalised.

Concluding remarks Through such a focus on the criminalised migrant solidarity practices that some local citizens engaged in at the border-​zones of EUrope, we have not sketched a general theory of solidarity. Rather, this chapter has pointed to the necessity of politicising solidarity, both in the scholarship and in the public debate –​showing when solidarity practices become a ‘problem’ for states. By taking it as a constitutively relational concept, we have put solidarity into motion, drawing attention to the play of dominations that the criminalisation of solidarity practices reveals. The unstable commoning generated through sedimented shared knowledges and through the reactivation of the political memory of struggles is in itself mobile in a twofold sense: on the one hand, we have been witnessing the periodical ‘eruption’ of practices and spaces of solidarity across EUrope; on the other, the specificity of the migrant solidarity practices that we have taken into account concern their being moulded and adapted to the condition of migrants being en route, in transit. However, a clarification is needed about our engagement with crimes of solidarity. By focusing on the increasing criminalisation of migrant solidarity practices in Europe we do not want to corroborate a legal and moralistic view on smuggling that would trace neat partitions between the ‘fake and good’ smugglers –​the European citizens who support migrants in transit –​ and the ‘true and bad’ smugglers –​who ask money from the migrants in order to make them cross. Rather, through this chapter we argue that a de-​criminalisation of solidarity practices should be coupled with a critical appraisal of the global economy of migration that produces the very ‘figure of the smuggler’ as a crucial subject for the migration logistics of crossing. While solidarity, as one of the main political and social values of the European Union, is essentially codified by European politicians as a bordering 196

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notion –​for example, solidarity among member states to share the ‘refugee burden’ –​independent groups that mobilise in solidarity with migrants appear as troubling to the politics of states. Yet, in considering how solidarity becomes a contentious political terrain, we caution against subsuming the heterogenous practices and experiences we illustrated in the chapter within the vocabulary of citizenship. Nor do we think that ‘the language of citizenship is that which best encapsulates the language of political subjectivity’ (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012: 11). Rather, in the chapter we engaged in a methodological opening-​up gesture that contributes to subvert and overcome the limits of EUrope. This consists in bringing attention to the political spaces generated by local practices and temporary transversal alliances between migrants and citizens which are not fully legible through the language of citizenship, further exploring the modes of collective subjectivities that emerge out of that. Thus, this chapter has shown how these solidarity practices contribute to subvert and partially overcome the limits of EUrope. On the one hand, a focus on the criminalisation of solidarity practice makes it possible to repoliticise the notion of solidarity and to rethink it as a relational concept. On the other hand, we should caution against the rebordering of solidarity as a neatly defined political space and the tracing out of clear-​cut boundaries with humanitarianism, with state politics and with forms of struggles that cannot be easily described in terms of solidarity. By engaging with the time–​space of solidarity, we have focused the attention on work of solidarity, meaning the ways in which the memories of political struggles and the mobile commoning formed by shared practical knowledges have been reactivated and put to work in the present. The laborious work of solidarity practices to support migrants en route opens up the very notion of solidarity to its politicisation. As long as practices and acts of solidarity with migrants are criminalised, obstructed or labelled as a threat to social cohesion, a focus on solidarity highlights EUrope at its limits. Notes 1

2 3

4 5

www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/9cc6ac38-32f5-4c0a-a3379a8ae4d5740f/​publishable_​en.pdf https://​eur-​lex.europa.eu/​legal-​content/​EN/​TXT/​?uri=​CELEX:12007L/​TXT We borrow the idea of time–​space from May and Thrift (2001: 1–​46), who develop the concept to avoid the binary separation of time and space that marks much social theory after the spatial turn. ‘[T]‌he picture that emerges is less that of a singular or uniform social time stretching over a uniform space, than of various (and uneven) networks of time stretching in different and divergent directions across an uneven social field –​think, for example, of the uneven dissemination of the mechanical clock through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries or of railway time in the mid to late nineteenth century’ (p 5). Particular ‘senses of time’ are embedded in different social practices and spaces. www.tni.org/en/publication/the-shrinking-space-for-solidarity-with-migrants-and- refugees www.saradura.org/INTERVISTE/2-Nicoletta%20Dosio.pdf 197

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6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

For instance, within Italy, the NoTav supported the NoDalMolin movement against the establishment of a US military base near the Italian city of Vicenza. Notably, the NoTav has politically supported the Zapatista movement. Interview with S.M., coordinator of the association Liberament Insieme, Bardonecchia, 19 May 2018. Interview conducted with two NoTav activists in the city of Claviere in the occupied room in the church, 30 March 2018. www.valsusaoggi.it/profughi-in-valsusa-dal-weekend-apre-il-ricovero-notturno-abardonecchia-​cerchiamo-​medici-​e-​infermieri-​volontari/​ http://escalade-pays-de-gex.com/2017/12/08/humanitaire-ong-tous-migrantsguides-​sans-​frontieres-​secours-​migrants-​montagne/​ This would introduce hierarchical relationships between hosts and guests instead of opening up a common terrain of struggle. https://​eur-​lex.europa.eu/​legal-​content/​EN/​ALL/​?uri=​celex%3A32002L0090 In fact, it has been mobilised by the Court to condemn French citizens who gave any kind of humanitarian support to the migrants while, in turn, the humanitarian clause enshrined in the article is used by human rights organisations to defend those citizens. www.lemonde.fr/​politique/​article/​2018/​04/​06/​apres-​28-​heures-​de-​debats-​et-​l-​etude-​ de-​850-​amendements-​le-​projet-​de-​loi-​asile-​et-​immigration-​adopte-​en-commission_​ 5281959_​823448.html​

Acknowledgements We want to thank Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski and the participants of the ‘Limits of EUrope’ conference (London, October 1-​2, 2018). References Ataç, I., Rygiel, K. and Stierl, M. (2016) ‘Introduction: The contentious politics of refugee and migrant protest and solidarity movements: remaking citizenship from the margins’, Citizenship Studies, 20: 527–​544. Baudet, V. and Carrere, V. (2004) ‘Delit de solidarité’, Plein Droit, 1: 14–​17. BBC (2017) ‘Europe migrant crisis: EU court rejects quota challenge’, 6 September, www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​europe-​41172638 Carrera, S., Guild, E., Aliverti, A., Allsopp, J., Manieri, G. and Levoy, M. (2016) ‘Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants’, Policy Department C, LIBE. Carrebregu, G. (2016) ‘Habermas on solidarity: an immanent critique’, Constellations, 23(4): 507–​522. Darnault, M. (2017) ‘Charles Heller et Christina Del Biaggio: En montagne, comme en mer, la frontière est violente pour les migrants’, Liberation, www. liberation.fr/​debats/​2017/​12/​14/​charles-​heller-​et-​cristina-​del-​biaggio-​ en-​montagne-​comme-​ en-​mer-​la-​frontiere-​est-​violente-​pour-​les-​m_​ 1616731

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De Genova, N. (2013) ‘Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(7): 1180–​1198. Dijstelbloem, H. (nd) Border as vehicle (book manuscript under review). Donzelot, J. (1991) ‘The mobilization of society’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault effect, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Fassin, D. (2010) ‘Inequality of lives, hierarchies of humanity: Moral commitments and ethical dilemmas of humanitarianism’, in I. Feldman and M. Ticktin (eds), In the name of humanity: the government of threat and care, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Fassin, E. (2017) ‘Le procès politique de la solidarité (3/​4): les ONG en Méditerranée’, Media-​part, https://​blogs.mediapart.fr/​eric-​fassin/​blog/​ 170817/​le-​proces-​politique-​de-​la-​solidarite-​34-​les-​ong-​en-​mediterrane Fekete, L. (2017) ‘Introduction’, in Institute of Race Relations, Humanitarianism: the unacceptable face of solidarity, London: Institute of Race Relations, www.irr.org.uk/​ publications/​issues/​humanitarianism-​the-​unacceptable-​face-​of-​solidarity/​ Fekete, L. (2018) ‘Migrants, borders and the criminalisation of solidarity in the EU’, Race & Class, 59(4): 65–​83. Fekete, L. (2009) ‘Europe: crimes of solidarity’, Race & Class, 50(4): 83–​97. Fiedler. M. (2013) ‘European citizenship and the place of migrants’ struggles in a New Radical Europe. An interview with Sandro Mezzadra’, LeftEast, www.criticatac.ro/ ​ l efteast/ ​ e uropean- ​ c itizenship- ​ a nd- ​ t he- ​ p lace- ​ o f-​ migrants-​struggles-i​ n-a​ -n ​ ew-r​ adical-e​ urope-a​ -t​ alk-w ​ ith-s​ andro-m ​ ezzadra/​ Foucault, M. (2016) The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972–​1973, New York: Springer. Garelli, G. and Tazzioli, M. (2018) ‘Governing migrants through smugglers in the Mediterranean. Undoing the ‘smuggler-​enemy’ script’, unpublished paper. Greiner, F. (2017) ‘Introduction: Writing the contemporary history of European solidarity’, European Review of History, 24(6): 837–​853. Hunt-​Hendrix, L. (2018) ‘Solidarity: the history of a powerful idea and how it can shape philanthropic practice’, HistPhil, 16 April, https://​histphil. org/​2018/​04/​16/​solidarity-​the-​history-​of-​a-​powerful-​idea-​and-​how-​it-​ can-​shape-​philanthropic-​practice/​ Johnson, L. (2015) ‘Mater ial interventions on the US-​M exico border: investigating a sited politics of migrant solidarity’, Antipode, 47(5): 1–​18. Kelliher, D. (2018) ‘Historicising geographies of solidarity’, Geography Compass, 12(9), https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​gec3.12399 Kelz, R. (2015) ‘Political theory and migration: concepts of non-​sovereignty and solidarity’, Movements, 1(2).

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Langford, L. (2013) ‘The other Euro crisis: rights violation under the Common European Asylum system and the unraveling of EU solidarity’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 26: 217–​264. Linebaugh, P. (2009) The Magna Carta manifesto: Liberties and commons for all, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. May, J. and Thrift, N. (2001) ‘Introduction’ in J. May and N. Thrift (eds) Timespace: geographies of modernity, London: Routledge, 1-​46. Mezzadra, S. and Neumann, M. (2017) ‘Al di la dell’opposizione tra interesse e identità. Per una politica di classe all’altezza dei tempi’, Euronomade, www.euronomade.info/​?p=​9402 Millner, N. (2011) ‘From ‘refugee’ to ‘migrant’ in Calais solidarity activism: re-​staging undocumented migration for a future politics of asylum’, Political Geography, 30: 320–​328. Mohanty, C.T. (2003) Feminism without borders: decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity, New Delhi: Zubaan. Nyers, P. and Rygiel, K. (eds) (2012) Citizenship, migrant activism and the politics of movement, Abingdon: Routledge. Pallister-​W ilkins, P. (2018) ‘Hotspots and the geog raphies of humanitarianism’, Environment and Planning D, https:// ​ d oi.org/​ 10.1177%2F0263775818754884 Papadopoulos, D. and Tsianos, V.S. (2013) ‘After citizenship: autonomy of migration, organisational ontology and mobile commons’, Citizenship Studies, 17(2): 178–​196. Rancière, J. (1999) Disagreement: politics and philosophy, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Ross, M. and Borgman-​Prebil, Y. (eds) (2010) Promoting solidarity in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rygiel, K. (2011) ‘Bordering solidarities: migrant activism and the politics of movement and camps at Calais’, Citizenship Studies, 15: 1–​19. Stjernø, S. (2011) ‘The idea of solidarity in Europe’, European Journal of Social Law, 3: 156–​176. Tazzioli, M. (2018) ‘Crimes of solidarity. Migration and containment through rescue’, Radical Philosophy, 2.01, www.radicalphilosophy.com/​ commentary/​crimes-​of-​solidarity Trimikliniotis, N., Parsanoglou, D. and Tsianos, V. (2014) Mobile commons, migrant digitalities and the right to the city, New York: Springer.

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Response to Martina Tazzioli and William Walters Liz Fekete

In this thought-​provoking essay, Martina Tazzioli and William Walters argue that the political concept of solidarity is under-​theorised in the academy, particularly as compared to concepts such as justice, equality, citizenship, equality. But in calling for a sharper ‘analytics of solidarity’ they are clear that theory must be informed by practice and that the perspectives of those struggling for migrant and refugee rights in a ‘new era of protest’ are key. By interrogating solidarity within the migration context, they show how the bounded and bordered nature of top-​down solidarity, as institutionalised both in EU declarations, charters and policies and the more recent state-​model of ‘good refugee hosting’, divides citizen from foreigner, betraying universal values. They contrast the branded ‘paternalistic humanitarianism’ favoured by the European Commission, with the bottom-​ up internationalist (and therefore anti-​racist) solidarity of Europe’s citizens’ initiative of solidarity practices at the French-​Italian frontier as a case study. This essay takes the attempts to criminalise those NGOs and individuals who create lieux de lie (spaces of life) for migrants and refugees and defend the ‘spaces of sociability’ fostered by migrants themselves as the vantage point from which to expose EU’s repressive approach to migration, as the ‘hostile environment’ (first coined by Theresa May) is generalised across Europe. The authors stress ‘how history continues to shape contemporary practices of solidarity’, a history that migrant struggles draw upon and lessons they reactivate. It is ‘nativism’, with its rhetorical rallying cry of ‘our own people first’, and its populist vocabulary that reduces ‘non-​natives’ to ‘swarms’, ‘invaders’ or, as Italy’s far-​r ight interior minister Matteo Salvini puts it, 201

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Africa’s ‘new slaves’, that forms the backcloth to the authors’ concerns. The term xeno-​racism, first deployed by A. Sivanandan (Sivanandan, 2001), is used to describe a virulent form of racism meted out to foreigners and its institutionalisation within law and policy through specific measures that segregate asylum seekers and migrants from the rest of society, strip them of human rights and render them vulnerable to deportation. While the authors are right to warn against a solidarity that reduces migrant solidarity initiatives to narrow legal fights (to reform the 2002 Facilitators Directive, for instance), they may have inadvertently downplayed the role of the law as a boundary-​creating device and the importance that attempts to challenge it can play in any resistance struggle, as unjust laws invoke memories of the conscientious objector. In addition, it is the xeno-​racist laws institutionalised by European governments over several decades that, in giving a fillip to popular stereotypes against migrants and refugees, undermine governments’ attempts to institutionalise liberal models of solidarity around ‘good refugee hosting’. When Chancellor Merkel attempted to open up a passage for Syrian refugees in the summer of 2015, her ‘paternalistic humanitarianism’ and state-​sanctioned Gastrecht (hospitality) was soon under attack. The far-​r ight Alternative for Germany (AfD) seized on the 2015 New Year’s Eve events in Cologne, involving sexual assaults and muggings by gangs of petty criminals, many North African, and large swathes of the liberal press taking fright. Embracing aspects of AfD’s racist and reactionary agenda, liberal media commentators debated the ‘limits of hospitality’ –​in the process revealing the limits of liberalism when it comes to fighting racism. But this is an important essay that will strengthen advocacy on the ground, and NGOs and others, whose research is more case-​oriented, can benefit too from its accessibility. The concept of ‘shrinking space’ could provide a useful way of deepening the authors’ critique of the ‘multiple split of humanitarianism’, where ‘independent and grassroots movements... are under attack, while established NGOs and IGOs take part more than ever’ in the governance of migration, ‘reinforcing the entanglement between security and humanitarianism’. This is how a coalition of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in a Transnational Institute (TNI) discussion paper (Transnational Institute, 2018) described increasing restrictions, overt political interference and government de-​legitimisation of their work within the global trend of securitisation and repression within governments and donors. The concept of ‘shrinking space’, a metaphor to describe a gamut of restrictions on political struggle, is also a framework for CSOs to discuss their problematic relationship with governance –​domestic, EU and international. In strikingly similar terms to Tazzioli and Walters, the TNI warned that there is a big difference (in terms of access to power) between highly-​professionalised NGOs and civil society actors, and that spaces traditionally inhabited by 202

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CSOs are increasingly being captured by private interest groups, lobbyists and GONGOs (government-​oriented NGOs). In its 2017 report, Humanitarianism: the unacceptable face of solidarity, the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) carried out a detailed examination of 26 ‘crimes of solidarity’ case studies, involving 45 individuals. Tazzioli and Walters’ assertion that the real target of the EU’s laws is not the individual actor but the autonomous channels, infrastructure and logistics of support, is borne out by the cases we collected and continue to log. It seems that some states might be learning the dangers posed by over-​zealous and manifestly unjust prosecutions that generate large-​scale protests and media attention once they come to court. For example, Benoit Ducos, the Refugee Solidaire volunteer medic and trained member of an Alpes-​Maritime ski patrol, was interrogated after assisting a pregnant woman trying to cross the Alps, and though initially summoned to appear before court, ultimately faced no charges. According to Ducos, the state’s purpose was not so much prosecution as intimidation, a tactic used against dozens of other activists who have been summoned by the French authorities over the past few months. Given the limits of space, the question of the prosecution of search-​and-​ rescue (SAR) NGOs could not be covered by Tazzioli and Walters, though Tazzioli has addressed ‘crimes of rescue’ in a recent essay in Radical Philosophy (Tazzioli, 2018). A range of measures have been deployed to erase this vital and life-​saving form of solidarity, from the use of undercover agents and bugging devices, to the de-​registering and impounding of ships. There has also been an extension from SAR NGOs to commercial vessels of the ‘refusal to disembark’ policy, as documented in Amnesty International’s report Beyond the devil and the deep blue sea. Europe fails refugees and migrants in the Central Mediterranean (2018). ‘Rescuers and frail and exhausted rescued people are left stranded at sea for days, even weeks, as each disembarkation is negotiated individually’ (p 5). The authors’ time–​space model (a consideration of political terrain and memory at one and the same time) explores the past in the present –​the sedimented knowledge that remains with us from past struggles. It brings to mind the ways in which smuggling has always been a response born of human solidarity, whether bringing Jews out of Germany and Nazi-​ occupied territories before and during the Second World War, or helping people cross the Berlin Wall during the Cold War. It also invokes memories of Europe’s post-​war, anti-​racist, internationalist traditions, such as against apartheid in South Africa, or ethnic cleansing in Sri Lanka and Palestine. Sea rescue, that most basic form of human solidarity, has the deepest time–​ space of all, and a political memory embracing seafarers from all cultures, who have from time immemorial come to the aid of those in peril on the sea. It is this ancient ethic that the governments of Italy and Malta are currently attempting to erase. 203

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References Amnesty International (2018) Between the devil and the deep blue sea: Europe fails refugees and migrants in the Central Mediterranean, www.amnesty.org/e​ n/​ documents/​eur30/​8906/​2018/​en/​ Institute of Race Relations (2017) Humanitarianism: the unacceptable face of solidarity, London: Institute of Race Relations, www.irr.org.uk/​ publications/i​ ssues/h ​ umanitarianism-t​ he-u ​ nacceptable-f​ ace-o ​ f-s​ olidarity/​ Sivanandan, A. (2001) ‘Poverty is the new Black’, Race & Class, 43(2): 1–​5, October-​ December. Tazzzioli, M. (2018) ‘Crimes of solidarity: migration and containment through rescue’, Radical Philosophy, February, https://w ​ ww.radicalphilosophy.com/​ commentary/​crimes-​of-​solidarity Transnational Institute (2018) On ‘Shrinking Space’: A framing paper, Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, https://​kvennabladid.is/​2018/​12/​ 14/​r iki-​evropu-​beita-​akaeruvaldinu-​til-​ad-​glaepavaeda-​samstodu-​og-​ mannudarstarf/​

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PART IV

Limits to Transformative and Normative Europe

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Entering the ‘Post-​Shame Era’: The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Populism and Neo-​Authoritarianism in EUrope Ruth Wodak

Introduction On 17 July 2018, former US president Barack Obama was invited to give the Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture in Johannesburg. In his speech, he warned that: a politics of fear and resentment and retrenchment began to appear, and that kind of politics is now on the move … I am not being alarmist, I am simply stating the facts. … Strongman politics are ascendant suddenly, whereby elections and some pretence of democracy are maintained –​the form of it –​but those in power seek to undermine every institution or norm that gives democracy meaning.1 Obviously, Obama did not use the terms ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘neo-​ authoritarianism’ or ‘populism’ (or other terms which currently dominate social-​science scholarship and media reporting), but he certainly put his finger on the drastic socio-​political changes that have been taking place globally, including in EU member states, specifically since the so-​called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018). Indeed, as a study on ‘Fear not values’ conducted by de Vries and Hoffmann (2016) in eight EU member states2 illustrates, over 50% of the 207

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voters for far-​right parties viewed globalisation as the major threat in the future.3 Moreover, 53% of those who fear globalisation perceive migration as the major global challenge, and 54% display anti-​foreigner sentiments. In a similar vein, political scientist Ivan Krastev concludes in his widely acknowledged essay Europadämmerung (2017: 48–​49) that the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 might eventually lead to the destruction of the EU. Although many politicians at EU and national levels, as well as other prominent public intellectuals, are explicitly warning against the European and global drift towards more (ethno-​)nationalism, illiberal democracies and authoritarianism –​and thus against violations of human rights, international treaties and EU norms and values (for example, Otmar Karas,4 Emmanuel Macron,5 and Jürgen Habermas6) –​official responses on the part of the EU have been slow and follow complex, institutionally defined procedures (Article 7 of the European Treaty).7 Along these lines, Grabbe and Lehne (2017b: 8) state that: EU actors must therefore explain why they have to protect core EU standards and make it clear that steps will be taken against any government that undermines EU law. Strong statements from other Central European governments would be particularly helpful. The EU can also counter claims of double standards by getting tougher on bad behaviour by member states across the board, particularly on corruption and misuse of public funds. Due to space restrictions, I will have to neglect the institutional struggles on the EU level and the various attempts to negotiate with Hungary and Poland, but those have been covered extensively by Uitz (2015), Kerski (2018), and Möllers and Schneider (2018). Uitz (2015: 293–​295) also provides compelling evidence for the impossibility of drawing on the agreed-​upon conventions of dialoguing, negotiating and compromising, if one of the partners in these interactions does not want to comply with the established rules of such language games (Wodak, 2015a, 2017): this precludes that there is no ‘productive dialogue’ (Utiz, 2015: 294). The Hungarian and Polish governments seem convinced that these conventions do not apply to them and are driven ‘by the urge to establish exceptions, in the spirit of constitutional parochialism’ (Utiz, 2015: 296). In other words, context-​dependent discursive strategies of blame avoidance, denial, Manichean division, victim-​perpetrator reversal and eristic argumentation dominate official communication, accompanied by ever-​more nationalism, chauvinism and nativism. In this vein, I claim that this kind of rejection of dialogue relates to a ‘post-​ shame era’ rather than, as many scholars believe, merely to a ‘post-​truth era’ (for example, Scheff, 2000; Hahl et al, 2018): anti-​elitist and anti-​pluralist/​ exclusionary rhetoric, symbolic politics (such as focusing on the ‘headscarves’ of Muslim women while neglecting complex socioeconomic issues associated 208

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with migration and integration), ‘digital demagogy’, ‘bad manners’ and ‘anti-​politics’ support the non-​complying behaviours of powerful politicians that frequently resonate as ‘authentic’ with the core followers of these politicians, their parties or governments. Instead of discussing and providing solutions for major socio-​political problems such as globally rising inequality and youth unemployment, and the consequences of climate change for migration politics, refugees and migrants serve as the scapegoat and simplistic explanation for all woes. Against this background, ‘anti-​politics’ is defined as a specific attitude and related discourse which systematically undermine democratic institutions (Diehl, 2017: 28–​29). The state itself, the entire political system, is challenged, like in reality TV: shamelessness, humiliation of other participants, defamation, lies and ad hominem attacks dominate. Indeed, such shameless behaviour could be observed, for example, in several TV debates during the presidential election campaign in Austria in 2016, employed by the far-​r ight populist candidate (for the Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), Norbert Hofer (Wodak, 2017). Mastropaolo (2000: 36) mentions similar patterns of scandalisation, ‘politicotainment’ and the decay of democratic procedures in Italian politics in the 1990s (Wodak, 2011). In this chapter, I trace the trajectory of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in its transformation into the ‘New People’s Party’ under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, recently entering a coalition government with the populist extreme-​ right FPÖ. This allows me to identify the many small and large changes that Austria has undergone on the way from a constitutional liberal democracy since 1945 to a potentially Orbánesque illiberal democracy, thus indicating some limits of the liberal democratic European project envisioned by the founding fathers. This, I argue, must be recognised as a process of ‘normalisation’ –​the normalisation of far-​r ight ideologies in both content and form. This process can also be observed in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) has exerted much influence on the mainstream, labelled the ‘Geert Wilders-​effect’.8 Thus, specific patterns and stages of the Austrian trajectory can most probably be generalised to other EU member states. In this context, I will also discuss some constitutive discursive strategies of the post-​ shame era, the adaptation and integration of illiberalism and authoritarianism into formerly liberal democratic regimes. First, however, I shall briefly define the relevant concepts mentioned earlier and necessarily restrict myself to briefly elaborating on ‘populism’, ‘authoritarianism/​neo-​authoritarianism’ and ‘illiberal democracy/​managed democracy’.

Defining relevant concepts Populism There is no consensus as to whether ‘far-​right populism/​populist right-​ wing extremism’ is an ideology (thin or thick; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: 5), 209

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a philosophy (Priester, 2007: 9), a specific media phenomenon (Pajnik and Sauer, 2017), a strategic option for right-​wing extremists like the strategies used by the Nazi Party in the 1930s and 1940s (Salzborn, 2018) or a specific political style (Moffitt, 2017; Brubaker, 2017: 3) that manifests mainly in performance and communication. In their frequently cited approach, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 9–​12) emphasise three parameters of populism: first, the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’; second, a grounding in the volonté générale of the people; third, its character as a thin ideology, because it does not constitute a coherent structure of beliefs but assembles contradictory ideologemes in an eclectic fashion. As Mudde and Kaltwasser do not restrict their definition to the populist far right, the notion of ‘the people’ refers to the people as both sovereign (demos) and the common people. Moreover, it can refer to the people as ethnos. Furthermore, the notion of ‘the elite’ is differentiated into elites with (cultural, economic or social) power and elites defined on purely ethnic grounds. Finally, the volonté générale is equated with the general will of the people in the sense of Jean-​Jacques Rousseau. This rather general definition must be specified –​four dimensions are crucial in the context of recent political developments in the EU (Wodak, 2015a: 20–​22, 25–​33): • Nationalism/​Nativism/​Anti-​pluralism: Far-​r ight populist parties stipulate a seemingly homogenous ethnos, a populum or Volk, which can be arbitrarily defined –​often in nativist (blood-​related) terms. Such parties value the homeland or Heimat, which seems to require protection from dangerous invaders. In this way, threat scenarios are constructed –​the homeland or the ‘we’ is threatened by ‘others’: strangers within and/​or outside society. • Anti-​elitism: Such parties share an anti-​elitist and anti-​intellectual attitude (‘arrogance of ignorance’;Wodak, 2015a) related to strong EU scepticism. According to these parties, democracy should essentially be reduced to the majoritarian principle, that is, the rule of the (arbitrarily defined) ‘true people’. • Authoritarianism: A saviour, a charismatic leader is worshipped, alternating between the roles of Robin Hood (protecting the welfare state, supporting the ‘simple folk’) and the ‘strict father’ (Lakoff, 2004). Such charismatic leaders require a hierarchically structured party and government to guarantee ‘law and order’ and ‘security’. • Conservativism/​Historical revisionism: Far-​right populist parties usually represent conservative values (emphasising family values) and insist on preserving the status quo or a return to former, ‘better’ times. The aim of protecting the homeland also builds on a shared narrative of the past in which ‘we’ are either heroes or victims of evil (a conspiracy, enemies of the 210

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fatherland, and so on). This transforms past suffering or defeat into stories of the successes of the people or into stories of betrayal and treachery by others. Social welfare, in the concomitant welfare chauvinism, should only be given to ‘true’ members of the ethnos. Although not all far-​r ight populist parties endorse all of these strategies and positions, these –​realised in specific combinations –​can be generalised as typical ideologies of the far right. In all cases, such parties will advocate change, moving away from an allegedly dangerous path –​a looming crisis –​that would lead straight to catastrophe.

Illiberal democracy The distinction between ‘liberal/​constitutional democracies’ and ‘illiberal democracies’ is not new. The salient criterion for the existence of a liberal democracy is constitutionalism in the sense of checks and balances designed to protect the state and its society from the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. According to Zakaria (1997: 23–​24), who coined the term, illiberal democracies are increasing around the world and are increasingly limiting the freedoms of the people they represent (such as civil liberties of speech or religion). Nevertheless, the term ‘illiberal democracy’ remains a contested concept (see Krastev, 2006). Since its public use in 2014 by Hungarian Prime Minster Victor Orbán, leader of the far-​right/​nationalistic-​conservative party Fidesz, ‘illiberal democracy’ has entered everyday discourse in Europe and has been appropriated by some politicians as a positive model to be followed; and as a political system to be vehemently opposed by others. In his speech on 30 July 2014, Orbán maintained that: the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-​liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central element of state organization, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.9 Here, Orbán defines ‘illiberal democracy’ as rejecting tolerance for minorities while supporting strong forms of majoritarianism. He emphasises his belief in nationalism (Hungary’s uniqueness vis-​à-​vis the EU and the other 27 EU member states) and exceptionalism. The Hungarian Constitution, which was revised and accepted by the Hungarian Parliament on 25 April 2011, reflects Fidesz’s illiberal values by, for example, cutting the freedom of the press, reforming the electoral system in unfair ways, and challenging and undermining the independence of justice (Uitz, 2015: 285–​288; Grabbe 211

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and Lehne, 2017a). In Poland, similar developments are taking place under the nationalistic-​conservative government of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and its leader Jarosław Kaczyński (Grabbe and Lehne, 2017b; Kerski, 2018). Of course, gerrymandering and using the resources of the state on a very large scale to ensure a sweeping full-​majority victory would not necessarily imply fraudulent elections in a formal sense, but the boundaries of legality are shamelessly pushed as far as possible (Uitz, 2015).10 Indeed, Sutowski (2018: 17–​18) labels the new Polish way as ‘neo-​authoritarianism’. Thus, liberal democracies cannot be defined solely by the fact that elections are formally held; as Möllers and Schneider (2018: 7–​9) maintain, the protection of oppositional parties and movements, freedom of opinion and the press, fair elections and independence of the judicial system must be guaranteed. Therefore, the authors argue that potential future majorities must be protected: the opposition must retain the institutional opportunities to win majorities in a future election (pp 89–​90). This specific criterion is necessary, the authors argue, to prevent the rise of an authoritarian system.

(Neo-​)Authoritarianism Fuchs (2018: 56–​58) defines right-​wing/​neo-​authoritarianism by drawing on the traditions of the Frankfurt School (specifically Franz Neumann and T.W. Adorno) along four similar dimensions, namely: Nationalism, Friend/​Enemy-​Scheme, Authoritarian Leadership and Patriarchy and Militarism. Two elements stand out in Fuchs’ conceptual framework: political fetishism of the nation ‘to deflect attention from class contradictions and power inequalities’; moreover, ‘leader fetishism is used as a political organization principle that often extends to the organization of the capitalist economy, culture and everyday life’ (p 56). Secondly, Fuchs emphasises the glorification of the soldier and warrior; indeed violence, imperialism and war are accepted ‘as appropriate ways for organizing social relations’ (p 57). Fuchs’ neo-​Marxist framework allows understanding the link between the neoliberal world order and the rise of illiberal democracies as well as neo-​authoritarian regimes. Mudde (2007: 22) also draws on the Frankfurt School but subscribes to a more socio-​psychological tradition: authoritarianism is defined as ‘a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical towards authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority’ (Adorno et al, 1969: 228, emphasis added). However, Mudde also points to Juan Linz’s influential definition of authoritarianism as a form of government characterised by strong central power and limited individual freedoms. 212

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Following Linz (1964), four dimensions are emphasised as salient elements of an authoritarian government: • limited political pluralism places constraints on political parties, interest groups and NGOs; • legitimacy is largely dependent on emotions, on identification with the regime; • suppression of the opposition; and, • vague and non-​transparent definitions of the powers of the executive.11 Obviously, these criteria overlap with our definitions of illiberal democracy. Furthermore, Levitsky and Way (2002) point to another relevant concept: ‘competitive authoritarianism’, which differs from so-​called ‘façade’ electoral regimes (also labelled ‘pseudo-​democracies’, ‘virtual democracies’ and ‘electoral authoritarian’), that is regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation of power (such as Egypt, Singapore and Uzbekistan in the 1990s). Competitive authoritarianism implies regimes that are democratic in appearance but authoritarian in nature; thus, democratic institutions exist in form but not in substance, because the electoral, legislative, judicial, media and other institutions are so heavily skewed in favour of current power holders. Russia under President Vladimir Putin, the authors claim, would fall within the category of competitive authoritarianism.12 In a detailed comparative study of media systems, Becker (2004: 149) regards the Russian press under Putin as a neo-​authoritarian media system. He argues that ‘state-​owned media have limited autonomy, and appointments to key positions are linked to political loyalty. Access to the media may be open and private ownership may be tolerated, but other mechanisms are used to control messages.’ Economic and legal pressures are applied to suppress freedom of opinion. The regime also uses or tolerates violence against opposition journalists and editors. In this way, self-​censorship is reinforced. As will be elaborated later, the Austrian government coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ has placed severe controls on information and is attempting to intervene in the public state-​owned media; this could certainly be regarded as a significant step in the direction of an illiberal democracy and a neo-​authoritarian media system. Such developments clearly point to the limit of EUrope as envisioned and indeed as stipulated, for example, in the European Treaty of Lisbon 2008–​09.13

The turquoise-​blue government in Austria, 2017–​18 Looking back: the rise of the FPÖ The Austrian ‘Freedom Party’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) must be distinguished from other populist far-​r ight parties in terms of its history and 213

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continuous ties to National Socialism, as well as its nativist, anti-​immigrant, anti-​pluralist and white-​supremacist ideology.14 Today, one might consider labelling the party as populist extreme-​r ight, owing to some of its ideological characteristics, as well as its leading members who belong to German-​ national duelling fraternities.15 After Heinz-​Christian (HC) Strache took control of the FPÖ in 2005, frontstage activities of the party saw a softening of extreme-​right positions and an increase in the salient mobilisation of symbols of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995):16 displaying the Austrian flag, singing the national anthem and utilising an abundance of other symbols of national pride. In many instances, the respective texts and performances feature Strache himself wielding these symbols, portraying the FPÖ politicians as brave, strong and skilled mountaineers who have climbed to the very mountain top, and subsequently addressing their role as the saviours of ‘true Austrians’. With Strache’s leadership came a re-​branding of the FPÖ as the ‘Soziale Heimatpartei’, the Social Homeland Party (a label it shares with the extreme-​ right National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD). Further provocations relate to the use of religious imagery and symbols (for example, Strache carried a Christian cross during a demonstration against the building of a Mosque in Vienna; Wodak, 2015a: 140), as well as the redefining of religious concepts, such as Nächstenliebe (neighbourly love or charity) in nationalistic terms. The accompanying claims to represent and ‘defend’ the Christian heritage of Austria in the face of an alleged ‘Islamic invasion’ have been protested, inter alia, by the Catholic Church. Indeed, the FPÖ’s ‘othering’ has come to focus strongly on Islam, cast as an ethnic other, medieval/​pre-​ modern/​barbaric and religious zealot/​fanatic or terrorist threat (Wodak, 2017: 116–​117; Wodak and Rheindorf, 2018).

2017 parliamentary elections The Austrian parliamentary elections on 15 October 2017 exemplify the shameless normalisation of the previously far-​right positionings of the FPÖ. The ÖVP (now rebranded as ‘Ballot Sebastian Kurz –​The New People’s Party’, strategically changing colour from black to turquoise) focused almost exclusively on migration issues (equating all refugees with so-​called ‘illegal migrants’17). This new programme changed the agenda and structure of the ÖVP,18 which had been established immediately after the restoration of Austria’s independence in 1945 and has been represented in parliament ever since. The ÖVP has consistently been the strongest or second-​strongest party; as such, it has led or at least been a partner in most of Austria’s governments (Grande et al, 2012: 52). Sebastian Kurz, who had strategically prepared to take over the ÖVP since mid-​2016 (as was disclosed by newspapers in June 201719), was elected as party leader on 1 July 2017, after his predecessor had resigned, 214

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and immediately changed the structure of the ‘grand old party’: he surrounded himself with an extremely loyal team of mostly young male supporters and with politically inexperienced career-​changers who are completely dependent on him. He employs a large team of spin doctors who cleverly manage his online presence and his campaign, apparently copying many elements of US election rallies (see Horaczek and Tóth, 2017; Hofer and Tóth, 2017). In this way, the party has become identified with his persona to the point where Kurz is the new ÖVP with a strict centralised, hierarchical structure. Apart from proposing to dismantle the social partnership (and thus one of the constitutive cornerstones of the Austrian social model) and support employers’ organisations,20 the new ÖVP repeatedly promised to close the ‘Mediterranean route’ to migration; to reduce the legally fixed minimum welfare (for recognised refugees but also for other people in need); moreover, to reduce the upper limit for asylum applicants, in effect since 2016, from 35,000 to zero (although the number of new arrivals since 2015 has decreased dramatically).21 In so doing, Kurz adopted almost verbatim the programme of the FPÖ. It is thus fitting that the Green Party referred to Kurz during the 2017 election campaign as ‘the better Strache’.22 Fearmongering was the persuasive macro-​strategy in the FPÖ’s and ÖVP’s election campaigns in 2017 (Wodak, 2018a). They wilfully selected specific scapegoats as being responsible for the misery or threat identified: ‘illegal migrants’, Muslims and Islam, the Jewish philanthropist George Soros, NGOs, the EU and the media, as well as the previous coalition government, in which Kurz had served six years as minister for foreign affairs, and the integration of migrants. Both Strache and Kurz staged themselves as saviours of the ‘true Austrian people’ (see Figure 19.1), ready to ‘solve’ the alleged problems by, for instance, closing borders and deporting ‘illegal migrants’. A new, positive narrative was created, which should raise hope, advertised as an unspecified change. The stirring up of resentment by Kurz and Strache was successful at the election.23 The national-​conservative ÖVP won a majority with 31.5%. The FPÖ took third place with 26%.24 Due to the substantial overlap between the political programmes of the FPÖ and ÖVP, coalition talks began soon after. The new turquoise-​blue government, albeit accompanied by loud protests, was inaugurated by President Van der Bellen on 18 December 2017.25 During negotiations to form this government, President Alexander van der Bellen (in office since 26 January 2017) successfully prevented the Ministries of the Interior and Justice going to FPÖ officials as part of the coalition deal and pushed for the EU agenda to be relocated from the FPÖ-​led Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chancellery of Kurz. Despite all this, Van der Bellen did inaugurate the turquoise-​blue coalition, notwithstanding frequent assurances to the contrary he had given while running for president.26 215

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Figure 19.1: Poster with Sebastian Kurz: ‘Now or never! ÖVP, Ballot Sebastian Kurz, the new People’s Party. Movement for Austria!’ (personal photo)

Moving towards ‘Orbánism’ The ÖVP’s adoption of a far-​r ight, nationalist-​conservative agenda implies the normalisation of a previously extreme-​r ight, taboo agenda. It is thus not surprising that the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) published an editorial on 6 July 2018 –​after the beginning of Austria’s EU presidency on 1 July 2018 –​with the headline ‘Austria: When good countries go bad’,27 thus clearly indicating the limits of EUrope with respect to the officially accepted values of the European Treaty: Concerns centre on a set of inter-​related issues: the Austrian Government’s stance on asylum and migration; its closeness to the demagogic leaders of certain countries; its underlying anti-​EU stance; its courtship with Russia. The country’s ability to play the role of the Presidency is questioned because its obsessive and biased approach to migration and its love-​in with the extremists may preclude the neutrality required. … while the threat from extremist-​nationalists like the Freedom Party is clear …, the anti-​migration, anti-​Europe agenda becomes far more powerful through the conversion of mainstream leaders and parties to the cause, along with their subsequent complicity in allowing institutional and political capture by the migration obsession of the bad company they decide to keep. In the following, I briefly point to some salient indicators for Austria’s move towards an illiberal democracy while focusing on the discursive and argumentative strategies accompanying new legislation.28 216

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Fearmongering: us and them The new Austrian government propagates an extremely restrictive immigration policy (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018) and closed borders (even to Italy and South Tyrol), including the so-​called Mediterranean route. Shamelessly, both the FPÖ and the new ÖVP are actively spreading rumours, strawman fallacies and erroneous reports about migrants and refugees –​which all merge into a single threat scenario consisting of an imagined ‘invasion’ by so-​called ‘illegal migrants’ (Wodak, 2018b). To side-​step the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and prevent further loss of voters to the FPÖ, ÖVP politicians now define people who have been persecuted and are fleeing as ‘illegal migrants’ in their government programme.29 This implies that they are claiming to be refugees but are in fact travelling to rich European countries to live off welfare and benefits, and thereby endanger the prosperity of those countries. Such fallacies foment resentment and envy: why should foreigners gain access to benefits that take something away from ‘us’? Such exclusionary and xenophobic politics –​sustained and implemented by the formerly Christian-​social ÖVP –​correspond to the welfare chauvinism of other far-​r ight populists in Europe, such as the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Sweden Democrats or the Dutch PVV (Wodak, 2017, 2018a). Euphemisms are used with the aim of making restrictive new migration policies acceptable: in a meeting of EU heads of state in Brussels on 28 June 2018, Kurz and his allies Orbán and Matteo Salvini (LEGA, Italy’s Interior Minister) launched new terms, such as ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ instead of ‘camps’, to retain refugees in Northern Africa, thus preventing them from entering Europe. Moreover, facts about the plights of refugees are challenged and expert opinions neglected. For example, on 22 June 2018, in an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, editor-​ in-​chief Giovanni Di Lorenzo asked Sebastian Kurz what he felt when confronted with videos and pictures of children who had been separated from their parents at the US–​Mexico border.30 Kurz argued that these accounts may have been ‘fake news’: ‘I don’t want to speculate, but I have devoted myself a lot to migration. I know that frequently the mistake is being made, that something is represented differently than it is.’31 As Hannah Arendt (1971) asserted long ago, politicians can quickly change facts into opinions that one can then oppose –​quite shamelessly –​with alternative viewpoints. In this way, she argues, scholarly and factual evidence can be blunted and even negated.

Antisemitism/​racism/​historical revisionism As Hans-​Hennig Scharsach (2017) argues in his book Stille Machtergreifung [Quiet Coup], the FPÖ’s internal structures have changed significantly since 217

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HC Strache took over as leader in 2005, moving the party ever closer to the radical and extreme right:32 members of duelling fraternities, which make up only 0.4% of the Austrian population, have effectively taken over the FPÖ. FPÖ politicians such as Strache, Norbert Hofer (Minister for Infrastructure), Johann Gudenus and Manfred Haimbuchner (vice-​governor of Upper Austria) constitute the highest leadership body of the FPÖ. They all belong to duelling fraternities (Schlagende Burschenschaften; Rauscher, 2017).33 Core characteristics of the extreme right, such as anti-​liberalism, authoritarian leadership and subservience, a so-​called Volksgemeinschaft (an ethno-​culturally defined people), misogyny and racism apply to most duelling fraternities. Immediately after the new government was formed on 18 December 2017, numerous scandals related to antisemitic and revisionist documents disrupted the everyday agenda of the government: this included Facebook posts as well as songbooks containing Nazi-​songs with explicitly antisemitic stereotypes which are typical of such extreme-​r ight duelling fraternities.34 Moreover, the FPÖ’s Herbert Kickl, now Interior Minister, proposed ‘to concentrate people who enter asylum procedures in one place, because it must be our common interest to reach a corresponding result very, very quickly’.35 Obviously, the verb phrase ‘to concentrate people’ invites associations with the Nazi term ‘concentration camp’. The centre-​left broadsheet Der Standard maintains and continuously updates a list of euphemistically labelled ‘singular events’ [Einzelfälle] of antisemitism and revisionism which have been occurring on an almost weekly basis and keep the FPÖ in the headlines.36 Conspiracy theories have become a salient strategy in this context. They draw on the traditional antisemitic world-​conspiracy stereotype which also characterised and continues to characterise Nazi and fascist ideologies (Richardson, 2017). For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán published a list of 200 so-​called ‘Soros mercenaries’37 (including scholars, journalists, intellectuals and NGOs, who allegedly supported the Jewish Hungarian-​American philanthropist) who are trying to help refugees in Hungary. Indeed, Soros has been demonised via such traditional antisemitic conspiracy stereotypes as the primary Feindbild of Hungary and, subsequently, also of the FPÖ (Wodak, 2018b).38 Symbolic politics intentionally and strategically distract and divert from unpopular reforms implemented by the government and dominate the media. For example, Harald Waldhäusl, FPÖ councillor in Lower Austria, challenged the slaughtering of animals according to Jewish and Muslim rites, and proposed monitoring and registering orthodox Jews who bought such meat –​as was to be expected, this provoked a media scandal and negative responses by the opposition and the Jewish community.39 Another highly emotional issue relates to the Muslim headscarf: for years, the FPÖ has been protesting ‘the headscarf ’ as a symbol of female oppression (an example of the ‘right-​wing populist perpetuum mobile’; see Wodak, 2015a). The government has proposed forbidding the headscarf in kindergarten40 –​although nobody 218

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knows how many, if any, three-​year-​old Muslim girls are forced to wear a headscarf in kindergarten. On 24 July 2018, an FPÖ village councillor was finally expelled from the party after he had labelled the French soccer team that had won the World Cup as ‘Congo-​monkeys’ (Kongoaffen).41

Challenging press freedom It is also part of the current government’s programme to ‘reform’ the media –​which seems to be a euphemism for continuous and vicious attacks on established journalists and moderators. Such attacks are often made by the FPÖ via social media, using the rhetorical strategy of ‘calculated ambivalence’. This strategy seeks to convey distinct messages to multiple audiences (the party’s extreme-​right base and the public) while maintaining plausible deniability through ambiguity (Engel and Wodak, 2013). In a case that exemplifies this, a meme posted by Strache (as Austrian Vice-​Chancellor) was headed by the label ‘satire!’ and a smiling emoticon. Showing the well-​ known and internationally renowned journalist and moderator of the main news show of the Austrian public broadcaster ORF in the background to the right, the text reads ‘There is a place where lies become news. That is the ORF. The best of Fake News, lies and propaganda, pseudo-​culture and involuntary fees. Regional and international. On television, radio and the Facebook profile of Armin Wolf.’ Both Armin Wolf and the ORF have sued Strache for libel and won. Strache had to apologise publicly and pay €10,000 to Armin Wolf, who donated this money to the Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW), an NGO that documents neo-​Nazi and extreme-​r ight activities. Meanwhile, the FPÖ has continued to publicly campaign for the downsizing or privatisation of the ORF, while backchannel pressure on editors and journalists has been increased.42 Kurz and his government have also implemented a strategy of ‘information management’(labeled, message control).43 Each week, a specific topic is launched in a press conference and is then elaborated for one week, until being replaced with a new agenda seven days later. In this way, the media are kept busy and simultaneously distracted from other relevant news. Moreover, access to information is being severely restricted: government employees have been forbidden to speak with the press. Such rules come close to ‘managed democracies’ and their press policies, as defined earlier.

Conclusions: ‘shameless normalisation’ –​paving the way to illiberalism Investigative journalist Florian Klenk aptly illustrates the strategies of distraction and silence employed by the coalition government when challenging 219

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the Austrian post-​war liberal consensus and its open society.44 For example, the Austrian government has pushed a new law through parliament (without the conventionally agreed-​upon period for seeking expert opinions) which raises maximum daily working hours from 8 to 12 and maximum weekly working hours from 40 to 60. They have sought to legitimise this by appeals to ‘flexibility’ –​a neoliberal notion –​thus destroying an extremely important pillar of Austria’s post-​war democracy and ‘guaranteed workers’ rights. Raising the number of hours has predictably angered the electorate of the FPÖ. A first huge demonstration organised by the trade unions against this law took place on 30 June 2018. Specific populist measures such as the retraction of the anti-​smoking law, which would have taken effect on 1 May 2018 –​a concession the ÖVP made to the FPÖ despite the abundance of scientific evidence for the raised mortality caused by cigarettes –​have not sufficiently appeased the FPÖ’s core electorate.45 One could thus speculate that the government has strategically decided to please its electorate with ever-​more restrictive migration policies, while implementing many ‘uncomfortable’ policies even though the numbers of migrants and refugees have fallen drastically. Interestingly, Chancellor Kurz usually remains silent when the FPÖ crosses a so-​called ‘red line’, ignoring multiple requests for interviews or comment on false claims about ‘illegal migration’, revisionist or racist and antisemitic incidents, potential violations of human rights or attempted dismantling of the social welfare state. Moreover, the government does not take parliamentary enquiries posed by the opposition seriously, answering in vague and ambiguous terms. This blatant disregard forced even Wolfgang Sobotka, the ÖVP-​nominated President of the Parliament, to reprimand Kurz and his ministers for not adequately fulfilling their parliamentary duties.46 As already observed by Uitz (2015) regarding Orbán’s Hungary, dialogue with experts, the opposition and journalists also seems to be out of the question in Kurz’ Austria; consultations with the trade unions, NGOs and other important organisations are not granted; rational discussion is mostly substituted by symbolic politics, impoliteness, eristic argumentation or denial. Legislation that is not sufficiently well worded is pushed through parliament; scientific empirical evidence is frequently neglected or ridiculed. It seems as if the ÖVP in its streamlined, strategically planned trajectory to power in the sense of leading the new government has either ignored or quietly accepted the kind of non-​democratic ideologues they have aligned themselves with, thus normalising the previously unsayable and unacceptable. Indeed, most of the breaches of constitutional order, such as freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedom of press and the independence of the legal system in illiberal democracies (Poland and Hungary) are not announced explicitly; they are made in small –​seemingly unimportant –​steps 220

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like the intervention into the Supreme Court in Poland, where replacing irremovable judges was implemented through a small, banal paragraph about the retirement age of judges, although the Constitution sets a fixed term for supreme court judges.47 In this case, some of the supreme court judges resisted, and thus this incident made international headlines.48 As Grabbe and Lehne (2017b: 3) argue, these changes imply ‘mind-​closing narratives’ which are obviously ‘gaining force as formerly liberal politicians run after populists’. Such a dynamic corresponds to –​what I have labelled elsewhere –​ ‘shameless normalisation’ (Wodak, 2018a), to be observed not only in the Central and Eastern European countries but also in Austria, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands. The non-​compliance with EUropean values and the yearning for exceptionalism vehemently challenge the European project; the rejection of all dialogue, agreed norms and established conventions seems to render negotiations impossible and to pave the way for illiberalism and neo-​ authoritarianism. New narratives, new public spaces, new communication modes and –​most importantly –​new policies are urgently needed to protect the achievements of enlightenment and pluralistic liberal democracies. Notes 1 2

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See www.cbsnews.com/​news/​president-​obama-​full-​speech-​south-​africa/​ Voters in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Hungary and the UK were interviewed: countries from the East, West and South –​but none of the Scandinavian countries. 78% of AfD voters, 76% of FN (Front National) voters, 69% of FPÖ voters, 66% of LEGA Nord voters, 57% of PVV voters, 58% of PiS voters, 61% of Fidesz, 50% of Jobbik voters and 50% of UKIP voters fear migration more than war, poverty, financial crises or climate change (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016). https://​kurier.at/​politik/​ausland/​karas-​zu-​orbans-​eu-​politik-​ignorant-​und-​uneinsichtig/​ 309.059.190 www.presseportal.de/pm/6511/3938672 www.zeit.de/kultur/2018-07/european-union-germany-challenges-loyalty-solidarity For more information, see the so-​called Tavares Report (http://​www.europ​arl. europa. eu/​sides/​getDoc.do?pubRef=​-​//​EP//​TEXT+​REPORT+​A7-​2013-​ 0229+​0+​DOC+​ XML+​V0//​EN) and the role of the Venice Commission (Nergelius, 2015: 291–​294; Closa et al, 2014: 19). See https://​foreignpolicy.com/​2017/​03/​13/​the-​geert-​wilders-​effect/​ See http:// ​ h ungar​ i ans​ p ect​ r um.org/​ 2 014/​ 0 7/​ 3 1/​ v ik​ t or-​ o rb​ a ns-​ s pe​ e ch-​ a t-​ t he-​ xxv-balvanyos-​free-​summer-​university-​and-​youth-​camp-​july-​26-​2014-​baile-​tusnad-​ tusnadfurdo/​​ For the Hungarian case, see www.nytimes.com/​2018/​04/​09/​world/​europe/​hungary-​ election-​orban-​fidesz.html Gasiorowski (2006: 110–​11) mentions the distinction between personalistic authoritarian regimes characterised by arbitrary rule and authority exercised ‘mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules’ (such as in post-​colonial Africa) and populist authoritarian regimes defined as ‘mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving

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key lower-​class groups’ (for example, Argentina under Peron, Venezuela under Chavez and Maduro). Krastev (2006), however, prefers the label of ‘managed democracy’ for 21st century Russia (and challenges Zakaria’s approach to illiberal democracies; see for example Nisnevich and Ryabov, 2017 for details on developments in Russia since 1989). A managed democracy, Krastev argues, functions like an autocracy; thus, governments are legitimised by elections that, however, do not impact on the state’s policies and agenda. See https://​eur-​lex.europa.eu/​resource.html?uri=​cellar:88f94461-​564b-​4b75-​aef7-​ c957de8e339d.0006.01/​DOC_​1&format=​PDF Among the vast literature on the FPÖ, see Forchtner et al (2013), Wodak (2015a, 2015b, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), Scharsach (2017), Wodak and Pelinka (2002), Ötsch and Horaczek (2017), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Ottomeyer (2000), and Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2009). See Rheindorf and Wodak (2018) for the history of the FPÖ after 1945. Backstage, nativist, racist, misogynistic and antisemitic ideologies remained explicit (Rheindorf and Wodak, forthcoming). See the third part of the ÖVP’s election programme on order and security: https://​ww w.b undeskanzleramt.gv.at/d​ ocuments/1​ 31008/5​ 69203/​ Regierungsprogramm_2​ 017–2​ 022. pdf/​b2fe3f65-​5a04-​47b6-​913d-​2fe512ff4ce6 The ÖVP is the successor party to the Christian-​Social Party, a staunchly conservative and antisemitic movement founded in 1893 by the then mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger, a highly controversial right-​wing populist. Between the two World Wars, most of the members of the Austrian People’s party also belonged to the Vaterländische Front under its leader Engelbert Dollfuß, who was assassinated by members of the then illegal National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) in 1934. While still sometimes honoured by ÖVP members for resisting Hitler, the regime of Dollfuß was authoritarian in nature and has been labelled as ‘Austrofascism’ (Pelinka, 2017). https://s​ poe.at/s​ tory/​kurz-​papi​ere-​bewei​sen-​oevp-​hat-​regie​rung​sarb​eit-​gezi​elt-​saboti​ert; www.falter.at/​archiv/​wp/​projekt-​ballhausplatz; https://​pla​yer.fm/​ser​ies/​ falter-​radio/​ episode-​3-​der-​geheime-​plan-​des-​sebastian-​kurz Part of the ‘Austrian success story’ after 1945 is the establishment of the Austrian Sozialpartnerschaft. The most important employer and employee organisations work together and with the government, finding acceptable compromises for economic issues, salary negotiations and so forth (www.polipedia.at/​tiki-​index. php?page=​ Sozialpartnerschaft). In this way, Austria experienced few strikes and social conflicts in the post-​war period. S e e h t t p s : / / ​ d e. s t a t i s t a . c o m / ​ s t a t i s t i k / ​ d a t e n / ​ s t u d i e / ​ 2 9 3 1 8 9 / ​ u m f r a g e /​ asylantraege-​in-​oesterreich/​ See www.oe24.at/​oesterreich/​politik/​wahl2017/​Im-​Kern-​ist-​Kurz-​ein-​ Strache/​ 303871667 It is not possible to describe the election campaigns here, beset as they were by many (media) scandals, rumours and partly criminal machinations. Rather, the aim here is to trace the change of hegemonic discourse and accepted practices due to a ‘successful’ adoption of populist extreme-​r ight propositions and rhetoric. See www.spiegel.de/​politik/​ausland/​oesterreich-​alle-​ergebnisse-​der-​nationalratswahl-​ 2017-​a-​1172061.html See www.der standard.at/​2000070495198/​regierungsprogramm-​oevp-​fpoe-​kurz-​ strache-u ​ eberblick-a​ nalyse and https://d​ erst​ anda​ rd.at/j​ etzt/​ livebericht/2​ 000070552695/​ koalition-​liveticker-​neue-​oevp-​fpoe-​regierung-​angelobt-​ tausende-​bei-​protesten-​in-​ wien

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See https://​www.bunde​spra​esid​ent.at/​aktuel​les/​det​ail/​news/​aufga​ben-​und-​rec​hte/​ On Van der Bellen’s premature assertions regarding a coalition that might include the FPÖ, see: www.diepresse.com/​home/​politik/​innenpolitik/​4828916/​Van-​der-​ Bellen_​ Wuerde-​FPOegefuehrte-​Regierung-​nicht-​angeloben www.ecre.org/editorial-austria-when-good-countries-go-bad/ I unfortunately must neglect the manifold, complex reasons for such a global move to the right, such as rising economic inequality, the financial crisis of 2008, austerity politics, identity politics and so forth, which are covered extensively elsewhere (Wodak, 2015a, 2017, 2018b; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Fuchs, 2018). See https://​kurier.at/​ p olitik/​ regierungsprogramm-​r igorose-​m assnahmen-​gegen-​ asylmissbrauch/​302.354.984 www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-06/wien-sebastian-kurz-giovanni-di-lorenzo-live In the original German: Ich will da jetzt nicht mutmaßen, aber ich habe mich sehr viel mit Migration beschäftigt. Ich weiß, dass oft sehr schnell der Fehler gemacht wird, dass etwas anders dargestellt wird, als es ist. See Pfahl-​Traughber (2015: 75–​81) on the differences between right-​wing, left-​wing and religious extremism. On the history of the FPÖ, see Rheindorf and Wodak (forthcoming) as well as Wodak and Rheindorf (2018). S e e t h e we e k l y m a g a z i n e D e r Fa l t e r : h t t p s : / / ​ c m s . f a l t e r. a t / ​ f a l t e r /​ der-​falter-​und-​die-​burschenschaften/​ https://k​ uri​ er.at/p​ olit​ ik/i​ nla​ nd/fl ​ uech ​ tlin ​ ge-k​ onzent​ rie​ren-​wel​twei​ter-​wir​bel-​um-​ kickl/​ 306.070.490 https://​derstandard.at/​2000072943520/​einzelfall-​ausrutscher-​fpoe-​oevp-​regierung; www.dw.com/en/hungarys-viktor-orban-targets-critics-with-soros-mercenariesblacklist/​a-​43381963 These antisemitic slurs seem to contradict the many explicit affirmations of friendship with the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu. That many populist extreme-​r ight parties seek to befriend and support the Israeli government, however, indicates a coalition based on similar interests and exclusionary politics –​of fighting the left-​wing opposition, on the one hand, and the alleged Muslim threat, on the other. It does not indicate anti-​fascist and anti-​antisemitic beliefs and activities (Betz, 2013; Wodak, 2018c). https://​derstandard.at/​2000083825283/​Waldhaeusl-​besteht-​weiter-​auf-​Registrierung-​ Schaechten-​sei-​Tierquaelerei https://​diepre​sse.com/​home/​innen​poli​tik/​5399​881/​Kopft​uch-​im-​Kinder​gart​en_​​ Kurz-​lehnt-​politischen-​Abtausch-​ab https:// ​ d erstandard.at/ ​ 2 000084024629/ ​ F POe- ​ Politiker- ​ t rat- ​ n ach- ​ r assistischem-​ Kongoaffen-​Posting-​aus-​Partei-​aus www.zeit.de/kultur/2018-06/orf-oesterreich-rundfunk-fpoe-journalisten-entlassungpressefreiheit https://​derstandard.at/​2000075143822/​Wie-​Tuerkis-​Blau-​Widersprueche-​wegredet; w w w. f a l t e r . a t / a r c h i v / F A LT E R _ 2 0 1 8 0 7 1 1 F 2 E E 3 D 4 8 8 F / w i e - d i e bundesregierung-unsere-​offene-​gesellschaft-​schliesst www.krone.at/603088 https://​ders​tand​ard.at/​200007​8514​603/​Sobo​tka-​tad​elt-​Kurz-​wegen-​mange​lhaf​terAnfragebeantwortung​ I am very grateful to Jan Grzymski for pointing me to this case, as it provides more evidence for my overall argument. https://​orf.at/​stories/​2328900/​2328903/​

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Acknowledgements I am very grateful to the editors of the special issue for their important and constructive comments. References Adorno, T.W., Frenkel-​Brunswick, E., Levinson, D., and Sanford, R.N. (1969) The authoritarian personality, New York: Harper. Arendt, H. (1971) Wahrheit und Lüge in der Politik, Frankfurt/​Main: Suhrkamp. Becker, J. (2004) ‘Lessons from Russia. A neo-​authoritarian media system’, European Journal of Communication, 19(2): 139–​163, https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​0267323104042908 Betz, H.-​G. (2013) ‘Mosques, minarets, burqas and other essential threats: the populist right’s campaign against Islam in Western Europe’, in R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik and B. Mral (eds), Right-​wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, London: Bloomsbury, pp 71–​87. Billig, M. (1995) Banal nationalism, London: Sage. Brubaker, R. (2017) ‘Why populism?’ Theory and Society, 46(5): 357–​385, https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11186-​017-​9301-​7 Closa, C., Kochenov, D. and Weiler, Joseph H.H. (2014) Reinforcing rule of law oversight in the European Union, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 25. de Vries, C.E. and Hoffmann, I. (2016) ‘Fear not values. Public opinion and populist vote in Europe’, post, http://​e upinions.eu/​d e/​text/​ fear-​not-​values/​ Diehl, P. (2017) ‘Antipolitik und pastmoderne Ringkampf-​Unterhaltung’, ApuZ, 67(44–​45): 25–​30. Engel, J. and Wodak, R. (2013) ‘‘Calculated ambivalence’ and Holocaust denial in Austria’, in R. Wodak and J.E. Richardson (eds), Analysing fascist discourse: European fascism in talk and text, London: Routledge, pp 73–​96. Forchtner, B., Krzyżanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2013) ‘Mediatisation, right-​wing populism and political campaigning: the case of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)’, in M. Ekström and A. Tolson (eds), Media talk and political elections in Europe and America, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 205–​228. Fuchs, C. (2018) Digital demagogue. Authoritarian capitalism in the age of Trump and Twitter , London: Pluto Press. Gasiorowski, M. (2006) ‘The political regimes project’, in A. Inketes (ed.), On measuring democracy, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, pp 105–​121. Grabbe, H. and Lehne, S. (2017a) Defending EU values in Poland and Hungary, Brussels: Carnegie Europe. Grabbe, H. and Lehne, S. (2017b) The closing of the European mind –​and how to reopen it, Brussels: Carnegie Europe.

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Grande, E., Dolezal, M., Helbling, M. and Höglinger, D. (2012) Political conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hahl, O., Kim, M., and Zuckerman Sivan, E.Z. (2018) ‘The authentic appeal of the lying demagogue: proclaiming the deeper truth about political illegitimacy’, American Sociological Review, 83(1): 1–​33. Hofer, T. and Tóth, B. (eds) (2017) Wahl 2017. Loser, leaks & leadership, Vienna: Kremer & Scheriau. Horaczek, N. and Tóth, B. (2017) Sebastian Kurz –​ Österreichs neues Wunderkind? Vienna: Residenz. Kerski, B. (2018) ‘Was uns trennt, verbindet uns’, ApuZ, 68(10–​11): 4–​8. Krastev, I. (2006) ‘Democracy’s ‘Doubles’’, Journal of Democracy, 17(2): 52–​62. Krastev, I. (2017) Europadämmerung. Ein Essay, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Kriesi, H. and Pappas, T.S. (eds) (2015) European populism in the shadow of the great recession, Colchester: ECPR Press. Krzyżanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2009) The politics of exclusion: debating migration in Austria, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Lakoff, G. (2004) Don’t think of an Elephant: Know your values and frame the debate, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green. Levitsky, S. and Way, S. (2002) ‘The rise of competitive authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy, 13(2): 51–​65. Linz, J. (1964 [1973]) ‘An authoritarian regime: the case of Spain’, in R.A. Dahl (ed.) Regimes and oppositions, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp 171–​259. Mastropaolo, A. (2000) Antipolitica: all’origine della crisi italiana, Naples: Ancora. Moffitt, B. (2017) The global rise of populism. Performance, political style, and representation , Stanford: Stanford University Press. Möllers, C. and Schneider, L. (2018) Demokratiesicherung in der Europäischern Union, Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Mudde, C. (2007) The populist radical r ight parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C.R. (2017) Populism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nergelius, J. (2015) ‘The role of the Venice Commission in maintaining the rule of law in Hungary and in Romania’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional crisis in the European Constitutional Area, Oxford: Beck, pp 291–​310. Nisnevich, Y.A. and Ryabov, A.V. (2017) ‘Modern authoritarianism and political ideology’, Basic Research Program Working Papers (Series Political Science) WP 44/​PS.

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Ötsch, W. and Horaczek, N. (2017) Populismus für Anfänger: Anleitung zur Volksverführung, Frankfurt/​Main: Westend. Ottomeyer, K. (2000) Die Haider-​S how: zur Psychopolitik der FPÖ, Klagenfurt: Drava. Pajnik, M. and Sauer, B. (eds) (2017) Populism and the web: communicative practices of parties and movements in Europe, London: Ashgate. Pelinka, A. (2017) Die gescheiterte Republik, Vienna: Böhlau. Pfahl-​Traughber, A. (2015) ‘Die Nicht-​Erkennung des NSU-​Terrorismus’, in U. Backes, A. Eckhard and J. Gallus (eds), Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 27, Baden-​Baden: Nomos, pp 73–​96. Priester, K. (2007) Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen, Frankfurt/​Main: Campus. Rauscher, H. (2017) ‘Stille Machtergreifung’ der Burschenschafter, Der Standard, 1 September, http://d​ erst​ anda​ rd.at/2​ 000063​ 4817​ 09/S​ til​ le-M ​ ach​ terg​reif​ung-​der-​ Burschenschafter Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001) Discourse and discrimination. Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism , London: Routledge. Rheindorf, M. and Wodak, R. (2018) ‘Borders, Fences and Limits: Protecting Austria from Refugees. Metadiscursive negotiation of meaning in the current refugee crisis’, Journal Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1): DOI: 10.1080/​ 15562948.2017.1302032 Rheindorf, M. and Wodak, R. (forthcoming) ‘‘Austria First’ revisited: a diachronic cross-​sectional analysis of the gender and body politics of the extreme right’, Patterns of Prejudice (in press) Richardson, J.E. (2017) ‘Fascist discourse’, in J. Flowerdew and J.E. Richardson (eds), The Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies, London: Routledge, pp 447–​462. Salzbor n, S. (2018) ‘Right-​w ing Populism as a strategy of the Radical Right’, CARR: Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right, 21 May, www.radicalr ightanalysis.com/​ 2 018/​ 0 5/​ 2 1/​ right-​wing-​populism-​as-​a-​strategy-​of-​the-​radical-​r ight/​ Scharsach, Hans-​Henning. 2017. Die Stille Machtergreifung: Hofer, Strache und die Burschenschaften. Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau. Scheff, T. (2000) ‘Shame and the social bond: a sociological theory’, Sociological Theory, 18(1): 84–​99. Sutowski, M. (2018) ‘Guter Wandel’ zum ‘Neuen Autoritarismus’ –​und wie weiter? ApuZ, 68(10–​11): 15–​18. Uitz, R. (2015) ‘Can you tell when an illiberal democracy is in the making? An appeal to comparative constitutional scholarship from Hungary’, I. Con, 13(1): 279–​300. Wodak, R. (2011) The discourse of politics in action: politics as usual, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

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Wodak, R. (2015a) The politics of fear: what right-​wing populist discourses mean, London: Sage. Wodak, R. (2015b) ‘Normalisierung nach rechts: Politischer Diskurs im Spannungsfeld von Neoliberalismus, Populismus und kritischer Öffentlichkeit’, Linguistik Online, 73(4): 27–​44. Wodak, R. (2017) ‘The ‘establishment’, the ‘élites’, and the’people’. Who’s who?’ Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4): 551–​565. Wodak, R. (2018a) ‘Vom Rand in die Mitte –​‘Schamlose Normalisierung’’, Politische Vierteljahres Zeitschrift, 75: DOI: 10.1007/​s11615-​018-​0079-​7 Wodak, R. (2018b) ‘The Revival of Numbers and Lists in Radical Right Politics’, CARR: Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right, 30 June, www.radicalr ightanalysis.com/​ 2 018/​ 0 6/​ 3 0/​ the-​revival-​of-​numbers-​and-​lists-​in-​radical-​ right-​politics/​ Wodak, R. (2018c) ‘Antisemitism and the radical right’, in J. Rydgren (ed.), Handbook of the Radical Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 61–​85. Wodak, R. and Pelinka, A. (eds) (2002) The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, New Brunswick: Transaction Press. Wodak, R. and Rheindorf, M. (2018) ‘The Austrian Freedom Party’, in A. Waring (ed.) The new authoritarianism: Vol. 1: a risk analysis of the alt-​right phenomenon, New York: Ibidem. Zakaria, F. (1997) ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76(6): 22–​43.

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Response to Ruth Wodak Heather Grabbe and Andreas Aktoudianakis

Observing the political debate across Europe in real time, a striking feature of the changes in political discourse since the political crisis around migration started in 2015 is the shift in the normative boundaries. Xenophobic rhetoric that used to be unacceptable has become acceptable, while liberal values that used to be widely accepted are now questioned. Ruth Wodak’s chapter in this volume is an important contribution to understanding how the discourse is shifting, particularly in the case of Austria. Working in a non-​governmental organisation focused on rights and values, we interact with a large range of policy actors, from elected politicians (MEPs and national ministers) to officials in the EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, Council) and national diplomats –​both in Brussels and in national capitals. Our impression from these interactions is that most policy actors were initially shocked at the rhetoric about migration used in 2015 and after by politicians such as Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini. The political and policy elites at EU level generally adhere to the post-​1945 and post-​1989 liberal consensus around the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. They have been educated and socialised into the principle that racism, antisemitism and other forms of xenophobia and discrimination are unacceptable in a liberal democracy, and most of them observed or were involved in the application of the Copenhagen conditions for EU membership to the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. The liberal values consensus remains strong at EU level, but policy actors are sensitive to the changes in politics at national level, not least because their job is to find where the consensus lies for agreement on policy at EU level. We observe that these actors, like many others in politics across Europe, are getting used to the anti-​migrant and anti-​migration rhetoric used by 228

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a growing number of politicians, some of whom are now in government. A process of normalisation is taking place among these actors. They do not like the shift, and many feel a sense of personal moral outrage at the crossing of the normative boundaries, but they accept the change in political rhetoric as something that they cannot influence directly. This normalisation is not uniform, and there are significant instances of policy actors resisting it, but we observe it affecting the perceptions of policy makers about what is politically feasible in migration policy and other policies. Here are a few examples of statements we have heard from policy actors in private in recent years: ‘NGOs shouldn’t press for stricter implementation and enforcement of the Race Equality Directive in this political climate. We’d never get that directive through the legislative process today.’ ‘We have to respect what’s politically feasible these days on migration and asylum. This is a very different situation from when the Geneva Convention was agreed.’ ‘Be realistic, see what we can get through the Council when the Orbáns and Salvinis say what many others are thinking.’ Ruth Wodak’s chapter discusses how this normative frame is shifting towards post-​shame, how the boundaries around what is considered acceptable by the political mainstream are moving –​both the boundaries around what politicians can say and what policies governments adopt. There are some rhetorical/​policy gaps, in that migration and asylum policies have not always become harsher and rights-​abusing following a shift in rhetoric, which initially led to complacency in Brussels and other national capitals. However, Wodak points to where rhetoric has indeed led to changes in policy. Her chapter would benefit from more examples of exactly how this has happened, and references to policy analysis and studies of the impact of the current ÖVP–​FPÖ coalition on practices (such as processing of asylum claims and treatment of migrants on borders and once on Austrian territory). The analysis would also benefit from a comparison of Austria with other member states such as neighbouring Germany and Slovakia, to see how far post-​shame claims about migration result in significantly different policies and practices from those in neighbouring countries. Examples and comparison are difficult to do in a short chapter and with fast-​moving events, but they would help greatly as research in this area advances so that our understanding of how much and exactly how post-​ shame rhetoric also affects human rights and society. Austria is a particularly important case study because it has often been a harbinger of Europe’s shift to the right, starting with the formation of the first ÖVP–​FPÖ government 229

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in 1999. Over the past two decades, liberal taboos are often broken first in Austrian politics, then others follow. Ruth Wodak’s chapter begins with the claim that the populist right-​wing political discourse in Europe has entered an era that should be defined as post-​shame. Post-​shame politics is characterised by ‘anti-​elitist and anti-​ pluralist/​exclusionary rhetoric, symbolic politics … digital demagogy, bad manners’. Combined with strong argumentative strategies, these discursive elements resonate with the electoral base of populist right-​wing politicians, who project themselves to their publics as being powerful because they can defy the EU’s rules through non-​compliance. Post-​shame politics nurtures this perception among the electorate by moving the focus of the political debate away from major socio-​political problems (for example rising global inequality, youth unemployment and climate change). Thus, the chapter suggests, post-​shame politics makes itself relevant by framing migration, refugees and migrants as a top priority in policy making. By emphasising these issues, post-​shame politics engages in scapegoating that explains away all woes as the doing of migrants and refugees. Over time, post-​shame politics becomes normalised in political discourse and leads to the systematic abuse of civic discourse and democratic institutions. Using this framework, the chapter attains two goals. First, it identifies the ‘many small and large changes that Austria has undergone on the way from a constitutional liberal democracy since 1945 to a potentially Orbánesque illiberal democracy’. Towards this end, the chapter traces the trajectory of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in its transformation into the ‘New People’s Party’ under Sebastian Kurz. It argues that the trajectory of the ÖVP should be ‘recognised as process of ‘normalisation’ … of far-​right ideologies in both content and form’. Secondly, through analysis of the case of the Austrian trajectory, the chapter identifies ‘specific patterns and stages’ which, it suggests, can be generalised to other EU member states. As part of this argument, the chapter discusses constitutive discursive strategies of the post-​shame era that facilitate the adaptation and integration of illiberalism and authoritarianism into formerly liberal democratic regimes. There are three important ways in which this chapter contributes to the understanding of populist far-​r ight movements and their strategies: 1. The chapter engages with a breadth of theories and their underlying concepts: populism, nationalism/​nativism/​anti-​pluralism, anti-​elitism, authoritarianism, neo-​a uthoritarianism, conservatism/​h istorical revisionism and illiberal democracy. By engaging in analysis of the conceptual vocabulary of far-​r ight populism and applying its concepts in the case study, this chapter bridges an important gap between the realms of academia and policy making. By considering a broad range of the conceptual vocabulary on the study of populism, and 230

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linking these concepts to particular stages in the transformation of the ÖVP under Sebastian Kurz and its recent coalition government with the FPÖ, this chapter allows inter-​disciplinary exchange and conceptual convergence. 2. Having established the relevant conceptual vocabulary, this chapter links the conceptual/​discursive elements with the structural dimensions of the study. The ‘discursive and argumentative indicators’ of fear-​mongering, euphemisms, anti-​Semitic/​racist historical revisionism, symbolic politics, and challenging press freedom can accurately reflect the objective state of institutions in liberal democracies. Thus, the chapter addresses an important challenge that social scientists face in our times: it explains the various -​isms without losing sight of the post-​and neo-​prefixes in the contemporary debate. For example, it is very useful to explain the difference between authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism and neo-​authoritarianism with reference to real cases, such as the state of democratic institutions and freedom of the press in Putin’s Russia. This approach allows examination of contemporary regimes using concepts that accurately depict the stage of state-​capture achieved by populists in various countries. 3. Through studying the trajectory of the ÖVP in coming to power and the rebranding of the FPÖ, this chapter contributes to the study of populism by identifying the underlying process of normalisation in practical terms and by defining its stages. For example, the chapter notes that the ‘extreme-​right’ position adopted by the FPÖ before 2005 gave way to ‘banal nationalism’, through an increase in the mobilisation of symbols such as the Austrian flag. The use of religious imagery and symbols and their redress in nationalistic terms is defined as an integral part of that process. Additionally, the chapter considers the ÖVP leadership’s implementation of changes in the ‘grand old party structure’ and image post-​2016. The move towards a more centralised, hierarchical party structure and the adoption of ‘elements’ from US rallies post-​2016, gave early signs that Kurz was intent on engaging a ‘strongman’ approach to political leadership. Crucially, the new ÖVP’s proposals to ‘dismantle social partnership’, ‘close the Mediterranean route to migration’, to ‘reduce the legally fixed minimum welfare’ and the ‘upper limit for asylum applicants’ were adopted ‘almost verbatim’ in the programme of the FPÖ. The chapter suggests that that the path of ascendance of populist right and far-​r ight parties to the forefront of political discourse is a long one. Thus, by identifying the existence of a pattern with stages to normalisation, policy makers, academics and civil society organisations can act more effectively and proactively before these parties gain momentum and become part of the main discourse. By identifying the concepts, theories and stages in the process of normalisation of discourse and positions that were previously considered 231

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to be far-​r ight, the chapter author lays the foundations for addressing other crucial questions: 1. Is there a unifying motif in the path to normalising authoritarianism that supersedes the cultural and structural boundaries of states in Europe? Addressing this question could help avoid labelling case studies after their exponents. This is crucial because by labelling the state of affairs in a member state as ‘Orbánesque’ or ‘Kurzesque’, there is an implicit suggestion that each case is sui generis. This prevents extrapolation of concepts and theories to other cases and identifying broader patterns in the rise of the far-​r ight global populist movement. 2. What are the limits of EUrope with respect to the officially accepted values of the Treaty on European Union? Are those limits due to structural weaknesses or do they relate to the exercise of political agency at the national level? How are agency and structure linked in this debate? At a meta-​theoretical level, it is crucial to consider how the study of far-​ right and right-​wing populism can resist politicisation. Xenophobia and anti-​minority rhetoric and positions are phenomena that threaten liberal democracies regardless of where their exponents position themselves on the political spectrum. The study of populism is important to liberal democracies so that people can understand what is happening to their democracies and their societies. That is why it is important that academic study of the political phenomena is objective and fact-​based, demonstrably avoiding a strong normative agenda of its own. If the scholarly analysis of these phenomena seems to be emanating from centre-​left intelligentsia, it risks aiding xenophobic populists in their efforts to broaden their electoral base, polarising societies, and tightening their grip on power.

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Opportunistic Legitimisation and De-​Europeanisation as a Reverse Effect of Europeanisation Spasimir Domaradzki

The limits of EUropeanisation Over the past decade, the EU’s experience with the rule of law and human rights in its new member states has been ambiguous. Today, the results of the fifth enlargement are overshadowed by growing concerns over the quality of adherence to the EU values (as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union) in its new member states. Although signs of concern are present in several recently admitted members states, including Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Malta, it is Hungary and Poland that are considered the dominant examples of democratic backsliding and a turn towards authoritarian tendencies within European societies. These concerns are expressed mostly by liberal intellectuals, journalists and scholars. This chapter aims at more critical reflection on the ambiguous role played by the European Union itself in these processes. Commencing from a critical overview of the dominant institutionalist theories of enlargement Europeanisation, the chapter reassesses the EU’s impact on the internal politics of its current and prospective member states. Based on two case studies of Bulgaria and Serbia, I argue in the chapter that de-​Europeanisation could be conceptualised by two forms of legitimation practices: revolutionary, and opportunistic. Based on the experience of the fifth and sixth enlargement wave, the dominant assumptions within EU studies emphasise the asymmetrical nature of the relations between the EU and the countries pursuing membership. Due to the presupposed stronger position of the European Union, the 233

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external pressure of the EU is considered by many EU scholars as essential in determining the behaviour of the applicant states (Vachudova, 2005; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009). The relations between the EU and prospective members are viewed as transactional and as leading to compliance with the EU formal and informal requirements (Grabbe, 2003). This was labelled as the logic of conditionality, which in fact entails that in this asymmetrical relationship the countries willing to join the European Union will comply with the existing norms and will adopt the relevant rules, because they consider EU membership as the ultimate award (Schimmelfennig et al, 2005: 31). Since the early 2000s two basic theoretical approaches embedded in the institutionalist paradigm –​the external incentive model (EIM) and the diffusion model (DM) –​have dominated EU studies research to analyse the specific dynamics between the EU and prospective and new members.

External incentive model In 2017 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier proposed a revised version of their external incentives model (EIM). The EIM, which has dominated the research on enlargement Europeanisation for over 15 years, recognises the bargaining nature of the relationship between the two sides in an asymmetric environment (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). That is, actors with alternative options and a smaller need for agreement possess more bargaining power. This asymmetrical relationship paves the way for conditionality. In the areas considered important, the EU sets up conditions (political and regulatory) and assigns rewards, leaving their acceptance to the free will of the external partner. The model assumes that, as rational players, external partners will take their decisions based on a cost/​benefit analysis (Schimmelfennig and Trauner, 2009: 2). The EU and the national authorities negotiate the outcome, but the theory takes into consideration the existence of ‘veto players’ (domestic institutional, electoral or interest groups) that can challenge it. Ultimately, the lack of implementation equals no reward. The basic assumptions are that candidates want to join the EU more than the EU wants to have them. The cost/​ benefit analysis is the spiritus movens of the interaction between the EU and the member state. The process of enlargement is overwhelmingly elite driven (Pridham, 2006: 383). EIM takes into consideration additional conditions like ‘the size and speed of rewards, the determinacy of the conditions, the credibility of the conditionality, and the size of the adoption costs that influence the effectiveness of conditionality’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017: 3). The model acknowledges certain regularities with regards rewards: material rewards (pre-​accession funds) are better than immaterial (acknowledgement of reforms); and the timing of rewards plays an important mobilising role 234

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for action. Clear conditions positively influence conditionality (Sedelmeier, 2011: 29), since the recipients of conditionality incentives are aware what exactly they need to do, thus also decreasing their own implementation costs. A sound prioritisation of the norms to be implemented also motivates action. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier continue, credibility is another, yet very important assumption about the functioning of conditionality. The model suggests that weaker EU interest in enlargement and thus the smaller bargaining power of the candidate increase the credibility of the EU’s threats. However, on increased credibility of threats undermines the credibility of rewards. Furthermore, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier emphasise the importance of time on credibility. Ultimately, the size of domestic adoption costs determines the outcome of the negotiations. Two types of costs are identified. The first can be generally identified as power costs: incumbents are unwilling to adopt rules that can deprive them of power. Second, EU regulations may mobilise veto players, who perceive the EU conditions as a threat to their interests. Moreover, if EU conditions are popular among various societal groups and actors, they can influence the government’s decision to adopt these rules. Sedelmeier also recognises that the novum in the 2017 version of the EIM is the acknowledgement that governments can also use EU conditionality to overcome domestic resistance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017: 4). Notwithstanding the numerous variables and alternative arguments that could be provided, the general application of the EIM to the relationship between Bulgaria or Serbia and the EU in the context of political conditionality should confirm these trends. Applying EIM theory accordingly would mean that a country (Bulgaria or Serbia) willing to join the EU will enter voluntarily into bargaining with the ultimate aim of achieving membership. As previously mentioned, political conditionality is vaguer and, as such, is subject to smaller pressure of compliance. On the other hand, the acceptance of the EU’s basic principles as defined in the Copenhagen criteria and Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union requires their complete incorporation. Accession to the EU involves a full recognition of a country’s systemic performance in becoming a functioning market economy and as having achieved ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (Pridham, 2006: 373). Hence, there are two main aspects of the applicability of this theory: first, the lower push for compliance in the rule of law due to its unclear demands; second, the possible existence of veto players that may create a dilemma around whether to adopt rule of law and lose power, or retain power and remain outside the EU. Ultimately, since Bulgaria became a member of the EU, the assumed conclusion should be that it has met the requirements and thus has received the ultimate reward. The case of Serbia can shed more light on the operation of the model in practice. 235

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Furthermore, as the primary actor in this process, the national political elites should have calculated that adjustment to the EU values is more profitable than opposition to them. Hence, since the questions of rule of law and human rights were among the key ones, the theory would assume that the national political elites will have consciously adjusted to relevant EU expectations. Jakob Tolstrup (2013: 727) argues if ruling elites want to maintain tight control over the economy and the distribution of rents and, at the same time, preserve the freedom to suppress, it seems plausible that they will try to diminish the external costs of suppression by reducing linkages to external actors, who are generally favorably disposed to a market economy and democratization. However, Linka Toneva-​Metodieva (2014: 539) aptly claims that ‘it is arguable whether corrupt officials and political actors have indeed minimized their appetites in the pre-​accession stage, given the numerous corruption scandals involving misuse of EU funding’. Consequently, the Bulgarian reality shows that political elites can retain tight control over the economy, continue or even develop their rent-​seeking opportunities and capture the state while being not only exposed to Europeanisation but also recognised as a (perhaps handicapped) member of the EU. Importantly, according to the EIM, Bulgaria is the only side in this interaction that is exposed to Europeanisation. The theoretical conceptualisation of the enlargement Europeanisation had to take into consideration the practical consequences of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Bulgaria and Romania joined almost three years after ten new members joined the EU in 2004; in 2002 the Council decided that the two countries were not yet ready (Council of the European Union, 2003: 4). Moreover, they became subject to additional protective clauses in the accession treaties and a separate mechanism of post-​accession Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was created for them. Notwithstanding the vague nature of the Copenhagen criteria, the CVM explicitly identifies the areas requiring further improvement. The establishment of the CVM was an attempt to extend the pre-​ accession conditionality to post-​accession membership. In other words, although the Bulgarian and Romanian cases revealed the limits of Europeanisation, the only solution proposed by the EU was to extend the pre-​a ccession conditionality to the post-​a ccession reality. The establishment of the CVM was in line with the EIM’s theoretical argument that after EU accession the new member states would face a decline of conditionality and a slow-​down of the compliance dynamic, since the largest reward would have been achieved (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 236

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2005: 226; Trauner 2009: 3). Early studies have promptly acknowledged the existing gap between ‘strong formal and weak practical compliance record of the new member states’ (Schimmelfennig, Trauner 2009: 2). On the other hand, mechanisms of social learning, built in pre-​accession administrative capacities, closer interactions (Pop-​Eleches, 2010) and the formal mechanisms of law enforcement (infringement procedure, Article 7) were supposed to substitute the loss of pre-​accession dynamics, hence maintaining the pace of reforms. A decade later, the EIM still emphasises only the post-​accession compliance slow-​down in political conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017) and continues to praise the generally successful nature of the fifth enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2017). Nonetheless, Sedelmeier (2016) consciously excludes Bulgaria and Romania from his extensive argumentation illustratively entitled Compliance after conditionality: why are the European Union’s new member states so good? This, however, does not explain either why Bulgaria was accepted, since it practically failed to meet political conditionality. It remains also unclear who the veto players are at the national level. As Tolstrup (2013: 727) summarises, ‘ruling elites carefully weigh the size and distribution of costs incurred at the national level before engaging in EU integration. If costs are unfavourably distributed or too high compared to the benefits, integration will not be pursued.’ Apparently, in the case of Bulgaria (and Romania) the costs (of adopting rule of law, judiciary reforms and fight against corruption) were either not too high or simply irrelevant, since the national veto players did not block the enlargement. At the same time, Bulgaria’s human rights and rule of law record persistently deteriorated over the last decade. Another premise of the EIM is that ‘integration with the EU will only take place if domestic elites in candidate countries consider the EU to represent values and ideals fairly similar to their own personal values and those they perceive to be state values’ (Tolstrup, 2013: 728) This process would assume an approximation of the national elites’ patterns of behaviour in accordance with EU expectations, including political criteria. Contrary to such an assumption, the human rights and rule of law indexes for the past decade (see Table 21.1, also Figures 21.1 to 21.10 in the Appendix) not only reveal the opposite trend, but also that the Bulgarian political system is under a mechanism of permanent and largely inertial supervision. The Serbian case is even more interesting because, unlike the Bulgarian case where we analyse the reality ex post, the country is actually under the strongest possible exposition to Europeanisation pressure that takes place during accession negotiations. The revised version of the EIM does not consider the substantial changes in conditionality after 2007 (Anastasakis, 2008) and the different nature of the negotiation environment (O’Brennan, 2014) as factors that require a redefinition of the model. 237

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Table 21.1: CVM benchmarks Bulgaria

Romania

(1) Adopt constitutional amendments removing (1) Ensure a more transparent, and any ambiguity regarding the independence efficient judicial process notably and accountability of the judicial system. by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes. (2) Ensure a more transparent and efficient (2) Establish, as foreseen, an integrity judicial process by adopting and agency with responsibilities for implementing a new judicial system act and verifying assets, incompatibilities and the new civil procedure code. Report on the potential conflicts of interest, and for impact of these new laws and of the penal issuing mandatory decisions on the and administrative procedure codes, notably basis of which dissuasive sanctions on the pre-​trial phase. can be taken. (3) Continue the reform of the judiciary in (3) Building on progress already made, order to enhance professionalism, continue to conduct professional, accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the non-​partisan investigations into impact of this reform and publish the results allegations of high-​level corruption. annually. (4) Conduct and report on professional, non-​ (4) Take further measures to prevent and partisan investigations into allegations of fight against corruption, in particular high-​level corruption. Report on internal within the local government. inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of high-​level officials. (5) Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and within local government. (6) Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focusing on serious crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas. Sources: Commission of the European Communities (2006: 10), Gateva (2010: 13–​14)

The diffusion model Acknowledging the limits of Europeanisation in 2012, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse offered an extended version of the social institutionalist logic offered by the ‘goodness of fit’ approach, in which the driving force for Europeanisation is the existence of ‘misfit’ between European and national norms and rules. Misfit triggers adaptational pressure that occurs through causal mechanisms as legal imposition, positive and negative incentives, 238

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and socialisation by persuasion and learning through which Europe hits home. While looking to answer ‘under which conditions the adoption of EU policies results in domestic institutional change and to what extent EU institutions directly induce such changes’ (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 3), the diffusion model tried to enrich the theoretical tools to comprehend the relationship between candidates and the EU. The added value of the diffusion model lies in the scholars’ acknowledgement of the existence of formal and informal systems of rules understood as ‘expectations of appropriate behaviour based on a given collective identity’ (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 3-​4).Thus, the model focuses on the interaction between the EU and the future candidate. The concept assumes two ways of diffusion through direct and indirect incentives. Within the direct incentives model, the authors distinguish several roles, including that of socialisation. This overlaps with as Jan Grzymski (2016: 132-​134) defines them popular ‘self-​orientalization’ expectations among Bulgarians that the EU is more reliable than national political institutions and that the European Union will change the nature of Bulgarian politics (Standard Eurobarometer 2015, Standard Eurobarometer 2016, 10 years in EU 2017). Escaping from the bargaining nature of the EIM, the EU is perceived as a ‘gigantic socialisation agency’ operating through socialisation and habitualisation (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7). This approach assumes that actors (in this case national political elites) seek to meet social expectations in each situation. Accordingly, if the Bulgarian society declares that it trusts its politicians less than EU institutions, national institutions and ruling elites should absorb European standards of behaviour and political responsibility. Given the levels of public trust in the EU and Bulgarian political institutions, we can question whether the EU’s socialisation and habitualisation power can be found in the context of the rule of law and the fight against organised crime and corruption in the period after 2007. Within the mechanism of indirect incentives, the authors identified the process of normative emulation/​mimicry, when actors emulate others to increase their legitimacy or because it is appropriate. Börzel and Risse’s (2012: 10) example is directly related to our case, when they claim that states might want to be members of an international community ‘in good standing’ and thus fight corruption, improve human rights standards or institute the rule of law. … It resembles automatic ‘downloading’ of an institutional ‘software’ irrespective of functional need, simply because this is what everybody does in a given community. This apt and useful observation raises a few additional questions. Does the mimicry assume practical implementation that will ultimately bring change, or just acknowledge the reason why countries would accept external 239

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norms? This apt and useful observation raises several additional questions. Does the mimicry assume practical implementation that will ultimately bring change, or just acknowledge the reason why countries would accept external norms? In the former case, we do not see a practical follow up in the examined case. The transfer of institutional know-​how and the automatic downloading does not warrant that these norms will be actually/​practically applied at national level. Should it be the latter option, the theoretical model only recognises the fact of the diffusion, but neither the quality nor the reasons. The diffusion model deserves credit for acknowledging the role of the weaker partners ‘at the receiving end’ of the mechanisms of indirect diffusion through emulation (Börzel and Risse, 2012: s.8). What seems more troubling is the conceptualisation of the reasons for action at this ‘receiving end’. The diffusion model limits the driving forces for action to the logic of appropriateness’ and ‘the logic of consequences’ (Börzel and Risse, 2012: s.5) That is the need to solve a problem, to overcome a crisis or the just want to download a model, because this is how the desired community operates. Although there is no reason to question such sources of motivation the main weakness of this approach is the incapacitation of the candidates for membership. Indeed, in our case that would mean that Bulgarian actors emulate European values simply because they look nice or ‘trendy’. Such an explanation does not develop the reasons for such emulation and satisfies itself with the recognition of the rather instrumental approach towards rule of law and human rights. Bortzel and Risse (2012: 5) conceive diffusion as ‘a process through which ideas, normative standards, or –​in our case –​policies and institutions spread across time and space’. Since the mechanisms themselves are insufficient to explain why these processes take place, Bortzel and Risse offered five scope conditions that determine whether diffusion takes place or not. They include domestic incentives, degrees of limited statehood, democracy vs autocracy, and power (a)symmetries. Particularly useful in our case are the domestic incentives, within which the authors explain that the EU demands can overlap with the authoritarian or corrupt elite’s survival strategy. Hence, these elites will use these demands (for example insistence on the introduction of rule of law and human rights) to ‘push forward their own political agenda and consolidate their power’. This profound observation still reveals only half of the picture. It accounts for the symbiosis between quasi-​democratic regimes and European values but tells us nothing about the implications of this interaction. One outcome could be the formal adoption with informal resistance to these Western 240

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norms (O’Brennan, 2014: 229–​230); another could be the process of silent, subconscious proliferation of these formal norms into the fabric of the political elites. Its identification would require an analysis of the political practices in the context of EU values across a longer time span. Since there is no time and space for such study here, suffice it to say that the cyclical CVM reports on Bulgaria do not indicate any substantial improvement on the settled benchmarks over the past decade. Hence, a hypothesis can be raised that the Bulgarian political elites use the EU as a fig leaf to cover the differences between the reality on the ground and EU values.

Opportunistic and revolutionary legitimisation The national political elites of the new member states have not only learned how to swim in the sea of European bureaucracy, but also how to push forward their own agendas. The oversimplified representation of those states in studies on enlargement Europeanisation contributes to the distorted picture of the integration process and ignores an essential aspect of the limits of EUrope. The question of compliance with EU values has been present in relations between the EU and candidate states since the early 1990s. The general expectation that the gap between EU values and the new member states will disappear (Vachudova, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2016) has been proven wrong, and the problem becomes more acute every year. Although Hungary and Poland are in the spotlight, the challenges are much more serious and reveal the limits of Europeanisation of EU values not only among the member states, but also in countries willing to join. Following Fiszer’s (2018) argument about the EU’s mega crisis, which would shake the integration process, it is apparent that the rule of law is an integral part of the mega crisis. To identify the limits of EU’s transformative and normative power, there is a need to escape from the paradigm of asymmetry and attractiveness. The EU cannot be treated as an omnipotent and all-​embracing normative power, since it also serves as a source of legitimisation of political action with positive and negative consequences. Exploring the nature of this legitimisation can shed more light on the fabric of political interaction within the integration process. The EU provides for at least two different types of legitimisation within the political process of new member states. On one hand, it provokes local resistance to EU policies and encourages reflections on the future shape of Europe. On the other, it strengthens the credibility of the local political elites as members of the EU club of values. The grand assumption is that all political players at national level (or at least the dominant ones) follow the same general, loosely identified European values and interpret them in a similar way. This is a process of mutual recognition where the EU elites are legitimised through their interaction with national –​democratically elected –​elites and the national 241

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elites are legitimised through their participation in the decision-​making process of the EU. This mutually beneficial legitimisation not only defines the limits of ‘what is possible’ for the euro-​enthusiastic national and EU political elites, but also empowers political players to exploit the dominant political patterns of behaviour for their own purpose (rent-​seeking). Such behaviour is much more opportunistic than revolutionary and aims to reinforce the national elite’s political stance through additional external legitimisation. Opportunistic legitimization takes place when formally pro-​European elites violate at national level the EU’s political values and simultaneously exploit their EU membership, and their own personal relations with EU and other member states political stakeholders to legitimise their own political performance. Within the process of such ‘opportunistic legitimization’, the EU becomes, conscious or unconscious, accomplice in the silent undermining of its own values. Such opportunistic legitimization is dependent on the larger political context. Growing constraining dissensus increases the costs of political unity for the EU political elites. The accumulation of crises within the EU give priority to survival instincts (integrity concerns) over EU values. For example, while facing the threat of Brexit and potential further disintegration the EU needs to show unity. Following the logic of ‘every drop counts’ the EU leaders are ready to ignore or deprioritise ill covered disregard for EU values for the sake of unity of formally like-​minded aids. In this way, rent-​seekers can balance between EU’s integrity and own well-​being. Reliable ad hoc allies gathered around ideologically biased solutions become more valuable than long-​term political consequences. The urgent need to resolve existential crises (like Brexit) can override rule of law and human rights concerns. Such reshuffling of priorities is a window of opportunity for national political elites with careless attitude towards EU values. Opportunistic legitimization means that the EU’s political elites enter a vicious circle of supporting pro-​European political elites that at the same time undermine the basic principles for with the EU stands. The same EU political elites are self-​restrained and cannot apply outright criticism, because they might undermine the position of flawed but obedient political elites and risk opening the floor to alternative political forces at national level that does not have to be necessarily as euro-​enthusiastic and may or may not wish to support EU’s elites in the same way. Hence, in a reversed application of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s external incentives model, the EU’s political elites will search to accept those political counterparts at a national level that are less demanding and more responsive than nationally emancipated. The EU will be much more lenient on the application of EU values towards national political elites that uncritically replicate EU’s political agenda than towards political elites that cumulate 242

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their national support around the criticism of the recent status quo of the integration process. The alternative revolutionary legitimization is best exemplified by Orban’s Hungary and Kaczyński’s Poland proposal of cultural counterrevolution (TVN24, 2016). The two countries’ ruling parties offer alternative visions to the dominant philosophy of European integration. They draw clear limits for EU’s competences and challenge the creeping materialization of the concept of “ever closer union”. The recent Hungarian and Polish parties in power openly manifest clear visions of a united Europe of nations, even if this is not the federalist and liberal vision that dominates mainstream Europe and that most of the member states’ politicians want to see. Simultaneously, they do not search Brussels support for strengthening their national political legitimization. Instead, they cumulate it from the clash with the so-​called ‘Brussels’ elites and German domination. Such division allows us to clearly distinguish between what seems to be the dominant habit of putting all problems with the rule of law and democracy in the EU in the same basket and a more careful and case-​oriented analysis. Hungary, Poland, Austria, Romania and Bulgaria all seem to be sharing the same problem, but practically they are not. Whereas Poland and Hungary represent examples of revolutionary legitimisation, Bulgaria and Serbia serve as case studies of opportunistic legitimisation. The remainder of this chapter will use two case studies to highlight the specifics of opportunistic legitimisation.

On Bulgaria and Serbia Examination of the commonly accessible indexes of human rights and rule of law for the two countries reveal a different, more disturbing picture. A comparative analysis of such indexes as Freedom House Nations in Transition, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index for the period 2007–​2017 looking at Bulgaria and Serbia alongside some regional peers (the V4 states of Poland, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia) only partially confirm the institutional findings that during the post-​Enlargement process, when countries become EU members the power of Europeanization, understood as adoption of values and norms, will weaken, but will be replaced by other incentives like sanctions and social learning (Schimmelfennig, Trauner 2009: 7) (see Appendix). Inspired by the Eastern enlargement scholars accented on the efficient role of EU’s conditionality when paired with tangible awards (Grabbe, 2006). In our case that would mean that during the analyzed decade the Bulgarian and Serbian trajectories should be different. Bulgaria’s yearly indicators should stagnate and keep the levels of 2007 or even slowly deteriorate as a result of post-​accession normalization (Schimmelfennig 243

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and Winzen, 2017). Indeed, post-​accession slow-​down is visible across the board. However, if this seemed to be the logical explanation in the case of the new member states becoming full members, Bulgaria was tied to a post-​ accession conditionality mechanism. Taking into consideration Bulgaria’s performance, the CVM seems to be futile (Gateva, 2010, 2013; Toneva-​ Metodieva, 2014: 541). However, in the case of Serbia after 2007, in the context of equivocal claims for membership and rhetorical determination, and particularly after the commencement of official negotiations in 2014, the same indicators should be permanently growing as a result of the continuous EU pressure and the climax of conditionality. However, all the examined indexes show a different trend of stagnation and slow down resembling the Bulgarian experience. What we get in the field of rule of law and human rights are very similar processes in the two countries. In Bulgaria we observe not only stagnation but also noticeable backsliding, whereas in Serbia, there is no backsliding, but also no improvement. Notwithstanding the theoretical peak of EU conditionality at the negotiation’s point, it is not only puzzling why there is no improvement, but also why the trends in the two countries become more and more alike. Simultaneously, one cannot ignore the fact that Serbia is still in a pre-​ accession position, where at least theoretically the EU leverage should be stronger if not at its peak. Even if we admit that the accent in the post 2007 enlargement has shifted from the ‘finish’ to ‘the journey’ (Anastasakis, 2008) and that both the EU and Serbia face ‘enlargement fatigue’ and ‘accession fatigue’ (O’Brennan, 2014), still one would expect the existence of noticeable willingness on the applicant’s side to meet the European standards, particularly in such areas as European values. Instead, what we observe is a decrease in Serbia’s performance in these basic indicators, and the occurrence of such terms as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Bieber, 2018) among scholars indicates a dominant trend that also embraces the trajectory of political events in Serbia. Moreover, in the context of new geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West (NATO and EU), the Western Balkans has re-​emerged as a battlefield of conflicting interests (Balcer et al, 2015; Bechev, 2017). That has resulted in a reassessment of the EU’s commitment to the Western Balkans. In addition, regardless of the substantially reassessed, changed and upgraded approach towards conditionality after 2007, it still assumes that both sides need to be interested in participating in this approximation transaction. Hence, there needs to be goodwill on behalf of the Serbian authorities to meet the EU conditions. Regardless of these new incentives, the trends in human rights and rule of law reveal an opposite trajectory, underlining the EU’s inability to bring substantial change in the realm of political values through the power of conditionality. Regardless of the importance of this observation, this is not the primary focus of my further deliberations. Instead, 244

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I would like to further inquire how is it possible that such incompatible political values between the EU and a new member state (Bulgaria) or a country applying for a membership (Serbia) endure. Two selective cases of the intensive interaction between the EU and these two countries will highlight the patterns of opportunistic legitimisation that lead to practical de-​Europeanisation.

The impact of the Bulgarian presidency in the Council of the EU on the rule of law Bulgaria’s presidency of the Council of the European Union can be explored as a raw case study of opportunistic legitimisation. As it was mentioned earlier, Bulgaria is a very special case of membership in the EU. Officially it has been a full-​fledged member since 2007 with all rights and duties. However, in practical terms the country is under the post-​ accession CVM and faces tacit obstruction of its efforts to join Schengen and the eurozone. It thus faces in practical terms integration ostracism and marginalisation. Simultaneously, the decade-​long post-​accession rule of law record is dubious. The precise benchmarks and clearly defined steps set up within the CVM are seldom followed by sound recognition of their fulfilment. Instead, behind the careful and politically correct tone of the annual country reports for Bulgaria, such statements as ‘a need to take care of an action plan’, ‘several key initiatives are still to be adopted and implemented’, ‘Others are in an initial stage of implementation with concrete actions still to be clearly defined’, European Commission, 2017) and ‘in the near future’ reveal the essence of the CVM. It is a mechanism grounded in the assumption of post-​accession willingness to adopt reforms and implement Western know-​how, but it completely overlooks the fact that national political elites have no reason to introduce such changes. Two new modes of conditional pressure were introduced in the last report (European Commission, 2017). The first differentiates Bulgaria and Romania, claiming that Romania’s track record is satisfactory and its CVM might be completed by the end of the Commission’s term. The second is the pressure coming from the reassessment of the CVM mechanism for the next European Commission, which will need to be made at the time of the 2018 report. The depressive content of the annual reports on Bulgaria reveals a picture of stretched and repeating adoption of strategies, sluggish and piecemeal introduction of institutional changes, and conscious sabotage of any effort to fight corruption. Given the limits of this chapter, I will briefly look at the nature of the rhetoric in EU–​Bulgarian relations during the Bulgarian presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2018. The Bulgarian authorities 245

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considered the presidency as an enormous challenge. Its first presidency took place in the shadow of the migrant crisis, Brexit, and growing concerns for the Rule of Law in Poland and Hungary. At the same time, the presidency put Bulgaria under the spotlight and concerns that Brussels could use it to exert additional pressure for reforms in the judiciary and the fight against corruption were not ungrounded. However, the relations between Bulgarian political elites and Brussels appear to be better than ever. Even though the last CVM report was issued in mid-​November 2017, six weeks before to the Bulgarian presidency started, during the presidency, no senior representative of the main European institutions mentioned the deep gap between the Bulgarian reality and European values. Jean-​Claude Juncker was the first to downplay the problem of corruption, claiming in an interview for the Panorama programme on Bulgarian national television that ‘there should be no sign of equality between Bulgaria and corruption’ (ClubZ, 2018). These words are not surprising, bearing in mind that the disconnection between the CVM and the Bulgarian presidency was discussed in October 2017 by the Secretary-​General of the European Commission Alexander Italianer and Martin Selmayr, the then Juncker’s Head of Cabinet and Chief of Staff (ClubZa, 2017). The Bulgarian presidency intensified relations between Sofia and Brussels. Apart from routine meetings within the EU, Donald Tusk and Jean-​Claude Juncker visited Bulgaria for the EU–​Turkey Summit in Varna and the Western Balkans Summit in Sofia, not to mention Bulgarian Prime Minister Borisov’s visits to Brussels. None of these events were used to raise the problems with the judiciary, freedom of speech or fight against corruption, which undermine ‘the tripod of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights’ that shapes Europe’s shared destiny (Timmermans, 2018). Donald Tusk and Antonio Tajani’s diplomatic avoidance of these issues was dimmed by Juncker’s eulogies on the fantastic, over-​productive and efficient Bulgarian leaders that ‘Bulgarians can be proud of ’ (Trud, 2018). Juncker went further, underlining the democratic credentials of the Bulgarian prime minister claiming that ‘Borisov is a proven democratic politician’ (Darik, 2018). At the same time, the developments in two of the CVM’s criteria (the fight against corruption and organised crime) went in the exactly opposite direction. Two killings (on 19 December 2017 and 8 January 2018), of a tax inspector and a business connected to the prime minister’s party GERB reconfirmed the power of organised crime and its persistence. As Svetoslav Terziev (2018) aptly summarised, ‘the authorities are efficient in fighting unorganized crime and left the organized crime to take care of itself.’ On the day of the official opening of the Bulgarian presidency, the Bulgarian Parliament rejected the president’s anti-​corruption law that was recognised 246

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as another tool in the hands of the executive to secure its position and discourage whistle-​blowers in corruption cases (Terziev, 2018). Terziev also acknowledges the fact that ten years ago Bulgaria was scoring at the same level as France in the Freedom of Speech index, whereas now it ranks alongside Gabon. Regardless of the post-​presidency public relations offensive of the Bulgarian authorities reconfirming the success of their presidency, the consequence of this experience for the promotion of the ‘tripod of Europe’s shared destiny’ is disastrous. The Bulgarian political elites that ignore such fundamental questions as the fight against corruption, organised crime or human rights received unequivocal approval of their ‘way of doing things’. The questions of judicial reforms or the fight against corruption were not only ignored, but practically downplayed and humiliated. Among Juncker’s priorities was the completion of the CVM by the end of his term in office. If his tactic is to resolve it by swiping it under the carpet, the consequences for the whole integration process will be ominous.

The peacock dance of Serbia’s EU membership negotiations Similar traces of such a ‘peacock dance’ can be found in the relations between Serbia and the EU. The elite driven nature of the negotiations determines their framework and toolkit. Here, this broad topic will be narrowed down to the membership negotiations concerning c­hapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security). The relevance of these chapters stems from the new approach towards pre-​accession conditionality adopted in the EU Enlargement strategy from 2012 (MEI, 2017). It contends that the early opening of ­chapters 23 and 24, extended monitoring and their formal closure at the end of the negotiations process acts as a period for Europeanisation. Such an approach is supposed to allow the EU to have a better leverage on the domestic changes in the areas directly related to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Moreover, the opening of new chapters is dependent on the progress made by the Serbian authorities. The EU country reports on Serbia reveal an obscure image of the progress made in the areas of rule of law and human rights. These broad frameworks encompass both technical requirements (such as reform of the public administration or procedures for selection of judges) and behavioural changes. The juxtaposition of Serbia’s human rights and its performance in rule of law with the Serbian political leader’s rhetoric and the new EU approach towards conditionality brings puzzling findings. Despite the assumption that no new chapters would be opened if there is no recorded progress in the currently open chapters, since the opening 247

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of ­chapters 23 and 24 the Serbian government and the EU have opened ten new chapters. Hence, the logical assumption is that, even if arduous, progress should be noticeable. The European Commission’s report (2018) diplomatically identifies that ‘some level of preparation’ exists in the context of rule of law and human rights and pinpoints areas of urgent action. Among others, the report admits only ‘partial fulfilment of the recommendations from 2016’, ‘the need for revision of the national judicial reform strategy’ and ‘the serious delay in the new Anti-​Corruption Agency law’. The report acknowledges improvements in the adoption of regulations and adjustment of legal acts in line with the recommendations but remains reserved as to their practical assessment. Comparing the practice so far and notwithstanding the different contexts, the report recalls the EU’s experience with the fifth enlargement wave rather than its progress with Turkey. The EU country reports continue to mix causes with effects in Europeanisation of rule of law and human rights. Focusing on the backlog of cases or the adoption of new legal regulation creates the feeling for a search for positives in order not to disappoint various partners. Simultaneously, there are very important critical voices from inside Serbia that deserve attention. The non-​transparent nature of the negotiations, the lack of progress and transparency of negotiations, the use of elections as an excuse and the silent procrastination of the necessary reforms compare most closely with the experiences of the 2007 accession countries than with any others (PrEUgovor, 2017). The dominant perception of EU–​ Serbian relations shifts from the liberal towards realist, arguing that the EU is ready to trade off stability over democratic institution consolidation (Cvijić, 2017; PrEUgovor, 2017). This is not surprising given the evident inconsistency within the negotiations process. A look at Serbia’s country reports’ recommendations paints a grim picture of the lack of any reforms with regards the fight against corruption, organised crime, and freedom of expression. Hence, the simple logic must be that no new chapters should be opened. Especially as the Serbian prime minister honestly admits that there are difficulties with reforms in ­chapter 23 (B92, 2017). In the meantime, during every negotiation meeting two new chapters are being opened and some are promptly being preliminarily closed (European Commission, Timeline n.d.). This pattern of behaviour resembles too much the Bulgarian and Romanian paths towards membership. Hence, these sketchy reflections cast a shadow on the EU’s allegedly more sophisticated conditionality adopted after the 2007 experience. Bearing in mind Bulgaria’s and Romania’s post-​accession rule of law and human rights track record, it will be difficult to project a positive outcome for Serbia’s democracy and for its EU integration. However, this could be a matter of secondary importance, overshadowed by the EU’s security 248

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considerations in its closest neighbourhood. However, if this is the case, the EU should abandon its lofty and empty rule of law rhetoric and replace it with unequivocal geopolitical arguments. This disillusionment will be beneficial for the citizens of member and candidate states, and hence for the integration process.

Conclusions This episodic analysis of the relations between Brussels and the two countries reveals the problems that deserve further attention. The conceptualisation of opportunistic and revolutionary legitimisation can provide a helpful extension of the existing toolbox for analysis of the relations between the EU and its member states. However, further research is necessary to explore the role of legitimisation in the relations between member states and the EU. Notwithstanding the substantially different formal relations between the EU on one side and Bulgaria (member state) and Serbia (non-​member candidate state) on the other, the patterns of behaviour beyond the political rhetoric offers inspiring food for thought. The index data and the political developments in the two countries show that rapprochement towards European values, if it ever existed, has stalled or more aptly, completely vanished. Furthermore, it is barely or not at all dependent on EU external pressure. Even if it exists, due to the elite driven nature of the integration process, any actions in that respect are shallow and formal, and are successfully resisted by the local ways of doing things. The EU’s position towards Bulgaria and Serbia reveals that in both cases the EU’s approach is not driven solely by technocratic or self-​restrained involvement but is a subject of a conscious and uneasy marriage between the EU’s normative and security interests. Especially today, in times of dynamic geopolitical contest, any attempt for a harsher conditionality towards the two countries will further strengthen Russia’s position in the region. Serbia walks on a very thin ice trying to balance between the EU and Russia mainly due to Kosovo and its strong economic dependence on the latter. In Bulgaria, exertion of pressure on the Borisov government for failing to comply with the CVM benchmarks sooner or later will lead to new elections. The alternative party coalitions to Borisov’s government at this point are more nationalist or more pro-​Russian and supported by shallow populism. In this context, any alternative is grimmer than Borisov’s party in power. However, it is one thing to try to grasp the nature of political relations and something completely different to change them. The aim of this chapter was not to push for changes, but to give a new breath to the one-​way dominated

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direction of Europeanisation studies. The asymmetric and conditional nature of pre-​and post-​accession relations does not mean that these new applicants do not have their own agenda and are unable to prioritise their preferences. Such players can upload their own values and favourable conditions within the integration process. More importantly, these values can be incompatible with the basic EU standards. They do not have to necessarily collide with the EU. As long as they do not undermine the dominant status quo, they are tolerated (silently) or even nurtured (through conscious or unconscious legitimisation) as peripherical processes. Simultaneously, the system’s normative self-​adoration allows decision makers to believe that they can control these anomalies. This uploading of a country’s own values and principles does not necessarily have to be conflictual. As already mentioned, silent existence of political shortcomings in the EU’s peripheries does not have to constitute a clear and present danger for the EU and its operational status quo. However, these minor but consistent contradictions ‘drill the rock’ of dominating EU political practices. For example, a journalist being killed in Malta or Slovakia does not mean that overnight French or German politicians will start ordering murders. The fact that Bulgarian political elites capture the state does not mean that there will be an immediate emulation in the Netherlands. However, such cases create a silent precedence for which other national political elites can reach, should they decide that a legal or political shortcut is necessary. The acceptance of new member states with dubious rule of law and human rights record does not immediately undermine the EU, but it extends the collection of available ways of doing things within the EU’s political experience. If these new samples in the EU collection are negative or contradictory to the EU’s basic values, do we still talk about Europeanisation or de-​Europeanisation? The Bulgarian and Serbian cases are pure examples of serpiginous de-​Europeanisation, when lofty, pompous and empty EU rhetoric is formally and consistently repeated and at the same time the daily reality at national level is dominated by processes that have nothing to do with the EU’s norms, values and standards of political behaviour. Hence, they do not contribute to the process of European integration but blow it up from within. At this point the main success of Bulgarian authorities is the preservation of its specific political system regardless of the EU membership and influence. So far there is no evidence of Serbia and, even more importantly, Bulgaria being able to upload these de-​Europeanisation practices to other member states. However, the current form of European integration –​elite driven and allergic to democracy –​provides a fertile ground in which political pathologies at national level can thrive. It remains to be seen whether these pathologies can be uploaded to the European level. 250

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Appendix Key: BG: Bulgaria; SRB: Serbia; RO: Romania; HR: Croatia; PL: Poland; HU: Hungary; CZ: Czechia; SK: Slovakia; SLO: Slovenia.

Figure 21.1: Freedom House nations in transition democracy score, 2007–​17 4.50 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 BG 2007

SRB 2008

RO 2009

HR

2010

2011

PL 2012

HU 2013

CZ

2014

2015

SK 2016

SLO 2017

Notes: The Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy scores and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Source: The country reports for the selected countries contain the data for the last ten years. available online at: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​nati​ons-​tran​sit-​2018. For the period before 2009 data were retrieved from: https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​ transit/​nations-​transit-​2015#.XDdtR2lCepo

Figure 21.2: Freedom House corruption score, 2007–​17 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 BG 2007

SRB 2008

RO 2009

HR 2010

2011

PL 2012

HU 2013

2014

CZ 2015

SK 2016

SLO 2017

Note: The Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy scores and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Source: The country reports for the selected countries contain the data for the last ten years. available online at: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​nati​ons-​tran​sit-​2018. For the period before 2009 data were retrieved from: https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​ transit/​nations-​transit-​2015#.XDdtR2lCepo

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Figure 21.3: Freedom House judicial framework and independence score, 2007–​17 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 BG 2007

SRB 2008

RO 2009

HR 2010

2011

PL 2012

HU 2013

2014

CZ 2015

SK 2016

SLO 2017

Note: The Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy scores and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Source: The country reports for the selected countries contain the data for the last ten years. available online at: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​nati​ons-​tran​sit-​2018. For the period before 2009 data were retrieved from: https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​ transit/​nations-​transit-​2015#.XDdtR2lCepo

Figure 21.4: Freedom House electoral process score, 2007–​17 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 BG 2007

SRB 2008

RO 2009

HR 2010

2011

PL 2012

HU 2013

2014

CZ 2015

SK 2016

SLO 2017

Note: The Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy scores and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Source: The country reports for the selected countries contain the data for the last ten years. available online at: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​nati​ons-​tran​sit-​2018. For the period before 2009 data were retrieved from: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​ tran​sit/​ nations-​transit-​2015#.XDdtR2lCepo

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Figure 21.5: Freedom House independent media score, 2007–​17 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 BG 2007

SRB 2008

RO 2009

HR 2010

2011

PL 2012

HU 2013

2014

CZ 2015

SK 2016

SLO 2017

Note: The Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy scores and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Source: The country reports for the selected states contain the data for the last ten years. available online at: https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​nati​ons-​tran​sit-​2018. For the period before 2009 data were retrieved from: https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​ transit/​nations-​transit-​2015#.XDdtR2lCepo

Figure 21.6: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2007–​11 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 BG

SRB

RO

HR 2007

2008

PL 2009

HU 2010

CZ

SK

SLO

2011

Note: During the evaluated period from 2007 to 2011 the CPI scale was from 0 Highly corrupt to 10 Very clean. The scroll menu provides access to annual reports. Source: https://​www.transparency.org/​cpi2014/​results

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Figure 21.7: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2012–​17 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 BG

SRB

RO

HR

2012

2013

PL 2014

HU

2015

2016

CZ

SK

SLO

2017

Note: CPI changed its scale in 2012. The index provides a score which indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 (Highly Corrupt) to 100 (Very Clean), and a rank which indicates the country’s relative position towards other countries included in the survey. This table is based on those scores, and the scroll menu provides user access to annual reports. Source: https://​www.transparency.org/​cpi2014/​results

Figure 21.8: BTI rule of law status, 2006–​18 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 BG

SRB

RO 2006

2008

HR 2010

PL 2012

HU 2014

2016

CZ

SK

SLO

2018

Note: Rule of law is one of the five criteria of the BTI Democracy status that evaluates the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, prosecution of office abuse and civil rights. Source: https://​atlas.bti-​proj​ect.org/​share.php?1*2018*CV:CTC:SEL​ BGR*CAT*BGR*REG:TAB

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Figure 21.9: BTI stability of democratic institutions, 2006–​18 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 BG

SRB

RO 2006

2008

HR 2010

PL 2012

HU 2014

2016

CZ

SK

SLO

2018

Note: BTI stability of democratic institutions is one of the five criteria of the BTI Democracy status that evaluates the performance of democratic institutions and the commitment to democratic institutions. Source: https://​atlas.bti-​project.org/​share.php?1*2018*CV:CTC:SELBGR*CAT*BGR*RE G:TAB

Figure 21.10: BTI democracy status, 2006–​18 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 BG

SRB

RO 2006

2008

HR 2010

PL 2012

HU 2014

2016

CZ

SK

SLO

2018

Note: The Democracy Status describes where a country stands on its way to democracy. It is composed of 5 criteria evaluated on a 1-​10 scale. Source: https://​atlas.bti-​project.org/​share.php?1*2018*CV:CTC:SELBGR*CAT*BGR*RE G:TAB

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Acknowledgements I would like to express my deep gratitude to Jan Grzymski and Russell Foster for their encouraging remarks and helpful suggestions. I am also very grateful to Krassen Stanchev’s interesting and instructive suggestions that reveal further pathways for the exploration of this topic.

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European Commission (2017) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2017) 43 final, 25 January, Brussels: European Commission, https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​trans​pare​ncy/​reg​doc/​rep/​1/​2017/​EN/​ COM-​2017-​43-​F1-​EN-​ MAIN-​PART-​1.PDF European Commission (2018) Serbia 2018 Report. Commission Staff Working Document, Strasbourg: European Commission, pp 11–​20. Fiszer, J. (2018) ‘Unia Europejska po brexicie’, W Unia Europejska –​ Chiny w XXI wieku,, Warszawa 2018 pod redakcją prof. Józefa M. Fiszera, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Gateva, E. (2010) ‘Post-​accession conditionality: support instrument for continuous pressure?’ KFG Working Paper No.18, October, Kolleg-​ Forschergruppe (KFG) ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’, Freie Universität Berlin. Gateva, E. (2013) ‘Post-​accession conditionality –​translating benchmarks into political pressure?’ East European Politics, 23(4): 420–​442. Grabbe, H. (2006) The EU’s transformative power: Europeanization through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Grzymski, J. (2016) Powrót do Europy –​Polski dyskurs. Wyznaczanie perspektywy krytycznej, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Uczelni Łazarskiego. Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2010) Competitive authoritarianism, hybrid regimes after the Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitz, P. and Pop-​Eleches, G. (2010) ‘Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession’, Comparative Political Studies, 43(4): 457–​485. MEI (2017) Semi-​annual EC Progress Report on Chapters 23 and 24 published. Ministry of European Integration, Government of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade. O’Brennan, J. (2014) ‘On the Slow Train to Nowhere? The European Union, ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western Balkans’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(2): 221–​242. P r E U g ovo r ( 2 0 1 7 ) ‘ I n s u f f i c i e n t p r o g r e s s o f S e r b i a i n ­c hapters 23 and 24’, 25 May, www.preugovor.org/​N ews/​1 362/​ Insufficient-​progress-​of-​Serbia-​in-​chapters-​23.shtml Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on the Accession Countries. in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (ed) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 210-​229. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2017) ‘The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: the External Incentives Model Revisited’, Paper for the JMF @25 conference, EUI, 22/​23 June.

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Schimmelfennig, F. and Winzen, T. (2017) ‘Eastern enlargement and differentiated integration: towards normalization’, Journal of European Public Policy, 24(2): 239–​258. Sedelmeier, U. (2016) Compliance after conditionality: why are the European Union’s new member states so good? MAXCAP Working Paper Series, No22, Berlin: ‘Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond (MAXCAP). Standard Eurobarometer 84 (2015) National Report, Bulgaria, December, European Commission http:// ​ e c.europa.eu/ ​ c ommfrontoffice/​ publicopinionmobile/i​ ndex.cfm/S​ urvey/g​ etSurveyDetail/s​ urveyKy/2​ 098 Standard Eurobarometer 86 (2016) National Report, Bulgaria, December, European Commission http:// ​ e c.europa.eu/ ​ c ommfrontoffice/​ publicopinionmobile/i​ ndex.cfm/S​ urvey/g​ etSurveyDetail/s​ urveyKy/2​ 137 Terziev, S. (2018) ‘Sega’, Сега разбрахте ли, г-​н Юнкер, какво натворихте в България? Tom 13 6078. 16 January. Timmermans, F. (2018) Speech by First Vice-​President Frans Timmermans at the European Parliament plenary session on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 June 2018. Tolstrup, J. (2013) ‘When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites’, Democratization, 20(4): 716–​742. Toneva-​Metodieva, L. (2014) ‘Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 15(4): 534–​551. Trauner, F. (2009) Post-​accession compliance with EU law in Bulgaria and Romania: A comparative perspective. in F. Schimmelfennig and F. Trauner (eds) Post-​accession compliance in the EU’s new member states, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 2, 13(21): http://​eiop.or.at/​ eiop/​texte/​2009-​021a.htm. Trud (2018) Юнкер: България ни впечатлява с председателството си. 1 March. TVN24 (2016) ‘Kaczyński i Orban zapowiadają ‘kontrrewolucję kulturową’ w UE’. Vachudova, M.A. (2005) Europe Undivided, Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Indexes sources Freedom Houce Nations in Transit Indexes PL https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​polandhttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​poland

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CZ https://​ f reedomhouse.org/​ r eport/​ n ations- ​ t ransit/ ​ 2 018/ ​ c zech-​ republichttps:// ​ f reedomhouse.org/ ​ r eport/ ​ n ations- ​ t ransit/ ​ 2 015/​ czech-​republic HU https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​hungaryhttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​hungary SK https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​slovakiahttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​slovakia BG https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​bulgariahttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​bulgaria RO https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​romaniahttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​romania SRB https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​serbiahttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​serbia SLO https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​sloveniahttps://​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​slovenia HR https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2018/​croatiahttps:// ​ freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2015/​croatia Transparency International CPI https://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​news/​feat​ure/​corruption_p​ erce​ ptio ​ ns_i​ nde​ x_​20​17ht​tps://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​news/​feat​ure/​corrup​tion​_​per​cept​ ions​_​ind​ex_​2​016 https://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​cpi2​015 https://​www. trans​pare​ncy.org/​cpi2​014/​resu​lts https://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​cpi2​ 013/​resu​lts https://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​cpi2​012/​resu​lts https://​www. transparency.org/​cpi2011 https://​www.transp​ aren ​ cy.org/c​ pi201​ 0htt​ ps://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​resea​ rch/​cpi/​cpi_​2​009/​0 https://​www.trans​pare​ncy.org/​resea​rch/​cpi/​cpi_​2​ 008/​0 https://​www.transparency.org/​research/​cpi/​cpi_​2007/​0 Bertelsmann Transparency Index Access to all data is available at https://​a tlas.bti-​p roj​e ct.org/​share. php?1*2018*CV:CT C:SELBGR*CAT*BGR*REG:TAB 259

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Response to Spasimir Domaradzki Krassen Stanchev1 Spasimir Domaradzki’s chapter demonstrates the relativity of political criteria for EU membership, especially since the negotiation of the last enlargement which started in 1998. It attempts to test the political criteria application to countries like Bulgaria and Romania that were believed to be ‘latecomers’ among the countries that joint the Union after the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, still being a part of that ‘wave’. It is likely that the same analysis would be relevant for another latecomer, Croatia: it joined the EU on 1 July 2013 with a much worse macroeconomic situation than Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007. Domaradzki, though this is not his main objective, also reassesses the political-​science analytical tools designed to review memberships in such complex international arrangements as the EU, and, in my view, contributes to the critical review of contemporary methodology for the explanation of the EU enlargement. His focus on Bulgaria and Romania, and on Serbia gives food for thought for the interpretation of next wave of EU enlargement that is most likely to involve most of the West Balkan countries –​the ex-​Yugoslav successor states and Albania. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU is still attractive to these and other new members. It is likely in the next year or so the Balkan path to the EU would call for deeper understanding of their backgrounds. Domaradzki’s analysis avoids repetition of generally available European Commission reviews on the most ‘problematic parts’ of the Acquis Communitaire, and focuses on the ways candidate countries’ political leaders play with the political criteria.2 Of these countries, Serbia, arguably, is the most complicated case.

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Principal issues In my understanding of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘opportunism’, societal and political phenomena associated with them change over time, both as public moods and as political rhetoric, and both have an impact on the preferences and expectations of involved political leaders on both ends of the accession as well as of the affected individuals or voters in the already-​member state and the newcomers. More specifically, if ‘legitimacy’ is the trust that rules of the game (institutions, in Douglas North’s sense) and competing individuals who form and apply them are the most appropriate at a given period of time, the process of ‘Europeanisation’ (EU accession and enlargement) –​roughly the time periods between 1989 (or the first post-​communist elections) and the formal start of EU negotiations (approximately 1998) and formal entry into the Union (2004, 2007 and 2013 for the countries mentioned in the text) –​was a time of political opportunism and legitimisation of the rules of the game (values, institutions) that were believed, or trusted to be, ‘European’. On the other hand, if ‘opportunism’ is a behaviour through which someone uses every situation to seek and/​or gain power or an advantage, regardless of moral principles or the legitimate interests of others, individuals involved, as political leaders and voters alike, also changed their expectations and objectives over time –​vis-​à-​vis the EU and in general. It was due to opportunistic behaviour in Bulgaria and Romania that no political party ever questioned d’Estaing’s draft EU constitution, perhaps because it would have been an impolite gesture on behalf of an ‘aspiring’ new club member. But almost no political party, political scientist, or economic observer in 2004 remembered this. I remember the CASE 2005 Annual Conference in Warsaw (in 2005) where Georges de Ménil’s (2004) criticism of the Draft was met with almost cold apathy. Poland’s Seim and the Senate, in the last April days prior to the 1 May 2004 formal entry to the EU, voted, over the course of 48 hours, for amendments to 140-​plus laws that were forgotten in harmonisation with the Acquis. There were EU sceptics in all new member states but they were not very welcome by the media, and they themselves were almost reluctant to seek public popularity.

Time and leaders In this sense, we witnessed a deliberate opportunism that spread over two to three periods of political changes in the relationship between (the future) new member states and the Union. The first was an informal or semi-​formal integration of the re-​emerging European economies and countries, after communism, with the European

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Economic Community –​ a somewhat ‘natural’ economic process of trade reorientation, restoration of private property (decriminalisation of entrepreneurship, already happening before the fall of the Berlin Wall, even in the USSR),3 constitutional separation of powers, reorientation of international contracts –​from trade agreements to membership in international financial institutions, the WTO and other international organisations, to participation in the First Gulf War, to diplomatic rearrangements with ‘the West’ and with the world. The second period consisted of formal EU membership talks, or the accession process, also known in these countries as a period of ‘ticking boxes’ to achieve ‘harmonisation’ with the Acquis that was an actual bureaucratic process –​not only in the pejorative sense –​of ticking boxes. The third period is those years after formal accession to the EU in 2004, 2007, or 2013 for Croatia. In these periods, the international affairs process was led by political figureheads (the author and his sources use the term ‘elite’) who used opportunism: their moral principles, visions and expectations, that one should take into account. And, of course, I doubt that there will be many political scientists surprised by politicians’ and political leaders’ opportunism. In my point of view,4 there are several important changes in leaders’ visions, the most important of which was their view of ‘change’ or ‘revolution’. In their eyes, the 1989 revolutions were first of all anti-​totalitarian, and the reforms they triggered were reforms aimed at the restoration of pre-​ communist ways of public governance, a Return-​to-​Normality effort, not an elaborate vision of reform, ‘transition to Paradise’, or something of the sort.5 These not very sophisticated visions affected ‘traditional’ reform political parties (those who ran ex-​communist countries between 1989 and 2004–​ 2007), their rhetoric and the process of political competition ‘necessitated’ populist divers of public life. If one digs into the individual backgrounds of personalities of political leaders of those years, one would easily recognise the following common denominator: they were either dissidents of the late communist regime, or human rights and/​or opposition trade unionists, or they were individuals who formed the generation of the 1960s (which in Eastern Europe was preoccupied with human dignity and individual freedom, not with Mao or even with Marcuse) –​this generation spearheaded the reforms of the 1990s. In many of the countries there existed a spontaneous and very visible process of restoration of old, pre-​1940s political parties and traditions, agrarian and small landowners’ parties, radical democrats, social democrats and the likes (many of which had been banned and persecuted by the old regime). 262

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Political-​scientific analytical tools On the point of analytical methods, the author discusses the ‘external incentives mechanism’ as a methodological instrument to describe and analyse political incentives to work towards and accept EU integration. This method is based on the assumption that someone among the political leaders or governments of the accession countries had ever made or attempted to undertake an articulated cost benefit analysis of the EU accession. Joining the EU was a symbolic and historic change for both the leaders and their voters, and closing the page on the communist past was a Return, a Restitution of the pre-​communist normality that now, in 1989 into the early 1990s, existed as ‘Europe’, ‘West’ or European Economic Community. The prospect of ‘joining’ some different political union was not on the agenda. The rhetoric of ‘utilising EU funds’ and EU economic ‘solidarity’ came from the EU, and much later gained popular circulation in the political discourse and practices of the new member states. Notes 1

2 3

4 5

Krassen Stanchev teaches Macroeconomic Analysis and Public Choice Theory at Sofia University; he is also Board Chairman of the Institute for Market Economics. European Commission (2016). See Poland’s Law on Economic Activity, dated 23 December 1988, applied after the take-​off of Poland’s reforms after 1 January 1990, which letter and spirit was upgraded in 2004 by the Freedom of Economic Activity Law of 2 July 2005; Decree 56 of 6 January 1989 of the Bulgaria Council of Ministers; even most of the ex-​Soviet republics, although leaning more towards central planning, adopted similar regulations. In 2017, I attempted to summarise the picture in Stanchev (2017). The constitution making of early 1990 in virtually all countries confirms this observation, this was a common mood of all political leaders of the period, and from Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia to Zhelyo Zhelev in Bulgaria; this was the vision of most members of the Constitutional Assembly of 1990–​91 Bulgaria (in which I was a chairman of the environment committee). See an interpretation in Auer (2004), Sebastyen (2009) and Aslund and Djankov (2014); for the philosophical background of the vision, one may refer to the writing of Georgy Markov in the 1960s, and Solzhenitsyn and Havel in the 1970s –​to name just a few of many important sources.

References Aslund, A. and Djankov, S. (eds) (2014) The great rebirth: lessons from the victory of capitalism over communism, Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Auer, S. (2004) Liberal nationalism in Central Europe, New York: Routledge Curzon. Станчев (2014) Протестът 4 #Кой и #Как –​ Бележки и личен архив по българските окупации и протести: 2011–​2014, www.marginalia. bg/​a nalizi/ ​p rotestt-​ 4 -​koj-​ k ak-​ b elezhki-​ l ichen-​ a rhiv-​ p o-​ blgarskite-​ okupatsii-​ protesti-​2011-​2014/​ 263

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European Commission (2016) The Western Balkans and the EU enlargement and challenges, http://​www.europarl.europa.eu/​RegData/​etudes/​BRIE/​ 2016/​589791/​EPRS_​BRI(2016)589791_​EN.pdf de Ménil, G. (2004) ‘Righting the EU Constitution’, Project Syndicate, 31 May, www.project-​syndicate.org/​commentary/​r ighting-​the-​eu-​constitution Sebastyen, V. (2009) Revolution 1989: The fall of the Soviet Empire, London: Phoenix. Stanchev, K. (2017) ‘Competition between parties and interest groups in ex-​communist Europe (How to read recent political developments)’, in (eds) Татяна Томова, Симеон Петров (съставители и редактори). Международният трансфер на административни модели и инструменти: възможности, ограничения и рискове. София СУ.

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Is Homo Oeconomicus an Extinct Species and Does It Matter for EUropean Integration? Attitudes towards Free Trade and Populism Bogna Gawrońska-​Nowak

Introduction There are two leading hypotheses that try to offer a comprehensive response to questions concerning the origins of the latest Eurosceptic and populist waves in Europe. One argues it is due to ‘cultural backlash’; the other points to ‘economic insecurity’. In fact, they can both be true, and are not mutually exclusive –​economic insecurity affects values and beliefs (Ballard-​Rosa et al, 2017). Authoritarian values can be the consequence of economic conflict (Algan et al, 2017). Exploring the economic insecurity hypothesis means working over globalisation’s impact on country economies and its key actors. De Vries and Hoffmann (2016) deal with various opinion surveys from European countries to prove that fear of globalisation is the decisive factor behind demands for changes away from the political mainstream. Immigration plays an important role in fuelling these fears. Nevertheless, there are more problematic questions generating fears in European societies and resulting in radicalism (Dustmann et al, 2017): the global financial crisis, income disparities, and free trade/​import competition. Intuition suggests that the bigger the magnitude of macroeconomic shock is, the bigger income disparities are, and the higher unemployment is; and then public opinion (social attitude) is more radical and exposed 265

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to populism. Another question, important with regards to the persistence of radicalism, is whether public opinion preserves some ability of rational judgement that relies on objectively defined magnitude and nature of problems, or whether instead people are inclined to stick to ‘clichés’, which help them to form these attitudes but that also fuel their fears, no matter how false the judgement behind it. And finally, what are the proportions in attitude formation process? In other words, how much belongs to homo oeconomicus and how much it is fear-​driven –​launched beyond economic self-​interest? Recently, free trade agreements (FTAs) have drawn public attention through new waves of political populism, alter-​globalisation, and tendencies to redefine patterns of world economic ties. From a European perspective, in particular the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have raised serious public concerns about environmental protection, food quality, job security, and citizen rights. Following this, US President Donald Trump (after he had openly criticised and opposed free trade also with Europe) started a new era of trade wars. In this chapter I would like to have a deeper look into citizens’ attitudes towards free trade as a potential determinant of European populism, with an attempt to distinguish between rational and irrational driving components. I believe that neither theoretical nor empirical works with regard to European populism have yet taken full advantage of telling a difference between those two ‘ingredients’. This chapter recapitulates my views and ideas supported by literature and research results. First, I briefly present some of the most striking features of contemporary international trade that may have an impact on populism’s rise in the EU. Second, I review some empirical evidence of the relation between free trade and populism in some European economies. Next I look for some guidance in literature to explain what lies behind the mechanism of attitude formation towards free trade. Before drawing conclusions and making recommendations, I present a general image of European citizens’ attitudes towards free trade and some results of content analysis for the Polish case study.

Free trade, GVCs and declining industry What is international trade about today? It is about ‘the highly fragmented pattern of production and trade in tasks’, rather than ‘arm’s-​length exchanges of final goods or transfers within multinational corporations’ (Mayer et al, 2017: 3). Trade in intermediate inputs now accounts for as much as two-​ thirds of international trade and, according to UNCTAD (2013: 133–​135), 80% of trade passes through global value chains (GVCs), although GVCs’ importance appears to have peaked in 2010–​2012 after two decades of 266

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continuous increase and since 2012 (until the most recent data, for 2017) the relative importance of GVCs in global trade has been retreating (UNCTAD, 2018: 22–​24). Outsourcing and offshoring of production has resulted in the creation of a new global map of specialisation. GVCs have become crucial to understanding the new complex net of value creation, retention and capture. However, some actors in the world economy have benefited from production defragmentation and some have failed to become successfully integrated into GVCs. Enabling free imports and exports, as an entry pass to GVCs, has not turned out to be sufficient in many cases. Tracing production fragmentation on a world map is not easy. The latest data released by UNCTAD (2018: 40) show that the share of Foreign Value Added (FVA)1 in exports was extremely high for the EU in 2017. It was the highest among all developed economies (38%, compared with 13% for the US and 21% for Japan) and higher than FVA in developing economies (28% en masse). However, according to UNCTAD (2018: 40), such a distinguished position in the FVA ranking may largely be explained by advanced European integration processes including markets and shared institutional settings, which encourages and supports the rise of strong regional value chains. The EU, with Belgium and the Netherlands in top positions, is at the same time leader of the GVC participation rate2 ranking (60%), above the United States (46%), Japan (48%) and developing economies (56%). Belgium and the Netherlands are global service, technology and finance providers, and they have managed to go far beyond their own small domestic market capacities, overcoming Singapore and China in national rankings. It is worth noting that even the biggest global production value added providers still considerably depend on foreign inputs. GVCs generate various interdependencies between the global and local levels. This refers to a broad range of issues like access to technologies and their use and creation, and the acquisition of knowledge, regulations and standards, which matters for local industry development. Local industry transformation causes significant changes in local societies, affects labour markets and culture, and impacts individual behavioural patterns and decision-​making processes –​including political choices. Timmer et al (2014) deconstruct the final output of the transport equipment manufacturing industry in Germany, focusing on German cars. It becomes apparent that between 1995 and 2008, DVA content dropped from 79% to 66% while FVA share increased from 21% to 34%. The intermediates were increasingly imported into Germany, generating income for labour and capital employed outside the country. Additionally, it can be noticed that the value added by capital increased (from 29% to 35%), while the share of labour dropped (from 71% to 65%). The drop in labour was almost exclusively concerned with less-​skilled workers inside the country. The share for high-​skilled workers both within and outside Germany increased. 267

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As Timmer et al identify (2014: 104): ‘the patterns of shifting location and factor content of activities in the global value chain of German cars are representative for many other chains of manufactures’. Changes in factor shares in the GVCs observed between 1995 and 2008 can be perceived as signalling a decline of manufacturing –​shrinking labour demand for low-​ skilled workers inside the country and, as a consequence, declining personal incomes. France experienced a decrease in its low-​skilled workers share by 8.7%; the UK by 8.0%, Italy by 14.8% and Spain by 12.9% (Timmer et al, 2014: 111). De Marchi et al (2017) discuss factors affecting the evolution of industrial districts in Italy and point out the aggressive pricing policies of Asian competitors, together with the consequences of the 2008–​09 world recession, which resulted in geographical and organisational consolidations in most Italian industries at country and firm level. Competitive pressure often required giving up local roots and substituting them with foreign intermediate inputs. De Marchi et al (2017: 35–​36) define three different ‘trajectories’, pathways from the traditional industrial district model: • ‘Decline’,3 which can be characterised by a radical cut in the number of firms capable of competing globally and generating added value. • ‘Hierarchisation’,4 which is a radical change of market structure in favour of a few large corporations, currently the dominant model. That alteration may (but does not have to) keep the employment level stable despite reduction of small enterprises’ numbers. • ‘The resilience trajectory’,5 which is connected with moderate reduction of employment and number of companies. If market concentration is not overwhelming, there is a chance that the industry district will have good capacity to generate the added value. ‘Decline’ is very much in line with what Timmer et al (2014) refer to. The latter two trajectories seem to be moderately positive or at least ‘not-​ that-​harmful’ scenarios. However, De Marchi et al (2017; also in earlier publications, De Marchi and Grandinetti, 2014) emphasise that in any case transformation of the traditional model causes strong cultural and social changes. There is an erosion of local entrepreneurs’ human capital due to the decreasing number of small and medium companies as well as succession problems (such as the decreasing birth rate, which used to be high while the traditional model was operating). Also, according to these authors, the inflow of immigrant workers and foreign entrepreneurs weakens ‘the communitarian factor’, which is fundamental to the traditional model. Criscuolo and Timmis (2018) use centrality metrics to identify central sectors and countries –​those that are highly connected and influential within GVCs –​and peripheries –​those sectors and countries weakly connected 268

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within GVCs. Their analysis covers 62 economies for the period 1995–​ 2011, and contributes to a better understanding of the consequences of the industrial district traditional model evolution in the EU, signalled earlier by Timmer et al (2014) and De Marchi et al (2017). Some new centres of world manufacturing have been established, although some remained unchanged. Computer and electronics manufacturing hubs have been moved to emerging economies in Asia, while the UK and Japan have suffered from declining importance. Moreover, almost every manufacturing industry in the UK and Italy has become less influential. However, Germany and the US have retained their leading roles as motor vehicle, machinery and equipment manufacturing hubs. At the same time, Central and Eastern European economies (along with other emerging economies) have been gradually gaining more influential positions and advancing their connection levels with highly-​developed economies like Germany. Another interesting discovery concerns shock propagation mechanisms. A minority of highly connected firms and sectors account for the majority of aggregate volatility. For example in Belgium, the 100 most central firms account for 91.3% of Belgium’s aggregate volatility (Magerman et al, 2016). It must be underlined that a shock affecting a particular company has multidimensional consequences. Not only are suppliers and customers of that company hit, but also the suppliers and customers of its suppliers/​ customers. This is happening worldwide in the whole network in GVCs. Hence central firms, industries, and countries ‘play a disproportionate role in determining aggregate performance’ (Criscuolo and Timmis, 2018: 6). Mitigating supply shock is a kind of trade-​off that the firm may face: higher production costs and lower productivity versus lower risk. The decline of manufacturing in advanced economies may be neutralised by reshoring –​moving the value chains back to the multinational firms‘ home economies. If, to rely on surveys that explore managers’ intentions, one may say that the ‘coming back’ trend is indeed apparent; but judging by firms that already have done, the prospects seem to be less optimistic. In the Midlands of the UK only 16% of the surveyed manufacturing firms were undertaking reshoring, and only 5% actively considering it (Bailey and De Propris, 2018: 13).

Free trade and populism The backlash against globalisation, and international trade in particular, is usually seen as rooted in the uneven distribution of trade gains. Foreign competition is perceived as crowding out local industries, destructive for labour demands for narrowly specialised labour, and destructive towards local production, which makes people vote for populists and against European integration. 269

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There are some empirical works that investigate the relationship between international trade and populism in Europe. Colantone and Stanig (2018) using disaggregated referendum returns on Brexit and individual level data show that support for the Leave option in the referendum regarding EU membership of the UK was systematically higher in regions hit harder by import shock (imports from China). The effect of import shock remains statistically significant, even after having added some immigration variables. The relationship between import shock and voting for Brexit has been confirmed both in analysis of disaggregated vote shares, and individual data analysis. Becker et al (2017) analyse vote and turnout shares across 380 local authority areas in the UK. Both immigration and trade provide relatively little explanatory power for the referendum vote. Instead, education profiles, historical dependence on manufacturing employment, as well as low income and high unemployment, seem to matter. Los et al (2017) conducted analysis at the NUTS 2 level. Their outcomes support the hypothesis about the relationship between the ‘Leave’ vote and dependency of local industries on EU markets. The regions of the UK that are most dependent displayed a higher proportion of Leave votes. Dippel et al (2016) used causal mediation analysis to identify the effects of trade integration on voting behaviour in Germany. They focused on federal election data from 1987 to 2009 and the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) for trade variables and German Social Security records, and the German Federal Statistical Office data for labour market variables. They find that extreme-​right party vote share increases with import competition and decreases with export access opportunities. It also important to notice that two-​thirds of the total effect of trade integration on voting is driven by labour market adjustments, particularly referring to manufacturing employment. As Dippel et al (2016: 36) say, ‘while theory and empirical evidences mostly agree that trade integration has positive effects, it also creates distributional frictions between its winners and losers’. Dluhosch (2018) presents a more complex view to this question than just a winner–​loser perspective. Drawing mainly on subjective wellbeing (SWB) data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and income statistics from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) covering 2010–​14, she conducts a cross-​section analysis (ordered logistic regression model used). She tries to separate and identify the role of perceptions, mainly by tracing how probabilities across ranks of SWB are affected by changes in various measures of inequality at different levels of openness to trade. She discovers that the level of an economy’s openness changes perception of income inequality. The greater the openness, the more people are concerned about an income gap. Dluhosch (2018) links that with group identity based on the ‘them-​versus-​ us’ perspective to trade. She thinks that this type of attitude towards trade makes people more inclined to populism than in a case of those motivated 270

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solely by the distributional impact of trade. The must be considered as empirical evidence for existence of bias perception towards trade, which can be rooted in factors different from economic self-​interests. It is worth noticing that these results are very much in line with findings by Mutz and Kim (2017). Their survey relies on data from 2,350 US citizens, and supports the perceived intergroup competition hypothesis promoted by Dluhosch (2018). Higher levels of competition lead some Americans to prefer beggar-​ thy-​neighbour-​policy –​trade policies that benefit ‘the in-​group’ and hurt ‘the out-​group’ –​to policies that help both their own country and the trading partner country, which in turn creates a ‘populism-​vulnerable’ environment.

Attitude formation In fact, there is substantial literature available in which formation of attitudes towards free trade is discussed in detail. Economic self-​interest hypothesis plays an important role. The origins of this hypothesis come from the Stopler-​ Samuelson theorem. Dani Rodrik presents contemporary interpretation of the theorem on his blog:6 regardless of the number of goods and factors, at least one factor of production must experience a decline in real income from trade as long as trade induces the relative price of some domestically produced good(s) to fall (and as long as the productivity benefits from trade are restricted to the traditional, inter-​sectoral allocative efficiency improvements). Such reasoning implies that citizens are mainly interested in the consequences of free trade for themselves. Empirical studies testifying the economic self-​ interest hypothesis have been concentrated on job-​related attributes such as skill levels, income and sector of employment. That direction of research is appealing to the ‘winners or losers’ perspective. In this scenario, an individual employee’s attitude towards free trade would be affected by their ability to adapt to a new market environment, which is much easier for a high skill worker (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). It is also possible that individuals working for the same industry may have diverging economic self-​interests towards free trade, depending on their firms’ productivity levels. The more productive a firm is, the more free trade supporting its employees are (Bearce and Tuxhorn, 2017). Hypothesis of sociotropic formation of attitudes towards free trade contrasts with aforementioned economic cost-​benefit assessment process rooted in individualistic approach. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) notice that citizens form their attitudes relying on their perception of free trade effects on the national economy rather than referring to their own jobs and incomes. Sociotropic 271

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hypothesis includes the ‘group clashes’ explanation offered by Dluhosch (2018) and Mutz and Kim (2017). Individuals may form their attitudes towards trade by socialising and interacting with each other through their group-​belonging patterns. Decisions to join any particular group are not random, and as aware self-​selection processes they must have an impact on free trade attitude. In this context, Lü et al (2012) show that group identification may be based on a universal value-​sharing route. Their survey experiment, conducted in the US and China, proves that both Chinese and American citizens want to protect the low-​skilled workers due to altruism, at the same time opposing the protection of high-​skilled (well paid) workers due to envy towards the rich. It does not appear to matter that the Chinese low-​skilled are in a rather favourable position contrary to the American low-​skilled employees. Altruism and ‘elite aversion’ have rebalancing power. Kuo and Naoi (2015) examine mediums and mechanisms of information transmission from groups to individuals, and among individuals and groups, as crucial but still underestimated factors in attitude formation. There is little doubt that a large strand of informational effect is generated by political persuasion. Hicks et al (2014), using district-​level referendum results on CAFTA, have supported this hypothesis. Left-​leaning parties succeeded in having persuaded voters to oppose signing FTAs with the US. On the other hand, instead of political persuasions, genuine policymaking can affect attitudes towards trade. According to ‘embedded liberalism’ by Ruggie (1982), governmental policies shielding citizens from the income shocks of trade liberalisation can result in higher support for free trade. This is confirmed by empirical findings concerning positive influence of job-​training programmes and welfare policies (Hays et al, 2005). It also seems that well-​informed citizens, provided with facts about the assistance programmes, are much more inclined to hold supportive attitudes towards trade (Ehrlich and Hearn, 2014). Describing the influence of informational effect on attitudes towards free trade becomes more complicated when the worldwide web is considered. Framing and priming channels do not belong exclusively to the traditional media market any more, in a majority of countries. Briefing this framing theory (Druckman, 2001), one can say that the more complex the issue is (such as free trade), the more people tend to rely on clichés that help them to form their attitude, no matter how false the judgement behind it. Producing special clichés that easily reach social consciousness by simplifying or personalising the message is a specialism of populists, and the internet is by far the most easily accessible dissemination channel for these stereotypical attitudes. So-​ called elite cueing might work as heuristics for individuals to lower the costs of forming opinion on a specific free trade agreement (Jungherr et al, 2018). Certainly, variation in the information environment –​dispersion of framing sources, innate to the internet –​makes evaluation of partisan actors’ and interest groups’ relevance for attitudes towards free trade very difficult to counteract. 272

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EU28 and Polish attitudes towards free trade and FTAs Is it possible to quickly draw upon generalised and simplified, but still reliable, outlines of EU citizens’ attitudes towards free trade? Easily accessible Eurobarometer survey data provides us with such a general view. A majority of Europeans perceive free trade as something positive and such a positive image has been gaining more popularity recently (Table 23.1). At the same time globalisation does not appear to be perceived as a threat, more of an economic opportunity. Again, a positive image of globalisation has been steadily ‘tamed’ by respondents, although halted in 2018. Examination of country-​specific distribution levels show that even those French who are least enthusiastic about free trade are still positive about it, as more than half of French citizens keep a positive image of free trade in their minds (57%) in spring 2018. The Austrians (60%) and Greeks (62%) belong to the same doubtfully ‘negative’ group. The Polish people are the most supportive nation towards free trade (86%). Ireland (86%) and Sweden (85%) take leading positions in the ‘positive attitude’ ranking too. To complete the country-​specific picture it is worth noticing that the eurozone countries have lost slightly more in terms of their positive perception of globalisation (decrease by 3 percentage points since autumn 2017) than the non-​eurozone countries (decrease by 1 percentage point). It remains an open question whether this small perception gap between eurozone and mainly Central and Eastern European citizens can be explained by having gained favourable positions of the latter in GVCs.

Table 23.1: Distribution of the EU28 respondents’ answers to question QA10: Could you please tell me whether the term ‘Free Trade’ brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative? Year

Total ‘positive’

Total ‘negative’

2018

73%

19%

2017

71%

20%

2016

68%

22%

2015

69%

21%

2014

70%

21%

2009

77%

17%

2007

76%

16%

2006

71%

19%

2005

70%

20%

Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018.

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As Table 23.2 indicates, attitudes towards specific trade agreements should not necessarily be treated as crystallised instances of the abstract principle of free trade, but rather as a different class of attitude objects (Jungherr et al, 2018). Indeed, in 2015 and 2016 when the TTIP was for the most part still on the agenda of the negotiators, the greatest opposition towards TTIP, apart from Austrians (2015: 67% and 2016: 70% ‘against’), were Germans (51% and 59% ‘against’) and Luxembourgers (49% and 50% ‘against’), whereas Lithuanians (79% and 77% ‘for’), Romanians (78% and 77% ‘for’) and Irish (77% and 70% ‘for’) were among the biggest supporters of TTIP. That was not a perfect replica of geographical allocation of free trade attitudes in the EU. Nevertheless, Polish enthusiasm towards free trade turned out to be almost bulletproof while expressed as quite high support for TTIP (71% ‘for’ in 2015 although with a decline to only 59% in 2016). Table 23.2: The distribution of the EU28 respondents’ answers to question Q18a.4: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Globalisation is an opportunity for economic growth’ Date

Total ‘positive’

Total ‘negative’

‘Do not know’

Spring 2018

60%

27%

13%

Autumn 2017

62%

27%

11%

Spring 2017

59%

27%

14%

Autumn 2016

58%

29%

13%

Spring 2016

57%

29%

14%

Autumn 2015

56%

29%

15%

Spring 2015

57%

28%

15%

Autumn 2014

55%

30%

15%

Spring 2014

53%

31%

16%

Autumn 2013

52%

34%

14%

Spring 2013

52%

34%

14%

Autumn 2012

51%

35%

14%

Spring 2012

49%

35%

16%

Autumn 2011

47%

35%

18%

Spring 2011

50%

32%

18%

2010

56%

27%

17%

Autumn 2009

61%

26%

13%

Spring 2009

59%

27%

14%

2008

56%

27%

17%

Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018

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Is there much more about EU citizens’ attitudes towards TTIP hidden in the socio-​demographic qualities? As we can see in Table 23.3, there were not big differences between male and female response distribution patterns in 2015. Shares of EU28 and Polish men that supported TTIP vaguely overcame supporting majorities of women, which was the opposite tendency for the German ‘against’ male and female majorities. Moreover, the younger the citizens, the more open they were towards TTIP, which was a universal trend regardless of the geographical reference of the respondent. It should not be that surprising that more advanced education levels corresponded to more incisive views on TTIP if only ‘for’ views were to be considered, but it also works for German ‘against’. Both ‘for’ and ‘against’ appeared to be ‘educated guesses’, although contradictory. Analysis of the next socio-​ professional characteristics contributes very little. The most interesting observation is that self-​employed were sending extremely clear message of either their support (EU28 and Poland) or opposition (Germany) compared to other categories. Neither manual workers nor the unemployed (both categories relevant for some theoretical concepts and intuitive assumptions presented earlier) stood out in this ranking. Share of managers with a negative attitude was the highest among all other opposing professionals in the EU28 but the distribution of responses was quite uneven even in the whole socioeconomic subcategory. The Europeans were getting rather more sceptical about TTIP until early 2016, with a small increase in late 2016 and early 2017: Spring 2017 was last time when the question about TTIP was included in the Eurobarometer survey (Table 23.4), two months after the negotiations had been officially suspended.7 At the same time, negotiations of CETA –​a free trade agreement between Canada and the EU –​were ending successfully and on 21 September 2017 CETA provisionally entered into force. CETA was not as famous as TTIP and it looked like social perception was more favourable towards CETA. However, there has not been much research done on attitudes towards CETA’s social perception to verify this, and no research concerning broader Polish public internet opinion. Therefore, we conducted content analysis of seven Polish web portals to describe Polish netizens’ attitudes towards CETA (Działo et al, 2017a, 2017b). We collected 91,486 documents in the Polish language only, without time restrictions. We used one keyword: CETA, which has made our period of analysis defined –​from January 2016 to February 2017 (release dates of all available documents in which CETA has occurred at least once). We have created Polish language dictionaries consisting of ‘expert knowledge’ (consisting of the FTA related expert words) and ‘common knowledge’ (consisting of the FTA related popular words) to examine the content.8 275

The Limits of EUrope

Table 23.3: Socio-​demographic characteristics of the EU28, German and Polish respondents answering question Q18.5: Please tell me whether you are for or against the statement: ‘A free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the USA’ EU28

Germany

Poland

For

Against For

Against For

Against

56%

28%

31%

51%

71%

14%

Male

60%

29%

36%

50%

74%

14%

Female

53%

27%

26%

51%

70%

13%

15–​24

62%

26%

34%

49%

75%

13%

25–​39

60%

26%

31%

50%

75%

13%

40–​54

58%

29%

35%

50%

71%

14%

55+​

51%

29%

27%

53%

68%

13%