The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe (Trends in European IR Theory) 3030526429, 9783030526429

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TRENDS IN EUROPEAN IR THEORY SERIES EDITORS: KNUD ERIK JØRGENSEN · AUDREY ALEJANDRO ALEXANDER REICHWEIN · FELIX RÖSCH · HELEN TURTON

The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe Edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen

Trends in European IR Theory Series Editors Knud Erik Jørgensen Aarhus University Aarhus, Denmark Audrey Alejandro London School of Economics and Political Science London, UK Alexander Reichwein Justus-Liebig-University Giessen Giessen, Germany Felix Rösch Coventry University Coventry, UK Helen Turton University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK

A series of nine select Palgrave Pivots that together will provide concise accounts of IR theoretical traditions in Europe and the historical and theoretical roots that European IR currently is missing. The series will provide a theoretical backbone for the IR discipline and define and strengthen the identity of European IR theory. Each Pivot in the series will constitute and reconstruct IR theoretical traditions in Europe (Liberalism, Realism, English School, International Political Economy, International Political Theory, Feminism, and the post-positivist tradition including constructivism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and critical theory), and a concluding volume will look back and summarise the advances (and missed opportunities) of the discipline in the 20th century, all following an initial framework volume setting the scene and providing the rationale. As a theoretical tradition is nothing without theorists to produce, reproduce and transform it, the individual volumes will necessarily focus on the contributions of individual theorists, a feature that will provide the series with a unique edge, and covering the main characteristics of each tradition that is sorely missing. But more than just providing roots, the series will have a critical integrative function. In order to achieve this aim, the projects will take a transnational perspective, going beyond the sociology of knowledge studies that so far have been predominantly national in its orientation. Each Pivot will be kept as close as possible to a common length and shared structure; the volumes will be developed individually yet with a very clear common thread and thus appear as an exclusive collection. Individual volumes will have a largely identical structure which the editorial committee will define and enforce. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15636

Knud Erik Jørgensen Editor

The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe

Editor Knud Erik Jørgensen Department of Political Science Aarhus University Aarhus, Denmark

Trends in European IR Theory ISBN 978-3-030-52642-9    ISBN 978-3-030-52643-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Détail de la Tour Eiffel © nemesis2207/Fotolia.co.uk This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions, published in 2017, argued that the IR community in Europe needs to improve its knowledge about the origins and historical development of the scientific discipline of International Relations, including its theoretical dimensions. In order to function as a framework volume for other contributions to the book series Trends in European IR Theory, the authors explicated and reconsidered key terms such as discipline, tradition, hegemony and diversity. The present volume focuses on the liberal theory tradition in Europe, that is, focuses on one of the main if not the main branch of the IR theory tree. It covers an unusually long period, specifically the 100  years after 1919, thus contributing to the IR centenary debate, arguing that the discipline took off with strong liberal characteristics. When we launched the project of which this book is the outcome, we noticed with astonishment that the liberal theory tradition, while often critiqued, has only occasionally received the attention a main theoretical tradition deserves. Moreover, a pronounced selection bias seems to play an important role, resulting in only scarce attention to liberal theorists on the European continent. IR scholars seem to reproduce patterns known from research on liberalism rather than delve into this rich history themselves. In this context, it is telling that the publication of In Search of European Liberalisms. Concepts, Languages, Ideologies (Freeden et al. 2019) came more than 90 years after the publication of Guido de Ruggiero’s The History of European Liberalism (1927). The two books do not focus on IR liberal theory but they have the comprehensive European scope that also, despite its brevity, v

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characterizes the present volume. We hope the book will inspire scholars to further explore how theorists of a liberal orientation in multiple European settings have theorized global affairs and how their theories have distinct cultural, temporal and spatial characteristics. Bringing this book together has been no small task. I am most grateful for the trust the book series editors showed me after receiving the book proposal. Their individual publications during the last few years have been great sources of inspiration. Moreover, I very much appreciate the exquisite patience the contributors demonstrated during the lengthy preparation process it turned out to be. Finally, I offer my thanks to Sarah Roughley at Palgrave for her professional interest in the project right from the beginning and during all its phases as well as for her timely deadline reminders. Aarhus, Denmark February 2021

Knud Erik Jørgensen

Contents

1 Introduction: The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Context  1 Knud Erik Jørgensen 2 Liberal IR Theorizing During the Early Twentieth Century: 1900–1939 31 Lacin Idil Öztığ 3 Liberalism and Domestic Politics Approaches in IR 45 Aukje van Loon 4 Republicanism and Liberal International Theory 59 Kevin Blachford 5 Liberal European Peace Theories and Their Critics 73 Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon 6 Liberal Security Theories 91 Kamil Zwolski

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7 When Liberalism Meets the English School105 F. Asli Ergul Jorgensen 8 Classical Liberalism and IR Theory119 Edwin van de Haar 9 Conclusion and Perspectives133 Knud Erik Jørgensen Index139

Notes on Contributors

Kevin  Blachford  is a lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College and the Estonian School of Diplomacy. He completed his PhD in 2017 and his thesis was entitled ‘A Republican Approach to International Relations: Imperial Republics and the Balance of Power’. His research interests include the history of international political thought, security studies and foreign policy analysis. Lothar Brock  is Senior Professor of Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt and Senior Fellow of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. His work presently focuses on the role of international law in international relations and the theory and practice of cooperation in conflict. He has published extensively on the politics of international cooperation between North and South, on the relationship between environmental degradation and conflict and on peace theory. His English book publications include Civilizing World Politics. Society and Community Beyond the State, Rowman and Littlefield 2000 (co-editor with Mathias Albert und Klaus-Dieter Wolf), Democratic Wars. Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace, Palgrave 2006 (co-editor with Anna Geis and Harald Müller), Fragile States. Violence and the Failure of Intervention, Polity 2012 (co-author with Georg Sørensen, Michael Stohl and Hans Hendrik Holm), The Justification of War and International Order, Oxford University Press, forthcoming (co-editor with Hendrik Simon). F.  Asli  Ergul  Jorgensen is an assistant professor at Ege University, Turkey. She teaches International Relations theory, the Middle East and identity. She was a visiting researcher at Aarhus University, Denmark; at ix

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IBEI, Spain; at the University of Sussex, the UK. She has several publications in edited volumes and peer-reviewed journals, including Middle Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Global Affairs. She is involved in the COST ENTER Network as a working group leader for “New Realities”. Currently she is preparing an article on English School perspectives on the African Union. Knud  Erik  Jørgensen  is a professor at Aarhus University. He teaches International Relations theory and European foreign policy. He is a member of the advisory board of IBEI, Barcelona, and co-editor of the Palgrave Studies in International Relations, the European Union in International Affairs and Global Affairs. Publications include The Sage Handbook on European Foreign Policy (co-ed 2015); International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (Palgrave 2017); co-edited with Oriol Costa, The Influence of International Institutions on the European Union: When Multilateralism hits Brussels (Palgrave 2012); co-edited with Katie Laatikainen, Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power (Routledge 2013). Articles have appeared in the European Journal of International Relations, Journal of European Integration, Journal of European Public Policy, Cooperation and Conflict. He is involved in the COST ENTER Network, the EUNPD Network and EURDIPLO, a research project on the EEAS.  Currently he is preparing What Is International Relations? Lacin Idil Öztığ  is an associate professor at Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul. She teaches Middle East politics and international organizations. She does research on secularism, Middle East politics, democratization, human rights, and populism. Her work has appeared in various journals including Third World Quarterly, Middle East Policy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Journal of Borderlands Studies. She has been the editor of Alternatives: Global, Local, Political since 2016. She has a forthcoming article in Government and Opposition. Hendrik  Simon  is a research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and a lecturer at Goethe University Frankfurt. His interdisciplinary research covers international political and legal history and theory, with a particular focus on the justification and critique of war in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century. Publications include ‘The Myth of Liberum Ius ad Bellum. Justifying War in 19th-Century Legal Theory and Political Practice’ (European Journal of International

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Law, 1/2018); co-edited with Lothar Brock, The Justification of War and International Order. From Past to Present (forthcoming with Oxford University Press). Hendrik was Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Advanced International Theory/University of Sussex (2017), at the University of Vienna (2016 and 2018), at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Frankfurt (2015–16) and at the Cluster of Excellence ‘Normative Orders’ (2010–12). Currently, he is preparing a book on The Myth of Liberum Ius ad Bellum. Edwin  van de Haar  is an independent scholar who specializes in the liberal tradition in international political theory. He has been a lecturer at Brown University, Leiden University and Ateneo de Manila University. Van de Haar is the author of Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory. Hume, Smith, Mises and Hayek (2009), Beloved yet Unknown. The Political Philosophy of Liberalism (2011, in Dutch) and Degrees of Freedom. Liberal Political Philosophy and Ideology (2015). He contributed to The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith (2013) and his articles on liberal ideas and liberal thinkers appeared among others in the Review of International Studies, International Relations and International Politics. Aukje  van Loon is Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Chair of International Politics, Ruhr University Bochum (RUB), Germany; Dr. rer. soc. (political science, RUB); MA European Culture and Economy (RUB); BA Communication and Modern Languages (Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen). Her research/teaching concentrates on global and European economic and financial governance, with specific foci on EU trade policy and EMU reform. She is the author of Domestic Politics in European Trade Policy: Ideas, Interests and Variation in Governmental Trade Positions (Routledge, forthcoming); co-editor of Global Power Europe Vol. 1–2 (Springer, 2013). Book chapters are published in The Future of Global Governance (2020); The European Union and the BRICS (2015); Global Power Europe  – Vol. 1 (2013). Articles appear in Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (forthcoming); Politics and Governance (2020); Journal of Contemporary European Studies (2018); European Politics and Society (2018). She is Global Young Faculty VI member (2019–2021, Mercator) and was visiting scholar at ACTORE (University of Antwerp, 2019).

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Kamil Zwolski  is Associate Professor in International Politics, University of Southampton, and Jean Monnet Chair of European Security Governance. He is also a senior fellow of the Higher Education Academy. Dr. Zwolski’s latest book, European Security in Integration Theory (2018), shows how international integration theories developed after World War I (federalism and functionalism) should be revisited today, particularly in the context of the troubled European-Russian relations and the conflict in Ukraine. Dr. Zwolski also regularly publishes in peer-reviewed journals. For example, he published on David Mitrany and contemporary European security order (JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies); power relations in the so-called communities of practice in international relations (Journal of European Integration); or how the study of the sociology of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behaviour in international relations can help to explain the EU’s international security policy (JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies).

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Context Knud Erik Jørgensen

Abstract  The chapter outlines the rationale of the book and contextualizes the liberal theoretical tradition within the discipline of International Relations as well as in relation to broader currents of political thought, with a view to building bridges between disciplinary, theoretical and intellectual history. Moreover, the chapter introduces the agenda for the volume, provides a conceptual framework and an overview of the origins and trajectories through the twentieth century, including the various ways in which the liberal tradition branches out in distinct currents of thinking. Despite the tradition being a major, perhaps the main International Relations (IR) tradition, a comprehensive presentation of the tradition hardly exists and this general feature is in Europe amplified by the priority given, in the existing literature, to national settings.

K. E. Jørgensen (*) Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_1

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Keywords  Liberalism • Liberal • Theory • International • Discipline • Europe The recession of the liberal democratic tide in the last decade has given a new urgency to the study of the history of political thought. For those at least who value the basic elements of the liberal and democratic philosophies, it is more important now than at any time during the last hundred years to investigate the conditions for their effective maintenance. (Macpherson 1941: 564)

Welcome to the museum of modern International Relations (IR) theorizing. Today’s guided tour will focus on the wing the museum devotes to liberal IR theorizing, specifically theorizing in Europe during the twentieth century. It is an important contribution, especially because it makes it possible to connect what is often kept separate: the liberal, the international and the theoretical. Concerning liberalism, the nineteenth century, often called ‘the liberal century’, continued into the twentieth century, and both liberal thought and practice had a deep impact on international affairs, although it is also true that political and ideological liberalism declined significantly during the interwar years. Paradoxically, liberal international theory emerged during the time political liberalism declined. Moreover, during the late liberal nineteenth century, ‘the international’ emerged as an ever more important problematique, concerning both intra-­ imperial relations in Europe—that is, nation-state-empire relations—and colonial relations beyond Europe. Likewise, the industrial revolution boosted a new level of interaction among states and societies in terms of trade and communication, not to neglect international migration. Finally, we should not forget that the founders of the once new academic discipline, International Relations, created it in a liberal ‘advocacy’ image, for which reason the discipline was one of the main interfaces between academic reflections and political practices. Some might be reluctant to enter the museum, believing it will celebrate the past, thus forgetting the dark sides, or downplay the glorious present or ignore desirable or possible futures. Nothing could be more wrong. The museum you are about to enter is inspired by Hans Magnus Enzenberger’s Museum der Modernen Poesie (1960) and will thus not cherish the custodian but the kind of curator who organizes exhibitions in a fashion that is intended to be relevant for contemporary visitors. The

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museum is not just a collection of oeuvres and historical artefacts but an invitation to engage in a reflexive process through which contemporary theorists can study and possibly learn from past experiences. Others might be reluctant to enter because the liberal wing of the museum is bound to challenge numerous intellectual path dependencies and other kinds of inertia, thus intervening in well-established comfort zones and scholarly orthodoxies. In this case, warnings are in order not least because a project on the liberal IR theory tradition in Europe is bound to challenge a string of well-established wisdoms. The book focuses on one of if not the main theoretical tradition within the discipline of International Relations. It is thus difficult to overestimate its significance (Griffiths 2011). Indeed, in some fields of study, liberal theorists enjoy full yet largely unacknowledged hegemony (but see Mearsheimer et al. 2005). Given this prominent status, it is almost obligatory for students of International Relations to know its trajectories whether they subscribe to it or feel at home in other traditions. The rationale of the book is also explained by the dispersed yet concerted development of liberal theory in Europe, dispersed in the sense that most branches co-exist, yet in a mode characterized by a strange mutual neglect and concerted in the sense that liberal theorists actually share important features, not least compared to competing theoretical traditions. The book is designed to connect the dispersed and to acknowledge the existence of shared features. Finally, the timing of the book is perfect. Similar to other volumes in the Trends in European IR Theory Series, the book mainly focuses on the twentieth century and, thus, on the ups and downs of a long tradition. In disciplinary terms, 2019 marked the symbolic centenary of the discipline of International Relations, originally created in a liberal image. Moreover, both liberal theory and political practice are currently under attack at close range, indeed the last 20 years are characterized by an avalanche of critique of both liberal theory and ideology (Mearsheimer 1994; Richardson 2001; Jahn 2009, 2013; Reus-Smit 2001; Long 1995; Friedman et al. 2013). Considering the significance of the tradition and all the critiques of the liberal theory tradition, soon a century-long constant, one would intuitively think that preparing this book would be a straightforward and often repeated exercise. Would not the target of critique be well known? Would there not be numerous museums with “shows of force” (Luke 1992) to tap into, align with or put distance to? Not so. Decades ago, Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew pointed to a surprising fact: “a systematic

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presentation of liberal international theory is not offered in any wellknown texts” (1995: 107; see also Jahn 2013; Sylvest 2009; Friedman et al. 2013). Hence, the book will not be one among numerous reappraisals of the theoretical tradition but it will be an appraisal. The following section explains the settings for the volume and explicates key choices. It contextualizes the liberal theoretical tradition within the discipline of International Relations as well as in relation to broader currents of liberal thought, thus building bridges between disciplinary, theoretical and intellectual history. The second part outlines a brief overview of the general trajectories of liberal theorizing during the twentieth century, divided into three phases.

Settings A study of the liberal international theory tradition in Europe during the twentieth century is bound to thoroughly explicate the key terms, specify its temporal and spatial scope, as well as critically examine the relevant scholarly echo chambers. It is a tall agenda, not least because the key terms all belong to the category of essentially contested concepts, the scope is controversial and echo chambers tend to be slightly provocative. Figure 1.1 shows the three main focal points of our research agenda and suggests three main connecting axes: liberalism-international theory, liberal theory and international theory. However, connections among specialized scholarly communities could be stronger. A few examples suffice Fig. 1.1  The three main focal points. (Source: Author) LIBERAL(ISM)

INTERNATIONAL

THEORY

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to indicate the problem. In John Gray’s work on liberalism (1993, 1995, 2010), liberal international theory is hardly mentioned. In most overviews of liberal international theory (Zacher and Matthews 1995; Moravcsik 1997, 2001; Panke and Risse forthcoming), liberal thought is reduced to a hardly detectable background variable. In studies of liberalism as ideology (Richardson 1997, 2001; Sylvest 2009; Jackson and Stears 2012), the theoretical dimension plays at best a minor role in footnotes. The three narratives of liberal thinking seemingly run in parallel on completely distinct tracks, whereas in reality they tend in various ways to be closely connected. Liberal(ism)  In an imagined nomination for most contested concept, the terms liberal and liberalism would be strong candidates. It is therefore not surprising that the scholarly production constitutes a frightening mountain of literature in which scholars seek answers to basic questions such as “what is liberalism?” (Bell 2014), “who is a liberal?” (Voegelin et al. 1974) and “how do political thinkers understand liberal and liberalism?” (Freeden et al. 2019). Duncan Bell provides a most helpful overview and critically examines the main approaches to the study of traditions of thought, outlining their main characteristics and deficiencies. He offers a framework for analysis called a summative contextualist approach, indicating that he draws on the famous Cambridge School and its contextualizing take on interpretation. Bell ends up defining the liberal tradition as “constituted by the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognized as such by other self-proclaimed liberals” (Bell 2014: 689–690). Bell’s definition might be broad but it is very suitable for the purposes of this book. He points out how the definition forces us to examine traditions “as evolving and contested historical phenomena, conjured into existence by the work of many hands, shaped by scholarly knowledge-production and pedagogical regimes and often inaugurated and remade with specific politico-intellectual purposes in mind” (Bell 2014: 690). Bell’s approach resembles Eric Voegelin et al.’s (1974) exposé of the liberal tradition, in which he emphasizes the changing perceptions if not foundational transformations of what counts as liberal. International  In the context of this book, the term ‘international’ serves a dual function. First, it designates international as something distinct from domestic. Hence, the focus is not on thinking about domestic affairs. When domestic does play a role, it is in the context of the domestic-­

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international nexus, cf. the examples of republican liberal IR theory and liberal intergovernmental theory. The focus is also not political theory but international political thought, international political theory and international IR theory. The latter term points to the second delineating function, the disciplinary part of the equation. It implies that the book will focus on the trajectories of liberal theorizing within the discipline of International Relations. However, this solution has its limits as a focus on theory building strictly within disciplinary boundaries would be too narrow, especially given that the discipline was emerging during the early twentieth century. The application of not too strict disciplinary criteria enables an understanding of the processes through which liberal theorizing about international affairs increasingly crystalized and got its own life and its own identity in the discipline’s pedigree, how certain forms of theorizing gained ground and other forms were either abandoned or reduced to minor currents within the liberal IR theory tradition. Theory  The simple explication of IR theory is to define it as theory developed within the discipline of IR. The solution is simple because it leaves us with only two unknowns: theory and discipline. However, if the devil is in the detail, he is also in these two unknowns. The concept of theory triggers a dilemma. If we define theory too broadly, it becomes a meaningless catch-all phrase, and we will find it everywhere, cf. traditional critiques (Singer 1960; Aron 1967). If we understand it in a narrow fashion, it is unlikely we will find much liberal theory, or we will find only what some call ‘bloodless’ varieties (Long 1995). Hedley Bull represents an example of the former option, “By the theory of international politics we may understand the body of general propositions that may be advanced about political relations between states, or more generally about world politics” (Bull 1972: xx). While ‘body of general propositions’ would work, the exclusive focus on interstate relations and politics would be too narrow for our purposes. By contrast, Duncan Bell’s definition of the liberal tradition can be adapted to the subfield of liberal IR theories; the liberal IR theory tradition is constituted by the sum of the arguments about international relations that have been classified as liberal and recognized as such by other self-proclaimed liberals. A similar approach is proposed by Michael Freeden and Javier Fernández-Sebastián, who do not want to explore what ­liberalism is but instead ask two questions: (i) what did they mean by lib-

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eral or liberalism?1; (ii) “which diverse conceptual collocations and cognates have imparted and fine-tuned the competing and coalescing meanings liberalism has exhibited throughout its history” (Freeden et al. 2019: 2). In terms of the relationship between theory and practice, liberal theorists are keen on informing and reforming political practice. Though such a relationship is hardly unique for liberal theorists, it is a perhaps somewhat more pronounced feature, producing intriguing examples of theory morphing into practice. Hans Morgenthau wonders why theoretical concern with International Relations was late in emerging and speculates that one of the reasons “lies in the reformist orientation that characterized theoretical thinking on foreign policy in the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century” (1962: xx). He concludes, “it was intellectually and morally impossible to deal in a theoretical, that is, an objective, systematic manner, with problems of international relations” (1962: xx). Context  IR theorists do not theorize in a vacuum but at distinct times and spaces as well as in distinct political-institutional cultures (Jørgensen and Knudsen 2006). Their theorizing reflects a perspective from somewhere, and this somewhere is embedded in a given space and time but might transcend both dimensions, cf. the European origins of liberal and realist theory in the United States (Rösch 2014). Their theorizing also tends to reflect but seldom influence broader intellectual and political-­ ideological currents (Buzan and Little 2001). With these general characteristics, it is time to examine the liberal international nexus in more detail. At some point between the publication of Guido de Ruggiero’s The History of European Liberalism (1925/1927) and Michael Freeden et al.’s In Search of European Liberalisms (2019), the world was made to believe that liberalism essentially is an Anglo-American affair. In the world of studies of international political thought, Europe ceased to exist as an analytical category and became divided, not by an iron curtain but by a politico-analytical curtain, specifically a distinction between Continental European and Anglo-American political thought as well as between the 1  They specify that “they” (in the citation) “refers to a collective of transgenerational historical agents who lived in different European countries between the beginning of the nineteenth and the end of the twentieth century” (Freeden et al. 2019: 2).

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liberal West and the totalitarian or developing rest. The Anglo-American construction was made the beacon of liberal thought, with Continental Europe sliding into the intellectual backwaters of the field, a world where little of interest seemingly happened. In the West, the Anglo-American hegemony was celebrated, and scholars in Continental Europe tended to consent and thereby reproduce the hegemony. Through a process of collective amnesia, liberalism in Europe was turned into a ‘terra incognita’ and in the field of international thought, Europe became a lost world (cf. Rosenblatt 2018). The disappearance of Europe and the emergence of the Anglo-American world was strongly reflected in the historical depictions of IR theory. Disciplinary historians exorcise the European peace movement and theory from disciplinary pre-history. The conceptualizing activities of the International Studies Conference (ISC) are not acknowledged and its participants largely forgotten. Paradoxically, the cultivators of the Anglo-­ American outlook on global affairs were predominantly émigré Europeans (see Rösch 2014) and, finally, with the institutional killing of the ISC (Long 2006), the discipline of International Relations no longer had its own (quasi-) association but was subsumed within political science. Voegelin warns that a “narrowing of the subject to national societies – German, French, English, or American  – is hardly justifiable. For the regional phases of liberalism are only parts of a common Western movement; and furthermore, this movement can only with difficulty be isolated from other movements that run parallel with it in time” (Voegelin et al. 1974). The present book’s focus on Europe is thus a compromise between national and common Western perspectives, a compromise characterized by advantages and limitations. The temporal scope is no less intricate than the spatial. Periodization is not a neutral analytical tool but has distinct purposes and serves distinct functions. Holsti (1985) constructs a 300 years’ consensus conception of international theory and then engages in a decline narrative, arguing that by the 1970s the discipline and its theoretical hegemony began to break down. Some argue that the discipline and the first experiments in theorizing began during the 1950s, thus pushing the first four decades of conceptualization into precursors. Kenneth Waltz (1990) argues that it is only with his launch of neorealism that realism turned theoretical. In short, periodization always has a purpose. The purpose of the century scope of the present volume is to enable our appraisal of liberal theorizing within

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the discipline of International Relations, including an adequate amount of contextualization. At the general level, Edwin van de Haar (2009) explores links between Hume, Smith, von Mises, Hayek and International Relations theory and wonders why liberal international theory developed in what he calls “such a biased fashion”. However, the entire field seems to be characterized by a plethora of biases. In their account of the historical development of liberal international theory, Zacher and Matthew (1995) do not make much of theorizing during the first four decades of the twentieth century. They appoint a trio—Hobson, Angell and Wilson—as the most notable thinkers but also have comments on Muir, Zimmern, Delaisi and Mitrany. Their account is a highly conventional representation of early twentieth-century international liberalism and can be found in most English-language publications. By contrast, Kal Holsti recognizes, though unapprovingly, the impact of these thinkers, “The liberal view of international politics and relations had a pervasive effect on the academic study of the field throughout the first four decades of this century” (Holsti 1985: 29). If we look at the first wave of retrospective appraisals, it is clear that they were very critical if not caustic. The liberal thinkers were called “utopian idealists” and their science was claimed to be in “its infancy” (Carr 1939); they represented an “argument from desperation” (Wight 1968: 27); they were “preachers” and unable to theorize (Morgenthau 1962). The second wave of appraisals was explicitly revisionist, and the appraisers drew very different conclusions (Long and Wilson 1995; Ashworth 1999). Jaap de Wilde insists that “it is a myth to think that half a century of serious research by concerned, well-trained intellectuals has yielded merely rubbish” (de Wilde 1991: 4). Combined, these studies represent a thorough reconsideration of early twentieth-century liberal thinking. Yet, what is of interest in the present context of scope is that the two waves of appraisals share a focus exclusively on Anglo-American thinkers and thus contribute to only one aspect—the British—of liberal international theorizing in Europe. Ashworth is explicit about the focus on the Anglo-American subject of IR and thereby represents an exception to the dominant trend. In order to fully understand the European contribution, it is useful to draw on three sets of literature and triangulate them to build a synthesized framework.

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The first literature consists of the scope of and approach in studies by Freeden et al. (2019), Voegelin et al. (1974), Ruggiero and Collingwood (1928).2 In other words, Europe means Europe, even if Germany, France, Italy and England get more attention than the rest of Europe. Moreover, it is significant that Freeden et al. insist on a plurality of liberalisms. They all focus on the trajectories of liberalism, and this is where the second set of literature becomes relevant, because the topic of this chapter is not liberalism but liberal international theory (de Wilde 1991; Long and Wilson 1995; Ashworth 1999). This literature focuses on liberal international theorizing during the early twentieth century yet tends to focus on individual thinkers. The third literature applies a transnational perspective, a relatively recent turn in the field of international history, and is represented by, for instance, Daniel Laqua’s Internationalism Reconfigured. Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars (2011a, b). With this triangulation of analytical perspectives, it is possible to sketch a comprehensive account of liberal international theorizing in Europe during the early twentieth century. In summary, the scope is liberalisms in Europe with a focus on reflections about international affairs in a transnational perspective.

Origins and Beginnings The beginnings of liberal international theorizing in the early twentieth century were in important ways also continuities of the nineteenth-­century liberalism, and this duality should obviously be kept in mind in appraisals of twentieth-century developments. During the late nineteenth century, the political ideology of liberalism played a significant role throughout Europe, an unevenly distributed role to be sure. The outcomes of the 1848 revolutions were different; the fabric of European empires as well as the triangular relationship between conservatism, liberalism and socialism found different expressions in different geographies. Also, liberal thinking about international affairs developed differently across Europe, and the modest ambition of the present chapter is to offer a sketch of the highly complex nexus between intellectual history and international theory. It was intellectuals in political (liberal) and social (peace) movements as well as scholars at universities (in departments such as law, history, sociology, philosophy and economics) who produced the reflections and  Collingwood (1946) also focuses on Europe, and the book might be one of the last before the exclusive Anglo-American scope became hegemonic. 2

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ideas that at the time counted as theories of International Relations (Russell 1936).3 However, with WW1, both political liberalism and the peace movement went into dramatic decline and never regained their role as social frameworks for liberal international theorizing. In a sense, the League of Nations took on that role, and, in the academic world, a new scientific discipline emerged. Scholars looked at the new discipline with both great hope and, loyal to conservatism within academia, deep scepticism if not contempt. When Max Horkheimer (1937) made his famous distinction between critical and traditional theory, he could not have had liberal international theory in mind. Not because it does not easily fall into either of the categories, but because there was no such theory. During the interwar years, it was not common to explicitly employ the term theory. It was before the turn to theory, that is, before it became both fashionable and standard academic practice to build theories of International Relations. The era’s liberal thinkers were practical scholars who focused on practical problems. This does not imply that they did not have scientific aspirations. Several publications indicate that they did have aspirations for a scientific study of International Relations,4 but they were reluctant to employ the term theory, unable to define the discipline and spell out what it takes to be scientific.5 This inability is to some extent caused by the field being at the time predominantly interdisciplinary. If theorizing was absent, conceptualization was very much present. The main substantive themes on international affairs included war, peace, imperialism, democracy, international organization and commerce. Throughout this period, endeavours to identify the causes of war and the conditions for peace were among the top priorities. Frederik Bajer, an influential peace activist, imagined a “peace science”. While reflections on  On the pre-1914 peace movements, see Sandi Cooper (1991).  Jäckh, Politik als Wissenschaft (1931); Zimmern, The Study of International Relations (1931); Russell (1936); EH Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (1939). 5  The human sciences comprised many of the most basic tools, including positivism (Comte), objectivity in the social sciences (Weber), human sciences (Dilthey), historicism (Ranke, Meinecke), philosophy, ideal types (Weber), evolution theory. Classical sociology was much more devoted to international issues than assumed in common wisdom (see Pendenza 2014). This new understanding of classical sociology has important ramifications for our understanding of Pareto, Tönnies, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel (see Pendenza 2014; Inglis 2009; Cotesta 2017). 3 4

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war have a long historical pedigree, Jan Bloch’s six-volume study War of the Future and Its Economic Consequences (1897) was a game changer, not least in terms of conceptualizations, propositions and predictive qualities.6 Bloch’s book inspired Norman Angell’s equally influential The Great Illusion (Eisenbeiss 1990). After WW1, reasoning about the causes of war and the conditions for peace took on a new dimension because in retrospective studies of WW1 analysts could explore which factors caused the war and would the Treaty of Versailles provide the conditions for peace. Answers differed and caused a major split within liberal thinking. In conventional accounts, the role of power is outside the scope of liberal international thinking, according to EH Carr because “their intelligence was seduced by the League” (see Wight 1968: 121). However, it was only certain segments of liberal thinkers who did not recognize the role of power in international affairs. For other thinkers, power played an important role, not least among German and French liberals (e.g. Max Weber, Ernst Jäckh, Albrecht Mendelsohn-Bartholdy and Raymond Aron). This current of power thinking is a precursor to the Cold War liberals. In the early twentieth-century study of International Relations, a key theme concerned the dialectics between nationalism and internationalism (Stöckmann 2017). It is also in this context that concepts such as international mind and international solidarity should be seen. The former was a recurrent theme on the interwar agenda, and Russell even wrote about a realistic theory of international solidarity (Russell 1936: 3). Closely connected to the theme on nationalism-internationalism, we find studies of imperialism either at a general level (Hobson 1902) or focused on national variants, including Austria-Hungary (Masaryk, Bauer). While German liberal theory has not attracted much attention, some focus on German liberal imperialism in the late nineteenth century (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2008), that is, an aspect of European politics that German liberalism shares with liberal imperialists elsewhere.7 It would be worthwhile to explore linkages between liberal and imperial thinking, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter (cf. Long and Schmidt 2005; Hobson 2012).

6  Another major liberal thinker on war and peace was Jacques Novicow, a Russian who mainly published in French. 7  Hobson (2012) makes an attempt but focuses despite referring to the discipline on all sorts of reflections that can be found under a liberal umbrella.

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By 1919, sufficient time had elapsed to make sense of a History of Internationalism (Lange and Schou 1919). At the same time, the theme of international organization gained attention, cf. Jacob ter Meulen’s three volumes Der Gedanke des Internationalen Organization in seiner Entwicklung (ter Meulen 1917, 1929, 1940). By the 1930s, the first retrospective studies appeared: Florence Stawell published The Growth of International Thought (1929), and Frank Russell published Theories of International Relations (1936). However, advances in liberal thinking were not matched by political liberalism. The fascist regimes that increasingly ruled Europe during the 1920s and 1930s were not exactly promoting liberal activities, including IR theorizing with liberal characteristics, at universities and think tanks. Most liberal-oriented thinkers moved from or were forced to flee the European continent and settled in the United Kingdom or the United States.8 Despite all sorts of differences, they engaged in reflecting on the politics and economics of the continent they in many cases were forced to leave behind.

Liberal Theory During Years of Cold War and Decolonization If WW1 prompted liberal thinkers to launch all the initiatives described in the section above, then what did WW2 prompt them to do? What was the impact of WW2, the Cold War and processes of decolonization? After WW2, the liberal thinkers of the interwar years found themselves in a markedly new environment though it took some time to specify the profound change. While some had been killed, others decided to work outside Europe (e.g. Zimmern, Jäckh, Deutsch). In general, they picked up where they were interrupted by the war. The ISC crowd did their best to re-establish their international network and get on with their grandiose project (Riemens 2011; Long 2006; Pemberton 2020; Stöckmann 2017) and continued to work on having the IR discipline recognized. However, the constraints were considerable. Neither the communist regimes in East Central Europe nor the authoritarian regimes in, for example, Portugal, Spain and Turkey had any interest in accepting a liberal research agenda 8  Whereas the United Kingdom benefitted from Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich Hayek, Hersch Lauterpacht, Karl Mannheim, Karl Popper, Albrecht Mendelsohn-Bartholdy and David Mitrany, the United States became the base for, for example, Karl Deutsch, Ernst Jäckh, Zimmern, von Mises and Ernst Haas.

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within their borders. In the world of academic political thought, contestation of liberal thinking was mounting, and an avalanche of critique of reason and ‘scientific man’ was about to gain speed. If Scheler (1926), Marcuse (1934) and EH Carr (1939) had been early warnings, Morgenthau (1946), Oakeshott (1947) and Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) made the ‘perfect storm’ that pushed liberal thinkers into a defensive position. The increased professionalization of the study of International Relations also challenged ‘the good and the great’ liberals who during the interwar years had benefited from bridging the scholar-practitioner divide. The centre of theorizing gravity moved from Europe to the United States. Finally, it is significant that Europe in terms of foundation funding was less prioritized. Liberal theorizing was done within the context of a changing configuration of main IR theoretical trends. A divide emerged between “traditionalists” and “behaviouralists” about building a “theory of international politics” (Bull 1966; Holsti 1971).9 The Rockefeller Foundation sponsored several important initiatives, yet none on advancing liberal theorizing. Funding outcomes included one volume edited by Fox (1959), one edited book by Butterfield et al. (1966) and one special issue of RFSP on political theory edited by Raymond Aron, including one article on IR theory (Hoffmann 1961). However, one should not forget the so-called Cold War liberals—Aron, Popper and Berlin—yet often presented as being more public intellectuals than theorizing scholars (Müller 2008; Nardin 2015). During the 1950s and 1960s, there were not that many IR scholars and even fewer IR theorists in Europe. If we focus on not the general trends but on trends within the world of liberal theorizing, it is possible to identify five main characteristics.10 First, to kick-start the British Committee on International Theory, Martin Wight came up with the famous question, Why is there no international theory? By implication, his general question also applies to the more specific issue, Why is there no liberal international theory? If anyone, Martin Wight should know because he taught the topic at the LSE throughout 9  Although he was not part of any of the camps, Waltz’ Theory of International Politics (1979) can be seen as a latecomer to the endeavour. 10  A collective amnesia about the 1950s and part of the 1960s kicked in at a later stage and characterized numerous meta-studies. For instance, Czempiel (1965) describes the early stages of the discipline, but when it comes to the first decades after WW2, he is silent about European contributions.

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the 1950s (cf. The Three Traditions, which introduces no less than ten theories [Wight 1991]). During the war, David Mitrany had published A Working Peace System (1943) and The Road to Security (1944), the former probably as rationalist and social engineering as it gets. Mitrany’s functionalism and subsequently Haas’ neofunctionalism gained traction and became major theoretical enterprises, the latter with a significant reception in Europe (Sæter 1998; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). It was predominantly theorists of a liberal orientation who found European integration to be of significance and worthwhile theorizing. Thus, the 1960s marked a rupture not least due to the arrival of integration theory (Kaiser 1967), transnational theory (Kaiser 1969; Burton 1972), peace theory and conflict theory (Burton 1962, 1969; see also Dunn 2005). Karl Kaiser (1969) was persistent in conceptualizing transnational relations and, thus, contributed to launching a new research agenda in which not only states but also societal actors were worthy of analytical attention. Notably, Kaiser was active within both the German- and the English-speaking IR communities, and he engaged in comparing European and American research traditions (Kaiser 1967). Second, the conception of theory changed, and its relevance within International Relations became much more important and cherished (Wight 1968; Burton 1967; Aron 1967). IR theory became one of the vehicles that was meant to upgrade the discipline’s scientific status and create a distance to two of its origins: international law and diplomatic history (cf. Carr, the historian who did his best to reject and discredit IR as a discipline). At the same time, theory gave the expanding profession an edge vis-à-vis practitioners, for instance, writing diplomats. The new interest in theory signalled a reconfiguration of scholarly production equipping International Relations with additional scientific features. Several liberal theorists, for instance, peace theorists, jumped on this new opportunity to gain some comparative advantages, though the tendency is much less pronounced than in North America. Third, liberal IR theorizing was characterized by a pronounced disconnect to contemporary liberal philosophy, for example, philosophers such as Isaiah Berlin, Brian Barry, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls (but see Hoffmann 1989). Liberal IR scholars did not use available philosophical underpinnings for their theories for which reason they also were without linkages to the general currents of liberal thought. For instance, liberal theorizing did not make much of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment in which they blame the destruction of enlightenment on

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enlightenment, that is, on itself. Similarly, republicanism in philosophy was kept apart from republican IR theory (see Chap. 3). Fourth, it is possible to identify distinct islands of research in which theorizing is interwoven with application, for example, an island of conflict studies and, at some distance, another island on international integration, a third island on international institutions and a fourth island on the democracy and foreign relations nexus. Here and there, these research agendas are intertwined but often pursued as strictly separate research fields. Europe produced a distinct approach to conflict studies (Burton 1969; Groom 1990). Institutionally, centres for peace research emerged— Groningen, Stockholm, Oslo, Tampere, Frankfurt, Bradford—and in numbers that contributed to much peace theory and research, a predominantly European enterprise. Journals like JCMS, JCR, JPR, Cooperation and Conflict, Integration and International Organization (IO) became favoured publication outlets. If globalization was the buzzword during the 1990s and 2000s, (complex) interdependence was the liberal axiom during the 1970s. Fifth, another feature is a limited degree of explicit critical self-­reflection, that is, the kind of critical reflection that prompted Robert Keohane (1989) to conclude that he would no longer subscribe to either republican liberalism or commercial liberalism. Concerning critical self-reflection, I also have in mind something similar to the critical retrospective Bull (1972) presents in his meta-study of 50 years’ scholarship. It seems that European liberal theorists in general did not pick up meta-studies. Exceptions include Kaiser (1967) and Zimmern (1953). The profound contrast between Zimmern (1936) and (1954) does indicate an engagement in significant rethinking. At the level of theoretical school, Wight explained that the rationale of his lectures on IR theory was that the two-­ school approach simplified understandings to such a degree that simplification became dysfunctional. Hence, a third perspective had to be invented. It turned out to be an English School within the Grotian tradition, characterized by a philosophical pedigree that includes the entire family photo of liberal thinkers in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Dunn (2005) represents a third example of self-­ reflection—of 50 years’ peace research—but it is generally more celebratory than critical. In addition to the five trends, the special case of Raymond Aron calls for a section. In War and Peace (1962), Aron examined Kant’s Perpetual Peace, accepted Kant’s key claim and thereby one of the key features of

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what is now known as democratic peace theory (Kjeldahl 2000). However, this does not make Aron a full-blooded liberal theorist. As Trine Kjeldahl points out, “No commentator of Aron’s work will ever be able to remove the label of realism from his theory. This has neither been my intention. Instead I wanted to show that Aron’s theory of international relations gives an idea of what a continental, liberal, realist and idealist approach can consist of” (Kjeldahl 2000). Raymond Aron is presented as the biggest twentieth-century French liberal.11 According to George Lichtheim, “Aron, though always fair to socialists, is in the liberal tradition. His work, therefore, may be described as a critical analysis of French history since about 1750, from the standpoint of a sociologist who asks himself why the liberal tradition has not, on the whole, been as influential as the socialist one” (Lichtheim 1965).12 Similarly, Daniel DiSalvo calls Raymond nothing less than “the savior of French liberalism”, stating, “His liberalism fits into the French historical tradition more than the classical liberalism of England or the United States. For instance, Aron did not stress ideas of natural rights, which are the root of American liberal principles” (DiSalvo 2016). Gwendal Châton (2012) is very much aware of the apparent contradictions in interpretations of Aron and suggests that Aron was critical of both utopian liberalism and a Cold War realism that degenerated into simplistic ideology (Hassner 2007). Such a via media has been seen elsewhere, namely, in the English School. Perhaps we should count a Frenchman among the founders of the English School and use this new member as an opportunity to explore the boundaries between the liberal tradition and the English School (see Chap. 7)! During five decades, liberal international theory made considerable progress. However, the sustained efforts at liberal theorizing that gained speed from the mid-1960s are frequently reduced to simply being new versions of idealism; “The views I have been describing are linked only very loosely together, but they all embody a return to the idealist or progressivist interpretations of international relations of the 1920s, and may indeed be described as the neo-idealist or neo-progressivist fashion of the 1970s” (Bull 1982: 150). However, Bull seems to be plainly wrong in 11  Aron seems capable of attracting contending interpretations of his work. Some present Aron as a French realist, even a representative of neoclassical realism before the term was coined (Battistella 2012). Others ask rhetorically, “Raymond Aron: Too realistic to be a Realist?”, yet find that “the answer becomes much more complicated” (Hassner 2007). 12  George Lichtheim in New York Review of Books, 1965.

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regarding liberal theory advances as a return to a 1920s vintage idealism; indeed, his analysis seems to collapse the founding rationale of the English School.

Liberal Theory After the Cold War The beginning of the third period was a truly interesting time and a good opportunity to reconsider the weaknesses and strengths of all IR theoretical traditions. Many scholars jumped on the opportunity and produced a small avalanche of reconsiderations (Olson and Groom 1991; de Wilde 1991; Allan and Goldmann 1992; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Kegley 1995). As Ken Booth and Steve Smith wrote, “This is a confusing yet exciting and important time for those who study international relations” (Booth and Smith 1995: xi). Given that the liberal world won the Cold War, that Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) and others celebrated the victory of liberalism, that interstate wars largely disappeared (Mueller 1990) and that liberal democracy for the first time ever became the standard of civilization in Europe, one could perhaps be excused if expecting a celebratory key in the scholarly reflections on liberal international theory. However, this did not quite happen. Jaap de Wilde (1991) focused on saving the legacy of liberal interdependence thinking during the first half of the twentieth century. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) were critical of all theoretical orientations, and in International Relations Theory Today, Booth and Smith (1995) basically neglected liberal theory. In the volume edited by Allan and Goldmann (1992), Allan devoted his chapter to “the end of IR theory”. Groom and Olson’s volume is the one that most explicitly includes reflections about the state of affairs within the liberal IR tradition, including pitching the tradition as an evolving set of theories. The somewhat muted appraisal is both surprising and perhaps predictable. It is surprising because liberal theorists had made significant progress. Democratic peace theory was back in town, and neofunctionalism as well as the notion of civilian power Europe (Duchêne 1972) continued to inspire scholars pursuing research on the EU. It is predictable because the neo-neo-synthesis (Nye 1988) collapsed the distinction between realism and liberalism, at least concerning their (neo-)currents of thinking. Moreover, the early 1990s were devoted to a critique of realism and the promotion of social constructivism, the latter without acknowledging its, in terms of substance, liberal foundations. Also, the

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rationalism-­constructivism divide caused a downplaying of liberal orientations, not least because liberal theorizing tended to be based on rationalist foundations. In this context, it might well be that democratic peace theory was brought back as a prominent liberal theory, but this prominence was often undermined by an excessive cultivation of methodology that basically abandoned theoretical work. Liberal theorists were not terribly discouraged by the lukewarm reception the stock-takers had given the liberal theory tradition. Instead, they soldiered on and predominantly along six avenues. The first avenue was to engage in retrospectives, not as a narrow interest in the past but as a strategy to define future endeavours. Jaap de Wilde’s Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century (1991) offers a comprehensive appraisal of some of the most prominent interdependence theorists. De Wilde describes his approach in the following fashion: In this study, I stress in what ways the work of Angell, Muir, Delaisi, Merriam and Mitrany can contribute to the improvement of contemporary theories on International Relations. The aim is to save the good parts of their work from oblivion. The rest can be forgotten. The general tradition in reviewing contributions to science, however, seems to work the other way round: the good parts are forgotten because critics take their credit primarily from their ability to lay bare the shortcomings of the works they review. The bad parts are stressed, the rest is taken for granted. This is a very inefficient method of accumulating knowledge. (de Wilde 1991: 4)

This chapter is inspired by de Wilde’s way of connecting past and present. However, the single most important feature of the third period is that it was generally believed that we witnessed not only increased interdependence but a movement to an entirely new level of interaction, called globalization. The challenge was therefore not to revise theories of interdependence but to understand processes of globalization theoretically. Such a task proved to be more difficult than it sounds, and, one decade later, Michael Zürn concluded that the two literatures were strikingly similar, also in their failed attempts at building sound theories (Zürn 2002). The second avenue engages republican liberalism. While Robert Keohane (1989) was explicit in rejecting republican liberalism, a group of European liberal scholars tend to embrace it, though they accompany it

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with a variety of qualifications. Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1986) is among the first to revisit the democratic peace thesis and to consider it as one of the main strategies for peace. With the transition of Europe ongoing, more scholars got into this area of the liberal research agenda. Andrew Hurrell (1990) examined its Kantian sources, and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994, 1995a, b), Czempiel (1995) and Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre (1997) examined contemporary applications. Harald Müller (2002, Müller and Wolff 2006) critically examined the democratic peace thesis, aiming at turning general claims into more specific and thus analysable propositions. He followed up with a book on democratic wars. Håvard Hegre examined what he calls The Limits of the Democratic Peace (2004) and subsequently dove further into numerous issues linked to the democratic peace thesis. In addition to these more general studies, the research agenda branched out into ever more finely tuned issues, but also into research on macro-phenomena such as global “zones of peace” (Kazowicz 1995) and processes of democratization (Sørensen 1993). Chapter 4 is devoted to republican theory, reviewed by Kevin Blachford. Chapter 3 by Aukje van Loon evaluates progress within commerce and ideational liberal theory. The commerce part analyses trade, interdependence and globalization, and the latter part focuses on the role of ideas and policy paradigms. Both currents have a long pedigree, the former reaching back to Hobson and Schumpeter (1919). The third avenue of theorizing picks up previous efforts at theorizing international and European integration. European Studies was quick to generate its own family of theoretical orientations, starting with neofunctionalism and (classical) intergovernmentalism in the 1960s. Later arrivals include liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998; Schimmelfennig 2015), constructivist liberalism (Christiansen et  al. 1999) and Europeanization approaches (Héritier 1999). Neofunctionalism, transnationalist theory and liberal intergovernmentalism belong essentially to the liberal IR tradition, and constructivist approaches in the field draw heavily on constructivism within IR.  Similarly, the Europeanization literature is first and foremost an application of the more general second-image-­ reversed literature (Gourevitch 1978). Within European Studies, scholarly discourses are surely specialized but are predominately influenced by the official quasi-legalistic discourse of policymaking, thus less by discourses of theory. No matter which liberal current of thought—interdependence, institutional or republican liberalism—it is primarily concerned with the dynamics of the European subsystem, not how the European Union shapes or is shaped by international society.

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The fourth avenue concerns liberal security theory and is thus a continuation of previous interest in the causes of war and the conditions for peace, including peaceful change. In Chap. 5, Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon present the main characteristics of peace research in Europe. In Chap. 7, Kamil Zwolski reviews liberal security theories and dismisses the idea that security constitutes a hard case for liberal theorists. Combined, they provide exciting insights into the nexus between liberal theorizing, security, as well as war and peace, that is, one of the classical dimensions of liberal theorizing. Security Studies has always been on the liberal research agenda, first with a focus on peace and war, subsequently extended several times to include collective security and peaceful change. The fifth avenue of research examines boundaries between the liberal tradition and other traditions. Which features make the liberal tradition distinct, and which features does the tradition share with other traditions? Regarding the boundary between liberal theory and English School theory, the most pertinent issues include the striking similarity between Wight’s canon of rationalists thinkers and the canon of liberal thinkers but also the extent to which English School solidarists share perspectives with full-blooded liberal scholars, cf. the intriguing cases of John Vincent and Nicholas Wheeler? Moreover, how do prominent English School scholars—Wight, Bull, Buzan, Navari—portray the liberal tradition? Compared to the interest in English School-realism linkages, English School-liberal linkages are a surprisingly rare path taken. However, the wide spectrum of shared research interests makes it an exciting path. It does not necessarily begin with the founding of the English School because it might well be that liberal theorists during the first half of the twentieth century had characteristics that later on would be labelled ‘solidarist’. In Chap. 7, Asli Ergul Jorgensen dives further into the issue. The sixth avenue is about rethinking the diverse foundations of the liberal tradition. In Chap. 2, Lacin Idil Öztığ gives a broad overview of developments until 1939 (WW2), a historical era during which Europeans politically left liberal potentials behind and became increasingly supportive of illiberal and authoritarian trends. The limited number of theorists explains why it makes sense to summarize theorizing in the early twentieth century in such a bundled fashion. Moreover, the branching into currents of thinking, while detectable, was not as developed as it would be later. Nor were research specifications, that is, leaving the big questions behind and instead going for ever smaller issues as pronounced as they later would be.

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Table 1.1  The chapters and configurations of periods and main theorists in Europe Currents/ periods

1900–1939

1939–1989

1989–2019

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Until 1939

Introduction Bloch, Hobson, Ritchie, Seeley, Hobhouse, Cobden, Angell, Zimmern, Muir, Delaisi, Jäckh Mitrany, MendelsohnBartholdy, Carr, Schumpeter

Introduction

Introduction

Kaiser, Burton, Hassner

Dür, Hall, Hay, Nölke, Risse, Schirm

Czempiel, Müller, Risse-Kappen, Krell

Risse-Kappen, Risse, Sørensen, Müller

Chapter 3 Economic and ideational theory Chapter 4 Republican theory Chapter 5 Peace theories

Chapter 6 Security theories

Angell, Mitrany

Chapter 7 Liberal boundaries Chapter 8 Classical liberalism Chapter 9

Lauterpacht

Risse, Müller, Held, Habermas, Maus, Brock, Brücher, Deitelhoff, Jahn, Geis, Wiener, Richmond, Eberl, Niesen Burton Hasenclever, Meyer, Rittberger; Webber, Krahmann, Sperling, Schröder Wight, Bull, Vincent, Wheeler, Knudsen

Hayek, von Mises

Hayek, von Mises

Conclusion

Conclusion

Source: Author

Kelsen, Wehberg, Schücking, Lauterpacht, Benjamin

Czempiel, Senghaas, Gantzel, Galtung, Picht, Krippendorff, Doyle, Foucault

Conclusion

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Combined, the chapters in this volume provide a thought provoking perspective on the liberal theory tradition as it evolved in Europe during the last 100 years. The book combines what is often kept apart, takes a historical perspective instead of the conventional separation of historical and contemporary studies. The authors describe the roads frequently travelled but also some of the roads that almost never are entered. While widespread practices of standard referencing may highlight scholarly excellence, they also tend to reify a very limited selection of theorists who are known to be known, for which reason they reduce curiosity and disable critical reconsiderations of both individual thinkers and intellectual traditions. Hence, the book is meant to counter conventional wisdom about one of the most important IR theoretical traditions (Table 1.1).

References Adorno, T.  W., & Horkheimer, M. (1947). Dialektik der Aufklärung. Amsterdam: Querido. Allan, P., & Goldmann, K. (1992). The End of the Cold War. Evaluating Theories of International Relations. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff. Angell, N. (2010, 1909). The Great Illusion. New York: Cosimo Classics. Aron, R. (1962). Guerre et paix entre les Nations. Paris: Calmann-Levy. Aron, R. (1967). What Is a Theory of International Relations? Journal of International Affairs, 21(2), 185. Ashworth, L. (1999). Creating International Studies. Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition. Aldershot: Ashgate. Battistella, D. (2012). Raymond Aron, réaliste néoclassique. Etudes internationales, 43(3), 371–388. Bell, D. (2014). What Is Liberalism? Political Theory, 42(6), 682–715. Bloch, J. (1903). The Future of War: In Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations. Boston: Ginn. Booth, K., & Smith, S. (1995). International Relations Theory Today. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Brock, L., Geis, A., & Müller, H. (2006). Democratic Wars. Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace. Houndmills: Palgrave. Bull, H. (1966). International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. World Politics, 18(3), 361–377. Bull, H. (1972). The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969. Burton, J. W. (1962). Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament. New York: Knopf. Burton, J.  W. (1967). International Relations: A General Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Burton, J. W. (1969). Conflict & Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (Vol. 1969). London: Macmillan. Burton, J. W. (1972). World Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Butterfield, H., Wight, M., & Bull, H. (1966). Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2001). Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It. Millennium, 30(1), 19–39. Carr, E. H. (1939). The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Châton G. (2012, Septembre). Pour un « machiavélisme postkantien »: Raymond Aron, théoricien réaliste hétérodoxe. Études internationales, 43(3), 389–403. Collingwood, R. G. (1946). The Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cooper, S.  E. (1991). Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cotesta, V. (2017). Classical Sociology and the First World War: Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Scheler in the Trenches. History, 102(351), 432–449. Czempiel, E.-O. (1965). Die Entwicklung der Lehre von den internationalen Beziehungen. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 6(3), 270–290. Czempiel, E.-O. (1986). Friedensstrategien. Paderborn: F. Schöningh. Czempiel, E.-O. (1995). Are Democracies Peaceful? Not Quite Yet / Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. De Ruggiero, G., & Collingwood, R.  G. (1928). The History of European Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press. de Wilde, J. H. (1991). Saved from Oblivion – Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century: A Study on the Causality between War and Complex Interdependence. Groningen: University of Groningen. DiSalvo, D. (2016). The Multifaceted œuvre of Raymond Aron. Society, 53(3), 320–325. Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe’s Role in World Peace. Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, 41, 43. Dunn, D. J. (2005). The Fifty Years of Peace Research: A Survey and Interpretation. Eisenbeiss, W. (1990). Einsicht vor der Zeit: Der seit 1900 sinnlose Krieg. Über die Schriften der Kriegskritiker Johann v. Bloch und Norman Angell. In R.  Steinweg (Ed.), Lehren aus der Geschichte? Historische Friedensforschung (pp. 369–400). Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp. Enzensberger, H. M. (Ed.). (1960). Museum der modernen Poesie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Fitzpatrick, M. (2008). Liberal Imperialism in Germany. Expansionism and Nationalism. New York: Berghahn Books. Fox, W. T. R. (Ed.). (1959). Theoretical Aspects of International Relations. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

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CHAPTER 2

Liberal IR Theorizing During the Early Twentieth Century: 1900–1939 Lacin Idil Öztığ

Abstract  The catastrophic consequences of World War I became a catalyst for liberal thinkers to theorize international peace. The scholarly interest into the conditions underlying peace tapped into the rising anti-war sentiments among European societies. The establishment of the League of Nations, international agreements and the evolution of international legal norms enhanced optimism regarding peaceful change. During this period, liberal scholars denounced nationalism as a destructive ideology and saw the idea of sovereignty as a hindrance against peaceful interstate relations and human welfare in general. This chapter sheds light on scholars (who came from different disciplines, representing both Anglo-Saxon and continental traditions) who contributed to liberal internationalist thinking during the interwar period. Keywords  Liberal IR tradition • Liberal internationalism • International law • Peace • War

L. I. Öztığ (*) Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_2

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Introduction The liberal international relations (IR) tradition has its roots in Enlightenment philosophy with its emphasis on reason, equality, freedom of the individual, and goodness of human nature (Smith 1992). Enlightenment philosophers believed in the possibility of human progress and ‘saw war not as part of the natural order or a necessary instrument of state power, but as a foolish anachronism, perpetuated only by those who enjoyed or profited by it’ (Howard 2001: 26). John Locke (a contract theorist) and Immanuel Kant (theorist of international ethics) were the most influential Enlightenment philosophers on the liberal IR tradition with their emphasis on the possibility of peace by underlining its individual and interstate-level conditions, respectively (Doyle 2012). Locke argued that the state of nature is governed by reason that promulgates the protection of life, individual freedom, and property (Beitz 1979). Locke took the view that the dedication of citizens and statespersons to the rule of law is essential for peace (Doyle 2012). Kant, on the other hand, proposed evolutionary changes at the macro level. He believed that the abolishment of absolutist monarchies would tame states’ aggressive interests. On this basis, he argued that perpetual peace would only be possible on the condition that all states evolved into liberal republics and eventually established a world federation (Doyle 2006). One of the earliest contributors of internationalism was Émeric Vattel, a Swiss international lawyer who lived in the eighteenth century. Vattel was sanguine about the possibility of an international society of states. While acknowledging the limitations of morality in international politics, he supported the idea that states have duties beyond borders (Hurrell 1996). Liberal internationalism started to take shape in the nineteenth century, as liberals, during that period, in opposition to conservatives who associated peace with a balance of power, argued that peace would be the result of social and economic progress on an international scale (Howard 2001). In the beginning of the twentieth century, optimism about peace that rose among Europe’s intellectual circles in parallel with the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were dashed with World War I (Knutsen 1992). While before World War I, many liberals believed in the emancipatory potential of nationalism and even argued that nationalism and liberalism were compatible ideologies, after World War I, liberal scholars denounced nationalism and started to associate it with atavism and illiberalism (Smith 1992; Rich 2002).

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The destructive consequences of World War I urged many scholars to contemplate ways to prevent conflicts. Furthermore, as a result of enhanced internationalism during the interwar period, especially with the League of Nations, international agreements, and the growth of the discipline of international law, an optimistic view of international relations prevailed among both scholarly circles and the public. Seeing war as an obstruction to individual liberty, many liberals turned to internationalism as a way of maintaining peace among states and thus emancipating the individual (Francescet 2002). Against this backdrop, liberal internationalism became a dominant tradition in the interwar period. While the Anglo-Saxon scholarship played a crucial role in the development of the early IR theorizing, it should be noted that many continental scholars also made important contributions to the internationalist thinking. Furthermore, this period also witnessed an increased communication between the disciplines of IR and international law with many international lawyers producing innovative responses to the problems of international relations (Long 2003). This chapter sheds light into the development of liberal internationalism during the interwar period by analyzing the scholars who came from a variety different disciplines, representing both Anglo-centric and continental traditions.1

The Development of Liberal Internationalism IR as a discipline emerged in 1919 with the establishment of the chair of international politics at the University College of Wales (Dunoff and Pollack 2013). The Anglo-Saxon scholarship prevailed in the early period of IR theorizing with the contribution of scholars from various disciplines to internationalism. One of the most important contributors to liberal internationalism during the interwar period was Leonard T. Hobhouse, who pioneered the establishment of sociology as an academic discipline in the UK. Hobhouse contributed to the IR theorizing by developing a concept of internationalism that laid a great emphasis on strengthening international cooperation and the development of moral universalism (Zaidi 2019). Hobhouse believed in the possibility of progressive evolution of 1  While many British liberal thinkers contributed to liberal IR theory during the interwar period such as David Ritchie, John Seeley, Norman Angell, and Ramsay Muir, the selection on thinkers was made with a consideration on the balance between British and continental thinkers.

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humankind through the improvement of rationality (Holthaus 2014). Seeing humankind as one community, he focused on not only peaceful interstate relations, but also the progress of individuals (Hobhouse 1921). Acknowledging that the spread of liberal democracy across states did not bring international cooperation and peace, Hobhouse recommended the development of democracy on an international level. To this end, he suggested the establishment of an international organization (that includes both states and transnational associations, such as churches and trade unions) that would enable citizens to develop transnational loyalties. Hobhouse argued that the development of multiple loyalties would not instigate conflict, but rather help human rationality progress (Hobhouse 1921). While Hobhouse believed in the emancipatory potential of internationalism, he criticized international cooperation embodied in the League of Nations. Rather than seeing the League as a step toward internationalism conductive to peace, he criticized it by casting doubt on its democratic credentials and its failures to tackle international problems (Holthaus 2014). Hobhouse’s ideas had a great influence on John A. Hobson, a British economist and social scientist (Hodgson 2001). Drawing upon Hobhouse’s ideas, Hobson analyzed international relations through a holistic and evolutionary framework (Long 1996). Hobson’s concept of internationalism was based on liberal principles with a focus on human rationality and the possibility of progressive human affairs. Hobson expressed his belief in reason by stating that it ‘would help humanity by bringing its individual members and its nations, or other groups, into finding their common good, their community, in orderly and mutually beneficial intercourse’ (Hobson 1933: 10). He went on to express his optimistic view on the humanity in the following words: ‘[d]istinctions of race, colour, language, would be subordinated to a rising sense of humanity, while environmental differences of soil, climate, situation, would be utilized for special forms of work and wealth which would by regular processes of free commerce be apportioned for the benefit of the whole world’ (Hobson 1933: 10). Understanding humanity as a social organism, Hobson treated interstate relations as one aspect of world society and rejected the idea that national interests should be prioritized over human welfare or international interests (Long 1996). Similar to Hobhouse’s concept of internationalism, Hobson’s concept of internationalism entailed transnational relations of groups and individuals (Holthaus 2014). He suggested that states’ diversion from ‘isolated individualism’ and their tendency toward

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‘increased social organisation and collectivism’ create permissive conditions for the emergence of a world society (Holthaus 2014: 724). In line with a traditional liberal argument, he objected to state sovereignty on the grounds that it is an absolutist doctrine. He stressed that by triggering separatism and anarchical international relations, sovereignty has detrimental effects on human welfare and as such precludes the establishment of a world society. In this context, Hobson envisioned federalism as the best way to tame aggressive state interests and bring about peaceful international relations (Holthaus 2014). As mentioned earlier, the League of Nations embodied the initial optimism of the interwar period. One of the most important scholars who emphasized the importance of the League of Nations for international peace was Alfred E. Zimmern, a British scholar of international relations (Rich 2003). Zimmern retained his optimism toward the League despite its failures to solve international crises in the 1930s (Rich 2003). Zimmern shared the traditional liberal belief with his optimistic views on the progress in international relations and goodness of human nature. He emphasized the positives roles that education and public opinion can play in the achievement of peace. As an anti-war liberal, Zimmern identified nationalism as one of the most important factors that led to World War I. Yet, rather than rejecting the ideology of nationalism, he positioned himself against militarism and imperialism. Differing from Hobhouse and Hobson who moved beyond the traditional state-centric view by including ‘transnationalism’ in their conceptualization of the international, Zimmern’s liberal internationalism was limited to peaceful interstate relations. He argued that relinquishing state sovereignty would translate into sacrificing political liberties (Rich 2002, 2003). Another example of the growing trend toward internationalism during the interwar period is the establishment of Commonwealth of Nations (later renamed Commonwealth), an association between the UK and its former colonies in 1931. The Commonwealth of Nations was built upon the idea of strengthening cooperation among states that share the same language, similar culture, and institutions. In addition to the League of Nations, Zimmern was an ardent supporter of Commonwealth. He underlined that it can make a positive impact on the international system by bringing morality and justice (Rich 2002, 2003). Zimmern also focused on the role a multinational association could play in preventing the eruption of wars by constraining its most important triggers: interracial relations, economic relations, and nationalism (Rich 2002, 2003).

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The interwar period also witnessed the beginning of a theoretical tradition of functionalism which particularly rose to prominence in parallel to the start of the European integration from the early 1950s onward (Lamb and Robertson-Snape 2017). Functionalism was developed by David Mitrany, a Romanian-born and naturalized British political theorist (Mitrany 1975). Mitrany viewed state officials as the victims of the dynamics of the international system and underlined that the international system that consists of sovereign, territorial states stymied the establishment of peaceful interstate relations. He further argued that coalitions of states and states’ voluntary implementation of international law would not be sufficient in bringing about peace. Inspired by the utilitarian and humanitarian insights, he proposed the creation of functional international organizations as a way to prevent aggression and war (Imber 1984). Mitrany argued that states’ responsibilities in the areas of welfare and technical administration could be more efficiently provided through intergovernmental cooperation. In the Progress of International Government, Mitrany outlined his functional perspective to international relations by underscoring that ‘international integration—the collective governance and “material interdependence” between states—develops its own dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas’ (Mitrany 1933: 101). All in all, he held the view that with the establishment of intergovernmental organizations that operate on specialized fields and the introduction of sanctions against states which violate the rules and procedures of these organizations, conflicts and wars could be prevented (Imber 1984).

An International Law Perspective to Liberal Internationalism As mentioned in the Introduction, in the interwar period during which the disciplinary boundaries between international law and international relations were not yet sharpened, international lawyers made significant contributions to liberal internationalism by contemplating ways to overcome conflicts and wars. For example, during this period, George Scelle, a French international lawyer, contributed to liberal internationalism by taking into account international law as well as sociological and historical dynamics (Cassese 1990). Scelle emphasized the importance of morality in

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international relations and supported the development of a coherent and unified international legal system (Cassese 1990). Like Hobhouse and Hobson, Scelle moved beyond traditional state centrism in his conceptualization of the world community. He saw the world community as an assembly of multiple communities including families, local communities, regions, nations, international associations. Scelle stressed the importance of states in the world community by taking into consideration that all individuals and groups are attached to states. Moreover, he underlined that rather than the coexistence of states, the mutual relations established by individuals and groups that go beyond borders laid the foundation of the world community. Based on this argumentation, he went on to argue that individuals, not states, are the real subjects of international law (Cassese 1990). Taking into consideration the increased trend toward internationalism during the interwar period, Scelle viewed sovereignty as an outdated concept by describing it as the ‘modern expression of the old ideology of tribal nationalism’ (Scelle 1956: 216). He argued that the progress in the world community necessitated constraining states’ sovereign authority and the establishment of international bodies (Cassese 1990). On this basis, he focused on the importance of social solidarity for peaceful international order (Focarelli 2012). To this end, he proposed the idea that the world community should strive toward the establishment of progressive universal federalism (Couveinhes 2006). Scelle emphasized the role that individuals and associations (such as international trade unions, churches, international nongovernmental organizations) can play in taming states’ selfish interests. He put a special emphasis on the role democratically minded people can play in the establishment of a world community by stating that ‘[e]ven in non-dictatorial regimes, ignorance and passivity of peoples often make subsist the de facto authority of a society of princes. If democratic control is really exercised, we can then speak of a society of peoples and individuals. Only then can an ecumenical legal order take form or at least announce itself’ (Scelle 1960: 477). Like Scelle, Nicolas Politis (a Greek and naturalized French legal scholar who belonged to the group of French internationalists) viewed individuals as the true subjects of international law (Papadaki 2012). By arguing that the idea of sovereignty fostered arbitrary state behavior such as imperialistic policies, war, and aggression, and hindered states’ subjection to law,

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Politis recommended the complete elimination of sovereignty from juridical language (Nicolas 1925). Politis’ optimistic view of international politics is revealed in his argument that emphasizes the norm-based dimension of international peace. In specific terms, he argued that with the prevalence of norms such as individual liberty and social justice in the international system, aggression and warfare could be prevented. On this basis, he argued that intellectuals (especially jurists) can play an efficient role in the promotion of benevolent norms by helping state officials recognize their duties beyond borders (Papadaki 2012). Another contribution to liberal internationalism during the interwar period came from Hersch Lauterpacht, a Polish-British legal scholar. Influenced by liberal humanism, cosmopolitan individualism, and Kant’s political philosophy, Lauterpacht saw law and morality intertwined. He also stressed a close linkage between the universality of international law and universal human rationality (Koskenniemi 1997; Kita 2003). The failures of the League of Nations and the growing aggression in international politics in the late interwar period led Lauterpacht to evaluate interwar years as ‘a period of retrogession’ from cosmopolitanism and liberalism (Koskenniemi 1997). He attributed failures to tackle international crises during the interwar period to the secondary importance given to international law (Lauterpacht 1932, 1936). Nonetheless, Lauterpacht kept his optimism about future international relations. He argued that collective security would be possible with the effective implementation of international law. The interwar period also gave rise to the idea that associates international law with pacifism. One of the most prominent proponents of this idea was Walther Schücking, a German professor of international law (García-Salmones 2011). Schücking belonged to the German idealist tradition. He was also strongly influenced by Kantian idealism and neo-­ Kantian philosophers such as Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen (Bodendiek 2011). Schücking suggested taming war by ‘turning it into an instrument of law’ (Tams 2011: 737). He also recommended a close communication between science and politics. He proposed the idea that scientists should concentrate on current political issues and come up with solutions to political problems by utilizing scientific methods (Bodendiek 2011). Schücking argued that international peace could be achieved with the strengthening of internationalism that would cultivate equality in

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interstate relations. He believed that the growing trend toward internationalism would eventually pave the way for a federal state on the international level. Yet, he saw the continuing power of nationalism as an impediment toward the establishment of an international federal state (García-Salmones 2011; Bodendiek 2011). While Schücking was optimistic about future international relations, his thinking reveals the fading of initial optimism regarding the League of Nations. He stressed the partiality of the League by describing it as a platform that promotes imperialistic policies of powerful countries (Tams 2011). Another international lawyer who associated international law with pacifism was Hans Wehberg, a German scholar of international law (Wehberg 1931). Wehberg advocated the transformation of international law for the realization of international peace. Importantly, he saw states’ right to self-defense as an instigator of anarchy in the international order. He criticized the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Geneva Protocol, the Locarno Treaties, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact for not denouncing the norm of self-defense. On this basis, he called for revolutionizing international law with the abolishment of the norm (Smeltzer 2018). Yet, differing from Hobhouse and Schücking who were not optimistic about the role of the League of Nations (mostly due to its repeated failures) in the maintenance of peace, Wehber stressed the importance of further empowerment of the Council of the League of Nations (Smeltzer 2018). In addition to Enlightenment philosophers and neo-Kantians, political activists had a great influence on liberal internationalist thinking. A conspicuous example is Bertha v. Suttner, a prominent political activist and radical pacifist who lived in the nineteenth century. Stuttner denounced the brutality of the Battle of Solferino and the US Civil War in her book Weapons Down. Inspired by Stuttner’s ideas, Max Huber (a Swiss scholar of international law) developed a strong interest for finding ways in which peaceful international relations could prevail (Delbrück 2007). Similar to Zimmern, interstate relations occupied a central place in Huber’s thinking. He focused on the importance of the state both in social life and in the international arena. He viewed international relations as a power struggle between states (Delbrück 2007). He saw hegemonic state relations as the main impediment toward the establishment of a universal organization (Sandoz 2007). While depicting a bleak picture of the interwar period, Huber was optimistic about the strengthening of internationalism in the future (Delbrück 2007). He placed a special emphasis on the role transnational movements can play in international peace (Diggelmann 2012).

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Conclusion Liberal internationalism depicts an optimistic view of the international system by emphasizing the increasing unity of human kind through growing interdependence among states and people (Wilson 2011). During the interwar period, liberal internationalists from a variety of disciplines (belonging to both Anglo-Saxon and continental traditions) criticized the international order dominated by states’ selfish interests. Legal scholars contemplated ways to transform international law so as to achieve permanent peace. It should be underlined that the liberal internationalist literature during this period did not focus on the causal analysis of conflicts and wars. As such, it was mainly normative and descriptive (Stein 2016). Liberal internationalists’ thinking analyzed in this chapter reveals a fading optimism regarding the role of the League of Nations in the prevention of aggressive interstate relations, even though some liberal thinkers (such as Zimmerman and Wehberg) remained optimistic about its role. Notwithstanding their ideas about the League and theoretical differences, liberal scholars analyzed in this study recommended increased attention paid to individuals (and human welfare) and strengthening internationalism (albeit with different degrees) as a way to transform the international order. Nevertheless, World War II dashed hopes about peace once again. In Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939, Edward H.  Carr associated optimistic views of international relations with utopianism and argued that rather than explaining the causes of peace, liberal thinking was prescriptive, as it mainly focused on laying out norms of political practice (Carr 2001). Carr’s critique was a catalyst for intellectual apathy toward liberal internationalism in the following periods (Wilson 2003). Even though liberal IR thinking did not disappear after World War II, a realist tradition, which gives primary attention to state interests and stresses the inevitability of conflict among states due to their power-­ seeking behavior, dominated IR theorizing. Legal scholars became more interested in the analysis of formal rules and decision-making procedures than underlying conditions of peace. Realist IR scholars questioned the efficacy of international organizations and international law in international politics (Steans et  al. 2010). Under this scheme, the idea of the possibility of peace with the transformation of the international order through enhanced internationalism and international law lost its popularity.

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References Beitz, C.  R. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bodendiek, F. (2011). Walther Schücking and the Idea of ‘International. Organization The European Journal of International Law, 22(3), 741–754. Carr, E.  H. (2001). Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cassese, A. (1990). Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law. European Journal of International Law, 1, 210–231. Couveinhes, F. (2006). Georges Scelle, les ambiguïtés d’une pensée prémonitoire. Revue d’histoire des facultés de droit et de la culture juridique, du monde des juristes et du livre juridique, 25–26, 339–405. Delbrück, J. (2007). Max Huber’s Sociological Approach to International Law Revisited. The European Journal of International Law, 18(1), 97–113. Diggelmann, O. (2012). Georges Scelle (1878–1961). In B.  Fassbender & A.  Peters (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Doyle, M. W. (2006). Kant and Liberal Internationalism. In I. Kant (Ed.), Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (P. Kleingeld, Ed. & D. L. Colclasure, Trans.). New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Doyle, M. W. (2012). Liberal Peace: Selected Essays. London/New York: Routledge. Dunoff, J.  L., & Pollack, M.  A. (2013). International Law and International Relations: Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue. In J.  L. Dunoff & M. A. Pollack (Eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Focarelli, C. (2012). International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Francescet, A. (2002). Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. García-Salmones, M. (2011). Walther Schücking and the Pacifist Traditions of International Law. The European Journal of International Law, 22(3), 755–782. Hobhouse, L.  T. (1921). Democracy and Civilisation. The Sociological Review, 13(3), 125–135. Hobson, J. A. (1933). Rationalism and Humanism. London: Watts & Co. Hodgson, G. M. (2001). How Economists Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science. London/New York: Routledge. Holthaus, L. (2014). L.T.  Hobhouse and the Transformation of Liberal Internationalism. Review of International Studies, 40(4), 705–727. Howard, M. (2001). The Invention of Peace. London: Profile Books.

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Hurrell, A. (1996). Vattel: Pluralism and Its Limits,’ in Ian Clark and Iver B. In G.  Neumann (Ed.), Classical Theories of International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Imber, M. F. (1984). Re-Reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty. Review of International Studies, 10(2), 103–123. Kita, Y. (2003). Sir Hersch Lauterpacht as a Prototype of Post-War Modern International Legal Thought: Analysis of International Legalism in the Universalisation Process of the European Law of Nations. Durham University, Durham theses, available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur. ac.uk/3656/ Knutsen, T.  L. (1992). A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press. Koskenniemi, M. (1997). Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law. European Journal of International Law, 8(2), 215–263. Lamb, P., & Robertson-Snape, F. (2017). Historical Dictionary of International Relations. Lanham: Rowman & LittleField. Lauterpacht, H. (1932). Japan and the Covenant. The Political Quarterly, 3, 174–194. Lauterpacht, H. (1936). Neutrality and Collective Security. Politico, 2, 133–155. Long, D. (1996). Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J. A. Hobson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Long, D. (2003). Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary International Theory. In D. Long & P. Wilson (Eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitrany, D. (1933). The Progress of International Government. London: Allen & Unwin, Yale University Press. Mitrany, D. (1975). The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Robertson. Nicolas, P. (1925). Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l’abus des droits dans les rapports internationaux. Paris: Hachette. Papadaki, M. (2012). The ‘Government Intellectuals’: Nicolas Politis  – An Intellectual Portrait. The European Journal of International Law, 23(1), 221–231. Rich, P. (2002). Reinventing Peace: David Davies, Alfred Zimmern and Liberal Internationalism in Inter-War Britain. International Relations, 16(1), 117–133. Rich, P. (2003). Alfred Zimmern’s Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth. In D.  Long & P.  Wilson (Eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Sandoz, Y. (2007). Max Huber and the Red Cross. The European Journal of International Law, 18(1), 171–197. Scelle, G. (1956). Le phenomene juridique du dedoublement fonctionnel. In Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation (pp. 324–342). Festschrift fur H. Wehberg. Scelle, G. (1960). Quelques reflexions heterodoxes sur la technique de l’ordre juridique interetatique. In Hommage dune generation de juristes au President Basdevant. Paris: Pedone. Smeltzer, J. (2018). Hans Wehberg and the Jus Belli Ac Pacis in Inter-War International Law. Global Intellectual History. https://doi.org/10.108 0/23801883.2018.1500867. Smith, M.  J. (1992). Liberalism and International Reform. In T.  Nardin & D. R. Mapel (Eds.), Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steans, J., et  al. (2010). An Introduction to International Relations Theory Perspectives and Themes (3rd ed.). Harlow: Longman. Stein, A. A. (2016). Neoliberal Institutionalism. In J. K. Cogan, I. Hurd & I. Johnstone (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tams, C. J. (2011). Re-Introducing Walter Schücking. The European Journal of International Law, 22(3), 725–739. Wehberg, H. (1931). The Outlawry of War. Washington: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wilson, P. (2003). Introduction: The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Category of ‘Idealism’ in International Relations. In D. Long & P. Wilson (Eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, P. (2011). Idealism in International Relations. In K.  Dowding (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Power. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Zaidi, W. (2019). Liberal Internationalism and the Search for International Peace. In C. P. Peterson, W. M. Knoblauch, & M. Loadenthal (Eds.), The Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 3

Liberalism and Domestic Politics Approaches in IR Aukje van Loon

Abstract  This chapter reviews liberal and domestic politics approaches in International Relations (IR), highlighting the three variables interests, institutions and ideas. Under scrutiny are theories of domestic sources of foreign economic policies, varieties of capitalism, historical institutionalism, the liberal IR theory and the societal approach to governmental preference formation. The chapter begins with a brief review of liberal IR theory during the Cold War, followed by contemporary liberalism and domestic politics approaches highlighting theoretical assumptions and propositions. The chapter then discusses the societal approach to governmental preference formation. This complementary innovative advancement conceptualises the conditions for the prevalence of all three variables vis-à-vis each other in shaping governments’ positions. A short conclusion points to the significance of future accentuation on domestic factors in governmental preference formation.

A. van Loon (*) Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_3

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Keywords  Interests • Ideas • Institutions • Domestic politics approaches • Liberal IR theory • Societal approach

Introduction In international politics, delineating what governments seek to do, and why they do so, principally requires an examination of the domestically determined preferences of actors within these states’ societies. Focus of the liberal theory of International Relations (IR) and domestic politics approaches is explicitly on this link between societies and governments as, in democratic politics systems, the latters’ re-election purposes engender responsiveness to the former’s demands, which in turn legitimises governments’ behaviour. These approaches are distinctive in the variables they privilege, for example, domestic interests, ideas and institutions, which logically differ from those of other IR theoretical schools: (neo)realism and international institutionalism. The explanatory deficiency of these IR theories hence correlates with the necessity to employ liberalism and domestic politics approaches in explaining foreign policymaking. This chapter shortly recalls the trajectory of the liberal theory during the Cold War followed by several key works applying contemporary liberalism and domestic politics approaches in IR and is divided into several sections. Firstly, a section discussing authors’ work which fall within the scope of the liberal theory of IR and domestic politics approaches. It is organised around the domestic explanatory variables interests, institutions and ideas. The aim of this section is to concisely review a body of literature. The next section will be more thorough in its deliberation on domestic politics approaches’ further advancement of the societal approach to governmental preference formation by Stefan Schirm. The section will especially discuss the specification of variables and innovative conceptualisation of hypotheses.

Liberal Theory During the Cold War The very early origins of the liberal international theory and its evolution took place in the seventeenth century with liberal theorists being mainly philosophers and economists. Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew (1992) provide a chronicled overview of its evolution from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century and focus primarily on Anglo-American authors.

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Their omission of liberal scholars from a wider European setting is picked up in the first two chapters of this volume, while sketching two centuries of ‘the conceptual history of European liberalism’ is also subject of Michael Freeden et al.’s In Search for European Liberalisms (2019, 2). The historical understanding several thinkers of liberal international theory have employed during the Cold War will be briefly reflected upon here, which reveals the main drivers of this theory’s further trajectory and development of contemporary liberalism and domestic politics approaches. The general development of the liberal international theory was characterised by a gradual yet certain disconnection between liberal philosophers and social scientists, as well as a divide between a few European liberal scholars and a limited number of primarily US-based theorists. After World War II, the adjustment of the prevalent state-centric approaches instigated a first generation of scholars, occupying a thin liberal research agenda, to jointly set the scene in advancing a new wave of scholarship gaining momentum in the 1960s and 1970s. As the state-centric model of International Relations gained criticism for neglecting the increasing significance of transgovernmental and transnational actors in international politics, an early liberal emphasis from this time period stems from Karl Kaiser’s Transnationale Politik. By pointing out the limits of state-centric perspectives, he introduced an original approach proposing a research agenda on a transnational society in which societal actors were the centre of analytical attention (1969) (see Chap. 1, this volume). This society defined ‘as a system of interaction in a specific issue area between societal actors in different national systems’ (Kaiser 1971, 802) paid particular attention to non-state actors and the political processes between governments and/or between governments and transnational society were viewed as the preconditions for the development and intensification of transnational politics. In this fashion, Kaiser launched an aspect within the liberal tradition which was innovative at the time. Almost simultaneously, inspired by the 1968 student protests in Paris, Pierre Hassner (1968) made an appealing attempt in hypothesising the critical connection between state and civil society dynamics, emphasising that the international system was prone to be impacted by societal actors. Scholars also transposing the liberal international theory during this time period were James Rosenau (1967) revealing insights into the intersection of domestic politics and foreign affairs in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy as well as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane linking the concepts Transnational Relations and World Politics (1971). John Burton (1972)

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argued that state-society relations were significant for an increasingly transnational World Society. An analysis of this particular society was viewed by Burton as ‘the study of the total environment in which the behaviour of individuals, groups, nations and states occurs. The social and political behaviour of others is the social and political environment of each system’ (Burton 1972, 4). Further writers cultivating this approach were Peter Katzenstein (1977) investigating different national responses and their interaction with international forces in the international political economy and Peter Willets stressing the role of international pressure groups by examining ‘how small, overworked and under-funded NGOs with little formal authority manage to oversee changes in the practices of nation states and international organizations’ (1982). From the 1960s, with state power in retreat and non-state actors’ demonstrated influence in international and domestic politics, a gradual yet solid activity in liberal theorising took place.

Contemporary Liberalism and Domestic Politics Approaches in IR This offset of scholars’ progressive interest, however, was simultaneously accompanied by several works noting the deficiency of liberalism’s importance in comparison with other dominant IR theories. This concurrently suggested a broad dissatisfaction with neorealism’s explanatory limitations of systemic arguments. Michael Doyle highlighted the limited ‘canonical description of liberalism’ (Doyle 1986, 1152) and Arthur Stein conveyed that the versatile aspects of liberalism results in ‘what is or is not at its core can be disputed’ (Stein 1990, 7). Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew even stated that ‘while contemporary (…) international theories reflect canons articulated in the writings (…) rooted in the expositions of Hans Morgenthau (1967) and Kenneth Waltz (1979), a systematic presentation of liberal international theory is not offered in any well-known texts’ (Zacher and Matthew 1992, 107). The alteration from a Cold War order to a liberal world order, thereby accelerating an increase in democracies as well as growing economic transactions and interdependence, refocused scholars’ attention and advanced an impressive lineage of liberal international theory and domestic politics approaches. Increased claims that domestic politics matters in explaining

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states’ foreign policy behaviour resulted in intense debates and a significant growing literature emanated from the 1990s onwards, with scholars offering liberal international theory and domestic politics approaches as viable alternatives having a profound impact on International Relations. Here it is valuable to briefly recap central theses and strands drawn out from the writings of contemporary liberalism and domestic politics approaches. This is important for identifying current scholars as well as for allowing comparisons and complementarities and to facilitate the development of liberal international theory. The starting point are core assumptions specifying the dominance of societal actors, governments’ representational roles and preferences as well as the composition of mutually dependent governmental preferences. The basic liberal insight is that state-society relations have a fundamental effect on governmental preferences towards international conflict or cooperation. While during the Cold War these preferences’ origins were viewed to be emanating from transnationalisation, since the 1990s the process of globalisation was thought to induce shifts in domestic actors’ expectations in realising their goals. This oftentimes resulted in countries facing competing demands from the winners and losers of changes in material resources, dominant values and institutional control, three domestic variables accentuated in Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Theory of International Politics (1997, 513). With these premises being sparse in specifying distinct domestic sources of governmental preferences, the three variants, commercial, ideational and republican liberalism, derived from these assumptions, explain the causal importance of governmental behaviour as formed by (1) material interests of ‘individuals and groups’ facing distributional consequences induced by economic interdependence, (2) a clash or congeniality of a society’s national, political and socio-economic ideas as fundamental ‘collective social values or identities’ and (3) national institutions as ‘domestic representation’ (…) of social groups’ aggregating societal preferences within the political system, thereby creating a potential increase in revenues (Moravcsik 1997, 515) (see Chap. 4, this volume). With the remaining of this section being organised around the three domestic explanatory variables—interests, institutions and ideas—core variants of domestic politics approaches and theorising coming out of Europe are systematically attached to each of these societal considerations.

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Interests, Institutions and Ideas Societal interests stress economic interdependence reflected in theories of domestic sources of foreign economic policies, particularly within the field of trade. The relevance of such interests for governmental preferences has been emphasised by Andreas Dür who holds that societal actors’ trade preferences, in favour of either protectionism or liberalisation, reflect the distributions of anticipated costs and benefits of a prospective change. This situation creates domestic winners and losers and thus results in supporters and opponents in favour of or against trade cooperation. In Protection for Exporters Dür states that losers tend to be better identified and organised than the winners of trade cooperation. Hence, as exporters do not typically pursue gains, nor lobby offensively for liberalisation due to the rewards being too distant and too vague, they do mobilise against losses and lobby ‘in defense of losing existing market shares abroad rather than in pursuit of improved market access’ (Dür 2010, 11). In order to defend existing market shares and respond to discrimination, their governments can threaten retaliation, set up an alternative trade agreement or accede to the existing preferential agreement. This line of thought of analysing conflict or cooperation over foreign economic policy has prompted Dirk de Bièvre and Andreas Dür, who studied the interrelationship between interest groups and governments with the former articulating demands to politicians, which the latter aim to satisfy due to their dependency on interest group resources for re-election purposes (De Bièvre and Dür 2005, 1272). Interest groups’ ability in shaping governmental positions, however, also depends on the type of actor, in particular whether interest groups defend concentrated or diffuse concerns, and on the policy issue, since depending on the issue concerned, distributive, regulatory and redistributive policies, the possibility that conflicting interest groups demands arise increases (Dür and De Bièvre 2007a, 5–6). Concerning the type of actor, diffuse interest groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) accordingly ‘fail to influence political outcomes because they do not dispose of specific resources that would help legislators achieve their own preferences (…) or be useful in affecting a political actor’s chances for re-election or re-appointment’ (Dür and De Bièvre 2007b, 81)1. 1  See van Loon (2020) for the important role of a broad range of domestic stakeholders, including exporters and NGOs, lobbying during the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations.

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While the earlier mentioned approaches turn to societal interests, Peter Hall and David Soskice provide ‘for understanding the institutional similarities and differences among the developed economies’ in the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001, 1). Although they agree that domestic politics approaches’ focus on ‘prevailing economic conditions’ (Hall and Soskice 2001, 52) bares value in explaining governments’ motivation to (non)cooperation, Hall and Soskice highlight an alternative by considering domestic institutions as crucial factors in shaping governmental preference formation. Hence, at the core of this approach are institutional complementarities of a particular political economy which provide firms with comparative economic advantages and long-term behaviour. This insight is portrayed in terms of two major types of capitalist models distinguished by the degree to which a political economy is coordinated. The liberal market economy (LME, typically Great Britain), determined by arm’s-length competitive relations, competition and formal contracting, and the operation of supply and demand in line with price signalling, is opposed along these elements to the coordinated market economy (CME, typically Germany), dependent on non-market relations, collaboration, credible commitments and deliberative calculation on the part of firms (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8). As not all economies attune to the LME-CME dichotomy, this approach is extended by Andreas Nölke et al. to emerging markets as state-­permeated market economies (SMEs). They conduct a cross-country comparison on Brazil, India and China and distinguish ‘between the domestic and international level in (…) policymaking’ thereby stating that domestic actors ‘are motivated by an interest to avoid the establishment of powerful global institutions that might disrupt essential domestic institutional complementarities’ (Nölke et al. 2015, 544). This partly echoes Orfeo Fioretos’ research on The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Preferences (2001) in which he illustrates that domestic institutional complementarities shape governments’ multilateral preferences. Equally, in another study, Fioretos applies historical institutionalism which interrelates with the focus of domestic politics approaches on material interests as it is ‘key to identifying the conditions under which past decisions and designs shape individual’s preferences over the structure of current and prospective institutions’ (Fioretos 2011, 373). This can be linked to Margaret Karns et  al.’s International Organizations (2015) and John Ruggie’s focus on international institutions in Multilateralism (1992, 572), where he perceives multilateralism as an institutional form which ‘coordinates relations among

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three or more states in accordance with generalized principles of conduct, will have different specific expressions depending on the type of institutionalized relations to which it pertains’. A third explanatory variable introduced in scholars’ work and viewed as a welcoming aspect to the more traditional focus on societal interests and institutions are ideas. Analytical conceptualisation has been published by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993) and Peter Hall (1997) with the following European scholars primarily positioning themselves in the constructivist realm. Mark Blyth ‘turns to ideas’ (Blyth 2003, 695) and specifically questions IR scholars’ dominant focus on rational choice interest-­based explanations. He argues that in the 1990s, unanticipated developments such as the end of the Cold War inspired scholars to emphasise ideas rather than to take material interests as given. Ideas accordingly result in being a decisive complementary explanatory variable which provide ‘content to preferences and thus make [governmental] action explicable’ (Blyth 2003, 702) when considering electoral consequences of certain policy choices. In the same vein, ideas played a significant aspect in The Role of Ideas by Andreas Gofas and Colin Hay (2010, 3) where they underline scholars’ disputes over ‘the status of ideas’ and the conflict of ideational and material variables over causal or constitutive dominance in the explanatory role of ideas. Although equally welcoming the ideational turn, Hay (2004, 213), nevertheless, stated that ‘ideational factors certainly need to be given greater attention, but not at the expense of more traditional structural variables’. By equally not dismissing the role material interests play, Thomas Risse highlights the importance of ideas as ‘principled beliefs (“beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals”) (…) which in turn influence the behaviour and domestic structure of states’ (2017, 121).2 He illustrates that liberal democracies’ different governments’ positions in foreign policymaking are the result of variation in countries’ domestic structures as the ‘similarities in public attitudes across various countries do not necessarily lead to similar policies’ (Risse 2017, 26–27). Given this chapter’s space constraints, the discussion of scholars applying material, institutional and ideational dimensions only serves as an exemplary review without attempting at exhaustiveness. Nevertheless, this section has touched upon several works mainly from European-based scholars, thereby highlighting the domestic variables interests, institutions 2

 Risse furthering Goldstein and Keohane’s definition (1993).

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and ideas. The following section will illuminate the endeavours of further developing the intellectual exchange of thoughts on these societal considerations.

The Societal Approach to Governmental Preference Formation The societal approach to governmental preference formation offers such an analysis (Schirm 2009, 2016, 2019, 2020) not only by opening the black box but by actually unfolding it. On the one hand, it integrates and complements the aforementioned domestic politics approaches, whereas, on the other hand, it engages in an additional advancement of these. Analogue to the previous approaches mentioned, the core assumption of the societal approach is that elected governments in democratic political systems aim to remain in office and their positions therefore are a reflection of societal actors’ preferences, which can range from lobby groups’ pressure to public opinion attitudes and behavioural practices (Schirm 2013, 690). Besides, in contrast to highlighting the importance of one or two domestic factors, this approach incorporates all three domestic explanatory variables, interests, ideas and institutions. In applying the societal approach, the theory-­guided empirical investigation is, however, not completed when providing an answer to the question which of these explanatory variables accounts to variation in governmental positions? An additional step is undertaken in analysing why interests dominate in shaping governmental positions in some cases, whereas ideas prevail in other situations of policymaking. This aspect is hitherto not included in previous domestic politics approaches. Schirm (2019, 107) notes that [p]revious theories of domestic politics have employed the variables of interests, ideas, and institutions but did not ask for the reasons for their prevalence vis-à-vis each other. Thus, the core innovation of the societal approach is the conceptualisation of hypotheses on the conditions under which either material interests, or ideas or institutions matter.

Explicit specification of each of the three variables supports the articulation of individual hypotheses on the conditions for prevalence in shaping governmental positions. By reflecting on the work of previously mentioned scholars, the societal approach characterises domestic actors and structures as follows: the (1) material interest variable is viewed as

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economic sectors’ distributional calculations which adjust swiftly to alterations in the international economy, while (2) the variable ideas as voters’ durable value-based shared expectations on apt government behaviour and (3) the variable institutions identify these as formal arrangements of the socio-economic coordination. The three central hypotheses, accounting for the impact of economic sectors (interests), societal expectations (ideas) and domestic structures (institutions), are conceptualised as follows: (1) when economic sectors face meaningful distributional calculations, material interests predominate in shaping governments’ positions, due to intense lobbying; (2) when economic sectors face diffuse distributional concerns and fundamental questions on the role of politics in steering the economy are affected, ideas will prevail in shaping governments’ positions and (3) when the policy issue concerns questions on formal arrangements of socio-economic coordination, governments’ positions will be consistent with domestic institutions. The effect of material interests and value-based ideas on governmental preference formation is strengthened by these institutional frameworks when conforming to these, while non-correspondence to these national arrangements dilutes the domestic factors’ effect in shaping governmental positions (Schirm 2016, 69). This analytical instrument’s consideration of domestic factors’ singular role, in supporting or opposing each other, as well as their dual or trilateral interplay and plurality (Schirm 2020) in shaping governments’ positions is therefore crucial. Although the importance of domestic factors’ interrelationship has been acknowledged by Blyth (2002) and Hay (2004), it awaits further theoretical development. Through application of the societal approach, Schirm’s work has been considerably impressive in advancing and refining existing domestic politics approaches both theoretically and empirically (Schirm 2020). Case studies have dealt primarily with governments’ positions of established and emerging powers in global economic and financial governance issues (Schirm 2009, 2013, 2016, 2018a) and the variation of European governments’ preferences towards the Eurozone crisis (Schirm 2018b). By conceptualising the conditions under which material interests, value-based ideas and regulatory institutions dominate in shaping governments’ positions, the societal approach thus complements Moravcsik’s static focus on domestic interests, ideas and institutions. In sum, the said approach makes a major contribution to the understanding of governmental preference formation as domestic material and ideational and institutional factors are necessary for the explanation of variation in governments’

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positions in cross-country comparisons. The unique selling point of the societal approach, however, is the conceptualisation about the conditions for prevalence of interests, ideas or institutions in shaping governmental preferences.

Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to recall liberal international theory and domestic politics approaches, thereby highlighting the historical baseline during the Cold War, which was subsequently followed by scholars’ progressive work in the contemporary period under investigation. By having illuminated endogenous societal considerations as independent variables, for example, interests, institutions and ideas, playing a prominent role in explaining governmental preference formation, the plain commonality of the liberal international theory and domestic politics approaches is that all illuminate domestic actors and domestic structures to explain governmental preference formation and varying governments’ positions in foreign policymaking. The prominent attention on these variables offers a comprehensive understanding of governments’ positions as dependent variables, thus clarifying an analytical approach. Analogue to liberal-inspired characteristics, the joint prevalence of liberalism and domestic politics approaches is their distinct focus on the domestic level of analysis due to the examination of domestically determined preferences prior to considering international and/or institutional characteristics and structures. This specific bottom-up perspective thus distinguishes itself from other theoretical traditions, for example, (neo)realism and international institutionalism, and is viewed by scholars applying liberalism and domestic politics approaches as analytically first-best. This chapter has supported this argument through application of a stringent synthesis of liberal-inspired domestic politics approaches. Focus on the genealogy starting during the Cold War revealed scholars’ interest in liberal international theory and domestic politics approaches increased within the context of transnationalisation, with state-society relations obtaining an original place during this time period. As reflected in the acceleration of research and significant growing literature emanating from the 1990s onwards, the context of globalisation reinforced the significance of this relationship between governments and domestic actors. With scholars’ attention primarily on the application of three societal factors in explaining governmental preferences, interests, institutions and ideas, this

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contemporary research nicely complemented the work from Burton, Kaiser and Hassner. The subsequent discussion of the societal approach to governmental preference formation emphasises that it should be regarded as a distinctive complementary and advancing analytical instrument in contemporary domestic politics approaches. An explicit specification of the domestic variables, interests, ideas and institutions supports the conceptualisation of hypotheses in order to empirically examine the conditions for the prevalence of the three variables vis-à-vis each other in shaping governments’ positions. This embracement of all three domestic factors in the societal approach is as crucial as the discussion of their interrelationship. Liberalism and the domestic politics approaches of IR under scrutiny in this chapter offer an unmistakeable richness to explain and comprehend domestic politics, societal actors and national institutions in shaping governments’ positions. Investigating under which conditions interest, ideas and institutions matter in shaping such preferences resides as an accentuation of the societal approach to governmental preference formation. In sum, during the Cold War an original scholarship solidly put domestic politics on the research agenda, which decidedly paved the way for an exceptionally well and further developed European research output.

References Blyth, M. (2002). Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. Blyth, M. (2003). Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in Political Science. Perspectives on Politics, 1(4), 696–706. Burton, J. (1972). World Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Bièvre, D., & Dür, A. (2005). Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American Trade Policy. Comparative Political Studies, 38(10), 1271–1296. Doyle, M. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review, 80, 1151–1169. Dür, A. (2010). Protection for Exporters: Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930–2010. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Dür, A., & De Bièvre, D. (2007a). The Question of Interest Group Influence. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(1), 1–12. Dür, A., & De Bièvre, D. (2007b). Inclusion Without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(1), 79–101.

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CHAPTER 4

Republicanism and Liberal International Theory Kevin Blachford

Abstract  Republicanism is a theory of liberty centred around the ideals of virtue, active citizenship and a free polis. It is a political discourse which stresses the importance of free citizens participating in an open public sphere. Republicans in both historical thought and practice have sought to secure internal liberty for the polis by expanding republican restraints on power to the international sphere. This tradition of thought therefore views the domestic and the international in a co-constitutive manner. As this chapter shows, modern liberal republicans have looked to the republican tradition to understand the possibilities for political order within Europe. Keywords  Republicanism • Political liberty • Democratic peace • Republican history • European order

K. Blachford (*) Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia Estonian School of Diplomacy, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_4

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Introduction The republican tradition traces its roots to Ancient Greece and Classical Rome. It is celebrated today as part of a ‘European inheritance’ (Van Gelderen and Skinner 2002), and as a rich tradition of political thought. It is a discourse which has long been influential within the discipline of Political Theory, but has been relatively neglected by International Relations (Onuf 1998). The legacy of republicanism within International Relations (IR) deserves to be re-examined because the history of republican states has played a major part in forming European identity and European political order. This is evidenced in the role republican states played in early modern European history. From the Italian city states, such as Genoa, Venice and Florence, to the Dutch United Provinces, English Commonwealth and the French republic, republican states have been widely influential in both historical thought and practice. The following chapter examines the republican influence upon European IR and argues that modern liberal republicans seek to secure the freedom of the polis by promoting republican values and institutions to the international sphere. Liberal republican approaches have traditionally emphasized the domestic nature of a state and stress the importance of checks on power. As this chapter shows, liberal republicans argue that a state with checks on power, a free public sphere and free citizens is more likely to enter into peaceful relations with other republican states. Liberal republican thinkers have historically sought ways to civilize or tame the international in order to allow liberty to flourish. To explore these ideas the following chapter develops in three stages. The first section presents a brief overview of the republican tradition in both political philosophy and IR. The second section then looks to a Kantian-inspired tradition of republican IR which emphasizes the importance of regime type and republican institutions. The third section then moves on to examine the idea of Europe as a whole being regarded as a form of republic. This historical vision of a great European republic is intertwined today with ideas originating from democratic peace theory and has influenced the development of the European Union. The chapter concludes by calling for deepening our understanding of European republicanism within a historical and global context.

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What Is Republicanism? Republicanism is a forerunner to modern liberalism (Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008) and can be understood as a tradition which aims to secure political liberty. The republican and liberal traditions share ‘significant common elements’ and many thinkers are treated as ‘belonging to one or the other tradition have combined elements of both’ (Klusmeyer 2010, 390). The republican approach emphasizes the need for citizen participation within a community. It is a discourse that draws inspiration from both the classical Greek and the Roman polis and the history of early modern European thought. As a theory of liberty, republicanism has long been influential within the disciplines of Intellectual History (Pocock 1975; Skinner 1998) and Political Theory (Pettit 2001). Inspired by a classical Roman tradition, contemporary political theorists look towards republicanism as a discourse centred on the ideal of freedom as non-­ domination. Republicans believe liberty can only be secured when a citizen is not subject to arbitrary control. The ability to interfere with the lives of individuals or the community, in a capricious manner without restraint, is viewed by republicans as the very definition of tyranny. As Philip Pettit (2001, 35) has argued, the republican approach is based on freedom as non-domination because ‘even the slave of a kindly master— the slave who suffers no interference— is unfree’, as the slave is dependent on the benign goodwill of an arbitrary master able to restrict the freedom of the slave at will. Republicanism therefore aims to present a third way of viewing political liberty between Isaiah Berlin’s positive and negative dichotomy (Viroli 2002, 40). The benefit of a republican perspective towards international politics is that it is a discourse which seeks to defend liberty, without succumbing to the quest for power inherent in a machtpolitik conception of realism, or the utopianism of idealism, which expects political liberty to spread as a simple matter of course as the enlightenment project continues to evolve. The republican tradition is commonly seen as an alternative to a Lockean liberal approach (Laborde and Maynor 2008, 2) and can act as a corrective to atomistic conceptions of liberty through the republican emphasis on the community and citizenship. Modern liberal republican thought can draw upon an extensive history of European republican states. From the aristocratic republicanism of Venice to the republican debates within England’s constitutional monarchy and the republicanism of the French revolution, there has been a diverse historical tradition of liberal

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republican thought within European history (Hammersley 2012). However, despite its widespread influence within Political Theory, republicanism is less acknowledged within the discipline of IR. When republicanism is considered, it is largely through the context of the American founding moment (Deudney 2007) or as a tool for American strategy and foreign policy (Tjalve 2008, Hendrickson 2017). Republicanism is rarely explicitly acknowledged as a stand-alone tradition within IR, but republican thought has long been incorporated within the theoretical traditions of both realism and liberalism. Canonical figures within the discipline such as Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant and Rousseau are seen as part of the foundational story of IR as a discipline. But these figures were writing as citizens of republican polities in which republican concerns dominated their thinking (Deudney 2004, 317). The republican influence of these authors has been largely overlooked, although some European scholars have disputed realist claims to canonical authors such as Rousseau (Knutsen 1994; Hassner 1997). When republican ideas have been brought into IR, it is primarily through the tradition of republican liberalism. The liberal republican approach to IR recognizes that the freedom of a republican polis is dependent on achieving security ‘outside’ of the republic in the international sphere (Long 2010). Liberal republican thinkers therefore advocate that peaceful relations within the international sphere are explicitly linked to regime type. This school of thought argues that checks on power, the rule of law and accountable institutions can be used to create peaceful relations between republican states. As the following section explores, contemporary international thought has built upon the work of European republican thinkers, such as Baron de Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant, in developing democratic peace theory. It is within this liberal approach of democratic peace where European republican thought can be found.

A Liberal Republican Democratic Peace European IR has built upon a movement which advocates the possibility of peaceful relations among Kantian republics in the international sphere. Defined as democratic peace theory, it has become one of the major strands of contemporary liberal IR theory. Liberal scholars argue that democracies are more likely to conduct peaceful relations with other democracies and that internationally the influence of democracies can help to overcome the warlike behaviour of an anarchical system (Owen 1994;

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Doyle 2005). European IR seeks to use this liberal republican argument to understand contemporary relations between states within the European Union and Western security community. Democratic peace theory builds upon the arguments of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), in which he argued that states constituted as republics could create a zone of peaceful relations. Kant’s thesis was built on the idea that republican states could unite within a confederation as republics were less likely to go to war compared to monarchical powers (Hurrell 1990). In the post-Cold War era, the democratic peace literature has developed by building upon the arguments of Kant (Sorensen 1992), and liberal European scholars continue to argue that modern democracies are more peaceful actors (Jørgensen 2010, 137). The democratic peace theory rests on Kant’s argument that peace can evolve from the three pillars of a democratic culture, a common moral foundation and economic interdependence (Sorensen 1992, 412). Liberal republican theorists have sought to use Kant to explain how the Western security community and Western European nations have built a zone of peace, in which ‘wars against other democracies are excluded from the spectrum of possible democratic behaviour’ (Muller and Wolff 2006, 68). The success of this Western security community has led European IR theorists, such as Georg Cavallar (2001), to argue that the lesson of Kant is that there is a moral dimension to promote republicanism as a means for peace. Contemporary IR scholars have looked to the republican liberal tradition in order to explain the peaceful relations between modern democratic states. While some argue liberal democracies are more likely to be law abiding and peaceful (Jackson and Sorensen 2010, 9), others have emphasized the effects of interdependence and trade as a way to promote peace (Dorussen and Ward 2010). The pacifying effect of international trade has been a common theme within the liberal republican tradition. Both Kant and Baron de Montesquieu saw trade as a way to improve relations between states. The French philosopher Montesquieu is primarily known for his republican arguments on the separation of powers which influenced the US constitution, but he also argued that the influence of Doux Commerce could moderate aggressive quests for conquest (Patapan 2012). Montesquieu stated ‘peace is the natural effect of trade’ (Dorussen and Ward 2010, 31), and contemporary liberal scholars continue this republican argument in advocating for a democratic peace. The interdependence of international trade is seen as having a restraining effect and acting as a check against aggressive state behaviour.

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In following the arguments of Montesquieu and Kant, the democratic peace literature has celebrated the ideals of European republican thought, but without examining the history of early modern republics. Contemporary approaches to democratic peace often overlook their implicit normative assumptions (Geis and Wagner 2011), and presuppose the existence of a liberal democratic community. In the modern liberal peace literature, Kant’s republican constitutions have become simply equated with modern liberal capitalist democracies. This misinterpretation obscures the concerns of republicanism for competing power relations within the polis. Issues of power contestation, the meaning of democracy and freedom are therefore taken as unproblematic by many democratic peace theorists (Paris 2006, 426). This leaves power relations within and across the polis as largely unexamined. However, Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795) explicitly stated that in order for there to be peace, ‘the Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican’. European republican thought has therefore sought to argue against treating modern democracies as synonymous with republican polities. Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1996) argued for a more radical reading of Kant’s idea of a republic. He emphasized that the democratic peace literature did not account for, or problematize, the existing practices of real democracies. Czempiel, instead, called for more transparency and citizen participation in foreign policy. Republicanism can therefore strengthen contemporary liberal arguments by highlighting the co-constitutive connections between the domestic and the international. Republican theorists have traditionally stressed that the liberty of the polis is intertwined with the external sphere. This has led republicans to argue for the importance of internal checks on power. Writing in the eighteenth century, the philosopher Emmerich de Vattel (1758) argued that only by striving for the republican concept of equilibrium could liberty be maintained. Internal checks on power were also a key part of Kant’s reasoning in support of a republican peace. Kant argued citizens wouldn’t want to suffer the burdens of war and should be able to hold their leaders to account (Hegre 2014). Contemporary research on republicanism has continued to build on the distinct republican argument for restraints on power. The ability of republican institutions to act as sources of restraint can be applied to both the domestic and the international (Kustermans 2010). European republican theorists emphasize the importance of domestic institutions as a key determinant of a state’s foreign policy (Marcussen et al., 1999). The republican approach is to stress the importance of citizenship within a community. Jorg

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Kustermans (2011) has therefore argued that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can itself even be understood as a liberal republican community, which places duties on its ‘citizens’ of member states. Democratic peace theory has evolved as substantial research paradigm. However, much of the democratic peace literature takes questions of democracy and liberty for granted and seeks to follow a positivist methodology with calls for new ‘datasets’ being repeated ad nauseam (Hobson 2017). The benefit of a republican approach is that it can deepen our awareness of the co-constitutive relationship between the polis and the international sphere. It can therefore act as a way to broaden liberal theory by incorporating normative understandings of citizenship and political liberty. The republican approach which emphasizes citizenship and community can also be found within both historical and contemporary arguments in support of a European republic.

Europe as a Republic Contemporary republican scholars seek to strengthen liberal IR theory by calling for a re-evaluation of the republican emphasis on ‘sovereignty, legitimacy and political community’ (Kenny 2003, 142). These arguments are equally apparent within debates on the European community as a whole. The democratic peace theory builds upon a Kantian paradigm which has been explicitly used by the Council of Europe and the European Communities to advocate for closer integration and peace between Western European democracies (Ghervas 2017). As the following argues, a concurrent trend within international thought is to see the community of Europe as a republic in itself. The term ‘Europe’ is not just a geographical name, but is linked to questions of history, identity and culture. Early modern republicans viewed the identity of Europe as intimately linked to questions and debates regarding the structure of political order. These thinkers celebrated the idea of Europe as a whole being conceived in terms of a ‘republic of Europe’ (Onuf 1998, 88). This ideal of a republican political order which covered the whole of the continent developed from struggles against hierarchical rule and by challenging Medieval conceptions of universal monarchy. The republican emphasis on self-rule, citizenship and accountable power was developed in direct contrast to the hierarchical absolutism of Medieval kingship (Bouwsma 1984, 11). In response to the hierarchy of the divine right of kings, republicanism was advanced as an ‘alternative

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and opposing set of ideas to the domination of absolute monarchy’ (Long 2010, 775). Early modern theorists such as the Venetian Friar Paolo Sarpi attacked monarchical universalism as a tyrannical form of governance (Keenan 2015). Breaking away from universal absolutism was a way to defend the division of Europe into separate territorial entities. But, crucially, this division was also believed to ensure the security of republican liberty. Political order among European states was maintained while ensuring the ‘independence and liberty’ of each actor (Christov 2005, 574). The ‘balance of Europe’ therefore became a prominent phrase for republicans keen to support this division of power between the states of Europe and in rejection of the arbitrary power of universal monarchy (Schmidt 1966). For republican thinkers, the states of Europe could therefore be understood as citizens within a broader community. The idea of Europe as a ‘great republic’ continues to influence modern ideas of European community. Emphasizing Europe as a republican order is based on the conception that there is a tradition of shared common values of public law and the separation of powers (Aron 1976, 6). It is this republican tradition with its emphasis on the rule of law and cooperation which enhances Europe’s normative power (Lavdas 2010). A broad range of authors have turned to republican ideas on institutions to call for a renewed emphasis on the European Union as a modern-day form of republic (Nicolaidis 2004; Fabbrini 2005; Simms 2012). The institutional design of the European Union reflects a republican desire to secure liberty by restraining the member states with separate sources of authority (Halden 2011a, 441–442). The understanding of Europe as a republic can be further broken down into two broad trends within international thought. Firstly, there are those who wish to see member states retain a strong autonomy and identity within a broader European community. A Europe of republican states is advocated as a way to connect supranational institutions to the ‘demoi’ of member states (Bellamy 2019). The European republic of nation states is an approach which can be commonly seen within the debates of French elites, who have historically tied their view of Europe to a French identity based on enlightenment and republicanism. The French republican ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité are therefore attached to the idea of Europe as a community of enlightened democratic republican states (Marcussen et al. 1999, 621). Secondly, there are those who view European integration as a path towards a republican federation colloquially referred to as a ‘United States of Europe’ (Burgess 2000, 249; Nicolaidis 2004; Trechsel 2005; Fabbrini 2010). However,

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there is a possibility for the development of a third way between this debate of national republics or a federation of republics. Another strand of IR has involved a historical turn to examine the republican history of Europe’s member states, such as the Swiss Confederation and the Holy Roman Empire (Halden 2011b; Lerner 2011). Peter Halden (2011c) has also shown that the German Confederation between 1815 and 1866 can be seen as a form of political order based on republican principles. This ‘compound republic’ acted as a form of restraint by creating a balance of power within the German polity that acted to ensure stability both within the Confederation and in its external relations. A broader and deeper understanding of republican history is vital to contextualize contemporary IR theory. Looking to history can also help maintain a realistic understanding of liberal republican politics and the possibility of political order. Within the discipline of international Political Theory, scholars have looked to Europe as a model of success and present republicanism as a universalized ideal (Bellamy 2016; Laborde and Ronzoni 2016), which can then be championed to promote republicanism as a model for ‘global’ justice (Laborde and Maynor 2008, 14). But as critical theorists recognize, Europe’s republican liberty did not evolve solely as endogenous to Europe (Tully 2008). The idea of a Kantian peace evolving within Europe and expanding internationally risks the danger of becoming a mission civilisatrice. As this chapter has argued, much of the Kantian peace literature within IR conflates modern democracies to historical republics without examining the normative meanings of democracy, liberty and citizenship. To continue research on liberal republicanism within IR there needs to be a greater investigation into the history of actual republican polities. European history contains a rich array of republicanism in both political thought and actual practice which can be used to deepen our understanding of both political liberty and the possibilities of a liberal political order. Placing this European republican history within a global context, which recognizes how Europeans interacted with powers and actors outside of Europe, can deepen our understanding of liberal republicanism as a tradition.

Conclusion Republicanism can complement and enhance liberal IR theory. Although the two schools of thought share significant common elements, republicanism presents an older language of liberty which stresses the importance

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of citizenship and community. As this chapter has shown, European republican thinkers have also emphasized the relationship between a domestic regime and the external sphere. Liberal republican arguments have therefore focused on the internal checks on power within the state and its relationship to the external sphere. Highlighting the importance of internal checks on power and in making power accountable to citizens is particularly relevant for contemporary European politics. Post-Cold War liberalism has often viewed political liberty as an assumed condition in which the security of individual liberty is an achieved condition. The expansion of a liberal democratic peace was therefore understood in the 1990s in teleological terms as part of Fukuyama’s claims to the end of history (Gray 2011). However, at a time when public commentators and scholars are concerned about limits to liberty (Snyder 2017), the demise of Western liberalism (Luce 2017) and the decline of democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Moyo 2018), republican history shows that political liberty is always limited in scope and prone to decay, decline and fragility. The liberal tradition can therefore be enhanced by looking to republicanism with its emphasis on citizenship, community and the importance of republican institutions as a check against corruption and the abuse of power.

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Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H.  J., & Roscher, K. (1999). Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), 614–633. Moyo Dambisa. (2018). Edge of Chaos. London: Little, Brown. Muller, H., & Wolff, J. (2006). Democratic Peace: Many Data, Little Explanation? In A. Geis, L. Brock, & H. Mueller (Eds.), Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace (pp. 41–73). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Nicolaidis, K. (2004). We the Peoples of Europe…. Foreign Affairs, 83(6), 97–110. Onuf, N. G. (1998). The Republican Legacy in International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Owen, J. M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security, 19(2), 87–125. Paris, R. (2006). Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary Studies of the Liberal Peace. International Studies Review, 8(3), 425–440. Patapan, H. (2012). Democratic International Relations: Montesquieu and the Theoretical Foundations of Democratic Peace Theory. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 66(3), 313–329. Pettit, P. (2001). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schmidt, H. D. (1966). The Establishment of ‘Europe’ as a Political Expression. The Historical Journal, 9(2), 172–178. Simms, B. (2012). Towards a Mighty Union: How to Create a Democratic European Superpower. International Affairs, 88(1), 49–62. Skinner, Q. (1998). Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorensen, G. (1992). Kant and Processes of Democratization. Journal of Peace Research, 29(4), 397–414. Snyder Timothy, D. (2017). On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century , London: Bodley Head. Tjalve, V. (2008). Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Trechsel, A.  H. (2005). How to Federalize the European Union…and Why Bother. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(3), 401–418. Tully, J. (2008). Modern Constitutional Democracy and Imperialism. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 46(3), 461–493. Van Gelderen, Martin and Skinner, Quentin eds., Republicanism: The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe: A Shared European Heritage, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Viroli, M. (2002). Republicanism. New York: Henry Holt & Company Inc.

CHAPTER 5

Liberal European Peace Theories and Their Critics Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon

Abstract  The chapter reviews contributions on three approaches to theory building on peace: peace through modernization, peace through democratization, and peace through law and international institution building. Our basic thesis is that liberal European theory building owes a lot to the tradition of Kant on the one hand, but on the other hand carries with it a reflection on the inherent limitations and contradictions of each of the three approaches. In addition to the inherent (reflexive) critique of liberal approaches to theory building on peace there is also a critique of the liberal approach to theory building as such. However, we suggest that the intra-European critique of liberal theory building itself is rooted in the liberal tradition in as much as it functions as some kind of critical liberalism.

L. Brock (*) • H. Simon Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_5

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Keywords  Peace theory • Peace as civilizing process • Democratic peace • Democratic wars • Peace through law • Law as justification of violence • Post-liberal peace • Critical liberalism

Introduction: European Liberal Peace Theories Between Reflexivity and External Critique The possibility and feasibility of peace has been a subject of public debates and ‘private’ anxieties throughout human history (Picht 1971; Richmond 2008). Europe has its own stories to tell. But the way they are being told has not lead to a uniform European tradition in thinking about peace (and war), which as such could be clearly distinguished from non-European (other Western) traditions. Furthermore, in Europe, as elsewhere, peace theories are not the exclusive objects of a specific academic discipline. They involve Ethics, Philosophy (International Political Theory), the Social Sciences (including International Relations [IR]), International Law, History, Geography, and also the Natural Sciences (Physics, Biology, Environmental Sciences, etc.). The fact that the concept of peace eludes rigid disciplinary boundaries implies that theory building on peace proceeds in a multidisciplinary manner interacting with a multitude of audiences who may not even be aware of each other. If there is a common denominator of European liberal thinking on peace, it is, perhaps, the struggle with the question whether ‘perpetual peace’ (Kant) is possible in the face of perpetual wars. We identify three fields of study regarding this question: (1) peace through modernization, (2) peace through democratization, and (3) peace through law and international institution building. Our basic thesis is that liberal theory building in Europe carries with it a reflection not only on the heuristic potential but also on the inherent limitations and contradictions of each of the three approaches. This involves an interplay between internal and external critique, that is, between rejection and reflexivity. Some peace researchers in Europe feel that theory building should be directed towards a ‘post-liberal peace’ (Richmond 2011); others call for more reflexivity in terms of a ‘critical liberal peace theory’ (Geis and Müller 2013: 362). We feel that both positions are part of the European tradition as long as they speak to each other.

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From Peace Through National Liberation to Peace Through Modernization The establishment of today’s peace research in Europe owes a lot to Johan Galtung and the foundation of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) as an avant-garde institution in this field of study. Galtung contributed immensely to structuring the issues to be dealt with and to formulate an analytical and normative focus under which this could be done (Galtung 1969). Under his guidance, the beginning of peace research was decidedly critical. It was directed against ‘strategic studies’ which engaged academic research as a tool to strengthen the West in the Cold War; it advocated non-violent modes of dealing with conflict (in the Gandhian tradition) but it also took sides in the ongoing anti-colonial struggles in favour of the ‘Third World’. Galtung’s differentiation between negative and positive peace, direct and structural and later on also cultural violence (Galtung 1969, 1975) provided a vocabulary which quickly gave peace research a voice in the liberal democracies and especially in the evolving social movements for peace and emancipation. Peace researchers in general retained a critical stance towards the established security politics of states (cf. Senghaas 1972b; Gantzel 1975; Krippendorff 1985); however, the border line between those who considered themselves as belonging to ‘critical peace research’ and those who did not share this label became quite blurred during the 1980s and especially after the end of the Cold War. The result was what Anna Geis and Harald Müller (2013: 362) identified as critical liberal peace research. It was critical in as much as it continued to work on overcoming the nexus of injustice and insecurity in a globalizing world, and liberal in as much as it proceeded on the assumption (if cautiously) that peace had to be understood as a civilizing process interacting positively with democratization, economic development, and the growth of an international rule of law. One of the most productive European academics who embodied (and still does) this critical liberal peace research was Dieter Senghaas. Among his early work topics was the critique of nuclear deterrence as a system of organized non-peace. Drawing on his cooperation with Karl Deutsch, Senghaas used the concept of learning pathologies to describe the arms race as an autistic process, that is, as a system of communication by non-­ communication, which for this very reason developed a dangerous dynamic of its own. While Senghaas argued that between East and West the only way to peace was more communication, he pleaded (in accord with the

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great Latin American debate on ‘dependent reproduction’) for a strategic dissociation of the South from the North as a way to overcome structural violence as a precondition of peace (1972a). From these critical beginnings, Senghaas, in the 1990s, turned to identifying the constitutive elements of domestic and international peace. He named six such elements which made domestic peace possible (Senghaas 1995). The complete configuration, the much-cited ‘civilizational hexagon’, was located by Senghaas in the liberal democracies (constituting the ‘OECD world’). However, he did not argue that peace would only come about when all six elements of the configuration were in place. Rather, peace had to be understood as a civilizing process which unfolded as the six elements of the configuration emerged as a result of concrete historical struggle. Senghaas built on Norbert Elias’ study on ‘The Civilizing Process’ (2010 [1939]). While he emphasized that there would always be the danger of regression (cf. today’s populism and nationalism in liberal democracies), the main focus of his approach was on demonstrating the possibility of progress towards sustainable peace through what can be summed up as modernization. The scaling up of such intra-state processes to the global level according to Senghaas had to proceed by concerted international efforts to protect people from violence, want, and chauvinism and to ward off all threats to freedom. This, in turn, would call for ‘multiple complex programs’ which Senghaas formulated in analogy to Kant’s text on eternal peace and which tied together his previous work in an effort to come to grips with the Kantian dictum that peace does not come about by itself but must be actively pursued (gestiftet) (Senghaas 2004). While Senghaas approached this issue from the viewpoint of the domestic pacification of modern states, a research group around Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel focused on global socialization as a moving frontier between tradition and modernity. Their central thesis was that modernity as such fostered non-war approaches to conflict whereas the encounter of tradition with modernity was a lasting source of war (Gantzel 1997; Schlichte 1996; Jung 1995; for an alternative focus on the emergence of world society under the perspective of ‘Civilizing World Politics’ cf. Albert et al. 2000). But the expectation that modernization as such fosters peace remains highly contested—and rightly so. We may continue to qualify global change as modernization, but this change has done more to transform war than to establish peace (cf. Joas 2002; Hassner 2000). As Andrew Linklater states in his observations on global civilizing processes, ‘early complex

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societies reduced the dangers that emanated from the natural world only to increase the threats that human beings posed to each other’ (Linklater 2010: 165). Today, we experience that modernization also increases the dangers emanating from the natural world and this way adds to the threats that human beings pose to each other. Hence, liberal ideas on modernization and the strategies derived from them for state and nation building in the global South have met with substantial criticism (Jahn 2007). Liberal modernization is seen as a hegemonic project pursued by the liberal democracies in an attempt to do the world over in their own image. Time and again, so post-colonial studies are pointing out, the claim that there is no alternative to the liberal way of overcoming fragile statehood has been falsified by empirical evidence. As Oliver Richmond writes, the renunciation of an alternative to liberal peace building derives from ‘crypto-colonial claims of cosmopolitan universalism’ based on ‘a knowledge system and epistemic community, allied to a narrow set of interests, norms, institutions and techniques, developed from these’ (Richmond 2011: 2, 3; cf. Smith 2011; Mac Ginty 2008; Chandler 2017). A similar critique pertains to the debate on the linkage between peace and (liberal) democracy.

Peace Through Democratization For a number of years, ‘Kantian peace’ was regarded and debated as a way out of the ambiguities of modernization. In the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, the democratic peace proposition inferred from Kant’s plan for eternal peace became one of the major battlefields in liberal IR. While the sceptics challenged the democratic peace proposition altogether (some for theoretical and others for statistical reasons), the proponents of the proposition debated whether it applied to all foreign relations of democracies or to intra-democratic relations only. One of the Continental pioneers in this theatre, who developed his ideas concurrent with Michael Doyle (1983), was Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1986, 1996). Following (like Doyle) a liberal approach and building equally on Kant as on David Easton, Czempiel addressed the linkage between domestic political order and foreign policy in terms of the rule-specific transformation of societal preferences into authoritative outputs (Czempiel 1986). He posited that political systems characterized by a high degree of consensus and a correspondingly low degree of repression would also prefer consensus to coercion in their foreign relations (1986: 114, 115). However, according to Czempiel

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few states if any met the criteria for a full-fledged democracy, least of all in the realm of foreign relations. Thus Czempiel, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, referred to ‘Kant’s theorem’ in order to explain why the behaviour of existing democracies routinely fell short of the expectations generated by the programmatic linkage between democracy and peace.1 In addition to these democratic deficits of democracies, so Czempiel argued, democratic governments in crisis situations would be just as prone to do the unwise thing as non-democracies. From this point of view, Czempiel regarded international organizations as indispensable in order to cope with residual security dilemmas even among democracies and to bring out the good in the foreign relations of democracies even in their relations with non-democracies (Czempiel 1996; cf. Rittberger and Fischer 2008). In a strong variation of Czempiel’s plea for looking at Kant more deeply, Lars Eric Cedermann (2001) argued that Kant’s ‘eternal peace’ should be understood as addressing a historic learning process which is ‘dynamic rather than stationary in that states alter their behavior as a consequence of taking past experience into account’. This is to say that ‘the effect of democracy changes over time’. This process ‘is dialectical because catastrophic reversals, such as world wars, drive home the point that there is little choice but to eliminate violence in interstate relations’. Combining his reading of Kant with a quantitative approach to testing Kant’s proposition, Cedermann concludes that democracies are learning faster than non-­ democracies from catastrophic disruption on how to achieve the inevitable, that is, peace. This learning process can spill over into the non-democratic world, thus providing for the possibility of approaching peace even before general democratization. The vast majority of the liberal IR community in Europe as elsewhere agrees that the democratic peace proposition constitutes one of the few laws, if not the only ‘law’, in IR (Hayes 2012; for the most recent confirmation of this view cf. Hegre et al. 2020). However, the causal logic of the democratic (dyadic) peace and its effects on the behaviour of democracies in general as well as its spillover effects on the international system remain contested (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997). Systematic research at these three levels of analysis got a big push through introducing quantitative methods to peace research. In this context, Nils Petter Gleditsch from the Peace Research Institute Oslo and Peter Wallensteen from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University contributed 1

 Also see the chapter by Kevin Blachford on republican theory in this book.

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tremendously to ‘making peace researchable’ (Wallensteen 2011a) by building up databases which are widely used for research on violent conflict and methods of conflict resolution (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Wallensteen 2011b; cf. Wallensteen 2012). The introduction of quantitative methods also helped to restate questions pertaining to the impact of economic globalization (especially the resulting international interdependence and domestic modernization) as a source of peace (cf. Schneider 2010; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010; Bussmann et al. 2005). At the same time, academic interest in dealing with the ‘flip side’ of democratic peace, democratic war, grew under the impact of the interventionism practised by the Anglo-American democracies and their coalitions of the willing in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Two aspects came to the fore in dealing with the double finding that democracies were peaceful in dealing with each other but did not hesitate to use force vis-à-­ vis non-democracies (Geis 2001): the first one pertained to the question why democracies did not fight each other even though they obviously were not war-averse as such; the second one regarded the question of whether or to what extent democracies may even have a special motivation to use force in dealing with non-democracies (Daase 2006). As to the first question, Thomas Risse-Kappen offered an explanation by referring to well-known patterns of ingroup-outgroup interaction. He argued that democracies, while being states among other states, recognized each other as belonging to a group bound together and set apart from other states precisely by being (or by regarding themselves as being) liberal democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995). Conflict within the ingroup, so the argument went, is assessed on the basis of familiarity and trust while conflict with non-democracies calls for caution mixed with distrust. The source of this difference according to Risse-Kappen is the self-perception of democracies as peaceful and reasonable, which creates a negative mirror image of non-­ democratic states. The ingroup-outgroup constellation, according to Risse-Kappen, supports the formation of security communities the individual members of which do not judge each other by however militant they may behave vis-à-vis non-democracies. Rather, expectations are determined by the perception of the other states as democracies. These observations picked up on the growing interest in norms, identities, and perceptions as part of the constructivist turn in IR in the 1990s. This goes also for the way the second question was addressed, that is, the question as to whether or to what extent democracies may be more war-­ prone in dealing with non-democracies than these are among themselves.

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On this issue the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) embarked on a special research programme under the heading of the ‘Antinomies of the Democratic Peace’. The title was from Harald Müller’s theoretical substantiation of the programme (Müller 2004). The idea behind the project was not to repudiate the democratic peace proposition altogether but rather to show that democratic peace came with a dark side: democratic war (Geis et al. 2006; Rengger 2006). This dark side, according to Müller, was ingrained in the very nature of liberal democracies. They perceived themselves as the vanguard of peace but by this very token they also felt themselves authorized and even called upon to spread democracy and to defend human rights if necessary by the use of force. Under this perspective, the practice of the Bush Jr. administration to identify rogue states which figured as the enemies in the US “war on terror” was not merely a reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It rather resulted from the predisposition of democracies in general to perceive themselves as (liberal) ‘forces for good’ (Geis et al. 2013). Müller (2006) located this predisposition even in the thinking of Immanuel Kant and his notion of the ‘unjust enemy’. Jürgen Habermas (1997) felt that this notion was of minor importance in Kant’s thinking. In contrast, according to Müller, the unjust enemy was a necessary figure in Kant’s theoretical approach to perpetual peace. This aroused some controversy. In addition to the implicit rejection of Müller’s observations on Kant’s ‘unjust enemy’ by Habermas, Oliver Eberl (2011) argued that Kant’s thinking should not be confused with contemporaneous notions of rogue states and the self-authorization of individual democratic states to fight them. Along this line, Beate Jahn reversed Müller’s argument. She called for a clear distinction between liberal internationalism (which in her reading is always imperialistic) and Kant’s plans for a perpetual peace (Jahn 2005). Jahn’s argument was supported by critical studies of liberal peace building and by post-colonial studies which confronted liberal cosmopolitanism with the harsh realities of liberal interventionism (Chandler 2017; Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2008). PRIF did not join this allout critique of liberalism. In line with Soerensen (2006), it preferred to stick to the notion of the ambivalence of democratic peace. However, PRIF differentiated the notion of ambivalence by comparing the war proneness of different liberal democracies against non-­ democracies (Geis et al. 2013). Based on thorough empirical case studies, the research team demonstrated how the standard explanations of democratic peace—utilitarian preferences, institutional constraints, and

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inhibiting norms—play out quite differently in different constellations of conflict depending on power relations, role models, and historical experience (collective identities). This is to say that ‘the relationship between democracy, peace and war is much more contingent than causal assumptions of D[emocratic] P[eace] scholarship imply’ (Geis et al. 2013: 340). This certainly holds true for the idea of peace through law, too.

Peace Through Law, or: ‘The Self-Assertion and Self-Destruction of Peace as Rule of Law’2 Just as the discourse on ‘peace through democratization’, the discourse on ‘peace through law’ owes a lot to Immanuel Kant’s writings (cf. Cedermann 2001). Kant argues that it is reasonable to call for the relinquishment of the arbitrary use of force but posits the necessity to bring reason to bear not only through democratization (as the realization of freedom) but also through positive law and institutionalized international cooperation. With his ‘eternal peace’, Kant establishes a civilizing telos of international order which comes to bear as a process of overcoming the arbitrary use of force (Habermas 1997; cf. Niesen and Eberl forthcoming). To this day, Kant’s teleological project of ‘peace through law’ has been further developed in IR, International Law, and International Political Theory. Older European legal scholars like Walther Schücking, Hans Wehberg, Hans Kelsen, and Hersch Lauterpacht pushed for ‘peace guaranteed by compulsory adjudication of international disputes’.3 They also emphasized the importance of general international organizations to foster and follow up on international legalization. With the end of the Cold War liberal international thought received a big boost, resulting in a considerable literature on the further legalization of international relations— and even on the constitutionalization of international law as the central feature of establishing a global peace order derived from Kant (Habermas 1997, 2001). Starting from the so-called “German debate in IR” on the possibility of deliberation and persuasion in the sense of Habermas’ discourse ethics, important impulses from scholars such as Thomas Risse (2000), Harald Müller, Nicole Deitelhoff (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005), and Antje Wiener (2018) have found their way into broad empirical

2 3

 Brock and Simon (2018).  On Lauterpacht, see F. Asli Ergul Jorgensen’s chapter in this book.

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research on (legal) norms in IR and their contribution for overcoming war as a practice of dealing with conflict. This is to say that Kant’s theory of ‘peace through law’ has certainly made it into the core of modern peace theories (even acknowledged, if critically, by Waltz [1962]; for Raymond Aron’s engagement with Kant, see Jørgensen’s Introduction: 16–17). As British political theorist Richard Tuck has argued in his seminal book on The Rights of War and Peace (1999), concepts of international legal order lie at the heart of the formation of modern liberal political theory in Europe. While the discourse on ‘peace through law’ is firmly anchored in European history, this unfortunately cannot be read as signalling a special peace proneness of the Europeans—liberal or not (Koskenniemi 2001). Two World Wars centred in Europe clearly speak against too much confidence regarding the pacifying effects of international law—even more so since European liberals had already anticipated the outlawry of war in the nineteenth century (Simon 2018).4 Yet, it was precisely the double disaster of the World Wars which brought about what has recently been called a revolutionary turn in legal thinking on peace and war (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017; cf. the chapter by Lacin Idil Öztığ). In that sense, ‘peace through law’ as a liberal narrative clearly can be understood as a European success story that spread to the world and then in part came back to Europe (cf. Kelsen 1944). However, as we can see today, more legalization per se does not go along with more peace (Payk 2018). Hence, the success story unfortunately cannot be read as a linear progress in the factual curtailment of war (Koskenniemi 2001). In addition to empirical objections to the notion of progress in hedging war, there are also normative arguments that have been voiced against faith in the further legalization of international relations. This critique emerged in the context of the debate on the ‘constitutionalization of international law’. Habermas’ disciple Ingeborg Maus insisted that in a world of nation states freedom and peace could only be achieved and maintained on the basis of the unrestrained exercise of popular sovereignty. In her view this is incompatible with the constitutionalization of international law (Maus 2006). In contrast, Habermas insisted that ‘political empowerment of a pre-political global civil society composed of 4  This emphasizes once again that the ‘beginnings of liberal international theorizing in the early 20th century were in important ways also continuities of the 19th century liberalism’, see Jørgensen’s Introduction: 10.

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citizens from different nations is a different matter from imposing a constitution on an existing state power’ (Habermas 2008: 448). According to Habermas, Kant’s idea of a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ (weltbürgerlicher Zustand) left room for the protection of both freedom and peace. Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan condition’ could thus take the shape of a worldwide constitutional order (Habermas 2001). For achieving such an order Habermas distinguished two paths of legitimacy—one national, the other cosmopolitan. Both ‘would meet in the General Assembly of the world organization (…) for the latter would be responsible for the normative parameters of both peace and human rights policy and global domestic politics’ (Habermas 2008: 448). This was an issue which David Held problematized in his extensive writings on global democracy. In his path breaking study on ‘Democracy and the Global Order’ (Held 1995) Held pioneered a concept for a cosmopolitan institution which would respond to the then broadly observed ‘de-bordering of the world of nation-states’ (Albert and Brock 1996) and provide for a reframing of democracy in a globalized world (Archibugi and Held 1995). Today, these debates seem to be out of tune with reality. This has to do not only with the resurgence of nationalism but also with the intrinsic contradictions between peace and law. While the liberal theory of ‘peace through law’ puts hope in the pacifying force of law, both critical scholars within the liberal theoretical tradition and outside of it refer to the fact that law is always a product of political violence. Much in this sense, Hans Kelsen stated in his famous book on Peace Through Law (1944: 3–7) that while peace as the absence of violence was conceivable only as a legal order, a legal order is by its very nature a ‘coercive order’: Because law is a result of social, economic, and political conflicts, violence burns itself ‘fatefully’ into legal orders as Frankfurt philosopher Walter Benjamin (1969 [1920/21]) has argued. Or, in free reference to Clausewitz and Michel Foucault, who prominently described himself as a critical Kantian, law functions as ‘a continuation of war by other means’ (2009 [1976]: 32). The fundamental problem of law as it relates to violence thus survives legalization (Menke 2012: 7–8). The insight into the ‘fateful’ continuation of violence in law (Benjamin 1965 [1920/21]) constitutes a fundamental challenge to liberal theory building, but it is not the end of liberal theorizing on ‘peace through law’. Critical thinkers like Benjamin, Foucault, and Menke tell us that it is not enough to rely on checks and balances on the one hand, and legal review on the other. Rather, ‘progress’ in dealing with the problematic constellation of law and violence calls for

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the establishment of a legal order that provides the space for a constant reflection of its own entanglement with arbitrariness—avec la force de la loi (Derrida 1992; Brock and Simon 2018). From this Gertrud Brücher, a highly sophisticated expert on peace theory from a Luhmann’ian viewpoint, warns that a peace theory which focuses on the distinction between civilizing and de-civilizing violence threatens to lose its distance from Realpolitik. In accord with the Ghandian tradition (and Galtung), she therefore insists that peace can only be achieved if pursued by peaceful means (Brücher 2008: 90). Though legalization certainly does not overcome the arbitrary use of force, it increases the pressure to justify it. This, in turn, may help to internalize the non-use of force in conflict as a standard of adequacy in international relations. To wit, the justification of the use of force always adds up to an instrumentalization of law by those acting violently. However, as Lothar Brock argues, law as such is not at the unabashed disposal of political actors. It has a normative core which resists total instrumentalization because total instrumentalization would drain reference to law of its legitimating effect. Political actors are interested in law for the very reason that there are limits to its instrumentalization (Brock 2010). Accordingly, political actors are performing an act of self-binding when they refer to the law, as law can only be of value to them if it retains its relative autonomy vis-à-vis politics. In this sense, propagating peace through law opens up an arena for both the justification and the hedging of violence (Brock 2010; Brock and Simon forthcoming). With a view to this constitutive feature of law, Anglo-American liberals tend to emphasize the enabling function of international law, while Continental Europeans concentrate more on its restricting function. However, faced with the current crisis of the liberal international order, there seems to grow a basic scepticism as to whether international law has any function at all (Brown forthcoming). Perhaps one of the roots of this crisis might be found in the precarious relationship between peace and democracy debated above.

Conclusion: ‘Knowing War—Thinking Peace’ As this incomplete sketch may have shown, European liberal peace theories constitute a rich and complex tradition of thinking in modern IR, International Law, and International Political Theory. However, in the context of liberal interventionism it has come under heavy fire by contemporaneous critics of liberal approaches to peace (Jahn 2007; Richmond

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2011; Chandler 2017; Mac Ginty 2008; Neu 2018). This academic criticism is now being followed by the crisis of the liberal order emanating from its internal contradictions as they interact with a global power shift. In this situation, how shall we continue to think about peace? In her text on ‘knowing war and thinking peace’ Monique Castillo (2005) calls for a universalism that is neither possessive nor triumphalist but intentional and open and as such would allow a truly ethical grounding of the idea of peace. In a similar vein, Anna Geis and Harald Müller (referring to Tony Smith [2011]) conclude their substantial study on ‘the militant face of democracy’ (2013: 364) with the statement: ‘Our findings underline that a “triumphalist” and self-certain liberalism is unwarranted. Instead, the return to the critical legacy of the Enlightenment is a good antidote: the practice of (…) self-reflection as an emancipatory exercise of the self as well as the acknowledgement of ambivalence should caution against liberal hubris’. Would that help to spur the historical learning process which Lars Eric Cedermann delineates in his reading of Kant in the context of 200 years of practice (Cedermann 2001)? Hopefully, it still makes sense to assume that it would—so that, in Kant’s words, der Mensch noch in die Welt passe.

References Albert, M., & Brock, L. (1996). De-bordering the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations. New Political Science, 35, 69–106. Albert, M., Brock, L., & Wolf, K.  D. (Eds.). (2000). Civilizing World Politics. Society and Community Beyond the State. Lanham: Lynne Rienner. Archibugi, D., & Held, D. (1995). Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Benjamin, W. (1965 [1920/21]). Zur Kritik der Gewalt. In W. Benjamin (Ed.), Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze (pp. 29–65). Suhrkamp: Frankfurt. Brock, L. (2010). Frieden durch Recht. In P. Becker, R. Braun, & D. Deiseroth (Eds.), Frieden durch Recht? (pp. 15–34). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag. Brock, L., & Simon, H. (2018). Die Selbstbehauptung und Selbstgefährdung des Friedens als Herrschaft des Rechts. Eine endlose Karussellfahrt? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 59(2), 269–291. Brock, L., & Simon, H. (Eds.). (forthcoming). The Justification of War and International Order. From Past to Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brown, C. (forthcoming). Justified: Just War, the Ethics of Violence and World Order. In L.  Brock & H.  Simon (Eds.), The Justification of War and International Order. From Past to Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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CHAPTER 6

Liberal Security Theories Kamil Zwolski

Abstract  Liberally minded European thinkers have developed a wealth of ideas on how to achieve a more peaceful international security order. This chapter begins with the discussion of interwar and wartime enthusiasts of international federation. In particular, the distinction is drawn between Europe-focused Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and more outward-­oriented British liberal internationalists. Subsequently, the chapter contrasts the federalist ideas with the functionalist approach of David Mitrany. In the third section, the chapter brings the discussion to more recent times, revisiting the European take on international regimes. The chapter concludes with the reappraisal of the contemporary debates on European security governance and the European Union’s role in international security. Keywords  Federalism • Functionalism • Coudenhove-Kalergi • Mitrany • Security community • Security governance • European foreign policy

K. Zwolski (*) University of Southampton, Southampton, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_6

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This chapter reappraises some of the key European liberalist arguments and discussions pertaining to European and global security. It may come as a surprise to some readers that liberalism has had anything meaningful to say about international security ‘during the century of extreme violence’—a label accurately attached to the twentieth century by the editors of the volume. A number of important debates have taken place, however, and they can be grouped into two broad categories. The first category includes interwar and World War II (WWII), empirical-normative discussions between federalists and functionalists concerning the optimal shape of international integration. One way to think about this literature is to consider it a strand of the broader, liberal tradition of International Relations as it emerged after the Great War. Thinkers such as Norman Angell and David Mitrany are among the founding fathers of the discipline and this chapter revisits their respective propositions for the lasting international peace. The second category includes post-WWII, mostly empirical-­explanatory discussions describing and theorising already existing phenomena: international regimes and European integration. While the former is an extension of the American neoliberal-institutionalist debate on international cooperation, the latter is a European endeavour, striving to make sense of the unprecedented nature of post-WWII international integration.

International Federalism Concern with international security was at the centre of proposals for some form of international federation as early as immediately after World War I (WWI). To many, the war proved that individual states cannot be trusted to maintain peaceful international order and what is needed instead is some form of supervisory political structure overseeing the most sensitive aspects of International Relations. Those ideas have since been dismissed and arguably discredited by E.H. Carr and the subsequent outbreak of another major war only twenty years after the conclusion of the first one. This criticism is, however, irrelevant for the purpose of this contribution. First, Carr’s depiction of the entire strand of interwar thinkers as utopian was challenged in Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis. Second, I only aim to focus on a particular set of propositions which, to an extent, actually did materialise in the form of the post-WWII European integration project.

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Two strands of international federalism in Europe emerged after WWI—one represented by Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and another one represented by a group of British liberal internationalists. Those two strands, although similar in that they both advocated regional integration, differed substantially as to the purpose and scope of that integration. By today’s standards, we could depict Coudenhove-Kalergi as a European patriot. He was disappointed by Europe’s relative decline compared to other world regions, and wanted Europe to regain its former glory. He didn’t care much for world peace. Rather, he wanted to see Europe reborn and rebuilt to effectively compete with the United States and ensure protection against the expansionist Soviet Union. His concern about the latter point to international security was an overarching consideration in proposing his pan-European Union, entailing ‘the political and economic consolidation of all the states from Poland to Portugal into a federal union’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926: 21). Coudenhove-Kalergi distrusted Soviet Russia and its Communist dictatorship, considering it the existential threat to Europe. For this reason, he could not really grasp as to why European states would be compelled to fight against each other in what he called a ‘civil’ war, if a much larger threat was looming in the east. His vision for integrated Europe was narrow compared to other federalist thinkers and advocates. Geographic proximity and its estimated impact on the coherence of the envisioned federal block prompted him to exclude the United States and other non-­ European democracies, but also Great Britain. What he proposed was a purely continental political structure, coherent enough to speak and act with one voice in the name of European values and interests. His vision did not materialise on time to prevent the outbreak of WWII, although French Prime Minister Aristide Briand did announce his failed proposal for a European Union as early as in 1929. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s impact on post-WWII European integration is debatable, but he was formally recognised as an inspiration to those latter developments and Konrad Adenauer was his vivid supporter (Zwolski 2018). A group of British thinkers and policy practitioners, who were concerned with ensuring international peace rather than rebuilding Europe’s relative standing, represent the second strand of post-WWI international federalist thought. British interwar internationalists worked to support the League of Nations, but were increasingly disappointed by the organisation’s inability to enforce disarmament. For this failure, they blamed the anarchic structure of International Relations. Norman Angell is among

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the best-known proponents of fundamentally transforming the international system. In his contribution to Leonard Woolf’s The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War (Angell 1934), he compared the system of International Relations to road traffic, in that both contexts require rules ensuring orderly conduct. If the problem of overcoming international anarchy seemed urgent in 1934, the calls for international federation appeared desperate in 1939, when Clarence Streit’s Union Now was published. Streit articulated his argument loud and clear: a Federal Union of the North Atlantic democracies is needed as soon as possible, entailing integration in government and citizenship, defence, trade, money, postal and communication services (Streit 1940: 4). As indicated, it was uncommon for British federalists to argue for the federation of Europe because they considered themselves citizens of a much wider empire. As the political situation in Europe was deteriorating towards the late 1930s, however, federalists faced the dilemma. While a world federation was still the ultimate objective, some of them began insisting that the integration of Europe must take priority. Lionel Robins from the London School of Economics was among those thinkers who considered global federation ‘utopian’ and ‘doomed to disaster’. Instead, he proposed the United States of Europe. This geographically limited project should have a higher chance of success, because ‘[a]fter all there is a common European consciousness; and it is surely in the logic of history that sooner or later this should be enshrined in common political institutions’ (Robbins 1939[1968]: 106). Other proponents of European integration included an Australian-born lawyer and a British Labour activist R.W.G. MacKay, whose federalist ideas found the most comprehensive expression in his 1940 book Federal Europe, bearing the subtitle ‘being the case for a European federation together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe’. Finally, the foremost interwar idealist David Davies, in his 1940 book A Federated Europe, advanced a somehow similar proposal for European federation. In the end, Europe-oriented proposals could claim a degree of success with the post-WWII process of European integration. Still the criticism of those early integration ideas did not just focus on their feasibility. It also concerned their substance.

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International Functionalism The main source of this criticism was the so-called functionalist approach to international integration represented by Romanian-born, British political thinker David Mitrany. Mitrany advocated progressive international integration throughout his life and his ideas were underpinned by a firm belief that the outdated system of national sovereignty and international anarchy are the main culprits responsible for the tragedy of wars, poverty and human misery. Yet his ideas differed from those promoting European integration. In fact, he was a staunch critic of Coudenhove-Kalergi and its political expression—the Briand Memorandum. Mitrany saw the prospective United States of Europe as an attempt to create a closed-door system of preferential economic relations, which would only have hampered economic integration globally. He argued that regional unions would operate on the same territorial basis as nation states. Thus, while promising to establish peace within such unions, they would not contribute one bit to peaceful relations with other parts of the world. In fact, they would reinforce the old system of alliances, only at a different level: Here is the undiluted spirit of the thing [Pan-European union]. It is the policy of the balance of power which, happily shelved in politics, for the time being, the Pan-Europeans and their kin would apply to economics. In international relations, individualism leads, with the fatality of cosmic law, to alliances, and alliance to a struggle for the balance of power. (Mitrany 1930: 468)

Mitrany rejected the argument that regional integration initiatives, such as the pan-European union, are a necessary step towards more ambitious world integration. For him, the difference between the two was not one of degree, but one of the essence: The one would proceed in the old way by a definition of territory, the other by a definition of functions; and while the unions would define their territory as a means of differentiating between members and outsiders, a league would select and define functions for the contrary purpose of integrating with regard to them the interests of all. (Mitrany 1930: 476)

What was so attractive to Mitrany about the League was its invitation to all the countries in the world to abide by certain universal principles, like peace, thus bringing countries together rather than dividing them

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according to a ‘sectional code’ and guided by the motto ‘Pan-Europa, right or wrong!’ (Mitrany 1930: 477). The best-known account of functionalism in International Relations was developed by Mitrany in A Working Peace System—an essay published in 1943 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Unsurprisingly, at this point, he became disillusioned with the League of Nations. In his taxonomy of different forms of international organisation, he categorised the League as a loose association with mere advisory capacities. He contrasted it with a federal system, which is more coherent but ineffective for achieving international security, for the reasons already outlined. The third form and the one he advocated is functionalism, which can be summarised as linking authority to a specific activity, rather than territory (Mitrany 1966: 27). These activities would be administered by executive agencies with autonomous authority, in contrast to the League system, which only comprised modest secretariats. The activities selected for transnational administration would be specific, addressing some of the most pressing economic and social problems of ordinary people in different countries. They would also be organised separately, reflecting their specific nature. It is the very needs and activities required to address these needs which would inform the form of international organisation. Power would not be attached to territorially defined units, such as states or continental unions, but to specific tasks or functions. The question would thus be where power should be exercised, based on the specific requirements of the task, rather than who should exercise it, that is, who the authorities are (Mitrany 1966: 84). Mitrany envisaged the international system as gradually, yet spontaneously evolving towards a thick web of transnational practices of cooperation without any conscious effort to formally codify it. How would this process contribute to international security? In a distant future, Mitrany did not discard the idea that such functional cooperation could lead to a world federation. This was a completely different vision, however, to that proposed by international and European federalists. For Mitrany, the international federation would be ‘the solid growth of a natural selection and evolution, tested and accepted by experience’, rather than an outcome of political decisions, and thus vulnerable to changing political preferences (Mitrany 1966: 83). More immediately, Mitrany suggested transforming the perception of security from a negative one, as the lack of conflict, to a positive one, involving ‘active regular life of the people’ (Mitrany 1966: 40). A functional approach to the

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international organisation would organically lead to the emergence of such active life internationally. It would not make states obsolete, but it would make geopolitical boundaries meaningless over time.

International Regimes For this next European liberal contribution to the study of international security, we must fast-forward to more recent times, which mark a completely different approach to how scholarship is approached. Long gone are jargon-free, empirical-normative contributions aimed at a general audience and produced by thinkers of diverging professional backgrounds. Instead, today’s scholarly inputs are narrowly disciplined, analytical, largely explanatory and produced by full-time university faculty members. As a result, they can come across as less accessible to non-experts but more focused and more systematic—hence more ‘scientific’. The students of international regimes certainly strived to be rigorous in how they theorised the concept. International regimes were most thoroughly studied in the United States, with the 1982 special issue of International Organization (a leading American journal of International Relations) setting the parameters of this debate. Stephen Krasner (1982: 186) famously defined international regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’. Examples of international regimes include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the American context, the discussion of international regimes followed the predictable realist-liberalist divide. Realists, represented by Stephen Krasner or Joseph Grieco, argued that state power remains relevant in the instances of international cooperation represented by regimes, just as it is relevant when states do not get along. When cooperating through regimes, states undertake to utilise their power to influence the exact setup of the regimes as well as relative gains they acquire through cooperation. In contrast, liberal institutionalists (e.g. Robert Keohane) emphasise the role of regimes as an opportunity for states to mitigate the negative effects of international anarchy by facilitating the exchange of information, building international trust and—ultimately—allowing all state parties to benefit. In spite of those differences, significant similarities characterise the two positions. In line with the dominant American tradition of International Relations, both realists and liberal institutionalists

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assume that states are rational, unitary actors, pursuing their self-interest in an anarchic environment. States’ interests are exogenous and can be considered in a causal as independent variables affecting policy outcomes, that is, the structure and process of international regimes. In the context of European liberal theory, this elegant narrative has been challenged by three authors, who offered their own take on international regimes. Amdreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger in their seminal book (1997) and the subsequent article (2000) reiterated the established divide between the liberalist and realist takes on international regimes. To that duopoly, they also added cognitivist approaches, dividing them into weak and strong. Weak cognitivists underline uncertainty characterising many international settings and, in that context, the potential influence of actors who can offer credible knowledge and interpretation of scientific findings, such as epistemic communities (Haas 1992). In other words, weak cognitivists are interested in how beliefs can help to explain the structure and processes of regimes. Strong cognitivists (or constructivists), in turn, reject the notion of causes and variables and instead propose a sociological take on how social knowledge shapes actors’ perceptions and preferences, stressing the mutually constituted nature of actors (state participants) and structure (regimes) (Wendt and Duvall 1989). The main contribution of Hasenclever et al. comes from their attempt to integrate the theories of international regimes by demonstrating how realist and liberal-institutionalist positions can be seen as complementary, and by arguing that weak cognitivist focus on regime formation can supplement the two dominant theories. To that end, they offer the so-called contextualised theory of international regimes, indicating that certain empirical contexts will render the realist interpretation more relevant, and on other occasions the liberal-institutionalist (or neoliberal) approach will be more appropriate. Following on from this proposition, the authors reject the idea that the problem of absolute versus relative gains must necessarily place realism and neoliberalism at odds with each other. Rather, they suggest that, in line with the close reading of the two dominant schools, international regimes do not have to be irrelevant when states are concerned with their relative gains more than absolute ones. Instead, regimes in those situations can assume additional responsibilities, mitigating the concerns about members’ relative gains. Still, distinguishing situations when states prioritise absolute gains from those when relative gains are mostly cared for allows predicting the stability of a regime. Borrowing from a realist Joseph Grieco, the authors suggest the so-called theory of

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state motivation, delineating conditions under which states may be more inclined to be satisfied with absolute gains and vice versa (e.g. the friend/ foe perceptions). What is arguably still missing in this framework, according to the authors, is to shed light on and problematise the choices actors make at different stages of regime formations. Here, we need to take ideas and actor learning seriously—an argument familiar to the students of mainstream social constructivism. Using the illustration of the NATO-Soviet relations, authors emphasise that neither structural nor functional arguments alone can account for the change of Soviet policy, which eventually allowed to end the Cold War. The unique ‘weak cognitivist’ contribution, in that case, is to explain the causal power of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and how actor’s perceptions about cause and effect can actually lead to tangible foreign policy outcomes, changing the course of International Relations and—in turn—affecting the likelihood and durability of international regimes. The final component of the framework advanced by Hasenclever et  al. is a reverse situation, in which ideas do not explain actors’ socially constructed interests, but rather intervene in between interests and outcomes. In this model, actors’ ideas and interpretations help to reconcile divergent policy options when perceived benefits of different policy outcomes are similar. In those situations, cognitivist rather than rationalist explanations hold explanatory promise, pointing to how ideas can converge expectations about outcomes and lead to a particular form of international regime (to make and illustrate this point, the authors borrow from Garrett and Weingast [1993]).

Theorising European Security Integration The discussion of European liberal security theories would be incomplete without reappraising the vast body of scholarship, which emerged in response to European integration making strides into the field of international security. We can distinguish between two broad strands of the literature on European security integration: (a) European security governance and (b) the European Union (EU) as a global actor/power. The notion of international security governance has been growing in prominence since the 1990s, when the term ‘governance’ became widely utilised to denote policy challenges and reforms within states and internationally. Admittedly, the relationship between the notion of governance and international regimes is ambiguous. Rosenau (1992: 8–9), drawing on the classical

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understanding of regimes as developed by Krasner (1982), distinguishes governance from regimes by their scope. Whilst regimes refer to converging rules, norms and procedures in a given issue area (non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution), governance is not limited to a single area of International Relations. Instead, governance refers to the principles, norms, rules and procedures ‘when two or more regimes overlap, conflict, or otherwise require arrangements that facilitate accommodation among the competing interests’ (Rosenau 1992: 9). ‘Security governance’ has traditionally been approached through focusing on its properties. That was the approach undertaken by Mark Webber and others, who proposed to define security governance as the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes. (Webber et al. 2004: 4)

The consensus is that security governance involves the multitude of actors, governmental and non-governmental, as well as public and private. Although the concept of security governance can, in principle, be applied to any geopolitical setting, it has become a custom to associate the notion of security governance with Europe and transatlantic relations. The multitude of regional organisations concerned with security, fragmented authority, the relative openness of political systems and the unprecedented model of international integration exemplified by the EU all make Europe the default geopolitical location to look for and analyse the instances of cooperation which can be depicted as security governance. There are at least two ways in which we can approach European security governance. One is to study Europe and/or North America as a potential system of security governance. It typically entails assessing the extent to which the post-Cold War institutional and policy developments in Europe and transatlantic relations conform to a set of properties associated with the notion of security governance. This approach has been firmly established with an article by Webber et al. (2004), analysing some fundamental security processes in Europe through the lens of the security governance concept. The second way in which one can approach European security governance entails studying concrete policy initiatives of actors such as the EU, which can be conceptualised as security governance. The ‘security

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governance’ framework, in this case, is applied to what the EU does in a particular policy field, so that the policy can be conceptualised and potentially compared across different policy fields (Zwolski 2014). The European security governance approach remains influential, but it has not captured the imagination of scholars as much as the strand of scholarship on the EU as a global security actor/power. British/Swiss national François Duchêne, perhaps unintentionally, launched this latter body of literature, when he proposed for the Community to draw on its own ‘inner characteristics’, which included ‘civilian ends and means (…)’, when dealing with the external environment (Duchêne 1973: 20). Admittedly, Duchêne was rather vague and unsystematic, reminiscent more of the interwar political writing than of the systematic and disciplined approaches modern scholars are accustomed to. The idea of civilian power Europe was therefore in a dire need of further conceptualisation, a task undertaken, for example, by Kenneth Twitchett (1976: 1–2) and Ian Manners (2002). The latter, famously, took the whole notion of Europe as a ‘different kind of power’ to the next level, by introducing the idea of Europe as a normative power. Somehow in parallel to the notion of Europe as power, a more neutral concept of ‘actorness’ gained influence in the study of Europe’s global role. Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) were among the first ones to recognise the potential significance of non-state actors on the international scene and to develop a theoretical framework to assess the degree of their actorness. In assessing those actors, they proposed to look at their autonomy (from states), impact and external recognition. A few years later, Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) built on that framework but proposed that ‘the capacity of being an actor is most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent’ (Sjöstedt 1977: 14). Even more properties were included at this point. Since the 1970s, the discussion on the European Community/EU’s actorness has evolved into a booming research topic, with each author readjusting the ‘criteria of actorness’ to meet their preferred research framework (Kaunert and Zwolski 2013). The discussion on the EU’s international security actorness represents what Jørgensen (2015: 19) calls a more pragmatic strand of scholarship on the EU’s international role, accepting that the EU does policies pertaining to international security and focusing on assessing these policies. Both ‘power’ and ‘actorness’ continue to inform the scholarship on the security dimension of European integration. The EU continues to do

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things internationally, including in the field of a broadly defined security policy, so it must be some kind of an actor. Equally, the EU systematically attempts to develop policy instruments and strategic documents to assert its position vis-à-vis international powers, so it must be some kind of power itself, even if only a small one. Alternatively, even if those attempts have minuscule effects on the tangible capabilities of the EU, there is always the possibility that the military weakness still allows the EU to be a power, only of a different kind.

Conclusion The discussion here, in line with the liberalist tradition of International Relations, has revolved around different forms of international integration and institutions. Integration and institutions, according to liberalist thinkers, represent the best hope for more peaceful international order. While this common thread introduced a degree of coherence to the chapter, it has prompted me to exclude some other European liberal contributions, even if they are also concerned with international peace and security (my concern was also to maintain maximum depth within a relatively short space). Here, it is worth mentioning John Burton—an Australian civil servant, who pioneered studies on conflict resolution at his Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at University College London. His insights into the link between (unmet) basic human needs and violent conflict remain relevant in numerous geopolitical contexts today (Burton 1979). Finally, the editors of this series invite contributors to reflect on the evolution of their respective theoretical traditions. In this context, can we conclude that the European liberal security tradition has advanced in some important ways? I am sceptical. Yes, a ‘methodologically-minded’ reader may discard the early integration debates as ‘unscientific’ and hail the post-WWII contributions as adhering to the (American) ‘scientific’ norms. I argue, instead, that the interwar and WWII contributions faced a more demanding intellectual task of arguing over something, which had not yet materialised in the real world. This fact made those discussions relatively less empirically focused but certainly as much if not more intellectually stimulating compared to the contemporary exercises in describing and explaining already existing phenomena, such as regimes or the EU. I would particularly invite readers to explore original sources shaping the early integration debates as

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well as point them to the longer and more encompassing reappraisal of the theories discussed here in European Security in Integration Theory (Zwolski 2018).

References Angell, N. (1934). The International Anarchy. In L. Woolf (Ed.), The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War (pp. 19–66). London: Victor Gollancz. Burton, J. (1979). Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems. New York: St. Martins Press. Cosgrove, C. A., & Twitchett, K. J. (1970). New International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic Community. London: Macmillan. Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. (1926). Pan-Europe. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Duchêne, F. (1973). The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence. In M.  Kohnstamm & W.  Hager (Eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community (pp.  1–21). Basingstoke: Macmillan. Garrett, G., & Weingast, B.  R. (1993). Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market. In J. Goldstein & R.  O. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (pp. 3–30). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35. Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Integrating Theories of International Regimes. Review of International Studies, 26(1), 3–33. Jørgensen, K.  E. (2015). The Study of European Foreign Policy: Trends and Advances. In A. K. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. E. Jørgensen, K. Laatikainen, & B. Tonra (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy (pp. 14–29). London: Sage. Kaunert, C., & Zwolski, K. (2013). The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Krasner, S. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205. Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. Mitrany, D. (1930). Pan-Europa: A Hope or a Danger? The Political Quarterly, 1(4), 457–478. Mitrany, D. (1966). A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Robbins, L. (1939[1968). The Economic Causes of War. New York: Howard Fertig.

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Rosenau, J. and Czempiel, E.-O. (Eds.). (1992). Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sjöstedt, G. (1977). The External Role of the European Community. Westmead: Saxon House. Streit, C. (1940). Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union. London: Harper & Brothers. Twitchett, K. (1976). Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market. London: Europa Publications. Webber, M., Stuart, S., Howorth, J., & Krahmann, E. (2004). The Governance of European Security. Review of International Studies, 30(1), 3–26. Wendt, A., & Duvall, R. (1989). Institutions and International Order. In E. Czempiel & J. N. Rosenau (Eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (pp.  51–73). Lexington: Lexington Books. Zwolski, K. (2014). How to Explain the Transnational Security Governance of the European Union? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(4), 942–958. Zwolski, K. (2018). European Security in Integration Theory: Contested Boundaries. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

CHAPTER 7

When Liberalism Meets the English School F. Asli Ergul Jorgensen

Abstract  In this chapter, we explore the overlap and interaction between liberal theory and the English School tradition. Especially in the context of the debate on the protection of human rights in the face of state sovereignty, we found that the dilemmas in both traditions reveal similar structural features. Unless it involves radical transformation of the international system, it can be seen that the solidarist wing of the English School heartily supports the liberal cosmopolitan ideas of Kant. The commonalities of the two traditions are more striking in matters such as humanitarian intervention, internationalism and democracy. Keywords  Liberalism • English School • Solidarism • Humanitarian intervention • Liberal internationalism

F. A. Ergul Jorgensen (*) Ege University, Izmir, Turkey © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_7

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Introduction Liberalism is a multidimensional theoretical tradition that offers an abundance of concepts, perspectives and principles. As shown in the previous chapters, the liberal tradition has generated many different theoretical perspectives and distinct theories. Given that theoretical traditions are not watertight categories, it is possible to trace both the affinities and the differences that characterize boundaries between traditions. The founding fathers of the English School, mainly Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, claim that the English School occupies the middle ground between two other traditions, specifically realism and liberalism, yet leaves relations to the latter tradition largely unspecified. The relationship between the School and these two traditions has been widely debated in the literature. Due to the scope of the present volume, we can leave aside the realist tradition and in this chapter we will adopt a multilayered scope and look into the similarities and boundaries between liberalism and the English School. Both traditions are convenient platforms for debates between different ideas because of their polyphonic and multilayered structures. The priority of state sovereignty or the rights of humans is one of the critical topics for each tradition that creates a central disjunction. In liberal theory this can be seen around the idea of the possibility of either world system transformation ending up with peace or a confined peace approach limited to significant cooperation between states. As can be seen in the framework volume on Liberal International Relations Theory and EU Foreign Policy, Derek Beach makes this meaningful differentiation between “weak-liberal theories”, suggesting a limited change based on interest-driven cooperation models and the “strong-liberal theories” focusing on the very transformation of the nature of international relations (Beach 2015: 87–90). In this understanding, Keohane’s liberal institutionalism and interdependence model (Keohane 1984, 1989), as well as Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 1998) can be seen within the weak-liberal context, since they are just seeking mitigation of anarchy through institutions. On the other hand, the strong liberals like Deutsch (1968) refer to broader patterns of interactions between states and societies, which could hypothetically transform the nature of international relations for the sake of human freedom and the “good life”. This differentiation makes sense not only for understanding the differences between the scope of different liberal theoretical thinkers, but also for identifying the overlap with the English School tradition. A similar

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“volume” discussion can be observed within the English School. One of the prominent figures of the School, Hedley Bull, made a distinction between the “thin” morality of pluralists and “thick” morality of solidarists. While the pluralists claim that every state cultivates its own conception of “good life” and these differences should be kept and not be intervened, in order to keep the order in international society, the solidarists, on the other hand, underline universalistic ethics and the moral duty of the society of states to protect humans against state violations, which might mean also intervention (Bull 1966: 51–73; Knudsen 2019: 179). Typical philosophical debate between “cosmopolitanism” versus “communitarianism” reflects on this very debate. While the weak liberals and the pluralists are focusing on the protection of the state, the strong liberals and the solidarists unite around the cosmopolitan idea of protecting the humans against the state. There is a noticeable correspondence between the pluralists and the weak liberals as well, but it is relatively limited only around their state-centric views. On the other hand, the solidarists and the strong liberals share almost the same language of “humanity” and also the same key inspiration figure, Immanuel Kant. The similarity is sometimes so strong that it is almost impossible to understand who is a liberal or an English School theorist, when they discuss human rights, humanitarian intervention or international law. This ambiguity, in fact, best explains the motivation behind writing this chapter.

Basic Arguments As a pedestal philosophical and political tradition, liberalism has its roots in Enlightenment philosophy with its emphasis on the concepts of reason, equality and human freedom, and on the claim of the goodness of human nature (see Chap. 2). It is underpinned by normative engagement around five important elements holding the great promise for a better and peaceful future. These are: Strong faith in human reason, belief in the possibility of historical progress, claims about the connection of domestic-international politics, potential of economic interdependence for a peaceful world and positive effect of processes of institutionalizing international relations (Jørgensen 2018: 66–67, 75). Based on the seventeenth-­century political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), by means of reason, humankind can understand and shape nature and society without being dependent on any higher authority. Human reason and processes of social learning make progress in human history. Moreover, humankind is not doomed to live in

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a perpetual conflict but is able to make better political choices to avoid it. As war is the cancer on the body politic, human beings themselves have the capacity to cure it. The treatment that liberals began prescribing since the eighteenth century is the twin medicine of democracy and free trade (Burchill 2001: 33). As an “inside-out” approach to international relations, they favour a world in which the endogenous determines the exogenous (Burchill 2001: 63). Ever since the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) “Perpetual Peace”, liberals see a causal link between domestic and international politics, which renders international peace through liberal and democratic domestic institutions (Jørgensen 2018: 66–67). Moreover, as argued by Adam Smith (1723–1790) and Richard Cobden (1804–1865), development of the free exchange of goods between nations and, consequently, economic interdependence will reduce the likelihood of war and conflict among the states, which would lead the world societies to world peace (Gartzke 2005). Liberalism has a deep impact on many other traditions, including the English School (or the international society tradition), which emerged within British—or rather British Commonwealth—academic institutions in the late 1950s. It represents a tradition of thought going back to the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who laid the foundations of international law. The founders of the tradition, Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and John Vincent, mainly elaborated on the key concept of International society, basically constituted by the common values, institutions, traditions and rules of the states respected in the international domain. Upon this holistic ground, the tradition claims to represent a via media between the realist and liberal arguments, which is an acclamation of being at the same distance to both traditions. Martin Wight prefers to call these traditions as realism and revolutionism (instead of liberalism), and positions the English School as rationalism, which is a middle way to capture the greater complexity of international thinking and to bring back the Grotian tradition to its rightful place (Wight 1978; Wight 1991). According to Wight, it is the ideal level between the realist explanation of states condemned to take part in international competition and conflict and the revolutionist belief in the utopia of replacing the current state system with a new form of world government. Yet, he opened an extra room for revolutionism, or radical liberalism, and argued that the continuing discussion about international relations would be impoverished without the liberals’ protest against the weak morality within world politics. On this argument, Wight suggests the rationalists should avoid

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the naïve utopian orientations but remain open to the revolutionists claims about the moral imperfections of the state system (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 155–157; Linklater 2011). He claims: “Political expedience itself has to consult the moral sense of those who it will affect” (Wight 1966: 128). According to Bull, “there are moments when Wight seems as much drawn towards the Kantian tradition as towards the Machiavellian or the Grotian.” Bull then he explains the reason for Wight being drawn to the Kantian tradition is that he saw deepest element in it, “the moral passion to abolish suffering and sin” (Bull 1976: 107). According to Bull, the dilemma which, on the one hand, brings the concept of sovereignty as something never to be breached might mean to abandon the victims of human rights to their fate; and, on the other hand, the argument that a state forfeits its sovereignty because of its serious human rights violations brings the risk of opening the floodgates to intervention and pushes foreign policymakers to decide between “terrible choices” (Bull 2000: 227). Yet Bull himself made such a “terrible choice” and prioritized the protection of international society over human rights, since he believes that if the short-term benefits of the victims of human rights abuses are cared for too much, there would be a long-term damage to the international order. He also engaged in conversations with radical liberal scholarly opponents such as Richard Falk and harshly criticized the utopian dimension of liberalism (Jørgensen 2018: 117). The founding fathers of the English School are hesitant about the strong liberals’ belief in the human reason and about social learning eventually bringing humanity to perpetual peace, as well. It would, as they claim, derail the tradition from realities. However, they were still unwilling to settle for a form of “rule consequentialism” which reduces the society of states inactive against the most terrible violations of human rights (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 140). The strength of the action differs between the pluralists and the solidarists of how much they want to include liberal and cosmopolitan values within the mechanism of international society. Yet, even the thick moralists, the solidarists, have a distance to the idea of the strong liberals to totally transform the system into a cosmopolitan world construct. The braking role of the realist balancing against the utopianism of liberalism shows itself in every dimension of the English School, whenever it comes to keeping the states as the actors.

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Liberal Internationalism and International Society It is possible to find some similarities between international society approach and liberal internationalism, especially on the grounds of their legal, institutional and normative foundations. As explained in Chap. 2, liberal internationalism depicts an optimistic view of the international sphere underlining the increasing unity of humankind through increasing interdependence among states and individuals. Émeric Vattel, an eighteenth-century Swiss international lawyer, is one of the important liberal figures who supported the possibility of an international society of states which is based on the idea that states also have duties beyond their borders (Hurrell 1996). Later, a British-Polish lawyer and judge at the International Court of Justice, Hersch Lauterpacht, influenced the interwar period liberal internationalism with his ideas about the development of international law around morality (Lauterpacht 1932; Lauterpacht 1936). His ideas were influenced by liberal humanism, universal rationality and cosmopolitan individualism (Lauterpacht 1970; Jeffery 2006). In a neo-Grotian and Kantian cosmopolitan way, he declared that in the absolute enhancement of the structure of international organization and the principle of enforcement of international law “the inalienable rights of the individual conceived as the ultimate unit of all law” (Lauterpacht 1975/1950: 167). As peace had to be enforced by several measures in domestic society, international sphere had to have a similar regulatory system in order to cope with clashes and an international force could be put into function if non-violent resolutions failed. This kind of international community formulation rests on something more than any strand of liberal project but on the domestic analogy referring to the extension of society ideas originating within the state to the international realm (Suganami 1989: 94–113). The extension of internal ideas is not limited to politics. According to liberals, one of the most sensitive state concerns—security—has also to be seen in a collective context. In other words, “each state in the system accepts the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response of aggression” (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 30). According to the British military historian Michael Howard, who was discussing the fine-tune between war and the liberal conscience, this given security system entails “a degree of mutual confidence, a homogeneity of values and a coincidence or perceived interests” (Howard 1978: 132).

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The League of Nations was in fact established upon these liberal internationalist projects. The aim was to re-establish peace in Europe after WW1. According to the liberal American President Woodrow Wilson, peace could only be protected with the construction of an international organization which regulates anarchy in the world. In fact, security is too vulnerable to be left to secret diplomacy or a blind faith for the balance of power. Due to all these social, political and security expectations from the League of Nations, practices did not match aspirations. It never turned into a well-functioning international organization, because of its functional problems and also because the US abandoned the League. It is not surprising that liberals were not impressed with this practice of international cooperation. The internationalist functionalist David Mitrany was one of the sceptical liberals who were appreciating the organization’s missionary nature for inviting all countries to abide by certain universal principles, but highlighted that its loose organization and limited capacities were only for advising, not for taking action (Mitrany 1943). Yet, this failed attempt to create an international organization for more cooperative state relations did not cede liberal ideas. After WW2, the United Nations was established with better planning and a refurnished liberal internationalism. Moreover, it is not uncommon for English School theorists to accept the biggest and, probably, the most capable international organization, the United Nations, as the most tangible institution for members of international society. As a framework organization, it organizes the working of the fundamental institutions of international society along the lines of solidarist values and practices. The renowned representatives of solidarism, Tonny B.  Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, take the liberal internationalist Lauterpacht as an inspiration in their book, and argue that international organizations and regimes materialize the primary institutions and they point to the UN as the main organization for this purpose (Knudsen and Navari 2019). Knudsen underlines the multi-level authorized body of the organization and claims that a revival of solidarism and the practice of humanitarian intervention mainly depend on “the legitimate site of multi-actor humanitarian crisis management and institutional innovation” (Knudsen 2019: 188). It might not be wrong to say that the solidarist form of international society finds its convenient platform within the legal and normative constructs of liberal internationalism.

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Cosmopolitan Ethics Humanitarian crises and how to cope with them might be one of the most complicated matters of international relations. Choosing between respecting the immunity of states in question from intervention based on the principle of sovereignty or taking coercive action to protect humans at risking the sovereignty of the state is not easy, since it might challenge the state sovereignty of human lives. Liberal theorists are divided over the issues of universal rules and instruments, between non-interventionists who defend state sovereignty and interventionists who claim the promotion of ethical principles can justify intervention in the domestic affairs of other states (Burchill 2001: 44). This division follows a similar vein as of strong and the weak liberals. Following the logic of this chapter, we can argue that solidarists of the English School and the intervention justifiers of the liberals fall almost into the same standpoint. According to solidarists, while the positive law orientation underlines the indispensability of sovereignty, rivalry and non-intervention, the natural law tradition highlights the necessity of including cosmopolitan sentiments of human rights, international law and humanitarian intervention in the dynamics of the society of states. The well-known solidarists of the School, Vincent and Wheeler, are closer to the Kantian tradition, because they believe there is evidence of global normative development in the contemporary society of states (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 119). Actually, Vincent was in his earlier works a defender of pluralism (Vincent 1974), that is, following Bull’s argument and recognizing, “order between states before justice for individuals within them” (Vincent 1974: 344). He was convinced that pluralism is not the absence of morality, but knowing the limits of it (Vincent 1986). However, Vincent changed his mind about the priority of order and justice. In his later works, he asked “order for whom?” and was more open to the possibility of universal human rights, arguing that by virtue of their common humanity all individuals have a right to life (Vincent 1986: 126). Another solidarist, Nicholas Wheeler, went beyond the dilemma of humans against the sovereign states and underlined the legitimate reasons to “saving strangers” (Wheeler 2000). He also highlighted the responsibility of sovereign states to protect humans and said: “A state’s legal and moral right to claim protection of the norm of non-intervention would depend upon its observance of certain minimum standards of common

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humanity” (Wheeler 2000, 3). As a solidarist fundamental institution shaped towards basic human justice, humanitarian intervention makes it possible for states to help minorities exposed to genocide and mass atrocities (Knudsen 2019: 186). The cosmopolitan ethics of Kant is the main inspiration of these solidarist readings. Yet, there is an interesting example, which develops a multilayered reading of Kant including both pluralist and solidarist interpretations. According to Andrew Hurrell, Kant never aimed at the ceasing of state autonomy under a “federation of states”; he always sought non-intervention. In fact, Hurrell boldly says, “Kant is certainly much more of a statist than the characterization of the Kantian tradition would suggest” (Hurrell 1990: 204; Hurrell 2013). Hurrell was successful in flourishing a rich Kant reading that outlines the division between the state-oriented and human-oriented approaches in the tradition.

Inside-Out Democracy Democratizing world politics might be off limits for many theorists, since this could be both utopian and unnecessary. Hence, these kinds of domestic analogies carving for democratic relations between states, or societies, are mainly pursued at the far end or radical tendencies of each tradition. Ironically, these radical views have developed highly similar arguments around the concepts of cosmopolitan democracy, human rights and world society. At a deeper level, the radical liberals have questions about all statist models of governance, since they are undemocratic as elites are notoriously self-serving (Dunne 2001: 110). The approach to globalization takes with these sentiments a different turn and the radical liberals underline the necessity of democratizing global politics (Held and McGrew 2002). As one of the leading radical liberals, David Held is visiting the idea of international society when he is highlighting the inadequacies of the “Westphalian order”, or the modern state system. According to him, democratization has happened in a very limited number of states and has not been completed by an overall democratization of the society of states. He is also not happy with the established system of hierarchy between great powers and the rest, which has not been overcome by any international organization so far, including the UN. He frames a “cosmopolitan model of democracy” which can be achieved through several steps. The creation of regional parliaments and the extension of existing regional authorities like the EU is the first phase of the global democracy

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movement. It must be followed by incorporating human rights conventions into national parliaments and opening these national organs for international monitoring. Lastly, he refers to the reform or replacement of the UN with a democratic and accountable worldwide parliament. Even though Held himself has some doubts about the applicability of the realization of cosmopolitan model democracy, he believes that for the sake of democratization the national and international institutions and regimes should be democratized from scratch (Held 1993, 2006). A similar search for the necessity of global democracy has always existed in the English School. Yet, the tendency has been inclining upwards. When writing on the normative grounds of international society, Mayall (2009) explains the inclination with the mood of democratic optimism spreading throughout international society. Putting these sentiments as the central part of the book Progress and Its Limits, he raised the critical questions of “Can the internal constitution of states be determined by international society and can international society itself be democratized?” (Mayall 2009: 218). His answer to these questions is that there might be democracy for everybody but it depends on the forms of life. However, there is a necessity of meeting the cultural preconditions before democratic values (Mayall 2009: 220), which might mean developing the democratic institutions nationally. As can be seen from these examples of the two traditions, the proliferation of democracy from the domestic to the global level highly depends on the institutional capabilities, starting from the national to the global. The Kantian inspiration about the cosmopolitan rights within universal codes and the republican regimes around civil constitutions can be felt in these modern arguments of globalizing democracy. In that sense, sometimes it is almost impossible to detect boundaries between the solidarist variety of international society and the liberal tradition.

Conclusion It is not surprising that liberalism and the British School, which are two multifaceted and multilayered theories, often overlap conceptually and purposefully with one another. These two traditions, which are involved in a wide debate based on human rights and state sovereignty, have contributed radically to the development of the European liberal tradition. It is seen that the issues that can be dealt with in the context of international law, international institutions and moral obligations are discussed and

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reproduced in abundance by both traditions on the basis of Kantian understanding. However, with regard to the ideal world order, the idea of​​ a permanent peace and a cosmopolitan world state, as suggested by the Kantian liberal view, is not fully accepted in the most powerful cosmopolitan wing of the English School. The state should continue to exist as the most important actor of the international community, even if it is subjected to international interventions when necessary. Nevertheless, the fact that, gradually, people and morality-oriented debates are increasing in both theories, which we have not seen in other theories, increases the belief in the development of a Kantian and solidarist middle line.

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Hurrell, A. (1990). Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations. Review of International Studies, 16(3). Hurrell, A. (1996). Vattel: Pluralism and its limits. In Classical Theories of International Relations (pp. 233–255). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hurrell, A. (2013). Kant and Intervention Revisited. In J.  Welsh & S.  Recchia (Eds.), Just and Unjust Military Intervention (pp.  196–218). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jeffery, R. (2006). Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 12(2), 223–250. Jørgensen, K.  E. (2018). International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. London: Macmillan International Higher Education. Palgrave. Keohane, R.  O. (1984). After Hegemony (Vol. 54). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, R.  O. (1989). International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. Westview Press. Knudsen, T. B. (2019). Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change. In T.  B. Knudsen & C.  Navari (Eds.), International Organization in the Anarchical Society (pp.  23–50). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Knudsen, T. B., & Navari, C. (2019). International Organization in the Anarchical Society. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Lauterpacht, H. (1932). Japan and the Covenant. The Political Quarterly, 3(2), 174–193. Lauterpacht, H. (1936). Neutrality and Collective Security. London School of Economics and Political Science. Lauterpacht, H. (1970). International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. Linklater, A. (2011). Prudence and Principle in International Society: Reflections on Vincent’s Approach to Human Rights. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), 87(5), 1179–1191. Linklater, A., & Suganami, H. (2006). The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Vol. 102). Cambridge University Press. Mayall, J. (2009). The Limits of Progress: Normative Reasoning in the English School. In I. T. B. Knudsen & C. Navari (Eds.), International Organization in the Anarchical Society (pp. 209–226). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. McGrew, A., & Held, D. (2002). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Polity Press. Mitrany, D. (1943). A Working Peace System. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473–524. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Roberts, A., & Kingsbury, B. (1993). Introduction: The UN’s Roles in International Society Since 1945. In A. Roberts & B. Kingsbury (Eds.), United Nations, Divided World: The UN in International Relations (pp. 1–63). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Suganami, H. (1989). The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Vol. 6). Cambridge University Press. Vincent, R.  J. (1974). Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton University Press. Vincent, R.  J. (1986). Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wheeler, N.  J. (2002). Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wight, M. (1966). Western Values in International Relations. In I. H. Butterfield & M.  Wight (Eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Vol. 3, pp. 89–131). Harvard: Harvard University Press. Wight, M. (1978). In H.  Bull & C.  Holbraad (Eds.), Power Politics. Leicester: Leicester University Press [for] Royal Institute of International Affairs. Wight, M. (1991). In G.  Wight & B.  Porter (Eds.), International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

CHAPTER 8

Classical Liberalism and IR Theory Edwin van de Haar

Abstract  Most international relations (IR) scholars are unaware of the richness of the liberal tradition. Classical liberalism is largely absent from liberal IR theory and consequently so are its ideas about fostering individual liberty in the international environment. Classical liberals do not expect conflict and war to be abolished. These should be dealt with by the state. The classical liberal world is one of a state-based international society, with little room for most current international organisations and regimes. Nationalism, free immigration and development aid do not fit the classical liberal view on international relations either. This is made clear by an analysis with a focus on the writings of Mises and Hayek, who stand in a wider tradition originating in (Scottish) Enlightenment thought, most notably of Hume and Smith. Keywords  Classical liberalism • Smith • Hume • Mises • Hayek • Liberal tradition

E. van de Haar (*) The Hague, The Netherlands © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_8

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Liberal IR theory should include theories on international affairs by liberal thinkers. That sounds simple, but there are numerous international relations (IR) theories that carry the adjective ‘liberal’, yet are completely unrelated to a liberal thinker, or only focus on a number of (vaguely) liberal ideas (see Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 105–137; Zacher and Matthew 1995; Panke and Risse 2007). IR scholars generally overlook that the liberal tradition is very rich in ideas. Michael Freeden (2015: 1) wrote: ‘there is no single unambiguous thing called liberalism’. Others have underlined that ‘liberalism resists easy description … covering a swathe of ideas’ (Wall 2015: 1). Therefore ‘we should be seeking to understand liberalisms, rather than liberalism’ (Ryan 2012: 22). Most liberal IR theories that are (loosely) based on a liberal variant in political philosophy are associated with so-called social liberalism (in the US: ‘liberalism’). The two other main variants within liberalism, classical liberalism and libertarianism, are neglected or ignored. These three liberalisms together are divided over a number of questions, but particularly the justified role of the state in the life of individuals (Brennan 2012; Mack 2018; Tomasi 2012). Social liberals (such as John Stuart Mill, the English New Liberals, John Rawls) favour a relatively large role of the state in individual life, with the objective to ensure equal chances for all people, for example, through extensive welfare arrangements. Classical liberals (including David Hume, Adam Smith, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and James Buchanan) want a limited state that only provides a small amount of public goods, while libertarians (e.g. Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand) desire a minimal state, or even no state at all (Van de Haar 2015). All three liberalisms are acutely aware of the influence of international relations on individual freedom and also have different ideas on international relations. This chapter shows how classical liberalism, which by the way is a tradition according to all the common criteria in political theory (Van de Haar 2009: 5–40; Jørgensen et  al. 2017: 43–55), thinks about international relations and how it wants to secure the overriding liberal goal, the safeguarding of individual liberty. Focal points will be the writings of the twentieth-century Austrian thinkers Von Mises and Hayek.

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Characteristics of Classical Liberalism Understanding classical liberal ideas on international affairs requires knowledge of its ideas on domestic politics. It is a ‘bottom-up’ theory: from a classical liberal perspective all ideas on international order originate in notions on national order (Sally 1998: 15–16). Thus, classical liberals apply their core ideas both nationally and internationally, of course adapting to the different circumstances. These core concepts are individualism, freedom, natural law, spontaneous order, rule of law and the limited state. They are briefly introduced in this paragraph, to be applied to international relations in the next. Classical liberals value men as individuals, which is based on their appreciation of human nature. Conceptions of human nature are basic to all political philosophy and political experience (Berry 1986: x) and are defined here as the expectations and assumptions people hold of human capacities, both mental and physical. Human nature was a key issue during the (Scottish) Enlightenment; it was, for example, central to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature (1738) and to Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). This fascination continued into the twentieth century, for example, with Von Mises’ Human Action (1948), or Hayek’s The Sensory Order (1952), on the foundations of theoretical psychology. Classical liberals have a realistic view of human nature. They do not idealise man’s capacities, nor his intellect. Men are fallible, bound to make misjudgements and unable to process all the knowledge needed to maximise their utility in a rational way. Human behaviour is the outcome of an interplay of emotion and reason. Rationality has an important role in human life, if only to help people adapt to ever-changing circumstances, but is not decisive in explaining human behaviour, as emotions are ultimately more important factors. Classical liberals do not view humans as selfish creatures either. Man is social and unable to live without family and friends. Yet, given human nature, where people live together, there will also be misunderstanding and conflict (Sally 1998: 17–21; Conway 1995: 1–24; Barry 1987: 1–43). The best way to deal with this human condition is not through control, but liberty. Freedom is seen as the core of the Aristotelian ‘good life’. Individuals can use their talents the best way in freedom. Of course, this is not boundless. Following the harm principle, the freedom of one person ends where the freedom of another person is damaged. Compared to social liberals, classical liberals favour a larger degree of individual

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freedom, along the lines of Berlin’s difference between positive and negative freedom. Both liberal varieties defend personal liberties, such as religious freedom and toleration. Yet they diverge on the role of state. Social liberals believe in a large role for the state to provide conditions for individual liberty; classical liberals think that the free market and capitalism provide the best opportunities for individual flourishing (Van de Haar 2015: 25–27). The justification for individual liberty is found in secular natural law. For classical liberals there is natural coexistence between people, who are of the same value and born with the same rights to life, liberty and property. These are negative rights; their protection does not depend on any obligatory efforts by someone else, but is grounded in respect and non-­ intervention (see, for example, Rasmussen and Den Uyl 2005: 263–282). Three natural laws are added to protect the rights: the inalienability of property, the transfer of property based on mutual consent and the keeping of promises. Together they function as a protection against too much intervention by the state or other citizens. Hence, they also function as a guard of individual liberty and a justified human coexistence. The goal of politics is to protect the natural rights, also in international affairs. Lacking faith in the ultimate power of human reason, classical liberals also distrust decision-making by groups of people. They put more trust in spontaneous order (Polanyi 1998), summarised by Adam Ferguson as ‘the result of human action, but not of human design’, or by Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. People (say the baker or the butcher) care for their own interest in doing their business, but in the process unintended positive effects for the whole of society are reaped (the supply of bread or meat). This is based on the division of labour, and it fosters specialisation and trade. Classical liberals believe that many forms of societal order emerge as an unintended effect of human conduct. Hayek (see 1998: 1–144) put a lot of work in the distinction between ‘grown’ and ‘made’ order, arguing that the first type was superior and more just. Yet, not all that emerges spontaneously is beneficial to individual liberty. Therefore, there is a need for a limited number of state tasks and some positive legislation (De Jasay 1998; Leoni 1961). The tax needed to pay for state services is seen as an acceptable limitation of individual freedom, as long as it is kept at a minimum. Classical state tasks are the administration of a justice system, police and the organisation of external defence (Von Mises 1996: 52). In modern societies the state also needs to provide at least (primary) education, a small social welfare system, environmental

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rules and health services for uninsurable risks (Hayek 1993: 253–394). While specific arrangements are open for debate, classical liberals generally oppose the large post-war European welfare states. According to Swiss economist Wilhelm Röpke (1998: 153–154), there is a big contrast between the extraordinary success of the social and economic order relying on the regulating and stimulating forces of the market and free enterprise, and the results of continuous redistribution and income for the sake of equality. The state was often the greatest threat to life, liberty and property in the twentieth century. Protection against it must be taken care of by the separation of powers and constitutional limits for state action (Epstein 1995; Epstein 2003; Dicey 1982). Yet these are insufficient measures, as classical liberals believe all powers will be abused at the end of the day. Therefore, it is best to limit the number of state tasks, to decrease this chance.

Classical Liberal IR Theory These classical liberal principles in the domestic context make for a different liberal look on international relations. As Jørgensen (2018: 67–68) is right to describe, most people see liberalism in IR theory as a tradition characterised by a strong faith in human reason, the belief in the possibility of historical progress, a close connection between domestic and international institutions, the idea that economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict and war and lastly the positive effect of processes of institutionalising international relations. One may add—the nation is seen as a problematic actor in world politics whose room for manoeuvre needs to be curtailed, the belief that world peace is attainable, the idea that trade fosters peace and support for humanitarian intervention (Van de Haar 2019). Most of these ideas are related to social liberalism, not classical liberalism, as will be made clear in this short paragraph. The most fundamental difference is the view on human nature. The presumption that conflict and violence in inter-human relations can be abolished relies on rational behaviour. Classical liberals do not believe that is tenable; for them the relevant question is not how to eradicate war, but how to deal with its inevitable occurrence. A world without states, an idea that often figures in liberal IR theory, is no feasible alternative for classical liberals. Feelings of adherence between individuals are strongest in the family and then start to lose strength,

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reaching their limit at the level of the nation. Beyond that, feelings of sympathy are of course possible, but often just for a small period of time (e.g. sympathy for the victims of a natural disaster), and without political consequences. A world of states is the most natural and preferred order of things. Most classical liberals treat nation, country and state as synonymous, but realise there is more to questions of nationhood (e.g. Von Mises 1983: 9–14). All agree there is a line between positive and negative national feelings, the nation must be valued, but nationalism is poison (Hayek 1967: 143). The role of the state in international relations is to protect and safeguard individual freedom as best as possible in the anarchical international condition. One way to achieve that is through the balance of power, an example of spontaneous order at the international level. When great powers seek to dominate each other, in different alliances, the result is often international order, as they balance each other, thus preventing large-scale conflicts. Of course this works better for the major power blocks, because the balance of power is less concerned with smaller countries or territories (Bull 1995: 97–121, Little 2007). Nevertheless, it is a form of spontaneous order that is highly valued by classical liberals (Van de Haar 2011), because it helps to foster international order without an overload of international legislation. As in the domestic situation, some law and international treaties are needed though. For example, to settle cross-border issues (such as air pollution) or bilateral questions (to settle border disputes or other issues). In times of war, classical liberals embrace the just war tradition. They do not support war for just any purpose; they need a justified cause of war and rules of conduct in a war. Foreign military intervention is not a regular foreign policy instrument, and certainly not an ethical obligation (Van de Haar 2009: 130–131, 2013). Beyond the bare minimum, intergovernmental institutions, regimes and organisations are mostly seen as a threat to individual liberty. Together they function as a big state, but in the international arena rules are harder to change, and international organisations almost impossible to abolish. For example, Hayek and Von Mises were very critical about the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. They saw it as a ‘rationalist constructivist’ outfit. Likewise, the UN Declaration of Human Rights was ‘an attempt to fuse the rights of the Western liberal tradition with the altogether different tradition deriving from the Marxist Russian revolution’ (Hayek 1966, 1968, 1998: 104–106; Von Mises 1983: 90–91).

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Development aid is also pointless. Pioneering British development economist Peter Bauer emphasised that development aid was bringing money from the poor in the rich countries, to the rich in the poor countries (Bauer and Yamey 1957; Bauer 1971). Only free trade, capitalism and liberal policies are able to provide development and economic growth in the underdeveloped countries (Von Mises 1990: 34, 242–243; Hayek 1993: 3, 48–53, 322, 366–67). This plea for free trade has always been associated with classical liberalism. It is praised for its cultural and economic effects. However, there is great misconception about its political effects. Doyle and others erroneously associate classical liberalism and trade with peace. This does not comply with the classical liberal view on human nature. In practice, governments that grow rich through trade also have more opportunity to spend on defence. This makes the world unsafe, not peaceful. This insight is also a difference between classical liberal international thought and that of nineteenth-century luminaries Cobden and Bright, who are routinely presented as classical liberals, but often had rather different ideas (see Van de Haar 2010). There is no classical liberal right to free immigration. Social liberalism is joined here by the libertarians who also claim that migration should be free and unlimited, on the basis that it is the individuals’ decision to move abroad. States should not interfere, on moral and economic grounds (Van der Vossen and Brennan 2018: 19–57). Classical liberals disagree and put emphasis on the negative effects for the receiving population, culturally and in terms of property rights. Hayek and Von Mises experienced the great influx of poor immigrants into Vienna after World War I, and noted the great influence it had on the city’s character and its daily life. Consequently, they called for restricted immigration (Hayek 1978; Von Mises 1985: 10–11). The existence of modern welfare states offers additional arguments. While in no way the classical liberal ideal, the fact is that citizens obligatorily pay into all the different insurance schemes, building up property rights to these insurances. Free immigration is an unwarranted threat to (the levels of) these property rights that should also be taken into account when discussing (levels of) immigration. A world of states is the normal condition in international relations, according to classical liberals. Yet there are exceptional circumstances where states are incapable of living together. In that case it is needed to decrease their sovereignty and form a federation to safeguard individual liberty through the curtailing of the then member states. This can be done

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without too much (economic) policy centralisation and expansion of tasks. In the wake of World War II, Von Mises became involved in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-European Movement (Von Mises 1984: 54–55, 84–85; 1985: 278–282; Coudenhove-Kalergi 1944). He also drafted a number of plans for international unions in Eastern Europe, which he considered the prime cause of European instability (Von Mises 1985: 282–290; 2000: 169–201). Hayek also embraced European federation and remained a staunch defender of federations throughout his life, arguing, for example, for the federalisation of Jerusalem (Hayek 1948: 255, 269–271; 1982; 1997: 161–164). To sum up, the classical liberal view of international relations is foremost concerned with individual liberty within sovereign states. It is a theory of restraint, but it is not isolationist. It recognises the dangers of world politics, but is realistic about the possibilities for change. In terms of existing IR theory, it should be situated in the pluralist Grotian, or international society tradition of the English School (Van de Haar 2008, 2009: 139–141), whereas most other liberal IR theories are firmly Kantian, or world society.

Classical Liberalism and IR Theory Classical liberalism, or classical liberal thinkers, have not often been objects of study in IR theory. Due to academic specialisation and lack of knowledge of their writings, their potential contribution to IR debates has not been recognised. Hume was seen as a philosopher and historian, Smith as an economist, like Mises and Hayek (and Friedman and Buchanan for that matter), the latter three all winning the Nobel Prize in that field. As an ideology, classical liberalism lost out to the ever-growing influence of social liberalism, certainly after the publication of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls. The possible exception are the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were influenced by classical liberals, among them Hayek and Friedman. Yet classical liberalism itself also contributed to its neglect in IR, due to its main focus on economics, philosophy and legal studies. That said, classical liberals are not totally neglected in IR theory, except for Von Mises He actually wrote two books on international affairs, but was only once, and negatively, reviewed in Foreign Affairs in 1945. To do him some historical justice, a synopsis of both books will be provided here. Nation, State and Economy, published in 1919, was written to ‘contribute

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to the politics and history of our time’, as its subtitle purports. Mises starts with an analysis of the relation between the state and the nation, broadly defining the nation as a speech community. In politics, the nationality principle has two appearances: liberal or pacifistic versus militant or imperialistic. Mises then attempts to provide evidence for this in a historical analysis of the development of Germany and Austria. He then turns to contemporary Europe, offering a mostly economic analysis of the devastating effects of World War I. Mises argues that the war economy was of a true socialist nature, which was further developed after the war, under the label ‘transitional economics’. To make matters worse, there is a close relation between socialism and imperialism. Mises closes his study by arguing that Germans and other Europeans should refrain from socialism and return to liberalism; otherwise the future will ‘hinge not on cool understanding but on unclear feelings, that work not with logic but rather with the mysticism of a gospel of salvation, [because] socialism does not proceed from the free will of the majority of the people but rather from the terrorism of wild fanatics’ (Von Mises 1983: 221). Omnipotent Government. The Rise of the Total State and Total War (1944) does more or less the same, only now for the situation after World War II.  It also offers a historical analysis of the collapse of liberalism in Germany, the triumph of militarism and the dangerous influence of nationalism. He adds an analysis of the dangerous cocktail of Nazism, anti-­ Semitism and racism. Yet in this book Mises does not just argue for liberalism as a solution, but he offers many concrete policy proposals. For example, he warns against new ideas for planning on world scale (world governments, planed production, monetary planning, etc.), while Mises argues in favour of a Union of Western Democracies, and an Eastern Democratic Union which must replace all former states in Eastern Europe and turn them into provinces of the overarching new Democratic Union. However, the League of Nations can only render non-political services, as it will be unable to foster global or regional peace in any way. Having lived through two world wars at the time of writing, Mises apparently does not dare to predict that his advice will be followed up, so he ends his book by just questioning whether Europeans will learn from their mistakes (Von Mises 1985: 301). While Hume and Smith are not part of the liberal IR canon, their ideas have been analysed (see Van de Haar 2008, 2009: 52–56, 70–74, 2013; Keene 2005: 138–145; Ashworth 2014: 57–59; Walter 1996). A relatively well-known public figure from the 1940s to 1990s, Hayek is mentioned in

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the work of a number of (British) IR scholars. Young (1989) and Easley (2004) take note of his ideas of federations and of the role of spontaneous order in regime formation. Yet Richardson (1997) and Ashworth (1999) misinterpret his ideas in an almost malicious way. Brown (2010: 164–165) erroneously argues Hayek was in favour of ‘night-watchman state’, but does notice the wide gap between the ideas of Rawls and Hayek. In the middle of a somewhat superficial description of Smith, Lang (2015: 104) introduces Hayek in a box on ‘neoliberal theory’, implying that his ideas are to blame for the financial crisis of 2008. Mearsheimer (2018: 65–66) only notes a few of Hayek’s principles. Like most writers he does not analyse his international thought. IR theorists generally fail to provide an academically sound representation of Hayek’s ideas. Jahn is one of the few IR scholars who acknowledges and researches contradictions within liberalism, and between liberalism in IR and liberal political philosophy. Yet her focus is on the writings of John Locke, presented as the (sole) liberal founding father, despite acknowledging that a search for a ‘mono causal’ explanation has the weakness of overlooking the possibility that liberal differences actually find their origin in different liberal thinkers (Jahn 2013: 1–6, 10, 16). That assessment is right. The discrepancy between liberal IR theory and liberal political philosophy needs to be addressed, but a focus on just one liberal founding father is insufficient, given the plurality of liberal political thought (Van de Haar 2019). Also, it is questionable whether Locke, and Bentham for that matter, qualify as liberal founding fathers, considering the full range of their ideas (Van de Haar 2009: 38–40).

Way Forward This chapter attempted to show that there is an intra-liberal debate on international relations waiting for further analysis by IR academics. Also, when writing about liberalism, or using the word liberal, IR scholars need to be clear what they actually mean. Is it the whole tradition, the ideas of a particular thinker or a ‘constructed liberalism’ in the context of IR theory? If so, they must spell out what the particular liberal element actually constitutes. For example, what is liberal about the liberal global order, which liberalism or liberal ideas are used in liberal internationalism and other liberal IR theories? Where is the evidence in the writings of a particular liberal thinker, and what did he (less often she) actually say about international relations. A more grown-up debate on liberalism requires

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more work to uncover the ideas of individual liberals on international affairs, and more knowledge of the history of political philosophy in general. Liberalism is too important to not make the effort.

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Richardson, J.  L. (1997). Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present. European Journal of International Relations, 3, 5–33. Röpke, W. (1998). A Humane Economy. The Social Framework of the Free Market. Wilmington: ISI Books. Ryan, A. (2012). The Making of Modern Liberalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sally, R. (1998). Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order. Studies in Theory and Intellectual History. London: Routledge. Tomasi, J. (2012). Free Market Fairness. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. Van de Haar, E. R. (2008). David Hume and International Political Theory: A Reappraisal. Review of International Studies, 34, 225–242. Van de Haar, E.  R. (2009). Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory. Hume, Smith, Mises, and Hayek. New  York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Van de Haar, E.  R. (2010). The Liberal Divide over Trade, War and Peace. International Relations, 24, 132–154. Van de Haar, E. R. (2011). Hayekian Spontaneous Order and the International Balance of Power. The Independent Review, 16, 101–118. Van de Haar, E. R. (2013). David Hume and Adam Smith on International Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention. In S. Recchia & J. M. Welsh (Eds.), Just and Unjust Military Intervention. European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van de Haar, E.  R. (2015). Degrees of Freedom. Liberal Political Philosophy and Ideology. New York/London: Routledge. Van de Haar, E. R. (2019). Fostering Liberty in International Relations Theory: The Case of Ayn Rand. International Politics, 56, 1–16. Van Der Vossen, B., & Brennan, J. (2018). In Defense of Openness. Why Global Freedom Is the Humane Solution to Global Poverty. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Von Mises, L. (1983). Nation, State, and Economy. Contributions to the Politics and History of Our Time. New York/London: Institute for Humane Studies & New York University Press. Von Mises, L. (1984). The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics. Auburn: The Ludwig von Mises Institute of Auburn University. Von Mises, L. (1985). Omnipotent Government. The Rise of the Total State and Total War. Grove City: Libertarian Press. Von Mises, L. (1990). Economic Freedom and Interventionism. An Anthology of Articles and Essays by Ludwig von Mises. Selected and Edited by Bettina Bien Greaves. Irvington-on-Hudson: The Foundation for Economic Education. Von Mises, L. (1996). Liberalism. The Classical Tradition. Irvington-on-Hudson: The Foundation for Economic Education.

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Von Mises, L. (2000). Selected Writings, Volume 3. The Political Economy of International Reform and Reconstruction. Edited by Richard M.  Ebeling. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Wall, S. (2015). Introduction. In S.  Wall (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walter, A.  W. (1996). Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition in International Relations. In I. Clark & I. B. Neumann (Eds.), Classical Theories of International Relations. Houndmills: Macmillan Press. Young, O.  R. (1989). International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Zacher, M. W., & Matthew, R. A. (1995). Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands. In C.  W. Kegley Jr. (Ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion and Perspectives Knud Erik Jørgensen

Abstract  This chapter concludes the volume and presents wider perspectives. While common threads within the liberal tradition can be identified, its various strands often do not recognize family resemblance but make a priority of highlighting differences. Moreover, the chapter highlights how liberal scholars throughout Europe contribute to make the liberal theory tradition a living tradition that branches out in several strands of thought. In summary, the authors present a tradition that is currently under attack from both left and right. Keywords  Liberalism • Liberal • Theory • International • Discipline • Europe We can witness in 2020 something akin to what C.B. Macpherson observed in 1941, a recession of the liberal democratic tide. This time not only the emergence or reappearance of authoritarian regimes on the European

K. E. Jørgensen (*) Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52643-6_9

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continent but also an implosion of the two countries that are often considered the beacons of the liberal international order, the United States and the United Kingdom. The process of decline has been under way for some time and analysts published the first diagnoses of liberal decay more than two decades ago. However, at the time, the enthusiasm triggered by 1989 was widespread and accomplishments during the 1990s overshadowed the voices of concern, or analysts thought the problems were among these bumps on the road that for centuries have accompanied liberal politics. As the problems turned out to be enduring, the rationale for critically appraising the liberal international theory tradition increased, and became mandatory. Not because we believe that theoretical reflection, ideology and politics are three words for the same phenomenon. On the contrary, we believe that theoretical reflection tells something about ways of seeing the world, that is, how theorists conceptualize key actors, dominant structures and important processes, not to mention how they assess causal or constitutive linkages. In contrast to ideologues, theorists within scientific disciplines are explicit about their assumptions and propositions, and they are prepared to revise their theories. The aim of understanding such reflections and how they change over time is more than a sufficient objective for one book. Hence, we leave the study of ideologues and politicians to those who have an interest in such topics. When the team embarked the project of appraising the liberal international theory tradition as practiced in Europe, it was clear to all that it would be a challenge. In following the guidelines of the framework volume for the Trends in European IR Theory book series (Alejandro et al. 2015), the project is pitched in such a fashion that it is bound to be innovative and transcend several intellectual path dependencies. In other words, it was not meant to shuffle and reshuffle a few episodes in an often told story. Instead, the project faced the task of connecting fragments in search of synthesis. Each of the fragments might be well-known to specialists but remains unconnected or they are sufficiently mindboggling to be left aside. For instance, when John Mayall (1989) writes about the liberal theory of international society and Martin Wight (1991) traces the origin of the rationalist tradition—the English School—to liberal writers, they both bring together in a disquieting fashion what textbooks often present as separate traditions. In turn, such interventions call for further examination of the boundaries between the liberal tradition and the English School, cf. Ergul Jorgensen’s review (Chap. 7).

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During the interwar years, liberal theorizing developed closely intertwined with the development of the scientific discipline of IR, itself created with strong liberal underpinnings. Given that both theorizing and discipline formation were experimental, it was a time characterized by uncertainty about objectives and means as well as trial and error approaches. There were numerous ideas about how a scientific study of international relations might look and if there could be some value in theorizing as well as what it entails to be a discipline. Liberal theorizing is very much an offshoot or spillover from the liberal nineteenth century, including theoretical reflections within the European peace movement, a delayed, almost out of sync, offshoot that is. If Titanic hit an iceberg, the liberal century hit WW1. It follows that interwar theorizing evolved as reflections on and visions for a world that increasingly opted for illiberal political templates. It is striking to witness how contemporary critical scholars repeat the early Frankfurter School in resisting distinctions between liberal and illiberal practices. While optimism and pessimism divided interwar liberal scholars, Öztığ (Chap. 2) describes how the optimistic crowd increasingly lost their hopes. Moreover, scholarly theorizing and political practices were intimately linked, frequently at home within the same individual, the scholar-­ practitioner. Whereas the range of practical solutions to practical problems were impressive, not least given the increasingly difficult conditions for their accomplishment, the theoretical production was more modest. However, as Zwolski points out, it can intellectually be more stimulating to think about visions than to engage in rear mirror analysis, even if one is equipped with magnificent datasets and fantastic research techniques. It is along a similar line of argument that Blachford refers to barefoot conceptual analysis accompanied by hairsplitting methodological exercises and calls for new ‘datasets’ being repeated ad nauseam. The chapters document, each in their own fashion, how theorists within the liberal tradition employ a number of different analytical languages. Domestic factors, for instance, do not only play a role in republicanism and IR republican approaches, they also play a role in domestic politics approaches, though in such approaches the factors are pitched in the language of variables and hypotheses. Concerning republicanism, Blachford makes the point that republicanism presents an older language of liberty that is somewhat out of touch with contemporary IR republican theory. Zwolski points out that John Burton’s argument about linkages between (unmet) human needs and violent conflict remains as relevant in the twenty-first century as it was during the 1970s. However, while the

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substantive argument remains relevant, Burton is not quite a standard reference in contemporary scholarship, presumably because he did not couch the argument in one of the dominant contemporary languages. Brock and Simon show how the peace research community branches into three distinct lines of inquiry, each employing several analytical languages. Across several chapters, the concepts citizen, institution and liberty make a common theme. Republicanism’s emphasis on making power accountable to citizens is in English School solidarism extended to international society’s responsibility to protect individuals in need, especially in situations where domestic accountability has collapsed. Importantly, the focus on individuals is a continuation of interwar liberal theorizing, cf. Öztığ’s argument (Chap. 2). Concerning liberty, even a small collection of chapters on liberal theory documents the many and changing faces of liberty. During the 1990s, contributions were often on the extension of ‘zones of liberty’, whereas contemporary studies are keen to emphasize the fragility of liberty. In this context, linkages to Hayek and von Mises’ liberalism seem unavoidable and clearly worthwhile exploring, demonstrated in van de Haar’s account of classical liberalism (Chap. 8). Brock and Simon ‘triangulate’ peace, liberal and IR, components that can be kept separate but which gain from being connected and synthesized into a rich strand of knowing war and thinking peace. Ergul Jorgensen calls (Chap. 7) for a more grown-up debate on liberalism, emphasizing that a precondition for meaningful exchanges is proper explication of key terms such as liberal and liberalism as well as specification of the scope of analysis, that is, does it concern the entire tradition, strands of scholarship or individual theorists. In terms of drawing conclusions, it is an important reminder that theorists tend to be more complex thinkers than textbooks and other presentations make them, a crucial insight that is too valuable to forget and which only intellectual laziness can hinder being acted upon. The theorists of a liberal orientation that we appraise in this book demonstrate, time and again, the existence of hybrid or crossover theorists. In other words, theorists who defy easy classification and thus do not fit one of the many boxes we love to create for them. Liberal theorists such as Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Ernst Jäckh were liberals who found it difficult to accept the rules-based international order of the interwar years, not least because the rules in question were very tough on Germany. They very much felt the power behind the (imposed) rules and the new international institution, the League of Nations, did not exactly soften the deal. The proto-type realist, E.H. Carr,

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turns out to be a disappointed liberal scholar but his critique of interwar liberals for being blind to power did not stick on the German and many other liberals. Indeed, it seems he shares parts of their analysis. Zimmern, the archetypical interwar liberal, turned into a Cold War liberal whose 1953 book typically escapes the attention of studies of liberal theory. Raymond Aron is on the one hand presented as a neoclassical scholar before someone coined the term and, on the other hand, the towering French liberal who singlehandedly defended a liberal outlook in the context of the Cold War. The Austrian liberal scholars Hayek and von Mises are so much out of touch with mainstream liberal IR theory that the easy option is not to mention them at all, so that is what happened. The same fate applies to Vilfredo Pareto probably because he was a conservative liberal and occasionally interpreted as a proto-fascist, nonetheless influencing Norberto Bobbio’s socialist liberalism. It is probably not a coincidence that the present volume appears simultaneously to the publication of Michael Freeden et  al.’s European Liberalisms (2019), the latter being the first book for a very long time that analyses what liberalism means across Europe highlighting numerous varieties. Whereas the spatial dimension of the two books is similar, European Liberalisms focuses on historical varieties of political ideology and liberal thought and the present volume on international theory as cultivated within the IR discipline. During the last three decades (1989–2019), processes of European research integration have involved a sufficiently high number of exchanges of ideas to make it increasingly natural to consider Europe a common public sphere of scholarly practices of knowledge production and thus imagine Europe as a unit of analysis. It seems we are finally past the long shadows of the Cold War, not back to the future some predicted and beyond a map of Europe that only shows national boundaries. It is increasingly possible to imagine theoretical traditions along transnational lines. However, the description of such traditions does not come easy. The fault lines between scholarly preoccupations are more important than perhaps expected. While specialization is inherent and unavoidable in scholarly work, the fault lines function as veritable demarcation lines between no go zones, thereby constraining our efforts at synthesis. Examples include, for instance, the counterintuitive separation of philosophical and IR republican theory. A second pronounced fault line is temporal provincialization, that is, not historical studies only or a pronounced resistance to engage in historical analysis and a strong preference to focus on contemporary scholarship, preferably published within the most recent

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decade. Temporal provincialization is also about the translocation of selected contemporary norms in assessments of past developments. Finally, the chapters above show how the liberal international theory tradition evolves over time and how theorists understand the world in which they are living. The chapters also show how the tradition comprises different intellectual strands, how these strands intertwine and how they over time gain and loses traction in the community of IR scholars. The chapters also have their limits. We are thus unable to compare to liberal theorizing outside of Europe, simply because comparison goes beyond our research design. Each chapter is a brief sketch; combined they can function as a feasibility study that shows the topic deserves further research and more comprehensive studies.

References Freeden, M., Fernández-Sebastián, J., & Leonhard, J. (Eds.). (2019). In Search of European Liberalisms: Concepts, Languages, Ideologies. New  York: Berghahn Books. Mayall, J. (1989). 1789 and the Liberal Theory of International Society. Review of International Studies, 15(4), 297–307.

Index1

A Angell, Norman, 9, 12, 19, 92–94 Aron, Raymond, 12, 14–17, 137 B Balance of Europe, 66 Balance of power, 32, 67, 95, 111, 124 Bauer, Peter, 125 Bell, Duncan, 5, 6 Bloch, Jan, 12 Boundaries, 6, 17, 21, 22, 36, 74, 97, 106, 114, 134, 137 boundaries between theoretical traditions, 106, 114, 134 Briand Memorandum, 39, 95 Brock, Lothar, 21, 84 Brücher, Gertrud, 84 Buchanan, James, 120, 126 Bull, Hedley, 6, 16–18, 106–109, 112

C Carr, E.H., 12, 14, 15, 40, 92 Cedermann, Lars E., 78, 85 Citizens, 9, 34, 60–62, 64–66, 68 Classical liberalism, 119–129 and international relations theory, 126–128 and the state, 120–121 as tradition, 17 Cobden, Richard, 108, 125 Cold War liberals, 12, 14 Core concepts, 121 Cosmopolitan ethics, 112, 113 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard, 93, 95 Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 14n10, 20, 64, 77–78 D Davies, David, 94 de Bièvre, Dirk, 50 Deitelhoff, Nicole, 81

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refers to notes

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INDEX

Democracy, 11, 16, 18, 34, 64, 65, 67, 68, 77, 78, 81–85, 108, 113–114 Democratic peace, 62, 63, 68 Democratic Peace Theory, 1, 17, 18, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67 Democratic war, 20, 79, 80 de Ruggiero, Guido, 10 Development aid, 125 Discipline formation, 135 Domestic politics, 45–56, 83, 121, 135 Doyle, Michael, 48, 125 Duchêne, Francois, 101 Dür, Andreas, 50 E English School, 16–18, 21, 105–115 European actorness, 101 European power, 99, 101 European security, 99–103 European Union, 20, 60, 63, 66, 93, 99 F Federalism, 35, 37, 92–94 Federation, 32, 66, 67, 92–94, 96, 125–126, 128 Fioretos, Orfeo, 51 Freeden, Michael, 6, 7, 10, 120, 137 Free trade, 108, 125 Freedom, 32, 60–62, 64, 76, 81–83, 106, 107, 120–122, 124 Friedman, Milton, 120, 126 Functionalist approach, 95–97 G Galtung, Johan, 75, 84 Geis, Anna, 75, 85

Ghandian tradition, 84 Gleditsch, Nils Peter, 20, 78 Globalization, 16, 19, 20, 49, 55, 79, 113 Grieco, Joseph, 97, 98 Grotius, Hugo, 62, 108 H Habermas, Jürgen, 80–83 Hasenclever, Andreas, 98, 99 Hassner, Pierre, 47, 56 Hayek, Friedrich A., 9, 120–128, 136 Held, David, 83, 113, 114 Hobhouse, Leonard T., 33–35, 37 Hobson, John A., 9, 12, 20, 34, 35 Horkheimer, Max, 11, 14, 15 Huber, Max, 39 Humanitarian intervention, 107, 111–113 Human nature, 32, 35, 107, 121, 123, 125 Human rights, 80, 83, 107, 109 Hume, David, 9, 120, 126, 127 Hurrell, Andrew, 20, 113 I Ideas, 34, 35, 40, 46, 50, 56 Immigration, 125 Institutions, 16, 35, 46, 49–56, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 77, 94 Interests, 21, 32, 34–37, 46, 48–56 Intergovernmental organizations, 36 International cooperation, 34, 81, 92, 97, 111 International federalism, 92–94 International functionalism, 95–97 Internationalism, 12, 128 International law, 15, 33, 36–40, 74, 81, 82, 84 International regimes, 92, 97–99

 INDEX 

International relations theory, 9, 106 International society, 20, 32, 107–111, 114, 126, 134, 136 Interstate relations, 6, 34–36, 39, 40, 78 Intervention, 79, 80, 84, 100, 107, 109, 111–113, 115 Interwar period, 2, 11, 13, 14, 33–40 J Jäckh, Ernst, 11–13 Jahn, Beate, 80, 84, 128 Just war tradition, 124 K Kaiser, Karl, 15, 16, 47, 56 Kantian, 20, 38, 39, 65, 67, 76, 77, 83, 109, 110, 112–115, 126 Kant, Immanuel, 16, 32, 38, 62–64, 74, 76–78, 80–83, 85, 107–108, 113 Krasner, Stephen, 97, 100 L Lauterpacht, Hersch, 13n8, 38, 81n3, 110, 111 League of Nations, 33–35, 38, 39, 93, 96, 111, 124, 127, 136 See also United Nations Liberal century, 2, 9 Liberal cosmopolitanism, 80 Liberal internationalism, 32–33, 35–36, 38, 40, 80, 110, 111, 128 Liberalism, 2, 4–6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16–20, 32, 38, 46–49, 55, 56, 61, 64, 68, 80, 85, 92, 106–109, 114, 120, 121, 125–129, 136, 137 Liberal peace theory, 74

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Liberal theory, 3–4, 6, 12–23, 46, 49, 65, 74, 83, 98, 106, 128, 134–137 See also Strong liberal theories Liberal tradition, 5, 6, 17, 21, 47, 61, 63, 68, 92, 106, 114, 120, 124, 134, 135 Libertarians, 120, 125 Liberty, 33, 38, 60, 61, 64–68, 120–126, 135, 136 See also Freedom Linklater, Andrew, 76 M MacKay, RWG, 94 Macpherson, C.B., 2, 133 Manners, Ian, 101 Matthew, Richard A., 3, 9, 46, 48 Meinecke, Friedrich, 11n5 Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, Albrecht, 11–13, 136 Mitrany, David, 9, 13n8, 15, 19, 36, 92, 95, 96, 111 Moravcsik, Andrew, 49, 54, 106 Morgenthau, Hans, 7, 14, 48 Müller, Harald, 20, 75, 80, 81, 85 N Nationalism, 12, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 76, 124, 127 Nölke, Andreas, 51 Non-intervention, 112, 113 P Pan-European Union, 93, 95 Peace theory, 15, 16, 18, 19, 60, 62, 63, 65, 74, 84 Peace through democratization, 74, 77–81

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Peace through law, 74, 81–84 Peace through modernization, 74–76 Pettit, Philip, 61 Pluralism, 112 Political economy, 48, 51 Political-institutional culture, 7 Political practice, 2, 3, 7, 40, 135 Politis, Nicolas, 37, 38 Post-liberal peace, 74 Preference formation, 46, 51, 53–56 R Rawls, John, 15, 120, 126, 128 Realism, 8, 17, 18, 21, 46, 55, 61, 62, 98, 106, 108 Republicanism, 16, 59–68, 135, 136 Republican liberalism, 16, 19, 20, 49, 62 Richmond, Oliver, 22, 74, 77, 80, 84 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 18, 20, 22, 79 Risse, Thomas, 5, 22, 52, 81, 120 Rittberger, Volker, 22, 78, 98 Robins, Lionel, 94 Rockefeller Foundation, 14 Russell, Frank, 11–13 S Scelle, George, 36, 37 Schirm, Stefan, 22, 46, 53, 54 Schücking, Walther, 22, 38, 39, 81 Security governance, 91, 99–101 Senghaas, Dieter, 22, 75, 76 Sjöstedt, Gunnar, 101 Skinner, Quentin, 60, 61 Smith, Adam, 9, 108, 120–122, 126–128 Social liberals, 120–122 Societal approach, 45, 46, 53–56 Solidarism, 111, 136

Sørensen, Georg, 20, 22 Spontaneous order, 121, 122, 124, 128 State sovereignty, 35, 105, 106, 112, 114 Stawell, Florence, 13 Streit, Clarence, 94 Strong liberal theories, 106 T Theoretical traditions, 3, 18, 23, 55, 62, 102, 106, 137 See also Boundaries Theory, 1–23, 33, 46–49, 53, 55, 59–63, 65, 67, 74, 78n1, 81–84, 98, 106, 120–121, 123, 126, 128, 134–138 Trade, 2, 34, 50, 63, 94, 97, 108, 122, 123, 125 Tradition, 3–6, 16–21, 23, 32–33, 36, 38, 40, 47, 55, 60–63, 66–68, 74–76, 83, 84, 92, 97, 102, 106–109, 112–115 Transnationalisation, 49, 55 Tuck, Richard, 82 U United Nations, 111, 124 United States of Europe, 66, 94, 95 V Vincent, John, 21, 22, 108, 112 Voegelin, Eric, 5, 8, 10 von Mises, Ludwig, 9, 13n8, 120–127, 136, 137

 INDEX 

W Wallensteen, Peter, 78, 79 War, 10–18, 20, 21, 32–33, 35–40, 46–49, 52, 55, 56, 63, 64, 74–76, 78–82, 84, 85, 92–95, 99, 100, 108, 110, 123–127, 136, 137 Weak liberal theories, 106 Webber, Mark, 22, 100 Weber, Max, 11n5, 12

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Wehberg, Hans, 22, 39, 40, 81 Wheeler, Nicholas, 21, 22, 112, 113 Wight, Martin, 9, 12, 14–16, 21, 22, 106, 108, 109, 134 Z Zacher, Mark W., 3, 5, 9, 46, 48, 120 Zimmern, Alfred E., 9, 11n4, 13, 16, 22, 35, 39, 137 Zones of peace, 63