The Japanese Empire In East Asia And Its Postwar Legacy 3891295022, 9783891295021

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M onographien H erausgegeben vom D eutschen In stitu t fü r Japanstu dien d er P hilipp Franz von Siebold Stiftu ng Band 2 2 ,1 9 9 8

Harald Fuess (ed.)

The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy

Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftung

Band 22 1998

M onographien Band 22 H erausgegeben vom D eutschen In stitu t fü r Japanstu d ien d er Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftu ng

Direktorin: Prof. Dr. Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit

Anschrift: Nissei Köjimachi Bldg. Kudan-Minami 3-3-6 Chiyoda-ku 102-0074 Tökyö, Japan Tel.: (03) 3222-5077 Fax: (03) 3222-5420 e-mail: dijtokyoddijtokyo.twics.com

Title: Shanghai Landing of the Naval Forces Explanation: When the Japanese naval forces landed in Shanghai, they selected the Japanese elementary school as their headquarter. The sign at the gate warns, "Beware of stonethrowing by the Chinese." Shanghai, June 1925 (Courtesy of Asahi Shinbun)

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP Einheitsaufnahme The Japanese empire in East Asia and its postwar legacy / Harald Fuess (ed.). - München : Iudicium-Verl., 1998 (Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftung ; Bd. 22) ISBN 3-89129-502-2

© iudicium vertag GmbH München 1998 Alle Rechte Vorbehalten Druck: Offsetdruck Schoder, Gersthofen Printed in Germany ISBN 3-89129-502-2

T able of C ontents

I. I ntroduction

Preface

Irm ela Hiiiya-Kirschnerett.......................................................................................9 Overview

Harald F uess........................................................................................................ 11 Opening Remarks: Em pire in the Age of N ationalism Prasenjit D u a r a ......................................................................................................15 II. Asia in J apan: T he D omestic F oundations of J apanese Imperialism

Japan's Asia in die Politics of a New W orld Order, 1914-19 Fred Dickinson........................................................................................................27 The Dream of One Asia: Okawa Shüm ei and Japanese Pan-Asianism Christopher W. A. Szpilman.................................................................................. 49 A Com parative Study of the Töyö Kyökai and the N an'yö Kyökai Hyung Gu Lynn ......................................................................................................65 Technocratic Visions of Em pire: Technology Bureaucrats and the "N ew Order for Science-Technology" JanisMiMURA..........................................................................................................97 m . Imperialism at W ork: T he J apanese E mpire dm Asia

Consumption as Resistance: The National Products Movement and Anti-Japanese Boycotts in M odem China Karl G. Gerth........................................................................................................119

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Inhalt

Econom ic Expansionism and the M ilitary: W ith Special Reference to die Japanese Community in Shanghai in 1931 Harumi Goto-Shibata........................................................................................ 143 The Taiw an Governm ent-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast A sia, 1900-1936 Adam Schneider................................................................................................ 161 IV. T he P ostwar L egacy of the J apanese E mpire Resurrecting die Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postw ar China, 1945-49 D ating Yang ......................................................................................................... 185 In the Shadow of die M onolith: Yoshida Shigeru and Japan's China Policy During die Early Cold W ar Years, 1949-54 C M .B raddick.......................................................................................................207 Japanese Relations in Northeast Asia: China and Soviet Interference Joachim Glaubttz...................................................................................................233

C ontributors to this V olume

251

I. Introduction

P reface

"Japan in A sia" is the title of a new research project launched by die Ger­ man Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in 1997. Even though questions of Japan's relationship to die rest of Asia may at first glance appear to be tim eless, they have taken on particular relevance since at least the begin­ ning of the 1990s, w here we observe in many spheres, in politics and economics as w ell as in culture and society in general, a new orientation in Japan fowards Asia. Japanese attem pts at redefining its relationship to w hat it perceives tolbé Asia, that is, East and Southeast Asia, are part and parcel of a global re-m apping since the end of die Cold W ar, and this process, which is still in the making and which also im plies a re-definition of Ja­ pan's relationship w ith "th e W est" w ill definitely affect the rest of die world as w ell. At the DIJ with its m ulti-disciplinary set-up and its agenda of conducting research on modem Japan in the fields of the humanities, the social scienc­ es, and economics, w e try to tackle some of the numerous possible ques­ tions w ithin this framework which we find are of particular relevance from our European perspective. The m ajority of our twelve research associates is presently involved in one way or another in this project. Needless to say, though, this research profits greatly from cooperation w ith other research institutions and specialists in the field. "Japan in A sia" is undoubtedly a much-studied topic already, and w hat is more, at die DIJ w ith its Japan-di­ rected research, there is a constant need of tapping research on other Asian areas in order to place our findings in an adequate perspective. In its tenth year since its foundation in 1988, the anniversary edition of die DIJ year­ book Japanstudien is devoted to "Japan's New Role in A sia." By organizing workshops and conferences, as well as inviting specialists to contribute to our publications, we not only hope to create an environment conducive to better insight into our topic, but also to contribute to networking in the scholarly community beyond the borders of academic tradition and episte­ mological domains. The theme of "Japan in A sia" seems particularly suited to such an approach. In the sphere of cultural studies, our research presently focuses on ten­ dencies am ong Japanese intellectuals toward claim ing a particular "A sian spirituality." Analyses of literary texts, essays, and w ritings by scholars with a w ide readership reveal that claim , attached to such keywords as animism, sham anism , and reisei (spirituality), to be rooted in an attem pt to form ulate a counter-culture against what has been experienced as a he-

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Irmela H uiya-Kirschnereit

gemony of "W estern" thinking throughout m uch of Japan's m odem his­ tory. Another focus o f concern within the framework of "Japan in A sia" is Ja­ pan's role in the process of integration in Asia. Political and economic as­ pects are so closely interwoven that an interdisciplinary approach appears to be the only feasible option, and is the one chosen by the DIJ. Whether it is the(analysis of the domestic debate concerning Japan's future role in Asia) or thám fluence of business and interest groups on Japanese foreign-policy dedsionm akiijg, or the economic relations between Japan and Asia in generajrandcurrent changes regarding Japanese production networks within the Asian region in particulan—all these findings have to be scrutinized un­ der a grid of interrelated paradigms, one of these being the history of Japanese-Asian relations in file twentieth century. And this is where file present volum e's topic comes to the fore, because it provides an indispensable backdrop to our current study of "Japan in A sia." "The Japanese Em pire in East Asia and its Postwar Legacy" is the title of a conference that w as funded and organized by the DIJ in Tökyö on 17 October 1997. Its purpose was to provide a historical background to file "Japan in A sia" project, especially in regard to file political, econom ic, so­ cial, and cultural dim ensions of the interactions of Japan and the Japanese w ith Asia and Asians. The present volum e includes m ost of the papers presented on this occasion. The conference participants and authors com e from different countries of Asia and Europe, and also the United States, file m ajority of them being in an early stage of their academ ic career, having recently com pleted or just finishing their doctoral dissertations. The present book could thus also be read as an indicator of w hat them es and subjects attract the im ag­ ination of today's young historians of Asia. Our thanks go to Prasenjit Duara, Professor of H istory at Chicago Uni­ versity, who gave the keynote speech at the conference and in the discus­ sions provided invaluable feedback to the presenters. W ithout the keen eye of Nina Raj, the copy editor, numerous errors would have been over­ looked. Special credit, m oreover, is due to Harald Fuess, research associ­ ate at the D IJ, who, w ith relentless energy and enthusiasm , planned and organized the conference, and saw to the speedy publication of its results. It is hoped that this volum e w ill contribute to a better understanding of the dom estic foundations of Japanese im perialism , its workings in A sia, and the em pire's postw ar legacy as it m anifests itself especially in SinoJapanese relations. Tökyö, August 1998

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Irm ela H ijiya-Kirschnereit D irector, DIJ

O verview Harald F u ess

When w ar broke out betw een Japan and China on 1 August 1894, m ost W estern observers assumed that China would prevail because of its size, but the w ar turned out like the biblical fight between David and Goliath; the sm aller com batant won w ith better weapons and tactics. W hat was a surprise to many had been die fruit of Japan's effort to m odernize in the late nineteenth century, driven by a quest to m aintain national independ­ ence and to attain equal status w ith W estern nations. W ith the acquisition of its first colony, Taiw an, as the prize of its victory over China in 1895, Ja­ pan em barked on building an em pire, just as W estern powers had done before. The Japanese em pire lasted for only half a century, and it vanished in die sam e way it had begun—in a w ar w ith China. The Second Sino-Japanese W ar, started in 1937, eventually lead to die Second W orld W ar, which resulted in Japan's surrender and the dism emberment of its em pire in 1945. M ore than half a century has elapsed since the dem ise of Japan's em­ pire, but because of its centrality in early tw entieth century East Asian his­ tory, it still continues to attract the attention o f numerous scholars. They, just as generations o f scholars before them , reinterpret the past in light of the present, especially now that Japan's role in Asia is growing again in the fields o f econom ics, politics, and culture. They usually place the crea­ tion, dynam ics, and term ination of the Japanese em pire w ithin world­ wide trends of im perialism , nationalism , totalitarianism , and m odernity with reference to particular circum stances and developm ents in East A sia.1They often differ in their respective overall assessm ent. On the one hand, are scholars who view Japan's pursuit of em pire, at least in its ear­ lier stages, as the normal course of action in a general clim ate of im peri­ alism .2 On the other hand, are those who call for new theoretical para­ 1 For an overview of the state o f scholarship in English on the form al and inform al Japanese em pire see Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Co­ lonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese W artime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). 2 Marius Jansen, "Japanese Im perialism : Late M eiji Perspectives," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,61-79.

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Harald F uess

digms to explain the special features of Japanese im perialism .3 In this conference volum e, scholars from Europe, Asia, and die United States dis­ cuss the historical significance of the form al and inform al Japanese em­ pire. Prasenjit Duara in his opening rem arks introduces die "E ast Asian m odem ," a regional discourse of the m odem and the unique, as a back­ ground for the interpretation of the construction of em pire in an age of na­ tionalism . The other contributors, many of whom are just embarking on an academ ic career, are grouped according to three broad them es: the do­ m estic foundations of Japanese im perialism , die w orkings of die Japanese em pire in Asia, and the Japanese em pire's postw ar legacy. The volum e begins w ith four essays that assess the dom estic founda­ tions of Japanese im perialism . Fred Dickinson shows the place of Asia in the struggle for power among Japanese elites during the First W orld W ar, the end of which saw the dissolution of a national consensus for continen­ tal expansion. W hile recognizing the influence of international events and W ilsonian ideas on Japan, he stresses the initiatives of Japanese policy­ m akers in die prom otion of overseas expansion in order to distract from dom estic issues. Christopher Szpilm an then explains in a case study of the prom inent intellectual Ökawa Shum ei how pan-Asianism could appeal to an im portant stratum of die conservative prew ar elite. W ith his panAsianism , ökaw a justified Japan's m ission to liberate Asia from W estern influence, if need be by war. Hyung Gu Lynn describes die developm ent and shifting goals of Japan-Asia associations. M embers used die JapanAsia associations to form interest netw orks in foreign affairs in a prew ar polity often characterized as ridden by rivalry between different elite groups. Janis Mimura concludes this section w ith her exam ination of war­ tim e state planning, especially in m atters of technology policy and ideol­ ogy. In the w ritings of m embers of the supram inisterial Asia Develop­ m ent Board, she sees justifications for Japan's political dom inance in Asia based on its technological leadership role. Also, she finds fundamental sim ilarities in Japanese thought on technology policy w ith those of "reac­ tionary m odernist engineers" in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The w orkings of the Japanese em pire in Asia is die subject of die next three essays. Karl Gerth analyzes the rise of Chinese nationalism in the spread of an ethic of nationalistic consumption. This ethic increasingly defined consum ption of Chinese goods as patriotic and becam e a force in sustaining anti-Japanese boycotts. Harumi Goto-Shibata shows how Jap­ anese on the turbulent frontier turned econom ic im perialism into m ore vi3 Japanese im perialism is called "backward im perialism ." See Peter Duus, The Ab­ acus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration o f Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: Univer­ sity of California Press, 1995).

12

O verview

oient form s of im perialism . Her study of die Japanese com munity in Shanghai reveals how businessm en increasingly relied on the navy in­ stead of die consulate to protect their com m ençai interests in the face of anti-Japanese boycotts. Adam Schneider exam ines sub-im perialist drives for econom ic expansion in colonial Taiwan. M otivated by a desire to less­ en dependence on trade w ith m etropolitan Japan, the Taiw an Govern­ m ent-General prom oted econom ic integration w ith South China and Southeast A sia, but trade failed to take off until die m id-1930s, when the policy of industrialization for Taiwan becam e effective. The three final three essays focus cm the em pire's postw ar legacy, espe­ cially for Sino-Japanese relations. Daqing Yang describes die existence of a continuity in Sino-Japanese econom ic and technical cooperation in the immediate postw ar period, which was only term inated by the incipient Chinese civil war. Chinese authorities and Japanese m anagers encour­ aged Japanese contributions to Chinese technology developm ent, and many Japanese experts remained in China after 1945 to w ork. C.W . Braddick exam ines diplom atic history w ithout diplom atic relations. In the ear­ ly Cold W ar, when no official ties existed betw een Japan and China, pow­ erful Japanese politicians sought a special relationship w ith China, which they view ed forem ost as an Asian country and only secondarily as a com­ m unist country. Joachim Glaubitz discusses Sino-Japanese diplom acy be­ fore the norm alization of diplom atic relations. He credits the Chinese leadership for astute m anipulation of Japanese public opinion and politi­ cians to obtain a treaty on C hina's term s.

O pening R emarks: E mpire in the A ge of N ationalism Prasenjit D u ara

The understanding of die Japanese im perial and colonial legacy varies considerably among different com m unities. The world outside Japan, on the one hand, knows of the horrors and atrocities, a knowledge that ob­ scures all other dim ensions of this historical experience in part because of the Japanese governm ent's own dom estic agenda and refusal to com e to terms w ith the past. Post-war W estern (principally American) scholar­ ship has tended to focus, on the other hand, upon die developm ental con­ sequences of the spread of Japanese form al and inform al models of gov­ ernance. This is m ost evident in the three-volum e series on the Japanese empire collectively edited by Ramon M eyers, M ark Peattie, and Peter Duus.1W hile generating a w ealth of new research which often had the ef­ fect of redressing the view of Japanese expansionism as an unm itigated disaster for all concerned, die m odernization paradigm led to a set of re­ lated questions: w hat w ere the developm ental consequences of Japanese colonialism in com parison w ith other colonialism s? W hy w ere diese de­ velopm ental consequences kept relatively obscured (or why w ere the Jap­ anese colonizers so unloved by die colonized)? W hat was the reason for the failure of this expansionary project? W hile acknowledging and absorbing the m oral significance and re­ search contributions of these tw o perspectives, it is im portant to demar­ cate a field of inquiry w here neither the m odernization nor the nationalist paradigms are so central that they conceal other developm ents. W ithout rehearsing the extensive critique of these paradigms—them selves over twenty years-old—let m e suggest that these paradigms belong roughly to the same m oment or period as J apanese im perialism itself and them selves need to be historidzed in relation to this im perialism . In these brief intro­ ductory rem arks, 1 want to suggest som e ways in which we m ight view Japanese im perialism as sharing many of the sam e assum ptions of these 1 Ramon H. M yers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 18951945 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and M ark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 18951937 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 19% ).

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Prasennt D uara

paradigm s, w hich in tum represented die dom inant global forces of the tw entieth century, nam ely nationalism and m odernization. How m ight this view produce a different agenda o f research? In an era w here die ide­ ological dom inance of nationalism is being challenged by globalization, the historical picture of East Asia and the world w ill alm ost certainly have a different look. As several essays in this volum e suggest, both im perial­ ism and nationalism w ere represented by several different agents and ac­ tors w ith com plicated and uncertain relationships to the im perial or na­ tional cores. Doubtless, many of those who have been accused as "collaborators" w ill be found to have had legitim ate hum an reasons for doing w hat they did. M oreover, some "traditional" arrangem ents w ill be found to have m ore globally sustaining value than m odernization projects. Yet I am not sure that the alternative m orality is sufficiently de­ veloped to allow us to call for a definitive break w ith die old paradigms. The pow erful epistem ological and m oral underpinnings of the old para­ digm s have inform ed our own generation's view of the w orld too deeply for that. Japanese im perialism took shape w ithin the norm ative context of mod­ ernization and nationalism . First, an East Asian discursive language of the m odem (and, hence, of the unique) em anating principally from Japan, circulated in the colonies of Korea and Taiw an and, som ewhat less con­ spicuously, in the Chinese m ainland. To be sure, this was a regional me­ diation of a global trend, but this discourse included distinctive w ays of dem arcating and representing the spheres of m odernity and tradition, state and society, and nation and self. Despite the destructive violence of Japanese im perialism , this im perialism also hat to engage, experim ent w ith, and extend this m odernizing process—a process that both this vio­ lence and reactive nationalism has tended to obscure. The second context is the transition in world dom ination from the ide­ ology of im perialism to the ideology of nationalism . The first half of the tw entieth century was not only a period when nationalism becam e hege­ monic—when the nation-state system expanded from a European/N orthem club to cover m ost of the globe—but it w as one when the surplus of nationalism in the nineteenth century that was im perialism cam e to be ideologically rejected as foreign to nationalism . Indeed, na­ tionalism now began to define itself as anti-im perialist. Bruce Cumings has suggested that the latecom ers to im perialism like Germany and Japan found it particularly vexing to confront this change in the rules of the game w hereby im perialism came to be seen increasingly as illegitim ate.2 2 Bruce Cumings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in K orea," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,485.

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Opening Remarks: Empire in the A ge o f Nationalism

Yet in m any im portant ways, all nationalism s had to adapt to these new ideological conditions. Both im perial and national states w ere m odem state form s driven by a territorial im perative, and the im perialist or ex­ pansionist tendencies o f the new nations had to be concealed in national­ ism 's new ideology. Perhaps conceal is not the right word. Nationalism in this era devised new political form s; form s that w ere supranational but not overtly or traditionally im perialist. Pan-Asianism , Manchukuo, kôminka w ere the Japanese expressions of this new political form . W hat is interesting is that there are parallel—though not the same—new political forms w hich seek to accomm odate the expansionist tendencies of the new nations, such as China or India w ith regard to their shaky claim s on their peripheries. W hat I am calling the East Asian m odem is, first of all, part of the global circulation of discourses of the m odem . Once the w orld com es to be com­ posed of hom ological nation-states, these states frequently pursue the common goals of scientific m odernity, adopt sim ilar or related models to achieve these goals, encounter many of the same problem s, and resort to sim ilar solutions. Thus we have the ironic phenomenon of nations pro­ claim ing their authenticity as the m ark of their uniqueness even as m ost other national cultures are doing the sam e. But of course the global deter­ m ination is m ediated and specified by local, national and regional trajec­ tories both historical and contem porary. Thus w e need to focus on the re­ gional m ediation of global and national discourses. In this context, we have to establish not only why East Asia is a region, but w hat is the region of East A sia. Both historical (historical interaction, shared language and culture) and theoretical research are involved here because the cultural geography of East A sia—or what it m eans and to whom—is a changing one. Thus for instance, the im perial Chinese saw the old tribute region in­ cluding Burma and N epal as part of East A sia, w hereas the Japanese in the interwar era increasingly saw Siberia and Central Asia as part of this re­ gion. W hile I am not equipped to speak for the Korean role, central to the for­ mation o f the East Asian m odem is, of course, the interaction of the Japa­ nese and the Chinese. The conditions of interaction in this region from 1900 to 1945 include Japanese strategic, m ilitary, econom ic, and cultural projects in China; Chinese students, professionals and political exiles in Japan and their return; and the re-im portation of the Japanese lexicon of modernity. A large num ber of studies in English, Chinese, and Japanese have adequately covered tire interactions of this period. Among the many, they include the work of Tam Yue-him , Sanetô Keishû, M arius Jansen, Akira Iriye, Douglas Reynolds, and Joshua Fogel. This is an indis­ pensable base for our studies, but I also believe we need to chart out som e

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Praseniit D uara

new ground relating to die discursive interactions producing the com­ m only held assum ptions about m odernity in East Asia and the kinds of subjectivities these generate. Furtherm ore, w hile like the above scholars, I can see the historical relationships and parallels as the basis of this en­ counter, I also see an East Asian m odem being produced by this encoun­ ter. In other w ords, w e cannot sim ply invoke historical relationships to explain this m odem , but have to see how history is often shaped and re­ constituted as a resource to serve contem porary im peratives and even con­ struct a new East Asia. An exam ple of the use of history as a reconstituted resource can be found in the lexicon of m odernity. Thousands of specialized and com­ mon w ords, com pounds, and phrases of classical Chinese prove­ nance— such as gem ing/kakum ei or fengjian/höken —w ere given new and different m eanings in the m odem discourses form ulated in Japan. W hen they w ere brought back to China, this lexicon gave the appearance of a continuous history and a transparent relationship to the Chinese and East Asian past. In actuality, this "lexical effect" incorporated m odem Chinese into a new , regional East Asian discourse of the m odem formu­ lated first by the Japanese. Indeed, these linguistic transactions perhaps brought m odem C hinese, Koreans and Japanese—a tem poral communi­ ty—discursively closer to each other than, for instance, to their peasants. But to be sure, the discursive encounter is not restricted to lexical trans­ fers. This exchange is accom panied by several other m odes of cultural in­ teractions. The profile of the East A sian m odem that I w ant to consider and that is significantly a product of the Japanese dom inance of the area is consti­ tuted around the question of authenticity. In the era of nation-states, all nations, regardless of w hether or not they w ere im perialistic, w ere pre­ occupied w ith two tem poral or historical issues: the universally recog­ nized goal of achieving progress in linear tim e, and, a less recognized, but equally universal, im perative of having to constitute a core of tim e­ less authenticity. The authentic refers to the true qualities, character, and values that cultures and nations seek to secure w hile they pursue the goals of m odernity, or in other w ords, w hile the nation lives in linear tim e when all is flux and change. Thus the authentic is not only the true but also the unchanging w ithin change, it is identity in a w orld w here all is change. There is a definite tension betw een the order of authenticity on the one hand, and the order of H istory or change understood as succes­ sive and linear and necessary for both capitalism and m odernity on the other. Indeed, this core of authenticity is necessary for the nation's claim to sovereignty and to w ithstand the incursions of global capitalism . But the relationship betw een the tw o orders is not only conflictual and al­ 18

Opening Remarks: Empire in the A se o f Nationalism

lows an elaborate traffic of authorizations and delegitim ations betw een the tw o.3 The order of authenticity is politically very im portant because it locates the source of authority in a society and can empower those who control this realm . It endows a cultural inviolability to those who can speak for it: whether it be the Shöwa restorationists, the Afghan Taliban, American param ilitarists, or Lee Kuan-yew 's anti-W estern Confucian essentialism . Internally, it subordinates the individual to the rhetoric of the collective, and externally, it provides an authoritative shield from charges from oth­ er states or nations. O ften the issue of rights em erging from territorial sov­ ereignty and rights em erging from authentic traditions tend to coalesce: the state has sovereignty because it claim s to embody the authenticity of a people and their territory. The sources of authenticity, their modes of representation, and their ef­ fects on subject or identity form ation in East Asia w ere profoundly shaped by—though rarely identical with—Japanese discourses of the au­ thentic. In addition to the better-know n influence of "m odernizing" cate­ gories, such as local self-governm ent or progressive history, I have exam ­ ined the influence of Japanese discourses of such varied sources of authenticity as the locality or xiangtu/kyOdo, the prim itive, the self-sacri­ ficing woman, and pan-Asianism . To be sure, the nature of the influence is itself quite varied. Thus, w hereas many of the categories and periodi­ zation schem es of m odem Chinese history until the 1920s w ere modelled on Japanese ones,4 in the case of the local or xiangtu, which pervaded a range of knowledge practices from literature to geography to rural re­ form , Japanese discourses shaped one o f two influential Chinese m odels. In yet other cases, Japanese penetration of the mainland and efforts to in­ corporate "prim itive" peoples w ithin Japanese narratives of belonging, led to Chinese form ulations of the "prim itive" and the periphery in re­ sponse. W e are fam iliar w ith how many of the Japanese colonial cultural practices in Korea, such as archaeology or folklore, w ere absorbed by Ko­ rean nationalists into their narratives of Korean greatness.5 Let me con­ clude this short essay by turning to one of these sites of discursive inter­ action: pan-Asianism in China. Through this instance I hope not only to

3 Prasenjit Duara, "The Regime of Authenticity: Tim elessness, Gender and Na­ tional H istory in M odem C hina," forthcom ing H istory and Theory 37 (October 1998). 4 Fu Sinian, 1928. "Zhongguo lishi fenqizhi yanjiu" in Beijing Daxue Rikan April 17-23 (Reprinted in Fu Sinian quanji vol 4:176-85). 5 Roger L. Janelli, "The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship," Journal o f Amer­ ican Folklore 99 (1986): 24-49 and Cum ings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in K orea," 478-96.

19

Praseniit D uara show how the Japanese role in East Asia has to be seen in relation to die two new contexts of the tw entieth century, die production of a regional m odernity and the hegem ony of nationalist ideology, but also how the specificity of Japanese im perialism or m ilitary expansionism especially affected die situation. Pan-Asianism , w hich perhaps emerged first in Japan toward the end of die nineteenth century and developed a worldwide response during the Russo-Japanese W ar from a range of A sian leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and Rabindranath Tagore, embodied a variety of m eanings. I do not w ant to reduce this variety to a single interpretation even though it w ill obvi­ ously be necessary to find certain common points of reference. Indeed, to anticipate my conclusion, I believe that Japanese m ilitarism w hich gained a great deal from this m eaningful variety that w as pan-Asianism , tended, in the course of its headlong plunge into the Pacific W ar, to appropriate and reduce its m eaning to a single hegem onic one that elim inated alter­ native visions embedded in pan-Asianism that sought to redeem or re­ construct m odernity. W e can see differences in Japanese pan-Asianist thought even in the ear­ ly stages when we look at the ideas of Okakura Tenshin and his associates, for whom the construction of an alternative dvilizational foundation was of greatest im portance, and those, for instance, of Okawa Shüm ei, whose pan-Asianism w as backed by a strong nationalist im petus, as discussed in this volum e by Christopher Szpilman. Hashikawa Bunso has advised us that the use of pan-Asianism to further Japanese nationalism or im perial­ ism was probably as strong as the desire to basically strengthen Asia.6 hi China, too, pan-Asianist movements were numerous and strong in the first half of this century, but have been basically ignored in the historiog­ raphy. Here too there were significant differences. There were those "re­ demptive m odem societies" who believed that Eastern religions such as Confucianism , Buddhism, Taoism produced a common dvilizational, m oral, and spiritual fount in the different Asian countries. By turning to these religions, the m orally rejuvenated East would be able to redeem true modernity from the decadent W est. Som e of these sodeties, such as the M orality Sodety (Daodehui), the Red Swastika Sodety, the Dao Yuan, claim ed to have many m illions of follow ers; at the very least they had a much larger following than did the May Fourth sodeties and groups. They w ere engaged in philanthropy and m oral and religious education. Anoth-

6 Hashikawa Bunso, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Co­ prosperity," in The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Inter­ actions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 3 2855.

20

Opening Remarks: Empire in the A ge o f Nationalism

er kind of pan-Asianism that developed in China was based on Sun Yatsen's vision of the traditional "kingly w ay" (wangdao), the ideal of rule by moral suasion allegedly pursued by ancient emperors. The w ay in w hich Sun and his follow ers shaped düs pan-Asianism also incorporated a strong anti-im perialist dim ension, the ideological basis of a kind of united hont o f colonized nations. Yet another use of pan-Asianism in China was the rhetoric used by the Kuomintang state to appeal to die m inority peo­ ples on the peripheries of the Chinese nation to join the nation on the basis of their common brotherhood and anim osity toward im perialism .7 Despite these differences, it is clear that certain basic conditions had to emerge before such ideologies could flourish as they did. Pan-Asianism embodied an authenticity that was ironically located not in the nation but in a civilizational ideal. The idea that the m ost authoritative and authentic values arose not out of the nation but from a transnational, civilizational source w as, actually and very sim ply, an effort to m irror die source of au­ thority of W estern im perialism : the Christian and Enlightenm ent civiliza­ tion of Europe. W e shall defer the question of how nations com e to, or seek to, appropriate this civilizational authenticity until a later stage of our analysis. The interesting historical question that arises is w ith regards to when it becom es possible to assert that there is a plurality of civilizations. Through much of the M eiji period, die notion of civilization (bunmei/wenming) refers particularly to Enlightenm ent values as also in China for the period between 1900and 1920. It is around die tim e of die First W orld W ar when a European critique of m aterial civilization is also launched that a singular notion of civilization referring solely to Enlightenm ent values is perhaps decisively dethroned. And yet there w ere surely efforts to con­ struct an alternative Eastern civilization earlier (as w ith Okakura and Okawa). W as it perhaps based on a Christian vision of alternative civiliza­ tions that was m ore catholic than the Enlightenm ent conception? W hat role m ight die Congress of W orld Religions held in Chicago in 1893 played in constructing the foundations of plural civilizations? A t any rate, the se­ curing of die idea of a plurality of civilizations in the afterm ath of W orld W ar I has much to do w ith the emerging global force of nationalism . The transnational source of national authenticity, or in other w ords, die yearning of the nation to transcend its territorial lim its toward a transna­ tional ideal turns our attention to the second context: the growth of the he­ gemony of nationalist ideology over im perialist ideology. Fred Dickin­ son's paper in this volume speaks to the im portant role of Woodrow W ilson's doctrine of the right to self-determ ination in facilitating this tran7 Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicam ent o f Sovereignty, Mod em China 1900-1945," American H istorical Review (October 1997).

21

Praseniit D uara

sitíon. In addition, the support of the Soviet Union for nationalism s all over the colonized world as w ell as in addressing the national question w ithin the Soviet Union, played a significant role in this transform ation. As men* tioned above, this had the effect of elim inating the rhetorical justification for expansionism w ithout removing the territorial im perative to expan­ sion embedded in the nation-state. Consequently, I have suggested that new political forms appeared, and pan-Asianism was one such expression. As the transnational supplement of nationalism , pan-Asianism could, of course, be practically used for expansionism , but as the source of dvilizational authenticity it was always also som ething m ore than nationalism . Japanese im perialism both inherited and transform ed the relationship w ith pan-Asianism that had been developing interactively from the be­ ginning of the tw entieth century betw een various Japanese pan-Asianism s and mainland ones. On the (me hand, the m ilitarists, who dearly sought to extend Japanese national power, fostered and propagated these m ovements; on the other hand, they sought to appropriate these m ultioriented movements for the purposes of the m ilitary regim e during the Pacific W ar. Japanese pan-Asianism was welcomed or supported by many pan-A sianist groups in China and by many anti-W estern national­ ist movements in other Asian countries, such as in Indonesia and the In­ dian National Army led by Subhash Chandra Bose. In M anchukuo, for ex­ am ple, the puppet government of the Japanese m ilitary brought all of the different kinds of Chinese redem ptive sodeties, such as the M orality Sod ety and the Red Sw astika Sodety, under its aegis soon after it estab­ lished its power and assim ilated th a n into its pan-Asian vision of

wangdao. A t the tim e the Chinese redem ptive sodeties encountered the Man­ chukuo regim e, there was a rem arkable convergence o f ideological inter­ ests between them and certain currents in Japan. Sim ilar "redem ptive" so­ d eties in Japan, such as the Shibunkai, com bining Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to excessive m aterialism and individu­ alism , had begun to grow in strength from the 1920s, particularly as social unrest grew under w orsening econom ic conditions. A sian m oral system s em phasizing ethical responsibilities w ere celebrated as alternatives to capitalism and M arxism , both W estern doctrines. By the 1930s, the re­ dem ptive rhetoric of elite Confudan sodeties and the right w ing nation­ alist and m ilitarists not only began to com e together but w ere also assim ­ ilated in an active political and educational program by the Japanese government.8 8 W arren H. Sm ith, Confucianism in M odem Japan: A Study o f Conservatism in Ja­ pan's Intellectual H istory (Tökyö: The Hokuseido Press, 1959), 154r-66.

22

Opening Remarks: Empire in the Age o f Nationalism

Thus it was that Manchukuo state had at its disposal an ideology and language w ith which to forge an alliance w ith die redemptive societies in Northeast China. Under the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, these re­ demptive societies were prohibited and persecuted, largely because their religious and, often, popular religious orientation earned them die oppro­ brium of superstition and backwardness. Like the Kuomintang, the Man­ chukuo government censured die "superstitious" character of die redemp­ tive societies, but instead of seeking to eradicate the societies them selves, it saw in them the potential for their transform ation into state-controlled civ­ ic organizations. In this new political framework, the M orality Society be­ came what in Japanese was called a kyöka (jiaohua in Chinese) organiza­ tion—an agency engaged in w elfare and enlightenment of the people. W ere these Pan-Asianist societies then co-opted by the Japanese m ili­ tary? W as their redem ptive ideology w hich sought to produce a different society peopled by individuals engaged in spiritual and m oral cultivation and rejecting w hat they considered w ere the artificial boundaries of na­ tionality and ethnicity hijacked by the Japanese m ilitary and subordinat­ ed to (som eone else's) nationalist ends? I have studied the records of one of these societies—the M orality Society. W ithout going into the details, it is clear that the society got a chance to flourish as it had never had before under a regim e which professed to pursue its own goals of a Confucian m orality (wangdao) and "Eastern spirituality." Indeed, there appears to have been considerable cooperation and even enthusiasm am ong the ac­ tive m em bers of the society w ith the regim e's social and ethical goals. The personal narratives of the Chinese women lecturers of this society reveal some o f fhe m otives that led them to the M orality Society. Again and again, w e see the im portance of their faith in Buddhism and the way in which the M orality Society, which demanded a com m itm ent to public service to the point of self-sacrifice, had opened up this path of service to the w orld for women. For the first tim e, says one woman, women could, like m en, devote them selves to the social good. Once a woman had satis­ factorily served the in-law s, it was incum bent in the next phase to serve the w orld, in accordance w ith Buddhist teachings. A Mrs. Chen empha­ sizes not only the value of self-sacrifice that women had cultivated in the home, but how these values could purify the world once women engage in public service. This same woman later reveals the different ways in which her parents w ere good people and the way in which she could be a m orally pure person. Her parents w ere good people of a village or a county; she is a good citizen of the nation and the world.9 W hile there 9 Manzhouguo Daodehui bianjike, ed., Disanjie M anzhouguo Daodehui daode jiangxi yulu (Xinjing: Manzhouguo Daodehui H uijike, 1936).

23

Prasenjit D uara

w ere certainly instrum ental goals interm ixed in their narratives, I have—against the usual cynical view of pan-Asianism —presented this glim pse of som e subjectivities w hich were shaped by the pan-A sianist program s of the society and the state. And yet it is just as clear that when the chips began to fall, the regim e becam e m ore and m ore com mitted to its own interests and that of the Jap­ anese nation. Everywhere, in Indonesia as in M anchukuo, w hat initial en­ thusiasm there was for the new order and "co-prosperity" began to evap­ orate. Pan-Asianism had once stood for a yearning am ong nationals to transcend the confines of a system w hich their universalizing spiritual values could not sanction. Its co-em ergence w ith a nationalism devoted to rectifying the injustices of im perialism endowed it w ith a prom ise to build a new order beyond the nation. And yet in the end, it was the expansionist im perative w ithin nationalism that succeeded in reducing it to one of its political instrum ents w ith w hich it could expand its power under the rhetoric o f brotherhood. W hether or not the rhetoric of brotherhood itself would have yielded equal citizenship rights can never be fully known—although the very idea of köminka would suggest that som e ver­ sion was perhaps inevitable. In any event, that the rhetoric of A sian broth­ erhood could never be fully em ptied of m eaning is perhaps evident from tire essays in this volum e by Christopher Braddick and Joachim G laubitz, who dem onstrate the continued popular interest in China that pervaded Japan in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.

T he

IL A sia in J apan : D omestic F oundations of J apanese Imperialism

J apan ' s A sia in the P olitics of a N ew W orld O rder, 1914-19 Fred D ic k in so n

I n tro d u c tio n

The fall of the Berlin W all in 1989 ushered in a period of feverish specu­ lation regarding the shape of the post-Cold W ar world. Among the areas of debate has been the likely direction of the centerpiece of American strategy in Asia in the Cold W ar period, Japan. But analysts have had very little to guide their forecasts of Japanese foreign policy in the tw enty-first century. Academic studies of Japan in English offer a one-dim ensional portrait of Japanese decision-m aking in fite m odem era. W hile M eiji Japan's (1868-1912) founders are hailed for steering their country into the m odem age, in the foreign policy realm , they appear as pow erless pawns of inter­ national events. Highlighting Japan's "opening" to the W est at the barrel of a gun, diplom atic historians describe the country from the nineteenth century as forever disadvantaged on fite international stage.1 Prejudiced by the record of U .S.-Japanese relations after 1945, specialists of interna­ tional affairs speak of Japanese statesm en as "determ ined to follow " in­ ternational trends.2 Both of these im ages are, of course, a far cry from the w ell-established portrait in the popular literature in English and in Marx­ ist studies in Japan of aggressive Japanese im perialists set to conquer Asia, if not the world. W ithout stigm atizing m odem Japan's preem inent policym akers as un­ repentant im perialists, this paper aim s to restore a sense of agency to the academic discussion o f Japanese foreign policy. Japanese statesm en have neither been prim arily "victim s" nor predom inantly passive actors on the international stage. They have, rather, actively attem pted to shape their relations w ith the outer world.

1 Peter Duus goes so far as to argue that such disadvantages m erit the creation of a new theoretical category of im perialism for Japan, called "backward im perial­ ism ." See Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration o f Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 2 See Richard D. Leitch Jr., Akira Kato, and M artin E. W einstein, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World (W estport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 6.

27

Fred Dkkinson

This has been true especially of Japanese relations w ith Asia. Intellec­ tual historians have recently reminded us of the centrality of Asia in Jap­ anese efforts to shape a national identity in die m odem era. Harry Harootunian has highlighted the role of nativist scholars in transform ing a Sinocentric into a Japan-centric w orld in die eighteenth century.34And Stephan Tanaka has analyzed the conscious efforts of Japanese historians in the first half of the tw entieth century to establish Japanese leadership in Asia by locating China, or "shim ," w ithin a Japan-centric history of East A sia, or "töyöshi.”* As an intellectual construct, Asia becom es w ith these schol­ ars less an objective circum stance to w hich Japanese elites responded than a blank slate upon w hich those men fashioned their own image. Both Harootunian and Tanaka suggest that Japan's intellectual separa­ tion from China played an integral role in Japanese aggression on the con­ tinent in the 1930s. But intellectual transform ations alone do not precipi­ tate m ajor international events. Rather, Japanese statesm en actively aim ed to shape their relations w ith Asia in another arena m uch m ore direcdy related to diplom atic decision-m aking: politics. If the intellectual separation o f Japan from China laid the critical groundwork for Japanese aggression in the 1930s, it is the place of China in Japanese dom estic pol­ itics that had the greatest bearing upon Japan's specific foreign policy choices in the first half of die tw entieth century. This essay exam ines the place of Asia in Japanese politics during a piv­ otal event in the tw entieth century: W orld W ar I. W ith the distraction of the great powers to Europe after 1914, die G reat W ar becam e a tim e of in­ tensified Japanese diplom atic activity in Asia. The w ar also marked a crit­ ical turning point in the politics of Asia in Japan. U ntil 1918, Japan's pol­ icy-m aking elite spoke w ith one voice of the wisdom of strengthening Japanese influence on the Asian continent. And Japan's A sian, particular­ ly China, policy was a critical focus of its turbulent dom estic political batties. W ith the growth of die Japanese econom y and the American redefi­ nition of allied w ar aim s, however, die consensus upon continental expansion dissolved. The prim ary focus of political discussions, moreo­ ver, shifted to issues of political reform . The transform ation of die politics of China during die first great political, econom ic, social, and ideological watershed of die tw entieth century would have a profound effect upon the direction of Japanese diplom acy in the interw ar period. It should also

3 Harry D. Harootunian, "The Functions o f China in Tokugawa Thought," in The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 9-36. 4 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s O rient: Rendering Pasts into H istory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 28

tapan's A sia in the Politics o f a New World Order. 1914-19

bear lessons for Japanese foreign policy after the final turning point of the century, the end of the Cold W ar.

T h e D om estic C o n text o f J apan ese I m perialism

Diplom atic historians describe die origins of Japanese im perialism in Asia prim arily in die context of national defense. As one renowned specialist argues, Japanese em pire-building in the nineteenth century marked "an entirely reasonable approach to security in an era when much of the world and m ost of Asia seemed divided up betw een the pow ers."5 But unlike China, after three bombardm ents of the Satsum a and Chöshü d o­ mains in the 1860s, the great pow ers never physically menaced Japan. On the contrary, Japanese policym akers enjoyed virtually a free hand to con­ struct their own em pire in Asia unimpeded. N or was foreign policy the prim ary concern of Japanese statesm en in the nineteenth century. Rather, after having forced over two and a half centuries of feudal rule to a close, they faced the m uch m ore form idable task of m olding a m odem unified nation state from over 270 autonomous feudal domains. The prim ary context of nineteenth century Japanese im perialism , in other w ords, is not the international balance of power but the dom estic context of nation-building. W ithin that framework, Japanese expansion in Asia appears less an exercise in national security than in national self-def­ inition. M odem Japan's founders engaged China in w ar in 1894 not to protect from im m inent invasion. They did so to becom e a great power. A t a tim e when a foothold in China had becom e a benchm ark of national power, Japanese leaders chose m ore than sim ple survival. They aim ed, in the words of famed educator Fukuzawa Yukichi, to becom e the "leader of A sia."6

T he P o litic s o f A sia

in I m peria l J apan

If the quest to becom e "leader of A sia" served to define the Japanese na­ tion, it also becam e the basic adhesive of Japanese politics. The disparate political forces that cam e to com prise the M eiji state coalesced for the first 5 Marius Jansen, "Japanese Im perialism: Late M eiji Perspectives," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon M yers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 76. 6 Kimitada M ina, "Fukuzawa Yukichi's 'Departure from A sia': A Prelude to the Sino-Japanese W ar", in Japan's M odem Century, ed. Edmund R. Skrzypczak (Tökyö: Sophia University, 1968), 25.

29

F ra i D ickinson

tim e w ith Japan's spectacular victories over China in 1895/ And Japanese statesm en came to regard a vigorous pursuit of rights in Asia as an inte­ gral component of their political mandate. The failure to secure Japanese rights—such as the inability to obtain all of Sakhalin Island or a w ar in­ dem nity after the Russo-Japanese W ar—guaranteed widespread criti­ cism , even violent p rotest Japanese policym akers in 1914, then, unani­ mously welcomed the w ar in Europe as an opportunity to strengthen Japanese rights in Asia. Although pursued by men of different political stripes, all m ajor foreign policy initiatives undertaken during the war sought to fulfill this aim. A consensus upon continental expansion, however, did not mark the end of politics in Japan. On the contrary, one of the distinguishing char­ acteristics of the M eiji polity was political turbulence. For m odem Japan's founders created a political system incapable of regulating com peting de­ mands am ong the new class of elites. Instead o f assuring the hegemony of the architects of the new system as intended, full sovereignty in an em­ peror who did not actually rule guaranteed a perpetual jockeying for po­ sition among would-be policym akers: the elder statesm en, m embers of the civilian and m ilitary bureaucracies, and, increasingly in the tw entieth century, members of Japan's rising political parties. If the pursuit of lead­ ership in Asia w as a given in Taishö era (1912-26) politics, then, Asian, particularly China affairs, were a central locus of the turbulent political battles that w ere a legacy o f the M eiji polity. Like the more celebrated po­ litical campaigns against oligarchic rule and for universal manhood suf­ frage, tiie quest for leadership in Asia becam e a critical com ponent o f the turbulent struggle for power am ong Japanese elites in Taishö Japan.

T he T w enty -O ne D em ands and F oreign M in istry S uprem acy

Japan's prim ary foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis Asia during the Great W ar have been the subject of m eticulous research. The Twenty-One De­ mands, the movement to depose Chinese president Yuan Shikai, the Nishihara loans, and the Siberian Intervention have been highlighted pri­ m arily for their significance in the history of Japanese diplom acy. But each initiative had an explicitly dom estic political com ponent as w ell. As such, they reveal Japanese policym akers as less slave to international7

7 For an illustration of the evolution of national sym bols and surge of national sentim ent during the Sino-Japanese W ar, see Carol Gluck, Japan's M odem M yths: Ideology in the Late M eiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 8 8 89; 135-36.

30

Japan's Asia in the Politics o f a New World Order, 1914-19

events than active architects o f their own destiny. They ate, in short, clear representations less of the strategic pull than of the political push of pol­ icy-m aking vis-à-vis Asia in Taishö Japan. The list of negotiating points presented by Japan to Beijing in January 1915 and known derisively as die 'Tw enty-O ne Dem ands" enjoys a prom inent place in the history of Japanese foreign policy. Together w ith the Siberian Intervention of 1918, historians regularly describe the de­ mands as a critical step in Japan's eventual m arch to w ar against China in the 1930s.8 But w hile the initiative did play a critical role in die rise of Chi­ nese nationalism and turned the favor of American President W oodrow W ilson against Japan, its prim ary im port in the history of m odem Japan lies not in its lessons for Japanese diplom acy. Rather, the demands offer one of the clearest dem onstrations of the political significance of Asia, particularly China, in Im perial Japan. Appeals for a com prehensive agreement with China flooded the Okuma Shigenobu adm inistration (April 1914—October 1916) from all quar­ ters at the outbreak of the Great W ar. Analyses of Japanese foreign policy during this period tend to stress the com plicity of the m ost extrem e ele­ ments in Japanese politics in the formulation of die demands.9 But the Black Dragon Society was only one among a wide assem bly of more or­ thodox foreign policy actors in the fall of 1914 pressing for a thorough ne­ gotiation of Japanese rights. The num ber of these petitions indicates the overwhelming political momentum for continental expansion in Japan in 1914. They reveal, as w ell, the degree to which most negotiating item s as eventually formulated by Foreign M inister Katö Takaaki were accepted as a m atter of course in Tökyö. Indeed, w hile the demands appeared for the first tim e as one package, none were remarkable in the context of previous Japanese approaches to Beijing or of the accepted rules of great power com petition in China since the Sino-Japanese W ar.10 Katö Takaaki titled his negotiating instructions, in fact, "Solution of Pending Problem s."11

* See, for exam ple, Toyama Shigeki, Im ai Seiichi, Fujiwara Akira, ShOwashi (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 7. 9 Both M arius Jansen and Usui Katsumi stress the com plicity of Uchida Ryöhei and the Black Dragon Society in the form ulation of the demands. See M arius Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Y at-sen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 180; Usui Katsumi, Nihon to Chügoku: Taishö jidai (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1972), 58-60. >0For a detailed analysis of the routine character of the Twenty-One Demands in the context of great power com petition in China since the Sino-Japanese W ar, see Fred Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 19141919 (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, forthcom ing), chapter III. 11 Itö M asanori, Katö Takaaki, 2 vols. (Tökyö: Katö Haku Denki Hensan Iinkai, 1929), II, 155.

31

Fred D ickinson

And even Yoshino Sakuzö, who would becom e the m ost ardent advocate of democracy in Im perial Japan, would describe the initiative as the "bare m inim um " necessary.12 Even as they expose the pow erful political m omentum for a strong China policy in Tökyö, the Twenty-One Demands reveal China policy as a central arena for the basic struggle for pow er in Taishö Japan. That struggle had exploded in full force in 1913 when for the first tim e in the history of Im perial Japan a coalition of political parties had toppled an oligarchic cabinet. The Taishö political crisis, as this event is know n, re­ vealed the bankruptcy of oligarchic politics less than tw enty years after their form al institutionalization. And the subsequent cabinet of Adm iral Yam am oto Gonnohyôe (February 1913—A pril 1914) exacerbated politi­ cal tensions by prom oting the interests of the m ajority Seiyükai party and the navy against m em bers of the pow erful m ilitary-bureaucratic Yam agata faction. The Twenty-One Demands deserve a place in Japanese political history as prom inent as the Taishö political crisis or the Yamamoto cabinet. For in his decisive control of both the substance and tim ing o f negotiations w ith China, foreign m inister and president of the Döshikai party, Baron Katö Takaaki, handily outmaneuvered the three m ost pow erful contenders for power in Taishö Japan: the elder statesm en (genrö), the arm y, and the Sei­ yükai. The Twenty-One Demands are im portant not as evidence of esca­ lating continental am bitions in Tökyö but as a decisive victory for cabinet and Foreign M inistry suprem acy in the m aking of foreign policy. Since their creation of the m echanisms of a m odem state in the 1880s, m odem Japan's founders had w ielded decisive control in the shaping of Japan's dom estic and foreign policies. W hile after the turn of the century they no longer enjoyed a direct hand in policy-m aking as official members of the cabinet, in their capacity as elder statesm en, these m en continued to exert a pow erful influence. Field M arshal Yamagata Aritom o, in particu­ lar, used a vast netw ork of supporters in the civilian and m ilitary bu­ reaucracies (the Yamagata faction) to exercise a commanding voice after the death of his chief oligarchic rival, Itö Hirobumi. Foreign M inister Katö utilized Japan's China policy first to take aim at the lingering power of the genrö. W hile the elder statesm en expected to participate in the im portant policy-m aking process at a tim e of national crisis, Katö seized the opportunity of war in Europe to entirely exclude the genrö from decision-m aking. Katö single-handedly orchestrated a cab12 Yoshino Sakuzö, N isshi köshöron (Tökyö: Keiseiron, 1915), 255-56; cited in Mitani Taichirö, Shinpan Taishö demokurashii: Yoshino Sakuzö no jidai (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), 156.

32

¡m arts A sia in the Politics o f a New W orld Order. 1914-19

inet decision for w ar against Germ any on 7 August and inform ed die elder statesm en of the decision, and of a proposed ultim atum to Germ a­ ny, only after the fact. He ignored genrö advice in Septem ber to send a spe­ cial envoy to negotiate a com prehensive agreem ent w ith China, but chose instead to pursue his own agenda via the Foreign M inistry representative in Beijing die follow ing January. Japan's generals had becom e a pow erful political force after die m ili­ tary victories over China and Russia. The Im perial Army had surged from thirteen to nineteen divisions after the Russo-Japanese W ar and had begun to com pete w ith the Foreign M inistry in China by creating a netw ork o f its own representatives throughout the A sian continent. This netw ork attem pted, unsuccessfully, to intervene in the Chinese revolu­ tion in 1911.13 But Japan's generals view ed the outbreak of w ar in 1914 as another opportunity to advance arm y pow er via m ilitary operations on die continent. Foreign M inister Katö had hoped to deprive the arm y of such a chance by arranging for the peaceful transfer to Japan of Germ an concessions in Shandong.14 But having failed to avoid a m ilitary cam­ paign, Katö m oved sw iftly after the Eighteenth D ivision's seizure of the German fortress at Qingdao in Novem ber 1914 to defuse arm y momen­ tum by replacing operational troops w ith occupation forces. To avert army interference in subsequent negotiations w ith China for a com pre­ hensive agreem ent, Katö delayed the start of talks until these occupa­ tional troops assum ed their place.15 And after discussions began in Jan­ uary 1915, he doggedly deflected the arm y's bid for m ilitary action against China. Since its creation in 1900, the Seiyukai party had boasted the greatest political strength in the Im perial Diet. Its president, Hara Takashi, more­ over, had steadily expanded party influence to the House of Peers, the ci­ vilian bureaucracy and to Japanese colonial government. Katö used his command of the nation's im portant China policy to deal as resolutely with his greatest political party rival as w ith the genrö (elder statesm en) and arm y. He refused to entertain queries in the Thirty-fifth D iet (7-25 December 1914) regarding his plans for Sino-Japanese relations. And he

13 For details, see Kitaoka Shin'ichi, Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978), 93-96. 14 Itö, Katö Takaaki, U, 83-85. To give Berlin am ple tim e to capitulate w ithout a fight, Katö set an ultim atum deadline of seven days, rather than the custom ary 48 hours. 15 Governor-General o f Korea, General Terauchi Masatake, would lam ent K atö's failure to begin negotiations before the withdrawal of operational troops from Shandong. Tanaka G iichi kankei monjo, Terauchi to Tanaka, 27 January 1915 (Kensei Shiryö Shitsu, N ational Diet Library, Tökyö).

33

Fred D ickinson

convened the Diet early and orchestrated an early dissolution to prevent Seiyükai interference w ith his discussions w ith President Yuan. Finally, he hoped that successful talks in Beijing would facilitate a Döshikai vic­ tory in the upcoming general election. W hile the negotiations dragged on as Japanese voters w ent to the polls, the Döshikai w ould, nonetheless, shatter the Seiyükai's fifteen year D iet m ajority in M arch 1915. Katö pursued talks with China in 1915, then, in an attempt both to define Japan's position in Asia and his own political position at home. He was so successful on both counts that he transformed tire Japanese political canvas. Before the war, the confrontation between the expanding Seiyükai and the primary casualty of its advances, the Yamagata faction, had marked die chief political drama of Imperial Japan. But by decisively commanding the approaches to China, Katö emerged as the preeminent policymaker in Tökyö. Field Marshal Yamagata would soon abandon his campaign to de­ stroy the Seiyükai to concentrate upon the more formidable task of sup­ pressing Katö. He would twice assemble the group of four remaining genrö to pressure Okuma, first to exclude the foreign m inister from the policy­ making process, then to remove him from office.16 Meanwhile, Tanaka Giichi, then major general, bemoaned the low "authority of the m ilitary vis-àvis the Foreign M inistry."17 "There is little hope," he grieved, "for applica­ tion of the principle that peace can be preserved through arm s."18 On Yamagata's command, Tanaka worked to nudge from office War M inister Oka Ichinosuke, whose cooperation with Katö according to Yamagata pre­ sented an "obstacle to the progress of national business."19 As for Katö's chief political party rival, Seiyükai President Hara Takashi complained bit­ terly of the political effect of the foreign m inister's initiatives. The declara­ tion of war against Germany, he suspected, aimed to "buttress the cabinet by directing public sentiment outward."20 And the m ilitary pressure applied

16 At the 24 Septem ber 1914 meeting with Prem ier Okuma, the genrö commanded Okuma to make the fundam ental decisions in foreign policy him self in consul­ tation with the genrö, after which he was to "com pel the foreign m inister to obey th is." Tokutomi Iichirö, ed., Köshaku Yamagata Aritomo den, 3 vols. (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1969), III, 912. At the 25 June 1915 meeting with Okuma, the elder states­ men would call directly for the removal of Katö from office. Itö, Katö Takaaki, II, 48; Yamagata hoped, as well, to "destroy the D öshikai." Hara Keiichirö, ed., Hara Takashi ntkki, 6 vols. (Tökyö: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), IV, 100 (18 May 1915) (hereafter, cited as Hara nikki). 17 Terauchi M asatake kankei monjo 315-32, Tanaka to Terauchi, 20 January 1915 (Kensei Shiryö Shitsu, National Diet Library, Tökyö). 18 Terauchi m onjo 315-34, Tanaka to Terauchi, 3 February 1915. 19 Ibid. 20 Hara nikki, IV, 26 (14 August 1914).

34

Japan's Asia in the Politics o f a New World Order, 1914-19

on China on the eve of the general election was "not external but internal di­ plomacy."21

R em oving Y uan S hdcai A broad an d th e E n em ies o f M ilita ry B ureaucratic R ule a t H om e

Fortunately for Yam agata, Katö left the Okuma cabinet w ith Home Min­ ister Oura Kanetake in August 1915 after the latter was accused of buy­ ing votes for arm y expansion. But the foreign m inister's resignation did not end the political jockeying that had greeted the outbreak of w ar in Europe. On the contrary, Japan's next m ajor China policy initiative, the m ovement to depose Chinese President Yuan Shikai in the spring of 1916, becam e the next conspicuous attem pt to reorder pow er relations at home. The policy to depose Yuan began as a m odest w arning to the Chinese president in O ctober 1915 not to reintroduce im perial rule in China. In light of the dom estic unpopularity of the May 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties that w ere the product of the Twenty-One Demands, Yuan hoped to but­ tress his own power by donning the robes of the august form er occupants of the dragon throne. The reshuffled Okuma cabinet issued the October warning on the grounds that such an initiative would bring civil chaos to China and threaten "peace in the Far East."22 But Yuan's actions w ere less critical as a threat to stability in Asia than as a challenge to Japanese cab­ inet and Foreign M inistry claim s to be the preem inent foreign policy de­ cision-m akers in Japan. Foreign M inister Katö, as w e have seen, had used a powerful demon­ stration of Japanese leadership in China to establish cabinet and Foreign M inistry suprem acy. But there w ere im mediate signs of the lim its to Jap­ anese leadership. No sooner was an agreem ent w ith Beijing concluded than Chinese authorities began capitalizing upon loopholes in the May treaties to fortify their own position in M anchuria.23 Yuan's proposed as­ sumption of the em perorship offered further proof of the lim its of Japa21 Tôkyô A sahi Shinbun, 23 M arch 1915,2. Katö had relented in march to a tempo­ rary expansion of Japanese m ilitary presence in Shandong by overlapping the fresh and old troops during the regular troop rotation period. But he continued to refuse arm y appeals for m ilitary action. 22 Foreign M inistry text of warning to Yuan; Gaimushö, ed., Nihon gaikO bunsho: T aishôjidai, 36 vols. (Tökyö: Gaimushö, 1964-87), 1915, II, 99-100. 23 Claim ing that under article five of the South M anchuria, Eastern Inner M ongolia Treaty Japanese civilians in Manchuria were now legally covered under Chinese police law , the Chinese government in July advised the removal of Japanese po­ lice stations in Chouyang in Liaoyuan county. In the beginning of October, the

35

Fred D ickinson

nese power. Evidence o f weakness in China raised doubts about the abil­ ity of the architects of the M ay treaties to effectively conduct Japan's foreign policy. W hile they had little bearing upon stability in A sia, then, Yuan's actions im pinged directly upon the political survival of the Okuma cabinet. Justice M inister Ozaki Yukio, author of a Novem ber cabinet resolution to w ithhold recognition of a Yuan m onarchy, w orried that the "arm y clique" would use Yuan's dem onstration of strength to destroy the cabinet.24 As a journalist close to the Foreign M inistry inform ed SeiyQkai president Hara Takashi, the decision to w arn Yuan aim ed to avoid the criticism that Okuma was a "stooge" of the Chinese president.25 The m odest warning to Yuan not to introduce im perial rule w ould evolve by M arch 1916 into a hostile attem pt to depose the Chinese presi­ dent. Like Prem ier Okuma in O ctober, the prim ary architect of the new plan, Tanaka G iichi, now lieutenant general and vice chief of the Army General Staff, would describe the notably m ore aggressive posture in term s of security in East Asia. Yuan's inability to suppress dom estic op­ position, he noted, threatened "peace in the Far East."26 But, as w ith the October cabinet decision, the evidence in the held in M arch 1916 pointed to Yuan's strength, not weakness. Tanaka aggressive­ ly solicited cabinet support for a cam paign to depose the Chinese presi­ dent after reports from general staff representatives in China noted Yuan's likely success in suppressing dom estic rebellion.27 As in O ctober, the Chinese president's actions threatened less peace in Asia or Japanese security titan the cabinet's public im age. A Chinese show of strength, Tan­ aka com plained bitterly in January, was equivalent to "ig n o rin g ] the face

Japanese press reported Chinese claim s to their form er legal rights over Korean residents in Jiandao, near the Sino-Korean border. This directly contradicted a 13 August Japanese cabinet declaration that the new treaties superseded the Jiandao Treaty o f 1909, which had assigned legal dominion to China; see Usui Katsum i, "N anm an, Tömö jöyaku no seiritsu zengo," in Tai-ManmO seisakushi no ichimen, ed. Kurihara Ken fTökyö: Hara Shobö, 1966), 126-27. 24 In an extraordinary cabinet session called on 3 November to discuss Yuan's in­ transigence; Hara nikki, IV, 142 (6 November 1915). 25 Ibid., 136 (14 October 1915). 26 Hamaomote M atasuke m onjo, no. 15, Tanaka to Banzai, 17 January 1916; in "Hamaom ote M atasuke m onjo," comp. Yamaguchi Toshiaki, in Kindai Nihon to higashi A jia, ed. Kindai Nihon Kenkyükai (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1980), 221-22. 27 Advisor to the Hubei Regular Army, Colonel Teranishi Hidetake, for exam ple, informed General Staff Second Division C hief Fukuda Masataró on 1 February that if the Japanese government did not decide by mid-month to tacitly support the revolutionary party in China, "the probability that Yuan pacifies Yunnan and establishes im perial government is great;" Hamaomote m onjo, no. 27, Teranishi to Fukuda, 1 February 1916, in ibid., 230.

36

Japan’s A sia in the Politics o f a New W orld Order, 1914-19

of Japan."28 M ore specifically, it jeopardized Tanaka and die Im perial Ar­ m y's new centrality in Japan's foreign policy decision m aking. Indeed, Tanaka's orchestration of die movement to depose Yuan repre­ sented a m ajor shift in the locus of policy-m aking in Japan. W hile he had served as foreign m inister, Katö Takaaki had, as w e have seen, excluded Tanaka and his fellow generals from any role in the m aking of foreign pol­ icy. By January 1916, however, after K atö's resignation and his own pro­ m otion to vice chief of the general staff, Tanaka had w rested control of Ja­ pan's continental policy horn die inexperienced new foreign m inister, Ishii Kikujirö. He had done so by com manding the netw ork of Japanese army representatives that had been established in China after die RussoJapanese W ar.29 Tanaka form ulated his China policy to be highly advantageous to die Im perial Army. Echoing arm y am bitions at the tim e of die 1911 Chinese revolution, he called not sim ply for the elim ination of Yuan Shikai but for a m ajor expedition of Japanese troops to China in the nam e o f containing civil w ar.30 Yuan's suppression o f rebellion in south China in the spring of 1916, then, threatened not sim ply to nullify Japanese cabinet support for rebellion. It jeopardized the potentially enorm ous political benefits to the army of a m ajor m ilitary cam paign on the continent.

T he N bh ih a r a L o a n s an d T erauchi S uprem acy

Tanaka's plan for a m ajor expedition of Japanese troops to China evapo­ rated w ith the death of Yuan Shikai in June. The failure of his schem e, like evidence in the fall of 1915 of serious leaks in the Sino-Japanese treaties, offered the occasion for another m ajor reorganization of pow er relations in Tökyö. The Terauchi M asatake cabinet em erged in October 1916 as an attem pt by the Yam agata faction to restore the waning power of m ilitarybureaucratic rule. General Terauchi stood second in command in the fac­ tion and fashioned a "transcendental" governm ent divorced from all par­ ty affiliation.

28 Hamaomote m onjo, no. 15, Tanaka to Banzai, 17 January 1916, in ibid., 221-22. 29 Among the key army representatives in the field through whom Tanaka briefly commanded Japan's approaches to China were Lieutenant General Aoki N orizumi, Lieutenant Colonel Taga M uneyuki, Colonel Banzai Rihachirö, and Colo­ nel Teranishi Hidetaka. 30 See the series of letters between Tanaka and representatives of the army general staff in China in Hamaomote monjo: nos. 41 (Tanaka to Banzai, March 1916), 61 (Tanaka to M orioka, May 1916)^64 (Tanaka to Aoki, 20 May 1916), in ibid., 239, 253,255.

37

Fred D ickinson

The public reacted angrily to this first non-affiliated cabinet since the Taishö political crisis."31 But the chief political drama of the Terauchi years transpired not betw een the soldier-prem ier and the cham pions of representative government. Terauchi diffused the political pressure in the D iet by coopting som e of its leaders in a new deliberative body, the Ad­ visory Council on Foreign A ffairs. The greatest political challenge to the new prem ier, rather, cam e from w ithin the Yamagata friction itself. W hile he owed his prem iership to factional patriarch Yam agata, Terauchi had indicated upon assum ing office that he would not be bound by the field m arshal's com mands.32 Rather than welcome Yamagata associate Hirata Tösuke to the new governm ent, the general granted the pivotal post of vice prem ier to H irata rival Gotö Shinpei. And follow ing a pattern since die end of the Russo-Japanese W ar, Terauchi, to Yam agata's great sur­ prise, assigned budget priority to the navy. One of Terauchi's m ost conspicuous attem pts to throw his political w eight was in the arena of China affairs. Follow ing the advise of Gotö and others, the new prem ier distinguished him self from his predecessor via a declaration of change in Japan's approaches to China. The M arch 1916 cabinet decision to depose Yuan Shikai had been kept from the public. Terauchi now exposed the conspiracy and vowed, in his first official state­ m ent on China in January 1917, to refrain from interfering in the country's internal affairs.33 The Nishihara loans, w hich would becom e the centerpiece of Tera­ uchi's China policy, would hardly constitute non-interference in Chinese dom estic politics. Prem ier Duan Q irui would make full use of Japanese largesse to subdue his political enem ies. But as an exercise in financial di­ plom acy, die loans are justifiably noted by historians as a departure from die m ilitary schem es of Tanaka G iichi. They also reflected the new finan­ cial power enjoyed by Japan. Thanks to the expansion o f m arkets for Jap­ anese arm s, shipping, and textiles since the outbreak of w ar, Japan en­

31 Osaka M ainichi Shinbun, 6 October 1916; in Terauchi M asatake naikaku kankei shiryO, ed. Yamamoto Shirö, 2 vols. (Kyöto: Kyöto Joshi Daigaku, 1985), 1,441. 32 During discussions with Prem ier Okuma in July 1916 over an eventual transfer of power, Terauchi had informed Yamagata that he was no longer a child, and could not, therefore, listen to everything that the elder statesm an said. Oka Yoshitake, ed., Taishö dem okurashiiki no seiji: M atsumoto Gökichi seiji nisshi (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1957), 13 (19 July 1916 diary entry). 33 Gaimushö, Nihon gaikö nenpyö narabi ni shuyö bunsho, 1840-1945,2 vols. (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1965), 1,424-27. 38

Japan's Asia in the Politics o f a New World Order, 1914-19

joyed a balance of paym ents surplus by 1916 for the first tim e in its history.34 But Terauchi and deputy N ishihara Kam ezö devised the new loan pol­ icy not sim ply to utilize the new foreign policy instrum ent at their dispos­ al. The January declaration of change may not have signalled a genuine shift to non-interference in Chinese dom estic affairs. But it did m ark a substitution of the chief foreign policy actors. Tanaka G iichi, as we have seen, had, since January 1916, monopolized the approaches to China by directing members of the arm y general staff in the held. If he hoped to wield any authority in the foreign policy arena, Terauchi had to neutralize this im pressive network of Tanaka subordinates. Indeed, the new pre­ m ier's advisors w ere unanimous in their counsel that Tanaka be removed from the position of vice chief of the arm y general staff.35 Sim ple cabinet declarations had no effect upon the vice chief's clandes­ tine operations. The ökum a regim e, after all, had budgeted monies after Yuan Shikai's death to dissolve the m ilitary operations aimed at deposing the Chinese president. But these funds had been diverted by the same men who had orchestrated the anti-Yuan plot to schem es against the new regim e of Duan Q irui in Beijing.36 Nor did General Terauchi, serving as prem ier outside of the m ilitary chain of command, enjoy any authority over operational planning in the General Staff. The new prim e m inister vowed, therefore, to m aneuver around Tanaka's network via a policy that he could hope to command: financial diplom acy. The Nishihara loans, in other w ords, reflected not only the availability of a new instrum ent of di­ plomacy. They marked a specific attem pt by Terauchi to outflank the net­ w ork of continental m ilitary advisors that Vice C hief of the General Staff

34 By 1916, Japan had transform ed a consistent annual balance of payments deficit from 1903, which had reached 106.6 m illion yen in 1913, to a healthy excess of 604.7 m illion yen. Kazushi Ohkawa and M iyohei Shinohara, eds., Patterns o f Jap­ anese Economic Development: A Q uantitative Appraisal (New Haven: Yale Univer­ sity Press, 1979), 334. 35 This included Gotö Shinpei, Communications M inister Den Kenjirö and Chöshü elder M iura Gorö, who spoke of Tanaka as "the epitom e of the China problem ." For Gotö, see Terauchi m onjo 27-50, Gotö to Terauchi, 3 October 1916. For Den, see Hora nikki, IV, 224 (12 October 1916). For M iura, see Hara nikki, 229 (5 No­ vember 1916). Miura also informed Terauchi of a consensus among party lead­ ers Hara and Inukai, and Itö M iyoji on the need to remove Tanaka; Terauchi monjo 441-46, "M iura shishaku danwa yöryö (12 October 1916)," in Yamamoto, Terauchi naikaku shiryO, 1 ,187. Den and Hirata Tösuke agreed in a discussion in November on the advisability o f dism issing the vice chief of staff; Den Kenjirö nikki, 17 November 1916, in Yamamoto, Terauchi naikaku shiryô, 1 ,146. 36 Terauchi m onjo 2 0 8 -1 5 ,1 6 ,1 7 , Nishihara to Terauchi, 2 4 ,2 6 ,2 9 December 1916, in Yamamoto, Terauchi naikaku shiryô, 1 ,160-166,169-171.

39

Fred D ickinson

Tanaka G iichi had used to m onopolize die approaches to China under Prem ier Okuma.37 The m ost exciting drama of die Nishihara loans, dien, unfolded not across the negotiating table betw een Nishihara and m embers of the Duan regim e, but betw een die tw o chief contenders for foreign policy leader in die Terauchi regim e, N ishihara Kam ezö and Tanaka G iichi. Tanaka was able to foil N ishihara's first attem pts to establish ties betw een Terauchi and Duan.38 And he aim ed during a personal m ission to China in the spring of 1917 to secure the political suprem acy of President Li Yuanhong, w ith whom die General Staff had developed a close rapport, over the recently deposed Prem ier Duan.39 But by July, Duan would establish decisive m ilitary control in Beijing. And via 200 m illion yen in loans to the Chinese prem ier, Terauchi and deputy Nishihara would finally control Japan's approaches to China.

S iberia

an d th e

R evitalizatio n

of

A rm y

an d

E m pire

In die first half of die Terauchi regim e, then, Tanaka and the Im perial Army w ere rendered as pow erless in the prosecution of Japan's continen­ tal aim s as they had been at the hands of Katö Takaaki in 1915. Added to the budget priority that Prem ier Terauchi continued to grant the navy, this represented a hum iliating loss of political power. By 1917, however, there appeared an even m ore serious challenge to arm y authority: the fundam ental transform ation of the world order. H istorians of Europe and the United States have long recognized the transform ing effects of the G reat W ar in their respective countries. Unlike the m ain European belligerents, Japan's w artim e experience was, of course, less one o f destruction than of production. The Japanese econom y thrived as its industries filled wartim e orders from the allies and entered new m arkets opened by the w ithdraw al of European pow er from Asia. 37 Terauchi had directly confronted Tanaka in early October for his reckless schemes on the continent. Hara nikki, IV, 223 (11 October 1916). But in response to Miura G orö's petitions in early November to remove the vice chief of staff from power, the prem ier suggested that “there is another m eans;" Hara nikki, IV, 229 (5 November 1916). 38 Specifically, Nishihara suspected the hand of General Staff officer Aoki N orizumi in the Chinese Guom indang's refusal to sanction the dispatch of a specialChinese envoy from the new Duan Qirui government in Beijing to Tökyö in No­ vem ber 1915; Terauchi monjo 208-13, Nishihara to Terauchi, 12 December 1916, in Yamamoto, Terauchi m ikaku shiryö, 1 ,155-56. 39 See Takakura Tetsuichi, Tanaka G iichi denki, 2 vols. (Tökyö: Tanaka G iichi Denki Kankökai, 1958), 1,653-58.

40

layan's A sia in the Politics o f a New W orld Order. 1914-19

But w hile devastating hum an and m aterial losses transform ed European politics and society, econom ic grow th had profound social and political consequences in Japan. M ost conspicuous was die rise of private industry and capital and the explosion of labor unrest. Prim e M inister Terauchi de­ cried the new "w ind of luxury and frivolity" that now gripped Japan and considered the increasing frequency of work stoppages "m ost troubling." In October 1917, he urged an assem bly of police bureau chiefs to prom ote a mood o f "frugal industry and sim plicity" and a spirit o f loyalty and pa­ triotism .40 The transform ation of Japanese society w ithin was facilitated by a piv­ otal event without: the Am erican declaration of war. The United States entered the war in A pril 1917 seeking not m erely a resolution to the Eu­ ropean conflict. President W oodrow W ilson declared his intention to elim inate w ar for all tim e. To do so required a com plete transform ation of international politics. For the largest w ar the w orld had ever known, W il­ son held, had sprung from the m isguided practices of the "old diplom a­ cy :" from balances of power, the quest for em pire, the com petition for ar­ m aments, and international negotiations behind closed doors. To prevent the recurrence of another great w ar, the president proposed a cooperative international association o f states (a League o f N ations), the self-determ i­ nation of peoples, peaceful econom ic com petition, and open covenants. W ilson's rejection o f die "old diplom acy" was equivalent to a condem­ nation of the national trajectory of m odem Japan. For Japanese statesm en, like their European counterparts, had follow ed the practices of the "old diplom acy" in their quest for international respectability since the mid­ nineteenth century. The Am erican president's censure of Germ an "m ili­ tarism ," m oreover, translated in Tökyö into a condem nation of Japan's national polity. For m odem Japan's founders had followed the exam ple of Im perial Germ any in creating a highly centralized system of m ilitarybureaucratic rule. A fter having been hailed abroad for the m ilitary con­ quest of China in 1895 as the "pioneer o f progress in the O rient," then, Ja­ pan in 1917 suddenly appeared to stand upon the conservative side of world change. As Kenseikai orator Ozaki Yukio noted in a January 1918 interpolation in the D iet, "although the W estern allies are trying to de­ stroy m ilitarism , the Terauchi cabinet is trying, at home and abroad, to strengthen and protect it."41 It is this context of a fundam ental questioning of the world order and the Japanese state in which Japanese statesm en drafted plans for the last great foreign policy initiative of the war: the Siberian Intervention. Anal40 Oka Yoshitake, Tenkanki no TaishO (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1969), 89. 41 Otsu Junichiro, Dai Nihon kenseishi, 10 vols. (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1970), VIH, 163-64.

41

Fred D ickinson

yses of the intervention typically discuss it w ithin the context of a trans­ form ation in the balance of power in the Russian Far East.42 The Russian revolution of 1917 produced a political vacuum in Siberia and threatened the spread of Bolshevik power. Indeed, allied governments proposed a joint expedition to Vladivostok precisely to deal w ith the Bolshevik ad­ vance. But Japanese aim s in the Russian Far East in the fall of 1918 are less un­ derstandable in the context of a Bolshevik advance in Siberia than w ithin the framework of Japanese politics at home. They are less a response to an external threat than they are reflective of an unprecedented opportunity. As w e have seen, since the outbreak of w ar in Europe, Japanese policy­ m akers had enthusiastically seized the political momentum in Tökyö for a stronger Japanese position in Asia by prom oting ever m ore aggressive policies in China. The political vacuum in Siberia offered another great opportunity to advance Japanese continental interests. W ith the w ar winding down in Europe, m oreover, Japanese statesm en recognized the occasion as very likely the last such opportunity. As Japanese troops em­ barked for Vladivostok, Tanaka G iichi hailed the chance for a "display of national authority at the end of the w ar" as the "crow ning act of the Em­ p ire."43 But the opportunity for a m ajor expedition of troops to the Asian con­ tinent assumed particular significance in light of the social and political changes sparked in Japan by w artim e econom ic growth and A m erica's entrance into the war. To many, the rising popularity of m otion pictures and the Asakusa opera and the explosion of labor strife signalled social dissipation. W ilson's appeals to make the w orld "safe for dem ocracy," m oreover, played directly into the hands of the enem ies of m ilitary-bu­ reaucratic rule. M embers of the transcendental Terauchi cabinet, then, rel­ ished the opportunity presented by a new m ilitary cam paign on the con­ tinent to shore up the bases of m ilitary-bureaucratic rule. Finance M inister Shöda Kazue advised Terauchi in late January to "use relations w ith Russia to direct dom estic trouble outw ard."44 And Com m unications M inister Den Kenjirö insisted that, as with the Sino- and Russo-Japanese

42 See, for exam ple, the classic studies of the expedition, Hosoya Chihirö, Shiberia shuppei no shiteki kenkyü (Tokyo: Yûhikaku, 1955) and Jam es M orley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). W hile both men offer detailed analyses of policy battles in Tökyö, they describe the expedition prim arily as a reaction to the spread of Bolshevik power. 43 Takakura, Tanaka denki, II, 141-42. 44 Terauchi m onjo 297-20, Shöda to Terauchi, 30 January 1918, in Yamamoto, Tera­ uchi naikaku shiryö, II, 45.

42

Japan’s Asia in the Politics o f a New World Order, 1914-19

wars, w ith an expedition of troops to Siberia, "national opinion w ill uni* formly return to m ilitarism ."45 The likely political effects of an expedition to Siberia w ere particularly attractive to die Im perial Army. For, in addition to their loss of control of Japan's continental policy and continuing budget inferiority to the navy, Japanese econom ic grow th and W ilson's pronouncements directly chal­ lenged the raison d'être of Japan's generals. The surge of private capital produced decreasing w illingness to support large m ilitary expenditures. And W ilson's rejection of em pire and arm aments struck at the heart of a force that had been created in the 1880s to project Japanese power upon the A sian continent. The Im perial A rm y's founder, Yamagata Aritom o, not surprisingly, w orried about the arm y's loss of "public sym pathy" due to w artim e econom ic growth.46 And he objected fiercely to W ilson's vi­ sion of a new world order. "I w onder," he protested in M arch 1918, "if m ilitarism and im perialism are really so hateful?"47 Two weeks after the Am erican declaration of w ar, Vice Chief of the General Staff Tanaka G iichi inform ed Prem ier Terauchi of a grandiose plan to restore the slipping power of the Im perial Army. Conceived as a revision of the 1907 Basic Plan of National Defense that had served as the basic outline of m ilitary strategic planning, Tanaka's "D raft for Army Pre­ paredness" hoped to com m it both the navy and the governm ent to an un­ precedented program of expansion for the army.48 The problem w as how to justify the 57 percent increase in size of the standing army. It was precisely at this tim e, as the arm y scram bled to stem the contin­ uing erosion of its position vis-à-vis the governm ent and the navy, and when even its chief raison d'etre, continental em pire, had been called into question, that opportunity knocked in the Russian Far East. Confronted w ith Prem ier Terauchi's austerity, Tanaka's "D raft for Army Prepared­ ness" did not go anywhere after its subm ission in April 1917. By Septem ­ ber 1918, however, Japan's generals had committed the governm ent and the navy not only to the m obilization of ten divisions to Siberia. They had obtained sanction, as w ell, for Tanaka's colossal program for army expan­ sion. The Siberian Intervention, then, provided Yamagata and the general staff w ith tangible cause to re-anchor Japanese defense firm ly upon the

45 Hunt nikki, IV, 421 (26 July 1918). 46 The field m arshal worried particularly about the effects of the rice riots. Tokutomi Sohö kankei monjo 40-42, Yamagata to Tokutom i, 5 Septem ber 1918, in ltd Takashi et al., eds., Tokutomi Sohö kankei monjo, 3 vols. (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1985), II, 395. 47 Yamagata, "Jikyoku iken (15 March 1918)," in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, comp. Oyama Azusa (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1966), 360. 48 Kitaoka, Nihon rikugun, 326.

43

Fred D ickinson

continent and to justify an enorm ous expansion of arm y power.49 A fter having been displaced by the financial diplom acy of Nishihara Kamezö, Yam agata and Tanaka succeeded, as w ell, in steering their w ay back to the center o f foreign policy decision-m aking via the restoration o f a m ili­ tary solution to Japan's continental interests.

D issolution

of a

C on sen sus o n A rm y

an d

E m pire

If the Siberian intervention offers a glim pse of the continuing political po­ tential of expansion in A sia, it also m arks, nonetheless, a turning point in the politics of Asia in Taishö Japan. The expedition may have advanced the dom estic position of Yam agata and the Im perial Army in the imme­ diate term . But it did nothing to address the long-term threat to m ilitarybureaucratic power posed by econom ic grow th and Woodrow W ilson's appeals for dem ocracy and internationalism . Like m embers of the Terauchi cabinet, Yam agata had hoped that a m ajor m ilitary operation on the continent would help stem the dissipation in public consciousness spurred by econom ic change and W ilson's pronouncements. A t a tim e when peaceful coexistence had becom e the catch phrase of the day, the field m arshal insisted that the w ar had proven, rather, the im portance of arm aments. "The Great European W ar," he observed in June 1918, "has done aw ay w ith the delusion of the prom oters of peace and dem onstrated that the com plete independence of all states m ust be preserved through enorm ous w ar preparations."50 An expedition of troops to Siberia, he had explained to Seiyúkai President Hara Takashi in M arch, would help to "raise the idea of m ilitarism among the people."51 Unfortunately for Yam agata, the expedition did no such tiling. Expect­ ing to w itness a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm for m ilitary conquest on the scale of that seen for the Sino- and Russo-Japanese W ars, the architects of the intervention, rather, faced civil protest throughout Japan. One day after the official announcem ent of Japanese participation in an expedition, the m ost dram atic effect of w artim e econom ic grow th leapt into the na­ tional headlines. An inflationary spiral of rice prices brought two m illion protesters to the streets in a ram page of burning and looting that required 49 Lieutenant General Oi Shigem oto, Commander of the Twelfth Division sent to Siberia in August 1918, later remarked that the Im perial Army had seized upon the American proposal to rescue Czech forces in Siberia as the "perfect pretext to deploy troops on the continent." Shinobu Seizaburö, Taishö seijishi, 4 vols. (Tökyö: Kawade Shobö, 1951), H, 536. 50 Yamagata, "Kokubö höshin kaitei ikensho Oune 1918)," in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, 373. 51 Hara nikki, TV, 376 (30 M arch 1918).

44

Javarís Asia in the Politics o f a New W orld Order, 1914-19

one hundred thousand troops to suppress. Yam agata viewed the bad tim­ ing of the rice riots w ith "unbearable regret."52 And Lieutenant General Machida Keiu lam ented the "cold stare" directed by die public at Japa­ nese troops em barking for Vladivostok. "Com pared to die hearty sendoffs and w elcom es and cries of 'banzai' resonating at the train stations and ports each tim e the expeditionary forces passed in the last tw o great w ars/' he noted, "th ere is truly a w orld of a difference."53

L eg a c y o f th e G r e a t W a r in I n ter w a r J a pa n

Indeed, public sym pathy for im perial conquest now seemed a luxury of the past. For the com bination of w artim e econom ic grow th and W oodrow W ilson's appeals for a new world order had decisively altered the place of Asia in the politics of Im perial Japan. W hile not even Yoshino Sakuzö had doubted the wisdom o f pushing aggressively for Japanese continental in­ terests in 1915, the Forty-First Diet (Decem ber 1918—M arch 1919) actively challenged the utility of sending 73,000Japanese troops to the Russian Far East.54 Japanese public opinion steadfastiy hoped for great pow er recog­ nition at Versailles of all of Japan's w artim e gains. But as the peace con­ ference proceeded in the first m onths of 1919, public attention focused elsewhere. Rather than cheer Japanese w artim e accom plishm ents w ith handsome floats and celebratory lanterns, Tökyö trem bled horn signs of a new w orld order. In January, the Kenseikai's Hamaguchi O sachi hailed the "great tide of dem ocracy" that was "overw helm ing the entire w orld at this m om ent."55 On 1 M arch an assem bly of 50,000 students, m erchants, and factory and clerical w orkers swarmed Hibiya park to rally for univer­ sal manhood suffrage. On 30 August the single union Yüaikai becam e a Japanese national federation of unions vowing "n ot to refrain from a struggle of m artyrs" for expanded labor rights.56 And Yoshino Sakuzö called in the spring and sum mer of 1919 for partial self-governm ent in Ko52 Tokutomi monjo 40-42, Yamagata to Tokutom i, 5 Septem ber 1918, in Tokutomi Sotó kankei monjo, n , 395. 53 Uehara m onjo 102-19, Machida to Uehara, 28 August 1918, in Uehara Yäsaku kankei monjo, ed. Uehara Yúsaku kankei m onjo kenkyükai (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976), 484. 94 See Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York: Dou­ bleday, Doran & Co., 1935), 209-212. 55 Hamaguchi O sachi, "Törai no sandai m ondai," Tökyö N ichinidü Shinbun 5 Janu­ ary 1919; cited in M itard Taichirö, "Taishö dem okurashii no kenryoku to chishikijin," in Kokka to shim in, ed. Kokka gakkai hyakunen kinen (Tökyö: Yühikaku, 1987), 0 , 69 . 96 Oka, Tenkanki no TaishO, 122-23.

Fred D ickinson

rea and an end to the Japanese association w ith the pro-Japanese "m ilitary bureaucratic clique" in Beijing.57 The econom ic and political changes ushered in by the Great W ar did not bring outright rejection of em pire in Japan. But they did m ove conti­ nental expansion away from center stage in Japanese politics and slow the unrelenting quest for "leadership in A sia" that had typified the w ar years. Japan's ever tum ultuous struggle for political power would in the 1920s revolve not around the quest for leadership in Asia but around issues of political reform: universal manhood suffrage, labor, and tenant rights. And the increased attention to greater political and fiscal responsibility w ould, by m id-decade, bring genuine reductions in both the Japanese em­ pire and the arm ed forces.58 Katö Takaaki's Kenseikai (after 1927 M inseitö) party dom inated the turbulent politics of 1920s Japan. But it did so not, as its predecessor in 1915, via an aggressive prom otion of Japanese continental interests. On the contrary, Katö deftly rode the popular wave for universal manhood suffrage and dom estic political reform . M eanw hile, his foreign m inister Shidehara Kijürö kept China out of the m ajor dom estic political debates by rejecting the im pulse to control events on the continent. By coopting the m ost popular dom estic political agenda of the day and downplaying the significance of crises in China, the Kenseikai and Min­ seitö decisively outm aneuvered their chief political rival, the Seiyúkai, in the 1920s and early 1930s. W ith its prim ary source of power am ong land­ ed elites, the Seiyúkai, after all, stood at a decided political disadvantage after the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in 1925. Nor could it hope to defeat the Kenseikai w ith its conservative approach to the prob­ lem of rural and labor strife. Unable to com pete in an era of liberal reform , the Seiyúkai, in the latter 1920s sought to shift the political dialogue from dom estic reform to international crisis. Field M arshal Yamagata had re­ sponded to the social dissipation accom panying econom ic grow th and W ilson's appeal for dem ocracy and internationalism in 1917 by stressing the value of arm s and em pire. Likew ise, the Seiyúkai created a vision of crisis in China in the latter 1920s to defuse the momentum of liberal re­ form at home.

57 Yoshino Sakuzö, "Chosen bôdô zengosaku," Chüö Kôron 34, no. 4 (April 1919): 122; Yoshino Sakuzö, "Peipin gakuseidan no ködö o manba suru nakare," ibid. 34, no. 6 (June 1919): 1. 58 Japanese troops withdrew from Shandong and Siberia in 1922, Japan agreed to naval arms lim itations at the W ashington Conference in the same year, and the Katö Takaaki cabinet paved the Im perial Army by four divisions in 1925.

46

Japan’s Asia in the Politics o f a New World Order, 1914-19

L esso n s o f

th e

G rea t W ar

for

P o st -C o ld W ar J apan

The Seiyükai and its m ilitary-bureaucratic allies succeeded in the latter 1920s in tapping into a latent sentim ent for Japanese leadership in Asia. By m anufacturing an im age of crisis in China and declaring the Kenseikai and M inseitö responsible, they destroyed the m ost pow erful dom estic force for dem ocratic reform. They also shattered the chances for democ­ racy itself and ultim ately invited the obliteration of Im perial Japan. In the era of peace that follow ed the Sino-Japanese and Pacific W ars, the United States replaced China as the central focus of Japan's dom estic po­ litical battles. Japanese conservatives and progressives defined their re­ spective positions not by their degree of enthusiasm for expansion in Chi­ na but by their acceptance or rejection of the U .S.-Japan security alliance. A transform ation of the place of China in Japanese dom estic politics after tiie Great W ar had a profound effect upon Japanese diplom acy in the 1920s and 1930s. Sim ilarly, the direction of Japanese diplom acy in the post-Cold W ar era w ill likely depend upon changes in the place of the United States in Japanese dom estic politics. W hile the historian m ust be wary of draw ing parallels betw een two dis­ tinct eras, a few sim ple com parisons m ight be instructive. The first great watershed of the tw entieth century, the G reat W ar, com plicated Japanese politics by advancing a new definition of national power. In place of m il­ itarism and im perialism , econom ic grow th and W ilson's pronounce­ ments offered the prospect of greater social m obility at home and peaceful cooperation abroad. Those who stood to lose m ost politically by the new order responded w ith a vigorous new drive for m ilitarism and im perial­ ism. The last great w atershed of this century, the end of the Cold W ar, of­ fered another new vision of the world order. In the place of a polarized world poised on the brink of destruction, a relaxation of the Soviet-Am erican rift raised the possibility of a less confrontational m ulti-polar world. But, as in 1918, there w ere pow erful political forces in post-Cold W ar era Japan that benefited from a continuation of the old order. Just as Yam agata and the Im perial Army rose to power at the turn of the century via an aggressive pursuit of "leadership in A sia," the Liberal Democratic Party enjoyed thirty-eight years of uninterrupted rule from 1955 largely due to strong ties cultivated w ith the United States under the U .S.-Japan security alliance.59 The im m ediate reaction of the LDP to the end of the Cold W ar, 99 For an extraordinary look at the symbiotic relationship between the LDP and suc­ cessive American administrations, see Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

47

Fred D ickinson

then, w as not to weaken düs centerpiece of United States Cold W ar strat­ egy in Asia. It w as to strengthen it. As w ith Yam agata and die Im perial Army in 1918, however, there w ere signs in the 1990s that the LDP w as swimming against the political tide in Japan. W hile Japanese public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance reached an all-tim e high in the 1980s, dom estic criticism of the unwavering Amer­ ican m ilitary presence in Japan grew after the wide publidzation of the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by Am erican servicem en in Okinawa in 1995. A fter yielding in the 1980s to a debate over political reform , disa­ greem ents over the direction of die U.S.-Japan alliance, m oreover, re­ turned to center stage in Japanese politics.60 The degree to w hich the LD P's political rivals tap into dom estic sentim ent for a relaxation of ties w ith the United States w ill have a significant bearing upon the thrust of Japanese policy tow ard the U.S. in the post-Cold W ar era. A change, in turn, in the place of the United States in Japanese politics w ill likely affect the position of Asia in the future political dialogue in Ja­ pan. The political momentum for continental expansion of course, dissi­ pated after 1945. But the yearning for "leadership in A sia" did not. h i die m id-1990s, rightw ing political activists attem pted to force the issue of dis­ puted territory betw een Japan and its A sian neighbors to the center of the Japanese political stage.61 The degree to w hich this endeavor succeeds in the future w ill have a direct bearing upon Japan's post-Cold W ar relations w ith Asia.

60 The Social Dem ocratic Party, for exam ple, cited conflict w ith coalition partner LDP over the new defense guidelines in its decision to forgo cooperation with the LDP in the summer 1998 upper house elections. "Sham in, getsunai ni yotö ridatsu m o," A sahi Shinbun, 2 May 1998,1. 61 Particularly, the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and that between Japan and Korea over Takeshim a Island.

48

T he D ream of O ne A sia: Ö KAW A SHÜM EI AND JAPANESE P a N -A s IANISM

Christopher W. A. S z pilm a n

This paper exam ines the career and view s of Okawa Shüm ei, political ac­ tivist, best-selling w riter, and advocate of Japan's divine m ission on the Asian continent. Though, in its m ost obvious m anifestations, this panAsian m ission cam e to an end w ith Japan's defeat in the Second W orld W ar, O kaw a's quest for uniquely Asian values, w hich was an integral part of this m ission, appears still to have adherents in Japan today. Take, for exam ple, the declaration, w hich, in 1994, the then Prim e M inister Hosokawa M orihiro m ade to his Chinese counterpart Li Peng. "T he W est­ ern concept of hum an rights," he asserted, "should not be blindly applied to all nations."1 If Okawa w ere alive today, he no doubt would have ap­ proved of this statem ent m ade by the grandson of his tw o prom inent panA sianist contem poraries, M arquis Hosokawa M oritatsu and Prince Konoe Fumimaro. A fter all, he dedicated his life to proving this proposition in a m ore explicit form , nam ely, that W estern values of dem ocracy, equal­ ity, and hum an rights do not apply to Asia. This tierce opposition to W est­ ern values, as I shall argue below , constituted the essence of Okaw a's dream of one Asia. A t first sight, Okawa is difficult to classify. He was a man of seem ing contradictions, a paradox. Though he clearly belonged in the right w ing camp, he nevertheless sym pathized w ith Bolshevik Russia and adm ired Lenin.2 Though he denounced dem ocracy, he w as on friendly term s w ith Yoshino Sakuzö, the m ost influential proponent of dem ocracy in Japan.3

1 "Looking Casual, Japan's Prim e M inister Flies H om e," New York Times, 22 March 1994, A6. The recent dialogue between Japanese novelist-tum ed-politidan Ishihara Shin taró and the Prim e M inister of M alaysia, M ahathir Mohamad, indicates that the Japanese form of pan-Asianism has supporters also outside Ja­ pan; see M ahathir Mohamad and Ishihara Shin taró, “No" to ieru A jia (Tökyö: Köbunsha, 1994). 2 See, for exam ple, his glowing account of the Bolsheviks in chapter 7 of Okawa Shümei, Fukkô A jia no shom m dai (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1993), 162-79; also Nihonteki genkO, in vol. 1 of Okawa Shümei zenshü kankökai, ed., Okawa Shümei zenshü (Tökyö: Iwasaki Shoten, 1961; hereafter OSZ), 384. 3 See letter from Yoshino to Okawa, dated 7 July 1926, reproduced in Otsuka Takehiro, Okawa Shümei (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1995), 97.

49

Christopher W. A. S zpilman

He ardently supported the im perial institution,4but his best-selling books w ere censored for lese m ajesty.5 He professed utter contem pt for the narikitt (nouveaux riches) businessm en of Taishö Japan, w hile accepting fi­ nancial support from one of the m ost notorious of these narikin, Ishihara H iroichirö.6 He was im plicated in die terrorist incidents of the thirties, yet remained on friendly term s w ith Count M akino Nobuaki, whom this ter­ ror aim ed to dislodge from pow er.7 It would be tedious to m ultiply such contradictions, but they certainly have deterred historians from tackling him .8 H istorians have largely neglected to study Okawa but they agree that he was a pan-A sianist and a radical. Okawa owes his reputation as a panA sianist to his research activities and his w ritings. He owes his reputation as a radical to his m embership in right w ing organizations, his prison sen­ tence, and his arraignm ent as a class A w ar crim inal. To both he also owes his neglect by historians, who tend to avoid these two troublesom e, yet seem ingly related themes. The neglect suffered by Okawa is curious when one considers that his one-tim e pan-A sianist partner Kita Ikki basks in the spotlight of academic attention. Kita Ikki's charism a, his socialist view s, and his execution for his involvem ent in the February 26,1936, putsch made him a popular fig­ ure for both the right and left w ing after the w ar. Perhaps as a result, he has been the subject of many studies in both Japanese and English. Yet Ki-

4 For exam ple, see Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no m ichi, vol. 1, 0 5 Z , 49-52; see also Furuya Tetsuo, "N ihon fuashizumu ron," vol. 20 o í hvanam i köza Nihon rekishi (Tôkyô: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 89. 5 Otsuka, Okawa, 140. 6 On the connection between Okawa and Ishihara, see Awaya Kentarô et al., Ishi­ hara H iroichirö kankei monjo (Tôkyô: Kashiwa Shobö, 1994) vol. 1,302. 7 Itö Takashi, ed., M akino Nobuaki nikki (Tôkyô: Chûô Köronsha, 1991), entries for 10 July 1924,146; 13 July 1924,147; and 27 February 1931,431; see also, for ex­ am ple, Hashikawa Bunsö, "K aisetsu," in Okawa Shümei sha, ed., Hashikawa Bunsô, vol. 21 of Kindai Nihon shisö taikei (Tökyö: Chikuma Shobö, 1982), 430 (hereafter Okawa Shümei sha). 8 There are signs that this situation is changing, at least, in Japan. In this connec­ tion, the two recent books by Otsuka Takehiro must be mentioned: Okawa Shamei to kindai Nihon (Tôkyô: M okutakusha, 1990), and Okawa Shümei (Tôkyô: Chüö Köronsha, 1995). In English there is Mary Esthes Liebermann, "Okawa Shümei and Japan's 'D ivine M ission,'" Ph.D. diss.. University of California, Ber­ keley, 1956, and two articles, one by Takeuchi Yoshim i, "Okawa Shümei: Profile of Asian Minded M an," The Developing Economies 7, no. 3 (Septem ber 1969) (hereafter "P rofile"), the other by George M. W ilson, "K ita Ikki, Okawa Shümei and the Yüzonsha: A Study in the Genesis of Shöwa N ationalism ," Papers on fapan 2, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University (August 1963). These, and scattered references to him in passing, represent the sum -total of the schol­ arship on Okawa in English.

50

The Dream o f One A sia

ta's postw ar reputation tends to exaggerate his actual prewar influence. Before the w ar m ost of his books w ere banned and those that w ere not were usually out o f print. Consequently, few readers had access to them. Kita, m oreover, never held an official position of any kind; he never taught at a university; he never even graduated from one. His much vaunted influence in the army was lim ited to "sim ple, junior grade offic­ ers, ignorant of social realities."9 Q uite the opposite w ith Okawa. The near-oblivion he has been con­ signed to after the w ar downplays his prew ar im portance. Okawa w rote influential best-sellers; he received a doctorate from the Faculty of Law, Tökyö Im perial U niversity; he taught at prestigious universities; he head­ ed the highly regarded research institute of the Southern M anchurian Railway; he had connections to leading politicians (e.g., Viscount Gotö Shinpei),10 the highest nobility (e.g., M arquis Tokugawa Yoshichika),11 the Im perial Court (e.g., Count M akino N obuaki), the highest ranks of the army (e.g., Nagata Tetsuzan, Töjö H ideki);12 Colonel Hashimoto Kingorö and other officers in the Sakurakai (Cherry Society) regarded him practi­ cally as their ideologue in residence.13 Okawa rather than Kita provided a blueprint (or at least an inspiration) for the m ilitary architects of the an­ nexation of M anchuria. Already in 1926, for exam ple, Okawa argued for the necessity of creating an independent M anchuria-M ongolia before an audience consisting of Itagaki Seishirö, Nagata Tetsuzan, Töjö Hideki, Anami Korechika, and several other m id-ranking staff officers.14 In con­ trast to postw ar historians, his contem poraries felt no doubt as to the greatness of Okaw a's achievem ents. Even after Japan's defeat, senior Jap­ anese foreign m inistry officials believed "h e was the m ost em inent theo­ retician and greatest expert on Anglo-American aggression of all the ac­ cused [at the Tokyo Tribunal]." Since he was "no man to succumb to 9 Tanaka Ryükichi, Nihon gunbatsu antöshi (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1988), 25; on Kita, see George M. W ilson, Radical N ationalist in Japan, Kita Ikki, 1883-1937 (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). 10 "Okawa Shümei ryakuden," 0 5 Z , vol. 1 ,5 ; see also Otsuka, Okaiva, 115. 11 See Tokugawa Yoshichika, Saigo no tonosama: Tokugawa Yoshichika den (Tökyö: Ködansha, 1973), 122-67; also Otabe Yüji, Tokugawa Yoshichika no jügonen sensö (Tökyö: Aoki Shoten, 1988), especially chap. 3. 12 See, for exam ple, Tanaka, Nihon gunbatsu antdshi, 25. 13 On some aspects of Colonel H ashim oto's close friendship w ith Okawa, see, for example, Okawa Shümei Kenshökai, ed., Okawa Shümei nikki: M eiji 36 nen Shâwa 24 nen (Tökyö: Iwasaki Gakujutsu Shuppansha, 1986) (hereafter Okawa nikki), entries for 10 and 11 August 1922,125-26 (It seems the two w ere on such friendly terms that they even went to brothels together.); see also a popular account in Matsumoto Seichö, "Sakurakai no yabö," vol. 4 of ShOwashi hakkutsu (Tökyö: Bungei Shunju, 1994), 102-3. 14 Hata Ikuhiko, ShOwa no gunjintachi (Tökyö: Bungei shunjü, 1982), 93.

51

Christopher W. A. Szpilman

m ental Illness," they inform ed the young sot of M arquis Hosokawa, "A m ericans poisoned him out of fear of the pow er of his argum ents."15 Okawa w as bom in 1886 in Sakata, Yam agata Prefecture, son of a doc­ tor. As a young boy, he received an education typical of a m em ber of die local elite. In addition to the usual curriculum , he studied Chinese classics and m odem foreign languages. Like so many other young m iddle-class Japanese in the M eiji period, Okawa cam e into contact w ith Christianity.16 Though he never becam e a Christian—he found the church hypocritical — Okawa was im pressed by the universalistic claim s of Christianity. It was probably as a result of this fleeting encounter w ith W estern religion that Okawa developed a desire to discover a set of A sian values that would m atch the universalisai of Christianity. In search of som e great universal truth, Okawa, as a m iddle school stu­ dent, flirted for a w hile w ith the socialism of Kôtoku Shúsui17 but he re­ jected it, angered by the socialists' pacifist stance during the Russo-Japa­ nese W ar. He found the universalisai of socialism , as he had found the universalisai of C hristianity, too W estern for his taste. Instead, he would dedicate his life to the quest for a Japanese, that is, an A sian alternative to tiie universalistic values of the W est. For that reason, when, after gradu­ ating from the prestigious Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto, Okawa en­ tered Tôkyô Im perial U niversity, he did not enroll at the Faculty of Law as m ost am bitious young m en would have done in his place. Instead, he chose to read O riental philosophy and religion at the Faculty of Letters w ith Anesaki M asaharu, the fam ous historian of religion. It was at the Faculty of Letters that he acquired a theoretical foundation for his already pronounced pan-A sianist sentim ents when attending the lectures of the w ell-know n art historian and author, Okakura Kakuzô (Tenshin), one of the precursors of Japanese pan-Asianism .18 A fter graduating horn the university in 1911, Okawa continued his study of A sian, and especially Indian, philosophy as an independent scholar. But his interest shifted to current affairs in 1913 when, by chance, 15 Hosokawa M orisada, Hosokawa nikki, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Chüö Köronsha, 1993), 479 (199), entry for 23 May 1946. 16 Anraku no mon, vol. 1 o f OSZ, 773-74. 17 Like Kita Ikki, Okawa subscribed to the anarchist Heimin Shinbun as a middle school student. Im mediately after graduating horn m iddle school and before he entered the Fifth Higher School, Okawa spent some tim e in Tökyö w here he at­ tended lectures by Kôtoku Shúsui, Sakai Toshihiko, Abe Isoo, and other socia­ lists and anarchists. Details of O kaw a's early interest in socialism , in Otsuka, Okawa Shûmei to kindai N ihon, 22-24. 18On Okakura Tenshin and his significance, see, for exam ple, Umehara Takeshi, ed., Okakura Tenshin shü, vol. 7 of Kindai Nihon shisO taikei (Tôkyô: Chikuma Shobö, 1976), 378-412.

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The Dream o f One A sia

in a second-hand book store, he cam e across Sir Henry C otton's New In­ dia. That book made him realize "th e tragedy of India under British ru le"19 and, as he recalls in his autobiography, transform ed him "from a com plete cosm opolitan (sekaijin ) into an A sianist."20 The transform ed Okawa sought out the com pany o f like-m inded men. One of them w as die right w ing pan-A sianist journalist M itsukawa Kam etarö, who introduced Okawa to Kita Ikki. By 1920 the three panA sianists w ere active in the YOzonsha, an organization, founded a year before by M itsukawa and Okawa, and dedicated to dom estic reform , the liberation of A sia, and discovery of an A sian, or m ore specifically a Japa­ nese, alternative to W estern universalistic values.21 To this end, the Yüzansha published a m onthly journal, O takebi, w ith Okawa as a m ajor con­ tributor. But, though Okawa and Kita may have agreed on the im portance of Japan's m ission in A sia, their personalities w ere quite incom patible. They quarreled and, by 1923, the Yûzonsha had disintegrated w ithout any concrete achievem ent.22 Okawa, however, rem ained in the m ainstream o f Japan's right w ing movement and pursued his quest for uniquely Asian values. He was a principal figure in two right w ing organizations, the Gyöchisha (after 1925) and the Jinm ukai (after 1931). He w rote editorials and articles for the G yöchisha's m onthly Nihon. But his w riting for that periodical consti­ tuted only a sm all fraction of his literary output. Throughout the tw enties and the thirties, Okawa published several popular books and essays cm Asian and Japanese history, politics, and culture, in w hich he propound­ ed the uniqueness of Japan and Asia. W ith these publications, he had es­ tablished him self, by the late 1920s, as a leading rightist theoretician of his day. Nor did his success as a popular w riter prevent him from pursuing an im pressive professional and academ ic career. In 1919 Okawa entered the research institute of the South M anchurian Railway, w hich in interw ar Japan played an im portant role in gathering and analyzing inform ation on A sia.23 In 1927 Okawa was appointed di­ rector o f the (now independent) institute and editor of its m onthly publi­ cation, Töa, w hich, under his editorship, served as a forum for pan-Asian ideas.

19 Anraku no mon, 788-89; Nojim a Yoshiaki, Okawa Shürnei (Tökyö: Shinjinbutsu Orais ha, 1972), 47. 20 Anraku no mon, 804. 21 Takeuchi, "P rofile," 368-69. 22 For a sym pathetic account of the Yûzonsha, see Doi Tadashi, "Taishô ishin no yakata: Yûzonsha no hitobito," Shinseiryoku 23, no. 6, (15 August 1979): 20-28; in English see W ilson's "K ita Ikki, Okawa Shürnei and the Yûzonsha." 23 Unless otherw ise stated, the following paragraphs are based on O tsuka, Okawa.

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Christopher W. A . S zpilman

In 1921 Okaw a's appointm ent as a professor at Takushoku Daigaku (Colonial University) launched his form al academ ic career that would continue interm ittently until 1945.24 Concurrently w ith his professorship, Okawa also cooperated in running a private center for the study of social education, Shakai Kyöiku Kenkyüjo (later known as Daigakuryö), housed w ithin the grounds of the Im perial Palace. In 1926, he crowned his aca­ dem ic career w ith a doctorate from the Law Faculty of Tokyo Im perial U niversity for a dissertation on the origins and developm ent of chartered colonial com panies in the W est.25 At the same tim e Okawa managed to reconcile his theoretical academ ic pursuits w ith m ore "applied," active political involvem ent on behalf of pan-A sianist ideals. In the num erous public lectures he delivered throughout Japan in the late 1920s, Okawa advocated Japanese m ilitary expansion in China and castigated the M inseitö governm ent for its inten­ tion to sign the London Naval Treaty that im posed lim itations on the build-up of Japan's im perial navy.26 Okawa followed his words w ith deeds. He participated in an abortive coup d'etat in 1931, known as the M arch Incident, and, in M ay 1932, he aided and abetted the assassination of Prem ier Inukai Tsuyoshi by pro­ viding the plotters w ith "guns, am m unition, and a certain am ount of m oney."27 Though he received a fifteen-year prison sentence for his role in the assassination, he actually spent only sixteen m onths in prison.28 Okawa certainly was no exception to the judicial tolerance w hich Japa­ nese rightists enjoyed in the early thirties.29 Far from harm ing his career, his crim inal record even im proved

24 Okawa owed his first academ ic job to Viscount Goto Shinpei, President of Ta­ kushoku University, "Okaw a Shumei ryakuden," vol. 1 o f OSZ, 5. 25 Ibid., 6. 26 Hashikawa Bunsô, Chôkokkashugi (Tökyö: Chikuma Shobö, 1964), 369. 27 "Jiken jinm on chösho," in Okawa Sham ei sha, 348. 28 Okawa was initially sentenced to 15 years in prison (on 3 February 1934). On ap­ peal, this term was leniently reduced to five years (24 October 1935). The autho­ rities' generosity did not stop there, and Okawa was allowed to choose when he would start serving his sentence. He remained free for another six months, en­ tering Tama Prison only on 16 June 1936. But he was not left there for very long. Due to efforts by M arquis Tokugawa and Shimizu Kônosuke, he was released on parole on 13 October 1937. O tsuka, Okawa Shümei to kindai Nihon, 220, Otsuka, Okawa, 160. 29 Between 1920 and 1935 three Japanese prim e m inisters were assassinated: Hara Takashi (1921), Hamaguchi Osachi (shot 1930, died the following year as a result of the inflicted wounds) and Inukai Tsuyoshi (1932). None of foe assassins nor their instigators received capital punishment and m ost emerged from prison re­ latively quickly, thanks to various am nesties, as did foe assassins of Inoue Junnosuke and Dan Takuma.

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The Dream o f One Asia

Okaw a's professional standing. In October 1937, that is, im m ediately after he had com e out of prison, he becam e dean of colonial studies at H ösei, one of Tökyö's m ost prestigious private universities. He w rote m ore best­ selling books, such as Nihon 2600-nen shi (1939). And he even began to play a m inor role as a behind-the-scenes political broker. He enjoyed di­ rect access to several cabinet m inisters and occasionally even prim e min­ isters required his services.30 He was the m oving spirit behind the Japa­ nese governm ent's bizarre and ultim ately unsuccessful schem e to im prove Am erican-Japanese relations by obtaining Am erican capital for investm ent in China (1939-40).31 A fter Japan's defeat, his connections w ith high-ranking governm ent of­ ficials as w ell as w ith the radical Right led to his indictm ent as a class A w ar crim inal, but he avoided a trial for reasons of m ental incom petence. Diagnosed w ith syphilis of the brain, Okawa was released from prison,32 and, after he had recovered, he spent the rest of his life in seclusion, trans­ lating the Koran into Japanese (1949) and working on his autobiography, Anraku no mon (The Gate to Serenity). He died in 1957. Okawa professed to be a pan-Asianist. Roughly put, pan-Asianism is a doctrine claim ing that "A sia is on e," the slogan coined by Okakura Tenshin, whom Okawa readily recognized as a m ajor intellectual influence.33 Okakura m ay perhaps be the best-know n Japanese pan-A sianist, but he certainly was not the first. The pan-Asian tradition in Japan has been traced to the w ritings of such people's rights advocates as Ueki Emori and Tarui Tökichi in the 1870s. In the 1880s, pan-Asianism was taken up by Töyama M itsuru and his Fukuoka-based G en'yösha, m any of whose members, led by Uchida Ryöhei, subsequently (1901) formed the notori­

30 For exam ple, on 30 January 1939, Hiranuma Kiichirö, the newly appointed pri­ me m inister (5 January), sent a m essage to Okawa asking him to persuade Ad­ m iral Kabayama Sukehide to accept a position in his cabinet; Okawa nikki, 198; on 1 February 1939, Okawa called on the Education M inister, General Araki Sadao, at his official residence; ibid., 199; on 16 February 1939 hie visited the Justice Mi­ nister, Shiono Suehiko, at his official residence to intercede on som ebody's be­ half, ibid., 201. 31 Kusunoki Seiichirö, "Okaw a Shümei to tai-Bei seisaku," Nihon Rekishi, no. 474 (November 1987): 54-70. 32 Otsuka, Okawa, 186-87; Kobayashi M asaki's documentary m ovie entitled Tökyö saiban, captures the moment when Okawa, shown sitting in the dock directly be­ hind General Töjö, all of a sudden hits the latter in the head with a rolled-up sheet o f paper. It was this behavior that led to a psychiatric exam ination, which revealed syphilitic dementia. 33 See, for exam ple, Okawa Shüm ei's preface to his Nihon seishin kenkyû (Tökyö: Meüi Shobô, 1939), 8; also Takeuchi Yoshim i, "Okaw a Shümei no Ajia kenkyü," in Okawa Shümei shü, 403.

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Christopher W. A. S zpilman

ous Kokuryükai (Am ur River Society), w hich rem ained active as a panAsian organization w ell into the 1930s.34 A ll pan-Asianists had to confront the obvious linguistic, cultural, and political diversity of Asia that belied the purported unity of that vast con­ tin en t M ost Japanese pan-A sianists evaded düs contradiction by focus­ ing only on East Asia and neglecting die rest.35 ök aw a's A sia, however, covered an area greater than die geographic A sia, including Egypt and even the M uslim -inhabited parts of the Balkan Peninsula.36Okawa was o f course w ell aw are of die trem endous linguistic, cultural, and political di­ versity of A sia, but did not think that it contradicted his vision of Asian unity. He believed that all A sian nations shared certain underlying char­ acteristics that the W est lacked. These traits w ere spiritual or m oral in character, and they, rather than any linguistic, cultural or political fea­ tures, defined the "A sianness" of Asia. "A sia," Okawa w rote, "is w here the soul of m ankind resid es... Asian history has been in essence spiritu­ a l."37 For Okawa, the spirituality of Asia made it tim eless and im m utable, intuitive, and introspective. This spirituality, above all, accounted for the Asian attachm ent to culture and tradition, an attachm ent, w hich, he stressed, was no m ere rom antic nostalgia for the past. It provided A sians, he believed, w ith penetrating insights into the nature of tilings. By dint of some intuitive process, w hich Okawa never fully explained, "A sia" was capable of "distinguishing the eternal elem ents from the transitory ephem eral fluff in all kinds of cultural phenom ena, w hether in religion, custom s, or m orality."38 If this concept of A sian spirituality appears vague, it is because ökaw a's Asia cannot be grasped properly w ithout understanding his po­ sition on the W est. The W est, for Okawa, was the Other, in opposition to w hich Asia (the Self?) acquired its identity and significance as Asia. A sia and tite W est had distinct (though intertw ined) histories. "A sia's history," he insisted, "h as been essentially spiritual;" W estern history m aterialis­

34 On the genesis o f Japanese pan-Asianism , see, for exam ple, Takeuchi Yoshim i, "N ihon no A jia-shugi," vol. 3 of Takeuchi Hyöronshü (Tökyö: Chikuma Shobö, 1969), 256-317. 35 For exam ple, Prince Konoe Atsum aro's Tö-A Döbunkai and Uchida Ryöhei's Kokuryükai; on Prince Konoe, see M arius Jansen, "Konoe A tsum aro," The Chi­ nese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 107-23; on Uchida Ryöhei, see Takizawa Ma­ leóte, Hyôden Uchida Ryöhei (Tökyö: Yamato Shobö, 1976), esp. 149-78. 36 For exam ple, in Fukkö Ajia no shomondai, Okawa devoted chapter 9 ,2 2 3 -5 4 , to Egypt and chapter 10,255-88, to Muslims in Europe. 37 Okawa Shüm ei, Shin A jia shöron (Tökyö: Nihon Hyöronsha, 1944), 85. 38 Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no m ichi, 73.

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tic.39 "A sia is the training ground of m ankind's spirit; Europe is man­ kind's source of [practical] know ledge."40 The separateness of historical experience, Okawa believed, m eant that W estern ideas and methods could not be applied m echanically to solve A sian problem s. The French revolution, for exam ple, m ay have been appropriate in France, but it would be wrong to im itate it in Asia.41 Reform in A sia, Okawa insisted, m ust accord w ith the principles of its underlying nature. It m ust be first and forem ost spiritual, not m aterialistic as in the W est.42 O kaw a's philosophy of history was closely related to his pan-Asianism and his concept of Asia. Okawa regarded w ar as a positive historical fac­ to r the dynamic creative force behind civilization and progress. "Every­ thing in nature always stru ggles... Since the days of ancient H om o: until file present d a y ,... world history has been a history of w ar."43 This quasiM ussolini emphasis on the "creative aspect" of w ar foreshadowed the in­ famous October 1934 arm y pam phlet "Cardinal Principles of National De­ fense and Proposals for Their Strengthening" (Kokubö no hongi to sono kyöka no teishti) which opened w ith the words "W ar is the father of creation, the mother of culture."44*The central them e in world history, Okawa believed, was the incessant conflict between Asia and the W est (Europe). "O f all wars in world history, the m ost heroic in scope, the m ost profound in sig­ nificance is the recurrent w ar between East and W est, Asia and Europe. "*s But Okawa did not reject W estern civilization. Far from it. In his outline of world history, he insisted that Asia and Europe com plemented each other. Through a kind of synthesis, the East-W est conflict enriched both European and A sian civilizations and elevated them to a higher historical stage. In short, w ar generated progress and civilization. If this view of his­ tory sm acks of H egel, it is not by coincidence. O kaw a's philosophy of his­ tory bears H egel's signature all over it. And like H egel's, Okaw a's philos­ ophy of history was teleological. That is, Okawa m aintained, progress

34 A jia, Yoroppa, N ihon, vol. 2 of OSZ, 870. 40 Ibid. 41 Nojima, Okawa Shûmei, 97. 42 The reform s proposed by Okawa included: "The construction o f 'a restoration Japan;' the establishm ent of national ideals; the realization of freedom in spiri­ tual life; the realization of equality in political life; the realization of fraternity (ydai) in econom ic life." After the realization of these "reform s," "the m oral uni­ fication of the w orld," Okawa hoped, would follow presumably autom atically. See die 1925 platform o f the Gyöchisha, drafted by Okawa cited in Takeuchi, "P rofile," 377. 43 Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon, 841. 44 Quoted in Eguchi Keiichi, Jûgonen sensô no kaim aku, vol. 4 o f ShOwa no rekishi (Tôkyö: Shögakukan, 1989), 311. 41 Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon, 841.

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produced by the dialectical clash of Europe and Asia inexorably led to­ ward history's ultim ate goal—the unification of the world by one state. This unification, he foretold in 1925, would com e about in the near future as a result of another great war. Various sym ptom s, according to Okawa, heralded the approach of this final stage of world history. They included the decline of W estern civilization in the afterm ath of the First W orld W ar and the stirrings of nationalism throughout Asia.46 In the approaching w ar, Okawa prophesied, Japan, "th e strongest nation of A sia" would "m ake its first positive contribution to w orld history" by defeating Amer­ ica, the strongest nation of the W est.47 From this perspective, Japan's "2600-year-long" history had been sim ply a process of preparation for this dram atic duel. By achieving this ultim ate victory, Japan would "oust darkness from the world and light it up w ith a radiant sun."48 A fter the end of the w ar, Okawa predicted in a H egelian fashion, Japan would uni­ fy the w orld, thus no doubt bringing history to an end. N aturally, this final w ar would also liberate Asia from the "enslave­ m ent" of W estern colonialism . Japan would "becom e a Lincoln for the 900 m illion of Asian slaves."49 Japan, Okawa insisted, w as uniquely qualified to carry out this m ission, because it embodied A sian virtues better than any other Asian nation. A fter all, Japan alone in Asia managed to preserve com plete independence due to its superior m orality. This was in stark contrast to China, a pale shadow of its form er self, w here, Okawa noted, "th e half-educated literary elite, [who] lead the half-educated m asses ... in circles, w ill certainly never save China from its present turm oil."50 Giv­ en such an im moral m ess, Okawa concluded, Japan had a duty to help Asians save them selves. But, Okawa noted, it would be a thankless task. Asians were "peoples w ithout their own states" who "m ust not be regard­ ed as equal to the Japanese." They had lost their national independence 46 A jia, Yoroppa, Nihon, 865, on the decline of W estern civilization; ibid., 866, on the stirrings of Asian nationalism ; on the latter see Okawa, Fukkö A jia no shomondai, passim . 47 A jia, Yoroppa, Nihon, 873. There is a striking sim ilarity between these and the ideas of Ishiwara Kanji. But it seems that Okawa arrived at his view s indepen­ dently of Ishiwara. Okaw a's work had already been published before Ishiw ara's return in O ctober 1925 from Germany where he had developed his ideas under the influence of the N ichiren form of Buddhism. A more likely, if unacknowled­ ged, source for Okawa was his erstw hile associate, Kita Ikki, who like Ishiwara was an earnest follower of Nichiren. On Ishiw ara, see Mark Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1975), 49. On Kita Ikki's views, see, for exam ple, W ilson, Kita Ikki. 48 A jia, Yoroppa, Nihon, 873. 49 Okawa Shùmei and Mitsukawa Kam etarö, "Sengen," O takebi 1, no. 3. (October 1920): 1. 50 Okawa Shüm ei, "A rasou koto o yam ete m anabe," Tôa 2, no. 5, (May 1929): 1.

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precisely because of their m oral inferiority. Likew ise, they w ere bound to m isunderstand Japan's efforts to help them.51 In short, horn this perspec­ tive, A sians, especially Chinese, seemed like children who resented hav­ ing to go to school, though education was to benefit them. Just as individ­ uals on reaching m aturity appreciated the value of their education, Okawa reasoned, so would Asians eventually learn to appreciate Japan's continental m ission. Concerned as he was about Asian ingratitude tow ards Japan, Okawa was far m ore worried about the obstacles to Japan's pan-Asian m ission w ithin Japan. He may have thought Japan superior to other Asian na­ tions, but he realized it was far from perfect. "N o true Japanese," Okawa lam ented, "can be satisfied w ith die Japan of today." Japan, in his opinion, no longer deserved to have a national flag adorned w ith a divine "red sun," because "Japan is not any m ore an objective realization of national m orality."52 The decline of Japan as a state, Okawa pointed out, had started as early as the Russo-Japanese W ar,53but it assum ed alarm ing proportions only as a result of the First W orld W ar. There were several factors that contribut­ ed to this regrettable phenomenon. First, there was "m oral corruption," w hose symptoms w ere m aterialism and selfishness. Second, there was factionalism and lack of public spirit among the ruling elites that, in turn, resulted in "th e oppression of the common m an" and "the decline of loy­ alty and patriotism ." Third, the great w ar prosperity brought about class hostility as a result of rising prices, shortages, and the appearance of the so-called w ar nankin. Fourth, there was an "unhealthy and abstract" de­ bate about "th e concept of the state" betw een the pro-dem ocracy scholars who "sold their souls to the W est" and the "ultra-conservatives" who "protected the national polity" w ith "divine wind argum ents."54 To m ake things even w orse, the geopolitical situation was also clearly to Japan's disadvantage. Poring over the map of the w orld, Okawa noted w ith great grief how "sm all" the territory of the Japanese Em pire was in com parison with the "vast expanse" of the British possessions.55 The powerful "A n­ glo-Saxons," having defeated Germ any, were now free to carry out their expansion in A sia, or at least m aintain the status quo at the expense of Ja­ pan.

51 Okawa nikki, entry for 4 August 1937,142. 52 Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi, 6. 53 Hashikawa, Chökokkashugi, 358. 54 "D ai-ni ishin no hatsujöki," Nihon bunmeishi, vol. 4 of OSZ, 427, (hereafter "D aini ishin"). 55 Okawa nikki, January 1937,138.

Christopher W. A. Szpilman

In short, Okawa had no doubt that die great w ar had ushered in a "dark night" for Japan. N ot only Japan's m ission, but also its survival was ap­ parently at stake. W ithout undergoing a series of fundam ental reform s, to be m ore specific, w ithout a Taishö restoration, Okawa despaired, "Japan w ill share die fate of G erm any."56 The Taishö restoration57 espoused by Okawa opposed "all ideas that deny die state, w hich at present surround us like dark clouds."58 Thus it was anti-party-political, anti-dem ocratic, anti-individualist, anti-hedonistic, and anti-socialist.59 It was also anti-capitalist and anti-finance. Okawa stressed that die 'T aish ö restoration" necessitated "destruction of m oney ru le" ju st as the M eiji restoration had necessitated die "abolition of the feudal structure of die shogunate."60 N evertheless, he explidtiy op­ posed die concept of class struggle, w hich in his view did not apply to Ja­ pan. H is restoration, instead of erecting class barriers, would "fu se die ruler and the people into one w hole".61 Only this totalitarian fusion o f sa­ cred and secular, of the d vil and political state, of the private and the pub­ lic dom ain could lead to "th e realization of die true foundational spirit" and enable Japan to becom e "d ie true savior of the w orld." The Japanese state, in his view , w as "capable of no ev il."62 O nly a reform ed spiritual A sia led by a reform ed spiritual Japan, Okaw a believed, had die potential to stand up to the W est w ith its ow n authentic A sian values. A s a precedent, Okaw a d ted the early Islam ic state, w hich, by fusing state and church, had successfully challenged the W est w ith its uniquely A sian values.63 Islam , how ever, failed in the end because it had succum bed to corruption and decadence. A re­ form ed Japan w ould be im m une to such decay and com plete d ie task o f unifying the w orld on behalf o f A sia, w hich Islam had begun centuries before. Even after the defeat of Japan, Okawa did not give up his hope for an ul­ tim ate victory of Asia over the Occident. True, on 15 August 1945, after listening to die Em peror's surrender speech, he feared that 40 years of w ork "tow ard the revival of Asia has vanished like a soap bubble,"64 but 56 "D ai-ni ishin," 427-30. 57 After H irohito succeeded his father as em peror o f Japan in December 1926, the Taishö restoration becam e naturally the Shöwa restoration, but without any per­ ceptible change in its content. 56 Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no m ichi, vol. 1 o f OSZ, 4. 59 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 61 "D ai-ni ishin," 427. 62 Takeuchi, "P rofile," 377. 63 On Okawa's views on Islam , see his Kaikyö gairon (Tökyö: Keiö Shobö, 1942). 64 Okawa nikki, 15 August 1945,391.

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he quickly got over his initial w orries. In 1949, after the defeat of Chang Kai-shek, for exam ple, Okawa perceived a "close resem blance" between "today's devotees of communism and the early M uslim s" and w ished for "a second battle of Tours-Poitiers," w hich this tim e would no doubt end in victory for A sia.65* These, in short, are the pan-A sianist view s of Okawa Shüm ei. Through­ out his w hole career, Okawa put the greatest stress on the liberation of Asia, w hich, he believed, was Japan's sacred duty. H is liberation of Asia was, of course, contingent on Japan's victorious w ar to unify die world. This w ar w as predeterm ined by a H egelian process o f historical develop­ ment. In order to prevail, Japan had to reform dom estically, i.e., it had to becom e increasingly statist and totalitarian. Sm all wonder that the senior army officers found his view s congenial. A fter all, he expressed in elo­ quent w ords their innerm ost thoughts. In spite of this em phasis upon pan-Asianism , it is striking how litde concrete Asia there is in O kaw a's w ritings. He travelled to Southeast Asia and China several tim es, but his diary affords little insight into his senti­ m ents tow ard Asia or Asians. On a dow n-to-earth level, the m an who made a life-long career of condem ning British colonialism , could, on his visit to the British colony of Hong Kong, w rite the follow ing: "Buildings are solid, roads perfect, goods plentiful, people nu m erou s,... a w ealthy d ty indeed. [By com parison,] Japan's cities are ju st like large villages. Prices are low , surprisingly so com pared w ith T ö k y ö ... [Procurers] com e to the ship to sell wom en; in departm ent stores pictures of nude women are on sale, and after dark w hite streetw alkers hang out in public parks. Cannot detect any hypocritical restrictions. I would like to stay in Hong Kong for tw o or three w eeks w ith plenty of m oney and have some fun. ',66 One cannot detect m oral indignation at the outrages of British im perial­ ism in this passage or, for that m atter, elsewhere in the diary. For all his em phasis on Asian authenticity, Okawa derived his inspira­ tion as m uch from W estern as from native Japanese or Asian sources. He made no secret of his intellectual debt to Plato67*(elitism and idealism ); Hegel (his philosophy of history); neo-Hegelian Russian philosopher

65 Takeuchi, "P rofile," 374. O kaw a's view s were by no means isolated. Takeuchi Yoshim i, one of the forem ost Japanese Sinologists, regarded the above state­ ment of O kaw a's as "a profoundly interesting prophecy." According to Take­ uchi, "in the long run of history, we cannot say that the day of this prophecy w ill not com e. W e cannot conclude that some d a y ... the believers in the civilization which judged Okawa w ill not them selves be judged by him ." Ibid. 46 Okawa nikki, entry for 15 October 1921,98-99. 47 For a reference to Plato, see, for exam ple, Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no m ichi, 4.

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Christopher W. A. S zpjlman

Soloviev68 (the significance of w ar in history and situational ethics); the now obscure French m ystic, Paul Richard,69 who confirm ed his view of Ja­ pan's m oral superiority; Lothrop Stoddard and Oswald Spengler, the pes­ sim ists, who proclaim ed the decline of the W est, etc. Like these W estern sources of his inspiration, Okawa was essentially a conservative thinker, even if he occasionally sounded and behaved like a radical. Certainly, O kaw a's much-vaunted pan-Asianism is hardly a rad­ ical doctrine, but m erely appears to be a disguised anti-W esternism . His Asia, after all, is not an independent entity; it acquires an identity only as a reaction to the W est. W hile the W est is the Other, Asia is ju st an imper­ fect extension of Japan, to be molded by Japan in its own image. Much m ore palpable than O kaw a's vision of Asia is his reaction to the dom estic change in Japan, w hich closely parallels his vision of Asia. Just as Asia failed to live up to his ideal of "A sianness," so the Japanese m asses failed to live up to his ideal of "tru e Japan." In his em phasis on the strengthening of the state and the Japanese spirit by "m oral reform ," Okawa echoed the conservative lam ent over the declining m orals, social upheavals, and thought confusion to which allegedly the Japanese suc­ cumbed in the afterm ath of the First W orld W ar. At the root of this degen­ eration and chaos lay pernicious W estern influences. To fend off the per­ ceived W estern threat, he recommended a variety of m ore or less radical m easures, which taken together did not detract in any way from the es­ sentially conservative character of his thought. Certainly Okawa, unlike his erstw hile collaborator Kita Ikki, never pro­ posed any radical changes to the im perial institution or the M eiji political system as a whole. Unlike the radical (som e even would say fascist)70 Kita, Okawa was also pusillanim ous as regards econom ics and labor relations. Take, for exam ple, his proposal for "th e realization of fraternity (yûai) in econom ic life" included in his program for the Gyöchisha in 1925. This proposal is a m ere reiteration of traditional paternalism . In fact, the whole of the Okawa-drafted Gyöchisha program , which also advocated, for ex­ am ple, "th e realization of freedom in spiritual life" and of "equality in po­

48 Okawa translated sections o f Soloviev pertaining to war as "Sorobiefu no sensö ron", in vol. 4 of OSZ, 543-60 (originally published in Gekkan Nihon, June 1928). In his postwar autobiography Okawa wrote: "So lov iev ... has been my intellec­ tual sustenance for many years . . . " Anraku no mon, 736; see also Okawa Shümei shû, 248. M See O kaw a's introduction to Richard's Eien no chie, vol. 4 of OSZ, 866-67. 70 In an article, which rejects the applicability o f the concept of fascism to Japanese history, Duus and Okim oto specifically identify Kita Ikki as a fascist. See Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, "Fascism and the H istory of Pre-W ar Japan: The Failure of a C oncept," Journal o f Asian Studies 39 (November 1979): 65-76; esp. 67.

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The Dream o f One Asia

litical life /' contained nothing to w hich a conservative politician or bu­ reaucrat would object. If we consider Okawa as a conservative (rather than a radical) thinker, some of the apparent contradictions in his thought disappear. His admi­ ration for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, for exam ple, is not necessarily evi­ dence of the radicalism o f his view s or even sym pathy for communism as an ideology. Rather, it is a consequence of his anti-W esternism and is an expression of hope that communism as an Asian ideology [sic!] would de­ stroy W estern civilization and the m enacing liberal values it represents. By classifying Okawa as a conservative, it is also easier to understand his cordial relations w ith various senior governm ent officials. There was re­ ally no contradiction between those friendships and Okaw a's involve­ ment in various conspiracies and putsches. A fter all, none of Okaw a's friends in high places cam e to any harm. Nor does his indirect involve­ m ent in the assassination of Prim e M inister Inukai Tsuyoshi, a party pol­ itician par excellence, necessarily prove the radicalism of his view s, at least on the spectrum of Japanese politics. Like many other Japanese conserv­ atives, Okawa hated die established political parties, regarding them as a radical m enace to his ideal o f Japan and the help he gave the m urderers of Inukai stemmed from his hatred of parliam entarism , rather than from the radical nature of his views. The conservative nature of O kaw a's pan-Asianism does not dim inish in any way his responsibility for his contribution to bringing Japan closer to w ar, for, after all, it was the, now largely forgotten, conservative reac­ tion of the 1920s that paved the way for the tragic events of the 1930s and 1940s. From this perspective, the neglect of Okawa and his dream of one A sia is sym ptom atic of a broader issue, nam ely, Japan's unw illingness to com e to term s w ith its own past.

63

A C omparative Study of the T öyö K yökai and the N an ' yö K yökai H yung Gu L yn n

I n tr o d u c to r

W hile a vast storehouse of academ ic research has been accum ulated on Ja­ pan's prew ar political history and its relations w ith the rest of A sia, the m ajority of the research has coagulated around w ell-know n individuals and w ell-recognized institutions of the m odem nation-state, such as po­ litical parties, governm ents, and individual m inistries. There have been several w orks w hich have studied econom ic relations through private sector institutions such as individual zaibatsu, industry associations, and cham bers of com m erce, w hile a growing num ber of studies on interna­ tional conferences or Japanese overseas com m unities have been pro­ duced of late.1 However, analysis of other avenues of interaction, such as voluntary and non-governm ental associations, has been com paratively neglected. In fact, the pages of archives and history books are littered w ith an as­ sortm ent of nam es belonging to geographically specific foundations, as­ sociations, and organizations—Töyö Kyökai, N an'yö Kyökai, Chüö Chösen Kyökai, Kokuryükai, Töhö Kyökai, Nichi-Doku Bunka Kyökai, Nichi-M an Jitsugyö Kyökai, Nichi-Ro Kyökai, Nikka Jitsugyö Kyökai, N ihon-Biruma Kyökai, N ichi-In Kyökai, N ichi-Ran Kyökai, Fuirippin Kyökai, N ichi-Gö Kyökai, am ong many others. In addition to the seem ing proliferation of such associations, several of them had long organizational life spans. The Töyö Kyökai existed from 1898-1945 (forty-seven years) while the N an'yö Kyökai lasted from 1915-45 (thirty years). This longev­ ity is com parable to m ore fam iliar organizational entities such as the Sei-

1 See for exam ple, Namikata Shöichi, ed., Km dai A jia no Nihonjin keizai dantai (Tökyö: Döbunkan, 1997), especially Hashiya H iroshi, "Tônan Ajia ni okeru N ihonjinkai to N ihonjin shögyö kaigisho," 215-36; also Yoshikawa Yöko, "Senzen Filipin ni okeru höjin no 'kanm in sekkin' no közö," in TOnan A jia to Nihon, ed. Yano Töru (Tökyö: Köbundö, 1991), 129-46; and Mizuno Naoki, "1920 nendai Nihon-Chôsen-Chügoku ni okeru A jia ninshiki no ichidanm en-Ajia minzoku kaigi o m eguru sankoku no ronchó," in Kindai Nihon no A jia ninshiki, ed. Furuya Tetsuya (Tökyö: Ryokuin Shobö, 1996), 509-48.

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yükai (Qiyütö 1881] 1900-1940); Rikken Döshikai (1913-40), Kyöchökai (1919-46), or the W om en's Suffrage League (1925-40). D espite the proliferation and the longevity of these legally incorporat­ ed voluntary associations, few academic works have focused on the role of these organizations in prew ar Japanese dom estic and foreign affairs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the roles of two geographically specific associations, the Töyö Kyökai and the N an'yö Kyökai, and establish their significance in dom estic Japanese politics and in interactions w ith Asia in the prew ar period. Töyö Kyökai (East Asia Association) and N an'yö Kyökai (South Seas Association) w ere active in political, econom ic, educational, and cultural projects.2 In term s of foreign affairs, due in large part to their networks and resources, both associations w ere able to engage in data collection and research, publication, and educational activities regarding other countries in Asia. In dom estic politics, personal netw orks allowed for ef­ fective lobbying in cases related to Japan-Asia interactions, w hile having positions w ith such lobbying organizations kept the nam es of some of the executives in political prom inence. M ost im portantly, Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai w ere concrete em­ bodim ents of the cross-institutional political interlocks and coalitions un­ dergirding the surface politics of Nagata-chö. Previous scholarship has contributed greatly to a clearer understanding o f w orkings in official and private sector institutions by analyzing one institution, or by establishing detailed taxonom ies of factions and subdivisions w ithin a given m inistry, party, or m ilitary body. Distinguishing the leanings of one bureau in the Home A ffairs M inistry from another, or one faction in die arm y from an­ other is im portant for establishing the dynamics and channels of power w ithin the political system. However, official institutions can be julienned only so far. W hile cliques and divisions w ithin government institutions and political parties were im portant, these were not the only avenues for form ing interest coalitions. The constituents of the Töyö Kyökai and the N an'yö Kyökai w ere bureaucrats, scholars, politicians, m ilitary officials, and industrialists, cutting across form al departm ental lines and organiza­ tional hierarchies. I do not argue against the im portance of official affili­

2 Previous works which have focused on Töyö Kyökai or N an'yö Kyökai are Akashi Yöji, "N an'yö Kyökai, 1915-45," Shakai Kagaku Tökyü 40, no. 2 (December 1994): 1-29 (502-30); Go Kömei, "K indai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki: 'Taiwan Kyökai Kaihö' to ‘Töyö Jihö' o chüshin n i," in Kindai Nihon no A jia ninshiki, ed. Furuya, 211-42. A kashi's article is a solid description of the association's activities, while G o's article deals with the contents of the journal published by Töyö Kyökai rather than the organization itself.

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A Comparative Study o f the TOvO Kyökai and the Nan'vö KvOkai

ations, but radier exam ine dim ensions of foreign relations and policy­ making not adequately captured through analyses o f official institutions. In Japanese, the term that m ost accurately captures associations such as Töyö Kyökai and the N an'yö Kyökai is hanmin hankan dantai (sem i-pri­ vate, sem i-public organizations). To avoid the rather awkward transla­ tion, I use the term "voluntary associations" in this paper.3 The term "vol­ untary association" is com monly used in anthropology and sociology. W hile the definitions for the concept are still being debated among organ­ izational theorists, one point that is agreed upon is that these are not m erely synonym s for "volunteer organizations." The basic point is that in a voluntary organization, the m ajority of its m embers are not paid, and that it is not die prim ary place of work for the m ajority of its members. The antonym for voluntary associations are not "selfish " organizations, but governm ents, corporations, ascriptive organizations and social divi­ sions, such as tribes, classes, ethnic groups, and fam ilies. My definitions of die term for the purposes of the paper is as follows: Voluntary associations are form ally organized ... groups, m ost of whose participants do not derive their livelihoods from the organi­ zations' activities, although a few positions may receive pay as staff or leaders. A substantial proportion of associations consist of organ­ izations or persons w ith econom ic interests, such as trade associa­ tions, professional societies, and labor unions, w hile many others prom ote the non-econom ic concerns of their members. Association boundaries are often fuzzy and porous, since many involve episodic supporters and passively interested constituents who can be m obi­ lized under exceptional circum stances to provide financial or politi­ cal sustenance.4 3 There seem s to be much confusion over term s such as "voluntary associations," "N G O s," or even "organizations." To clarify the term inology used in this paper, I should state that NGOs are not, as is often construed in Japan, volunteer or­ ganizations concerned with promoting international harmony overseas (in Ja­ pan, for some reason, dom estic social w elfare associations are not included among NGOs), nor must they be environm entally concerned groups such as Greenpeace or the Audobon Society. "Non-govem m ental organization" means not officially part of the government. "Voluntary association" and " hanmin hankan dantai" are not legal term s, but sociological ones. The legal definitions for voluntary organizations vary according to country. For exam ple, in France, non­ profit organizations are called "association,” while those which are profit-orient­ ed are labeled “société,” whereas in Japan, foundations are divided into various types of "juridical persons" (hojin), such as zaidan höjin, shadan hojin, gakkô hOjin, etc. 4 Adapted from David Knoke and David Prensky, "W hat Relevance Do Organi­ zational Theories Have for Voluntary O rganizations," Social Science Quarterly 30, no. 3 (M arch 1984): 3 -4 .

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H vuns Cu Lynn

There are various types of organizations that fit fite definition, for exam* pie cham bers of com m erce, industry associations, political cam paigns, ac­ adem ic associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and grassroots neighborhood organizations am ong others. The m em bers of such associ­ ations can include average citizens and heads of states, depending on the objectives and boundaries of the group. Part I of the paper details the structures and resources of each organi­ zation and their activities in gathering and dissem inating inform ation on other parts of Asia. Part I, section tw o, profiles the educational activities w hich served as an im portant conduit for inform ation and im ages about Asia. Part H, section one, outlines specific lobbying activities undertaken by Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai, w hile section tw o analyzes the role of personal netw orks in lobbying. Part m addresses the im pact of gener­ ational change am ong the core leadership of the organizations, and the re­ sultant organizational decline in the 1930s.

P a r t 1: R eso u r c es a n d I n fo r m a tio n a l A c t iv it ie s

Inform ation Dissemination and O rganizational Profiles This section outlines organizational birth, boundaries, formal goals, legal status, and resources of Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai. Financial re­ sources, scale, legal environm ent, and other em pirical factors defined the extent to w hich each organization could conduct research, hold lectures throughout Japan, publish periodicals and booklets, and sponsor confer­ ences and exhibitions. W ith enough resources for regular publications and connections to sponsor and attract forum s and lecture tours, both Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai served as key non-official channels for shaping im ages of Asia in prew ar Japan.

TöyöK yökai Töyö Kyökai originated from the Taiw ankai, an inform al group for those who had either worked in or traveled to Taiwan. A t its second m eeting in Tökyö, the m otion to turn the Taiw ankai into a form al organization was accepted, and the Taiwan Kyökai was established in A pril 1898 to support the developm ent of Taiwan. The first president of the association w as Katsura Tarö,5 and the treasurer Okura Kihachirö. The executive included 5 Katsura's (1848-1913) interest in Taiwan stemmed from his brief days as the governor-general of Taiwan, 2 June-14 October 18% . Katsura spent a grand to ­ tal of nine days in Taiwan 0u ne 12-20) during his term .

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A Comparative Study o f the Tôyô Kyôkai and the Nan'vö Kyôkai

Taiw an Governm ent-General officials, such as M izuno Jun (first Taiw an Governm ent-General Civil A ffairs Departm ent Head), Izawa Shüji (first Taiwan Governm ent-General Education Departm ent Head), M aki Bokushin (first Taiw an Governm ent-General Internal A ffairs Departm ent Head), and business figures, such as O tani Kahei and Inoue Kakugorô. Political figures, such as Sakatani Yoshirö, Sone Arasuke, Kaneko Kantarö, and Taguchi Ukichi, also num bered am ong the directors. Taking its cue from its European counterparts, the Taiw an Kyôkai had no explicit and specific statem ents regarding political policies and plat­ forms in its charter. Its m ission was to prom ote econom ic interest and pro­ vide inform ation for the grand new colonial project in Taiwan. O ther stat­ ed objectives of the organization included sending researchers to Taiw an; gathering Taiw anese goods; expediting travel betw een Taiwan and Ja­ pan; assisting Japanese conducting business in Taiwan; creating opportu­ nities to learn and practice Taiw anese language; establishing the Taiwan Kaikan for Taiw anese visiting Japan; developing the association; holding lecture series on Taiw an; and supervising and caring for Taiwanese stu­ dents in Japan. Reflecting the expansion of Japanese interests in Korea and M anchuria, Taiwan Kyôkai changed its nam e to Tôyô Kyôkai in February 1907, and the organizational charter w as revised to include Korea and M anchuria.67*9 The dissem ination of inform ation regarding Taiw an, Korea, and Manchu­ ria, conducting research on the socioeconom ic conditions of the three ar­ eas, training of personnel to work in private and public sectors in the three areas, publishing its organ paper, holding lectures, and collecting re­ search m aterials w ere some of the goals in the revised charter. The ex­ panded roster of directors included business figures connected to the Mit­ subishi zaibatsu, (e.g., Iw asaki Yanosuke, Toyokawa Ryöhei) and the M itsui zaibatsu (e.g., Hayakawa Senkichirö, Fujiwara G injirö, Ariga Nagafum i), w hile younger bureaucrats and politicians, such as Gotö Shinpei, M achida Chüji, and Sekiya Teizaburö, also joined the association. In term s of its boundaries and scale, Tôyô Kyôkai had five branches by 1907. It established branches in Taipei (January 1899), and Osaka (April 1899)/ w hile the Seoul and M anchurian branches w ere both started in

6 Katsura's speech on the occasion of the name change is reproduced in full in Tokutomi Sohö (Iichirö), ed., Kôshaku Katsura Taró den, 2 (konkan) (Tökyö: Ko Katsura Köshaku Kinen Jigyókai, 1917), 916-22. 7 The Osaka branch was started up in 1899, but was dissolved due to lack of in­ terest. It was revived again under Goto Shinpei, with long-tim e Osaka city may­ or, Ikegami ShirO, as the brandi head. See Tôyô Kyôkai-Osaka shibu ktyaku rnrabi meibo (Tökyö: Töyö Kyôkai, 1924); and "Tôyô Kyôkai shohôkoku," Tôyô 28, no. 9 (Septem ber 1925): 2.

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M ay 1907.8 In m embership num bers, at its inception in 1898, the associa­ tion had around 80 m em bers, but this expanded to over 1,700 by the end of 1899. By Septem ber of 1923, its m embership had grown to 2,994. How­ ever, the num bers began to decline after 1929, so that in 1936, the organi­ zation had 1,904 m embers, and by 1944,1,840 members.9 General mem­ bership fees for the Töyö Kyökai w ere ¥50 per m onth, w hile one becam e a special member by donating m ore than ¥100 or ¥1,000 at a tim e. Honor­ ary m embers did not have to pay fees, but had to be recommended by the association president. Commonly, several members of a branch in the start-up phase made large contributions in their own nam e, or in their com pany name. These funds constituted the initial branch endowment. For regular operations and special projects, these m embership fées con­ stituted only a sm all percentage of the association funding source. Initial endowment at establishm ent in 1898 was solicited from individual exec­ utives of the top zaibatsu, as w ell as from individual politicians and bu­ reaucrats. In legal term s, Töyö Kyökai was initially a m idan hôjin (a jurid­ ical foundation) but changed to a shadan hôjin (a corporate juridical association)8910 in July 1914.11 This change in status made it possible to sell advertisem ent space in its journals, invest in stocks, and generate reve­ nues from tire activities of its individual members. Töyö Kyökai owned stocks and real estate, and held long-term savings accounts in several banks. For its research division, the association received subsidies from the Taiw an Governm ent-General on specific projects, w hile special exhi­ bitions and tire like garnered endowments from tire Governm ent-General of Korea, Taiw an, South M anchurian Railw ay, and Karafuto O ffice.12 N evertheless, the funding situation was not alw ays stable, especially after Katsura's death in 1913, and the resulting decline in political pull during second president Kom atsubara Eitarö's tenure (1913-19). By the post-First W orld W ar slump, there w ere even suggestions at the executive m eetings that the m onthly periodical, Töyö, should be discontinued as it

8 Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi (Tökyö: Takushoku Daigaku, 1955), 105. 9 Membership numbers are listed in the annual reports in Töyö Jihö and Töyö. 10 The difference between a zaidan höjin (Stiftungsperson) and a shadan hôjin (Körper­ schaftsperson), in principle, is that a zaidan hôjin operates on an endowment, whereas a shadan hôjin operates from the assets of its members and can generate profits through activities of its members. These distinctions were generally de­ rived from German civil law. The basic articles relevant to zaidan and shadan hôjin are articles 37-39 of the Japanese C ivil Law Codes, established in 18% . For further details, see, for exam ple, Hayashi Toshiji, Zaidan-Zaidan hôjin no kenkyü (Tökyö: Shönandö, 1983). 11 Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi (Tökyö: Takushoku Daigaku, 1980), 181. 12 See for exam ple, the "Töyö katsudö shashinkan shüshi kessan," section of "Töyö Kyökai shohökoku," Töyö 26, no. 9 (Septem ber 1923): 21-22.

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A Comparative Study o f the Töyö KvOkai and the Nan'yö Kyökai

was a financial drain despite the sales of subscriptions and advertisem ent space.13 Generally, however, the association was able to keep out of the red in its annual accounts.14 Töyö Kyökai's m ain publication was a m onthly journal w hich was in­ tended to provide inform ation on events in Taiwan and the rest of East Asia. Taiwan Kyökai kaihô was published from 1898 to January 1907 for vol­ umes 1-10. The name w as changed to Töyö Jihö (1907-21) for volum es 1 124, then to Töyö (1921-July 1944) from volum e 24 for a total of 47 vol­ um es.15A typical issue of Töyö covered Taiwan, Korea, Russia, China, and occasionally Brazil or Central A sia, and some fiction. M ost of the articles dealt w ith econom ic issues, but there w ere occasional articles on art his­ tory, travelogues, the role of cows in human history, and political opinion pieces. Despite the fact that Taiwan was no longer the novelty colonial project that it was at the tim e of the Töyö Kyökai's birth, the m onthly fea­ tured regular contributions from and on Taiwan. Töyö Kyökai also pub­ lished a w eekly new spaper, the Töyö W eekly, the academ ic journal Töyö Gakuhö, a forum for dissem inating research findings concerning East Asia, and over fifty separate research booklets on a variety of topics.16 Töyö Kyökai-sponsored events w ere one of few non-govem m ental fo­ rums for dissem inating inform ation about Asia w ithin Japan. For exam­ ple, in February 1923, the association sponsored a China Custom s Exhi­ bitions H all in Tökyö in w hich clothing, transportation, foods, wedding cerem onies, school uniform s, shoes, and other item s and scenes of China w ere presented in dioram ic displays for a m onth. In the sam e year, a na­ tionw ide lecture tour on overseas events drew average audiences of around one thousand for each lecture. Annual tours of Taiw an and South China, and occasional tours of Korea and M anchuria, w ith com plete itin­ eraries—including visits to the office of the Governor-General of Tai­ wan—w ere also run by the association. A t ¥550 per person, and a ceiling of forty people, these tours w ere not intended to generate profits through m ass-m arketing tourism to Taiw an, but they w ere intended to make Tai­ wan m ore accessible to those w ith m oney to invest or political pow er to wield.

13 "Töyö Kyökai shohökoku," Töyö 28, no. 9 (Septem ber 1925): 2-3. 14 See, for exam ple, the balance sheets for 1936 or 1944. "Kaim u hökoku," Töyö 32, no. 12 (December 1936): 180; and "Kaim u hökoku," Töyö 46, no. 3 (M arch 1943): 53. 15 Go Kömei m istakenly states that Töyö was published until December 1942. Go, "Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki," 212. 16 For a listing of the research booklet titles to 1943, see the back of Shim seiboku ra­ to gaiken 51 (Tökyö: Töyö Kyökai, 1943).

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The success of Töyö Kyökai, a non-profit association, in m aintaining publishing activities for som e forty-six years was in large part due to its mem bership. W ith executives representing a w ide range of business and political interests, Töyö Kyökai was able to attract funds from various governm ental and private sources.

Nan'yö Kyökai The genealogy of the N an'yö Kyökai can be traced back to fite N an'yö Kondankai, established in 1912 by president of foe Nan-A Köshi, Inoue M asaji,17 head of foe Taiw an Governm ent-General C ivil A ffairs Depart­ m ent, Uchida Kakichi,18 president of M alay Gomu Köshi, Hoshino Shakuo,19and a number of Japanese entrepreneurs operating in Southeast Asia and officials o f foe Taiw an Governm ent-General.20 In late December 1913, foe members of fois group established foe N an'yö Kyökai to further facilitate contacts between Taiw an Governm ent-General officials and Jap­ anese businessm en operating in Southeast Asia. This first incarnation of

17 Bom in 1877, Inoue graduated from W aseda, then went to the University of Ber­ lin, where he studied colonial adm inistration and econom ics. As a member of the Töa DObunkai, he was sent to Korea to be financial advisor to the Korean governm ent, and later secretary to the M inistry of the Im perial Household of Korea in 1905. In 1911, after consulting with a number of people, among them Ma kino Nobuaki, Den Kenjirö, Akashi M otojirö, Yamagata Aritomo, and Okuma Shigenobu, he established Nan-A Köshi with financial help from Morimura Ichizaemon. Nagami Shichirö, Kßa ichiro Inoue M asaji (Tökyö: Tökö Shoin, 1941), 514-15,527-28. 18 Uchida was bom in 1866 and graduated from the Im perial University of Tökyö. After serving in the M inistry of Telecom m unications, he becam e the director of Civilian Adm inistrator in the Taiwan Governm ent-General under GovernorGenerals Sakuma and Andö. He was in the post from 22 August 1910 to 19 Oc­ tober 1915 and was appointed vice m inister of telecom m unications in 1917 un­ der Den Kenjirö. Uchida was appointed to succeed Den as governor-general of Taiwan and served in the post from 6 Septem ber 1923 to 1 Septem ber 1924. He becam e the first president of Japan Telegraphic and W ireless, Co., in 1925. O ther directors of the firm included Shibusawa Eiichi, Nakajima Kumakichi, W ada Toyoji, Gô Seinosuke, and Hara Tom itarö. Uchida died in January 1933. See Kokusai denki tsüshin kabushiki kaishashi (Tökyö: Kokusai denki tsúshin kabushiki kaisha, 1949), 9-10; and Uchida Makoto, Chichi (Tökyö: Sôgabô, 1935). 19 Hoshino was bom in 1853 and is best known for promoting sm all and medium enterprises. Among various posts, he was president of Manshü Nichi Nichi Shinbun, director of Nihon Seitö, and was vice president of the Tökyö Chamber of Commerce from 1907-17. He was president of the Nihon Jitsugyö Kumiai Rengökai, from 1908, and also active in various other organizations. Hoshino Shakuo Ó Kanshakai, Hoshino Shakuo 0 den (Tökyö: Hoshino Shakuo 0 Kanshakai, 1935). 20 Nagami, Inoue M asaji, 611-12; and Nishioka Kaori, ShingapOru noN ihonjin shakaishi (Tökyö: Fuyö Shobö, 1997), 49.

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A Comparative Study o f the Tövö KvOkai and the Nan'yö Kyökai

the N an'yö Kyökai w as dissolved due to lack of interests and funds. Inoue him self was busy m anaging Nan-A Köshi in its initial stages of operation, and could not devote m uch tim e to the organization. H ie second and m ore lasting incarnation of the N an'yö Kyökai was formed in January 1915 by die sam e com bination of Inoue M asaji and Uchida Kakichi. Due to the explosion in exports to N an'yö and Southeast Asia in 1914-16, Inoue and Uchida were able to accum ulate support for a new association devoted to conducting research on Southeast Asia and dissem inating the results. Eighteen prom inent figures from politics and business, including Den Kenjirö, Ogawa H eikichi, Yamamoto Teijirö, Shibusawa Eiichi, Otani Kahei, W ada Toyoji, Hayakawa Senkichirö (M itsui Bank), Fukui Kikusaburö (M itsui Trading), and Kondö Yasuhei (NYK), gave their endorsem ents to the new organization. Financial support was provided by the Taiw an Governm ent-General, die Foreign A ffairs M inis­ try and die Commerce and Agriculture M inistry. The executive of the N an'yö Kyökai consisted of one president, two vice presidents, one exec­ utive director, one general m anager, one treasurer, and an unspecified number of directors. A t its inaugural general assem bly, Uchida stated in his opening re­ marks that the N an'yö Kyökai "harbors no political am bitions, and con­ sequently w ill not have connections to any political party or political fac­ tion. Furtherm ore, our association w ill not direcdy manage any enterprises."21 Describing the Töyö Kyökai as being prim arily concerned w ith Sinic cultures, the N an'yö Kyökai specified that die territory that fit under the rubric of "N an 'yö" (South Seas) included Southeast A sia, as well as the South Seas Islands.22 Among its other various m issions, the as­ sociation was to conduct research on N an'yö and prom ote m utual under­ standing between Japan and the area; research-specific industries, sys­ tem s, societies of N an'yö; introduce the research results to Japanese; dissem inate inform ation about Japan in N an'yö; train personnel for in-

21 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi (Tökyö: N an'yö Kyökai, 1925), 4. 22 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 2 ,6 . My use of the term for this paper w ill also cover both areas. The term s Inner and Outer N an'yö were used to differentiate be­ tween the Japanese mandate islands in M icronesia, and also Southeast Asia in general. My use of the term N an'yö includes all of Southeast Asia and the South Seas. In 1940, after "G reater Co-Prosperity Sphere" becam e part of the official lingo, "N anpö" becam e the prim ary term for the area. For a m ore detailed dis­ cussion of the definitions of the term , see, for exam ple, Yano Töru, "Nanshin " no keifu (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1975), 6 -6 ; Yano Töru, Nihon no Nan'yö shikan (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1979), 112,123-24; and Shim izu Hajime, "Senkanki Nihon-keizaiteki "N anshin" no shisöteki haikei," in Senkanki Tönan A jia no keizai masatsu, ed. Sugiyama Shin'ya and Ian Brown (Tökyö: Döbunkan, 1990), 13-44.

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dustries operating in the area; sponsor lectures about die area; and set up a N an'yö museum and library.23 The first president was Yoshikawa Akimasa,24 w hile Uchida Kakichi was elected to one of the two vice presidencies. The treasurer was Hayakawa Senkichirö, and directors included Den Kenjirö, Fukui Kikusaburö, Gö Seinosuke, Hoshino Shakuo, Inoue M asaji, Nitobe Inazö, Ogawa Heikichi, Tokonami Takejirö, Shibusawa Eiichi, and W ada Toyoji. W hen Yoshikawa Akim asa, whose interest in Southeast Asia was not particular­ ly ardent, becam e ill, Den Kenjirö was elected in his place in May 1919. Hayakawa took over as vice president after Yoshikaw a's death, and when Hayakawa died, the post was filled by Wada (1923), dien Fujiyam a Raita (1924). In 1920, Inoue M asaji was appointed as executive director, w hile another core m em ber, Iizum i Ryözö, becam e general m anager of the as­ sociation in 1921. At its conception in January 1915, the organization had 79 members. By December 1915 it had grown to 360 members, including members of the Taiw an branch. By 1923, N an'yö Kyökai had grown to 1,450 members, and by 1929, it had 1,386 members.25 N an'yö Kyökai started out w ith three ma­ jor centers of operation in Tökyö, Taiwan, and Singapore. The Tökyö headquarters was first tem porarily located in the Taiwan GovernmentG eneral's Tökyö office, then it was moved to a building in Yaesu. By the end of 1944, the association had branches in Tökyö, Taipei (est. 1916), Sin­ gapore (1916), Java (Batavia, 1921), Kansai (Osaka, 1923), M icronesian is­ lands (Palau, 1923), Manila (1924), Tökai (Nagoya, 1924), Davao (1929), Su­ matra (Medan, 1929), Kanagawa Prefecture (Yokohama, 1941), Hiroshima (1942), Yamaguchi Prefecture (1944), Thailand (Bangkok), and an office in Saigon for its members in French Indochina. The branches in Japan re­ ceived donations and subsidies from prefectural and city governments and generally had sim ilar operating budgets of around ¥10,000 per year.26 W hile the branches received subsidies from local governm ents, die head branch in Tökyö was fueled by large donations from the Taiwan Governm ent-General. M embership fees w ere ¥6 per year but required the introduction of at least two members. A supporting member had to do­ 23 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 7 -8. For a slightly diderent translation, see Akashi, "N an'yö Kyökai," 4. 24 Yoshikawa Akimasa (1841-1920) was a politician w ho, after a tenure as Tökyö governor, served as m inister of education, home affairs, justice, and communi­ cations during the period between 1890 and 1903. 25 Annual numbers and detailed breakdowns by branch can be found in die annu­ al summary reports presented by the association vice presidents in Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, and annual reports in issues of Nan'yö and Nan'yö Kyökai Zasshi. 26 See for example account sheets for the Kanagawa and Hiroshima branches, Nan'yö 28, no. 2 (February 1942): 155, and Nan’yö 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 140.

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A Comparative Study o f the Töyö KvOkai and the N an’yö Kvökai

nate ¥50 at one tim e, w hile an honorary m em ber had to be recommended by directors and approved by the president of the association.27 By 1944, the fees had changed to ¥12 year, or a ¥200 donation in lump sum , or a ¥500 donation in lump sum. Unlike the Tôyô Kyökai, N an'yö Kyökai started as a shadan höjin, then becam e a zaidan hSjin in January 1939. This change made the association even m ore dependent on funds from the Foreign A ffairs M inistry and the Colonial M inistry. N an'yö Kyökai also operated com m ercial museums in Singapore (est. 1918) and Surabaya (est. 1924). The Singapore museum was started at the behest of the M inistry of Agriculture and Com merce, (which provided five-eighths of its operating budget). According to the association's statis­ tics, in its first year of operation, the museum in Singapore drew an aver­ age of 170 people per day.28 A student center, which also served as a hotel for Japanese businessm en traveling through Singapore, was housed in the sam e building as the museum.29 The N an'yö library in the organiza­ tional charter had collected 930 volum es by 1920. The association also supported tem porary exhibitions, lecture series, and conferences. Members of N an'yö Kyökai lectured in various places within Japan, and a lecture series was held on a w eekly basis at numerous lecture h alb in Tökyö. In 1920, N an'yö Products Exhibition, organized by the association w ith the help of the [h itch East Indies Government-Gen­ eral and the Java Bank, toured the m ajor cities of Japan, displaying cus­ toms and products of N an'yö. A conférence on exchange rates w as spon­ sored jointly w ith the N ichi-In Kyökai and two other organizations. Another conference N an'yö Kyökai organized was the Conference on Nan'yö Economic A ffairs, held from 14-22 Septem ber 1939 in Tokyo and Osaka.30 Sim ilar to Töyö Kyökai, N an'yö Kyökai organized regular tours of the N an'yö area. In 1926, N an'yö Kyökai and Töyö Kyökai jointly spon­ sored an inspection tour of N an'yö industries. Unlike Töyö Kyökai, much of the research activity of N an'yö Kyökai was left to the branch offices. The Taiw an branch w as especially active in all areas, including language training, publishing, and conducting re­ search on Taiw an and surrounding areas. Each branch surveyed natural resources in its area and reported back to the Tokyo head branch. In Oc­

27 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 7. 28 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 50. 29 For details on the Surabaya museum, see Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 206-10. For budgetary details see 94-97. Branch museums were established in Medan and Batavia. 30 N an'yö Kyökai, Nan'yö keizai kondankai hökokusho (Tökyö: N an'yö Kyökai, 1940). Vice President Hayashi Kyüjirö and Executive Director Iizumi Ryözö were par­ ticularly active in organizing the event.

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tober 1942, N an'yö Kyökai set up die Institute for Living Conditions in the Nanpö (Nanpö Seikatsu Kenkyûjo) in Java to conduct research on health and health econom ics in foe region.31 This institute published a m onthly journal, Nanpö Seikatsu, in addition to conducting its research on m edical science relevant to foe tropics. Specific research projects on em igration possibilities in N orth Borneo, Cam eron Highlands, Siam , and other places w ere also undertaken.32 Even as late as 1943, m uch of foe rhetoric sur­ rounding N an'yö clung w ith am azing tenacity to foe perennial dream of the undiscovered tropical em igration paradise o f endless natural resourc­ es and low population density.33 The publication activities of the association w ere as prolific, if not m ore so, than those of foe Töyö Kyökai. N an'yö K yökai's m onthly w as first called foe Nan'yö Kyökai Kaihö, then changed to Nan'yö Kyökai Zasshi, and lastly to Nan'yö. The periodical w as published m onthly from Janu­ ary 1915 to O ctober 1944 for a total of thirty volum es. D etailed statistical inform ation on various industries and travelogues w ere featured in the m onthly. From 1919-25, the Singapore branch published a separate m onthly entitled Nan'yö K eizai Jihö, w hich w as eventually incorporated into foe m ain publication, w hile the Java branch published foe Ranryö Indo Jihö. As w ith foe Töyö Kyökai, the N an'yö Kyökai published a con­ tinuing series of research booklets w hich totaled over fifty. M ost detailed the conditions of a specific industry in one area, such as agriculture in the Philippines, or com m ercial law s pertaining to the Dutch East Indies.

Educational A ctivities One of the m ost im portant m ethods of inform ation collection and dissem ­ ination was the training of personnel to work abroad in China, the colo­ nies, and the Southeast Asia-South Seas. M ark Peattie's statem ent that Japanese colonialism had "no specialized colonial service or colonial school, like those in Britain and France, to provide particular training in colonial adm inistration,"34 is accurate in the sense that there w ere no in­ stitutions devoted solely to foe production of a colonial bureaucracy. However, his rem arks give the m isleading im pression that there w ere no

31 "H on kyökai ni Nanpö seikatsu kenkyüjo o setchi," N an’yö 28, no. 12 (December 1942): 140; Iizum i Ryözö, "N anpö seikatsu kagaku kenkyûkai no kaisetsu," N an’yö 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 1. 32 For details, see Hara Fujio, Eiryö M araya no Nihonjin (Tökyö: Ajia Keizai Kenkyû­ jo, 1986), 66-115. 33 See for exam ple, Iizum a Ryözö, Nan’yö 29, no. 5 (M ay 1943): 2. 34 M ark Peattie, Nan’yö: The Rise and Fall c f the Japanese in M icronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu: University of H awaii Press, 1988), 71.

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A Comparative Study o f the Töyö KvOkai and the Nan’yö KvOkai

private institutions of higher education w hich explicitly focused on over­ seas Japanese and W estern colonies in Asia.35 Although both associations trained significant num bers of students in area-specific knowledge and language, Töyö K yökai's educational projects had m ore im pact in that they trained a greater num ber of students and operated their educational facilities longer than did those of N an'yö Kyökai.

TöyöK yökai If one takes the M arunouchi subway line from Tökyö to M yögadani sta­ tion, in addition to the better-know n Ochanomizu W om en's U niversity, one can find the legacy of Töyö Kyökai's educational project, originally started in 1900. Takushoku University36 was intended to train people to work in the public and private sectors in the colonies and overseas. As M izuno Jun put it, British bureaucrats in India spent two years learning "In­ dian," then spent two years in India for further training before stepping into their perm anent posts.37 The objective was to train people to w ork in Taiw an, either as public officials or in the private sector. Katsura was one of the strongest advocates of developing Taiw an as a gateway for expansion of trade in Southeast Asia and South China. To ad­ m inister Taiw an and conduct business in the area, Japanese w ith Taiwan­ ese language ability would expedite developm ent. The second president of Töyö Kyökai and fite school, Kom atsubara Eitarö, in a speech to the in­ com ing class of April 1917, emphasized Taiw an and its links to N an'yö, 35 The best-known of the area-specific training schools w as the Töa Döbun Shoin in Shanghai, founded by the Töa Döbunkai, which trained China specialists. For details, see, for exam ple, Daigakushi Hensan Iinkai, Töa Döbun Shoin Daigakushi (Tökyö: Koyükai, 1982); and Kurita Hisaya, Shanhai Töa Döbun Shoin (Tökyö: Shinjinbutsu Jüraisha, 1993). Another school, Daitö Bunka Daigaku, was found­ ed in 1923 by foe Daitö Bunka Kyökai, an association of peers and Diet members. The president w as Count Oki Ènkichi, and the vice president, Ogawa H eikichi. Another exam ple w as the N ichi-Ro Kyökai's higher com m ercial school operat­ ing out o f its Harbin Com m ercial Museum, established in 1918 to further trade with Russia. See for exam ple, Nagami, Inoue M asaji, 618; Gotö Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tam e n i," Töyö 28, no. 6 Gime 1925): 2 -3 ; 'T ö y ö Kyökai kin ji," Töyö 28, no. 7 (July 1925): 178; and Daitö bunka daigaku 50 nenshi (Tökyö: Daitö Bunka Gakuen, 1973). There were other Japanese higher schools in foreign cities that were not related to area training, such as the m edical school founded in Shang­ hai by the Döjinkai. 36 The school went through numerous name changes. It was first named Taiwan Kyökai Gakkö, then Taiwan Kyökai Senmon Gakkö. W hen the Taiwan Kyökai becam e the Töyö Kyökai, the school name was changed to Töyö Kyökai Senmon Gakkö, then to Töyö Kyökai Shokumin Senmon Gakkö, then to Takushoku Daigaku. There was yet another change to Töyö Kyökai Daigaku in 1922, then back to Takushoku Daigaku in 1926. 37 Taiwan Kyökai Kaihö 1, no. 8 (20 May 1899): 3.

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Korea, and its gateway position to M anchuria and Siberia. N oting the high enrollm ents in the school for Chinese, Kom atsubara noted that Tai­ w anese and Korean w ere the school's areas of com petitive advantage and encouraged students to take up the latter two languages.38 Aside horn the aforem entioned languages, English, Russian, econom ics, statistics, com­ m ercial, colonial, and constitutional law , classical Japanese, w riting, Asian history, and m athem atics w ere some of the other subjects in the school curriculum . During its first thirty years, som e notable names taught as faculty at the school, am ong them Ariyoshi Chûichi, Baba Eiichi, Izum i Tetsu, N itobe Inazö, and Okawa Shümei. O f the first graduating class of 1903,21 out of 45 w ent into the Taiwan Governm ent-General. But by the third class, the geographic distribution of graduates had becom e m ore varied. By 1919, of the total 1,075 gradu­ ates of the school, 85 were in Taiw an, 336 in Korea, 146 in M anchuria, 75 in Central China, 8 in Southern China, 8 in Siberia, 17 in N an'yö, and 353 in Japan.39 According to its survey in 1929,908 of its alum ni w ere in Japan, 75 in Taiw an, 288 in Korea, 197 in M anchuria, 89 in China, 17 in N an'yö, and 27 in other foreign countries. O f these 1,128 w ere in the private sector, w hile 168 w ere public officials employed by one of the m inistries or in a colonial adm inistration.40 The notable decline in graduates who entered official colonial adm inistration was prim arily due to the system atization of staffing procedures for the colonial governm ents, where bureaucrats from the various m inistries, especially the Home M inistry, came to be ro­ tated in and out of the colonies. In April 1919, succeeding Katsura and Kom atsubara, Gotö Shinpei be­ came the third president of the university and Töyö Kyökai. He held both positions until his death in April 1929. In 1922, the school received ap­ proval from the M inistry of Education in its change from a technical col­ lege (senmon gakkô) to a university. According to M inistry of Education regulations, a new university had to possess a ¥500,000 endowment to be given university accreditation. The subsidies from Taiwan Governm entGeneral to the school had stopped dining Kom atsubara's term , and Töyö Kyökai could only afford to give the school ¥200,000 in real estate and liquid assets.41 In this pinch, Goto called upon his connections to persuade a num ber of sugar m anufacturing com panies operating in Taiw an to do­ nate the ¥500,000 in 1921.42 38 39 40 41 42

Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi, 196. Ibid., 211,272. Ibid., 270-73. Ibid., 311. Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi, 253. For details on G otö's policies on sugar during his days in Taiwan, see for exam ple, Tsurumi Yúsuke, Goto Shinpei 2 (Tökyö:

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A Comparative Study o f the Töyö Kyökai and the N an’vö Kyökai

Nagata H idejirö, who had follow ed on G otö's heels as the m ayor of Tokyo,43 also succeeded Gotö as the president of the university in April 1929 after G otö's death. Unlike his predecessor, Nagata was not concur­ rently president of Töyö Kyökai, but its vice president under the fourth president M izuno Rentarö. M izuno had not been associated w ith the uni­ versity previously, whereas Nagata had served as a director. In 1932, to cope w ith the increasing num ber of students, the school moved to a new campus, die location of the present-day campus in M yögadani. In 1940, another campus was opened in Kodaira (Hanakoganei) for university preparatory students.44 The Töyö Kyökai provided lim ited number of scholarships to students of Takushoku University. For exam ple, starting in 1936, three students rec­ ommended by the school w ere given scholarships of ¥ 3 5 per m onth, w hile another six recommendees were sent on all-expenses-paid research trips, two each to M anchuria and China, and one each to Taiwan and Korea, to study custom s, traditions, and educational system s of each area.45 In Sep­ tember 1943, the French Indochina Academy (Futsu-In Gakuin) w as estab­ lished on the Takushoku University campus. The academy conducted in­ struction in Vietnam ese (Annamese) and French for fifty students.46 A fter N agata's death in Septem ber 1943, Okura Kinmochi,47 who was the university dean, took over as president on a tem porary basis. In March 1944, Ugaki Kazushige was appointed by the board of directors as the new university president. Although the school had 3,367 students en­ rolled for the 1943 academ ic year, w ith many of the senior students mo­ bilized into labor team s in farms and coal m ines, the president and the school board of trustees had few educational issues to address.48 Töyö Kyökai also operated other educational and research institutes. In 1907, it established a branch campus of the college in Keijö (Seoul). The Keijö branch becam e independent of the parent school in 1918 and was taken over by the Governm ent-General and renamed Keijö H igher Com-

KeisöShobö, 1937-38, reprint 1965); and Nonaka Fum io, Nan'yd toM atsue Shunji (Tökyö: Jidaisha, 1941), 105-10. 43 Goto was m ayor from 17 December 1920-28 May 1923, w hile Nagata w as mayor from 29 May 1923-7 O ctober 1924. 44 Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi, 320-21. 45 "Kaim u hökoku," Töyö 39, no. 8 (August 1936): 177. 46 "Kaim u hökoku," Töyö 46, no. 7 (July 1943): 107. 47 Okura Kinm ochi (1882-1968) is better known as a director of South M anchurian Railway from 1906 to 1931, or for his role in form ation of the aborted Ugaki cab­ inet, or as the executive director of the N ational Policy Research Group (Kokusaku Kenkyükai). 44 The 1944 board of trustees consisted of Ugaki, Okura, Akaike Atsushi, and M i­ zuno Rentarö.

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m erdal School in 1920.49 This school w as one of the few avenues of up­ ward social m obility for Koreans under colonial rule, as the top graduat­ ing students from each class were virtually guaranteed jobs in the private sector.50 In Taihoku (Taipei), the association operated the Taiwan Higher Com mercial School, established in 1919. As w ith its counterpart in Korea, alm ost tw o-thirds of the students w ere Japanese,51 but the Taiw anese who graduated from the school had considerably better em ploym ent pros­ pects than those of other schools.52 In Septem ber 1910, Töyö Kyökai estab­ lished the Dairen Com m ercial School w ith 379 entering students, w ith a w om en's education section that w as eventually spun off into a separate school. A lso in 1910, the Töyö Kyökai Ryojun (Port Arthur) Language School was opened w ith 255 incom ing students,53 w hile the Shinkyö (Shinjian) Language Research Center w as started up in M anchuria in 1932. Additionally, the association provided housing for a lim ited num ber of Taiw anese students in Japan in the Taiw an Kaikan, and kept track of the num ber of Taiwanese and Korean students in m iddle school and higher educational institutions in Japan.

Nan'yö Kyökai The N an'yö Kyökai's educational undertakings w ere conducted on a far sm aller scale and in a m ore sporadic fashion than those of the Töyö Kyökai. The association began several language courses soon after its es­ tablishm ent, but did not start an official school of higher learning until 1942. Through its fragmented but num erous educational program s, N an'yö Kyökai prom oted the im age of N an'yö as a land of opportunity, w ith infinite resources for those who wanted a tropical adventure. In ad­ dition to providing inform ation, it was later able to provide capital assist­ ance for would-be entrepreneurs, further reinforcing the im ages of tropi­ cal paradises and lim itless natural resources.

49 Governm ent-General of Korea, "Revised Educational Regulations for Chosen" (1922), 3. 90 The top five of a graduating class from the Keijô Higher Commercial School gen­ erally entered one of the m ajor banks, while the next ten or so entered trading com panies. Usually, 600 or so Koreans applied for 60 slots for each year. Japa­ nese students constituted the other 120 for each year. Interview w ith Choe Daesuk, class of 1938, Seoul, 13 July 19% . 51 For exam ple, in 1925,229 out of the total 547 students were Japanese, w hile in 1936,238 out of 573 were Japanese. 52 See George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule M ovement, 1895-1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 178; Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugika no Taiwan (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1929, reprint 1988) 154-59. 53 Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenski, 113.

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A Comparative Study o f the TOvO KvOkai and the Nan'yö Kvökai

Recognizing the need for foreign languages in conducting business, N an'yö Kyökai conducted Dutch and M alay language courses from 1917 to 1941 at its Tökyö branch,54 w ith a hiatus betw een 1931 and 1936 due to a shortage of funds and a gradual drop in enrollm ents. The association's Taiw an branch held Dutch, English, and M alay language courses from 1916 to 1931. Regularly scheduled lectures on N an'yö provided another inform al forum for learning about the natural resources and cultural cus­ toms of die N an'yö area. Inoue and N an'yö Kyökai started a training program to supply busi­ nesses operating in Southeast Asia w ith personnel equipped w ith area knowledge. The Taiw an Governm ent-General gave ¥15,000 for the project, w hile Foreign A ffairs M inister Ishii Kikujirö donated ¥3,000, and A griculture and Commerce M inister Köno Hironaka gave ¥2,000. M itsui, Kuhara, M itsubishi, Furukawa, NYK, and other large firm s contributed another ¥140,000.55 The one-year training took place in the Singapore Com mercial Museum w ith the first class starting in Septem ber 1918. The program , called the Com mercial Practical Training System , which includ­ ed training in Dutch, M alay, and English, was discontinued after the sec­ ond class graduated (1st class 20 students, 2nd class 11) in 1920, due to a shortage of operating funds and lack of corporate interest. Some of the problem s in m anaging the program are reflected in N an'yö Kyökai exec­ utive director Ishikaw a's annual report to the general assem bly in 1919, in which he directed criticism at the M inistry of Education for its lack of in­ terest in prom oting education related to N an'yö in Japanese schools, and the M inistry of A griculture and Commerce for its overem phasis on tech­ nical and vocational training.56 In 1929, a sim ilar program , the Nanpö Practical Com mercial Training Program (Nanpö Shögyö Jisshùsei Seido) was started up on a larger scale in response to dem ands voiced by business. W ith financing from the For­ eign A ffairs M inistry, the program was free o f charge for those accepted, and m oreover, provided help w ith capital for those who com pleted the course and rem ained in N an'yö and opened their own business. This pro­ gram proved to be m ore successful. By 1943, N an'yö Kyökai had trained some 798 people, of whom 669 rem ained in N an'yö.57 In 1942, the association launched its first official school, the N an'yö Gakuin Technical School in Saigon. Under the supervision of the Foreign

54 Malay was started in 1922. 55 Nagami, Inoue M asaji, 616-17. Kondö Renpei was the head of the fund-raising drive. 56 Nan’yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 64-65. 57 Akashi, "N an'yö Kyökai," 16.

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A ffairs M inistry, and funded by die m inistry to the tune of ¥278,752, its day-to-day managem ent was subcontracted to the N an'yö Kyökai. Ac­ cording to one alumnus of the N an'yö Gakuin, the school was placed in Saigon to fortify relations w ith the Vichy Governm ent-General.58 It is also likely that as the area was not under direct Japanese control, it was not feasible to sim ply send Japanese teachers to local schools. This was pos­ sible in areas such as Singapore, w here the 25th Army recruited local Jap­ anese schoolteachers to train local schoolteachers in Japanese language education.59 Several army and navy officials from die General Staff O ffice w ere present at the opening cerem onies for the N an'yö Gakuin, sym bolizing the strong interest of m ilitary in school. All m ilitary officials present stressed the im portance of Nanpö for its oceans of oil, rubber, and m iner­ als that found no equal in M anchuria or China.60 The school provided housing, books, food, and everything else for die price of donations of ¥360 tw ice a year by the parents of the students who w ere accepted. In its three years o f its existence, N an'yö Gakuin trained 112 students.61 Only the first class com pleted the three-year course. The third class was to arrive in May 1944, but due to attacks on transport ships by die American naval fleet, die students did not arrive until m id-July.62 The third class, as m ost were still under eighteen, did not serve in the arm y in 1944-45, but the first and second classes w ere all drafted into the army as w ere many of the teachers. Thus, though m ost of the first graduating class found jobs w ith well-known firm s, their actual tim e of employm ent was minim al to nil, due to onset of the war.63 Although the contribution of the school to Japanese com m ercial ventures was negligible in the prew ar period, the school did provide the army w ith a number of Japanese who could speak some French and Vietnam ese. The association also operated the Köa Japanese Language School in Ja­ karta, w hich operated Japanese classes attached to Köa Cultural Center. The center, established at the behest of the 16th Army in Java, also taught Bahasa Indonesia for resident Japanese. Some of the special exchange stu­ dents from Southeast Asia who came to Japan in 1944 stayed at a dorm i58 Kameyama Tetsuzö, N an’yö Gakuin (Tökyö: Fuyö Shobö, 19% ), 18-19. 59 The teacher training school was called the Shönan Nihon Gakuen. Nishioka, Shingapöru no Nihonjin, 226; see also Akashi Yöji, "N ihon gunseika no M araya, Shingapôru ni okeru bunkyö shisaku, 1941-1945," in Tönatt A jiashi no naka no Ni­ hon senryö, ed. Kurasawa Aiko (Tökyö: W aseda Daigaku, 1997), 293-332. 40 Kameyama, Nan'yö Gakuin, 33-34. 61 Kameyama, Nan'yö Gakuin, 308-9. Not 110, as stated by Akashi, "N an'yö K yökai," 21. 62 Kameyama, Nan'yö Gakuin, 108. 63 For details, see Kameyama, Nan'yö Gakuin, 115-93.

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tory m anaged by N an'yö Kyökai for a lim ited tim e,64 but generally, die N an'yö Kyökai had less contact w ith foreign students in Japan than the Töyö Kyökai.

P a r t U : L o bby in g a n d N etw o r k s

Lobby Cases In addition to training people, gathering and dissem inating inform ation, and expanding its boundaries, Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai conduct* ed lobbying activities using its resources and netw orks. Although the two voluntary associations did not succeed in obtaining all policy goals, they were generally able to bring issues to the attention of various m inisters and m inistries. This was especially the case in the 1920s, when the presi­ dents of the associations, Töyö Kyökai's Gotö Shinpei and N an'yö Kyökai's Den Kenjirö, w ere two of the m ost prom inent political figures of the day. Both associations concerned them selves w ith a variety of issues over their organizational lifespans. For the Töyö Kyökai, Taiw an and its poten­ tial trade connections to N an'yö constituted its lobby dom ain until the fo­ cus moved toward continental policy prior to the Russo-Japanese W ar. Generally, Töyö Kyökai concentrated on China, Russia, the formal colo­ nies, and occasionally N an'yö, w hile N an'yö Kyökai's province was Tai­ wan, the M icronesian islands, Thailand and the colonies of the W estern powers. The territories of the two associations overlapped considerably over Taiw an, but there w ere no disputes over territory.

Nan'yö Kyökai Nan'yö Kyökai was m ost active in lobbying cabinets to negotiate w ith the governments of colonies in N an'yö, and obtaining financial aid for invest­ ments in W estern colonies. Executive director Inoue M asaji persuaded Kuhara Fusanosuke to purchase a rubber plantation in 1916 in North Bor­ neo for settling Japanese em igrants.65 The venture itself turned out to be an em igration failure as the land yielded poor harvests, but it did contin­ ue to function as a rubber plantation. The failure of the project to attract emigrants had absolutely no effect in dam pening Inoue's dreams of emi­ gration. In 1917, the British introduced an ordinance prohibiting foreign64 For m ore details, see, for exam ple, Kurasawa Aiko, Nanpö tokubetsu ryügakusei ga mita senjika no Nihonjin (Tökyö: Sôshisha, 1997). 65 Nagami, Inoue M asaji, 566; Hara, Eiryö M araya, 155.

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ers from owning m ore than 50 acres o f land in M alaya. N an'yö Kyökai, as w ell as Kuhara, subm itted several petitions to the Foreign A ffairs M inis­ try, and sent Inoue and association vice president Uchida Kakichi to m eet w ith Foreign A ffairs M inister M otono Ichirö to urge that die governm ent address die issue.66 The m inistry negotiated w ith die British but to no avail. A lso in 1917, when die British seized and ceased all telegraph services in die Dutch East Indies in June, Japanese businesses reported to N an'yö Kyökai that they could not conduct trade and shipping w ithout commu­ nications. The association president Yoshikawa and vice president Uch­ ida Kakichi m et w ith Foreign A ffairs M inister M otono, A griculture and Commerce M inister N akaköji Ren, and N an'yö Kyökai director and Com­ m unications M inister Den Kenjirö, to urge action on the issue. The minis­ ters successfully petitioned w ith the British and m anaged to re-open tel­ ecom m unication channels between N an'yö and Japan in Novem ber of the same year.67 Starting in July 1919, N an'yö Kyökai president Den Kenjirö urged suc­ cessive prime m inisters, foreign affairs m inisters, and agriculture and com­ merce ministers to negotiate w ith the French in order to remove trade bar­ riers to doing business in French Indochina. Since Japan had no commercial treaty with France, the highest tariff rates were applied to Japanese goods. In one of the petitions, Den stated that the French applied the lowest possi­ ble customs rates to European and American goods, and applied discrimi­ natory high customs rates to Japanese goods. There was a Taiwan to French Indochina steamer service, run by Yamashita Steamships,68 but due to die high tariff rates, no cotton and textile goods could be exported on the steamers. Possibly as a result of years of constant Japanese protests spurred by N an'yö Kyökai, the French Governor-General M artial M erlin visited Ja­ pan in 1924 to improve relations between the two countries.69 66 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 115-16. Kuhara was seen by the British as the m ost sig­ nificant lobbyist against the ordinance. See Yun Choi-ren, "M araya ni okeru Ni­ hon no gomu, tekkö töshi," in Senkanki Tönan A jia, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 50, 54-55. 67 Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 2 7 ,116. W hile the reasons for the British actions are not clear, it might have stemmed from concerns with the neutral Netherlands and its Netherlands Overseas Trust Company trading in contraband with Germany. See Erik Hansen, "Betw een Reform and Revolution: Social Democracy and Dutch So­ ciety, 1917-1921," in Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923, ed. Hans A. Schm itt (Charlottesville, V. A.: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 183. 68 For details, see Katayama Kunio, Kindai Nihon no kaiun to A jia (Tökyö: Ochanomizu Shobö, 1996), 221-50,278-99. 69 As Den had injured his foot, he could not m eet w ith M erlin at the scheduled tim e. Nan'yö Kyökai 10 nenshi, 93-94,118-20. An actual com m ercial treaty for Ja­ pan-French Indochina trade was not signed until M ay 1932.

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The 12 February 1934 Dutch East Indies Im port Ordinance put severe im port quotas on Japanese goods entering the Dutch East Indies. N an'yö Kyökai, along w ith the Tökyö Cham ber of Commerce and other industry associations, subm itted petitions in support of governm ent negotia­ tions.70 On 10 M arch and 23 April 1934, N an'yö Kyökai appealed directly to the Dutch governor-general, tire president and vice president of the Volksraad, and the m inister of colonial affairs, urging them to rescind the ordinance. Inoue and general m anager Iizum i Ryözö, along w ith two oth­ er m embers of N an'yö Kyökai, Ishihara H iroichirö and M atsue Shunji, w ere invited by the Foreign A ffairs M inistry to participate in tire JapanN etherlands Trade Conference of June-Decem ber 1934.71

Töyö Kyökai W hile Töyö Kyökai was m ore active than N an'yö Kyökai in educational projects, in lobbying, especially during second president Kom atsubara Eitarö's tenure,721913-19, the organization generally was not particularly active. Kom atsubara chose to concentrate on managing the school, but during Gotö Shinpei term as president, 1919-29, G otö's policy view s w ere reflected in the pages of its publications. In debates over the fundam ental principles of colonial governance, be­ tw een self-rule and assim ilation, m ost m em bers of Töyö Kyökai w ere vo­ cal advocates of assim ilation. During the 1920s and 1930s, the editorials in Töyö w ere filled w ith num erous opinion pieces and editorials against the Taiw anese self-rule movement and the post-First W orld W ar Taiw an legislature establishm ent issue.73 However, not all m em bers were avowed assim ilationists. Tögö M inoru, w ho contributed regularly to the

70 Akashi, "N an'yö K yökai," 12-13. 71 For details on the negotiations, see Murayama Yoshitada, "D ai ichiji N ichi-Ran kaishö-Nihon no yûwateki keizai shinshutsu no tenkanten," in Ryötaiserüamki Nihon-Tönan A jia kankei no shosö, ed. Shim izu Hajime (Tökyö: Ajia Keizai Kenkyüjo, 1986), 99-118; Adachi H iroaki, "Kaisenzen no keizai köshö-tai Ranin, Futsuin köshö," in " Nanpö kyöeiken"-senji Nihon no TOnan A jia keizai shihai, ed. Hikita Yasuyuki (Tökyö: Taga Shuppan, 1997), 101-34; and Kokaze Hidemasa, "N ichi-Ran kaiun m asatsu no Nichi-Ran kaishö," in Senkanki TOnan A jia, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 109-40. 72 Kom atsubara (1852-1919) was a bureaucrat o f the Yam agata Aritom o clique. He served as governor o f Saitam a, Shizuoka, N agasaki prefectures, vice min­ ister of ju stice, home affairs, and was the education m inister and agriculture and com m erce m inister during Katsura Tarö's second cabinet in 1908. Aside from his political career, he devoted his energies to education adm inistration, serving as Kokugakuin U niversity's president in addition to his post in Töyö Kyökai. 73 See, for exam ple, the editorial in Töyö 26, no. 5 (M ay 1923): 138.

Hvung Gu Lynn

periodical, was am ong a m inority of Töyö Kyökai opposed to assim ila­ tion.74 There w ere also som e m embers who expressed support for anti-im pe­ rialists who w ere seeking refuge in Japan. Pan-Asianist tones vivified fea­ ture articles on Subhas Chandra Bose and Artem io Ricarte, w hile anger oscillated through com m entaries against British and American racism and arrogance.75 There were also constant calls by some association members in Taiwan for m ore cargo freight trains cars and few er luxury sleeping cars in Taiwan in order to improve die distribution of goods on the island from the ports, m ore convenient transportation linkages to the home islands and French Indochina, m ore freedom of the press, more education related to Taiwan in Japan, and other issues related to die adm inistration of Taiwan.76 W hether as a direct result or not, the number of freight train cars increased from around 5,000 to around 10,000 in Taiwan from 1920 to 1930.77 Especially for the period betw een the Gotö-Joffe talks in die spring of 1923 to the norm alization of relations in 1925, Russia-related articles w ere frequently featured. Such constant urgings for greater Russo-Japanese trade and cooperation w ere consistent w ith president Goto Shinpei's for­ eign policy views regarding Russia.78 Throughout the 1920s, the pages of Töyö w ere filled w ith articles outlining the natural resources of the Rus­ sian Far East, and the potential econom ic benefits of norm alization with post-revolution Russia.79

74 See, for exam ple, Tögö M inoru, "Shokum inchi seido no konpon höshin," Töyö 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2-12. 75 The features on Bose were unabashed and biting in its criticisms of IshiiKikujirö and subdued but hardly ambivalent in its praise of Töyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryôhei, and Köno Hironaka. See Nakayama Kei, "Indo no shishi, Bösu shi," Töyö 28, no. 1 (January 1925), 61-85; ibid. 28, no. 2 (February 1925): 51-66; ibid. 28, no. 3 (March 1925): 124r-140; also Rasai Gakujin, "Döjingo," Töyö 28, no. 1 (January 1925): 92-97. 76 See for exam ple regular contributions from Taiwan by S. S. Sei, "Taiw an jihö—saikin no m ondai," in most issues of Töyö in the 1920s and 1930s in which these and many other issues are raised. 77 Takahashi Yasutaka, Nihon shokuminchi tetsudöshi ron (Tökyö: Nihon Keizai Hyöronsha, 1995), 30. 78 For details, see, for exam ple, Sakurai Ryöju, Taishö seijishi no shuatsu-Riken döshikai no seiritsu to sono shühen (Tökyö: Yamakawa, 1997), especially 186-88; and Aizawa Kiyoshi, "N ihon kaigun no senryaku to sankoku dömei m ondai," in Nihon no kiro to M atsuoka gaikö, ed. Miwa Kim itada and Tobe Ryöichi (Tökyö: Nansösha, 1993), 41-45. 79 See for exam ple, Matsumoto Kunihira, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon gaikö no tachiba o ronji—Nichi-Ro-Shi sankoku dômei ni tsuite," Töyö 28, no. 4 (April 1925): 2 -13; Gotö Shinpei, "N ichi-Ro kôkanfuku ni tsuite," Töyö 28, no. 3 (M arch 1925): 1-14; Goto Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tame n i," Töyö 28, no. 6 (June 1925): 2-12; and M oriya Sakao, "Kakum ei go no R oshia," Töyö 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2-18.

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Networks and Effectiveness Effectiveness in lobbying has been linked to organizational interlocks and personal connections. As noted in the previous sections, the executives of both associations w ere generally well-known bureaucrats and business­ men, a fact w hich facilitated their lobbying activities. Interlocking direc­ torates and connections link organizations and their leaders to segments of the political and econom ic environm ent, usually w ith those of sim ilar socio-political standing, or sim ilar levels of "clou t and grace."80 Factors such as age, position in politics, educational background, length of tim e in an organization, and personal values also lead groups and individuals into different coalitions, depending on the issue.81 One type of interlock was w ith prom inent political positions, such as cabinet posts. Proxim ity of organization executives to m ajor public office facilitated policy access. From the latter half of the 1910s through the 1920s, Gotö Shinpei and Den Kenjirö w ere two of the m ost pow erful cab­ inet m inisters not to have becom e prim e m inister. N ot coincidentally, of the num erous voluntary associations engaged in lobbying, Toyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai were two of the m ost pow erful during the 1910s and 1920s. During the Terauchi M asatake cabinet (October 1916-Septem ber 1918), Goto was known as the de facto pow er in the cabinet as he held successive posts as home affairs and foreign affairs m inister. Den was appointed com munications m inister in the cabinet. In April 1918, Privy Councilor Itö M iyoji told Den Kenjirö that either Den or Gotö would m ost likely be ap­ pointed as the prim e m inister to succeed the Terauchi cabinet.82 In the Yamamoto Gonnohyöe cabinet (September 1923-January 1924), Gotö and Den were again placed in cabinet posts to balance power. Goto was appointed home m inister, w hile Den was assigned the agriculture and com merce post. Genrö Saionji Kinmochi feared that w ith Gotö as home m inister, anti-Seiyükai tendencies would becom e strongly reflected in tiie cabinet; thus, he hoped Yamamoto would favor Den m ore as Den was close to the Seiyükai. Saionji even assem bled a pro-Den, anti-Gotö group during the Yam am oto cabinet to block G otö's policy initiatives.83 In 80 See Joseph Galaskiewicz et al., "The Influence of Corporate Power, Social Status, and M arket Position on Corporate Interlocks in a Regional N etw ork," Social Forces 64 (December 1985): 423; and also Mayer Zald, Organizational Change: The Political Economy o f the YMCA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 81 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (M arshfield, M ass.: Pitm an, 1981), 37. ° Den Kenjirö Denki H ensankai, Den Kenjirö Denkt (Tökyö: Den Kenjirö Denki Hensankai, 1932), 345-47. 83 Matsumoto Gökichi, Taishö dem okurashii Id no seiji (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 256,274-75.

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1926, Den, along w ith Hiranuma Kiichirö and Uehara YOsaku, was a top candidate to form a new cabinet, but the task eventually fell to W akatsuki Reijirö.84 Having pow erful figures as association presidents helped membership and fund-raising drives, attracted audiences for association sponsored lectures, and m oreover, expedited lobbying. For exam ple, in the afore­ m entioned 1917 case of the British seizing telecom m unications betw een Dutch East Indies and Japan, Den was at the tim e, a director of die asso­ ciation (Yoshikawa was the president, Uchida vice president) and concur­ rently, the com m unications m inister in the Terauchi cabinet. Uchida Kakichi's appointm ent as governor-general of Taiw an in 1924 was also facilitated through his ties to Den. W hen Yamamoto Gonnohyöe offered Den the com m unications m inister post w hile Den was back visiting Tökyö from Taiw an, Den insisted on assurances that som eone w ith pre­ vious experience in Taiw an would succeed him as Taiw an governor-gen­ eral. Once Uchida Kakichi's appointm ent becam e official, Den drove out to Om ori, w here Uchida lived, to congratulate him on die appointm ent.85 Although U chida's connection to Den through the N an'yö Kyökai w as presum ably not the sole reason why he was appointed, his lobbying ac­ tivities as vice president of the association had kept him in contact w ith various prom inent bureaucrats and politicians, and had kept U chida's nam e on the political stage. Even if the lobbying had no direct connection w ith the official posts held by association executives, die fact that the representatives of the as­ sociation held m ajor posts helped lobbying through sim ple cachet. For ex­ am ple, in the case of G otô, w hile he was president of Töyö Kyökai (191929) he was also Tökyö m ayor (1920-23), and home affairs m inister (192324), but he did not hold an official post related to foreign affairs (he was foreign affairs m inister in 1918). N evertheless, the association could take up the Russo-Japanese norm alization issue w ith some effect due to G otö's personal interests in the issue and his political influence. Gotö had ob­ tained approval from Prim e M inister Katö Tomosaburö to negotiate w ith Joffe,86but m et w ith unofficial resistance from other quarters. Ogawa H eikichi gave Kita Ikki money to criticize G otö, and openly criticized the talks w ith Joffe in die Diet.87 Töyö Kyökai served as a counter to such crit-

84 85 86 87

M atsumoto, TaishO dem okurashii ki no seiji, 301. Den Kenjirö denki, 528,533. Tsurum i, Goto Shinpei, 4,385. Itö Takashi, D aiichiji sekai taisen to seitö naikaku (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1997), 225-26.

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idsm s, w ith various prom inent figures expressing their support for G otö's foreign policy initiative in print. The associations provided one m ore base, in addition to political par­ ties, on w hich bureaucrats and other candidates for official posts could m aintain and develop links to political and business leaders. If not occu­ pying a form al post, the presidency or directorship of a m ajor voluntary association allowed bureaucrats and politicians to keep their nam es rea­ sonably prom inent, obtain inform ation cm issues of interest, and lobby under the nam e of the association. These ties and cross-institutional netw orks w ere m aintained through various m ethods. The first and m ost obvious strategy was to have indi­ viduals becom e m embers of the association. Another method w as to form alliances w ith other sim ilar organizations. Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyôkai had several interlocking directorates and m em berships during its overlapping years of existence, 1915-45.88 O ften, business figures and re­ tired politicians held m em berships to numerous associations, facilitating to inform ational exchanges and join t projects betw een the two organiza­ tions. Another form of netw ork m aintenance and inform ation exchange was hosting dinners and lectures w ith officials in key positions. For exam ple, both Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai regularly scheduled dinners w ith colonial bureaucrats, usually at the bureau chief or vice governor-general levels. For exam ple, Töyö Kyökai invited vice governor-generals of Korea to dinners whenever they w ere back in Tökyö. Educational projects also provided opportunities for expanding net­ works. Prom inent officials w ere frequently asked to give speeches at graduation cerem onies and school year opening cerem onies.89 In 1938, Takushoku U niversity adopted an advisory system . Rather than advisors renowned for their expertise in higher education, nam es such as Ugaki Kazushige, Hirota Köki, N agai Ryütarö, Nakajim a Chikuhei, M atsuoka Yösuke, Yasukawa Yünosuke, Shimom ura H iroshi, Kodama Kenji, Fukai Eigo, M izuno Rentarö, Fujiyam a Raita, and Yüki Toyotarö filled the ros­ te r.90

88 Hayakawa Senkichirö, Ishizuka Eizö, Kondö Renpei, öh ash i Shintarö, Otani Kahei, M agoshi Kyôhei, Masuda M asuzô, Ikeda Kenzö, Kamata Eikichi, Masuda G iichi, W ada Toyoji, Inoue M asaji, and Den Kenjirö were some of the over­ lapping directors and members of N an'yö Kyökai and Töyö Kyökai. m See, for exam ple, Töyö 26, no. 5 (May 1923): 139; and ibid. 39, no. 7 (July 1936): 1 4 27,146; also N an’yö Kyökai zasshi 15, no. 1 (January 1929): 108; and Nan'yö 25, no. 3 (March 1939): 76. 90 Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi, 289.

H vutíj Gu Lynn

Questions as to w hether these associations represent collusion of poli­ ticians w ith big business or w hether they represent the voice of private in­ terests against governmental bureaucratic controls over the econom y de­ flect attention from the fact that personal netw orks w ere the engines w hich drove these groups. It should be noted that not all genrö, politi­ cians, and bureaucrats thought alike sim ply because they w ere Japanese, as is im plied in the "uniquely Japanese cooperation betw een state and en­ terprise" clichéd construction invariably invoked from som e quarters. O f course, despite the relatively large m em bership num bers, neither of the two associations were ever m istaken for populist or grass-roots move­ ments. These w ere elite coalitions and cliques w hich m anifested them selves in voluntary associations. These netw orks created access and attracted funds. The divisions w ere along personal and policy lines, not along pri­ vate-public, or inter-m inisterial distinctions. It should be noted that the "governm ent" was not com posed of individuals who were alw ays in power, but individuals who rotated in and out of cabinet posts, and vied for cabinet positions. A tool in this jockeying and lobbying process w as a position w ithin a w ell-know n, w ell-connected organization, such as N an'yô Kyôkai or Töyö Kyökai.

P a k t III: O rg a n iz a tio n a l D ec lin e

Despité tite paucity of research directly on voluntary organizations, there have been some views put forth regarding their impact and changing roles in prewar Japanese history in the context of the southward advance (rumshin ). Most explain the decline in influence of these organizations during the 1930s in terms of changes in the external environment. However, I would argue that the internal changes within the associations have been overlooked in the existing literature. By focusing on generational change and the consequent deterioration of personal networks, the impact of inter­ nal dynamics on the decline of these organizations can be highlighted. O f the environm ental approaches, one of the m ore popular ones has been the "advance guard" view , w hich stresses the m ilitary significance of voluntary associations before the outbreak of the Pacific W ar. The N an'yô Kyökai is portrayed as an intelligence arm for later m ilitary ex­ pansion.91 Especially after 1936, the association did undertake several in­ telligence reports for the army and navy. From the beginning to the end, 91 See Eric Robertson, The Japanese File: Pre-W ar Japanese Penetration into Southeast Asia (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).

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N an'yö Kyökai received substantial subsidies from the Foreign Affairs M inistry and the Taiwan Governm ent-General, and had many bureau­ crats in its executive and membership.92 In term s of spy cases, there were cases involving em ployees of firm s which w ere m embers of the N an'yö Kyökai, such as the one in December 1934, where Ishihara Sangyö Singa­ pore branch head, Nishim ura Yoshio, died in a British prison after having been arrested on spying charges.93 Another view stresses the im pact of the "Fundam ental Principles of the National Policy" statem ent of August 1935 which explicitly outlined the im portance of expansion into N an'yö. During the tenures of successive governors from Den to Nakagawa, the Taiw an Governm ent-General's southward advance activities had been lim ited to econom ic research, but now a renewed age of southward expansion began in 1935. The Taiwan Governm ent-General, the Tokyo governm ent, Colonial M inistry, Foreign A ffairs M inistry, and the navy sought to obtain control over the south­ ward advance policy.94 The navy successfully landed adm iral Kobayashi Seizö in the Taiwan governorship (1936-1940). Kobayshi implemented new policies to prom ote industrialization, assim ilation, and m ilitary pre­ paredness. Reflecting this interest, Navy General Staff m embers began at­ tending m eetings of the N an'yö Kyökai beginning in July 1935. Another argument em phasizes the econom ic environm ent in explain­ ing the role of voluntary associations. Due to the proliferation of trade barriers against Japanese goods in the 1930s, voluntary associations be­ came progressively closer to the Foreign A ffairs M inistry as trade barriers necessitated increasing negotiations w ith foreign governm ents. In order to expedite their lobbying, the larger trading firm s in particular used vol­ untary organizations to cooperate w ith the Foreign M inistry. For exam ­ ple, N an'yö Kyökai also counted Foreign A ffairs M inistry officials such as Tögö Shigenori and Shigem itsu Mamoru among its directors even prior to 1935. Hashiya Hiroshi argues that in 1938, when N an'yö Kyökai becam e a zaidan hOjin, it was in com pliance w ith a move by the Foreign A ffairs

92 From 1939 to 1941, the Taiwan Government-General gave ¥12,000 each year to N an'yö Kyökai, and another ¥6,000, ¥10,000 and ¥6,000 to the Taiwan branch. Kondö M asami, Söryokusen to Taiwan-Nihon shokuminchi hökai no kenkyü (Tökyö: Tösui Shobö, 19% ), 110-11. 93 Supposedly, he committed suicide by drinking poison. Nishioka, Singapöru no Nihonjin, 150. 94 Goto K en'ichi, 'T aiw an to Nan'yö-Nanshin mondai tono kanrende," in Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi, ed. Oe Shinobu et al., vol. 2 (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 1 4 7 ,150,153-54; also Hatano Sum ió, "Kokubö kösö to N anshinron," in Tönan Ajia to Nihon, ed. Yano, 147-65; and Hatano Sum ió, "N ihon kaigun to 'N ansh in ,'" in Ryötaisenkanki Nihon-Tönan A jia, ed. Shim izu, 207-36.

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M inistry to put the various sem i-private and private organizations under its unified supervision.95 An explanation slightly different from the above three is one that can be labeled a resource dependence view . Hara Fujio surm ises that N an'yö Kyökai overextended itself in acquiring land in the Cameron Highlands for an em igration project in 1937. Twenty fam ilies moved in, but all but three left prior to Decem ber 1941. The jungle hillside conditions, poor har­ vests, and British and Chinese hostility all discouraged the em igrants from staying. As a consequence of the considerable financial strain, the only way for N an'yö Kyökai to realize die long-held dream s of successful em igration to N an'yö and to continue other association operations was for the association to cooperate closely w ith the m ilitary or w hoever con­ trolled the governm ent purse strings.96 A ll of the above view s point out im portant factors in driving the decline of N an'yö Kyökai. H ara's assessm ent of die im pact of financial depend­ ency on the governm ent funds points to one of the basic w eaknesses com­ m on to m ost voluntary associations. Especially w ith N an'yö Kyökai and Töyö Kyökai, executives had used personal connections to solicit dona­ tions and endowm ents and had relatively little in the w ay of independent sources of funds. The 1935 declaration, econom ic barriers, and wartim e intelligence also clearly had m ajor im pacts on independence and direc­ tions of the N an'yö Kyökai. W hile acknowledging the environm ental forces and lim itations in re­ sources, I would argue that the fundam ental reason for the decline was due to generational changes in leadership w ithin N an'yö Kyökai and Töyö Kyökai. Both associations had already undergone changes in plat­ form and power by 1935, when the environm ental changes peaked. Organizations are not established in vacuum s; therefore, vestiges of history influence structure and original power distributions. A ll organi­ zations face problem s of retention and diffusion of knowledge, skills, in­ form ation, and political power. During the 1920s, Den and Gotö had been two of the m ost significant political figures, always being mentioned as possible prim e m inisters. By the 1930s, the de facto leaders of both organ­ izations w ere not com parable in term s of political pow er, and perhaps more im portantly, com m itm ent to the associations. The im portance of leadership succession in the associations can be seen clearly in the case of Töyö Kyökai. A fter it w as started by Katsura, the or­ ganization experienced a slight lull under Komatsubara. W hen Gotö in­ herited the presidency, he m anaged to revive it quickly w ith his personal 95 Hashiya Hiroshi, "Tönan A jia," 213-36; also Yoshikawa, "Senzen Fuirippin," 129-46. 96 Hara, E iiyô M araya, 61-76.

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netw orks and tireless lecture tours. During his term , Gotö used his per­ sonal netw orks to obtain funds from die sugar m anufacturers association for the university, and also used his status as a form er civil governor of the Taiw an Governm ent-General to obtain funds from the Taiw an Gov­ ernm ent-General for specific research projects. W hen G otö becam e president of the association after Kom atsubara's death, he asked his close friend M izuno Rentarö97*to becom e the vice pres­ ident. M izuno replied that he would on the condition that Nagata Hidejirö be appointed executive director.96 W hen G otö died in 1929, M izuno was elected new president. However, M izuno in the 1930s did not w ield die sam e kind of pow er Gotö had in the 1920s. M izuno had failed to im­ press Saionji during the collapse of die Kiyoura Keigo cabinet in June 1924. As Saionji put it, " ... especially when Yamamoto (Gonnohyöe), Tokonami (Takejirö), and M izuno com e to visit, there is no point in talk­ ing to them ."99 Furtherm ore, due to the scandal in 1928when M izuno first resigned, then rejoined the Tanaka G iichi cabinet as m inister of education when Kuhara Fusanosuke was appointed as com m unications m inister,100 Mizuno him self w as not as pow erful a figure as he had been.101 Unlike M izuno, the new vice president, Nagata H idejirö,102 held cabi­ net positions in the 1930s, as colonial m inister in the Hirota Köki cabinet (March 1936-February 1937), and railw ays m inister (November 1939-

97 Mizuno (1868-1949) w as vice home affairs m inister under Gotö in the Terauchi cabinet, then becam e home m inister when Gotö switched to foreign affairs. He was appointed vice governor-general of Korea in 1919, then served as home af­ fairs m inister in die Katö Tomosaburö and Kiyoura Keigo cabinets. He was ap­ pointed education m inister in the Tanaka Giichi cabinet in 1928, but resigned to protest the appointment of Kuhara Fusanosuke as communications m inister. Mizuno was the central Seiyükai figure within the home m inistry. In 1935, he left the party after he served on a deliberative council in 1935 for h e Okada cab­ inet. From 1936, he w as the head of the Kyöchökai, and served as advisor to the Sanpö Hökokukai and other wartim e organizations. 96 Mizuno Rentarö, "N agata H idejirö kun o om ou," Tôyô 46, no. 12 (December 1943): 7. 99 M atsumoto, Taishö dem okurashiiki no seiji, 301. 100 For m ore details on the incident, see, for exam ple, Awaya Kentarö, 15 tun sen­ s e d no seiji to shakai (Tökyö: Otsuki Shoten, 1995), 22-24. 101 M izuno's decline in influence can be seen in the fact that in 1940 he had to strug­ gle m ightily to keep the Kyöchökai (of which he was president) intact under government-mandated reorganizations of labor-related bodies. Takahashi H ikohiro, "Shinkanryö, kakushin kanryö to shakaiha kanryö-Kyöchökai bunseki no ichishiten toshite," Shakai Rödö Kenkyü 43, nos. 1-2 (1996): 52. 102 Nagata (1876-1943) was Home M inistry poiice bureaucrat who was promoted by Mizuno and Gotö. He had two term s as Tökyö mayor, in 1923-24, and in 1930-31.

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January 1940) in the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, but had neither the stature, pull, nor clout that Katsura and Gotö had wielded. The N an'yö K yökai's top executive also changed drastically around the same tim e. Den died in 1930, and Uchida in 1933. Several other founding m em bers, such as Nitobe Inazö, Inoue Junnosuke, and Otani Kahei, also died in 1932. Executive director Inoue M asaji enlisted Konoe Fumimaro to be the new association head, but Konoe's personal interest in the econom­ ic and em igration possibilities for N an'yö were not strong. Starting in 1930, a new generation of N an'yö businessm en, such as Ishihara Hiroichirö and M atsue Shunji entered the organization. Ishihara had close ties to right-w ing figures, Okawa Shüm ei in particular.103The spy cases in Southeast Asia involved Ishihara Sangyö em ployees as w ell as N an'yö Kyökai researchers, but all of these occurred after the deaths of Den and Uchida, and the decline in influence of Inoue M asaji, who had turned his attention in em igration projects in South America around 1932. In 1938, Inoue and Fujiyam a Raita both retired as vice presidents. Inoue retained connections to N an'yö Kyökai as an advisor, w hile Kodama Hideo and Hayashi Kyüjirö becam e the new vice presidents. This is not to assert that had M izuno not reached his political peak in the 1920s alongside G otö, Töyö Kyökai members would have becom e anti-w ar activists, or that had Den and Uchida lived longer, N an'yö Kyökai would not have engaged in intelligence operations or have re­ belled against Taiw an Governm ent-General and Foreign A ffairs M inistry controls. However, the decline in independence arose not only from the pressure of external forces, but also from succession and generational change occurring in the key positions w ithin the associations and also in elite ranks in general. Generational change among the elites also m eant that the leaders of Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai had few er connec­ tions to active cabinet m inisters, and the number industrialists who had been sources of non-governm ental funds declined rapidly as such indi­ viduals as M agoshi Kyöhei, Shibusawa Eiichi, Asano Soichirö, and others died in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As personal netw orks w ere based on ties between various individuals, these links could not be institutionalized and transferred very successful­ ly. The internal changes in Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai com bined with generational change and environm ental changes to produce the de­ cline in independence and lobbying activities.

103 On Ishihara, Okawa, the M eirinkai, and Jinm ukai, see Akasawa Shirö and Awaya Kentarö, eds., Ishihara HiroichirO kattkei bunsho, vol. 1 (Tökyö: Ritsumeikan Hyakunenshi Henshûshitsu, Kashiwa Shobö, 1994), 302-7.

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C o n c lu sio n

The Töyö Kyökai and die N an'yö Kyökai conducted a w ide-range of ac­ tivities. Research on specific regions, inform ation dissem ination, educa­ tion, lobbying, and other activities inform ed governments and private com panies of specific conditions in other areas of Asia. In term s of inter­ actions w ith A sia, the tw o associations gathered data and distributed in­ form ation and im ages through lectures, schools, exhibitions, tourism , and publications. In term s of dom estic politics, they lobbied on specific issues as w ell as served as a base of power for G otö Shinpei, Den Kenjirö, and other political figures. The two organizations also displayed institutional isomorphism—sim ilar organizational form s, internal dem ography, or­ ganizational scale, financial dependency, and other characteristics. Although existing view s stress the environm ental changes to explain the roles of voluntary organizations, in the case of Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai, leadership changes by the first half of the 19306 had con­ siderably m ore im pact in decreasing their lobbying pow er than changes in econom ic conditions, or even the national policy. W hen the role of per­ sonal netw orks operating w ithin and w ithout each voluntary association are em phasized, rather than the political and social system itself, the in­ ternal changes and the effects they engendered on organizational survival become m ore obvious.104 Such organizations as Töyö Kyökai and N an'yö Kyökai were form ali­ zations and m anifestations of cross-institutional linkages that w ere at the core of m ost political bargaining and transaction in Japan. This is not to deny the im portance of form al affiliations and hierarchies, but rather to point out that through these organizations, interest netw orks w ere formed and fortified, and these significantly affected interactions w ith other countries, w hile providing candidates for cabinet positions w ith an organizational base to draw on. The analysis of elite cross-institutional netw orks and coalitions have been subsumed by the tide of nation-centered narratives which focus pri­ marily on official structures and institutions of the nation-state. Although more w ork needs to be done on these types of elite associations and the personal netw orks, the exam ination of the role of Töyö Kyökai and Nan'yö Kyökai in dom estic politics and foreign interactions shows the importance of personal netw orks in shaping Japanese history.

104 See Chester I. Barnard, The Function o f the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); and Howard Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood C liffs, N. J.: Prentice H all, 1979), 281.

T echnocratic V isions of E mpire: T echnology B ureaucrats and the "N ew O rder for Science-T echnology" Jan is M im u ra

Today Japan ranks as one of the w orld's technological superpowers. This achievem ent is rem arkable in three respects: Japan w as a late developer, it lacks natural resources, and it developed its technology w ithout the sci­ entific tradition of die W est. Faced w ith such constraints, Japan chose to pursue a path of technological developm ent that differed from that of fite advanced W estern countries. The nature of fifis distinctive m odel of tech­ nological developm ent form s the subject of recent research on contempo­ rary Japanese technology policy. One scholar has suggested fite existence of a "technonational ideology," highlighting the role of strategy and ide­ ology in Japanese technology policy.1 Others have suggested fite forma­ tion of a "regional production alliance" or "vertical keiretsu netw ork" in Asia that w ill ensure Japan's technological hegem ony in fite region.2 These studies point to long-term strategic thinking about technology among Japanese policym akers. During the Second W orld W ar, a group of technology-m inded bureau­ crats devoted considerable effort to form ulating a long-term strategy for technological developm ent for Japan and its empire. These "technology bureaucrats" sought to devise a technology policy for Japan that would overcome the country's backwardness, lack of sufficient raw m aterials, and weak scientific base. They hoped to achieve this through the estab­ lishment of a "N ew Order for Science-Technology" (Kagaku gijutsu shintaisei) betw een 1940 and 1942.3 As part of Konoe Fum im aro's "N ew Or­ der," the New Order for Science-Technology represented one attem pt by the governm ent to m obilize the nation along totalitarian lines to prose­

1 Richard J. Sam uels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": N ational Security and the Techno­ logical Transformation o f Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 2 W alter H atch and Kozo Yamamura, A sia in Japan’s Embrace: Building a Regional Production A lliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3 For a discussion of the New O rder for Science-T echnology see the follow ing works: Tessa M orris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan (Cam­ bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1994); Saw ai M inoru, "Policies for the Prom otion of Science and Technology in W artim e Japan," Keizaigaku RonshQ 35, no. 1 (1995) and "N itchû sensöki no kagaku gijutsu seisaku" NenpO Kindai Nihon

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cute the w ar in China. M ore than just a plan to m obilize science and tech­ nology for w ar, the New Order for Science-Technology formed a corner­ stone in the bureaucratic vision of a postw ar Japanese em pire in East Asia. The technology bureaucrats looked beyond the m ilitary's im m ediate con­ cerns of fighting a w ar and im agined an autarkic em pire that would rep­ resent the outward projection of a united, industrialized, and technolog­ ically advanced Japan. A central objective of this movement was an attem pt to devise a Japanese type of "science-technology" (kagaku gijutsu). Japanese planners believed that building a "new order" in Japan was the prerequisite for constructing a "new order" in East Asia - that placing Ja­ pan upon a scientific basis was the necessary first step to building a tech­ nologically based em pire. This essays seeks to illum inate w artim e bureaucratic thinking about technology and technocratic control by exam ining the ideas underlying the movement for a New Order for Science-Technology. The focus here is on patterns of thought and im plicit ideas about technology and its per­ ceived role in Japan and East Asia. In this essay, I analyze the w ritings of two of the ideologues of the m ovement, M iyamoto Takenosuke and M ôri Hideoto. M iyamoto w as an engineer in the Home M inistry and head of the Japan Engineering A ssociation (Nihon Gijutsu Kyökai).*4 M ôri was a renovationist bureaucrat from the Finance M inistry who helped design M anchuria's planned economy.5 Both M iyamoto and M ôri believed that they represented a new breed of bureaucrats em erging after the First W orld W ar known as "technology bureaucrats" (gijutsu kanryS), equipped w ith both specialized technical knowledge and broad adm inis­ trative experience.6 Both joined the Asia Developm ent Board (Kôain) in 1938 and the Cabinet Planning Board in 1941, w here they designed a sci­

Kenkyü 13 (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1991): 44-65; Kawahara H iroshi, Shffwa seiji shisö kenkyü (Tökyö: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1979); Hiroshige Tetsu, Kagaku no shakai shi: Kittdai nihon no kagaku taisei (Tökyö: Chuö Kóronsha, 1973); Nihon kagaku shi gakkai, Nihon kagaku gijutsu shi taikei, vol. 4 (Tökyö: Daiichi Höki Shuppan, 1966). 4 For a study on Miyamoto Takenosuke, see Oyodo Shöichi, M iyamoto Takenosuke to kagaku gijutsu gyOsei (Tökyö: Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989) and Furukawa Takahisa, Shöwa senchüki no sOgO Kokusaku kikan (Tökyö: Yoshikawa Köbunkan, 1992). 5 For studies on Möri Hideoto, see Itö Takashi, "M ôri Hideoto ron oboegaki" in his ShOwaki no seiji (zoku) (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppankai, 1993). 6 For a recent study on the technology bureaucrats, see Oyodo Shöichi, Gijutsu kanryO no seiji sankaku: Nihon no kagaku gijutsu gyOsei no maku hinüd (Tökyö: Chûkô Shinsha, 1997). In contrast to Oyodo, I adopt a broader definition o f tech­ nology bureaucrats, which includes not only bureaucrats w ith an engineering background but also bureaucrats who closely identified them selves with the lat­ est technological trends.

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ence and technology policy for Japan and its em pire. They prom oted their ideas by m eans of an ideological campaign launched in engineering and right-w ing journals, through speeches and interview s, and finally in the drafting of the New O rder for Science-Technology.

S t a t e E ffo r t s t o M o b il iz e S c ien c e a n d T ec h n o lo g y

In m any respects, w artim e policies to m obilize science and technology during the w ar represented no m ore than an intensification of existing policies that sought to raise the technological standard of Japan.7 One can point to an im pressive history going back to foe M eiji period of govern­ ment attem pts to im port and adapt advanced W estern technology and prom ote private and public technical research through financial grants and foe establishm ent of public research institutes, technical colleges, and universities. The sem i-governm ental Institute for Physical and Chem ical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyûjo, or Riken), founded in 1917, perhaps best represents foe state's early com m itm ent to enhance Japan's industrial and m ilitary capability through science and technology. State efforts to m obilize science and technology for w ar can be traced back to foe First W orld W ar. For foe m ilitary, foe First W orld W ar indi­ cated that future w ars would be "total w ars" (söiyokusen ), requiring foe m obilization of not only the country's m ilitary forces, but all aspects of ci­ vilian life— including science and technology.8 A t foe center of total war m obilization w as foe attem pt to make Japan self-sufficient in resources. This would require foe developm ent of heavy industry and foe promo­ tion of scientific and technical research to create not only sophisticated weapons for w ar, but synthetic substitutes for resources that foe country lacked. The m ilitary's prom otion of science and technology for total w ar included the establishm ent of research centers during foe First W orld W ar, foe navy's efforts to develop synthetic petroleum from 1919, and foe establishm ent of foe Resource Bureau (Shigen Kyoku) in 1927, w hich marked the first of a series of technocratic organs com posed of m ilitary of­ ficers and civilian bureaucrats. After the outbreak of the China w ar in 1937, the state began to assume a more interventionist role in promoting science and technology for war. Es­ pecially after foe Nomonhan Incident, which demonstrated foe superiority of Soviet m ilitary technology, and Germ any's invasion of Poland in 1939, 7 M orris-Suzuki makes this point in The Technological Transformation o f Japan. 8 For a discussion of total w ar m obilization, see M ichael Barnhart, Japan Prepares fo r Total War (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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palls by the m ilitary for Japan to m obilize science and technology readied a peak.9 In April of 1938, the Konoe cabinet established the Science Council (Kagaku Shingikai) for the purpose of resolving the nation's resource prob­ lem s through science. Headed by Prim e M inister Konoe and supervised by the Cabinet Planning Board, the Science Council brought together m inistry officials, professors, and m ilitary officers to devise m easures to prom ote scientific and technical research, especially in file area of m achine tool pro­ duction. A year later w ithin the Cabinet Planning Board, the Science Divi­ sion (later renamed the 7th Division) was created to prom ote science and technology for total w ar m obilization. W ithin the M inistry of Education, active promotion of science began after the assumption of the former arm y m inister Araki Sadao to the post of M inister of Education in 1938. Through its Science Promotion Investigative Council (Kagaku Shinkö Chösa Kai), the m inistry aim ed to increase funding for science research, prom ote tech­ nical education, and encourage the application of science in daily life.10 Likewise, the M inistry of Commerce and Industry, which had been at the forefront of technological innovation since the early 1930s, created a series of laws to expand production in strategic areas, such as machine tools, au­ tom obiles, and aircraft to m obilize for war. Among these laws w ere the Ar­ tificial Petroleum Law and Steel Industry Law of 1937, and the M achine Tool Industry Law and A ircraft M anufacturing Law o f 1938.

L ayin g th e I deological F oundations fo r a T echnology - ba sed E m pire

The movement for the New Order for Science-Technology is commonly in­ terpreted as simply one m ore attem pt by the state to mobilize science and technology for war. However, this study suggests that the New Order for Sdence-Technology was qualitatively different. The movement gained m o­ mentum in December 1938, with the establishm ent of the Asia Develop­ ment Board, a supraministerial agency created to oversee the governm ent's policies in occupied China. The appointment of M öri to the economic sec­ tion and Miyamoto to the technology section marked the beginning of an alliance between the renovationist bureaucrats and engineers.11 In contrast

9 In the so-called "Nom onhan Incident," Japanese troops suffered heavy losses when they clashed with Soviet forces along the Manchurian—M ongolian border between May and Septem ber o f 1939. The incident was pivotal in alarm ing Jap­ anese planners of the backwardness of Japan's m ilitary technology. 10 Saw ai, "Policies for the Promotion of Science and Technology in W artime Ja­ pan," 49. 11 For a description of the Asia Development Board see Im ura Tetsuô, KOainkankô tosho zasshi mokuroku (Tökyö: Fuji Shuppansha, 1994).

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to the m inistries and the cabinet, which viewed Japan's deficiencies in sci­ ence and technology m obilization as a problem of m aterial and human re­ sources, Miyamoto and M öri believed that fite problem went even deeper and lay in fite minds of the Japanese. In their w ritings, both took pains to distinguish their efforts from those of the m inistries and cabinet. Miyamoto warned: "It is a great m istake to view the promotion and mobilization of science as necessary for a state under a wartime system and only necessary to achieve fite specific goal of handling the China Incident. " 12 He described the establishm ent of file Science Deliberation Council and Science Mobili­ zation Council in the cabinet as merely attempts to m obilize "w eak Japa­ nese science."13 M öri saw the problem as one in which technology contin­ ued to be understood as sim ply a human resource issue—an increased demand for skilled labor and engineers corresponding to the new demands of the wartime economy. M öri explained: "The problem of technology in our country's wartime economy today—while it is becoming an important problem—still means no more than the unprecedented increase in impor­ tance of laborers and engineers within the econom y."14 As for the task that lay ahead, he suggested that "[tjechnology's transition from a m aterialistic existence within the economy to a life existence directly tied to the spiritual power of the race or nation is the essential problem of politics from now on."15 For the technology bureaucrats, the challenges of m obilizing science and technology w ere not only m aterial but ideological and conceptual in nature. These bureaucrats keenly perceived that science and technology were crucial to transform Japan into an industrial and m ilitary power. Yet science and technology w ere viewed as foreign—as products of the W est, developed w ithin a W estern liberal tradition, and based upon natural re­ sources available to file W est. M oreover, science w as looked upon w arily by the ruling class as subversive of Japan's em peror system . The historian Kawahara H iroshi suggests that the tendency to "slight technology and view science as dangerous" (gijutsu o keishi ski, kagaku o kikenshi suru) formed one part of tenno sei ideology.16A t a tim e of increasingly restricted access to W estern technology, disillusionm ent w ith W estern liberalism , and heightened calls to m obilize the nation under the im perial sym bol, these bureaucrats recognized the need for Japan to develop a technology u Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kagaku kokusaku ron," in Kagaku no dOin (Tökyö: Kaizôsha, 1941), 6. 13 Ibid., 8-9. 14 Möri H ideoto, "G ijutsu no kaihö to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin," KaibO Jidai (September 1939): 4. 15 Ibid., 5. 16 Kawahara, ShOwa seiji shisO kenkyü, 200.

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policy that was independent of the W est and com patible w ith Japanese thought. They also perceived the need for a new type of bureaucrat to lead Japan, not m andarin bureaucrats trained in law , but "technology bureau­ crats" equipped w ith technical expertise and a broad vision of em pire.

Miyamoto Takenosuke M iyam oto's appointm ent as head of the technology section in the newly created Asia Developm ent Board represented the culm ination of efforts by M iyamoto and m embers of the Japan Engineering A ssociation to pro­ m ote technology and raise the status of engineers w ithin the government. Founded as the Japan A rtisan Club (Nihon Kojin Kurabu) in 1920, this as­ sociation made "dem ocracy and trade unionism " its guiding spirit and sought to m obilize engineers and enlighten society about technology.17 The organization proposed such m easures as the prom otion of technolog­ ical research, advancem ent of technical education, job search assistance, and the dissolution of academ ic cliques in the engineering field. From the beginning it adopted a critical stance toward capitalism , taking pains to separate technology from capitalism : engineers were "creators" (sözösha), w hile technology was described as a "cultural creation that fused to­ gether natural science and technique."18 In 1935 the Japan A rtisan Club changed its nam e to the Japan Technology A ssociation and adopted the slogan of "guiding public opinion based on technology" and "technolog­ ical patriotism ."19 The title of their journal would also change from Kôjin (Artisan) to Gijutsu Nihon (Technology Japan), and later to Gijutsu Hyôron (Technology Review). From 1939, M iyamoto began to design the blueprint for Japan's tech­ nology-based empire. In a speech he gave shortly after joining the Asia Developm ent Board, M iyamoto delineated the requirem ents for the con­ struction of a new East Asia: a long period of time—betw een thirteen and thirty years, and a large amount of funds, raw m aterials, and human re­ sources.20 Such conditions w ere possible only in tim es of peace. Quoting an American scholar, M iyamoto indirectly called for an im mediate end to hostilities w ith China: "Perpetual peace m ust be established betw een Chi­ 17 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "G ijutsuka no shakaiteki danketsu," Gijutsu Hyôron (June 1937): 2. 18 Kaneko Gen'ichirO, "M iyam oto kun o om ou," Gijutsu Hyôron (February 1942) quoted in Kawahara, ShOwa seiji shisô kenkyû, 65. 19 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Gijutsuka danketsu no shidö genri," Gijutsu HyOnm (July 1937): 1. 20 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Köa gijutsu no konpon genri," from Gijutsu taikai köen (1 M arch 1939), reprinted in Miyamoto Takenosuke, Tairiku no keizai kensetsu (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1941), 145.

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na and Japan in order to develop China. Japan and China are o f the sam e race and script, and theoretically it is natural that they should cooperate for their m utual benefit."21 In a key essay that he w rote foe follow ing year entitled "K öa gijutsu no mittsu no seikaku" (The three characteristics of Asian developm ent tech­ nology), M iyamoto developed the concept of "A sia developm ent technol­ ogy" (köa gijutsu).22 The unique features of Asia developm ent technology would be its "rapid advance" (yakushirtsei), com prehensiveness (sögösei), and "regional potential"—or ability to tap the sources o f its surroundings (ritchisei). "Rapid advance" was defined in relative term s, as he explained: "for the purpose of the perpetual m aintenance of the cooperative economy between foe two countries and the fruits of joint prosperity, it is absolutely crucial that Japanese technology always m aintains its superiority over Chinese technology."23 M iyamoto suggested: "If Chinese technology ad­ vances by one, then Japanese technology m ust advance by two. Even if from now on the half-century handicap between the technology of bofo countries becom es increasingly pulled apart, rather than reducing it, lim­ itless advance must be continued. For this reason Japanese technology must be m ore advanced."24 To ensure that Japanese technology stayed ahead, its com prehensiveness and "regional potential" were essential. By comprehensive character M iyamoto referred to a unified and coordinated technology policy; by "regional potential" he meant that "Japan m ust have its own original technology which has been developed to suit foe condi­ tions—natural, social, econom ic conditions—of Japan."25 "A sia developm ent technology" would be developed within a so-called East Asian Economic Community (Töa keizai kyödötai) (kyödötai being a translation of foe German word gem einschaft). M iyamoto contrasted foe notion of "com m unity" to foe idea of an "econom ic bloc." He defined "econom ic bloc" as "sim ply a joint phenomenon of both parties, a union through a bloc econom y such as that formed between foe colony and mainland, and held together by means of an economy of m ercantilist ex­ ploitation."26 In contrast, he suggested that foe term econom ic community "m akes as a condition reciprocity and equality, and common existence and common prosperity. It does not allow an exploitative economy of cap­

21 Ibid., 139. 22 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Köa gijutsu no m itsu no seikaku," Tenshin Kyoku Zasshi (March 1940), reprinted in Tairiku no keizai kensetsu, 177-183. 23 Ibid., 179. “ Ibid. 25 Ibid., 181. “ Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Töa keizai kyödötai ron," Gijutsu Hyöron (December 1940), reprinted in Tairiku no keizai kensetsu, 58.

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italistic selfishness w ithin it."27 Essentially, M iyam oto's conception of an East Asian Economic Community was based on the im plicit ideas of hier­ archy and m utual dependence. M utual dependence in a superior-inferior relationship was to form die basis for Japan's relationship to China. Hence, it was necessary that Japanese technology m aintains its "rapid advance" and m aximizes its effectiveness through "com prehensive" developm ent and through its regional character. "If M anchurian and Chinese—espe­ cially Chinese—technology rapidly develops in the future w ithout the aid of Japan and that country's rich resources can be developed, then mutual sharing of technology between Japan and China w ill cease to exist, and w ill bring about none other than die internal collapse of die East Asian Economic Com m unity."28 In other w ords, Asia developm ent technology would enable Japan to catch up w ith the W est through the resources of the G reater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere at a tim e when access to foreign technology and raw m aterials was becom ing increasingly restricted. M oreover, it would represent Japan's "contribution" to East Asia, and thereby provide the justification for Japanese hegemony in the region.

Möri Hideoto Among the renovationist bureaucrats, M ôri had the m ost developed and philosophically grounded vision of em pire that he developed in m onthly essays in the renovationist journal Kaibô fidai (Era of A nalysis) under the pen nam e Kamakura Ichirö. Together w ith the renovationist bureaucrats M inobe Yöji and Sakom izu H isatsune, M öri was known as one of the "three ravens" (sanba karasu) of the Cabinet Planning Board and the ideo­ logue of the group. According to M inobe, M öri would provide the ideas, Sakom izu would system atize them , and M inobe would be responsible for their im plem entation.29 As a m em ber of the Asia Developm ent Board and Cabinet Planning Board during the key years between 1939 and 1941, M öri participated in drafting policies for the New Order for Science-Tech­ nology. Particularly through his essays in Kaibô Jidai and contributions to technology journals, such as Gijutsu Hyôron and Kagakushugi Kögyö, M öri undertook the task of m aking science and technology a part of Japanese culture. H is attem pts to take technology and science out of the abstract, universal, individual-based liberal capitalism and place it w ithin a na­ tional com munity (kokuntitt kyôdôtaî) based on the "volk" (minzoku) and "concrete" national activity w ere rem arkably sim ilar to efforts by so27 Ibid., 59. 28 Ibid., 63. 29 M inobe Yöji, Yöyö katto- M inobe Yöji tsuitöroku (Tökyö: Nihon H yöronsha, 1954), 129.

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called reactionary m odernist engineers and intellectuals in W eim ar and Nazi Germ any.30 In an essay w hich he w rote shortly after joining the Asia Developm ent Board entitled "Töa kyödötai to gijutsu no kakum ei" (The East Asian Community and the revolution of technology), M öri attem pted to devel­ op a new theoretical basis for technological developm ent w ithin a JapanM anchuria-China sphere.31 W ithin this regional sphere, technology would be developed upon the new econom ic basis o f the "national economy"(kokumin keizai) instead of upon the basis of W estern liberalism . M öri contrasted this national econom y w ith the liberal economy. The lib­ eral econom y w as founded upon the principle of the individual and the "universal principles of m ankind," w hile "liberal econom ics" explained econom ic phenomena in term s of the "surface relationship" betw een the national and world econom y. In tire pursuit of com m ercial profit, tire na­ tional econom y had previously "expanded its area of participation in the world econom y through the mechanism of free trade."32 The liberal sys­ tem subordinated a nation's econom ic activity to the world econom y, where the value of a country's natural resources and the extent of their de­ velopm ent w ere dictated by the world m arket. However, as he explained, "the significance of today's econom ic activity is national econom ic activ­ ity, not for an abstract individual or m ankind; it is activity as concrete na­ tional activity."33 The national econom y would be independent of the world econom y, and econom ic activity, especially the developm ent of natural resources, would be based upon the needs of the national econo­ my rather than upon som e abstract notion of free trade. Like M iyam oto, M öri believed that the key to a self-sufficient national economy w as the developm ent of synthetic raw m aterials, w hich he be­ lieved represented a "new industrial revolution." As M öri explained in "G ijutsu no kaihö to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin" (Government and the liberation of technology: the reform of the spirit of technology): "W hen raw m aterial resources do not directly exist w ithin the state's ter­ ritory, the state m aintains relationships abroad. In this w ay, both domes­ tically and internationally, a country's governm ent is dependent upon 30 See Jeffrey H erf, Reactionary M odernism (Cambridge, M ass.: Cambridge Univer­ sity Press, 1984). It is not d ear to what degree German engineers and intellectu­ als influenced Japanese technology bureaucrats. However, one active partiripant in the debates on the New Order for Science-Technology, Aikawa Haruki, was fam iliar with of their w ritings. See Aikawa Haruki, Sangyô gijutsu (Tökyö: Hakuyösha, 1942). 31 M öri Hideoto, 'T ö a kyödötai to gijutsu no kakum ei" KaibO jidai (M arch 1939): 4 -

12. 32 Ibid., 5-6. 33 Ibid., 5.

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and subjected to an econom y that is built upon die control of natural raw m aterials."34 If technology could solve Japan's resource problem , then de­ veloping technology would no longer be a problem of m obilizing m ateri­ als, but would becom e a problem of m obilizing the creative powers of the people— in other w ords, "a problem tied to die national com munity and to its spirit and people." The new technology "cam e to possess spiritual and cultural significance because its progress was the gauge to m easure the freedom of creativity of the people." In term s of this creativity—"im ­ m ense creativity is not of one hum an being but is rigidly and deeply tied to the people's com munal life."35 M öri summed up the characteristics of the new technology as follow s: technology is neither sim ply a m eans of production nor specialized individual technology resulting from random discoveries as in the W est, but is a technology of the national com munity based upon synthetic raw m aterials and "supported by the lively creative character w ithin the com m unity." M oreover, "it is com prehensive, uni­ form , and possesses a greater planning character due to its being unified into som ething ethnic and its uniform character m akes technology's ac­ tions spiritual."36 A prom inent them e in the w ritings of M öri and M iyamoto was the call for a new type of bureaucrat to adm inister such a technology-based soci­ ety. A technology-based society m eant not only a society based upon syn­ thetic resources and heavy industry, but one built upon superior organi­ zation. According to M iyamoto: "The guiding principle of so-called renovationist national policy i s ... rationalization of every section of soci­ ety, of the econom y, and of government. The utm ost efficiency of struc­ ture should take priority; the minimum use of labor to achieve maximum efficiency is the principle of the econom y."37 M öri envisioned a function­ alist society organized by occupation. In such a society, conflict between labor and capital w ill be elim inated, and "w orkers and entrepreneurs w ill acquire the status of organizers."38 He suggested that, "[f]o r the nation, possession of industrial raw m aterials and supplies necessary for life and all other things becom es not a problem of im porting money and capital, but a problem of organization".39 M öri suggested that, as for the new type

34 Möri Hideoto, "G ijutsu no kaihö to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin," KaibO Jidai (Septem ber 1939): 4 -8 , reprinted in Gijutsu HyOroti (Septem ber 1939): 12-15. 35 Ibid., 7. 36 Ibid., 8. 37 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kakushinteki kokusaku juritsu no yôken," Gijutsu Hyôron (August 1937): 3. 38 Möri Hideoto, "N ihon kokumin keizai no keisei to seiji," KaibO jid ai (April 1939): 30. 39 Ibid., 30.

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of bureaucrat, "naturally, they m ust change from legislative bureaucrats to so-called "creative bureaucrats" (sözöteki/kurie-chibu na kanryö). This is a strange w ord; however, in the area of technology it is also the same. W e were "conservative engineers" (hoshuteki gijutsusha) who drafted, ap­ plied, and interpreted law s; from now on w e w ill be "creative engineers

(sözöteki gijutsusha)."10 W hile M öri advocated the need for "creative engineers" in the bureauc­ racy, M iyamoto called for the need for "adm inistrative engineers" in the technical field: The concept of integrated technology is the latest concept, even abroad. As in Germany, the term "adm inistrative engineer (Venoaltungsingenieur) is being used. In contrast to the specialized engineer who is entrenched in his own field, [the adm inistrative engineer] maintains contact with all fields including government, economics, and culture, and displays the synthesized resu lts... I think that this is tiie new direction of technology and at the same time its true mission.4041 Here, the vision of technocratic control put forth by M öri and Miyamoto was that of a society run by technology bureaucrats who perceived the challenge of governm ent as ultim ately that of organization.

D e sig n in g t h e N ew O r d er fo r S c ien c e -T ec h n o lo g y

The movement for the New Order for Sdence-Technology was officially launched on 12 April 1940 as part of Prime M inister Konoe's New Order m ovem ent Upon the request of the chief of the political section of the Asia Development Board Suzuki Teiichi in May of 1940, Miyamoto began pro­ ducing the first drafts for the Technology Board. These drafts were then pre­ sented to the Cabinet Planning Board director Hoshino Naoki. The models which the technology bureaucrats turned to were not the liberal models of tiie advanced W estern countries, America and Britain, but the statist models of the late developers "M anchukuo," Soviet Russia, and Nazi Germany.

Organizing the New Order fo r Science-Technology One organizational model for the future Technology Board could be found in the Continental Science Board (Tairiku Kagakuin) in Manchuria.42 As

40 "Zadankai: Kakushin kanryö," JitsugyO no Nihon (1 January 1941). 41 Miyamoto, "Köa gijutsu no konpon genri," 152. 42 Kawahara, Shöwa seiji shisô kenkyü, 84-92.

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w ith many of Japan's wartime planning agencies and control laws, Man­ churia served as an important experim ental ground to try out new policies and methods for Japan and its empire. Plans for a central agency for scien­ tific research were initiated by the renovationist bureaucrat Hoshino Naoki, under whose leadership at the Cabinet Planning Board the sciencetechnology new order would be launched. A Finance M inistry official in the early 1930s, Hoshino rose to the prime ministership in Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and was known as w ie of the ni-ki-san-suke.*3 Upon the in­ vitation of Hoshino in 1934, the founder of Riken, Okochi M asatoshi, estab­ lished the research center w ith the assistance of engineers and scientists such as Fujisawa Takeo of the Cabinet Resources Bureau and Suzuki Umetarö of the research bureau of the South Manchurian Railways (Mantetsu). As the central agency for scientific research in M anchuria, the Conti­ nental Science Board sought to develop the resources of M anchuria, train researchers, and prom ote scientific knowledge. All science and technolo­ gy-related research was to be assumed by the agency, including the sci­ ence research functions of M antetsu. H oshino justified the assum ption of M antetsu's scientific research center in Dairen by the need to geographi­ cally centralize research practices in the capital of Shinkyö (now Chang­ chun). Politically, this m ove sym bolized the takeover of science and tech­ nology planning by the renovationist bureaucrats after their arrival in M anchuria. The original inspiration for the Continental Science Board was Germa­ ny's Kaiser W ilhelm Institute, w hich served as a model for a centralized, sem i-govem m ental research institute.4344 The organization of its various re­ search sections was m odeled on Riken. However, Riken's grow th into a spraw ling conglom erate also served as a lesson in w hat to avoid. Suzuki Um etarö lam ented: "there are over 680 research laboratories and insti­ tutes both private and public. These various institutes cover different ju­ risdictions resulting in sectionalism , inflexibility, and overlapping of re­ search. From the standpoint of cost, it is extrem ely inefficient. We seek to avoid these problem s in M anchuria and m ake it as close to the ideal as possible."45 For this reason, the Soviet m odel becam e the principle organ­ izational m odel for the Continental Science Board.

43 The ni-ki-san-suke referred to the last syllable of the leaders o f the Manchukuo government: Töjö Hideki and Hoshino Naoki, and Kishi Nobusuke, Ayukawa Giisuke, and Matsuoka Yösuke. 44 On the founding of the Continental Science Board see Hoshino N aoki, M ihatenu yum e (Tökyö: DLamondosha, 1963), esp. 170-75. 45 Suzuki Umetarö, "Tairiku no hatten to kagaku" (1938), in Nihon kagaku gijutsu shi taikei, vol. 4,324.

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The attractive features of the Soviet m odel w ere that science research was centralized and placed under the state, and scientists participated di­ rectly in policy-m aking and enjoyed high status w ithin the government. Suzuki described Soviet science policy in the follow ing way: As you all know, after the Russian revolution, religion, and supersti­ tion were disaffirm ed, and the basis for governm ent becam e the sta­ bility of the people's lives - in other w ords, planning for the strength­ ening of national defense and providing for the necessities of life. Only through the power of science-technology can this be achieved. As a result, a large am ount of energy is devoted to prom oting science. M ore than ten large research organs w ere constructed in M oscow, prom inent scholars and researchers gathered and organized an acad­ emy which was made into the central research agency for sciencetechnology. [Furthermore,] its head participates in die highest levels of planning w ithin the government. As for im portant national poli­ cies, the academy is consulted via this representative, and concrete plans are drafted based on research studies carried out in the various research institutes. These becom e the working plans for such things as the Five-Year Plan.46 Sim ilar principles w ere applied in die design of the Continental Science Board. It w as placed direedy under the Prim e M inister (kokumin sOridaijin), the head of the institute w as given the rank of m inister by being "sp e­ cially appointed" (tokunin kan), and researchers becam e "research bu­ reaucrats," a rank higher than that of clerk (jimu bunkan), and w ere provided a salary equivalent to that of a high-level civil servant (tokkyü bunkan). In term s of its research policy, die Continental Science Board would be a com prehensive research organ dealing w ith all aspects of the natural sciences. Its research agenda aim ed to further national policy and was to be set by a Science D eliberation Com m ittee com posed of the Prim e M inister, Chief of General A ffairs (sômuchô kan), bureau chiefs, and the di­ rector of the Continental Science Board.47 In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the founders of the Continental Sci­ ence Board would apply their experiences in M anchuria at the Cabinet Planning Board in Japan. Under Konoe's second cabinet, Hoshino Naoki would direct the New Order as p résid ait of the Cabinet Planning Board and Fujisawa Takeo would becom e head of the Cabinet Planning Board's

46 Suzuki Um etarö, "M anm ö shigen no kaihatsu to kagaku," Gijutsu Hydron (Oc­ tober 1941): 33. 47 Manshükokushi Hensan Kankökai, ed ., ManshOkokushi: SOron (Tökyö: Manmö Döhö Engokai, 1965), 1127.

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Seventh Division. Suzuki Um etarö, as head of the Continental Science Board, would continue to preach the virtues of Soviet science policy, and the Cabinet Planning Board's resident Soviet specialist, Nakamura M asao, would regularly contribute articles to M iyam oto's Technology Review about Soviet technology policy. However, as the technology bureaucrats would discover, developing science and technology policy in Japan posed a m uch more form idable challenge. Unlike in M anchuria, w here technol­ ogy bureaucrats w ere given a free hand to create science and technology policies from scratch, planners in Japan had to confront a firm ly en­ trenched political culture that looked w arily upon science.

Mobilizing the Scientific Spirit c f the Nation. If the Soviet m odel of science m obilization provided an im portant organ­ izational inspiration for the New Order for Science-Technology, it was the "scientific" and "spiritual pow er" of Nazi Germany that set the standard for the ideological m obilization of science and tedm ology in w artim e Ja­ pan. The head of the science division of the Cabinet Planning Board and adm irer of German technology policy, M orikawa Kakuzö, even pub­ lished a study entitled Ñachi seiji to waga kagaku gijutsu (The N azi Govern­ m ent and Our Science-Technology).48 In this book, M orikawa set about analyzing the national character of Germ ans and the role of science and technology in Germ an society in order to grasp the secret of G erm any's technological success. He admired the national character of die Germ ans, which he described w ith the words Sachlichkeit, Zweckmäßigkeit, and Ra­ tionalismus (objectivity, practicality, and rationality). In com paring Japan and Germ any, he suggested that in contrast to Germ any, "Japan lacked the communal spirit, and has not undergone training in obedience, as ev­ idenced by die recent spate of gekokujö (juniors overpowering seniors).49 M oreover, "in contrast to the Japanese, the spirit of science perm eates die everyday lives of G erm ans."50 M orikawa was particularly im pressed by die Deutsches Museum in M unich, w hich he believed dem onstrated the high level of common aw areness of science and technology in German so­ ciety.51

48 Morikawa Kakuzö, Ñachi seiji to waga kagakugijutsu (Tökyö: Okakura Shobö, 1942). 49 Ibid., 129. 50 Ibid., 131. 51 Morikawa Kakuzö, "D oitsu no gijutsu sha to Nihon no gijutsu sha" Gijutsu HySrott, January 1941, contained in M inobe YOji bunsho (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Toshokan hen, 1988).

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M iyamoto also looked to Germany as the m odel for technology mobi­ lization in Japan. W hat attracted M iyamoto to N azi Germany was its na­ tional spirit: "N azi Germany says 'w e w ill not grieve over our lack of re­ sources. It is sufficient to overcom e our intellectual poverty. Now w e w ill either acquire or m anufacture w hat w e need.' The Japanese as w ell m ust overcome m aterial difficulties through spirit and effort like the Ger­ m ans."52 M iyamoto was deeply influenced by the German "blitzkrieg," which he believed was made possible by two factors: "scientific pow­ er"—represented by superior weapons produced through science and machines—and "spiritual pow er." M iyamoto believed that the two were not conflicting, but w ere m utually dependent and represented a "harm o­ nious fusion."53 He believed that technology was the foundation for na­ tional defense, industry, and life, and that science made technology pos­ sible. The German blitzkrieg highlighted the im portant relationship between state and science, which he classified into three areas: national defense and science, industry and science, and daily life and science. In term s of the relationship between national defense and science, he sug­ gested that "present and future wars are wars based on extrem ely ad­ vanced science and m achines."54 Industry and science had also becom e intim ately related. Not only was "th e application of science in the manu­ facturing production process indispensable," but science had becom e a substitute for raw m aterials. Through science, low-grade ore can be sub­ stituted for high-grade ore, w hile wood fiber can be used to make raw cot­ ton, coal to make oil, and coal and lim e to make rubber.55 Finally, as for the relationship betw een daily life and science, he offered the following: "a country's national power is determ ined by the sum of m aterial and hu­ man resources. If they are appropriately com bined, the functional form it takes is national defense power and industrial power. D eficiencies in hu­ man resources can be supplemented by science."56 Miyamoto believed that the real obstacles in developing science and technology lay in Japanese and "oriental" culture, as he explained: In the ancient O rient, m aterial things w ere looked down upon and spiritual things w ere revered. Our tradition was one in which mate­ rialism was rejected and idealism embraced. It is wrong to reject sci­ entific civilization as m aterialist culture. Science is not m aterial, and

52 Miyamoto, "Köa gijutsu no konpon genri," 147. 53 Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kokka to kagaku," Risd (December 1940); reprinted in Kagaku no dßin, 19. 54 Ibid., 11. 55 Ibid., 12. 56 Ibid., 13. Ill

fanis Mimura

scientists a ie not m aterialists. Science is the study that m akes d ear ancient truths, and conform s to the law of m athem atical prindples, or the law of experience. "The 'clarification of the kokutai' (kokutai meichö ron) looks coldly upon sdence as if it w ere a heretic. It auto­ m atically assum es that it is absent from the Japanese character be­ cause it is a foreign culture. It is m istakenly linked w ith historical ma­ terialist thought, and looked down upon as a m aterial filing, w hile [in contrast,] the Japanese value file spirit—hence it is viewed as com­ bining charcoal and ice."57 M iyamoto tried to dispel two myths that he believed w ere associated w ith science in Japan: that science was associated w ith historical m aterialism , or M arxism , and hence incom patible w ith Japan's notion of kokutai; and that science's "m aterialist" orientation m ade it incom patible w ith the non-m aterialism , or "idealism " of oriental culture. By doing so, he hoped to make science m ore w idely accepted among the people. As he suggest­ ed: "science is not only necessary for scientists, but crud al for nurturing the scientific way of thinking and perception am ong the general popu­ lace."58Only by incorporating science and the "scientific way of thinking" could Japan com pete w ith the W est. M iyam oto's solution was to advocate a new type of Japanese "sd encetechnology," in w hich he drew a distinction betw een "pure science" and "applied sdence" (i.e., technology) w ith an em phasis on the latter. Japa­ nese sdence-technology recognized the intim ate relationship between pure sdence and technology: technology was possible only through basic sdentific research. However, sdence could possess a unique Japanese character only if it was directed toward the developm ent of technology based upon the resources of Asia and furthered Japan's goals of m ilitary and industrial "catch-up." As he explained: "W hat I reject is pure sdence having a universal character. I affirm applied science having a regional, state, and rad al character." M iyamoto believed that science and technol­ ogy are rigorously tied together, and that the developm ent of technology w ithout sdentific research is like "flow ers bloom ing w ithout grass" (kusa

nashi ga harm o hiraki). M öri saw the need for a new ideology for Japanese sdence-technology "for the purpose o f truly fusing sdence and technology into the life of the Japanese race"59 Developing such an ideology involved several steps. In file same w ay in w hich M öri had taken technology out of liberal capital­ 57 M iyam oto, "Kokka to kagaku," 22. 58 Ibid., 8. 99 Möri Hideoto, "Seiji ishiki to kagaku gijutsu suijun," Gijutsu HyOron (January 1941).

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ism and placed it w ithin die national com munity, he would now take sci­ ence out of the "m echanistic m aterialistic w orldview " and place it w ithin his so-called "new w orldview of quantum theory." In a dialogue w ith the Japanese philosopher M iki Kiyoshi in April of 1941, M öri described the new stage of science.60 According to M öri, "Japanese science-technology remained no m ore than a struggle w ith the economy from the m oment it awakened as m odem science-technology."61 lik e technology, science re­ search in Japan had been driven by econom ic developm ent, and as a re­ sult, science-technology was subordinated to the econom y and could only have a "m aterialistic existence." Like M iyamoto, M öri believed that sci­ ence had been associated w ith M arxism w ithin Japanese ideology and was seen as the "source of the historical m aterialist w orld view ."62 M öri justified the m obilization of science by arguing that science w as now m oving toward a "higher stage" and was now com patible w ith Jap­ anese culture: M odem science, w hich is pushing toward the com pletion of the study of atom ic energy, is itself revising its view o f the form er histor­ ical, m aterialistic, m echanistic world picture and m oving toward em­ bracing oriental philosophy. C an't Japanese philosophy and today's new science becom e com pletely fused together? In other w ords, I sense that the developm ent of science today is now able to be fused for the first tim e w ith our philosophy and science, and the reason why our ideology opposed science is because science was still in a prim itive stage.63 The new stage of quantum theory, according to M öri, represented "th e fu­ sion of m echanistic and m etaphysical elem ents." This fusion heralded the fusion of tiie previous m aterial, m echanistic science of the W est, and the non-m aterial, spiritual philosophy of the Orient. According to M öri: "The reason why 1 am interested in science-technology is because, after all, the scientific view of the quantum theory and so-called 'm etaphysical cogni­ tion' have becom e unified and [Japanese science-technology] no longer contradicts the Japanese totalitarian world view ."64 Having created a new ideological basis for both technology and sci­ ence, the last step for M öri w as to unite them into a Japanese type of "sci­ ence-technology. " He saw this as ultim ately a problem of government. In 40 Möri Hideoto and M iki Kiyoshi, "A shita no kagaku Nihon no sözö," Kagaku Gijutsu KBgyO (April 1941). 61 Ibid., 187. 42 M öri, "Seiji ishiki to kagaku gijutsu suijun," 25. ° Ibid., 24. 44 Möri and M iki, "A shita no kagaku Nihon no sözö," 196.

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an essay in the January 1941 issue of Technology Review, M öri suggests: "There m ust exist greater sensitivity toward the m utually influencing character of science and technology in order to create a superior technol­ ogy." A science-technology based upon a com m ercial econom y "tends to sever science and technology, and a government founded upon a com­ m ercial econom y, naturally from this standpoint, has a short-term per­ spective which is poor in the power of im agination about the future char­ acter of the ethnic people." Hence, for M öri, "political consciousness m ust be created before technology and science are m echanically tied together." This was the duty of scientists and engineers to teach politicians and the people about the new stage of science and technology. "W e m ust raise the people's political aw areness of science in order to develop Japan's sci­ ence-technology."65

I m plem en tin g th e N ew O r d er fo r S c ien c e -T ec h n o lo g y

The "O utline Plan for the Establishm ent of a New Order for Science-Tech­ nology" (Kagaku Gijutsu Shintaisei Kakuritsu Yökö) was approved by the cabinet on April 1941. In the opening statem ent o f policy, the govern­ m ent anticipated "th e com pletion of a Japanese character of science-tech­ nology based upon the resources of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." This goal was to be achieved through "th e establishm ent of a to­ tal w ar state system of science-technology," "th e rapid developm ent of technology," "the epoch-m aking advancem ent of science," and "th e pro­ m otion of the scientific spirit of the nation."66 The "Japanese character of science-technology" was based upon M iyam oto's "A sia developm ent technology." The Outline proposed policies that w ere grouped into three areas: pol­ icies to prom ote scientific research, policies to prom ote technology, and policies to "cultivate the scientific sp irit." The centerpiece o f the New Or­ der for Science-Technology was the establishm ent of the Technology Board (Gijutsuin).67 Like the Continental Science Board, the Technology Board was to serve as a com prehensive research agency for science and conduct research on basic science, applied science, and industrialization. As in the case of the Continental Science Board, the technology bureau­

65 Ibid. 66 Kikakuin Kenkyükai, Kokubö kokka no yökö (Tökyö: Shinkigensha, 1941), 173. 67 For a detailed study of the establishm ent of the Technology Board, see Sawai M i­ noru, "Kagaku gijutsu shintaisei kösö no tenkai to gijutsuin no tanjö," Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku (December 1991): 367-95.

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crats sought to avoid the overlapping and redundancy of science and technology research in Japan. Through the supra-m inisterial Technology Board, they hoped to bring together representatives o f the various m inis­ tries to draft national policies and plans such as a Five-Year Plan for the rapid developm ent of technology.68 However, due to strong opposition by the various m inistries, especially by the M inistry of Education and die M inistry of Commerce and Industry, who viewed such plans as infring­ ing upon their area of authority, the drafters w ere forced to withdraw their plan and resort to trying to coordinate research among over 1,000 re­ search institutes in Japan. In addition to the Technology Board, a ScienceTechnology Deliberation Council (Kagaku Gijutsu Shingikai) was to be established to unite the various science-technology inquiry boards such as the M inistry of Education's Science Prom otion Investigative Council.69 The establishm ent of both the Technology Board and the Science-Tech­ nology D eliberation Council was delayed until 1942. However, by this tim e, given the severe conditions of the Pacific W ar and demands of the m ilitary, science and technology m obilization was geared toward the short-term goal of fighting the w ar.

C o n c lu sio n

The New Order for Science-Technology represented an attem pt by Ja­ pan's technology bureaucrats to develop a science and technology policy for Japan and its em pire in East Asia. These bureaucrats sought to achieve this by developing a Japanese type of science-technology inspired by the m odels of scientific and technological developm ent of Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and their own experim ental ground of M anchuria. In launch­ ing the movement for the New Order for Science-Technology, renova­ tionist bureaucrats and sym pathetic engineers joined together to launch an ideological campaign to make science and technology com patible w ith Japanese culture. These bureaucrats also sought to convince the Japanese public that they as "technology bureaucrats" w ere uniquely qualified to run Japan's em pire in East Asia. Through the New O rder for Science-Technology technology bureau­ crats such as M iyamoto and M öri articulated a vision of a postw ar Japa­ nese em pire. They im agined this em pire to be built upon the idea of a

68 Ibid., 193. 69 For a study on the Science-Technology Deliberation Council see Sawai Minoru, "Taiheiyö sensöki kagaku gijutsu seisaku no hitokusari" Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku (October 1994): 1-23.

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"com m unity" characterized by m utual dependence, or a sym biotic rela­ tionship in w hich m em bers would provide for the others' needs. For the "com m unity" to be sustainable, each m em ber would adhere to a defined role, w ith Japan assum ing the position as technological leader in the re­ gion. A fter the w ar the ideological foundations of this New Order w ere no longer tenable as Japan was now firm ly entrenched in the dem ocratic world order and its em peror system was disavowed. W ithin the postw ar order, Japan has achieved trem endous econom ic grow th and now ranks among the m ost technologically advanced countries in the w orld. How­ ever, w ith Japan's growing econom ic presence in A sia, concerns have been raised about whether Japan is building a "regional production alli­ ance" or a peacetim e "yen bloc" in Asia.70 W ith the rapid econom ic devel­ opm ent o f Asia and Japan's increasing econom ic and technological influ­ ence in the region, has becom e all the m ore im perative to come to term s w ith Japan's recent past in Asia. The New Order for Science-Technology provides a window into w artim e bureaucratic thinking about technology and technocratic control and in doing so, provides an im portant historical perspective to current discussions of Japanese technology policy and its role in Asia.

70 See for instance, H atch and Yamamura, A sia in Japan's Embrace, and Paul M aidm ent, "The Yen Bloc: A New Balance in A sia?" Economist (15 July 1989).

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in. Imperialism at W ork: T he J apanese E mpire in A sia

C onsumption as R esistance: T he N ational P roducts M ovement and A nti-J apanese Boycotts in M odern C hina K arl G. G erth

Always remem ber and never forget M ay Ninth [1915]. A 1915 poster w ritten in its author's blood Com mercial W arfare can defeat M ilitary W arfare. By remem bering May Ninth and May Thirtieth [1925], [Chinesemade] Sanjiao Brand tow els w ill bring down [Japanese-made] Tiem iao Brand tow els. Advertisem ent in a Shanghai newspaper in June, 1925 Boycotts figure prom inently in die history of Sino-Japanese relations in the first third of the tw entieth century, and w ith good reason. During this period, such boycotts precipitated or accompanied m ajor turning points in relations betw een the two countries—w ith significant boycotts direct­ ed against the Japanese in 1908,1909,1915, 1919,1925,1928, and then nearly continuously into the second Sino-Japanese W ar (1937-45). In­ deed, a recent book on the origins of the w ar asserts that die policies un­ derpinning Chinese boycotts provoked die w ar w ith Japan.1 Despite the frequency and centrality of boycotts, studies usually focus on individual incidents, ignoring any continuity w ith previous ones.2 Even the few books that cover m ultiple boycotts fail to adequately problem atize die continuity betw een them.3 As such, the historiography of boycotts interprets these events as isolated m anifestations of a cycle that 1 Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs: The Failure o f China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy," 1931-32 (Ann Arbor: University of M ichigan Press, 1991). 2 Two exam ples o f studies that exam ine individual boycotts include: Jordan, Chi­ nese Boycotts and Joseph T. Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai: The M aking o f a Social M ovement in M odem China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971). Among several recent studies on the Anti-Am erican boycott of 1905, Wong Sin-kiong is helpful in suggesting how this boycott develops protest tropes. See W ong, "The Genesis of Popular M ovements in M odem C hina," Ph.D. diss., Indiana Univer­ sity, 1995. 3 The m ost im portant studies covering m ultiple boycotts are: C harles F. Renter, A Study o f Chinese Boycotts: With Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness (Baltim ore: D ie Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933) and K ikudii Takaharu,

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intensified over tim e. The sequence of events w ithin each cycle can be summarized as follow s: A foreign "hum iliation" prom pts a popular re­ sponse in the form of a boycott, and the Japanese respond by pressuring the Chinese governm ent to suppress it. The Chinese governm ent then at­ tem pts to suppress the boycott w ith varying degrees of intensity until gradually the boycott dissolves as governm ent suppression from above, inertia from below , and the profit m otive am ong m erchants underm ine the com mitment of participants. A few years later, another round begins.4 My concern here is the inactivity that is assum ed to exist between these "cycles." In the first part of the paper, I introduce a Shanghai-based com­ m ercial and industrial organization w ith ties throughout the region, and exam ine how it tried to m ediate the econom ic im pact of political and so­ cial changes on its businesses and industries. I argue that this organiza­ tion continually prom oted an ethic of nationalistic consum ption as part of its strategy to com pete against foreign com panies in Chinese m arkets. Com bining elem ents of anti-im perialism , nationalism , and Chinese iden­ tity, this ethic made the consum ption o f "national products" (guohuo) pa­ triotic and the use of foreign products akin to treason. The ethic increas­ ingly came to shape aspects of Chinese life by legitim izing government policies, sanctioning social activity, influencing clothing fashions, and more. Throughout this paper, I refer to the growing num ber of diverse or­ ganizations, activities and agendas supporting this ethic of nationalistic consum ption as the "N ational Products M ovem ent" (Guohuo yundong, or NPM). In the second half of this paper, I exam ine the relationship between the National Products Movement and the boycotts by looking at the 1915 boycott. I focus on the agenda and activities of a single organization that embodied a particular ethic of nationalistic consum ption to see how this ethic spread and influenced the interpretation of objects and events be­

Chügoku minzoku undo no kihon kôzô: Taigai boikotto no kenkyû (Tökyö: Daian, 1966 [expanded and revised edition, 1974]). W hile periodically m entioning some of the long-term effects of boycotts, such as the replacem ent of Japanese products with new Chinese ones, Renter's focus is "econom ic effectiveness" from the per­ spective of trade statistics, not institutions, activities, or symbols. Kikuchi does a superior job of connecting boycotts by analyzing them alongside the growth of dom estic Chinese industry. He also acknowledges the appearance of the Na­ tional Products Movement (NPM) organizations, but only exam ines them w ith­ in the narrow context of individual boycotts and does not trace their activities across boycotts. In other cases, m ultiple boycotts are subsumed under other sub­ jects. 4 This interpretation of boycotts is reinforced by the common practice of number­ ing boycotts in contem porary coverage, especially Japanese. See, for instance, S him ni okeru hainichi undo (Osaka: Osaka Shôgyô Kaigisho, 1928), 1-6.

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yond its original scope. A t die heart of düs paper is a reinterpretation of boycotts, specifically die anti-Japanese boycott of 1915, through their recontextualization. I propose that the NPM links and redefines diese events, shifting die interpretative paradigm away from boycotts as spo­ radic and usually tem porarily successful events to boycotts as a highly visible m anifestation of growing com mitment to and extension of an ethic of nationalistic consum ption.5 Exam ining events such as boycotts from the perspective of a movement that prom oted a refusal to buy foreign products in general, and increasingly Japanese products in particular, w ill reveal that popular resistance to Japanese and other foreign activity in China is underestim ated and m isunderstood.6 Indeed, die m isinterpre­ tation of diese events as isolated incidents leads to a devaluing of impor­ tant dim ensions of Chinese nationalism and form s of anti-im perialism that Japanese encountered throughout China.7

D om esticatin g C on sum ption P rio r

to

1915

This section exam ines the developm ent of an ethic of nationalistic con­ sumption through the early history o f a key organization in the N ational Products M ovem ent, the N ational Products Preservation Association (Zhonghua Guohuo W eichi H ui, w hich I hereafter refer to as die NPPA).8

5 The groundbreaking work of Shanghai econom ic historian Pan Junxiang in­ cludes boycotts as a m anifestation of the NPM but does not explore the links be­ tween the two. See Pan, "Guohuo yundong pingjia de ruogan w enti," in Pan Junxiang, ed., Zhongguo jindai guohuo yundong (Beijing: Zhongguo W enshi Chubanshe, 1996), 577-78. 6 In contrast with these studies that concentrate on the economic dimension of the Sino-foreign rivalries, I focus on the broader context of organizations, activities, and symbols that shape these rivalries. The growth of Chinese domestic industry and its im plications for Sino-Japanese economic rivalry are surveyed in M arieQ aire Bergère, The Golden Age o f the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 63-98; Kikuchi, Chügoku minzoku undo, and many other places. Specific rivalries between Chinese and foreign businesses are examined in industry studies, such as Sherman Cochran Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1980) and Takamura Naosuke, Kindai Nihon mengyO to Chügoku (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), especially 140-156. 7 The Japanese also encountered these form s of nationalism within boycotts and the NPM in overseas Chinese com m unities, especially in Southeast Asia. See, for example, Akashi Yoji, "The Boycott and Anti-Japanese N ational Salvation Movement of the Nanyang Chinese, 1908-1941." Ph.D. diss., Georgetown Uni­ versity, 1963. * Translating the Chinese name for the NPPA poses problems. I chose the middle course between two extremes—one stressing the purpose of the organization and

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The section illum inates the developm ent of the NPM as a coherent move­ ment w ith the means to shape and prom ote this ethic. It dem onstrates that the movement as a whole was indeed a sustained effort, rather than a se­ ries of unconnected or loosely connected events subordinated to boycotts. N either the movement nor the NPPA was, as one scholar stated and m any others im plied, m erely "cam ouflage for boycotts."9 In fact, this paper ar­ gues that tite reverse may be the case. The second half of the paper uses the anti-Japanese boycott of 1915 and its legacy to show how the NPM, through such organizations as the NPPA, came to define the social, ideo­ logical, and econom ic bases of boycotts.

Advocating Nationalistic Consumption The form ation of an ethic of nationalistic consumption w as closely linked to other changes in China. The political revolution of 1911 that led to tite downfall of China's last dynasty further destabilized, or com pletely over­ turned, state-sponsored sym bols, institutions, and ideologies. M oreover, there was more than one contender to make replacem ents, as m ounting in­ ternal problems caused the Qing dynasty to collapse at least as much as it was overthrown by strong revolutionary forces in control of com peting weapons, soldiers, and ideologies. The contenders w ere anxious to consol­ idate power, and at the local level these struggles w ere often expressed in battles over sym bols, such as anti-foot binding campaigns, the cutting of queues, tite m odification of clothing, the reorganization of tim e through holidays and the introduction of the solar calendar, among others.10W hen the other one a m ore literal translation. I elected to translate w eichi as "preserva­ tion" to contrast it with its implied antonym , which often appeared in die phrase, "national annihilation" (loangguo). "Preservation" im plies not only pre­ serving the industries involved in the NPPA, but also the Chinese nation through the "preservation" of its industries. A NPPA document from 1925 translates its name as "China Products Improvement A ssociation" (Suzhou Mu­ nicipal Archives Suzhou zong shanghui quanzong 2.1 [all m aterials come from this collection referred to hereafter as SZMA]: File 397). Although im proving Chinese products was an explicit and central part of the agendas of NPM groups, such as NPPA, the term does not adequately invoke the foreign threat that promoting Chinese products im plied. O ther translations for NPPA are "Chinese Product Protection Society" and "Society to Encourage Use of Nation­ al Goods." Linda Pom erantz-Zhang, Wu Tingfang (1842-1922): Reform and M od­ ernization in M odem Chinese H istory (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), 235. 9 See for exam ple, Matsumoto Shigeharu, The H istorical Development o f Chinese Boycott, Book 1,1834-1925 (Tökyö: Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Re­ lations, 1933). 10 Li Shaobing, M inguo shiqi de xishi fongsu toenua (Beijing: Beijing Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1994).

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examined, these conflicts over rival state-building agendas are usually seen as battlegrounds for political, m ilitary, and intellectual elites at one end of the social hierarchy and students, secret societies, and other mass movements of resistance at the other end.11 However, powerful econom ic interests also m obilized resources to redefine the new sym bols of state to reinforce and extend com peting narratives of the nation, its people, and its route to "national salvation" (jiuguo).12 The NPPA had pressing reasons for linking consum ption w ith bur­ geoning Chinese nationalism . In the conflict over how the Chinese should look, the new republican governm ent m ade relentless efforts to eradicate queues and introduce W estern-style dress for men. Because of the close association between queues and Chinese-style clothing, the NPPA had a legitim ate concern that the dom estic silk industry was in grave danger. The im m ediate goal of the NPPA, then, was to prevent political leaders throughout China from sanctioning the clothing changes that were ac­ com panying queue cutting. M oreover, they w ere successful in lobbying to m andate that Chinese clothing be m ade o f dom estically produced ma­ terials, especially silk. In the process, the organization managed to sever the old link between hair and clothes, and to attach distinct m eanings to each. For instance, the NPPA helped redefine the Chinese-style long gown (changpao) as a patriotic style. Such reinterpretations helped ensure the survival of Chinese clothing, but also had a more subtle long-term sig­ nificance in building an ethic of nationalistic consum ption that would de­ fine other products as national interests.13 To defend itself against this im m ediate threat posed by clothing change, the pow erful interests represented in the NPPA quickly built a so­ phisticated organization. This organization im m ediately sought to take advantage of many opportunities created by the fall of dynastic rule, which allowed econom ic interests to form new, even m ore specific inter11 Prasenjit Duara makes im portant contributions to scholarship at both ends of the spectrum , analyzing the resistance to state-building agendas both among na­ tional elites and within local movements. See Duara, Rescuing H istory from the Nation: Questioning Narratives o f M odem China (Chicago: The University of Chi­ cago Press, 1995). 12 Indeed, 1would argue that this ethic of nationalistic consum ption was very com­ petitive, contributing largely to the emerging dom inant narrative of history, rather than to "alternative" ones. For a lucid discussion o f the concepts of na­ tionalism and narrative as they relate to m odem Chinese history, see Duara, Res­ cuing H istory, Part 1. 13 My discussion throughout the first half of this paper of the role of the NPPA and the NPM in the battles over defining a new orthodox appearance draws on "Em ­ pires of Appearance and Disappearance: The Politics of H air and W ear in Mod­ em China, 1880-1930," a paper w ritten for the Annual Association for Asian Studies Conference, W ashington, D.C., 27 March 1998.

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est groups than the cham bers of com m erce that only recently had been al­ lowed to form . Indeed, organizations of Chinese sojourning in Shanghai, or native-place associations, that eventually formed the NPPA began or­ ganizational activities shortly after the outbreak of the revolution. A fter tw o m onths of organizational m eetings, the association w as form ally es­ tablished in Shanghai on Decem ber 12, 1911, at the m ain hall of the Hangzhou Qianjiang native-place association.14 Although the NPPA becam e a large organization w ith hundreds of m embers representing native-place associations, industries, students, and many other groups, it was inaugurated by a sm all and narrow group of only four representatives from each of eight native-place associations, a total of thirty-tw o.15 M oreover, these associations represented only three industries—silk /satin , hat, and pawn shops—all in the Jiangsu and Zhejiang area. The initial agenda of the NPPA not only reflected the im­ m ediate concern over the survival of Chinese-style hats and clothing, but it also articulated w idely held notions that quickly attracted new mem­ bers, branch organizations, and sim ilar groups throughout China and in overseas Chinese com m unities.

14 For m ore inform ation on foe preparatory m eetings, see Zhonghua Guohuo W eichi H ui, Zhonghua guohuo xoeichi hui ershi zhounian jinian kan (Shanghai, 1932) [hereafter, NPPA, Jinian kan], Huiyi jilu section. The NPPA is regularly labeled the oldest NPM organization. See, for instance, Pan Junxiang, "Guohuo yundong zhong de shanghai minzu zichanjieji," in Dang’an yu lishi (1989), 55; and Xin Ping et al., M inguo shehui dagang (Fuzhou: Fuzhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 348. However, a reporter attending foe in­ augural meeting of foe NPPA informed foe gathered that there were already three other sm aller organizations in Shanghai. See Li Zhuoyun's short speech in Zhonghua Guohuo W eichi Hui, Zhonghua Guohuo W eichi hui zhangcheng xoendu huilu (Shanghai, 1912) [hereafter NPPA, Zhangcheng xoendu huilu,], 9a. Because I discuss native-place associations only in Shanghai and Jiangnan, I follow Good­ man and use "native-place association" to denote both huiguan (m eeting hall) and gongsuo (public office), the institutions established by sojourning mer­ chants. Bryna Goodman, N ative Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identity in Shanghai, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995), 39. 15 There is much confusion in foe secondary, and indeed, prim ary, literature con­ cerning foe establishm ent of the NPPA. The above scholars (as does the NPPA, Jinian kan: Huishi section, 1) all incorrectly list the founding number of nativeplace associations as ten, with an initial representation of forty members. In ac­ tuality, thirty-tw o persons, or four representatives from each of eight nativeplace associations, made up foe founding group. See NPPA, Zhangcheng xoendu huilu, 4b-5a. Others get the founding date wrong. For exam ple, Zheng Qing [Chen Zhengqing], "Shanghai Zhongguo Guohuo gongsi zai zhanshi de houfang," Dang'an yu lishi 1987.3,64-71, lists foe founding of the NPPA as 1915, and Pom erantz-Zhang, Wu Tingfimg, 235, seem s to say that Wu organized the group in 1914.

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Hierarchies o f Dissemination From the start, the NPPA faced three m ajor obstacles in gaining support for its agenda. First, it had to w in over Chinese m ilitary and political lead­ ers, m any of whom w ere already endorsing policies the NPPA opposed, such as clothing reform. N aturally, it focused on cultivating support in and around the Shanghai base of operations, where its influence was strongest. Second, it had to dissem inate its agenda and build support out­ side of Shanghai. Lastly, it had to make its agenda appealing beyond a narrow group of political and econom ic elites. W ith the collapse of impe­ rial power and die growth of regional pow er centers, m embers under­ stood that they would not be able to rely exclusively on state and elite pa­ tronage. Cultivating Patronage. The NPPA prized pow erful patronage, and worked hard to gain early support from influential politicians. At its in­ augural m eeting, the NPPA developed these contacts by inviting and giv­ ing prom inent roles to Shanghai leaders, county and provincial officials, and representatives of other groups as w ell as individuals from the m ili­ tary, political, com m ercial, and academ ic circles. In the m onths follow ing the inaugural m eeting, the NPPA continued to lobby these political and m ilitary elites by w riting letters, sending telegram s, and encouraging their attendance at other organization functions. These efforts yielded public letters of support from such prom inent Chinese as Sun Yatsen, Shanghai m ilitary governor Chen Qim ei, and noted diplom at Wu Tingfang. Shortly after its establishm ent, the NPPA received a letter from Wu Tingfang endorsing its form ation and inquiring about membership. The NPPA im m ediately asked him to join and in less than a year elected him president.16 Support such as this helped establish the legitim acy and prom inence of the NPPA. Building a National Network. From its inception, the NPPA hoped to pro­ vide an organizational tem plate to facilitate the establishm ent of sim ilar groups throughout China. It im mediately began cultivating ties to cham­ bers of com merce and local governm ents in other provinces by "sending

16 Sun Yatsen's letter to the NPPA w as published in N anjing's Lanshi zhengfu gongbao 7 (4 February 1912); for Chen Q im ei's assurances to die NPPA that clothing would be regulated, see his letter to the NPPA reprinted in the newspaper Shen bao, 20 December 1911, and republished in the collection Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan, ed., Xinhai gem ing zai Shanghai shiliao xuanji (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 423-24. On Wu Tingfang, see NPPA, ]inian kan, Huiwu jilu section, 3; I deal extensively w ith W u's involvem ent in the NPPA in "Em pires of Appearance and Disappearance. " The NPPA also received early letters of sup­ port from lower ranking officials, including one from the Shanghai Shangwu Chairman W ang, see NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 2.

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telegram s to far places and w riting letters to nearby o n es/'17 The corre­ spondence aimed not only to secure support for the NPPA agenda, but to urge other cities and towns to set up sim ilar groups, propagate common econom ic goals locally, and lobby local, regional, and national authorities. To assist in the form ation of sister organizations, it circulated m aterials on all aspects of its organization. The earliest and m ost com prehensive of these was a 1912 booklet that detailed all aspects of the organization, in­ cluding its initial m em bership, bylaw s, and copies of speeches from its in­ augural m eeting. It also provided form letters, and it urged other groups to use them as a basis for lobbying local, regional, and national authori­ ties. These NPPA tem plates becam e the basis for letters from other groups and the model for the establishm ent of sim ilar organizations.18 The N PPA's appeal found im mediate success in provinces and cities across China, including Tianjin, Fuzhou, Changsha, Tonghai, Anqing, Bei­ jing, Nanjing, Jiaxing, Zhenjiang, Hankou, Jinan, and many m ore.19 The Shanghai-based NPPA had varying degrees of contact w ith these other organizations. It was directly involved in setting up some organizations, w hile w ith others it only exchanged correspondence and passed along copies of its literature. Its relationship w ith Suzhou was particularly close. In July of 1912, Suzhou becam e among the earliest cities to follow the NPPA lead in establishing an organization to prom ote the NPM agenda. W ith a third of its population working in the silk industry, Suzhou had a lot to lose if the silk industry continued its downward slide.20 Already, an influential Suzhou silk native-place association, the Yunjin Gongsuo, was involved in the establishm ent of the NPPA in Shanghai. Now, this native-

17 Nearly every speaker addresses the im portance of helping to establish sim ilar organizations in other cities. See, for instance, the speech by Li Zhuoyun, NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 9a. There was a large pool of potential contacts as, by the end of 1911, there were nearly 800 local-, county-, and provincial-level cham­ bers of commerce in China. Bergère, The Golden A ge, 57. 18 Indeed, it becam e common practice for later NPM organizations to send each other copies of bylaws and other organizational literature. The NPM organiza­ tions active in the spring of 1925 are surveyed and categorized in Jiang W eiguo, "Jindai Zhongguo guohuo tuanti chuxi," in M in'guo dang'an 1995.1,75-83, who classifies the NPPA as a "producer/m arketer" NPM organization, 76-77. 19 Conveniently summarized in Huang Yiping and Yu Baotang, eds., Beiyang zhengfu shiqi jingji (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan Chubanshe, 1995), 182. The NPPA, finían kan log lists the establishm ent of these branches as w ell as contact with others. Pan, Guohuo yundong, 19-20, com piles a list to dem onstrate the breadth of the NPPA correspondence with other NPM organizations throughout China and with overseas Chinese. 20 The establishm ent of the Suzhou NPPA branch in the context of the local silk in­ dustry is covered in W ang Xiang, "Jindai sichou shengchan fazhan yu Jiangnan shehui bianqian," Jindaishi yanjiu (1992.4), 1-20.

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place association, w orking through the Suzhou General Cham ber of Com merce, oversaw the establishm ent of a local branch.21 Popularizing the National Products Movement Agenda. From its beginnings, the NPPA used diverse channels to dissem inate its agenda, includ­ ing form al (letters and petitions) and inform al (word of mouth w ithin na­ tive-place associations), new (telegraph, new spapers, periodicals) and old (m eetings at teahouses, restaurants, and native-place association halls). To provide an idea of this range, the follow ing paragraphs intro­ duce som e of these initial channels that formed the basis of boycotts and the backbone of the NPM.22 From its inception, the NPPA w as concerned w ith conveying its mes­ sage to as many Chinese as possible. For instance, it printed a synopsis of what m ight be term ed its "m ission statem ent" in colloquial Chinese (baihua), and included it w ith the initial booklet of inform ational tem­ plates.23 It also used other form s of dissem ination intended to broaden its reach. Each year, the NPPA printed and distributed handbills, leaflets, newspaper advertisem ents nationally and overseas as w ell as other ma­ terials designed to boost m em bership, advertise NPPA activities, increase awareness of the NPM, prom ote specific national products, and so on. Print runs varied by subject and year, ranging from several thousand to several tens of thousands. And the total for all categories of propaganda literature ranged from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands of pieces each year.24 By the early 1930s, the NPPA would claim that these efforts to publicize "national products" (guohuo) w ere so w idely success­ ful that even "all women and children knew " about the im portance of buying Chinese products.25 Locally, the NPPA also organized lectures and other forum s to dissem­ inate its m essage m ore w idely. At the inaugural m eeting in December, 1911, m em bers decided to hold a "Prom ote National Products Dissem i­

21 SZMA 2.1: File 8 4 0 ,8 -1 2 ,2 7 . In writing to the office of the Jiangsu governor and city authorities, eight members of the new Suzhou branch of the NPPA associ­ ation explained their purpose and requested official recognition of the group in a petition with lines drawn from the 1912 NPPA tem plate. 22 The NPPA also continually developed new channels, including parades, expo­ sitions, periodicals, and others. For a brief introduction to the channels not dis­ cussed here, see Pan, "Guohuo yundong zhong," 55-59. 23 NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 24a-25b. 24 NPPA, Jinian kan, Huishi section, 16-18. The NPPA, finían kan, Huiwu jilu sec­ tion records hundreds of instances of printing handbills, circulars, special-prod­ uct catalogs (yangben) on silk and other products, and so on. For instance, in its first year (12 December 1911 to 12 December 1912) the NPPA circulated over 5,000 copies of a handbill encouraging the use of nationally produced silk. 25 NPPA, Jinian kan, Huishi section, 2.

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nation R ally," w hich drew over3,800people. Follow ing the success of this event, NPPA m embers agreed to organize regular Saturday evening lec­ tures to teach Chinese that it was their responsibility to buy national prod­ ucts. The m eetings started out slow ly; only four persons attended the first of these rallies. Gradually, organizers learned to be m ore flexible, varying tim e and inviting social figures to make speeches as w ell. The num ber of onlookers grew into the thousands.26 Eventually, these rallies culm inated w ith the inauguration of annual "N ational Products Salvation R allies." The NPPA actively sought to publicize its agenda through the m edia, w hich it considered an effective tool for quickly getting m essages out and shaping public opinion. They attem pted to enlist the newspapers in re­ versing earlier trends and encouraging Chinese to consider the econom ic consequences for "th e nation" of their individual purchasing decisions. Beginning w ith its inaugural m eeting, during w hich several reporters even gave speeches supporting the form ation of the organization, the NPPA invited reporters to attend its m eetings. M oreover, NPPA mem­ bers w ere urged to w rite new spaper articles and place ads in periodi­ cals.27 As the N ational Products Movement developed, the NPPA used many other tactics. They created a certification process for goods claim ing to be national products, established stores that sold only these products, assist­ ed area m anufacturers in m arketing products in other places, participated in organizing national expositions for Chinese products, and much m ore. Som e of these other tactics w ill be exam ined below w ithin the context of the 1915 boycott. As the above suggests and the second part w ill demon­ strate, prior to the 1915 boycott an entrenched organizational netw ork was in place to quickly interpret and expand such events as boycotts.

Elements o f an Ethic These numerous channels of dissem ination left a significant document trail, enabling the reconstruction o f the NPP A 's ethic of nationalistic con­ sum ption, which brought together many ideological trends that m utually

26 NPPA, Jinian kan, Kaihui section, 13: M eetings were held at both the Qianjiang Huiguan and Ningbo native-place association. From 1912 to 1924, the NPPA held fifty-nine such m eetings. The first rally was held in July of 1912, and the sec­ ond two months later in Septem ber, when three were held. From then until Jan­ uary o f 1914, rallies were held nearly every week; the NPPA kept a log of these talks, which includes speaker and a brief summary. The influential Shanghaibased paper Shen bao, for instance, gives a good overview of one such rally, 4 No­ vem ber 1912. 27 NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 15a-16b.

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reinforced its central m essage. Above all, the early documents of foe NPPA and foe group's early activities dem onstrate how foe NPPA sought to separate the issue of abolishing foe queue from the issue of reform ing Chinese dress, supporting foe elim ination of foe queue w hile arguing for the preservation o f Chinese-style dress. The NPPA aim ed to save foe silk industry by establishing a link betw een silk interests and those of foe en­ tire country. To do this, they sought to persuade people that clothing was an issue of national survival, not m erely foe health of a few industries. To strengthen this link, foe NPPA advanced argum ents that blended eco­ nom ic, political, sym bolic, and nationalistic reasoning, arguments that would appeal to a broad spectrum of Chinese. C ollectively these strands formed an ethic o f consum ption that quickly cam e to apply to other prod­ ucts, inform discussions on econom ic relations, shape interpretations of events that would lead to boycotts, and so on. The Economy and the Ethic. Linking foe health of foe econom y and foe w ell-being of foe nation was fundam ental to foe discourse anim ating this new ethic of nationalistic consum ption. The econom ic consequences of changing clothing, for exam ple, w ere m ore im portant than "appearing m odem to foreigners" by w earing W estern-style clothing, the num ber one consideration of m any politicians, intellectuals, and other Chinese.28 This w as m ost clearly evident in the econom ic rationale offered for oppos­ ing clothing change. As documents and speakers frequently w arned, sw itching to wool suits from cotton and silk gowns would have a devas­ tating effect on the Chinese economy. Silk played a central role in Chinese econom y; the process of sw itching to w ool would destroy a key industry w ithout creating one in its place because China produced alm ost no w ool products. As a result, these m aterials would have to be im ported, at least until China could develop a w ool industry. In the m eantim e, NPPA liter­ ature w arned, the displacem ent of the silk industry would throw m illions out of w ork, effecting the entire economy. The econom ic rationale also included an im m ediate and practical con­ sideration, nam ely a financial argum ent against dress conversion. If m en were forced to change clothing, Chinese would be forced to spend a for­ tune. Such concern seem s ludicrous, but as the rise of a Republican inter­ pretation of appearance suggests, and indeed Sun Yatsen's own initial preference for suits indicates, foe possibility of shift, at least among foe upper classes, m ust have seemed quite real.

28 Chinese diplom at Wu Tingfang, an early advocate of rem oving queues, w as the most fam ous proponent o f this position. His collected writings contain numer­ ous discussions of the subject. See, for exam ple, Wu Tingfang ji, ed. Ding Lanjun and Yu Zuofeng (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993), 358-360.

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Commercial Warfare. NPPA literature also frequently argued that inter­ national trade was even m ore serious than a zero-sum gam e because buy­ ing foreign products not only hurt the Chinese, but also helped its ene­ m ies. To reinforce this claim , the organization regularly invoked the concept of "com m ercial w ar" (shangzhan).29 One popularizer of this con­ cept in the late nineteenth century was the com pradore-scholar Zheng Guanying (1842-1921), who in Warnings to a Prosperous Age (c. 1893) (Shengshi weiyan), argued that international com m ercial relations repre­ sented even m ore of a threat to China than the territorial am bitions of im­ perialist pow ers. To survive this w ar, China needed to "stim ulate com­ m erce" (zhenxing shiye). As w ith Zheng several decades earlier, invoking this phrase during the NPM enhanced the social position of econom ic elit­ es and pressured governments to adopt m ercantilist policies. Now there w ere new er, m ore dem ocratic im plications as w ell. W hereas Zheng aim ed his recomm endations at Chinese elites, m odem m ass communica­ tion brought the m essage to others, encouraging them to enlist in the "w ar" by not buying w hat would increasingly com e to be known as "en­ emy products" (chouhuo) after 1915. The spread of the notion of "com m ercial w ar" accompanied a grow ing obsession w ith C hina's balance of paym ents. By the beginning of the tw entieth century, this concern over trade im balances crystallized into w hat econom ic historian Chi-m ing Hou described as the w idely popular notion of a "drain effect": Any profits made by foreigners in China came at the expense of the Chinese.30 During this tim e, Chinese trade statistics becam e enshrined as the single m ost im portant m easure of how the "w ar" was going. And during the NPM, they w ere frequently published and re­ published in tables, charts, graphs, and essays.31 This preoccupation w ith the "loss of econom ic control to foreigners" and the "leakage of profits" (liquan waiyi and louzhi), as "com m ercial w arfare" was commonly de­ scribed, is typified in the inaugural m eeting speech of a key figure

29 Guo Xianglin et al., Zhongguo jindai zhenxing jingji zhi dao de bijiao (Shanghai: Caijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1995), 65-83. 30 In 1877, China began running a trade deficient that quickly ballooned, see Hazama Naoki et al., Deeta de miru Chügoku kindai ski (Tôkyô: Yûhikaku, 19% ), 21. Chi-m ing Hou, Foreign Investment and Economie Development in China, 1840-1937 (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 93-94. Historian Parti Co­ hen summarizes late-nineteenth century economic nationalism in his biography of a well-known proponent of "com m ercial w arfare," Wang Tao (b. 1828); Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and M odernity: Wang T a o and Reform in Late Ch’ing China (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 185-208. 31 A typical exam ple of trade statistics as scorecard for the NPM is Guangdong Jianshe Ting, Cuohuo diaocha baogao (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jianshe Ting, 1930).

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throughout the history of the NPPA, W ang Jiean. A member from a Su­ zhou native-place association w ith a long history of representing the in­ terests of the silk industry, he took early responsibility for com m unicating w ith outside groups and raising public aw areness of issues the NPPA supported. W ang's speech is w orth quoting: Today w e convene this organization to preserve national products (guohuo). As China is an expansive land, rich in natural resources, w ith more than enough to m eet its own needs, w hy, then, is com­ m erce and the econom y in dire straits? It's all due to the fact that Chi­ na doesn't understand the "W ay of Com mercial W arfare" (shangzhan zhi dad). Foreigners say that "m ilitary w arfare makes [a state] power­ ful and com m ercial w arfare makes [a state] w ealthy" (bingzhan qiang shangzhan fu ). But, China doesn't understand com m ercial w arfare. It continually exports raw m aterials and reim ports finished products, thus allowing the profits to flow into foreign h an d s... W hen profits are drained in this w ay, China is losing in com m ercial w arfare. Con­ sequently, the econom y faces hard tim es. Com patriots should re­ search how to im prove sem i-finished products and sell finished ones. Everyone should make preserving national products a main objec­ tive, and not sim ply blithely follow fashion trends. In this way pres­ ervation of national products w ill be g re a t... Although the scope of this group is sm all now, it is my hope that it reaches all provinces and gets them to preserve national products.32 Form ulating and dissem inating an ethic of nationalistic consum ption w as a creative response to im perialism . NPPA leaders such as W ang Jiean also understood that the key to success lay in m aking Chinese industry m ore com petitive; and NPPA members made frequent m ention of the need to make im provem ents.33 In the interim , however, m embers, in a proto-im ­ port substitution argum ent, sought to prevent im ports from destroying their industries. Because the "unequal treaties" denied China tariff auton­ omy until the very end o f the 1920s and because these treaties set tariffs at a paltry 5-7.5% ad valorem , Chinese leaders could not w ield the tradition­ al tool of protective tariffs.34 M oreover, the lack of a strong, stable govem -

32 Wang Jiean's speech in NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 8b. 33 Outlining the im portance o f finding new uses for silk, the first NPPA president Zhang Ziyin went so far as to say that finding uses for Chinese silk m aterials should be considered akin to cherishing the "essence of the Chinese nation" (huangzu guocuQl NPPA, Zhangcheng xoendu huilu, 7b. 34 On C hina's protracted negotiations to recover tariff autonomy, see Stanley F. W right, China's Struggle fo r T ariff Autonomy: 1843-1938 (Shanghai: Kelly & W alsh, Ltd., 1938).

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m ent w ith the financial m eans to support econom ic developm ent left a vacuum. The result w as that Chinese com m ercial and industrial interests such as those in the NPP A sought to erect non-tariff barriers to trade, such as m andating clothing styles that made use of nationally produced fab­ rics. Peace and Political Stability. The NPPA also warned that w idespread eco­ nom ic destruction would accompany any clothing sw itch and would have im m ediate political reverberations. According to this line o f reason­ ing, a chain reaction begun by m assive dislocations in the silk industry would destabilize China as m illions w ent hungry and began to wander the country in search of food. M oreover, allow ing foreigners to benefit at fite expense of the Chinese econom y would delegitim ize die government. It warned the new governm ent that in reestablishing political order after die Revolution of 1911 it ought not allow the m asses to navigate on their own such cultural changes as those in appearance. One Ethnic, One Ethic. Through the ethic of nationalistic consum ption, such NPM organizations as die NPPA also sought to create a bounded Chinese ethnic m arket in w hich m embership was predicated on con­ sum ption of the products of one's com patriots (tongbao). From the first NPPA president onward, leaders of NPM organizations stressed contin­ ually that "all 400 m illion Chinese have this responsibility" to prom ote the NPPA agenda.35 In addition to the econom ic w ell-being of die nation, Chinese independence was at stake because sw itching to wool clothing not only benefited foreign econom ies, it also encouraged foreign im perial pow ers to sink their teeth deeper into China. As the second half of this pa­ per w ill dem onstrate, this them e would grow in im portance after the Jap­ anese presented the notorious Twenty-One Demands in early 1915.

" N a tio n a l H u m ilia tio n " a n d C o n su m ptio n in 1915

Hum iliating experiences at the hands of foreigners are so common in Chi­ nese m odem history that enum erating them could, and indeed has, filled thick encyclopedias. They include every im aginable variety, such as "un­ equal treaties," foreign wars fought on Chinese lands, and countless acts of violence against individual Chinese. Reviewing the sheer num ber is a sobering experience; and the next half of this paper in no way attem pts to deny their num bers and the very real harm they caused. N evertheless, sim ilar to other historical events, their m eanings are neither im m ediately self-evident nor fixed for all tim e. They, too, are sites of contention, often 35 NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 5b.

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defined by those w ith the power to get a definition to stick. This half of my paper exam ines how one set o f hum iliations fed the growing NPM.

The Politics o f Defining Events Opportunism , ultim atum s, dem ands, threats—by any reckoning 1915 contained an abundance of Sino-Japanese friction, generating the raw ma* terials for the creation of pow erful anti-Japanese sym bols. Keeping in mind the activities of the NPPA and the ethic of nationalistic consum ption w ithin the NPM, the events of 1915 take on new , more pow erful signifi­ cance. The boycotts of that year do not appear sim ply as ephem eral events, "five m inutes o f enthusiasm ," as foreigners and many Chinese of­ ten derided such events, but overt m anifestations of and fuel for a grow­ ing movement. Long after die boycotts dissipated, the student organiza­ tions disbanded, and m ore regular Sino-Japanese econom ic intercourse resum ed, the NPPA and a growing num ber of sim ilar organizations with­ in the NPM w ent about dissem inating interpretations of 1915 that linked consumption of Chinese products w ith anti-im perialism . Although the politics behind die im position and acceptance of die Twenty-One Demands are com plex, the basic elem ents are sim ple. On January 18,1915, Japan secretly presented Chinese President Yuan Shikai w ith a list o f dem ands, divided into five groups. The first four groups in­ cluded: the form al recognition of the transfer of Germ an rights in Shan­ dong province to Japan, the extension of leases and rights which Japan had won from Russia in 1905, the joint control over the Hanyeping Iron W orks, and a Chinese com mitment not to cede any territory to a third country. The final group of demands im m ediately triggered the m ost Chi­ nese opposition, because it required the virtual transfer of Chinese sover­ eignty by placing Japanese advisors in all branches of governm ent, joint policing of troublesom e areas, contracting die Japanese to build railw ays, and establishing special econom ic rights in Fujian province. N egotiations dragged out for die next five m onths. Under pressure, Japan withdrew this fifth set of demands and presented the rem aining ones as an ultim a­ tum on M ay Seventh, which the Chinese w ere forced to accept on May Ninth. May Seventh and M ay Ninth quickly becam e days of "national hum il­ iation" (guochi), w orthy of yearly com memoration.36 Organizations and individuals across China quickly spread this definition, denouncing Ja­

36 Sym ptom atic o f die fragm ented political state of C hina, this hum iliation was com m em orated on two different days. May Seventh was the focus o f com ­ m emoration in North China, and May N inth was the commemoration day in the

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pan's "latest, m ost serious hum iliation." h i a m anifesto sent to cham bers of com merce and newspapers across China, the Beijing Cham ber of Com* m erce voiced a popular Chinese response to die events that the NPPA helped dissem inate in die Shanghai area: Japan is taking advantage of w ar in Europe to have its way in East Asia. The ultim atum o f May Seventh is the best m anifestation of this opportunism . If Chinese w ish to live as human beings, we m ust nev­ er forget the hum iliation of M ay Seventh ... The memory should be passed on to our children and grandchildren, from one generation to the next, for all eternity. From this May Seventh onward, w e 400 m il­ lion Chinese m ust struggle w holeheartedly to help our country. Al­ though our bodies may perish, our w ill cannot die, and we m ust for­ ever remem ber this hum iliation.37 In addition to fixing these days as "hum iliations," public statem ents such as this one also cam e to im pliddy or expliddy signify how to remem ber and redress die outrage.

From Humiliation to Resistance Sustaining such outrage and channeling it into die NPM was a complex process. The lengthy negotiations over die Demands gave Chinese plenty of tim e to grow im patient; it also gave them tim e to organize opposition and create new, and appropriate old, ways of expressing dissent. They ex­ pressed dissent through activities ranging from violent boycotts to avoid­ ing popular Japanese hairstyles. Although these forms of protest expressed varying levels of commitment to the ethic of nationalist consumption, they all contributed to the NPM. This section begins to trace how these events, once defined, become signals to not consume Japanese products.

South. Sun Fanjun et al., eds., M inguo ski da cidian (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1991), 57. The difference in days provides a way of evalu­ ating the types of sources and focus of readings. In his useful survey of the pol­ itics surrounding the Twenty-One Demands, Jansen, for exam ple, only men­ tions the commemoration of May Seventh. M arius B. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1975), 209-23. 37 Reprinted in Zhichi Hui [Society to Inform of die H um iliation], ed., Guachi, June 1915,2 vols., no pagination. Sim ilar sentim ents w ere expressed in a widely dis­ tributed Beijing Education M inistry telegram , reprinted in Shen bao, 14 June 1915. On the NPPA role in spreading the form er, see Shen bao, 20 May 1915; the same issue says that the Jiangsu Provincial Education Association vowed to hold yearly commemoration days to remind students and staff at all schools o f the meaning of this "hum iliation."

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Local political environm ents shaped forms of dissent, w ith m uch of it feeding into the NPM. The m assively unpopular Twenty-One Demands put these governments in a difficult position. On the one hand, local and provincial leaders received a constant stream of pressure and orders from the top to keep a lid on dem onstrations and agitation that m ight further provoke Japan or further delegitim ize the Beijing central government. On the other hand, local governm ents w ere often sym pathetic to the outpour­ ing of anti-Japanese sentim ent and w ere reluctant to try to suppress all m anifestations of dissent; others m erely wanted to further erode the dwindling credibility of Yuan Shikai because of his unw illingness to con­ front Japan. The national governm ent was w ell aware of growing resent­ m ent, and officials continually tried to reassure an anxious populace w ith pronouncements that the negotiations w ere proceeding successfully.38 Local governm ents negotiated the tension betw een m aintaining order and yielding to popular pressure by cracking down on prim arily overt m anifestations of dissent. They prohibited and disbanded public gather­ ings, confiscated inflam m atory circulars, prevented the removal of Japa­ nese product ads, and heightened police visibility near Japanese business­ es.39 M eanwhile, m ore subtle forms of dissent flourished. Japanese targets certainly got the m essage. In M arch of 1915, a Japanese shopkeeper in Shanghai frustrated over Chinese boycotts posted the fol­ lowing verse poster outside his shop: W e are am ong the strongest of nations. W hy should we fear you bastards? The current boycott of Japanese goods Is ju st empty talk. If you continue to protest in this way W e w ill order your President to suppress it. Qingdao, Taiw an, and Korea. No, we are not jesting. Soon you w ill be an extinct nation. And assuredly you w ill becom e slaves.40

38 For a summary of the role o f dom estic politics in negotiations over the TwentyOne Demands, see Ernest P. Young, The Presidency o f Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and D ictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: University of M ichigan Press, 1977), 186-92. On the eve of the settlem ent, these reassurances become more frequent and insistent. See, for instance, Ximoen bao, 1915.5.7. M eanwhile, these same papers printed editorials denouncing leaked versions o f what they derided as a sham "p eace" settlem ent. See especially Shen bao. 39 Ximoen bao, 2 7 ,2 9 ,3 1 M ardi 1915 and 1 April 1915. 40 Shi bao, 29 M arch 1915.

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The poster expressed a lot m ore than the anger and bravado of a Japanese shopkeeper. It unintentionally articulated the frustration of a growing num ber o f Chinese. Reprinted in a Chinese newspaper, it cleverly used a Japanese text to dissem inate growing Chinese suspicions about Japan and its intentions in China. Here, the poster affirm ed, was proof positive that Japan, flush w ith its startling success over Russia a decade earlier, now considered itself a first-rate world power w ith the arrogance necessary to push its own agenda in A sia; it was m erely looking for an excuse to fur­ ther hum iliate China. The references to three recent acquisitions of an ex­ panding Japanese em pire was an unambiguous statem ent of C hina's fate, "national extinction" (wangguo).4,1 M oreover, the poster emphasized the pow erlessness of the Chinese, whose boycotts and politicians w ere con­ sidered m ere short-term obstacles to the inevitable. By reprinting the inflam m atory poster, the Chinese paper also im plied an appropriate response, a challenge to redouble resistance to Japanese im perialism , and prove the Japanese w rong. It was a call to action. The events of M ay confirm ed that the Chinese could not depend on their pol­ iticians to preserve C hina's im mediate interests, much less the integrity of the nation. Despite growing governm ent pressure, organizations such as the NPPA found ways to signal this threat as w ell as relate it to a desired Chinese response in the form of an ethic of nationalistic consumption.

"A Certain Empire:" Invoking Japan to Signify Nationalistic Consumption Under increasing pressure, organizations and individuals created subtle signs that signified "Japan" w ithout specifying it. Even after the form al boycotts and governm ent pressure subsided, these signs continued to ex­ ist. The NPM 's invocation of Japan reminded the Chinese of Japanese "hum iliations" and the need for the rejection of Japanese products and services. The dates of these and later hum iliations were vivid and com­ mon sym bols. For instance, the num bers "5 -9 " unam biguously represent­ ed May Ninth. On one level, then, sim ply w riting "5 -9 " signified "hum il­ iation at the hands of the Japanese." These num bers w ere w idely used as sym bols in posters, illustrations, and handbills throughout China. Natu­ rally, they often signified m ore than one m essage. W ithin the NPM, for exam ple, "5 -9 " also cam e to signify a response to hum iliation: Do not buy 41 41 Chinese intellectuals im m ediately added acceptance o f the Twenty-One De­ mands to a rapidly expanding narrative of "hum iliations" {guochi) clim axing with "national extinction." By June, one group, which included Liang Qichao, had already com piled a set of essays on "extinct nations," such as Poland and In­ dia, and detailed how China was headed for the same fate: Yan Ruli, ed., Wang­ guo jian fu guochi lu (Shanghai: Taidong Tushuju, 1915 [1919 reprint]).

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Japanese products. O ften, such signs w ere explicitly linked, especially in advertisem ents and product nam es. W ithin m onths after the M ay hum il­ iations of 1915, com panies co-opted the "5 -9 " sym bol into product nam es, including cigarettes and silk products.42 W ith Japanese pressure on die Chinese government to crack down on boycotts, diere were many other less explicit, but equally com prehensible, ways of dissem inating boycott m essages. Because of die official pressure on explicit attacks on Japan, Japan was often referred to in not-so-subde ways. A common way to refer to Japan at this tim e was "a certain em pire" (mou diguo). For exam ple, in Guangzhou, Chinese papers regularly re­ ceived letters from readers offering money to support arm ed resistance to "unw arranted aggression of a certain em pire."43 Occasionally, references to this "certain em pire" w ere sim ply remind­ ers of the hum iliations perpetrated by Japan. Increasingly, however, these references signified an appropriate response, instructions on form s of re­ sistance. For instance, one w ell-w ritten but sim ple-to-read pam phlet was open to several interpretations. In the m ost straight-forw ard reading, the pam phlet discussed problem s caused by the Japanese in China. Under closer scrutiny, it conveyed a m ore em otional statem ent: "O ur country is becom ing a second K orea!" The m ost inflam m atory and central m essage of all required reading from right to left, rather than from top to bottom , as was ordinary: "C itizens, don't buy Japanese goods."44 These signs of protest also took the form of poem s, w ritten in flow ery prose, but deliv­ ering a stem m essage. As one poem put it: "Japan indeed oppresses us, and selfish are its claim s. Yes, boycott all things Japanese—a duty ever­ m ore."45

The NPM " Camouflages" Boycotts, or Vice Versa? As rumors spread and tensions mounted, Shanghai police became more ag­ gressive, often searching the houses of returned students, especially those coming back from Japan, and other known activists.46 In response, more strident groups and individuals advocating aggressive anti-Japanese activ­

42 See, for instance, the ad for "5 -9 Brand C igarettes" in Guohuo diaocha lu, ed. Wang Hanqiang, 3 ed. (Shanghai: The National Products Preservation Associa­ tion, 1915), 64. 43 North-China Herald (Shanghai weekly [hereafter NCH]), 27 M arch 1915,895-% . 44 NCH, 10 April 1915,84. 45 Xinwen bao, 1 April 1915; NCH, 24 April 1915,241. 46 Xinwen boo, 2 ,3 April 1915. One case of police confiscating handbills from stu­ dents returned from Japan received a lot of attention at the tim e. See Xinwen boo, 1 0 ,1 9 ,2 9 April 1915.

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ities began expressing dissent by adopting the organizational forms, slo­ gans, and techniques of the NPM. This has led contemporary observers and historians to m isinterpret the NPM as a whole as sim ply an extension of the boycott, led by students and opportunistic businessmen. Matsumoto Shigeharu's interpretation of NPM activities during 1915 is typical: The movement for the "Encouragem ent of the Use of Native Prod­ u cts," which was still no m ore than a cam ouflaged boycott move­ m ent, cam e into existence first in Shanghai, where by M arch 16th an Association for the Encouragem ent of the Use of N ative Products was formed under the auspices of the Chinese students who returned from Japan. Later in Hanyang, Hankow, Changsha, and in many oth­ er cities sim ilar organizations w ere established. These associations carried on the boycott, carefully evading the law and authority.47 Clearly, the founding of the NPPA in 1911 and the subsequent develop­ m ent of the NPM dem onstrate that the movement was m uch m ore than "cam ouflage" for a boycott. A t the same tim e, M atsumoto and others are certainly correct about tw o things. First, the patriotic rhetoric and nonconfrontational techniques of the NPM insulated it from official censure. Second, the movement grew rapidly as a consequence of popular re­ sponse to the Twenty-One Demands.

Organizing National Survival Threats of government retaliation pushed public displays of anti-imperial­ ist sentim ents into activities, organizations, and vocabularies of the NPM.48 At the same time, Chinese businessm en, students, intellectuals, and many others worked from below to form organizations to facilitate this transfer of sentim ent and develop it within the context of the NPM. For instance, con­ tributing to a National Salvation Fund (Jiuguo chujin) was a popular and less risky way of expressing the sentiments underlying the boycott. In April of 1915, the Awareness of the Humiliation Association (Zhichi Hui) set up a fund in Shanghai to solicit $50 m illion yuan to ensure national survival through the twin patriotic objectives of supporting the construction of ar­ senals, the raising of an army and the building of a navy, as well as financ­ ing the development of domestic industries. As the threat of immediate war

47 M atsumoto, The H istorical Development o f Chinese Boycott, 40. 48 President Yuan Shikai repeatedly ordered provincial authorities to end boy­ cotts, prohibit discussions of the negotiations, disband organizations, and cen­ sor telegram s. M adeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 60.

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with Japan receded, die economic elites in charge of die Fund gradually shifted the emphasis to die NPM objective of economic development.49 The Fund quickly becam e a socially and legally acceptable way to ex­ press w hat one observer called "practical nationalism ." In only a few weeks in A pril, the fund cam paign raised and deposited $250,000 in the Bank of China. As money poured in from all over China and overseas, the management of the Fund becam e m ore sophisticated, even organizing special com m ittees to explain it to depositors. In allow ing only Chinese to contribute and setting no lim its on subscriptions, the Fund's regulations reflected the larger goals of the NPM. The appeal found broad support, as a large num ber of poor Chinese participated. It provided such a seeming­ ly innocuous way to express nationalism that even government officials, civil servants, m embers of arm ed forces, and policem en all agreed to con­ tribute one m onth's salary, w hich was expected to raise over $10 m illion.50 Naturally, the Japanese understood the deeper m eaning of these deposits, claim ing donations to such funds by Chinese officials revealed these offi­ cials actually supported boycotts and their cover, the NPM.51 Although initiated in Shanghai, by M ay there w ere 70 branches established throughout China.52 W ithin a few m onths, Shanghai alone collected $640,000 and had prom ises for another $700,000; Beijing raised $1,940,000 and other provincial cities gathered $2,100,000. By June, $20 m illion of the $50 m illion target had been raised.53 This popular technique had the participation and support of many of the m ost pow erful econom ic and political m agnates who cam e to be openly associated w ith the Fund. Under the direction of such elites in Shanghai, deposits quickly expanded, as did new ways of finding partic­ ipants. M oreover, the success of the Fund spawned m ore am bitious plans and organizations. A group of Shanghai businessm en, including NPPA leader W u Tingfang, established a group modeled after the National Sal­ vation Fund. The new group had a sharper focus, knowing that even w ith $50 m illion China could not build an arm y, a navy, and industry. Instead, the new group, the League o f China, placed developm ent of dom estic in­ dustry at the top of its agenda.54

49 Zhichi Hui, Guachi, vol. 1. This volume also contains the bylaws of the group set up to adm inister the fund. See also, NCH, 24 April 1915,255. 50 Xinwen boo, 10 May 1915; NCH, 19 June 1915,825-26. 51 NCH, 26 June 1915,944. 52 For a partial list of these locations, see Kikuchi, ChOgoku minzoku undo, 164-65. 53 Xinwen bao, 15 April 1915,28. 51 NCH, 19 June 1915,825-26. The frequent coverage of these funds also under­ scores their popularity and innocuous appearance. See, for instance, the run of articles in the Xinwen bao, 7 ,8 ,1 0 April 1915.

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NPM organizations also took m ore overtly pro-boycott positions. In M arch of 1915, for exam ple, som e one hundred representatives from twenty m ajor native-place associations m et in the International Settle­ m ent of Shanghai to form the A ssociation to Encourage the Use of Nation­ al Products (Zhuanyong Guohuo Hui). This group resolved not to accept consignm ents of Japanese goods or use Japanese ships to transport goods. It also resolved to cut off relations w ith Japanese m erchants. Despite a Bei­ jing governm ent ban on the group, w ithin a few m onths, the groups ap­ peared in seventy cities and towns and counted politicians among its ranks, including C hina's future M inister of Foreign A ffairs, W ang Zhengting.55 Even a Japanese paper that called for the Japanese govern­ ment to force China to end its boycott concluded that because of a lack of organizations explicitly calling for and organizing the boycott, there was not m uch m ore the Chinese governm ent could do.56

The NPPA through 1915 The events o f 1915 fueled trem endous grow th w ithin the NPPA, expand­ ing the frequency and scope of its activities. Chinese resistance was in­ creasingly pushed into NPM form s of expression because Japan could not be confronted directly by m ilitary and econom ic means. Boycotts acted as a sort of m embership drive. From slightly over a hun­ dred members during its first year, the NPPA grew steadily during its first few years. During 1915, however, m embership soared to 688, a 26 percent increase over the previous year, its highest single year increase.57 M oreover, the structure of the m em bership changed, as the group contin­ ued soliciting women to join. By 1919, the only year for w hich títere is a com plete m embership list, 41 of the 749 m embers w ere women.58 How­ ever, this grow th in membership largely accounted for by new types of members. The initial bylaw s (huizhang) of the A ssociation m ade joining difficult in that other potential native-place associations "w ith common interests" had to receive approval from representatives of all other asso-

55 Kikuchi, Chügoku minzoku undo, 164; Cochran, Big Business in China, 68. NPPA also sent one of its leading members, Wang W endian, to help establish the group and w rite its bylaws. Shanhai Nippon Shögyö Kaigisho, Hainikka nitsu to Nikka haiseki no eikyö (June 1915): Vol. 1 ,6 5 ; Shen boo, 17 May 1915 and 31 May. 56 Osaka M ainkhi Shinbun quoted in NCH, 10 July 1915,87-88. 57 NPPA, finían kan: Huishi section, 12. 58 SZMA 2.1: File 4 5 4 ,20-21.1 address the role of women in the NPM extensively in other places; see especially, "Engendering N ationalistic Consumption: 'W om en's N ational Products Year' in China, 1934,"a paper w ritten for the 43rd Annual International Conference of Eastern Studies, Tökyö, 23 May 1998.

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dations.59 During 1915, however, m em bership types expanded to indude three types. In addition to native-place associations and individual mem­ bers, enterprises (gongshang chang) also began sending representa­ tives— 49 in 1915, w ith m ore joining every year. As indicated earlier, in its first three years of activities, the NPPA pub­ lished and distributed over 100,000 pieces of literature per year, including m embership inform ation, circulars on and prom otions of national prod­ ucts, verification of the status of products, group advertisem ents, and so on. During 1915, however, the total num ber of publications expanded to over 300,000. The reach o f these publications is incalculable, as the NPPA instructed redpients to further dissem inate them. The new activities of the NPPA also reflected the interests of its expand­ ed ranks. As local, regional, and national Chinese governm ent officials began to advocate polides that prom oted national goods, investigating and certifying the status of goods becam e an increasingly im portant func­ tion of organizations such as the NPPA. These "certifications" becam e es­ pecially im portant during boycotts, when such classifications could m ake or break a com pany. Before com m ercial or industrial enterprises could join tiie NPPA, it sent a team to investigate the applicant's products. There were many types of investigations induding com prehensive exam ina­ tions, tradem ark investigations, capital origins, m aterial origins, nation­ ality of em ployees, and a m iscellaneous category. In its first year, 1912, NPPA conducted only eleven such investigations. As w ith its other activ­ ities, however, things took off in 1915, when it conducted 383 such inves­ tigations, a total only equaled or exceeded in two other years w ith w ide­ spread boycotts, 383 in 1925 and a high of 464 in 1928.60 The NPPA published the results o f these investigations along w ith oth­ er propaganda in an increasing array of publications. Two of the m ore in­ novative w ere the Records o f National Products Investigations (Guohuo diaocha lu) and a m onthly m agazine, The National Products Monthly (Guohuo yuebao). The purpose of the Records w as to dissem inate an approved list of dom estically m anufactured products, thereby giving dom estic m anufac­ turers a place to prom ote their wares and m erchants a m eans of finding replacem ents for im ported products.61 As each new national product was added to the list, the concept of a national product defined im plicitly in these books against those products, presum ably "non-Chinese, unpatri­

m NPPA, Zhangcheng wendu huilu, 3b. 60 NPPA, Jinian kan: Huishi section, 14-16. 61 Wu Tingfang's forward to W ang Hanqiang, Guohuo diaocha lu. These Records were w idely circulated. See the reprint in Nippon Shögyö Kaigisho, Hainikka nitsu to Nikka, 77-127.

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otic products," the benefits to dom estic producers of attaching a national products label to their product becam e m ore com pelling. A dvertisem ents also made die distinction betw een the national and foreign products more apparent.

C o n tin u ity w ith in B o y c o tts a n d th e N P M

It is understandable that observers and historians have usually concluded that the National Products M ovement and boycotts w ere die same dung. By late 1915, the political confrontation betw een Japan and China slipped from the front pages of Chinese and foreign new spapers, widespread anti-Japanese boycotts dissolved, and some of the m ore strident activism w ithin the NPM disappeared. A ccording to trade statistics, Sino-Japanese econom ic relations returned to their pre-1915 position.62 From this per­ spective, the nationalistic sentim ent and activity underlying the boycott was, perhaps, m erely "five m inutes of excitem ent" or a "cy cle." However, by exam ining the history of the NPPA in this period, this paper has pro­ posed an alternative interpretation of boycotts that places them in the context of a growing ethic of nationalistic consum ption w ithin die organ­ izations, activities, and vocabularies of the NPM. To be sure, the events of 1915 provided fuel to the movement, but it w as neither the first nor the last source. The NPPA continued to expand its hierarchies of dissemina­ tion, for exam ple, helping to establish leading organizations during the turm oil of 1919 and 1923, and other years.63 It also sought to am plify its ethic of nationalistic consum ption, especially on the im portance of having women and children consum e goods w ith the nation in mind. W hile some m easurable form s of NPM activism may have dropped from 1916 to 1918, the NPPA case suggests that form s of resistance through consumption persisted and spread—ready to generate, define, and absorb new expres­ sions of nationalism .

62 O r, in Rem er's words: "the trade statistics show that the effect of the boycott was temporary disturbance of the trade rather than any falling off." A Study o f Chi­ nese Boycotts, 53. 63 These organizations include: Industrial and Com m ercial Study Society o f China to Preserve International Peace (Zhonghua Gongshang Baocun Guoji Heping Yanjiu Hui), formed in early 1919, and the Shanghai Citizens Association on Sino-Japanese Relations (Shanghai Duiri W aijiao Shim in Dahui), established in 1923.

142

E conomic E xpansionism and the M ilitary: W ith Special R eference to the J apanese C ommunity in S hanghai in 1931 H arum i G o to -S h iba ta

The period betw een the W ashington Conférence of 1921-22 and die Man­ churian Incident of 1931 was the tim e when econom ic expansionism flourished in Japan.1 Japan in the period put aside the am bitions it showed during the First W orld W ar and, instead, endeavored to further its econom ic interests. Shidehara KijûrG, Japan's foreign m inister horn 1924 to April 1927 and from July 1929 to the end of 1931, believed that Ja­ pan had no other option but to industrialize and to make profits by ex­ ports. He regarded China as the m ost suitable m arket for Japanese indus­ tries because of its proxim ity. He was of the opinion that Japan should start from China, and then m ove on to Southeast Asia.2 Many Japanese actually w ent to China in order to do business and gain profits there. Among all treaty ports in China, the International Settle­ ment of Shanghai was file center of foreign trade and investm ent.3 W ith its strategic location at the estuary of the Yangzi River and its protected harbor, Shanghai was ranked as the fourth largest port in the world in the 1920s. As far as business and trade w ere concerned, it was m ore im por­ tant than the northeastern part of China, even for the Japanese. The typi­ cal Japanese in Shanghai was a businessm an or a banker, w hile the typical Japanese in the N ortheast was an official or an em ployee of the South M anchurian Railway. In Septem ber 1931, however, Japan started to invade the N ortheast and in January 1932 bombarded the Chinese area of Shanghai. This paper is a case study of the failure of econom ic expansionism and of the beginning of a m ore violent phase of Japanese im perial expansion. It m ainly deals

1 Akira Iriye, "The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918-1931," in Japan in Cri­ sis, ed. Bernard S. Silberm an and Harry D. Harootunian (Princeton, N. J.: Prince­ ton University Press, 1974). 2 Shidehara KijürO (Tökyö: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955), 331-32. 3 The history of foreign settlem ents in Shanghai can be traced back to the Treaty of N anjing. In 1863, the American and British settlem ents becam e incorporated into the International Settlem ent, which adopted the adm inistrative machinery of the British settlem ent, nam ely the elected M unicipal Council.

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w ith the m en-on-the-spot,4 nam ely Japanese businessm en and the Japa­ nese navy in Shanghai. It considers why the Japanese businessm en whose interest w as predom inantly econom ic cam e to rely on naval pow er in the summer of 1931.5

T h e G row th

o f th e J apan ese

C om m unity

in

S hanghai

A considerable num ber of the Japanese cam e to and settled in Shanghai after the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1871. Before the Sino-Japanese W ar of 1894-95, however, the Japanese population in the foreign set­ tlem ents was only a few hundred. Among those, about fifteen w ere work­ ing for M itsui Bussan, a trading com pany, and seven or eight for the consulate, w hile the m ajority of the m ale population consisted of sm all m erchants who dealt in porcelain or fancy and sundry goods. The Japa­ nese by no m eans belonged to the establishm ent of the Shanghai foreign settlem ents. Although M itsui Bussan had its branch in the flourishing area of the International Settlem ent, even that was a sm all business by Shanghai standards. Yamamoto Jötarö, who worked for M itsui Bussan, w rote to a friend that he had influence only over other Japanese living in Shanghai.6 Its victory in the Sino-Japanese W ar enabled Japan to join the group of treaty pow ers and acquire m ost-favored-nation status. The Treaty of Shim onoseki, signed in 1895, perm itted foreigners to establish factories in the treaty ports so that the economy of the treaty ports subsequently entered a new , industrial, phase. * W hat w as happening in the period seem s to be m ore easily placed in the expla­ nation of D.C.M. Platt or J.S. Galbraith than the framework of a transition from an inform al em pire to a form al empire. In analyzing British im perialism in the m id-nineteenth century, they stated that "turbulence" on the frontier made the m en-on-the-spot take action. See, for exam ple, D.C.M. Platt, "The Im perialism of Free Trade: Siome Reservations," Economic H istory Review XXI (1968); J.S. Gal­ braith, "The Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," Comparative Studies m Society and H istory II (1960). 5 Since the 1980s, several historians have researched the Japanese community in Shanghai, and tire period after 18 September 1931 has been well studied. See, for exam ple, Murai Sadtie, "Shanhai jihen to N ihonjin shökö gyösha," in NenpO kindai Nihon kenkyü 6: SeitO rnikaku no seiritsu to hökai (Tökyö: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1984); Yamamura Mutsuo, "M anshü jihen ki ni okeru Shanhai zairyû Nihon shihon to hai Nichi undo," W ake keizai, nos. 2 0 -2 2 ,2 0 -2 3 (1988); Horimoto Naohiko, "Shanhai no kO N ichi undo to N ihonjin kyoryQ m in," Shindaishigaku, no. 14 (1989). 6 Shanhai Kyoryümin Dan, Shanhai kyoryümin dan sanjügp shQnen kinenshi (Shang­ hai, 1942), 42; Hara YasusaburO, Yamamoto Jötarö (Tökyö: Jiji Tsúshinsha, 1965), 51-52.

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The Boxer Uprising in 1900 and Jap an's victory in the Russo-Japanese W ar in 1905 afforded a further opportunity for Japan to consolidate its po­ sition as one of the treaty powers in China. Sino-Japanese trade started to develop and many Japanese settlers moved into China, seeking business opportunities. Shanghai becam e the center of Japanese investm ent in the cotton industry in China. In 1902 the Shanghai branch of M itsui Bussan purchased a cotton m ill w hich had been established by Chinese capital. The first Japanese cotton m ill in China, N aigai M en m ill, was established in Shanghai in 1911/ In 1905, there w ere 12,000 foreigners in the foreign settlem ents of Shanghai, 30 percent of whom w ere Japanese. In order to offer a venue for social contact and the exchange of inform ation, the Japanese Club w as or­ ganized in 1906. Although there was already in existence the Shanghai Club, w here leaders of the British com munity lunched and socialized, no Japanese, except the consul-general, could join it. This was partly because of tiie problem of language and partly because of the difference in the standards of living betw een the Japanese and the British who enjoyed predom inant status in China.78 The num ber of Japanese increased even further by the outbreak of the First W orld W ar. Indeed, by 1915 the Japanese formed the largest national group, second only to the Chinese. Because of their num bers, the Japanese came to be represented by one councilor on the M unicipal Council in 1916, w hen the Japanese division of the M unicipal Police was estab­ lished.9 Japan also gained an enorm ous econom ic advantage during the war because exports of the W estern powers decreased and because Japan reached the stage w here its industries, especially the cotton industry, were producing a substantial volum e of exports. Japanese cotton manu­ facturing in China grew dram atically, partly as a result of higher tariff rates for cotton im ports com ing into China after 1918.10 By 1931, the Jap­

7 Takamura Naosuke, Kindai Nihon mengyO to Chügoku (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), 116; Charles Frederick Rem er, Foreign Investments in China (New York: M acm illan, 1933), 9 7 ,4 1 9 ,4 2 6 -2 7 ,4 9 5 . * Shanhai Nihon Shögyö Kaigisho, Go sanja jiken chOsasho (Shanghai, 1925), 599; Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlem ents in China, 1895-1937," in The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. M yers, and M ark R. Peattie (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 192-94. 9 Shanhai Nihon Shögyö Kaigisho, Go sanja jiken, 4 22,446; Shanhai kyoryümin dan, Shanhai jihenshi (Shanghai, 1933), 503. 10 Takam ura, Kindai Nihon mengyO, 114-16; Richard C. Bush, The Politics o f Cotton Textiles in Kuomintang China 1927-1937 (New York and London: Garland Pub­ lishing, 1982), 23; Peter Duus, "Zaikabö: Japanese Cotton M ills in China, 18951937," in The Japanese Inform al Em pire, 81-83, and Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlem ents," 184.

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anese increased even m ore, reaching about 20,000, and cam e to constitute 70 percent of the foreign population.11 The division among the Japanese in Shanghai becam e noticeable in the early 1920s. One group was called the "N ative Faction" and included nu­ m erous poor Japanese residents who had m igrated to Shanghai dream ing of better lives and had com e to possess their sole social and econom ic stake in Shanghai. About 60 percent w ere from w estern Japan, and among them m ore than half w ere from Kyüshû because of its proxim ity. Their oc­ cupations were various, including shopkeepers, gardeners, and doctors. M ost of them lived in renovated Chinese houses and often turned the front parts into sm all shops. Their standard of living w as the same as that of the Chinese populace.12 A Japanese em ployee of a shop in Hongkou could possibly earn only C$50 or C$60 per m onth, w hile the m onthly sti­ pend of a member of the Shanghai M unicipal Police was C$80.13 The other group of Japanese consisted of die people who worked for the branches of big trading com panies, banks, and cotton m ills, so that it was called the "Com pany Faction." The heads of the group w ere w ell ed­ ucated and usually spent only a few years in Shanghai. Some of them had already had experience in the W est. The group's business was generally m ore stable than that of the "N ative Faction."14 The "N ative Faction" was dissatisfied w ith the existing situation of the International Settlem ent. It resented both the predom inant status of the British, and the stratification w ithin the Japanese com munity. The fran­ chise system of the International Settlem ent had been adopted to secure die retention of m unicipal control in the hands of those foreigners w hose land-owning and business interests w ere paramount. It was based on property not on people, and thus m ost Japanese in the "N ative Faction" w ere not eligible for voting in the International Settlem ent. Besides, since the official language of the M unicipal Council was English, the councilors had to com municate in English, so that Japanese candidates were not se­ lected from this faction. The "N ative Faction" was aw are that it was slighted.15

11 Shanhai Nihon Shöeyö Kaigisho, Shanhai Nihon shOgyö kaigisho nenpö, no. 8 (Shanghai, 1925), 7; Osaka shôkô kaigisho geppô, no. 219, August 1925. 12 Japanese Foreign M inistry Archives (hereafter, JFM A), Chösho, Tsü 205, Tsu 255 and Tsü 262; NHK Shuzai Han, ed., Dokyumento ShOwa 2: Shanhai kyödO sokai (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1986), 35-51; Takatsuna Hirofum i, "Shanhai jihen to Nihonjin kyoryüm in" in NitchU sensô, ed. Chüö Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyüjo (Tökyö: Chüô Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1993), 26-56. 13 "M ore Japanese Police," North-China Herald (hereafter, NCH), 10 April 1926. 14 Ishii Itarö, Gaikßkan no isshö (Tökyö: Chüô Köronsha, 1986), 228,235. 15 JFM A, 5.3.2.155-1,20 May 1925, Yada to Shidehara, no. 385; Ishii, GaikOken, 246.

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Economic Expansionism and the M ilitary

R ela tio n s

betw een th e J apan ese in

S hanghai a n d

th e

C hin ese

M ost Japanese w ent to Shanghai seeking business opportunities. Al­ though their intention was not violent, once in China they had to cope w ith hostile atm osphere. Japan's policy toward China had made Chinese anti-im perialist nationalism grow , and the Japanese residents thus found them selves on the front line in the confrontation betw een Japanese im pe­ rialism and Chinese nationalism . Let us consider the situation w ithin Shanghai first. N ot only Japan but also China gained from the tem porary retreat of the W esterners during the First W orld W ar when Shanghai capitalists expanded into manufac­ turing and m odem banking.16 The com petition w orried Japanese manu­ facturers and becam e one of the reasons they started establishing cotton m ills in Shanghai.17 By 1924, however, the "golden age" for the Chinese industrialists ended w ith a full return of foreign com petition. The result­ ing econom ic crisis made them acutely aware and resentful of foreign eco­ nomic encroachm ents.18 The greatest rival for C hina's growing economy was Japan's econom ic pow er rather than that of W estern countries, in­ cluding Britain, because industrialization of China and Japan started in the sam e fields, such as the cotton industry. Besides, the end of the war did not bring back the golden days of British industry and trade. The relations of the Japanese w ith Chinese w orkers w ere not cordial ei­ ther. Labor disputes in Japanese-owned cotton m ills were ram pant since the end of 1924. The first and m ost im portant cause of the troubles was de­ teriorating living conditions of Chinese w orkers. They demanded wage increases, because living expenses in Shanghai, especially food and hous­ ing prices, had surged sharply since the outbreak of the First W orld W ar. Second, betw een 1924 and 1927, Shanghai becam e a significant center for Chinese communism and the trade-union movement, and w orkers were influenced by com m unist cadres. Third, presented w ith this grow th of communism, the foreign m ill owners strengthened control.19 Another reason for the troubles was that the Chinese w orkers w ere strongly critical of the ill treatm ent they received from Japanese m ill own­ ers, although it is not clear w hether the conditions in Japanese m ills w ere actually w orse than those in Chinese-owned m ills. Many Chinese w ork­ ers, w ho had m igrated to Shanghai from the countryside, w ere new to the

16 Takamura, Kindai Nihon mengyO, 104-5. 17 Duus, "Z aikabö," in The Japanese Informal Empire, 81. 18 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the N ationalist Government (Cam­ bridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 26. 19 NHK Shuzai Han, Dokyumento S horn, 78.

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experience and difficulties of an industrial society, as w ell as to the con­ frontation betw een m anagem ent and labor. In the Chinese-owned m ills, the conflicts w ere understood sim ply as those betw een the w orkers and ow ners, or as those betw een the pre-industrial life style and the industrial one, w hile in foreign-ow ned m ills these facts w ere kept in the back­ ground, and the différence in race, nation and culture w ere emphasized.20 N evertheless, it is im possible to deny that the relations betw een the Chinese w orkers and the Japanese staff w ere hostile. This is underlined by tiie rem iniscences of the Japanese w ho worked for the m ills in Shang­ hai. They w ere actually frightened of the Chinese and tried hard not to show the w hite feather. According to them , it was "scary" to com mute from the com pany accom m odation to the m ills; it w as as if they were strong as long as they w ere in the m ills but helpless once they w ent out of them ; and it was "extrem ely unpleasant" to patrol the m ills at night.21 Had relations been cordial, these w orries of the Japanese would have been unnecessary. Unfriendly relations and labor disputes resulted in the outbreak of the M ay Thirtieth Incident. In February 1925, the N aigai M en m ill dism issed several w orkers, which led other w orkers to a protest strike. On 15 Feb­ ruary, strikers made an attack on Toyoda m ill, and one Japanese was beat­ en to death. Although these strikes w ere settled before the end of Febru­ ary, m ore troubles occurred. On 15 M ay, a collision betw een the Chinese w orkers, who w ere protesting against the discharge of yet another tw o w orkers, and the Japanese w ith the support of two Sikh policem en result­ ed in the death of a Chinese worker. On 30 M ay, the Chinese organized a m em orial service for him , dem anding com pensation for his death and the start o f an anti-Japanese boycott. Chinese dem onstrators gathered on the Nanjing Road and approached the police station. The Shanghai M unici­ pal Police under the command of a British inspector opened fire on the dem onstrators. The Chinese com munity was enraged by the bloodshed, and it was decided to go on general strike as of 1 June. Although the trouble originated in Japanese-ow ned m ills, the target of the strike and boycott turned out to be the British.22 However, the leaders of the Japanese cotton industry w ere not pleased w ith the developm ent. The unique characteristic of the Japanese cotton industry in China w as that it developed w ithout the assistance of the Japanese government. The m ill ow ners w ere proud of their independence and did not expect much

20 Takam ura, Kindai Nihon mengyö, 140. 21 NHK Shuzai Han, Dokyumento ShOwa, 66-71. 22 For details, see Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai 1925-31 (Lon­ don and Basingstoke: M acm illan, 1995), chap. 2.

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protection of Japanese governm ent, w hile they believed the protection of the M unicipal Council and British adm inistrative pow er was indispensa­ ble. A s they feared, the protection seem s to have reduced after the May Thirtieth Incident. In Septem ber 1926, at a conférence held at the Osaka Cham ber of Commerce on the problem s concerning China, one partici­ pant m entioned the change in the stance of the M unicipal Police. Accord­ ing to him , the police used to prevent the occurrence of troubles, but since tile incident, they would only intervene after som ething happened.23 Let us now turn to the situation surrounding Shanghai. The greatest problem for the Japanese com munity in Shanghai w as that their fortunes were seriously affected by Japanese policies toward Shandong and the Northeast. D espite their peripheral existence in the Japanese im perial power structure, the Japanese residents could not claim that they were good Japanese, totally irrelevant to the violent policies pursued by some­ body else in Japan. As a result, they w ere presented w ith anti-Japanese boycotts several tim es. Especially after the reunification of China, the ef­ fects of the boycotts w ere considered to have becom e m ore serious than before. In May 1928, an anti-Japanese boycott was started in Shanghai as a pro­ test against the Sino-Japanese m ilitary clash at Jinan.24 An Anti-Japanese Association was organized to halt transactions in Japanese goods. It ad­ vised Chinese m erchants to cancel contracts w ith the Japanese and de­ manded that m erchants should register goods already kept in stock by 31 May. If m erchants made donations to a national salvation fund, the asso­ ciation would issue certificates allow ing them to sell the Japanese goods. Trade in Japanese goods w as still possible, but it becam e m arkedly more difficult and expensive. The rate of contribution to the fund differed ac­ cording to tiie com m odities involved, and basic necessities that could not be substituted by Chinese products w ere exem pted.25

23 Osaka shßgyö kaigisho geppO, no. 233, October 1926,3-10. 24 On the anti-Japanese boycotts, see Kikuchi Takaharu, Chügoku minzoku undo no kihon kOzO (Tökyö: Daian, 1966); Charles Frederick Remer, A Study o f Chinese Boy­ cotts (Baltim ore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933); Banno Junji, "Japanese Industrial­ ists and M erchants and the Anti-Japanese Boycotts in China, 1919-1928," in The Japanese Inform al Empire; Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs (Ann Arbor: University of M ichigan Press, 1991); Harumi Goto-Shibata, "Japa­ nese and British Perceptions of Chinese Boycotts in Shanghai," in The Growth o f the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcom ing). 25 "Japanese Boycott Revival," NCH, 4 August 1928; "The Anti-Japanese Boycott" and "Boycott Seizures to be Returned," NCH, 11 August 1928; Nihon Shökö Kai­ gisho, Shim rum’yO ni oikeru saüán Nikka haiseki no keika m rabini eikyO (Tökyö: Ni­ hon Shökö Kaigisho, 1929), 20-25.

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The anti-Japanese boycott continued for m ore than a year, and its aim and character changed over tim e. The Chinese tried to further Chinese in­ dustries by stim ulating the production of certain articles w hich had been im ported from Japan by using the national salvation fund. Their intention was not only to boycott Japanese products, but also to protect and devel­ op national industries.26 Japan's econom ic power had come to be regard­ ed as the greatest obstacle to C hina's econom ic independence, and a boy­ cott served the same purpose as protective tariffs against im ports from Japan.27 Furtherm ore, the boycott was the only effective m easure against the products of Japanese cotton m ills flourishing in Shanghai. The methods of the boycott also developed and becam e m ore rigorous. On 15 January 1929, the A nti-Japanese A ssociation stopped issuing certif­ icates acknowledging contributions to the national salvation fund. In­ stead, it decided that Japanese goods should be confiscated and sold at public auctions. Transactions involving Japanese goods becam e alm ost im possible in Shanghai. The profits from the auction w ere paid into the national salvation fund.28 The Japanese in Shanghai began to feel as if they w ere victim s. In June 1928, the Japanese Cham ber of Commerce and Industry in Shanghai or­ ganized a series of m eetings for Japanese business representatives in Shanghai. As the m eetings w ere to be held on Fridays the organization was named Kin'yökai (Friday Club). Members of the consulate, the com­ m ercial attaché, and the resident naval and m ilitary officers w ere also ex­ pected to attend these sessions. A t the first and second m eetings, on 26 June and 6 July 1928, many representatives insisted that Japan should take a strong stand against the Chinese, w hile a consul, Shim izu Töru, ar­ gued that it was im possible to protest against the anti-Japanese boycott because the Chinese had liberty of choice in m aking purchases.29 A t the m eeting on 13 July, however, Shim izu m entioned the possibility of using naval power, an idea to which the naval attaché was w ell disposed. It is not recorded w hat kind of naval power Shim izu contem plated us­ ing, and probably his idea was lim ited to patrols by the navy. The Japa­ nese m erchants becam e very keen on the idea of relying on naval power

26 League of Nations, The Report cfth e Commission o f Enquiry o f the League o f Nations into the Sino-Japanese Dispute (Geneva, 1932), 117; Kikuchi, Chügoku minzoku un­ do, 326; Kubo Töru, "Kokum in seifu ni yoru kanzei jishuken no kaifuku katei," TOyO Bunka Kenkyûjo KiyO, no. 98 (1985): 350-57. 27 Remer, Chinese Boycotts, 153,240; Kubo, "Kokum in seifu," 376. 28 League of N ations, The Report, 117; "Japanese Boycott M easures," NCH, 27 Oc­ tober 1928; Nihon Shökö Kaigisho, Shim nan'yö, 82. 29 Tökyö Shökö Kaigisho Shökö Toshokan, Kin'yökai hökoku (hereafter, Kin'yökai), nos. 1 and 2.

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and repeatedly m entioned it, so that Shim izu, who suggested it first, now attem pted to instil them w ith caution.30 As the boycott continued, how­ ever, naval power ceased to be m entioned, probably because no positive response from the navy was forthcom ing. On 31 July 1929 the Guomindang banned die anti-Japanese movement. Although the boycott was not resum ed in Shanghai until die sum mer of 1931, the Japanese in Shanghai could not be confident about die future prospects of their businesses. As m ost of the world w as hard hit by the Great D epression in this period, w ith the exception of the Japanese cotton industry in China, business was bad. Besides, the Japanese in Shanghai gained the im pression that the Nanjing government was m aking consid­ erable efforts to prom ote C hina's econom ic independence. For exam ple, Nanjing raised tariffs to provide revenue to stabilize government financ­ es, but a protective effect was inevitable. Nanjing also held conferences and form ulated various policies in order to protect and develop national industries.31 The situation seemed especially bleak for sm all-scale Japa­ nese m erchants in Shanghai.

R ely in g o n th e N a v a l L a n d in g P a rty

The Anti-Japanese Boycott in the Summer o f 1931 The W anbaoshan Incident and die Korean Incident led to the revival of agitation against Japanese goods in Shanghai. A t W anbaoshan near Changchun in the northeastern part of China, a conflict had continued since A pril 1931 betw een m igrated Korean peasants and Chinese peas­ ants over disputed irrigation ditches. On 2 July, die arm ed Chinese clashed w ith the Korean peasants, and this escalated into an exchange of gunfire betw een the Chinese and the Japanese police. The W anbaoshan Incident caused anti-Chinese riots in Korea from 4 to 7 July, in w hich, as revenge, 119 Chinese w ere murdered and m ore than 200 injured. Since Korea was Japan's colony, it w as reported in Shanghai that Japan suggested that the Koreans should persecute die Chinese,32 and the tw o incidents resulted in the revival of the anti-Japanese boycott in Shanghai. On 13 July, various Chinese industrial and com m ercial organizations, the

30 Kin'yOkai, nos. 3 ,4 ,6 ,7 , and 8, respectively 13 July, 20 July, 3 August, 10 August, and 16 August 1928. 31 Arthur C. Young, China's Nation Building Effort (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 49,307; Kin'yökai, Shanhai hai Nikka jitsujO, no. 50 ,1 0 January 1931. 32 See for exam ple, Shen boo, 7 July 1931,4,13.

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Shanghai Guom indang, and the Chinese in Shanghai held a m eeting where the Shanghai M unicipal Anti-Japanese and Protect Overseas Chi­ nese A ssociation (AJPOC) was organized. This declared a boycott of Jap­ anese goods and the perm anent severance of econom ic relations w ith Ja­ pan. On 16 July, it ordered new spaper com panies not to carry advertisem ents for Japanese com m odities. On 19 July, the actual boycott started, although the scale was sm all.33 As usual, transactions in Japanese goods increased first, because som e Chinese m erchants tried to gain prof­ its before another full-scale anti-Japanese boycott made dealings diffi­ cult.34On the afternoon of 23 July, the registration of Japanese goods start­ ed. One point that differed from the form er boycotts was that the confiscation of goods at the checkpoints overseen by the AJPOC pickets was adopted as the m ain m ethod from the beginning.35 A t this tim e, there w ere several different opinions among the Guomin­ dang members and m erchants.36 Nanjing kept its distance from the boy­ cott, stressing that the agitation was a private initiative directed from Shanghai. Jiang Jieshi w ished to avoid another source of conflict. Further­ m ore, the financial situation did not allow the Nanjing governm ent to be too favorable to the anti-Japanese boycott, because both trade w ith Japan and Japanese m anufacturing w ithin China w ere rich sources of revenue. As a result, both M urai Kuram atsu, the consul-general in Shanghai, and Captain Kitaoka Haruo, the naval attaché, reported that the Chinese were not very keen on boycotting Japanese goods. The Japanese authorities hoped that, lacking encouragem ent from the Nanjing governm ent, the anti-Japanese agitation would rem ain ineffective and soon die out. On 22 July, Shigem itsu M amoru, who becam e the m inister to China on 6 August 1931, urged the Chinese foreign m inister to halt the boycott. Accordingly, a letter by Jiang which urged caution upon the nation w as published on the next day.37 In total contrast to the stance of N anjing, the Shanghai

33 Shen boo, 14 July 1931,13, and 17 July 1931,13; Nihon gaikO monjo, Shöwa ki I dai 1 bu dai 5 kan (hereafter, NGM), no. 676, M urai to Shidehara, 14 July 1931; JFM A, A. 1.1.0.20-2 (hereafter, JFM A, A), vol. 1, Murai to Shidehara, no. 328,17 July 1931, and m ilitary attaché to Army Vice-M inister, no. 750,20 July 1931. 34 Shot boo, 20 July 1931; ibid., 26 July 1931,13. 35 "The Boycott Dem and," NCH, 21 July 1931; Shanhai Nicht Nicht Shinbun (hereaf­ ter, SNNS), 21 July 1931, evening 2. 36 NGM, no. 688, Shigem itsu to Shidehara, 27 July 1931; JFM A, A, Murai to Shide­ hara, 4 August 1931, no. 386. 37 NGM, no. 675, M urai to Shidehara, 13 July 1931; NGM, no. 681, Shidehara to Shigem itsu, 21 July 1931; NGM, no. 683, Shigem itsu to Shidehara, 23 July 1931; JFM A, A, M urai to Shidehara, 15 July 1931, no. 321-1; JFM A, A, vol. 1, m ilitary attaché to General Staff, 21 July 1931, no. 7; JFM A, A, vol. 1, m ilitary attaché to General Staff, no. 772 (1,2), 22 July 1931.

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Guom indang decided that it should participate in the AJPOC and lead the movement, although it should do so through individual members taking active roles, not as a leadership unit.38 Chinese business interests in Shanghai naturally thought that they should make the m ost of this opportunity in order to com pete effectively w ith Japanese producers, to prom ote their own business, and to expand the movement w hich would advocate the usage of national products. Yet, there w ere divisions betw een the old com m ercial elite in Shanghai and the younger party-oriented and nationalistic m erchants.39 The boycott, once enforced, would hurt many Chinese traders who profited from deal­ ings in Japanese industrial and consum er goods. Thus som e m erchants were dissatisfied w ith the overly rigorous m ethod of the boycott.40 The stance of Yu Qiaqing, the honorary AJPOC chairm an, was com pli­ cated. He had been participating in various boycotts since 1898 and as re­ cently as the 1928-29 anti-Japanese boycott. H is shipping interest was in a position, according to Japanese intelligence, to take advantage of the boycott, so that he was thought to be attacking his com petitors, such as the Nisshin Kisen. But he had visited Japan on business, and some Japa­ nese asked him to prevent "econom ic severance." Yu did not attend the inaugural m eeting of the AJPOC and stated that "on ly a boycott w hich was voluntarily instituted by m erchants could bring about the desired re­ sults." He preferred die m erchants handle the boycott w ithout the inter­ vention of the Shanghai Guomindang. Aside from his advocacy of die m anufacture and use of national products, the opinion of Yu as a capital­ ist was incom patible w ith the attitudes of the Shanghai Guomindang and radical young m erchants.41

The Stance o f the Japanese Navy Although Chinese opinion was not united, die Japanese in Shanghai felt that their business was in danger. As such com m odities as cotton yam , soap, and glass bottles w ere confiscated by the AJPOC, the Japanese in Shanghai becam e extrem ely agitated.42 A t die Friday Club m eeting on 24 38 Shett boo, 16 July 1931,12. 39 See Kaneko Hajim e, "Shöm in kyökai to Chügoku Kokumintö (1927-1930)," Retíshi Gaku Kenkyü, no. 598 (1989). 40 JFMA, A vol. 1, Shigem itsu to Shidehara, no. 660,20 July 1931; Jordan, Chinese Boycotts, 3 2 -3 7 ,4 1 -4 2 ,5 6 . 41 Shen bao, 18 July 1931,13; and 26 July 1931,14; Kikuchi, Chügoku minzoku undo, 384. 42 NGM, no. 686, M urai to Shidehara, 25 July 1931; JFM A, A, vol. 1, m ilitary attaché to General Staff, no. 772 ( U ), 22 July 1931; SNNS, 25 July 1931,7; SNNS, 27 July 1931, evening, 1; SNNS, 30 July 1931,9; SNNS, 31 July 1931, evening, 2.

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July 1931, the representative of the A ssociation of Japanese Cotton Piece Goods M erchants in Shanghai observed that the pow erful Chinese cotton piece goods m erchants had joined the anti-Japanese association and that the effect of the anti-Japanese agitation would be serious. The consulate, however, emphasized that the Nanjing governm ent was not supporting the movement and that even the m embers of the Shanghai Guomindang w ere joining in m erely on an individual basis.43 Since the founding of the Friday Club in June 1928, the Japanese arm y and navy officers residing in Shanghai had been expected to attend its m eetings. The Japanese First Expeditionary Fleet, w hose commander had the authority to decide w hether to use force at Shanghai, w as m ore active in this period than during the period of the anti-Japanese boycott of 192829. A t the Friday Club m eeting on 24 July 1931, a resident naval officer, Kuwabara Shigetö, asked the participants to report the situation of the anti-Japanese boycott to the navy as w ell as to the consulate, because the navy intended to protect the lives and the property of the Japanese in con­ cert w ith the consulate.44 The m ain reason for this change in the stance of the First Expeditionary Fleet was the personality and attitude o f the naval com mander, who had been Rear Admiral Shiozawa Köichi since 1 Decem ber 1930. The second possible reason was the change in the Japanese navy. In 1930, the navy had experienced a fierce internal confrontation over the London Naval Conference and the question of disarm ament. One group, the so-called "Treaty Faction," insisted that Japan should accept the proposal of the United States and Britain in order to m aintain harm ony w ith those coun­ tries. The other, the "Fleet Faction," insisted that Japan should not accept the disarm am ent proposal. It was this latter group which gained in strength in the course of the confrontation. It is not known to which fac­ tion Shiozawa belonged, but his firm attitude m ight have been related to the general trend of the Japanese navy. In the m eantim e, Shigem itsu was asking Foreign M inister Shidehara w hether he w as allowed to protest against the anti-Japanese boycott offi­ cially. He was of the opinion that boycotts would be harm ful if they were to be repeated to put pressure on every Sino-Japanese negotiation. Surely the Guomindang was not supporting the boycott, but, he noted, neither did they make any efforts to control it.45

43 JFM A, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 404,14 August 1931; Kin'yökai, nos. 113 and 115, respectively 24 July and 5 August 1931. 44 Kin'yökai, no. 113,24 July 1931. 45 NGM, no. 688, Shigem itsu to Shidehara, 27 July 1931; NGM, no. 690, Shigem itsu to Shidehara, 4 August 1931.

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In grappling w ith the anti-Japanese boycott in the summer of 1931, the lack of trust and com m unication between the Japanese Foreign M inistry and the navy was serious. Each organization was working in isolation, pursuing its own objective. At the Friday Club m eeting on 31 July, the rep­ resentative of a shipping company asked Kuwabara w hether the navy could patrol the canals or not.46 Kuwabara did not give any answers dur­ ing the m eeting, but on 3 August 1931, Shiozawa issued an order concern­ ing the anti-Japanese movement to the units under his command: W h at Japanese goods are to be confiscated in Sh an g h ai,... sailors should be d ispatched ... in order to control the disorderly activities. The Tim ing of the Dispatch. W hen the Consulate requested, or when fite sufferers requested di­ rectly and the units adm itted the necessity.47 Two days later, the consulate in Shanghai found out that fite above order had b e a t issued, and was extrem ely shocked because it had not been con­ sulted in advance. M urai im mediately protested through the naval at­ taché. The consulate was o f the opinion that since the Chinese authorities stated that they would control the situation, it was too early even to let a steam launch w ith an armed unit patrol the Huangpu.48 However, cross­ ing the protest of M urai, an order was issued by the commander of the na­ val landing force in Shanghai, who was a subordinate of Shiozawa, to pre­ vent the confiscation of the Japanese goods.49 At the m eeting of the Friday Club on 7 August, Kuwabara reported that the navy had decided to pre­ vent violence.50 The M inistry of Foreign A ffairs believed that these orders of Shiozawa and the naval landing party in Shanghai w ere contrary to the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets which had been issued by the Navy M inistry in 1898. A rticle 23 of the order read as follows: That the com m anda should resort to arm s, only when the life, free­ dom and property of im perial subjects are in great danger and the governm ent of the involved country does not fulfill her duties and there is no other way of protection but to use our arm s. In this case, the com mander should consult our diplom ats residing in the country or the consuls in advance. However, when he is faced w ith a great

46 Kin'yOkai, no. 114,31 July 1931. 47 NGM, no. 692, M urai to Shidehara, 5 August 1931. 48 NGM, no. 692, M urai to Shidehara, 5 August 1931. 49 JFM A, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 9 5 0 ,6 August 1931. 50 Kin'yOkai, no. 1 1 6,7 August 1931.

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em ergency and does not have tim e to consult our diplom ats or con­ suls, he may be exempted from this requirem ent.51 On 8 August, M urai visited Shiozawa on his flagship, Ataka, and dis­ cussed the m atter. Shiozawa told M urai that he did not intend to resort to arm s im mediately. However, he continued, if Japanese goods w ere de­ tained near where the Japanese fleet was at anchor, to let the Chinese do w hatever they wanted would damage Japan's prestige. In that situation and if it should be found necessary, the navy intended to stop the disor­ derly deeds.52 Shidehara also found Shiozaw a's order distasteful, because it was is­ sued w ithout consulting Shigem itsu or M urai, and also because it de­ clared that the navy could take action only after a direct request from the victim s. Shidehara believed that this condition was contrary to the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets and decided to discuss the m atter w ith the Navy M inistry.53 On 14 August 1931, the Navy M inistry cabled Shiozawa that, although it generally agreed w ith the order, there seemed to have been som e m is­ understanding between Shiozawa and M urai. Shiozawa should solve this m isunderstanding and, from then on, should discuss the situation in Shanghai w ith the consulate even m ore thoroughly than before.54 Since Shiozaw a's order was so obviously contradictory to the O rders for Expe­ ditionary Fleets, the Navy M inistry yielded to the opinion of the Foreign M inistry, but Shiozaw a's order itself was not withdrawn. Shiozaw a's order remained in effect and, on 19 October 1931, at the fourth m eeting of the First Expeditionary Fleet, it was explained to the captains of ships. The interpretation given at the tim e was that since the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets decided that, in peacetim e, fleets should act in conjunction w ith the diplom atic authority, the captains should al­ ways keep contact w ith diplom ats. However, the First Expeditionary Fleet decided that "keeping contact" and "being ordered" w ere two dif­ ferent things, and it was determ ined that the navy would judge the situ­ ation and take necessary steps on its own: the Fleet under Shiozawa would not take orders from the diplom ats.55

51 JFM A, A vol. 3, Gunkan gaimu rei. 52 NGM, no. 695, Murai to Shidehara, 10 August 1931. 53 NGM, no. 697, Shidehara to Shigem itsu, 13 August 1931. 54 JFM A, A, Navy M inistry to the commander of the First Expeditionary Fleet and Kitaoka et al., no. 115,14 August 1931. 55 National Institute for Defense Studies, Japanese N aval Archives (hereafter, JN A), 10/K öbun b ik ö /s6 -1 1 2 ,19 O ctober 1931, Dai ichi kengai kantai, no. 31-4.

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The Japanese Community's Opinion o f the Navy and the Consulate W hile the tw o m inistries w ere negotiating, the naval landing party was called out several tim es in accordance w ith the order of Shiozaw a, so that the expectation of naval protection grew among die Japanese in Shanghai. On 11 August, the hem pen bags of a Japanese trading com pany w ere con­ fiscated on die Suzhou Creek in the International Settlem ent. The mem­ bers of the consulate negotiated w ith the Chinese of the AJPOC, and it was decided that the bags would be released. However, before the actual release, three officers and twenty sailors w ere dispatched from the naval landing party w ithout the knowledge of the consulate, because a Japanese who witnessed the detention directly inform ed the navy of the trouble. The m embers of the AJPOC w ere shocked to see the navy and released the detained goods.56 On 12 August, when 171 bags of Japanese cotton yam were to be shipped off by a ship of Butterfield and Swire moored at Pudong, about thirty Chi­ nese, who belonged to the AJPOC, assaulted a Japanese and tried to detain the bags. A launch of a Japanese shipping company happened to pass by and informed the Ataka of the emergency. Consequently, one officer and fifteen sailors set off on the launch, seized four Chinese and took the com­ modities back. The AJPOC men w ere handed over to the consulate.57 On 13 August, Shiozawa reported on these two successful missions to the Navy M inistry, which on the next day cabled back that Shiozawa should solve the misunderstanding between him self and the consulate.58 On 14 August, a m eeting of the AJPOC was held in order to discuss how to carry on the anti-Japanese agitation. A t this m eeting, the differences of opinion among the Chinese becam e even clearer. The ideas o f the power­ ful m erchants in Shanghai including Yu Qiaqing w ere not shared by the lower ranks of the Guomindang and students. On 21 August, Yu pro­ posed that he should withdraw from the com m ittee of the AJPOC.59 The effect of dispatching sailors was im pressive to the Japanese in Shanghai. Although the Foreign M inistry believed that the problem had been settled as it wished, even it came to think that the stance o f the navy was understandable, especially because the control of the situation by the Chinese authorities was incom plete.60

56 NGM, no. 696, Murai to Shidehara, 11 August 1931. 87 JFM A, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 399,13 August 1931; Kin'yOkai, no. 117, 14 August 1931; Shen boo, 14 August 1931,13. 58 JNA, 10/K öbu nbikö/ s6-60, Shiozawa to Navy Ministry, no. 106,13 August 1931. 59 Shen boo, 22 August 1931,14, and 28 August 1931,14; SNNS, 22 August 1931. 60 NGM, no. 700, M urai to Shidehara, 17 August 1931; NGM, no. 701, Shidehara to M urai, 24 August 1931.

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The Japanese in Shanghai w ere not inform ed of this stance of the For­ eign M inistry, so that they w ere extrem ely dissatisfied with the lackluster response of the consulate. One exam ple is the consulate's reaction on 12 August, when the m arine products of a trading com pany w ere confiscat­ ed by the A JPO G Although the com pany reported the confiscation to the consulate, the latter was unw illing to help. On the contrary, the consulate reproached the com pany for its carelessness. The com pany was told that it should negotiate for the return of die goods by itself.61 On 20 August, the Sharthai Nichi Nichi Shinbun criticized the "incom pe­ tence and sham elessness" of the Japanese diplom atic authorities. It re­ ported that people were dissatisfied w ith four "so-called strong protests" m ade by the diplom ats, because no com m odities had been returned and the protests them selves had not been officially presented by the m inister, Shigem itsu. In addition, it continued, the consulate was wrong to criticize the naval protection.62 Firm opinions w ere expressed by the m ajority at the 118th m eeting of the Friday Club held on 21 August. Members had come to think that m erely continuing negotiations w ith the Chinese would not solve any­ thing. Shidehara's peaceful negotiations and friendship w ere less attrac­ tive to die Japanese in Shanghai than assertive m easures by Shiozawa. Consul-General M urai, who was caught in the middle of this situation, was criticized both by the indignant Chinese 63 and the Japanese business­ men in Shanghai. He attended the Friday Club m eeting on 28 August and reported that he had seen the m ayor of Shanghai, Zhang Qun, on 22 and 27 August. He had requested that Zhang see to the return of captured Jap­ anese goods w ithin the w eek; if the goods w ere not returned, the victim s m ight take some counterm easures, but M urai could not take any respon­ sibility for that. Zhang agreed to return the goods. M urai insisted that the dispatch of the sailors had strengthened the anti-Japanese m ovement, but the rem ark was far from convincing to the members of the Friday Club.64 On the sam e day, the Chinese decided to return the detained Japanese goods, and this decision was carried out by 29 August.65 61 Kin'yökai, no. 117,14 August 1931. a SNNS, 20 August 1931,1. 63 Shen boo, 15 August 1931,13. According to this report, the mayor of Shanghai, Zhang Qun, protested against the dispatch of sailors. 64 Kin'yökai, no. 119,28 August 1931. 65 JFM A, A, vol. 4, Murai to Shidehara, no. 442,29 August 1931. The dispatch of the sailors was not the only reason why the AJPOC decided to return the detained Japanese goods. The following developm ents should also be taken into consid­ eration: the withdrawal of the Japanese police from W anbaoshan on 8 August 1931; floods in central China; and sym pathies shown by the governm ent, the Im­ perial Household, and the people of Japan for the sufferers of the floods.

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S o m e C o n c lu d in g T h o u g h ts

To the Japanese residents in Shanghai, the situation went from bad to worse after the outbreak of the M anchurian Incident. Naturally enough, the incident drastically strengthened the anti-Japanese feeling of the Chi­ nese, w hile the Japanese governm ent was preoccupied w ith the problem s in the Northeast. The frustration of the Japanese in Shanghai becam e total, with the result that they urged naval intervention. It was not the Japanese government which decided to employ naval force. The m en-on-the-spot brought about the hostility. There was one significant difference between the developm ent in Shanghai and that in the Northeast or European im perial expansion in and after 1880s. The Japanese governm ent did not accept the situation cre­ ated by the m en-on-the-spot. First of all, it did not have any strategic rea­ sons to be fully involved in the problem s of Shanghai at this stage. Shang­ hai was not even a buffer zone in the protection of the "sp ecial" interests in the Northeast. Second, the international repercussion made the govern­ m ent worry. Third, econom ic m otivation for intervention was not high. Business interests in Shanghai w ere m ostly private and developed with­ out the protection of the government. Although the Japanese Foreign M inistry had made great efforts in keeping C hina's tariff rate as low as possible, it w as not prepared to play a larger role. A cease-fire agreem ent was reached on 3 M arch 1932. The Japanese troops w ere withdrawn in May 1932. Presented w ith the rise of anti-im perialist nationalism , the Japanese in Shanghai came to the conclusion that, despite the m otto of econom ic ex­ pansionism , the Japanese diplom atic authorities were not interested in as­ sisting their enterprises. Therefore, they decided to rely on the navy which had been assertive since 1930. The sole object of the Japanese in Shanghai w as to protect their com m ercial rights and expand their busi­ ness. However, the attack upon Chinese nationalism did not achieve their desired goal. Security for trade was not established. Instead, it only result­ ed in the failure of Japan's econom ic expansionism . It m ight be true that Japan occupied a m ilitarily stronger position after the conflict, but the anti-Japanese feeling intensified further, the anti-Japanese boycotts con­ tinued, and no Chinese w illingly bought com m odities from their enemy any longer.

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T he T aiwan G overnment-G eneral and P rewar J apanese E conomic E xpansion in South C hina and Southeast A sia, 1900-1936 A dam S c h n eid er

I ntroduction : E xpan sion , D evelopm ent ,

an d

T rade

in th e

C olo n ial

S ettin g

The centrality of econom ic developm ent in Japanese colonial policy and the relationship of developm ent to im perial expansion have been the ob­ jects of historical inquiry for some tim e.1 It is thus surprising that die ef­ forts of Japan's oldest colonial adm inistration to prom ote econom ic ex­ pansion beyond its colonial borders have rem ained unexamined. Over m ost of its fifty years, the Taiw an Governm ent-General im plem ented a range of different policies to increase its influence over South China and Southeast A sia, a region that cam e to be known collectively as the nanpö. These included cultural m easures, such as the prom otion of schools, hos­ pitals, and new spapers, political m eddling, and in at least one case m ili­ tary intervention, although the Amoy Incident2 of 1900 ended abortively with Tökyö reining in the Governm ent-General. The m ost im portant and 1 The them es o f expansion and developm ent are treated in several articles in the series o f three volum es edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. M yers, and M ark R. Peattie: The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1984), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1898-1937 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), and The Japanese W artime Empire, 19311945 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). These themes are also addressed in recent series of Japanese works, including Oe Shinobu et al., eds., hvanami kOza—kindai Nihon to shokuminchi, eight volum es (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1992-93) and ö ish i Kaichirö, ed., Nihon teikoku shugi shi, three volumes (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985-94). 2 The Amoy Incident involved an attem pt by die governor-general of Taiwan, Kodama Gentarö, and his assistant Gotö Shinpei to take advantage of the confusion generated by the Boxer Uprising to occupy Amoy. A fire deliberately set at a Jap­ anese tem ple in the coastal city in late August w as used as a pretext for the oc­ cupation, and a sm all group of Japanese m arines was actually sent in, but Tökyö stopped the plan before the m ain force assem bled in Taiwan departed. Kodama, exasperated, sought unsuccessfully for perm ission to resign. The incident was one factor contributing to the collapse of the Yamagata cabinet in October, but it also marked die end of the Taiwan Governm ent-General's m ilitary adventurism in South China. See M arius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 99-103. 161

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enduring m easures adopted by the Governm ent-General, however, were econom ic. Until the m id-1930s, Taiw an's econom y served m ainly as an agricultur­ al appendage whose exports eased the strains of industrialization in Ja­ pan. The Governm ent-General's developm ent policy toward Taiwan has been studied, and it has becom e a truism that the needs of the Japanese m étropole determ ined the econom ic roles assigned to its colonies.3 The Governm ent-General's econom ic policy toward the nanpö, however, re­ flected its own sub-im perialist am bition as much as m etropolitan needs. Expectations were high for both the developm ent of Taiwan and external econom ic expansion, but the colonial governm ent's achievem ents in the nanpö were overshadowed by the rem arkable grow th of the island's do­ m estic economy. Taiw an's dom estic econom ic developm ent can be viewed as the result of sustained increases in both the factor inputs and productivity of rice and sugar cultivation.4 A few com parisons suggest the m agnitude of the transform ation that occurred between 1900 and the 1930s. Total output of sugar cane rose more than 2,000 percent, from about 500,000 to 12 m illion

3 Samuel Pao-San Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. M yers and Peattie, 347. 4 There is a growing literature on the econom ic developm ent of colonial Taiwan, but the best single book in English rem ains Samuel P. S. Ho, Economic Develop­ ment o f Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), which also contains a useful if now somewhat dated bibliography. There are relevant arti­ cles by Ho and others in Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. The reader w ishing a general introduction should also consult Tu Zhaoyan's Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975), the m ost com prehensive monograph in Japanese. Zhang Zonghan's Guangfu qian Taiwan zhi gongyehua (Taibei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye, 1980) is another general survey, but it is somewhat slanted. H ighly detailed inform ation about the colonial economy is available in three works com piled for the M inistry of Finance after the war: Okurashö Kam i Kyoku, "N ihonjin no kaigai katsudô ni kansuru rekishiteki chôsa tsükan dai-jùni satsu Taiwan hen dai-ichi bunsatsu dai-ichi bu Taiwan keizai hansei shi gaikan," "N ihonjin no kaigai katsudô ni kansuru rekishiteki chôsa tsùkan daijûyon satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono ich i)," and "N ihonjin no kaigai katsudô ni kansuru rekishiteki chôsa tsùkan dai-jûgo satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono n i)." The Bank of Taiwan in its postw ar, Chinese incarnation put out a number of detailed volum es on Taiw an's econom ic history, although some of them tend to be more descriptive than analytic. References to these are listed in the bibli­ ography of H o's book. The best collection of statistical series, along with a number of useful essays, is to b e found in M izoguchi Toshiyuki and Umemura M ataji, eds., Kyü Nihon shokum inchi keizai tökei (Tökyö: Töyö Keizai Shinpösha, 1988). 162

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m etric tons betw een 1901 and 1939.5This was driven by an increase in cul­ tivated land area of alm ost 900 percent, from 16,500 to 145,000 hectares, and by efficiency gains in sugar production of alm ost 500 percent, from 1.8 to 8.8 tons/hectare, between 1902-3 and 1939-40.67Rice agriculture also expanded, if not quite as dram atically as sugar, from about400,000 to 1.3 m illion m etric tons between 1901 and 1939/ Indigenous rice yields in 1900 w ere about 6 -7 koku /kö in 1900 versus 14-15 koku /kô for high-yield strains of rice in the 1930s.8 D escriptions of econom ic grow th in term s of productivity gains and in­ creases in factor inputs, however, obscure the purposeful and planned human action that was its source. M assive investm ent in the sugar indus­ try by Japanese industrialists, the efforts of countless Taiw anese, m ostly farm ers, and, above all, aggressive intervention by the colonial state lay behind this success. Although the first m ajor Japanese sugar firm in Tai­ wan was set up in 1900, it was not until after the Russo-Japanese W ar that Japanese industrialists began to invest w holeheartedly in Taiw anese sug­ ar production.9 Industry grow th, driven by high profits, was rapid but volatile. Three rounds of consolidation—in the late M eiji era, after the First W orld W ar, and in the early 1940s—narrowed toe field to four large Japanese com panies, elim inating W estern and Taiw anese com petition in the process.10 Private industrial investm ent in Taiw an before the m id1930s rem ained predom inantly in sugar, accounting for about 186 m il­

5 Yhi-Min H o, A gricultural Development o f Taiwan, 1903-1960 (N ashville: Vander­ bilt University Press, 1966), 141. 6 Nörinshö Nörin Suisan Gijutsu Kaigi Jimukyoku N ettai Nögyö Kenkyü Kann Shitsu, Senzen senji ni okeru Taiwan nögyö gijutsu no hattatsu—ine kansho (1978), 24. 7 Yhi-Min Ho, Agricultural Development, 135-36. * Takahashi Kam ekichi, Cendai Taiwan k eim ron (Tökyö: Chikura Shobö, 1937), 183. One kö is equal to about 0.97 hectares. 9 The nationalization of the railroads in Japan was an im portant factor in the de­ velopm ent of the sugar industry in Taiwan because it put a great deal of capital in private hands that was subsequently used to finance sugar com panies. See Steven J. Ericson, The Sound o f the W histle—Railroads and the State in M eiji Japan (Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 372-73. On the early histo­ ry of Taiw an's m odem sugar industry, see Mori Hisao, "Taiw an sötokufu no tögyö hogo seisaku no tenkai," Taiwan lángendai shi kenkyü no. 1 (1978), 41-82. 10 See chapter four of Tu, Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan, 271-367. The four larg­ est firm s w ere Dainippon Sugar (Dainippon Seitö), M eiji Sugar (M eiji Seitö), Ensuikö Sugar (Ensuikö Seitö), and Taiwan Sugar (Taiwan Seitö). A ll but the first were based in Taiwan. These four firm s were among the largest m anufac­ turing and m ining com panies in the em pire, ranking in the top thirty in 1919 and toe top forty in 1940; Nakagawa Keiichirö, M orikawa Hidem asa, and Yui Tsunehiko, eds., Kindai Nihon keiei shi no kiso chishiki (Tökyö: Yühikaku, 1974), 452,454. 163

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lion yen out of 200 m illion yen of total paid-in capital in industry as late as 1935.11 The success of the sugar industry in Taiw an also depended on the Taiw anese, of course. There w ere a few m odem Taiwanese-owned firm s, although the last one w as bought out in 1941,12 and Taiw anese w orked in Japanese sugar com panies, but Taiw anese cane grow ers m ade the largest contribution.13 By cultivating m ore acreage of higher-yielding cane varieties, they raised their own standard of living14 as w ell as sugar com pany profits. The developm ent of high-yield hôrai rice in the early 1920s also allow ed them to produce m ore rice and, by providing a prof­ itable alternative to cane cultivation, gave them m ore leverage in negoti­ ating cane prices w ith the sugar com panies. Both Japanese industrialists and Taiw anese form ers, however, w ere de­ pendent on the colonial state. The sugar com panies initially relied on a va­ riety of direct and indirect subsidies,15 and they enjoyed monopsony cane purchasing privileges in legally established regions around their plants throughout the colonial period. N ot only was their access to raw m aterials protected, but tariffs shielded their m arket in Japan from international com petition. Taiw anese cane farm ers also shared indirectly in these ben­ efits at the expense of the Japanese consumer. Furtherm ore, these farm ers w ere directly indebted to the state for the com bination of better fertilizer, high-yield crop strains, and advanced irrigation facilities that made it possible to increase agricultural output so dram atically.16 The state also built the basic transport and com m unication infrastructure that linked supply in Taiwan w ith demand in Japan for cane and rice. This linkage fostered the econom ic com plem entarity w ith Japan that came to dom inate Taiw an's external trade. Although m ost of Taiw an's 11 Taiwan Sötokufu Kanbô Chösaka, Taiwan sötokufu dai-sanjükyü tökei sho (1937), 451-52,506-7. 12 Shinkö Sugar (Shinkö Seitö) was bought out by Taiwan Sugar in October 1941; Tu, Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan, 334. 13 The population of Taiwan in 1935 was approxim ately 5.3 m illion. Out of this fig­ ure, the fanning population w as about 2.8 m illion, w hile only 64,246 Taiwanese were factory employees, and few er than 35,000 of these were involved with sug­ ar production. Mizoguchi and Umemura, eds., Kytt Nihon shokuminchi keizai tökei, 256-57; Taiwan Sötokufu Kanbö Chösaka, Taiwan sötokufu dai-sanjükyü tökei sho (1937), 347,442-43. 14 For a survey of agricultural living conditions in Taiwan, see Chang Han-yu, "A Study of the Living Conditions of Farm ers in Taiwan 1931-1950," The Developing Economies 7, no. 1 (March 1969): 35-62. 15 A chart summarizing different Governm ent-General support m easures for the sugar industry is in Takahashi, Gendai Taiwan keizai ron, 230-31. 16 The state was responsible for several large irrigation projects and the develop­ m ent of high yield rice strains. It also promoted the use of better fertilizer, m uch of which was imported from other parts of the em pire. Takahashi, Gendai Taiwan keizai ron, 110-21; Ho, Economic Development o f Taiwan, 1860-1970,41-69. 164

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion

trade in die precolonial period w ent to China, from about die tim e of the Russo-Japanese W ar trade w ith Japan eclipsed its total trade w ith other countries. This trend accelerated w ith the agricultural developm ent of Taiw an, until Taiw an's total im port and export trade w ent overwhelm­ ingly to Japan. In the early 1930s, for exam ple, trade w ith Japan constitut­ ed nearly 80 percent of im ports and 90 percent of exports.17 Trade w ith other parts of die em pire w as insignificant, and trade w ith foreign coun­ tries, w hile not negligible, was sm all compared to trade w ith Japan. Even during the boom years of the First W orld W ar, export grow th was medi­ ated through Japan. On the one hand, w hat is clear, even from such an abbreviated narra­ tive o f die econom ic developm ent of Taiw an, is that both grow th and an increasingly close trade relationship w ith Japan, based on the exchange of agricultural raw m aterials for capital and m anufactured goods, w ere sought and achieved in large part through the econom ic policy of the co­ lonial state. The external expansion that w as also prom oted by die state, on the other hand, w as inherently a m ore elusive goal than the develop­ m ent of the island itself. Correspondingly, the policies used to pursue it w ere m ore varied and the degree of success achieved m ore d ifficult to m easure. The general objective of econom ic policy tow ard the tiattpö w as to control the region by integrating it w ith Taiw an, but this m eant dif­ ferent things at different tim es and to different adm inistrations in Taihoku (Taibei). Stronger trade ties, influence over the financial envi­ ronm ent in the nanpö, and control over key service enterprises, like ship­ ping, w arehousing, and banking, w ere all interm ediate goals. Policy tools included subsidies and official and sem i-official corporations. These w ere used in different com binations, although one can distin­ guish tw o m ain periods in external econom ic policy divided around the First W orld W ar. In taking up the Governm ent-General's econom ic program for the nan­ pö, the tem ptation is to com pare it unfavorably to the very successful do­ m estic econom ic policy. The m ore im portant question, however, has to do w ith the relationship betw een the two, and specifically how the econom ic com plem entarity between Japan and Taiw an constrained the Govern­ m ent-General's efforts to control and integrate the nanpö. Understanding this relationship also throws light on the subsequent period between the m id-1930s and the outbreak of the Pacific W ar, during w hich the Govern­ m ent-General adopted a new program of industrialization for the Tai­

17 Calculated from M izoguchi and Umemura, eds., Kyü Nihon shokumirtchi keizai tökei, 246-47,251.

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w anese econom y and, at die same tim e, moved m ore aggressively than ever before to carve out its own sub-im perial sphere.

E a r ly G o v ern m en t -G en er a l E c o n o m ic M ea su r es

The failed plot that resulted in the Amoy Incident of 1900 led the Govern­ m ent-General, under die leadership of Kodama Gentarö (1898-1906) and his civil affairs chief G otö Shinpei (1898-1906), to abandon direct m ilitary action as a strategy for South China. G otö, to whom Kodama delegated much responsibility, was an aggressive im perialist, but he was also a pragm atist. He continued to sim ultaneously try to free Taiwan from its traditional econom ic subordination to the continent and to extend Japa­ nese influence into South China, but w ith corporate instrum ents rather than force.18 These corporate proxies w ere largely extensions of the Gov­ ernm ent-General itself, involving individuals w ith close ties to the ad­ m inistration and frequently public funds as w ell. W hile this was a viable strategy in some sectors, it was not feasible in others, particularly those that required large am ounts of capital. Gotö and subsequent leaders in the Governm ent-General therefore adopted other approaches that allowed them to draw on capital resources in Japan. A s Mark Peattie has noted, Japanese im perialism was characterized by a shortage rather than a sur­ plus of capital.19In practice, these Governm ent-General approaches could mean sim ply persuading an existing Japanese shipping com pany to es­ tablish routes connecting Taiwan w ith other regions, or more form ally setting up an institution like the Bank of Taiw an (Taiwan Ginkö; BOT), w hich was subsidized by the central government. One of the earliest firm s to em erge as an offshoot of the Governm entGeneral was the Sango Company (Sango Köshi).20 The Sango Company w as established as a private corporation in 1902, the thirty-fifth year of M eiji, from which it took the tw o num erals that m ade up its nam e. W hile posing as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise, the com pany was really the brainchild of Gotö and w as run by his protégé, Akuzawa Naoya, a Tökyö Im perial University graduate who worked briefly for M itsubishi before joining Goto in the Governm ent-General.21 The Sango Company was di­ 18 Kitaoka Shin'ichi, Gotö Shinpei—gaikô to bijon (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1988), 6 4 65. 19 Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction" in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Myers and Peattie, 12. 20 Tsurumi YQsuke, Gotö Shinpei dai-nikan (Tökyö: Keisö Shobö, 1965), 491. 21 Nakamura Takashi, "Taiw an sötokufu no Kanan tetsudö kösaku—Chö-Sen tetsudö o m egutte," Nanpö Bunka 14 (November 1987): 73.

166

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Javanese Economic Expansion

vided up into three divisions for education, research, and operations, but the education division, w hich ran a school from 1904 to 1909 and research division were of secondary im portance.22 Although little is known about Akuzawa and the com pany, especially in its later years, in the decade be­ fore the First W orld W ar the operations division had several m ajor projects in South China and was an im portant instrum ent of Governm entGeneral econom ic policy. The com pany's two largest enterprises w ere a camphor business in Fu­ jian and the Chaozhou-Shantou railroad. Japanese involvement in the rail­ road w as disguised through the use of Taiwanese and Chinese interm edi­ aries, who tunneled Governm ent-General money into the project.23 The line of about thirty m iles was com pleted in 1906, a little m ore than two years after construction began, and Akuzawa arranged for the Chinese front company to contract the management of the railroad to his Sango Company. Sango then brought in Japanese and Taiwanese staff from the railw ay section o f the Governm ent-General to actually run the operation. Although it faced com petition from w ater transport in the first few years, the railroad gradually becam e m ore successful. There was considerable friction between the railroad and local Chinese, however. The forced sale of land to the com pany resulted in an attack on the railroad during the construction phase that claim ed the lives of several Japanese. Later, the railroad becam e the target of anti-foreign protests, and in 1909 an incident occurred between the Chinese workers and Japanese management that ul­ tim ately led to nom inal Japanese withdrawal from the railroad. Akuzawa retained control, however, through a new secret management contract. Thereafter, he cut back on the use of Japanese staff, relying on Taiwanese and Chinese to reduce the potential for future conflict. Another result of fois incident was that foe Governm ent-General withdrew from foe project and stopped its annual subsidies to Sango. Sakuma Sam ata, a career m il­ itary man from Chöshü already in his sixties, had replaced Kodama as governor-general in 1906, but he lacked the im agination of his predeces­ sor, had a corrupt civil affairs chief, and preferred to concentrate his efforts on the subjugation of the aborigines in Taiwan.24 Thus after G otö's depar­ ture to head foe new South M anchurian Railway Company, there was less support w ithin foe Governm ent-General for Sango. The com pany contin­ ued to operate foe railw ay profitably into the 1920s, but was forced to re-

22 Nakamura Takashi, 'T aiw an to 'N an-Shi N an'yö'" in Nihon no nanpö kan'yo to Taiwan, ed. Nakamura Takashi (Tenri: Tenrikyö Dôyüsha, 1988), 10-11. 23 On the railroad project, see Tsurum i, Gotö Shinpei, 493-95,500-504, and Naka­ mura, "Taiw an sötokufu no Kanan tetsudö kösaku," 73-103. 24 Huang Zhaotang, Taiwan sötokufu (Tökyö: Kyöikusha, 1981), 89-98. 167

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iinquish control in 1922. M anagement of the railroad deteriorated rapidly after that, and it had to be reorganized in 1929. The Sango Com pany's cam phor project evolved out of G otö's desire to strengthen the position of the cam phor m onopoly in Taiw an by extending its business into South China.25 Camphor was traditionally one of Tai­ w an's m ajor products, along w ith rice, sugar, and tea, but it declined in im portance during the colonial era, particularly after the First W orld W ar, when synthetic substitutes becam e available.26 A t the turn of the century there was little hint of this, though, and Akuzawa, acting on the instruc­ tions of the Governm ent-General, began negotiating w ith the Chinese at the local and central level in 1901 and eventually succeeded in obtaining an exclusive cam phor concession for Fujian in 190227 Sango set up man­ ufacturing and distribution operations based in Fuzhou and Shanghai, w ith a netw ork of other purchasing outposts. Although the business w ent w ell for the first few years, increasing pressure from the Chinese to recov­ er foreign concessions eventually forced the com pany out in 1909. W hile both the railroad and the camphor project were in South China, the Sango Company also began to move into Southeast Asia. For exam ple, as the camphor project began to run into trouble, the Sango Company moved into gum plantations in Malaya; in fact, as the first m ajor Japanese gum ven­ ture, it was later referred to as the "founder" (kaiso) of the Japanese gum en­ terprise in Malaya.28 This position allowed it to take full advantage of high prices during the First World W ar, unlike newcomers who had to w ait sev­ eral years before their gum trees becam e productive. By the end of the war it was considered the leading Japanese gum firm in Malaya.29 There is little inform ation about the gum enterprise thereafter, but it was still the leading Japanese plantation by area in Malaya in a 1936 survey.30 A second firm that served the Governm ent-General in econom ic rela­ tions w ith China was the Nankoku Company (Nankoku Köshi), w hich brought w orkers from mainland China to Taiwan.31 Precolonial Taiw an 25 Camphor becam e a public monopoly in Taiwan in 1899. 26 During the 1920s and 1930s cam phor accounted for only about 2 percent of ex­ ports by value, less than either bananas or tea and about the same level as alco­ hol; Okurashö Kanri Kyoku, "N ihonjin no kaigai katsudô ni kansuru rekishiteki chösa tsükan dai-jüyon satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono ich i)/' 10. 27 On the cam phor project, see Tsurum i, Goto Shinpei, 492-93,497-500, and Naka­ mura, 'T aiw an to 'N an-Shi N an'yö,"' 11. 28 Taiwan Sötokufu, "M inam i Shina oyobi N an'yö chösa dai-jüroku: N an'yö ni okeru höjin no kigyö" (1918), 56. 29 Yano Töru, ‘N anshin’ no keifit (Tökyö: Chüö Köronsha, 1975), 105. 30 Taiwan Sötokufu, Nan'yö kakuchi höjin kigyöyöran (Taihoku, 1937), 36. 31 On the Nankoku Company, see M atsuo H iroshi, Taiwan to Shinajin rödösha

168

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Javanese Economic Expansion

attracted seasonal m igrant labor from South China, especially to support the tea industry, w hich boomed during the second half o f the nineteenth century. Around die tim e that Taiw an was ceded to Japan, several thou­ sand w orkers w ere com ing annually, typically arriving in the spring and returning to the m ainland in die fall. Concerned w ith the ongoing guer­ rilla resistance to Japanese rule, die Governm ent-General initially restrict­ ed im m igration, but after control had been established, it reversed itself to allow an adequate supply of labor for the m ajor infrastructure projects started at the turn of the century. An 1899 regulation established a licens­ ing system for labor im porters, but in 1905 this was replaced w ith an ar­ rangem ent whereby one Goto M ötarö and his firm (Taika Shokumin Göshi Kaisha) w ere granted an exclusive concession to im port w orkers. In 1915, this firm was reorganized into the Nankoku Company. Nankoku recruited labor through Chinese com pradors at offices in Fuzhou, Shantou, and Amoy and used deposits and guarantors to filter out unwelcome elem ents.32 There was a fairly steady surplus of immi­ grants over those returning to m ainland China, so that between 1905 and 1935 the num ber of Chinese w orkers resident in Taiw an grew tenfold from about 4,000 to about 40,00o.33 Nankoku retained its exclusive con­ cession until 1937, when labor im ports w ere stopped because of the China Incident. As in 1899, labor demand eventually w on out over security con­ cerns, and in 1940 labor im ports w ere restarted. A t this point, however, Nankoku Company saw its operations com pletely absorbed by the Tai­ wan Developm ent Company (Taiw an Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha), which was the m ain instrum ent of overseas econom ic expansion from Taiwan after its form ation in 1936. In addition to fostering new com panies to serve specific policy objec­ tives, the Governm ent-General also harnessed established Japanese ship­ ping firm s to its econom ic goals. Grants for the operation of regular ship­ ping routes connecting Taiw an to South China and Southeast Asia constituted a m ajor com ponent of total Governm ent-General spending on subsidies and were im portant in persuading private firm s to open and m aintain routes. A fter arranging w ith Osaka Com mercial Shipping Com­ pany (Osaka Shösen Kaisha; OSK) and the Japan M ail Steam ship Compa­ ny (Nihon Yüsen Kaisha; NYK) to operate O saka-Jilong and K obe-Jilong services, the Governm ent-General next com missioned the OSK to operate (Taihoku: Taiwan Sötokufu Taihoku Kötö Shögyö Gakkö Nan-Shi N an'yö Keizai Kenkyükai, 1937), and the documents in Nakamura Takashi, "Nankoku köshi ni tsu ite," NattpO Bunka 7 (December 1980): 159-177. 32 Matsuo, Taitoan, 33-35. 33 Matsuo, Taiwan, 43. The traditional tea w orkers also gave way to carpenters and odd-jobbers (zatsuddfu) during the late 1920s and 1930s.

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a D anshui-H ong Kong route in 1899. This was followed over the next few years by an A nping-H ong Kong line and four other routes connecting Chinese coastal cities. By 1911, Taiw an was linked by die OSK to Canton, Shanghai, and Shantou, as w ell.34 One explanation that has been offered for why die Governm ent-General chose the OSK for all but one of the routes is that the NYK was m ore closely tied to the central governm ent and therefore potentially less am enable to the G overnm ent-General's de­ mands than the OSK.35 The Governm ent-General sought first to push die British steam ship firm of Douglas out of Taiw an and then to challenge it in South China. The OSK received 3.5 m illion yen in subsidies from the Governm ent-General, including grants for die O saka-Jilong line, over the decade 1896-1905 to help it achieve this.36 The Governm ent-General's larger aspiration was to use die inroads it made in South China shipping to extend OSK lines into Southeast Asia. It sponsored a number of investigative missions w ith die OSK prior to the First W orld W ar to determine if a Java line would be profitable. The Gov­ ernment-General hoped to use die OSK to get a share of die trade between Southeast Asia and South China, such as sugar from the Dutch East Indies, rice from Saigon, and Chinese passengers going to work overseas.37 W hat the investigative reports revealed, however, was that Chinese and British interests were too strongly entrenched for the OSK to challenge. The OSK and NYK in fact chose not to cooperate w ith the Communications M inistry when it set up a subsidized Japan-Java route in 1912 because the subsidies offered were insufficient, allowing die route to go to a new company, South Seas M ail Steamship (Nan'yö Yüsen). By 1916, facing a huge surge in ship­ ping demand and with the W estern powers distracted by war, die OSK was ready when the Government-General offered a generous subsidy of 100,000 yen annually to run from Jilong to Java with stops along die China coast and in Singapore.38 The OSK was able to establish a position in the Java trade thanks to the financial support of the Government-General. Although the Sango Com pany, Nankoku Com pany, and the OSK each contributed to the G overnm ent-General's overseas econom ic program , during the period before die 1930s the colonial governm ent's m ost im por­ tant instrum ent was the Bank of Taiwan, which opened its doors in 1899. Claim s by som e scholars that Taiw an lacked a true national policy com­ 34 35 36 37

Katayama Kunio, Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia (Tökyö: Ochanomizu Shobö, 19% ), 223. Katayama, Kindai Nihon, 218. Katayama, Kindai Nihon, 222. Katayama, Kindai Nihon, 265; Katayama Kunio, "The Expansion of Japanese Shipping into Southeast Asia before W orld W ar I: The Case of die O .S.K .," The Great C ircle 8, no. 1 (April 1986): 5. 38 Katayama, Kindai Nihon, 290.

170

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar iavanese Economic Expansion

pany before the 1930s notw ithstanding,39 die BOT, in addition to serving as a colonial central bank, was set up explicitly to pursue national policy goals in Southeast Asia and South China.40 To be sure, the BOT focused on Taiw an during its first decade, using its capital to finance the nascent sug­ ar industry and public developm ent projects, as w ell as the Governm entGeneral, but during this period it w as also active in China, w here it sup­ ported Governm ent-General goals in a num ber of ways. The m ost basic m ethod the bank used to prom ote the Governm entG eneral's econom ic program was by providing exchange and trade fi­ nancing to business through a netw ork of offices in South China and Southeast Asia. BOT branches sprang up in Amoy (1900), Hong Kong (1903), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), Canton (1910), Shanghai (1911), Hankou (1915), and dozens of other places in China, m ostly in the south, w hile it w as eventually represented in over thirty locations in Southeast Asia, starting w ith Singapore (1912). A sense o f rivalry w ith Japan's m ain foreign exchange bank, the Yokohama Specie Bank (Yokohama Shökin Ginkö),41 and aggressive leadership by Yagyû Kazuyoshi,42 president from 1901 to 1916, contributed to this expansion, but the lending practices driving the BO T's rapid growth later proved disastrous. The BO T's activities in South China also included lending to the Chi­ nese, although these loans proved equally im prudent. As early as 1900, it had already begun negotiations, and it concluded eleven loans before the fall of the Q ing in 1911.43 In addition to tírese individual loans, tíre BOT also participated in various Japanese bank syndicates that used loans to try to exert influence in China during the chaotic 1910s and 1920s. The BOT tried other w ays of extending econom ic influence into South China, too. Its branches issued their own drafts (shiharai tegata), for exam ple, and

39 See Kubo Fum ikatsu, "Taiw an Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha to 'nanpö shinshutsu' (I)," Chao Daigaku Kigyö Kenkyüjo Nenpö 13 (1992): 77-106, and 'T aiw an Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha to 'nanpö shinshutsu' (II)," Chüö Daigaku KigyO Kenkyüjo Nenpö 14 (1994): 145-182. 40 Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi (Tökyö, 1964), 8. 41 Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 384,395-96,405-6; Namikata Shöichi, Nihon shokuminchi kin’yü seisaku shi no kenkyü (Tökyö: W aseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1985), 312; Katayama Kunio, "Tokutei kenkyü 'bunka ma­ sa tsu' C. Nihon no nanpö kan'yo: Intabyü kiroku—kyü Taiwan Ginkö no tokushitsu" (1979), 14. 42 Katayama, "Intabyü kiroku," 23. 43 In addition to the eleven loans by the BOT, several other negotiations were be­ gun but never concluded. Sunaga N oritake, "Taiw an Ginkö no Chügoku shihon yushutsu katsudö—jiko shikin tandoku shakkan o chüshin to shite," Tochi Seido Shigaku 35, no. 2 (W inter 1993): 26. A com prehensive list of BOT loans to China during the Taishö and early Shöwa eras is in Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 358-63. 171

Adam Schneider

the M inistry of Finance w as also persuaded to let it circulate silver yen in South China. The approxim ately 10 m illion yen it pumped into circula­ tion had little effect in such a broad region, however.44 There was also a proposal in 1912 to transform and expand the BOT from a regional bank for Taiw an based in Taihoku into an overseas bank for China.45 This ulti­ m ately cam e to nought, as did the loans to China when the Chinese de­ faulted. The circulation o f silver yen also dw indled as a result o f the antiJapanese sentim ent provoked by the Twenty-One Demands and the oc­ cupation of the Shandong peninsula.46

E c o n o m ic M e a su r es a ft e r t h e F ir st W o r l d W a r

The First W orld W ar brought rapid grow th to Taiw an as w ell as Japan. The sugar industry enjoyed unprecedented profits, sym bolized by die 100 percent dividend issued to stockholders in 1920 by Taiw an Sugar, one of file leading sugar firm s in die Japanese em pire.47 Rice riots in Japan cre­ ated more demand for Taiwanese rice, ultim ately leading to file develop­ m ent of the high yield hOrai strain that transform ed agriculture in the 1920s. These trends bound Taiw an's econom y m ore closely to Japan, even as they expanded Japanese trade w ith Southeast Asia. Leadership in the Governm ent-General also evolved. Sakum a's dec­ ade-long reign cam e to an end in 1915, and he was succeeded by a series of m ore activist governor-generals, Andö Sadayoshi (1915-18), Akashi M otojirö (1918-19), and Den Kenjirö (1919-23). W hile this represented an increase in turnover, the fact that one civil affairs chief, Shimom ura Hiro­ shi (1915-21), served all three provided continuity. M ore im portantly, Shimom ura, a colorful figure who w ent on to pursue a career as a jour­ nalist and later politician, returned to the expansionist approach of Goto Shinpei. Although Andö was preoccupied w ith both quelling a m ajor armed uprising and containing peaceful Form osan dem ands for greater political participation stim ulated by the visit to Taiwan of veteran parlia­ m entarian Itagaki Taisuke, his adm inistration did begin to focus attention back on external affairs. Governm ent-General representatives w ere post­ ed to Japanese consuls in South China, various cultural initiatives w ere stepped up, and budgetary allocations for subsidies, discussed in detail

44 45 46 47

Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö ski, 399-400. Namikata, Nihon shokuminchi kin'yü, 313-14. Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkß ski, 401. Kubo Fum ikatsu, Shokuminchi kigyó keiei sk i ron (Tökyö: Nihon Keizai Hyöronsha, 1997), 182.

172

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion

below , also began to increase.48 It was the pair of Shimom ura and Akashi, however, that, like Gotö and Kodama before diem , provided die m ost ag­ gressive leadership. Under Shimom ura, both die m ethods and regional focus of the G overnm ent-General's overseas econom ic program s changed. The w artim e trade boom solidified a shift in the focus of policy from South China to Southeast Asia that had begun earlier, and new firm s w ere created to supplem ent the G overnm ent-General's existing corporate proxies. Another developm ent was the increased use of subsidies to stricdy private firm s, a shift from the earlier reliance on corporations w ith m ore direct ties to die colonial government. Although there were subse­ quent changes in die 1920s and early 1930s, these institutions and ap­ proaches constituted the basic direction of overseas econom ic policy. These new tools did not mean that all of the Governm ent-General's ex­ isting ones w ere jettisoned. W hile the Sango Company was reducing its commitment to China and establishing a leading position in the gum busi­ ness, the other m ajor instrum ent of Government-General policy, the BOT, expanded so rapidly during the war that the bulk of its financing activities shifted from Taiwan to Japan and overseas. The BOT provided loans to many Japanese firm s, including exporters, gum plantations, and so forth, both during the boom and after.49 Perhaps the m ost famous of these was Ishihara H iroichirö's m ining company, which was started in 1920 with BOT loans,50 and which was later one of the largest suppliers of Japanese iron ore im ports. The BOT deviated from its m ission in Taiwan and South­ east Asia and South China, however, to pursue profits in Japan proper dur­ ing the w ar, so that in the early 1920s around half of its deposits and loans were concentrated there.51 W hile Ishihara's enterprise flourished, the BOT went down in 1927 w ith its main loan custom er, Suzuki Trading (Suzuki Shöten). Although the BOT had managed to keep Suzuki afloat for awhile, when its deposits in Japan fell drastically, the bank could no longer finance the failing Suzuki and was so overextended that it tem porarily closed as well. The bank was reorganized after its collapse, but it limped along in the 1930s and did not recover a prom inent role until the Pacific War. The collapse of prices for tropical products, anti-Japanese boycotts by Chinese at hom e and overseas, and the return of W estern com petition to

48 Ide Kiwata, Taiwan chisdd shi (Taihoku: Taiwan N khi Nichi Shinpösha, 1937),590-91. 49 Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 411-17. 50 Yasukichi Yasuba, "H iroichirö Ishihara and the Stable Supply of Iron O re," in The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia, ed. Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, N .Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), 143-44. 51 Katö Toshihiko, Honpö ginkö shi ron (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1957), 225; W atanabe Sahei and Kitahara M ichitsura, eds., Gendai Nihon sangyö hattatsu shi dai-26 kan—ginkö (Tökyö: Köjunsha, 1966), 325. 173

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Southeast Asian m arkets in the postw ar hurt Japanese business and by ex­ tension Japanese shipping. W hile the OSK w as able to hold on to its posi­ tion in Southeast Asia during the 1920s, die 1930s brought intense com­ petition horn other Japanese com panies and the Dutch. Ishihara, who had begun to vertically integrate his m ining operations by shipping his own ore from M alaya, triggered a shipping w ar in 1931 when he moved into the Java shipping trade.52 This had tw o m ajor ram ifications. First, the Jap­ anese governm ent arranged a m erger that created a single new firm from tiie Java routes of several Japanese shipping com panies. Then, after re­ peated negotiations w ith the Dutch, the Japanese finally reached an agreem ent in 1936 that allocated the shipping trade betw een this new Jap­ anese firm and the Dutch. The Governm ent-General continued to subsi­ dize the OSK through the Pacific W ar, but it stopped relying on that firm for overseas routes and turned to other shipping com panies.53 In addition to the continued use of these existing institutions, the Govern­ ment-General sponsored the formation of two new service enterprises for the rutrtpö, the Kanan Bank (Kanan ginkö) and the Southern Godown Com­ pany (Nan'yö Söko). They were conceived as a pair that would complement the shipping provided by subsidized OSK lines, but unlike the OSK these in­ stitutions sought to harness the resources of overseas Chinese to the Gov­ ernment-General's expansionist aims.54 In this respect, the participation of prominent Taiwanese was initially crucial to both companies for attracting Chinese support, and it made them distinctly colonial institutions. Although the Kanan Bank was a postw ar creation, the idea for it origi­ nated some years earlier, before the w artim e boom . In 1913, a successful Taiw anese tea exporter based in Java, Guo Chunyang, proposed to set up a joint Sino-Japanese bank that would bring together the capital of over­ seas Chinese w ith Japanese capital in Taiwan to finance business in Southeast A sia.55 In contrast to the BOT and Yokohama Specie Bank, this institution was to focus on long-term developm ent financing. Under Akashi and Shimom ura, this idea w as realized. An organizational confer­ ence attended by BOT leaders, representatives from the central govem 52 On this econom ic confrontation, see H iroshi Shim izu, "Dutch-Japanese Compe­ tition in the Shipping Trade on the Java-Japan Route in the Inter-w ar Period," Tönan A jia kenkyû 26, no. 1 (June 1988): 3-23. 53 Katayama, Kindai Nihon, 239. Governm ent-General subsidies did include money for a stopover in Jilong on the O SK's Bangkok line. 54 For exam ple, the initial provisional name for w hat becam e the Southern Godown Company was the Kanan W arehouse Company (Kanan Söko); N itta Risuke, Nan’yö Söko Kabushiki Kaisha jag o nen shi (Kobe: N an'yö Söko Kabushiki Kaisha, 1936), 87. 55 Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö ski, 424. On Guo, see Yoshida Seidö, Taiwan kokon zaikaijin no yokogao (Taihoku: Keizai Shunjüsha, 1932), 227-32. 174

The Tom an Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion

m ent m inistries, and Shimom ura w as held in Tökyö in 1918.56 Guo him ­ self w ent to Japan and m et w ith Prim e M inister Hara Kei the follow ing year to pitch die proposal.57 H aving persuaded die central governm ent, the prom oters then recruited Lin Xiongzheng, a m em ber of the Banqiao Lins, an old and extrem ely w ealthy Taiw anese fam ily w ith real estate and trading interests. The Lins had previously used their influence in Amoy to help the BOT set up its first overseas branch there, receiving in exchange Governm ent-General patronage when they later moved into the sugar business in Taiwan.56 Lin Xiongzheng and a group of BOT men toured the m ajor cities of South China and Southeast Asia during the summer of 1918 to drum up interest in the stock offering for the new bank am ong prom i­ nent Chinese businessm en.59 The Kanan Bank w as launched in Taihoku early in 1919, w ith a capital­ ization of ten m illion yen. Lin served as its president, and ten of the twen­ ty-tw o directors w ere Chinese. In addition to the head office in Taiw an, it eventually opened overseas branches in Burma, French Indochina, Java, Singapore, and Canton. Although the bank managed profits in the first few years, the postw ar recession and anti-Japanese sentim ent among overseas Chinese weakened it severely. A m ajor reorganization that halved the bank's capitalization was im plem ented in 1924, but the finan­ cial crises of 1927 found it still struggling. A second reorganization, w hich included a 3-m illion-yen governm ent bailout, the elim ination of three overseas offices, and another reduction in capital, follow ed in 1928.60 O ne consequence of this string of problem s w as that C hinese stock ow nership and the num ber of C hinese directors declined.61 The depar-

56 Kanan Ginkö, "Kanan G inkö" (1918), 4. 57 Muköyama Hiroo, Nihon töchika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undô shi (Tökyö: Chüö Keizai Kenkyüjo, 1987), 342. 58 Thomas B. Gold, "Colonial O rigins of Taiwanese C apitalism ," in Contending Ap­ proaches to the Political Economy o f Taiwan, ed. Edwin A. W indeier and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), 110. 59 Kanan Ginkö, "Kanan G inkö," 5 -6 . 40 Kanan Ginkö, "Kanan G inkö," 9-10. 61 The num ber of Chinese directors fell from ten in 1919 to five in 1930. Interest­ ingly, the number of Taiwanese directors and the Taiwanese proportion of stock ownership both increased. Kanan Bank Share Ownership (%) C hinese

Japanese

Taiw anese

Total

1919

48,800 (49)

23,190(23)

28,010 (28)

100,000(100)

1930

12,503(25)

14,825 (30)

22,672(45)

50,000(100)

Source: Kanan Ginkö, "Kanan G inkö," 16.

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Adam Schneider

ture of C hinese investors and depositors m eant that the bank becam e increasingly dependent on Japanese and Taiw anese sources for its cap­ ital. Lending also gravitated tow ard Taiw an and Japan. In 1930, for ex­ am ple, 81 percent of the bank's available funds and 55 percent of dis­ counting and loan activity w as w ithin Japan and Taiw an.62 The bank did not abandon its m ission to finance business in Southeast A sia, how ­ ever. On the one hand, starting in 1929, it becam e the centerpiece of the G overnm ent-G eneral's new strategy for supporting these overseas businesses through loan subsidies, and its activities as a source of inex­ pensive capital for such firm s are discussed below . On the other hand, it did dispense w ith the idea of m obilizing the capital of overseas C hi­ nese. In the 1930s, the bank shifted tow ard greater reliance on Taiw an­ ese capital, and during the Pacific W ar the BOT transferred three of its branches in Taiw an to the Kanan Bank to help it in this area.63 Thus the bank continued to pump m oney into the G overnm ent-G eneral's inter­ ests in the nanpô, but relied on Taiw anese as opposed to C hinese capi­ tal. Like die Kanan Bank, the Southern Godown Com pany w as part of the G overnm ent-General's plan to prom ote and direct econom ic expansion southward. In 1916, the Taiwan W arehouse Company (Taiwan Söko) was formed through die cooperation of die Governm ent-General, die BOT, and m ajor sugar producers, like Taiw an Sugar Com pany. Southern Godown, established in 1920 w ith a capitalization of 5 m illion yen, was in one sense an extension o f Taiwan W arehouse, w ith die latter transferring its Canton facility to the new com pany.64 In addition to the head office in Taiwan and the Canton office, Southern Godown also had storage facili­ ties in Singapore, Haiphong, Saigon, Batavia (Jakarata), and several other locations around the Dutch East Indies. As w ith the Kanan Bank, a prom ­ inent Taiw anese, Lin Xiantang, was brought in to front for the organiza­ tion and give it the appearance of a join t Sino-Japanese venture.65 Al­ though unrelated to Lin Xiongzheng, Lin Xiantang was also from an old and w ealthy fam ily. Lin had various com m ercial interests, but was m ost fam ous as a m oderate Taiw anese leader, a pragm atist who sought to pro­ m ote hom e rule in Taiw an through cooperation w ith the Japanese. Southern Godown ran into the sam e initial problem s as the Kanan Bank when the business environm ent turned sour in the 1920s. It was m ore for­ tunate in that it was able to find business w ith Ishihara when overseas

62 63 64 65

Kanan Ginkö, "Kanan G inkö," 14-15. Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 425. Ibid., 427. Ibid.

176

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar layanese Economic Expansion

Chinese failed to patronize the new firm .66 N evertheless, it still faced dif­ ficulties serious enough to require the com pany to reorganize. Ishihara H iroichirö has w ritten that BOT president Nakagawa Kojürö, who had earlier provided Ishihara w ith the loans to get his own com pany started, approached him to help Southern Godown.67 Ishihara agreed, and at a special m eeting of stockholders in 1930 the com pany's capitalization was reduced, and a bunch of new directors representing Ishihara's interests were brought in.68 Ishihara him self took a controlling interest in the com­ pany and the post of com pany advisor, but Lin rem ained as a figurehead president. The BOT also negotiated low er interest rates for the com pany's outstanding debts because Ishihara guaranteed them .69 Southern Godown ceased receiving financial support from the Governm ent-General that year, and in 1932 it moved its headquarters to Kobe, near Ishihara's base in Osaka. The com pany w as successful in the 1930s, thanks to the re­ surgence of Japanese exports to Southeast Asia follow ing the devaluation of the yen, and of course to Ishihara's continuing patronage. Southern Godown thus fulfilled its intended role as a service enterprise in Southeast Asia, although perhaps m ore as a tool of Ishihara than of the Govern­ m ent-General. In addition to setting up new sem i-official com panies, the GovernmentGeneral also developed new methods for supporting private businesses overseas m ore directly. From about 1900 the Governm ent-General had provided subsidies to further its cultural and econom ic program s in South China. These funds went under various names and included transfers to schools and for trade prom otion. The sums involved before 1914 were sm all, never m ore than 90,000 yen. Starting in that year, however, the opaque title "South China and South Seas Facilities Expenditures" (M inami Shina oyobi N an'yö shisetsuhi) was introduced for this budget item . The nam e stuck for the next three decades, and m ore im portantly the level of funding grew rapidly from the end of the First W orld W ar (Table 1). Tracing the flow of financial support from the Governm ent-General to pri­ vate corporations in general is difficult, and a com plete picture w ill prob­ ably rem ain out of reach. It is known, for exam ple, that initial capital for the Sango Company was taken from funds allocated to disaster relief,70

66 Taiwan Ginko Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 428. 67 Ishihara's original connection to Nakagawa was through Ritsumeikan Univer­ sity, where Ishihara had studied and Nakagawa had been president; Ishihara Sangyö Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Hensan Iinkai, SOgyO sanjügo nen o kaiko shite (Osaka, 1956), 71. M Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginkö shi, 428. 49 Taiwan Ginkö Shi Hensan Shitsu, Taiwan Ginko shi, 429. 70 Nakamura, "Taiw an sötokufu no Kanan tetsudö kösaku," TJ. 177

Adam Schneider

(yen)

(yen)

(yen)

1900

10,000

1912

70,000

1924

900,000

1901

10,000

1913

70,000

1925

765,000

1902

10,000

1914

70,000

1926

765,000

1903

10,000

1915

120,000

1927

765,000

1904

10,000

1916

120,000

1928

765,000

1905

20,000

1917

300,000

1929

765,000

1906

90,000

1918

600,000

1930

688,500

1907

90,000

1919

750,000

1931

585,225

1908

90,000

1920

900,000

1932

550,112

1909

70,000

1921

900,000

1933

582,682

1910

70,000

1922

900,000

1934

582,682

1911

70,000

1923

900,000

1935

582,862

T able 1: Taiwan Governm ent-General "South China and South Seas Facilities Ex­ penditures" (Minami Shina oyobi N an'yö shisetsuhi) Sources: Kondö Masami, SOryokusen to Taiwan (Tökyö: Tösui shobö, 1996), 70. Ökurashö Kann Kyoku, "Nihonjin no kaigai katsudö ni kansuru rekishiteki chösa Taiwan hen dai-roku bunsatsu no yon—furoku Taiwan töchi gaiyö," 551-52, and the appendix to Taiwan Sötokufu, "N ettai sangyö chösasho: Nanshi Nan'yô ni okeru höjin kigyö no josei" (1935), give slightly different numbers. Note:

Before 1914 this budget item had several different names.

and subsidies that went to some of the national policy and sem i-official com panies alm ost certainly found their way into private hands. A list of distributions between 1915 and 1934 does exist, however.71 This document accounts for only a portion of the total funds dispensed under the budget expenditure item ; the rest of the money w ent to support the GovernmentG eneral's cultural and other programs in South China and Southeast Asia. The inform ation on grants to com panies shows a num ber of interesting trends in the location and types of firm s supported, as w ell as their size and num ber. All of these characteristics changed around 1929, and the subsidy program after the First W orld W ar can therefore be understood 71 Taiwan Sötokufu, "N ettai sangyö chösasho: Nanshi N an'yö ni okeru höjin kigyö no josei" (1935).

178

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Javanese Economic Expansion

as divided into tw o periods around that date. Relatively few Japanese firm s in the rumpO b en efited from subsidies before 1928. Just tw elve re­ ceived money betw een 1915 and 1928, although m ost of these obtained grants for several years. W hen die Governm ent-General changed its ap­ proach in 1929 and began to subsidize com panies by paying a portion of die interest on loans extended by the Kanan Bank, the num ber of firm s in­ volved increased substantially. From about four per year betw een 1915 and 1928, the average num ber jum ped to m ore than thirty firm s annually between 1929 and 1934. The average subsidy decreased from around 15,000 to 6,000 yen as a result, despite an increase in the total value of grants handed out. The Governm ent-General did not cease direct subsi­ dies altogether, but m ost of the com panies w ere helped through loan sup­ ports. One possible reason for the shift w as that loan subsidies, w hich re­ quired firm s to pay part of the interest and all of the principal, created more discipline than direct handouts. In any case, the colonial adm inis­ tration handed out literally hundreds of grants. A variety of projects, including agriculture, general trading, lum bering, fishing, printing, and even hat m aking w ere supported across the rtanpO in both periods, but the Governm ent-General concentrated on certain re­ gions and activities in each period. Excluding subsidies to the Kanan Bank and Southern Godown Com pany, m ost of the support before 1929, meas­ ured by both the num ber and value of grants, w ent to firm s in the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo. These firm s tended to be engaged in gen­ eral agriculture and copra cultivation. In contrast, after 1928 the Govern­ m ent-General concentrated on the Philippines and M alaya, where the chief products w ere M anila hemp and gum. In the second period, ordi­ nary trading com panies and not ju st agricultural firm s also benefitted. Another change occurred in the relative im portance of the Kanan Bank and Southern Godown grants betw een the two periods. Before 1928, al­ most half of the total subsidies, m ore than 400,000 yen, w ent to Southern Godown, but as m entioned this firm received no subsidies thereafter. No grants to the Kanan Bank are listed for the first period, and a relatively sm all am ount of money w as distributed to it during the second period for research and inform ation gathering. Thus, overall Governm ent-General support moved away from these sem i-official enterprises. An increase in the total level of support and num ber of firm s, a shift from sem i-official to private com panies, and a change in approach from indirect support through service enterprises to direct support of compa­ nies producing raw m aterials characterized the evolution of the Govern­ m ent-General subsidy program across the two periods. These patterns re­ flected political and econom ic changes in Taiwan. A fter Den and Shimom ura, political leadership becam e fragm ented, w ith five different

179

Adam Schneider

governor-generals and four different civil adm inistrators betw een 1923 and 1931. A t the sam e tim e, m ajor governm ent funded projects, such as the enorm ous Kanan irrigation w orks and a large hydroelectric plant for the new ly established Taiw an Electric Power Company (Taiw an Denryoku), ran into financial difficulties. Coupled w ith the BOT debacle in 1927, such factors may have contributed to the shift in em phasis away from large, direct grants to sem i-official firm s and toward sm all grants in loan form to private firm s. M ore generally, these difficulties raised questions w ithin the Governm ent-General about w hether developing Taiw an itself or pushing econom ic expansion abroad should be given priority, but there seem s to have been no attem pt to resolve this problem before the 1930s.72

C o n c lu sio n

A cross several decades and using various m ethods and institutions, the Governm ent-General pursued the econom ic integration of Taiw an and the ttanpö. The intensity w ith w hich different adm inistrations pursued ex­ pansion also varied; Goto and Shimom ura provided m ore vigorous and aggressive leadership than Sakuma and the governor-generals of the 1920s. The G overnm ent-General's corporate proxies likew ise faced differ­ ent obstacles and follow ed different trajectories. The Sango Com pany and Southern Godown succeeded in establishing positions in Southeast A sia, w hile at the same tim e m oving away from their original patron, the Gov­ ernm ent-General. The OSK and the colonial governm ent cooperated to drive foreign shipping out of Taiwan and challenge it in coastal China and Southeast Asia. This m utually beneficial relationship lasted until the 1930s, when com petition w ith other shipping firm s in Japan and the Dutch cut into the O SK's business. The G overnm ent-General's financial institutions, the BOT and Kanan Bank, both suffered from serious prob­ lem s as a result of the postw ar retrenchm ent in the Japanese econom y and in Southeast Asian trade. W hile the BOT was not a factor again in Gov-

72 Indications can be found of Governm ent-General support for both positions. One the one hand, Tanaka Saikichi published an article in the official m agazine of the Governm ent-General advocating the developm ent of Taiwan. On the oth­ er hand, the Governm ent-General's representative to a trade conference spon­ sored in Tokyo by the M inistry of Foreign A ffairs in 1926 appealed to the central governm ent to support Taiw an's econom ic expansion into the nanpO. Tanaka Saikichi, "Taiw an shokusan ginkO setsuritsu no kyüm u," Taixvan Jihô 87 (Febru­ ary 1927): 36-39; Nagaoka ShinjirO, "Kanan shisaku to Taiwan sOtokufu," in Ni­ hon no nanpö kan'yo to Taiwan, ed. Nakamura, 237-38.

180

The Taitoan Government-General and Prewar Javanese Economic Expansion

em m ent-General expansionism until the late 1930s, the Kanan Bank overcam e this obstacle, w ith generous official support to be sure, and becam e a source of financing for num erous firm s in Southeast Asia. If the m ethods and institutions of the Governm ent-General varied, they still m anifested several long-term trends. First, there w as the general shift from South China toward Southeast Asia. This reflected the influence of different forces, from the rise of Chinese nationalism to Japan's increasing demand for tropical raw m aterials. A t bottom , Southeast Asia offered greater scope for the am bitions of the Governm ent-General. A second theme w as the m ove from official to private institutions. W ith the excep­ tion of the shipping subsidies, M eiji and Taishö era intervention w as me­ diated through official and sem i-official com panies, w hich provided in­ direct support as service enterprises. During the 1920s, the lim its of this strategy w ere exposed, and the Governm ent-General tried to reach pri­ vate enterprise directly, subsidizing producers rather than the banks and w arehouses that provided them w ith services. The achievements of the companies involved in the Government-Gener­ al's economic program were constrained by larger economic forces. Natu­ rally, among these were the general economic problems that afflicted the whole Japanese empire in the afterm ath of the First W orld W ar and again in the late 1920s. M ore specifically, however, the colonial government's do­ mestic and overseas economic programs were in a fundamental sense at odds w ith each other. The success of the Governm ent-General's domestic economic policy created a trade pattern that increasingly bound Taiwan to Japan. This was just the typical complementarity of colonial trade, w ith raw materials flowing to Japan and finished goods to Taiwan. In attem pting to move in the opposite direction away from Japan, the Government-Gener­ al's overseas program tried to integrate Taiwan w ith a region consisting mostly of other colonies producing some of the same raw materials. There w as little com plem entarity and therefore little trade. If Taiw an had been the low est cost producer of rice and sugar it m ight have been able to export these products to the nanpö, but it could not com pete w ith rice from Indochina, for exam ple, and the very existence of the Taiw anese sugar industry depended on tariff w alls protecting it from Javanese sugar. W hile total trade betw een Taiwan and China betw een 1900 and 1913 was a little less than half the size of trade w ith Japan, that fraction dropped to about one-sixth for the period 1914 to 1935.73 O f course these figures re­ flect Taiw an's total China trade and thus are an overestim ate of trade w ith South China. The trade w ith Southeast Asia was just 4 percent of the level 73 Trade figures calculated from data in Taiwan shengxingzhengzhangguangongshu tongji shih, ed., Taiwan sheng wushiyi man lai tongji tiyao (1946), 962-63,966-67. 181

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of trade w ith Japan betw een 1900 and 1913, falling to 3 percent betw een 1914 and 1935. The absolute value of Taiw an's Southeast Asia trade did increase, peaking at 17 m illion yen for com bined exports and im ports in 1920, but this m ust be m easured against trade w ith Japan on die order of 300 m illion yen. One consequence of this lack of com plem entarity was that the G overnm ent-General's efforts frequently resulted in stronger ties betw een the rnnpö and Japan rather than the rnnpO and Taiw an. The grav­ itation of Southern Godown toward Ishihara and the tendency of the sub­ sidized sm aller private firm s in Southeast Asia to send their output to Ja­ pan rather than Taiw an for processing can be understood in this context. This fundam ental constraint on Taiw an's econom ic relationship to the rnnpö only began to change in the m id-1930s. A t that point, die Govern­ m ent-General adopted a policy of industrialization for the island that em­ phasized the processing of raw m aterials from China and Southeast A sia in Taiwan, powered by new ly constructed hydroelectric capacity at SunMoon Lake. The goal was to transform Taiwan from its position as the co­ lonial periphery of the Japanese m étropole into its own industrial m étropole drawing raw m aterials from the rnnpö. Two events in 1936 marked the inauguration of this strategy. The Japan Aluminum Company (Nihon Aruminiumu) began m anufacturing aluminum w ith bauxite from the Dutch East Indies in Takao at the end of year. M ore im portantly, 1936 saw the form ation of the Taiw an Developm ent Company. As a national policy com pany, it attem pted, among other things, to secure the overseas resources necessary for industrialization in Taiw an. Both com panies en­ larged their operations through the Pacific W ar, and the Taiw an Devel­ opm ent Company in particular grew to becom e the defining econom ic in­ stitution of die final decade of colonialism in Taiw an, w ith projects stretching from Indochina to the Philippines, and from South China to Java. W hile Japanese m ilitary priorities closed down the possibility of the kind of sub-im perial sphere sought by the Governm ent-General, recent trends in Taiw anese econom ic ties w ith South China and President Lee Teng-hui's "'G o South"74 initiative for investm ent in Southeast A sia sug­ gest that die relationship of these regions to Taiw an's developm ent has not lost any of its relevance.75

74 This policy was originally referred to as the "southern advance policy" (nanjitt zhengce) and used the sam e characters as the prewar Japanese term (rnnshin seisaku), but it was later changed to "southern policy" (nanfang zhengce) to avoid any association with Japanese im perialism . See Tu Zhaoyan, Taiwan kara A jia no súbete ga mieru (Tökyö: Jiji Tsüshinsha, 1995), 144. 75 On Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia, see Xiangming Chen, 'Taiw an In­ vestments in China and Southeast A sia," Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 447-67. 182

IV. T he P ostwar L egacy of the J apanese E mpire

R esurrecting the E mpire? J apanese T echnicians in P ostwar C hina,

1945 4 9 1 -

D aqing Y a n g

"Trust is needed when you m ake use of the Japanese ... W hen they are trusted, the Japanese people w ork w ith devotion, even at the risk of their lives. This is their character. "2 These words w ere not taken from a book on Japanese culture, but w ere addressed to the Chinese N ationalist govern­ ment in late 1945 by Nishikawa Akitsugu, Toyoda's general m anager in China. These w ere truly rem arkable words when one considers the fact that such a call for trust was made shortly after the long and bloody war that cost tens of m illions of Chinese lives as a result of the Japanese inva­ sion. It would be prem ature, how ever, to dism iss these words as sim ply w ishful thinking on the part of one Japanese businessm an. Nishikawa was but one of the tens of thousands of Japanese who actually spent their early postw ar years in China to provide technical assistance. This study hopes to shed light on the activities of Japanese technicians in postw ar China in the context of both international politics and econom­ ic developm ent. W hile keeping the picture of entire China, I shall focus on those Japanese civilians belonging to the Toyoda textile enterprise in Shanghai in order to highlight the prospects and lim its of the proposed technical cooperation. In doing so, this study seeks to fill a gap in the his­ tory of Japan's relations w ith Asia in the postw ar period, w hich, in m ost standard accounts, begins w ith the Peace Treaty negotiations or the com­ m unist victory in m ainland China.3 A reader is given the im pression that the several m illions Japanese soldiers and civilians in the Asia Pacific re­ gion sim ply all packed up and w ent home w ithout a trace. That many Jap­ anese rem ained in the form er im perial outskirts (gaichi) after the collapse 1 The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support from the Yokohama Association for O verseas Exchange and the Japan international Cultural Ex­ change Foundation. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at die Dcei (M asaru) Sem inar at Keiö University, fall 1994, and at the 40th International Conference of Eastern Studies held in Tökyö, May 1995. 2 Untitled memo by Nishikawa Akitsugu (November 1945), China Textile Ma­ chine M akers Co. Papers, Q 192-23, The Shanghai M unicipal Archives, China. (H ereafter CTMM Papers.) 3 For exam ple, Tanaka Akihiko, N itcha karikei, 1945-1990 (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppantai, 1991), and Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon gaikO to Chügoku, 1945-1972 (Tökyö: Keiö Tsüshin, 1995).

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of the em pire is not only little known, but its im pact also hardly assessed.4 The only English-language study on the subject of Japanese staying on in China, described the involvem ent of Japanese m ilitary personnel in die Chinese Civil W ar in detail, but dism issed any significant role of the civil­ ians. The Chinese N ationalists failed to m ake "anything even approach­ ing adequate use of Japanese civilians in C hina," we are told, because they were "com pletely dom inated by narrow-m inded professional soldiers" and its forem ost civilian leader, T.V. Soong, often considered anti-Japa­ nese, "declined to m ake use of the Japanese."5 As this study hopes to dem­ onstrate, although the actual cooperation probably failed to accom plish its political objectives, die influence of these Japanese technicians should be regarded as an im portant, if unintended, legacy of the Japanese em­ pire.

P o litic s

Japanese Initiatives W ithin days after the announcement of Japan's surrender in August 1945, General Okamura Yasuji, com m ander-in-chief of the Japanese arm y in China and a leading China expert in the arm y, began form ulating Japan's postw ar policy toward China. Although he had vehem endy objected to surrendering the "one m illion and fifty thousand unbeaten Im perial Ar­ m y," he finally came to accept the reality of Japan's defeat. A fter consult­ ing w ith Ogura M asatsune, a well-known businessm an from the Sum ito­ mo concern then serving as the suprem e econom ic advisor to the N anjing regim e, Okamura took the unusual step to draft by him self w hat becam e known as the "O utline of Postw ar Settlem ent w ith C hina." Recognizing that China would becom e the sole rem aining pow er of East Asia, Okam u4 A search on the Diet Library CD-ROM under the subject o f "repatriation" (hikiage) turned up over 200 Japanese books acquired by the library since 1948. For a general study w ritten by a historian of m igration, see W akatsuki Yasuo, Sengo hikiage no kiroku (Tökyö: Jiji Tsüshinsha, 1991). 5 Donald G. G illin and Charles Etter, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949," Journal o f Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (1983): 497-518. See also unpublished papers by E. Bruce Reynolds, "A Thwarted Strategy: The United States and Japan's Plans for Postwar C hina" (sem inar paper, University of Hawaii-M anoa, n.d.), and David Reuther, "Repatriation of Japanese Troops and Ci­ vilians From China, 1945-1946," (sem inar paper, The George W ashington Uni­ versity, 1996). The latter two studies focused on Japanese intentions and American response, relying m ostly on declassified U.S. government sources, in­ cluding the im portant MAGIC documents—intercepted Japanese diplom atic correspondence.

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ra concluded that "Japan should contribute to the future restoration of the em pire and the reconstruction of East Asia by clearing up the m isunder­ standing betw een itself and China and by helping strengthen China wherever possible."6 Adopted at the m ilitary and political affairs liaison conference in N anjing, the O utline was sent to all Japanese consulates in China by the em bassy on 21 August and forwarded to Tokyo. Im provem ent of relations w ith China was by no m eans a new them e in Japan's A sian policy. As the w ar turned against Japan in the Pacific, Asian solidarity found new endorsem ent am ong Japanese leaders.7 N ot surpris­ ingly, this latest call follow ing Japan's surrender was echoed in Tokyo. In a dispatch to N anjing, Shigem itsu M amoru, the new foreign m inister of Japan and a long-tim e advocate of Sino-Japanese cooperation, agreed that Japan "w ill henceforth strive to foster the basis for a Japanese-Chinese co­ alition." "Before we can even hope to achieve this end," he further elabo­ rated in the telegram , "w e shall have to carefully lay the groundwork by using every possible approach open to u s."8 Sino-Japanese cooperation apparently becam e one of Japan's objectives im m ediately after the war. As a method to forge a cooperative relationship betw een Japan and postw ar China, O kam ura's O utline recommended that "w e shall dis­ patch Japanese technical experts to China on a large scale; and, in partic­ ular, we w ill develop w idely in China those branches of industry (prohib­ ited) in Japan as w ell as m ining and agricultural techniques."9 In Okam ura's view , now that Japan was defeated in w ar, the "only w ay it could provide assistance was through technology and experience."10 To government leaders of Japan, therefore, technical assistance to postw ar China was to take on political significance. Nam ely, it would becom e a 6 "W ahei chokugo no tai-Shi shori yökö" (18 August 1945), reprinted in Senryö shiroku 2: T asen to gaikôken teishi, ed. Etö Jun (Tökyö: Ködansha, 1989), 148-51. See also Okam ura's diary on 16 August, in Okamura Yasuji taishß shiryö 1 (Tökyö: Hara Shobö, 1970), 34. Now that China had replaced Japan to accom plish the "liberation of East A sia," Okamura w rote, "Japan m ust assist China to becom e strong and prosperous." 7 In addition to Akira Iriye's seminal works in English, Power and Culture (Cam­ bridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), the latest research in Japanese can be found in Hatano Sum ió, TaiheiyO sensö to A jia gaikß (Tökyö: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 19% ). 8 "Sino-Japanese Relations: Japan's China Policy" (Publication of Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Com m ander-in-Chief United States Fleet and C hief of Na­ val Operations, 2 O ctober 1945), 19-20, Record Group 457, SR H -093, U.S. Na­ tional Archives. This was largely based on English translations of ULTRA inter­ cepts of Japanese diplom atic correspondence. 9 "W ahei chokugo," 150; "Sino-Japanese Relations," 7-8. 10 When Nishikawa visited Okamura in Shanghai in April 1948, as the latter re­ corded in his diary, they agreed com pletely on policies toward postw ar China. Okamura Yasuji taishß shiryö, 21,177.

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m eans to m aintain and to strengthen Japan's influence in that country af­ ter Japan had failed in its m ilitary endeavor. Technical assistance to post­ w ar China was also seen as an econom ic incentive for Japan. Given the dire socioeconom ic condition in Japan, som e argued, em ploym ent of Jap­ anese technicians to China would help alleviate unemploym ent pressure at home. As one Foreign M inistry official noted in an internal memo, due to the rem oval of many industrial facilities for reparation as w ell as the large-scale repatriation of Japanese from overseas, considerable unem­ ploym ent am ong Japanese technicians would be expected. Therefore, he concluded, "Japan should consider how to m ake use of them [techni­ cians], especially in places long under Japanese adm inistration, such as Taiw an and Kwantung provinces [i.e. southern M anchuria]."11 In the fall o f 1945, Nishikawa Akitsugu of Toyoda subm itted a long let­ ter to T.V. Soong, prem ier of the Chinese N ationalist government. The let­ ter is w orth quoting in som e length, as it spelt out the vision of technology as the medium of Sino-Japanese cooperation: It is unfortunate that China and Japan had resorted to w ar, but since the w ar has ended this w ay, w e are now friendly neighbors. Howev­ er, Japan has benefited much from the elder [senpai] China, and has developed by learning much in fields of culture, Buddhism , m oral teachings, and business. From now on, since the w ar has ended, we m ust consider ways of repaying the debt of gratitude. W hat we are capable of doing is to serve China and its people through the textile technology, nam ely, to teach the Chinese people the technology of autom atic loom s invented by our late (founder) Toyoda S a k ich i... This is because I believe that, by transplanting Toyoda's textile tech­ nology to a revitalized China, w e can start friendly relations betw een the two peoples and open the path to coexistence and coprosperi­ ty ."12 Nishikawa Akitsugu first cam e to Shanghai in 1919, accom panying in­ ventor and founder of the com pany, Toyoda Sakichi, to assess the China m arket and to acquire the land for new Toyoda m ills. By the end of the Second W orld W ar, Nishikawa had been Toyoda's top m anager for its China operations for nearly three decades, alm ost his entire adult years. Likew ise, many other senior management or technical personnel had been in China over tw enty years. Like many Japanese long involved w ith

11 "N ik-Ka kankei seijôka ni kanrenseru shomondai oyobi kokkô shûfuku ni itaru katoki ni okeru enjo yôsei jik ö" (April 1946), 23, A 0122 6 -2 , Postwar Records, The Diplomatic Record O ffice, Japan. (H ereafter Postwar Records.) 12 Nishikawa Tatsu, ed., Nishikawa Akitsugu no om oide (Nagoya: n.p., 1964), 61-62.

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China, Nishikawa viewed the eight-year w ar betw een the tw o countries only as an aberration to a longer history of peaceful Sino-Japanese ex­ changes. His confidence in the superiority of Toyoda technology was cer­ tainly not affected by Japan's defeat in the w ar. In another letter, he re­ minded the Chinese that, having been in Shanghai throughout the war, the Toyoda technicians would be an invaluable asset to the N ationalists returning from inland China after eight years.13 Although there was no evidence that Nishikawa was acting under the orders of the Japanese governm ent, it was noteworthy that H oriuchi Tateki, Japan's m inister in China since 1942, played the role of a facilita­ tor. In fact, Nishikawa later recalled that he first learned about the possi­ bility of rem aining in China from H oriuchi, who in turn had been in­ structed to rem ain in China "to deal w ith the necessary affairs under the new situation."14 Alm ost certainly a participant of the liaison m eeting in Nanjing in August that approved the O utline, it is therefore m ore than just a coincidence that H oriuchi's view s closely resem bled the aforemen­ tioned O utline.15 A career diplom at w ith thirty years of service in China, H oriuchi him self had been a proponent of Sino-Japanese cooperation. As Horiuchi saw it, the future industrial recovery of Japan depended on both a steady supply of raw m aterial and foodstuff as w ell as a huge m arket. Since China possessed both, assistance to China in the form of Japanese equipm ent and skills was an indirect form of contribution to Japan's own recovery.16 Together w ith N ishikaw a's letter, H oriuchi w rote on his own to the Chinese governm ent to recommend Toyoda's technology. N ishikaw a's faith in Japanese technology was shared by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, form er president of the M anchurian Heavy Industry C o., who was to be in charge of all rem aining Japanese in entire northeast China. In appealing to his fellow Japanese, however, Takasaki downplayed the role of politics: W e are neither politicians nor m ilitary men. W e cam e to M anchuria as businessm en and developed industries here. However, as a result of the w ar m ost of the facilities w ere taken away by the Soviet troops. It feels ju st like our own child being taken aw ay from us. How can we abandon these enterprises in M anchuria and go home? W hy don't

13 Untitled memo by Nishikawa (November 1945), CTMM Papers. 14 Ambassador (Tani) to Foreign M inister (Shigem itsu) (26 August 1945), in SenryO shiroku, 165-67. 15 Horiuchi allegedly in turn read it in the newspaper. See his speech at a dinner in honor of Japanese technicians (4 May 1947), CTMM Papers. 16 Horiuchi Tateki, ChOgoku no arashi no naka de (Tôkyô: Kangensha, 1950), 96-97.

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w e help restore these half-dam aged enterprises and then leave? This is the duty of us technicians.17

Chinese Policies Toyoda's offer of technical assistance was welcomed by the Chinese lead­ ers. In the early spring of 1946, T.V. Soong m et w ith Nishikawa in Shang­ hai, w ith Horiuchi Tateki present. Expressing interest in N ishikaw a's sug­ gestions, Soong urged him to make a detailed proposal as soon as possible. Despite his alleged anti-Japanese stance, Soong's attitude came as no surprise. During the m eeting just m entioned, Soong w as said to have contided in Horiuchi about his disappointm ent w ith both the Soviet Unirai and the United States, w hich had concluded the Yalta Agreem ent behind C hina's back.18 A t the tim e of Japan's surrender, the N ationalist Govern­ m ent in Chongqing w as already considering "drafting Japanese POWs in China so as to expedite recovery of the industry, m ining, and transporta­ tion in the occupied areas."19 These areas, including M anchuria, PeipingTianjin area and lower Yangtze area, and Taiw an, boasted the bulk of Chi­ na's m odem economy. As soon as the N ationalists returned, the govern­ m ent confiscated all Japanese-ow ned enterprises. Although som e of them were later auctioned off to private Chinese businesses, operation o f many industrial enterprises remained a governm ent responsibility. One official reported from Nanjing that those sent from Chongqing to take over Jap­ anese facilities "know nothing about the political and econom ic situations in the occupied area and do not know how to proceed."20 Convinced that it desperately needed Japanese expertise in C hina's postw ar reconstruc­ tion, the governm ent prom ulgated "Tem porary Regulations Concerning the Use of Japanese Personnel in C hina" in late 1945. According to it, Jap­ anese w ith expertise which China currently lacked, or w hose departure would interrupt regular work or transfer operations, m ight be retained by the Chinese government. All retained Japanese m ust sign pledges that they would obey Chinese law s as w ell as their Chinese superiors. Before

17 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, M ansha no shüen (Tökyö: Jitsugyö no Nihonsha, 1953), 305. 18 Okada Akira, Hong Kong (Tökyö: Iwanami Shinshö, 1985), 51-52. The author was H oriuchi's interpreter. 19 "Chuli Riben wenti ijianshu" (Discussed at the Supreme National Defense Com­ m ittee on 12 August 1945), Zhonghua M inguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: Dui-Ri kangzhan shiqi Series 7, Vol. 4 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang W eiyuanhui Dangshi W eiyuanhui, 1981), 639. 20 Shao Yuling to Chiang Kai-shek (22 Septem ber 1945), Zhonghua M inguo, 31-32.

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conclusion of a peace treaty w ith Japan, these retained Japanese would be paid only living expenses.21 Soong's interest in N ishikaw a's suggestion also reflected the fact that the recovery of the textile industry, was arguably the m ost im portant in­ dustry for China, was high on the governm ent agenda. The num erous Japanese textile m ills confiscated by the Chinese governm ent becam e the single largest conglom erate of C hina's postw ar textile industry—The Chi­ na Textile Reconstruction Corporation (CTRC). The Toyoda m ill, long re­ garded as a "m odel m ill" because of its cutting-edge technology, was the first am ong all Japanese m ills to resum e production after the w ar.22 As an im portant com ponent, textile m achinery m anufacturing in China was now considered a "national policy." The China Textile M achinery M aker (CTMM), capitalized at 6 billion yuan, was set up to repair and manufac­ ture the m uch-needed m achinery. Private businesses supplied 60 percent of the capital, w hile the rem aining 40 percent cam e from the government in the form of the Toyota Auto Factory and another Japanese-ow ned tex­ tile m achinery factory.23 N ot all Chinese w ere in favor of retaining Japanese technicians, to be sure. To som e it w as a hum iliation having to rely on technicians from a de­ feated country; others also suspected that those Japanese who chose to re­ main in China harbored designs of econom ic aggression. Indeed, the Na­ tionalist governm ent had to w alk a fine line and to avoid being too close to the Japanese. Though preoccupied w ith econom ic and m ilitary m at­ ters, they w ere not entirely oblivious to the political im plication of Japa­ nese technical assistance for postw ar Sino-Japanese relations. Perhaps as a tactic of persuasion, the Chinese director told Japanese technicians in the northeast China that: W e w ill not treat retained (technicians) as belonging to a defeated country. We do not create inequality between Japanese and Chinese. You are chosen to carry out Sino-Japanese cooperation which is cur­ rently receiving w orldw ide attention ... No am ount of diplom atic pleasantries can com e close to such cooperation. By taking a firm first step, we can settle the past and build the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.24 21 "Zhongguo jinnei Riji yuangong zhanxin zhengyong tongze," in Ziyuan iveiyuanhui dang'an shiliao huibian—Guangfu chuqi Taiwan jin ji jianshe, comp. Xue Yueshun, vol. 1 (Xingdian, Taiwan: Guoshiguan, 1993), 14. 22 Chen Shouzhi, "Zhongfang gongsi jieguan de Rizi m ianfangchang ziliao," Zhongguo jindai fangzhi shi yanjiu ziliao huibian 9 (Septem ber 1990): 46. 23 Incidentally, Soong him self also had invested heavily in the textile industry. Rongjia qiye shiliao (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehuikexueyuan Chubanshe, 1983) II. 24 Hirajima Toshio, Rakudo kara naraku e (Tökyö: Ködansha, 1972), 244.

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American Responses It did not take long for Am erican policym akers to establish a linkage be­ tween die Japanese rem aining in China and a potential resurgence of Jap­ anese influence in its form er empire. Continued m onitoring and intercep­ tion of Japanese diplom atic com m unication provided a steady flow of dam aging evidence. In beginning of October, the Pacific Strategic Intelli­ gence Section of Com m ander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations issued a confidential study titled "Sino-Japanese Rela­ tions: Japan's China Policy," in w hich the above-m entioned O utline and other secret Japanese correspondence w ere extensively quoted.25 Al­ though the Americans accepted the right of theater com manders to retain Japanese soldiers at their discretion, they soon becam e concerned that not only soldiers but also large num bers of civilian technicians w ere retained in China. In late 1945, the Far Eastern subcom m ittee of the State-W arNavy Coordinating Com m ittee (SWNCC) proposed that the U .S. reiterate support for including Japanese civilians in the repatriation. It warned that it m ust be realized that any Japanese civilians rem aining in China w ill be secretly striving for a resurgence of Japanese pow er and in­ fluence in the Pacific area to the exclusion of W estern pow ers and w ill therefore directly jeopardize American interests in China. The danger is already apparent in the acquiescence by the Chinese Gov­ ernm ent to the retention of Japanese "technicians" in positions w hich they held during the war. The SWNCC paper w ent on to d te reports of 400 such "technicians" w orking in the Chinese governm ent agencies and thousands m ore em­ ployed in governm ent bureaus, railroad transportation, factories, and com m unication com panies in the Shanghai area alone.26 Such suspicion was corroborated by reports from Am ericans in China. "W e have reasons to believe, and evidence to show ," pointed out a ranking Am erican officer in China in early 1946, "th at the Japanese have begun a long-range pro­ gram in China designed to pit O rientals against O ccidentals. Their new idea is to grow fraternal w ith the Chinese and turn our A llies against u s."27

25 "Sino-Japanese Relations". 26 Appendix "B " of SWNCC 258 (1 February 1946) "Repatriation of C ivilian Japa­ nese from C hina," in Congressional Inform ation Service, Occupation o f Japan (m i­ crofilm published by the Congressional Inform ation Service and M aruzen C o., 1989). 27 Quoted in G illin and Etter, "Staying O n," 508.

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Such Am erican concern w as not only real, but served as the basis for U.S. policy for tim ely repatriation of all Japanese from China. During his visit to China, General W edemyer told General H o Yinging at their m eet­ ing in N anjing in O ctober 1945 that all Japanese in China should be repat­ riated by June 1946, w ith foe exception of Taiw an, w here som e Japanese technicians w ere allowed to stay till January 1947. This policy, however, encountered resistance from foe Chinese N ationalist government. Opposition to foe com plete repatriation of Japanese technicians from Chinese governm ent w as understandable, especially from the standpoint of those responsible for industrial recovery program s. A report from Tai­ wan in M arch 1946 stated that the allocated quota of 1,000 Japanese tech­ nicians w as far from sufficient for the various industries, and at least an­ other 5,000would be needed for at least five m onths. The report described the consequence of drastically reducing Japanese technicians in alarm ing term s: m ost m anufacturing would stop and equipm ent w ould be stolen. "W ith reduced production," the report w ent on, "unem ploym ent would increase and security deteriorate, perhaps even leading to riots."28 As a re­ sult, foe Nanjing governm ent decided to allow tem porary retention of 7,000 technicians and 28,000 thousand dependents in Taiw an alone.29 As the N ational Resource Com m ission reiterated to General Ho Yinqing a m onth later, retained Japanese technicians w ere indispensable to ensure continued operation of many factories and m ining facilities. As if to ward off Am erican concerns, it testified that over the m onths these Japanese "have been able to obey orders and w ork strenuously," and it was still necessary to utilize Japanese technology in this period of postw ar recon­ struction, as long as it did not harm foe [China's] national interest.30 Although A m erica's position softened som ewhat on the issue of re­ m aining Japanese technicians in China, accepting the usefulness of Japa­ nese technical expertise to C hina's postw ar reconstruction, it nonetheless urged the Chinese governm ent to retain only those Japanese whose pres­ ence was required on grounds of professional or technical abilities. A t foe same tim e, they had to dem onstrate by their past records that they did not represent any threat to the peace and security of China and w ere not likely

28 M inistry of Economy to N ational Resource Com m ission, quoting a report by Special Representative Bao Yonghe in M arch 1946, reproduced in Zñfuan wei~ yuanhui, 2. 39 Minutes of the second m eeting on retained Japanese (21 M arch 1946), in Zhengfu jieshou Taiwan shiliao huibian (Xindian, Taiwan: Guoshiguan, 1990), 609-10. 30 National Resource Commission to Commander Ho (April 1946), 2 (l)/8 8 3 7 , The Executive Yuan Papers, The Second H istorical Archives, China. (H ereafter as Executive Yuan Papers).

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to serve as an entering w edge for foe resurgence o f Japanese influence on foe Continent.31 Given foe persistent pressure from foe United States, foe Chinese gov­ ernm ent made further concessions. In June 1946 foe Chinese notified the Am erican government that it would retain som e 12,000 Japanese in China proper, excluding Taiw an and M anchuria. On 21 October 1946, an inter­ m inisterial m eeting was held at foe Departm ent of Defense to address foe m atter of Japanese technicians in China. As various m inistries that em­ ployed Japanese technicians voiced foe desire to continue such employ­ m ent, foe Foreign M inistry reminded them that due to prior agreem ent w ith foe Am erican governm ent, foe total num ber of Japanese technicians should be kept at no m ore than 12,000 and only on a tem porary basis. The m eeting did not produce new policies, but concluded that em ploym ent of Japanese technicians should be m ade on a voluntary basis and their reim ­ bursem ent should be brought to foe sam e level as foe Chinese.323

T ech n ical A ssista n ce

Technicians The total num ber of Japanese technicians and skilled w orkers in China im m ediately after foe w ar is difficult to ascertain. Am erican records show that at foe end of 1946, after nearly three m illion Japanese had been repat­ riated from China, slightly over 90,000 Japanese still remained in foe country (including Taiw an and M anchuria). N eedless to say, not all of them w ere technicians or skilled w orkers, since many w ere dependents. The w ere also a significant num ber of m ilitary personnel. A nationw ide survey by foe N ationalist governm ent around foe same tim e put foe num ber of Japanese technicians at slightly over 14,000.a3 This survey w as by no m eans inclusive, however, since many local authorities either failed to report or gave foe sm aller figure. M oreover, it did not include those Japanese in areas under com m unist control.34 (See Appendix. Japanese Technicians in Postw ar China [December 1946]) 31 Enclosure in SWNCC 258/5 (revised 25 June 1946) in Occupation o f Japan micro­ film. 32 "Guofangbu zhaokai zhengyong Riji jishu renyuan taolunhui jilu " (21 O ctober 1946), 2(1)/8838; see also M inister of Defense Bai to Prem ier Song (12 November 1946), 2 (l)/8 8 3 7 , Executive Yuan Papers. 33 See Appendix in Reuther, "Reparation of Japanese," 2. 34 Despite their rhetoric condemning the collusion between the N ationalists and Japanese m ilitarists, the Chinese communists regarded the capture of some 100 Japanese technicians when the com m unist troops took the Anshan coal m ine as

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In term s of geographical distribution, the largest concentration of Jap­ anese technicians were found in northeastern China, w hich was on its way to becom e a m ajor industrial base during the fourteen years under Japanese control. Over 10,000Japanese technical personnel, together w ith some 33,000 dependents, rem ained in that region after the first wave of re­ patriation in 1946.35 N early 1,000 Japanese worked on the railw ay alone. All of the Japanese technicians w ere organized under a special office (Riji lianluo chu), set up in M ay 1946 by the Chinese N ationalists w ithin the overall liaison office. Headed by Hirayama Fukujirö, a high official from the South M anchurian Railway Company (SM R), it had branch offices in several cities.36 A large num ber of Japanese w ere also retained in Taiw an, which had been ruled by Japan as a colony for over half a century. W ithin China proper, Shanghai saw the highest num ber of Japanese technicians because of its status as the largest com m ercial d ty , follow ed by other ma­ jor cities like Peiping and Hankow, as w ell as such industrial centers like Datong and railw ay nexus like Xuzhou.37 Those who did stay behind had different reasons. Many had lived in China for decades and w ere optim istic for its future. Som e considered their service as a form of reparation for Japan's invasion of China. Espe­ cially during the early period, many Japanese w ere not particularly eager to return to their devastated homeland and preferred the relatively good pay as prom ised by the Chinese government. A significant portion of these Japanese perhaps stayed in China against their w ill, although the ac­ tual use of force on the Chinese part was rare. Many sim ply resigned to the reality that Japan had to pay for its defeat, and som e accepted to stay so that hundreds of thousands of other Japanese could be sw iftly repatri­ ated. No doubt, efforts of persuasion by the Chinese as w ell as by Japa-

"a cause for celebration." See H irajim a, Rakudo kora, 170. For experiences of Jap­ anese technicians retained by the Chinese com m unists, som e of whom rem ained till 1954, see also M arusaw a Tsuneya, Shin Chügoku kensetsu toM antetsu C hao Shikenjo (Tökyö: N igatsusha, 1979); Hirota Közö, M antetsu no shOen to sono go (Tökyö: Seigensha, 1990). O fficial histories include M an-M ö shüsenshi, 708-22; Kan H iroshi et al., "Chükyö chiku no kinkyö," (Septem ber 1949), in Zoku-Hikiage engo no kiroku, comp. Köseishö H ikiage Engokyoku (Tökyö: n.p., 1955), 55-58; Kaneko H akase, "D arian chiku kara no hikiage ni kasuru mondai ni tsuite," and "M anshü chiku sanryüsha no ippan jökyö." See also W akatsuki, Sengo hikiage, 194-95. 35 W akatsuki, Sengo hikiage, 193. 36 H irajim a, Rakudo kara, 225. 37 "Quanguo ge diqu jieguan gongchang zhengyong R iji jishu renyuan renshu ji jishu zhongrei tongjibiao" (Decem ber 1946), 2(2)/2868, Executive Yuan Pa­ pers.

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nese like Horiuchi and Takazaki changed m any m inds am ong those who had wanted to leave.38 W hat is relatively clear is that the tens of thousands of Japanese w ere employed in China in a w ide range of fields, ranging from m anufactur­ ing, railw ay, m ining, to hospitals, schools, and even governm ent agen­ cies. In other w ords, w hat is generally grouped together as techni­ cians—jishu renyuan in Chinese, gijutsusha in Japanese—in fact consisted of different professions. W hile nearly a quarter of all Japanese technicians in early postw ar China worked in factories, many w ere adm inistrators or econom ists. Their functions also varied considerably. Many Japanese stayed on to m anage the transition from Japanese to Chinese (in Manchu­ ria and for a brief period, Soviet) control. Som e w ere retained sim ply be­ cause there was a lack of skilled persons in such fields as m edicine. Al­ though sm all in total num ber, Japanese m edical personnel was m ost w idely distributed and found in all parts of China. Som e Japanese worked in liaison offices that coordinated activities o f the rem aining Jap­ anese w ith the Chinese authorities, others taught in schools, as not a few Japanese fam ilies had children of school age. Finally, a num ber of Japa­ nese stayed on to conduct research, to teach and pass on their knowledge to the Chinese.

Anatomy o f Assistance To better understand the activities of retained Japanese technicians, it is helpful to go beyond generalizations and exam ine Toyoda's engineers headed by N ishikaw a Akitsugu in Shanghai.39 Betw een A pril and June of 1946, N ishikaw a, who had been selected to head the A ssociation of Japanese Technicians in Shanghai, held a series of frequent m eet­ ings— over sixty in all—w ith the new Chinese president of the CTMM. A fter som e initial discussion, N ishikaw a and seventeen other Japanese technicians from Toyoda agreed to stay on to w ork for the new ly found­ ed CTMM. In August 1946, CTMM w as form ally granted perm ission

38 H irota, M antetsu no shorn, 182-84; W akatsuki, Sengo hikiage, 193; H irajim a, Rakudo kara, 225-26; H oriuchi, ChOgoku no arashi, 205-6; M arusawa, Shin ChOgoku, 55-56. A num ber of publications in Japan used the term "forced " (kyöset) to describe som e circum stances, but in general, they tend to make a clear distinction betw een those taken to Siberia by the Soviet Union and those who stayed in China. M antetsukai, M antetsu shain shüsen roku (Tökyö: M antetsukai, 1997), 660. 39 For a more detailed discussion, see Daqing Yang, "Technirial Cooperation and Postwar Sino-Japanese Cooperation: Toyoda in China, 1945-1949," Transactions c fth e International Conference on Eastern Studies No. XL (1995): 132-41. 196

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from the Chinese Defense M inistry to em ploy these Japanese techni­ cians.40 One of the m ajor problem s feeing CTMM w as the fact that textile ma­ chinery in Chinese m ills cam e from different countries and m akers, thus follow ing different standards. The lack of a com mon standard posed dif­ ficulty in repairs and m aintenance. The CTMM would therefore begin w ith repairs and changes of file huge variety o f spindles in Chinese m ills, w hich w ere to be based on Toyoda's High D raft A lfa, or file so-called Ja­ pan Standard type. Then it w ould m anufacture autom atic loom s as w ell as autom atic parts. CTM M 's ultim ate goal w as to produce an entire set of textile m achinery including spinning equipm ent. The production of Toyoda autom atic loom s in China had already been planned when the Toyoda m achinery factory was set up in Shanghai in 1942. The loom s w ere abandoned, however, in favor of hand grenades and other light am m unition due to the pressing demand of the w ar.41 Al­ though CTMM was to use the designs and equipm ent from form er Japa­ nese factories in Shanghai and em ploy the rem aining technicians, for Nishikawa, cooperation from Toyoda in Japan was essential to the pro­ duction of Toyoda autom atic loom s in China. N ishikaw a's plan was to re­ quest Toyoda in Japan to make key parts of the loom s and send m achine tools as w ell as som e 100 technicians to Shanghai. As a veteran m anager and lieutenant of the venerable Sakichi, Nishikawa had a certain am ount of confidence in securing the deal. In m id-1946, Lu Chen, a Chinese engi­ neer w ith many years of experience in the textile m achinery industry, was dispatched to Japan ostensibly to w ork on reparations m atters in the Chi­ nese Delegation in Tokyo. In fact, he was to deal w ith Toyoda directly on issues relating to textile m achinery production in China. The cooperation between Toyoda and the Chinese envisioned by Nishikawa was soon encountering several obstacles. First, there were con­ siderable differences between Nishikawa and his colleagues in Shanghai on the one hand and Toyoda's leadership in Japan on the other, a fact that was only exacerbated by the difficulty in communication between the two groups throughout the period.42 The Toyoda patent was one central issue under contention. From the very beginning, Nishikawa had indicated 'Toyoda's willingness to contribute its high draft patent," which was 40 M inister o f Defense (Bai) to CTMM (24 August 1946), CTMM Papers. Altogeth­ er, twenty-two Japanese em ployees requested monthly stipends for their fami­ lies or relatives in Japan, ranging from 500 to 3,000 yen. 41 Toyoda Jidö Shokki Seisakusho Shashi Henshü Iinkai, Toyoda Jidö Shokki Seisakusho Yonjünenshi (Nagoya: n.p., 1967), 278. 42 The correspondences, it appears, had all gone through Chinese eyes before they reached the other party, if at all.

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"based on the hope that it w ill be immediately put to use in China." Since it is patented in Japan, he pointed out, its production in China w ill bring much profit to keep CTMM in operation.43 Upon hearing of sim ilar attempts by other factories in China to make Toyoda high draft spindles, Nishikawa and his Japanese colleagues proposed "resorting to legal measures to ensure CTM M 's monopoly in using the Toyoda patent".44 He told die Chinese that "J-A lfa [spindle] is patented in Japan, and nobody is allowed to copy it. Our company received the patent and changed it to C.S.(Chinese Standard)." Although he was concerned that other domestic and foreign makers would also rush to follow suit, and consequently give Toyoda headquarters head­ aches, Nishikawa nonetheless considered CTMM as the legitimate recipient of patent rights.45 On the other hand, die Toyoda leadership in Japan viewed the matter quite differently. Due to the changing conditions inside Japan, the company was undergoing reorganization and was to resume production soon under SCAP orders in 1946. Production of the best-selling automatic looms in China, let alone unconditioned use of its patented tech­ nology, was clearly not in the com pany's interest. In addition to the resistance from Toyoda in Japan, CTMM also faced a num ber of problem s at home. Som e w ere econom ic: spiraling inflation and a shortage of funds w ere causing production to be postponed several tim es. Low efficiency made things worse. In the m eantim e, this was not cooperation betw een equal partners. One could not ignore die fact that af­ ter the Japanese accepted defeat in China, public sentim ent toward Japa­ nese citizens was still largely negative, not w ithout reason. The relation­ ship betw een Japanese technicians and their Chinese counterparts w ere not alw ays smooth. But it needs to be pointed out that Chinese leaders as w ell as top m anagers of CTMM treated the Japanese technicians w ith ut­ m ost courtesy. N ishikaw a, on the other hand, was free to criticize as w ell as to advise. The relationship was thus far from that of one betw een the victorious and die defeated. In their discussions, Nishikawa gave opin­ ions on a broad range of issues including the length of w orking hours, methods of paym ent (by piece, rather than by tim e), m anagem ent-labor relations, workshop design, structure of the com pany, acceptance of or­ ders, and price calculation. The assistance by Nishikawa and his fellow Japanese technicians helped produce im pressive results. Despite various difficulties and delays, in early 1947, CTMM announced its success in manufacturing automatic spin­ dles—the Alpha High Draft based on the Toyoda m odel, which was re-des­

43 Huang-Nishikawa m eeting No. 7, CTMM Papers. 44 Huang-Nishikawa m eeting No. 59, CTMM Papers. 45 Huang-Nishikawa m eeting No. 57, CTMM Papers.

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ignated as the Chinese Standard. A year later, CTMM produced China's first automatic loom modeled after fite famed 44' G Type Toyoda Automat­ ic Loom. By the end o f 1948, the company was producing 20,000 new spin­ dles and 200 looms.46 This was a remarkable achievement for a manufac­ turer that had been established less than three years before, and Nishikawa and his fellow Toyoda technicians played indispensable roles. Already or­ ders for fite looms w ere pouring in from numerous domestic and foreign m ills. By February 1949, already some two months behind schedule, the company had a standing orders for 1,300 automatic looms.47 By early 1949, however, just as the cooperation began to bear results, it was also running into further difficulties. Peng Xuepei, Chairm an of CTMM and its chief sponsor in the N ationalist Party's Central Commit­ tee, died in a plane accident, soon to be follow ed by the loss of CTMM president, Huang Bojiao, due to illness. Two of Japanese engineers had also died of illness. Beginning in late 1948, the rem aining Japanese tech­ nicians returned to Japan one after another. W hen the People's Liberation Army began advancing tow ard the N ationalist heartland, Nishikaw a, too, took leave after nearly thirty years in Shanghai.48

C losu re a n d C au ses

Repatriation of m ost Japanese technicians from China had already been under way by then. In addition to prom ises made to the Am ericans, there were other pressures on the Chinese government. As situations in China continued to deteriorate just as conditions in Japan began to recover, more and m ore Japanese demanded repatriation. In August 1947, the Governm ent reiterated that unless there was a desperate need, Japanese technicians m ust be repatriated. Som e enterprises w ere able to find Chi­ nese replacem ents, thus no longer had to keep the Japanese. In Taiwan, many Japanese technicians w ere released from duty in early 1947 and one report indicated the num ber of Japanese greatly reduced.49 In northeast China, m ost of the retained Japanese technicians w ere released from serv­ ice by the N ationalist governm ent by the end of 1947, partly because of

46 H oriuchi, Chttgoku no arashi, 200. 47 "Z hiji Jiaohuo Jianbiao" (23 February 1949); Bunge Far East Agencies, Inc. to CTMM (27 Septem ber 1948), CTMM Papers. 48 CTMM paid $2,400 and 54,000,000 yuan respectively to their fam ilies. After re­ turning to Japan, Nishikawa spent some tim e recuperating from illness before taking up work in a Toyoda-related trading company. 49 Only 25 Japanese remained employed in petroleum , electric power, pulp, and cem ent production. See "Zai-Tai gedanwei jixu liuyong Riji renyuan m indan," in Ziyrnn vxiyuanhui, 9-13.

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Chinese replacem ents, but m ore likely for fear of leaving them to the ad­ vancing Chinese com m unists. The Japanese liaison office was disbanded in Septem ber 1947 and its members w ere repatriated in the follow ing month.50 By early 1948, the total num ber of Japanese technicians in Na­ tionalist-controlled areas had dwindled to about 1,361 (w ith 4,092 de­ pendents). The last group of sixty-six Japanese w orking on the railw ay or in pow er plants rem ained after August 1948, after w hich the Chinese com m unists took over.51 H oriuchi, a strong advocate in Japanese techni­ cal assistance to China, left for Japan at the end of 1948. A fter the establishm ent of the People's Republic of China, quite a num ber of Japanese technicians continued to w ork in China. M any med­ ical w orkers even participated die Korean W ar w ith the Chinese "Volun­ teer A rm y." A num ber of Japanese scientists horn the SM R Central Lab­ oratory supervised the construction of new plants and their initial productions. Alm ost all of them returned to Japan in 1956 by way of the first exchange of visits betw een the tw o countries. Prolonged presence of large numbers of Japanese in China as envisioned by Japanese leaders immediately after the W ar did not m aterialize, largely because it was m et with international pressure. The American insistence on removing Japanese influence from China stemmed from the fact that de­ spite their civilian status, Japanese technicians in Asia were considered de­ scendants of die empire. W hile employing hundreds of thousands of Japa­ nese as forced labor in Siberia, Soviets also pressured the Chinese to release Japanese technicians from Dalian, where some 3,500Japanese remained af­ ter die war. It was partly because Am erica's insistence; partly because die Soviets w ere keen on replacing diem w ith Soviet technicians. International factors alone could not explain the rem arkable case of Toyoda technicians in Shanghai, w here changing dom estic situations in both Japan and China w ere perhaps m ore crucial. The escalating civil w ar in China, w hile involving many Japanese on both sides, hastened die re­ patriation o f the rem aining Japanese and hence the early end of JapaneseChinese technical cooperation. A t die sam e tim e, the accelerated econom ­ ic recovery in Japan under Am erican occupation no doubt further attract­ ed Japanese technicians from overseas. It also served as a new justifica­ tion, as in the case of Toyoda in Japan, against transferring advanced Japanese technology and equipm ent to other Asian countries.52

50 H irajim a, Rakudo kara, 248-49,275-78. 51 M an-M ö shüsenshi, 695-97. 52 For a discussion of im plications of U.S. policy change, see Nishikawa H iroshi, "Am erika no tai-N ichi seisaku no tenkan to Chûgoku no dôkô," Keizaigaku Kenkyü 43, no. 4 (1994): 73-92.

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S ig n ific a n c e

Although China probably had retained die largest num ber of Japanese technicians after the w ar, it was by no m eans the only country to do so. Japanese technicians w ere also found in other parts of die form er em pire in the im m ediate postw ar era. In Pyongyang alone, for exam ple, over 2,000 Japanese technicians and skilled w orkers w ere registered in early 1946. To coordinate their activities, a Japanese section was set up w ithin die N orth Korean Industrial Technology A ssociation (Kita ChSsen Kögyö Gijutsu Renmei Nihonjin Bu). As of m id-1947, over 400 Japanese techni­ cians, many w ith fam ily m em bers, w ere still w orking in m ines, factories, hospitals, and schools in the northern half of the Korean peninsula.53 Just as the repatriation of nearly seven m illion Japanese from overseas follow ing the w ar w as a logical consequence of Japan's collapsed em pire, the continued presence of tens o f thousand of technicians in various parts of Asia w ell after its dem ise m ust also be seen as one of its m ultifaceted legacies. W hat was its historical significance? W as retaining Japanese technicians an adm ission that the Chinese w ere not qualified to adm inis­ ter these areas, as George Kerr said about Taiwan?54 Does it dem onstrate that Japan w as now dedicated to assisting its A sian neighbors? O r yet an­ other exam ple of the residual benefits of the Japanese Empire? Though defeated in the w ar, Japan still possessed considerable techno­ logical strength com pared to its A sian neighbors.55 The presence of tens of thousands of Japanese technicians in China and Korea was a result of ex­ tensive econom ic and industrial developm ent in the em pire and reflected Japanese control of the industries and exploitation of the natural resourc­ es in occupied areas and colonies. Therefore, it was often im possible for these enterprises to function w ith the sudden w ithdraw al of Japanese technical experts.56 In this sense, China continued to be dependent on Ja­ pan technologically even after its declared victory. Such technological de­ pendence was obvious to Japanese and Chinese leaders as w ell as to the 53 M orita Yoshio, Chosen shQsen no kiroku (Tökyö: Gannandö, 1964), 758-808. 54 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (New York: De Capo Press, 1965), 116. 55 In fact, the Soviets also dem onstrated much interests in the scientific research at the SM R Central Laboratory and a delegation from the Academy of Sciences vis­ ited the institute in 1946. See Marusawa, Shin Chügoku, 15-31; Hirota, M antetsu no shQen, 64-66. Sim ilarly, the United States, Britain, as w ell as the Soviet Union, acquired much German technology during the early postwar period. See John Gim bel, Science, Technology and Reparation: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), and John Farquharson, "Governed or Exploited? The British Acquisition o f German Technology, 19451948," Journal o f Contemporary H istory 32, no. 1 (1997): 23-42. 56 Man-MO shûsenshi, 693.

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Paging Yang Japanese technicians them selves, although they exploited it for different purposes. Although die presence of Japanese technicians in postw ar China was a short-lived one, tw o areas seem particularly fertile for future explora­ tions.

Technological Legacies Technology transfer, as Daniel Headrick has pointed out, was part of W estern colonialism in the Third W orld. The experience of Nishikawa and other Japanese technicians in postw ar China shows that die sam e process was at w ork after the dem ise of Japanese im perialism in A sia.57 Toyoda's technicians played ju st such a role. The lasting im pact of this short period of technical cooperation could be seen in w hat has been de­ scribed as the "astonishingly rapid recovery" of C hina's textile industry after 1949, despite the fact that im ports of Japanese m achinery w ere cut off due to trade restrictions. In fact, in the m id-1950s, die People's Repub­ lic of China even began exporting textile m achinery to Southeast Asia and Eastern European countries. In 1958, for exam ple, China agreed to help build textile m ills in Burma and provide all die necessary equipm ent. Not surprisingly, it becam e a m atter of concern in Japan.58 It is possible to at­ tribute the phenomenon of post-Second W orld W ar industrial grow th to the existence of the Japanese textile industry in China before die w ar—the so-called Zaikabö.59 Obviously, in the Toy oda episode at least, the early postw ar years played an im portant link that is com monly underacknowl­ edged. By using the Toyoda model as the basis for the new CTMM pro­ duction, Nishikawa succeeded in bringing postw ar Chinese textile ma­ chinery on a Japanese track, so to speak. Furtherm ore, Toyoda's conduits to Chinese textile industry by no m eans ended w ith the departure of its technicians. Personal ties formed before and during this period w ith Chi­ nese textile industrialists who later moved to Hong Kong and Taiwan helped future Toyoda sales to those areas.

57 Daniel H eadrick, Tentacles o f Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age o f Imperial­ ism, 1850-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Recently, the issue of technology transfer in the early postw ar transition has also been raised by Jap­ anese scholars. See Imura Tetsuo, "Sorengun no Töhoku shinkö to sengo Chügoku Töhoku no sangyö," unpublished paper. 58 Töa Keizai Kenkyükai, Shin Chügoku no tikai kôgyô (Tökyö: Töa Keizai Kenkyükai, 1960), 184-185. 99 Kiyokawa Yukihiko, "Chügoku sen'i kikai kögyö no hatten to Zaikabö no ig i," in Keizai Kenkyü 43, no. 1 (1983): 22-39.

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Although further study of other industries are needed, Toyoda's expe­ rience was certainly not unique. For exam ple, Japanese scientists from the South M anchurian Railw ay's Central Laboratory played im portant parts in utilizing their research in many chem ical, pharm aceutical, m ining, and other industrial enterprises in China.60

Political Implications H ie other area w orth further study is the im pact of such technical assist­ ance on the overall bilateral relations betw een Japan and China. To H oriuchi, for instance, the benefits of Toyoda's assistance on Sino-Japanese re­ lations outweighed any possible negative repercussions on the Japan's textile m achinery industry.61 The attem pt to use Japanese technicians in postw ar China as agents of resurgent Japanese influence in Asia, as envi­ sioned by Okam ura, Shigem itsu and other Japanese leaders, did not pro­ duce intended results. The short-lived technical cooperation certainly af­ fected both Japanese and Chinese and their attitudes toward each other. In this sense, Japanese like Nishikawa were not only providing technical assistance to China; Nishikawa was also influencing postw ar C hina's per­ ception of Japan through his devotion to work and his belief in a special Sino-Japanese relationship. Although it is difficult to assess the exact im­ pact, the fact that Chinese leaders such as T.V. Soong and other ranking officials w ere among his direct and indirect contacts is significant. Ac­ cording to H oriuchi, even the Chinese press reversed its earlier skepti­ cism and offered favorable coverage when CTMM succeeded in produc­ ing the new loom s, even publishing N ishikaw a's photograph.62 In term s of its long involvem ent in China and its closeness to C hina's government after the w ar, the Toyoda case was perhaps exceptional. But there is abundant evidence that in northeast China, ranking Chinese offi­ cials such as Zhang Gongchuan (Chang Kia-ngau) also regularly consult­ ed Japanese experts on industrial, financial, and agricultural recovery af­ ter the departure of Soviet troops.63 T.V. Soong, after touring Taiw an, was reportedly very im pressed w ith the Japanese achievem ents and asked 60 61 0 63

For details, see H irota, M m tetsu no shorn, and Marusawa, Shin ChOgoku. H oriuchi, ChOgoku no arashi, 200. H oriuchi, ChOgoku no arashi, 206-7. See m eetings of Zhang Gongquan (Chang Kia-ngau) with Japanese technical ex­ perts, recorded in his diaries dated 2 5 ,2 7 ,2 8 ,3 0 June; 8 ,1 2 ,1 3 July; 1 4 ,1 6 ,1 7 ,2 0 , 28,31 August; 2 ,2 6 Septem ber; 10,27 O ctober; 1 7 ,2 7 ,2 9 ,3 1 January; 13 Febru­ ary. Yao Songlin, comp. Zhang Gongquan xianshen nianpu chugao (Taibei: Zhuanji W enxue Chubanshe, 1982). For a partial English translation, see Lost Chance in M anchuria (Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994). Also Man-MO shOsenshi, 693-721.

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H oriuchi to organize a group of Japanese technicians to assist econom ic developm ent of die Hainan bland .64 On the other hand, a num ber of Jap­ anese not only rem ained interested in Chinese affairs, but put their Chi­ nese connection to use after returning to Japan. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who oversaw Japanese technical assistance in form er M anchuria during the years after the w ar, w as one. A fter serving as m inister o f the Japanese M inistry of International Trade and Industry, he would later play an im­ portant role in setting up w hat becam e known as the L-T memorandum trade betw een Japan and China.65 Hagiwara Teiji, a chem ist from SMR Central Laboratory who stayed on in China, becam e actively involved in postw ar trade w ith China soon after his return to Japan in 1954.66 Here one should not oversim plify the com plex variety of circum stanc­ es. There also seem ed to be considerable differences as to how such expe­ rience affected the Japanese. A Japanese governm ent survey of repatriat­ ed Japanese from M anchuria in late 1946 revealed a w ide range of view s am ong those returned Japanese technicians. W hile a few acknowledged the Chinese (and Soviet) support, m any com plained about their condi­ tions. On the issue of Sino-Japanese cooperation, the opinion w as sharply divided. W hile many supported the idea and were w illing to offer Japa­ nese special sk ilb , a few m aintained that such cooperation could succeed only when Japanese w ere in positions of guidance.67 U ltim ately, then, this study suggests that the period im m ediately after the w ar was far from being "years of no significance," but was instead filled w ith both opportunities and uncertainties. Though defeated in w ar, many Japanese— both governm ent leaders as w ell as ordinary citi­ zens—sought to construct new types o f relationship w ith its A sian neigh­ bors. Even though technical assistance to China w as cut short due to a com bination of dom estic and international factors, Japanese technicians in postw ar China w ere already m aking the transition to a post-im perialist w orld in w hich Japan would excel.

64 H oriuchi, Chügoku no arashi, 200-203. During the w ar, Japan had began to devel­ op its much-deeded resources, such as rice, rubber, sugar on the island, which, Horiuchi believed, continued to be im portant to Japan after the war. 65 Soeya, Nihon gaikO, 162-67. 66 See his rem iniscence in Marusawa, Shin Chügoku, esp. 188. 67 Kanrikyoku Zaigai H ôjin-ka, "M anshû hikiagesha no kansô oyobi kibô ni tsuite no chösa" (12 December 1947), 1103-14, in K-0001, fram es 1103-14. Postwar Records. Undoubtedly, such sentim ent had m anifested in arrogance on the part of some Japanese technicians, which led to further friction w ith the Chinese. See an exam ple of this reported in G illin and Etter, "Staying O n," 509-10.

204

Compiled by the Second Department, ROC M inistry of Defense (14 December 1946) Note: A ll figures based on reports by various m ilitary, governm ental, and other agencies before 14 Source: RG2(2), File 2868, No. 2 H istorical Archives, Nanjing, China.

Japanese Technicians in Postw ar China

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Appendix

205

In

Shadow of the M onolith: Y oshida Shigeru and J apan ' s C hina P olicy D uring the E arly C old W ar Y ears, 1 9 4 9 -5 4 the

G W . B r a d d ic k

" I do not think it w ill affect Japan very m uch."1 W hen Prim e M inister Yoshida Shigeru made this statem ent before the House of Representatives Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee on 22 February 1950, he was of course referring to the freshly m inted Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, A lliance, and M utual A ssistance. One could argue that this pact represented only the latest tw ist in a "regional triangle of tension [which] had pitted Russia, Japan, and China against each other through ... three-quarters of a century of confrontation and conflict."2 Certainly, from the signatories' point of view , the Alliance—like its predecessor con­ cluded in 1945—w as, at least in part, a legacy of the Japanese Em pire in East Asia. The treaty's pream ble was explicit: it was directed at prevent­ ing "d ie revival of Japanese im perialism and the resum ption of aggres­ sion on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way w ith Japan."3 In M cCarthyite W ashington, however, in the wake of the "loss of C hina," the alliance w as interpreted as a further act of aggres­ sion against the United States. Even the State Departm ent, which had ear­ lier pursued a m ore flexible policy toward China, could only conclude that M ao Zedong had now "attached China to the Soviet chariot."4 Thus was the m yth of "m onolithic com m unism " bom . It has recently been observed that "w hen Mao Zedong openly leaned to one side and concluded an alliance w ith the Soviet Union in February, 1950, the chances that Tökyö and Beijing would establish anything like strong ties of friendship becam e very sm all indeed. Very rarely does the friend of one's enem y becom e one's friend."5 During the last years of the 1 Asahi Shinbun, 23 February 1950. 2 Allen S. W hiting, Siberian Development and East A sia: Threat or Promise? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 3. 3 See Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, M ao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260. 4 Clubb to Kennan, 25 April 1950, cited in M ichael Schaller, The American Occupa­ tion tíf Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 188. s Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the G ift: The Im pact of the Korean W ar on Ja­ pan," Journal o f American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 1 (spring 1993): 36.

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Occupation, the Japanese w ere indeed under enorm ous pressure to adopt the Cold W ar perspectives of their Am erican overseers, but as w e shall see, m ost drew a clear distinction betw een M oscow and Beijing. To them the Chinese w ere akadaikon: like the radish, their "redness" was only skin deep.6 Toward "N ew C hina," popular sentim ent w as still dom inated by a sense of w ar guilt, w hereas Stalin's opportunism during the last week of the Pacific W ar had redoubled tire traditional hostility felt for Russia. There w as nothing feigned about Yoshida's declared indifference to the Sino-Soviet A lliance. As a career diplom at who had seen extensive service in prew ar China, he was convinced that a Sino-Soviet rift w as inevitable, and believed that the process could be accelerated by building ties to Be­ ijing, as the m ore vulnerable of tire two to seduction by the W est.7 Yoshida persistently sought to persuade tire British and Americans of the virtues of this "th esis," but after 1950 his optim ism was increasingly dism issed at home and abroad as m ere "w ishful thinking." Yoshida is w idely credited w ith having laid the foundations o f postwar Japanese foreign policy during his seven-year reign as prem ier, yet he re­ m ains an enigma. His China policy, in particular, continues to arouse in­ tense debate. How, for instance, does one reconcile the view that "Yoshida remained a staunch supporter of the Chinese N ationalist government on Taiwan until his death," w ith his having "fought a vigorous, rear-guard action against the American peace-treaty negotiator, John Foster Dulles, in order to avoid recognizing the Taipei government instead of the Beijing governm ent."8 W ere Yoshida's m otives in prom oting his "th esis" strate­ gic, as he claim ed, or m ercantilist, as those w ho credit him w ith being the originator of seikei butiri (the separation of econom ic from political rela­ tions) would assert.9 Is it true that: "Throughout the postw ar period he never abandoned his private conviction that at some future tim e, after the Sino-Soviet alliance had collap sed ... the two great East A sian powers [Ja­

6 See Richard Ston y, "Som e Aspects of Social Change in Japan," in Symposium on Economic and Social Problems o f the Far East, ed. E.F. Szczepanik (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962), 440. 7 Yoshida joined the Foreign M inistry in 1906. He served in Mukden (Shenyang) during 1907-8, was appointed consul in the port of Antung (Andong) in 1912, and the follow ing year becam e secretary to the governor-general of Korea. From 1922-25 he was consul-general in Tientsin (Tianjin) and then held the same post in M ukden until the beginning of 1928. Japan, An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tökyö: Kodansha, 1993), 1757. 8 Janet Hunter, Concise Dictionary o f M odem Japanese H istory (Tökyö: Kodansha In­ ternational, 1984), 251, and Chalmers Johnson, "The Patterns o f Japanese Rela­ tions with China, 1952-82," Pacific A ffairs 59, no. 3 (fall 1986): 403. 9 George Jan, "The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Toward Communist Chi­ n a," W estern Political Quarterly 22 (summer 1969): 605.

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pan and m ainland China] could resum e their natural historical relation­ ship."10 If so, then w e are still left to ponder the extent to which the prim e m inister's private view s motivated official policy, for his biographer still m aintains that, "Yoshida never mounted a serious or sustained campaign to prom ote a m ore enlightened China policy by the United States."11 This is a study of diplom atic history w ithout diplom atic relations. For­ tunately, recently declassified docum ents in the diplom atic archives in Tökyö, W ashington, London, and Canberra are throw ing new light on the thinking behind the Japanese governm ent's China policy during the Cold W ar, but w e cannot confine ourselves to the as-yet-incom plete official record. This study w ill also draw on contem porary published m aterials and an array of secondary sources in English and Japanese in an attem pt to resolve the contradictions outlined above and to answ er one funda­ m ental question: to w hat extent did Japanese policy-m akers' view "N ew C hina" through the prism of old China, or alternatively, to w hat degree w ere their perceptions shaped by the encroaching Cold W ar, represented by the Sino-Soviet alliance? The approxim ately five-year period from 1 O ctober 1949, when the People's Republic of China was proclaim ed, until 10 Decem ber 1954, when Yoshida was forced from office, can be divided into three unequal segm ents, according to the degree to w hich he actively pursued the "Yoshida thesis." The first phase spanned m ost of Yoshida's second term as prim e m inister of Occupied Japan. Initially, the "Yoshida thesis" en­ joyed the support of a near consensus of international anti-com m unist opinion, but it was gradually eclipsed by John Foster D ulles's "hard w edge" strategy—prom oting a rift by increasing Chinese dependency on the Soviets rather than reducing it—at least in the policy councils of W ashington. The second phase, a two year hiatus, lasted until M ay 1954, and the final phase, covering Yoshida's last eight m onths in office, saw him make a futile attem pt to revive his "th esis."

B ir th o f th e " Y o sh id a T h e sis "

As early as Novem ber 1948, Yoshida Shigeru, recently restored to the pre­ m iership, reportedly view ed: "w ithout any anxiety the possibility of a to­ tal [seizure] of China by the com m unists." This was reportedly because he believed that a com m unist Chinese regim e would soon prove as nation­ alistic and xenophobic as its predecessors, and thus rather than contrib­ 10 John W elfield, Empire in Eclipse (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), 41. 11 John Dower, Japan in War and Peace (New York: The New Press, 1993), 233.

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uting to Soviet pow er in Asia, would actually dim inish it. He also appar­ ently argued that Sino-Japanese ties could be rebuilt to die benefit of both.12 American thinking at düs tim e tended to confirm Yoshida's assessm ent that "Titoism in C hina" w as a realistic prospect. In M arch 1949, official United States policy aim ed to "augm ent, through perm itting restoration of ordinary econom ic relations w ith China, such forces as m ight operate to bring about serious rifts between Moscow and a Chinese Com munist regim e."13Som ewhat contradictorily, however, W ashington now extend­ ed export controls to include China—albeit less severe than those im­ posed on the Soviet Union—and GHQ in Tökyö applied these to Sino-Jap­ anese trade.14 Yoshida repeatedly made clear his opposition to all such restrictions, for instance, telling CBS journalist, W illiam Costello, in M ay 1949: I don't care w hether China is red, w hite or green, we are w illing to do business w ith her. China is our neighbor. There is a danger that trade betw een our countries m ight be perm anently cut, but I believe that we shall eventually transcend ideological differences and progress together.15 It w as noted in W ashington "how distinctly assertive, unified, and confi­ dent the Japanese appeared on this issue, as com pared to the alm ost cow­ ering rem arks on foreign policy that usually em anated from Tökyö."16 That sum mer, w hile die pro-m ainland trade lobby in Japan was busily getting itself organized, the Chinese com m unists sent a sm all trade m is­ sion to Japan.17 It bore no fruit, but by year's end, Yoshida's trade m inis­ ter, Inagaki H eitarö, was confident enough to set a target for C hina's share

12 Schalter, The American Occupation, 188. Unfortunately, he does not offer any source to support these observations. 13 NSC 41, "U S Policy Regarding Trade with C hina," Foreign Relations o f the Unit­ ed States [H ereafter FRUS], 1949, IX, 826-34. 14 Yasuhara Yoko, "Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, 194852," Journal o f Diplomatic H istory 10, no. 1 (winter 1986): 81-82. 15 W illiam Costello, "Could Japan Go Com m unist?" Nation 168, no. 20 (14 M ay 1949): 534. See also Schaller, American O ccupation, 188-89, and Reinhard Drifte, The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-52 (Ripe, E. Sussex: Saltire Press, 1983), 128. 14 Schaller, American Occupation, 189. 17 The non-partisan Diet M em bers' League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade (NitchQ Böeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) was established that summer with Progressive Party Secretary General Tomabechi Gizö as chairm an and an initial membership numbering about ninety. This was soon followed by the Sino-Jap­ anese Trade Promotion Association (NitchQ Böeki Sokushin Kai) led by Sugi M i-

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of Japan's total foreign trade of between one-quarter and one-third—sig­ nificantly greater than during the 1930s.18

The "Yoshida Thesis" in Retreat Even after die establishm ent of the PRC on 1 October 1949, W ashington in theory remained w illing to allow Japan "to m aintain norm al political and econom ic relations w ith fite com m unist bloc and, in the absence of open hostilities, resist com plete identification either w ith fite interests of the United States or Soviet U nion."19 O ver fite next tw elve m onths, however, under the triple im pact of the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet A lliance, the outbreak of fite Korean W ar, and C hina's subsequent intervention there­ in, the optimism of the spring gradually evaporated, to be replaced by a fear of losing Japan as w ell.20 Yoshida's thinking did not undergo any such transform ation. A t w orst he thought the Sino-Soviet alliance m ight delay Japan's peace treaty 21 He remained convinced that "C hina would never becom e a slave to the K rem lin." Yoshida's reasoning seem ingly owed m ore to racial prejudice than rational analysis: Referring to centuries of Chinese history, the character of the Chinese people, their consistent successes in the past in thwarting efforts at dom ination or absorption, and their superiority to the Russians in in­ telligence, cleverness and political astuteness, he declared that he had every confidence in the outcom e. The Chinese, he concluded, w ill be "too much for the R ussians."22

chisuke of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce. See M akiko Ham aguchi-Klenner, China Images o f Japanese Conservatives (Hamburg: M itteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 1981), 71; Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 241; R.K. Jain, China and Japan, 1949-80 (Oxford: M artin Robertson, 1981), 26. 18 New York Times, 25 November 1949, cited in Schalter, American Occupation, 189. The average figures for 1930-39 were 21.6 percent of Japanese exports and 12.4 percent of im ports according to Japan's M inistry of Finance. Okita Saburo, "Sino-Japanese Trade and Japan's Economic Grow th," in Szczepanik, Symposium, 158. The actual figures for 1949 were 0.6 percent of Japanese exports and 2.3 per­ cent of im ports. Gaim ushö, Nitchü böeki nogenjö (Tökyö: 1969). 19 Howard Schonberger, Aftermath o f War (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 152. 20 Schalter, American Occupation, 190. 21 Asahi Shinbun, 23 February 1950. 22 Memorandum of Conversation [H ereafter MC], Yoshida and Cloyce Huston, 8 April 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 1167.

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Such view s remained widespread in Japan. Just tw o days after the alli­ ance was signed, Asahi Shimbun claim ed that "Com m unist China is al­ ready considering itself the leader of the union of socialist nations in Asia. China thinks that this union should be independent of the Soviet Union and should stand on an equal footing."23 Yoshida w as under increasing pressure to hasten the end of the Occupation and spur stagnating SinoJapanese trade. A m ulti-party resolution, adopted by the House of Coun­ cillors at the end of A pril, anticipated W ashington's de facto recognition of Beijing and called on the governm ent to "leave aside ideological and political differences and ... exchange econom ic m issions w ith the new C hina."24

The Korean War The outbreak of the Korean W ar caused the Trum an adm inistration not only to defer indefinitely any prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift, but also to dow ngrade b elief in its own ability to influence the process.25 Sim ilarly, the Japanese Foreign M inistry issued a statem ent w hich presupposed the existence of a "m onolithic com m unism " by suggesting a link be­ tw een N orth K orea's invasion of the south and the earlier signature of the Sino-Soviet alliance.26 N ot every Japanese diplom at shared this view . A fter reports of C hina's "volunteer arm y" intervening in the con­ flict w ere confirm ed in late N ovem ber, W ajim a E iji, head of the m inis­ try 's C ontrol Bureau (K anrikyoku), privately w arned the A m ericans that "th e Japanese ... w ould be apathetic to an attem pted invasion by the Soviets but w ould resist such an attem pt if m ade by the C hinese com m unists alon e." H is explanation for the differentiation w as sim ple, in the form er case, "th e Japanese w ould feel that they had better leave 23 Asahi Shinbun, 16 February 1950. See also Hongö Gaichi, "Soren to Chükyö no kyokutô seisaku," Chüô KOron 65, no. 3 (M arch 1950): 81. 24 Ishikaw a Tadao, N akajim a M ineo, and Ikei M asaru, eds., Sengo shiryO: N itchû kankei (Tökyö: N ihon H yöronsha, 1970), 23, and Gordon Chang, Friends and Enem ies (Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press, 1990), 73. Yoshida im m ediately responded by secretly despatching Finance M inister Ikeda H ayato to W ash­ ington in an effort to persuade the United States to end the O ccupation as soon as possible. The proposal w as discussed in W ashington at the highest levels, but no official response w as forthcom ing. W elfield, Em pire in Eclipse, 46 -4 7 ; M ichael Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco P eace Settlem ent (New York: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1983), 34; and Schalter, A m erican O ccupa­ tion, 257-58. 25 Chang, Friends and Enemies, 80. 26 "Statem ent issued by the Foreign M inistry for the purpose o f clarifying Japan's position in the Korean conflict, 19 August 1950," Contemporary Japan 19 flu ly Septem ber 1950): 463-69.

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such resistance to the O ccupation forces," w hereas in the latter in­ stance, "th e long-standing enm ity existing betw een die Japanese and C hinese w ould be sufficient to cause them to resist."27 Yoshida, m ean­ w hile, continued to publicly dow nplay the seriousness of any com m u­ n ist threat to Japan, telling the D iet the follow ing m onth, "W e do not have the slightest expectation that the com m unist countries w ill invade Jap an ."28 The A m ericans lacked Yoshida's certitude. In Decem ber 1950, ju st nine months after General Headquarters (GHQ) had form ally authorized Jap­ anese trade w ith the PRC, W ashington embargoed all exports to China.29 W ith no choice but to com ply, Japanese trade w ith the m ainland plum­ m eted.30 Yoshida raised the em bargo question w ith Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles at the end of January 1951: [He] spoke of the long-term necessity of trading w ith China, and w hile he realized that in view of [the] present com m unist dom ination of that country it would not be possible to expect great results in the near future, nevertheless, he believed that in the long run the Chinese would adopt the attitude that "w ar is w ar and trade is trade" and that it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place be­ tween Japan and China.31 This w as perhaps the first tim e that Yoshida gave voice to a concept later to be called seikei bunri. It is im portant to note, however, that he was rec­ ommending such a policy for China, not Japan. Tökyö w as to use trade for covert, strategic purposes: "Japanese businessm en because of their long

27 MC, W ajima and Richard Butrick (Director General Foreign Service), 15 Decem­ ber 1950, 794.00/12-1550, Record Group 59, N ational Archives, W ashington D.C. [H ereafter NA.] W ajima was a senior diplom at with m ore than twenty years service, including the period from July 1937 to October 1943 in China. GaimushO nenkan, (Tökyö: Gaim ushö, 1961), 567. 28 John Dower, Empire and Aftermath (Cambridge, M ass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), 391. Follow ing the im plem entation of the "Red Purge," Yoshida w as also able to declare: "A s far as the Japanese skies are concerned, the Red star is receding," Yoshida Shigeru, "Japan and the C risis in A sia," Foreign A ffairs 29, no. 2 (Jam 1951): 179. 29 Jain, China and Japan, 27. 30 From a postw ar high of $19.6 m illion in 1950, exports fell to $5.8 m illion the fol­ lowing year, and were ju st $600,000 in 1952. Im ports followed a sim ilar plunging trajectory. Chae-Jin Lee, Japan Faces China (Baltim ore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 144. See also Howard Schonberger, "John Foster Dulles and the China Question in the Making of the Japanese Peace Treaty," in The Occupation o f Japan: The International Context, ed. Thomas Burkman (N orfolk, Virginia: MacArthur M em orial, 1984), 234. 31 MC, Yoshida, Dulles, and Sebald, 29 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 827-28. 213

C . W. Braddíck

acquaintance w ith and experience in China, w ill be the best fifth column of dem ocracy against the Chinese com m unists," Yoshida claim ed.32 Such talk, however, sim ply m ade the A m ericans m ore nervous about a future sovereign Japan, w hich the CIA had already labelled "opportunis­ tic."33 Thus, on 23 A pril, D ulles extracted an oral pledge from Yoshida not to sign a separate peace treaty w ith the mainland .34 Even so, right up until his departure for San Francisco, he kept on trying to sell his "th esis" to an­ yone who w ould listen.35

San Francisco and the "Yoshida Letter" W hen the San Francisco Peace C onference convened in Septem ber 1951, A nglo-A m erican differences m eant that neither Beijing nor Taipei w as represented.36 Yoshida carefu lly avoided the issue o f w hich regim e Tökyö w ould recognize. H is speech—extensively rew ritten by the A m ericans—claim ed that "th e role of C hinese trade in [the] Japanese econom y ... has often been exaggerated."37 On his return to Tökyö, Yoshida initially tried to tem porize in the face o f harsh D iet questioning concerning a peace treaty w ith C hina.38 H ow ever, on 29 O ctober, Yoshi­ da indicated a w illingness to place relations w ith M ao and Chiang on an equal footing. Specifically, he expressed an interest in opening an overseas office in Shanghai (like the one about to open in Taipei) and said he w ould w elcom e a com m unist C hinese office in Tökyö if its sole purpose w ere to prom ote trade.39

32 MC, Yoshida, Dulles, and Sebald, 29 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 827-28. Yoshida subsequently withdrew this form ulation. MC, Yoshida, and Sebald, 20 February 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 828. 33 Memorandum by CIA, N IE-19, "Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Associ­ ation with U S," 20 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, V I, 998-99. 34 MC, Yoshida to Dulles, 23 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, P t l, 1316. 35 R.G. Casey to Sir Arthur Tange, "Copy Personal Diary Entry of Talk w ith Yoshi­ da in Japan in [7 August] 1951," 9 December 1959, A 1 8 3 8 /2 8 0 -3 1 0 3 /1 0 /1 0 /2 , Australian Archives, Canberra [H ereafter AA], and Murphy, AmEmbTok, to Dept, of State [H ereafter DOS], "The China Policy of an Independent Japan", 13 May 1952,693.94/5-1352, NA. 36 Britain's Labour governm ent had extended recognition to the PRC in January 1950. For a recent study, see Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the hum, and the Eagle: Q tinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994). 37 R.K. Jain, Japan's Post-W ar Peace Settlements (New Delhi: Radiant, 1978), 372. 38 AmEmbTok to DOS, 23 October 1951,694.001/10-2351, Enc. in Perkins to Rusk, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1389. 39 Vice Foreign M inister Iguchi, when later "discussing these rem arks w ith Am­ bassador Sebald, term ed them 'indiscreet' rather than m isleading or a political 214

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The China Lobby in W ashington was reportedly furious, believing Yoshida had reneged on his earlier prom ises.40 A t die sam e tim e, a State Departm ent paper inverted the logic of the "Yoshida thesis" to argue that "[increasing Chinese] dependence on the Soviets for econom ic necessities is m ore likely to work in our favor than against us by hastening the day when China becom es disillusioned w ith Russian aid ."41 The so-called hard wedge strategy w as bom . O ther officials feared that a Sino-Soviet rift m ight ultim ately lead to the developm ent of a Sino-Japanese "thirdforce."42 D ulles was forced to m ake a fourth trip to Tökyö.43 A com prom ise was soon reached on the diplom atic front: Japan would recognize the Republic of China as a government of China rather than the government, and any peace treaty signed would be restricted to the area under actual N ationalist control.44 However, preferred approaches to the Sino-Soviet alliance w ere now poles apart: Yoshida remained wedded to his belief that "Japan m ight be able to play an im portant role in weaning China away from dom ination by the Soviet politburo," som ething Dulles regarded as no better than "political fantasy."45 In his view , w ith Commu­ nist China now representing the prim ary threat to Japanese security, the "hard w edge" strategy was the only realistic option.46 For Yoshida, the resulting eponymous letter represented a postpone­ ment of his "th esis" not its abandonm ent.47 H is sole contribution was a sop." According to Nishimura Kumao (Treaty Bureau Director), Yoshida had acted im pulsively. Yoshitsu, Japan and San Francisco, 71-72. Both im ply Yoshida was being sincere. 40 Roger Dingman, "The Anglo-American O rigins of the Yoshida Letter, 1951-52," in Perspectives on Japan’s External Relations, ed. David Lu (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University, Center for Japanese Studies, 1982), 30-31. 41 David M ayers, Cracking the M onolith (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 103. 42 N IE-52, "The Probable Future O rientation of Japan," (O ffice of Intelligence and Research (OIR) contribution), 27 December 1951,794.00/12-2751, NA. 43 A fortnight before Dulles arrived, in m id-Decem ber, Yoshida m et with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern A ffairs, Dean Rusk, and promised him that Ja­ pan "w ould not enter into 'direct negotiations' with the Peiping authorities without the knowledge of the U S." Rusk then pressed Yoshida on his "th esis," asking him whether he believed that "the Peiping regim e m ight be on the point of changing its policy or its alignm ent with die Soviet U nion." Yoshida's reply lacked its usual conviction: "H e knew Japanese who had friends on the main­ land and who m ight be of assistance to him in finding whether there were useful steps w hich he m ight take." MC, Yoshida, Rusk, and Sebald, 27 November 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1417. 44 MC, Dulles and Iguchi, 12 December 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1437-9. 45 Sebald to Acheson, 14 December 1951, FRUS 1951, VI, 1450-51. 46 MC, Dulles and Yoshida, 13 December 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1438-9. 47 For exam ple, on 1 February, Yoshida said, "The relations with China ... have been intim ate geographically and historically, and these relations ought to be

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reference to the Sino-Soviet Treaty—"a m ilitary alliance aim ed at Ja­ pan"— as an added justification for Japan's action. This w as disingenuous to say the least, for as w e have seen foe pact had never particularly per­ turbed Yoshida. It appears to contradict his fundam ental belief in foe in­ evitability of foe Sino-Soviet rift, and to finally presage his adoption of foe United States' w orld view .48 U nless, that is, he expected foe letter to be published, in w hich case it can be seen as a useful weapon w ith which to defend his reluctant decision dom estically, in circum stances w here even Japan's Socialists w ere uneasy about the Sino-Soviet alliance.49

The Japan-ROC Peace Treaty Even at fois late stage, Yoshida sought to avoid a total com m itm ent to Na­ tionalist China. He hoped to m aintain w orking relations w ith bofo Chi­ nas, but foe United States would not perm it it, and Britain was too w eak to intervene.50 Follow ing foe Senate's ratification of foe Japanese Peace Treaty, Nishimura Kumao, a close advisor to Yoshida on China policy, described to United States Em bassy officials: "Japan's conviction that foe Peking Regime is not and w ill not be really com m unist, in foe sense of be­ ing directed by M oscow ." He characterized foe Taipei talks as "sim p ly ... a local, m inor settlem ent," w here foe United States should not force foe pace "a t foe cost of prejudicing a possible com prehensive settlem ent in East A sia."51 A fortnight later, he described how Yoshida "had many tim es expressed foe view that Japan as an old nation fam iliar w ith foe Far East, could assist and even guide foe US, w hich is inexperienced in for­ eign policy and has got itself in a 'circle' on foe China question."52 These

made better, w ith the lapse of tim e and indeed as soon as may be possible. How­ ever, this is now im possible, but again this does not mean that these relations have been severed for good. W e w ill continue to pay attention to these relations and try to im prove them ." Murphy to DOS, "The China Policy of an Independ­ ent Japan," 13 May 1952,693.94/5-1352, NA. 48 In his explanation to the Diet delivered on 26 January, Yoshida added two further rationales: the support of Beijing for the JC F s efforts to overthrow the Japanese government and foe fact that it stood condemned as an aggressor by foe UN. DOS, OIR, 2 April 1952, IR 5812, "The China Debate in Japan," OSS/State Dept., Intelli­ gence and Research Reports, Japan, Korea, South-east Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950-61 Supplement (Washington: UPA, 1979), and Jain, Japan's Post-W ar, 62-63. 49 See J. A.A. Stockw in, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism (M elbourne: Mel­ bourne University Press, 1968). 80 Richard Storry, "O ptions for Japan in the 1970s," The W orld Today 26, no. 8 (Aug. 1970): 325-33, Jain, Japan's Post-W ar, 62. 51 MC, Nishimura and Stokes, "Japan's China Policy", 8 April 1952, 6 9 3 .9 4 /5 1352, NA. “ MC, Nishimura and Finn, 22 April 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1250-51. 2 16

In the Shadow o f the M onolith

diplom atic probes produced no concrete results, however, and ultim ately Japan signed a "peace settlem ent" that also recognized Taipei's jurisdic­ tion over territories w hich in future m ight fall under its control. The Jap­ anese public, w hich was overw helm ingly in favor of restoring full diplo­ m atic relations w ith die m ainland, gained the im pression that Yoshida had finally turned his back on Beijing.53

P o st -O c c u pa tio n J a pa n

Japan Joins COCOM During the next two years, Yoshida m aintained a judicious silence vis-àvis the Sino-Soviet alliance. This did not, however, calm American fears regarding his China policy. W ith the ink barely dry on the Taipei treaty, Robert M urphy, A m erica's first postw ar am bassador to Japan, was al­ ready w arning W ashington about "th e indigenous policy tendency." W hile recognizing the constraints Japan's overwhelm ing dependence on the United States im posed, he asserted that the Yoshida-Nishim ura group ... is determ ined to pursue a positive policy toward Peking, w ith a view to establishing a relatively norm al commercial and diplomatic intercourse as soon as possible ... argu[ing it] would be highly advantageous to long-range US interests because it would be accom plished by Japanese subversion of Chinese obei­ sance to the Krem lin.54 But M urphy also did not rule out die possibility that this was being used cynically as a "gam bit in bargaining for increased econom ic assistance from the U S."55 The follow ing m onth, on 1 June 1952, disregarding the hostility of the Yoshida cabinet, three opposition D iet m embers signed the first unofficial Sino-Japanese Trade Agreem ent in Beijing.56 It was a m odest effort, aim­

53 An A sahi Shinbun poll conducted between 9-11 May 1952, found 57 percent sup­ ported norm alization, with only 11 percent opposed (Sample 3000). Allan Cole and N akanishi Naomichi, eds., Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Signifi­ cance, 1947-1957 (M edford, M ass.: Tufts University, 1958), 679. M Murphy to DOS, 13 May 1952,693.94/5-1352, NA. Italics added. » Murphy to DOS, 13 May 1952,693.94/5-1352, NA. 56 Yoshida's governm ent had earlier blocked participation in the Moscow Interna­ tional Econom ic Conference by a group of Japanese politicians led by Ishibashi Tanzan, Murata Shözö, and Kitamura Tokutarö. Kurt Radtke, China’s Relations xoith Japan, 1945-83 (M anchester: M anchester University Press, 1990), 99,112, n. 45, and AmEmbTok to DOS, 7 M arch 1952,794.00/3-1452, NA. 217

C . W. Braddick

ing for a total of £60 m illion in balanced trade.57 The M inistry of Interna­ tional Trade and Industry (M ITI) im m ediately responded by laying down its ow n, very strict, conditions for trade w ith the m ainland.58 The Foreign M inistry apparently felt that M ITI was still being too generous, for two days later it declared that "Japan selling production m aterials to Commu­ nist China m eans contributing to in creasin g... her political and m ilitary threat to Japan."59 That sam e w eek, it published a w hite paper attacking die unofficial trade agreem ent, and accusing Beijing of aim ing to drive a wedge between Japan and its friends.60 The Foreign M inistry won this particular battle, as later that m onth the Japanese governm ent officially announced its desire to join COCOM — the U .S.-led body controlling strategic trade w ith the com m unist bloc. There followed three m onths of difficult negotiations, at the end of w hich Japan gained adm ission. This would have represented a significant victo­ ry for Yoshida, placing Japan's trade w ith China on an equal footing w ith W estern Europe's, but for die fact that the Americans had insisted on ad­ ditional bilateral assurances from Japan.61 W ashington was forcing Tökyö to abandon the "Yoshida thesis" for fear that Japan may try to take advantage of US-USSR conflict; desiring to re­ store Japanese influence on the continent of Asia and to regain [the] advantages of China trade, Japan m ight conclude that an accommo­ dation w ith com m unist-controlled areas in Asia would serve Japa­ nese interests.62

57 Jain, China and Japan, 29. Im mediately upon their return home they helped found a nationwide organization to be chaired by form er Vice-M inister of Greater East Asian Affairs, Yamamoto Kumaichi: the Japan-China Trade Prom otion Associ­ ation (Nitchü Böeki Sokushin Kai). Köwa Shinbun, 5 June 1952. The treaty was de­ liberately denominated in pounds, and trade conducted in pounds, because of Chinese hostility for everything American. 58 DOS, IR 5941, "Pei-p'ing T rad e Agreem ent' and its im pact in Japan," 30 June 1952,693.94/6-3052, NA. 59 It also described C hina's trade as "com pletely dependent upon the Soviet Un­ ion." Inform ation and Culture Bureau, Foreign M inistry, "The Trade Policy of Communist China and the So-called 'China-Japan Trade A greem ent,"' World Report, 7 June 1952. 80 Radtke, China's Relations, 99 and 112, n. 52. 61 Yasuhara, "Japan, Communist C hina," 87-89. 62 NSC 1 2 5 /2 ,7 August 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1302. 2 18

In the Shadow o f the M onolith

New Leaders The New Year reawakened hopes for change. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in­ augurated as the thirty-third U.S. president in January 1953, privately "exp ress[ed ]... the belief that there w as no future for Japan unless access were provided for it to the m arkets and raw m aterials of M anchuria and North C hina." H is secretary of state, John Foster D ulles, disagreed how­ ever, arguing that the em bargo could be m aintained "for perhaps five years," w hile Japan was encouraged to look instead toward the m arkets of Southeast Asia.63 A few months earlier, Niizeki Kin'ya, in charge of the Foreign M inistry's East European Desk, had claimed that Moscow was concentrating its energy on "strengthening ties with its satellites, including Communist China."64 Similarly, respected academics, like Professor Ohira Zengo of Hitotsubashi University, were heard to declare that "at present, Communist China can be called ttie most faithful, effective, genuine, model satellite of the Krem lin."65 The death of Joseph Stalin in M arch 1953 sparked renewed interest in prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift.66 W ada Shusaku, in charge of the Foreign M inistry's South Asia Desk, suggested that "it would be possible to wean China away from M oscow ... [if] Japan was to sever its ties w ith the Chi­ nese N ationalist and French-controlled Vietnam ese regim es and to seek to form a 'cooperative bloc' w ith the Peiping Governm ent."67 Three months later, his boss, W ajim a Eiji, now D irector of the Asian A ffairs Bu­ reau (A jia Kyoku) claim ed that "th e Chinese com m unist leaders had been and still were taking their orders, at least in [the] foreign affairs field, from M oscow ." N evertheless, he felt: "it was only a m atter of tim e before the Chinese reached the point when they would no longer find it to their ad­ vantage to cooperate so closely with the Soviets."68 Sim ilar opinions w ere being expressed outside of the Japanese Foreign M inistry. A poll conducted that spring cam e up w ith the interesting find­ ing that for every two respondents who expected the dem ocratic camp to split first, five saw the com m unist bloc as the m ore vulnerable to 63 NSC, 139th M eeting, [dated] 16 April 1953, Declassified Documents Reference System [H ereafter DDRS], 1987/2885. 64 Niizeki Kin'ya, "Soren sekai seisaku no gendankai," GaUcO¡Otó 111, no. 1 (Nov. 1952): 64. 65 Ohira Zengo, "Katayotta Chükyökan o hai su ra," Jiyü no hata no moto ni 1, no. 3 (March 1953): 52. See also Hirasawa Kazushige, "Chü-So wa dö dem : Shinsekai senryaku e no tenkan," Daiyamondo 40, no. 36 (11 October 1952): 48-50. 46 For exam ple, one commentator predicted that "A fter his [Stalin's] death, the So­ viet pressure upon the satellites w ill inevitably become weaker and Communist China w ill become less subordinate to the Soviet U nion." Takaya Kakuzö, Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 March 1953 (evening edition). 47 MC, Wada Shusaku and LaRue Lutkins, 5 M arch 1953,690.94/3-1653, NA. 48 MC, W ajima Eiji and Lutkins, 30 June 1953,693.94/7-853, NA.

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schism .69 M ore specifically, Suma Yakichirö, a Progressive Party (Kaishintö) D iet m em ber, noted C hina's abandonm ent of its pro-Soviet Liu Shaoqi line follow ing Stalin's death.70 A ccording to Ishikaw a Shigeru, an expert on Chinese econom ics, one's view s on the subject depended on one's background. Those who saw "Com m unist China perfectly follow ­ ing Soviet policy" tended to be Soviet specialists, w hereas the view "com m on am ong China researchers says that com m unist Chinese na­ tionalists are conscious of the rift in in terests."71 The United States rem ained less confident. Rem arkably, in view of sub­ sequent developm ents, the State Departm ent was worried that "th e Sovi­ et Union now m ay have a closer, m ore productive alliance w ith Commu­ nist China than we do w ith Japan."72 Although it was recognized that "th e death of Stalin w ill create many problem s of adjustm ent in China-Soviet relations," and their entente was vulnerable ideologically and nationalistically, it was nevertheless felt that "th e Mao regim e w ill continue its al­ legiance to the Soviet U nion."73

Korean Armistice The term ination of the Korean W ar in Ju ly 1953 initially led the Am eri­ cans to reinforce their hard line against China.74 In Japan the reaction w as rather different. Public opinion w as already responding favorably to Beijing's "p eop le's diplom acy" initiatives!'5 In Septem ber, the Central

49 "W hich of the two cam ps w ill be split first?" "The com m unists w ill split first": 29.1 percent; "Dem ocrats w ill split first": 11.8 percent; "O thers": 16.9 percent; "D on't know ": 26.2 percent; "D on't know Red C hina": 15.5 percent. Sample: ur­ ban 1,807; rural 1,246. Reply: 87.2 percent (rural data weighted double). The World and Japan 2 (15 August 1953), Enc. in Berger to DOS, 611.94/9-2253, NA. 70 Suma Yakichirö et al., "M ö Takutö jid ai to Nihon no kiki," M am 6, no. 10 (Octo­ ber 1953): 78. 71 Ishikawa Shigeru, "Chü-So kankei o kettei suru yöin," Soren Kenkjfü 2, no. 9 (Septem ber 1953): 21. An exception was Takeda N an'yö, "Chükyö—Soren ippentö no gendankai," Soren Kenkyü 2, no. 8 (Aug. 1953): 36-46. 72 O ffice Memo, Young (NEA), to Robertson and Johnson (FE), "U S Policies in Ja­ pan," 9 Septem ber 1953,611.94/9-953, NA. 73 J. Barnard to Paul N itze, "V ulnerabilities of the Sino-Soviet Entente", 3 April 1953, DDRS 1993/727. 74 Chang, Friends and Enemies, 89-90. 75 In 1953, the number of Japanese visitors to China totalled 139, up from fifty the previous year, and ju st nine in 1951. Chügoku nenkan (Tökyö: Ishisaki Shoten, 1959), 57. M oreover, an Asahi Shinbun poll conducted in June 1953, found that 38 percent believed Japan should be "neutralist" as opposed to 35 percent "proA m erican," 1 percent "pro-Soviet," and 26 percent "oth er/D .K ." The compara­ ble figures for Septem ber 1950, were: 22 percent, 55 percent, 0 percent, and 23 percent, respectively. Douglas M endel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 43.

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Executive Com m ittee of the Left-Japan Socialist Party (JSP) w ent so far as to propose that a Sino-Soviet-A m erican jo in t security guarantee for Japan replace both the U .S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Sino-Soviet al­ liance.76 M ore threatening to Yoshida, how ever, w ere the bonds being forged betw een those business groups interested in trade w ith the com ­ m unist countries, Shigem itsu M am oru's Progressive Party, and the breakaw ay Hatoyam a faction from Yoshida's own Liberal Party (Jiyütö).77 O n the eve of the signature of the Korean arm istice, they helped pass a D iet resolution dem anding that the governm ent tem porarily re­ duce its em bargo to a level "a s low as the W estern European coun­ tries."78 A lthough intended as an attack on the prim e m inister, it w as seized upon by Yoshida as a useful w eapon in his battle w ith W ashing­ ton over the China trade. A form al request to shorten the list prom pted the new U .S. am bassador in Tôkyô, John M. A llison, to com plain that "Tokyo ... still basically holds to the theories of the durability of [the] com m unist capture of C hina and of the possibility of facilitating the al­ ienation o f Peking from M oscow ."79 D ulles's response w as m ore accom ­ m odating, how ever. In October, while a delegation from the Diet members' League was in­ specting trade prospects in China (and signing a second unofficial trade agreement), Yoshida again sent his protégé Ikeda Hayato to Washington.80 Ikeda's talks, better known for the compromise readied on Japanese rear-

76 JA .A . Stockw in, "'P ositive N eutrality'—The Foreign Policy of the JSP ," Asian Survey 2, no. 9 (Nov. 1962): 38. 77 Radtke, China's Relations, 9 9 ,101. In A pril, Kazami Akira, an independent Diet member, helped to bring them together in the Alliance for the Promotion of Nor­ m alised Diplom atic Relations with China and the Soviet Union (Nitchü N isso Kokkö Chösei Sokushin Döm ei). By the autumn it had developed into a general coordinating body: the N ational Conference for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations w ith China and the Soviet Union (Nitchü N isso Kokkö Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi), and was led by Majima Kan, a m edical doctor. "N isso köshö to sayoku no senden katsudö," Nippon oyobi Nipponjin 6, no. 8 (August 1955): 34-37. 78 The resolution was sponsored by the recently revived Diet M em bers' League for tire Prom otion of Sino-Japanese Trade led by Ikeda M asanosuke, a leading light in Hatoyama Ichirö's breakaway Liberal Party. The league was by now the larg­ est inter-party organization in the D iet, com prising not only all the socialists, but forty-plus progressives, and m ore than seventy m embers of Yoshida's own con­ servative Liberals. Qing Sim ei, "The Eisenhower Adm inistration and Changes in W estern Embargo Policy Against China, 1954-1958," in The Great Powers in East A sia, 1953-1960, ed. W arren Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 121-42. 79 Allison to DOS, "A m erican Leadership and Japan," 3 Septem ber 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1495. 80 Jain, China and Japan, 29.

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marnent, also produced partial agreement on the trade issue.81 Six months later, on 8 March 1954, Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Secu­ rity Assistance Agreement and within a few days the United States finally agreed to release Japan "gradually, as appropriate" from its obligations un­ der the September 1952 agreement on China trade controls.82 It is not diffi­ cult to imagine that the former acted as some kind of quid pro quo for foe lat­ ter. Yoshida's success produced a 75 percent jump in Sino-Japanese trade, but fois was not sufficient to satisfy his critics at home, let alone Beijing.

T he " Y osh id a T h esis " R eborn

Difficult Delivery By late 1953, foe Japanese Foreign M inistry once again appeared rather dism issive of prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift. A t foe China Desk, Takeuchi Harumi told foe Americans that he "did not think that there was any chance at [foe] present tim e or in [foe] foreseeable future of Japan or any other nation weaning Com munist China away from its intim ate ties w ith M oscow ."83 H is boss, W ajim a Eiji, was less certain. He basically con­ curred w ith foe m ajority view that "a general m utuality of interests in foe Far East made continued Sino-Soviet ties a strong probability for some tim e to com e." But he also believed that if foe Soviet Union resisted Chi­ na's em erging "peaceful coexistence" strategy, "fo e opportunity would present itself to approach Peking in an effort to w iden w hatever crack de­ veloped." Apparently, W ajim a w as not alone; others in foe Foreign Min­ istry "had considered significant foe different m anner in which foe repa­ triation of Japanese had been handled during foe past year by foe Chinese Com munist and Soviet governm ents."84 They had also "detected certain differences in the approach taken by the Soviet and Chinese representa-

81 Hosoya Chihiro, "From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock," in The United States and Japan, ed. Akira Iriye and W arren Cohen (Lexington: Kentucky Uni­ versity Press, 1989), 23. 82 Memo, M cClurkin to Drumwright, 14 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-52, XIV, 1634-35. 83 MC, Takeuchi Harumi and Lutkins, 7 December 1953,693.94/12-753, NA. 84 He also mentioned speculation that "Russia might have given Peking pretty much of a free hand in the Far East and might in particular have allotted her the leading role in implementing com m unist bloc strategy toward Japan." This "d i­ vision of labor" theory was to prove very popular in the later 1950s as a way o f explaining away conflicting Sino-Soviet policies in East Asia without recogniz­ ing the em erging rift. MC, W ajima Eiji and Lutkins, 21 December 1953, 693.94/12-2153, NA.

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fives at G eneva/'85 The Geneva Peace Conference held out the prospect of a new era of détente in East Asia. Opinion polls reported strong support for trade and even diplom atic relations w ith China from all areas of Jap­ anese society.86 Perhaps it is not surprising therefore that Yoshida chose this moment to relaunch his "th esis."87 In late M ay, Yoshida ordered both the Foreign M inistry and the Cabinet Research O ffice (Naikaku Chösashitsu) to undertake a high priority study of the im m ediate prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift and w hat steps Japan m ight take to hasten the process.88 W e now know that this recently declas­ sified and detailed report expressed "m any doubts about w hether SinoSoviet relations are [characterized by] brotherly love, but they are mutu­ ally beneficial." Hence, it predicted that only "w hen they are econom ical­ ly equal w ill it be possible [for China] to becom e 'independent.'" Finally, the report's authors concluded rather pessim istically that "M ao Zedong is totally com m itted to the Soviet Union ... [and] as long as Mao Zedong is alive Com munist China w ill not becom e a second Yugoslavia."89 W ithout w aiting for the results, however, Yoshida had approached Ambassador A llison, inform ing him that by a judicious com bination of diplom atic persuasion and pressure exerted from the W estern Pacific island chain Peking could be weaned away from its dependence upon and alliance w ith the Soviet Union and the stage m ight even be set for the unseating of the Chi­ nese Com munist R eg im e.... The Japanese ... because of their long

85 Interestingly, Dulles suppressed news of "Peking's displeasure with m odest So­ viet su p p ort... [lest it] encourage Asian wishful thinking that China was more Asian than com m unist and that a reasonable accommodation could be reached with Peking." 26 April 1954, FR U S1952-54, XVI, 621. 86 W ilbur M artin, "Som e Findings of Japanese Opinion Polls," in Japan Between East and West, ed. Hugh Borton et al. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/H arper, 1957), 310-11. 87 Yoshida later claim ed that ju st after the fall of Dienbienphu (7 May 1954) he had once again broached w ith Dulles his plan to use overseas Chinese as agents to fight the communists in China. Kem to Robertson, 11 December 1958, 611.94/12-1158, NA. 88 MC, A llison and Yoshida, 28 May 1954, Enc. in AmEmbTok to DOS, 7 9 4 .0 0 /7 2054, NA. 89 "Chükyö no genjö to sono dökö", 8 August 1954, [A -0137/10/0009-89], Gaimushö Shiryökan, Tökyö. It should be noted that rumors circulating at this time claim ed that "the Asian A ffairs Bureau's researches about the Soviet Union and Communist China are low -key." The reason, it was suggested, was that anyone producing positive reports was blacklisted (chüi jinbutsu) and in such an atmosphere "no able officers Uke[d] to rem ain at the China Desk and those who do keep silen t." Mukohara Tatsuzö, "G aim ushö," Chao Kâron 69, no. 11 (No­ vember 1954): 98-99. 223

C . W. Braddick

experience on the m ainland could play a valuable role in prom oting these desirable developm ents by w orking to reconcile Am erican and British policies tow ard China.90 The U.S. Embassy dism issed it all as a m ere "restate[m ent of] the hoary thesis, so dear to Japanese 'O ld China H ands.'"91 This assessm ent was confirm ed by a form er diplom at, Hirasawa Kazushige, when he unfavo­ rably contrasted the older generation of Japanese diplom ats and p olitician s... [with] younger inform ed Japanese bureaucrats [who] are aw are that there is little possibility of splitting Com munist China from the USSR in the next few years [because] Com munist C hina's econom y and its plans for industrial developm ent are closely geared to the Soviet econo­ my.92 The generation gap was not the only dim ension to the Japanese split on the "Yoshida thesis." An "interesting difference of opinion," for instance, was said to exist "w ithin the Foreign O ffice betw een the Soviet and China D esks." According to N iizeki K in'ya, in charge of the form er: All signs indicate that the Soviet Union and Com m unist China are currently bound by the closest ideological, econom ic and national se­ curity ties; there is nothing to indicate that any significant parting of the ways can be expected in the foreseeable future.93 In contrast, Ogawa H eishirô, the new man in charge of the China Desk, claim ed that "th e possibility should not be ruled out, even w ithin the next few years of a real divergence of Sino-Soviet interests, in the econom ic field at least." N iizeki predicted a Russian unilateral initiative to norm al­ ize relations w ith Japan "before long," whereas Ogawa thought that "the apparent inability of Russia to supply all the equipm ent and services w hich China desires in order to carry out her industrialization plans ... would lead Peking to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Japan and the W est." Yet the differences should not be overdrawn. Ogawa w as, after all, the m ain author of the pessim istic Foreign M inistry report com mis­ sioned by Yoshida on the Sino-Soviet rift. M oreover, in the long term , N ii-

90 Berger to DOS, "Foreign O ffice Views on Geneva Conference and Sino-Soviet Relations", 11 June 1954,693.94/6-1154, NA. 91 Ibid. 92 MC, Hirasawa Kazushige and Richard Lamb, 9 July 1954,794.13/7-2054, NA. 93 MC, N iizeki Kin'ya and Lutkins, 27 May 1954, Enc. in Berger to DOS, 6 9 3 .9 4 /6 1154, NA. 224

In the Shadow o f the M onolith

zeki thought that "serious potential tensions undoubtedly exist and Rus­ sia, for her part, probably feels real concern about the grow th of Chinese m ilitary and industrial pow er." Furtherm ore, Ogawa recognized that "se ­ curity considerations and the reluctance of Peking to carry out a m ajor re­ adjustm ent of the country's foreign trade, now so overw helm ingly orient­ ed toward M oscow, could operate to prevent die Chinese leaders from proceeding far in [Japan's] direction."94 Yet such intra-m inistry differ­ ences w ere probably a factor in the decision by a gathering of Japanese diplom atic envoys in Europe that sum mer to im prove the system for col­ lecting inform ation on China and Russia.95 In July, a m ulti-party Japanese delegation returned horn a peace con­ ference in Sweden via Moscow and Beijing. N ishim ura Naom i, the Liber­ al Party leader of die group, was surprised at the "w ide differences" he observed betw een the two. He suggested this m ight reflect differences be­ tween Europe and A sia, or die fact that "th e Soviet Union is a grown-up country, w hereas Com m unist China is a young one." N ot every member of the team shared this view , however. Nakasone Yasuhiro (Progressive Party), for exam ple, concluded that "The Soviet Union and Com munist China are one and undivided and have organized a strong united front."96 Three days later, Foreign M inister Okazaki Katsuo—reversing die logic of the "Yoshida thesis"— claim ed that because of the Japan-ROC Peace Trea­ ty it w as "m uch easier for Japan to norm alize relations w ith the USSR than w ith Com m unist C hina."97* It was assum ed at the tim e that Yoshida was not very happy at this.96 Yet during August, Fukunaga Kazuomi of Yoshida's Liberal Party and the Foreign M inistry's Ushiba Nobuhiko w ere allowed to visit the Soviet Union to discuss trade and fisheries problem s.99 The Foreign M inistry also withdrew its opposition to a visit by a Chinese Red Cross delega­ tion.100 But m ost im portantly, Ikeda Hayato, now Liberal Party secretary-

94 MC, Ogawa Takeo [sic] and Lutkins, 1 June 1954, Enc. in Berger to DOS, 693.94/6-1154, NA. 95 Memo, 25 August 1954, A 1 8 3 8 /2 8 3 -7 3 1 /3 /1 1 , AA. 96 Nishim ura Naomi, "W atashi wa akai kuni Soren, Chûkyô o kö m ita," and Na­ kasone Yasuhiro, "Fukam i niwa yoru to yakedo," JitsugyO no Nihon 57, no. 21 (1 Septem ber 1954): 4 4 ,47. 97 Allison to Dulles, 24 July 1954,661.94/7-2454, NA. 90 Allison to Dulles, 30 July 1954,661.94/7-3054, NA. 99 "Shindankai ni haita Chü-So kokkö kaifuku," Ekonomisuto 32, no. 45 (6 Novem­ ber 1954): 16-17, and Jam es M orley, Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies toward Japan, 1950-57 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), 8. 100 The delegation, led by M rs. Li Dequan, was the first "official" visit by repre­ sentatives of the PRC to postwar Japan. Follow ing inform al conversations w ith M inistry of W elfare officials, the delegation signed a new repatriation agree­

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general, m ade a speech to party leaders asserting that "T his is not the tim e for Japan to choose outright between W est and E a s t... Japan's attitude should be characterized by greater flexibility in foreign and econom ic pol­ icy ."101 Am bassador A llison concluded in brutal term s that "Japan is for sale to the highest bidder."102 As usual, he was over-reacting. Ikeda's "tri­ al balloon" was soon deflated. A report by his party's Foreign Policy Re­ search Council (Gaikö Chösakai), issued later in August, expressed sup­ port for increased trade w ith Beijing and associated visits, but specifically excluded early diplom atic recognition.103

The Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration and the Fall ofYoshida D espite the serious crisis developing in the Taiw an Straits, another m ulti­ party D iet m em bers' m ission led by Yam aguchi Kikuichird visited Beijing in early October, in an effort to underm ine Yoshida's official China poli­ cy.104 In w ide-ranging talks w ith Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prem ier "ex­ pressed opinions on Japanese rearm am ent, econom ic independence, the historical influence of Sino-Japanese friendship, Chinese industrializa­ tion and peaceful coexistence, cultural exchange, the problem of Japanese recognition, w ar crim inals, residents, com m unications, fishing, and trade problem s."105The group w as told that China w ished to sign a peace treaty establishing norm al relations as soon as Japan w as truly independent, dem ocratic, and free. It would then be possible to conclude a non-aggres­ sion pact.106 Delegates generally agreed that "C hina was neither Titoist nor a satellite, but rather a junior partner advancing toward increasing equality."107 For one w riter, "T his visit becam e the starting point for the rapid developm ent of econom ic, cultural and other 'friendly' (non-offi-

m ent. In addition, trade m atters were discussed with Murata Shözö of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT). More surprising­ ly, several m eetings took place between m embers of the delegation and Ogawa H eishiro, head of the China Desk at the Foreign M inistry, an early supporter o f the Chinese visit. Radtke, China's Relations, 102,105, and 114 n. 83, A. Doak Bar­ nett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Council on Foreign R elations/V intage, 1960), 264, and Jain, China and Japan, 20. 101 A llison to Dulles, 11 August 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1698-99. 102 Allison to Dulles, 25 August 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1714-15. 1