The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic: Power, Process, and Development 3031246942, 9783031246944

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Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Omololu Fagbadebo Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi   Editors

The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic Power, Process, and Development

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development Series Editors Diery Seck, CREPOL - Center for Research on Political Economy, Dakar, Senegal Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-political dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed. The book series is indexed in SCOPUS.

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Omololu Fagbadebo • Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi Editors

The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic Power, Process, and Development

Editors Omololu Fagbadebo Department of Public Management, Law and Economics Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi College of Law Osun State University, Ifetedo Campus Ifetedo, Nigeria

ISSN 2198-7262 ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic) Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development ISBN 978-3-031-24694-4 ISBN 978-3-031-24695-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

We dedicate this book to colleagues, friends, and legislative practitioners who are committed to the promotion of a virile legislative institution in Nigeria.

Acknowledgments

This book is a continuation of our contributions to legislative study and governance. We are conscious of the important role of the legislature in a presidential democracy. Our desire, therefore, is to advance scholarly works directed toward the understanding of the functioning of the legislature as a major stakeholder in Nigeria’s presidential system. We, therefore, acknowledge the support of colleagues who participated in the blind review of the manuscript and their constant scholarly engagements. We drew inspiration from your constructive criticisms of the initial final drafts and volume. Chapter authors are the kings here for sparing their time to present their works. We are indebted to the editorial team of Springer Nature, particularly, the Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development series. Special recognition and acknowledgment of the role of Niko Chtouris who facilitated this process. We are grateful.

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Omololu Fagbadebo and Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi

1

The Legislature in a Presidential System: Structure, Functions, and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Omololu Fagbadebo

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The Historical Overview of the Evolution of the Legislature in Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lucky A. Tongs, Omololu Fagbadebo, and Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi

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Legislative Oversight as Accountability Mechanism: The Nigerian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jacob Olufemi Fatile and Kehinde David Adejuwon

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The Politics of the Investigative Powers of the Legislature in Nigeria’s National Assembly in the Fourth Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon and Adebayo Olumide Adedeji

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The Legislature and Social Development in Nigeria, 2015–2019 . . . . . . . Oluwatunmise Taiwo Paimo Representative Democracy, Political Disengagement, and Young People’s Perceptions of Legislators in Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mayowa Micheal Adeniji and Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi

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Corruption and Executive Interference in Legislative Oversight in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Oyewole Oyindamola Opeoluwa, Daramola Iyanunioluwa Oluwatobi, and Gbadeyan Olawale James Constituency Projects in Nigeria’s 8th National Assembly, 2015–2019 . . 127 Oluwatobi O. Adeyemi and Adekeye Adeshola Joseph

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Contents

Nigeria’s Presidential System and the Vicissitudes of Executive-Legislative Conflicts in the Fourth Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Ojo Celestine Jombo and Omololu Fagbadebo Party Affiliation and Law-making Efficiency: A Study of the Seventh and Eighth Nigerian National Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Oluwabukola Oluwadamilare Olaniyi Comparing the “New” and the “Old” Regimes of Legislative-Executive Relations and Its Implications in Governance: Evidence from Osun State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Olusegun Busola Adeyeni, Bolanle Waliu Shiyanbade, and Gbeminiyi Kazeem Ogunbela Nigerian Presidentialism and Legislative Decadence in the Fourth Republic, 2015–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Solomon A. Adedire Legislative Turnover in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Issues and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Akinlolu Elijah Akinola and Oludare Olawale Mosunmola The Legislature, the Rule of Law, and the Politics of Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb The Legislature, Subnational Governments, and Child’s Education Rights in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Tunde A. Abioro Constitutional Underpinnings of Partisanship and Consensus Building in Nigeria’s National Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi Two Decades of Legislative Activities in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Adeleke Adegbami

List of Figures

Chapter 7 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6

Scores of principles of democracy. Source: Generated by the authors . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . Representative Democracy Score distributions across geo-political zone. Source: Generated by the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Source: Generated by the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geo-political zones and the awareness of the profiles of parliamentarians. Generated by the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Young citizens’ communication with MPs through constituency offices. Generated by the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceptions of representative democracy and the willingness to engage parliamentarians. Generated by the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100 100 101 102 104 105

Chapter 11 Fig. 1

Graphical representation of bills under the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies . . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . 161

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List of Tables

Chapter 4 Table 1 Table 2

Some of the reported Cases of Corruption in the National Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some Nigerian legislators facing criminal allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 6 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Violent operations by Boko Haram Insurgent Group (2015–2019) . . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . Showing percentages of unemployed youths in Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . Showing rate and levels of employment in Nigeria (in millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82 85 85

Chapter 7 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Young people’s membership of political parties and the knowledge of constituency delimitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Registered voters’ awareness of the existence of constituency offices . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . 103 Hypothesis testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Chapter 11 Table 1 Table 2

Status of bills in the Seventh National Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Status of Bills under the Eighth Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

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List of Tables

Chapter 12 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Comparison of Legislative-Executive relations between old and new regimes in Osun State . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . 176 Summary of Comparison of Legislative-Executive relations between old and new regimes in Osun State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Chi-square . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 178

Chapter 14 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7

Legislative turnover rates and their indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turnover in the Nigerian Senate since 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turnover rate in the House of Representatives since 2007 . . . . . . . . . Seat volatility in Nigeria’s Parliamentary Elections since 1999 . . . . Intra-party turnover for the Senate between 2015 and 2019 . . . . . . . . Intra-party turnover in the House of Representatives (2015 and 2019) . . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . The legislative efficiency of Nigerian Federal Parliament for 2003–2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

202 204 204 205 208 208 211

Introduction Omololu Fagbadebo and Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi

1 The Context of the Book The series of political instability generated by Nigeria’s First Republic parliamentary system gave rise to the adoption of a presidential system in the Second Republic in 1979. Nevertheless, the military truncated this process in December 1983. The fledgling Third Republic, concocted by the military, suffered the same fate in November 1993, when another military dictator swept away the Interim National Government (ING). In all these past democratic failures, the legislative institution suffered setbacks. While the executive and the judiciary remained operational, the legislature was in limbo (Fagbadebo 2020). In other words, the legislative institution in the Nigerian political system has remained the victim of a democratic recession. The birth of the Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999, brought to the fore the emergence of the legislature as yet another experiment in a presidential democracy. Its structure and organization in the system are an indication of its primary role in the life of the government. In the constitutional arrangement, its position takes precedence before the other two branches of government. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, prescribes a system of separated but share power among the three branches of the government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (Sections 4–6). Section 4 of the Constitution entrusts the legislative powers of the federation and the component states in the National Assembly and the 36 legislative houses, respectively. They have the power

O. Fagbadebo (✉) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] M. O. A. Alabi College of Law, Osun State University, Ifetedo Campus, Osogbo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_1

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to make laws for peace and good government. Since the executive operates within the ambit of the law, it means that the legislature in Nigeria’s presidential system is constitutionally empowered to set the pace for the administration of the government. Sections 11 and 12 also prescribe legislative power for the maintenance of public security and order and foreign policy, respectively. Thus, the Nigerian legislature has the power to regulate the country’s domestic and foreign activities. The legislature has both the allocative and authorization power for the executive to act. The executive branch is empowered to execute and administer the laws, while the judiciary has the power of adjudicating conflicts between the legislation and the implementation of the laws. The Constitution precludes the two political branches of the government from any form of tyranny in the exercise of their power. Section 4 (8) stipulates Save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the exercise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and judicial tribunals established by law, and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or a judicial tribunal established by law.

In other words, the legislature does not have the power of life and death; it must operate within the ambit of the law. Central to this law-making power is the oversight responsibility that the Constitution extended to the legislature. The legislature has the power to scrutinize and monitor all government policies and actions. Since these policies are composite of the law-making power of the legislature, the Constitution empowers the legislature to take oversight of the implementation process to ensure compliance for the intended purpose. Section 16(1) of the Constitution prescribes the functional objectives of the Nigerian state. These are: (a) Harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant economy. (b) Control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity. (c) Without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, manage and operate the major sectors of the economy. (d) Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy. To achieve these objectives, the Constitution also mandates the state to direct its policy to ensure

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(a) The promotion of a planned and balanced economic development. (b) That the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good. (c) That the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group; and (d) That suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the disabled are provided for all citizens (Section 16 (2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). These objectives as well as the directive principles of state policy are central to the exercise of legislative powers of allocation, authorization, and oversight. The legislative allocative and authorization powers connote that government policies and activities are within the prescribed policy directives enacted and financially backed up, by the legislature. Section 80(2) of the Constitution prescribes No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or an Act passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution.

Even though the Constitution empowers the president to prepare the projected yearly fiscal Bill, the legislature has the power to appropriate and authorize the funds to finance all the projects. The legislative oversight power is exercisable thorough investigation of the activities of the executive in terms of the implementation of the appropriated fiscal policy. This, in essence, is necessary to enshrine the culture of accountability. There are prescribed oversight mechanisms to make the executive accountable (Fagbadebo 2020). These mechanisms are designed to ensure effective public service delivery. Thus, no proper appraisal of Nigeria’s democratic experiment can be done without situating it within the context of the contributions of the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly to the development of this emerging democracy in Africa. The central theme of this book is to examine the extent to which the legislative institution, state and national, in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been able to harness its constitutional powers to impact public policy. Authors of different chapters discuss these issues within the context of the power of the institution and the prescribed process. As in other fledgling presidential systems, the executive branch in Nigeria is obsessed with power, wanting to undermine legislative assertiveness in oversight responsibility (Fagbadebo 2020). As Bulmer (2017, p.3) has noted, “excessive concentration of powers in the presidency may result in a hyper-presidential regime, in which the president is subject to few effective constraints, undermining both democracy and good government.” The consequence of this is a weak legislature whose oversight responsibilities of executive actions would be compromised (Huneeus et al. 2006). To what extent has the legislature in Nigeria been hindered by the hyper-presidential phenomenon? This question speaks to the development of the legislative institution in Nigeria since

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1999. And authors will address the magnitude, with empirical evidence, of this phenomenon vis a vis public service delivery. Since 1999, the Nigerian state has not been able to showcase, as expected, the dividends of presidential democracy. The crisis of governance is deteriorating daily, political instability is becoming more critical, social cohesion has lost its steam and the livelihood of citizens has been characterized by high uncertainties. Infrastructural facilities are depreciating daily, while corruption and mismanagement of public resources become more evidence in terms of revelations and discoveries of defiant attitudes of public political and bureaucratic officials.

2 The Book The authors of this volume address the various legislative activities in Nigeria’s presidential system of the Fourth Republic from different perspectives. In Chap. 2, Omololu Fagbadebo presents a general overview of the roles of the legislature in the presidential system. Scholars of comparative politics have discussed the presidential system from different perspectives but the central role of the legislature, as a body of the collective will of the people remains constant. With three generic roles, the legislature is the hub of the policy process designed and structured to promote accountability and stimulate effective public service delivery. The system of separated but shared powers associated with the presidential system entrenched the legislature as the central pillar in the oversight of the activities of the executive. While separation of powers allows the interdependent exercise of power among the three branches of the government, the legislature, by its design, sets the pace for scrutinizing executive activities to ensure compliance with the intendments of its authorized policies and programs. In Chap. 3, Lucky Tongs, Omololu Fagbadebo and Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi discuss the historical overview of the development of the legislative institution, particularly at the federal level, as a foundational basis for understanding the dynamics that define its power and processes as the central institution of governance in Nigeria. From the colonial legislative gathering by name rather than function, the legislature in Nigeria metamorphosed into an institutional structure designed to function as a major stakeholder in the promotion of accountability in government. The authors note that the inactive exercise of requisite oversight power to enforce accountability has remained a challenge to the credibility of the country’s democratic culture. Jacob Fatile and David Adejuwon, in Chap. 4, examine the oversight responsibility of the Nigerian legislature as an accountability mechanism. They note that the prescribed oversight functions of the legislature in Nigeria were designed to ensure accountability and the promotion of good governance. They argue that the Nigeria legislature in the Fourth Republic has not been able to perform its oversight functions to the expectations of Nigerians in terms of entrenching accountable and transparent governance that will guarantee good governance for the benefit of

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citizens. The chapter concludes that for effective functioning, the legislature should be insulated from the influence of the executive which is sometimes counterproductive in entrenching accountable governance since such influence tends to sway the minds of the legislators from the serious business of law-making. Leke Oluwalogbon and Adebayo Adedeji concentrate their discussion in Chap. 5 on the politics associated with the investigative powers of the legislature. They noted the constitutional provisions that empower the legislature to investigate the activities of the executive as part of its oversight power. Legislative functions the world over are usually classified as legislative and non-legislative. While the former deals with the power to make and change laws, the latter bothers on a variety of other functions ranging from financial, executive, representative, and investigative functions among others. Nevertheless, the legislature has failed to harness the virtue of this investigative power to stimulate accountability in government. In Chap. 6, Oluwatunmise Paimo discusses the role of the legislature in social development. The chapter identifies the policies made by the legislature on social development from 2015 to 2019 and how they impacted the democratic governance of Nigeria. The chapter concludes that although the democratic process has become a practice in Nigeria, social development—human security, poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth—has been crippled. Mayowa Adeniji and Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi examine representative democracy, political disengagement, and young people’s perceptions of legislators in Nigeria, in Chap. 7. Using a mixed method approach, the chapter collected primary data from a survey of young people drawn from serving members of Nigeria’s National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme and focus group discussions with officials of youth-based civic groups (ages 18–30). While reinforcing the widely known poor perceptions of representative democracy among young people, the findings further demonstrate an abysmally low level of knowledge of the process that births the legislature and legislators through the mechanics of representative democracy. We also found evidence to refute the notion of “critical citizens” as the driving force behind depressing levels of young people-MPs disconnect in Nigeria. In Chap. 8, Oyewole Oyindamola Opeoluwa, Daramola Iyanunioluwa Oluwatobi and Gbadeyan Olawale James examine the issue of executive interference in legislative oversight activities. They noted that this practice has weakened legislative oversight capacity with reinforced money politics. In Chap. 9, Oluwatobi O. Adeyemi and Adekeye Adeshola Joseph examine the implementation of constituency projects in the 8th National Assembly. They noted that legislative involvement in the execution of projects was beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the constitution. They discovered that the implementation of the various projects was characterized by corruption. Ojo Celestine Jombo and Omolou Fagbadebo, in Chap. 10, discuss the recurring legislature-executive conflicts. The findings showed that rather than propel greater commitment towards the institutionalization of a strong regime of accountability in governance, the unending conflicts between the two branches of government manifested as parts of the unbridled competition among the political class to gain undue advantage over one another in determining the direction of state policy. The

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paper concludes that frictions between political actors across the executivelegislative divide portend serious implications and consequences for the smooth running of government business in Nigeria, as well as the stability of the nation’s democratic process. In Chap. 11, Olaniyi Oluwabukola Oluwdamilare examines the impact of party affiliation on the law-making capacity of the legislature. Using the descriptive method, the study extensively draws on qualitative official documents, interviews, discussions, books, journal articles and newspapers on surrounding issues; while subjecting it to thematic content analysis. The study concludes that objectivity, transparency, and accountability are indispensable values a democratic leader should display. This, in turn, depicts the need to reinforce the efficiency of lawmakers in discharging legislative duties as against pronouncing disparities in individual and party ideologies. Olusegun Busola Adeyeni, Bolanle Waliu Shiyanbade and Gbeminiyi Kazeem Ogunbela in Chapter 12 compare the regime of executive interference in legislative activities in Osun State. The study compared old and new regimes in Osun State. Data gathered were analyzed using descriptive and content analysis. The study revealed the ease of passage of Executive-sponsored bills by the Legislature, agreement levels for the old and new regimes were respectively 85.7% and 77%, while, in respect of the Executive approval of the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis, agreement level for the old and new regimes were 85.7% and 92.3% respectively with no significant difference at 90.5%. The study concluded that there was no significant difference in the relationship under the regimes compared to Osun State. In Chap. 13, Nigerian Presidentialism and legislative decadence in the Fourth Republic, 2015–2021, Solomon Adebayo Adedire explores the various infractions of the legislature in the course of its oversight activities. The study observed that certain factors like subjugation of the legislature by the executive, self-centeredness of the legislators, commercialization of the law-making process, and high leadership turnover in the legislative chambers amongst others are responsible for the weak institution of the legislative houses. The study, therefore, recommends transparency and accountability of the legislative houses, financial autonomy of the legislature, strengthening of oversight functions, and autonomy of the standing committees as means of strengthening the legislature and making federalism an ideal one. Akinlolu Elijah Akinola and Oludare Olawae Mosunmola examine the implications of legislative turnover in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic on the performance of the legislature in Chap. 14. The study discovered that the high turnover of legislators in Nigeria deprives the legislature of the necessary experience for effective legislative activities. In Chap. 15, Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb interrogates legislative activities relating to impeachment in Nigeria. The author reviews some of the impeachment cases and notes that the lawmakers demonstrated their failures to harness the overhit power of impeachment to stimulate accountable leadership. The author concludes that observable high frequency, geographical spread and attendant judicial reviews questioning the validity of the impeachment tool attest to the popularity and ease of its

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deployment largely for reasons of political expediency and power contestations that threatens the Consolidation of Representative Government. Tunde A. Abioro, in Chap. 16, The Legislature, Subnational Governments and Child’s Education Rights in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, reviews legislative oversight on child’s education rights in light of the provisions of Section 18(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The study concluded that governments at all levels have not demonstrated the required political will to ensure the full domestication of the Child Rights Act by all the federating states. At the same time, retaining education as a non-justiciable matter has not done justice to the purpose it intends to serve in nation-building and development. In Chap. 17, Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi examines partisanship and consensus building in the Nigerian National Assembly. Using a participant-observer approach, the author notes that differences in religion, ethnicity, and other centrifugal forces have challenged the capacity of political leaders in building cross-party consensus and politics of accommodation on critical issues of national development. The author suggests a few steps for the promotion of politics of accommodation in parliament without necessarily discountenancing the partisan character of national politics inherent in the adoption of multi-party democracy in a system that places less premium on party discipline or ideological commitment. In Chap. 18, Adeleke Adegbami examines the activities of legislators in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic intending to establish the areas of their weaknesses and strengths in the course of performing their constitutional functions. The study identifies the challenges facing legislators’ activities to include, among others, a lack of political ideology, strained legislative-executive relations, frequent changes of leadership, inadequate knowledge of the legislative process, corruption, and imbalanced selection of house committees’ leaders. The study recommends that concerted efforts should be made to address those challenges halting legislative activities in Nigeria for the sustenance and advancement of the country’s budding democracy.

References Bulmer E (2017) Presidential legislative powers: International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 15, 2nd edn. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Sweden Fagbadebo OM (2020) Impeachment in the Nigerian presidential system: challenges, successes and the way forward. Palgrave Macmillan Huneeus C, Berríos F, Cordero R (2006) Legislatures in presidential systems: the Latin American experience. The Journal of Legislative Studies 12(3):404–425

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Omololu Fagbadebo holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a Research Associate and a lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute (SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in June/July 2010. He has published academic papers in journals and books. He has presented papers at conferences and workshops. He is a member of the editorial board and associate editor of reputable journals. His area of specialization includes comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies, and African government politics. He is the Coordinator of African Impact Initiatives for Scholars. He is a member of the Editorial Board of SN Social Sciences. Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi has over 30 years of teaching and research experience in universities and research institutions in Africa. He is a Professor in the Department of Public and International Law, and the Provost, College of Law, Osun State University, Nigeria. He is a Visiting Professor, at the University of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Hitherto, he had taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Babcock University, and the University of Ilorin where he became a Professor in 2011, and Constitutional Law at the University of Abuja. He had also been a researcher at the Pan-African Intergovernmental Organization (CAFRAD) based in Morocco and at the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja. A former Speaker of the Osun State House of Assembly (1999–2003) and Member of the House of Representatives (2015–2019), Professor Alabi was the Head of the Parliamentary Capacity Building Program at CAFRAD (2008–2010). He is the author of The Supreme Court in the Nigerian Political System (2002), ECOWAS Court and Regional Integration in West Africa (2016), and Constitutionalism in Nigeria: Politics and Law in an Emerging African Democracy (2022), and Co-Editor of Perspectives on the Legislature in the Government of Nigeria (2010) among other books and articles in learned publications.

The Legislature in a Presidential System: Structure, Functions, and Expectations Omololu Fagbadebo

Abstract This chapter presents a general overview of the roles of the legislature in the presidential system. Scholars of comparative politics have discussed the presidential system from different perspectives but the central role of the legislature, as a body of the collective wills of the people remains constant. With three generic roles, the legislature is the hub of the policy process designed and structured to promote accountability and stimulate effective public service delivery. The system of separated but shared powers associated with the presidential system entrenched the legislature as the central pillar in the oversight of the activities of the executive. While separation of powers allows the interdependent exercise of power among the three branches of the government, the legislature, by its design, sets the pace for scrutinizing executive activities to ensure compliance with the intendments of its authorized policies and programs.

1 Introduction The legislature, in a presidential democracy, is the symbol of the public. It defines the importance of “the people” in the conceptualization of democracy as the government organized by the people for the promotion of the public rather than sectional interests (O’Flynn 2010; Mounk 2018). While modern democracy makes it practically impossible for the people to exercise this power directly, the legislature, as the composite representation of the people, defines “the people.” Thus, the legislature’s institutional structure gives meaning to democracy (Gandhi et al. 2020). In the functioning processes and development of democracies worldwide, the importance of the legislature cannot be overemphasized. The existence of the legislature, as the symbol of public participation in the policy process, gives meaning to democracy.

O. Fagbadebo (✉) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_2

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The hallmark of the presidential system of government is the compartmentalization of the power, structures, and function of the government. Each structure has its boundary, working interdependently for a common objective of promoting the public good. This presupposes that each structure of the government has its sphere of operation in a relationship characterized by separate but shared power. This nature of relationships is guided by the principle of separation of power and the doctrine of checks and balances (Gratton and Morelli 2022; Gandhi et al. 2020). Separation of powers to avert concentration of state power in a single individual or structure and checks and balances to forestall the tyranny of an individual and instill a culture of accountability. The doctrine of checks and balances is “an ingenious though precarious system” measure adopted by the American Founding Fathers to stabilize the “precarious imbalance of power” that characterized the relationships between the monarch and the parliament in England (Riggs 1994:72). The presidential system adopted by the American founding fathers has its origins in England’s monarchical system (Squire 2012; Scheuerman 2005).

2 Presidential System The emergence of the presidential system in America in the eighteenth century as a governing system was a paradigm shift in the governing of contemporary states. The motives were to establish a strong executive branch of the government to administer the state with institutional checks against abuse of power (Gratton and Morelli 2022). The other two branches of the government, the legislature and the judiciary, are structures to limit the absolute exercise of the power of the state by a single individual in the executive branch of the government (Goldgeier and Saunders 2018). As a derivative of the English monarchical system, presidentialism was designed to avert the absolute power of the king, as practiced in England, the power that colonized America until its independence in 1787. Thus, the central theme of a presidential system is a decentralization of the power of the state whereby no single branch of the government has absolute control over the other (Linz 1994). Presidentialism is a governing system that exhibits independence among the branches of the government in terms of tenure and participation in the policy process. In particular, unlike the parliamentary system, the tenure of the president is insulated from the control of the legislature. And the president is the head of the government and the state (Gandhi et al. 2020). In a parliamentary system, the legislature is the only “democratically legitimate institution” whereby the authority of the government “is completely dependent upon parliamentary confidence” (Linz 1994). The office of the president, the head of state, is different from the head of the government, the prime minister. While the president usually has ceremonial power, the prime minister exercises executive power. The prime minister and members of the cabinet are drawn from the parliament. This fusion of the executive and legislative powers obfuscates the independence of the two branches of the government. However, presidentialism provides for dual legitimacy whereby the members of the

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legislature and the heads of the executive enjoy public legitimacy because they are elected. Scholars have different viewpoints on the definition or description of what a presidential system entails. Most scholars define it as a governing system that exhibits independence of origin and survival of members of the legislature and the executive (Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Linz 1994; Sartori 1994; Lijphart 1994; Stepan and Skach 1994; Elgie 2005; Hochstetler 2006; Marsteintredet and Bermtzen 2008; Hochstetler 2011; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011). The president and members of the legislature have electoral mandates derived directly from the people. While the executive has fixed terms of office, members of the legislature owe their membership to the goodwill of the people who exercise their voting power to determine the number of times a legislator can serve. The legislature can, however, remove members of the executive before the expiration of their terms of office through the prescribed constitutional procedures such as impeachment or declared declaration of incapacitation on the grounds of ill health. The head of the executive can also resign. This mutual independence of the two political branches of the government exemplifies a balance of shared power in the policy process (Linz 1994, 2010). The notion of separation of powers among the three branches of the government is a common feature of most presidential constitutions. This is designed to ensure adequate checks and balances in the exercise of power by the independent institutions of the government functioning interdependently (Lijphart 1994; Fukuyama et al. 2005; Hochstetler 2011). While the legislature checkmates the executive vis its oversight power, the executive can veto legislative actions and the judiciary can exercise its power of judicial review to redirect executive and legislative actions. This power-sharing model is the hallmark of a presidential system where effective delivery of public services is a sign of good governance. The fragmented levels of authority absolve the system of autocracy and celebrate accountability (Ndulo 2002). Thus, a major concern of the presidential system is the need to checkmate the proclivity of political officials to abuse power and discipline any form of misconduct (Kada 2002; Fagbadebo 2020). In the conceptualization of presidential system, some scholars considered the impacts of its institutional and structural designs on its functionality for the realization of its desired goals (Linz 1994; Fukuyama et al. 2005; Hochstetler 2011). These designs include its electoral process and modes of composition and control of the government. Zero-sum politics, undisciplined political parties, absence of coalition incentives, the rigidity of term of office, institutionalization of minority government and vulnerability to breakdown or gridlock are some of the attributes that some scholars perceived as weaknesses of the presidential system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Valenzuela 2004; Lijphart 2004; Chaisty et al. 2012). However, these are the characteristic features that define the essence and nature of the system. Cheibub, for instance, considers an undisciplined political party as a feature that strengthens the independence of the branches of the government and as such

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O. Fagbadebo office-seeking political parties have no reason to impose discipline on their members; their survival in office does not depend on the result of any particular vote in the legislature. Individual members of congress also lack any incentive to accept the discipline of political parties (if they were to try imposing it) since there is no provision for early elections that could remove the wayward representatives from office (Cheibub 2007, p.10).

Thus, most of these attributes that seem to work against the functionality of the system are meant to strengthen its practices with the tendency to adapt their principles with constant provision of public services. The functionality of any governing system is located in its performance to meet the democratic yearnings of citizens. Thus, Laski (1944) is of the view that a governing system would be dysfunctional if it fails to give citizens the “hope and exhilaration which is born only of an economy that, by its power to expand, is capable of raising the standard of life for all our citizens (Laski 1944, p.358). This developmental approach to the understanding of the presidential system presumes that no governing system is inherently good or bad but application and adaption in the context of societal needs would institutionalize its practice over time. Moe and Caldwell (1994:172) admonish that the choice of a governing system implies that the people “are choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously—whether they like it or not—out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion.” Ginsburg et al. (2013) are of the view that what defines the functionality of a governing system is the nature of the exercise of the power of the state to advance the interest of the people. Thus, the application o power, especially within the context of legislative-executive relationships would determine the extent to which the government would be able to promote democratic governance. Effective use of legislative oversight power would induce accountability and good governance. An accountable executive would implement policies capable of stimulating public support and participation in the policy process. This is a necessary instrument for democratic stability as citizens would have a sense of community. Similarly, executive veto power (Scheuerman 2005; Tsebelis 1995) would induce a responsible legislative process with inclusivity as a yardstick in the authorization of public policies. The structure of the government in the presidential system defines the nature of the power structure and relationships among the branches of the government.

3 Structure of a Presidential System The presidential system recognizes a tripartite governmental structure with institutional boundaries in a system of separated but shared powers. This structure divides the functions and responsibilities of the government into three categories. The execution category describes the functions of the executive branch of the government (Goldgeier and Saunders 2018). This role is also called the administration of rules or the authorizations of the legislature. In other words, this role presupposes

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that the executive branch of the government depends on the legislature for the direction of public policies. In other words, the executive does not have absolute power to determine the program of the government. With wide coverage of programs and activities, the executive branch has a more direct impact on the lives of citizens as the manager of the policies and programs of the government. The adjudication category describes the roles of the judiciary in the administration of the state. The power of judicial review is a critical instrument available for courts to determine the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. As the custodian of statutes, the judiciary interprets the laws passed by the combined activities of the legislature and the executive. In determining the desirability of these laws, the judiciary considers the consistency of the legislative frameworks with the letters and spirits of the constitution, the supreme law that guides the whole activities of the government. Judicial review, therefore, is central to the practice of a presidential system to establish the need for a decentralized governing system. This is to safeguard citizens and the state from the tyranny of a singular or combined power of the political branches of the government. The adjudicative role of the judiciary extends to conflict resolution between and among the various stakeholders and levels of the government. The legislative category describes the role of the legislature as a central structure of the government that defines the direction of the programs and policies of the government. Thus, legislative functions are the central drivers of the government. The legislature is a major stakeholder that sets the pace for the exercise of executive and judicial powers. Its centrality to democratic government is borne out of its role as the symbol of the people. The legislative arena, therefore, is a sine qua non for the expression and understanding of the support and demands of the people for the system in democratic societies. Societal differences find their way into the governmental processes through the representative assemblies with vital ties to the populace (Fagbadebo 2020, 25).

This symbol is defined in its different roles designed to advance the interests of the collective.

4 Legislative Roles and Responsibilities In a presidential system, the legislature plays a vital role as the bridge between the electorate and the administration. Indeed, a presidential system is often regarded as a Congressional governing system, with a president as the head of the executive branch, and the legislature, in a system of separated but shared powers. While the president presides over the executive branch, the legislature sets the policy direction and monitors the implementation. Specifically, the legislature is the representative body entrusted with the power “to make laws, including the power to approve budgets” as well as other “deliberative and oversight functions” (Bulmer 2017, p.6).

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The nature of the legislative and executive control of the policy process depends on the constitutional arrangement of powers between the two political branches of the government. Instructively, however, the gatekeeper role of the legislature is a derivative of its pivotal role in safeguarding the interests of the people. There are three basic generic functions of the legislature: representing the people in the government, law-making, and oversight (Johnson and Nakamura 1999).

4.1

Representation

Legislative capacity to perform these functions varies. Personal motivations, role perception and nature of the response to constituent needs define the representative function of the legislature. Johnson and Nakamura (1999) list four contemporary models of representation. Some legislators see their roles in the Madisonian/Delegate conception. By this, a lawmaker mirrors or transmits constituency attitudes. The Burkean/Trustee conception allows the legislator to determine policies in the best interests of the constituents. The politicos mode of representation permits the legislator to serve as a broker in finding common ground amidst competing interests of the constituent. Marxian/Leninist conception places the political party, as in the case of the Central Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) of the former USSR as the determinant of the policy choices of the constituents. The exemplar conception of representation allows the lawmaker to fulfill the symbolic concerns of constituents by sharing racial, ethnic, religious, or other characteristics. The effective performance of these legislative functions depends largely on several factors. These include the extent of the formal powers of the legislature, the procedural capacity and structural support, the extent of its independence from other structures, the political space at its discretion, and the role perceptions of the legislative leadership.

4.2

Law-Making

The tripartite structure of modern democratic government compartmentalizes power according to the constitutional responsibility assigned to each branch of the government. The legislature legislates all rules guiding the government, the executive executes the rules legislated by the legislature and the judiciary passes on judicially the conflicts that arise from the legislated rules designed for execution or already executed (Fishkin 2018; Biswas et al. 2021). These rules include laws and policies that have passed through different stages of consideration intended of promoting the interests of the state and citizens. The process for the passage of these rules is not an exclusive domain of the legislature. The executive also has some legislative roles in this process. In other words, the exercise of the legislative power of law-making is

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guided by the necessary checks and balances between the executive and the legislature (Gratton and Morelli 2022). The law-making stages of major policies, such as budget, start with the executive as the initiator. This constitutional responsibility confers the executive with legislative power to present its policy proposals for legislative consideration and authorization. The essence of such consideration and authorization is to infuse public interests and participation into the policy-making process.

4.3

Oversight Function

One of the major obligations of the legislature, as the representative body of the collective will of the people, is to scrutinize the execution of public policies in a manner that would promote the greater good. The interest of citizens is paramount to members of the legislature because they serve as their representatives in the government. “As the representatives of the people, members of the legislature are bound to offer an environment conducive for the promotion of accountability in government through an effective oversight of executive decisions” (Fagbadebo 2019a, b:1). Oversight in the words of Oleszek (2014) is a constitutional responsibility of the legislature to challenge attempts by the executive to subvert the will of the people as presented by the legislature in the policy process. In other words, the legislature can confront the executive to “raise and ask the tough fiscal and policy questions of public officials and to help administrative leaders fix (or avoid) mistakes” (Oleszek 2014:382). As an instrument of accountability, oversight at the disposal of the legislature is a weapon to advance transparency through compliance with authorized policies and programs during the implementation process. The oversight power of the legislature is derived from its legislative role in the establishment of government units and structures. Constitutionally, executive actions in the proposition of governmental units require legislative authorization. Thus, with the power to establish, the legislature has the responsibility to keep surveillance on its power through monitoring and inquisition on their performances to ensure the achievement of the intended purposes (Onyango 2020; Daudu and Fagbadebo 2019). Thus, legislative oversight of executive actions is a form of surveillance that “is premised because the legislature enacts the laws that can create administrative agencies, and these, in turn, are assigned functions and responsibilities by such enabling laws” (Fagbadebo 2019a, b:2). Oversight is not a vindictive activity or witch hunt of the executive. It is part of the package to secure the interest of the people whose expectations of effective service delivery rest on the representative body. Effective oversight requires the legislative capacity to access information on government programs. This is necessary because of the role of the bureaucratic units of the executive in the drafting of the implementation strategies of the policies and programs of the government. Critical to this is the need for compliance with the authorized program designed to address the needs of the people. Alteration or

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non-compliance with the intendments of the police would lead to policy failures. As Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) have noted, oversight requires the capacity of the legislature to ascertain the various processes involved in the formulation of the policies to enable adequate surveillance of their implementation. Effective oversight is difficult to exercise because it requires information about executive branch activities, the legislative capacity to process that information, legislative will to act, and the power to back up demands for improvement/access/responsiveness. Oversight, even more than lawmaking, puts the legislature into an adversarial relationship with at least some portion of the executive branch (Johnson and Nakamura 1999).

The legislature, by its position in the government, is the heartbeat of a democratic state. It is the organ of the government in a tripartite. There are four basic types of legislatures. They are the transformative, arena, emerging and rubber stamp (Johnson and Nakamura 1999). Legislatures in advanced democracies like the USA and Great Britain fall into the transformative and arena legislatures. Legislative assemblies in emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, Asia, and partly Africa are in the category of emerging legislatures, while rubber stamp legislatures are found in “authoritarian and totalitarian countries where legislatures are largely symbolic bodies endorsing the decisions of leaders” (Johnson and Nakamura 1999, p.8). Thus, in such legislative assemblies, internal procedural capacity and independence are less feasible and considered unnecessary. Essentially, rubber stamp legislatures are not active agents of governance. There may be justification for the democratic credential of rubber stamp legislatures in some climes. For instance, in the USA, Congress endorses the outcome of the US Electoral College, an external body independent of the legislature, in the election of the President. Proponents of a strong or dominant party system view the legislature as a rubber stamp in endorsing the policy options placed before it since members were elected on the platform of the political party. They argue that since the electorate voted for the party rather than the candidate based on the programs presented in the manifestoes, it behooves the lawmakers to endorse such a proposal without question. Nevertheless, voters’ electoral references differ. While some voters have a preference for the candidate as a person, others might prefer the programs of the political party. Thus, in the spirit of deliberative principles of democracy, especially in a multiparty system, government proposals should be placed before the public through the representatives for exhaustive consideration. In most developing democracies like Nigeria, rubber stamp legislatures emerge because of some factors. These factors include the preponderance of patron-client politics, corruption, and incoherent political structure. Most of the lawmakers won the election as agents of some political patrons or godfathers (Fagbadebo 2020). Thus, preferences for legislative proposals are viewed from the lenses of the interests of the patrons. Where the patrons constitute the bulk of the executive or support the members of the executive, informal discourse in different caucuses remains the forum for the ratifications of policies without questioning. Whenever there is disunity within the caucuses, the legislators become the pawn of the stronger faction

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in the power calculation (Fagbadebo 2020). This phenomenon characterizes the exercise of legislative oversight power of impeachment in Nigeria. The legislature becomes the instrument of manipulation in the hands of disunified ruling elites at the executive branch of the government, in what Fagbadebo (2020) refers to as mercantilist politics.

5 Conclusion The essence of the legislature is to stimulate accountability in government. This includes monitoring the implementation of the programs and policies of the government. The role of the legislature in the tripartite governmental structure in the presidential system is a unique mechanism for ensuring public participation in the policy process, and the administration of the state. Given its centrality to the administration of the state, good governance as a goal of the presidential system should be a common attribute of the government. Nevertheless, this is a rarity in most developing countries with a presidential system. A compromised legislature that fails to harness its oversight power would remain a rubber stamp assembly that has lost its relevance in a system of government that celebrates constructive power relationships among the branches of the government. The relevance of the legislature in a presidential system manifests in the structure of power relations with the executive branch of the government. Where the legislature can hold the executive accountable, its institutionalization in the administration of the state would induce good governance. On the other hand, where a weak institutional structure makes the legislature dependent on the executive in the exercise of its statutory power, public service delivery would be in jeopardy and the public sector would become an instrument of personal accumulation of wealth and resources at the expense of the people. This is a common phenomenon, especially in Africa where the crisis of governance has widened the gap between the rich and the poor in societies with abundant resources but paradoxically generated more poverty. Excercerbated corruption and the scourge of mismanagement of resources have made the practice of the presidential system burden as the legislative institution fails to harness its power to stimulate responsible and responsive government.

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Chaisty P, Cheeseman N, Power T (2012) Rethinking the ‘presidentialism debate: conceptualizing coalitional politics in cross-regional perspective. Democratization iFirst:1–23. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13510347.2012.710604 Cheibub JA (2007) Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York Daudu IA, Fagbadebo O (2019) Public participation in legislative oversight: a review of nature and practice in Nigeria and South Africa. In: Perspectives on the legislature and the prospects of accountability in Nigeria and South Africa, pp 233–250 Elgie R (2005) From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?’. Democratization 12(1):106–122 Fagbadebo OM (2020) impeachment in the nigerian presidential system: challenges, successes and the way forward. Palgrave Macmillan. https://bit.ly/332d5AQ Fagbadebo OM (2019a) An overview of legislative oversight and accountability mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa. In: Fagbadebo OM, Ruffin FA (eds) Perspectives on the legislature and the prospects of accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, pp 19–44 Fagbadebo OM (2019b) Understanding the legislature as an instrument of accountability. In: Fagbadebo OM, Ruffin FA (eds) Perspectives on the legislature and the prospects of accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, pp 1–15 Fishkin JS (2018) Random assemblies for lawmaking? Prospects and limits. Politics Soc 46(3): 359–379 Fukuyama F, Dressel B, Chang B (2005) Facing the perils of presidentialism? J Democr 16(2): 102–116 Gandhi J, Noble B, Svolik M (2020) Legislatures and legislative politics without democracy. Comp Polit Stud 53(9):1359–1379 Ginsburg T, Cheibub JA, Elkins Z (2013) Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. CoaseSandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 668, University of Chicago Law School. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Goldgeier J, Saunders EN (2018) The unconstrained presidency: checks and balances eroded long before Trump. Foreign Aff 97:144 Gratton G, Morelli M (2022) Optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty. Int Econ Rev 63(2):549–569 Hochstetler K, Samuels D (2011) Crisis and rapid reequilibration: the consequences of presidential challenge and failure in Latin America. Comp Politics 43(2):127–146 Hochstetler K (2006) Rethinking presidentialism: challenges and presidential falls in South America. Comp Politics 38(4):401–418 Hochstetler K (2011) The fates of presidents in post-transition Latin America: from democratic breakdown to impeachment to presidential breakdown. J Politics Latin America 3(1):125–141 Johnson JK, Nakamura RT (1999) A concept paper on legislatures and good governance. A paper prepared for the United Nations Development Program, July, 1999 Kada N (2002) The politics of impeachment in Latin America. A doctoral degree dissertation, University of California, San Diego, United States of America Laski HJ (1944) The parliamentary and presidential systems. Public Adm Rev 4(4):347–359 Lijphart A (1994) Presidentialism and majoritarian democracy: theoretical observation. In: Linz J, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy: comparative perspectives, vol I. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 91–105 Lijphart A (2004) Constitutional design for divided societies. J Democr 15(2):96–109 Linz JJ, Stepan A (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Linz JL (2010) The perils of presidentialism. In: Diamond L, Plattner MF, Costopoulos PJ (eds) Debates on democratization. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 252–272

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Linz J (1994) Presidential or parliamentary democracy: does it make a difference? In: Linz J, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 3–90 Mainwaring S (1993) Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy. The difficult combination. Comp Polit Stud 26(2):198–228 Mainwaring S, Scully TR (1995) Introduction: Party systems in Latin America. In: Mainwaring S, Scully TR (eds) Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp 1–34 Mainwaring S, Shugart M (1997) Juan Linz, presidentialism, and democracy: a critical appraisal. Comp Politics 29(4):449–471 Marsteintredet L, Berntzen E (2008) Reducing the perils of presidentialism in Latin America through presidential interruptions. Comp Politics 41(1):83–101 Moe T, Caldwell M (1994) The institutional foundations of democratic government: a comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems. J Inst Theor Econ 150(1):171–195 Mounk Y (2018) The undemocratic dilemma. J Democr 29(2):98–112 Ndulo M (2002) Presidentialism in the Southern African states and constitutional restraint on presidential power. Vt Law Rev 26:769–802 O’Flynn I (2010) Deliberative democracy, the public interest and the consociational model. Polit Stud 58(3):572–589 Oleszek WJ (2014) Congressional procedures and the policy process. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA Onyango G (2020) Legislative oversight and policy-reforms in “unsettled” political contexts of public administration. Int J Public Adm 43(3):213–228 Pelizzo R, Stapenhurst F (2012) Parliamentary oversight tools: a comparative analysis. Routledge, New York Riggs FW (1994) Conceptual homogenization of a heterogeneous field: presidentialism in comparative perspective. In: Dogan M, Kazancigil A (eds) Comparing nations: concepts, strategies, substance. Blackwell, pp 72–152 Sartori G (1994) Comparative constitutional engineering, 2nd edn. New York University Press, New York Scheuerman WE (2005) American Kingship? Monarchical origins of modern presidentialism. Polity 37(1):24–53 Squire P (2012) The evolution of American legislatures: colonies, territories, and states, 1619–2009. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI Stepan A, Skach C (1994) Presidentialism in comparative perspective. In: Linz J, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy: comparative perspectives, vol I. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 119–136 Tsebelis G (1995) Decision-making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. Br J Polit Sci 25(3):289–325 Valenzuela A (2004) Latin American presidencies interrupted. J Democr 15(4):5–19

Omololu Fagbadebo holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a Research Associate and a lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute (SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in June/July 2010. He has published academic papers in journals and books. He has presented papers at conferences and workshops. He is a member of the editorial board and associate editor of reputable journals. His area of specialization includes comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies, and African government politics. He is the Coordinator of African Impact Initiatives for Scholars. He is a member of the Editorial Board of SN Social Sciences.

The Historical Overview of the Evolution of the Legislature in Nigeria Lucky A. Tongs, Omololu Fagbadebo

, and Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi

Abstract This chapter presents a historical overview of the development of the legislative institution, particularly at the federal level, as a foundational basis for understanding the dynamics that define its power and processes as the central institution of governance in Nigeria. From the colonial legislative gathering by name rather than function, the legislature in Nigeria metamorphosed into an institutional structure designed to function as a major stakeholder in the promotion of accountability in government. During the colonial era, the legislative institutions were characterised by the dominance of colonial government leaders who performed all functions in a system of fused legislative and executive powers. This colonial legacy of executive dominance has characterised the practice of presidentialism that promotes a system of separated but shared powers among the three branches of the government. This chapter discussed how the post-independent legislature gradually moved away from the inherited parliamentary system of the First Republic to the presidential system that began in the Second Republic in 1979 through the Fourth Republic that began in May 1999. Incessant military intervention in Nigerian politics since January 1966 shaped the character and culture of the most crucial institution in the country’s political system. The inactive exercise of requisite oversight power to enforce accountability has remained a challenge to the credibility of the country’s democratic culture.

L. A. Tongs (✉) Department of Democracy and Governance, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies, National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria O. Fagbadebo Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] M. O. A. Alabi Department of Public and International Law, College of Law (Ifetedo Campus), Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_3

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1 Introduction The chapter presents the legislature’s 152-year evolution from an advisory body to a structure of the government with governance and development powers and functions (Ojo 1997a, b). The chapter also highlights the transformational changes in the power and status of the legislature from an instrument of British colonial administration to an institution that enjoys some measure of limited sovereignty. The functions of the legislature and the executive during the colonial administration were almost unified. These institutions have metamorphosed into a new institutional framework in which powers are separated and institutional capacity for governance and growth is increased (Fagbadebo 2020; Muheeb 2019). Generally, the legislature is simply an assembly of people that perform a representative function. Although its role varies from country to country, depending on the political and constitutional systems in operation, the legislature occupies a central position in the operation of any democratic government. In this regard, its principal functions include representative, legislation scrutiny and oversight, political recruitment, leadership development, conflict resolution, and quasi-judicial role. Broadly speaking, its role is founded on the tripartite mandate of representation, law-making and oversight (Lienert 2013; Alabi 2009; Strom 1997). When these functions are effectively performed, the legislature connects citizens to the governments by providing a platform where their needs and concerns are anticipated and expressed, their voices and concerns are heard, and governments are held accountable. Generally, the legislature is simply an assembly of people that perform a representative function. Although its role varies from country to country, depending on the political and constitutional systems in operation, the legislature occupies a central position in the operation of any democratic government. In this regard, its principal functions include representation, legislation scrutiny and oversight, political recruitment, leadership development, conflict resolution, and quasi-judicial role. Broadly speaking, its role is founded on the tripartite mandate of representation, law-making and oversight (Lienert 2013; Alabi 2009; Strom 1997). When these functions are effectively performed, the legislature connects citizens to the governments by providing a platform where their needs and concerns are anticipated and expressed, their voices and concerns are heard, and governments are held accountable. Contemporary significance and relevance, in terms of its power and processes, have to be situated within the contexts of the vicissitudes of its growth and development as an institution with a century and half of existence without an equivalent measure of success or enviable traditions with similar institutions of comparative history in other climes.

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2 Colonial Heritage of the Legislature in Nigeria The National Assembly, as the principal legislative institution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has had a long history of institutional evolution dating back to June 1862, barely a year after the annexation of Lagos after a 10-year battle of conquest (Daldry 1960; Ojo 1997a). The history of its growth and development is, therefore, intimately linked to and incorporates features of the British colonial administrative authority (Stultz 1968). Thus, the creation of a crown colony in Lagos also witnessed the birth of the Lagos Legislative Council, which played an important role in colonial governance. The Central Legislative Assembly was created as an advisory body by Governor Stanhope Freeman who administered the Colony as an annexed dependency that formed a member of the Crown’s conquered territories. In the colony, the Governor headed the executive government and was also visible in the legislature as a representative of the British Crown (Bertram 1930). Although the central government for the whole British West African settlements of Sierra Leone, Lagos, the Gold Coast and the Gambia was based in Freetown (1866–1874), the Lagos Legislative Council continued to exist separately under an administrator who, according to the Royal Commission of February 19, 1866, was accountable to the government-in-chief based in Freetown (Davies 2018). The arrangement worked until 1906, except for a brief period (1874–1885) when the colony’s affairs were conducted in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) to cut administrative costs (Bening 2009; Martin 1927). As the British consolidated their hold on Lagos, aggressive expansionist moves were made into the hinterland, with consequential expansion in the powers and territorial jurisdiction of the legislature to the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906. The Legislative Council of Southern Nigeria, which lasted until 1913, was established to help the governor with administration, and the Lagos protectorate order in council in 1899 outlined the territory covered by its powers and jurisdiction (Tamuno 1969). Legislative Councils in the British Colonies had four principal functions, according to A. J. Harding of the Colonial Office. To act as a safety valve, providing an opportunity for the few persons in the colony who truly have views on public issues to express those views and ventilate personal and other grievances; to provide an opportunity for unofficial members to provide useful advice to the government; and, to provide an opportunity for unofficial members to provide useful advice to the government. They may serve as some check on official extravagance (cf. Tamuno 1969:557).

The role envisioned for the legislature remained largely unchanged throughout colonial rule; but the structure and composition of the central legislature in Nigeria changed from its inception in 1862 to its independence in 1960, with a mix of officials and nominated unofficial members (Stultz 1968). For instance, the introduction of the elective principle under the Clifford Constitution gave three representatives to Lagos and one to the municipal part of Calabar with the extension of adult suffrage in the Southern part of Nigeria (Tamuno 1982). The status of the unicameral legislature changed in 1958 with the establishment of the Senate, even

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though the Northern and Western regions had a bicameral legislature in 1946 and 1951, respectively. The House of Representatives, as the national legislature was christened then, functioned from 1952, comprising unofficial members as well as a Council of Ministers (Daldry 1960; Ojo 1997a). The bicameral legislature functioned from 1960 to 1966, with the upper body (Senate) exercising particular powers not shared by the Federal House of Representatives under the frameworks of the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions. The parliamentary system between 1959 and January 15, 1966, adopted the characteristics of a fusion of executive and legislative powers. While the colonial legislatures were expected to function like the British Parliament, significant differences existed in terms of powers, structural organisation and composition (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019; Van Der Linden 2016; Lawal 2010). The nationalism and anti-colonial struggles’ activities propelled the ascendancy of the representative functions of the legislature as more Nigerians got elected to the legislative councils with consequential reductions in the number of nominated members and European officials (Alabi 2009). Nonetheless, the colonial legislatures were subsumed under the overall authority of the Governor-General and the Colonial Secretary (Van Der Linden 2016). Unlike the British Parliament, the colonial legislatures had considerable financial power but were not independent to make policy decisions. The Governor would dictate the instructions passed down by the Secretary of State for the Colony. The law-making powers of the councils were similarly limited. The Governor would initiate all legislation, but the Crown reserved powers on specific categories of legislative Bills. Colonial legislative enactments were inferior to their counterpart in the British parliament and thus the legislatures were treated as junior partners in the governing of the state (Wight 1945). The colonial legislatures did not have the privilege of the tradition of the existence of formal opposition given the collaboration between the official and unofficial members. The colonial legislature was subordinate to the executive (Coleman 1958), a legacy that continued past political independence (Alabi 2009; Fagbadebo 2020).

3 Formative Years of the Central Legislature, 1914–1951 Notwithstanding the limited conception of its role and the reality of its actual functioning, the Nigerian legislative institutions blossomed in terms of number, size, and power as colonial rule grew steadily and the decolonisation process intensified in the wake of Pan-Africanist inspired resistance to colonialism. The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 formally established a united Nigeria (Ezera 1960). This did not alter much of the structure of the government beyond the unification of the two supreme courts that had previously operated in Northern and Southern Nigeria (Ezera 1960; Van Der Linden 2016). As a result, there was only one Chief Justice and one Attorney-General in the entire government. In 1914, Sir Frederick Lord Lugrd established the Nigerian

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Council and remained in place until 1922 when Sir Hugh Clifford, composed the Legislative Council (Ezera 1960; Agi 2008; Akanji 2021). Sir Hugh Clifford dismissed the Nigeria Council in 1922 because it lacked legislative or executive authority (Cookey 1980). The Nigerian Council had 36 members, which included both official and unofficial representatives from various sectors such as the Chamber of Commerce, Ships and Banking, and the Mining Industry with six nominated African unofficial representatives. There was no legislative or executive authority attached to any council decisions that passed, and the Governor was not obligated to implement them unless he deemed it appropriate or if he was specifically permitted to do so (Wheare 1950). The indirect rule policy of the British colonial administration was an administrative mechanism used to govern communities through the traditional authorities and institutions, which formed the native authority, to administer them through their traditional institutions (Oyebode 2003; Maiangwa et al. 2018; McAlexander 2020; Vaughan 2022). They were to ensure conformity with colonial rules and regulations, maintaining order, settling local disputes, and collecting taxes, which was the responsibility of the traditional authority. An indigenous treasury, police force, and court system worked alongside the Native Authority to implement the colonial rules in the local areas. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 enshrined the elective principle that gave rise to the formation of political parties (Cookey 1980; Agi 2008; Lawal 2010; Vaughan 2022). The Legislative Council had 46 members; 27 officials, including the governor, and the 19 unofficial Nigerians, only 4 were elected representatives, while the others were appointed. The municipalities of Lagos, with three seats, and Calabar, with one seat, had elective representation (Van Der Linden 2016; Akanji 2021; Vaughan 2022). The unofficial member had a 5-year tenure except if they were reelected. The Legislative Council could legislate according to the regular practice of enacting legislation for peace and order. The jurisdiction of the Council’s legislation was restricted to Southern Nigeria, while a different Council was composed for the Northern Province, including the lieutenant governor, senior residents of Northern province, and representatives of the Kano Chamber of Commerce and Mining Industry in the north. The lieutenant governor sat on the Council because of his membership in the executive council. The Legislative Council remained the same body and was almost static throughout its 24-year history, from 1922 to 1946, except that the numbers of nominated members increased as new Areas or peoples appeared to the Governor to be sufficiently homogeneous and politically advanced for representation (Akanji 2021). As a result, six seats were occupied in 1923, representing the colony, Oyo province, rivers division, African traders, Egba, and the Igbo. The inhabitants of both Warri and Benin Provinces were represented by the inclusion of one seat in 1928, while Ijebu Province and the Ibibio people were represented by the addition of two seats in 1938 (Van Der Linden 2016; Vaughan 2022). Following the implementation of the Nigerian (legislative council) Amendment Order in Council of 1941, members were nominated to represent Ondo and the southern province of Cameroon in 1942.

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The Nigerian minority in the parliament was unable to influence the legislative process, even though they had their say. It was typical for the official majority to overrule strongly held unofficial minority opinions and votes. Although the Governor administered the government through proclamations, legislative decisions were rarely used for executive actions. Even at that, the operations of the Legislative Council were limited to the Southern Provinces, a development that impeded the growth of uniform legislative culture in Nigeria (Fagbadebo 2020; Akanji 2021). The Sir Arthur Richards Constitution in 1946 provided for a 44-member Legislative Council; 24 were nominated and 4 were elected by the African unofficial majority comprising 3 and 1 from Lagos and Calabar, respectively (Ezera 1960). The Northern, Western, and Eastern Regional Legislative Councils appointed 18 of the 24 nominated unofficial members. The Governor appointed one member of the colony after discussions with local authorities, and he also appointed one representative of the colony and three other members to represent interests or groups that he considered were not effectively represented by the colony’s elected representatives (Vaughan 2022; Akanji 2021). The House of Chiefs (West and North), Houses of Assembly, and the Legislative Council all shared a common membership, allowing them to operate well together. The Nigerian nationalists, especially from the South, opposed the Constitution and demanded immediate and full self-government (Ezera 1960). But Governor Arthur Richards claimed, in his inaugural address to the Legislative Council, that Nigeria lacked the necessary unified socio-political, and economic features capable of granting immediate and full self-government (Osadolor 2017; Ezera 1960). This claim generated heated debates as Nigerian members of the Legislative Council, as well as nationalists, opposed the adoption of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Chief Secretary, Mr. H.M. Foot, advised the withdrawal of the motion for immediate self-government and constitutional reforms. Richards’ successor, Sir John Macpherson, announced his readiness to review the 1946 Constitution as demanded by the Nigerian political elites. In 1949, the Legislative Council approved the resolution to constitute a select committee that would consider the motion. The committee began its work in earnest, and after a series of deliberations and conferences, the Constitution was promulgated in 1951. The Constitution marked a significant breakthrough in Nigerian legislative competence by introducing an elected majority of members in the central legislature and regional Houses of assembly, as well as endowing legislative assemblies with autonomous legislative power in several sectors of governmental activity (Akanji 2021). With a hybrid model of direct and indirect elections the House of Representatives consisted of 136 elected and 13 nominated members, with 68 from the North and 34 from the East and West. The convening of sessional sessions beyond Lagos was an intriguing feature in the history of the central legislative during their period of constitution writing. Following the general constitutional conference in January 1950, the Legislative Council convened in Enugu, in the Eastern Region, to evaluate the suggestions of the conferences as well as the views of the regional legislatures. The proposals for greatly enhanced regional autonomy within a united Nigeria were adopted at this

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meeting, giving Nigerians a full share in shaping government action in a central council of ministers and regional executive councils, as well as the creation of more representative regional legislatures with increased powers (Sklar 2015). However, in the time between the two meetings of the Legislative Council in 1950, the regional legislatures convened and deliberated on the nature of the central legislature, submitting their views. The select committee studied the proposal for a bicameral legislature but suggested that in the immediate post-war years, it would be preferable to have a unicameral (one-chamber system) rather than two in the central legislature. There were 148 members of the House of Representatives under the 1951 Constitution; 136 were elected, the Governor selected 6 offical and unofficial members, respectively, to represent interests that he felt were not adequately represented. The representation of the Northern area was equal to the combined member of the two Southern regions (Ikime 1985; Dudley 1974). The Constitution guaranteed a limited degree of citizens’ engagement in governance. Though it was a significant improvement over the previous constitutions, the 1951 constitution was not without its flaws. As a whole, it was a unitary constitution with the central government wielding considerable influence over the regions. By 1954, the Lyttleton Constitution was promulgated (Lawal 2010). Each regional House of Assembly elected four members of the House of Representatives to serve on the council of ministers. Oliver Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary, convened a conciliatory conference in London from July 30 to August 22, 1953, which resulted in the ratification of a federal Constitution. This was one of the fallouts of the self-government motion that Anthony Enahoro initiated in 1953 (Lawl 2010; Adewoye 1986; Coleman 1958). The Constitution established the House of Representatives had 184 elected members, 94 from the North, 42 from the West and East, 2 from Lagos, and 6 from Southern Cameroons. The Council of Ministers consisted of 13 members, 3 from each region, a Cameroonian representative, and 3 other officials, each with a unique ministerial duty. On March 22, 1955, at the first session of the newly reconstructed federal House of Representatives, Jaja Wachukwu and Ayo Rosiji proposed the establishment of the office of the Prime Minister (Adewoye 1986). The House of Representatives did not act on the proposal due to the deliberate design of the 1954 Constitution, which had the Council of Ministers’ membership based on a territorial rather than party basis, making it improper for the Prime Minister’s office. The prime minister’s most important responsibility under a Westminster-style administration is to form his government. On May 31, 1957, the Federal House of Representatives unanimously passed a motion that Nigeria would become an independent state in 1959 (Adewoye 1986). After 6 years of conflict, Nigerian leaders finally came together on an issue that threatened the country’s existence as an emerging national entity (Coleman 1958:404). It was agreed at the rescheduled London conference in May and June of 1957 that the Eastern and Western regions would have full internal self-government in 1957 and Nigeria’s independence was fixed for October 1, 1960.

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4 The Legislature in the Post-Independent Parliamentary System The 1960 independence Constitution established a bicameral legislature. Section 36 of the Constitution states, “There shall be a Parliament of the Federation, which shall consist of Her Majesty, a Senate and a House of Representatives” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960). Her Majesty was represented by the Governor-General. Section 33 (1) of the Constitution established the office of the Governor-General thus: There shall be a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Federation, who shall be appointed by Her Majesty and shall hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure and who shall be Her Majesty’s representative in the Federation (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960).

Membership of the Senate, as prescribed by Section 37 of the Constitution includes “twelve Senators representing each Region” selected at the joint sitting of the regional houses “from among persons nominated by the Governor”, four Senators represented the Federal territory and the Governor-General, selected four Senators “in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960). The House of Representatives consisted of elected 305 members. The Senate was established as the nation’s upper chamber, and the Federal House of Representatives was established as the nation’s lower chamber. The second chamber was supposed to make it easier for the unrepresented groups or interests. On October 1, 1963, Nigeria became a Republic with a new Constitution that replaced the position of Governor-General with a president as the ceremonial head of state while the Prime Minister was the head of government (Fagbadebo 2020; Akanji 2021). Section 34 of the 1963 Constitution established the office of the president thus: There shall be a President of the Republic who shall be elected to office in accordance with section 35 of this Constitution and shall be the Head of State of the Federation and the Commander in-Chief of the armed forces of the Federation (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

Section 35 (2) of the Constitution stipulated The President shall be elected by secret ballot at a joint meeting of both Houses of Parliament held for the purpose of electing the President (hereinafter in this section referred to as an “election meeting”); and each member of Parliament shall be entitled to a single vote in each ballot for the election of the President taken at such a meeting (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “presidential ballot”) (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

Nevertheless, the parliament still consisted of “Her Majesty, a Senate and a House of Representatives” (Section 41, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963). There was no difference in the composition of the parliament in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions.

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The Constitution also distinguished between the functions of the Federal and regional parliaments. Section 69 (a & b) stated that the Federal parliament had the power to make laws (a) for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria (other than the Federal territory) or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Legislative Lists; and (b) for the peace, order and good government of the Federal Territory with respect to any matter, whether or not it is included in the Legislative Lists (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

Section 69 (2) of the Constitution further empowered the Federal Parliament “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Regions with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List shall (save as provided in section 78 of this Constitution) be to the exclusion of the legislatures of the Regions” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963). The items in the legislative lists defined the sphere of activities of the federal and regional parliaments. There were two legislative lists: exclusive and concurrent. The exclusive lists comprised 45 items that were exclusive t the Federal parliament to legislate. The concurrent lists of 29 items that both the Federal and Regional parliaments could legislate upon. Even at that, Section 69 (4) of the Constitution stated If any law enacted by the legislature of a Region is inconsistent with any law validly made by Parliament, the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the Regional law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

The 1963 Constitution further entrenched the culture of legislative politics in a parliamentary system of the British Westminster model. Unlike the British Queen as the head of the government, the president in Nigeria’s 1963 Constitution was conferred with the executive power, even though he was not the head of government. Section 84 stated The executive authority of the Federation shall be vested in the President and subject to the provisions of this Constitution may be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

This executive authority of the president included the appointment of the Prime Minister from among the members of the House of Representatives (Section 87 (2) and the execution of the laws passed by the legislature. Whenever the President has occasion to appoint a Prime Minister he shall appoint a member of the House of Representatives who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of the members of the House (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963).

Even though there were elements of separation of powers between the legislature and the executive given the executive authority of the president, nevertheless, Westminster model fused executive and legislative powers because the role of the president was largely ceremonial. The nature of the legislative-executive relations during the First Republic contributed partly to the crisis that precipitated the January 15, 1966 military coup. The change of government halted the growth and

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development of the legislative institution in Nigeria until 1979, when the military restored civil rule after 13 years of autocratic rule (Fagbadebo 2020).

5 Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential System of the Second Republic The 1966 military coup and counter-coup plunged Nigeria into a 30-month Civil War that ended in 1970. The delay in the restoration of civil rule after the war party precipitated another coup that ousted genera Yakubu Gowon (Fagbadebo 2020). The Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo military regime promised a return to civil rule and commenced a transition programme. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) approved the political transition plan and decided to return Nigeria to democratic governance on October 1, 1979. Despite the failed military coup that claimed the life of the Head of State, General Mohammed, his successor, General Obasanjo did not renege on the promise, and ushered in the Second Republic on October 1, 1979, with a new governing system. The presidential system adopted in the Second Republic was markedly different from the First Republic’s parliamentary system. Unlike the fusion of the executive and legislative powers, the presidential system promotes separation of powers among the three branches of the government: legislature, executive and judiciary (Fagbadebo 2020; Okunroumu 2014). This tripartite structure of the government enabled the practices of checks and balances to ensure effective oversight of the activities of each of the branches. The bicameral National Assembly, comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives, was vested with the legislative power of the country (Section 4(1–3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). At the state level, the unicameral legislatures had the legislative power to direct the affairs of their respective states but were limited to the items in the concurrent legislative lists. The presidential system of the Second Republic recognised the independence of the legislature with specific constitutional responsibilities to drive an accountable government, including making laws to maintain peace, order, and good governance. Unlike the parliamentary system of the First Republic, the president could not dissolve the legislature, and neither could the legislature remove the president without following the prescribed constitutional provisions (Fagbadebo 2020). Beyond this, the Constitution empowered the legislature to monitor and scrutinise the activities of the executive. Sections 82–83 of the 1979 Constitution prescribed the power of the legislature to investigate matters that fall within its sphere of legislative powers. This investigative authorisation was designed to enable the legislature to make laws with respect t any matter within its legislative competence and to correct any defects in existing laws; and o expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement of

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administration of funds appropriated by it (Section 82(2a&b), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979).

This provision of the Constitution entrenched a crucial legislative role to control the administration of the country’s resources and the management of the legislative authorisation powers. This oversight power of the legislature is an accountability mechanism to ensure an effective and transparent public service delivery. This legislative control of the administration and public policies is central to the democratic tenet of good governance. Thus, the 1979 presidential Constitution of Nigeria prioritised the legislature as a critical stakeholder in the promotion of good governance. The idea of separation of powers in the 1979 Constitution served as the foundation of the structure of the government in the new democratic dispensation. The principle outlined the structure and pattern of interactions between the executive and the legislative, their roles and responsibilities, and the decision-making process. Although critics of the presidential system noted the tendency toward authoritarianism, political gridlock, and impediments to leadership change (Linz 1990), this principle of separation of powers has its advantages. The history of the Second Republic illustrates the degree of conflict between the executive and the legislature. As a new governing system, the practice of the presidential system in the Second Republic was characterised by constant friction at the state and national levels (Sklar 1981; Fagbadebo 2020). The instability associated with the practice of the presidential system, coupled with the arson that followed the 1983 general elections precipitated another round of military putsch that ended the Second Republic democratic regime. For another 16 years, the military governed Nigeria with decrees. The military regime that seized power on December 31, 1983, lasted until August 1985 when another group of military officers ousted the government. An attempt by the new military government to return the country to a democratic state in 1993 was aborted by the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential elections, a development that precipitated a national political crisis. The Interim National Government (ING) arrangement that succeeded the departure of the military in August 1993 only lasted for 3 months when another full-blown military regime commenced in November 1993. The sudden death of the military head of state in 1998 precipitated the new transition to democracy. On May 29, 1999, the military handed over power to a civilian government that commence the Fourth Republic. During this year of military interregnum, the legislative institution was in abeyance. The presidential system of the Fourth Republic resurrected legislative roles and responsibilities in the Nigerian political system.

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6 Nigeria’s Legislature in the Fourth Republic The 1999 presidential Constitution was similar to the 1979 Constitution in terms of the governing system and the structure of the government at all levels. Section 4 (1) of the Constitution vested “the legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. . .in a National Assembly for the Federation, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). These powers would enable the two chambers of the National Assembly “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List” (Section 4(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature while the state Houses of Assembly are unicameral. The principle of separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances in a tripartite structure of the government are features of the Constitution. Section 4(6–7) of the Constitution also vest the legislative powers of the states in their respective house of assembly. Section 4(8) of the Constitution reaffirmed judicial independence and the primacy of judicial review. Save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the exercise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law, and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

As a form of safeguard against any form of arbitrary exercise of legislative powers, the Constitution barred the legislative institutions at the national and state levels from making laws with retrospective effects (Section 4(9), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). Section 5 of the Constitution vested the executive powers of the Federation and the State in the president and the governors, respectively. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the Federation: (a) shall be vested in the President and may subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and (b) shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the National Assembly and to all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

The bicameral legislature was supposed to provide more legislators a say in legislators a voice in the legislative process. The Senate has 109 members (3 senators representing each of the 36 states, and 1 representing the Federal Capital territory). The House of Representatives consists of 360 members representing constituencies. Section 58 of the Constitution empowred the National Assembly to make laws through legislation passed by both the Senate and the House of representatives.

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The president has to assent the bill to become a law except if he withheld the assent. Section 58(4–5) s the Constitution states (4) Where a bill is presented to the President for assent, he shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent. (5) Where the President withholds his assent and the bill is again passed by each House by a two-thirds majority, the bill shall become law and the assent of the President shall not be required (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

However, this veto power applies to money bills and other fiscal legislative frameworks. Section 59(1) of the Constitution states that the provisions should apply to: (a) an appropriation bill or a supplementary appropriation bill, including any other bill for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation of any money charged thereon or any alteration in the amount of such a payment, issue or withdrawal; and (b) a bill for the imposition of or increase in any tax, duty or fee or any reduction, withdrawal or cancellation thereof (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

The exercise veto in this section is a mechanism to ensure proper scrutiny and oversight of legislation passed by the legislature. Even at that, the judicial power to review executive and legislative actions and decisions is also crucial to the institutional oversights of public policies. The Constitution also empowered the legislature to hold the executive accountable by controlling its expenditure and disbursement of funds to enforce good governance. Section 80 of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly over public funds. The revenues accrued to the Federal Government should be domiciled in the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) of the Federation out of which the government would draw for all its expenditures. (2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or an Act passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution. (3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Act of the National Assembly. (4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly (Section 80(2–4)).

These provisions, popularly known as the legislative power of the purse, afford lawmakers to scrutinise and monitor the disbursement of public funds for their intended purposes. This, indeed, is the most crucial power of the legislature to direct the course of governance and the management of the nation’s resources. The Constitution empowers the president to present the proposal of the annual fiscal policy of the government to the legislature for deliberation and scrutiny for authorisation. Thus, the government can only implement the authorised fiscal policy passed by the legislature and assented to by the president. To strengthen the oversight power over fiscal policy, the Constitution empowers the legislature to investigate the disbursement of the appropriated funds for the

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authorised fiscal policies (Section 88, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). Section 88(2a–b) explains the essence of the investigative power of the National Assembly (a) make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

These provisions imply that effective oversight of executive actions and decision on policy implementation would promote good governance and instill accountability. The Constitution further empowers the legislature at the state and national levels to discipline erring executive through impeachment procedure specifically prescribed in Sections 143 and 188. It is, therefore, appropriate to state that the 1999 presidential constitution of the Fourth Republic institutionalises the culture of transparency and accountability for good governance.

7 Conclusion Despite the constitutional provisions designed to promote good governance, the Nigerian state, since 1999, has been embroiled in a deepening crisis of governance. Since 1999, it is hard to ascertain the level of commitment of the stakeholders. Corruption and mismanagement of public resources have created gaps in the country’s development strides. Over the years, Nigeria has remained at the lowest ranks in the various development and growth indexes (Fagbadebo 2019). For instance, in the 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI), Nigeria ranked 154 out of the 180 countries analysed with a score of 24% (CPI 2021). In the Global corruption Barometer (GCB), 44% of Nigerians believed that corruption in government has increased more than the previous years while 44% of users of public services paid bribes to government officials than the previous years (GCB 2019). In the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Nigeria has remained in the category of countries with deteriorating governance indicators (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2021). The overall governance index of the IIAG includes security and the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunities, and human development. Despite its enormous natural and human resources, Nigeria remains a centre of focus in terms of good governance with endemic rise in insecurity, debt profile, poverty, and unemployment. Even though the government expressed its commitment to eradicating corruption and promoting good governance, this is more of a slogan than action in a system characterised by mercantilist politics (Fagbadebo 2020). The legislature, rather than serve as the gatekeeper of the nation’s resources has become an institution that aid and abet corrupt practices.

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References Adewoye O (1986) Colonial constitutions, the rule of law and politics in Nigeria, 1862-1960. A paper presented at the seminar on Historic Roots of the Contemporary Nigerian Nation Agi SPI (2008) Constitutional matrix of the evolution of the Nigerian political party system, 1914-1960. Lwati: A Journal of Contemporary Research 5:259–278. https://doi.org/10.4314/ lwati.v5i1.36866 Akanji OO (2021) Nigeria between 1914 and 1960: political-constitutional changes and crises in an era of colonialism. In: Ajayi R, Fashagba JY (eds) Nigerian politics. Advances in African economic, social and political development. Springer, Cham, pp 37–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-50509-7_3 Alabi MOA (2009) The legislatures in Africa: a trajectory of weakness. Afr J Polit Sci Int Rel 3(5): 233–241 Bening RB (2009) Integration and disintegration in British Colonial West Africa: the case of the Gold Coast and Lagos 1874-1886. Ghana J Geogr 1:1–16 Bertram A (1930) The colonial service. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Coleman JS (1958) Nigeria: background to nationalism. University of California press, Berkely, CA Cookey SJS (1980) Sir Hugh Clifford as Governor of Nigeria: an evaluation. Afr Aff 79(317): 531–547 Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria (1960) Federal Government Printer, Lagos Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1963) Federal Government Printer, Lagos Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979) Federal Government Printer, Lagos Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) Federal Government Printer, Lagos Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2021). https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Daldry LC (1960) Nigeria’s Federal Parliament. Afr Aff 59(237):292–300 Davies L (2018) Urban Lagos 1927–67: a tale of two cities? In: Garrard J, Mikhailova E (eds) Twin cities: urban communities, borders and relationships over time. Routledge, London Dudley B (1974) A coalition of theoretical analysis of Nigerian politics, 1950-66. Afr Rev 2(4): 525–552 Ezera K (1960) Constitutional developments in Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Fagbadebo OM (2020) Impeachment in the Nigerian presidential system: challenges, successes and the way forward. Palgrave Macmillan. https://bit.ly/332d5AQ Fagbadebo O (2019) Corruption, and the challenge of accountability in the post-colonial African states: a discourse. J Afr Union Stud 8(1):9–32. https://doi.org/10.31920/2050-4306/2019/ v8n1a1 Global Corruption Barometer Report (2019). https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/africa/ africa-2019 Ikime O (1985) In search of Nigerians: changing patterns of inter group relations in an evolving nation-state. Presidential inaugural lecture delivered 30th Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka on 1st May Lawal OA (2010) From colonial reforms to decolonization: Britain and the transfer of power in Nigeria, 1947-1960. J Hist Soc Nigeria 19:39–62 Lienert I (2013) Role of the legislature in budget processes. In: Allen R, Hemming R, Potter BH (eds) The international handbook of public financial management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315304_7 Linz J (1990) The perils of presidentialism. J Democr 1(1):51–69 Maiangwa B, Suleiman MD, Anyaduba CA (2018) The nation as corporation: British colonialism and the pitfalls of postcolonial nationhood in Nigeria. Peace Conflict Stud 25(1):Article 3. https://doi.org/10.46743/1082-7307/2018.1438 Martin EC (1927) The British West African settlements, 1750–1821. Longmans, Green & Co., London

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McAlexander RJ (2020) A reanalysis of the relationship between indirect rule, ethnic inclusion, and decolonization. J Politics 82(4). https://doi.org/10.1086/708779 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2021) 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Index Report. https:// mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag Muheeb IO (2019) The trajectory of the legislature, lawmaking and legislation in Nigeria. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi O-RM, Nwankwor C (eds) The National Assembly. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, pp 33–56 Ojo TI (1997a) The Nigerian legislature: a historical survey of colonial administration before independence, vol I. ASCON, Badagry Ojo TI (1997b) The Nigerian legislature: a historical survey of Nigeria governmental system, 1960–1993, vol II. ASCON, Badagry Okuroumu F (2014) Why the parliamentary system is more appropriate for the Nigerian environment than the presidential system. Being a paper delivered to the National Conference, Abuja, April 2 Omotoso F, Oladeji O (2019) Legislative oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi O-RM, Nwankwor C (eds) The National Assembly. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, pp 57–72 Osadolor OB (2017) The national question in historical perspective. In: Momoh A, Adejumobi S (eds) The national question in Nigeria: comparative perspectives. Routledge, London. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781315191843 Oyebode A (2003) The foundations of Nigeria: essay in honor of Toyin Falola. Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ Wheare J (1950) The Nigerian Legislative Council. Faber and Faber, London Wight M (1945) The development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945. Faber and Faber Ltd, London Sklar R (1981) Democracy for the Second Republic. Issue: A Journal of Opinion 11(1/2):14–16 Sklar RL (2015) Nigerian political parties: power in an emergent African nation, vol 2288. Princeton University Press, Princeton Strom K (1997) Rules, reasons and routines: legislative roles in parliamentary democracies. J Legis Stud 3(1):155–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339708420504 Stultz NM (1968) Parliaments in former British Black Africa. The Journal of Developing Areas 2(4):479–494 Tamuno T (1982) The evolution of the Nigerian State: the southern phase 1898-1914. Longman Group, London Tamuno TN (1969) The role of the Legislative Council in the Administration of Lagos, 1886-1913. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4(4):555–570 Van Der Linden M (2016) The acquisition of Africa (1870-1914): the nature of international law (vol 20/8). Nijhoff, Brill Vaughan O (2022) The colonial administration of Nigeria. In: Falola T, Heaton MM (eds) The Oxford handbook of Nigerian history 2022.; online edition Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190050092.013.21

Lucky A. Tongs studies political science at the University of Jos, Nigeria. He is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja, Nigeria. His area of specialization includes legislative studies, political economy, development studies, elections, and governance. Omololu Fagbadebo holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a Research Associate and a lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute

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(SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in June/July 2010. He has published academic papers in journals and books. He has presented papers at conferences and workshops. He is a member of the editorial board and associate editor of reputable journals. His area of specialisation includes comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies, and African government politics. He is the Coordinator of African Impact Initiatives for Scholars. He is a member of the Editorial Board of SN Social Sciences. He is the author of The Supreme Court in the Nigerian Political System (2002), ECOWAS Court and Regional Integration in West Africa (2016), and Constitutionalism in Nigeria: Politics and Law in an Emerging African Democracy (2022), and Co-Editor of Perspectives on the Legislature in the Government of Nigeria (2010) among other books and articles in learned publications. Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi has over 30 years of teaching and research experience in universities and research institutions in Africa. He is a Professor in the Department of Public and International Law, and the Provost, College of Law, Osun State University, Nigeria. He is a Visiting Professor, at the University of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Hitherto, he had taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Babcock University, and the University of Ilorin where he became a Professor in 2011, and Constitutional Law at the University of Abuja. He had also been a researcher at the Pan-African Intergovernmental Organisation (CAFRAD) based in Morocco and at the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja. A former Speaker of the Osun State House of Assembly (1999–2003) and Member of the House of Representatives (2015–2019), Professor Alabi was the Head of the Parliamentary Capacity Building Programme at CAFRAD (2008–2010).

Legislative Oversight as Accountability Mechanism: The Nigerian Perspective Jacob Olufemi Fatile

and Kehinde David Adejuwon

Abstract In Nigeria, like other countries all over the world, the legislature performs oversight functions to stop the excesses of the executive arm of government and to check wastages in governance which is considered one of the ends of democracy. Considering the great responsibility assigned by the constitution, one would expect that the legislative power would be balanced with a high degree of public accountability which is the hallmark of modern democratic governance. In this paper, the oversight functions of the legislature to scrutinize, and oversee executive action and any organ of state are brought to the front burner. It examines the constitutional provisions expressing powers of the National Assembly on oversight; current and new mechanisms for oversight and accountability; coordination amongst the spheres of government. The chapter reveals that the legislature has not lived up to the expectation of Nigerians in terms of entrenching accountable and transparent governance that will guarantee good governance for the benefit of citizens. The chapter further reveals that legislative oversight which is a crucial function of the legislature has been severally compromised and often used as a hunting dog. The paper concludes that for effective functioning, the legislature should be insulated from the influence of the executive which is sometimes counter-productive in entrenching accountable governance since such influence tends to sway the minds of the legislators from the serious business of law-making.

J. O. Fatile (✉) School of Management, IT and Governance, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] K. D. Adejuwon Faculty of Management Sciences, Department of Public Administration, Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_4

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1 Introduction In democratic governance, the legislature occupies a strategic position, with the mandate and responsibility of aggregating and articulating the collective will of the people through representative government (Okoosi-Simbine 2010). Legislature is a critical law-making institution in a democratic system. It is instrumental in the establishment and maintenance of legal order (Fatile and Adejuwon 2016). Awotokun (1998) captured the centrality of the legislature when he asserts that the legislature is important to any democratic system. Most countries’ legislatures are constitutionally mandated to hold governments accountable (Shephard 2008). Legislature is an institution of a democratic government in most countries of the world. Going by the belief that in most parts of the world, democratic governance is now the preferred system of government. Legislature constitutes a crucial part of the governance process that makes a democratic system function effectively (Nwogwugwu and Ishola 2019; Omilusi 2018). Legislature is at the heart of democratic governance and the arm of government that citizens entrust with the task of making sure that public officials fulfill their functions in the interests of the citizens. This belief is deepened by the ray of hope that is embedded in the oversight functions of the legislature (Jooji 2019). Since 1999, the question of the effectiveness of the Nigerian National Assembly has been generating concerns among political analysts, scholars, and other stakeholders. This is attributed majorly to the excessive and immoral behaviors of some legislators. No doubt, the National Assembly has never ceased to make headlines. Most of these issues ended up soiling its public image as people saw the legislators fighting or struggling for self-interests. This is evident in the various court cases of corrupt practices against public officials and institutions in Nigeria. If one looks at some of the cases that the Nigerian National Assembly has not been able to resolve with the power of oversight, such as The Maina N195 billion Pension Scam; Kerosene subsidy scam: Police Pension Fund Fraud; Stella Oduah N255 million armored car scandal; Missing N20 billion Naira oil money in 2013; $15 million private jet/arms scandal; Abba Morro Immigration Scandal; Malabu Oil Scandal; among others (Martins et al. 2019). The National Assembly investigated these cases but was unable to bring them to closure. This contradictory trajectory portrays the National Assembly as an arm of government “too weighty to discard and much problematic to retain.” The intensity of the condemnation of the institution in many quarters makes it necessary to review some of the issues that are generating concerns to know how to chat a way forward for the institution’s reform (Martins et al. 2019). This chapter explores the legislative oversight option as an accountability mechanism in the management of public funds. Section 2 presents the conceptual issues. The third section gives an overview of the legislature and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Section 4 examines legislative and oversight functions in Nigeria. In the fifth section, the paper reviews legislative oversight and accountability mechanisms. The sixth part of the paper focuses on an assessment of the performance of oversight functions in Nigeria. The seventh section presents the requisite for strengthening

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legislative oversight for accountable governance, while the last section concludes the paper.

2 Legislative Oversight: Conceptual Discourse The term “oversight” was first used by John Stuart Mill (in Considerations on Representative Government 1861) in the context of a proper office of a representative assembly to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable behavior. Nyathela and Makhado (2012) state that oversight entails watchful care, supervision, and strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by the legislature in respect of the implementation of laws, the execution of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and provisions of the Constitution. Oversight is a constitutionally mandated and assigned function of the legislature to scrutinize and oversee executive action and any organ of the state. It, therefore, follows that oversight entails the informal watchful, strategic, and structured scrutiny exercised by Legislatures (South African Legislative Sector 2012:4). Caparine (2002) argues that oversight involves the watchdog function of ongoing activities. Oversight is seen as a central facet of democracy because it ensures that the Legislature ensures that the executive carries out its mandates, implements policy and draws from experiences for future law-making. The legislative oversight function as observed by Williams (2012) is one of the cornerstones of democracy. The legislative oversight function as observed by Williams (2012) is one of the cornerstones of democracy. To Jaja (2012) legislative oversight is an expansive constitutional power conferred on the legislature to act as overseer or watchdog on the application of public funds. The oversight function of the legislatures according to Saiegh (2014, 2) means: ensuring the implementation of laws, ensuring that legislation and government policies are implemented effectively. Monitoring, reviewing and investigating programmes and activities of government to ensure that the actions taken are transparent, accountable and consistent according to the original intent as allowed by the constitution.

Legislative oversight can also be seen as the power of the legislature to monitor, review, and supervise government agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation strategies of the executive arm of government. This is to ensure that the executive sustains the principles of good governance, and remains responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorates (Ndoma-Egba 2012). Akeredolu (2008) explains legislative oversight as surveillance of policy implementation, which entails how policies and decisions have been carried out. It is a situation in which the post-administrative actions are investigated while public officials are invited to account for their financial and administrative actions. No wonder Jaja (2012) observes that legislative oversight is an expansive constitutional power

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conferred on the legislature to act as overseers or watchdog on the application of public funds. The oversight function of the legislatures is a measure to ensure the implementation of laws, ensuring that legislation and government policies are implemented effectively. Monitoring, reviewing and investigating programmes and activities of government to ensure that the actions taken are transparent, accountable and consistent according to the original intent as allowed by the constitution (Saiegh 2014:2).

Legislative oversight, therefore, refers to the powers of the parliament to review, monitor, and supervise the executive arm of government, including government agencies such as; Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)’s activities. The legislature exercises this power largely through its legislative committee system (Ehigiamusoe and Umar 2013). The essence of the oversight function is to ensure compliance with due process by the public officeholders. This involves monitoring and scrutiny of public officials in MDAs. This can be done through an investigation of the activities of public officials to ensure that they comply with their rule of engagement (Abegunde 2016). Thus, legislative oversight, therefore, entails a review and evaluation of selected activities of the executive branch of government by the legislative arm of government.

3 Accountability as a Concept Accountability has diverse meanings in different systems of governance. In a political system, accountability remains the fundamental value that provides the government with the means of understanding how programs may fail and finding ways that can make programs perform better. In the context of the public service, accountability is linked to the processes that make the public officials explain, justify and rectify their actions and decisions taken in the capacity of the public trustees and make the officials accept the consequences of their actions. Accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance (Adejuwon 2014). Accountability refers to institutionalized practices of giving an account of how assigned responsibilities are carried out. Accountability is the duty of government officials or functionaries who are entrusted with the rules and regulations that guide the operations of accountability measures to implement these rules and regulations in their day-to-day operations and also account to the people they serve, who conversely depend on them (Agu 2016:2).

Accountability ensures actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight, to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be benefiting. Accountability in the view of Adegite (2010) is the obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted following agreed rules and standards and that the officer reports fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and or/plans. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) explain accountability as the answerability for the performance of public officials and institutions. Theletsane (2014:153) further

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defines accountability in the public sector as a mechanism whereby the public exercises the right to be given an account of the effective, efficient, economic and transparent utilization of state funds in the process of achieving the mandate given to their public representatives (the Legislature). Accountability in public administration is therefore about securing and maintaining the integrity of government as part of good governance.

4 The Legislature and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria As a political institution, the legislature is seen as an important organ used to address the important question of unity and stability in any given society. The legislature is ubiquitous in every system of government to perform legislative functions (Tom and Attai 2014). The popularity of the legislature cannot be divorced from the wave of democratization in Africa. Indeed, if democracy is a system anchored on the informed and active participation of the people, the legislature is a vehicle for equal and wider representation (Yaqub 2004). Abegunde (2016) argued that the legislature is an essential institution in any democracy. It functions majorly to regulate the conduct of government through the doctrine ofseparation of powers that have long recognized the legislature as one of the arms ofgovernment responsible for law-making to guide against abuse of powers and violations ofhuman rights. The roles the legislature performs in a democracy and the extent to which the roles are performed vary with the system of government in place, as well as they differ from one country to another. No wonder, Abdulrasheed (2007) argued that for any democracy to have meaning or grow, the legislature not only makes laws for the good ordering of the society but must as well ensures that laws and orders are not flagrantly violated by other arms of government. If the constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations, ideas and collective will of the people, the legislature is the collective defender and watchdog of the aspiration, ideas and collective will of the people, if the constitution is the social contract between the people and their government, the legislature is the advocate for the people and the arbiter of the national interest (Odinga 1994, 123).

The clamor for sustainable democracy in Nigeria through the evolution of proper political culture has conferred additional responsibility on the legislature (Nwaubani 2014). The Nigerian state assumed a new governance status in 1999 following the demise of the authoritarian regime in the country. It is the longest democratic period in the history of Nigerian politics since independence (Egbefor 2015). The source and nature of transition in 1999 were later found to constitute a threat to the foundation of democracy and obliterate the current efforts at consolidating democracy. The re-birth of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 in the view Ossai (2013) gave the citizens hope for the practicability of the principle of the rule of law, justice and respect for human rights. In the same vein, Oluwole (2014) has observed that with

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the emergence of a multiparty system and the subsequent establishment of a democratic regime, there are greater hopes and expectations among Nigerians. Since 1999, the country has successfully passed through eight legislative houses both at the center and the component units (Egbule 2020). The legislature is constitutionally and strategically positioned to undermine authoritarian tendencies on the part of the executive, engender government effective and adequate response to the delivery of public goods and services, and enhance strict adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law. Thus, the legislature is the embodiment of popular power. This suffices that any hindrance to its proper functioning represents an obstacle to democracy (Fashagba 2009). Similarly, Alabi and Fashagba (2010) note that the legislature within the framework of the constitution remains the foremost accountability and probity institution in Nigeria. This important function of the legislature in Nigeria underscores its democratic essence as the bastion of the people’s will and its importance to the deepening of democracy and responsible governance. In Nigeria, despite more than two decades of democratic rule, the concern of most perceptive observers of Nigerian democracy is how to ensure its consolidation and prevent the reversal of autocratic rule (Omitola and Ogunnibi 2016). No doubt, there exists largely some imperfections in the democratic system. Democratic consolidation in Nigeria is viewed in the context of seamless transfers not just from military to civil rule but also from one civil administration to another. In this regard, the legislature is a very important institution of democracy as it has responsibilities of representing the diverse interests of members’ constituencies while performing other legislative functions such as law-making, approval of budgets and appointments, impeachment process and oversight functions. Legislatures in Nigeria have been variously described by Bassey, Eloma and Oloidi (2014) as “rump” assemblies, theaters of illusion, or even mere rubber-stamp chambers, and they remain a veritable instrument for the democratic process. Instead of exposing corruption, inefficiency, or wastage by the executive, the legislature itself was enmeshed in corruption and ineptitude (Omenka 2008). Despite the importance of the legislature to democratic consolidation, it is clear from Nigerian experience that some legislatures fail to play a such role with an expected level of success. Experiences since 1999, have shown that the Nigerian legislature has failed to live up to its constitutional responsibility of being the harbinger of democratic consolidation as it is struggling to overcome executive interference, crippling internal conflict, inexperience, corruption, and materialistic obsession. Similarly, Tom and Attai (2014) argued that many legislators were hardly aware that they were in the legislature as representatives of the people and as such owed a duty to advance the interests of the nation. They lacked a sense of commitment to the well-being of citizens.

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5 Legislative Oversight and Accountability in Governance In the presidential system of government, the principle of separation of powers is the most fundamental element, particularly in a truly democratic government (Omejec 2015). Accountability in the public sector throughout the world is being given serious attention because the government is the highest spender of public funds. Those in authority assume fiduciary status with the attendant responsibilities requiring them to render their stewardship accounts to those for whom the authority is held in trust. The general public is increasingly requiring public officers to be accountable by demonstrating effective use of public assets and funds in the delivery of services and pursuit of government objectives (Obazee 2006). In any democratic governance, legislative oversight is essential in ensuring accountability and limiting the excessiveness of the executive (Nwagwu 2014). Legislative oversight is a very important instrument that assures that the nation’s resources in addition to state revenue and expenditure are properly considered and fiscally sound and that government programs address the people’s relevant needs and are executed in a timely and proper manner (Arowolo 2004). The importance of legislative oversight as a tool in monitoring government activities was underscored by Woodrow Wilson thus: There are some scandals and discomfort but the infinite advantage in having every affair of the administration subjected to the test of constant examination on the part of the assembly... Quite important as legislation is the vigilante of administration (Woodrow Wilson 1885, quoted in EGPA Study Group on “Legislative Oversight” (Glasgow, Caledonian University, Glasgow (UK) 2000).

Woodrow Wilson similarly praised oversight and exalted the practice as coequal to the writing of legislation: “Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration” (Wodrow 1885:297). The role of the legislature as the watchdog over public finance is part of its oversight functions over the executive in the management of the capital resources of the Nigerian State to ensure good governance, accountability, and probity for a sustainable democracy. Without legislature, the raison d’etre of democracy and governance would be a mirage. The existence of structurally weak control mechanisms, which create a variety of loopholes that have tended to facilitate and sustain, corrupt practices is the bane of public sector financial mismanagement in Nigeria since the oil boom years. Adejuwon and Okewale (2010) are of the view that democracy in Nigeria has been plunged into crisis by its failure to ensure accountability of the ruler to the ruled as well as the inability of the state to make officials accountable for their actions and bringing corrupt ones to justice. Nigerian legislators have been using the oversight function as an avenue to enrich themselves. For instance, a member of the House of Representatives, Haruna Yerima, alleged that his colleagues used to demand bribes from ministries and parastatals to induce members into taking favorable decisions. He said, whoever tells you there is no corruption in the house is corrupt. Ministers and Heads of parastatals are often asked to bring money so that their budgets can be passed. MTN bribes

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J. O. Fatile and K. D. Adejuwon us every month. It brings recharge cards worth 7,500 Naira monthly to each member (cf. Aliyu et al. 2014).

Rather than investigate the substance of the allegation, the House suspended him for a month. Illegal funding of legislative committees’ activities by government departments and agencies was another means by which the legislators extracted money from government ministries or agencies over which they have oversight responsibility. This undermines accountability and responsible government as due process is subverted and subsisting laws, rules and regulations are compromised for selfish aggrandizement. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has ranked Nigeria among countries with high incidents of corruption. The character of the National Assembly, as an institution, shows that it cannot address the fundamentals of corruption. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, the National Assembly has lurched from one scandal to another associated with financial malfeasance, corruption, and outright embezzlement of public funds. Ishiekwere (2005) captures it as a “prevailing corpus of nauseating events in the National Assembly.” The instances of corruption activities are so numerous that the institution has lost its place of pride among the institutions of democracy. Commentators and analysts at one time or the other referred to the National Assembly as a den of thieves and self-centered people. For instance, Obasanjo (2003) designated the National Assembly as “an assemblage of thieves and rogues.” The leadership of the National Assembly has been enmeshed in allegations of corrupt practices. Between 1999 and 2013, three out of the five Speakers elected in the House of Representatives were impeached and removed on allegations of corruption and unethical practices. One of the former Speakers that survived impeachment is facing prosecution on charges of corruption and embezzlement of public funds after his tenure. In the Senate, three out of six Senate Presidents as shown in Table 1 below were also removed from office on allegations of corruption and unethical conduct. An institution with a culture of corruption and extra-legal means of appropriating public funds, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, cannot lay any claims to an anti-corruption posture. The issue of public perception of the National Assembly is a concern that refuses to abate since the inception of the Fourth Republic. The National Assembly is seen as a conduit pipe through which public fund is siphoned, especially under the banner of constituency project fund and extraneous allowances that are shrouded in secrecy despite public outcry for the institution’s finances to be made public (Oladesu 2016). The legislature is given a lot of powers in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria to perform oversight functions and act as the watchdog of the executive. Yet, in evolving an enduring legislative culture, the legislature has gone through thick and thin since the beginning of the present democratic governance. If oversight and accountability of public finances are not effective, corruption could escalate and poor services would contribute to the failure and subsequent collapse of the government. The overall performance of the Nigerian legislators following their constitutionally mandated functions and roles in public policies and programs has fallen short of both national and international expectations (Agba et al. 2014). Another issue of concern

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Table 1 Some of the reported Cases of Corruption in the National Assembly S/ N

Names Senate Evans Enwerem

Status/designation

Year

Nature of allegation

Outcomes

Senate President

1999

Forced resignation

2

Pius Chuba Okadigbo

Senate President

2000

3

Haruna Abubakar

Deputy Senate President

2000

4

Ibrahim Mantu led the committee for screening political nominees

Deputy Senate President

2003

5

Adolphus Wabara

Senate President

2005

6

John Mbata, Abubakar Maccido, Emmanuel Chris Adighije Abdulazeez Irahim

Leaders and members, senate committee on education

2005

7

The ad-hoc committee that investigated the PTDF case

Members

2006

8

Iyabo Obasanjo

Chairman, senate committee on health

2008

Falsified age, names, and academic qualification Awarded contracts to cronies at the inflated price Embezzled #16.9 million ($140,833) as Xmas and Sallah gift Nasir el-Rufai alleged that the committee requested #54 million as a condition for confirming his nomination Connived with chairmen of Senate and House committees on education to take a bribe of #55 million ($458,333) from the education ministry Connived with chairmen of Senate and House committees on education to take a bribe of #55 million ($458,333) from the education ministry Alleged to have taken bribe from the vice president to cover the truth on PTDF stolen fund Collected #10 million ($83,333) as a share of senate committee from the unspent budget of 2007

1

Impeached

Impeached

Case swept under the carpet

Resigned, arraigned but prosecution inconclusive

Chairman and vice lost the committee’s leadership positions, arraigned, but the prosecution inconclusive The report was rejected and a new committee was set up Arrested and arraigned

(continued)

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J. O. Fatile and K. D. Adejuwon

Table 1 (continued) S/ N 9

10

Names Iyabo Obasanjo

Status/designation Chairman, senate committee on health

Year 2008

Senator Nicolas Yahaya Ughani

Chairman, Senate Committee on power

2009

Nature of allegation Alleged to have taken a contract worth #3.5 billion for power generation alongside an Austrian firm, but failed to execute the contract after taking a certain amount Alleged complicity in #5.2 billion power contracts

11

House of Representatives Salisu Ibrahim Speaker

1999

Falsified academic claim

12

Maurice Ibekwe

Member

2004

13

Garba, S. Matazu Osita Izunaso Gariel Suswam

Leader and members, house committee on education

14

Patricia Etteh

Speaker

2007

15

Leaders and members of the HoRs

Leaders and members of various committees

2005

Defrauded a German businessman of #350,000 and 75,000 Connived with chairmen of Senate and House committees on education to take a bribe of #55 million ($458,333) from the education ministry Award contract at an inflated price of #628 million ($233,333) Alleged to have collected money from ministries, departments, and agencies of government (MDA) before approving their budget

Outcomes Reported but not properly investigated

Arrested by the Economic and Financial Crime Commission on May 11, 2009, and arraigned in court on 13th and 18th May 2009 remanded in Kuje prison between 18th May and June 4, 2009. Forced to Resign and arraigned, received a presidential pardon Died in prison while still under trial Chairman and vice lost the committee’s leadership positions, arraigned, but the prosecution inconclusive Forced resignation

Dr Haruna Yerima accused his colleagues in the house of extorting money from MDA before passing their budget (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) S/ N 16

17

Names Dimeji Bankole

Status/designation Speaker

Year 2008

Ndudi Elumelu, and Paulinus Igwe; Mohammed Jibo

Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the committee on power, Chairman, House Committee on Rural development, respectively.

2009

Nature of allegation Alleged to have over-invoiced the bill for the purchase of vehicles for oversight functions at the rate of #2.4 billion Alleged complicity in #5.2 billion power contracts

Outcomes Cleared of allegations in a controversial manner.

Arrested by the Economic and Financial Crime Commission on May 11, 2009, and arraigned in court on 13th and 18th May 2009. remanded in Kuje prison between 18th May and June 4, 2009.

Source: Adapted from Alabi and Fashagba (2010)

is the wide allegation of corruption leveled against members of the institution. The instances of corruption activities are so numerous that the institution has lost its place of pride among the institutions of democracy as evident in the table below. The legislature in Nigeria has the constitutional responsibility to ensure that the executive is accountable to the people for the management of public funds. Accountability is fundamentally needful for building public trust in leadership (Adejuwon (2012). Abata and Adejuwon (2012:25) have argued that without a reawakening of the culture of accountability, the trusting relationship needed to forge between the government and the governed for the actualization of good governance would not materialize. There is, therefore, a critical link between accountability and oversight for the delivery of the dividends of democracy to the people. However, for accountability to be achieved in Nigeria, legislators at all levels of government must ensure that appropriate laws and oversight functions are properly performed by them.

6 Legislative Oversight and Appropriation Bill in Nigeria Related to the issue of corruption is the concern on budget handling by the National Assembly and legislative oversight is a crucial pillar for creating credibility in budgeting and in holding governments accountable for the results. In any democratic government, the legislature has a constitutional responsibility to exercise its power of financial oversight. Legislative oversight is an indispensable tool in modern

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Table 2 Some Nigerian legislators facing criminal allegations S/ N 1

Name Senator David Mark

2

Hon. Iorwase Hembe and Hon. Ifeanyi Azubuogu

3

Senator Bukola Saraki

4

Senator Theodore Orji

5

Senator Danjuma Goje

6

Senator Goodhope Uzodimma

7

Senator Adamu Aliero

8

Senator AbdulAzeez Murtala Nyako

Allegations Court papers in London showed that in the early 2000s, He operated foreign accounts with six million pounds: three at the Northern Bank, Isle of Man, and one at the Allied Irish Bank, Jersey The duo was accused by the former Director-General of the Security and Exchange Commission of demanding N39 million in bribes and an additional N5 million, during the probe of the near-collapse capital market in 2012. He was alleged to have violated Nigeria's Money Laundering laws as a result of the consistent stealing of public funds through his assistant, Abdul Adama and other staff who helped him in laundering the monies in bits. They were recommended for prosecution for offences relating to Money Laundering Act and Forex (4Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. The former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mohammed Adoke directed the Inspector-General of Police to stop further investigation The Senator was linked to the withdrawal of N5.6 billion in cash from Abia State accounts in the Guarantee Trust Bank, against the regulation of the Central Bank. He was the conduit through which Abia state was defrauded during the 8-year reign of his godfather, Kalu. He was in the detention of the EFCC when he won the Governorship election in Abia State, he was released be of constitutional immunity. He is yet to be cleared. A former Governor of Gombe State. He was alleged to have stolen the sum of N52 billion Gombe State funds. He was charged to court by the EFCC. The case is ongoing He allegedly transferred funds from the account of the National Maritime Authority to the former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. He also collected an N250 million mobilization fee, which he made a refund. He was detained by the EFCC when one of his companies—Transurb Technical Consult Ltd—went bankrupt. He is yet to be cleared of any of these allegations. He was a former Governor of Kebbi State. He was alleged to have stolen N10.2 billion funds from the State. He is yet to be cleared of the charges by the EFCC and ICPC. He was the son of the former Governor of Adamawa State, Murtala Nyako. He was accused of stealing, abuse of office and money laundering by the EFCC. He was being investigated for laundering N15 billion in State Government money to the account of five companies belonging to him: Blue opal Nig. Ltd., Crust Energy Nig. Ltd., Blue Ribbon Multilinks Ltd., Tower Assets Mgt. Ltd., and Blue Ribbon Bureau De Change. He was elected to make laws for Nigerians (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) S/ N 9

Name Senator Ali N dume

10

Senator Stella Odua

11

Senator Sam Egwu

12

Senator Buruji Kashamu

13

Senator Joshua Dariye

14

Senator Abdullahi Adamu

Allegations The Nigerian government had alleged that he has links with the insurgent group, Boko Haram and that he furnished the sect with information that aided their operations in the country. He was arraigned before an Abuja High court by the federal government on a four-count criminal charge and tendered proof of evidence that indicated the lawmaker made contact with the Boko Haram sect 73 times. He is yet to be cleared of the charges. Allegation of certificate forgery, i.e., forged MBA and Ph. D. certificates and was also indicted for corruption by the House of Representatives when she approved the illegal purchase of two armored BMW cars for a whopping sum of N255 million. She has not been cleared of the allegations. He was accused of stealing billions of funds belonging to Ebonyi State when he was the Governor. He gave a false declaration of asset. The EFCC arrested and detained the former Accountant General of the State but the former governor was not touched. He is wanted by the US government for alleged drugrelated offences. Senator Kashamu and 14 others were charged in 1998 for their alleged involvement in an international conspiracy to smuggle heroin into the US. Also, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency placed him under house arrest in an attempt to extradite him to the USA. The matter is still before a court. He was arrested by the Metropolitan Police on 20th January 2004 in London with over $9 million. While on bail, he escaped to Nigeria and has since not gone back to clear himself of the money laundering charges the British Government brought against him. On July 13, 2007, he was arraigned on a 23 count charge of money laundering and theft of billions of naira by the EFCC. His appeal to the Supreme court was dismissed and ordered to go back to the high court to face his trial. But He was a former Governor of Nasarawa State. He was arrested by the EFCC in 2010 over allegations of fraudulent award of contracts and stealing of public funds estimated at N15 billion. He was arraigned by the EFCC on a 149 count charge of fraud, he made several attempts to the courts to drop the charges against him but to no avail. He is also in the Senate making laws for Nigerians.

Source: Adapted from Politico Magazine, 29th June 2015

democracies. It is important in ensuring budget accountability. No doubt, powers of appropriation and oversight of expenditures are perhaps one of the most essential duties of the legislature (Osigwe and Nghargbu 2020). To ensure fairness in the

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budgetary process, it is essential, therefore, to introduce the principles of accountability to achieve the basic tenets of the process for budget process (Philip 2013). The legislature is charged with the responsibility of overseeing and ensuring prudent allocation of the government’s scarce resources among its citizenry through the budgetary system. Through appropriation, approval, and oversight functions, the legislature plays a very critical role in ensuring prudent allocation of resources (Rotimi et al. 2015). Budget processing in the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic is characterized by several complexities which undermine the sanctity of the whole exercise. More importantly, since the return to civil rule in 1999 in Nigeria, the federal capital budgets have been poorly implemented by the executive. Hardly has capital budget implementation risen above 50% at the end of the fiscal year. This has led to poor social indicators, infrastructural deficit, poverty massive unemployment and underdevelopment (Onyekpere 2012). The legislative processes between 2015 and 2019 were characterized by legislative-executive conflicts, especially in the aspect of budget approval. For instance, President Buhari’s first budget for 2016 was presented on December 22, 2015; it took almost 6 months (May 6, 2016) before the National Assembly passed it into law. Beyond this was the introduction of a new vocabulary into Nigeria’s political parlance, “budget padding,” which some have described as social evil (Awotokun and Okotoni 2020). Moreover, the Legislature in pursuance of its Constitutional powers over the appropriation process over the years is gradually drifting towards lawlessness or for the liberals becoming too much overbearing and therefore ending the powers of budget in the economic management (Gbajabiamila 2014). The NASS has also degenerated to the extent of using the appropriation process as bargaining for pecuniary interest. No doubt, previous studies such as Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014), Stapenhurst (2011), and Fashagba (2009) noted that the legislative oversight role has been compromised in Nigeria. As a result, the legislature is increasingly seen as part of the problem of corruption. This is because, in the views of Otusanya et al. (2015); Nwagwu (2014); and Fasagba (2009), the oversight and investigative committees have become avenues for money-making or political influence by the legislators. The survey conducted by in 2015 Afrobarometer showed that trust in the legislature is low and declining, where 75% of respondents noted that the country was heading in the wrong direction. Legislature in Nigeria has failed to justify its role in democratic sustainability in law-making, oversight functions and representational function. The oversight function of the legislature is such that will make the political office holders and others in the position of authority render their stewardship any time called upon for such. Contrary to this, the oversight functions of the legislature are selectively performed on targeted individuals that are not in a good record of either the legislatures or the executive that have the overbearing power to control the legislature. The legislative members are at best representing and protecting their interests against the interest of the people in their constituency (Abegunde 2016). The legislature appeared sufficiently equipped under the Constitution to serve as an effective check on the

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executive and its administrative agencies in all aspects of public administration. Yet, it appears that the legislature at all levels of government—federal, state and local— have been unable to adequately discharge the onerous duties devolved upon it by the Constitution in this regard. Even though accountability was largely expected to be facilitated through scrutiny of administration, the legislature appeared concerned with the material and financial benefits it could amass using its office and power.

7 Strengthening Legislative Oversight for Accountable Governance Although the National Assembly, by the provisions of the constitution is both the watchdog of public funds and an anti-corruption institution of government, it is operated as a predatory institution. The National Assembly cannot be an effective anti-corruption crusade until the most pernicious form of corruption, which is a corrupt process of accessing power, is addressed. It is common knowledge that the road leading to power in Nigeria is laden with corruption, and that is why those who have a strong predilection for corruption appear to constitute the majority in National Assembly. The effective exercise of the oversight functions of the legislature over the activities of the executive can go a long way in exposing corrupt practices. Section 88 of the 1999 constitution empowers the National Assembly to conduct an investigation into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry, or government department; the disbursing or administering of amounts of money appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly, etc. One of the purposes of this investigative power is to “expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of funds appropriated by the National Assembly” (Richard and Eme 2015). There is no doubt that effective legislatures contribute to effective governance by performing important oversight functions necessary to sustain democracy. Today, there is a decline in the culture and personality of the legislature (Omilusi 2018). Nigeria needs a vibrant legislature that is capable of checkmating the excessiveness of public officials. They need institutions that are capable and genuinely committed to finding the solution to problems and making life worth living for the citizens by strengthening the delivery of the dividend of democracy to the people. This is much more desirable in Nigeria today. The legislature in Nigeria should be open to the media and civil society as a fundamental way of ensuring effective legislative oversight. Also, the relationship between the legislature and the Auditor General should be balanced, separated, clearly defined and independent of another. This will enhance public confidence that resources are used with due regard to the efficient and effective running of the economy. Civil society and the media should therefore be encouraged to become actively involved in ensuring the accountability of government.

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8 Conclusion The legislature has constitutional powers to hold the executive arm of government to standards of transparency and accountability. This paper has shown that legislative oversight can be effective in ensuring accountability if the legislature is sincerely committed to it. If not compromised, legislative oversight is the best option for Nigeria to curtail the wastages, abuses, and corruptive tendencies in the management of public finance and procurement systems of awards and implementation of government contracts (Martins et al. 2019). Given corrupt practices among public officials in Nigeria, the exercise of legislative oversight has become imperative. The viability of a legislature largely depends on its ability to carry out effective oversight in addressing corruption and mismanagement of public funds. Since the legislature is an important institution in representative democracy and plays a significant role in the delivery of public goods, well-articulated, thoughtful, unbiased legislative oversight becomes a veritable accountability mechanism in building a strong, virile, and sustainable democracy in Nigeria. The foregoing assessment of the legislative oversight mechanism in Nigeria’s national assembly reveals that the legislature has not lived to the expectation of Nigerians in terms of making laws that will guarantee good governance for the benefit of all and sundry. As far as legislative oversight functions concerning the use and administration of the public fund are concerned, the legislature in Nigeria has performed below expectation given the constitutional role and powers it is supposed to wield.

References Abata MA, Adejuwon KD (2012) Accountability and transparency in public financial management in Nigeria: challenges and prospects. Int J Market Technol 2(5):14–33 Abdulrasheed A (2007) Legislative corruption and the challenge of democratic sustenance in Nigeria. Dept. of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria Abegunde O (2016) The legislature and democratic sustainability in Nigeria. Int J Human Soc Sci Stud III(III):226–235 Adegite EO (2010) Accounting, accountability and national development. Nigerian Account 43(1): 56–64 Adejuwon KD, Okewale RA (2010) The challenges of democracy and development in Nigeria. Int J Soc Policy Iss 7(1):1–16 Adejuwon KD (2012) The dilemma of accountability and good governance for improved service delivery in Nigeria. Africa’s Public Serv Deliv Perform 1(3):25–45 Adejuwon KD (2014) Enhancing public accountability and performance in Nigeria: periscoping the impediments and exploring imperative measures. Africa’s Public Serv Deliv Perform 2(2): 102–125 Afrobarometer Round 6 Summary of Results for Nigeria (2015). http://afrobarometer.org/sites/ default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/nig_r6_so r_en.pdf

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Nwogwugwu N, Ishola A (2019) Legislators and their oversight functions in policy implementation in Nigeria. Int J Human Soc Sci Educ 6(3):93–102 Nyathela M, Makhado N (2012) Legislative oversight failure, catalyst for corruption. http://www. gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8636.htm Obasanjo O (2003) From pond of corruption to the island of integrity. Text of President Obasanjo’s speech, 7 November. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200311200461.html Obazee JO (2006) Development in public sector accounting and reporting. A paper presented at a workshop organized by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria on Public Sector Accounting, held at Sharon Ultimate Hotel, Abuja, June 14–15 Odinga R (1994) Parliamentarians and corruption and human rights. In: AFL summary report of seminar organized by African leadership forum in Entebbe, Uganda, December 12–14, pp 119– 124 Okoosi-Simbine A (2010) Understanding the role and challenges of the legislature in the Fourth Republic: the case of Oyo State House of Assembly. Nigeria J Legisl Aff 3(1& 2):1–27 Oladesu E (2016) Tinubu to Oyegun: stop frustrating peace moves. The Nation Newspaper, 23 February Oluwole OE (2014) The challenges of democratic consolidation in Nigeria, 1999-2007. Int J Politics Good Gov 5(1) Omejec J (2015) Principle of the separation of powers and the constitutional justice system. Conference of constitutional control bodies of Central Asia: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Safeguarding the Supremacy of the Constitution Strasbourg, 28–29 October Omenka JI (2008) Legislative oversight and socio-economic development in Benue State. A PhD Thesis in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences Submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies, University of Jos Omilusi M (2018) A legislative chamber or retirement cocoon? Nigeria’s National Assembly and former executive heads. J Advocacy Res Educ 5(1):28–38 Omitola B, Ogunnubi OR (2016) Sub-National Legislature and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: lessons from Osun State House of Assembly. J Soc Sci 12(4): 160–170 Onyekpere E (2012) Legislative oversight and the budget. Punch Newspaper, 26 November Osigwe AC, Nghargbu R (2020) Using constituents to boost budget oversight in Nigeria. Int J Res Innov Soc Sci IV(I):162–166 Ossai JN (2013) Rule of law in Nigeria. In: Akpochafo WP (ed) Elements of citizenship education, human rights and the rule of law for teacher education in Nigeria. JusticeJeco Printing and Publishing Global, Benin-City Otusanya OJ, Lauwo S, Ige OJ, Adelaja OS (2015) Sweeping it under the carpet: the role of legislators in corrupt practice in Nigeria. J Financial Crime 22(3) Pelizzo R, Stapenhurst F (2014) Parliamentary oversight tools: a comparative analysis. Routledge Research in Comparative Politics, Routledge Philip DA (2013) Towards ensuring accountability and control in the budgeting process in Nigeria. Eur J Bus Manag 5(24):108–114 Richard AO, Eme OI (2015) Analysis of legal frameworks for fighting corruption in Nigeria. Problems and challenges. Kuwait Chap Arab J Bus Manag Review 5(3):1–33 Romzek BS, Dubnick MJ (1987) Accountability in the public sector lessons from the challenger tragedy. Public Adm Rev 47:227–238 Rotimi ME, Aminu I, IseOlorunkanmi J (2015) Towards designing effective national fiscal budget under the presidential system: the Nigerian experience. Int J Dev Sustain 4(8):897–909 Saiegh SM (2014) The role of legislatures in the policymaking process. www.researchgate.net/ profile/sebastian_saiegh/..... Accessed 2 Oct 2020 Shephard M (2008) Administrative review and oversight: the experience of Westminster. In: Stapenhurst R, Pelizzo R, Olson DM, Von Trapp L (eds) Legislative oversight and budgeting. World Bank Institute, Washington DC

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South African Legislative Sector (2012) Oversight model of the South African legislative sector. RSA Parliament, Cape Town Stapenhurst F (2011) Legislative oversight and curbing corruption: parliamentarianism and presidentialism revisited (unpublished thesis). Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Theletsane KI (2014) The legislative oversight bodies in ensuring public financial accountability and responsibility. University of Pretoria, Pretoria Tom EJ, Attai AJ (2014) The legislature and national development: the Nigerian experience. Glob J Arts Human Soc Sci 2(9):63–78 Williams JG (2012) Parliamentary function of oversight. J Gov Dev 2(4):1–15 Wilson W (1885) The study of public administration. Polit Sci Quart Yaqub N (2004) The military, democratic transitions and the 1999 elections. In: Olurode L, Anifowoshe R (eds) Issues in Nigeria’s 1999 general elections. John West Publications and Reboniks Publications, Lagos

Jacob Olufemi Fatile is a Professor of Public Administration at the Lagos State University, Nigeria. He obtained a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc), Master of Science (M.Sc) and Doctorate from Obafemi Awolowo University, the University of Lagos and the University of Benin, respectively. Fatile is an Associate Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ACA). He was a former Head of the Department of Public Administration and Deputy Director of Open and Distance Learning and Research Institute (ODLRI). He is the Director of the Institute for Public Policy, Law and Economic Development of the International Institute for Policy Review and Development Strategies. He was also a Visiting Professor at the School of Management, IT and Governance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is currently an Honorary Full professor with UKZN. Fatile is also a member of many reputable academics and professional associations such as the Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA), International Institute for Policy Review & Development Strategies (IIPRDS), Institute of Public Diplomacy and Management, South African Association of Public Administration (SAAPAM), African Studies Association (ASA), Chartered Institute of Local Government and Public Administration of Nigeria (CILGPA), Nigeria Institute of Management, Nigerian Association of Public Administration and Management (NAPAM), Institute of Public Administration of Nigeria (IPAN), Chartered Institute of Personnel Management of Nigeria (CIPMN). He has published extensively in reputable local and international journals. Fatile is the author or co-author of over 120 publications in the field of Public Governance, Intergovernmental Relations, Local Government Administration, and Comparative and Development Studies. Kehinde David Adejuwon is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Public Administration, at Lagos State University. He received his Master of Science in Political Science (Public Administration) from the University of Lagos, and a Bachelor of Science in Public Administration from Lagos State University, Lagos—Nigeria. Members of several professional associations, such as the European Alliance for Innovation (EIA), Belgium. Public Management Association, Salem, Oregon, European Studies Association for Sub-Saharan Africa (ESA-SSA), Center for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria, South Africa, Association of Middle Eastern Public Policy & Administration, The American University of Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt, International Society for Development and Sustainability, Japan. He has published intensively in the areas of Governance, Public Sector Management and Development Studies. His current research focus is on Emergency and Disaster Management, the Internet of Things and Smart City Development.

The Politics of the Investigative Powers of the Legislature in Nigeria’s National Assembly in the Fourth Republic Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon and Adebayo Olumide Adedeji

Abstract Legislative functions the world over are usually classified as legislative and non-legislative. While the former deals with the power to make and change laws, the latter bothers on a variety of other functions ranging from financial, executive, representative, and investigative functions among others. A good number of studies have examined the legislative arm in Nigeria in relation to the performance of some of the non-legislative functions, as seen in studies on executive-legislative relations. However, there is the need to scrutinize the investigative function, which seems to have been inadvertently overlooked, but is at the heart of the doctrines of separation of powers, checks and balances, and is integral to the Presidential system, to which Nigeria subscribes. Although the legislative power to investigate as enshrined in Sections 88 and 89 of the Nigerian Constitution is given to the National Assembly, or a committee set up for such a purpose, the politics behind the performance of this function, particularly in the first two decades of the central legislature is the focus of this chapter.

1 Introduction The structure of democratic governments is not hierarchically arranged, depicting that none of the arms of government has an overbearing influence. In other words, in the tripartite structure of governmental institutions, the arms of government are interdependent. Under the presidential system of government that Nigeria currently subscribes to, the doctrine of separation of powers dictates that the arms of government be separated in functions, personnel, and agencies (Akinsanya et al. 2013). It denotes the need for governmental powers to be compartmentalized, such that powers are not vested in one person or organ of government, to avoid the tyranny of one arm over the others. Indeed, modern democratic states are held together by the L. A. Oluwalogbon (✉) · A. O. Adedeji Department of Political Science, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Osun State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_5

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interrelations between and among the different arms (Yagboyaju and Akinola 2019). While it is true that each arm is distinct and plays specific roles in the smooth running of the state, it is also clear that the interdependence of these arms makes them the most efficient. The twin principles of separation of powers and checks and balances are intricately interwoven to ensure transparency and accountability in governance and much more, to ensure that citizens, who are the object of governance, maximally benefit from government policies. To be sure, the legislative arm is that arm of government constitutionally empowered to make laws for the smooth running of the state. These laws are then implemented by the executive arm, which is also responsible for the general administration of the state. The task of interpreting the law, which includes the settlement of disputes between and among the different arms and tiers of government, private citizens, and the punishment of law offenders, rests on the shoulders of the judiciary, which is also considered the preserver of the rights of the masses. The legislature is integral to the democratic culture of the state, as it is described as the state’s sovereign organ, alluding to the magnitude of responsibilities vested in it, particularly, the representation of the people, who wield the state’s sovereignty, especially in a presidential system of government (Nwabueze 2000:8). As Oyediran (2003) explains, the legislature is “an assembly of ‘citizen ambassadors’ who serve their constituencies in various ways as ombudsmen or intermediaries between the citizens and government officials.” Traditionally, it makes laws for the smooth and effective running of the state and performs certain other functions such as executive, oversight, investigative, representative, and constitutional functions. (Oyediran 2003). Indeed, the legislature in modern times has become a force to be reckoned with, as it is unthinkable to have a democratic state without one. This is because it serves as an institutional mechanism for achieving vertical and horizontal accountability and deepening democratic practice (Fashagba et al. 2014). However, legislative functions and structures differ across states based on constitutional provisions, historical peculiarities, and the political environment (Appadorai 2004; Kreppel 2008). The law-making function is considered the core of all legislative activities and the foundation upon which all other functions exist, and it cuts across the different systems of government. Other functions, such as the electoral function, which describes public officials’ selection by the legislature such as the Prime Minister, are unique to the Parliamentary system. There are also executive and oversight functions. The executive function is the legislature’s power of ratification, which enables it to give effect to executive nominations and treaties. In contrast, the oversight function is the power of the legislature to try erring public officials such as the President, Vice-president at the national level as well as Governors and their deputies at the state level. The investigative function is usually exercised through legislative committees purposely set up to inquire about a given situation, such as uncovering information desired by the legislature. The constitutional function is seen in the amendment of a state’s constitution. The representation function is described as the essence of representative

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democracy, as it represents every shade of interest within the state (Anifowoshe 1999). Rosenthal (1999) outlines three critical functions of the legislature. These are the balancing of power, representing constituencies, and the law-making functions. The “balancing of power” function is the legislature’s ability to be genuinely independent of the executive arm, with which it shares powers and participates in the policy process. The legislature’s ability to effectively represent its constituencies, as well as the diverse groups spread across the country by providing essential legislative services such as information and local projects is at the core of the second function. The law-making function, considered the primary function of this arm of government, is described in a broader sense, encompassing other functions such as oversight. Rosenthal (1999) adds the foresight function, which describes the legislature’s ability to “look ahead to develop policies to meet the future needs of the state.” One of the very critical functions the legislature performs is that of oversight. According to Kreppel (2008), the legislature’s ability to perform oversight functions over the executive arm is implicit in the principle of representative government. The legislature’s investigative power is a potent means of checking the excesses of the executives both of their persons and office. Fagbadebo (2019) highlights two categories of oversight tools available to the legislature. These are the internal and external tools. Whereas the internal tools are such as are within the ambit of the legislature and are usually politically determined as they are influenced by such factors as political parties and the committee system of the legislature. On the other hand, the external tools of legislative oversight are such as those that are constitutionally guaranteed to strengthen the legislative process. The nature of control the legislature has over the executive can further be explained by the method of election of the members of the legislature and executive arms. Under the Presidential system, members of the two arms are elected independently by the electorate, hence the tendency for each arm to pursue an agenda independent of the other, thereby giving room for adequate checks by the legislature over the executive. On the other hand, under the Parliamentary system, where the executive is elected from the legislature, there is usually an alignment between the two arms on policy issues. For the government to remain in office, it must enjoy the support of the majority of the legislature. This, in turn, reduces the possibility of policy-related conflict between them.

2 The Evolution of the Legislature in Nigeria The evolution of the legislative arm of government cannot be severed from the totality of Nigeria’s history. Indeed, it can be traced to Nigeria’s constitutional development, first under the British colonial administration and then in subsequent post-independence constitutions. As Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) pointed out, the various traditional societies in Nigeria had well-established governance structures and institutions before the advent of colonial administration. The Crown Colony

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constitution used to administer Lagos provided for a Legislative Council in 1862 (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019; Olusanya 1980). The Council was composed of top British officials, including the Chief Justice and the Colonial Secretary. The Council’s competence was then extended to the Southern Protectorate by 1906 when the Crown Colony was amalgamated with the Southern Protectorates. In 1914, Lord Lugard, the first Governor-General of colonial Nigeria, established the Nigeran Council that derived its powers from a legal instrument, the Order-in-Council of 1913. This instrument deprived the Nigerian Council of any powers whatsoever. Thus, the initial legislative bodies were merely consultative, as they lacked real legislative powers (Olusanya 1980). By 1922, Sir Hugh Clifford’s administration established the first legislature with real powers, howbeit its powers were limited to the Southern part except on such matters as budget estimates while the Governor’s proclamation ruled the north. The legislature, for the first time, had elected representatives, as provided for under the elective principle of the constitution. The four elected representatives (3 from Lagos and 1 from Calabar) were part of the 19 unofficial and 26 official members that constituted the legislature. The legislature was, however defective, in that it was discriminatory in the use of adult male suffrage, residential qualification, those living in Lagos and Calabar, and the income benchmark was put at an annual income of a hundred Pounds. The 1946 Richard Constitution significantly altered the structure of the Nigerian state with a regional system and a Central Legislative Council with powers to make laws for the entire country. Bicameral legislatures were established in the Northern and Western regions (House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs), while the Eastern region had a unicameral legislature. The Central Legislature had 46 members but could not engender development as expected because it was still very much restricted in its functions. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 provided for a quasi-federal structure, comprising the central and regional governments, each with its executive and legislative councils. The membership of the central legislature, the House of Representatives, was further enlarged to accommodate more representatives. The regional legislatures continued to act as electoral colleges for elections into the central legislature. A total of 148 members constituted the central legislature, out of which 136 were unofficial members elected from the regional legislatures. 68 were from the North, while 34 each were from the West and East. Six other members were official members and the other six as ex-officio members. The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 retained much of the legislative structures in previous constitutions: unicameral legislatures in the Eastern region and the central legislature and bicameral legislatures in the North and Western regions. Membership of the central legislature was further increased to 184 directly elected members, with 92 from the North, and 42 each from the East and West. Another two represented Lagos, and six represented Southern Cameroon. Between Independence in 1960 and 1966, Nigeria practiced the Parliamentary system of government. One basic implication of this was that the legislative and executive arms were not separated. Under this arrangement, with the provision for parliamentary oversight, the legislature was

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still unable to perform such functions on the executive arm, leading to the eventual end of the republic. The adoption of the independence Constitution of 1960 followed the series of Constitution Review Committee meetings held between 1957 and 1958. The Constitution introduced the full-fledged parliamentary system of government, both at the central and regional levels—creating separate legislative lists for the Senate and House of Representatives (Akanji 2014). During the Second Republic, between 1979 and 1983, the presidential system of government was adopted as a ready alternative to the failed parliamentary system, which was considered one of the factors that led to the early demise of the First Republic (Fagbadebo 2020). It was believed that the separation of power model, that the presidential system possesses would help to sustain the democratic experience. However, that was not to be, as the legislature was reportedly weak, leading to the abrupt collapse of the Second Republic (Lafenwa and Oluwalogbon 2020; Fagbadebo 2020). The National Assembly was re-introduced in 1992, in the wake of the military transition to the aborted Third Republic. To be sure, the diarchy that existed during this period rendered the National Assembly of no effect. The return to democratic rule in 1999 came with institutionalized legislative institutions at the national and state levels of government.

3 Constitutional Basis for Legislative Investigation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic The powers exercised by the three arms of government are derived from the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended. Specifically, Sections 4–6 of the Constitution divided governmental powers into three distinct compartments, with each having its functions and responsibilities. Section 4(1) vested the legislative powers of the Federation in the National Assembly, comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives. Furthermore, Section 4 (2) states, “The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.” Sections 4(4a&b) also states: In addition and without prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section, the National Assembly shall have power to make laws with respect to the following matters, that is to say:—a. any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to this Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto; and b. any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

Therefore, the scope of the legislative powers of the National Assembly covers items on the exclusive legislative list for which only the National Assembly can legislate as well as items on the concurrent legislative list, which can be jointly legislated on by the National Assembly and state Houses of Assembly. Sections

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88 and 89 of the Constitution empower both houses of the National Assembly to initiate investigations on matters for which they have powers to make laws, and on “the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department” having powers to execute laws made by it as well as disburse money, whether already appropriated for or not. This power is usually exercised through the legislative committee system (Fagbadebo 2019). To avert any possibilities of abuse of power, Section 88(2a&b) specifically states the grounds for legislative investigations. The primary basis for legislative investigations is to strengthen the law-making process. Section 88(2a) affirms that the legislature can embark on an investigation to “make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws.” Also, investigations can be carried out by the legislature to “expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.” Section 89 further confers on the National Assembly or any committee so appointed to investigate any matter for which it has the powers to make laws, the power to “procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct or circumstantial, as it may think necessary or desirable, and examine all persons as witnesses whose evidence may be material or relevant to the subject matter.” Such pieces of evidence are also required by law to be given on oath. The legislature, in Section 89 (1) (C) of the Constitution, is also vested with such powers to “summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, and examine him as a witness and require him to produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, subject to all just exceptions.” Should a person summoned by the House or Committee fail to appear before it, Section 89 (1) (D) gives the House the power to issue a warrant to compel such person(s) to appear before it as well as to bear the cost incurred in the course of ensuring compliance with the summon. However, the exercise of such powers exists only concerning existing or proposed laws. As opined by an American Jurist, Earl Warren, though the powers of the legislature on investigation seem large, it is confined (PLAC 2016). A legislative investigation is not an alternative to the state’s judicial process as the outcome of such investigations are not in themselves verdicts of guilt or innocence. A court decision affirmed this view in the case of Tony Momoh V. Senate of the National Assembly (1982) NCLR, 105. The court held the legislature is not given powers to usurp the general investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the judiciary. Therefore, any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose defined in the relevant section is invalid. Also, the prosecution of persons found guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or misconduct in the discharge of the public office is left to the executive. Furthermore, any investigation which is sought to only expose or ridicule persons, especially their private affairs, without any legislative intent, will not be entertained.

Indeed, a legislative investigation is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve other ends as seen in Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution, which describe the

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process of removal of the head of the executive arm at the national and state levels, respectively. The elaborate procedure specifies the stages and requisite stakeholders to be involved in the process.

4 The Politics of Investigation: Selected Cases of Legislative Investigations in the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic This section interrogates selected cases of legislative investigations across both chambers of the National Assembly since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999. The section discusses the factors that necessitated the investigations, as well as how the investigations were executed, including the notable personalities and the roles they played in the entire process of investigation. Lastly, the outcome of the investigations, that is, whether the investigations were conclusive or not and whether indictments were made or not are examined.

4.1

The Pension Probe

The genesis of the pension probe which is also referred to as the police pension probe started with a series of petitions from the would-be beneficiaries and civil society groups in 2010. In response to this, the then Head of Service, Steve Oronsanye, constituted a Pension Reform Task Team (PRTT) headed by Alhaji Abdulrasheed Maina (Eme et al. 2014). The duties of the task team were to resolve all issues relating to the administration of pensions, restore sanity to the system, and stop the practice of “ghost” pensioners often inserted by officials to defraud the government (Eme et al. 2014). The revelations of how officials of the pension office had defrauded the government shocked the nation. The team disclosed that it had recovered over 159 billion naira in cash and properties from individuals who perpetrated the fraud (Takor 2012). Notwithstanding, there were still reports of fraudulent activities going on in the various pension departments (Akintola 2012 cited in Eme et al. 2014). This is based on the observation that despite the federal government’s commitment of 1.5 billion naira to settling pension claims every month, notable pensioners were still not getting their entitlements. This observation prompted the Senate in 2012 to mandate its Joint Establishment and Public Service and State and Local Government Administration committees to unravel the problems surrounding pension administration in the country. The committee commenced its investigation by touring the six geo-political zones and conducting public hearings (Daily Trust 2012). However, a twist in the investigative hearing occurred when an Assistant Chief Account in the Police Pension Office accused the PRTT chairman of mismanaging 21 billion naira of pension funds

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(Eme et al. 2014). Based on this allegation, the committee summoned Alhaji Maina to appear before it to defend himself against this allegation. Initially, the PRTT chairman failed to appear before the committee, citing security concerns (Akinrinmade et al. 2013). However, he did submit a rejoinder to the committee and denied all allegations against him. This report, notwithstanding, did not exonerate him as the committee still found him culpable in the mismanagement of pension funds. Not satisfied with the outcome of the Committee’s report, Maina accused the chairman of the Committee of demanding a bribe from him and the sole aim of the committee was to tarnish the achievements of the PRTT. In a statement issued by Hassan Salihu, the spokesperson to Maina, he observed, “The Distinguish Senate Probe Committee has grossly misinformed and misled the entire Senate with a fictitious report muddled up with a multitude of naked untrue and misleading unjustifiable conclusions against the Pensions Reform Task Team” (Tukur 2013). In response to this allegation, the chairman of the joint committee, Aloysius Etuk, denied ever demanding a bribe from the task team. Although the Senate inaugurated a committee to ascertain the authenticity of these allegations, the report from the Aloysius Etuk-led Committee was already discredited. For instance, the report was greeted with the allegations that the task team only relied on documents submitted by pensioners and did not collect data or files from the pension office to conduct the biometric exercise. Consequently, the task team removed 71,133 pensioners from the payroll because they were classified as ghost pensioners (ICIR 08/07/2012; Premium Times 2012a). However, the same 71,000 names that the committee alleged the task team removed were also the same ghost pensioners, the committee acknowledged existed (Premium Times 2012b). Discrepancies like this informed comments that lawmakers lack the intellectual ability to make meaningful contributions to debate and investigations. The recommendations from the report were not implemented. Similarly, Maina was disengaged from public service in 2013 after a series of protests from the Senate (Premium Times 2017a). However, Maina was reinstated by the Buhari administration despite a 2-billion-naira fraud case instituted against him by the EFCC (Premium Times 2017b). This decision generated protests from civil society organizations and senior government officials who considered this an affront to the anti-corruption agenda of the Buhari administration. Maina was subsequently sacked and charged before a Federal High Court for money laundering in 2019 (Premium Times 2019). While it is evident that the Senate, with the support of the civil society, was able to force the disengagement of Maina from public service, the report of its investigation into the fraud in the pension was discredited by the allegation of bribes demanded by members of the committee.

4.2

Power Sector Probe

The probe of the power sector by the House of Representatives was another investigative activity of the National Assembly. The Obasanjo administration

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(1999–2007) had spent billions of naira on improving the generation and distribution of electricity in the country. However, the outcome was at variance with the amount spent. Ezirim et al. (2016) quoting a late former president, Yar’Adua, stated that over 10 billion dollars were expended on various power projects without proportional returns. This allegation spurred the House of Representatives to direct its Power and Steel Committee, led by Ndudi Elumelu, in 2008 to investigate the projects. The intention was to identify the reasons/factors responsible for the poor supply of electricity despite the huge investments made by the Obasanjo administration. The committee disclosed that between 10 billion and 16 billion dollars were expended on the power sector. Out of this amount, the committee was able to track 12.93 billion dollars (Ezirim et al. 2016). A breakdown of the amount showed that the Ministry of Energy received 40 million dollars, Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) received 3.2 billion, National Independent Power Project (NIPP) received 3.07 billion dollars, Rural Electrification Agency (REA) 500 million dollars and the Energy Commission of Nigeria got 10 million dollars. This amount excluded loans received from the World Bank and other donor agencies, internally generated revenue of the PHCN and NNPC contributory funds and joint ventures on power plants, making a total of 6.14 billion dollars. The then Minister of State for Power, Fatima Ibrahim, disagreed with the amount of 16 billion alleged to have been expended on the power sector and insisted it was 10 billion dollars spent (Ezirim et al. 2016). At the end of the committee’s investigation, it recommended that certain high-level government officials and prominent businessmen should be investigated and prosecuted by the appropriate Anti-Corruption agencies (Etu et al. 2015). Top on the list of government officials recommended for investigation and prosecution were the former president; Olusegun Obasanjo, former Minister of Power and Steel, Senator Liyel Imoke, Alhaji Abdulhamid, former Minister of State, Energy, Dr. Olusegun Agagu, former Minister of Power and Steel and Engr. Joseph Makoju, former Managing Director of the PHCN and Special Adviser (electric power) to former President Goodluck Jonathan. According to the report, these individuals were alleged to have engaged in manipulation of due process; granting of presidential waivers to contractors instead of going through due process, gross incompetence in managing PHCN and NIPP; project overscoping; project cost inflation; awarding one contract two times or more; award of huge contracts to unregistered companies; calculated vandalism; sale of PHCN property by its workers; etc (Etu et al. 2015).

However, the report was not forwarded to the Executive for implementation. This was based on a minority report written by a member of the committee who indicted the chairman of the Committee (Etu et al. 2015). The minority report prompted the House of Representatives to set up an ad-hoc committee to review the recommendations of the Power Committee. The ad-hoc committee rejected 84 out of the 88 recommendations of the Power Committee (Etu et al. 2015). Apart from the establishment of the ad-hoc committee, the chairman of the Power Probe Committee, Ndudi Elumelu, was prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for an alleged 5.2 billion contracts scam in the Rural Electrification Agency

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(Etu et al. 2015). Although Ndudi Elumelu was subsequently acquitted by the Federal High Court, his arraignment by the EFCC stained the credibility of the report.

4.3

Fuel Subsidy Probe

In 2012, the Nigerian political space witnessed unprecedented protests spearheaded by the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress (TUC). The protests were in response to the increase in the pump price of Premium Motor Spirit from 65 Naira per liter to 141 Naira per liter. The federal government ascribed the increase to its inability to sustain the subsidy regime in the country. This explanation was not acceptable to the labor unions and insisted that government should investigate the management of the subsidy. They insisted that the subsidy was flawed with endemic corruption. In response to the deadlock between the labor unions and the federal government, the House of Representatives inaugurated an ad-hoc committee to investigate the management of the fuel subsidy from 2009 to 2011 (Jukwey 2012). The committee decided to investigate these years based on the observation that the number of companies involved in the importation of fuel rose from 19 in 2008 to 140 in 2011. The ad-hoc committee headed by Honorable Farouk Lawan discovered a lot of anomalies in the management of the fuel subsidy program. A summary of the findings of the committee showed that: 1. Based on the guidelines stipulated in the Petroleum Support Fund (PSF) that agencies participating in the downstream oil sector should maintain a reliable database, there was a deliberate attempt by these agencies not to do so. 2. A high percentage of the money paid as a subsidy was not for the volume of PMS consumed. In other words, companies were paid for PMS not supplied. 3. There were discrepancies in the amount quoted by the Accountant-General of the federation (1.6 trillion naira) and the Central Bank (1.7 trillion naira). However, the committee discovered that about 2.6 trillion naira was paid as a subsidy as of 31st December 2011. 4. The NNPC continued making payments of subsidy on kerosene despite a presidential directive in 2009 to discontinue subsidy on kerosene (Premium Times 2014). The report of the committee was sent to former President Goodluck Jonathan, the office of the Attorney General of the Federation, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for implementation. However, the probe report became entangled in the allegations of inducement levelled against the committee chairman by the owner of one of the companies indicted in the probe (Oghojafor et al. 2014). Mr.Femi Otedola, the owner of Zenom oil, accused Mr. Farouk Lawan of demanding 3 million dollars in bribes from him. A payment of 620 thousand dollars was made to Mr. Lawan which was captured in a video recording. This video was used as evidence against the committee chairman (Oghojafor et al. 2014). This allegation

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and the subsequent trial of Lawan rescind the probe report to the archives of the government. Nothing much was done after, despite the setting up of committees by the federal government to review its recommendations. Mr. Lawan was found guilty and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment (Ejekwonyilo 2021).

5 Implications for Democratization A recurring pattern in the cases of legislative investigation examined in this chapter is the credibility issue. A few of the investigations carried out by the Senate and House of Representatives were often discredited on the grounds of corruption. The outcome often had been the non-implementation of the recommendations of the reports. The implication for the democratization process in the country is the weakening of the system of checks and balances, which is one of the hallmarks of presidential democracy. The apparatus of the government could be hijacked by a minority and used against the majority. To mitigate this, a system of checks and balances enshrined in the constitution to safeguard the democratic experience should be respected and followed. A legislative investigation is an oversight of the activities of the executive. Holcombe (2018) notes that the mere fact that legislative oversight is stipulated in the constitution is not a guarantee that it would be effectively carried out. Factors responsible for this range from rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974), and regulatory capture (Stigler 1971) to undue influence of special interest (Olson 1965). In the case of Nigeria, the relatively young legislative branch and the overgrown executive branch have made the latter have undue influence over the former. This is evident by the constant conflict in the National and State Assemblies often alleged to have been orchestrated by the Executive. For instance, Ibietan and Ayodele (2019:284) note, “the executive arm becomes too powerful arising from prebendalism, through which it controls political agenda and behavior of politicians via funding of political parties and candidature.” This observation manifests in the various attempts by the executive to change the leadership of the legislature perceived not to be working in their interests (Fagbadebo 2020). A case in point was the emergence of five different Senate presidents under the administration of President Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007 (Anyim-Ben et al. 2017). Corruption is one of the major factors hindering the economic and political development of the country. By its constitutional responsibilities and power, the legislature is in a better position to checkmate mismanagement of public resources. However, the political space has been inundated with allegations of corruption against members of the National Assembly (Fagbadebo 2020; Abah and Obiajulu 2017). The performance of the National Assembly since the return to democratic rule has not measured up to the expectations of Nigerians (Agba et al. 2014). Orluwene (2014:1419) analyzed the Nigerian legislature and public accountability in the country and concluded that “public accountability and separation of powers are all

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elusive, superficial and pejorative. It does not necessarily make for checks and balance.” There were a few cases of embezzlement and mismanagement of public funds in the National Assembly. Nigerians were still enjoying the euphoria of democracy when the main custodians of the political system were caught in acts inimical to its tenets. From the demand for exorbitant furniture allowance to the allegations of collecting bribes to approve the budget of the MDAs, the National Assembly has been embroiled in a series of credibility problems. The crisis of legitimacy of the country’s electoral system, the nature of the political elites, and the inadequate analytical knowledge and expertise of its members have limited the capacity of the legislature to effectively carry out its oversight functions and most likely erode the consolidation of democratic principles in the country.

6 Conclusion The prominent role that the legislative arm of government plays in entrenching democratic values is indubitable. However, the challenge is for this institution not to meet this expectation demanded by the citizens. The return to democratic rule in 1999, raised the expectations of Nigerians for a more stable and democratic society. These expectations began to diminish with each scandal that erupted within the corridors of the National Assembly. Members of the National Assembly were entangled in several financial recklessness and embezzlement at the onset of the Fourth Republic. These instances did not subside with each assembly but rather took different dimensions. There was the furniture allowance episode which grossly undermined the image of the National Assembly. This moved on to the allegation of demanding gratification from ministries and government agencies for budget approval. Thus, the public image of the National Assembly was that of elected officials who pursued personal gains over collective interests (Nwaubani 2014). This created a conducive platform for executive officials to allege demand of financial inducements by the National Assembly often to discredit their investigations. Viewed from another perspective, the National Assembly members are unable to effectively discharge their legislative duties because of their quest for re-election. However, the executive (President and Governors) stands in the way of this ambition. The President and Governor for the most part control the political party and to a large extent determine who wins the party’s ticket. With this position occupied by the executive, National Assembly members must heed the bidding of the President and Governors, otherwise, their quest for re-election may be truncated (Aluko 2015). These perspectives probably explain the attitudes exhibited by political appointees towards legislative summons and investigations. The cases examined in this paper have shown that the National Assembly has not been able to effectively carry out its oversight functions. This is antithetical to democratic consolidation. While successive leadership at the Senate and House of Representatives have tried to redeem the negative image of its members, a lot still

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needs to be done. The leadership of the National Assembly must ensure that legislative investigations are perceived for what they are and not as a vendetta against political appointees. Similarly, pressure should be mounted consistently to implement the reports of legislative investigations. This may curb the impunity often displayed by political appointees. These two recommendations are more likely to work if the public perception of the National Assembly shifts from a corrupt institution to one that espouses public accountability.

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Premium Times (2017a) How Senate threatened Jonathan before he sacked Maina-David Mark. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/247426-senate-threatened-jonathan-sackedmaina-david-mark.html. Accessed 27 Feb 2021 Premium Times (2017b) Shocking: Buhari administration recalls wanted ex-pension boss sacked for alleged corruption. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/246791-shockingbuhari-administration-recalls-wanted-ex-pension-boss-sacked-alleged-corruption.html. Accessed 28 Feb 2021 Premium Times (2019) EFCC set to arraign Maina, son. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ top-news/359411-efcc-set-to-arraign-maina-son.html. Accessed 28 Feb 2021 Rosenthal A (1999) The good legislature. https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/ the-good-legislature.aspx. Accessed 20 Aug 2020 Stigler G (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21 Takor I (2012) Pension scam in Nigeria: role of regulator. vanguardngr.com/2012/12/pensionscam-in-nigeria-role-of-regulator-2/. Accessed 27 Feb 2021 Tukur S (2013) Maina fights back, says Etuk committee grossly misinformed Senate. Premium Times, February 17. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/120727-maina-fights-back-saysetuk-committee-grossly-misinformed-senate.html. Accessed 11 June 2020 Tullock G (1967) The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies and theft. West Econ J 5:224–232 Yagboyaju DA, Akinola A (2019) Nigerian state and the crisis of governance: a critical exposition. SAGE Open. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019865810

Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Osun State, Nigeria. He is a Doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. He has participated in several local and international workshops and conferences. He is a Fellow of the Ife Institute of Advanced Studies and an Alumnus of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Sao Paulo Workshop. Adebayo Olumide Adedeji is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Nigeria. His research interests are political and organizational behavior, governance and public sector management.

The Legislature and Social Development in Nigeria, 2015–2019 Oluwatunmise Taiwo Paimo

Abstract This paper looks at governance and democratic practices in Nigeria from 2015 to 2019. With a working organ of the executive, legislative, and judiciary since 1999, Nigeria has maintained the practice of a democratic system of governance. The sustained interests of such practice have been envisioned to proffer social and economic developments. The chapter identifies the policies made by the legislature on social development from 2015 to 2019. It investigates how these policies have impacted the democratic governance of Nigeria; and unravels gaps in the effective dividends of democracy in Nigeria. The chapter concludes that although the democratic process has become a practice in Nigeria; social development—human security, poverty reduction, and sustainable economic growth—has been crippled in Nigeria. Using the descriptive method of analysis, the study will rely primarily on secondary data.

1 Introduction The existence of a state entity is to fulfill the politically ascribed duties of preserving its inherent values, population, and polity from possible threats and extinction. This constitutional role offers the assurance of relevance and survival with other sovereign powers in the global space. The return and practice of democracy in Nigeria on May 29, 1999, initiated a new tide in political governance. Unlike the military era, democratic rule is envisioned to ascertain political, social, and economic development; as it opined to provide improved quality in the well-being of the general public. Popular participation, equity, legitimacy, and abundant resource management are indicators that attest to the efficient practice of democracy (Salisu Ogbo and Avidime 2016). Democracy as a system of government has a connecting relationship with the rule of law and constitutionalism. More so, with an effective and working system of, the O. T. Paimo (✉) Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_6

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executive, legislative, and judiciary organs of government; specific roles must be played in the political affairs of the state. As an embodiment of sovereignty, the legislature is constitutionally saddled with the making of laws that benefit the electorate (Abegunde 2016; Olufemi 2010). However, in Nigeria, the legislative organ embodied in the National Assembly is perceived by many Nigerians as antipeople and enmeshed in corruption. Others have asserted that there is a continuous or persistent failure by the legislative organ to actualize democratic sustainability at the level of law-making oversight and representational function (Alabi et al. 2010; Fagbadebo 2020). The efficiency of the established law(s) is hindered by barriers of poor democratic culture and a compromising legislative environment (Arowolo 2010). At the same time, dysfunction in the Nigerian socio-economy results from an abysmal failure in the dividends of democracy. A widened gap of income inequality, the widespread collapse of social values and infrastructural services, insecurity, political corruption; illusion instead of the expectation of equity, and deficit dividends undermine sociopolitical development in Nigeria (Egwemi and Aliu 2010; Oke 2010; Salisu Ogbo and Avidime 2016). These issues attest to the inadequacies of the legislature in its constitutional functions of law-making, oversight, and representation in government. Despite the identified gaps in a practicing democratic government, the paper seeks to examine the legislative organ of government at the federal level from 2015 to 2019 and investigates the extent of social development of the Nigerian state. Specifically, from the years 2015 to 2019, Muhammadu Buhari’s Administration has been chosen because of obvious inconsistencies in the dividends of democratic practice, needed to identify the extent of effective practice of the Nigerian legislature on the social development of Nigeria. This paper has been organized into five sections. Section 1 which is the introduction is followed by Sect. 2, defining relevant concepts in the study. This section also includes the theoretical framework that properly situates the study among relevant literature. The third section is an overview of the democratic system of governance in Nigeria from 2015 to 2019. Section 4 expatriates on policies adopted by the legislative council on Nigerian social development, with instances of its efficacy on human security, poverty reduction, and economic growth. The last section has been divided into the conclusion and recommendations, which proffers measures for Nigeria’s social development.

2 Social Development Development is a gradual and consistent process of positive change, usually identified with an object or occurrence (Jacobs and Asokan 1999). In the political environment, it is an upward or ascending movement in the levels of energy, efficiency, quality, productivity, complexity, comprehension, creativity, mastery, enjoyment, and accomplishment of political goals (Jacobs and Asokan 1999). From this definition, it is inferred that for development to be ascertained there

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must be evidence of positivity described and ascertained with overall benefits. To thrive, certain factors must be engaged to achieve maximum social and effective change. Without such necessary and requisite needs for progress and change, development becomes impossible, especially in a politically organized setting. Social development is associated with different meanings and practices. An overview will reveal social development to include financial empowerment and high standard of living, employment opportunities, accessible housing, and welfare facilities, and equal and even opportunities for viable resources within a defined geography. Likewise, technological innovation and advancement, infrastructural development with responsive and efficient governmental activities; adequate security of individuals, unbiased legal framework, and security of the future of work, with the assurance of the basic fundamental human rights of citizens serve as parameters for measuring the social development of a state (Social Development Briefing 2017). On the other hand, development is a process of change, growth, and evolution (Midgley 2013). Therefore, social development is the process of evolvement from the initial primitive societal level to a far more advanced and civilized society, which ensures that the adoption of developmental programs and planning is aimed at improvement in the total welfare of persons (Chodak 1973; Midgley 2013). Social development ensures an integrated, well-balanced, and unified social and economic development of society. This gives expression to the concentrated effort and values of human dignity, equality, and social justice in a state. Thus, social development seeks to create a humanistic society that is committed to achieving peace and progress for people all over the world. Individual interaction and cooperation within such a society ensure active progress and change.

3 Democracy A system of government that assures the direct and equal participation of its population, in the decision-making processes within a given society or setting is referred to as democracy (Christiano 2006). It includes the popular recognition of sovereignty, equal opportunities, majority rule, rights of choice, and consensus on fundamental issues with periodic elections (Almond 2004; Oke 2005). It is the most referred to in the modern contemporary system that guarantees peaceful coexistence. Sambo (1999) explains democracy as a form of government practiced when the acceptable universal principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultations, and periodic elections as attributes facilitate good governance. It is the way of life or an attitude of the mind, and a method of organizing societies politically (Heater 1964). In another instance, the cardinal dimensions of individualism, liberty, equity, and fraternity cooperate to create a wholesome society (Plano 1979).

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4 Governance The concept of “governance” is not new; it is derived from the Greek word “kubernaein” which means “to steer” (Tripathi 2017). In other words, the steady management and conduct of a political system are referred to as governance. UNESCO International Bureau of Education (2013) defined governance as structures and processes designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based participation. With such a comprehensive definition, governance is an activity supported by structures and processes to achieve progress and development in a given society. World Bank (2004) also defined governance as how power is exercised in the management of the country’s economic and social resources for development. This is with the implication that all existing governing organs of government interact collectively, to promote and implement good policies that affect the human, social, and financial conditions of its citizens towards a reputable standard of development (Yahaya 1999). The efficiency of these political objectives is dependent on competent representatives in government. Olowu (2005) defines it as how the state’s political leaders manage and use (or misuse) powers to either promote its social and economic development or pursue agenda that undermines such goals. Governance assures accountability, transparency, and efficient management of existing state institutions to achieve an adequate standard of living or sustainable development for the people. It is also the totality of the process of constituting a government as well as administering the political community (Ozohu-Suleiman 2016). The exercise of authority in the management of a country’s affairs which comprises the complex mechanism, processes, and institutions by which citizens and groups articulate their interests, and exercise their legal rights and mediate their differences is governance (UNDP 1997).

5 Legislature The term “legislature” has been given different names across the world. It is referred to as the Parliament in the UK, the National Assembly in Nigeria, and Congress in the USA (Oni 2013; Arowolo 2010). Lafenwa (2009) conceptualizes the legislature as an official body of elected individuals, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws: as well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government. Hague (2017) identifies the duties to be legislation, oversight, and representation. Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) opine that the institution has a goal of ensuring a good and quality life for the people it represents. Further, it is an institution that is constitutionally empowered to make authoritative policies for the smooth running and administration of the state. It is an essential constituent of a democratic government, which has a propelling ability to develop (Poteete 2010).

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The Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration (2016) asserts that the power of the legislature can thwart, encourage, or propel the actions of other institutions of government in a governed society. This implies that the organ is powerful to decide on specific issues that relate to the good practice of governance. Rosenthal (1999) puts it that, “the role of a balancer of power is dependent on the legislature.” According to him, the legislature is constitutionally independent and separate with co-equal branches of the executive; to contain imbalances in government. A more elaborate definition by Arowolo (2010) specifically addresses the legislature as an institution established to represent the common and collective interest of the people, through the enactment of laws and exercise of oversight functions, on the activities of the executive arm of government. In other words, the legislature is pivotal in a democratic and representative system of government.

6 The Wrong Perception of the Legislature An independent and important institution of government recognized and established to represent the collective interest of its citizens, against abuse of powers and violation of human rights; through the enactment of laws and the exercise of oversight functions on the activities of the executive arm of government is the legislature (Abegunde 2016; Arowolo 2010). According to Olufemi (2010), he asserts that in a democratic system of government, the legislature is constitutionally responsible to make laws for the welfare of its citizen. It is responsible for making or amending necessary law(s), articulating the views of the people in the decisionmaking processes, and overseeing the executives to ensure accountability in governance (United Nations 2002). While a virile legislative organ promotes stability and development, a weak one engenders political instability and underdevelopment in society (Abegunde 2016). The legislature, as the representative unit of the public, exists to articulate the expected goals of democracy. Supporting this principle by the electorate, the legislators are institutionally recognized bodies of representatives that make laws on social, political, and economic related matters of a nation. The materialistic expectation of the people is dependent on specialized ministries and agencies under the auspices of the executive arm of government. The connection between the legislature and executive in a presidential system of government is that constitutional powers are fused in the assent of law-making. In essence, it serves as a system of checks and balances that allows each organ to constitutionally defend its position in the structure of government (Oni 2013). The misconception in the public dividends of good infrastructural services, economic development, and many others is a function of the executive, with the legislature constitutionally responsible for oversight duties; including the power to investigate and monitor public finance, necessary to ensure that policies of development by the executive are implemented. (Fashagba et al. 2019; Gbajabiamila 2013; Ihedioha 2012).

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7 The Practice of Democracy in Nigeria According to Omotoso and Oladeji (2019), the survival of democracy is characterized by the unrestricted ability to propel efficient development that is dependent on the effective nature of the legislature. This is on the reality that a working legislative organ is the custodian and sustenance of a suitable democracy, good governance, and government. Since the return to democratic governance in Nigeria, considerable reservations have been made by the public on the sustainability of democratization processes that uses the state’s level of development as a yardstick for evaluation. In Nigeria, elected representatives in the executive and legislative arms of the government are expected to demonstrate responsive and responsible leadership. They are at the center of the policymaking process. Unfortunately, the circumstances that surrounded their elections would not make them accountable to the electorate. The elections are not only flawed but warped, the political parties are dominated by godfathers, money bags, and ex-military leaders, and their party primaries (if ever conducted) are mostly selective, non-participatory and undemocratic, thus resulting in the corruption of the leadership, loyalty to god-fathers and patrons, and indifference to the electorate and citizens in their style of governance (Olu-Adeyemi 2012: 169).

Corruption in politics is a prevalent social norm that has smirked the democratic governance system in Nigeria into a state of decay and total collapse (Fagbadebo 2019a, b). This distorts proper performance in government as duties required of the public officials require a continuous bribe, with an undue advantage over the citizen whom they ought to represent (Fagbadebo 2019a). According to Olu-Adeyemi (2012: 169), “the most disturbing and damaging form of corruption is made manifest in the succession of kleptocratic governments, which has produced extremely wealthy generals and political leaders.” It can be inferred that corruption is embedded in Nigerian politics (Fagbadebo 2019b). Political positions and appointments have become avenues for private accumulation of wealth through unethical practices and misuse of power. In the practice of democratic governance, sustainability is always questionable (Abdulhamid 2016). Therefore, it is on this premise that only with an orderly and consistent democratic government can development be ascertained. Omotosho and Oladeji (2019), on the other hand, submit that Nigeria’s democratic governance system since Independence is infrequent; for it is smirked with the constant legislative interruption in its procedures and practices.

8 Nigeria’s Legislative Agenda on Social Development, 2015–2019 As a constitutional democratic body, the legislature in Nigeria is saddled with oversight duties, advice, and law-making (Fagbadebo 2020; Nnamani 2006). With the indicators of human security, economic development, and poverty alleviation, the agenda of the specific policies of the legislature for Nigeria’s social development

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will be analyzed. The legislative agenda that was proposed by the 8th National Assembly Agenda, affirmed these outlined policies for development. It stated that the National Assembly would “legislate to achieve reforms in Nigeria’s national economy and development, tackle poverty, unemployment, confront the scourge of corruption, terrorism, and security challenges in the country” (The Legislative Agenda 2015: 1–2). The agenda indicated action plans to resolve some specific social development issues. Human Security, Economic Development, Unemployment and job creation.

8.1

The Nigerian Legislature on Human Security

Human security is the protection of the lives and properties of citizens from threats and dangers, such that, peaceful societies and sustainable development is guaranteed (The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 2018). It is the responsibility of the government to safeguard its human population. The United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003) established that the freedom of human lives from eminent fear and wants, which guarantees the safety of future generations to inherit a healthy environment and protects the core human value, is human security. However, in the northeastern part of Nigeria, the prevalence and rate of violence and insecurity in human lives by the insurgent group Boko Haram constantly violate the fundamental rights of the citizen. This prevalence of insecurity and use of terror by the Islamist group has its roots in economic, political, ethnic, religious, and social factors (Foyou et al. 2018). In an economic view, demonstration of violence gained impetus from the conceived notion of northern zoning and restricted allocation of funds in the region (Bekoe 2011). The belief and practice of Islam are formed on the notion that Islamic principle is ideal and therefore must be embraced to sustain the good practice of governance (Onuoha 2014). As a necessary evil needed to be contained by the government, a counterinsurgent approach to the Multinational Joint Task Force operation that had earlier remained dormant and inactive was initiated. The security operation ensured the partnership of Nigeria, with its neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin Republic. This was needed to coordinate, command, and conduct the joint operation of its forces, for the restoration of a safe and secured environment (African Peace Facility Factsheet 2015). Although the joint operation has recorded successes, the group continues as a threat to the perceived peace and security; as it attacks innocent civilians, kills and kidnaps aid workers; and strengthened the displacement of persons (African Union 2019). The intentional act of violence by the non-state actor of Boko Haram is terrorism (GTI 2019). The Global Terrorism Index Report (2019) identified Nigeria as third place in the world of terrorism. It is also the 11th out of the 20 most fatal areas of terrorist incidences in the world. Between 2017 and 2018 alone, Nigeria recorded 2040 deaths: a gross violation of the fundamental human right to life. Despite counter-insurgent operations, the Boko Haram insurgent, known as Jama’tu Ahlis

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Table 1 Violent operations by Boko Haram Insurgent Group (2015–2019)

Month January March April July September February February March July

Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 2018 2018 2019

Number of death 2000 2 400 145 30 88 0 3 65

Number of kidnap 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 1 0

Source: CNN Library, September 2019

Sunna Lidda’ awatiwal Jihad, is ranked the fourth deadliest terrorist group in the world; the deadliest in Sub-Saharan Africa (GTI 2019). To further curb the menace of the group, President Muhammadu Buhari approved $1 billion to purchase security equipment (Adetayo 2018; Felter 2018). Yet, security improvement was low, threatening regional stability and development. In the aftermath of atrocities perpetrated by the Islamic sect, the National Assembly passed the North-East Development Commission (Establishment) Bill 2017. The Bill was enacted to manage funds by the Federal Government and international donor agencies, for resettlement, rehabilitation, integration, and reconstruction of infrastructures in the Northeastern part of Nigeria. This was to address the humanitarian needs of the insurgent victims, proffering a much better opportunity for development and stability in the affected northern regions (Premium Times 2017). A utilization fee of 10 billion naira was allocated in 2019, to kick off the development processes (Aileman 2019). However, the process of humanitarian aid and development has been slow, with a chain of bureaucratic procedures. The National Assembly in a recent debate gave legislation on Demobilization, Deradicalization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration of the repentant insurgent members. The action that sought to integrate and reinsert 608 rehabilitated members of Boko Haram into society was opposed by some lawmakers and Nigerians. This is with the excuse that the legislature gave no prior consultation to the receiving states on the development program of reinsertion (Campbell 2020; NAN 2020). Table 1 shows the number of lives lost to the Boko Haram insurgent activities.

8.2

The Nigerian Legislature on Economic Development

The challenge of security in Nigeria affects her economic development. There has been a significant decline in the economy, low growth in trade, and poor interest in tourism with low revenue allocation (GTI 2019). In the global ranking of economies, Nigeria is ranked third in economic drawbacks (GTI 2019). The challenge of national insecurity—Boko Haram insurgency—on economic development has

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varying social and economic implications on the people, particularly those in the Northeastern part of the country. In the Northern part of Nigeria, tourism which was initially embraced as a choice of satisfaction for foreigners (Oketola 2015) has become vulnerable, as the choice of the northeastern part of the country has witnessed reduced patronage by tourists. The Yankari National Park, Gashaki-Gumpti National Park, Sukur Cultural Landscape, Queen Amina Wall, Surame Cultural Landscape, Ancient Kano City Walls, Ancient Nok Settlement, and Sambisa Game Reserve, to mention a few, have been negatively affected by the threats of Boko Haram insecurity. With frequent violent attacks in the northern states, the decisions of tourists on places of attraction have been negatively influenced, creating obstruction even in the generation of revenue for the Nigerian government (Ezenagu and Enohuean 2017). In the same vein, the northern region known for its peculiarity in producing local food products for the nation—the food basket of the nation—has been strangled economically. With persistent devastation and operations of the insurgent group; compulsory migration and internal displacements for a haven, agricultural produce has reduced (Idris et al. 2014). Typical are the death of 13,000 farmers and the relocation of over 1.5 million farmers, who fled their homes in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, to the southern part from the insurgent attacks of Boko Haram. Since agriculture has input the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the nation, a decline in its practice has created more poverty and unemployment as the land remains uncultivated (Adebisi et al. 2017). Francis and David (2012) gave a summary that agriculture in Nigeria accounted to be over 60% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, with such insecurity in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, no farmer will be ready to invest in an environment with high insecurity. Where the importance of agriculture makes provision for a job, reduces poverty, and gives a vision for industrialization, securing the northeast becomes germane. The passage of the Finance Bill 2019 by the National Assembly, which sought to reduce the tax burden on Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), is an improvement on the economic revamp. It gave an enabling environment for small businesses to survive among the developed ones. Instead of huge tax payments, such small businesses could re-invest their profits and strengthen their productivity (Adegboyega 2020; Iwere 2020). The Act with its favorable policies on tax boosts the economy of the country, stimulating positive growth for the MSMEs. Given the favorable opportunities for business growth and development by the Nigerian government to the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises—the bedrock of the Nigerian economy—employment privileges, innovation and ideas on businesses will be encouraged. At the same time, poverty becomes alleviated (Deloitte Nigeria 2018).

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The Nigerian Legislature on Poverty Reduction

The situation of high level of poverty has become a major concern for Nigerian leaders, both past and present (Uma et al. 2017). With such concern, Uma et al. (2017) affirmed that poverty has become a Nigerian situation. This has been signaled by the actions of leaders and those closest to the power that siphons societal resources for personal use. The US Statement on Poverty (June 1988), defined poverty as a state of denial of choices and opportunities, which violates human dignity and respect in society. This is on the reality of lack or no access to the daily three-square meals, shelter, and clothing. With a varying degree of modalities for poverty alleviation by the government, the poverty level remains high (Ogwumike 2002). It dampens economic growth and creates a vicious circle, where high poverty levels lead to lower aggregate growth (Lopez 2006; Thorbecke 2013). The income of an individual determines the extent of his or her poverty. This suggests that, if income is the determinant of poverty in humans, then there must be no challenge in the labor force, which has a steady income for the public. Reuters (2018) reported that 23.1% of the population was unemployed and backward with a recession in a quarter of the century. The National Bureau of Statistics (2019) affirmed that 43.3% of Nigerians were either unemployed or underemployed. Likewise, Plecher (2020) states that youth unemployed stood at 20%. The legislature passed a bill for the establishment of the National Poverty Alleviation Commission in 2016. The law sought to create and make provisions for employment opportunities and empowerment programs for Nigerian citizens (The National Assembly 2016). In this light, programs like N-Power, National Home-Grown School Feeding Program (NHGSFP), National Cash Transfer Project (NCTP), Government Enterprise, and Empowerment Program (GEEP) were created to alleviate poverty. For the National Social Investment Plan, feeding provision was made for 4.2 million pupils in public primary schools (Sanni 2019; The Partnership for Child Development 2020). The National Home-Grown Feeding program has positively made provision for feeding opportunities for children from poor homes and backgrounds, improving their health and educational outcomes. It has served over 7.5 million pupils in 46,000 public primary schools in 22 states (Action Health 2018). Therefore, with this social investment platform, the government provides the privilege of literacy to more pupils; such that education is encouraged and agriculture embraced by local farmers. In the creation of jobs and empowerment opportunities, N-Power has assured employment opportunities to over 500,000 Nigerians in the six geopolitical zones of the country, changing their lives. It has created jobs in the categories of agriculture, education, health, innovation, and creativity, thereby equipping unemployed Nigerian youths (Nnodim 2020), even though some of the claims by the government have been refuted (Awojulugbe 2017). Adeyemi (2019) has noted that insufficient manpower, ghost workers syndrome, poor conditions of work, the record of remittance to a less functional worker, and stealing of funds are obstacles to the effectiveness of the unemployment program.

The Legislature and Social Development in Nigeria, 2015–2019 Table 2 Showing percentages of unemployed youths in Nigeria

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Year 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007

Percentage 19.58 19.68 19.96 20.67 16.3 12.62 9.84 9.75 9.71 9.65 9.49 8.66 8.51

Source: Statista 2020 Table 3 Showing rate and levels of employment in Nigeria (in millions) In the labor force (also willing and able to work) Employed (with job) Employed full-time (40 h/week) Employed part time Unemployed (did nothing or worked less than 20 h/ week)

Age 15–64 15–64 15–64 15–64 15–64

2015 75.94 68.4

2016 80.66 68.72

13.20

11.19

2017 85.1 69.09 51.1 18.02 17.6

2018 90.5 69.54 51.3 18.21 20.9

Source: Labor Force Statistics Report, December 2018

The Nigerian unemployed youth is estimated to be 53.40 percent (National Bureau of Statistics 2020). And this unemployment rate in Nigeria has continued to increase. The youths have achieved less in socio-economic development than the National Youth Development Policy, designed to improve the lives of youths (Nigerian National Youth Policy 2009). Tables 2 and 3 specify the unemployment rate in Nigeria. The World Data Labs Poverty Clock (2019) gives a total of 91,885,874 million persons, estimated as 46.5% of the total Nigerian population to be in extreme poverty. Prior to this year, in 2018, Nigeria was named the poverty capital of the world for its total number of 87 million people in poverty. The root of poverty is underlined in the deprivation of the necessities of man. Food, healthcare and sanitation, education and property acquisition are a requirement that qualifies for sustainable development (lshaq et al. 2017).

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9 The Legislature and National Development in Nigeria As an expected contributor to development, the legislature holds a vital role in the social and economic development of the country. This is because of its position as a harbinger of the existence, survival, and implementation of laws and the welfare of the people. The Nigerian legislature should exercise power to promote the interests of the people. Policies or an agenda for consideration is a collective responsibility of all members of the legislature through intermittent deliberation and commitment to the implementation of the outcomes. The legislature wields power to make laws, oversee functions; as well as serve as a watchdog to the other arms of government. With a constitutional responsibility to endorse development projects for the people, it serves as a prospective organ for development at all levels—social, political, economic, cultural, educational, and technological—of government. The legislature is the structure of the government needed for the achievement and expectations of democratic governance. It is the custodian of democracy and good governance (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). An organ saddled with the responsibility to monitor lapses and excesses of the other arms of government. Therefore, the sustenance of development (evident) in government lies in the question of absolute compliance with constitutional roles and responsibilities. Most importantly, the legislature has the overall capacity to ensure progress, development, and growth (Abegunde 2016). In Nigeria, citizens have mistaken the role of the executives for that of the legislature. While the legislature makes the law, the executive executes the law for the public good. The negative results of poor infrastructural services, social amenities, inadequate security, and provision of better opportunities lead to the conclusion that the legislature has failed to secure the interests of the people (Osumah 2014). Uneven development manifests more in urban and rural areas. Development is unevenly distributed, thereby contributing to the negative reality of inadequacies on the part of the legislature. Honesty, equity, and transparency are questionable in the operations of the legislature. This is such that, acquiring power in such political spaces has been used as a tool to generate funds (money-making venture) for their financial enrichment (Abegunde 2016; Akomolede and Bosede 2012; Obasanjo 2012; Tom and Attai 2014). The Nigerian legislature has been perceived to be against national development. This is because of the motivation for seeking such positions in government. Sanusi (2010), a former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, claimed that the National Assembly gulp 25% of the country’s expenditure. The cost of financing the legislature, therefore, is much more than the allocated funds for the promotion of basic amenities to citizens. The people perceive that the Nigerian legislature lacks the necessary commitment to their well-being (Tom and Attai 2014).

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Conclusion

The paper established the roles of the legislature in the achievement of democratic dividends. Investigating the duties of law-making and oversight by the legislature, it identified the agendas made on the social development of Nigeria between the periods 2015 and 2019. Pieces of evidence of poor implementation of policies adversely affected human security, economic development, and poverty reduction. The continuous attacks by the Boko Haram insurgent groups, as well as the bourgeoning rise in cases of kidnapping for ransom, is a clear instance of the government’s failure to arrest the redress its failing responsibilities. This is an indication of the weakness of the legislature as the agent of national development. It is hereby recommended the legislature should adhere to the recommended separation of powers with a commitment to effective oversight of executive activities in the policy process. Monitoring and evaluation of policies should be strengthened to ensure effective public service delivery. The committee system in the legislature should be strengthened to function as the central agent of legislative oversight. Above all, the legislative institution in Nigeria should redeem its public image through disciplined disposition and commitment to the exercise of power for an inclusive national development.

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Oluwatunmise Taiwo Paimo is a researcher in the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria; where she is undergoing her Ph.D. study. Her research addresses issues of development, gender, conflict, insurgency and foreign policy in Africa, particularly Nigeria. She is an Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Crescent University, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria. Her research has been interdisciplinary, showing the interconnectedness of social science disciplines. She is a laureate of Gender Institute CODESRIA and a Fellow of the Ife Institute for Advanced Studies.

Representative Democracy, Political Disengagement, and Young People’s Perceptions of Legislators in Nigeria Mayowa Micheal Adeniji and Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi

Abstract Youth political disengagement and poor perceptions of the political system continue to dominate many democracies. While the phenomenon of youth voter apathy, as a specific form of disengagement, is noticeable in Nigeria, little is known about what factors influence young people’s perceptions of representative democracy on the one hand, and how such perceptions influence their willingness to engage elected national and subnational parliamentarians, on the other hand. This study explores this phenomenon by drawing on the importance of an inclusive governance system that caters to all groups, especially in Nigeria where young people constitute an overwhelming majority of the population. A mixed method approach utilizing a survey of young people drawn from serving members of Nigeria’s National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme and focus group discussions with officials of youth-based civic groups (ages 18–30) helped in shedding light on the subject. While reinforcing the widely known poor perceptions of representative democracy among young people, the findings further demonstrate an abysmally low level of knowledge of the process that births the legislature and legislators through the mechanics of representative democracy.

1 Introduction Political engagement is an important precondition for a healthy democracy (Homana 2018). As a result, young people’s political disengagement and poor perceptions of the political system are topical issues that attract the attention of researchers, being sources of concern across democracies (Kitanova 2019; Farthing 2010). Citizens, generally, are noted as being disaffected with representative democracy (Gherghina and Geissel 2015), and many young people are dissatisfied with the state of M. M. Adeniji Department of Political Science, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Nigeria T. I. Odeyemi (✉) School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_7

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representative democracy in their respective countries (Ilišin et al. 2017). As Saunders (2009) noted, young people are described by pundits as a generation that refrains from voting, is uninformed about current political happenings and news, and is disaffected, disengaged, and politically cynical. In the same vein, Norris (2003, p.2) argues that “political disengagement is thought to affect all citizens but young people are believed to be particularly disillusioned about the major institutions of representative democracy, leaving them apathetic (at best) or alienated (at worst).” Present generation of young people are identified and perceived as disinterested in the formal political process, being apolitical and unpolitical (Walsh et al. 2018; Hart 2009). Comparatively, they have been established as participating less in traditional politics than the previous generations (Mycock and Tonge 2012). In the same manner, due to their continued low level of turnout during elections and reduction in participation in traditional politics, young people are regarded as some of the most disengaged groups in politics (Kitanova 2019; Mengistu 2017). Grasso (2014) noted that the trend is noticeable both in terms of formal and informal participation in politics. However, some scholars have argued that young people’s current prevailing disconnectedness from politics is not necessarily a source of worry. These scholars see the lack of political participation as not being a product of general apathy toward politics and that young people are not disengaged and apathetic (Soler-i-Martí 2014; Sloam 2012, 2016). Instead, their involvement in politics nowadays is not oriented towards the “traditional political mediating institutions or stakeholders of representative democracy” (Soler-i-Martí 2014, p.16). While their level of participation and engagement with institutional politics is low, and they continue to distance themselves from formal politics, many of them resort to alternate and non-electoral forms of participation, e.g., engagement through the internet and social media, civil activities, protesting and volunteering (Soler-i-Martí 2014; Sloam 2012). It is argued that “civic and political engagement has been transformed, and young people are at the vanguard of this transformation” (Sloam 2012, p.670). These alternative forms of participation are influenced by socio-economic and education status, and could widen the existing political participation inequalities, particularly among young people with low economic status and low educational attainment (Sloam 2013). While it is correct to argue that young people are wont to engage through non-traditional sources as espoused by scholars, we decided to explore the dimension of willingness to directly engage elected politicians, in this case, members of parliament (MPs), to open up broad discussion on how that links with other forms of participation, especially future elections. Extant literature demonstrates that voter apathy is dominant in Nigeria, and gets worse with successive elections (Onuoha et al. 2020). We, therefore, aim to account for elite-young people engagement in-between elections to see the possibility of deepening governance engagement, in this context, as a route toward also reversing youth voter apathy in future elections.

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2 Young People’s Perceptions of Representative Democracy and Engagement of Elected Officials The phenomenon of young people’s political withdrawal and poor perceptions of the political system has been identified across parts of the world (Banaji 2008). Although there are observable generalities in the level of political apathy, young people’s political behavior is dynamic and conditioned by socio-political realities and specificities of the country in question (Sloam 2012). Young people’s distancing from politics has been attributed to factors such as a general lack of interest and disaffection toward the public sphere (Putnam 2000; Pirie and Worcestern 1998), increasing skepticism of the way the system works (Henn et al. 2007), absence of opportunities to participate in formal politics and the perceptions that political actors do not focus on their interests (Henn and Foard 2014), lack of civic education (Saunders 2009), as well as the influence of age, level of education, and social class (Kitanova 2019). The foregoing factors contribute to disengagement and disconnectedness from political leaders and representatives. This is particularly true of MPs and legislative institutions (Saalfied and Dobmeier 2012). It is exemplified prominently in a low level of interactions with parliamentarians (Adeniji 2020), negative perceptions of MPs and the parliamentary institutions (Aiko et al. 2016; Rolef 2006), and distrust of MPs and parliaments, with evidence suggesting that parliaments are among the most distrusted institutions of representative democracies (Aiko et al. 2016; Dogan 2005; Leston-Bandeira 2012). Studies have also identified widening gaps between MPs and citizens (Murana and Bakare 2019; Odeyemi and Abati 2021), and low participation of young people in the legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] 2018). The foregoing issues appear to be pervasive across polities. According to the IPU (2018), in 2018, young people below the age of 30 constitute just 2.2% of MPs across the world. Similarly, Hájek (2019) while establishing young people’s low level of political participation especially in institutional politics compared to older citizens in Czech, noted that principal positions in the parliament were filled by the elderly; younger MPs tended to spend less time in the parliament and older MPs tended to propose bills in the parliament than younger MPs. These trends of young people’s disconnection from parliament continue to exhibit concerns and have motivated many parliamentary institutions into enhanced information dissemination, citizen engagement, and public integration into the legislative process (IPU 2012; Leston-Bandeira and Thompson 2017; Odeyemi and Abati 2021), especially through the use of online technologies where young people are the most prominent demographic group in terms of use (Odeyemi and Abioro 2019). As we previously noted, some studies have argued that young people’s disconnectedness and disengagement from politics are not necessarily a source of worry. In this regard, political participation especially in traditional forms such as voting, membership in a political party, etc. is seen as a product of the recent transformation in young people’s political relationships (Soler-i-Martí 2014; Sloam 2012, 2016). Accordingly, young people’s political participation predisposition has shifted from

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“traditional political mediating institutions or stakeholders of representative democracy,” to non-institutional forms (Soler-i-Martí 2014, p.16). While their level of political participation and engagement with institutional politics has reduced noticeably, and they continue to distance themselves from formal politics, their involvement in the alternate and non-electoral forms of participation., e.g., civil activities, protesting, volunteering and online activism, is notable (Soler-i-Martí 2014; Sloam 2012, p.680). The foregoing notwithstanding, young people’s current depressing level of political participation has not always been the case. There is an identifiable distinction between pre-independence Africa and modern Africa. Pre-independence African indigenous leadership and nationalists for instance were composed of young people. However, the level of activeness and agility with regard to formal politics that was obtainable at that time has since reduced significantly as older people keep a tight grip on positions of power (Abbink 2005). Relatedly, Muna et al. (2014) have argued that in Africa, politics is considered the domain of the old. This has led to generational conflicts between the young, who are considered radicals on the one hand, and the old, who are regarded as conservatives on the other hand. This has the likelihood to cause a disconnection between representatives, who are mostly older and the represented, who are mostly populated by young people. The importance of citizen engagement and positive perceptions of the political system and its institutions cannot be overemphasized (Adeniji 2020; Holmberg et al. 2017). A veritable way through which the functioning and stability of democracies can be ensured is the proliferation and approbation of participant democratic political culture among the citizens, especially young people (Ilišin et al. 2017). Again, a vital element of participant political culture, which is one of the normative expectations of representative democracy, is the engagement of political officials by the citizens. Perceptions of representative democracy, and MPs-citizens’ engagement is still a wide minefield waiting to be explored in research. While there exist related studies, the attention is usually on trust in parliament, the trajectory, functioning and development of Parliaments, public support for Parliaments and MPs-constituents’ relations (Azevedo 2009; Rolef 2006; Holmberg et al. 2017; Muheeb 2019; Murana and Bakare 2019; Tom 2010). Studies also tend to focus on established democracies as against those in Africa. There is also the propensity to explore national as against the subnational parliaments, mostly overlooking the critical importance of the latter, especially in federal systems. This becomes significant as there are often differences with regard to the level of trust in, evaluations of, and workings of national and subnational parliaments (Odeyemi and Abati 2021; Wolak 2017); the latter are noted as facing unique challenges in areas of capacity, powers, performances, and resources (Fashagba and McMahon 2015). In drawing its point of departure, this study focuses on connections between young people’s perceptions of representative democracy and engagement with national and subnational MPs in Nigeria.

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3 Theoretical Framework Representative democracy theory is embraced as the hypothetical premise of this paper. It is inseparably tied with the double idea of democracy and representation. Numerous scholars have added to the arrangement, improvement, and enunciation of the hypothesis in different manners. These include traditional researchers like Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, James Mill, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Robert Dahl. Others are George Galloway and Hanna Pitkin. In Deliberations on Representative Government, Mill (2010) contended that agent government is the perfect type of government. Representative democratic theory is predicated on the assumptions and standards of freedom and equality of people, the portrayal of residents by those chosen by them and the responsiveness and responsibility of the representative to the represented. The theory presupposes the determination of representatives by the residents of a nation to speak for them in government and settle their basic political choices due to the practicalness of citizens’ immediate participation. The practicalness emerges essentially because of the enormous scope of modern-day social orders, inclusiveness and extension of citizenship, absence of intrigue, capability and competence among citizens and so on. The representatives are therefore responsive and responsible to the electorate. The theory presupposes a contract between a principal and agent; the principal being the represented, and the agent, the representative. Should the represented be unsatisfied with the performance(s) of the delegate, the agreement can be ended at an appointed time. The parliament holds a basic spot in this hypothetical idea; it is a central institution in representative democracy (Murana and Bakare 2019). There exist three fundamental models of agent vote-based systems: delegate, trustee, and politico. The delegate model was promoted by James Mill; the model demands that the representative follows the desire of the represented consistently. In other words, the delegate is only the mouthpiece of the constituent and his judgment is not allowed. The model likewise postulates that delegates must endeavor to advance the interests of their constituents first before taking the country’s interests into thought. The trustee model on the other hand was first postulated by Edmund Burke. The model accords the representative extended freedom. The representative’s judgment and competence are trusted, thus he is permitted to utilize his instinct, conviction, and discretion in the discharge of his responsibilities. The model licenses the representative to take activities that are beneficial to the country, even if it does not address immediate constituency needs and preferences. In other words, the representative’s capacity goes beyond the portrayal of the electorates’ choice. Representatives are likewise permitted to use and adhere to their judgment even it clashes with the assessment of the electorates, as long as the judgment is objective. The Politico model, on the other hand, is an endeavor to combine the trustee and delegate models. A mainstream defender of this model is George Galloway. The model noted that decision-making is not only the question of constituents’ wishes or representative’s convictions, other factors such as interest groups, party leaders, and

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political relationships affect representatives’ decisions and actions. The model permits the representative to be adaptable. For instance, in circumstances where there is low citizens’ input to a policy, the representative can follow the trustee’s way and if the other is the case, i.e., in situations wherein citizens actively provide inputs during policymaking, the representative is to be guided by the delegate model. Furthermore, the representative must endeavor unflinchingly to disclose his convictions to his constituents at any point where he feels that their wishes are negative to the country’s long or short-term developmental goals (Russell 2012). In light of the foregoing, this study tests the impacts of geo-political zones and geopolitics, partisanship demonstrated through membership of political parties, voting status and gender, on how young people relate with elected national and subnational MPs, guided by the following hypotheses: H1: Young people’s geo-political zones influence their perceptions of the state of representative democracy in Nigeria. H2: Young people’s geo-political zones influence their familiarity with MPs representing their district/constituency. H3: Young people who are members of political parties will be more knowledgeable about constituency delimitation than those who are not members of any political party. H4: Young people who are registered voters have more awareness of the existence of the constituency office. H5: Young men are more likely to communicate with representatives than young women. H6: There is a significant relationship between young people’s perceptions of representative democracy and the willingness to engage parliamentarians. The hypotheses serve as the basis of our analysis and discovery of some of the factors that influence young people’s perceptions of representative democracy, engagement of representatives, and the connections between the two.

4 Research Methods We collected data through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, focusing on young people’s perceptions of the state of representative democracy in Nigeria, perceptions of legislators, levels of engagement of, and trust in, legislators and legislative institutions, and perceptions of legislators’ performance. The study population comprised individuals between the ages of 18 and 30. Structured questionnaires were distributed to members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were chosen because the NYSC provided a study sample reflecting the concept of young citizens and comprised individuals from different parts of the country. This ensured that to varying degrees, various parts of the country are represented. NYSC is Nigeria’s post-study compulsory year-long national service for young people. It was initiated by the Nigerian government in 1973 after the country’s civil war as part of mechanisms of post-war reconciliation, reconstruction, and rebuilding, as well as

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to encourage national unity and common ties among young people (Okafor and Ani 2014). The program is only available for graduates who are below the age of 30 and who are not disabled. Corps members across the 36 states are mobilized and dispersed across the country, with the standard procedure being to post individuals to state and geo-political zones different from their origins. Respondents were drawn from Osogbo in Osogbo Local Government of Osun State. The population of the corps members in the local government was 500.1 The sample size was calculated following Krejcie and Morgan (1970). Consequently, questionnaires were distributed to 217 corps members. The youngest of the sample population is 19 years old while the oldest was below 29 upon graduation, but had attained the age of 30 when filling out the questionnaire. Questions were generally framed to measure how respondents perceive the state and quality of representative democracy in Nigeria, as well as how these link with the willingness to engage elected MPs in national and subnational legislatures. Furthermore, focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with three youth-based civic organizations at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, a federal tertiary institution situated in Osun State, southwest Nigeria. Data were collected in the last quarter of 2019, 5 months after the country’s general elections. To measure young people’s level of political engagement, we examined their knowledge of the delimitation of constituencies by which MPs are elected to the parliament, their familiarity with the profile of legislators, their knowledge of the existence of legislators’ constituency offices, frequency of visits to the constituency offices and the examination of the channels through which citizens interacted with legislators if they ever did. In measuring young people’s perceptions of the state of representative democracy, critical features of representative democracy were highlighted for the respondents and they were subsequently told to rate Nigeria in terms of compliance with the principles on a scale of 0–5, 0 being the least mark and 5 being the highest possible mark. Through this, we arrived at a standardized representative democracy score and index. In the case of FGDs, which were to deepen understanding of the quantitative data, participants were first told to present their notions of the term representative democracy and, subsequently, to assess its practice in Nigeria. Results are presented in the subsequent section.

5 Results and Findings 5.1

Geo-political Zone and Perceptions of Representative Democracy

Figure 1 illustrates young people’s perceptions of the state of representative democracy. Participants reported a worrisome perception of the state of representative

1

Discussion with Osogbo Central Local Government NYSC Chief Liaison Officer, October 28; 2019.

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Elected representatives are accountable to citizens in Nigeria

27.2

29

Citizens are treated equally before the law in Nigeria

46.5

Elections are free and fair in Nigeria

46.5

Citizens are genuinely represented by elected representatives in Nigeria

34.1

30

Freedom of the press exists in Nigeria

0

20 2

3

20.7

40

9.7 3.7 8.34.1 10.64.6 2.3 12.92.8

36.9

41.5

1

21.7

30

45.2

Young people are adequately represented within Nigeria’s governing elite

2.3 20.7 3.7 18

35.9

34.1

The needs of young citizens are adequately catered for in Nigeria’s governance system

11.5 6.92.3 17.5 4.15.1

30.9

34.3

The Judiciary enjoys complete independence from interference in Nigeria

13.8 13.4

17.5 7.84.6

31.3

42.4

Fundamental human rights are respected in Nigeria

0

26.7

38.7

Citizens’ opinions are listened to and respected in Nigeria

16.6 32.7

35

12.4 6.54.6

60

80

100

120

4

Fig. 1 Scores of principles of democracy. Source: Generated by the authors

12

11.33 10.23

10

10.51

10.72

North Central

Aggregate

9.43

9.15

7.5

8

6

4

2

0 South West

South South

South East

North West

Noth East

Representative Democracy Score

Fig. 2 Representative Democracy Score distributions across geo-political zone. Source: Generated by the authors

democracy in Nigeria. Treatment of citizens equally before the law and elections being free and fair received the least score (46.5% each), while accountability of elected representatives to citizens received the highest (13.4%). The findings are in line with Ilišin et al. (2017) indicating young people’s dissatisfaction with and consequent negative perceptions of the state of representative democracy. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the representative democracy score based on Nigeria’s geo-political zones: North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East, and South-South. In our survey, the maximum score that could be attained for representative democracy is 40. Figure 2 shows the mean score (10.72) of the entire respondents to be less than the average score (20), thus indicating an aggregate low score across the country. The South-West had the highest score with 11.33, with the North-East having the lowest (7.50). Apart from

Representative Democracy, Political Disengagement, and Young People’s. . .

101

100 90

87.6

80 70 60 50 40 30 20

12.4

10 0 State of Representative Democracy Negative

Positive

Fig. 3 Source: Generated by the authors

the North-East, the results of the various geo-political zones are almost uniform, and there were no significant outliers from the aggregate score. In Fig. 3, representative democracy scores were broken into categories: good and bad. Those who scored Nigeria at 20 (the average mark) and above were considered to perceive the system positively and those who scored Nigeria below 20 were considered to have bad perceptions of the system. The diagram indicates that 87.6% of young people perceived the state of representative democracy negatively as against 12.4% who perceived it positively. This submission is in tandem with Taylor’s (2015) findings of overwhelming negative perceptions of representative democracy by citizens. As shown in Fig. 4, an overwhelming proportion of young people demonstrate a lack of awareness of who their MPs were. Generally, 65.4% reported ignorance of MPs who represented their constituencies in the national and subnational legislatures; among those who were aware of the names of their MPs, Senators (15.7%) were the most known class of MPs across all geo-political zones, followed by House of Representatives members (8.3%) and House of Assembly (3.2%). We argue, like Wolak (2017), that this is attributable to the low level of press monitoring and the consequent lower familiarity with the public as well as lower public relations staff and activities of subnational legislatures. Among the various geo-political zones, young people from the South-West demonstrated the most familiarity with the profiles of MPs, with the South-East, North-Central, South-South, North-West, and North-East following successively.

M. M. Adeniji and T. I. Odeyemi

102

North Central

2.9 5.7

20

71.4

Noth East

100

North West

14.3

28.6

South East

5.7 5.7

20

South South

15

South West

12.7 0

42.9

14.3

10

11 20

68.6

5

70

5.1 6.8 1.7

62.7 40

60

80

Senator

House of Rep. Member

Subnational MP

All MPs

Senators and House of Rep. members only

None

100

120

Fig. 4 Geo-political zones and the awareness of the profiles of parliamentarians. Generated by the authors

5.2

Young People’s Membership in Political Parties and the Knowledge of Constituency Delimitation

Table 1 presents the awareness of young people on their state and federal legislative constituency delimitations. Nearly 3 of every 10 (27.8%) card-carrying members of political parties could identify their state assembly constituency. This proportion is higher than those who reported the same for the House of Representative’s constituency (22.2%) but lower than 1 of every 3 (33.3%) for senatorial districts. Irrespective of partisanship demonstrated by political party membership, more than nine of every ten had no idea of their national and subnational constituency delimitations.

5.3

Registered Voters’ Awareness of the Existence of Constituency Offices

Table 2 illustrate awareness of the existence of MPs’ constituency offices. The descriptive analysis shows that 35% of registered voters believe federal MPs do operate constituency offices. The figure is greater than that of those who are not registered voters (15.3%). The responses are identical to those provided on the existence of constituency offices by subnational MPs with one of three registered voters believing that subnational MPs operate offices.

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Table 1 Young people’s membership of political parties and the knowledge of constituency delimitation

Non-Political party member (%) Those who choose not to answer Political party member (%) Total

Knowledge of State House of Assembly constituency delimitation (%) Do not Know know 95.0 5.0

Knowledge of Federal House of Representative Constituency delimitation (%) Do not Know know 97.8 2.2

Knowledge of Senatorial District (%) Do not Know know 93.9 6.1

100

–

100

–

100

–

72.2 93.5

27.8 6.5

77.8 96.3

22.2 3.7

66.7 92.2

33.3 7.8

Source: Generated by the authors

Table 2 Registered voters’ awareness of the existence of constituency offices

Non-registered voters (%) Those who choose not to answer Registered voters (%) Total

Knowledge on the existence of constituency office by Federal MPs They do not I do not They have know have 8.3 76.4 15.3

Knowledge of the existence of constituency office by State Assembly members They do I do not They not have know have 5.6 77.8 16.7

4.0

92

4.0

4.0

92

5.8 6.5

59.2 68.7

35 24.9

7.5 6.5

59.2 69.1

4.0 33.3 24.4

Source: The authors

We argue that citizens’ lack of knowledge about the existence of constituency offices is a product of poor political education as well as poor publicity about, and knowledge of, the existence of constituency offices. This could also be attributed to the below-par performance of existing constituency offices, and their inability to invoke public enthusiasm. Dan-Azumi and Okereke (2018) submitted that the effectiveness of constituency offices in Nigeria is challenged, among others, by lack of professionalism by constituency office staff, non-visitation of offices by MPs, inability to identify the offices by constituents, partisan politics, etc. However, our findings show that, for both national and subnational MPs, registered voters are more likely to be aware of the existence of constituency offices than those who are not, reinforcing, as LACSOP (2011) found, that constituency offices sometimes extend as political offices of MPs and their political parties.

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5.4

Young People’s Communication with MPs Through Constituency Offices

Figure 5 illustrates young people’s level of communication with MPs through the use of constituency offices. Generally, constituency offices are rarely used in communicating with MPs. More than nine of ten (92.2%) of young people generally had not consulted MPs through the offices. This is not surprising; as indicated in Tables 1 and 2, many of them were not aware of the existence of the offices. This aligns with the findings of Dan-Azumi and Okereke (2018), that constituents hardly make use of the platforms provided by the constituency offices due to a lack of knowledge about their existence and usefulness, as well as a lack of trust and confidence in MPs. Based on gender, more males (11.6%) tended to use the platform than their female counterparts (4.9%). This agrees with the findings of Henn and Foard (2014) showing a higher likelihood of young men engaging political officials than young women.

95.1

100

92.2

88.4

90 80 70 60

50 40 30 20

11.6

10

7.8

4.9

0 Male

Female Yes

Aggregate

No

Fig. 5 Young citizens’ communication with MPs through constituency offices. Generated by the authors

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5.5

105

Young People’s Perceptions of Representative Democracy and the Willingness to Engage Parliamentarians

Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between young people’s perceptions of representative democracy score and their engagement with MPs through the use of constituency offices. While the diagram affirmed that few of them engage MPs, it also indicates that engagement is not influenced by perceptions of representative democracy, either bad or good. Figure 3 indicates that 92.2% of those who have bad perceptions of the state of representative democracy had never visited their MPs’ constituency offices, while 7.4% had done so. On the other hand, 88.9% of those who had good perceptions of representative democracy had not visited constituency offices before, while 11.1% had visited. We argue that the phenomenon of low contact with constituency offices confirms the findings of prior research (Dan-Azumi and Okereke 2018; Odeyemi and Abioro 2019); young people rely more on digital tools than traditional means when they engage public officials.

5.6

Predictors of Young People’s Behavior and Sentiments Toward MPs and Representative Democracy

Our FGDs further augmented and confirmed the data sourced through the survey, as shown in Table 3. More than half of the discussants claimed not to have heard of the term “representative democracy.” Those who had heard it demonstrated an elementary understanding of the system and concept. They mostly saw it as the system 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30

20 10 0 Those who have visited MP(s) constituency offices before Good Perceptions

Those who have not visited MP(s) constituency offices before Bad Perceptions

Fig. 6 Perceptions of representative democracy and the willingness to engage parliamentarians. Generated by the authors

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Table 3 Hypothesis testing Independent variables Dependent variables Hypotheses testing using ANOVA Geo-Political Zone Perceptions of Representative Democracy Hypothesis testing using chi-square Geo-Political Zone Awareness of profiles of MPs Political party membership Knowledge of Constituency/District delimitation Voting Status (Registered Awareness of Federal MPs constituency offices Voters) Awareness of subnational MPs constituency offices Voting Status (Registered Voters) Gender Status Communication with MPs through constituency office Representative Dem. Willigness to engage MPs Perceptions

Pvalue 0.760 0.865 0.0 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.498

Source: The authors

which makes provisions for elections of representatives by and for the people. When asked about their opinion on the state of its practice in Nigeria, all of them expressed disappointment at the state of things, using words like “an illusion,” “a mirage,” “[that which exists] theoretically” and “not practically,” etc. Many of them claimed MPs had been ineffective and had not represented citizens’ interests. According to a participant: I don’t think representative democracy is working well in Nigeria. When you look at the individuals that are chosen to represent us [. . .], most of the time, they don’t communicate the goals, the ideas, the ideologies of the people that elected them and I can say that most times, after they’ve been elected when they get to such positions, they sometimes forget or most times try to, you know, favor (some specific) group of people.

For another participant, “Once they get there [are elected], they see you (constituents) as strangers, they forget those that elected them and see them as strangers and they start [. . .] pursuing their own goals.” A majority of the participants also expressed dissatisfaction with the level of youth inclusiveness in politics. They claimed that young people had not been well encouraged to participate actively, especially through being elected as leaders, even though qualified youths had continuously expressed enthusiasm for taking charge of public affairs. A participant expressed thus: We should sensitize our people too that nobody is too young to serve them. . . . .and our youths should be more involved. They shouldn’t just give them a peripheral involvement . . . . so that when our old people go, we’ll have people that can succeed them very well, perfectly well so that there would be a continuity instead of them leaving and then we will now be looking for another old person to come out of nowhere.

Some participants on the other hand expressed skepticism about the capability of young people to occupy positions of authority. They claimed the value system of the country had become flawed and as a result, youth performance in positions of

Representative Democracy, Political Disengagement, and Young People’s. . .

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authority would not be significantly different from that of the elderly. They justified their positions with instances of young political officeholders who had been enmeshed in corruption scandals. Table 3 refutes the proposition that the geo-political zone of citizens significantly influences their perceptions of representative democracy and the awareness of profiles of representative democracy. Thus, our first and second hypotheses are refuted. The implication of this is that irrespective of geo-political zones, young Nigerians do not have an impressive opinion of the system of government in practice. This negates the submissions of previous studies (Maleki and Hendriks 2015; Ruiz-Rufino 2013) that showed culture and ethnicity as influencing the formation of peoples’ opinions and perceptions of democracy. Most of the participants did not know the names of their MPs. One of the participants argued that if elected officials had done something “tangible” he certainly would know them. Another claimed that MPs and politicians were better known during elections. A participant claimed to know MPs because she had been involved in some civic activities and had met some MPs at functions. Another participant who claimed to know his Senator representing his district gave the wrong name. As shown in Table 3, political party membership is a strong determinant of young people’s ability to correctly identify their legislative districts. Members of political parties could identify their constituencies and districts better than those who claimed no partisan leaning. This confirms our third hypothesis. The finding reiterates the submissions of Sirivunnabood (2016) and Odeyemi et al. (2022) on political parties’ capacities to provide political education for their members. In the FGDs, only a participant could correctly mention the three constituencies and districts through which MPs are elected in his locality. A majority of the participants claimed non-alignment with any political party, but more expressed awareness of MPs’ constituency offices. Table 3 further confirms our fourth hypothesis that young people’s voting status influences their awareness of constituency offices. The variables were statistically significant for both national (0.02) and subnational MPs (0.05). Our fifth hypothesis is refuted as gender is not a predictor of how well young people engage representatives through constituency offices. None of the FGDs participants had actively communicated with their MPs; some passively follow the online activities of MPs on social media but had not made any attempt to actively communicate with them. Finally, there is no significant relationship between young people’s perceptions of representative democracy and their willingness to engage MPs. Engagement is done with no recourse to how the state of representative democracy is perceived: whether positively or negatively. This negates the findings of Gherghina and Geissel (2015) who noted that though weak, there exists a correlation between citizens’ conception of democracy and political participation.

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6 Summary and Conclusion We sought to explicate the nuances of young people’s perceptions of the state of representative democracy and their level of engagement with members of parliament, amid evidence in the literature suggesting that young people are withdrawn from formal politics compared with older folks. Through a survey of young people and FGD sessions with youth-based good-governance advocacy groups, this study sought to answer questions about young people’s perceptions of the system of representative democracy in Nigeria, the extent of awareness of constituency delimitation through which representatives are elected into parliaments, the profiles of MPs representing various districts and the existence of constituency offices and willingness to utilize it as an instrument of engagement. It also determined the relationship between young people’s perceptions of representative democracy and the willingness to engage national and subnational MPs. The data indicate no significant difference in the poor perceptions of representative democracy across the six geo-political zones. There also exists an absence of political education for the humongous proportion of young people as they could not identify their district/constituencies through which representatives are elected into national and subnational parliaments. However, membership of political parties strongly influenced the knowledge of constituency delimitation. Young people who belong to political parties are more likely to be able to identify the constituencies and districts through which their representatives are elected than those who are not political party members. Registered voters also tend to be more aware of the existence of constituency office—an important platform through which MPs can be engaged—than those who are not registered, voters. Again, there is no significant difference in the levels of engagement demonstrated by the male and female participants. We also established no association between young people’s perceptions of the state of representative democracy and engagement with MPs. The findings strongly indicate that young people are disengaged from the reality of the political process, especially in the traditional forms of participation. Although evidence suggests strong ethnic and geo-political affiliations and consciousness the Nigerian political system, this does little to moderate disenchantment with the political system. Young people consider themselves co-habitants in the Nigerian political system and not participants. We conclude that concerning engagement with elected officials as represented by MPs, there is a debilitating level of political disengagement among young people in Nigeria. We recommend that appropriate policies be formulated and implemented by stakeholders to ensure that young people are appropriately engaged and made participants in the political system. Furthermore, MPs should sensitize and encourage citizens on the mechanism through which they can be engaged. A two-way form of communication should also be encouraged.

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Mayowa Micheal Adeniji works as an Administrative Officer at the Redeemer’s University, Ede where he is also a graduate student. He obtained his Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. His research interests are in legislative politics, development studies, and public policy. Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi is a doctoral researcher in the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, UK and lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. His research interests focus primarily on comparative politics and democratic engagement among actors and institutions, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. His most recent articles appeared in The Journal of Legislative Studies, Journal of Public Affairs and The Theory and Practice of Legislation.

Corruption and Executive Interference in Legislative Oversight in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Oyewole Oyindamola Opeoluwa, Daramola Iyanunioluwa Oluwatobi, and Gbadeyan Olawale James

Abstract Democracy encompasses majority participation in the governance process of a country. The legislative arm of government serves as the representative of the people; as it is charged with the responsibility of making laws and reining in on the powers of the executive and judicial arms. Nigeria has had two decades of uninterrupted democratic rule and successful transition, the legislative arm is expected to be viable, productive, and serve the interest of the masses. Anything short of this poses a great threat to the progress of the Nation. It is believed that the acts of legislature embody the interest and will of the people hence; in line with the principle of “separation of power,” the legislative arm is expected to work as a “check” on the excesses of the executive arm of government. The National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) is charged with these responsibilities. To perform its duties effectively and efficiently, the National Assembly must overcome the challenges of corruption, executive overreach, prebendal politics, and the effects of military incursion in Nigeria’s democracy.

1 Introduction It has been over two decades of democratic rule and a smooth transition of power in Nigeria. Democracy is a system of government that embraces the contribution of the majority in the decision-making process. The legislature, as one of the branches of government in any democratic political system, is saddled with the responsibility of making laws that reflect the mind of the majority. The state, according to social O. O. Opeoluwa (✉) Department of Political Science, Achievers University, Owo, Ondo, Nigeria D. I. Oluwatobi Department of Political Science, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa G. O. James Conflict Transformation and Peace and Peace Studies, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_8

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contract theorists, is the creation of the people, having surrendered their freedom to a body of rules (McLean 2019). In the state of nature, there was no government and there was no law to regulate them. Hardships and oppression were prevalent. To overcome these societal challenges, citizens entered into two major agreements which are “Pactum Unionis” and “Pactum Subjectionis” (McLean 2019). By “Pactum Unionis,” people wanted the protection of their lives and properties. This resulted in the formation of a society where people pledged to show courtesy to each other and to live in peace and harmony. By “Pactum Subjectionis,” people agreed and promised to submit to authority and give up a complete portion of their freedoms and rights to an authority. In return, the authority is expected to provide security of “life,” “property,” and to some extent “liberty” to everyone. Hence, they must unite to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing their rights to freedom in the State of Nature. To ensure their escape from the State of Nature, they must agree to live together under common laws and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it (Manzoor 2013). The legislature, as the representative body of the public, is responsible for checkmating the exercise of executive power in a manner that would promote the public good. As the representatives of the people, members of the legislature have the responsibility to provide an environment that engenders accountability in government; through effective oversight of executive decisions (Fagbadebo 2019a). The legislature has various names in different countries. For instance, in the USA it is referred to as Congress, in Britain it is referred to as Parliament, in Nigeria it is referred to as Assembly. However, despite these variant tags ascribed to the body, the function is largely the same—to make laws, while the executive is to implement the law made, the Judiciary interprets the law. These organs were not created to be inferior or less important to each other but are expected to complement one another in furtherance of the public good. Despite an uninterrupted democratic dispensation, the legislature in Nigeria has not been able to deliver optimally, her constitutional responsibilities. The organ has not lived up to the expectation of many Nigerians. Dictates and major decisions by the executive arm are merely debated with no proper scrutiny by the legislative body. Rather, they are rubber-stamped and passed into law. Hence, this paper examines the functions of the legislature and assesses how undue executive interference in legislative processes engenders corruption in Nigeria’s democratic governance.

2 Conceptual Clarification 2.1

Legislature

The legislature is generally referred to as an official body, chosen by the electorate, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws; as well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government (Lafenwa 2003). Mortimer opines that the

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legislature is the single most important branch of government in any nation governed by the rule of law. Where law rules, the legislature matters because the legislature makes the law. Legislatures matter in the context of multiparty politics and democratization, because they are mechanisms for achieving both vertical and horizontal accountability of the rulers to the ruled. As the one institution explicitly established to represent society’s diverse interests in government, legislatures promote vertical downward accountability of the state to the public at large, particularly to organized interests or civil society (Barkan 2009). The main idea behind legislative functions within any democratic polity is to ensure a quality policy-making process, accountability, and good governance through effective checks on executive “absolutism” in the exercise of governmental tasks (Nwaubani 2014). Drawing from the above, the legislature constitutes a group of people, elected during an election to represent the majority in the decision-making process and as well to make laws that would reflect the needs and aspirations of the people. The legislature is an organ that is expected to be accountable to the people. They also perform oversight functions to prevent executive tyranny. If effective and efficient, the legislature has the impetus to stimulate comprehensive development in a country, as well as extol the principles of democracy. If otherwise, however, gloom and doom are inevitable.

2.2

The Executive

The executive is the arm of government that is responsible for implementing laws and policies passed by the legislature. The executive is constitutionally expected to execute people’s aspirations. In a presidential system, in particular, the executive and the legislature are both directly accountable to the people. Nevertheless, especially in developing democracies, the executive often interferes in the activities of the legislature to control its leadership (Fagbadebo 2019b). In most cases, the executive seeks to dictate and direct the functioning of the other arms of the government. This is an abuse of power that is contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers (Ihemeje et al. 2016). The level of credence accorded to the executive by the Nigerian citizens, because of its functions and overbearing presence in public affairs, has reduced the selfesteem of the legislative arm of the government. This manifests in the voters’ perception of the government during elections. Many voters are more concerned with who becomes the governor or the president than who would represent them in the law-making chambers. Most times, in Nigeria, the electoral victories of members of the legislature depend largely on the support of the members of the executive as well as political godfathers (Fagbadebo 2020). The executive arrogates so much power that it dictates the kind of bills to be debated and passed unto the legislative chamber. For instance, at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the president sought to control the leadership of the National

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Assembly. The frequent interference of the executive, among other factors, led to instability in the legislative arm. In a spate of four years, the Senate had three presidents (Sobechi 2019). Similarly, in 2016 the leadership of the Senate had to battle the executive over the attempts to subvert the chamber’s internal rules to remove the president and his deputy (Azimazi and Seye 2016). When this failed, there were attempts to criminally indict the Senate President, Bukola Saraki, as part of an elaborate plot to unseat him (Ibekwe 2015). In response to the case, Senator Aliyu Sabi pointed out that Nigeria’s democracy is in danger and that the attempt by the federal government to muzzle the legislature and “cause leadership change in the National Assembly is a return to the era of impunity and lack of respect for due process” which everyone fought to abolish (cf. Azimazi and Seye 2016). The nature of the interaction between the executive and legislative arms in Nigeria is akin to the patron-client relationships, which negates the principle of separation of power. It is also contrary to the tenets of the presidential system that presupposes the independent capacity of the legislature to hold the executive accountable (Barkan 2009). This in turn engenders corruption and reduces the efficiency of the legislative arm.

2.3

Corruption

The World Bank (2020) conceptualizes corruption as, The abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts edicts or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefits even if no bribery occurs through patronage and nepotism, the thief of state assets or the diversion of state revenue.

Corruption is perceived by the majority as a major factor that hinders the development of any effective system of administration (Dong et al. 2012). Corruption can be understood as a manifestation of unethical behaviors in the administration of the state (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Corruption is a challenge to good governance, it interferes with public policy, affects the equitable distribution of public goods, and causes a setback to economic development (Bardhan 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Annan 2004). Corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit, while the private benefit is often in the form of illicit money or in-kind from a client to the agent. This is called bribery. Lipset and Lenz in Fagbadebo (2007), define corruption as an “effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means”—private gain at public expense. According to Dike in Fagbadebo (2007), corruption is a result of significant wealth inequality, the belief that political office is the primary route to acquiring wealth, conflicts between evolving moral codes, a lack of effective social and governmental enforcement mechanisms, and a lack of a strong sense of national identity. Thus, corruption is an act that contradicts existing orders or rules in any

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given environment. And the primary motive is wealth-making by diverting the wealth of the state for personal gains.

2.4

Separation of Power

The theory of the separation of powers may be bifurcated into the ancient and modern historical epochs. The philosophical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and ancient Greece formed the ancient theory of the principle of separation of power (Gailmard 2017; Barber et al. 2019). Classical political thinkers recognized the different functions of the branches of the government. The writings of these philosophers have found their way of influencing modern scholars. In his political work, Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, Montesquieu prominently featured the principle of the separation of powers in his analysis of the government. Montesquieu makes a distinction between the court and what he refers to as “the power of judging,” or the legislative and executive branches of government. This three-partite system offers responsibility separation and checks and balances to prevent the concentration of unchecked authority in order to prevent despotism or inefficiencies. For any democratic political system to experience optimal functioning, there must be room for each organ of government to be independent of each other but harmoniously working together for the success of the whole system. Each organ is expected to be a watch on the others in a bid to checkmate their excesses. Power without control can corrupt and destroy the system and the manager of the power itself. The doctrine of checks and balances is a stabilizing mechanism that would propel optimal functioning and accountable government (Saskia 2017; Goldgeier and Saunders 2018). The essence of the theory of separation of powers, therefore, is built on the belief that, if the executive, legislature, and judiciary powers are vested in one person or group of individuals, such people would have unlimited powers, a development that is contrary to democratic ethos (Saskia 2017). These powers can be used contrary to constitutional prescriptions such that the powerholders become despotic and cruel (DePlato 2021). However, separation of powers guarantees that power will not be cruelly and unjustly used, hence, no group of individuals who constitute the government of a country can prescribe, execute, and adjudicate in a case at the same time—perpetration of injustice is therefore minimized (DePlato 2021). In Nigeria, the principle of separation of powers faces grievous challenges. A major challenge is that, often, the legislature operates like an extension of the executive arm (Fagbadebo 2020). This is because the executive controls more power with reverence than the other arms of government. This is contrary to the spirit of constitutional democracy, and the intendment of the drafters of the Nigerian presidential constitution. This has consequently subjected the process of policy and law-making to manipulation while the judicial pronouncements have been treated with contempt.

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3 The Genesis of Executive Interference in Nigeria Chapter 1, Sections 1–12 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution vested governmental powers in the three arms of the government: legislature, executive, and judiciary. This division of powers is not created to institutionalize the isolation of any arm of government. Thus, the definition of powers to each arm only ensures an interlocking system of checks and balances rather than an absolute separation of powers, which is impracticable. This is obvious under the Nigerian constitutional arrangement. While Article 1, section 7 of the 1999 constitution grants the President the power to veto any bill that is passed by the legislature. The legislative houses can impeach the President over constitutional infractions. Also, the President’s nominations for the appointment of Justices to the Supreme Court and the appointment of the Chief Justice of Nigeria are subject to the Senate’s confirmation. The legislature has the authority to oversee public finances as well as conduct investigations. The courts, on the other hand, have the authority to scrutinize executive and legislative decisions. A system of checks and balances, which enables each branch of government to defend its position within the constitutional structure of government, is essentially what the division of powers operationally entails. It requires adaptability, comprehension, and collaboration among the branches of government, with each branch understanding and upholding their own bounds. All governmental branches work together as partners in progress to fulfill the government’s mission in this way. Anyaegbunam (2000) notes that the executive frequently perceives the legislature, in performing its oversight function, as exceeding the constitutional limits. The administration frequently views this as impeding the government’s ability to quickly address the needs of the populace. Anyaegbunam (2000) adds that the legislature, on the other hand, sees the failure of its oversight function as a direct violation of the will of the people. The legislative interprets the executive’s lack of cooperation as a denial of the public’s right to know about the executive’s operations. Usually, this cycle of mistrust leads to chilly ties between the two branches of government. The Clifford constitution’s 1922 merger of the Nigerian Council of 1914 with the Legislative Council of the Colony of Lagos to form the Nigerian Legislative Council marked the beginning of administrative influence in the legislative process. The Council, on the other hand, was merely a deliberative body made up of Nigerians and numerous representatives or appointees of the colonial authority. The Council’s decisions lacked legal standing. The Southern Provinces, which included the colony of Lagos, were the only areas under the Council’s narrow purview; the Northern Provinces were not subject to its legislative authority. The colonial office in London and the governor in Lagos continued to exercise colonial control over Northern Nigeria (Oyediran 2007). It is arguably crucial to remember that the Nigerian Legislative Council did not exist for any benevolent purpose; rather, it was established to allow British authorities to solicit as much indigenous input and opinion as possible while they exercised their power (Olusanya 1980). The Executive Council, however, was primarily made up of Europeans because Africans were not represented there despite the Council’s great power. It was made

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up of the Governor, Chief Secretary, Southern and Northern Provinces’ governors, the Administrator of the Colony, and numerous department heads. An opportunity for the uncontrolled use of absolute authority was created by the governor’s conferral of vast powers (Olusanya 1980). Nigerians were denied the chance to participate in the creation and implementation of policies that would have a significant impact on their daily lives as a result of their exclusion from the Executive Council. Additionally, because the Nigerian Legislative Council was subordinate to the Executive Council, the latter was susceptible to the whims and caprices of the Governor. As long as he followed the instructions from the British Government, the Governor had the ability to veto or approve any law enacted by the Legislative Council. The Governor possessed and used unchecked power. The Richard Constitution did not constitute the Central Nigeria Legislative Council and the three regional assemblies for the three provinces it had designated— North, West, and East—until 1946. The major ethnic groups in the nation were essentially represented by these regional divisions: Igbo in the east, Hausa-Fulani in the north, and Yoruba in the west. For the first time, this Legislative Council was permitted to have outstanding African majority representations with the authority to establish legislation for the entire nation (Akinboye and Anifowose 2008). The Council was made up of 45 people, including the Governor, who remained its head, 16 official members, 13 ex-officio members, 3 nominees, 28 unofficial members, 4 directly elected members, and 24 nominated or indirectly elected members (Ojo 1998). While the Northern Region had a bicameral legislature made up of a House of Assembly and House of Chiefs, each of the Western and Eastern Regions had a unicameral legislature called the House of Assembly. While the House of Assembly was made up of nominees of the Native Authorities chosen from among their members as well as official and unofficial members, the House of Chiefs was made up exclusively of first-class chiefs and was presided over by the Chief Commissioner, a new title for the Lt. Governor. The new constitution, however, had little effect on the Executive Council. Officials and certain nominated members made up the majority of the membership. No ordinance could be passed without the Governor’s approval, and as such, the situation was the same as in 1922, despite the fact that there was a larger representation of Africans. The Governor was still all-powerful and overruled the Legislative Council as he set the agenda. Notably, The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 created the groundwork for the first brand of a federal structure for Nigeria by outlining the areas of authority for the central and regional legislative bodies as well as providing for the first time the residual, exclusive, and concurrent lists. As a result, Nigeria developed into a federation with three independent regions. The Governor-General and the regional governors were no longer members of the legislature, and each area had a Premier, a cabinet, and a legislature. The Governor or his nominee was no longer the head of either of the houses in the West; instead, the Speaker of the House of Assembly and the President of the House of Chiefs were elected at the discretion of the respective Houses. While the Governor continued to preside over the House of Chiefs and his nominee continued to serve as

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Speaker of the House of Assembly in the North, the Governor continued to appoint the Speaker of the House of Assembly in the East. Three legislative lists were made in accordance with the federal structure: an exclusive list of matters on which only the House of Representatives could legislate; a concurrent list on which the House of Representatives and the Regional Houses of Assembly could both pass laws; and a residual list of matters on which the regional legislatures alone could pass laws (Ojo 1998). During Nigeria’s Second Republic, which lasted from 1979 to 1983, the National Assembly and President Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari, who was frequently frustrated with the legislature, engaged in unhealthy rivalry and competition for supremacy. The hostility was characterized by allegations of constitutional breaches in the discharge of responsibilities (Dunmoye 2005). During this period, the legislature that sought to exert its supremacy was not independent of the control of the executive (Nwabuzor and Mueller 1985). The domineering power of the president and the governors as the leaders of their political parties in their respective domains stifled the assertive role of legislators who were forced to abide by the orders of their political parties. This was possible because of the dominance of the political party in the control of the legislature and the executive. With the power of political patronage to pacify members of the legislature, the president and the governors were able to control, indirectly, the legislative agenda (Awotokun 1988). Though the separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, it is imperative to note that the three branches of the government are not completely separated from each other. This is understandable: presidentialism is a governing system that exhibits the axiom of separated but shared powers. A system of checks and balances exists among them. Sections 58 (1) and 100 (1) of the Constitution affirmed that the president or the governor shares the law-making power with the legislature through assent to bills passed by the legislature to become laws. However, in accordance with sections 58 (5) and 100 (5), the respective legislature may overcome a presidential or gubernatorial refusal to consent to a law by a two-thirds majority. Again, Sections 147 (2) and 192 (2) of the 1999 Constitution state that while the president or governor may nominate members of the executive council, those appointments must be approved by the legislature. Additionally, Sections 175 and 211 of the Constitution, which provide the President and Governor the discretion to grant pardons, respectively, impose judicial authority on the executive.

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4 Cases of Executive Interference and Its Impact on Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic The relationship between the legislature and executive as regards executive interference or overreach on legislative duties and processes has been a major challenge in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Since the return to democracy in 1999, the country has witnessed conflicts between the legislators and the executive at all levels of government (Ikoronye 2005). While there are constitutional provisions that provide the demarcations of the statutory power of the two institutions, the Fourth Republic seems to have experienced the highest levels of confrontational and conflictual power relations and the absence of comity and cooperation between the executive and the legislature (Mbah 2007). Below are the instances and cases of executive interferences in the country within the dispensation with relevant references to the constitution and its impact on governance. Executives overbearing started right from the inauguration of the Fourth Republic over the choice of leadership in the National Assembly. This cumulatively led to the change of leadership in the National Assembly: 3 Senate presidents and 2 House of Representative speakers in the first four years of the Fourth Republic as President Obasanjo insisted on having not only the last say but also the way the leadership of the legislators was chosen. Similar theatrics was played out at the start of the 8th NASS, when against the designs of some political godfathers, Senator Bukola Saraki, hid in a car at the NASS complex on June 9, 2015, pending his subsequent election as President of the Senate, while Tambuwal and Ihedioha disguised themselves and surreptitiously crept into the NASS premises earlier to secure themselves pending the start of plenary session (Sobechi 2019). These escapades did much to underscore the legendary pattern of executive interference in the selection process of the National Assembly leadership. One of the issues of interference by the executives over legislative duties in the early days of the Fourth Republic was the dissolution of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) established under Decree No. 25 of 1994 by the President. The president authorized the winding up of the agency after several series of allegations of massive fraud, lopsided distribution of projects between North and South, as well as the lack of checks and balances in its operations. The National Assembly viewed this as a clear invasion of its statutory and constitutional authority to enact and amend legislation. To put the situation to rest, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice had to step in. According to the provisions of Section 315(4)(a) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution, which stated that the President might change any existing law, the Minister contended that the President’s action was not illegal. He asserted that the modification might take the form of an addition, an adjustment, an omission, or an outright repeal. Executive interference and overbearing were also experienced during the 2002 budget approval process. The Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation was established by Section 80 of the 1999 Constitution, which also stipulates that no money may be taken out of the fund unless it is used to pay expenses that have been

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charged to it or where the issuance of the funds has been authorized by the legislature in accordance with Section 81 of the Constitution. It further stipulated that only withdrawals approved by legislative acts, which must explicitly specify the mode of the withdrawal, may be made from any other Federation funds. Notably, Section 81 (1) gives the executive the authority to create the budget. This has led to friction between the legislative and executive organs of government since the start of civilian rule in 1999. The unilateral amendments to the proposed budget are a fundamental duty of the parliament as well as its approval. The 2002 proposed budget was characterized by gridlock before it was approved five months after its presentation to the legislators (Aiyede and Isumonah 2002). The executive sent a Budget proposal of N1.06 trillion to the National Assembly, with a provision of N297 billion capital expenditure and N587, 096, 146, expenditure. However, the lawmakers amended the budget by increasing the capital allocation from N297 billion to N458.7 billion and slashing recurrent allocation by 20%. The National Assembly perceived the President’s revision of the budget estimate as executive meddling in its legislative responsibilities as a result of his frustration with the altered budget. The National Assembly started the impeachment process against the President as a result of the President’s choice to execute the revised budget without adhering to the version approved by the National Assembly. To stop the impeachment attempt, nonetheless, it took the leadership of the ruling party (PDP). The debate surrounding the legislature’s adoption of the Electoral Act of 2001 and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) Act 2000 also resulted in blazing conflict between the two arms. This was due to the addition of a provision to Section 80 of the Electoral Act 2001 that would prevent new political parties from fielding candidates in 2003, with the exception of local elections. By inserting a singular provision, section 80 (1) of the bill was changed to state that a newly registered political party would be qualified to run in both federal and state elections as long as it first took part in local elections and won at least 10% of the councillorship and chairmanship positions across the federation, distributed among two-thirds of the federation’s states and the Federal Capital Territory. However, clause 80 (1) of the original bill stated that any political party that does not sponsor at least 15% of the candidates for councillorship, council chairmanship, and state houses of assembly throughout the federation, distributed among two-thirds of the states of the federation, and the Federal Capital Territory, should not take part in the general elections after the close of nominations (Ogunmupe and Phillips 2002). The incident led to a historic dispute regarding the veracity of the 2001 version of the Electoral Act between the National Assembly and the Presidency (Sanyaolu 2002). Some cases of the executive overboard on the legislatures have also led to serious frictions in the relationship between the two institutions, in 2012, the National Assembly refused to allocate a budget to the Security and Exchange Commission, a federal financial agency. This was because of the refusal of the President to implement the resolution of the House of Representatives to suspend the Director General of the agency, Arunmah Oteh. Ms. Oteh was accused of not satisfying the

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legal requirements before her appointment to the Office as the Director General. She was subsequently suspended as the DG, but the President recalled and reinstated her. The National Assembly saw this as an affront. The Senate decided to ostracize the Commission and would not consider its budget proposals until the executive abided by its recommendation to remove the DG. The Senate later adopted the resolution of the House of Representatives by withholding the budgetary allocation of the Commission in the final 2013 appropriated budget proposal transmitted to the President for assent (Udo 2013). A historical assessment of the executive interference in legislative institutions in Nigeria, as shown above clearly evidenced the fact that the institutions of governance which are established to checkmate each other in a complementary manner have continually engaged in the battle for supremacy. This, however, has negative impacts on the performance of these institutions and more importantly on Nigerians.

5 Conclusion The constant rift between the executive and legislative arms has always been one that is born out of ego, self-interest, and the struggle for superiority, not a genuine commitment to public service. The struggle to acquire and hold on to state power is usually the greatest concern of political actors. This very well applies to Nigerian politicians who see public office as means to achieve their pecuniary interests and massage their egos. Politics in Africa is one of showmanship and personality cults hence, a clash of egos abounds in the continent. Political actors in the legislative and executive branches of government in Nigeria must realize the fact that the will and wishes of the people supersede the satisfaction of their egos and political interests. Government should imbibe the culture of subjecting its policies and plans to wide consultations, public debate, and scrutiny. A knowledge of people’s will and wish can guarantee and promote the unity of purpose which will prevent such rifts from occurring. Noteworthy is the fact that the Nigeria 1999 Constitution is ambiguous on so many important issues. There is a need for a robust constitutional review of the 1999 constitution; one that will clearly define the scope and modus operandi of the different branches of government and how concerned political actors wield state power. The promotion of public good and interest should be the most important justification for the exercise of state powers. Therefore, powers to be exercised by the executive, legislative and judicial branches must be reviewed in the 1999 Constitution in a manner that guarantees the independence of the branches and limits the interference in the performance of the responsibilities of each of the branches of the government.

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References Aiyede RE, Isumonah AV (2002) Towards democratic consolidation in Nigeria: executive-legislative relation and the budgetary process. Development Policy Centre, Ibadan Akinboye SO, Anifowose R (2008) Nigerian government and politics. In: Anifowose R, Enemuo F (eds) Elements of politics. Sam Iroanusi Publications, Lagos Anyaegbunam EO (2000) Assembly handbook: a legislator’s companion. FEF, Lagos Annan K (2004) Forward in United Nations Convention against corruption. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UN, New York City Awotokun K (1988) Legislative-executive relations: case studies. In: Victor A, Soremekun K (eds) Nigeria’s Second Republic. Daily Trust Publications, Apapa, pp 85–106 Azimazi MJ, Seye O (2016) Senate alleges executive interference in planned trial of Saraki, Ekweremadu. The Guardian Newspaper, on 20 June, retrieved from https://guardian.ng/news/ senate-alleges-executive-interference-in-planned-trial-of-saraki-ekweremadu/ on 18/02/2021 Barber M, Bolton A, Thrower S (2019) Legislative constraints on executive unilateralism in separation of powers system. Legis Stud Q 1. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12232 Bardhan P (1997) Corruption and development: a review of issues. J Econ Lit 35:1320–1346 Barkan JD (2009) Legislative power in emerging African democracies. Lynne Rienner Publisher, New York DePlato J (2021) The theory of executive emergency power: competing thoughts and models supporting extraordinary executive power in times of crisis. US-China Law Rev 18(3):134–152 Dong B, Dulleck U, Torgler B (2012) Conditional corruption. J Econ Psychol 33(3):609–627 Dunmoye AR (2005) Legislative powers and executive- legislature relations in Nigeria: 1999 to 2003. Niger J Polit Sci 9(1 & 2) Fagbadebo OM (2007) Corruption, governance and political instability in Nigeria. Afr J Polit Sci Int Relat 1(2):28–37 Fagbadebo OM (2019a) An overview of legislative oversight and accountability mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa. In: Fagbadebo OM, Ruffin FA (eds) Perspectives on the legislature and the prospects of accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, pp 19–44 Fagbadebo OM (2019b) Interrogating the constitutional requisites for legislative oversight in the promotion of accountability and good governance in South Africa and Nigeria. Insight Afr 11(1):38–59 Fagbadebo OM (2020) Impeachment in the Nigerian presidential system: challenges, successes and the way forward. Palgrave Macmillan. https://bit.ly/332d5AQ Gailmard S (2017) Building a new imperial state: the strategic foundations of separation of powers in America. Am Polit Sci Rev:1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000235 Goldgeier J, Saunders EN (2018) The unconstrained presidency: checks and balances eroded long before Trump. Foreign Aff 97(5):144–156 Ibekwe N (2015) Conduct Bureau slams 13-count corruption charge on Senate President, Bukola Saraki. Premium Times, September 16. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ news/top-news/190161-conduct-bureau-slams-13-count-corruption-charge-on-senate-presi dent-bukola-saraki.html. Accessed 18 Feb 2021 Ihemeje CG, Zaid BA, Jayum AJ (2016) Factors influencing the executive and legislative conflict in Nigeria political development. IOSR J Humanit Soc Sci (IOSR-JHSS) 21(8):20–25 Ikoronye I (2005) Legislative executive relationship and powers functions of the legislature in local government administration. J Niger Gov Polit 1(1):123–131 Lafenwa SA (2003) The legislature and the challenges of democratic governance in Africa: the Nigeria case. A Draft Seminar Paper for Conference Organised by the Politics and International Studies Center for African Studies, University of Leeds on Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects Manzoor L (2013) Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2410525. Accessed 04 Dec 2021

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Mbah P (2007) Executive-legislative relations in Nigeria: the Presidency and the National Assembly, 1999-2006. Nigeria J Soc Sci 1(1) McLean JM (2019) For a law of public contract per se: an intervention from liberal contract theory. Oxford J Leg Stud 39(4):856–877. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqz023 Nwabuzor EJ, Mueller M (1985) An introduction to political science for African students. Macmillan Publishers Ltd, London Nwaubani OO (2014) The legislature and democracy in Nigeria, (1960-2003): history, constitutional role and prospects. Res Humanit Soc Sci 4(15) Ogunmupe B, Phillips A (2002) Death of Electoral Act. Newswatch, January 14. 35(2) Ojo JD (1998) The Executive under the Nigerian Presidential System, 1960–1995. In: Amuwo K, Agbaje A, Suberu R, Herault G (eds) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Spectrum Books Ltd., Ibadan, pp 299–315 Olusanya GO (1980) Constitutional development in Nigeria: 1861–1960. In: Ikime O (ed) Groundwork of Nigerian history. Heinemann, Ibadan Oyediran O (2007) Nigerian constitutional development. Oyediran Consults International, Ibadan Rose-Ackerman S (1999) Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge University Press, New York Sanyaolu K (2002) Matters arising on the electoral law verdict. The Guardian, March 31:1 Saskia PR (2017) Populism and the erosion of horizontal accountability in Latin America. Polit Stud:1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217177235 Sobechi L (2019) Tracing executive interference in national assembly leadership selection process. The Guardian 02 April. Retrieved from https://guardian.ng/politics/tracing-executive-interfer ence-in-national-assembly-leadership-selection-process/ on 20/09/2020 The World Bank (2020) Anticorruption Fact Sheet. February 19. Retrieved from https://www. worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/19/anticorruption-fact-sheet Udo B (2013) How presidency, National Assembly Feud over SEC boss, Oteh, makes workers suffer. Premium Times. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/116819how-presidency-national-assembly-feud-over-sec-boss-oteh-makes-workers-suffer.html on 20/08/2020

Oyewole Oyindamola Opeoluwa is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Achievers University, Owo Nigeria. He bagged his Ph.D. in Political Economy and Development Studies from the University of Abuja, Nigeria. His area of specialization includes Political Economy and Development Studies, Political Theory, Political behavior, Electoral Management, and International Political Economy. Daramola Iyanunioluwa Oluwatobi is a researcher and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Achievers University, Owo. He is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa. His area of interest includes public policy, Climate change and climate policies, international relations and diplomacy, conflict management, and conflict resolution. Gbadeyan Olawale James is a faculty member at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Federal University Oye-Ekiti. He is currently a doctoral student at the University of KwaZuluNatal, South Africa. His areas of interest include resource Conflict, Conflict Management, and security sector reforms.

Constituency Projects in Nigeria’s 8th National Assembly, 2015–2019 Oluwatobi O. Adeyemi and Adekeye Adeshola Joseph

Abstract This study interrogates the constituency project implementation in Nigeria during the 8th National Assembly. It critically appraises the impacts of constituency projects on the quality of life of average citizens in Nigeria during the period under review. The research method adopted is qualitative techniques of data collection and interpretation through the content analysis of information obtained from government documents. The findings of the study reveal that constituency project implementation in Nigeria during the 8th National Assembly has contributed meaningfully towards the improvement in the quality of life of average Nigerians in some sections of the country. However, the success stories recorded could have been holistic if project implementation is devoid of corruption, embezzlement, inflation of contract award, use of substandard materials, and diversion of funds. Therefore, the study recommended that there is a need for collaboration between the legislature and the people residing in each constituency to synergize their efforts towards achieving inclusive development. Above all, the legislature should stick to its traditional responsibilities of lawmaking and oversight functions while the executive arm of government should focus on project implementation strictly.

1 Introduction The introduction of constituency projects into budgetary process in Nigeria became a reality during President Olusegun Bosanko’s administration in 1999. Normally, policy implementation function is the primary responsibility of the executive while the legislature makes laws and the judiciary interprets the law. However, constituency project implementation shows a clear departure from the constitutional roles of O. O. Adeyemi (✉) Department of Local Government & Development Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria A. A. Joseph Department of Public Administration, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_9

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the legislature by meddling in the roles of the executive. However, the lawmakers were eventually considered as major stakeholders in the initiation and execution of constituency projects in their respective zones so as to ensure that resources are evenly distributed to their various respective constituencies. In view of the above, this study appraises the impacts of constituency projects on the life of average citizens during the 8th National Assembly. It also seeks to examine the constitutional roles of legislature and executive in the implementation of constituency projects and ascertain whether the implementation of constituency projects during the period under review has improved the quality of life of average Nigerian citizen.

2 Methodology The study employed a qualitative approach of data gathering of official documents which include government publications, National Development plans, National Assembly Bulletin and National Dailies. The above documents contained all the necessary information on the implementation of constituency projects in the 8th National Assembly.

3 Conceptual Framework A constituency can be viewed as an electoral district, location, or zone delineated to present the wishes and aspirations of the people in the community to the parliament for legislative action. It equally refers to an area divided for elections, and from which the legislative member is elected to serve in a parliament. In Nigeria for example, each of the 36 states is divided into three senatorial districts totaling 109 and 360 federal constituencies. For the purpose of this study, a constituency refers to a demarcated zone or district based on the strength of population and land area for the conduct of election and the delivery of democratic dividend to the people residing in such communities. Constituency projects on the other hand are schemes initiated by the legislature in conjunction with the people in their respective communities. Dogara (2016) defines constituency projects as developmental projects proposed and implemented in the constituency of members of the National Assembly or House of Assemblies. Such projects are executed by various Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs). For the purpose of this study, constituency project refers to the special schemes included in the annual appropriation bill by the legislature for the purpose of boosting the standard of living of the people at the district or zonal levels.

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4 Theoretical Framework The institutional approach was adopted as a theoretical framework since it focuses on legislature-executive regarding the implementation of constituency projects. The proponents of this theory include; Lijphart (2004), Cheibub (2007), Hammond and Christopher (2003), the theory assumes that disagreement and collaboration among the three arms of government (executive, legislature, and judiciary) is a function of the nature of institutional arrangement. This may not be unconnected with the fact that institutions have the capacity to dictate the scheme of things politically, economically and socially. The institutional approach is applicable to this study since there have been series of arguments and counter-arguments on whether the executive or legislature should be responsible for the initiation and implementation of constituency projects during the 8th National Assembly. Ordinarily, the primary responsibility of the legislature as an institution is to make laws and checkmate the activities of the executive arm of government. On issues regarding the implementation of constituency projects, the legislature is expected to sponsor bills on the kind of projects which require urgent attention from his constituency and forward same for executive approval. On the other hand, the executive is expected to approve the Appropriation Act, release funds and implement the constituency project while the legislature has to carry out oversight functions on such projects. In practice, the 8th National Assembly usually oversteps its bound by appointing contractors who were loyal to them for the implementation of constituency projects. The corruption associated with this practice has generated heated debate between the executive and legislature over the years.

5 Implementation of Constituency Projects in Nigeria During the 8th National Assembly and Quality of Lives of Average Citizens in Nigeria The idea of introducing constituency projects in annual appropriation bills by the legislature became a reality in the fourth republic during the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The aim of this novel idea was to ensure inclusive growth and boost the quality of life of people residing within a given zone or district across the country. Nigeria as a nation would have been a little heaven if all the constituencies projects initiated by the legislature during the 8th National Assembly were implemented according to specification. On the contrary, only few projects were effectively implemented while others were abandoned, misappropriated, or poorly implemented. The breakdown of funds released by the Office of Accountant General of the Federation between 2015 and 2019 according to Akintunde (2018) indicated that the sum of N50 billion was approved for zonal intervention scheme in 2015 in three

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(3) tranches; N12.5 billion (1st quarter), N12.5 billion (2nd quarter) and N25 billion (3rd & 4th quarters respectively). The released funds were set aside for the execution of 1284 projects within some selected zones across the state of the federation. In 2016, N80 billion was made available for the execution of 2515 zonal intervention schemes across the country. The funds were released in four (4) tranches; N20 billion, N30 billion, N20 billion, and N10 billion respectively. By 2017, 70 billion was released for the execution of over 2600 constituency projects in two (2) tranches; N50 billion and N20 billion respectively (Akintunde 2018). Similarly, record shows that 30% of the N100 billion approved for the execution of zonal intervention scheme were made available in the 2019 budget by December 13th (Aborisade 2019). A glance at the above information reveals that constituency projects have been implemented in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 but in real sense, the people residing in areas where such projects were purportedly implemented are yet to feel the impact of such monumental investments. In most zones within Nigeria, the populace were made to perceive the implementation of constituency project as a favor done to them by their representatives in parliament. In actual sense, the zonal intervention schemes are funded by government through the appropriation of public funds. By implication, such projects are not provided as an endowment to the community by their representatives as portrayed. As a matter of fact, the implementation of such projects is part of the statutory duty that the government is expected to render to the people (Sunday 2020). In the opinion of Aborisade (2019), “most residents in each respective zones are passing through harrowing experiences due to the abandonment of several constituency schemes during the period of the 8th National Assembly.” In most cases, funds may be released to contractors who will thereafter connive with the lawmakers in diverting such funds into private pockets. Normally, the expected role of the lawmaker is to initiate the inclusion of constituency project in national budget on one hand while the respective Ministry, Department, and Agencies (MDAs) are saddled with the responsibilities of engaging contractors for project implementation but in most cases, lawmakers may decide to use their own contractors for the execution of such projects in connivance with MDAs to siphon public funds into private pockets. In the 8th National Assembly, N1trillion was approved for zonal intervention schemes but the impact of such monumental investment have no direct impact on the quality of life of the people in each respective constituencies nationwide due to arbitrary inflation of contracts, poor execution of projects, outright abandonment of projects by contractors after the release of funds and lack of effective oversight by lawmakers. By implications, inferior materials were used for road construction, erection of structures, and construction of bridges by contractors without effective monitoring (Sunday 2020). In most cases, the projects whose funds have been appropriated, released, and looted are usually included in the appropriation bill of the next fiscal year. In August 2019, the Anti-corruption agency uncovered and impounded goods valued N117m which were stolen and kept in an unknown building. The impounded goods from a lawmaker include; 168 machines, 51 Keke Napeps, 203 Mill equipment, 60 machines and electricity transformers in a building which were procured

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through funds released for the implementation of Zonal Intervention Schemes. The recovered goods were later shared with beneficiaries by Senator Utazi, the Chairman, Senate Committee on Anti-Corruption between 2015 and 2019 (Sunday 2020).

6 Discussion This study examines the execution of Zonal Intervention projects in Nigeria during the 8th National Assembly. The results obtained from the reviewed literature indicates that lack of checks and balances between the legislature and executive arm of government made it possible for approved projects to be abandoned or poorly implemented without holding anyone responsible for such sharp practices. In most cases, the legislature who is saddled with the responsibilities of carrying out oversight on the executive arm of government may even connive with the MDAs and contractors to divert the released funds for the execution of constituency projects into private pockets. As a matter of fact, the yearly N100 billion usually set aside for the implementation of constituency projects is shared into ratio of 60:40 between the Lower and Upper Chambers respectively. By implications, the Lower house is entitled to N60 billion while the Upper house goes home with N40 billion. The Lower Chamber (House of Representatives) is made up of 360 members while the Upper Chamber (Senate) is made up of 109 members. Suffice it to say that only a handful of the approved funds may be released to the legislators after series of deductions by the leadership of the two Chambers. In Senate, for instance, the leadership of the House usually takes N20 billion while the remaining N20 billion goes to about 100 floor members of the house to fund Zonal Schemes in their respective constituencies. In the House of Representatives, the leadership of the house is given N20 billion out of N60 billion while the sum of N40 billion is distributed to other members for the purpose of funding constituency projects. Subsequently, the leadership of the two Houses still have the right to share out of the amount distributed to ordinary members since they can appoint any of the members to be in charge of a particular project in the long run (Busari 2018). Constitutionally, it is not the duty of lawmakers to have access to the funds set aside for the purpose of implementing constituency projects. Specifically, the responsibility of the legislature is to identify the projects to be implemented based on the needs of the people in their respective Zones across the country. Subsequently, the identified projects would be included in budget prepared by each respective MDAs. On the contrary, the projects may be advertised in line with the provision of Public Procurement Act but the lawmakers still have the right to nominate a particular contractor for the execution of such projects in the long run. In most cases, projects are awarded to companies or contractors that may in turn connive with the lawmakers to corner the resources into private pockets. At times, the projects may be abandoned, poorly done or implemented in a half-hazard manner.

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The leadership of each respective house was the one responsible for determining the amount to be allocated for the execution of identified projects on Zonal bases. As observed by Busari (2018), “each Senator is given the sum of N200 million but not in cash since the quotation for the implementation of identified projects would be submitted to each respective Agencies of government for requisition and implementation purposes.” The lawmakers may not have direct access to the fund but they have devised several cunning and crafty ways of obtaining their own share from the funds meant for the implementation of constituency projects. This may take the form of inflation of contract award, the use of substandard materials, or outright connivance with the respective Agencies of government involved in the implementation process to divert the funds into private pockets. An assessment of capital spending for constituency projects by Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) within the period of 2013–2017 indicated that the organization’s capital components increased as follows; 2013 (N960 million), 2014 (N2.7 billion), 2015 (N778 million), 2016 (N1.8 billion), 2017 (N2.18 billion). Subsequently, the legislature outrageously raised the capital expenditure component to N9.52 billion. This amount is more than all the budgets from the preceding years put together (Busari 2018). The lawmakers decided to use SMEDAN as a conduit pipe for siphoning public funds into private packets since the activities of the agency such as training, empowerment, and supply of materials are difficult to track by Anti-corruption Agencies. Other agencies used by the lawmakers in controversial circumstances include the; National Directorate of Employment (NDE), River Basin Development Agency and Lower Niger River Basin Development Agency, and other River Basin Agencies. The NDE capital budget for instance was outrageously increased from N1.1 billion in 2013 to N4 billion in 2017 (Busari 2018).

7 Conclusion and Recommendations The introduction of constituency projects into budgetary process in Nigeria can be traced to 2001 under the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo when the leadership of the legislature based on an unending demand for dividends of democracy by constituents sought the approval of the executive for the identification and execution of social projects in their communities. The argument was that the implementation of constituency projects would allow even infrastructural development across the country since lawmakers who have direct links with constituents at the grassroots have better understanding of the needs of the people. Specific details on the projects, including project type, cost, and target sector have been kept secret in the past because lawmakers engage in self-enriching deals in the implementation of the projects. Thus, constituents hardly know what should statutorily accrue to them. By implication, the implementation of constituency projects in Nigeria during the 8th National Assembly has not improved the quality of life of average citizens considerably due to widespread corruption and lack of accountability.

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In the light of observations made, issues discussed, and facts established, the following recommendations are considered fundamental while making decisions on the implementation of constituency projects in Nigeria: i. The legislature should focus only on its constitutional role of law-making and oversight of the constituency projects implemented by the executive instead of providing contractors, paying contractors and implementing such projects in connivance with the executive arm of government. ii. There is a need to adhere strictly to the provision of Public Procurement Acts to drastically reduce wastage, failure of project implementation, abandonment of projects, and inflation of contract awards. iii. Any ongoing constituency project should be divested of all forms of attachment to individual legislators. Ownership of such projects should be vested in the proximate local government councils. This will reduce the partisan coloration that has characterized constituency projects hitherto and which caused the abandonment of such projects whenever the particular legislator who initiated such projects vacates office. iv. The Constitution should be amended to prevent lawmakers from arbitrarily padding an appropriation bill forwarded to it by the executive. This measure would prevent the insertion of the funding of constituency projects or any other projects in any Appropriation Bill or Act. v. The people residing in each respective community within a given Zone should be directly involved in the initiation and execution of Zonal Intervention projects. This will go a long way in ensuring effective stock-taking on the number of projects implemented in each constituency in a given period of time.

Appendix 1: Allocation Fund for Federal Constituency Projects, 2012–2017 Years 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Source: Sahara Reporters, 2019

Allocation funds #60b #100b #100b #50b #100b #100b #100b #100b

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Appendix 2: The State of Federal Constituency Project in Nigeria Number of State tracked Niger State Anambra State Ogun State Gombe State Delta State Edo State Jigawa State Kebbi State Kogi State Cross River State Imo State Ondo State Kano State Oyo State Kaduna State Total

Number of projects 33 33 29 33 30 18 29 32 31 24 29 33 39 26 17 436

Completed 4 15 9 14 12 5 19 18 8 5 8 14 4 7 3 145

Ongoing 5 14 2 0 9 2 2 4 3 7 9 3 3 7 7 77

Not done 24 4 18 19 9 11 8 11 20 12 12 16 32 12 7 215

Source: Budget/tracker 2015

Appendix 3: 2016 Federal Constituency Projects Across 19 States in Nigeria Number of State tracked Akwa Ibom Cross River Delta Edo Ekiti Enugu Gombe Imo Jigawa Kano Kebbi Kogi Kwara Niger Ondo

Number of projects 30 40 64 70 27 24 43 87 25 36 42 52 8 30 41

Completed 4 13 42 15 14 4 30 34 10 11 30 9 0 16 16

Ongoing 4 5 4 5 1 13 4 7 6 4 0 17 8 9 4

Not done 22 18 15 43 11 1 3 46 9 21 12 32 0 5 16 (continued)

Constituency Projects in Nigeria’s 8th National Assembly, 2015–2019 Number of State tracked Oyo Osun Ogun Sokoto

Number of projects 51 24 71 24

Completed 24 41 26 14

135 Ongoing 1 13 9 4

Not done 25 1 36 6

Source: BudgIT, 2016 Federal Constituency Projects Report

References Aborisade S (2019) Constitutions projects: controversy lingers as communities suffer neglect. Punch Newspaper. 13th December Akintunde B (2018) Despite controversies, constituency projects gulp N200bn in three years. Premium Times. October, 2 Busari K (2018) How Nigerian lawmakers share N100 billion zonal intervention fund annually. Premium Times. April, 22 Cheibub JA (2007) Presidentialism, parliamentary and democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York Dogara Y (2016) Legislative oversight as a critical component of good governance. Being a convocation lecture paper delivered by Dogara Yakubu, Speaker, House of Representatives, at the fourth convocation of Achievers University, Owo, Ondo State, April 9 Hammond TH, Christopher KB (2003) Some complex answers to the simple question, do institutions matter?: policy choice and policy change in presidential and parliamentary systems. J Theor Polit 15(2):145–200 Lijphart A (2004) Constitutional design for •divided societies. J Democr 15(2):96–109 Sunday E (2020) Constituency projects: still a long way to getting value for money. The Guardian. 5 April

Oluwatobi O. Adeyemi holds B.Sc in Political Science in 1999; an M.Sc in Political Science and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysis from the University of Abuja; Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba, and University of Abuja, respectively. He is currently a Reader in the Department of Local Government and Development Studies and also Vice-Dean, Faculty of Administration at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria. His areas of research interest are Public and Local Governance, Policy and Development Studies. He has published articles in both International and Local Journals. Adekeye Adeshola Joseph has a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Abuja. He is a Lecturer and Ag. Head, Department of Public Administration, Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria. He has several books and articles to his credit, both locally and internationally. His area of research interest is Public Administration and Policy Analysis.

Nigeria’s Presidential System and the Vicissitudes of Executive-Legislative Conflicts in the Fourth Republic Ojo Celestine Jombo and Omololu Fagbadebo

Abstract This chapter explores executive-legislative conflicts as a common feature of democratic governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. It interrogates the conflicts, political rivalry, and mutual suspicion that characterized the acrimonious nature of executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system over the course of successive administrations since 1999. The work relies on descriptive and analytical methods to utilize data from both primary and secondary sources to explore some of the major factors manifesting in gridlocks between the executive and legislative branches, and contributing to the ineffectiveness of government. The findings showed that rather than propel greater commitment toward the institutionalization of a strong regime of accountability in governance, the unending conflicts between the two branches of government manifested as parts of the unbridled competition among the political class to gain undue advantage over one another in determining the direction of state policy. The chapter concludes that frictions between political actors across the executive-legislative divide portend serious implications and consequences for the smooth running of government business in Nigeria, as well as the stability of the nation’s democratic process.

O. C. Jombo (✉) Department of Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] O. Fagbadebo Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_10

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1 Introduction Executive-legislative conflicts have been a common feature of democratic governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Many observers have argued that the disagreements between the executive and legislative branches were necessary for the deepening of democratic values in the nation’s political process (Akinbobola 2005; Aminu 2006; Oyewo 2007; Oleszek 2014). For instance, the occasional face-offs between the two branches over the oversight role of the legislature in some agencies and parastatals of government had somewhat increased the momentum of the calls for accountable governance in Nigeria (Aminu 2006). However, the country’s experience since 1999 has shown some semblance of personal dimensions to the struggles between the two arms of government yet manifesting as constitutional issues (Oboh 2014). As Ukase (2014) has noted, a scrutiny of the relationships between the executive and the legislature since 1999 revealed a pot full of acrimonies and conflicts with far-reaching implications on the smooth running of government and the nation’s democratic process. Conflicts, political rivalry, and mutual suspicion characterized the acrimonious nature of the executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system over the course of successive administrations since 1999 (Aiyede 2005; Oyewo 2007). These have been major contributing factors to the ineffectiveness of government, manifesting in gridlocks over policy formulation and implementation as well as funds appropriation. The unending conflicts between the executive and legislative actors have serious consequences for democratic growth and stability in Nigeria (Bassey 2006; Fashagba 2012). Crisis-ridden relationships between the executive and legislative branches, as Lafenwa (2009) has reasoned, remain a major source of political instability in Nigeria. Executive-legislative feuds, in developed democracies, are catalysts for the deepening of democratic values. Among such values is the attainment of more clearly defined spheres of influence of the two organs of government because there is a greater propensity to resort to judicial intervention during policy logjams. In addition, frictions between the two branches not only propel greater commitment toward institutionalizing a strong regime of accountability in governance but also stimulate a robust debate for building strong institutions (Oboh 2014; Oleszek 2014). Nevertheless, such outcomes in Nigeria’s presidential system are different because incessant frictions between the two arms are parts of the narratives for the deepseated leadership crisis. This is a constant phenomenon, manifesting through an unbridled competition among the political class for the soul of the state, apparently for a strategic political gain and undue economic advantage associated with public office. This chapter is divided into four main parts. The first is the introduction while the second part captures some major concepts relevant to the subject matter of the work and teases out a theoretical exploration that defines the framework of analysis for the study. The third part explores, using empirical data, some of the factors promoting executive-legislative feuds in the country’s practice of the presidential system. The

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third part concludes the study with recommendations on the necessity for the two branches of government to work collaboratively and, at the same time; act as checks on each other as envisaged by the 1999 Constitution.

2 Conceptual and Theoretical Explorations David Easton, the foremost proponent of the systems approach to politics identifies the political system as a system of interactions within a given environment. In other words, the political system does not operate in a vacuum; it functions in an environment of interactions and exchanges (Parsons 1968). According to Easton (1965), the political system operates and interacts with the environment in a process involving input and output mechanisms. The inputs are information emanating from the environments, which are expressed in form of demands, material requests, or support and fed into the political system. After processing, they are converted as outputs and released into the environment as authoritative decisions, which in turn, generate feedback from the environment. Awotokun (1992) notes that Easton’s analysis identified information being fed into the political system as inputs and the outcome of its conversion as outputs. The environment, he reasons, would therefore include the people, the constitution, (or constitutional history), political parties, constituency interests, political culture, public opinion, and other variables defining the political context. Going by the prescriptions of system theory, the political system is in a state of constant interactions and seemingly unending exchanges with the environment. This implies that the political system is constantly shaped and shaped by events or happenings in the environment. The presidential system, by design, positions the legislative branch of government to play some vital roles in the governing process (Jombo and Fagbadebo 2019; Nwabueze 1985). Unlike the fusion of power synonymous with parliamentary democracies, the presidential system espouses the notion of separate but shared powers in a system of institutional checks and balances. Under this arrangement, both the executive and the legislature are recognized institutions of government operating within the dictates of their environments. These environments, as described by Oyewo (2007, p. 18), include the broader context of the socio-economic, political, and cultural milieu under which the two institutions operate. In other words, the environment which represents the political context within which the two governmental branches function largely shapes and determines the mode of exchanges between them in the policymaking process. This context, for the legislature, is described as the legislative environment. Legislative role theorists used the concept of the legislative environment to denote the link between the legislators and their constituents. The theory of representative linkage by Hurley and Hill (2003), for example, espouses the necessity for established links between the legislators and their constituents on some issues (Fagbadebo 2016). However, Wahlke et al. (1962) in their earlier work notes that

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the efficacy of such links is determined by the legislative environment. This, according to them, denotes the context or the operational environment under which the legislators perform their representative roles. In their subsequent study, Cooper and Richardson (2006) submit that the operational environment of the legislators can be formal or informal. The formal environment entails the operational boundaries that allowed the legislators by law to function as people’s representatives, including the physical infrastructure such as office space and apparatus in addition to their “party affiliates or ideological leanings” (Cooper and Richardson 2006). While the informal environment represents “the undefined, ever-changing modes of constituents” demands and preferences, party pressures, public opinion as well as the nature of exchanges between the executive and legislative branches of government’ (Hurley and Hill 2003, p. 21). This chapter defines the legislative environment as the political context under which the legislators carry out their representative duties and oversight functions. It includes both the formal and informal operational environment suitable for the performance of legislative assignments. An executive-centered environment where the executive is elevated far above the legislature is considered an adverse legislative environment and is repulsive to the realization of the goals of parliaments (Oni 2013; Ukase 2014). Since the return of democracy in 1999, the executive arm, of Nigeria’s presidential system, has continued to operate as “a super-ordinate branch” over other branches of government. For this reason, it is commonplace for the Nigerian public to ascribe the appellation of “government” to the executive branch (Fagbadebo and Francis 2016, p. 11). Under the Nigerian presidential system, the executive branch has a tremendous edge over the legislature. The executive role over the course of the military interregnum had always been stabilized and expanded as against the legislature, which was not allowed to function (Personal Interview IX, April 6, 2018). This situation has resulted in a weakened legislature and over-celebrated executive with enormous political goodwill from members of the public. The executive has always harped on this to foster his will on the legislature, which often results in conflicts. The primary role of the legislature in presidential democracy is to represent the interests of its constituents. This legislative role entails the set of internalized norms of behavior by the legislator, which informs or determines his actual behavior (Jombo 2019; Olson 2002). Nevertheless, the extent to which this can be achieved is dependent on the conscience of the legislator and the preferences of the people. This is especially true in developing societies with asymmetric political cleavages and a high prevalence of poverty such as Nigeria (Lafenwa 2009; Olson 2002; Fukuyama 2015). Most often, the legislators have to battle between their political survival and the demanding postures of their constituents, which could force them to abandon the ideals, they strongly believed in before their elections into office. This implies that the preferences of the people could at times be at variance with their true interests which change over time and the representative role of the legislators. As a result, most of the behaviors and dispositions of the legislators that often heighten executive-legislative conflicts do not conform to their political representation role but in response to the demands and preferences of their

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constituents. Fagbadebo (2016) notes that a large proportion of the citizenry in ‘developing democracies like Nigeria is not well informed on what constitutes the official responsibilities of their representatives. In place of that, he reasons that “to determine the behavioral disposition of legislators in crucial decisions, there is the need for an analysis of the context in which they seek to represent the preferences of the constituents” (Fagbadebo 2016, p. 112).

3 Obstacles to Harmonious Executive-Legislative Relationships in Nigeria Executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria are in a state of flux, considering the political contexts of the nation’s presidential democracy that is characterized by conflictual executive-legislative relationships. Some factors promoting the incessant face-offs between the two branches of government have been identified; this section explores some of these factors.

3.1

Constitutional History and Perceived Executive Dominance

Nigeria’s constitutional history has shown that the legislature suffered from the prolonged culture of military dictatorship, in terms of the institutionalization of representative democracy. During the periods the military held sway, while the executive and administrative structures of the military government get more entrenched and expanded, there was a total absence of any legislative body to serve as a check on the exercise of powers of the military. Lafenwa (2010) observes that one of the reasons for the recognition of executive powers in the Nigerian context was because of the nature of inactive legislatures existing alongside resilient and active executives over a long period. Even in the periods preceding independence in 1960, the colonial government had always arrogated state power and important functions to the executive council largely dominated by expatriates at the expense of the legislative council (Awotokun 1998; Ojo 1998). The situation became worse in the course of the prolonged military rule as institutions of lawmaking were side-lined, with support shifting to the executive branch, thereby making it more powerful (Jombo 2019). The untoward effect of this was a context where two unequally developed arms of government were made to stand side by side as autonomous and competing entities of government. In Nigeria, past military leaders have dominated the political parties during transitions to democracies after periods of military rule. Given this, a former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, who was also a military Head of State under the military era, exercised absolute governmental powers without any form of legislative

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oversight or interference and was expectedly less tolerant of a legislature he perceived as being an interfering body irrespective of their constitutional powers and role (Oyewo 2007; Fashagba 2009). The leadership of the National Assembly accused him of being overbearing with the mentality of a military leader and as such could hardly survive the intrigues and politicking that goes with democratic practices (Anyim 2003). Between 1999 and 2007, Obasanjo’s military background was always coming to the fore in his longdrawn supremacy battle with the National Assembly, the nation’s central legislature, over appropriation-related matters and other issues. At the state level, governors were also having running battles with members of their legislative assemblies over issues of shared responsibility such as budgeting and allocation of public funds. Oftentimes, the conflictual relationships between the executive and legislature degenerated into severe constitutional issues, which nearly undermined democratic consolidation. Some state governors and their deputies were the victims of executive-legislative conflicts having lost their seats through impeachment by their legislatures (Fagbadebo 2020). For instance, Ayo Fayose, the governor of Ekiti State, and his deputy, Abiodun Olujimi, were impeached on October 16, 2006, and many others (Fagbadebo 2016, 2020; Fatile and Adejuwon 2016). The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, as amended, gives the state houses of assembly power and control over public funds. Sections 120(3) of the constitution specifically state that “no money shall be withdrawn from any fund of the State unless the issues of those monies had been authorized by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State.” Similarly, section 121 of the Constitution provides for an Appropriation Bill which serves as the basis of the executive’s plan for a given fiscal year and which must be considered and passed by the legislature before any money can be withdrawn from relevant accounts of the state. Unfortunately, many of the state governors have not come to terms with these provisions in the running of the affairs of their states.

3.2

Poor Institutional Capacity

The presence of a great number of legislators, newly elected every four-year, due to the lack of continuity in legislative membership, often accounts for the lapses of the legislature in the discharge of its function. Oftentimes, members of parliament do not return to their seats, which reduced the turnout of necessary legislative experience that could boost their capacity, and in turn, deepens their depth of knowledge in relating effectively with the executive. Since the nation’s return to presidential democracy in 1999, there is a high turnover rate of legislators who did not return to their seats (Omitola and Ogunnubi 2016). For instance, between 1999 and 2003, almost all the individuals who served the legislative assemblies lost their re-election bids, and, as a result, a new set of individuals with little or no legislative experience were elected to the legislature. In Ondo and Ekiti states, out of the 26 members that served in their respective Houses of Assembly between 1999 and 2003, only one

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each returned to their seats. Oyo, Osun, and many other states presented similar developments (Omitola and Ogunnubi 2016). At the return of the country to civil rule in 1999, the legislature was in its infancy in terms of structures, functions, and rules of conduct. Thus, it took the National Assembly and the various State Houses of Assembly some time to appreciate their constitutional powers and roles. The longer the duration of democracy, the better equipped the legislators and staff aides, and the deeper will be the entrenchment of democratic values and practice. This would facilitate and promote stable and harmonious relationships between the executive and the legislature.

3.3

Absence of Ideological-Based Political Parties

Adebayo (2008) submits that political parties are an important institutional component of liberal democracy and the electoral process. The growth and stability of modern democratic practice revolve around political parties, which stand out as organized platforms for the articulation of aspirations of the diverse interests that make up the nation. Essentially, political parties are most often recognized and defined by their common goal; they set their eyes on capturing political power through competitive struggles for citizens’ votes and endorsement. Omodia and Egwemi (2011) maintain that the distinguishing factor that separates political parties from other groups in a political system is the goal of attaining and maintaining political power. Dwelling on the importance of political parties, Osaghae (1998) affirms that political parties perform some crucial roles in a democracy, ranging from recruitment of political actors, and mobilization of the citizenry to the provision of alternative political and electoral choices for the populace. For political parties to be able to perform these all-important roles effectively, such parties must put on the toga of ideology (Jombo 2015; Omotola 2008). In other words, the issue of ideology is so central to the activities of political parties that none can effectively achieve its purpose without due recourse to it. Ideology indicates the durable convictions commonly held by party members and determines the natural attitude of a political party toward every public question (Iyare 2004; Moore 2002; Nnoli 2003). It represents a “certain ethical set of ideals, principles, doctrines, myths or symbols of a social movement, institution, class, and large group that explains how society should work, and offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order” (Nnoli 2003, p. 8). Political ideology serves as a veritable means of identification for political parties as well as an instrument of conflict resolution, a prescriptive formula, and a unifying force for mobilization. It guides the operation and activities of political parties, especially their programs of action in and out of government. However, Nigerian political parties since the return of democracy in 1999 have hardly shown any sign of ideological distinctiveness (Omotola 2008). There are 91 political parties in Nigeria (Jombo 2019). Of all these political parties, there is

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none with clear-cut ideological foundations and structures to enable them to contribute effectively to the political process. They are neither progressive nor conservative. Ideology, as captured by Okosi-Simbine (2005), remains the driving force that provides direction for political parties. Since all members of both the National Assembly and States legislative assemblies must belong to a political party, it makes sense that they should be subject to the agendas and manifestoes of their political parties. Nevertheless, political parties in the Fourth Republic have consistently shown their lack of commitment to ideological leanings. Moreover, this deficiency continues to undermine their capacities to embrace broad-based manifestoes that could offer a sort of agenda-setting for their members in government (Omotola 2008; Omodia and Egwemi 2011). For instance, despite their national spread, both the APC and the PDP are not immune to the ethnic bickering and competition characteristic of Nigeria’s political space since independence (Jombo 2015). As Anifowose (2004) has noted, common development in any of the ruling parties is for the sitting president or governor, mostly surrounded by their kinsmen, to take sweeping control of both party and administrative machinery of the government for political reasons. This often resulted in intraparty crises and factions. These internal squabbles and factional acrimonies most often found their way into the policymaking process and invariably engendered disharmonious relationships between the executive and the legislature even in a situation where a single party controls the two arms of the government. The two political parties that ruled in the Fourth Republic, the PDP and the APC, had majority members in the National Assembly. The PDP had majority control of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives between 1999 and 2015. Similarly, the APC has had a majority of the members of the two chambers in the National Assembly from 2015 up to date. Nevertheless, this political advantage has not in any way translated into a smoothened relationship between the executive and legislative branches (Aiyede 2005; Oyewo 2007; Fatile and Adejuwon 2016; Fagbadebo 2020). A former Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Barnabas Gemade, affirmed this deficiency when he lamented that members of the party in the National Assembly failed to adhere to the party’s directives on some issues (This Day 2015, p. 1). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ability of a party to integrate its members in government in line with its ideology is somewhat antithetical to the ideals and principles of the presidential system and could not in any way remove executivelegislative acrimony. This is because; unlike in the parliamentary system where party discipline is a sine qua non for the continuity of government, in presidential systems, members of both the executive and legislative branches of government have an independent base of power arising from their separate competitive political contests. As a result, there is bound to be friction between the executive and the legislature in the course of policymaking irrespective of party affiliation.

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Executive High-Handedness and Interference in the Oversight Functions of the Legislature Since the nation’s return to democracy in 1999, the executive arm of government has attracted a lot of criticism for the way and manner it handles some issues involving the legislature (Uchendu 2008). The determination of who occupies various leadership positions in the legislature as Fatile and Adejuwon (2016) have noted, generated power tussles between the executive and members of the legislature. Most times, the executive has been accused of meddling in the affairs of the legislature, including the performance of its oversight functions (Akomolede and Akomolede 2012). One of such was the Senate investigations into the handling of the Petroleum Trust Development Fund by the Presidency in 2005. President Obasanjo had rejected the findings of the Senate’s probe, which indicted him. He opposed the composition of the Senate Committee that investigated the matter (Momodu and Matudi 2013). Obasanjo alleged that his deputy, Atiku Abubakar, influenced the membership of the Senate committee against him, to secure a legislative reprieve over his alleged unethical conduct. At the height of the imbroglio, another committee was reconstituted that subsequently investigated the matter (Obidimma and Obidimma 2015). This has led to so much tension and crisis in the legislature, which in a way impacted executive-legislative relationships, negatively, over the period. In Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, there are always persistent overtures by either the president or governor to influence the choice of leadership of the legislature. Many observers believe this development is a definite ploy by the executive to ensure its firm grip on the legislature by manipulating it to do its biddings (Aiyede 2005; Okpeh 2014; Ukase 2014; Mohammed and Kinge 2015; Fagbadebo 2020). However, whenever the executive failed to achieve that, it resorted to surreptitious means to stifle either the legislature or its leadership. Ukase (2014) submits that one of the persistent issues that brought disagreements between the two arms of government in Nigeria was the fact that the executive had not come to terms with the reality of the legislative oversight responsibilities. Besides its extensive powers of appropriation and control over public funds, the legislature has the power to scrutinize and approve certain appointments of the executive, including Ministers, Ambassadors, and Heads of security agencies as well as ratification of treaties for domestic use. Section 4(2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “the National Assembly shall have the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof for any matter included in the Exclusive legislative list set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.” In the same vein, section 147(2) states that “any appointment to the office of Minister of the Government of the Federation shall be made by the President but subject to the confirmation by the Senate, an arm of the central legislature.” The 1999 Constitution also grants substantial powers to the legislature in the conduct of external relations. In addition, the legislature is further empowered to remove any erring President, Vice President, Governor, and Deputy Governor via the impeachment procedure

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provided for in the Constitution. Sections 143 and 144 of the 1999 Constitution provide for the impeachment of the President or vice president, while sections 188 and 189 provide for the removal of a governor or deputy governor from office. In the course of performing its oversight functions as well as running its internal affairs, scholars have discovered that there was excessive interference of the executive arm in the activities of the legislature, mostly in the selection of its leaders, which often generated a crisis in the legislature (Akomolede and Akomolede 2012; Obidimma and Obidimma 2015; Okpeh 2014; Ukase 2014). Cases of leadership turnover in the legislature at the national and state levels were mostly orchestrated by the executive (Ovwasa and Abdullai 2017). Executive high-handedness also manifested in form of non-implementation of House resolutions (Fagbadebo 2020). Most often, the legislature deliberated on some national issues and arrived at resolutions. Though it has always been argued by members of the executive branch that the executive does not need to implement resolutions of the legislature, resolutions are not laws, but advisory statements often issued by the legislature to call the attention of the executive to some matters of public importance. Thus, the executive is sometimes reluctant to carry out the legislative requests or may even choose to ignore them and this often results in conflicts, which hinder harmonious relationships between the two branches of government.

3.4

Corruption

Corruption is of global concern to the discourse on public accountability and good governance, especially in developing democracies. Nevertheless, its forms, intensity, and sophistication vary from one country to another. Hence, attempts at defining the concept often prove difficult due to its multifaceted forms and dimensions. Scholars have come to see the concept from different perspectives depending largely on their purpose and orientation. Corruption is considered to pose a great challenge to the development of Nigeria as a democratic nation. The capacity of the nation’s democracy to engender good governance and better the lot of the citizenry is being eroded by the pervasive corruption ravaging every facet of the country’s political and economic space. Nevertheless, the starting point of discussion on the concept in this part commences with Adegbite’s pontification where he avered In human history, no nation ever prospers with perverse values. In fact, no nation can prosper where established procedures are observed in the breach, where governance is for selfenrichment rather than public service. There exists a yawning gap between leadership and stewardship. . . . virtuous societies are built by leaders who are accountable to the led and driven by the altruistic desire to improve the lot of the highest number of the people. (cf. Jombo 2015, 117)

Corruption can be classified according to the context of its occurrence. This chapter focuses on political and economic corruption. Political corruption often

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takes the form of manipulating people and the institutional apparatus of government to gain or retain political power. Moreover, it usually occurs in the political arena, especially in activities related to or connected with elections and succession into political offices (Fagbadebo 2020). Economic corruption, on the other hand, often assumes the circumvention of procedures and subversion of institutional regulations to benefit the underserved favor or unmerited advantage. This could manifest in the activities of parliamentarians in the discharge of their legislative duties, especially in the exercise of their oversight powers over the administrative agencies of government (Orluwene 2014). Corruption in this chapter connotes all types of irregular behavior that vitiate or impede the rules of public conduct, not just in terms of the exchange of material means but also in terms of the deployment of state power for pecuniary motives. Corruption is the bane of Nigerian society. Though the executive branch together with officials of its administrative machinery is often at the center of most corruption scandals, the legislative institution is not immune from the vagaries of the country’s “pervasive culture of corruption” (Fagbadebo 2016, p. 110). The legislative institution in Nigeria is enmeshed in corruption (Fagbadebo 2016). The Nigerian political landscape since 1999 has been characterized by the increasing boldness of the ruling elites to abridge and circumvent the democratic norms to enliven their primordial interests. One of the ways this often manifests is in the desire of and sometimes struggle by the executive arm to manipulate or excessively control the other two arms of government as extensions of the executive branch rather than as independent organs in a system of shared powers. This development, Fagbadebo (2016) has noted, “is a common political strategy to secure legislative and judicial shields against impeachment.” This is because both the legislature and the judiciary play a crucial role in the impeachment process in Nigeria’s presidential system. While the legislature reserves the right and power to initiate the proceedings, the judiciary is empowered to set up the panel that would prove the allegations of misconduct (section 188 of the 1999 Constitution). To secure their seats, state governors always seek, in the legislature and the judiciary, a willing ally, who is ready to be co-opted into the regime of executive dominance and recklessness. In a system where the legislature depends on the executive for funding, the leadership becomes vulnerable to manipulation.

4 Conclusion and Recommendation This chapter examines the phenomenon of executive-legislative conflicts as a common feature of Nigeria’s presidential democracy in the Fourth Republic. As the former British Colony moves farther on its democratic journey, escalating conflicts between the executive and legislative branches represent one of the most potent drawbacks that pose serious threats to the nation’s stability and democratic development.

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An undeniable fallout of this seemingly unending impasse is the far-reaching implications that acrimonious executive-legislative relations have on the smooth running of government as well as the nation’s democratic process. The chapter explores some of the factors promoting executive-legislative conflicts and uncovers personal dimensions of the struggles between the two branches of government which the political elites across the divide often portray as constitutional issues. In consideration of the underlying principles of Nigeria’s presidential constitution, it is evident that the most viable and practical means of enthroning executivelegislative harmony in the country is to imbibe and institutionalize the culture and procedure of dialogue between the two branches of government. Moving forward, therefore, requires that the political elites operating in the two branches part ways with unbridled competition for personal gain and demonstrate greater commitment toward institutionalizing a strong regime of accountability in governance. Presidentialism as a governing principle espouses a regime of independent but shared powers among the principal arms of government. In other words, one major operational tenet of a presidential system is the necessity of the three arms of government to work collaboratively and also act as checks on one another. Under this arrangement, no branch of government can achieve its purpose without the support of another. For this reason, the executive and legislative arms of government should operate within the limits of their constitutional powers while the judicial branch is insulated from the vagaries of partisan politics. This is necessary for a political environment besieged by the pervasive influence of powerful patrons and political merchants who often make independent actions by state institutions impossible.

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Ojo Celestine Jombo obtained a Masters of Science degree in Political Science from the Obafemi Awolowo, Ile Ife, Nigeria in 2013; and holds a doctoral degree also in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko, Nigeria. He was a recipient of the Nigerian Federal Government NEEDS Assessment Scholarship in 2017. He is widely traveled and has presented papers at conferences and workshops in Nigeria and overseas, including publications in both local and international journals. His area of research interests includes; comparative governance, policy science, local government, legislative and development studies. Omololu Fagbadebo holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a Research Associate and a lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, and the University of

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KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute (SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in June/July 2010. He has published academic papers in journals and books. He has presented papers at conferences and workshops. He is a member of the editorial board and associate editor of reputable journals. His area of specialization includes comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies, and African government politics. He is the Coordinator of African Impact Initiatives for Scholars. He is a member of the Editorial Board of SN Social Sciences.

Party Affiliation and Law-making Efficiency: A Study of the Seventh and Eighth Nigerian National Assemblies Oluwabukola Oluwadamilare Olaniyi

Abstract At the core of the achievement of good governance and service delivery, in any given democracy, is the legislature. Given that political leaders emerge from political parties with differing ideologies, an efficient executive-legislative relationship underscores the execution of favorable public policies while seeking to entrench the democratic process. Using the Seventh and Eighth Nigerian National Assemblies as cases, this study explores the dynamics of the party affiliation of leadership, both at the executive and legislative arms, in managing and discharging legislative duties—oversight functions, scrutiny of bills, and the conduct of government officials. The study investigates how competing interests and/or party ideologies shape the legislative process during both periods. Using the descriptive method, the study extensively draws on qualitative official documents, interviews, discussions, books, journal articles, and newspapers on surrounding issues; while subjecting it to thematic content analysis. The study concludes that objectivity, transparency, and accountability are indispensable values a democratic leader should display. This, in turn, depicts the need to reinforce the efficiency of lawmakers in discharging legislative duties as against pronouncing disparities in individual and party ideologies. The paper is compartmentalized into five parts—introduction; overview of legislative decision-making in the realization of good governance; investigation of party homogeneity at the leadership level and the discharge of duties in the Seventh National Assembly; exploring party variance at the leadership level and the discharge of duties in the Eighth Assembly; and the conclusion.

O. O. Olaniyi (✉) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_11

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1 Introduction With credible election being the heart of representative democracy, the citizenry selects representatives, from the variety of ideologies represented by political parties and confers legitimacy on them to oversee and represent their interests at the helm of affairs, while they, in turn, are expected to be accountable to the governed. Good governance as a hallmark of excellence in any given dispensation (Addink 2017) cannot be detached from the existence of strong institutions which are capable of fostering economic, political, and social growth. Representation and a democratic form of government is not a universal theme in Africa; nonetheless, Muriaas and Wang (2012) opine that some of the few who practice it are virtually laden with power tussle between the legislature and the executive. With political leaders emerging from parties with differing ideologies, an executive-legislative relationship underscores the execution of favorable public policies as well as an efficient law-making process. Although disputes and conflicts of interest permeate every human relationship, a lack of cordial relations and genuine drive toward national development at the leadership level is enough to subject matters of governance to anomalies. Therefore, adeptness in achieving set objectives hinge on the existence of a congenial relationship at the leadership level of the arms of government. The law-making and enforcement process is bound to either strengthen or weaken governance. This places the legislature at the pivotal point of governance within a democratic setting. Democratic consolidation is tied to political actors as to how their roles are discharged would either foster and deepen democratic practices or impair them (Ikpe 2011). Political actors are, therefore, indispensable in entrenching the democratization process and factually, there is no modern democracy that has advanced without the existence of committed/efficient political actors and/or elected representatives (Teorell 1999). Guided by the constitution, the law-making function of any democratic state is largely shouldered by the legislature, alongside the task of providing constituency needs and oversight function, although veto power lies with the executive. With the configuration, degree of function, and influence exerted varying across cultures in the world (Fashagba 2019), the accomplishment of legislative duties strengthens the course of accountability in any democratic setting (Barkan 2009). Law-making cannot be underscored as it is channeled toward the articulation of the people’s will and also the anchor on which orderliness is built. The need for the key role played by the legislature is the long-run objective of launching socio-economic as well as political growth and development. Political power in sub-Saharan Africa is however labeled as being informal and heavily personalized (Blaug 2010; Brierley 2012; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The performance of the Nigerian legislature, in the discharge of its duties, at different phases and dispensations has been distinctly rated (Olaoye 2014; Tom and Attai 2014; Ehigiamusoe and Umar 2013; Alabi and Fashagba 2010; Fashagba 2009). Subsumed in the low and/or unsatisfactory degree is the usage of the law-making

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process as a means of seeking personal gains, settling “scores” as well as pleasing political patrons. With the duration of any parliament, as well as a parliamentarian, being four consecutive years, ceteris paribus, the seventh National Assembly ran its course from June 6, 2011, to June 6, 2015; while the eighth Assembly between June 9, 2015, to June 9, 2019, the study investigates the efficiency of both Assemblies in discharging its law-making function. The work is compartmentalized into five sections. The next section discusses governance issues within the law-making process. Subsequent is party affiliation and law-making efficiency under the Seventh Assembly. Following are party affiliation and law-making efficiency under the Eighth Assembly, and the conclusion.

2 An Overview of Governance and the Law-Making Process The role of governance in a country’s social, economic, and political development cannot be underscored as it is a major global index in measuring a government’s success or failure. Governance is typically about the processes, structures, and organizational traditions which determine the exertion of power, decision-making process as well as accountability of decision-makers (Egwu 2005; Potter 2000); notwithstanding, the realization of this poses a challenge to democracies in different degrees and levels. With the citizenry conferring legitimacy on representatives to make laws and oversee governance issues on their behalf, it is pertinent that the latter is committed to the discharge of its duties while functioning at its highest capability. Considering the tendency of power to corrupt (Acton 1887), the principle of the separation of powers is renowned for its attempt to check absolute power and serve as a preventive measure against potential arbitrariness, recklessness and tyranny which is typical of human nature (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). Even though the logic behind the separation of powers is for a distinct clarity between the roles and jurisdiction of government arms as a bid to limit possible interferences in the action (s) of each division, cases of overlap and executive dominance pervade the narrative of quite some democratic state as “legislatures in presidential systems lack the autonomy to operate without executive interference” (Fagbadebo 2019:126) with the tendency to undermine good governance. As a law-making body, the legislature influences rules and policies that advance a democratic political system (Okoosi-Simbine 2010). Kaiser (2007) notes that oversight as a part of the system of checks and balances deals with how the legislature holds the government to account to the public. The legislature is accorded the power to query and investigate any executive agency as deemed fit, as a strategy to check the power of the executive, since humans are liable to abuse power when entrusted with responsibility and resources (CABRI 2018; Williams 2012; Stair-Hall 2011). As the representative of a constituency, legislatures are also tasked with overseeing the welfare of their constituents. Section 88(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) lays credence to this,

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The powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of this section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to—(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.

The provision of the Constitution is no indication that the arms of government are completely detached from each other; but rather, are meant to complement each other in the discharge of their duties to the governed. Nevertheless, good governance requires teamwork resulting from different opinions as against rivalry among government institutions (Fagbadebo 2019). Legislative-executive relations in Nigeria have, at different times, experienced “constructive” and “conflictive” relationships (Momodu and Matubi 2013; Aiyede 2005; Muheeb 2019). This has been one of the determinants of the nature of public trust or distrust in the country’s democratic process. In its study on 40 African countries, Gallup/Wellcome Global Monitor Survey (2018) recorded that while 27.5% of African countries have a high level of trust in their national governments, 72.5% have a low level of trust in theirs. Trust at the Meso-level revolves around the ability of governments to efficiently manage economic and social issues, as related to law and policymaking (Bouckaert 2012). The legislature, as an assembly of elected representatives from geographically defined constituencies, holds a pivotal role in democratic governance. This is evident in its law-making function as well as in articulating and expressing the collective will of the citizenry (Bernick and Bernick 2008; Okoosi-Simbine 2010). In other words, the legislature exists as a link provider between the government and the people. It is the constitutional obligation of the legislature to diligently probe government affairs as it is to serve as the citizenry’s voice and eyes; and in like manner, represent the will of its constituents (Simmons 2002). At the core of the achievement of good governance and service delivery, in any given democracy, is, therefore, the legislature; as it is the arm of government laden with the responsibility of enacting laws, ensuring its functionality as well as holding the government accountable. Legislators are laden with quite some responsibilities, one of which is law-making, which is done by introducing bills, ensuring that bills are drafted acceptably, and are properly scrutinized. This process is a premeditated and delicate pursuit that requires meticulous deliberation. It is a chain of activities involving the passing of motions into resolutions, scrutinizing bills, and passing bills into laws as a means of fostering national development (Tom and Attai 2014). A thorough deliberation is required given the extensive influence which a passed law has on all spheres of public life—cultural, religious, political, social, and economic. As such, legislators are tasked with the creation of a conducive environment for the citizenry to go about their affairs, ensure nation-building as well as guarantee a transparent and accountable implementation of all government budgets and policies. Initiating a bill is spurred by detecting a perceived need that requires urgent attention. This could be in form of an innovative idea or an adjustment to existing law. Adjustments are often made because there have been “some changes in government policies or changes in the society” (Muheeb 2019). Irrespective of the

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three categories of bills in the Nigerian parliament—executive, members, and private, all bills pass through three readings before their adoption, although sittings on them vary. While executive bills originate from any section of the executive arm and are dispatched to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, they may be treated simultaneously in a single sitting by the Senate and the House of Representatives; member bill is advanced by a member or a group of members of the National Assembly, and is separately considered by each chamber; private bills could originate from individuals or organizations, but are introduced on the floor of either of the chambers by a member of the National Assembly and is also considered separately by both chambers. Bills require majority votes before they are passed for the next stage. This goes to further demonstrate the collaboration that exists between both chambers as well as the executive arm. The constitutional provisions, in delegating power to the arms of government, ensure balance in the decision-making process, given that the overall objective is to better the lives of the citizenry while enacting laws and formulating policies to combat economic, social, and political challenges. The legislative-executive relation is thus one of the defining features of a functioning political system (Kopecky 2004) as both are tasked with the making of laws and overseeing decision-making activities. It is therefore imperative that both arms jointly work toward delivering the benefits of democracy and good governance to the citizenry. Transparency necessitates the disclosure of all important data, which in turn increases accountability and better governance (Barrett et al. 2021; IPU 2008). Put succinctly, transparency and accountability augment a sense of national community (Fagbadebo 2007). Of the roles performed by the National Assembly, the passing of bills and the scrutiny of the budgetary process seem to be the most pronounced and documented as it intersects societal, economic, and political concerns. It is no longer novel that this is mostly alluded to when the accomplishment of the legislature is being interrogated. However, the number of bills passed by a legislative session is not an indication of either its effectiveness or performance regarding decision-making. Evaluation, therefore, goes beyond numbers to emphasize the significance of bills passed, the nature of the existing relationship between the legislature-executive as well as its administrative strengths and weaknesses.

3 Party Affiliation and Law-making Efficiency Under the Seventh National Assembly The organization of political parties is such that its primary motive is to compete in elections and capture political offices. The 2011 general elections witnessed the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) emerge as the winner of the presidential election with 58.89% of votes and also captured a large percentage of seats in the legislature with 71 seats in the upper house and 202 seats in the House chamber. This made up for about 58.3% of seats in the legislature. The Seventh Assembly spanned from June 6, 2011, to June 6, 2015. The Senate President, David Mark, and the Speaker of

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the House of Representatives, Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, had contested and won under the same political party—PDP. Given the bi-cameral nature of the National Assembly, which holds it to ensure careful and thorough scrutiny of bills, bills are required to be passed at both chambers before being presented for presidential assent. Needless to say, a party is considered to be in government if it holds a larger percentage of seats in one or both houses; where it is presumed that party members would vote in support of government measures with little or no criticism. This is no inference that members of opposition parties always disapprove of proposed measures by the ruling party. However, the dynamics of loyalty to an inner faction and/or pursuance of personal ideology occasionally cause internal struggle with trajectories of indifference to party directives. The symbiotic relationship existent between interest groups and political parties cannot be overlooked as the latter provides the former with legislation in response to their demands, given their influence as lawmakers. Whereas the presence of differing parties is liable to sway and subject government budget, policies, and proposals to extensive scrutiny and critique—an undertaking which is quite beneficial in governance issues; it could also be of immense detriment to the legislature in cases where criticism is not genuine. Since the inception of the Fourth Republic, leadership tussle has pervaded the legislature at different phases. In the course of the Seventh Assembly, it was observable that there were pronounced intra-party crises stemming from personality and ideological collision, and frigid legislature-executive relationship; irrespective of party homogeneity at the leadership level. Some obvious instances that demonstrated this, as Ajayi and Muawiyya (2019) state, was the refusal of the Senate President to declare the seats of defecting Senators vacant, irrespective of such defections being to the detriment of his party which was suffering an internal crisis at the period. The intra-party crisis witnessed by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) also led to the defection of the leader of the House of Representatives to the opposition party in 2014. As shown in Table 1, a total number of 880 bills were presented before the Seventh Assembly, out of which 20 were executive bills and 2 were sponsored by the Senate. Eighty bills were transmitted by the House of Representatives to the Senate for concurrence, of which all were passed. At the end of the session of the seventh Assembly, 205 bills were passed, 174 bills were yet to be reported out of committee, with 18 bills negatived and 6 withdrawn. Table 1 Status of bills in the Seventh National Assembly

Bill Status Bills introduced at the House of Representatives Bills introduced by Senate Bills Passed by both houses Bills passed Bills Negatived Bills Withdrawn Source: PLAC (2015)

Number 752 128 80 205 18 6

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The policy is birthed from the concession of contending interests, ideas, and purposes; thus, decision-makers often require extensive time as there are deliberations on stakeholders’ interests as well as the implications of the bills. Among the achievements of the Seventh Assembly are the Occupational Safety and Health Bill, Pension Reform Act amendment (Repeal and Re-enactment), Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, Terrorism (Prevention) Act, and Violence against Persons with Disability (Prohibition) Bill. Despite party homogeneity at the leadership levels of both the legislature and executive, the decision-making process under the Seventh Assembly was not without its challenges as it passed a total of 205 bills (Umeagbalasi 2015). The existence of a homogenous party in both the legislative and executive arms of government made the Assembly susceptible to insinuations that the legislature was not autonomous. Circumstances surrounding such allegations are traceable to the deterrence of meaningful inquiries and investigation of the administrative errors of the government. In its legislative agenda, reviewing and addressing loopholes in the constitution was a key focus; however, assent to the majority of such amendments was declined assent by the President. This resulted in tension within the National Assembly as there were confrontations as regards the amendment of the 1999 constitution without the assent of the President. The position of some legislators was that the assent of the President was not required once it is passed by more than two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly. This was evident in the valedictory speech of Senator David Mark, “As much as we tried to bequeath an acceptable constitution, we found ourselves in a legal quagmire induced by the executive; the entire process, efforts and resources needlessly dissipated.” Members of Parliament (MPs) are not completely detached from their political parties as they are subject to the party as regards advice and guidance on their behavior in parliament (Rush and Giddings 2011). In line with Michels’ (1962) assertion that political parties are inherently inclined toward oligarchy when the decision-making process becomes unstructured such that the interests of the elite are prioritized, this is most evident when the party serves as a channel through which MPs can re-contest and sustain their political career. Describing political parties in the Fourth Republic, Egwu (2005) states that political parties are a departure from political organizations as they share no common visions and values for the political community but rather find their common ground in capturing political power. It is thus beneficial for any democratic process that parliaments have mechanisms that tolerate an active role from the opposition, both at the plenary and committee levels (IPU and UNDP 2017). This fosters transparency and involvement of all stakeholders (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). The lack of executive support was displayed under the dispensation as most bills were not assented to and most of such bills, as Fashagba (2019) observes were predominantly private member bills. This underscores Omotola’s (2009) assertion that Nigerian political parties are either ideologically deficient or devoid of ideological commitment. The display of loyalty often exhibited by political actors to the political party on whose platform they were elected to office as well as its ideologies,

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more often than not always has an undertone of self-interest. Although capturing political power to ultimately meet the aggregate interest(s) of the political party through which a candidate is elected to office is a major defining factor, there is the need for proper restructuring of the rudiments of governance.

4 Party Affiliation and Law-making Efficiency Under the Eighth National Assembly At the 2015 elections and the events that had occurred in the two major parties, the intra-party friction which often results from personal preference was pronounced as Senator Saraki won the election as the legislative head against the desires of the party. The consequences that party preferences breed is known to eventually manifest in the political process (Kam 2009) as candidates whose ideological preference does not align with the hub are bound to encounter some level of opposition. This sometimes breeds the fear of suffering exclusion or deprivation of carrying out duties and/or contesting for subsequent political posts. Notwithstanding the frosty relations the leadership of the Eighth legislature had with the executive, on the grounds on which the legislative leadership was selected, the latter prioritized the achievement of an efficient law-making process. The 8th Assembly, which spanned from June 9, 2015, to June 9, 2019, sought to work to improve citizens’ comprehension of the Senate’s roles as well as boost their confidence in the government’s ability to meet their needs. The overall intent of this was to reposition itself as being efficient and capable of improving the country’s governance system as well as the people’s living conditions. The legislature, being the voice of the citizenry, is not an offshoot of the executive and is not subject to expressly approve of the executive’s actions and/or carrying out its bidding. The ability of the legislature to effectively monitor the executive is an indicator of good governance (Stapenhurst et al. 2013). This is vital in the need to verify that executive actions are targeted at meeting the demands of the citizens while probing the process. This aspect of governance, through the historical trajectory, is known to be a major cause of friction as it often gives the impression of disparagement. Partisanship is one major factor that has been identified across literature concerning legislative-executive face-offs (Lafenwa and Gberevbie 2007; Aiyede 2005). In its bid to ensure a transparent legislative process, the Eighth Assembly widely engaged with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the media in delivering its legislative agenda to the public. This was evident in its passage of 96 bills and 72 petitions within two legislative years, as shown in Table 2, thereby surpassing the highest record of 65 bills and 6 petitions held by the Fifth Assembly. Also to its credit is the first National Assembly Joint Public Hearing on the budget. In line with this, it also guaranteed an improvement in the quality of bills, timeliness in their passage and effective implementation. Notable in its

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Bill Status Bills introduced at the Senate Bills introduced at the House of Representatives Bills passed at the Senate Bills passed at the House of Representatives Total Bills passed

Number 815 1674 172 343 515

Source: PLAC (2019)

4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

0 Bills introduced

Bills passed 7th Assembly

Bills introduced at Senate

Bills introduced at HOR

8th Assembly

Fig. 1 Graphical representation of bills under the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies

law-making process was the significant increase in the number of treated bills and also the passed bills against its predecessors since the inception of the Fourth Republic (Fig. 1). Through the course of its dispensation, 2640 bills were introduced while 515 were passed. Although the executive declined assent to 53 bills. Out of the passed bills, 21 were Constitution Alteration bills and only 5 of these received presidential assent. Although most of the bills took a considerable time to be passed, prominent among the bills passed by the Eighth Assembly include the Electronic Transaction bill (2016), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Alteration) bill (2015), the Not-too-young-to-run bill, North East Development Commission bill (2015), National Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Est, etc) bill, Sexual Harassment in Tertiary Educational Institutions Prohibition bill (2016), Whistle Blowers Protection bill (2016) and National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Bill (2019), among others. Noteworthy of these bills was the extensive recognition and applause they received from the media, civil society organizations as well as the citizenry; given the pronounced relevance of most of the bills in addressing issues of probable effect if granted assent and properly implemented. Irrespective of disruptions during its legislative year and owing to the lessons gained from the experiences of the Seventh Assembly, the Eighth Assembly was

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adept in handling legislation such that it made significant improvements as to its predecessors. The 8th Assembly which had 279 new members proved beyond reasonable doubt its commitment to swiftness in handling legislative duties, with both the number of introduced and passed bills surpassing that of its predecessor. The achievement of a considerable number of landmark bills was also a resultant effect of the Assembly’s recognition of inputs shared by citizen groups as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) on various legislative issues through the organization of public hearings. This was evident in the urgent consideration and subjection of bills and budget policies to critical analysis and discourse. This invariably underscores its positive disposition to participatory law-making, although it had its crossroads just like any other Assembly. Any given party is a conglomerate of diverse ideas, principles, interests, and objectives. Irrespective of adopted party ideology, individuals are prone to manifest personal-ideology preference, as disagreements are inevitable in any human relation, causing a responsive change and eventually a review and rethink of their commitment to a common drive. The emergence of representatives from the same party is no guarantee that they would manifest the same behavior and preferences in parliament (Kam 2009; Ceron 2012). Political parties, across different countries, encounter ideological challenges which more often than not lead to internal conflicts. The pronounced role of party organization is the decision on candidate selection and electoral promises (Schumacher and Giger 2017). As Seliger (2019) observes, politics is inseparable from ideology; however, debates remain among theorists and scholars of democracy and comparative politics about the achievability of a “common goal and ideology” within a political party. Ideology as the foundation of the social representation shared by a group plays an insignificant role in most African democracies (Van Dijk 2006; Young 2012). Regardless of its potency to bind people irrespective of social status, ethnicity, sex, religion, and culture, the question of ideology is not quite obtainable in Nigerian politics as conflicts are shrouded in personality issues and the quest to hold power. Under the seventh Assembly, the Senate President defected from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to All Progressive Congress (APC); and in like manner under the eighth Assembly, the Senate President defected from the ruling APC to the opposition PDP. Party switching has become somewhat customary among political actors in the Fourth Republic; and as Fashagba (2019) notes, the singular occurrence during the seventh Assembly “emboldened the defecting Senate leader in 2018.” Cross-carpeting among political actors is typically linked to party indiscipline and unwillingness to subscribe to a party’s ideology. This reveals the significance of ideologies as it eventually translates to the management and discharge of function(s) within organizational structures. Political parties are not entirely devoid of internal crises and corrupt practices which infringe on bureaucratic processes. Such prevalent unethical practices within the political circle of the polity give headway to detrimental effects on governance issues, and specifically the law-making process. Most often, party affiliation is exploited in addressing stemming issues within the two chambers of the National Assembly. For instance, the composition of committees is often used as a reward

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mechanism for devotees of the leadership of both chambers (Fashagba 2009). In his remarks after the second legislative year of the administration, the Senate President, Bukola Saraki appreciated the leadership cooperation that existed in the legislative arm. I cannot fail to mention in particular the support and partnership I have enjoyed with our ever-amiable and dependable DSP, H.E Ike Ekweremadu (the Ikeoha ndigbo); our Senate Leader, Senator Ahmad Lawan for his immeasurable industry and broadmindedness; our minority leader, H. E Senator Godswill Akpabio and the entire leadership of the Senate. Thank you all for the bipartisanship, vision, patriotism, fraternity and solidarity. (The Senate 2017)

There are disparities between decisions and compromises that have to be made when government and ideological statements are held on the sidelines (Kritzinger et al. 2004). the strive for power and dominance is in human nature and this inevitably breeds difficulty in interest articulation and aggregation. There are instances where the executive declined assent to legislative bills as a result of failure to harmonize viewpoints and ideologies. Although subjecting actions, policies, and budgets to thorough scrutiny is healthy for governance, the underlying tone that political tussle sometimes plays cannot be underemphasized. Decision-makers seek to differentiate their party or themselves from others at plenary sessions, thereby amplifying their differences (Omotola 2009). The efficient management of a country’s economic and social resources to foster development underscores good governance. This broadly entails the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies, supervision of activities in the public sector as well as accountability (Potter 2000). Decision-makers must not make party affiliation a prime focus, such that they are entangled in defending the cause of their political party and/or party members when an opposition raises a motion; but instead, strive to entrench cooperation and coordination in fulfilling their constitutionally mandated responsibilities. The achievability of this is highly dependent on strong leadership alongside binding rules which are capable of reducing internal disagreements that may seem party affiliated.

5 Conclusion Since any legislative-executive relationship is to foster democratic stability and development, gridlocks often ensue between both arms. A perpetual lack of focus and discipline in fulfilling constitutional obligations is bound to be detrimental to governance as it leads to “broken trust” and wanes the democratization process. The existence of tension between the legislative and executive arms of government is not exclusively constructed around executive dominance as other factors, which include party affiliation, and political and ideological tussle are often determinants that dictate the formulation, implementation, and speed of policies at the helm of affairs. This is not to say that legislative-executive tension is an unhealthy phenomenon for democracy, as honest disagreements, deliberations, and negotiations underline advancement.

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The realization of tremendous development in any democratic country’s political, economic, and social domain is largely dependent on the decision-making capability and efficiency of both the executive and legislative arms. It is inexplicable how representatives at the helm of political affairs place little or no priority on the promotion of national interests, but rather prioritize personal and/or party interests. Disregarding political affiliation at the point of discharge of duty is quite imperative for representatives—most especially on the leadership front –to truly represent the interests of the nation. The need to promote a desirable relationship between the arms of government, most importantly at the leadership front, cannot be overemphasized as existing synergy cannot be downplayed in policy productivity and service delivery. A workable, personality-rid, and party-rid relationship among legislative members and between both arms is required to facilitate good governance as poor political leadership is bound to endanger democracy in the long run. Leadership style, based on the personality of the leader and the institutional structure, played a vital role in issues of administration and law-making efficiency under both Assemblies. The adoption of a participatory style resulted in novel ideas which translated to a greater level of efficiency under the Eighth Assembly. The inability to focus on fostering development is capable of derailing any institution thereby causing major setbacks. Probity, respect for the rule of law, objectivity, transparency, and accountability are indispensable values any democratic leader should possess. This emphasizes the need for lawmakers to rightly position themselves in assigned constitutional duties as against pronouncing disparities in individual and party ideologies as matters of national interest should be at the forefront of any democratic government’s agenda. It is therefore required that decision-makers exhibit a high level of commitment to protecting the “sanity” of democracy.

References Acton EED (1887) Letter to Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887 Addink GH (2017) Good governance: importance in practice, theories and definitions. Halu Oleo Law Rev 1(1):1–32 Aiyede ER (2005) Executive-legislature relations in Nigeria’s emerging presidential democracy. UNILAG J Polit 10(2):283–297 Ajayi OM, Muawiyya A (2019) Senate leadership in Nigeria’s Fourth republic, 1999 to date. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian national assembly. Springer, Cham Alabi MOA, Fashagba JY (2010) The legislature and anti-corruption crusade under the fourth republic of Nigeria: constitutional imperatives and practical realities. Int J Polit Good Govern 1(1 & 2):1–39 Barkan J (2009) African legislatures and the ‘third wave’ of democratisation. In: Barkan JD (ed) Legislative power in emerging African democracies. Lynne Reiner, Boulder, pp 231–251 Barrett B, Dommett K, Kreiss D (2021) The capricious relationship between technology and democracy: analyzing public policy discussions in the UK and US. Policy Internet 13(4): 522–543

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Bernick EM, Bernick LE (2008) Executive-legislative relations: where you sit really does matter. Soc Sci Q 89(4):969–986. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406237.2008.00594.x Blaug R (2010) How power corrupts: cognition and democracy in organisations, 1st edn. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274853 Bouckaert G (2012) Trust and public administration. Administration 60(1):91–115 Brierley S (2012) Party unity and presidential dominance: parliamentary development in the Fourth republic of Ghana. J Contemp Afr Stud 30(3):419–439 Ceron A (2012) Bounded oligarchy: how and when factions constrain leaders in party positiontaking. Elect Stud 31(4):689–701. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.07.004 Chabal P, Daloz JP (1999) Africa works disorder as a political instrument. International African Institute, London Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (as amended) Egwu S (2005) The legislature in Nigeria’s Fourth republic. In: Gana AT, Omelle YBC (eds) Democratic rebirth in Nigeria: 1999–2004. AFRICOV Ehigiamusoe UK, Umar A (2013) Legislative oversights and budget performance in Nigeria: issues and policy options. IOSR J Econ Finance 1(5):1–12 Fagbadebo O (2007) Corruption, governance and political instability in Nigeria. Afr J Pol Sci Int Relat 1(2):28–37. https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR.9000026 Fagbadebo O (2019) Inter-chamber relations in Nigeria’s presidential system in the fourth republic. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian national assembly. Springer, Cham Fashagba JY (2009) Legislative oversight under the Nigerian presidential system. J Legis Stud 15(4):439–459. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330903302497 Fashagba JY (2019) Exploring the Nigerian central legislative institution. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian national assembly. Springer, Cham Ikpe BU (2011) Evaluating democratic consolidation in Nigeria: some theoretical considerations. In: Bamisaye OA, Awofeso O (eds) Democracy and democratic practice in Nigeria: issues, challenges and prospects. MacGrace Publishers, Lagos IPU & UNDP (2017) Parliamentary oversight: Parliament’s power to hold government to account. Global parliamentary report 2017. http://www.ipu.org/oversight IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) (2008) Evaluating parliament: a self-assessment toolkit for parliaments. IPU, Geneva. http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/self-e.pdf Kaiser FM (2007) Congressional oversight. In: Plesser CS (ed) Congress of the United States: oversight, processes and procedures. Nova Science Publishers, New York, pp 221–226 Kam C (2009) Party discipline and parliamentary politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kopecky P (2004) Power to the executive! The changing executive–legislative relations in Eastern Europe. J Legis Stud 10(2–3):142–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/1357233042000322274 Kritzinger S, Klemmensen R, Chari R (2004) Party leadership and party cohesion: determining factors of government participation and incumbency success of right-wing parties. Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, NJ Lafenwa S, Gberevbie DE (2007) Legislative oversight and cost of governance in Nigeria. In: Cost of Governance in Nigeria. An evaluative analysis. Ambrose Ali University Publishing House, Ekpoma, pp 216–244 Lindstedt C, Naurin D (2010) Transparency is not enough: making transparency effective in reducing corruption. Int Polit Sci Rev 31(3):301–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0192512110377602 Michels R (1962) Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. Macmillan, New York Momodu AJ, Matubi GI (2013) The implications of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. Public Policy Adm Res 3(8):30–42 Muheeb IO (2019) The trajectory of the legislature, law-making and legislation in Nigeria. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian national assembly. Springer, Cham

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Muriaas RL, Wang V (2012) Executive dominance and the politics of quota representation in Uganda. J Mod Afr Stud 50(2):309–338. https://doi.org/10.2307/41653703 Okoosi-Simbine AT (2010) Understanding the role and challenges of the legislature in the fourth republic: the case of Oyo state house of assembly. Nigeria J Legis Aff 3(1–3):1–27 Olaoye FO (2014) An exploratory evaluation of legislative lawlessness in the Nigerian budget process. Singaporean J Bus Econ Manag Stud 51(1515):1–8 Omotola S (2009) Nigerian parties and political ideology. J Alter Perspect Soc Sci 1(3):612–634 Omotoso F, Oladeji O (2019) Legislative oversight in the Nigerian fourth republic. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian national assembly. Springer, Cham PLAC (2015) Bills Track. Nigeria National Assembly. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre. https:// placng.org/i/ PLAC (2019) Bills Track. Nigeria National Assembly. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre. https:// placng.org/i/ Potter D (2000) Democratization, good governance and development. In: Allen T, Thomas A (eds) Poverty and development into the 21st century. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 365–382 Rush M, Giddings P (2011) Parliamentary socialisation. In: Rush M, Giddings P (eds) Parliamentary socialisation. Understanding governance series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi. org/10.1057/9780230316850_7 Schumacher G, Giger N (2017) Who leads the party? On membership size, electorates and party oligarchy. Polit Stud 65(1):162–181. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716667957 Seliger M (2019) Ideology and politics. Routledge, Milton. https://doi.org/10.4324/ 9780429284779 Simmons CW (2002) Legislative oversight of the executive branch, vol 2. California State Library, Sacramento, CA Stair-Hall G (2011) Legislative oversight: a guidebook for Ohio legislators. Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Ohio Stapenhurst R, Pelizzo R, Von Trapp L (2013) Legislative oversight and budgeting. The World Bank, Washington, DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-7611-9 Teorell J (1999) A deliberative defence of intra-party democracy. Party Polit 5(3):363–382 The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) (2018) The role of the legislature in the budget process: Nigeria. CABRI, Centurion The Senate (2017) Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Votes and Proceedings, June 9, 2017. 8th National Assembly Second Session, No. 105 Tom EJ, Attai AJ (2014) The legislature and national development: the Nigerian experience. Glob J Arts Humanit Soc Sci 2(9):63–78 Umeagbalasi E (2015) Challenges of legislative intellectualism before the eight national assembly OF Nigeria. https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/sports/179835/challenges-of-legislative-intellec tualism-before-the-eight-national-assembly-ofnigeria.html Van Dijk TA (2006) Politics, ideology and discourse. J Political Ideol 11(2):115–140. https://doi. org/10.1080/13569310600687908 Williams JG (2012) Parliamentary function of oversight Young DJ (2012) An initial look into party switching in Africa: evidence from Malawi. Political Party 20(1):105–115. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811436041

Oluwabukola Oluwadamilare Olaniyi is a doctoral student at the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Riverside Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. She obtained Bachelor’s (Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2012) and Master’s (Political Science, 2018) degrees from Obafemi Awolowo University. Her research interests include Legislative Studies, Comparative Politics, and Development Studies.

Comparing the “New” and the “Old” Regimes of Legislative-Executive Relations and Its Implications in Governance: Evidence from Osun State Olusegun Busola Adeyeni, Bolanle Waliu Shiyanbade, and Gbeminiyi Kazeem Ogunbela

Abstract Across the Globe, Legislative-Executive Relations play an important role in the administration of good governance through their responsiveness to develop their state in a way to improve the standard of living for the populace and to ensure the system of governance is controlled by them (populace). However, it appears that one of the major focuses of any state is to ensure that provision of social services is provided to the citizenry within the state through the approval and implementation of fiscal policies. These were with the view to understanding the nature of the relationship between the Legislature and the Executive in Nigeria. The study revealed that the Executive interfered in the legislative process which has a significant effect in terms of service delivery to the populace in Nigeria at large. This study, therefore, compared old and new regimes in Osun State. Data gathered were analyzed using descriptive and content analysis. The study revealed the ease of passage of Executive-sponsored bills by the Legislature, agreement levels for the old and new regimes were respectively 85.7% and 77%, while, in respect of the Executive approval of the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis, agreement level for the old and new regimes were 85.7% and 92.3%, respectively, with no significant difference at 90.5%. The study concluded that there was no significant difference in the relationship under the regimes compared to Osun State.

1 Introduction Governance is imperative for the social, political, and economic progress of every country (Fabbrini 1995; Ogundiya 2010) and is indispensable for the achievement of the noble objectives of a state (Oburota 2003). Governance is viewed in terms of process and structure. Ogundiya (2010) sees governance as consisting of two essential elements of the state, namely, the structure of the state and the procedures O. B. Adeyeni · B. W. Shiyanbade (✉) · G. K. Ogunbela Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_12

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of the legislative, judicial, executive, and administrative bodies at all tiers of government. Since governance is both a structure and a process, the onus is on every state to adopt a model of governance whose structure and process it considers suitable for the achievement of its noble objectives. The Westminster parliamentary government in Nigeria enthroned a system regarded by scholars as confrontational and conflict-generating as the Prime Minister shared power with the President and there was no complete separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature. Thus, the executive is part of and derived its power from being included in the legislature (Eteng 1997; Ogowewo 2000; Momoh 2000; Akinwumi 2004; Adeyeni 2015; Fagbadebo 2020). The return to civilian rule in October, I979 after 13 years of military rule would inevitably have been a landmark of great significance for Nigeria. What has given it quite exceptional importance is the fact that Nigeria adopted a presidential system. Unlike the preceding military regime, the Second Republic was anchored on the 1979 presidential Constitution. The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was mandated by the government to produce a constitution that would discourage institutionalized opposition to the government (Aiyede 2005). The report of the 1977 and 1978 Constituent Assembly justified the adoption of a presidential system on the premise that it would promote harmonious inter-branch relationships as well as ensure the independence of the legislature to enhance the performance of both the executive and the legislature (Omoleke and Olaiya 2014). The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was a repetition of the 1979 presidential Constitution, with some amendments (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federation and the states on the legislature at the national and state levels, respectively. Section 5 also vests the executive powers of the Federation and the states on the President and the governors, respectively. Although the 1999 Constitution vests the governmental powers on the three separate arms of government, the division of powers is not created to institutionalize the isolation of any arm of government (Oshio 2004). Thus, the definition of powers to each arm only ensures interdependent relationships in a system of checks and balances rather than an absolute separation of powers. The president and the governor can veto any bill passed by the legislature but the legislature can impeach the president and the governor. The executive nominations for the appointment of certain categories of public officials require the confirmation of the legislature. The legislature exercises oversight of executive action. The courts exercise the power of judicial review over executive and legislative actions. Thus, separation of powers operationally involves sharing of the powers of the government by the three branches. The relationships between the legislature and the executive are one of the key defining characteristics of the functioning of any political system. It is central to the constitutional and political system of any territory and has been at the forefront of parliamentary debate in recent times (Winetrobe 2000; Adeyeni 2015). These relationships are complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices. The constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures and the executive are, of

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course, most important because they structure the interactions between the two powers (National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2000). However, numerous informal rules and conventions, such as the customs concerning the nomination of members of the cabinet following an election, practicality, precedent, habit, and the influence of political parties are very important as well (Bernick and Bernick 2008). The variation of these circumstances across countries of the world accounts for the wide differences in how political power is shared and the relative influence each branch of government has over policy formulation (NDI 2000).

2 Political Institutions Government fulfills its role of effective governance by dividing its powers and functions between its institutions with each performing some specific functions (Edosa and Azelama 1995). Perhaps it is because of the division of the powers and functions among these institutions of governance that government is defined as a set of institutions through which the will of the state is realized (Adler 1996). Thus institutionalist scholars averred that powers and functions of government are vested in the legislature, the executive, and the judicial organs of government which are coordinated or independent. Laski (1992) reiterates this position when he averred that since the time of Aristotle, it has been generally agreed that political power is divisible into three broad categories. These authorities, according to him, include the legislature which makes the general rules for the society, the executive which seeks to apply those rules laid down by the legislature to particular situations and the judiciary which settles disputes between the government and its citizens and those between citizens.

2.1

The Legislature

The term “legislature” has been given different names across nations. It is the parliament in Britain, National Assembly in Nigeria, the Congress in the United States, etc. (Heywood 2007). The legislature occupies a key position in any democratic government (Heywood 2007). It articulates and expresses the collective will of the people (Bernick and Bernick 2008; Okoosi-Simbine 2010). The legislature is the branch of government composed of elected representatives whose duties among other things are to make laws, control executive activities, and safeguard the interest of the people (Awotokun 1998). Perhaps, it is in light of this, that Smith (1966) as cited in Adeyeni (2015) sees the legislature as the symbol of power and legitimacy because its decision is based on the collective wisdom of men and women who enjoy the confidence of the electorate. Jewell (1997), on the other hand, identifies two features that distinguish the legislature from other branches of government. The first feature, according to him, is that

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the legislature possesses the formal authority to make laws, and secondly, members are normally elected to represent various elements in the population. Thus, Davies (2004) avers that representative liberal democracy cannot exist without a healthy, lively, and credible legislature. He noted that the establishment of the legislature rests on the assumption that in the final analysis, political power still resides in the people and that the people can if they choose, delegate the exercise of their sovereignty to elected representatives. Loewenberg (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010) seem to concede to this important view of the legislature as the people’s representative by viewing the legislature as assemblies of elected representatives from geographically defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process of a country. The fact that the legislature is an assembly of people elected to represent the citizens is perhaps, the reason why Awotokun (1998) notes that the legislature is an assembly of ambassadors who serve their constituencies in various ways as intermediaries between the citizens and government officials. The strength and the state of the legislature have been identified as among the strongest predictors of a country’s democratic development and survival (OkoosiSimbine 2010; Poteete 2010). The legislature is the central element of democracy. Democracy cannot exist in any country without a healthy and lively legislature (Bondel 1973; Taiwo and Fajingbesi 2004). As noted by Edosa and Azelama (1995) the nature of the legislature that is adopted determines whether a given political system is democratic or not. The centrality of the legislature to democracy is perhaps succinctly captured by Awotokun (1998) when he avers that the legislature is the pivot of modern democratic systems. According to Edosa and Azelama (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), legislatures vary in their design, structure, pattern of organization and operational procedures, selection process as well as sizes, tenure of office and frequency and nature of meetings. The variation is contingent upon traditions, theory of government, the character of the regime and most importantly the nature of the society in question (Okoosi-Simbine 2010). Modern legislative procedures are derivative of British procedures and thus serve as a model for the development of legislature and legislative procedures for many countries around the world. Edosa and Azelama (1995) traced the emergence of the legislature in Nigeria to the need for advisory bodies by the executive. In this perspective, the origins and the essential features of the modern legislature are found in the advisory councils which, from ancient times, were established to advise local rulers for effective governance (Nwabuzor and Mueller 1985; Edosa and Azelama 1995). The method of constituting these advisory councils and their level of usage, however, depended on the character of the ruler, the historical period, and the type of society involved (Nwabuzor and Mueller 1985). According to Edosa and Azelama (1995), the ruler had the discretion to determine the mode of selecting members of the advisory councils.

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The Executive

The executive is the irreducible core of government (Heywood 2007; Shiyanbade et al. 2016). Similarly, Laski (1992) sees the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the administration of a state. The executive in democratic systems exists to, among other things, decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted to the legislative assembly for approval. And ensure the implementation of the approved policy choices (Edosa and Azelama 1995). The executive coordinates the activities of the different departments of the state (Puke 2007). Since the executive implements the laws made by the legislature, it must comprise competent and efficient people. As observed by Fabbrini (1995), the executive must convey a sense of public purpose, forged through interaction with public opinion that counteracts the inertia of well-organized minorities and other powerful interest groups. The status, powers, and functions of the executive are not everywhere or at all times identical. They vary according to the type of executive and according to the prevailing conceptions regarding the sphere of the state. The functions of the executive are greater in those countries having a non-parliamentary executive than in those having a parliamentary executive.

3 Legislature-Executive Relations The relationship between the legislature and the executive is one of the key defining characteristics of the functioning of any political system (Shiyanbade et al. 2016; Lijphart 2004). Posner and Young (2007) averred that institutionalized rules are increasingly becoming relevant in regulating the behaviors of political actors, especially in Africa. This new development, to Fashagba (2010), is heart-warming because it aligns with the postulation that democracy entails an institutionalized arrangement for arriving at political decisions. While the institutional view of executive-legislature may hold strong as a factor that shapes the relationship between the executive and the legislature, numerous informal rules and conventions, such as the customs concerning the nomination of members to the cabinet following an election, are very important as well. Such relationships are largely shaped by the attitudes and beliefs of the stakeholder (Bernick and Bernick 2008; Fagbadebo 2020). They contend that these relationships are complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices. Constructive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government are essential to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law (Fagbadebo 2020). In recent years, however, the character of these relationships has changed significantly, both because of changes in governance and because of wider societal changes. Scholars have been expressing a wide variety of viewpoints on legislature-executive relations, conflict, and cooperation, whether one or the other dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either.

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While some see the conflict between the executive and legislature as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling government (Shiyanbade et al. 2016), others view it as contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective.

4 Modes of Legislature-Executive Relations Bernick and Bernick (2008) summarize the relationship between the two branches into three configurations: the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant and the two are competitively structured. Bernick and Bernick (2008), however, noted that the more frequent circumstance is the last, in which the governors and legislatures have a delicate balance and changes in either branch can shift the relationship into one of the other two categories. The analysis of Pennings (2003) is similar in this dimension. The modes of interactions between the legislature and the executive depend on the power divisions within and between the legislative assembly and the executive. In this regard, Pennings (2003) identifies three modes of legislatureexecutive relations: the government dominates parliament, the parliament dominates the government, and the parliament and government are balanced. Furthermore, he identifies three basic variables that constitute these relationships: (a) The role of the vote of investiture. He argues that the constitutional requirement of this imposes a barrier on the executive when there is no majority in the legislative assembly. (b) The vote of confidence. This procedure can be used by both parliaments and governments to achieve their goals. (c) The role of the Head of State. This in particular relates to the formal powers of the legislature and the executive. Andeweg (1992) modified this classification into four patterns, namely, the non-party mode, intra-party mode, inter-party mode, and cross-party mode. This subsumed the opposition mode postulated by Kings (1976), as a variety of the interparty mode. Andeweg (1992) further classified the inter-branch relationship into monism and dualism. The monistic interaction, according to him, describes osmosis—the diffusion of powers and functions between the executive and the legislature; on the other hand, the dualistic relationship refers to a separation of power between the two institutions. Anyaegbunam (2010) observes that the legislature in most democracies, particularly Nigeria, is often perceived by the executive as n institution that often oversteps its constitutional boundaries in the performance of its oversight duties. This, the executive often sees as hindering the government from speedily meeting the needs of the public. The legislature also views the executive frustration of its investigative role as a direct affront to the people’s mandate. Thus, the legislature sees the executive’s uncooperative attitude as a denial of citizens’ rights to be acquainted with the executive’s activities. This cycle of mutual suspicion usually degenerates

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into a frosty relationship between both arms of government. According to Anyaegbunam (2010), this experience in most countries has established three patterns of relationship. The first pattern of legislature-executive relations according to him is the polarized relationship which is a kind of worrisome antagonistic relationship between the executive and the legislature. The second nature of legislature-executive relations is the cordial relationship. In this type, according to Anyaegbunam (2010), executivelegislature disagreements over policies are resolved through healthy and mutual understanding. This mostly occurs when legislative assemblies lost their constitutional oversight role to the overwhelming influence of the executive, thereby hampering the necessary checks and balances which should aid the social, economic, and political well-being of the masses. The third pattern of executive-legislature relations is mild hostility. This is a kind of mild and inconsistent hostility short of outright antagonism between the executive and the legislature.

5 Factors Determining the Nature of Legislature-Executive Relations Lijphart (2004), in an attempt at analyzing the sources of presidential powers in a presidential system, identified three sources of presidential power that determine his relationships with the legislature. One is the power of the president as defined by the constitution. This constitutional power consists of reactive powers, especially presidential veto power and proactive powers, especially the ability to legislate by decree in certain areas. The second source of the power of the president is the strength and cohesion of his party in the legislature. The analysis of Lijphart (2004) here suggests that party discipline is a determinant of legislature-executive relations. In this regard, the strength and cohesion of the president’s parties in the legislature will affect his power relative to the legislature. The third source of the power of the president is his direct popular election. From the three sources of the power of the president enumerated by Lijphart (2004) above, the first (constitutional power) and the third (direct popular mandate) source border on the constitutional arrangement. Thus Lijphart (2004) tends to suggest institutional designs as the major determinant of legislature-executive relations particularly in a presidential system of government. Jones (2002) also lends his credence to the fact that the constitutional design of a country greatly determines the nature of legislature-executive relations in the country. According to him, the relationship between the executive and legislature in a presidential system is determined by the constitutional legislative power of the president, e.g., formal constitutional powers, agenda-setting prerogatives, and budgetary authority. This argument has been the position of the group of scholars known as the institutionalist approach (Linz 1994; Lipset 2010; Lijphart 2004).

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The neo-institutionalist scholars have, however, found the part constitutional practices and partisan powers of the executive as equally important predictors of legislature-executive relations (Hammond and Butler 2003). According to them, informal factors such as personalistic, clientelistic, the support enjoyed by the executive’s party in the legislature (majority, veto-sustaining or not veto-sustaining) and the responsiveness of the legislators to the executive are important determinants of legislature-executive relations (Sargentich 1993; Samuels and Eaton 2002; Chiebub 2007). What is less clear is the extent to which these para-constitutional variables uniquely determine the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Sargentich (1993) notes that the relationship between the executive and the legislature depends upon many factors other than the constitutional structure. Such factors include the political culture, party system, and electoral arrangement. This is because politics is much more complex and multi-dimensional than a single-minded focus on constitutional formalities acknowledges. Accordingly, the relative power of the executive or legislative branches cannot be determined simply based on a nation’s formal type of governmental system. Some political factors in addition to the constitutional arrangement that has been chosen have great implications for legislature-executive relations and the government’s stability.

6 Field and Methods This section describes the methodology used in the study and clarifies how the research problems would be solved using appropriate research methods. It covers the research procedures, ranging from research design through the study area, data sources, study population, sampling size, sampling techniques, measurement of variables, data collection techniques, research instruments, and validation of research instruments as well as the method of data analysis. The descriptive research design was adopted for the study and it focused on the Legislative and Executive in the State. The use of a descriptive survey is relevant in this research, as a questionnaire was used to gather relevant information needed for the work. This study was accrued out in Osun State, Southwestern Nigeria. This study covered the activities of both Legislative-Executive arms of government in the State. The study utilized primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were collected through the administration of the questionnaire, conduct of interviews and observation. The study population comprised 100 members of both former and present executive council and legislative arms of government in Osun State. In all a total of 80 copies of the questionnaire were administered, the questionnaire elicited information on the extent of executive interference in the legislative process of Osun State House of Assembly as well as the nature of legislative-executive relations in the State. Secondary data was obtained from textbooks, academic journals, official documents, and other relevant information, and the Internet. Given the sensitivity of the activities of these arms of government, we ensured

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adequate confidentiality of the identity and information supplied by each respondent. All the respondents had the right to withdraw from participation in the field exercise. Data collected were analyzed using appropriate descriptive and inferential statistics.

6.1

Synopsis of the Discussion of Findings and Interpretations

Presentation and analysis of data generated by the study from a questionnaire administered and secondary sources were the major concerns of this section. In this regard, out of 80 copies of the questionnaire administered, 47 copies were returned representing 59% of the total number of respondents sampled.

6.2

Comparison of Legislative-Executive Relations between the Old and the New Regimes in Osun State

This section compares Legislative-Executive relations between the old regimes (1999–2003; 2003–2011) and the new regime of 2011–2014. The four indices used in assessing Legislative-Executive relations were repeated for comparison. They were: ease of passage of annual budgets by the Legislature; ease of passage of other Executive-sponsored bills by the Legislature; the Executive approval of the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis; and absence of hindrances from the Executive on the oversight functions of the Legislature. Table 1 shows the comparison made. Table 1 shows no significant difference in the relationship under the regimes compared. 90.5% of the respondents agreed/strongly agreed that during the old regimes (1999–2011), annual budgets were easily passed by the Legislature with little or no conflicts with the Executive. For the new regime, 84.7% of the respondents agreed/strongly agreed with the claim. On ease of passage of other Executive-sponsored bills by the Legislature, the respondents’ agreement levels for the old and new regimes were, respectively, 85.7% and 77%. In respect of the Executive approval of the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis, the respondents’ agreement levels for the old and new regimes were, respectively, 85.7% and 92.3%. In the absence of hindrances from the Executive on the oversight functions of the Legislature, the respondents’ agreement levels for the old and new regimes were, respectively, 81% and 88.5%. The common position of the interviewees however slightly differs from that of questionnaire respondents. Most of the people interviewed submitted that Legislative-Executive relations under the new regime were much better than in the old. References were made to the conflict between the two arms during the Governorship of Bisi Akande, during which a member of the House of Assembly was assassinated in Ile-Ife (Fagbadebo 2020). The reason for the improvement under the

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Table 1 Comparison of Legislative-Executive relations between old and new regimes in Osun State

Annual Budgets are/were easily passed by the Legislature with little or no conflicts with the Executive Total Other bills sponsored by the Executive arm of the government are/were passed by the Legislature with ease and devoid of acrimony Total The Executive approve (d) the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis Total The oversight functions of the House are/were carried out without hindrances from the Executive Total

Strongly agreed Agreed Disagreed Strongly disagreed

Strongly agreed Agreed Disagreed Strongly disagreed

Strongly agreed Agreed Disagreed Strongly disagreed

Strongly agreed Agreed Disagreed Strongly disagreed

Source: Fieldwork

Period of service Old (1999–2011) Frequency Percent 6 28.6

New (2011–2014) Frequency Percent 12 46.2

Total Frequency 18

Percent 38.3

13 0 2

61.9 0 9.5

10 1 3

38.5 3.8 11.5

23 1 5

48.9 2.1 10.6

21 4

100 19.0

26 10

100 38.5

47 14

100 29.8

14 1 2

66.7 4.8 9.5

10 1 5

38.5 3.8 19.2

24 2 7

51.1 4.3 14.9

21 3

100 14.3

26 9

100 34.6

47 12

100 25.5

15 2 1

71.4 9.5 4.8

15 1 1

57.7 3.8 3.8

30 3 2

63.8 6.4 4.3

21 8

100 38.1

26 10

100 38.5

47 18

100 38.3

9 3 1

42.9 14.3 4.8

13 1 2

50.0 3.8 7.7

22 4 3

46.8 8.5 6.4

21

100

26

100

47

100

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Table 2 Summary of Comparison of Legislative-Executive relations between old and new regimes in Osun State

Annual Budgets are/were easily passed by the Legislature with little or no conflicts with the Executive Other bills sponsored by the Executive arm of the government are/were passed by the Legislature with ease and devoid of acrimony The Executive approve(d) the budget of the House of Assembly with little or no crisis The oversight functions of the House are/were carried out without hindrances from the Executive Average

Strongly agreed Old New 28 46

Agreed Old New 62 39

Disagreed Old New 0 4

Strongly disagreed Old New 10 11

100

19

39

67

38

5

4

9

19

100

14

34

71

58

10

4

5

4

100

38

38

43

50

14

4

5

8

100

25

39

61

46

7

4

7

11

100

Total

Source: Fieldwork

new regime was premised on the complete absence of minority membership in the house as well as the absence of intra-party crisis within the ruling party and, barring a few important and striking exceptions, legislatures have declined in certain important aspects and particularly in respect of powers to the executive arm of governments. Hypothesis H0: There was no significant difference in the Legislative-Executive relations between the old and new regimes in Osun State. Using the chi-square test to test the hypothesis with data in Table 2. chi-square (X2) calculated is given as X(ðoi - ei Þ2 ) ei where oi is the observed frequency of the new regime and ei is the expected frequency of the new regime (the old value). As shown in Table 3, X2calculated = 0.08 Degree of freedom = 2–1 = 1 X2cv at 5% significance level = 3.84 Since X2calculated < X2cv, we accept H0

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Table 3 Chi-square Responses Strongly agreed/agreed Strongly disagreed/disagreed Total

Observed frequency (oi) 85 15 100

Expected frequency (ei) 86 14 100

(oi - ei)2 1 1

ðoi - ei Þ2 ei

0.01 0.07 0.08

Source: Generated from Table 2

Therefore, we conclude that there was no significant difference in the LegislativeExecutive relations between the old and new regimes in Osun State. However, comparing the legislative-executive relations and democratic governance of the two regimes in the State also revealed that the four indices used in assessing legislative-executive relations: ease of passage of annual budgets by the Legislature; ease of passage of other Executive-sponsored bills by the Legislature; the Executive approval of the budget of the House of Assembly; and unhindered performance of the oversight functions of the Legislature there was no significant difference like the relationship under the regimes compared.

7 Conclusion Remarks and Recommendations Based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that the Executive did interfere in the legislative process in the State through party influence. This was largely due to the executive presidential system of government practiced in Nigeria which made the Executive arm of the government to be so powerful to the extent that the legislative process could not be carried out independently of the executive. The Executive Governor being the party leader in the state played a major role in deciding who represents the party in different constituencies of the State Assembly. Thus, the Executive determined to a large extent who becomes the leader of the House in the State. The Executive interference notwithstanding, there was a harmonious relationship between the Executive and the Legislators. This had promoted a smooth running of the government such that- the annual budgets and other Executive-sponsored bills were easily passed, while the oversight functions of the House of Assembly were carried out unhindered. The relationships equally influenced peace and development witnessed in the state in the areas of infrastructural amenities, security of lives and property as well as maintaining law and order. Thus, the following recommendations are offered to help in the LegislativeExecutive Relations and Democratic Governance in Osun State, Nigeria based on the findings of the study. The Legislative arm should perform its duties and act as a check on the Executive’s excesses. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Also, the successive government in the state should build on the

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existing harmonious Executive-Legislature relationship in the state to witness continued peace and development.

References Adeyeni OB (2015) Legislative–Executive Relations and Democratic Governance in Osun State, Nigeria (1999–2013). An unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Submitted to Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria Adler MJ (1996) The common sense of politics. Fordham University Press, New York Aiyede ER (2005) Executive-legislature relations in Nigeria’s emerging presidential democracy. UNILAG J Polit 2(1):64–87 Akinwumi O (2004) Conflicts and crisis in Nigeria: a political history since 1960. LIT Verlag, Munster Andeweg RB (1992) Executive-legislative relations in the Netherlands: consecutive and coexisting patterns. Legis Stud Q 17(2):161–182 Anyaegbunam EO (2010) Assembly handbook: a legislator’s companion. FEF, Lagos Awotokun AM (1998) Legislative, executive and judicial duties in sustaining democracy: a theoretical discourse in Nigeria. Ind Soc-Leg J XXIV(1 & 2):53–60 Bernick EM, Bernick LE (2008) Executive-legislative relations; where you sit really does matter. Soc Sci Q 89(4):969–986 Bondel GO (1973) Democracy and constitutionalism under federalism in Nigeria. Africana 2 (89):106–129 Chiebub AJ (2007) Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy: Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge University Press, London Davies AE (2004) The role of the legislature in fostering an efficient system of public finance. In: Fageigbesi AO (ed) Fiscal Federalism. CEMA/ACBE Edosa E, Azelama J (1995) Institutions of government. In: Ikelegbe AO (ed) Politics and government: an introductory and comparative perspective. Uri Publishing Ltd, Benin City, pp 35–55 Eteng FO (1997) Constitutional development and the military experiment in Nigeria. In: Ozumba GO (ed) Nigeria government and politics. Abia, AAU Industries Fabbrini S (1995) Presidents, parliaments & good government. J Democr 6(3):128–138 Fagbadebo OM (2020) Impeachment in the Nigerian presidential system: challenges, successes and the way forward. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore Fashagba JY (2010) Executive-legislature relations in Kwara and Oyo states, Nigeria (1999–2007). Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria Hammond TA, Butter AD (2003) Legislative and executive relations in democratic setting: the role of the national assembly in Senegal. J Afr Mod Stud 3(9):627–639 Heywood A (2007) Politics, 3rd edn. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Jewell ME (1997) Legislature in The encyclopaedia Americana international, vol 17. Grolier incorporated, Connecticut, pp 172–189 Jones MP (2002) Legislator behaviour and executive-legislative relations in lane, Ruth (1994) structural-functionalism reconsidered: a proposed research model. Comp Polit 26(4):461–477 Kings A (1976) Modes of executive-legislative relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany. Legis Stud Q 1:11–36 Laski HJ (1992) A grammar of politics. George Allen & Unwin, London Lijphart A (2004) Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Linz JJ (1994) Presidential or parliamentary democracy: does it makes a difference? In: Juan LJ, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of parliamentary democracy. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 3–87

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Olusegun Busola Adeyeni has a Ph.D. from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He was a Member of the Osun State House of Assembly between 2011 and 2015. He served as Executive Secretary, Ife East Local Government Area of Osun State in 2017 and the Chairman, Ife East Local Government from 2017 to 2021. Bolanle Waliu Shiyanbade is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the same University, with an emphasis on local governance, service delivery, social change and development, and Africa development. He has published in several international journals and books. He is a recipient

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of the prestigious Ph.D. Travel Fellowship award by the Abdul-Kabir Aliu Foundation (AAF) Scholarship; the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU) Ph.D. Research Grant; Travel Grant for Data Collection by Centre for Grassroot Development and Governance in Africa; and Doctoral of Philosophy Scholarship and Research Grant for the direct membership of Chartered Institute of Leadership and Governance (Nigeria and USA). Gbeminiyi Kazeem Ogunbela is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His research interests include Social and Public Policy Analysis, Development and Governance Studies, and Technology Studies. He currently teaches in the Department of Public Administration, Federal Polytechnic Ilaro, Nigeria.

Nigerian Presidentialism and Legislative Decadence in the Fourth Republic, 2015– 2021 Solomon A. Adedire

Abstract The Nigerian presidential constitution empowers the legislative arm of government with four cardinal functions: law-making, representation, oversight, and budgeting. The study discusses the ineffectiveness of the legislative houses in discharging their constitutional assigned roles in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 2015–2021. Data for the study was collected from secondary sources and the data was analyzed qualitatively. The study argues that legislature at both the federal and state levels was controlled and manipulated by civilian leaders. Also, the study observes that certain factors like subjugation of the legislature by the executive, self-centeredness of the legislators, commercialization of the law-making process, and high leadership turnover in the legislative chambers amongst others are responsible for the weak institution of the legislative houses. The study, therefore, recommends transparency and accountability of the legislative houses, financial autonomy of the legislature, strengthening of oversight functions, and autonomy of the standing committees as means of strengthening the legislature and making federalism an ideal one.

1 Introduction The Nigerian political system operates within the framework of the presidential system, which vests central executive power in the President, legislative power in the National Assembly, and Judicial power in the Supreme Court (Herskovits 1979). In addition, the federal system provides for a bicameral legislature, comprising the House of Senate (Upper House), and the House of Representatives (Lower House) at the federal level, and a unicameral legislature (House of Assembly) at the state level. The adoption of the Presidential system of government in 1979 allows for a clearcut separation of powers among the various branches of government at the same level. Precisely, in Section 4 (1), the 1979 Constitution empowers the National S. A. Adedire (✉) Present Address: Department of Political Science, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_13

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Assembly to legislate for the good government of the country. Representation in the Senate is based on equality of states, while representation in the House of Representatives is based on population. Similarly, at the state level, Section 100 (1–5) empowers the House of Assembly to make laws by passing a bill to the Governor for assent. It further states that where the Governor withholds or refuses to give assent to the bill, the bill shall become law and the assent of the Governor shall not be required (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). This spelled-out constitutional framework is fundamental to effective governance in modern society (Edosa and Azelama 1995). Aside from the various provisions to scrutinize government policies, the constitution empowers the legislature to exert the maximum sanction of political discipline, impeachment, against the executive found guilty of “gross misconduct in the course of the discharge of assigned responsibilities” (Sect. 143 and 188 of 1999 Constitution). Essentially, the legislature makes authoritative policies for the smooth running of the state (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). The executive gives meaning to the legislation or policies through enforcement (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). The judiciary organ is to interpret the laws, as well as arbitrate any disputes that may arise from the processes of authoritatively making and executing governmental decisions (Omotoso and Oladeji 2015). Notwithstanding the separation of powers among the organs of government, the principle of checks and balances exists to check the excesses of the institutions of government. Constitutionally, through its power of judicial review, the judiciary can declare the acts of the legislature and actions of the executive that are contrary to the constitution as null and void, unconstitutional, ultra vires, and with no effect. The legislature has oversight functions over the activities of the executive and its agencies. Usman (2015) observes that legislatures as representatives of the citizens not only make laws but also act as a watchdog on the other arms of government, especially the executive. However, despite the constitutional provisions regarding the legislative oversight functions, the legislators of the Fourth Republic were very weak, particularly in their relations with the executive. Basiru (2014) observed that, though the National Assembly retained its structure of representation, it had a relatively weak structure as the executive preferences shaped the political agenda and more importantly, the legislature did not exercise significant oversight of the executive or other government operations. The political decadence in the fifth phase (2015–2019) and the sixth phase (2019–2021) of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in the legislative houses was obvious in the eighth and ninth sessions of the National Assembly. Fashagba and Babatunde (2016) observed that there were a series of crises, scandals, and corruption that erupted among the leadership of the two chambers. Interestingly, scholars have concentrated their efforts on unpacking the roles of the legislature in governance, yet, there is still a dearth of literature in assessing the various legislative functions, to determine their effectiveness in a polity. The main objective of this paper is to examine the Nigerian presidential system and legislative decadence in the Fourth Republic, to determine the legislative effectiveness in a polity from 2015 to 2021.

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This piece also interrogates the factors that inhibit legislative performance in a political system. To achieve these objectives, the work uses secondary methods to collect data and interpretive methods to analyze data.

2 Legislative Decadence A vibrant and independent legislative organ of government is needed to discharge its constitutional responsibility in the interest of the electorates that reposed confidence in them through their votes (Abegunde 2016). The rationale for the tripartite institutional structure in a presidential system is the need for political synergy to ensure probity and accountability (Fagbadebo 2016). The functions of the legislative arm of government are contained in Part 11 Section 4, Subsection 1–8 of the 1999 Constitution (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Similarly, the legislature is empowered to carry out oversight functions on the executive or any of its agencies for probity and accountability. According to Barkan (2009), the legislatures exercise oversight of the executive to ensure that policies agreed upon through the passing of legislation are religiously implemented by the state. The legislature in Nigeria since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999 has frequently engaged with the executive in squabbles over their sitting allowances and other mundane issues (Yagboyaju 2009). The “furniture allowance palaver” in which the legislators demanded to equip their new official quarters by awarding the contracts by themselves also erupted before the end of their first year in office. In the 8th National Assembly, the President accused the legislatures of budget padding to the tune of N500b. For example, the erstwhile Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriation, Abdulmumin Jibrin, blew the whistle on padding the budget and stated that the padding was done after the President signed the bill into law. Jibrin alleged that ten (10) House of Representative Committee Chairmen padded their respective committees’ budgets to the collective tune of N280b. Jibrin further stated that the speaker of the 8th National Assembly, Honorable Yakubu Dogara and three other principal officers unduly pressurized him to appropriate additional N40b constituency projects arbitrarily and disproportionately in their favor (Drenkat 2016). Similarly, legislators at the Red Chamber were alleged to have received N4.4 m recharge cards from a major service provider to overlook complaints of high call rates, thus refusing to ease the plight of consumers (Agbo 2012). The legislative decadence also manifested in form of a lack of adequate knowledge of the legislators on probing matters. The former Director-General, Security and Exchange Commission, Arunma Oteh, during the public hearing, discovered that some of the committee members have little knowledge of the issue they were probing (Umaru 2017). The decadence in the legislative branch of government also takes the form of the commercialization of law-making functions by the legislature. Legislature quests for personal gains and self-aggrandizement have reduced legislative’s public support (Oni et al. 2019). At times, legislatures are lobbied and succumb to money bags in politics who are interested in influencing legislative activities (Oni et al. 2019).

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3 Nigerian Presidential System: An Overview The concern of the framers of the American presidential constitution, the progenitor of presidential systems, is how to devise a governing system capable of averting the dangers inherent in the absolute exercise of power by an individual (Scheuerman 2005: Turley 1999; Nichols 2011; Farrand 1911; Ahrens 2001; The Federalist Papers 2021). Most modern presidential constitutions epitomize the notion of the separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances (Lijphart 1994; Fukuyama et al. 2005; Hochstetler 2011). In this system, branches of government share powers with measures to checkmate the exercise of these powers by the other branch (Ackerman 2000). The Nigerian presidential system of government has been largely informed by the United States of America’s presidential system (Awotokun 2020). For Nwabueze (1981), the rationale for the adoption of presidential democracy is hinged on the need for principle and probity in government and politics, the centrality of man’s humanity, the national unity and stability, need for effective government, the need for economic development, and need for limitations on government. The 1999 Nigerian constitution established a presidential democracy with a legislature that is bicameral (Oni et al. 2019). Section 58 (1) and 100 (1) conferred on the President and the Governor, respectively, to give assent to bills passed by the National Assembly or House of Assembly. One of the features of the Nigerian presidential system was the impeachment power granted to the legislature on the President and his Deputy, the governors and their Deputies, and the Speakers and their Deputies, to check the excesses of the political office holders and ensure good governance. Impeachment in its original conception is a design to checkmate gross official misconduct defined as a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the constitution (Fagbadebo 2016). While there has not been any case of the executive President being impeached in Nigeria, there are cases of impeached Governors, Deputy Governors, Senate Presidents, and Speakers of the State House of Assemblies (Nkwede et al. 2014). However, most of these impeachments never complied with constitutional provisions (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019).

4 Powers and Functions of the Legislature: Evidence from the 1999 Constitution Nigerian federalism provided for two houses of legislature at the federal level: the Senate (Upper House) and the House of Representatives (Lower House). At the state level, a single house of legislature known as the House of Assembly is provided in all 36 states of the federation. Legislature serves as an essential constituent for any democratic government and a major factor in its sustenance (Odalonu 2020). The significance attached to the legislature derives from the extensive powers vested in the legislative institution and the broad range of functions it is expected to perform,

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which include, but are not limited to, representation, deliberation, law-making, the exercise of the power of the purse, education, socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, aggregation and harmonization, and keeping a potent check on other arms of government through oversight, scrutiny, and investigation (Anyaegbunam 2010; Hague and Harrop 2004; Olson 1980, 2004; Mahler 2003; Akinsanya and Idang 2002; Almond et al. 1996). Overall, legislative functions can be classified into law-making, representation, and oversight. The primacy of the act of legislation in democratic governance cannot be overemphasized. The reason is not unconnected to the fact that governance starts with the act of passing bills into laws, and follows with the enforcement of laws. The primacy of legislation is centered on legislative bills that are enforced by the executive and interpreted by the judiciary (Mahajan 2012). Law-making is the act of the expression of the will of the state by the people through the elected representatives (Nwaubani 2014). As noted by Nwaubani (2014), the law-making responsibility of the legislature is fundamental because the laws of a country are an expression of the will of the people and the life of the people is substantially defined by the laws enacted by the legislature. In legislation, the will of the people is transferred into the will of the state (Hague and Harrop 2004). Across modern democracies, countries adopt different ways of allowing representatives to express the will of the people. In countries like Italy, France, Spain, and Chile the referendum is used to determine the legislative matters while the legislative process may be initiated by an individual who has adequate information to analyze in a liberal democracy (Zander 2012). For example, Italy Act 138 of the constitution adopted a referendum on the review of the constitution, financing of political parties, life imprisonment, and free keeping of arms (Zander 2012). In the case of Nigeria, representatives of the people are elected into the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly, while representatives are nominated to the U.S. Congress. This deviates markedly from what operates in Canada, where Senators are nominated by the governor-general on the recommendation of the Prime Minister (Hague and Harrop 2004). Since Nigeria returned to democratic governance on May 29, 1999, the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly have been involved in various legislative processes, especially law-making. The law-making process takes the form of initiation and passage of bills, which can either originate from the legislature or the executive (Sanyaolu and Sanyaolu 2017). Bills passed during the 8th National Assembly include the 2018 Electoral Amendment Bill, The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill, the Sexual Harassment Bill, the Whistle Blowers Protection Bill, and the Proceeds of Crime Bill. In addition, the National Assembly has to its credit the passage of bills such as the Sovereign Wealth bill, the FOI bill, money laundering, and anti-terrorism bills, income tax bill, and other crucial ones that would affect the economy and Nigerians positively, speak volumes of the significant contributions of the legislature to national development. Secondly, Nigerian legislatures like other democracies involve in representation function. For administrative convenience, a country is delimitated into

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constituencies. Constituencies’ delimitation is the act of demarcating boundaries of electoral constituencies to create a far balance of the voting population (Premium Times March 19, 2013). The legislature is saddled with the responsibility of representing the interests of their constituencies to allow for accountability to the voters. Barkan (2009: 7) identifies representation as a legislature’s fundamental function, Regardless of the type of electoral system by which the members of the legislature gain their seats, the main purpose of individual legislators and the body to which they belong is to represent, that is to say re-present or mimic the varied and conflicting interests extant in society a whole. The legislature is the institutional arena where representatives of competing interests articulate and strive to advance their respective objective in the policy making process.

Since the Parliamentarians are elected by the electorates, they must serve the interest of the people they represent. Barkan (2009: 7) expands representation to include constituency service. Such constituency service can take the form of legislators paying regular visits to their constituencies to meet their individual needs (Elemo 2014). Also, legislators can sponsor developmental projects like road maintenance, water supply, schools rehabilitation, and primary health centers (Elemo 2014). Initially, the constituency project was limited to the provision of water and rural electrification. However, the projects have leap-frogged cutting across all sectors (Premium Times April 22, 2018). Thirdly, the legislature carries out an oversight function. The legislative function does not end in the passage of bills into law (Fashagba 2019: 5), but rather extends to the monitoring of the implementation of laws so that members of the legislature can uncover any defect or deviation from the original intent and act to correct misinterpretation, misapplication, or maladministration (Report of a Commonwealth Parliament Association Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya 10–14 December 2001, p. 1; Parliamentary oversight of finance, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Nov. 2011). Legislature uses its oversight function to supervise the ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) within the legislative competence of the committee set up to oversee such MDAs. Relevant provisions of the 1999 Nigerian constitution guarantee the oversight function of the legislature at both the federal and state levels. “At the federal level, Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution provides that: each House of the National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, Ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by the National Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly” (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

A similar provision of the power of the State House of Assembly to conduct an investigation is contained in Section 128 of the 1999 Constitution.

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There is a wide range of legislative oversight functions that cut across modern democratic government. In the Nigerian context, the National Assembly is empowered to authorize the release of funds for the government to perform its statutory responsibilities. In other words, the withdrawal from any public fund of the federation must receive the approval of the National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

5 Assessing Legislative Performance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 2015–2021 The legislature is regarded as the custodian of sustainable democracy, good governance, and development (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). The constitutionally assigned roles of the legislature include law-making, representation, oversight functions, and budgeting. Scholars have observed that there is no precise way of measuring legislative performance. Arter (2006) observes that there is a lack of “precision tools with which to calibrate the extent of the policy power of the legislature.” Notwithstanding, scholars have adopted bill sponsorship to assess legislative effectiveness (Volden and Wiseman 2009; Volden and Wiseman 2013; Ekor et al. 2014; Cox and William 2008; Miquel and Snyder 2004; Adler and Wilkerson 2005; Adler et al. 2005; Krutz 2005; Adler et al. 2003; Hall 1992; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hall 1992). Perhaps, the precursor to the legislative decadence of the Fourth Republic could be traced to the weak legislative institution inherited from the First and Second Republics, and the abrogation of the legislative institution during the military regime, particularly between 1983 and May 1999 (Fashagba 2009; Adebayo 1986; Lafenwa 2006). During this period, there was no institution to serve as a watchdog on the executive. Drawing from the parliamentary system of government of the independence period, the fusion of the legislative and executive arms of government weakened the legislature (Fashagba 2009; Lafenwa 2006; Adebayo 1986). Between July 9, 2015, and July 2018, the National Assembly passed a total of 213 bills (Umoru 2018). Notwithstanding the bills passed during the 8th Assembly, the performance of the legislature was abysmal. Demarest (2021) observes that legislative oversight functions over the MDAs have been considered as an avenue to extract additional revenue from the government. In this, Kadir and Ahmed (2014) observe that legislators have become sitting contractors, an action that has resulted in a conflict of interest between public interest and private concern. The House of Committees in the 8th and 9th Assembly have become “hunting dogs” that hunt their victims. The committee system of the National Assembly has constituted most of the scandals that erupted in the Assembly. For example, the House Committee on Capital Market was embroiled in a scandal involving “allegations of bribery, conflict of interests and bias” in the conduct of its oversight functions (Ayorinde 2012). In the discharge of their oversight functions, the

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legislative committees have had to grapple with integrity issues emanating from both abuse and laxity in the exercise of their oversight powers (Nwozor and Olanrewaju 2019). This has, undoubtedly, undermined public confidence in the National Assembly and devalued its credential as a constitutionally empowered watchdog to champion “accountability and good governance through prudent fiscal management” (Jombo and Fagbadebo 2019: 123).

6 Factors Inhibiting Legislative Performance in Nigeria Legislature exists as a veritable instrument of representative democracy, yet, it is unable to perform its role of serving as effective checks on the executive as well as making laws capturing the interests of the people (Oni et al. 2019). The legislative function is hindered by the dominance of the legislature by the executive, and this dated back to the independence period. According to Basiru (2014: 86), “during the First Republic, despite the inclusion of parliamentary oversight in the 1960 Constitution, the parliament hardly checked the executive.” Contributing to the executive dominance of the legislature, Akomolede and Bosede (2012) remark that the legislature is truly not independent of the executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Despite adequate provisions to carry out legislation, the legislature fell short of the requisite human and material resources to initiate and sustain independent action (Muheeb 2019: 52). Furthermore, the selfish interest of the legislators has made them lobby for positions and contracts from the MDAs they are meant to supervise. In achieving this, they resort to humiliation and intimidation of their prey (government officers) and force them to do the bidding of the legislators (Omotoso and Oladeji 2019). At times, the legislators use their memberships in committees as an opportunity to enrich themselves (Akomolede and Bosede 2012). Lafenwa (2009, 2009b) observed that some legislators see their positions as means of promoting selfish and parochial interest rather than national interest. This is quite evident in various cases of allegations leveled against the committee members in the discharge of their duties. Of utmost importance is the intervention of the military in Nigerian politics, which has adversely affected the legislative institutions that were in existence in the first republic. The two decades of military rule in Nigeria suspend the legislative institution, and subjected it to the control of the executive arm of government, therefore, weakening the legislators. The legislature is the only arm of government that gets encumbered as long as a military rule lasts (Alabi 2009: 237). Specifically, the legislators are denied access to a better understanding of legislation (Oni et al. 2019). Therefore, the inexperienced nature of the legislature manifests in the Fourth Republic, when Nigeria returned to democratic governance. Aside from this, the legislatures lack the training and capabilities for the effective performance of the legislative duties (Babatope 2001). Another factor that inhibits effective legislative performance in Nigeria is the colonial antecedent. Nigerian weak legislatures were the product of double colonial

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tragedy (Alabi 2009). First, the legislatures were created to be weak. Second, they were subjected to the executive arm. The colonial heritage of the legislative institution vis-a-vis other organs of government, particularly the executive, weakened the legislature (Alabi 2009). The colonial heritage was transient to the constitutional provisions that were later adopted. The implication of this is that the constitution gave more powers to the executive, thereby, making the executive strong and the legislature weak. Legislative decadence is heightened by a lack of financial autonomy. Onigbinde (2000) observes that severe resource scarcity and lack of financial autonomy of the legislature, weak career service in the legislature, and moral crisis of public administration generally have reinforced the “relative institutional dwarfing” of the legislature compared to the other arms of government. The bid for election and re-election into the legislatures often makes legislators vulnerable to financial inducements from the executive and patronage from overbearing party leaders, which invariably hinders legislators’ independence in the discharge of their official duties to the detriment of their mandates (Muheeb 2016). These shortcomings notwithstanding, legislatures remain the linchpin joining the people to the political system of a polity, the intermediaries in the peaceful transfer of executive power, the articulators of grievances, the agencies of oversight, and forums for scrutiny of the executive (Baldwin 2013).

7 Reforming Legislatures for Effectiveness To prevent legislatures from becoming mere “rubber stamping,” drastic reforms are desirable so that the dividends of democracy can be delivered to the citizens. The fulfillment of these reforms requires that constitutional powers are granted to the elected legislators, who are alive to their oversight functions. Accessibility of legislators to information is sine qua non to effective legislation. If the only information available to the legislature is that provided by the executive arm of government, then the legislature cannot meaningfully examine government policy choices presented to it, and nor will it be able to make alternative policy prescriptions (Hamalai et al. 2016). Considering the peculiarity of the less developing countries, of which Nigeria is no exception where “substantive, policy-relevant information is often exclusively the preserve of the executive arm of government” (Frantzich 1979). Therefore, the legislature needs to access reliable information quickly and independently, to understand government policy choices, if it is to effectively carry out its legislative and oversight functions (Hamalai et al. 2016). In this regard, the use of library information, and Information Communication Technology (ICT) to facilitate timely information cannot be overemphasized. Also, a legislative long tenure which is a product of re-election has been identified as a critical factor for expertise development and other legislative traits such as personal talents (Hamalai et al. 2016). Legislative tenure is said to be positively correlated with legislative effectiveness as legislators become more effective with

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experience through learning-by-doing (Miquel and Snyder 2004; Bo and Rossi 2008). A lower turnover rate would have greatly improved legislative performance by contributing to increasing the institutional knowledge base or intellectual capital of the National Assembly (Hamalai et al. 2016). More importantly, skillful and trained legislative staff is necessary for effective legislative performance. The technical know-how of the administrative staff of the legislative chambers who support the legislative processes has a great impact on the smooth operations of legislation. It is pertinent to know that the standing committees of the Assembly draw from the pool of the Assembly workforce to carry out their legislative functions.

8 Conclusion and Recommendations The rationale for the adoption of presidential democracy is hinged on the need for principle and probity in government and politics, the centrality of man’s humanity, the national unity, and stability, the need for effective government, the need for economic development, and the need for limitations on government (Nwabueze 1981). The presidential system of government allows the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances among the organs of government. However, the principle of separation of powers between the executive and legislature in the presidential system has often been wrongly interpreted in Nigeria (Awotokun 2020). Consequently, the executive exerts domineering power over the legislature. The eighth and ninth sessions of the Nigerian National Assembly of the Fourth Republic have witnessed ineffectiveness in the legislative institution. This is quite evident in various cases of allegations leveled against the committee members in the discharge of their duties. Thus, democratic governance and the Nigerian presidential system have suffered serious setbacks. Similarly, the Fourth Republic legislatures, particularly the eighth and ninth sessions were ineffective partly due to the weak structures inherited from the long years of military rule amongst others. In the real sense of it, the legislatures of the two sessions (eighth and ninth) were dominated by the executive at the federal and state levels. Drawing from the argument of Akomolede and Bosede (2012), the legislature is truly not independent of the executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus, the legislature that was supposed to curb the inefficiency in the MDAs exhibited incompetency in legislative matters. To improve Nigerian presidential democracy and make legislative institutions effective, the following are recommended: There is a need for the legislature to purge itself of corruption. The legislatures must refrain from all forms of financial inducements that can dent her oversight function.

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The legislature needs to be reformed a bit to have a stronger legislative institution that would engender democratic governance. Such reformation requires building legislative capacity that will change the structure of legislative-executive relations. Through the constitutional amendment, the legislature should be empowered to compel erring executive members or its agencies and committee members who are indicted to appear before the legislature for prosecution. By doing so, the vulnerability of the legislatures to financial inducement will be minimized. The effective performance of the legislature requires skill acquisition. Therefore, the Institute of Legislative Studies must be saddled with the responsibility of capacity building of the legislators. There is a need for training and re-training of the legislators to keep them abreast of information needed for effective legislation. Finally, there is a need for a constitutional amendment that will revisit the unbalanced legislative-executive relations. Such an amendment must give independent powers to the legislature and free them from executive dominance.

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accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 123–142 Kadir A, Ahmed ND (2014) Legislative oversight failure, catalyst. Retrieved from http://www. gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8636.htm. Accessed 6 July 2020 Krutz G (2005) Issues and institutions: winnowing in the US congress. Am J Polit Sci 49:313–326 Lafenwa SA (2006) The legislature and democratic governance in southwestern Nigeria, 1960–2003, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Ibadan Lafenwa SA (2009) The legislature and the challenges of democratic governance in Africa: the Nigerian case. A seminar paper delivered at a conference on governance and development on democratization in Africa: retrospective and future, prospects, held on December 4–5, at University of Leeds, United Kingdom Lijphart A (1994) Presidentialism and majoritarian democracy: theoretical observation. In: Linz J, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy: comparative perspectives. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 91–105 Mahajan VB (2012) Political theory: principles of political science, 4th edn. L-chad and Company Ltd., New Delhi Mahler GS (2003) Comparative politics: an institutional and cross-national approach. Prentice Hall, New Jersey Miquel PG, Snyder J (2004) Legislative effectiveness and legislative life. MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04–28 Muheeb IO (2016) Characterizing Nigeria’s fourth republic legislature (1999–2015). Occasional Paper Series No. 78. The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS), Cape Town (University of South Africa) South Africa Muheeb IO (2019) The trajectory of the legislature, law making and legislation in Nigeria. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian National Assembly. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham, pp 33–56. ISSN 2198-7262 Nichols J (2011) The genius of impeachment: The founders' cure for royalism [online]. http://lib. myilibrary.com?ID=378633 Accessed 9 Mar 2021 Nkwede JO, Ibeogu AS, Nwankwo OU (2014) Political Godfatherism and governance in a developing democracy: Insight from Nigeria. Acad J Interdiscip Stud 3(4):137–143 Nwabueze BO (1981) Constitutionalism in the emergent states. Hurs and Co, London Nwaubani OO (2014) The legislature and democracy in Nigeria (1960–2003): history, constitutional role and prospects. Res Humanit Soc Sci 4(15):81–90 Nwozor A, Olanrewaju JS (2019) Oiling the legislature: an appraisal of the committee system in Nigeria’s National Assembly. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian National Assembly. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham, pp 165–187 Odalonu HB (2020) The role of legislature in promoting good governance in Nigeria. In: Aninwene EO, Anoke KN, Odalonu BH, Chia BA (eds) Studies in social sciences and humanities. Book Works Publisher, Makurdi, pp 140–160 Olson D (1980) The legislative process: a comparative approach. Harper & Row Publishers, New York Olson DM (2004) Administrative review and oversight: the experience of post-communist legislatures. In: Pelizzo R, Stapenhurst R (eds) Legislatures and oversight, p 58 Omotoso F, Oladeji O (2015) Executive-legislative relations: towards democratic consolidation in Nigeria (1999-2013). In: Adesola F, Iwebunor O, Akonai R, Iwilade A (eds) State, governance and security in Africa: a festschrift in honour of Professor Bamitale Idowu Omole. SokheChapke Publishing Inc., Tallahassee, FL, pp 70–86 Omotoso F, Oladeji O (2019) Legislative oversight in the Nigerian fourth republic. In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian National Assembly. Springer Nature, Cham, pp 57–72 Oni S, Olanrewaju F, Deinde-Adedeji O (2019) The legislature and law making in Nigeria: interrogating the National Assembly (1999-2018). In: Fashagba JY, Ajayi OM, Nwankwor C (eds) The Nigerian National Assembly. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham

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Onigbinde A (2000) Monitoring the implementation of budget by the legislature. Paper presented at the workshop on appropriate handling of budgeting by the legislature for members of the Osun State House of Assembly, Nigeria, held at MicCom-Golf Resort, Ada, Osun State, Nigeria. 15th January, 2000 Sanyaolu CO, Sanyaolu JS (2017) The process of law-making by the legislature in a democratic setting. Polit Sci Democrat 1:1–12 Scheuerman WE (2005) American kingships? Monarchical origins of modern presidentialism. Polity 37(1):24–53 The Federalist Papers. New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School). Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed72.asp. Accessed 15 Feb 2021 Turley J (1999) Senate trials and factional disputes: impeachment as a Madisonian device. Duke Law J 49(1):1–146 Umaru UD (2017) Corruption and legislative functions in Nigeria. IOSR J Econ Finance 8(1):1–8 Usman MM (2015) Assessment of the role of national assembly oversight functions on corruption in the Nigerian federal public service (2007–2013). Unpublished MSc. Dissertation submitted to Department of Public Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria Umoru H (Vanguard, May 19, 2018) Why we delayed in passing 2018 budget Volden C, Wiseman AE (2009) Legislative effectiveness in congress. Retrieved from https://my. vanderbilt.edu/alanwiseman/files/2011/08/LEP_webpage_090710.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2013 Volden C, Wiseman AE (2013) The lawmakers. Available online at http://polisci.emory.edu/home/ cslpe/conference_2013/papers/Craig_Volden_Ch2_Ch4_pdf Accessed 9 Mar 2021 Yagboyaju DA (2009) Big men, big fraud and big threat: lessons from Nigeria’s Fourth Republic electoral process. Paper presented at the 37th Annual Conference of the National Association for Ethnic Studies (NAES), Borders and Boundaries, San Diego, California, April 2–4 Zander M (2012) PACE (The police and criminal evidence act 1984): past, present, and future. National law school of india review, LSE legal studies working paper 2/2012, 1–15

Further Reading Newspapers Premium Times 19 March, 2013 Premium Times 22 April, 2018

Magazines The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999)

Official Documents [object HTMLSpanElement]Festschrift for Erwin Deutsch. In: Ahrens H, Bar C, Fischer G, Spickhoff A, & Taupitz J (eds) The American Journal of Comparative Law. 49(2): 359–362 [object HTMLSpanElement][object HTMLSpanElement][object HTMLSpanElement][object HTMLSpanElement]

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Solomon A. Adedire is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo. He obtained his B.Sc. and M.Sc. Degrees in Political Science from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and University of Lagos, respectively. He earned his Ph.D. Degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His areas of research interests include Comparative Politics and Public Administration.

Legislative Turnover in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Issues and Implications Akinlolu Elijah Akinola and Oludare Olawale Mosunmola

Abstract The roles of the legislature for the sustenance of any democratic state cannot be over-emphasized. Indeed, the legislature serves as the most veritable medium through which citizens of a liberal democracy participate and are represented in the government of their states. Hence, the modern legislature is required to be composed of people with the requisite skills and experience in the art of law-making to effectively discharge their functions. However, as observed in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, a recurring trend in legislative elections is the high turnover rate of members of parliament in every election cycle; this trend is noticed both at national and sub-national levels. The level of legislative turnover is often used to measure the performance of the legislature as an institution of government. Thus, a moderately low legislative turnover might result in an efficient and effective legislature, while a very high turnover rate might have adverse effects on the legislature as an institution. Based on this, the paper interrogates the issues of legislative turnover in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic by focusing mainly on the legislature at the national level. In so doing, the paper intends to provide answers to the causes of high legislative turnover as well as its implications for legislative efficiency in the country.

1 Introduction The legislature, as one of the three institutions of government, is, in some respects, an oddity. In most states, changes in the personnel composition of members of the executive are usually through elections in democracies or extra-constitutional means in non-democratic societies. More so, the civil service, a body of core professionals within the executive, enjoys the security of tenure and acts as an institutional A. E. Akinola (✉) Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria O. O. Mosunmola Department of Political Science, Adeyemi Federal University of Education, Ondo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_14

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“stabilizer” for the country. This factor helps to protect the government against the danger of incessant changes that may lead to political instability. Similarly, the judiciary enjoys personnel stability as judges are hardly replaced in large numbers at any given period. Therefore, the oddity of the legislature can be observed in the ways members of parliament are routinely replaced from one election to the next (Squire 1998), which, in some extreme cases, is occurring at an alarmingly high rate. Legislative turnover is the term widely used to describe this phenomenon. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999 in Nigeria, a trend in legislative elections is the high turnover rate of members of parliament in every election cycle; this trend is noticed both at national and sub-national levels. During every election cycle, a large number of incumbent legislators in Nigeria lost their reelection bids to remain as lawmakers. High legislative turnover is often cited in the literature as having a debilitating effect on the law-making capacity of the legislators, as more experienced lawmakers are not reelected to the parliament (Matland and Studlar 2004; Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; and Buehler and Nataatmadja 2019).

2 Conceptualizing Legislative Turnover Scholarly attention has, over the years, been drawn to legislative turnover due, in part, to its implications for traditional political science theories of elite circulation, public policy, and democracy (Kuklys 2013; Matland and Studlar 2004; Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; and Salvati and Vercersi 2018). Like most concepts in the social sciences, legislative turnover has been subjected to various definitions, interpretations, and measurements. Francois and Grossman, (2015: 458), highlighted the various ways the term has been defined; in their words, “turnover may be defined as electoral success, incumbent advantage and the ratio of new members.” However, following Matland and Studlar (2004), the ratio of new members (in the parliament) has formed the basis for defining legislative turnover among scholars. Thus, when Gouglas and Maidens (2017: 1) conceived legislative turnover “as the proportion of members of a legislative assembly that changes after general elections,” a reference was made to newly elected members of the legislature. In the same vein, Heinsohn and Freitag, (2012), using Matland and Studlar’s method, measured legislative turnover based on candidates who won elections. They calculated the turnover rate by looking at the number of elected assembly members that were not elected to the previous parliament. This is mathematically calculated as: (the number of newcomers divided by the assembly size, multiplied by 100). In any case, the proportion of newcomers into the legislature as against the total number of seats in the assembly determines the level of legislative turnover. Generally, the membership of a new legislative assembly can be categorized into returning members of parliament, new members of parliament elected for the first time and, a former member of parliament reelected after a previous electoral defeat (Salvati and Vercersi 2018; Francois and Grossman 2015). However, defining legislative turnover on the ratio of new members suffers some important limitations.

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First, reelected former members of parliament can hardly be described as “legislative neophytes,” yet this approach lumped them with fresh MPs with no legislative experience. Also, the approach is incumbent-centric, as it focuses only on the forms of incumbent exit from the parliament. Notwithstanding this definitional shortcoming, this chapter follows Matland and Studlar’s tradition of using the ratio of new members to the total number of seats in the parliament. Simply put, legislative turnover is the rate at which members of a legislative assembly change or the rate at which new members are elected to the legislature. Using this definition makes calculating the ratio of legislative turnover easier. Furthermore, it has been noted that focusing only on the ratio of new members does not “affect the validity of turnover rates between different election cycles” (Buehler and Nataatmadja 2019: 3), even when no attempt was made to differentiate between fresh and reelected former MPs (Francois and Grossman 2015).

3 Legislative Turnover as an Indicator of the Quality of Democracy Mostly thought of as a form of elite circulation, legislative turnover is an indication of the rate of continuity or renewal of legislative elites as well as the stability or otherwise of the legislature as an institution (Salvati and Vercersi 2018; Kuklys 2013). The legislature remains an essential feature of any democratic state. Even in non-democratic states, the legislative arm of government performs a legitimizing role. As the institution with the closest contact with the populace, it is imperative to have a strong parliament to prevent the tyranny of the executive and its associated tendency to abuse power. The rate of turnover among parliamentary elites has an impact on the quality of members of the legislature which, in turn, determines its effectiveness or otherwise as a check on the power of the executive. The quality of the new members as a body of inexperienced legislators can also affect the effectiveness or otherwise of the legislature as a check on the abuse of power by the executive. As more experienced legislators are replaced, a gradual weakening of the legislative institution is taking place via the loss of institutional memory, loss of political know-how, and institutional knowledge (Squire 1998; Buehler and Nataatmadja 2019). In this instance, legislative operations suffer from the displacement of experienced lawmakers. Since new members often require a period of “apprenticeship” to acquire the necessary legislative skills, the quality of legislation is also affected (at least at the beginning of a new legislative assembly). Therefore, a low legislative turnover rate plays an important role in strengthening the legislature since the presence of experienced legislators has a stabilizing effect on its workings and operations. In the words of Polsby (cited in Salvati and Vercersi 2018: 83), “Stable groups of incumbents within a legislature are fundamental to structure and

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Table 1 Legislative turnover rates and their indication Rate of turnover 95% 40–60%

20–40% Less than 20%

Indication Complete or near-complete changes of the political order (regime discontinuity) (I) restricted systemic changes (e.g., changes in the electoral system (II) Volatile elite structures linked to the transformation of the party system at large The normal level of exchange Tending toward the development of oligarchical structure

Source: Kuklys (2013)

routinizing organizational behaviors, moreover, they promote specialization and differentiation, which are considered a crucial feature of the efficient legislature.” High legislative turnover poses threat to democratic governance (Matland and Studlar 2004; Francois and Grossman 2015). On the other hand, extremely low legislative turnover (below 20%) might aid the development of an oligarchic structure in a democracy as only a small pool of new entrants is elected into the parliament. A low legislative turnover always guarantees that a greater proportion of incumbents would be reelected than new entrants. The lack of democratic renewal that this causes could harm democracy (Francois and Grossman 2015). A parliament dominated by long-term incumbents prevents the political representation of new groups (especially in a culturally heterogeneous and plural country such as Nigeria). Thus, citizens whose groups are denied political representation in the parliament are likely to feel excluded in governance especially when the laws made by the parliament do not reflect their reality. This may affect the legitimacy of the government as the unrepresented or under-represented group (in the parliament) may feel excluded or marginalized in the process of law-making and may therefore regard the composition of the parliament as unfair and unjust. If this frustration persists for a long without the group getting representation, it could engender political apathy with a devastating effect on the democratic credentials of the country. A high legislative turnover, on the other hand, creates more opportunities for aspiring elites to attain elite status, thus, offering a much better prospect for democracy (Kuklys 2013). The high level of democratic renewal in the legislature means that people from different socioeconomic classes have relatively equal chances of being elected. Without this, it would be near impossible for new members and groups to be represented in the parliament as a particular group keeps recycling itself in every electoral cycle to the exclusion of others. While the legislature as an institution is governed by rules and procedures, which determine its effectiveness or otherwise, a high or low turnover rate affects the quality of members of the legislature. Turnover rate (whether high or low) determines if the legislation would be mostly influenced by a large pool of experienced incumbents or legislative “neophytes.” Table 1 explains the rate of legislative turnover. While low legislative turnover leads to long-term legislative careers among incumbents, which helps in deepening legislative institutionalization; high turnover, however, tends to weaken the legislature because of the influx of inexperienced

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legislators, who may happen to be in the majority. When this happens, the legislature, in relation to the executive, may become weaker due to the presence of few lawmakers with legislative experience. This has grave implications for executivelegislative relations as it could tilt the balance of power in the favor of the executive; when such a situation occurs, the consolidation of democracy is at risk. The conventional view of democracy emphasizes the importance of the common people in the composition of the government. Yet, modern representative democracy is nothing but a classic case of elite circulation (Kuklys 2013) in which the power of the people is restricted to choosing the elites to be conferred with political authority. From the perspective of the legislature, the circulation of the elite feeds into the wider discourse on legislative turnover. The rate of legislative turnover does not only affect legislative operations and stability but can also be taken as a litmus test for gauging the quality of democracy. A quick comparison based on legislative turnover between advanced democracies and transition democracies would reveal that high legislative turnover is common in emerging democracies with the advanced democracies experiencing low legislative turnover. The root causes of legislative turnover have been extensively studied by scholars from both a comparative and single case study perspective. Since no two states are the same, it goes to say that there might be some peculiar factors for legislative turnover. The next section focuses on the causes of high legislative turnover in Nigeria.

4 High Legislative Turnover in Nigeria: An Interrogation After an unprecedented six successive general elections, with the penultimate one resulting in the alternation of power to the main opposition party in 2015, Nigeria has come a long way from the history of electoral authoritarianism, which characterized the period from 1999–2007 (Hamalai et al. 2017). The history of “electoral authoritarianism,” according to Hamalai et al. (2017), refers to the period in Nigeria (1999, 2003, & 2007) when elections were characterized by blatant electoral fraud. In other words, instead of the election reflecting the wish of the people during these periods, the elections were mostly rigged to reflect the wish of the party in power. From the point of view of the National Assembly, the changes taking place in the country’s electoral democracy can be viewed from the declining share of the proportion of seats held by the then-ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 2011, and the control of most seats in the National Assembly by the opposition All Progressives Congress, (APC), in 2015. The APC’s winning of a parliamentary majority in the 2015 election was made possible by mass defections from the PDP by aggrieved politicians and lawmakers. Many of the lawmakers elected under the platform of the PDP in 2011 were reelected as APC lawmakers in 2015. While these changes have been celebrated as important political milestones, certain challenges remain unchanged. Among these challenges are the problems of high legislative turnover. The recurring issue of high legislative turnover in Nigeria has eluded a solution. It can be said that Nigeria has one of the highest rates of

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Table 2 Turnover in the Nigerian Senate since 2003 Year 2003–2007 2007–2011 2011–2015 2015–2019 2019–till date

Number of new senators 73 86 74 76 65

Turnover rate (%) 67 79 68 70 60

Sources: INEC database; Fashagba (2009); Hamalai et al. (2017) Table 3 Turnover rate in the House of Representatives since 2007 Year 2007–2011 2011–2015 2015–2019 2019–till date

Number of newly elected HOR members 271 260 290 221

% of turnover 75 72 80 61

Sources: INEC database; Fashagba (2009); Hamalai et al. (2017)

legislative turnover in the world (See Tables 2 and 3). This means that many members of parliament are not reelected in every electoral cycle. The trend of high legislative turnover has reached a worrisome level since 1999 as over 60% of legislators in the country are not reelected to the legislative assembly (see Tables 2 and 3). Speaking on the issue, former Senate President, David Mark, lamented that such a trend “is not good for Nigeria’s democracy” as the influx of large numbers of new members portends a slow start for legislative business to resume (Terhemba 2015). While the literature on legislature turnover often highlights a host of institutional and electoral factors responsible for the high turnover rate in the legislature, a cursory analysis would reveal that many of the factors cited in the literature do not explain the causes of high legislative turnover in Nigeria. For instance, the type of electoral system used by a country is often identified as an important factor influencing legislative turnover in any national setting (Krupnikov and Shipan 2018; Kuklys 2013; Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; and Matland and Studlar 2004). Comparative studies in this regard showed that legislative turnover is usually high in countries with proportional representation systems and low in majoritarian systems. The argument in support of this position is that in majoritarian systems, “incumbent advantage,” the use of resources, and their status as experienced leaders make it easy for incumbents to win reelections. Extending the logic of this argument to Nigeria revealed its flaws. Nigeria, as a country with a majoritarian electoral system, has one of the highest rates of legislative turnover. Also, the incumbent advantage, which may favor the reelection of incumbents in some countries, is the incumbent disadvantage. Since 2003, more than half of legislators in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in Nigeria were not reelected to the parliament. This, clearly, shows that the cause of

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Table 4 Seat volatility in Nigeria’s Parliamentary Elections since 1999 Legislative Session Senate House of Representatives

1999 and 2003 12% 9.3%

2007 and 2011 23% 19%

2015 and 2019 11% 3.45%

Source: Authors’ calculation. *calculation was based on the Pedersen index model of electoral volatility. In this case, instead of using the vote score of each party, their share of seats at a given legislative assembly was used

legislative turnover in the country is not, in any way, related to the type of electoral system operating in a country. Another determinant of legislative turnover often is electoral or seat volatility. According to this view, the degree of change in voting behavior or voter preference in-between elections can lead to a spike in the rate at which new members are elected to the parliament (Moncrief et al. 2004; Matland and Studlar 2004; Mannow 2007; Salvati and Vercersi 2018). When voters switch their preference from a ruling party to an opposition party, such changes in voter preference often lead to more new members being elected (from the opposition) into the parliament. A new member in this instance is defined as the newly elected legislator that has not held office as a lawmaker previously. The definition also extends to those who have held office as lawmakers at the sub-national level but are newly elected into the national parliament. This is a limitation of our definition. However, restricting our definition of newcomers to only those newly elected into the national parliament makes it easy for us to determine the rate of legislative turnover in the country. However, in Nigeria, this factor offers a limited explanation. As seen from Table 4, seat volatility reached an unprecedented level when a comparison is made between the 2007 general elections, when the PDP was the dominant party, and the 2011 elections, when the opposition parties began to control more seats in both chambers of the National Assembly. While this helps to explain the high turnover recorded for both the 2011 and 2015 elections, it does not explain the consistent trend of high turnover that characterized legislative elections since the return to democratic rule in 1999. The level of professionalization of a parliament measured in terms of remuneration and benefits, lengths of legislative sessions, and availability of resources also influence turnover in the legislature. In the words of Heinsohn and Freitag (2012), MPs are less likely to abandon the legislature when the benefits are greater, and the institutional context is professionalized. According to Salvati and Vercersi, (2018: 83), professionalization can be defined as the “condition in which MPs can conceive of their parliamentary activity and their main occupation.” Some studies focus on how the level of professionalization in the parliament influences the incentive to run for reelection which also affects turnover (Krupnikov and Shipan 2018). Therefore, incumbents, upon realizing the frailties of the legislature, will abandon their position for a more lucrative and powerful office in the executive. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that the extremely high legislative turnover in Nigeria is occasioned by low professionalization or poor funding. The

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Nigerian National Assembly is, perhaps, the most lucrative in terms of remuneration on the continent (Animasaun 2013). Lawmakers in Nigeria are often criticized for being grossly overpaid compared to other professions in the country. The cause of legislative turnover in Nigeria cannot be attributed to poor remuneration and funding of the legislature or low professionalization, since the National Assembly meets the criteria of a professionalized legislature. We defined legislative professionalism as the “enhancement of the capacity of the legislature to perform its role in the policymaking process with expertise, seriousness and effort comparable to that of other actors (the executive) in the process”. Term limit, the imposition of restrictions on the number of terms a legislator can serve in parliament, has been found to have a positive effect on the incidence of high turnover (Moncrief et al. 2004; Francois and Grossman 2015). Although the imposition of a term limit on members of the legislature is rare, many states in the United States of America, such as Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado to mention a few, opt for the imposition of a term limit as a way of addressing the issue of low legislative turnover confronting the country (Moncrief et al. 2004). States in the United States of America impose either a lifetime limit (that is members of the legislature can only serve two or three terms in office) or a consecutive limit (that is, members of the parliament cannot serve more than two consecutive terms in office). There is no term limit for legislators in Nigeria, yet the proportion of new members always exceeds that of reelected members in the parliament in every legislative session since 2003.

5 The Causes of High Legislative Turnover in Nigeria As pointed out in the preceding section of this chapter, attempts have been made to explain and generalize the causes of high legislative turnover across countries. However, most of the explanations offered for high legislative turnover do not explain the Nigerian case. The following factors have been identified as the cause of high legislative turnover in Nigeria.

5.1

Voters’ Behavior

Voters, in Nigeria, are influenced by a host of factors in making electoral choices; some of these factors include vote-buying, candidates’ appeal, as well as the perceived strength or popularity of political parties. Out of all these factors, the most entrenched and arguably the most significant is identity politics. How does this aspect of voters’ behavior affect legislative turnover in Nigeria? Indeed, most Nigerians vote based on ethnic and religious affiliations. In a country with over 250 ethnic groups, a zero-sum game understanding of development means that ethnic groups compete with one another to get a slice of the national cake (economic

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resources, infrastructural development, etc.). This struggle is further exacerbated by the understanding that political leaders are biased toward their ethnic groups in terms of the allocation of resources (Ololajulo 2016). To avoid conflicts, a political turntaking arrangement, popularly called zoning or rotation was evolved by political elites to guarantee political representation for all, one representative at a time. To this end, it is the position of this paper that political zoning, which influences voters’ behavior, is a major cause of high legislative turnover in Nigeria. With the principle of zoning firmly in place in most political parties, incumbent legislators are discouraged from pursuing reelection and are put under immense pressure when they do so. This is based on the understanding that the election of an incumbent violates the idea of zoning as it denies other ethnic or interest groups the opportunity to have their representatives in the parliament.

5.2

Public Perception of the Legislative Roles

Relating to voters’ behavior is the public perception of the roles of a legislator. Members of the public hardly rate legislators based on their legislative competence (in terms of bills and/or motions moved on the floor of the parliament) rather, legislators are evaluated based on the projects and other infrastructural development they can attract to their constituencies. To meet up this expectation, lawmakers usually provide infrastructure projects such as the sinking of the borehole, construction of maternity centers, classrooms, etc., for their constituencies. Often, incumbent legislators are criticized for failing to deliver infrastructural projects in their constituencies and when they do, they are often accused of bias toward other communities within their constituencies. This creates an opportunity for challengers with the financial ability to successfully unseat the incumbents. It can be argued that if legislators are evaluated based on their legislative competence, incumbents could leverage their legislative performance and efficiency, rather than on the provision of social amenities to seek reelection.

5.3

Intra-Party Turnover

Intra-party turnover refers to non-electoral legislative turnover that occurs at the party level in which parliamentarians are replaced or not retained by their political parties to contest for the next election. The discourse on the causes of high legislative turnover in Nigeria usually begins with a focus on the number of incumbents that failed to be reelected. However, emerging studies on turnover suggest that this focus misses the point (Gouglas and Maddens 2017). While the absence of incumbents in the parliament is noticed only after the inauguration of a new legislative assembly, turnover usually begins at the party level before the general elections are held. Many incumbents were simply not retained by their party for the next election. They could

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Table 5 Intra-party turnover for the Senate between 2015 and 2019 Year 2015 2019

Number of incumbent’s legislators not retained by their parties 69 51

% of intra-party turnover 63% 47%

Source: Authors’ calculation using the INEC’s list of candidates for Senatorial elections (2015 & 2019) Table 6 Intra-party turnover in the House of Representatives (2015 and 2019) Year 2015 2019

Number of incumbents not retained by their parties Not available 195

% of intra-party turnover Not available 54%

Source: Authors’ calculation using the INEC’s list of candidates for House of Representatives elections (2015 & 2019)

be defeated at the primaries, defect to another party, or just decide not to run. An analysis of the list of candidates presented by political parties in Nigeria for the 2015 and 2019 National Assembly elections reveals that a significant proportion of legislative turnover occurred at the party level before the general elections. Many incumbent legislators were not adopted by their political parties (see Tables 5 and 6). For instance, 63% and 47% of incumbent senators, in the 7th and 8th Assemblies (2011 and 2015), respectively, were not adopted by their parties in the next poll. Similarly, 195 House of Representatives members, representing 54% of incumbents in the 2015 legislative assembly lost at the party level. A major shortcoming noticeable in Tables 5 and 6 is the failure to distinguish among incumbents who lost out at party primaries; from those who decamped to another party or those who remained in their party but did not contest the primary election. However, the tables show that more than half of the legislative turnover in Nigeria occurs at the party level and is not necessarily due to electoral factors.

5.4

Method of Candidate Selection

The method of selecting candidates for legislative offices as well as other positions by many political parties in Nigeria can be described as top-down and highly centralized (Angerbrandt 2020). A brief analysis of the causes of turnover would easily identify the top-down and centralized method of candidates’ selection by parties as a cause of high legislative turnover in Nigeria. After all, many studies on legislative turnover, particularly those in Europe and North America, have attributed the high turnover rate to a centralized party system of selecting aspirants (Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; Krupnikov and Shipan 2018; Gouglas and Maddens 2017). This is the reason why scholars on the subject posit that proportional representation aids

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high legislative turnover due to the centralized nature of political parties in countries using the PR systems. Conversely, in the case of Nigeria, the problem is not so much on centralization but rather on the personalized method of candidate selection. In Nigeria, party structures and organizations at the state level are usually placed under the control of regional or local political elites and sitting governors. In most cases, it is these strong men that decide who gets the party’s support in terms of nomination for political offices. Often, the criteria for selecting candidates are based on perceived loyalty and closeness or affinity of the aspirants to the godfathers. Given that the power dynamics within a state change frequently and unexpectedly, it is not uncommon for the incumbent legislators, who had been selected for their loyalty, to lose favor with their political godfathers in the subsequent electoral cycle. An incumbent that falls out of favor with the party’s strong men faces a tougher hurdle in getting party nominations. A case in point is the failure of Senator Shehu Sani, the senator representing Kaduna Central, to gain his party’s (APC) nomination for the 2019 election. His opposition to the state Governor’s policies was alleged to have cost him the party ticket. Similarly, defection, which is a feature of the party system in Nigeria, also contributes to a high turnover of legislators. When a godfather or party bigwig defects from a party, it is expected that all his followers, including incumbent legislators whose nomination he influenced, should follow him to the new party. When this happens, (and they occur regularly) in a ruling party or a party with a legislative seat, this creates room for new aspirants to be nominated in the following election. More so, if the incumbent refuses to follow his godfather, he is most likely to be sidelined in the nomination process, for reelection, by the new power blocs in the party.

5.5

High Remuneration

Popular commentaries and media coverage of the National Assembly have, for long, claimed that lawmakers in Nigeria are among the highest paid on the continent (Council of Foreign Relation, March 20, 2018). However, when Senator Shehu Sani revealed in a media chat that Nigerian senators are paid monthly expenses of #13.5 million ($37,500), in addition to their monthly salary of #750,000 ($2000) (Animasaun 2013) his revelation only confirmed what the populace had long suspected. In a country where two-thirds of the population lives on less than $1 a day, there is a wide gulf between the national minimum wage (#30,000) and the takehome pay of the legislators in the country. A high level of parliamentary compensation makes the position of a lawmaker very lucrative. Since politics is still driven by a sense of patronage and distribution of largess to ethnic clients, legislative seats then become scarce resources that are to be rotated among different interest groups in each constituency. The financial reward of being elected a lawmaker makes legislative seats lucrative and competitive.

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6 Implications of High Legislators Turnover Scholars have argued that legislative turnover affects the quality of public policy (Herzeele 2017). Low and high legislative turnover are responsible for poor policy outcomes and low governmental legitimacy (Krupnikov and Shipan 2018). A high legislative turnover can hinder consistency in the making of public policy as a large number of legislators are replaced at every election cycle. The effect, according to Kuklys (2013), can be observed from the lower average level of parliamentary elites in terms of experience, expertise, and effectiveness. Nigeria has the lowest retention rate of lawmakers in the national parliament around the world (Onuigbo and Innocent 2015). Given the unceasing upsurge in the rate at which the majority of the Nigerian legislators are changed at every election cycle, there is a need to interrogate the implications of this high legislative turnover on the overall performance of the legislature as an institution. Some scholars share the view that a relative turnover rate of between 20% and 40% is healthy for the country; while anything below 20% or more than 40% is injurious to the workings of the legislature (Squire 1998; Moncrief et al. 2004; Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; Kuklys 2013; Krupnikov and Shipan 2018; Abioye and Amin 2019; Buehler and Nataatmadja 2019). However, there is a dissenting view on this; for scholars like Maverick, Pareto, and Mosca (cited in Kuklys 2013), a high turnover is seen as a political stabilizer. Drawing on the above, the best way to understand how legislative turnover has affected the Nigerian legislature is to situate the discourse within the context of the constitutional roles of the legislature as an institution. This approach is preferable because not only does it allow an unbiased assessment to be made, but also prevents any prejudice that one may have regarding the effects of a relatively low or high turnover on a country. In the discharge of its oversight functions, the legislature is vested with the power to confirm the appointment of people into high political or public office, scrutinize government spending as well as setup investigatory committee to investigate any matter of public importance. Fashagba (2009: 443) argued that the oversight function of the legislature “ranks high among the roles of modern legislatures.” As observed by Fagbadebo (2019: 23) “Inherent in the process of initiating and implementing policies is the legislative responsibility to scrutinize and oversee the actions of the executive of the state.” Thus, the oversight function of the legislature “goes beyond the literary definition of its traditional role of law-making; it includes scrutiny and supervision of the policies to ascertain compliance with the intendment of the initiators” (Fagbadebo 2019: 23). Hence, in assessing the efficiency of any legislature, special focus should be given to the process of legislation and oversight functions. In the views of Onuigbo and Innocent (2015), the Nigerian legislature (both at the state and national level) exhibits “capacity lapses” in the areas of law-making thanks to the high turnover rate in the legislature. This position was corroborated by the former Senate President, David Mark, who observed that the high turnover rate has a debilitating effect on the

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Table 7 The legislative efficiency of Nigerian Federal Parliament for 2003–2019 Legislative Session 5th Assembly 2003–2007 6th Assembly 2007–2011 7th Assembly 2011–2015 8th Assembly 2015–2019

Number of bills introduced in the House 298

The number of bills passed by the House 159

Legislative efficiency (%) 53%

757

91

12%

1063

106

10%

2166

515

24%

Source: Authors’ calculation

process of legislation because of the inexperience of most of the new entrants into the legislature (Krishi and Sule 2015). Table 7 shows the legislative efficiency of the Nigeria’s National Assembly between 2003 and 2019. The efficiency percentage is arrived at by dividing the total number of bills passed by the total number of bills introduced for the period under the review. The focus on the process legislation should primarily be on both quality and quantity. A look at the number of bills passed by successive legislative assemblies during this period reveals an abysmal performance in terms of the number of bills passed by the legislators. Based on the individual analysis, the average bill passed per member of the National Assembly in the period under review stood at 0.3 bills per member for the 5th Assembly; 0.19 per member for the 6th Assembly; 0.21 per member for the 7th Assembly, and 0.45 per member for the 8th Assembly. This output is very low compared with the huge financial resources budgeted yearly for the legislature. For instance, between 2011 and 2015, the National Assembly was reported to have spent N600billion (Olufemi and Akinwunmi 2015). It is apposite to note that in the reconstitution of the National Assembly from 2003 to 2019, more than 60% of the incumbents lost their reelection bid (Fashagba 2019). When there is poor legislative output because of high legislative turnover, the legislature may be hampered in providing policy direction, through the enactment of relevant legislation, for the executive. Besides the inexperience of a large section of the members of the legislature, another “culture” observed in Nigeria’s parliament is the haste with which the members of the legislature rush to pass pending bills at the twilight of their legislative tenure. They often do this, probably, because of the realization that they may not return to the legislature at the start of another legislative session. For example, the 7th Senate (2011–2015) passed 46 pending bills within 10 minutes! (Jimoh and Onochie 2015). No doubt, such hastily passed bills would lack the necessary scrutiny required of any good legislation. As observed by Doyle (2018: 12), “The overriding sentiment expressed in the literature . . . reveals that

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passing legislation in a short amount of time does not necessarily lead to efficiency— emphasis is placed on the quality of legislation passed as opposed to rushing the passage of a bill.” Legislative oversight is the mechanism used by the legislature to check the excesses of the executive arm of government and to make the executive arm and its agencies accountable to the public. Put differently, “oversight is a measure to check or control the exercise of executive powers in a manner that would make the executive accountable and responsible to the electorate in between elections” (Fagbadebo 2019: 1). Through the effective performance of oversight function, the legislature can check the excesses of the executive and its agencies; ensure probity and accountability in governance and, to a larger extent, guarantee effective service delivery to the public. Thus, from the point of view of the public, the performance of oversight ranks higher than any other role of the modern legislature. Despite its importance as a key function of the modern legislature, measuring oversight poses a challenge because there appears to be a dearth of key performance indicators for assessing the level of performance of oversight by any legislative assembly. For instance, how does one measure oversight function? Is it through the number of such oversight visits embarked by the legislators? The holding of public hearings? Or perhaps, the outcome or resultant behavior from the oversight visits and public hearings? The consensus, however, is to base the assessment on oversight of the activities of the legislature (Hamalai et al. 2017). Over the course of fourteen years, 1999 to 2013, the Nigerian central legislature made a minimum of 228 oversight visits to various ministries, departments, and agencies of government (Hamalai et al. 2017). During this period, the assembly conducted at least 214 public hearings and 191 interactive sessions with various stakeholders on various issues of national importance (Hamalai et al. 2017). As reported by Hamalai et al. (2017), the number of hearings organized by the Senate increased from one in the Fifth National Assembly to 19 in the 7th Assembly. Similarly, the number of investigations conducted by the House increased from 1 in the Fourth National Assembly to 44 in the 7th Assembly. Thus, what has been observed over the years is the increase in the number of oversight activities for each successive legislative assembly from 1999 to date. A strong legislature is borne out of many factors which include the experience and expertise of members of the legislature; this experience is often garnered through cumulative years of being in the legislature. In countries, such as the United States of America, with a low legislative turnover rate, the legislature appears to have more impact on the executive arm of government through the discharge of oversight functions. A country with a high turnover in the legislature produces a weak legislature whose oversight function is usually a case of motion without movement.

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7 Conclusion Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, high legislative turnover has been a recurring trend in every legislative election. It has become a norm for the National Assembly to lose at least half of its members at every election. The central thesis of this paper is anchored on how the view that the root cause of high legislative turnover in Nigeria can be traced to institutional factors such as voting behavior, method of candidate selection, and intra-party turnover. In this regard, the paper contends that it is the political parties, rather than the electorates, that are the major drivers of high legislative turnover in the country. The study further argues that high legislative turnover has grave implications for the legislature in Nigeria. As demonstrated in the chapter, high legislative turnover affects the quantity as well as the quality of legislation in Nigeria. Consequently, the challenges faced by the parliament in oversight and law-making can be addressed when more incumbent legislators are reelected. This will strengthen the legislature as an institution and further enhance its institutional memory. Given that democratic institutions and democracy, as a project are still evolving, it is expected that high legislative turnover in Nigeria will decline with time. For this to happen, political parties in the country need to reform the personalized and centralized nature of candidates’ selection.

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Hamalai L, Egwu S, Omotola S (2017) Nigeria's 2015 general election: continuity and change in electoral democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Abuja. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31954096-2_1 Heinsohn T, Freitag M (2012) Institutional foundations of legislative turnover: a comparative analysis of the Swiss cantons. Swiss Political Sci Rev 18:1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1662-6370.2012.02078.x Herzeele B (2017) The influence of legislative turnover on policy innovation. ECPR conference, September 2017. Oslo Jimoh MA, Onochie BC (2015) Senate dumps own rules, passes 46 bills in 10 mins. The Guardian Nigeria News — Nigeria and World News. June 4, 2015. https://guardian.ng/lead-story/senatedumps-own-rules-passes-46-bills-in-10-mins/ Krishi MA, Sule IK (2015) Mark: high turnover of lawmakers will slow legislation. Daily Trust. April 28, 2015. https://dailytrust.com/mark-high-turnover-of-lawmakers-will-slow-legislation/ Krupnikov Y, Shipan CR (2018) Voter uncertainty, political institutions, and legislative turnover. Polit Sci Res Methods 8:1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.32 Kuklys M (2013) Legislative turnover in the Baltics after 1990: why is it so high and what are its implications? Balt J Polit Sci 2:29–49 Mannow P (2007) Electoral rules and legislative turnover: evidence from Germany's mixed electoral system. West Eur Polit 30(1):197–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019852 Matland RE, Studlar DT (2004) Determinants of legislative turnover: a cross-national analysis. Br J Polit Sci (Cambridge University Press) 34(1):84–108. Accessed 21 June 2020. http://www.jstor. org/stable/4092401 Moncrief GF, Niemi RG, Powell LW (2004) Time, term limits, and turnover: trends in membership stability in U.S. state legislatures. Legis Q 29(3):358–380 Ololajulo BO (2016) Eating with “one spoon”: zoning, power rotation and political corruption in Nigeria. Afr Stud 75(1):153–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/000201 Olufemi J, Akinwunmi R (2015) Report card: Nigerian senators, rep cornered N600 Bn in 4 years but passed only 106 bills. Premiumtimesng.com. May 12, 2015. https://www.premiumtimesng. com/news/headlines/182824-report-card-nigerian-senators-reps-cornered-n600bn-in-4-yearsbut-passed-only-106-bills.html?tztc=1 Onuigbo RA, Innocent EO (2015) Legislative turnover in the National Assembly: a study of the south–east zone, 1999-2015. Glob J Hum Soc Sci 15(7):1 Salvati E, Vercersi M (2018) Party organizations and legislative turnover: signals of an unstable parliamentary class? Ital Political Sci 13:82–94 Squire P (1998) Membership turnover and the efficient processing of legislation. Legis Stud Q 23 (1):23. https://doi.org/10.2307/440212 Terhemba D (2015) Mark decries high turnover of lawmakers in 8th assembly. The Guardian Nigeria News — Nigeria and World News. April 28, 2015. https://guardian.ng/news/markdecries-high-turnover-of-lawmakers-in-8th-assembly/

Akinlolu Elijah Akinola is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His research interest covers comparative politics and international relations. His most recent works were published by The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and the African Security Review. Oludare Olawale Mosunmola, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, teaches at the Department of the Political Science at the Adeyemi Federal University of Education, Ondo, Nigeria. He bagged his first and second degrees in Political Science from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His broad areas of interest are comparative politics and legislative studies. Mosunmola’s research focuses on how the roles of sub-national legislatures as institutions of governance impact governance at the sub-national level.

The Legislature, the Rule of Law, and the Politics of Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb

Abstract The efficacy of an impeachment campaign in political and power contestations underscores the centrality of the rule of law in representative government. An extensive survey reveals both vertical and horizontal intra- and inter-institutional impeachment campaigns between 1999 and 2015. Speakers and their deputies were impeached for overbearing tendencies, financial misconduct, technical incompetence, and abuse of office. It spilled to state governors and their deputies keeping executives on their toes, curtailing their excesses and inordinate pursuits while in office and capable of sanitizing the entire political system if well-conceived and faithfully prosecuted. Abuses were however rife, negating the letters and spirit of the constitution. Sittings were held outside legislative chambers with reported attempts to an actual compromise of the judiciary. Cases abound of missing mace from assembly chambers. Lawmakers reportedly courted zealots who occasionally invade assembly chambers at will while intra-party crises were also exploited in some scenarios. State Assemblies particularly disregarded due process, as executive officials were arbitrarily removed from office on the recommendation of controversial panels credited to external influences. In controversial circumstances, panels of the investigation were set up in quick succession against constitutional provisions. This paper establishes a nexus between power contestation and constitutional breaches in impeachment campaigns. Power theory and prebendalism constitute the theoretical framework. The paper relies largely on the case study and content analyses. Observable high frequency, geographical spread, and attendant judicial reviews questioning the validity of the impeachment tool attest to the popularity and ease of its deployment largely for reasons of political expediency and power contestations that threatens the Consolidation of Representative Government.

I. O. Muheeb (✉) Brothers of Charity Services, Galway, Republic of Ireland © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_15

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1 Introduction Representative government is the establishment of the legitimate authority of the state within a democratic polity (Hans 2000). This presupposes that the executive and the legislature’s performances are to be rightly measured vis-à-vis people’s expectations. Representative institutions constitute desirable subjects and objects of analysis in contemporary democratic governance discourse (Hague and Harrop 2004). The legislature, as a critical unit of a political entity, is expected to make the values, goals, and attitudes of a social system authoritative in the form of legislation (Almond et al. 1996), while the executive actions should reflect the terms of engagement with the electorates in the form of the manifesto and electoral promises. A political system with legitimate character incorporates the legislature, executive, and judicial arms of government. The legislature is to function within the confines of the separation of powers (Fagbadebo and Dorasamy 2020). Separation of powers requires that the legislature has the responsibility for lawmaking, the executive ensures the implementation of the laws, while the judiciary is to interpret the laws and also serve as arbiter when and where necessary as Section 4(8–9) of the 1999 Constitution stipulated (Fagbadebo and Dorasamy 2020; Fagbadebo 2016; Muheeb and Orisadare 2018). The separation of powers incorporates the principles of checks and balances among the three arms of government, to harmonize governmental activities and achieve inter-institutional synergy (Lijphart 1992). Hence, constitutional provisions require that the executive recourse to the legislature push government policies through and for appropriation to execute government programs. This is to serve as an ultimate restraint against the usurpation of the power of the legislature as well as possible arbitrary use of power by the executive. Executive assent is also required for a bill to become law as clearly stated under Section 58(1–4) and 100(1–4) of the 1999 constitution for the National and subnational legislatures, respectively. The Constitution empowers the executive to veto the bill, as it deems necessary, although such veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote by the legislature in line with Sections 58(5) and 100(5) of the 1999 constitution. This is to check the possible abuse of powers by the legislature. Thus, the 1999 Constitution made adequate provisions for the effective functioning of representative legislatures (Muheeb 2015). Sections 69 and 110 of the Nigerian Constitution empower constituents to recall any erring representatives serving in the national or subnational legislature while Sections 143 and 188 of the 1999 constitution prescribe impeachment of erring elected officials in the executive arm of government, namely, the President, the Vice President, Governor, and Deputy Governor, respectively. Impeachment is to be carried out by the legislature in collaboration with the judiciary exclusively for acts and omissions amounting to gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of the office. Section 143(11) and 188(11) of the 1999 constitution define “gross misconduct,” as a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the National

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Assembly or a State House of Assembly to gross misconduct. The noticeable loopholes arising from the scanty details on impeachment in the Nigerian constitution without highlighting the specific grounds for removing elected executive officials from office left the exact definition of impeachable offenses open to interpretation by the legislature. Pliable legislatures harped on the seeming constitutional lacuna to impeach on questionable grounds. Thus, the recurring cases of impeachment campaigns fraught with controversies thrived on sundry excuses and its benefits were often overshadowed by power and political contestation, arising from irreconcilable differences among political gladiators (Muheeb 2016; Onyekpere 2014; Solomon 2014; Ukumba 2014; Ogaziechi 2014). Impeachment of an elected government official has far-reaching consequences for the affected institutions and the entire polity. Removal of elected public officers should ordinarily not bring government and administration of a state to a halt but rather facilitate progressive changes in the affected institutions and the system of rule. The reverse was however the case with flawed and controversial impeachment campaigns within the two decades of the Fourth Republic. Over one hundred and ninety impeachment campaigns were brought to bear in different political contestations and power struggles that manifest in intra-institutional and inter-institutional relations. The popular cliché “powers that be” is featured in virtually everything in politics including the election and removal of public office holders (Muheeb 2015). In the ensuing scenarios, mere signals of impeachment and actual impeachment proceedings not only brought governance to a halt in many States but also threatened the peace and security of not a few in the battle of wits by political actors and their sympathizers. Several state assemblies were found wanting on some occasions, as reported for incidences in Adamawa, Anambra, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Oyo, and Plateau States (Muheeb 2007, 2015, and 2016, and Anyaeche 2006). In Anambra State, for example, Chidi Anyaeche recalls how parallel governments exemplified by the trade unions, uncivil group, and their ilk infiltrated the political space for action against the impeachment of Peter Obi. He noted that: Pentecostals were invited to pray, market women, traders and area boys were marshaled out, politicians and “elders” were paid, students were mobilized, civil servants were induced, the purported ban on the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) was lifted, National Association of Road Transport Owners (NARTO) was unbanned and the gods were invoked to protest the impeachment of governor Peter Obi (Anyaeche 2006).

The defective state system, inordinate ambitions of lawmakers, political intrigues, and machinations by diverse interests fueled uncivil conduct by promoters and victims of impeachment campaigns amidst political actors’ willingness to compromise collective commitment to responsible and responsive governance (Onuoha 2006). This accounts for the speed with which lawmakers accede to the arbitrary deployment of impeachment against their principal officers, on the one hand, and their executives on the other hand. For example, the ambition of a former Speaker of the Anambra State Assembly to become acting Governor of the State, the desperation of a former Speaker of Ekiti State to become acting Governor of the State in the event of a successful impeachment of the substantive governor, and the attendant

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confusion that led to the dissolution of the Ekiti State House of Assembly through the declaration of the State of Emergency by President Obasanjo in October 2006 were all suggestive of scripts acted out by the legislators to the detriment of their respective mandate and that of the legislative institution (Muheeb 2007, 2016; Onuoha 2006). To this, Onuoha queried the former Ekiti State Assembly for disregarding an earlier ruling by the Chief Justice of Nigeria against the impeachment process initiated against governor Fayose in 2006. Other than acting out the script handed down by external forces, the lawmakers’ effrontery was arbitrary (Onuoha 2006). Impeachment was brought to bear by the federal executive instrument under president Obasanjo purportedly in response to allegations of abuse of office and official misconduct against the governor. Thus, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) promoted the impeachment campaign disregarded due process, and damned the reported court injunctions in its onslaught against Fayose. This was similar to an earlier case in Plateau State. Oppositions to the externally propelled impeachment campaign argued that the tacit support enjoyed by 8 of the 24-member Plateau State House of Assembly that assumed the required two-thirds majority to impeach the governor of the state was to provoke violent protest. The violent protest against the Plateau State lawmakers’ arbitrariness, leading to indiscriminate shooting by men of the Nigeria Police Force in Jos was to be located in this school of thought (Onuoha 2006). This chapter, therefore, interrogates the extent to which impeachment serves the private interest, and as a manipulative tool brought to bear more by power and abuse of it rather than the desire for a deterrent for malfeasance. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is an ongoing discourse.

2 Theoretical Framework The concept of power is the most constant variable in political contestation in Nigeria. Nigeria’s experience in representative government cannot be understood without reference to the nation’s experience of authoritarian rule. While the centrality of power is not peculiar to Nigerian politics, there is an intrinsic relationship between the exercise of power and recurring cases of impeachment. Power rather than service is both the latent and manifest reason for whatever desire for change. Power in whatever form and to whatever end is a major determinant of political action, inaction, or activity. In Nigeria, as elsewhere, power is central to political discourse on account of its multifarious ramifications (Hague et al. 2019; Johari 1987). The political process revolves around “the distribution, shaping, and exercise of power.” Politicians participate in the political process in which power is sought and individuals are brought within the domain of power. Power is of significance in political theory because the study of power and its uses is crucial to the understanding of politics (Hague et al. 2019; Bealey 1999; Johari 1987). Johari (1987) stressed further that politics entails the relations of men in the ensuing competition, association, submission, and control, seeking power in their

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negotiations. Power is the political aspect of an entire social process. Besides seeking power, politics is also the manifestation of power exercised through coercion, force, threat, intimidation, blackmail, domination, and the like. In the exercise of power, influence could also be brought to bear through persuasion. Popular power desires authority to legitimize its exercise. Control is the exercise of power, which can be executive, legislative, judicial, or otherwise, less concentrated in the intensity of its manifestation (Johari 1987). Following Baum (2003), power arbitrarily exercised stifled the vulnerability of freedom and capacity for individuality to act autonomously in a variety of circumstances including self-defense, self-government, and self-development. In contexts such as being discussed in other federal contexts similar to Nigeria, relative autonomy thrives on the degree of recognition accorded constituent sovereign entities in “self-regarding” matters by parties in the power equation. This is not to underestimate the fact that autonomy has often been undermined by self-inflicted deprivation through clandestine commitments and indiscriminate subscriptions that compromise the natural notion of people as autonomous “choosers.” Thus, the increasing pursuit and defense of self-interests as opposed to seeking autonomy for common good (Baum 2003). Hague et al. (2019) observation suffice to the effect that Nigeria’s Fourth Republic political landscape has featured variants of power with an interplay of multiple power dynamics ranging from the phenomenon of vested interest, hegemonies, federal might, state security, religion, ethnicity, and party politics to political expediency and so on (Hague et al. 2019).

3 Political Power and the Nigerian State Richard Joseph’s conception of the Nigerian state and politics, as noted elsewhere, suffices to the extent that any meaningful discussion on party politics in Nigeria would require a prior understanding of the nature, extent, and persistence of an underlining political behavior and its social and economic ramifications. Such discussion would also require a clear understanding of the magnetic state system, attracting the attention of individuals with personal or group agendas to promote. Groups outdo one another in desperate bids to gain access to the control of state resources (Muheeb 2015; Joseph 1987). Arbitrary and controversial impeachment processes, patronage, intense competition for state resources, and possible use to which state power is deployed make the continued reference to Joseph’s prebendalism theory contextually relevant (Joseph 1987). Claude Ake’s immemorial exposition further emphasized the desperate struggle for power and relevance with the over-politicization of social life. Ake’s position was echoed by Richard Joseph in his prebendal political analysis thus: . . .We are intoxicated with politics; the premium on politics is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme measure to win and to maintain political power. . ., the Nigerian state appears to intervene everywhere and to own virtually everything including access to status and wealth. Inevitably a desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this

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control means for all practical purposes being all-powerful and owning everything. Politics became warfare, a matter of life or death (Joseph 1987: 75).

Thus, Joseph’s prebendalism underscores the persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state. It implies that the Nigerian state and politics are concerned with “how interests are represented, and benefits distributed.” Politicians and public officials exploit the system to further individual or group interests. The struggle for economic and political power in this context implies prebendal politics, which so far underlines the essence of politics and social life in the Fourth Republic. The prebendal disposition of political actors at the national level is replicated across the states (Max 2013; Joseph 1987). This underlines the often fierce, contest for, and retention of power and access to the distribution of resources in a context of scarcity, insecurity, and disregard for official norms and regulations.

4 Impeachment Campaign, Political Power, and the Rule of Law The foregoing analysis of the nature of party politics rooted in the dynamics of Nigerian society contextualizes impeachment campaigns in the Fourth Republic. In the ensuing contest, when confronted with impeachment, an elected official either resign as a sort of compromise or allow the impeachment process to run its course (Mgbe 2013). For example, in July 2014, the Adamawa State Deputy Governor, Bala James Ngilari resigned before the State Assembly members could impeach him along with his Governor Murtala Nyako. Similarly, Hafiz Abubakar, the Deputy Governor of Kano State, also resigned in August 2018 when thirty of the fortymember State Assembly initiated impeachment proceedings against him over sundry allegations. Some victims have thereafter proceeded to the court for reinstatement or interpretation of some relevant provisions of the Constitution relating to their impeachments. These include the Deputy of Bauchi State, Garba Gadi, and Governor Peter Obi of Anambra State. Many State Governors including Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo, Joshua Dariye of Plateau, Peter Obi of Anambra, and Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti States at the different time challenged their impeachments and sought redress from the courts (Mgbe 2013; Enweremadu 2011). However, of all these cases, that of Governor Peter Obi of Anambra State offers a unique stretch of representative government vis-à-vis pre and post impeachment dislocation in institutional and systemic stability. Peter Obi was the governorship candidate of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) in Anambra State in the 2003 gubernatorial election. INEC declared Chris Ngige of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the winner of the election. Peter Obi challenged INEC’s decision at the State Governorship Election Petition Tribunal to retrieve the mandate. Obi won, as the Tribunal so declared on March 15 2006 after almost three years of post-election legal tussle. Obi took the Oath of Office and was

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inaugurated as Governor of Anambra State On March 17, 2006 (Mgbe 2013; Enweremadu 2011). Peter Obi and Virginia Etiaba assumed office as Governor and Deputy Governor, respectively, in March 2006 on the platform of the opposition party, the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), after a court ruled that Obi’s predecessor in office, Chris Nigige, had rigged the 2003 gubernatorial election (Mgbe 2013; Enweremadu 2011). Perhaps, Peter Obi would not have won the case but for the infighting within Ngige’s PDP. Chris Ngige from the governing People’s Democratic Party had been Anambra’s governor for three years. He reportedly fell out with party stalwarts soon after the election, purportedly for his refusal to compromise his office to pay back for their support (Mgbe 2013, Enweremadu 2011). The State Assembly impeached Governor Peter Obi after seven months in office on eleven (11) impeachable offenses that included an allegation that Obi, directly and indirectly, acted in a corrupt manner to enrich himself and/or his cronies (Anyaeche 2006). The impeachment process took place at about 5.00 a.m. on November 2, 2006, by 21 members of the State’s thirty-member House of Assembly even before the seven-man probe panel submitted its report. The legislators were also alleged to have impeached the Governor for deliberately marginalizing them, implying a crisis of confidence, in the running of the affairs of the state. A vastly unpopular action, Obi’s purported impeachment and subsequent replacement by his deputy caught the electorate unaware (Mgbe 2013). Coincidentally, the impeachment was effected shortly after President Olusegun Obasanjo ended a state visit to Anambra, during which he pointedly told Governor Obi that he would not return to the office, as the State Governor in May 2007 (Sahara Reporters 2006). The rule of law was undermined in Anambra State as it happened in Oyo State where Governor Rashidi Ladoja’s impeachment by 18 lawmakers was nullified by the court. A Federal High Court in Awka later declared as unconstitutional, null, and void the purported impeachment of Governor Peter Obi in the suit filed by Obi against his removal. Delivering his ruling, Justice Umegbolu Nri-Ezedi ordered that Peter Obi should be reinstated as governor of the state with immediate effect (Mgbe 2013). Despite the appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Obi and ordered his reinstatement on February 9, 2007. The intensity of political contestation and power struggle in Anambra was remarkable as Onuoha (2006) recounts that Anambra State parades some of Nigeria’s foremost nationalists and achievers of repute like former President of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe, former Vice President, Alex Ekwueme, former Secretary-General of Commonwealth of Nations, Emeka Anyaoku, and warlord Odumegwu Ojukwu among others. This array of individuals of national reckoning could not guarantee the state’s exception from the theatrics of political contestation and the consistent struggle for the control of the lever of the state resources, being the hallmark of the Fourth Republic politics between 1999 and 2015. Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju’s PDP government was accused of running the State aground, as federal allocations were allegedly shared among party gladiators in the State, led by one of Obasanjo’s cronies, Sir Emeka Offor (Onuoha 2006).

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Onuoha (2006) further reported that the refusal of Chris Ngige to hand over the State treasury to another “Obasanjo boys,” Chris Uba as a reward for his being rigged into office, as well as his failure to honour “agreement” culminated in the July 10, 2004, abduction of Ngige from his office as governor and the attendant crisis that was visited on the state. Ngige was to later confess that his election and that of President Obasanjo in 2003 were rigged on the same table in Anambra State. Ngige’s confession was followed by President Obasanjo’s subsequent description of Chris Uba as a young man who helped PDP win elections. Chris Uba was also reported to have lamented at the World Igbo Congress somewhere in the United States of America that he regretted rigging Ngige into power as governor of Anambra State. These revelations came to the fore simply because Chris Ngige refused to pay three billion Naira to Uba, which payment from the state coffer was approved by the PDP national executive as a reward for the electoral fraud (Onuoha 2006).

5 Judicial Reviews of Impeachment Campaigns in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic The foregoing attests to the palpable procedural shortcomings in the deployment of impeachment. Nnochiri (2014) reported that the voiding of the impeachment of former Deputy Governor of Taraba State, Sani Abubakar (table 1 no. 11) by the Supreme Court brought into focus the arbitrary deployment of impeachment. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Governor was illegally removed from office on the recommendation of a compromised panel that denied the erstwhile Abubakar a fair hearing. It ordered Abubakar’s reinstatement as the Deputy Governor of the State forthwith. The Court also held that the seven-man panel that purportedly investigated allegations leveled against the Deputy Governor “merely played out a script previously prepared and handed over to the panel.” It held that the conduct of the lawmakers was in breach of section 188 of the 1999 Constitution. It specifically declared the conduct of the proceeding that heralded the impeachment as illegal, as it noted that the sitting that culminated in the impeachment was held at a guesthouse that belonged to the majority leader of the State Assembly as against the chambers of the State Assembly (Muheeb 2016; Nnochiri 2014). In arriving at its judgment, the Supreme Court vacated the earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal Yola Division dated July 19, 2013, which had affirmed a previous verdict by the Taraba State High Court dated March 19, 2013. It reasoned that the lower court ought to have declared the entire proceedings of the panel null and void and no legal or factual effect whatsoever to resolve the issue of denial of a fair hearing in favor of the Deputy Governor (Nnochiri 2014). Danladi, serving his second term as Deputy Governor of Taraba State under Governor Danbaba Suntai, had gone to the apex court to challenge the legality of his impeachment by the Assembly. After his impeachment, Alhaji Garba Umar took over as the Deputy Governor of the state. However, following the involvement of Governor Suntai in an

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air accident that left him incapacitated, Umar took over as the Acting Governor of the state, a position he occupied until the Supreme Court verdict (Nnochiri 2014). It would be recalled that as Section 188 of the Constitution requires, consequent upon the resolution of the State Assembly, the Speaker requested the Acting Chief Judge of the State to constitute a 7-member panel to investigate allegations leveled against the Deputy Governor (Nnochiri 2014). The state lawmakers had on September 4, 2012, laid before the Speaker a notice of complaint of gross misconduct against the appellant. On September 18, the Assembly passed a motion, under section 188(4) of the constitution, to investigate the allegations against the Deputy Governor (Nnochiri 2014). Although the Deputy Governor filed an Originating Summons restraining the panel from investigating him, the panel ignored this court action. Following the refusal of the panel to allow him to call witnesses to prove his innocence, the appellant amended his suit before the court, contending that he was denied the opportunity to effectively defend himself. While upholding the case of the appellant, the apex court noted that the Taraba Assembly, at the lower court, relied on an incomplete and edited report, to conclude that the appellant did not prove his denial of a fair hearing (Nnochiri 2014). The Yola Division of Federal Court of Appeal, Adamawa State nullified the impeachment of Former Governor Murtala Nyako on 11th February 2016. Channels Television reported that a five-man panel of Appeal Court judges sitting in Yola nullified the impeachment by setting aside an earlier ruling of a lower court that upheld the impeachment. Muheeb (2016) recalls that Nyako was removed from office on July 15, 2014, after 17 of a 25-members Adamawa State House of Assembly adopted the report of a panel set up to investigate alleged corrupt practices and abuse of office against Nyako. The report found the governor guilty of all the counts of gross misconduct. The Court ruled that the impeachment was not done under the provision of the law. The five Judges unanimously described Nyako’s impeachment as high-level impunity, recklessness, rascality, and gross abuse of legislative powers by the Adamawa State House of Assembly to achieve orchestrated, premeditated, and selfish motives. While declaring the impeachment as null, void, and of no effect, the judges averred that the impeachment of the former governor was a misuse of the powers and privileges of the legislature. The decision of the House of Assembly to ignore the constitutional provision of personal service of impeachment notice on the former governor was a misnomer to the constitution that must not be tolerated. The court condemned in strong terms the arrogance of the lawmakers and some politicians who flagrantly refused to obey court orders against the impeachment process despite the order of the high court in Adamawa State (Yusuf et al. 2016). The Court specifically faulted the “impunity and arrogance” of the Adamawa State House of Assembly and their collaborators, in setting up a panel to investigate Nyako despite a subsisting court order to the contrary. The Court declared all the processes that led to the impeachment null and void and ordered that Nyako be accorded all rights of the office of the governor of Adamawa State through the period of office and be paid all his entitlement as governor of the state while it lasted. The judgment stated that it did not matter whether Nyako committed the alleged offenses

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but that since he was not availed of the right to any fair hearing and having his fundamental human rights trampled upon, the assembly acted in an affront to the rule of law and such illegality cannot stand as legal. The impeachment was therefore reversed to mean that Nyako remained the Governor of Adamawa State until the elapse of his tenure. The judge, however, posited that the issue of tenure elongation for Nyako cannot stand as his term has elapsed (Ajayi 2016; Channels Television 2016).

6 Legislative Actions and Activities: A Critical Appreciation Following Barkan (2009), the legislature is a significant arm of government, the rallying point for the collective wishes and aspirations of the electorate, and a bridge between the government and the people. Representative government thrives on the effective and influential legislature as regards lawmaking, representation, and oversight of the executive. Conversely, the primitive disposition of legislative responsibilities and the arbitrary exercise of legislative powers that informs a paradigm shift from an emphasis on checking executive excesses to curtailing the legislative abuse of powers give cause for concern. Legislatures were enmeshed in political and power contestations in an environment and under circumstances that undermined legislative effectiveness, compromised accountability, institutions building and instead advance the personalization of government business. Effective representation has been threatened by institutional instability occasioned by the overzealousness of compromised lawmakers determined to advance the power of legislatures in questionable circumstances. Legislatures have deployed impeachment tools occasionally at the expense of effective representation and lawmaking. The impeachment campaigns against principal officers, governors, and deputy governors were fraught with shortcomings and illegalities on the part of the legislature (Muheeb and Orisadare 2018). The respective houses of assembly fell short of adhering to the rule of law. Legislative sessions were held sometimes at odd hours in undignified locations outside legislative chambers excluding legislative staff. Legislative rules and operational principles are often compromised in such circumstances with flagrant disregard for the rule of law. The substantive and procedural rules are observed in breach setting negative precedence across the states. Legislative activities often focused on discrediting principal officers and marked executive officials to selfish ends. These impeachments have sparked flames of trouble in several states, where supporters of different political parties have clashed. Impeachment campaigns within the legislature and against the executive have ignited institutional instability in many states. Impeachment campaigns have increased intra- and inter-party crises and deepened the crisis of confidence among lawmakers. Indiscriminate deployment of impeachment to

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settle intra-legislative crisis should not be misconstrued to mean legislative dynamism (Muheeb and Orisadare 2018; Adeyinka-Eweje 2010). Indiscriminate suspension of dissenting members on flimsy excuses, and spurious charges at odd hours outside agreeable periods, as the case in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Ogun, Plateau, and Rivers States, among others, were off-marks. The unceremonious removal of principal officers has divided members along selfish and primordial sentiments. Assemblies have been polarized making a crucial decisions on major government policies often unrealistic in the affected states. Legislative ineptitude leading to a political quagmire should not be misconstrued for activism and vibrancy (Adeyinka-Eweje 2010). The maze, which is the symbol of authority had been the victim of legislative rascality both at the state and national levels. The Mace is often stolen, substituted, or occasionally broken into parts becoming a fighting tool at the disposal of opposing sides. Minority decisions have also taken precedence over and above the majority in gross violation of constitutional provisions and the legislative process. This worrying trend threatens the sustainability of the democratic system. Controversies generated by many impeachment campaigns and the attendant judicial reviews attest to the arbitrary deployment of impeachment tools amidst lawmakers’ susceptibility to external manipulation as the foregoing reveals. By and large, the Nigerian constitution empowers the legislators to hold the executive accountable while being accountable to the electorate in return. Legislators are not accountable to the governor or president in Nigeria and acting otherwise would amount to compromising an ignorance of constitutional provisions and by implication disregard for their respective constituents. Impeachment is to be carried out as a deterrent for malfeasance rather than used for settling personal scores as witnessed in many states. The constitution provides that all the principal of the various houses can only be removed by a two-third majority of lawmakers sitting at the same time. Members are expected to act under these provisions regardless of personal or party differences. Lawmakers should act with sense of purpose and responsibility. The constitutional procedure for the removal of principal officers should be followed in the letter. Recourse to acts that negate professional conduct in any guise, undermines the procedural and substantive rules and amounts to a desecration of legislative duties and flagrant disregard for the constitutions. Appropriate legislative tools should be deployed, as and when required to seek clarifications from the executive on issues of public importance to avoid being accused of ulterior motives and misrepresentation. Legislators should be aware of and internalize the legislative process. Awareness requires knowledge of the limit of the exercise of legislative powers. It also entails the understanding that lawmakers are accountable to the people on whose mandate they serve. The people as the sovereign should not condone legislators’ indiscretion. Hence, the provisions for recall of legislators by their constituents when found wanting. The electorates should be kept informed. The electorate should ask questions about elected representatives. Excessive electioneering informs taking action considered politically expedient but undermines progressive legislative conduct. Members seeking election to the legislature should be properly scrutinized and screened to ensure credibility with considerable knowledge of legislative duties.

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7 Conclusion The political landscape of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has featured variants of power amidst multiple power dynamics including the deployment of federal might for political expediency (Hague et al. 2019). The trajectory of representative government was fraught with the overbearing influence of vested interests evident across the States. The legislature and the rule of law were compromised in widespread politics of impeachment. Anambra State, for example, signposts prevalent open display of power through manipulation of state institutions to intimidate the opposition and whip recalcitrant actors into line. In a show of whits, the legislative institutions were caught in the web of intractable power struggles where the judiciary was visibly present in its stabilizing role, as arbiter. Allegations and counterallegations of electoral malpractices and institutional manipulation indicting former President Obasanjo among other political gladiators and their foot soldiers in the case of Anambra point to the nature and characters of the politics of the early Fourth Republic. The associated confusion, which culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency in some states undermines electoral politics and popular government. Intra- and inter-institutional politics bred infighting, acrimonies, and irreconcilable differences across legislative and executive institutions. Legislative assemblies were polarized in many affected states making these representative institutions vulnerable to external influences, as the foregoing discussion reveals. Nevertheless, the legislature will continue to be relevant in political power relations. Legislators should be alert to the limit of their powers and parliamentary responsibilities in interinstitutional and inter-government relations by striving to not compromise the spirit and letters of the constitution and the overall interest of their respective constituents. The personalization of government business and the dynamics of power politics vis-à-vis the significand and functioning of the legislature would be recurring subjects in Nigeria’s political and legislative studies discourses for the foreseeable future.

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Fagbadebo OM (2016) Exploring the politics of impeachment in Nigeria’s presidential system: insights from selected states in the fourth republic, 1999 – 2007. A PhD dissertation, University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa Fagbadebo OM, Dorasamy N (2020) An analysis of the judicial review of the impeachment procedures in Anambra, Oyo, and plateau in Nigeria’s fourth republic. Transylv Rev XXVII (48):12211–12219 Hague R, Harrop M (2004) Comparative government and politics – an introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Hague R, Martin H, John MC (2019) Comparative government and politics, 11th edn. Red Globe Press, London Hans K (2000) Comparative democratic politics - a guide to contemporary theory and research, 1st edn. Sage, London Johari JC (1987) Cotemporary political theory. Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi Joseph R (1987) Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic. Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan Lijphart A (ed) (1992) Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 1–157 Max S (2013) Soldiers of fortune: Nigerian politics under Buhari and Babangida (1983–1993). Cassava Republic Press, Abuja Muheeb IO (2007) Anti-corruption war: legislatures’ weak points and its implications for an emerging Federal Democratic Polity. J Arts Humanit 4(3):94–102 Muheeb IO (2015) The legislature and representative government in OGUN state Nigeria, 1999–2011. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan Muheeb IO (2016) Frequency, substance and procedural shortcomings of state level impeachment campaigns in an emerging Federal Democracy. J Soc Sci 12(2):117–128. https://doi.org/10. 3844/jssp.2016 Muheeb IO, Orisadare JL (2018) The legislature in intra-executive crisis and institutional instability in Nigeria. Ann Rev Res 3(5):1 Nnochiri. Ikechukwu (2014) S-Court reinstates impeached Taraba Deputy Governor. November 22, 2014. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/s-court-reinstates-impeached-taraba-deputy-gover nor/accessed 24/11/2015

Online Resources Adeyinka-Eweje O (2010) Political insanity or legislative rascality. 09 Sept 2010 http:// saharareporters.com/2010/09/09/political-insanity-or-legislative-rascality. Accessed 12 June 2020 Ajayi A (2016) Court of appeal voids Nyako’s impeachment. 11 Feb 2016. http://www. premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198302-court-appeal-voids-nyakos-impeachment.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2016 Anyaeche C (2006) The impeachment process of Gov. Peter Obi. Thursday, 19 Oct 2006. http:// nigeriaworld.com/articles/2006/oct/194.html. Accessed 1 Dec 2015 Channels Television Appeal court nullifies Nyako’s impeachment. 11 Feb 2016. http://www. channelstv.com/top-videos/. Accessed 16 Feb 2016 Mgbe J (2013) The impeachment of Jude Agbaso: lessons from Gov. Peter Obi. http://247ureports. com/the-impeachment-of-jude-agbaso-lessons-from-gov-peter-obi-by-john-mgbe/. Accessed 1 Dec 2015 Ogaziechi N (2014) As impeachment whirlwind blows. http://dailyindependentnig.com/2014/08/ impeachment-whirlwind-blows/. Accessed 7 Aug 2014

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Onuoha E (2006) Re: the impeachment process of Gov. Peter Obi. Monday 23 Oct 2006. http:// nigeriaworld.com/articles/2006/oct/231.html. Accessed 1 Dec 2015 Onyekpere E (2014) Matters arising from the impeachment gale. http://www.punchng.com/ opinion/matters-arising-from-the-impeachment-gale/. Accessed 28 July 2014 Sahara Reporters (2006) Breaking news: Peter Obi of Anambra state impeached. 02 Nov 2006. http://saharareporters.com/2006/11/02/breaking-news-peter-obi-anambra-state-impeached-0. Accessed 1 Dec 2015 Solomon K (2014) Abuse of impeachment under 1999 constitution. http://thenationonlineng.net/ new/abuse-of-impeachment-under-1999-constitution/. Accessed 6 Aug 2014 Ukumba I (2014) Impeachment: Al-Makura looks set to go. http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/ impeachment-al-makura-looks-set-to-go/. Accessed 28 July 2014 Yusuf U, Biobele J, Georgewill A, Ogakwu OA (2016) Appeal court quashes ex-Gov Nyako’s impeachment. 12 Feb 2016. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/02/appeal-court-quashes-exgov-nyakos-impeachment/. Accessed 16 Feb 2016

Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb has published extensively on the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic including his study of “The legislature and Representative Government in Ogun State.” He has a special interest in inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships, and how this affects leadership succession, institutionalisation, governance and administration.

The Legislature, Subnational Governments, and Child’s Education Rights in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Tunde A. Abioro

Abstract The traditional responsibility of the legislature the world over is lawmaking. Over time, it has included oversight of governmental Ministries, Departments, and other Agencies as well as other controls including political and financial among others. Pre-1999, the menace of out-of-school (OOS) children was rife owing to the suspension of fundamental human rights and other social neglect during the military administrations. However, on the restoration of democratic rule that heralded the fourth republic in 1999, institutional and political efforts were geared toward restoring the education rights of the children. Thus, Section 18(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria expresses that the “government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.” Subsequently, the Universal Basic Education Act was domesticated in the year 2000 by the national legislature. Similarly, the Second Schedule, Part II, item 30 of the 1999 constitution further empowered the House of Assembly of each state of the federation to make laws with respect to primary, postprimary, and other forms of education. This study explored the role of the national legislature in ensuring the education rights of the children are protected, how the subnational government’s education policy has impacted the education rights of the children; and how the role of other critical stakeholders shaped the education sector in Nigeria. The study explored documented reports and other secondary sources for data.

T. A. Abioro (✉) Department of Local Government and Development Studies, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_16

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1 Introduction Nations of the world have identified the necessity to further strengthen and transfer knowledge, ethics, values, and culture. In this recognition, concerted efforts are being made toward not just standardizing it, but making it reach as many individuals as possible across the globe. Of note, education comes in both formal and informal forms; however, the focus of this study is on the formal type of education as supported by the institutions of government in Nigeria and more specifically, through international agreements and other legislations. Undoubtedly, the domestication of continental and global instruments has enriched national and subnational laws. These include but are not limited to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Charter (UDHR); 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; 1989 United Nations General Assembly that adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC); 1990 African Union Assembly of Heads of States and Governments that adopted the African Union Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (CRWC). Also, there is the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand (1990), the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China (1995), and The World Education Forum, Dakar, Senegal (2000) which resulted in Education for All (EFA) movement, while the Millennium Development Goals that later metamorphosed into sustainable development goals were offshoots of the Millennium Summit in the New York (2000) and the United Nations General Assembly (2015), respectively. These documents created the foundation on which most nations drafted their fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy which include fundamental obligations of the government, political, economic, social, and educational objectives among others. Underscoring the velocity of the educational deficit, UNESCO (2018) noted that the continent of Africa has warehoused the highest number of out-of-school in the primary school category. This category includes dropouts and not attendants, which constitute about 21%. Meanwhile, among the interventions to address the negative trend, the Federal Ministry of Education and UNICEF 2003 partnered to intervene in three critical areas that include achieving universal basic education, promoting equality among the genders as well as combating HIV and AIDS and other diseases through the Strategy for Acceleration of Girls’ Education in Nigeria (SAGEN). Of note, the nature and character of the Nigerian state with time formed the structure put in place by the government to achieve delivery in the education sector. It transformed through colonial education vis-a-vis Christian missionary, British politics of indirect rule, post-colonial home rule, military adventurism, and civilian administration. These regime types including the development of public service constituted the environment that developed the education sector. The Nigerian state is a developing nation with a population of about 200 million people. It is ingloriously one of the major poverty capitals on the globe. Over time, it

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has exhibited inconsistent and overlapping rules and policies as well as unclear and poorly managed interventions to gravitate and lead the people not only out of the menace of poverty but poor and alarming school enrolment (Abioro 2021: 250). Further, UNICEF stated that 10 million of the 18.5 million out-of-school-children in Nigeria are girls and this figure constitutes the highest in the world (Vanguard news 2022). However, some of the abuses the girl-child is constantly exposed to include cultural disenfranchisement in school enrolment, the disparity in favor of the male sex in regular family lives, sexual harassment, child labor, street hawking, child trafficking, and genital mutilation among others (Agusiobo 2018: 778). Unfortunately, it has led to an increase in the rate of child marriage, prostitution, narcotic consumption, and other vices. This study examines the intervention, adoption, and performance of the global, continental, and national legislative instruments on child education in Nigeria. The sections include attempts to: introduce the study; understand government intervention in child’s education; as well as the role played by the legislature at international and national levels to protect the education rights of the child. It also discussed the domestication of the Universal Basic Education Act and Child Rights Act as well as the politics, policies, and practices that defined child’s education rights, while a discussion on education stakeholders and other interventions precedes the conclusion.

2 Understanding Government Intervention in Child’s Education in Nigeria The government can be loosely understood as the institution of the state saddled with the responsibility of creating wealth and abundance to assist the people to reach their maximum potential. Its core function is ensuring the distribution of public goods in basic sectors of the economy. In this, provision and unrestricted access to quality, early life schooling comes to the fore. However, the period for a child’s emotional, cognitive, and physical development is between ages 0 and 8 years. Meanwhile, the environment is an important factor that guides the formation, development, and even regulation of the child’s brain. The concern, therefore, is that as a Third World country, Nigeria has negative profiling in socio-economic development. It has a shortage of revenue that cannot meet its expenses, thus, allocation to the education section is mostly inadequate. However, the financial, material, and technical support by stakeholders such as UNICEF, UNESCO, World Bank, Non-governmental Organizations, Community-Based Organizations, and other donor agencies have impacted the delivery of child education at the primary and post-primary levels. The UNICEF proposal of national budgetary allocation of 15–20% to fund education in developing countries has not been met, rather, the nation has only done a paltry 5–7% in the last six years (2016–2021). Omitola and Ogunnubi (2016: 169) submitted there is a glaring failure of government and the paltry budgetary

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allocation has not justified enough governmental determination toward achieving qualitative education. In this, the national and sub-national legislatures have not lived up to their constitutional responsibilities in the areas of serving as institutional checks as well as accountability in policy implementation. The National Policy on Education (2004) states that “education is an instrument designed to effectively drive the nation towards a targeted national development.” By implication, it can reduce poverty and thus increase economic prosperity. However, with about 8 in 10 of the citizens aged 35 years and below, the country no doubt has a youthful population. The estimates by the federal government revealed a breakdown of school eligibility to include “pre-primary 19 million, primary 34 million, junior school 15 million, senior school 13 million and postprimary education 25 million, to make a total of about 106 million children” (FGN 2021). As mentioned earlier, Nigeria has the highest number of out-of-school (OOS) children in the world despite the government’s expansion initiatives to improve access to education during the last few decades, even as a quarter of Nigeria’s school-age children (6–15 years) were not attending primary education. Of note, the number had increased by 100% between 2003 and 2020 due to the activities of insurgents, bandits, terrorists, and secessionist groups in the North-west, North-East, and South-east regions of the country (NBS 2020). Also, despite the various governmental and non-governmental interventions, the girl child represents about 60% of the figure. However, socio-economic and demographic characteristics have influenced student enrolments in Nigeria. Religion, culture, and economic status have determined the enrolment rate at both primary and post-primary school levels. Obi and Obi (2014: 42) submit that after passing through two critical stages, that is, rapid expansion occasioned in 1950–1980 during the policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE); and rapid declines experienced between 1981 and 2009, it is apt to state that the education sector is yet to witness significant turnaround despite the resources in terms of finances and personnel invested in it. To this extent, it is reflected in the performance of statistical downturns in the areas of employability, proper job match, standard academic qualifications, competence, and skills among others.

3 The Legislature and the Education Rights of the Children in Nigeria At international, national, and subnational levels, the functions and responsibilities of the legislatures who might have been elected or selected are cut out. In Nigeria where the legislatures are elected, their task is to ensure enabling legislations which might include the establishment of required bodies, amending, repealing, and consolidating the provisions of existing legislations to help government deliver on its mandate.

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The traditional role and responsibility of the legislature the world over is lawmaking. Over time, it has included oversight of governmental ministries, departments, and agencies, even as it has acquired subtle controls over political and financial matters. Chilaka et al. (2021: 22) further noted the legislature is critical and has a function to protect and preserve democracy by ensuring the delivery of prompt, appropriate, and adequate social services to the people. In achieving this, Omitola and Ogunnubi (2016: 161) stressed that the legislature is the most representative of all institutions of democratic governance and at the same time, the closest to the people. Thus, the purpose and responsibility of the legislature is to ensure a prosperous and socio-economic developed nation. Similarly, Edet and Amadu (2014) underscored the relevance and importance of legislature to national development. Jooji (2019) expressed that “the legislature is a deliberate assembly that is bestowed with law-making rights for clearly defined and prescribed entity or region.” It enjoys membership that is from the constituent political community that makes collective decisions arising from complex legislative stages including first and second readings, committee and report stages as well as presentation for assent by the executive or other prescribed authority. It is bestowed with lawmaking powers over other arms of government, and more specifically it can check or control the exercise of executive powers or make the executive accountable and responsible to the electorates (Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre 2016: 1). One major way it carries out its check and balance responsibility, as well as review and evaluation on the implementers of policies, is often referred to as legislative oversight. Broadly speaking, PLAC (2016: 7) classified oversight into political and technical. Notably, legislative oversights are carried out either constitutionally or by practice. Thus, the frequent adoption of one or most to ensure that legislative responsibility is adequately carried out is through but not limited to routine oversight; appropriation oversight; investigative oversight; and public account committee oversight. All these are conducted through visits, committee hearings, discussions, and/or hearings at plenary sessions, public account committees, a commission of inquiry, auditors’ general interpolation, and an ombudsman among others. The legislatures are compelled to embark on oversight to improve service delivery and justify political representation and performance. However, legislators are often faced with challenges of either voting along personal initiative and judgement or seeking for and following instructions of constituents or that of political parties on national issues. Ayeni-Akeke (2008: 299) further explicates the situation and noted that “such dilemmas have found a base in two broad theoretical viewpoints which are mandate and trustee theories. The former believes that a representative merely performs a delegate function, that is, to do the bidding of his electors as their spokesperson while the latter is the exact opposite and saddles the representative with discretionary freedom based on his skills, knowledge and available information in making decisions on legislation.” Notably, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 18(1) of 1999 enshrined the rights of the Nigerian child to quality education. It expresses that the “government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and

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adequate educational opportunities at all levels.” Similarly, the Second Schedule, Part II, item 30 of the 1999 constitution further empowered the House of Assembly of each state of the federation to make laws with respect to primary, post-primary, and other forms of education. With this item appearing under the concurrent exclusive legislative list, education in Nigeria has technically been made the responsibility of the three levels of government, that is, federal, state, and local. Subsequently, the Universal Basic Education Act was domesticated in the year 2000 by the national legislature. In 2003, the Universal Basic Education Programme was repackaged, therein, states were empowered to develop curriculum, textbooks, learning materials as well as distinct teacher education programs among others.

4 Rights of the Child and the Universal Basic Education Act in Nigeria (The Domestication) Article 1 of The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) describes a child as “. . .every human being below the age of 18 years.” Article 2 of The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) supports this description. Among others, the rights and responsibilities of the Nigerian child are protected by the Child Rights Act of 2003. It dwells on the best interest a child can have to maximize potential and improve societal values. However, the formal Nigerian education system is structured into (i) Early child care and development, targeting 0 to 5 years; (ii) basic education, targeting 6 to 14 years, that is, 6 years of primary education and 3 years of junior secondary education; (iii) post-basic education, which is 3 years in senior secondary schools or technical colleges, and (iv) tertiary education in colleges of education, monotechnics, polytechnics, and universities (Federal Government of Nigeria 2021). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child revealed under Articles 28 and 29 the existing relationships between legislative and administrative measures. It further stated that (i) “every child has the right to free, compulsory and universal basic education and it shall be the duty of the government in Nigeria to provide such education”; (ii) “every parent or guardian shall ensure that his child or ward attends and completes his primary school education; and junior secondary education”; and (iii) “every parent, guardian or person who has the care and custody of a child who has completed his basic education, shall endeavor to send the child to a senior secondary school.” Of note, the Act did not only legislate the rights and responsibilities; it also prescribes sanctions for erring parents and or guardians. The Universal Basic Education (UBE) was introduced in 1999 and domesticated in the year 2000 by the national legislature to replace the Universal Primary Education (UPE) which had been operational since 1976. The UBE Act 2004 at inception has targeted and identified mandates to “develop in the citizenry a strong consciousness for education and a strong commitment to the promotion; the provision of free UBE for every Nigerian child of school going age; reducing drastically

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the incidence of drop out from the formal school system through improved relevance, quality and efficiency; catering for the learning needs of young persons who for one reason or the other have had to interrupt their schooling through appropriate forms of complementary approaches to the provision and promotion of basic education; and ensuring the acquisition of the appropriate level of literacy, numeracy, manipulative communicative and life skills as well as the ethical moral and civic values needed for laying a solid foundation for life with the ultimate desire to eradicate illiteracy, ignorance and poverty” (UBEC 2004). Similarly, the CRC (2019) stated that: . . .the education to which every child has a right is one designed to provide the child with life skills, to strengthen the child’s capacity to enjoy the full range of human rights and to promote a culture which is infused by appropriate human rights values. The goal is to empower the child by developing his or her skills, learning and other capacities, human dignity, self-esteem and self-confidence.

In adoption, the purpose of childhood education as prescribed by relevant international instruments in which Nigeria is a signatory, drive toward achieving and effecting the smooth transition from home to school; preparing the child for the primary level of education; providing adequate care and supervision for children; inculcating social norms and values; inculcating the spirit of creativity and inquiry; developing a sense of cooperation and team spirit; teaching good habits and teaching the rudiments of numbers, letters, colors, forms, and shapes through play (The Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013; Akinnimisi et al. 2020: 73). Whereas, the philosophy and goals of education in Nigeria as documented in the National Policy on Education (2014) identified the guidelines, objectives, standards, strategies, and management for achieving the national education goals in Nigeria. Operationally, the Federal Ministry of Education (FME) through departments, agencies, and parastatals ensures the implementation of the necessary legislatively approved and administratively assigned tasks to deliver education in the country. Similarly, the Ministry of Education (state) and the Universal Basic Education Board (state) ensure the delivery of basic education at both state and local government levels (FGN 2021). Thus, the involvement of non-governmental organizations/ agencies has improved the attention and subsequent provision of resources, infrastructure, and funding for education. This has been achieved through advocacy and the maximization of technology to improve participation in governance.

5 Politics, Policies, and Practices that Have Defined Child’s Education in Nigeria Regime type and political will are some of the political conditions that influence education reforms. The politicization of the sector takes place in the forms of financial, infrastructure, material, staffing, access, and exclusion among others. Education in Nigeria like in most developing countries is largely politicized,

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especially by governments. This to a large extent has influenced the attitudes of public officers including bureaucrats and government agencies; formation, execution, and general management of education including curriculum development and interpretation; staff recruitment and training; promotion and welfare packages. In all, other stakeholders like the Teachers’ Union, governmental officials as well as international players and other community stakeholders in one way or the other influence policies and decisions of government. At all levels, the authoritative allocation of scarce values and resources is a major responsibility of the government. Though, the legislature serving as a check has the prerogative to adjust financial proposals submitted by the executive, more so, if it is in the interest of the public. However, political will is critical in the domestication and implementation of international and national laws by both national and subnational legislatures. Pointedly, Odude (2022) observed that only 25 out of the 36 states of the federation have domesticated the CRA into laws. This no doubt has implications for quality and nationwide measurement of performance. Also, the interactions between the executive and legislature, on the one hand, and the federal, state, and local governments on the other have defined the current state of the education sector at the subnational levels. The public policy remains the clear presentation and expression of government interest in particular areas, and the legal frameworks not only make the presentation formal but binding. The education policies developed to enhance the quality of the sector include the National Policy on Integrated Early Childhood Development as well as Teacher Education Policy. The education component is adequately reflected and covered in the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) as well as the State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS). Therein, measures to improve the quality of education were stated to include “improvement of school infrastructure through various government institutions i.e. Education Trust Fund, Universal Basic Education Commission grants as well as Federal Ministry of Education Debt Relief Funds. It includes in-service teacher training programs through the National Teachers Institute (NTI), National Commission for Colleges of Education (NCCE) and UBEC. So also is the improvement of sanitation in schools including the provision of safe water and construction of latrines through the DFID, EU and UNICEF/FME funded programs; promotion of school health and hygiene in schools through integration into the curriculum, child to child, child to parent, and child to community strategies and introduction of schools health clubs; improvement of school management through the establishment of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs), every public school in Nigeria is mandated by law to establish an SBMC to plan, coordinate and manage schools effectively; provision of teaching and learning materials to schools; introduction of school-based teacher training programs; and the introduction of competitions to promote academic excellence” (Convention on the Rights of the Child 2008). Section 2 (1) of the Act provides that every government in Nigeria shall provide free, compulsory, and universal basic education for every child of primary and junior secondary school age. Similarly, Section 2 (2) provides that every parent shall ensure that his child or ward attends and completes (a) primary school education; and

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(b) junior secondary education. Meanwhile, under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, education matters are listed under the fundamental objectives and directive policies of the government. It is also a non-justiciable matter and the governments at both levels enjoy some sort of reprieve as they cannot be sued for not implanting part or all of the stipulated. Having defined justiciability as a set of judge-made rules, norms, and principles, delineating the scope of judicial intervention in social, political, and economic life, it suffices to express that the placement has influenced the education policy willingly entered into by national governments. The justiciability or otherwise of the right of the child has often been subjected to debates in Nigeria as the nation’s grandmum listed the right under fundamental objective in section 18 (3a-d) and not a fundamental right that can be interpreted as compulsory. Akingbein (2021) further expressed that if education remains under the directive principle of state policy, it only remains constitutionally obligatory and therefore unenforceable. In effect, the menace of quality child education was rife owing to the suspension of fundamental human rights and other social neglect during the military administrations. Thus, before the restoration of democratic rule that heralded the fourth republic in 1999, institutional and political efforts were not just low, but without elements of transparency and accountability. Therefore, the call to enhance the education and general rights of the child was almost absent on the home front. Chukwuka et al. (2015: 11) identified legal and institutional framework as critical to an efficient Child Rights Act. Therein, other factors such as enrolment and funding are to be supported by federal, state, and local governments. The recurring challenge and attack on the security architecture and rampant kidnap of school children have been identified as responsible for increased numbers of out-of-school children, though most common in the northern part of the country. Unfortunately, the number of out-of-school children keeps increasing. Also, the reaction of the education sector during the Ebola pandemics and most recently the Covid-19 pandemic that ravaged the world exposed the sector that is abysmally reactive, unprepared, and not showing enough zeal to survive and transcend beyond the period. The existing structures have not been proactively structured to absorb emergencies as the existing gap between scholarship and community has not been closed to ensure the discovery from laboratories of the impact on the homeless children. More so, Okoye et al. (2021: 126) averred that education is treated with disparity, contempt, and levity by both national and subnational governments and this includes both the executive and legislative arms. Language and use of mother tongue have been identified by UNESCO (2003) and Ajayi (2008) as practical tools of teaching. Unfortunately, the lingua franca which is the English language has been adopted for teaching across the country. It has not encouraged the development and adoption of local languages to transmit knowledge. Therefore, the lack of well-trained personnel, language barrier, and unavailability of textbooks and legislation have deprived the full impact of communication intended in teaching. Also, the practice of federalism in Nigeria has birthed the non-entrenchment of ideal democracy and decentralization. Thus, intergovernmental relations across ministries, departments, and parastatals have either overlapped or are

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not clearly and or poorly funded. There has further politicized the sector and left it with low performance. Generally, politics, policy, program, processes, and products are the cycle that determines educational intervention outcomes (Obanya 2011: 15). Meanwhile, the politicization of the sector might not necessarily be disadvantageous, but rather the intention, values, and orientation and nature of players might.

6 Education Stakeholders and Other Interventions in Nigeria Governmental and non-governmental bodies are the critical stakeholders that are either directly or indirectly connected or concerned with the development, deployment, execution, and performance of the education sector in the country. Their responsibility is to ensure improved service delivery in formal education to include improvement of learning outcomes sufficient to trigger socio-economic development. For instance, Ndifon et al. (2021: 25) advocated the partnership between various sectors for improved service delivery. However, private sector, civil society organizations including faith-based organizations, community-based organizations, media, international donors, and strategic partners have not just played complimentary roles, some have played leading roles in ensuring access to quality education for the children. Even as there are cases of religious, funding, and administrative disputes between some governments and religious organizations providing education, and total collapse have occurred where such were poorly managed, it has not ruled out the positive impact the collaborations have produced. The stakeholders have also played significant roles in ensuring an improvement of the literacy level among the populace. However, implementation according to Amuche and Kukwi (2013: 165) remains unsatisfactory, especially in the northern region of the country which has well over 10 million of the 18.5 million OOSC (UNICEF 2020). Religious institutions have invested greatly in education. The misrepresentation of social complexities like religion, culture and especially poverty among the rural dwellers have somehow shaped the terms of reference embarked upon by various stakeholders in the educational sector. Most Nigerian societies favor patriarchy. Although groups are advocating the rights of the girl child which includes access to quality education without any form of hindrance or discrimination, stakeholders must ensure the improvement in the girl child school enrolment. To this extent, Bello and Tukur (2021: 258) underscored the need to review the policy process to include contributions of community-based organizations due to their closeness and constant interaction with the rural dwellers for effectiveness.

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7 Conclusion The Nigerian federal state with its significant youth population and weak institutional structure has had to battle with various challenges at different times of its national life. Even with international, national, and subnational legislation, it has not been able to reduce the ever-bulging number of out-of-school children. Unfortunately, the high rate of insecurity has further discouraged access to education. Also, the issues of funding, curriculum development, staffing, promotion, and partnership with other stakeholders have thus continuously generated concerns. This study concludes that governments at all levels have not demonstrated the required political will to ensure the full domestication of the Child Rights Act by all the federating states. At the same time, retaining education as a non-justiciable matter has not done justice to the purpose it intends to serve in nation-building and development.

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Convention on the Rights of the Child (2019) United Nations Office on drugs and crime. United Nations Edet JT, Amadu JA (2014) The legislature and national development: the Nigerian experience. Glob J Arts Humanit Soc Sci 2(9):63–78 Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) National policy on education. NERDC Press, Lagos Federal Republic of Nigeria (2021) Education sector analysis: assessing the status of education in the federation and Oyo, Adamawa and Katsina states. IIEF-UNESCO, Dakar Jooji IT (2019) Legislative oversight functions and the entrenchment of democracy in Nigeria. Int J Dev Strat Humanit Manag Soc Sci 9(3):212–224 National Policy on Education (2014) National policy on safety, security and violence-free schools with its implementing guidelines. Federal Government of Nigeria Ndifon RA, Edu GO, Olofu MA, Adie JA (2021) The role of stakeholders in the implementation of school curriculum in Nigeria. Eur J Soc Sci 62(2):1. http://www.europeanjournalof socilasciences.com/ Obanya P (2011) Politics and the dilemma of meaningful access to education: the Nigerian story. Consortium for research on educational access, transition and equity. Create pathways to access, research monograph no. 56. University of Sussex, Centre for International Education Obi ZC, Obi CU (2014) Impact of government expenditure on education: the Nigerian experience. Int J Bus Finance Manag Res 2:42–48 Odude F (2022) Ensuring the child’s rights act protects Nigerian children. https://www. financialnigeia.com/enusring-the-child-s-right-act-prtects-nigerian-children. Assessed 28 July 2022 Okoye KE, Ibenwa CN, Ekekwe E (2021) Beyond the rhetoric of educational policy in Nigeria: understanding the state actor neglect on education during the COVID-19 pandemic. J Int Coop Dev 4(1):117–130 Omitola B, Ogunnubi OR (2016) Sub-national legislature and democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s fourth republic: lessons from Osun state house of assembly. J Soc Sci 12(4):160–179 Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (2016) Guide to legislative oversight in the National Assembly. PLAC, Abuja United Nation’s Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (2003) Education for all global monitoring report. Gender and education for all: the leap to quality. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/48223/pdf0000133513. Assessed 28 July 2022 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (2018) Handbook on measuring equity in education. UNESCO-UIS, Montreal United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2020) Global annual results report. In: Every child learns, Goal Area 2. UNICEF Universal Basic Education (2004) Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education Act, 2004. Federal Government of Nigeria Vanguard News (2022) Stakeholders raise alarm over state of BASIC education in Nigeria. https:// www.vanguardngr.com/2022/05/stakeholders-raise-alarm

Tunde A. Abioro holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. He is a Faculty Member in the Department of Local Government and Development Studies of the University. His research interest is in comparative governance, legislative studies, public policy, and human security. Currently, he is researching human security; and the trends and turns of tackling it through good governance in Africa. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association.

Constitutional Underpinnings of Partisanship and Consensus Building in Nigeria’s National Assembly Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi

Abstract Pluralist democracy and its attendant promotion of multi-party competition for political power necessarily makes recourse to partisanship a norm, particularly in a heterogenous society like Nigeria where existing fault lines are reinforced by differences in religion, ethnicity, and other centrifugal forces that have challenged the capacity of political leaders in building cross-party consensus and politics of accommodation on critical issues of national development. The multiplicity of views, policies, and programs is the cornerstone of (parliamentary) democracy in general, and commitments to particular policy orientations, through ideology or party membership, have often been thought of as part of the ethos of participatory democracy. Recent developments across political systems have, however, provoked a rethinking of the virtue or otherwise of partisanship, as recourse to extreme, divisive, and disintegrative tendencies on the altar of pursuing partisan interests has come to the forefront of national debates, whether in the advanced democracies of the West or nascent democracies of Africa and other developing parts of the Global South. In this paper, the author, who has had practical knowledge of the inside working of the legislative institutions at both the federal and the state levels in Nigeria, reflects on the scourge of extreme partisanship in the Nigeria political system, interrogating how the provisions of the presidential Constitution has sought to moderate the impact of partisanship in critical aspects of the workings of the National Assembly and the political system. From the perspective of a participant– observer, the author suggests a few steps for the promotion of politics of accommodation in parliament without necessarily discountenancing the partisan character of national politics inherent in the adoption of multi-party democracy in a system that places less premium on party discipline or ideological commitment.

M. O. A. Alabi (✉) Department of Public and International Law, College of Law (Ifetedo Campus), Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_17

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1 Introduction In Nigeria, the series of immediate post-independence political crises that culminated in the abrupt termination of the First Republic through a military coup d’etat in January 1966 are often traceable to extreme partisanships that attended the political developments of the time, including the Western Region House of Assembly debacle, the treasonable felony trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, creation of the Midwestern Region, the census imbroglio, the federal election of 1964, and indeed the Western regional parliamentary elections of 1965. The differences were reinforced by the fact that the leading political parties that promoted partisanship were regionally based and, in a federal system with extremely strong regional governments, recourse to partisanship in matters of national importance could not be easily prevented particularly when one of the regions (the Northern) wielded disproportionally strong power equal to those of the remaining three regions combined. While the 13-year military interregnum (1966–1979) might have forced a sense of national unity, particularly after a 30-month civil war (May 1967–January 1970), and the adoption of some policies targeted at promoting national integration, fears of ethnic rivalry bolstered by extreme partisanship remained high. Thus, in drafting a new Constitution, considerable attention was paid to the need to ensure the growth of national institutions that could ensure some measure of geographical spread to promote a sense of belonging and reduce recourse to undue partisanship on matters that require consensus at the national level. The successive presidential constitutions (1979, 1989, 1995 draft, and the current 1999), therefore, have provisions specifically inserted to promote national integration and facilitate consensus building in parliamentary workings and processes. Yet, by promoting multi-party democracy under the rule of law, the Constitution itself could be said to have laid the foundation of partisanship in the conduct of politics in general and parliamentary affairs. This chapter examines Nigeria’s 1999 presidential Constitution in terms of the extent to which its provisions could be said to have laid the foundations of partisanship and consensus building in the National Assembly. It reviews the pros and cons of partisanship as the cornerstone of modern parliamentary democracy, specifically interrogating the role of political parties in using their partisan character to promote or retard development. The paper highlights the provisions of the Constitution that are designed to reduce the scourge of “hyper-partisanship” (Starke 2018) in the legislative institution at the federal level, and the implications of these for partisanship and consensus building for national development in a heterogenous society that envisions pluralist democracy in its national politics and democratic practices. The author insists that the constitutional prescription of multi-party democracy (and hence partisanship) does not necessarily preclude recourse to politics of accommodation in parliament and government and urge the practitioners of the system to adopt some measures to promote these two contradictory ideas to deepen the democratic process for good governance.

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2 Democratic Partisanship Partisanship is defined as “a strong adherence, dedication, or loyalty to a political party—or an ideology or agenda associated with a political party” (Duignan 2022). It is a sine qua non to democracy. This is because democracy as a government of the people emphasizes the liberalization of the political space, permitting diversity of views, opinions, and choices. As a majoritarian proposition, democracy also permits the most extreme of views, howbeit unpopular, to be heard and respected. The participatory virtues of democracy also permit unfettered association of people of like minds, within or outside the legislative chambers, to freely come together and pursue their respective developmental agenda within the purview of the constitutional framework put in place in any country under the rule of law. Partisanship or recourse to partisan considerations is therefore an indispensable part of the practice of modern democracy. Although a cross-country phenomenon, its origin has distinctively been traceable to the United States of America (Duignan 2022). While the term “partisanship” has been used in popular discussions with negative connotations, its significance for the growth of democracy and good governance has also been recognized. The “positive effects” of partisanship in politics have been noted to include: facilitation of connections between political leaders and the public, the aggregation of related public opinions and interests, the relatively clear articulation of political problems and challenges and their possible solutions, the encouragement of political involvement by individual citizens and interest groups, and . . . a greater level of stability of government (Duignan 2022).

The absence of partisanship may make parliamentary debates less robust or, to use the words of Kerr (1978:51), “intolerably dull.” When partisanship in politics is taken to an extreme that unduly polarizes the system and threatens national development, however, it may become a threat to democracy. For instance, recent developments in the USA have placed a question mark on the supposed pragmatic character of American politics as divisive partisan considerations have tended to obscure recourse to consensus in important national debates (Jacobs and Milkis 2022). Divisions along partisan lines, whether based on political parties or some other commitments to a common cause, have also been noted to be antithetical to good parliamentary practice in Canada (Starke 2018). Similar observations abound elsewhere (Lupu 2016; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In Africa, Nigeria (Johnson 2021), Ghana (Nyabor 2018), and other countries have reported similar experiences. In many countries, while political partisanship may permeate major aspects of national life, its most visible manifestations are brought out during debates and voting in parliaments where differences on issues, policies, and ideas are often brought to the forefront. Thus, any discussions of partisanship, whether in its positive or negative connotations, cannot be properly or fully articulated without situating it within the context of parliamentary democracy.

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3 Democracy, Parliament, and National Development Parliament, or to use a more extensively used terminology—the legislature, is the core institution of democracy anywhere in the world. It is the cornerstone of modern democratic practice, and the importance of the legislative institution, of whatever variety and status, for the furtherance of democracy, whether in the developed or the developing world, cannot be overemphasized. Although not a perennial future of history, being a later development that post-dated the fall of absolutism in Europe and elsewhere, Parliament has grown in power and significance in the last couple of centuries to become the leading institution that separates democracy from other forms of government. There could be no democracy without parliament. In the African context, the importance of the legislature is underscored by the fact that the legislative institution is often the first casualty of any unconstitutional change of government. For instance, every military takeover of the government in Nigeria (1966, 1983, and 1993) had led to the dissolution of the national and state assemblies among other democratic institutions. While the other arms of government were permitted to exist and indeed blossom, albeit, in their adulterated forms, the legislature was abrogated, or, to use the technical term that the CPA, IPU, and other inter-parliamentary institutions are wont to use, put in abeyance while the military rule lasted. Similar patterns were witnessed in other parts of Africa and the developing world under the dictatorial rule of the military or other unconstitutional regimes, including the personalized one-party “democracies” that held sway in the past (van Cranenburgh 2009). The central position occupied by the legislature in democratic governance has not however translated into a position of pre-eminence for the institution in national politics. The fact that parliaments have become the major casualty of dictatorial and other unconstitutional changes of power has had a deleterious impact on the growth and development of the legislative institutions worldwide, reducing them to something of a junior partner in the business of governance, even under democratic rule, as they struggle for relevance under the uncontrollable weigh of executive power. Although the resurgence of democracy normally brings parliament to life, the institutions have suffered stulted growth, particularly in the developing democracies, with the consequential implications of being confronted with some challenges, some endogenous by the nature of the parliamentary institutions themselves and others being a product of environmental factors of the socio-economic, cultural, and political environment that tend to obscure their role in the governance system, with wide perceptions, wrongly held no doubt, by the general mass of the people that parliament has little or no role to play in national development and hence unnecessary drains of the resources of any country. Parliaments, anywhere in the world, do have a more important role in national developments than is generally acknowledged. Whatever the status enjoyed by parliaments and parliamentarians in any political system, the existence of the legislature confers legitimacy on the exercise of power, since the democratic rule is defined in terms of power belonging to the people. Even in the pre-colonial

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African and other political systems where an elective representation of the type popular in modern democracies was lacking, some form of representation existed in the palace chiefs being regarded as accredited representatives of the communities they represented. Similar patterns of growth and development of representative institutions were witnessed in Europe and other parts of the developed world where summons by monarchies to landowners to raise taxes to prosecute wars and for other societal needs led to the practice of representative government as parliament grew in power and significance to what it has become today (Alabi and Egbewole 2010). Notwithstanding the ubiquitous presence of parliaments in modern democracies, legislative powers vary from one political system to another. Legislative power may be unlimited as in Great Britain where the idea of legislative supremacy of parliament has become a euphemism for uncontrollable power to make any law whatsoever, appropriate resources for national development, and oversight of the exercise of executive power. This has been noted to be borne out of the unwritten nature of the British Constitution. In many other countries, including the USA, Nigeria, and The Gambia, the powers of parliaments are limited by the written constitutions, which, as the supreme authority (grundnorm) defines the scope and extent of the powers of the organs and institutions of government. Parliaments are also variously organized and structured—unicameral or bicameral and vary in composition from the small parliaments composed of as few as 6 members (the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State) and the large parliaments with as many as 1480 (UK) and the 2980-member unicameral National People’s Congress of China. Through their deliberative functions, parliamentarians serve as a bridge, an important one no doubt, between the government and the generality of the populace, drawing the attention of the government to the needs and expectations of the masses, on the one hand, and conveying the import of governmental policies and actions to the people, on the other hand. Such a role is often overlooked but no doubt important as a disconnect between the rulers and the ruled may lead to mistrust with a consequential impact on system stability and persistence. Of course, this deliberative function does play a dysfunctional role too, particularly where the needed legislative-executive collaboration for national development is grossly lacking, or where, for reasons of undue partisanship, parliamentarians are unable to rise beyond primordial considerations in times of need for national consensus on matters of importance to the generality. The legislature plays important role in mobilizing resources for national growth and development. As the guardian of the purse, the legislature not only appropriates funds for policies and programs and the smooth running of governmental apparatus, but it also helps to bring sanity to the business of governance. Parliament is the custodian of national finances, and through its power of appropriation, oversight, audit, and investigations, it seeks to ensure openness, transparency, and accountability in the use of public economic and other resources. This is particularly important for many African countries which depend on foreign aid for development, whether bilateral or multilateral. In this regard, the role of parliament is central in providing evidence of domestic accountability that could help strengthen bilateral or

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multilateral grants for national development. Generally, donors expect inclusive participation in the policy process, legislative backing for government policies, robust oversight of governmental policies and actions, curbing corruption, and a general parliamentary guarantee of transparency, openness, and accountability in procurement and other governmental activities. Broadly speaking, the existence of legislative institutions gives a polity a sense of openness that guarantees societal stability under the rule of law.

4 Partisanship in Parliament The requirement of an “open, stable and prosperous society governed by the rule of law” means that sound democratic politics must necessarily promote a multiplicity of ideas, views, and policies. Democracy encourages heterogeneity with the attendant ups and downs. Because parliamentary institutions are generally expected to compliment the executive arm of government in facilitating national development, the power struggle is often reflected in parliament than in any other place as both the government in power and the opposition (official or unofficial) seek control of parliament to further the interests of their respective political parties and platforms. As a partner in development, parliament is expected to cooperate or collaborate with the executive arms to bring development to the country. To that extent, the government seeks to have a majority in parliament to get its program agenda through parliamentary scrutiny and approval. The practice of democracy does not, however, permit parliament to be unduly subservient to the executive. While legislative-executive collaboration is generally desired, it is out of tune with the sound democratic practice for such collaboration to result in an undue legislative-executive collaboration that gives little room for proper legislative scrutiny of executive proposals. Also, as democracy involves a struggle for power among competing political platforms, including political parties, partisan considerations cannot be excluded from politics generally and parliamentary politics in particular.

5 Political Parties and Partisanship The role of political parties in giving partisan character to parliamentary working and deliberations cannot be overemphasized. As agencies for the aggregation of myriads of competing interests and views, they have become important instruments of democratic governance. Indeed, political parties are the bedrock of modern democracy and parliamentary democracy appears impossible outside the confines of party activities (Edoh 2012). With the growing demand for openness, diversity, and pluralism in the business of governance, political parties have grown in power and significance as an indispensable instrument of democratic politics, both within the

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confines of parliamentary chambers and the larger political system. Yet, political parties have been found to play a dysfunctional role in democratic politics, particularly in heterogenous and highly segmented societies, which has caused some political leaders to have distrusted the activities of political parties. For instance, in his farewell address after two decades of leading the USA as its first President, George Washington warned future generations of leaders of the divisive tendencies inherent in political parties (Claypoole 1796). Also, while inaugurating a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to signal the commencement of a transition to civil rule program after 13 years of military interregnum in Nigeria, General Murtala Mohammed tasked the 49-member Committee to interrogate the possibility of a governmental system without the involvement of political parties (Odinkalu 2001). Unfortunately, the “wise men” could find none and were only able to recommend stringent conditions for the registration of political parties to bring them within manageable proportions. Another military ruler, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (IBB) had to ban and unban political parties a few times and experimented with a zero-party system before finally forcing a two-party system on the country in a long and windy transition to a civil rule program that ended abruptly “without end” (Diamond et al. 1997). In essence, even in their dysfunctional role, political parties have become indispensable instruments of democratic politics, and what remains, particularly within the context of parliamentary business, is how to moderate the divisive tendencies in strategic manners in aid of the developmental agenda of the larger political system.

6 Party Discipline The dysfunctional role of parliament is often borne out of the nature of parliament as an assembly for the cohabitation of divergent views and interests. Parliamentary institutions, as the symbol of democracy, are necessarily composed of two or more partisan interests represented in parliaments with constant competitive bids and struggles with each other for control of the reins of government. This occurs through the instrumentality of political parties, which, depending on the system of government in practice, do often require their members to be disciplined in terms of being loyal to party programs and policies during debates and voting in parliament (Masari 2012). The extent to which political parties can enforce discipline on their members in parliament to toe party lines is a function of the system of government in operation. In the cabinet system of the United Kingdom, for instance, where a government can lose power upon being defeated in parliament on a major issue or upon a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and head of government, the operational dynamism of legislators in acting outside the dictates of partisanship is limited. As a recent study finds, British MPs tend to vote along party lines “when the outcome is anticipated to be close and most consequential to the success/failure of a bill” even against their personal opinions (Raymond 2017). Also, where society is much more

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partisan in character and electoral behavior, a tendency exists for legislators to always vote along party lines (Fleming 2022). A slightly different scenario operates in the presidential system of the USA, Nigeria, and other countries where the chief executives of governments have fixed tenure unaffected by whether their parties control parliament or not thereby giving the legislators some freedom of choice. Nonetheless, party loyalty has had a great influence on the behavior of legislators even in the Presidential system (Pearson 2015). But, unlike in a parliamentary system, instances exist where different political parties and hence different partisan interests control the executive and the legislative arms of government (Renka 2010). Whatever may be the system of government, partisanship is often unavoidable in any legislative house, except, of course, in one-party systems that are gradually falling into disuse in modern times. In multi-party democracies around the world, partisanship in parliamentary composition, organization, and deliberation is necessarily part and parcel of the nature of government, particularly in multi-ethnic, culturally diverse, and heterogenous societies. In such systems, the requirement of party discipline, or party supremacy, tends to make party activities divisive as members are bound by their party interests and pursuits. What remains is the end to which such multi-partisan orientations serve, whether for national development or disintegrative purpose.

7 Partisanship in Presidential Democracy The measure of freedom enjoyed by members of Parliament under the presidential system to vote according to their conscience leaves room for the President and the House leaders to seek to build consensus among legislators on critical national issues, policies, and programs. In the USA, which is frequently cited in this regard, efforts to build bi-partisan support for programs and policies often rest on the leadership of the Houses on critical issues of national importance. However, there have been instances when important policies and programs have either been blocked or delayed on account of partisan considerations, particularly in the built-up to elections (Binder 2015; Miras and Rouse 2022). In some other countries, the impact of partisanship is sought to be moderated by appointing judges or something of a neutral person, even outside the parliament, as the Presiding officers. In Singapore, for instance, The Speaker of the Parliament of Singapore may or may not be an MP but must possess the qualifications to stand for election as an MP. Because partisan loyalties are capable of propelling national crises that threaten the entirety of the political system, most developing democracies have sought to enforce cross-party collaboration by constitutional provisions that require near consensus in parliament on critical national issues. In Nigeria, the regionally based political parties of the pre-and immediate postindependence era did contribute to divisive tendencies in parliament that aggravated the series of post-independence political and constitutional crises, which hastened the collapse of the First Republic. To prevent a reoccurrence, the 1979 and the other

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subsequent presidential constitutions, including the current 1999 Constitution (as amended), made strict provisions for political parties to have a national outlook. This can only expect to have minimal impact on the growth of partisan politics since the Constitution itself promotes a multi-party system that guarantees diversity of interests, platforms, and programs. But the Constitution seeks further to forge some sense of national consensus in parliament through some provisions that require more than a simple majority of the votes of members of parliament to get some decisions through. While decisions in each of the chambers of the Nigerian parliament are taken by a simple majority (Section 56(1)&(2) and 98(1)&(2) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999), there are some resolutions, relating to amendment of the Constitution, creation of states and local government areas, removal of judicial officials, and impeachment of executive officeholders that require decisions to be taken across party lines. In most matters of policies, however, the simple majority vote ensures that partisan considerations are allowed to guide Members in their decisions although there is no constitutional obligation on Members to toe party lines in voting in parliament.

8 Constitutional Foundations of Consensus Building Nigeria may not be easily classified with Ghana as a system where “the constitutional arrangements . . . make consensus-building an almost-impossible task,” with a kind of “winner-takes-all” politics that practically totally excludes the opposition parties and the absence of any “state agency responsible for inter-party dialogue” (Aikins 2022). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, no doubt, seeks to promote pluralist democracy under the rule of law. Having defined Nigeria as a State founded on democracy and the rule of law, the Constitution goes further to make provisions that seek to facilitate multi-party democracy, emphasizing freedom of association and the creation of political parties that underscore the heterogeneous character of the Nigerian state. Thus, the 1999 Constitution guarantees in Section 40 the right to peaceful assembly and association, including “any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests.” This provision has been used to justify the multi-party composition of the National Assembly and liberalization of the political space including the formation of political parties. Although the Constitution gives the electoral commission the power to license and regulate political parties, expected to meet the basic requirements spelled out for registration under sections 222 and 223, including open membership to all Nigerians without discrimination, the geographical spread, headquarters in Abuja, and registration of its names, constitution, symbols, and officers with the INEC, with the consequential registration of five political parties during the 2nd republic, an attempt has been made to widen the political space such that at a time Nigeria was having close to 100 political parties many of which existed only on paper. This no doubt constituted a major headache for the electoral commission in designing ballot papers

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for election in a largely illiterate society where party identification had to be by the logo and not necessarily the name until a reprieve came through an amendment to the Constitution (Section 225A, inserted by Fourth Alteration, No. 9 of 2017) that permitted de-listing of political parties that failed to meet the basic minimum requirements (Dr Israel Nonyerem Davidson & ors v Independent National Electoral Commission (2021). With such a liberalized political space, partisanship is anticipated, and Nigeria’s constitutional history has been laced with crises that often attended negotiations for new constitutional instruments. But the Constitution also has provisions that give opportunities for consensus building on critical areas of political life. Such provisions include the following: (a) Creation of new states and local government areas or adjustments of existing boundaries requires two-thirds majority votes of the members representing the area demanding and the area affected by the boundary adjustment at every critical stage of the process. The stringent provisions have been difficult to meet in reality, and that is why no civilian administration has been able to create states (Alapiki 2005). The Supreme Court of Nigeria has insisted that such creation will remain “valid but inchoate” without complying with the mandatory provisions of sections 8(5) and (6) of the Constitution which requires the state to make a return to the National Assembly to alter the provisions of the Constitution to reflect the names and headquarters of the new states and LGAs (Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation (2004) LPELR-10 (SC)). (b) Alteration of the Constitution itself through the stringent provisions of section 9(2), which requires the support of each of the two houses of the National Assembly and concurrent votes of two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly. The Constitution is thus rigid, and its amendment procedure seeks to build consensus not only within the national parliament but also across the parliamentary institutions at both the state and federal levels (PLAC 2019). There are more stringent provisions to alter sections 8 or 9 or the entirety of Chapter IV of the Constitution, providing for four-fifths majority votes of all the members of each of the houses (notwithstanding any vacancy) and concurrent votes of two-thirds of all the State Houses of Assembly. Such stringent conditions can only be met when leaders of the house build consensus on critical national issues. (c) While the Constitution promotes pluralist democracy through freedom of association, it seeks, by section 15(2), to promote national integration through the “formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious and or other sectional barriers.” Also, consensus building through inclusiveness is further sought to be entrenched through the provisions of section 14(3) on federal character. (d) Another issue on which the Constitution requires some measure of consensus among parliamentarian is the removal of judicial officers. The elaborate procedure detailed in section 292(1)(a)(i)&(ii) is concluded by two-thirds majority votes of the legislators. The special status enjoyed by the judiciary under the Constitution and the need to insulate judicial officers from undue political

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influence, guarantee them security of tenure and promote the independence of this arm of government under a constitution that is anchored on separation of powers and the rule of law could not have dictated otherwise (The Commonwealth 2015). (e) Removal of Auditor-General under sections 87(1) and 127(1) and of members of constitutionally created “executive bodies” under sections 153(1) requires two-thirds majority votes of the Senate or State House of Assembly as the case may be, thereby creating an opportunity to force consensus on the removal of these high state officials. The provisions on impeachment of the President/VicePresident under section 143 and Governor/Deputy Governor under section 188 require 2/3 s majority votes at every critical stage of the process. Also, the Constitution grants the National Assembly the power to regulate its own procedure (Section 60, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999) and it is in exercise of this power that the standing orders and rules of the houses have provisions intended to strengthen consensus building in a multi-party setting. Thus, all Members, irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or the minority parties, have equal votes in the selection of the presiding and other officers of the House (House of Representatives 2016). There have been instances when the Houses have voted against the known party preferences for leadership position. Also, apart from the Speaker and Deputy, virtually all positions of the house have equivalent in majority and minority parties (House of Representatives 2016). The partisan character of the legislative houses is also reflected in the composition and workings of their committees, with little regards for the academic/professional backgrounds and experiences of the members, which necessarily impact negatively on the performance of these committees (National Institute for legislative Studies 2014). Nonetheless, some positions, e.g., Chairmanship of Public Accounts and Public Petitions Committees are reserved for the minority parties in practice.

9 Conclusion The Nigerian constitutional arrangements do recognize that partisanship or competitive politics can aid or retard national development. While it promotes partisanship through the provisions that encourage multiplicity of views, ideas, policies, and choices, it also has provisions that can be used by leaders to build consensus on critical national issues. Such consensus may need to be forced in periods of national emergencies as in war, famines, public health emergencies such as COVID-19 (Merkley et al. 2020), and other critical situations that demand unanimity of purpose. Within these broad framework, parliamentary leaders can seek to build consensus and mutual accommodation in a number of ways, including relating with each other as colleagues rather than adversaries and promoting inter-personal relationships even outside the precincts of the legislative houses. Even in systems where the government has overwhelming majority in parliament and is able to get its policies and programs through the parliament with ease or little

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resistance from the opposition, it is still within the purview of sound democratic practice for the majority parliamentarians to accommodate the opposition and avoid such occasional registration of disapproval through such tactics as undue delay, willful obstructions, filibustering, media hype, press statements, walk-outs, boycotts, and physical disruption of proceedings. Such collaboration and consensus building for avoidance of gridlock and unnecessary brinkmanship that threaten national growth and development can be promoted through involvement of the opposition leaders in key decisions in parliament and in government while the opposition also reciprocates by toning down unnecessary rhetoric on issues of common national interests. Parliamentarians can also tap from such existing constitutional and extraconstitutional frameworks as the National Council of States and the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) to deepen their collaborative efforts. Robust civilsociety engagement of the legislators can also help to promote mutual inter-party relations (Alabi 2011). The Standing Orders and Rules of the House should also be couched in a manner as to promote consensus-driven politics in plenary and in committee proceedings and reports (Halligan and Reid 2016). Also, good ethical codes can be helpful in moderating behavior of parliamentarians toward promoting democracy and good governance (Stapenhurst and Pelizza 2018). Finally, legislators, whether in government or opposition, should always be conscious of their roles as leaders elected by the people to further the general interests of people. As Lyndon Johnson, the 36th President of the USA, in a joint address on invitation by both chambers of the US Congress On November 27, 1963 soon after the assassination of J F Kennedy, emphasized: We will serve all the Nation, not one section or one sector, or one group, but all Americans. These are the United States-a united people with a united purpose. Our American unity does not depend upon unanimity. We have differences; but now, as in the past, we can derive from those differences strength, not weakness, wisdom, not despair. Both as a people and a government, we can unite upon a program, a program which is wise and just, enlightened and constructive (Johnson 1963).

Of course, there is connection between political partisanship and national development or integration, whether for bad or for good. The only reason why democracy promotes multiplicity of views is to facilitate national development through crossfertilization of views, ideas, and policies. It is expected that through exchange of ideas, the best could arise. Political partisanship becomes more problematic, as is the case in many developing countries, where existing fault lines are reinforced by ethic, cultural, and religious differences. Whichever way House leaders are appointed or elected, they must enjoy the confidence of their colleagues in parliament and have demonstrable capacity to build consensus in aid of national development. The requirement of building national consensus on critical issues necessitates that leaders seek to suppress partisan considerations in the larger interest of the society and for system stability. While recourse to partisan considerations may not be preventable, legislators must be patriotic enough to know when partisan interests need to be subordinated to the goal of national development.

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References Aikins ER (2022) Consensus building in 8th parliament: moving beyond rhetoric. Graphic Online, May 26. Available at https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/ghana-news-consensus-build ing-in-8th-parliament-moving-beyond-rhetoric.html. Accessed 21 Aug 2022 Alabi MOA (2011) Civil society engagement of the legislature in Nigeria: the case of Osun State. In: Alabi MOA (ed) Unbroken legacy of service: speaker Bello’s twelve years under three administrations in Osun State. Intellectual Research Institute, Ilorin, pp 276–309 Alabi MOA, Egbewole WO (2010) Perspectives on the legislature in the Government of Nigeria. CAFRAD, Tangier Alapiki HE (2005) State creation in Nigeria: failed approaches to National Integration and local autonomy. Afr Stud Rev 48(3):49–65 Binder S (2015) The dysfunctional congress. Annu Rev Polit Sci 18:85–101 Claypoole DC (1796) President George Washington’s Farewell Address. American Daily Advertiser, September 19 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Dalton RJ, Wattenberg MP (2000) Parties without partisans: political change in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford University Press, Oxford Diamond L, Hamilton A, Kirk-Greene M, Oyediran O (1997) Transition without end: Nigerian politics and civil society under Babangida. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Duignan B (2022) Partisanship. Encyclopedia Britannica. February 15. Available at https://www. britannica.com/topic/partisanship Edoh T (2012) Political parties in Nigeria: history function and responsibilities. In: Mato K (ed) Party politics and democracy in Nigeria. Yaliam Press, Abuja, pp 20–45 Fleming TG (2022) Partisan dealignment and personal vote-seeking in parliamentary behaviour. Polit Stud 70(1):195–215 Halligan J, Reid R (2016) Conflict and consensus in committees of the Australian parliament. Parliam Aff 69(2):230–248 Jacobs N, Milkis SM (2022) Conclusion: executive-centered partisanship and the future of American democracy. In: Jacobs N, Milkis S (eds) What happened to the vital center? Presidentialism, populist revolt, and the fracturing of America. Oxford University Press, Oxford Johnson LB (1963) Let us continue. Voice of Democracy, November 27. Available at https:// voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/johnson-let-us-continue-speech-text/. Accessed 21 Aug 2022 Johnson D (2021) Partisanship: bane of parliament’s inability to effectively check executive — Gboluga Ikengboju. Vanguard, June 25. Available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/06/ partisanship-bane-of-parliaments-inability-to-effectively-check-executive-gboluga-ikengboju/ Kerr HH Jr (1978) The structure of opposition in the Swiss parliament. Legis Stud Q 3(1):51–62 Lupu N (2016) Party brands in crisis: partisanship, brand dilution, and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Masari AB (2012) Party supremacy as a necessary ingredient for stable democracy and polity. In: Mato K (ed) Party politics and democracy in Nigeria. Yaliam Press, Abuja, pp 2–4 Merkley E, Bridgman A, Loewen PJ, Owen T, Derek R, Zhilin O (2020) A rare moment of crosspartisan consensus: elite and public response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada. Can J Polit Sci 53(2):311–318 Miras NS, Rouse SM (2022) Partisan misalignment and the counter-partisan response: how national politics conditions majority-party policy making in the American states. Br J Polit Sci 52(2): 573–592 National Institute for Legislative Studies (2014) Committees in the National Assembly: a study of the performance of legislative functions, 2003–2013, 2nd edn. National Institute for Legislative Studies, Abuja Nyabor J (2018) Partisanship in parliament makes our work ‘extremely difficult’ – Muntaka. CNR, June 27. Available at https://citinewsroom.com/2018/06/partisanship-in-parliament-makes-ourwork-extremely-difficult-muntaka/

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Odinkalu C (2001) The management of transition to civil rule by the military in Nigeria (19661996). In: Amuwo K, Bach DC, Lebeau Y (eds) Nigeria during the Abacha years (1993–1998): the domestic and international politics of democratisation. IFRA-Nigeria, Ibadan, pp 57–99 Pearson K (2015) Party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives. University of Michigan Press, Michigan PLAC (2019) A step-by-step guide to the process of amending the Nigerian constitution. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Abuja Raymond CD (2017) Simply a matter of context? Partisan contexts and party loyalties in free votes. Br J Polit Int Rel 19(2):353–370 Renka RD (2010) Party control of the Presidency and Congress, 1933–2010. Available at https:// cstl-cla.semo.edu/rdrenka/ui320-75/presandcongress.asp. Accessed 21 Aug 2022 Standing orders of the house of representatives (2016) 9th ed, National Assembly Complex, Abuja Stapenhurst R, Pelizza (2018) Legislative ethics and codes of conduct. In: Obadan M, Egwu S, Dan-Azumi J (eds) Africa parliamentary reader, vol II. National institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies, Abuja, pp 393–412 Starke R (2018) The rise of partisanship and how it paralyses parliaments. Can Parliam Rev 41(2): 1–6 The Commonwealth (2015) The appointment, tenure and removal of judges under commonwealth principles: a compendium and analysis of best practices. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London van Cranenburgh O (2009) Restraining executive power in Africa: horizontal accountability in Africa’s hybrid regimes. S Afr J Int Aff 16(1):49–68

Cases Cited Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation (2004) LPELR-10 (SC) Dr Israel Nonyerem Davidson & ors v Independent National Electoral Commission (2021) LPELR52805 (CA)

Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi has over 30 years of teaching and research experience in universities and research institutions in Africa. He is a Professor in the Department of Public and International Law, and the Provost, College of Law, Osun State University, Nigeria. He is a Visiting Professor at the University of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Hitherto, he had taught Political Science at Obafemi Awolowo University, Babcock University, University of Ilorin where he became a Professor in 2011, and Osun State University before moving to the Faculty of Law in the same institution. He also taught Constitutional Law at the University of Abuja. He had also been a researcher at the Pan-African Intergovernmental Organisation (CAFRAD) based in Morocco and at the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja. A former Speaker of the Osun State House of Assembly (1999–2003) and Member of the House of Representatives (2015–2019), Professor Alabi was the Head of the Parliamentary Capacity Building Programme at CAFRAD (2008–2010). He is the author of The Supreme Court in the Nigerian Political System (2002), ECOWAS Court and Regional Integration in West Africa (2016), and Constitutionalism in Nigeria: Politics and Law in an Emerging African Democracy (2022), and Co-Editor of Perspectives on the Legislature in the Government of Nigeria (2010) among other books and articles in learned publications.

Two Decades of Legislative Activities in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward Adeleke Adegbami

Abstract The study examines the legislators’ activities in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This is to establish the areas of their weaknesses and strengths in the course of performing their constitutional functions. The data for the study were drawn from a primary source, which involved the author’s observations of various events in Nigeria’s polity, and secondary sources which include the 1999 Nigeria Constitution, official documents of the National Assembly, journals, textbooks, newspapers, and magazines. The study identifies the challenges facing legislators’ activities, including lack of political ideology; strain legislative-executive relations; frequent changes of leadership; inadequate knowledge of the legislative process; corruption; and imbalanced selection of house committee leaders. Others include—recurrent disruption of plenary sessions; intermittent cross carpeting among members; absenteeism from the legislative plenary sessions; self-centeredness of members; and a high number of dependent political followers. The challenges notwithstanding, the Senate was able to pass into law 735 bills for twenty years; and also succeeded in investigating various anomalies being perpetrated in the public offices in Nigeria, including those of the National Assembly. The study concludes that the legislative activities in the early years of the two decades of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic were hectic and could be seen as a period of “trial legislative process.” The study recommends that concerted efforts should be made to address those challenges halting legislative activities in Nigeria for the sustenance and advancement of the country’s budding democracy.

1 Introduction The period from 1999 to 2019 was eventful in the annals of the political history of Nigeria. The year 1999 marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic. The year 2019 was a political landmark as the country celebrated two decades of unbroken civil A. Adegbami (✉) Department of Public Administration, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Fagbadebo, M. O. A. Alabi (eds.), The Legislature in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy of the Fourth Republic, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24695-1_18

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rule. The three arms of government, viz, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary are considered major partners for democratic sustenance and advancement of the country. Out of these arms of government, the legislature could be said to be unique, as its significant role in democratic governance cannot be overemphasized. Put differently, the legislature could be seen as the essential part of a democratic government, based on the following. Firstly, unlike the other arms of government, the legislature has two chambers vis-à-vis, the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives, and have a higher number of elected officials 109 for the Senate, and 360 members for the House of Representatives. Secondly, the membership of the National Assembly cut across all parts of the country. Thirdly, the legislative body is also unique in the sense that it is responsible for presenting the views and opinions of the members of various constituencies in the country. Fourthly, the lawmakers are responsible for making “laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Federation” (The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p.6). Fifthly, the legislative body, through its oversight function, monitors and scrutinizes the implementation of authorized policies. Lastly, without lawmaking activities of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary will not be to function in their respective roles. Beyond the foregoing, for democratic governance to be sustained as well as developed, the legislators need to direct their capacities to make laws suitable for the promotion of societal interests (Poteete 2010). In Nigeria, at the commencement of the Fourth Republic, the legislature at the state and national levels began to function within the context of constitutional stipulations. The National Assembly was inaugurated on June 3, 1999, with the composition of the legislative leadership. This chapter X-rays the activities of the National Assembly with particular references to the Senate, in the two decades of democratic governance of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This is intended to establish the areas of weaknesses and strengths of the legislators in the course of performing their constitutional duties.

2 Constitutional Provision for the Legislative Activities in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) makes provision for the functions and responsibilities of the National Assembly of Nigeria. These provisions as documented in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, are to serve as a guide to the parliamentarians against any form of breach, addition, subtraction, and distortion from the stipulated legislative functions and responsibilities as stated, in the course of performing their duties. Nigeria's Fourth Republic commenced on 29th May 1999, and as of May 28th, 2020, the country has witnessed twenty years of uninterrupted democratic governance. Thus, it has been two decades of sustained legislative activities, and no doubt the Fourth Republic legislative arm has been the longest existing one in the history of

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Nigeria. To date, there have been five sessions of legislative activities in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, while the sixth session is ongoing. Those five sessions were— between 1999 and 2003 which was termed “Fourth Session”; from 2003 to 2007 “Fifth Session”; while 2007-2011 was termed “Sixth Session.” The period of 20112015 and 2015-2019 was referred to as “Seventh Session” and “Eight Session” respectively.The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria vested legislative power at the state and national levels in the Houses of Assembly and the National Assembly, respectively (Section 4 (1–4) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The Constitution endowed the legislature with the responsibility to drive democratic governance in a system characterized by separated but shared powers among three principal institutions of government (Oni et al. 2019). The tripartite functions of rulemaking, implementation and interpretation of rules begin with the legislators who will, first of all, make the rules for interpretation and implementation. Nigeria’s National Assembly is saddled with the oversight responsibility to monitor and scrutinize all activities of the executive. According to Section 88 (2) (b) of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to: Expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it (The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

Thus, any constituted body that is saddled with the lawmaking responsibilities for good governance is expected to comprise and parade people of proven integrity, whose interests are subordinated to that of the populace. Thus, the country requires a representative body composed of upright and disciplined individuals with patriotic zeal for effective public service delivery (Fagbadebo 2020). Twenty years is more than enough for “governance experimentation” or “trial governance,” rather it is the time to properly set the country on the right footing of socio-economic and political advancement.

3 The Legislators and Legislative Challenges in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic There is no doubt that all were not well with the legislative arm of government in the last twenty years of Nigeria’s unbroken democratic governance. This has not only hampered democratic advancement but also hindered considerably the socioeconomic development of the country. The challenges that Nigeria’s legislative arm faced since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999 include, but are not limited to—lack of political ideology; strain of legislative-executive relations; frequent changes of leadership; inadequate knowledge of the legislative process; corruption; imbalanced selection of house committees’ leaders; recurrent disruption of plenary sessions; intermittent cross carpeting among members; absenteeism from the legislative plenary sessions; self-centeredness of members; and a high number of dependent political followers. All these are discussed thus:

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Lack of Political Ideology

Across the globe, politicians and political parties alike are identified by their ideologies, as well as their philosophies. Ideology specifies the thinking, values, view, or belief of politicians which determines the political parties they associate with, such that politicians join those parties that share their views, and beliefs, and as such, these form the basis of the party’s policies and programs the politicians will pursue. In essence, ideology can be seen as guiding principles for politicians and political parties, a plan or blueprint for political parties that help in the articulation of political issues. Political ideology also offers a platform for simplifying political issues or political matters in a manner that electorates will comprehend (Nnamdi and Ogan 2019), and as such, political ideology is the main and vital guiding principle of a political party (Omotola 2009). However, political parties in Nigeria have continued to play politics of pretense and deception, although they have manifestoes, and are categorized into “the progressive” and “the conservative,” but they are not committed to any clear ideology. In other words, Nigerian political parties are deficient when it comes to the matter of ideology. It is not surprising, therefore, that politicians continued to move from one political party to the other, and even on most occasions work against their parties whenever they were not nominated to contest during general elections (Olanrewaju 2015). Thus, the lack of an ideologically-driven political party system in Nigeria explains in part the plethora of challenges that have continued to engulf the Nigeria National Assembly since 1999, when the country returned to democratic governance. It is in Nigeria that a candidate can just leave the political party on whose platform he or she was elected to the National Assembly and cross to another political party, while the new party he or she has crossed to will not bother to investigate or care about the candidate’s activities in his or her former party. This has made the electorates be cajoled to vote for the highest bidder who can pay more for their votes, as voting is no longer based on candidates’ personality or party’s ideology or manifesto.

3.2

Strain Legislative-Executive Relations

One of the features of the presidential democracy is the presence of three arms of government, viz—the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. These three arms are very vital in a democratic setting as their roles are essential for the advancement of democracy. However, the conflictive relation between the executive and the legislature constitutes a clog to the policymaking and implementation process as well as good governance. The fact that the executive and the legislative body used most parts of the twenty years of the Fourth Republic to procure a “battle of supremacy” hindered greatly the much-expected development (Momodu and Matudi 2013, p.30). Thus, according to Tobi and Adegbami (2020), the relationship pattern

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between the legislature and the executive in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been a threat to good governance, clogging the administrative machinery of the state on many occasions, and creating divisions among members of the legislature.

3.3

Frequent Changes in National Assembly Leadership

Another major challenge faced by the National Assembly in the last two decades of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic was frequent changes in its leadership. The storm of impeachments and frequent changes of the National Assembly leadership of the Senate, especially in the first eight years of its inauguration, without doubt, has taken its toll on the socio-political and general well-being of Nigerians and the development of the country. The issue has not only brought about a series of intrigues, scheming, and power play among the lawmakers, but also brought unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of the legislature by the executive arm of government. For instance, from the onset of the current Republic, the executive arm has always been interested in the leadership of the National Assembly. The executive always strives to ensure that its surrogates and stooges are imposed on the National Assembly with the intent of controlling the parliament (Ukase and Dzeka 2018). For example, President Obasanjo worked unremittingly and imposed Senator Evan Enwerem as Senate President. The President’s action created serious conflicts among the members of the Senate, and along the line, Enwerem was eventually impeached. It should be noted, however, that different reasons were offered for the series of impeachments that took place in the Senate. There were allegations/accusations and counter-allegations/accusations on the persons and personalities of the Fourth Republic Senators. Many of the Senators have been accused, alleged, and found guilty of bribery, misappropriation of public funds, contracts inflation, perjury, and forgery among other accusations (examples include: Senator Evan Enwerem’s perjury and age falsification allegation; Senator Chuba Okadigbo’s corruption allegation, among others). Whenever any of these cases are raised on the floor of the house, it did generate commotion and conflict that have severally brought the activities at the Senate chamber to stand still and thus obstructed legislative activities. That three Senate Presidents emerged within the spate of 14 months of the inauguration of the National Assembly in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic were unprecedented in the history of the National Assembly in Nigeria. Thus, the first four years of the Fourth Republic were a great threat to the stability of the country’s emerging democracy, due to frequent changes of leadership that pervaded the Senate chamber anytime a Senate President was impeached, this has continued to be antithetical to Nigeria’s evolving democracy, and national development.

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Inadequate Knowledge of Legislative Process

Adequate knowledge of legislative duties, activities, and processes by parliamentarians goes a long way to determining the level, extent of success, and advancement of democratic governance in a given country. The National Assembly of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, however, was full of legislators who do not have what it takes to make laws for the good government of the country. This challenge was largely due to a long period of military incursion in the governance and administration of Nigeria, which suspended all legislative functions and vested the functions in other bodies apart from the legislative arm of government. Therefore, the majority of the so-called parliamentarians of the 4th and 5th Senates were greenhorns, who “lack a democratic culture, dialogue, tolerance and respect for each other’s opinion” (Arowolo 2010, p.36). Besides, many Senators from time to time absented themselves from Senate plenary sessions as a result of “the absence of quality debate and the alleged inexperience of the presiding officer” of the National Assembly (Banjo 2013, p.140). Inadequate knowledge of the legislative duties of Senators, especially, in the first eight years of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic seriously hindered the development of parliamentary democracy. For instance, lack of adequate legislative experience inhibited robust debate and compromised various issues of national interest. Therefore, according to Yusuf et al. (2018), some legislators with low levels of education need to undergo training and retraining courses and programs to improve the quality of legislation in Nigeria.

3.5

Corruption

One major issue that cut across the Fourth Session of the Senate (1999–2003), to the Eight Session of Senate (2015–2019) is corruption. The corruption phenomenon has not only hampered the democratization process but caused great damage to polity and development in Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria has become a plaque that infected every sector of the economy and public offices. The National Assembly is not exempted from corrupt practices, as the Senate of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic was enmeshed in corruption, such that, no sooner than the fourth session of the Senate was inaugurated than cases of corruption allegations against the parliamentarians started. The Senators in the first instance were alleged to have received the sum of eight hundred and fifty thousand naira (₦850, 000) each to elect Senator Evan Enwerem, instead of Senator Chuba Okadigbo as Senate President. Similarly, the same Senators were alleged to have collected a sum of five million naira each as furniture allowance, instead of the three million, five hundred thousand naira they claimed to have received (Ologbenla 2007). In addition to this was Nasir El-Rufai’s outburst regarding the Senators. According to El-Rufai, Senators demanded a sum of ₦54

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million from ministerial nominees to ease their confirmation for the position of minister in 2003 (Jombo and Fagbadebo 2019). Similarly, Senator Chuba Okadigbo a former Senate President was found guilty of inflating the cost of contracts and other sundry acts while in office. Senator Wabara another Senate President was also accused of collecting ₦55 million inducements from Prof. Fabian Osuji, a former Minister of Education to facilitate easy approval of the inflated budget of the Ministry in 2005 (cited in Orluwene 2014). Other series of allegations against the Nigeria Senate in the Fourth Republic include ₦300, 000 kickback allegedly given each senator on the supply of vehicles; ₦6 million allegedly cornered by Enwerem on street lighting contract; ₦4 million alleged bribes from the presidency on the floor of the House and ₦3 million bribe money returned to the Senate by Senator Mamman Ali. ₦ 18 million insurance scam involving Senator Haruna Abubakar (Deputy Senate President); allegation by Senator Authur Nzeribe that each Senator collected ₦3 million to remove Pius Anyim; Anyim allegedly built an ₦800 million edifice in Abuja and spent ₦500 million at his mother’s burial. Sharing of ₦3 million each to Senators to dump Obsanjo’s impeachment motion; ₦60million allegedly collected by Senator Anyim and Mantu to drop impeachment against Obasanjo; ₦22 million allegedly misappropriated by Nzeribe on spurious claims (Ologbenla 2007: 110).

Thus, the elected Senators that are supposed to enhance accountability in governance through its oversight function have become the monsters looting the country’s treasury, this action has continued to impede the socio-economic development and democratic advancement of Nigeria.

3.6

Imbalanced Selection of House Committees’ Leaders

The legislators undoubtedly occupy a special place in democratic governance, with vital roles to play for good government. The roles being performed by the legislators include lawmaking, screening of ministerial and other government appointees, as well as performing oversight functions and constituency services. For legislators to effectively carry out these functions, they rely on committees most of the time, and each of the committees has its leader for proper coordination of its activities. However, the pattern or manner of selecting the head of committees of the Senate in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has always been faulty and detrimental to democracy and good governance in Nigeria. Given the fact that the selection of leadership for different committees of the Senate is mainly at the Senate leader’s discretion, he or she gave out these positions to the loyal members as compensation for their loyalties. The committees’ headship has thus become a reward or compensation, rather than competence and rendering effective services to the people, and so, the selection of committees’ headship is more of sentiment or attachment, and not of competence and capability. The appointments of members into the Senate committees and committees’ headship have been severally used by successive Senate leaders as sinecures to consolidate

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their tenures (Nwozor and Olanrewaju 2019). A situation where committee leaders are loyal to the Senate leader and not the country portends danger to democratic governance and good governance for national development.

3.7

Recurrent Disruption of Plenary Sessions

Another challenge faced by the National Assembly in the last two decades was the repeated disruption of the Senate plenary session, prompted by contentious issues. Contentious issues on many occasions have spawned scuffles, brawls, throwing of chairs and physical combats, and mace snatching. Issues of contention can be brought about by matters that have to do with the people or peripheral matters that have to do with the interests of the legislature. One such disruption was the snatching of the mace by the thugs that accompanied a suspended Senator to the Senate chamber. It would be recalled, that on April 18, 2018, during the plenary session of the Senate, some political thug (dependent political followers) escorted Senator Ovie Omo-Agege to the Senate chamber and seized the mace which is the symbol of authority of the house. The Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu, who presided over the plenary session, and other Senators at the plenary were forced into the tea room. Besides, the political thugs also abducted a Senator representing Lagos West, Senator Adeola. The political thug bombarded the Senate chamber in protest against the suspension of their godfather, Senator Omo-Agege, who was suspended from the Senate plenary session for a period of 90-day (Johnson et al. 2018).

3.8

Intermittent Cross Carpeting among Members

Cross carpeting, otherwise referred to as party defection and decamping pervaded the political scene in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The extent to which politicians are moving indiscriminately from one party to the other showed their level of understanding of political ideology. It was to this extent that Babalola (2018) describes cross carpeting in Nigeria as the shameless movement of politicians from one political party to the other, and consequent changes in their political allegiance to achieve personal political goals. In other words, leaving one’s political party for another politician most of the time is for selfish motives by politicians who lack political ideology and have nothing to offer to the people (Mbazie et al. 2019). Other reasons for frequent cross carpeting among the Senators include—lack of party discipline, which manifest in the form of breaching of the party’s rules and regulations; individual funding of political parties; the unrestricted influence of an individual over the party and its structure, as well as decision to freeing oneself from godfather’s domination.

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Cases of cross carpeting among the Senators include those of—Senator Ehigie Uzamere who was representing the Edo South constituency under the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Senator Uzamere defected to the Action Congress of Nigeria before the 2011 elections and was successively re-elected. Besides were eleven PDP Senators–Bukola Saraki (Kwara Central); Mohammed Shaba Lafiaji (Kwara North); Umaru Dahiru (Sokoto South); Ibrahim Abdullahi Gobir (Sokoto East); Magnus Ngei Abe (Rivers South-East); Wilson Asinobi Ake (Rivers West); Bindawa Muhammed Jibrilla (Adamawa North); Mohammed Danjuma Goje (Gombe Central); Aisha Jummai Alhassan (Taraba North); Abdullahi Adamu (Nasarawa West) and Mohammed Ali Ndume (Borno South) all of them defected to the current ruling party, the All Peoples Congress (Ebere, 2014, cited in Mbazie et al., n.d.). Some of these Senators have since defected back to their former political parties, while some to other parties. The effects of cross carpeting include—restriction of democratic consolidation, by whittling down the power of opposition parties, as most of the defectors move to a ruling party. It can also lead to the emergence of weak new political parties, as politicians at times leave one political party to find another. The repeated defection of politicians can confuse the electorates on choices of whom to vote for during an election, whether to vote for party or personality (Awofeso and Irabor 2016). Above all, cross carpeting can be counterproductive to the political development of the country.

3.9

Absenteeism from the Legislative Plenary Sessions

Another challenge to the Senate activities was absenteeism from plenary sessions. For example, during the tenure of Senator Anyim Pius Anyim as Senate President between 2000 and 2003, there was apathy and dispiritedness on the part of members of the Senate, and thus, many Senators remain indifferent to the legislative activities then. This attitude was seen as a direct protest against the emergence of Anyim as the President of the Senate. Therefore, on several occasions under the headship of Senator Anyim, the Senate barely formed a quorum, as a result, few Senators who normally arrived at the Senate chamber on time have to wait for hours before the house could form a quorum (Banjo 2013). In another instance, the eighth Senate was once challenged and accused by Mr. Femi Falana, a foremost human rights lawyer, of absenteeism from their duties, while collecting their full salaries and allowances for work they did not do. According to him, the Senate and its House of Representatives counterpart failed to sit for the required number of days specified by the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) in the legislative year that ended on June 9, 2015. According to Falana: Out of the 181 days, the constitution mandates legislatures to sit. . .the Senate sat for just 96. But members of both houses obtained their full pay for working for roughly 55 percent of the time required of them to attend to the republic's legislative duties (The Nation 2016).

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Thus, Senators’ absenteeism from the plenary sessions did not only slow down the pace of legislative activities, but it is also an indication that most of the Nigerian Senators that absented themselves did not know the imperativeness of the legislative plenary sessions, as well as the importance of putting them in the position of responsibility, first as representatives and second, as spokesperson of the people.

3.10

Self-centeredness of Members

Self-interests of members of the Senate constituted a great challenge to the effective performance of Senators of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic as their attitude continues to whittle down efforts toward developing the country. For instance, a large percentage of Nigerian politicians are political merchants, who see politics “as a business deal that brings forth huge profits” (Adegbami and Uche 2016, p.204), they have no interest in the people at heart, they are self-serving who constantly strive to acquire and accumulate wealth for themselves and cronies without bothering about what happens to the masses. This set of political leaders has allowed self-interest and other primordial considerations to drive them and allowed this to take priority over the interest of the public (Yagboyaju and Akinola 2019). The level of self-centeredness of Nigeria’s politicians is better understood from the outburst of Adedokun who avers that: Selfishness, the pursuit of self-interest, and self-aggrandisement are the driving forces of Nigerian politicians. From bottom to top and back again, of those emotions, not one is free, not one is clean, not even President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s widely touted emblem of what is sane and altruistic in the polity (Adedokun 2019).

Self-centeredness among the parliamentarians has thus become one of the banes of Nigeria’s efforts at development.

3.11

Dependent Political Followers

It is a common practice for a “good politician” to have political sons and daughters, political admirers, as well as political followers. Politicians use these sets of people to achieve their rational ambition and inordinate ambition. Most of these political followers can be likened to formidable tools, in the hands of the politicians, which can be used to navigate through torrential political expeditions. Just as the laborer is worthy of his wage or reward, so also, the political followers or subjects (most of whom depend on the political officeholders for daily sustenance) are worthy of some sort of compensation. Therefore, a good politician must set aside a certain percentage of his or her earnings for the upkeep of these dependent subjects. It is not uncommon for political officeholders to have a politically dependent family with whom he or she shares part of the money he or she is making in public office. The Senator of the

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Federal Republic of Nigeria is one of those politicians with a great number of politically dependent families. The number of the politically dependent family determines the amount of money a Senator will set aside to maintain them from time to time. When the amount of money earned by a Senator cannot adequately cater to the number of his or her followers, he or she looks elsewhere to get additional funds. In Nigeria, the politicians in this category did engage in stealing public funds. Thus, a series of cases of corruption and mismanagement of public funds were investigated, and those that were not investigated among the parliamentarians were not unconnected with sourcing more funds to settle politically dependent families.

4 The Achievements of the Legislature in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic The incessant changes of leadership, apparent volatility, and rowdy Senate sessions in the first twenty years of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic notwithstanding, the parliamentarians of Nigeria’s “upper Chamber” still managed to carry out to some extent, its constitutional duties. During the period of the fourth Senate, which covered 1999 and 2003, a total number of 258 bills were introduced, out of which 65 bills were passed. In the fifth Senate from 2003 to 2007, the Senate was able to pass 132 bills from the 392 bills received. The sixth Senate session did not fare better, as the Senate passed only 91 bills from the 514 introduced, and passed 92 resolutions. The seventh session of the Senate passed 128 bills and made 115 resolutions out of the 591 bills it received (Owete 2019). By the time the eighth Senate session ended in June, it had passed 319 bills, with over 500 bills pending passage. The summary of the bills passed by the Senate in the Fourth Republic showed that the bills passed by the fourth Senate were the least. This was largely due to the leadership crisis which continued unabated throughout the time the fourth Senate session lasted (Jimoh 2019). In addition to this was the inexperienced and unpreparedness of the Senators, many of them were coming to the Senate for the first time. The eighth Senate was however reputed to have passed more bills than other Senate sessions. Some of the bills passed by the Senate in the past twenty years of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic include—The Freedom of Information Act (FoI); Electoral Act Amendment; Not-too-Young-to-Run; Federal Road Maintenance Act (FERMA); National Minimum Wage; the Money Laundering Prohibition; National Institute for Cancer Research and Treatment Bill; and Electronic Transaction Bill. Others were— National Poverty Eradication Commission Bill; Public Procurement Act (Amendment) Bill; Petroleum Industry Governance Bill; the National Research and Innovation Bill; National Centre for Disease Control Prevention Bill; National Commission for Peace, Reconciliation, and Mediation Bill (The Nigerian Senate 2018); Defence Research and Development Bureau (establishment) bill; Disability Bill, and Police Reform Bill (The Guardian (2019). The Senate also passed the Bills for the

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establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC); Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC); Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); and North East Development Commission (NEDC), in addition to the yearly Appropriation Bills passed (The Nigerian Senate 2018). The Senate was equally able to investigate and probe a series of corrupt activities perpetrated in public offices in line with its oversight power and function. According to Section 88(2) (b) of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution as (amended), the National Assembly has the power to “expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it” (The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p.39). In line with this provision, the Senate in the last twenty years of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic was able to probe into the Police Pension Fund fraud, the $16 billion spent on the power sector; the ₦255 million armored cars bought by the former Aviation Minister Stella Oduah; Halliburton bribery scandal; Malabo oil deal; and Maina Pension Scam and Kerosene subsidy scam. The Senate was also able to probe some of the allegations of corruption against its members including— former Senate President Chuba Okadigbo and other Senators involved in the ₦1.9 billion contract award scandal; former Senate President Evan Enwerem’s criminal case; and the ₦54 million bribe allegation for the confirmation of Nasir El-Rufai for a ministerial position, among others (Akinrinmade et al. 2013; Owete 2019).

5 Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations The period from 1999 to 2019 was eventful and remarkable in the political history of Nigeria. The year 1999 ushered the country into its Fourth Republic, and 2019 marked two decades of uninterrupted democratic governance in Nigeria for the first time. The executive, the judiciary, and the legislature, that is, the indispensable partakers of democratic governance contributed their quotas to the democratic advancement of the country. However, the legislative body takes a special place in tripartite relations. The legislators, for instance, represent the people, and thereby, are responsible for presenting their views and opinions in lawmaking. In addition, it is the law made by the legislators that the judiciary and the executive will interpret and implement, respectively. Twenty years of Senate activities in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic which commenced on June 3, 1999, when the fourth Senate was inaugurated till June 9, 2019, when the eighth legislative session rounded up, was not a bed of roses, but full of crises, scuffles, and brawls, coupled with unnecessary scheming and rivalries which considerably undermined the performances and activities of the Senate. Issues such as— lack of political ideology; strain legislative-executive relations; frequent changes of leadership; inadequate knowledge of the legislative process; corruption; imbalanced selection of house committees’ leaders; recurrent disruption of plenary sessions; intermittent cross carpeting among members; absenteeism from the legislative

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sessions; self-centeredness of members; and a high number of dependent political followers extremely hindered the activities and performance of the Senate of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. In terms of achievements, the Senate sessions in the first twenty years of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic passed a total of 735 bills, which appears too low for twenty years. The Senate equally probed into a series of anomalies perpetrated in public offices across the country. The study, therefore, concluded that the legislative activities in the early years of the two decades of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic were hectic and could be seen as a period of “trial legislative process.” However, a period of two decades is more than enough for “governance experimentation” or “trial governance,” rather it is the time for the National Assembly to stand up and rewrite its wrongs, redeem its dented image, and put the country on the right footing of socio-economic and political advancement, by coming out with desirable legislation that will propel socioeconomic and political development for the country. The study, therefore, recommends, that concerted efforts should be made to address those challenges halting legislative activities in Nigeria for the sustenance and advancement of the country’s budding democracy. To this extent, only people of proven integrity should be allowed to contest elections in the country. For that reason, there is a need for the people to be directly and actively involved in choosing the candidates at the parties’ primary level before the general elections. People with outstanding track records should be allowed to contest, while those with questionable character and who had been found guilty of corruption, criminal and similar cases should be barred completely from holding public offices.

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Adeleke Adegbami is of the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Administration and Management Sciences, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria. His research covers Governance, Conflict and Security Studies, and Inter-Governmental Relations. He has presented papers at notable local and international conferences and also published widely in reputable local and international journals. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) and the Association of Nigerian Public Administrators (ANPA).