The Last of the Romans: Bonifatius – Warlord and comes Africae 9781472593108, 9781780937175, 9781780938103

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The Last of the Romans

Also available from Bloomsbury The Roman Empire, Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller In Search of the Romans, James Renshaw Hadrian, James Morwood Cicero, Kathryn Tempest Roman Frontiers in Britain, David J. Breeze

The Last of the Romans Bonifatius – Warlord and comes Africae Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2015 Paperback edition first published 2016 © Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele 2015 Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele has asserted his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978–1–78093–717–5 PB: 978–1–47429–599–4 ePDF: 978–1–78093–810–3 ePub: 978–1–78093–847–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wijnendaele, Jeroen W. P., author. The last of the Romans :Bonifatius--warlord and comes Africae / Jeroen W.P. Wijnendaele. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-78093-717-5 (hardcover) 1. Bonifacius, -432. 2. Rome—Army—Officers—Biography. 3. Rome—History—Empire, 284-476. 4. Rome—History, Military. 5. Africa (Roman province)--History. I. Title. DG322.5.B66W54 2014 937’.63092—dc23 [B] 2014028024 Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain

Dedicated to Fiona Catherine Tweedie

Woe to you, O land, when your king is a child, and your princes feast in the morning! (Ecclesiastes 10:16)

Contents List of Maps Acknowledgements

xi xii

Introduction

1

1

9

2

3

4

5

6

The World of Bonifatius (375–420) The transformation of the western imperial office Collapse and recovery of western imperial security Dissidence in late Roman Africa

9 16 24

Bonifatius’ Early Career (c.413–421) Origins Soldier of Christ

29

Rise to Power (422–425) Constantius’ legacy Lord of war Civil war in the Mediterranean

43

Enemy of the State (426–428) Power games Pandemonium in Africa The path towards reconciliation

65

Fighting for the Empire (429–433) The Vandal invasion The empress’ champion

87

Epilogue: Sebastian’s Odyssey (432–442) The exiled general Asylum in Africa

29 32

43 48 56

65 72 81

87 96 105 105 111

x

Contents

Conclusion The legacy and afterlife of Bonifatius Bonifatius’ role in western Roman history Timeline of Events Dramatis Personae Notes Bibliography Index

115 115 118 123 125 133 167 181

List of Maps Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4

Late Roman Empire c. 375-400 Late Roman Africa c. 400 Western Roman Empire under Constantius III, 418-420 Western Roman Empire c. 441-454

8 28 42 104

Acknowledgements The genesis of this work occurred nearly a decade ago in an era when studies on ‘the fall of the (western) Roman Empire’ had yet to herald their onslaught. At Ghent University, Dr Frederik Vervaet (now University of Melbourne) convinced me that a study on the career of Bonifatius was long overdue, and a worthy topic for a masters thesis. My supervisors Prof. Giusto Traina (Université Paris Sorbonne-Paris IV) and Prof. Koen Verboven (Ghent University) aided me greatly throughout that project. The brunt of the research was then conducted through the Erasmus exchange programme at Università di Bologna (2006–2007). During this wonderful sojourn in Italy, I received tremendous help from Prof. Valerio Neri, Prof. Antonio Baldini and Dr Umberto Roberto (Università Europea di Roma) on various issues in late Roman history and its historiography. New life was breathed into this work several years later during a visiting fellowship at the University of Melbourne (2011–2012). Dr Frederik Vervaet, who graciously hosted my candidature, persuaded me to save the original research from piecemeal publication in articles, and instead expand it into a book. Distance in time and space, together with numerous new publications in the field of late Roman studies, helped me to properly re-evaluate and supplement the work. This task would never have been achieved without the invaluable support of many meritorious scholars whom I am beholden to. Prof. Em. Ronald T. Ridley read an early draft of the manuscript and fastidiously identified various flaws. My doctoral supervisor, Dr David Woods (University College Cork), Dr Frederik Vervaet and Dr Mark Hebblewhite (Macquarie University) read drafts of several chapters and also provided me with much appreciated criticism. Bart Van Wassenhove (University of Chicago), my academic brother-in-arms, supplied me with countless articles and book chapters I would not have got my hands on otherwise. I owe a particular debt to Dr Julian Barr (University of Queensland) who painstakingly proofread the final version and cleansed it of many infelicities. I am absolutely positive that many aspiring writers could profit from his exemplary diligence. Papers on various major questions in this book were presented during previous years at conferences in Ireland, the United States, Australia and New

Acknowledgements

xiii

Zealand. I am grateful for the thorough and very helpful feedback I received on these occassions from Prof. Ian Wood (Leeds University), Prof. Walter Kaegi and Prof. Clifford Ando (University of Chicago), Prof. Em. Roger Scott (University of Melbourne), Prof. Em. John Moorhead and Dr Amelia Brown (University of Queensland), Prof. Andrew Gillett (Macquarie University), Dr Peter Brennan (University of Sydney), Dr Meagan McEvoy (University of Oxford) and Dr Jeremy Armstrong (University of Auckland). Needless to say, this meticulous readership and these articulate responses have helped to correct many problems, whilst any remaining errors are solely mine. Michael Greenwood gave great help during the crucial phase of turning this project into publication, and I consider myself very fortunate that Bloomsbury Academic has granted me the opportunity to see it published. It was a great pleasure to work with Charlotte Loveridge and Anna MacDiarmid, as well as the anonymous referees, with their helpful communications and suggestions. I also wish to thank Craig Molyneux, senior cartographer at Spatial Vision Melbourne, for designing the four maps in this volume. Finally, I wish to offer my gratitude to my loving partner Fiona. Her support helped me through this endeavour, especially during its last and most bitter phase. It is with warm affection, therefore, that I dedicate this work to her. Jeroen W.P. Wijnendaele, Melbourne

Introduction In 1915, M. de La Ville de Mirmont opened his article on Cn. Domitius Corbulo, famous commander under the emperors Claudius and Nero, with the fitting observation that: ‘The Roman general Corbulo is more famous than known.’1 Much the same can be said about the late imperial commander Bonifatius, who was famously called the ‘last of the Romans’.2 As an officer in Africa, who struck up a friendship with Augustine, he became involved in court politics after the death of Constantius III (421).3 Bonifatius played a crucial role in the restoration of the exiled empress Galla Placidia after the death of her brother Honorius (423), but fell out of grace shortly afterwards. As a result, he became involved in a civil war with Ravenna, in which he was even alleged to have called in the help of the Vandals, who would conquer North Africa. He died after a battle with Flavius Aëtius, the other so-called ‘last of the Romans’. The intention of this book is to present a new political biography of Bonifatius, commander of the western Roman field army in North Africa (comes Africae). In 1941, Johannes De Lepper published his doctorate on Bonifatius. His biography is clearly a careful and scholarly work.4 Since that time, few scholarly articles have been written on the subject. The most significant of these are by German, French and Italian historians. Yet after more than seventy years, a revision is required. Therefore, I wish to present the first comprehensive enquiry into the life and times of Bonifatius written in English. Bonifatius lived in an era that has seen tremendous revision during the last couple of generations. The first half of the fifth century CE used to be seen as part of Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, in which the internal structures of Rome were so corrupted that it eventually became overrun by barbarian peoples.5 This opinion, in vogue during De Lepper’s time, is to a certain extent still echoed. But already in the same period as he finished his dissertation, Santo Mazzarino famously remarked that we can never again return to Edward Gibbon’s view.6 In his monumental study on the social, economic and administrative history of the later Empire, A.H.M. Jones similarly concluded that the institutional weaknesses of the Empire cannot have been a major factor in its decline.7 Peter Brown’s World of Late Antiquity shed a totally new light on the cultural and religious life of this era.8 The studies of Walter Goffart, Herwig

2

The Last of the Romans

Wolfram, Wolf Liebeschuetz and Peter Heather on the nature and settlement of the Gothic people unleashed a debate that still rages.9 New insights were given on a whole range of key figures from Bonifatius’ life such as Augustine,10 Galla Placidia11 and Flavius Aëtius,12 to name but a few of the most important ones. There have been further recent developments which are pertinent to this study. Only in the last two decades has the late Roman army become an area of intensive research in its own right.13 Late antique Africa is one the provinces of the late imperial west that has seen the greatest re-evalutions since De Lepper’s time.14 Especially in the fields of archaeology and epigraphy, our knowledge on this area has advanced tremendously.15 Major studies have been published on the Vandals while an authoritive study has finally been made on the Mauri tribes of late antique Africa.16 A whole range of new editions and studies on the great majority of sources have appeared over the last couple of decades. The works of R.C. Blockley and Averil Cameron on the classicizing historians are indispensable for a study on Bonifatius, as are Brian Croke’s, Stephen Muhlberger’s and Richard Burgess’ studies on the chronicles of Marcellinus comes, Prosper, Hydatius and the anonymous Gauls of 452 and 511.17 Bonifatius is also one of the rare cases in the study of ancient history for which new evidence has been discovered since De Lepper’s time. In 1981, Johannes Divjak published a collection of previously unknown letters of Augustine that he had discovered, including two which involve Bonifatius.18 Last but not least, it should be noted that archaeological and numismatic evidence in Africa can be linked to Bonifatius. Despite De Lepper’s work, scholarly opinion has remained widely divided on the person of Bonifatius. One scholar even states that Bonifatius was ‘a character who has been diversely judged. For some, he was a traitor and for others an imbecile’.19 Another remarked that there have been several biographies on leading generals of the western Roman Empire, ‘even’ one for Bonifatius.20 The remark indicates a certain feeling of surprise, which might imply that Bonifatius should not be included in the same list of people as Stilicho, Constantius (III), Aëtius and Ricimer. The only author who has so far studied these men as a collective omitted him altogether from his list of generalissimos.21 Because of all the new major insights in the field of late antiquity, its sources and the uncertainties that still surround our protagonist, I believe that after seventy years a new biography of Bonifatius is not only justified, but even necessary to understand properly his role in the history of the western Roman Empire.22 Yet anyone who wants to write a biography of a leading figure from ancient Greek and Roman history, as Stewart Oost famously remarked, is faced with a difficult situation: full knowledge of a person could be quite possible if one had available

Introduction

3

the subject’s letters and those of their contemporaries, their (written) work and documentary sources for the external facts of his or her life. However, it is nearly impossible to apply this model for a biography of someone from antiquity, except for rare cases like Cicero, who have left large amounts of written material that have survived until this day.23 For late antiquity, the only two persons for whom we could write a biography on these terms are the emperor Julian and Augustine.24 A ‘biography’ such as this book rather tries to investigate the role people such as Bonifatius played in the political history of the Roman Empire, the influence they had on their world et vice versa. This biography intends simultaneously to provide neither a political history of the late imperial west nor one of Roman Africa in Bonifatius’ time. Both topics will be dealt with, but Bonifatius remains the focus of the main narrative. The present study is based upon a new reading of the primary sources in light of the most recent and authoritative academic literature on the various aspects of his life. I have opted for a ‘documented history’, where as much of the ancient source material as possible is provided to the reader; this approach has recently yielded fruitful results.25 What is presented here will therefore not only provide a new account of his life, but also re-examine the concept of late Roman warlords. This study will demonstrate that Bonifatius was the first successful one.

The sources In constructing a biography on any major political figure of the fifth century, we face the challenge of lacking the complete history of an authoritative contemporary author.26 Few historians have captured the problem as well as John Bury. Quite rightly, he commented that: [T]he fifth century was one of the most critical periods in the history of Europe. It was crammed with events of great moment, and the changes which it witnessed transformed Europe more radically than any set of political events that have happened since. . . . [T]here is no history of contemporary events, and the story has had to be pieced together from fragments, jejune chronicles, incidental references in poets, rhetoricians, and theologians. Inscribed stones which supply so much information for the first four centuries of the Roman Empire are rare. Nowhere, since the time of Alexander the Great, do we feel so strongly that the meagreness of the sources flouts the magnitude of the events.27

4

The Last of the Romans

When the sources are so few, scanty and disparate it is of the utmost importance to collect all of them and give insight into their background. To create some kind of order, the authors have been divided into western and eastern, starting with the ones closest to Bonifatius’ life. While this division might appear to be somewhat artifical, it will help us to understand their background better and how that might have influenced what they have said about Bonifatius. The final verdict of these authors on Bonifatius will be assessed in the conclusion.

Western authors Augustine is by far one of the most important thinkers in the history of early Catholic Christianity in which he is known as one of the four western ‘Fathers of the Church’.28 He was born in Thagaste in 354, received an education in Carthage and tried a short-lived career in rhetoric at the court of Valentinian II. After having followed Manichaeism, he dedicated his life to Christianity and more specifically to its unity in his native North Africa. As bishop of Hippo Regius between 396 and 430 he was one of the most important figures in the fight against Donatism and Pelagianism. For historians, his writings, especially his sermons and letters, give a unique picture of late Roman Africa. He is our only source who knew Bonifatius personally, as seen in several letters that he exchanged with him.29 Prosper, sometimes mistakenly called Prosper Tiro, was a native of Aquitaine.30 He was born around 390, lived in Marseilles during the late 420s and settled in Rome around 430. He was a layman and follower of Augustine. There is a tradition that sees him as the secretary of Pope Leo I, but probably he was merely connected with the papal administration. Besides his chronicle, which is the first known continuation of Jerome’s in the west, he was also known for his theological works and propaganda for Augustine’s views on grace. His chronicle was meant as a didactic work, full of moral lessons. For western imperial events in the second quarter of the fifth century, the chronicle is nonetheless one of our best-informed sources. Possidius was a bishop of Calama in Numidia.31 He belonged to the clergy of Augustine’s monastery and remained in touch with him for several decades. He was present at the Vandal siege of Hippo Regius in which Augustine died, and was present at his death. He wrote a book on the life of Augustine, which was one of the earliest examples of Christian biography. It had considerable influence on hagiography in the medieval era.

Introduction

5

The Gallic chronicler of 452 was a devout, ascetic Christian who seems to have lived in Marseilles.32 His identity has been lost to us. Like Prosper, he wrote a continuation of Jerome’s chronicle. Though also a native Gaul, he disagreed with Prosper about a greal deal. He was opposed to Augustine’s doctrines, and saw the state of the western empire as calamitous, a stark contrast to Prosper’s serene image of the Empire. His chronology tends to be more unreliable than that of Prosper. Hydatius was a Spanish bishop in Gallaecia, who wrote a chronicle at the end of his life around 468.33 Despite the limitations of the genre, it is one of the best histories of its kind and one of the most important sources for western events in the fifth century. It differs greatly from other chronicles, because it focuses to a great extent on the Iberian peninsula, for which it is our exclusive source between 429 and 468. It is extremely pessimistic, due to Hydatius’ belief that the apocalypse was immenent. Sidonius Apollinaris was a local Gallic aristocrat of the Auvergne.34 He composed panegyrics for the emperors Avitus, Majorian and Anthemius. His letters and poems give an important impression of the desintegration of imperial authority in Gaul and relations with the successor kingdoms of the Visigoths, Burgundians and Franks. Victor of Vita wrote a history of the Vandal persecutions against Catholics, from the time of their arrival in 429 until 484.35 He seems to have written virtually all his work in the latter year. Little is known about Victor. Most probably he was a priest in Carthage who later became bishop of a see in Vita. The Gallic chronicler of 511 is even more obscure than his compatriot of 452.36 Most likely, the author was also situated in southern Gaul, perhaps in Arles or Marseilles. Most of the time this work follows other chronicles mentioned here, such as Hydatius, though it gives us some unique information towards the end of the fifth century. The pseudo-Bonifatius is by far our most puzzling source. It represents a collection of sixteen letters, supposedly written by Augustine and Bonifatius themselves. Desiderius Erasmus rejected this document’s authenticity in the Renaissance, an opinion that has been reaffirmed by authorities during the last couple of centuries. De Lepper discerned specific names and events unattested in other sources, which made him claim that the forgerer was a contempary partisan of Bonifatius, defending the reputation of his patron.37 Frank Clover, on the other hand, noted errors in chronology, geography and use of items that no contemporary of the comes Africae would have made. Most probably, the letters

6

The Last of the Romans

were written in Ostrogothic Italy. They could have been a rhetorical pastiche of a man who had access to several contemporary sources.38 Cassiodorus Senator was, together with Boethius, the most important Roman statesman of Ostrogothic Italy during the reign of Theoderic the Amal (493–526).39 He wrote several works which give us important insights into the workings of Theoderic’s administration. His chronicle was written around 519, and draws chiefly upon previous authors such as Eusebius, Jerome and Prosper. It should be noted, however, that where possible he distorts events in favour of the Goths. Paul the Deacon was one of the most important historians of early medieval Italy.40 He wrote during the final days of the Longobard kingdom, lived at the court of Benevento and even attracted the attention of Charlemagne. He died at the end of the eighth century. For this study we only mention his Historia Romana, a continuation of Eutropius’ Breviarium that he compiled at Benevento between 766 and 771. It was very popular in the medieval era and it is listed here for its inclusion of Bonifatius.

Eastern authors Olympiodorus was a native of Thebes in Egypt.41 His literary skills as a poet launched his career as a diplomat in service of the court of Constantinople. He wrote a Greek history that, surprisingly, focuses almost completely on western events between the downfall of Stilicho and the coronation of Valentinian III (407–425). However, of the twenty-two books he wrote, we possess only fragments that have come down to us via Photius’ Bibliotheca.42 The Church historians Sozomen, Philostorgius and the pagan Zosimus also used his work exhaustively, even copying a great deal verbatim. From the surviving fragments, we can deduce that he was an eyewitness to several of the events he described. Furthermore, it can be determined that he had access to first-hand information through high officials, such as the rhetor Justinian, the general Candidianus and the governor Valerius. The loss of his history is most regrettable for our knowledge on Bonifatius. Priscus of Panium was the major historian of the fifth century, together with Olympiodorus.43 His work has also come down to us in fragments preserved in the eastern emperor Constantine VII’s Excerpts and the Suda. He wrote in the classicizing tradition of Thucydides, and is the most important source for the reign of Attila and the Huns. His focus was on the east and mostly dealt with

Introduction

7

western events to the extent that they affected Italy and Africa. His history was widely used by later historiographers such as Jordanes and Procopius. Marcellinus Comes, an Illyrian cancellarius of Justinian, wrote a Latin chronicle in Constantinople around 518/519, which he updated in 534.44 His chronicle is an important source for the reigns of Anastasius, Justin I and Justinian as well as the Hun, Ostrogoth and Bulgar invasions of the Balkans. Procopius of Caesarea wrote on a voluminous scale about the wars of Justinian, and was the major writer of the sixth century.45 As a staff member of the great general Belisarius, he was an eyewitness to many of the events he described, though he did write his histories long after. In the early stages of his life he received an education in the classics and became a rhetor. One of the major controversies concerning Procopius is that the great historian of the Wars and the panegyrist of the Buildings was also the author of the highly vitriolic Secret History, in which Justinian and his wife Theodora were notoriously portrayed as two of the vilest humans ever to have walked the earth. He mentioned several key episodes of fifth-century history in his works, but mostly in his digressions where he found it appropriate. Jordanes could be called one of the first ‘narrators of barbarian history’.46 He was an official of Constantinople who later became a monk and wrote both a Roman (Romana) and a Gothic history (Getica) in Latin. The Romana was a compendium of remarkable events from the beginnings of world history to the final victory of Narses against the Ostrogoths in 552. The tone is remarkably less pro-Roman or pro-Gothic than the Getica, which was heavily influenced by the lost history of Cassidorus Senator. John of Antioch is the author of a history of the Christian world, from Adam until the accession of Heraclius (October 610).47 It is probable that John came from Antioch and that he had received his education in a Syrian community, and that later he moved to Constantinople. John used an abundant number of sources for his history. It is evident that John not only had access to many of these sources in their complete form, but that he was also able to enrich his reading of them by verifying the authors to whom his sources referred. Theophanes Confessor’s chronicle covers the period of 284–813 and is one of the most important sources of eastern Roman history and that of the Near East under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties.48 It is especially valuable for the seventh and eight centuries where the chronicle draws on sources that are now completely lost to us. For events of the fifth century he mainly uses the histories of Socrates Scholasticus, Sozomen and Procopius.

Map 1 Late Roman Empire c. 375–400

1

The World of Bonifatius (375–420) The transformation of the western imperial office During the last quarter of the fourth century, the nature of imperial rule transformed drastically, imposing a heavy burden on the government of the western Roman Empire. The loss of military authority previously attached to the imperial office had significant implications for the high command of the western Roman army. On 17 January 395, the emperor, Theodosius I, died in Milan.1 Though traditionally regarded as the last emperor to reign solely over the eastern and western imperial realms, Theodosius had already formally appointed both his sons, Arcadius and Honorius, as co-Augusti in the imperial college during his lifetime.2 At the dawn of 395, the Empire found itself in a rather peculiar situation. Superficially, unity had been restored. For the first time in twenty years, emperors of the same dynasty jointly ruled both realms. Yet the establishment of Theodosius’ house in the west had come at a high cost. When Honorius succeeded his father, the imperial west was barely recovering from twelve years of internecine political strife featuring the death of four emperors and the replacement of their respective regimes.3 The Roman Empire of the fourth century had experienced an altogether relatively stable government, after the restructuring of its administration and the accompanying reconfiguration of the imperial office under Diocletian.4 Nearly all emperors in this age were adult rulers who personally travelled around their respective realms with their army and court. Many of them possessed extensive military experience. Even younger aspiring emperors, such as Constans and Julian, prioritized their role as supreme commander of the Roman army, regularly supervising frontiers and personally leading campaigns. While some emperors have received considerably hostile treatment in contemporary historiography, such as Constantius II or Valens, one recent study makes the claim that: ‘the reigns of the emperors from Diocletian to Theodosius represent a high point of imperial rule: a long sequence of consistently able rulers’.5 While this was certainly true for the imperial east until Theodosius’

10

The Last of the Romans

death, the western realm experienced graver difficulties accommodating its rulers in their effective enactment of government during the two decades prior to the latter event.

The heirs of Valentinian When the emperor Valentinian I died unexpectedly of apoplexy at Brigetio in Pannonia on 17 November 375, a group of senior commanders and civil administrators on the spot deemed it both necessary and opportune to elevate the emperor’s younger son Valentinian to the imperial purple immediately.6 This is rather surprising, considering Valentinian I already had an immediate successor in his elder son Gratian who had been co-Augustus since 367.7 Therefore, there was no apparent need for an additional emperor and Gratian could have remained sole emperor over the west. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, the Frankish magister peditum Merobaudes feared that the army of the Danube would proclaim his rival Sebastian emperor if they were not presented with a ruler from the house of Valentinian.8 Gratian was still residing in Trier and the situation in Pannonia at the end of 375 was potentially volatile; both mutiny in the Illyrian army and barbarian incursions from across the Danube were possible. There were probably more suitable candidates than the toddler Valentinian II, but proclaiming those would have resulted in civil war.9 Neither Gratian nor his uncle Valens had originally sanctioned the elevation, but considering the circumstances Merobaudes could sell the decision as serving the interests of the state. This does not obscure the fact that Merobaudes’ elevation of Valentinian II to the imperial purple also served the general’s own aims. Despite the relatively smooth succession, Valentinian I’s unforeseen death was to have massive implications for the respective governments of his sons. Both Gratian and Valentinian II had obtained the highest position of official power in the Roman world at an incredibly young age. Gratian was sixteen years old when he became senior Augustus of the imperial west, while Valentinian II was only four. The death of their father, who during his reign of nearly twelve years had ruled the imperial west with an iron fist, allowed opportunists to steer the imperial brothers’ government. One recent scholar has suggested that their government was run by ‘committees’, including influential military and civil officials, such as Merobaudes, Ausonius and Petronius Probus.10 The installation of Valentinian II as emperor was especially useful as an opportunity to get rid of potential rivals, such as the magister equitum Theodosius ‘the elder’ and the

The World of Bonifatius (375–420)

11

comes rei militaris Sebastian.11 Even though he had been proclaimed Augustus, Valentinian II was effectively sidelined for the next eight years while his brother took care of ruling the west.12 Gratian tried following in the footsteps of his father and emulating the traditional model of fourth-century imperial rule as mobile soldier-emperor. Originally he ruled from Trier, but during the outbreak of the Gothic crisis he made preparations in order to assist Valens. Already in these years, signs of insubordination were fomenting. In 377, Gratian had ordered his comes domesticorum Richomeres to assist Valens with a couple of cohorts. Yet Ammianus writes that most of these soldiers were induced by Merobaudes to remain at their stations, since the magister peditum feared that Gaul would be left defenceless against barbarian raids otherwise.13 Merobaudes’ insights may have been well founded, considering the invasion of Raetia by the Lentienses when Gratian departed for the east in 378.14 Gratian eagerly took this opportunity to earn military renown and pursued the Lentienses until he brought them to complete surrender.15 Nevertheless, Merobaudes’ initial counter-orders still demonstrated a disregard for the emperor’s authority and showed that Gratian was not in full control over his military. Eventually this would lead to the latter’s downfall. The young emperor’s prolonged presence in Illyricum and northern Italy during the following years fuelled resentment among north-western elites.16 At the time of Valentinian I’s death, Ammianus wrote that the Gallic armies were ‘not always of devoted loyalty to legitimate emperors, and [they] regarded themselves as arbiters of the imperial power’.17 It cannot have been a coincidence that Valentinian I spent the major part of his reign residing at Trier as western emperor, while he was initially proclaimed as sole emperor in Bithynia after the death of Jovianus in 364. Gaul had launched the usurpation of Magnentius in 350, which overthrew Constans and brought about a major civil war with the east. The rebellions of Silvanus in 355 and Julian in 360 were also launched from Gaul. Silvanus was swiftly assassinated, but in Julian’s case civil war was only narrowly avoided due to the sudden death of Constantius II.18 Keeping the Gallic troops loyal might have been just as much Valentinian’s aim as supervising the Rhine frontier.19 The wisdom of this policy was apparently lost on his son, whose reign came to an end in very similar circumstances to the emperor Constans in 350.20 Both were young emperors, who spent considerable time in Gaul and gained military repute at the start of their reign. Yet after prolonged residence among the elite of Italy and Illyricum, both emperors’ absence from Gaul triggered juntas within the Transalpine military aristocracy.21

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The demise of the soldier-emperor In the summer of 383, the army in Britain proclaimed their commander Magnus Maximus as emperor. The exact motives for his usurpation are hard to discern, considering the vilification of Maximus in the historiographical tradition after his execution, though he had been an old associate of the house of Theodosius I.22 The eastern emperor’s independent dynastic stance, even proclaiming his son Arcadius as Augustus on 19 January 383 without consulting Gratian, combined with the latter’s increasing absence from Gaul, might have provided Maximus with the most opportune context for his own bid for the purple. He swiftly crossed the Channel and received backing from the Rhine armies. When the armies of Gratian met him at Paris, there followed five days of cautious skirmishing until the major part of the legitimate emperor’s forces defected to the usurper.23 A key figure in this desertion was Merobaudes, the very same general who had played a pivotal role in the proclamation of Valentinian II.24 Gratian tried to flee, but was intercepted by Maximus’ magister equitum Andragathius and murdered at Lyons on 25 August 383.25 So far, Magnus Maximus’ bid for power still followed traditional patterns of fourth-century emperorship and usurpation.26 It was organized by an experienced commander, who could boast a track record of proven soldiership and aimed to direct the government of the empire actively.27 After Gratian’s murder, Maximus’ western Roman army was probably the strongest force in the empire, with the east still recovering from the loss of manpower at Adrianople, and Valentinian II’s ‘central empire’ dependent on Theodosius’ suzerainty. However, the policies embarked upon by both Theodosius and the palatine factions surrounding Valentinian II would ultimately not only prevent Maximus from taking over the entire imperial west, but also considerably curtail the military authority of the legitimate western emperor. After Gratian’s death, Valentinian II’s magister equitum Bauto organized the Alpine defences against the usurper Maximus. Compared to his Frankish compatriots Merobaudes and Arbogastes, we are very badly informed about his background or policies during the reign of Valentinian’s house.28 When the bishop Ambrose conducted an embassy to Maximus’ court on behalf of the government in Italy, the usurper bemoaned that Bauto was using the boy Valentinian as a figurehead so that the general could claim the empire for himself.29 Bauto vanishes from the historical record after his consulship in 385 and probably died before Maximus’ confrontation with Valentinian and Theodosius. He was succeeded in his post by Arbogastes, who might have been a close relative.30 Bauto’s succession was in its own right unauthorized since Arbogastes was not appointed by an

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emperor but acclaimed by the army.31 This shows that the army had regarded Bauto as its actual ruler and not the infant Valentinian, which is another sign of the progressive fragmentation of military loyalties. In the early summer of 387, after three years of reluctant imperial recognition by Theodosius, Magnus Maximus’ forces invaded Italy virtually unopposed.32 While Valentinian fled with his court to Thessaloniki and appealed to Theodosius for aid, aristocratic elites in Italy welcomed Maximus with open arms.33 Details about the ensuing war between Maximus and Theodosius are scanty, and it is hard to make an assessment of the damage wrought upon both imperial armies. Theodosius had to fight two battles in Illyricum, near Siscia and Poetovio, while each side engaged in naval operations and employed barbarians to stir up trouble in the rear-side of the other’s armies.34 It is possible that Theodosius’ army caught Maximus by surprise, striking faster than Maximus had anticipated, and swiftly overrunning his defences before Maximus was able to unite all his forces. He was still residing at Aquileia when he was captured by eastern forces and duly executed on 28 August 388.35 The death of Magnus Maximus meant that during the next decade the western emperor’s military role became considerably more restricted.

The marginalization of the western Roman emperor Nominally, Valentinian II was now sole ruler of the imperial west and senior Augustus as the last male member of Valentinian I’s dynasty. He had reached adulthood and might even have gained some military experience during naval operations in the war with Maximus.36 However, Theodosius deliberately kept Valentinian from having any share in the triumph and celebrations. Instead the young emperor was sent to Gaul with Arbogastes, while the eastern emperor established himself in Italy for no less than three years, took over government of the ‘central empire’ and reinforced his eastern forces with the best pick from the defeated western Roman army.37 Arbogastes, who had served as general in Theodosius’ campaign, was instructed to restore order in Gaul, where Maximus’ son and co-Augustus Victor still resided.38 After eliminating the latter he campaigned against Frankish tribes, who had used Maximus’ civil war as an opportunity to loot Roman territory along the Rhine frontier. Valentinian was not given any opportunity to pursue military credentials, and instead Arbogastes launched a counter-offensive to pacify the Franks.39 Though there was no way to foresee it at the time, Arbogastes’ operation would be the very last imperial campaign on the eastern side of the Rhine. For the time being, it must have been a very effective one. For the next fifteen years, no more trouble occurred, while

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both Arbogastes and later Stilicho were able to renew treaties with the neighbouring client kings and make them supply recruits for the imperial army.40 Valentinian was in many ways an emperor who reigned but was never allowed to rule, while Theodosius allowed Arbogastes to take care of state affairs in the transalpine provinces.41 When the eastern emperor departed for Constantinople in 391, Arbogastes confined Valentinian II to the palace at Vienne to such a point that the young emperor became a powerless prisoner. If the historiographic record can be trusted, Arbogastes even slew one of Valentinian’s counsellors with his own hands and ignored his dismissal by the emperor, saying: ‘The emperor had not given him his command and could not take it away’.42 It is very tempting to see all of this as a vivid illustration of a general shamelessly working for himself and depriving the emperor of his proper authority. However, the quote could mean that either Arbogastes was taking direct orders from Theodosius or, as previously mentioned, he regarded himself as ruling on behalf of the army. It is equally revealing that, as with Gratian at Paris in 383, the Gallic army was prepared to follow not its legitimate emperor but the dominant magister militum. Ultimately, events spun out of control and on 15 May 392, Valentinian II was found hanging dead from a noose in the palace at Vienne.43 The sources are at odds whether the young emperor had committed suicide or was murdered by his general.44 The former seems to be more likely, considering that Arbogastes stood to lose a great deal lot more with Valentinian’s death: a harmless legitimate emperor and Theodosius’ support.45 Ambrose, probably the one contemporary author most likely to have known what happened, spoke about the topic in the most opaque language during Valentinian’s funerary oration, but he did not imply that the emperor had been murdered; the bishop of Milan also seems to hint at suicide as cause of the western emperor’s death.46 Meanwhile, Arbogastes had sent on envoys to Constantinople and waited for instructions. Only when it became apparent that Theodosius was not inclined to accept his overtures for reconciliation, and was most probably preparing retribution for the loss of Valentinian, did this generalissimo take the step of proclaiming Eugenius emperor as a matter of self-preservation. Just as there are striking parallels between the downfalls of Constans and Gratian, there are obvious similarities between the usurpations of Magnus Maximus and Eugenius. Both were launched in the transalpine provinces and received the support of the Galllic armies. Both were able to establish themselves in Italy with relative ease and were warmly accepted by aristocratic elites there. Both emperors had no intention of challenging the east and actually tried to reach a diplomatic equilibrium with Theodosius I.47 However, Eugenius was a very different emperor

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from Maximus and his elevation can be seen as a further step in the deterioration of state authority traditionally exercised in the imperial west. The new western emperor had been a teacher of Latin grammar and served in Valentinian II’s government as magister scrinii.48 What can be deduced from the source materials shows, at best, that state affairs were now run under the partnership of a civilian emperor and supreme military commander. Yet even Eugenius, portrayed as Arbogastes’ puppet in the historiographical record, personally travelled to the Rhine to renew treaties with the petty kings of the Franks and Alamanni while displaying his armies to awe them.49 He was also present at the Frigidus for his showdown with Theodosius.50 In the bloody carnage that ensued on 5 and 6 September 394, both western and eastern Roman armies suffered atrocious casualties. Eventually, the eastern army emerged victorious and burst into Eugenius’ camp. The usurper was immediately beheaded, while Arbogastes took his own life, after having fled into nearby mountains. Theodosius now found himself in the position of sole adult emperor, but was not to enjoy his victory for long. He passed away unexpectedly five months later, hardly fifty years old.

The reconfiguration of imperial authority The installation of Theodosius’ sons as emperors of both realms could be interpreted as the triumph of the dynastic principle to guarantee stability for the government of the empire, as it had previously been carried out by Constantine I and attempted by Valentinian I.51 However, the death of Theodosius meant the end of direct active rule by an adult soldier-emperor and the entrenchment of isolated child-emperors for the foreseeable future. The eastern emperor’s death did herald a new phase of emperorship in late antiquity: the emperor was no longer a mobile supreme commander but became a predominantly ceremonial figure reigning from his palace. Until 395, all emperors had tried remaining close to their troops, with the possible exception of Valentinian II whom Theodosius and Arbogastes had restrained from doing so. Perhaps the personal presence of the emperor should not be overstated: the risks of having the emperor actually joining battle could be gigantic, as the dramatic events of Julian’s Mesopotamian campaign and Valens’ handling of the battle of Adrianople demonstrated. The unforeseen deaths of both emperors on the battlefield provoked successioncrises and granted the enemy at war significant advantages.52 Nevertheless, Gratian, Theodosius and Maximus had still personally led their forces in the 380s. With the accession of the boy-emperor Honorius as sole emperor of the

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western provinces, and his teenage brother Arcadius as sole emperor of the eastern provinces, the entire empire was now dynastically united but under direct supervision of senior officials with individual agendas. While this did not severely hamper the functioning of the eastern Roman government, the various civil wars in the imperial west of this age – especially those Theodosius embarked upon with Magnus Maximus and Eugenius – hamstrung political and military resources in this realm.53 The elimination of Gratian, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius, respectively, was accompanied by the purging of key military personnel and costly regime changes. More importantly, the experiments with military autocracy of Merobaudes, Bauto and Arbogastes had paved the way for the ascendancy of a single magister militum governing the imperial west. While Merobaudes may have been the most dominant official among several civilian and military magnates in Gratian’s government, Bauto and especially Arbogastes were already acting as ‘right hand’ of Valentinian II and Eugenius. The new model of partnership between a ceremonial childemperor and governing generalissimo would not remain uncontested, however. Honorius’ reign witnessed attempts at novel forms of opposition beyond usurpation of the imperial office or setting up an emperor. The career of Bonifatius exemplified this tendency towards innovative methods of insurgency.

Collapse and recovery of western imperial security Despite the many episodes of political upheaval inside the imperial west during the last quarter of the fourth century, the realm had altogether been spared from great external threats. Yet during the two decades following Theodosius’ death the empire witnessed unprecedented deterioration of central authority over its western provinces. This weakening manifested in a series of political and military crises which eventually culminated in the collapse of the Rhine frontier, the sack of Rome and the settlement of barbarian groups inside Gaul and Spain.54 Towards the end of the second decade of the fifth century, the western imperial government achieved a precarious restoration of domestic security. Nevertheless, the outcome of these events would loom large in the world of Bonifatius as his career progressed.

The accession of Stilicho’s regime When Arcadius and Honorius assumed their respective ‘sole reigns’ in 395, both emperors’ governments were effectively steered by their guardians.

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Especially in the west, Flavius Stilicho consolidated his position as military patron of the imperial throne far more thoroughly than any magister militum before him and thus became a model for other ambitious generals.55 Stilicho was the son of a Roman noblewoman and a Vandal cavalry officer, although his ‘ancestry’ did not have any bearing on his upbringing or career which was exclusively Roman.56 He rapidly rose through the chain of command in the eastern Roman army under Theodosius I and received the hand of the emperor’s niece Serena as a reward. He accompanied Theodosius to the west for the war against Eugenius, and after his emperor’s death he found himself in the unique position of being the most senior commander to have survived the battle of the Frigidus. When Theodosius I died on 17 January 395, he served as western magister peditum praesentales and publicly claimed the regency over both his sons, Arcadius and Honorius. However, there were several problems with this claim. Legally, there was no such thing as a regent of a properly crowned Augustus.57 It is indisputable that Honorius was a child, being only ten years old at most, who therefore could not properly govern the western empire. For the next thirteen years, Stilicho effectively controlled the imperial west in the name of Honorius, but palatine factions in Constantinople heavily contested his eastern claims. Arcadius was already seventeen or eighteen and old enough to start ruling in his own right. Most importantly, Arcadius’ government and closest advisers did not wish to see the western supreme commander’s influence extending into Constantinople. In 395 and 397, Stilicho organized two campaigns ostensibly aimed at quelling Alaric’s mutinous Gothic army in Greece.58 However, on both occasions Constantinople feared this was a mere ploy for Stilicho to seize power afterwards in the eastern capital. Diplomatic relations between the two realms soured and led to a phase of ‘cold war’, in which Alaric played a pivotal role.

Alaric and the (Visi)Goths Alaric and his men were predominantly, but not exclusively, members or descendants of the Greuthingi and Tervingi, who had crossed the Danube and sought asylum in the Balkans in 376. The eastern emperor Valens allowed these Gothic tribes to settle in Moesia for the moment. A combination of corrupt administration and mutual suspicion soon exploded into violence, and the Goths revolted.59 As a result, Valens assembled his field armies for a campaign against the Gothic rebels. The ensuing battle at Adrianople in 378 resulted in a major defeat where Valens and two-thirds of the eastern field army were

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annihilated. After four years of skirmishing, his successor Theodosius I eventually managed to integrate these Goths in the military infrastructure and allowed them to remain in Moesia as foederati. In return, they were expected to support imperial campaigns by providing recruits. These Gothic soldiers participated in Theodosius’ civil wars against Magnus Maximus and against Eugenius. Both the western field armies, as Theodosius’ Gothic auxiliaries, saw especially huge losses at the Frigidus. Gothic resentment was high due to the heavy casualties their ranks had suffered during the battle. Alaric was able to exploit these grievances to raise a mutiny after Theodosius’ death. Very little is known about Alaric’s background.60 Sixth-century historiography, as preserved by Jordanes and probably derived from Cassiodorus, imagined him as descending from a Gothic clan with royal pedigree. However, contemporary sources indicate that Alaric started as an obscure figure commanding Gothic auxiliaries in Theodosius’ army during the battle of the Frigidus. Afterwards, he was dismayed that he did not receive a proper generalship as a reward. Under Alaric’s banner several Gothic regiments went into revolt, and these became the nucleus of the group that eventually evolved into the Visigoths.61 The Balkans were virtually defenceless, since the eastern forces were still under Stilicho’s command in Italy. When the latter tried to attack Alaric in Greece, his forces were ill-disciplined, and the court in Constantinople forced Stilicho to return the eastern units and vacate Greece. Alaric continued pillaging Attica and the Peloponnese, until Stilicho returned with a new force in 397. Some fighting occurred in the peninsula, but Stilicho was forced again to withdraw after Constantinople declared him a public enemy. In return, Alaric was allowed to retreat into Epirus and received the senior generalship of the eastern army in Illyricum (magister militum per Illyricum). Despite these setbacks, Stilicho managed to make his authority in the west virtually absolute by bringing the entire western army under his sole command after suppressing the magister utriusque militiae per Africam Gildo’s insubordination in Africa. Stilicho further strengthened his control over Honorius by marrying his elder daughter Maria to him in 398 and, after her death in 407, his younger daughter Thermantia.62 At the dawn of the fifth century, Stilicho’s western Roman government was looking at a promising future, but storms were gathering on the horizon.

Invasions of Italy In the aftermath of a failed coup by a different Gothic general in Constantinople, Alaric found himself stranded without a legitimate eastern command.63 This

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may have been the first occasion that he took on the title of rex, but his ultimate goal still remained a senior generalship in the Roman army. Therefore, he decided to switch potential benefactors and invaded Italy in 401 to pressure Honorius’ court into granting him such concessions. He entered Italy virtually unopposed and was able to besiege Milan for several months, until Stilicho descended upon him with his forces from Raetia. Two stalemate battles were fought at Pollentia and Verona, but Stilicho ultimately held the upper hand and was able to capture Alaric’s family and baggage train. Alaric lost a significant number of men through battle, hunger, disease and desertion, but still retreated with a considerable force into western Illyricum. It is feasible either that Stilicho did not have the resources to destroy Alaric or that he wished to use his Gothic soldiers as auxiliaries for future campaigns. Indeed, by 405 at the latest Stilicho had given Alaric a command in Illyricum, but needed to deal with domestic security before pursuing his eastern ambitions. At the end of the same year Italy was invaded by immense barbarian confederation, led by a certain Radagaisus. Nothing is known of Radagaisus’ origins or background prior to the invasion of Italy, which might have been prompted by either the advance of the Huns in central Europe or purely internal reasons.64 His forces are said to have included hundreds of thousands of warriors, an unbelievably high estimate given army numbers in the later Roman Empire.65 In response, Stilicho gathered thirty field units (numeri) of the western Roman army, supported by barbarian auxiliaries such as Alans, Goths and Huns. Stilicho’s force may realistically have numbered between 15,000 and 20,000 men.66 Radagaisus’ hordes initially met with little resistance and devastated northern Italy. His forces were split up into three groups, probably due to lack of supplies. Radagaisus’ main force besieged Florence during the spring of 406. The city was about to surrender, until the timely arrival of Stilicho’s army. The western Roman army surrounded Radagaisus near the hills of Fiesole and blocked all access to supplies, thereby starving his forces. He tried to escape but was apprehended and executed on 23 August 406. Stilicho suffered minimal losses and allegedly managed to incorporate 12,000 of Radagaisus’ warriors into his auxiliary forces.67 The western Roman government was given no respite, however, and it is possible that survivors of Radagadius’ horde fleeing over the Alps set other barbarian warbands in motion.

The collapse of the Rhine frontier On the very last day of either 405 or 406, the Rhine frontier was overrun by large warbands of Vandals, Alans and Sueves.68 In response to the unrest in Gaul, the

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British army proclaimed several men as emperors in quick succession. Constantine became their final choice, after two previous candidates for the purple, Marcus and Gratian, were deemed unsatisfactory and were lynched.69 Constantine ‘III’ crossed the Channel and landed at Boulogne with the British field army, a force that can realistically have consisted of 5,000 soldiers.70 After engaging the Rhine invaders, he managed to score at least one victory over them, containing them in northern Gaul and securing the Rhine.71 The exact chronology and itinerary of Constantine’s advance in Gaul is notoriously problematic and needs to be reconstructed via his coinage.72 During the summer and autumn of 407, Constantine captured Trier and Lyons where he started minting coins. Initially Stilicho was not inclined to deal with the situation, and sent his Gothic general Sarus with an army over the Alps to prevent the usurper from capturing Arles.73 After some initial success, Sarus’ counter-offensive against Constantine III failed and he needed to retreat to Italy. The political capital that Stilicho had gained by his victory over Radagaisus slowly started to evaporate due to his failure to contain Constantine III, who was rapidly taking over the rest of Gaul and Spain. Honorius’ court had effectively lost control over its transalpine provinces at the start of 408. Furthermore, Alaric had marched with his Gothic army into Noricum.74 Previously, he had received a western Roman command in the Illyrian provinces. It is unclear whether he had been instructed to use his army as the vanguard for a campaign to retake the eastern Illyrian provinces held by Constantinople or simply to guard the western provinces.75 After having sat idle in Epirus for more than a year, Alaric moved his forces into Noricum and demanded 4,000 pounds of gold for his services.76 After extensive negotiations with the Roman senate, Stilicho was able to procure this payment and wished to use Alaric’s army against Constantine. However, an unforeseen event would thwart these plans. On 1 May 408, Arcadius died. Instead of focusing on the campaign against Constantine, Stilicho desired to travel to the east to supervise the installment of Theodosius II, Arcadius’ infant son and successor.77 Soon, however, Stilicho completely lost control over events. The generalissimo’s adamant desire to manage palatine policies at Constantinople, despite Constantine’s seizure of the transalpine provinces, triggered a palace coup led by the magister officiorum Olympius.78 This faction arranged the public assassination of Stilicho’s leading ministers and officers during an inspection of the army in Honorius’ presence at Ticinum.79 Meanwhile, laws were decreed in which Stilicho was branded an enemy of the state and his associates condemned.80 Roman soldiers subsequently slaughtered families of his barbarian recruits, quartered in the cities around Italy.81 Such a move was reminiscent of the pogroms which the

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population of Constantinople unleashed upon Goths living in the eastern capital in 400. After a failure to parley with the emperor at Ravenna, Stilicho was arrested and brought to execution on 22 August 408. Even though he still had access to barbarian auxiliaries, he did not resist his arrest. Despite hostile accusations of treason, he ultimately died as a loyal servant of Theodosius’ dynasty.

The Gothic crisis in Italy The pogroms following Stilicho’s execution brought about the defection of thousands of barbarian auxiliaries, who found a safe haven in Noricum with Alaric. When Honorius’ government rebuffed Alaric’s requests for peace and rewards, he marched into Italy with his forces. The Visigoths bypassed Ravenna and laid siege to Rome during the winter of 408/409.82 They cut off the city’s grain supply from the Tiber, and the looming threat of famine forced the senate to negotiate an agreement. In return for huge sums of gold, silver, silk, spices and a great number of slaves, Alaric withdrew his forces to Tuscany while arranging a meeting with imperial representatives near Rimini in the spring of 409. Alaric mainly used Rome as a tool to pressure Honorius’ court into negotiations. During the first talks he demanded Stilicho’s former position, gold and grain for his soldiers, as well as the provinces of Venetia, Dalmatia and Noricum to station them. Honorius’ court refused these terms, after which Alaric merely requested grain and Noricum. When this was also refused, Alaric marched on Rome again and commenced a second ‘siege’, or rather he provided a show of strength near the city to intimidate the senate. In collaboration with Alaric, they set up the city prefect Priscus Attalus as emperor in December 409.83 Attalus appointed Alaric as his supreme commander and together they tried bringing the cities of northern Italy to their fold during the first half of 410. They laid siege to Ravenna, where Honorius’ garrison was on the verge of mutiny. The timely arrival of 4,000 eastern Roman soldiers in the harbour of Ravenna meant an unexpected reinforcement of Honorius’ position. Meanwhile, Alaric and Attalus had failed to secure the African provinces. The comes Africae Heraclian remained loyal to Honorius, and sent the emperor financial aid.84 More importantly, he annuled grain shipments to Rome, and thereby critically undermined Attalus’ authority in the city. A dire famine broke out among the Romans, who allegedly even resorted to cannibalism.85 Alaric attempted one last time to negotiate a settlement with Honorius, for which he deposed Attalus as a gesture of goodwill. An unexpected raid on the Visigothic camp by Sarus ultimately broke down these peace talks.

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Alaric saw no alternative but to satisfy the demands of his troops, and returned to Rome for a final siege that soon resulted in its surrender. From 24 to 27 August 410 the Visigoths were allowed to sack the city, on the condition that no arson was committed and citizens seeking sanctuary in churches be spared. Politically and militarily, the sack of Rome did little to change the stalemate between the Visigoths and the imperial court. Nevertheless, it created a major outcry among Romans around the Mediterranean and stirred intellectual debate between pagans and Christians.

The pacification of Gaul and Spain Despite some initial successes, the regime of Constantine III did not prove to be more stable. Vandals, Alans and Sueves invaded Spain in 409, probably at the instigation of the usurper’s general Gerontius, who revolted against Constantine.86 The usurper and his dissident general were soon battling each other in Gaul. Honorius’ new magister utriusque militiae, Constantius, managed to intervene against Constantine III, who was besieged by Gerontius in Arles.87 Gerontius’ soldiers joined Constantius, while a relief army was defeated. However, during the suppression of Constantine’s usurpation at Arles, a new Gallic usurper had already been proclaimed at Mainz. Jovinus, a local aristocrat, had established a regime centred on the Rhine and Rhone axis in eastern Gaul.88 In the meantime, Alaric had passed away while trying to move his people to Sicily in order to cross over to Africa. His successor and brother-in-law, Athaulf, led the Visigoths out of Italy into Gaul in 412. Athaulf ’s Visigoths initially supported the Gallic rebels, but eventually switched their allegiance back to Honorius and delivered them to Constantius for execution as part of a deal to receive urgent food supplies. Constantius failed to live up to his side of the agreement because of the comes Africae Heraclian’s revolt in 413. This was quickly suppressed, but proved to be very embarrassing for Honorius’ regime, since this comes Africae had blocked the grain shipments. Therefore, it was not possible for the moment to provide the Goths with the promised grain. Athaulf and Constantius prepared for war again, since an agreement could not be reached. The Visigoths managed to take Bordeaux, Toulouse and Narbonne, but Constantius enforced an embargo upon their supplies both by land and sea. They were forced to move to Spain, where Athaulf was murdered in 415. After an extremely short interregnum of his murderer’s benefactor, the Visigoths elected Vallia as their new king, with the intention of continued warfare against the

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Romans.89 Yet Vallia also proved unable to deal with the problem of feeding his people. He came to terms with the Romans, promised military assistance and delivered them back Galla Placidia, Honorius’ half-sister, in exchange for grain supplies. Placidia had been their hostage since the sack of Rome and had even married Athaulf. In the next years the Visigoths crushed the Alans and Siling Vandals in Spain, until they were recalled and settled by Constantius as foederati in Aquitania in 418 or 419.90 For the time being, the empire had struck back victoriously against its opponents.

The price of victory Honorius’ court had still a long way to go in re-forging the western Empire’s hegemony over all its provinces. Britain was de facto severed from the empire, while control over northern Gaul and the outer Danubian provinces had become nominal at best. Northwestern Spain still hosted unpacified barbarian warbands, while northwestern Gaul was in a state of anarchy. All the western provinces, save North Africa, had been ravaged and ample tax cuts were necessary to bring some relief. More than two decades of incessant fighting had taken their toll on the western Roman war machine. The enigmatic Notitia Dignitatum preserves a snapshot of the imperial bureaucracy and military establishment in the late Roman west during the 420s.91 At face value it portrays an impressive state apparatus that puts control over western imperial forces in the hands of its most senior general, the magister peditum praesentalis, who in this era often commanded both branches of the western army as magister utriusque militiae.92 But detailed analysis of military units shows the detrimental attrition the army had suffered in the preceding decades during the reign of Honorius. These losses are best explained through the many usurpations, military unrest, barbarian incursions and civil wars, which had now plagued the imperial west as much as the apex of the so-called ‘crisis of the third century’. A prime victim of this turmoil was the western army whose field units experienced casualties galore and suffered heavily from attrition throughout these decades, as reflected in the Notitia. Out of 181 units of the western comitatenses, seventy-six perished during the battle of the Frigidus, the wars against Alaric and Radagaisus, as well as the countless civil wars against usurpers and rebels. The loss in manpower could only be compensated in makeshift ways by transferring garrison troops into the mobile field units: from ninety-seven newly raised regiments, sixty-two had been frontier troops upgraded on paper. 93

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Despite these tremendous losses, under the auspices of Constantius the balance of power had been restored in favour of the empire during the late second decade of the fifth century. Contemporaries enthusiastically spoke about an ordo renascendi.94 Constantius had reunited the western Roman field armies, after his suppression of usurpers and rivals, and pacified most of Gaul, Spain and Africa. Most importantly, the western Mediterranean heartlands remained secure, thereby providing a base for future reintegration of provinces temporarily outside imperial control. In 420, Rome’s fortune looked considerably brighter than it had a decade before.95

Dissidence in late Roman Africa Military uprisings Two domains deserve closer attention before examining Bonifatius’ career: the military revolts in Africa and the regional religious situation.96 In the early 370s a serious war was waged by the magister equitum Theodosius against the local rebel Firmus.97 Firmus was the son of Nubel, a king of a local Mauri tribe. He and his other brothers were local magnates who provided security for the settled population. Firmus murdered one of his brothers, Sammac, who was a close friend of the comes Africae Romanus. Romanus brought the case to Valentinian I and blocked any attempts of Firmus’ friends to hear the latter’s side of the story.98 As a result, Firmus was driven into revolt, supported by several native tribes and imperial army units. His rebellion was only crushed after several years of heavy fighting. Older scholarship has interpreted Firmus’ revolt as part of a national movement against the empire and applied labels to him such as ‘Moorish chieftain’ or ‘African prince’.99 Despite his Mauri background, however, Firmus’ heritage and culture were very Roman and Christianized. Rather than a national revolutionary, he was a local man trying to climb his way up the Roman ladder, but forced into revolt because he was unable to compete with the influence of Romanus.100 The combination of romanitas and ambition becomes even more apparent in the case of Firmus’ brother Gildo.101 During the campaign against Firmus he had sided with the imperial forces, and was given the position of comes Africae several years later by the eastern emperor Theodosius, whose father was the same Theodosius sent against Firmus. At the same time, however, Gildo was connected to the usurper Magnus Maximus, and refrained from becoming actively involved in the civil war

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between the two men. Theodosius granted the unique title of magister utriusque militiae per Africam to Gildo in 393, nonetheless, in order to safeguard Africa and to secure his loyalty.102 The emperor also provided his daughter with a husband and Gildo’s grandchildren were raised in Constantinople. Gildo, therefore, became tied to the eastern court through family loyalty and dynastic interest. When Theodosius died and Stilicho made claims on the regency over both parts of the empire, he was naturally inclined to shift his allegiance to the east, where Stilicho’s policy was strongly opposed. Eventually he decided to cancel the grain shipments to Rome, and in 398 an army was sent against him under the command of his brother Mascezel. He crushed Gildo’s forces, which consisted both of Roman troops and Mauri tribesmen. On his return, however, Mascezel died in a suspicious accident.103 Just like Gildo, Mascezel had become a player in imperial politics through his local standing and connections with Italian Catholic circles. Stilicho apparently was not inclined to take any more risks in the future and eventually awarded the post of comes Africae to his own brother-in-law Bathanarius, a strong indication of the value that was seen in this rank with regard to North Africa’s position in the late imperial west.104 Bathanarius would be killed in the purge that followed after Stilicho’s downfall and this time the rank of comes Africae was given to Heraclian.105 He proved to be one of Honorius’ staunchest allies. During Alaric’s invasion of Italy he redirected the grain shipments from Rome to Ravenna, and supplied the emperor with funds. He was even rewarded with the consulship in 413, but revolted the same year. His revolt was apparently triggered by Constantius’ execution of Honorius’ minister Olympius.106 Both he and Olympius had been involved in Stilicho’s execution, and Heraclian might have tried to strike back at Constantius when the latter was committed to the Visigothic campaign in Gaul. These revolts have in the past been interpreted as African secessionist movements.107 It is more apt, however, to see them as the result of the individual ambitions of local military men to play a part in imperial politics. If Firmus were competing on a local scale with Romanus, then Gildo’s and Heraclian’s revolts definitely aimed at a greater role in the imperial echelons. This dynamic would reach its apex with Bonifatius.

The African Church Since the third century, North Africa had been the western province where Christianity was most firmly rooted.108 During the time of the great persecutions of that century, however, a schism arose that would tear the region apart for

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several generations. The conflict that raged in the North African Church was based on the question of how to deal with Christians who had renounced their faith in time of persecutions. A considerable number of the clergy had even turned in fellow Christians to the imperial authorities and handed over the scriptures. When Constantine I started extending his authority over the west, many of these men were reinstated to their sees. The majority of the Churches outside Africa, supporting Constantine’s policy of uniting Church and state, accepted this. Donatus and his followers, however, refused to accept the authority of these ‘traitors’, because they deemed it an offence to the integrity and purity of the Church. These Donatists started a serious schism and opposed any Christian assimilation into the empire.109 After the council of Arles, Constantine went so far as to send troops to North Africa in 317, thereby causing the first state-sponsored persecution of Christians by other Christians. The campaign was not succesful at all, since the Donatists refused to resort to violence, but readily accepted martyrdom, and in 321 he cancelled it. Though the emperor Constans banished Donatus in 346, and Catholicism was reasserting itself somewhat for a while, Donatism became a mass movement. During the primacy of Parmenian (362–391), the Donatists comprised a majority of the African Christians. Especially in Numidia, it was a dedicated sectarian rural religion that had no equivalent in the rest of the Mediterranean world. Its intransiginism became infamous by the acts of the closely associated circumcelliones: groups portrayed as bands of militant fanatics that roamed around the countryside resorting to violence against their opponents. However, recent scholarship has revealed that circumcelliones were not exclusively associated with the Donatists and that Catholics harboured them just the same.110 The Catholic Church in Africa, however, eventually managed to corner the Donatist movement in dangerous isolation through the indefatigable labour of its most famous representative, Augustine. With the election of Aurelius as bishop of Carthage (391–427), the African Catholics would start a counter-offensive by which they not only managed to reassert their primacy in the region but even led North Africa to dominate western Church affairs in the first quarter of the fifth century. The key figure whom Aurelius introduced in this struggle was Augustine, who was given the honour of preaching the opening sermon at the plenary episcopal council of Hippo Regius in 393. He was only a presbyter then, but became bishop of this city by 396. In the next fifteen years he became the champion of the Catholics and laboured hard to force the Donatists into a great open debate. Members of the losing side would be condemned by the imperial government and branded

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as heretics. In 405, he managed to persuade the Ravennese government to start measures against the Donatists, and in 411 he succeeded in confronting them at the conference of Carthage.111 After intense debating, the imperial tribune and notary Marcellinus judged in favour of Catholicism as the true Church of Africa. An imperial edict soon banned the Donatists, confiscated their property and imposed heavy fines on those who refused to become Catholic. Yet Augustine’s victory over the Donatists soon became overshadowed by greater religious occupations. In the early years of the fifth century, Pelagius, a conversus of British origin and resident of Rome, challenged conventional Christians to take responsibility for their souls. He believed that the soul was free to choose good as easily as evil. Only corruption of society and force of habit held it back, while baptism could be a dramatic break to begin a new and perfect life. Pelagius’ outlook directly opposed that of Augustine, who saw the fate of human souls as predestined so that only ‘grace’ could bring them salvation. Each man had previously held a good opinion of the other. However, from 411 a theological battle erupted between them, making Augustine an international figure for the first time in his life.112 Pelagian preachings attracted significant attention from the Italian aristocracy, and he received a great hearing in the east. Augustine tried to have Pelagius declared a heretic by papal and imperial degree, but he would only achieve this after Jerome’s monastery in Palestina was attacked by gangs associated with Pelagius in 418. In the same moment that Constantius (III) had brought some order and relief to the western provinces which had suffered under the civil wars and barbarian incursions, Augustine had created unity in Christian Africa. That both events would not outlive their architects would become apparent during the career of Bonifatius.

Map 2 Late Roman Africa c. 400

2

Bonifatius’ Early Career (c. 413–421)

Origins We know virtually nothing of Bonifatius’ past. None of the sources give us any information concerning his date of birth, youth, family or background prior to his public career. As with nearly all fifth-century imperial officers, we have none of his personal writings, certainly excluding the false letters of the pseudoBonifatius. The only thing known about him is his origin, of which we have two different testimonials, one of which is provided by the forger of the pseudoBonifatius letters, and the other by Procopius. The false letter of Bonifatius says: ‘Born a Thracian, I scarcely escaped from the Scythian!’1 On the other hand, Procopius tells us: ‘There were two Roman generals, Aëtius and Bonifatius, especially valiant men and in experience of many wars inferior to none of that time at least.’2 Procopius’ statement does not provide much scope for investigation.3 A Thracian ethnicity, on the other hand, would not be unheard of and has been accepted.4 The Balkans had produced some of the toughest soldieremperors of the so-called ‘third century crisis’. Even in Bonifatius’ day, men from this region reached the highest military positions in the imperial west. Constantius (III), born in Naissus, and Gaudentius and Aëtius, natives of Durostorum in Moesia, are three of the most illustrative examples.5 The authority of the composer of the pseudo-Bonifatius on this matter, however, is not above suspicion. In Clover’s opinion, the forger was not merely stating the origins of the men when he referred to Bonifatius as a Thracian and Castinus as a Scythian.6 When talking about Castinus as a ‘Scythian’, he actually meant barbarian. For men of letters in late antiquity, the name ‘Thracian’ had a similar meaning. For them, Danubian origins were enough to make military men look like barbarians. To start our investigation, we have nothing more than his name. The name of Bonifatius translates as ‘he of good omen’, and is a compound Christian ‘sentence name’ of the Deusdedit type. It was a wishname, bestowed by parents to bless

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their child with good luck. The name came into vogue during the later empire.7 For the province of Thrace, it was extremely rare.8 In African epigraphy, on the other hand, it was very popular, frequently used and rarely attested outside the diocese.9 Most probably it was a translation of a Semitic (Punic) name.10 In light of Bonifatius’ career, an African origin seems perfectly plausible.11 Except for brief appearances in Marseilles and Italy, he spent most of his time in the Maghreb. Nevertheless, we cannot merely dismiss the testimony of the pseudoBonifatius just because of the author’s intentions. The forger had access to a wide range of contemporary sources, including a panegyric on the general that had featured in Olympiodorus’ history.12 Further prosopographic research might tip the scale. For the later Empire between 260 and 640, we know of only eleven officials who carried the name of Bonifatius. All of these were situated in the west. Bonifatius, the subject of this biography, was the only official of his name alleged to have roots in the east. More importantly, from the start of the fifth century until the end of this period, we only find these persons in Africa and Italy.13 The origins of only one other Bonifatius are explicitly mentioned, he being none other than the Vandal king Gelimer’s secretary who was a native of Byzacena in Africa Proconsularis.14 Although this evidence is not conclusive, it does favour the hypothesis that Bonifatius was more likely to have been of African or Romano-Punic stock than a Thracian. Yet it is worthwhile asking if it really makes any difference to our understanding of Bonifatius’ career whether he was either an African or a Thracian. After all, the provincial origins of men like Aëtius and Constantius did not have any impact or influence on their western careers or policies. In light of certain gaps in our knowledge of Bonifatius’ public life it might be valuable to raise the question again later.

Marseilles In the year 413, Bonifatius made his first known public appearance in Marseilles. Here he found himself caught in the proverbial hornet’s nest. Athaulf ’s Visigoths, in service of the western court, had crushed the regime of the Gallic usurper Jovinus.15 They had offered to return Galla Placidia, Honorius’ half-sister and their hostage since Alaric’s sack of Rome in 410, in exchange for food supplies.16 Yet at exactly the same time that the heads of the rebels were presented to the citizens of Ravenna, the comes Africae Heraclian had revolted, blockaded the grain supply of Rome and set sail with his troops to Italy.17 Even though Heraclian’s army was quickly defeated, his revolt proved to be a great

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embarrassment for Honorius’ government as they were unable to deliver the promised grain.18 According to Olympiodorus, Athaulf then decided to supply his people himself and tried to capture several Gallic cities. When Athaulf was asked to return Placidia, he demanded the grain which had been promised. Although they could not fulfil their promises, they nonetheless swore to deliver it, if they received Placidia. The barbarian pretended to agree and proceeded to the city named Marseilles, which he hoped to capture by treachery. There he was wounded by a blow from the most noble Bonifatius and, barely escaping death, he retired to his own camp, leaving the city rejoicing and full of praise and acclaim for Bonifatius.19

Even though Athaulf ’s Gothic army transformed into a veteran force between Alaric’s mutiny in 395 and their settlement in Aquitaine in 418/419, they still lacked the logistics to besiege and storm cities.20 Marseilles was, in late antiquity, one of the most prosperous harbour cities of the western Mediterranean and was fortified with impressive wall circuits.21 This incident has often been interpreted as a siege or battle in which Bonifatius successfully organized the defences against a Visigothic assault.22 Alternatively, it has been suggested that Athaulf might have possibly hoped to win over Marseilles by persuading the local administration that he had imperial permission to enter the city.23 However, Olympiodorus states that it was the imperial authorities who were still pretending to maintain the agreements that had previously been arranged. Therefore, it is much more likely that city officials had actually tried to set a trap for Athaulf by the time he ventured to Marseilles but failed to apprehend him. It had been a recurring tactic of imperial authorities in the fourth century to kidnap or even assassinate barbarian leaders during banquets or other ‘peaceful’ encounters.24 Despite the motivations of the actors involved, something clearly went awry and some sort of melee occurred, in which Bonifatius struck and almost killed the Gothic leader. Olympiodorus is the only author to mention this event and we do not have any other sources on Bonifatius before Augustine started his correspondence with him. It is thus impossible to determine how, when and why Bonifatius ended up in Marseilles.25 Yet this lack of information might also indicate that there simply was nothing important to mention about him and this was his first known public feat.26 Bonifatius was only a tribune when Augustine wrote his first letters to him, so a fair guess would be that he was just a regular soldier at the time of his brawl with Athaulf.27 For an ordinary soldier to have wounded a Gothic king by his own hand would have made him quite a celebrity,

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as the reaction of the citizens of Marseilles illustrated. Bonifatius was only a minor character in the great events of 413, yet Olympiodorus already gives him a lot of credit in this passage. Indeed, the epithet ‘most noble’ (γενναιότατος) is the only superlative adjective used of a person throughout the fragments of Olympiodorus’ history.28 While the eastern diplomat wrote with the benefit of hindsight and possessed extensive information about Bonifatius’ future deeds, there seems little reason to doubt that Bonifatius’ battle prowess at Marseilles formed the basis for his subsequent military career.

Soldier of Christ Letters of faith Approximately four years after his celebrated performance in Marseilles, Bonifatius appears in Africa as tribune in command of a unit of foederati.29 We do not have information on his whereabouts in the intervening years. Yet as we shall see, there might be a plausible explanation for his location. Here he started corresponding with one of the most remarkable men of late antiquity, Augustine, the bishop of Hippo Regius. In 417, Bonifatius received his first known epistle from their correspondence.30 What follows hereafter is more a book than a letter, which Augustine called The Correction of the Donatists, and has been described as ‘a miniature history presented as a beginner’s primer on the nature of the Christian conflict in Africa’.31 It discusses at length the troubles with the Donatists, but also digresses about the types of people responsible for sectarian violence. A few key passages shed information on Bonifatius himself. I must express my praise and congratulations, and I am amazed, my most beloved son Bonifatius, that amid the cares of armed warfare you anxiously desire to know the things that pertain to God. From hence it is truly clear that you serve the faith that you have in Christ even in a military setting. In order, therefore, to inform Your Charity briefly of the difference between the errors of the Arians and that of the Donatists, the Arians say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are different in substance. . . . But sometimes some of them, as we have heard, wishing to win the Goths to their side, when they see that they have some power, profess to believe the same thing as the Goths. But they are refuted by the authority of their predecessors, for not even Donatus himself is said to have held this belief, and it is his sect to which they boast of belonging.32

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As the letter states, Bonifatius had continued his military career and was occupied by violent disturbances in Africa. The fact that Bonifatius asked about the difference between Arianism and Donatism is noteworthy. As Augustine explained, the first was a heresy while the latter was a schism. Yet the Donatists, who were in quite dire straits in these times, were desperate to find powerful benefactors and wanted to proselytize the Arianic Goths. The Goths to whom Augustine is referring are foederati, whom Bonifatius commanded.33 The situation might have been a bit puzzling for Bonifatius, since his soldiers were technically also ‘heretics’.34 Since the records are very voluminous, especially for you who are occupied with other matters essential to the peace of Rome, it would take a great deal of time to read how the Donatists were overcome in every way at the conference itself, but you could perhaps read a digest of them, which I believe my brother and fellow bishop Optatus has, or, if he does not have it, it could easily be procured from the church of Sitifis, since this book too is perhaps wearisome for a man with your burdens because of its lengthiness.35

The fact that Augustine advised Bonifatius to contact Optatus or the church of Sitifis helps to localise the officer’s area of operations. De Lepper was tempted to identify his rank as tribune with that of the Praepositus Limitis at Gemellae, because of its proximity to Sitifis and the see of Optatus.36 There is, however, no evidence to confirm this location, while we know that several years later Augustine visited Bonifatius at his post in Tubunae.37 The latter place definitely seems justified as his headquarters and takes us to southern Numidia, a region where the tribune could not avoid contact with the Donatist church. At the conference of Carthage in 411, Donatism had lost its cause in front of the imperial officials and its members had been continually persecuted by imperial authorities ever since. The cult still remained at large, however, in the countryside of Numidia, where it continued its resistance. Augustine’s letter makes it appear as if the Donatists had been completely defeated and only small pockets of resistance were left. Yet a couple of years later Augustine would admit that many people had feigned their conversion and that the ‘pockets’ had actually become ‘regions’.38 Another tribune, Dulcitius, was also asking about the activities of this sect and Augustine told him that he had already sent works to other men.39 It is not unlikely he was referring here to Bonifatius as well. From this we can without any absurdity interpret the declaration of the blessed apostle Paul, where he says, ‘We are ready to punish all disobedience

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once your earlier obedience is fulfilled’. For this reason the Lord himself bids that guests first be invited to his great banquet, and afterward forced. For, when his servants answered him, ‘Lord, we have done what you commanded, and yet there is room’, he said, ‘Go out into the roads and pathways and force whomever you find to come in’.40

This policy of religious coercion would anticipate centuries of religious intolerance in the medieval era and after. Lancel remarks, however, that it might be a little extreme to brand Augustine as father of the Inquisition.41 He was definitely opposed to killing people he considered heretics, if only because he did not wish to make martyrs of them. Originally Augustine had resisted coercion. Yet the experiences of his hometown, where gangs of Donatists had resorted to violence and destruction, had moved him to support coercion in order to bring his African flock back into the fold.42 Men like Bonifatius and Dulcitius were given the task of implementing the imperial edicts against the condemned cult. Augustine wrote Letters 185 and 189 to Bonifatius during the period when the bishop was fully occupied by the Pelagian issue. Between the summer of 416 and the summer of 418 he had received tidings from Orosius in Palestine about the heresy’s vicissitudes and was mustering the African bishops to appeal their case to the Pope. Yet the bishop of Hippo Regius found the time to write Bonifatius one of the longest letters he ever composed. Augustine would not have made such great efforts if he did not already have some knowledge of Bonifatius’ merits.43 He wrote to Bonifatius: ‘It is highly pleasing to me that amid your civic duties you do not neglect also to show concern for religion and desire that people found in separation and division be called back to the path of salvation and peace’.44 This letter makes it clear that Bonifatius was a Christian with no small interest in theological matters. Shortly afterwards, Augustine sent him Letter 189. This letter clarified that Bonifatius’ interest in theology sprang not only from his official duties but also from his pious nature. In Letter 189, he said: ‘[Y]ou greatly desire that I should write you something that would build you up unto the eternal salvation that you hope for in our Lord Jesus Christ.’45 Just like Letter 185, this epistle does not tell us as much as we would like to know, but it does illuminate certain points which are important for reconstructing Bonifatius’ religious attitude. For instance, Letter 189 also makes it clear that Bonifatius had a certain level of anxiety about the compatibility of Christian belief and military service. Augustine admonished him: ‘Do not suppose that it is impossible for anyone to

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please God who as a soldier carries the weapons of war.’46 Bonifatius’ fear was illustrative of one of the greatest challenges the Catholic Church faced in the later Roman Empire: the relationship of the military to its faith, and the means by which to reconcile a warlike institution with its message of peace.47 The problems concerning the morality of war in Christianity had been troublesome for apologists long before the fourth century. Compared to other doctrinal issues, however, this was only a matter of minor controversy. Christianity soon came to be identified with the Roman Empire and this intertwining forced Christian writers to develop several doctrines by which it would try to define the proper role of a Christian soldier. Augustine’s response to Bonifatius has to be seen in a larger context of the Church’s decision to bring the imperial army within the fold of Christian belief and create a code of ethics by which the Christian warrior could live.48 He accepted the concept of justifiable war in order to restore peace and believed that it would not be sinful for a Christian to kill in battle. The Church did not try to make Christianity an impossible burden for the military.

On the frontier Augustine’s letters also give further insight into Bonifatius’ military occupations at this time. In Letter 189, he wrote: Those who have abandoned all these worldly activities and also serve God with the perfect continence of chastity certainly occupy a higher place before God. ‘But every person’, as the apostle says, ‘has his proper gift from God, one this gift, another that’. Hence others fight against invisible enemies by praying for you; you contend against visible barbarians by fighting for them.49

Bonifatius’ military duties have been noticed on several occasions in Augustine’s letters. In this one it is explicitly stated that it involves combating ‘visible barbarians’. The exact nature of his service would become apparent in a letter written many years after their first exchange of letters, in which Augustine reminded Bonifatius of his early days as a staff officer in Africa: ‘[Bonifatius] as a tribune had pacified all those tribes by force of arms and menacing them with a few foederati.’50 The rank of tribune was one of the lowest offices in the comitatenses.51 Tribunes commanded regiments, the basic unit of the field army, whose numbers tended to range somewhere around 400 for cavalry and 800 for infantry. They could also be called praepositus and, as in Bonifatius’ case, they could command foederati. If he was a regular soldier in Marseilles, then the

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position of tribune by the second half of the 410s was definitely a considerable advancement in his career. In these years the magister utriusque militiae Constantius had gained de facto control over all military echelons, after the elimination of the Gallic usurpers and his rival Heraclian. In 416, a treaty had been concluded with the Visigoths and Placidia had returned to Italy.52 Bonifatius might have stayed behind in Marseilles until the war between Goths and Romans had ended. Alternatively, he might have joined Constantius’ forces in Spain. By this time his reputation as a war hero could have been known in the higher military levels, possibly even confirmed by Galla Placidia, who might have had first-hand knowledge about the career-soldier through her former husband Athaulf.53 Constantius must definitely have been responsible for his promotion and in his case it might be relevant to raise the issue of Bonifatius’ origins again.54 One of the features of Constantius’ reorganization of the provinces was that local Romans were entrusted with important positions. This was definitely the case regarding Gaul in 418, when the council of the seven provinces was installed to bind the provincial aristocracy closer to the imperial government in Italy.55 It would have been completely compatible with this policy to reward a native soldier for outstanding service with the prestigious position of safeguarding the frontier of his home province.56 For comparison, Bonifatius’ contemporary Asterius, a Spaniard from Tarraconensis, held the position of comes Hispaniarum.57 I suspect that the Gothic foederati could have been veterans assigned to Bonifatius after Constantius and Vallia had struck their treaty. Operating from his headquarters in Tubunae, Bonifatius’ task was to patrol the Numidian border. It was a desolate region of chotts, or dry salt lakes, between the mountains of Batna and Chott el Hodn, part of the pre-Saharan area which was separated by the Tell – mountanous, well-watered districts of the Mediterranean North African zone – to the north, and characterized by a band of semi-arid inland plains, high steppe and mountains.58 The Afri Barbari that he confronted here were Mauri tribes. It should be noted that most of the time the task of the frontier garrisons was actually to manage these nomads when they were moving outside of the provinces for their transhumance and not to fight them.59 One of the tribune’s duties here was hearing the oaths taken by them when they were engaged in this activity.60 Though actual warfare rarely transpired, serious raids still occurred every now and then.61 On these occasions the Roman cavalry intervened. If Augustine’s words of ‘pacifying’ and ‘terrifying’ are put in their correct military and diplomatic context, they signify that Bonifatius was able to beat them into submission and impose a treaty on them.62 Augustine

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wrote this around 419 to a colleague in Salona. When he mentions that certain barbarian nations became ‘pacified’, he uses the same language as when he talked about Bonifatius’ success against these tribes. For there are among us, that is, in Africa, countless Barbarian nations where the gospel has not yet been preached; it is easy for us to learn this every day from those who are taken captive from them and are now among the slaves of the Romans. Yet it was only a few years ago that certain of them, very exceptional ones and few in number, were pacified and became part of the Roman territories, so that they do not have their own kings but have governors set over them by the Roman empire, and they and their governors began to be Christian. But those who are further inland and are not under Roman power have no contract with the Christian religion in any of their people, and yet it is by no means correct to say that God’s promise does not pertain to them.63

If we take a date of 416/417 for ‘only a few years ago’, then we have the same period as that in which the bishop of Hippo made his first contact with Bonifatius. It might be tempting to connect the latter with these actions, but the distinction that Augustine makes between the Mauri makes it less probable. There were two types of Mauri operating along the borders of Roman Africa. Several native tribes scattered inside the provinces formed kingdoms, but there were also clans established outside the frontier. During the fifth century these would start their ‘ethnic expansion’, much like the Goths and the Vandals in Europe, who associated groups of diverse origins and laid the foundation for the impressive regional powers that caused the eastern Roman governors so much trouble in the sixth century.64 The tribes that Bonifatius battled belonged to the second type and should not be identified with those that evolved into the local Mauri kingdoms of the Aures. It was also a source of concern to Augustine that these had not been Christianized yet, and that they even harboured Roman slaves.65 Already since the third century these Mauri had raided southern Numidia, making it one of the more vulnerable parts of Roman Africa that had to be extensively surveyed and fortified.66 The forces that Bonifatius had at his disposal primarily consisted of cavalry troops, who were the most effective means of dealing with the swift raids of desert nomads.67 The African cavalry was one of the numerically strongest of its kind in the Empire, amounting to nearly half of the provincal forces. For several years Bonifatius was busy maintaining the peace around his sector of the Numidian frontier, when disaster struck in his personal life.

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Death of his first wife Looking back many years later, Augustine recalled how Bonifatius had written to him in distress after his first wife died and appealed to him for guidance. As he said: Recall what manner of man you were while your first wife of hallowed memory was still alive, how you held in horror the vanity of this world soon after her death, and how you desired to enter the service of God. We know, we can testify to what you said to us at Tubunae about your state of mind and desires when brother Alypius and I were alone with you. Indeed, I do not think that the earthly cares with which you are now engrossed have such power that they could wipe this completely from your memory. In fact, you wanted to abandon completely the public life in which you were engaged and to withdraw yourself to sacred leisure and to live the life that God’s servants, the monks, live.68

The sudden loss of his wife dealt Bonifatius an immense psychological and emotional blow, clearly indicating that she had been an important part of his life. His intention to become a monk demonstrates once again the high level of his personal piety which has already been noted. In the past, Bonifatius’ religious attitude has been judged as hypocritical in light of his future deeds.69 So far, however, this decision would have been consistent with his earlier religious expressions. We should not underestimate their impact. Bonifatius’ decision would not have been a unique case. One other example of a famous soldier retiring from his military career due to the inspiration of Christianity was the Gallic warrior Titus. During the reign of the eastern emperor Leo I (457–473) Titus sought service in the east with his buccellarii and was given the title of comes.70 Yet when he came in contact with Daniel the Stylite, he decided to become a hermit and discharged his soldiers. But what was it that prevented you from doing this? Only that you considered, when we pointed it out, how great the service of what you were doing would be to the churches of Christ. You were pursuing it with this sole intention, namely, that all might live, as the apostle says, ‘a quiet and tranquil life in all godliness and honesty’, protected from the attacks of the barbarians. But you also wanted to seek nothing from this world than what was necessary for the maintenance of your own life and those dependent on you, while you were girded with the belt of the chastest continence and, in the midst of bodily armour, were defended more surely and more strongly with the armour of the spirit.71

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Most interesting is the role of Augustine in this affair. He had been the great propagator of monasteries in North Africa and Bonifatius probably had sent a message to consult him on his desire to become a monk. As we have seen in a previous letter, Augustine had explicitly stated that monks ‘certainly occupy a greater place before God’.72 For Bonifatius, who was at a loss as to what he should do with his life now that he had lost his wife, it must have seemed the most ideal way to spend the rest of his life. Augustine was present in Tubunae when Bonifatius explained his intentions. He must therefore have travelled all the way down there with Alypius from his see in Hippo Regius. This was an unprecedented journey for the elderly bishop, which took him for the first time to Lower Numidia. The contrast between the Romanised coastal cities where Augustine operated and the region of the Tell where Bonifatius patrolled could not have been sharper. Augustine was definitely a stranger here.73 Tubunae was situated on plains that reached about 470 metres high and it would remain in use as a fortress into the time of the Exarchate. It must have been a burdensome trip for the old bishop, who was in his late sixties and a notoriously bad traveller.74 In order to reach this destination, Augustine and Alypius had to journey more than 400 kilometres from his see.75 The year of their meeting is not easy to determine. We know that Bonifatius was recalled to Italy for a great campaign in 422, immediately after this meeting. A reasonable date seems to be 421, when Augustine might have attended a council in Carthage.76 There is good reason to suppose that Bonifatius was still a tribune then, and not yet comes Africae.77 The latter had his headquarters in Carthage and his presence in Tubunae would only have been required in times of imminent warfare. In more peaceful times it was the tribunes like Bonifatius who remained in charge there and supervised frontier operations. A man as conscious of his duties as Bonifatius would not have contemplated retiring from office in a period of military struggle, and it seems very unlikely that Augustine would have risked travelling such a long way into a war zone. Bonifatius, therefore, probably wanted to withdraw from secular life when his presence was not absolutely necessary.78 Yet, as Brown rightly observed, it was Augustine of all people who dissuaded him from doing so, while thirty years before he had persuaded a member of the imperial secret service to become a monk.79 Augustine wanted Bonifatius to remain in office because of the valuable services he performed there, by protecting the Church and provinces against the Mauri. Augustine offered him a solution; he was to remain an officer but live a chaste live instead. If his extraordinarily lengthy letter on the Donatists could have been an indication of the esteem that Augustine held for Bonifatius, then

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his decision to go all the way down to Tubunae and persuade him to continue his military service was an undeniable sign of the importance of their relationship. One might ask, however, why would the bishop go to such great lengths for a regular officer? Since the great conference of Carthage in 411, Augustine had kept in touch with important military commanders. With some of them, like Marcellinus, who had presided over the conference, he struck up a genuine friendship. Yet when Marcellinus was executed two years later, during the revolt of Heraclian, he took that as a personal blow which showed him that churchmen were well advised to align themselves with the most powerful military force. Unlike Ambrose, Augustine was never the man to challenge imperial authority, and in the last two decades of his life he favoured the imperial enforcers who were sent to Africa.80 Bonifatius was not yet an important actor in imperial affairs, but he was definitely making his reputation in Africa. Soon he attracted attention again from overseas, as a different letter from Augustine may indicate: The chance to greet Your Charity was given to me, which I know is most gratifying to you, when the people who had to hasten on to you were driven to our shore. Observing in their case, then, the mercy that one human being owes another and their love for you, we welcomed these men who were nearly shipwrecked, and we supplied them with what they needed as best as we could. They were severely tossed about and put in danger by the violence of the sky and the sea, and they barely escaped death, having lost all their possessions.81

It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly this letter could have been written, but the tone is still as cordial as the previous ones and does not show a change in the relationship on Augustine’s part as would occur in later years. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that the letter could have been written somewhere between 417 and 421. A date closer to the latter, however, seems favourable. The letter says that people from overseas wanted to visit Bonifatius. More importantly, they had to make speed to contact him. The brevity of Augustine’s message might also indicate that he wanted to warn the tribune as fast as possible about the matter. After all, he was not normally reticent in his letters.82 Shortly after the death of his wife, Bonifatius would be recalled to Italy.83 Though the letter does not indicate that the men looking for the tribune came from the imperial court, it makes for a plausible suggestion.

Map 3 Western Roman Empire under Constantius III, 418–420

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Rise to Power (422–425)

By 421, Constantius had reached the pinnacle of his power. As patrician and magister utriusque militiae he controlled the entire western Roman army and in the past decade he had eliminated all his rivals. Through his marriage with Galla Placidia, the emperor’s sister, he had become a member of the imperial family. Their marriage, however, could hardly have been a happy one: Honorius had to force her into matrimony with Constantius and at a certain point she had threatened to divorce her husband over a religious issue.1 For the survival of the Theodosian dynasty in the west, on the other hand, it proved to be a significant advantage. Honorius had been unable to produce an heir, but Placidia gave birth to a son, Valentinian, in 419.2 The emperor declared him nobilissimus in 421 and elevated Placidia to the rank of Augusta and her husband to that of Augustus as Constantius III. Yet after seven months, Constantius died unexpectedly.3 His death unleashed a new power struggle, in which Bonifatius became a pivotal actor.

Constantius’ legacy The campaign in Baetica Immediately after Constantius’ death, at the start of 422, a major campaign was organized against the confederation of Vandals and Alans in Baetica. Its aim was to settle unfinished business. In 418, the Visigoths, operating under imperial authority, had destroyed the Siling Vandals and Alans in Spain. The remnants of these tribes sought a safe haven in Gallaecia with the Hasding Vandals. For two years the situation remained stable, until the comes Hispaniarum Asterius intervened in a war between the Vandals and the Sueves in this province.4 He might have desired to finish off the work that the Visigoths had started under Vallia, but instead reversed its results. The Vandals ceased their quarrel with the Sueves and turned on the Roman forces. They fought their way out of Gallaecia,

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killing an unknown number of Asterius’ men along the way and seized Baetica in 420. Asterius would compensate for this setback by defeating and capturing the usurper Maximus, an old associate of Constantine III’s general Gerontius, who had staged a new revolt in the same period.5 Honorius celebrated his tricenallia, his thirty-year reign, with Maximus’ execution. He then elevated Asterius to the rank of patrician, thereby making him the most important man in the empire after his colleague Constantius III.6 By occupying Baetica, however, the Vandals were the first non-Imperial group to have access to the Mediterranean and the region was far too valuable for the imperial administration to tolerate its loss. Two western chroniclers described how the imperial counter-offensive did not go according to plan: At this time an army was sent to Spain against the Vandals under the command of Castinus. By a senseless and unjust order, he excluded Bonifatius, a man quite well known for the arts of war, from partnership in his expedition. As a result that man [Bonifatius] reckoned him [Castinus] as dangerous to himself and degrading to be followed – since he [Bonifatius] had found him to be quarrelsome and proud – and he [Bonifatius] rushed off to Portus and from there to Africa. That was the beginning of many troubles for the state.7 In Baetica, Castinus, a magister militum, waged war against the Vandals with a large detachment of troops and Gothic auxiliaries. But when he had already reduced them to starvation with an effective siege, so that they were prepared to surrender, he recklessly engaged them in open battle and was defeated, after being betrayed by the treachery of his auxiliaries. He then fled to Tarraco.8

The sheer scale of operations suggests that the campaign might already have been in preparation when Constantius was still alive.9 Asterius had probably died around the same time as Constantius, since we hear nothing further about him after his elevation. As the highest-ranking general and having previously commanded in Spain, it seems only natural that he would have taken control of the campaign. With both men gone, it was now open to question who would take over the command against the Vandals. Hydatius makes it clear that Castinus was in charge in Baetica with the rank of magister militum. Almost nothing is known about Flavius Castinus’ past, except that he had fought against the Franks as comes domesticorum, around 420.10 His promotion probably originated from this previous high rank and his close standing with Constantius.11 He was probably magister peditum praesentalis, since we know that a certain Crispinus

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was magister equitum at least as late as February 423.12 Prosper reported, however, that Bonifatius was present in Italy and should have joined in the expedition as partner of Castinus, but the latter excluded him on ‘unjust grounds’. How and in what circumstances did Bonifatius arrive in this situation? From the start it became clear that Castinus’ intention was to step into Constantius’ boots as generalissimo and fill the vacuum the latter had left behind. Such an ambition, however, would sooner or later bring him into conflict with Galla Placidia. Her primary aim was to make sure that one day her son Valentinian would rule the western empire.13 For that reason she did not want to see anyone gather the same amount of power her husband had gathered in his lifetime. But simultaneously, Constantius’ death had weakened her position at the court and her enemies were manoeuvring against her.14 Therefore, the empress needed allies and might have found it convenient to recall Bonifatius. She could have known about him through her first husband Athaulf, who had personally fought Bonifatius, or through her second husband Constantius, who was responsible for all major military appointments.15 Future events would show that Bonifatius remained a partisan of Galla Placidia, and it can be suspected that his appearance in Italy was by her initiative. As one of Constantius’ officers, who had built up an impeccable military record, he was her best counterweight against Castinus, and was therefore assigned to the Spanish campaign. The original plan of the campaign could have been for Castinus to attack the Vandals from the north with the main army, while Roman forces from Africa under Bonifatius’ command would attack them from the south.16 The union of the Hasding Vandals with the remnants of the Siling Vandals and Alans was one of the greatest barbarian confederations in the west, however, and might have been able to put as many as 15,000 warriors, or even more, in the field.17 Probably in reference to Castinus’ campaign, the Gallic chronicle of 452 described how ‘nearly twenty thousand soldiers were killed in Spain fighting against the Vandals’.18 The number is grossly inflated, but such tremendous loss of manpower and Castinus’ initial success seem to indicate that the western Roman army had gathered enough units to match them. The only forces who could spare such numbers to cope successfully with barbarian confederations were the field armies of Italy and Gaul. The Gallic army could only have supplied units if the Goths mentioned by Hydatius were Visigothic allies from the kingdom of Toulouse.19 Otherwise, it was tied down to its local territory, because it had to supervise the Visigoths, Burgundians and Franks as well as the Armoricans and provincial bacaudae.20 In such circumstances, the army of Italy would have been the main force to back up the Spanish comitatenses for this campaign.

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Even without Bonifatius’ contingent, however, Castinus managed to corner the Vandals and starve them into submission. He had probably deployed the same strategy of blockading their means of supply by sea and land, as Constantius had done in his struggle with Athaulf ’s Visigoths.21 When the Gothic auxiliaries deserted him, Castinus still tried to force his luck by attacking with the Roman forces and was soundly beaten. As a result, the Vandals won their first major victory since having crossed the Rhine, and were clearly established as the dominant force in southern Spain.22 It has been suggested that the desertion of both Bonifatius and the Goths was a plot by Placidia to foil Castinus’ rise to power by deliberately sabotaging his campaign.23 There are several arguments against this view. Hydatius criticizes Castinus for having acted so foolishly. The Spanish bishop wrote with the benefit of hindsight and was often inclined to portray Goths in the most negative ways.24 However, he might have been correct that it was reckless to force a decision against a desperate enemy. In an age when western Roman military resources were becoming precarious, Castinus’ predecessors Stilicho and Constantius had successfully employed Fabian tactics to bring down opponents such as Radagaisus and Athaulf. The fact that Castinus still insisted on giving battle can be interpreted as eagerness to gain glory and boost his credentials, to smooth the transition as Constantius’ successor as generalissimo.25 The Visigoths, on the other hand, might have been lukewarm about the entire operation in light of recent circumstances. Constantius, the architect of their establishment in Aquitaine, had recently died and they might have been suspicious about the quarrel between Castinus and Bonifatius.26 Bonifatius’ desertion only happened after Castinus had excluded him from partnership in this campaign. Their quarrel featured also in one of the forged letters of the pseudo-Bonifatius. The author narrated the events thus: That Castinus, private citizen and former consul, persecutor of my life and name, as it is known to all, practising and fashioning very mischievous discord, as if unmindful of my gifts accomplished by me, had fled from Italy and has handed himself over to be entrusted to my guardianship in Africa. I say, nothing, most blessed father, of the tribulations once piled upon me by this same man, and the dangers threatened. By running from him I live until now. Born a Thracian, I scarcely escaped from the Scythian! A soldier, I persevered under a jealous consul.27

The composer of this letter was clearly not contemporary with both men, as determined from the fact that he anachronistically called Castinus a consul

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during the time of this quarrel with Bonifatius. In fact, the magister militum only obtained this honour in 424. The forger of the pseudo-Bonifatius also describes his protagonist as a soldier persecuted by a jealous officer, suggesting that Prosper’s use of ‘partnership’ did not necessarily mean a position of exact equality. The exact nature of their partnership is a tougher question to answer. The absence of other sources makes it a hazardous task to divine exactly what rank Bonifatius held in this campaign. It seems very unlikely that, even if Placidia had wished so, Bonifatius was a possible candidate for the position of magister militum.28 Castinus’ rank of comes domesticorum, commander of elite imperial household troops, was second only to the magistri militum, which made him a much more obvious choice than the North African tribune ever could have been. Yet Bonifatius, on account of his military reputation and with the probable backing of Placidia, was important enough to be given a subordinate rank in the campaign. Previous scholars have believed that he was promoted to comes Africae, a position for which he would have qualified. The position would have made him one of the most important western generals of this time.29 Yet there are no precedents for men to be promoted as comes Africae and be assigned to campaigns outside their regional command.30 Furthermore, this option is ruled out by the fact that when Bonifatius abandoned Italy he found it necessary to ‘leave the palace and invade Africa’, as Hydatius reports.31 Such a gambit should have been unnecessary if he already held the supreme command of the troops there. Instead, De Lepper believes that he had become a tribune of the scholae palatinae. After 425, Bonifatius himself became a comes domesticorum and tribunes of these armies of imperial bodyguards usually qualified for this position.32 The fact that he deserted the palace implies also the desertion of a position there.33 De Lepper himself admits, however, that he is skating on thin ice and it requires a very forced reading of Hydatius. Of all possible options, it remains nonetheless one of the most plausible ones. An important consideration to make in this case is Zecchini’s suggestion that the Gothic auxiliaries could also have been the buccellarii that Galla Placidia had gained through her marriage with Athaulf and who had accompanied her to Italy after his death.34 They had formed a significant part of Constantius’ forces and they might have been called in for the campaign. Zecchini believes it also to be more likely that the auxiliaries in Baetica were Visigothic allies, but this does not rule out the possibility that Placidia’s retinue was expected to accompany the field army as well. In that case, she definitely would have wanted to appoint her own choice of commander. The rank of commander of the palace guards might

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have given Bonifatius the appropriate authority to fill this position. Yet whatever rank he received ultimately did not matter, since Castinus ordered the removal of his command from the campaign. Prosper states explicitly that it was only after this that Bonifatius retreated to Africa. This raises the most important question on this matter: how was he able to get away with this desertion? In his position as magister militum Castinus was, by all means, Bonifatius’ superior. Bonifatius’ action was nothing more than pure insubordination. Even if he had the support of Placidia, he could not have committed such an act of defiance unpunished, unless it would have been considered dangerous to stop him. In other words, the former tribune had achieved considerably more power since Augustine had left him at Tubunae. This newfound source can be connected to a new woman who had entered Bonifatius’ life.

Lord of war Second marriage Writing several years after their meeting at Tubunae, Augustine recalled how Bonifatius had discarded his sacred promises once over the sea. In his words: At the time, then, we were rejoicing that you had this resolution, you crossed the sea and married a wife. But crossing the sea was an act of obedience that, according to the apostle, you owed to ‘the higher powers’; on the other hand, you would not have married a wife if you had not abandoned the continence you had taken upon yourself and been overcome by concupiscence. The fact that I heard you refused to marry her unless she first turned Catholic comforted my grief to some degree.35

The exact date of Bonifatius’ new marriage used to be a matter of disagreement among many scholars. Several believe that it took place somewhere between 425 and 427.36 Shortly after this period Augustine wrote Letter 220, and his reference to the baptism of Bonifatius’ daughter made the marriage appear a recent event. Yet Augustine’s words make it clear that the wedding itself happened immediately after his meeting with Bonifatius at Tubunae. There is no doubt about the fact that Bonifatius was expected in Italy to participate in the Vandal campaign of 422. That he found a new wife in the same year seems to be the most reasonable deduction.37 From Augustine’s later statements, we can deduce that his new wife was a former Arian.38 She does not appear in other contemporary sources during

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Bonifatius’ life, but the eastern Roman chronicler Marcellinus states that she was called Pelagia and that she was married to Aëtius, allegedly at the request of a dying Bonifatius.39 From testimonials of Sidonius Apollinaris and Aëtius’ panegyrist Merobaudes we gather that this wedding did occur afterwards. More specifically, they said that she was a Gothic princess, descended from royal and heroic ancestry: A wife not to be celebrated by trivial songs An offspring of heroes, and a descendant of kings, Her renown outdoes that of womanhood.40 What realm shall I win for my son, debarred as I am from a Gothic sceptre, if Rome ignores me and, to crown all, our little Gaudentius is trodden underfoot by this youth’s destiny.41

It has been thought that she was a daughter of Theoderic I, but Gil Egea has demonstrated that her actual father was Beremudus.42 Several years later, when the imperial envoy Darius negotiated Bonifatius’ reconciliation with the imperial court, he received a hostage from the latter called Verimodus.43 Darius’ language indicates that this was most probably Bonifatius’ son and we know that his name is the Latin version of Beremudus. The name can only imply that he was a son by his second marriage with Pelagia, and that it had a profound significance.44 When Vallia died he could have claimed the throne, but declined to do so and instead joined the retinue of Theoderic I. Jordanes claimed he was a scion of no one less than Ermaneric, ‘most noble of the Amali’. As he said: Just at that time Beremudus, the son of Thorismund, whom we have mentioned above in the genealogy of the family of the Amali, . . ., came to the kingdom of the Visigoths. Well aware of his valor and noble birth, he believed that the kingdom would be the more readily bestowed upon him by his kinsmen, inasmuch as he was known to be the heir of many kings. . . . But he was not himself eager to make known who he was, and so upon the death of Vallia the Visigoths made Theoderic his successor.45

At face value the marriage of Bonifatius, a Roman, with Pelagia, a barbarian, might not seem the most common thing. Aristocratic circles of the early Empire would probably have thought the mere notion horrendous. One might get the impression that the same opinion was still in vogue during the later Empire. The Theodosian Code explicitly prohibited provincials from marrying barbarians,

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threatening citizens with capital punishment should this kind of union result in suspicious or criminal events.46 This specific law was issued, however, on behalf of Theodosius ‘the elder’ during his war against Firmus. It represents the failure of the court to understand the exact social situation in Africa and the way her general was mishandling it.47 Times had changed considerably. Many foreigners were able to climb the social ladder because of their military service during this period. In the higher echelons of society, a marriage between a ‘Roman’ and a ‘barbarian’ was therefore entirely possible. For the fourth and fifth centuries we know of many such cases, and even imperial families allowed non-Roman outsiders to marry their relatives.48 Bonifatius and Pelagia were typical of these, since their marriage involved a military man, whose career was very mobile by nature, and an aristocratic barbarian. Intermarriage involving Goths tended to increase slightly from the reign of Theodosius I on.49 The exact circumstances of this marriage are lost to us, but since it happened in Italy it would not seem unlikely that Galla Placidia had a hand in it.50 She had strong relations with the Visigothic world, being married once to Athaulf and having acquired a personal force of retainers from him. Pelagia also provided her husband with a retinue of her own and this is the key element that reveals the significance of these marriages.51 These warrior retinues were not mere bodyguards, but miniature armies in their own respect. Already during Honorius’ reign they were known as buccellarii, which means ‘biscuit eaters’.52 Men like Rufinus, Stilicho and Sarus already had similar personal forces. By the sixth century, when most of our evidence for buccellarii appears, these soldiers clearly formed some of the finest mounted shock troops in the eastern Roman army. In the most exceptional cases, such as that of Belisarius, they could consist of several thousands of retainers; though most other men rarely maintained more than several hundred. The buccellarii have often been considered as originating in the barbarian world, along the model of Celtic and Germanic chieftain’s warrior retinues. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the institution cannot be separated from the growing influence of barbarians in the late Roman army.53 However, this notion should be treated with caution. The most famous description of a barbarian comitatus goes back to Tacitus’ Germania and a few scholars have applied it to the buccellarii, despite the highly complex nature of this source and the vast distance in space and time between both institutions.54 In fact, the term buccellarii appears for the first time in the title of the most senior eastern commander of the cataphractarii, an elite cavalry unit, and clearly attests their position as state troops. Their ‘Roman’ roots can also

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be seen in the adoption of the word in Latin in the Visigothic legal codes. Despite their status as troops of the state, which issued them their equipment, they were generally paid and maintained by individual military patrons or civilian magnates. It is not surprising, therefore, that close relationships tended to develop between such retainers and their commander-in-chief. Thus, Pelagia will have been a particularly attractive bride for many Roman nobles eager for power. A fragment of Olympiodorus’ history sheds light on what made Bonifatius, an officer of moderate rank, a good match for her and a suitable lord of her retinue: [Bonifatius] was also a lover of justice and free from avarice. The following is one of his deeds. A certain peasant had a young and pretty wife who was having an affair with one of the barbarian auxiliaries. Bewailing the injury, he sought Bonifatius’ help. Bonifatius asked the distance to the place and the name of the field in which they committed their adultery and dismissed the petitioner for the meanwhile, ordering him to return on the following day. That evening he slipped away completely unnoticed and went to the field which was seventy stades away. Finding the barbarian lying with his adulteress, he cut off his head and returned the same night. When the husband returned on the next day as he was ordered, Bonifatius handed him the barbarian’s head and asked if he recognized it. The husband was struck dumb by the sight and was at a loss for words, but when he realized what had happened he was full of thanks for the justice done him and departed happily.55

Bonifatius is portrayed in highly panegyrical tones as a brave and righteous warrior who conquered the native Mauri tribes of Africa.56 The word ‘heroic’ is again a great compliment to Bonifatius, emphasizing personal courage and skill in combat, either in close combat or in small-group skirmishes. It has been argued that this kind of prowess hints at a more barbarian nature rather than Greek or Roman.57 It has even been identified as a sign of the times that the highest praise a Roman soldier could receive for his warlike capacities, as seen in Sidonius Apollinaris’ writings, was to be compared favourably with those of a barbarian.58 However, such remarks fail to take into account the long tradition of single combat in the Roman army for which soldiers could receive praise and awards, as far back as the Republic.59 This martial image is worth stressing, however, because there is only one other person in the surviving fragments of Olympiodorus’ history who is praised in a similar way; the Goth Sarus is also called ‘heroic’.60 Sarus was a Gothic optimate and was involved in a feud against Alaric and Athaulf.61 He is recorded

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to have had a retinue of 200 or 300 retainers and he started his career in the imperial army under Honorius, but eventually broke with him and joined the Gallic usurper Jovinius. Athaulf ambushed him and Sarus died in a blaze of glory. The comparison between Sarus and Bonifatius is not only justified because they were both warriors. They both relied on an armed retinue and were highly dissident generals from time to time.62 Also, Sarus was an aristocratic Goth, while Bonifatius was married to one. The picture derived from Olympiodorus is quite obvious. Bonifatius was a natural warrior who could compete with the best of his Gothic soldiers, even exacting justice on them with his own sword if he found it necessary. Years of fighting in Africa with these foederati must have given him an intimate knowledge of their world. Last but not least, there is the fact that in his earlier career he had nearly dealt a fatal blow to a Gothic king, which made him the hero of the day in Marseilles. In the highly martial Gothic world this would have boosted fame his fame further. Placidia could have chosen no better commander for her own retinue, should they have been expected to join Castinus’ expedition. Pelagia’s warriors would definitely have considered him worthy to follow. The decisive factor, however, must have been the very prospect of the forthcoming campaign against the Vandals. Under the command of Bonifatius they could have expected to receive a share of the spoils of war. If this made him a good match for Pelagia, it nevertheless represented a tremendous shift in Bonifatius’ mentality. That it was not a matter of the heart becomes apparent from the rest of Augustine’s account. Only a year before he had sworn an oath of chastity as compensation for not becoming a monk. Now he was not only engaging in an arranged marriage, but was even accused of having affairs with other women. Augustine reproached him in these terms: ‘Moreoever, people say, though this may be unfounded gossip, that your own wife was not enough for you but that you defiled yourself by affairs with various concubines.’63 Augustine may be saying that the reports of his infidelity were mere slander, but he would not have included it in his letter if he did not think it were true. When there are so few sources available and any personal writings of the protagonist are absent, it is a dangerous task to divine personal motivations. In its entirety this particular letter of Augustine, written in hindsight of Bonifatius’ later career after his fall from grace, strongly hints that Bonifatius simply dropped his old moral standards when faced with the prospect of rising to the highest imperial echelons. So far, however, we have noted two key aspects in the life of Bonifatius: the martial side and the religious. When faced with the death of his first wife he decided to abandon the first in favour of the second, yet it was Augustine of all

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people who had convinced him to continue his life as a soldier. Bonifatius had not simply given up on his religious beliefs in Italy, as made clear in his insistence that Pelagia become Catholic. This not only represented a strong act of will on Bonifatius’ part, but also illustrates his moral outlook, since he found her Christian orthodoxy necessary in order to marry her. The main argument that had persuaded him to remain in office at Tubunae was the valuable services that he had performed as a military man. Perhaps this argument still lingered in his mind when he decided to marry Pelagia. If he had done great things in Numidia with few means over the last couple of years, he might have hoped to do even more now with the power he would gain by this marriage and his new position. In light of the past developments, however, Castinus’ motivation to exclude Bonifatius from the campaign starts to make more sense than Prosper’s biased language has revealed so far. Bonifatius simply wielded far more influence at this particular point than his normal rank would have granted him in other circumstances. Add to that a position of subordinate commander, and he might have formed a potential threat to Castinus’ own authority. The new magister utriusque militiae may have found it prudent, therefore, not to have such a colleague in his campaign, not least one who could be suspected of being a partisan of the empress. This removal constituted a major problem for Bonifatius, far more important than any sentiments of indignation as reported by Prosper. Augustine shrewdly observed that such men depended on rewards of service and were always anxious that their chief should keep, or even increase, his rank in imperial service, so that he could be sure to look after their interests: To mention just one of these things: Who cannot help but see that many persons flock around you to protect your power and safety, and that, even if they are all loyal to you and you need not apprehend treachery from any of them, they still certainly desire to obtain through you those goods that they too covet, not in a godly way, but from a worldly motive? And in this way you, whose duty it was to have curbed and bridled your cravings, are forced to satisfy those of others.64

This had never been a problem for men such as Stilicho and Rufinus, who virtually ruled the respective imperial realms and had considerable fortunes. Bonifatius, however, found himself in a totally different situation. Despite all his martial qualities, he was merely an officer of modest rank. The only way he could have provided for his retainers was by granting them a share of the booty that would be gathered in the forthcoming campaign.65 The best argument against

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Bonifatius deliberately sabotaging Castinus’ campaign on behalf of Placidia by deserting is that this directly opposed his own interests. If he had any nefarious intentions towards Castinus, it would have been more convenient to join the campaign anyway and wait for an appropriate opportunity in Baetica. Instead, Bonifatius simply walked away unopposed, to acquire a position that would be appropriate with his new power and gave him the means to provide for his warriors.

Comes Africae We have already seen how Hydatius stated that Bonifatius invaded Africa, something which the Gallic chronicle of 511 repeated verbatim several decades later.66 While this account gives the impression of a military invasion, we have to remind ourselves that invadere could also mean ‘to usurp’. Another source indicates that Bonifatius did not simply conquer the province but rather usurped power there. The Gallic chronicle of 452 noted that for the year 408/409 the comes Africae Ioannes was killed by the people.67 This date, however, is quite difficult to reconcile with our knowledge of this office. In this period Bathanarius was executed and immediately replaced by Heraclian. How do we place Ioannes then in this year? The Gaul who composed this chronicle was known for his erratic chronology prior to Honorius’ death, and very limited knowledge of events outside of his province.68 If his original information dated to an indication year he might have put the event in the wrong indication cycle, as he did with Honoria or Sebastian.69 A better date may rather have been about fifteen years later in 423, possibly connecting the event with Bonifatius’ return to his province. A further indication of local disturbances can be seen in one of the Divjak letters. In 423, local authorities had opened the coast for bands of slave traders who kidnapped African peasants to work on the estates in Italy and southern Gaul. The Christian community of Hippo ransomed some 120 free men, while Augustine tried to find a legal solution and sent Alypius to the court.70 Ioannes’ death may have aggravated this crisis, though it remains nonetheless very obscure and it is dangerous to force a wicked connection with Bonifatius. The letters of Augustine reveal that Bonifatius was a popular leader, who must have acquired extensive networks in previous years. Perhaps Bonifatius simply seized the opportunity to replace a lynched commander, whose demise was entirely due to a frenzied mob.71 It becomes apparent that this was a very delicate matter if we consider that he had not only deserted a major Roman campaign, but also seized control over the most important western Roman province on his own

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authority in one and the same year.72 By commanding all imperial forces in Africa he became virtual master of the province and, more importantly, of its grain supplies on which Italy depended. This renegade action would not, however, make him a new Gildo or Heraclian. The Theodosian Code shows that grain supplies between Africa and Italy had remained stable in 423 and do not hint at any disturbance in their provision.73 Therefore, Honorius’ government must not only have acquiesced to his position but also made it legal. Our first direct evidence for this dates from this same year, when things in Italy had spun out of control since Bonifatius’ departure: Finally, because of this flare-up of enmity and the hatred as strong as their former love, when Honorius proved the stronger, Placidia was exiled to Byzantium with her children. Bonifatius alone continued loyal to her and from Africa, which he governed, sent whatever money he could and promised other kinds of assistance. Later, he contributed all his resources towards her restoration as empress.74

When Castinus returned from Spain, political tensions reached a climax in Ravenna. The political frictions of his struggle with Galla Placidia left their traces in the chancellery. Between the spring of 422 and the summer of 423, no fewer than three different comites rerum privatum and four praefecti praetorio per Italiam succeeded each other.75 Mutual suspicions, accusations and hostility between factions were rife. Placidia was accused of having an incestuous affair with her brother Honorius. Similar propaganda must also have been hurled at Castinus by Placidia’s faction. I suspect that Prosper’s depiction of Bonifatius’ unfair treatment by Castinus might be a product of this. Tensions at court eventually exploded into violence on the streets where Roman soldiers and Gothic retainers were fighting each other.76 The final straw was the execution of two pagan philosophers from Castinus’ faction, probably instigated on orders of Galla Placidia.77 Honorius, who had previously been under the influence of his sister, eventually yielded to Castinus’ faction and exiled her together with her children in the spring of 423. If Bonifatius’ position had become official by this time, she must have been responsible for it. Yet by early 423 her own authority at court had dwindled dramatically, so it seems more reasonable that she had arranged it somewhere in late 422 when Castinus’ own position had been temporarily weakened as a result of his defeat in Baetica.78 With Placidia out of the way, it must have been clear to all involved in western imperial politics that Castinus had emerged as the dominant force at court who, just like Stilicho and Constantius before, would be the one directing state affairs.

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At this point Bonifatius was the second most powerful man in the west, by virtue of his private forces and control of Roman Africa. Honorius had not attempted to dislodge him so far, and rather than pursuing any attempts at reconciliation with Castinus, he decided to support the exiled empress instead. The money he sent to Placidia may have been derived from the former property of Heraclian, which a decade before had been awarded to Constantius.79 That he had decided to throw his support behind her was politically the least advisable thing to do. Placidia arrived in Constantinople where her cousin Theodosius II barely tolerated her presence. Bonifatius may have owed his unique power to conditions created by her influence, but he had estranged himself from the government in Ravenna by his actions, and he may have more than likely earned the enmity of Castinus at this stage. The stalemate in this situation would only be lifted by the disappearance of another major character on the political scene.

Civil war in the Mediterranean The position of Constantinople If Honorius ever resembled his father in anything, it was not in the matters of life but in death. He succumbed also to symptoms of oedema on 15 August 423.80 Blockley’s sharp comment on his reign is worth quoting in full: ‘The kindest thing that can be said about this most ineffective incumbent upon the imperial throne is that his long periods of inertia caused less damage than his bouts of relative activity just before and after the destruction of Stilicho’.81 It has recently been argued that Honorius was the most successful of all western child-emperors, precisely because he consciously chose a passive ceremonial role. Hence he survived three decades on the throne and died peacefully, while a plethora of usurpers and military strongmen perished around him.82 Be that as it may, given that a multitude of crises both internal and external had hamstrung imperial authority in the provinces, it could also be said that his reign sowed the seeds for the eventual demise of Roman rule in western Europe.83 If Constantius’ death had resulted in a mere struggle for political dominance at the court, then the impact of Honorius’ passing would be felt throughout the Mediterranean world. Relations between Theodosius II and his uncle Honorius had considerably cooled towards the end of the latter’s reign. Since Honorius had failed to produce any male offspring, Theodosius would have been the only man with a legitimate

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claim on the western throne.84 Galla Placidia, however, nullified this when she gave birth to a son on 2 July 419. To emphasize the dynastic significance of this event, she named her son Valentinian, after her maternal grandfather and the last great emperor of the imperial west. Less than two years later, the boy was elevated to the imperial distinction. This occurred just when Theodosius was about to marry Eudocia, and he had not been consulted on the matter. As a result, the eastern emperor refused to recognize Valentinian, Placidia and Constantius’ elevation.85 Because of their exile, however, Valentinian was not able to succeed his uncle and Castinus’ faction would definitely not have wanted Placidia’s son to inherit the throne.86 Without any basis of political authority in the west, she needed support that only her relatives in the eastern Empire could have provided her.87 Now that Honorius was dead, however, Theodosius effectively became the first sole Augustus to reign over the entire Empire since 364.88 A few contemporary western chroniclers remarked that he did so, while eastern historiographers mention that Theodosius initially suppressed news of his uncle’s death.89 Therefore, he was not at all inclined to defend Valentinian’s case.90 The western prince was not even considered for a consulship in 424.91 To make matters even worse, Theodosius had reached an agreement with Placidia’s nemesis: Castinus was designated as the western consul for that year. This clearly implied that the two men had reached a consensus, and Theodosius started legislating for both parts of the Empire.92 This must have been a major affront for Placidia, but in her current situation she was completely powerless and could merely watch from the sidelines as the imperial west slipped out of her hands.

Governing Africa Placidia’s situation seemed completely hopeless because of Theodosius’ decision. How did this affect Bonifatius in Africa? His position concerning the western Roman government had been incredibly ambiguous since his quarrel with Castinus in 422. Given the likelihood that the western magister utriusque militiae served in Italy with the blessing of the eastern court, Bonifatius knew that his position could very soon become untenable. Olympiodorus’ fragmentary history, mentioned earlier, reveals a few hints of his activities: ‘Later, he contributed all his resources towards her restoration as Empress.’93 He went on to say that: ‘Bonifatius was an heroic man who was often victorious against hordes of barbarians, sometimes attacking them with a few troops, sometimes with many, and occasionally engaging in single combat. In a word, he used every means to free Africa from many barbarians and diverse tribes.’94 We have already seen how

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Augustine remembered Bonifatius’ earlier success against the Mauri in his early years as tribune. Olympiodorus clearly distinguished the battles that were occasional skirmishes from those that were fought with greater forces. A crucial issue here is how we should interpret the notion that Bonifatius used ‘every means’ to ‘free Africa’ from the Mauri. On a chronological note, Olympiodorus’ portrait of Bonifatius appears towards the end of his history, after he had become comes Africae. Olympiodorus wrote his history retrospectively, long after 425, the formal ending of the events narrated. Augustine makes it clear, however, that Bonifatius had lost the initiative against the Afri barbari not long after that year.95 Olympiodorus’ statement that the native tribes were pacified in this area between 422 and 426 does not seem to be empty rhetoric. Bonifatius was now able to deploy the African field units against them together with his own retinue, which was basically a small army in its own right.96 He might have found it advisable, perhaps even necessary, to use ‘every means’ against them as soon as he had become supreme commander of the regional forces. His buccellarii had only recently missed the opportunity to show their mettle and gather war booty against the Vandals. The only other possible means of satisfying their demands could have been an offensive against the native tribes. Such a campaign would have had several other advantages as well. It would not only strengthen his control over Africa, but also win him the favour of the provincial population, as Augustine remembered: ‘Who did not say, when you assumed power as comes, that the barbarians of Africa would not only be subdued but would even be tributaries to the Roman state?’97 The legitimacy of Bonifatius’ command was never out of question in these years, however, and he might have anticipated a reaction from Italy against him.98 In the event of a Ravennese offensive it would have been strategically sound to have the African hinterland secure lest he be pressed to fight on two fronts. Future events would show that the tribes beyond the frontier would seize such an opportunity when it came to pass. From the polemic correspondence between Augustine and the Pelagian bishop Julian it can be gathered that the Mauri were not the only ones who were faced with Bonifatius’ forces on his return.99 Julian accused Augustine and Alypius of having brought reinforcements into Africa against the Pelagians. Alypius was present in Italy in 422 and was on his return ‘accompanied by tribunes’.100 The persecution of heretics was no unfamiliar task for Bonifatius and it definitely bought him the favour of the African Church. With the support of the military rank and file, the people and the Church, Bonifatius now firmly controlled the region and could turn his attention to affairs outside Africa.

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As mentioned previously, Olympiodorus noted that only Bonifatius continued to support Placidia and that he did everything possible to assist in her restoration. If this endeavour had been daring when Honorius was still alive, it certainly cast Bonifatius as ‘one man against the world’ as soon as it became clear that Theodosius had not made any arrangements to change the vacancy of the western imperial office. But what could Olympiodorus actually have meant when he said that Bonifatius used ‘all his resources’ during Placidia’s exile to organize her restoration? An armed intervention against Italy was definitely out of the question. The African army could not compete in quantitative or qualitative terms with that of Italy. With twelve regiments of infantry and nineteen regiments of cavalry it may have numbered just over 20,000 soldiers.101 It had a very fine selection of mounted units, but the majority of Bonifatius’ troops were frontier garrison troops (limitanei) whose primary duty was to maintain internal security against the Mauri. The actual field army numbered only ten units and most of them were pseudo-comitatenses, limitanei who had been drafted into the field army and had only been upgraded on paper. Only four units, perhaps a total of 2,000 or 3,000 soldiers, were elite troops. Bonifatius would have to leave troops behind to safeguard his province and only when most of the Italian field army was absent would he stand a chance. Heraclian had made such an attempt a decade before, however, and its result was a complete fiasco.102 Above all, as long as Theodosius supported Castinus, such a move might incur the direct wrath of the east. With Placidia and Valentinian in Constantinople, for whose cause he was mobilizing his resources, that was something he had to avoid at all costs. There was one trump card left which Bonifatius had not played so far. The majority of the inhabitants of Rome were basically dependent on the efforts of the African authorities to supply them with grain.103 According to one scholar’s calculations, the annual canon frumentarius urbis Romae amounted to over 3,910,000 modii, sufficient for around 65,000 recipients.104 Only a few days’ delay in the arrival of the African grain ships could, and often did, lead to famine and riots. Bonifatius’ predecessors who had revolted against Italy had often favoured the tactic of delaying or even blocking the grain shipments to Rome. This always caused grave consternation in the former caput mundi. In the most extreme case, during Alaric’s siege of Rome when Heraclian had redirected the African grain fleet to Ravenna, it would result in starvation and even the consumption of human flesh.105 There is no evidence to confirm that Bonifatius deliberately disrupted the grain supply to Rome, as Gildo and Heraclian had done previously. This was, however, only the first round of the game and he did

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not immediately have to resort to such a measure. The mere threat of doing so could exercise sufficient political pressure for his purposes.106 It would soon become apparent in the former capital that he succeeded in doing so.

Ioannes’ usurpation The western throne had been vacant for three months after Honorius’ death, until unexpectedly the primicerius notariorum Ioannes was proclaimed emperor on 20 November 423.107 The exact motivation for his usurpation is unknown, but two things stand out. On one hand, Theodosius’ insistence on ruling the entire empire had allowed Castinus a comfortable position in Italy to carry out his policy, without having to deal with an emperor watching over his shoulder.108 Ioannes, on the other hand, was proclaimed in Rome, the city most vulnerable to any disruption of its annonae. After threats, Bonifatius may have decided gradually to lower the number of shipments and eventually even to delay them. Theodosius may have cared little for such distant affairs when there was no direct aggression involved and he might well have patiently waited to see how events would evolve. The magistrates in Italy, however, could not afford to take this stance. The date of 20 November is crucial in the whole affair. At the end of November, the sailing season in the Mediterranean finished and it became perilous to cross the sea.109 If the grain shipments were not to be continued in spring 424, the city would have faced a very grave crisis. Ioannes’ proclamation has been interpreted as the direct result of Bonifatius’ actions, actions which ended Theodosius’ vision of a unique sovereignty.110 On the contrary, it should be noted that not all factions in Italy had acquiesced in the face of Theodosius’ plans. Ioannes’ proclamation was backed up by factions in the Roman senate, such as the powerful Anicii, who organized games for him.111 That a civil official was proclaimed western emperor, more than three months after the death of the legitimate emperor, only confirms that there was no immediate candidate ready to take over power.112 For the western officials this constituted a significant crux, since dignitaries in the various chancelleries would have been anxious to have their own emperor to provide patronage and ensure appointments.113 Three factors, therefore, fuelled Ioannes’ proclamation: bureaucratic anxiety, the unwillingness of the eastern emperor to appoint a colleague, and a looming crisis in Africa. Bonifatius was not the sole cause of the western usurpation, but he certainly provided the catalyst that set events in motion. Castinus’ role in this political turmoil is far from clear, however. There is a general consensus among scholars that he was the military patron supporting

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Ioannes’ regime.114 In this, he would have been following a pattern established by Arbogastes, Alaric and Gerontius, who provided the military arm for the ceremonial adult emperors Eugenius, Priscus Attalus, and Maximus in Spain. Yet I believe that Prosper’s entry on both men casts serious doubt on such a reading. He says: ‘Honorius died and Ioannes took his imperial authority, with the connivance, it was judged, of Castinus, who led the army as magister militum’.115 Prosper is consistently hostile towards Castinus in his chronicle. Yet writing after Castinus’ downfall, when no one would have had a stake in defending him, Prosper implicitly confessed that the magister militum’s support for Ioannes was not apparent.116 As we shall see later, Prosper repeated this verdict when describing Castinus’ ultimate fate. Certainly, Castinus’ previous position would have granted him more freedom, but if Castinus wished to retain his power in Italy, then he had to deal with the aggravation that Bonifatius was causing. I believe it safer to respect Prosper’s statement that Castinus had not supported Ioannes wholeheartedly, possibly only rallying behind him when pressed by the crisis in Africa. Rather than Castinus, it seems that Ioannes’ principal military backers were Gaudentius and the latter’s son Aëtius.117 Unlike Theodosius, no official in Italy could afford simply to wait and see how events would transpire. By the beginning of 424, the new regime’s first priority would have been a counter-offensive against its opponent in Africa. Ioannes sent ambassadors at the same time to Constantinople to explain the situation to Theodosius. He would have none of it, and immediately threw them in prisons scattered around the Propontis.118 If Theodosius could not reign over the empire himself, then he would definitely not tolerate a western colleague who did not even belong to his house. He hoped for the continuation of his grandfather’s dynastic legacy, and at this point he finally gave his support to restore Valentinian and Placidia. Bonifatius had won this first round, but the most dangerous phase of all for him followed directly. The east was quite slow to move against Ioannes.119 Castinus’ consulship was only abolished on 26 April and Valentinian was not crowned Caesar until 24 October.120 By the time Theodosius had mobilized his forces, it was already winter. Bonifatius could expect to receive the brunt of Ioannes’ retaliation throughout 424.

Leading the resistance It was for this reason that Bonifatius had established himself at Carthage. Even in the early fifth century, this city had remained a splendid metropolis. It was the most important western Mediterranean harbour and only Rome, Alexandria,

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Antioch and Constantinople could compete with it in terms of monuments and the magnificent games it provided for its people. That Bonifatius was present in the African capital to supervise his defences can be noted from Augustine. In 424, he had travelled for the last time to Carthage and stayed there between April and July.121 Even in times of imminent warfare, Bonifatius took the time to attend church and listen to his old friend. Surprisingly, Augustine never refers to the comes Africae; while in the past he had not refrained from referring directly to persons in his sermons. Yet the whole theme of his preaching was the forgiveness of sins and granting pardon to fellow human beings. It is difficult to determine whether Augustine was making a political statement here, but is not an unreasonable suggestion. A lot of African provincials would not have been pleased with the prospect of civil war at their front door. Many of them might have remembered the bloody purges that had followed in the wake of Heraclian’s failed rebellion.122 They had therefore good reason to be afraid of the consequences of Bonifatius’ actions. In two significant ways, Bonifatius would push the limits of his authority here even further, whilst labouring for Valentinian’s restoration. The Gallic chronicle of 452 notes that in the year 425: ‘Carthage was surrounded with a wall. This city had been forbidden by decree of the Romans to be fortified since the ancient city was destroyed, in case it afforded a shelter for rebellion’.123 Excavations do seem to favour a date in conjunction with Bonifatius’ tenure as comes Africae.124 The great wall was the last major western Roman construction in Carthage and an exceptional event. Few Roman cities in the Maghreb had fortifications, thanks to the relatively peaceful environment in the coastal plains. Many years later, when the Vandals invaded Africa, only Cirtae, Hippo Regius and Carthage were sufficiently fortified to hold out for a while.125 None of the native tribes were able to threaten the great cities and it seems reasonable, therefore, that Bonifatius had given orders to fortify the city in anticipation of an attack from overseas.126 Carthage would always be the first target of any invading army. His relentless determination to restore the legitimate dynasty was not limited to the strengthening of the city’s defences, however. Bonifatius also relaunched the operation of the city’s mint, which had not seen use since Domitius Alexander’s usurpation in 310, and he issued a series of small bronzes.127 While the construction of Carthage’s wall was an immense achievement, the production of coins on his own authority was truly exceptional. During the later empire this was the exclusive domain of the reigning emperors and only a usurper struck his own coins. Bonifatius would never show such ambitions.128 Instead, it is important to remember that coins were the most successful means of propaganda in the ancient world. The minting of these coins

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was a clear sign to the rest of the world that he was championing the cause of the Theodosian, ergo legitimate, dynasty.129 Finally, as Prosper recorded, Bonifatius was faced with an armed intervention from Italy in retaliation: ‘Theodosius made his cousin Valentinian Caesar and sent him along with the Augusta, his mother, to take back the western empire. At the time, Ioannes’ defences were made weaker because he was trying through force of arms to take Africa, over which Bonifatius was maintaining his hold.’130 The Gallic chronicler of 452 provides some corroboration for the idea that Ioannes launched an expedition against Bonifatius at this point. Although he wrote that ‘Sigisvult hastened to Africa against Bonifatius’, it is probable that he conflated Ioannes’ expedition with that of Sigisvult, which occurred several years later.131 It is not impossible that the actual commander was Castinus instead.132 Someone needed to deal with Bonifatius in Africa. Gaudentius was occupied in Gaul, while the latter’s son was sent to the Huns in order to recruit mercenaries.133 If there is any truth in Prosper’s verdict on the failure of the 422 campaign against the Vandals as a clash of egos, then it is easy to imagine Castinus being eager to exact retribution on Bonifatius.134 Considering the urgency of a food blockade, it seems entirely reasonable that Italian troops invaded Africa in March, the earliest possible moment that year at which it was possible to sail between Italy and Carthage. The exact details of his campaign are not known, but Prosper makes it clear that the usurper’s defences were seriously weakened by war in Africa. By 425, the expedition had not returned. It must have been either terribly inactive, or perhaps it is more likely that Bonifatius at least halted the enemy force, if he did not defeat it entirely. We see no sign of any uprising of the tribes, indicating either that they were still pacified, or that the Italian counter-offensive was beaten surprisingly fast. Meanwhile, it is possible that the actions of Bonifatius had inspired factions in Gaul unhappy with Ioannes’ regime to do the same. Both Gaudentius and the praetorian prefect Exuperantius were soon killed in a military uprising at Arles in 424/425.135 The results of Bonifatius’ diversion of Ioannes’ forces would come to fruition the following year, when the eastern army under the command of the generals Ardaburius, Aspar and Candidianus was finally launched.136 During the winter of 424/425 this army occupied Salona in Dalmatia before splitting up in early 425.137 Aspar and Candidianus advanced with the cavalry into northern Italy where they managed to take Aquileia and several other cities.138 Ardaburius set sail from Dalmatia with the rest of the army, but his fleet was scattered in a storm. He was captured and taken to Ravenna, but given enough freedom of movement that he could suborn several officers, who had

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been previously discharged by Ioannes.139 Aspar pushed forward to Ravenna and took the city, though he seems to have either allowed his troops to pillage it or been unable to prevent them from doing so.140 The failure of Ioannes to put up any significant resistance in Italy is in a way reminiscent of Magnus Maximus’ defeat in 388: eastern forces caught both usurpers by surprise after western forces had been distracted on several fronts.141 Ioannes was captured and executed in the summer of 425 at Aquileia after carefully staged victory celebrations and rites of public humiliation.142 It is said that Theodosius II, who was presiding over the games in the hippodrome, urged the population to follow him in prayer through the streets of Constantinople and attend church together, after having received word of the usurper’s downfall.143 At the end of the year, Galla Placidia finally returned with her son. Bonifatius’ actions were incredible in more than one way. Just like Gildo and Heraclian, he had challenged the authority of the leading magister militum in Italy as comes Africae, by putting political pressure on Rome when he either disrupted its grain supply or threatened to do so. He succeeded, however, where his predecessors had failed in such an attempt. He survived a head-on confrontation with the western field army. As Olympiodorus states correctly, he had mobilized all his resources to engineer the restoration of the Theodosian dynasty in the imperial west.144 Such dedication and perseverance, when no one else was willing to back up the claims of Placidia from the start, would definitely not have passed unnoticed. He would now reap the consequences of his actions.

4

Enemy of the State (426–428)

Despite their relative obscurity, the events of 423–425 were highly significant. This was the only civil war fought between the western and eastern realms of the Roman Empire throughout the fifth century. Ioannes was the last usurper in the west to try establishing himself against the reigning dynasty.1 Instead, the house of Theodosius was even more firmly reinstalled. During the reign of Valentinian III, no one would make an attempt on the purple again. If Theodosius II had not succeeded in his bid to become sole senior emperor, like his grandfather, then he had at least settled his hegemony over the western court, as Bonifatius would soon find out.

Power games The new chain of command The city of Rome was bustling and full of activity when on 24 October 425 a ceremony of the utmost importance took place. One year previously, the child Valentinian had been reinstated in his imperial status and elevated to the rank of Caesar at Thessaloniki.2 His uncle Theodosius had been too ill to perform the task himself, and transferred the duty to his magister officiorum, Helion.3 In order to strengthen the eastern alliance, Valentinian had been betrothed to Theodosius’ daughter Licinia Eudoxia, who was barely two years old at that time.4 Now the same dignitary would complete the restoration by placing the diadem on Valentinian’s head in the former western capital, thereby making him Augustus.5 There is little reason to doubt that this took place in the presence of his mother, the senate and the highest dignitaries of the imperial west.6 News of the eastern Roman victory and Ioannes’ execution could have reached Africa as soon as the end of that summer. As one of the chief architects of Valentinian’s restoration, Bonifatius would, naturally enough, have desired to be present at his emperor’s coronation.7 That he returned to Italy is beyond doubt, since he

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received a new appointment from the Augusta. However, there is no confirmation in any of the existing sources that he returned in conjuction with the coronation of Valentinian. One of Augustine’s Divjak-letters does confirm that he was absent from Africa, and would not return before spring 426. Augustine had asked his deacon Faustinus to help settle a dispute about money which a widow owed to the Church. The letter makes it clear that Bonifatius gave the money several years before, when he was already comes Africae. As he said: Several years ago, when the domesticus, Florentinus, was still alive, the comes Bonifatius gave the Church a certain sum of money. . . . If, however, the woman is not at Sitifis, my brother Novatus should see to it that the tribune Felician replies concerning this matter and that the case is brought to the attention of the comes Sebastian, who can determine regarding it what he sees is just.8

The woman was the widow of Bassus, one of Bonifatius’ tribunes who had been entrusted with the money. Bassus had divided the sum in two and given it to two collectarii. They gave Bassus a receipt, and after a while Bonifatius decided that the Church should receive this money. Yet by the time the first collectarius wanted to retrieve his receipt, Bassus had died and his widow had left Hippo. Later this collectarius died as well, and his heirs returned the rest of the money to the widow when she came back. She gave them the receipt, and now promised to donate all the money to the Church as well as the other receipt from the second collectarius. She demanded that the receipt should be either given back to her or voided, but when they presented her with the receipt, she changed her mind again. She entrusted all the money to a third party, and left Hippo.9 It is significant that at that time Augustine did not advise his deacon to address Bonifatius but Sebastian, who was Bonifatius’ son-in-law and is mentioned as holding the same rank.10 This seems to imply that Sebastian had taken over Bonifatius’ command during his absence.11 The fact that Bonifatius could simply appoint his own sonin-law as acting comes Africae is also a telling sign of how thoroughly he had entrenched his power in Africa. When Bonifatius came to Rome, his reputation must have been at its peak. If he had expected, however, to be rewarded generously for those valuable services that had made his return possible, then he was in for a surprise. Procopius and Augustine reveal the prizes offered to him: There were two Roman generals, Aëtius and Bonifatius, especially valiant men and in experience of many wars inferior to none of that time at least. These two came to be at variance in regard to matters of state, but they attained to such a degree of high-mindedness and excellence in every respect that if one should call either of them ‘the last of the Romans’ he would not

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err, so true was it that all the excellent qualities of the Romans were summed up in these two men. One of these, Bonifatius, was appointed by Placidia general of all Libya.12 [W]ho would have feared that, after the appointment of Bonifatius as comes domesticorum and stationed in Africa as comes Africae with so great an army and such great authority.13

Besides confirming his present rank, Galla Placidia also made him comes domesticorum. While we have seen that this was no ordinary command, its effective value was diminished for Bonifatius, since he was instructed to stay in Africa.14 He may not have been qualified to become magister militum after Constantius’ death, but in light of the past years in which he had devoted all his resources to the empress’ cause, it would have been an appropriate reward. Yet several events had made this impossible. Shortly after Ioannes’ execution, an army of Huns had arrived in Italy. The usurper had sent Aëtius, his cura palatii, to Pannonia to recruit them since the remainder of the Italian army was occupied in Africa and he was in desperate need of additional forces.15 Aëtius engaged Aspar’s army but after heavy casualties on both sides, it became obvious that he was fighting for a lost cause: Aëtius, one of Ioannes’ subordinate commanders, arrived three days after his death leading as many as sixty thousand barbarian mercenaries. His and Aspar’s forges engaged, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. Afterwards Aëtius made an agreement with Placidia and Valentinian and he received the title of comes. The barbarians in exchange for gold laid aside their anger and their arms, gave hostages and exchanged oaths, and retired to their own lands.16

Ioannes’ faction might have lost its leader, but it still had an army.17 This gave Aëtius a strong bargaining position and he received a command in Gaul for redirecting his Hun allies homeward. An amnesty for the military supporters of the usurper was the only way for Placidia to end the rebellion without prolonging the civil war.18 Yet it is worthwile to consider again the support Castinus had given to Ioannes. Prosper repeats his statement of ‘connivance’, implying that nobody was certain to what extent Castinus had actually supported Ioannes. In Prosper’s words: Augusta Placidia and Caesar Valentinian with incredible good fortune crushed the usurper Ioannes and regained the realm as victors. Pardon was given to Aëtius, because the Huns he had brought in on behalf of Ioannes

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were turned back home by his efforts. Castinus, however, was driven into exile, because it seemed as if Ioannes would not have been able to take over the realm without his connivance.19

The fact that the former magister utriusque militiae was merely exiled is actually surprising. Aëtius was able to save his own hide because of his access to Hunnic might outside imperial control. We might seriously wonder why Castinus did not share the same fate as Ioannes, however, since this was an era that did not look kindly upon high-ranking supporters of usurpers; the price of failure was nearly always death.20 It is conceivable, therefore, that Castinus had not been a main supporter of Ioannes and only reluctantly joined the rebellion at the last moment to safeguard his own position. His exile could be a reflection of this and the earlier pact between him and Theodosius.21 Otherwise, it is very hard to explain why Prosper did not tarnish Castinus’ reputation more vehemently. The supreme command of the western Roman army was given to the hitherto unknown Flavius Constantius Felix.22 There is some disagreement whether he was one of Placidia’s men or an eastern Roman appointee.23 The influence of Constantinople was nevertheless strong during these years.24 The western consulship of 427 was reserved for Ardaburius, and Theodosius may have seen to it that Bonifatius would not become magister militum.25 He definitely would not have been well disposed towards the comes Africae, who had been independently powerful enough to impede his plans. For Bonifatius this must have been a very disappointing and frustrating moment. Promotions to high commands were a public event and it would not have gone unnoticed that he had been passed by. Shortly afterwards, Augustine made it clear that Bonifatius had expected more: ‘But you may perhaps reply to this that we should instead lay this blame upon those who have injured you, who have given you not a fair reward comparable to your services in office but instead the very opposite.’26 Placidia’s decision was nevertheless quite understandable. Valentinian was only six years old, and could not yet exercise his proper authority. She herself could not rule directly because she was a woman. With Bonifatius and Aëtius she already had two competent but dangerously independent generals. Therefore she might have wanted to maintain some level of independence by putting Felix, who could not boast similar military credentials as the other two, between them.27 There were not many alternatives as rewards remaining. The western consulship was already reserved for the first two years for Valentinian and Ardaburius. The influence of Constantinople would have prevented her from awarding him a higher rank.28 And even if she had wished to reward Bonifatius more generously, it is unlikely she was eager to see any of her generals becoming a new Stilicho or Constantius, who would completely

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overshadow the reigning emperor. Yet without a military ‘manager’ at court, whose authority was unquestioned, the political situation had turned out just the same as when Constantius had passed away. This time the result turned out to be even more disastrous.

Court intrigues Looking back from the sixth century, Procopius provides the most detailed account of the court intrigues that immediately followed after the new appointments in the military high command. He recorded: But when Bonifatius had got out of the way, Aëtius slandered him to Placidia, saying that he was setting up a tyranny and had robbed her and the emperor of all Libya, and he said that it was very easy for her to find out the truth; for if she should summon Bonifatius to Rome, he would never come. And when the woman heard this, Aëtius seemed to her to speak well and she acted accordingly. But Aëtius, anticipating her, wrote to Bonifatius secretly that the mother of the emperor was plotting against him and wished to put him out of the way. And he predicted to him that there would be convincing proof of the plot; for he would be summoned very shortly for no reason at all. Such was the announcement of the letter. And Bonifatius did not disregard the message, for as soon as those arrived who were summoning him to the emperor, he refused to give heed to the emperor and his mother, disclosing to no one the warning of Aëtius. So when Placidia heard this, she thought that Aëtius was exceedingly well-disposed towards the emperor’s cause and took under consideration the question of Bonifatius.29

As will be shown later, the story provided by Procopius that Aëtius conspired against Bonifatius found a great following among later eastern Roman historiographers. Authors like John of Antioch and Theophanes copied it almost verbatim. Prosper confirms that Bonifatius had to acquit himself in Italy, but refused to do so. Yet the chronicler states that not Aëtius but Felix was responsible for the charges: ‘Due to the decision of Felix war was declared in the name of the state against Bonifatius whose power and glory were growing in Africa, because he had refused to come to Italy.’30 How should each opinion be viewed? There are still scholars inclined to accept Procopius’ statement that Aëtius was responsible for an intrigue against Bonifatius.31 Yet there are arguments that favour Prosper’s version of events. To start with, Procopius was writing more than a century later in the east, while Prosper was a western contemporary of the events. Further,

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there is nothing to indicate that Aëtius was particularly hostile towards his colleague in North Africa from the onset of Valentinian’s reign.32 Both found themselves in mutually opposed factions during the civil war of 424–425, but more as a result of circumstances than any real rancour. I suspect that it is even possible that the two of them had never met before their ultimate confrontation at the battle of Rimini. Immediately after his deal with Ravenna, Aëtius was sent to Gaul where he had to relieve Arles from a Visigothic siege.33 Galla Placidia would have had very few reasons to trust a turncoat, who only the year before had been fighting against her restoration, over the man who had been her staunchest ally in her most desperate hour.34 Aëtius’ real rise to power had yet to begin; he simply did not have the kind of influence then, such as that he would attain a decade later. We may surmise that he would have been wise enough not to even attempt such an action. Last but not least, we have to remember that Procopius’ account is part of a digression, and not a comprehensive account of fifth-century western affairs. He was merely interested in providing historical background for his readers. Since characters such as Felix had become very obscure in his time, Procopius merely skipped them and focused the plot upon Aëtius and Bonifatius, because, in the end, they did clash.35 Some scholars believe that both Felix and Aëtius were plotting against the comes Africae.36 However, we know that Aëtius was still heavily committed to campaigns in Gaul in 426–427.37 Procopius and Prosper specify that either Aëtius or Felix was the person responsible for the intrigue, not a collaboration of the two.38 That Felix was the prime instigator against the empress’ former champion seems beyond doubt. Already in 426 he had assassinated several ecclesiastical figures.39 The most notable was Patroclus, the powerful bishop of Arles and a former partisan of Constantius and Placidia. The removal of Bonifatius would have been compliant with the policies of former generalissimos who had always seen to it that a rival for power did not control Africa. Such a move might even have been supported by Theodosius.40 Bonifatius, as comes domesticorum, held a rare command that did not fall under direct control of the magister utriusque militiae. Felix could, therefore, not have simply ordered his return to Italy. On what pretext then could Felix have summoned Bonifatius? He was, after all, targeting one of the empress’ men and would have needed her consent for a trial. It has been argued that a likely issue could have been religion, since Placidia was bent on establishing a firm Catholic policy and Bonifatius’ dealings with his Arian retinue might have attracted her suspicion.41 One far more likely pretext, explicitly mentioned by Procopius and partially confirmed by Prosper, is the accusation that Bonifatius was setting up a ‘tyranny’ in Africa which could have easily instilled fear and hostility in the minds of several factions at court.

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Since the late fourth century, Africa had gained in prominence as the most prosperous province of the imperial west. In previous decades, major rebellions by its senior commander had provoked political crises in Italy. Fears that Bonifatius could turn the tables against the newly established regime were not entirely without grounds. For three years, between his departure from Castinus’ campaign and Valentinian’s restoration, Bonifatius had been the virtual master of Africa. He may have been defending Placidia’s cause, but it would not have gone unnoticed that he had overstepped the boundaries of his official authority in doing so. In particular, the fortification of Carthage and the reactivation of the regional capital’s mint had been extraordinary acts. It even seems that Bonifatius still remained very active in Africa up to 427, as evident in Prosper’s words that ‘his power and glory were growing’ there. The connotations of these terms here are those of unconstitutional power and thirst for glory.42 Only one inscription that can be linked to Bonifatius might date from this time. It celebrates him as the restorer of the town Magna Villa, southwest of Carthage.43 Following the lead of Stilicho, he had also employed a Gallic poet to produce panegyrics. Writing to a friend in the mid–460s, the Gallic aristocrat Sidonius Apollinaris gave a brief survey of such panegyrists: ‘[N]or those who even in their earliest days were the greatest of our fathers comrades of whom one, following Bonifatius and the headstrong Sebastian, abhorred in boyhood his native Cadurcans, loving Pandion’s Athens more’.44 Stilicho had used Claudian as an instrument to produce a stream of propaganda, and his example was soon followed.45 Sidonius’ words could imply that the man following Bonifatius and his son-in-law was not just a poet, but also serving in some sort of military capacity.46 This would have been similar to two panegyrists who served as officers under Aëtius.47 Bonifatius appears to have been as powerful as before and desired to attain an even more prominent role, for which Augustine criticized him later: [C]an you deny before God that you would not have fallen into these straits if you had not loved the good things of this world, which, like the servant of God whom we had formerly known you to be, you ought to have entirely despised and esteemed worthless? Indeed, you ought to have accepted them, when offered, in order to devote them to pious use, but not to have sought them when they were denied or given to others so that on their account you would be reduced into these present straits.48

This is a critical point in Augustine’s evaluation of Bonifatius’ character. If he had received the benefit of the doubt for his actions in 422, then it seems quite clear that by 426 Bonifatius had primarily become interested in the highest military

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and political power. In this, however, he was not any different from other generals of his day. As one scholar rightly commented, this type of behaviour was displayed by nearly all western Roman generals of the fifth century: the resolution of internal power struggles was always at the forefront of their actions, whether or not this priority contributed to the overall benefit of the Empire.49 That Bonifatius refused to appear at court when he was summoned should not be seen as confirmation of any guilt regarding the charges made against him. High-ranking generals were never safe from trumped up charges and the fourth century is rife with examples of such men who were brought down by their rivals through such ploys.50 One only needs to be reminded of the fate of Stilicho, who wished to parley with the emperor at Ravenna during his fall from grace, but was arrested and executed instead. Felix had already demonstrated that he was not Placidia’s puppet by having her former ally Patroclus murdered. His timing in this affair cannot have been coincidental: he moved against Bonifatius in 427, probably bolstered by his recent success in regaining western Pannonia. Bonifatius surely believed that obeying the summons would have been tantamount to signing his own death warrant on a trumped up charge. Felix’s next step is illustrative, since he arranged it that Bonifatius was declared ‘enemy of the state’ (hostis publicus).51 This is the exact same procedure that was enacted against Gildo nearly forty years earlier, and the parallel might not have been a coincidence. Felix might also have had the same motivation as Stilicho, when the latter declared Gildo an enemy of the state but did not intervene personally. By sending Mascezel against Gildo instead, Stilicho could downplay the wider political implications by making it look like some kind of local struggle.52 For this specific declaration the Roman senate had to act as one bloc, implying that there were at least sufficient members willing to support an action against the comes Africae. Members of the family of the Anicii, who had backed Ioannes’ usurpation, could have been prominent in this process. The next step was obvious, as Cassidorus remembered almost a century later: ‘War was unpropitiously inflicted upon Bonifatius, while he was holding Africa’.53

Pandemonium in Africa The first imperial expedition Both Prosper and pseudo-Bonifatius provide details of the campaign Felix organized against the defiant comes Africae. Prosper reports: ‘The war was

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prosecuted by Mavortius, Gallio and Sanoeces. By the betrayal of the last of these, Mavortius and Gallio were killed while they were besieging Bonifatius, and soon he himself was killed by Bonifatius when his deceit was uncovered.’54 On the other hand, pseudo-Bonifatius says: But in order that he may not stir up anything by his usual stratagem of mischief against me, as is his custom, and think that by his deceit he will benefit the Roman commanders and busy himself with my ruin, let him give concerning his feelings a complete oath to Your Blessedness, if no deception is turned about in his heart.55

As a result of Prosper’s brevity, the details of this campaign are very puzzling. One striking element is the triple command of the imperial army sent against Bonifatius. This was a widespread eastern Roman practice in later times, and probably originated from a desire to prevent one commander from becoming too powerful.56 Felix definitely would not have wished to have Bonifatius defeated, only to see him replaced by a new rival. Nothing is known about Sanoeces, Mavortius or Gallio, though their names do not seem to imply that they were of Roman origin.57 Quite how they managed to corner Bonifatius is impossible to reconstruct without further sources. A possible location for a siege would have been the recently fortified Carthage, where the comes Africae had his residence in times of peace.58 Prosper places this event in the year 427. De Lepper, however, has argued that the expedition had already been sent in 426. The council of Hippo Regius took place in 427, and a reference in the acts could be seen as an indication that it had only been possible because of restored order.59 Yet this does not necessarily preclude the explicit date of 427 that Prosper supplies for the military engagement. It might as well indicate that the first expedition was swiftly crushed.60 Curiously enough, the account of pseudo-Bonifatius mentions that Castinus was still alive and had found a safe haven in Bonifatius’ own headquarters. The latter had apparently delivered him to Augustine, to avoid collaboration between Castinus and ‘the Roman commanders’. De Lepper is inclined to believe the authenticity of this story.61 Given their history and the source’s poor authenticity, Bonifatius had very little to gain by providing shelter for Placidia’s nemesis after her restoration. Both had very good reasons to detest Castinus, considering the tribulations the latter had inflicted on them. If he had actually commanded Ioannes’ counter-offensive launched in 424 against Bonifatius, as I strongly suspect, he might have been simply exiled in absentia after having fled.62 The complete lack of details makes it impossible to reconstruct Sanoeces’ reasons for betraying his colleagues, or how Bonifatius managed to kill him afterwards.

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Perhaps he had hoped to eliminate Bonifatius by means similar to those he had used against his colleagues, in order to return afterwards as new major power broker, the very thing that Felix had tried to prevent. Regardless of such intentions, the campaign ended as a travesty. Bonifatius remained unbeaten and probably incorporated the forces of his adversaries.63 For the government in Italy this must have been not only embarrassing, but also alarming. This was the second time in less than three years that Bonifatius had beaten an attack from a western field army that should have been theoretically superior to his forces. Even worse, the fact that Bonifatius had been able to command imperial units against dynastic troops was a striking sign that the goverment in the west had effectively lost its authority over the African military. Gildo had the backing of the east when he defended himself against Stilicho.64 Heraclian was suspected of intending to become emperor when he invaded Italy with his forces. Bonifatius, however, was not even aiming at this sort of imperial support or legitimacy when he resisted attempts to depose him this time. That the court failed to discharge him is a telling sign of how the African comitatenses had shifted their allegiance from the emperor to their commanders. For all intents and purposes, they had thereby turned into Bonifatius’ personal army.65 Both sides were now arming themselves for another confrontation.

The Vandal invitation Procopius relates how at this critical point in Bonifatius’ struggle, the latter made a desperate attempt to secure military aid for his cause: But Bonifatius, since it did not seem to him that he was able to array himself against the emperor, and since if he returned to Rome there was clearly no safety for him, began to lay plans so that, if possible, he might have a defensive alliance with the Vandals, who, as previously stated, had established themselves in Spain not far from Libya.. . . Bonifatius accordingly sent to Spain those who were his own most intimate friends and gained the adherence of each of the sons of Godigisclus on terms of complete equality, it being agreed that each one of the three, holding a third part of Libya, should rule over his own subjects; but if a foe should come against any one of them to make war, that they should in common ward off the aggressors. On the basis of this agreement the Vandals crossed the strait at Gadira [Gades] and came into Libya, and the Visigoths in later times settled in Spain.66

The invitation to the Vandals is by far the most controversial part of Bonifatius’ career. Procopius’ statement that he called them to Africa was both denounced

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and defended by scholars throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.67 Numerous scholars have been inclined to accept the historicity of this ‘invitation’.68 The possibility that a hard-pressed Bonifatius called upon Geiseric’s warbands to assist him in his struggle against imperial forces at this point is not ludicrous and should not be discarded a priori. Despite his victories against field armies on two occasions, Bonifatius’ forces must have sustained severe casualties. It does not seem that Ravenna was giving him any respite, for a new expedition under the command of the Goth Sigisvult was organized that same year and was expected to arrive in the spring of 428, as Prosper relates: ‘Thereafter, the sea was made accessible to peoples who used not to know the use of ships, when they were called upon to help the rivals. The conduct of the war begun against Bonifatius was transferred to comes Sigisvult.’69 Bonifatius appears to have been in dire straits. If he had to face Sigisvult’s forces in open battle, any extra military support would have been welcome.70 The only potential source for that would have been the confederation of Hasding Vandals and Alans, who at that point had been living in Baetica for almost a decade. Three authors discussed Bonifatius’ recruitment of the Vandals. According to Jordanes: Geiseric, king of the Vandals, had already been invited into Africa by Bonifatius, who had fallen into a dispute with the emperor Valentinian and was able to obtain revenge only by injuring the empire. So he invited them urgently and brought them across the narrow strait known as the Strait of Gades, scarcely seven miles wide, which divides Africa from Spain and unites the mouth of the Tyrrhenian Sea with the waters of Ocean.71

John of Antioch elaborated further: When the empress wrote him to come, he handed Libya over to the Vandals and was not persuaded to come, thinking the disclosures made to him by Aëtius were true. Later, when men sent to him and a treaty was made, the deception was discovered. The empress was all the more well disposed toward him, and she loathed Aëtius for having acted recklessly in this, though he had not been able to do any harm. She was never able to recover Libya from Bonifatius.72

Theophanes likewise commented: Bonifatius, in fear of the Roman emperors, crossed from Libya to Spain and came to the Vandals. Discovering that Godigisel had died and that the rule had passed to his sons Gunderic and Geiseric, he roused them by promising that he would divide western Lybia into three parts on condition that each

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(including himself) would rule a third part and that they would combine in defence against any enemy whatever. Under these terms, the Vandals crossed the strait and settled in Lybia from the Ocean as far as Tripolis beside Cyrene.73

To adopt a Gibbonian witticism: the stories of Jordanes, John of Antioch, and Theophanes are admirably told and the only defect of these pleasing compositions is the want of truth and common sense. One striking element is that all these sources are derived from eastern authors writing more than a century after the events they describe. Jordanes, John of Antioch and Theophanes are seemingly echoing Procopius’ statements. Not a single one of the western contemporary writers, however, mentions a pact between Bonifatius and Geiseric. From the African side, the complete silence of Augustine and Possidius on the matter is striking. Victor of Vita, writing fifty years later, did not place the blame for the Vandal invasion on the shoulders of Bonifatius, whom he still remembered as ‘famous’.74 The Gallic monk Salvian, writing immediately after the fall of Carthage in 439, does not mention Bonifatius at all. While their opinions on the Vandals could not be more different, both Salvian and Victor saw the Vandal migration as a divine act and not one of human effort.75 Even Cassiodorus in the early sixth century did not connect Bonifatius with the Vandal invasion but twisted it, unsurprisingly, into a Gothic event: ‘The tribe of the Vandals, removed from Spain by the Goths, crossed over to Africa.’76 Finally, the earliest accusation in a western source of treason only appears at the end of the eighth century! – ‘Because Bonifatius felt that he was not safe in Africa, however, and noticed that he was in danger and because he rose against the downfall of the entire state, he let the tribe of the Vandals and the Alans, who were called in together with their leader Geiseric from Spain, enter Africa.’77 More importantly, the Spanish bishop Hydatius described in his chronicle how the Vandals were already raiding the Balearic Islands and Mauretania Tingitana during the time of Ioannes’ usurpation.78 The Vandals were quite capable of travelling by sea and their future leader Geiseric retained an incredible talent for striking at the Romans in times of extreme vulnerability.79 When the opportunity was presented to him in such circumstances, he clearly did not need an invitation. A last argument against an alliance between the two men is that they both were allied with rival Gothic connections.80 All of this was enough for Courtois to conclude that: ‘The case against the comes Africae consists more of accusations than proof.’81 It should come as no surprise that ancient historians were eager to put the blame for the Vandal invasion on the shoulders of Bonifatius.

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They conceived historical causation both as personal and moral. They did not have much conception of impersonal phenomena, and when they were shocked by the misfortunes of the imperial west in the fifth century, they sought scapegoats to explain them.82 In this way Stilicho was considered to be the real cause of Alaric’s sack of Rome, the empress Eudoxia for Geiseric’s sack of the same city and, accordingly, Bonifatius for the loss of Africa.83 But how should Prosper’s account be interpreted then? Could it not indicate proof of Procopius’ accusation? When writing about the fifth century, Prosper rarely made mistakes in his chronology, so why then would he date their invasion two years earlier? A plausible explanation, which could simultaneously form the basis for the story of the invitation, is that Bonifatius’ ‘people who used not to know the use of ships’ were actually Vandal mercenaries whom he recruited in 427.84 By the time Bonifatius was reconciled again with the western empire, Geiseric had already organized his invasion to profit from the chaos that had arisen. Hostile factions in Italy would later use this as propaganda against Bonifatius after his death.85 Although this explanation has many merits to it, I will argue later that the origins of ‘Bonifatius betrayal’ will have to be looked for in a different phase of his career. Indeed, Prosper clearly makes a distinction between the Vandal invasion and the allies of Sigisvult and Bonifatus. His entry on the conflict between both imperial commanders was immediately followed by a separate one on the Vandals: ‘The Vandal people crossed from Spain to Africa’.86 We should not take it for granted that Prosper knew about the Vandals’ naval skills. After all, the raid on the Balearic Islands was an obscure event that only Hydatius knew.87 Instead, we have to take into consideration that Prosper grouped these events together in one entry, not because of a close chronological connection, but because they were consequences of the civil war. Even though they presented the matter very differently, both Procopius and Prosper believed that the real cause of the Vandal invasion was political discord in the highest echelons of the western empire.88 Furthermore, there is a more convincing answer to the identity of the mysterious seafarers than the Vandals. As a disciple of Augustinian thought, Prosper could have been aware of a historiographical tradition of people who were poorly adapted to naval crossings.89 Orosius’ history contains two infamous failures of Gothic attempts to cross into Africa: that of Alaric in 410 and that of a group operating in Spain during Vallia’s kingship.90 Considering Prosper’s ‘peoples who used not to know the use of ships’ are linked to both Sigisvult and Bonifatius in this entry, it is more plausible to identify them with the Goths. Contrary to the Vandals, the Visigoths actually did supply auxiliaries to the western government on several

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occassions.91 They had recently been cowed by Aëtius and given the court’s precarious military resources it is very likely that they were reminded of the stipulations of their foedus. Therefore, when Gothic auxiliaries from Aquitaine were shipped to Africa under the command of Sigisvult, Prosper could rightly claim that ‘the sea was made accessible’ to them for the very first time in 427.

Augustine versus Bonifatius While Bonifatius was organizing his forces, he received a message from Augustine in the winter of 427/428.92 After Tubunae, contact between the two men became less frequent, as Augustine himself seems to admit: But it not easy for any one to give you counsel in accord with God, to prevent the destruction of your soul; not because you lack friends who would do this, but because it is difficult to find an opportunity when they might be able to speak on these subjects with you. Indeed, for I have always longed to do so but never have found the place or the time to deal with you as I ought to deal with a man whom I love ardently in Christ. However, you know in what state I was when you saw me at Hippo, when you were so gracious as to come visit me, for I was scarcely able to speak, prostated as I was by bodily weakness. Now then, my son, hear me as I speak to you by this letter at least, which I could never have sent you in the midst of the dangers you were facing since I had in mind the danger to its bearer and apprehended having my letter come into the hands of people whom I should not have wished it to fall.93

The last time we saw the two men in each other’s vicinity was in Carthage during Ioannes’ usurpation. When Bonifatius was not occupied in his campaigns against Mauri tribes from outside the frontier, he would be present in the African metropolis, where he had his residence as comes Africae. Augustine, who had reached his seventies, a venerable age by ancient standards, was as active as ever in this decade. He had only recently finished his great work, The City of God, in between producing an incredible number of letters and theological tracts. Despite his duties, Bonifatius had gone all the way to Hippo to pay a visit to his old friend. The letter he received this time was sent after the first expedition, since Augustine did not want to risk the life of his messenger. Its content, however, might have come as a surprise to Bonifatius. Augustine rebuked him: ‘What shall I say regarding these evils, numerous and grave and patent to all, that you have perpetrated since you were married? You are a Christian; you have a conscience, you fear God. Consider for yourself what I am unwilling to say, and

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you will find how great the evils are for which you ought to do penance.’94 The entire letter reprimands Bonifatius’ degenerated Christian morality and his vices. We have already seen that Augustine blamed Bonifatius’ hunger for power for this. Now several factors were causing the aged bishop severe distress: And yet the heresy of those who deny the true Son of God has acquired such influence in your house that your daughter was baptized by them. Now, if what was reported to us is not untrue – though I wish it were false – namely, that these heretics have even rebaptized maidens consecrated to God, with what great fountains of tears should we not bewail such a calamity?95

Just as in 422, Bonifatius’ obligation to maintain the loyalty of his retinue was taking its toll. Now that he had fallen out with Ravenna it was the only source of power on which he could rely. Once again they started pressuring him for rewards for their service. The only way he could have satisfied their demands was to let them provide for themselves from the local population, much to Augustine’s chagrin96: When, therefore, will you succeed, with so many armed men whose ferocity you fear while you humour their craving, when, I repeat, will you succeed I do not say to satisfy the desires of these men who love the world, since that is in no way possible, but to feed them partially in order to avoid still greater widespread destruction, unless you do that which God forbids, while he threatens those who do it? In order to afford them gratification you see the havoc has been so complete that one can scarcely find anything of any worth for them to to plunder.97

It should also come as no surprise that Bonifatius’ daughter was baptized by an Arian priest at this time. Her baptism as an Arian does not necessarily mean that Bonifatius had become an Arian himself.98 If so, Augustine would definitely have commented on it. Most probably this was a compromise between him and Pelagia, who had converted to Catholicism for him and now demanded that their child should receive the sacraments of her people’s religion. In those circumstances, Bonifatius could only have acquiesced. Augustine, with his strict orthodox principles, found this horrific, but the reports he had received from the south were even more appalling: What shall I say about the devestation of Africa that the African barbarians carry out without meeting opposition, as long as you are tied up in your difficulties and take no measures by which this calamity might be averted? Who would have ever believed, who would have ever feared that . . . the

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barbarians would now have become so bold, would have encroached so far, would have devestated, plundered, and desolated such vast places once crowded with people?99

We have already seen that Augustine mentioned the expectations of the African population and the high hopes that they had placed in their general. News of the vicissitudes on the Numidian front seems to have circulated rapidly and freely throughout North Africa.100 The ‘African barbarians’ whom Augustine mentions were those to whom he had previously referred when discussing Bonifatius’ early years as tribune. The fact that there were no troops to oppose them at this stage can only indicate that they had been redrawn to assist Bonifatius in his struggle with the imperial forces.101 As a result, the border at Tubunae lay open and tribes from outside the frontier were able to penetrate the provinces. This was no ordinary raid, but a massive invasion: Tubunae and several other towns had become ‘official’ Mauri territory by the time of the Vandal king Huneric’s reign (477–484).102 From Bonifatius’ point of view, however, this strategy was sound. He could not afford to fight on two fronts at the same time. Imperial forces from Italy could reach Carthage in a couple of days and were far more dangerous opponents than the tribes from the south. He had to concentrate all of his forces, if he were to stand a chance. For Augustine, however, that did not change anything. In Letter 220, he told Bonifatius that he would have to answer to God for his misdemeanours. Of course you maintain that you have a just case, which I cannot judge for I am unable to hear both sides . . . I myself cannot examine and judge these matters; rather look at and inquire your own case, in which you know that lies not between you and any men, but with God . . . You perhaps say to me, ‘In such straits what do you wish me to do?’ If you ask me for council in terms of this world’s standards about how to secure this transitory life of yours and how to preserve this power and wealth that you have, or how to increase them even more, I do not know what I should answer to you.103

Peter Brown aptly called this letter of Augustine ‘studiously unpolitical . . . both a pastoral reminder of abandoned ideals, and a tacit withdrawal of support’.104 More importantly, however, the letter seems to indicate that Bonifatius was entirely convinced of his innocence in this conflict with Ravenna. It cannot be deduced whether Bonifatius had earlier contacted Augustine to press his side of the story, or whether the bishop was merely rhetorically representing the general’s voice in this letter. For Bonifatius it must have been a vital element convincing

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local opinion in Africa, not least his own soldiers, that he was not a rebel but instead fighting a just war that had been wrongfully inflicted on him. Augustine, instinctively loyal to the court, was unwilling to take sides. Yet in the end he strikes us as completely out of touch with his dissident friend’s situation: For, if you had not a wife, I would tell you what we said to you at Tubunae; that you should live in the holy state of continence. To that I would add what we then forbade you to do, namely, that you should withdraw from your military duties as far as is possible without prejudice to the peace of society, and that in the community of the saints you should be free for that life for which you then desired to be free, that in life in which the soldiers of Christ contend in silence not to kill men but to wrestle against ‘the principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness, that is, against the devil and his angels’.105

Augustine thus recommended Bonifatius, currently a victim of a court cabal and desperately struggling to survive, to do the very thing that the old bishop himself had prevented him doing at Tubunae: become a monk! The whole letter appears as a characteristic case of Augustine, who could not control himself about a matter that needed to be corrected ecclesiastically.106 What Bonifatius might have felt about the issue is an entirely different matter. For the moment, he definitely had more immediate concerns than Christian morality. By the end of 427, his public reputation would have hit rock bottom. Considering the warm friendship both men had once shared, it nevertheless must have been a bitter disappointment for Bonifatius. It seems that his tribulations were only becoming worse.

The path towards reconciliation Sigisvult’s arrival The fallout from Bonifatius’ dispute with Ravenna was clearly felt in Augustine’s own city, which became the scene of the most important events in Bonifatius’ life during the next years. By that time Hippo Regius had existed for more than a millennium and during the last two centuries it had become a civitas Romana. The city provided an exceptionally large forum, a theatre that could seat several thousands of spectators, a great public bath and a classical temple. It derived its importance from its position as second harbour of Africa. Its prosperity did not come from trade by the sea, however, but from its rich fertile plains that provided great quantities of wine, olive oil and – above all – grain.107 The city’s tranquility

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would soon be disturbed by grave events starting with the landing of Sigisvult’s forces in Africa. The apocryphal correspondence between ‘Augustine’ and ‘Bonifatius’ gives us an illustration of Sigisvult’s arrival: ‘Soldiers from overseas, I hear, have reached the shore of Africa. But the commander of these soldiers disagrees with the Universal Truth. What I should pray for, as is fitting, I do not know. A public enemy is reported (to have come from Italy), raising up haughty spears against victorious battle standards’.108 The commander referred to is definitely Sigisvult, whose Arianism opposed ‘the universal truth’, and who was sent against Bonifatius after the defeat of the previous expedition. Yet once again, the forger shows that he was neither contemporary with the events he described, nor particulary interested about details, since he mistakenly called Sigisvult ‘a public enemy’.109 From a sermon that Augustine preached in this year it is clear that Sigisvult had the rank of comes for this campaign. It has been suggested he was assigned Bonifatius’ own position as comes Africae, as Bonifatius’ authority would have been declared void in 427.110 The Gothic commander also had an Arian bishop, Maximinus, in his retinue, who made a visit to Hippo where he soon became involved in a heated argument with Augustine’s designated successor Heraclian. The latter was no match for Maximinus’ rhetorical skills and found it necessary to call in the assistance of Augustine: Augustine also held a conference at Hippo with a bishop of these same Arians, a certain Maximinus, who came to Africa with the Goths. This was in accordance with the desire of many illustrious men who requested it and were present for the discussion . . . When Maximinus returned from Hippo to Carthage, because of his great loquacity in the conference he boasted that he had returned victorious from the debate.111

Maximinus had so dominated the debate and had left so hastily that Augustine had no choice but to publish a separate tract containing what he had wished to say. He would also preach in church against this heretic who ‘was uttering his blasphemies in Africa’.112 The fact that Maximinus immediately returned to Carthage indicates that Sigisvult was residing there and, consequently, that the city was no longer in Bonifatius’ possession. Therefore, the city had either been conquered or abandoned. From a military perspective the latter possibility seems more reasonable. Bonifatius had already been besieged once and he must have known that Carthage would be the first target of the next force sent against him. It seems unlikely that he had left troops behind in the city when he retreated.113 If he had any intentions of using the African capital as a bastion to delay Sigisvult’s operations, then he would have to leave a substantial garrison

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behind to man the walls. Doing so would have weakened his forces, and in these circumstances he needed to concentrate them. Maximinus’ words make it clear, however, that it had not been his intention to debate theology when he was in Hippo but that he had been sent by Sigisvult: ‘Augustine and Maximinus met together in Hippo Regius, with many present, both clerics and lay persons. Maximinus said, ‘I did not come to this city in order to stage a debate with Your Holyness. I am here, sent by comes Sigisvult with a view to peace”.’114 His immediate departure for Carthage after the debate implies that he had finished his mission, and Bonifatius must have been around the vicinity of Hippo.115 Apparently, Ravenna had finally decided to cease the war.

Inbictissimo There are plenty of reasons to suppose that the court wanted to restore relations with its renegade general at this point. After almost two years it had completely failed in its original mission to remove Bonifatius. As a result, the North African provinces had been devastated by the forces of both sides. The raids of the Mauri tribes were getting out of control. There is not the slightest indication that Bonifatius had disrupted the grain dole of Rome this time, but the first expedition around Carthage might have delayed supplies. Taxation of the provinces must definitely have become irregular at best, which meant a serious setback for the treasury, since Africa was the richest diocese of the imperial west and the only one that had not been devastated by barbarian incursions previously. The government in Italy may even have been receiving reports about an upcoming Vandal invasion.116 But in Rome the friends of Bonifatius, remembering the character of the man and considering how strange his action was, were greatly astonished to think that Bonifatius was setting up a tyranny, and some of them at the order of Placidia went to Carthage. There they met Bonifatius, and saw the letter of Aëtius, and after hearing the whole story they returned to Rome as quickly as they could and reported to Placidia how Bonifatius stood in relation to her. And though the woman was dumbfounded, she did nothing unpleasant to Aëtius nor did she upbraid him for what he had done to the emperor’s house, for he himself wielded great power and the affairs of the empire were already in an evil plight; but she disclosed to the friends of Bonifatius the advice Aëtius had given, and, offering oaths and pledges of safety, entreated them to persuade the man, if they could, to return to his fatherland and not to permit the empire of the Romans to lie under the hand of barbarians.117

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Some Roman senators, who were friends of Bonifatius, reported to Placidia that Aëtius’ accusation was false, even showing her Aëtius’ letter to Bonifatius, which Bonifatius had sent them.118

Procopius and Theophanes’ explicit statements indicate that some Roman senators had been on Bonifatius’ side. Perhaps they belonged to the CaeioniiDecii, strongly dynastic and allies of Placidia.119 The involvement of senators in these peace talks should not come as a surprise. Members of the Italian aristocracy owned vast estates in the African provinces, and had often served in the diocese as imperial officials.120 Several of these magnates must have been displeased by Felix’s action of declaring Bonifatius an enemy of the state, to which they had to lend their support. A protracted civil war could only damage their interests, and thus their property, in the long run. It seems very unlikely that Felix would have desired to make peace with Bonifatius, when he could have gained more by having his most powerful rival removed in a war that he was slowly winning.121 At this point, however, his prestige must have been severely weakened. Placidia must have noticed that the situation in Africa was escalating and with Felix’s authority diminished, she could have taken the initiative to bring the war to an end.122 The second embassy mentioned by Procopius would have been the one of Darius, who attracted Augustine’s attention during the winter of 428: ‘I have heard from my holy brothers and fellow bishops Urban and Novatus what a good and great man you are. One of them had the opportunity to come to know you near Carthage in the town of Hilari and soon afterward in Sicca, but the other at Sitifis.’123 Darius’ mission took him from Carthage to the interior of Mauretania Sitifensis. It seems very probable that he was in Sitifis to meet Bonifatius. It has been claimed that Sigisvult’s mission was to reconcile Bonifatius from the start, based on the argument that nowhere throughout the campaign do we hear about a major engagement between the two armies.124 Indeed, Augustine was hopeful about a bloodless resolution to the conflict: But it is a mark of higher glory to slay wars themselves with a word, than slaying men by the sword, and to win and maintain peace by peace, not by war. After all, for those who fight, if they are good men, undoubtedly seek for peace; nevertheless they still do so through bloodshed. However, you were sent in order that no one’s blood would be shed; others, then, are under that necessity, but you have this good fortune of averting that calamity.125

However, I believe that Darius’ reply casts doubt on the idea that Sigisvult’s campaign was entirely pacifistic. Letter 230 says:

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[I]f we have not terminated wars, we have certainly postponed them, and with the help of God, who is the ruler of all, the evils that had increased to a certain peak of disasters have been diminished. Yet I hope from God, . . ., that this postponement of war, which I mentioned . . . may bring with it and maintain a lasting and perpetual foundation for peace.126

If Sigisvult’s campaign had been to seek peace from the outset, it is difficult to explain Darius’ statement concerning the ‘postponement of the war’. The absence of pitched battles does not exclude the possibility of guerilla skirmishes while Bonifatius was gradually withdrawing his forces from Africa Proconsularis and Numidia. By drawing the imperial forces to the interior, he was forcing them to fight on his native terrain just as Firmus and Gildo had done during their revolts. Gildo was only defeated quickly at the battle of the Ardalio because his opponent was his own brother, familiar with the region, and able to suborn Gildo’s Roman troops.127 Theodosius ‘the elder’, on the other hand, needed several years of tenacious skirmishing before he was finally able to crush Firmus.128 Darius’ statement, that he feared that even at the end of 428 the war might only be postponed, is crucial. It can only imply that Bonifatius was still powerful enough to challenge the imperial troops. He had probably entrenched himself firmly in the region. When we consider that Bonifatius was considered dangerous even at the end of this year, it seems no exaggeration to claim that he had put up ‘a valorous resistance’.129 By now the court was just as eager to settle a definitive peace. When a first agreement had been made with Maximinus, Bonifatius could have come to Carthage to strike a truce. Afterwards, a second embassy sent by Placidia would negotiate a definitive peace. This would have been Darius’ embassy and the second mission described by Procopius, when the great lines of a treaty had already been set out. When he arrived in Sitifis, therefore, he would have been truly able to ‘slay wars themselves by the word’.130 Augustine’s and Darius’ correspondence reveals that Bonifatius handed over his son Verimodus as a hostage to demonstrate his good faith, as evident in Letters 229–231.131 It has been suggested that Augustine had some role in reconciling the two parties.132 The most striking element in these letters, however, is that Augustine does not once ask Darius about Bonifatius. His letters to the imperial ambassador show that Augustine was only interested in the end of the war and Darius himself. The tender care he showed for Bonifatius’ son should not imply a similar attitude towards the father. The old bishop of Hippo must have become increasingly dismayed by Bonifatius’ behaviour as the chaos in Africa dragged on. Yet once

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again Bonifatius had survived throughout extraordinary circumstances. For the third time in less than five years he had resisted an offensive from Italy. In the end he still remained inbictissimo – unconquered.133 This time, however, there was little reason to celebrate. The mayhem created by Gothic retainers, imperial soldiers and Mauri raiders had exhausted the African provinces. Peace may have been established between Bonifatius and Ravenna, but soon even more violence would spill out all over Africa.

5

Fighting for the Empire (429–433)

In February 429, laws were issued again to Celer, proconsul of Africa, indicating that the diocese was back in the imperial orbit.1 If the African population had hoped finally to get some respite after almost two years of civil war, however, they would be terribly mistaken. For more than two decades the African diocese had been spared from the violence that had plagued the European continent, but its darkest hour was soon to come.

The Vandal invasion From Spain to Africa Ever since the defeat of Castinus, the Vandals had been left alone in Baetica. In the following years their king, Gunderic, would seize and sack several cities, but he did not seem able to maintain a firm control over the region, let alone set up a government of any sort.2 The great city of Seville was captured in 425, yet three years later he had to take it again.3 On that occasion, he suddenly died during the looting. He was succeeded by his half-brother Geiseric, probably the most cunning and most accomplished barbarian king of the fifth century.4 In 429, he decided to leave Baetica behind and transfer his confederation to Africa: ‘In the month of May, King Geiseric abandoned Spain and with all the Vandals and their families crossed over from the shores of the province of Baetica to Mauritania and Africa.’5 This trek should not be considered as the logical next step in the wanderings of a great tribe. By abandoning southern Spain, the Vandals gave up on a very prosperous region that was relatively unthreatened by other contenders.6 Geiseric had good motivation to move on, however. Since the death of Constantius, no magister militum had been able to make his authority within the western Roman government absolute. Should one rise up, Geiseric’s confederation would most likely be his first target. Therefore, the Vandal king needed a region that removed his people directly from the threat of future

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Romano-Gothic expeditions.7 Africa was a sound choice, since it was only a short distance away from Baetica. Strategically it was more easily defensible, since an imperial counter-offensive by sea would require more time and resources than land operations. This plan was not a novelty. Alaric had contemplated moving his Goths to Africa, and so did another Gothic warband in Spain during Vallia’s kingship, but on both occassions the ships they had gathered were destroyed in a storm.8 The Vandals, on the other hand, had already made raids on the Balearic Islands before their great embarkment. Furthermore, they had established a bridgehead in Mauretania Tingitana during the civil war of 424-425.9 With another civil war raging in Africa, the time seemed perfect to invade. Augustine’s biographer Possidius described their crossing into Africa: It happened soon after, in accordance with the divine will and power, that a great host of men, armed and trained for war, came in ships from the land of Spain across the sea and rushed into Africa. They were a mixed group of savage Vandals and Alans, together with a Gothic tribe and people of different races. Everywhere throughout the regions of Mauretania, and even crossing to other provinces and lands, they gave vent to their rage by every kind of atrocity and cruelty, devastating everything they possibly could by pillage, murder, various tortures, fires and other countless indescribable evil deeds.10

The Goths mentioned by Possidius were probably the aforementioned warband who had belonged to Vallia’s confederation, but had split off and made a failed attempt to cross to Africa.11 Since Courtois, it has been generally accepted that the Vandals crossed the strait of Gibraltar and travelled all the way through the Maghreb.12 Another opinion, however, holds that they invaded by sea and landed straight in the heart of Roman Africa.13 There is explicit evidence for the Vandals’ naval skills and that the land route from Tingitana to Caesariensis was largely uncharted. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that they would have considered going by land. It is true that between the summer of 429 and the spring of 430 we hear nothing about the Vandals’ journey. The only source that could explicitly refer to their passing by Mauretania is an inscription at Altava, which mentions the wounding of one of its inhabitants by ‘barbarians’ in 429. Logistic reasons, however, make it inconceivable that the Vandals traversed by sea. When Belisarius invaded Africa a century later, his ships each carried seventy men, including horses and supplies.14 Geiseric’s confederation consisted of at least several tens of thousands people, therefore he would have required at least several hundred ships to carry his forces in a single wave. If he had to transport his forces in several waves, at such a long distance, they could have been swiftly

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slaughtered on the beaches by Bonifatus’ forces.15 The Vandal crossing at Gibraltar would have resembled the allied withdrawal at Dunkirk in 1940, rather than one great Viking raid. The crossing was probably carried out by as many different types of vessels that Geiseric could have mustered.16 This slow and laborious process also helps explain the date of the Vandal crossing. Geiseric had probably already made the first preparations in 427–428, when civil war was raging in the heartland of Roman Africa, but was prevented from carring out the operation due to looming Suevic aggression. Only in 429, when he had retaliated against the Sueves and killed their king, he could feel confident to complete the crossing into Africa.17 It took the Vandals more than a year, traversing a distance of almost 2,000 km, before they encountered their first major armed resistance in late spring 430 near Hippo Regius. The relatively slow pace of their advance is easily explained by the combination of Mauretania’s rough mountainous terrain and the fact that they were taking their families, including elders and children, with them. Minor resistance in the villages and small towns could also have caused delay.18 They left a path of destruction in their wake: Tassacra, Portus Magnus, Cartenna, Caesarea, Icosium, Auzia, Sitifis, Calama, Thagaste, Sicca and Thuburbo Maior were plundered.19 It should be noted, however, that although war atrocities were committed, the Vandals’ behaviour during their conquests was no worse than that of other barbarian warbands, or even that of the imperial army.20 The modern connotations of ‘vandalism’ would not be introduced until the French Revolution by the bishop of Blois.21

Defensive measures Bonifatius has been suspected of being terribly inactive all this time.22 Nevertheless, we must not forget that before his reconciliation with Ravenna, the external Mauri tribes had launched a major incursion into southern Numidia. I do not think it is inconceivable that as soon as he was back in command, Bonifatius would have spent most of 429 campaigning in the south to contain the Mauri as best as possible. As Victor of Vita and Procopius report, the Vandals had considerable fighting strength, and Bonifatius would not have wished to engage them straight away when they entered Mauretania Caesariensis in 430. As Victor reported: A large number made the crossing, and in his cunning dux Geiseric, intending to make the reputation of his people a source of dread, ordered then and there that the entire crowd was to be counted, even those who had

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come from the womb into the light that very day. Including old men, young men and children, slaves and masters, there was found to be a total of 80,000. News of this had spread widely, until today those ignorant of the matter think that this is the number of their armed men, although now their number is small and feeble.23

Procopius described the situation thus: The Vandals and the Alans he arranged in companies, appointing over them no less than eighty captains, whom he called ‘chiliarchs’, making it appear that his host of fighting men in active service amounted to eighty thousand. And yet the number of the Vandals and Alani was said in former times, at least, to amount to no more than fifty thousand men. However, after that time by their natural increase among themselves and by associating other barbarians with them they came to be an exceedingly numerous people. But the names of the Alans and all the other barbarians, except the Mauri, were united in the name of Vandals.24

The number of 80,000 was once considered to be the only unquestionable strand of data we have about the size of barbarian peoples in this era, since two authors reported it independently from each other. For Victor, however, this number represented the entire confederation, while Procopius says it was originally believed to present only Geiseric’s armed forces after their establishment in Africa. Both authors agree that it was a trick of Geiseric to deceive his opponents about the actual strength of his warriors. The number, therefore, does not seem to be any more or less accurate than other numbers we have for different barbarian groups.25 As noted earlier, they might have been able to field as many as 15,000 or even 20,000 warriors. We have already seen that the comes Africae had, on paper, little more than 20,000 soldiers at his disposal, so this would have given the African army a slight advantage. Yet in the past five years they had been forced to fight imperial armies on three different occasions. It is not improbable that Bonifatius’ army had been reinforced with Sigisvult’s forces, to make up for the losses sustained during the last civil war.26 Otherwise Bonifatius’ forces would have been well beneath full strength and the Notitia Dignitatum reflects this. The only two units of African limitanei mentioned are the Milites fortenses at Leptitanis and the Milites Munifices at Madensibus near Gabes. Between the borders of Tingitana and the eastern empire a whole series of frontier posts had been abandoned, indicating that they either had been swept away during the invasion or drafted into Bonifatius’ army.27 Tingitana, on the other hand, had its limitanei still intact and its field units had been reinforced with additional cavalry.

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Their mission could have been to prevent the Vandals’ return in case Bonifatius defeated them.28 Procopius relates, however, that the clash took a turn for worse: And when Bonifatius heard this, he repented of his act and of his agreement with the barbarians, and he besought them incessantly, promising them everything, to remove from Libya. But since they did not receive his words with favour, but considered that they were being insulted, he was compelled to fight with them, and being defeated in the battle, he retired to Hippo Regius, a strong city in the portion of Numidia that is on the sea. There the Vandals made camp under the leadership of Geiseric and began a siege; for Gunderic had already died.29

At first glance, it should not come as a surprise that Bonifatius lost a battle with the Vandals. Even if he had mustered enough forces, there still remained a fundamental mismatch in quality between the two sides. Geiseric’s confederation consisted of battle-hardened warriors, some of them veterans who had fought their way across the Empire, opposing Franks, Visigoths, Sueves and comitatenses on several occasions ever since they had crossed the Rhine. The majority of Bonifatius’ army, as we have seen in the past, were garrison troops who were primarily trained in fighting desert nomads.30 His elite soldiers must have already seen the most damage in their ranks after the battles against Castinus, Felix’s commanders and Sigisvult. We might suppose that Bonifatius had suffered minimum casualties during these encounters, had absorbed the forces of Felix’s commanders and was reinforced with Sigisvult’s troops. His buccellarii were still in good condition, as future events would show. In such a best-case scenario he might even have doubled the number of shock troops under his command, compared to the theoretic disposition of forces in the Notitia Dignitatum. But even then in a confrontation with Geiseric’s warbands he was still probably outnumbered at least three to one. Repelling the Vandals in such conditions was, as one author sharply remarked, ‘like commanding a rising tide to ebb’.31 However, I remain hesitant of this traditional reading of Procopius as a proper battle between the armies of Bonifatius and Geiseric. No other source mentions an armed encounter of this type and I suspect that Procopius might have inflated a minor event for reasons of contemporary propaganda, as seen in an anecdote mentioned during Belisarius’ invasion of Vandal Africa.32 In Procopius’ words: And they said that an old oracle had been uttered by the children in earlier times in Carthage, ‘to the effect that gamma shall pursue beta, and again beta itself shall pursue gamma’. And at that time it had been spoken by the children in play and had been left as an unexplained riddle, but now it was

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perfectly clear to all. For formerly Geiseric had driven out Bonifatius and now Belisarius was doing the same to Gelimer. This, then, whether it was a rumour or an oracle, came out as I have stated.33

In Procopius’ history, Bonifatius was alleged to have suffered two defeats against Geiseric before he departed Africa. The ‘oracle’ could then mirror these setbacks to the twin successes of Belisarius, the historiographer’s focus, against Gelimer at the battles of Ad Decimum and Tricamarum. Indeed, it seems very doubtful whether Bonifatius did commit the outnumbered African field army to a pitched battle against Geiseric. Despite this alleged defeat, his forces still retained enough manpower to withstand lengthy sieges at Carthage, Cirtae and Hippo. Procopius describes a parley between both sides prior to this ‘battle’, which in fact may have been nothing more than a skirmish between representatives of Geiseric and Bonifatius. It is even possible that Bonifatius simply wanted to stall Geiseric while he was garrisoning his three strongholds by first attempting to settle a truce.34 The terms offered may have been nothing more than Procopius’ earlier claim that Bonifatius had been willing to sacrifice two-thirds of Africa to the Vandals, since Geiseric had already conquered as much at this stage when he reached the walls of Hippo. The Vandal vanguard participating in the parley could have easily seen through the insincerity of such an offer and deemed it an insult, as Procopius describes ealier, taking up arms against Bonifatius in the process. Both this ‘first defeat’ and the ‘betrayal of Africa’ were at best minor events magnified out of proportion in later eastern historiography with a domineering afterlife in modern scholarship. The location of this melee is nowhere specified but it cannot have been far from Hippo. From a strategic point of view, a possible site was on the plains near Lake Fezarra, since Bonifatius immediately withdrew to the city. The real clash between the Vandals and the imperial army could finally begin.

The siege of Hippo The city was well fortified and strategically well placed for defence. It was situated at the end of the plain of the river Seybouse, covered two little hillocks and was backed at the west by the Djebel Edough, a high mountainous headland. Its harbour was easily accessible from Sardinia, making sea links possible between Hippo and Portus for supplies.35 Here Bonifatius made his stand, as the eyewitness Possidius recalled:

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Because of his profound wisdom, Augustine daily and copiously lamented all these occurrences. His grief and sorrow were intensified by the fact that the enemy came also to besiege the city of the Hippo-Regius, which so far had maintained its position. At this time the defence of the city was in charge of the former comes Bonifatius and an army of allied Goths. For almost fourteen months the enemy blockaded the city, cutting off even its seacoast with their blockade.36

For the citizens of Hippo, the siege must have been an extraordinary event. The town had not experienced warfare since Julius Caesar’s civil war of 46 bce, when a naval battle was fought in its waters.37 Possidius’ statement that the city was put under an embargo by sea does not necessarily imply that Geiseric had maintained a link with his ships when he had crossed the Strait of Gibraltar. The ancient city of Hippo was situated in the south near the left bank of the Seybouse River. The northern side by the sea could have been blockaded by purely terrestrial means.38 For more than a year Bonifatius was trapped with his Gothic soldiers in the city, as Possidius states. Two things are noteworthy about this. The fact that the Vandals stayed behind so long indicates that either they had not acquired siege technology, or that Bonifatius was putting up a strong resistance, if not both. Perhaps the Vandals effectively tried to assault the walls with ladders during the first stage of the siege. Surprise attempts during night hours might also have been envisioned. Without support from proper siege engines, though, the Gothic sentinels would have repelled them easily. Geiseric clearly considered that Bonifatius’ forces remained a sufficient threat, given that he maintained the siege all that time. After a couple of months, however, the morale of the inhabitants received a severe blow. They lost their spiritual leader: ‘And, behold, in the third month of the siege Augustine succumbed to fever and was tormented with his last illness.’39 The author of the pseudo-Bonifatius put the following words into Augustine’s mouth: I do not believe that it escapes the notice of Your Excellence that I lie in bed; I eagerly desire that my last day come to me. I rejoice in your victory. Save the Roman state, I beg you. Command your men as a good comes. May you not count on your own strength in any way. Take pride in the originator of your bravery, and you will have concern for no enemy at all. Farewell!40

Augustine had not abandoned his see when the siege had begun. He had urged bishops throughout the African diocese to follow his example, but in August 430, at the age of seventy-six, he passed away.41 The picture derived from the pseudoBonifatius is not authentic, of course, but it is intruiging to contemplate whether

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Bonifatius would have visited Augustine before he died. During his last ten days, Augustine only permited visitors when food was brought to him or his physician was examining him.42 Bonifatius’ immediate presence on the walls would only have been required in case the Vandals launched an attack on the city. At this stage of the siege, they would have been clever enough to refrain from doing so. Bonifatius would have been able to visit Augustine if he wished. It is true that Augustine had withdrawn his support for Bonifatius when he revolted against Ravenna, but even at that time there were still feelings of their old friendship lingering when he reprimanded him. After all, he had written to Bonifatius: At the bidding of love, I have written these things to you, my dearly beloved son; by that love I love you by God’s standards, not by those of the world. For, mindful of the words of Scripture, ‘Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you; rebuke a fool, and he will go on to hate you more’, I certainly ought not to have thought you as a fool but as a wise man.43

By that time the two men had known each other for at least thirteen years. Even in all his orthodox severity Augustine would not have refused to see Bonifatius in his last days. Whether or not Bonifatius would have visited him, however, is a question that must be left unanswered. One cannot rule out the possibility that Augustine’s last known letter, sent to Bonifatius when his public career had hit rock bottom, had offended his pride. The bishop of Hippo died on 28 August, having lived just long enough to witness what has been called ‘an implosion of his life’s work’.44 All the time Hippo was under siege, the Vandals were raging throughout Numidia and Africa Proconsularis. Unlike the continental provinces, we hear of very few indications of resistance.45 One Marxist scholar saw the Vandal invasion as the final straw causing the desintegration of Roman Africa, after decades of struggles between Donastists and Catholics, between the oppressed agrarian populations and the aristrocratic upperclasses, and between the Romano-Punic provincials and the Mauri.46 While social tensions might have facilitated the progress of Geiseric’s forces, we must not forget that Roman Africa had no experience in dealing with barbarian invasions on this scale.47 During the so-called crisis of the third century, the African provinces had been mostly spared from any large-scale warfare, while throughout the fourth century and the first three decades of the fifth, it had seen only local revolts and the occasional Mauri raid. Furthermore, Africa also suffered from a key strategic weakness: its defence system had been concentrated on the pre-Saharan zone since the second century. When the Vandals crossed into Mauretania they thrust themselves directly into Africa’s unprotected rearguard.48 In contrast to provinces

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such as Gaul, Spain or Noricum, there was no nexus of bishops or aristocracies who organized local defences. When the imperial army was not present to offer resistance, most people of the province preferred to flee instead of taking up arms themselves.49 The very fact that only three major cities were sufficiently fortified, as Possidius implies, underlines the peaceful nature of the coastal plains: ‘Of the countless churches scarcely three survive – at Carthage, Hippo, and Cirta. It was through God’s kindness that these were not destroyed. These cities likewise remain, supported by divine and human protection, although after Augustine’s death the enemy burned the city of Hippo, which had been abandoned by its inhabitants.’50 After more than a year, Geiseric was forced to raise the siege. By that time he was certain that he was unable to take Hippo. His attempts to capture the city by cutting off its supplies had also failed miserably, since his warriors were the ones who were starving by now. That Hippo had enough supplies to support a strong garrison for more than a year against a numerically superior army shows thorough organization on Bonifatius’ part and again further strengthens the hypothesis that Bonifatius had not engaged in a battle prior to the siege, but rather entrenched his troops in the key bastions of the Maghreb. Disease, possibly connected with hunger typical of siege warfare, might also have compelled the Vandals to pull back.51 Famine and disease were not the only elements, however, that convinced the Vandals to leave Hippo behind and reunite their scattered forces. Both the eastern and western courts must have been anxiously waiting on news of the African front. The potential loss of the African diocese would be a major blow for Ravenna, while Constantinople would be eager to avoid being threatened in Mediterranean waters. As soon as Placidia heard about Bonifatius’ defeat near Hippo, she called in the support of her nephew in Constantinople. He sent a force to Africa as Procopius relates: But after much time had passed by, since they were unable to secure Hippo Regius either by force or by surrender, and since at the same time they were being pressed by hunger, they raised the siege. And a little later Bonifatius and the Romans in Libya, since a numerous army had come from both Rome and Byzantium and Aspar with them as general, decided to renew the struggle, and a fierce battle was fought in which they were badly beaten by the enemy, and they made haste to flee as each one could.52

The Augusta probably appealed to Theodosius as a last resort in 430, when it was clear that Bonifatius could not repell the Vandals with the forces that he had at

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his disposal.53 An eastern expedition required a considerable amount of time to organize and prepare. Once again, it was Bonifatius’ resistance in Hippo that bought time, and once again Aspar was chosen as commander for a delicate intervention in the west. Aspar’s army and western reinforcements arrived in the early summer of 431 and probably disembarked at Carthage, which was still in Roman hands.54 The Council of Ephesus took place in the same year and news of the Vandal war made it to the acts.55 The magistrianus Ebagnius even accompanied the eastern Roman forces with a personal invitation for Augustine to attend the Council, only to discover that the bishop had already passed away when he arrived in Africa.56 Aspar’s forces reunited with Bonifatius and immediately engaged the Vandals. Therefore, the battle would have been fought somewhere between Carthage and Hippo, probably at the border of Numidia and Africa Proconsularis. That Geiseric inflicted a severe defeat on them may be determined from the fact that he was able to capture a considerable number of hostages, including one of Aspar’s personal guards, who would become the future emperor Marcian (450– 457).57 Geiseric might have won the battle, but he had not won the war. Aspar retained enough manpower to stay in Africa and continue the resistance. Yet before Bonifatius could decide on a new strategy against the invaders, he was recalled to Italy by Placidia, who was once again caught in political chaos.

The empress’ champion The rise of Aëtius The respective careers of Bonifatius and Aëtius could not have been more different in the years separating Valentinian’s crowning from Aspar’s landing in Carthage. Bonifatius had fallen from war hero to public enemy, had been compelled to fight legitimate troops and had been cornered in Africa by the Vandals. Aëtius, on the other hand, had been climbing steadily to the top. Backed up by his Hunnic auxiliaries, he defeated a Visigothic assault on Arles in 425.58 In the following years, he would restore order in Gaul in a way that not even Constantius had succeeded in doing. The Franks were beaten back from northern Gaul into Belgica Secunda and he was even able to recover the western bank of the Rhine.59 During these years he forged strong ties with the GalloRomanic aristocracy and bishops.60 Eventually he started expanding his sphere of operations by campaiging against Iuthungi and bacaudae in Noricum.61 He might have even established the first steps towards initiating diplomatic contacts

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to re-establish imperial authority in Britain.62 For his military successes he was promoted from comes rei militaris to magister equitum per Gallias.63 Aëtius’ meteoric rise deeply disturbed his superior, Felix. As supreme commander of the western Roman army, Felix had tried to restore legitimate control in all its sectors. In 427, he managed to retrieve Pannonia from the Huns.64 At the same time, he tried to eliminate independent actors who could harm the fragile restored unity. Patroclus, the powerful bishop of Arles, had been his first victim. He went on to try removing Bonifatius with disastrous results. By 429, when Bonifatius was restored to favour and Aëtius had received promotion, his policy had clearly failed and his prestige had been severely diminished. Galla Placidia benefited from this by becoming more politically independent, but at the same time she was desperately trying to maintain a balance between her generals at all costs. Though she would not have easily forgotten Aëtius’ siding with Ioannes, at the same time she could not deny the valuable services that he had contributed to the restoration of imperial authority in Gaul. On the other hand, she had to make sure that he remained subordinate to Felix. In conjunction with Aëtius’ promotion, the empress awarded Felix with the consulate in 428 and the patriciate in 429.65 With Bonifatius back in control over the comitiva Africae in the same year, she had once again settled a balance of power. And just as four years earlier, it was not made to last. In May 430, a military uprising broke out in Ravenna. Felix, his wife and a deacon were murdered at the very doorstep of the capital’s basilica.66 Not long before this, rumours had been spread that the patrician was plotting the assassination of Aëtius. Such rumours seem credible enough in light of Felix’s past actions, but Aëtius’ handling of the matter hints that this was nothing but a pretext. The empress must have been infuriated by this brutal violation of her authority, but she was politically paralysed. In this same year the Vandals had cornered Bonifatius in Hippo Regius and she had been forced to call in Theodosius’ assistance as a last resort.67 For the moment she could only acquiesce, and appointed Aëtius as the new magister utriusque militiae. He continued his campaigns in the Danubian provinces, while she waited for an opportunity to retaliate.

Investment of authority While Geiseric was still at large in Africa, Bonifatius’ presence was requested in Italy. He returned, though considering the recent defeat of the allied imperial forces it hardly seemed to be the most opportune moment to abandon his post. What convinced him to do so? The answers lie in Procopius, Hydatius and

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Prosper. Procopius tells us: ‘Aspar betook himself homeward, and Bonifatius, coming before Placidia, acquitted himself of the suspicion, showing that it had arisen against him for no true cause.’68 Meanwhile, Hydatius says: ‘Bonifatius, recalled by Placidia from Africa to Italy as a rival to Aëtius, returned to the palace.’69 Tellingly, Prosper records: ‘Bonifatius, having accepted the rank of magister militum, came from Africa to Italy through Rome.’70 Contrary to Procopius’ statement, Aspar did not immediately return to the east. Theodosius had made no small commitment to the west, and his armies would stay for several years in Africa. In 434/435 the absence of these armies in Thrace was so keenly felt that Constantinople was even willing to pay higher tribute to the Huns.71 Despite their initial defeat, Bonifatius and Aspar continued to hold the line against the Vandals throughout 431–432. With the eastern magister militum in Carthage, Bonifatius could have entrusted the defence of the diocese to his colleague. The only way Placidia could have persuaded Bonifatius to return was by promising him the supreme command of the western armies, something that he had been craving for years. If Bonifatius had any intention of recovering the rest of Africa, his power base for nearly a decade now, then he needed to control all elements of the western military.72 Prosper’s statement can be understood to mean that Placidia had sent him official codicils on this occasion, thereby providing extra incentive for him to return to Italy.73 Around this time the western court also consented to the rehabilitation of the elder Nicomachus Flavianus, just when his son became praetorian prefect of Italy.74 In the autumn of 432, Bonifatius landed in Rome and was duly appointed magister militum. Compared to circumstances at the time of Valentinian’s coronation, however, it could hardly be called the summum of his career. His last victory had been won as a rebel against legitimate imperial forces, while his recent defeat against the Vandals must have lowered his prestige. We can safely assume that Placidia had recalled and promoted Bonifatius because of the loyalty he had demonstrated in the past. She might have felt more secure, however, to entrust him the senior generalship in the knowledge that his present condition would not make him over-confident.75 Aëtius initially suspected nothing. He had just conducted another successful expedition against the Franks and when he returned to his headquarters in Arles he was making preparations for a diplomatic mission against the Sueves.76 When Aëtius returned to Italy he expected to receive his first consulship. As the western chroniclers reveal, however, he would soon discover that there was little reason to celebrate.77 Some scholars believe that Aëtius rushed from Gaul to Italy to engage Bonifatius head-on when he heard about his rival’s appointment.78 But the words

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of Prosper and the Gallic chronicler of 452, who were in general not favourable towards Aëtius, make it clear that he was present in Italy and had reacted graciously to his removal from office.79 Can we assume that he voluntarily obeyed Galla Placidia’s orders and acquiesced? The situation seems very puzzling, considering that Aëtius had shown no hesitation in eliminating Felix by brute force, on the mere suspicion that the latter was plotting the same thing in return. Aëtius’ sphere of power, however, had hitherto been in Gaul, and he had not previously integrated himself in the political heart of Italy.80 Placidia would not have tried to depose him if he had still been present in Gaul at the head of the field army. Such an act would surely have triggered a similar reaction to that of Bonifatius in Africa in 427. If the Gallic chronicler can be trusted in his chronology of events, I suspect that the consulship was the bait used to draw Aëtius out of his proverbial cave.81 While not conferring any power as such, the consulship remained one of the highest marks of imperial favour and an extraordinary honour. In the later Roman Empire, the consulship was a chance to obtain memorial immortality since specific years were named after the contemporary wielders of the office.82 When Aëtius returned to the Italian peninsula, he must have realized all too late that the empress had engineered his downfall. Nevertheless, he had the nerve to show up at court to lay down his power officially: a stunningly bold act.83 Bonifatius was now unquestionably the legitimate supreme commander of the western Roman empire. It is at this point that Marcellinus comes calls both Bonifatius and Aëtius ‘patricians’. Constantine I had introduced this title as a uniquely high civil distinction, but during the fifth century it was mostly carried by the western Roman generalissimo. The sources sometimes intended this additional meaning when they used the term to designate the most powerful general, even if he was not carrying the title.84 From contemporary sources we know that Aëtius received this honour only several years later, but Marcellinus could have been anticipating this.85 He is the only source to mention it for Bonifatius, however, and it has been doubted whether Bonifatius ever received the patriciate at all.86 Others argue that Placidia conferred this honour because by now she must have realized that having more than one powerful general around was not manageable. By granting Bonifatius the title, she could have made it clear to everyone that he was once again her champion.87 This verdict ulimately depends on Marcellinus, who might seem to imply an equal standing between Aëtius and Bonifatius as generals when he called them ‘patricians’. This can be noted from another battle in his chronicle. Around 464, Italy was invaded by an Alan warband and Marcellinus calls both the Alan leader Beorgor and Ricimer, the magister militum who defeated them,

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‘kings’ to indicate that they were both barbarian warlords.88 Yet Marcellinus later refers to Sebastian as the son-in-law of ‘the one time Patrician Bonifatius’.89 To Marcellinus, therefore, there was no doubt that Bonifatius had received the patriciate and given the circumstances it seemed justified.90 Now that he could direct the military rank and file as he pleased, Bonifatius might have considered returning to Africa to launch a new offensive against Geiseric. Instead, he set out to do that which Stilicho and Constantius had succeeded in achieving when they held his position, and Castinus and Felix had failed to accomplish: to eliminate his most dangerous rival of all.

The Battle of Rimini As the year 432 drew to a close, a terrible winter set in.91 A later continuator of Prosper’s chronicle tells us that Bonifatius and Aëtius came to blows at the fifth milestone from Rimini.92 Once again we deal with a battle for which the details are scanty in the sources. As one scholar has remarked, it was significant because: ‘For the first time a civil war was fought not over who should be emperor, but over who should be the emperor’s generalissimo.’93 If Felix’s murder had not yet dispelled any illusions that the western Roman court was in control over its military, then an open battle between its two most powerful commanders so close to an imperial capital must have broadcast the message loud and clear. It has been thought that Bonifatius had superior forces at his disposal because of his new position.94 There is good reason to suppose, however, that this was not the case. Liebeschuetz remarks sharply that Italy was completely defenceless when the Vandals invaded Sicily eight years later.95 Valentinian was even forced to issue a law that granted citizens the right to take up arms themselves, because the government could do nothing until the field army returned from Gaul where it had concluded a war with the Visigoths.96 For most of Valentinian’s reign, the western Roman army had barely enough units to man one force for great campaigns. At the time of Constantius III’s death, the Italian field army had become the only force to provide manpower for operations outside its designated area. We have seen that it suffered severe casualties in Castinus’ campaign against the Vandals. More manpower was lost in the civil war with the imperial twin regime of the east. Both Ioannes and Felix used the Italian field army against Bonifatius with additional losses. Units had probably stayed behind after Sigisvult’s expedition, and Placidia had sent even more forces to back up Aspar’s army. It seems quite reasonable, therefore, that a sizeable force of the Italian field army was present in Africa. Bonifatius had probably already transferred the African field

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army, or what was left of it, to Aspar before he came back to Italy.97 Aëtius could not have taken the Gallic army with him without upsetting the recently restored order against Visigoths and Franks, or provoking the Burgundians and bacaudae.98 Indeed, there are no indications that these groups became hostile during this conflict. When all possibilites are taken in consideration, it is most likely that the battle of Rimini was nothing more than a miniature war fought out between Aëtius and Bonifatius with their respective buccellarii.99 The relative small scale of this battle could obscure the fact that the stakes were quite high for all participants involved at the time. It is likely that at this showdown, ‘the last of the Romans’ met for the very first and last time. Bonifatius and Aëtius were indeed two sides of the same coin. Just as Bonifatius had become the true lord of Africa, after having risen through the ranks due to his martial prowess and aided by Gothic warriors, so Aëtius had developed a regional power base in Gaul and had become all but untouchable through his Hunnic cavalry.100 The victor of Rimini would ultimately decide the future course of the imperial west and its steering force: Africa and the Goths or Gaul and the Huns. Marcellinus comes provides the only details of the battle’s vicissitudes: ‘Aëtius engaged Bonifatius and wounded him, with a longer lance than that of Bonifatius, which had been made for him the previous day. He himself was unscathed.’101 His account makes it appear as though the battle of Rimini was no more than a medieval duel between the two generals. A few scholars are inclined to believe the curious detail that Aëtius wounded Bonifatius personally with a longer weapon.102 The stratagem with the longer lance, however, would have required Aëtius to know that Bonifatius’ weapon was shorter than his prior to the battle. It does not seem to be credible.103 On the other hand, it is not improbable that Aëtius and Bonifatius encountered and engaged one another personally in battle. Bonifatius was famous for his show of arms in single combat, while Aëtius had learned impressive cavalry skills from his time as a hostage of the Goths and the Huns.104 Both in the fifth and sixth centuries we come across examples of prominent generals entering a melee with enemy leaders.105 As noted previously, this should not necessarily be seen as a form of combat closer to the barbarian tradition than the Roman one. Their personal showdown did not alter the course of the battle, but it proved to have an unexpected, dramatic consequence.

Death of Bonifatius For the first and last time in his career Aëtius was defeated in battle, but Bonifatius would not enjoy his victory for long.106 The reports of Bonifatius’ death, however,

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are downright contradictory. It is worthwhile laying out the relevant snippets from the sources for comparison: He [Bonifatius] defeated him [Aëtius], who was opposing him in battle, and died from disease a few days later.107 Bonifatius was wounded in his battle against Aëtius; he was victorious but retired from it to die.108 [B]ut he [Bonifatius] died a few months later from a wound he had received in a battle undertaken against Aëtius . . .109 Three months later Bonifatius died from the injury he had incurred . . .110 When Bonifatius crossed from Libya with a large army, he [Aëtius] outgeneralled him so that he [Bonifatius] died of disease as a result of his anxieties and Aëtius gained possession of his wife and property.111

John was the only author to assign victory to Aëtius. Marcellinus does not specify the broader outcome at all. The western chroniclers, writing independently from one another, agree that Bonifatius conquered his rival in battle and the fallout of the battle would show that Aëtius had effectively lost. John’s fragment, on the other hand, was derived from a necrology of Aëtius in Priscus’ history in which he was represented as the great bulwark of Valentinian III.112 Therefore, a slight twist on the matter is only natural. Prosper and John attributed Bonifatius’ death to disease, while Hydatius, Marcellinus and the Gallic chronicler of 452 attribute it to a battle wound. These reports do not necessarily contradict each other. The Gallic chronicler of 452 remembered how during the winter of 432/433, ‘there was severe cold that was also ruinous to the health of a great many people’.113 The author of this chronicle placed his entry on the battle between Bonifatius and Aëtius immediately after this winter. In the circumstances of a dire winter, a badly treated wound might have been infected with gangrene. How the matter was represented later, however, could easily have been influenced under the pressure of official propaganda – especially once Aëtius had finally established his military supremacy at court.114 The clearest example of this is Prosper, who spoke well of Bonifatius, but would display an unfavourable attitude towards Aëtius in the rest of his chronicle. The first edition of his chronicle was written immediately after the events, however, and omitted certain significant details that even the less-knowledgeable Gallic chronicler remembered twenty years later.115 Precisely for that reason it is suspicious that he is the only one to mention that Bonifatius died a few days later, while peripheral writers such as Hydatius and Marcellinus comes speak of a couple of months.

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There may even be some truth behind John’s hostile words when he speaks of Bonifatius’ anxieties. It brings Ammianus Marcellinus’ portrait of Petronius Probus to mind. At the very height of his riches and honours, he was always plagued by anxieties and illnesses.116 It was a perfectly reasonable reaction to the stress of participating in Machiavellian games at the highest echelons of the Empire.117 The agony that Bonifatius must have felt during his last months in the winter of 432–433, as his bodily health was slowly fading, can only be imagined. He had become the first undisputed generalissimo since Constantius, only to lose everything immediately afterwards. Instead, he had left the stage at Rimini just as he had entered it two decades earlier in Marseilles: brawling against one of the most important actors of his era. He lived and died, as the old saying goes, by the sword. Et sic transit gloria mundi.

Map 4 Western Roman Empire c. 441–454

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Epilogue: Sebastian’s Odyssey (432–442)

The death of Bonifatius would have a significant effect on the dramatis personae who had played a major role in his life. This is particularly illustrated in the case of his son-in-law Sebastian, whose chequered career presents itself as a jigsaw puzzle in the surviving source material. Nevertheless, a striking image emerges of an audacious man, always on the move all over the Mediterranean, and constantly reinventing himself in order to remain ahead of his enemies.

The exiled general In the aftermath of the battle of Rimini, when Bonifatius was mortally wounded by Aëtius, Hydatius reports that ‘his son-in-law Sebastian replaced him’.1 Sebastian’s appointment as replacement to his father-in-law is an indication that senior authority in the western Roman military was growing increasingly hereditary.2 Placidia might have hoped that he could maintain the loyalty of her former champion’s buccellarii as a direct relative of Bonifatius.3 While Aëtius retreated to his estates, Sebastian set about finishing the task his father-in-law had started, as Prosper reports: ‘Aëtius, who had laid down his power, resided on his estates and there some of his enemies tried to crush him with a sudden attack. Fleeing to Rome and from there to Dalmatia, he thereafter reached the Huns through Pannonia. Using their friendship and assistance, he obtained the peace of the emperors and got his power restored.’4 It should be noted that Prosper did not reveal the identity of the person in charge of the operation to eliminate Aëtius, but it can be inferred from Hydatius that Sebastian was responsible given the recent political circumstances.5 The Gallic chronicle of 452 notes how the western government had tried calling upon Gothic aid in 433.6 It is possible Placidia or Sebastian, if not both, had requested auxiliaries from Toulouse, but it is unclear whether this support ever materialized. If so, it seemed to matter little when in the same year Aëtius

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marched back into Italy with an army of Huns, blackmailed the government to grant him the supreme command of the western forces and had Sebastian exiled. The latter chose to venture to Constantinople.7 It is not improbable that Sebastian hoped to find employment there in the imperial service. Throughout the fourth and early fifth century, officers and generals had frequently switched between western and eastern positions. However, Hydatius and Marcellinus comes make it clear that Sebastian had to flee Constantinople after a while. Hydatius tells us: ‘Sebastian, detected in the place in which he had sought refuge and warned that he was being plotted against, fled from Constantinople.’8 Very similarly, Marcellinus says: ‘Sebastian, the son-in-law of the former patrician Bonifatius, fled from the imperial palace and was killed in Africa.’9 Hydatius does not mention this departure until 444 in which he condenses half of his itinerary in a single entry. The Spanish bishop’s chronology has come to be accepted as the official one.10 Yet a decadelong sojourn at Constantinople simply does not make sense in light of other events, as will be discussed later. Marcellinus comes states that Sebastian fled in 435, and died in Africa soon after. The Constantinopolitan chronicler provides no further information concerning Sebastian. Therefore, the information about his death should not be interpreted as occurring in 435 but rather as a condensed anticipation of his ultimate fate.11 Marcellinus presents the official Constantinopolitan line and was well informed about the capital’s history. The question of chronology will be discussed later, but there seems no reason to doubt that Sebastian had worn out his welcome by 435 and fled. One plausible explanation is that the palace intrigues between the the empress, Pulcheria, and certain chamberlains, with senior generals caught in the middle, ultimately forced Sebastian to leave the eastern capital.12 Yet we know next to nothing of potential ties between the eastern government and Sebastian, except that he was allowed to reside in the capital for some time. It is far more likely that political relations and communication between the two imperial courts were the cause of Sebastian’s second fall from grace. In 435, Aëtius officially established his supremacy over the western imperial government as patrician and magister utriusque militiae. In 437, Valentinian III would marry Theodosius II’s daughter Eudoxia in the eastern capital. The marriage had already been arranged during the young western prince’s exile in 424.13 It has been argued that Aëtius himself accompanied Valentinian to Constantinople for this wedding.14 While not impossible as such, it is very likely that at least Merobaudes, Aëtius’ panegyrist and officer, accompanied the young emperor east.15 Also, both consulships of 437 were reserved for two western

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commanders: Aëtius himself and Sigisvult.16 In the context of a marriage that was supposed to serve as a symbol of imperial unity, and the new military regime established at the western court by Aëtius, the presence of Sebastian at the eastern court suddenly became a potential source for tension and embarrassment.17 As the chroniclers relate, Sebastian must then have feared for his life and decided to flee Constantinople.

Mediterranean freebooter It is probably at this juncture that piracy had broken out amongst his retainers, as a section from the Suda dealing with the reign of Theodosius II reveals: Since he [Theodosius II] had been brought up under the influence of the eunuchs, he was open to their every demand. The result was that even the senior officials needed their support, and there were many innovations in the civil and military administrations, since positions were not filled by people who could administer them but by people who paid gold for them because of the greed of the eunuchs. Moreover, piracy broke out amongst Sebastian’s retainers and harassed the Hellespont and the Propontis.18

This information comes from a hostile source who aimed to slander the rule of Theodosius II, most probably Priscus, who was very well disposed towards Aëtius. Therefore, it is hard to judge whether we are dealing with nefarious court gossip or not. However, the description of Sebastian’s buccellarii resorting to piracy is reminiscent of Bonifatius’ retinue in 427, when they pillaged the provincial population of Africa at a time when their patron had been stripped of his rank. It has been suggested that Sebastian inherited his father-in-law’s buccellarii, which is possible but difficult to prove.19 It has also been asserted that after Bonifatius’ death, these buccellarii would have remained with Pelagia and preferred to remain neutral in the conflict between Aëtius and Sebastian.20 However, this argument is based on Marcellinus comes’ claim that the dying Bonifatius had urged his wife to remarry his foe: ‘Three months later Bonifatius died from the injury he had incurred, imploring his very wealthy wife Pelagia to marry no one other than Aëtius.’21 Given that this claim is only supported by a sixth-century eastern source, generally well disposed towards Aëtius, it is more likely to be a product of the latter’s propaganda after having seized her and her property.22 Yet Marcellinus only speaks of Pelagia’s wealth.23 While it is likely that Sebastian may have secured the allegiance of some, if not all, of Bonifatius’ buccellarii, he might personally have recruited other retainers as well during his

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brief stint as magister utriusque militiae. Such men became his only remaining source of power and protection after his second fall from grace. Yet the only way to retain their loyalty was to provide for them. Turning to piracy may have been the only available option. The sources do not mention Sebastian explicitly again until his arrival at the court of the Visigothic king, Theoderic I (418–451).24 However, at least one of his pit-stops between Constantinople and Gaul can be attested. Prosper mentions that ‘barbarian deserters of the foederati took to piracy’ in 437, and that ‘the same pirates plundered many islands, especially Sicily’, in 438.25 Marcellinus comes reports a similar sudden upsurge of piracy in these years, and says that in 438: ‘The brigand Contradis, along with his pirates and companions was captured and killed.’26 A few scholars believe that Prosper must be referring here to the Vandals, whose king, Geiseric, had concluded a treaty with the imperial west in 435.27 Indeed, this entry immediately follows after a lengthy description of how Geiseric inflicted tribulations upon Catholic bishops.28 Yet Prosper was perfectly capable of naming and blaming them for such nefarious behaviour, as he did in other parts of his chronicle, if they actually were Vandals.29 Furthermore, Geiseric did not yet possess the naval means to engage in piracy, as he would do after his capture of Carthage and its grain fleet in 439.30 As Olympiodorus notes, both buccellari and foederati could refer to imperial army units and the line between them was a very thin one.31 Prosper distorts the real identity of these foederati by including them in a same group of entries dealing with a people with whom the empire had concluded a foedus a few years earlier. At the very least, Prosper chooses once again to leave Sebastian unmentioned, despite being aware that he had become a freebooter and lost several of his buccellarii to desertion.32

Soldier of fortune As Hydatius noted, Sebastian fled from Constantinople to Gaul. But at what point did he arrive in Gaul? A plausible context seems to be some time during the war between the Visigoths and the Romans, which raged from 436 to 439, or at least in its initial phase. Jordanes mentions that in the year 439 a band of foederati in Gaul arrived which caused Aëtius to wage war against the Visigoths: ‘In the consulship of Theodosius and Festus the Romans broke the truce and took up arms against him [Theoderic] in Gaul, with the Huns as their auxiliaries. For a band of the Gallic Allies [foederati], led by comes Gainas, had aroused the Romans by throwing Constantinople into a panic.’33 Clover has demonstrated

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that Jordanes confused Sebastian with the Gothic general Gainas who had already been dead for more than thirty years at this juncture.34 Yet Jordanes assigns the start of this war to 439 when it was at its peak. Prosper, an exact contemporary of these events, states that Theoderic started the war by capturing several cities and besieging Narbonne in 436.35 Narbonne was the closest harbour city to Visigothic Aquitaine and the most probable beachhead for Sebastian to land with whatever remaining troops he had. The siege lasted several months, and was only broken by Aëtius’ subordinate general Litorius.36 Over the next two years the war intensified. Litorius fought all the way to the Visigothic capital of Toulouse, until he went down in a charge of his Hun brigade.37 Aëtius himself had to continue the war and eventually brokered a peace treaty in 439. Considering the extent of the war zone, it is difficult to interpret how Sebastian could have joined forces with Theoderic from overseas between 437 and 439, the exact period in which some of his buccellarii had chosen to remain pirates around Sicily.38 Given that Sebastian had already fled Constantinople in 435, it is possible that he landed in southern Gaul in 436, just in time to join the Visigoths besieging Narbonne. Given that some of his buccellarii were already deserters by 437 at the latest, this implies that he had been unable to provide for all of them sufficiently. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the fugitive commander wished to perpetuate this economic uncertainty and risk further mutiny by marauding around the Mediterranean for several years. I suspect that Sebastian’s early participation in the Visigothic war might be a factor that helped in bringing about Litorius’ defeat. Writing after 445, Sidonius Apollinaris, Prosper and Victor of Vita all describe Sebastian as a headstrong man, skilled in warfare.39 In fact, we know very little of which wars Sebastian participated in, but he must have built up considerable experience to receive these epithets.40 Ever since Alaric’s death, the Visigoths had not obtained a single victory over imperial forces.41 It seems not unlikely that Litorius’ defeat could have been facilitated through the aid and expertise of Sebastian, himself a former magister utriusque militiae. Once again, it is also worthwhile to note that Prosper does not mention Sebastian at all during his Gallic tenure, despite being aware that the latter crossed to Africa from Spain.42

The warlordship of Tarraconensis Sebastian’s expulsion from Aquitaine was probably a result of the treaty of 439 between the western Roman government and the Visigoths, in which Theoderic

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most likely sacrificed him in the interest of his realm. Once again Sebastian had to roam around. Hydatius mentions him briefly taking over Barcelona at this juncture: ‘Coming to Theoderic, the king of the Goths, he was declared an outlaw and then entered Barcelona, which he had sought for himself as best as he could.’43 The choice of Barcelona may have been fortuitous, since it was the first major city on the land route from southern Gaul into Spain.44 Sebastian’s occupation of Barcelona might seem like an isolated event, but is of considerable importance if one takes into account the political context of mid-fifth-century Spain. Since the departure of the Vandals in 429, the Sueves remained the only major barbarian power in Spain. Throughout the 430s they had remained confined in Gallaecia, but with the accession of their king Rechila in 438, the balance of power changed considerably.45 During the next years he launched attacks affecting half of the peninsula. In 438, he defeated the last attested provincial army in Baetica.46 In 439, Rechila even captured the diocesan capital Merida.47 Tarraconensis, where Barcelona was situated, remained the only province firmly in imperial hands. It was a natural defensible region with a local aristocracy that had proper resources to arm itself.48 Barcelona had been the residence of the usurper Maximus and the Gothic king, Athaulf, earlier in the fifth century. It had been properly fortified with walls, was a wealthy city thanks to its port, and was in regular communication with the rest of the Mediterranean.49 Even as late as 472, the Visigoths had to send several armies to defeat local forces and besiege the coastal cities when they wanted to conquer the Ebro valley.50 In such a context, it seems highly unlikely that Sebastian took Barcelona by storm and Hydatius’ statement does not seem to imply such a reading. It is more plausible that the city eagerly welcomed him. Tarraconensis would have been the perfect playground for a warlord such as Sebastian and Barcelona an excellent base. There is one further piece of evidence to support this hypothesis. In 441, for the first time in twenty years, an imperial field army was sent to Spain, not to reconquer Merida, nor to fight the Sueves, but to restore order in Tarraconensis where it had to slaughter huge numbers of bacaudae.51 There remains considerable controversy over the exact nature of these groups, especially concerning the ones in Gaul.52 In the Spanish case, however, it is reasonable to see them as a collection of warbands or private militias raised by the local aristocracy as a matter of selfdefence in a province officially governed but no longer defended by the Empire. This is actually the very first time the bacaudae appear in Spain and a connection with Sebastian would definitely make sense in the larger scheme of things. Yet our desperado does not seem to have intended to become a late Roman Sertorius. He departed from Barcelona in 440, and made for Africa.53

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It has been argued that news of the imperial campaign to Tarraconensis may already have been public in 440 and compelled Sebastian to leave.54 This is unlikely. When Geiseric conquered Carthage in 439, this caused all western Roman military effort outside Italy to be halted. Indeed, Valentinian III issued a decree in 440 intending to raise Italy’s defences against Vandal raids, and expected the imminent arrival of Aëtius’ forces. In these conditions, it is unimaginable that an imperial army could have already been intended to march on Spain in 440, when the Vandal king had already landed in Sicily and besieged several cities.55 I believe it was this last fact that urged Sebastian to make haste for Africa at full speed. Nearly ten years earlier, he must have been part of Bonifatius’ force that left Africa for Italy. In a certain sense, Sebastian was finally returning home to the province where his career had started. The move would ultimately spell his doom. This is the most difficult part of Sebastian’s life to reconstruct and again we need to examine the wider geopolitical context closely.

Asylum in Africa In 439, Geiseric had broken his treaty with the Empire and taken Carthage by surprise. The next year he crossed over to Sicily, where he besieged several cities. Prosper states that Geiseric chose to return to Carthage because he heard that Sebastian was on his way from Spain: While Geiseric was inflicting serious damage on Sicily, he received word that Sebastian was crossing from Spain to Africa and quickly returned to Carthage. Geiseric thought it would be most dangerous to him and his people if a man skilled in warfare was bent upon retaking Carthage. But Sebastian, wishing to appear as a friend rather than an enemy, found everything in the mind of the barbarian contrary to what he had hoped. That hope was to him a cause of the greatest calamity and an unhappy death.56

This entry is in fact the only time Prosper mentions Sebastian by name and he does not make any effort to introduce him properly.57 Prosper’s testimony has been dismissed on the basis that Sebastian was ‘alone and a fugitive’, hence not able to pose any threat to Geiseric.58 As will be discussed later, this cannot be the case, since Geiseric later needed a pretext to eliminate Sebastian. If Sebastian had been a sole desperado, it would not have been necessary for him to engineer

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such a pretext. It has similarly been dismissed as a piece of imperial propaganda and scaremongering meant to compel Geiseric to leave Sicily, based on the argument that Hydatius did not depict Sebastian arriving in Africa until five years later.59 Hydatius is without doubt one of our most important sources for the history of the mid-fifth-century late Roman west, but it has to be emphasized that his recollection of events outside his native Gallaecia is not always sound. This entry by Prosper provides the clearest case against Hydatius’ chronology of Sebastian’s trek.60 Hydatius noted that Sebastian arrived in Vandal Africa in 445, and that between 449 and 450 he was put to death. But the latter entry also states that he was killed shortly after his arrival. The clearest argument against this version is Prosper’s chronology. Prosper published his chronicle in three different editions: the first one in 433, the second one in 445 and the final one in 455.61 The last recorded event in this second edition took place in 444. Already before 445, Prosper knew that Sebastian was no longer amongst the living and this fact is the strongest argument against relying on Hydatius’ chronology for the life of Sebastian. Sebastian’s decision to set sail for Vandal Africa has been interpreted as the final decision forced upon a man who had worn out his welcome with all other major political players around the Mediterranean.62 From a completely different perspective, John Bury writes that Sebastian was operating in the service of Theodosius II when he crossed to Africa.63 That seems unlikely, considering he was an enemy of the state in both imperial realms. Yet I think Bury perhaps struck much closer to the truth than any other scholar since. Sebastian was still operating as an independent agent, but probably took a gamble to seize a final opportunity to redeem himself. Prosper clearly states that Sebastian was initially bent on recapturing Carthage. At this time, the eastern Empire was organizing an armada to relieve Sicily. Valentinian III had already publicly announced on 24 June 440 that Theodosius II was to send help.64 If Sebastian were able to take Carthage, one of the very few fortified North African cities, while Geiseric was absent in Sicily, it would be possible for imperial forces to smash the Vandals between a hammer and an anvil. It would not have been the first time that a fifth-century general managed to receive an imperial amnesty as a result of his valuable services. Indeed Sebastian’s nemesis, Aëtius, had in fact forged his career that way. Yet one does not simply walk into Carthage. A direct naval crossing from Barcelona across open sea would have been extremely perilous. If Sebastian had wanted to reach Africa from Barcelona, he probably would have stuck close to the Spanish coastline and have crossed over from the closest harbour opposite the Numidian coast, Cartagena. Such an operation would have been identical to the emperor Majorian’s

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campaign against the Vandals twenty years later. However, both failed for the exact same reasons. Both in Sebastian’s and in Majorian’s case, Geiseric possessed informers who kept track of enemy movement.65 From Sicily, it was just a few days to head back to Carthage, so by the time Sebastian reached Africa, Geiseric was already waiting for him. The eastern Roman navy only arrived a year later and Prosper explicitly criticizes their delays: ‘Theodosius opened hostilities with the Vandals, by sending the generals Areobindus, Ansila and Germanus with a large fleet. They deferred the business with long delays and proved to be more of a burden to Sicily than a help to Africa.’66 When Sebastian landed in Africa and found Geiseric already present, there must have been no other option than to make common cause with a former enemy who was at war with a government that had branded both men as enemies of the state.67

Sebastian’s death Prosper and Hydatius both agree that Sebastian must have died not long after his arrival at Geiseric’s court. Hydatius foreshadowed the event in the following ominous terms: ‘Exiled, Sebastian sought asylum in the power of Geiseric, an act which was to prove his ruin, as the outcome afterwards demonstrated, for shortly after his arrival Geiseric ordered him to be killed.’68 Victor of Vita provides a lengthy anecdote of Sebastian’s stay, in which he engaged in a battle of wills with Geiseric, who was plotting his demise: There was a comes Sebastian, subtle in counsel and valiant in war, son-in-law of the well-known comes Bonifatius. Geiseric, just as he deemed his counsels necessary, dreaded being in his presence. He longed to put an end to him, and found a pretext for killing him in religion. The king decided to address Sebastian while his bishops and domestici were present.69

Victor reveals that Sebastian managed to overcome Geiseric by a trick worthy of Ulysses.70 Unlike his father-in-law, Sebastian seems to have strictly adhered to the Catholic faith and did not wish to compromise himself with Arianism. Therefore, Victor’s main intention of including Sebastian in his history was to uphold him as a Catholic martyr, who persevered in the face of a hostile persecutor. As far as this narrative can be trusted, there are two noteworthy elements: Geiseric needed a pretext to kill Sebastian and could not simply eliminate him. The need for a pretext indicates that he still had some sort of protection, probably from the remaining members of his buccellarii serving as

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bodyguards. Geiseric also felt the need to do this in front of his domestici, his own household officers. Victor goes on to state that ‘afterwards on some other grounds, he had the warlike man put to death’.71 At some point between 440 and 445, Geiseric had Sebastian killed. Following Prosper and Hydatius, this probably occurred at a date closer to his arrival. The year 442 provides the most plausible context for a pretext under which Geiseric assassinated Sebastian. Prosper explained: ‘The Augustus Valentinian made peace with Geiseric and divided Africa between the two into distinct territories.’72 At that point, a long-lasting treaty was struck between the western empire and the Vandals, under whose terms Geiseric’s son Huneric was betrothed to the emperor Valentinian’s daughter Eudocia.73 As our source Prosper relates, 442 was also the year that Geiseric firmly established a monarchy based on his dynasty in North Africa at the expense of the Vandal aristocracy which rose up against him: Some of Geiseric’s magnates [optimates] conspired against him because he was proud, even among his own people, due to the successful outcome of events. But when the undertaking was discovered, they were subjected to many tortures and killed by him. And when the same thing appeared about to be attempted by others, death came to so many through the king’s suspicion that he lost more men through his worry than if he had been overcome in battle.74

No source claims that the treaty stipulated Sebastian’s elimination, or that he was part of the rebellion against Geiseric.75 Yet ever since his exile from Italy, wherever Sebastian roamed, he seemed to leave a trail of dissidence and became an obstacle to international relations. In 435, he had to flee Constantinople in the same year Aëtius became officially patrician and magister utriusque militiae, while his retainers engaged in piracy. Before 437, he landed in Gaul where he possibly participated in a Visigothic war against the western Roman government, but had to flee as soon as a peace treaty was struck. Before 440, he had established himself in Barcelona around the same time local militias were governing themselves in the absence of imperial government. Finally, Victor of Vita implies that Sebastian was killed because Geiseric deemed him a threat to his own authority. Given his impeccable track record for rebellion and jeopardizing international relations, 442 seems the most likely year that Sebastian met his ultimate end after a decade-long odyssey.

Conclusion

The legacy and afterlife of Bonifatius Scholars have often been tempted to defend or denounce Procopius’ praise of Bonifatius as the ‘last of the Romans’, together with Aëtius. John Bury thought that the compliment to Aëtius was weakened by the inclusion of Bonifatius.1 Peter Heather’s recent standard narrative on the later Empire even heads his section on Aëtius as ‘the last true Roman of the West’, while relegating Bonifatius’ claim to a mere footnote.2 J.R. Moss, on the other hand, believed that Bonifatius had a far better claim to the title than Aëtius, whom he considered a traitor to the western Empire.3 De Lepper concluded his doctorate on Bonifatius’ life also in glorifying tones.4 The truth is that Procopius’ epitaph is not particularly helpful in establishing Bonifatius’ significance in the history of the western Roman Empire, nor is it absolutely necessary to take into serious consideration. Procopius’ account of Bonifatius and Aëtius was, after all, only part of a digression to explain how the Vandals conquered Africa, and he was not especially interested in specific fifth-century details. We have seen how other and later eastern Roman historiographers, such as Jordanes, John of Antioch and Theophanes, basically followed this tradition, which was possibly derived from Priscus and hostile western sources.5 As a result, the representation of Bonifatius in most eastern sources is mostly negative compared to that of Aëtius. When Olympiodorus mentioned Bonifatius for the first time in his history, he was a celebrated war hero. Already in the decades after his death, however, his role in Placidia’s reign was being downplayed in favour of Aëtius in eastern accounts such as that of Priscus. After the sixth century, Bonifatius would chiefly be remembered as an enemy of the state. If there was one event that would make Bonifatius go down in history, it was his so-called ‘invitation’ to the Vandals to assist him in his struggles with the Empire in exchange for African territory. Procopius, who had access to both Olympiodorus’ and Priscus’ histories, clearly spared him by giving him some praise with his title of ‘last of the Romans’.6 Not

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everyone would use this kind of finesse, and after Procopius, Bonifatius would chiefly be remembered for his ‘betrayal’. This evolution should not necessarily be assigned to one specific author, such as Priscus, though he certainly might have had a hand in providing material for it. Marcellinus seems to be an exception to this tradition, but even he was more interested in stressing Aëtius’ splendid show of arms in his combat with Bonifatius.7 This popularity of Aëtius in eastern historiography should not necessarily be seen as a result of the general’s propaganda and, in fact, probably represented genuine local opinion.8 Aëtius’ panegyrists and hostile senatorial factions would also have had few qualms about misrepresenting Bonifatius’ parley with Geiseric to sully his reputation. It is hard to miss the irony that Bonifatius’ memory would remain that of a hostis publicus, when one points out that Aëtius had made himself an ‘enemy of ’ Placidia, and thus the state, multiple times.9 Yet Aëtius would remain the great hero of the western Roman empire in sixth-century historiography. Western chroniclers such as Hydatius, Cassiodorus and the anonymous composers of the Gallic chronicles of 452 and 511, who predominantly wrote from the periphery and at least several decades after Bonifatius’ death, did not have a specific opinion about him. They contented themselves mostly with mentioning a couple of his best-known acts. In Africa he was mentioned only incidentally in the works of Possidius and Victor of Vita, though the latter seemed to have kept a favourable memory of Bonifatius. Salvian does not mention him at all, while Sidonius Apollinaris includes him in his works only because of his Gallic panegyrist. We can only conclude that in the west our protagonist did not make a strong impression on later generations. The same cannot be said, however, about his impact upon those men who were writing closest to his lifetime. In the fragmentary history of Olympiodorus, Bonifatius is by far the most positively described character. Though it is possible that Olympiodorus might have derived his information from Bonifatius’ own panegyrist, the Egyptian poet’s opinions on the general were compatible with his historical aims.10 The chief intent of Olympiodorus’ history was to tell ‘how the west was won’ with the restoration of Valentinian through eastern arms as the climax. As we have seen, Bonifatius was one of the chief architects of its success. We also have to bear in mind that Olypiodorus writes from the side of the partisans of Placidia, who always favoured Bonifatius over Aëtius.11 A third crucial reason is Olympiodorus’ belief in good relations between the Romans and Visigoths as key to the stabilization of western imperial power. He understood and accepted Stilicho’s

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view that the best hope for Rome lay in a realistic accommodation of the Visigoths.12 The best-known symbol for this was the marriage of Athaulf and Galla Placidia. The Goths were a crucial element in Bonifatius’ career: he wounded a Gothic king, commanded Gothic soldiers in the imperial army, married a Gothic noblewoman and became an independent power thanks to the Gothic retainers of their marriage. In Olympiodorus’ vision, Bonifatius may have fitted perfectly therefore as a bridge between the two groups. Unintentionally, however, this also cast Bonifatius in the role of one of the first ‘barbarized’ Roman generals.13 At about the same time as the Egyptian diplomat was writing his history, Prosper of Aquitaine composed the first edition of his chronicle in Rome. He started to give serious attention to political affairs as soon as Bonifatius’ conflict with Castinus occurred. His entries on Bonifatius’ conflict with Castinus, Felix and Aëtius are among the longest and most detailed sections in his work. Bonifatius is portrayed as a competent military man and, far more importantly, the only western general whom Prosper directly praises and who is not involved in some explicitly shameful deed. It is true that he also noticed Bonifatius’ ambition, but compared with the other generals of his day, whom Prosper generally considered a foul lot, this representation is remarkable. A possible explanation might be Prosper’s connection with Augustine, but it is difficult to tell to what extent the chronicler knew about the latter’s relationship with Bonifatius. We cannot claim that Prosper was a partisan of the general, but perhaps he wished to use him, the best of a bad lot, to illustrate the graver faults of Bonifatius’ colleagues.14 This is even better reflected in Prosper’s attitude towards Sebastian, whose identity is shrouded in his chronicle when reporting dubious events the renegade general was involved in, while directly praising him in a single entry. The few things that give us most insight into Bonifatius’ background have to be judged ultimately on the information that Augustine provides us. The picture that we derive from their letters seems straightforward enough, if heavily coloured by the bishop of Hippo’s rigid orthodox views. As long as Bonifatius was a devout Christian, Augustine held him in the highest regard. When Bonifatius married Pelagia and usurped the comitiva Africae, the bishop might have started to doubt the officer’s behaviour. Augustine might have felt a certain level of comfort in the knowledge that Pelagia converted to Catholicism and her husband persecuted Pelagians after his return in Africa, just as he had persecuted Donatists before. When Bonifatius brought civil war upon Africa, however, Augustine withdrew his support.

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The picture of Bonifatius in Augustine’s correspondence is exceptional in another matter. Bury once aptly stated, invoking the image of the blind seer Teresias trapped in the underworld, that ‘the Roman emperors, statesmen, and generals [of this era] are dim figures, some of them mere names . . . [We] can form little or no idea of their personalities; τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ άίσσουσιν’.15 Bonifatius seems to be an exception among fifth-century western generals, since we have a rare insight into his private life. De Lepper regarded Bonifatius’ marriage with Pelagia as the turning point in the officer’s life.16 While its importance is beyond doubt, an even more crucial point seems to be the meeting of Augustine and Bonifatius at Tubunae. It is at that pivotal meeting that we can catch a glimpse of what kind of person Bonifatius might have been.17 He was so devastated by grief over the loss of his wife that he wanted to withdraw from public life and dedicate the rest of his days to a more venerable cause. It would be unfair to claim Augustine was responsible for Bonifatius’ future acts, when he convinced him to remain a military man. He took Bonifatius away, however, from a path that might have caused less disaster in the end. The safest thing that we can say about the man Bonifatius, when taking his entire career into account, is that he was definitely not a saint. Yet ironically enough it was a saint who had prevented him from achieving something more devout in his life.

Bonifatius’ role in western Roman history Among all sources, Prosper probably comes closest to capturing the true impact of the events during Bonifatius’ career: ‘That [Bonifatius’ desertion] was the beginning of many troubles for the state.’18 In the last stage of Constantius’ career, the western empire had recovered to a great extent and was even able to go on the offensive again. If Castinus’ campaign against the Vandals in 422 had been successful, a major barbarian confederation would have been subdued and the Mediterranean heart of the imperial west safeguarded. Instead, a power struggle was unleashed that raged for more than a decade, while the west was still at bay. On the one hand, several generals wanted to become uncontested supreme commander. Galla Placidia, on the other hand, directed all her energies to prevent this. As a result, during Bonifatius’ tenure as comes Africa, valuable military resources were wasted and the Vandals were able to capture the west’s most important province. When Aëtius finally made his comeback in 433, little could be done to reverse the damage sustained to the fragile integrity of the state.

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Trying to single out one individual who was most responsible for this chaos is pointless, and would only lead us to the same old scapegoat theories that Roman historiographers used to explain the disasters of the imperial west.19 Bonifatius played his part in the chaos that resulted from the struggle for the supreme command of the western armies. Yet the establishment of childemperors such as Honorius and Valentinian III paved the way for senior generals to directly manage state affairs. Putting Bonifatius in a list of these generalissimos, such as Stilicho, Constantius, Aëtius and Ricimer, does not reveal his importance.20 We have seen that by the time he became supreme commander he was hardly at the peak of his military career, and in the end he did not live long enough to make a difference in this role. In fact, his death might even have prevented a prolonged civil war in Italy. Speculating, as Moss did, how the western empire could have prospered if Bonifatius had survived to direct its affairs, is the sort of counter-factual history that is better reserved for historical novels.21 So did Bonifatius make a difference then? Is there a moment in time when it becomes impossible to erase our protagonist from the history of his times? Can we pinpoint a moment when his person and actions made such a big difference that it would be inconceivable to write about that particular historical period without mentioning him? De Lepper would have argued that if it had not been for Bonifatius, the entire Roman Empire would have remained united under the sovereignty of Theodosius II.22 Events showed, however, that this had become impossible by the fifth century, and Bonifatius’ actions merely accelerated the demise of Theodosius’ project. Yet it was indeed Ioannes’ usurpation that would demonstrate Bonifatius’ extraordinary power. The very nature of this power does not become apparent if we compare him with previous militum such as Stilicho or Constantius, or even comites Africae such as Gildo or Heraclian. There is one other man, however, whose career several decades later strongly paralleled that of Bonifatius. In 461, the western emperor Majorian was executed by his magister militum Ricimer.23 Marcellinus, probably a comes rei militaris, refused to recognize Ricimer’s puppet emperor Libius Severus and revolted in Dalmatia.24 He did not make any attempt to become emperor or proclaim one himself. Instead, he governed Dalmatia on his own authority, backed up with the regional field army and ‘Scythian’ foederati. He campaigned against the Vandals in Sicily, and even threatened to invade Italy. When the eastern emperor Leo sent Anthemius as new western emperor to Italy in 467, Marcellinus accompanied him with his forces and was awarded the patriciate and a position as magister militum. He was murdered in Sicily, most probably on behalf of Ricimer, at the pinnacle of his

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power. Marcellinus’ nephew Julius Nepos would inherit his uncle’s power in Dalmatia and even become the last legitimate western Roman emperor.25 Marcellinus belonged to a new generation of military men, just like his colleague Aegidius in northern Gaul and Ricimer in northern Italy. When they refused to recognize a specific emperor, each of them went into open rebellion and separated his respective province of command from central authority. They exercised a decisive role in political affairs without conforming to the structure of imperial office-holding which hitherto had been the traditional source of legitimacy for power-holders in the late Roman world. None of them took the traditional step of usurpation, nor did they try to create alternative imperial governments of their own.26 Bonifatius may have been championing Placidia’s cause after Honorius’ death, but as long as Theodosius refused to support her, he was ruling Africa on his own authority. In his position of comes Africae, just like his predecessors Gildo and Heraclian, he had probably put political pressure on Italy by disrupting its grain supplies or the threat of doing so. The vital difference is that Bonifatius was capable of resisting Italian counter-offensives when push came to shove. Even when the legitimate goverment tried to remove him later, he could command and direct the African army against it. His career, occurring less than a few years after the death of Constantius III, already shows the evolution taking place in the military upper classes. Both Stilicho and Constantius had wielded enormous power beyond their official rank of magister utriusque militiae, exercising de facto control over the government of the imperial west. Yet both men had followed a traditional career path inside the officer’s class and on no occasion did they break from the dynastic government. Bonifatius achieved his military position and power in substantially different ways. Each was claimed in actions which, from a legitimist point of view, can only be identified as insubordinate and violently opposing the expressed wishes of central authority. Bonifatius was able to establish local dominance in Africa based on his access to private forces, which he could muster successfully on three different occasions against Castinus, Felix and Aëtius. Bonifatius became the first western Roman officer to challenge and resist central authority successfully, without resorting to the traditional means of usurping the imperial office – a course still taken by other contenders during his early career. Hence, Bonifatius established a new paradigm for political and military opposition by professing loyalty to the reigning dynasty but not to its generalissimos. In the process he broke the western imperial government’s monopoly on violence, paving the way for future warlord-commanders, the demise of usurpation of the imperial office

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and the disintegration of the western Roman army in the second half of the fifth century. Similarly, Sebastian has been described as a ‘pirate and condotierre’ and his activities post-433 as the fate a generalissimo who had lost his power base could expect.27 Indeed, the case of Sebastian is the most spectacular example of a band of soldiers-of-fortune travelling considerable lengths through areas of the former or remaining Empire in search of employment. But Sebastian’s story was not unique. In the same framework we could place Sarus, who became a freebooter in Picenum during Alaric’s siege of Rome, and later took some of his followers to Gaul.28 We might also consider the magnate Titus, who travelled all the way from Gaul to Constantinople in order to serve Leo I with his buccellarii. The Scirian prince Odoacer had a similar fate. In the aftermath of the disintegration of Attila’s empire, he roamed through the Balkans and Noricum to finally become the last supreme commander of the western Roman army.29 All of these men had private forces which made them powerful enough to move as independent actors, yet not powerful enough to remain so indefinitely. Most of them desired to become part of official power structures if the opportunity occurred, given the dire consequences should they fail to do so.30 Otto Seeck’s verdict, written nearly a century ago, still rings true for the world of Bonifatius and Sebastian: ‘Whoever desired to achieve martial glory in the Roman empire only had the choice between supreme power or violent death.’31 Ultimately, Procopius’ praise of Bonifatius could not have been more ironic when he called the first western imperial warlord the last of the Romans.32

Timeline of Events 375 376 377 378 379 383 388 392 394 395

395–397 399–400 401–402 405–406 406–407 408 410 411 413 414

Valentinian I dies. Succeeded as western Augustus by Gratian. Valentinian II proclaimed emperor by court cabal. Greutunghi and Tervingi enter Roman Moesia. Revolt of the Goths after bad treatment by corrupt officials. Battle of Adrianople: emperor Valens (364–378) perishes with nearly two-thirds of the eastern field army. Theodosius I becomes eastern Roman emperor. Usurpation of Magnus Maximus. Murder of Gratian. Civil war between Theodosius and Magnus Maximus. Suicide of Valentinian II. Usurpation of Eugenius. Battle of the Frigidus. Western Roman army suffers massive casualties. Theodosius dies in Milan. Succeeded by Honorius in the west, with Stilicho as guardian. Succeeded by Arcadius in the east, with Rufinus as main advisor. Alaric mutinies and pillages Greece. Stilicho intervenes twice but has to call off his campaigns on both occassions. Pogroms against Gothic soldiers in Constantinople. Alaric invades Italy, but is twice kept at bay by Stilicho. Radagasius invades Italy. Defeated near Florence. Alan, Suevian and Vandal warbands cross the Rhine. The army in Britain revolts. Execution of Stilicho and pogroms against his barbarian auxiliaries in Italy. Final breakdown of negotiations between Alaric and Honorius. Visigoths sack Rome. Constantine III defeated and executed by Constantius (III). Usurpation of Jovinus. Visigoths crush Jovinus. Heraclian revolts. Bonifatius wounds Athaulf at Marseilles. Marriage of Athaulf and Galla Placidia. Renewed war between Goths and Romans.

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415 416 417 418–419 420–421 421 422 423

424 425 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436–439 439 440 442

Timeline of Events

Athaulf murdered in Spain. Eventually succeeded by Vallia. Vallia releases Placidia. Treaty whereby Visigoths restore order in Spain. Bonifatius tribune in Africa. Corresponding with Augustine. Visigoths settled in Aquitaine. Bonifatius’ first wife dies. Meeting at Tubunae with Augustine. Constantius proclaimed co-emperor of Honorius. Dies six months later. Bonifatius marries Pelagia. Deserts Castinus’ campaign against Vandals. Placidia and Valentinian exiled to Constantinople. Bonifatius supports her. Honorius dies. Ioannes proclaimed western Roman emperor. Bonifatius resists Ioannes’ counter-offensive in Africa. Theodosius II finally supports Valentinian and sends army to Italy. Ioannes executed. Valentinian III proclaimed emperor. Bonifatius appointed comes Africae et comes domesticorum. Bonifatius declared hostis publicus. Defeats army sent from Italy. Truce negotiated between Bonifatius and western Roman government. Vandals invade Africa. Vandals besiege Hippo, defended by Bonifatius. Augustine dies. Allied Roman army relieves siege of Hippo. Defeated by Geiseric. Bonifatius recalled to Italy and appointed magister militum. Battle of Rimini between Bonifatius and Aetius. Bonifatius dies. Succeeded by Sebastian as magister militum. Aëtius seizes supreme military power in Italy. Sebastian is exiled and departs to East. Sebastian flees Constantinople. Turns freebooter with his buccellarii. Romano-Visigothic war. Sebastian assists Theoderic I. Treaty between Theoderic and Aëtius. Sebastian enters Barcelona. Sebastian tries to capture Carthage, but joins Geiseric afer being forestalled by him. Treaty between Geiseric and Valentinian III. Revolt of Vandal aristocracy. Sebastian probably dies at this time.

Dramatis Personae For the following overview, only names that have been mentioned more than once in the main narrative are listed. Aegidius: Senior general (magister militum) in Gaul (c. 457–464/465). Rebelled against Ricimer and Libius Severus after Majorian’s execution. Briefly became king (rex) of the Francs. Alaric: Leader of mutinous Gothic regiments in the imperial army (395–410). Aimed to become supreme commander, but ended his life as first king of the Visigoths after having sacked Rome in frustration due to failed attempts at negotiating a settlement with Honorius. Aëtius: Partisan of Ioannes (423–425). Senior general in Gaul (425–430). Supreme commander of the western Roman Empire (magister utriusque militiae), (430–432/434–454). Son of Gaudentius. Second husband of Pelagia. Managed to wrest military power from the western imperial government on several occassions. Murdered by Valentinian III. Ambrose: Bishop of Milan (374–398). ‘Father of the Church’. Correspondent of the emperors Gratian, Valentinian II and Theodosius I. Ammianus Marcellinus: Historiographer whose surviving books deal with imperial history between 354–378. Arbogastes: Frankish magister militum in western Roman service (c. 380–394). Instructed by Theodosius I to supervise Valentinian II in Gaul (389–392). When the latter committed suicide, Arbogastes was forced to proclaim Eugenius emperor due to Theodosius I’s lack of help remedying the situation. Committed suicide after the battle of the Frigidus. Arcadius: Eastern Roman emperor (383–408). Senior Augustus (395–408). Eldest son of Theodosius I, brother of Honorius. Succeeded by his son Theodosius II. Ardaburius: Alan magister militum in eastern Roman service. Father of Aspar and joint-commander of the eastern Roman campaign against the usurper Ioannes (424–425).

126

Dramatis Personae

Aspar: Eastern Roman magister milium (c. 424–471). Commanded forces against Ioannes (425) and the Vandals (431–434). Dominated eastern Roman government after the death of Theodosius II, until brutally murdered by Leo I. Asterius: Senior commander of the Spanish field army (comes Hispaniarum), c. 419–421. Apprehended the usurper Maximus. Athaulf: King of the Visigoths (410–415), successor and brother-in-law of Alaric. First husband of Galla Placidia. Murdered in Barcelona. Attalus, Priscus: Western Roman usurper (409–410, 414–415) proclaimed first by Alaric, later by Athaulf. Delivered by Vallia to Honorius in 416. Mutilated and exiled. Bathanarius: Comes Africae (401–408). Brother-in-law of Stilicho. Bauto: Frankish magister equitum in western Roman service (c. 380–385?). Dominated the court of Valentinian II and shored up resistance in Italy against Magnus Maximus. Possible relative of Arbogastes. Belisarius: Eastern Roman magister militum in service of Justinian I (c. 527–565). Conquered Vandal Africa in a rapid series of stunning victories. Beremud: Pelagia.

Gothic aristocrat who joined Theoderic I in Aquitaine. Father of

Bonifatius: Romano-African career soldier. Comes Africae (422–432). First succesful warlord-commander of the western Roman army. Husband of Pelagia. Father of Verimodus. Father-in-law of Sebastian. Castinus: Western Roman magister militum (422–425). Rival of Galla Placidia and Bonifatius. Exiled after the death of Ioannes. Claudian: Egyptian court poet, employed by Stilicho (395–404) to provide panegyrical speeches praising his benefactor and condemning his enemies. Constans: Western Roman emperor (337–350). Youngest son of Constantine I. Killed by Magnentius. Constantine I: Roman emperor (306–337). Architect of the Christianization of the Roman government, founder of Constantinople, reformer of the chain of command of the late Roman army. Constantine (III): British usurper (407–411). Briefly ruled Britain, Gaul and Spain. Defeated and executed by Constantius (III).

Dramatis Personae

127

Constantius II: Eastern Roman emperor (337–350). Sole Augustus of the Empire (353–361). Middle-son of Constantine I. Constantius (III): Magister utriusque militiae of the western Roman army (411–421). Co-Augustus of Honorius (421). Second husband of Galla Placidia. Father of Valentinian III and Honoria. Partially pacified Gaul and Spain (411–419). Darius: Emisary negotiating truce between Sigisvult and Bonifatius (428). Donatus: Bishop in North Africa (first half fourth century). Staunchly opposed clergymen who had lapsed during the Tetrarchic persecutions and were reinstated to their sees. Founder of the Donatist schism. Eudocia: Eldest daughter of Valentinian III and Eudoxia. Betrothed to the Vandal prince Huneric after the treaty of 442. Eudoxia: Daughter of Theosodius II. Betrothed to Valentinian III during the usurpation of Ioannes. Married to him at Constantinople in 437. Eugenius: Western Roman usurper (392–394). Ceremonial emperor proclaimed by Arbogastes. Executed by Theodosius I after the battle of the Frigidus. Felix: Magister utriusque militiae of the western Roman army (425–430). Tried bringing Bonifatius to heel in Africa but failed. Murdered by Aëtius. Firmus: Mauretanian aristocrat who raised a revolt in Roman Africa (c. 371–374). Brother of Gildo and Mascezel. Crushed by Theodosius ‘the elder’. Gainas: Gothic magister militum in eastern Roman service. Tried to seize control of Constantinopolitan government (399–400). Failed and killed in flight by Huns. Galla Placidia: Daughter of Theodosius I (c. 390–450). Widow of Athaulf and Constantius III. Mother of Valentinian III and Honoria. Augusta of the western Roman empire (425–437). Patron of Bonifatius but eventually acquiesced to the military dictature of Aëtius. Gaudentius: Comes Africae (399–401). Magister militum in Gaul of Ioannes (423–425). Father of Aëtius. Killed in a mutiny at Arles in 425. Geiseric: King of the Vandals and Alans (428–477). Conqueror of Roman Africa.

128

Dramatis Personae

Gerontius: Magister militum of Constantine III. Proclaimed his domesticus Maximus as emperor in Spain (409). Gildo: Mauretanian aristocrat. Brother of Firmus and Mascezel. Appointed comes Africae and later magister utriusque militiae per Africam by Theodosius I (385–398). Attempted to bring down Stilicho, but failed and crushed by Mascezel. Gratian: Western Roman emperor (367–383). Senior Augustus of the west (375–383). Elder son of Valentinian I. Brother of Valentinian II. Heraclian: Comes Africae (409–413). Remained loyal to Honorius during Attalus’ usurpation. Revolted in 413 and crossed over to Italy, but defeated and killed after fleeing to Carthage. Honoria: Daughter of Constantius III and Galla Placidia. Sister of Valentinian III. Honorius: Youngest son of Theodosius I. Brother of Arcadius and Galla Placidia. Emperor of the western Empire (395–423). Ceremonial emperor for the military regimes of Stilicho and Constantius (III). Married, in turn, Stilicho’s daughters Maria and Thermantia, but died childless. Ioannes: Western Roman usurper (423–425). Supported by Gaudentius, Aëtius, and factions in the Roman senate and western imperial bureaucracy. Defeated and executed by an eastern Roman army led by Ardaburius and Aspar. Jovinus:

Gallic usurper (411–413). Crushed by Athaulf for Constantius (III).

Julian: Roman emperor (361–363). Nephew of Constantine I. Promoted a revival of paganism but died during a failed Persian campaign. Julius Nepos: Nephew and successor of the warlord Marcellinus in Dalmatia (468–474). Last legitimate western Roman emperor (474–475/475–480). Justinian: Roman emperor (527–565). Destroyed the Vandal regime in Africa and Ostrogothic regime in Italy. Leo I:

Eastern Roman emperor (457–474).

Libius Severus: Western Roman emperor (461–465), proclaimed by Ricimer. Litorius: Lieutenant of Aëtius. Commanded Hunnic auxiliaries against the Visigoths (436–439). Broke their siege of Narbonne but was later defeated and executed by them near Toulouse.

Dramatis Personae

129

Magnentius: Western Roman usurper (350–353). Brought down Constans, but eventually suppressed by Constantius II. Magnus Maximus: Western Roman usurper (383–388). Brought down Gratian. Briefly ruled Britain, Gaul and Spain. Defeated and executed by Theodosius I. Last strong soldier-emperor of the Roman west. Majorian: Western Roman emperor (457–461). Last significant western emperor to rule in his own right. Marcian: Eastern Roman emperor (450–457). Served as officer in Aspar’s campaign against the Vandals, but was briefly taken hostage by Geiseric. Maria:

Elder daughter of Stilicho and Serena. First wife of Honorius.

Maximus: Asterius.

Western Roman usurper in Spain (409–412/419–420). Defeated by

Merobaudes (1): Frankish magister peditum praesentalis in western Roman service (c. 375–383/388?). Engineered the elevation of Valentinian II. Deserted Gratian at Paris in 383 and joined Magnus Maximus. Later forced to commit suicide by the latter. Merobaudes (2):

panegyrist of Aëtius (430s and 440s).

Odoacer: Scirian prince who became the last supreme commander of the western Roman army (476–493). Orosius: Spanish priest and pupil of Augustine (c. 375–418). Wrote ‘Seven Books of History Against the Pagans’ to show that contemporary disasters were not worse than those in other periods in Roman history. Olympius: Western Roman Magister officiorum. Brought down Stilicho. Later executed by Constantius (III). Pelagia: Gothic noblewoman. Second wife of Bonifatius. Second wife of Aëtius. Mother of Verimodus. Pelagius: Ascetic of Romano-British descent. Challenged Augustine’s doctrine of grace and held views on free will, and the doctrine of ‘original sin’ which were eventually declared a heresy. Pulcheria: Daughter of Arcadius, sister of Theodosius II. Acted as guardian for Theodosius from 415 onwards and maintained major influence over the eastern Roman court.

130

Dramatis Personae

Radagaisus: King of a great barbarian confederation moving from central Europe into Italy (405–406). Rechila: King of the Sueves (438–448). Expanded Suevic dominance over the western half of the Iberian peninsula. Ricimer: Half-Sueve/half-Visigoth senior general of the western Roman army in Italy (456–472). Responsible for the downfall and subsequent creation of five western emperors. Rua:

First king to unite the Huns in central Europe (c. 420–435).

Rufinus:

Eastern praetorian prefect and guardian of Arcadius.

Sarus: Aristocratic Goth. Western Roman commander (406–412). Rival of Alaric and Athaulf. Sebastian: Son-in-law of Bonifatius. Western Roman supreme commander turned exile, freebooter and soldier of fortune (c. 432–442?). Serena: Niece of Theodosius I. Wife of Stilicho. Mother of Eucherius, Maria and Thermantia. Executed by the senate of Rome during Alaric’s first siege. Stilicho: Magister utriusque militiae of the western Roman empire (395–408). ‘Guardian’ of Honorius. Husband of Serena. Father of Eucherius, Maria and Thermantia. Theodoric I:

King of the Visigoths in Aquitaine (418/419–451)

Theodosius ‘the elder’: Western Roman magister equitum of Valentinian I. Father of Theodosius I. Executed under mysterious circumstances at Carthage in 375. Theodosius I: Eastern Roman emperor (379–395). Father of Honorius, Arcadius and Galla Placidia. Theodosius II: Eastern Roman emperor (408–450). Son of Arcadius. Nephew of Honorius and Galla Placidia. Father of Eudoxia. Thermantia:

Daughter of Stilicho and Serena, second wife of Honorius.

Valens: Eastern Roman emperor (364–378). Brother of Valentinian I. Defeated and killed during the battle of Adrianople in 378. Valentinian I: Western Roman emperor (364–375). Brother of Valens. Father of Gratian and Valentinian II. Last strong emperor of the west.

Dramatis Personae

131

Valentinian II: Western Roman emperor (375–392). Proclaimed emperor at the age of four by a court cabal. Committed suicide in frustration over his management by Arbogastes and Theodosius I at Vienne in 392. Valentinian III: Son of Constantius III and Galla Placidia. Western Roman emperor (425–455). Husband of Eudoxia. Vallia: King of the Visigoths in Spain (415–418). Decimated Alans and Vandals in Spain on behalf of Constantius (III) in exchange for food supplies. Verimodus: Son of Bonifatius and Pelagia. Delivered as a hostage to Sigisvult during negotiatons between the latter and his father in 428. Zosimus: Last pagan historiographer (c. 500).

Notes Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Corbulo (RH, 1–53): ‘Le général romain Corbulon est plus illustre que connu’. Proc. BV 3.3.15. All dates are CE, unless stated otherwise. Ensslin (1943); Thompson (1947). Since the start of the twenty-first century this theme has seen drastic re-valuation, see: Lewit (2001); James (2008); Wijnendaele (2011). Mazzarino (1942) preface, also cited in Banaji (2002) VII. Jones (1964) 1068. Brown (1971). Goffart (1980); Wolfram (1988); Liebeschuetz (1990); Heather (1991). Lancel (1999); Brown (2000); O’Donnell (2005). Sirago (1961); Oost (1968); Sivan (2011). Zecchini (1983); Stickler (2002). Elton (1996); Nicasie (1998); Le Bohec (2006); Lee (2007). Raven (1993); Briand-Ponsart & Hugoniot (2005); Le Bohec (2005). Mattingly & Hitchner (1995); Sarantis (2013). Courtois (1955); Clover (1993); Modéran (2003); Merrils & Miles (2010). Blockley (1983); Cameron (1985); Muhlberger (1990); Burgess (1993, 2001); Croke (1995, 2001). Aug. Ep. 7*, Ep. 14*. Le Bohec (2005) 255. ‘[L]e comte d’Afrique Bonfiace, un personnage qui a été diversement jugé. Pour les uns, il fut un traître et pour les autres un imbécile.’ Lutkenhaus (1998) 1. O’ Flynn (1983) 230–231. Many scholars still tend to speak of a ‘western Roman Empire’ and ‘eastern Roman Empire’ as if these were separate states. It is true that during most of the fourth and fifth centuries more than one emperor governed imperial territory. Each kept his own court, administration and army. Especially as the fifth century progressed, it became impossible for one emperor to impose his authority over the entire realm even when he was a legitimate candidate, as apparent in the case of Honorius after the death of his brother Arcadius (408) and Valentinian III after the death of his uncle Theodosius II (450). Despite these practical issues of administration, the

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23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48

Notes to pp. 2–9 Empire constitutionally remained a single state. See: Kornemann (1930); Sandberg (2008). Oost (1968) VII. Stickler (2002) 306. Birley (2005); Sivan (2011). For a basic summary of sources on Bonifatius, see: PLRE II: ‘Bonifatius (3)’; PCBE I: ‘Bonifatius’ (13). A general overview of historiography in late antiquity can be found in: Rohrbacher (2002); Marasco (2003); Woods (2009). Most translations are derived from standard editions, with occasional personal emendations. Bury (1923) preface. Lancel (1999); Brown (2000); O’Donnell (2005). Aug. Ep. 185, 185a, 189, 220, 7*, 11*. Markus (1986); Muhlberger (1990) 48–135; Humphries (1996). Hamilton (2004); Hermanowicz (2008). Muhlberger (1990); Burgess (2001). Muhlberger (1990); Burgess (1993); Gillet (2003) 36–83. Anderson (1936); Harries (1994). Moorhead (1992); Lancel (2000). Burgess (2001). De Lepper (1941) 9–15. Clover (1993c). O’Donnell (1979); Croke (2003) 358–67. Goffart (1988) 329–431. Baldwin (1980a); Blockley (1983) 27–47; Gillett (1993); Baldini (2004). Patriarch of Constantinople from 856 to 867 and again from 877 to 886. His Bibliotheca or Myriobiblon contained extracts and abridgments of hundreds of works of ancient authors. Thanks to Photius we possess works such as the lost books and writings of Diodorus Siculus or Arrian. Baldwin (1980b); Blockley (1983, 2003). Croke (1995, 2001). Cameron (1985); Kaldellis (2004). O’Donnell (1982); Goffart (1988) 20–111; Croke (2003) 367–375. Gordon (1960) XII–XIII; Roberto (2005). Mango & Scott (1997).

1 The World of Bonifatius (375–420) 1 Amb. de ob. Theod.; Oros. 7.35.23; Zos. 4.59.4. 2 PLRE 1: ‘Flavius Arcadius 5’, 99; ‘Fl. Honorius 3’, 442.

Notes to pp. 9–12

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3 In general: McLynn (1994); Curran (1998) 104–110; Potter (2004) 526–575; Errington (2006) 31–41. 4 On the imperial office in the fourth century: Martin (1997); Kelly (1998) 139–162; McEvoy (2013) 23–47. On the late Roman emperors’ role as supreme commander: Lee (2007) 22–30; Whitby (2004); Hebblewhite (2013). 5 Halsall (2007) 74. 6 PLRE 1: ‘Flavius Valentinianus 7’, 933–934. 7 PLRE 1: ‘Fl. Gratianus 2’, 401. 8 Amm. 30.10.1. 9 Rodgers (1981) 87, 90. 10 McEvoy (2013) 48–70. Zos. 4.19.3 remarks that ‘the emperors did not have absolute power because of their youth’. 11 PLRE 1: ‘Sebastianus 2’, 812; ‘Flavius Theodosius 3’, 902–904. 12 McEvoy (2013) 61–64. 13 Amm. 31.7.4. 14 Rodgers (1981) 90. 15 Amm. 31.10.2–17. 16 Zos. 4.35.2 contains a fanciful story of Gratian showing ostentatious favours to a band of Alan deserters, rewarding them lavishly and preferring them over all other army units. Though far from reliable, the story does provide an apt metaphor for the emperor’s absence in the Balkans which infuriated British and Rhine troops who also desired the emperor’s patronage. See: McLynn (1994) 153–154. 17 Amm. 30.10.1. 18 PLRE 1: ‘Fl. Magnus Magnentius’, 532; ‘Fl. Claudius Julianus’, 477–478; ‘Silvanus 2’, 840–841. 19 Drinkwater (2007) 270–275. 20 The similarity between the downfall of the both emperors is also discussed in Hebblewhite (2013) 48–51. 21 On Constans’ reign and downfall, see: Hunt (1998) 5–11; Harries (2012) 189–196. 22 PLRE ‘Magnus Maximus 39’ 588. Western sources outside Italy do take a more neutral stance towards the usurper. 23 Zos. 4.35.5. Prosper s.a. 384 notes that Merobaudes was responsible for the defection. 24 O’Flynn (1983) 3 remarks that the orator Pacatus nowhere mentions Merobaudes as a traitor in his panegyric on the defeat of Maximus. Most probably, Merobaudes only joined Maximus when it was apparent that Gratian no longer commanded the allegiance and respect of his troops, who then switched to the usurper’s side. He might have remained magister peditum under Maximus, alongside the usurper’s magister equitum Andragathius. See also: Nixon & Rodgers (1994) 486–487. Maximus forced Merobaudes to commit suicide before 388.

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Notes to pp. 12–14

25 Ruf. HE 2.14; Soz. 7.13.8; Soc. 5.11.7. Zos. 4.35.6 mistakenly places this event at Singidunum. 26 Wardman (1984) 227, 235. 27 Matthews (1975) 175 surmises that Maximus could portray himself as establishing ‘in place of the rule of dilettante youth and child, a vigorous military regime after the style of the elder Valentinian’. 28 PLRE 1 ‘Flavius Bauto’, 159–160. The young Augustine, whilst still pursuing a secular career at Milan, composed a panegyric for Bauto’s consulship in 385. Had this document survived, it might have considerably elucidated Bauto’s career. 29 Amb. Ep. 30 (24).4. 30 PLRE 1 ‘Arbogastes’ 95–97. Joh. Ant. Fr. 187 claims that Bauto was the father of Arbogastes. However, John’s history is a very late source and no earlier text hints at such a direct relationship between the two commanders. 31 Zos. 4.33.1–2; Joh. Ant. Fr. 187 32 For Maximus’ advance upon Italy: Nixon & Rodgers (1994) 492 (n. 108). 33 A particularly embarrassing case was the conduct of Symmachus, who had held the highly prestigious office of praefectus urbi of Rome under Valentinian II, but went to Milan to deliver a panegyric for Maximus. After Theodosius’ victory he was allowed to acquit himself publicly, but it shows how precarious ties of loyalty to Valentinian II were inside the emperor’s own government when push came to shove. 34 On the diverse battlefronts: Amb. Ep. 73 [40] 23. Naval operations by Andragathius and Valentinian II: Zos. 4.46.1; Oros. 7.35.3. Maximus offering rewards to subordinate barbarian recruits in Theodosius’ army: Zos. 4.45.3. 35 Pacat. 35.1; Amb. Ep. 73 [40] 22; Oros. 7.35.4; Zos. 4.46.1. 36 McLynn (1994) 294–295. Zos. 4.45.4–46.1 described a campaign at sea, while Amb. Ep. 73 [40] 22–23 speaks of a victory obtained by dynastic forces in Sicily. 37 Zos. 4.57.2 38 Zos. 4.47.1; Prosper s.a. 388. 39 Paulin. V.Amb. 8, 30; Greg. Tur. Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.9 (citing the lost history of Sulpicius Alexander). 40 Errington (2006) 53–54. 41 McLynn (1994) 335–337. 42 Zos. 4.53.3; Joh. Ant. Fr. 187; Greg. Tur. Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.9. 43 Zos. 4.54.3; Soc. 5.25.4; Oros. 7.35.10; Hier. Ep. 60.15. 44 Croke (1976) provides the most thorough deconstruction of the sources surrounding Valentinian’s death. He notes that between the death of Valentinian on 15 May and the proclamation of Eugenius on 22 August, there was an interval of more than three months. In the meantime, Arbogastes started circulating coinage in the name of Arcadius and seemed to wait for Theodosius’ instructions. This

Notes to pp. 14–19

45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63 64

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indicates that Valentinian probably did commit suicide and Arbogastes had no immediate replacement at his disposal. O’Flynn (1983) 10–11. Amb. De Ob. Val. 35: ‘He preferred death for himself rather than be a cause of death for others’. See: Liebeschuetz (2005) 359. Szidat (1979); Delmaire (1997) 122. This is most apparent in their coinage, the only type of source material giving us their ‘testimony’ and not contaminated by Theodosian propaganda after their execution. Both emperors minted coins depicting them harmoniously sharing a globe with their eastern colleague as a sign of imperial concordance. PLRE 1 ‘Fl. Eugenius 6’, 293. Greg.Tur. Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.9, based on the lost contemporary history of Sulpicius Alexander. Zos. 4.58. Errington (2006) 41–42. Ferrill (1988) 64–65; Lee (2007) 35. Goffart (1981) and Halsall (2005) 48–49 point out that the dismantling of Magnus Maximus’ regime was detrimental to the survival of imperial power northwest of the Alps. After his fall, no western emperor ruled from Trier, which had continuously functioned as the imperial residence and focus for Gallic elites since the crisis of the third century. This retreat of the governmental apparatus south of the Loire would pave the way for the political fragmentation of Roman Gaul in the fifth century. For general events: Stein (1968) 191–274; Jones (1964) 156–188; Blockley (1998); Heather (2005) 145–250; Halsall (2007) 165–234; Mitchell (2007) 81–100. On Stilicho, see: Mazzarino (1942); Cameron (1970); O’Flynn (1983) 14–62; McEvoy (2013) 153–186. PLRE 1: ‘Flavius Stilicho’, 853–858. Cameron (1969) 276 (n.55). O’Flynn (1983) 28–36; Heather (1991) 199–205; Kulikowski (2007); 165–168. On this Gothic war, see: Burns (1994) 1–42; Heather (2005) 145–181; Halsall (2007) 170–180; Kulikowski (2007) 123–143. PLRE 2: ‘Alaricus 1’ 43–48. For the debate surrounding the genesis of the Visigoths and Alaric’s position, see especially: Heather (1991) 193–224; Kulikowski (2007) 161–177; Halsall (2007) 200–206. PLRE 2: ‘Maria 1’, 720; ‘Aemilia Materna Thermantia’, 1111–1112. On the political crises in Constantinople during the very last years of the fourth century, see: Liebeschuetz (1990) 89–131; Cameron & Long (1993) 199–252. PLRE 2: ‘Radagaisus’, 934. On Radagaisus’ invasion: Burns (1994) 195–198; Heather (2005) 194–201, 205–206. Goffart (2006) 79 makes the ingenious

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65

66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89

Notes to pp. 19–22 suggestion that Radagaisus’ invasion could have been instigated by Constantinople to forestall Stilicho’s designs on the Illyrian provinces held by the eastern Roman government. Yet Goffart himself admits there is no proof for this. Oros. 7.37.4 speaks of ‘200,000 Goths’; Zos. 5.26.3 of ‘400,000 Gauls and Germans’. The imperial army gathered by Stilicho nevertheless demonstrates a considerable barbarian force. Zos. 5.26.4. Olymp. Fr. 9. On the controversy surrounding the date, see: Kulikowski (2000a) 325–331; Birley (2005) 457–460; Heather (2009). PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Claudius Constantinus 21’, 316–317; ‘Gratianus 3’, 518–519; ‘Marcus 2’, 719–720. Constantine received partial recognition from Honorius in 409. However, he was never accepted as a legitimate emperor in the imperial college (CLRE 352–353). Full accounts of his reign can be found in: Drinkwater (1998) 271–287; Kulikowski (2000b) 332–341. Burns (1994) 212–213. Olymp. Fr. 13.1; Zos. 6.3.2–3. Drinkwater (1998) 275–279. PLRE 2: ‘Sarus’, 978–988. Zos. 5.29.3–4. On this debate, see: Burns (1994) 192–199; Heather (2005) 219–222; Kulikowski (2007) 170–172. Olymp. Fr. 7.2; Zos. 5.29.6–9. PLRE 2: ‘Theodosius 6’, 1100. PLRE 2: ‘Olympius 2’, 801–802. Soz. 9.4.4–8 (=Blockley, Olymp. Fr. 5.2); Zos. 5.32.2–7. CTh 9.42.21–22. Zos.5.36.5. On these events, see: Matthews (1975) 284–306; Burns (1994) 224–246; Kulikowski (2007) 173–177. PLRE 2: ‘Priscus Attalus 2’, 180–181. PLRE 2: ‘Heraclian 3’ 539–540. Zos. 6.11.2. PLRE 2: ‘Gerontius 5’, 508. On Constantius [III], see: O’Flynn (1983) 63–73; Lutkenhaus (1998); McEvoy (2013) 197–220. PLRE 2: ‘Iovinus 2’, 621–622. On Jovinus, see: Scharf (1993); Drinkwater (1998), 287–290. The extent of Jovinus’ power can be traced through his coinage that was struck at Trier, Lyons and Arles, but did not reach much further. PLRE 2: ‘Vallia’, 1147–1148.

Notes to pp. 23–27

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90 On the settlement in Aquitaine, see: Burns (1994) 263–274; Kulikowski (2001); Halsall (2007) 228–233. 91 The exact date of the Notitia remains a conundrum. The eastern half most likely dates to Theodosius’ campaign against Eugenius in 394, yet the western copy was several times edited and amended after this date. The last datable western military unit is the newly raised Placidi Valentiniaci Felices, which is a clear reference to Valentinian III who was born in 419 and crowned emperor in 425. See: Kulikowski (2000a). To all intents and purposes, the Notitia should be used cautiously since it is a very antiquarian text clearly demonstrating ideological purposes rather than practical, see: Brennan (1996); Traina (2013). 92 The concentration of so much military power into the office of magister peditum praesentalis is best explained due to the unique position Stilicho found himself in after the death of Theodosius I, as the most senior commander who had survived the battle of the Frigidus and guardian of Honorius. On the evolution of the magistri militum, see: Demandt (1970); Hoffman (1974). 93 Jones (1964) 355. 94 Rut.Nam. 1.139–140; Oros. 7.42.15–16. 95 Heather (2005) 250; Halsall (2007) 233–234. 96 Kotula (1979) and Shaw (2011) 36–52 analyse as a whole the rebellions of Firmus, Gildo and Heraclian. I do not subscribe to their views, however. 97 PLRE 1: ‘Firmus’ 3, 340; ‘Nubel’, 633–634. On Firmus, see: Blackhurst (2004); Drijvers (2007). 98 On Romanus, see: Warmington (1956); Coskun (2004). 99 Most notably, Kotula (1970). 100 Heather (2005) 100–104. 101 PLRE 1: ‘Gildo’, 395–396. On Gildo, see: Modéran (1989); Blackhurst (2004). 102 CTh. 9.7.9 is the only source preserving Gildo’s title. 103 Oros. 7.36.13; Zos. 5.11.4–5. 104 Warmington (1954) 12. 105 For Heraclian’s revolt, see: Oost (1966); Kotula (1977); Gaggero (1991). 106 Oost (1966). 107 Kotula (1979). 108 Thorough general accounts can be found in Frend (1984) 651–697; Lancel (1999); Brown (2000), and O’Donnell (2005). For a radical new interpretation, see: Shaw (2011), a very thought-provoking work, but not all of its findings could be incorporated at the time of this present study. 109 On Donatism, see: Frend (1952); Tilley (1997); Kaufman (2009). 110 Shaw (2004); Dossey (2010). 111 On the conference of Carthage in 411, see: Lancel (1972); Graumann (2011). 112 On Augustine and Pelagianism, see: Dunphy (2005); Lössl (2007); Mali (2010).

140

Notes to pp. 29–31

2 Bonifatius’ Early Career (c. 413–421) 1 Ps.-Bonif. Ep. 10. 2 Proc. BV 3.3.14. 3 Diesner (1963b) 101 (n. 1) interprets Procopius’ statement as implying an Italian origin for Bonifatius. The grounds for this seem puzzling to me. 4 Demandt (1970) 671; Brown (2000) 425–426. 5 PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Constantius 17’, 321–325; ‘Gaudentius 5’, 493–494; ‘Fl. Aetius 7’, 21–29. Demandt (1970) 651. 6 Clover (1993c) 84–85. 7 Marrou (1977) 434; Solin (1977). 8 Fraser & Matthews (2005) compiled all known names between 800 bce and 600 CE for the region of Thrace. They attest only two (!) individuals named Bonifatius here, one being that of the pseudo-Bonifatius. 9 Kajanto (1965) 18; Duval (1977) 454. 10 Kajanto (1965) 22–23. 11 Clover (1993c) 84 already raised the suggestion that Bonifatius was of African or Romano-Punic stock rather than a Thracian, but did not explore this further. 12 Olymp. Fr. 40. 13 Africa: PLRE II: ‘Bonifatius (2)’, 237; ‘Bonifatius (3)’ 237–240; PRLE III: ‘Bonifatius (1)’, 237–238; ‘Bonifatius (3)’, 238. Italy: PLRE II, ‘Bonifatius (4)’ 240; PRLE III, ‘Bonifatius (2)’, 238; ‘Bonifatius (4)’, 238; ‘Bonifatius (5)’ 238. The two volumes of PCBE note twenty-nine persons for Africa and forty for Italy. 14 Proc. BV 2. 4.33. 15 Chron. Gall. 452, 69; Olymp. Fr. 20; Oros. 7.42.6; Sozom. 9.15.3. On these events, see: Burns (1994) 256–257; Drinkwater (1998) 287–292; Halsall (2007) 223–224. 16 PLRE 2: ‘Aelia Galla Placidia 4’, 888–889. Olymp. Fr. 22.1. 17 PLRE 2: ‘Heraclian 3’, 539–540. On Heraclian’s defeat, see: Oros. 7.42.14; Hydat. 48 (56). 18 Jones (1964) 188; Oost (1968) 120; Stein (1968) 266; Matthews (1975), 315–316. 19 Olymp. Fr. 22.2. 20 Wolfram (1988) 168–170; Elton (1996) 88. 21 Loseby (1992) 165–168; Liebeschuetz (2000) 88. 22 Sirago (1961) 159; Diesner (1963b) 101–102; Courcelle (1964) 90; Demougeot (1979) 465; Zecchini (1983) 106–107; Wolfram (1988) 175; Blockley (1998) 131 (n. 26); Stickler (2002), 27 (n. 131); Halsall (2007) 225; Sivan (2011) 90. Heather (2005) 239 speaks opaquely of ‘some fighting between the Goths and Constantius’ forces around Marseilles’. 23 Oost (1968) 124. Lütkenhaus (1998) 77 (n. 89) also expresses doubt about interpreting the skirmish near Marseilles as a siege.

Notes to pp. 31–34

141

24 Famous examples are the successful capture of the Alamannic king Vadomarius (Amm. 21.4.3–6), the unsuccessful attempt to apprehend the Gothic leader Fritigern (Amm. 31.5.5–8) and the assassination of the Quadi leader Gabinus (Amm. 29.6.5–6). On this topic, see: Lee (2009). 25 Merrils & Miles (2010) 52 claim that Bonifatius’ career was launched in the war against the usurper Jovinus. This is an attractive suggestion, but there is no evidence in the sources that Constantius (III) ever deployed imperial forces against Jovinus. Instead, the magister utriusque militiae had employed Athaulf ’s Goths to crush the Gallic usurper. Ultimately, Bonifatius cannot be connected to these events. 26 MacGeorge (2002) 82–83 asserts that every fifth-century magister militum whose pedigree is known came from an aristocratic background, while among those whose social background we do not know there are no allusions to their having risen through the ranks of the lower classes. Bonifatius seems to be an exception to this pattern. His career was more akin to that of officers in the late third and fourth century, where talented men from the lower classes could achieve the highest positions. 27 De Lepper (1941) 20; Burns (1994) 257 (n. 43). 28 Baldwin (1980a) 219. 29 For his rank and troops: Aug. Ep. 220.7, discussed later. 30 For the date: PCBE Afrique: ‘Bonifatius (13)’. 31 Shaw (2011) 242. 32 Aug. Ep. 185.1.1. 33 Olymp. Fr. 42; Aug Ep. 220.7; Poss. V.Aug. 28.12. 34 Brown (2000) 426. 35 Aug. Ep. 185.2.6. 36 De Lepper (1941) 22–23. 37 Diesner (1963b) 101. Shaw (2011) 532 (n. 98) is perhaps too severe in rejecting the possibility that Bonifatius was a praepositus of the Numidian frontier due to the absence of explicit source evidence. His title of tribunus and presence at Tubunae conform with such an office. On praepositi, see: Nicasie (1998) 127. 38 Frend (1952) 297–299. 39 Aug. Ep. 204. 40 Aug. Ep. 185.6.24. 41 Lancel (1999) 428. 42 O’Donnell (2005) 216. 43 Lancel (1999) 427 (n. 79). Hermanowicz (2008) 153 claims that Augustine put a lot of effort into his correspondence with Bonifatius because the latter was ‘a general dedicated to a largely Arian military force’. However, the actual number of Arian (= Gothic) soldiers under Bonifatius’ command would have been relatively small in

142

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71

Notes to pp. 34–38 the greater African military during the late 410s. Furthermore, the correspondence clearly demonstrates that Bonifatius’ orthodox credentials were sound in these years. Aug. Ep. 185a. The rest of this letter is completely lost. Aug. Ep. 189.1. Aug. Ep. 189.4. Lee (2007) 177–193. Shean (2003); Clark (2006). Aug. Ep. 189.5. Aug. Ep. 220.7. Elton (1996) 90, 94, 101, 147. Oros. 7.43.12–13; Olymp. Fr. 31; Philost. 12.4; Prosp. s.a. 416. Oost (1968) 124 (n. 139). For Constantius and his officers, see: Lütkenhaus (1998) 163. Drinkwater (1998) 292; Kulikowski (2001) 32. Bonifatius would not have been the first native career soldier to reach high office in Africa. Besides the case of Gildo, the comes Africae Cretio serving in the 350s was most probably also of African origin, see: PLRE 1: ‘Cretio’, 231; Shaw (2011) 36 (n. 79). Kulikowski (2000c) 132–133. Rushworth (2004) 77. Heather (2005) 275–276. Blackhurst (2004) 62. On these oaths, see: Uhalde (2011). Mauretania suffered only two serious revolts by Berber tribes, in 253–260 and 290–293. Similarly, in the fourth century, only Tripolitania was affected by the razzias of Saharan nomads (363–367), and only Mauretania by the war against Firmus (371–375). The heart of Roman Africa was never threatened on these occasions. See: Lepelley (1992) 55 (n. 4). Modéran (2003) 393. Aug. Ep. 199.12.46. Modéran (2005). Clark (2011) 41–42. Modéran (2003) 395. Warmington (1954) 19 anachronistically envisioned these border skirmishes as colonial wars, compared to the more traditional imperial campaigns on the continent. For new approaches to understanding Rome’s relationship with Africa’s indigenous peoples, see: Vanacker (2013). Aug. Ep. 220.3. Bury (1923) 245. Very few modern historians would adopt such a moralizing approach. PLRE 2: ‘Titvs 1’, 1122–1123. On this episode, see: Jones (1964) 666. Aug. Ep. 220.3.

Notes to pp. 39–44 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83

143

Aug. Ep. 189.3. Frend (1952) 293. Shaw (2011) 10 (n. 1). Perler (1969) 367–369. Aug. Ep. 220.4: ‘. . . [Y]ou crossed the sea . . . a matter of obedience that . . . you owed to higher authorities’; discussed in the next chapter. Contra Frend (1952) 74; Paronetto (1975) 405 (n. 1); Wills (1999) 114; Hermanowicz (2008) 144 and McEvoy (2013) 216 (n. 159), who believe that he was already comes Africae in 417. Heather (2005) 258–259 even regards Bonifatius as Heraclian’s successor. Against such views it should be noted that we know of the existence of at least one other comes Africae, Classicianus, in the years between 417 and the meeting at Tubunae: Lepelley (2001) 379–380. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Bonifatius had to usurp the comitiva Africae in 422. Therefore, he cannot have been comes Africae already. On the origins and evolutions of this office, see: Hoffman (1968). Diesner (1963b) 104–107. Brown (2000) 426. O’Donnell (2005) 225. Aug. Ep. 17.1*. Compare Aug. Ep. 189.8, also ‘written in haste’ to Bonifatius yet vastly longer. Aug. Ep. 220.4.

3 Rise to Power (422–425) 1 Olymp. Fr. 36. On Constantius and Placidia’s marriage, see: Oost (1968) 161–167; Sivan (2011) 60–88; McEvoy (2013) 213–215. 2 PLRE 2: ‘Placidus Valentinianus 4’, 1138–1139. 3 Olymp. Fr. 33.1; Soc. 7.24.2–3; Philost. 12.12; Soz. 9.16.2. 4 Hyd. 66 (74). On this campaign, see: Kulikowski (2004) 173–174; Merrils & Miles (2010) 45–46. 5 PLRE 2: ‘Maximus 4’, 744–745’. He is probably identical with PLRE 2: ‘Maximus 7’, 745. Oost (1968) 170, Lütkenhaus (1998) 171 and Collins (2004) 29 believe that Castinus was responsible for the capture of Maximus. Yet the evidence of Aug. Ep. 22*, which mentions a campaign of Asterius against a ‘tyrant’ in the region, clearly supports Kulikowski’s (2000c) view in favour of this comes Hispaniarum. 6 Chron.Gall.452, 85; Marcell.Com. s.a. 422. On Asterius’ elevation to the patriciate, see: Kulikowski (2000c) 127–128. 7 Prosper s.a. 422. 8 Hyd. 69 (77). 9 Heather (2005) 265; Halsall (2007) 236.

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Notes to pp. 44–47

10 PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Castinus 2’, 269–270. 11 Lütkenhaus (1998) 170–171. Zecchini (1983) 127 believes that Castinus received a promotion because of his successful campaign against the Franks. Oost (1968) 170 notes that the sources do not indicate whether he was successful at all. Heinen (2000) however confirms that Castinus did succeed in his mission. 12 PLRE 2: ‘Crispinus’, 329; Demandt (1970) 640. 13 Oost (1968) 169–171; O’Flynn (1983) 74–75. 14 Olymp. Fr. 39. Sivan (2011) 90. 15 Oost (1968) 170; Matthews (1975) 378. 16 Courtois (1955) 55 (n. 4). 17 Liebeschuetz (2003) 58–68. 18 Chron. Gall. 452, 107. This chronicle entry is placed among events of 428 and the Gallic chronicler probably conflated Castinus’ defeat with that of the Sueves by Geiseric in 428. The word ‘soldiers’ (militum) does not seem to refer to barbarians: Zecchini (1983) 155 (n. 54); Muhlberger (1990) 172 (n. 80); Kulikowski (2004) 177 (n. 5); Halsall (2007) 240 (n. 93). 19 Burns (1994) 274; Elton (1996) 188. 20 Jones (1964) 197. 21 Moss (1973) 714. On Constantius’ strategy: Oros. 7.43.1. 22 Merrils & Miles (2010) 46–47. 23 Zecchini (1983) 128–130. 24 Muhlberger (1990) 222–223. 25 Halsall (2007) 236. 26 Moss (1973) 714. A further consideration might be that the Visigoths were aware of the ‘market value’ of their soldiers as auxiliaries and did not wish to throw away unnecessary lives in a pitched battle, as they had been forced to do at the Frigidus for instance, rather than achieve an easy victory through starving the Vandals. For such an interpretation of Theoderic I’s aims to increase the value of his troops, see: Wolfram (1988) 175. 27 Pseud.Bonif. Ep. 10. 28 Contra Merrils & Miles (2010) 46. Equally, Kulikowski (2004) 174 describes Bonifatius as ‘one of the most powerful men in the western empire’, at the time of Castinus’ campaign. This seems rather a retrospective view of the power Bonifatius would ultimately obtain, and not in accordance with his position at this particular time. Kulikowski’s earlier description of Bonifatius as ‘a hero of the Gothic war of 413’ seems more fitting. 29 Stein (1968) 275. 30 Contra Bury (1923) 223 (n. 47) who considered that he had already received the position of comes Africae before his refusual to go to Spain. 31 Hyd. 70 (78).

Notes to pp. 47–51

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32 Aug. Ep. 220.7. On the comes domesticorum, see: Jones (1964) 143; Frank (1969) 83–90; Elton (1996) 101, 240. 33 De Lepper (1941) 30. 34 Zecchini (1983) 128. 35 Aug. Ep. 220.4. 36 PLRE 2: ‘Bonifatius (3)’, 239; Muhlberger (1990) 100; Mathisen (1999) 179; Stickler (2002) 36 (n.171); Mathisen (2009) 146; Traina (2009) 85. 37 De Lepper (1941) 35; Stein (1968) 319; Courtois (1955) 156; Diesner (1963b) 107; Oost (1968) 173; Scharf (1989) 141. 38 Aug. Ep. 220.4. 39 PLRE 2: ‘Pelagia 1’ 856–857. Marriage to Aëtius: Marcell.Com. s.a. 432.3. 40 Merob. Carm. 4, 16–18. 41 Sid. Apo. Carm. 5, 203–206. 42 Gil Egea (1999) 498–501. 43 PLRE 2: ‘Verimodvs’, 1155. 44 Already suggested by De Lepper (1941) 67–68, 71. 45 Jord. Get. 174. 46 CTh. 3.14.1. 47 Sivan (1996). 48 Demandt (1989); Mathisen (2009). 49 Blockley (1982) 71. 50 Sivan (2011) 107–108. 51 Bonifatius’ retinue is explicitly mentioned in Aug. Ep. 220.6. 52 Olymp. Fr. 7, 11. For the development of the buccellarii: Diesner (1972); Liebeschuetz (1986); Schmitt (1994). 53 Demougeot (1951) 29 (n. 176); Liebeschuetz (1986); Schmitt (1994) 153; MacGeorge (2002) 9; Sarris (2006) 163. 54 Tac. Germ. 14. Diesner (1972) 322 (n. 38) and Liebeschuetz (1990) 42. 55 Olymp. Fr. 42. 56 Clover (1993c) 79 (n. 23) already suggested that it is very likely that Olympiodorus’ source for this fragment was a Gallic poet who had been in the service of Bonifatius. The latter is mentioned in Sid. Apo. Carm. 9 277–288. The poet eventually ended up in Athens, hence Olympiodorus may have had the chance to encounter him in the east. PLRE 2: ‘Anonymous 120’, 1237 leaves this possibility open. However, Mathisen (1993) 61 (n. 38) points out that the three poets discussed by Sidonius all had in common that they left their native country and settled in a different one. That the panegyrist wished to stress Bonifatius’ role as stern disciplinarian is also intruiging considering the later difficulties he had in managing their avarice. 57 Baldwin (1980a) 222. 58 Liebeschuetz (1993) 275.

146 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Notes to pp. 51–57 Goldsworthy (1996) 264–282. Olymp. Fr. 3. PLRE 2: ‘Sarus’, 97–988. Drinkwater (1998) 278. Aug. Ep. 220.4. Aug. Ep. 220.6. For a similar case, see Cameron & Long (1993) 203 (n. 24) who observe that Gainas’ lack of a proper command in 395 temporarily prevented him from maintainining a significant personal following. Esmonde-Cleary (2013) 439 also sees the success of generals’ ability in maintaining buccellarii based on their ability to provide them with food and booty. Chron. Gall. 511, 40 (571). Chron. Gall. 452, 59. Burgess (1990); Muhlberger (1990) 148; Murray (2000) 76. PLRE 2: ‘Ioannes (5)’, 594. Aug. Ep. 10*. For the social situation in Roman Africa of the 420s: Lepelley (2001) 357–375. In general, see: Dossey (2010). A parallel can be found in the death of the eastern magister equitum Hermogenes who was killed during a riot at Constantinople in 343 (PLRE 1: ‘Hermogenes 1’, 422–423), and that of the magister militum per Illyricum Butheric at Thessaloniki in 390 (PLRE 1: ‘Butherichus’, 166). Stein (1968) 275 asserts that Placidia sent him financial aid. There is no evidence for this, however. CTh 13.6.10; De Lepper (1941) 38–39. The law shows that Honorius could rule against the navicularii of Africa. This at least indicates that official imperial authority was regulated at a time that Bonifatius was comes Africae. Olymp. Fr. 38. Stein (1968) 275. Olymp. Fr. 38. Marcell.Com. s.a. 423.4; Neri (1974). Oost (1968) 173 (n. 14); Zecchine (1983) 130–131; Stickler (2002) 36. Olymp. Fr. 23; Zecchini (1983) 133 (n. 28). Soc. 7.22.20; Olymp. Fr. 41. Blockley (1998) 136. McEvoy (2013) 317–318. Bleckmann (1997). Stein (1968) 274. Holum (1982) 128. Sivan (2011) 88 (n. 99) believes that Honorius had stripped Galla Placidia and her son of their imperial titles as part of their exile. However, Oost (1968) 182–184 (n.

Notes to pp. 57-59

87 88

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98

99 100 101

102 103

147

48) already showed that Constantius’ imperial rank had been posthumously recognized through the inclusion of his name in western laws of 421. This may also imply recognition of Placidia’s rank of Augusta and Valentinian’s as nobilissimus. This indicates that they were recognized for the first time, rather than being reconferred. Therefore, Honorius had probably not stripped their titles when exiling them. Oost (1968) 176–177. Stein (1968) 282. Theodosius I is often regarded as the last emperor who ruled the entire empire, but already during his lifetime he had elevated his sons to the dignity of Augustus. The last emperor to reign alone before Theodosius II was Jovian (363–364). Theodosius reigning alone: Hyd. 73 (82); Prosper s.a. 423. News of Honorius’ death kept quiet: Soc. 7.23; Philost. 12.13. Contra Muhlberger (1990) 94; Millar (2006) 54–56; and Deliyannis (2010) 44, who see Theodosius II immediately supporting the cause of Placidia and Valentinian. McEvoy (2013) 229. Stein (1968) 282; Oost (1968) 179; Demandt (1970) 635; Zecchini (1983) 133 (n. 27); Stickler (2002) 29 (n. 141). Olymp. Fr. 38. Olymp. Fr. 42. Aug. Ep. 220.7. Christie (2011) 42 describes Bonifatius defeating African raiders as magister militum. However, he never held this rank whilst serving in Africa and would only obtain it in Italy. Aug. Ep. 220.7. PLRE 2: ‘Bonifatius (3)’ 238 suggests that Theodosius may have conferred the title of comes Africae on Bonifatius after Honorius’ death. This cannot be correct since Bonifatius already held the title when Honorius was still alive. However, it is possible that the eastern emperor confirmed Bonifatius’ position once he had decided to support Galla Placidia and Valentinian against the usurper Ioannes. De Lepper (1941) 37 (n. 2); Diesner (1963b) 108; Zecchini (1983) 130 (n. 17). Aug. op. imperf. in. Iul. 3.35. Briand-Ponsart & Hugoniot (2005) 302–313. Note, however, that such calculations ultimately depend on attributing arbitrary numerical strenghts to the various units listed in the Notitia Dignitatum. See the reservations of Diesner (1963b) 109 (n. 35). Despite this caveat, I am willing to accept that the African field army will have numbered at least a few thousands of elite soldiers, considering Theodosius ‘the elder’ was sent with 2,500 soldiers to crush Firmus (Amm. 29.5.29), while Mascezel had 5,000 soldiers to bring down Gildo (Oros. 7.36.5–6). Oros. 7.42.12–14; Hyd. 48 (56). Jones (1964) 695–705; Tengström (1974); Sirks (1991a).

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Notes to pp. 59–61

104 Sirks (1991b). 105 Zos 6.11.2; Proc. BG 3.2.27. On the nexus between famine and cannibalism in the context of siege warfare in the ancient world: Garnsey (1988) 28–29. 106 As early as the last generation of the Roman Republic, Pompeius Magnus and Sextus Pompeius had withheld grain from Italy as a tool to help realize their political goals. See: Vervaet (2010) 149–154; Linn (2012) 305. Welch (2012) 54–55, 239–240 also notes that the Roman plebs had a tendency to blame their urban leaders for such shortages rather than the people engineering them. 107 PLRE 2, ‘Ioannes (6)’, 594–595. 108 Stein (1968) 283; Stickler (2002) 29 (n. 143); Zecchini (1983) 135 (n. 32). 109 Veget. Epit. 4.39. 110 De Lepper (1941) 42–43. 111 Olymp. Fr. 41.2. 112 There is a similar parallel with the interregnum in the west after the suicide of Valentinian II on 15 May 392. The magister militum Arbogastes, who owed his appointment most probably to Theodosius I, had tried to assuage Theodosius for three months. Only when the eastern emperor gave no sign of appeasement did Arbogastes resort to the final move of engineering Eugenius’ usurpation. 113 On late Roman emperors and the bureaucracy, see: Kelly (1998). McLyn (1994) 335 notes similar tensions between Italy and Constantinople when Theodosius I departed for the east in 391, while Valentinian II remained a virtual prisoner at the palace in Vienne. 114 Sirago (1961) 266; Jones (1964) 327; Oost (1968) 181–182 (n. 42); Moss (1973) 719; Matthews (1975) 379; O’Flynn (1983) 75; Elton (1996) 12; Blockley (1998) 136; Collins (1999) 87; Whitby (2000) 296; Kulikowski (2004) 176 (n. 1); Heather (2005) 259; Halsall (2007) 236; Sivan (2011) 90; McEvoy (2013) 227. 115 Prosper s.a. 423. 116 Prosper s.a. 425, discussed in the next chapter. 117 PLRE 2: ‘Gaudentius 5’, 493–494; Zecchini (1983) 137. Gaudentius had been a former comes Africae under Stilicho (398–401), but his career must have stalled since he is not reported again after 401 until serving as magister militum in Gaul during Ioannes’ reign. Most probably he was Ioannes’ magister equitum praesentalis. 118 Philost.12.13; Theoph. AM 5915. 119 Contra Matthews (1975) 380; O’Flynn (1983) 76; Muhlberger (1990) 94; Millar (2006) 54–56 and Deliyannis (2010) 43 who describe Theodosius as reacting swiftly to this usurpation and championing Valentinian’s cause. 120 Stein (1968) 283 believes that Theodosius did this in order to have an exit strategy should the campaign against Ioannes fail and pick up relations with the latter again. Stickler (2002) 30 (n. 145) rightly comments that the severe dynastic policy of Constantinople makes this highly unlikely.

Notes to pp. 62–63

149

121 Aug. Serm. 114: ‘On the words of the Gospel, Luke 17:3–4: If your brother sins against you, rebuke him, etc.: Preached one Sunday at the shrine of Saint Cyprian in the presence of comes Bonifatius on forgiving the brethren’. For the date: Perler (1969) 373–380. 122 Not coincidentally perhaps, Augustine refused to make any comment on Heraclian’s revolt despite the fact that this comes Africae must have given tremendous support to the suppression of the Donatists after the conference of Carthage in 411. 123 Chron. Gall. 452, 98. 124 Clover (1993a) 9; Wells (1994). 125 Poss. V.Aug. 28. 126 Moss (1973) 725 thinks that the walls were built as a precaution against the Vandals. Merrils & Miles (2010) 51 (n. 119) rightly comment that the construction of the wall would have had little connection with the possibility of a Vandal invasion, however. The most reasonable suggestion, already advanced by Diesner (1963b) 43 (n. 108), is to see the wall being constructed as a defensive measure against Ioannes. 127 For Bonifatius’ coinage, see: Clover (1993) 15; Kent (1994) 232–234; Calabria (2004). For Domitius Alexander’s coinage, see: Salama (1973). 128 Contra Mitchell (2007) 168 and Sivan (2011) 194 who attribute imperial aspirations to Bonifatius. This is not borne out by the evidence. 129 His coins were accompanied by a message, which could be seen in the following legends that his coins bore: DOMINO NOSTRO, DOMINIS NOSTRIS and DOMINIS NOSTRIS P(ER)P(ETVIS) AVG(VSTIS). The most common reverse legend was CARTAGINE P(ER)P(ETVA) or CARTAGIN(E). ‘Our Lord’ refers to Theodosius II, while the two lords are the eastern emperor and Valentinian. The reference to Carthage is an expression of local authority. 130 Prosper s.a. 424. 131 Chron. Gall. 452, 98. PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Sigusvultus’, 1010. De Lepper (1941) 43; Oost (1968) 187 and Zecchini (1983) 135 believe that Sigisvult could have been sent twice against Bonifatius. I agree with Mathisen (1999) 176 (n. 12) that Placidia would not have trusted such a delicate operation to a former supporter of Ioannes. 132 Suggested by Stickler (2002) 31 (n. 151). Heather (2005) 261 states that Castinus was Ioannes’ commander in Gaul. This is certainly a mistake for Gaudentius. 133 Greg.Tur. Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.8. 134 As discussed in the next chapter. This could also partially confirm his ultimate fate and possible appearance in the pseudo-Bonifatius correspondence. 135 PLRE 2: ‘Exuperantius 2’, 448. On their death see: Chron. Gall. 452, 97, 100. 136 On the campaign, see: Stein (1968) 283–284; Oost (1968) 187–189; Zecchini (1983) 137–140; Stickler (2002) 32–35. 137 Philost. 12.13 explicitly notes that the city had to be taken manu militare. On the occupation of Salona, see: Wilkes (1972) 388–389.

150

Notes to pp. 63–67

138 Olymp. Fr. 43.1. 139 Philost. 12.13–14. Blockley (1983) 220 (n. 84) remarks that these could have been senior officers previously loyal to Honorius and discharged by Ioannes after his accession. 140 Chron. Gall. 452, 99. 141 Elia (1999) 10 shows surprise about the lack of resistance near Aquileia, which served as the first bastion obstructing any army invading Italy from the east until its desolation by Attila in 452. 142 Proc. BV. 3.3.9. 143 Soc. 7.23. 144 Wilkes (1972) 391 asserts that Bonifatius had not played an active role in the destruction of Ioannes. It is true that he did not contribute directly to the campaign in Italy. By only focusing on the war effort in Italy, however, we risk missing out on the significance of his efforts in Africa. These efforts triggered not only the usurpation of Ioannes, but also the latter’s subsequent downfall.

4 Enemy of the State (426–428) 1 Coincidentally, Ioannes’ execution at Aquileia also represents the last recorded victory celebration of the western Roman court – already conducted under the watchful eye of Constantinople. See: McCormick (1986) 59–60. 2 Olymp. Fr. 43; Philost. 12.13–14. 3 PLRE 2: ‘Helion 1’, 533. 4 PLRE 2: ‘Licinia Eudoxia 2’, 410–412. 5 Olymp. Fr. 47; Soc. 7.24. 6 Oost (1968) 192–193. 7 Diesner (1963b) 112 (n. 43). 8 Aug. Ep. 7*, 1–2. 9 Concerning church finances in this era: Andreau (1983). 10 PLRE 2: ‘Sebastianus 3’, 983–984. 11 The date for Aug. Ep. 7* is considered to be 426/427. Andreau (1983) argues for a date in the first half of 427. This seems unlikely, because at that time Bonifatius would have been stripped of his titles. The same likely held true for his associates such as Sebastian. Therefore, early spring 426 seems preferable. 12 Proc. BV 3.3.14–16. 13 Aug. Ep. 220.7. 14 Diesner (1963b) 111; Stein (1968) 318–319; Demandt (1970) 655; Stickler (2002) 36 (n. 172). I disagree with Diesner and Stein who evaluate the appointment respectively as a ‘belanglosen Titel’ and ‘un titre vide’, since this overlooks the high

Notes to pp. 67–68

15 16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23

24

151

rank of this office. It is intriguiging to note that the western court was willing to grant Bonifatius the unprecedented dual command of comes Africae et comes domesticorum, but did not consider reviving Gildo’s former position of magister utriusque militiae per Africam. Perhaps it was apprehensive about such a command, given Gildo’s ultimate role in western politics. If so, the court would eventually find itself in a similar situation regardless. Greg.Tur. Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.8 (citing the lost contemporary history of Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus). Philost. 12.14. Jones (1964) 176 rightly remarked that ‘the number of 60,000 may be taken with a grain of salt’. Mitchell (2007) 111 confusingly states that Aëtius had vanquished Ioannes with these Hun mercenaries. Elton (1996) 198; McEvoy (2013) 245. Prosper s.a. 425. This is well reflected in the fate of Magnus Maximus’ magister equitum Andragathius (PLRE 1: ‘Andragathius 3’, 62–63) and Eugenius’ generalissimo Arbogastes (PLRE 1: ‘Arbogastes’, 95–97). Both men preferred taking their own lives after the defeat of their emperors rather than being at the mercy of Theodosius I. There might be a parallel with the fate of Castinus and that of Vetranio (PLRE 1: ‘Vetranio 1’, 954). In 350, the western emperor Constans (337–350) was murdered in a junta staged by the high command of the Gallic army. While their emperor Magnentius took over power in the west, Constans’ magister peditum Vetranio usurped power in Illyricum. He played a crucial role in safeguarding this area from Magnentius while the eastern emperor Constantius II was organizing his armies to march to Europe. Vetranio voluntarily discarded the purple for Constantius II. The price of failed usurpation was nearly always death, but Vetranio’s life was spared and he was merely exiled to Bythinia. On this episode, see: Drinkwater (2000) 146–159. PRLE 2: ‘Felix (14)’, 461–462. Eastern choice: Kaegi (1968) 23; Moss (1973) 715; McEvoy (2013) 234. Placidia’s choice: Jones (1964) 176. Oost (1968) 210 comments that there is ‘not a shred of evidence’ in the sources to uphold the former view. In his opinion Felix was probably an old adherent of Placidia, who was chosen because he lacked a military background. These two views are not incompatible, as shown by Zecchini (1983) 142 and McEvoy (2013) 234. Theophanes, AM 5931 states that both Aëtius and Bonifatius had been sent to Rome by Theodosius II at Valentinian’s request. Mango & Scott (1997) 147–148 (n. 4) rightly point out that this is an invention on the eastern chronicler’s part, but it may be a distorted reflection of the temporary eastern hegemony over state affairs in the west.

152

Notes to pp. 68–70

25 Sivan (2011) 105 (n. 45) believes that the western throne might have been offered to Aspar in 425. The sixth-century Acta synhod.habit. Rom. 5,23–26 does indeed state that the senate of Rome once had offered him the imperial office, but that the Alan general refused ‘since he did not wish to set a precedent’. If there is any truth in this story, it is more likely to refer to events after the death of Theodosius II in 450, when Aspar established himself as the most dominant eastern Roman magister militum. See also, PLRE 2: ‘Fl Ardabur Aspar’, 168; Moorhead (1992) 8 (n. 7); MacGeorge (2002) 266 (n. 24). In 425, by contrast, Aspar had only made his debut in this office, while his father clearly held the senior command of the campaign. 26 Aug. Ep. 220.8. 27 Oost (1968) 211; O’Flynn (1983) 77–78. 28 Stickler (2002) 37–38. 29 Proc. BV. 3. 3. 17–22. 30 Prosper s.a. 427. 31 PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Aetius 7’, 23; ‘Bonifatius 3’, 239; Collins (1999) 83; Graham (2006) 189 (n. 55); Halsall (2007) 240. Mathisen (1999) 189–191 sees the initiative coming from Aëtius, who thus would have had a free hand to intervene in Spain after the Vandals’ departure. This seems highly unlikely considering that after the Vandals did leave Spain, and Aëtius became uncontested generalissimo in 433, he paid no attention to Spain until the 440s. Sivan (2011) 106–107 notes the possibility that Felix could have been responsible, but still follows Procopius’ attribution to Aëtius. McEvoy (2013) 247 accepts that either Aetius or Felix could have been responsible for the plot. 32 Contra Collins (1999) 83 and Lee (2013) 85 who already see the struggle between Aëtius and Bonifatius taking place from 425 onwards. 33 Prosper s.a. 425; Chron. Gall. 452, 102. On the problems concerning the chronology of Aëtius’ campaign to relieve Arles, see: Halsall (2007) 237. 34 Sivan (2011) 152 correctly argues that in time such a stance could have shifted, especially once Aëtius entrenched his position as generalissimo after 433. Given the flux of power relations and court politics, the possibility that Bonifatius could one day have turned against her is not out of the question. Yet I disagree with the argument that such a stance should have occurred as early as 425–426, when Aetius had yet to prove his worth, while Bonifatius had already done precisely that. 35 Zecchini (1983) 34ff.; 60; 146. 36 De Lepper (1941) 49; Wood (1998) 533; Elia (1999) 54; Merrils & Miles (2010) 52. 37 Stickler (2002) 41–42. 38 Oost (1968) 221 (n. 46). 39 Prosper s.a. 426. 40 Stickler (2002) 43. 41 Oost (1968) 223.

Notes to pp. 71–73

153

42 Muhlberger (1990) 104. 43 CIL VIII, 898: FELICI HUIUS URBIS RESTAURATORI COM BONIFACIO . . . DOMITORI. V. C. F.; De Lepper (1941) 19 (n. 3); Diesner (1963b) 112. 44 Sid. Ap. Carm. 9, 277–279. 45 Gillett (2003) 92. 46 Gillet (2010) 273. 47 PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Merobaudes’, 756–758; ‘Quintianus’, 932–933. 48 Aug. Ep. 220.5 49 Stickler (2002) 46 (n. 228). 50 PLRE 1: ‘Flavius Abundantius’, 4–5; ‘Barbatio’, 146–147; ‘Silvanus 2’, 840–841; ‘Flavius Timasius’, 914–915. 51 Prosper s.a. 427. 52 O’Flynn (1983) 37. 53 Cass. s.a. 427. 54 Prosper s.a.427. 55 Ps.-Bonif. Ep. 10. 56 Oost (1968) 222. 57 Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 77 believes that Sanoeces might have been a Hun. Though not impossible, we have to remember that names of Huns in our sources usually are Germanic versions. Without any other sources on the commanders it is impossible to recover their origins. The same applies to an old hypothesis mentioned in Zecchini (1983) 147 (n. 28), that they were rebels from Bonifatius’ army. 58 Diesner (1963b) 105. Calabria (2004) 1727 notes that several coins attributed to Bonifatius with the legend ‘INBICTISSIMO’ might have been issued to the local population during this invasion. 59 De Lepper (1941) 58. 60 Diesner (1963b) 113 (n. 47). 61 De Lepper (1941) 28–34. 62 Though impossible to prove, perhaps Castinus had even sought shelter with native tribes in Africa. A similar approach was taken by the usurper Maximus in Spain, who fled to the barbarians after his first usurpation failed in 412 (PLRE 2: ‘Maximus 4’, 744–745), and Eudoxius, leader of the bacaudae near the Loire, who fled to Attila’s court in 448 (Chron.Gall. 452, 133). Castinus’ ultimate fate must remain a mystery, however. 63 Zecchini (1983) 147. 64 Cameron (1970) 102. 65 Liebeschuetz (1993) 269–270. 66 Proc. BV 3.3.22–27.

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Notes to pp. 75–79

67 An excellent summary of the debate in older scholarship can be found in Oost (1968) 221–223. 68 Bury (1923) 245; Sirago (1961) 278 (n.1); Diesner (1963b) 113–114; Stein (1968) 319; Scharf (1989) 142; Elia (1999) 55; Williams & Friell (1999) 54; Collins (2000) 124 (n. 23); Whitby (2000) 296 (n. 31); Todd (2004) 176; Acre (2005) 348; Dossey (2010) 21–22; Shaw (2011) 772–773. 69 Prosper s.a. 427. 70 Merrils & Miles (2010) 53. 71 Jord. Get. 167. 72 Joh. Ant. Fr. 196. 73 Theoph. AM 5931. 74 Vict. Vit. 1.19. 75 Lambert (2000) 111–112. 76 Cass. s.a. 427. 77 Paul.Diac. Hist.Rom. 13.10. 78 Hyd. 77 (86). 79 PLRE 2: ‘Geisericus’, 496–499. He captured Carthage at a time when the western imperial army was fighting a major war with the Visigoths in 439, and sacked Rome in 455 only a couple of months after the murder of Valentinian III. 80 Schwarcz (2004) 52. 81 Courtois (1955) 157: “Le dossier du comte d’Afrique est fait d’accusations plus que de preuves”. 82 Clover (1966) 31; Wolfram (1997) 166. 83 Oost (1968) 197–198. 84 Mathisen (1999) 189–191. 85 Traina (2009) 130 makes an apt comparison with the story of the Romano-British leader Vortigern ‘inviting’ the Saxons to invade Britain. 86 Prosper s.a. 427. 87 Muhlberger (1990) 96. 88 Muhlberger (1990) 95–97. 89 Clover (1966) 23. 90 Oros. 7.43.11–12. 91 Hyd. 61 (69), 69 (77), 126 (134). 92 Concerning the date, see: Diesner (1963a); Paronetto (1974). 93 Aug. Ep. 220.2. 94 Aug. Ep. 220.5. 95 Aug. Ep. 220.4. 96 Naturally, Augustine took offence at the rapacity of Bonifatius’ soldiers and his failure to protect the provincial population. Clark (2011) 42 points out, however, that contrary to the majority of contemporary ancient writers, Augustine did not have an issue with the ethnicity of Goths themselves.

Notes to pp. 79–85 97 98 99 100 101

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

122 123 124 125

155

Aug. Ep. 220.6. Contra Sirago (1961) 276. Aug. Ep. 220.7. Graham (2006) 88. Diesner (1963b) 110 suggests that some of these Mauri raiders may actually have been enlistened by Bonifatius into his regular forces, comparing such activities with that of Firmus and Gildo during their respecive rebellions against the western government. However, given Augustine’s critical stance of Bonifatius in this letter, it would be remarkable should he not have castigated him for this. Modéran (2003) 394–395. Aug. Ep. 220.5, 8, 9. Brown (2000) 427. Aug. Ep. 220.12. O’Donnell (2005) 225. Dennis (1970); Brown (2000) 183–187. Pseud.Bonif. Ep. 4. Clover (1993c) 80–81. Bury (1923) 245; Sirago (1961) 277–278; Diesner (1963b) 113. Poss. V. Aug. 17. Aug. Sermo 140. That a sizable garrison could successfully withstand a siege at Carthage can be deduced from the fact that this city was one of the very few that did not fall into the hands of the Vandals during their invasion in 430. Aug. Coll. 1. Mathisen (1999) 178–180. De Lepper (1941) 74; Stein (1968) 320; Traina (2009) 86. Proc. BV 3.3. 27–30. Theoph. AM 5931 Zecchini (1983) 150. Matthews (1975) 25–30. Bury (1923) 245; Oost (1968) 233 (n. 55) and Traina (2009) 86 argue that Felix would have been alarmed by both the rising power of Aëtius and possible reports of the Vandal invasion. Therefore, Felix might have also been quite eager to be reconciled with Bonifatius. This is not impossible, but given Felix’s track record of attempting to eliminate (potential) political rivals or religious dissidents it seems unlikely he should have been willing to relent when Bonifatius was being backed into a corner. Stickler (2002) 46. Aug. Ep. 229.1. Mathisen (1999) 178–183. Aug. Ep. 229.2.

156

Notes to pp. 85–89

126 127 128 129 130 131 132

Aug. Ep. 230.3. Oros. 7.36.4–11. Amm. 29.5. De Lepper (1941) 70; Zecchini (1983) 150. Mathisen (1999) 181–182. Aug. Ep. 229.2; Aug. Ep. 230.6; Aug. Ep. 231.7. Clover (1993c) 74–75. De Lepper (1941) sees Aug. Ep. 223, and Aug. Ep. 224, as a sign of an episcopal intervention at the court. Zecchini (1983) 149 (n.34) shows that these are unrelated and connected with the Pelagian affair, however. 133 See (n. 58). The epiteth invictus was also used for the magister militum Ricimer (Sid. Ap. Carm. 2, 352–353). It has rightly been observed that this was no hollow praise since Ricimer is never known to have lost a battle: Scott (1984) 27; MacGeorge (2002) 238. At this point in time, the same was very much true for Bonifatius. Nevertheless, this was a bold declaration since the title was once solely reserved for emperors or members of the imperial family, see: McCormick (1986) 21–24.

5 Fighting for the Empire (429–433) 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16

CTh.11.1.34, 11.30.68. Courtois (1955) 156 (n. 6). PLRE 2: ‘Gundericus’, 522. Hyd. 77 (86), 79 (89). Kulikowski (2004) 177. PLRE 2: ‘Geisericus’, 496–499. Hyd. 80 (90). Merrils & Miles (2010) 50–51. Christie (2011) 43 raises the possibility that the Vandals were pushed out of Spain through Suevic pressure. This seems unlikely considering Geiseric had actually pursued the Sueves and defeated them in Lusitania, prior to the crossing: Hyd. 80 (90). Heather (2005) 265–266; Halsall (2007) 241; Traina (2009) 84. Alaric: Jord. Get. 157. Gothic warband in Spain: Oros. 7.43.11. Hyd. 77 (86). Kulikowski (2004) 178; Merills & Miles (2010) 51. Poss. V.Aug. 28. Wolfram (1988) 170. Courtois (1955) 160–162. Kulikowski (2004) 177–178. Proc. BV. 3.11.13–16. Heather (2005) 268–269. That the African littoral was under military surveillance can also be deduced from Aug. Ep. 115 who describes the tribune Cresconius as responsible for shore defences. Courtois (1955) 161.

Notes to pp. 89–94 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

157

Already advanced by Bury (1923) 246 (n. 26). Courtois (1955) 162, 205–209; De Souza (1999) 231–232 (n. 25). Schwarcz (2004) 52 (n. 25). On war atrocities by both Romans and barbarians, see: Ward-Perkins (2005) 13–31. Briant-Ponsart & Hugoniot (2005) 479; Merrils (2009). The enduring legacy of this anachronism can nevertheless still be seen in scholars’ description of Geiseric’s sack of Rome in 455 as ‘vandalism’: Mitchell (2007) 115; Christie (2011) 44. Le Bohec (2005) 256; Christie (2011) 43 Vict. Vit. 1.2. Proc. BV. 3.5.18–22. Goffart (1980) 231–234; Wood (1998) 521. Zecchini (1983) 174 (n. 24). Ward (1974) 432. Kulikowski (2000c) 376 (n. 70) rejects Ward’s general thesis about the nature of the Notitia but still accepts the value of his section on the African units. Ward (1974) 432 (n. 182). Proc. BV. 3.3.30–33. Shaw (2011) 35 does not incorrectly describe the late imperial army in Roman Africa functioning more as a ‘national police force or regional militia’. Raven (1993) 195. Surprsisingly enough this is the last occasion that Procopius mentions Bonifatius in his work, yet this piece of information is often overlooked. It is not mentioned in PLRE II: ‘Bonifatius 3’, 237–240. Proc. BV. 3.3.14–16 Geiseric himself would later use such a ploy to annihilate Basiliscus’ armada during the ‘fourth Punic war’ of 468 (Proc. BV. 4.6.2–4, 10–16). Courtois (1955) 163 (n. 3); Brown (2000) 183. Poss. V.Aug. 28. Caes. B.Afr. 96; Dennis (1970) 57. Courtois (1955) 163 (n. 4). Poss. V.Aug. 29. Pseud.-Bonif. Ep. 15. Brown (2000) 428–429. Poss. V.Aug. 29. Aug. Ep 220.12. Hermanowicz (2008) 61. Mitchell (2007) 111 sees the successful defence of Hippo as evidence of the strength of local resistance. Quite the opposite, Hippo was rather a rare exception during the Vandal conquest of Africa.

158 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73

Notes to pp. 94–98 Diesner (1969) 74s. Shaw (2011) 35 (n. 10). Le Bohec (2005) 256–257. Brown (2000) 428. Poss. V.Aug. 28. Randers-Pehrson (1983) 154 sees the Vandals as outsiders for whom contact with a simple virus could have had lethal consequences, in contrast to the stable local community that had developed its own natural immunity. This is most probably overstating the circumstances, considering the Vandals had been living in the Mediterranean for more than two decades at this time. Proc. BV 3.3.34–35. Oost (1968) 226 (n. 65). The chronology can be deduced from Augustine’s death. Poss. Vit.Aug. 29 situates his death in the third month of the siege. Prosper s.a. 430 gives 28 August as the date of his death. Given that the siege lasted fourteen months, Aspar’s army landed in the summer of 431. De Lepper (1941) 96 (n. 3). PLRE 2: ‘Ebagnius’, 383. Millar (2006) 57. Proc. BV. 3.4.1–2; Courtois (1955) 163 (n. 2). For diplomatic relations between Aspar and Geiseric at this time, see: Bachrach (1973) 44–48. Prosper s.a. 425. Prosper s.a. 428. Twyman (1970); Traina (2009) 73–75. Chron. Gall. 452, 106; Hyd. 83 (93), 85 (95). On these campaigns, see: Drinkwater (2007) 325–327. Wood (1987) 252. Stickler (2002) 47–48 (n. 237). Marcell.Com. s.a. 427.1. On Felix’s recovery of Pannonia, see: O’Flynn (1983) 175 (n. 21); Croke (1995) 77. Oost (1968) 227–228. Prosp. s.a. 430, Hyd. 84 (94); Marcell.Com. s.a. 430.2; Joh. Ant. Fr. 201 Mitchell (2007) 111 sees Aëtius already in 430 calling on Hun auxiliaries to assist him against Bonifatius. This seems to be a distorted reading of the events surrounding the aftermath of the battle of Rimini in 432. Proc. BV. 3.3.36. Hyd. 89 (99). Prosper s.a. 432. Blockley (1992) 60 (n. 9). Scharf (1989) 146. Demandt (1970) 656.

Notes to pp. 98–101

159

74 Oost (1968) 231 interpreted this event as a geture of Placidia towards the aristocracy in order to gather support against Aëtius. Elia (1999) 17 and Hedrick (2000) 223–224 point out that Aëtius might have been just as likely behind this move. I agree with McEvoy (2013) 243 (n. 92) that the evidence does not allow for firm declarations either way. 75 Stickler (2002) 55. 76 Hyd. 86 (96), 88 (98). 77 Hyd. 89 (99); Chron.Gall. 452, 109; Prosper s.a. 432. 78 Stein (1968) 321–322; O’Flynn (1983) 80; Scharf (1989) 146; Heather (2000) 6, (2005) 261–262. 79 Mathisen (1999) 184 states that Bonifatius’ quarrel with Aëtius escalated into the civil war of 432. Halsall (2007) 242 goes even further when claiming that Bonifatius rebelled against Aëtius in 432. However, the sources clearly show that Bonifatius was acting on behalf of the central authority during these events. 80 Stickler (2002) 54 (n. 270). 81 Twyman (1970) 502 considers the possibility that Aëtius’ would have been deprived of his consulship as soon as Bonifatius replaced him in Italy. He rejects this on the ground that Aëtius would have made sure to see it restored as soon as he was back in power in 433. There is, however, no need to entertain this option in the first place, since the Gallic chronicle of 452 clearly describes Aëtius celebrating his consulship and that the latter was also acknowledged in the east, see: CLRE 399. 82 CLRE, 1. 83 Zecchini (1983) 160 (n. 73). 84 O’Flynn (1983) 85. 85 Croke (1995) 80. 86 Barnes (1975) 165–166. 87 Oost (1968) 232; O’ Flynn (1983) 80; Stickler (2002) 55. 88 Marcell.Com. s.a. 464. 89 Marcell.Com. s.a. 435. 90 Demandt (1970) 656. 91 Chron. Gall. 452, n. 110. 92 Addit. Prosp. Haun. s.a. 432. 93 O’ Flynn (1983) 80. 94 Zecchini (1983) 160. 95 Liebeschuetz (1993) 273. 96 NVal. 9.1. 97 Elton (1996) 212. Collins (1999) believes that Bonifatius shipped most of the African field units to Italy for his struggle with Aëtius in 432. Given the military crisis against the Vandals, especially the recent defeat against Geiseric, this seems

160

98

99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106

107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

Notes to pp. 101–105 very unlikely and makes it harder to explain how Aspar was able to further contain them until his departure in 434–435. Gillett (2003) 43–44, 61 (n. 95) observes that at least one side-effect of the civil war between Bonifatius and Aëtius was that the imperial envoy Censorius had to abort his participation in peace talks between the Sueves and Gallaecians. Randers-Pehrson (1983) 155. Wijnendaele (2013) 149. Marcell.Com. s.a. 432.3. Croke (1995) 80; Zecchini (1983) 160. De Lepper (1941) 106; Oost (1968) 233 (n. 87); O’Flynn (1983) 176 (n. 28). Sid.Ap. Carm. 7.230–231. The Goth Flavius Aereobindus, serving as comes domesticorum in the eastern Roman army, allegedly defeated Ardazanes, one of the leaders of the Persian army in 422, in single combat. (Socr. 7.18.25, Malal. 364). Similar incidents recur throughout Procopius’ histories. Henning (1999) 16 and Merrils & Miles (2010) 55 curiously mention that Aëtius murdered Bonifatius. This seems to be a distorted interpretation of the latter’s ultimate death after having fought the former. Prosper s.a. 432. Chron. Gall. 452, 111. Hyd. 89 (99). Marcell.Com. s.a. 432.3. Joh.Ant. Fr. 201. Blockley (1983) 68. Chron.Gall. 452, 110. Zecchini (1983) 161 (n. 77). Muhlberger (1990) 99. Amm. 27.22.2–6. Heather (2005) 254–255.

6 Epilogue: Sebastian’s Odyssey (432–442) 1 Hyd. 89 (99). 2 Demandt (1998) 145. An earlier case can be seen in Arbogastes, a possible relative of Bauto, who inherited the latter’s command after 385. The inheritance of western Roman military authority became even more prevalent in the second half of the fifth century, as can be seen in the cases of Aegidius and his son Syagrius, Marcellinus and his nephew Julius Nepos, and Ricimer and his nephew Gundobad. On these, see: MacGeorge (2002); Liebeschuetz (2007) 485–488.

Notes to pp. 105–108 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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24

161

Demandt (1970) 657; Diesner (1972) 341; Liebeschuetz (1993) 269. Prosper s.a. 432. Hyd. 89 (99). Chron.Gall. 452, 113. Hyd. 95 (104). Hyd. 121 (129). Marcell.Com. s.a. 432.2. Nevertheless, Hydatius’ chronology is still considered to be the standard one for Sebastian’s career. See: PLRE 2: ‘Sebastianus 3’, 983–984; Courtois (1955) 198 (n.3), 255, 284; Sirago (1961) 352–353; Diesner (1972) 342; Moss (1973) 729 (n. 160); Wolfram (1988) 177; Demandt (1998) 123; Mathisen (1999) 187; Heather (2000) 6, (2005) 262; Gillett (2010) 273. Mathisen (1999) 188 even makes the grandiose claim that Hydatius ‘could virtually qualify as Sebastianus’ biographer’. Hydatius devotes five entries in his chronicle to Sebastian, but only gives us a bare-bones report. Victor of Vita devotes far more space to his martyr-hero. Nevertheless, Thompson (1982) 143 (n. 29) is probably right that Hydatius would not have devoted so many entries to Sebastian if he had been an admirer of Aëtius. I concur with De Lepper (1941) 107–115 and Clover (1993b) that the chronology of Prosper and Marcellinus comes provides a more secure framework for Sebastian’s itinerary, but I am not in agreement with all of their interpretations. Croke (1995) 82. Scharf (1989) 147–149. Oost (1968) 242–245; Croke (1995) 82; McEvoy (2013) 229–230. Barnes (1975) 166–168. PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Merobaudes’, 758; Clover (1971) 36. CLRE, 408–409. Scharf (1989) 149 and Stickler (2002) 66 assert this too without exploring the matter further. Suda 145 (= Blockley, Priscus Fr. [4]) Stickler (2002) 55–56. Scharf (1989) 146–147. Marcell.Com. s.a. 432.3. Gil Egea (1999) 502–503. Croke (1995) 80 notes that we do not know the origin of Pelagia’s wealth. Given that she was Bonifatius’ widow, she could have inherited any property he had in Africa. Considering Bonifatius had served in the regional military between 417 and 431 – dominating the region between 422 and 427 – it could even have exceeded the value of Heraclian’s property which consisted of nearly 2,000 pounds of gold and landed property worth 2,000 litrai (as reported in Olymp. Fr. 23). Hyd. 121 (129).

162

Notes to pp. 108–110

25 Prosper s.a. 437, 438. 26 Marcell.Com. s.a. 438 27 Clover (1993b) 71–72; Merrils & Miles (2010) 61 (n. 14). Scharf (1989) 151 raises the possibility that Sebastian’s piracy could be connected to the events reported by Prosper and Marcellinus comes, yet does not explore this further. 28 Prosper s.a. 437. 29 Prosper s.a. 406, 409, 422, 427, 435, 437, 441. 30 De Souza (1999) 231–232. 31 Olymp. Fr. 7.4. Clover (1993b) 71 (n. 48) also makes this observation to substantiate Jordanes’ error for assigning some of Sebastian’s activities to Gainas. However, he fails to make the same connection between Sebastian’s buccellarii and the deserters mentioned by Prosper for 437. Sivan (1987) 767 (n. 38) suggests that these were ‘probably Roman deserters from Gaul’. 32 It might even be possible that Contradis (not listed in PLRE2) was a former domesticus of Sebastian, who split off with some his men along the Mediterranean. 33 Jord. Get. 36, 176–177. 34 PLRE 1: ‘Gainas’, 379–380. Clover (1993b) 70–71. 35 Prosper s.a. 436. 36 PLRE 2: ‘Litorius’, 684–685. 37 Prosper s.a. 439. 38 Jones (1964) 189; Clover (1993b) 72 believes that Sebastian joined forces with Theoderic between 438 and 439. Scharf (1989) 151 also opts for 439 but contradicts himself by suggesting that Sebastian may have been responsible for Litorius’ defeat. However, at this point in time Litorius had pushed the Visigoths back to Toulouse. Given that Narbonne had just been relieved by western Roman forces, and Sebastian had to come overseas, this scenario seems unlikely. 39 Prosper s.a. 442; Vict. Vit. 1.19; Sid. Ap. Carm. 9, 277–279. 40 Given that he served as acting comes Africae in 426, it is reasonable to suppose that he had fought in Africa with Bonifatius against the imperial troops sent by Felix, and later against the Vandals, before joining his father-in-law in Italy for the looming showdown with Aëtius. 41 A possible exception could be Athaulf ’s capture of Iovinus after the siege of Valentia in 412. However, Iovinus’ military power was based on a precarious alliance between Alans, Burgundians and former soldiers of Constantine ‘III’. Since the usurper’s authority never reached further than territories near the Rhine and Rhone, it is possible that Athaulf possessed superior manpower when he crushed Iovinus. 42 Prosper s.a. 440. 43 Hyd. 121 (129). 44 Thompson (1948) 138 suggests that Theoderic had sent Sebastian forward to capture Barcelona. This is unlikely, given that Sebastian had been expelled from the Visigoths.

Notes to pp. 110–113

163

45 Collins (2004) 31; Kulikowski (2004) 180–181; Halsall (2007) 245. 46 Hyd. 106 (114). There is some disagreement about the identity of Andevotus, who was defeated by Rechila. PLRE 2: ‘Andevotus’, 86 postulates that he could have been a Vandal prince adopting a latinized name and ruling over Vandals left behind in Baetica. Kulikowski (2004) 180 sees him as a local aristocrat rather than an imperial commander. It is indeed doubtful whether the provincial army ever recovered from Castinus’ defeat. However, in the decade between the Vandal departure and the defeat of Andevotus there could have been ample time to build up at least a local militia. 47 Hyd. 111 (119). 48 Van Dam (1985) 50–53. 49 Liebeschuetz (2000) 90; Fernández-Ochoa & Morillo (2005) 303; Esmonde-Cleary (2013) 137. 50 Chron.Gall.511, 79 (652) [s.a. 472]. 51 Hyd. 117 (125). 52 Van Dam (1985) 25–56; Drinkwater (1992); Harries (1994) 72; Wood (2000) 502–504. 53 Clover (1993b) 68 states that Sebastian was expelled from Barcelona. It is possible that the urban nobility pressured Sebastian to depart at some stage, but Hydatius’ chronicle entry does not suggest such a reading. 54 Scharf (1989) 152. 55 Prosper s.a. 440; Hyd. 112 (120). 56 Prosper s.a. 440. 57 Muhlberger (1990) 108. 58 Courtois (1955) 191 (n. 4). 59 Mathisen (1999) 187–188. Followed by Halsall (2007) 247 (n. 121). McEvoy (2013) 262 (n. 41) is more cautious about this hypothesis. 60 Muhlberger (1990) 297 (n. 34). Courtois (1955) 156 (n. 7) remarks that Sebastian’s flight to Geiseric does not imply any previous treaty between his father-in-the-law and the former in 427–428, as eastern Roman historiographers claim. 61 Muhlberger (1990) 48–60. 62 Stickler (2002) 238. 63 Bury (1923) 255 (n. 69). 64 NVal. 9. 65 Hyd. 195 (200) reports how Majorian’s fleet near Alicante was destroyed by the Vandals in 460, after Spanish informers had passed on information on the emperor’s naval operation. 66 Prosper s.a. 441. 67 NVal 9.1 describes Geiseric as ‘the enemy of our Empire’. 68 Hyd. 136 (144).

164 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Notes to pp. 113–118 Vict.Vit. 1.19. Vict.Vit. 1.19–21. Vict.Vit. 1.19. Prosper s.a. 442. PLRE 2: ‘Eudocia,’ 407–408; ‘Hunericus’, 572–573. Prosper s.a. 442. Halsall (2007) 247 raises the suggestion that the uprising was ‘possibly Romaninspired’, implying that either the western court or provincial magnates might have had a hand in it.

7 Conclusion 1 2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15

Bury (1923) 300 (80). Heather (2005) 288 (63) Moss (1973) 714–720. De Lepper (1941) 116–118. It is not impossible that this type of backstabbing story, which seems to have become dominant in the east from the sixth century onwards, was designed to be part of the imperial discourse in Constantinople to justify military intervention in former western imperial provinces. On this theme, see especially: Croke (1983). Sivan (2011) 105 (n. 47) describes the epithet as ‘bizarre’ and ‘awarded for no apparent reason other than his somewhat deluded judgment of their character’. While the title is indeed at odds with Bonifatius and Aëtius’ behaviour in Procopius’ history, I believe it makes more sense Procopius’ using material ultimately derived from both Olympiodorus and Priscus, who portrayed each general respectively as one of the most attractive characters in their histories. Gil Egea (1999) 502–503. Croke (2001) 176. Moss (1973) 729 (n. 159). Treadgold (2004) 726 (n.2) believes that Candidianus might have provided Olympiodorus with information on Bonifatius. While this is not impossible, it is far more likely to prove that the information may have derived from Bonifatius’ own panegyrist. Blockley (1983) 29. Ibid. 44. A parallel can be seen in the case of the Gallo-Roman general Aegidius, who became rex of the Franks after his revolt against Ricimer and Libius Severus in 461. Muhlberger (1990) 99–101. Bury (1923) preface.

Notes to pp. 118–121

165

16 De Lepper (1941), ‘Stelling V’. 17 I agree with MacGeorge (2002) 305 that one of the most fascinating aspects of studying this poorly-documented era is when one actually stumbles across a rare glimpse of real personality. 18 Prosper s.a. 422. 19 Halsall (2007) 282 astutely observes about the decline of the western Roman Empire that ‘the most ironic thing is that it is almost impossible to identify a single figure who had actually tried to cause its demise’. 20 O’Flynn (1983) removes him altogether from his list. Lütkenhaus (1998) 1 stresses that Bonifatius was uncontested generalissimo for only a very short time. Collins (1999) 87 states that ‘some [generalissimos] proved short-lived or unsuccessful, as in the cases of Boniface and of Castinus’. Liebeschuetz (2007) 482 tacitly acknowledges the hiatus between the death of Constantius III in 421 and the supremacy of Aëtius in 435, when there was no unchallenged generalissimo. This coincided in the exact same period that witnessed Bonifatius’ rise to power in the western Roman military and this is where his true importance lies. 21 For a recent defence and adaption of this technique to the study of political biography, see: Mayor (2010) 73–96, 360–370. I remain unconvinced of the merits of such an approach. 22 De Lepper (1941) 42–43. 23 PLRE 2: ‘Fl. Ricimer 2’, 942–945. On Ricimer, see: O’Flynn (1983) 104–128; Gillett (1995); MacGeorge (2002) 173–268. 24 PLRE 2: ‘Marcellinus 6’, 708–710. On Marcellinus, see: Henning (1999) 277–281; Kulikowski (2002); MacGeorge (2002) 17–67. 25 PLRE 2: ‘Iulius Nepos 3, 777–778. 26 Kulikowski (2002) 190. 27 Stickler (2002) 66. 28 Zos. 6.2.13; Olymp. Fr. 18. 29 PLRE 2: ‘Odovacer’, 791–793. 30 Oost (1968) 234 believed that Sebastian’s activities after his exile from Italy were all aimed at obtaining assistance against Aëtius. Indeed, while the government controlled by Aëtius regarded Sebastian as an enemy of the state, we could be deceived into thinking that Sebastian wished to remain a warlord or oppose the Empire as such indefinitely. It is more far likely that Sebastian adapted to extreme circumstances as best he could, while trying to preserve his warlord group. Ultimately, he could only do so by securing ‘gainful employment’. If need be, he would accept employment from barbarians but he preferred imperial. 31 Cited by Dienser (1972) 343 and Scharf (1989) 140. 32 For a comparison with modern warlords, see: Whittaker (1993) 298–300; Wijnendaele (forthcoming 2016).

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Index Aegidius: 120, 160 (n. 2), 164 (n. 13) Aëtius: 29, 49, 61, 66–70, 78, 96–102, 106–111 Alans: 19, 22–23, 44–45, 162 (n. 41) Alaric: 17–22, 88, 109 Ambrose: 12, 14, 40 Ammianus Marcellinus: 11, 103 Aquileia: 13, 64–64, 150 Arbogastes: 12–16, 61, 136 (n. 30), 136–137 (n. 44), 148 (n. 112), 151 (n. 20), 160 (n.2) Arcadius: 12, 16–17, 20, 132 (n. 22), 136 (n. 44) Ardaburius: 63, 68 Arles: 20, 22, 63, 70, 96–98, 138 (n. 88) Aspar: 63–64, 67, 95–96, 98, 152 (n. 25), 158 (n. 54, 57) Asterius: 36, 43–44, 143 (n.5) Athaulf: 22, 30–31, 36, 51–52, 110, 117, 141 (n. 25), 162 (n. 41) Athens: 71, 145 (n. 56) Attalus, Priscus: 21, 61 Augustine: 2, 26–27, 32–40, 48, 52–54, 62, 66, 71, 78–85, 93–94, 96 Barcelona: 110, 112 Bathanarius: 25, 54 Bauto: 12–13, 136 (n. 28), 160 (n. 2) Beremud: 49 Belisarius: 50, 88, 91–92 Bordeaux: 22 Burgundians: 45, 101, 162 (n. 41) Caesarea: 89 Cartagena: 112 Carthage: 26–27, 39, 61–63, 71, 73, 82–85, 91–92, 95, 98, 111–13, 149 Castinus: 29, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 60–61, 63, 67–68, 73, 117, 143 (n. 5), 144 (n. 11, 18), 151 (n. 21), 153 (n. 62) Cirtae: 62, 92 Claudian: 71

Constans: 9, 11, 26, 135 (n. 21), 151 (n. 21) Constantine I: 26, 99 Constantine iii: 20, 22, 138 (n. 69), 146–147 (n. 86) Constantius II: 9, 11, 151 (n. 21) Constantius [iii]: 22–24, 25, 36, 43, 45, 57, 141 (n. 25) Constantinople: 14, 17–18, 56, 61, 64, 106–107, 137 (n. 63) Darius: 49, 84–85 Donatus: 26 Ephesus: 96 Eudocia (wife of Theodosius II): 57 Eudocia (daughter of Valentinian III): 114 Eudoxia: 66, 77, 106 Eugenius: 14–16, 61, 136 (n. 44), 139 (n. 91) Felix: 68–70, 72, 84, 97, 151 (n. 23), 152 (n. 31), 155 (n. 121) Firmus: 24–25, 50, 85, 142 (n. 61), 147 (n. 101), 155 (n. 101) Franks: 13, 15, 44–45, 91, 96, 144 (n. 11) Gainas: 108–109, 146 (n. 56) Galla Placidia: 23, 30–31, 36, 43, 45–47, 55–57, 59, 64, 67–68, 70, 84–85, 95–99, 105, 146–147 (n. 88), 159 (n. 74) Gaudentius: 30, 61, 63, 148 (n. 117) Geiseric: 75–77, 87–96, 108, 111–114, 144 (n. 18), 156 (n. 6) Gelimer: 30, 92 Gerontius: 22, 44, 61 Gildo: 24–25, 59, 72, 85, 142 (n. 56), 147 (n. 101), 151 (n. 14), 155 (n. 101) Gratian: 10–12, 135 (n. 16, 24) Heraclian: 21–22, 25, 30, 40, 56, 62, 149 (n. 122), 161 (n. 23)

182

Index

Hippo Regius: 26, 39, 54, 62, 66, 73, 78, 81–83, 89, 91–96 Honoria: 54 Honorius: 15–18, 21, 43–44, 55–56, 138 (n. 69), 146–147 (n. 88) Huneric: 80, 114 Ioannes (comes Africae): 54 Ioannes (usurper): 60–61, 63–64, 67, 150 (n. 139) Jovinus: 22, 30, 138 (n. 88), 141 (n. 25) Julian: 3, 9, 11, 15 Julius Nepos: 120, 160 (n. 2) Leo I: 38, 119, 121 Libius Severus: 119 Litorius: 109, 162 (n. 38) Lyons: 12, 20, 128 (n. 88) Magnentius: 11, 151 (n. 21) Magnus Maximus: 12–14, 64, 135 (n. 24), 137 (n. 53) Majorian: 112–113, 119 Marcian: 96 Maria: 18 Marseilles: 30–32, 144 (n. 22) Mascezel: 25, 72, 147 (n. 101) Maximus: 44, 61, 110, 143 (n. 5) Mauri: 24–25, 36–37, 58–59, 80, 89, 94, 155 (n. 101) Merida: 110 Merobaudes (magister pedium 375–383): 10–12, 16, 135 (n. 23–24) Merobaude (panegyrist): 49, 106

Radagaisus: 19–20, 137–138 (n. 64) Ravenna: 21, 25, 55–56, 63–64, 97 Rechila: 110, 163 (n. 46) Rimini: 21, 100–101 Ricimer: 99, 119–120, 156 (n. 133), 160 (n. 2) Rome: 21–22, 25, 59–60, 65–66, 98, 136 (n. 33), 152 (n. 25) Rufinus: 50, 53 Salona: 37, 63, 149 (n. 137) Sarus: 20–21, 50–52, 121 Sebastian: 54, 66, 71, 105–114 Serena: 17 Sicily: 22, 108–109, 111–113, 119, 136 (n. 36) Sigisvult: 63, 75, 77–78, 82, 84, 90, 107, 149 (n. 131) Stilicho: 14, 17–21, 25, 50, 71–72, 139 (n. 92) Sueves: 19, 22, 43, 89, 98, 110, 144 (n. 18), 160 (n. 98) Tarraco: 44 Tarraconensis: 36, 110–111 Theodosius ‘the elder’: 10, 24, 50, 147 (n. 101) Theodosius I: 9, 12–16, 18, 136 (n. 33) Theodosius II: 20, 56–57, 60–61, 63–64, 65, 68, 98, 107, 112, 147 (n. 98) Theoderic I: 49, 108–109, 144 (n. 26) Thermantia: 18 Thessaloniki: 13, 65, 146 (n. 71) Toulouse: 22, 109 Trier: 10–11, 20, 137 (n. 53), 138 (n. 88) Tubunae: 33, 36, 39, 80,141 (n. 37)

Narbonne: 22, 109, 162 (n. 38) Odoacer: 121 Orosius: 34, 77 Olympius: 20, 25 Paris: 12 Pelagia: 49–50, 53, 79, 107, 161 (n. 23) Pelagius: 27 Priscus: 102, 107, 115–116, 164 (n. 6) Prosper: 53, 55, 61, 67–68, 71, 77, 108, 112, 117 Pulcheria: 106

Valens: 9–11, 15, 17 Valentinian I: 10–11 Valentinian II: 10–14, 136 (n. 33, 34, 44) Valentinian III: 43, 57, 61, 65, 68, 100, 106, 112,114, 139 (n. 91) Vallia: 22–23, 36, 49, 77, 88 Vandals: 19, 22–23, 43–46, 62, 74–77, 87–96, 108, 111–114, 152 (n. 131), 158 (n. 51) Verimodus: 49, 85 Visigoths: 18, 21–23, 30–31, 36, 43, 45–46, 77, 100–101, 108–110, 116–117