The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays 9781032611822, 9781032521930, 9781003462415, 1032611820

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THE KANTIAN SUBJECT Edited by Fernando M.F. Silva and Luigi Caranti

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THE KANTIAN SUBJECT NEW INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS Edited by Fernando M.F. Silva and Luigi Caranti

The Kantian Subject

This book presents a critical reconsideration of the Kantian cognitive and practical subject. Special attention is devoted to highlighting the complex relation between subjectivity as it is presented in the three critiques and the way in which it is construed in other writings, in particular the Anthropology. While for Kant our cognitive apparatus and the structure of our will are common to all humans, the anthropological subject reveals degrees of variation, depending on a myriad of external circumstances that pose a challenge to the unity of Kant’s account and await theoretical solutions. The chapters collected in the volume delve into how the different shapes of human nature are not unrelated. They explore how and why different ‘Kantian subjects’ are closely connected at their core, if not entirely unifed. The notions of personality, humanity, and citizenship will serve as leading threads for the reconstruction of this possible underlying unity. An engaging read that promises to deepen our understanding of human nature, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics, psychology, social anthropology, ethics, and epistemology. Fernando M.F. Silva is a postdoctoral fellow and member of the Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon. He completed his PhD in 2016, on Novalis’s critique of identity. He is the co-editor of the journal Estudos Kantianos and the co-coordinator of the Study Nucleus Kant and German Idealism, CFUL. His areas of research interest include Kantian Aesthetics and Anthropology, German Idealism and Romanticism, in authors such as Fichte, Novalis, or Hölderlin. His publications include the forthcoming volume ‘The Poem of the Understanding Is Philosophy’: Novalis and the Art of Self-Critique, in Mimesis Verlag, Germany. Luigi Caranti is Professor of Political Philosophy at the Università di Catania. He focuses on Kant, human rights, peace studies, and contemporary political theory with a special emphasis on distributive justice. Among his recent publications: The Kantian Federation (2022) and Kant’s Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress (2017).

The project leading to this application has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 777786

The Kantian Subject New Interpretative Essays

Edited by Fernando M.F. Silva and Luigi Caranti

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Fernando M. F. Silva and Luigi Caranti; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Fernando M. F. Silva and Luigi Caranti to be identifed as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-52193-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-61182-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-46241-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Contributors Preface

vii xi

I

Personality and Human Nature

1

1

3

On the Distinction between Humanity and Personality in Kant LUIGI CARANTI

2

Kant on the Frailty of Human Nature

21

ROBERT B. LOUDEN

3

‘A Man for All Faculties’?: The Unity of Kantian Reason from a Pragmatic Point of View

28

GUALTIERO LORINI

4

‘Geography Makes Us Citizens of the World’: On the Cosmopolitical Nature of Kant’s Geographical Thought

50

FERNANDO M.F. SILVA

II

Personality and Subjectivity 5

It thinks: On a Function of the ‘I’ in the Formula of the Principle of Apperception

69 71

MARIO CAIMI

6

A Role for Creative Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Science PATRÍCIA KAUARK-LEITE

87

vi

Contents

7

On Becoming a Person and Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Evolution and Revolution towards Freedom

99

PAULO JESUS

8

The Concept of Person in the Metaphysics of Morals: From a Formal to a Material Concept

121

SORAYA NOUR SCKELL

9

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia.: Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works

132

MARITA RAINSBOROUGH

III

Personality and Citizenship

143

10 Kant’s Social Sympathy: Debunking Benefcence and Cultivating the Sense of Justice

145

NURIA SÁNCHEZ MADRID

11 Active Citizenship and Kantian Republicanism

161

LUKE J. DAVIES

12 Personhood according to Kant (and Schiller): Personality, Being a Human Being, and Revolution

180

ANTONINO FALDUTO

13 Kant on Natural Right and Revolution

199

FIORELLA TOMASSINI

Name Index Subject Index

213 216

Contributors

Mario Pedro Miguel Caimi was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1947. He studied Philosophy in the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Mainz and obtained his PhD from University of Mainz in 1982. Caimi served as Professor at the University of Buenos Aires until his retirement in 2017. His main research feld is Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Among his published works are ‘Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer’, in Kant-Studien, 2005; ‘Das Prinzip der Apperzeption und der Aufbau der Beweisführung der Deduktion B’, in Kant-Studien, 2017; Kant’s B Deduction, 2014; and many articles on theoretical issues in Kant. He has translated the Critique of Pure Reason, Prolegomena, The Progress of Metaphysics, Anthropology, and other Kant’s works. Luke Davies is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Prior to this, he was a fellow in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He completed a DPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. His recent papers have focused on Kantian defences of welfare, Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizens, and Kant’s endorsement of politically relevant duties to self. Antonino Falduto is Lecturer in Moral Philosophy at the University of Ferrara, Italy. He was Assistant Professor at the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg (Germany) and the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz (Germany) and postdoctoral research fellow of the Humboldt Foundation at the University of St Andrews (UK). He is the author of The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy (2014; paperback: 2016) and of numerous contributions to Kant’s ethics and, more generally, to Scottish Enlightenment and classical German philosophy. He is the editor of the frst exhaustive collection on Schiller’s theoretical writings (A. Falduto and T. Mehigan eds., The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Friedrich Schiller, forthcoming 2022). Paulo Jesus is a full-time researcher at Centre of Philosophy University of Lisbon (CFUL), Portugal, and a part-time lecturer of Moral, Legal, and

viii Contributors Political Philosophy at Portucalense University (UPT), Portugal. After being himself a PI (at CIPh-Paris and FCT: Poetics of Selfhood: Memory, Imagination), he has been taking part in national and European research projects, namely Cosmopolitanism: Justice, Democracy, and Citizenship without borders (PTDC/FER-FIL/30686/2017) and Kant in South America (KANTINSA/ H2020-MSCARISE). His most important area of expertise is Kantian and classical German philosophy as well as philosophy of psychology, notably narrative personality and the symbolic construction of self-identity, which entails a close relationship with literature as a laboratory for the experimental study of selfhood and otherness. Patrícia Kauark-Leite is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil) and researcher at National Council for Scientifc and Technological Development (CNPq), Brazil. She received her PhD from Ecole Polytechnique (Paris) in 2004. She was visiting scholar at Stanford University (2011–2012), Martin Luther Universität HalleWittenberg (2019–2020), Universidade de Lisboa (2020), and University of Catania (2022). Her book Théorie quantique et philosophie transcendantale: dialogues possibles  (Hermann, 2012) won the Prize Louis Liard (2012) from  Académie des sciences morales et politiques  (France). She co-edited the book Kant and the Metaphors of Reason (Olms, 2015). Her research interests focus on Kant’s theoretical philosophy, Kant’s theory of imagination and scientifc creativity, and Neo-Kantian approaches to quantum physics. Gualtiero Lorini is Assistant  Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Catholic University of Milan, Italy, and an Alexander von HumboldtAlumnus. His research encompasses classical German philosophy, with particular attention to Kant’s philosophy and its sources in theory of knowledge and anthropology, the reception of Kantian philosophy in German idealism, the debate between Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology, and the applications of the ‘Philosophy of signs and interpretation’. Among his most recent publications: ‘“Diversa Theologiae Naturalis Systemata”: Christian Wolff’s Ways to God’, in Rivista di Storia della Filosofa, 2021/76-4, pp.  760–781; Knowledge, Morals and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology (Ed. with R.B. Louden, New York 2018); ‘A Kingdom of God on Earth: Kant’s Legacy on Church and State in German Idealism’, in Giornale di Metafsica 2019/41-1, pp. 278–298; ‘The Unity of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Capital Punishment as a Case Study’, in Archivio di flosofa 2019/87-1, pp. 189–203. Robert B. Louden is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. His publications include Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education (Bloomsbury, 2021), Anthropology from a Kantian Point of View (Cambridge University Press, 2021), Kant’s Human Being (Oxford University Press 2011), The World

Contributors

ix

We Want (OUP 2007), Kant’s Impure Ethics (OUP 2000), and Morality and Moral Theory (OUP 1992). A past president of the North American Kant Society (2009–2014), Louden is also editor and translator of two volumes in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Nuria Sánchez Madrid is BA in Philosophy and Classical Philology and PhD in Philosophy and Sciences of Religion from the University Complutense of Madrid, Spain. She has been teaching at the Faculty of Philosophy (UCM) since 2000 (since April 2019 as Associate Professor). From 2017, she has coordinated the Complutense Research Group 970798 ‘Normativity, Emotions, Discourse and Society’ (GINEDIS). She is President of the Academic Society of Philosophy (Spain) from 2019 and coordinator of the  Latin American, Portuguese, and Spanish Network RIKEPS, supported by the AUIP, from 2018. She is an associate member of the Complutense Institute of Gender Studies and external member of the CFUL of Lisbon, of the Institute of Philosophy of Oporto, of the PhD Philosophy Programme of the Univ. Roma Tre/Tor Vergata, and of the Group of Ethics and Political Philosophy of the UFRN (Brazil). Her key lines of research are history of philosophy and legal, political, and social philosophy. Marita Rainsborough teaches at the Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Germany, and at the University of Kiel, Germany. She holds a PhD from the University of Hamburg and a habilitation from the University of Lüneburg. Since 2018, she has been an associate member of the Center of Philosophy University of Lisbon (CFUL), and since 2022, she is co-editor of the journal Estudos Kantianos. One of her books is Foucault heute. Neue Perspektiven in Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaft, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018. She is co-editor of the book Rethinking Postcolonialism: Rutura, transgressão e transformação nas literaturas lusófonas de África, Lisboa (Edições Colibri), 2017. Her latest book is published under the title Interkulturelles Philosophieren: Kant und Foucault in der afrikanischen Gegenwartsphilosophie, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2022. Soraya Nour Sckell  is tenured Associate Professor at the NOVA School of Law, Lisbon. She is a researcher at CEDIS (NOVA School of Law) and at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. She is the Principal  Investigator of the Project ‘Cosmopolitanism: Justice, Democracy and Citizenship without Borders’. She received the Wolfgang Kaupen-Preis (German Society for Sociology, section  Sociology of Law, 2018) and the German-French Friendship Prize (Embassy of Germany  in Paris, 2012). She was also director of the research program on cosmopolitanism at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris (2013–2019). She has obtained a PhD in  Philosophy from the University Paris Nanterre and the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

x

Contributors am Main (thesis in cotutela, 2012) and a PhD in Law from the University of São Paulo (1999).

Fiorella Tomassini is Assistant Researcher at CONICET (Argentina). Prior to this, she was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. She  earned her PhD at the University of Buenos Aires (2018) and held visiting positions at the Martin Luther Universität HalleWittenberg with support of the DAAD.  She  has published on topics of Kant’s  political philosophy and its relationship with the natural law tradition.

Preface

An object of much analysis and refection throughout the history of Kant’s reception, Kant’s theory of subjectivity may appear as an overly broad and elusive notion. On the one hand, Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy can be construed, in virtue of the Copernican revolution, as nothing but a novel theory of subjectivity. On the other hand, if one leaves aside the a priori constitution of our cognitive apparatus and the structure of our will, which for Kant are common to all humans, the German philosopher himself allows for a degree of variation among human subjects depending on a number of external circumstances. Moreover, it is undeniable (even if certainly not surprising) that in Kant’s works the anthropological subject greatly differs from the logical subject; that the aesthetic one has features hardly predictable by looking merely at the frst Critique; or that the subject in Kant’s geography is other than the one to be found in his political writings. Does it make sense to have a book about the Kantian subject in general? It does if one considers the full scope of Kant’s refection. Precisely because the Kantian subject is not exhausted by the critical account of the cognitive and practical subject, it makes sense to add some light on aspects of the Kantian subjectivity other than the ones explored by centuries of scholarship. Moreover, the felds of knowledge that focus on these different ‘Kantian subjects’ are openly related, be it because of their theoretical or practical affnity, or because of their nature and aim, or because of their proximity in Kant’s architectonic. Some areas of human knowledge, given their intimate affnity, cannot even be thought of as dissociated from others. Think of Anthropology and Geography, or Politics and Moral, or Aesthetics and Anthropology, or Logic and Metaphysics, or Cosmology and Ontology. And so, just as in Kant’s refection, several felds of knowledge are openly akin to one another, so can the different shapes of Kant’s subject, therein assumed, appear as not so different and unrelated as before. Quite to the contrary, they stand as proof that although Kant’s subject has to appear in different attires, and under a different designation, from domain to domain, these different shapes rest on core features and dispositions which allow for more than random connections, sometimes even between the seemingly furthest areas of knowledge. They stand as proof that subjectivity, as an angular concept, can be sub-divided—and is sub-divided—into cognitive, social, cultural,

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ethical forms, without thereby fragmenting the subject. They stand as proof that Kant’s subject is in its core but one, even though by its nature it cannot always be manifested as such. Instead, it must appear under different personae in order to be most effcaciously grasped. Amid all the different shapes that Kant’s subject displays, this book focuses on three ‘faces’ that duly represent the underlying unity just described, indicated by Kant as the technical notions of personality, humanity, and citizenship. These concepts, in their modern sense, are creations of the 18th century that have helped mould (and gained due voice in) multiple felds of knowledge—cosmology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and political theory—arising, even at the time, as interdisciplinary, inter-discursive key concepts. After the 20th-century linguistic turn, with its denial of a universal subjectivity, to be rather understood as fully dependent on the various ‘forms of live’; after the ongoing assault launched by naturalism against transcendental philosophy (at least if properly understood as a theory of the invariable and necessary subjective contribution to the shaping of the objects of knowledge); after the reconsideration of the normative basis of our belonging to separate and yet more and more interrelated political communities in a time more and more similar to a new cold war era, deepening our understanding of these concepts has never been so problematic, so challenging and yet of so paramount intellectual and practical importance. Imbued with the belief that the Kantian subject is both a legitimate object of inquiry and one with timely resonance with current urgent practical and intellectual issues, the present volume presents the broadest possible image of Kant’s concept of subject as it unfolds in the various dimensions of the human condition. In the opening chapter, ‘On the Distinction between Humanity and Personality in Kant’, Luigi Caranti takes a fresh look at the Kantian distinction between humanity [Menschenheit]—the capacity to set ends in general—and personality [Persönlichkeit]—the capacity to set moral ends. The exact defnition of the two concepts and their competing ambition to be the source of normativity in Kant have recently become themes of fascinating confrontation between interpreters. Caranti argues that personality, not humanity, is the ground that Kant perceives as the basis of humans’ (and rational beings’) status as ends in themselves, hence that personality, not humanity, is the source of moral normativity. Caranti recognizes, however, that, particularly in a Kantian perspective, it is extremely diffcult even to conceptualise the notion of personality as nothing but a special application of humanity, as opposed to a capacity of its own. Caranti thus defends a third way between the two readings by arguing that the notion of an agent endowed with humanity and yet either unable to recognize the validity of the moral law or unable to be suffciently motivated to act as morality requires is (a) at odds with the way we conceive of ourselves (deliberators ultimately responding only to our reason) and (b) oblivious of the fact that moral agency is nothing but an occurrence of ordinary end-setting, admittedly made special by the potential absence of sensuous incentives.

Preface

xiii

In his chapter, ‘Kant on the Frailty of Human Nature’, Robert Louden’s focus is on how to properly account for the all too common phenomenon of people deciding to ignore their personality to deviate from what their conscience indicates as morally obligatory. In real life, examples of people who act against their better judgment in moral as well as nonmoral contexts are not hard to fnd. However, over the centuries, philosophers have often been unable to make sense out of the common phenomenon of weakness of will. If we know what the right thing to do is and are able to do it, why don’t we just do it? Although Kant does not discuss weakness of will in detail, his brief remarks about this bring him closer to ordinary judgments concerning its ubiquity in daily life. His primary concern, as one might expect, is with moral cases of weakness of will. In this chapter, Louden’s two central aims are to analyse and defend Kant’s position on moral weakness of will, or what he calls ‘the frailty of human nature’. Gualtiero Lorini in his chapter, ‘“A Man for All Faculties”? The Unity of Kantian Reason from a Pragmatic Point of View’, investigates the way Kant deals with the relation between the individual and humankind in his anthropological project. Departing from the apparent irreconcilability between the transcendental investigation and anthropology, as defended by many scholars, Lorini contends that the specifcity of the anthropological point of view on the world can be effectively brought to light by taking into consideration the specifc way Kant’s anthropology deals with two crucial elements of the Copernican revolution. Lorini challenges this position frst by reassessing the nature of the relation between anthropology and normative reason, then by stating the need for the ‘pragmatic’ nature of Kant’s anthropology to be reinterpreted within the broader framework of Kant’s practical philosophy. In his chapter, ‘“Geography Makes Us Citizens of the World”: On the Cosmopolitical Nature of Kant’s Geographical Thought’, Fernando Silva considers the place of the human being in Kant’s physical geography, a feld of study that has attracted a great deal of attention since the 2009 publication of part of Kant’s relevant lectures in the Akademie-Ausgabe. Silva frst analyses and evaluates Kant’s reasons to disentangle Geography as Empirical Physics and Geography as Physical Geography; then he ascertains the new object, scope, and status of Physical Geography within Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges; fnally, he elaborates on Physical Geography as part of a ‘doctrine of the world’, thereby focusing on Kant’s anthropogeographico-cosmological view of the I in the world—or the ‘I as world’. Mario Caimi in his chapter, ‘It Thinks: About a Function of the “I” in the Transcendental Deduction’, deals with the principle of apperception, and its central tenet is that the ‘I think’ should be able to accompany all the representations of the cognitive subject. Following Lichtenberg, Caimi asks whether the grammatical subject of the principle of apperception should necessarily be an ‘I’ with personal identity or, otherwise, whether it may be an impersonal ‘it’. While some commentators consider the presence of the pronoun ‘I’ in the ‘I think’ of apperception as obvious, others demand for a ground for the

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use of ‘I’ in the formula and yet others fnd it altogether unnecessary. Caimi argues that the principle of apperception should not only possess unity, but it requires identity as well. This requirement can be complied with only if the formula of the synthetic unity of apperception includes the concept ‘I’, a concept which is invariable and identical in itself through each and every act of transcendental synthesis. Patrícia Kauark-Leite’s chapter, ‘A Role for Creative Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Science’, attempts to do precisely what the title proposes: to state that the creative, fctional power of reason, once linked to the faculty of imagination—under the form of genius—is indeed not only compatible but benefcial for science. In particular, KauarkLeite intends to show that science appeals not only to the determining power of judgment, along with the logical rules that structure scientifc knowledge, but also to the refecting power of judgment, along with ideas of reason that are explicitly regulative and even fctional. Kauark-Leite considers that the creative, fctional power of reason, linked to the faculty of imagination, in its scientifc use, is incompatible with the needlessly restrictive view of the activity of genius that Kant himself presents in the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, as limited only to artistic creativity. Going beyond Kant in this respect, Kauark-Leite introduces a distinction between artistic creation based on aesthetic ideas and philosophical creation based on ideas of reason in an attempt to provide a meaningful characterization of scientifc genius in contrast with artistic genius as well as to provide evidence in favour of the valuable contribution of genius in the development of scientifc and even philosophical theories. The chapter, ‘On Becoming a Person and Creating a Kingdom of Ends: Evolution and Revolution towards Freedom’, by Paulo Jesus starts from the long and consolidated tradition to think of personality, and of human nature in general, as halfway between animality and divinity, with a partial entanglement and an ontological overlap between the three modes of being. This anthropological legacy remains signifcantly infuential throughout the Western philosophical canon, from Plato to Kant. At the same time, the tradition lacks a formally rigorous and defnitive grasping of the essence of the human being. Anthropology rather develops ‘expositions’ and ‘descriptions’ of humanity, although with axiological and normative dimensions. The theoretical question of the essence yields to the practical question of existence, as proper existence, the human art of living well. Thus, Jesus proposes a novel reading of Kant’s anthropology as an Enlightened version of the ethics and politics of cura sui or self-determination. ‘The Concept of Person in the Metaphysics of Morals: From a Formal to a Material Concept’, by Soraya Nour Sckell, starts from the consideration that the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals seeks and identifes the ‘highest principle of morality’ while the Metaphysics of Morals derives specifc duties from this formal principle. Sckell notices that the concept of person plays a central role in the execution of this task and is already strategically mentioned in the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’.

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xv

Beyond that, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant develops the transition from rational moral being to particular human beings, and insofar as the human being is considered in its multiple composition, the concept of person gains an empirical determination. The chapter shows how the formal concept of person from the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’ gains empirical content in the Doctrine of Right and in the Doctrine of Virtue. Marita Rainsborough’s chapter, ‘Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia: Michel Foucault’s Questioning of the Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works’, proposes to focus on Michel Foucault’s and Kant’s divergent concepts of person and humanity. Departing from the contrast between Foucault’s view of a constructive, non-purposive human being and its relations to knowledge and power and Kant’s concept of the human being as an ‘end in itself’, capable of autonomy and freedom, Rainsborough sets out to ascertain just how much Foucault’s concept of human being owes to Kant’s conception of the subject and how much the latter’s project of critique and enlightenment is or could be incorporated in Foucault’s theory. ‘Kant’s Social Sympathy: Debunking Benefcence and Cultivating the Sense of Justice’, by Nuria Sánchez Madrid, deals with the role that benefcence plays for the constitution of the subject. After reconstructing Kant’s account of benefcence and linking it to his approach to social class struggle, Madrid inspects Kant’s wariness of some of the unwitting consequences of cultivating benefcence. The chapter ends with an explanation of how the moral duty of benefcence introduces a concern for poverty and exclusion in Kant’s theory of justice. ‘Active Citizenship and Kantian Republicanism’, a chapter authored by Luke Davies, deals with Kant’s (in)famous distinction between active and passive citizenship. Davies focuses on the rights to political participation that Kant reserves for active citizens, as well as on their role in shaping the laws. This Davies does by frst discussing Kant’s ambivalent position towards democracy; secondly, by considering the right to vote and its relation to active citizenship; and thirdly, by delving on the contribution of active citizens to the state. ‘Personhood according to Kant (and Schiller): Personality, Being a Human Being, and Revolution’, by Antonino Falduto, explores the different conceptions of personality and humanity in Kant and Schiller. He argues that the difference is relevant to account for the different reasons they have to reject citizens’ right to rebel against their rulers (even the most despotic), despite the sympathies that they both manifestly have for the French Revolution. Finally, Fiorella Tomassini’s chapter, ‘Kant on Natural Right and Revolution’, addresses the same issue of the right to rebel by examining the question of whether a moral permission to oppose an unjust sovereign can be grounded on Kant’s innate right to freedom. While we may think that a people’s revolt against a despotic regime that constantly violates individuals’ external freedom should be permissible by virtue of that innate right, Kant considers this reasoning to be wrong. Tomassini thus attempts to show why

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Kant maintains that a right to revolution is incompatible with the natural rights of individuals and peoples. She argues, however, that an exception to the prohibition to revolt can be justifed from a Kantian perspective by appealing to the concept of permissive law.

I

Personality and Human Nature

1

On the Distinction between Humanity and Personality in Kant Luigi Caranti

One of the most fundamental distinctions in Kant’s ethical thought is that between humanity [Menschenheit] – the capacity to set ends in general – and personality [Persönlichkeit] – the capacity to set moral ends, that is, to perform authentic moral actions. The exact defnition of the two concepts and their competing ambition to be the source of normativity in Kant have been themes of fascinating confrontation between interpreters. Some believe that our capacity to set ends freely, that is humanity or rational nature, is the central value. Prominent in this line of thought are the interpretations by Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood (Wood 1999, 2007; Korsgaard 1996a, 1996b, 2003). Others (Allison 2011; Caranti 2017, Geiger 2020) think that this deduction is both incorrect as an attempt to capture Kant’s argument and philosophically dubious in its own right. Kant had in mind that it is our capacity for moral behaviour – personality – that establishes humans’ status as ends in themselves, thereby entitling and binding them to morality. On this interpretation, even when Kant suggests that it is humanity that is to be seen as an end in itself, what he really means is that it is humanity insofar as it also embodies the capacity for morality, that is, personality. Thus, the second formula of the CI, ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (GMS 4: 429) is to be read by paying attention to the fact that humanity appears ‘in your own person and in the person of any other’ (GMS 4: 429). Similarly, one should keep in mind that already at the time of the Groundwork, what makes a rational being an end in itself is for Kant ‘morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality’ (GMS 4: 435). This chapter intends to take a fresh look at the debate. It argues, pace Korsgaard and Wood, that personality, not humanity, is the ground that Kant perceives as the basis of humans’ (and rational beings’) status as ends in themselves, and thus that personality, not humanity, is the source of moral normativity. It also argues that personality, at least on Kant’s mature theory, is a capacity that is not already contained in humanity or inferable from it. The chapter recognises, however, that, particularly in a Kantian perspective, it is extremely diffcult even to conceptualise the notion of humanity as not bound to that of personality. The central thought will be that since reason is perceived by those who possess it as the highest authority in their DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-2

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decision making, when this faculty suggests a moral end, no matter how costly from the point of view of happiness, treating its command as something we can disregard, as if it did not apply to the entities we take ourselves to be – namely, rational beings – borders on inconsistency. It thus defends a third way between the two readings by arguing that the notion of an agent endowed with rationality and yet either unable to recognise the validity of the moral law or able to do so while remaining either fully unmotivated or insuffciently motivated to act as morality requires is a) at odds with the way we conceive of ourselves (deliberators ultimately responding only to our reason) and b) oblivious of the fact that moral agency is nothing but an occurrence of ordinary end-setting (humanity) made special by the fact that the individual is supposed to fnd an overarching determining ground for action in the sheer recognition of the validity of the moral law. Given this goal, the chapter naturally falls into four main parts. The frst two reconstruct Kant’s notions of humanity and personality starting from the account presented in Religion (1793) and moving backward to the use Kant makes of the concept of humanity in the Groundwork (1785). Expanding an argument presented elsewhere (Caranti 2017, 2019), the third part defends the thesis that the source of normativity for Kant is our capacity for morality (personality). In the fourth and last section, in a somewhat dialectical spirit, I give my own interpretation of why human beings can hardly be thought of as endowed merely with humanity but not personality, thereby perhaps vindicating the intuition behind the interpretation championed by Korsgaard and Wood. 1.1 Humanity and Personality Kant introduces the notions of humanity and personality in different texts and in very diverse contexts. The most thorough and detailed account of the distinction is to be found in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1792–1793) where the two concepts are (a) considered both as human nature‘s ‘predispositions to good’, (b) contrasted with the predisposition to animality, and, most importantly, (c) indicated, in an all-important footnote, as neither reducible to one another nor inferable from one another. By ‘original predispositions’ (ursprüngliche Anlagen) to good, Kant means drives to obtain what we want that do not determine our actions but are nonetheless parts of our constitution. They are drives that human beings, who are here assumed to be radically free, may or may not endorse to craft certain maxims. Noteworthy is that all these predispositions, being predispositions to good, involve some form of self-love, including the one pertaining to personality. Animality [Thierheit] is presented as ‘physical or merely mechanical selflove, i.e., a love for which reason is not required’ (RGV 6:26–27); it covers our fundamental instincts: ‘frst, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive’ (RGV 6:26–27). For them, reason is

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not required, and the form of love they express is ‘mechanical’ in the sense that they do not presuppose a representation or deliberation on the part of the subject. We do not choose to be interested in self-preservation. Selfpreservation is given as a natural end, although obviously, by virtue of our radical freedom, the naturality of these ends is not to be understood in the sense that they are inescapable. The predisposition to humanity is presented as ‘a self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required)’ (RGV 6:27). As such, it encompasses all our rational capacities that are directed to our happiness (whatever conception we may have of it and no matter how accurate this conception is) having no specifc reference to morality. In short, humanity is the capacity to set ends through reason (GMS 4:437). While through animality we are immediately given self-preservation, reproduction, and sociality as our ends, all other ends dictated by inclination are selected through reason. As Wood notices (Wood 1999, 119), in the Anthropology, Kant subdivides the predisposition to humanity into the ‘technical predisposition’, which includes our capacities to manipulate things as means to our arbitrary ends, and the ‘pragmatic predisposition’ (VA 7:322–324), which enables us not only to set ends but to compare the ends we set and organise them into a system (KU 5:426–427). Kant’s present reference to a comparative dimension, however, does not seem to imply this systematic dimension. He rather explains it by saying that ‘only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy’. Hence, humanity is the capacity to set ends that reason judges as functional (RGV 6: 27) to the pursuit of happiness, which the subjects perceive as attained in a degree dependent on how successful is or is believed to be the same attempt carried out by others. Independently of this comparative nature and connection to happiness, the crucial point to keep in mind is that humanity is the capacity to set ends, any ends. This is indeed also the defnition we fnd in the Doctrine of Virtue: ‘The capacity to set oneself an end — any end whatsoever — is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)’ (MS 6: 392). Finally, in the same context, Kant suggests that humanity is not given to us as a fxed and already fully developed capacity but as something that we have a duty to develop and perfect through the cultivation of our faculties and the increase of our culture: ‘A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends’ (MS 6: 387). The predisposition to personality is presented as ‘susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a suffcient incentive to the power of choice’. Being a form of ‘susceptibility’, personality seems to involve a disposition to feel in a certain way. Indeed, it seems to be not the feeling of respect itself, that in Kant’s theory the moral law is supposed to inspire infallibly in us, but the inborn confguration of our sensitivity on which that feeling rests. Kant clarifes that by itself this feeling (or better predisposition to that feeling) does not constitute any particular end, because an end enters the picture only when our free power of choice determines itself towards an end: in this case, the specifc end required by the moral law. At the same time, personality is

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not to be confated with a good character because this ‘can only be acquired’ (RGV 6:27). Rather, personality is to be understood as that piece of our nature without which the process of self-perfection and habituation ultimately leading to a ‘good character’ could not begin. It is a subjective ground ‘onto which nothing evil can be grafted’ (RGV 6:27–28). In other words, we are talking about the capacity to be sensitive to the perceived rightfulness of a certain action (or omission) to the point that the ensuing moral feeling becomes a suffcient determining ground for action. Personality is thus the capacity to respect the moral law and to act having duty or the moral law as a suffcient motive of the will. It involves reason as the faculty that reveals the obligatory character of a certain action but also engages feeling to the extent that rests on, in fact consists of, a susceptibility to fnd an incentive strong enough to overcome all others. As such, at least in the account of Religion under consideration, personality seems to reveal the motivational story behind autonomy. Or perhaps, I should say, it is autonomy itself, seen from the perspective of how humans can perform autonomous acts (the principium executionis of the moral law, as Kant sometimes calls it). As Wood correctly points out (Wood 1999, 118), personality, in its being a ‘susceptibility’, is reminiscent of what Kant elsewhere calls the ‘subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty’, which are ‘moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem)’ (MS 6:399). Finally, in an all-important footnote, Kant tells us that personality cannot be inferred from humanity. Given its obvious importance for our purposes, it is worth quoting the footnote in full: We cannot consider this predisposition [personality] as already included in the concept of the preceding one [humanity], but must necessarily treat it as a special predisposition. For from the fact that a being has reason does not at all follow that, simply by virtue of representing its maxims as suited to universal legislation, this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence to be ‘practical’ on its own; at least, not so far as we can see. The most rational being of this world might still need certain incentives, coming to him from the objects of inclination, to determine his power of choice. He might apply the most rational refection to these objects - about what concerns their greatest sum as well as the means for attaining the goal determined through them – without thereby even suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law which announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the highest incentive. Were this law not given to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning on our part would produce it or win our power of choice over to it. Yet this law is the only law that makes us conscious of the independence of our power of choice from determination by all other incentives (of our freedom) and thereby also of the accountability of all our actions. RGV 6:26, my emphasis

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The sharp distinction between humanity and personality, that Kant comes to articulate with the precision we just saw only in Religion, can be seen as the culmination of an evolution in Kant’s theory of freedom. This process leads Kant from the idea that humanity is the capacity at the same time necessary and suffcient to make sense of moral life to the (implicit) rejection of this very claim and the endorsement of the mature (from 1784 on) theory that in addition to humanity (or rationality) we need personality (or autonomy) to be moral agents. It may be useful to recall the main steps of this evolution. Already at the time of the frst Critique (frst edition), human actions are seen by Kant as not fully determined by the sensuous inclinations that normally motivate us. Rather, given any inclinations, no matter how strong, Kant thinks that it is always up to the individual to ‘endorse’ them or to resist them. This means that all voluntary actions stem from the individual’s free evaluation of a certain subjective rule of action, or maxim, as Kant calls it. Thus humans scrutinise through their reason the opportunity (moral or prudential) of a certain maxim and are free to adopt it or reject it. Kant, at times, expresses this point with reference to the notion of an arbitrium liberum, distinguished from the arbitrium brutum typical of animals (KrV, A533–534/B561–562). Humans, on this theory, set the ends of their life for themselves without being driven or fully determined by desires and needs. At most, desires and needs suggest a course of action, but a free decision on the part of actors to endorse such a course, thereby making it their own end, is necessary. Humans set ends for themselves. These ends are in no way coerced by external forces or internal passions. To give an example, if I am thirsty, and I see no reasons why I should resist or delay the satisfaction arising from quenching my thirst, I can freely select the maxim: ‘Any time an agent X is thirsty, she should drink if she can’. Humans enjoy this kind of freedom, which Kant at times calls ‘freedom in the practical sense’ (KpV, 5:562). In a nutshell, this is the theory of freedom Kant presents in the frst Critique and that around 1781 he thought suffcient for the sake of morality. In the mid-1780s, however, things change. In the lecture notes known as Naturrecht Feyerabend, dated approximately 1784, Kant explains that ‘if only rational beings can be ends in themselves, this is not possible because they have reason, but because they have freedom’ (V-NR/ Feyerabend: 1321–1322). At most, reason, understood both as the capacity to pick appropriate means for one’s ends and as self-awareness, is a necessary condition for our being ends in ourselves. ‘Without reason a being cannot be an end in itself, because he cannot be conscious of its own existence, it cannot refect on it’. But reason alone would not be suffcient for our status as ends in ourselves; it would not, as Kant says, ‘confer on us dignity’ (V-NR/ Feyerabend:1322). For this, we need freedom that in this context Kant seems to take in the strong sense of autonomy, for the simple reason that the term he contrasts it with, namely reason, seems to include what in the frst Critique he called ‘freedom in the practical sense’. In any event, the breakthrough in his theory of freedom and morality is clearly present in the Groundwork (1785). Morality is here no longer made dependent on practical freedom but explicitly on autonomy. Autonomy, as

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defned in this work and later in the Critique of Practical Reason, entails more than independence of pathological necessitation. It entails the ability to act in complete independence from inclinations. Positively expressed, this means being able to fnd suffciently strong motivation in a very special kind of non-empirical interest, which is – obviously – the respect for the moral law. An autonomous agent does not merely give herself the rule of her action (this is spontaneity or practical freedom or ‘mere rationality’ or humanity). She does so independently of any inclination (Allison 1990, 97). The offcial defnition of autonomy in the Groundwork is ‘the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)’ (GMS, 4:440; my emphasis). The distinction between these two forms of freedom, which is identical to that between humanity and personality, is absolutely fundamental to making sense of Kant’s mature practical philosophy and to avoiding quick and all-too-famous alleged impasses thereof. The distinction is again expressed clearly in a famous passage of the Doctrine of Virtue. In this passage, Kant does not contrast reason and freedom, as in the lecture notes, but understanding and (morally practical) reason. Here is the passage: In the system of nature, a human being (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest of animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value (pretium vulgare). Although a human being has, in his understanding, something more than they and can set himself ends, even this gives him only extrinsic value for his usefulness (pretium usus); that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than another, that is a price as of a commodity in exchange with these animals as things, though he still has lower value than the universal medium of exchange, money, the value of which can therefore be called preeminent (pretium eminens). But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them. (MS, 6:434–435) While Religion and The Metaphysics of Morals have a humanity/personality distinction fully developed, it should be recognised that in the earlier account of the Groundwork things are slightly different. To begin with, even if the terms are present, and they do not seem to be used in a sense profoundly different than in the later texts, Kant does not have a defnition of personality clearly crafted.1 More importantly, in this work, Kant seems to assign to humanity, not personality, the status of end in itself with absolute value,

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which in turn is presupposed for the possibility of a categorical imperative. Since much of the debate related to the humanity/personality distinction concerns whether one or the other can aspire to the role of source of moral normativity, it is advisable that we go back in time, so to speak, and take a close look at the role of humanity in this earlier account. 1.2 Humanity in the Groundwork Let us recall that the methodology in the Groundwork is to move from ‘common rational to philosophical moral cognition’ (section I), where morality is shown to rest on categorical duties; from (popular) moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals (section II), where this basic insight is further elaborated to show that categorical duties rest on the presupposition that the will is endowed with autonomy; from this result to the argument (section III) that autonomy and morality imply each other and that autonomy is real because as ‘a rational being, and thus as a being belonging to the intelligible world, the human being can never think of the causality of his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom’ (GMS 4:452). Within this general argumentative scheme, in Groundwork II, Kant claims that the categorical imperative presupposes that something exists as an end in itself, because only on this condition can it determine the will independently of the subjective ends agents may (and may not) have. In other words, only on this condition can we think of categorical duties. In the argument leading up to the proof that this end in itself exists and that humanity or rational nature is precisely that end, Kant starts by stating that the will is a capacity to determine itself in conformity with the representation of laws and that ‘what serves the will as an objective ground of its selfdetermination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings’ (GMS 4:427). In other words, rational agents are those beings who (a) have the capacity to act by adopting freely certain practical rules; (b) in following these rules they tend towards a self-chosen end, (c) if this end is not dictated by contingent causes (inclinations) but by reason alone, it holds for all rational beings. If a categorical imperative is to be possible, there must be an end with the last feature, that is, an end in itself. As we said, Kant wants to show that humanity (or fnite rational nature) is that end in itself. In order to understand his argument, it is important to keep in mind the taxonomy of ends he offers. Ends are organised along three major distinctions, one between subjective and objective ends, one between ends that correspond either to formal or to material practical principles, and one between ends to be effected and self-standing ends. While subjective ends depend on inclinations and their ground is an incentive, objective ends, says Kant, are those ‘given by reason alone’ (GMS 4:427) and their ground is a motive. As such, these ends are those that are valid for all rational agents, independently of their particular inclinations. The fact that an end is universally valid for all rational beings needs qualifcation,

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because some ends may be said to be shared by all rational beings and yet far from possessing the kind of objective validity required by the notion of the categorical imperative. Thus, for example, Allison distinguishes between ends that are objective in the weak sense that all subjects with suffciently similar inclinations necessarily have them, and ends that are objective in the strong sense, required by the argument, that they hold for all rational agents independently of their particular circumstances (Allison 2011, 207–209). An example of the frst kind is as follows: my medical condition gives me and all the people who suffer from the same disease a reason to take the medicine that will cure the sickness in question. The medicine is an objective end in the weak sense. The other kind pertains to ends that all rational beings cannot help but set for themselves, quite independently of their particular inclinations, needs, circumstances. It is this kind of objective ends that must exist if a categorical imperative is to be possible. The example, in fact the only possible example, of this kind of objective end in the strong sense is according to Kant humanity or rational nature, as we shall see in a moment. The other relevant distinction is that between material practical principles that rest on subjective ends and formal practical principles that ‘abstract from all subjective ends’, hence rest on objective ones. Finally, ends to be effected are such that, whatever value we attach to them, they are always contingent on whether a will wants to bring them about. In contrast, the value of independently existing ends does not suffer from this contingency. Here we have ends that impose themselves on any will independently of arbitrary choice. We are now in the position to understand what it is for an end to be an end in itself. An end is an end in itself on two major conditions: (a) its value (hence its very existence as an end) does not depend on subjective circumstances, and (b) the same value does not depend on any action that may bring into being the ‘thing’ that embodies that value. In light of this, we can approach the frst part of Kant’s defnition of humanity: Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. (GMS 4: 428) Humanity, and in general rational nature, exists as an end in itself. Since this is taken as suffcient to rule out the possibility that rational beings be treated as mere means, Kant seems to include in the notion of being an end in itself also that of enjoying absolute value. The natural question at this point is: what is the exact notion of humanity Kant is operating with? How does this notion authorise the idea that humanity is an end in itself with absolute value? This articulates itself in two sub-questions:

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(1) We are told that humanity is an end in itself with absolute value (and as such it grounds the possibility of a categorical imperative), but we are still unclear about the referents of this notion; who are exactly the beings that embody humanity? (a question about reference or extension) (2) What feature of humanity confers on those who fall into this category the all-important status of being ends in themselves? Humanity must have a feature that explains why all beings who possess it must be considered as ends in themselves and of absolute value. But what exactly is this feature? (a question about sense or intension). Since the second question, obviously crucial for the purposes of this chapter, will occupy us in the next section, let us now focus on the frst. There is virtual unanimity among interpreters that Kant uses ‘humanity’ in such a way that its referents – quite awkwardly – do not coincide with the members of the human species, both in the sense that (a) the term is predicated of entities that are not humans and in the sense that (b) some humans seem to be excluded. 2 Regarding (a), as noted by Dean (2006), Kant often considers humanity as a characteristic ‘in’ a person and uses the term interchangeably with rational nature.3 For example, in the Groundwork he defnes morality as the condition on which rational beings (not only humans) can be an end in themselves and thus members of the kingdom of ends (GMS 4:435). In the Anthropology Kant explicitly makes room for the thought of non-terrestrial rational beings clearly conceived as embodying the defning feature of humanity (capacity to set ends) and subject to the moral law. He recognises that, even leaving aside angels, we may very well be one subset of rational beings, thus opening up the possibility of alien entities still part of the sensible world. He also argues that there is an ‘ideal of humanity’ (Anth 7: 321), 332) to which we cannot help but compare ourselves with the frailties of our nature, thus suggesting that humanity is both something that we humans have, but also an ideal we may live up to with different degrees of success. Regarding (b), as numerous critics of Kant’s ethics have been eager to point out, precisely because Kant conceives of humanity as the rational capacity to set ends, and as the only thing that is an end in itself and has absolute value, he seems to be bound to exclude from the referents of ‘humanity’ members of the human species with severe brain damage, inborn or acquired either by illness or accident.4 1.3 The Source of Moral Normativity: Humanity or Personality? As we said, the question concerning the exact feature (or features) that defne(s) humanity and the related question about the reason why rational agents (and in particular humans with a normally functioning brain) should be ends in themselves is divisive among interpreters. It is possible, following Dean (2006), Allison (2011), and to a certain extent Geiger (2020), to

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identify three major positions. Some think that it is our ‘mere’ capacity to set ends that makes us ends in ourselves. Korsgaard (Korsgaard 1996, 110–111) thinks that the feature in question is the minimal capacity to set ends, Wood (Wood 1999, 118–119) opts for that capacity reinforced by the ability to organise these ends in a systematic manner, Guyer (2016, 2019) insists on our having a will (understood as Willkür), while Hill (Hill 2002, 77) goes as far as to include also the capacity to legislate and, most importantly, to act on moral laws (which would be technically speaking ‘personality’).5 Others (in fact, as far as I know, only Dean 2006) think that Kant attributes this status only to agents who follow the moral law, presumably in a stable and consistent manner. Yet others (Allison 2011; Caranti 2017; Geiger 2020) believe that the capacity in question is that of following the moral law, as opposed to our succeeding in doing so. According to the frst interpretation, what makes rational agents ends in themselves is their capacity to set ends, any ends whatsoever, quite independently of whether these are moral or not. We are ends in ourselves, and hence have absolute value, simply because our actions are not determined by external forces, but it is our spontaneous choice to pursue a certain path.6 Notice that on this reading there must be a sense in which when we perform morally horrifc acts we are instantiating the very same capacity that gives us dignity and value. Not accidentally, Kant also suggests that the predisposition of humanity is the source of ‘diabolical vices’, such as envy, ingratitude, and Schadenfreude (RGV 6:27; 75). This becomes particularly clear if we follow the account given in Religion. There, as we saw, the predisposition to humanity is contrasted not only with the lower status predisposition of animality, but also with the higher one, personality, that is, the capacity to set moral ends. The question thus becomes why Kant, at least in the Groundwork, spotted in our humanity, rather than in our personality, the ground for our being ends in ourselves. Wood argues that the main reason is that Kant cannot let our status as ends in themselves depend on our moral performance. As he puts it: ‘rational beings cannot be ends in themselves only insofar as they are virtuous or obedient to the moral law’ (Wood 1999, 120). This, however, as correctly noticed by Allison (Allison 2011, 213), does not even consider the possibility that the ground of our status is not our actual moral performance but the ‘mere’ ability to follow the moral law. This opens up the path leading to the view that the ground of our status, hence of our dignity, is precisely our capacity of realising the force of moral imperatives and of obeying them. While this interpretation shares with the frst reading the idea that the sought ground is a capacity, quite independently of whether we use it or how well we do so, it shares with the second the intuition that the same ground cannot be fully detached from morality and the value we receive from our ‘relationship’ with it. Obviously, the difference with the second interpretation is that the ground here is neither a performance, nor a good record of past moral performances, nor a stable practical disposition reached through a process of moral efforts and gradual

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improvement ultimately leading up to a stable virtue. The link with morality stops at the possession of a capacity for moral agency. This avoids the pitfalls of the second interpretation. Indeed, despite the meritorious efforts by Dean, this remains stuck with the counterintuitive conclusion that rational agents (human or not) have a degree of worth dependent on their success in following the moral law, which in turn leads to the conclusion that only some individuals may reach the threshold that entitles them to the status of ends in themselves. Moreover, Kant’s ethical theory would entail either that the rather large set of humans who are not virtuous can be treated merely as means or that the respect they are entitled to varies in proportion to their level of moral (im)perfection. The third interpretation thus seems to stand out as most solid both in terms of closeness to the text and in terms of intrinsic philosophical worth. In a previous work, indeed, I have endorsed it unconditionally (Caranti 2017). On closer consideration, however, I now think that there are diffculties that should be recognised and properly dealt with. To begin with, and most obviously, if Kant meant to identify the ground of our status as ends in ourselves with our personality, why didn’t he say so instead of referring steadily and consistently to humanity in the Groundwork? Of course, the clear distinction between humanity and personality comes later than 1785, in fact no less than nine years later in Religion (1793). However, even if at that time Kant neither uses the term ‘personality’ nor has a clear distinction between humanity and personality, he certainly already has the notion of person(s), as we shall see in a moment. Hence the problem of explaining why Kant talks about humanity in the Groundwork remains. Not accidentally, supporters of the third interpretation, such as Allison (2011, 215), acknowledge that their reading is more about what Kant should have said than about what he actually said. Similarly, Geiger recognises that when Kant introduces the idea that humanity (and in general rational nature) exists as an end in itself (GMS 4: 428), ‘he is talking about rational beings and the humanity in their persons and not about their humanity tout court’ (Geiger 2020, 11). I do not mean to suggest that this obstacle is fatal. Even if the Groundwork contains neither a defnition of personality as developed as that of Religion nor a distinction between humanity and personality as clear as that of the later work, Kant is explicit that ‘morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself’ (GMS 4:435, my emphasis) and that what endows the same being with dignity is ‘morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality’ (GMS 4:435). Moreover, as correctly noticed by Geiger (Geiger 2020, 4), in the Groundwork and elsewhere, Kant conceives of fnite rational agents as possessing both humanity and personality: ‘rational beings are called persons’ (GMS 4:446). Furthermore, at the beginning of Groundwork III, which is devoted to the crucial notion of the reality of autonomy, in a passage in clear tension with the footnote of Religion we quoted above, Kant is explicit that the positive concept of freedom, that is autonomy, associated with personality, fows from the negative concept of freedom, that is, from the capacity of the will to set ends ‘independently of alien causes determining

14 Luigi Caranti it’ (GMS 4:446), which seems to refer to humanity. Finally, there is an explanation fully consistent with this reading, in fact enabled by it, of why Kant talks about ‘humanity’ as the end in itself with absolute value. If, as this reading claims, Kant is talking about the capacity for recognising and acting on the moral law and not on the consistent exercise or realization of the capacity, it follows that the being he is talking about is taken to have the capacity to act otherwise than the moral law dictates. But this means that the being can set ends that aren’t moral – and that’s very close to humanity, possibly just is humanity. This suggests that humanity is taken by Kant as a ‘larger’ faculty, one that encompasses ‘personality’ as a special application of it. We will return on this crucial point in the last section, but we can already notice that it would follow from this that even if our status and absolute value come from personality, if the latter is nothing but a special application of humanity, it is quite understandable that Kant talks about humanity as the end in itself.7 This last remark can obviously be exploited as a powerful reply by the frst reading. It is open to Korsgaard and Wood to qualify their position by saying that in focusing on humanity they never meant to attribute to Kant the view that the source of moral normativity is the capacity to pursue our goals if this capacity is considered as fully severed from that of following the moral law. Such an impoverished capacity cannot be the ground of rational beings’ status as ends in themselves with absolute value. Rather, the point is that one can infer personality, the property that carries the weight of grounding our special status, from a more basic (and more encompassing) property that is humanity. After all, if humanity is the capacity to set any end, this must include also moral ends. This is somehow also recognised by supporters of the personality reading. For example, Geiger correctly points out that even interpreters who focus on humanity do not suggest that the sheer capacity to pursue happiness could be for Kant of absolute value. Indeed, even Wood recognises that ‘strictly speaking Kant ascribes dignity not to “humanity” but to “personality”, that is, not to rational nature in general, but to rational nature in its capacity to be morally self-legislative’ (Wood 1999, 115). Thus, the real question that divides the two readings is whether it is possible to infer personality from humanity in a somewhat analytic fashion, that is, by fnding in the concept of a free rational agent the resources to attribute to the same agent also the capacity for moral agency, or whether personality, as the footnote cited above from Religion seems to suggest, is either a capacity fully independent of humanity or with some overlapping with, but ultimately non-inferable from, the latter, at least without using extra assumptions. To this last and decisive question, we now turn. 1.4 Is Personality Already Included in the Notion of Humanity? It is useful to address this question by taking a close look at Korsgaard’s reading. Her interpretation, as presented in Creating the Kingdom of Ends and Sources of Normativity, and further developed in more recent writings

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(Koorsgaard 2003), turns around the possibility of using humanity as the pivotal concept of Kant’s practical philosophy. Much in this reading turns on her reconstruction of the argument leading to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. The passage of the Groundwork she targets is the following: The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds in me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (GMS 4:429) Korsgaard takes Kant’s thesis that human beings represent their own existence as an end in itself to mean that ‘in our private choices and in general in our actions we view ourselves as having a value-conferring status in virtue of our rational nature’ (Korsgaard 1996a, 122). In other words, since we embody humanity (rational nature), we can set our own ends. Once we have chosen them, if we were asked why we consider them good and worth pursuing, we would only need to reply that this is so because we chose them, we confer value upon them. As she puts it, ‘We act as if our choice were a suffcient condition for the goodness of the object’ (Korsgaard 1996a, 122). The next crucial move is to realise – and of course it is implicit in Korsgaard’s argument that we cannot fail to realise – that all other human beings have the same value-conferring capacity, again, humanity. As Korsgaard puts it ‘If you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of rational choice, you must view everyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value conferring status’ (Korsgaard 1996a, 123). It follows, or so it seems, that we grounded the basic principle of morality. All rational beings are bound to take one another as value-conferring entities with the same title to use their end-setting capacity (or in Korsgaard’s terminology ‘value-conferring’) and to choose their course of action. None of them can be taken as a mere means for the ends of others because he or she has the very same capacity for end-setting or value conferring. This is obviously nothing but the second formula of the categorical imperative. Moreover, and this is the crucial point for us, it seems that human beings are rationally constrained to recognise other human beings as legitimate end-setting authorities. Reason ‘forces’ them to recognise that they need to take into account other beings with the same title to be recognised as end-setting authorities. Not

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only that: since the faculty that imposes this recognition is not an external authority but their own reason, it follows that human beings cannot excuse themselves from the obligations by saying that they are not suffciently motivated or that conficting incentives render the execution impossible. This line of argument is not available because reason presents itself to the beings who embody it as their own highest authority. It follows that from our rational nature one can infer our personality, the capacity to follow the moral law. Ingenious as it is, Korsgaard’s argument is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. Geiger, for example, notices that all the argument shows is that rational beings are bound to recognise reciprocally equal and most extended spheres of external freedom, with no obligation regarding the reason why they do so (in short with complete disregard of their motivation) and, perhaps most clearly, with no obligations whatsoever (whether with the right motivation or otherwise) regarding themselves (Geiger 2020, 15–17). At most, Korsgaard’s argument can be used to ground the universal principle of right, not the categorical imperative, which is obviously intensionally and extensionally different from the former.8 Perhaps even more deeply, and this is why I think, unlike Geiger, that Korsgaard’s argument does not even ground the universal principle of right, the problem is that it is easy to imagine ways in which people may take seriously the value-conferring property, theirs and that of others, and end up with moral (and political) principles blatantly inconsistent with the Categorical Imperative, most clearly with its second formula, and with the universal principle of right. Respectively: Imagine humans were to agree that possible controversies among them should be handled not through the rule of law (at the very least, an independent judge called to apply a body of norms ultimately inspired by our sole innate right to freedom) but by something like a mob rule. If I perceive that you overstep my equal sphere of freedom or disrespect my end-setting capacity by treating me as a mere means, I am entitled to respond with private violence, and force will determine the outcome of the dispute. Since this mob principle can be reciprocally and freely decided by the parties, it appears that each has taken seriously his own end-setting capacity and that of others. When private vengeance hits a perceived culprit, nobody can say that the target is treated as a mere means simply because ex hypothesi he or she accepted this rule of controversy resolution. And yet one can hardly imagine that a mob rule is consistent with the Categorical Imperative, particularly in its formula of humanity. Change slightly the example and you will see that even the principle of right would remain without a proper basis. If these entities respectful of the value-conferring property they embody freely decide to build a society in which the most intelligent ones have more freedom and rights than others (perhaps because they think this will enhance happiness for all), they will construe a society of unequal spheres of freedom, which is the opposite of what the universal principle of right prescribes. These unwelcome results happen anytime we think that the foundation of morality or law can be somehow squeezed from rationality through a procedure reminiscent of the Rawlsian original position, in which the parties fnd

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themselves negotiating basic normative principles merely under constraints of mutual recognition of their rationality. The central problem with this procedure, already experimented without much success by Gewirth (Gewirth 1978), is that without pre-contractual constraints ruling out outcomes of the negotiation that would violate the status of human beings as ends in themselves, it is easy to imagine principles generated through an impeccable procedure (perfectly equal negotiating power and symmetrical position) that end up in moral disaster. And it is even easier to imagine moral principles that are in external conformity with the Categorical imperative but ask nothing of the parties themselves as to the kind of attitude they need to have in implementing and respecting the same principles. Finally, principles generated through this rationality-based procedure are – quite evidently – unable to accommodate the possibility of duties towards ourselves. If all that matters is our value-conferring ability, our capacity to decide what has value for us, then it is hard to see how people could be obligated to develop their talents or stopped from committing suicide if terminating their life is what they have conferred value upon. The upshot of these considerations is that one cannot extrapolate morality (at least not morality as Kant conceives of it, that is, as based on categorical imperatives ultimately presupposing the existence of ends in themselves with absolute value and dignity) without assuming that the principles we come up with must respect certain conditions that are not up for negotiation (no matter how idealised the special conditions of deliberation). Morality will never be generated through a procedure in which parties are called to decide by using their rational ability to set ends for themselves. More than an original position, we need a sort of original constraint on our prudential and instrumental rationality. A constraint that is external in the sense that is not left to individual or collective discretion and yet internal in the sense that its origin lies in our own pure reason. If we go back to the passage from the Groundwork at the basis of Korsgaard’s interpretation, when Kant says, ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily thinks of his own existence in this way’ I take him to mean something different than what Korsgaard thinks. The point is not that we are capable of conferring value on things. The point is that, in addition, we are ends in ourselves. In other words, we take ourselves not only as rational deliberators with end-setting or value-conferring capacity. We also take ourselves as entities endowed with end-in-itself status with absolute worth, that is, entities with dignity. Already here we have constraints in the way in which we can treat us and others and on the attitude in which we are supposed to do so. The point is not that our end-setting capacity needs to be harmonised with that of others. The point is that we are ends in ourselves with absolute value, and by this very fact, we are already bound to treat ourselves in a certain manner and, consequently, to treat in the same manner all those who seem to have the same status. If we cannot extrapolate morality from our capacity for end-setting, that is, from humanity in Kant’s language, this means that personality cannot

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be inferred from humanity. From the realisation that we can set any end (humanity), one cannot infer the capacity to set ends in the very particular manner that morality requires, that is, motivated by the sheer recognition that a certain kind of treatment of others and ourselves is required by our status as ends in themselves with absolute worth. As we saw, this is the central message of the crucial footnote from Religion we cited above. There Kant explains that from our rational nature and from the ability to see a maxim as suited for universal legislation, that is, acceptable by all in Korsgaard’s argument, it ‘does not at all follow that this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence to be “practical” on its own’ (RGV 6:26). It does not because the ability to be motivated by sheer recognition of our status as radically free agents, that is autonomous agents, takes a ‘special predisposition’ (RGV 6:26) – personality. From looking at our rational nature, even if compassionately understood as encompassing a commitment to reciprocal and acceptable-by-all principles, one could not even suspect, as Kant says quite eloquently, ‘the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law which announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the highest incentive’ (RGV 6:26). It is true, however, and this much I am ready to concede to the humanity reading that this higher, special predisposition to follow the moral law for its own sake is nothing but an application of our rational faculty to the special circumstance characterised by the absence of any sensuous motive. The peculiarity of the moral case is that reason must exercise its role of highest authority in ‘splendid isolation’, so to speak. In fact, it is precisely in this case that its supreme authority over us is best revealed because reason is called to rule without ‘external’ assistance. This is the signifcance of Kant’s insistence that what ‘makes us conscious of the independence of our power of choice from determination by all other incentives’ is the law given to us ‘from within’ (RGV 6:26). And yet we do not appeal within ourselves to two different authorities when we make practical decisions. It is always our general capacity to set ends freely that we interrogate to make practical decisions. We could not do otherwise precisely because, if Kant is right, any decision, even the one most favoured by our senses, always needs to be approved by reason. Korsgaard and Wood are thus right in insisting that it is our general capacity for free end-setting that lies at the ground of everything in Kant’s practical philosophy. And yet they are wrong to the extent in which they downplay the point, made repeatedly by Kant, even in the Groundwork, that we have absolute value by virtue of this peculiar application of free end-setting in which we fnd a suffcient motive for acting, in fact, as Kant says, ‘the highest incentive’ (RGV 6:26), in the sheer validity of the moral law. In other words, if we want to stick to the procedure suggested by Korsgaard, all we have to do when we ‘sit down’ to determine the basic principle of our coexistence is just to go a bit further in the game of recognition (of what we and others are) and pay attention to the fact

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that our rational nature is capable of more than protecting the value that we happen to bestow on objects. It also has this shocking ability of being autonomous and this bestows on us absolute worth. Acknowledgement All references to Kant’s works follow the Kant Studien sigla. Some passages in the frst section have been reproduced with minor changes from a porevious publications [Caranti 2017, Caranti 2019(1)]. Notes 1 To be precise, in the Groundwork, Kant never uses ‘Persönlichkeit’, but he does use the term ‘Person’ with roughly the same meaning he will later attribute to ‘Persönlichkeit’. 2 See Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason, 39; Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 119– 120; Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110–111; Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 137, Allison 2011: 209, Louden 2019. 3 See in particular GMS 429–439. 4 The same criticism is levelled against any attempt to use Kantian resources to ground human rights. If we start from the premise that human rights are grounded in human dignity and human dignity rests on rational nature (understood either narrowly as spontaneity or more ambitiously as autonomy), then it follows that humans with inborn or acquired severe brain damage do not have human rights. In a previous work (Caranti 2019.(3)), I replied to this criticism by arguing that indeed a subset of humans with severe brain damage should not be recognized as possessing the same human rights attributed to normally functioning humans and that the possibility of denying certain human rights to these individuals (e.g., the right to participate in the political decisions of one’s country) is a strength, not a weakness, of a Kantian foundation of human rights. 5 Guyer’s argument is that we all have our own wills and we all know that. To treat someone as a mere means amounts to denying that they have wills of their own, thus denying something we know to be true. In other words, morality would rest on humanity reinforced merely by the mere principle of non-contradiction. For a reply to this specifc argument, see Caranti 2019.(2). 6 Of course, I am stipulating that mechanical responses to stimuli, such as the classic leg’s involuntary uplifting after a hammer’s strike on the knee, do not count as ‘actions’. 7 Thanks to Ido Geiger for suggesting this thought. 8 Since the end of the 1990s, the standard interpretation according to which Kant’s Universal Principle of Right (UPR) is simply the application to external actions of the categorical imperative has come under attack by a number of scholars ‒ most notably, Willaschek (1997), Wood (2002), and recently Pinzani (2017) – who deny that the UPR is even remotely dependent on the categorical imperative. Even those, like Guyer (Guyer 2002) and myself (Caranti 2019.(1)), who resist this new reading are far from asserting that UPR contains the same obligations of the CI (e.g., no room for duties towards ourselves) and that when obligations do overlap (e.g., do not steal) the UPR prescribes ‘in the same manner’ (no regards for intention).

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References Allison, H. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press. Allison, H. 2011. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Caranti, L. 2017. Kant’s Political Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress. Cardiff: Wales University Press. Caranti, L. 2019(1). “The Ultimate Ground of Morality (and Law) in Naturrecht Feyerabend.” In S. Bordoni and M. Ruffng (Eds.). Kant´s ‘Naturrecht Feyerabend’: Analysis and Perspectives. Berlin: De Gruyter, 131–144. Caranti, L. 2019(2). “Kant’s Political Legacy. Replies to Sangiovanni, Williams and Guyer.” Kantian Review, 24(2): 289–305. Caranti, L. 2019(3). “The Dignity Approach to Human Rights and the Impaired Autonomy Objection.” Human Affairs, 29(3): 273–285. https://doi.org/10.1515 /humaff-2019-0023. Dean, R. 2006. The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Geiger, I. 2020. “Humanity and Personality – What, for Kant, is the Source of Moral Normativity?” Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1779124. Gewirth, A. 1978. Reason and Morality. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Guyer, P. 2002. “Kant’s Deductions of the Principles of Right.” In M. Timmons (Ed.). Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23–64. Guyer, P. 2016. The Virtues of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guyer, P. 2019. Kant on the Rationality of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hill, T. (co-edited with Zweig, A.) 2002. Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Korsgaard, C. M. 1996a. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, C. M. 1996b. Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, C. M. 2003. “The Dependence of Value on Humanity.” In Joseph Raz (Ed.). The Practice of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 63–85. Pinzani, A. 2021. “Wie kann äußere Freiheit ein angeborenes Recht sein?” In JeanChristophe Merle and Carola Freiin von Villiez (Eds.). Zwischen Rechten und Pfichten – Kants ›Metaphysik der Sitten‹. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 79–94. Willaschek, M. 1997. “Why the Doctrine of Right does not belong in the Metaphysics of Morals.” Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 5: 205–227. Wood, A. W. 1999. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, A. W. 2002. “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” In M. Timmons (Ed.). Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–22.

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Kant on the Frailty of Human Nature Robert B. Louden

2.1 Weakness of Will In real life, examples of people who act against their better judgment in nonmoral as well as moral contexts are not hard to fnd. Someone opts for a second (or is it a third?) glass of wine at a party even when he knows he shouldn’t, another chooses to enter a sexual liaison even though she’s convinced it’s a bad idea, and a third can’t bring himself to donate a penny to a worthy charity – even though he clearly knows that this is what he ought to do, and even though he is clearly able to do it. However, over the centuries philosophers – particularly those who pride themselves on being rational and logical (i.e., most philosophers) – have often been unable to make sense out of the common phenomenon of weakness of will. If you know what the right thing to do is and are able to do it, why don’t you just do it? Thus Socrates, in Plato’s Protagoras, famously denies the very possibility of akrasia: ‘no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better’ (Protagoras 358 b–c). Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, summarises Socrates’ intellectualism as follows: ‘there is no such thing as akrasia; no one, … [Socrates] said, when he judges acts against what he judges best – people act so only by reason of ignorance’ (1145b25–27). And this Socratic eliminativist strategy is not merely an ancient relic. For instance, R.M. Hare, in The Language of Morals (1952) also holds that weak-willed actions are impossible. On Hare’s view, ‘it becomes analytic to say that everyone always does what he thinks he ought to do [if physically and psychologically able]’ (Hare 1952, 169; cf. Stroud 2014, 3). And some philosophers who admit that akrasia is possible still condemn it as blatantly irrational. Thus Donald Davidson, while ‘absolutely certain’ that weak-willed actions exist (Davidson 1980, 29), nevertheless concludes that ‘what is wrong is that the incontinent man acts, and judges, irrationally, for this is surely what we must say of a man who goes against his own best judgment’ (Davidson 1980, 41). Kant, as others have noted, ‘never gave us an explicit and thorough discussion of weakness of will’ (Hill 2012, 107), but his brief remarks about it bring him closer to ordinary judgment concerning its ubiquity in daily life. DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-3

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And – though this next point is perhaps more controversial – I don’t think Kant is as quick as other philosophers are to condemn weak-willed actions as irrational. Weak-willed (or what Kant would call ‘frail’ – gebrechlich – literally, ‘breakable’ – see RGV 6: 29)1 agents always have reasons for doing what they do. Their reasons are not the best reasons, for the best reasons are moral reasons, and weak-willed persons fail to do what is morally right. But they do have reasons for doing what they do.2 As is already evident, Kant’s focus – and this will also be my focus for the remainder of the paper – is on moral weakness of will. He’s not terribly concerned with the person who drinks another glass of wine even though he knows he shouldn’t, and in his brief comments on this issue in both the Anthropology and The Metaphysics of Morals, he is surprisingly nonrigoristic. While ‘intoxication that does not enliven sociability [Geselligkeit] and the reciprocal communication of thoughts has something shameful [etwas Schändliches] in it’ (Anth 7: 170), the consumption of wine at a dinner party ‘bordering on intoxication [bis nahe an die Berauschung], since it enlivens the guests to lively conversation and in so doing unites them in open-heartedness [Offenherzigkeit verbindet]’ is permissible (MdS 6: 428). On the other hand, Kant is very concerned with our propensity to fail to do what we morally ought to do even when we clearly know what we morally ought to do and are able to do it. One key issue that needs to be stressed at the outset concerns Kant’s particular perspective on action. Whenever we act, we act on a maxim – a ‘subjective principle of volition’ (GMS 4: 401n.), personal policy, or underlying intention. And the maxims that we act on are always chosen by us – they are the result of our own free choice or Willkür. As Kant remarks in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason – and this is also the key passage that Henry Allison refers to in elucidating his ‘Incorporation Thesis’, which is the familiar tag under which many contemporary American readers group these points – humans’ ‘freedom of the power of choice [Willkür] has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except in so far as the human being has incorporated [aufgenommen] it into his maxim’ (RGV 6: 23-24; cf. Allison 1990). In other words, ‘one does not simply have a maxim, one makes something one’s maxim’ (Allison 1990, 88). This means that, at least for Kant, a purely conative or desire-based account of weakness of will is ruled out. We’re not simply overcome by inclination when we act morally wrongly. But in Kant’s view, we freely choose to act this way, and we have our reasons for doing so. Kant’s account of weakness of will is thus a cognitive or reason-based one, and it stands in opposition to the more familiar desire-based or conative accounts. Kant’s most explicit discussion of weakness of the will occurs in Part One of the Religion, when he describes ‘three different grades [Stufen]’ of the ‘natural propensity to evil’ (RGV 6: 29). The frst grade or step, he notes, ‘is the general weakness of the human heart in complying with adopted maxims, or

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the frailty [Gebrechlichkeit] of human nature’ (RGV 6: 29). He then elaborates (alas, all too briefy) on this frst step of the propensity to evil as follows: First, the frailty (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed even in the complaint of an Apostle: Willing I have indeed, but performance is lacking; i.e., I incorporate the good (the law) into the maxim of my Willkür; but this good, which objectively, in the idea (in thesi), is an insurmountable incentive, is subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in comparison with inclination) when the maxim ought to be complied with. (RGV 6: 29) It is noteworthy that Kant paraphrases Apostle Paul’s own description of weakness of will (from Romans 7: 18) in this passage. For Paul’s description is the frst, and still today the most famous, articulation of weakness of will, and Kant is essentially endorsing Paul’s description and equating his own conception of the frailty of human nature with it. Kant also explicitly endorses Paul’s confession of ignorance regarding the specifcs as to why humans are weak-willed (‘I do not understand why I act the way I do’, as one translation of Romans 7: 15 puts it – American Bible Society, 1995) a bit later in the Religion when he writes: The rational origin … of this disharmony in our Willkür with respect to the way it incorporates lower incentives in its maxims and makes them supreme, i.e. this propensity to evil, remains inexplicable to us [bleibt uns unerforschlich]. (RGV 6: 43) However, most philosophers are not satisfed with this profession of ignorance, and more than a little ink has been spilled in addressing the question, ‘Why, on Kant’s view, are humans weak-willed? What is the explanation for this Gebrechlichkeit, this frailty or breakableness in our nature?’ In the remainder of this section of my presentation, I will discuss briefy but critically a few of the more prominent recent hypotheses. Thomas Hill, in ‘Kant on Weakness of Will’, suggests that weak-willed people are vague in their resolution to be moral and inexplicit in what being moral entails. Weak-willed persons, he notes, ‘are committed unconditionally to doing right despite inclination, but they are typically not very clear, defnite, and explicit about what specifcally this implies for various particular choices’ (Hill 2012, 120–121). Although this strikes me as a plausible hypothesis for why some people in real life might be weak-willed, I don’t think it accurately refects Kant’s own position for at least two reasons. First, it conficts with a basic epistemic point about the moral law. Morality, in Kant’s view, is epistemically easy. We know what morality demands of us, in part because of the heavy lifting that Kant carried out in the Groundwork.

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All of us are now in possession of ‘a guiding thread [Leitfaden] and supreme norm by which to appraise’ (GMS 4: 390) actions correctly, and as a result, morality is no longer susceptible to epistemic corruption. We know what the right thing to do is. The problem is that we don’t do it. Weakness of will is thus not ‘a result of vagueness about right and wrong’ (Rukgaber 2015, 242). Second, diagnosing weak-willed people as vague seems inappropriate from a Kantian perspective simply because not all weak-willed people are in fact vague. Many of them, unfortunately, are all too precise and defnite in their actions. But what Kant is talking about in his discussion of frailty as the frst degree of evil is a propensity that ‘belongs to the human being universally (and hence to the character of the species)’ (RGV 6: 29). Kantian frailty is a trait or propensity that is present in all of us, not just some. Hill’s second hypothesis concerning weak-willed people is that they are insuffciently resolute in their willing to do the right thing. When we act from weakness of will, he notes, we will ‘weakly: that is, we resolve half-heartedly, wavering off and on, without willing specifcally, in anticipation, the necessary and available means’ (Hill 2012, 126; cf. 121). While I do think his second suggestion fts Kant’s texts better (in part because nonresoluteness does sound more like a universal propensity: frail people are nonresolute or wavering in their moral willing, and we see examples of this tendency in all human cultures), to my ears it sounds analytic to call weak-willed people nonresolute. Weak-willed people by defnition will weakly, i.e., nonresolutely – this is part of what being ‘weak-willed’ means. So Hill’s second suggestion lacks explanatory effcacy. It simply doesn’t tell us much. What we want to know is why people will weakly. As others have noted, ‘the standard interpretation of [Kantian] frailty is that it is a form of self-deception’ (Rukgaber 2015, 240). Thus Broadie and Pybus, in ‘Kant on Weakness of Will’, argue that ‘a mechanism of selfdeception’ is ‘brought into play’ (Broadie and Pybus 1982, 410) whenever we engage in weakness of will, and Nelson Potter holds that ‘the major, perhaps the sole source of evil, is self-deception, the inner lie, by which we defeat morality in us, and thereby defeat ourselves’ (Potter 2002, 386). Similarly, Henry Allison notes that ‘self-deception … is an essential ingredient in the propensity to evil’, and that the frail person deceives herself about her weak acts, denying (a la Sartrean bad faith) that they are the results of a ‘free evaluation’ for which she is in fact responsible (Allison 1990, 159). And Pablo Muchnik argues that Kantian frailty requires ‘active self-deception on our part’, and that the frail person ‘makes herself believe that her motivational structure is essentially good, even when her actions suggest otherwise’ (Muchnik 2009, 156, 157). Granted, self-deception does play a major role in Kant’s account of evil, particularly as regards evil’s two higher stages of impurity and depravity. As Kant metaphorically puts it, we often ‘throw dust in our own eyes’ (RGV 6: 38), thereby deceiving ourselves about the real maxims of our actions. But if he is going to remain true to the experiential facts of weak-willed actions, I

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don’t think he can plausibly analyse weakness of will in terms of self-deception. For weak-willed persons know that the actions they have performed are wrong. They regret that they chose to act on an immoral maxim and did not frmly stand by their commitment to be moral. In genuine cases of weakness of will, ‘we cannot pretend that we acted in ignorance’ (Hill 2012, 108). So I am inclined to agree with Matthew Rukgaber, who argues that Kantian frailty is ‘not caused by any sort of self-deception’ (Rukgaber 2015, 234). What, then, is the cause of our frailty? Hypotheses other than the ones discussed briefy here have been offered in the past, and no doubt industrious Kant scholars will offer more in the future. But I myself take Kant seriously when he says that the rational origin of the universal propensity to evil (of which frailty is but the frst of three degrees) – a propensity that is ‘subjectively necessary in every human being, even the best’ (RGV 6: 32; cf. 30) – ‘remains inexplicable to us’ (RGV 6: 43). To the best of my knowledge, the closest Kant himself comes to offering an explanation as to why we are weak-willed is when he refers to the human being’s tendency to reverse ‘the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims’ (RGV 6: 36). In other words, we have a tendency to choose the subjective principle of self-love over the objective principle of morality. Morality is more demanding than self-love, and perhaps no further explanation of the strange but common phenomenon of weakness of will is needed other than to point out that, when given the choice, humans often tend to choose the easier path over the more diffcult one. At any rate, this is as far Kant’s own analysis goes. We act for a reason when we are weak-willed, but we don’t act for the best reason, because the best reasons are moral reasons. Morality overrides all other interests. When we are weak-willed, we choose the easier path, epistemically speaking. Weakness of will is thus a kind of intellectual laziness. We do not remain resolute. But as to why we succumb to this ‘weakness of the human heart’, this ‘frailty of human nature’ – this remains ‘inexplicable to us’. 2.2 Vice But what, if anything, does weakness of will have to do with vice? Most of us, I suspect, will answer: not much. A weak-willed person, though far from perfect, is not normally equated with a vicious person. Someone who knows what is morally right and is committed to doing it but who, at the last moment, falters and fails to carry through on her commitment does not seem to be on the same level, morally speaking, as someone who is fundamentally unjust, deceitful, or cruel. And even Kant assigns only ‘unintentional guilt (culpa)’ to the ‘frst two stages [of evil,] (those of frailty and impurity)’, whereas ‘deliberate guilt (dolus)’ is assigned to the third stage of depravity (RGV 6: 38). The frail person is merely negligent, whereas the truly vicious person regularly engages in active deceit and fraud. However, because Kant also defnes moral virtue as ‘a moral strength of the will’ (MS 6: 405; cf. 380, 384, 390),3 in his view, there is nevertheless a

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connection between weakness of will and vice. The virtuous person possesses a moral strength of will that enables her to consistently fulfl her duty – to determine her actions through the maxim of ‘the good (the law)’ (RGV 6: 29) rather than an inferior maxim – whereas the weak-willed person, by defnition, lacks this moral strength of will. Nevertheless, I still maintain that, in Kant’s view (which is certainly not everyone’s view), weakness of will is not exactly the same as vice. As he remarks in The Metaphysics of Morals, the ‘real opposite’ of virtue is vice, while virtue’s ‘logical opposite’ is ‘moral weakness’ (MS 6: 384). In his 1763 essay, ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’, Kant notes that in cases of logical opposition, ‘two things are opposed to each other … through contradiction’, whereas in cases of real opposition, ‘two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction’ (NG 2: 171). Moving back to ethics, someone who fails to fulfl his duties of virtue – ‘unless he should make it his principle not to comply with such duties’ – displays ‘not so much vice (vitium) as rather mere want of virtue, lack of moral strength (defectus moralis)’ (MS 6: 390). In other words, weakness of will is not itself a vice, but it does indicate a lack of virtue.4 Notes 1 Kant’s works are cited in the body of the text by volume and page number in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then BerlinBrandenburg) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter, 1900–), 29 vols. Translations are my own. The following abbreviations are used: Anth = Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 7: 117–333. GMS = Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, 4: 385–463. KpV = Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 5: 1–163. MS = Metaphysik der Sitten, 6: 203–493. NG = Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 2: 165–204. RGV = Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 6: 1–202. 2 Robert Johnson, in ‘Weakness Incorporated’, cites Kant’s claim that ‘we will nothing under the direction of reason except insofar as we hold it to be good or evil’ (KpV 5: 60) as implying that ‘we are, in other words, irrational to the extent that we will to do something we do not hold to be good’ (Johnson 1998, 357). This claim seems to me to involve an overly restrictive conception of ‘rationality’. Moral reasons are not the only reasons, though, in Kant’s view, they do trump other kinds of reasons. However, later in his essay, Johnson also states that ‘weakwilled people in general act voluntarily, and so have reasons for what they do’ (Johnson 1998, 361). This second claim, although it appears to contradict the frst one, is closer to my own interpretation of Kant’s position. 3 For further discussion of Kantian virtue, see Louden (2011, 3–24) and Baxley (2010). 4 An earlier version of this essay was presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting in 2017 as an invited talk for a Symposium on ‘Kant on Weakness of Will and Vice’. I would like to thank Anne Margaret Baxley, both for her invitation to participate in this APA Symposium and for her helpful email discussions with me about Kant and weakness of will.

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References Allison, H. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. New Testament: Contemporary English Version 1995. New York: American Bible Society. Baxley, A. M. 2010. Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Broadie, A. and E. M. Pybus. 1982. ‘Kant and Weakness of Will’, in Kant-Studien 73: 406–412. Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ in Davidson (ed.), Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 21–42. Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hill, T. 2012. ‘Kant on Weakness of Will’, in Hill (ed.), Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–128. Johnson, R. N. 1998. ‘Weakness Incorporated’, in History of Philosophy Quarterly 15.3: 349–367. Louden, R. B. 2011. Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press. Muchnik, P. 2009. Kant’s Theory of Evil. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Potter, N. 2002. ‘Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism, and Self-Deception in Kant’s Ethics’, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, ed. M. Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 371–389. Rukgaber, M. S. 2015. ‘Irrationality and Self-Deception within Kant’s Grades of Evil’, in Kant-Studien 106: 234–258. Stroud, S. 2014. ‘Weakness of Will’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will/).

3

‘A Man for All Faculties’? The Unity of Kantian Reason from a Pragmatic Point of View1 Gualtiero Lorini

3.1 Observation and Regularity For many years studies on Kantian anthropology have been mainly concerned to reconstruct the historical genesis of this discipline in Kant’s thought in the belief that tracing the sources of this discipline would help to defne the limits of a knowledge that, in its development, seems to expand into a sea, whose waters continuously interact with the regions of critical philosophy.2 The controversial epistemological status of anthropology resulting from this research has nourished a sort of communis opinio, according to which Kant’s anthropology is not a discipline in its own right and is therefore unable to answer the fundamental questions it raises, most basically the question concerning the essence of the human being. The irreducible plurality of the elements at issue in this question has been summed up by N. Hinske, who claimed that philosophical anthropology ‘seeks to cross the boundaries of the discipline, striving for totality’.3 This insightful reading by Hinske ideally anticipates a trend that has taken hold over the last two decades, frst thanks to the German publication in 1997 of Kant’s lectures on anthropology in volume 25 of the Akademie Ausgabe, and then through the publication of an English translation of a selection from these lectures in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in 2012.4 What Hinske seemed to allude to was the need to conceive Kantian anthropology in a broader sense than the pragmatic anthropology delivered by the text of 1798. What is at issue is in fact the possibility of thinking of a genuinely and simply philosophical anthropology, which is determined in a pragmatic sense as a result of needs that partially come from the critical project. In this complex panorama, it therefore becomes essential to read anthropology as a result of a vast material consisting of both the lectures and the text published in 1798, which indeed derives from them. On the basis of this methodological indication, in the frst part of this essay (Sections 3.23.4), we will attempt to highlight the specifcity of the anthropological view on the world by taking into consideration the way in which, in the feld of anthropology, Kant deals with two peculiar elements of his Copernican revolution. DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-4

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The frst element consists in the normative nature of reason, which constitutes the distinctive trait of the human being with respect to other beings.5 Since its object is the human being, anthropology focuses on reason, but insofar as the anthropological inquiry is a posteriori, it proceeds from the world where the reason expresses its own normative nature. At the same time, the anthropological perspective is itself an expression of this reason and of its methodological demand for self-analysis; therefore, anthropology can only speak the language of normativity. The distinctive practice of anthropology is observation, not understood as the simple observation of a plurality of empirical elements but, rather, as a fundamental observation of how reason manifests its own regularity at the level of experience, thereby expressing the rules of the Denkungsart.6 This brings us to the second central aspect of criticism, whose anthropological consideration can help to clarify the nature of anthropology itself: this second aspect is the distinction between the subjective and the objective side of knowledge. Indeed, while the transcendental investigation delimits the area of objectivity by means of universal laws a priori, in the anthropological domain, the objective validity of the norm must be reached a posteriori, that is, starting from the Teilbarkeit, which indicates the effective possibility of sharing the norm’s validity with other subjects. It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, this Teilbarkeit can be related to the intersubjectivity reached on the transcendental plane. On the basis of the relation between normativity and objectivity conceived from the anthropological perspective, we may be able, perhaps, not to solve the diffculties related to the anthropological positioning of anthropology in Kant’s thought-building, but at least to clarify the reasons underlying these diffculties, which seem to depend on the way in which anthropology envelops and penetrates critical philosophy, rather than being included in it. As case studies of this state of affairs in Section 3.5, we will analyse some examples of the way anthropology allows a deeper and more updated understanding of some key concepts and principles of critical philosophy, dwelling in particular on the cosmopolitan domain. Finally, in Section 3.6, we will analyse the ‘repetition’ of the frst Critique that M. Foucault gathers in Kant’s anthropology as a perspicuous attempt of integration between critical project and anthropology. 3.2 Observation, Regularity, and Normativity It is well known that the introduction of anthropology into the curriculum of Kant’s university lectures dates back to the early 1770s. As a textbook for this discipline, Kant employs the section devoted to the Psychologia empirica of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, the same textbook of his lectures on metaphysics. The way Kant conceives empirical psychology is very useful for understanding the methodological traits that characterise anthropology.

30 Gualtiero Lorini Already in the lecture announcement of the Winter Semester 1765–1766, Kant attributes to empirical psychology – intended as ‘the metaphysical science of man based on experience’ [die metaphysische Erfahrungswissenschaft vom Menschen]7 – an introductory position within the ordo expositionis of metaphysics. This discipline concerns how Kant believes that the parts of the Schulmetaphysik must be reorganised. Yet, when, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant exposes his own concept of metaphysics understood as a system of pure knowledge a priori, he peremptorily banishes the empirical psychology from this domain by stating that it may still be welcomed into the system of metaphysics only according to ‘the customary scholastic usage’. Therefore, if empirical psychology still remains within the confnes of metaphysics, it is only as ‘a long-accepted foreigner, to whom one grants refuge for a while until it can establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology’.8 This transfer of tasks between psychology and anthropology had been clearly expressed by Kant in a course of the late 1770s devoted to the Philosophical Encyclopedia, in which anthropology was defned as the science of the empirical treatment of the thinking nature.9 The key to understanding the step from empirical psychology to anthropology is provided by Kant himself in his letter to M. Herz in late 1773. Here, he explains how he intends to introduce anthropology at the university and defnes it as an ‘observative doctrine’ [Beobachtungslehre].10 This is the same approach that Kant claimed to have adopted in 1764 in his Observations on the Feeling of Beauty and Sublime, which constitute a kind of anticipation of the themes at stake in the anthropology lectures.11 These are indeed issues that, according to Kant, must be considered ‘more with the eye of an observer than of the philosopher’.12 The crucial gap between anthropology and empirical psychology lies precisely in the nature and the non-purely speculative fnality of the anthropological observation. The observation characterising empirical psychology in the context of Wolffsm, for example, aims to reach a truth in the domain of dogmatic metaphysics, whereas the goal of Kant’s anthropology is practical-pragmatic, since its purpose is to enlighten the subject’s relations with other human beings. This aspect can be indirectly grasped in the lectures on metaphysics when Kant defends that: Affections are motion of the sensitive soul , which put a human being out of the position to remain in power over himself […] Passion makes blind—and wholly suspends the faculty of ruling oneself.—This matter belongs to anthropology.13 However, it is only in the lectures on anthropology that Kant most clearly separates the anthropological perspective from traditional empirical psychology. Here, not only does he reject the purely psychologist perspective on the essence of the soul, but he also introduces the feature that characterises his own anthropology in an absolutely original sense, one which

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refers to the proper matter of anthropology: this is the concept of character. From his frst lectures on anthropology, Kant defnes it as a ‘higher principle […] to make use of all the capacities and incentives’ or to ‘to sacrifce and to restrain sensations’.14 In the frst pages of the Parow lecture notes, for instance, we read: ‘Here one can learn about the source of all human actions and the character of human beings in [their] correlations’.15 Stark has drawn attention to the proximity of the terms source and character, claiming that character is the source of human action as Kant analyses it throughout his lectures.16 In the Anthropological Characteristics of the published Anthropology, Kant defnes character as Denkungsart and distinguishes it, as a moral disposition, both from the natural aptitude [Naturanlage] and from the temperament, since the Denkungsart does not show ‘what nature makes of the human being’, but rather ‘what human being makes of himself’.17 Kant further develops this idea by adding that ‘simply to have a character signifes that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to defnite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason’.18 Therefore, if, on the one hand, the observational method of anthropology is not intended to reach eternal metaphysical truths, on the other hand, it is far from being rhapsodic. On the contrary, Kant’s goal is to establish the rules of human behaviour, and, to do this, he can only follow the reason, namely the essential element orienting the subject’s actions. Therefore, through the study of the empirical manifestation of character, the anthropological observation aims to identify the modalities that enable referring the subject’s behaviour to specifc rules. This both rational and empirical nature of the character makes it possible to understand in what sense the characteristic should be considered as a ‘doctrine of method’ of anthropology, as Kant argues in the Dohna lecture notes.19 The normative structure of reason does not cease to be the thread of observation since the observer has no other tools at his disposal. Yet, in comparison to the critical-transcendental inquiry, the anthropological observation is interested in the ‘subjective’ side of the rules. Indeed, here we cannot but detect a certain symmetry with the critical approach, as attested by the Anthropologie Friedländer, where anthropology is not ‘a description of human beings, but of human nature’,20 and the human being is conceived as ‘the object of inner sense’.21 However, this symmetry also highlights the distance between these two points of view, a distance that, since it is structural, is impossible to bridge. In this respect, the published Anthropology of 1798 emphasises the empirical nature of the observation targeted to inner sense, which is the main activity of anthropology: Inner sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being does, since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is a consciousness of what he undergoes, in so far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts.22

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Thus, an anthropology observing the subject’s faculties and actions, as perceived within the inner sense, can obviously not reach the universality of the laws deduced a priori at the transcendental level. Such an anthropology is rather characterised by what Kant, in the frst and third Critiques, defnes as the ‘comparative universality’23 of the empirical rules that are gained inductively. This particular meaning of universality can be defended in concreto, as long as it meets no exception to its rule. Nevertheless, differently from the absolute universality of the laws a priori, the comparative universality cannot exclude the possibility of exceptions, as signifcantly attested by the Refexion 4812: ‘A priori rules [Regeln] are laws [Gesetze], a posteriori rules are never without exceptions’.24 It is precisely in the light of this methodological distinction between absolute and comparative universality that in his published Anthropology Kant uses the term Generalkenntniß, ‘general knowledge’ in order to describe the very universality of the anthropological knowledge.25 Kant’s defnition of anthropology as ‘pragmatic’ – which, at the time when Kant introduced it, was all but commonplace – is crucially shaped precisely by this peculiar kind of ‘general knowledge’. Therefore, we need now to investigate the most salient traits of the objectivity rising from the anthropological ‘comparative universality’, a universality based upon an observation focused on the inner sense and aimed at identifying those rules of human behaviour which are fxed in the character of the individual. 3.3 Subjectivity, Objectivity, Intersubjectivity: On the Anthropological Side In order to grasp the essential features of this type of objectivity, it is necessary to broaden the anthropological examination of sensibility. Indeed, next to the treatment of inner sense, which allows us to grasp the empirical dimension of subjectivity understood as the object of a phenomenic observation, Kant adds – both in the lectures on anthropology and in the published Anthropology – the analysis of the external sense ‘through which we perceive objects outside of ourselves’.26 In 1798, while studying in depth the external sense, Kant interestingly analyses and classifes the fve senses the human being is endowed with: Three of them are more objective than subjective, that is, as empirical intuitions they contribute more to the cognition of the external object than they stir up the consciousness of the affected organ. Two, however, are more subjective than objective, that is, the idea obtained from them is more a representation of enjoyment than of cognition of the external object. Therefore, one can easily come to an agreement with others regarding the objective senses; but with respect to the subjective senses, with one and the same external empirical intuition and name of the object, the way that the subject feels affected by it can be entirely different. The senses of the frst class are 1) touch (tactus), 2) sight

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(visus), 3) hearing (auditus). Of the latter class are a) taste (gustus), b) smell (olfactus).27 Kant’s emphasis on the distinction between the more or less objective component and the more or less subjective component characterising a defnite group of senses with respect to the others introduces into the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity a gradation that it is obviously not possible to fnd in a perspective aimed at determining a priori the conditions of objectivity and distinguishing it from any subjectivity not transcendentally determined. Moreover, not only does the anthropological classifcation proceed according to degrees of objectivity or subjectivity, but it rather also introduces a further and very particular parameter, that of ‘nobility’ [Adel]: The sense of sight, even if it is not more indispensable than that of hearing, is still the noblest, because among all the senses, it is furthest removed from the sense of touch, the most limited condition of perception: it not only has the widest sphere of perception in space, but also its organ feels least affected (because otherwise it would not be merely sight). Thus, sight comes nearer to being a pure intuition (the immediate representation of the given object, without admixture of noticeable sensation).28 In order to delve more into the meaning that in this context Kant attributes to the adjective ‘noble’, we must refer to the Anthropologie Friedländer, where Kant states that ‘The more human beings can share in them, the nobler are the senses, and the more they make objects mutual for us’.29 Once again, Kant refers to the semantic domain of gradation, but here he aims to express those rules – as general as possible – which characterise the anthropological ‘comparative universality’. From this point of view, we can connect the attribute of ‘nobility’ with the possibility of ‘easily come to an agreement with others’ quoted above with reference to objective senses. Therefore, nobility might be meant to clarify that the more or less objective quality of an external sense must be understood (and measured) as the a posteriori equivalent of the universal intersubjectivity that at the transcendental level determines objectivity a priori. Thus, the specifcity of anthropology would lie in the fact that it derives from below what the critical system deduces from above, of course with a proportionally inferior degree of universality. However, the lectures seem to provide arguments to put this into question. Indeed, still in the Anthropologie Friedländer, a little further on, a certain degree of nobility is ascribed to the sense of smell – which is then listed among the subjective senses – whereas this property is denied to the Gefühl, which Kant sometimes identifes with touch, at other times with a kind of sixth sense more general than touch, but still objective. There is something similar in the last course on anthropology, the Anthropology Busolt (dating from the late 1780s), as regards the subjective sense of taste, which Kant

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defnes as the most ‘social’.30 It is therefore not possible to establish an equation between objectivity and nobility understood as the possibility of sharing [Teilbarkeit] and so a symmetry between these anthropological concepts and transcendental intersubjectivity. Of course, the objection according to which it is not possible to completely trust the lectures, and Kant’s last word is to be found in the published Anthropology would be far too easy. In any event, the gradual continuity that, in the Anthropology of 1798, Kant acknowledges between objectivity and subjectivity seems to frmly rule out any assimilation to the critical conception of objectivity. Indeed, in the published Anthropology, after having treated the most ‘objective’ senses (sight, hearing and touch), Kant states: These three outer senses lead the subject through refection to cognition of the object as a thing outside ourselves.—But if the sensation becomes so strong that the consciousness of the movement of the organ becomes stronger than the consciousness of the relation to an external object, then external representations are changed into internal ones.— To notice smoothness or roughness in what can be touched is something entirely different from inquiring about the fgure of the external body through touching. So too, when the speech of another is so loud that, as we say, the ears hurt from it, or when someone who steps from a dark room into bright sunshine blinks his eyes. The latter will be blind for a few moments due to the too strong or too sudden light, the former will be deaf for a few moments due to the shrieking voice. That is, both persons are unable to fnd a concept of the object because of the intensity of the sensations; their attention is fxed merely on the subjective representation, namely, the change of the organ.31 Even making abstraction from the subtleties and the sometimes oscillating formulations of the lectures, the anthropological treatment of the fve senses – —in addition to being remarkably juxtaposed to that of the inner sense – provides a very important indication. The tendency to project on anthropology the fundamental structures of transcendental philosophy does not take into account the limit represented by the essential approach of anthropology, namely the observation a posteriori. This does not prevent this discipline from often ending up by formulating hypotheses that correspond to the results of transcendental deductions a priori, but a posteriori, that is, as a sort of photographic negative. In other words, what marks the fundamental distance between the two perspectives is the quantitative-inductive modality to which anthropology must be limited, unlike the universality that characterises the qualitative-deductive approach. This means that the objectivity that anthropology is entitled to deal with – an objectivity allowing room for degrees – has as its main purpose the establishment of what can be taken as the object of an observation. As a consequence, when in the frst course on anthropology Kant defnes as ‘objective’

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the senses that increase our knowledge,32 he is referring to the senses allowing us to identify those objects which are as such in relation to our cognitive faculty. In this context, objectivity must be understood frst and foremost as Gegenständlichkeit, namely as the property of what from time to time ‘faces’ the subject and can thereby be observed. 3.4 The Cyclops and the Antropologia transscendentalis After the analysis of the methodological specifcities of anthropology in relation to the critical-transcendental investigation, the question implied hitherto is clear: is there any relationship between these two perspectives? If so, how should it be understood? A possible way to answer this question could be found in the famous Refexion 903, dating from the late 1770s, where Kant defnes ‘cyclops’ the ‘egoist of science’, who needs ‘a further eye, in order to be able to look at his object from the point of view of other human beings’. Kant goes even further: This is the basis of the humanity of science [humanitaet der Wissenschften], namely, the sociability [Leutseligkeit] of judgment, since one submits together to the judgment of another. […] The second eye is that of human reason that knows itself: without it, we would have no measure of the extent of our knowledge. This knowledge of human reason is the basis for doing this measure […] It is not enough to apprehend many other sciences, but the self-knowledge of understanding and reason. Antropologia transscendentalis.33 This Refexion is important because it clearly demonstrates the need to trace all human knowledge back to a wider space of possibility, the space of the human, the only domain in which all knowledge acquires meaning. Yet, this domain of the human is nothing but reason. This brings us back to our opening remark: the inquiry into human nature can only be translated into an inquiry of reason about itself. Reason expresses itself through norms: however, the objectivity of these norms does not consist in a dogmatic apriorism, but rather in its a priori validity for beings endowed with reason, a validity that must be ‘rediscovered’ (not deduced) also in the a posteriori investigation. This is precisely the second eye of which anthropology provides all too specialised knowledge: it is a constant and fundamental reminder of the need to be able to share – to socialise – the validity of a judgement with the other representatives of reason: with other human beings. Certainly, the ‘social’ sharing that characterises anthropology has nothing to do with the intersubjectivity by which transcendental objectivity is constituted. In anthropology, the rational subject is faced with the variety of the world, and, as Beobachtungslehre, anthropology records the complexity of the dynamics resulting from this encounter and tries to fnd out regularities therein. But, again, in order to observe the dynamics by which human beings

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build their lives in the world from their own tendencies and characters, anthropology can do no more than follow the rules of what constitutes the essence of mankind, namely reason. This is the reason why, in the Refexion about the cyclops, the real diffculty consists in admitting that the task of the general self-knowledge of reason can be entrusted to a single discipline, which should embrace in a single glance what the critical path has analysed and exposed in a progressive way. For this reason, R. Brandt has claimed the need to move from a Defnitionsfrage on the human being – poorly limited to Kant’s explicitly anthropological texts – to a Bestimmungsfrage focused on the I, whose answer should be ideally sought in a fourth Critique, which would replace the problem of knowledge with that of consciousness and would diagonally cross the whole of Kant’s thought.34 Thus, although a historical inquiry into the academic and epistemological origins of anthropology is indispensable, it is obvious that the essence of this discipline must be sought in its capillary diffusion in Kant’s thought. Therefore, today it would not be accurate to take Kant’s anthropology as a discipline in its own right. It would probably be more correct to consider it as a tendency inspired by a comprehensive overview of our ‘thinking self in life’.35 The reason why what we continue to call ‘anthropology’ escapes any systematisation is precisely that the generality and complexity of its object, the human being, impels us to consider any discipline as a diverse and complementary expression of the one and single reason. The human being as a rational being is the only condition that the a posteriori observation accomplished by anthropology shares with transcendental philosophy and constitutes the pre-comprehension of it. In the preface to the published Anthropology, Kant states that the expressions ‘to know the world’ [Welt kennen] and ‘to have [the] world’ [Welt haben] are pretty far from each other in their meaning, since one of them only understands the play that one has watched, while the other has participated in it.36 In commenting on this, H. Holzhey has effectively remarked that we, as human beings, live in a world that is not just our ‘place of stay [Aufenthaltsort], but must be conceived as a community’.37 Kim adds also that every human being has his own ‘eigene Welt’, and, ‘according to the way in which this world appears, each human being sets himself a goal to achieve during his life and his interactions with other men’.38 From here comes the need to highlight the normative aspect of Kant’s conception of the human being, primarily understood as an I in the world. According to Kant, the access to this world, even before its knowledge, signifes entering a dimension made of norms allowing the relationship with other rational beings.

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3.5 Two Case Studies: Theodicy and Cosmopolitism The interpretation keys traced so far allow us to identify the anthropological element as more or less explicitly cooperating with the unitary determination of the human being as a rational being in several moments of the critical philosophy. It suffces to think, for example, of the way Kant’s treatment of theodicy retrospectively illuminates some references to anthropology that in moral writings appear almost occasional. In the writing On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy (1791), Kant starts from the assumption that the human being is the product of a freely acting ground and at the same time a subject that can act freely. Here the link between the human being’s moral freedom and his unavoidably anthropological relationship with God is called into question in so far as Kant tries to conceive of a renewed theodicy, which should be anthropologically shaped. Although the attempt at a philosophical foundation of the theodicy is, according to Kant, doomed to failure, this essay allows him to go beyond the a priori defnition of human freedom’s ‘perimeter’, since – for example, by means of the biblical fgure of Job – he delves into the often problematic ways in which this freedom is concretely experienced by human beings. Such an anthropological analysis results in the possibility of assessing the consequences of human actions as phenomena of freedom. Furthermore, this way of looking at anthropology cannot but remind us of the ‘practical anthropology’ that Kant alludes to in the preface to the Groundwork,39 and even more the ‘moral anthropology’ mentioned in the Metaphysics of Morals, which: Would deal only with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulflling the laws of a metaphysics of morals. It would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts based on experience.40 This seems to be the sense in which anthropology from a pragmatic point of view has often been identifed as Kant’s attempt to provide ethics with a phenomenal matter in which the self-determination of the human being through respect for the moral law cannot be simply justifed but rather recognised. That, thanks to its hybrid epistemological status, anthropology could carry out an integration task with respect to ethics had been contended since the end of the 19th century by E. Arnoldt: As a part of practical philosophy, Kant’s anthropology stands under the legislation of reason according to laws of freedom, which prescribe what ought to be; on the other hand, even if it is morally-practical, it is part of a comprehensive [empirical] anthropology which stands under the legislation of reason according to the concept of nature, which indicates what is. Kant did not determine this relationship more closely.41

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Refecting on the several possible ways in which Kant’s lectures on anthropology, thanks to their richness, can actually be seen as a ‘second part’ of ethics, R. Louden pores over the ‘destiny of the human species’. Kant takes humanity indeed as a species on the way to a destination and provides some normative indications that – so Louden – allow us to recognise a ‘considerable overlap between Kant’s lectures on anthropology and his philosophy of history […], as well as with his lectures and essays on education’.42 This leads to an important sense in which anthropology makes it possible to catch with a single gaze certain dimensions of the human that in transcendental consideration are either considered separately from each other or are completely absent. As A. Lyssy argues, alongside pragmatic anthropology, ‘which conceives the human being as a free and moral being and discusses what the human being can or should be’,43 there is a physiological anthropology, ‘which discusses the human being as a natural being of the human species’.44 It is against the background of this duality that the identity of the individual as a person is achieved. On the basis of an overtly anthropological research, in the Religion Kant analyses precisely the predisposition [Anlage] on whose ground the ‘character’ is determined, which allows us to consider the human species as good (or bad) by nature. This Anlage must be read ‘with reference to its end’ and is articulated in three elements to be taken ‘as elements of the vocation [Bestimmung] of the human being’.45 Kant lists here the predisposition to the animality of the human being, as a living being; […] to the humanity in him, as a living and at the same time rational being; […] to his personality, as a rational and at the same time responsible being.46 Personality does not represent a conciliation between the frst and the second moment, but rather a high level of reason’s self-imposition, since the frst [predisposition] does not have reason at its root at all; that the second is rooted in a reason which is indeed practical, but only as subservient to other incentives; […] the third alone is rooted in reason practical of itself, i.e. in reason legislating unconditionally.47 By virtue of this, ‘the predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a suffcient incentive to the power of choice [Willkür]’.48 Thus, in the predisposition to personality, a peculiar trait of the species – its rationality, expressed by the capability to recognise the universality of moral law and respect it – is represented in the individual. This description of the species–individual relationship returns in a surprisingly similar manner, but with reference to beautiful, in Schiller’s 27th Letter on the Aesthetic Education of Man: We enjoy the pleasures of the senses simply as individuals, and the race which lives within us has no share in them. […] We enjoy the pleasures

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of knowledge simply as race, and by carefully removing every trace of individuality from our judgement. […] It is only the Beautiful that we enjoy at the same time as individual and as race, that is, as representatives of the race.49 Not by chance this Schillerian passage has aroused Kant scholars’ attention. F. Nobbe, for instance, seems to echo it in order to claim that the reconciliation between individual and species is only achieved by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment by means of the structure of refective judgement.50 The two possible meanings of refective judgement, aesthetic and teleological, share a reference to purpose, in the former case subjective and in the latter objective, which is expressed in normative form as ‘conformity to laws’ [Gesetzmäßigkeit]. If, at the same time, we keep in mind that the highest predisposition to personality described in the Religion must always be read in reference to a purpose, namely as a task to be fulflled, and that this purpose consists in the determination of the human being, i.e., of his ‘vocation’, we recognise a normative structure working as a bridge between the apriorism of the critical system and the historical becoming of anthropological analysis. This is neither a mirroring nor an analogy but rather a veritable completion. The systematic unity of reason’s theoretical and practical dimensions can be identifed in the structure of judgement, the normative essence of which cannot be said to be complete until the determining judgement is fanked by the refective judgement, thereby completing the description of the way in which reason is lawgiver in and for itself. This lawgiving is indeed universal in so far as it is deduced a priori, that is, by abstracting from sensibility, but once again, this absolute universality needs the comparative perspective of anthropology to become lived universality. In a sense, we need to move a step forward from the ‘battlefeld’51 of metaphysics to the ‘theater of war’ represented by history. Only here the individual as a person can rediscover the universality of the law in so far as, by facing animal and selfsh drifts, he or she stands as a representative of the species and take on the universality and unity of reason in the ‘partial’ or at most ‘general’ forms of empirical objectivity. This unavoidable and even necessary confict between reason and animality is shaped by a programmatic normativity, namely purposiveness, and so it unsurprisingly brings to rationally desirable outcomes in the mundane dimension, as Kant states in the Idea of 1784: ‘a universal cosmopolitan condition, as the womb in which all original predispositions of the human species will be developed’.52 It should be noted that the diverse forms of community life are addressed by Kant by means of a path that through private and international law culminates in cosmopolitan law. As mentioned, the presuppositions of this can already be found in the Idea of 1784 and are extensively developed in Perpetual Peace (1795) and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Yet, the connection between the human being’s cosmopolitan and therefore social vocation and his or her need to actualise this vocation in the normative form

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of a special right outstandingly emerges in the last pages of the published Anthropology. Here Kant clearly expresses anthropology’s role in and contribution to the unitary idea of reason. Kant contends that the necessary coexistence, to which humans are forced by the fnitude of the Earth’s surface, is in harmony with a natural inclination to sociality, which operates according to the rules of mutual coercion. The composition of such rules – somehow as in the case of vector forces – results in an overall progress. More interesting from our point of view, however, is Kant’s reference to the model explaining how this goal is to be achieved, namely the idea that the genus should be structured in a cosmopolitan unifed system.53 In each system, the parts retain indeed their independence and are united by the sharing of laws that allow mutual exchange. This progress towards a systematic organisation thus effectively shows that cosmopolitanism achieves its goal in the composition of different individuals who share an anthropological state. Such a state allows them to reconcile their collective natural humanity and their differences as political and juridical subjects. Of course, as R. Pasquarè recently pointed out, this does not mean that anthropology in its pragmatic meaning can be constituted as a ‘system’ in the strong sense of the term, as Kant defnes it in Architectonic, namely as ‘the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea’.54 In the last section of the published Anthropology, Kant does indeed confer unity to the manifold, i.e. the empirical observations of pragmatic anthropology, employing ideas, namely the idea of possible rational beings on earth and the idea of the human species’ vocation. But these ideas […] do not stem from within pragmatic anthropology. Rather pragmatic anthropology requires them to confer unity to its material but borrows them from pure reason.55 Yet this does not weaken but rather makes structurally even more necessary a close and reciprocal relationship between pragmatic anthropology and pure reason, since on one side, pragmatic anthropology needs pure reason to attain the ideas capable of bringing unity into its empirical observations. On the other side, pure reason needs the empirical evidence provided by pragmatic anthropology to reinforce the theoretical and practical status of the idea of the human species’ developing toward cosmopolitanism.56 3.6 Foucault’s ‘Repetition’ Path By transposing on the stage of history the tension between nature and freedom in the human being, cosmopolitanism appears as the concept in which the necessary integration of transcendental philosophy and anthropology is most evident. From this point of view, Kant’s distinction between

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knowing and having a world fnds its fullest and most concrete expression. This is inscribed in a broader reading of anthropology’s functional role with respect to critical philosophy. At the same time, as the closing of the previous section has highlighted, this is not a one-way relationship, since anthropology receives from transcendental philosophy its own meaning precisely because it ‘provides world’ to the a priori normativity of the transcendental dimension. This relationship between anthropology and transcendental philosophy has been grasped in a genuinely original way by a philosopher, who certainly cannot be counted among the Kant scholars, but perhaps just because of his fresh glance on Kant’s anthropology and thanks to his acute historical sensitivity has caught with surprising anticipation some aspects to which the Kant-Forschung has come only in recent years. It is Michel Foucault, with whose observations we want to close this essay. We refer here in particular to the introduction to Kant’s Anthropology that Foucault wrote at the beginning of the 1960s as a part of his thèse complémentaire, which included also his own translation of Kant’s text. This work remained unpublished for a long time and was only released for the frst time in 2008.57 We will not go into the details of the theoretical path bringing Foucault to deal with this text.58 What should instead be highlighted from the outset is that, even without having the Vorlesungen notes available, Foucault begins by underlining the need to read Kant’s text of 1798 for what it is, i.e., the result of a long and intense teaching activity, with all the related implications in terms of internal evolution and constant comparison with contemporary printed texts.59 He also dwells on many themes from the precritical writings, which fnd a re-proposal and re-actualisation in the anthropological domain.60 However, what matters most here is Foucault’s core thesis, which he achieves also by means of the mentioned historical reconstruction, namely that: The Anthropology says nothing other than what is said in the Critique, we need only glance through the 1798 text to see that it covers exactly the same ground as the critical enterprise. However, the meaning of this fundamental repetition must not be asked of the words that are repeated nor of the language that repeats, but instead of that toward which the repetition is directed.61 Foucault identifes the purpose of this repetition in the ‘three-beat structure [structure ternaire] which is in question in the Opus Postumum and which characterises the Inbegriff des Daseins: source, domain, limit’.62 Yet he is well aware that such a ‘three-beat’ structure echoes the expression used by Kant on several occasions in order to defne the Critique’s preliminary task as regards the system, which transcendental philosophy should fnally be turned into.63

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With respect to the subject of criticism, whose self-consciousness is determined by the time making relationships possible, the human being of anthropology experiences time and the intertwining of relationships that is innervated by it. By virtue of this, the ‘originary’ loses the traits of necessity that shape it in the a priori defnition of transcendental philosophy,64 thereby discovering that ‘the originary is not the really primitive, it is the truly temporal’.65 The mark allowing the human being to fll this lived temporality, which is originary without being aprioristically primitive, is represented by language, not by chance put at stake by Kant precisely in the Anthropology.66 Foucault maintains that ‘anthropology’s man is indeed a Weltbürger […] not in the sense that he belongs to a given social group or such and such institution’, but ‘purely and simply because he speaks’.67 Thus, the sense in which the originary is not chronologically primitive like the a priori means that it is not to be found in an already given, secret meaning, but in what is the most manifest path of the exchange. It is here that language takes, realises, and rediscovers its reality; it is also here that man exhibits his anthropological truth.68 The absence of a ‘degree zero’ within the temporal, linguistic, and therefore dynamic dimension of anthropology69 allows the human being to act as trait d’union between God and the world, in so far as he is limited by the former and part of the latter. This state of affairs reproduces the aforementioned ternary structure marked by source, domain, and limit of human being’s knowledge, but now human being’s life sounds more accurate. This tripartition remains the heart of the way Foucault reads the relation between critique and anthropology. The transcendental a priori of criticism corresponds to the sources of pure reason, while transcendental philosophy represents the fundamental level of refection that needs a critical propaedeutic. Since Kant, the implicit project of all philosophy has been to overcome this essential division, to the point where it becomes clear that such overcoming cannot take place outside of a thinking which repeats it, and by repeating it, instates it. Anthropology is precisely the site where that confusion will be reproduced, incessantly. Whether it is referred to as such, or concealed in other projects, Anthropology, or at least the anthropological level of refection, will come to alienate philosophy.70 We do not venture here into the discussion about the notion of ‘historical a priori’, which Foucault is elaborating in these very years,71 and which seems evocated by the ‘intermediary character of the originary’72 attributed in these lines to the anthropological analysis. We are rather interested in underlining that this intermediate character of the originary is ‘situated between the a priori and the fundamental’, thereby functioning ‘as an impure and unthought

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hybrid within the internal economy of philosophy’.73 Foucault thus captures that essentially normative element of anthropology which paradoxically— but perhaps not that much—consists in the structural ambiguity of Kant’s Menschen-Kenntniß. This is indeed both ‘knowledge of man, in a movement which objectifes man on the level of his natural being and in the content of his animal determinations’ and ‘knowledge of the knowledge of man, and so can interrogate the subject himself, ask him where his limitations lie, and about what he sanctions of the knowledge we have of him’.74 By virtue of this, anthropology grounds and limits, or rather helps to ground and limit, all human knowledge because it allows the human being to turn his gaze to an a priori that precedes him like a shadow without taking away from this gesture the strength of the originary. Just as the Menschen-Kenntniß is not only knowledge of the human being but, in the double sense of the genitive, also knowledge of all the human beings’ ways of knowing, in the same way, the repetition of the frst Critique that Foucault recognises in Kant’s anthropology makes sense only if it is extended to the whole critical project. In fact, if we admit that the a priori of the frst Critique fnally comes out modifed and enriched by its necessary development in the empirical horizon, we must equally admit that this last horizon touches the moral, aesthetic, and cosmopolitan issues discussed in the previous section. If, on the one hand, Foucault perhaps goes a little too far—in a sense justifed by his own philosophical project—to support the systematic character of Kant’s anthropology,75 on the other hand, his analysis brilliantly does justice to the sense in which this anthropology, precisely because it is irreducible to the critical project, decisively contributes to its systematicity. Notes 1 Indications regarding the English translations of Kant’s writings are provided in the frst note in which a work is mentioned. In subsequent notes in which we refer to this translation, we confne ourselves to the indication ‘Engl. transl.’ followed by page number. All the translations not taken from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant are my own. 2 See, for instance, the classical studies by B. Erdmann, ‘Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von Kants Anthropologie’, in Id., Refexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, Leipzig: Fues’s, 1882: 37–64; E. Arnoldt, ‘Kants Vorlesungen über physische Geographie und ihr Verhältniß zu seinen anthropologischen Vorlesungen’, in Id., Gesammelte Schriften, 10 voll., ed. by O. Schöndörffer, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1906–1911, vol. 4 (1908): 347–373. See also the dispute between E. Adickes and W. Dilthey concerning the placement of the Anthropology in Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, which is documented by G. Lehmann,‘Zur Geschichte der Kantausgabe’, in Id., Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969, pp. 3–26. These scholars disagree with each other on many points, but they share the research horizon characterized by the history of sources and development of the anthropological knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. For more recent accounts of these issues, see, e.g., H. L. Wilson, ‘Elucidations of the Sources of Kant’s Anthropology’, in G. Lorini and R. B. Louden (Eds.), Knowledge, Morals

44

3 4 5

6 7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Gualtiero Lorini and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 11–28, here p. 13; B. Jacobs and P. Kain, Introduction, in Ids. (Eds.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 1–14, pp. here 5–6; J. H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 292–302. N. Hinske, Kants Idee der Anthropologie, in H. Rombach (Ed.), Die Frage nach dem Menschen: Aufriss einer philosophischen Anthropologie, Festschrift für Max Müller, Freiburg-München: Alber, 1966, pp. 410–427, here p. 426. See I. Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, ed. by A. W. Wood and R. B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. See I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 127, Engl. transl. by R. B. Louden, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 239. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 291–292, Engl. transl. pp. 389–390. M. Immanuel Kant’s Announcement of the Programme of His Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766, AA: 309, Engl. transl. by D. Walford in collaboration with R. Meerbote, in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 295. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 848–849/B 876–877, Engl. transl. by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 700. See also Metaphysik Volckmann (1784–1785), AA 28: 367; Anthropologie Collins (1772–1773), AA 25: 8, Engl. transl. by A. W. Wood, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, ed. by A. Wood and R. B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 15–16; Anthropologie Parow (1772–1773), AA 25: 243, Engl. transl. by A. Wood, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, p. 31. See Vorlesungen über die Philosophische Enzyklopädie, AA 29: 11, 44. On the infuence of Baumgarten’s empirical psychology on Kant’s anthropology, see N. Hinske, ‘Kant und Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Ein leider unerledigtes Thema der Anthropologie Kants’, in Aufklärung 14, 2002, pp. 261–276, here p. 263. I. Kant to M. Herz, end of 1773, AA 10: 143–146. S. B. Kim, Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule, Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1994, p. 98. I. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, AA 2: 207, Engl. trans. by P. Guyer, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, p. 23. Metaphysik Dohna (1792–1793), AA 28: 679, Engl. transl. by K. Ameriks and S. Naragon, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 380. Anthropologie Collins, AA 25: 227, Engl. transl. p. 26. Anthropologie Parow, AA 25: 244, Engl. transl. p. 32. W. Stark, ‘Historical Notes and Interpretative Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology’, in B. Jacobs and P. Kain (Eds.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, p. 28. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 292, Engl. transl. p. 390. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 292, Engl. transl. pp. 389–390. See Anthropologie Dohna-Wundlacken (1791/1792), in A. Kowalewski (Ed.), Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants, München-Leipzig: Rösl

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20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

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& Cie, 1924, pp. 70, 75; Randnotiz zu Anthropologie VII, 159, in AA 7: 400 (Ergänzungen aus H.). On the link between the conception of the anthropological characteristic as a doctrine of the method of anthropology and the critical subdivision into doctrine of the method and the doctrine of the elements, see C. Schmidt, ‘Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology’, in KantStudien 98/2, 2007, pp. 168–169. Anthropologie Friedländer (1775–1776), AA 25: 471, Engl. transl. by G. F. Munzel, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, p. 48; see also Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 120–121, Engl. transl. pp. 232–233. Anthropologie Friedländer, AA 25: 473, Engl. transl. p. 50. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 161, Engl. transl. p. 272. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 3–4, A 92/B 124, Engl. transl. pp. 137, 223; Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 5: 213, Engl. transl. by P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 98. Refexion 4812 (1775–1776), AA 17: 736. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 120, Engl. transl. p. 232 (emphasis in the translation). See also P. Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 38–39. Anthropologie Friedländer, AA 25: 492, Engl. transl. p. 65. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 154, Engl. transl. pp. 264–265. See also Anthropologie Mrongovius (1784–1785), AA 25: 1242, Engl. transl. by R. Clewis, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, pp. 369–370. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 156, Engl. transl. pp. 267–268. Anthropologie Friedländer, AA 25: 495–496, Engl. transl. p. 68. In the same sense, the attribute of nobility can be found also in the Anthropologie Collins, AA 25: 53. Anthropologie Busolt (1788–1789), AA 25: 1454. In the published Anthropology, Kant states that ‘smell is contrary to freedom and less sociable than taste, where among many dishes or bottles a guest can choose one according to his liking, without others being forced to share the pleasure of it’ (I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 158, Engl. transl. p. 269). I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 156–157, Engl. transl. p. 268. See Anthropologie Collins, AA 25: 53. Refexion 903 (late 1770s), AA 15: 395. On this point, see R. Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, Hamburg: Meiner, 2007, p. 11. I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 5: 461, Engl. transl. p. 325. I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 120, Engl. transl. p. 232. H. Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff. Quellengeschichtliche und bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen, Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1970, p. 309. S. B. Kim, Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule, Frankfurt-Bern: Peter Lang, 1994, p. 138 n. 452. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 4: 388, Engl. transl. by M. J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 44. I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6: 217, Engl. transl. by M. J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, p. 372.

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41 E. Arnoldt, Kritische Excurse im Gebiete der Kant-Forschung, Königsberg: von Ferd, 1894, p. 351, translated by R. B. Louden in his essay ‘The Second Part of Morals’, in B. Jacobs and P. Kain (Eds.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, pp. 60–84, here 72. For a broader assessment of Kant’s anthropology as closely related to his ethics, see R. B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 42 R. B. Louden, ‘The Second Part of Morals’, p. 72. Louden refers in particular to Kant’s Pädagogik, AA 9: 498–499, and Philanthropin, AA 2: 447. 43 See A. Lyssy, ‘Kant on the Vocation and Formation of the Human Being’, in G. Lorini and R. B. Louden (Eds.), Knowledge, Morals and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology, p. 83. 44 See A. Lyssy, ‘Kant on the Vocation and Formation of the Human Being’, p. 83. 45 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 26, Engl. transl. by A. W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 74. Translation slightly modifed by replacing ‘determination’ with ‘vocation’, which fts better in this context. The translation of Bestimmung with ‘vocation’ is wider accepted in the English-speaking literature. 46 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 26, Engl. transl. p. 74. For an in-depth examination of this three-step distinction and its implication in Kant’s anthropological framework, see A. Lyssy, ‘Kant on the Vocation and Formation of the Human Being’, pp. 83–93. 47 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 28, Engl. transl. p. 76. 48 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 27, Engl. transl. p. 76. 49 F. Schiller, Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, in Sämtliche Werke, edited by G. Frike-H.G. Göpfert, München: Hanser, 1980, vol. 5: 667–668, Engl. transl. by R. Snell, New York: Dover, 2004, p. 138. 50 F. Nobbe, Kants Frage nach dem Menschen. Die Kritik der Urteilskraft als transzendentale Anthropologie, Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1995, pp. 17, 286. 51 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A VIII, Engl. trans. p. 99. 52 I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, AA 8: 28, Engl. transl. by A. W. Wood, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, p. 118. 53 See I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 07: 333, Engl. transl. pp. 428–429. 54 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A832/B860, Engl. transl. p. 691. 55 R. Pasquarè, ‘Cosmopolitanism in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: Regulative Ideas and Empirical Evidence’, in Con-Textos Kantianos 10 (2019), pp. 140–161, here 159. 56 R. Pasquarè, ‘Cosmopolitanism in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: Regulative Ideas and Empirical Evidence’, p. 159. 57 M. Foucault, Introduction à l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, Paris: Vrin, 2008, Engl. transl. by R. Nigro and K. Briggs, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008. The page numbers in the following notes refer to the English translation, indicated as ‘M. Foucault, Introduction’. 58 It suffces to mention here that Kant’s treatment of psychic and mental pathological phenomena in the anthropological feld may have undoubtedly contributed to Foucault’s interest in Kantian anthropology. Thirteen years before its publication, when Foucault’s introduction to Kant’s Anthropology was only available at the Bibliothèque de Saulchoir, G. Zöller, who had access to this text, highlighted this possible reason for Foucault’s interest in Kant’s Anthropology; see ‘Michel

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59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

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Foucaults Dissertation über Kants Anthropologie’, Kant-Studien 86 (1995), 1, pp. 128–129 (here 129). M. Foucault, Introduction, pp. 21–22, 28. M. Foucault, Introduction, pp. 28–32. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 83. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 83. See, e.g., I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 11/B 25, Engl. trans. p. 149; Id., Logic, AA 9: 25, Engl. transl. by J. M. Young, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 538. I. Kant, Opus Postumum, AA 21: 7: ‘Was notwendig (ursprünglich) das Dasein der Dinge ausmacht gehört zur Transc. Philosophie’, Engl. transl. by E. Förster and M. Rosen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 256: ‘What necessarily (originally) forms the existence of beings belongs to transcendental philosophy’. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 92. Cfr., for instance, I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 7: 192, Engl. transl. p. 300. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 102. M. Foucault, Introduction, pp. 102–103. See M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 103. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 106. In these years, Foucault is working out the notion of ‘historical a priori’, which will be largely employed in The Order of Things (1966). M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 106. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 106. M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 117. See, for instance, M. Foucault, Introduction, p. 92.

References Arnoldt, Emil. 1894. Kritische Excurse im Gebiete der Kant-Forschung. Königsberg: von Ferd. Arnoldt, Emil. 1908. ‘Kants Vorlesungen über physische Geographie und ihr Verhältniß zu seinen anthropologischen Vorlesungen’, in Id., Gesammelte Schriften, 10 vol., ed. by O. Schöndörffer. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1906–1911, vol. 4. Brandt, Reinhard. 2007. Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Hamburg: Meiner. Erdmann, Benno. 1882. ‘Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von Kants Anthropologie’, in Id., Refexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie. Leipzig: Fues’s. Foucault, Michel. 2008. Introduction à l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique. Paris: Vrin; Engl. transl. by R. Nigro and K. Briggs. 2008. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). Frierson, Patrick. 2003. Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hinske, Norbert. 1966. ‘Kants Idee der Anthropologie’, in H. Rombach (Ed.), Die Frage nach dem Menschen: Aufriss einer philosophischen Anthropologie, Festschrift für Max Müller. Freiburg-München: Alber, pp. 410–427. Hinske, Norbert. 2002. ‘Kant und Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Ein leider unerledigtes Thema der Anthropologie Kants’, in Aufklärung 14: 261–276. Holzhey, Helmut. 1970. Kants Erfahrungsbegriff. Quellengeschichtliche und bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen. Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe. Jacobs, Brian and Kain, Patrick. 2003. ‘Introduction’, in Ids. (Eds.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–14.

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Kant, Immanuel. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals, Engl. trans. by M. J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353–604. Kant, Immanuel. 1992. M. Immanuel Kant’s Announcement of the Programme of His Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766. Engl. trans. by D. Walford in coll. with R. Meerbote, in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 287–300. Kant, Immanuel. 1993. Opus Postumum, Engl. transl. by E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Engl. trans. by A. W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–216. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Engl. transl. by M. J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–108. Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Lectures on Metaphysics, ed. by K. Ameriks and S. Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason, Engl. trans. by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment, Engl. trans. by P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Engl. trans. by R. B. Louden, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227–429. Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Engl. trans. by P. Guyer, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 18–62. Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, Engl. transl. by A. W. Wood, in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 107–120. Kant, Immanuel. 2012. Lectures on Anthropology, ed. by A. W. Wood and R. B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, Soo Bae. 1994. Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. Kowalewski, Arnold (Ed.). 1924. Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants. München-Leipzig: Rösl & Cie. Lehmann, Gerhard. 1969. ‘Zur Geschichte der Kantausgabe’, in Id., Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 3–26. Louden, Robert B. 2000. Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lyssy, Ansgar. 2018. ‘Kant on the Vocation and Formation of the Human Being’, in G. Lorini and R. B. Louden (Eds.), Knowledge, Morals and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 81–98. Nobbe, Frank. 1995. Kants Frage nach dem Menschen. Die Kritik der Urteilskraft als transzendentale Anthropologie. Frankfurt a. M: Lang. Pasquarè, Roberta. 2019. ‘Cosmopolitanism in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: Regulative Ideas and Empirical Evidence’, in Con-Textos Kantianos 10: 140–161.

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Schiller, Friederich. 2004. ‘Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen’, in Sämtliche Werke, edited by G. Frike and H.G. Göpfert. München: Hanser, 1980, vol. 5, Engl. trans. by R. Snell. New York: Dover. Schmidt, Claudia. 2007. ‘Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology’, in Kant-Studien 98/2: 156–182. Stark, Werner. 2009. ‘Historical Notes and Interpretative Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology’, in B. Jacobs and P. Kain (Eds.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–37. Wilson, Holly L. 2018. ‘Elucidations of the Sources of Kant’s Anthropology’, in G. Lorini and R. B. Louden (Eds.), Knowledge, Morals and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 11–28. Zammito, John H. 2002. Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Zöller, Günter. 1995. ‘Michel Foucaults Dissertation über Kants Anthropologie’, in Kant-Studien 86(1): 128–129.

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‘Geography Makes Us Citizens of the World’ On the Cosmopolitical Nature of Kant’s Geographical Thought Fernando M.F. Silva

4.1 Introduction It is well known that the 1760s and 1770s – that is, approximately half of Kant’s lecturing career – consist of a period of intense refection on the possible complete systematicity of human knowledge; more specifcally, on the position, the task, and status of each science within the ample feld of human knowledge. During these decades, Kant struggles not only with ascertaining the individual characteristics of each science but, what is much more complex, aspires to depart from those individual traits towards a common disposition, that is, a conjoint scientifc – and therefore infallible – alignment of all sciences within one and the same spiritual framework: an exercise which, though hardly stressed by Kant prior to his critical work, would cost the philosopher much mental doubt and toil, mostly excogitated before his students, in several of Kant’s courses at Königsberg. One of those courses – not by chance – was that of Geography, which Kant lectured precisely during the 1760s and 1770s and beyond (1756–1796): a subject long forgotten by Kantian readers, yet today revived by the recent (and ongoing) publication of Kant’s Lectures on Geography, vols. AA 26, which has resulted in a surge of studies on Kant’s geographical thought, especially on Kant’s role as a founder of modern Geography, the role of Geography within Kant’s body of work, or its implications regarding his Philosophy, Politics, or Moral.1 Our objective, however, is different. Instead, bearing in mind Kant’s greater problem – that of the reciprocal (and reciprocally correct) disposition of human knowledges – and the fact that this problem was clearly extant throughout the frst decades of Kant’s Lectures on Geography, we set out from the fact that there is an undeniable connection between Kant’s geographical thought and that greater framework of the problem. That is, we believe that, on the one hand, Kant’s problem of the common schematic disposition of all human knowledges not only gives rise but presupposes the consideration and study of the (physical) soil of Geography, just as it does that of Anthropology; not by chance, such decades are those DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-5

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where Geography, Anthropology, and even Aesthetics and Psychology are elevated to their modern scientifc status. On the other hand, it is also our opinion that Geography too, by then a rising science, plays a crucial role in the transformation of the pan-scientifc panorama of the time in general and decisively leads to a redefnition and subsequent frmer fxation of Kant’s much-desired scheme of human knowledges. Finally, we believe that such an interconnection between planes of thought will ultimately have a direct infuence on – if not indeed decisively stimulate – the emergence of a new Kantian concept of human being, and/or personhood, a concept arisen from Kant’s anthropo-geographical thought, and the key concept of his cosmopolitanism. And, as such, we propose to concentrate our investigation around a hitherto almost neglected topic: that of ascertaining the main features, the task, and the object of Kant’s Geography – Physical Geography – both as a way to propose a necessary reassessment of its position and role within Kant’s broader scheme of human knowledges and as a way to rethink and revalidate its role and importance in the construction of Kant’s person- or human-based cosmopolitanism. The previous intentions could be translated into two objectives. They are as follows: 1. First of all, to present an initial image of Kant’s scheme of the division of human knowledges, focusing especially on its version in the Lectures on Geography, and ascertain the equally initial (very limited) position and role that Geography, if seen as Empirical Physics, plays in the resolution of Kant’s overall problem (Section 4.2). 2. Finally, to submit both Kant’s scheme of human knowledges and Kant’s conception of Geography to one and the same re-examination. Namely, the aims are to consider Kant’s dissociation of Physical Geography from Empirical Physics; to consider how Kant’s stricter, physical sense of Geography contributes to the expansion and fnal reconfguration of his own scheme of knowledges, just as such a reconfguration of the latter contributes towards the new concept of Geography; and, as a result, to consider Physical Geography, just as the indissociable Pragmatic Anthropology, as a possible third, cosmopolitical dimension of human knowledge. 4.2 Kant’s Fundamental Scheme of Human Knowledges: The Position and Task of Geography, as Empirical Physics, in This Scheme

To the reader of Kant’s lectures in general, it is a known fact that Kant used to initiate his lectures with a scheme of the division of human knowledges. This scheme is not specifc of just this or that academic domain, rather it was fundamental for Kant, as is shown by its re-emergence in lectures as apparently disconnected in theme as the Lecture on Encyclopedism (1777/1778), the Lectures on Anthropology (1772–1796), the Lectures on Metaphysics

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(1755–1796), or even the strongly contested Lectures on Geography collected by Rink (1774) and Vollmer (1778–1793).2 It is Kant’s view – for example, in his Lecture on Encyclopedism – that this scheme is divided into two dimensions, two dimensions wherein all human sciences and hence their respective knowledges are to be found. Namely, all human knowledges are either parts in relation to a whole, that is, rational parts, and hence a system (System), or they are parts in relation to other parts, that is, empirical parts, and hence an aggregate (Aggregat) (see AA 29.1: 5; AA 29.1: 747). The frst dimension is constituted by sciences of reason, or sciences of insight, and proceeds vertically, ascending or descending in such a line according to its distance from the empirical; the second dimension is constituted by historical sciences or sciences of erudition (AA 29.1: 5; AA 28.2: 531) and proceeds horizontally, advancing or regressing according to its distance from rationality. This very scheme resurfaces in very similar, yet more detailed, terms in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics;3 especially, and not by chance, in the lecture which stands temporally nearest to the Lecture on Encyclopedism, Metaphysik-Pölitz I (1777/1778). Here, Kant states that ‘all cognitions are united either through coordination, or through subordination’ (AA 28.1: 171).4 Namely, subordinated are the cognitions which proceed regarding one another according to rules (AA 28.1: 357; AA 29.1: 747), ‘as causes in relation to consequences’ (id.). These cognitions, which act here as if they were on a ‘ladder’ (Leiter, AA 28.1: 171), compose a cognitive dimension deemed ‘profound or grounded knowledge’, which, on the one hand, cannot interfere with experience and, on the other, is fnite when considered regarding ‘the limits of human knowledge, which the human understanding cannot surpass’ (id.). Precisely for this reason, Kant adduces, this ‘ladder’ of rational knowledge has a ‘terminus a priori’ in its highest, and a ‘terminus a posteriori’ in its lowest point (ibid.; AA 28,1: 357). Among the sciences which pertain to this subsumptive, creative line of human knowledge are, therefore, transcendental philosophy, Metaphysics and its sciences: Ontology, Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Natural Theology. Coordinated, in turn, are the cognitions ‘which conduct themselves as parts regarding a communitarian whole’ (AA 28.1.: 171). Coordinated cognitions, which operate through the addition or association of other cognitions, are related as if they were on a ‘plane soil’ (ebenen Boden, id.) (id.), thus composing a cognitive dimension which Kant deems as empirical, ‘extended knowledge’ (ibid.); a dimension which, on the one hand, diverges from rational knowledge and its principles and, on the other hand, is infnite and does not possess termina, for even though its limits ‘are real, they are however very undetermined’ (ibid.). Among the knowledges which pertain to this descriptive, imitative line of human knowledge are ‘natural history and history as such’ (ibid.), or, in other words, among others,5 History, Empirical Psychology (which Kant often links with Anthropology), or Empirical Physics (which, for the time being, we may understand as Geography).

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Now, as was said, one such fundamental scheme arises not only in the previous felds of knowledge but also, not at all coincidentally, in the scope of the topic of our article – in Kant’s Lectures on Geography;6 in this case, as Kant’s effort to approach the problem of Geography’s due collocation, delimitation, task, and utility amid the ample soil of human knowledges. Let us then attempt to enquire on the contribution of Kant’s Lectures on Geography not only towards ascertaining the position and object of Geography but also towards a clearer comprehension of the full picture of Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges. According to the lecture Geographie-Rink,7 all analysis departs from the fact that Man creates knowledge ‘either from pure reason, or from experience’ (KPG: 421); a vision corroborated not only by Geographie-Vollmer,8 wherein Kant states that ‘All science is either founded on experience, empirical, or derived from reason, rational’ (PG, I.1: 3), but by all other dimensions of Kant’s thought and work. This means, so proceeds Kant, now in a fashion reminiscent of the Lectures on Metaphysics and Encyclopedism, that ‘all our cognitions are either coordinated, or subordinated’ (id.). Kant elaborates on this distinction. Namely, subordinated are the cognitions which are ‘brought under one idea, derived from a principle’ (ibid.); they convey deeper and deeper ‘insights’ (ibid.), ‘their domain is closed’ (ibid.) and as such rational sciences are ‘complete’ (ibid.), they ‘constitute a system, and this alone results in science’ (ibid.) Coordinated, in turn, are the cognitions ‘associated to one another, in a series’ (ibid.). They are the product of ‘chance’ (ibid.), resemble ‘islands swimming’ (ibid.), and therefore result in a ‘rhapsodic collection’ (ibid.) of data: an ‘aggregate’9 (ibid.), or ‘erudition […], the limits of which extend more and more, throughout all times’ (id.: 3–4). Without surprise, here, as in other lectures, Kant again inscribes History, Empirical Psychology (or Anthropology), and Empirical Physics (or Geography) along the horizontal, coordinated human knowledges. And, as such, were we to initially ask for Geography’s position in such a scheme of human knowledges, we could conclude by anticipation that Geography, if seen in its condition as Empirical Physics, is a knowledge of erudition, a historical knowledge, and has its place in the horizontal line of knowledge: for, according to what preceded, Geography is an aggregate knowledge, an ever incomplete collection of more and more infnite cognitions, which arises from sheer chance and therefore cannot but produce mere contingency. The proofs not only of the bidimensional infallibility of this scheme of human knowledges but also of the previous collocation and delimitation of Geography in the historical ‘plain soil’ of that very scheme are, in truth, numerous; and it is Kant himself who brings them to light immediately after this summary presentation, under the guise of an analysis of ‘The Determination of Geography’ (PG, I.1: 3–10), in Geographie-Vollmer. Erudition – ‘the plain soil’ of empirical knowledge – is, according to Kant, the proper terrain of ‘poli-historians’ (id.),10 and as such erudition as a whole

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is no more than a conjugation of multifarious-themed historiographies, for example, the temporal history of men, the spatial history of men, the history of the opinions, the history of the follies, or the history of the actions and omissions of men in the World; which means that, for instance, Geography, if seen as Empirical Physics, and as one such empirical knowledge, is also a kind of (geographical) historicisation of the world. And why is this so? The answer to this relies on Kant’s structural view of the problem and the reciprocal collocation of the different historical knowledges amongst themselves – among which, and especially, Empirical Physics or Geography. Namely, according to Kant, there is a formal erudition, related to language, and a real erudition, related to our experience in time and space.11 And real erudition, that is, the line of empirical knowledge, is divided into (i) a ‘Physical History, the history of Nature as such’ and (ii) an ‘Anthropological History’.12 Now, the frst one, ‘Physical History’, or, in the proper sense of the word, Empirical Physics, or Geography, is divided into a physical history ‘of the exterior nature’, which Kant deems a ‘Geogony’, and a physical history ‘of the interior nature’, which Kant deems an ‘Empirical Psychology’;13 this second term being intimately connected with ‘Anthropological History’, i.e., with Anthropology. But, let it be noted, also the second one, ‘Anthropological History’, is divided into the anthropological history of ‘interior freedom’, that is, the aforementioned history of the actions and omissions, the follies and errors of Man, and the anthropological history of ‘exterior freedom’, which Kant deems a ‘political history’ (PG I.1: 5),14 and therefore again connects, as in a circle, with a ‘physical history of exterior freedom’, that is, for example, with the history of morals, or the history of commerce, or indeed political history, which are also elements of Geography. Which means, in a word, that in this more detailed elaboration of the problem, Empirical Physics or Geography – just as Empirical Psychology or Anthropology – are endowed with an eminently descriptive character and hence are themselves per se historiographies of Man’s interiority and exteriority in the world; in a word, parts of the polihistorical line that is that of empirical knowledge. Now, in our view, three preliminary assumptions can be drawn from Kant’s initial outtake on the position of Geography, as Empirical Physics, within his scheme of human knowledges. They are as follows. Firstly, that Geography is indeed identifed with Empirical Physics, and that in its empirical condition it is an historical science: a historiographical description of the world, or Man’s external sense. Empirical Physics, or Geography, is frst and foremost a history, and the spirit which presides over them, the determination of their objective, is that of a history of the things of the World (i.e., Empirical Cosmology). Secondly, that Empirical Physics, or Geography, as a historical science, is to be included in the ‘plain soil’ of empirical knowledge, as is the case with Empirical Psychology or Anthropology. Those are, so to say, their restricted seats, as well as their sphere, in Kant’s equation of the division of human knowledges.

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Thirdly, that Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, Geography, and Anthropology, or the history of the external sense and the history of the internal sense of Man are not simply related, or neighbours, in this horizontal line of knowledge. Quite on the contrary, they are genuinely akin, they are interconnected, as are Man and World, to the extent that they can be deemed [historiographic] sisters. As such, one may say – as does Kant – that the horizontal line of human knowledge is composed of different historical narratives of Man in the World: namely, it is composed of a historical description of the objects in the World, a ‘description of the World’ [Weltbeschreibung], here as of the description of Nature or the World as an object of the exterior sense (an Empirical Physics, or Geography), and by a descriptive history of the modifcations of those objects in the World, a ‘World history’ [Weltgeschichte], here as a history of the phenomena of the human soul, or the World as an object of the interior sense (an Empirical Psychology or Anthropology). And, in addition to this, one may say that this crossing of narratives – both the ‘description of the World’ and the ‘History of the World’ – are intimately and mutually complementary: for in them, in Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, seems to reside the fundament of Man’s position and conduct in the World, and, as such, they truly embody the historiographic, empirical nature of the ‘plain soil’ of human knowledge. Now, as a brief summary of what preceded, one could state that Geography, as Empirical Physics, just as Empirical Psychology, as Anthropology, do indeed have their own place in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; a place which, to be sure, is reserved to them as historical sciences, or physical histories of the interior and exterior senses of Man, in the ‘plain soil’ of human knowledge. And this place, let it be noted, is in itself generator of a direct correspondence, and hence a dialogue, not only horizontally, between Geography and Anthropology, twin sciences, but also vertically, for Geography and Anthropology, respectively Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, are directly and quite naturally linked with Rational Physics (Somatology) and Rational Psychology, in the ‘ladder’ of rational knowledge; insofar as the four of them are, after all, the essential components of Empirical Cosmology, in the case of the frst two, and Rational Cosmology, in the case of the latter two. But, let it also be noted – and here seems to lie the kern of the question – besides Geography’s and Anthropology’s relations, one must, above all, underscore Kant’s position regarding the collocation and determination of both sciences. And, judging by these initial premises, the place Kant ascribes to Geography, and in addition to Anthropology, seems to be quite a modest, not to say exiguous and painstakingly limited one, for it is simply devoid of any infuence, or even contact, with reason. For Geography, just as Anthropology, emerge in the Lecture on Encyclopedism and in the Lectures on Geography, but especially in the Lectures on Metaphysics, as two sides of one and the same coin, the (historical) propaedeutic sciences of all human knowledge, and as such they surely have their value and due place in the

56 Fernando M.F. Silva scheme of knowledges. But if seen as here, in their mere condition as historical sciences, then, according to Kant, their position is merely a subalternate one and one cloistered upon itself. Geography, just as Anthropology, are in this sense no more than aggregates, the knowledge they acquire is merely contingent and never defnitive. For, we reiterate, they are as ‘islands swimming’ (PG I.1: 3) which now return, now depart from the cognitive mainland, simply because nothing detains them there, just as nothing prevents them from again and again fowing astray; which, quite ironically, renders Geography’s knowledge now excessively ample, now at the same time excessively insuffcient – but, as such, ever uncertain, volatile, and ultimately precarious. And so unequivocal is this that one may even ascribe Geography, if seen as Empirical Physics, the same rather unfavourable characteristics that Kant ascribes to Anthropology, if seen as Empirical Psychology, in his Lectures on Metaphysics: namely, and we paraphrase, (a) that Geography, as Empirical Physics, lives up to its title and is indeed merely empirical;15 (b) that Geography has a mere historical character; (c) that, as such, Geography cannot be paired with reason,16 i.e., Geography and reason do not share but the aforementioned (faint) correspondence, and hence Geography cannot gather phenomena of experience and provide reason with valid operative empirical principles; (d) that Geography cannot display a complete knowledge of the World, nor of Man’s position amidst the latter, for it had not yet evolved to that systematic condition and did not yet possess – nor, ironically, would it ever possess – suffcient knowledge to accomplish this task; and (e) lastly, as the result of the previous causes, that Geography cannot yet be elevated to the condition of philosophical science, or, in other words, to the condition of an academic discipline.17 Five less than pleasant arguments which, however, seem irrefutable and thus irrevocably confne Geography to the condition of a historical science, to the horizontal position of the empirical line of knowledge, and to a state of near-inexpressiveness and zero-impact, all in the framework of a knowledge which instead of general, systematic, and truly scientifc seems to be no more than individual, fragmentary, and random – and therefore of little use. Hence, once analysed all of Kant’s criteria ascertaining the validity, i.e., the systematicity of sciences, namely, the determination of each science, the measurement of its sphere, and the assertion of its possible utility; and now that we know that Geography, if considered as Empirical Physics, is to be seen as a historical science, a lesser science, endowed with a limited, nearly inexistent, and mostly passive feld of action and scarce utility; we ask: is it possible to see beyond this and discern a different Kantian outtake on the position and validity of Geography? That is, is it possible that Geography has other distinctive features, a different role other than that of a knowledge

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destined to merely describe the history of the external sense of Man, thus completely failing to present the position and conduct of Man in the World? And if so, is it possible that Kant’s scheme of human knowledges is not confned to such an apparently rigid and ordered bidimensionality? 4.3 The Distinction between Physical Geography and Empirical Physics 4.3.1 The Third, Geo-anthropo-cosmological Dimension of Human Knowledge and the Emergence of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism

Given the current state of our research on Kant’s opinion on Geography, and given the need for a defnitive answer to the previous question, we return to the philosopher’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, if possible to reassess it and determine its fnal form but also to discern if the last disposition of such a scheme may help us demystify an apparently unilateral – and unilaterally limitative – vision of Geography. We have concluded that Kant conceives of two lines of human knowledge: one, that of rational sciences, and another one, that of historical sciences, both of which are separated. We have also established that, given this necessary separation, Geography, as Empirical Physics, is to be situated in the horizontal line of such a scheme, namely, along the line of historical sciences, for Empirical Physics is a ‘physical history […] of the exterior freedom’ (PG I.1: 5), just as its sister in determination, scope, and utility, Empirical Psychology, is a ‘physical history […] of interior freedom’ (id.); and, lastly, from this we subsumed the rather unfavourable characteristics of Geography within Kant’s scheme of human knowledges, which confne it to the empirical and to its impossibility of ever becoming more than a casual aggregate of cognitions, bereft of any contact with rationality. One such separation, as is known, is to be found throughout other dimensions of Kant’s work. Kant’s Metaphysics, surely, but also Kant’s Logics or Kant’s Mathematics, and especially Kant’s Critiques, all admonish against the interference, and hence confusion, of rational and empirical, of their lines of cognitive action and their respective sciences; and in all these domains, Geography, if contemplated as Empirical Physics, would surely be – or indeed is – confned to the associative, historical line of human knowledge. However, let it be noted that Kant’s position, though real and even predominant throughout the philosopher’s work, is not maintained, and deliberately so, in all domains of the philosopher’s thought. For, indeed, Kant’s scheme of human knowledges is characterised by its bidimensional, or bilinear, structure: a structure which, in truth, derives its simplicity from its two divergent, apparently non-contacting, lines and, through such a divergence, casts a pattern for a critical, strictly philosophical model of thought: and this applies, as true, to all logical or metaphysical thinking and their respective sciences. But in other less vertical dimensions of Kant’s work, or even at times amid the latter ones – and without denying the previous restrictive law – there

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arises, in Kant’s own words, the possibility – and indeed utility – of a joint consideration of rational and empirical; namely, a possible reassessment of the importance of the empirical, a safeguard of sensibility, a respect for experience, all of which, along with rationality, should be thought of as two essential, reciprocal, interconnected parts of human philosophising. Indeed, as if thereby Kant established a circle composed of both rationality and the empirical: a circle in constant movement, be it because experience provides the data which, once brought to the form of empirical principles, are to be conveyed to reason, be it because rationality itself draws from the empirical, under the guise of empirical principles, this very data, a knowledge which is to be reapplied to experience. Now, what Kant hereby suggests is that, depending on the feld of knowledge, the possibility of a non-exclusion between rational and empirical can be a forbidden error; but, at the same time, it can also be not just a mere possibility but rather a benefcial necessity: just as it is possible to think human knowledge either negatively, by turning one of its two simultaneous dimensions, experiential and non-experiential, into the denegation of the other – as does Kant’s critical method – or positively, by taking its two dimensions, experiential and non-experiential, as a validation of one another: as is the case, for instance, of Kant’s Anthropology, Geography, or Cosmology. For, namely, the two lines in question, which constitute Kant’s scheme of human knowledge, are indeed two autonomous lines, running separately, one opposed to the other, and thus presents Kant his bidimensional scheme of human knowledge. But this is only completely true until, imbued with a practical spirit, we realise that one dimension does not exist without the other. Once we do, we perceive that each of the lines in Kant’s scheme, despite its own specifcity, despite their mutual divergence, rather arise and run from one another; they are in mutual support of and depend on one another, and hence cannot be, nor should they be, understood as being entirely independent. Quite on the contrary, precisely because the ‘ladder’ of human knowledge can only rise if based upon the ‘plain soil’ of the empirical, just as the ‘plain soil’ can only acquire height through the rational ‘ladder’ of knowledge, then the two lines of human knowledge are not, nor can they be, separated. Instead, they must be joined, and this not only as such but at least by one real point, the point which unites the lowest degree of the rational line of knowledge to the frst of its empirical line. Thus is constituted, according to Kant, a vertex between lines of knowledge, and upon that vertex, or better yet, around it, Kant erects a whole perpendicular scheme of human knowledges which is truly important not because it is new, or singular, but because in the convex amplitude formed between them is to be found the possibility of new connecting and disconnecting points between the two lines of human knowledge. This leads us to two preliminary conclusions. One, more immediate, conclusion regarding the scheme of human knowledges is that the apparently disconnected and isolated lines, as proposed by Kant’s scheme of human knowledges, are indeed two lines connected by a

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concrete point and several latent ones, and the bidimensional form which we thought was that of Kant’s scheme is indeed real, but it is to be seen as a dynamic bidimensionality. For between the two lines, from the vertex between them, there opens a whole third dimension, an array of now forbidden, now legitimate and productive relations, which in turn is itself constitutive of other hybrid felds of knowledge. Not by chance, it is precisely between these three planes of Kant’s scheme of human knowledge that the problem of the reciprocal delimitation of scientifc knowledges takes place. And, as such, it is also within this triple stage of human knowledge that the problem of Geography is to unfold, as is here that Geography is to be ascribed its defnitive collocation and cosmopolitan utility. A second conclusion, not so evident, yet true, pertaining more to Geography is that the perception of a third dimension in Kant’s scheme of human knowledge is to be understood by the Kantian reader, and in particular the reader of this scheme, as an admonishment against an excessive linearisation or compartmentalisation of Kant’s vision of the human knowledges. Instead, one should perhaps think that in some specifc cases – namely, cases within the non-strictly rational sciences – there are certain knowledges which are not rational, yet are not entirely empirical, which do indeed have spheres of action as well as utilities greater than those of merely empirical sciences, and which, for this reason, just as the scheme where they dwell, must be reassessed and thought in a broader, alternative picture. Because, as is by now visible, we believe one of those cases to be that of Geography, then it is our task to reconsider this science in accordance to such conclusions. Namely, it is our task (i) to frst submit Kant’s concept of Geography to a new exam, not by chance, an exam similar and in consonance with the one to which we have just subjected Kant’s general scheme of knowledges; and then (ii) see in what way, if any, Kant’s defnitive concept of Geography, once understood in its newer sense, is related, depends on, or indeed constitutes this new third dimension of the scheme – and what this represents to his cosmopolitan project, under the attire of his notion of personhood. 1. First and foremost, we have to deal with a possible reassessment of Kant’s concept of Geography, namely, a reconsideration of the determination, the sphere, and the utility of Geography; which is to say, to rethink Geography in its designation as, or in its connotation with, Empirical Physics. Empirical Physics, Kant stresses, is Geography; and, as was seen, Kant characterises Geography as an empirical science, historical in character, which therefore congregates only vague, infnite cognitions, has no dealing with reason, and does not deserve to be deemed a scientifc knowledge in the strict sense of the word. All of the latter, we understand them as characteristics of Geography. However, let it be noted that Kant, as well as we, have been referring to Empirical Physics as Geography but never just as Geography or the

60 Fernando M.F. Silva Geography. Yet, according to Kant, there is a key difference between the two designations. The proofs of this are variegated as well as elucidating. For, not by chance, in the Lectures on Metaphysics, Kant refers to Empirical Physics as Geography, just as he refers to Empirical Psychology as Anthropology. But, nevertheless, Kant never does the opposite: that is, nowhere does Kant refer to Geography by saying that it is (the) Empirical Physics, just as he does not refer to Anthropology by saying that it is (the) Empirical Psychology, which indeed means that the frst ones do not entirely correspond to the latter. Quite on the contrary, Kant thought Empirical Physics may be thought as Geography, but not the other way around. Empirical Physics is Geography insofar as it is a part of Geography, but Geography, which is much more ample in knowledge and in scope, cannot be included in, rather greatly surpasses, Empirical Physics; and therefore, we state, Geography is not the same as Empirical Physics (just as Empirical Psychology is not the same as Anthropology). Furthermore, it is worth noticing that Kant unequivocally believed that Geography, if seen as Empirical Physics, is historical: it is a ‘physical history […] of exterior freedom’. But, upon approaching the author’s Lectures on Geography, not once does Kant say that Geography has a historical character (just as, upon approaching Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology, not once does the philosopher say that Anthropology is a kind of history). Quite conversely, such epithets are either tacitly cast aside or expressly negated in detriment of pragmatic, in the case of Anthropology, and physical, in the case of Geography; which, in turn, means that neither physical nor pragmatic may be mistaken for historical, just as neither Physical Geography nor Pragmatic Anthropology may be mistaken for Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology. Lastly, let us mention that in regard to Geography as Empirical Physics, as well as to Anthropology as Empirical Psychology, Kant states that these could be no sciences, not even academic disciplines. Yet, let it be noted that Kant effectively lectured these courses in the University of Königsberg, and this not only in the condition of emerging sciences – yet sciences nonetheless – but also in the condition of academic disciplines he himself had founded,18 in the case of Physical Geography since 1756, and in the case of Pragmatic Anthropology since 1772. And if this was the case from such early dates, then there could not be such a great incongruence between Kant’s spirit and Kant’s words to the extent that, some years later, Kant, in the condition of lecturer of Metaphysics, would state that these sciences were still Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, and therefore neither sciences nor academic subjects. Instead, here, just as in the previously mentioned facts, Kant undoubtedly shows that Empirical Physics is something different from Physical Geography, the same being the case with Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology. And so, this means that with the exception of the felds of the historical sciences of Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology themselves, which they respectively embrace, Physical Geography and

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Pragmatic Anthropology, indeed blood sisters, must be reserved a whole different place of action, a whole different determination, scope, and utility – in a word, a whole different role in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges. 2. Hence, we ask: how to see now Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, and how to defnitively overcome, and replace them, through these renewed versions of the latter, as Physical Geography and Pragmatic Anthropology, within Kant’s scheme of human knowledges? Kant himself answers this question, frstly in Geographie-Vollmer, and then, in a more detailed fashion, in Geographie-Rink, and this by, once and for all, underscoring the insuffciency of the frst sciences. For, in Geographie-Vollmer, it is Kant’s view that Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology are a ‘description of the world’, or a ‘description of Nature’, which makes them physical histories of the interior and exterior senses. Namely, Empirical Physics is destined to be a geographic history, thus describing the objects of the world; and Empirical Psychology is destined to be an anthropological history of the actions and omissions, follies, and opinions of men in the world – but no more than this. This means, then, that Kant does encapsulate Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology within Empirical Cosmology, which is correct. But, at the same time, Kant, again correctly, confnes them to Empirical Cosmology, which means that both do describe the world, and the things of the world, but do so in a merely descriptive and hence passive fashion – which defnitively proves their insuffcient scope. They are, as such, mere passive descriptions of the world, and the world is for them that which it is in the eyes of a merely Empirical Cosmology: a set of individual phenomena of Nature, the description of which can only result in a dispersed, nonsystematic account of (interior or exterior) Nature. Furthermore, such a limited or incorrect concept of world is reproduced in an incorrect assessment of its things: namely, for instance and above all, in the assessment of the most central of its objects: Man; he who, in this condition, may be seen as a passive, inactive – for merely empirical I – in the world. And hence, we conclude, Man, because he is devoid of principles other than empirical ones, and because such empirical principles cannot give rise to other superior ones, is here limited to a secondary, merely individual, passive role in the world (Anthropology understood as Empirical Psychology); and the world, as something amorphous, as a mere producer of natural phenomena devoid of rational order, is itself restricted in its condition and not a Whole (Geography understood as Empirical Physics). In a word, the world is still a fragment, not universal; and Man is still an individual, not, as it should, a Person. However, if we bear in mind not this but our previous reasoning, according to which Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology are always Geography and Anthropology, but not the other way around, then we can conclude

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that what preceded may certainly be applied to the frst ones, but not to the latter. This important nuance is notable not only in Geographie-Rink but in Geographie-Vollmer and was already discernible in the Lectures on Anthropology. According to Kant, in Geo-Rink, the World can indeed be taken now as the ‘object of the exterior sense’ (KPG: 422), wherein it is ‘Nature’, now as the ‘object of the interior sense’ (id.), wherein it is ‘soul or human being’ (ibid.). And soul and nature, as was the case in Empirical Psychology and Empirical Physics, are two sides of the same coin, which in fact allows for the interior and/or exterior description of the World. But, so adduces Kant, the true knowledge of Nature is either a specifc one, where things are considered in their dissociation, each by itself: natural cognition of a horse, a lion, a tree, a madrepora, etc., or a general one, where it [the World] is considered as a whole: Physical Geography. (PG, I.1: 8) And the same way, we adduce, the knowledge of the human soul is either an individual, specifc one – a ‘physiological’ one – where human beings are considered as individuals in their phenomenal manifestations (the never-ending cognition of this or that human being), or a universal one, where the human being ‘is no aggregate, rather constitutes a system’ (KPG: 423).19 This means that if it is understood as the individual, disconnected, incomplete knowledge of the things in the world, Geography, here as Empirical Physics, is limited to being the passive (historical) description of an empirical, hence infnite aggregate of Nature (a ‘systema naturae’ or a ‘registration of the whole’ (id.: 426)). But if understood as the general knowledge of the latter, that is, no longer in a historical perspective, nor in a merely empirical cosmological perspective, but now in a properly cosmological – that is, cosmopolitical – prism, the human being is always considered as part of a greater, universal structure – the World – and hence such a knowledge is seen as systematic, as a science in its full right, in accordance with the architectonic idea20 that presides over the whole. And the same is the case with Anthropology, which, on the one hand, as Empirical Psychology, is a mere physiological, medicinal, anatomical, or pneumological description of the I in the World, but on the other hand, as Pragmatic Anthropology, actively places Man in the centre of the Universe, and the Universe in the centre of Man’s concerns, and in this reciprocity is truly cosmological. In a word, facts which more than suffciently prove that when Kant speaks of Physical Geography and Pragmatic Anthropology, he includes in them, yet does not refer specifcally to, Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology. Now, given this fnal distinction, we ask what the true difference is between these two Kantian concepts of Geography and Anthropology. The difference, it is now clear, lies between adopting the two terms in the sense that Geography and Anthropology had until the mid-18th century, that is, tacitly accepting

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the disciplinary multifariousness which, to their great disadvantage, the two knowledges congregated; or, quite on the contrary, as is Kant’s case, discriminating, from this connotation, a singular plane, a ‘more restricted understanding’ [engern Verstand] of Geography and Anthropology – namely, as Physical Geography and Pragmatic Anthropology: a small yet great difference which allows Geography and Anthropology to see the things of the world, and specially the most important of these things, Man, not as disconnected, but as inter-reciprocating parts, as sources and effects not of a mere historical order, but of a superior cosmological order – here, in the sense of a cosmopolitan order. And how does Kant propose this? Precisely by explaining Geography and Anthropology not according to their merely rational connotations, as Rational Physics and Rational Psychology, nor in their merely empirical connotations, as Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, which are either part of a strict Rational Cosmology (an Ontology?), or a strict Empirical Cosmology (a History). That is, not by proceeding as Rational Cosmology, which cares only for the sources, or as Empirical Cosmology, which cares only for the phenomena. Quite on the contrary, Kant says, Cosmology – here understood in a third, cosmopolitan connotation, can and should not separate sources from phenomena (physiologically (empirically) or speculatively (rationally)); that is, it cannot restrict itself merely to causes, or to consequences, as is the case with these two methods, rather, between the two, it must see in the sources the cause for the phenomena, and in the phenomena the reapplication of the sources. This intermediate method, which embodies the belief in the reciprocity between pure and empirical of which we spoke earlier, goes by various names in Kant’s work, not only in the Lectures on Geography but also in the Lectures on Anthropology: prudent application of Man in the World; the suitable and useful use of that same knowledge in the correct position of Man in the World; or providing our cognitions with the practical (see KPG: 423) which they always lack in merely empirical or rational planes of knowledge; or even, as is here the case, the use of the designation physical in the broadest, most hybrid conceivable sense of the term. But only one name congregates all others: for that which Kant expounds here is, in truth, a singular pragmatic-cosmological (or physical-cosmological) perspective of Man in the World:21 a Man who no longer is egoist in kind, rather plural in his views, and thereby acquires the universal traits that render him a person; and a World which no longer is lifeless and dispersed in kind, rather a stage for Man’s personhood to be applied. In other words, a whole new perspective which no longer is a ‘description of the World’, or a ‘History of the World’, rather is a pragmatic, practical, or physical ‘knowledge of the world’ [Kenntnis der Welt], or ‘knowledge of Nature’ [Kenntnis der Natur]: in a word, a ‘doctrine of the World’ [Weltlehre]22 which, precisely because it deals with the ‘play of our dexterity’ (KPG: 423), and because it is as intimately related with the empirical as well as the rational, must embrace these felds, if not as such, at least in their ulterior design.

64  Fernando M.F. Silva Hence, in order to, as much as possible, answer our own questions, we could say that Physical Geography differs from Empirical Physics by all that Empirical Physics cannot be and Physical Geography is; something which is true in all possible regards. For, let it be noted, unlike Empirical Physics, (a) Physical Geography is not merely empirical, for it is not a descriptive, associative, and hence infinite knowledge – since it does not depart from phenomena to phenomena – rather departs from, and brings together, phenomena and principles; (b) Physical Geography is no history, nor does it have a historical character, not even a rational character, rather it is situated between the latter, approaching not the individual as such, nor the individual among the things in the World, rather Man, or the human being as a species, and its prudent conduct – its practice – in the World; (c) Physical Geography does indeed deal, through a singular dialogue, with reason, something which is mutually beneficial for reason and the understanding,23 which thus receives principles, and for the empirical, which is itself the final receptor of its own (by then transformed) data; (d) Physical Geography does indeed provide us with a complete, systematic knowledge of the World; for, according to Kant, it is a ‘general sketch of Nature’ (KPG: 430) [allgemeiner Abriβ der Natur], it shows the World as ‘the stage of human dexterity’ (PG, I.1: 14): a finite, systematisable stage to be conceived of as a whole; and (e) Physical Geography is therefore, in its own merit, a science, as well as an academic discipline. And if so, that is, if the conclusion is that Physical Geography is everything that Empirical Physics is not, the same happening in relation to Metaphysics, which renders it a science above Empirical Physics and, of course, below Metaphysics; in a word, if Physical Geography occupies, so to say, a mediating position and role between applied Metaphysics and the historical sciences, then this means that also in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges, it will have to respect its hybrid – and hybridifying – nature and be situated between the latter, in a new dimension of the scheme, not by chance, a third dimension of the scheme, which is to be taken into account in the ascertainment of Physical Geography’s singular position, scope, and status. Namely, to put this into other, final words: Physical Geography is definitively erected as a new science: 1. Regarding its definitive and singular collocation in the scheme of human knowledges, which in fact is the cornerstone of its greater amplitude and better utility as science. For, let it be noted, Physical Geography and Pragmatic Anthropology’s intermediate, mediating character between pure rationality and impure experience could not be simply stated as if its statement did not require a field of application suitable to its unique

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characteristics. This is indeed the case; and since it is, since Geography and Anthropology, in light of their properly cosmological character, stand as Man’s new understanding of his prudent action, his central position, his grandest destination in the order of the things of the World, then a similar position, equally singular, equally hybrid, and equally amplifying, must be ascribed to it within the scheme of human knowledges. This position, the only which we believe refects Kant’s opinion on this matter, is therefore that of the abovementioned, until now unsuspected third dimension of the scheme, the one which precisely opens between the two opposites, cutting through rational and empirical, not to separate the two, but to better serve the interest of their possible union. Namely, Physical Geography, just as Pragmatic Anthropology, if seen through this prism, are the fundamental and only constituents of the third, cosmological dimension of human knowledge; it is due to them, we could say, that Kant opens an exception to his bidimensional scheme and it is through them that Kant conceives of a healthy, very benefcial dynamism between otherwise opposing parts. And because they are at the initial point, as well as in all the remaining points of this new prism, then we may, once and for all, state that they are the propaedeutic sciences, or, in Kant’s words, the ‘substratum’ (PG, I.1: 14; KPG: 429) of human knowledge. For, by departing from the vertex between the rational and the empirical, and between a rational understanding (Rational Cosmology) and an empirical understanding (Empirical Cosmology) of the human being in the World – a vertex which, to be sure, is Man himself – both Physical Geography and Pragmatic Anthropology not only inaugurate a new dimension of human knowledge – that of Man as a Person – but do indeed reside, operate, and work precisely in the convex angle of the scheme of human knowledges: there, where the cosmological dimension of Man’s existence and knowledge may help avoid the weaknesses, as well as soothe the excesses of both opposing dimensions. 2. Regarding the sphere or amplitude of this new science. Regarding this, it is Kant’s conclusion that, as the ‘general delineation of Nature’ [allgemeiner Grundriβ der Natur] (KPG:430), Physical Geography, unlike the (eternally) incomplete Empirical Physics, is singularly broad: it is ‘no less than Nature, than the World’ (PG, I.1: 10). Indeed, it is Kant’s view that Physical Geography is so ample in its transversal disposition that it ‘partly constitutes the ground, partly contains the main parts of other sciences’ (id.) – as is the case, for instance, of Empirical Physics. However, let it be noted, Physical Geography is not Physical Geography just because it is broad and therefore confnes with both the rational and the empirical. Instead, Physical Geography itself summons to its presence, as well as re-emerges in, sciences from both dimensions, such as Mathematics, Politics, Moral, or Theology: which is why, according to all Lectures on Geography, Physical Geography is at the basis of a Mathematical Geography, a Moral Geography, a Political Geography, a Mercantile

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Geography, a Theological Geography, among others.24 And likewise, all of these different Geographies, which arise here not in one or other extreme prisms, rather in their cosmopolitical prism, unfold in accordance with their domain in the schematic framework: namely, cosmopolitically, thereby creating ties of conformity amongst each other, as different geographical sciences, and through those new ties attempting to envisage a new human being. This means, therefore, that Physical Geography proceeds not rationally (subjectively), nor empirically (objectively), but in such an intermediate way that it does not dissociate sources from phenomena, rather promotes their mutual explanation: namely, according to the teleological disposition of the World,25 whose discernment and understanding by Man is here its ultimate objective. 3. Regarding the status of this new science, that is, the greater, truly scientifc status of Physical Geography, and the lesser, aggregational one of Empirical Physics; a topic which is suffciently clear, on which we shall dwell no further, under pain of merely repeating what preceded. Notes 1 To cite but a few, see May, J. A. 1970. Kant’s Concept of Geography and Its Relation to Recent Geographical Thought. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Harvey, D., 2009. Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom. Columbia University Press; Sanguin, A.-L. 1994. ‘Redécouvrir la pensée géographique de Kant’, in Annales de Géographie, Year 103, Nr. 576, pp. 134–151; Elden, S. & Mendieta, E. 2011. Reading Kant’s Geography. SUNY Press; Popke, G. 2007. ‘Geography and Ethics: Spaces of Cosmopolitan Responsibility’, in Progress in Human Geography, 31(4), pp. 509–518; Louden, R. B. 2014. ‘The Last Frontier: The Importance of Kant’s Geography’, in Environment and Planning Society and Space, 32(3), pp. 450–465; Vitte, A. C. 2014. Kant, o Kantismo e a Geografa. Histórias, Percalços e Possibilidades Investigativas. Appris; Richards, P. 1974. ‘Kant’s Geography and Mental Maps’, in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 61(1), pp. 1–16. 2 See, regarding Anthropology, all the ‘Prolegomena’ and ‘Proemia’ sections in the Lectures on Anthropology; regarding Geography, not only the text ‘Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Colegii der Physischen Geographie’ (AA 2: 3–12) but also the much contested lectures on Geography ‘Geographie-Rink’, in Rink, Friedrich Theodor,‘Vorlesungen über Physische Geographie’, in Immanuel Kant’s Physischer Geographie, Königsberg: Göbbels und Unzer, 1802, and ‘Geographie-Vollmer’, in Vollmer, Johann J. W., Immanuel Kant, Physische Geographie, 4 vols., vol. 1.1, Mainz und Hamburg: Gottfried Vollmer, 1801–1805; regarding Encyclopedism, the lecture ‘Philosophische Enzyklopädie’ (AA 29.1: 5–45); regarding Logic, ‘Immanuel Kant’s Logik. Ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen’, better known as LogikJäsche (AA 9: 1–87); and, regarding Pedagogy, AA 9: 439–499. 3 Such is the case in Metaphysik-Mrongovius (AA 29.1.2: 747–940), MetaphysikVolckmann (AA 28.1: 355–459), Metaphysik L2 (AA 28.2: 525–610), or Metaphysik-Dohna (AA 28.2: 615–702). 4 All citations will be presented in a traditional manner (abbreviation of work, volume of work, number of page(s)). The abbreviation of each work cited fnds correspondence in the fnal bibliographical section. All citations have been translated from their original German language into English.

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5 Namely, Aesthetics, Natural History, Pedagogy, Medicine, etc. 6 A brief, pre-emptive methodological remark is here in order. We are fully aware of Adickes’s profcient effort in the elucidation of the veracity – or not – of several of Kant’s extant lectures or transcribed lectures on Geography. As such, we fully agree with Adickes’s general position according to which a part of GeographieRink, and the whole of Geographie-Vollmer (presented below), are not to be trusted entirely as Kant’s texts, rather are more to be considered as a fusion of various transcriptions. So much so, that, in such cases, not only did Kant not avail himself the writings, but he would certainly not subscribe to some of the positions – or better yet, the order, the register, and the formulation of certain positions – therein contained. This, we conclude, is true and even visible to the unexperienced Kantian reader. However, as much as we agree with Adickes’s position, we argue that in such texts, and especially in the rich ‘Prolegomena’ of the latter, there is Kantian content both of interest and of importance towards a correct ascertainment of the philosopher’s geographical thought. This is visible, frstly, in the exposition of the problem between metaphysical and erudite or historical sciences, which bears more than a casual reminiscence with Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics or the Lecture on Encyclopedism. Secondly, this is visible in certain expressions in both texts – which we will leave untouched here – expressions which not only set the texts to a certain degree of conformity with one another but with other introductory academic texts of Kantian authorship. As such, we aim at carefully dissociating that which is clearly not Kantian, or could not have been said by Kant – which is at times the case in said texts – from that which could only have been said by Professor Kant; and, taking only this in consideration, ascertain to what extent this flls a void regarding Kant’s theoretical positions in what concerns Physical Geography. 7 ‘Geographie-Rink’, in Rink, Friedrich Theodor, ‘Vorlesungen über Physische Geographie’, in Immanuel Kant’s Physischer Geographie. Königsberg: Göbbels und Unzer, 1802. The date of the lecture is uncertain. 8 ‘Geographie-Vollmer’, in Vollmer, Johann J. W., Immanuel Kant, Physische Geographie, 4 vols., vol. 1.1. Mainz und Hamburg: Gottfried Vollmer, 1801–1805. The date of the lecture is uncertain. 9 ‘For in the system the whole exists prior to the parts, whereas in an aggregate the parts exist previously’ (KPG: 423). 10 Compare with Kant’s Lecture on Encyclopedism: ‘All historical sciences compose erudition. To History belongs all that is given. When erudition is very ample, it is designated as poli-history (Polyhistorie). This is opposed to pansophy (Pansophie), which contains in its scope all rational sciences; but not the historical ones, otherwise it would be a poli-history’ (AA 29.1: 5). 11 ‘Formal erudition is erudition of language […]. Real erudition, because the objects of our experience are manifest to us in space, next to one another, and in time, after one another, regards in part the description of objects: description of the World, in part the report of their modifcations: history of the world’ (PG, I.1: 5). 12 ‘Hence, there is, 1) a Physical History: the history of genuine Nature […], 2) an Anthropological History: the history of freedom’ (PG, I.1: 5). 13 ‘1) A Physical History: the history of genuine Nature. Namely, either “of external nature”; Cosmogony or Geogony. Or: “of internal nature”, Empirical Psychology’ (PG, I.1: 5). 14 ‘There is 2) an Anthropological History: the history of freedom, that is, of internal freedom (history of the opinions, of human follies and errors as propaedeutic […], or of external freedom. (History of human actions as depiction of their attempts to give themselves a government ft for humanity. Namely, political history.)’ (PG, I.1: 5).

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15 ‘The genuine empirical doctrine of the body most certainly does not belong in Metaphysics; for I cannot speak of air, etc., in metaphysics, for the latter requires empirical principles and therefore belongs to Empirical Physics. The same must I say from the doctrine of the soul; so is Psychology, which serves itself from empirical principles, no pure philosophy’ (AA 28.1: 367). 16 See AA 29.1: 757. 17 See AA 2: 4. 18 See in the case of Geography, AA 2: 4; in the case of Anthropology, AA 25.1: 7–8. 19 ‘The knowledge of the world must be a system, otherwise we cannot be sure of having grasped the whole’ (PG, I.1: 9). 20 ‘This [system] bears a relation with all sciences which produce a connection with us, for instance, with Encyclopedism, wherein the whole frst appears in its coherence. The idea is architectonic; it creates sciences. He who, for instance, wants to build a house frst forms an idea of the whole, from which he then derives all the parts. So is the case too with our present preparation, it is an idea of the knowledge of the world. Namely, we discern here an architectonic concept, a concept in which the multiple comes from the whole’ (KPG 423–424). See also PG, I.1: 9. 21 ‘It (Geography) makes us citizens of the world and links us to the most remote nations. Without it we are […] nothing but children of Nature’ (PG, I.1: 15). 22 ‘Hence, Geography simultaneously cultivates and civilises, and is no lesser part of the knowledge of the world [Weltkenntnis], no less important than the genuine knowledge of men, the propaedeutic of which is given by Anthropology’ (PG, I.1: 16). 23 ‘Nothing cultivates and forms the sane understanding of men more than Geography’. (PG, I.1: 14); or: ‘Because sane understanding refers to experience, it cannot expand in considerable manner without the knowledge of Geography’ (KPG: 429). 24 See PG I.1: 10–13; KPG: 427. 25 ‘The usefulness of this study is very ample. It serves a purposeful [zweckmässigen] ordination of our knowledges, as well as our own pleasure’. Regarding the agreeability of pragmatic or physical knowledges, see also Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: ‘This observation [anthropological observation] is nonetheless one of the most agreeable matters’ (AA 25.2: 733). See also AA 25.2: 734.

References Adickes, E. 1911. Kants Ansichten über Geschichte und Bau der Erde. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Adickes, E. 1913. Ein neu aufgefundenes Kollegheft nach Kants Vorlesung über Physische Geographie. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Kant, I. 1901ff. Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. Von der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer. (AA) Rink, F. T. 1802. Immanuel Kant’s Physischer Geographie. Königsberg: Göbbels und Unzer. (KPG) Vollmer, J. J. W. 1801–1805. Immanuel Kant, Physische Geographie, 4 vols., vol. 1.1. Mainz und Hamburg: Gottfried Vollmer. (PG)

II

Personality and Subjectivity

5

It thinks On a Function of the ‘I’ in the Formula of the Principle of Apperception Mario Caimi

In the English version of the Critique of Pure Reason, B 131 (chapter 16 of the Transcendental Deduction), the principle of apperception is stated in the following wording: ‘It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations’.1 In the German original text, the subject of the sentence is the ‘I think’. Literally: ‘The “I think” must have the possibility of accompanying all my representations’. In the present work, we want to approach the question of whether it is necessary to designate the subject of the principle of apperception as an ‘I’ (and not as an impersonal ‘it’). We will try to give a rationale for including the ego in the formula of apperception. This justifcation is arguably necessary, for some interpreters take such involvement of the ego as self-evident and in need of no further explanation, while others offer (or request) full justifcation of such connection of the ego with the principle, and yet others maintain that the use of the term ‘I’ in the principle of apperception is superfuous since the principle could be better expressed impersonally by ‘It thinks’. 5.1 The ‘I’ and the ‘It’ in Kantian Research Manfred Baum has unmistakably shown that consciousness necessarily presupposes ‘I think’ (i.e., self-consciousness). Baum writes: ‘Thus, although self-consciousness appears to be only a special kind of consciousness, consciousness nevertheless logically presupposes self-consciousness, the original apperception’.2 Similar to Prof. Baum, Hans Dieter Klein pointed out the logical-analytical necessity of assuming an ‘I’ in every act of speech. He asserts ‘that the validity claim of a speech act is always the responsibility of an ego. Therefore, every sentence X has the deep grammatical form: “I say X”’.3 Thus, he goes a step further by not only presupposing self-awareness but expressly presupposing an ego that makes consciousness possible. Consciousness, therefore, presupposes self-consciousness; but does it hence presuppose an I? Is the I synonymous with self-consciousness? Does self-consciousness fully exhaust the meaning of ‘I’? To be sure, every DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-7

72 Mario Caimi statement includes, with logical necessity, a subject; but does this subject necessarily have to be expressed as ‘I’? Or to put it another way: Does selfconsciousness acquire an additional meaning when it is conceived as an ‘I think’? These questions have been raised many times and answered in different ways.4 It is true that Kant occasionally seems to adopt a hint from Lichtenberg, e.g., in KrV B 404, where he writes: ‘Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates’. But the question remains open as to why Kant used the ‘I’ to express the principle of apperception. Does the ego (instead of the ‘It’) fulfl a specifc function in the principle of apperception? Klaus Düsing gives a positive answer to this question. Firstly, the synthetic act of thinking is performed by a single subject; secondly, the subject of this action is self-conscious. Both the unity of the subject and self-consciousness actually belong to the concept of an ego. Therefore, the subject of apperception is to be described as an ego. In Prof. Düsing’s words: In order to ground thinking on the spontaneous, pure I or on the active subject, two more arguments should be added to Kant’s statements: On the one hand, the spontaneous action of thinking, accomplished in pure self-activity, namely active synthesis, cannot take place anonymously as a process merely occurring of itself and destitute of a subject. Rather, it must be initiated and carried out by an autonomous, spontaneous subject that is both unique and confers unity. On the other hand, this ‘actus’ of thinking does not in principle occur in an unconscious manner; but, rather, the subject performing it knows it to be his own, e.g. the subject gives himself an account of the degrees of validity of its judgments. Such account is performed explicitly in the modalities of the judgments with regard to the question whether these are possible, real or necessary. In this way, the subject constituting the syntheses of judgments and their validity refers at a higher level to itself as the one performing the synthesis. Such an intellectual self-relation can only beft a thinking subject. Therefore it must be: ‘I think’.5 In a seminal work, Dieter Henrich defended the thesis that the principle of apperception is based on identity (and thus on the ego, as we may assume).6 For this reason, accordingly, he does not need to enquire into the question of the legitimacy of including the ‘I’ in the formula of apperception, for such an inclusion goes without saying. Undoubtedly, Kant was ‘nowhere able to distinguish between the plan of a transcendental deduction based upon the simplicity of the subject, from the plan of such a deduction based upon its identity’.7 Nevertheless, the ‘key argument’ of the transcendental deduction is to be found (according to Henrich) in the concept of identity, even if ‘simplicity and identity are equally primal aspects of self-consciousness’.8 Henrich

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goes as far as considering the ego of apperception to be something real, a ‘real individual’.9 Apparently, Dennis Schulting does not regard Kant’s use of the pronoun ‘I’ in the formula of the principle of apperception as problematic. He only tries to distinguish the empirical ego from the transcendental.10 The interpretations of the principle of apperception hitherto presented assume that the inclusion of the ‘I’ in the formula of the principle is selfevident. However, one can fnd another conception of the relation between consciousness and ego. In several papers, Prof. Düsing refers to Lichtenberg’s observations: ‘It thinks, one should say, just as one says: it fashes. Saying cogito is already too much once translated by I think. To assume, to postulate the ego is a practical need’.11 Johann Gottlieb Fichte also deals with the thought of an impersonal subject who thinks: I can […] certainly say: it is being thought […] more cautiously: the thought appears: that I feel, look at, think; but by no means: I feel, look at, think. Only the frst is fact; the second is a fctitious addition.12 In the same vein, Alois Riehl writes: ‘[T]he representation: “I” is produced by the unity of consciousness. Only the law of the unity of consciousness is a priori; the representation is ensuing to the law’.13 The identity of ego and apperception has vanished here; self-consciousness frst ‘brings forth’ the representation ‘I think’,14 so it is not identical with this. Karen Gloy draws attention to the possibility of conceiving of consciousness without recourse to the ego. She discusses, in our spirit, the ‘reasons for assuming an egological structure [of consciousness]’.15 Gloy concludes that the egological structure of self-consciousness as subject, synthetic unity and numerical identity cannot be based on any reality but only on the logical-grammatical sentence-structure which comprises the characteristics of subject, unity and identity as analytic implications.16 Heiner Klemme also examined the possibility of a non-egoic conception of apperception. According to this view, representations are ‘my representations precisely when it is a property of these representations that, in a cognitive judgment expressed by me, they can be linked in the concept of an object’.17 If one agrees with this interpretation of the apperception principle, according to Klemme, it is ‘irrelevant’18 that one accompanies the representations with the sentence ‘I think’. Accordingly, the principle of apperception can also be formulated without the ‘I’. Likewise, Karl Ameriks has asked why apperception ‘requires a genuinely personal subject at all’.19 Ameriks argues against Lichtenberg’s proposal (although he does not explicitly refer to it) by taking for granted the presence of the ‘I’ in the formula of apperception. The actual execution of the

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transcendental apperception, according to Ameriks, is based on an empirical apperception, which ‘per defnitionem’ belongs to and is performed by a real self.20 Claudia Jáuregui points out that the objectifying consciousness, which is aware of itself and its own identity, cannot be characterised as an ‘I’: ‘The I that we encounter in the cogito is itself the source of all objectifcation and therefore does not remain objectifed itself’.21 Any time we try to thematize or characterise objectifying consciousness, ‘our statement is never entirely adequate. Nor are the terms by which we attempt to designate self-consciousness suitable’. The pronoun ‘I’, according to Claudia Jáuregui, is only an aid we resort to in order to designate the subject of apperception through an analogy: In the statement ‘I think’ we borrow the meaning of the expression ‘I’ from the act of naming the inner phenomenon of which we are empirically conscious, and we use this expression to think by analogy that original self-consciousness, namely the transcendental apperception.22 Gerard Gentry points to a purely logical-transcendental principle of the synthetic unity of apperception, which he distinguishes from the real principle of ‘I think’. The frst is quite formal and impersonal and thus cannot be identifed with the second. It is the supreme principle of transcendental logic; being a purely formal logical principle, it does not imply any action of the mind (‘does not correspond to any real act’). In this way, Gentry succeeds in formulating the supreme principle of apperception without recourse to the ‘I’.23 The interpretations presented above show that there is disagreement among commentators as to whether it is necessary, or at least permissible, to include the ‘I’ in the formula of apperception, or whether the pronoun ‘I’ should rather be replaced by the impersonal ‘It’. 5.2 Presentation of the Problem In our attempt to solve this issue, we would like to explore the possibility of expressing the subject of apperception not through an ‘I’ but through an impersonal subject. We will try to show that such an application of the impersonal ‘It’, while possible, is inadmissible because it has some paradoxical consequences. Then we will propose a reason for including the ‘I’ in the formula of apperception, in order to resolve the paradoxes originated in the assumption of an impersonal subject. The principle of apperception appears in §16 of the Deduction as the solution to a problem that consists in explaining the possibility of connection in general. For experience comes about through synthesis; synthesis, in turn, presupposes unity, so that a supreme, universal unity, such as ‘the unity

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of the theme in a play, a speech, or a story’,24 is to be presupposed as the supreme condition of experience. It is to this purpose that apperception is brought in. Namely, it designates the supreme unity, which in turn makes possible that the experience produced by synthesis be a single one. 25 If we agree with this explanation of the function of apperception, we should then ask whether such a function could just as well be performed by an ‘It’ as the subject of consciousness. It is therefore necessary to determine more precisely the function of the ‘I’ in designating the highest unity. Therefore, the question arises again: What is the purpose of the ‘I’ in the formula of apperception? What function may it be that the ‘I’ performs in this formula? Wolfgang Carl gave this question a particularly clear expression. He writes: It is a remarkable fact that he [i.e., I. Kant, M.C.] always describes the role that pure apperception is supposed to play as a formal condition of thinking or cognition with the help of the use of the expression ‘I’. […] How do we come about the connection between the concept of apperception and the above explained mention of the ‘I’?26 In a sense, the inclusion of the ‘I’ in the principle of apperception is even disturbing, for it could lead to the assumption of an existing subject (be it a human being or a substance) that underlies the representations as a substratum27 (which Kant expressly excludes). The inclusion of the expression ‘I’ in the formula of the principle of apperception appears even more problematic when one considers another property of the ego, namely identity. This essential trait of the ego, which is part of the ego conception, is not exhausted in the mere conception of oneself as the same subject through all changes. It also means that I am no other person than myself, even though no changes are occurring or should be contemplated.28 I designate myself as ‘I’ by distinguishing myself from all other I-subjects: I am not He, even though He designates Himself as ‘I’. One might assume that the demarcation of the ego from other ego-subjects concerns only the empirical ego. It occurs, however, for the same reason that the “I” of apperception differs from its objects: for without such a distinction, the self would be as diverse and many-coloured as the objects of consciousness.29 Both identity and self-consciousness can be explained by this function of demarcation.30 As is well known, self-consciousness does not mean that the ego knows itself. Identity and self-consciousness, however, are to be understood as the differentiation from the non-ego, i.e., as a differentiation which is a fundamental determination of the ego. This can be clearly seen in the realm of the practical: there is no way a particular practical ego might undertake responsibility for the actions of another ego. We encounter the demarcation of the ego from other egos in particular in the case of the empirical use of the expression ‘I’. I am the one who is ‘no

76 Mario Caimi other’. The exclusion of other egos is inseparable from the empirical concept of ego. However, if we consider the principle of apperception, it seems that a paradox arises: namely, the ‘I’ of apperception does not distinguish itself from other egos. It doesn’t exclude them as expected. Rather, the connection of the manifold according to the unity of apperception is a universally valid objective connection that establishes a universal objective unity. Such a unity applies universally; it does not only apply to a specifc subject to the exclusion of all others. An objective unity is namely ‘one that must be accomplished by every discursive understanding’;31 hence, it is a universal unit. The task of the transcendental I is not to establish what is different but rather to establish what is common and universal. It seems, then, as were it the case that the ‘I’ of apperception lacked that determination of the ego (namely, the demarcation just mentioned) by which the ‘I’-subject distinguishes itself not only from the non-ego (namely, from its manifold representations) but also from all other ‘I’-subjects. An anonymous I would probably be self-contradictory. But the ‘I’ of apperception seems to be exactly so, insofar as it does not distinguish itself from other egos.32 The discussion just outlined brings forth a need to clarify the fundamental and most general meaning of the word ‘I’, its fundamental meaning regardless of whether this word is employed to denote the transcendental, the empirical, the logical, the practical, or the psychological I. Only through such clarifcation can we hope to escape the perplexity we have come to by discussing the egological versus non-egological character of the apperception principle. 5.3 A Suggested Solution Some of the interpretations presented so far suggest that the place of the supreme unity could perhaps be occupied by an impersonal subject. We have found reasons, both in the relevant literature and in Kant’s text,33 to believe that the principle of apperception could be formulated without making use of the word ‘I’ to formulate it. So our question (in Section 5.1) was justifed: What is the ‘I’ for? What does thinking spontaneity attain when it becomes an ‘I think’? Our question is not whether there is an I (whether noumenal or empirical) at all. Nor does it refer to whether the ego could be somehow known. It claims no determination of the ego. Rather, our question is: What function does the word ‘I’ fulfl in the principle of apperception? When pure spontaneity is denoted by the pronoun ‘I’, it is expressed that in every instance of its activity, it remains the very same (i.e., that it is and remains identical to itself) and that it has a knowledge of its own identity. This knowledge of its own identity is the fundamental feature of ‘I-ness’. Identity, for its part, is a condition for thinking an ultimate, unconditional unity. Only through the consciousness of its own identity (i.e., only through that which we have called its ‘I-ness’) does thinking spontaneity remain a single subject that accompanies all its representations. The clear and distinct

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conception of such a supreme unity is the beneft brought by including the word ‘I’ in the principle of apperception. The I is necessary because the principle of apperception allows for a possible misuse, namely one in which the unity of the subject is lost. Since if the I-thought is excluded, the demand of the principle of apperception, according to which the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations, would turn into the following: ‘The “It thinks” must be able to accompany all representations’. Such an impersonal request could then be fulflled if several It-subjects, independent of one another, accompany the individual representations in the manner: It-subject 1 thinks the representation a; It-subject 2 thinks representation b; It-subject 3 thinks the representation c; etc. In this way, the condition is met that any one of the ‘It thinks’ can accompany any one of the many representations.34 Attempts have been made to remedy this abuse by assuming a ‘higher level’ of apperception,35 which then connects the multiplicity of thought acts in the following way: A second-level subject thinks that frst-level subject number 1 thinks representation a, and also that frst-level subject number 2 thinks representation b, and also that frst-level subject number 3 thinks representation c. If one were to dispense with the ‘I’ in the formula of the principle of apperception, then these higher stages could be multiplied at will in the form: A third-level It-subject thinks that a second-level It-subject thinks that frst-level It-subject number 1 thinks representation a, and that frst-level It-subject number 2 thinks representation b and frst-level It-subject number 3 thinks representation c. And then: A fourth-level It-subject thinks that a third-level It-subject thinks that a second-level It-subject thinks that frst-level It-subject number 1 thinks representation a, and frst-level It-subject number 2 thinks representation b, and frst-level It-subject number 3 thinks representation c. And then: A ffth-level It-subject thinks … etc.36 and so on. On the other hand, if we assume an ‘I’ (an ‘I think’) instead of an ‘It’ (that is: instead of an ‘It thinks’), which accompanies all my representations, unlimited duplication becomes impossible or empty: the ego remains the same and always unique to itself through all possible stages. It is ‘one […] and the same executive I’,37 so that it no longer makes sense to devise a plurality of higher stages. By defning the subject of self-consciousness as an I, the subject conceives itself ‘as one and the same subject’.38 Only in this way is it possible for us to avoid the nonsensical – though possible – interpretation of the principle of apperception: i.e., to avoid the wrong interpretation that claims to fulfl the demand of the principle by means of a multiplication of the subject. It is again Wolfgang Carl who, alluding to Harry Frankfurt’s explanation of the concept of person,39 pointed out the inevitability of the expression ‘I’. For the explanation of the concept of moral person, Frankfurt

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resorts to ‘second-level intentions’, which refer to frst-level intentions and ascribes them to the moral subject.40 Carl comments: But this is only possible if we interpret the schema ‘x intends that y intends’ in such a way that not only is it true that x is identical to y, but also that the variables are replaced by the expression ‘I’. Self-ascriptions require the use of this word, and the possibility of statements that have the character of “refexive self-evaluation” depends on the non-eliminable use of the word ‘I’. The use of coextensive names or labels cannot suffce here.41 What applies here to the explanation of the concept of moral person also applies to the indispensable function of the ‘I’ in the self-attribution of representations. Here too (in the case of self-attribution of representations) we are dependent on the ‘non-eliminable use of the word “I”’. 5.4 The Function of the ‘I’ in the Principle of Apperception Our investigation has not aimed at determining the transcendental I but merely at explaining the reason why the term ‘I’ is introduced into the formula of apperception. As Kant himself states, the ego itself is ‘not a mere logical function, but determines the subject […] with regard to existence’.42 But that falls beyond the scope of our purpose. As a result of our foregoing considerations, we can say that the ‘I’ of the formula of apperception has a strictly defned, and quite formal, function that must not be mistaken for the functions of a real ego.43 For the fulflment of the function of the ‘I’ within the formula of apperception, some other functions and characteristics of the ego are dispensable, even if they are nonetheless essential functions and characteristics of the real ego. The function of the expression ‘I’ in the formula of apperception is to express the universal and necessary unity that constitutes the condition of objectivity.44 A synthesis is considered objective if the resulting structure is not put together ‘at random’ and not ‘arbitrarily’ but necessarily.45 Now a necessary synthesis is the one, the opposite of which is not possible.46 A synthesis of representations would not be possible if any of those representations did not belong to the same (the very same) subject as the others. Then there is no room for the opposite of the synthesis which can bring representations under the universal unity of the subject (all of which means as much as: the same and only subject must be able to accompany all my representations).47 Therefore, the possibility that representations belong to the very same single subject is necessary and is a condition of objectivity. This is what the Critique of Pure Reason says: Now all unifcation of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness

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that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding.48 The word ‘I’ in the formula of apperception expresses this condition of objectivity. For it designates a subject that always remains the same and knows himself to be identical, i.e., that is unique. The consciousness of one’s own identity (which constitutes the peculiarity of the ‘I’) serves solely to ensure the unity of the highest principle.49 The supreme unity of the subject of experience (which is at the same time the supreme unity of experience itself) can only be expressed by the word ‘I’ (as we have just seen); for only a subject conscious of itself and of its identity (i.e., an ‘I’) can be designated as a supreme, ultimate unity. It is for this reason alone that we use the word ‘I’ to term this supreme condition. The inclusion of the “I” in the formula of apperception does not intend to characterise the ego, be it that of psychology, of metaphysics, or of anthropology.50 The I-thought is included in the formula for the sole purpose of fulflling the function of an immutable identical unity that provides the ground of objectivity and of the unity of experience. Not the subject itself, but its function is characterised by the I-thought. 5.5 The ‘I’ and We, the Empirical Subjects We may call this necessary condition egoic because it exhibits the determinations of self-consciousness, of unity, and of identity, which are qualities we normally ascribe to an ego. But perhaps we need to be more precise in saying that we may call the empirical ego an ‘I’ just because it shares such properties (self-referentiality, unity, identity) with the “I” of apperception which is the original ‘I’. The egoic character that characterises consciousness in general is also found in every individual consciousness. I can call myself an ‘I’ only insofar as my own consciousness is structured like the universal consciousness to which apperception belongs. The I of universal consciousness, the ‘I’ of apperception, is the original I. The ‘I’ of empirical subjects is derived and is called an ‘I’ only by analogy with that subject. The ‘I’ of the individual consciousness expresses the same condition of all-encompassing experience and consciousness in general that we have called apperception. In the individual, we fnd this necessary structure of consciousness merged with accidental physical, historical, circumstantial factors, accompanied by sensibility and imagination. This is how the empirical I comes into being. But we only call this empirical I an ‘I’ because its basic structure is exactly the same as that which we found in consciousness in general. The characterisation of the empirical subject as an I is not based on empirical or metaphysical inquiry. The reason for this characterisation is that the

80 Mario Caimi basic structure of the empirical subject is precisely that which universal selfconsciousness exhibits: the empirical subject is called an ‘I’ insofar as it is the sole, self-conscious and always identical subject of a synthetic activity which proceeds according to the a priori necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. The ‘I’ of the principle of apperception, its abstract and universal I-ness, serves as the ground or condition of the many empirical I. If we call ‘I’ each one of these, it is only because the structure of each particular, single, actual empirical ego conforms to the abstract universal structure of the principle of self-consciousness. This universal structure serves as the fundament of the ‘I’-ness each single empirical ‘I’ can exhibit. It is what enables us to refer to the empirical knowing subject as an ‘I’. Without this relation to the necessary ‘I’ of apperception, the empirical subject is not an ego but merely an accidental accumulation of representations and impulses. I would suggest that it is not the fact of the individual subject’s judging activity that gives rise to the thought of apperception (as Ameriks seems to suggest),51 but conversely, that it is the ‘I’ in the thought of apperception which makes possible the conception of the individual subject as an I. This also solves the paradox mentioned in Section 5.2, according to which the transcendental ‘I’ creates only a unity common to all ego-subjects, while it is an essential feature of every real ego to distinguish itself from other ego-subjects. The paradox is solved as soon as one recognizes that each individual ego obtains its feature of being an I only through its participation in the universal, original ‘I’. It is also true that the universal ‘I’ of apperception possesses nonetheless the essential trait of demarcation: it demarcates itself from the manifold of intuition as well as from single thoughts and representations. The further differentiation of the individual egos (including their mutual demarcation) occurs through accidental circumstances that actually have little to do with the fundamental, original ‘I’ of apperception. 5.6 Review and Conclusion The ‘I’ is the expression of self-consciousness; at least, it is the word (or concept) used to describe self-consciousness. Baum explains it as follows: The ‘I’ is the expression of the intellectual self-consciousness of a being that has understanding and can think not only its representations and thoughts, but can also conceive of the subject who possesses these representations and thoughts, the so-called self.52 Baum further explains the ‘I’ as ‘the representation of the one who is conscious of his representations and thoughts’.53 The following elements can be distinguished in the concept of self-consciousness:

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1. Self-consciousness is an act. It is not the same as passively receiving a representation. One could describe this act as ‘the becoming aware’. Kant asserts that self-consciousness provides no knowledge of the ego; however, it is a kind of cognition; the cognition we call ‘self-consciousness’ refers to consciousness itself;54 it is the awareness that there is content in my mind. This is how Kant explains it in the Logik: Consciousness (i.e. knowledge relating to the subject and not to the object) is ‘a representation that another representation is in me’.55 Self-consciousness is an action that takes place in spontaneity, not in passive, receptive sensibility. 2. In self-consciousness, an aspect (or moment) of identity can also be distinguished.56 Being an act of spontaneity, self-consciousness is the opposite of passivity and its representations. This opposition means that self-consciousness distinguishes itself from what is not spontaneity: It demarcates itself from what is only a passively received content which the action of consciousness refers to. Faced with the varying multiplicity of possible contents of consciousness, self-consciousness remains always the same. Consciousness does not identify with its contents; I do not have the ‘multicolored self’ spoken of in KrV B 134. 3. In the concept of self-consciousness, one can also recognize an aspect of unity. In the consciousness of a manifold the thought of unity must be included. Unity can be understood as either relative or absolute. (a) Relative unity refers to a certain limited multiplicity (such a unity is, for example, that of an empirical concept in which several empirical representations are united into one). (b) Absolute unity encompasses the whole of the diversity that can be presented to consciousness and that constitutes the very matter of experience. This is the unity of consciousness. It is absolutely necessary because without it there would be no consciousness, no object, and no experience. In our work, I have aimed at suggesting, contrary to Henrich’s view,57 that unity is the fundamental and supreme aspect of self-consciousness in apperception. Identity, as an aspect of self-consciousness, has the function of facilitating proper understanding of unity. But indeed it is unity that is necessary for the possibility of experience. The ‘I’ is included in the formula of apperception to express identity. This, in turn, has the function of ensuring the unity of the subject of apperception: the inclusion of the ‘I’ in the formula of the principle of apperception prevents the infnite multiplication of higher and higher instances of consciousness: the consciousness (2) of the consciousness (1) of the object; the consciousness (3) of the consciousness (2) of the consciousness (1) of the object, etc. Preventing multiplication of the instances of consciousness is a function that the impersonal ‘It’ cannot accomplish.58

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Notes 1 We quote the Critique of Pure Reason according to Norman Kemp Smith’s translation: Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan and Co., 1929. 2 Manfred Baum: “Logisches und personales Ich bei Kant”. In: Dietmar H. Heidemann (ed.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Cologne: frommann-Holzboog, 2002, pp. 107–123, here p. 108. 3 Hans-Dieter Klein: “Subjektivitätstheorie als dialektische Monadologie”. In: Dietmar H. Heidemann (ed.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Cologne: frommann-holzboog, 2002, pp. 151–161, here p. 157. 4 A treatment of this question with reference to Plato’s Theätet can be found in Hans Sluga: “Von der Uneinheitlichkeit des Wissens”. In: Marcelo Stamm (ed.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 133–153, here p. 145: There it reads ‘that we should actually say “it thinks”, “it recognizes”, “it knows” (like we also say “it rains”) and not “I think”, “I recognize” and “I know”. The only question is why such a language reform proves to be impracticable in practice’. 5 Klaus Düsing: “Apperzeption und Selbstaffektion in Kants ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’. Das Kernstück der ‘transzendentalen Deduktion’ der Kategorien”. In: Norbert Fischer (ed.): Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik. Einführung in die “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. Hamburg: Meiner, 2010, pp. 139–153, here p. 143. See also recently Klaus Düsing: “Gibt es eine Kantische Kategorienentwicklung aus der Einheit des ‘Ich denke’?”. In: Nicolas Bickmann, Lars Heckenroth and Rainer Schäfer (eds.): Kategoriendeduktion in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2020, pp. 29–42. See also K. Düsing: “Spontane, diskursive Synthesis. Kants neue Theorie des Denkens in der kritischen Philosophie”. In: Sabine Doyé, Marion Heinz and Udo Rameil (eds.): Metaphysik und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004, pp. 83–108, esp. pp. 102–103. See also K. Düsing: “Das reine Ich denke und die Kategorien”. In: Antonio Moretto (ed.): Scienza e conoscenza secondo Kant. Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2004, pp. 79–100, especially p. 85: ‘The performance of the synthesis cannot […] take place anonymously or without an actor’. Thus, Düsing asserts that an ego is indispensable for thinking. 6 Dieter Henrich: Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976, p. 72. 7 Henrich, ibid., p. 94. 8 Henrich, ibid., p. 98. 9 Henrich, ibid., p. 111, cf. ibid., p. 83. 10 In his exposition of the principle of apperception, Schulting does not seek a substitute for the term ‘I’ in the formula of the principle. See Schulting, Dennis: “Gap? What Gap? On the Transcendental Unity of Apperception”. In: D. Schulting (ed.): Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives in the Transcendental Deduction. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 141–191, esp. pp. 165f. Schulting summarises his position on this problem very briefy in: Dennis Schulting: “Gaps, Chasms and Things in Themselves: A Reply to My Critics”, in: Kantian Review, 23, No. 1, March 2018, p. 136. See also Schulting: “Transcendelntal Logic and the Logic of Thought”, in: Studi Kantiani, XXXIV, 2021, pp. 115–126, especially p. 120f. 11 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Sudelbuch K, No. 76. 12 Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Berlin, in the Vossische Buchhandlung, 1800, p. 172. We quote from the digital facsimile copy of the Bavarian State Library.

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13 Alois Riehl: Der philosophische Kritizismus. Geschichte und System, 1st volume, 3rd edition, Leipzig: Kröner, 1924, p. 515 note. 14 KrV B 132. 15 Karen Gloy: “Der Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins bei Kant und Fichte”. In D. Heidemann (ed.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Cologne: frommann-holzboog, 2002, pp. 125–140, here pp. 134f. 16 Karen Gloy, ibid., p. 137. 17 Heiner Klemme: Kants Philosophie des Subjekts. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis. Hamburg: Meiner, 1995, p. 195. 18 Klemme, loc. cit., p. 196. 19 Karl Ameriks: “Apperzeption und Subjekt”. In Dietmar Heidemann and Kristina Engelhard (eds.): Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2004, pp. 76–99, here p. 86. 20 Ameriks, ibid. Cf. ‘I can exist without this particular thought of refection, but this particular thought cannot exist as a concrete act without me’ (Ameriks, supra, p. 87). 21 Claudia Jauregui: Sentido interno y subjectividad. Un análisis del problema del auto-conocimiento en la flosofía transcendental de Kant. Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2008, p. 139. 22 Claudia Jáuregui, personal communication to the author. 23 Gerard Gentry: “Pure Synthesis and the Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception”, in Kant-Studien, 113, No. 1, 2022, pp. 8–39. 24 KrV B 114. 25 On the other hand, see Henrich, loc. cit., p. 62f. 26 Wolfgang Carl: “Ich und Spontaneität”. In Marcelo Stamm (ed.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 105–122, here p. 110f. 27 See, for example, Roderick M. Chisholm, “On the Simplicity of the Soul: Some Logical Considerations”. In Marcelo Stamm (ed.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 53–62. 28 On the other hand, Henrich claims that the transition from one state to another is what determines identity. See Henrich, op. cit., p. 86. 29 KrV B 134. 30 Donald Davidson pointed to demarcation as a condition of identity from an analytical point of view, where he writes: ‘The concept of oneself as an independent entity depends on the realization of the existence of others, a realization that comes into its own with communication’. Donald Davidson: “The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self”. In Marcelo Stamm (ed.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 123–130, here p. 128. 31 Baum, loc. cit. p. 117. 32 See Section 5.5. 33 Cf. the passage from B 404 already quoted: ‘Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X’. 34 For an in-depth discussion of this multiplicity of subjects, see Sasa Josifovic: “The Crucial Role of Pure Apperception within the Framework of Kant’s Theory of Synthesis and Cognition”. In Gertrudis Van de Vijver and Boris Demarest (eds): Objectivity after Kant: Its Meaning, Its Limitations, Its Fateful Omissions. Hildesheim, Zurich, New York: Olms, 2013, pp. 221–233, esp. pp. 229f. 35 Ameriks (op. cit. p. 83) also introduces the conception of multiple stages of apperception. According to Ameriks, the highest level corresponds to transcendental

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Mario Caimi apperception. ‘It represents the “necessary possibility” of a “global” or all-encompassing “I think”, an “I think” that we can use to tie together all “frst-level” acts of thought performed by a single subject , and which thus has a whole world of experience as its correlate’. Ameriks develops this conception in a different direction than we do here. In empirical apperception, he is looking for ‘the distinguishing characteristic of the level of those acts […] that are something “for me” and thus belong to the identity of a self as such’ (p. 86). The question of the function of the ‘I’ of apperception is thus answered by pointing to the real, specifc ego ‘of an individual perspective’ (ibid. p. 86). In the realm of the practical, Harry Frankfurt has declared the superiority and subordination of ‘desires’ and ‘volitions’ of the frst and second level to be an essential trait of the human person. He claims that ‘a person may have […] desires and volitions of a higher order than the second. There is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders’. Harry G. Frankfurt: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, in: The Journal of Philosophy, 68, No. 1, Jan. 14, 1971, pp. 5–20, here p. 16. Düsing: “Apperzeption und Selbstaffektion”, p. 144. Kant: Anthropologie, AA VII, 134 note. Harry G. Frankfurt: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, in The Journal of Philosophy, 68, No. 1, Jan. 14, 1971, pp. 5–20. Actually, Frankfurt does not refer to ‘intentions’, but to desires and acts of will. Carl, op. cit. p. 117f. KrV B 429. Accordingly, Ameriks (ibid., p. 90) distinguishes the conception of the ‘I’ as an epistemic subject from the conception of the ego as an existing subject. In the present study, we refer only to the former conception of the ‘I’. On the other hand, see Henrich, op. cit., p. 111. Likewise Hermann Cohen: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, 3rd edition, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1918 (1871), p. 409: ‘the “I think” is to be thought of as the summary and as the unity of all conditions’. See also ibid., p. 412: ‘Self-consciousness consists in the unity of the synthesis of the manifold’. KrV A 104. A. G. Baumgarten: Metaphysica, §101. We quote Baumgarten’s Metaphysics from the historical-critical edition: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Metaphysica/ Metaphysik. Historical-critical edition. Translated, introduced, and edited by Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommannholzboog, 2011. This edition is based on editio IV (1757). See too Kant: Ref. 6393, AA XVIII, 704: ‘But we can only see that a thing is necessary through the contradiction of the opposite (either because the concept contradicts itself or because it contradicts the existence of other given laws)’. ‘One may view such necessity as ultimately founded in the transcendental unity of apperception, as Kant himself seems to suggest in the frst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (A 106–7)’. Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch (eds.): Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism. Lanham, Toronto, Oxford: Scarecrow, 2005, keyword ‘Necessity’, p. 191. KrV B 137. Cf. B 139: ‘The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object’. On the other hand, Henrich, as already explained, advocates the thesis that identity, rather than unity, is the fundamental function of the subject in the principle of apperception. See Henrich, op. cit., p. 62f. and p. 79f. See Ameriks, supra, loc. cit. p. 81: ‘The point of using “apperception” in the Critique of Pure Reason is not that mind or subjectivity are defned as such, but

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that this word marks the minimal cognitive level specifc to the characteristic of human cognition and must be ranked higher than mere receptivity or mere mental activity’. Ameriks, loc. cit., p. 87. Manfred Baum: loc. cit., p. 108. Baum, ibid. We shall not deal here with the problem of the possibility of unconscious representations. Logik, AA IX, 33: ‘All our cognition has a twofold relation: frstly a relation to the object, secondly a relation to the subject. In the frst respect it relates to representation, in the latter to consciousness’. Logik, AA IX, 33: ‘Actually, consciousness is a representation that another representation is in me’. For the distinction between identity and unity within the concept of self-consciousness, we follow Dieter Henrich: Identität und Objektivität, p. 72f. Identität und Objektivität, pp. 84f. An earlier version of this work was published in Spanish, in Mario Caimi (ed.): Temas kantianos. Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2014.

References Ameriks, Karl. 2004. ‘Apperzeption und Subjekt’, in: Dietmar Heidemann und Kristina Engelhard (Hrsg.): Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. Berlin und New York: de Gruyter, S. 76–99. Baum, Manfred. 2002. ‘Logisches und personales Ich bei Kant’, in: Dietmar H. Heidemann (Hrsg.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Köln: frommann-Holzboog, S. 107–123. Baumgarten Alexander Gottlieb. 2011. Metaphysica/Metaphysik. Historischkritische Ausgabe. Übersetzt, eingeleitet und herausgegeben von Günter Gawlick und Lothar Kreimendahl. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog. Carl, Wolfgang. 1998. ‘Ich und Spontaneität’, in: Marcelo Stamm (Hrsg.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, S. 105–122. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1998. ‘On the Simplicity of the Soul. Some Logical Considerations’, in: Marcelo Stamm (Hrsg.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, S. 53–62. Cohen, Hermann. 1871. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, 3. Auf. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1918. Davidson, Donald. 1998. ‘The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self’, in: Marcelo Stamm (Hrsg.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, S. 123–130. Düsing, Klaus. 2004. ‘Spontane, diskursive Synthesis. Kants neue Theorie des Denkens in der kritischen Philosophie’, in: Sabine Doyé, Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil (Hrsg.): Metaphysik und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag. Berlin: de Gruyter, S. 83–108. Düsing, Klaus. 2004. ‘Das reine Ich denke und die Kategorien’, in: Antonio Moretto (Hrsg.): Scienza e conoscenza secondo Kant. Padova: Il Poligrafo, S. 79–100. Düsing, Klaus. 2010. ‘Apperzeption und Selbstaffektion in Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. Das Kernstück der “transzendentalen Deduktion” der Kategorien’, in: Norbert Fischer (HG.): Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik. Einführung in die ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’. Hamburg: Meiner, S. 139–153.

86 Mario Caimi Düsing, Klaus. 2020. ‘Gibt es eine Kantische Kategorienentwicklung aus der Einheit des “Ich denke”?’, in: Nicolas Bickmann, Lars Heckenroth und Rainer Schäfer (Hrsg.): Kategoriendeduktion in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, S. 29–42. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 1800. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Berlin: in der Vossischen Buchhandlung, 1800, S. 172. Wir zitieren nach dem digitalen FaksimileExemplar der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek. Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, in: The Journal of Philosophy 68(1) (Jan. 14, 1971): 5–20. Gentry, Gerard. 2022. ‘Pure Synthesis and the Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception’, in: Kant-Studien 113 (1): 8–39. Gloy, Karen. 2002. ‘Der Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins bei Kant und Fichte’, in: D. Heidemann (Hrsg.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Köln: frommann-holzboog, S. 125–140. Henrich, Dieter. 1976. Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion. Heidelberg: Carl Winter. Holzhey, Helmut und Mudroch, Vilem (Hrsg.). 2005. Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism. Lanham, Toronto, Oxford: Scarecrow. Jáuregui, Claudia. 2008. Sentido interno y subjetividad. Un análisis del problema del auto-conocimiento en la flosofía transcendental de Kant. Buenos Aires: Prometeo. Josifovic, Sasa. 2013. ‘The Crucial Role of Pure Apperception within the Framework of Kant’s Theory of Synthesis and Cognition’, in: Gertrudis Van de Vijver and Boris Demarest (Hrsg.): Objectivity after Kant: Its Meaning, its Limitations, its Fateful Omissions. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms, S. 221–233. Klein, Hans-Dieter. 2002. ‘Subjektivitätstheorie als dialektische Monadologie’, in: Dietmar H. Heidemann (Hrsg.): Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Köln: frommann-holzboog, S. 151–161. Klemme, Heiner. 1995. Kants Philosophie des Subjekts. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis. Hamburg: Meiner. Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph. 1991. ‘Sudelbuch K, Nr. 76’, in: von Wolfgang Promies (Hrsg.): Lichtenberg Aphorismen. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Oyarzún Robles, Pablo. 2018. ‘Pensamiento, lenguaje y ‘yo’. Lichtenberg y Kant’, in: Gustavo Leyva, Álvaro Peláez, and Pedro Stepanenko (Hrsg.): Los rostros de la razón. Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica (3 Bände). 1. Band: Filosofía Teórica. Barcelona und México: Anthropos und Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, S. 144–159. Riehl, Alois. 1924. Der philosophische Kritizismus. Geschichte und System, 1. Band, 3. Auf. Leipzig: Kröner. Schulting, Dennis. 2017. ‘Gap? What Gap? On the Transcendental Unity of Apperception’, in: D. Schulting: Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives in the Transcendental Deduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan, S. 141–191. Schulting, Dennis. 2018. ‘Gaps, Chasms and Things in Themselves: A Reply to My Critics’, in Kantian Review 23(1): 131–143. Schulting, Dennis. 2021. ‘Transcendental Logic and the Logic of Thought’, in: Studi Kantiani XXXIV: 115–126. Sluga, Hans. 1998. ‘Von der Uneinheitlichkeit des Wissens’, in: Marcelo Stamm (Hrsg.): Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht. Synthesis in Mind. Stuttgart: KlettCotta, S. 133–153.

6

A Role for Creative Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Science1 Patrícia Kauark-Leite2

6.1 Introduction Even today, scientifc creativity is regarded by our best theories of knowledge as belonging to a grey zone. This means that it is seen as a kind of cognitive process not clearly or easily defned and not covered by existing categories or set of rules. Many philosophers of science have considered it to be a merely intuitive, non-analysable, non-logical, and even non-rational cognitive process. For example, Karl Popper (2002 [1935/1959]: 7–8), in his seminal book The Logic of Scientifc Discovery, classifed the act of conceiving or inventing a scientifc theory within what Hans Reichenbach (1961 [1938]: 6–7) came to call three years later ‘context of discovery’ in contrast to ‘the context of justifcation’. In Reichenbach’s words: The way, for instance, in which a mathematician publishes a new demonstration, or a physicist his logical reasoning in the foundation of a new theory, would almost correspond to our concept of rational reconstruction; and the well-known difference between the thinker’s way of fnding this theorem and his way of presenting it before a public may illustrate the difference in question. I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of justifcation to mark this distinction. Then we have to say that epistemology is only occupied in constructing the context of justifcation. (Reichenbach 1961 [1938]: 6–7) Because the way in which the scientists invent or discover a new theory is so refractory to any logical analysis, both Popper and Reichenbach hold that it would belong more properly to the feld of empirical sciences, such as psychology or sociology of knowledge, than to the feld of epistemology or philosophy of science itself. In this sense, the process of conceiving a new idea, whether in art or science, is held to be similar in both cases, and it is not guided by any predetermined rules or methods. Only the process of justifcation in science follows a pattern that can be logically described by a set of rules and is properly part of the task of the epistemology or the logic of knowledge. In order to support this general idea of sharply distinguishing DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-8

88 Patrícia Kauark-Leite between the empirical process of conceiving a new idea and the philosophical methods of examining it logically, Popper then makes use of Kant’s distinction between quid juris and quid facti questions, introduced in §13 of the transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. In Popper’s words: The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic confict, or a scientifc theory—may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientifc knowledge. This latter is concerned not with questions of fact (Kant’s quid facti?), but only with questions of justifcation or validity (Kant’s quid juris?). Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justifed? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps contradict them? (Popper 2002 [1935/1959]: 7) In my view, Popper is right to consider the Kantian approach concerning the validity of scientifc propositions within the context of justifcation as a ‘de jure matter’ and not within the context of discovery as a ‘de facto matter’. As is well known, Kant begins the second chapter of the Analytic of Concepts (KrV, A84–87/B116–19) by arguing in §13 that the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding concerns questions about what is lawful (quid judis) and not questions about facts in the empirical world. Correspondingly, one of the main tasks of his frst Critique is to offer us a transcendental and not an empirical deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding. The transcendental deduction contains an ‘explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori’ as a normative endeavour in order to provide a justifcation for how a pure natural science is possible. Popper (2002: 11) is right in calling the problem of demarcation, i.e., ‘the problem of fnding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as ‘metaphysical’ systems on the other’, Kant’s problem. But was Popper right in claiming that Kant was not concerned with the context of discovery or, rather, with the process of creating scientifc theories? Kant certainly does not offer us a systematic approach to this complex and intricate cognitive process. Moreover, in his Critique of the Power of Judgment, he presents reasons for holding that the creativity process is not an object of empirical study (psychological or sociological) but instead an object of a transcendental investigation. More precisely, via his theory of genius, in the third Critique, Kant develops a transcendental inquiry into creativity, aimed specifcally at transcendental refection on the production of beautiful art. Nevertheless, despite Kant’s claim in the third Critique that genius produces only beautiful art, I argue in this work in favour of a more comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s theory of science, according to which the creative activity of human genius contributes to both original artistic

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and scientifc production alike. I want to show that science, in a transcendental perspective, appeals not only to the determining power of judgment, along with the logical rules that structure scientifc knowledge, but also to the refecting power of judgment, along with ideas of reason that are explicitly regulative and even fctional. In my view, it is precisely this creative, fctional dimension of scientifc theories that constitutes the Kantian radical enlightenment of knowledge: dare to know! ‘Dare to know’ is also ‘dare to create’. We can fnd suffcient material in Kant’s 1790 book for asserting, against Popper and Reichenbach, that the context of discovery has its place in a properly transcendental philosophical inquiry. As a consequence, even if we take as a given the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justifcation, and if we take into account Kant’s theory of genius’s creativity, it does not follow that the former belongs exclusively to the feld of empirical science. Both contexts in Kantian terms are thus a matter of philosophical and transcendental inquiry. 6.2 The New Role for Imagination The focus of Kant’s inquiry into imagination undergoes a profound shift in transcendental perspective from the frst to the third Critique. This is intimately related to the new role the faculty of imagination plays in the context of the refecting power of judgment in relation to artistic creativity. Kant attributes the properly creative function to the faculty of imagination, which acquires, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a completely novel dimension by comparison with that which was reserved for it in the frst Critique. In the third Critique, the critical function of imagination and its free play with the understanding is presented as part of the theory of genius. Kant, however, in the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, limits the creative and fctional activity of genius to artistic creativity only. If we want to take into account the original scientifc use of the faculty of imagination, the creativity of the scientifc genius is incompatible with the needlessly restrictive view of his theory of artistic genius in the third Critique. Meanwhile, we can fnd, in Kant’s third Critique, elements which enable us to think about a creative function of imagination in a broader sense capable of including the context of scientifc discoveries. From this perspective, then, I propose to consider the faculty of imagination in the frst Critique as related to the context of justifcation whereas in the third Critique as related to the context of discovery. In its earlier function or role, presented in the frst part of the transcendental doctrine of the determining power of judgment, or Analytic of Principles, of the frst Critique, imagination is responsible for producing the synthesis of schematism according to which schemas connect the pure concepts of understanding to sensibility through the temporal determination of the inner sense in general. Or in Kant’s words: ‘without schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not represent

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any object. This signifcance comes to them from sensibility, which realises the understanding at the same time as it restricts it’ (KrV, A147–B187). So, the function of imagination in the frst Critique is clearly a matter of providing justifcation and validity for the a priori concepts of pure understanding insofar as they are related to the manifold of intuition provided by the faculty of sensibility. Together with the other transcendental functions of the mind, the imagination forms the basis for explaining how a pure natural science is possible, how a posteriori and empirical statements are logically dependent on a priori and transcendental ones, and also how in general the system of knowledge is judged in respect of its validity and reliability. But, unlike the other transcendental functions, imagination plays a special mediating role that it alone is able to exercise, which is the function of synthesis either of the manifold of sensible intuition (synthesis speciose) or between concepts and intuitions (synthesis intellectualis). Even though it is said to be a blind function of which we are rarely conscious (KrV, A78/B103), the effects of both syntheses, in the case of scientifc knowledge, are completely limited to the schematism of categories, providing determined images either for the sensibility or for the understanding in their connection with the concepts. Hence the properly creative function of the imagination is very narrowly constrained in the frst Critique. Nevertheless, in its later function, as presented in the transcendental doctrine of the refecting power of judgment of the third Critique, the imagination acquires a new and original meaning, essentially related to the natural talent of human genius. This fundamental shift of perspective in favour of a greater autonomy of thought is based on the distinction, frst introduced by Kant in the third Critique, between the determining power of judgment and the refecting power of judgment. According to Kant, the determining power of judgment, originally described in the Critique of Pure Reason, is not an autonomous faculty, ‘for it merely subsumes under given laws or concepts as principles’. By sharp contrast, the refecting power of judgment, introduced in the third Critique, plays a special role for judgments of taste, for artistic production, and also for thinking about living beings. In a scientifc context, even though the refecting power of judgment is not an autonomous faculty, it has a nomothetic function that, together with the imagination, the understanding, and the reason, is able to subsume new particulars under the new general laws or concepts that are not yet given. Kant considers in the Second Division of the Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment that these general laws and concepts, even coming from the reason, are absolutely necessary to know nature according to its empirical laws (KU, §69, AA 05: 385). In this section of the third Critique, to provide a systematic and organic account of nature, Kant attributes to the power of judgment a nomothetic capacity for refecting which can subsume new images under new general principles and theoretical scientifc concepts. This new capacity was not exercised by the determining power of judgment. Thus, in order to handle the scientifc creativity and this new function of the refecting power of judgment,

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it is necessary to expand his theory of genius in such a way that the free play of the powers of representation can also be applied to the scientifc context. In my opinion, Kant was wrong when he asserts in §46 of the third Critique that genius produces only beautiful art (KU, AA 05: 307). So let’s take a critical look at the arguments he uses to justify his claim that only beautiful arts are the product of genius, whereas science should be excluded from the realm of genius. 6.3 Creativity and Genius Kant states in §43 that art, as a human ability to produce something, is to be distinguished from science, as theoretical knowledge about nature, in the same way that ‘knowledge-how’ (Können) differs from ‘knowledge-that’ (Wissen), or ‘[the] practical faculty is [to be] distinguished from a theoretical one, as technique is distinguished from theory (as the art of surveying is distinguished from geometry)’ (KU, AA 05: 303). And there is science, but not art, if the ‘knowledge-how’ is derived from the ‘knowledge- that’, as in the apocryphal case, mentioned by Kant, of Christopher Columbus’s egg:3 as soon as the solution of the enigma is known, anyone can do it. In this case, ‘know-how’ results from ‘knowledge-that’, and therefore there is no art in it. Conversely, in the domain of art, having the ability to do something does not stem from the knowledge of its causal effect or result. Suffcient knowledge of the product of art does not imply the ability to produce it. Kant cites as example the Dutch anatomist and naturalist Petrus Camper (1722–1789), who, although he had written a treatise on the best kinds of shoes,4 was unable to manufacture even one pair. Art is related not to theoretical knowledge, which is proper to science, but instead to man’s ability or faculty, through his freedom or power of choice, to produce something. However, since it is a mechanical art, which is concerned with utility, and not an aesthetic art, which has as its immediate purpose the feeling of interested or disinterested pleasure (§44), the art of producing the best shoes requires no genius. And among the aesthetic arts, which are either agreeable or beautiful, only the latter, that is, beautiful art, for Kant, ‘must necessarily be considered as arts of genius’ (KU, AA 05: 307, boldfacing in the original). Thus, Kant excludes from the activity of genius not only the mechanical arts and the pleasant aesthetic arts but also science and even philosophy. As we know, unlike the agreeable aesthetic arts which aim solely at producing pleasurable sensations, the beautiful arts presuppose the disinterested pleasure of refection and require the refecting power of judgment, through which both the universal communicability of a judgment of taste and the production of aesthetic ideas become possible. Because they do not aim at a specifc end, such as the production of shoes, that is proper to the mechanical arts, ‘beautiful art, by contrast, is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself’.

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As we know, on the basis of the second part of the third Critique, ‘The Critique of Teleological Power of Judgment’, the principle of conformity to ends is not restricted only to art and has a large application for thinking about nature in general and the living beings in particular. I want to hold, however, that it has an essential regulative function not only for biology but also for the mechanical science of nature. I want to argue here that the refecting power of judgment is what allows us to approach both art and science in order to understand, from a Kantian point of view, whatever there is, within science, that also belongs to art. My interest here does not focus on aesthetic judgments of science. As Kant puts it in §62 of the Analytic of the Faculty of Teleological Power of Judgment, we may take even the properties of circles and numbers, or various other facts of natural science, to be beautiful. But such a judgment would not be properly aesthetic, or a judgment of taste, since it would be an appraisal according to concepts and not according to the feeling of pleasure, in this case, therefore, an intellectual appraisal. My interest here focuses instead on the role of genius in scientifc activity insofar as it brings it closer to art in its mode of production, but not specifcally on aesthetic judgments of beauty in science. More specifcally, my point here is that, notwithstanding the position taken by Kant in his third Critique, science, especially in its revolutionary periods, is marked by the same conditions spelled out by Kant for artistic genius. In order to do so, I shall start from the defnition of genius given by Kant in §46, according to which ‘[g]enius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’ (KU, AA 05: 307, boldfacing in the original). And in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, he adds further that ‘Genius is the talent for discovering that which cannot be taught or learned’ (Anth, AA 07: 318). In line with this defnition, I will then show that science, with special emphases on the regulative principles of reason and on refective judgments, is possible only as a product of the genius. Correspondingly, I will argue that of the four properties of genius as explained by Kant in §46, namely, (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

originality, exemplarity, lack of logical rules, and what I’ll call ‘aestheticism’,

only the latter must be bracketted out for my purposes. If I am correct, then one can conclude that not only beautiful art but also our best scientifc theories must be taken to be the products of genius (Cf. KU, AA 05: 307–8). By the notion of originality, Kant wants to capture the basic characteristic or property of genius, to the effect that it cannot be taught or acquired by any learning process. It refers to the genius’s ability to produce something absolutely new and unique, that is, something that comes to exist in a primitively unprecedented way. The product of genius, by virtue of its originality, and

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precisely because it is not derived from any predetermined logical or epistemic rule, must nevertheless serve as a model or example for deriving rules that serve as a standard of judgment for new artistic works. Thus, exemplarity is also another basic characteristic or property of genius. And because its products have not been derived from a process of learning or imitation, there is no set of prescriptive rules according to which the creator, or anyone else, is able to explain how the creative process started or unfolded. Hence there are no logical or epistemic rules that can justify a priori the creative process in the production of beautiful art. Lack of logical or epistemic rules is thus the third basic characteristic or property of the genius. There is, in this sense, no science of art but instead only a critique of art (AA 5: 304). This is not to say that, for Kant, beautiful art does not presuppose or cannot be determined by rules. Since ‘every art presupposes rules which frst lay the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is frst represented as possible’, and also since ‘without a preceding rule a product can never be called art’ (KU, AA 05: 307), then, it is therefore necessary to assume, with Kant, that nature in the subject (and by means of the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art, i.e., beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius. And on the basis of this assumption, Kant infers the fourth basic characteristic or property of genius. His idea is that in art no rule-governed procedure can completely determine the artistic products of genius. By contrast, in science there would be a rule- governed method or procedure for generating its discoveries and so the genius plays no role in that. I call this fourth property of the genius ‘aestheticism’ for lack of a better term, since it emphasises the supremacy and superiority of aesthetic genius over other forms of creative manifestations of the human spirit such as science and philosophy. In my opinion, Kant is right about basic characteristics or properties (i), (ii), and (iii), but wrong about (iv), especially as regards the role of creation in scientifc research. By identifying science with ‘imitation’ or mimesis, Kant seems to contradict the radical consequences of his philosophical analysis of science in the frst Critique, when for instance, he says in the preface of B edition, referring to Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl, that They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires. (KrV, BXIII) In this quotation, Kant uses the terms ‘design’ [Entwurf] or ‘designed plan’ [entworfenen Plan] to express the idea that these insightful scientists

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discovered many new things because they acted as architects or sculptors, or more generally as an artist. It is hard to admit that scientists who led a revolution in physics in the way of thinking are guided by the ‘spirit of imitation’. His account of the nature of revolutions in science in the frst Critique is in clear opposition to his restrictive account of science in the doctrine of genius in the third Critique. So, I cannot agree with Kant’s claim in the third Critique that science is essentially imitation, and therefore its activity is entirely contrary to the power of genius. But why does Kant identify science with mimesis? The main reason, he argues, is because it is an activity that can be learned, which in turn essentially requires imitation, and therefore would not properly be produced by genius. In Kant’s own words: ‘since learning is nothing but imitation, even the greatest aptitude for learning, facility for learning (capacity) as such, still does not count as genius’ (KU, AA 05: 308). He then adds that not only is scientifc learning a result of imitation but also that scientifc discoveries themselves would be the result of an effort of learning and therefore of mimetic activity. And in this connection, he says that even if [someone] invents a great deal for art and science, this is still not a proper reason for calling such a great mind […] a genius, since just this sort of thing could also have been learned, and thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and refection in accordance with rules, and is not specifcally distinct from that which can be acquired with effort by means of imitation. (KU, AA 05: 308) In that sense, according to him, Newton would be a great mind, but not a genius, since, differently from the art of poetry, one can learn all the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy but not learn how to write a brilliant poem (KU, AA 05: 308–9). In the third Critique, Kant considers that the characteristic mark of scientifc endeavour would be a procedure marked by strictly logical rules that could be imitated by anyone with a proper educational background. Bryan Hall, in his essay, ‘Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientifc Discovery’, says – and I completely agree with him – that ‘the rule-governed procedure Kant has in mind is similar to what contemporary philosophers of science call a ‘logic of discovery’, i.e., a rule-governed procedure where the discovery is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises’ (2014: 539). Thus, according to Kant, there would be a logic for scientifc creation and no logic for creating a work of art. At frst glance, one might think that what would distinguish art from science, in Kant’s approach, would be that the former is not governed by rules. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that, on Kant’s theory of genius, an artistic production, in order to be considered the result of a creative process (and, thereby, truly innovative), must be understood against the background

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of some set of rules. Even if these rules are not predetermined, this does not mean that they do not exist at the end of the process. This is indeed what constitutes the proper natural talent of genius: ‘the predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’. There is no creativity without rules. Otherwise, the product of genius would be mere unregulated nonsense. And since new and original rules are created by the natural talent of genius, they reach the status of exemplarity. Serving as paradigmatic examples, they deserve imitation because of their excellence. In this sense, I argue that any creative process, whether artistic or scientifc, implies the reinvention of a new set of rules, which for their exemplarity can be learned and taught. So, for instance, both Newton’s laws of motion and Beethoven’s Piano Sonata can undoubtedly be taught or learned by an imitative procedure. But just as it was not possible to reconstruct by any methodological device the rules that led Beethoven to create his sonata, it would not be possible in the scientifc sphere to enunciate any methodological procedure that led Newton to the discovery of his laws. 6.4 The Context of Production and the Context of Reception in Art and in Science So far, I have tried to argue that the context of reception, whether in art or science, is not the same as the context of production and creation of the artistic or scientifc work. Yet, if there are important transcendental differences between the contexts of reception in art and science, there also should be important transcendental differences between the context of creation in art and in science. My fundamental purpose here is to try to understand what is fctional in the sciences, which make them distinct from the arts, and what is the role of scientifc imagination in producing the ideas of reason. So, it is crucial to distinguish the artistic genius from the scientifc genius and also from the philosophical genius. If the artistic genius is committed to the creation of aesthetic ideas, then the scientifc and philosophical genii are committed to the creation of ideas of reason. In Kant’s account, the idea of reason is the counterpart of the aesthetic idea, this being ‘a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate’ (KU, AA 05: 314). What I want to emphasise here is that the scientifc enterprise uses, besides the empirical laws produced by the interaction between sensibility and understanding, ideas of reason that can be used only hypothetically and heuristically as products of the creative activity of imagination. It is these ideas that are able to explain, at a second justifcatory level, why the empirical laws ft so well to sensible data. In this process, the imagination realises an aesthetic enlargement of thought, which only the genius, in its non-imitative production, is capable of realising. This new function of imagination related to the genius is what properly distinguishes the theory of imagination in the third Critique from the theory of the imagination in the frst Critique. In the frst Critique, the

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imagination is constrained by the understanding. But in the third Critique, it is autonomous.5 It allows itself to go beyond the agreement of intuition to the concept, thereby providing a material rich in content that the understanding could never achieve. What I think Kant lacked, however, is a theory of the imagination that is not limited to an auxiliary function of understanding, to the production of schemata (as in the frst Critique), and also not limited only to the function of the creation of aesthetic ideas (as in the third Critique). It is thus necessary to extend the faculty of imagination so that it is also directly involved in the creation of ideas of reason, which in turn are absolutely necessary for the scientifc investigation of nature, in order to recreate it as an organic whole containing a systematic unity of empirical laws. In this way, the faculties of sensibility and understanding do not exhaust the ‘fundamental sources of mind’ in the production of knowledge. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account for the development of scientifc theories another faculty besides these two, notably the power of refecting judgment, whose function is related to the reason, which is also a content producer. But the irreducible contents produced by the reason in its free play with the imagination can be used only in a hypothetical or regulative sense, as if (‘als ob’) reality were so constituted, but never constitutively in order to affrm that reality is in fact and objectively in accordance with these contents. Only the empirical laws can be constitutively used. In my opinion, the ideas of reason provide certain irreducible contents for scientifc knowledge that are neither false nor true, over and above purely empirical facts. They are not descriptive but instead prescriptive, and for this reason, they cannot be realistically interpreted. These new contents are projected by reason onto nature in order to satisfy its own desires and interests. But they are also necessary to explain constitutive empirical laws. Especially in the transcendental Dialectic of the frst Critique, and in the introductions and the second part of the third Critique, Kant makes it clear that the construction of empirical knowledge must appeal both to an inductive process (regulated by rules of understanding) and also to a heuristic procedure of proposing hypotheses (which is not governed by rules, whose function is attributed to reason in the frst Critique or to the refecting power of judgment, as he expounds in the third Critique). Without this characteristic activity of reason, consisting in a creative anticipation of nature, where what is at stake is the transcendental principle of conformity to the ends of the refecting power of judgment, an organic and systemic construction of scientifc theories would not be possible. We cannot understand transcendentally the scientifc activity as reduced to the mere action of the determining power of judgment in its procedure of subsumption of the categories of understanding to sensible intuitions. In scientifc activity, besides the schematism of the concepts in its application to empirical objects, it is important as well to consider the creative activity of reason in its refective free play of the cognitive powers. It is in relation to

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this second procedure that the creative and original force of scientifc genius is made manifest. It is certain that Kant introduces the notion of the free play of the cognitive powers in order to take into account our claim to universal necessary validity for our judgments of beauty on the basis of a feeling of pleasure or displeasure (KU, §9). However, on my account, the free play of the cognitive powers is not restricted to the aesthetic feeling of pleasure/displeasure in the production of both outputs: a pure judgment of taste and a beautiful object. In my opinion, the free play of the cognitive powers can be expanded to our intellectual dimension in the production of new concepts or universals or even a theory. Thus, the free play can take place in both directions: either to produce new single images, as in the case of aesthetic ideas, or to produce new concepts, as in the case of the ideas of reason. In the former, the refecting power of judgment (that is, ‘the faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general’) subsumes a new singular image under a predetermined universal concept as a result of the free play between imagination and understanding. In the latter, the refecting power of judgment subsumes also a new singular image under a new universal concept from a dynamical free play between imagination and reason. In this latter use, the refecting power of judgment has the role of assisting reason (that is, ‘the faculty for the determination of the particular through the general’) in its creative process of new concepts. The free play of the cognitive powers in scientifc contexts allows the creation of ideas to which no intuition can be adequate. This play, in which it is not possible to dispense with intuition, also creates new intuitive representations or images, in relation to which no conceptual scheme is adequate, in the service of an aesthetic enlargement of thought. Thus, unlike art, which cannot dispense with aesthetic ideas, where the understanding is at the service of imagination, by contrast in science, which cannot dispense with ideas of reason, the imagination is at the service of the refecting power of judgment and reason. Notes 1 This project has received funding from the Brazilian  Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES) and is part of the activities of Kant in South America (KANTINSA) project, founded by Minas Gerais Research Foundation (FAPEMIG) and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 777786. 2 I would like to deeply thank Andrew Ward for his critical comments that greatly improved the manuscript and also my colleagues Giorgia Cecchinato and Virginia Araujo Figueiredo for their thoughtful and helpful suggestions. I also thank Heiner Klemme, who welcomed me as a visiting researcher at Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, where part of this research was developed. I am also grateful to Robert Hanna, Günter Zöller, Manja Kisner, Larissa Wallner, Henny Blomme, and Karin de Boer for inviting me to discuss some of these ideas in conferences organ-

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ised in Kaliningrad, Munich, and Leuven. Finally, I would like to thank Fernando Silva and Luigi Caranti for the invitation to publish this work in this collective volume dedicated to Kantian thought. 3 See Wikipedia, ‘The Egg of Columbus’ (2019): ‘An egg of Columbus or Columbus’[s] egg […] refers to a brilliant idea or discovery that seems simple or easy after the fact. The expression refers to an apocryphal story in which Christopher Columbus, having been told that discovering the Americas was inevitable and no great accomplishment, challenges his critics to make an egg stand on its tip. After his challengers give up, Columbus does it himself by tapping the egg on the table to fatten its tip’. Available online at URL 4 Petrus Camper, Abhandlung über die beste Forme der Schuhe, Berlin, 1783. 5 Cf. Virginia Figueiredo, O gênio kantiano ou o refém da natureza. Impulso, 38, 2004, 47–58.

References Figueiredo, Virginia. 2004. ‘O gênio kantiano ou o refém da natureza’, in Impulso 38: 47–58. Hall, Bryan. 2014. ‘Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientifc Discovery’, in Intellectual History Review 24, no. 4: 539–556. Kisner, Manja. 2019. ‘Originalität im Denken und das Denken der Originalität bei Kant’, in Kisner, Manja et al. (Hrsg.). Das Selbst und die Welt. Beiträge zu Kant und der nachkantischen Philosophie. Festschrift für Günter Zöller. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann Verlag, pp. 74–95. Popper, Karl. 2002. The Logic of Scientifc Discovery. London and New York: Routledge (Original published in German in 1934; frst English translation in 1959). Reichenbach, Hans. 1961. Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Chicago: Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press (Original published in 1938).

7

On Becoming a Person and Creating the Kingdom of Ends Evolution and Revolution towards Freedom Paulo Jesus

7.1 Know Thyself! In Search of the ‘Idion’ of Humanity 7.1.1 The Will to Defne and Value

Any defnition of the essence of humanity encloses and assumes necessarily a system of relationships and differential oppositions with their qualitative overlaps, hiatuses, borders, and possible bridges. In this sense, grasping one’s own innermost idion or proprium mode of being, or essentially ‘proper’ mode of becoming, brings about and opens up a meaningful whole, a wide cosmos and physis grounded in a normative system of value, belief, and hope. In an Aristotelian logical perspective,1 a defnition conveys a frst principle or frst beginning (arche) that must exhibit the unifed essence of a kind of being and, by the same token, lay the groundwork of a unifed science. However, it seems to remain obscure the way in which empirical induction and comparison interact with intellectual intuition and refection in order to grasp the essence of humanity. To apply judiciously one’s discernment to disentangle the ultimate essential defnition or formula of humanity (our fundamental logos tes ousias) from the rhapsodic plurality of seemingly unique characters (idia) constitutes a most demanding logical, metaphysical, and empirical task. Ideally, all human idia should fnd their source and their meaning in one and only supreme idion, i.e., the human essence. A rigorous essence-grasping defnition manifests a universal attribution where subject and predicate must necessarily be convertible and coextensive. In the Jäsche Logic, Kant offers a hugely demanding doctrine on defnition, incorporating the content of the Posterior Analytics, thus jeopardising the epistemic aspirations of Anthropology: § 99 Defnition A defnition is a suffciently distinct and precise concept (conceptus rei adaequatus in minimis terminis, complete determinatus). […] § 103 Impossibility of empirically synthetic defnitions Since the synthesis of empirical concepts is not arbitrary but rather is empirical and as such can never be complete (because one can always DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-9

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discover in experience more marks of the concept), empirical concepts cannot be defned, either. […] § 105 Expositions and descriptions Not all concepts can be defned, and not all need to be. There are approximations to the defnition of certain concepts; these are partly expositions (expositions), partly descriptions (descriptions). The expounding of a concept consists in the connected (successive) representation of its marks, insofar as these are found through analysis. Description is the exposition of a concept, insofar as it is not precise. […] § 106 Nominal and real defnitions By mere defnitions of names, or nominal defnitions, are to be understood those that contain the meaning that one wanted arbitrarily to give to a certain name […]. Defnitions of things, or real defnitions, on the other hand, are ones that suffce for cognition of the object according to its inner determinations, since they present the possibility of the object from inner marks. […] Logical nominal defnitions of given concepts of the understanding are derived from an attribute, real defnitions, on the other hand, from the essence of the thing, the frst ground of possibility.2 The attractiveness and saliency of some idia generate a chaotic diffusion of nominal defnitions whose orbits around the true essence are not intelligible. An essential or real defnition should organise all idia in an architectonic plan, projecting a hierarchical totality, a perfect groundwork to a science. Yet, to a large extent, a presumptively essential defnition comprises an explanans underneath and beyond all possible explanation, as though it enclosed an irreducible core of heuristic passivity and activity under the guise of an audacious belief, claiming or attempting to claim absolute evidence or intellectual unquestioned certainty, amounting to petitio principii, quite similar to a half-sensory and half-ideational irresistible hallucination. In the case of anthropology, most defnitional attempts translate into nothing but incomplete descriptions and arbitrarily nominal defnitions. Given human’s self-focusing attention that permanently fuctuates accompanying our experience without any strict logical discipline, the defnition of humanity is likely to be the most susceptible to confound an idion with an ousia, and, what is more, to mistake mere axiological and metaphysical preferences for truly logical or ontological hierarchies. Feuerbach’s denunciation of the imaginative structure of theology as projected anthropology formulates a daring hypothesis that puts into question the human capacity to understand its essence, that is, the consciousness of the genus homo, for consciousness is the ‘capacity to science’ that presupposes the ‘consciousness of genera’ whose connection to religion is established by infnity: just as religion is the consciousness of infnity, so self-consciousness is the consciousness of the human infnite essence.3 One stumbles so easily upon diverse salient human idia that one may immediately yield to multiple fabulations

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of preferred realities, hallucinations of supposed or assumed essences, which may reveal themselves to be rather incidental postulates belonging to a peculiar mode of valuing certain types or qualities of human life. The idea of human essence may easily ebb and fow in accordance with the gravity of various axiologies, drawing and erasing a plurality of non-essential idia in the unstable sand of myth and rite. Many once-compelling idia may also over time and across different communities of value lose their semblant of uniqueness. In the closing sentences of The Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses), one might argue, Foucault is inebriated by the unbearable ontological and axiological lightness of humanity in the realm of modern human sciences, thus prophesying its disappearance, its irreversible erasure, ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’.4 Such a positive new arrangement of human knowledge would probably require a non-human logician to achieve it. The invention of humanity is neither a recent invention nor an exhausted invention of Discourse fowing towards an impersonal post-human venture. Rather, the mutations of Discourse testify to human inventiveness itself. Among the most forceful human idia are those that analytically propose hermeneutic self-refexiveness, namely: ‘Only humans search for their defnition as if for a frst self-explanation of all other possible explanations’. In other words, the intellectual passion for primitive beginnings, ultimate ends, and qualitative transitions blends the value of self-understanding with the value of self-improvement, demonstrating that anthropological concepts are originally created and loaded with axiological energies, where Bewusstsein der Gattung, Bewusstsein des Unendlichen, and Selbstbewusstsein overlap and fuse. Aristotelian and Kantian axiological anthropologies partly share the main centres of gravity and the main vectorial forces, namely: zoe, logos, nous, polis. The self-grounded and self-responsible power of living according to the idea of the good through logos and nous constitutes the natural dynamic determination of humanity, a unique process of self-actualisation in the whole living universe. For both philosophers, the exceptional nature of humanity lies in the self-developmental potentiality of ‘thinking’ whose intrinsic value imposes itself as self-evident, self-explanatory, and self-dignifying. However, rather than a directly positive self-contained and self-affrming defnition of humanity, the distinctiveness of this ’proper’ human oikos in cosmos and physis requires a clear system of differences with a specifc self-demarcation and self-discovery in relation to otherness, especially the intimate otherness of ‘animality’ and ‘divinity’. Identifying and conceiving one’s own proper being involves the hermeneutic selection of a realm of self-enlightening otherness. By otherness, it is meant here all those modes of being broadly experienced and conceived as other-than-me located within the shared symbolic system of life, an ideal wholeness of being together, living with and against each other, according to determined commonalities and singularities discovered as conceptually effcacious, inferred as problematically true-in-themselves, and deemed to be existentially signifcant and valuable. In other words, given the

102  Paulo Jesus metaphysical uncertainty concerning human’s true nature, the question of the human mission in the history of life on earth enjoys a qualitative primacy over the question of the most primitive and explanatory essence. 7.1.2 Axiological Anthropology: Primal Earthly Scenes of Self-Reflection

However vague and however uncertain they may be, the etymological meanings of ἄνθρωπος and homo, the classical nouns for common humanity, in contrast to gendered ἀνήρ and vir, testify to the Indo-European cultural history of the self-interpretation and self-evaluation of humanity when attempting to grasp and express their own essence in contradistinction with significant modes of otherness. The system of oppositions that unfolds in those etyma since the Homeric imagination seems not only to revolve around the difference between lower and higher, earth and heaven, but also to exhibit the natural hierarchy of living beings which comprise mortals and non-mortals, as well as, among the mortals, those (‘us humans’) that stand up on two feet and can turn their face to the sky, and those (‘them beasts’) that must remain on the ground on four feet and keep their gaze turned downwards. The Proto-Indo-European roots for ‘humans’ and ‘gods’ already denote and discriminate ‘inhabitant of the earth’ (*dhghem-ō(n)) living ‘below’, on the ground under the sky (*(é)n-er-o-), and ‘inhabitant of the heaven’ (*deiu-ó-) living ‘above’ and ‘beyond’ (*(s)úp-er-o-). The traditional etymology of ἄνθρωπος exposes its derivation from a compound word joining man (ἀνήρ, ἀνδρός) and eye, face or countenance (ὤψ, ὠπός), which is intended to convey a mode of self-understanding that emphasises the earthly human rootedness by referring to the specific human way of appearing, seeing and being seen, as well as the specific bodily human way of relating to things. An alternative etymology, argumentatively justified by R. Garnier, renders the human embeddedness in the ground more explicit and more crucial, for it replaces the root ἀνδρ- by ἄνθρ-, and thereby argues that the ending corresponds to the nominalisation of an adjective. This alternative has the double merit of avoiding any semantic privilege assigned to masculinity (because ἀνήρ means usually male human) and of overcoming the need for explaining a linguistic enigmatic transformation in the genitive root of ἀνήρ. It hence follows that the core meaning of ἄνθρωπος encompasses nothing but a simple spatial orientation and a bodily countenance, ‘the one who is below on the ground’, i.e., ‘earthling’, terrestrially oriented being. The ‘earthling’ appears also in the Latin homo, intimately related to humus, ‘earth’, whose ancestry delves equally into the Proto-Indo-European, *ǵʰm̥mṓ (earthling) and *dʰéǵʰōm (earth). Similarly, justifying the hypothesis of a deep linguistic genetic relationship, Semitic languages also connect our common humanity (ha-adam) with earth or soil (hadamah). The Yahwist source of the Pentateuch reinterprets some elements of the Epic of Gilgamesh5 and designs a narrative account of the creation of humanity (Gen. 2, 4b-25), whose most innovative feature is displayed by the relational and dialogical matrix of

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Adam who comes to life formed and called by God, known and desired by God as a living whole: ‘God formed the man [ha-adam] from the dust [hadamah] of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath [neshamah] of life, and the man became a living being [nefes hajja]’ (Gen. 2, 7). Dust and breath do not prefgure the dualism of body and soul; rather, the generation and maintenance of life by God’s warm breath constitute a transcendent gift, a constitutive intimacy, an ontological bond, between Adam and God, at the heart of life.6 This breath announces the semblance that elevates human life to a mysterious theomorphism and differentiates humanity from all animality. Interestingly, Aristotle imagines that there is a kind of immanent, heavenly breath, ‘a matter different from and more divine than the so-called elements’, a fery breath encapsulated within the semen of animals because all vital force must be already in the semen: All have in their semen that which causes it to be productive; I mean what is called vital heat. This is not fre nor any such force, but it is the breath included in the semen and the foam-like, and the natural principle in the breath, being analogous to the element of the stars. (Aristotle, Generation of Animals, II 3, 736a32–37)7 The Priestly account of the creation of humanity (Gen. 1, 26–27) introduces a striking stylistic rupture when it comes to labours of the sixth day: God creates everything by calling to being, ‘Let there be […]’, but when ha-adam is called to being, the poetic creative formula changes. A qualitative novelty arises, God pronounces a new poem focused on their intimacy: Let us make ha-adam in our image [tselem], in our likeness [demut], so that they may rule over [all other living beings]. So God created ha-adam in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. (Gen. 1, 26–27) The semantic ambiguity of imago Dei cannot be dissolved, but one must underline that God’s similitude involves the whole person and the whole humanity at the climactic point of the cosmogonic narrative on the sixth day. The divine image shines in ha-adam as a full-fedged living being, encompassing its unity and diversity, for ha-adam is both male and female. God does not bestow the divine similitude on humanity, not on a single human individual, nor on a human quality, such as immortal anima/psyche, higher rationality, or intelligence. Moreover, it seems to inaugurate an alliance of collaboration in the sense that Adam is invested with a God-like cosmic vocation and mission: to rule over every living being, to fll the earth, and to subdue it. This cosmic responsibility does not authorise any natural right of simple self-preservation; rather, it expresses a duty of caring and cultivating as an earthling committed to attending to earth’s natural order.

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In sharp contrast with the constitutively interlocutory life and mission of Adam, the story of Enkidu is pervaded by the uneasy solitude in the wilderness among animals despite the supposed companionship with Gilgamesh; and, at the end of his life, Enkidu astonishingly regrets having been deprived from the state of nature. For the Yahwist writer, the inanimate dust of the ground is at once the origin and the destiny of humanity: the cycle of human life traces an arc from dust to dust, from earth to earth – through earthly active ethos of labouring in the soil, cultivating the earth and making it fourish (instead of the ethos of noetic contemplation, theorein). There are two different trees in the garden, the tree of knowledge and the tree of life; their fruits transform those who eat them into quasi-gods by infusing the sense of good and evil and instilling the gift of immortality. The similitude to God attains a transformational stage when God herself acknowledges the truth proclaimed by the deceiving serpent to incite the irrepressible desire of transgressing the accepted order (‘For God knows that in the day you eat of it, your eyes will be opened and you will be like God, knowing good and evil’. Gen. 3,5) and declares: Behold, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil. And now, lest he reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever […] Therefore, the Lord God banished him from the Garden of Eden to work the ground from which he had been taken. (Gen. 3,22) The scandal of human mortality and human evil, equated with the desire to become equal to gods through instinctually self-destructive forces, will be depicted by Kant as a natural human contradiction, an internal division, between the sensible character and the intelligible character. For Kant, the personhood of humanity (i.e., enjoying the conscious power of freedom) assures her natural goodness, while evil derives solely from a kind of ‘selfabandonment’, never a positive consent to evil sub specie boni.8 Under the aegis of the cosmogonic myth, this inner confict of good and evil (and enduring guilt), as well as the confict of life and death (and ingrained hopeful desire of eternity), dwells at the centre of both creational narratives, Babylonian and Hebrew. Therefore, the anthropological issues seem culturally more cogent than the cosmological and cosmogonic hypotheses, especially if one considers the greater attention assigned to the primordial story of humanity, in comparison with the only Biblical cosmogony, the liturgical portrayal of the creation of the world (Gen. 1,1–2,4a), compounded by the Priestly source, maybe the latest stratum of the Pentateuch.9 ‘From dust to dust’ (Gen. 3,19; Eccles. 3, 20) – this is an unbearable melancholy imagining for the human self-consciousness, which is deeply entangled with the idea of being and with the simplicity of selfhood, immediately thought and felt as though in infnitum. The conscious recognition of the

On Becoming a Person and Creating the Kingdom of Ends  105 possibility of death unleashes an anxious and illusory inner dialogue revolving around the impossible thought that ‘I am not’, carrying with itself ‘not a horror of dying’ (for it can be imagined as a gentle liberation and release from all pain) but ‘horror at the thought of having died (that is, of being dead)’.10 The consciousness of total ontological dependency on the insufflation of life through the divine breath invites one to trust on the caring goodness of God’s generous creativity. Between dust and life as well as between life and dust, there is an act of God, instilling or withdrawing breath, according to inscrutable wisdom. 7.1.3 Anthropos: Understanding an Exceptional Animality

With wide philosophical and linguistic liberty, Plato in Cratylus describes Socrates building an etymological reasoning on ἄνθρωπος, whose meaning would denote a ‘specific way of seeing’ that integrates intelligence. Socrates maintains that ἄνθρωπος was originally a sentence (ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε) that became the name of an animal species, thus giving a strictly semantic explanation based on the difference between humans and beasts in their ways of seeing: The name ‘human’ [ἄνθρωπος] signifies that the other animals do not investigate or reason [ἀναθρεῖ] about anything they see, nor do they examine anything. But a human being no sooner sees something—that is ‘has seen’ [ὄπωπε]—than he observes closely and reasons [καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται] about what he has seen. Hence human beings alone among the animals are correctly named ἄνθρωπος, he who examines what he has seen [ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε].11 (Cratylus, 399 c) This passage bears strong affinities with Theaetetus (186 c–d) where Socrates distinguishes humans and animals on the basis of the difference between ‘calculations’ (ἀναλογίσματα), which lead to one’s grasping being and truth, that is, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which transcends the realm of mere perception (αἴσθησις) or sensory experience: Socrates: And thus there are some things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are naturally able to perceive as soon as they are born; I mean, the experiences which reach the soul through the body. But calculations regarding their being and their advantageousness come, when they do, only as the result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal of trouble and education.12 (Theaetetus, 186 c) In both passages, Plato engages in the description of crucial human idia without providing a clear and explanatory essential definition. A more formally

106  Paulo Jesus perfect account assigned to the Platonists will result in an ironical, if not sarcastic, taxonomic definition that devises a specific place for human corporeality in the system of animals, while remaining completely empty from a mental or psychical perspective where the connection between logos and psyche seems to unveil the secret of human exceptionality. A philosophical legend reported by Laertius depicts Diogenes of Sinope reducing to absurdity the definition of mankind as ‘biped featherless animal’ (ζῷον δίπουν, ἄπτερον).13 This formula resembles the Aristotelian structure of definitions – genus proximum and differentia specifica – and its relatively formal success requires the location of the human being within the confines of zoology. In fact, the ‘Young Socrates’ praises the reasoning of the ‘Visitor’ who attempts at discriminating the properties of mankind by dividing animal species and thus opposing the attributes of humanity to those of other classes of animals: four-footed to two-footed, feathered to non-feathered, and animal-herding to human-herding (pointing to the unique human manner of sociality as an idion).14 The definition of essence through the branching or dualising of zoological classes offers a relatively sound logical solution, though metaphysically unsatisfactory. This solution resonates (maybe ironically, if not sarcastically) across some Aristotelian passages, namely in the Categories (V, 3a9–15; 21–25) and in Metaphysics (VII 12, 1037b9–23), heralding the logical formula of man: Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not treated of it in the Analytics; for the problem stated in them is useful for our inquiries concerning substance. I mean this problem: – wherein consists the unity of that, the formula of which we call a definition, as for instance in the case of man, two-footed animal; for let this be the formula of man. […] [T]he differentiae present in man are many, e.g., endowed with feet, two-footed, featherless. Why are these one and not many? Not because they are present in one thing; for on this principle a unity can be made out of any set of attributes. But surely all the attributes in the definition must be one; for the definition is a single formula and a formula of substance, so that it must be a formula of some one thing; for substance means a ‘one’ and a ‘this’, as we maintain.15 (Metaphysics, VII 12, 1037b9–23) When Aristotle focuses on a description of the nature of humanity without the logical aim of designing a rigorous taxonomy and reaching the perfect form of a definition, then the idia of humanity multiply and their centre of gravity lies in logos. The human being alone has a kind of koinonia giving rise to the family and the city, because humanity alone enjoys logos, whose power goes far beyond animal vocalisation, the mere phonetic expression of pleasure and pain. For logos exhibits the power of thinking and enacts meaningful shared articulation, expressing also the sense of good and evil, just and unjust, required as a necessary condition of all possible human koinonia:

On Becoming a Person and Creating the Kingdom of Ends  107 Now, that man is more of [μᾶλλον, ‘more’ or ‘rather’] a political animal [πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον] than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain [μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ], and man alone of the animals possesses speech [λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων]. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech [λόγος] is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man [τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον] that he alone [τὸ μόνον] has any sense [αἴσθησιν] of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association [κοινωνία] of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state [οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν].16 (Aristotle, Politics, I 2, 1253a7–18) ‘Nature makes nothing in vain’, that is to say, the seemingly heterogeneous set of idia of humanity forms an organic system, a well-concatenated living whole, foreshadowing the Kantian notion of ‘organism’ and ‘natural end’ (Kant, CPJ, § 64–66, AA 05: 369–377). The nature’s design is demonstrated by the systematic and unified organisation of the human being, whose natural architecture exhibits a perfectly functional congruence and teleological efficacy between the anatomic structure (two-footed, upright posture with free hands) and the mental powers, as Aristotle argues: In man the forelegs and forefeet are replaced by arms and what we call hands. For of all animals man alone stands erect, in accordance with his god-like nature and substance [ten physin autou kai ten ousian theian]. For it is the function of the god-like [theiotatou] to think [noein] and to be wise [phronein]; and no easy task were this under the burden of a heavy body, pressing down from above and obstructing by its weight the motions of the intellect [dianoian] and of the general sense [koinen aisthesin]. When, moreover, the weight and corporeal substance become excessive, the body must of necessity incline towards the ground. In such cases therefore nature, in order to give support to the body, has replaced the arms and hands by forefeet, and thus converted the animal into a quadruped. […] For all animals, man alone excepted, are dwarf-like in form. […] This is the reason why no other animal is so intelligent [aphronestera] as man.17 (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, IV 10, 686a25–686b22) The human psychical principle and the human corporeal structure constitute a functional unity, as though the body supplied the necessary condition (if not the efficient causality) for the activities of the soul or mind. Now, the development of the unique human logos presupposes the liberation of the

108  Paulo Jesus soul from the weight of dwarf-like and quadruped bodies, which amounts to a certain lightness, close to a certain ‘disembodiment’ or liberation from the degrading gravity of corporeality. Humanity alone possesses a type of body (i.e., a proportionate bodily form) that overcomes animality and thereby envelops a God-like nature and essence. In this sense, anthropology transgresses the boundaries of zoology and demands a properly human, and quasi-divine psychology. As Aristotle upholds in the Book III of De Anima (especially 429a10–429b9), the special human psychology of thinking provokes the collapse of the general hylomorphic principle of psychology. Given the exceptional nature of thinking, humanity must stay absolutely alone in an unclassifiable ontological atopia. The uniquely quasi-divine human thinking activity (τὸ νοεῖν), contrarily to sensation or perception (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι), is performed by a very peculiar soul (or power of the soul, ἡ νοητική) which does not reside in any bodily organ, nor does it animate any sort of body; thus, such a soul persists as pure inexhaustible and perpetual activity, utterly independent and disengaged from all possible types of koinonia between bodies and souls. Subsequently, the generation of νοῦς cannot be explained by embryological processes, one must admit a new natural and enigmatic exception, a non-bodily principle coming from outside: ‘It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason’ (Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 3, 736a27–29).18 As an indeterminate thinking capacity, the thinking soul or intellect (νοῦς) consists of a disembodied, unextended ‘place of forms’ (τόπος εἰδῶν), a pure potentiality of becoming everything. Here a new imago Dei reveals itself, placing anthropology in a hybrid realm between zoology and theology, which invalidates the epistemological legitimacy to pursue a science solidly built on the human essence.19 As a matter of fact, one may contend that a formally accurate definition of the human being is not available in the Aristotelian corpus; accordingly, there is no anthropological treatise, and maybe the most approximate and germane attempt would reside in the ethics. The full accomplishment of humanity lies in the exercise of νοῦς, a quasi-divine theorein, and hence for us humans to live perfectly in total agreement with our nature amounts to ‘make ourselves immortal’ (i.e., as typifying a divine life); for that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X 7, 1178a5–8)20 Happiness equates with contemplation, and contemplation alone. This is why animals cannot be happy, whilst gods are permanently happy. It follows inexorably that, in the middle anthropological ground, the share of happiness that humanity may enjoy depends solely on the degree of likeness

On Becoming a Person and Creating the Kingdom of Ends  109 through which human beings may approach wisdom and thereby approach gods themselves, partaking in their substance as it were: For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which was best and most akin to them (i.e., intellect) and that they should reward those who love and honor this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man is manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be also happiest; so that in this way too the wise man will more than any other be happy.21 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X 8, 1179a24–32) In the pursuit of happiness, humanity searches for the divine within herself. The ‘essence’ of humanity cannot be clearly unveiled and grasped by a formally accurate logos tes ousias. It remains true, nevertheless, that the natural vocation of all human development must be oriented towards the fulfilment of the highest excellence. So, all human poiesis and all human praxis (including the ultimate self-realisation of phronesis in ethical life and in political constructions) aim at theoria, the happiness of humanity, experiencing and appreciating an intellectual kind of theomorphism – the metaphysics of God exposing simply a ‘self-thinking thought’ (νόησις νοήσεως).22 The virtues of every individual and the laws of every polis obtain one and the same summum bonum, happiness, the intensive and extensive satisfaction of νοῦς through the ‘energy’ of its nature and essence, τὸ νοεῖν. The lack of a formally correct classification and essential definition of humanity renders understandable the lack of a genuine ‘science of mankind’. To a certain extent, this situation entails an epistemic humility, appreciatively celebrated by the Cynics, both ancient and modern, and converted into a stable groundwork for an ever-renewed Socratic experiential eidos of philosophy. As Brandt23 aptly emphasises in his contextual assessment of the Kantian anthropology, the historical failure of an essential grasping of humanity promotes the flourishing of an Enlightened Stoic movement that abandons the Definitionsfrage and embraces the Bestimmungsfrage. This displacement proves to be very congenial with the fundamentally ‘praxical’ import of the Aristotelian νοῦς whose activity generates ‘good life’, as well as with the Kantian primacy of practice over theory. Yet the idea of human essence and human nature cannot be entirely dismissed and relinquished, insofar as Bestimmung and Selbstbestimmung carry with themselves a sort of dynamic self-defining interiority, implicitly appealing to the ‘natural’ principle of self-agreement or conducting one’s life secundum naturam. The elucidation of the human vocation and her ‘proper’ way of living, faithful to a vow one pledges to oneself, promising self-fidelity and self-accomplishment, assumes necessarily that there is an intrinsic and transcendental practical

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truth granting a defnitive criterion or canon for self-understanding and selfevaluation. This practical ‘essence’ unfolding epigenetically and historically in infnitum enacts the epiphany of the seminal and essential human potentialities, however theoretically obscure they may be. 7.2 Care for Yourself! In Search of the ‘Method’ for Humanisation In keeping with the logical and metaphysical tradition, Kant also confronts the daunting and ultimately insoluble task of establishing a defnition of human essence under the main heading of ‘character of the person’ (der Charakter der Person, whose hard core lies in the Charakter als Denkungsart)24 and ‘character of human species’ (der Charakter der Gattung / Menschengattung).25 If one adopts the dichotomic division within terrestrial animality between ‘rational or intelligent beings and ‘non-rational (i.e., merely sensible) beings’, thus opposing humanity to all other animals, then rationality or intelligence would be an exclusively human trait (idion and monon). Now, if there is no possibility of comparing different types of intelligence, then the very nature of intelligence remains opaque. The ousia of humanity enigmatically withdraws from the scope of knowledge. Assuming that some terrestrial, non-human, animals are also intelligent, or at least analogically intelligent, Kant could devise an effcient tertium comparationis, approaching maybe the Leibnizian metaphysics and its principle of panpsychical continuity. However, Kant does not ponder such trans-specifc modes of intelligence among earthly animals. Veritably, intelligence stricto sensu comprehends the spontaneity of understanding, the power of rules and concepts operating necessarily under the unity of consciousness (i.e., the self-possession and self-accompaniment of the I). Despite his egological and conceptual notion of intelligence as generation of universal validity and objective experience, through das Bestimmende in mir (B158n), Kant concedes that irrational animals do display sensible cognition and arbitrium brutum, encompassing obscure representations, obscure inclinations, reproductive imagination, and instinctive refection.26 Ergo, humanity is ontologically exceptional in the realm of life. The only imaginable path would be a fctional scenario in which the widest genus of intelligent beings would comprise terrestrial and non-terrestrial beings, a hypothesis (so far) beyond experience, although a heuristic hypothesis which Kant enjoys entertaining as a source for philosophising.27 Another imaginative exploration on the essence of rationality seems to be tentatively and inchoatively examined by comparing the human intelligence (implying discursivity as intellectus ectypus) with the divine intelligence (absolutely intuitive and creative as intellectus archetypus).28 Needless to say, Kant does not succumb to any metaphysically dogmatic vision, such as a divine participation or imago Dei, since he does not locate intelligence in a sphere of non-animality. For Kant, intelligence belongs to the creative materiality of nature, being in humans the naturally effcient guiding force, functionally correlative to animal instinct. The incompleteness of this system

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of contrasts and analogies stays unsurmountable. Anthropology evolves or divagates descriptively without any authentically self-suffcient and selfexplanatory Leitfaden. It hence follows that the determination of the essence of intelligence, and by the same token the essence of humanity herself, persists as an open task.29 The openness and the indeterminacy of the idea of humanity stand overtly perceivable since the frst page of the Anthropology when Kant proposes the relation to one’s own thinking self, the intellectual evidence of the I, as the human idion par excellence: § I. The fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in his representations raises him infnitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person – i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes. This holds even when he cannot yet say ‘I,’ because he still has it in thoughts, just as all languages must think it when they speak in the frst person, even if they do not have a special word to express this concept of ‘I.’ For this faculty (namely to think) is understanding.30 The I of the I think exposes a void: it encloses the consciousness of spontaneity and the certainty of being. This I think and I am means solely the unity of a purely and simply empty representation of the cognitive activity in myself and contains a feeling of existence, a bare declaration of being active, ‘thinking happens in me’ as it were. However, as the Paralogisms of Pure Reason have extensively demonstrated, self-consciousness does not provide any selfknowledge, any source of psychological or anthropological science (Critique of Pure Reason, B 406–432). So, the I cannot elucidate the ontological interiority of human nature, essence, or substance, although it indicates a peculiar type of relationship, where personhood emerges in contrast with thinghood (‘things’ comprising here all animals as mere ‘means’). In so doing, Kant displaces immediately his focus from the theoretical to the practical realm, restating the principle of human dignity that elevates humanity to the quality of absolute worth as an end-in-itself for itself, thereby echoing the formula of humanity, presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (AA 04: 429–430, 434). To treat oneself as an end-in-itself presupposes immediately that the practical power of humanity consists frst and foremost in the very capacity of setting ends and setting oneself as one’s own most valuable end. That is why the substantial ignorance of psychology and anthropology gives rise to an existential and earthly wisdom, a cosmic and cosmopolitical self-awareness, a practical rational belief, surpassing and subordinating all possible sciences. In a sense, the pragmatic vein of Anthropology achieves the conversion of the empty science of humanity into a form of practical wisdom that carries with it the self-understanding of the human life, where

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‘rationality’ or ‘intelligence’ is not a self-grasping and self-explanatory cognitive essence but rather a ‘legislative power’ that establishes a hierarchy of ‘essential ends’ subordinated to one only and single fnal end: ‘the entire vocation of human beings’ (den ganzen Bestimmung des Menschen, A840/ B868), the self-responsible vocation, unfolding as a self-formative and selfcreative infnite history accomplishing the ‘complete systematic unity of reason’.31 The Preface of the Anthropology resonates with the conceptus cosmicus of philosophy as ‘an archetype in the ideal of the philosopher’ and with the teleologia rationis humanae, demanding that the philosopher no longer be an ‘artist of reason’ but the ‘legislator of human reason’ (CPR, A 838/B 866); and therefore, it places humanity immediately at the heart of the world, as a fully earthly species that must accomplish itself in the world. If there is any possibility of true and signifcant human self-knowledge, it will derive from the progressive self-accomplishment of the human mode of being-in-theworld, as in an infnite joint self-epiphany of humanity and world. Somehow there is here an atmosphere similar to that of the sixth day of the Creation, because the summit of the Creation reveals itself in this ‘self-recognition’ of oneself as the fnal end of all Creation, the living fnal end that must infnitely cultivate itself, that is to say, to set itself as its own innermost end and remain faithful to becoming and persisting auto-telos, auto-nomos, auto-poiesis, and auto-dynamis in infnitum. The theomorphic Leitmotiv has yielded here to an auto-morphogenetic and auto-generative process, not only as dignifying possibility but also – and above all – as necessary hope and duty towards oneself: All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world’s use. But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: because the human being is his own fnal end [sein eigener letzter Zweck]. – Therefore, to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world [Weltkenntniß], even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth. A doctrine of the knowledge of the human being [Kenntniß des Menschen], systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. - Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being [was die Natur aus dem Menschen macht]; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself [was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll]. (Preface, Anthropology, AA 07: 119; Cambridge Edition, p. 231)

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Converted into a cura sui, instead of a cognitio sui, Anthropology concerns the understanding and promotion of the moral self-development of humanity; for the true human being does not exist yet and perhaps will never exist, humanity means a self-commitment to becoming itself, by indefnitely persisting in becoming its better possibility. The proto-existentialist notion of character corresponds to this moral dynamic and open self-developmental essence. As the ‘property of the will by which the subject binds himself to defnite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason’, character signifes the moral essence of the person, at once capable of freely making herself and morally obliged to make herself better (Anthropology, AA 07: 292; Cambridge Edition, p. 389). Given the creative import of the character, that necessarily must be self-produced or selfacquired, it bears some structural resemblance to the power of genius. For in the arts and in morals alike, to be a genius, in opposition to an imitator, is to expose in works the power of creative originality in accordance with universally understandable principles (otherwise originality will plunge into eccentric nonsense). The talent of inventing oneself and inventing one’s own life as a morally beautiful artwork manifests the essence of character, that is, the moral genius, capable of generating virtue in an original and exemplary way.32 The originality that stems from character is also emphasised by the revolutionary and explosive nature of its acquisition, in the sense that character inaugurates and produces ‘a kind of rebirth’, ‘unforgettable transformation’, ‘the beginning of a new epoch’, through the moral vow to oneself, testifying to the ‘absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct’ which entails a kind of universalisable self-constitution – and here springs the primal source of dignity (Anthropology, AA 07: 293–294). As a dynamic and open essence, the character of the person is deeply entangled with the character of the species. In fact, the basic principle of human nature states that the infnite generations of species are the condition for the full accomplishment and understanding of humanity. The indeterminacy of the ‘frst character of the human being’ (der erste Charakter der Menschengattung) enlightens the character of the person and demonstrates how intimately related they are; it consists of ‘the capacity (Vermögen) as a rational being to obtain a character as such for his own person as well as for the society’ (Anthropology, AA 07: 329), and therefore the signifcance of the replacement of ‘animal rationale’ by ‘animal rationabile’: Therefore, in order to assign the human being his class in the system of animate nature, nothing remains for us than to say that he has a character, which he himself creates, insofar as he is capable of perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the capacity of reason (animal rationabile), can make out of himself a rational animal (animal rationale) – whereby he frst preserves himself and his species; secondly, trains, instructs, and educates his species for domestic society; thirdly,

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governs it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate for society. (Anthropology, AA 07: 321–322; Cambridge Edition, p. 417) Undoubtedly, this capacity is essentially moral and relies on the intrinsic goodness of humanity, the moral predisposition or intelligible character of humanity, which amounts to the presupposition that practical reason itself and consciousness of freedom at once envelop and express a Naturanlage and Naturbestimmung (Anthropology, AA 07: 324). Therefore, humanity is essentially a process of self-humanisation, synonymous with selfrationalisation and self-moralisation, i.e., self-development of the natural potentialities of reason that moves humanity from within, through selftransformation,33 towards the better. Hence the crucial relevance of moral education34 as well as just government in order to comprehend humanity as a whole system, organically and cosmopolitically united in one and single vocation. Notes 1 Book B of Posterior Analytics is dedicated to ‘defnition’, that is to say, to the recognition or statement of essence, establishing complex relationships between defnition, demonstration, deduction, and induction. Aristotle distinguishes three main types of defnition: frstly, a defnition unfolds an ‘indemonstrable positing of what something is’; secondly, a defnition contains a demonstrative deduction and shows the ultimate reason why something is what it is; and thirdly, a defnition consists of a conclusion derived from the explanation (APo II, 94a5–15). In so doing, Aristotle establishes a high standard for essential defnitions: they are expected to display self-suffcient explanatory power. To state what something is encompasses to expound why something is. Furthermore, such explanatory power is truly essential only if it is radically primitive, theoretically capable of supplying the frst principles of a science. 2 Kant, The Jäsche Logic, § 102–109, AA 16: 141–144; Cambridge Edition, pp. 632–634. 3 Feuerbach’s introduces his opus magnum with an essay on ‘The Essence of Man in General’ where one fnds many pedagogical lapidary formulae, inviting one to learn how to grasp the human essence, i.e., self-consciousness, such as: ‘Bewusstsein im strengsten Sinn ist nur da, wo einem Wesen seine Gattung, seine Wesenheit Gegenstand ist. Das Tier ist wohl sich als Individuum – darum hat es Selbstgefühl –, aber nicht als Gattung Gegenstand – darum mangelt ihm das Bewusstsein, welches seinen Namen vom Wissen ableitet. Wo Bewusstsein, da ist Fähigkeit zur Wissenschaft. Die Wissenschaft ist das Bewusstsein der Gattungen. […] Die Religion im allgemeinen, als identisch mit dem Wesen des Menschen, ist identisch mit dem Selbstbewusstsein, mit dem Bewusstsein des Menschen von seinem Wesen. Aber die Religion ist, allgemein ausgedrückt, Bewusstsein des Unendlichen; sie ist also und kann nichts andres sein als das Bewusstsein des Menschen von seinem, und zwar nicht endlichen, beschränkten, sondern unendlichen, Wesen. […] Bewusstsein im strengen oder eigentlichen Sinne und Bewusstsein des Unendlichen ist identisch. […] Das Bewusstsein des Unendlichen ist nicht andres als das Bewusstsein von der Unendlichkeit des Bewusstseins’

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(Feuerbach, L., Das Wesen des Christentums. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006, p. 28, 29, and 30). Foucault, M., The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, p. 387). A most careful and scholarly edition may be found at George,A. R., The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts (2 vols.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). As for the rapprochement of mythical content between Gilgamesh and the Hebrew Bible, see Heidel, A., The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), and Loretz, O., Schöpfung und Mythos (Stuttgart: Verlag katholisches Bibelwerk, 1968). G. von Rad comments on this verse by highlighting the direct dependency of life (as psychosomatic unity) on God’s breath: ‘Personifziert, individualisiert wird diese göttliche Lebenspotenz aber erst durch ihr Eingehen in den stoffichen Körper; erst der sich mit dem Körper verbindende Odem macht den Menschen zu einem „Lebewesen“. So ist der V. 7 ein locus classicus der ad. Anthropologie; sie unterscheidet hier aber nicht Leib und „Seele“, sondern realistischer Leib und Leben. Der sich mit dem Stoffichen verbindende göttliche Lebensodem macht den Menschen zu einem „Lebewesen“ sowohl nach der Seite des Physischen wie des Psychischen hin. Dieses Leben stammt direkt von Gott; – so direkt wie der leblose Menschenleib den Anhauch aus dem Mund des über ihn gebeugten Gottes empfangen hat! Trotzdem ist eine gewisse Düsterheit des Aspektes als Unterton unverkennbar: – schon eine leise Vorwegnahme des Lebensstandes des nachadamitischen Menschen! Wenn Gott seinen Odem zurückzieht (Ps. 104,29 f.; Hiob 34,14 f.), so fällt der Mensch zurück in tote Stoffichkeit’ (von Rad, G., Das erste Buch Mose: Genesis, p. 53). Aristotle, Generation of Animals, transl. A. Platt, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1143). See, among others, Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (AA 07: 293–294, 324, 318–329) and Lectures on pedagogy (AA 09: 492). The controversy on the age of the Pentateuch sources may have strong exegetical impact; see Van Seters, J., The Pentateuch: A Social-Science Commentary (London: Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 56 ff). The idea of the irreversible unconsciousness of death, annihilation of all possible feeling and thinking, seems to be stoically neutralised by Kant in the Anthropology with a straightforward formal contradiction, without a proper consideration of the human depths of despair in face of death, the need for emotional and rational consolation, and the duty of hope for personal immortality. Kant dismisses too swiftly the legitimacy of existential anxiety, appealing to wisdom: ‘So it is not luck but only wisdom that can secure the value of life for the human being; and its value is therefore in his power. He who is anxiously worried about losing his life will never enjoy life’ (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, § 66, AA 07: 239; Cambridge Edition, p. 342). Therefore, in a distinctly Stoic vein, Kant declares: ‘The thought I am not simply cannot exist; because if I am not then I cannot be conscious that I am not. I can indeed say: “I am not healthy,” and think such predicates of myself negatively (as is the case with all verba); but to negate the subject itself when speaking in the frst person, so that the subject destroys itself, is a contradiction’ (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, AA 07: 167; Cambridge Edition, p. 278). I have slightly modifed the translation based on Plato, Cratylus, in Complete Works, ed. by J. M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997, pp. 117–118.

116  Paulo Jesus 12 Plato, Theaetetus, in Complete Works, ed. by J. M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997, p. 206. 13 Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI, 40, 235 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 430). 14 ‘Visitor: Then I say that in this case one must immediately distribute what goes on foot by opposing the two-footed to the four-footed class, and when one sees the human still sharing the field with the winged alone, one must go on to cut the two-footed herd by means of the non-feathered and the feathered; and when it has been cut, and the expertise of human-herding has then and there been brought into the light, one must lift the expert in statesmanship and kingship like a charioteer into it and install him there, handing over the reins of the city as belonging to him, and because this expert knowledge is his. Young Socrates: That’s well done, and you’ve paid me the account I asked for as if it were a debt, adding the digression as a kind of interest, making up the sum’ (Plato, Statesman, 266 e; in Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997, p. 308). 15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, transl. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1638). 16 Aristotle, Politics, transl. B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1988). 17 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, transl. W. Ogle, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 1070–1071). 18 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, transl. A. Platt, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1143). 19 In this regard, the analysis of C. Kietzmann is extremely relevant and convincing. See Kietzmann, Christian, ‘Aristotle on the Definition of What It Is to Be Human’, in Aristotle’s Anthropology, ed. by G. Keil and N. Kreft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 25–43). 20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1862). 21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 1863–1864). 22 ‘And thought [or thinking] in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. [20] And thought thinks itself [νόησις νοήσεως] because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e., the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore, the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say, therefore, that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII 7, 1072b18-31; in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, ed. by J. Barnes, p. 1695). 23 Brandt, Reinhard, ‘Kap. 3: Der stoische Ursprung der Bestimmungsfrage’’, in Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007, pp. 139– 178).

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24 Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 285 and 291–295; Cambridge Edition, pp. 384 and 389–393. 25 Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 321–333; Cambridge Edition, pp. 416–429. 26 Reasoning analogically, Kant explains that animals have ‘something similar to what we call representation (because it has effects that are similar to the representations in the human beings) but which may perhaps be entirely different – but no cognition of things; for this requires understanding, a faculty of representation with consciousness of action whereby the representations relate to a given object and this relation may be thought’ (Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 141 note; Cambridge Edition, p. 252; this passage appears only in the Handschrift). Among other parallel passages on the mental qualities of non-rational animals, see Critique of Pure Reason (A534/B562), Lectures on Metaphysics (AA 28: 255; 29: 896), Conjectural Beginning of Human History (AA 08: 111), Anthropology (AA 07: 196), Critique of the Power of Judgment (AA 20: 211). 27 In this context, it is especially worth mentioning the fctional species of extraterrestrial rational beings ‘who could not think in any other way but aloud’ and whose communicative transparency would be accompanied by perpetual peace (if, and only if, ‘they were all pure as angels’) or would unleash a radically incorrigible unsociability. By their contrast, these imaginary beings shed some light on the specifcally human ‘unsociable sociability’ as well as on the specifcally human progress from evil (including dissimulation and lying) towards the good. See Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 332–333; Cambridge Edition, pp. 427–429. For a more systematic treatment of Kantian ‘alienology’ from the Theory of Heaven to Anthropology, see P. Szendy, Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials: Cosmopolitical Philosofctions (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 28 See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, § 77, AA 05: 407–408. 29 ‘In order to indicate a character of a certain being's species, it is necessary that it be grasped under one concept with other species known to us. But also, the characteristic property (proprietas) by which they differ from each other has to be stated and used as a basis for distinguishing them. – But if we are comparing a kind of being that we know (A) with another kind of being that we do not know (non-A), how then can one expect or demand to indicate a character of the former when the middle term of the comparison (tertium comparationis) is missing to us? – The highest species concept may be that of a terrestrial rational being, however we will not be able to name its character because we have no knowledge of non-terrestrial rational beings that would enable us to indicate their characteristic property and so to characterise this terrestrial being among rational beings in general. – It seems, therefore, that the problem of indicating the character of the human species is absolutely insoluble, because the solution would have to be made through experience by means of the comparison of two species of rational being, but experience does not offer us this’ (Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 321; Cambridge Edition, p. 416). 30 Kant, Anthropology, AA 07: 127; Cambridge Edition, p. 239. 31 The vision of humanity as the fnal end of Creation pervades many different Kantian works. Let us mention in passing the Groundwork (AA 04: 428), the Conjectural Beginning (AA 08: 114), and, above all, the Critique of the Power of Judgment (AA 05: 469–477). 32 In order to further consolidate the rapprochement between character and genius, see the parallel exposition of genius in the Anthropology (§ 57, AA 07: 224–225, and 293) and in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (§ 46–49, AA 05: 307– 320). 33 It would be important to examine the way in which nature guides the process of rational self-development, namely through the dynamics of ‘unsociable sociabil-

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ity’. In this regard, the comment of M. Castillo on the 5th Proposition of the essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitical Aim is worth quoting: «Cet accent mis sur le dépassement forcé de soi-même met en évidence le fait que la société est un moteur historique de la transformation des appétits en capacités, en compétences et en talents. Le développement de soi se fait par la transformation de soi. […] La profondeur de l’humanisme kantien réside peut-être dans cette manière de traiter historiquement l’humanité comme une vocation, comme une destination à être, une fnalité en devenir, tirée en avant par son propre inachèvement, et non pas l’effet de conditionnements successifs» (Castillo, pp. 18–19). 34 Let us recall some lapidary sentences from the Lectures on Pedagogy: »Der Mensch ist das einzige Geschöpf, das erzogen werden muß. […] Die Menschengattung soll die ganze Naturanlage der Menschheit durch ihre eigne Bemühung nach und nach von selbst herausbringen. […] Der Mensch kann nur Mensch werden durch Erziehung. Er ist nichts, als was die Erziehung aus ihm macht« (Kant, AA 09: 441 and 443; Cambridge Edition, pp. 437 and 439).

References Aristotle. 1995. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (2 vols.), ed. by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Baumeister, David. 2022. Kant on the Human Animal: Anthropology, Ethics, Race. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Brandt, Reinhard. 1999. Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798). Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Brandt, Reinhard. 2007. Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Caranti, Luigi. 2022. The Kantian Federation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009037013 Castillo, Monique. 2017. ‘Comment l’Idée kantienne d’histoire prévoit-elle, en 1784, sa propre réalisation?’, in M. Ruffng & S. Grapotte (dir.), Kant: L’année 1784: droit et philosophie de l’histoire. Paris: Vrin, pp. 15–26. Cohen, Alix. 2009. Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History. London: Palgrave. Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2006. Gesammelte Werke 5: Das Wesen des Christentums (bearbeitet von W. Schuffenhauer und W. Harich, 3. durchgesehene Aufage). Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences. A Translation of Les mots et les choses. New York: Vintage Books. Frierson, Patrick R. 2003. Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frierson, Patrick R. 2013. What is the Human Being? Abingdon: Routledge. Garnier, Romain. 2008. ‘Nouvelles réfexions étymologiques autour du grec ἄνθρωπος’, in Bulletin de la société de linguistique de Paris, CII, 1, pp. 131–154. George, A. R. 2003. The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts (2 vols.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heidel, Alexander. 1949. The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Höffe, Otfried. 2012. Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft: Eine Philosophie der Freiheit. München: Verlag C. H. Beck.

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Jesus, Paulo. 2008. Poétique de l’ipse: Étude sur le ‘je pense’ kantien. Bern: Peter Lang. Jesus, Paulo. 2015. ‘The Poetics of Moral Selfhood: On Believing and Hoping As-If’, in P. Kauark-Leite, G. Cecchinato, V. A. Figueiredo, M. Ruffng & A. Serra (Eds.), Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms Verlag, pp. 263–276. Jesus, Paulo. 2015. ‘Autonomie avec et contre théonomie: Kant et Lévinas sur la généalogie de la loi morale’, in S. Grapotte, M. Ruffng & R. Terra (dir.), La raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Paris: J. Vrin, pp. 173–182. Jesus, Paulo. 2017. ‘La construction du «règne des fns»: épigénèse infnie de la liberté et de la justice’, in M. Ruffng & S. Grapotte (dir.), Kant: L’année 1784: droit et philosophie de l’histoire. Paris: Vrin, pp. 313–322. Kant, Immanuel. 2007. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. by P. Guyer, transl. by P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2012. ‘Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798)’, transl. by R. B. Louden, in G. Zöller & R. B. Louden (Eds.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227–429. Kant, Immanuel. 2012. ‘Lectures on pedagogy (1803)’, transl. by R. B. Louden, in G. Zöller & R. B. Louden (Eds.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 434–485. Kant, Immanuel. 2009. ‘The Jäsche logic’, in transl. and ed. by J. M. Young, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 517–640. Kietzmann, Christian. 2019. ‘Aristotle on the Defnition of What it is to Be Human’, in G. Keil & N. Kreft (Eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–43. Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, Christine M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laertius, Diogenes. 2013. Lives of Eminent Philosophers (ed. with introduction by T. Dorandi). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Loretz, Oswald. 1968. Schöpfung und Mythos: Mensch und Welt nach den Anfangskapiteln der Genesis. Stuttgart: Verlag katholisches Bibelwerk. Louden, Robert. 2014. ‘Cosmopolitical Unity: The Final Destiny of the Human Species’, in A. Cohen (Ed.), Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 211–229. Louden, Robert. 2011. Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Louden, Robert. 2021. Anthropology from a Kantian Point of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108592871 Mensch, Jennifer. 2013. Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Plato. 1997. Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

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Rundell, John. 2021. Kant: Anthropology, Imagination, Freedom. Abingdon: Routledge. Schneewind, J. B. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Szendy, Peter. 2013. Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials: Cosmopolitical Philosofctions. New York: Fordham University Press. Van Seters, John. 2014. The Pentateuch: A Social-Science Commentary (2nd ed.). London: Bloomsbury. von Rad, Gerhard. 1972. Das erste Buch Mose: Genesis, übersetzt und erklärt von Gerhard von Rad (9, überarbeitete Aufage). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Wilson, Holly. 2006. Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Signifcance. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

8

The Concept of Person in the Metaphysics of Morals From a Formal to a Material Concept1 Soraya Nour Sckell

8.1 Introduction While in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant wishes to search for and consolidate the ‘highest principle of morality’, in the Metaphysics of Morals he aims at deriving contentual duties from this formal principle. The concept of person plays a central role in the execution of this task and is already strategically mentioned in the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’.2 At a frst moment, the concept of person is transposed from Kant’s Groundwork. But beyond that, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant develops the transition from rational moral being to particular human being, and insofar as the human being is considered in its multiple composition, the concept of person gains a material determination. Hence, as ‘Preliminary Concept’, the formal concept of person is not only a precondition for all other concepts that Kant unfolds in the Metaphysics of Morals but also a frst step towards the reconstruction of the material concept of person. This chapter enquires how the formal concept of person from the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’ is ascribed material content (1) in the Doctrine of Right (2) and in the Doctrine of Virtue (3). 8.2 The Concept of Person in the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’ In the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’, Kant defnes person, in contrast with things, as a responsible acting subject. However, such responsibility results not from the identity of self-consciousness but rather from moral self-legislation. Kant states that each representing subject feels identical in different times and places; our consciousness is indeed unitary. As such, a unity, a connection between the different contents of consciousness (the different representations), must necessarily exist. If representations can be connected in a coherent sequence, in a thought, then knowledge is possible. All representations are seconded by the representation ‘I think’, and through this they are ascribed connection and unity. The unitary thinking subject is the precondition of all cognising and all thinking. This is why Kant preserves it DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-10

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and deems it transcendental personhood, or soul, in the common usage of the term. This, however, does not prove its real existence. Kant refutes this paralogism of personhood, which from the fact of a personhood in a transcendental sense, or an apperception, subsumes the existence of the soul as substance. Alongside this transcendental personhood, Kant acknowledges moral personhood, which consists of moral self-legislation in accordance with the categorical imperative. Kant sustains, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, that all in Nature derives from laws. Only a rational being is endowed with will.3 The ends of will may be objective – valid for all rational beings – or subjective – objects of particular interest.4 The only objective end is the rational being, who is end in itself and not only a means for other ends. This is why it is described as a person, in contrast with things.5 This end in itself, as an objective end, which is valid for all, can be one such principle of will. Since often reason does not determine the human will, the principle of will presents itself as an imperative. Imperatives can be categorical – that is, the prescribed action is end in itself – or hypothetical – that is, the prescribed action is a means to another end. The categorical imperative, which is derived from the rational being as end in itself, is: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’.6 The idea of a rational being as end in itself leads to the idea of autonomy. If human beings were given the moral law from outside, they would be no end in themselves. They will give themselves their law, and through this autonomy human beings earn their ‘dignity’ as persons, as members of a kingdom of ends, that is, a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis).7 The fact that the human being belongs to two kingdoms – to the mundus intelligibilis as homo noumenon, and to the sensible kingdom as homo phaenomenon – is decisive: as homo phaenomenon, human beings possess a value common to all other animals, from which they stand out through their understanding (the capacity to think) and the ability to posit their own ends.8 But this gives the human being no absolute value.9 The human being, if considered as a homo noumenon, as a person who ascribes themselves their own moral laws, is end in itself – and not ‘a means to the ends of others or even to their own ends, but as an end in itself’.10 Only thus do human beings not have a price, rather ‘an absolute inner worth’,11 a dignity, and can claim from other human beings respect for humanity in their person. The idea of person as an end in itself is regarded as the highest stage of development of modern morality. It is categorical, and as such, it is based on no other ground.12 Therefore, we now enquire on how this concept is rendered concrete in the Metaphysics of Morals, then in the Doctrine of Right (2), and fnally in the Doctrine of Virtue (3). 8.3 The Concept of Person in the Doctrine of Right In the ‘Introduction’ to the Doctrine of Right, Kant states that Right concerns ‘only […] the external and indeed practical relation of one person to

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another’.13 To consider Right as relations between persons has consequences for the two parts of the Doctrine of Right, ‘private right’ and ‘public right’, and this in their respective subdivisions, that is, in the case of ‘private right’, property right, contract right, and domestic right, and in the case of ‘public right’, the right of a State, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right. The most important consequence for property right, the frst part of private right, consists in the fact that there is no legal reference between a person and a thing. Property right, just as for instance the right to possession, is not grounded on a direct legal relation between my free will and a corporeal thing, as was then the case in extant theories. If I say that I possess this thing, I thereby mean not a direct relation between me and this thing, rather a direct relation between me and all other persons, a legal relation between persons whose object is the original or founded common possession of this thing, of which I own but its private use.14 In contract right – the right to determine another to a certain act, for instance, in a purchase contract – the second part of private right, this standpoint, according to which the concept of Right concerns only relations between persons, means the following: a personal right can only be acquired through a contract. According to Kant, and in contrast with the tradition of his time, a personal right can ‘never be acquired originally and on one’s own initiative’.15 The third important consequence of this concept of Right as relation between persons emerges in the third part of ‘private right’, which Kant also designates as ‘domestic right’ (‘rights to persons akin to rights to things’). This right is ‘the possession of an external object as a thing and use of it as a person’16 or also ‘the right to have something external as one’s own’.17 This right arises from the relation between free beings which compose a society – the household – wherein they become the members of a whole.18 According to this right, ‘a man acquires a wife; a couple acquires children; and a family acquires servants’. Kant thus takes position against the ‘pater familias’ tradition, according to which wife, children, and servants are things which belong to a lord, as do house, animals, and soil. The concept of person in ‘private right’ gains material content insofar as it is determined by age, gender, and status. The moral autonomy of the Groundwork, or the capacity to ascribe one’s own moral law, becomes factual autonomy, or factual independence, in ‘private right’. Factual independence is the capacity to, for instance, legally bind oneself and thus become a carrier of property right, contract right, or domestic right. On the other hand, in ‘public right’, moral autonomy means the groundwork for political autonomy. To be a person means here to live in a political order under the law that the persons can – or could – ascribe themselves. The concept of person too is herein expanded and no longer describes a mere individual, rather through analogy, the State itself, and its powers. In the right of a State, the frst part of public right, Kant confronts by means of civil personhood the civilian and the subject, which implies an essential

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alteration in the relation between ruled and ruler. The moral personhood of the Groundwork becomes civil personhood in the right of a State. Moral autonomy becomes ‘civil independence, of owing his existence and preservation to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people’.19 The capacity for self-legislation becomes the capacity for voting.20 Furthermore, Kant forms an analogy between person and political institutions which, according to Volker Gerhardt, belongs to ‘the founding insights of European philosophy on State’. Kant has a personalistic concept of State: it is a ‘moral person’ (today we deem it a ‘juridical person’), that is, it acts according to its own will and, just as a person, it is also an end in itself.21 As a ‘person endowed with its own will’, the State cannot be treated as a thing. From this results, for instance, that ‘No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation’.22 The State as moral person, in turn, is subdivided into three powers, or rather, three persons, for they arise from the State’s own legislative will: the person of the legislator (sovereign authority), the person of the ruler (who executes the law – executive authority) and the person of the judge (who acknowledges each one’s possession according to the law – the judicial authority).23 Because these authorities are moral persons, they are assigned according to one another, ‘that is, each complements the others to complete the constitution of a state’.24 In the right of nations, the second part of public right, the analogy between a person and the State means that, just as persons ascribe themselves their moral law, so must all States, as moral persons, ascribe themselves their own laws. To do so, States must no longer fnd themselves in a situation where they balance their power, rather they are to unite in a league of nations. In cosmopolitan right, the third part of public right, the standpoint according to which the concept of right concerns only persons means not that no nation has an original right to a piece of soil, rather that they stand in a community of possible physical interaction (commercium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering to engage in commerce with any other, and each has a right to make this attempt without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this attempt.25 Furthermore, it means that, regarding the occupation of new-found lands, this can only take place by means of a contract. Kant thus takes a stand against the justifcations according to which [this] is to the world’s advantage, partly because these crude peoples will become civilized […], and partly because one’s own country will be cleaned of corrupt men, and they or their descendants will, it is hoped, become better in another part of the world.26

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8.4 The Concept of Person in the Doctrine of Virtue While the concept of person in the Doctrine of Right unfolds in contrast to that of thing, the difference between person and human being is the guiding thread in the Doctrine of Virtue. The human being, or homo phaenomenon, is determined through its bodily existence, but the person, or homo noumenon, is a free being. Thus differentiates Kant between the human being as an animal being and the human being as a moral being – or as a person. The concept ‘humanity’ no longer describes the ideal ‘personhood’, rather the individuum in the unity between spirit and body. The body must also be taken into consideration as ‘a part of my I’. The Doctrine of Virtue contains both the duties which are that of the human being, due to their ‘rationalitas’, and the duties which they are ascribed on account of their ‘animalitas’. Considered under these two aspects, humanity is inviolable not only in the person of a human being but also in the person of another and limits all freedom. In the Groundwork, the persons determine themselves in the subjective perspective through the objective perspective. This self-referral of a moral being is expanded to the self-referral of a moral and animal being. The selfreferral is in the Doctrine of Virtue the duty of self-preservation, as well as the prohibition of ‘killing oneself’,27 of ‘defling oneself by lust’,28 and of ‘stupefying oneself by the excessive use of food and drink’29 – ‘Man’s duty to himself as an animal being’.30 The concept of human being as a moral being – or that of person – is therefore expanded to the concept of human being as a moral being who is not only free but also has moral qualities which in general enable the spirit’s receptivity for the concept of duty. All human beings as moral beings – or as a person – originally have these moral qualities in them. These feelings are: the moral feeling, that is, ‘the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty’,31 moral conscience, love to the human being (which can produce benefcence), and respect. Because as persons we are endowed with moral conscience, the self-referral which in the Groundwork is self-legislation becomes self-enquiry and selfaccusation in the Doctrine of Virtue. One such self-referral, and not egoism or narcissism, is also the cause for self-esteem. From this self-esteem results the ‘The human being’s duty to himself merely as a moral being’:32 the prohibition on lies,33 on avarice,34 and on false humility (sycophancy).35 Self-enquiry is the frst precept of all duties to oneself: know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself, not in terms of your natural perfection (your ftness or unftness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart – whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure.36

126 Soraya Nour Sckell Therefore, persons are beings who not only conduct themselves according to rational principles but also beings who can value themselves: Every human being has a conscience and fnds himself observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this authority watching over the law in him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow […] He can at most, in extreme depravity, bring himself to heed it no longer, but he still cannot help hearing it.37 In moral conscience, this courthouse inside the human being, the human being is both accuser and accused. Through this self-referral, Kant develops the concept of ‘dual personality’38 or ‘doubled self’.39 This concept leads to the conception of an ‘ideal person’ in us, which enables for a distanced stance from our course of action, and fnally is associated with the idea of God in us: Such an ideal person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be a scrutinizer of hearts, since the court is set up within the human being. But he must also impose all obligation, that is, he must be, or be thought as, a person in relation to whom all duties whatsoever are to be regarded as also his commands; for conscience is the inner judge of all free actions. Now since such a moral being must also have all power (in heaven and on earth) in order to give effect to his laws (as is necessarily required for the offce of judge), and since such an omnipotent moral being is called God, conscience must be thought of as the subjective principle of being accountable to God for all one’s deeds. In fact, the latter concept is always contained (even if only in an obscure way) in the moral selfawareness of conscience.40 Following the feelings – or maxims – ‘love to other human beings’ and ‘respect’, which all persons have in them, the duties towards others, ‘merely as human beings’,41 are ordered: the duties of love42 are the duty of benefcence,43 the duty of gratitude,44 and the duty of sympathy;45 the vices of the duty of respect towards other human beings are loftiness,46 backbiting,47 and scorn.48 Self-referral in the Doctrine of Virtue also becomes self-love. From selflove results that I must act towards the happiness of other human beings – whereupon each one must appreciate what makes them happy:49 since our self-love cannot be separated from our need to be loved (helped in case of need) by others as well, we therefore make ourselves an end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is through its qualifcation as a universal law, hence through our will to make others

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our ends as well. The happiness of others is therefore an end that is also a duty.50 Through this, the other person not only is considered as a free being but also as a being who has their own specifc concept of happiness and, as such, is to be respected. Notes 1 This work was supported by Portuguese funds provided by the FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., Portugal), the Portuguese national funding agency for science, research, and technology, under the Project PTDC/FERFIL/30686/2017, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Justice, Democracy and Citizenship without Borders’. 2 See AA 6: 223 (Practical Philosophy: 377–378). All citations, taken from the Akademie-Ausgabe, will be followed by their corresponding translation in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Title of Volume: page). 3 AA 4: 412 (Practical Philosophy: 66). 4 AA 4: 427–428 (Practical Philosophy: 78). 5 ‘Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion […]. Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends, the existence of which as an effect of our action has a worth for us, but rather objective ends […]’ (AA 4: 428 [Practical Philosophy: 79]). 6 AA 4: 429 (Practical Philosophy: 80). 7 ‘Now, from this it follows incontestably that every rational being, as an end in itself, must be able to regard himself as also giving universal laws with respect to any law whatsoever to which he may be subject; for, it is just this ftness of his maxims for giving universal law that marks him out as an end in itself; it also follows that this dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural beings brings with it that he must always take his maxims from the point of view of himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings (who for this reason are also called persons). Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis as a kingdom of ends is possible, through the giving of their own laws by all persons as members. Consequently, every rational being must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the universal kingdom of ends’ (AA 4: 438 [Practical Philosophy: 87]). 8 ‘In the system of nature, a human being (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest of the animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value (pretium vulgare). Although a human being has, in his understanding, something more than they and can set himself ends, even this gives him only an extrinsic value for his usefulness (pretium usus); that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than another, that is, a price as of a commodity in exchange with these animals as things, though he still has a lower value than the universal medium of exchange, money, the value of which can therefore be called preeminent (pretium eminens). But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of

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others 6:435 or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them. Humanity in his person is the object of the respect which he can demand from every other human being, but which he must also not forfeit’ ([AA 6: 434–435 Practical Philosophy: 557]). Greiner, Daniel. ‘Der Begriff der Persönlichkeit bei Kant’. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 1897, Vol. X, pp. 40–84, here pp. 41–45. AA 6: 434–435 (Practical Philosophy: 557). AA 6: 435 (Practical Philosophy: 557). Sturma, Dieter. Philosophie der Person. Die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität. Paderborn/München/Wien/Zurüch: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997. ‘The concept of right, insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right), has to do, frst, only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) infuence on each other’ (AA 6: 230 [Practical Philosophy: 387]). ‘The usual exposition of a right to a thing (ius reale, ius in re), that ‘it is a right against every possessor of it,’ is a correct nominal defnition. – But what is it that enables me to recover an external object from anyone who is holding it and to constrain him (per vindicationem) to put me in possession of it again? Could this external rightful relation of my choice be a direct relation to a corporeal thing? Someone who thinks that his right is a direct relation to things rather than to persons would have to think (though only obscurely) that since there corresponds to a right on one side a duty on the other, an external thing always remains under obligation to the frst possessor even though it has left his hands; that, because it is already under obligation to him, it rejects anyone else who pretends to be the possessor of it. So he would think of my right as if it were a guardian spirit accompanying the thing, always pointing me out to whoever else wanted to take possession of it and protecting it against any incursions by them. It is therefore absurd to think of an obligation of a person to things or the reverse, even though it may be permissible, if need be, to make this rightful relation perceptible by picturing it and expressing it in this way. So the real defnition would have to go like this: a right to a thing is a right to the private use of a thing of which I am in (original or instituted) possession in common1 with all others. For this possession in common is the only condition under which it is possible for me to exclude every other possessor from the private use of a thing (ius contra quemlibet huius rei possessorem) since, unless such a possession in common is assumed, it is inconceivable how I, who am not in possession of the thing, could still be wronged by others who are in possession of it and are using it. – By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common. Otherwise I would have to think of a right to a thing as if the thing had an obligation to me, from which my right against every other possessor of it is then derived; and this is an absurd way of representing it. By the term “property right” (ius reale) should be understood not only a right to a thing (ius in re) but also the sum of all the laws having to do with things being mine or yours. – But it is clear that someone who was all alone on the earth could really neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own, since there is no relation whatever of obligation between him, as a person, and any other external object, as a thing. Hence, speaking strictly and literally, there is also no (direct) right to a thing. What is called a right to a thing is only that right someone has against a person who is in possession of it in com-

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mon with all others (in the civil condition)’ (AA 6: 260-261 [Practical Philosophy: 413–414]). ‘An external object which in terms of its substance belongs to someone is his property (dominium), in which all rights in this thing inhere (as accidents of a substance) and which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases (ius disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows that an object of this sort can be only a corporeal thing (to which one has no obligation). So someone can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases) – still less can he dispose of others as he pleases – since he is accountable to the humanity in his own person. This is not, however, the proper place to discuss this point, which has to do with the right of humanity, not that of human beings. It is mentioned only incidentally, for a better understanding of what was discussed a little earlier’ (AA 6: 270 [Practical Philosophy: 421]). ‘My possession of another’s choice, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed in accordance with laws of freedom (what is externally mine or yours with respect to the causality of another), is a right (of which I can have several against the same person or against others); but there is only a single sum (system) of laws, contract right, in accordance with which I can be in this sort of possession’ (AA 6: 271 [Practical Philosophy: 421]). AA 6: 271 (Practical Philosophy, 421–422). See also: ‘Certainly no human being in a state can be without any dignity, since he at least has the dignity of a citizen. The exception is someone who has lost it by his own crime, because of which, though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s choice (either of the state or of another citizen). Whoever is another’s tool (which he can become only by a verdict and right) is a bondsman (servus in sensu stricto) and is the property (dominium) of another, who is accordingly not merely his master (herus) but also his owner (dominus) and can therefore alienate him as a thing, use him as he pleases (only not for shameful purposes) and dispose of his powers, though not of his life and members. No one can bind himself to this kind of dependence, by which he ceases to be a person, by a contract, since it is only as a person that he can make a contract’ (AA 6: 329–330 [Practical Philosophy: 471–472]). AA 6: 276 (Practical Philosophy: 426). ‘Put briefy and well, the defnition of a right to a person akin to a right to a thing is this: “It is the right of a human being to have a person other than himself as his own.”* I take care to say “a person”; for while it is true that someone can have as his own another human being who by his crime has forfeited his personality (become a bondsman), this right to a thing is not what is in question here’ (AA 6: 358 [Practical Philosophy: 494]). ‘This right is that of possession of an external object as a thing and use of it as a person. – What is mine or yours in terms of this right is what is mine or yours domestically, and the relation of persons in the domestic condition is that of a community of free beings who form a society of members of a whole called a household (of persons standing in community with one another) by their affecting one another in accordance with the principle of outer freedom (causality). – Acquisition of this status, and within it, therefore takes place neither by a deed on one's own initiative (focto) nor by a contract (pacto) alone but by law (lege); for, since this kind of right is neither a right to a thing nor merely a right against a person but also possession of a person, it must be a right lying beyond any rights to things and any rights against persons. That is to say, it must be the right of humanity in our own person, from which there follows a natural permissive law, by the favor of which this sort of acquisition is possible for us’ (AA 6: 276 [Practical Philosophy: 426]).

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19 AA 6: 314 (Practical Philosophy: 458). 20 AA 6: 314 (Practical Philosophy: 458). 21 See Gerhardt, Volker. Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’. Eine Theorie der Politik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft [WBG], 1995, pp. 48–49. 22 AA 8: 344 (Practical Philosophy: 318). 23 ‘Every state contains three authorities within it, that is, the general united will consists of three persons (trias politica): the sovereign authority (sovereignty) in the person of the legislator; the executive authority in the person of the ruler (in conformity to law); and the judicial authority (to award to each what is his in accordance with the law) in the person of the judge (potestas legislatoria, rectoria et iudiciaria). These are like the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major premise, which contains the law of that will; the minor premise, which contains the command to behave in accordance with the law, that is, the principle of subsumption under the law; and the conclusion, which contains the verdict (sentence), what is laid down as right in the case at hand’ (AA 6: 313 [Practical Philosophy: 457]). 24 AA 6: 316 (Practical Philosophy: 459). 25 AA 6: 352 (Practical Philosophy: 489). 26 AA 6: 353 (Practical Philosophy: 490). 27 AA 6: 422 (Practical Philosophy: 546). 28 AA 6: 424 (Practical Philosophy: 548). 29 AA 6: 427 (Practical Philosophy: 550). 30 AA 6: 421 (Practical Philosophy: 546). 31 AA 6: 399 (Practical Philosophy: 528). 32 AA 6: 428 (Practical Philosophy: 552). 33 AA 6: 429 (Practical Philosophy: 552). 34 AA 6: 432 (Practical Philosophy: 555). 35 AA 6: 434 (Practical Philosophy: 557). 36 AA 6: 441 (Practical Philosophy: 562). 37 AA 6: 438 (Practical Philosophy: 560). 38 AA 6: 439 (Practical Philosophy: 560). 39 AA 6: 439 (Practical Philosophy: 560). 40 AA 6: 439 (Practical Philosophy: 561). 41 AA 6: 448 (Practical Philosophy: 568). 42 AA 6: 448 (Practical Philosophy: 568). 43 AA 6: 452 (Practical Philosophy: 571). 44 AA 6: 454 (Practical Philosophy: 573). 45 AA 6: 456 (Practical Philosophy: 574). 46 AA 6: 465 (Practical Philosophy: 581). 47 AA 6: 466 (Practical Philosophy: 582). 48 AA 6: 467 (Practical Philosophy: 582). 49 AA 6: 388 (Practical Philosophy: 519–520). 50 AA 6: 393 (Practical Philosophy: 524).

References Gerhardt, Volker. 1995. Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’. Eine Theorie der Politik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft [WBG]. Greiner, Daniel. 1897. ‘Der Begriff der Persönlichkeit bei Kant’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Vol. X, pp. 40–84. Kant, I. 1901ff. Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. Von der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.

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Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Practical Philosophy. Engl. transl. by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sturma, Dieter. 1997. Philosophie der Person. Die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität. Paderborn/München/Wien/Zurüch: Ferdinand Schöningh.

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Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works Marita Rainsborough

9.1 Introduction Michel Foucault is regarded as a sharp critic of the classical philosophical concept of the subject and investigates modes of subjectifcation as well as their formation processes in contexts of knowledge and power. According to Foucault, man as a historical ‘event’ cannot, in contrast to Kant, be regarded as the starting point, foundation, and guarantor of thought and morality. For Kant, man has a privileged position and humanity is frst and foremost a normative moral and legal-philosophical concept. The ‘humanity within us’ (6:436) or ‘humanity […] in your own person or in the person of any other’ (4:429) is at the centre of Kant’s moral reasoning, especially with regard to his concept of man as an ‘end in itself’ (4:429) and human dignity. Thus, for Kant humanity is signifcantly more than the totality of all human beings. Foucault’s critique of Kant’s concepts of the person and humanity culminates in his thesis of the death of the subject, which emphasises the subject’s constructedness and negates its freedom. On the other hand, Foucault refers to Kant’s theorems of the enlightenment as well as critique and, exhibiting the attitude of ethos, places himself in the tradition of Kant’s parrhesia – as defned by Foucault. How can this contradiction be understood in Foucault’s philosophical thinking? What is the signifcance of Kant’s philosophy for Foucault and how do Kant’s concepts of the person and humanity impact his thinking? 9.2 Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works Kant embeds man in a holistic concept of complex relationships with regard to nature, the cosmos and the world, also in political-historical terms. He notes in the chapter ‘The Character of Species’ of his work Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View:

DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-11

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. 133 So it presents the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational beings that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant progress toward the good. In this its volition is generally good, but achievement is diffcult because one cannot expect to reach the goal by the free agreement of individuals, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united. (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 333, p. 238) In this context, Kant emphasises the cultural orientation of man, particularly with regard to the perfectibility of human beings as a species that is destined to develop its talents in the course of history in the sense of progress.1 Human morality is at the centre of his concept of man as the perfection of the individual and humanity, which in his practical philosophy contains a universalist component by means of the categorical imperative, the a priori principle of practical reason. Man obtains dignity through Kant’s formula of the end in itself and demonstrates particularly in his morality the ability of autonomy and freedom, aspects which essentially determine Kant’s concept of man. Kant analyses man in terms of his potential, the decisive factor is what man makes of himself. This comprises the realisation of the moral and legal humanity in the sense of the normative understanding of the concept within us, which also focuses on the human right to freedom and human dignity. ‘Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity’ (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 238, p. 63). The realisation of the regulative principle of a ‘humanity within us’ (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 437, p. 231) understood as ‘perfect humanity’ (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A568 / B596) is a task for all of humanity. The concept of humanity in our own person refers to the idea of man as an end in itself, in which the person entails the intelligent nature of man with regard to his moral being. Kant summarises the free and independent qualities of the person in the ‘idea of personality, which arouses respect’ (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 88, p. 112). Kant's concept of the person focuses on the aspect of the idea of the ‘I’2 as well as the attribution of actions in relation to the subject as ‘being endowed with the power of practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice’. (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 324, p. 229) This concept also implies duties with regard to the person (23:357), whose free and self-determined actions are to be respected. Thus the concept of the person implies both the aspect of the possibility of a refexive relationship to oneself and the aspect of interpersonal relationships, whereby moral action presupposes having to assume points of view of ‘every

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other rational being, as lawgiving beings (who for this reason are also called persons)’ (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 438, p. 45). The theorem of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment provides the justifcation for Kant’s idea of progress and his seemingly utopian philosophy of history provides its political framework. The focus is on the individual in his contextual integration, even if Kant’s critical endeavours may initially have a solipsistic appeal. The analysis of human reason and its relation to the subject does not exclude interpersonal aspects, communication, and the relation to the other, even though Kant develops the principle of morality not on the basis of human coexistence but on the basis of the a priori of practical reason. Kant also thinks of economic activity as being connected to the perfection of man in terms of civilization, culture, and morals in the process of perfecting the human species over the course of history. It is the spirit of trade, which cannot coexist with war, which will, sooner or later, take hold of every people. Since, among all of the powers (means) subordinate to state authority, the power of money is likely the most reliable, states fnd themselves forced (admittedly not by motivations of morality) to promote a noble peace and, wherever in the world war threatens to break out, to prevent it by means of negotiations, just as if they were therefore members of a lasting alliance. For the great alliances for the purpose of waging war, as is the nature of the matter, can arise only very rarely, and even more seldom can they succeed. (Kant, Towards Perpetual Peace, 368, p. 92) In the preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, a cosmopolitan conception of human nature, knowledge about man as a citizen of the world, becomes apparent. The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world. – This much belongs to anthropology. As for what concerns this distinction according to metaphysical concepts, it lies entirely beyond the feld of the science treated here. That is to say, if the question were merely whether I as a thinking being have reason to assume, in addition to my own existence, the existence of a whole of other beings existing in community with me (called the world), then the question is not anthropological hut merely metaphysical. (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 130, p. 18) According to Kant, a way of thinking that goes beyond the individual necessarily opens up to diversity and plurality. In Kant’s anthropology, the

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. 135 self-conception of the individual as a citizen of the world is the starting point for his preoccupation with man. Pragmatic anthropology focuses on ‘what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 119, p. 3). Kant’s anthropological considerations are thus to be regarded in connection with his cosmopolitically oriented historical-philosophical conception and substantiate it. Kant’s theorem of unsociable sociability can be regarded as the core of Kant’s philosophy of intersubjectivity and at the same time as a motor for the realisation of humanity within us. Man proves to be ‘a socially antisocial being [in his behaviour] towards his fellow human beings’.3 Kant applies the theorem to domestic, intergovernmental, and global processes, thus adding a political dimension to his theory of intersubjectivity.4 The antagonism thus allows us to ‘understand the dichotomy […] between individualism and the desire to belong on a small scale, between nationalism and globalization on a large scale’.5 This applies equally to the confict between particularism and universalism and between the local and global. In particular with this theorem, Kant’s philosophy of history demonstrates its signifcance for his overall philosophical concept. ‘Kant regards history as the space of being in which man can accomplish his humanity in an approximating and optimizing manner’.6 Belwe continues: The unsociable sociability of human beings is defned as anthropological fact. Without the antagonism of different natural predispositions, without the antagonism between the individual and society as a mechanism of competition and self-assertion, the natural predispositions on which they are based could not be refned, nor could they differentiate man as a social and individual being, because only as a social being can man become an individual being. Man can only become an autonomous as well as a socially competent individual if he has become a social being.7 Humans as individual and social beings are thus also closely related to each other in Kant’s theory, which is usually not emphasised clearly enough in Kant’s reception: in addition to the individual being, which harbours human reason, humans as social beings are usually underestimated or forgotten in their theoretical signifcance. The very desire for recognition and prestige shows mutual interdependencies in spite of all the unsociable qualities of man. Kant’s concept of broadened thought also presupposes the inclusion of the other and emphasises thinking from the other’s perspective as the intellectual realisation of other modes of thought and positions in order to qualify one’s point of view to achieve respect of others on the basis of human dignity. The broadened thought counterbalances the universal thinking in Kant’s philosophy. Kant's universalism in his concept of man, which is based in particular on human reason and morality, is thwarted by the differences in race and gender

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observed by Kant but is not abolished. Kant’s imperfect universalism/egalitarianism is rightly criticised time and again, but this does not change Kant’s basic theorems. His concept of cosmopolitanism tries, among other things, to regulate global international trade relations through contractual agreements and the establishment of an international as well as cosmopolitan law and to make them legitimate. Thus, he creates a basis for the establishment of republics which, according to Kant, will gradually be transformed on a voluntary basis into a federal federation on a global level with the goal of eternal peace. With his philosophy Kant claims to present universal knowledge in the sense of universal validity, guaranteed by the apriority of reason. The basis of his cosmopolitan concept is his normative view of man, humanity, and the person, whose realisation in the historical process is conceived on the basis of basic teleological assumptions. The realisation of humanity within us therefore requires the cosmopolitan orientation of his philosophy. 9.3 Critique, Enlightenment, and Parrhesia: Michel Foucault’s Questioning of the Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works In Foucault’s works, the human being is understood as a historical event that disappears like a face in the sand. With his critique of the basic theorem of man, Foucault formulates a universal attack on all anthropologically and/or humanistically based ways of thinking and, at the same time, on the concept of the autonomous subject, as advocated in particular by Kant. For Foucault, man – both as subject and object – is not the starting point, central theme, and guarantor of his philosophical theory, but embodies the episteme of modernity, which structures the thinking and knowledge of this era, in particular in the human sciences in contrast to the epistemes of similarity in the Renaissance and representation in the classical age, and thus man is a historical phenomenon. For Foucault, Kant makes this philosophical turn towards man by investigating the conditions of possibility of knowledge in his Critiques on the basis of the forms of perception, categories, and regulative ideas inherent in human forms of knowledge. Also in ethics, Kant’s human reason with its categorical imperative constitutes morality. The shift or transformation that occurred with Kant’s analysis of human cognitive limitations therefore implies that man must create and uphold the order in the new world of modernity. […] Man is, however, only able to account for this order by turning the limitations that he fnds there toward the self.8 According to Foucault, this structuring of knowledge by the theorem of man is already in the process of dissolution. Foucault says: [T]hat is to say that man, the idea of man, functioned in the nineteenth century somewhat similarly to the way in which the idea of God had

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. 137 functioned in the course of the preceding centuries. People believed, and people still believed in the last century, that it was practically impossible for man to be able to tolerate the idea that God does not exist (it used frequently to be said that 'If God does not exist, everything would be allowed'). People were appalled by the idea of a mankind able to function without God, hence the conviction that the idea of God had to be maintained for mankind to be able to continue functioning. Now you are saying to me: perhaps the idea of mankind has to exist even if it is only a myth for mankind to function. I’ll reply by saying: perhaps, but perhaps not. No more and no less than the idea of God.9 According to Foucault, structuralism, with its emphasis on language, already indicates a transformation and thus the end of the episteme of man, with no clear indication of what will take its place.10 For Foucault, the question remains open what could take the place of the episteme of man as a function to structure knowledge in post-modernity. According to Foucault, there is no fxed nature of man, it is in each case shaped by the historical process. On the one hand, the subject assumes empty spaces in discourses and is formed by power practices, and on the other hand, according to the ethics or aesthetics of the self, it also has the possibility of shaping itself by means of the practices of the self, which presupposes the subject’s consciousness and self-awareness. The individual should form his or her life according to art as a role model. It becomes apparent that in his philosophy, Foucault develops the concept of a self-formation of the subject in aesthetic, critical, and moral respects, which at the same time presupposes man as acting autonomously. Freedom and autonomy are playing an increasingly fundamental role in the self-conception of the subject. While Foucault does not speak of man, mankind, person, and personality but of an attitude, an ethos, which does not refer to humanity within us and the perfectibility of man as a species but to the individual capacity for criticism, morality, autonomy, and a potential for transformation. These changes concern, on the one hand, the subject itself and, on the other hand, a desired social condition in which rigid power structures are broken up and the question of the art of governing can be posed. Foucault understands critique as ‘the art of voluntary insubordination, that of refected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth’.11 According to Foucault, this question of governing and/or being governed is also raised in Kant’s theory of enlightenment. Kant complains in his essay ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ (1784) about the state of humanity’s incapacity, in which man allows himself to be guided (leiten) by others without using his own understanding.12 Immaturity results from a lack of courage and a lack of decision-making towards authority.13 According to Foucault, Kant’s defnition of enlightenment is almost ‘a sermon’ and is to be understood as a ‘call for courage’.14 He continues:

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What Kant was describing as the Aufklärung is very much what I was trying before to describe as critique, this critical attitude which appears as a specifc attitude in the Western world starting with what was historically, I believe, the great process of society's governmentalization.15 Kant’s critique refers primarily to the analysis of the limits of knowledge ‘as a prolegomena to the whole present and future Aufklärung’.16 Foucault regards Kant’s ‘separation […] between Aufklärung and critique’17 and his emphasis on the question of knowledge as problematic with regard to the theorem of critique and suggests that ‘[i]t may take the question of the Aufklärung as its way of gaining access, not to the problem of knowledge, but to that of power’,18 understood as ‘an examination of ‘eventualization’ (événementialisation)’,19 and proposes at the same time to analyse the knowledge–power nexus using the methods of archaeology and genealogy as well as taking into account the dimensions of strategy and relationships of interactions, which constitute different levels.20 Foucault asks: In conclusion, given the movement which swung critical attitude over into the question of critique or better yet, the movement responsible for reassessing the Aufklärung enterprise within the critical project whose intent was to allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of itselfgiven this swinging movement, this slippage, this way of deporting the question of the Aufklärung into critique – might it not now be necessary to follow the opposite route? Might we not try to travel this road, but in the opposite direction?21 Foucault demands as Kant said, to get out of one’s minority. A question of attitude. You see now why I could not, did not dare, give a title to my conference since if I had, it would have been: ‘What is the Aufklärung?’22 Foucault continues by explaining his understanding of the enlightenment: I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasise the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematises man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject – is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.23 According to Foucault, Kant practised a philosophical approach which he intends to adopt on the basis of modifed philosophical assumptions – he

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. 139 criticises Kant’s transcendental philosophical concept – and by using different methods such as archaeology and genealogy.24 Foucault specifes Kant’s intention: ‘The one I have pointed out and that seems to me to have been at the basis of an entire form of philosophical refection concerns only the mode of refective relation to the present’.25 Here, Foucault refers in particular to Kant’s philosophical effort to grasp social and political topicality. For Foucault, Kant is both a historical example and a role model for his critique in the sense of truth speaking, the parrhesia. Foucault understands truth speaking as declaring and personally standing up for the truth. Foucault’s understanding of parrhesia is to be located within the framework of the ethics or aesthetics of the self and is to be understood along with Foucault’s interest in the formation of an individual lifestyle in accordance with his theorem of life as a work of art, which is equally based on an ethical understanding. In contrast to Kant, Foucault no longer seeks universal categories, forms, and structures and does not attempt to examine the conditions of possibility of cognitive judgments, morally appropriate action, and aesthetic judgment in a transcendental philosophical project, thereby determining the limits of the appropriate use of reason and the difference between knowledge and belief, but conversely to point out singularity and contingency of the supposedly universal in history. Critique, according to Foucault, is aimed at possible transgressions, at exploring the possibility of ‘no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’.26 Critique thus assumes a new emancipatory orientation as a ‘historico-critical attitude’,27 in which ‘the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them’.28 This ‘historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one’.29 Foucault’s emphasis on the signifcance of enlightenment, critique, and parrhesia in Kant’s works must be seen particularly in the context of his aesthetics or ethics of the self as a rehabilitation of the subject. Thus, at the same time, the theorem of man shifts back to the centre of his philosophy. 9.4 Conclusion Despite his provocative and experimental approach, Foucault fails to formulate the threshold for the restructuring of knowledge according to a new episteme in the postulated transformational situation. It is precisely his recourse to Kant that makes this clear. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person and personality, and his teleological concept of history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique – understood as parrhesia – and enlightenment and by his conception of the subject based on the aspects of freedom and autonomy. His reinterpretations do not completely abandon the Kantian roots. A return to the theorem of man can be observed in Foucault’s philosophy, which makes him appear as the philosopher of the threshold. Like Kant, Foucault thus ultimately turns out to be a philosopher of modernity.

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Notes 1 In this process, man can be confdent, according to Kant’s natural teleological assumptions, that his projects and ambitions ft into nature. 2 ‘The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infnitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person’ (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 127, p. 15). The ability to say ‘I’ to oneself focuses human thinking and is connected to the normative concept of the person, which assigns dignity to man as an end in itself in autonomous moral action. 3 Belwe, Andreas. 2000. Ungesellige Geselligkeit: Kant: Warum die Menschen einander ‚nicht wohl leiden’, aber auch ‚nicht voneinander lassen’ können. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 20–21 (own translation). 4 The unsociable sociability between individuals is equivalent to war in the intergovernmental domain: according to Kant, war means ‘unavoidable confict of culture with the nature of the human species’ (cf. Belwe 2000: 27) (own translation). At the same time, he promotes cultural development until humans are forced ‘to renounce offensive war altogether, in order to enter upon a constitution which by its nature and without loss of power is founded on genuine principles of right, and which can persistently progress toward the better’ (cf. Belwe 2000: 27); Belwe cites Kant 1979. Confict of the Faculties. New York: Abaris, p. 169. 5 Belwe 2000: 9 (own translation). 6 Belwe 2000: 12 (own translation). 7 Belwe 2000: 17 (own translation); and further: ‘Freedom to unite (sociability) and as its counterpart freedom to be independent (unsociability) in the mutually constitutionally guaranteed autonomy’ (Belwe 2000: 27) (own translation). 8 Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius & Thaning, Morten S. 2016. Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 167. 9 Foucault, Michel 1999. ‘Who Are You, Professor Foucault?’ In: Carrette, Jeremy R. (Ed.). Religion and Culture. New York: Routledge, p. 102. 10 Foucault says, for example, in Les mots et les choses that ‘we must henceforth ask ourselves what language must be in order to structure in this way what is nevertheless not in itself either word or discourse’. In: Foucault, Michel. 1989. The Order of Things. London: Routledge, p. 417. Cf. Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer, Thaning: ‘In place of man, language has become the positive aspect that is located in everything’ (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer, Thaning 2016: 157). It can be noted that language and the human being are in a dynamic relationship with each other in the process of historical transformation. For this reason, it cannot be assumed that the episteme of man will be ultimately transcended, but rather that it falls into crisis or is transformed. Foucault does not close this theoretical gap. 11 Foucault, Michel. 2007. ‘What Is Critique?’ In: Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), p. 47. 12 Cf. Foucault 2007: 47–48. 13 Cf. Foucault 2007: 48. 14 Cf. Foucault 2007: 48. 15 Cf. Foucault 2007: 48. 16 Foucault 2007: 50. History ‘offered a greater opportunity to pursue the critical enterprise’ than it did for Aufklärung itself (Cf. Foucault 2007: 50). 17 Foucault 2007: 58. 18 Foucault 2007: 59. 19 Foucault 2007: 59. He is concerned with the ‘connections that can be identifed between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge’ (Foucault 2007: 59). 20 Foucault 2007: 64–66.

Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. 141 21 Foucault 2007: 66–67. 22 Foucault 2007: 67. Vogelmann comments on this: ‘Foucault contrasts this shift from the Enlightenment to the Critique with his research as a reversal, as an attempt at a renewed shift. Critique should not be a self-restriction of reason, but a diagnosis of the limit, which it examines for possible fractures and thus makes experimental transgressions conceivable’. In: Vogelmann, Frieder. 2012. ‘Foucaults parrhesia – Philosophie als Politik der Wahrheit’. In: Gehring, Petra & Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.). Parrhesia: Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zürich, Berlin: Diaphanes, p. 226. Foucault’s interest in the enlightenment is particularly evident in his 1984 text ‘What Is Enlightenment?’. In: Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles: (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 97–119. Foucault explains his interest in Kant’s essay on enlightenment as follows: ‘In his other texts on history, Kant occasionally raises questions of origin or defnes the internal teleology of a historical process. In the text on Aufklärung, he deals with the question of contemporary reality alone. He is not seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement’ (Foucault 2007: 99). 23 Foucault 2007: 109. 24 At the same time, enlightenment itself must be subjected to analysis: ‘We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment’ (Foucault 2007: 110). 25 Foucault 2007: 111. 26 Foucault 2007: 114. 27 This concerns the development of an ‘ontology of ourselves’ (Foucault 2007: 114). 28 Foucault 2007: 118. 29 Foucault 2007: 114.

References Belwe, Andreas. 2000. Ungesellige Geselligkeit: Kant: Warum die Menschen einander ‚nicht wohl leiden’, aber auch ‚nicht voneinander lassen’ können. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Foucault, Michel. 1989. The Order of Things. London: Routledge. Foucault, Michel. 1999. ‘Who Are You, Professor Foucault?’, in: Carrette, Jeremy R. (Ed.). Religion and Culture. New York: Routledge. Foucault, Michel. 2001. ‘What Is Critique?’, in: Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), pp. 41–81. Foucault, Michel. 2007. ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in: Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), pp. 97–119. Kant, Immanuel. 1900ff. Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 1–22 hg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Bd. 23 von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; von Bd. 24 an von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin: De Gruyter. Kant, Immanuel. 1979. The Confict of the Faculties. New York: Abaris. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2006. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kant, Immanuel. 2006. Towards Perpetual Peace & Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Raffnsøe, Sverre, Gudmand-Høyer, Marius & Thaning, Morten S. 2016. Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Vogelmann, Frieder. 2012. ‘Foucaults parrhesia – Philosophie als Politik der Wahrheit’, in: Gehring, Petra & Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.). Parrhesia: Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zürich, Berlin: Diaphanes, pp. 203–229.

III

Personality and Citizenship

10 Kant’s Social Sympathy Debunking Benefcence and Cultivating the Sense of Justice1 Nuria Sánchez Madrid

This chapter aims to take part in a current debate about Kant’s contribution to the philosophical foundation of benefcence, which he examines in The Metaphysics of Morals as a wide duty (MM 6: 390),2 i.e., a duty that allows the subject to choose the manner of abiding by the goals that virtue demands. Kant thus highlights the fact that, unlike the narrow fulflment of duties of right, moral duties seem to widen ‘the practice of virtue’ (MM 6: 390), a feature that involves an emotional reward – Kant hints at this as a ‘contentment with oneself’ (MM 6: 391) – and often social recognition for the subject who allows the goal of relieving social suffering in the civil community to guide his will.3 From the outset, Kant’s treatment of the moral duty of benefcence highlights the strong emotional and moral bonds that join people together in a community, focusing on the fact that moral expectations are not indifferent to the social role that the human impulse to give benefcence to others must fulfl. Put differently, Kant views the duty of benefcence as an extremely entangled issue that, despite its dangers, fosters the cultivation of virtue. Indeed, the social sympathy that every subject is expected to feel towards every other underpins Kant’s remarks about a virtue that, on the one hand, entails the peril of disorienting the human will from the duty of caring for oneself and boosting one’s own practical horizon of wellness and welfare; on the other hand, benefcence has the advantage of helping the human will to overcome naturally the obstacles with which self-love and the prioritisation of one’s own goals impede practical thinking, thus clearing a hopeful path for the transformation of human cohabitation into a credible ‘realm of moral ends’. In consideration of these preliminary remarks, my frst aim in this chapter is to give an account of Kant’s analysis of benefcence which, as an interpretative key of this moral duty, draws on his approach to social class struggle. As is well known, Kant is sympathetic towards the efforts of the middle class to thrive in the social realm, inasmuch as he condemns the feudal economic habits that hinder the success of a liberal market, one which should instead favour those people whose merits and actions justify their occupying the highest positions in the social order. In Kant’s vision of an ideal economic order, the free competition of human capacities opens DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-13

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up a hopeful perspective compared to the static landscape that aristocratic landlords imposed in 18th-century Prussia. He thus takes a quite harsh view of the forms of life that nobility encourages, one that Max Weber would later share in his critical approach to the German Junkers at the dawn of the 20th century. Secondly, I will examine Kant’s wariness of some of the unwitting consequences of cultivating benefcence. In that section, I will draw especially on excerpts from The Metaphysics of Morals and the Lectures on Ethics, which display Kant’s interest in this moral duty as a sort of psychic mechanism that may lead the subject to embrace a broader view of the moral bonds that unite all human beings into a community. The notion of reward will play a key role in Kant’s remarks on the cautious practice of wide duties, in terms of the love that all human beings should feel towards others. Finally, I will conclude that Kant engages in this discussion of the moral value of benefcence so as to outline a wide sense of justice, one that appeals directly to the individual will and demands that every subject should do his best to alleviate the social suffering of the outcasts, i.e., those who are unable to face by themselves the requirements of civil independence. 10.1 The Condemnation of Original Accumulation: Kant’s Criticism of the Nobility The discussion of the liberal roots of Kant’s republicanism is still open and further readings will continue both to enrich this topic and to uncover new aspects of Kant’s arguments. Although I have addressed this in previous papers regarding Kant’s legitimation of state-run poverty relief (Sánchez Madrid 2018, 2019), I would like to concentrate here on the consequences that his critique of the social contribution of the nobility provides for determining his systematic notion of justice as a political duty that the republican state must fulfl. Most interpreters tend to interpret Kant’s hints at this, in expressions such as the ‘injustice of the government’, in a way which is overly abstract and which prevents us from understanding exactly which addressee these words are intended to challenge. In my view, Kant has in mind the fgure of the aristocrat, as he takes issue with the alleged privileged ‘birthright’ that the aristocracy view as a natural endowment of their class. Such a set of class-biased beliefs targets the nobility as the social layer responsible for the injustice most damaging to the commonwealth, according to the triad of principles that underpin the civil state.4 An overview of Kant’s grounding of the political republican order calls attention to the role that I attribute to what Kant calls ‘birthright’, a term that seems to overlap with the ‘innate right’ of freedom mentioned in the introduction to The Doctrine of Right (MM 6: 237–238). As ‘independence from being constrained by another’s choice’ (ibid.), Kant considers this notion of freedom as ‘the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity’ (ibid.). Yet he hints ironically at the illegitimate claims of the nobility to possess the right to occupy a higher position than others (the middle and working classes), as

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such social privilege is merely inherited by birth. Kant argues for the reverse, declaring that a republican state should consider the ‘birthright’ of every subject – passive or active, according to the properties that guarantee his civil independence – as being equal to the ‘birthright’ of everyone else as citizens of the civil state. I have not found further evidence of this overlapping mention of ‘innate right’ and ‘birthright’; it is, however, a helpful sign that suggests that Kant views the political claims of the nobility as the greatest hindrance to establishing a republican state in the 18th century. The following passages eloquently elaborate on what I highlighted earlier: [T]he birthright of each individual in such a state (i.e. before he has performed any acts which can be judged in relation to right) is absolutely equal as regards his authority to coerce others to use their freedom in a way which harmonises with his freedom. Since birth is not an act on the part of the one who is born, it cannot create any inequality in his legal position and cannot make him submit to any coercive laws except in so far as he is a subject, along with all the others, of the one supreme legislative power. Thus no member of the commonwealth can have a hereditary privilege as against his fellow subjects; and no-one can hand down to his descendants the privileges attached to the rank he occupies in the commonwealth, nor act as if he were qualifed as a ruler by birth and forcibly prevent others from reaching the higher levels of the hierarchy (which are superior and inferior, but never imperans and subiectus) through their own merit. (TP 8: 292–293) Kant’s text is adamant regarding the intolerable demands that the aristocratic mindset raises in the social space. As birth does not result from one’s own actions, that such a fact might entail social inequality among citizens is impossible to accept. However, social interaction and the struggle for merit according to the rules of the liberal market might provide legitimate claims for generating inequality in this space, as this would seem to mirror the different values that human merits, capacities, and efforts deserve. Kant thus rejects the beliefs and claims of the aristocratic subject insofar as this particular individuum refuses to consider itself a member of a civil commonwealth. Moreover, the nobles demand that other social layers simply accept being condemned to act as their hierarchical inferiors. Moved by his deep misgivings about the nobility, Kant points out in Theory and Practice that in the past large landowners – usually members of the nobility who have inherited their properties – accumulated the property of land, generating a radical social inequality that has forced many others into subservience to these alleged ‘owners’ of the greater part of the land. What Kant saw as especially suspect here is the fact that aristocrats have not attained their properties through their own efforts and merits, but this ownership stems rather from the alleged privilege assigned to a ‘birthright’, which a priori promoted them

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without their acting within the framework of the classic liberal market, i.e., the sort of market theorised by Kant’s contemporaries such as Adam Smith. A passage near the one previously cited focuses precisely on this tendency of the nobility to demand political recognition of their superiority with regard to other subjects of the civil state on the basis of the properties they have accumulated, often benefting from ‘rogue states’ that ignore the injustice inherent in the existence of large estates: As for landowners, we leave aside the question of how anyone can have rightfully acquired more land than he can cultivate with his own hands (for acquisition by military seizure is not primary acquisition), and how it came about that numerous people who might otherwise have acquired permanent property were thereby reduced to serving someone else in order to live at all. It would certainly confict with the above principle of equality if a law were to grant them a privileged status so that their descendants would always remain feudal landowners, without their land being sold or divided by inheritance and thus made useful to more people; it would also be unjust if only those belonging to an arbitrarily selected class were allowed to acquire land, should the estates in fact be divided. (TP 8: 296) Kant argues, especially in a programmatic text such as Theory and Practice, that the republican order should not allow ‘feudal landowners’ to remain a privileged class that challenges the political authority of the lawgiver. Indeed, feudal economic principles have had a considerable negative impact on the efforts of the liberal market to set other rules for social advancement insofar as feudal inertia counteracts and hinders the dynamics of the struggle between subjects to display their capacities in equal conditions.5 My own reading suggests that Kant’s criticism of the hindrances that the nobility represents for the republican political agenda casts further light on the hints he makes in various texts, from the 1770s – see, for example, the Lecture on Ethics (Collins) – to the 1790s – the decade in which The Metaphysics of Morals was published—, at the useful contribution made by the moral virtue of benevolence to dismantling at least part of the ‘injustice of the government’ found in the persistence of aristocratic privileges at the foundation of European national states in the Age of Enlightenment. Kant seems eager for these states to react to the negative scope of such tolerated injustice. In fact, he does not hesitate to recall in this discussion the republican tenet which holds that ‘what a people (the entire mass of subjects) cannot decide with regard to itself and its fellows, the sovereign can also not decide with regard to it’ (MM 6: 329).6 He shows little hope, however, in the ability of institutions to reverse the accumulation of commodities and properties that have characterised the aristocracy as a ‘stealthy revolution’ —borrowing Wendy Brown’s words to describe the neoliberal transformation of society. Moreover, Kant

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directly addresses individual subjects who in his judgment might institute change in order to amend the unequal conditions in which the nobility still live compared to the majority of citizens. In my view, the point here should be the following: Kant seems to address his demands for the alleviation of the social suffering ensuing from such inequality to the individual efforts of some subjects. Yet who might those subjects be? I feel that this question is clearly related to the social role played by the aristocracy, the part of society that Kant refers to in the sort of impeachment he stages in the texts I will analyse in the next section of this chapter. Kant seems also to legitimate here that the members of the commonwealth should condemn the claims of noble subjects against social equality insofar as a virtuous human being should always remember that the injustice tolerated by a neglectful government must be rectifed through the efforts of the community as a whole. 10.2 The Instinct of Benevolence as the Threshold of a Systematic Notion of Justice Kant endorsed arguments very close to what might be considered a complaint about the ‘structural injustice’ that states either directly foment or simply do not contest, despite their sovereign power.7 As I argued in the frst section, Kant’s account of the injustice stemming from aristocratic forms of life outlines a phenomenon that calls for a civil response. Yet such a response does not directly address the lawgiver of the political ruler but instead opens up a moral refection that widens the scope of virtue. In this same vein, Kant had already praised in the Lecture on Ethics (Collins) the capacity of a moral virtue such as benevolence to broaden the sources of the subject’s sympathy. In the excerpt I will quote from that text, it is notable that Kant describes benevolence as a psychic tendency towards compassion among human beings. Furthermore, this sort of natural inclination, ingrained in the human mind, seems to activate in the agent a sense of injustice which otherwise would not be easy to invoke. Thus, Kant refers to divine wisdom as the structure responsible for such an instinct, called forth to repair in a wider sense the unjust deeds of the subject: [P]rovidence has implanted in us another source [different from respect for right], namely the instinct of benevolence, whereby we make reparation for what we have unjustly obtained. We thus have an instinct for benevolence, but not for justice. By this impulse men take pity on another, and render back the benefts they have previously snatched away, though they are not aware of any injustice; the reason being, that they do not rightly examine the matter. One may take a share in the general injustice, even though one does nobody any wrong by civil laws and practices. So if we now do a kindness to an unfortunate, we have not made a free gift to him, but repaid him what we were helping to take away through a general injustice. For if none might appropriate more of this world’s goods than his neighbour, there would be no rich

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folk, but also no poor. Thus even acts of kindness are acts of duty and indebtedness, arising from the rights of others. (V-Mo/Collins 27: 415–416) The passage is telling, as it sheds light on a feature that is not usually related to an attitude of care for the well-being and happiness of others. This is the impulse to behave benevolently in social cohabitation as a sort of mechanism capable of undoing the injustice of the past, which Kant identifes as ‘general injustice’ and identifes with the wrongful toleration of social injuries that seriously menace the republican principles of freedom, equality, and independence. He speculates that, even if the subject himself has not contravened the law, he might be the facilitator of an injustice that does not possess a concrete face. This is undoubtedly related to the aristocracy I spoke of in the frst section. Yet Kant addresses the passive attitude of the rest of society as a subsidiary cause that stokes feudal claims over the commonwealth. In this vein, I suggest that the ideas conveyed in the above passage should be associated with the notion of collective responsibility, a concept that has still scarcely been analysed in Kant scholarship. Although writings such as Theory and Practice display a quite neutral attitude towards the fact of social inequality,8 according to which the normative order of right would be a determining tool for preventing social oppression in the subordination of some subjects to others, the Lectures on Ethics confrms that Kant’s reading of Rousseau left a deep imprint on his own account of the social order. It is likely that Rousseau led him to assume as a matter of fact that passivity always legitimates the rise of despotism and reduces the republican horizon. This vision of the positive contribution that benevolence would make for lessening material inequalities among citizens, which otherwise impede the republican agenda, reappears in later writings such as The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant highlights there that the benefcence – a reformulated presentation of the ‘benevolence’ used in the Lectures on Ethics of the 1770s – of the affuent is actually devoid of moral value. Moreover, he emphasises that this conduct should be interpreted the other way around, i.e., as a refund of those commodities that were previously snatched away without provoking a decided reaction from the political authorities. Insofar as a rich subject has not in fact undergone any sacrifce in handing some of his goods over to the outcasts, this sign receives a key meaning in Kant’s interpretation. What is more, he states that only a moral illusion enables us to consider the apparently benefcent conduct of more affuent subjects as a ‘meritorious duty’, since this behaviour should instead be analysed as an attitude that the ‘injustice of the government’ made possible by neglecting the republican commitment to the institutional realm: Someone who is rich (has abundant means for the happiness of others, i.e., means in excess of his own ends) should hardly even regard benefcence as a meritorious duty on his part, even though he also puts others under obligation by it. The satisfaction he derives from his benefcence,

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which costs him no sacrifce, is a way of reveling in moral feelings. […] Having the resources to practice such benefcence as depends on the goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored through the injustice of government, which introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their benefcence. Under such circumstances, does a rich man’s help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be called benefcence at all? (TL §31, 6: 453–454) The texts analysed are centred on Kant’s criticism of a moral virtue that already enjoys broad social approval. This is the case of benefcence, which authors of the Scottish Enlightenment such as David Hume linked to the emotional basis of social life. Yet Kant also views benevolence as a kind of intermediate emotional step towards assuming that injustice should in fact be removed through the action of law, and openly denounces the illusions that benefcent conduct entails. At the same time, he focuses on the benefts that ensue from cultivating the moral duty of widening our practical view to include the welfare of others among our own practical goals. In effect, Kant underscores the fact that benefcence in itself would boost the decadence of the moral order insofar as universalising this value clearly counteracts the emergence of property as a right universally recognised by the state. The Lectures on Ethics contain eloquent passages on the destabilising effect of placing benefcence at the core of social life. To some extent, Kant attributes to the benefcent mind shortcomings characteristic of a childish forma mentis, which expects that someone else will always provide for replacing goods that are consumed and guarantee that such commodities are always available. In any case, the social realm must transform itself into a civil state that provides rightful protection to all of the human agents taking part in the commonwealth: If all men were willing to act from benevolence merely, there would be no ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ at all, and the world would be a stage, not of reason, but of inclination, and nobody would trouble to earn anything, but would rely on the charity of others. In that case, however, there would have to be the greatest abundance of everything, and it would all be passive, as when children enjoy something which one of them shares out to the rest, so long as it lasts. (V-Mo/Collins 27: 416) The Metaphysics of Morals contains similar passages that turn the ambiguity associated with benefcence into a specifc set of duties, i.e., moral or wide duties, which each agent must determine how to fulfl. In 1798, Kant would also claim that if benefcent conduct were ruled by a universal law, it would become impossible to display the rule of right in society. Thus, individual

152 Nuria Sánchez Madrid judgment is expected to determine when and how to care for the welfare and happiness of others and to prevent falling into the very indigence that benefcence intends to remove: [A] maxim of promoting others’ happiness at the sacrifce of one’s own happiness, one’s true needs, would confict with itself if it were made a universal law. Hence the duty is only a wide one, the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no specifc limits can be assigned to what should be done.— The law holds only for maxims, not for determinate actions.9 (TL 6: 393) The last two excerpts focus on the discipline that benefcence requires so as not to damage life, an issue that Kant had already mentioned in pre-critical writings such as Observations about the Feeling of Beauty and Sublime. Some interpreters have focused their hermeneutical efforts on the value that Kant assigns to the side duty of benefcence.10 Although I recognise the benefts of obtaining a well-defned notion of benefcence before evaluating Kant’s treatment of it, my aim here is to give an account of the function that Kant’s doctrine of virtue assigns to this moral duty, insofar as it might also inspire the foundation of the basic material rights needed to guarantee the universal welfare of the commonwealth. My reading is indebted to Pinheiro Walla’s explanation of Kant’s line of argumentation in the previously quoted texts, which sheds light on the regulative function that addressing the structural injustice ignored by governments fulfls within the logic of political right. Claiming the value that the lex iusti possesses with regard to the space covered by the lex iustitiae distributivae, Pinheiro suggests that Kant’s discourse on benefcence and equity outlines a foundation of welfare rights, aimed at guaranteeing a minimum threshold of social protection for the civil community: [E]quity can and should inform improvements and reforms of codified legal systems. This is why I will argue that equity-based rights can be used to create codified welfare programmes. Precisely because they are extra-positive judgments about rights, they can help us understand the shortcomings and limitations of existing formal legal systems we would not be able to identify from within them. (Pinheiro Walla 2019: 12) As I have stated elsewhere (Sánchez Madrid 2021), I am inspired by Pinheiro Walla’s hypothesis that assumes the wide sense of benefcence as a potential regulative guideline for designing social policies that address contemporary social challenges. As is well known, Kant ascribes high practical tasks to the regulative features of reason. His treatment of benefcence highlights the shortcomings of public right, especially when understood as a legitimation of private claims to property, which does not seem capable of removing the

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‘general injustice’ that has been naturalised in the social space with the help of non-republican states. While the state manifests its impotence to address the legitimacy of property claims by enquiring into their empirical genealogy, Kant chooses the standpoint of benefcence and equity to gain a novel perspective on the sources of social injustice. This wider standpoint makes it possible to ask for accounts and responsibilities directly from individual human agents, who supersede the agency of the state and help to create a broader sense of justice inspired by a perspective of pity for the fate of others, the claims of whom may not be recognised by the rightful state under the universal law of external freedom. 10.3 Kant’s Account of the Faces of Injustice Kant’s approach to the moral duty of caring for the goals and self-fulflment of others shares some key points with the moral refection laid out by Judith Shklar in The Faces of Injustice (1990). As Shklar states in the conclusion of her book, the tools of law encounter unyielding boundaries when one addresses issues as the sources of injustice. Put another way, viewing a given act on a social scale greater than the legitimate imputation of the deed serves to alleviate the social suffering triggered by inequality and oppression: What is bad luck, and what is unjust? It has not been my purpose to draw a line between them, since it is the argument of this book that no such line can be drawn in general or abstractly. Whatever decisions we do make will, however, be unjust unless we take the victim’s view into full account and give her voice its full weight. Anything less is not only unfair, it is also politically dangerous. Democratic citizens have the best chance of making the most tolerable decisions but certainly not always, given the extent, variety, and durability of human injustice. (Shklar 1990: 126) I have the impression that, despite Kant’s legendary fame as a rigorist, his writings show a profound comprehension of the injuries from past misdeeds that we are condemned to accept in the present and the concept of removing inequality by moral means, rather than introducing a moral perspective into the political agenda. Naturally, Kant’s interpreters are led to suggest like Pinheiro Walla, as I mentioned before – that sympathy for external social suffering should be combined with the law-giving agenda. Yet Kant chose to articulate both features – benefcence and equity on the one hand, justice on the other – as two different accounts of civil normativity, even if the moral duty to behave in accordance with the happiness and welfare of others belongs in a wide sense to Kant’s notion of justice. This is the issue that I would like to concentrate on in this third section. The writings we have already analysed furnish passages in which human generosity becomes a path for discovering the sacred character of the rights of others. Thus, virtues such

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as benefcence, which carry the real danger of impoverishing the individual while following the inspiration of this moral duty, lead the subject through a sort of revolution of conscience, insofar as the Other – in a quite Levinasian sense – becomes the centre of moral refection. The next passage will help us to better grasp the way in which Kant seems less interested in fostering the social spread of benefcence than keen on using this virtue to transform the natural selfsh tendencies of the human will: If we have taken something away from a person, and then do him a kindness when in need, that is not generosity, but a poor recompense for what has been taken from him. Even the civil order is so arranged that we participate in public and general oppressions, and thus we have to regard an act we perform for another, not as an act of kindness and generosity, but as a small return of what we have taken from him in virtue of the general arrangement. All acts and duties, moreover, arising from the right of others, are the greatest of our duties to others. All acts of kindness are permitted only insofar as they are not contrary to the right of another; if they are so, the act is morally impermissible. Thus I cannot rescue a family from misery and afterwards leave debts behind. There is nothing in the world so holy, therefore, as the right of another. Kindness is an extra. He who perform no kindly actions, but has also never offended against the rights of others, can always be a righteous man, and if everyone were like him, there would be no poverty. (V-Mo/Collins 27: 432) Kant’s argumentation in this case points out that caring for the destiny of others belongs to the sort of moral pedagogy that governments should encourage in their societies, as morality widens the notion of distributive justice that the lawgiver aims to establish within the commonwealth. In other words, as the notion of justice is not limited to settling private claims regarding property entitlement, which may be successfully ended by the public right, it brings forward other features that receive their own place in the system of morals.11 It is likely that the uncanny function of the innate right to freedom takes root in territories characterised by the discomfort that invades the subject as he contemplates the nonsense of unequal wealth. However, as the courts are not charged in Kant’s view with the task of reversing the ‘injustice of the government’, the moral conscience of ordinary people takes its place in the progressive transformation of oppressive relationships into rightful bonds. Naturally, Kant is not taking for granted that the state should be superseded by the contribution of individual agents. In my view, he is advocating a radical revolution of the comfortable standpoint that refuses to take the interests of others into account, thus providing an objective status to ‘the rights of others’, to which the republican state should always be orientated.12 In his criticism of aristocratic privilege, Kant stressed that a republican lawgiver could not accept the ‘thought-entity

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without any reality’ which that social estate had come to represent. Yet he nuanced his remarks on the nature of the civil union by stating that Enlightenment does not involve a radical revolution of morals and social habits. On the contrary, his treatment of abortion, duels, and feudal privileges suggests that society – literally, ‘the public opinion’ – has the last word in the generation of change, as it is able to abandon outdated points of view and adopt other ones closer to the goals of republicanism.13 Later in the MM, Kant recommends the adoption of habits that help the subject put himself in the place of others, especially those who undergo deep suffering due to poverty, disease, or debt. As occurred with the instinct of benevolence that Kant noted in the Lecture on Ethics (Collins), providence or natural wisdom seems to have ingrained in us an inclination to explore the suffering of others and thereby strengthen the power that the representation of duty in itself might achieve: But while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys) of others, it is a duty to sympathise actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them. — It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shut sickrooms or debtors’ prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist. For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone not accomplish. (TL §35 6: 457) This excerpt from §35 of The Doctrine of Virtue calls for the incorporation into moral pedagogy of a basic acquaintance with locales such as marginal neighbourhoods, hospitals, and prisons in order to accustom the senses of the agent to spectacles he would otherwise probably ignore. The term Mitgefühl plays a key role in Kant’s moral theory, as it favours the agent putting himself in the place of another person, as theorised by Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy with regard to sympathy. This feeling clearly differs from compassion – defned as humanitas aesthetica, i.e., receptivity to the feeling of joy and sadness in the company of others – and rather stimulates an abidance by practical law, inasmuch as it reveals that the human being has the capacity and will to share the feelings of others, referred to as humanitas practica (MM 6: 456–457).14 Thus, instead of counteracting moral motivations, this disposition to share the feelings of others reinforces the fulflment of moral maxims, overcoming the encumbrances and obstacles that stem from our fnite human nature.15 At the same time, the role of benefcence as a moral duty in Kant’s treatment of social injustice urges the abandonment of any impression of humbling and therefore depreciating people in need when

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helping them, as if practical reason itself dictated that the experience of poverty and social exclusion should be removed from the world.16 10.4 Conclusion Kant’s remarks on the moral duty of benefcence shed light on the enlargement of the legal scope of justice through the idea that it must frst mature within the society before being integrated into a state’s corpus of rights and duties. In my view, the demanding standpoint that Kant endorses regarding the remorse of conscience that the individual agent should feel towards the suffering of others responds to the fact that a position of republicanism requires that the common beliefs of the society meet the principles of freedom, equity, and independence that guarantee the sustainability of the commonwealth. Thus, a society that tolerates the persistence of feudal privileges will not raise its voice as a general will ruled by the universal law of right, which would otherwise prevent the emergence of illegitimate subordination and oppression. However, as the subject comprehends that poverty in the present is the consequence of the fraudulent accumulation of land and commodities in the past, he will be able to demand from his government a substantial transformation of wealth distribution that Kant’s theory of right does not in itself yield. As Shklar pointed out, cultivating a sense of justice involves putting the other at the centre of one’s practical refection, and this aim is indeed among the purposes that right should fulfl in Kant’s critical project. In any case, to establish a formal map of right, emotional tests are needed that lead the human mind to reject egoism as a useful habit and to embrace a broader perspective regarding the sources of social injustice. As the ‘public opinion’ makes this step forward, the united will that distinguishes a society from a civil state addresses the powers of the state with claims which go beyond those of receiving military protection or securing formal universal equality under the law. As the populace grasps the meaning of the social rights that ensue from belonging to a commonwealth, political activity acquires a more enduring quality and engages with the task of alleviating the violence of economic inequality, even if property entitlements appear completely legitimate, as they draw primarily on a prior apprehension that allegedly decided the distribution of the world’s land.17 Furthermore, the apprenticeship of benefcence reveals that the traces of past injustices are not always easy to notice. Discovering how they conceal their effects throughout history, however, is one of the goals of enlightening a historical epoch to the principles of republican citizenship. Kant kept this commitment alive in his marginal remarks on the moral lessons that a systematic enquiry of the wide duty of benefcence can offer. Notes 1 This chapter has been supported by the following ongoing research projects: Precariedad laboral, cuerpo y vida dañada. Una investigación de flosofía social

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(PID2019-105803GB-I0); the Ayuda de Humanidades Digitales program of the Fundación BBVA 2019; the CAM Macrogroup On Trust-CM (H2019/HUM5699); the project UCM-Santander PR87/19-22633 Filosofía y pobreza. Una historia cultural de la exclusión social; and PIMCD UCM 2019 n.º 84 Precariedad, exclusión social y diversidad funcional (discapacidad): lógicas y efectos subjetivos del sufrimiento social contemporáneo (II). See MM 6: 390: ‘[I]f the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, no actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom (latitude) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g. love for one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by which in fact the feld for the practice of virtue is widened’. An illuminating text regarding this feature is MM 6: 391: ‘If this merit [that moral duties brings about] is a human being’s merit in relation to other human beings for promoting what all human beings recognise as their natural end (for making their happiness his own), it could be called sweet merit; for consciousness of it produces a moral enjoyment in which human beings are inclined to sympathy to revel. But bitter merit, which comes from promoting the true well-being of others even when they fail to recognise it as such (when they are unappreciative and ungrateful), usually yields no such return. All that it produces is contentment with oneself, although in this case the merit would be greater still’. See TP 8: 290: ‘The civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following a priori principles: I. The freedom of every member of society as a human being. 2. The equality of each with all the others as a subject. 3. The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen. These principles are not so much laws given by an already established state, as laws by which a state can alone be established in accordance with pure rational principles of external human right’. See TP 8: 293–294. See the following passage from MM 6: 329: ‘Now a hereditary nobility is a rank that precedes merit and also provides no basis to hope for merit, and is thus a thought-entity without any reality. For if an ancestor had merit he could still not bequeath it to his descendants: they must acquire it for themselves, since nature does not arrange things in such a way that talent and will, which make meritorious service to the state possible, are also hereditary. Since we cannot admit that any man would throw away his freedom, it is impossible for the general will of the people to assent to such a groundless prerogative, and therefore for the sovereign to validate it’. Allais (2014) offers a stimulating account of Kant’s approach to poverty relief, which mostly agrees with Ripstein’s idea that Kant intends to progressively transform economic dependence into independence. Allais claims that Kant identifed ‘structural injustice’ as a civil problem for his republican model of the state. Even though I argued for a different interpretation of Kant’s remarks on poverty and economic dependence (Sánchez Madrid 2018, 2019, and 2021), I highly recommend reading Allais’s account of Kant’s wide notion of justice for its analysis of the intertwinement of manifold levels of justice in Kant’s writings. See especially Allais 2014: 7–8: ‘In Kant’s analysis, humiliation is a central objection to begging, but his reasons for thinking there is humiliation are somewhat different: the humiliation is not just (or even primarily) a result of asking for money in degrading ways (dressing like a clown), but is a function of being in a position in which you have no option but to ask strangers to choose to help you meet your basic and essential needs (there is nothing degrading about charity organisers asking for

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donations dressed as clowns). Explaining this requires seeing why, on his account, it is wrong for people to be in a position in which they are systematically dependent on discretionary giving to meet their basic and essential needs, and why these needs should be met through justice and not charity’. For an account of the potential legitimation of welfare rights based on those texts in which Kant hints at an ‘injustice of the government’ that should be decidedly counteracted by a rightful state, see Pinheiro Walla (2019). On this issue, see Hasan 2018: 925: ‘When in TP Kant justifes a state in which no concern is paid to the “welfare” of the poor, “welfare” refers to overall happiness rather the conditions for symmetrical external freedom. All Kant means in TP is that the state has no obligation to redistribute to the extent necessary to secure equal well‐being or satisfaction with one’s life, which is consistent with the claim that it must redistribute to the extent necessary to realise external freedom’. Cfr. TL §§30 (TL 6: 453) and 31 Casuistical Questions (TL §31 6: 454): ‘How far should one expect one’s resources in practicing benefcence? Surely not to the extent that he himself would fnally come to need the benefcence of others’. As a balanced account of benefcence in Kant, I highly recommend the paper by Formosa/Sticker 2019: 637: ‘According to our novel reading, Kant has a moderately demanding conception of benefcence. On this view, the permissible ends of all self‐legislating agents, including our own personal ends, have deliberative salience in moral deliberation. If we promote others’ ends for the right reasons, then we do our duty and act meritoriously and virtuously. But if we promote our own ends, then although this is morally permissible (if we are not indifferent to others); it is not a matter of duty and is neutral in terms of merit and virtuousness. Further, we are closer to ourselves than to (most) other people, and this makes it morally permissible for us to prioritise our own ends (provided we are not indifferent to others), even though, from an impartial perspective, they are not more or less valuable than the permissible ends of others. […] This Kantian conception of benefcence can enrich current debates about demandingness, since it makes an agent’s personal projects, and the fact that partiality towards self and others are important ethical concerns, part of a principled account of benefcence. It provides a baseline under which we are not allowed to fall and thus sets limits. Furthermore, it can explain both why it is good to do more in helping others but also why it is legitimate to make room for one’s personal projects within an ethical life. It makes concern for oneself part of benefcence and morality, without being overly moralistic. In this way, this account promises to avoid both overdemandingness and undemandingness objections’. Cfr. the stimulating approach of Moran (2017) to this issue. See, for example, MM 6: 458: ‘Would it not be better for the well-being of the world generally if human morality were limited to duties of right, fulflled with the utmost conscientiousness, and benevolence were considered morally indifferent? It is not easy to see what effect this would have on human happiness. But at least a great moral adornment, benevolence would then be missing from the world. This is, accordingly, required by itself, in order to present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection, even if no account is taken of advantages (of happiness)’. Refection 6736 on natural right in the Achenwall textbook insists on this transformation of common social beliefs. See R 19: 145: ‘Many people take pleasure in doing good actions but consequently do not want to stand under obligations toward others. If one only comes to them submissively, they will do everything: they do not want to subject themselves to the rights of people, but to view them simply as objects of magnanimity. It is not all one under what title I get something.

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What properly belongs to me must not be accorded to me merely as something I beg for’. See MM 6: 324–325: ‘The estates of knightly order can be revoked without scruple (though under the condition mentioned above) if public opinion has ceased to favor military honors as a means for safeguarding the state against the indifference in defending it. The holdings of the church can be similarly revoked if public opinion has ceased to want masses for souls, prayers, and a multitude of clerics appointed for this as the means for saving the people from eternal fre. Those affected by such reforms cannot complain of their property being taken from them, since the reason for their possession hitherto lay only in the people’s opinion and also had to hold as long as that lasted’. The most complete essay devoted to the scope of Mitgefühl in Kant’s moral theory and anthropology is that of Wehofsits (2016: 132–154). Baron (1995: 220) pointed out this feature of Kant’s interest in the moral scope of British sympathy, a well-known force in the Scottish Enlightenment: ‘[S]ympathetic impulses do indeed accomplish something that the representation of duty alone would not accomplish’. See also Baron/Fahmy (2009). Kant affrms in this vein that, precisely to forestall the humiliation of the beggar and poor, ‘it is our duty to behave as if our help is either merely what is due him or but a slight service of love, and to spare him humiliation and maintain respect for himself’ (MM 6: 449). Pinheiro Walla also claims to break down two different but complementary features of justice in Kant (2019: 6): ‘Kant claims that one can take a share in general injustice, in a way that does not presuppose the violation of any specific laws of the state. In other words, it is possible to do wrong without doing any form of injustice identifiable by the system of laws. Kant’s claim presupposes two different concepts of justice and injustice: one that can be recognised with reference to the positive laws of the state and one which cannot be recognised from a positive legal perspective’.

References Allais, Lucy. 2014. ‘What Properly Belongs to Me. Kant on Giving to Beggars’, in Journal of Moral Philosophy 12(6): 754–771. Baron, Marcia. 1995. Kantian Ethics almost without Apology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Baron, Marcia and Fahmy, Melissa. 2009. ‘Benefcence and Other Duties of Love in The Metaphysics of Morals’, in T. Hill (Ed.), Kant’s Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 209–228. Formosa, Paul and Sticker, Martin. 2019. ‘Kant and the Demandingness of the Virtue of Benefcence’, in European Journal of Philosophy 27: 625–642. Hasan, Rafeeq. 2018. ‘Freedom and Poverty in the Kantian State’, in European Journal of Philosophy 26: 911–931. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. Political Writings. Ed. by Hans Reiss. Trans. by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge U.P. Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Lectures on Ethics. Ed. and trans. by P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. Moran, Kate A. 2017. ‘Neither Justice nor Charity? Kant on “General Injustice”’, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47: 477–498.

160 Nuria Sánchez Madrid Pinheiro Walla, Alice. 2019. ‘A Kantian Foundation for Welfare Rights’, in Jurisprudence 1: 1–16. Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. 2021. ‘Kant on Social Suffering: Vulnerability as Moral and Legal Value’, in L. Caranti and A. Pinzani (eds.), Kant and the Contemporary World. London: Routledge (forthcoming). Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. 2019. ‘Poverty and Civil Recognition in Kant’s Juridical Philosophy: Some Critical Remarks’, in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofa 75: 565–582. Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. 2018. ‘Kant on Poverty and Welfare: Social Demands and Juridical Goals in Kant’s Doctrine of Right’, in Larry Krasnoff, Satne Paula and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (eds.), Kant’s Doctrine of Right in the 21st Century. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp. 85–100. Wehofsits, Anna. 2016. Anthropologie und Moral. Affekte, Leidenschaft und Mitgefühl in Kants Ethik. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter.

11 Active Citizenship and Kantian Republicanism Luke J. Davies

11.1 Introduction1 Kant’s account of citizenship has been the subject of some critical attention in recent literature.2 This literature has focused primarily on his criteria for distinguishing active from passive citizens. Active citizens, Kant says, are those members of a state who are entitled to introduce and maintain the laws of that state. Passive citizens are protected by those laws, but they do not contribute to them. Understanding the criteria for active citizenship is an important task given the centrality of the state and its laws in Kant’s political philosophy. However, the result of the focus on this aspect of Kant’s views is that the nature of active citizenship itself has not been suffciently discussed. This is unfortunate since an examination of the rights and duties associated with active citizenship provides us with resources for better understanding Kant’s republicanism. In this chapter, I contribute to remedying the lack of attention that has been paid to active citizenship on Kant’s account. In doing so, I hope to show that Kantian republicanism is compatible with a number of different modes of participation on the part of citizens. This, we may think, is an attractive feature of Kant’s political philosophy. It suggests that Kantian republicanism is multiply realisable and thus consistent with a number of different forms of state. Before continuing, let me address a potential concern. It may appear that a characterisation of active citizenship is easy to provide. Kant states in both of his published discussions of citizenship that active citizens are those members of a state who are entitled to vote. We might therefore think that being eligible to vote is the right that one gains as an active citizen. However, the matter is more complicated than it at frst appears. This is because Kant was not committed to democratic institutions. While Kantian republican commitments are consistent with democracy, they do not require democracy (or so I will argue). This does not in itself pose a problem for the characterisation of active citizens as members of the state entitled to vote. That entitlement may be conditional on the state being democratic. However, it does raise the question of whether this entitlement exhausts the rights of active citizens. I do not think that it does. There are other ways of contributing to the laws of the state that do not require democracy.3 Moreover, it is an understanding of DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-14

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these different modes of contribution that allow us to see the different ways in which Kant’s republicanism can be realised. My discussion continues as follows. Section 11.2 sets out Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizens. Section 11.3 argues that Kant is not committed to democratic institutions. Section 11.4 discusses the entitlements that might be gained by virtue of one’s status as an active citizen. Section 11.5 presents some textual evidence for the claim that active citizens also possess duties not possessed by passive citizens. §6 concludes. 11.2 Distinguishing Active and Passive Citizens It is not my intention in this chapter to thematise the grounds on which Kant distinguishes active from passive citizens. However, it is worth setting out Kant’s criterion for active citizenship and a possible reason for his selection of that criterion.4 This will provide some context for the discussion of the rights and duties of active citizens in Sections 11.3–11.5. In brief, Kant states that active citizens possess the attribute of ‘civil selfsuffciency’ (‘bürgerlichen Selbstständigkeit’, see MM 6:314).5 The members of a state who possess this attribute are those who do not need to be under the authority of any private person or group of people in order to maintain themselves. Passive citizens need to be under the authority of others to maintain themselves.6 This is Kant’s view in both ‘Theory and Practice’ and the Doctrine of Right, the only two published works in which he discusses the distinction between active and passive citizens. In ‘Theory and Practice’, Kant says that an active citizen is one who ‘serves no one other than the commonwealth’ (TP 8:295, see also Stark 245). In the Doctrine of Right, he says that a member of a state who is civilly self-suffcient owes his ‘existence and preservation to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people’ (MM 6:314). A civilly dependent member of the state is one ‘whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) depends not on his management of his own business but on [the direction (Verfügung) of another (except that of the state)]’7 (ibid.). Each of these passages speaks in favour of understanding the distinction between active and passive citizens in terms of relations of authority. Moreover, understanding the distinction in this way allows us to make sense of some of Kant’s puzzling examples.8 For instance, a person who is in the service of the state counts as civilly self-suffcient because she is employed by the state, which, according to Kant, does not express the will of any private individual but the general will. Domestic servants, on the other hand, are employed by a family. They require the permission of ‘another among the people’ in order to perform the tasks by which they support themselves. Domestic servants also require permission to interfere with the property of those for whom they work; there is no chance for them to exercise their skill without the permission and direction of a private person.

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The same is true of wig makers (see TP 825n) and travelling blacksmiths (see MM 6:314). What is the signifcance of serving another person? Why should civil selfsuffciency (understood in this way) be the characteristic that determines who counts as an active citizen? Kant gives us very little to go on here. However, it is plausible to believe that he thought that those who are under the authority of a private person or group are beholden to that person or group in a way that makes instances of corruption more likely. That is, he may have thought that those who are under the authority of another are more likely to act in a way that advances the private interests of themselves or those on whom they depend when they manage the laws of the state. As we have already seen, Kant claims that active citizens serve no one other than the commonwealth. This suggests the worry that those who are civilly dependent will serve a private interest if given the opportunity to participate in the activities of active citizens. Such acts of corruption would undermine the public status of the law. This is signifcant for Kant’s political philosophy since publicity plays an important role in justifying state authority. What is meant to distinguish the actions of state institutions from the actions of individuals in the state of nature is that the former do not advance the interests of particular individuals. To allow those who are likely to advance such interests in their management of the state would undermine the institutions of that state. Thus, if we understand Kant in this way, members of a state who are civilly dependent are excluded from managing the state and its laws in response to concerns about maintaining a central feature of the state as Kant understands it. 11.3 Democracy in the Kantian State I have now suggested one (to my mind plausible) way of understanding Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizens and a reason why he might have drawn this distinction. What remains to be seen is the kinds of entitlements and duties that are gained by virtue of being an active citizen. This is a topic about which there has been very little discussion in Kantian scholarship. One reason for this might be the fact that in both of his published discussions of active citizenship, Kant claims that active citizens are those members of the state who are entitled to vote (see MM 6:314–315 and TP 8:295). In this section, I argue that voting need not be included among the entitlements of active citizens. I do this by considering possible arguments in favour of democracy as a condition of state legitimacy. This strategy is apt because if democratic institutions were necessary in the Kantian republic, then it would be plausible to hold that all active citizens should be permitted to vote. That is, if all Kantian states were democratic, then we might plausibly believe that voting would be an entitlement possessed necessarily by active citizens.9 If one wants to defend a democratic reading of Kant’s political philosophy, it may seem that the following passage is a good place to start:

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Any true republic is and can only be a system representing the people, in order to protect its rights in its name, by all the citizens united and acting through their delegates (deputies). (MM 6:341) In this passage, Kant claims that a true republic must be a system representing the people. Due to the fact that Kant believes that all states must be republican (see PP 8:349), he must also believe that all states must represent the people. The question to ask, then, is whether this representation requires democratic institutions. I do not believe that it does.10 Kant’s claim is simply that a state only needs to be ruled in a republican manner. It seems that this can be done without any form of citizen participation (see PP 8:372). Actual consent given by voting is not necessary. A ruler only needs to pass laws that could have been consented to by her subjects. Here are two passages in which Kant discusses this point: if a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it […], it is unjust; but if it is only possible that a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted about it, it would probably refuse its consent. (TP 8:297, my emphasis) One must represent all laws in a civil society as given through the consent of all. The contractus originarius is an idea of the agreement of all who are subject to the law. One must test whether the law could have arisen from the agreement of all, if so then the law is right. (NF 27:1382, my emphasis; see also WE 8:39, DCF 19:610, TP 8:299) These passages speak against the view that Kant strongly advocated for democratic institutions. Rather than acting on actual consent, a ruler only needs to ask whether the people could have consented to a law. If they could have consented, then the law is just and the citizens are bound to obey. Kleingeld (2018b) argues these passages do not represent Kant’s mature view.11 While Kant believed democratic participation was not necessary at the time of the 1784 lectures on natural right or the 1793 ‘Theory and Practice’, she claims his mind had changed by the time of the 1797 Doctrine of Right. Kleingeld appeals to the MM 6:341 passage quoted above in order to support her view. This is because that passage no longer uses the language that citizens ‘could have’ consented to a law.12 Since Kant had consistently used this language previously, it is not unreasonable to suspect that a change in language corresponds to a change in belief. However, the MM 6:341 passage is compatible with the view that the people are represented, but just not by people who they have decided will

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represent them. Since there are many different ways of selecting representatives, the mere fact that representation is necessary does not (on its own) tell us that democracy is necessary. If we read the passage with this in mind, what Kant says in the Doctrine of Right can be rendered consistent with his earlier writings. Moreover, in the 1798 Confict of the Faculties, Kant makes claims similar to those found in the lectures on natural right and ‘Theory and Practice’. He says, The constitution may be republican either in its political form or only in its manner of government, in having the state ruled through the unity of the sovereign by analogy with the laws that a nation would provide itself in accordance with the universal principles of legality.13 (CF 7:88, the last emphasis is mine) Here Kant says that the sovereign may rule in a way analogous to the way a people would rule itself. The people itself does not need to rule. Confict of the Faculties was published one year after the Doctrine of Right. Thus, Kant’s later works of political philosophy do not unanimously support the view that he had a change in belief from his earlier writings. It seems that Kant remained committed to the view that the state may be ruled in a way that is compatible with principles of right without seeking the actual agreement of its citizens. This casts considerable doubt on Kleingeld’s reading. Kant’s work around the same time as the Doctrine of Right continues to affrm the position of the lectures on natural right and ‘Theory and Practice’, and there is nothing in the Doctrine of Right itself that speaks conclusively against that position. Due to this, it is reasonable to believe that Kant’s position on this matter remained unchanged. There are other reasons to be sceptical that Kant was committed to actual democratic institutions. For example, in the Doctrine of Right he claims the following: The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right is to proceed from it, it cannot do anyone wrong by its law. Now when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non ft iniuria). Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative. (MM 6:313–314; see also TP 8:295) This might be taken to offer support for the democratic reading. Since one may be wronged by arrangements made by another, each should make arrangements for herself. This, we might think, requires democratic input on the part of the citizens. The worry that arises for arguments making use of

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this passage is that it presents a very high standard for voting. Kant does not merely claim that each must have a say. He says that each must decide the same thing for all and all for each. It is implausible to believe that such a condition could ever be satisfed by democratic institutions, as it would require that each come to the same decision as all others.14 This again speaks against the belief that Kant was concerned with actual democratic institutions. Might we argue that while Kant’s texts do not support the necessity of voting, certain of his commitments do? This is the view that Hanisch (2016) takes. He claims that the innate right to freedom15 can provide the grounds for the necessity of voting. This is because, in his view, the innate right is meant to contain an element that entitles each of us to positively ‘authorise and shape the state’s coercive institutions’ (2016, 86). In order to support this view, Hanisch appeals to Byrd and Hurschka’s claim that external freedom comprises both ‘independence from another’s constraining choice [and] simultaneous “dependence on laws” in a juridical state’ (Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 87). There are two things to note about this. First, it is not clear that the innate right contains a positive entitlement. Kant merely characterises the innate right as entitling each person to freedom from the necessitating choice of another. This entitlement is purely negative. Byrd and Hruschka also understand the innate right this way, claiming that in order to generate the positive aspect of external freedom, we need to go further than the entitlements of the innate right (see 2010, 89). Thus, Hanisch appears to mistakenly identify the innate right to freedom with the positive conditions for external freedom more generally. Second, the positive aspect of external freedom, as understood by Byrd and Hruschka, does not entitle each person to participate in choosing representatives. They tell us: ‘In the positive sense of external freedom, I become free when I move to a juridical state where my rights are secured through public law’ (2010, 88). There is no mention of active participation here. The positive aspect of external freedom is understood in terms of one’s rights being secure, and democratic representation is not necessary for this.16 Here is how I believe we should understand the positive and negative aspects of external freedom on Byrd and Hruschka’s account. The negative aspect is the entitlement to be free from the necessitating choice of another, as specifed by the innate right. The positive aspect is the entitlement to be a member of a state that coercively secures one’s rights. The latter aspect is positive only because it requires the institution of the state and not merely the noninterference of others. What is important for our purposes is that the positive aspect of external freedom can be secured without democratic participation, as we have seen in the numerous passages quoted above. Hanisch’s approach, then, appears to misunderstand the way in which Byrd and Hruschka draw the distinction between positive and negative aspects of external freedom in two ways. He both (i) mistakenly identifes the innate right to freedom with external freedom more generally and (ii) takes the positive aspect of external freedom to entitle members of a state to

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democratic participation when all it requires is the institution of a state that secures rights. As we have seen in the passages above, Kant does not believe that democratic participation is a necessary condition for securing rights. While this is not fatal to Hanisch’s project, it does mean that he owes us an account of why the positive aspect of external freedom should be understood in terms of such participation. In light of the passages presented above, this will be a diffcult task. Let me consider one more argument in favour of the belief that the Kantian state requires democratic institutions. Kant claims that the state of nature is a condition in which different opinions about right are possible (see MM 6:312, DMM 23:278–279, NF 27:1381). More specifcally, each person in the state of nature is entitled to be the judge in her own case and so may disagree with others about the extent of the others’ rightful entitlements. Some of this disagreement may be the result of indeterminacies about general principles of right or the application of those principles to particular cases. Some disagreement may be about the relevant empirical facts. While disagreement about empirical facts cannot be a matter of indeterminacy (there will be a fact of the matter about who claimed this plot of land frst, for example), no person is in an epistemically superior position to settle disputes about those facts. Thus, disagreement about empirical facts will also make disagreement about rights possible in the state of nature. The civil condition is meant to uniquely be able to provide a solution to this problem.17 The legislative branch of the state promulgates a single interpretation of the law publicly, thus making general principles of right determinate. The judiciary settles disputes about the application of those principles in specifc cases. However, we might worry that this doesn’t provide an adequate solution to the problem. This is because public offcials suffer from the same lack of insight into general principles, the application of those principles, and empirical facts as private individuals. Thus, it is not clear how public offcials are able to resolve disagreements that arise. We may disagree with the decision of a legislator or a judge in the same way that we may disagree with another private individual.18 Active citizenship, understood in terms of democratic participation, may appear to provide a recognisably Kantian solution to this problem. In particular, we might think that the problem of disagreement can be addressed by the fact that active members of the state ‘give the law to themselves’. On this view, the reason that the state is able to coercively enforce a publicly promulgated interpretation of the law is that the citizens of that state are the authors of that law. They are thus only subject to self-imposed obligations. Not only does this appear to offer a solution to the problem of disagreement, it does so in a way that develops, in the political realm, a popular understanding of Kant’s views of ethical obligation in the Groundwork. This is the view that the moral law lays an obligation on us because it is a law that we have legislated for ourselves.19 The political equivalent of this view is thus that external laws can only be rightfully coercively enforced if we are the authors of those

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laws. Participatory institutions might then be seen as a necessary feature of the Kantian state since it is only through such institutions that members of a state can become authors of the laws of that state. The central problem with this view is the following. Not all of the ways in which active citizens participate in maintaining and contributing to the laws of a state entail that they are the author of all of the laws of that state or that they agree with the application of those laws to particular cases. If an active citizen serves on a jury, for example, it is not true that she can thereby be said to be the author of all of the coercively enforced laws of a state (or even that she has consented to those laws). As a result of this, disagreement with respect to those laws for which an individual citizen cannot be said to be the author could still arise. This is so even when we include voting as a means of participation. Consider a case in which active citizens vote for representatives who then run the state. In such a state, do those active citizens whose representatives were not chosen count as co-authors of the laws? It would seem not, unless we are supposing that members of a state have agreed to majority rule (and that all the actions taken by representatives really do count as actions taken by the voters themselves). However, whether to take the majority decision is itself a matter about which there can be signifcant disagreement, disagreement that voting (unless unanimous) cannot resolve. This does not mean that enforcing the laws of a state coercively would not be justifed with respect to any of the members of that state. If members of a state could be considered to be the authors of some of the laws of that state, then those members would be rightfully subject to coercive enforcement of those laws. However, this does not tell us why the laws of a state in general can be coercively enforced when members of that state are active in lawgiving in some form. Disagreement is still possible in a state in which citizens contribute to the laws. For this reason, we cannot argue for the necessity of participatory institutions on the grounds that such institutions are necessary as a solution to the problem of disagreement. Thus, there are good reasons to think that Kant was not committed to democratic institutions. A state only needs to be governed in a republican manner (i.e., preserve the distinction between executive and legislative branches of the state and represent the people), and this does not require any actual input from citizens.20 This may seem to raise a problem. As Meckstroth notes, ‘if Kant were really concerned only with hypothetical or modal consent (imputed from formal universality), then his distinction between “active” and “passive” citizens would be meaningless, since every citizen would be “passive” in just the sense that he describes’ (2015, 128). If the difference between active and passive citizens is that the former are permitted to participate in lawgiving but the latter are not, then the fact that the state need not have democratic institutions appears to allow for the possibility that all citizens will be passive. I am not sure that Meckstroth’s worry is well founded.21 One reason for this is that the difference between active and passive citizens may simply be conditional. Active citizens may be

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those members of a state who are permitted to vote if and when that state is a democracy. This preserves the distinction between active and passive citizens without requiring that all states be democratic. Another, more signifcant, reason is that the worry about a lack of democratic institutions threatening the distinction between active and passive citizens only arises if we believe that the entitlement to vote exhausts the entitlements of active citizenship, but it does not (or so I will argue below). Active citizens may also participate in lawgiving in other ways, such as by serving on juries, going to court, and holding public positions. None of these contributions requires democratic institutions. Thus, non-democratic constitutions do not threaten the distinction between active and passive citizens. 11.4 Active Citizenship beyond the Vote Kant claims that active citizens are true members of the commonwealth (rather than simply parts of it) who act ‘from [their] own choice in community with others’ (MM 6:314). He also says that active citizens have the ‘right to manage the state itself […], the right to organise it or to cooperate for introducing certain laws’ (MM 6:315). Passive citizens, to the contrary, are free and equal associates of the state who may not contribute to the management of the state.22 On the basis of these general remarks, it is unclear why active citizenship should be limited to voting (though, as already mentioned, this is the only entitlement that Kant mentions explicitly). This is because there are numerous activities necessary for the management of a state and its laws in addition to voting in elections. Note that this is true even when the constitution of the state is democratic. For each of the additional activities that are necessary for managing the state, Kant must be committed to the view that only active citizens may hold the relevant positions associated with those activities. The reason for excluding those who merely count as passive citizens is either that the relevant person is not capable of contributing to the laws of the state (as in the case of children) or is likely to do so in a way that is inconsistent with the public nature of the law (as in the case of adults who are civilly dependent). Let us consider a few examples of this kind of participation in the management of the state. These examples will not exhaust the kinds of entitlements that may be possessed solely by active citizens. However, they will allow for a sense of the variety of such entitlements. Representation by sortition and citizens’ assemblies. Democracy is not the only way of choosing representatives. This leaves open the possibility of other forms of representation that do not require the vote of active citizens. Sortition and the use of citizens’ assemblies are good examples of this. In each case, members of the state (or organisation) are chosen by lot to serve as representatives of their peers. In a state in which the ruler is chosen by sortition, only those members of the state

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who count as active citizens would be candidates for selection. The same would be true of citizens’ assemblies gathered in order to address a particular problem. Serving on a jury and representing oneself in court. An example similar to that of representation by sortition and citizens’ assemblies, but also considerably more familiar, is that of serving on a jury. Kant is explicit about the fact that those serving on juries are to be members of the people and not the legislative or executive authority. He says: ‘A people judges itself through those of its fellow citizens whom it designates as its representatives for this by a free choice and, indeed, designates especially for each act. […] only the people can give a judgement upon one of its members, although only indirectly, by means of representatives (the jury) whom it has delegated’ (MM 6:317). Only the people are able to make a judgement concerning one of their own without thereby wronging them (ibid.). While Kant does not mention this explicitly, it makes sense to read him as limiting this kind of participation to active citizens. While jurors do not introduce new laws, they do make decisions about the application of existing laws. For this reason, membership on a jury is a public position and so is not suitable for those who are under the authority of others. Thus, only those who are civilly self-suffcient (active citizens) may be called for jury service. Passive citizens are also not permitted to represent themselves in court. In his discussion of the attributes of citizens, Kant claims that being civilly self-suffcient is what gives a person their civil personality, which consists in not having to be represented by another where rights are concerned (see MM 6:314). This indicates that passive citizens must be represented by others in matters of right. Kant makes this explicit in the case of women in the Anthropology: ‘But just as it does not belong to women to go to war, so women cannot personally defend their rights and pursue civil affairs for themselves, but only by means of a representative’ (A 7:209). Women are passive citizens on Kant’s account because they must always be under the authority of a man (ibid.). Since passive citizens cannot represent themselves in civil matters, Kant is committed to the view that women may not represent themselves in court. It may be worth mentioning in this context that despite the fact that passive citizens cannot represent themselves, they are entitled to representation and equal protection under the law. They are still free and equal members of the state. However, only active citizens can go to court in their own name. Holding public positions. In addition to serving on a jury, other public positions in the Kantian state will only be open to active citizens. This, importantly, includes positions associated with the civil service. As positions that serve to promote the aims of the executive, they play an important role in the maintenance of the state and its laws. Here, we should not just think of prominent public positions, such as those held by ministers, but also those who work under them as restricted to active citizens.

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Each of these examples demonstrates that the entitlements of active citizenship need not be exhausted by voting for representatives. While Kant does not thematise these other forms of participation in his writings, he does explicitly mention serving on juries and representing oneself in civil matters. Not only this, but the running of a state (and the public positions required for this) necessitates a role for active citizens that could not be played by passive citizens on Kant’s account. Indeed, the examples above illustrate forms of participation related to each of the three branches of a republican state: the legislature, judiciary, and executive. The result of this is not only that the entitlements of active citizens extend far beyond merely voting, but that they must extend in this way. Even in states whose constitution is not democratic, we can meaningfully distinguish between active and passive citizens because active citizens are the only members of the state permitted to contribute to its institutions. This means that, even in states that are democratic, there are entitlements that distinguish between active and passive citizens that go beyond mere voting. In addition to helping us understand the distinction between active and passive citizens, this also tells us something about Kantian republicanism. In particular, the variety of ways in which members of a state may participate in maintaining and shaping the laws of that state speak to the fact that Kantian republicanism is multiply realisable. One of the strengths of Kant’s view, which becomes apparent when thinking about his account of citizenship, is that it is consistent with a wide range of constitutions and modes of participation. While the Kantian republic need not be democratic, as we have seen, this does not mean that it can be a state in which citizens do not play an active role. Active citizens have the entitlement to perform certain actions for themselves, such as going to court in their own name, and the option of other forms of participation. The result of this is that republics in Kant’s sense may take on a number of different forms, each corresponding to the different ways in which active citizens may participate. 11.5 The Duties of Active Citizens So far I have primarily argued that active citizenship should not solely be understood in terms of the entitlement to vote. There are other entitlements that active citizens possess and passive citizens do not. In this section, I want to suggest that Kant may have believed that active citizens also have duties that passive citizens do not. Such a suggestion must remain speculative given the fact that Kant did not discuss these duties in his published work. However, there are textual grounds for ascribing this claim to Kant, and the existence of duties belonging to active citizens allows for a greater appeal of the account of citizenship as a whole. A frst indication that Kant believes that citizens possess duties appears in the Doctrine of Right. He says, By the well-being of the state is understood, instead, that condition in which its constitution conforms most fully to principles of right; it

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is that condition which reason, by a categorical imperative, makes it obligatory for us to strive after. (MM 6:318) In this passage, Kant claims that reason makes it obligatory for us to bring the constitution of a state into conformity with principles of right. While he does not mention active citizens explicitly here, it is reasonable to believe that he has them in mind. This is because, as I have argued above, it is only active citizens who are permitted to make the necessary changes. Passive citizens may not contribute to the maintenance of the state. For this reason, only active citizens are bound by the categorical imperative to improve the state.23 According to the Friedländer transcriptions of Kant’s anthropology lectures (1775–1776), Kant claims: ‘Insofar as it depends on age, maturity is the civilian majority, when people are in the position to provide not only for their own civic affairs, but also for those of the common good’ (A/Fried 25:543). This passage appears to suggest that the civil self-suffciency, discussed above in Section 11.2, is insuffcient for active citizenship. This is because active citizens do not only provide for themselves but also for the common good. Kant repeats this sentiment almost 20 years later in the 1793 drafts for ‘Theory and Practice’. He writes: A citizen is a human being in society who has his own rightful independence [rechtliche Selbständigkeit], i.e. can be considered as himself a member of the universal public legislative authority. Consequently every servant [Gesinde] is a human being who, like a parasitic plant, is rooted only on another citizen […]. The possessors of land are the genuine state subjects because they depend on the land for vitam sustinendo [sustenance of life]. To the extent, however, that they farm only as much as they need to live they are not citizens of the state. For they could not contribute to the commonwealth. Only possessors of great amounts of land who have many servants, who themselves as servants cannot be citizens, could be citizens, and yet they are citizens only to the extent that their surplus is purchased by others who, as free citizens, do not depend on the land. […] those whose existence depends on the will of another, thus those who do not enjoy a free existence, have no vote. (DTP 23:137–138; my emphasis) There is a lot going on in this passage, and I am not going to address it all. We can see, however, that elements of the account found in ‘Theory and Practice’ and the Doctrine of Right can also be found here. For example, Kant tells us that domestic servants cannot be citizens, an exclusion also found in his other accounts.24 Since Kant says that those whose existence depends on the will of another have no vote, we might also think this passage is consistent with the authority reading of civil self-suffciency.

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What is important for my purposes here is the fact that Kant makes a signifcant addition to the accounts found in his published works. In particular, he tells us that those who do not produce more than they need are not citizens because they could not contribute to the commonwealth. Moreover, only those who contribute to the commonwealth are entitled to vote. Since the entitlement to vote is only held by active citizens, Kant’s comments here suggest that active citizens must contribute to the state. This introduces a duty possessed by active citizens that is not possessed by passive citizens. There is a ready objection here. The passages in which Kant mentions contribution to the state are found in transcriptions of his lectures and an unpublished draft. Given this fact, we might think that contribution to the state is not a necessary condition for active citizenship on Kant’s mature view. As already mentioned, my suggestion that the status of active citizenship also includes duties must remain speculative. However, I believe that there are three additional reasons for ascribing this view to Kant. These reasons do not speak conclusively in favour of this position, but they do provide some additional support for it. The frst reason to think that Kant was concerned with contribution to the state is simply that citizenship in Prussia at the time was a special status that had to be earned. Citizens had both rights and duties in addition to those possessed by other members of the state. In order to acquire this status, some contribution to one’s society was necessary.25 This contribution frequently took the form of a payment in addition to the taxes one already paid. However, one could also marry into citizenship or become a citizen through membership in a guild (the latter of which was also often accompanied by a membership fee).26 Given that these were common practices, Kant may not have felt the need to explicitly refer to them in his published works. The second reason is that two of Kant’s contemporaries, Karl Heinrich Heydenreich and Johann Heinrich Abicht, took Kant’s position to be that some material contribution to the state is necessary for active citizenship. However, while both of them endorsed the view that some contribution is necessary, they criticised Kant on the grounds that restricting this to material contribution was too narrow. Heydenreich specifcally mentions that those who serve in the military should be considered to have satisfed the condition that one contribute to the state.27 The third reason is the following. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès’s discussion of active and passive citizenship explicitly draws the distinction between active and passive citizens in terms of contribution to the state. Sieyès was one of the central intellectual fgures of the French Revolution. He exerted considerable infuence on the politics of France at that time and was involved in writing a new French constitution. To my knowledge, Kant never refers to Sieyès directly in his published writing, lectures, or notes. And, even if some references do exist, they do not fgure prominently in Kant’s work. However, Sieyès’s interest in, and admiration for, Kant’s writings were mentioned to Kant in some letters in 1796 (see C 12:64 and C 12:141). Moreover, Karl

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Thèremin, a Prussian diplomat in Paris and part of Sieyès’s circle, mentions Kant’s respect for both Sieyès, and some of his short essays, in a letter to his brother that same year (C 12:59).28 We thus have evidence that Kant was aware of Sieyès’s ideas, and some of his work. To a certain extent, this is unsurprising given Kant’s well-known interest in the French Revolution. It is important for us here because Sieyés has a discussion of active and passive citizenship that was published four years prior to ‘Theory and Practice’.29 Moreover, the views of the two authors are signifcantly similar. In one of his discussions of citizenship, Sieyès writes: All the inhabitants of a country should enjoy the rights of the passive citizen: all have a right to the protection of their person, of their propriety, of their liberty, etc., but not all have the right to take an active part in the formation of public powers; not all are active citizens. Women, at least in the current state of things, children, foreigners, those also who contribute nothing to the maintenance of the public establishment, should not actively infuence the public weal […]. All can enjoy the advantages of society; but only those who contribute to the public establishment, are like true stockholders in the great social enterprise. Only they are true active citizens, the true members of the association. (Sieyès 1789b, 36–37, cited in Sewell 1994, 176–177) The similarity between Kant and Sieyès in this passage is striking. Sieyès claims that we should draw a distinction between active and passive citizenship and that passive citizens have a right to the protection of their person and their property. As we have seen, Kant believes that passive citizens possess the rights of freedom and equality, which protect their innate and acquired rights. Sieyès also excludes women and children from the status of active citizenship since they do not contribute anything to the commonwealth.30 Only those who make a contribution count as active citizens on his view. Given that Kant was aware of and respected Sieyès’s work, we might believe that this speaks in favour of thinking that Kant was also concerned with contribution to the state and not just relations of authority in his discussion of active citizenship. The similarity between Kant and Sieyès of course does not speak conclusively in favour of this view. Kant may have been infuenced by Sieyès without endorsing all of the latter’s views. However, given the other evidence of this view presented above, I believe that the similarity between the views at least speaks in favour of thinking that Kant was concerned with the contribution to the state. Thus, I believe that there are three reasons that speak in favour of the view that Kant’s account of active citizenship requires that one make a contribution to the state, in addition to the fact that he endorses this requirement in the drafts for ‘Theory and Practice’. The frst is that this practice was common at the time Kant was writing. The second is that some of Kant’s contemporaries took him to be endorsing this view. The third is that Kant’s

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work seems to have been infuenced by that of Sieyès, and Sieyès explicitly understands the distinction between active and passive citizenship in terms of the contribution that a member of a state makes to that state. 11.6 Conclusion I have argued here that active citizenship, for Kant, comprises both rights and duties. Active citizens are those members of the state who are entitled to manage the state and its laws. While most literature discussing active citizenship in Kant’s political philosophy only mentions the right to vote, I have argued that the entitlements of active citizens are much broader than this. Indeed, for each activity necessary for the management of the state, only active citizens will be eligible for the position associated with that activity. Moreover, while voting for representatives is one way in which active citizens might contribute to the state and its laws, it is not a necessary feature of Kantian republics. There are many different ways in which active citizens may contribute. I have also suggested that there may be duties that active citizens alone possess. Like the rights of active citizens, it is plausible to suggest that the duties will depend on the constitution of the state. The variety of rights and duties of active citizens is signifcant since it speaks to the multiple realisability of Kantian republicanism. Kant’s republican commitments do not fx the way in which citizens contribute to the state. Notes 1 For comments and discussions on previous versions of this chapter, I am grateful to Ralf Bader, Tom Bailey, Stefano Lo Re, Thomas Sinclair, Jens Timmermann, and Ralph Walker. 2 For representative discussions, see Baynes (1989, 455), Ellis (2006, 551–552), Kersting (1992a, 357; 1992b, 153–154), Kleingeld (1993, 137–138), Mendus (1992, 168–174), Mulholland (1990, 330), Pateman (1988, 171), Pinzani and Madrid (2016), Pogge (2002), Uleman (2004, 596), and Weinrib (2008). 3 For the purposes of this chapter, I understand democracy to be something like representative democracy, characterised by universal (or near universal) enfranchisement for the purposes of electing representatives. 4 I give a full defence of the view I present in this section in Davies (2023). 5 References to Kant’s works refer to volume and page numbers of the Academy text (Kants gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer/W. de Gruyter, 1902). Abbreviations used are the following: MM = Metaphysics of Morals, PP = Toward Perpetual Peace, TP = ‘On the common saying: that may be true in theory, but it is of no use in practice’ (‘Theory and Practice’), CF = Confict of the Faculties, WE = ‘An answer to the question: what is enlightenment?’, A = Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, NF = Feyerabend lectures on natural right, A/ Fried = Friedländer lectures on anthropology, DCF = Drafts for Confict of the Faculties, DTP = Drafts for ‘Theory and Practice’, C = Correspondence. There are some passages that are not included in the Academy text but do appear in Nachforschungen zu Briefen und Handscriften Immanuel Kants (2014) edited by Werner Stark. References to those texts are cited using ‘Stark’ and the pagination

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from that volume; for example, ‘Stark 244’. Translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant unless otherwise indicated. The account that I give here differs from the standard reading of Kant’s remarks found in the literature. According to the standard reading, active citizens are those members of the state who are economically independent (see Pinzani and Madrid 2016; Baynes 1989; Ellis 2006; Maliks 2014; Mendus 1992; and Rosen 1993 for some examples of this reading). On my account, this standard reading is too narrow. While economic relations are one of the kinds of relations of authority that Kant is concerned with, they are not the only such relations. The square brackets mark modifcations of Gregor’s translation of the Doctrine of Right. Kant’s examples have been the subject of some criticism due to the diffculties that arise in making sense of them (see Ellis 2005, 197, and Beiner 2010, 25). I believe that the authority reading is able to deal with these concerns. This section expands upon my discussion in Davies (2020, §3). See Hanisch (2016, 72) and Pinzani (2008, 209) for expressions of similar concerns. Byrd and Hruschka (2010, 181) also claim that Kant’s views changed to support democratic institutions at the time of the Doctrine of Right. Kant’s characterisation of the right to freedom of citizens also says that freedom is the attribute of ‘obeying no other law than that to which he has given [gegeban] his consent’ (MM 6:314, my emphasis). This also lends support to Kleingeld’s reading. See also CF 7:91, where Kant states that a monarch can treat her citizens according to principles that ‘are commensurate with the spirit of laws of freedom […] although they [the citizens] would not be literally canvassed for their consent’. On certain readings of Rousseau, according to which the general will is generated by actual voting, this problem also appears. Even drawing on his discussions of the importance of civic education, it is diffcult to see how this strong requirement can be fulflled. One way to avoid this is to view Rousseau’s general will as a standard against which acts of government can be held. I believe that something similar can be said of Kant here. Kant’s claim that the general will is united a priori provides further support for this reading (see MM 6:246). ‘Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity’ (MM 6:237). Byrd and Hruschka’s own defence of the claim that Kant endorsed democracy in the Doctrine of Right concerns Kant’s changing beliefs about the different forms of state (see 2010, 179–181). Their view closely resembles Kleingeld’s, as discussed above. This problem is often called the problem of indeterminacy. However, since disagreement over empirical facts is both intractable and not a result of normative indeterminacies (i.e., indeterminacies arising from the application of principles of right to particular cases), it seems preferable to call it the problem of disagreement. For discussion of this problem, see Ripstein (2009), Mulholland (1990), Stilz (2011), Williams (1983), and Pallikkathayil (2010). For related discussion, see Sinclair (2018) and Kolodny (n.d.). For two prominent examples of this interpretation of Kant’s view of ethical obligation, see Rawls (1971, 225) and Korsgaard (1996, 112). Kleingeld (2018a, 2018b) has argued that it is misleading to speak simply of ‘giving the law to ourselves’ in the context of Kant’s ethical philosophy. Kantian ethics, at least at the time of the Groundwork, is primarily concerned with giving universal law. Of course,

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in giving a universal law, one is also giving the law to oneself. However, this difference in terminology also signals a signifcant difference in the emphasis of the view. Kant, according to Kleingeld, is not as much concerned with the possibility of self-imposed obligation, as much as the possibility of universal obligation. I do not need to take a position on whether this is an accurate characterisation of Kant’s ethics. However, I do believe that it adequately characterises his political philosophy. Kant is not concerned with self-imposed political obligations, so much as obligations based on a priori principles of right. We might think that this gets Kant into trouble, since it would appear that he now owes an account of what it means to govern a state in a republican manner. While this is true, I do not believe that it puts him in a worse position than contemporary theorists such as Rawls (1971) or Scanlon (1998), who rely on devices such as the veil of ignorance or appeals to reasonable rejectability. The vast literature dedicated to determining the obligations that a Rawlsian or contractualist position commits us to speak in favour of the belief that Kant is, at least, not alone in not having fully specifed the content of his views. I am grateful to Thomas Sinclair and Jens Timmermann for discussion on this topic. See Kleingeld (1993) for a critical discussion of Kant’s claim that passive citizens (especially women) are in fact free and equal members of the state. Given the diffculties associated with understanding the relationship between the categorical imperative, categorical imperatives, and Kant’s political philosophy (for an excellent discussion, see Willaschek 2002), we might worry that this passage is too vague to be helpful. I am sympathetic to this concern. However, what is important for my purposes here is simply that Kant believed that there are some duties that active citizens possess that passive citizens do not. This passage supports this claim (though not conclusively) without requiring a worked-out view of how Kant thinks of categorical imperatives in the Doctrine of Right. Thanks to Tom Bailey for pointing this passage out to me. Kant’s use of ‘Gesinde’ in the passage above indicates that he is referring to domestic servants and not civil servants (see MM 6:283 and MM 6:360 for other instances of this). I say ‘society’ rather than ‘state’ above since payment was made to the government of one’s town rather than the state itself. On this, see Walker (1971) and Maliks (2014). See Heydenreich (1794, 117) and Abicht (1795, 140), both cited in Maliks (2014, 99). Thèremin was keen that Kant and Sieyès should take up a correspondence, but this never happened. It was Thèremin who wrote to Kant about Sieyès’s respect for Kant’s work. On the relation between Kant and Sieyès, see Shell (2016) and Maliks (2014). Shell claims that, ‘Kant’s categories of “active” and “passive” citizen are lifted almost verbatim from the French Constitution of 1791, following the recommendations of Abbe Sieyes’ (2016, 11). Sieyès, unlike Kant, appeared to have some reservations about the exclusion of women (see Sieyès 1789a, 19–20, quoted in Sewell 1994, 148).

References Abicht, Johann Heinrich. 1795. Kurze Darstellung Des Natur-Und Völkerrechts Zum Gebrauch Bey Vorlesungen. Bayreuth: Lübels Reben. Baynes, Kenneth. 1989. ‘Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract’, in The Monist 72 (3): 433–53.

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Beiner, Ronald. 2010. ‘Paradoxes in Kant’s Account of Citizenship’, in Responsibility in Context, edited by Gorana Ognjenovic. London: Springer, pp. 19–34. Byrd, Sharon, and Joachim Hruschka. 2010. Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Luke. 2020. ‘Kant on Welfare: 5 Unsuccesful Defenses’, in Kantian Review 25 (1): 1–25. ———. 2023. ‘Kant on Civil Self-Suffciency’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 105 (1): 118–140. . Ellis, Elisabeth. 2005. Kant’s Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. 2006. ‘Citizenship and Property Rights: A New Look at Social Contract Theory’, in The Journal of Politics 68 (3): 544–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468 -2508.2006.00444.x. Hanisch, Christoph. 2016. ‘Kant on Democracy’, in Kant-Studien 107 (1): 64–88. Heydenreich, Karl Heinrich. 1794. Versuch Uber Die Heiligkeit Des Staats Und Die Moralitat Der Revolutionen. Leibzig: im Schwichertschen Verlage. Kersting, Wolfgang. 1992a. ‘Kant’s Concept of the State’, in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Howard Williams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 143–65. ———. 1992b. ‘Politics, Freedom and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy’, in Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 342–66. Kleingeld, Pauline. 1993. ‘The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant’, in The Philosophical Forum 20 (2): 134–50. ———. 2018a. ‘Moral Autonomy as Political Analogy: Self-Legislation in Kant’s Groundwork and Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law’, in The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, edited by Stefano Bacin and Oliver Sensen. Vol. forthcoming. Cambridge: Chicago University Press. ———. 2018b. ‘The Principle of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Its Rise and Fall’, in Kant on Persons and Agency, edited by Eric Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61–79. Kolodny, Niko. 2019. ‘Being Under the Power of Others’, in Republicanism and the Future of Democracy, edited by Yiftah Elizar and Geneviève Rousselière. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maliks, Reidar. 2014. Kant’s Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meckstroth, Christopher. 2015. The Struggle for Democracy: Paradoxes of Progress and the Politics of Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mendus, Susan. 1992. ‘Kant: An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bourgeois?’, in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Howard Williams. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 166–90. Mulholland, Leslie. 1990. Kant’s System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press. Pallikkathayil, Japa. 2010. ‘Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity’, in Ethics 121 (1): 116–47. Pateman, Carol. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Pinzani, Alessandro. 2008. ‘Representation in Kant’s Political Theory’, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 16: 203–26. Pinzani, Alessandro, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid. 2016. ‘The State Looks down: Some Reassessments of Kant’s Appraisal of Citizenship’, in In Kant and Social Policies, edited by Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sanchez Madrid, and Alessandro Pinzani. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25–47. Pogge, Thomas W. 2002. ‘Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a “Comprehensive Liberalism”?’, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, edited by Mark Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 153–88. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Ripstein, Arthur. 2009. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rosen, Allen. 1993. Kant’s Theory of Justice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sewell, William H. Jr. 1994. A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution: The Abbé Sieyes and What Is the Third Estate? Durham; London: Duke University Press. Shell, Susan Meld. 2016. ‘Kant on Citizenship, Society, and Redistributive Justice’, in Kant and Social Policies, edited by Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sanchez Madrid, and Alessandro Pinzani. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–24. Sieyès, Emmanuel-Joseph. 1789a. Observations Sur Le Rapport Du Comité de Constitution Concernant La Nouvelle Organisation de La France. Versailles: Baudoin. ———. 1789b. Preliminaire de La Constitution Francoise: Reconnaisance et Exposition Raisonnie Des Droits de I’homme et Du Citoyen. Paris: Baudoin. Sinclair, Thomas. 2018. ‘The Power of Public Positions: Offcial Roles in Kantian Legitimacy’, in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 4: 28–52. Stark, Werner, ed. 2014. Nachforschungen Zu Briefen und Handschriften Immanuel Kants. Berlin: De Gruyter. Stilz, Anna. 2011. Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Uleman, Jennifer K. 2004. ‘External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre: Political, Metaphysical’, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3): 578–601. Walker, Mack. 1971. German Home Towns: Community, State and General Estate 1648–1871. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press. Weinrib, Jacob. 2008. ‘Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence’, in Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33: 1–25. Willaschek, Marcus. 2002. ‘Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals’, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, edited by Mark Timmons. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–89. Williams, Howard. 1983. Kant’s Political Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

12 Personhood according to Kant (and Schiller) Personality, Being a Human Being, and Revolution1 Antonino Falduto

12.1 Introductory Remarks on Personhood: Personality and Being a Human Being In this chapter, my aim is to show how Kant’s account of personhood fundamentally differs from those defended by the early readers of his philosophy at the end of the 18th century. I will argue that this difference is due to the coexistence of two different ways of considering the characteristics upon which the defnition of ‘human being’ (Mensch) rests: at the apogee of the Enlightenment and the dawn of idealism in Germany. My frst aim in this text is to answer the question: what precisely does the word ‘personhood’ refer to in Kant’s works? Since Kant’s notion of personhood depends on how he conceives of the notion of a person (Person), which is explained through moral personality (Persönlichkeit), I will concentrate on the concept of ‘personality’ as the expression of our rational nature (Vernunft, reason). I will show that, according to Kant, we ought to perfect ourselves as rational beings, as persons, in order to perfect ourselves as human beings and that the necessary and suffcient condition for the perfection of ourselves as human beings is the perfection of moral personality, i.e., of the rational part of our nature. I will show how, according to Kant, ‘being a human being’ (Menschsein) thus fundamentally depends on personality. Indeed, Kant also contemplates a sensible counterpart (something that is not personality) in human beings. This part is called ‘animality’ (Tierheit). He refers to it by discussing the sensible constitution of the human being and its belonging to the world of appearances. Still, in his grounding of what a person is, as considered from the practical perspective in particular, Kant does not take the sensible world into account, nor does he refer to the sensible side of the human being when discussing the foundation of personality or how to perfect oneself. I will show how reason’s supremacy in explaining personality was questioned by many early readers of Kant’s philosophy, who underscored the necessity of also perfecting the human being’s sensible nature as a condition of proper personality. DOI: 10.4324/9781003462415-15

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In order to elucidate my argument, I will divide my chapter into four parts. In the frst two parts, I will focus on Kant’s work. In particular, I will mention passages from the frst Critique and the Metaphysics of Morals before concentrating on the second Critique and the account of ‘personality’ and ‘being a human being’ that it contains. I will begin with Kant’s defnition of the human being and the human being’s belonging to two ‘worlds’, i.e., the sensible world of appearances and the intelligible world of the supersensible. I will then underscore how the human being’s personality strictly pertains to only one of these worlds, namely the intelligible world. I will conclude that, according to Kant, being a human being and personhood are characterised by and grounded in the intelligible nature of the human being, i.e., its rationality, since for Kant reason is the sole element that makes the human being’s personhood possible. As a conclusion to my explanation of Kant’s point of view, and since ‘personhood’ as we know it today is a concept that not only refers to theoretical or moral philosophy but, importantly, has a legal and political dimension, in the third part of my chapter, I will underscore the political consequences of Kant’s defnition of moral personality. I will illustrate Kant’s defnitions of ‘freedom of thought’ and ‘freedom of speech’, as these are to be found in many passages of his works (in particular On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice), before concentrating on how Kant deals with revolution and avoids connecting the ‘human right’ to freely express one’s own thoughts with the right to revolt. In this way, I will reveal the politically relevant aspects of Kant’s concept of ‘moral personality’ and consider its far-reaching consequences in the context of Kant’s philosophy of history and political thought. In the fourth part of my chapter, I will show how early readers of Kant’s philosophy distanced themselves from Kant’s monistic grounding of the human being in rationality alone. In order to do this, I will focus on one thinker in particular, namely Friedrich Schiller, and his conception of the entirety of the human being as an expression of proper personhood. Through analysing his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of the Human Being, I will show how the human being constitutes an inseparable unity of reason and sensibility for Schiller and how, against the predominance and strict sovereignty of reason that we fnd in Kant, Schiller’s approach views the cultivation of both sensible and intelligible elements as being necessary for reaching proper personality and realising oneself as human being. As a consequence of my analysis, we will have a better understanding of why both Kant and Schiller reject the concept of revolution on the basis of their differing accounts of personhood. 12.2 Kant’s Concept of Personhood: From the Theoretical to the Practical Point of View In the search for a defnition of the concept of ‘person’ in Kant’s philosophy, a good place to begin is the section of the Paralogisms chapter that Kant

182 Antonino Falduto newly re-wrote for the second edition of the frst Critique [KrV, B 406–432, Engl. 445–458].2 In this section, Kant introduces and distinguishes the metaphysical from the practical use of the concept of reason. He notes that the capital error of the traditional discipline of rational psychology (psychologia rationalis) consisted in the alleged possibility of analysing the properties of the soul. Kant’s objection is summarised in the well-known assumption that ‘through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not the least is won in regard to the cognition of myself as object’ and that ‘the logical exposition of thinking in general is falsely held to be a metaphysical determination of the object’ [KrV, B 409, Engl. 445]. As a result of this assessment, no theoretical argument for the metaphysical existence of the soul and for the defnition of a metaphysical personality grounded in this existence can be attained, according to Kant. From this Kant argues that, from a theoretical perspective, we refer to the concept of ‘person’ only in a ‘transcendental’ sense. As Kant puts it, ‘in thinking my existence I can use myself only as the subject of judgement, which is an identical proposition, that discloses absolutely nothing about the manner of my existence’ [KrV, B413, Engl. 448].3 Even if Kant does not further elucidate the concept of personhood through the activity of our reason in its theoretical use (spekulativer Vernunftgebrauch), the practical use of reason (praktischer Vernunftgebrauch) opens up new philosophical perspectives. A similar direction had already been considered by Kant in the pre-critical phase, even though in that period his ideas concerning the so-called Copernican turn still lacked clarity.4 A fully developed defnition of what Kant means when he refers to the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘personality’ from the perspective of the practical use of reason is to be found in the Metaphysics of Morals. There, Kant writes that a person is ‘a subject whose actions can be imputed to him’ [MS, AA VI: 223, Engl. 378]. From this it follows that moral personality can be defned as ‘nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the ability to be conscious of one’s identity in different conditions of one’s existence)’ [MS, AA VI: 223, Engl. 378].5 This defnition contrasts with Kant’s defnition of a ‘thing’ as ‘that to which nothing can be imputed’, that is, ‘any object of free choice which itself lacks freedom’ [MS, AA VI: 223, Engl. 378]. In order to distinguish between a person and a thing, the concept of freedom is needed. In the case of a thing, we are speaking of an object that lacks freedom. In the case of a person, we are speaking of a subject who can act freely. The concept of freedom in both cases is grounded in reason, that is, in the notion of a moral law that functions as a causality in the intelligible world and that distinguishes itself from the causality that rules the sensible world of appearances. The reference here is thus to the concept of freedom as autonomy and self-legislation, as we fnd it best explained in the context of the second Critique.

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What happened between the frst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 and the second edition dated 1787, or even more generally in the time following the publication of the frst Critique, with regard to the concept of personality? Without taking into account philological questions connected to the genesis of the new Paralogisms chapter, when it comes to understanding Kant’s conception of personhood, it suffces to consider the shift from the theoretical to the practical use of reason. This shift provides us with an answer to the question of why Kant provides a new defnition of ‘person’ and ‘personality’ in the passage from the Metaphysics of Morals mentioned above. Or at least it provides us with a defnition of ‘person’ that is grounded in the new use of reason now at stake: the practical one. This shift from the theoretical to the practical use of reason, which entails a new philosophical answer to the question of personhood, is to be found at least as early as the Groundwork, as is often pointed out.6 Nonetheless, in what follows, I will instead focus on the second Critique since I believe that this work, with its more accentuated focus on Kant’s two worlds theory, constitutes an even more viable candidate for explaining his ideas regarding the concepts of ‘person’, ‘personality’, ‘being a human being’, and ‘personhood’ from the practical perspective and in contrast to the theoretical one. 12.3 Kant’s Concepts of Moral Person and Personality: The Second Critique In one of the frst occurrences of the word ‘person’ in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant aims to deal with this concept systematically in the context of the Table of the Categories of Freedom [KpV, AA V: 66–67, Engl. 193– 194]. Nonetheless, in this table and its explanation, Kant dedicates only a very brief passage to ‘personality’ and to reconstructing the relation between this concept and those of ‘duty’ and ‘autonomy’ (leaving the reader largely confused). If we want to understand the moral signifcance of the concept of ‘person’ and ‘personality’ in the second Critique, however, we did better begin with what is arguably the best-known passage from Kant’s corpus: the conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason. Let us again consider the famous passage in question: Two things fll the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one refects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me […]. The frst begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense and extends the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into the unbounded times of their periodic motion, their beginning and their duration. The second begins from my invisible self (unsichtbares Selbst),

184 Antonino Falduto my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infnity, but which can be discovered only by the understanding. [KpV, AA V: 161–162, Engl. 269–270] This passage, written in an unusually felicitous rhetorical style for Kant, expresses the consequences of the dualism inherent in the human being, rooted in the distinction between sensibility and reason and relatedly in the distinction between the spheres of nature and freedom. These distinctions are due not solely to the requirements of Kant’s practical philosophy but also, and most importantly, to the principles underlying his theoretical philosophy. Kant had already illustrated these in the frst Critique, most notably in the context of his Refutation of Idealism and his doctrine of Transcendental Idealism.7 There, he lays forth the terms of his Copernican Revolution in theoretical philosophy, which implies the impossibility of cognising things in themselves and the limitation of possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience.8 In doing so, Kant is careful not to rule out our being able to think of things in themselves. In fact, as Kant himself writes in the Architectonic chapter at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, the difference between phenomena and noumena opens up a broad horizon for philosophy as the ‘legislation of human reason’ that pertains to two objects: nature and freedom.9 This dualistic approach underlies the whole of Kant’s philosophy. As the passage from the conclusion of the second Critique quoted above shows, we are thus permitted to acknowledge our place in the world of appearances ruled by the laws of nature, but we are also permitted to refer to our existence as intelligible beings. Our reason not only makes clear our visible connection to the world of phenomena but also provides us with a further clue about a world that has ‘true infnity’, disclosed to us by our personality, defned in the quoted passage as the ‘invisible self’ (unsichbares Selbst). This self is the proper consciousness of the moral being – a self that is not observable through sensible ‘intuitions’ (Anschauungen) but rather consists in the personality that derives from the law-giving characteristic of reason. It is through autonomy that we human beings achieve consciousness of our belonging to an infnite world which is not visible, observable, or perceptible through the senses. Personality is grounded in this infnite world opened up by reason. As Kant notes further, this second view of the human being begins with the moral law and ‘infnitely raises my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world’ [KpV, AA V: 161–162, Engl. 269–270]. Kant infers this independence from animality and the sensible world ‘from the purposive determination of my existence by this law, a determination not restricted to the conditions and boundaries of this life but reaching into the infnite’ [KpV, AA V: 161–162, Engl. 269–270]. The life that is grounded in my animality, i.e., the life of the human being grounded in sensible presuppositions and reducible to the sensible world, is not what is at stake when we as human beings refer to ourselves as persons. It is the moral

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law, derived from autonomy as the self-legislation of reason, that elevates the human being beyond its fniteness and points to the infnity of an invisible world, namely the world of reason. To understand the full meaning of these assertions in the conclusion, deeper insight into the concept of personality in relation to the two worlds theory is needed. To this end, earlier passages from the second Critique, specifcally those at the end of the so-called Triebfedern chapter dedicated to the subjective incentives of pure practical reason, come to our aid. Here, Kant underscores that the human being cannot be considered solely as a thing to be relegated to the sensible world. Something else allows him to stand out of this world, and this is nothing less than what elevates a human being above himself (as a part of the sensible world), what connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can think and that at the same time has under it the whole sensible world and with it the empirically determinable existence of human beings in time and the whole of all ends. [KpV, AA V: 86–87, Engl. 208] What is this element that elevates humanity beyond sensibility? In this respect, Kant’s answer is succinct and ingenious: It is nothing other than personality, that is, freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as also a capacity of a being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given by his own reason, so that a person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world. [KpV, AA V: 86–87, Engl. 208] In this passage from the second Critique, the role played by membership of two different worlds becomes evident in the defnition of personality. On the one hand, the human being is a member of the sensible world, where it considers itself an appearance, a member of nature, and, consequently, as acting under the laws of nature according to a strict natural causality and necessity. On the other hand, the human being possesses personality and, in this way, considers itself not as an appearance in the natural world but rather from the perspective of its ‘invisible self’. In this way, the human being is a member of the intelligible world and acts under a law it gives itself. It acts according to freedom as autonomy, as the self-legislation of reason, as independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature. Personality introduces the highest vocation of the human being and reverence towards humanity (a reference that is due to its characteristic of being the bearer of rationality): it is then not to be wondered at that a human being, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to his second

186 Antonino Falduto and highest vocation only with reverence, and its laws with the highest respect. [KpV, AA V: 86–87, Engl. 208]10 In the context of the second Critique, further confrmation of the fact that the human being’s belonging to the intelligible world is the grounding element of personality and that personality is based on reason as an element outside time is also to be found in the assessments at the beginning of the Antinomies chapter, where Kant refers to the possibility of this personality’s continuing endlessly in order for the highest good to be realised.11 From these considerations, it follows that the concept of ‘personality’ expressed in the Critique of Practical Reason is fundamentally dependent on and explained by reference to an infnite world in which personality itself is considered infnite thanks to its correspondence to the rational nature of the human being. Reason is the grounding element of this infnite world, and through its connection to reason alone the concept of personhood acquires signifcance. Conversely, personhood is the grounding element in defning what ‘being a human being’ means, such that neither sensibility nor the sensible world need to be part of the foundational elements of the concept of what a person is or of what fundamentally constitutes a human being. To be a human being in its highest expression involves realising our rational nature and our moral personality. No reference to the sensible world is needed in this regard. 12.4 Kant on Moral Persons, Moral Human Beings, and Revolution12 Let us keep in mind this moral, exclusively rational concept of personality as the sole foundational element for the perfect realisation of the human being as we now turn to the political relevance of Kant’s concept of personality and its signifcance in the context of his philosophy of history. In order to do this, we must frst refer to Kant’s articulation of ‘freedom of thought’ and ‘freedom of speech’ in different passages of his works in the philosophy of history since these concepts and that of personality are intrinsically linked. The centrality of these historical works notwithstanding, one of the frst references to the concepts of freedom of speech and thought in Kant’s published texts is likely that which appears in the Doctrine of Method of the frst Critique. There, we read that to our freedom there also belongs the freedom to exhibit the thoughts and doubts which one cannot resolve oneself for public judgment without thereupon being decried as a malcontent and a dangerous citizen. This lies already in the original right of human reason, which recognises no other judge than universal human reason itself, in which everyone has a voice; and since all improvement of which our condition is capable must come from this, such a right is holy, and must not be curtailed. [KrV, A752/B780, Engl. 650]

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This passage is paradigmatic of Kant’s idea of enlightenment, according to which freedom of speech and its defence is holy. Kant would repeatedly point to similar ideas in later writings, for instance, in the well-known Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784) or in the later What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? (1786) and the Doctrine of Right (1797). However, a particularly useful clarifcation of the connection between freedom of speech and freedom of thought is that expressed in On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793). In this text, similarly to what he does in the frst Critique, Kant connects the two forms of freedom just mentioned by further adding an important point about the rulers who are supposed to protect and promote these rights: a citizen must have, with the approval of the ruler himself, the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about what it is in the ruler’s arrangements that seems to him to be a wrong against the commonwealth. For, to assume that the head of state could never err or be ignorant of something would be to represent him as favoured with divine inspiration and raised above humanity. [TP, AA VIII: 304, Engl. 302] Both assumptions point to the egalitarian basis of Kant’s proposal, which is grounded in every single human being’s ability to reach rational conclusions. From every single human being’s possession of rationality, the necessity of freedom of speech follows. In Theory and Practice, Kant also states that freedom of the pen must be ‘kept within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution within which one lives by the subjects’ liberal way of thinking, which the constitution itself instils in them’ [TP, AA VIII: 304, Engl. 302]. Nonetheless, the ‘pens themselves keep one another within these limits, so that they do not lose their freedom’ [TP, AA VIII: 304, Engl. 302]. These properties of the freedom of the pen make it ‘the sole palladium of the people’s rights’ [TP, AA VIII: 304, Engl. 302]. In Kant’s argument, not only does communication between rational beings (and intellectuals in particular) constitute the limit of a respectful exchange of rational grounds, but it is also a prerequisite for not losing freedom. And, as we saw above, freedom as self-legislation is what discloses our reason, which marks out our personality and makes evident our membership in the intelligible world. Kant claims that communicating with one another is a natural calling of the human being that originates from freedom itself. He then concludes by wondering: ‘how else could the government get the knowledge it requires for its own essential purpose than by letting the spirit of freedom, so worthy of respect in its origin and in its effects, express itself?!’ [TP, AA VIII: 305, Engl. 303]. From this it follows that rationality implies communication between rational beings. This communication on rational grounds makes freedom of

188 Antonino Falduto verbal expression a prerequisite for the realisation of rationality. Only free communication can realise the scope of rationality in human beings, i.e., the individual’s self-legislation or, in other words, freedom in the Kantian sense of autonomy. This entails the necessity of free communication when it comes to the human being’s ability to strive for the realisation of its moral personality and, in this way, to pursue its own perfection as a rational being and a more perfect human being. Kant’s argument is appealing to advocates of freedom of speech and expression insofar as it appeals to the centrality of communicating one’s own thoughts in the realisation of full rationality. Still, as is well known, Kant’s idea of autonomy presupposes neither the existence of a fellow discussant nor mutual recognition realisable only through the existence of a plurality of selves or the observation of others as appearances in the sensible world. In fact, Kantian autonomy only presupposes pure practical reason and in no way depends on the sensible existence of others or on intersubjectivity.13 Again, as noted above, reason in itself suffces to ground the human being. Neither membership in a sensible world nor the presupposition of the existence of fellow human beings and their appearance to the agent is necessary for personhood, personality, or the activity of perfecting ourselves as human beings. 12.5 Schiller, Personality, Human Beings in Their Entirety, and Revolution One might think that our analysis of Kant’s account of personality and personhood could happily end here. Still, as I believe is clear from my analysis above, a critical discussion of Kant’s account is urgently needed. In fact, not only in the context of current philosophical debate but even for the very frst readers of Kant’s work, one of the most pressing problems of Kant’s philosophy overall was the apparent split representation of the human being as a subject divided between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom, to which I have referred throughout the above analysis of the concepts of ‘personality’ and ‘human being’. Philosophers who were responding to the Kantian system at the end of the 18th century found themselves in the position of striving to fnd a way to invalidate the distinction between the world in which natural laws rule and the world in which the moral law exercises its infuence. How, then, might it be possible to make sense of the human being as belonging to these two worlds without presupposing the fundamental duality of the human being? Does it at all make sense to ground personality in reason alone, leaving behind the sensible human being and the world of appearances, in this way bypassing all characteristics of the human being as a corporeal being living in a natural world? The consequences of precisely this dualistic picture of the homo duplex – that is, the dualism of a human being split between being a homo phaenomenon and a homo noumenon,

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which Kant quite clearly endorses in many places (and most precisely in the Doctrine of Virtue)14 – still need to be addressed. In order to do this, I will briefy focus on Friedrich Schiller since he very clearly exemplifes a robust attempt to criticise Kant’s view that the concepts of personality, being a human being, and personhood depend solely on rationality. Studies dedicated to Schiller’s philosophical relevance have garnered greater attention in recent years.15 Since scholarly interest still tends to focus on Schiller’s aesthetics, however, tending to overlook the relevance of his proposals in the context of moral philosophy, it is worth taking a second look at his texts in the context of the worries raised above.16 In an attempt to understand the extent to which Schiller provides us with a convincing critique of Kant’s approach to personhood, in particular from the political perspective of the philosophy of history, the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) provide an excellent starting point.17 I argue that in this text we fnd both a new proposal regarding the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘human being’ and an alternative theoretical foundation for the people’s right to revolution based on a new way of considering what it is to be human. In his Aesthetic Letters, frst published in Die Horen in 1795 and based on a series of letters written and delivered to his patron, Friedrich Christian von Augustenburg, Schiller seeks to accomplish several goals. Among others, he criticises the very idea of the Enlightenment, searches for a transcendental account of the concept of beauty, and provides a variegated view of human psychological mechanisms. Most importantly in the context of the present analysis, however, in the Aesthetic Letters,Schiller delivers an account of the philosophical basis of the French Revolution and points to a new, ideal form of government that allows human beings to reach their full potential as both rational and sensible. If individuals are to achieve personality at all, they can only do so by being in a modifed personal inner state in which their sensible and intelligible parts are harmonised: proper personality can be reached only by human beings who do not deny but rather appreciate their entirety as sensible-rational beings. Through this proposal of a unifed account of the human being, and by making proper personality depend on this account, Schiller’s argument clearly moves against Kant’s. Schiller does not want to reduce personality by explaining it solely in terms of rationality or moral agency. He recognises the importance of Kant’s analysis. Still, he aims to ground personality in the harmonic synthesis of both the sensible and the rational part of the human being so as to move beyond a merely moral characterisation of personality.18 This harmony can best be achieved through the spontaneous play of the two natures that are present in humanity, represented holistically: One can imagine two different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea, and, in consequence, just as many ways in which the State can assert itself in individuals: either by the ideal man

190 Antonino Falduto suppressing empirical man, and the State annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the State, and man in time being ennobled to the stature of man as Idea.19 From this passage, it becomes clear that there are two ways for the human being to preserve his rational nature: either by obeying the laws of reason, as they are explicated inwardly by his rational part and outwardly by a rational state, or by becoming ‘inwardly at one with himself’, in this way preserving ‘his individuality however much he may universalise his conduct’.20 This second way represents a way of perfecting ourselves not only as rational beings but also, and more importantly, as proper persons, individual subjects, unifed and non-dual human beings. This represents Schiller’s proposal for bridging the dichotomy between rational and sensible being that lay at the centre of Kant’s work. Schiller’s suggestion does not amount to a complete discounting of the importance of Kant’s theory and the centrality of rational nature, and it does not privilege the perspective of sensibility over rationality.21 Rather, Schiller proposes that both rationality and the senses must always, at the same time, be preserved since only in this way can the human being realise its uniqueness and individuality. As Schiller notes, whenever Reason starts to introduce the unity of the moral law into any actually existing society, she must beware of damaging the variety of Nature. And whenever Nature endeavours to maintain her variety within the moral framework of society, moral unity must not suffer any infringement thereby. Removed alike from uniformity and from confusion, there abides the triumph of form. Wholeness of character must therefore be present in any people capable, and worthy, of exchanging the State of compulsion for a State of freedom.22 The freedom in question is not autonomy as the majesty of the moral selflegislation of freedom but rather the spontaneous, harmonious, and syncretic interplay of rationality and sensibility in the context of the entirety of the human being.23 On the basis of these considerations, Schiller proposes that, instead of a political revolution, what is needed is a revolution in our mode of perceiving: an interior revolution of human character. Schiller’s diagnosis of the French Revolution was negative. Rather than pursuing a Jacobin approach to dealing with reality, he advocates a new form of revolt through a reactionary move.24 Schiller mentions the word ‘revolution’ in the last of his Aesthetic Letters, where his aim is not to praise the actions of the French revolutionaries but rather to condemn and ironically abrogate the violence that revolutions bring with them. He proposes another kind of revolution – one that has the potential to found an ‘aesthetic state’. Schiller writes that in order to realise this new revolution, what is required is the cultivation of our personality, which entails ‘higher powers of abstraction, greater freedom of

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heart, more energy of will, than man ever needs when he confnes himself to reality’.25 Importantly, this does not imply taking refuge in the ideal: ‘how ill-advised he would be, then, to take the path towards the ideal in order to save himself the way to the real!’.26 This warning to the Kantians is clear. Human beings must free themselves both from the chains of reality and from the illusion of being able to fnd a better self in an ideal, supersensible world. In contrast to Kant’s view, the kingdom in which human beings are allowed to enter via revolution and the attainment of proper personality is not the moral kingdom of ends, opened up to us by our becoming moral persons, but rather the realm of art, which the human being can access through accomplishing a ‘complete revolution in his whole way of feeling’: only in the realm of art can ‘proper personality’ (eigene Persönlichkeit) be reached.27 And yet we might wonder: how can the human being get to the point where proper personality is fnally reached? Schiller’s answer is as follows: Wherever we fnd traces of a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance, we may infer that a revolution of this order has taken place in his nature, and that he has started to become truly human. […]. As soon as ever he starts preferring form to substance, and jeopardizing reality for the sake of semblance (which he must, however, recognise as such), a breach has been effected in the cycle of his animal behaviours, and he fnds himself set upon a path to which there is no end.28 Not the constitution of a new state through a violent revolution supposedly guided by reason and moral personality, but rather a new way of sensing reality is what allows the human being to achieve personality. Proper personality is not based on the realisation of our rational part alone. Most importantly, it entails the fourishing of both the rational and the sensible parts of the human being. Cultivation of the capacity to beautify the world helps human beings to reach personality, which does not correspond to striving to perfect our rational part alone but also, and most importantly, entails the cultivation of sensibility. Personhood, according to Schiller, presupposes the personality of the human being in its entirety as a rational and sensible being. ‘Being a human being’ involves striving for the perfect realisation of all that is human: our rationality (i.e., our moral personality, as Kant would put it) and, at the same time, our animality, i.e., our being in the sensible world of appearances. This view contrasts with Kant’s ideal and the necessity of realising the human being’s pure rationality, a chief aim of the Enlightenment. Schiller’s proposal consists in the realisability, at the highest possible level, of the completeness of the human being. The human being should perfect itself both as a rational and as a sensible being, and only in this way can it wholly appreciate the world in which it lives and struggles for its (moral and sensible) improvement.

192 Antonino Falduto Against a common tendency of many supporters of revolutionary ideals, Schiller thus replaces political revolution with a revolution in our way of perceiving. In this way, according to him, the revolution toward which people must strive is not a change of government but rather a complete revolution of humanity. Thus, Schiller clearly does not confne himself to Kant’s constitutive concept of moral personality in his explanation of personhood. According to Schiller, rationality and the freedom that depends on the moral law do constitute a part of the human being and must be accounted for when understanding personality. Still, this moral part is only one of two parts that make up personality. For Schiller, the sensible part, which is neglected in Kant’s conception of moral personality, plays an equally infuential role in defning what it means to be a human being – and, correspondingly, what it means to be a person.29 12.6 Concluding Remarks At the close of my analysis, I hope to have made clear the extent to which Kant and Schiller fundamentally diverge on the concepts of personality and the human being and why, even if they both seem prima facie to sympathise with the French revolutionaries, neither can ultimately sustain the right to revolt on the basis of the concepts of the person they defend. Even if Kant’s argument for freedom of speech and expression appeals to communicating one’s own thoughts in the realisation of full rationality, his idea of autonomy presupposes neither the existence of a fellow discussant nor mutual recognition realisable only through the existence of a plurality of selves. According to Kant, autonomy – and from this proper personality, being a human being – and personhood – are fundamentally based on pure reason, not on our sensible nature or the world of appearances. In this context, Kant makes no overt claims about the world of appearances, the necessity of fellow human beings, or the presupposition of intersubjectivity when it comes to realising freedom. Against this background, Kant’s human being does not have any right to revolt in order to achieve true personhood and to perfect its humanity. In Schiller’s case as well, the French Revolution did not constitute an appropriate move towards the realisation of either proper personality or our self-perfection as human beings. This is conceived on completely different grounds than Kant’s argument, however. For Schiller, it is not the violent constitution of a new state but rather a new way of sensing reality that allows the human being to achieve proper personality and to perfect its humanity. Only the cultivation of the capacity to beautify the world helps us to acquire proper personality and, in this way, to become human beings in our entirety. By focusing on Kant’s concept of moral personality, I have attempted to explain what personhood means to him – and why revolution is not a permissible move in our realisation of ourselves as persons. Through reference

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to the early reception of Kant’s philosophy at the end of the 18th century, which I sought to specify by considering exemplary passages from Schiller’s work, I aimed to show that in limiting himself to the rational grounding of personhood in the concept of moral personality, making it solely dependent on rationality, Kant put unacceptably strict limits on what personhood entails. This counterposing of Kant and Schiller, based on their accounts of the importance of realising either rationality or both rationality and sensibility in striving for the perfection of personality, also gave me the opportunity to refect on further political implications of the concept of personhood. Without wanting to argue for Schiller’s view over Kant’s, I have aimed nonetheless, through the juxtaposition of Kant’s and Schiller’s refections, to shed light not only on the strengths but also on certain controversial aspects of Kant’s understanding of personhood. Notes 1 This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant agreement No 777786. Some materials of this paper have been used for my article “Kant’s Account of Independence as Self-Dependence: The Noumenal Personality in a Phenomenal World”. Con-Textos Kantianos – International Journal of Philosophy, vol. 16 (2022), pp. 152-167. I owe my gratitude to Carolyn Benson, who helped with the linguistic revision of my chapter. 2 Throughout this chapter, all passages from Kant’s works are cited by volume, page, and line number in the standard edition of Kant’s works, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian, later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, 29 volumes (Berlin, Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–). Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason are located by reference to the pagination of Kant’s frst (‘A’) and/or second (‘B’) editions. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, i.e., in particular, from the volumes: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with an introduction by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. The secondary literature dedicated to this section of the Critique of Pure Reason is extremely broad. For an account of the concept of personhood in the frst Critique and, in particular, in the Paralogisms chapter, see, among the others: Georg Mohr, ‘Der Begriff der Person bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel’, in: Dieter Sturma (Hg.), Person. Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie, Paderborn: Mentis, 2001, S. 103–141. 3 On this point, see Georg Mohr, ‘Der Begriff der Person bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel’, in: Dieter Sturma (ed.), Person. Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie, Paderborn: Mentis, 2001, S. 103–141, here in particular pp. 105–110. 4 Cf., for instance, Refexion 4227, AA XVII: 466, and Refexion 4228, AA XVII: 467. 5 For a similar presentation of ‘personality’ from the same years to which the publication of the Metaphysics of Morals dates, see Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie, AA VII: 324–325, Engl. 419–420]. On the connection between moral and anthropological perspectives with regard to

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the concept of personhood, see G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The ‘Critical’ Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Refective Judgment, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. For Kant’s defnition in the Groundwork, see GMS, AA IV: 428. On the concept of ‘personhood’ as presented in the Groundwork in particular, see (among many others) the more recent papers collected in Stephen R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010. See the sixth section of the Antinomy on the meaning of transcendental idealism [KrV A491–497/B519–525, Engl. 511–514] and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism [KrV B274-287, Engl. 326–33). See also the Transcendental Aesthetic [KrV A19– 49/B33–73, Engl. 155–171] and the Transcendental Deduction [KrV B129–169, Engl. 245–266]. See KrV BXXVI, Engl. 115. Cf. KrV A840/B868, Engl. 695. For further consideration of the topic of belonging to two worlds in the second Critique, cf. in particular the section dedicated to the Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason [KpV, AA V, 89–106, Engl. 211–225], which has been very rarely studied in the context of Kant scholarship (exceptions include Reinhard Brandt: ‘Kritische Beleuchtung der Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft (89–106)’ and Eckart Förster, ‘Die Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft (107–121)’, both contained in the volume: Otfried Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002, pp. 153–172 and pp. 173–186). Cf. KpV, AA V: 122, Engl. 237: ‘The production of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in such a will the complete conformity of dispositions with the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good. This conformity must therefore be just as possible as its object is, since it is contained in the same command to promote the object. Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is, however, holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an endless progress toward that complete conformity, and in accordance with principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul). Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I understand a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law)’. Throughout this section, I will use materials from my article: Antonino Falduto, ‘The Metaphysical Foundation of the Self and the Right to a Revolution’, in: Archivio di flosofa, LXXXVII/1, pp. 205–217. Allen Wood also argues in this way by pointing to the differences between Kant and Fichte when it comes to the concepts of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘communication’: ‘Kant never offers any transcendental argument concerning the existence of other rational beings or the cognizability of their mental states. It is not that the existence of a plurality of human beings, or the possibility of their mutual communicative interaction, is not important to the critical philosophy. On the contrary, Kant frequently stresses the importance of free, rational communication of a learned public as a condition for the very existence of reason itself […]; the concept of a community of rational beings, a ‘realm of ends’, is fundamental to his

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moral philosophy […], as well as to his conception of refective judgment and aesthetic experience […]. Kant appears to regard the necessity of rational communication as a merely empirical condition, just as our cognition of others is grounded merely on experience and lacks any transcendental necessity. Whether this is selfconsistent, however, is precisely what Fichte means to call into question’. Allen W. Wood, Fichte’s Ethical Thought, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, here pp. 85–86. Cf. MS, TL, §4, AA VI: 419, Engl. 543. Cf. in particular Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, but also, among the others, the recently published issue of Kant-Studien dedicated to Schiller’s challenge to moral philosophy, which includes the following studies: Martin Bondeli, ‘Schillers zwei Arten der Freiheit. Eine ästhetische Transformation von Reinholds Theorie der Willensfreiheit’, in: Kant-Studien, 111 (2020), pp. 227–247; Antonino Falduto, ‘Jenseits des Dualismus zwischen tierischer Natur und geistiger Natur: Kants Mensch in zweifacher Qualität und Schillers ganzer Mensch’, in: KantStudien, 111/2 (2020), pp. 248–268; Gideon Stiening, ‘Womit aber hatten es die Kinder des Hauses verschuldet, daß er nur für die Knechte sorgte? Schillers Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Rigorismus’, in: Kant-Studien, 111/2 (2020), pp. 269–284; Tim Mehigan, ‘Schiller after Kant: The Unexpected Science of the Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen’, in Kant-Studien, 111/2 (2020), pp. 285–302; Katerina Deligiorgi, ‘Kant, Schiller, and the Idea of a Moral Self’, in: Kant-Studien, 111 (2020), pp. 303–323. On the relevance of Schiller’s work to aesthetics, see, e.g., Paul Guyer, A History of Modern Aesthetics. Volume I: The Eighteenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 466–493; Patrick T. Murray, The Development of German Aesthetic Theory from Kant to Schiller: A Philosophical Commentary in Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education of Man’, Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1994; Hans-Georg Pott, Die schöne Freiheit. Eine Interpretation zu Schillers Schrift ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen’, München: Reinbeck, 1980. Schiller’s importance to moral philosophy is largely undervalued, his interpretation often dismissed as a misunderstanding of Kant’s ethics. Contemporary interpreters who wish to provide an account of Schiller’s ideas on moral philosophy and his relation to Kant’s ethics mainly concentrate on Schiller’s Gewissensskrupel (from his Xenien, 1796): ‘Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. / Hence, I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. / To this the answer is given: / Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, / And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins’ (translation by Herbert J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, London: Hutchinson, 1947, p. 48). Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, frst appeared in 1795 in the journal Die Horen: Eine Monatsschrift. Part 1: pp. 7–48; Part 2: pp. 167–210; Part 6: pp. 45–124. The best English translation of this work – a facing-page edition accompanied by a long introduction, a commentary, and a glossary of terms – can be found in: Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Edited and translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. In what follows, I will refer to this edition as ‘Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters’. See, for instance, Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 23rd letter, pp. 166–167. For a frst, comprehensive study on the concept of ‘person’ in Schiller, and in particular against Fichte’s presentation of this concept, see Emiliano Acosta, Schiller versus Fichte. Schillers Begriff der Person in der Zeit und Fichtes Kategorie der Wechselbestimmung im Widerstreit, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2011.

196 Antonino Falduto 19 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, fourth letter, pp. 18–19. 20 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, fourth letter, pp. 20–21. For an account of the relationship between the concept of ‘person’ and that of the state, in particular in Schiller’s plays, see Frank Suppanz, Person und Staat in Schillers Dramenfragmenten. Zur literarischen Rekonstruktion eines problematischen Verhältnisses, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2000. 21 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 25th letter, pp. 182–183: ‘As long as man, in that frst physical state, is merely a passive recipient of the world of sense, i.e., does no more than feel, he is still completely One with that world, there exists for him as yet no world’. 22 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, fourth letter, pp. 20–23. 23 For an account of the importance of this harmonic unity of the human being as Schiller deals with it even before the Aesthetic Letters, see both the Kallias Letters and the essay ‘On Grace and Dignity’. The Kallias Letters are a cycle of letters that constitute a treatise on beauty but to which we have access only as fragments, frst published in 1874 in a collection (four volumes) of Schiller’s correspondence with Körner. Schiller’s essay ‘On Grace and Dignity’ (Über Anmut und Würde) was frst published in Neue Thalia, volume 3 (1793). The original German text of both the Kallias Letters and On Grace and Dignity is easily accessible in the volume: Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder über die Schönheit – Über Anmut und Würde, edited by K. L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971. For an English translation of these works, see Friedrich Schiller, ‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner (1793)’, in: Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, edited by J. M. Bernstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 145–183; Friedrich Schiller, ‘On Grace and Dignity’, in: Schiller’s ‘On Grace and Dignity’ in Its Cultural Context: Essays and a New Translation, edited by J. V. Curran and C. Fricker, Rochester (NY): Camden House, 2005, pp. 123–170. For a recent interpretative attempt to understand the entirety of the human being in these two works by Schiller, see Antonino Falduto, ‘One More Time on the Alleged Repugnance of Kant’s Ethics? Schiller’s Kallias Letters and the Entirety of the Human Being’, in: European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). 24 For an attempt to present not only Schiller but also Fichte as conservatives, see Jean-Christophe Goddard, ‘Fichte est-il réactionnaire ou révolutionnaire?’, in: Fichte et la politique, edited by Jean-Christophe Goddard and Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, Moza: Polimetrica, 2008, pp. 483–501. 25 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 27th letter, pp. 204–205. 26 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 27th letter, pp. 204–205. 27 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 27th letter, pp. 204–205. 28 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, 27th letter, pp. 204–205. 29 On the concept of the entirety of the human being in the Aesthetic Letters, see Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 (in particular p. 163); Daniel O. Dahlstrom, ‘The Ethical and Political Legacy of Aesthetics: Friedrich Schiller’s Letter on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind’, in: Philosophical Legacies: Essays on the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and Their Contemporaries, edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Washington, 2008, pp. 93–102 (in particular pp. 101–102); Wolfgang Riedel, ‘Philosophie des Schönen als politische Anthropologie. Schillers Augustenburger Briefe und die Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung’, in: Wolfgang Riedel, Um Schiller. Studien zur Literatur und Ideengeschichte der Sattelzeit, edited by Markus Hien – Michael Storch – Franziska Stürmer, Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2017, pp. 225–277; Anne Pollok, ‘A Further Mediation and the Settings of Limits: The Concept of Aesthetic Semblance and the Aesthetic State’, in: Friedrich Schiller: Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, edited

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by Gideon Stiening, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2019, pp. 219–235. On the concept of revolution in the Aesthetic Letters, see in particular Jeffrey L. High, Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die Französische Revolution, Lewiston/New York, 2004.

References Primary sources Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with an introduction by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Schiller, Friedrich. 1967. On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Edited and translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schiller, Friedrich. 2003. ‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner (1793)’, in: Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, edited by J. M. Bernstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–183. Schiller, Friedrich. 2005. ‘On Grace and Dignity’, in: Schiller’s ‘On Grace and Dignity’ in Its Cultural Context: Essays and a New Translation, edited by J. V. Curran and C. Fricker. Rochester (NY): Camden House, pp. 123–170. Secondary sources Acosta, Emiliano. 2011. Schiller versus Fichte. Schillers Begriff der Person in der Zeit und Fichtes Kategorie der Wechselbestimmung im Widerstreit. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. Beiser, Frederick C. 2008. Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bondeli, Martin. 2020. ‘Schillers zwei Arten der Freiheit. Eine ästhetische Transformation von Reinholds Theorie der Willensfreiheit’, in: Kant-Studien 111: 227–247. Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 2008. ‘The Ethical and Political Legacy of Aesthetics: Friedrich Schiller’s Letter on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind’, in: Philosophical Legacies: Essays on the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and Their Contemporaries, edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, pp. 93–102. Deligiorgi, Katerina. 2020. ‘Kant, Schiller, and the Idea of a Moral Self’, in: KantStudien 111: 303–323. Falduto, Antonino. 2020. ‘Jenseits des Dualismus zwischen tierischer Natur und geistiger Natur: Kants Mensch in zweifacher Qualität und Schillers ganzer Mensch’, in: Kant-Studien 111/2: 248–268. Falduto, Antonino. 2021. ‘One More Time on the Alleged Repugnance of Kant’s Ethics?  Schiller’s Kallias Letters and the Entirety of the Human Being’, in: European Journal of Philosophy 29/4: 795–810. Goddard, Jean-Christophe. 2008. ‘Fichte est-il réactionnaire ou révolutionnaire?’, in: Fichte et la politique, edited by Jean-Christophe Goddard and Jacinto Rivera de Rosales. Moza: Polimetrica, pp. 483–501.

198 Antonino Falduto Guyer, Paul. 2014. A History of Modern Aesthetics. Volume I: The Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. High, Jeffrey L. 2004. Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die Französische Revolution. Lewiston/New York: Edwin Mellen. Mehigan, Tim. 2020. ‘Schiller after Kant: The Unexpected Science of the Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen’, in Kant-Studien 111/2: 285–302. Mohr, Georg. 2001. ‘Der Begriff der Person bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel’, in: Dieter Sturma (Hg.), Person. Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie. Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 103–141. Murray, Patrick T. 1994. The Development of German Aesthetic Theory from Kant to Schiller: A Philosophical Commentary in Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education of Man’. Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen. Paton, Herbert J. 1947. The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson. Pollok, Anne. 2019. ‘A Further Mediation and the Settings of Limits: The Concept of Aesthetic Semblance and the Aesthetic State’, in: Friedrich Schiller: Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, edited by Gideon Stiening. Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, pp. 219–235. Pott, Hans-Georg. 1980. Die schöne Freiheit. Eine Interpretation zu Schillers Schrift Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. München: Reinbeck. Riedel, Wolfgang. 2017. ‘Philosophie des Schönen als politische Anthropologie. Schillers Augustenburger Briefe und die Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung’, in: Wolfgang Riedel, Um Schiller. Studien zur Literatur und Ideengeschichte der Sattelzeit, edited by Markus Hien, Michael Storch and Franziska Stürmer. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, pp. 225–277. Stiening, Gideon. 2020. ‘Womit aber hatten es die Kinder des Hauses verschuldet, daß er nur für die Knechte sorgte? Schillers Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Rigorismus’, in: Kant-Studien 111: 269–284. Suppanz, Frank. 2000. Person und Staat in Schillers Dramenfragmenten. Zur literarischen Rekonstruktion eines problematischen Verhältnisses. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

13 Kant on Natural Right and Revolution Fiorella Tomassini

Despite his well-known sympathy for the French Revolution, and his positive assessment of the revolution as a progressive historical fact (SF, AA 07: 85),1 Kant denies the existence of a right to revolt in his metaphysical doctrine of right. From the perspective of pure practical reason, there is no room for a moral justifcation for resisting the sovereign’s authority, not even if this resistance aims at overthrowing a despotic regime and establishing a republican constitution.2 A frst, basic argument for such denial rests on the very concept of sovereignty. According to Kant, if a constitution included an article that, in a situation of extreme injustice, granted the people the permission to oppose the sovereign’s political power, it would entail a double contradiction. On the one hand, the supreme legislation would contain a clause admitting exceptions and, hence, denying its own supremacy. On the other hand, it would conceive the people as subject and sovereign at the same time (RL, AA 06: 320). Kant also maintains that if the people could legitimately resist the power of the sovereign, the latter would be and would not be the highest political authority (RL, AA 06: 372; cf. TP, AA 08: 300). Now, this argument aims to show that an insurrection cannot be authorised by a public law.3 We may still wonder whether a moral permission to oppose an unjust sovereign can exist, grounded on a natural law (i.e., a juridical law valid a priori) or on a natural right. If our only innate right is tantamount to freedom (i.e., the independence from being constrained by a private will (RL, AA 06: 237)), one may consider that a people’s revolt against a despotic regime that constantly violates this right, and has the purpose of establishing a new order based on the freedom of human beings, is permissible.4 However, Kant considers this reasoning to be wrong: opposition to political authority cannot be justifed on the basis of an individual right to freedom or in the name of the people’s right to self-determination (despite his strong defence of these two principles). In this chapter, I will try to show why Kant maintains that natural law is incompatible with a right to revolution, both on an individual (I) and on a collective (II) level. Finally, I will argue that an exception to the prohibition to revolt can be justifed from a Kantian perspective by appealing to the concept of permissive law (III).

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I Let us begin with a few remarks on the concept of natural right. In the modern tradition of natural right, the idea of ius naturae refers to the possibility of establishing supra-positive rights and juridical obligations using reason alone. Ius is, thus, not only a concept related to the existence of coercive public laws, but also a possible object of rational knowledge, whose principles can be determined in an accurate and systematic manner without appealing to experience. Since these principles are based on human nature, this type of ius is called ius naturae, as opposed to ius positivum. Furthermore, the idea of ius naturae involves two dimensions: the so-called objective (ius as lex) and subjective (ius as potestas) dimensions of ius. This is why there is not an exact translation of the idea of ius naturae (or Recht in German) into English: we have natural law for the frst meaning and natural right for the second one, but none encompassing both. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant is working within the natural right tradition, though reformulating its concepts in the light of critical philosophy.5 This is clear from the very beginning of the text, where he situates the Rechtslehre in the realm of the ‘systematic knowledge of the doctrine of natural right (Ius naturae)’ and claims that the purpose of this doctrine is ‘to establish the basis for any possible giving of positive laws’ (RL, AA 06: 230).6 As expected in any doctrine of natural right, we should fnd in the Rechtslehre certain natural rights (or innate rights) and certain natural laws (called here laws of freedom or moral laws) that establish natural (i.e., suprapositive) obligations. In the ‘General Division of Rights’, Kant himself draws a distinction between the two dimensions of ius we mentioned before: ‘rights, as (moral) faculties [Vermögen] for putting others under obligations’ (ius as potestas or facultas moralis) and ‘rights, as systematic rules [Lehren]’ (ius as lex) (RL, AA 06: 237). Then he argues that ‘there is only one innate right’ and this is ‘freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law’ (RL, AA 06: 237). This means that our innate right consists in a moral capacity to oblige others not to infringe upon our freedom. Conversely, we have the obligation not to infringe on the freedom of others. This (natural) and fundamental obligation is stated by the ‘universal principle of right’: ‘Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law’ (RL, AA 06: 230). Kant claims that this normative principle ‘is indeed a law that lays an obligation on me’, an obligation that commands to ‘so act externally that the free use of [my] choice can coexist with the freedom of others’ (RL, AA 06: 231). However, this is not our only supra-positive obligation. According to the ‘postulate of public right’, entering a rightful condition is a command of practical reason.7 In §41–42 of the Rechtslehre, Kant argues that the natural condition ought to be left because in this condition, as a

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status iustitia vacuus, there is no possibility to fully determine and secure ‘what is (internally and externally) mine and yours’ (that is, both innate and acquired rights). In the ‘General Division of Duties’, the third Ulpian command is claimed to be tantamount to the duty to enter the state, and to involve a derivation from the two other duties (RL, AA 06: 237). To put it briefy, the fundamental obligation to not infringe upon the freedom of others (which is equivalent to the second Ulpian duty neminem laede) can only be fulflled under the condition that everyone is subjected to public coercive laws. As opposed to the natural condition, ‘a rightful condition is that relation of human beings among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to enjoy rights’ (RL, AA 306-307).8 We can now turn to the problem of an individual right to revolution. If we are looking for some (natural) right to revolution, or a moral (but juridical) permission to revolt in some extreme cases based on a natural law or our innate right to freedom, this justifcation must be derived from (or, at least, be in accordance with) these two fundamental normative principles: the universal principle of right and the principle of innate freedom. Let us frst focus on the former (and on the juridical obligations established a priori by pure reason). Kant argues that a revolution cannot bring about a change in the civil constitution but only the overthrow of ‘all civil rightful relations and therefore all right’ (RL, AA 06: 340). A revolt against the head of the state cannot take place without going back to the state of nature, at least as a previous step to the institution of a new form of government. From the moral and normative perspective of right, returning to a natural condition is simply not possible because it would imply a direct contradiction with the fundamental obligation to enter a rightful condition. The transition from the status naturalis to the status civilis is not left to a prudential act, in which the benefts of being under coercive public laws are to be assessed, but is categorially commanded by reason. To start a revolution would imply acting against this categorical imperative, and thus a violation of the general law of right, because in a condition devoid of coercive public laws, there is no possibility to preserve freedom and, in general, to enjoy rights. In Kant’s words: The people did wrong in the highest degree by seeking their right in this way; for this way of doing it (adopted as a maxim) would make every rightful constitution insecure and introduce a condition of complete lawlessness (status naturalis), in which all rights cease, at least to have effect. (TP, AA 08: 301) Even for Hobbes, the subjects retain the power to defend their own lives and to return to the state of nature. In his opinion, the state is justifed as a means to an end (i.e., self-preservation); therefore, when the sovereign fails at accomplishing this end, and ceases to protect his subjects, the latter are no longer bound to remain under his power.9 Hobbes does not defend a right to

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resist the political authority but the possibility of releasing the subject from the obligation to obey. Kant endorses Hobbes’s account of sovereignty as an absolute power and its incompatibility with a moral permission to resist or revolt. However, he combines this view with a conception of the state as categorically necessary, that is, as the form under which human beings ought to coexist. Returning to the natural condition is not allowed, as it is for Hobbes, because the union of human beings under public coercive laws is ‘in itself an end’, ‘an unconditional and frst duty’, ‘and even the supreme formal condition (conditio sine qua non) of all other external duties’ (TP, AA 08: 289). If permission to oppose an unjust regime cannot be derived from a natural law (or a juridical law a priori), it cannot be founded in freedom as the natural right either. This is so because these two principles are related symmetrically: on the one hand, we have a moral capacity to oblige others not to infringe upon our freedom, on the other hand, we have the obligation not to infringe upon the freedom of others.10 Natural law and natural right are, for Kant, two sides of the same coin. With my obligation to enter the state goes a moral capacity to put others under the obligation to leave together the natural condition. This power is based on our innate freedom: only ‘by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful’ can a person wrong another. Consequently, ‘one is entitled [berechtigen] to use coercion against someone who already, by his nature threatens him with violence’ (RL, AA 06: 307),11 to make him enter into a juridical state. Now, since overthrowing an unjust government would imply (at least, temporarily) a transition to the natural condition, our innate right cannot entitle us to it. As I said before, to have a right means, for Kant, to have a legitimate power to coerce. Our innate freedom has the normative function to ground a moral power to oblige others to abandon the natural condition, because the equal freedom of everyone can only be guaranteed under the existence of coercive public laws according to the idea of a general will.12 Freedom is not a mere independence from an arbitrary constraint but ‘a condition to be subject (subjectus) to no other than to the external law to which oneself gave his own consent’ (VARL, AA 23: 341; cf. ZeF, AA 08: 350).13 One could argue that a political regime under which extreme violations of innate right take place (for example, where people are being killed, reduced to slavery, or treated as mere means) cannot in any account be described as a rightful condition. A situation in which people are under the mere unilateral will of others, and not under the rule of law, seems to lack the features of a rightful condition, and thus, the prohibition of abandoning it might not be at play. Such an oppressive and tyrannical regime could be claimed to be a real state of nature so that we would be entitled to use force and might in order to bring about a legitimate state. This argument may be plausible, although it does not exactly describe a right to revolution or a rightful resistance to the power of the ruler, but rather the creation of a state where there was only violence.14 The right of humanity does indeed ground the entitlement to live with others in a juridical condition under the rule of a lawgiving general

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will, but not a permission for opposing an unjust regime. Let us now turn to the problem of revolution from the collective perspective, i.e., from the perspective of the people acting as a political unit against an eventual tyrannical ruler. II According to Kant, a revolution cannot produce an immediate transition to a republican regime without destroying an existing state. Such a process cannot be considered a legitimate means for generating a political change since it directly contradicts both the individual and collective duty to enter a juridical condition. In Kant’s words: The reason a people has a duty to put up with even what is held to be an unbearable abuse of supreme authority is that its resistance to the highest legislation can never be regarded as other than contrary to law, and indeed as abolishing the entire legal constitution. (RL, AA 06: 320) This is the main argument against the possibility of a moral authorisation, based on a natural law or a natural right, to overthrow a government no matter how despotic or unjust it is considered to be. But there is also an important reason as to why the people cannot act as a unity against the ruler. This reason has to do with Kant’s understanding of the relationship between the normative ideal (i.e., the republic) and political practice. In Theory and Praxis, Kant emphasises the ‘undoubted practical reality’ of the general will, i.e., its moral and normative character, when considering the principles that should guide the political praxis (TP, AA 08: 297). This normative principle of reason imposes the obligation on the sovereign to legislate according to the idea of a general and public lawgiving will, leaving aside his private will (what he considers to be good or benefcial for the people). Since the general will makes the political authority of the sovereign legitimate (in theory), it serves (in practice) as a normative-evaluative standard for guiding him when giving the law. That means that the idea of a general will, namely the ideal of the people giving the law to itself, does not work as a norm for the people in order to produce a radical political change, but only for the ruler. And, in particular, it cannot justify a collective action of the people against an eventual sovereign that rules according to his private will and does not care about the right of the human beings in the name of this ideal. For Kant, the principle of the general will is inherent in the concept of sovereignty: it is always the sovereign who, in an existing political community, represents the united will of the people.15 He claims: For, since a people must be regarded as already united under a general legislative will in order to judge with rightful force about the supreme

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authority (summum imperium), it cannot and may not judge otherwise than as the present head of state (summus imperans) wills it to. (RL, AA 06: 318) For the people to be able to oppose the authority of the head of the state as a political unit, according to the law and not merely using violence, it should be united through the idea of a universal lawgiving will. However, were the people to constitute itself as a supreme authority, following Kant’s argument, two unacceptable scenarios emerge. Either both the people and the ruler would be the higher authority, entailing thus a contradiction, or the people would not be subject to the power of the sovereign anymore, establishing in that act a different political community. This latter option cannot be authorised by juridical moral principles since it implies dissolving a juridical order and returning, at some point, to the state of nature. In Theory and Practice, Kant presents a similar argument: before the general will exists the people possesses no coercive right at all against its commander since it can rightfully use coercion only through him; but if the general will exists, there is likewise no coertion to be exercised by it against him, since otherwise the people itself would be the supreme commander; hence the people never has a coercive right against the head of state (insubordination in word or deed). (TP, AA 08: 302) If there is a general will, it is instantiated in the head of the state, and the people as such cannot resist the highest political authority. For the people to have such a potestas, it should be considered united through the idea of a universal lawgiving will and constitute itself as a supreme power. Kant believes that, without a sovereign that rules with coercive laws, the people has no unity and cannot act as a collective agent. In fact, the people ‘owes its existence only to the sovereign’s legislation’ (RL, AA 06: 322).16 And if it eventually acts against the ruler and produces a radical political change, this ‘transformation would have to take place by the people acting as a mob, not by legislation’ (RL, AA 06: 340, italics are mine). In short, the concept of people is not a normative one but refers to an empirical fact that takes place only when a sovereign power rules according to the idea of a lawgiving will. In Kant’s words: if then a people united by laws under an authority exists, it is given as an object of experience in conformity with the idea of the unity of a people as such under a powerful supreme will, though it is indeed given only in appearance. (RL, AA 06: 371–372, italics are mine) Now, that the people cannot legitimately produce a political change by opposing the sovereign’s authority does not mean that it plays no role in a

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political reform towards the republican ideal. This role involves evaluating and judging the politics of the ruler, and making public any disagreement. In doing so, the people should not consider the benefts that a norm may produce, or the well-being that it may promote, but only the right of the human beings and the ends of humanity (cf. TP, AA 08: 305). While the sovereign should ‘give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people’, to every citizen corresponds ‘the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about what it is in the ruler’s arrangements that seems to him to be a wrong against the commonwealth’ (TL, AA 08: 297–304). Kant seems to believe that the freedom of the pen is a suffcient mechanism to protect the people’s rights (TP, AA 08:304), and to correct any excess or deviation of the ruler, in the path of gradual reforms towards a republican regime. III Kant’s account of sovereignty, together with his conception of natural law and natural right, leaves little room to accommodate a moral authorization to oppose an extremely unjust political regime. After all, the prohibition of revolution and resistance, as a means for achieving the republican ideal, is, as we have seen, a result of the normative foundations of his doctrine of right. But we can still wonder if one could conceive such permission in the name of the right of human beings, in accordance with Kant’s moral philosophy. One option is to renounce the possibility of grounding this authorisation on a juridical duty and to justify the action of a revolutionary on the basis of an ethical obligation. This is the path followed instance by Korsgaard. In cases where the adherence to the law implies supporting institutions that systematically violate human rights, she argues, a virtuous person could stop accepting the authority of the law. The revolutionary cannot give a juridical justifcation of her acts, but guided by a moral conviction, she follows the duty to care for the right of humanity in an unjust world.17 Another possibility is to argue (as instance Byrd & Hruschka and Ripstein do) that the prohibition to revolt does not hold in every state, but only in a juridical condition, i.e., in a condition in which what belongs to each person is secure to her against everyone else.18 However, as I see it, the existence of a moral permission to overthrow an unjust political regime does not follow from this argument. It rather implies, on the one hand, the possibility of describing an existing political organisation in terms of a lawless condition, due to its violation of basic normative commitments, and, on the other hand, the possibility of invoking the right of humanity entitling us to create a legal order where before only relations of might and force existed. What we need here is a conceptual resource, compatible with the normative principles of the doctrine of right, that makes (morally and not merely physically) possible an exception to the prohibition to revolt against the political authority when the rights and dignity of human beings are endangered. In the natural law tradition, a

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normative concept that allows an exception to a prohibition is indeed available: the notion of permissive law. The idea of a lex permissiva can be found in the scholastic repertoire of the 13th and 14th centuries (e.g. in Aquinas and Ockham) and in the natural law theories of the 18th century (e.g. in the doctrines of Wolff, Thomasius, and Achenwall).19 In general terms, this notion was used to introduce a permission to do something that would otherwise be forbidden according to the laws of nature. In the Vigilantius lecture notes, Kant discusses the question as to whether the concept of leges permissivae secundum ius naturae must be accepted and concludes that, in the case of legem prohibitivam generalem, ‘there are permissive laws as exceptions’ (V-MS/Vigil. AA, 27: 514).20 An example for this is the prohibitive law ‘might must not replace right’ (ibid.). Kant argues that in the natural condition an exception of this principle is needed in order to create a political constitution: only through might can a frst legal order be founded. Establishing a political authority requires this initial use of force because in general human beings do not easily want to subordinate themselves to the command of a superior: ‘by their own decision, therefore, no status juridicus would have come about, though it can indeed be brought about by force according to the permissive law’ (V-MS/ Vigil AA, 27: 516). In this framework, I consider that Kant's account of right could potentially accommodate a moral authorisation to oppose an extremely unjust ruler through the concept of a permissive law of reason. This law would permit an exception, in certain cases, to the general prohibition against challenging the political authority and leaving the state. The idea of revolution also fts the example given in the Vigilantius lecture since it could be described in terms of an initial use of force or violence, allowed by a permissive law, in order to establish a legitimate legal order. Of course, I am not saying that Kant does offer this argument. In fact, in the Doctrine of Right, he uses this notion in a different manner than in Vigilantius when discussing the acquisition of property rights. The lex permissiva serves there to allow an action (i.e., the possession of external objects of choice) that, according to the exclusive point of view of the principle of right and the principle of innate freedom, would be forbidden.21 My point is that when attempting to consider exceptions to the prohibition of revolt under Kantian principles of right, the concept of a permissive law becomes relevant. As I mentioned before, Kant’s basic claim against a permission to resist an unjust regime is that if a constitution included an article that, in certain circumstances, gave the people an authorisation to oppose the ruler, it would entail a contradiction. The idea of a lex permissiva can avoid this problem because it does not need the possibility of revolution to be guaranteed by a political constitution. It is reason itself giving the permission to stop obeying a regime that systematically violates the rights of human beings and to create a new political order. In doing so, the people constitutes itself as the highest authority and acts representing the general will.

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At the same time, the idea of a permissive law of reason does not collide with the fundamental juridical law (that lays us the obligation to remain in a juridical constitution) inasmuch as it introduces an exception, a sort of temporal suspension of this normative principle. This leads us to pose the question of when, under which conditions, can the people be legitimised by reason to collectively act against an unjust regime. These conditions could not be determined a priori, but they depend on the result of the revolution. As Korsgaard argues, ‘success makes the revolutionary, legally, the voice of the general will, and, morally, one who has promoted the cause of justice on earth […] in his own eyes and the eyes of the spectators this will justify him’. On the other hand, failure ‘means that he has destroyed justice for nothing, that he is guilty of murder and treason, an assailant of the general will’.22 Only after the revolution has triumphed could we say retrospectively that the people acted authorised by means of a permissive law of reason. ‘Revolution’, says Korsgaard, ‘may be justifed, but only if it wins’. And this argument can be completed with Kant’s claim according to which if the revolution succeeds and a new constitution is established, the subjects have now ‘the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens, and they cannot refuse honest obedience to the authority that now has the power’ (RL, AA 06: 323). Before concluding, it is important to point out that, according to the ideas presented here, the concept of permissive law could only authorise a revolution but not other forms of opposition to the political authority (such as a resistance or sedition). In Theory and Practice, Kant is especially concerned with rejecting the theory of resistance, defended, among others, by Achenwall. According to this theory, the people has a legitimate right to resist when the sovereign has turned into a tyrant, and thus a usurper of the political power.23 In Achenwall’s doctrine of right, and in most German natural law theories of the 18th century,24 the justifcation of the sovereignty of the state rested on the end of happiness and welfare of the people. Accordingly, when the sovereign failed to promote the end for which he was instituted as the highest political authority, the obligation has ceased and the people can legitimately resist. If the ruler, instead of using his power for the common good and the welfare of the people, destroys them, he loses his right to govern and becomes a tyrant.25 Kant holds that any form of political eudemonism (i.e., the attempt to ground juridical obligations in the principle of happiness) is the ‘greatest despotism thinkable’ (TP, AA 08: 291) and argues that this alleged right to resist is its main (pernicious) consequence: Here it is obvious what evil the principle of happiness (which is really not ft for any determinate principle at all) gives rise to in the right of a state […]. The sovereign wants to make the people happy in accordance with his concepts and becomes a despot; the people are not willing to give up their universal human claim to their own happiness and become rebels. (TP, AA 08: 302)

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We can see that Kant does not merely reject a right to resist because he denies the existence of a right to coerce regarding the sovereign. The theory of resistance also presupposes that the subjects should judge the political power at place according to the benefts and advantages that they may provide, because its end is to guarantee the wellbeing of the people. What is especially wrong with this theory is the moral or normative standard to assess the politics of the ruler: it is freedom and equality, and not our happiness (that involves, for Kant, always particular ends), that we should aim for. In the Contest of Faculties, Kant says: Welfare does not have any ruling principle, either for the recipient or for the one who provides it, for each one will defne it differently. […] A being endowed with freedom, aware of the advantage he possesses over non-rational animals, can and must therefore, according to the formal principle of his choice, demand for the people to which he belongs no government other than one in which the people are co-legislators. In other words, the right of human beings who are expected to obey must necessarily come before all considerations of their actual wellbeing. (SF, AA 07: 86 footnote, translation amended) Since resistance is based on an understanding of right based on eudemonistic principles, it cannot be defended from a Kantian perspective of morals. In opposition to this, the idea of revolution is bound up with the defence of freedom and the rights of human beings. As Hannah Arendt argues in her book on revolution, this notion has two salient features that distinguish it from resistance and other forms of opposition to the government. First, the idea of revolution does not merely imply a rise against established political authority but also a radical, collective action in the name of freedom. While resistance to the ruler admits different purposes and can be based on particular ends, a revolution involves a liberation of oppression that aims at the institution of freedom. Second, the notion of revolution involves a conscious process that has the purpose to destroy an old order and to bring about a new world. Instead, the idea of resistance does not mean a challenge of an established order as such, but a claim about the person who has the power to rule that aims to replace the tyrant or usurper with a lawful sovereign.26 In the end, Kant did not provide a moral justifcation of revolution, but he did argue in favour of the progressive character of the French Revolution. He seems to have believed that it was a collective action where the people acted guided by the ideals of reason. In the Confict of the Faculties, Kant remarks that the moral causes at play in that event were the right of a people to self-determination and the republican constitution, ‘the only one intrinsically rightful and morally good’, that as such is an end and a duty (SF, AA 07: 86). The enthusiasm of the spectators of the revolution was not provoked by ‘selfsh interests’ but was ‘directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right)’ (ibid.).

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Though Kant emphasises here the role of the spectators, he also takes into account the normative principles guiding the revolutionary actors.27 Because a revolution can be motivated by a normative ideal, it emerges as a morally relevant event. This shows that, although Kant did not include a right to revolution in his doctrine of right, he did not deny the signifcant role they may have in contributing the realisation of freedom and promoting the ends of humanity. The notion of a permissive law of reason could thus serve as a bridge connecting the potential of revolution as a possible course of political action with Kant’s account of natural right. Notes 1 On revolution from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy of history, see Beck (1971) and Ypi (2014). 2 Kant speaks in general of resistance [Widerstand, Widersetzlichkeit], sedition [Aufstand], rebellion [Aufruhr, Rebellion], but also of revolution [Revolution] (RL, AA 06: 323). Although these terms are not interchangeable, in every case, a form of opposition to the sovereign is at play, and as such, all of them are equally rejected from the moral perspective of pure reason. 3 In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that a revolt is an illegitimate means to overthrow an oppressive power because it contradicts the transcendental principle of publicness. According to this principle, an action affecting the rights of other human beings is wrong if its maxim cannot be made public (ZeF, AA 08: 381). Thus, if the people founded a political constitution, and established that in certain cases the head of the state can lose its power to coerce, both the people and the ruler would be ‘given authority as a prior condition of establishing the state’ (ZeF, AA 08: 381). This would entail the existence of two powers, and hence, the destruction of the state itself: ‘the injustice of rebellion is thus apparent from the fact that if the maxim upon which it would act were publicly acknowledged, it would defeat its own purpose’ (ibid.). 4 Many of Kant’s followers, like Jakob, Erhard, Fichte, Bergk, and Schlegel, reasoned in this way and expected him to provide a justifcation for revolution in his political philosophy. They consequently developed Kant’s thought and tried to reconcile its principles with a right to resistance and a moral permission for opposing a despotic regime. See Maliks (2012) and (2018). 5 Kant conceives the old ius naturae as a metaphysical doctrine of right, i.e., as a system of a priori principles through pure concepts, whose object is freedom of choice in its external use. That means that the set of juridical a priori principles is restricted to the sphere of reciprocal interaction between persons, and to the form of coexistence of their actions, leaving aside the end of their maxims (RL, AA 06: 230). This methodological change involves a strong rejection of the teleological aspect of the natural law theories (i.e., the normative relation between the moral law and an end). I developed this point in Tomassini (2018). 6 English quotations are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. I have indicated where I found necessary to amend the translation. 7 ‘when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice’ (RL, AA 06: 307). 8 Kant’s argument on the duty to enter the state rests also on his treatment of private right. The basic idea is that a unilateral will cannot legitimately impose on others the obligation to refrain from using a certain external object of the choice. Since

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the possibility of acquiring something external requires a general will, and a condition of being under a general external lawgiving is the civil condition, only in this condition ‘can something external be mine or yours’ (RL, AA 06: 256, cf. RL, AA 06: 263). Cf. Leviathan II, xvii, 1; II, xxi, 15, 21. Cf. Williams (2012), p. 68. Translation amended. Cf. specially RL, AA 06: 256; RL, AA 06: 263; RL, AA 06: 314. The translation is mine: ‘sie ist ein Zustand niemanden unterthan (subjectus) zu seyn ausser dem Gesetz zu welchem er selbst seine Einstimmung gegeben hat’. Ripstein (2009), p. 338. Cf. Flikschuh (2008), p. 394. In this, Kant follows Hobbes, according to whom there are not two contracts between individuals (one of association and one of subjection) but a single one. Korsgaard (1997), p. 321. Ripstein (2009), p. 338f; Byrd y Hruschka (2010), p. 182f. On the concept of lex permissiva, see Tierney (2001a) and (2001b). There is a type of prohibitive laws that are ‘universal’ and not ‘general’, for them ‘an exception is impossible, and a permissive law not to be thought of here at all’ (V-MS/Vigil. AA, 27: 514). In Perpetual Peace, the permissive law does not allow an ‘exception to a law’ but rather a postponement of complying with it. The deferral is permitted because the implementation of the law depends on the circumstances (ZeF, AA 08: 347). Korsgaard (1997), p. 320. Kersting (1993), p. 460ss. In the early Modernity, both Calvinist and Catholics shared the opinion that the subjects have a right to resist when the supreme magistrate commands something which is considered to be against the truth faith (Scattola, 2003, p. 7). Cf. Kersting (2006). Achenwall, Ius Naturae, II,§203 ; Maliks (2018), p. 453. Arendt (1963), 28ff. Cf. Ypi (2014), p. 281.

References Achenwall, Gottfried 2020 Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for Kant’s Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy. Edited by Pauline Kleingeld, translated by C. Vermeulen, with an introduction by Paul Guyer. London: Bloomsbury. Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. London: Faber & Faber. Beck, Lewis White. 1971. ‘Kant and the Right of Revolution’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, 32: 411–423. Byrd, Sharon and Hruschka, Joachim. 2010. Kant´s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flikschuh, Katrin. 2008. ‘Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke’, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36.4: 375–404. Kersting, Wolfgang. 1993. Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main. ———. 2006. ‘Politics’, in Haakonsen, K. (Ed.), The Cambridge History of EighteenthCentury Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1026–1068. Korsgaard, Christine. 1997. ‘Taking the Law into Our Hands: Kant on the Right of Revolution’, in Reath, A., Herman, B., Korsgaard, C. (Eds.), Reclaiming the

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History of Ethics. Essays for John Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 297–330. Hobbes, Thomas. 1968. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Maliks, Reidar. 2012. ‘Revolutionary Epigones: Kant and his Radical Followers’, in History of Political Thought, 23.4: 647–671. ———. 2018. ‘Two Theories of Resistance in the German Enlightenment’, in History of European Ideas, 44.4: 449–460. Ripstein, Arthur. 2009. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Scattola, Merio. 2003. ‘Before and after Natural Law. Models of Natural Law in Ancient and Modern Times’, in Hochstrasser, T., Schröder, P. (Eds.), Early Modern Natural Law Theories. Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment. Dordrecht-London: Springer Science- Business Media Dordrecht, pp. 1–30. Tierney, Brian. 2001a. ‘Kant on Property: The Problem of Permissive Law’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, 62.2: 301–312. Tierney, Brian. 2001b. ‘Natural Law and Property from Gratian to Kant’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, 62.3: 381–399. Tomassini, Fiorella. 2018. ‘Kant’s Reformulation of the Concept of ius naturae’, in Idealistic Studies, 48.3: 257–274. Williams, Howard. 2012. ‘Natural Right in Hobbes and Kant’, in Hobbes Studies, 25: 66–90. Ypi, Lea. 2014. ‘On Revolution in Kant and Marx’, in Political Theory, 42: 262–287.

Name Index

Abicht, Johann Heinrich 173, 177 Achenwall, Gottfried 158, 206, 207, 210 Adickes, Erich 43, 67 Allais, Lucy 157 Allison, Henry 8–13, 19, 22, 24 Ameriks, Karl 44, 73, 74, 80, 83–85 Aquinas, Saint Thomas 206 Arendt, Hannah 208, 210 Aristotle 21, 103, 106–109, 114–117 Categories 106 De Anima 108 Generation of Animals 103, 108 Metaphysics 106, 116 Nicomachean Ethics 21, 108, 109 Arnoldt, Emil 37, 43, 46 Augustenburg, Friedrich Christian von 189 Baron, Marcia 159 Baum, Manfred 71, 80, 82, 83, 85 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb 44, 84 Metaphysica 29, 84 Beethoven, Ludwig van 95 Beiser, Frederick C. 195, 196 Belwe, Andreas 135, 140 Bergk, Johann Adam 209 Bondeli, Martin 195 Brandt, Reinhard 36, 45, 116, 194 Broadie, Alexander 24 Brown, Wendy 148 Byrd, Sharon 166, 176, 205, 210 Camper, Petrus 91, 98 Carl, Wolfgang 75, 77, 78, 83, 84 Cohen, Hermann 84 Columbus, Christopher 98 Copernicus, Nicolaus xi, xiii, 28, 182, 184

Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 196 Davidson, Donald 21, 83 Dean, Richard 11–13 Deligiorgi, Katerina 195 Dilthey, Wilhelm 43 Diogenes of Sinope 106, 116 Düsing, Klaus 72, 73, 82, 84 Elden, Stuart 66 Erdmann, Benno 43 Erhard, Johann Benjamin 209 Fahmy, Melissa 159 Feuerbach, Ludwig 115 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 73, 82, 83, 193–196, 209 Die Bestimmung des Menschen 82 Formosa, Paul 158 Foucault, Michel 29, 41–43, 46, 47, 101, 115, 132, 136–141 Introduction à l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique 46, 47 The Order of Things 47, 101, 140 The Politics of Truth 137, 141 ‘What is Critique?’ 140 ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 141 Frankfurt, Harry 77, 84 Frierson, Patrick 45 Galilei, Galileo 93 Garnier, Romain 102 Geiger, Ido 11–16, 19 Gentry, Gerard 74, 83 Gewirth, Alan 16 Gloy, Karen 73, 83 Goddard, Jean-Christophe 196 Greiner, Daniel 128 Gudmand-Høyer, Marius 140 Guyer, Paul 12, 19, 44, 45, 193, 195

214

Name Index

Hall, Bryan 94 Hanisch, Christoph 166, 176 Hare, Richard Mervyn 21 Harvey, David 66 Henrich, Dieter 72, 82–85 Herz, Marcus 30, 44 Heydenreich, Karl Heinrich 173, 177 High, Jeffrey L. 197 Hill, Thomas 12, 19, 21, 23–25 Hinske, Norbert 28, 44 Hobbes, Thomas 201, 202, 210 Leviathan 210 Holzhey, Helmut 36, 45, 84 Homer 102 Hruschka, Joachim 166, 176, 205, 210 Hume, David 151 Jacobs, Brian 44, 46 Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich 209 Jáuregui, Claudia 74, 83 Job 37 Johnson, Robert 26 Josifovic, Sasa 83 Kain, Patrick 44, 46 Kant, Immanuel: ‘Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’’ 175, 187 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 44–47, 92, 115, 132–135, 140, 175, 193 ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’ 26 The Confict of the Faculties 140, 165, 175, 208 Critique of Practical Reason 8, 183, 186 Critique of Pure Reason 30, 44–47, 71, 78, 82, 84, 88, 90, 111, 117, 133, 183, 184, 193 Critique of the Power of Judgment 39, 45, 88, 89, 117, 134 The Doctrine of Right 121–125, 146, 162, 164, 165, 171, 172, 176, 177, 187, 199, 200, 206, 209 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 7–13, 15, 17–19, 23, 37, 45, 111, 117, 121–125, 134, 167, 176, 183, 194 ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’46, 118

‘Lecture on Encyclopedism’/‘Lecture on Philosophical Encyclopedia’51–53, 55, 66–68 Lectures on Anthropology 28, 44, 45, 51, 60, 62, 63, 66, 68, 175 Lectures on Ethics 146, 150, 151 Lectures on Metaphysics 29, 30, 44, 51–53, 55, 56, 60, 67, 117 Lectures on Physical Geography 50–53, 55, 60, 63, 65–67 ‘Logik-Jäsche’66, 99, 114 The Metaphysics of Morals 8, 22, 26, 37, 39, 111, 121, 122, 133, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 175, 181–183, 193 Natural Right Feyerabend 7, 175 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime 30, 44 On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice 175, 181, 187 ‘On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’ 37 Opus Postumum 41, 47 ‘Plan and Announcement of a Series of Lectures on Physical Geography’30, 44 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 22, 46 Towards Perpetual Peace 39, 117, 134, 209, 210 ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ 187 Kersting, Wolfgang 175, 210 Kim, Soo Bae 36, 44, 45 Klein, Hans Dieter 71, 82 Kleingeld, Pauline 164, 175–177 Klemme, Heiner 73, 83, 97 Korsgaard, Christine 12, 14, 15–17, 176, 205, 207, 210 Lehmann, Gerhard 43 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 110 Levinas, Emmanuel 154 Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph xiii, 72, 82 Louden, Robert 19, 26, 38, 43, 66 Lyssy, Ansgar 38, 46 Maliks, Reidar 176, 177, 209 May, J. A. 66 Meckstroth, Christopher 168

Name Index Mehigan, Tim 195 Mendieta, Eduardo 66 Mohr, Georg 193 Moran, Kate 158 Muchnik, Pablo 24 Mudroch, Vilem 84 Munzel, Felicitas 194 Murray, Patrick T. 195 Newton, Isaac 94, 95 Nobbe, Frank 39, 46 Ockham, William of 206 O’Neill, Onora 19 Palmquist, Stephen R. 194 Pasquarè, Roberta 40, 46 Paul (Apostle) 23 Pinheiro Walla, Alice 152, 153, 158, 159 Plato xiv, 105, 115, 116 Cratylus 105, 115 Protagoras 21 Theaetetus 105 Pollok, Anne 196 Popke, Jeff 66 Popper, Karl 87–89 Pott, Hans-Georg 195 Potter, Nelson 24 Pybus, Elizabeth M. 24 Raffnsøe, Sverre 140 Reichenbach, Hans 87, 89 Richards, Paul 66 Riedel, Wolfgang 196 Riehl, Alois 73, 83 Rink, Friedrich Theodor 52, 53, 61, 62, 66, 67 Immanuel Kant’s Physischer Geographie 66, 67 Ripstein, Arthur 176, 205, 210 Rukgaber, Matthew 24, 25

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Sanguin, André-Louis 66 Sartre, Jean-Paul 24 Schiller, Friedrich xv, 46, 180, 181, 188–193, 195–197 Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man 38, 181, 189, 195, 196 Schlegel, Friedrich 209 Schmidt, Claudia 45 Schulting, Dennis 73, 82 Shklar, Judith 153, 156 Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph 173–175, 177 Smith, Adam 148, 155 Socrates 21, 105, 106, 116 Stahl, Georg Ernst 93 Stark, Werner 31, 44, 162, 175, 176 Sticker, Martin 158 Stiening, Gideon 195, 197 Stroud, Scott R. 21 Sturma, Dieter 128, 193 Thaning, Morten 140 Thèremin, Karl 174, 177 Thomasius, Christian 206 Torricelli, Evangelista 93 Vitte, Antônio Carlos 66 Vogelmann, Frieder 141 Volker, Gerhardt 124, 130 Vollmer, Johann J. W.52, 53, 61, 62, 66, 67 Immanuel Kant, Physische Geographie 66, 67 Weber, Max 146 Wehofsits, Anna 159 Wilson, Holly L. 43 Wolff, Christian 206 Wood, Allen W. 5, 6, 12, 14, 18, 19, 44, 46, 193–195 Zammito, John H. 44 Zöller, Günter 44, 46, 97

Subject Index

benefcence 125, 126, 145, 146, 150–158 benevolence 148–151, 155, 158 biology 92

110, 113, 114, 117, 132, 153, 190, 203, 208 choice 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 18, 22, 25, 38, 91, 124, 127–129, 133, 146, 157, 162, 166, 169, 170, 176, 182, 200, 206, 208, 209 citizen(ship)50, 68, 133, 147, 149, 150, 153, 161–177, 207 civil(ian) 123, 124, 129, 145–157, 162–164, 167, 170, 172, 177, 201, 210 coercion 40, 140, 202, 204 coexistence 18, 40, 134, 180, 209 cognition 9, 32, 34, 62, 75, 81, 85, 100, 110, 117, 182, 184, 195 commonwealth 124, 146, 147, 149– 157, 162, 163, 169, 172–174, 187, 205 community 4, 36, 39, 124, 129, 134, 145, 146, 149, 152, 169, 194, 203, 204 confict 39, 88, 104, 135, 140, 148, 152 conformity to laws 130 consciousness 31–36, 42, 71–81, 84, 85, 100, 104, 105, 110, 111, 114, 117, 121, 133, 137, 140, 157, 182, 184 constitution xi, xv, 4, 113, 124, 138, 140, 165, 169, 171–177, 180, 187, 191, 192, 199, 201, 203, 206–209 contingency 10, 53, 139 contract 123, 124, 129 cosmology xi, xii, 52, 54, 55, 58, 61, 63, 65 cosmopolitanism 40, 51, 57, 136 criticism 19, 29, 42, 137, 146, 148, 151, 154, 176 culture 5, 134, 140

causality 9, 107, 129, 182, 185 character 6, 24, 31, 32, 38, 42, 43, 54, 56, 59, 60, 64, 65, 76, 78, 79, 104,

deduction xiii, 71–74, 82, 88, 114 democracy 161, 163, 165, 169, 175, 176

activity xiv, 31, 41, 72, 76, 80, 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94–96, 100, 108, 109, 111, 134, 156, 175, 182, 188 aesthetics 51, 67, 137, 139, 189, 195, 196 affection 30 agent xii, 7, 8, 14, 149, 151, 155, 156, 188, 204 aggregate 52, 53, 57, 62, 67 analysis 25, 29, 32, 35, 37, 39, 42, 43, 53, 87, 88, 93, 100, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 145, 157, 181, 182, 188, 189, 192 animality xiv, 4, 5, 12, 38, 39, 101, 103, 105, 108, 110, 180, 184, 191 anthropology 28–43, 46, 50–68, 79, 92, 99, 100, 102, 108–117, 132–135, 159, 170, 172, 175, 193 appearance 185, 188, 204 apperception 31, 71–83, 122 archaeology 138, 139 architectonic xi, 40, 62, 68, 100, 184 Aristocracy 146–150, 154 art 87, 88, 91–97, 137, 139, 191 authority 16, 18, 124, 126, 130, 134, 137, 147, 148, 162, 163, 165, 170, 172, 174, 176, 199, 202–209 autonomy 6–9, 13, 19, 90, 122–124, 133, 137, 139, 140, 182, 183, 185, 188, 190, 192 avarice 125 awareness 7, 71, 81, 111, 137

Subject Index desire 22, 104, 135 dignity 7, 8, 12–14, 17, 19, 111, 113, 122, 127–129, 132, 133, 135, 140, 205 discipline 28–30, 34, 36, 56, 64, 100, 152, 182 discourse 101, 140, 152 displeasure 97, 125 divinity xiv, 101 dualism 103, 184, 188 duty 5, 6, 26, 103, 112, 115, 125–128, 145, 146, 150–159, 164, 173, 183, 195, 201–203, 205, 208, 209 dynamism 35, 65, 117, 148 egoism 125, 134, 156 empirical psychology 29, 30, 44, 52–57, 60–63, 67, 88 end(s)4–19, 38, 91, 95, 107, 111, 112, 117, 122, 124, 126–128, 132, 133, 137, 140, 155, 157, 191, 201, 202, 207–209 energy/ies 109, 191 enlightenment 89, 132, 136–141, 148, 151, 155, 159, 175, 180, 187, 189, 191 epistemology 87 equity 152, 153, 156 erudition 52–54, 67 essence 28, 30, 36, 39, 99–102, 106, 108–114 ethics 11, 21, 26, 37, 38, 46, 66, 108, 109, 136, 137, 139, 146, 148–151, 155, 176, 177, 195 evil 6, 22–26, 104, 106, 107, 117, 125, 133, 207 evolution xiv, 7, 41, 99 existence 7, 10, 15, 17, 47, 65, 78, 83, 84, 111, 122, 124, 125, 127, 134, 148, 162, 171, 172, 182, 184, 185, 188, 192, 194, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 208, 209 experience 29, 30, 37, 52–58, 64, 67, 68, 74, 75, 79–81, 84, 100, 105, 110, 117, 156, 184, 195, 200, 204 faculty 6, 14, 16, 18, 30, 31, 35, 89–92, 96, 97, 111, 117 faith 24, 210 family 106, 107, 123, 154, 162 fate 153, 155 feeling 5, 6, 30, 91, 92, 97, 111, 115, 125, 152, 155, 191 fction xiv, 89, 95, 110, 117

217

fniteness/fnitude 40, 185 frailty xiii, 21, 23–25 free will 123 freedom 5, 6–9, 16, 22, 37, 40, 45, 54, 57, 60, 67, 91, 99, 104, 114, 125, 129, 132, 133, 137, 139, 140, 146, 147, 150, 153, 154, 156–158, 166, 167, 174, 176, 181–190, 192, 199–202, 205, 206, 208, 209 gender 123, 135 genealogy 138, 139, 153 genius 88–97, 113, 117 geogony 54, 67 geography 50–68 god 37, 42, 103–109, 116, 126, 136, 137 good 4, 6, 12, 15, 23, 24, 26, 38, 101, 104–107, 109, 116, 117, 125, 133, 158, 172, 186, 194, 203, 207, 208 government 68, 114, 146, 148–151, 154, 156, 158, 165, 176, 177, 187, 189, 192, 201–203, 208 gratitude 126 hallucination 100 happiness 4, 5, 14, 108, 109, 126, 127, 150, 152, 153, 157, 158, 207, 208 harmony 40, 189 history 38–40, 43, 52–57, 60–64, 67, 68, 102, 112, 118, 133–135, 139– 141, 156, 181, 186, 189, 209 humanity 4–19, 35, 38, 40, 68, 99–114, 117, 122, 125, 128, 129, 132–137, 139, 146, 176, 185, 187, 189, 192, 202, 205, 209 humankind xiii humility 109, 125 ideal 11, 101, 112, 125, 126, 145, 189, 191, 203, 205, 208, 209 idealism 180, 184, 194 identity 38, 72–77, 79, 81, 83–85, 121, 182 ignorance 21, 23, 25, 111, 177 illusion 150, 191 imagination 79, 87, 89, 90, 95–98, 102, 110 imitation 93–95 immortality 104, 115, 194 imperative 6, 9–10, 15–19, 122, 133, 136, 172, 177, 201 impression 155 impurity 24, 25 inclination 6, 8, 22, 23, 40, 149, 151, 155

218

Subject Index

independence 6, 8, 18, 40, 123, 124, 133, 146, 147, 150, 156, 157, 166, 172, 176, 184, 185, 199, 200, 202 individual 7, 17, 32, 38, 39, 50, 56, 61, 62, 64, 73, 77, 79, 80, 84, 103, 109, 123, 133–137, 139, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153–156, 162, 167, 168, 190, 199, 201, 203 inequality 147, 149–153, 156 infnity/infnitude 100, 184, 185 injustice 146, 148–159, 199, 209 instinct 110, 149, 155 intelligence 103, 105, 110–112, 184 intersubjectivity 29, 32–35, 135, 188, 192, 194 intuition 12, 32, 33, 80, 84, 90, 95–97, 99 justice 43, 146, 149, 153–159, 207, 209 knowledge 25, 28–32, 35, 36, 39, 42, 43, 50–65, 68, 76, 79, 81, 87–91, 96, 101, 104, 105, 110, 112, 116, 117, 121, 132, 134, 136–140, 173, 187, 200 language 17, 21, 29, 41, 42, 54, 67, 82, 137, 140, 164 law 5, 6, 8, 11–18, 23, 26, 37–39, 57, 73, 93, 122–127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 148, 150–157, 163–170, 176, 177, 182–185, 188, 190, 192, 194, 199–209 legislation 6, 18, 37, 121–125, 184–188, 199, 203, 204 lie(s) 24 logic 66, 74, 82, 87, 88, 94, 99, 114, 152 love 4, 6, 109, 125, 126, 146, 157, 159, 187 mathematics 57, 65, 88 maxim(s)7, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 126, 152, 157, 200, 201, 209 mechanism 24, 135, 146, 150, 185, 205 metaphysics 9, 22, 26, 29, 30, 37, 39, 51–53, 55–57, 60, 64, 67, 68, 79, 84, 106, 109–111, 121, 122, 133, 134, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 181–183, 193 mind 5, 9, 39, 74, 81, 84, 90, 92, 94–96, 107, 146, 149, 151, 156, 164, 183

modernity 136–139, 210 moral(ity)5–18, 21–26, 31, 37, 38, 43, 50, 65, 77, 78, 113, 114, 121–126, 128, 132, 133, 137, 140, 145, 146, 148–159, 167, 180–186, 188–195, 199–209 mortality 104 motivation 8, 16 myth 101, 104, 137 nation(s)68, 123, 124 nature 4, 5, 8–11, 13–19, 21, 23, 25, 29–31, 35, 37, 38, 40, 50, 54, 55, 61– 68, 90–96, 101, 102, 104, 106–113, 116, 117, 122, 127, 132, 133, 137, 140, 155, 157, 161, 163, 167, 169, 180, 181, 184–192, 200–202, 204, 206, 209 necessity 42, 58, 71, 72, 84, 107, 166, 168, 180, 185, 187, 188, 191, 192, 195 nobility 33, 34, 45, 146–149, 157 normativity 17, 29, 31, 36, 38, 39, 43, 88, 99, 132, 133, 136, 140, 150, 176, 200–209 objectivity 29, 32–35, 39, 78, 79 obligation 16, 126, 128, 129, 150, 158, 167, 176, 177, 200–205, 207, 209 ontology xi, 52, 63, 141 originality 92, 113 otherness 101, 102 paradox 76, 80 parrhesia 132, 136, 139, 141 passion 30, 101 pedagogy 66, 67, 115, 118, 154, 155 perfection 6, 13, 125, 133, 134, 158, 180, 188, 192–194 permission xv, 157, 162, 199, 201–206, 209 person(ality)8, 11, 13, 15, 19, 22, 24–26, 38, 39, 51, 61, 63, 65, 75, 77, 78, 84, 99, 103, 110, 111, 113, 115, 121–130, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, 154, 155, 162, 163, 166, 167, 169, 170, 174, 180–186, 189, 192, 194–196, 202, 205, 208 personhood 51, 59, 63, 104, 111, 122–125, 180–183, 186, 188, 189, 191–194 physics 51–68, 94 physiology 38, 62, 112

Subject Index play 24, 31, 36, 63, 75, 89, 91, 96, 97, 189, 208, 209 pleasure 45, 68, 91, 92, 97, 106, 107, 125, 158, 195 pluralism 28, 29, 77, 99, 101, 134, 188, 192, 194 politics 50, 65, 107, 137, 173, 205, 208 possession 13, 24, 110, 123, 124, 128, 129, 159, 187, 206 poverty 146, 154–157 practice 29, 64, 82, 109, 145–148, 150, 151, 157, 162, 164, 165, 172, 174, 175, 181, 187, 203, 204, 207 Pragmatic 5, 28, 30, 32, 37, 38, 40, 45, 51, 60–65, 68, 92, 111, 112, 132–135 predisposition 4–6, 12, 18, 38, 39, 92, 95, 114 principle 15, 16, 19, 22, 25, 26, 31, 53, 71–82, 84, 92, 96, 99, 103, 106–113, 121, 122, 126, 129, 130, 132, 134, 148, 200, 201, 203, 206–209 progress 40, 112, 117, 133, 134, 140, 194 propensity 22–25 property 8, 14, 16, 31, 33, 35, 73, 75, 92, 93, 113, 117, 123, 128, 129, 147, 148, 151–156, 159, 162, 174, 206 prudence 63–65 psychology 29, 30, 44, 51–57, 60–63, 67, 68, 79, 87, 88, 108, 111, 182 purposiveness 39, 91, 184 reality 42, 73, 96, 141, 155, 157, 190–192, 203 refection 6, 34, 42, 50, 83, 88, 91, 94, 99, 102, 110, 139, 149, 153, 154, 156, 158 renaissance 136 representation 5, 9, 32–34, 73, 77, 80, 81, 85, 91, 95, 100, 111, 117, 121, 136, 155, 159, 164–166, 169, 170, 188 republic(anism) 146, 155, 156, 161– 164, 171, 175, 203 resistance 199, 202, 203, 205, 207–209 respect 5–8, 13, 17, 23, 29, 31–33, 37, 38, 41, 58, 64, 122, 125–129, 133, 135, 149, 159, 168, 174, 177, 185–187 revolution 28, 94, 99, 148, 154, 155, 173, 174, 181, 184, 188–192, 194, 197, 199, 201–209

219

ruler 124, 130, 147, 149, 164, 169, 187, 202–209 scheme 9, 51–61, 64, 65, 90–97, 99, 100, 108, 109, 111, 114, 127, 134 science 30, 35, 50, 51, 53–56, 59, 62, 64–66, 87–97 sedition 207, 209 self 36, 74, 75, 80, 84, 111, 126, 136– 139, 158, 183–185, 191; -deception 24, 25; -determination 9, 37, 199, 208; -esteem 6, 125, 187; -love 4, 25, 126, 145 sensation 33, 34, 108 sensibility 32, 39, 58, 79, 81, 89, 90, 95, 96, 181, 184–186, 190, 191, 193 servant 123, 162, 172, 177 sociability 22, 35, 117, 135, 140 society 113, 114, 123, 129, 135, 148– 151, 155–157, 164, 172–174, 177, 190 sociology xii, 87 soul 30, 55, 62, 68, 103, 105, 107, 108, 122, 182, 194 sovereign(ty) 124, 130, 148, 149, 157, 165, 181, 199, 201–205, 207–209 species 4, 11, 24, 38–40, 64, 105, 106, 110, 112, 113, 117, 132–134, 137, 140 speech 34, 71, 107, 181, 186–188, 192 spirit 54, 58, 60, 73, 93, 94, 125, 128, 134, 176, 187 spontaneity 8, 19, 76, 81, 110, 111 state 107, 123, 124, 129, 130, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156–159, 161–177, 187, 189–191, 196, 201–209 status 7, 8, 11–18, 28, 37, 40, 50, 51, 64, 66, 95, 123, 129, 148, 154, 162, 163, 173, 174, 201, 206 subjectivity 32–34, 84 supremacy 93, 180, 199 sympathy 126, 145, 149, 153, 155, 157, 159, 199 synthesis 72, 74, 75, 78, 82, 84, 89, 90, 99, 189 system 5, 8, 30, 33, 39–41, 52, 53, 62, 67, 68, 90, 99, 101, 102, 106, 107, 110, 113, 114, 127, 129, 133, 154, 159, 164, 188, 209 taste 33, 45, 90–92, 97 teleology 39, 66, 90, 92, 107, 134, 136, 139–141, 209

220

Subject Index

theodicy 37 theology 52, 65, 100, 108 theory 5–7, 13, 87–91, 94–97, 109, 135–137, 147, 148, 150, 155, 156, 159, 162, 165, 172, 174, 175, 181, 183, 185, 187, 190, 203, 207, 208 thing(s)6, 10, 11, 18, 21, 24, 26, 34, 72, 83, 84, 94, 100, 106, 108, 123–125, 128, 129, 165, 166, 182, 185 totality 28, 100, 132, 141 transcendental 29, 31–38, 40–42, 47, 52, 71–76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 88–90, 95, 96, 109, 122, 139, 182, 184, 189, 194, 195, 209 truth 30, 42, 53, 57, 63, 104, 105, 110, 137, 139, 210 understanding 8, 29, 30, 35, 52, 63–66, 68, 76, 79–81, 88–90, 95–97, 100–102, 105, 110, 111, 113, 117, 122, 127, 129, 133, 137–139, 146, 161–163, 167, 177, 181, 183–185, 193, 203, 208 unity 28, 39, 40, 72–81, 84, 85, 96, 103, 106, 107, 110–113, 115, 121,

125, 140, 165, 181, 190, 196, 203, 204 universality 32–34, 38, 39, 168 universe 62, 101 validity 10, 18, 29, 35, 56, 71, 72, 79, 88, 90, 97, 110, 136 value 8, 10–18, 55, 99, 101, 115, 122, 126–128, 146, 150–152 vice 25, 26 violation 159, 201, 205 virtue 5–8, 13, 15, 18, 25, 26, 113, 121, 122, 125, 126, 133, 145–152, 154, 155, 157, 162, 163, 176, 189 voting 124, 163–171, 175, 176 welfare 145, 151–153, 158, 207, 208 woman 170, 174, 177 world 6, 8, 9, 11, 28, 29, 35, 36, 41, 42, 50, 54–57, 61–68, 84, 88, 104, 112, 122, 124, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 138, 151, 154, 156, 158, 180–188, 191, 192, 194, 196, 205, 208 worth 6, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 111, 122, 127, 128, 184