The Japanese Empire and Latin America 9780824894610

The Japanese Empire and Latin America provides a comprehensive analysis of the complicated relationship between Japanese

253 38 6MB

English Pages 280 [320] Year 2023

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD PDF FILE

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
1 Turning the Water into Fair Pools: Prewar Japan’s Paternalistic Outreach in Its South American Emigration Policy
2 Japanese Shipping Lines in Latin America, 1905–1941
3 Toward a Prototype of the Total Empire: Japanese Migration to Brazil and Japanese Colonial Expansion in Asia, 1921–1934
4 Transpacific Migration and Japan’s Extraterritorial Settler Colonialism in the US-Mexican Borderlands
5 The Immigrant-Homeland Connection: The Development of the Japanese Community in Peru
6 Guiding Settlers: The Overseas Development Company and the Recruitment of Rural Brazil, 1918–1936
7 “South America Bound”: Japanese Settler Colonist Fiction of the Meiji Era
8 Chasing the Transnational Flow of Books and Magazines: Materials, Knowledge, and Network
9 Immigrant Propaganda: Translating Japanese Imperial Ideology into Argentine Nationalism
10 After the Empire: Postwar Emigration to the Dominican Republic and Economic Diplomacy
11 Were Issei in Brazil Imperialists? Emigration-Driven Expansionism in Nikkei Literature
Bibliography
Contributors
Index
Recommend Papers

The Japanese Empire and Latin America
 9780824894610

  • 0 0 0
  • Like this paper and download? You can publish your own PDF file online for free in a few minutes! Sign Up
File loading please wait...
Citation preview

The Japa­nese Empire and Latin Amer­i­ca

The Japa­nese Empire and Latin Amer­i­ca Edited by

Pedro Iacobelli and Sidney Xu Lu

University of Hawai‘i Press   Honolulu

 Th is book was partially funded by the ANID-Fondecyt Regular, Grant No. 1200031 © 2023 University of Hawai‘i Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of Amer­i­ca First printing, 2023 Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­P ublication Data

Names: Iacobelli, Pedro, editor. | Lu, Sidney Xu, editor. Title: The Japanese Empire and Latin America / edited by Pedro Iacobelli and Sidney Xu Lu. Description: Honolulu : University of Hawai`i Press, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022044589 (print) | LCCN 2022044590 (ebook) | ISBN 9780824892999 (hardback) | ISBN 9780824894610 (pdf) | ISBN 9780824894627 (epub) | ISBN 9780824894634 (kindle edition) Subjects: LCSH: Japanese—Latin America—History. | Japan— Emigration and immigration—Government policy. | Japan— Commerce—Latin America. | Latin America—Commerce—Japan. Classification: LCC F1419.J3 J37 2023 (print) | LCC F1419.J3 (ebook) | DDC 327.5208—dc23/eng/20220928 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022044589 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022044590 Cover illustration and design by Aaron Lee University of Hawai‘i Press books are printed on acid-­free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources. Designed by Westchester Publishing Ser­v ices

Contents

Introduction  1 Sidney Xu Lu and Pedro Iacobelli

1 Turning the ­Water into Fair Pools: Prewar Japan’s Paternalistic Outreach in Its South American Emigration Policy  16 Toake Endoh

2 Japa­nese Shipping Lines in Latin Amer­i­ca, 1905–1941  37 Elijah J. Greenstein

3 ­Toward a Prototype of the Total Empire: Japa­nese Migration to

Brazil and Japa­nese Colonial Expansion in Asia, 1921–1934  63 Sidney Xu Lu

4 Transpacific Migration and Japan’s Extraterritorial Settler Colonialism in the US-­Mexican Borderlands  93 Eiichiro Azuma

5 The Immigrant-­Homeland Connection: The Development of the Japa­nese Community in Peru  126 Ayumi Takenaka

6 Guiding Settlers: The Overseas Development Com­pany and the Recruitment of Rural Brazil, 1918–1936  145 Andre Kobayashi Deckrow

v

vi Contents

7 “South Amer­i­ca Bound”: Japa­nese Settler Colonist Fiction of the Meiji Era  168 Seth Jacobowitz

8 Chasing the Transnational Flow of Books and Magazines: Materials, Knowledge, and Network  191 Yoshitaka Hibi

9 Immigrant Propaganda: Translating Japa­nese Imperial Ideology into Argentine Nationalism  208 Facundo Garasino

10 ­After the Empire: Postwar Emigration to the Dominican Republic and Economic Diplomacy  227 Hiromi Mizuno

11 ­Were Issei in Brazil Imperialists? Emigration-­Driven Expansionism in Nikkei Lit­er­a­t ure  250 Ignacio López-­C alvo Bibliography 273 Contributors 295 Index 299

The Japa­nese Empire and Latin Amer­i­ca

Introduction Sidney Xu Lu and Pedro Iacobelli

I

n 1893, shortly a­ fter ending his tenure as Japan’s foreign minister, Enomoto Takeaki established the Colonial Association (Shokumin Kyōkai) in Tokyo. In this venture he was joined by a host of like-­minded Meiji politicians, business leaders, and intellectuals; their association aimed to pool resources both in and outside of the government to facilitate the empire’s migration-­driven expansion.1 One of the association’s most noteworthy proj­ects was land acquisition in southern Chiapas, Mexico, where it established a Japa­nese settler community in 1897 known as the Enomoto Colony.2 Though this proj­ect quickly failed due to poor planning and lack of funds, some of its key participants, such as Enomoto’s close associates in the Foreign Ministry Fujita Toshiro and Nemoto Tadashi, would go on to play critical roles in paving the way for Japa­nese migration to Peru and Brazil.3 However, before Enomoto was shoring up support for Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca, he had already pushed for the empire to expand into the South Seas. He made attempts to purchase the Mariana Islands, the Palau Islands, and Borneo for the empire as early as the 1870s.4 ­Under his leadership, the imperial navy took Japa­nese intellectuals and journalists on tours in the South Seas on its ­battle cruisers. Shiga Shigetaka, an editor of the magazine Nihonjin, went on one such tour and penned the book Nan’yō Jiji based on his observations, and it proved to be one of the most influential works advocating for Japan’s southward expansion during the Meiji era. ­ ere in danger of becoming a Nan’yō Jiji warned the Japa­nese that they w victim of Western colonialism like the native ­peoples in the South Seas and Hawai‘i had already done. To escape the clutch of Western imperialism, Shiga urged, Japan’s empire builders must make haste to occupy what 1

2 Introduction

he referred to as “unowned land” and sea lying to the south of the empire before the Westerners did.5 The ideas and activities of Enomoto Takeaki and his followers belong to a much larger story of the multifaceted connections between the Japa­nese empire’s legacies in the Asia-­Pacific region and Japa­nese mi­grant presence in Latin Amer­i­ca. Why and how does Latin Amer­i­ca m ­ atter in our understanding of the Japa­nese empire? How did the history of Latin Amer­i­ca and that of the Japa­nese empire intersect and intertwine as the latter sought to transform itself into a nation-­state? ­These are the central questions that this book seeks to answer. Due to the territory-­bound and nation-­based understanding of history, the experience of the Japa­nese empire in Asia and that of Japa­nese expansion to Latin Amer­i­ca have been studied in isolation with few connections with each other. Accordingly, ­these experiences often developed into contrasting narratives and w ­ ere memorialized differently in conventional wisdom, with the tragedy of colonialism and imperialism on the one hand and the saga of migration and ethnic integration on the other. The Japa­nese Empire and Latin Amer­i­ca challenges this intellectual separation by emphasizing the multidimensional links between the rise and fall of the Japa­nese colonial empire in Asia and the Japa­nese presence in Latin Amer­i­ca. It argues that we cannot adequately comprehend Japan’s imperial history, colonialism, and even domestic politics without taking Latin Amer­i­ca seriously. It also places the Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca into the global history of migration and settler colonialism and reexamines the location and significance of the Japa­nese empire in modern world. Since the beginning of the modern era, Japa­nese expansionists referred to the ongoing Anglo-­American expansion in the world as a textbook on empire building, in which migration was a central engine. US westward expansion, in par­tic­u­lar, served as a constant source of inspiration for Japan’s empire builders, who not only saw it as a guide for the Meiji colonization of Hokkaido but l­ater also turned to the American West itself as a frontier of Japa­nese expansion. The Japa­nese expansionists’ desire for a share of the North American land, however, turned out to be unfruitful. De­cades of anti-­Japanese campaigns in North Amer­i­ca that culminated in the promulgation of the US Immigration Act of 1924 forced Japa­nese empire builders to cast their gazes southward to Latin Amer­i­ca as an alternative target. For this reason, they often viewed Latin American land through a lens of colonialism and expected that the migration and settlement of Japa­nese



Lu and Iacobelli

3

subjects ­there would put down permanent roots for the Japa­nese empire in the New World.6 Additionally, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ­were a time when the newly in­de­pen­dent powers in Latin Amer­i­ca ­were conducting their own dual pro­cesses of nation building and expansion. Immigrants from Eu­rope, Spanish and Portuguese American elites reasoned, would not only help to whiten their own racial stocks but would also serve as trailblazers for their nations’ expansion into interior regions. The decrease of Eu­ro­pean immigrants and the rise of the Japa­nese empire in Asia at the turn of the twentieth c­ entury together made the Japa­nese an alternative source of immigrants for Latin American policy makers. Therefore, Japa­ nese migration was caught in the pro­cesses of empire building in both East Asia and Latin Amer­i­ca.

Japan in the Amer­i­cas, the Amer­i­cas in Japan From its onset, the Meiji government undertook several steps to enrich the nation, strengthen the army, and develop industry and commerce. While constrained to “unequal treaties” with the major Western powers in Asia, the empire sought to expand its diplomatic and commercial links across the Pacific. This pro­cess involved acquiring foreign techniques and knowledge and adopting Western ideas and practices. As a part of this pro­cess, during the late nineteenth ­century Japa­nese economists and politicians advocated for trade expansion to Latin Amer­i­ca.7 The Japa­nese diplomat and theorist Inagaki Manjirō, in 1891, claimed that “the powers compete for wealth in peacetime and in arms during war,” and thus, overseas Japa­nese settlements would help the extension of trade by creating markets for Japa­ nese goods (mostly silk and cotton textiles).8 The Japa­nese government or­ga­nized and promoted international migration through private emigration companies (imin kaisha), establishing Japa­nese settlements in several places from the early Meiji period. One of the features that characterized Japa­nese foreign policy before the Pacific War was its state-­endorsed migration programs.9 Japa­nese mi­grants from almost all corners of the archipelago, especially from Okinawa, Niigata, Yamaguchi, and Hiroshima, ­were shipped to countries and territories in Asia, the Amer­i­cas, and the Pacific Islands. By 1935, over 1,753,000 Japa­ nese subjects had migrated to the empire’s colonial territories and over

4 Introduction

550,000 to countries and territories in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Amer­i­cas.10 Japan was quick to establish diplomacy and trade agreements with several Latin American republics and opened offices in Mexico (1891), Brazil (1897), Chile (1902), Peru (1909), and Argentina (1918).11 Moreover, Japa­nese mi­grants began reaching the shores of Latin Amer­i­ca from the late nineteenth ­century: Mexico (1897), Peru (1899), Chile (1903), Argentina (1908), Brazil (1908), Colombia (1929), and Paraguay (1936), among ­others. Even though tens of thousands of Japa­nese had migrated to the Amer­i­cas during the Meiji period, Japa­nese migration gained its true Latin American colors during the Taishō period when migration to Peru and Brazil increased and Latin Amer­i­ca overtook North Amer­i­ca as a main destination.12 The Japa­nese empire’s links with Latin Amer­i­ca w ­ ere more diverse than just the circulation of ­people. In terms of trade, for Japan, World War I was a ­great stimulus for Japa­nese exports (and a surge of inflation), which set the quick development of Japan’s shipping industry.13 By the late 1920s and 1930s, Japan developed a cotton textile industry that rivaled its British counterpart.14 In the early 1930s, to retaliate against the Commonwealth’s boycott against Japa­nese textiles, the Japa­nese government sharply decreased raw cotton importation from India and turned to Brazil as a major cotton supplier.15 As the ­Great Depression slowed Japan’s economic expansion, Tokyo’s central reaction to the crisis was to strengthen its economic diplomacy.16 Latin American countries continued to stand as alternative markets for Japa­nese manufactures when tensions between the Japa­nese empire and the Anglo-­American powers continued to escalate in the 1930s. Though the Pacific War (1941–1945) put an abrupt end to Japa­nese trade with the continent, Japan swiftly reestablished its trade networks in Latin Amer­i­ca a­ fter the US occupation. The Japa­nese presence in Latin Amer­i­ca also gave place to discourses on race that ­were widespread in the Amer­i­cas and the rest of the world. Since the late nineteenth c­ entury, the expansion of the Japa­nese empire had seemed unstoppable. Its rise as a hegemonic power in Asia and an impor­ tant source of immigrants to the Amer­i­cas sparked a surge of anti-­Japanese invectives abroad. Literati and policy makers of Latin American republics reaffirmed their white supremacist beliefs and viewed the Japa­nese immigrants through an Orientalist lens. Hate, fear, and discrimination w ­ ere some of the ele­ments to be found in ­these ubiquitous discourses ­towards the empire of Japan in the Amer­i­cas during the first half of the twentieth



Lu and Iacobelli

5

c­ entury.17 Such racism against the Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, however, was matched by the racial ideologies of the Japa­nese expansionists, who saw themselves not only as the whites of Asia but also as colonial masters in Latin Amer­i­ca.18

The Lit­er­a­ture on the Japa­nese Empire and Latin Amer­i­ca Area studies, as Jordan Sand puts it, has kept Japa­nese history within Asia and far from other regions and disciplines, such as Asian American studies and—we may add—­Latin American history.19 This partition of knowledge follows its own historical and po­liti­cal rationale in North Amer­i­ca and, from ­there, has been replicated elsewhere.20 Existing lit­er­a­ture on Japa­nese involvement in Latin Amer­i­ca has been generally conducted u ­ nder the frameworks of ethnic studies and diplomatic history. The approaches of ethnic studies in Latin Amer­i­ca treat the experience of Japa­nese communities, past and pre­sent, in the historical context of Latin American socie­ties. Starting in the early period of the Cold War, scholars in Japan and the US together launched a series of ethnographic studies of the Japa­nese communities in Latin Amer­i­ca. Grounded on the logic of modernization, scholars like Izumi Sei’ichi (1957), Saitō Hiroshi (1960), Harvey Gardiner (1975), James Tigner (1981), and Robert Smith (1979) have elaborated the social and cultural successes the Japa­nese communities managed to achieve in their host socie­ties through agricultural activities and education.21 They have highlighted the enormous economic, cultural, and social contributions Japa­nese immigrants made to their host countries. ­These ­earlier studies, mainly in En­glish and Japa­nese, also inspired a ­whole generation of Latin American researchers—­most of them members of the Nikkei community—to survey the origins, consolidation, and presence of their own ethnic group. The early works of such scholars as Amelia Moritomo (1979) and Jorge Nakamoto (1988) are good examples of this pro­cess.22 Since the last de­cade of the twentieth c­ entury, a growing number of scholars have begun to examine the experience of Latin Americans of Japa­ nese ancestry who have migrated to Japan as foreign workers and are commonly known as Nikkeijin. The discrimination the Nikkeijin face at work and in the broader Japa­nese society due to their heritage and cultural background has been a constant topic of discussion among scholars. Studies of

6 Introduction

Nikkeijin belong to the category of ethnic studies in Japan, closely associated with studies of the experiences of other ethnic minorities in Japa­nese society, such as Koreans and Indigenous p ­ eople.23 The lit­er­a­t ure on Nikkeijin profoundly differs from the scholarship on Japa­nese immigrants in Latin Amer­i­ca countries in terms of methodologies and debates, b ­ ecause they are situated in two dif­fer­ent social contexts with distinct historical and cultural experiences. But they also mirror one another as both fall into the domain of ethnic studies in their own national contexts.24 At the turn of the twenty-­first ­century, joining the boom in diaspora studies, a growing number of scholars began to examine the experience of Japa­nese communities in Latin Amer­i­ca by highlighting their roles as cultural diplomats between the two sides of the Pacific. This trend of scholarship was made pos­si­ble, on one hand, by the increase in the Japa­nese government’s funding of related research and, on the other, by the growth of Japa­nese communities in Latin Amer­i­ca as a po­liti­cal force. Alberto Fujimori’s success in becoming the first Latin American president of Japa­nese descent in the 1990s strengthened the academic interest in the Japa­nese legacy in the Amer­i­cas at both ends of the Pacific Ocean. Japa­nese funds facilitated the training of Nikkei academics in Japan (including language acquisition in some cases) and supported the establishment of international research proj­ects, such as the Discover Nikkei Proj­ect, which examines Japa­nese mi­grants and their descendants.25 Moreover, the cele­brations of the first hundred-­year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and vari­ous Latin American nations, as well as the commemoration of the inception of Japa­nese migration to Brazil, promoted the publication of commemorative volumes that examined the history of the Japa­nese influence on the continent.26 The works of such scholars as Cecilia Onaha, Celia Sakurai, Marcia Takeuchi, Francisco Hashimoto, Sergio Hernández Galindo, Mary Fukumoto, and Isabelle Lausent-­Herrera illustrate this momentum.27 In addition, a more traditional diplomatic history approach to Japan–­Latin Amer­i­ca relations also gained popularity among researchers on both sides of the Pacific Rim who studied Japan’s diplomatic relations with Latin Amer­i­ca both in the past and at the pre­sent.28 As a result, by the turn of the new millennium, a robust corpus of scholarly works emerged—­that mainly dealt with ethnicity and diplomacy—­a long with a vibrant generation of young scholars. Transnational proj­ects such as Encyclopedia of Japa­nese Descendants in the Amer­i­cas (2002) and New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and P ­ eople of Japa­nese



Lu and Iacobelli

7

­ escent in the Amer­i­cas and from Latin Amer­i­ca in Japan (2002) showcase D ­these trends.29 While research in ethnic studies in both Latin American and Japa­nese contexts as well as in diplomatic history remain absolutely necessary, it is no longer sufficient. ­These nation-­bound narratives are incapable of capturing the critical role of the Japa­nese empire in vari­ous aspects of Japan’s involvement with Latin Amer­i­ca in the modern era. This book joins a group of innovative studies on the Japa­nese empire in recent years that have started to shed light on this topic by transcending the bound­aries of national history.30 Our goal is not only to illustrate the transoceanic connections but also to analyze Japa­nese colonialism and expansionism within a broad frame of global transformations.31 To this end, the book focuses on the ways in which the Japa­nese empire ­shaped the transoceanic movements of ­people, institutions, and ideas. It further considers the lasting consequences of ­these movements for the region’s social relations, cultures, and politics. It also pays attention to the transnational connections between business, cultural values, and politics within the broader Japa­nese diaspora in the Amer­i­cas and compares the interactions the Japa­nese empire had with Latin Amer­i­ca to ­t hose with North Amer­i­ca. By exploring ­these long-­neglected aspects of Japa­nese global expansion, this volume moves our understanding of the Japa­nese empire’s significance beyond Asia and rethinks its legacy in global history.

Main Themes The experience of the Japa­nese empire in Latin Amer­i­ca is vast. While migration is a critical part of it, other aspects are equally relevant to understanding the depth and polychromatic characteristics of the phenomena at both ends of the Pacific Rim. The core themes of this book include institutions, settlers, ideas, and legacies. The individual chapters cover a variety of topics, such as economic expansion, migration management, cross-­border community making, the surge of pro-­Japan propaganda in the Amer­i­cas, the circulation of knowledge, and the repre­sen­ta­tion of the Other in Japa­ nese and Latin American fictions. Together, this volume pre­sents a new narrative of the Japa­nese experience in Latin Amer­i­ca by excavating transpacific perspectives that shed new light on the global significance of Japa­nese colonialism and expansionism.

8 Introduction

Institutions First and foremost, Japan’s state apparatus was the central planner and a critical driving force of the empire’s expansion in Latin Amer­i­ca. It is hard to overstate the importance of Tokyo in almost all major aspects of the Japa­ nese presence in Latin Amer­i­ca. The first three chapters, accordingly, analyze the direct roles played by the imperial government in managing emigration and promoting trade with countries in Latin Amer­i­ca as well as how the government itself changed through the pro­cess. Toake Endoh’s chapter examines the po­liti­cal implications of Japan’s emigration policy ­toward Latin Amer­i­ca before World War II. A large number of the emigrants ­were guided and sponsored by their own government. This transpacific migration is distinct ­because of its anomalous pattern of immigration: Japa­nese emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca was not entirely eco­nom­ically motivated; Tokyo’s emigration policies continued despite migrant-­settlers’ ordeals and rising anti-­Japanese sentiment in the receiving socie­ties; and the origin of Japa­nese emigrants geo­graph­i­cally concentrated in the southwestern part of Japan. Driven by t­ hese puzzles, the chapter focuses on the intentions, perceptions, ideology, and actions of Japan’s migration-­sending state in advancing the elusive policy as a “national imperative.” Endoh’s state-­centric analy­sis sheds light on the convoluted relationship between the Japa­nese government and the emigrants, as well as the historicity of this transpacific migration within the larger framework of prewar Japan’s nation building beyond its territory. It provides a systemic explanation of the po­liti­cal essence of Latin American emigration policy, that is, “state expansion through ­human exclusion.” The emigration policy had dual purposes: (1) internally, to decompress social protest and radicalism and assure stability by physically removing abroad the seeds of social havoc; and (2) internationally, to support prewar Japan’s imperialist ambition for wealth, power, and status through its organic ties with its co-­ethnic diaspora. The empire attempted to substantiate its claim of “deterritorialized” sovereignty by mobilizing diasporic resources and symbols in Latin Amer­i­ca and expanding its sphere of influence in the Western Hemi­sphere. Latin Amer­i­ca was also a critical component of the expanding maritime network of the Japa­nese empire, as Elijah Greenstein’s chapter demonstrates. In addition to more familiar pro­cesses of territorial acquisition and emigration, Japan’s rise as a modern empire also entailed efforts to dominate oceans and seas. Its aggressive efforts to develop colonies and



Lu and Iacobelli

9

a­ reas of informal influence w ­ ere paralleled by and entangled with its concerted endeavor to carve out a place for commercial ships in world shipping. From the late nineteenth to the mid-­twentieth ­century, Japa­nese expansionists joined other empire builders in the world who projected their aspirations onto world shipping routes, key arenas where imperial competition and interaction played out. Japan’s shipping routes to Latin Amer­i­ca constituted one such trajectory for the empire’s oceanic expansion. In the immediate wake of the Russo-­Japanese War (1904–1905)—­which cemented Japan’s control over ­Korea and extended its reach into Manchuria—­t he Oriental Steamship Com­pany (Tōyō Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha) opened the first Japanese-­flagged ser­v ice to the West Coast of Latin Amer­i­ca. Several years l­ater, to maintain this transpacific connection, Tokyo began to subsidize the com­pany’s sailings. A de­cade l­ater, as world shipping was torn apart and reassembled during World War I, two more firms established ser­vices to the East Coast of Latin Amer­i­ca via India and South Africa. In the de­cades between the end of one world war and the onset of another, Japa­nese firms continued to link ports across Latin Amer­i­ca into an increasingly dense network of transportation ser­v ices. Greenstein’s chapter examines the establishment of Japan’s shipping ser­v ices to Latin Amer­i­ca from the end of the Russo-­ Japanese War u ­ ntil their suspension in the months before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. It situates t­ hese developments within discourses and pro­cesses of Japa­nese expansion and thereby traces how Latin Amer­ i­ca factored into Japan’s efforts to assume a place in the world as a maritime empire. Sidney Lu’s chapter, on the other hand, explains how Japa­nese emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca in general and Brazil in par­tic­u­lar transformed the nature of Japan’s imperial government itself. To maximize its ability to facilitate Brazil-­bound migration in the 1920s and early 1930s, the imperial government undertook a series of structural changes and found new ways to expand its collaboration with dif­fer­ent social groups to promote and manage emigration. ­These changes led to the formation of what Lu calls Japan’s migration state, which would ­later relocate hundreds of thousands of its subjects to Manchuria and Southeast Asia during World War II. The boom of interwar Japa­nese migration to Brazil, as this chapter demonstrates, laid the foundation for the rise of Japan’s migration-­driven total empire during World War II. Therefore, in a broad sense, the chapter challenges the conventionally territory-­based understanding of the Japa­nese

10 Introduction

empire by analyzing the continuities and connections between Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca and Japan’s colonial empire in Asia.

Settlers Chapters 4 through 6 look at the experience of Japa­nese mi­grants themselves in Latin Amer­i­ca from trans-­American and transpacific perspectives. They remind us that a mi­grant’s journey never completely ends as we can find scaled-­down migration systems within the host nation or across borders and, thus, challenge the nation-­based narratives of Japa­nese migration and ethnic experience that tend to dominate our current historical understanding. Moreover, t­ hese chapters bring to the fore the ubiquitous presence of the Japa­nese empire’s agencies in Latin Amer­i­ca, which in turn ­shaped the immigrant communities through their diplomatic missions and technical assistance. Indeed, as p ­ eople moved, they carried capital, ideas, and skills with them. We call Japa­nese mi­grants in Latin Amer­i­ca “settlers” to highlight their ties with vari­ous aspects of Japa­nese colonialism and expansionism. Eiichiro Azuma takes on Japa­nese trans-­American migration along the interconnected “frontier” of California and northern Mexico. During the 1910s and early 1920s, the brunt of white American racism—­federal immigration exclusion and the state ban on Japa­nese landownership and tenancy—­rendered “racism-­free” Mexico particularly desirable for Issei remigration from California while si­mul­ta­neously making the territories south of the border an entry point of unauthorized Japa­nese mi­grants into the US West. This chapter traces ­these complex cir­cuits of Japa­nese mobility and settlement, which turned California and Baja California into an integrated space for Japa­nese immigrant settler colonialism before World War II. This transborder community of self-­styled Japa­nese frontiersmen offers an example of historical formations that are now difficult to detect in existing ethnic narratives. The nationalized histories of Japa­nese Amer­ i­ca and Japa­nese Mexico have obfuscated their prewar ties and connections. Ayumi Takenaka bridges the local and the global in her discussion of Japan’s role in the development of the Japa­nese Peruvian community. While Japa­nese settlers in Peru w ­ ere victims of racial discrimination, some of them became part of the story of successful incorporation and upward social mobility. For the author, this cannot be understood solely by domestic ­factors nor by the individual or collective effort of the immigrants. Ever



Lu and Iacobelli

11

since the first group of Japa­nese immigrants arrived in Peru in 1899, the Japa­nese government has played an influential role in shaping the immigrant community by pouring in resources through its emigration and subsequent diaspora policies (­until this day). In other words, Takenaka looks into how Tokyo exerted influence in building immigrant communities as its “outposts” abroad and how Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants sought self-­ empowerment by relating and resorting to Japan as their “­mother country.” Together with California, Mexico, and Peru, the case of Japa­nese agricultural settlers in Brazil shows how both internal and external forces ­shaped mi­grant communities. Andre Kobayashi Deckrow’s chapter shows that between 1920 and 1935, some 200,000 farmers moved from Japan to rural Brazil, primarily the state of São Paulo, as part of a migratory program or­ga­nized by governments in both countries. The migratory arrangement saw Brazilian state governments ceding large parcels of supposedly empty lands, nucleos coloniais, to Japa­nese state-­led migration companies, who w ­ ere then contractually required to ­settle large numbers of Japa­nese families on t­ hese lands and make them agriculturally productive. As Kobayashi points out, u ­ nder the terms of the nucleo system, the Japa­nese government-­r un Overseas Development Com­pany was primarily responsible for working with local Brazilian governments to ensure the overall economic and social well-­being of ­these settler communities, including establishing agronomic offices and primary schools. Migration was, among other ­t hings, a contractual relation between Japa­nese mi­g rants and the semiprivate migration com­pany. This chapter assesses how the migration com­pany sought to fulfill its l­egal responsibilities to its settlers and local governments.

Identities In addition to the materialistic ties between settlers and the empire, this volume also explores the roles the empire played in the pro­cess of settler identity formation in Latin Amer­i­ca. Seth Jacobowitz’s chapter argues that Japa­nese migration to Mexico, Brazil, and Peru, from its very inception, should be considered within the context of Japa­nese colonialism and expansionism. The genre of settler-­colonist fiction emerged in the pages of proexpansionist magazines to promote Japa­nese migration to Latin American precisely when the Gentlemen’s Agreements restricted Japa­nese immigration to the US and Canada in 1908. Th ­ ese fictions, as he points out, rationalized

12 Introduction

Japa­ nese expansion by juxtaposing an overpopulated Japan with an empty and wealthy Latin Amer­i­ca. If the colonialist and expansionist discourses in Japan set a stage for the beginning of Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca, it was the vibrant circulation of information between East Asia and the Amer­i­cas that allowed the Japa­nese empire to stay at the center of the cultural life of the Japa­nese communities on the other side of the globe. Yoshitaka Hibi’s chapter illustrates the transoceanic and trans-­A merican distribution networks of Japa­nese books and magazines before World War II. Through the case of Mochizuki Seiji, president of the Japa­nese book distribution com­pany Nippon Shuppan Bōeki Co., Ltd (Japan Publications Trading Co., Ltd.), the chapter explains how book and newspaper shops emerged in Japa­nese communities in the Amer­i­cas and how book distribution companies managed to tie ­these shops with publishers in the Japa­nese empire. In a similar vein, the circulation of knowledge and ideas across the Pacific provided the framework for Japa­nese po­liti­cal activism in the Amer­i­ cas. As Facundo Garasino explains in his chapter, Japa­nese mi­g rants in Buenos Aires translated Japa­nese imperial ideologies into a universalist narrative of civilization and integrated it into Argentinian discourses of ethnic nationalism. Indeed, ­people such as Shinya Yoshio, a Japa­nese merchant and journalist, or­ga­nized pro-­Japan propaganda during the 1930s in cooperation with the local elites of Buenos Aires and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, Japan’s first national institution for cultural diplomacy. The case of Shinya epitomizes the intellectual and po­liti­cal attempts of Japa­nese mi­ grant elites to reframe Japa­nese colonialism and expansionism as part of the pro­cesses of nation and empire building in Latin Amer­i­ca to define their own identities in the New World.

Legacies The Japa­nese empire left a mark on Latin Amer­i­ca that is hard to ignore. The prewar deployment of institutions and mass migration programs as part of the po­liti­cal and cultural penetration in the region had long-­lasting effects on local socie­ties. The book’s final section brings to the fore two intriguing stories that demonstrate the broader legacies of the Japa­nese empire on both sides of the globe. Hiromi Mizuno’s chapter reveals the imprint of the empire on the postwar state-­led emigration program to the Dominican Republic. It draws on cases of second-­time mi­grants, who had partici-



Lu and Iacobelli

13

pated in the prewar migration program in Asia (Manchuria and ­Korea) and, upon repatriation, joined the postwar agricultural land development program (sengo kaitaku) in Japan. Mizuno also explains how the Japa­nese government continued to use the claim of “overpopulation,” common rhe­ toric to justify the empire’s expansion before 1945, to promote emigration to the Ca­rib­bean ­after the war. From an institutional point of view, Japa­ nese migration to Central Amer­i­ca also shows the disruption and changes between the prewar migration policy and its postwar version. The imprint of the empire is also pre­sent in the popu­lar culture of Japa­ nese communities in Latin Amer­i­ca t­ oday. As Ignacio López-­Calvo points out in the final chapter, the never accomplished proj­ect of Japa­nese formal expansion into Latin Amer­i­ca remains alive in Nikkei lit­er­a­t ure. While most Japa­nese Brazilian lit­er­a­ture tends to con­ve­niently avoid dealing with Japa­nese imperialism and colonialism, some works do contemplate and even critique links between Japa­nese immigration in Latin Amer­i­ca and imperial expansion. For instance, Ryoki ­Inoue’s novel, Saga (2006), explores the shameful episode of Shindō Renmei’s terrorism in the context of Japa­nese imperial ideology, including the concept of yamato-­damashii, emperor worship and the belief in Japan’s military invincibility. Saga also re­creates the presence of former imperial military officers, such as Junji Kikawa, among the leaders of this organ­ization. Another work that reaches similar conclusions is Jorge J. Okubaro’s O Súdito (Banzai, Massateru!) (2008), where the protagonist, Massateru, is portrayed as a victim of Japa­nese ultranationalist education. Okubaro even went as far as to suggest that Japa­nese emigration policies in the period before World War II had clearly become a means for the empire’s territorial expansion. In sum, this collaborative study illustrates vari­ous aspects of the enduring presence of the Japa­nese empire in Latin Amer­i­ca that have received ­little attention in the extant lit­er­a­ture. From dif­fer­ent disciplinary perspectives, it demonstrates that the history and legacies of the Japa­nese empire cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of its multiple layers of connections and transformations across the Pacific Ocean. From a Latin American perspective, this book makes the case for opening up its national histories to Asia, a point that the established historiography has failed to acknowledge. The focus on Japan and Latin Amer­i­ca is a methodological choice as well. Departing from US or Eurocentric views that place the North Atlantic as a driving force in world history, the study brings fresh insights on the mutual interdependence between Asia and Latin Amer­i­ca.

14 Introduction

Beyond connections, it bridges the studies of Japan and the studies of Latin Amer­i­ca more broadly and serves to advance our knowledge in the growing field of global history.

Notes 1. ​“Shokumin Kyōkai Setsuritsu Shoisho,” pp. 105–107. 2. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 58–61; Ota Mishima, Siete migraciones japonesas, ch. 1. 3. ​Lu, “­Great Convergence.” 4. ​Peattie, Nan’yō, pp. 6. 5. ​Shigetaka, Nan’yō Jiji, pp. 13–15. 6. ​A zuma, “Japa­nese Immigrant Settler Colonialism,” pp. 257–271; Azuma, In Search, pp. 135–149; Lu, Japa­nese Settler Colonialism, pp. 164–179. 7. ​Iriye, Pacific Estrangement. 8. ​Iriye, ­After Imperialism; Miller, Bankrupting the ­Enemy; Lu, “Colonizing Hokkaido.” 9. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan; Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca. 10. ​Myers and Peattie, Japa­nese Colonial Empire; Suzuki, Nihonjin dekasegi imin; Uchida, Brokers of Empire. 11. ​Hayashiya, “Nihon to Raten Amerika.” 12. ​Torres, Japoneses Bajo El Sol; Smith, “Ethnic Japa­nese in Brazil.” 13. ​Patrick, “Economic Muddle.” 14. ​Kawakatsu, Lancashire Cotton Industry. 15. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” p. 310. 16. ​Ikeda, Japan in Trade Isolation; Ishi, “Senkanki Nihon.” 17. ​Gasquet, El llamado de Oriente; Said, Orientalism; Sneider, Tea­house of the August. 18. ​“Shokuminchi ni taisuru honkai no iken,” Ensei, no. 5 (September 1891): 2, cited from Azuma, “Japa­nese Immigrant Settler Colonialism,” p. 260; Lesser, Discontented Diaspora, p. 5. 19. ​Sand, “Reconfiguring Pacific History.” 20. ​Notably, in Japan, where Latin American studies do not take into consideration the Japa­nese historical influence, see, for example, Masuda, Estudios Latinoamericanos. The historical formation of area studies in the US has been amply studied; see, for example, Morris-­Suzuki, “Anti-­A rea Studies”; Harootunian, History’s Disquiet; Iacobelli, “James Tigner.” 21. ​Izumi, Imin; Saitō, Burajiru no Nihonjin; Gardiner, Japa­nese and Peru; Tigner, “Japa­nese Immigration into Latin Amer­i­ca”; Smith, “Ethnic Japa­nese in Brazil.” 22. ​Morimoto, Los inmigrantes; Nakamoto, “Discriminación y aislamiento.” 23. ​Weiner, Japan’s Minorities, for example, defines and analyzes Nikkeijin as an ethnic minority who share a similar predicament with other ethnic minorities in Japan, such as Koreans, Chinese, and the Ryukyuans. 24. ​Salient works of Tsuda and Nishida demonstrate the comparability of ­these two paradigms of ethnic studies by synthesizing Japa­nese Brazilians’ ethnic encounters in both Brazilian and Japa­nese socie­ties. See Tsuda, Strangers; and Nishida, Diaspora and Identity.



Lu and Iacobelli

15

25. ​More information on this proj­ect can be found on its website: http://­w ww​ .­discovernikkei​.­org​/­. 26. ​For example, Socieda de Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa, Uma Epopeia Moderna; Nihon Aruzenchin Kyōkai, Nihon Aruzenchin kyōkai. 27. ​Onaha, “Sensen no ijūsha”; Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente; Wakatsuki and Kunimoto, La inmigración; Sakurai, Romanceiro da imigração Japonesa; Hashimoto, Sol nascente no Brasil; Takeuchi, O perigo amarelo; Galindo, La guerra. 28. ​For example, Ninomiya “O centenário”; Muñoz, Japón y la Argentina; Castellón and Pozo, “Historia”; Iacobelli “Empire of Japan”; Uscanga, “La Armada Imperial Japonesa.” 29. ​K ihumura and Imouye, Encyclopedia of Japa­nese Descendants; Hirabayashi, Kikumura-­Yano, and Hirabayashi, New Worlds, New Lives. 30. ​The works that have inspired this book include but are not l­imited to Endoh, Exporting Japan; Kingsberg, “Becoming Brazilian,” and “Japan’s Inca Boom”; Shiode, Ekkyōsha no seijishi; Negawa and I­ noue, Ekkyō to rendō; Iacobelli, Postwar Japa­nese Emigration; Azuma, In Search; and Lu, Making of Japa­nese. 31. ​As such, this book echoes the call of Sheldon Garon to rethink world history through the lens of Japan. Garon, “Transnational History.”

c h a p t e r

1

Turning the W ­ ater into Fair Pools Prewar Japan’s Paternalistic Outreach in Its South American Emigration Policy Toake Endoh

E

quatorial crossings by Japa­nese to the Ibero-­Americas commenced around the turn of the twentieth c­ entury. Beginning as an offshoot of the mainstream of Japa­nese migration to Hawai‘i and North Amer­i­ca, this migratory flow grew into a monumental movement, surpassing North Amer­i­ca–­bound migration in the 1920s and 1930s. The growth of Japa­nese migration to the region—­mainly Peru and Brazil—­owed much to the direct involvement of the sender state of Japan. The state-­guided migration to South Amer­i­ca was also distinguished by conundrums. For one, many mi­ grants experienced hardships and suffering in their settlements as a result of the state-­directed “downward” migration to less-­or undeveloped areas. Despite the mi­grants’ ordeals in unwelcoming circumstances in the receiving nations, Japan insisted on advancing the audacious emigration proj­ect. Further, Japa­nese emigration policy as kokusaku (strategic national policy) depended heavi­ly on certain regions for the recruitment of emigrants. To unwrap this elusive emigration policy, I look into the domestic po­liti­cal foundations of the policy and its international dimensions. What social prob­ lems did the Japa­nese state perceive and attempt to remedy via emigration? How did the national policy become so locally specific (i.e., in its geo­graph­ i­cal concentration in western Japan)? Using a state-­centric paradigm, this study focuses on the perceptions, ideas, and actions of the sender state of Japan—­the key enabler of South American migration (hereafter SAM)—­ through its policies and institutions. I also explore how SAM encapsulates prewar imperialist Japan’s expansionist ideology. What material or symbolic role did the state assign to its subjects in advancing this national goal? Adapted from my work Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca (2009), this chapter pre­sents the distinct form of governance 16

Endoh

17

­ anifested by the SAM policy. I conceptualize SAM as po­liti­cal machinm ery for nation builders comprehending two dimensions: one side is internal control (decompressing social dissatisfaction and restoring order by removing undesirables), and the other, grasping, imperialistic ambition for wealth, power, and status, by mobilizing diasporic resources and symbols into frontier developments in the Western Hemi­sphere. What emerges from that dualistic emigration-­colonial policy—­exclusion h ­ ere and inclusion ­there—is a convoluted po­liti­cal relationship between the prewar authoritarian state and its unwanted populations.

Unorthodox Patterns of Japa­nese Emigration Japa­nese migration to the Iberian Amer­i­cas started relatively late and on a more ­humble scale, like a branch, than the main streams to Hawai‘i and North Amer­i­ca. The first significant arrival on the South American continent was a cohort of 790 contract workers to Peru in 1899, more than three de­cades a­ fter the first Japa­nese l­abor migration to Hawai‘i in 1868.1 ­A fter them, Japa­nese emigration continued in parallel with the larger flows to Hawai‘i and the continental US. Early Japa­nese immigrants, mainly dekasegi (temporary mi­grant workers), had their eyes on the mainland US. Nowhere ­else in the Amer­i­cas could match the US ­labor market, which offered better wages and job opportunities.2 The Latin American economy was generally agrarian and less affluent by Western Hemi­sphere standards. In the eyes of early mi­grants, the region was their second or third choice or a transit point for their eventual entry into the US.3 Such negative prospects ­were reflected in the stagnation of early Japa­nese immigration t­ here. From the mid-1920s, though, the currents of transpacific Japa­nese migration changed, and the branch became the mainstream. In the 1920s, Latin American migration surged to 85,342, a 40-­percent increase from the previous period (see ­table 1.1). The region became the most popu­lar destination among the Japa­nese, absorbing 53.3 ­percent of all 160,049 mi­grants. Another 97,962 persons followed in the following de­cade. This surge contrasted with, and in fact substituted for, the sharp decline in North Amer­i­ca–­ bound migration, which was constrained by the American Japa­nese Exclusion Act of 1924. Latin Amer­i­ca—­specifically Peru in the 1920s and Brazil in the 1930s—­attracted the most Japa­nese mi­grants to the Amer­i­cas u ­ ntil

18

Chapter 1

T ­ ABLE 1.1 

Japa­nese Immigration by Destination (1868–1941) 1901–1920

1921–1930

1931–1941

Total (1868–1941)

911

60,731

85,342

97,962

244,946

Argentina

0

811

2,100

2,487

5,398

Bolivia

0

17

64

168

249

Brazil

0

28,661

70,913

89,411

188,985

Paraguay

0

0

1

708

709

Peru

790

19,378

9,172

3,730

33,070

Mexico

121

11,428

2,141

977

14,667

­Others

0

436

951

481

1,868

129,593

206,698

37,192

727

374,210

United States

30,130

61,018

16,105

0

107,253

Hawai‘i

90,572

128,124

12,484

0

231,180

Canada

8,891

17,556

8,603

727

35,777

Asia and South Pacific

5,202

32,369

26,333

28,463

92,367

33,069

14,764

11,182

5,786

64,801

168,775

314,562

160,049

132,938

776,324

Destination Latin Amer­i­ca

North Amer­i­ca

­Others Total

1868–1900

Source: Composed by the author based on JICA data. Kokusai Kyōryoku Jigyōdan, Kaigai ijū tōkei: Shōwa 27 nen–62 nen (Tokyo: Kokusai Kyōryoku Jigyōdan, 1987). Note: The ­table excludes twenty-­six persons whose destinations ­were unknown and excludes emigrants to Manchuria, K ­ orea, Taiwan, and other Japa­nese colonies.

the outbreak of World War II and the severing of bilateral relations. In the following, I provide a brief overview of how equatorial crossings by Japa­nese to South Amer­i­ca, mainly Peru and Brazil, evolved ­under tense sociopo­liti­cal circumstances. South American socie­ties, whose nation building depended more on African slaves or Eu­ro­pean immigrants than on Asian mi­grants, exhibited ambivalence about the arrival of Japa­nese ­labor mi­grants on their soil. They desired mi­grants as l­ abor but rejected them—­especially ­people of color—

Endoh

19

as ­humans. In Peru or Brazil, it was agribusiness, keen to secure cheap and sufficient l­abor for their plantations, that actively advocated Japa­nese immigration initiatives to their po­liti­cal patrons in the executive offices, including the president of Peru and sugar hacienda owner Augusto B. Leguía (1919–1930) and the coffee state governments of São Paulo and Minas Gerais in Brazil (authorized to import foreign mi­grants at that time). As Japa­nese immigrants increased in number and presence, however, ethnic chauvinism among locals, especially urban residents, reared its head. Immigration restrictionists, representing xenophobic public opinion, succeeded in legislating bills to curb Japa­nese inflows. Amid invigorated hate politics, the attitudes of the Peruvian and Brazilian governments t­ oward Japa­ nese immigrants vacillated between inclusion (pro-­migration) and exclusion (antimigration and race-­based restriction), increasingly inclining ­toward the latter. Triggered by Amer­i­ca’s ­Great Depression beginning in 1929, economic turbulence bred po­liti­cal instability in Latin American nations and disrupted Japa­nese immigration. The host countries’ immigration policies, as well as Japa­nese immigrants, lost their po­liti­cal patrons. Incoming leadership, such as Peru’s Luis M. Sánchez Cerro and Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas, was nationalist, openly anti-­Japanese immigration, and soon anti-­Japan in its alliance with the US in international relations. The populist nationalists portrayed the Japa­nese settlers as peons of the sugar and coffee barons and thus enemies of the regimes and their working-­class allies. Discriminatory mea­sures to narrow Japa­nese immigration (e.g., the Act to Restrict the Immigration of Aliens by Two P ­ ercent in Brazil from 1935) or to limit employment opportunities for the Japa­nese (Peru’s Act No. 7505 in 1932) ­were passed. Such anti-­Japanese legislation invigorated street demonstrations. In a riot in Peru’s capital, Lima, in 1930, one Japa­nese national was killed, and ethnic businesses and properties ­were damaged or looted. The government of Japan (hereafter GOJ) lodged an official diplomatic complaint and a demand for monetary compensation with the Sánchez Cerro government, in vain.4 Ironically, adversity in the receiving countries hardly arrested the Japa­ nese influx. Japan continued to pour out more mi­grants, and South American emigration crested in the mid-1930s, with 23,300 mi­grants in 1933 and 22,900 in 1934. The principal ­factor was the sender state of Japan, which entered the international migration business, applying its new migration/settlement stratagem. Since the 1880s, Japa­nese migration to the

20

Chapter 1

Amer­i­cas had been underwritten by private migration agencies; it was etatized in the mid-1920s as kokusaku. The reasons for this are multifaceted, as ­will be discussed. As far as the macro environments of international migration are concerned, Tokyo was apprehensive about the ­f uture development of Japa­nese migration if it remained laissez-­faire, given the growing anti-­ Japanese politics in host countries. The government had to step in to secure new settlements for immigrants wherever available. ­Under state tutelage in the 1920s and 1930s, Japa­nese immigrants trekked to the frontier, in isolated and deserted hinterlands like the Peruvian jungles, the northern interior of São Paulo and Paraná, the Brazilian Amazon, and rural areas of Paraguay. Th ­ ere, the physical and social infrastructure necessary for subsistence was non­ex­is­tent, let alone commercial or industrial dynamics for prosperity. Settlers reclaimed lands prepared by the GOJ or private entities. Japan’s colonial administrators expected frontier colonization to curb any conflict of economic or cultural interest with locals and to deflate the Japa­nese ethnic presence. In the early 1930s, the Japa­nese consulate in Lima reported to Tokyo that the ongoing settlement proj­ect in the Huallaga Valley would “placate the Peruvian government and diffuse growing anti-­Japanese sentiment” amid the economic instability.5 This rerouting strategy resulted in countless mi­grant hardships and sacrifices. Many mi­grants w ­ ere young families with small c­ hildren—­a result of the GOJ’s decision in 1927 to emphasize family-­based migration. It took them years or generations to achieve self-­sufficiency or commercial success in farming. Not a few settlers gave up and wished to repatriate or remigrate elsewhere. One of the few returnees escaping the economic hardships and the authoritarian Estado Novo of President Vargas (1937–1945) testified that “immigrants’ plights are getting unimaginably worse, and most of the 80,000 immigrants [in Brazil] are desperate to return home.”6 In fact, however, very few returned to Japan. The majority—as many as 85 ­percent of the total number of immigrants to Brazil—­did not (or could not) repatriate and remained in Brazil or remigrated elsewhere.7 Meanwhile, Japan continued to churn out 22,500 more mi­grants, including new brides of settled immigrants, from 1936 till 1941. ­A fter its etatization, SAM apparently deviated from its former pattern or the conventional pattern of international migration. On a micro level, mi­grants (and their families) w ­ ere herded to where opportunities to get rich quick w ­ ere slim. On the macro level, the migratory flow turned downward, from a developing economy (i.e., prewar Japan) to less developed econo-

Endoh

21

mies (new destinations in Latin American backwaters). This downstream pattern runs c­ ounter to the neoliberal explanation of international migration, which argues that a profit-­maximizing agent moves from lower to higher economies.8 Why did the Japa­nese state continue a scheme so deleterious to its own p ­ eople and so dicey in its economic prospects?

Geographic Origins of SAM ­ oday, Japan f­aces what former prime minister Abe Shinzo decried as a T “national crisis” of depopulation, at arguably the fastest pace in the world.9 When SAM started, the demographic threat was overpopulation. Since the early Meiji period (1868–1911), Japan’s population had grown so rapidly—­ about 60  ­percent from 1879 to 1910, for example—­that the land-­and resource-­scarce economy could hardly absorb (into job markets) and support (in basic consumption) the entire population in the pro­cess of modernization and industrialization. Overpopulation, as well as poverty, was particularly severe in rural areas, full of small-­property-­owning or landless peasants.10 Life chances w ­ ere particularly l­imited for second or third sons in the impoverished class due to the primogeniture system: they had to e­ ither become tenants or migrate to cities or overseas for other jobs.11 Per­sis­tent demographic and economic malaise in the countryside provided policy makers with a rationale to employ SAM as an instrument of long-­term structural adjustment. The first such attempt can be traced back to disaster relief in 1923. One month ­after the ­Great Kantō Earthquake ravaged the Tokyo metropolitan area in September, Nihon Imin Kyōkai (Japan Emigration Association), an emigration advocacy group, recommended that the Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet (September 1923–­January 1924) “translocate the excess population overseas and balance out Japa­nese demography” to ease postquake distress and avoid a massive inflow of rural population to Tokyo.12 Following their recommendation, the Yamamoto administration provided a relief program for quake victims to migrate to Brazil, with a two-­ hundred-­yen subsidy of travel expenses for each of the 110 program applicants.13 Subsequently, SAM was incorporated into the policy framework for population adjustment and promoted as national strategic policy with state guidance, financing, and direct engagement. The idea of solving domestic overpopulation through overseas migration was quickly ­adopted in policy maker circles of the time, and “overseas

22

Chapter 1

migration for solving overpopulation” was repeated like a man­tra. The policy’s effectiveness—­whether, that is, it could weather structural crises—­ was rarely examined. A careful reading of the policy debates suggests, however, that migration advocates w ­ ere projecting something other than or beyond the vaguely addressed “overpopulation.” Officials at the Ministries of Internal and Colonial Affairs frequently invoked such po­liti­cal woes as “social uncertainty or instability” and “radicalization ­toward communism” (sekika)—­highly unnerving threats to the establishment—in rationalizing the policy.14 ­These potentially threatening ramifications of national weakening ­were cited by many other SAM proponents but without elaboration. What (or who) was fomenting po­liti­cal instability where, and in what way? How could the emigration policy mitigate the po­liti­cal risk? Another puzzle of SAM policy appears in the geo­graph­i­cal concentration of emigrant origins. During the prewar period, roughly half of South Amer­i­ca–­bound mi­grants came from the western part of Japan, consisting of the eight prefectures (equivalent to provinces) of Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, Saga, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, and Okinawa. I refer to this geo­graph­i­cal cradle of SAM as “western Japan” in this chapter. (Okinawa is excluded from this analy­sis since it was excluded from state-­ directed SAM by the GOJ mostly due to ethnic discrimination against Okinawans.) The region, whose population was merely 17.2 ­percent of the nation’s total as of 1920, supplied 51.8 ­percent of all emigrants to Peru, 35.5 ­percent to Brazil, 30.5 ­percent to Bolivia, and 14.9 ­percent to Argentina.15 Except for the industrial and urbanized Hiroshima and Fukuoka, the region was generally rural, agrarian (or fishery) based, and less developed. Population pressure for emigration—as gauged by population density, landownership (the proportion of land-­poor and landless peasants), ­house­hold debt, and other indicators—­was salient in the region but was not a sufficient condition for the region to champion SAM.16 Other regions or prefectures—­ perhaps the northeast, or Nagano Prefecture—­might have wanted SAM but did not supply many emigrants.17 Further, ­there is evidence that the national strategic policy was rigorously applied to western Japan through its quota system. If the policy was national strategy, why did it become locally specific?18 This intuitive question, together with another puzzle concerning the state’s assertiveness in promoting SAM, begs close examination of the linkage between western Japan and the policy.

Endoh

23

Shedding the Unwanted Contemporaneous with the implementation of state-­g uided SAM in the 1920s, the sociopo­liti­cal climate of western Japan was worsening as antagonism between the ruling bloc and grassroots protesters sharpened. The po­liti­cal liberalization known as the Taishō Democracy empowered the formerly unprivileged and underrepresented to demand more rights and freedoms, assertively or forcefully. While rights crusaders marched most loudly in Tokyo, Osaka, and other urban areas, peripheral regions also took part in the mass protests. In western Japan, local po­liti­cal forces emerged from the very bottom of the social hierarchy: peasants, workers, and social outcasts (the so-­called burakumin, or “­people of the hamlets”).19 ­These marginalized groups and their collective actions, while prevalent in other parts of Japan, developed uniquely on the region’s structural and po­liti­cal vectors. They also made western Japan’s geopo­liti­cal climate distinct and daunting in the eyes of the authorities. The powers of the time problematized endogenous po­liti­cal developments par­tic­u­lar to the region: the synchronization of ­these social movements that arose uniquely from the region’s social matrix, the radicalization of some factions of ­these protesters against the system, and signs of the coalescence of multiple class interests or identities into a united antiestablishment force. I explain t­ hese risk ­factors below. Prewar western Japan was the crucible of modern Japan’s industrial and resource bases. The once-­peripheral region led national production of coal (in Chikuhō and Miike, Fukuoka), steel (in Yahata, Fukuoka), and naval vessels (in Kure, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki). Amid Japan’s imperialist advance to Asia, the military-­industry complexes boosted production, hiring large numbers of workers nationwide. Among coal miners w ­ ere an uncounted but significant number of impoverished burakumin peasants. “Where ­there is a coal mine, ­there is a buraku, and vice versa,” according to a proverb from Chikuhō.20 The strategic industrial significance of western Japan made the power holders—­particularly the military—­hypersensitive to the region’s stability and thus intolerant of any opposition by locals. An admonition uttered by the naval minister and ­later premier (1932–1934) Saitō Makoto against ­labor protests at the Kure Naval Shipyard in Hiroshima in 1912 reveals the rulers’ tenacity: “[The government ­w ill] categorically deny workers’ demands, even at the cost of a temporary closing of the factory.”21 It became established procedure to deploy military troops to coal

24

Chapter 1

miners’ disputes and strikes ­after the miners at Minechi colliery in Tagawa County, Fukuoka, killed imperial soldiers with dynamite in 1918. Unionized peasants and workers—­the Japan Farmers Union or Japan Council of L ­ abor Unions, for instance—­increased their leftist orientation, demanding more workers’ rights and shouting such Marxist slogans as “Land to peasants” or “Realization of a communist society f­ree from exploitation.” The Burakumin’s National Levelers Association attacked the emperor system as the root cause of class stratification and the enduring discrimination against the burakumin.22 Some radical factions of ­these social movements bluntly criticized Japan’s “imperialist wars” in Asia. Further, the Levelers sought an interclass alliance with peasants and the working classes. At their fifth national conference held in Fukuoka in 1926, they called for a united popu­lar front among the nonpropertied classes, with the aim that “multiple classes and strata unite and fight against the common ­enemy in order to realize the common goal beyond conflicts of class interests or difference in po­liti­cal values and world views.”23 How substantial the revolutionary forces mustered by t­ hese marginalized groups for a regime change ­were is one t­ hing; how irritated and intolerant the authoritarian elites grew, scowling at the marginalized protesters’ challenge with contempt, is quite another. On the national front, regime hardliners, including the Justice Ministry, the military, the House of Peers, and big business (represented by Baron Dan Takuma of Mitsui Mining), saw the radicalization of dissent through the lens of security and order and resorted to draconian mea­sures against subversives. On March 19, 1925, the Katō Takaaki cabinet issued the Peace Preservation Law, ­under which any individual or group threatening kokutai (the national polity) or capitalism was resolutely suppressed. Core ele­ments of social radicalism, including the leadership of the Japan Communist Party, farmers’ and workers’ ­unions, and the Burakumin’s National Levelers Association, ­were arrested, imprisoned, or censored. Meanwhile, the Home Ministry sought conciliatory methods more than raw vio­lence, providing welfare, compensation, jobs, and other aid to the needy. Its accommodative approach—­hoping to placate the distressed and dissatisfied masses with material rewards and earn the regime’s legitimacy—­ was a­ dopted by the Tanaka Giichi administration (1927–1929). Addressing the resurgence of the Communist Party, on April 25, 1928, the Lower House passed the resolution, “On the Ideological Crisis of the Nation,” pronouncing that “further advance of communism and other evil ideologies cannot be

Endoh

25

deterred by punishment alone. . . . ​Po­liti­cal safety valve institutions should work as effectively as the penal system in preventing an insurgency.”24 The overseas migration initiative was employed together with antipoverty, anti-­ unemployment, and anti-­leftist mea­sures. The SAM scheme, whose underpinning institutions w ­ ere almost fully laid out by that time, was thus concocted in a policy mix of accommodative politics. From its inception, SAM policy centered unequivocally on the rural population. As noted above, the Yamamoto administration, in implementing the postquake emergency plan to translocate excess agrarian population in 1923, instructed the national emigration and colonization policy companies,25 Kaigai Kōgyō and Nanbei Takushoku, to prioritize poor peasants in providing subsidies for emigration-­related expenses.26 Thereafter, emigration policy focused on the rural peasantry for the purpose of deterring superfluous rural populations from flooding into urban areas and destabilizing the economic, social, or po­liti­cal order. Attesting to this policy orientation, the majority of emigrants on the ships destined for South Amer­i­ca registered as “commoner-­farmers,” apparently preprinted as such on the passenger lists by the emigration companies.27 Local governments in western Japan played a vital role in advancing SAM in their districts. Prefectural, city, and village offices led the national emigration campaign through information dissemination and the recruitment of emigrants in collaboration with local emigration agents, including local branches of the state-­a ffiliated Overseas Emigration Association (OEA) and migration companies. The western prefectures ­were willing, even e­ ager, to take on larger quotas for recruiting emigrants than their peer prefectures, according to internal documents of Kaigai Kōgyō and Nanbei Takushoku.28 It was prob­ably local authorities that felt the urgency of the endogenous po­liti­cal instabilities noted above and the necessity of curbing the resulting po­liti­cal instability most keenly. Hayashida Shunjirō, chairman of the Fukuoka prefectural parliament and the vice chairman of the Fukuoka OEA, deemed overseas migration a method to “solve l­abor, agrarian, social, and ideological prob­lems and realize the welfare of 2.5 million Fukuokans.”29 Prefectural governors must have been motivated out of a sense of po­liti­cal responsibility and accountability to Tokyo since they ­were not elected but w ­ ere appointed by the Home Ministry. Parochial pride as traditional emigration fiefdoms also drove local offices to further the overseas migration movement from their locales. A long

26

Chapter 1

history of overseas migration—­tracing back to the early Japa­nese emigration to Hawai‘i in the 1880s—as well as their “social capital” for international migration, like local and transnational support institutions (e.g., prefecture-­ based associations called kenjin-­kai), knowledge, and experience, substantiated their self-­esteem as dentōteki imin ken (prefectures with a tradition of emigration). Fukuoka governor Matsumoto Manabu, who also chaired the OEA’s Fukuoka branch, wrote in 1930 that “Fukuokans are ambitious and outward-­looking ­people, having pride in advancing thousands of miles away since the ancient times. It is our duty as pioneers in overseas migration to encourage and assist ­others to follow our suit, by sharing our precious experiences with them.”30 Indeed, local activism enabled western Japan to champion SAM for a long time and render the national emigration enterprise locally specific. SAM was promoted for the emancipation and “redemption” of the long discriminated-­against underclass of the burakumin. The idea of “emancipation of the dangerous poor by overseas migration” was already advocated in the early twentieth c­ entury by conservative nationalist thinkers like Tōya­ma Mitsuru and Sugiura Shigetaka (an imperial tutor of the then-­crown prince Yoshihito). 31 Colonial bureaucrat Yanase Keisuke recommended Peru, Mexico, and Taiwan as ideal havens for burakumin salvation, believing that the more remote the destination, the quicker and more perfect their redemption could be.32 Burakumin migration to Latin Amer­i­ca was openly promoted within the framework of the state patronage program Yūwa Jigyō (Proj­ect of Reconciliation and Reincorporation) (1925–1941). The Yūwa proj­ect sought the burakumin’s social and economic redemption through their own efforts at “self-­reliance” and “self-­improvement.” Voluntary migration and realization of a ­free and in­de­pen­dent life in South Amer­i­ca would suit this welfare princi­ple. A part of the overseas emigration bud­get for state subsidies of travel expenses and other settlement costs was appropriated from the Yūwa bud­get ­under the administration of the Social Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry. In 1927, 2,750 yen in total (or 50–100 yen per ­family) was granted to would-be emigrants to Brazil.33 The subsidies continued to grow thereafter. In 1932, the Industrial and Economic Research Council, a governmental study group on the burakumin issue, observed the burakumin’s plight worsening amid the economic depression and released a policy recommendation: “In order to alleviate the population pressure in burakumin hamlets and stabilize their living situation, the government should promote

Endoh

27

emigration to South Amer­i­ca, Manchuria, and Hokkaido.”34 Print media disseminated the state-­funded emancipation-­via-­emigration scheme among the isolated communities. Yūwa jihō, the national newspaper of the Yūwa association, actively promoted Brazil-­bound migration, peppered with such seductive words as “limitless resources of land and nature” and “Brazilian culture of hospitality.”35 SAM was a mighty stone for killing two birds at once: the “burakumin’s emancipation from the agony of discrimination and despisal,” and the elimination of domestic troublemakers on national soil.36 The a­ ctual number of burakumin mi­g rants who went to South Amer­i­ca ­under Yūwa financing and their former occupations remains unknown. ­W hether peasants or coal miners of buraku origins, all ­were recorded as “farmers.”37 The state prescription to curb po­liti­cal opposition via emigration was also applied to the l­abor sector and against l­abor disputes, although the application was less systematic and of smaller scale. One early instance was the Kure Naval Shipyard l­ abor strike in Hiroshima in the post–­World War I period. Upon a large-­scale strike by shipbuilding workers against a massive layoff plan, the com­pany (i.e., the imperial navy) erected a recruitment booth in front of the main gate of the Kure Naval Shipyard, trying to recruit laid-­off workers to volunteer for Brazil-­bound migration.38 Similar attempts w ­ ere directed ­toward laid-­off workers (and their families) at the Sasebo Naval Shipyard in 1924 and 1929,39 as well as at coal mines in western Japan.40 ­These cases, while anecdotal, suggest that the emigration-­as-­ decompressor formula was extended to rural industrial areas experiencing economic turbulence. The SAM policy, originally grounded in a Malthusian rationale, increasingly weighed in on more immediate and concrete sociopo­liti­cal concerns and on western Japan, rife with such prob­lems. It assumed the function of a po­liti­cal safety valve removing perceived sources of current or potential instability via “voluntary” migration and restoring civic order and harmony inside Japan. This method of governance is essentially illiberal, subjugating a person’s (i.e., the emigrant’s) welfare and rights to the state’s higher goal of achieving pro­gress and a unified nation-­state ­under the emperor’s moral authority. That said, labeling the policy kimin (dumping ­people) misses a critical point—­the uniqueness of the SAM policy in its duality and continuity. Internally, SAM policy was part of a matrix of accommodative politics seeking to peacefully and effectively emasculate social opposition and restore po­liti­cal equilibrium while taking care of the rural poor and

28

Chapter 1

socially marginalized by presenting the opportunity of overseas migration. Externally, without severing ties with its translocated subjects, the paternalistic state attempted to “include” t­hose domestically superfluous and undesirable into an i­magined harmonious and perfect nation once translocated overseas, by reprogramming a transborder relationship with the emigrant diasporas. Such paternalistic outreach is another guiding ethos of SAM, which I explain below.

Making of a Double Commodity About three centuries before SAM, Sir Francis Bacon suggested the utility of emigration as a “double commodity” for empire building to King James of ­Great Britain. Bacon’s proposal of 1606 reads: “As if a man ­were troubled for the avoidance of ­water from the place where he hath built his ­house, and afterwards should advice with himself to cast t­ hose w ­ aters, and to turn them into fair pools or streams, for plea­sure, provision, or use. So ­shall your Majesty in this work have a double commodity, in the avoidance of ­people ­here, and in making use of them ­there.”41 I find that this synthesis of migration, social control, and state expansion apprehends SAM’s duality as well as the Japa­nese state’s paternalistic outreach ­toward its subjects overseas. In its pursuit of wealth maximization, Japan sought to deploy Nikkei resources (e.g., mi­grants’ ­labor and capital) onto foreign lands for agricultural development and trade. In this progressive (in the imperialist sense) scheme, emigrants ­were no longer unproductive or undisciplined masses but useful and dutiful surrogate actors in Japan’s expansionist overtures.42 That double commodity would also benefit the Asian empire by utilizing the co-­ethnic diaspora’s po­liti­cal and ideological symbols in elevating its international status. Japan’s overarching international strategy t­ oward Latin Amer­i­ca has been closely examined.43 The topic is to be further explored in other chapters of this volume. Below, I revisit Japan’s transnational statehood, referring to a case of agricultural development in Brazil and Peru. Cotton production was a successful tripartite agri-­development by the Japa­nese state, capital, and migrant-­farmers in prewar Brazil. The fluffy white fiber had been cultivated by small Nikkei farmers in the greater São Paulo area since 1916. It garnered Tokyo’s attention as its rivalries with the US and the British—­major cotton exporters to Japan—­intensified in the 1930s. The

Endoh

29

importer, exposed to the risk of a trade embargo, attempted “diffusion [i.e., diversification] of trade partners.”44 Nikkei farmers should increase their commercial cotton production in Brazil in order to export more cotton to Japan, according to the Colonial Ministry of Japan.45 Nikkei Paulista modernized local cotton concerns, such as Brazcot and Algodeira do Sul Limitada, with Japa­nese capital and expanded their production for export. The first shipment destined for Japan left Port Santos in 1933, with a h ­ umble 79.6 metric tons worth 61,900 yen. By 1937, exports had risen exponentially to 51,445 metric tons (47,890,000 yen).46 Pleased to gain a new trading partner in cotton, Japan still insisted that the imports should be based upon Japa­nese emigration. In the 1936 trade talks, Japan requested more Japa­nese immigration in the northern part of Brazil in exchange for its increased cotton purchases. In fact, Japan’s ambition was higher than business. The Colonial Ministry’s newsletter, Takumu Jihō, stressed that emigration and development ­were mutually reinforcing and inseparable from Japan’s pursuit of international power.47 The same hybrid model of migration and colonization was also applied to Peru. The Colonial Ministry’s staff at the Japa­nese Embassy in Lima identified cotton as a favorable commercial crop since t­ here seemed no conflict of interest with local Peruvian plantations. It instructed Perū Menka K. K., a subsidiary of the national policy com­pany, Kaigai Kōgyō, and other Nikkei concerns to incorporate their cotton production business locally and employ co-­ethnic immigrants as tenants in the coastal areas of Chancay and Cañete or in mountain areas. If needed, the home government provided subsidies or investment capital. Nakauchi Hiroshi, a colonial bureaucrat in Lima, foresaw multiple benefits of the agricultural undertakings: “While alleviating Peruvians’ antipathy against Japa­nese, Japa­nese immigrants are able to prove their loyalty to the country with their work [i.e., cotton farming]; they can also acquire land titles and permanently ­settle in the locales, and Japan can achieve a genuine kaigai hatten [overseas advance].”48 The paternalistic state encouraged the sustainable growth of Nikkei farming, especially family-­based and small-­scale in­de­pen­dent farms, many of which w ­ ere struggling operationally and financially, and encouraged their collectivization and u ­ nionization. The Industrial Promotion Department within the Japa­nese Consulate General in São Paulo financed the formation of the COTIA Trade Union by Nikkei potato farmers in the greater São Paulo area. The Pinheiros-­based association (1928–1994) was

30

Chapter 1

the first and prob­ably the largest state-­sanctioned Nikkei cooperative in Latin Amer­i­ca, boasting 18,000 members at its peak.49 The COTIA incubated cash crops, represented vari­ous produce interests, and engaged in nonfarming communal activities, including infrastructure building, warehousing, loans, ethnic education, and entertainment. All ­these ­were among immea­sur­able benefits for ­union members, who tended to be isolated and marginalized in the larger society. The COTIA achievement spurred about fifty more Nikkei trade associations and cooperatives in the states of São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Paraná by the end of 1934.50 To supervise and communicate (usually Tokyo’s interests) with ­these numerous ­unions, the Colonial Bureau of the Colonial Ministry established the local overseeing association, the Central Association for Japan-­Brazil Trade Associations in 1934. When Nikkei farmers, stirred by “cotton fever,” rushed into cotton crop production, the local consulate sent them the disciplinary message “not to focus too much on cotton, or to seek speculative profits from agriculture.”51 Diversification into noncotton products was encouraged instead, for the sake of sustainable farming. The ingenious synthesis of migration, social control, and paternalistic outreach is not unique to Japan. As quoted above, Francis Bacon articulated the colonization model to James I, and his proposal was practiced by the British in Australia. ­There is no evidence that the Japa­nese state was familiar with the Bacon model and ­adopted it as a national policy, but its essential hybridity is evident in Japan’s colonization of Hokkaido, Taiwan, ­Korea, and Manchuria.52 That said, the SAM enterprise fundamentally diverges from its peers in terms of its extensive control over its co-­ethnic diaspora in other sovereignties (i.e., Latin American nations). On what basis did Japan imagine and attempt to substantiate its extraterritorial rule, which might muddle with South Amer­i­ca’s legal-­formal sovereignty? Law on nationality provided Japan a theoretical basis for its claim on this extraterritorial statehood. Before World War II, a significant (although unaccountable) number of Nikkei immigrants to Latin Amer­i­ca held Japa­ nese passports. Most of the first generation, particularly males, kept Japa­ nese nationality, planning to return home one day. Also, expatriation was technically impossible due to a l­egal catch-22: the GOJ required military ser­v ice of its male citizens before expatriation, whereas, for instance, Brazil ­under President Vargas also required it for naturalization. As a result, many retained Japa­nese nationality. Moreover, many second-­or third-­generation immigrants—­nisei or sansei, respectively—­born to Japa­nese parents in for-

Endoh

31

eign countries held dual citizenship, a result of a difference in citizenship law: many Latin American nations practiced jus soli while Japan observed jus sanguinis. A child born to Japa­nese parents overseas was granted Japa­ nese nationality through Japan’s local consulate, thanks to the international arrangement of birth registration. This registration system also contributed to a numerical expansion of the overseas Nikkei community.53 Dual nationality was de jure prohibited but often tolerated by “home” and host governments. Further, the GOJ willingly made a head count of the unregistered (and thus non-­Japanese) nisei or sansei as “Japa­nese,” to make the co-­ethnic pool larger.54 With this diasporic linkage—­legal or i­magined—in mind, imperialist Japan demanded the diaspora’s economic (as noted above), po­liti­cal, or cultural engagement and contributions, particularly in times of crisis, and reprimanded disloyal or uncooperative be­hav­ior.55 Meanwhile, the state often failed in its responsibilities to protect its nationals—­herein the prewar Law on Immigrants’ Rescue and Repatriation may be relevant—­from perils, such as the economic depression (during which only seventeen Japa­nese immigrants w ­ ere retrieved from Brazil 56) and the race-­driven persecutions in Peru in the early 1930s.57 Some Latin American nations suspected Japan’s paternalistic outreach ­toward its co-­ethnics as a sign of imperialist infiltration of their national sovereignty. “El peligro de la asianización” concerned Peruvians, who saw land acquisition and the implantation of Japa­nese nationals in Japa­nese estates in the countryside.58 The advancement of Japa­nese immigrants and businesses in the Brazilian Amazon was condemned as a step ­toward the “Manchurianization of Brazil” in the words of the anti-­Japanese Brazilian ideologue Miguel Couto.59 To pacify skeptical sovereigns, Japan hid the imperialistic teeth of its migration-­colonization operations. The Nikkei development efforts ­were “not an act of aggression but a peaceful enterprise to be conducted with the agreement of the other [host] nation, whose formal sovereignty Japan fully respected,” a colonial official insisted.60 Land acquisition and owner­ship—­ quin­tes­sen­tial ­matters of sovereignty—­were executed with care. In 1929, the Japa­nese Colonial Ministry directed that “land in Latin Amer­i­ca be purchased and owned by private entities in consideration of Japan’s relations with t­ hese nations.”61 The International Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated, “It is undesirable from an international relations perspective that Japan’s government agencies directly purchase land [in the

32

Chapter 1

Peruvian Amazon].”62 In the states of São Paulo and Pará in Brazil, Junin Province in Peru, or La Colmena in Paraguay, property transactions and management wore a “peaceful guise,” using the private names of such entities as Kaigai Kōgyō or of the individuals who represented ­those organ­ izations.63 It would have been unwise to expose the GOJ’s presence and unnecessarily irritate the host countries, which might halt the colonizing enterprise. The state’s involvement was thus camouflaged. It is hard to imagine that Tokyo’s pacifist pretense dispelled Latin Amer­i­ca’s suspicions. Nonetheless, the host nations allowed Japa­nese immigration and frontier settlement ­until World War II. Latin American government motives w ­ ere prob­ably as pragmatic and shrewd as Japan’s. They tolerated Japan’s colonial endeavors as long as the mi­grants’ reclamation, development, and practical use of lands benefitted the other­w ise stagnant regions. ­A fter all, Japan’s self-­assertive gambits in the South American frontier hinged upon the tacit consent of the host states. The pre­sent study recognizes Japan’s prewar emigration policy ­toward South Amer­i­ca as an integral part of the state’s organic mechanism for social domination and imperialist overtures in the continuum of its efforts at modernization. Originally grounded in a Malthusian rationale—to solve overpopulation and poverty via emigration—­the policy increasingly pivoted to more immediate and imminent po­liti­cal concerns, popu­lar disobedience in par­tic­ u­lar, and t­oward the western part of Japan, rife with such prob­lems. This po­liti­cal decompressor conjoined with Japan’s international ambition to proj­ect power to Latin Amer­i­ca, mobilizing its co-­ethnic diaspora’s material and symbolic resources in the settlements. The hybridization of the policy essence thus prolonged the life of an other­w ise unsustainable emigration policy. A state-­centric approach is useful in revealing the intent of the Japa­ nese state in its elusive SAM policy. The approach also highlights the historical continuity of Japan’s cross-­border migration. The dual strategy of “exclusion h ­ ere and inclusion ­there” was revived in the 1950s and 1960s by demo­cratized postwar Japan. In that time of structural transformations and social discontent with the probusiness and conservative regime, the postwar GOJ revisited the Latin American emigration policy as a safety valve to remove perceived sources of current or potential instability and to improve its international status via emigration.64 Smaller in scale and divergent in destinations (e.g., the Dominican Republic and Bolivia as new

Endoh

33

destinations),65 the postwar policy resonated with the ­earlier regime’s statist and illiberal disposition—­that is, national interests overriding the well-­ being of individual mi­grants. The downward migratory flows to hinterlands (which caused settlers hardship), the geo­graph­i­cal concentration of mi­grant origins in western Japan, and the sender state’s assertions regarding the flawed policy ­were other, repeated patterns. However, state-­centric analy­sis may have compromised a more substantial investigation of the experiences, achievements, and thoughts of Japa­nese mi­grants (and their descendants). The voices and actions of mi­grants, who are also protagonists in the history of South American migration, are far from monolithic, often nuanced, and hard to generalize, s­haped by their personal or social attributes and circumstances.66 They may contest or reject the top-­down, dogmatic thinking of the Japa­nese state. As in their transborder relationships with their “home” state, mi­grants may engage or collaborate with it, defy or disengage from it, or remain in­de­pen­dent. Nikkei Brazilian youths who fought and died as Japa­nese soldiers during World War II67 and the group lawsuit brought by former immigrants to the Dominican Republic against the GOJ in the 1960s are cases in point. H ­ ere, as recent diaspora studies demonstrate, a people-­focused approach certainly reveals numerous, unaccounted chronicles of the state-­society linkage. It also substantiates or reconceptualizes the po­liti­cal community (in this case, Japan) across time and space.

Notes 1. ​A Eu­ro­pean venture transported 153 Japa­nese workers to Hawai‘i without Japa­ nese government authorization (the gannenmono incident of 1868). ­A fter hearing of the quasi-­slave treatment of its citizens on sugar plantations in Hawai‘i, the government hardened its attitude against l­abor emigration. 2. ​Suzuki, Nihonjin dekasegi imin, p. 97. 3. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, p. 33. 4. ​Gaimushō, Amerika-­k yoku, Shōwa jūninendo oyobi jūsannendo, pp. 71–72. 5. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, p. 71. 6. ​Osaka asahi shinbun, dated May 18, 1930. The newspaper article was documented in the MOFA rec­ord, Imin jōhō zassan, Burajiru koku no bu, at the Diplomatic Rec­ords Office (DRO), Tokyo. 7. ​Suzuki, Nihonjin dekasegi imin, pp. 166–67. 8. ​Briggs, International Migration; ­Castles and Miller, Age of Migration; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, Controlling Immigration; Hatton and Williamson, Age of Mass Migration.

34

Chapter 1

9. ​NHK News Web, “Abe shushō.” 10. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese. 11. ​A disproportionately larger number of the second and third sons of agrarian families migrated to Latin Amer­i­ca and, ­later, Manchuria. In contrast, Hawai‘i-­and US-­bound emigration had more f­ amily heads and first sons ­because many emigrants intended to return home a­ fter making their fortune. 12. ​In “Saigai go no shinkō-­saku to shiteno kaigai ijū o shōrei suru no iken,” at the National Archives of Japan (NAJ), Tokyo, 1923. 13. ​Ogishima, “Japa­nese Emigration.” 14. ​See, for example, Takumu-­shō, Ishokumin kōshūkai kōen-­shū, pp. 1–3; Naimu-­ shō, Shakai-­kyoku, Shakai-bu, “Kokumin kōsei undō gaikyō,” in the Database System for the Minutes of the Imperial Diet of the National Diet Library (NDL), Tokyo, http://­w ww​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/­en​/­data​/­diet​.­html. 15. ​Note that the data period differs by destination: 1899–1941 for Brazil; 1899– 1923 for Peru; as of 1941 for Bolivia and Argentina. See Saga-­ken, Saga-­ken kaigai ijū shi, pp. 114, 280, 290; Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol, p. 142; Wakatsuki, Sengo hikiage no kiroku, pp. 23, 25. The proportion of the population of western Japan to the nation’s total was calculated based on the national census: Naikaku Tōkei-­k yoku, Nippon teikoku tōkei nenkan 1882–1940. 16. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan. 17. ​For structural and socioeconomic differences between northeastern and western Japan, see Endoh, Exporting Japan, pp. 109–111. 18. ​Another pos­si­ble explanation of the geo­g raph­i­cal concentration of SAM’s sources is chain migration. While it is true that western Japan historically championed emigrants to the Amer­i­cas, the majority of state-­recruited mi­g rants w ­ ere sent to hinterlands where t­here ­were no compatriot settlers. In some cases, ­earlier Japa­nese settlers opposed the GOJ’s plan to send more settlers or condemned the SAM policy as kimin-­teki (dumping p ­ eople). Endoh, Exporting Japan, p. 184. 19. ​The term burakumin, as used throughout the text, is highly controversial in the ­legal, po­liti­cal, and social worlds of Japan. This social group is so named b ­ ecause they are, historically, the ­people of a “special hamlet” (tokushu buraku). Thus, the word itself is already discriminatory, differentiating this communal group from other Japa­nese based on place of origin or occupation. In this book, I use the term simply as a m ­ atter of pragmatism. 20. ​Fukuoka Buraku-­shi Kenkyūkai, Fukuokaken hisabetsu burakushi, pp. 361–362. 21. ​Hiroshima-­ken, Hiroshimaken ijūshi, p. 1073. 22. ​Nishi Nihon Bunka Kyōkai, Fukuokakenshi, pp. 506–507. 23. ​Shindō, Buraku kaihō undō, p. 148. 24. ​The Resolution of the Lower House of the Diet, “Shisō teki kokunan ni kansuru ketsugi” (April 25, 1928), NAJ. 25. ​The term kokusaku kaisha (national policy companies) is often used to refer to special-­purpose companies ­either funded by the Japa­nese government or established ­under state guidance in the prewar period. 26. ​“Saigai go no shinkō-­saku to shiteno kaigai ijū o shōrei suru no iken,” NAJ, 1923. 27. ​In “Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken, kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, kaigai tokōsha meibo,” exhibit no. 6, “Kazoku imin boshū yoteisū oyobi chihōbetsu

Endoh

35

boshū haitō-­hyō (Showa 5–6), April 1930–­March 1931; “Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken, nanbei takushoku kabushiki kaisha, kaigai tokōsha meibo” (January 1934), DRO. 28. ​“Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken, nanbei takushoku kabushiki kaisha, kaigai tokōsha meibo” (January 1934), DRO 29. ​Fukuoka Kaigai Kyōkai, Hakkō, pp. 4–5. 30. ​Fukuoka Kaigai Kyōkai, Hakkō, p. 3. 31. ​Narusawa, “Yūwa undō to seisaku.” 32. ​Yanase, Shakaigai no shakai. 33. ​“Ijū no shidō, shōrei ni kansuru jikō,” in “Yūwa jigyō ni kansuru sangyō keizai shisetsu yōkō,” in Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūjo, Yūwa jigyō nenkan. 34. ​Osaka Jinken Rekishi Shiryōkan, Manshū imin, p. 47. 35. ​ Yūwa jihō, September 1931; Yūwa jihō, Kyushu regional edition, August 1, 1933. 36. ​Yūwa jihō, no. 86, January 1, 1934. 37. ​A survey of the Nikkei population in Brazil conducted in 1964 found that t­ here ­were 250 “miners and quarrymen” (and their families) among the 10,501 emigrants studied who w ­ ere “nonfarmers” and emigrated during the state-­guided emigration period (1923–1941). Burajiru Nikkeijin Jittai Chōsa Iinkai, Burajiru no Nihon, pp. 378–81. 38. ​Hiroshima-­ken, Hiroshimakenshi, p. 643. 39. ​Ha­ra, “Senkanki Nagasaki-­ken,” p. 75. 40. ​Ueno, Shutsu nippon ki, p. 20. 41. ​From “The Plantation in Ireland,” in Bacon, Works of Lord Bacon. 42. ​Regarding migrant-­settlers’ cooperation with the Japa­nese state, Mackintosh’s comment was instructive: “The fact that migrant-­settlers ostensibly went of their own volition allowed the state to mobilize its settlers ‘inclusively’ as ‘co-­ethnic’ representatives of Japan’s colonial expansion and prestige abroad.” See Mackintosh, review of Exporting Japan. 43. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan; Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca; Normano, “Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil”; Normano, “Japa­nese Emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca.” 44. ​Kaneda, Shōwa jūninen ban, p. 136. 45. ​Takumu-­shō, Menka ni kansuru chōsa. 46. ​Hiroshima-­shi, Kaigai ijū, p. 31. 47. ​ Takumu jihō, no. 8, January–­June 1935, pp. 2–3. 48. ​Takumu-­shō, Perū koku zairyū hōjin, p. 47. 49. ​Nakamura, Burajiru Fukuoka kenjin hattenshi, p. 110. 50. ​Kaneda, Shōwa jūninen ban, p. 110. 51. ​Kaneda, Shōwa jūninen ban, p. 37. 52. ​Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes; Young, Japan’s Total Empire. 53. ​Uchiyama, Sōbō no kyūjūninen, pp. 98–100. 54. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, p. 131. 55. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan; Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca; Normano, “Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil”; Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil.” 56. ​ Osaka asahi shinbun, dated May 18, 1930. The newspaper article was documented in the MOFA rec­ord, Imin jōhō zassan, Burajiru koku no bu, 50, DRO. 57. ​Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle, p. 19.

36

Chapter 1

58. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol, p. 236. 59. ​Kaneda, Shōwa jūninen ban, pp. 78–84. 60. ​The words of Takayama Sanpei, chief of the Colonial Bureau of the Colonial Ministry. Takayama Sanpei, “Waga kuni no ishokumin mondai ni tsuite,” in Takumu-­ shō, Takumu-­k yoku, Takumu jihō, no. 8, January–­June 1935, p. 5. 61. ​­Inoue, “Imin gyōsei.” 62. ​Correspondence from Taketomi of the Bureau of International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the bureau chief of colonial affairs in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, June 3, 1930, in Gaimu-­shō, Imin jōhō zassan. 63. ​The phrase “peaceful guise” was used by Miyasaka Kunihito, the se­nior director of the OEA and the proprietor of the La Colmena colony in Paraguay. Ra Korumena Nijusshūnenshi Kankōkai, Paraguai koku saisho. 64. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan. 65. ​Iacobelli, Postwar Emigration to South Amer­i­ca. 66. ​Handa, Imin no seikatsu; Higashide, Adios to Tears; Lu, Making of Japa­nese; Migita, Mariana sensei; Nakamura, Burajiru Fukuoka kenjin hattenshi; Ueno, Shutsu nippon ki. 67. ​They ­were nisei, sent to and educated in Japan by their parents. Among the martyred, two ­were of Okinawan origin. See Uchiyama, Sōbō no kyūjūninen, pp. 98–100.

c h a p t e r

2

Japa­nese Shipping Lines in Latin Amer­i­ca, 1905–1941 Elijah J. Greenstein

I

n the first half of the twentieth ­century, Japa­nese shipping firms developed an extensive network of shipping lines to Latin American ports, many with state support.1 Ships on ­these lines carried trade between Japan and Latin Amer­i­ca, as well as tens of thousands of Japa­nese immigrants. In facilitating ­these flows of p ­ eople and goods, ­these shipping ser­v ices represented the essential infrastructure of a set of entanglements and interactions between states, socie­ties, nations, and empires in East Asia and the Amer­i­cas. Such entanglements have, at times, been characterized as “transpacific” or constitutive of a larger “Pacific history.”2 Neither term, however, fully captures the scope of the Japa­nese shipping activities that touched on Latin Amer­i­ca. Whereas the two terms lay emphasis on a par­tic­u­lar ocean space (the Pacific), and the former suggests a preoccupation with transit across that space, Japa­nese activities in Latin Amer­i­ca also extended to other ocean spaces and w ­ ere significant in creating, mediating, and transforming connections between a range of ports and regions. To be sure, Japa­nese shipping activities in Latin Amer­i­ca created links across the Pacific, but they also carried flows of traffic in the Indian Ocean, across the Atlantic, between the Amer­i­cas, and along a number of coasts. Japa­nese shipping lines to Latin Amer­i­ca, in other words, can be understood as supportive of a range of “transpacific” proj­ects but also as integral components of the global transportation system beyond the Pacific. Many officials and businessmen consequently suggested that shipping lines ­were critical to securing a place for Japan among the world’s ­great powers. Much as William Tsutsui has argued that efforts to extract marine resources through fisheries represented the making of a “pelagic empire,”3 ­these shipping boosters viewed competition between shipping firms as an extension 37

38

Chapter 2

of interimperial competition. At the same time, shipping lines w ­ ere also linked to other shipping networks, railways, and transportation systems. Similar to network building by land-­based institutions, such as Japan’s South Manchuria Railway,4 Japa­nese shipping firms sought to dominate sea-­ lanes while si­mul­ta­neously integrating ser­vices into multimodal systems that conveyed ­people and goods across oceans, continents, and po­liti­cal borders. Shipping lines thus represented claims on both ocean space and the infrastructure of global circulation. This chapter shows how Japa­nese shipping lines in Latin Amer­i­ca contributed to and w ­ ere ­shaped by t­ hese interlinked expansionary proj­ects.

Transpacific Flows, Interoceanic Infrastructure, and the West Coast Route Japa­nese shipping in Latin Amer­i­ca initially developed along two routes (fig. 2.1). The “South Amer­i­ca West Coast route” (Nanbei seigan kōro) across the Pacific to Mexico, Peru, Chile, and other Pacific-­facing countries, and the “South Amer­i­ca East Coast route” (Nanbei tōgan kōro) across the Indian and Atlantic Oceans to Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina.5 The earliest voyages of Japa­nese ships w ­ ere or­ga­nized around the transport of mi­grant workers, such as the 790 laborers who arrived in Peru aboard the Saikyō Maru in 1899 or the 781 laborers who arrived in Brazil aboard the Kasato Maru in 1908.6 In the early twentieth ­century, Japa­nese shipping firms also began to open regularly scheduled shipping ser­v ices on ­these routes. The TKK (Tōyō Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha) opened a shipping line on the West Coast route in 1905, and the OSK (Ōsaka Shōsen Kabushiki Gaisha) and NYK (Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha) established regular ser­vices on the East Coast route in 1916 and 1917, respectively.7 The TKK’s operations on the West Coast route ­were ­shaped by turn-­ of-­the-­century efforts to promote Japa­nese shipping, the re­orientation of Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca, and developments in the infrastructure of global transport. Following victories in wars with China (1894–1895) and Rus­sia (1904–1905), Japan not only acquired an empire of overseas colonies and concessions; it also began to assume a larger role in world shipping. In 1896, the government passed legislation to subsidize shipping and shipbuilding, and the Ministry of Communications began to subsidize specific ser­v ices designated as “ordered lines” (meirei kōro). Over the next

7. Manzanillo 8. Salina Cruz 9. Balboa 10. Callao 11. Iquique 12. Valparaiso

West Coast Line 3. Yokohama 2. Kobe 1. Hong Kong 13. Saigon 14. Singapore 15. Colombo 16. Durban 17. Cape Town 18. Rio de Janeiro 19. Santos

20. Montevideo 21. Buenos Aires 19. Santos 18. Rio de Janeiro 22. New Orleans 23. Galveston 9. Cristóbal 6. Los Angeles 3. Yokohama

East Coast Line

FIG. 2.1.  Map illustration of the West Coast and East Coast Lines, ca. 1920s. Note: Balboa and Cristóbal, the Atlan­ tic and Pacific ports of the Panama Canal, are marked as a single location (9) on this map.

1. Hong Kong 2. Kobe 3. Yokohama 4. Honolulu 5. San Francisco 6. Los Angeles

40

Chapter 2

s­ everal years, firms established transoceanic lines to Seattle, San Francisco, Australia, and Eu­rope, and ­after the Russo-­Japanese War, the TKK extended this network to South Amer­i­ca.8 Emigration boosters welcomed the direct link to Latin Amer­i­ca, a region that they viewed as a promising alternative for transpacific migration in the face of immigration restrictions in the United States, Canada, and Australia.9 Japa­nese officials, meanwhile, supported the extension of shipping ser­v ices to a region where transcontinental railways and the Panama Canal promised to foster movements of ­people and goods between the Pacific and the Atlantic. Th ­ ese developments in shipping, migration, and global transportation converged to shape the TKK’s operations on the route. Though the TKK’s establishment of semiregular ser­v ices to Peru and Chile in 1905 marked the beginning of “Japa­nese” shipping in the region, Japan’s entry into world oceans still rested on Eu­ro­pean, particularly British, sources of steamships. In 1898, when the TKK established a ser­v ice to San Francisco, it ordered three steamships from British shipyards.10 Likewise, when the com­pany began sailings on the South Amer­i­ca West Coast route, it again employed foreign-­built ships. For the inaugural voyage, the com­pany chartered a British steamer, the Glenfarg, which departed Yokohama in December, bound across the Pacific to Callao, Peru, and Iquique, Chile. Early the next year, the British commercial ensign was joined by the Rising Sun when the TKK further employed the Kasato Maru—­a British-­ built steamer owned by the Rus­sian Volunteer Fleet ­until its capture by the Imperial Japa­nese Navy during the Russo-­Japanese War.11 Other spoils of that war included overseas territories; the renamed Kasato Maru, meanwhile, contributed to the expansion of Japa­nese shipping on the Pacific. In 1907, the firm employed another British ship u ­ nder charter, the Katherine Park, ­until it temporarily suspended ser­vices the next year. ­After the Ministry of Communications began to subsidize the West Coast line as an ordered line in 1909, the com­pany resumed operations with three British-­built, Japanese-­ flagged steamers.12 In sending t­ hese ships to South Amer­i­ca’s Pacific coast, the TKK entered a region in which shipping was largely controlled by British firms. In the mid-­nineteenth c­ entury, Britain’s Pacific Steam Navigation Com­pany had assumed a dominant position on runs between San Francisco, Panama, Peru, and Chile, and between the Pacific coast of South Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope. Despite competition from Germany’s Kosmos Line in the run to Eu­rope and from Chile’s Compañia Sud Americana de Vapores in the routes to

Greenstein

41

San Francisco and along the coast of Latin Amer­i­ca, Pacific Steam retained a power­ful place on the Pacific coast of Latin Amer­i­ca ­until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.13 In the early twentieth c­ entury, however, the TKK sought to or­ga­nize its activities around transpacific traffic. Upon inaugurating its ser­v ice, the TKK carried several flows of trade and passengers across the Pacific. While developing plans for the route, TKK man­ag­ers saw prospects in carry­ing Japa­nese mi­grants to Peru on outbound voyages and returning to Japan with Chilean nitrates. The com­pany’s president, Asano Sōichirō, presented ­these trades in terms of national interests, asserting that the new shipping line was an “imperative” (kyūmu), necessary “to make prosperous the trade and commerce between South American countries and the [ Japa­nese] Empire, and to resettle [ishoku] the Empire’s subjects in the region.”14 At the same time, the TKK also earned fares carry­ing Chinese mi­grants and rice from Hong Kong to Peru.15 In 1907, the com­pany projected that passengers and cargoes loaded in Hong Kong would make up more than a third of passenger revenue and more than half of freight income on the line (­table 2.1). Hong Kong’s significance was not unique to the West Coast line. Chinese ports ­were often impor­tant sources of cargoes on transoceanic routes in which Japa­nese foreign trade only partially filled ship holds. On the Eu­ rope line, for example, Japan’s trade imbalance left the NYK reliant on Chinese exports to fill ships on outbound sailings.16 Traffic between Hong Kong and South Amer­i­ca was of such importance to the TKK’s West Coast line that reductions in that traffic led to the suspension of sailings. In February 1908, the Peruvian government raised entry fees for Chinese immigrants, leading to a sharp decline in migration; strong harvests in South Amer­i­ca, meanwhile, presaged reduced exports of Saigon and Rangoon rice transshipped in Hong Kong.17 Already facing losses on the route, the TKK temporarily suspended sailings. Several Japa­nese officials also viewed ser­v ices on the West Coast route as an opportunity to link Japa­nese ships into transportation networks that extended beyond the Pacific coast or even South Amer­i­ca. In mid-1905, as the TKK prepared to open ser­v ices, the Japa­nese minister to Brazil, Sugimura Fukashi, proposed that the com­pany make Valparaiso, rather than Iquique, its southern terminus. On the one hand, he suggested that the extension might encourage the Chilean government to subsidize the line—­a practice not without pre­ce­dent, as both the Chilean and Peruvian governments had subsidized Pacific Steam in the 1840s.18 At the same time, he

42

Chapter 2

T ­ ABLE 2.1 

Projected Income on the TKK’s South Amer­i­ca Route, 1907

Total Income: ¥131,500 Freight Revenue: ¥91,500 Origin and Destination

Freight

Rate/Ton

Income

Hong Kong to Peru

General cargo, 3,000 tons

¥19

¥57,000

Kobe, Yokohama to South Amer­i­ca

General cargo, 200 tons

¥20

¥4,000

Between Valparaiso and Iquique

General cargo, 1,500 tons

¥8

¥12,000

Chile to Kobe, Yokohama

Saltpeter, 1,000 tons

¥11

¥11,000

Peru to Kobe, Yokohama

Sugar, 1,000 tons

¥7.5

¥7,500

Passengers

Rate/Person

Income

Hong Kong to Peru, Chile

150

¥100

¥15,000

Kobe, Yokohama to Mexico and South Amer­i­ca

200

¥80

¥16,000

Coastal, between Chile and Peru

—­

—­

¥3,000

South Amer­i­ca to Japan, Hong Kong

50

¥120

¥6,000

Passenger Revenue: ¥40,000 Origin and Destination

Source: Asano to Yamagata, November 5, 1907, in NGB, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 739.

argued that the extension to the “premier trading port on South Amer­i­ca’s Pacific coast” would connect the line to Valparaiso’s transcontinental railways to Argentina and shipping lines to Eu­rope.19 Ambitions to claim a place for Japan in interoceanic transportation similarly ­shaped the reor­ga­ni­za­tion of the West Coast line when it was reopened as an ordered line in 1909. ­Under the terms of the government’s subsidy, the TKK was required to maintain six annual sailings between Hong Kong and Coronel, Chile, with mandatory stopovers in Salina Cruz, Mexico, as well as ports in Peru and Chile.20 The extension of the shipping ser­vice to Mexico was the result of negotiations between Japa­nese and Mexican officials and transportation firms. At their center was the Japa­ nese minister to Mexico, Arakawa Minoji, who, in July 1908, met with Mexican president Porfirio Díaz and proposed that the Japa­nese and Mexican

Greenstein

43

governments jointly subsidize steamship ser­v ices between the two countries.21 Over the following two years, he sought to garner support for this venture from officials and businessmen in both countries. Arakawa’s visions for the line centered as much on the ­f uture of transportation between the Atlantic and Pacific as Japanese-­Mexican relations. Like many of his contemporaries, he viewed transportation infrastructure and the circulation it generated as progressive forces, and he argued that regular sailings would encourage trade and amity between Japan and Mexico. At the same time, he aimed to link the shipping line to the Tehuantepec National Railway, which crossed Mexico from Salina Cruz to Puerto México (Coatzacoalcos). First completed in 1894, the railway had been overhauled and reopened with g­ reat fanfare in 1907.22 In communications with other Foreign Ministry officials, Arakawa argued that a link with the railway would reroute trade between Japan and the United States from American transcontinental railways to a new, multimodal network: “Cargo can be directly transported from the banks of the Mississippi River and, through New Orleans, by sea route to Coatzacoalcos, Mexico; it can then be delivered from that port to Salina Cruz via the Tehuantepec Railway, and t­ here loaded aboard Japa­nese steamships and directly carried to Japan.”23 This transportation system, promised Arakawa, would convey trade between Japan and commercial centers in the eastern United States in less time and at a reduced cost. At the same time, and much as Mexican officials sought to make the Tehuantepec Railway a critical link between the Pacific and Atlantic, Arakawa viewed an arrangement with the railway as an opportunity for Japan to assume a new prominence in the Pacific and the global transportation system. Of concern for the diplomat was the construction of the Panama Canal, which promised to transform global commerce and to intensify competition in global transport: “Already it is widely recognized that, for our national development, it is necessary for the Japa­nese shipping industry to become a conqueror [hasha] of the Pacific Ocean; however, one must never forget the global competition that [­will arise] in Pacific shipping the day that the Panama Canal is completed.”24 According to Arakawa, Japan could meet this competition by establishing a shipping line to Salina Cruz, thereby creating a line of transportation from Japan to the Amer­i­cas and Eu­rope that would ultimately be shorter and more competitive than the route through Panama. Arakawa’s proposal was compatible with Porfirio Díaz’s own ambitions to develop maritime links to Mexico and to center the Tehuantepec Railway

44

Chapter 2

in global commerce.25 In the late nineteenth ­century, Díaz’s government had encouraged the development of maritime ser­v ices to Mexico by subsidizing several American-­owned shipping enterprises. At the same time, Mexican officials also sought to reconfigure the country’s maritime links through the establishment of shipping ser­vices that would bypass San Francisco and directly link Mexico and East Asia. The Mexican government realized this latter goal by granting tax exemptions to the China Commercial Steamship Com­pany Ltd., which opened the first regular ser­ vice from Hong Kong to Mexico in 1903.26 ­A fter meeting with Arakawa, Díaz proved amenable to supporting an additional transpacific ser­v ice to Salina Cruz operated by the TKK, and the president and his minister of finance offered to match any subsidy offered by the Japa­nese government. The Pearson Com­pany—­which held a controlling interest in the Tehauntepec National Railway—­likewise indicated support for an arrangement with a Japa­nese shipping line.27 In Japan, however, Arakawa strug­gled to generate similar enthusiasm. Asano Sōichirō rejected the proposal for a direct Japan–­Mexico line, and instead offered to make Salina Cruz a port of call on the West Coast line. Japa­nese communications officials likewise indicated a preference for integrating Salina Cruz into the West Coast line.28 In response, Mexican officials offered a reduced subsidy to support stopovers in Salina Cruz on the West Coast line, but negotiations stumbled when they further demanded ser­v ices to Manzanillo and twelve annual sailings. In 1909, a­ fter several months of negotiations, the Mexican government and the TKK concluded an agreement u ­ nder which the former was to provide a subsidy of 10,000 pesos per sailing, and the latter agreed to maintain at least six annual sailings to Salina Cruz.29 Though Japa­nese officials and businessmen rejected a direct Japan–­ Mexico line, Arakawa’s arguments about the ­future of global transport ­were echoed by communications officials when they submitted a proposal for a West Coast line subsidy to the Imperial Diet in 1909. Responding to doubts raised in the Lower House,30 the head of the Mercantile Marine Bureau, Uchida Kakichi, drew attention to the Tehuantepec Railway, arguing that it “­w ill not only help our trade with Mexico, it w ­ ill prove to be 31 a major highway of global transportation.” Like Arakawa, Uchida emphasized the railway’s potential to streamline New York–­Yokohama traffic and to transform global transport: “Due to connections [renraku] such as the link [setsuzoku] with the railway between Argentina and Chile and the link with the Tehuantepec Railway, I expect that this shipping line ­w ill

Greenstein

45

become a foundation of global transport, and that it must therefore be opened quickly. Moreover, I expect that this shipping line w ­ ill also develop 32 Japan’s trade with Mexico, Chile, Peru, and this region.” American observers, too, saw the development of Japa­nese shipping on the West Coast route as linked to Japa­nese ambitions in Latin Amer­i­ca and the Pacific. Commenting on the subsidized West Coast line, the Washington Post suggested that Japan “sees in Chile and the wide pampas of Argentina beyond an im­mense and fertile country for the exploitation of her laborers. . . . ​The new line w ­ ill rapidly tend to develop trade between the two countries and easily induce the emigration of Japa­nese to South Amer­i­ca.”33 The newspaper also drew attention to the partnership with the Tehuantepec National Railway: “By the time the [Panama] canal is completed the Mexican railroad w ­ ill have been in full operation for a sufficient period to establish Japa­nese commercial supremacy, if their theory works out in practice as well as it looks on paper.”34 The TKK’s arrangement with the Mexican government ultimately proved short-­lived. In 1910, the Japa­nese Ministry of Communications sought to terminate the subsidy contract due to concerns that it granted a foreign government authority over a shipping line of national significance.35 Such concerns soon became moot, however, as Díaz was forced to resign in 1911, and his successor canceled the TKK’s subsidies. 36 Nevertheless, negotiations over the connection at Salina Cruz and the configuration of the West Coast line exemplify the multiple objectives pursued through the development of shipping between Japan and Latin Amer­i­ca. The establishment of the West Coast line was presented as a means of fostering transpacific exchanges of p ­ eople and commodities, and thus an opportunity for Japan to proj­ect its population overseas while acquiring Latin American resources. At the same time, Japa­nese and Mexican officials alike sought to assume a central place in global transportation in the Pacific and beyond by linking the West Coast line and the Tehuantepec National Railway. The West Coast line thus si­mul­ta­neously extended Japa­nese influence into Latin Amer­i­ca, the Pacific, and the infrastructure of global circulation.

Migration, War, and the East Coast Route As on the West Coast route, the development of shipping lines on the East Coast route reflected Japa­nese interests both in Latin Amer­i­ca specifically and in world shipping more generally. In the early twentieth c­ entury,

46

Chapter 2

immigration boosters and companies began to encourage emigration to Brazil, where officials and plantation ­owners welcomed Japa­nese l­abor.37 As the TKK opened its West Coast line, officials and boosters called for the establishment of another line between Japan and Brazil to support immigration. The low volume of trade on the route initially precluded regular ser­ vices, but the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918) created new opportunities. With Eu­ro­pean production and shipping devoted to the war effort, Japa­nese exporters and shipping companies entered new overseas markets. Shipping firms opened new lines, and the Japa­nese fleet ended the war with an expanded place in world sea-­lanes, including the East Coast route. Parallel to the development of the West Coast line in the early twentieth c­ entury, Brazilian officials sought to encourage shipping on the East Coast route. In 1905, as the TKK prepared to open its line to Peru and Chile, the Brazilian ambassador to Japan proposed an alternative line from Yokohama to Rio de Janeiro, and in late 1906, Brazilian officials and politicians passed legislation to subsidize shipping between Japan and Brazil.38 Brazil’s overseas shipping at the time was largely in the hands of British firms that carried triangular trade between Eu­rope, Brazil, and the United States. In the late nineteenth ­century, Brazilian officials had sought to reconfigure maritime ser­v ices touching on Brazil through mea­sures that included subsidies granted to foreign firms, such as the United States and Brazil Mail Steamship Com­pany. 39 Proponents of the 1906 legislation hoped that a new ser­v ice would promote Japa­nese immigration and Brazilian commerce. The legislation required the subsidized firm to exhibit such Brazilian products as coffee, sugar, and gum in Japa­nese cities, and officials also hoped that a direct link with Cape Town would encourage exports of coffee to South Africa.40 The Brazilian foreign minister ultimately forestalled the subsidy,41 but Japa­nese and Brazilian officials continued to discuss opening transportation links between the two countries. In late 1907, Uchida Sadatsuchi, newly appointed minister to Brazil, learned of negotiations between Brazil’s largest steamship enterprise, Lloyd Brasileiro, and a French firm, Chargeurs Reunis, u ­ nder which the latter would establish ser­v ices from Japan to Salina Cruz, which would connect to ser­v ices between New York and Brazil managed by Lloyd Brasileiro via the Tehuantepec Railway. Uchida was able to convince Lloyd Brasileiro directors to consider partnering with a Japa­nese firm, but in early 1908, NYK president Kondō Renpei rejected the partnership as unlikely to be profitable.42

Greenstein

47

Even as emigration companies began to or­ga­nize Japa­nese migration to Brazil, insufficient cargo for return voyages impeded regular ser­vices. In April  1908, the Kasato Maru, recently released from the suspended West Coast line, again steamed at the vanguard of Japa­nese shipping to Latin Amer­i­ca when it departed Japan with almost eight hundred emigrants bound for Brazil. Also aboard was Mizuno Ryō, the president of the Imperial Emigration Com­pany (Kōkoku Imin Gaisha), who, in 1905, had traveled to South Amer­i­ca aboard the Glenfarg.43 Between 1908 and 1914, emigration companies or­ga­nized ten voyages to Brazil (­table  2.2).44 To prevent ships T ­ ABLE 2.2 

Voyages to Brazil, 1908–1914

Departure

Emigration Com­pany

Ship Name

04/1908

Imperial Emigration Com­pany

Kasato Maru

05/1910

Takemura Colonial Com­pany

03/1912

Gross Tons

Own­er

Families

Mi­grants

6,209

Imperial Japa­nese Navy

158

781

Lüshun (Ryojun) Maru

4,806

NYK

447

909

Takemura Colonial Com­pany

Itsukushima Maru

3,882

Oshiro Steamship

367

1432

03/1912

Oriental Emigration Com­pany

Kanagawa Maru

6,151

NYK

357

1419

03/1913

Takemura Colonial Com­pany

No. 2 Unkai Maru

3,951

Nakamura Seishichirō

384

1506

03/1913

Oriental Emigration Com­pany

Wakasa Maru

6,266

NYK

394

1588

08/1913

Takemura Colonial Com­pany

Teikoku Maru

4,997

South Manchuria Railway

527

1946

09/1913

Oriental Emigration Com­pany

Wakasa Maru

6,266

NYK

470

1908

03/1914

Takemura Colonial Com­pany

Teikoku Maru

4,997

South Manchuria Railway

408

1809

03/1914

Oriental Emigration Com­pany

Wakasa Maru

6,266

NYK

412

1688

Sources: Ōsaka shōsen Mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha, Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha hachijū-nen shi (hereafter OSK 80-nen shi), p. 335; Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, pp. 184–186.

48

Chapter 2

from returning in ballast, ­owners sought return cargoes in other countries. The NYK, for example, or­ga­nized sailings to Brazil as an extension of its Eu­rope line. Outbound, its ships steamed to Brazil along the East Coast route, calling at Singapore and Cape Town en route; the ships then returned via Eu­rope, where they loaded Japan-­bound cargoes.45 Dramatic shifts in world trade brought on by World War I, however, created new opportunities on the route. The Entente’s diversion of ships to the war effort and Germany’s withdrawal from world shipping created tonnage shortages, and Japa­nese companies profited from heightened demand for shipping.46 Disruptions to Eu­rope’s export trade also created opportunities in overseas markets, and Japa­nese exports to Latin Amer­i­ca increased rapidly (fig. 2.2). At the same time, export controls in other countries forced Japa­nese manufacturers to pursue alternative sources of raw materials. The OSK therefore saw an opening to establish a new line on the East Coast route based on expectations that Australian controls on wool would drive demand for wool from South Amer­i­ca and South Africa.47 In December, the OSK opened an East Coast line, employing the Kasato Maru on the inaugural voyage. In early 1917, almost nine years a­ fter transporting Mizuno Ryō’s first load of contract laborers, the Kasato Maru again arrived in Bra-

FIG. 2.2.  Trade between Japan and Latin Amer­i­ca, 1901–1940. Source: Yamazawa and Yamamoto, Bōeki to kokusai shūshi, pp. 206–213.

Greenstein

49

zil, dropping anchor in Rio de Janeiro before steaming south to Buenos Aires.48 As predicted, the OSK found plentiful cargoes on the East Coast route. The Kasato Maru returned to Japan with wool and other South American products, and demand was such that in 1917 the OSK or­ga­nized extra sailings to South Amer­i­ca and South Africa.49 The NYK, too, entered this trade. In 1916, the com­pany had concluded an arrangement with the Brazil Emigration Group (Burajiru Imin Kumiai) to maintain three annual voyages to Brazil beginning in 1917. Initially, the NYK routed return voyages to New York and back to Japan via the Panama Canal, but in 1918, it rerouted return voyages back to South Africa and Singapore, entering the wool trade and increasing ser­v ices to six annual sailings.50 Both companies also profited from third-­country trade. In 1918, the OSK reported additional revenue from carry­ing rice, jute, and sugar that had accumulated in intermediate ports, 51 and the NYK established an additional shipping line to carry cargoes from Calcutta to Buenos Aires.52 The OSK’s and NYK’s war­time establishment of ser­v ices on the East Coast route contributed to Japa­nese expansionism in several dimensions. The ser­vices w ­ ere the infrastructural foundation for what Sidney Xu Lu has referred to as Japan’s “Malthusian expansionism” in Latin Amer­i­ca, 53 and they facilitated increased immigration to Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s. In this, they undergirded efforts to cultivate national power in Latin Amer­ i­ca through the resettlement of Japa­nese subjects. At the same time, the shipping lines w ­ ere also part of an effort to expand the nation’s place in the oceans and flows of global commerce. Commenting on conditions in shipping a­ fter the war, Terashima Shigenobu, an NYK researcher, called for the “internationalization” (kokusaika) of Japa­nese shipping: the development of “global shipping lines” (sekaiteki kōro), such as “shipping lines from Bombay to Southern Eu­rope, or from South Amer­i­ca to France.”54 Though Japan’s “production capacity” (seisanryoku) was ­limited, Terashima suggested that global shipping networks offered an alternative source of wealth. Likewise, NYK president Kondō Renpei also advocated for the development of such shipping lines and suggested that South Amer­i­ca, as well as the “South Seas” (Nan’yō) and South Africa, ­were areas in which Japa­nese shipping might be “cultivated” (kaitaku).55 Much as immigration boosters viewed migration to Latin Amer­i­ca as a way for the Japa­nese population to exceed Japa­nese territory, shipping boosters and business leaders saw shipping routes as additional spaces for expansion.

50

Chapter 2

Reor­ga­ni­za­tion and New Technologies In the de­cade that followed World War I, Japa­nese shipping firms faced new opportunities and challenges on the Latin Amer­i­ca routes. The 1920s saw an acceleration of Japa­nese immigration to Brazil, spurred on by immigration restrictions in the United States and support from the Japa­nese government.56 At the same time, the war­time trade and shipping booms came to an end. World tonnage had expanded during the war, but postwar trade did not see a rapid return to prewar levels, creating an oversupply of tonnage. Postwar economic recovery initially sustained shipping, but in 1920 demand fell and the industry entered an extended depression.57 The value of Japa­nese trade with Latin Amer­i­ca also fell sharply from 1920 to 1921 and did not return to war­time levels ­until the 1930s (fig. 2.2).58 Japa­ nese firms, moreover, faced renewed competition from Eu­ro­pean and American ships, galvanizing efforts to acquire large, fast, technologically advanced ships. Combined, t­hese developments in trade, migration, and technology drove changes in the organ­ization of shipping to Latin Amer­i­ca. In the immediate wake of World War I, officials endeavored to maintain Japan’s expanded network of shipping lines in Latin Amer­i­ca. In late 1919, communications officials announced plans to subsidize shipping on the East Coast route and to mandate additional sailings on the TKK’s subsidized West Coast line. The head of the Mercantile Marine Bureau, Wakamiya Sadao, defended the former as necessary to facilitate emigration to Brazil, maintain Japa­nese trade with South Amer­i­ca, and assist Japa­nese ships in competition with British ships expected to return to the route between Cape Town and South Amer­i­ca.59 In early 1920, the Imperial Diet approved the subsidy, which communications officials awarded to the OSK ­after the com­pany declined to retain subsidies on its transpacific Tacoma line.60 Revisions to the TKK’s subsidy, meanwhile, required monthly sailings on the West Coast route.61 The end of the war also saw the OSK reor­ga­nize sailings on the East Coast route around a new set of trade flows. In 1919, the com­pany ordered the Panama Maru to follow a new course on its return voyage. Rather than returning across the Atlantic, the ship instead steamed north to the Gulf of Mexico, calling at South American ports en route. In New Orleans, the ship unloaded coffee, loaded cotton and pig iron, and then passed through the Panama Canal to return to Japan across the Pacific. The following year, the OSK began to route all return voyages to the Gulf, where ships loaded

Greenstein

51

cotton and other cargoes in New Orleans and Galveston before returning to Japan via the Panama Canal (fig. 2.1).62 In ­doing so, the com­pany established a more direct line of ocean transport for Texas-­and Louisiana-­grown cotton, which previously had been carried by rail to San Francisco or Seattle for transfer to transpacific liners.63 OSK operations thus came to rest on Japa­nese emigration, Asian exports to South Africa and South Amer­ i­ca, South American exports to the United States, and American exports to Japan. The author Ishikawa Tatsuzō pithily described t­ hese flows in his award-­winning novel Sōbō (1939), when he wrote of the cargoes transported by an OSK ship as it carried Japa­nese immigrants to Brazil: “Japa­nese textiles to Colombo, Colombo’s black tea to Cape Town, Brazilian coffee to North Amer­i­ca, North American cotton to Japan . . . ​The world economy moves with the La Plata Maru. The wealth of the world beats like waves.”64 The NYK, in contrast, continued to route return sailings on its unsubsidized East Coast line back to Japan via Cape Town and Singapore. Whereas American trade with South Amer­i­ca and Japan was an impor­tant source of revenue for the OSK, African trade was of greater significance for the NYK. During World War I, the NYK negotiated an arrangement with the London-­based Furness Withy and its subsidiary, Rio Cape Line, regarding the transport of coffee from Rio de Janeiro to Cape Town. The NYK remained active in the wool trade, too, sending its ships to additional South African ports during the peak wool season. In the late 1920s, however, the NYK and OSK began to compete for bilateral trade between Japan and Africa when the latter opened a direct, subsidized line to ports in East Africa and Durban, South Africa. In response, the NYK began to route outbound sailings on its South Amer­i­ca East Coast line to Mombasa. Competition between the OSK and NYK came to an end in 1931, however, when the firms concluded an agreement to minimize competition during the ­Great Depression. The OSK eliminated its Tacoma line, which paralleled the NYK’s Seattle line, and the NYK withdrew from the South Amer­i­ca East Coast route. The OSK, in turn, extended its East Africa line to South American ports, replacing NYK ser­v ices between Asia, Africa, and South Amer­i­ca.65 In the Pacific, meanwhile, competition from American and Eu­ro­pean ships and reductions in trade left the TKK struggling to remain afloat. In 1920, the United States Shipping Board, which had overseen war­time shipbuilding, leased several President-­class ships to the Dollar Steamship Com­pany for the run between San Francisco and East Asia. The faster

52

Chapter 2

American ships attracted passengers and more lucrative cargoes, and the TKK lost revenue. At the same time, the TKK also saw reduced traffic on the South Amer­i­ca West Coast route: Japa­nese exports to South Amer­i­ca fell, and outbound cargoes largely consisted of rice loaded in Hong Kong. Japa­nese demand for Chilean nitrates also fell, and in 1924 the com­pany began to route return voyages to Portland to load lumber. Due to reduced traffic on both transpacific lines, the TKK began to see losses in 1922 and suspended dividends. In 1923, business leaders proposed that the TKK merge its operations with the NYK. A ­ fter several years of negotiations, in 1926 the companies reached an agreement ­under which the TKK transferred its transpacific lines to the NYK in exchange for shares of stock.66 ­Under the competitive conditions in world shipping that followed World War I, many shipping executives and officials viewed the acquisition of large, fast ships as key to maintaining ser­vices. Fast, fuel-­efficient ships outfitted with turbine or diesel engines could attract higher-­value cargoes and passengers while offering reductions in operating expenses.67 The late 1920s saw several such ships introduced to the subsidized ser­vices to Latin Amer­ i­ca. In 1924, the OSK ordered three diesel-­powered motorships from the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard—­the Santos Maru, La Plata Maru, and Montevideo Maru—­and several years ­later purchased two additional motorships: the Buenos Aires Maru and the Rio de Janeiro Maru. The NYK, in contrast, continued to employ aging ships on its unsubsidized East Coast line. While NYK ships required sixty-­five days to reach Santos, the OSK’s Santos Maru–­class ships could make the passage in forty-­seven days. Thus, in the late 1920s, the OSK carried a greater share of Japa­nese immigrants to Brazil (fig. 2.3).68 The NYK, however, also invested in new ships for its subsidized lines, including a motorship for the West Coast route. The Heiyō Maru was launched from the Osaka Ironworks in late 1929 and began operations in 1930.69 In the de­cade following World War I, Japa­nese shipping to Latin Amer­ i­ca largely developed within the shipping networks established in the first de­cades of the twentieth c­ entury. The major development in the geography of Japa­nese shipping to Latin Amer­i­ca was the OSK’s reor­ga­ni­za­tion of its East Coast line into a round-­the-­world ser­v ice. The transfer of the TKK’s transpacific lines to the NYK consolidated ser­v ices to Latin Amer­ i­ca u ­ nder Japan’s two major liner companies, and their 1931 agreement eliminated competition between Japa­nese firms on the major routes to Latin Amer­i­ca. At the same time, the OSK’s investment in motorships reduced

Greenstein

53

FIG. 2.3.  Japa­nese immigrants transported by the NYK and OSK on the East Coast Line. Sources: OSK 80-­nen shi, p. 337; Kamotsu-ka, Waga sha kaku kōro, pp. 333–337; Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, p. 75.

the travel time between Japan, South Africa, and Latin Amer­i­ca and facilitated Japa­nese migration to Brazil, which flourished between 1924 and 1934.

Latin Amer­i­ca and Oceanic Domination In the 1930s, Japan embarked on further imperial expansion in continental Asia, beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and followed by the occupations of China in 1937 and Southeast Asia in 1941. During this period, the orientation of Japa­nese migration shifted from Latin Amer­ i­ca to Northeast Asia, as Brazil imposed limits on immigration in 1934 and Japa­nese officials encouraged settlement in Manchuria.70 The de­cade also saw Japan’s oceanic expansionism reach its zenith.71 In the early 1930s, Japa­nese trade began to recover from the ­Great Depression, and Japa­nese shipping firms developed new ser­vices. Despite the decline of Japa­nese emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca (fig. 2.3), the region retained a central place in this “advance” (yakushin) of Japa­nese shipping.

54

Chapter 2

Developments in Japa­nese trade and shipping policies buoyed renewed expansion at sea. In 1931, Japan embargoed gold exports, and the depreciation of the yen stimulated exports; Japa­nese trade with Latin Amer­i­ca increased rapidly from 1932 to 1937 (fig. 2.2).72 At the same time, the government also a­ dopted new policies to support shipping and shipbuilding. In 1932, the Ministry of Communications implemented a scrap-­and-­build scheme intended to modernize the Japa­nese fleet. ­Under the program, the government subsidized shipbuilding on the condition that o­ wners scrap older vessels. Similar schemes implemented in 1935 and 1936 supported further building, as did the National Shipping Policy (Kaiun Kokusaku) ­adopted in 1937 that provided subsidies and low-­interest loans to support transoceanic shipping and the construction of luxury liners.73 Japan’s export trade and government policies combined to support a boom in shipping, and a number of Japa­nese firms expanded their ser­v ices.74 ­These included the NYK and OSK, as well as several other firms, including two that opened lines to Latin Amer­i­ca: the Yamashita Steamship Com­pany (Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha) and the Kawasaki Steamship Com­ pany (Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha).75 In the routes touching on Latin Amer­i­ca, advances by Japa­nese ships in the mid-1930s ­were closely linked to developments in the eastward route to New York via the Panama Canal. U ­ nder the first scrap-­and-­build scheme, the NYK purchased six diesel freighters to improve its New York line and used its older ships to establish a subsidized ser­vice to Ca­rib­bean ports that had seen increased traffic in Japa­nese exports. In the past, cargoes bound for the region ­were transshipped in Cristóbal or New York, but the NYK began to carry goods from the Philippines, China, and Japan directly to such ports as Puerto Colombia, La Guaira, Kingston, Port-­au-­Prince, and Havana.76 Similarly, when, in 1936, Kawasaki Steamship introduced high-­ speed motorships to its New York line (first opened in 1932), it used its older ships to open a line to the Pacific coast of Latin Amer­i­ca ­under an arrangement with the NYK aimed at avoiding competition on the parallel West Coast line.77 New York City also held an impor­tant place in several other lines extended to Atlantic ports in Latin Amer­i­ca. In 1937, Kawasaki Steamship opened a westward, round-­the-­world line similar to a round-­the-­world ser­ vice between Japan, Eu­rope, and New York that the com­pany had jointly operated with an American firm in the late 1920s. In 1937, however, Kawasaki Steamship reor­ga­nized the ser­v ice, routing ships from New York

Greenstein

55

to South American ports before they passed through Panama.78 Similarly, when Yamashita Steamship sought to enter the New York route in 1937, it or­ga­nized its ser­vice around a triangular trade between Japan, North Amer­ i­ca, and South Amer­i­ca and sought to carry cargoes from New York to South Amer­i­ca and between South Amer­i­ca and California.79 The development of such lines in Latin Amer­i­ca and beyond was accompanied by a shift in Japa­nese discourse on shipping. Officials and boosters increasingly promoted the expansion of Japa­nese shipping in third-­country trades, highlighting shipping as a source of foreign exchange that contributed to Japan’s balance of trade. At the same time, they framed such developments in militaristic terms as the conquest or domination of ocean spaces. Shipping in Latin Amer­i­ca, too, was refracted through ­these visions of expansion and domination. Yamashita Steamship, for example, was praised for advancing into the Atlantic to claim a share of trade between New York and South Amer­i­ca.80 A fundamental tension, however, lay at the core of such ideas, which appealed both to nationalist visions of oceanic domination and cosmopolitan ambitions to make Japa­nese ships into vehicles of global commerce, migration, and travel. This tension was on display when the OSK introduced two new ships to the East Coast route. Subsidized u ­ nder the 1937 National Shipping Policy, the Argentina Maru and Brasil Maru ­were constructed in Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki Shipyard and launched in 1939. Portrayed as symbols of Japan’s mastery of marine technologies, the vessels ­were incorporated into the discourse of oceanic domination. At the same time, the OSK marketed the ships and their ser­vices to foreign clients and used them as tools of public diplomacy. Si­mul­ta­neously loaded with nationalist and cosmopolitan aspirations, the “national policy ships” (kokusakusen) and the spectacle that surrounded their voyages evinced the conflicting po­liti­cal currents of the de­cade. Officials, OSK man­ag­ers, and the press presented the two ­sister ships and the National Shipping Policy as key components of Japan’s conquest of the seas. In an overview of the policy, communications officials claimed that ships produced u ­ nder the scrap-­and-­build schemes had “overwhelmed foreign fleets and seized control” of the New York route and suggested that the subsidized national policy ships would make similar advances.81 Similar language attended the launching of the Argentina Maru in 1939. The Asahi shinbun newspaper announced the first voyage of the liner ­under the headline “Seizing Hegemony in the Pacific” and observed that the ship was

56

Chapter 2

to join a fleet of fast Japa­nese vessels that had set speed rec­ords on transpacific passages.82 At a shipboard reception in Tokyo before the ship’s first sailing, OSK president Murata Shōzō likewise emphasized the Argentina Maru’s role in making claims on ocean spaces, declaring: “Three-­ quarters of the earth is ­water, a place that belongs to nobody in the world; I firmly believe that the domination of [this ­water] is a mission that has been laid upon Japan, though it is one that w ­ ill not be completed in a sin83 gle generation.” At the same time, the Argentina Maru also offered ser­v ices to global shippers and travelers. OSK man­ag­ers emphasized the importance of close relations with the South American countries for which the national policy ships w ­ ere named.84 The head of the OSK Passenger Section, meanwhile, observed that tensions in Eu­rope had increased South Amer­i­ca’s appeal as a tourist destination and expressed hopes that wealthy South African and American tourists would travel to South Amer­i­ca aboard the “charming” Argentina Maru. Fares from ­those passengers, moreover, would be a source of desperately needed foreign currency.85 English-­language advertisements likewise appealed to foreign clients to utilize Japan’s latest ships for global travel. OSK advertisements published in the Los Angeles Times juxtaposed the modernity of “­today’s newest ships” against the “romantic ports of yesterday” that could be visited along the route.86 OSK management also used the inaugural voyages of the national policy ships to pursue a public relations campaign in Latin Amer­i­ca. In Belém, Brazil, the OSK’s agent publicized the arrival of the Argentina Maru in local newspapers, and OSK management issued invitations for a shipboard cocktail party. Guests included Brazilian officials and elites, consular officials from several countries, and Japa­nese residents.87 The OSK or­ga­nized similar events when the Brasil Maru arrived in South Amer­i­ca on its maiden voyage the following year. In Santos, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, the ship hosted several events, such as exchanges of gifts, luncheons, and dinners for officials, reporters, diplomats, and overseas Japa­nese.88 American business interests, meanwhile, greeted this outreach with some alarm. One businessman who attended a reception aboard the Brasil Maru observed that through such events Japa­nese business and organ­izations “keep before the public the year round, and to a ­great extent they are buying their way into Brasil [sic] through ­these missions and their lavish scale of entertaining. . . . ​I am sure that they are trying to become firmly established in Brazil while the Eu­ro­pean countries are at war.”89

Greenstein

57

Imperial expansion in continental Asia, however, ultimately severed Japan’s connections to Latin Amer­i­ca and ended its oceanic expansionism. In 1940, heightened tensions with Britain ­after the signing of the Tripartite Pact led the OSK to suspend its westward ser­v ices to South Amer­i­ca and employ the Argentina Maru and Brasil Maru on the Osaka–­ Dalian route—­a reassignment from global transportation to empire in Northeast Asia. The com­pany continued to maintain sailings to South Amer­i­ca via Panama, but in July 1941, a­ fter Japan’s occupation of southern Indochina, the United States closed the canal. Several OSK ships, as well as an NYK ship on the Gulf line, ­were forced to return to Japan around Cape Horn.90 With war on the horizon, Kawasaki Steamship suspended sailings on the West Coast route in September.91 The NYK, in contrast, maintained West Coast ser­v ices u ­ ntil the outbreak of the Pacific War in December. At the time of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the Naruto Maru was off the coast of South Amer­i­ca. Its return to Japan in January 1942 marked the final withdrawal of NYK ships from global shipping.92 During the Pacific War, the ships that had deepened Japan’s links to Latin Amer­i­ca and its hold on transoceanic transportation ­were instead harnessed to support territorial occupation and the circulation of troops, matériel, and resources within Japan’s war­time empire. Shipping lines to Latin Amer­i­ca contributed to several expansionary proj­ ects pursued beyond Japa­nese territories in the first half of the twentieth ­century. As the essential infrastructure of transoceanic transportation, the lines facilitated efforts by emigration boosters and officials to resettle Japa­ nese subjects in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. Such immigration was framed in terms of national interests served by the overseas expansion of the Japa­nese population. Likewise, shipping boosters and officials presented shipping lines as an expansion of the nation into ocean spaces between territories and a global transportation system that transcended territories. Th ­ ese efforts at expansion converged and reinforced each other in the routes to Latin Amer­i­ca. Immigrants ­were a source of revenue for the firms that opened ser­v ices, while efforts to expand Japan’s place in oceans and global transport, in turn, created the maritime infrastructure that carried immigrants overseas. Though t­ hese proj­ects ­were suspended due to continental aggression in the early 1940s, they w ­ ere revived soon ­after the end of World War II. In 1950, American occupation officials began to permit Japa­nese shipping

58

Chapter 2

firms to resume overseas sailings, and the OSK re­entered the East Coast route in December. With the resumption of Japa­nese immigration to Latin Amer­i­ca in 1952, the OSK also reopened lines on the eastward, transpacific route to Atlantic ports via Panama with ships that bore the names of their prewar pre­de­ces­sors: the second-­generation Santos Maru, Brasil Maru, and Argentina Maru.93 ­Later that de­cade, Kawasaki Steamship and the NYK also returned to Latin Amer­i­ca.94 Out of the ruins of empire in Asia, the postwar years saw Japa­nese officials, boosters, and businesses resume conjoined efforts at expansion in Latin Amer­i­ca, world oceans, and the global transportation system. Japa­nese ships rapidly reclaimed a central role in the global system of trade and transportation, and the Rising Sun could again be seen in ports and sea-­lanes around the world.

Notes 1. ​The author gratefully acknowledges the hospitality and support of the Program on US-­Japan Relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and the Centre for Japa­nese Research at the Institute of Asian Research, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia. 2. ​For example, in a discussion of Pacific empires, Jordan Sand highlights “trajectories of migration and influence” that linked Japan and the United States. Sand, “Reconfiguring Pacific History,” p.  3. For a critique of “transpacific” and “Pacific empires,” see Chang, “Looking at the Pacific,” pp.  23–27. For Japan’s transpacific activities, see Uchida, “ ‘Pacific Empire,’ ” pp. 28–31; Uchida, “From Island Nation,” pp. 57–90. For discussion of transpacific and Pacific history more generally, see Kurashige, Hsu, and Yaguchi, “Introduction,” pp. 183–188; Matsuda, Pacific Worlds. 3. ​Tsutsui, “Pelagic Empire,” pp. 21–38. Also see Muscolino, “Fisheries Build Up,” pp. 56–70; Uchida, “From Island Nation,” pp. 57–90. 4. ​Kate McDonald describes such activities as an “asymmetrical integration.” McDonald, “Asymmetrical Integration,” pp. 115–149. 5. ​Despite t­ hese names, the ser­v ices extended beyond South Amer­i­ca. The “South Amer­i­ca West Coast line,” for example, included stopovers in the United States, Mexico, and Panama as well as South American countries. Hereafter, ­these routes ­w ill be referred to as the “West Coast route” and the “East Coast route.” 6. ​Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 7–23, 52–56. 7. ​The OSK and NYK w ­ ere well known internationally by t­hese acronyms; the TKK was often referred to as “Toyo Kisen Kaisha.” En­glish translations are as follows: TKK, Oriental Steamship Com­pany; OSK, Osaka Mercantile Shipping Com­pany; NYK, Japan Mail Steamship Com­pany. 8. ​For historical studies, see Greenstein, “Sailing,” 70–121; Wray, Mitsubishi and the N. Y. K., pp. 293–340; Kokaze, Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun, pp. 295–331; Chida and Davies, Japa­nese Shipping and Shipbuilding, pp. 20–22. For com­pany histories, see

Greenstein

59

Nihon keieishi kenkyūjo, Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha hyaku-­nen shi (hereafter NYK 100-­nen shi), pp. 116–135; Nakano, Tōyō kisen rokujūshi-­nen, pp. 35–45. 9. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, p. 166. 10. ​Nakano, Tōyō kisen rokujūshi-­nen, pp. 21–25. 11. ​Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 17–19, 56–57; Matsuura and Sasagawa, Tōyō kisen to eiga, p. 97; “Ship Kasato-­maru,” in National Diet Library, Japan, 100 Years of Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil, https://­w ww​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/ ­brasil ​/­e​/­column ​/ ­k asatomaru​ .­html. 12. ​Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 56–57; Matsuura and Sasagawa, Tōyō kisen to eiga, p. 96; Kamotsu-ka, Waga sha kaku kōro, pp. 361–362. 13. ​De La Pedraja, Oil and Coffee, pp. 17–22, 29–35; Clarke, “Pioneering Steamship Line,” pp. 221–250. 14. ​A sano to Ishii, April  17, 1906, in Nihon gaikō bunsho (hereafter NGB), ed. Gaimushō chōsakyoku, vol. 39, no. 2, p. 220. 15. ​Sugimura to Katsura, August 20, 1905, in NGB, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 413. 16. ​Wray, “Japan’s Big-­Th ree Ser­v ice Enterprises,” pp. 39–40. 17. ​ Asahi shinbun, “Nanbei kōro haishi,” March 18, 1908. 18. ​De La Pedraja, Oil and Coffee, p. 18. 19. ​Sugimura to Katsura, August 20, 1905, in NGB, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 414. 20. ​Teishinshō daijin kanbō, Teishinshō nenpō, no. 28, p. 100. 21. ​Arakawa to Terauchi, July 16, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 307–310. 22. ​Garner, British Lions, pp. 94–117. 23. ​Arakawa to Terauchi, July 16, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 309. 24. ​Arakawa to Terauchi, July 25, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 311–312. 25. ​Garner, British Lions, pp. 94–117; López, “Transpacific Mexico,” pp. 155–161; López, “From Sail to Steam,” pp. 262–268. 26. ​López, “From Sail to Steam,” 262–275; López, “Transpacific Mexico,” pp. 140– 147, 188–190. 27. ​Arakawa to Terauchi, July 19, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 310–311; Arakawa to Terauchi, July 25, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 311. 28. ​A rakawa to Komura, October 14, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 314–315; Nakashōji to Ishii, October 22, 1908; Komura to Arakawa, October 29, 1908, in NGB, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 316–317. 29. ​A rakawa to Komura, December 28, 1908, in NGB, vol. 42, no. 2, p. 320, and communications from January to July 1909, in “Chū-­Nanbei kōro kaisetsu kankei ikken,” in NGB, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 54–95; López, “Transpacific Mexico,” pp. 193–197. 30. ​“Yosan iin dai-­roku bunka (Teishinshō shokan) kaigiroku (sokki),” no. 1, February 1, 1909, p. 9, Shūgiin iinkai kaigi roku. 31. ​“Yosan iin dai-­roku bunka (Teishinshō shokan) kaigiroku (sokki),” no. 4, February 4, 1909, p. 33, Shūgiin iinkai kaigi roku. 32. ​Yosan iin dai-­roku bunka (Teishinshō shokan) kaigiroku (sokki),” no. 4, February 4, 1909, pp. 35–36. 33. ​ Washington Post, “Nippon in Latin Amer­i­ca,” February 25, 1909. 34. ​Washington Post, “A Route to the Orient,” January 14, 1909. 35. ​Communications from February to June 1910, in “Chū-­Nanbei kōro kaisetsu kankei ikken,” in NGB, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 366–383.

60

Chapter 2

36. ​López, “Transpacific Mexico,” p. 223. 37. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan, pp. 26–29; Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 164–169. 38. ​Sugimura to Katsura, August 20, 1905, in NGB, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 413; Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 83, 112–113. 39. ​De La Pedraja, Oil and Coffee, pp. 7–9, 35–42. 40. ​Sugimura to ­Inoue, September  1, 1907, in Gaimushō kiroku, B-3-6-3-70, Japan Center for Asian Historical Rec­ords Reference Code (hereafter JACAR) B11092483400; Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 83–84. 41. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 113–119. 42. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 116–119. 43. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” 96–105, 132–139; Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 8–17, 57. 44. ​Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, pp. 184–186. 45. ​Kamotsu-ka, Wagasha kaku kōro, pp. 331–332. 46. ​Wray, “Opportunity vs. Control,” pp. 59–83; Chida and Davies, Japa­nese Shipping and Shipbuilding, pp. 28–35; Nakagawa, Ryōtaisen-­kan no Nihon kaiungyō, pp. 73– 109. 47. ​ K ōbe shinbun, “Shōsen shin kōro kaisetsu mondai (ichi/ni),” March  7–8, 1917. 48. ​ OSK 80-­nen shi, p. 346. 49. ​ Ōsaka mainichi shinbun, “Nanbei keizai jijō,” May 30, 1917; Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Eigyō hōkokusho (1917/2), p. 2. 50. ​Kamotsu-ka, Wagasha kaku kōro, pp. 332; NYK 100-­nen shi, pp. 217. 51. ​ Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Eigyō hōkokusho (1918/2), p. 2. 52. ​Kamotsu-ka, Wagasha kaku kōro, pp. 358–359. 53. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 3–7. 54. ​Jiji shinpō, “Nihon kaiun zento,” October 13, 1919. 55. ​ Asahi shinbun, “Sekai kaiun zento,” October 30, 1919. 56. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 197–201; Endoh, Exporting Japan, pp. 66–67. 57. ​Chida and Tomohei, Japa­nese Shipping and Shipbuilding, pp. 36–38; NYK 100-­ nen shi, p. 245; Kawasaki kisen kabushiki gaisha, Kawasaki kisen gojū-­nen shi (hereafter Kawasaki 50-­nen shi), pp. 42–45. 58. ​Yamazawa and Yamamoto, Bōeki to kokusai shūshi, pp. 206–213. 59. ​ Kokumin shinbun, “Nanbei teikisen kōro no shin zōsetsu wo hojo,” December 24, 1919. 60. ​Tōkyō asahi shinbun, “Nanbei kōro hojo kyōsō: Yūsen Shōsen no taikō,” January 31, 1920; Ōsaka shinpō, “Nanbei kōro keieinan: Shōsen to kōro hojo,” February 6, 1920; Teishinshō, Teishin jigyō shi, 6:848–849. 61. ​Nakano, Tōyō kisen rokujūshi-­nen, pp. 179–180. 62. ​ Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-­nen shi (hereafter OSK 50-­nen shi), p. 327. 63. ​Nakagawa, Ryōtaisen-­kan no Nihon kaiungyō, pp. 120–123. 64. ​Ishikawa, Ishikawa Tatsuzō sakuhin shū, p. 104. 65. ​ OSK 50-­nen shi, pp. 351–353; Kamotsu-ka, Wagasha kaku kōro, pp. 332, 340– 341, 356–357; Asahara, Nihon kaiun hatten shi, pp. 304–305.

Greenstein

61

66. ​Sugiyama, Kaiungyō to kin’yū, pp. 89–122; Nakano, Tōyō kisen rokujūshi-­nen, pp. 183–224. 67. ​The OSK’s most celebrated use of motorships was its introduction of fast freighters to the New York route in 1930. Tatsuki, “Intensifying Competition,” pp. 88–107; Tatsuki, “Kaiun fukyō to teikisen,” pp. 303–335; Nakagawa, Ryōtaisen-­kan no Nihon kaiungyō, pp. 123–131; Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha, Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-­nen shi (hereafter NYK 50-­nen shi), pp. 388–390; NYK 100-­nen shi, pp. 327–328. 68. ​Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 71–72, 75. 69. ​Kamotsu-ka, Wagasha kaku kōro, p. 364. 70. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, p. 223; Endoh, Exporting Japan, pp. 32–34. 71. ​This was also true for the “pelagic empire.” Tsutsui, “Pelagic Empire,” pp. 29– 30. 72. ​ N YK 100-­nen shi, pp. 309–311. The depreciation of the yen partly accounts for the increase in the value of Japa­nese trade shown in figure 2.2. As seen in that figure, however, trade with Latin Amer­i­ca also began to make up a growing portion of Japan’s total foreign trade at that time. 73. ​Yoneda, Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan, pp. 185–286. 74. ​For details, see Greenstein, “Sailing,” 230–261. 75. ​Yamashita Steamship was established in 1911, and its ships became active overseas during World War I. In the 1920s, the firm primarily engaged in tramp shipping (irregular ser­v ices), but in the 1930s, it established several regular lines. Kawasaki Steamship was established by the Kawasaki Shipyard in 1918, and from the 1920s to the 1930s, it engaged in liner and tramp shipping. Nakagawa, Ryōtaisen-­kan no Nihon kaiungyō, pp. 84–96, 161–183, 203–230; Yamashita Shin-­Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha shashi henshū iinkai, Shashi: Gappei yori jūgo-­nen (hereafter Yamashita 15-­nen), pp. 394–400, 404–422. 76. ​ N YK 50-­nen shi, pp. 388–390; NYK 100-­nen shi, pp. 327–328. 77. ​ Kawasaki 50-­nen shi, pp. 60–61, 74–76, 95–96. 78. ​ Kawasaki 50-­nen shi, pp. 60–61, 95–96. 79. ​ Yamashita 15-­nen, pp. 454–455. 80. ​Toda Teijirō, “Nihon kaiun no yakushin,” pp. 122–123. 81. ​Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen, p. 171. 82. ​ A sahi shinbun, “Nigiru Taiheiyō no haken: Aruzenchina Maru kyō funade,” July 11, 1939. 83. ​Murata Shōzō, “Aruzenchina Maru teito kaikō ni saishite,” in Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Umi, p. 24. 84. ​Tajima Masao, “Aruzenchina Maru ga mono ga ietara,” in Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Umi, p. 25. 85. ​Nakamura Tomikatsu, “Ginrei wo sekai no umi ni furu,” in Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, Umi, p. 28. 86. ​Los Angeles Times, “Now Around the World,” May  21, 1939; Los Angeles Times, “Round the World via the Southern Hemi­sphere,” May  28, 1939; Los Angeles Times, “­Today’s Newest Ships,” August 20, 1939. 87. ​ Folha de Norte, “Grande cruzeiro de luxo á volta do mundo: Realizando essa maravilhosa viagem, aportarà hoje ao Pará, pela primeira vez, o modern transatlantico Japonez ‘Argentina Marú,’ ” September 15, 1939; Folha de Norte, “Maravilhosa viagem

62

Chapter 2

A Volta do Mundo: A Folha em visita ao luxuoso e modern transoceanico ‘Argentina Maru,’ ” September 16, 1939, in Gaimushō kiroku, F-1-6-0-7, JACAR B09030238000. 88. ​OSK Tōkyō shiten to Shibusawa, March 5, 1940; OSK Tōkyō shiten to Shibusawa, March 12, 1940; Sakane to Arita, March 27, 1940, in Gaimushō kiroku, F-1-60-7, JACAR B09030238000. 89. ​Pedrick to Arledge, March 11, 1940, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, 178-­P1–937. 90. ​ OSK 80-­nen shi, pp. 339–340; NYK 100-­nen shi, p. 381. 91. ​ Kawasaki 50-­nen shi, pp. 95–96. 92. ​N YK 100-­nen shi, p. 381. 93. ​ OSK 80-­ nen shi, pp.  341–345, 351–357; Yamada, Fune ni miru Nihonjin, pp. 210–223. 94. ​N YK 100-­nen shi, pp. 517–518; Kawasaki 50-­nen shi, p. 193.

c h a p t e r

3

­Toward a Prototype of the Total Empire Japa­nese Migration to Brazil and Japa­nese Colonial Expansion in Asia, 1921–1934 Sidney Xu Lu

O

n March 8, 1930, a twenty-­four-­year-­old young man named Ishikawa Tatsuzō boarded the ship La Plata in Kobe. He was heading for Brazil in hopes of pursuing a ­career in South Amer­i­ca. ­A fter a brief stay in Brazil, he returned to Japan and established himself as a respected writer by winning the inaugural Akutagawa Prize with the novel Sōbō (The Masses). Written based on the author’s observations during his Brazil trip, Sōbō won acclaim for its depiction of impoverished Japa­nese subjects who migrated to Brazil as the nation’s “abandoned p ­ eople” (kimin), whose lives the government refused to take responsibility for.1 However, a closer look at how migration trips ­were conceived, planned, and arranged by the Japa­ nese government would reveal that t­ hese Brazil-­bound emigrants ­were anything but “abandoned.” Ishikawa was one of the hundreds of thousands of Japa­nese subjects who answered the call of the imperial government and took advantage of its subsidies to pursue a f­ uture in Brazil. The years from 1921 to 1934 marked the heyday of Japa­nese migration to Brazil: during this period, nearly 10,000 Japa­nese mi­grants reached Brazil’s shores e­ very year in the same prearranged way as Ishikawa had.2 This golden era of Japanese-­Brazilian migration was made pos­si­ble by a number of structural changes inside the Japa­nese government. ­These changes enabled the government to insert—­ and entrench—­itself in all aspects of the migration pro­cesses, including planning, promotion, financing, and management. The Japa­nese government strengthened its control over vari­ ous social interest groups and brought them into the fold to serve as the state’s auxiliary corps in the migration proj­ect. This new po­liti­cal structure, together with newly formed and strengthened ties between the state and social groups during ­these 63

64

Chapter 3

years, would continue to function as engines for Japan’s migration-­based expansion to Manchuria and Southeast Asia from the 1930s ­until the end of World War II. In other words, the genesis of Japan’s World War II migration state is to be found in its interwar experience with launching, organ­izing, and managing Japa­nese emigration to Brazil. This chapter examines how the Japa­nese government’s structural changes, made in the wake of World War I, ­were designed to maximize its ability to promote and manage emigration to Brazil. At both central and local levels, this early prototype of the migration state experimented with three dif­fer­ent models by working closely with migration companies, social organ­izations, industrial capital, or a combination thereof. Together, they mobilized an unpre­ce­dented number of Japa­nese subjects from diverse social backgrounds into the tide of Japa­nese migration to South Amer­i­ca. From the rural masses to business tycoons, from desperate job seekers to ambitious investors, the Brazil-­bound mi­g rants and their backers w ­ ere hailed by the state as participants in the mission of Japan’s overseas development (kaigai hatten), who would put down their roots in São Paulo’s coffee fields and conquer the inhospitable Amazon forests.3 By examining the changes occurring within the Japa­nese government and its relations with Japan’s civil society during the heyday of Japanese-­ Brazilian migration, this chapter aims to revise the prevailing understanding of the histories of Japa­nese colonial empire and Japa­nese migration in two ways. First, it challenges the territory-­bound narratives of the Japa­ nese empire by shedding light on the importance of Japanese-­Brazilian migration in the interwar years as a precursor to Japa­nese colonial expansion in Asia from the 1930s to 1945.4 This study joins recent transpacific lit­er­ a­ture in the study of the Japa­nese empire that has begun to uncover intriguing connections between Japa­nese migration to South Amer­i­ca and the empire’s expansion in Asia. Toake Endoh’s monograph makes the convincing argument that Japa­nese migration to Latin Amer­i­ca in general, both before and ­after World War II, should be seen as stories of Japan’s state-­driven expansion.5 Miriam Kingsberg Kadia, writing from a cultural perspective, reveals how Japa­nese intellectuals’ colonial imaginations of South Amer­i­ca w ­ ere closely tied with Japan’s changing imperial and national identities during the twentieth c­ entury.6 This chapter distinguishes itself from the existing body of transpacific lit­er­a­t ure by focusing on the importance of Brazil in the pro­cess of Japan’s

Lu

65

empire building. It analyzes the growth of Japa­nese migration to Brazil in the context of Japan’s rise as a global power a­ fter the G ­ reat War and explains how interwar Japanese-­Brazilian migration led to profound changes in the ways that Japa­nese government managed emigration—­changes that would eventually empower Japan’s migration-­driven expansion in Manchuria and Southeast Asia during World War II. This study also deepens our understanding of the culmination of Japan’s domestic mobilization for expansion during the early Showa era. It echoes recent studies that have highlighted the continuities between the imperial government’s control of the society and colonial expansion during the era of the Asia-­Pacific War and the empire’s social policies and expansion during the preceding de­cades. Using the concept of “social management,” Sheldon Garon has convincingly shown how Japa­nese state officials had tightened their control over civil society through collaboration with vari­ous social interest groups long before the 1930s.7 Louise Young has traced the roots of Japan’s mass migration to Manchuria during the total war back to vari­ous migration campaigns both inside and outside of the archipelago during the Meiji era.8 This chapter, on the other hand, explores specific connections between the experience of Japa­nese migration to Brazil and that of Japa­nese expansion in Asia by focusing on the structure of the imperial government and its relationship with social groups in promoting and managing emigration. Louise Young has shown that Japan’s expansion into Manchuria required—­ and resulted in—an unpre­ce­dented mass mobilization of its civil society in the 1930s, a phenomenon that she defines as the “total empire.”9 This study builds on Young’s concept but argues that the interwar-­era boom of Japa­ nese migration to Brazil had already given birth to a prototype of the total empire, in which the government’s mass mobilization of domestic resources for emigration had begun to take shape before the 1930s. The history of Japa­nese migration to Brazil is commonly traced back to the sail of the ship Kasato Maru in 1908, an event that officially brought a group of Japa­nese laborers to Brazilian shores. This chapter, however, focuses on the period between 1921, when the imperial government began to provide subsidies to its subjects bound for Brazil, and 1934, when Japa­ nese migration to Brazil suffered a precipitous decline due to changes in Brazil’s immigration policies.10 This period was marked by the largest wave of Japa­nese migration to Brazil in history. More importantly, it proved to be

66

Chapter 3

crucial to a series of structural changes of the imperial government, maximizing its ability to mobilize domestic society for Japan’s migration-­driven expansion in Asia during World War II.

“Citizens of the World”: Emigration, Trade, and the Formation of Japan’s Migration State Coming out on the winning side of World War I, Japan found itself as one of the few world powers that had a say in the construction of the postwar global order. On top of receiving German Micronesia and expanding into the South Pacific, it also joined the United Kingdom, France, and Italy as one of the four permanent members of the League Council, the core policy-­ making body of the League of Nations. Th ­ ese spectacular diplomatic achievements did not come without a cost, however, and the empire encountered a number of new obstacles in its quest for expansion. Although the US remained outside the League of Nations, its central role in the making of the postwar world order was clear at the Washington Conference of 1921. The conference advanced the US vision of the new order, one in keeping with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, by emphasizing both disarmament and open trade. At the same time, it ended Japan’s war­time mono­poly of control over Chinese politics and market. It also included Japan in the Five Power Treaty (with the UK, US, France, and Italy), which ­limited the construction of navy forces by the signatories. Nevertheless, immediately ­after the war, mainstream Japa­nese politicians and intellectuals embraced the new world order with g­reat enthusiasm. Opinion leaders, ranging from journalists to military strategists, recognized the necessity for Japan to accept the princi­ples of the new order, such as international cooperation, pacifism, and liberalism, to continue its pursuit of expansion.11 Accordingly, Japan’s leaders embraced “peaceful expansion” as the new princi­ple of empire building. For example, in his 1922 New Year’s message, Prime Minister Takahashi Korekiyo argued that it was no longer pos­si­ble to expand a country’s territory through force ­because of the fundamental changes the ­Great War had brought to the world. At the same time, Takahashi continued, ­great powers would never stop expanding. The difference was that they would now eschew military invasion in ­favor of trade and economic competition.12

Lu

67

For Japa­nese empire builders of the day, the pro­cess of peaceful expansion had three major components: trade, international cooperation, and emigration. While the United States served as a reliable market that soaked up 40 ­percent of Japan’s exports throughout the 1920s, further expansion of trade and overseas investment remained one of Japan’s top priorities. Japa­nese diplomats managed to reduce China’s tariff on Japa­nese exports and created more opportunities for Japa­nese traders in both Southeast Asia and the M ­ iddle East.13 Japa­nese investment also poured into the South Seas and South Amer­i­ca. Tokyo’s commitment to economic expansion during this period is best represented by the ideas and activities of Shidehara Kijūrō, foreign minister of Japan from 1924 to 1927. Known as “Shidehara Diplomacy,” Shidehara’s diplomatic strategies followed the same economic liberalism that buttressed the Open Door policy of the United States, and he was firmly supported by the growing business elites of the Taishō era who called for widening po­liti­cal participation at home and exploring new markets abroad.14 In alignment with the US-­centric new world order, Japan’s interwar economic expansion was guided by the princi­ple of international cooperation. In addition to playing a key role in the deliberations of the League of Nations as a permanent number of the League Council, Japan was also widely involved in a number of other internal organ­izations, such as the International ­Labor Organ­ization, the International Court of Justice, and the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs.15 According to Nitobe Inazō, the prominent Japa­nese intellectual who served as an undersecretary general of the League of Nations for seven years, Japan’s ultimate goal ­under this new world order was to produce subjects who could think beyond the archipelago and become “citizens of the world” by dedicating themselves to the ser­v ice of all humankind.16 Concerning this new path to empire defined by economic expansion and international cooperation, emigration played a central role. For many Japa­nese leaders of the day, the emigration of Japa­nese farmers and their permanent settlement overseas would be a peaceful means not only to proj­ ect national power abroad but also to increase trade opportunities between Japan and the host nations. By the 1920s, Japan had already conducted numerous experiments with agrarian migration to locales ­under its spheres of influence, including Manchuria, the Korean peninsula, and Micronesia.17 In 1924, the United States completely shut its doors to Japa­nese immigrants.

68

Chapter 3

In contrast, the doors of Brazil remained wide open to Japa­nese immigration, and the Japa­nese farming communities in the state of São Paulo ­were growing at a stunning rate. The success of Japanese-­Brazilian migration and community building, in turn, brought on an unpre­ce­dented expansion of the Japa­nese government’s role in the sphere of emigration, eventually leading to the formation of the migration state. The concept of the migration state highlights the fact that the Japa­nese state played a central role in promoting and managing Japan’s overseas emigration. The birth of the migration state is marked by two features that came into being during the 1920s. First, through a series of new legislation and structural changes, the imperial government, at both central and local levels, assumed direct responsibility in planning, subsidizing, and controlling overseas emigration. Second, in a manner similar to what Garon calls “social management,”18 the Japa­nese government began to collaborate closely with dif­fer­ent social groups and co-­opted ­people of vari­ous social backgrounds, from the rural masses to business elites, into the empire’s migration-­driven expansion. The following sections provide a close examination of three models by which the migration state first took shape. State support for Japanese-­ Brazilian migration was mostly dispensed through one of ­these three models: Kaikō, Aliança, and Nantaku. Together, they served as tentative blueprints for the migration machine of Japan’s total empire during the Asia-­Pacific War. First was the model of Kaikō, ­under which the Ministry of Home Affairs formed a partnership with the Overseas Migration Com­pany (Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, or Kaikō).19 Campaigns conducted u ­ nder this model offered a variety of financial aid to Japa­nese subjects who would migrate to southeast Brazil. They would initially work as coffee laborers but ­were expected to ultimately become landowners. The second model took its name from Aliança, a colony established by expansionists hailing from Nagano Prefecture. ­Under this model, Japa­nese government facilitated the formation of Oversea Migration Cooperative Socie­ties in individual prefectures as state agents to manage emigration at a local level. Working within their own prefecture, each of ­these socie­ties functioned as both a migration recruiting organ­ization and a credit ­union. In addition to receiving financial aid from Tokyo, they collected small funds from individual members to purchase land in southeast Brazil and directly settled their members ­there as farmers. The third model, that of Nantaku, received its name from the South Amer­i­ca Colonization Com­pany ­Limited (Nanbei

Lu

69

Takushoku Kabushiki Gaisha, or Nantaku). Jointly established by several industrial enterprises, this com­pany worked to manage Japa­nese settlement and capital investment in the Amazon River basin. For Nantaku’s colonial proj­ect in the state of Pará, Tokyo served as a critical financial backer and a policy guide but operated primarily b ­ ehind the scene.

Mobilizing the Masses: The Model of Kaiko¯ Like other passengers of La Plata, Ishikawa was recruited to Brazil by the Overseas Development Com­pany (Kaikō) through a government-­sponsored migration (seifu fujo imin) program. Before departure, he first went to Kobe. ­There he received ­f ree accommodation at the National Emigrant Camp (Kokuritsu Kaigai Imin Shuyōjo), which also offered Brazil-­bound mi­ grants classes on basic Portuguese as well as geography and customs in South Amer­i­ca. Registered as a single emigrant (tandoku imin), he received a subsidy of 200 yen from the imperial government to cover steamship transportation in a third-­class cabin to the port of Santos. Upon arrival, he signed a ­labor contract and was dispatched to a designated farm to start his term as a plantation laborer.20 Through Kaikō, the imperial government provided its impoverished subjects with vari­ous forms of financial aid and encouraged them to start a new life in Brazil. ­Under this model, state-­sponsored emigration served a dual purpose, both alleviating social poverty at home and accelerating Japa­nese settler colonial expansion in Brazil. At the end of their ­labor contracts, ­these emigrants w ­ ere expected to become in­de­pen­dent landowners and ­settle down in Brazil permanently.21 To ensure such a transition would happen smoothly, Kaikō took over the management of Iguape, a São Paulo colony founded e­ arlier by a group of Japa­nese expansionists. The government-­sponsored migration program came into existence by the end of World War I, as the empire’s mono­poly on the Chinese market during the war had led to a short-­term economic boom and a record-­ breaking wave of urbanization in the archipelago.22 The wealth increase in the archipelago, however, came at the price of a growing social gap. The sudden emergence of the nouveau riche (narikin) was accompanied by rising tensions in both urban and rural areas in the form of l­abor and tenant disputes. As Eu­ro­pean capital returned to Asia following the end of World War I, Japan quickly lost its economic mono­poly in the region. This led to

70

Chapter 3

an immediate economic downturn that exacerbated existing social tensions. In 1918, food price inflation triggered the biggest rice riots in Japa­ nese history. Such grassroots discontent marked the birth of what Michael Lewis called the “mass awakening.” The urban and rural poor began to adopt more or­ga­nized means of po­liti­cal protests, forming vari­ous u ­ nions and civil associations at both national and local levels.23 The rise of the masses as a major po­liti­cal force compelled the imperial government to take on a greater role in social welfare, providing poverty relief and basic food supply to its subjects. Embracing the increasingly popu­ lar claim that overpopulation was the root of all social ills that plagued the archipelago, policy makers began to portray emigration as a natu­ral solution to Japan’s social prob­lems.24 The first step of institutional change within the government was the formation of the Bureau of Social Affairs (Shakai Kyoku) in 1920. As a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, this agency began to promote emigration to Brazil as a solution to poverty,25 and Kaikō was its primary partner in this venture. Starting in 1921, the bureau began to fund Kaikō to promote emigration through a number of programs, including emigrant recruitment, training, conducting physical exams, and dispensing vaccinations.26 Kaikō itself was established in 1917 ­under the imperial government’s auspice as a means to unify migration-­related businesses both in and outside of the Japa­nese empire. It was the result of a merger of four dif­fer­ent migration companies, each of them focused on sending out emigrants to a specific region.27 ­A fter absorbing the Morioka Emigration Com­pany (Morioka Imin Gaisha) in 1919, Kaikō was able to monopolize all authorized Japa­nese businesses related to Brazil-­bound migration for several years. In addition to Brazil, Kaikō or­ga­nized emigration campaigns to Peru, the Philippines, and Australia. It also purchased land and held commercial farms in several countries in Latin Amer­i­ca and Southeast Asia.28 The first few years of the Bureau of Social Affairs’ partnership with Kaikō, however, proved unfruitful with regards to Brazil. From 1921 to 1923, the average number of Japa­nese subjects bound for Brazil remained less than 880, showing a decrease rather than increase from the yearly average during the 1910s.29 This number began to swell in 1924, a­ fter the bureau started providing direct subsidies to individual emigrants recruited by Kaikō. In 1923, the bureau started to offer thirty-­five yen per person to up to 2,000 emigrants recruited by Kaikō, fully covering the registration fees charged by the com­pany. The next year, the bureau further offered a

Lu

71

substantial stipend of 200 yen, covering the emigrants’ voyage expense to Brazil. The number of emigrants who received the government’s financial aid grew to over 7,500 by 1928, right before the newly formed Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumu-shō) took over the management of migration-­ related affairs from the bureau.30 This dramatic increase in government financial aid was the result of two related ­factors. First, the state of São Paulo, where over half of the Japa­ nese Brazilian immigrants had settled, completely terminated its subsidies to Japa­nese immigrants in 1922.31 The end of World War I brought numerous Eu­ro­pean immigrants to southeastern Brazil, sufficiently meeting the local demands for coffee laborers. As the Japa­nese had been commonly seen by the Paulista elites as less desirable substitutes for the Eu­ro­pean immigrants, they ­were no longer needed to fill the gap. The termination of Brazilian subsidies pushed Tokyo to take on greater financial responsibility to keep the migration proj­ect g­ oing. Secondly, two events intensified the Japa­nese public’s anxiety over overpopulation. The first was the G ­ reat Kantō Earthquake that struck Tokyo and Yokohama in 1923. Aside from the horrific casualty toll, the disaster immediately created hundreds of thousands of victims deprived of basic livelihood. To prevent potential social uprisings and chaos, the government responded quickly by making Brazil-­bound migration one of its disaster relief programs.32 A year ­later, the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 completely shut the United States’ doors to Japa­nese immigration, further narrowing down Japa­nese migration options.33 In the same year, the government hosted the Imperial Conference on Economy (Teikoku Keizai Kaigi), at which policy makers and bureaucrats specializing in social affairs, migration, and foreign affairs agreed to further expand the state-­ sponsored emigration program. The Bureau of Social Affairs, participants of the conference believed, should play a particularly central role in further promoting and guiding overseas emigration to combat rural depression and overpopulation. A month l­ater, the Imperial Diet approved this initiative, creating an extra bud­get that allowed the Bureau of Social Affairs to fully reimburse all government-­sponsored Kaikō emigrants for the expenses of their trip to Brazil.34

72

Chapter 3

Localizing the Migration Campaigns: The Model of Aliança ­ nder the Kaikō model, the imperial government directly provided subsiU dies to individual emigrants through a migration com­pany. ­There ­were two other models through which the government collaborated closely with dif­ fer­ent social groups and migration promoters. ­These two models w ­ ere made pos­si­ble by a growing interest, both in terms of nongovernment interest groups and the general public, in overseas migration in general and Brazilian migration in par­tic­u­lar. This trend was reflected by the emergence of several well-­circulated emigration magazines in the 1920s, such as Shokumin (The Colonial Review; a mouthpiece of Kaikō), Kaigai (The Overseas), and Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki (Brazil: Colonial Migration and Trade). 35 ­These new periodicals w ­ ere joined by established mainstream general-­subject magazines such as Kingu (The King) and Ie no hikari (The Light of F ­ amily), which also began to provide more coverage on emigration-­ related topics. The growth of media coverage on emigration further fanned public enthusiasm for emigration, stimulating the private sector’s interests in collaborating with the migration state. Aliança, a Japa­nese settler community in the state of São Paulo, was established within this historical context. The Aliança Colony was made pos­si­ble by the close cooperation between Nagano’s prefectural government and individual expansionists who held personal ties to the same prefecture. It became the poster child of another model of the migration state, one in which the prefectural government played a leading role in financing and managing emigration campaigns. The Aliança proj­ect was first conceived by Nagata Shigeshi and Wako Shungorō, two Nagano natives who sought to establish a new type of settler community in Brazil. Both men had previously migrated to the United States and worked as journalists in Japa­nese American communities on the West Coast. ­A fter quitting his journalist ­career, Nagata returned to Japan and became the president of Nippon Rikkō Kai (Japa­nese Striving Society), a major migration com­pany based in Tokyo, while Wako moved to Brazil and continued working for Japanese-­language media in São Paulo. Unsatisfied with Kaikō’s contract-­laborer-­centered migration program, Nagata and Wako wanted to establish a new Japa­nese community in Brazil that would be composed of in­de­pen­dent farming settlers directly migrated

Lu

73

from Japan; in addition, the community would be eco­nom­ically self-­ sufficient, f­ ree from the control of big companies like Kaikō.36 To this end, Nagata and Wako worked with Nagano’s prefecture government and the Nagano Board of Education to establish the Shinano Overseas Association (Shinano Kaigai Kyōkai) in 1922. The association was funded by both public and private money; it had the governor of Nagano and the leader of the prefectural diet as its first director and vice director. The association functioned as a semigovernmental organ­ization in charge of promoting emigration among Nagano residents, hosting public lectures, publishing and circulating materials, funding investigation trips overseas, and raising funds to support specific emigration campaigns.37 The Aliança colony, established in 1924 in the state of São Paulo, was its crowning achievement. As a product of the migration state, the Aliança proj­ect differed from Kaikō’s government-­sponsored emigration program in a number of aspects. First, unlike the Kaikō model that recruited and transported Japa­nese subjects to Brazil as contract laborers, Aliança directly recruited and settled Japa­nese subjects in Brazil as farmers. To this end, the Shinano Overseas Association purchased land in São Paulo and built a host of facilities, including a rice mill, a coffee refinery, a clinic, and a school, all aiming to foster the growth of the farming community.38 The found­ers of Aliança believed that the prospect of Japa­nese expansion in Brazil depended upon the prosperity of in­de­pen­dent and self-­sufficient Japa­nese farmers. As Nagata claimed with pride, the goal of Aliança was to “cultivate ­people rather than coffee [kōhī yori hito wo tsukure].”39 Secondly, dif­fer­ent from the Kaikō program that relied almost exclusively on government subsidies, a part of the financial backing of the Aliança proj­ect came from the mi­grants themselves. Th ­ ese mi­grants fell into two categories: first, individuals who w ­ ere able to purchase land in the colony in advance and would move to Aliança directly as in­de­pen­dent farmers; second, ­those who would first ­settle in Aliança as contract farmers. They usually started with loans from the Shinano Overseas Association. Financially backed by the prefectural government, the association functioned as a credit ­union for Nagano emigrants.40 The mi­grants would ­later become in­de­pen­dent owner-­farmers by paying off the loans. Both of ­these categories required the recruits to have a certain amount of funds to begin with.41 In other words, a substantial portion of Aliança’s financial

74

Chapter 3

resources, used for land purchase and fa­cil­i­ty preparation in São Paulo, came from individual mi­grants themselves. Unlike the Kaikō recruits, most of whom w ­ ere struggling at the bottom of the society, the average Aliança mi­grant was financially closer to becoming an owner-­farmer in Japan before their migration. Thirdly, unlike the Kaikō program, which recruited nationally, the Aliança proj­ect emphasized local identity and personal ties. The pro­cesses of planning, fund­rais­ing, and migration recruiting ­were mainly ­limited to Nagano residents and ­those who had personal connections to the prefecture. The prefectural government also played a central role from b ­ ehind the scenes by providing financial and po­liti­cal assistance through the Shinano Overseas Association. The Aliança proj­ect, therefore, opened a new chapter in the history of Japan’s migration state, one in which local governments began to directly insert themselves into the area of migration promotion and management. Inspired by the Aliança proj­ect, the Overseas Associations of Tottori, Toyama, and Kumamoto, backed by their respective prefectural governments, also completed land purchases near Aliança in São Paulo. Tottori’s colony, appropriately named Aliança II, was established in 1926, and Kumamoto’s Vila Nova colony was established in 1927. In the same year, the Toyama Overseas Association and the Shinano Overseas Association jointly founded Aliança III. The Aliança model, with its prefecture-­based scope, farmer-­centered focus, and the princi­ple of mutual support among its members, was officially ­adopted by Tokyo as a central means of migration promotion and management and was applied nationwide. In 1927, the imperial government promulgated the Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties Law (Kaigai Ijū Kumiai Hō), authorizing each prefecture to establish an overseas migration cooperative society. Each society, backed by its respective prefectural government, would recruit emigrants and raise funds to establish its own prefecture-­centered settler community in Brazil by following Aliança’s example. Seven cooperative socie­ties formed in the same year, and they jointly formed the Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties (Kaigai Ijū Kumiai Rengōkai). As the oversight body of all prefectural cooperative socie­ties, the federation had forty-­four members by the mid-1930s. Upon its formation, it immediately received a loan of 1.7 million yen from the imperial government, allowing it to facilitate and coordinate the prefectural socie­ties’ migration and land-­acquisition campaigns in Brazil.42

FIG. 3.1.  A photo­graph of Umetani Mitsusada during his investigation of the Japa­nese community in Tietê, São Paulo. Source: National Diet Library, Japan, “100 Years.”

76

Chapter 3

Aliança’s presence loomed large during the early days of the federation. Umetani Mitsusada, the former Nagano governor and a central backer of the Aliança proj­ect, was its first executive director, and he soon arrived in Brazil on an investigative trip. The federation established Sociedade Colonizadora do Brazil Limitada (Brazilian Colonization Com­pany ­Limited, or Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai [Burataku]) to serve as its agent in Brazil to carry out land purchases and Japa­nese community-­building proj­ects. By the end of the 1930s, when Burataku ­stopped its operation in Brazil, it had established three Japa­nese settler communities, including Bastos (along the Sorocabana Railway in São Paulo), Tietê (along the Noroeste Railway in São Paulo), and Tres Barras (in northern Paraná). In addition to managing ­these three colonies, Burataku also took over the administration of all four communities associated with Aliança along the Noroesete Railway, including Aliança I, II, and III and Vila Nova. In total, Burataku acquired and managed 537,668 acres of land and oversaw the lives of 18,317 Japa­nese settlers, most of whom ­were owner-­farmers.43

Assembling Private Capital: The Model of Nantaku While the Kaikō and Aliança models focused on the exportation of emigrants in the form of contract laborers and farming settlers respectively, the third model of the migration state was centered on capital exportation. It was exemplified by the activities of the South Amer­i­ca Colonization Com­ pany ­Limited (Nanbei Takushoku Kabushiki Gaisha, or Nantaku), established in 1928. The Nantaku model was marked by a combination of settler migration, land acquisition, resource extraction, and capital exportation. It represented how the migration state worked closely with Japan’s business elites and involved private capital in its migration-­driven expansion. Similar to the model of Aliança, Nantaku conducted campaigns of land acquisition and the emigration of farming settlers, yet its primary goals w ­ ere not only to export and ­settle Japa­nese mi­grants but also to extract natu­ral resources from Brazil. Unlike the two aforementioned models, both of which depended heavi­ly on the financial resources provided by the government, the Nantaku model mainly relied on private money. ­Under this model, Japan’s business elites and industrial entrepreneurs took center stage in financially sponsoring, planning, and conducting land acquisition, emigration,

Lu

77

and community building in Brazil. They w ­ ere also the primary beneficiaries of the profits and resources generated by ­t hese campaigns. While the imperial government also provided po­liti­cal support, it mainly worked ­behind the scene. Nantaku came into being amid the rise of Japan’s cap­i­tal­ist expansion and emigration to the Amazon region in the mid-1920s. Unlike the models of Kaikō and Aliança that exported Japa­nese subjects, the Nantaku model focused on the prospect of natu­ral resource extraction. Accordingly, the site of its colonies shifted from southeast Brazil (particularly the state of São Paulo) to the Amazon River basin, targeting land in the northern states of Pará and Amazonas. Japa­nese expansionists’ growing interest in the region was stimulated by a deep-­seated national anxiety over the lack of resources (shigen) in the archipelago. In the wake of World War I, Japan’s policy makers became haunted by a fear of shortages in natu­ral resources. As the first total war in ­human history, the ­Great War demanded each participating nation to thoroughly mobilize both ­human and material resources, blurring lines between the battlefield and the home front. Recognizing the decisive role played by resources in deciding the war’s outcome, the Japa­nese government established the Bureau of Resources (Shigen Kyoku). Directly reporting to the cabinet, the bureau took charge of investigating and collecting information on Japan’s material resources. It also assisted the cabinet with its policy making in the area.44 Japan’s annexation of German Micronesia during World War I also turned the South Seas, including both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, into a potential resource supplier for the empire.45 Replicating the Western colonial discourse on the tropics, Japa­nese expansionists ­imagined that the North was the world of the h ­ uman and the home of pro­gress, technology, and civilization. On the other hand, they viewed the South as merely a world of materials, the home of natu­ral resources, where pro­gress, technology, and civilization w ­ ere absent.46 This North-­human-­South-­ material discourse (hokujin nanbutsu ron), to borrow a term from Yano Tooru, not only undergirded Japa­nese colonial expansion in the South Seas from the 1920s but also fostered the growth of Japa­nese colonial interests in the Amazon River basin around the same time. Japa­nese expansionists began to look at the rainforest land in northern Brazil through the same lens of tropical colonialism that they applied to the South Seas. The colonial imagination of the Amazon, fanned by a fear of natu­ral resource shortages, joined hands with a growing anxiety of overpopulation

78

Chapter 3

and food shortage in the archipelago. They became two main justifications for Japan’s capital exportation and emigration to the Amazon region. The formation of the Kansai-­based Japan-­Brazil Association (Nippaku Kyōkai, or Associação Nipo-­Brasileira) in 1926 symbolized the marriage between Japan’s business elites and promoters of Japa­nese migration to Brazil, particularly to the Amazons. With business elites and politicians as its board members and the governor of Hyōgo Prefecture as its president, the association vowed to solve the issues of overpopulation and resource shortage that plagued the archipelago by facilitating Japa­nese migration to Brazil and fostering bilateral trade.47 It founded a journal, Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki (Brazil: Migration and Trade), to disseminate information regarding opportunities for migration and investment in Brazil, providing advice and tips for Japa­nese investors and mi­grants. It also or­ga­nized a series of lectures and events to promote emigration and investment, including an exhibition about Brazil in the Mitsukoshi Department Store in Kobe.48 The exhibition showcased a variety of Brazil’s resources, from diamond and precious minerals to exotic animals and tropical plants. To the Japa­nese public, it offered up an image of Brazil that had boundless empty land and countless natu­ral wealth, all waiting for the Japa­nese to occupy and utilize.49 During the 1920s, Japa­nese business elites’ primary target in Brazil was the Amazon region due to both its natu­ral resources and local governments’ subsidiary policies designed to attract foreign immigration and investment. The formation of Nantaku itself provided a good example. ­After the Japa­nese ambassador to Brazil Tazuki Shichita obtained a grant of 500,000 hectares of land from the governor of Pará, Tokyo sponsored an investigation trip to Pará in 1925 to evaluate the local conditions for establishing Japa­ nese communities.50 The trip was funded by the Kanebo Textile Com­pany (Kanebo), the biggest textile com­pany within the Japa­nese empire, as it was searching for raw cotton suppliers outside Asia. The del­e­ga­tion was headed by Fukuhara Hachirō, a director of Kanebo, and included several government bureaucrats as well as experts in agriculture and medicine.51 Based on his investigation of the Amazon land in Pará, Fukuhara concluded that Japa­nese capital exportation and migration to the region was indeed full of promise. The land of the Amazons was not only ten times cheaper than São Paulo but also boasted abundant natu­ral resources. While civilized p ­ eople in other parts of the world w ­ ere busy competing for resources to survive, Fukuhara observed, Brazilians, due to the abundance of resources in their land, w ­ ere slow in their pace of life. For the same reason,

Lu

79

the Indigenous p ­ eople in the Amazons, he argued, w ­ ere especially mild-­ natured and obedient, easy for the Japa­nese to manipulate (oshiyasui). ­Because of the local residents’ lack of diligence and the small size of their population, he argued, the Amazon region remained largely a virgin land waiting for the Japa­nese to explore.52 Fukuhara further urged Japan’s business elites and investors to become trailblazers of the empire’s expansion in the Amazon. The failure of Japa­nese migration to the United States, Fukuhara reasoned, was ­because Japa­nese mi­ grants did not have a solid economic foundation in the host society. Land, manpower, and capital w ­ ere the three pillars of successful migration. Although the Brazilian land was full of natu­ral wealth and the Japa­nese settlers ­were incredibly diligent, the Japa­nese settler communities still lacked a solid economic foundation. Accordingly, he urged Japan’s business leaders to act on behalf of the empire by joining Japan’s migration-­driven expansion in the Brazilian land.53 Buoyed by Fukuhara’s report, Prime Minister Tanaka Gi’ichi hosted a meeting with over sixty Japa­nese business leaders in March 1928. From this meeting, Nantaku was born. Kanebo took on Nantaku’s princi­ple financial and managerial responsibilities by holding 25 ­percent of Nantaku’s stocks. A few other big companies also purchased substantial amounts of its stocks. Fukuhara himself became the first president of the com­pany. At the end of that year, he arrived in Pará again, established the Japan Plantation Com­ pany of Brazil (Companhia Niponica de Plantacao do Brasil) as a local agent of Nantaku, and signed the agreement of land concession in Acara, Monte Alegre, and three other areas from the Parã government to Nantaku. Nantaku established Japa­nese colonies in both Acara and Monte Alegre, where it built a host of public facilities, such as clinics, schools, playgrounds, ware­houses, and grocery stores. The com­pany recruited mi­grants in Japan and directly settled them in t­ hese two colonies as farmers. It provided each mi­grant ­family with ­free housing and an inexpensive lease of land, with the understanding that the land’s owner­ship would be transferred to the farming families at a low cost l­ater on. In addition to managing migration and community building, the companies also established laboratories in the colonies to experiment with new technologies in farming and pest control and to provide professional guidance to the farming settlers. The com­pany’s profits mainly came from the sale of crops produced by t­hese colonies, including cotton, rice, and tabaco, which it encouraged the mi­grants to cultivate.54

80

Chapter 3

FIG. 3.2.  A map in a guidebook of Japa­nese migration to Pará that marked out the two colonies established by Nantaku in the state. Source: HITKZ: NTKG, vol 2, J120, J3-2.

The ways by which Nantaku promoted emigration substantially differed from ­those of Kaikō and the Aliança. They targeted dif­fer­ent social groups as their campaign audience and had dif­fer­ent funding sources. However, as apparatuses of the migration state, each of the three represented a major way by which the Japa­nese government managed emigration: by collaborating with migration companies, social groups in local prefectures, or industrial corporations. Through their links with the Japa­nese government, the migration campaigns u ­ nder ­these three models w ­ ere also closely connected with each other. For example, Tatsuke Shichita, the first Japa­nese ambassador to Brazil, was a core planner of the investigation trip led by Fukuhara Hachirō in the Amazons that led to the formation of Nantaku.55 ­After leaving his office in Rio de Janeiro, Tatsuke became the founding director of the Federation of the Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ ties.56 ­ Inoue Masaji, the president of Kaikō during the height of its Brazilian migration and settlement programs from 1924 to 1937, and Mutō

FIG. 3.3.  A poster of Nantaku promoting its programs of migration to the Amazon River basin. Source: National Diet Library, Japan, “100 Years.”

82

Chapter 3

Sanji, the head of Kanebo (the largest shareholder of Nantaku), also served as members of the federation’s board of directors.57

From South Amer­i­ca to Asia: Heyday of the Migration State By the end of the 1920s, the Japa­nese government was able to form alliances with vari­ous social groups and mobilize Japa­nese subjects from dif­ fer­ent social strata into Japan’s migration-­driven expansion in Brazil. The rise of Japan’s migration state ushered in the heyday of Japa­nese migration to Brazil. Through vari­ous migration programs, directly or indirectly supported by the government, over 130,000 Japa­nese subjects arrived in Brazil between 1925 and 1934. Japa­nese settler communities in Brazil continued to grow both in terms of population and geo­g raph­i­cal scope. While the state of São Paulo continued to be the home of most Japa­nese plantation laborers and farming settlers, the Amazon region in the north emerged as a new destination for the Brazil-­bound Japa­nese mi­grants. The boom in Japanese-­Brazilian migration also made the sea route between Kobe and Santos highly popu­lar. During this golden era of Brazil-­ bound migration, most Japa­nese mi­grants departed the archipelago from the port of Kobe, heading westward for Southeast Asia. ­ A fter passing through the Strait of Malacca, the ships would sail across the Indian Ocean ­toward the southern tip of Africa. They would then head further westward across the Atlantic, eventually reaching the port of Santos. As a result, Kobe quickly grew into a central port of Japa­nese emigration that rivaled Yokohama. In 1928, the Japa­nese government established the National Kobe Emigrant Camp (Kokuritsu Kobe Imin Shūyōjo), a counterpart of the Emigration Center established previously in Yokohama during the heyday of Japa­nese migration to North Amer­i­ca. As an arm of the migration state, the camp offered f­ ree accommodation and meals to Brazil-­bound emigrants for up to ten days. The government also provided emigrants at the camp with orientation sessions, relevant training, and the required medical exams and vaccinations.58 As Japa­nese migration to Brazil grew steadily both in number and in its po­liti­cal and economic importance for the empire, it led to another profound structural change in the central government in 1929. In that year, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was established as a main branch of the

Lu

83

FIG. 3.4.  A map that illustrated the information of Japa­nese settler communities in the state of São Paulo in the early 1930s. Source: Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha.

central government. It took over the task of subsidizing overseas migration to Brazil and elsewhere from the Bureau of Social Affairs by providing grants to such migration companies as Kaikō, Nantaku, and the Federation of Migration Cooperative Socie­ties.59 At the same time, the ministry also managed Japan’s colonies in Asia by overseeing colonial administrations and colonial companies, such as the Southern Manchuria Railway Com­pany (Mantetsu) and the Oriental Development Com­pany (Tōtaku). The formation of the ministry further strengthened the power of the migration state by unifying previously separate governmental branches that had overseen migration activities in and outside of the empire. On a conceptual level, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs also symbolized an institutional

84

Chapter 3

convergence within the empire’s state structure between Japa­nese migration to Brazil and Japa­nese colonial expansion in Asia.60 More generally, the establishment of the ministry formalized the strategic unity and operational continuity within the Japa­nese government between migration activities inside and outside of the empire. In 1930, one year before the Manchurian Incident would usher in a new stage of Japa­nese expansion in Northeast Asia, two public events jointly marked the apex of state–­civic-­society collaboration in the promotion of Japa­nese migration to Brazil. Th ­ ese w ­ ere the Conference for Overseas Colonial Migration (Kaigai Shokumin Taikai) and the Harbor Exposition (Kaikō Hakurankai). The Colonial Migration Association (Shokumin Dōshikai) hosted the Conference for Overseas Colonial Migration on January  19  in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park, right next to Kasumigaseki, where the imperial government buildings ­were located. This half-­day conference, attended by over three thousand p ­ eople, was designed to encourage more Japa­nese subjects to participate in Japan’s migration-­driven expansion in Latin Amer­i­ca. It began with three keynote speeches given by the representatives of the host and Tokyo Nichinichi News Agency (the conference’s cosponsor) and ­Inoue Masaji, the head of Kaikō. In his speech, ­Inoue urged his fellow countrymen to contribute to the empire’s overseas expansion by making the entire world their home (sekai wo ie toshite). The keynotes ­were followed by the speech of the minister of colonial affairs, emphasizing the empire’s mission of peaceful expansion through emigration and the importance of collaboration between the government and social forces. Next ­were the tributes of diplomats from Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, the main destinations of Japa­nese migration in Latin Amer­i­ca, all extending warm invitations to more Japa­nese mi­grants to their land. The conference ended with the screening of two documentary films: one film highlighted the success of the Japa­nese farming settlers in Brazil, while the other was a history of Western colonial expeditions in Africa, an example that the Japa­ nese, the empire builders of the new era, w ­ ere supposed to learn from.61 From September 20 to the end of October that year, Kobe’s municipal government held the Harbor Exposition in three dif­fer­ent locations and attracted over a million attendees. Cosponsored by the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and supported by several central government ministries, the exposition aimed to highlight Japan’s recent accomplishments as one of the three greatest maritime empires in the world. It emphasized Kobe’s rise as Japan’s premier harbor city and a central base of the empire’s maritime

Lu

85

expansion in the South Seas and South Amer­i­ca. Through images, goods, ­music, films, and military displays, the exposition showcased the growth of Japan’s transoceanic trade, the advancement of her naval and air forces, the development of the empire’s steamship and fishery technology, and the prosperity of Japa­nese settler communities in Brazil.62 As a critical component of the exposition, the Pavilion of Overseas Expansion (Kaigai Hatten Kan) emphasized the contrast between a modern, civilized, but overcrowded Japan and an ancient, primitive, but resourceful and empty South Amer­i­ca, thereby portraying the emigration from the former to the latter as an act of spreading pro­gress and sharing benefits. A highlight of the pavilion was the exhibition of “The Dream Land,” with the subtitle “Migration to Brazil: Ten Years of Hard Work (Burajiru ijū: Jūnen no funtō).” This exhibition contained six consecutive scenes, starting with the emigrants’ departure from the port of Kobe and ending with them reaping a rich harvest as farmers in Brazil. It presented the experience of the Japa­nese mi­grants in South Amer­i­ca as a saga of how men conquered nature. According to this narrative, through a challenging but also rewarding decade-­long process—­including working as plantation laborers and taming forest land—­Japanese mi­g rants eventually became in­de­pen­dent farmers with their own land in Brazil. The exhibition exhorted more Japa­ nese to follow the footsteps of their countrymen and migrate to Brazil to pursue their own success.63 As the empire’s migration to Brazil reached a crescendo when the fourth de­cade of the twentieth ­century was just about to unfold, the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and the establishment of Manchukuo in the following year ushered in a new era of Japa­nese expansion in Asia. Mobilizing Japa­nese subjects to migrate to Manchuria became a military and po­liti­cal necessity for the empire. Apparatuses of the migration state wasted no time in rising to the occasion. Beginning in 1932, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs began to fund investigations in Manchuria and or­ga­nize migration campaigns. Some individuals that spearheaded Japan’s state-­centered migration to Brazil quickly turned to Manchuria as a new frontier of Japa­ nese expansion. Umetani Mitsusada, the first director of the Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties, moved back to Asia in 1932 to head the migration department of the Kwantung Army. He proceeded to carry out a series of migration campaigns and land acquisition in Manchuria.64 Nagata Shigeshi, a cofounder of the Aliança Colony in São Paulo, also participated in the promotion of Manchurian migration as early as

86

Chapter 3

1932. He would l­ater serve on a government committee to draft a plan for the five-­million-­person migration proj­ect.65 In the early 1930s, institutions that had backed the establishment of the Aliança Colony (including the Shinano Overseas Association, the Shinano Board of Education, the Japa­nese Striving Society, and the Nagano prefectural government) committed themselves to the promotion of Manchurian migration with ­g reat enthusiasm.66 It was Nagano that pioneered Japan’s prefecture-­centered model for Brazil-­bound migration; thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, out of all the prefectures, it was also Nagano that exported the largest number of mi­grants to Manchuria.67 However, before Tokyo launched its five-­million-­person migration proj­ ect on the eve of the total war, none of its Manchurian migration campaigns was successful: government subsidies ­were relatively ­limited, and the general living conditions in Manchuria ­were unattractive. In contrast, Japan’s migration and capital exportation to Brazil continued to grow. In 1933, the annual number of Japa­nese who arrived at the Brazilian shores reached 24,493, the highest in history.68 ­After de­cades of unfruitful campaigns, the anti-­Japanese social forces in Brazil did push through a quota restriction on Japa­nese immigration as a part of the New Constitution of 1934. However, the restriction was not strictly imposed and only had ­limited effects on Japa­ nese immigration, which began to decline but continued u ­ ntil 1941. The decrease in Japa­nese immigration, however, was accompanied by a surge in Japa­nese cap­i­tal­ist exportation in Brazil. In 1935, Japan’s Chamber of Commerce dispatched an economic mission to Brazil headed by Hirao Hachisaburō, director of the Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties, to further promote bilateral trade. A major achievement of this mission was a dramatic increase in Japa­nese importation of raw cotton from Brazil.69 Responding to the Commonwealth nations’ boycott against Japa­nese textiles, the Japa­nese government eschewed India in ­favor of São Paulo as a major cotton supplier. Japa­nese textile companies began to pour investment into Japa­nese farming communities in Brazil to expand their cotton cultivation.70 The 1930s also witnessed further expansion of Japa­nese presence in the Amazon basin, a trend exemplified by the formation of the Amazonia Industrial Com­pany (Amazonia Sangyō Kabushiki Gaisha) in 1935 based on a land concession in the state of Amazonas. It was funded by a ten-­year loan approved by the Imperial Diet as well as several Japa­nese industrial

Lu

87

corporations.71 The com­pany conducted both Japa­nese settler community building and agricultural cultivation. A turning point in Japa­nese migration to Brazil was Japan’s further expansion into China proper that led to the outbreak of the Second Sino-­ Japanese War and, eventually, the Pacific War. To facilitate this total war, the imperial government elevated migration to Manchuria as a national policy by launching an ambitious 1936 campaign with unpre­ce­dented amounts of financial and po­liti­cal commitments. This proj­ect called for relocating five million Japa­nese farmers to ­settle in Manchuria within the next two de­ cades.72 At the same time, on the other side of the Pacific, anti-­Japanese sentiment continued to intensify. For example, the totalitarian regime Estado Novo, proclaimed by Getúlio Vargas in 1937, banned all Japanese-­language schools in the Brazilian countryside.73 Then in 1941, by a presidential order, Vargas further banned the publication of foreign-­language printed media, including all Japa­nese newspapers and magazines in Brazil.74 The next year, ­after Brazil entered World War II as an allied power, its government confiscated all the businesses owned by Japa­nese companies as ­enemy properties, including t­ hose of Kaikō, the Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties, Nantaku, Amazonia Industrial Com­pany, and o­ thers.75 Around this time, apparatuses of Japan’s migration state in Brazil w ­ ere quick to shift the focus of their activities to Asia in support of the empire’s further expansion in Southeast Asia. Kaikō, for example, obtained Tokyo’s permission to start emigration programs to North Borneo.76 With financial assistance from the imperial government, Kaikō and the Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Socie­ties also relocated some Japa­nese immigrants from Brazil to Hainan Island in China. ­These re-­migrants from Brazil, with their farming experience in the subtropical climate in South Amer­i­ca, ­were expected to become trailblazers of the new subtropical frontier of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-­Prosperity Sphere.77 The Japa­nese Striving Society, led by Nagata Shigeshi, also launched campaigns to relocate Japa­nese subjects to the Philippines and Java.78 In 1937, a few months before the outbreak of the Second Sino-­Japanese War, a movie based on the novel Sōbō hit the silver screen. The film revolved around the lives of recent Japa­nese mi­grants to Brazil, portraying them as poor ­people that the government refused to take responsibility for. By contrast, as the government now had fully committed itself to protect and

88

Chapter 3

support the emigrants, Japa­nese subjects bound for Manchuria no longer had to fend for themselves in an alien and hostile land. Unlike their fellow countrymen in South Amer­i­ca, the settlers in Manchuria w ­ ere laudable trailblazers of the empire. However, the real­ity of Japa­nese migration to Brazil, as this chapter has illustrated, was quite dif­fer­ent. It was far from the story of an imperial government merely discarding its undesirable subjects. In fact, it was a critical chapter in the history of Japa­nese expansion that had close connections with Japa­nese colonial migration in Asia. The years from 1921 to 1934 w ­ ere the heyday of Japa­nese migration to Brazil, an era marked by the increased presence of the Japa­nese government in e­ very aspect of the migration pro­cess. This chapter has examined the impor­tant structural changes occurring within the government in the form of institutional convergence. It also discusses the new ways by which Tokyo collaborated with vari­ous social groups to mobilize Japa­nese subjects from dif­fer­ent social classes for Brazilian migration campaigns. Together, ­these changes led to the formation of the migration state, which was able to penetrate civil society to mobilize and manage emigration to an unpre­ce­dented degree. The same migration state, in a clear showing of both institutional and personnel continuity, would take on the mission to relocate hundreds of thousands of Japa­nese subjects to Asia to facilitate the empire’s expansion during World War II. Japa­nese migration to Brazil during the interwar period, therefore, should be understood as a critical preparative step ­toward Japan’s state-­driven mass migration to Asia, making it a prototype of Japan’s total empire. Fi­nally, as much as we need to recognize the connections and continuities between Japa­nese migration to Brazil and the empire’s expansion in Asia, it is also impor­tant to acknowledge the significant differences between the two experiences. Unlike the campaigns of migration to Asia during the total war, which ­were usually tied to military agendas and had military support, the imperial military did not play a role in Japa­nese migration to Brazil. Moreover, while most of the Japa­nese settlers in Asia during World War II sat at the top of the racial and colonial hierarchy established by the militant empire, their fellow countrymen in Brazil, on the other hand, fell victim to racism and state vio­lence ­under Estado Novo, another militant and authoritarian regime. Even so, the po­liti­cal structure that had enabled and directed the two proj­ects of migration on the opposite sides of the Pacific was one and the same. The migration state, still in its infancy during the interwar years, would continue to expand and further entrench itself,

Lu

89

culminating in the usage of migration as a critical tool for colonial expansion during Japan’s total war.

Notes 1. ​Kimura, Shōwa sakka no nanyōkō, pp. 59–60. 2. ​­There ­were 131,389 Japa­nese subjects who migrated to Brazil between 1925 and 1934, according to the Japa­nese government’s rec­ords. See Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” p. 235. 3. ​For an in-­depth analy­sis of the discourse concerning Japa­nese overseas development, as well as its connections with the idea of Japan’s peaceful expansion, see Azuma, In Search, p. 16. 4. ​It heeds the insights of recent scholarship that has revised our understanding of the Japa­nese empire through both transcolonial and transpacific approaches, such as Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas”; and Azuma, In Search. 5. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan. Her chapter in this volume, more specifically, illustrates the central role of Tokyo in the Japa­nese empire’s migration-­driven expansion in Latin Amer­i­ca. 6. ​Kingsberg, “Becoming Brazilian”; and Kingsberg, “Japan’s Inca Boom.” 7. ​Garon, Molding the Japa­nese Mind, pp. 6–7. 8. ​Young, Japan’s Total Empire, p. 331. 9. ​Young, Japan’s Total Empire, p. 13. 10. ​In 1934, the new constitution of the Vargas regime had imposed a quota restriction on Japa­nese immigration, limiting the annual number of Japa­nese subjects to enter Brazil as immigrants to 2,711 in the next year, 2 ­percent of the total number of Japa­nese immigrants who entered Brazil from 1908 to 1933. Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 345–347. Though the Brazilian government continued to admit Japa­nese immigrants outside of the quota in the following few years, the year 1934 marked the beginning of the quick decline of Japa­nese immigration to Brazil. 11. ​For public media’s opinion, see Osaka mainichi, August 2, 1918. For the ideas of the strategists in the imperial military, see the comment of Matsui Iwane, “Hokuman taisaku shiken,” mimeographed, June 1, 1923, cited from Iriye, “Failure of Economic Expansionism,” pp. 240, 245. 12. ​ Tokyo asahi, June 1, 1922, cited from Iriye, “Failure of Economic Expansionism,” p. 245. 13. ​Iriye, “Failure of Economic Expansionism,” pp. 246–247. 14. ​Nishita, “Shidehara Kijūrō,” pp. 96–99. 15. ​Dickinson, World War I, p. 70. 16. ​Iriye, “Failure of Economic Expansionism,” p. 256. 17. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 161–164. 18. ​By the concept of “social management,” Sheldon Garon has illustrated how the Japa­nese government bureaucrats collaborated and negotiated with leaders of dif­fer­ ent social interest groups during the interwar years to strength state control over society. Garon, Molding the Japa­nese Minds, pp. 6–7.

90

Chapter 3

19. ​For more detail regarding the history of Kaikō and its role in the history of Japa­ nese migration to Brazil, see chapter  6, “Guiding Settlers: The Overseas Development Com­pany and the Recruitment of Rural Brazil, 1918–1936,” by Andre Kobayashi Deckrow in this volume. 20. ​Ishikawa did not follow the regular path like most other emigrants on board. He quitted the farm a­ fter about a month and traveled north to the Amazon River basin. He then returned to Japan a­ fter stopping by the US West Coast. Moriya, “Burajiru Nikkei imin shōsetsu,” pp. 133–156. 21. ​The migration guides and pamphlets published by Kaikō usually encouraged its recruited mi­grants to become in­de­pen­dent owner-­farmers ­after their l­abor contracts ended. For example, see Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, Nanbei Burajirukoku to Nihon, pp. 1–3. 22. ​Young, Beyond the Metropolis, pp. 15–23. 23. ​Lewis, Rioters and Citizens, pp. 248–249. 24. ​Dinmore, “Small Island Nation,” pp. 20–28; Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 183– 185. 25. ​Sakaguchi, “Dare ga imin,” p. 55. 26. ​Iikubo, “Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha,” pp. 70–71. 27. ​Iikubo, “Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha,” pp. 66. 28. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha, pp. 10–40. 29. ​The numbers of Japa­nese mi­g rants to Brazil in t­hese three years w ­ ere 776 in 1921, 1,087 in 1922, and 757 in 1923, according to the rec­ords of the Japa­nese government. Burajiru Nikkeijin jittai chōsa iinkai, Burajiru no Nihon imin, p. 225. 30. ​Iikubo, “1920 nendai ni okeru,” p. 43. 31. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” p. 132. 32. ​Iikubo, “1920 nendai ni okeru,” p. 45. 33. ​The US doors to Japa­nese immigration w ­ ere not officially reopened u ­ ntil 1952. 34. ​Iikubo, “1920 nendai ni okeru,” p. 47. 35. ​The founding years of ­these magazines are Shokumin, 1922; Kaigai, 1927; and Burajiru: shokumin to bōeki, 1927. As Seth Jacobowitz’s chapter in this volume points out, ­these magazines also promoted Japa­nese migration to other Latin American countries. 36. ​Nagata, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, 2:32–34. 37. ​The official magazine of the association, Umi no soto, started to circulate in 1922. 38. ​Nagata, Shinano kaigai ijūshi, pp. 91–92. 39. ​Nagata, Shinano kaigai ijūshi, p. 134. 40. ​The Shinano Overseas Migration Cooperative Society took over the management and finance of Aliança migration from its establishment in 1927. Nagata, Shinano kaigai ijūshi, pp. 111–112. 41. ​To buy a piece of land of twenty-­five chobu in Aliança required 1,500 yen, while to enroll in the contract-­farmer program of Aliança required 700 to 800 yen too. Nagata, Shinano kaigai ijūshi, p. 134. 42. ​Nagata, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, 2:56; Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” pp. 250– 251. 43. ​Nagata, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, p. 73; Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” p. 269. 44. ​Satō, “Motazaru kuni” no shigen, pp. 69–70. 45. ​Satō, “Motazaru kuni” no shigen, p. 76.

Lu

91

46. ​Yano, Nihon no nanshin, p. 16. 47. ​Yamagata, “Sōkan no ji,” pp. 4–5. 48. ​The exhibit was also cosponsored by the Hyōgo prefectural government, Department of Commerce and Industry of Kobe Municipal Government, Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Osaka Mainichi News Agency. The composition of the cosponsors demonstrates the profound interest of Kobe-­based business elites in the opportunities in Brazil. See “Burajiru jijō tenrankai,” p. 93. 49. ​“Burajiru jijō tenrankai,” pp. 93–96. 50. ​National Diet Library, Japan, 100 Years, ch. 4. 51. ​Ikushima, Amazon ijū sanjūnenshi, p. 21. 52. ​Fukuhara, “Zenjin mitō no Burajiru,” pp. 26–29 53. ​Fukuhara, “Wa ga kuni,” pp. 58–59. 54. ​Burajiru koku parā shū shokumin nannai, in Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei. 55. ​Ikushima, Amazon ijū sanjūnenshi, pp. 21–25 56. ​ Osaka mainichi shinbun, “Kaigai ijū kumiai sōkai: yūshi jikō kettei,” August 7, 1927. 57. ​ Osaka mainichi shinbun, “Kaigai Ijū kumiai sōkai: yūshi jikō kettei,” August 7, 1927. 58. ​Imin Shūyōjo, Imin shūyōjo e nyūjo. 59. ​For the concrete numbers of the money that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs had provided to the migration companies in supporting Brazilian migration, see Iikubo, “Burajiru imin kara Manshū,” p. 109. 60. ​For an extended explanation of the Minister of Colonial Affairs on the responsibilities of the ministry, see Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei. 61. ​“Chūzai gaikoku shisetsu,” pp. 6–11. 62. ​ Osaka asahi shinbun, “Kugatsu nijūnichi yori hanabanashiku kaijōshita kankanshiki kinen kaikō hakurankai,” September 28, 1930. 63. ​Fukuda, “Senkō wo assuru ei,” pp. 72–73. 64. ​Nagata, “Manshū no shinano mura (1),” p. 21. 65. ​Nippon Rikkō Kai Sōritsu Hyaku Shūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō Iinkai Kinenshi Hensan Senmon Iinkai, Nippon rikkō kai hyakunen, p. 213. 66. ​Nagano ken kaitaku jikōkai Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai, Naganoken Manshū kaitakushi: sōhen, pp. 89, 150–166. 67. ​The number of Manchurian mi­g rants from Nagano was more than twice that of their counter­parts from Yamagata, which was ranked second. Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 329–330. 68. ​Burajiru Nikkeijin jittai chōsa iinkai, Burajiru no Nihon imin, p. 225. 69. ​Shibusawa Ei’ichi kinen zaidan kenkyūbu, Jitsugyōka to Burajiru ijū, pp. 133–134. 70. ​Tsuchida, “Japa­nese in Brazil,” p. 310. 71. ​Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: “Amazonia.” 72. ​Tagawa, “ ‘Imin’ shichō no kiseki,” pp. 129–130. 73. ​National Diet Library, Japan, 100 Years, ch. 5. 74. ​Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-­Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai, Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi, 3:113.

92

Chapter 3

75. ​For a full list of ­these businesses, see Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: “Zai.” 76. ​Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai. 77. ​Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai; “Kaigai ijū kumiai rengōkai, Kaigai ijū kumiai rengōkai jigyō gaiyō,” pp. 8–11, in Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan, Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai. 78. ​Nippon Rikkō Kai Sōritsu Hyaku Shūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō Iinkai Kinenshi Hensan Senmon Iinkai, Nippon rikkō kai hyakunen, pp. 260–273.

c h a p t e r

4

Transpacific Migration and Japan’s Extraterritorial Settler Colonialism in the US-­Mexican Borderlands Eiichiro Azuma

M

igration-­led expansionism, or mass migration and settler colonialism, formed a significant aspect of Japan’s empire building. Japa­ nese settler colonialism, as it unfolded in the Amer­i­cas and elsewhere, entailed the processes—­both projected and a­ctual—of land control and agricultural colonization not only through the outright settlement of equipped immigrant farmers but also by way of transplanting laboring masses that initially worked for investors and landowners before becoming “frontiersmen” in their own right. In t­ hese pro­cesses that ­were often spearheaded by the Japa­nese government as well as expansionistic entrepreneurs and ideologues, the state and the private sectors worked in tandem to promote the outward migration and settlement of rural Japa­nese within and without Japan’s colonial empire. Not only its puppet Manchukuo but also the other territories of imperial Japan, including Taiwan, Southern Sakhalin, K ­ orea, and the South Sea mandate (Nan’yō), experienced uneven state-­sponsored efforts to transplant ordinary ­people to erect a “new Japan” t­here between the 1910s and the early 1940s. As my recent monograph details, the settler colonialism inside Japan’s sovereign control was inseparable from what tran­spired in the Amer­i­cas, especially the United States, Mexico, and Brazil. What is especially impor­tant in ­these linkages between Japan’s settler empire and its extraterritorial immigrant settlements is the idea of US-­style frontier development, which many self-­styled “pioneers” of Japa­nese national expansion, including working-­class immigrants, embraced as a model for their own practices of settler colonialism all over the Pacific Rim.1 As the first site of Japa­nese frontier experience, the immigrant society in the US West held larger-­than-­life influence over the 93

94

Chapter 4

subsequent history of global Japa­nese mobility and diasporas, including migration to Latin Amer­ic­ a. Indeed, the guiding princi­ple of Japan’s state-­sanctioned colonization—­ family-­based migration and permanent settlement (eijū dochaku)—­emerged around 1905–1908 from the discursive and social-­engineering endeavors in Japa­nese immigrant society in the United States (especially California) and Hawai‘i, the first concentrations of overseas Japa­ nese settler-­ migrants in the history of modern Japan. During the 1910s, this princi­ ple was incorporated into Japan’s first settler colonial ventures in ­Korea and Brazil; the former was an official enterprise of the empire, and the latter was clandestinely supported by the prime minister and other high-­level government officials and moneyed elites in Tokyo.2 Thus, imperial Japan’s settler colonialism inside its sovereign territories and informal colonization efforts in Latin Amer­i­ca w ­ ere deeply entwined through the mediating role of “Japa­nese North Amer­i­ca” (hereafter Japa­nese Amer­i­ca), which helped produce key ideological under­pinnings of the empire’s borderless expansionism. In this triangular relationship, the US-­Mexican borderlands not only formed an impor­tant link between Anglophone and Latin Amer­i­cas, but the liminal space also allowed Japan’s state colonialism to exert its influence over the forms and pro­cesses of transpacific Japa­nese migration and settlement making in the Western Hemi­sphere. This chapter examines the integrated nature of Japa­nese mobility and agricultural colonization in the US-­Mexican borderlands, where the extraterritorial settler experiences of immigrants in Anglophone Amer­i­ca became tangled up with their counter­parts in Latin Amer­i­ca in the broader context of the migration-­driven expansionism of the Japa­nese empire. First, I ­w ill delineate why and how the US state of California and its transborder “frontier” in Mexico’s Baja California Norte served as an impor­tant junction point in migration cir­cuits and multidirectional mi­grant movements between Japan and Latin Amer­i­ca. ­Here, US settler racism provided a crucial background for generating complex streams of migration to, and proj­ects of settler colonization in, the northernmost region of Latin Amer­i­ca. In the context of its response to that racism, Japa­nese Amer­i­ca also served as a vital source of experienced immigrant farmers and colonial investment for Japanese-­settler colony making on the northern fringes of Mexico in par­tic­u­lar and of Latin Amer­i­ca in general between the early 1910s and the mid-1920s.3 This historical unfolding also entailed close interactions and collaborations between former and current members of Japa­nese Amer­

Azuma

95

i­ca and its home empire in the creation of a new borderland settlement—­ the stories that formed neglected integral components in the history of Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca and their complex relationship to Japan and its imperial expansionism.

Transpacific Migrations and the New Cir­cuits of Settler Colonist Mobility between Anglophone Amer­i­ca and Latin Amer­i­ca Between the 1910s and the 1930s, the Japa­nese in Southern California and Mexico’s Baja California Norte or­ga­nized what can be termed a “transborder” community—­one that was integral to what they saw as Japan’s global empire and its extraterritorial “overseas development” (kaigai hatten). Being transborder does not suggest homogeneity in the lives of the immigrant settlers ­there. Ironically, such a community could sustain its transnationality b ­ ecause of the politico-­legal differences between US and Mexican Californias, and the advantages with which both sides supplemented each other’s wants. The organ­ization of distinctive, often conflicting state structures created numerous points of divergence between the white supremacist US l­egal regime and the less-­exclusionist Mexican republic. This situation valorized the desirability of the “Latin Amer­i­ca” side from the standpoint of first-­generation Japa­nese Americans, who w ­ ere faced with race-­based exclusion and vari­ous forms of institutionalized discrimination from around 1908. As a result, the inter-­California borderlands witnessed the fluid movements of Japa­nese migrant-­settlers and their ethnic capital, as well as the spread of expansionistic ideas and practices from north to south, when the initial uproar of US Yellow Peril fearmongering led to the termination of mass immigration from Japan to that country. While more and more US-­bound mi­grants started to travel to northern Mexico to use its border region as a stepping-­stone into exclusionary California, many US Japa­nese residents also frequently moved their bodies and economic resources southward. ­These transmigrants established common institutions and shared discursive spaces and cultural practices across the loosely policed national border to develop a varied but integrated community life in that liminal space.4 At the same time, this transborder Japa­nese community could not have maintained itself without the remote interventions of imperial Japan. The

96

Chapter 4

multiple linkages that brought together the borderland Japa­nese migrant-­ settlers in the local context derived partly from Japan’s emigration policy, as well as its attempt to influence/control overseas residents from across the Pacific. While the United States and Mexico presented the contexts in which the borderland Japa­nese settler-­farmers found it desirable to remain connected and live in tandem across national bound­aries, their home empire played a crucial role in shoring up ideological and institutional apparatuses for the construction of their settlement, a “new Japan,” which overarched the two Californias. Japan’s embrace of American-­style settler colonialism and its enduring influence over immigrants particularly helped facilitate such a local unfolding. Indeed, the early history of transpacific Japa­nese migration revealed strong US-­slanted settler colonialism from the very beginning. Starting in the late 1880s, San Francisco attracted a significant number of Japa­nese immigrant (Issei) intellectuals and po­l iti­cal activists with expansionistic thinking and practice. Often affiliated with homeland po­liti­cal groups, like the Seikyōsha (Society for Politics and Education) and Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), which spearheaded Japan’s nascent advocacy of imperialism, ­these Issei expansionists embraced and helped pop­u­lar­ize the “discourse on overseas development” (kaigai hattenron), which formed an ideological backbone of Japa­nese settler colonialism. This popu­lar discourse posited “expansive” traits of the nation and race, which presumably remained in their blood and tradition. It also extolled the maritime destiny of the island empire and its ­people not only as a colonizing power but also as a nation “racially endowed” for expanding to frontiers all over the globe through trade, migration, and settlement making. In this formulation, many ideologues, including US-­based Issei intellectuals, drew inspiration from the American popu­lar discourse on frontier conquest and manifest destiny, shaping a common expansionistic mindset in the emergent empire. ­Because Tokyo officials had already ­adopted US-­style agricultural colonization as a model for the state-­sponsored development of Japan’s domestic “frontier” of Hokkaido in the early 1870s, Issei endeavored to emulate Anglo-­Saxon examples in the US West and brought their own settler colonialism into harmony with imperial Japan’s migration-­driven expansionism.5 The discourse on overseas development initially attained the nation’s ac­cep­tance when the earliest groups of Japa­nese l­abor mi­g rants left for Hawai‘i and then for the continental United States and Canada. During the 1880s, barely two de­cades a­ fter scrapping feudalism, Japan encountered

Azuma

97

a major politico-­economic crisis in the context of state-­led modernization efforts. While displaced farmers violently protested the government’s economic policy, young intellectuals and dissident activists, including ­those who l­ater fled to San Francisco, criticized Tokyo’s conciliatory diplomacy ­toward imperious Western powers. They demanded that Japan take a more aggressive, expansionistic course of action in dealing with t­ hese domestic and diplomatic prob­lems. Should the government embark on its own imperialist venture as a colonizing power, they argued, the West would re­ spect modern Japan as a civilized equal. Moreover, t­ hese pundits stressed other tangible benefits in Malthusian terms. Imperial expansion by way of popu­lar migrations would create new opportunities and sources of livelihood overseas for distressed rural populations while contributing to the greater goal of “overseas Japa­nese development.”6 Some of ­these early San Francisco residents ­were among the first group of Japa­nese who traversed the tablelands and plains of Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Chile, in search of “colonial” opportunities for adventurous Japa­nese frontiersmen and laboring masses alike. They even formed a Spanish study group to equip them with the necessary language command and knowledge about the lands they might wish to “conquer” as trailblazers of Japa­nese immigration and racial settlement making in the f­ uture.7 Combining an advocacy for a proactive imperialist policy in East Asia with a call for mass migration to the Amer­i­cas and elsewhere, ­these activist-­ intellectuals drew ­little distinction between colonialism (shokumin) and ­labor migration (imin). Rather, they tended to (con)fuse t­ hese concepts—­ and practices—­under the rubric of ishokumin, defining mass migration from rural Japan as a prerequisite for the nation’s colonial expansion.8 This idea converged with the pragmatic thinking of government brass, who thought that l­abor migration to Hawai‘i would not only be an effective solution to the rural economic crisis but also a con­ve­nient means to “enrich the nation and strengthen the military”—­Japan’s national motto when it endeavored to build a modern empire. Thus, in 1885, Tokyo suddenly reversed its long-­ standing policy against mass emigration, allowing over 29,000 commoners for the next nine years to work on Hawaiian sugar plantations ­under a bilateral agreement. While more and more rural Japa­nese traveled to the mid-­Pacific islands even ­after the US-­backed overthrow of the native monarchy in 1893, many o­ thers began to migrate to the western parts of the continental United States and Canada, then to Peru, Mexico, and Brazil, in search of work and colonial opportunities. Japan’s neighboring regions,

98

Chapter 4

like Taiwan, K ­ orea, and Manchuria, attracted much smaller numbers of Japa­nese newcomers ­until state-­sponsored settler migration commenced following Japan’s formal colonization.9 Therefore, combined with the public extolment of national expansion abroad, the idea of ishokumin propelled ordinary immigrants to see their economic endeavors and community building intertwined with the formal settler colonialism of imperial Japan.10 By influencing the mindset and action of ordinary Japa­nese, this idea made it pos­si­ble for the pervasive act of dekasegi (temporary) ­labor migration to be confounded with the state proj­ect of settler colonization ­after the annexation of K ­ orea in 1910. The origins of imperial Japa­nese migration w ­ ere therefore inseparable from the US-­inspired settler-­colonial ideology of Japan, which subsumed the extraterritorial l­abor and colonial aspects of mass migration u ­ nder the ubiquitous concept of “overseas development.” Japan’s settler colonialism was partially rooted in the ideological work of self-­styled Issei frontiersmen and their a­ ctual endeavors of agricultural colonization in the US West. Many of ­these Issei w ­ ere responsible for the muddling of l­abor and colonial aspects of early Japa­nese migration, since they dominated the management of most major “emigration companies” (imin gaisha) that shipped thousands of Japa­nese laboring masses to Mexico and Peru along with Hawai‘i and other Pacific islands between 1894 and 1908.11 US-­based proprietors of ­these human-­trafficking businesses and their partners in Japan portrayed the massive movements of working-­class Japa­nese as instances of imperial expansion, thereby dressing their exploitative enterprise in patriotic clothes. For the same reason, ordinary mi­grants could justify their self-­centered pursuit of material benefit—­including breaking state regulations as explained ­later—in terms of their “contributions” to the national imperative of overseas development.12 Compared to San Francisco and its surrounding region where prototypical Issei expansionists initially concentrated, Southern California occupied only a minor place in the early history of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca and its settler colonialism. The birth of a sizable immigrant community in the greater Los Angeles area is traced to intrastate Japa­nese movements during the first two de­cades of the twentieth c­ entury. Between 1905 and 1915, an increasing number of Issei migrated southward from Northern California ­under the combined effects of or­ga­nized exclusionist agitation and a devastating earthquake in San Francisco as well as agricultural development in the central and lower portions of the Golden State. By the 1930s, South-

Azuma

99

ern California grew into a center of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca on the continental United States—­w ith 47 ­percent of the aggregate state ethnic population (97,456), three major vernacular newspapers, and perhaps the most or­ga­ nized ethnic agricultural economy encompassing the “vertical and horizontal integration” of farm production, w ­ holesale, and retailing.13 From the outset, the formation of the Southern California Japa­nese community rested on its geographic identity as a borderland. While the 1906 San Francisco earthquake triggered a massive remigration of Issei from the north, Japan’s restrictions on ­labor emigration to the United States transformed the US-­Mexican border into a southern entry point for new laborers from Japan. Starting in 1900, Tokyo employed a policy of issuing US-­bound passports to only “students” and “merchants,” as well as onetime residents ­there, in response to the rise of California’s exclusionist agitation.14 This created two groups of working-­class Japa­nese who still attempted to come to the continental United States for work. One group successfully received legitimate US-­bound passports as ­either “students” or “merchants” by furnishing doctored documents and borrowing “show money” to pass as self-­financed (“­free”) immigrants. Though with fewer resources, another group still held on to the dream of quick riches in the United States by carry­ing passports intended for Mexico—­w ith preexisting ­labor contracts with Mexican employers. Once they arrived, the immigrant workers used that country as the transit point to the continental United States while bailing out of their l­ abor contracts.15 As official statistics show, over 1,200 Japa­nese suddenly left for Mexico in 1904. Following the end of the Russo-­Japanese War, the years 1906 and 1907 saw an even greater increase in Mexico-­bound emigrants, with aggregates of 5,068 and 3,822, respectively (see t­ able 4.1).16 The vast majority of ­these Mexico-­ bound immigrants must have subsequently crossed the border, ­because that country’s national census reported the presence of only 2,623 Japa­nese in 1910. In Baja California Norte and other northwestern Mexican states, the pool of Japa­nese border crossers grew even bigger, since hundreds of plantation workers from Peru also joined them in pursuit of better economic opportunities on the US side.17 With the large number of Japa­nese border crossers and immigration brokers who helped them, the borderland Japa­ nese community produced what can be termed a “culture of defiance” against not only class-­biased Japa­nese passport regulations but also racially exclusive US immigration policy a­ fter the US-­Japan Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908.

T ­ ABLE 4.1 

Numbers of Transpacific Japa­nese Emigrants

Year

US

Hawai‘i

Mexico

Peru

1900

7,585

1,529

1

0

1901

32

3,136

95

0

1902

70

14,490

83

0

1903

318

9,091

281

1,303

1904

640

9,443

1,261

0

1905

714

10,813

346

0

1906

1,715

25,752

5,068

1,257

1907

2,712

14,397

3,822

85

1908

1,585

3,455

0

2,880

1909

777

1,329

2

1,138

1910

926

1,717

5

483

1911

1,963

2,596

28

456

1912

3,378

4,732

16

714

1913

4,381

4,276

47

1,126

1914

5,553

3,187

35

1,132

1915

5,498

3,055

19

1,348

1916

5,761

3,643

22

1,429

1917

6,457

4,111

53

1,948

1918

6,306

3,024

128

1,736

1919

6,273

3,088

64

1,507

1920

5,959

2,789

53

836

1921

4,321

3,215

69

717

1922

3,558

2,960

77

202

1923

2,617

2,112

68

333

1924

4,064

2,163

76

651

Azuma Year

US

1925

101

Hawai‘i

Mexico

Peru

289

485

160

922

1926

344

636

326

1,250

1927

370

526

319

1,271

1928

306

265

353

1,410

1929

236

119

249

1,585

1930

0

0

434

831

1931

0

0

283

299

Source: Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga kokumin no kaigai, pp. 140, 144.

The bilateral government response to California’s grassroots exclusionism made it legally impossible for all new immigrant workers to travel from Japan to the United States, directly or indirectly. Tokyo ­stopped issuing passports to working-­class Japa­nese bound for both the United States and Mexico, except for ­family members of bona fide US residents; Washington then disallowed the secondary migration of Japa­nese from Mexico, Canada, and Hawai‘i to the continental United States.18 Nonetheless, ­under the pervasive culture of defiance, the Mexican border-­crossing option looked as though it still presented Japa­nese ship jumpers with a Peru-­bound passport and transmigrants from that country with the possibility of sneaking into the United States. This is impor­tant context to explain the dramatic increase of passports issued to Peru-­bound Japa­nese from a mere 85 in 1907 to 2,880 in 1908 and 1,138 in 1909—­when direct migration to Mexico became nearly halted by the Japa­nese government. During much of the 1910s, the Peruvian emigration figures continued to hover between 1,100 and 1,900.19 Although mass emigration to Brazil also took place ­after 1908, that country was not a realistic option for illicit border crossing b ­ ecause immigrants took a trans–­Indian Ocean / Atlantic route to get to São Paulo. In 1923, a Japa­nese diplomat estimated that Japa­nese smuggled across the US-­Mexican border had amounted to 350 annually and that a total of such individuals had reached approximately 3,700 in Southern California by June 1922.20 Around the same time, an American intelligence officer also reported on the “easy conscience of the Japa­nese in breaking our . . . ​ [immigration] laws.” Even though he exaggerated when he said that “most”

102

Chapter 4

of the estimated 130,000 Japa­nese “stowaways” worldwide ended up “­here in California” from 1916, the officer still provided a glimpse into the prevalence of illegal Japa­nese entries through Mexico and the borderland culture of defiance that shored it up: “The goal of the Japa­nese stowaway is California. They are h ­ ere, tens of thousands of them, hiding among their countrymen. . . . ​Many of them have been h ­ ere long enough to acquire domicile ­under our laws and could not be deported. . . . ​That the number of ­these smugglers is very large is evident from the frequent references to them in the Japa­nese local press.”21 Although t­ hese undocumented residents “still dread[ed] the pos­si­ble consequences of exposure,” their fellow Issei and home expansionists generally held them in high esteem as patriotic “adventurers.” The border crossers singlehandedly conquered multiple challenges, including discriminatory laws and the possibility of death, supposedly for the purpose of advancing the cause of the expanding home empire. The meaning of “defiance”—­ whether violating state regulations or breaking l­abor contracts—­was indeed multifaceted, and it looked quite admirable when viewed from the perspective of the discourse on overseas development. As discussed e­ arlier, that discourse had entailed conflicting ideological components; it could be useful to the state goal of imperial expansionism, and yet it might contrarily function as an antistate po­liti­cal advocacy when the government was deemed unsympathetic to the national imperative of mass migration, for example. The positive rendition of “defiance” stemmed from the latter, where an act of violating oppressive state regulations was justified in the name of the mi­grant’s dedication to the construction of a new Japan abroad. Examples of portraying illegal border crossers in a positive light are not hard to find in popu­lar discourse of the time. Published in Sacramento, the “history of Japa­nese from Aichi prefecture” carries many stories of early Issei “pioneers” and community leaders who had sneaked onto the US frontier. It glamourized their border-­crossing experiences as heroic and patriotic. The narrative then ends with this statement: “The fact that several hundreds of our stalwart Aichi youths knowingly took on the challenge of entering California by overcoming myriad tribulations should be commemorated as one big milestone in the chronicle of our ­people’s overseas development in Amer­i­ca.”22 Mi­g rant acts of defiance ­were tolerated and widespread in the US-­ Mexican borderlands even when ­those acts involved the outright violation of Japan’s own laws. Intercepted by a Japa­nese diplomat from a stowaway via

Azuma

103

Peru, a handwritten map of Mexico (fig. 4.1) revealed the formation of under­ground mi­grant knowledge shared clandestinely by border crossers. The map shows an oceanic ship route from Peru to Ensenada (Baja California Norte) via Salina Cruz (Oaxaca), Manzanillo (Colima), and Mazatlán (Sinaloa). It then delineates a land route from Ensenada to San Diego (California). Some vital information relative to terrain, border policing, and general smuggling tips are provided. According to this “guide,” it would cost a re-­migrant forty pesos to travel from Mazatlán to Ensenada by sea. The thirty-­k ilometer trip on a horse-­drawn carriage from Ensenada to the border would cost him twelve pesos, but the border crosser is advised to get off the carriage several kilo­meters before the border and proceed on foot into the United States. In order to avoid US immigration agents (identified as X on the map), he should follow a rural route (a dotted line swaying eastward) between Tijuana and San Diego, preferably traveling during the night and avoiding orange orchards as it is “risky to hide t­ here.” In San Diego, the map notes, “­there are Japa­nese inns which also work as (employment) brokers.”23 This Ensenada–­Tijuana–­San Diego route offered a shorter distance and safer terrain to navigate ­after jumping ship, especially for new immigrants with a Peru-­bound passport. Another option, the Mazatlán–­ San Felipe–­Mexicali–­Calexico route that comprised mostly deserts was more dangerous, albeit less detectable, but it was also less costly and hence more popu­lar among Japa­nese transmigrants from Peru or t­ hose from the interior of Mexico who had broken a l­abor contract and fled.24 Traversing Mexico’s desolate land, ­these border crossers initially took advantage of preexisting Chinese human-­smuggling channels. This is not surprising, b ­ ecause the Chinese had pioneered indirect immigration into the United States by way of Mexico ­after Congress passed the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Given the anti-­Asian US immigration policy of the time, immigrants from Asia—­lumped together as “Orientals”—­eventually found themselves altogether denied lawful admission by racist US laws, thereby engendering a common racial condition that rendered “illegal” immigration the only option to enter the United States. At the same time, in Baja California, Chinese transmigrants, like the undocumented Japa­nese who followed them, had been subject to a mandatory tax of one hundred pesos if caught by the local authorities. To avoid US immigration restrictions and the Mexican tax, Chinese had built clandestine infrastructures of border crossing, as well as communication networks that facilitated it. Based on the shared circumstances that ­limited their options in a similar

FIG. 4.1.  Mi­g rants’ handwritten map. Source: Teikoku Heigen Nihonjinkai to Ōya­ma Ujirō, September 29, 1915, Honpō imin kankei zakken: Bokkoku no bu, v. 3 (3.8.2.285-1), DAFMJ.

Azuma

105

manner, many Japa­nese took advantage of the preexisting system of undocumented Chinese immigration into California, especially in the early phase of transborder Japa­nese migration.25 However extemporary and expedient, interethnic “cooperation” in border crossing became a frequent phenomenon in the early twentieth ­century.26 By the mid-1910s, the Japa­nese or­ga­nized their own system of immigrant smuggling that revolved around the ethnic businesses overarching the border. In US border towns, like Calexico and San Diego, Issei merchants provided newcomers with shelter and transportation to local Japa­ nese farms and the ethnic ­labor market in Los Angeles. Following the Gentlemen’s Agreement, border town Japa­nese merchants benefited from the steady increase of the roundabout migration via Mexico and Peru, fattening themselves with commissions and other related profits. On the Mexican side, too, the respective border towns of Mexicali and Tijuana witnessed the emergence of Japa­nese stores and clandestine immigration brokerage, which usually worked hand in hand with US Issei merchants. Oftentimes, US Japa­nese interests ran the businesses south of the border, creating transnational enterprises that combined lawful and unlawful activities.27 Many leading Issei merchants in the US-­Mexican borderlands appear to have owed their economic prosperity to the continuous supply of newcomers from Baja California through the 1920s. Kawakita Yasaburō of Calexico/Mexicali is a case in point. A Los Angeles Issei journalist recalled how Kawakita built a one-­million-­dollar business empire, which included general merchandise stores and large farms on both sides of the border: “Mr. Kawakita Yasaburō used to stretch a net all over u ­ nder cover of midnight darkness, and you may ask what kind of game he was ­a fter. Put frankly, he was awaiting ‘customers’ from Mexico in the dead of the night. His role was to guide ­those customers [safely into the United States across the border]. He also sold them goods from his store and earned fees by exchanging Mexican pesos for US dollars—­a smart business method that brought him huge profits.”28 Through the agency of Kawakita and other borderland entrepreneurs, Southern California and Baja California Norte established close economic ties, which allowed the continuous movement of Japa­nese from the latter to the former. Coupled with the “easy conscience” of border crossers in evading US and Japa­nese l­egal restrictions, such a transnational business practice constituted an impor­ tant part of the borderland immigrant culture of defiance—­the culture that tolerated and justified in the language of overseas

106

Chapter 4

development the unauthorized acts of immigrant smuggling from Latin Amer­i­ca and the rise of transborder ethnic businesses spanning Anglophone and Latin Amer­i­cas.29 Supporting and partaking in the home empire’s cause of national expansion could and often did take the form of rebelling against the policy of its very government, a poignant example of how Japan’s settler colonialism operated outside its sovereign territories with immigrants as self-­conscious prac­ti­tion­ers and promoters of overseas ­development.

US Racism and the Overflow of Japa­nese Immigrant Settler Colonialism into Latin Amer­i­ca As noted, the extraterritorial settler colonialism of imperial Japan did not always unfold in a unidirectional manner from the empire’s metropole to its mi­grant destinations in the Amer­i­cas. Inside the Western Hemi­sphere, Japa­nese Amer­i­ca sometimes served as an impor­tant incubator of settler colonial aspirations and practices in/for Latin Amer­i­ca, ­because hundreds of California Issei farmers started to remigrate or considered moving south of the border from exclusionist Anglophone Amer­i­ca. Still, transborder US fearmongering followed them to prevent their settler colonialism from producing nothing but modest Japa­nese settlements on the northwestern fringes of Mexico before that country also turned less hospitable to them. Yet ­these small pockets of Issei presence from the mid1910s onward still signify important but often-­neglected aspects of the historical experiences of Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca as much as they speak to the transborder dimensions of prewar Japa­nese American history. Unlike its counter­parts in South Amer­i­ca that led to the rise of many impressive agricultural “colonies,” the study of Japa­nese settler colonialism in northern Latin Amer­i­ca requires more attention to its frustrated processes—­ the stories of what did not happen as planned or envisioned due to transborder Yellow Peril fearmongering. Generally, Issei’s settler colonial aspirations and practices in Mexico’s frontera ­were bound to be squashed by the l­ egal and extralegal reaches of US white settler racism, which strove to keep its “backyard” as Japanese-­free as its own territories. The rest of this chapter delineates the abortive proj­ects of Issei settler colonialism and its short-­lived partnership with an ambitious program of Japan’s mono­poly

Azuma

107

capital for the construction of a massive “new Japan” on the US-­Mexican borderlands. Despite social disorder caused by the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), the de­cades of the 1910s and the early 1920s witnessed the (re)migration of many California Issei farmers to northern Mexico, especially the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Baja California Norte. Along came also their moneys and US-­bred expertise as “frontier” farmers and settlement builders. Combined with the influx of undocumented working-­class Japa­nese from Peru and Mexico’s interior who moved in the opposite northward direction, the US-­Mexican borderlands thus witnessed the vibrant mobility of propertied California Issei, who expanded the bound­aries of their ethnic community and economy southward into the Mexican side. Overlapping spheres of Japa­nese immigrant agricultural settler colonialism consequently emerged on the northernmost perimeter of Latin Amer­i­ca, which held dual identities as an origin of Japa­nese Mexico, on one hand, and a satellite settlement of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca, on the other. The extension of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca into a new settler space south of the border dovetailed neatly with the concurrent shift in Tokyo’s policy mandate—­that is, diverting migration flows and efforts at settlement making from exclusionist Anglophone Amer­i­ca to racially friendly Latin Amer­i­ca from 1908 onward.30 Put differently, what unfolded on the US-­Mexican borderlands was a microcosmic articulation of the history of imperial Japan’s migration-­d riven expansionism, which came to identify Brazil and other Latin American regions as ideal sites to build “new Japans” ­after the Gentlemen’s Agreement. The continuous transborder and intrahemispheric mobility of Japa­nese immigrants and their community formation compensated for the virtual absence of direct transpacific Japa­nese migration to war-­torn Mexico during the 1910s, thereby keeping that country relevant to settler colonialism of imperial Japan and Japa­nese Amer­i­ca. In the eyes of many Issei, US Southern California and Baja California Norte had always registered as an integrated frontier since the 1890s. The ideology of overseas development rendered the po­liti­cal bound­aries between the United States and Mexico artificial and hence inconsequential to their settler-­colonial objectives, collective or individual. The frontier for them to conquer was not ­limited to the inside of Anglophone Amer­i­ca, many US-­ based immigrants believed; it was supposed to encompass the contiguous wilderness of Mexico despite existing national bound­aries.31 ­Under the spell of ­t hese expansionistic ideas, what catalyzed the transborder southward

108

Chapter 4

mobility of California Issei farmers was the displacement of the landed class of Japa­nese immigrants due to the Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920. The California legislation denied Issei landownership and tenancy and hence legally relegated them to the status of permanent field-­workers. U ­ nder such institutionalized racial discrimination, “Japa­neseness” denoted powerlessness and subordination in an unambiguous manner in California, depriving the b ­ earers of that mark of the opportunity to erect a new Japan ­there as they pleased. Once outside the po­liti­cal bound­aries of the white supremacist regime, however, the absence of l­egal hindrance and the perceived racial weakness of Mexicans (and Latin Americans in general) would enable Japa­nese (re)settlers to exert their racial strength to a full extent. Buoyed by Japan’s ongoing attempts at transplanting settler colonists in Taiwan, ­Korea, and Brazil, this imperial racial thinking facilitated the exodus of California-­based immigrant farmers and their investment in land acquisition across the US-­Mexican border during the 1910s and 1920s.32 As explained, the northward movements of smuggled Japa­ nese kept the US-­Mexican borderlands a liminal space of dynamic ­human mobility despite the closing of formal immigration pathways from Japan. In conjunction, this southward Issei remigration si­mul­ta­neously helped create transborder satellite communities of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca, thereby turning that liminal space into a new cornerstone of Japanese-­settler colony making on the northern edge of Latin Amer­i­ca, one that was deemed as impor­tant as Brazil and Peru during the 1910s.33 New settlements of US re-­migrants started to dot the landscape of Baja California Norte and the neighboring regions in that de­cade, and the 1920s—­especially the latter half—­saw a notable jump in the Japa­nese population ­there. Between 1924 and 1931, Mexican government statistics reported that 275 and 274 Issei passed through Tijuana and Mexicali, respectively, to resettle elsewhere in Baja California Norte, although most likely the official data grossly undercounted the resettlers and their ­family members.34 In par­tic­u­lar, the vicinity of Ensenada emerged as a home to many Japa­nese farm estates connected to the existing ethnic farm interests in Los Angeles. According to a 1927 Japa­nese consular report, two-­dozen well-­off Issei from Southern California had purchased barren lands near Ensenada for agricultural colonization. By then, nearly two hundred resettlers in the same region had already turned their transborder farming endeavors into profitable economic ventures, shipping chili peppers, beans,

Azuma

109

and other crops to the Los Angeles consumer market. ­These Japa­nese farmers of Ensenada also sponsored the immigration of over two hundred newcomers directly from Japan for work on the new sites of Japa­nese overseas development.35 In the meantime, the population of Japa­nese in Mexicali totaled more than eight hundred, most of whom worked on the vast cotton fields ­under the US-­owned Colorado River Land Com­pany (CRLC). One California Japa­nese farmer named Shintani Kusujirō reportedly managed to establish virtual control over—­but not l­egal owner­ship of—­nine thousand acres by the mid-1920s and ran an irrigation firm of his own near Mexicali.36 Replacing Chinese tenant farmers, who had been hard hit by post–­World War I recessions and Mexican nativism, about 180 Japa­nese residents of Mexicali, as well as many more “commuter” farmers from Calexico (US side), cultivated an additional several thousand acres of cotton fields, although 70 ­percent of such land was still u ­ nder the CRLC’s owner­ship.37 The making of ­these borderland settler communities swelled the demand for additional Japa­nese l­ abor in Baja California Norte, explaining a spike in Japa­nese migration figures from fewer than 100 to over 300 per year during the latter half of the 1920s (see ­table 4.1). The pro-­immigration policy of postrevolutionary Mexico aided the influx of Japa­nese newcomers, b ­ ecause its 1924 treaty with Japan allowed for the unrestricted entry of parents, ­children, and other relatives of bono fide Japa­nese residents, contrary to what the US exclusionist law of the same year did.38 Along with Tijuana/ Ensenada, the Mexicali Valley therefore came to occupy a significant place on the evolving landscape of Japanese-­settler colony making in Latin Amer­ i­ca a­ fter US racial exclusion. At the same time, while Japa­nese Amer­i­ca did not physically absorb ­these newcomers from Japan due to US policy, t­ hese first-­generation Japa­ nese Mexicans still belonged to the transborder ethnic economy and social world connected to Southern California’s Issei settlements. Although it is impor­tant to recognize that dissimilarities in ­legal regimes and race relations between the Anglo-­Saxonist United States and less exclusionist Mexico created certain qualitative differences in the lives of Japa­nese residents on each side, their transborder new Japans remained deeply entwined, ­because Baja California offered what Southern California lacked, and vice versa, u ­ nder the yoke of ever-­intensifying US politics of immigration exclusion. Whereas the dearth of institutionalized racism in Mexico accounted

110

Chapter 4

for a favorable ­legal environment that allowed transplanted Issei farming and unobstructed ­labor migration, the presence of a larger consumer market and ethnic capital base in Los Angeles encouraged socioeconomic developments in rural Japa­nese satellite communities across the border. And b ­ ehind all t­hese developments stood imperial Japan, whose expansionist policies and aspirations had extended beyond the realm of its formal sovereign territories, especially a­ fter the First World War.39 Indeed, the role of Japa­nese California as a central driving force for immigrant expansionism and settler colonization on the Latin Amer­i­ca side was constantly bolstered by po­liti­cal moves made by the Japa­nese government. For example, in order to interlock transborder ethnic economies for the creation of a regional hub of overseas Japa­nese development, Tokyo’s creation of local jurisdictional bound­aries without regard for the formal national border provided a crucial context, one in which the immigrant populations of Southern California and Baja California Norte became further integrated in terms of their consciousness, regional identity, and settler practices. In the eyes of ­these Japa­nese, an ethnic community was or­ga­nized geo­graph­i­cally by the lines of demarcation drawn by the local Japa­nese association (Nihonjinkai), which worked as an administrative arm of the Japa­nese consulate. ­Under the Gentlemen’s Agreement, Tokyo assumed responsibility for preventing laborers from departing for the United States while still letting ­family members of bona fide US residents travel across the Pacific with valid passports. In order to ensure and enforce this critical l­egal distinction, Tokyo required Japa­nese consulates to issue an official proof of US residency for each Issei, whose f­ amily member would apply for a passport with that document in Japan. The local consular officials, however, ­were too understaffed to verify the status and personal information of e­ very single US resident. In 1908, as a m ­ atter of expediency, the San Francisco consulate devised a new system by which to delegate the administrative function of certificate issuance to local Japa­nese associations, from which Issei residents in their jurisdictions could request necessary papers rather than from the consular office.40 This same procedure applied to ­every male Issei when they filed a request for annual deferment for Japa­nese military ser­vice on account of their foreign residence. As ­every immigrant had to theoretically register at the nearest Japa­nese association to use its ser­vices ­under this system, his or her perception of community membership came to revolve around the jurisdiction of a given Japa­nese association.

Azuma

111

In Southern California, the regional boundary of the ethnic community was firmly set ­after the establishment of the Japa­nese Consulate of Los Angeles in 1915, which oversaw the affairs of Japa­nese in Baja California Norte as well. Just as in the case of its counter­parts in San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle, the Los Angeles consulate had local Issei leaders set up the regional Japa­nese association headquarters as the umbrella organ­ization for all local affiliates in Southern California, as well as t­hose in the Baja California towns of Mexicali (1917), Tijuana (1922), and Ensenada (1926).41 Therefore, by virtue of coming ­under the control of the Los Angeles consulate, the Japa­nese residents of Baja California came to compose part of the po­liti­cal network centered on the Central Japa­nese Association of Southern California (CJASC) in Los Angeles’ ­Little Tokyo. It was therefore not surprising that this key Issei organ­ization helped spearhead the exodus of California’s Japa­nese farmers for northern Mexico by conducting formal surveys on favorable “colonial” conditions ­there and encouraging their remigration into a contiguous “new frontier.” Moreover, in response to the CJASC’s request for the establishment of a new consular branch along Mexico’s Pacific coast, Japan’s foreign ministry opened one in Mazatlán, Sinaloa, in 1925 in order to manage the rapidly increasing re-­migrants who wished to remain in­de­pen­dent settler-­farmers outside the reach of California’s racist laws.42 Collaborations between Japa­nese Amer­i­ca and imperial Japan often tran­spired in a highly or­ga­nized but inconspicuous manner. The Alien Land Laws propelled the moneyed interests of Los Angeles Issei to or­ga­nize a number of for-­profit concerns to broker immigrant land purchases and build infrastructure for a Japa­nese agricultural colony on Mexico’s frontera. From across the Pacific, Japan’s mono­poly capital, backed by like-­minded po­liti­ cal interests in Tokyo, frequently acted as an ­eager partner in such localized colonization efforts by California Japa­nese. Established in 1912, the Nichi-­Boku Industrial Corporation (NBIC) exemplified a Los Angeles–­ based enterprise and movement for immigrant resettlement and colonization in Mexico’s borderlands, which many p ­ eople of the home empire supported discursively and materially. A founder of an Issei-­owned bank that had financed California’s co-­ethnic farmers before ­legal exclusion, Takekawa Minetarō played a central role in organ­izing this transborder land com­pany. The NBIC published a twenty-­page publicity booklet in order to entice both Japa­nese American farmers and Japa­nese investors by presenting the familiar racial rhe­toric and (pseudo)scientific data, embellished

112

Chapter 4

with scholarly excerpts and eye-­catching pictures and elaborate maps. Takekawa discussed the availability of unoccupied fertile land on the Pacific side of Mexico, as well as the inferiority, manageability, and cheapness of “native” residents, who would “swarm any site of employment opportunities like mindless ants.” This racist characterization of Mexican workers led the interested parties to believe in the availability of cheap and expendable ­labor. At the same time, Takekawa did not neglect to mention the com­pany’s plans to bring “immigrants from Japan to Mexico.” According to the Los Angeles Issei businessman, ­these ­f uture partners in frontier conquest would be able to “offer much higher-­quality l­abor” than expendable “natives” and hence far greater support for colonization by California Issei transmigrants.43 In the northern coastal region of Sinaloa, less than 150 miles across the Baja California peninsula, the NBIC acquired 85,000 acres, which it subdivided for aspiring frontier settlers from Japa­nese Amer­i­ca. Published in the com­pany’s illustrated booklet, the “colony” map shows the land tracts to be sold to Japa­nese settler-­farmers of Southern California. The descriptions (sales pitches) in the margins say: “The State of Sinaloa is called the ‘California’ of Mexico. And [our] colony is reputed as the most desirable and fertile land in that state. . . . ​It is the world’s only and most ideal colony for our race’s development” (see fig. 4.2).44 Enticed by t­hese propitious images of the new transborder “California” frontier, a total of 104 Los Angeles Issei signed purchase agreements for an aggregate 12,379 acres between 1914 and 1921, and an additional 57 individuals reserved purchase ­orders for 4,820.45 Although most investors ­were Japa­nese residents of Los Angeles, the moneyed interests and po­liti­cal elites in Japan also chipped in.46 The Taiwan Seitō (Sugar Production) Com­pany, the most impor­tant corporate machinery of industrial development in Japan’s southern colonial frontier, made a large investment in the NBIC and sent its own agricultural specialist to conduct a land survey in Sinaloa.47 Dignitaries, including Ōkuma Shigenobu (former prime minister) and Sakatani Yoshirō (former finance minister), publicly endorsed the NBIC’s proj­ect.48 The Los Angeles Japa­nese consulate also approved it, giving the impression of government support. While he publicly declared that the Sinaloa colony was “an extremely promising enterprise” for “small-­scale [individual] settler agriculture” in a printed publicity material, the diplomat confidentially recommended to his superiors in Tokyo: “The [foreign] ministry should accord ­every fa­cil­i­t y for

Azuma

113

FIG. 4.2.  The “colony” map. Source: “Nichi-­Boku Colony: Nichiboku shokuminchi,” May 1914, p. 11, in the author’s personal collection.

[the NBIC] to create a model Japa­nese farming colony . . . ​so that more [similar] Japa­nese undertakings would follow” (in greater Latin Amer­i­ca).49 In 1920, the semi-­government-­r un Overseas Enterprise Com­pany (Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha) also dispatched an agent to investigate the feasibility of sponsoring the NBIC’s venture; this firm took charge of helping finance formal and informal colonization ventures inside and outside the Japa­nese empire. Despite all ­these signs of its promising ­f uture, the colony abruptly folded due to a financial scandal the following year. Yet it allowed a few hundred resettlers from Southern California to adopt the identity of frontier farmers without facing the constraints of the Alien Land Laws.50 A number of first-­generation residents in Sinaloa, whom the orthodox narrative of Japa­nese Mexican history now celebrates as ethnic “pioneers,”

114

Chapter 4

originated from ­these former California Issei, who ­were inspired by a rosy idea of northern Mexico as an integrated transborder frontier u ­ nder the 51 spell of Japan’s informal settler colonialism. Corporate attempts at organ­izing Japa­nese agricultural settler colonies across the border included the initiative of Japan’s mono­poly capital as well. As ­these zaibatsu interests had concurrently financed imperial Japan’s endeavors of large-­scale agricultural colonization within its sphere of influence since 1909, the instances in the US-­Mexican borderlands elucidated indivisible links between the empire’s formal colonialism and the extraterritorial manifestations of settler colonialism in the Western Hemi­ sphere. Some examples on the US-­Mexican borderlands featured well-­ known industrial leaders of imperial Japan, such as Shibusawa Eiichi and Asano Sōichirō, who envisioned the establishment of a gigantic Japanese-­ controlled cotton plantation in the Mexicali region. In t­hese examples, leaders and members of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca offered indispensable ser­v ice as intermediaries, migration brokers, and cross-­border settler-­farmers. ­Because agitators of the Yellow Peril scare in California, especially the fearmongering Hearst press, w ­ ere always on the watch for cases of Japa­nese entry (“invasion”) into Amer­i­ca’s “backyard” ­after the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the actions of Japan’s moneyed interests and their partnership with California Issei w ­ ere generally kept outside public eyes and rec­ords. Yet, existing sources reveal that the series of surreptitious negotiations for large-­scale land acquisition took place between the Japa­nese side and the white American-­owned CRLC, Mexicali’s largest corporate landowner. In 1909, Shibusawa Eiichi began his attempt at concluding a major land deal for plantation-­style settler colonization with Harry Chandler—­the publisher of the Los Angeles Times—­and a syndicate of white landowners, when Japan’s industrial mogul traveled to Los Angeles as the head of the empire’s first commercial mission to the United States. In the context of recessions following the Panic of 1907, Chandler and his colleagues wished to entice the Japa­nese to lease thousands of acres in the Mexicali Valley for cotton production, the most impor­tant US commodity export to Japan.52 Although nothing concrete came of this 1909 episode, Shibusawa’s circle kept an eye out for the possibility of creating a West Coast base of cotton importation for the textile industry—­a backbone of the prewar Japa­nese economy—­because domestic cotton mills and textile factories had relied on the more cost-­prohibitive land-­and-­sea transport from New Orleans via San Francisco and, a­fter 1914, through the Panama Canal importation

Azuma

115

route. Perhaps for this reason, the CRLC, of which Chandler’s concern was a major shareholder, received an offer of thirty million dollars from “certain moneyed interests” in Japan in 1915, when Shibusawa and his associates visited the United States again. CRLC executives took it for a formal “Japa­nese government” offer, which entailed the purchase of a large tract near the border town of Mexicali for “colonization” by local Issei farmers and laborers.53 At the same time, supported by many Tokyo government insiders, Asano Sōichirō, Shibusawa’s old friend, who ran his own industrial conglomerate, was also at work to strike a large property acquisition deal with the CRLC. Just like Shibusawa, Asano was interested in the Mexicali Valley ­because the area appeared to have the potential for erecting a Japanese-­ controlled hub of raw cotton production; California’s Imperial Valley, just north across the border, had been already a home to hundreds of Japa­nese immigrant farmers who had engaged in cotton production. The procurement of experienced growers and a ­labor force would not be an issue, and an increasing number of Issei had moved south of the border to make a name in local agriculture and commerce, exemplified by the likes of Shintani and Kawakita. A CRLC executive ­later recalled that Asano’s interest in the acquisition of its Mexicali land properties was as strong as Shibusawa’s had been for many years.54 In the spring of 1917, Asano dispatched his right-­hand man, Hashimoto Umetarō, a onetime leader of the Japa­nese ethnic community in the US Pacific Northwest, to negotiate with Chandler a lease for fifty thousand acres near Mexicali for the length of ten years. This was a deal that would be worth $3,600,000 in total value, and it would bring “four hundred to one thousand Japa­nese laborers,” presumably from both Southern California and Japan.55 Most likely, Hashimoto was responsible for drafting this aspect of the blueprint, for he had had experience in immigrant ­labor contracting when he had resided in Seattle.56 In order to boost Chandler’s enthusiasm for this big business deal, Asano’s proxy was accompanied by a member of the House of Peers and the New York branch man­ag­er of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which made this negotiation look like a state-­backed one.57 To jump-­start a new Mexicali venture, Hashimoto partnered with Gō Ryūsaburō—­one of Shibusawa’s protégés and a brother-­in-­law of the current foreign minister—­who had extensive experience in the textile trade with the United States. Gō was an expansionist-­minded entrepreneur in his own right, for he was involved in the establishment of the South Seas

116

Chapter 4

(Nan’yō) Society, the central organ­ization of southward expansionists in imperial Japan. When Hashimoto began his negotiations with Chandler and the CRLC in 1917, Gō resigned his executive position at Japan’s leading brick manufacturer (Shibusawa’s concern) and immigrated to Southern California.58 Available sources suggest that this veteran businessman was secretly entrusted with a mission to start a model cotton farm ­under the triangular partnership of Shibusawa, Hashimoto/Asano, and a foreign ministry clique that stood b ­ ehind them, with an eye to creating a sphere of Japa­nese economic influence and a major farm settlement in Baja California Norte. In Mexicali, Gō leased ten thousand acres, which instantly made him one of the largest Japa­nese farmers in the region at that time, and he hired an experienced Issei farmer to oversee eighty co-­ethnic workers brought from the California side.59 This experimental farm was meant to serve as the foundation of a new Japa­nese cotton plantation and settler colony when the pending negotiations with the CRLC materialized. Along with Hashimoto’s strenuous efforts, Asano’s enthusiasm made Chandler optimistic about the “prospect [of a] big deal,” leading the latter even to ­favor the idea of “sell[ing] the ­whole property [to the former] if ­things work out.”60 ­A fter initial amiable negotiations, Hashimoto was equally exuberant, writing in his June 1917 correspondence: “We believe that every­t hing of our g­ rand proj­ect w ­ ill be smoothly carried on [sic].”61 About two months l­ater, however, the US State Department abruptly intervened in the business dealing and put its objection “in the form of a request to [Chandler’s group] as patriotic Americans”—an argument that was hard to ignore when the United States had recently entered World War I.62 National security was a paramount concern of the white republic, and the idea of massive Japa­nese landholdings and settlements south of the California border did not sit well with US officials or the xenophobic public. Chandler had to concede for the time being, but the end of the war allowed him and Hashimoto to revive negotiations in December 1918. Backed by Asano’s moneyed power, the Japa­nese side now proposed to buy up as much as eight hundred thousand acres with fifty million dollars instead of just leasing fifty thousand acres—­a sweet offer that nevertheless met fierce re­sis­tance from within the ranks of CRLC shareholders.63 Inside the com­pany, the anti-­Japanese contingent mobilized a successful countermove against Chandler and his supporters by informing a War Department intelligence officer of the revival of the “repulsive” plan to construct a Japa­ nese settler colony in Amer­i­ca’s backyard.64 Along with Senator James

Azuma

117

Phelan of California, a chief voice of anti-­Japanese agitation at the time, the jingoistic Hearst press was quick to pick up the leaked story—­with highly sensational spin on the allegedly predatory intention of imperial Japan ­behind the CRLC land deal.65 With the War and State Departments looking over his shoulder now, Chandler caved in to pressure by April 1919, thus informing Hashimoto: “­Matters have taken a turn which prevent[s] me from giving further serious consideration to the business at this time.”66 National security concerns of the US government became wedded with the racial fears of the white American republic, thereby putting an end to the remote settler colonialism of Japa­nese cap­i­tal­ists and their partnership with segments of Japa­nese Amer­i­ca and Japa­nese Mexico. ­A fter 1919, sensationalized US press reports further intensified popu­lar Yellow Peril sentiments about Japa­nese “penetration” into “Amer­i­ca’s backyard,” rumored at the level of as many as “100,000 men.”67 ­These race-­driven demagogueries presented a significant push for the US decision to carry out a total ban on Japa­nese immigration u ­ nder the 1924 Immigration Act and the tightening of its southern border against Japa­nese mobility. Wedged apart from Japa­nese Amer­i­ca, northern Mexico thus ceased to look like a promised land for Japan’s overseas development and its extraterritorial settler colonialism—­a perception reinforced by Mexico’s decision to prohibit the immigration of working-­class foreigners (except for skilled individuals) in 1932.68 ­Because Japan proceeded to concentrate on the systematic transplantation of unemployed workers and farm families in the hinterlands of Brazil for agricultural colonization ­under bilateral agreements, the de­cade following 1924 witnessed the dramatic rerouting of Japa­nese migration flows from North Amer­i­ca to South Amer­i­ca.69 Nonetheless, while elevating the place of nonexclusionist Brazil on the imaginary map of Japa­nese overseas development, the manner in which northern Mexico dis­appeared from that map anticipated the decline of the entirety of Latin Amer­i­ca ­under the combined effect of local racial nationalisms and national security scares regarding Japa­nese residents and their home empire. ­These developments w ­ ere exemplified by severe restrictions on Japa­nese immigration imposed by Brazil and Peru in 1934 and 1936, respectively.70 Migration and settler colonialism in the US-­Mexican borderlands not only helped catalyze Japa­nese mobility to and colonization efforts in greater Latin Amer­ i­ca, but that history also signaled parallel developments with regard to the turbulent experiences of Japa­nese immigrants in South American socie­ ties and their complex relationships with the homeland and its aggressive

118

Chapter 4

imperialism that rendered them foreignized racial perils in their ­adopted countries even before the outbreak of the war. This chapter has explored the neglected history of Japa­nese settler colonialism in the northernmost region of Latin Amer­i­ca, specifically the borderlands of US and Mexican Californias. Between the early 1900s and the mid-1920s, this interstitial trinational space witnessed dynamic streams of Japa­nese immigrant bodies, moneys, ideas, and settler colonial practices in line with Japan’s expansionist ideology and policy mandate of overseas development.71 What emerged on the northern fringes of Latin Amer­i­ca was a borderland Japa­nese community of re-­migrants from California, Peru, and Mexico’s interior, as well as newcomers directly from across the Pacific. And this community was viewed as an extension of the home empire: a new Japan and its development celebrated as yet another example of the Japa­nese empire’s borderless expansion. Hence, the mobility of intrahemispheric re-­ migrants and transpacific immigrants into the US-­Mexican borderlands constituted part of the ongoing global diaspora of imperial Japa­nese, where US racism caused the vectors of their movements to shift steadily from exclusionist Anglophone Amer­i­ca to racially friendly Latin Amer­i­ca from the 1910s onward. Not only did this historical unfolding make northern Mexico inseparable from Japa­nese immigrant society in Anglophone Amer­i­ca, but it also rendered that liminal space an impor­tant (albeit largely neglected) area of Japa­nese Latin Amer­i­ca as well as a pivotal node in its connections to the home empire. Although the differences between the two Amer­i­cas w ­ ere significant in terms of the dif­fer­ent modes and forms of national race/immigrant politics, Japa­nese of the United States, Mexico, and greater Latin Amer­i­ca shared overlapping and interlinked experiences as immigrants through common aspirations and practices of settler colonialism rooted in Japan’s expansionist ideology and actions. This chapter documented such entangled histories of Japa­nese migrations and settler experiences in the Western Hemisphere—­ the histories that constituted integral components of imperial Japan’s extraterritorial settler colonialism and global expansionism.

Notes 1. ​On a fuller discussion of Japa­nese settler colonialism, its connections to US-­ frontier discourse, and its state and private components that cut across the presumed

Azuma

119

divides between Japan’s sovereign territories in the Asian Pacific and the extraterritorial immigrant communities in foreign lands (especially the Amer­i­cas), see Azuma, In Search, pp. 4–15. By challenging the similar divides between East Asia and Latin Amer­i­ca in the scholarly research on Chinese diasporas, Fredy Gonzáles’s study of Chinese immigrants in Mexico narrates the transpacific manifestations of nationalist and ethnic politics, as well as its inseparable ties to the home states in China. See Gonzáles, Paisanos Chinos, pp. 1–8, 11–13. 2. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 104–114. 3. ​Japa­nese Amer­i­ca, especially its Southern California ethnic community, produced a substantial number of re-­migrants to Brazil’s new Japa­nese settlements, especially during the 1920s. On this, see Azuma, In Search, pp. 143–144, 148–149; Azuma, Between Two Empires, p. 81; and Lu, Making of Japa­nese, p. 213. 4. ​On how white American racism propelled first-­generation Japa­nese Americans to seek their own “frontiers,” including Mexico, see Azuma, In Search, esp. chap. 2–3. On the formation of a common social and cultural space and local identity over this transborder ethnic community, see Azuma, “Community Formation,” pp. 39–41; and Tokunaga, “Hainichi iminhō,” pp. 65–81. 5. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 13–17, 37–41; and on Hokkaido colonization and transpacific migration, see Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 39–68. 6. ​Pyle, New Generation, pp. 99–102; Azuma, In Search, pp. 37–39; and Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 39–98. 7. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 57–64, 110. 8. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 5–6. 9. ​Azuma, Between Two Empires, pp. 27–29; Ichioka, Issei, pp. 40–52; Azuma, “Historical Overview,” pp. 32–38; and Uchida, Brokers of Empire, pp. 36–58. 10. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 16–17. 11. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 6–7, 81–89. On emigration companies, see also Ichioka, Issei, pp. 47–51; and Moriyama, Imingaisha. 12. ​On the blurring bound­aries of dekasegi laborers and colonial settlers inside and outside the formal empire, see Azuma, Between Two Empires, pp. 22–25, 89–110; and Azuma, In Search, pp. 63, 107–108. 13. ​Modell, Economic and Politics, pp. 115–118. 14. ​Ichioka, Issei, p. 52. 15. ​Ichioka, Issei, pp. 51–52, 67–70; and Azuma, In Search, pp. 25–30. 16. ​Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga kokumin no kaigai, pp. 140, 144. 17. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 33–34; and Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp. 342–348. 18. ​Ichioka, Issei, pp. 69–72. 19. ​Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga kokumin no kaigai, pp. 140, 144. 20. ​ Ōya­ma Ujirō, “Honpōjin mitsunyūkokusha ni kanshi torishirabe no ken,” March 26, 1923, in Fusei tokōsha oyobi dō-­hōjosha torishimari kankei zakken (3.8.8.21), Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Japan (hereafter DAFMJ), Tokyo. 21. ​Edward  P. Morse, “Po­liti­cal: Japa­nese Illegally in Amer­i­ca,” June  10, 1922, pp. 31–32, in box 563, Military Intelligence Division Correspondence, 1917–1941, Rec­ ords of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), National Archives and Rec­ords Administration (hereafter NARA), College Park, MD.

120

Chapter 4

22. ​Mizutani, Hokubei Aichi kenjinshi, pp. 259–270. The quote is from page 270. 23. ​See the map (fig. 4.1) attached to the report. Teikoku Heigen Nihonjinkai to Ōya­ma Ujirō, September 29, 1915, Honpō imin kankei zakken: Bokkoku no bu, v. 3 (3.8.2.285–1), DAFMJ. ­There was another route of illegal entry at Ciudad Juárez–­El Paso, which was popu­lar among t­ hose who fled mines in Chihuahua and Coahuila, even though the use of this route became more risky and far less prevalent than the Baja California routes a­ fter the early 1910s due to the effects of the Mexican Revolution and tightening US surveillance. And in 1914, the coordinated relocation of Japa­ nese residents from war-­torn Chihuahua to Mexicali took place u ­ nder the support of US-­based Japa­nese diplomats, thereby turning Baja California Norte into the central hub of prospective border crossers. See Masterson, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 33– 34; Geiger, Subverting Exclusion, pp. 124–134; and Adachi to Makino, April 10, 1914, Bokkoku nairan kankei ikken: Teikoku no taido, v. 3 (5.3.2.71–2), DAFMJ. 24. ​An example of Japa­nese “stowaways” who traveled from San Felipe to Mexicali in Baja California Norte reveals the danger of the second option. In August 1915, twenty-­ three immigrants from Japan chartered a small merchant vessel with thirty-­five Asian Indians and three Chinese at Mazatlán, Sinaloa, before heading for San Felipe on the Baja California peninsula. This group of multiethnic border crossers temporarily disbanded, however, when illness among the Japa­nese prevented them from continuing to proceed on land together. While the Asian Indians and Chinese headed northward into the vast desert from San Felipe, the Japa­nese stayed put with their sick friends for the time being. One week l­ater, they began to follow in their shipmates’ footsteps. Three days passed, and while ­water and food ran short, the Japa­nese saw no end of the desert in sight. Then, they stumbled upon the corpses of several of the Asian Indians, who had apparently died of dehydration in the summer heat. A quick deliberation resulted in a decision to go back to San Felipe to regroup. The return trip was a torturous one, as the Japa­nese had to survive on urine, and when they reached San Felipe, the head count had dropped to sixteen. While recouping and regrouping, the Japa­nese immigrants met the fourteen surviving Asian Indians, with whom they shared food and medicine. Two weeks ­later, the second expedition started with a total of thirty Japa­nese and Asian Indian members, but this time they w ­ ere also accompanied by hired Mexican guides, who knew where to obtain clean w ­ ater in the desert. ­After ten days of continuous walking, the group fi­nally arrived at Mexicali safely. On this episode, see Teikoku Heigen Nihonjinkai to Ōya­ma. On the life story of another Japa­nese border crosser from Peru, see Nagata, Kaigai risshiden, pp. 323–339. 25. ​On Chinese immigrant border crossing, see Lee, At Amer­i­ca’s Gates, pp.  161– 162, 179–187; Young, Alien Nation, pp. 153–193; and Romero, “Transnational Chinese Immigrant Smuggling,” pp. 1–16. On the Japa­nese/Okinawan use of the preexisting Chinese system, see Kōchi, Imin no aiwa, p. 39; and Ichioka, Issei, pp. 69–70. 26. ​See Azuma, “Community Formation,” pp. 34–35. 27. ​Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp. 342–343, 424–426; Kitamura, Issei toshite amerika, pp. 55–56; and Gaimushō Tsūshō-­k yoku, “Bokkoku ‘ensenada’ hōmen ni okeru honpōjin no hatten jōkyō” (May 1932), p. 6, DAFMJ. 28. ​Fujioka Shirō, Ayumi no ato, 545; and Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi, p. 205. 29. ​Given the illicit nature of immigrant smuggling, other brokers w ­ ere more of under­ground operations usually connected to the Tokyo Club, an or­ga­nized crime syn-

Azuma

121

dicate that was headquartered in the heart of Los Angeles’ ­Little Tokyo with branches all over the Golden State and the US-­Mexican borderlands, including San Diego / Tijuana, El Centro and Calexico / Mexicali. Between the 1910s and the 1930s, the Tokyo Club reigned over the close-­k nit networks of gambling halls and brothels up and down the Pacific Coast—­the clandestine channels that the gangsters presumably utilized when smuggling/helping smuggle ship jumpers and undocumented immigrants from Peru, Japan, and Mexico itself. With the power of money and threat of vio­lence, the immigrant gangsters held an upper hand over legitimate community leadership and businesses, squashing opposition to immigrant smuggling and attempts at moral reform backed by the local Japa­nese consulate. One example actually involved the murder of the Japa­nese Association secretary in Mexicali, who had tried to have female ship jumpers apprehended and deported in 1926. Tokyo Club members from Los Angeles w ­ ere subsequently arrested for the murder by the Mexican police. Available sources suggest that Tokyo Club bosses maintained strong ties to Japan’s ultranationalist Kokuryūkai, or the Amur River / Black Dragon Society, which played a notable role in pushing for imperialist agendas relative to ­Korea and Manchuria. It is not difficult to surmise that the ideology of overseas development, which Kokuryūkai activists also often employed, allowed Tokyo Club gangsters to justify their transnational criminal activities in the same language. See Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp. 472–477; Kashū mainichi, May 23, 1935; and Rafu shimpō, May 24, 1935. On the continuous role of Mexicali as a point of illicit Japa­nese entry a­ fter 1924, see Tokunaga, “Hainichi iminhō,” pp. 74–75. 30. ​See Masterson, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 10–11, 44–46, 51–85; and Azuma, In Search, pp. 99–101. 31. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 53, 57–59. 32. ​On the almost simultaneous upsurge of or­ga­nized farm settlement making inside and outside the Japa­nese empire around 1907–1913, see Azuma, In Search, pp. 105– 112. 33. ​Azuma, In Search, pp. 58–59, 88, 114–115. 34. ​Ota Mishima, Destino México, pp. 107, 111. In a recent Japanese-­language essay, Tokunaga Yū also examines the formation of a transborder ethnic community a­ fter 1924. See Tokunaga, “Hainichi iminhō,” pp. 65–81. 35. ​Kuga Narumi to Tanaka Giichi, “Bokkoku shucchōkata risei no ken,” May 21, 1927, in Honshō narabi zaigai kōkan’in shucchō kankei zakken: Zaibei kakkan (M.2.2.0.1-3-2), DAFMJ. ­A fter the termination in 1924 of new Japa­nese immigration into the United States, Ensenada also experienced the influx of immigrant fishermen from Japan, who freely traveled between Baja California and Southern California aboard their ships. Typically contracted by California-­based Japa­nese firms, t­ hese men engaged in coastal and deep-­sea fishing, landing at San Diego and San Pedro (near Los Angeles) periodically to drop off their catch of tuna and bonito. Although they ­were “residents of Mexico” on paper, t­ hose California cities w ­ ere as much their home as Ensenada was. See “Japa­nese Activities in Southern California,” n.d., pp. 1–2, in box 226, Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942–1946, Office of Naval Intelligence, (RG38), NARA; Gaimushō Tsūshō-­k yoku, “Bokkoku ‘ensenada’ hōmen ni okeru honpōjin no hatten jōkyō,” pp. 19–26; and Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp. 428–437.

122

Chapter 4

36. ​Yoshiyama, Chūmoku subeki Mekishiko, p. 301. U ­ nder Mexican law, foreigners could not own land within fifty kilo­meters of the border, but many got around the restriction by setting up a land com­pany or becoming a naturalized Mexican citizen. 37. ​See [Fukuoka shoki], “Shimo kariforunia hantō nanboku ryōshū jijō shisatsu hōkokusho,” September 1926, p. 127, in Honpō imin kankei zakken: Bokkoku no bu, v. 2, DAFMJ; Zai-­R afu Nihon Ryōjikan, “Rafu jijō,” November 1925, pp. 40–41, DAFMJ; Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, p. 440; and Masterson, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 61–63. On the CRLC, see Kerig, “Yankee Enclave,” pp. 16–179, esp. pp. 169–170. Most of the arable and undeveloped land in the Mexicali Valley belonged to the California-­based CRLC and its white American shareholders, including Harry Chandler. On the “multicultural society” in the Mexicali Valley and the prominence of Chinese cotton growers in Mexicali before the early 1920s, see Castillo-­Munõz, Other California, pp. 31–51; and Hu-­DeHart, “Chinese of Baja California,” pp. 11–12. 38. ​Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga kokumin no kaigai, pp. 140, 144; and García, Looking like the ­Enemy, pp. 78–81, esp. p. 80. 39. ​See Azuma, In Search, pp. 126–130, 135–143; and Tokunaga, “Hainichi iminhō,” pp. 65–81. 40. ​Ichioka, Issei, pp. 159–162; and Azuma, Between Two Empires, pp. 43–44. 41. ​Gaimushō, “Nihonjinkai narabi hōjin jitsugyō dantai chōsa,” 1939, DAFMJ. Major vernacular newspapers of Los Angeles, like the Rafu shimpō, the Rafu nichibei, and the Kashū mainichi, had significant pools of subscribers south of the border. Alongside vari­ous regional columns in t­ hese papers was the “Lower California” (Tei-­k ashū) section, where resident correspondents in Mexicali, Ensenada, and Tijuana periodically sent in reports of local occurrences. Japa­nese who’s who and yearbooks, which the Rafu shimpō and the Kashū mainichi published periodically during the 1930s, illuminate the Issei’s perceived linkages between Southern California and Baja California Norte. Directories of Japa­nese residents and businesses in Mexicali, Tijuana, and Ensenada ­were usually placed right a­ fter the Imperial Valley section or the San Diego section. See, for example, Rafu Shimpōsha, Rafu nenkan; and Kashū Mainichi Shimbunsha, Kamai Nenkan. 42. ​Ichioka, Issei, pp. 241–242; editorial in Rafu shimpō, April 10, 1924; and Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, ed, Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi, pp. 163, 174. Tokunaga discusses other reasons that justified the establishment of the Mazatlán consulate, which included Japan’s commercial interests and bilateral po­liti­cal considerations. See Tokunaga, “Hainichi iminhō,” pp. 71–73. 43. ​“Nichi-­boku Colony: Nichiboku shokuminchi,” May 1914, p. 11, in the author’s personal collection. All quotes are from this source. 44. ​“Nichi-­boku Colony,” pp. 14–15, and maps. The quotes are from a colony subdivision map (no pagination). See also “Nichi-­boku sangyō kabushiki kaisha jigyō setsumei,” 1918; and Takekawa Minetarō to Adachi Mineichirō, October 1, 1915, both in Honpō kaisha kankei zakken: Nichi-­boku sangyō kabushiki kaisha (hereafter HNB), DAFMJ. 45. ​“Tochi baibai keiyakusha,” in HNB, DAFMJ. The tally is by the author. 46. ​“Nichi-­boku sangyō kabushiki kaisha kabunushi roku,” in HNB, DAFMJ; and Ōkagawa, “ ‘Kyogyōka’ ni yoru giji benchā tōshi fando to risuku kanri,” pp. 14–15.

Azuma

123

47. ​Yamamoto Teijirō to Tanaka Tōkichi, “Nichi-­boku shokuminchi shisatsu hōkokusho,” November 4, 1920; and Ōya­ma Ujirō to Hanihara Masanao, February 16, 1921, both in HNB, DAFMJ. 48. ​See, for example, a com­pany advertisement for investment published in Tokyo nichinichi shinbun, July 13, 1920. Its Tokyo office was headed by the former chargé d’affaires of Japan to Mexico. 49. ​ Ō ya­ma Ujirō to Nakamura Takashi, December 7, 1917; Ōya­ma to Uchida Yasuya, December 2, 1920; and “Nichi-­boku sangyō kabushiki kaisha Mekishiko nōjō ijūsha annai,” ca. 1920, all in HNB, DAFMJ. 50. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Kaigai kōgyō kaisha shōshi (August 1935), p. 19, National Diet Library (hereafter NDL), Tokyo. On the l­egal trou­ble in which NIBC was engulfed, see Osaka asashi shinbun, June 15, 1921. 51. ​S ee Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp.  422–423; Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi, pp. 163–164, 235, 239–241, 326–328; and Murai Ken’ichi, Paionia retsuden (1975), pp. 63–64, 66–67, 101–102, 107, Nikkei imin kankei shiryō, Modern Japa­nese Po­liti­cal History Materials Room, NDL. 52. ​E. E. Easton to Henry Z. Osborne, November 26, 1909, folder 35, box “Anderson’s Portfolios,” Colorado River Land Com­pany Papers, Colorado River Land Com­pany Collection (hereafter CRLCC), Sherman Library and Gardens, Corona Del Mar, California. 53. ​“An outline of book on L.A. Times and development of So. Calif.,” n.d., in folder “Sale of Lands of CRLC to Japa­nese, 1915, 1923,” box 1, Enrique Cortes Papers, CRLCC. 54. ​See page 2 of a ten-­page report with no date in folder “118-­a, Colonization, Allison ­Matters ½,” box Q , CRLCC. ­Under the influence of the anti-­Asian Alien Land Laws, propertied Chinese immigrants in California also invested in farming endeavors in the Mexicali Valley. On their activities on CRLC estates, see Castillo-­Munõz, Other California, pp. 67–72. 55. ​[Harry Chandler] to M. Sugawara, U. Hashimoto, and K. Imanishi, June 12, 1917; and Chandler to T. E. Gibbon, June 19, 1917, both in folder 1917, box 7, MHS Letters, CRLCC. The quote is from the second source. The tally is by the author. 56. ​Having once lived in the western United States, Hashimoto had his own agenda. His penchant for frontier life, adventure, and settler colonialism was deeply ingrained in his past trajectory as a self-­styled New World pioneer. In the mid-1890s, for example, when he had learned about the discovery of gold in Alaska, Hashimoto had joined the Klondike Gold Rush, traveling to the Northern Territory with a dream of becoming a Japa­nese gold mining king. Although his Alaskan adventure was a disastrous failure, this enterprising leader of early Japa­nese Amer­i­ca did not give in and had a try at l­ abor contracting when emigration companies and their agents w ­ ere making a bundle of money by populating the western frontier with Japa­nese immigrant laborers. Between 1904 and 1908, Hashimoto had taken five hundred Japa­nese from Seattle to the Rocky Mountains and supervised their laying of railroad tracks. A de­ cade ­later, this colorful background induced him to envision a similar scheme of large-­ scale l­ abor importation for land development and cotton cultivation in the US-­Mexican borderlands. See Ōta, Hashimoto Umetarō, pp. 63–94, esp. pp. 78–83, 91–94.

124

Chapter 4

57. ​[Chandler] to Sugawara, Hashimoto, and Imanishi, June 12, 1917; and Los Angeles Times, “Seek Cotton Lands on the Colorado,” June 14, 1917. 58. ​Gakubuchi-­sei [pseud.], “Gō Ryūsaburō-­shi,” pp. 64–67; Matsushita, Jinteki jigyō taikei 2, p. 178; and Higashi Kōji, Bei-­boku jūō, p. 365. Gō remained in Southern California as a leader of the ethnic community and ran a trading firm u ­ ntil 1935, when he moved to Thailand to set up a Japa­nese government-­backed cotton plantation. See Yatabe to Hirota, August 20, 1935, in Honpō kigyōka no sōmen kōjō oyobi mengyō saien keiei ni kansuru ken; and “Shōmeisho,” April 27, 1939, in Kakkoku ni okeru nōsanbutsu kankei zakken: Men oyobi menka no bu, v. 18, DAFMJ. 59. ​ Ōta, Hashimoto Umetarō, pp. 138–139; Higashi, Bei-­boku jūō, pp. 365–368; page 3 of a ten-­page report with no date, in folder “118-­a, Colonization, Allison ­Matters ½,” box Q , CRLCC; and Gaimushō Tsūshō-­k yoku, ed., “Kaigai Nihon jitsugyōsha no chōsa,” December 1918, p. 231, DAFMJ. 60. ​Chandler to M. H. Sherman, tele­g ram, April 28, 1917; and Chandler to [Sherman], April 19, 1917, both in folder 1917, box 7, MHS Letters, CRLCC. 61. ​Hashimoto and Sugawara to Chandler, June 15, 1917, in folder 1917, box 7, MHS Letters, CRLCC. 62. ​Chandler to Sherman, August 9, 1917, in folder 1917, box 7, MHS Letters, CRLCC. Hashimoto’s published biography contradicts what primary sources reveal. According to the book, Hashimoto allegedly spearheaded the land deal of his own volition without Asano’s prior knowledge. Asano, as it narrates, convinced Hashimoto to cancel the deal ­after it was successfully concluded—­advice that Hashimoto accepted reluctantly. Most likely, this distorted narrative reflects an effort to absolve Asano from the rather embarrassing demise of the land deal caused by Yellow Peril demagogues. See Ōta, Hashimoto Umetarō, pp. 138–139. 63. ​Hashimoto to Chandler, tele­g ram, January 4, 1919; O. F. Brant to Chandler, January 6, 1919, and January 17, 1919, all in folder “Japa­nese to Buy Land, 1918–1919,” box 1, Enrique Cortes Papers, CRLCC. 64. ​C. A. Wardlaw to Frederick Simpich, March 1, 1919; and Brant to Chandler, January 17, 1919, both in folder “Japa­nese to Buy Land, 1918–1919,” box 1, Enrique Cortes Papers, CRLCC. 65. ​ Los Angeles Examiner, “Landowners Called upon to Give Full Explanation,” March 22, 1919. 66. ​[Chandler] to Hashimoto, draft letter, n.d.; and Chandler to Brant, January 21, 1919, both in folder “Japa­nese to Buy Land, 1918–1919,” box 1, Enrique Cortes Papers, CRLCC. 67. ​See García, Looking like the ­Enemy, pp. 48–55, 80–81; and, for example, San Francisco Daily News, “Japs Look to Mexico for Colonization,” August 3, 1925; and San Francisco Bulletin, “Japan Colony for Lower California Rumored,” October 23, 1924. 68. ​Tokunaga Yū unveils how local l­abor disputes between Issei farmers and Mexican immigrant workers in Southern California catalyzed anti-­Japanese agitation in Mexicali in 1933. See Tokunaga, “Japa­nese Farmers, Mexican Workers,” pp. 179–190. In Baja California Norte, long-­standing anti-­Chinese sentiments also produced a synergy with the rising nativist agrarista movement, which culminated in the expropriation of all “foreign-­controlled” farms, including the Japanese-­r un estates, by local Mexican citizens by 1937. See García, Looking like the E ­ nemy, p. 81; and Nichiboku Kyōkai,

Azuma

125

Nichiboku kōryūshi, pp.  443–445. On anti-­Chinese sentiments among borderland Mexicans, Hu-­DeHart, “Chinese of Baja California,” pp. 21–25; and Chang, Chino, esp. pp. 124–188. 69. ​On Japan’s state-­backed program of mass migration and agricultural colonization in Brazil, see Azuma, In Search, pp. 135–143; and Masterson, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 79–84. Between 1924 and 1934, Brazil’s Japa­nese population qua­dru­pled from 41,774 to 173,500. Aided by the rise of South Amer­i­ca as a prime destination of agricultural settler colonists from Japan before its seizure of Manchuria, Peru’s Japa­ nese population also doubled from 9,864 to 21,127; and Argentina’s from 2,388 to 5,492. In the same ten-­year period, Mexico experienced only a modest increase from 3,310 to 5,360. See Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga kokumin no kaigai, pp. 168–169. 70. ​See Masterson, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 71–73, 75, 81; and Gardiner, Japa­ nese and Peru, pp. 38–39, 51–53. ­There was evidence of the US’s role in whipping up a local abhorrence of Japa­nese “infiltration” and “yellow peril” in Brazil and Peru ­toward the late 1930s. See Lesser, Negotiating National Identity, pp. 93–94, 116–132, esp. p. 116; and Lee, “ ‘Yellow Peril,’ ” pp. 315–358. 71. ​On the entanglement of international diplomatic relations and local race politics in the US-­Mexican borderlands during the early 1930s, see Tokunaga, “Japa­nese Farmers, Mexican Workers,” pp. 165–197, esp. pp. 190–197.

c h a p t e r

5

The Immigrant-­Homeland Connection The Development of the Japa­nese Community in Peru Ayumi Takenaka

O

ver the course of their century-­long presence in Peru, Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants have established a unified, prosperous community. Long depicted (and sometimes criticized) as “closed” and “exclusive,” the community is frequently seen as a product that emerged out of the harsh external real­ity in pre–­World War II Peru.1 ­A fter all, Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants faced much hostility and discrimination as a racial minority in the country historically dominated by Eu­ro­pean settlers. As Yuji Ichioka succinctly described Japa­nese immigration to the Amer­i­cas as “a history of a racial minority struggling to survive in a hostile land,”2 in Peru, too, they ­were marginalized and racialized in the land where they once had a dream of making a fortune.3 Studies on immigrant integration typically focus on the context of reception. How the host society receives newcomers is impor­tant, as migrant-­ friendly policies and favorable l­abor market conditions generally facilitate their integration.4 The characteristics of immigrants also m ­ atter, such as their education, proficiency in the host language, and ethnic proximity to the majority population.5 Depending on a combination of ­these ­factors, immigrants may steadily assimilate or retain their own community. They may also engage in immigrant transnationalism by maintaining active and sustaining ties to their countries of origin. In ­either case, what is often missing in studies on immigrant integration is the role played by the sending state, or how the sending state shapes the course of immigrant integration in the host society. In this chapter, I examine the case of Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants in Peru and argue that their experiences—of why they suffered hostility and how they coped with it by building a solid community—­ 126

Takenaka

127

should not simply be understood within the local Peruvian context but in the broader historical context of Japa­nese national development. Overseas Japa­nese communities, originally called colonias (colonies) by the Japa­nese state and immigrants in Latin Amer­i­ca, formed part of Japan’s strategy to cultivate new commercial routes and extend spheres of influence in the world. This history helps us to understand better how Japa­nese immigrants ­were treated and marginalized in Peru and also how they developed their community in coping with the external hostility. I illustrate this pro­cess by looking at the case of Japa­nese immigrants in Peru. The well-­established, and now prosperous and reputable, community is not only a product of racism once rampant in the host society; it is also a remnant of how Japan attempted to expand its footholds abroad and how Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants related and resorted to Japan as their m ­ other country. Throughout the history of Japa­nese immigration and settlement in Peru, the Japa­nese state played a pivotal role in consolidating the community, and it in turn s­ haped the attitudes of the host society and the Peruvian government ­toward the immigrants. By tracing this history, the chapter sheds light on the broader debate on how ties between immigrants and their home country shape their integration pro­cess in the host society.6 In the sections below, I first discuss the host environment Japa­nese immigrants encountered upon arriving in Peru before turning to the role played by the Japa­nese state in community development. In discussing how Japan’s involvement ­shaped the relationship between immigrants and the host society, the following section focuses on cotton trade between Peru and Japan and the series of disputes it generated to illustrate the pro­cess.

Racial Hostility in the Peruvian Context Japa­nese immigration to Peru is often described as a history of hardship and suffering. A ­ fter the first group of Japa­nese immigrants set foot in Peru in 1899, they certainly endured what the Peru Shimpo called a “disillusioned farm life” (genmetsu no kōchi seikatsu). Immigrants ­were initially recruited to work on coastal sugar plantations u ­ nder a four-­year contract. At that time, Peru was undergoing rapid development as a result of economic expansion in Western Eu­rope; the demand for Peruvian agricultural products, such as sugarcane and cotton, increased rapidly.7 As a result, Western capital rushed in for expanding business, and this required armies of cheap

128

Chapter 5

l­abor. Initially, slave ­labor was brought in for plantation work, but slavery was abolished in 1854. The subsequent “coolie” trade brought over 87,000 Chinese indentured laborers, but it also came to an end in 1874. The attempt to bring in Indigenous populations from Peru’s interior did not work ­because of peasants’ strong attachment to their lands.8 The alternative was to rely on immigration. The Peruvian state, dominated by p ­ eople of Eu­ro­pean descent, desired nothing but Eu­ro­pean immigrants to “improve their race.” Although the government provided subsidies to immigrants from Eu­rope and the US by implementing the White Preference Law (1873), their efforts ­were unfruitful. Eu­ro­pean immigrants often preferred more profitable and po­liti­cally stable destinations, such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. Peru had l­ ittle to offer the prospective settler due to lower standards of living, the antiquated hacienda system that prohibited land owner­ship, and poor sanitary conditions with frequent epidemics, such as malaria, yellow fever, and typhus.9 Faced with growing pressure from plantation o­ wners, the Peruvian government reluctantly turned to “Asiatics.” So begun in 1899, Japa­nese immigration to Peru continued to grow, reaching 20,630  in 1923, when contract ­labor was abolished.10 The origins of the hostility the immigrants faced can be traced to their early plantation work. Largely incorporated as indentured laborers in transition from a slave economy to capitalism, they w ­ ere exploited in quasi-­slavery working and living conditions.11 Contracts ­were frequently broken. Payments w ­ ere delayed. ­Labor disputes ­were common.12 In an unfamiliar climate, diseases (e.g., malaria and typhoid) w ­ ere also prevalent.13 Just like Chinese and Indian indentured laborers who similarly substituted for African slaves in the Amer­i­cas, the Japa­nese rebelled, protested, and ran away; many also perished on the plantations. ­A fter their contracts ended, many Japa­nese immigrants headed for (or fled to) urban centers, such as Lima and Callao, while some remained in rural areas. In cities, most immigrants engaged in small businesses, such as barbers, restaurants, bodegas (small grocery stores), and bazares (small stores of textiles and h ­ ouse­hold goods) that required relatively ­little capital. As they became dominant in ­these small businesses, it ignited hostility on the part of the host society.14 Perceiving them as a threat, Lima’s central ­labor ­union established the Anti-­Asian Association in 1917 and appealed through their newspaper La Hoja Amarilla (The yellow page) to Peru’s president to abolish “yellow immigration.”15 The populist po­l iti­cal

Takenaka

129

party, Alianza Popu­lar Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), also supported such efforts by intensifying their anti-­Japanese campaigns both in the press and on the streets.16 Soon afterwards, a series of discriminatory mea­sures emerged, aimed at curtailing Japa­nese activities and further immigration from Japan. Hostility against the Japa­nese began to escalate during the 1920s and 1930s in the context of the economic contraction in the world. The ­Great Depression hit hard Peru’s economy, which was dependent on international commodity markets. Amid the economic downturn, the Leguía administration (1919–1930) was toppled by the military commander Sánchez Cerro in 1930, bringing about further social turmoil in the country. During this period of economic and po­liti­cal instability, a wave of nationalism surged in Peru. Peruvian nationalists attributed Peru’s growing economic and societal prob­lems to the penetration of foreign capital, which had increased to $400 million in the mid-1930s.17 Indeed, the US, which was Peru’s major creditor, controlled most of the largest corporations in Peru, while the British dominated Peru’s principal railways, petroleum, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. Italians dominated Peru’s banking, and the Japa­nese w ­ ere predominant in the retail trades and in cotton production.18 This growing sense of nationalism sweeping through Peru further aggravated the anti-­Japanese movement. It was in this context that a “community-­oriented structure” emerged among Japa­nese immigrants as a strategy to cope with the hostile environment.19 This period coincided with the creation of three Japa­nese newspapers and thirty-­six schools, in addition to the numerous prefectural associations.20 This community-­oriented structure, however, did not ­really become a solid community u ­ ntil the Japa­nese state stepped in.

The Role of the Japa­nese State The consolidation of the community began with the creation of an umbrella association. In 1917, the Central Japa­nese Association (Chūō Nihonjin kai, or t­oday’s Japa­nese Peruvian Association, known by the Spanish acronym APJ) was created by merging groups of immigrant laborers and so-­called intellectuals u ­ nder the leadership of Lima’s Japa­nese consulate. Both groups w ­ ere formerly antagonistic ­toward each other but agreed that a unified community would benefit them as an adaptation strategy. The

130

Chapter 5

merger, in real­ity, took the form of annexing the immigrants’ group by the intellectuals.21 Officially established to promote mutual help and solidarity, the Central Japa­nese Association was run as a quasi-­official organ of the Japa­nese government, with the director of Morioka Emigration Com­ pany in Peru, Kannosuke Iida, as the president of the association. Within the forcefully unified “community,” the poorer immigrants continued to be treated by Japa­nese bureaucrats and businessmen as “second-­class citizens,” and the community was or­ga­nized in a top-­down manner, with a strong orientation ­toward the “homeland.”22 Although the Japa­nese state exerted influence in other Japa­nese communities, nowhere was this influence more noticeable than in Peru.23 In the US, the Japa­nese consulate in San Francisco created a similar central body, the Japa­nese Association of Amer­i­ca, in 1908 to fight against the growing anti-­Japanese movement in the area.24 Like in Peru, the association was hierarchically or­ga­nized with the Japa­nese consul on top, and the government exerted influence over its emigrants in Amer­i­ca through such a structure.25 In Brazil, too, formal associations ­were led by Japa­nese consulate staff and employees of (quasi-­official) emigration companies; subsequently, t­ hese organ­izations ­were structurally and symbolically connected to Japan.26 In Peru, where the Japa­nese population was more clustered in Lima and smaller in number, it was easier to control and manage. As a result, the Japa­nese government maintained “a closer po­liti­cal control over its immigrant colonies in Peru than elsewhere in Latin Amer­i­ca” and managed to forge a more “unified” immigrant community than anywhere in the Amer­i­cas.27 By establishing associations, the government hoped to maintain and facilitate communication with the emigrants. It was critical, the government believed, to have a “representative voice” abroad both to render support and reap resources from the immigrant community. Much of Japa­ nese emigration to Peru (and elsewhere to South Amer­i­ca) was assisted, or induced, by the Japa­nese state anyway; it was part of Japan’s national development proj­ect, aimed at forging strong modern nationhood and catch up with the eco­nom­ically and militarily more advanced West. To this end, it was imperative to consolidate colonias and keep them subjected to their homeland, as emigrants ­were expected to contribute to its expanding empire as agents of development and territorial expansion.28 Through overseas colonies, the government also hoped to foster bilateral relations and commercial activities with the host country.29

Takenaka

131

The state’s involvement also reflected the prewar national ideology. Since all Japa­nese w ­ ere considered to be connected to the blood-­based f­amily headed by the emperor, emigrants naturally formed a part of the Japa­nese extended ­family.30 “The Japa­nese w ­ ill always remain Japa­nese, no ­matter where they emigrate and w ­ hether they acquire a foreign nationality. Japa­ nese ‘blood’ w ­ ill always be Japa­nese,” stated Shinpei Gotō, a pro-­emigration statesman, in debating over the nationality of foreign-­born c­ hildren of Japa­ nese emigrants.31 Since prewar emigrants w ­ ere considered an indispensable resource for Japan’s national development, it was also crucial for the state to keep them “Japa­nese.”32 Wherever Japa­nese emigrants settled, therefore, the Japa­nese state tried to instill a nationalistic ideology by subsidizing the construction of Japa­nese schools.33 The Japa­nese language was taught, along with Japa­nese spirit and morals, in accordance with the national school curriculum.34 An official of the Japa­nese Education Promotion Committee (Nihonjin Bunkyō Fukyūkai) commented when dispatched by the government to promote Japa­nese education in Brazil: “It is impor­tant to preserve and educate the Japa­nese language and spirit . . . ​[­because] . . . ​the overseas Japa­nese are destined to share the same fate with their motherland [Japan].”35 Consequently, prewar emigrants tended to hold on to a sense of attachment to Japan with the idea of repatriating one day.36 Many of them did maintain Japa­nese nationality without taking up foreign citizenship. Although their low naturalization rate was partially attributed to restrictive mea­sures in the host socie­ties (such as in the US and Peru), even in Brazil, where ­there ­were no such restrictions, only 2.6 ­percent of Japa­nese immigrants (5,000 out of 190,000) took up Brazilian citizenship.37 On occasion, emigrant nationalism erupted in extreme forms, such as an armed conflict that occurred in Brazil in the aftermath of World War II (1946– 1947). It was led by Shindō Renmei (Way of the Subjects of the Emperor’s League), an ultraright nationalist association, which did not believe in Japan’s defeat. Similar nationalist organ­izations—­A ikoku Dōshikai (Patriotic Association of Men of the Same Ideals), Kodo Remmei (Federation of Imperial Doctrine), and Yamato Minzoku (Club of Men of the Same Race of Old Japan)—­a lso emerged in Peru, preaching that the stories of Japan’s defeat w ­ ere false.38 The seemingly intricate and inseparable relationship between the immigrants and their motherland was met with suspicion in the host society. The immigrant associations and businesses, backed up by the Japa­nese

132

Chapter 5

government, fueled further hostility, and the immigrants ­were viewed and criticized as “imperial subjects,” “puppets of the Japa­nese state,” and agents of “the invisible sinister government.”39 The intensified anti-­Japanese hostility, in turn, prompted the Japa­nese state to tighten its grip on the community as a defense mechanism. In summary, the Japa­nese in Peru ­were heterogeneous and divided so that they did not become a community ­until external forces came in. One was the hostile environment in the host society. The other was the Japa­ nese state, which stepped in to cope with the hostile situation. ­These two forces mutually reinforced each other in a self-­perpetuating cycle. Most illustrative of this is the dispute over cotton trade that erupted in Peru around the 1930s, as elaborated below.

Cotton Trade Dispute The early twentieth ­century saw the price of sugar drop, following a declining demand for sugar worldwide. This affected Peru’s economy, which had been dependent on this product as a prime export commodity. To substitute for sugar, plantation o­ wners increasingly resorted to cultivating cotton, coinciding with the Peruvian government’s efforts to diversify its economy. Although cotton was already an impor­tant agricultural commodity in the country even before the collapse of the sugar market, its importance grew in the early twentieth c­ entury. During the 1920s, foreign textile companies rushed into Peru, most notably the American W. R. Grace & Co. and the British Duncan Fox & Co.; the latter became dominant in the cotton export market, especially in the country’s northern regions.40 In 1929, cotton textile constituted 28 ­percent of Peru’s total industrial production and generated 30 ­percent of employment in the country.41 By the early 1930s, cotton surpassed sugar to become the major export commodity in Peruvian agriculture.42 This presented an opportunity for the Japa­nese immigrants who had previously worked on sugar plantations as contract laborers. Although sugar required large capital and ­labor, cotton could be cultivated on small plots of land as tenant farmers.43 ­A fter World War I, plantation o­ wners also began to lease small plots of land to farmers as a strategy of diffusing financial risks.44 Hence, some Japa­nese immigrants took up cotton growing, and

Takenaka

133

some subsequently became successful. The most prominent of all was Ikumatsu (Nikumatsu) Okada. Okada arrived in Peru in 1899 as part of the first group of 790 immigrants from Japan. He initially worked as a contract laborer on the Hacienda Palpa, located in the Chancay Valley of the Huaral Province. Upon completing his four-­year contract, he administered a shop on the same plantation and in 1908 leased land in Huaral to begin growing cotton as a tenant farmer (yanacón) together with Hatsusaburo Motonishi, a fellow immigrant and business partner, and twenty other Japa­nese workers.45 Okada’s business soon expanded, extending to several plantations in the region, including La Huaca, Caqui, Torre Blanca, and Miraflores. Most of his workers ­were fellow Japa­nese immigrants, although Peruvians, such as Luis Santiago Allemart Oliva, a trade expert and administrator, also helped expand Okada’s business.46 From 1923 to 1929 the number of Japa­nese tenant farmers grew from 1,145 to 1,620 in the country, most of whom grew cotton in the Huaral region.47 Led by Okada, the Japa­nese soon became a dominant force in the region’s agricultural business and in cotton farming across the country. By 1941, more than half (51 ­percent) of cotton cultivation in the Chancay Valley was in the hands of the Japa­nese.48 Across Peru, the Japa­nese controlled about 30  ­percent of cotton production by the mid1930s, according to James Tigner and Victor Guevara (or 15 ­percent in 1941, according to Juan Franco Lobo Collantes).49 Much of the crop cultivated by the immigrants was supported by Japa­nese capital and exported to Japan. 50 In par­t ic­u ­lar, Caqui, one of Okada’s plantations, became the center of cotton cultivation and export to Japan during the 1930s.51 Okada also contributed to the development of the Japa­nese community in Huaral. He led in forming the Japa­nese Industrial Society and the Japa­nese Association of Huaral, both of which w ­ ere presided by himself. When Inka Gakuen, a Japa­nese school, was inaugurated with teachers sent in from Japan, the Japa­nese consul joined the ceremony. In recognition for all t­hese efforts, Okada was conferred a medal of honor by the Japa­nese emperor Hirohito in 1941.52

Japa­nese Cotton Companies in South Amer­i­ca The growth in cotton farming by Japa­nese immigrants cannot be understood without examining the financial and technological assistance provided

134

Chapter 5

by Japan. From the mid-1920s, Japan began to invest in cotton cultivation in South Amer­i­ca. A major reason ­behind it was the need to explore new markets to support the growing textile industry in the country. Prior to World War II, Japan was a principal exporter of cotton fabrics, and its raw material (raw cotton) was imported from India, the US, and China, among other countries. In the 1910s and 1920s, over half of raw cotton was supplied by British India, followed by the US.53 However, Britain began to implement trade restrictions to protect its own textile industry by imposing high tariffs on foreign products coming in from outside the British Empire. In reaction to this, Japa­nese spinners started a boycott of Indian raw cotton in 1933. Trade frictions with British India increased Japan’s reliance on the US for its raw cotton imports, but tensions grew between Japan and the US in the 1930s, and the US, too, imposed restrictions on Japa­nese imports.54 Growing protectionism posed a prob­lem for Japan to balance bilateral trade with the countries that supplied raw cotton yet restricted imports of Japa­nese cotton products. To sustain the growth of its import-­dependent textile export industry, Japan needed to look for alternatives and turned its eyes to South Amer­i­ca. It was a strategy to reduce the raw cotton imports from the US and retaliate against protectionism. At the same time, they attempted to diversify trade partners and commercial routes both to import raw materials and export (semi)finished products.55 In this effort, the Japa­nese government implemented an Export Subsidy Law in 1930, which provided financial assistance to firms selling in nonindustrialized countries, particularly in Central and South Amer­i­ca, Africa, and some parts of Asia. In countries where Japa­nese products w ­ ere unknown, the government announced an effort to buy their natu­ral resources to “turn them into loyal clients.”56 As part of this endeavor, Japan sent five representatives of the textile industry to Peru to hold a special exhibition of Japa­nese cotton products in 1933. Zōji Amari, a former Japa­nese consul in Lima who led the mission, made a remark prior to his departure: “The only relation Japan has had with South Amer­i­ca so far is through emigration, but my mission is to convert the vast unexplored territory of South Amer­i­ca into a ­grand Japa­nese market. This is my last ser­v ice to the Japa­nese State.”57 Two years ­later, in 1935, a major trade mission was dispatched to Brazil, led by the industrialist Hachisaburo Hirao. The Osaka mainichi shinbun, a daily, described the mission as “Japan’s opportunity to secure resources and establish new economic relationships in the region” and stated: “Hirao’s

Takenaka

135

team w ­ ill inspect cotton farms toiled by Japa­nese immigrants, with the aim to import raw cotton and export our cotton products. So far we have sent many emigrants to Brazil, but that is not enough to develop a robust bilateral relationship. We need to build business ties and a balanced give-­and-­ take trade relationship with the region.”58 Following the mission, the Japanese-­Brazilian Cotton Co. was established in Osaka, Japan’s textile hub, in 1936 with support from the major textile companies in the area. The com­pany, presided by Hirao, subsequently set up a subsidiary in Brazil to promote cotton production (mostly by Japa­ nese immigrant farmers) and trade between the two countries.59 Hirao’s idea of replacing American raw cotton with Brazilian cotton proved successful. The mission paved the way for establishing an economic relationship with South Amer­i­ca and helped sustain the growing Japa­nese textile industry, especially as Brazilian cotton was cheaper than the American product.60 By exploring business opportunities via emigrants, it also helped Japa­nese farmers in Brazil, many of whom had suffered amid the sharp drop in the price of coffee in the 1920s.61 Parallel to this development, vari­ous Japa­nese textile companies began to invest in Peru to promote cotton trade with the country. The first was the Peruvian Cotton Com­pany, established in Chancay in 1925. Financed by Kaigai Kōgyō, a government-­run emigration com­pany, and Osaka’s textile industrialists (including Hirao), the com­pany was managed by Okada and Motonishi, who had successfully run vari­ous cotton plantations in the region.62 By purchasing Hacienda Palpa, where Okada and other Japa­nese immigrants first toiled in sugar cultivation in 1899, the com­pany grew cotton and was dedicated to exports of raw materials and imports of cotton products.63 The second textile com­pany that went into Peru was the Retes Agricultural Com­pany. Established in Huaral in 1928, the com­pany was run by the entrepreneur Ichitaro Morimoto, who had worked in close connection with the Morioka Emigration Com­pany and Kaigai Kōgyō. A ­sister com­pany, Huaral Cotton Mill Com­pany, was soon established to pro­cess cotton seed oil. That was followed by Huaral Cotton (1931), Brascotto of Sumitomo (1933), and Toyo Menka of Mitsui Bussan (1937). ­These cotton companies all relied on Japa­nese immigrant ­labor to export raw cotton to Japan and imported Japa­nese textile products back to Peru, which ­were often sold at a lower price than the market price through Japa­nese immigrant merchants.64

136

Chapter 5

In this way, Japa­nese companies and government worked closely together with immigrant farmers and merchants in developing a trade-­ distribution relationship across the Pacific. For example, Okada, the most successful Japa­nese cotton grower in Huaral, had a commercial h ­ ouse in Lima that exported raw cotton to Japan and imported products from Japan and elsewhere. Likewise, Ichitaro Morimoto managed not only the Japa­nese cotton companies in Huaral but also a major commercial ­house, Morimoto Shōkai, in Lima that operated in collaboration with, and was subsidized by, vari­ous emigration and trade companies in Japan.65 ­These commercial h ­ ouses and trade companies then distributed products from Japan ­wholesale to vari­ous small businesses, such as bazares and almacenes (small shops), run by Japa­nese immigrant merchants in urban centers.66 Although the details of the distribution chain are not well known, Yoshimitsu Arao reports that the majority of cotton trade brokers in Peru ­were fellow Japa­nese nationals or companies.67 In 1940, almost three-­quarters of sales by Japa­nese merchants in Peru reportedly derived from products manufactured in or related to Japan.68 According to Isabelle Lausent-­ Herrera, the Japa­nese government imposed a quota to ensure 70 ­percent of Japa­nese textile products should be distributed through Japa­nese immigrant merchants in Peru.69 Subsequently, Chōtoku Ōgimi states, successful Japa­ nese merchants in Peru all had close contacts with Japan.70 ­These immigrant businesses, therefore, formed part of the broader Japa­ nese commercial trade network, prompted by the government’s endeavor to expand an agro-­industrial base and gain spheres of influence via emigration. Calling it a colonial-­emigration program (ishokumin jigyō), the government sent businesspeople abroad and provided subsidies in an attempt to promote trade, secure resources, and develop national industries.71 In South Amer­i­ca, too, financial and technical assistance from Japan contributed significantly to the growth of cotton farming by Japa­nese immigrants. Immigrants w ­ ere then inspired by the idea that the cotton they grew was being exported to their homeland.72 As the Japa­nese consul in Brazil commented in promoting the colonial-­emigration program in 1934, “By fostering Japa­nese investment in Brazil and a commercial relationship with the country, the program w ­ ill contribute to the development of the Japa­ nese colonia and that of Japan and to the expansion of the entire Japa­nese race!” 73 Indeed, the development of Japa­nese industries, nationhood, and immigrants often went hand in hand.

Takenaka

137

Trade Dispute The growing cotton trade with Japan generated a widespread dispute and resentment in Peru. Since the import of Japa­nese textile materials consistently surpassed the export of raw cotton to Japan, Peru’s bilateral trade deficit increased, particularly in the early 1930s—­from $3.3 million in 1913 to $74 million in 1937 and further to $87 million in 1940.74 This spurred already strong animosity against the Japa­nese, especially as cotton had become an impor­tant export commodity and driving force of the Peruvian economy.75 Hard hit by the worldwide economic recession in the 1930s, the Peruvian textile business fretted that the influx of Japa­nese products was destroying their already sluggish industry. When the Japa­nese mission held an exhibition of Japa­nese textile products in 1933, it generated a protest and led to a boycott of Japa­nese products.76 In his article “Japan Invades Latin Amer­i­ca,” Carleton Beals warned of “flooding Japa­nese cotton products” as a “threat” to the Peruvian market.77 Ciro Alegria and Alfredo Saco similarly accused the Japa­nese of a “mono­poly” in the cotton business in Peru: “Of the 12,000 hectares of the valley of Huaral, 80% is in the hands of the Japa­nese. Around Lima, too . . . ​one has to employ Japa­nese middlemen to buy cotton in Peru.” 78 La Prensa seized the opportunity to intensify its anti-­Japanese movement: “The Japa­nese produce cotton in Peru only for the sake of Japan without investing or generating any wealth in our country.”79 Particularly vehement in the movement w ­ ere power­ful agro-­ industrial business lobbies, such as the National Society of Industry and the National Society of Agriculture, which constantly pressured the Peruvian government to take action against the Japa­nese.80 In 1934, the Peruvian Congress approved the unilateral repeal of the Japanese-­Peruvian Commerce Treaty (1928), which subsequently ­limited the import of Japa­nese textiles.81 As a result, the quota of imports from Japan reduced drastically from 2,000 tons in 1933 to just 204 tons the following year.82 Prior to that, the 80% Law (1932) required at least 80 ­percent of the employees in each business enterprise to be Peruvian, and the 1936 Immigration and Business Restrictions Law further ­limited Japa­nese economic activities by prohibiting the transfer and establishment of businesses.83 Along with t­hese, Japa­ nese immigration was curtailed, and access to citizenship was restricted. The 1936 law forbade the immigration of “racial groups” (grupos raciales), targeting “Asiatic,” and particularly Japa­ nese, immigrants.84 In 1941, on the day of the Japa­nese attack on Pearl

138

Chapter 5

Harbor, all Japanese-­owned deposits in Peruvian banks w ­ ere frozen, and Japa­nese businesses w ­ ere expropriated. Subsequently, all Japa­nese business associations ­were banned and shut down.85 Soon afterwards, all Japa­nese farmlands w ­ ere confiscated.86 Although Japan had only a small share of all Peruvian trade, the Japa­ nese became the target of discrimination, as they ­were constantly depicted as “unassimilable,” “secretive,” and “impermeable.”87 Landowners, who w ­ ere of Eu­ro­pean descent, frequently expressed that the Japa­nese “produce cotton on Peruvian plantations and then ship it all to their native land” in contrast to Eu­ro­pean immigrants who contributed to the national economy.88 George Bertie, a representative of the British trade com­pany Duncan Fox, said at a meeting of the influential National Society of Industry, “Although the Italian community was more numerous and eco­nom­ically influential before the Japa­nese arrived, the Italians became well assimilated and integrated in Peru, whereas the Japa­nese are totally impermeable” (Industria Peruana 1934).89 In this manner, Duncan Fox, which came to dominate Peru’s cotton industry, constantly accused Japan of its “tacit ploy” in secretively establishing its own distribution chain through the Japa­nese immigrant community. Such criticisms ­were further ignited by the view that the Japa­nese embassy constantly intervened in the Japa­nese community and meddled with Peru’s national affairs through the community.90 The efforts by the power­ful business lobbies to curtail Japa­nese economic activities ­were in fact a strategy to protect their own interests. Th ­ ose Eu­ro­pe­ans who represented the emerging bourgeois agro-­industrial class in Peru felt threatened by “Japa­ nese infiltration.”91 Accordingly, the aforementioned 1934 law, pressed by the National Society of Industry, set much higher import quotas for Britain (845 tons), the US (476 tons), and Italy (448 tons) than for Japan (204 tons).92

Consequences of Japan’s Involvement Growing anti-­Japanese animosity only intensified intervention by the Japa­ nese state. Immigrants faced hostilities and acute discrimination not only in Peru but pretty much everywhere. This “immigration prob­lem,” as Japa­ nese officials called it, became a major concern and source of frustration. Indeed, it infuriated them, as they w ­ ere trying to fortify the nation and elevate their national standing, via emigration, in the international community. To overcome the prob­lem, the government believed it critical to help Japa­nese immigrants and enhance their status and reputation within

Takenaka

139

their countries.93 Accordingly, they continued to pour resources into the community by building institutions and supporting community activities. ­These efforts nonetheless resulted in intensifying hostilities against Japa­ nese immigrants, reinforcing their perception as conspirators of the Japa­nese state. In Peru, such hostilities culminated in the 1940s when Japa­nese businesses ­were looted and 1,800 community leaders, including Okada, ­were sent to detention camps in Texas in collaboration with the US government, Peru’s war­time ally.94 Following Japan’s devastating defeat in World War II (1945), the relationship between immigrants and their homeland changed drastically. Immigrants no longer saw it realistic to return home, at least any time soon, and started thinking about settling in Peru. And the government, too, began to encourage immigrants to assimilate in the host society instead of retaining ties with the homeland,95 even though they continued to “assist” immigrants and their descendants, financially and culturally, even a­ fter the war. More than half a ­century ­later, Lima’s Japa­nese community, comprising approximately 80,000 original immigrants and their descendants, have certainly become integrated and acculturated in Peru. A ­ fter all, the community produced a president, Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), and Japa­nese Peruvians are now well represented in the country’s po­liti­cal, business, and other social and cultural arenas. The month of April is now marked as Peru-­ Japan Friendship Month to commemorate the arrival of the first Japa­nese immigrants, including Ikumatsu Okada, on April 3, 1899, and is celebrated each year in the Peruvian Congress. Most Japa­nese Peruvians, now in the second, third, and fourth generations, no longer retain Japa­nese nationality or proficiency, and many have grown culturally and socially more distant from Japan. Even then, the Japa­nese community has not dis­appeared but has grown in scale and status into one of the most prosperous and prestigious ethnic communities in the country. With splendid institutions and facilities supported by Japan, the community boasts one of the finest theaters in the country, the Japanese-­Peruvian Theater, located within the complex of the Japanese-­Peruvian Cultural Center in Lima. The nation’s major hospital, the Japanese-­Peruvian Centenary Hospital, was also erected with subsidies from the Japa­nese government and private foundations on the occasion of the centenary anniversary of Japa­nese immigration to Peru in 1999. In celebrating the centenary anniversary of Japa­nese immigration to Peru, the or­ga­nizer proclaimed that Japa­nese Peruvians, called Nikkei

140

Chapter 5

t­ oday, have come a long way: “We are undoubtedly Peruvian, and our community’s mission is to contribute to Peru.” But he si­mul­ta­neously emphasized the importance of remembering their roots and the history of hardships their Japa­nese immigrant ancestors endured in Peru.96 “Our ­future rests on this history,” he said: “We Nikkei have become successful ­because of the values we have inherited from our ancestors, such as hard work, honesty, and perseverance. We w ­ ill work together t­ oward the f­ uture by preserving ­these values and spreading them widely in Peru!” Consolidating the well-­established community, as seen ­today, was certainly a long and arduous pro­cess. Emerging as a mechanism to cope with the harsh external environment, the community grew in close connection with Japan. In the end, the government’s continuous involvement—to this day—­did not necessarily prevent immigrants’ integration in Peru, but their history of integration is certainly incomplete without understanding the role of their ancestral homeland. In November 2017, Lima’s Japa­nese Peruvian community celebrated the centenary anniversary of the Japa­nese Peruvian Association (Asociación Peruano Japonesa), originally established as the Central Japa­nese Association by the Japa­nese consulate in 1917. To commemorate the event, the Japa­ nese ambassador to Peru was pre­sent, along with representatives of the Japa­nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, as well as ­those of the Peruvian Congress, including Keiko Fujimori, a ­daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori and a thrice presidential candidate.97 The Japa­nese ambassador congratulated the community’s “astonishing achievements” and praised the “extraordinary efforts” Japa­ nese immigrants and their descendants have made in becoming what they are ­ today—­ “acclaimed citizens of Peru with Peruvian and Japa­ nese hearts.” He referred to the 790 Japa­nese immigrants who first arrived in Peru in 1899 and to the 140 of them who perished u ­ nder harsh l­abor conditions within the first year and a half of their arrival. “Remembering this history,” the ambassador proclaimed to an audience of 800 invited guests from Japan, Peru, and across the Amer­i­cas, “Japan and Nikkei communities ­will continue to work together ­toward the ­future!” They indeed worked together throughout the history of Japa­nese immigration and settlement in Peru. Japan is certainly not unique in being involved in emigrant affairs. Britain repeatedly resorted to emigration to solve internal dissent, poverty,

Takenaka

141

and population pressure, and many other Eu­ro­pean countries attempted to “shovel out paupers” in the pro­cess of national consolidation and development.98 The case of Italy may particularly be comparable, as the country, like Japan, saw itself as a latecomer to development and encouraged emigration as a national strategy to expand its economy and territory to catch up with more advanced countries of Eu­rope.99 But Japa­nese emigration was much more centralized, and the state exerted more direct influence, not merely in sending emigrants but in shaping the lives of immigrants settled abroad.100 Maintaining ties with the countries of origin is common across immigrant populations in vari­ous countries, but “none had links to the governments of their native countries like the connection between Japa­nese immigrants and the Japa­nese government,” Ichioka has asserted in discussing the case of prewar Japa­nese immigrants in the US.101 The history of Japa­nese immigration to Peru is a history of hardship and racism encountered in the country. But it is also a history of immigrants’ relationship with Japan as part of Japan’s broader colonial-­emigration proj­ect. The Japa­nese state did play a crucial role in shaping the course of immigrant integration in Peru. And this must be understood in the broader historical context of Japan’s position in the global racial hierarchy and quest to gain po­liti­cal clout in the world.

Notes 1. ​Thompson, “Survival of Ethnicity”; Titiev, “Japa­nese Colony in Peru.” 2. ​Quoted in Ichioka, Chang, and Azuma, Before Internment, pp. xvii. 3. ​Takenaka, “Japa­nese in Peru.” 4. ​Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies. 5. ​Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies. 6. ​Délano, “Immigrant Integration.” 7. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol. 8. ​Normano and Gerbi, Japa­nese in South Amer­i­ca. 9. ​Vasquez, Immigration and Mestizaje; Suzuki, Nihonjin dekasegi imin. 10. ​Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 11. ​Thompson, “Survival of Ethnicity.” 12. ​Irie, “History of Japa­nese Migration.” 13. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 14. ​Takenaka, “Japa­nese in Peru.” 15. ​Suzuki, Nihonjin dekasegi imin. 16. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan. 17. ​Connell, “Internment of Latin-­A merican Japa­nese.”

142

Chapter 5

18. ​Connell, “Internment of Latin-­A merican Japa­nese.” 19. ​Maeyama, Ethnicity, Secret Socie­ties. 20. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú; Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 21. ​Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 22. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú; Maeyama, Esunishiti to Brazirujin. 23. ​Thompson, “Assimilation and Nonassimilation.” 24. ​Ichioka, “Japa­nese Associations.” 25. ​Ichioka, “Japa­nese Associations.” 26. ​Maeyama, Ethnicity, Secret Socie­ties; Negawa and Inoe, Ekkyō to rendō. 27. ​Thompson, “Assimilation and Nonassimilation”; Lyman, Asian in North Amer­i­ca. 28. ​Takenaka, “Paradox of Diaspora Engagement.” 29. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 30. ​Wakatsuki and Suzuki, Kaigai ijū seisaku. 31. ​Gotō, “Ishokumin koshukai kaikaishiki shukuji.” 32. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan. 33. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 34. ​Wakatsuki and Suzuki, Kaigai ijū seisaku; Negawa and Inoe, Ekkyō to rendō. 35. ​ANJA, Kaigai Nikkeijin, p. 34. 36. ​Wakatsuki and Suzuki, Kaigai ijū seisaku. 37. ​Wakatsuki and Suzuki, Kaigai ijū seisaku. 38. ​Titiev, “Japa­nese Colony in Peru”; Thompson, “Survival of Ethnicity”; Peru Shimpo, Inmigración Japonesa al Perú; Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 39. ​Ichioka, “Japa­nese Associations”; Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 40. ​Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado.” 41. ​Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado”; Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 42. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol. 43. ​Irie, “History of Japa­nese Migration.” 44. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 45. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol; Thorndike, Los imperios del sol; Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 46. ​Thorndike, Los imperios del sol. 47. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol, p. l. 48. ​Inamura, “Menkao”; Weston, “Un sol naciente.” 49. ​Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado”; Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru”; Guevara, “Las grandes cuestiones nacionales.” 50. ​Rodriguez Pastor, “Poderío del peón”; Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 51. ​Rodriguez Pastor, “Poderío del peón.” 52. ​Rodriguez Pastor, “Poderío del peón.” 53. ​Kagotani, “Senzenki Nihonjinshōsha.” 54. ​Delanghe, “Japa­nese Imports.” 55. ​Delanghe, “Japa­nese Imports.” 56. ​Delanghe, “Japa­nese Imports.” 57. ​ Osaka mainichi shinbun, March 11, 1931. 58. ​ Osaka mainichi shinbun, March 24, 1935. 59. ​Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai, Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi 2.

Takenaka

143

60. ​Delanghe, “Japa­nese Imports.” 61. ​Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai, Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi 2. 62. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 63. ​Thorndike, Los imperios del sol. 64. ​Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru”; Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú; Rippy, “Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca “ 65. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 66. ​Fukumoto, Hacia un nuevo sol. 67. ​Arao, Menka to menka torihiki. 68. ​Normano and Gerbi, Japa­nese in South Amer­i­ca; Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado.” 69. ​Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 70. ​Ogimi, Saikin no Peru jijō. 71. ​Irie, Hōjin kaigai hattenshi. 72. ​Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai, Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi 2. 73. ​Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin. 74. ​Rippy, “Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca”; Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente; Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado.” 75. ​Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 76. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú; Nonomiya, Nanbei saiko no shinnichikoku Peru to ichiman gosennin no zairyūdōhō. 77. ​Beals, “Japan Invades Latin Amer­i­ca.” 78. ​Alegria and Saco, “Japa­nese Spearhead.” 79. ​Cited in Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú, p. 105. 80. ​Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado”; Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 81. ​Normano and Gerbi, Japa­nese in South Amer­i­ca; Peru Shimpo, Inmigracion japonesa al Perú. 82. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú; Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado.” 83. ​Irie, “History of Japa­nese Migration.” 84. ​Peru Shimpo, Inmigración japonesa al Perú. 85. ​Titiev, “Japa­nese Colony in Peru”; Morimoto, Migración y comunidad; Thompson, “Survival of Ethnicity.” 86. ​Tigner, “Ryukyuans in Peru.” 87. ​Irie, “History of Japa­nese Migration”; Lobo Collante, “En defensa del mercado.” 88. ​Irie, “History of Japa­nese Migration.” 89. ​Cited in Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado,” p. 104. 90. ​Lobo Collantes, “En defensa del mercado”; Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 91. ​Lausent-­Herrera, Pasado y presente. 92. ​Lobo Collante, “En defensa del mercado.” 93. ​Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga kokumin no kaigai. 94. ​Japa­nese community leaders and business leaders in Lima w ­ ere shipped to US detention camps, mostly to Crystal City, Texas, in collaboration with the US government, a war­time ally of Peru. This deportation program was carried out as part of the

144

Chapter 5

US effort to exchange them for US soldiers detained by the Japa­nese army and to undermine Japa­nese presence in the Amer­i­cas. See Connell, “Internment of Latin-­ American Japa­nese”; Emmerson, Japa­nese Thread. 95. ​Wakatsuki and Suzuki, Kaigai ijū seisaku. 96. ​APJ (Asociación Peruano Japonesa), “Memoria.” 97. ​The event was celebrated in conjunction with the pan-­A merican Nikkei convention, a biannual gathering of Nikkei (overseas Japa­nese) communities throughout the Amer­i­cas. 98. ​Green and Weil, Citizenship. 99. ​Choate, Emigrant Nation. 100. ​Choate, Emigrant Nation. 101. ​Ichioka, “Japa­nese Associations,” p. 436.

c h a p t e r

6

Guiding Settlers The Overseas Development Com­pany and the Recruitment of Rural Brazil, 1918–1936 Andre Kobayashi Deckrow

F

rom 1908, with the arrival of the first ship carry­ing Japa­nese laborers, ­until 1942, when Brazil entered World War II on the Allied side and severed diplomatic relations with Japan, almost 200,000 Japa­nese migrated to Brazil. Most of ­these mi­grants initially entered the country as agriculturalists, ­either as workers on São Paulo’s coffee plantations or as settlers living in Japa­nese farming communities. Over time, what was first realized as a short-­term contract ­labor migration for São Paulo’s coffee industry evolved into the long-­term settlement strategy for a Japa­nese countryside. Prewar Japa­nese migration to Brazil benefitted from the increased involvement of the Japa­nese government beginning in the late 1910s. In 1917, the Japa­nese government established the Overseas Development Com­pany (Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, or Kaikō for short) to promote Brazilian emigration by merging and nationalizing the existing migration companies d ­ oing business in Brazil. Partly motivated by a desire to protect overseas citizens, Kaikō took over the l­egal obligations of ­these pre­de­ces­ sor companies: their contracts to supply coffee plantation ­labor to São Paulo state (Paulista) oligarchs and their duties to protect immigrants u ­ nder the terms of their contracts and the laws of the Japa­nese Emigrant Protection Act. At the time of its founding, Kaikō was responsible for over 15,000 Japa­nese coffee plantation laborers who had been brought to Brazil by its pre­de­ces­sor companies.1 In addition to providing for Japa­nese already in Brazil, the com­pany also recruited new mi­grants for its emigration schemes, ­either to work on coffee plantations as contract laborers (colonos) or as in­de­ pen­dent (landowning) farmers on the com­pany’s Iguape Colony. By 1920, as the existing migration apparatus was consolidated and nationalized, Kaikō also became legally responsible for the transport of almost all Japa­nese 145

146

Chapter 6

who entered Brazil. From 1918 to 1935, the emigration com­pany brought close to 135,000 Japa­nese immigrants to Brazil.2 This chapter examines a sample of Kaikō migrant-­facing promotional materials, beginning in the com­pany’s earliest years, to examine how com­ pany officials sold life in rural Brazil to potential mi­grants. ­These guidebooks, pamphlets, and photo books ­were part of a complex recruitment system that, as Toake Endoh observes, “took vari­ous forms, from lectures to posters, flyers, movies, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, so as to reach ­every corner of the street, in hospitals, barbershops, and public baths.” 3 ­These materials sought to introduce Brazil as an emigratory destination to Japa­nese and also demonstrate how com­pany migration schemes could lead to forms of rural life no longer pos­si­ble in Japan. What emerges in ­these documents is an understanding of how com­pany officials, motivated by broader concerns about rural Japa­nese life and the necessity of overseas settlement, sold Brazilian emigration to would-be recruits who w ­ ere also motivated by economic opportunity. Additionally, t­hese documents provide insight into the ways in which the advertising of com­pany colonies as Japa­nese social spaces played an impor­tant role in bolstering the credibility of the com­pany’s migration program. Over the course of its prewar history, Kaikō promoted coffee plantation ­labor and its colony-­based settlement side-­by-­side. To all but a small minority of Japa­nese who could afford to ­settle directly in Brazilian colonies, the materials presented a two-­step migration program, in which poor mi­grants initially worked on coffee plantations as contract laborers to save money to purchase their own land and become in­de­pen­dent farmers, ideally on the com­pany’s own Iguape Colony. Between 1918 and 1937, over 75 ­percent of Japa­nese agricultural families who arrived in Brazil w ­ ere initially classified as colonos, or contract laborers.4 While some scholars have suggested that Kaikō promotional materials often overstated the wealth that settlers might accumulate in Brazil, Teiiti Suzuki’s detailed survey of the Japa­nese community in Brazil reveals that Kaikō’s characterization of colono ­labor as a means of economic mobility reflected the broader trends of prewar Japa­nese Brazilian migration: “A ­g reat majority (69.8%) leave colono status within four years a­ fter arrival and nearly half (46.7%) within only two years.”5 What was less common, however, was for former colonos to purchase land in Kaikō’s Iguape Colony. Suzuki’s study shows instead, that upon completion of their contracts, Japa­nese in Brazil entered into a

Deckrow

147

number of dif­fer­ent ­labor arrangements, including the purchasing of land in a variety of Japa­nese agricultural communities. What ­matters in t­ hese printed materials, however, is not w ­ hether immigrants settled in the colony but rather the way in which the com­pany sought to portray its mi­grants’ continued ties to the Japa­nese empire. While coffee plantation l­abor was seen as a short period of financial hardship, becoming an in­de­pen­dent farmer in the com­pany’s Brazilian colonies meant economic and social participation in an autonomous Japa­nese village that was contributing to and profiting from the enormous wealth of the state of São Paulo. A reading of ­these materials shows how the earliest Kaikō logics of Japa­nese settlement, expressed in both economic and civilizational terms, transcended even the Japa­nese government’s increased investment in and financial subsidies for Brazilian emigration beginning in the mid-1920s (known as the kokusaku imin, or “national policy mi­grant,” period). From its earliest days, Kaikō terminology ascribed a higher purpose to Japa­nese colony-­based settlement than coffee plantation ­labor. Furthermore, ­these guidebooks reveal how the com­pany’s migration schemes survived the tumultuous years of the Getúlio Vargas–­ led Provisional Government (1930–1934) despite being threatened by the collapse of coffee prices and the overthrow of the pro-­immigration São Paulo–­based po­l iti­cal order. Lastly, in presenting its Iguape Colony as an attainable and aspirational form of Japa­nese settlement, Kaikō may have ultimately contributed to the challenges of a Japa­nese Brazilian community that came ­under increasing threat from anti-­immigrant politicians and activists in the mid-1930s.

Early Kaiko¯ Lit­er­a­ture To sustain its early operations in Brazil, Kaikō developed an overlapping network of organ­izations and operators in Japan to support its emigration programs. The com­pany established an official presence in almost all the prefectural capitals and coordinated with local governments and civic migration-­promotion groups to recruit new emigrants. The com­pany’s promotional materials advised interested recruits to “inquire at the com­pany’s [Tokyo] headquarters or its representative offices to learn more details.”6 And a 1918 com­pany fact sheet proclaimed that, in addition to its headquarters in Tokyo, “domestically [naichi], branch offices and official representative

148

Chapter 6

offices would be set up in ­every prefecture, district, and impor­tant locations.”7 Individual com­pany representatives ­were licensed by both Kaikō and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ­these representatives received financial compensation for each f­ amily migration contract secured. To help identify where and how to concentrate its operations, in its earliest days, Kaikō maintained a survey section (chōsabu) responsible for research on agricultural conditions at home and abroad. For example, an early Kaikō report from September 1918 entitled Japa­nese Medium and Small Farming House­hold Distribution and Their Economic Conditions, published in the immediate aftermath of the 1918 Rice Riots, detailed the state of agriculture at the prefectural level and included, as a supplement, a chart showing the prefectural distribution of Brazilian emigrants from January  1917 through July  1918. Echoing the conclusions of other Japa­nese agricultural thinkers at the time, the report warned that smaller plots of land coupled with a sudden increase in rice prices w ­ ere preventing small landowners and tenant farmers across the country from making ends meet and promoting a general “state of psychological anxiety.”8 As evidence of this anxiety, the report referred to a recent tenant-­farmer strike in Ehime Prefecture in northwestern Shikoku and, consistent with the beliefs of the era’s emigratory thinkers, suggested overseas settlement as a solution to ­these families’ economic prob­lems. Prefectural-­level analy­sis of agricultural conditions allowed Kaikō to concentrate its recruiting efforts in areas where farmers’ suffering was more pronounced, and naturally, t­ here w ­ ere a greater concentration of early Kaikō representatives in regions that historically produced many mi­grants.9 In making the case for Brazilian emigration, early Kaikō materials drew directly from the com­pany’s research to emphasize the dire social and economic conditions in rural Japan. The foreword to the 1919 edition of a Kaikō guide to Japa­nese immigrant life in Brazil, entitled Japa­nese Development in Brazil, provided a bleak assessment of the f­ uture of small-­scale agriculture in Japan. Attributed to the com­pany, it began with an observation about the effects of Japa­nese capitalism, using logic that would have been familiar to early promoters of agricultural emigration: While ­there are repeated debates about the cause and regulation of the recent rise in rice prices, it is primarily related to supply and demand, that is to say it is nothing more than the necessary goods are not available in Japan. If one looks at the ­people’s staple food, rice, the im­mense growth of

Deckrow

149

the population means that now 58 million p ­ eople live in this narrow country. On the other hand, the maximum production of rice, give or take, is 54 million koku, leaving an annual shortage of 5 to 6 million koku, so, of course, the price of rice ­w ill steadily increase.10

Where farmers may have believed that higher rice prices would lead to greater profit, the foreword quickly disabused its readers of this notion: “The only group that celebrates the higher rice prices are large landholders. Of course, ordinary citizens, small landowners, and tenant farmers are left unhappy.”11 The foreword to the 1919 Kaikō guidebook put the strug­gles of rural Japan in strikingly personal and material terms and tied ­these conditions directly to the com­pany’s Brazilian emigration efforts. Rice notably enjoyed a symbolic significance in popu­lar notions of Japa­nese identity, and it was well observed that rice was also one of the agricultural products being grown by Japa­nese in Brazil. The inescapable nature of the rural poverty suggested that long-­distance migration was one of the only ­viable forms of economic escape. The 1920 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil featured much of the same content in the chapters describing immigrant opportunity in Brazil but with a new foreword that described rural Japan in slightly more positive terms. The opening paragraph alluded to the same domestic ­factors—­inflation and population growth—­but now ­these challenges and the solution of overseas emigration w ­ ere treated as an inevitable consequence of civilizational pro­gress: “With humanity’s pro­gress, the organ­ ization of society becomes more complicated, and as the population increases, daily life becomes increasingly difficult for many. ­These phenomena appear in all nations. To overcome ­these obstacles and promote the sound development of the nation [kokka kokumin], we must si­mul­ta­neously advance domestic policies and put effort into overseas development. Each and ­every country must follow this same course. The issues of ­today are corroborated by world history.”12 In linking Brazilian emigration to national development, the 1920 edition sought to pre­sent overseas emigration not only as an escape from Japa­nese rural conditions but as a mutually beneficial arrangement with the homeland. Such a posture directly echoed the attitudes of Japa­nese thinkers and policy makers who viewed overseas populations as an asset in imperial development and presented t­ hese elite understandings of Japan’s place in the world to the broader populace.

150

Chapter 6

One of the more common motifs in ­these materials was to contrast the lack of arable land in Japan to the large amount of farmland available to Japa­nese in Brazil. In introducing Brazil to the public, Kaikō materials assumed would-be mi­grants had l­ittle familiarity with the country and highlighted its im­mense size and small population relative to Japan. A 1918 broadsheet stated the country was “the largest republic in South Amer­i­ca, Brazil’s area is almost twenty-­one times larger than Japan, but the population is about one-­third of Japan’s.”13 Similarly, the 1919 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil described Brazil as a “sparse population on a broad land.”14 ­These passing references to overpopulation and the limits of arable Japa­nese land mirrored the academic descriptions of early emigration advocates.15 Drawing implicit contrasts between Brazil’s geographic expanse and Japan’s overpopulated islands was part of Kaikō’s strategy to promote Brazilian emigration. Even into the 1930s, Kaikō guidebooks, like the 1932 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil, argued, “Fi­nally, to say one word about the pre­sent conditions in Japan: Japan, which has come to an impasse with its ­limited land and its population that continues to grow, now threatens p ­ eople’s livelihoods. Compare Japan and Brazil’s conditions, and you can understand that ­there are significant differences.”16 For agriculturalists, the guidebooks’ descriptions of an abundance of Brazilian land implied freedom from the hardships of Japa­nese rural life. Even the description of the creation of f­ amily units (kazoku kōsei), as required by Brazilian immigration law, was explained in the context of Brazil’s purported economic advantages: “Where in Japan, they say large families ­will immiserate, ­there [in Brazil], a f­ amily with many workers can save a lot of money and quickly become successful.”17 The shift away from more specific discussions of Japa­nese rural life may have also reflected the decision by Kaikō and the Japa­nese government to expand the geographic and occupational scope of its emigrant recruiting in the mid-1920s as the Japa­nese government invested significantly in promoting Japa­nese settlement in Brazil. Wako Shungorō’s 1938 study of the Japa­nese population in the Bauru region of the state of São Paulo, for example, revealed that immigrants in the region came from varying geographic backgrounds in Japan.18 Thus, while com­pany and government officials remained focused on the broad social and economic goals of large-­ scale agricultural emigration, Kaikō promotional materials largely avoided focusing directly on the difficulties of rural Japa­nese life and instead highlighted the relative economic potential of agricultural life in Brazil.19

Deckrow

151

The Coffee Plantation as Economic Mobility Throughout the entire prewar period, Kaikō advertised its coffee plantation ­labor arrangement as a form of economic mobility that would lead to long-­term settlement and landownership in Brazil. The coffee plantation was presented as a short, initial period of difficult l­abor and financial sacrifice in which colonos might save enough to become successful in­de­pen­ dent farmers. Thomas Holloway, in his examination of the Paulista coffee industry, notes that the region’s unique colono ­labor arrangement, in which immigrants arrived as contract laborers but w ­ ere allowed to engage in other forms of agricultural production when not working on the coffee plantations, was central to the growth of in­de­pen­dent landowners in the region.20 This type of upward economic mobility was first practiced by the large number of Italian immigrants, and Kaikō materials successfully promoted this same system for Japa­nese settlement. The 1918 broadsheet highlighted the economic potential of Japa­nese coffee plantation ­labor in São Paulo. It contained separate sections explaining “wages” (chingin) and “income” (shūnyū) in order to give would-be recruits a fuller picture of how they might earn and save while working on the coffee plantation.21 In addition to coffee l­ abor, the same broadsheet highlighted self-­interested types of agricultural ­labor.22 Its section on “work” (shigoto) suggested that families might “earn the permission of the plantation owner to intercrop rice, beans, or corn in land not used for coffee growing, or raise a few sheep, pigs, or chickens near their living quarters.”23 Likewise, the most successful h ­ ouse­holds lowered their “cost of living” (seikatsuhi) through t­ hese other forms of noncoffee agriculture.24 By 1924, the lit­er­a­t ure stated that “in a regular year, for a single ­family, net profits ranged from five hundred to two thousand yen.”25 For Kaikō officials, earnings from noncoffee agricultural ­labor ­were closely linked to a f­ amily’s ability to purchase their own land. To demonstrate both the acceptable conditions on São Paulo’s coffee plantations and the upward economic mobility they represented, the 1920 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil outlined the four outcomes for the com­pany’s coffee plantation l­abor mi­grants following the end of their two-­year contracts: “1, staying to work on the same coffee plantation; 2, moving to another coffee plantation; 3, become tenant farmers; and 4, purchasing their own farmland.”26 Of the four outcomes, Kaikō—­not to mention the Japa­nese government—­assumed that in­de­pen­dent farming was the ultimate goal of overseas settlement, in addition to being the most profitable. In

152

Chapter 6

the section of the guidebook entitled “The Secrets of Immigrant Success,” Kaikō warned would-be recruits of the dangers of moving to in­de­pen­dent farming too quickly: “Even ­after the completion of the initial contract, coffee plantation mi­grants and o­ wners mutually benefit from staying at the same plantation for another year. In their first year, plantation laborers are still inexperienced and ­can’t expect to make many profits, but from the second year on, they can easily save as much as 1000 yen a year.”27 Kaikō officials argued that Japa­nese agriculturalists would benefit from continued ties to the migration com­pany, as “the com­pany, where it can, ­w ill make its best effort to meet the immigrants’ aspirations [kibō].”28 Presented as a gateway to economic in­de­pen­dence, the primary appeal of coffee plantation ­labor was material in nature—­Japanese families tended to leave coffee plantation ­labor as quickly as eco­nom­ically feasible.29 Kaikō would continue its coffee plantation ­labor recruiting throughout the prewar period, but the emphasis of the temporary arrangement would evolve following the com­pany’s merger with the Brazil Colonization Com­ pany (Burajiru Takushoku Kaisha) in 1919. As part of the merger, Kaikō took over control of its first agricultural settlement, the Iguape Colony. Even early Kaikō recruiting materials ­imagined a two-­step pro­cess that encouraged former colonos to invest their savings in their own lands, w ­ hether on Kaikō’s own Iguape Colony or in the numerous Japa­nese agricultural communities that had emerged by the early 1920s. The 1919 and 1920 editions of Japa­nese Development in Brazil included a list of “new Japa­nese villages” along with the number of in­de­pen­dent farming families who had purchased land ­there. While the Iguape Colony’s 115 families ­were listed first with a parenthetical stating that the colony was “where successful immigrants [imin no seikōsha] ­were settling,” in listing the many other Japa­nese villages, the guidebooks suggest that from the com­pany’s earliest days, the goal of Japa­nese mi­grants was not just owning one’s own land but ­doing so in a community of fellow Japa­nese.30 Com­pany lit­er­a­t ure continued promoting coffee plantation ­labor as a ­viable step ­towards the economic freedom of in­de­pen­dent farming well into the 1930s, even a­ fter the collapse of coffee prices in 1929. The 1932 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil noted that Japa­nese h ­ ouse­holds might save only 665 yen a­ fter three years, a figure far lower than in previous years.31 The income projections in the 1931 and 1932 editions of Conditions in South American Brazil included a fine-­print explanatory note that warned, “This calculation of income and expenses is just one example of the current con-

Deckrow

153

dition of low coffee prices, but if coffee prices improve, then, the wages for weeding and picking along with daily wages ­will also improve, and income ­w ill grow.”32 By the printing of the 1936 edition, coffee prices had recovered enough that h ­ ouse­holds could save a projected 939 yen over the course of three years, with no need for the warnings of e­ arlier editions.33 The section “The Secrets of Immigrant Success” reiterated the idea that laborer ­house­holds could remain on the same coffee plantation a­ fter the expiration of their contracts: “Over three or four years, with the experience and savings, one can become in­de­pen­dent.”34 Com­pany recruiting materials also needed to persuade Japa­nese immigrants of the possibilities of long-­term economic success in Brazil outside of the coffee plantations.

The Economics of In­de­pen­dent Farming To distinguish between t­ hese two forms of Japa­nese migration, Kaikō materials used dif­fer­ent terms to refer to coffee plantation ­labor and in­de­pen­ dent farmers within the Brazilian context. Coffee plantation l­abor was dubbed “migration” (imin), while settlers ­were referred to as “colonists” (shokumin). Each of ­these words carried specific connotations regarding their forms of agricultural activity. The 1919 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil explained the difference in the context of Brazilian emigration: “Of the academic distinctions between mi­grants and colonists . . . ​at its most basic, mi­grants’ objective is income for their ­labor, and they aim only to be temporary overseas sojourners [dekasegi], and colonists are half or fully permanent residents in a foreign country and engage in opening [kaitaku] the land. In the case of Kaikō, who administers Brazilian immigration, ­those ­going to work on coffee plantations in São Paulo and Minas Gerais are imin, and t­ hose g­ oing to the same com­pany’s Iguape Colony are shokumin.”35 Where Brazilian emigration was seen from the outset as a long-­term commitment, life as a colono was presented as a temporary sojourn of its own. In drawing a distinction between the two forms of settlement, Kaikō imbued Japa­nese in­de­pen­dent farming with a higher purpose than that of coffee plantation ­labor. No longer just an economic claim, this difference of vocabulary signified the hierarchical relationship of the two forms of migration. Such distinctions in language would carry through the entirety of the prewar period. The unique circumstances of Japa­nese colony-­based migration allowed, at least from Kaikō’s perspective, for multiple beneficiaries,

154

Chapter 6

both at home and abroad. Yet, even if colony-­based settlement signified a continued relationship that benefited the Japa­nese empire—­through international trade, improving Japan’s international standing, or solving the prob­lem of domestic overpopulation—­Kaikō officials never failed to remind recruits that it was also profitable. Unlike coffee plantation l­ abor, in­de­pen­dent farming featured no fixed-­ term contracts and no set wages. Its profits varied from year to year, settlement to settlement, and even ­house­hold to ­house­hold. But Kaikō tried to persuade Japa­nese agriculturalists that, in the aggregate, long-­term overseas settlement was a profitable investment in one’s ­f uture. The 1919 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil focused primarily on coffee plantation ­labor but, ­toward the end of the guidebook, explained the benefits of “in­ de­pen­dent farming [dokuritsu kōsaku]” and an introduction to the com­pany’s recently acquired Iguape Colony. In a section entitled “The Income of In­ de­pen­dent Farmers,” Japa­nese Development in Brazil presented a reasonable bud­get for Japa­nese agriculturalists looking to s­ ettle in Japa­nese agricultural settlements.36 New settlers w ­ ere expected to commit at least 1,500 yen in capital to become in­de­pen­dent farmers in Brazil: 500 yen to buy land, a 450-­yen fee to clear the land for farming, 50 yen for equipment, 50 yen for seeds, 300 yen for living expenses, and 150 yen in reserves.37 Once in­ de­pen­dent, the guidebook argued that since annual expenditures for living expenses and seeds would total just 450 yen per year, agriculturally productive settlers, by their third year of in­de­pen­dent farming and sixth total year in Brazil (the first three as colonos), could earn as much as 1,780 yen in annual income.38 A 1926 pamphlet advertising Kaikō colony migration claimed that a normal settler h ­ ouse­hold with three workers might earn enough to save 450 yen by the end of the first year and 550 yen by the end of the second.39 Even as early as the late 1910s, the com­pany presented its Brazilian settlement program as an attractive economic alternative to rural life in Japan, assuming that potential recruits could weather the initial hardships. From the perspective of a potential Japa­nese settler, the idea of moving halfway around the world based solely on a migration com­pany’s promises of economic profit was, naturally, a major decision. To show the credibility of their claims, early Kaikō guidebooks included testimonials from successful Japa­nese in Brazil. For example, in a section titled “Dispatches from Our Brazilian Countrymen” (“Zaiburajiru dōhyō no tsūshin”), the 1920 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil featured ten reports designed to

Deckrow

155

demonstrate “more or less, the [Japa­nese] conditions in Brazil, the circumstances of our overseas countrymen, and how deciding to become mi­grants and cross the seas led them to a bright ­future.”40 With titles like “4–5,000 Yen in Three Years” and “Welcome to a Farmer’s Paradise,” t­ hese one-­to two-­page dispatches ­were intended to convince Kaikō’s audience of potential recruits that Japa­nese settlers had achieved economic success in Brazil.41 But just as impor­tant as the names and stories of ­these early settlers ­were their home prefectures, which for most ­were listed alongside their names. Yet ­these types of testimonials largely dis­appeared with increased Japa­nese government involvement in Brazilian emigration and the com­ pany’s emphasis of its own colony as the aspirational goal of Japa­nese agricultural settlement, even if settlers w ­ ere not bound to invest in Kaikō-­run settlements following their time on the coffee plantations. By the 1930s, editions of Conditions in South American Brazil contained testimonials that emphasized not where emigrants had originated but the Kaikō-­r un colony where they now resided.

The Iguape Colony as the Ideal Form of In­de­pen­dent Farming The earliest Kaikō guidebooks, published just ­after the com­pany’s acquisition of the Iguape Colony, featured maps and photo­graphs of the community and held it up as a model for Japa­nese cooperative settlement. Although they also listed Iguape alongside other non-­Kaikō Japa­nese communities, by the mid-1920s, migrant-­facing lit­er­a­ture eschewed mention of other non-­Kaikō communities and instead focused on making the colony the aspirational centerpiece of its Japa­nese emigration program. Founded in 1913 by Aoyagi Ikutaro, who represented a group known as the Tokyo Syndicate, l­ater known as the Brazil Colonization Com­pany, the Iguape Colony was the name of a collection of what would become three Kaikō-­ run colonies (the Katsura, Registro, and Sete Barras Colonies) located along the Ribeira de Iguape River in southern São Paulo State. Although the com­pany’s materials occasionally differentiated between t­hese settlements, the Iguape Colony served as a metonym for the entirety of the com­pany’s colony-­based agricultural settlement apparatus. In his exhaustive history of Japa­nese Brazilian migration, Tomoo Handa argues that the establishment of the Iguape Colony in 1913 marked an

156

Chapter 6

impor­tant turning point in the history of Japa­nese settlement in Brazil. Where, he argues, previously Japa­nese mi­grants had sought to earn money and quickly return to Japan, “this was one of the g­ reat successes of the Iguape Colony—­suggesting, for the first time, to Japa­nese immigrants the alternative of settling in Brazil.”42 By the time of Kaikō’s founding, its emigration program largely assumed that colono laborers hoped to buy their own land and s­ ettle long term in the country. Making Brazilian emigration attractive to Japa­nese required not only convincing them of Brazil’s economic opportunities but also that economic success might be easily achieved as in­de­pen­dent farmers. In contrast to the coffee plantations, which required learning to harvest an unfamiliar crop and a period of difficult work on behalf of a wealthy landowner, colony-­based settlement presented an image of in­de­pen­dent Japa­nese farmers with freedom over their own ­labor—­something many of them lacked in Japan—­and the ability to participate in eco­nom­ ically profitable cooperative agriculture.43 The population of the Iguape Colony zone (chitai) was a relatively small percentage of Kaikō immigrants entering Brazil in the prewar period. In 1917, before Kaikō took control of the colony, t­ here ­were 5,121 settlers, the majority of whom w ­ ere recruited 44 among the population already in Brazil. By 1936, the total population was at 783 families, or just 4,885 ­people.45 However, like Handa has noted about the colony itself, it was the repre­sen­ta­tion of the colony in ­these Kaikō recruiting materials that served as an impor­tant symbol for the aspirations of Japa­nese emigrants. While the mid-1920s saw the Japa­nese government become more invested in the Brazilian emigration program and the proliferation of new non-­Kaikō-­r un colonies, like the Aliança and Bastos Colonies, the com­ pany’s photo books and guidebooks concentrated on selling its own colony to potential settlers. Handa’s history of Iguape paints a varied and uneven experience for its settlers. This included the construction of a stone Catholic church by residents in 1928, photo­graphs of which did not appear in Kaikō promotional materials. However, com­pany lit­er­a­t ure was committed to portraying the colony as a profitable Japa­nese agricultural village in the Brazilian countryside. In text, Kaikō materials largely focused on the colony’s agricultural production, including descriptions of the colony’s primary agricultural products and figures detailing its annual production. Coffee, rice, and l­ater tea w ­ ere among the colony’s primary agricultural products. In its discussion of colony agriculture, the 1931 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil emphasized that although Brazil produced

Deckrow

157

rice at dif­fer­ent months than in Japan, aside from a few initial differences, once the rice was harvested “the remaining ­labor was indistinguishable from that of the Japa­nese home islands [Nihon naichi].”46 From the standpoint of individual farming ­house­holds, the similarities between modes of agricultural production in rural Japan and in the company-­run colony helped assuage worries about the financial and psychic risks of Brazilian emigration. Com­pany materials also highlighted the cooperative economic nature of its agricultural settlements and reassured recruits that the com­pany would provide the necessary support, technological and financial, to ensure economic success for its Japa­nese settlers. Visually, com­pany photo books and guidebooks also emphasized the Iguape Colony as a place where Japa­nese settlers could work communally in agriculture and socially with their fellow Japa­nese to preserve the customs of the former homeland. In contrast to the photo­graphs of coffee plantation l­abor that focused on coffee fields or Japa­nese mi­grants performing agricultural ­labor, Kaikō chose to portray its agricultural colonies as more complex communities in which the cooperative economics of Brazilian agriculture ­were also conducive to Japa­nese social and cultural practices. One 1924 photo­g raph, titled Child’s Play, for example, showed Japa­nese ­children playing outside together, one riding a donkey, while their parents ­were “working in the fields.”47 Kaikō-­published photo books also included photo­graphs of the colony’s medical clinic and its “Japa­nese doctor who was available to families at a cost of 60 sen per month, and provided f­ ree treatment in the event of illness.”48 As the lit­er­a­t ure made clear, in addition to the promise of agricultural success, the appeal and stability of the com­ pany’s settlements stemmed from living in a community of fellow Japa­nese. Some of the 1930s editions of Conditions in South American Brazil included a special photographic insert with more photos of colony life ­under the title “The Peaceful and Prosperous Rice Paddies along the Ribeira River,” which even included the lyr­ics to the colony’s song.49 Promotional lit­er­a­ ture also highlighted the many social organ­izations and cultural practices—­ such as colony baseball teams—to convince would-be mi­grants about their adaptability to rural Brazilian life. Perhaps no institution better embodied the continued links to Japa­nese culture than local Japanese-­language schools. B ­ ecause Brazilian regulations required that Japa­nese immigrants arrive as ­house­hold units, Kaikō’s recruiting materials emphasized the com­pany’s and the colony’s commitment to Japanese-­language education. The 1924 edition of the Brazilian

158

Chapter 6

Migrant-­Colony Photo ­Album noted that ­there ­were five Japa­nese elementary schools with plans to add two more.50 And by 1936, t­ oward the end of Kaikō’s prewar recruitment activities, Conditions in South American Brazil listed ten Japanese-­ language elementary schools, along with eleven Portuguese-­language schools, across its three Iguape colonies.51 Kaikō emphasized that instruction, at least in some schools, would be in Japa­ nese, and the schools served as a power­f ul symbol to would-be recruits of the types of Japa­nese institutions available in Brazil, even if many Japa­nese ­children did not attend such schools. In almost ­every collection of photo­ graphs promoting Kaikō colony-­based settlement during the 1920s and 1930s, officials included pictures of Japa­nese elementary schoolchildren posing or playing in front of their school­houses. The photo­graph from the 1932 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil prominently featured both the Brazilian and Japa­nese flags hanging over the school’s doorway b ­ ehind the assembled students along with both a Japa­nese and a local Brazilian teacher (see fig. 6.1). In emphasizing the presence of Japa­nese schoolchildren, Kaikō not only demonstrated its commitment to families of its settlement but implied to settler h ­ ouse­holds that their Brazil-­raised c­ hildren would also develop a familiarity with their parents’ culture. Kaikō’s recruiting materials emphasized Japa­nese institutions and customs, including groups to support the colony’s ­women and youth. Although the com­pany did not appear to explic­itly link its overseas emigration programs to the ideology of imperial expansion, in portraying the com­pany’s colonies as an autonomous and eco­nom­ically ­viable Japa­nese village, Kaikō visually presented its Brazilian settlements as Japa­nese social spaces. What emerges from the com­pany’s two-­step migration program is the privileging of in­de­pen­dent farmers in the company-­r un colonies as the ideal form of Japa­nese Brazilian settlement. The economic mobility of the Kaikō settlement plan even permeated the com­pany’s other migrant-­facing lit­er­a­t ure. In the 1926 edition of the Introduction to the Brazilian Language, a Portuguese-­language textbook prepared by the com­pany, one of the sample dialogues on “rural life” features a speaker explaining his own migration history. When asked where he lives, the speaker states that he lives in “the Registro Colony of Iguape,” and when asked if he has lived ­there long, he responds that he has been in Brazil for “seven years, but his first three ­were on a coffee plantation in the interior.”52 Similarly, coffee plantation laborers ­were led to believe that, once ­free of their contractual commitments and having saved the necessary money, they could invest long term in the

Deckrow

159

FIG. 6.1.  Japa­nese elementary school, 1932. Source: Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō, front ­matter.

com­pany’s settlement plan. Kaikō guidebooks emphasized the ways in which the com­pany helped its residents attain continued economic success. But the economic success was also borne out of a familiarity with the colony’s Japa­nese cultural institutions and forms, many of which w ­ ere prominently featured in com­pany recruiting materials. Over the course of almost two de­cades, Kaikō consistently presented its colony settlement program not only as an opportunity for farming ­house­holds to liberate themselves eco­ nom­ically but as a form of communal agricultural life that was no longer pos­si­ble in Japan.

Kaiko¯ Migration in Regional and National Contexts The Overseas Development Com­pany’s recruiting lit­er­a­t ure largely elided the discussion of the complex Brazilian l­egal and po­liti­cal contexts that had first allowed for the establishment of Japa­nese immigration. Where many Japa­nese experts on Brazil recognized the unique opportunity that Brazilian

160

Chapter 6

federalism offered to Japa­ nese migration companies, Kaikō officials omitted the details of Brazilian immigration policy and constitutional law from its settlers. Instead, Kaikō lit­er­a­ture focused on Brazil’s long track rec­ord of accepting immigrants, notably from Eu­rope, and presented the migration arrangement as an enduring and stable result of healthy Japanese-­ Brazilian relations. Although Japa­nese migration was very much the result of constitutional guarantees of state autonomy in the 1891 Brazilian Constitution, com­pany lit­er­a­ture suggested that the regional arrangements that allowed Japa­nese immigration would last in­def­initely into the ­future. Moreover, while Kaikō officials routinely promoted its emigration program through a national lens, even mentioning in passing the Japa­nese presence in states aside from São Paulo, the positive descriptions of Brazilian modernization and the country’s attitudes t­oward immigrants hewed closely to regional understandings of history. Just as e­ arlier promotional materials sought to highlight Brazil’s size relative to Japan, the 1930s editions of Conditions in South American Brazil observed that “the area of the state of São Paulo is slightly larger than Honshū and Shikoku combined.”53 Barbara Weinstein explains about 1920s São Paulo, “From the perspective of ­those who sought to secure Sao Paulo’s dominant position in the ­union, the de­cade began on a high note. . . . ​The state capital was now incontestably Brazil’s leading manufacturing center, and the Paulista West continued to be Brazil’s most productive agricultural zone.”54 As Weinstein argues, São Paulo’s prosperity, especially in relation to the rest of Brazil, motivated specific understandings of a São Paulo–­based regional identity, and Kaikō recruiting materials perpetuated many of the myths of Paulista exceptionalism that would fuel the state’s conflict against the federal government in the early 1930s. The 1920 edition of Japa­nese Development in Brazil, for example, in a section entitled “The State of São Paulo’s Golden Age,” posited that the economic opportunities available to Japa­nese settlers in the state ­were the result of “good land, good climate, and foreign immigrants from many countries working together.”55 The notion that Eu­ro­pean immigrants had contributed to São Paulo’s economic success was a common trope of Paulista elites, and Kaikō borrowed on ­these myths to suggest that Japa­nese w ­ ere next in line to contribute to and benefit from São Paulo’s modernization. 56 Similarly, the 1932 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil followed its description of Brazil’s long history of Eu­ro­pean immigration, by observing, “In terms of language, Portuguese is the national language, but Spanish, Italian, and French are also often used.”57 In addition to showing the Japa­nese

Deckrow

161

as the successors to e­ arlier Eu­ro­pean immigrants, the focus on foreign languages also suggested that Japa­nese might be afforded a level of autonomy in Brazilian life, consistent with the images of the Iguape Colony, which would ease the difficulties of the long-­distance migration pro­cess. Over the course of the entire prewar period, Kaikō’s promotional materials also featured photo­graphs of the city’s famous buildings and parks as a way of introducing Japa­nese agriculturalists to the state’s po­liti­cal and economic capital. Even though immigrants would find themselves living in agricultural communities far removed from this urban modernity, photo­ graphs of the city of São Paulo in Kaikō guidebooks played a prominent role in conferring legitimacy to the com­pany’s Japa­nese migration schemes. A caption of a photo­graph of the city in the 1924 photobook explained, “The city of São Paulo, and the capital of the state of São Paulo, is exceedingly impor­tant for Japa­nese. B ­ ehind Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, its population of 580,000 is the third largest in South Amer­i­ca.”58 Photo­graphs of the Jardim de Luz and Centro (downtown São Paulo) suggested to readers that São Paulo was a modern and Eu­ro­pean city, replete with brick skyscrapers and modern public transportation (see fig. 6.2). Similarly, the modern and scientific Hospedaria dos Imigrantes, the state of São Paulo’s immigrant-­processing center through which almost all Japa­nese passed, also featured prominently in Kaikō promotional materials, as did Kaikō’s Brazilian headquarters located in a fancy building in the city center. The implication from ­these photos and explanations was that the Japa­nese settlement proj­ect was contributing to and profiting from the city’s development by making the region’s rural lands agriculturally productive.

Stability Even u­ nder Vargas Just as Kaikō officials failed to foresee the collapse of coffee prices and the subsequent G ­ reat Depression, they also did not account for the 1930 Brazilian Revolution that would bring an end to the po­liti­cal system that had granted the state of São Paulo the authority to arrange Japa­nese settlement. Following the revolution, a new national government, led by Getúlio Vargas, suspended the 1891 Brazilian Constitution and sought to reshape the Brazilian economy and po­liti­cal system. Upon taking power, Vargas enacted a series of laws that restricted the entry and economic rights of immigrants for the first time in Brazilian history. The tensions between the Vargas regime

162

FIG. 6.2. 

Chapter 6

Centro, São Paulo, 1924. Source: Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru.

and the state of São Paulo proved far greater than questions of international migration. The 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution would see the state of São Paulo, unhappy with its lost autonomy ­under Vargas, take up arms against the Provisional Government. The conflict would end with the Provisional Government agreeing to abide by a new constitution, which, when written in 1934, would include a strict 2 ­percent immigration quota similar to the United States Immigration Act of 1924. As James Woodard observes about the tumultuous period of the late1920s to mid-1930s, “Coffee’s preeminent position in the Brazilian national economic made it impossible to insulate coffee policy from partisan politics. . . . ​Indeed, in campaigning for the presidency in late 1929, Júlio Prestes himself [the last elected president before the 1930 revolution] proudly proclaimed coffee to be the ‘basis of [Brazilian] wealth’ and the coffee planter to be the ‘type most representative of the nationality.’ ”59 Woodard’s analy­sis of the era’s politics paints a complex picture of local and national interests, one that the Japa­nese strug­gled to navigate, but from an economic perspective, the centrality of foreign agricultural l­abor along with preex-

Deckrow

163

isting agreements with Japa­nese immigration and colonization companies meant that Japa­nese immigration continued apace during the tumultuous years of the Provisional Government (1930–1934). In fact, the yearly number of immigrants would not peak ­until 1933 when 24,494 Japa­nese arrived in Brazil.60 Even though Brazil was now led by a government that openly targeted both foreign immigration and the state of São Paulo, Kaikō, in its recruiting materials, remained optimistic about the com­pany’s emigratory operations despite both fallen coffee prices and new laws aimed at restricting immigration. Kaikō recruiting materials treated the collapse of coffee prices and changes to Brazilian immigration law as separate issues; the former threatened the economic mobility of colono immigrants, while the latter, the com­pany argued, would have ­little effect on the livelihoods of ­those given permission to enter Brazil as part of Kaikō migration programs. Early 1930s editions of Conditions in South American Brazil, for example, emphasized the constitutional protections afforded to foreign immigrants as evidence of Brazil’s welcoming attitudes to Japa­nese (gaikoku imin no kangei). The 1931 and 1932 editions, for example, noted, “Article 72 of the Brazilian Constitution states that, ‘Constitutionally, for Brazilians and foreigners who reside in the country, freedoms as well as personal security and property rights are inviolably guaranteed.’ ”61 Neither edition, however, mentioned that Getúlio Vargas had suspended the 1891 constitution shortly ­a fter taking power. Moreover, one of Vargas’s earliest immigrant-­facing ­legal changes, the Law of Two-­Thirds, required all workplaces to have at least two-­thirds of their employees be Brazilian citizens. Although it was not immediately enforced in the country’s agricultural sectors, the law distinguished between the economic rights of citizens and noncitizens, contrary to the guidebooks’ assurances. When Vargas suspended most foreign immigration in 1931, the following year’s edition of the Conditions in South American Brazil defended the Provisional Government’s actions, to which Japa­nese w ­ ere exempted, saying the restrictions w ­ ere not a threat but rather evidence of pro-­Japanese sentiment in Brazil: “From last year, Brazil, to prevent urban unemployment, temporarily halted foreign immigration. However, the Japa­nese, who have contributed greatly to the development of sources of wealth [fugen kaitaku], have been given special permission to immigrate and indeed greatly welcomed.”62 Where Kaikō had previously sought credibility for its emigration program by linking it to São Paulo’s urban modernity and e­ arlier migration history, now com­pany officials

164

Chapter 6

sought to distance its rural emigration program from the urban crises of other foreign immigrants. From the outside, Kaikō’s claims that Brazil remained friendly to Japa­ nese immigrants appeared increasingly fantastical as the Vargas government continued to take even more hostile mea­sures against foreign immigration. The quotas in the 1934 Brazilian Constitution severely restricted all immigration, rural and urban, and disproportionately affected immigrants from Japan. Despite being the product of numerous po­liti­cal ­factors, including anti-­Japanese sentiment and the desire to limit São Paulo’s po­liti­cal dominance, when the new restrictions went into effect in mid-1935, annual Japa­ nese immigration fell by over 60  ­percent, from 21,930 Japa­nese entering Brazil in 1934 to 9,611 in 1935 and just 3,306 in 1936.63 Undeterred, the 1936 edition of Conditions in South American Brazil continued to tout the then forty-­seven years of uninterrupted republican government, which, while technically true, ignored the multiple disruptions to Brazilian national politics between 1930 and 1934.64 The guidebook also provided a narrow, legalistic reading of the quotas that focused on their nationality-­blind construction. In fact, it contended that the new limits on foreign immigration did not constitute Japa­nese exclusion (hainichi) ­because “the objective of the so-­ called immigration restrictions [imin seigen] was not to singularly target Japa­nese nor did they lead to discriminatory treatment of Japa­nese specifically.”65 Rather, the guidebook assured that the settlers who could enter Brazil would continue to benefit from the economic and ­legal conditions that had undergirded e­ arlier Japa­nese settlement. Kaikō’s interpretation of the Brazilian immigration quotas in its promotional materials contradicted the public complaints of the Japa­nese Brazilian community and the Japa­ nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs—­ which published numerous announcements in São Paulo’s Japanese-­language newspapers assuring Japa­ nese in Brazil that its diplomats w ­ ere working to fight the quotas. Many Japa­nese Brazilians saw the Vargas regime’s new restrictions as motivated by anti-­Japanese animus and as a direct threat to any f­uture Japa­nese immigration. In fact, by the time Conditions in South American Brazil was published in 1936, many potential recruits had likely turned their emigratory attention to Manchuria, especially as Vargas’s immigration restrictions proved a popu­lar news topic in an increasingly nationalistic Japan that saw them as another example of global anti-­Japanese sentiment. The Overseas Development Com­pany’s Brazilian promotional materials show that from the late 1910s to the late 1930s, the com­pany presented a

Deckrow

165

stable and consistently profitable vision of its Brazilian emigration programs to potential recruits. The continuities and changes across this sample of Kaikō recruiting materials reveals how the com­pany presented its Brazilian colony as the apogee of Japa­nese settlement. While it is hard to know exactly how t­ hese materials w ­ ere consumed by Japa­nese emigrants, t­ hose who moved to Brazil u ­ nder the auspices of Kaikō-­r un schemes, if ­these materials are to be believed, likely arrived with certain expectations about the nature of their new lives. Specifically, colono laborers may have harbored hope of f­ uture Brazilian agricultural lives within Japa­nese communities with robust institutional support. However, as the immigrant-­friendly po­ liti­cal and economic conditions of the Brazilian Old Republic further dis­ appeared ­under the nativist rule of Getúlio Vargas, the calculus of Japa­nese emigration changed. Even the rosy picture of life in Brazil presented in official materials was contradicted by the realities of changing circumstances on the ground. By 1935, anti-­Japanese politicians and critics in Brazil referred to Japa­nese communities in the interior of São Paulo as racial cysts and sought to ban foreign-­language education. The largely superficial treatment in Kaikō’s recruiting materials of Brazilian po­liti­cal institutions and the focus on the colonies’ autonomy suggest that t­ here was ­little emphasis on the com­pany’s part in developing Japa­nese settlers as po­liti­cal subjects in Brazil, despite brief mentions in guidebooks of the possibility of naturalization or intermarriage with Brazilian citizens. As conditions worsened, many Japa­nese settlers directed their complaints to the Japa­nese government.66 In emphasizing the continuities between Japa­nese rural life and colony-­based life in Brazil, t­ hese types of Kaikō’s recruiting lit­er­a­t ure may have helped lay the intellectual groundwork for a Japa­nese Brazilian community that, as Vargas’s anti-­immigrant politics intensified, found itself struggling to confront new po­liti­cal and economic challenges.

Notes 1. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajiru sãn pauro shū jōkyōsho,” assorted Brazilian migration-­related materials, Migration Collection, 3.8.2.80, Japa­nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive (MOFA), Tokyo, 1918. 2. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, front ­matter, chart 2. 3. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan, p. 70. 4. ​Suzuki, Japa­nese Immigrant in Brazil, p. 195. 5. ​Suzuki, Japa­nese Immigrant in Brazil, p. 247.

166

Chapter 6

6. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), 151. 7. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Information Sheet, Assorted Brazilian Migration Related Materials, Migration Collection, 3.8.2.80, MOFA, 1918. 8. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha Chōsabu, Zenkoku chūshōnō, p. 28. 9. ​Scholars of Japa­nese migrations have long debated the reasons why certain regions produced more emigrants. Some, like Alan Takeo Moriyama, have suggested that long-­held local practices of short-­term emigration had created cultures of migration in certain regions of Japan, especially Hiroshima. As such, w ­ hether a high concentration of Kaikō representatives was a cause or a product of large-­scale emigration remains unclear. See Moriyama, Imingaisha. 10. ​A koku of rice was defined as the quantity of rice required to feed one person for one year, or approximately 330 pounds. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, foreword to Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), pp. 1–2. 11. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, foreword to Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 1. 12. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, foreword to Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 1. 13. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajirukoku san pauro shūyuki imin kokore taiyō” (1918), Assorted Brazilian Migration Related Materials, Migration Collection, 3.8.2.80, MOFA, 1918. 14. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 2. 15. ​For an example, see Sapporo Agricultural College professor, Takaoka Kumao’s Chuō kōron article advocating large-­scale agricultural emigration to Brazil. Takaoka, “Burajiru imin ron.” 16. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932), p. 18. 17. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1931), p. 53. 18. ​Wako, Bauru kannai no Nihonjin. 19. ​As part of its emigratory apparatus, Kaikō still produced research and published reports that studied Japa­nese agricultural life, including population statistics in southwest and northeast Japan, where many of its recruits lived. See Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Sekai ni okeru. 20. ​Holloway, Immigrants on the Land, pp. 142–143. 21. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajirukoku san pauro shūyuki imin kokore taiyō,” MOFA. 22. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajiru sãn pauro shū jōkyōsho,” MOFA. 23. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajirukoku san pauro shūyuki imin kokore taiyō,” MOFA. 24. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajirukoku san pauro shūyuki imin kokore taiyō,” MOFA. 25. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinjō, p. 3. 26. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 43. 27. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 47. 28. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 48. 29. ​Seth Jacobowitz’s work has examined the strug­gles of Japa­nese immigrants in the coffee industry as presented in Japa­nese Brazilian lit­er­a­ture and draws a sharp contrast to Kaikō’s optimism about coffee’s economic possibilities. See Jacobowitz, “­Bitter Brew.” 30. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru no hojin (1920), p. 26. 31. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932), p. 28.

Deckrow

167

32. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932). 33. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 27. 34. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 29. 35. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 52. 36. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 89. 37. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 89–90. 38. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1919), p. 95. 39. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, “Burajiru yuki kazoku ishokumin annai,” immigration agency materials, assorted Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha–­related materials, Migration Collection, 3.8.2.300-2-6, MOFA, 1926. 40. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 95. 41. ​See Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), pp. 103, 122. 42. ​Handa, O imigrante Japonês, p. 338. 43. ​For more on the history of Japa­nese colonies in Brazil, including how the Iguape Colony and its institutions served as a model for l­ ater Japa­nese colonies, see Mita, Bastos. Rogério Dezem and Sidinalva Maria Wawzyniak’s chapters about Japa­nese colonies in the edited volume Cem anos da imigração japonesa: história, memória, e arte both examine the importance of the colony model of settlement within the longer history of Japa­nese Brazilian migration, including in public memory. See Dezem, “Um exemplo singular”; and Wawzyniak, “A ‘colônia’ como representação.” 44. ​Handa, O imigrante Japonês, p. 346. 45. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 30. 46. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō, p. 42. 47. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinjo, photo 58. 48. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinjo, photo 13. 49. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijo. 50. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinjo, photo 56. 51. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 32. 52. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru yōgo tehodoki, p. 61. 53. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 16. 54. ​Weinstein, Color of Modernity, p. 46. 55. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ni okeru hōjin (1920), p. 17. 56. ​Jeffrey Lesser has written about the ways in which Japa­nese sought to make themselves appear Eu­ro­pean in the broader context of Brazilian immigration. See Lesser, Negotiating National Identity. 57. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932), p. 4. 58. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinjo, photo 10. 59. ​Woodard, Place in Politics, p. 191. 60. ​Lone, Japa­nese Community in Brazil, p. 101. 61. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1931), p. 7; and Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932), p. 7. 62. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1932). 63. ​Lone, Japa­nese Community in Brazil, p. 101. 64. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 2. 65. ​Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanbei Burajiru jijō (1936), p. 18. 66. ​See Lone, Japa­nese Community in Brazil, p. 102.

c h a p t e r

7

“South Amer­i­ca Bound” Japa­nese Settler Colonist Fiction of the Meiji Era Seth Jacobowitz

T

his chapter investigates the origins of settler colonist fiction that began in the Meiji era and constituted one of the most tangible forms by which modern lit­er­a­t ure participated in the Empire of Japan’s broader expansionist aims. Contrary to the conventional wisdom which takes for granted that this genre was exclusively set in Japan’s burgeoning empire in Asia, from 1908 ­until the onset of World War II settler colonist fiction expressly promoted emigration overseas to sovereign nations in South Amer­ i­ca. Lit­er­a­ture was regarded as an indispensable supplement to Japan’s strategy for alleviating the burdens of overpopulation in the home islands while encouraging the expansion of the Japa­nese as a world ­people. To a lesser degree, the genre also highlighted emigration to the South Seas region (Nanyō, or in Chinese, Nanyang) and occasionally looked back ­toward North Amer­i­ca, where the Japa­nese community continued to grow and exercise a power­ful grip on the national-­imperial imagination despite the restrictions on immigration that began with the Gentleman’s Agreement.1 Sidney Xu Lu has rightly called the po­liti­cal calculus that lay ­behind ­these global efforts to resettle large numbers of Japa­nese immigrants “Malthusianism” or “Malthusian expansionism,”2 in recognition of the widespread perception that overpopulation constituted an existential threat to the nation, while also serving the imperialist imperative to equitably guarantee a Japa­nese presence alongside white settlers on both sides of the Pacific. The earliest known work of settler colonist fiction is Horiuchi Shinsen’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound” (“Nanbei yuki”), which appeared in the inaugural May 1908 issue of the journal Colonization World (Shokumin sekai) published by the Tokyo-­based magazine com­pany Seikō Zasshi Sha.3 Although largely forgotten ­today, both text and genre attest to the pressures 168

Jacobowitz

169

disproportionately confronted by the rural communities marked in Japa­ nese national-­imperial discourse as “surplus population” ( jinkō kajō). It consisted primarily of men whose seasonal l­abor “working away from home” (dekasegi) not only temporarily brought them into the cities, but who now also took on short-­term arrangements to work on sugarcane plantations in Hawai‘i and the South Pacific. Mass migration quickly took root in prewar Japan’s cultural life and thought system. Statesmen, ideologues, and professional writers often worked in concert to preach the gospel of socioeconomic advancement (shusse) overseas in mass-­market magazines such as Colonization World. Building upon his ­earlier studies of the domestic rags-­ to-­riches genre called “novels of success” (risshi shōsetsu), Wada Atsuhiko has demonstrated that disenfranchised but physically fit younger male workers with no access to capital w ­ ere made the target audience for a “discursive space of enticement” (sasoi no gensetsu kūkan) in settler colonist fiction, which exhorted them to emigrate for self-­benefit and the greater good of the empire.4 Enduring for only five issues between May and September 1908, Colonization World nevertheless set in motion production of a lowbrow but ideologically potent literary corpus in pro-­expansionist and general interest magazines that grew well into the early 1940s. Settler colonist fiction thus operated within a feeder system that promised a degree of state sponsorship and oversight to would-be immigrants, while maintaining the primacy of ambition, skill, and luck in navigating the perils of earning one’s fortune abroad. Personal responsibility, that perennial cap­i­tal­ist standard, was the bedrock value according to which outward, as well as upward, mobility would be mea­sured. In actuality, “South Amer­i­ca Bound” was doubly marked in the pages of Colonization World as “settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure” (shokumin bungaku) and “settler colonist fiction” (shokumin shōsetsu). The cartouche for the former is illustrated with the figure of a young shepherd and spotted calf, while the latter appears in fine print above the title of the work. ­There was nothing accidental or redundant about this nomenclature. The magazine sought to encourage a variegated lit­er­a­ture, while privileging short-­form prose fiction narratives as the chief means to persuade young men to emigrate to the still-­poorly understood countries of South Amer­i­ca. Throughout this chapter, I adopt the conceptual framework of settler colonialism as the preferred translation of shokumin to reflect the under­lying mission of imperial expansion b ­ ehind the emigration campaigns. By the same mea­sure, I consistently

170

Chapter 7

refer to Horiuchi’s work as settler colonist fiction in order to emphasize genre specificity within the general category of settler colonist lit­er­a­ ture that included poetry, travelogues, essays, translated prose fiction, and so on. The pre­sent study provides a reading of “South Amer­i­ca Bound” according to three critical contexts. First, it attends to the layout, editorial voices, and journalistic content of Colonization World that must be understood as establishing its horizon of legibility within the magazine itself. Second, it documents the naturalist and popu­lar fictional works that immediately preceded and surrounded this genre in the Meiji era, and which helped to situate settler colonist fiction within a larger literary landscape that persisted into the early 1940s. Third, it follows Shinsen’s serialization of this narrative into two additional installments about Peru, which produced a sense of narrative continuity from the immigrants’ old lives in Japan to new ones abroad. Despite being a true product of ­these interrelated frameworks, “South Amer­i­ca Bound” is remarkable for a number of historical firsts. It is the earliest known fictional work to represent the overseas migration to Peru, which was, in fact, the first Latin American nation to establish diplomatic relations with Japan in 1873. Although immigration to Peru began in 1899, less than a handful of ships had made the voyage by 1908, and the immigrants, who numbered fewer than three thousand, faced intense hardship due to tropical diseases, discrimination, and cultural and linguistic barriers. Shinsen’s depiction of Peru, then, was intended by the magazine as a public relations booster shot for an emigration campaign whose own success was far from assured. His embellishments and artistic liberties elsewhere notwithstanding, he accurately named the immigrant steamer in the story as the Kasato Maru, which had brought Japa­nese immigrants to Hawai‘i in 1906, and Mexico and Peru in 1907. In “South Amer­i­ca Bound,” the ship departs from Yokohama in the May 1908 issue of Colonization World and arrives in Callao in the following month’s issue, which exactly coincided with the Kasato Maru’s real-­time arrival in the port of Santos on June 18, 1908, bringing the first 781 Japa­nese immigrants to Brazil. Working in conjunction with the editorials that precede it, “South Amer­i­ca Bound” invested heavi­ly in South Amer­i­ca as the most promising site for Japa­nese colonial expansion outside East Asia. This came precisely at the critical juncture when the Gentleman’s Agreements with the United States (1907) and Canada (1908) had forced Japan to look elsewhere to annually

Jacobowitz

171

relocate tens of thousands of immigrants, particularly from the rural male ­labor force. Another literary dimension of “South Amer­i­ca Bound” is that it established the narrative paradigm for Japa­nese settler colonist fiction in parallel to the domestic novel of success. Th ­ ese working-­class dreams of overseas prosperity, like their home island opposite numbers, invariably pose a series of obstacles and strug­gles that ultimately culminate in personal financial success for the worthy (or comeuppance for malefactors). Further, they commonly portray the sojourner as an everyman who, at least in princi­ple, plans to return to Japan to reestablish himself—­the narrators and protagonists, modeling the ­actual immigrants, trend overwhelmingly masculine— as a landowner or shop­keeper as soon as he obtains sufficient capital. By contrast, investing in education for its own sake or forsaking one’s imperial citizenship to assume a new nationality is scarcely countenanced. Yet regardless of how brief or self-­directed one’s time might be spent abroad, it was understood that even the temporary act of emigration benefitted Japan’s overseas colonies. The stories thus work in verification of this twofold dialectic of patriotic duty. By pursuing one’s ambition and venturing forth to work in other sovereign nations, the sojourner not only repatriated newfound wealth to Japan, but further contributed to building its archipelago of colonies overseas. It must be acknowledged that Colonization World was far more effective in establishing the princi­ple of a literary paradigm than fixing its real­ ity. The settler colonist fiction published in its pages beyond “South Amer­i­ca Bound” can best be described as hackwork since Shinsen and other professional writers w ­ ere paid to hastily produce material of ­little artistic value. This chapter identifies “South Amer­i­ca Bound” as the sole work in the five issues of the magazine that transcended the inherent limitations of this incipient genre by staking out the fundamental narrative arc of the immigrant strug­gle. In so ­doing, it consciously preceded the organic emergence of literary production by Japa­nese immigrants to South Amer­i­ca themselves in the coming de­cades. It should be noted that Meiji-­era pro-­expansionist magazine publishers occasionally sponsored standalone, long-­form novels in a bid to extend the popularity of the genre. For instance, Sakai Ichirō’s Yamato nadeshiko (235 pages in length), published by Kaigaisha in 1917, depicts an enterprising Japa­nese immigrant who arrives in Chile and makes his way across South Amer­i­ca. While t­ hese novels did not possess any intrinsically superior aesthetic value to their serialized short-­form counter­parts,

172

Chapter 7

they labored at considerably greater length to describe the exotic locales and livelihoods that awaited prospective immigrants. By no ­later than January 1920, when the popu­lar literary journal New Youth (Shin seinen) made its debut, settler colonist fiction was already published with some regularity in mainstream magazines in Japan. The genre was set alongside or incorporated into works of high seas adventure fiction, agrarian fiction, detective fiction, science fiction, and “true-­life stories” ( jitsuwa) about successful immigrants. In the pro-­expansionist magazines of the prewar era, meanwhile, literary prizes, submission contests, and other promotional activities would further solicit the active participation of readers, most often in the production of their own settler colonist prose fiction. While they do not f­ actor into the pre­sent study, a diversity of literary production—­poetry, theatrical plays, screenplays, critical commentary, and biographical or autobiographical accounts—­would likewise wax and wane in the literary arts (bungei) column commonly found in the back pages of the pro-­expansionist magazines. Collectively, t­ hese texts, too, sought to stoke the public imagination beyond familiar thinking about the confines of an island nation or isolationist narratives of national destiny. Lest this chapter be perceived simply as an exercise in literary history or genre studies, I stake the claim that settler colonist fiction in general, and works such as “South Amer­i­ca Bound” in par­tic­u­lar, ­were not only upheld by Meiji ideologues as making vital contributions to the national-­ imperial doctrine of expansionism, but in fact help to make vis­i­ble the continuum that existed in Japan between colonization achieved at the barrel of a gun within its sphere of influence in East Asia and the more peaceful methods of emigration and commerce outside of its national-­imperial bound­aries. Although prewar North and South American scholars, politicians, and lay observers debated the implications and perceived threats of Japa­nese mass migration as colonial expansionism in the Western hemi­ sphere, a granular understanding of the interconnectedness of ­things has long since receded from our mainstream historical consciousness. As Pedro Iacobelli clarifies in Postwar Emigration to South Amer­i­ca from Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, The historiography of prewar Japa­nese migration tends to make a distinction between two types of migration: colonial migration and overseas migration (kaigai ijū). The former focuses on the expansion of the Japa­nese Empire and the establishment of Japa­nese settlements in neighboring areas

Jacobowitz

173

such as Taiwan (1895), Kwantung Lease Territory (Kantōshū, 1895), South Sakhalin (Karafuto, 1907), and ­Korea (Chōsen, annexed in 1910). By 1935, over 1,735,000 Japa­nese nationals had migrated to colonial territories. The latter type of migration focuses on the international emigration movement from Japan (including the Ryukyu Islands) to countries and territories in Southeast Asia, Oceania and the Amer­i­cas, which by 1935 had accrued over 550,000 ­people.5

At a glance, a summary of this kind is im­mensely helpful in identifying the scale, dates, and geo­graph­i­cal emplacement of the imperialist and migratory campaigns. Yet, in order to reconstruct the epistemic conditions that existed at the takeoff of Japa­nese colonial growth, it is necessary for us to go past the numbers alone in excavating the manifold forms of literary, visual, philosophic, journalistic, and print cultural evidence from the archives that guide the way. Only in this manner can transnational or transpacific Asian studies overcome the shortcomings of an area studies deconstruction that has per­sis­tently ­stopped short at the level of purely methodological critique.

Colonization of the World By the late 1970s, the literary scholar Takeuchi Yō had already shown that since January 1905 t­ here existed a discourse of emigration in the Seikō Zasshi Sha’s flagship publication, Success, with an “overseas column” and in other relevant sections of the magazine.6 Although Colonization World was exceedingly short-­lived in its own print run, it set the pre­ce­dent for programmatically congruent journals that succeeded it over the next several de­cades, notably Overseas Japan (Kaigai no Nippon, 1911–1942), The Overseas Journal (Kaigai, 1927–1933), The Colonial Review (Shokumin, 1924– 1934), and Brazil (Burajiru, 1927–1941).7 The discourse of expansionism found ample expression u ­ nder their combined patronage. By and large, this was no crude form of imperialist propaganda but a nuanced, cosmopolitan proj­ect, whose participants included the Christian-­denominated Rikkōkai and other stakeholders who vigorously supported emigration campaigns and commerce with sovereign nations rather than military conquest. In contrast to the hierarchical order established within Japan’s formal empire, they oftentimes considered, for instance, how immigrants o­ ught best to

174

Chapter 7

adapt to local customs and align themselves with power­ful po­liti­cal and economic interests where they settled. Still, ­these magazines unabashedly resolved imperialism and migration into a single discursive field, making them the most comprehensive and public-­facing serial publications to articulate this stance of unitary expansionism. The editorial tone in the first issue of Colonization World not only corroborates the centrality of settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure to the larger proj­ect of the magazine, but also asserts a geopo­liti­cal vision for accommodating Japan’s rapidly growing population throughout the world and as a world p ­ eople. The layout of Colonization World and its successors conforms to a standard template established by the Japa­nese magazine industry around the turn of the c­ entury. A typical issue would consist of nine or ten of the following items in this order: cover art; a t­able of contents printed in red ink; advertisements for long-­form genre fiction novels, dictionaries, and reference materials; glossy photographic portraits of eminent statesmen; editorials and opinion pieces; journalistic reportage on current and prospective locales for colonization; general interest articles pertaining to same; a roundup of telegraphic and miscellaneous news items; and a literary arts column, usually placed in the back pages. Advertisements, lithographic illustrations, and low-­grade photographic inserts of exotic locales, immigrant life, and the like ­were interspersed with the articles, while full-­page advertisements appeared once more in the final pages and back cover. In contrast to the leading general interest monthly magazines, such as The Sun (Taiyō, 1895–1928) and Central Review (Chūō kōron, 1887–­pre­sent), in which expansionist messaging was at best diluted, Colonization World and the ­later pro-­expansionist journals steadfastly reinforced their raison d’être within and across each issue. I adopt an analytic approach ­here that surveys a cross-­section of leading authorial voices in the first issue of Colonization World as they traverse dif­fer­ent geo­g raph­i­cal locations and their attendant geopo­liti­cal or practical business concerns. Their words lay bare the inherently ideological nature of the magazine, including advocacy for settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure as a means of emboldening readers to take the plunge overseas. The front covers to the first four issues of Colonization World are virtually identical save for a change in background color, a not uncommon cost-­ saving mea­sure in a competitive market where new titles w ­ ere constantly being introduced, tested, and discarded when unsuccessful. It pre­sents a bearded man dramatically, if somewhat incongruously, dressed in Elizabe-

Jacobowitz

175

than doublet and hose, holding up a spear and banner bearing the magazine’s title in his left hand and pointing a rapier in his right ­toward a circular cutout superimposing the contents of the issue over a map that compresses South Amer­i­ca and the South Seas. The fact that Colonization World was an imprint of the prestigious Tokyo-­based Seikō Zasshi Sha is proudly displayed in the lower right-­hand corner, while the far left-­hand side beguiles, “This magazine is a must-­read for the globally business-­minded!” (sekaiteki jitsugyōka). The repetition of the word “world” echoing the title was less significant than its appeal to the “business-­minded,” which was synonymous with the parent com­pany’s branding. This was repeated for a third time in a mission statement addressed to the reader by the editorial board on an unnumbered page opposite the t­ able of contents, which signals that “practical learning” ( jitsugyō), even before “training” (yōsei) and the acquisition of “knowledge” (chishiki), is the bedrock foundation for the bold overseas endeavors of “our citizens” (wa ga kokumin) and “brethren” (dōhō). The ­table of contents in the May 1908 issue has twenty-­eight entries, mostly short essays of two to three pages in length, which are subdivided into categories such as “Forum” and “In Focus” for the leading editorial essays; “Resources,” for the exploitation of natu­ral resources; “Business Affairs” ( jitsugyō) for industrial development; and “Overseas Trade,” for commercial enterprises. The centerpiece is “Settler Colonist Lit­er­a­t ure,” which consists of Horiuchi’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound” and Kodama Kagai’s “The Sojourning Goose” (“Yuku ōtori”), the latter parenthetically identified in smaller print as a free-­verse poem.8 In terms of its global reach for promoting Japa­nese colonization, the magazine traverses (in alphabetical order) the Amur River, Brazil, China, Karafuto (Sakhalin), ­Korea, Mexico, and Peru, with several of ­these sites, ­Korea foremost among them, made the subject of multiple articles and editorials. The exceptional placement of settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure in the ­table of contents was reinforced to varying degrees by each of the issue’s four main editorials. It marks a decisive turning point in the expansionist shift t­ oward South Amer­i­ca as the most auspicious area outside Japan’s sphere of influence, following the closure of the Anglophone countries to Japa­nese immigration. The lead editorial, “The Expansion of the Japa­nese Race and the Work of Colonization” (“Yamato minzoku bōchō to shokumin jigyō”), by the former prime minister and founder of Waseda University, Count Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), sets the tone for the issue and magazine as a ­whole.

176

Chapter 7

He wastes no time in his preamble framing the imperialist state of affairs that has reshaped the world since the age of exploration: “­There is not a country in the world, not even the lands inhabited by uncivilized savages who boast of cannibalistic ways [ jinniku o kutte, hokori to suru mikai yaban naru minzoku], nor remote islands in the vastness of the sea, whose wildernesses show no signs of life, that are not subject to the dominion of some ruling body, w ­ hether it is u ­ nder the control of a friendly country or an agreement by the G ­ reat Powers.”9 Japan’s overpopulation of the home islands, he elaborates, poses the single greatest threat facing the nation and necessitates procuring new territories in which to ­settle its immigrants. Ōkuma circumspectly sidesteps assigning ­legal distinctions to regions outside the sphere of Japan’s influence, but tellingly remarks that reliance upon trade and commerce, which could be cut off at any time, is insufficient. Instead, it is only natu­ral, in his estimation, for Japan to secure its own “colonial strongholds” (shokuminteki jiban)10 amid the international competition for resources. In the next section, “Ethnic Expansion and the Strengthening of National Power” (“Minzoku bōchō to kokuryoku shinchō”), Ōkuma outlines the reasonable prospects for emigration within Japan’s growing sphere of influence in northeast Asia. He regards the Korean peninsula and frontier expanses of Siberia as the most immediate and favorable destinations but qualifies that they are insufficient to adequately meet the challenges posed by Japan’s rapidly increasing population. Moreover, as the example of other world powers has proven, Japan, too, can only achieve an enhancement of its existing infrastructure of knowledge production, industry, and trade by taking colonies. Given the anti-­Japanese sentiment evinced in North Amer­ i­ca, alluding to the Gentlemen’s Agreements, Japan must find ways to be self-­sufficient and avoid war whenever pos­si­ble. Ōkuma ominously sketches the global situation as one in which “religious, racial, and po­liti­cal prejudices [shūkyōteki, jinshuteki, seijiteki henken] frequently lead to misunderstandings” that cloud Japan’s prospects for unfettered expansion.11 In the third and final section, “South Amer­i­ca and Our Settler Colonists” (“Nanbei to wa ga shokumin”), Ōkuma turns to the final frontier for Japa­nese settler colonists. “­There is no need to fight when North Amer­i­ca pushes us away,” he reassures the reader. “The world is vast, and the Japa­ nese p ­ eople ­w ill not only be expelled, but also welcomed elsewhere.”12 He estimates that K ­ orea may receive between six hundred thousand to one million Japa­nese settlers. In spite of its greater landmass, he avers, Siberia

Jacobowitz

177

could not boast such large numbers due to its inhospitable climate. By contrast, Ōkuma maintains South Amer­i­ca might easily accommodate four or five million immigrants and was “the most welcoming to [other] world races” (sekai jinrui no kōfuku de aru).13 Ōkuma does not mention any par­tic­ u­lar country by name, but given that immigration to Peru was still struggling and the arrival of the first cohort of immigrants to Brazil was still a month away, his essay can be read as a broad missive to educate and reassure the public that the pivot to South Amer­i­ca was already underway. The second essay is Gotō Shinpei’s (1857–1929) “A Plan for Colonization Courses at the Imperial Universities” (“Teikoku daigaku shokumin kōza keikaku”). It was paired with a full-­page photographic portrait of its author, who is identified as the first director of the South Manchurian Railway (1906–1908), although by then he was already acting in his role as minister of communications and director of the Railway Bureau (1908– 1911). Gotō’s essay summarizes his discussions with the presidents of Kyoto Imperial University and Tokyo Imperial University, where he successfully convinced them to found “colonization studies departments” (shokumin­ka).14 A medical doctor who had served as the head of civilian affairs in colonial Taiwan (1898–1906), where he rigorously applied his philosophy for governing according to biological princi­ples (seibutsugaku no gensoku), Gotō does not let pass the opportunity to share his disciplinary perspective in the conclusion of the essay by arguing that hygiene management and sanitation practices ­were essential training for the colonial administration of a rapidly expanding population. Gotō not only imbued the magazine with the prestige of his offices and accomplishments, but also added the rock-­solid commitment of the preeminent imperial universities to ­colonization. The third essay is Diet member, writer, and historian Takekoshi Yosaburō’s (1865–1950) “In Promotion of Settler Colonist Fiction” (“Shokumin bungaku o furiokoseyo”).15 Takekoshi, who paraphrased Horace Greeley to coin the phrase “Go south, young man!” in his bestselling Nangoku-­ki (Account of southern countries, 1910),16 was already intimately acquainted with Gotō’s tenure in Taiwan, which he effusively praised in the English-­language book Japa­nese Rule in Formosa (London: Longmans, Green, 1907; translated by George Braithwaite). The book in fact begins with a preface by Gotō. If it was somewhat predictable for Takekoshi’s essay in Colonization World to follow Gotō’s in consequence of their previous close collaborations, it is rather the subject ­matter and its placement in the

178

Chapter 7

magazine that warrants our careful attention. Takekoshi’s praise for settler colonist fiction amounted to nothing less than a de facto state patronization of the genre in this earliest of the pro-­expansionist journals. Takekoshi expresses his unabashed delight at the publication of Colonization World for providing much-­needed research for the nation’s current and ­future colonization policies. He saves his greatest admiration, however, for the magazine’s literary contribution, noting that t­ here was not a lack of outlets to promote colonization (shokumin ni kan suru kikan) but instead an “absence of settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure” (shokumin bungaku no ketsubō)17 that the nation now most desperately needed. Takekoshi devotes much of his essay to promoting the civic virtues of patriotism (kokuminsei), which he compares with France, Germany, and ­England as a basis for achieving national greatness and cultivating an expansionist spirit. He praises the Japa­nese privateers of the Tokugawa era, who v­ iolated the closed country prohibitions imposed by the shogunate to cross the seas and assert their p ­ eople’s national destiny, even trading with places as distant as Siam and Mexico. It is this “in­de­pen­dent spirit” ( jishu jiritsu no seishin),18 rooted in Japan’s imperial heritage, that he maintains provides the prerequisite to global colonization. Takekoshi concludes the essay by concurring with Gotō that colonization studies should be implemented in higher education but that “society should also greatly encourage settler colonist lit­er­a­t ure, alongside historical biographies and business affairs, so as to stimulate the flagging spirits of our youth” (shakai wa mata ooni shokumin bungaku no kōryū o hakari, korera ni kan suru shiden ya jigyō o tsutae, motte chōraku sento suru wa ga seinen no genki o kōfun seshimu beki o setsubō suru mono nari).19 His endorsement of the genre for its capacity to inculcate Japa­nese spirit, then, was a pragmatic extension of the magazine’s capacity to proselytize and inspire the uninitiated to fulfill their patriotic duty and seek their fortune overseas. The fourth editorial is entitled “The Motives b ­ ehind the Publication of Colonization World ” (“Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi”) by Takahashi Sanmin (biographical data unavailable), a regular columnist for Success and Colonization World. In his essay, he too decries the three centuries of the closed-­country policy upheld by the Tokugawa shogunate as having “conspicuously repressed the expansive character of our imperial nation” (ichijirushiku, wa ga teikoku kokumin no bōchōteki seikaku o yokuatsu shi). 20 Consistent with the Malthusian threat posed by domestic overcrowding, he posits the need to send two-­fifths of Japan’s population of fifty million

Jacobowitz

179

overseas to stave off national ruin. N ­ eedless to say, he continues, this ­w ill require serious investment in agriculture, commerce, and industry if Japan is to compete with the “advanced Western nations who are steadily moving forward with peaceful [resolution to] conflict by sending their immigrants throughout the world” (Ōbei no senshinkoku wa mina heiwateki sensō ni mukatte kyūkyū tari, shokumin o sekai no kakuchi ni itarite).21 In regard to the enigmatic turn of phrase “peaceful [resolution of] conflict,” which was repeatedly echoed by fellow expansionists, it is clear that immigration was seen not only as the avoidance of warfare, but the accomplishment of its most acquisitive aims—­that is, the settling of territory and exploitation of resources by nonmilitary means. Sanmin’s recommendations concerning where to achieve ­t hese goals map precisely onto the aforementioned regions deemed suitable for colonialism, while maintaining a dispassionate indifference to any notion of a division between imperialism and immigration: “Look around, ­there is the Manchurian territory, Korean lands, South Amer­i­ca’s fecund fields, and our new dominion in places like Karafuto and Taiwan” (Kubi o mawashite miyo, Manshū no chi, Kankoku no tsuchi, Nanbei no inno oyobi wa ga shin ryōdo taru Karafuto Taiwan no gotoki).22 The message could not be clearer that the mission of settler colonist fiction must be to encourage Japa­nese immigrants to play their part in the imperial mission. In his concluding remarks, he offers the ultimate encomium to Colonization World, noting, “Nothing would give me greater plea­sure as I contemplate the current affairs that have led to the publication of this magazine than if it should enable our imperial nation to accumulate wealth equal to the Western powers not with a martial conflict, but with peaceful [resolution to] conflict” (Yohai wa koko ni jisei no yōkyū ni ōjite honshi o hakkan su, moshi kore ni yorite, wa ga teikokumin ga buryokuteki sensō ni yorazu, heiwateki sensō ni yorite, ōbei no rekkyō ni otorazaru furyoku o baiyō suru no ichisuke to mo naraba, nan no kokei ka kore ni iwan ya).23 This rhe­toric found pre­ce­dent in other interventionist works besides Colonization World. Kō Youngran has in­de­pen­dently identified a pre­ce­dent in Katō Tokijirō’s (1858–1930) “The Nation’s Development” (“Kokumin no hatten”) in the July 3, 1904, edition of Socialism (Shakaishugi) published by the Heimin Shinbun, which advocated emigration to North Amer­i­ca as a strategy for “avoidance of war,” “peaceful expansion,” and “establishing ­Little Japans” overseas.24 By no means reducible to a single ideologue or text, it comprises an essential part of the discourse of imperial Japan that

180

Chapter 7

has often been marginalized for falling outside the dichotomy of the home islands (naichi) and East Asian colonies (gaichi).

Situating Emigration in Settler Colonist Lit­er­at­ ure According to Kamei Hideo, the genre of “settler colonist fiction was a direct outgrowth of the risshi shōsetsu, beginning with Ogouchi Gokyō’s globetrotting novel Colonization King: A Novel of Success (Shokumin-­ō: Risshi Shōsetsu, 1907) and followed by Shinsen’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound.”25 Colonization King’s subtitle points to a crucial generic distinction between the two texts in this moment of discursive transformation, as is evident from the former’s title page and the latter’s cartouche. Whereas Ogouchi’s novel explores continental Asia, the Levant, and the “dark world” (ankoku sekai)

FIG. 7.1.  Colonization King. Source: National Diet Library, accessed June 6, 2022, https://​ ­d l​.­ndl​.­go​.j­ p​/­info:ndljp​/­pid​ /­886765​/1­ .

Jacobowitz

181

of Africa, culminating in an encounter with Boer settlers in South Africa, it does not belong to the tightly knit cliques of Colonization World or to settler colonist fiction proper. Nor does it appear to be a “novel of success” in any conventional sense, since it is made up of equal parts geopo­liti­cal intrigue, travelogue, romance, and adventure. In generic terms, it is more in line with the po­liti­cal novels of the 1880s than settler colonist fiction of the 1900s. The issue of magazine patronage also returns h ­ ere in a critical light. Popu­lar lit­er­a­ture in turn-­of-­the-­t wentieth-­century Japan was routinely encountered in inexpensive mass-­market magazines, whose comparatively high production values radiated literary, visual, and typographic modernity, regardless of which niche world the works in question occupied. From the perspective of genre fiction, this magazine market most closely approximates for Meiji Japan the role of penny dreadfuls in the United Kingdom, dime novels in the United States, and colportage novels in Germany. Horiuchi Shinsen, meanwhile, serves up the nearest analogue to the likes of H. Rider Haggard in the United Kingdom, Horatio Alger Jr. in the United States, and Karl May in Germany. Akin to May, whose stories of the Wild West ­were purely a product of research and imagination, Horiuchi appears to have based his settler colonist fiction solely on reconstructions from the reference materials at hand. His stories accordingly should not be characterized as propaganda per se, but rather as sensationalist in nature, catering to the prevailing fears and fantasies of a domestic audience contemplating a new life overseas. This is not to say the genre of settler colonist fiction bore no relation to belles lettres. In Struggling Upward: Worldly Success and the Japa­nese Novel, Timothy Van Compernolle investigates the nexus of the Seikō Zasshi Sha, Shinsen, and the novel of success in relation to canonical works of Meiji lit­er­a­t ure by Tayama Katai, Natsume Soseki, Kosugi Tengai, and Takahama Kyoshi.26 ­These authors’ works in Van Compernolle’s monograph comprise two novels of the countryside, two of the city, and one set in colonial K ­ orea. In all five cases, success, and just as often failure, is exactingly mea­sured. In similar fashion, we may take note of the handful of Meiji-­era naturalist texts that register overseas emigration to the Amer­i­cas as an alternative form of self-­striving agency. Masamune Hakuchō’s short story “Dust” (“Jin’ai,” 1907) is a vignette about a newspaper editorial assistant, who laments his dead-­end prospects in publishing and missed opportunities to emigrate to Peru:

182

Chapter 7

I sat at Kitagawa’s desk facing Ono Michiyoshi, a piercing wind blowing in through the broken win­dow glass buffeting my back, and while proofreading I watched the spectacle in the editorial room indifferently. ­After the collapse of my plans for a trip to South Amer­i­ca I took this job as a proofreader, at the suggestion of a friend, to get by on ­until I could latch onto a promising position of some kind. I’ve been h ­ ere three months already. As I won­der how a man can stand to work at such a worthless job as this, I nurture my colossal hopes for my eventual day of escape. Gripping the worn brush in my hand hardened by weight-­lifting, I stare at the lifeless words.27

The unnamed protagonist is a young man, twenty-­five years old, who may still be fit for farm ­labor, but whose educational level, urban lifestyle, and stable, if low-­prestige, position in the newspaper business would seem to militate against such a life-­altering move. It is difficult to ascertain more about his background or prospects, given the short nature of the piece, but he is obsessed with the notion of social mobility and achieving a meaningful life. Nor was he alone in such sentiments. Wada calls our attention to Uchida Rōan’s still ­earlier “Year’s End” (“Kure no nijūhachi nichi,” 1898), about a young man who resolves to immigrate to Mexico as one of the so-­called Enomoto colonists, named for the staunch expansionist and proponent of mass migration to Mexico, Central Amer­i­ca, and the South Seas, Admiral Enomoto Takeaki (1836–1908).28 The most celebrated naturalist novel to pose the question of emigration to the Amer­i­cas is Shimazaki Tōson’s The Broken Commandment (Hakai), published in 1906, which cemented the author’s place in the literary establishment and modern Japa­nese canon. The narrative depicts a young schoolteacher in Nagano named Ushimatsu Segawa, who conceals a terrible secret regarding his outcaste burakumin origins. He swears an oath to his f­ ather never to reveal the truth, so as to pass in mainstream society and bury their f­amily history. To this end, the narrative adopts a strategy of meta­phor­ically driving its protagonist under­ground in a manner similar to what Deleuze and Guattari, in their reading of Kafka’s Metamorphosis, call “becoming-­animal.”29 Ushimatsu seeks paths of re­sis­tance and escape from the bureaucratic machinery of the Meiji educational system in which he works and the ideological state apparatus of national-­imperial subjectivity in which he lives and breathes, all of which w ­ ill ensnare him as a hinin (lit., “nonperson”) or eta, a derogatory word that translates as “full of filth,” if he should admit to his origins. Ushimatsu is torn between his bio-

Jacobowitz

183

logical ­father and his spiritual ­father, the charismatic writer Inoko Rentarō, who is a burakumin liberation activist and openly embraces being an outcaste to shatter the fearful stigma. As generations of readers have discovered to their dismay, however, the novel does not resolve this situation for Ushimatsu to “come out” and fight for civil rights following the deaths of his ­father and Inoko. Instead, Tōson makes recourse to a deus ex machina, or better still, “Texas ex machina,” whereby Ushimatsu, once his oath is broken, decides to permanently leave Japan and emigrate to Texas. However improbable and unsatisfying this may seem to con­temporary readers, Texas was one of several smaller North American colonies outside of the mainstays of Hawai‘i, California, and the Pacific Northwest.30 Ushimatsu decides to accompany the wealthy burakumin named Ohinata, who promises him a place in their “Japa­nese village” (Nihon mura): When Ushimatsu was introduced to Ohinata, he could not believe at first this was the man who was planning to start a bold and risky new venture overseas, in Texas—he might have been an ordinary country tradesman or herb doctor, he looked so ordinary; but gradually, as they talked, he sensed an unexpected depth in the other’s character, as well as a rocklike common sense. Ohinata told him of a “Japa­nese village” in Texas, and of some young men from Kita-­Sakuma who had gone to work t­ here, including one from a quite well-­to-do ­family who had graduated from a well-­known m ­ iddle school 31 in Tokyo.

Two so­cio­log­i­cal patterns coalesce in this passage. First, young men would establish themselves overseas in the same colony as their countrymen from the same village or province and then bring over wives and families (yobiyose) once conditions ­were suitable for their arrival. Second, although the paradigm for mass migration targeted the rural masses, the unrelenting burden of discrimination could compel even affluent and educated individuals from oppressed minority communities to seek a new life abroad. Kō Youngran has noted how controversy has surrounded t­ hese aspects of the protagonist’s identity: “Since the first publication of the revised edition of The Broken Commandment, voices from within the Burakumin Liberation Movement criticized not only the scene of Ushimatsu’s ‘confession,’ but also his being ‘Texas’ bound.”32 In 1957, she continues, Iwanami’s paperback edition included an afterward by the novelist and critic Noma Hiroshi, who

184

Chapter 7

went so far as to label the “search for a new paradise in Texas” a form of “escape.”33 The question of discrimination against burakumin and the notion of escaping imperial subjection through emigration lay bare the internal tensions inherent in national-­imperial subjectivity. Yet as Kō rightly insists, another issue at stake ­here is the changing nature of colonial emigration as reflected in the nomenclature of the Japa­nese government’s Immigrant Protection Law (Imin hogohō). Simply put, imin did not always mean “immigrant” or “immigration.” It encompassed a range of ­legal categories from temporary economic activities overseas resulting in eventual return to Japan to permanent residence and naturalization. The biases that presume a more exalted “expatriate” status for educated persons of means as opposed to regarding them as immigrants or economic refugees are clearly in evidence in the Meiji discourse of colonial emigration. A final point that Kō brings to the fore involves the number of immigrants to the United States, permanent or temporary, prior to the Gentlemen’s Agreement. According to the Japa­nese Foreign Ministry’s statistics on overseas migration, the number of immigrants r­ ose to 29,579 in 1906 and 20,808 in 1907. This high-­water mark in the Amer­i­cas would not be rivaled again or exceeded ­until the peak of Japa­nese mass migration to Brazil in the late 1920s and early 1930s. That shift ­toward South Amer­i­ca would only begin in earnest in the years immediately following the publication of ­these works by Hakuchō, Rōan, and Tōson, and its launching pad was Shinsen’s works in Colonization World.

“South Amer­i­ca Bound” “South Amer­i­ca Bound” was by design intended to educate ordinary citizens about emigration to a continent still largely a mystery to them, yet which had been judged the most favorable destination by Meiji Japan’s leading statesmen and expansionist ideologues. Shinsen’s narrative unfolds as a classic immigrant story of hardship and grit. In strictly workmanlike fashion, Horiuchi lay out the abject conditions, one a­ fter another, that prove the hopelessness of remaining in Japan. The narrator is born to a penniless ­family in the mountains of Kyushu. He and his best friend, Nisaburō, both of whose names indicate third-­born sons, strug­gle to eke out a living amid the harsh conditions in the rural southwest of Meiji Japan. Nisaburō is nicknamed “Tom Thumb” (issun bōshi) due to his diminutive stature that resulted

Jacobowitz

185

from a malnourished childhood. This fact is not lost on anyone in the village, who mercilessly bully and mock him for this ignominious mark of poverty stamped on his very being. ­A fter he is badly injured working as a woodcutter in the mountains, Nisaburō quits the village for good, g­ oing in search of better wages elsewhere. By contrast, the narrator served in the military and fought in the B ­ attle of Mukden during the Russo-­Japanese War. Katsuzō’s parents pass away, and he marries his cousin Mine, but his financial prospects remain unimproved u ­ ntil one day a letter comes from Yokohama, written by a fellow veteran from Kyushu, who encourages him to answer the call for able-­bodied laborers overseas. Seeing no alternative, Katsuzō entrusts his wife to his elder b ­ rother and sister-­in-­law, and plans to work two or three years abroad. He then makes the cross-­country journey to Yokohama, where the Meiji Emigration Com­pany puts him on the Kasato Maru bound for Peru. In June 1908, the serialized continuation of the story, entitled “The Expedition” (“Shokumin tai”), saw the Kasato Maru arrive in Callao, Peru, but with no further sign of the two young men from Kyushu. ­There was no murder mystery: Shinsen had abruptly and inexplicably written them out of the sequel. Their ignominious disappearance from the magazine corresponded, however, to an uncanny doubling of the ship itself, which appeared in a commemorative photo­ g raph taken of the 781 Japa­ nese immigrants on board the ship dated to April 1908, just prior to embarkation from Kobe.34 Considering that the National Diet Library includes this photo­graph in its trilingual online exhibit Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil with sole attribution to Colonization World, it remains the source of rec­ord for this historic departure.35 The permanent installation online by the NDL was inaugurated in 2008 to mark the centenary of the Japa­nese immigration to Brazil and therefore offers a striking present-­day acknowl­edgment by the Japa­nese government of Colonization World ’s contribution to the Meiji-­era discourse of expansionism through mass migration to South Amer­i­ca. It would be remiss not to mention that the iconography of the Kasato Maru in Brazil t­ oday is nearly ubiquitous, serving as a veritable Mayflower for the Nikkei community. Arguably the popularity of the Kasato Maru reached peak saturation in the centenary cele­bration, when photo­graphs and images of the steamer’s disembarkation in Santos graced the covers of magazines, books, postcards, and other publicity materials. A scale model of the ship remains on display at the Bunkyō Museum in the heart of São

186

Chapter 7

Paulo’s Japantown, along with a photo­graph of the ship in transit and assorted documents from this historic voyage. It has also been memorialized in the interior of Sao Paulo State with the Kasato Maru Park in the city of Sorocaba, some one hundred kilo­meters due west from the city of São Paulo. It features a traditional Japa­nese garden and bronze sculpture of a globe with a cable tracing its inaugural voyage. Yet even as the ship dematerializes into an endless reproduced signifier of immigrant arrival and the community’s spirit of perseverance and success,36 we must keep in mind that ­these very repre­sen­ta­tional origins began with Shinsen’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound” and Colonization World. Less effusive praise can be raised for the literary installments that ensued. Both “The Expedition Party” and its sequel, “A Voyage into the Deep Forest” (“Shinrin ryokō”), betray a change in focus whose chief priority was bridging the narrative from a story of national departure to one of foreign arrival and uncertain settlement. They eschew character development altogether, instead providing literary sketches of the topography, climate, and other notable aspects of the trip from port to the thick forests that lay outside the city limits of Lima. What remains are the formal genre markers that speak to the magazine’s imperative to create a genre based on ­actual lived experiences that it was not quite ready to deliver. In keeping with “South Amer­i­ca Bound” and its cartouche reading “settler colonist lit­er­a­ ture,” each of the two subsequent stories is labeled “settler colonist fiction” (shokumin shōsetsu) above the title and has a smaller parenthetical note below, marking it as a continuation (zokuhen) of the preceding story. ­These additional touches are curiously absent from the final two works of fiction in the magazine. Shinsen’s “The Torch” (“Aohi”) is essentially a story of filial piety with no reference to overseas life whatsoever. Mishima Sōsen’s “One House” (“Ikkenya”), published in the fourth issue, meanwhile, is only glossed as “fiction.” A vague reference in its opening lines to its “being set, simply put, in a certain state in North Amer­i­ca” (basho wa tan ni Hokubei no aru shū to itte okō)37 leads into the narrator’s somewhat dubious claim of having spent seven years living in California. Although his descriptions of ample opportunity for work in agriculture, animal husbandry, and fruit orchards are sufficiently anodyne, his claims to expertise in hunting quickly sour when he describes the bounty of local wildlife: “deer, rabbits, pheasants, pigeons, and kangaroos—it was almost unbelievable [uso no yō ni] how much I took home.”38 And so it was. This shambolic indifference to

Jacobowitz

187

FIG. 7.2.  Bronze sculpture, Kasato Maru Park, Sorocaba. Source: author’s personal collection.

verisimilitude was quite common in settler colonist fiction and pulp fiction more generally. Certainly many of the innumerable Japa­nese and Western texts produced in this discursive field in the three and half de­ cades leading up to World War II had their fair share of lurid, sensationalist, and nonsensical filler.39 This did not, however, diminish Colonization World ’s essentially tutelary role in shaping and bringing forth the literary

188

Chapter 7

genre that would continue to proselytize emigration as overseas expansionism and a form of patriotic duty for t­hose left b ­ ehind in Japan’s uneven modern and imperial development. For its long years of undistinguished ser­vice in lit­er­a­ture’s backbenches, the settler colonist fiction that traces its genealogy to “South Amer­i­ca Bound” was only belatedly elevated to belles lettres status in the twilight of its own success, when Ishikawa Tatsuzō’s short story “The Emigrants” (“Sōbō”) was awarded the inaugural Akutagawa Prize for Lit­er­a­t ure in August 1935. “The Emigrants” was adapted to film by the director Kumagai Hisatora in 1937, and then two years l­ater, Ishikawa republished his work as the novel The Emigrants: A Work in Three Parts with the addition of two more chapters, “South Seas Voyage” (“Nankai kōro”) and “­People without a Voice” (“Koe naki tami”), which depict the transoceanic passage, immigrants’ arrival in Santos, and their dispersal to their assigned plantations and colonies in Brazil. Ishikawa’s original short story pursues the essential narrative trajectory of Shinsen’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound” insofar as it lingers on the impoverished circumstances that lead the predominantly rural laboring masses to gather from all corners of Japan at the National Emigration Center in Kobe, and from t­ here to board immigrant steamers in search of a better life. At a remove of several years from his own traveling experiences, Ishikawa, too, would strive to represent ­those who took the plunge, in contrast to the ­earlier naturalist works that merely expressed intent or regret but cautiously remained on familiar shores. Settler colonist fiction’s temporarily elevated prospects in the wake of “The Emigrants” would be foreclosed within the span of a de­cade by the war, defeat, and Japan’s loss of empire. What had been a stolid, if decidedly unglamorous, genre defining a fundamental facet of Japa­nese modernity quickly faded into obscurity as the “myth of a homogenous Japan,” to borrow Oguma Eiji’s words, swiftly gathered force in the postwar era. Consequently, even for most modern Japa­nese literary scholars and historians, the anomaly of The Emigrants as a “singular” literary achievement was effectively all that remained known of the buried episteme that began with Shinsen’s “South Amer­i­ca Bound” and the imperial ambitions of Colonization World.

Jacobowitz

189

Notes 1. ​For a period of roughly a dozen years a­ fter the Gentlemen’s Agreement went into effect, a loophole permitted Japa­nese wives and ­children to join adult male immigrants in the United States. As Catherine Lee notes in Prostitutes and Picture Brides: Chinese and Japa­nese Immigration, Settlement, and American Nation-­Building, 1870–1920, its profound effects on the development of the Japa­nese American community w ­ ere threefold: “The practice of the proxy bride marriage had helped to alleviate ­earlier sex ratio imbalance, avoid the development of a bachelor society to which the Chinese community had succumbed, and foster the growth of a permanent Japa­nese American settlement.” Lee, Prostitutes and Picture Brides, p. 36. 2. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese, pp. 3–4. 3. ​This Shokumin sekai is not to be confused with the single-­issue magazine of the same name but that uses an alternate spelling, published in April 1910 by the South Amer­i­ca Association (Nanbei kyōkai). 4. ​Wada, “ ‘Risshi shōsetsu’ no yukue,” pp. 303–332. I follow Wada’s lead in concentrating on Shinsen as the focus for the pre­sent study. 5. ​Iacobelli, Postwar Emigration, p. 14. 6. ​Takeuchi, Nihonjin no shusse kan. Also cited in Wada, “ ‘Risshi shōsetsu’ no yukue,” p. 307. 7. ​Dates for the print runs of ­these journals, few of which are extant ­today in their entirety, come from the CiNii (Scholarly and Academic Information Navigator) provided by Japan’s National Institute of Informatics. 8. ​Kodama Kagai (1874–1943) was a socialist-­leaning poet who saw two collections of his work banned in 1903 and 1907. Thereafter, he turned to writing nationalist, imperialist, and pro-­expansionist poems for Colonization World, Adventure World (Bōken sekai), and Heroic World (Bukyō sekai). 9. ​ Ōkuma, “Yamato,” p. 1. 10. ​ Ōkuma, “Yamato,” p. 2. 11. ​ Ōkuma, “Yamato,” p. 2. 12. ​ Ōkuma, “Yamato,” p. 3. 13. ​Ōkuma, “Yamato,” p. 3. 14. ​Gotō, “Teikoku daigaku shokumin kōza keikaku,” pp. 4–5. 15. ​For further reading on Takekoshi’s role in founding the pro-­expansionist journal Japan in the World (Sekai no Nippon) in 1896 and the patronage it received from Japa­nese politicians, see Lu, The Making of Japa­nese Colonialism, pp. 109–210. Lu also provides valuable context for an ­earlier (1890s) debate about colonialism in the South Seas region that enjoined contributions from Ōkuma and Takekoshi (pp. 162–163). 16. ​Cited in Tierney, Tropics of Savagery, p. 108. I signal my debt h ­ ere to Tierney’s inclusion of Colonization World in his analy­sis of colonial lit­er­a­t ure linked to Southern Expansionist Doctrine in the South Seas region. 17. ​Takekoshi, “Shokumin bungaku o furiokoseyo,” p. 6. 18. ​Takekoshi, “Shokumin bungaku o furiokoseyo,” p. 6. 19. ​Takekoshi, “Shokumin bungaku o furiokoseyo,” p. 6–7. 20. ​Takahashi, “Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi,” p. 22. 21. ​Takahashi, “Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi,” p. 22.

190

Chapter 7

22. ​Takahashi, “Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi,” p. 23. 23. ​Takahashi, “Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi,” p. 23. 24. ​Kō, “ ‘Texas’ o meguru gensetsuken,” p. 201. 25. ​Kamei, Nijū seiki zenki no bungaku. 26. ​Jacobowitz, review of Struggling Upward. 27. ​Masamune, “Dust,” p. 408. 28. ​See Wada, “ ‘Risshi shōsetsu’ no yukue,” pp. 310–311. 29. ​See Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 38. 30. ​Japa­nese colonies w ­ ere founded in half a dozen counties in Texas between 1903 and 1914, where they had been invited to help develop the Gulf Coast rice industry. The Yamato Colony in Boca Raton, Florida, originally founded in 1903 as a pineapple plantation, is another such example of an isolated rural colony in the southeastern United States. 31. ​Shimazaki, Broken Commandment, p. 245. 32. ​Kō, “ ‘Texas’ o meguru gensetsuken,” p. 273. 33. ​Kō, “ ‘Texas’ o meguru gensetsuken,” p. 274. 34. ​See the National Diet Library digital collection for the centenary of Japa­nese immigration to Brazil, accessed November 21, 2021, https://­w ww​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/ ­brasil​/­data​ /­R ​/­S006​/­S006–001r​.­html. 35. ​See the National Diet Library digital collection for the centenary of Japa­nese immigration to Brazil, accessed September 1, 2021, https://­w ww​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/ ­brasil​/­data​ /­R ​/­S006​/­S006–001r​.­html. 36. ​Further examples of the Kasato Maru “brand” have been variously attached to a Brazilian craft beer, incongruously described by its brewers as a “New E ­ ngland IPA,” as well as a Japa­nese restaurant, h ­ otel, and office building. 37. ​Mishima, “One House,” p. 30. 38. ​Mishima, “One House,” p. 30. 39. ​In addition to such contemporaneous works of Western settler colonist fiction as Edgar Rice Burroughs’s Tarzan of the Apes (1912), with its blatantly racist misrepre­ sen­ta­tions of cannibalistic Africans and savage ape-­men, ­there is the Japa­nese cartoonist Tagawa Suiho’s New Year’s in the Tropics (Nanyō no oshōgatsu, 1930), published in the popu­lar magazine Young Men’s Club (Shōnen kurabu), which unabashedly depicts the Indigenous p ­ eople, flora, and fauna according to Sambo-­like caricatures from the “dark continent” of Africa.

c h a p t e r

8

Chasing the Transnational Flow of Books and Magazines Materials, Knowledge, and Network Yoshitaka Hibi

T

his chapter examines book distribution networks that connected the Japa­nese colonial empire with South Amer­i­ca, parts of North Amer­ i­ca, and East Asia before World War II. Although Japa­nese overseas and in their homeland ­were closely linked by vari­ous cir­cuits, it was the distribution network of books, magazines, and newspapers that enabled the exchange of knowledge and information among ordinary ­people. From local news to po­liti­cal articles, popu­lar novels to textbooks for c­ hildren, books and magazines have actively linked Japa­nese ­people. It is clear from the history of Japa­nese communities in North Amer­i­ca that immigrants from Japan, from the beginning, rented retail stores to sell newspapers, magazines, and books. Full-­time bookstores appeared shortly ­after that in areas with sizeable Japa­nese immigrant populations. Distribution companies in Japan linked t­ hese immigrant shops and bookstores with publishers in their home countries. It is necessary to understand the culture created in the Japa­nese language to understand the first generation of immigrants (Issei). In many cases, Issei ­were not fluent in host countries’ languages, such as Spanish, Portuguese, and En­glish, so they relied on media written in their native language for information, from everyday conversations to highly technical topics. Hence, the creation of the Japa­nese immigrant culture in North Amer­ i­ca, South Amer­i­ca, and other regions is inseparable from building and maintaining Japanese-­language environments, enabling p ­ eople to read, write, listen, and speak through Japa­nese. Only a­ fter distribution systems ­were created; newspapers, magazines, and books from Japan ­were imported; and such printed materials ­were published within the settlements outside 191

192

Chapter 8

Japan could sustainable ecosystems of Japa­nese immigrant culture emerge. What is impor­tant is that ­these publications ­were supported by a transnational distribution network consisting of vari­ous agencies, such as publishers, distributors, booksellers, readers, and writers inside and outside Japan.1 I should pay par­tic­u­lar attention to the materiality of books and its contribution to developing Japa­nese immigrants’ culture.2 Books and magazines w ­ ere not only imported for the enjoyment of immigrants. They w ­ ere a bond to immigrants’ homeland culture, essential ele­ments that s­haped their lives in host countries, and resources that ­shaped their minds. In other words, they w ­ ere among the most impor­tant actors in the formation of immigrants. Printed materials ­were critically impor­tant to sustain and develop the Japa­nese immigrant community. Books, newspapers, and magazines published in Japa­nese w ­ ere indispensable, especially for t­ hose of the Issei generation who had not yet mastered the language of the host community. They ­were responsible for the circulation of information within the community and maintained informational and emotional ties with their homeland. By reading the same media, they contributed to the creation of an ­imagined community of “Japa­nese immigrants” or “Japa­nese living in North/South Amer­i­ca.” This chapter focuses on how the Japa­nese empire and Latin Amer­i­ca ­were connected through the network of books and bookstores, tracing three Japa­nese immigrant history pieces to the Amer­i­cas. The first is the president of a book distribution com­pany, Mochizuki Seiji. The com­pany, Nippon Shuppan Bōeki Co., Ltd., exported books to South and North Amer­i­ca, and a book distribution network was built across the Pacific Ocean, de­cades before the end of World War II. The second is a bookstore, Endō Shoten, located in São Paulo, and a magazine, Bunka (Culture), published by the store. Examining the magazine articles, I argue that the role of books and magazines sold by Japa­nese bookstores in colonies, like Endō Shoten in São Paulo, acted as a critical f­actor in the colonies’ cultural scenes. I conclude with a brief history of bookstores established and dis­appeared in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from the 1920s to the 1940s, compared to other bookstores of Japa­nese overseas territories and settlements. This chapter aims to shed light on the transnational history of materials, knowledge, and ­people that connected Japan and immigrant communities in the Amer­i­cas to understand the role of the broad and multilayered networks of print culture and business. By focusing on t­ hese three topics, I give an overview of

Hibi

193

the history of the distribution of books between South Amer­i­ca and Japan, linking the history of the book distributors and their networks that connected with Japan’s overseas settlements to the history and role of specific retail bookstores in the immigrant communities.

Outline of Book Exports to the Amer­i­cas Attempts to export books and magazines out of Japan appeared in each region’s commercial centers when more Japa­nese w ­ ere ­going abroad to work. As an early attempt a­ fter the Meiji period, general merchandise stores w ­ ere selling or renting books from the 1890s in Japa­nese immigrant areas in Hawai‘i and North Amer­i­ca.3 In East Asia, as early as 1892, a bookstore called Hakubunkan opened in Hoeryong, on the Korean peninsula;4 ­after the Sino-­Japanese War, Niitakadō Shoten opened in Taipei; 5 ­a fter the Russo-­Japanese War, Tōa Kōshi, which traded in Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Fengtian, and other trading areas, opened; in Manchuria, an Osaka Yagō Shoten opened;6 and in Kolsakov (Ōdomari) in Sakhalin, a bookstore called Saito Branch opened in 1907.7 ­Until 1945, Japa­nese books and magazines for foreign countries ­were mainly distributed in colonies and occupied territories in East Asia, but t­ here was also a flow of books to North Amer­i­ca, South Amer­i­ca, and the South Seas. According to an article written in 1942, before the Pacific War intensified, the overseas destinations and dealers, excluding colonies, w ­ ere as follows: North Amer­i­ca and Hawai‘i: Iwagami Shōten North Amer­i­ca: Hakubundō, Katō Seiki Shōten, Goshadō, Aoki Taiseidō South Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope: Nippai Kaisha South Amer­i­ca: Kodama Akito, Endō Shōten Hawai‘i: Terada Yasutarō, Kojima Shōten North and South Amer­i­ca: Furuya Bōeki Gaisha Philippines: Ōta KōGyō Kaisha, Mayon Bazā Shiirebu Canada: Kōmura Shōten South Sea: Taiheiyō Bōeki Gaisha, Nanyō Bōeki Gaisha, Bungendō French Indochina: Shiroki Bōeki Gaisha, Seibudō Hawai‘i, North and South Amer­i­ca, Thailand, French Indochina, South Seas Islands: Yokohama Shōji Gaisha.8

194

Chapter 8

As for South Amer­i­ca, store names such as Nippai Gaisha, Kodama Akito, Endō Shōten, Furuya Bōeki Gaisha, and Yokohama Shōji Gaisha can be found. Nippai is a national, centralized distribution com­pany of books and magazines, established in 1942. Furuya Bōeki Gaisha is a trading com­pany that started business in Seattle. I describe Endō Shōten and Yokohama Shōji Gaisha l­ater. Kodama Akito is unknown, but he was prob­ ably a representative of a trading com­pany. Immigrants from Japan headed to North Amer­i­ca e­ arlier than South Amer­i­ca. Thus, the transportation of books for Japa­nese immigrants to North Amer­i­ca was improved ­earlier than for South Amer­i­ca. In San Francisco, for example, as early as the 1890s, rental bookstores and side business booksellers appeared. Side business bookstores ­were general merchandise stores that imported food, sundries, and souvenirs from Japan while ­handling novels and magazines. This kind of business was often seen in Japa­nese immigrant towns before the birth of full-­time bookstores, and we find that a store in Buenos Aires did the same business in the same manner as discussed ­later. The first full-­time bookstore for Japa­nese immigrants in San Francisco was Fuyōdō, which appeared in 1900. From that time, full-­time bookstores w ­ ere established one ­after another in the Japa­nese quarter of San Francisco, and around 1910, they grew to about eight bookstores within the area, creating a type of bookstore district. Since immigration to North Amer­i­ca was in part a bypass for young Japa­nese students who had dropped out of school in the ­middle of the Meiji era, Japa­nese immigrants in North Amer­i­ca w ­ ere relatively well educated. The success of bookstores in ­S eattle and San Francisco depended on the existence of highly literate ­immigrants. With the development of Japanese-­language bookstores in North Amer­i­ca, book exports to North Amer­i­ca began to be or­ga­nized. The American Booksellers Union of Japan was formed in 1915, with bookstores from San Francisco, Los Angeles, and other states of California as well as bookstores from Seattle, Chicago, Denver, and New York,9 and by 1930, the American Booksellers Union grew to include all booksellers on the Pacific coast.10 It was more advantageous to import as a ­union than to import as an individual store ­because visa fees and customs clearance fees ­were discounted, and it became pos­si­ble to negotiate fare discounts and loading methods.11 Mochizuki Masaharu was also involved in the formation of this ­union. Mochizuki initially worked for a store, Ōhu Shōkai, in Sacramento,

Hibi

195

California. He went to the United States in 1906 and found a job at a store that sold food and sundries to Japa­nese. H ­ ere, Mochizuki started selling books from Japan through the agency. As was ­later related in the com­pany history, “Books and magazines imported from Japan have spread not only to North Amer­i­ca but also to South Amer­i­ca, Cuba and Alaska through the unique mail-­order system.”12 At the request of his fellow traders, Mochizuki returned to Japan in 1918 to be involved in joint stocking operations and began exporting books and magazines to the United States and other countries as a branch office of the Yorozu Store in Sacramento.13 Aiming to expand its business further, Mochizuki established Yokohama Shōji Co., Ltd., in 1920 to start “trade that connects Japan with the United States and other countries.” The main business was the export of publications and general merchandise to Japa­ nese immigrants living abroad, the results of which l­ater included the “[­handling of] more than 60% of Japan’s publications exports.”14 As shown in the list of destinations and dealers mentioned above, Yokohama Shoji also handled the distribution of books to South Amer­i­ca. As Japan entered the Pacific War, the Japa­nese economy began to adopt a total war system, and the print culture was increasingly restricted. In May 1941, all the distributors of books and magazines ­were integrated, and Nihon Shuppan Haikyū Kabushiki Kaisha (Nippai) was established to control the distribution of all national publications, including overseas territories, with an integrated and centralized system. Companies involved in the export of books to foreign countries ­were integrated in the same way, and in January 1942, Nihon Shuppan Bōeki Co., Ltd., was established, “aiming to unify overseas exports of Japa­nese books.”15 Mochizuki, who was one of the found­ers of the organ­ization, became its first president. However, all trade with the United States was put on hold due to the US government’s freezing of assets in 1941. A ­ fter that, shares in Nihon Shuppan Bōeki w ­ ere transferred to Nippai, and the com­pany was placed u ­ nder Nippai management. As the war became worse, they could not perform their duties. During the war, the American Booksellers Union of Japa­nese was suspected of having a close relationship with Japan and was questioned by the FBI several times.16 ­There ­were other book exporters than Yokohama Shoji. Around 1933, an organ­ization called the Japan Magazine and Book Exporters’ Union was established. It mainly dealt with magazines to Hawai‘i, North Amer­i­ca, South Amer­i­ca, and Canada.17

196

Chapter 8

As for the popu­lar products that ­were exported to the overseas territories and settlements, they differed depending on where the bookstores ­were located. In the case of South Amer­i­ca, it can be said that Japa­nese magazines, fiction (e.g., novels and kodan stories, traditional narratives mostly about samurai), and language books (such as Portuguese and Spanish dictionaries and conversation texts) ­were popu­lar. In the analy­sis of bookstores in Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires that follows, I pre­sent specific examples of the kinds of books and magazines that w ­ ere imported.

Creating Local Culture: Endo¯ Shoten and Culture From ­here, I move to the specific history of Japa­nese bookstores in Latin Amer­i­ca. This section looks into Endō Shoten, a bookstore that has been ­doing business in the Japa­nese quarter of São Paulo. Official immigration from Japan to Brazil began in 1908 when the Kasato Maru arrived at the port of Santos. The first Japanese-­language newspaper, a weekly named Nambei, was published eight years l­ater in 1916. As the population of Japa­nese immigrants increased, Japa­nese newspapers developed significantly. According to 80 Years of Japa­nese Immigrants to Brazil, in 1938, the Nichihaku shinbun (est. 1916) sold 19,000 copies; Braziru jihō (est. 1917), 17,000; Seishu shimpō (est. 1921), 9,000; Aliansa jihō (est. 1930), 5,500; and 4500 for Noroesute minpō (est. 1934), 4,500.18 A survey conducted in 1939 within the jurisdiction of the consulate in Bauru wrote: of the 11,576 ­house­holds (comprising 36,051 males and 32,281 females) of Japa­nese descent, 10,154 (approximately 87.7  ­percent) subscribed to Japa­nese newspapers, 5,967 (approximately 51.5 ­percent) to magazines for men, 1,168 (approximately 10.1 ­percent) to magazines for ­women, and 1,078 (approximately 9.3 ­percent) to magazines for ­children.19 We can see the overwhelming subscription rate of Japa­nese newspapers and learn from this survey that magazines also spread to many ­house­holds. In terms of magazine subscriptions, Kodansha’ s Shōjo kurabu, Shōnen kurabu, and Kodomo no sono ­were the most popu­lar magazines for c­ hildren, while Fujin kurabu was the most popu­lar w ­ omen’s magazine, with Shufu no tomo in second place. By far, the majority of the magazines for boys ­were King, with Kodansha’s magazines in the majority, and such magazines for intellectuals as Chūōkōron, Kaizo, and Bungei shunjū ­were very rare.20

Hibi

197

Most of the newspapers w ­ ere written in Japa­nese in Brazil, and very few titles ­were imported from Japan. Wada Atsuhiko points out that immigrants in São Paulo, Brazil, in the 1930s had diverse distribution channels for books and magazines.21 Shops and bookstores imported and sold books from Japan, and Japa­nese newspapers, such as Nippaku shinbun and Braziru jihō, ­were also bought and sold. In addition, ­there ­were cases in which Japa­nese cooperatives published magazines, operated bookstores, and sold imported books. Furthermore, some local Japa­nese associations and youth associations took o­ rders for books and magazines and delivered them to readers living in the colonies. For example, the number of magazines and newspapers handled as many as 10,000 and 624,000 readers, respectively, during the year. A similar point was made by Mori Koichi. Youth associations purchased magazines, such as Yūben, Gendai, Kingu, Kōdan kurabu, and ­Women’s Kurabu from a book importer in São Paulo at the expense of the association and circulated them.22 Mori added that information and knowledge from newspapers, magazines, and books imported from Japan, combined with Japanese-­ language education and networks of Japa­nese organ­izations, formed the ethnic identity of “Japa­nese expatriates in Brazil” and “compatriots in Brazil.” The volume of books imported from Japan to Brazil increased by about 26 ­percent from 5,674 kg in 1928 to 7,147 kg in 1931.23 Endō Shoten has drawn attention when considering the Japanese-­ language environment in São Paulo. H ­ ere is the bookstore’s profile, following the most detailed description by Edward Mack.24 Endō Shoten was founded by Tsunesaburō Endō. Endō was born about 1890 and moved to São Paulo in 1913. He first worked as an assistant to a physician, but in September 1917, he was selling soy sauce. In August 1920, he opened a store that sold confectioneries, sundries, medicine, and more, and among the products he handled was the “rental book.” The store was not located in the city of São Paulo, but in Birigui, São Paulo State, located about 520 km northwest of São Paulo City. He opened a bookstore in São Paulo in 1923. In 1932, Endō Shōten changed its name to Endō Shoten on its tenth anniversary and became a bookstore in both name and real­ity. In addition to selling books at the store, Endō Shoten also sold books by mail and was a ­wholesaler to relay books to other stores in Brazil. From January 19, 1942, the distribution of printed materials in Japa­nese and the use of the Japa­ nese language in public places ­were prohibited ­under the direction of the São Paulo Security Bureau. Endō’s bookstore was closed, and its stock was

198

Chapter 8

hidden in a ware­house, but it was discovered and confiscated by the authorities. In 1949, the shop was reopened, and he started to sell second­ hand books and magazines and continued u ­ ntil 1965. Wada Atsuhiko researched the magazine Culture (published by Endō Shoten), compiled a total ­table of contents, and examined its features. Culture was first published in November 1938, and a total of nine volumes w ­ ere published as monthly magazines ­until September 1939. Ando Kiyoshi, who had worked for the Burajiru jihō and Nippaku shinbun, served as an editor in chief. Wada characterized Culture by “se­lection and introduction of Japanese-­language publications with an awareness of culture,” “awareness of and prob­lems with publishing and reading environments in immigrant areas,” and “the point of self-­reflection and valuing the act of reading.”25 Culture was a diverse magazine with a wide variety of articles. On the one hand, ­there ­were editorials that questioned the state of Japa­nese communities in Brazil and debated the politics and colonial policies of the ­mother country; on the other hand, t­ here ­were character reviews, travelogues, and accounts of exploration. Culture also promoted lit­er­a­ture. Haiku and tanka poems appeared in the magazine, and a colonial lit­er­a­t ure prize was planned by Endō Shoten, with the support of the group of the coterie magazine Horizon and the editors of Culture. Noguchi Takeji has also written an in­ter­est­ing article, “Retrospective on the Japa­nese Literary Circle,” in which he looks back on the literary figures of the Japa­nese literary circle in Brazil, referring to the currents in his native Japan.26 In this paper, which focuses on the role of bookstores in South Amer­i­ca, it is impor­tant to note that Culture also had the character of a reading guide, since Endō Shoten was involved. For example, in volume 1, issue 2 (December 1938), ­there is a column entitled Best-­Selling Books in Japan from January to October of This Year, listing Pearl S. Buck’s The Good Earth and The ­Mother and Ishizaka Yojiro’s Wakai hito as well as a total of thirty-­seven titles.27 In the column titled Reading Adviser, a reader requested, “Please tell me the names of authoritative books on Japa­nese history published in the last few years”; the writer answered carefully, naming specific books for over two pages. In addition, ­there ­were many advertisements for vari­ ous books with introductions to their contents. Many of the members of the literary coterie Horizon, which was active mainly in São Paulo, joined the magazine Culture. ­A fter the Brazilian authorities imposed restrictions on the Japa­nese language, from the ninth issue in 1939, the magazine announced that it would become the official

Hibi

199

journal of the research association of Japan and Brazil, or­ga­nized by students of the São Paulo Law School. It is clear that Culture had a role to play as a base for Japa­nese activities, and amid the changes in Brazil’s cultural governance policy, it was also intended to be a medium to support the activities of Brazilian intellectuals who ­were interested in Japan.

Bookstores as a Hub of Knowledge: Bookstores in Argentina Sinya Yoshio and Toriumi Chujirō are regarded as the first official Japa­ nese immigrants to Argentina ­after diplomatic relations ­were established between Japan and that country.28 In 1900, when the pair arrived on an Argentine training ship, Shinya was sixteen and Toriumi only thirteen. Japa­nese immigration to Argentina, unlike Peru and Brazil, was not based on collective ­labor contracts. As a result, Japa­nese immigrants in Argentina w ­ ere often t­ hose who had once entered Peru or Brazil and moved to other countries. For instance, it has been reported that 160 out of the 781 immigrants that had arrived on the Kasato Maru in 1908, the first Brazilian immigrants, eventually moved to Argentina.29 According to the 1930 Japa­nese census, Argentina had 3,888 Japa­nese residents, which included industrial workers, agricultural and horticultural workers, café workers, and employees or ­owners of dyeing and laundry businesses.30 According to a rec­ord of 1931, of the 4,300–4,500 Japa­nese living in Argentina, about 3,000 of them lived in Buenos Aires. 31 This characteristic of professional composition made the Japa­nese community in Argentina unique. The Japa­nese quarter was not formed since many urban dwellers ran cafés and operated dyeing and washing shops. ­These businesses (cafés and laundries) w ­ ere not allowed on the same premises; they had to go where no Japa­nese w ­ ere. From the Boca and Barracas districts, where Japa­nese lived together in the 1910s and the 1920s, Japa­nese had made inroads into vari­ous parts of the city and even into cities all over Argentina. The number of Japa­nese living in Boca and Barracas gradually decreased, and the Japa­nese quarter never appeared again in ­A rgentina.32 Unlike San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle in North Amer­i­ca and São Paulo in Brazil, Buenos Aires did not form a large Japa­nese district, but even a few Japa­nese bookstores appeared ­there. ­Here is a brief history

200

Chapter 8

based on advertisements in the Aruzenchin jihō (est. 1924) and other local Japa­nese newspapers. The oldest rec­ord of a bookseller I found to date was an advertisement printed in a newspaper for a general merchandise store in 1919, promoting “new Japa­nese magazines and novels” and “rental books,” alongside “Japa­ nese medicine,” “sundries,” “postcards of Japa­nese beauty,” and “rice cakes.”33 This type of subsidiary business by general merchandise stores was seen in San Francisco in North Amer­i­ca before full-­time bookstores appeared. Although the number of customers may not have been large, this advertisement tells us that some immigrants considered reading a part of their lives and that ­there was a desire to read Japa­nese books at a very early stage of immigration. As an early attempt to import printed materials from Japan, the Aruzenchin Jihō Com­pany planned the following. An advertisement printed in the newspaper on January 7, 1928, stated, “We provide new arrival books” and announced that the Aruzenchin Jihō Com­pany itself would sell them. The ad said that the money order should be addressed to “T. Midzuno,” publisher of the Aruzenchin jihō, that is, Mizuno Tsutomu. The description included “fictions and o­ thers,” “translations and sexual reading,” c­ hildren’s articles, kōdan storytelling, and magazines. However, no further articles appeared about the Aruzenchin Jihō Com­pany’s own efforts to sell books. It is unclear why the attempt did not work well, but it may have had to do with the relationship between the publisher and the distributor in the country, transportation prob­lems, a cash flow prob­lem, a ­labor shortage, or a profit shortage.34 Making money in the bookstore business in the Japa­nese community in Argentina was not easy at the time. Japa­nese newspapers in East Asian colonial cities often carried advertisements for magazines and books by publishers in Tokyo and Kansai, but no such advertisements existed in the Aruzenchin jihō as in Japa­nese newspapers in North Amer­i­ca. This was prob­ably due to the size of the market. However, the exception is language books. In the Aruzenchin jihō, dictionaries and Spanish textbooks appeared early on. For example, in an advertisement published on February 4, 1928, Ha­ra Shōten, a shop dealing with “Japa­ nese and Chinese fine arts,” was promoting three “new arrival dictionaries” concerning the Spanish language: Supein go kaiwa bunpō (Spanish conversation grammar), Dokushū supeingo zenshaku (Complete lecture for self-­ studying Spanish), Seiyaku seiwa jiten (Spanish translation, Spanish-­Japanese dictionary).

Hibi

201

The bookstore first mentioned in an advertisement in the Aruzenchin jihō is Libreria Oriental (also known as Orientaru Shoten), which was established at 3757 Santa Fé, in the northern part of the Japa­nese settlement in Buenos Aires on February 15, 1930. The owner was Hattori Toyosaburō. Hattori was born as the third son of Hattori Kyōichi, the principal of the Japa­nese Colonial School in Sapporo in 1911, and moved to Argentina with some of his fellow alumni a­ fter graduating from ju­nior high school in 1928. ­A fter arriving in Argentina, Hattori worked on a farm near Buenos Aires, but he returned to Buenos Aires soon and opened his bookstore. Hence, the opening of the bookstore was not that long ­after he had settled in Argentina. He was around twenty then.35 On November 29, the store’s opening advertisement, explaining its business plans, listed the following items: “lithography, typography, and art printing,” “special agency for Kodansha’s nine famous magazines,” and “sales of general books, stationery, and papers.” The titles of the illustrated magazines ­were Kingu, Fuji, Gendai, Yūben, Fujin kurabu, Shōnen kurabu, Shōjo kurabu, and Yōnen kurabu. Libreria Oriental provided delivery ser­ vices for magazines and books to the customers in town as was usual for bookstores at that time. An advertisement in the Aruzenchin jihō on February 6 showed the price of the six magazines of Kodansha in a tabular format with the large caption, “Japa­nese magazines and newspapers.” According to a note at the shop, they accepted only advanced payment o­ rders and did not sell books at the store. According to this advertisement, the Libreria Oriental also sold reduced-­ size editions of the Osaka mainichi shinbun and Osaka asahi shinbun. The publisher even planned to import the Osaka mainichi shinbun, the daily, according to an advertisement on March 28, 1931. The ambitious bookstore Libreria Oriental seemed to be d ­ oing well, but it was not easy to sell Japa­nese publications in remote areas. On April 4, 1931, an advertisement contained an apology by the bookstore. Only a few books and magazines of the first order since December of the previous year had arrived in April. The article said that the trou­ble was caused by a ­mistake in the communication from Japan to the Libreria Oriental. It explained that it was too far from Japan to respond to the situation immediately. The following week, on the eleventh, an advertisement announced that some of the magazines had been sent to customers who had made reservations. It was not u ­ ntil four months a­ fter the application that Argentine readers obtained new Japa­nese magazines.

202

Chapter 8

As of August 22, Libreria Oriental’s advertisement had dis­appeared from the pages of the Aruzenchin jihō. Hattori, the owner of the store, wrote the following in 1930: “­Today we have more than 3,500 Japa­nese and 2,500 residents in Buenos Aires.”36 It is difficult to say how many magazine and book buyers w ­ ere divided among the Japa­nese residents, but the management of the bookstore prob­ably did not do well. According to Hattori’s chronology, he had started working for the weekly Japa­nese newspaper in Buenos Aires in June 1932 and ­later became its editor in chief. Then he was engaged in a trade com­pany and began the management of an ironworks. He was president of the Dōai Shintaku Co., Ltd., from 1964 to 1980 and remained active in the Argentine business world for a long time a­ fter the war and even published a book on his own.37 The next appearance of a bookstore advertisement in the pages of the Aruzenchin jihō was on May 25, 1934, in the ten-­year anniversary issue of the newspaper. The bookstore was named Nakagawa Shoten, at 3040 Rivadabia, with the ad saying, “Sales of Japa­nese book magazines.” It was located a l­ittle south of the Libreria Oriental, also in the area where Japa­ nese live. The date of establishment is unclear. In a December 1934 advertisement, we can find Nakagawa Shoten promoting “Sale Japa­nese Books and Magazines, brokering Sales” and dealing with “1935 Asahi Yearbook,” “diaries,” and “other vari­ous monthly magazines, books, newspapers.” The advertisements by Nakagawa Shoten can be found up to April 13, 1935. Instead, an advertisement by Naoki Kurata, ­under the name “Agent of Nakagawa Shoten,” carried on the twenty-­seventh. The location of the store was dif­fer­ent from that of Nakagawa Shoten, 40 Luzuriaga, which was located farther south. The indication “agent” can be seen ­until August 3, and a­ fter that, the advertisement of “sales of magazines and books” ­under the name Naoki Kurata was put out for a while. The name Kurata Shoten first appeared in December. It can be said that this was the birth of Kurata Shoten, a representative—­that is, almost the only—­Japanese bookstore of Buenos Aires, which survived ­until April 1941. Interestingly, the name Kurata Shoten first appeared not in bookstores’ advertisements but in the introduction of a new publication of a book. Yoshio Shinya, an early intellectual among Japa­nese immigrants in Argentina, published a book entitled Pequeña contribution para la grandeza Argentina in Spanish. When the advertisement for this book appeared in the Aruzenchin jihō, Kurata Shoten was designated a sales agent.

Hibi

203

Kurata Shoten began to actively conduct its business. By following the contents of the advertisement by the bookstore, we can learn more about the Japa­nese publication culture in Buenos Aires during this period. An advertisement on January 11, 1936, said, “New Year’s issues arrived one ­after another!! Order before it is sold out” and encouraged ­people to order the New Year’s issue. The New Year’s issue, which is often filled with outstanding editing, was a familiar item that fostered a sense of the seasons in their home country. The sale of diaries at the end of the year was also paired with the New Year holiday. Buying a diary for the new year was a common practice in modern Japan. The most famous diary book of this period was published by Hakubunkan, which Kurata Shoten also advertised during January and February.38 What is in­ter­est­ing is a passage in the same advertisement stating, “We are open ­every Sunday, so please feel ­free to come.” This showed that, unlike other bookstores, Kurata Shoten did not allow customers to survey its stores during normal weekdays. Instead, they conducted a preorder and delivery business. The expression “we are open” tells us the nuance of not just being open and selling in the store but providing more freedom to use the interior space. From the same advertisement, it is known that the store had not only magazines in stock but also newly published books, especially popu­lar novels, including a reference to “several hundred books.” Kurata Shoten not only sold books but also rec­ords, like other Japa­nese bookstores of that period. For example, an advertisement dated April 24, 1937, stated, “Special sales of rec­ords in Japan started” and “Latest disks from Columbia, Victor and Polydor w ­ ill arrive soon.” Both Libreria Oriental and Nakagawa Shoten, which w ­ ere mentioned ­earlier, focused on new-­a rrival magazines and did not list the names of books they dealt with. It was only natu­ral that the bookstores placed popu­ lar magazines at the forefront of sales since they ­were expected to earn a regular income. On the other hand, one should not expect a large number of ­orders for books, and ­there ­were too many titles. Kurata Shoten also promoted the titles of major magazines such as Gendai, Yūben, Shōgaku ichi-­ nensei, ­women’s magazines, Hinode, Kōdan kurabu, and Fuji. He sometimes stated the titles of newly published books, such as Daisan kisou no ue ni by Kagawa Toyohiko, Bakusin by Mutō Teiishi, Senka by Kimura Ki, Shinran by Yoshikawa Eiji, Todoroki hanpei by Nomura Kodō, Shina jihen shashin zenshū, kanton shingun shō by Hino Ashihei, Nissosen ni sonahuru sho by

204

Chapter 8

Mutō Teiichi, and Sensen by Hayashi Fumiko. We can determine what interested readers ­here: the Sino-­Japanese War and the anticipated war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the latest works by famous novelists and books on current affairs. Th ­ ese titles indicate that t­ here ­were many books for the masses. The advertisements in the Aruzenchin jihō tell us that ­there was another bookstore in Buenos Aires in the late 1930s: Ōshiro Shoten (Tairyudō), which was run by Ōshiro Masao. Ōhshiro Shoten opened on February 5, 1936, and was located at 541 Entre Rios, as a “sales agent of magazines, books, and local newspapers from the home country.” By 1938, however, Tairyudō had dis­appeared from the pages of the Aruzenchin jihō. The reason is unknown. ­There might have been too many bookstores in Buenos Aires, or a personal reason could have led the owner to close the store or move. Kurata Shoten closed its shop in 1941. On April 1, the store changed its name to Miyazono Shoten. It is almost certain that Miyazono Shoten was the successor to Kurata Shoten, since the advertisement used the same address, phone number, and titles of the newly published books in the same format as Kurata Shoten.39 Miyazono Shoten continued to follow the line of Kurata Shoten ­until around November, but in the advertisement on November 1, it slightly changed. It listed rather sensational titles: A ­Woman’s Feeling by Yoshio Natsuo, Hitozuma no kyōyō by Shikiba Ryūzaburō, and Nikutai no ikusa by Naomichi Ōishi. Advertisements by Miyazono Shoten dis­ appeared in 1942, and a­ fter that, ­there ­were no traces of bookstores in the Aruzenchin jihō ­until August 1944.

The Impact of the Book and Bookstores The bookstore and the books served a fundamental function, both intellectually and on a daily basis, in sustaining the immigrant community. Lastly, I examine the role of bookstores and books in South American immigrant communities, paying par­tic­u­lar attention to their materiality. First, bookstores and books play a role in connecting immigrants to the culture of their home countries. In relation to the subject of this collection, it can be said that they connected Latin American Japa­nese immigrants to the Japa­ nese empire. So far, the Japa­nese newspapers’ role has been emphasized as an influx by which trends, knowledge, movements, and thoughts ­were brought from immigrants’ home countries.40 However, the role of maga-

Hibi

205

zines and books should not be overlooked. While newspapers have the advantage of concurrency and frequency, they tend to spread over a wide range of topics b ­ ecause they do not limit readers’ interests. On the other hand, magazines are specific to gender, literacy, age, and hobbies, so it had a strong influence on ideology and taste. As for the materiality of books and magazines, books had a more robust form than newspapers and stayed in individuals and communities for a long time. This feature gives books the ability to have lasting long-­term effects. Books not only go beyond space, but they go beyond time. The second role was to create an immigrant culture. As we have discussed, Endō Shoten and immigrant bookstores w ­ ere often involved in local publication culture activities. Endō Shoten, for example, not only published a magazine called Culture to provide a forum for discourse but also more actively invited readers to join in its contest and encouraged them to transform themselves into writers, thereby revitalizing the community’s discourse. The third role is shaping the rhythm and richness of daily life. Compared to the publication of books and the distribution of prizes, it was less con­ spic­u­ous, but it can be said that this was more closely related to many immigrants’ living conditions. Japa­nese in the Amer­i­cas had a variety of pastimes, but in an era without radio, tele­v i­sion, and the Internet, reading books and magazines was the most familiar means of recreation. In addition, bookstores also sold rec­ords, importing ­music from their home countries, and they provided Japa­nese immigrants with time to listen to m ­ usic. Books imported from Japan s­ haped the rhythm of life for Japa­nese immigrants, as in Buenos Aires and São Paulo. It may be a good idea to mention diaries ­here. Bookstores brought diaries printed with the Japa­nese calendar and sold them in immigrant towns. With that Japa­nese calendar in mind, the immigrants reflected on their lives in South Amer­i­ca and North Amer­i­ca. Diaries and bookstores supported the customs of immigrants who wanted to transcribe their lives, thoughts, and sentiments. While being aware of the distance from their home country and the difference from the calendar of their home country, they continued to live their daily lives with that sense of distance, which formed their identity as ­immigrants. The bookstore provided a place for intellectual exchange, although the distinguished instances ­were difficult to find in South Amer­i­ca. Endō Shoten had a close relationship with literary magazine coteries, and Kurata Shoten was open on Sundays. They may not have had a prominent personality

206

Chapter 8

like Uchiyama Shoten in Shanghai, which played a role in bringing together Japa­nese and Chinese intellectuals, but for some intellectuals in São Paulo and Buenos Aires, t­ hese bookstores ­were indispensable spaces.

Notes This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19K00343. 1. ​The system of book distribution was developed on a commercial basis by the private sector. The Japa­nese government did not get directly involved in book distribution u ­ ntil the 1940s when the controlled economy began to take hold during war­time. 2. ​Bruno Latour has written about the role of ­things as follows: “In addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘backdrop for ­human action’, ­things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render pos­si­ble, forbid, and so on.” Latour, Reassembling, p. 72. 3. ​Hibi, “Imin,” pp. 85–124. 4. ​Anon., “Chōsen,” p. 6. The owner of Hakubunkan was Okukichi Koike. It is thought to be a dif­fer­ent bookstore from Hakubunkan in Tokyo. 5. ​Murasaki, Taiwan, pp. 182–234. 6. ​Hibi, “Manshu,” pp. 102–117. 7. ​Hibi, “Karafuto,” pp. 58–67. 8. ​Shuppan dōmei shinbun, “Yushutu Gyōsha no Shimukechibetu,” May 3, 1942, p. 3. 9. ​Hashimoto, Nihon, pp. 124–125. 10. ​Zaibei Nihonjinkai, Zaibei, p. 285. 11. ​Mochizuki, “Wagakuni,” p. 49. 12. ​Rokujūnen, Nihon shuppan bōeki kabushikigaisha, p. 13. 13. ​Hashimoto, Nihon, p. 125. 14. ​Rokujūnen, Nihon shuppan bōeki kabushikigaisha, pp. 13–14. Exports of publications ­here refer to book distribution to foreign countries and do not include exports to such colonies as Manchuria, the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan. 15. ​ Shuppan dōmei shinbun, “Hosho no kaigai yushutu ichigenka wo mezashi Nihon shuppan bōeki kaisha setsuritsu,” Jan. 17, 1942, p. 3. The founding office was located in Yokohama Shoji in Honmachi, Nihonbashi Ward, Tokyo. 16. ​Mochizuki, “Wagakuni,” p. 46. 17. ​ Shuppan dōmei shinbun, “Zasshi kaigai yushutudaka, terada-­shi ha kataru,” Feb. 5, 1941, p. 3. 18. ​Imin Hachijūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, Burajiru, p. 132. 19. ​Wako, Bauru, p. 12, 18. Percentages are calculated by the author. 20. ​Wako, Bauru, p. 18. 21. ​Wada, “Sanpauro,” pp. 1–16. 22. ​Imin Hachijūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, Burajiru, p. 82. See also Mori, “ ‘Gengo,’ ” p. 51. 23. ​The breakdown is not clear. Imin Hachijūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, Burajiru, p. 131. 24. ​Mack, “Nihon.” See also Wada, “Sanpauro,” pp. 1–16.

Hibi

207

25. ​Wada, “Sanpauro,” p. 6. 26. ​Noguchi, “Dai ikkai shokumin,” p. 59. However, the first call for submissions was unsuccessful, as no corresponding work appeared. 27. ​Reading Adviser (column), Culture 1, no. 2 (1938): 37. 28. ​Aruzenchin Nihonjin Iminshi Hensaniinkai, Aruzenchin, pp. 25–28. For more on Shinya Yoshio, see the chapter by Facundo Garasino in this volume. 29. ​Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai, Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin, p. 285. 30. ​Ishikawa, Nikkei, p.49. 31. ​Oshima, Nanbei, p. 264. 32. ​Aruzenchin Nihonjin Iminshi Hensaniinkai, Aruzenchin, p. 105. 33. ​An advertisement for a bookstore named Benrisha, which was originally published in Buenosu Airesu Shūho, is reprinted in Aruzenchin Nihonjin Iminshi Hensaniinkai, Aruzenchin, p. 102. I have not seen the original. 34. ​Taiwan’s Japa­nese language newspaper, Taiwan nichinichi shinbun, once tried a similar business. Taiwan’s bookstores ­were selling books at a premium, ­because of the high cost of shipping from Japan, and the Taiwan nichinichi shinbun criticized this, insisting on selling books at a fixed price in order to spread the Japa­nese culture, challenging the existing bookstores head-on. The result was that the Taiwan nichinichi shinbun’s attempt did not last long, and the existing bookstore won. See Hibi “Gaichi shoten wo oikakeru,” in Murasaki, Taiwan. 35. ​Hattori, “Aruzenchin,” pp. 123–127; Hattori, “Yime,” pp. 308–310; and Hattori, Aruzenchin, pp. 254–255. 36. ​Hattori, “Aruzenchin,” p. 125. 37. ​Hattori, Aruzenchin, pp. 254–255. 38. ​Kurata Shoten, in Aruzenchin jihō, Dec. 5, 1936, p. 8. 39. ​For example, an advertisement by Kurata Shoten in Aruzenchin jihō (March 27, 1941, p. 2) promoted Saigō Takamori-­den, by Saneatsu Mushanokōji, and other books. On the other hand, Miyazono Shoten in Aruzenchin jihō on April 1, 1941, used the exact same format and the exact same book title. 40. ​See Handa, Imin, p. 602.

c h a p t e r

9

Immigrant Propaganda Translating Japa­nese Imperial Ideology into Argentine Nationalism Facundo Garasino

I

nternational migration played a crucial role in constructing the nation-­ state in both Latin Amer­i­ca and Japan, albeit with dif­fer­ent implications. Since the mid-­nineteenth ­century, the elites of the Latin American republics envisioned Eu­ro­pean immigration as the cornerstone of the new nation and the driving force for economic and social modernization. In Argentina, the jurist and diplomat Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–1884) stated that in the Amer­i­cas, “to govern is to populate.” This retained wide support among liberal intellectuals and the ruling classes well into the twentieth ­century.1 Further, following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan, expansionist intellectuals, bureaucrats, and adventurous entrepreneurs advocated transpacific mobility as the vehicle for economic modernization and transformation of the emigrant masses into national subjects working for the empire.2 Focusing on the intersections between migration and nation building, this chapter discusses the collaborations between ideologies of nationalism in imperial Japan and Argentina. It concentrates on the activities of the businessperson and journalist Shinya Yoshio (1884–1954), who or­ga­nized pro-­Japan propaganda during the 1930s and early 1940s in cooperation with the elites of Buenos Aires and Japa­nese institutions of public diplomacy. In ­doing so, this study explores how a Japa­nese immigrant social leader engaged with the expansion of the empire and how he translated its discourses of cultural nationalism and militarism into a local format. Following the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, Shinya actively vindicated Japan’s military and diplomatic actions in the major newspapers of Buenos Aires. Moreover, he collaborated with Argentine social technocrats and navy officers to establish the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute (Instituto 208

Garasino

209

Cultural Argentino Japonés). Around the same time, Shinya became the local representative of the Center for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, hereafter KBS), Japan’s first agency for cultural diplomacy.3 This chapter delves into t­hese activities and argues that Shinya reinterpreted Japa­nese imperial ideologies as a civilizational narrative compatible with the discourses of Argentine nationalism as a means to negotiate immigrants’ inclusion in the host society. Previous studies on Japa­nese migration history have often discussed immigrants’ transnational engagements with imperial Japan in terms of their conflict with nationalism in the host society. Insightful works indicate that the emergence of the Japa­nese Empire as a military and colonial power in Asia and the Pacific prompted discourses of Yellow Peril, anti-­Asian racism, and the establishment of exclusion policies throughout the Amer­i­cas.4 Particularly, in the context of an unpre­ce­dented expansion of mass politics during the 1930s in Peru and Brazil, chauvinist legislators and the popu­lar press promoted nationalism by drawing parallels between Japa­nese militarist expansionism in China and immigrants’ transnational economic activities or their collective expression of cultural differences.5 In contrast, we focus on the unexplored collaborative endeavors between immigrant leaders and local elites to integrate the promotion of Japan’s public diplomacy with Argentina’s nation building. ­These endeavors are made clear by characterizing Japa­nese immigrants as transnational agents who mediate the dissimilar nationalist discourses of both their sending and host socie­ties. Through conferences, newspaper articles, and books, Shinya emphasized the affinities between the ideologies of imperial Japan and the narratives of Argentine exceptionalism that predicted Argentina’s transformation into the hegemon of South Amer­i­ca. The following discussion elucidates how a Japa­nese immigrant leader balanced his support for Japan’s public diplomacy with his involvement in the Argentine society, from his double status as an imperial subject and the representative of a mi­grant ethnic minority. Local adaptation of Japan’s imperial ideologies was an essential ele­ment of the immigrant leaders’ efforts to negotiate the integration of the Japa­nese community with the Argentine nation-­state.6 Dominant ideas of the nation during the twentieth ­century in Argentina centered on an exceptional and homogeneous whiteness as the precondition and marker of the nation, thus disavowing the existence of other racial and ethnic groups.7 Shinya’s experiences as a pioneering immigrant and his transnational perspective

210

Chapter 9

allowed him to reshape the ideologies of Japa­nese uniqueness and imperialism for negotiating and challenging the notions of race, citizenship, and nation in the host society. This provides insight into the significance of imperial Japan’s ideologies on how nationhood was s­ haped in Argentina and the agency of immigrants in this pro­cess.8

Between Two National Proj­ects: Shinya Yoshio’s Early C­ areer Unlike Peru and Brazil, the Argentine government did not introduce or authorize Japa­nese contract l­abor immigration. Therefore, most Japa­nese immigrants living in Argentina before World War I entered from ­these two countries. From the late 1900s onwards, former colonists re-­emigrated from the coffee plantations of Brazil and the sugar plantations of Peru to escape poor ­labor conditions or ­after their contracts expired. The majority settled in the cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Córdoba, where they became factory workers, taxi d ­ rivers, and waiters. ­Others became gardeners, cooks, or stewards in wealthy h ­ ouse­holds; and a smaller number toiled in sugar plantations located in the inner provinces.9 The earliest Japa­nese immigrants who settled in modern Argentina arrived during the late nineteenth ­century as sailors or crew working on ships of diverse flags. Shinya Yoshio was one among the first group that came before the inaugural sail of the Kasato Maru to Brazil in 1908. He disembarked at Buenos Aires on September 30, 1900, from the Argentine Navy training ship Presidente Sarmiento, where he worked with another Japa­nese person.10 Born in 1884 in Karatsu, Saga Prefecture, as the second son in a renowned f­amily in the region, Shinya left home in 1899 a­ fter a dispute with his parents and headed to Nagasaki.11 He found a job ­there as a cabin boy on board the Presidente Sarmiento, which at the time was calling at the port in the midst of its first training cruise around the world. Once in Buenos Aires, Shinya built and maintained personal and professional relations with Argentine elites, Japa­nese diplomats, and foreign traders. His time on the Presidente Sarmiento allowed him to form lasting friendships with navy officers, and some of them became central allies to his propaganda activities during the 1930s.12 Upon arrival, he worked as a domestic servant for an officer he had met on the ship. However, Shinya soon gained ac­cep­tance within diplomatic circles by presenting himself as

Garasino

211

the first Japa­nese resident in the Argentine capital. When Ōkoshi Narinori (1856–1923)—­the first Japa­nese minister to Argentina following the signing of the 1898 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation—­ and Secretary Horiguchi Kuma’ichi (1865–1945) visited Buenos Aires in October 1902 to pre­sent their diplomatic credentials, Shinya received them at the port and became their self-­appointed guide. Ōkoshi mediated reconciliation between Shinya and his parents. He also introduced Shinya to J. R. Valle, an Italian trader who imported silk products from Japan through French and British intermediaries.13 ­Under the direction of Valle, Shinya began his ­career in international commerce. Further, Valle encouraged Shinya to continue his studies; thus, he entered the prestigious National School of Buenos Aires and ­later the Law School at the University of Buenos Aires. This formal education allowed Shinya to familiarize himself with Argentina’s intellectual landscape and granted him the cultural capital necessary to navigate through the social elites of Buenos Aires. In 1908, Shinya married Laura Hudson, an Anglo-­A rgentine w ­ oman and niece of the naturalist and writer William Henry Hudson (1841–1922). Shinya was introduced to Laura by her ­mother, Maria Helena Hudson, whom he met when participating in the local activities of the Young Men’s Christian Association. The ­couple soon traveled to Japan and Britain to visit their families.14 Around the same time, Shinya launched an in­de­pen­dent business with the capital he raised from his hometown in Karatsu. However, the endeavor was unsuccessful. In the subsequent years, a­ fter a short period employed in the Argentine Ministry of Navy, Shinya worked for the Yokohama-­based Matsuura Trading Com­pany (Matsuura Bōeki-­ten). In 1912, the Matsuura Trading Com­pany merged with the San Paulo–­ based Fujisaki Com­pany (Fujisaki Shōkai) to become the Fujimatsu Group (Fujimatsu Gumi). Shinya continued working t­here u ­ ntil its dissolution in 1921. In 1922, he established his own importation and trade repre­sen­ta­tion office called Shinya and Com­pany (Shinya y Compañía), which specialized in importing silk goods, ceramics, pottery, and toys from Japan. He also exported Argentine quebracho extract to Japan.15 Shortly ­after his arrival in Buenos Aires, Shinya began to contribute to the popu­lar Tokyo newspaper, Kokumin shinbun. Declaring himself as the precursor of Japa­nese trade and emigration in Argentina, he reported on the local economy, society, politics, and geography. Writing at a time when a sustained economic growth led by the exportation of grains, wool, and beef to the western and central Eu­ro­pean markets attracted large inflows of

212

Chapter 9

immigrants, Shinya described a country with limitless possibilities for agriculture and livestock farming.16 He also wrote about his achievements in importing Japa­nese silk goods and suggested the necessity of establishing direct shipping lines between the two countries.17 With Argentina’s favorable prospects in sight, Shinya announced in 1902 that he was seeking the approval of Argentine authorities to implement a proj­ect of Japa­nese agricultural colonization with the partnership of Valle.18 The following year, he sent two letters to Japan’s minister of foreign affairs, Komura Jutarō (1855–1911), requesting support.19 Shinya was influenced by a corpus of ideas that pursued the consolidation of the Japa­nese nation-­state and its cap­i­tal­ist development through the promotion and control of international emigration. Since the 1880s, propagandized discourses of Japa­nese intellectuals, bureaucrats, and pioneering emigrants on “overseas development” envisioned a transborder model of nation building through maritime trade, agricultural settlement, and the construction of diasporic subjectivities in Asia, the Pacific, and the Amer­i­cas.20 Viewing his efforts as a contribution to the economic expansion of the Japa­nese Empire, Shinya published an open letter addressing the young men of his hometown in the local newspaper Karatsu shinpō in February 1904, calling them to join him in South Amer­i­ca. He promised to assist prospective emigrants in starting businesses in agriculture or commerce. In ­doing so, they would foster trade between “the foremost country in South Amer­i­ca” and “the ­Great Britain of the East.”21 In other contributions to the Kokumin shinbun, Shinya stressed the significance of emigration to Argentina as a means to foster Japan’s economic expansion in accordance with its growing importance as an emerging empire.22 Shinya saw the Russo-­Japanese War as a unique opportunity, since Argentine public opinion showed an unpre­ce­dented regard to Japan as a paramount example of successful ­modernization.23 However, Shinya’s enthusiasm collided with Argentina’s nation-­ building proj­ect. T ­ oward the last quarter of the nineteenth ­century, the po­liti­cal elites drifted away from relatively inclusive conceptions of citizenship and redefined national belonging around racial whiteness and Eu­ro­ pean culture. 24 Since the 1870s, military campaigns that expanded the territory to the south and northeast while killing thousands of Indigenous ­people and Lamarckian theories of racial improvement, positivism, and eugenics intertwined to consolidate modernization and nation building as a pro­cess of racial whitening.25 The Immigration and Colonization Law of

Garasino

213

1876 explic­itly gave privilege to Eu­ro­pean immigration by granting subsidies for maritime transport and settlement. Although ­legal immigration bans or quotas did not exist, African and Asian ­peoples w ­ ere excluded from state support in practice. In this context, debates in the National Congress and the press often condemned Asian immigration with a disproportionate intensity to the ­actual numbers of immigrants. Often citing the turmoil created around anti-­Asian campaigns in California, lawmakers and journalists warned against the perils of introducing foreign races.26 Unable to obtain authorization for implementing his proj­ects, Shinya quickly learned that the Argentine elites would not support Japa­nese immigration. Nevertheless, t­ here ­were no active anti-­Asian exclusion movements or policies due to the small number of Japa­nese immigrants, their diverse integration in the l­abor market, and a general tendency to adapt to the host society. Between the 1910s and 1920s, a growing number of Japa­nese moved from wage ­labor to operate their own coffee shops, laundries, and floriculture businesses. Further, the first institutions that aimed to bring the immigrants together as a community emerged, and more p ­ eople began to call their families and acquaintances to join them in Argentina.27 By the late 1920s, approximately 3,500 Japa­nese p ­ eople resided in the country.28 During this time, Shinya defined his role as a social leader of the incipient Japa­nese community, taking part in the foundation of the Japa­nese Association in Argentina in 1917 and serving as its president in 1927. He adjusted his vision for the prospects of Japa­nese immigration to the realities of local racial politics. He warned that larger immigration schemes and government-­sponsored agricultural colonization w ­ ere counterproductive for the Japa­nese in Argentina. In an opinion article in the Bulletin of the Japa­ nese Association in 1924, he emphasized that the notion of Argentina as a white nation was the foundation of its politico-­legal system, as the Constitution of 1853 stipulated that “the federal government ­shall promote Eu­ ro­pean immigration.”29 As a young republic created in sparsely populated South Amer­i­ca, immigration was the axis of Argentina’s socioeconomic development, and the white nation was its ideological princi­ple for national integration. Nevertheless, Shinya promptly noted that the vast majority of the elites and educated ­middle classes admired Japan as a leading world power, and they appreciated the aesthetic and moral values of Japa­nese culture.30 Therefore, if the immigrants remained a small minority and complied with the highly regarded image of Japan, they could prevent the rise of exclusionist movements.

214

Chapter 9

Shinya’s Transnational Discursive Activities The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1934 generated concern among immigrant leaders, who feared that the sudden deterioration of Japan’s public image, especially among the elites, would undermine their security. Criticism of Japan’s aggressive expansionism in major newspapers and occasional episodes of vio­lence against Japa­nese residents during the Carnival cele­brations prompted public information campaigns.31 Prominent residents in Santa Fé and Córdoba—­mostly ­owners of restaurants and retail shops targeting Argentine customers—­defended Japan’s position in local newspapers.32 In Buenos Aires, the Japa­nese Association in Argentina and the Japa­nese Legation distributed leaflets among business, diplomatic, and journalistic circles.33 Shinya partook in this campaign by authoring several articles in the newspapers La Nación and La Razón between May 1932 and October 1933. A month ­later, he edited his writings ­under the title The Truth on the Manchurian Incident (La verdad sobre la Cuestión Manchuriana). Overall, Shinya argued that Japan’s actions ­were the last resort to defend its “special interests” in Manchuria, rightfully acquired through treaties recognized by China and the international community. He presented the Japa­ nese Empire as a stabilizing force in northeast China and the military incursion as a response to the violent attempts of local warlords to nullify the treaties.34 Shinya consolidated his role as a spokesperson for the Japa­nese Empire and the immigrant community by building durable media and institutional platforms in association with other immigrant leaders, the elites of Buenos Aires, and Japa­nese agencies of public diplomacy. Notably, he focused on the importance of cultural promotion to improve and maintain Japan’s public image as a civilized and refined nation. Shinya’s collaborative engagements allowed him to move from his accommodative position of adapting to the dominant structures of the white nation to that of actively negotiating the belonging of Japa­nese immigrants in Argentina’s nation building. The creation of the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute in October 1933 was the first major step in this direction. Established by the combined efforts of the art dealer Yokohama Kenkichi (1892–1978), the agricultural economist Tomás Amadeo (1880–1950), and the former navy minister Manuel Domecq García (1859–1951), the institute sought to strengthen the relations between Argentina and Japan through the promotion of Japa­nese

Garasino

215

culture. The Japa­nese Legation cooperated with the institute by providing books, hosting conferences and courses, and jointly organ­izing study trips to Japan for Argentine teachers and university professors. The institute was also affiliated with the Argentine Social Museum, an autonomous civilian organ­ization that promoted the study of eugenics, hygiene, social engineering, and immigrant control. The Argentine Social Museum brought together social scientists, physicians, jurists, legislators, and businesspersons for research and intervention over “social pathologies” threatening the stability of the nation—­namely, prostitution, communism, syndical agitation, and diseases.35 Through its association with this organ­ization, the institute presented its activities as a contribution ­toward the endeavors of social technocrats to advance Argentina’s nation building. In line with the mission of the Argentine Social Museum, the institute publicized traditional Japa­nese moral values as a universal model of civic virtue. Being the secretary of the institute, Shinya took a leading role in organ­izing activities and officiating as a translator and interpreter and received active cooperation from the local elites. Remarkable members of the institute included the aforementioned Domecq García (president), Amadeo (vice president), the former navy minister and rear admiral Pedro Casal (1879–1957), the biochemist and f­uture Nobel Prize in Chemistry laureate Luis Leloir (1906–1987), and the legislator and diplomat Rodolfo Moreno (1879–1943), who became the ambassador to Japan in 1939. Its prestigious members brought attention to the institute, and the newspapers of Buenos Aires reported on its activities and transcribed summaries of their conferences. Argentine affiliates accounted for two-­thirds of the institute’s membership and eagerly engaged in producing positive images of the Japa­nese. The author Jorge Max Rhode (1892–1979) narrated his “Impressions of the Japa­nese ­Woman” (“Estampas de la mujer japonesa,” July 1934) in which he recollected a recent trip to Japan; Casal gave a conference on “The Japa­ nese Navy” (“La marina japonesa,” August 1936); and the diplomat Albino Pugnalin applauded the “Aesthetics and Heroism of the Japa­nese Soul” (“Estética y heroísmo del alma japonesa,” September 1936). In ­these conferences, the Argentine members characterized the Japa­nese p ­ eople as being a model of self-­d iscipline and patriotism and encouraged a deeper understanding of Japa­nese modern history to improve the younger Argentine republic.36 Prominent members of the Japa­nese community collaborated with the institute. The pioneering livestock farmer Itō Seizō (1875–1941)

216

Chapter 9

presented on the “Characteristics of Japa­nese Agriculture” (“Las especialidades características de la agricultura japonesa,” August 1935), and Shinya’s ­daughter Violeta contributed with numerous discussions on Japan’s education system and cultural history. Shinya’s local endeavors intertwined with Japan’s public diplomacy through the KBS’s activities. The KBS was established in April 1934 as a semipublic organ­ization ­under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry’s Cultural Affairs Department. It was established as an attempt to preserve Japan’s policies of internationalism and avoid further diplomatic isolation ­after its withdrawal from the League of Nations.37 Culture as an asset for diplomacy in modern Japan had emerged during the negotiations for the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 and the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908 ­under the concept of “national diplomacy” (kokumin gaikō), which called for civil cooperation in influencing foreign public opinion.38 The KBS also engaged in cultural promotion as a vehicle for rebuilding Japan’s diplomatic relations.39 They issued printed materials and films in several languages, or­ga­nized lectures and exhibitions, coordinated academic exchanges, and dispatched cultural ambassadors. In December 1934, Shinya became the local representative of the KBS with the mediation of the Tokyo University gradu­ate and ­future historian Nakaya Ken’ichi, who visited Buenos Aires to survey the prospect of Japa­nese public diplomacy.40 However, rather than following the KBS’s instructions, Shinya collaborated with its proj­ ects while using its materials and institutional networks to expand the scope of his activities. Resultantly, the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute became a platform for receiving “cultural ambassadors” such as the aforementioned Horiguchi Kuma’ichi in July 1935 and the jurist Tanaka Kōtarō (1890–1974) in September 1939. Shinya also aided the author Shimazaki Tōson (1872–1943) and the painter Arishima Ikuma (1882–1974) as an interpreter when they visited Buenos Aires on the occasion of the ­Fourteenth International Congress of the PEN (acronym for poets, playwrights, editors, essayists, and novelists) clubs in September 1936.41 Fi­nally, Shinya introduced a Spanish section within the ethnic newspaper the Aruzenchin jihō (originally romanized as “Argentin Djijo”) in December 1934.42 The Aruzenchin jihō inaugurated the Spanish section with a pledge to provide the host society with accurate information about the Japa­ nese Empire’s efforts to bring stability and prosperity in East Asia. The idea was to prevent misinformation, as previously seen in reports on the Manchurian Incident.43 Furthermore, it exhorted the young Nisei to obtain a

Garasino

217

better understanding of their parents’ homeland and educate their Argentine friends about Japan by reading the new section. Although the Aruzenchin jihō was primarily distributed to subscribers within the Japa­nese community, Shinya attempted to reach wider audiences within the host society by sending copies to major newspapers in Buenos Aires and Córdoba. With weekly editions issued e­ very Saturday, the Spanish section featured four pages with editorial paragraphs and news on Japan’s latest po­ liti­cal, diplomatic, economic, and military affairs. ­There ­were also articles on history, lit­er­a­ture, and arts. The Spanish section utilized information distributed by the Dōmei News Agency and publications issued in Eu­ro­ pean languages, such as Con­temporary Japan and Nippon. ­There ­were also official statements by Japa­nese authorities and writings of American and Eu­ro­pean journalists who expressed pro-­Japanese views. Shinya also utilized booklets provided by the KBS to introduce the writings of influential Japa­nese authors and intellectuals.44 Shinya attempted to pre­sent “Japan as it is” and ­counter the influence of American and British news agencies in the coverage of East Asian affairs in the Argentine press. The Spanish section also regularly transcribed conferences hosted by the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute and KBS. Furthermore, by publishing excerpts from classic works of Argentine national lit­er­a­ture, essays on the meaning of national commemoration days, and moralizing essays on the civic responsibilities of ­children as ­future citizens, the Spanish section reminded the young Nisei that they owed allegiance to their country of birth.45 In an attempt to inspire his readers, Shinya invoked narratives of Argentina’s exceptional conditions to become the po­ liti­cal and cultural hegemon of South Amer­i­ca. He frequently reproduced excerpts from the writings of the influential psychiatrist, phi­los­o­pher, and sociologist José Ingenieros (1877–1925) as princi­ples that should guide the youth in constructing a g­ reat nation.46 From a synthesis of Spenserian biologism, social evolutionism, and Marxist economics, Ingenieros speculated that the vast geographic size, temperate climate, and the predominance of the white race would catapult Argentina into a regional power.47 He envisioned Argentina’s pacific economic expansionism, civilizing influence, and po­liti­cal tutelage over the South American republics rivaling the United States for hegemony over the Western Hemi­sphere.48 Emphasizing Argentina’s exceptional conditions, Shinya called on the host society to collaborate with him to “transform this country into a ­g reat nation.”49 He was convinced that “­here, at the shores of the La Plata River, a nation ­shall

218

Chapter 9

emerge to become the beacon for the civilized world; since no other country has the ele­ments and conditions that the providence has granted to us.”50 He also discussed Argentina’s economic and po­liti­cal issues in La Razón and in the volume A Small Contribution to Argentine Grandeur.51 In the preface, Shinya proclaimed himself an “Argentine by heart” striving for the development of his host society.52

Translating Japa­nese Imperial Ideologies into Argentine Nationalism Utilizing the aforementioned media, institutions, and networks, Shinya introduced Japa­nese culture and history as a patriotic ser­v ice to his a­ dopted country. He argued that a correct understanding of Japan’s culture and strug­gle to change the Western-­dominated international status quo was essential to materialize Argentina’s national destiny to become the hegemon of South Amer­i­ca. He reflected a transnationalism that attempted to negotiate not only the belonging of Japa­nese immigrants in the Argentine nation-­state but also their role in transforming it. In 1934, Shinya published an introductory volume on Japan’s history, culture, society, and achievements during colonial administration titled Empire of the Rising Sun: Its Extraordinary Modern Evolution (Imperio del Sol Naciente: Su maravillosa evolución moderna). This was a subtle yet de­ cided challenge to Argentina’s Eurocentric narratives of a white nation and a proclamation of the distinctive role of the Japa­nese in shaping nation building in their host society. The volume centered its arguments on the thesis of Japan as the merging point between the Oriental and Western civilizations (tōzai bunmei yūgōron), which was ubiquitous in intellectual discussions on the empire’s international relations since the Russo-­Japanese War. This thesis claimed that Japan stood on an equal footing with the most advanced Western nations as the first and sole Oriental nation that successfully assimilated Western civilization and constructed a power­ful nation-­state, while holding the right to guide its Asian neighbors ­toward modernization.53 Shinya expanded this theory in relation to Argentina’s racial politics of nation building. He argued that the emergence of modern Japan had the historical significance of refuting racial theories that linked ­people’s intellectual and moral capabilities with biological traits. Japan’s modern development demonstrated that “Orientals, Eu­ro­pe­ans, and Amer-

Garasino

219

icans can share the same ideals and princi­ples for common action.”54 Although Shinya avoided explicit attacks on Argentina’s ideology of the white nation, he suggested that the Japa­nese w ­ ere equally competent to white Argentines and Eu­ro­pean immigrants as agents of modern development.55 The outbreak of the Second Sino-­Japanese War in July 1937 pushed Shinya ­toward a more unambiguous propagandistic tone. He introduced Japan’s war­time rhe­toric of the construction of a “New Order in East Asia” and ideas of overcoming Western modernity as a crucial contribution to the construction of a modern nation in Argentina. This was evident at a series of conferences on Japa­nese cultural history that Shinya delivered at the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires from October to November 1938 with the sponsorship of the KBS. U ­ nder the title The Ideals of Japan (Los ideales del Japón), he outlined the historical evolution of the Japa­nese Empire into a major power that signaled the emergence of a new po­liti­cal and spiritual leadership in Asia and indicated its implications for the ­f uture development of the Argentine nation. Shinya presented a vision of an alternative international order at the crossroads of popu­lar ideas of “the decline of the West,” Japan’s pan-­Asianism, and Argentine nationalism. Shinya noted that since the end of the G ­ reat War, Japan had been committed to putting universal ­human values of freedom and equality beyond the distinctions of race. In contrast, Eu­rope became a hotbed for totalitarian regimes, and the United States legally excluded Asian immigration.56 Students and young intellectuals at the University of Buenos Aires would benefit by learning from Japan, since they ­were the vanguards of both Argentina’s and South Amer­i­ca’s civilizational development. Without knowledge of Japa­nese culture, Shinya warned that “the mission of the new world cannot be complete or satisfactory.”57 Shinya’s closing lecture on November 8, 1938, declared the end of the po­liti­cal and moral leadership of the West, and the rise of a “New World” centered on the progressive nations of East Asia and the Pacific. He directly quoted the “Declaration on the Construction of a New Order in East Asia” (Tōa shinchitsujo kensetsu no seimei), which had been recently issued by Japa­nese prime minister Konoe Fumimaro as the dawn of a new international order.58 Shinya carefully excluded Argentina from the decaying West by underscoring its traditional foreign policy of neutralism, nonbelligerence, and the absence of legally sanctioned racial exclusion. He noted that Argentina had been promoting justice and equality of rights among the nations by opposing military interventions in Latin Amer­i­ca, challenging

220

Chapter 9

the United States’ attempts to impose its hegemony on the continent in the Pan-­American Conferences, and advancing the signing of an inter-­ American Anti-­War Treaty of Non-­Aggression and Conciliation in 1935. In contrast, the Eu­ro­pean powers stubbornly refused to recognize equal rights for Japan, as seen in the rejection of the “Racial Equality Proposal” at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the League of Nation’s position on the Manchurian Incident. Shinya argued that Japan had been struggling on the international stage ­because they held the same princi­ples that animated Argentina; and he called on the audience to cooperate with the empire’s strug­gle to attain freedom, development, and equality for Asia.59 In June 1941, Shinya gave a speech titled “The Unchanging Concept of the ‘Family-­State’ in Japan” (“El concepto invariable del ‘Estado-­Familia’ en Japón”) at the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute. He expressed his thoughts about his visit to Japan during the previous year to participate in the commemoration of the “2,600th Anniversary” of the empire’s founding by the mythological emperor Jimmu. On this occasion, in an attempt to develop diplomatic strategies to secure access to Latin American markets and resources amid growing tensions with the United States and the British Empire, the KBS invited Shinya to a conference on Japan’s public diplomacy in South Amer­i­ca.60 He also attended the Tokyo Conference of Overseas Nationals (Zaigai Dōhō Tokyo Taikai), which celebrated emigrants as the pioneers and vanguards of national expansion.61 ­These per­ for­mances of imperial diasporic engagement ­were carefully choreographed around slogans that justified Japa­nese expansion in Asia and the Pacific through a rhe­toric of universal justice and civilizational development. Shinya translated Japan’s self-­righteous official slogans into a universal language that rendered ideologies of the Japa­nese Empire as a “Family-­ State” that was relevant for the improvement of the Argentine nation-­ state. According to him, the ­family and state in Japan integrated around the figure of a divine and benevolent fatherlike emperor. Both the ­family and state ­were based on the concept of one organic sociopo­liti­cal unity that generated harmony and interdependence between individual and communal interests, thus supporting the unparalleled longevity of the empire and the loyalty of the ­people.62 The premise of this discussion, however, emphasized the universal applicability of Japa­nese national morality. Shinya argued that the core spirit of the “Family-­State” resonated with the social teaching of the Catholic Church, as both agreed on the centrality of the ­family in guaranteeing social harmony.63 Japa­nese civic morality could pro-

Garasino

221

vide valuable lessons to the younger Latin American republics, where the state was or­ga­nized to protect and promote individual interests and they ­were still on their way to achieving effective national unity.64 It is impor­tant to note that a group of educators shared Shinya’s evaluation of the utility of Japa­nese imperial ideology in shaping the Argentine nation. During the 1920s and 1930s, educators, technocrats, and intellectuals valued humanistic and cultural education as the pillars of a new educational system that would inculcate ethical and religious values to shape a unified national subjectivity.65 Victorio Franceschini, who taught at elementary and secondary schools, engaged with the activities of the Argentine-­ Japanese Cultural Institute and contributed to the Spanish section of the Aruzenchin jihō. He studied Japan’s education system and pedagogical methods in Japa­nese public and private elementary schools between 1938 and 1939, with a fellowship of the International Students Association of Tokyo arranged by the Japa­nese Legation and the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute. In his research report, Franceschini argued that the empire’s educational system had played a leading role in forging the moral backbone of the nation around the belief that Japan was a ­great ­family with the emperor as its leader.66 In the prologue to this study, the director of the Pedagogical Institute of the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires Juan Emilio Cassani (1896–1981) commented that studying Japan’s model of national education would provide valuable information for introducing reforms in Argentina.67 However, the Pacific War ended Shinya’s collaborative propaganda activities. ­A fter the attack on Pearl Harbor, a Spanish edition of the Aruzenchin jihō came out on January 1, 1942. Transcribing the declarations of the Japa­nese minister of foreign affairs to the Diet, Shinya claimed that Japan had merely responded in its own defense to the po­liti­cal provocations and economic strangling by the United States and the British Empire. Thereafter, the Spanish section was reduced to an opinion column that was published irregularly from where Shinya praised the war efforts of the Japa­ nese Empire, criticized the cruelty of the British and American troops, and manifested his optimism on Argentina’s ­future as a world power ­because of its material prosperity and advanced culture. However, Shinya was more actively involved as a foreign correspondent for the Yomiuri hōchi shinbun. Although t­ here is a greater need for research on the concrete aspects of Shinya’s coverage for this newspaper, it is well documented that during war­time, the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute

222

Chapter 9

was accused of spying for the Japa­nese Empire from the pro-­A llied po­liti­ cal group Argentine Action.68 Additionally, following Argentina’s war declaration on Japan in March  1945, Shinya was arrested on charges of espionage along with the local directors of Japa­nese companies and banks, embassy personnel, and other correspondents for Japa­nese news companies and newspapers.69 Even though Argentina condemned the attack on Pearl Harbor, it did not have severe diplomatic relations with the Axis ­until January  26, 1944, and fi­ nally declared war on Japan and Germany on March 27, 1945.70 Argentina’s neutrality facilitated the operations of Japa­ nese intelligence in the country. Military attachés and correspondents of the Dōmei News Agency in neutral countries provided the Japa­nese Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministry with information on the economic and military movements of the Allies.71 However, Shinya’s arrest did not thwart his ­career or reputation. He returned to journalism in La Plata Hōchi from the newspaper’s foundation in 1948, where he wrote opinion columns in Japa­nese and Spanish u ­ ntil his late years. When he passed away in September 1954, the major newspapers of Buenos Aires mourned him as the precursor of friendship and understanding between Argentina and Japan. Since then, he has been commemorated as a pioneer and role model for the Nikkei. This study examined the personal and intellectual trajectory of a Japa­nese immigrant in Argentina, Shinya Yoshio. Shinya developed a transnational perspective that allowed him to reinvent the ideologies of Japa­nese imperialism into a civilizational narrative compatible with the Argentine discourses of nationalism. Shinya’s activities sought to promote Japan’s public diplomacy while integrating Japa­nese immigrants into the Argentine nation-­state. Although Shinya believed that Japan’s expansionism in East Asia and the Pacific was justified, he presented the ideologies sustaining Japa­nese imperialism as a contribution to the conformation of a power­f ul Argentine nation-­state in accordance with its geo­graph­i­cal and social conditions to become the ­f uture hegemon of Latin Amer­i­ca. Shinya emphasized that the study of Japa­nese history, culture, and society was of paramount importance to the betterment of the host society; and this idea was shared among the Argentine social technocrats, intellectuals, and navy officers who engaged with the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute. In ­doing so, he sought to debunk racial theories that denied the incorporation of Asians into the Argentine nation.

Garasino

223

Shinya’s case shows the importance of Japa­nese imperial ideologies in the immigrants’ challenge to the exclusive categories of whiteness and their efforts to accommodate Argentine exceptionalism. ­These activities demonstrate the agency of Asian Argentines in relation to not only their homeland or ethnic community but also the conformation and transformation of the nation-­state in Argentina.

Notes 1. ​DeLaney, “Immigration, Identity, and Nationalism,” p. 92. 2. ​Manzenreiter, “Japa­nese Emigrant Empire,” pp.  49–53; Eiichiro Azuma, In Search, pp. 32–37. 3. ​For a study on the foundation and evolution of the KBS in the context of Japan’s foreign policy, see Abel, “Cultural Internationalism.” 4. ​For analyses on the transpacific and hemispheric repercussions of the expansion of the Japa­nese Empire in the politics of migration and racialization in the Amer­i­cas, see Endoh, Exporting Japan; Lee, “ ‘ Yellow Peril,’ ”; and Azuma, “Japa­nese Immigrant Settler Colonialism.” 5. ​Endoh, Nanbei kimin seisaku; Takenaka, “Japa­nese in Peru,” pp. 90–93. 6. ​Shinya was not alone in articulating the ideas of Japan’s cultural and historical exceptionalism to assert the belonging of Japa­nese immigrants. The businessperson and author Okimura Teikichi published essays and novels on the parallels between the civilizational development of Argentina and Japan, and Yokohama Kenkichi, who traded in Japa­nese and Chinese art and became a close collaborator of Shinya, wrote on Japa­ nese culture and public diplomacy in ethnic media. See Okimura and Burena, Un Japonés y un Suramericano; Okimura, Sonriendo; Yokohama, “Un relato breve sobre.” 7. ​Ko, “From Whiteness to Diversity”; Alberto and Elena, “Introduction.” 8. ​This discussion ­w ill also contribute to a growing body of scholarship that challenges the notion that Asians in Argentina have been and still are considered foreign or socially irrelevant. See Ko, “­Toward Asian Argentine Studies.” 9. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 86–88. 10. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:26. 11. ​Satō, “Nihon to Aruzenchin,” 4. Shinya’s ­father was an elementary schoolteacher who once served as the village mayor, and his m ­ other was born in a h ­ ouse­hold that inherited the position of village headman during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868). 12. ​Shinya became close to Pedro Casal (1879–1957), who embarked on the first world cruise of President Sarmiento in 1899, and Manuel Domecq García (1859–1951), who oversaw the passing of two Argentine warships to the Japa­nese Imperial Navy at the eve of the Russo-­Japanese War in 1904. The two served as ministers of the navy and became active leaders of the Argentine-­Japanese Cultural Institute. 13. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:27.

224

Chapter 9

14. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:27–28. 15. ​Shinya’s personal life is also noteworthy. For example, his first d ­ aughter, Violeta, was born in 1910; she became the first Argentine Nikkei w ­ oman to receive a university degree and one of his closest collaborators. A ­ fter Laura Hudson’s passing in 1915, Shinya married another Argentine ­woman named Sofía Delia in 1921; they had two sons and one ­daughter. See Gashū, Aruzenchin dohō gojū-­nenshi, p. 286; Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:28. 16. ​Shinya, “Nanbei no hōko Aruzenchin.” 17. ​Shinya, “Nihon no daihyō-­teki shōhin.” 18. ​Shinya, “Nanbei no hōko Aruzenchin.” 19. ​Irie, “Zai-­a Nihon-­jin sōseiki.” 20. ​Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 310–317; Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Development,” p. 1192. 21. ​Shinya, “Aruzenchin tsūshin.” 22. ​Shinya admired the early liberal-­populist ideas of the director of the Kokumin shinbun Tokutomi Sohō (1863–1957), who advocated transforming Japan into a mercantile nation. Although the exact number of pieces that Shinya published in the Kokumin shinbun is difficult to determine, in the Directory of the Nikkei in Argentina (Zai-­A ruzenchin Nikkei-­jin roku) published by the ethnic newspaper La Plata Hōchi, twenty-­nine pieces written between 1902 and 1910 can be found. 23. ​Shinya, “Nihon no shōin.” 24. ​Alberto and Elena, “Introduction,” p. 6. 25. ​López-­Durán, Eugenics in the Garden, p. 3. 26. ​Imai, Aruzenchin no shuyō shinbun, pp. 35–41. 27. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca, pp. 90–95. 28. ​Higa, “Desarrollo histórico,” p. 490. 29. ​Shinya, “Gaikoku imin ni taisuru,” p. 11. 30. ​Shinya, “Gaikoku imin ni taisuru,” p. 11. 31. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:298. 32. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:298–299. 33. ​Asociación Japonesa en la Argentina, El Incidente en Manchuria. During the 1930s, Japa­nese diplomatic missions in Latin Amer­i­ca actively engaged in public diplomacy by promoting cultural exchange and publishing in the local press. For a study of Japa­nese public diplomacy in Chile, see Iacobelli and Camino, “Diplomacia pública Japonesa.” 34. ​Shinya, La verdad sobre, pp. 7–15. 35. ​López-­Durán, Eugenics in the Garden, p. 108. 36. ​Casal, La marina japonesa, pp. 29–30. 37. ​Shibasaki, Kindai Nihon to kokusai, pp. 24–25; Abel, “Cultural Internationalism,” p. 19. 38. ​Shibasaki, Kindai Nihon to kokusai, p. 36. 39. ​Shibasaki, Kindai Nihon to kokusai, pp. 81–82; Abel, “Cultural Internationalism,” pp. 20–21.

Garasino

225

40. ​Aruzenchin jihō, “Shinya-­shi kokusai bunka shinkōkai.” 41. ​Shinya translated and edited their conferences in a booklet in 1937 with the title of Toson Shimazaki y sus conferencias. 42. ​Founded in May 1924, the Aruzenchin jihō was the longest-­r unning Japanese-­ language newspaper in Argentina prior to World War II and the first to issue a Spanish section. 43. ​ Aruzenchin jihō, “Seigo-­ran no kaisetsu.” 44. ​For example, the linguist Shinmura Izuru, art critic Yanagi Sōetsu, literary critic Kikuchi Kan, essayist Hasegawa Nyozekan, and poet and literary critic Noguchi Yonejirō. 45. ​ Aruzenchin jihō, “Trozos escogidos de literatura”; Sumire, “La patria eres tú.” 46. ​Aruzenchin jihō, “Sermones laicos.” 47. ​Ingenieros, La evolución sociológica argentina, p. 98. 48. ​Terán, José Ingenieros, pp. 39–40. 49. ​Shinya, “Llamamiento a la juventud.” 50. ​Shinya, “Llamamiento a la juventud.” 51. ​Shinya, Pequeña contribución. For a discussion about the distribution networks of books and magazines of the Japa­nese in Argentina and the place of Shinya’s intellectual production within them, see Yoshitaka Hibi’s chapter in this volume. 52. ​In ­doing this, Shinya also manifested his adherence to the social values that identified the nation with the traditional ­family. He dedicated this book to his Argentine ­children and stated that he loved his adoptive country with the same feelings that he professed for his home. Shinya, Pequeña contribución, n.p. 53. ​Yamamuro, “Ajia ninshiki no kijiku.” 54. ​Shinya, Imperio del sol naciente, pp. 18–19. 55. ​Japa­nese immigrants in Latin Amer­i­ca repeatedly stressed their agency for economic and social pro­g ress while defending their presence. In Argentina and Brazil, the influence of Jean-­Baptiste Lamarck’s ideas on the transformative capacities of the environment for ­human improvement led po­liti­cal elites, intellectuals, and social reformers to see whiteness as a flexible category. In this regard, Japa­nese immigrant social leaders and diplomats stressed their productivity, work discipline, and observance of bourgeois societal norms in an attempt to negotiate their place within the Eurocentric racial hierarchy. For an examination of the influence and implementation of Lamarckian eugenics in Argentina and Brazil, see López-­Durán, Eugenics in the Garden. 56. ​Shinya, Los ideales del Japón, p. 13. 57. ​Shinya, Los ideales del Japón, p. 16. 58. ​The Second Konoe Declaration, or “Declaration on the Construction of a New Order in East Asia,” issued on November 3, 1938, sought to rationalize the empire’s invasion of China and establish a pro-­Japan puppet regime with the collaboration of certain sectors of the Kuomintang Nationalist government. 59. ​Shinya, Los ideales del Japón, p. 74. 60. ​Th is was a period of development in bilateral relations. In February 1940, an Argentine economic mission visited Japan; in December of the same year, the Japa­ nese Legation in Buenos Aires was promoted to the category of embassy. 61. ​Ruoff, Imperial Japan, pp. 148–179. 62. ​Shinya, El concepto invariable, pp. 18–19.

226

Chapter 9

63. ​Shinya, El concepto invariable, p. 14. 64. ​Shinya, El concepto invariable, p. 21. 65. ​Bentivegna, “Juan E. Cassani y Juan Mantovani,” p. 291. 66. ​Franceschini, La educación en Japón, p. 179. 67. ​Franceschini, La educación en Japón, pp. 6–7. 68. ​Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, Historia del inmigrante japonés, 1:318. 69. ​Nihon-­jin Aruzenchin Ijū-­shi Hensan Iinkai, Nihon-­jin Aruzenchin ijū-­shi, p. 136. Although the Argentine government arrested the directors of Japa­nese newspapers and organ­izations, intervened in their institutions, and confiscated the assets of companies founded with Japa­nese capital, it did not impose severe conditions on most Japa­nese residents. 70. ​For most of the war, the successive Argentine governments adhered to neutrality, maintained impor­tant trade relations with Britain, and provided the Allies with raw materials. The majority of society favored neutrality, although the reasons varied among dif­fer­ent social and po­liti­cal sectors. For analyses of Argentina’s position during World War II, see Rapoport, “Argentina y la Segunda Guerra Mundial”; and Iacobelli, “Empire of Japan.” 71. ​Kotani, “Nihon-­g un to interijensu.”

c h a p t e r

10

­After the Empire Postwar Emigration to the Dominican Republic and Economic Diplomacy Hiromi Mizuno

I

n 1956, twenty-­eight Japa­nese families left Yokohama for Dajabón, the Dominican Republic (DR). More followed over the next three years. A total of 1,319 men, ­women, and ­children emigrated to “the utopia in the Ca­r ib­bean.” They ­were part of the postwar state-­sponsored proj­ect that brought more than 62,000 Japa­nese to Latin Amer­i­ca. The majority of them emigrated to Brazil, Argentine, and Paraguay, where Japa­nese immigrants had already formed communities before 1945. The DR was unique in that it had never hosted Japa­nese immigrants before. Postwar agricultural emigration—­much smaller in size compared to its prewar predecessor—­ has received considerably less attention from scholars and is largely forgotten by many Japa­nese, but in the 1950s it was vigorously promoted by the government as one of the national policies and continued well into the 1970s. Including the postwar chapters in this book is impor­tant b ­ ecause it shows that Japa­nese emigration did not only happen with the expansion of the Japa­nese empire but was continued as the empire collapsed. This chapter situates postwar emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca in the rise and fall of the Japa­nese empire by focusing on the Dominican program and illuminates both continuities and differences between prewar and postwar emigration. The Dominican program is widely considered a failure. It resulted in collective repatriation in 1961–1962 and a historic lawsuit against the Japa­nese government in 2000. The program was also unique b ­ ecause the Japa­nese government proceeded without signing a formal immigration treaty. Kimin, “the abandoned p ­ eople,” is the term that is often used to describe the victims of the program—­deceived and abandoned by the Japa­nese government as excess population, when defeated Japan was struggling with the sudden increase in population while the territory shrank by half. Two seminal 227

228

Chapter 10

works on the topic, The “Utopia” of the Ca­rib­be­an (Karibukai no “rakuen,” 1987) and Dominican Emigrants W ­ ere the Abandoned P ­ eople (Dominika imin wa kimin datta, 1993), detail their hardship and strug­gles in the DR as kimin, and the post-­lawsuit apology and compensations by the state w ­ ere meant to re1 deem this abandonment. While the Japa­nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to avoid its responsibility by emphasizing emigration as the emigrants’ own decision based on their ­free ­will, and by insisting that the ministry provided them with opportunities and even rescued them when asked, t­ here is no denying that the Japa­nese government operated the Dominican program in an extremely irresponsible manner. Rather than simply repeating the story of abandonment, however, this chapter places the Dominican program in the wider context of the rise and fall of the Japa­nese empire, postwar economic reconstruction, and the Cold War. By d ­ oing so, I highlight the following aspects of the postwar emigration program. First, many postwar emigrants to Latin Amer­i­ca, including ­those who went to the DR, ­were repatriates from the former empire. Moreover, before they headed for Latin Amer­i­ca, many of them w ­ ere part of the postwar domestic kaitaku proj­ects. Sengo kaitaku, or “postwar agricultural land development,” overshadowed by the widely celebrated land reform u ­ nder the US occupation, is largely forgotten in affluent Japan and is also missing from vari­ous accounts of the Dominican program. It was, however, not only an impor­tant context but in fact an integral part of the postwar promotion of emigration. Second, what Louise Young called “the migration machine” was also in full operation for postwar emigration.2 Unlike the Manchuria migration machine, the main pillar of the postwar machine was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was new to agricultural emigration. The postwar machine was crankier but propelled by the Kishi administration’s economic diplomacy. Fi­nally, unlike prewar emigration, which was promoted and justified by what Sidney Xu Lu aptly calls “Malthusian expansionism,” postwar emigration could not mobilize that logic as Japan’s defeat and the collapse of the empire delegitimized Japa­ nese settler colonialism.3 Despite, or ­because of, the apparent continuity from Manchuria kaitaku to postwar domestic kaitaku to postwar emigration, a new language of “development” and “international cooperation” replaced the logic of expansionism. By the end of the 1970s, the migration machine was absorbed into the apparatus of international development. While many also emigrated to Latin Amer­i­ca on individual bases, the subject of this chapter is the state-­sponsored program launched and pro-

Mizuno

229

moted by the government as a national policy. The postwar migration machine, therefore, was essentially composed of the state apparatus: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), its auxiliary agencies such as the Federation of Japan Overseas Associations (Kaigai kyōkai rengōkai; hereafter Kaikyōren), the Overseas Emigration Promotion Com­pany (Kaigai ijū shinkō kabushiki gaisha), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF).

Colonia Japonesa The Dominican program started with extremely attractive advertisements. Information about the new emigration program was spread in Japan well before the program was officially announced. Kaikyōren’s publication Kaigai ijū carried the news as early as October 1954: “The Dominican government has unofficially requested 25,000 Japa­nese immigrants. Land w ­ ill be prepared by the Dominican government, and immigrants w ­ ill be welcomed as in­de­pen­dent farmers. . . . ​The Dominican climate is as comfortable as that of Hawai‘i.”4 A major daily newspaper also reported in November 1955 ­under the headline “The Ca­rib­bean Utopia, the Dominican Republic, Invites Japa­nese Immigrants”: “Immigrants w ­ ill be given all the rights equal to Dominican citizens and w ­ ill receive housing immediately.”5 Kawadai Tetsuemon, who joined the Dominican proj­ect at its first recruitment opportunity, ­later recalled how exciting the news was: “I had worked on the kaitaku land [in Hokkaido] for four years at that point and was thinking I could redeem the wasted ten years of my youth in Manchuria. Then, in May 1955, I saw an article in Hokkaido Daily about ‘The Utopia in the Ca­ rib­bean, ­Great News from the Dominican Republic.’ I became so obsessed by the news that I completely lost my interest in Hokkaido kaitaku.”6 The Dominican program was indeed attractive. The government had opened the Amazon program (June 1952), the Brazil program (May 1953), the Paraguay program (March  1954), but none of them offered 300 tarea (19 ha) of ­f ree land, ­f ree housing, and generous subsidies. In post-­ land-­reform Japan, farmers could only own up to 3 hectares (12 ha in ­Hokkaido). Like Kawadai, many applicants to the Dominican and other Latin American programs ­were repatriates from Manchuria.7 Launched by the Kwantung Army, the Manchuria agricultural program sent 321,882 Japa­nese

230

Chapter 10

to Manchukuo to ­settle, especially in the thinly populated areas along the Soviet border. MAF was an enthusiastic promoter, hoping that the program would help rehabilitate agrarian villages hit hard by the ­Great Depression; if 31 ­percent of the nation’s agricultural population left, according to the plan, the farmers in naichi could attain the magic number of 1.6 ha, the minimal size of farm required to sustain an in­de­pen­dent farming ­family without a debt. The majority of Manchuria settlers ­were second and third sons, as well as poor and landless farmers, who migrated for the opportunity of owning land.8 The use of the term kaitaku was strategic and ideological, however. In real­ity, many Japa­nese settlers did not work on wild land.9 The Manchuria Colonization Com­pany forcefully obtained cultivated land from local Chinese farmers for them. Th ­ ese kaitaku farmers and other Japa­nese civilians in Manchuria, totaling more than one million, comprised one-­third of all civilian repatriates from the former empire.10 Faced with acute food shortage and a massive number of repatriates, the jobless, and the homeless, the Japa­nese government launched the kaitaku program in naichi. About 40 ­percent of returnees from Manchuria moved on to t­ hese “kaitaku villages” on volcanic hillsides, wild land deep in the forests, marshland, and former military airfields all over the archipelago, this time r­ eally having to toil the land to render it arable. Their postwar kaitaku life was extremely difficult and often unfruitful. The funding for the kaitaku program was small and inadequate to begin with, and was further cut u ­ nder the Dodge Line, which made it even more challenging for t­hese kaitaku farmers to feed themselves, let alone establish eco­nom­ically sustainable agriculture, even ­after years of hard work.11 In this context, the Dominican program that promised 19 ha of f­ ree land, f­ ree housing, and monthly subsidies was surely appealing. Nonfarmer repatriates too found the Dominican program attractive as Japan was not so welcoming to t­ hose who came back with nothing; many of them w ­ ere treated as financial burdens by their relatives. While the government declared in 1955 that the postwar era was over, the postwar prosperity of the “economic miracle” was not quite a real­ ity for many Japa­nese yet. The “utopia in the Ca­rib­bean” was appealing to many who desired a new start or better life. The Dominican government had its own reasons for inviting Japa­nese settlers. The 1950s for the DR was a time of economic growth, agricultural and industrial development, and the nationalization or “Dominicanization” program, u ­ nder the Trujillo dictatorship. Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo Molina had, since his ascendancy to the presidency in 1930, aggres-

Mizuno

231

sively promoted the nation’s economic development through vari­ous mea­ sures. His legacy is mixed. On one hand, Trujillo succeeded in making the DR debt-­free: by the end of the 1940s, his government had paid back all foreign as well as domestic debt. The country also experienced thirty years of po­liti­cal stability, unpre­ce­dented in Dominican history that had been plagued by foreign occupations, war, and frequent po­liti­cal turnover. On the other hand, however, such stability and economic development came with Truji­ llo’s nepotism and corruption, heavy-­handed suppression of his po­liti­cal opponents, and brutal treatment and killing of Haitian immigrants.12 In fact, Trujillo invited the Japa­nese to help his Dominicanization program along the border with Haiti. The root of Dominican-­Haitian conflict goes back to the colonial period. The Dominican Republic sits on the eastern half of the island of Hispaniola, where Christopher Columbus landed in 1492 and the first permanent Spanish settlement in the Amer­i­cas was established. The western half was occupied by France, dividing the island between French Sant-­Dominique and Spanish Santo Domingo. Sant-­Dominique was France’s most prosperous colony, with its sugar plantations that used African slaves, while Santo Domingo remained less populous and eco­nom­ically undeveloped. Haiti, which achieved in­de­pen­dence from France in 1804 and aspired to rule the ­whole island, repeatedly invaded Spanish Hispaniola, even ­after it became the Dominican Republic in 1844. A nonintervention agreement was reached in 1874, but distrust, hatred, and constant conflicts over the border continued to characterize the relationship between the two countries. Dominican fear of Haitian incursions was also based on racialized cultural differences. Dominican leaders, proud of their Catholic faith and Spanish lineage, despised the Africanness of Haitians and their “black blood.” To guard the border against Haitian migration and incursions, in 1927 the Dominican government began establishing agricultural colonies with Dominican farmers along the thinly populated border. By the time Trujillo became the president, t­ here ­were nine such colonies. Trujillo accelerated and heavi­ly invested in the frontier agricultural colonization with the passage of the 1934 agricultural colonization law. In 1937, Trujillo massacred tens of thousands of Haitians who had lived on the Dominican side.13 Known as el corte (the cutting) ­because Trujillo made sure how many Haitians ­were killed by counting the ears cut off from them, this was a brutal way to clear the land of Haitian farmers. Th ­ ose areas soon became agricultural colonies for Dominicans. Trujillo’s agricultural colonies also

232

Chapter 10

­ oused Spanish Civil War refugees; more than three thousand came in h 1939 and 1940 by Trujillo’s invitation. He also offered a haven for approximately seven hundred Jews who fled central Eu­rope around the same time. They ­were all part of Trujillo’s Dominicanization proj­ect. Trujillo expected them to not only “whiten” the DR while bringing new farming techniques. In the late 1950s, as Japa­nese w ­ ere emigrating to the DR, another wave of Spaniards came based on an agreement between Trujillo and Francisco Franco, as well as a smaller number of Hungarian “Freedom Fighters.”14 The Dominican government made a significant investment in expanding transportation and irrigation, increased the number of colonias to fifty by 1953, and converted approximately one-­fourth of the country’s land to agricultural use. Trujillo intended to demonstrate a stark contrast between the undeveloped Haitian side and the modernized Dominican side. By the end of the 1950s, more than 100,000 ­people lived in colonias nationwide. The majority of farmers in the colonies ­were Dominicans, but the law allowed up to 10 ­percent to be occupied by foreigners. Colonies reserved for Dominican nationals typically settled landless peasants as well as urban slum dwellers. In this sense, the Dominican agricultural colonization program shared its aims with the Japa­nese postwar kaitaku program: to decrease the jobless and the landless while using them to expand agricultural land. Overall, Trujillo’s agricultural colonization program was successful, contributing significantly to the development of the national economy. The colonization program was “part and parcel of the master development plan.”15 This was how the Japa­nese w ­ ere invited to the DR. ­A fter being trained at a fa­cil­i­t y in Miyazaki Prefecture for ten days, twenty-­eight Japa­nese families boarded Brazil Maru in Yokohama as the first state-­sponsored emigrants to the DR. Stopping by Los Angeles on the way, they arrived in the port of Ciudad Trujillo, the nation’s capital (present-­day Santo Domingo), on July 29, 1956. Their arrival—­w ith a banner on the ship “Long Live the Generalissimo Trujillo!”—­was welcomed at the port by Dominican officials and hundreds of curious (but prob­ably mobilized) bystanders waiving ­little Dominican flags on the pier. Both sides had a vested interest in making this occasion lavishly celebratory. It was an impor­tant PR event for Trujillo to Dominican citizens and to the Japa­nese government, and Dominican newspapers made sure to report that Japa­nese immigrants received a subsidy for the first eigh­teen days on board. The Japan side returned with an extravagant reception party, hosted by the Japa­nese Embassy and Osaka Shōsen, the Brazil Maru owner hoping for more business to come. A Japa­nese

Mizuno

233

sword was presented to Trujillo, girls of the immigrant families danced in kimono, and a toast was exchanged. Dominican newspapers reported details of their arrival and reception party widely and followed the “happy and cordial” Japa­nese farmers for days.16 This first group was settled in La Vigía, Dajabón. Trujillo’s investment in this first colonia japonesa is clear. According to El Caribe, a Dominican daily, the colonia was equipped with “30 con­ve­nient and comfortable ­houses, a grocery store, a theater club, and other installations,” a highway that connected the colonia with the city of Dajabón, and three thousand tarea of land already prepared out of nine thousand tarea designated for this colonia. Each Japa­nese f­ amily also received farming tools, seeds, and a subsidy of sixty cents per person a day.17 However, they did not receive the promised three hundred tarea of land. Only seventy to eighty tarea ­were distributed to each ­family. Three months a­ fter, the second group of Japa­nese settlers arrived. ­These seventeen families ­were settled in Constanza in La Veiga. They ­were joined by twelve families in December and one additional ­family in March the following year, fulfilling the thirty-­family cap for this colonia. Unlike Dajabón, this was an inland colonia. Geo­graph­i­cal distance from the province capital (75 km away) was disadvantageous, but its mild weather due to height (1,200 feet above sea level) provided a much better environment for farming. H ­ ere, the Japa­nese settlers had been told they would receive one hundred tarea of land but ­were only given fifty tarea or so.18 As Dajabón and Constanza became full, more colonias ­were opened for the Japa­nese: Neiba, Duvergé, Harabacoa, La Altagracia, and Agua Negra. Except for Harabacoa, all w ­ ere located in the extremely dry region along the border with Haiti. Neiba was designated for vegetable cultivation, and the other two for coffee, but the crops did not grow on the arid and infertile land without adequate irrigation. Despite the poor conditions and prospects, thirty-­ nine families w ­ ere settled in Neiba, fifty-­seven families in La Altagracia, and fifty-­seven families in Agua Negra in 1958 and 1959. Between 1956 and 1959, a total of 1,319 emigrants w ­ ere recruited in Japan and sent, one group ­after another, to this Ca­rib­bean country, primarily along the Haitian border. Con­temporary sources praised the Japa­ nese settlers as exceptionally hardworking and productive. “Virtually all foreign colonists are now Japa­nese,” the American economic geographer John P. Augelli reported from his 1959 summer fieldwork. Most Eu­ro­pe­ ans had fled to cities as soon as opportunities arose: “With the exception

234

Chapter 10

of the Japa­nese, the foreign colony has been less successful than the [Dominican] national even though foreign groups have generally received more land, better housing, and other advantages.”19 Life for ­those Japa­nese in the DR was not easy, however. By the end of 1962, more than half of them— 133 families—­would repatriate back to Japan. The majority of Japa­nese settlers could not establish their living by farming. Immediate prob­lems differed in each settlement. For Dajabón, the prob­lem was the shortage of land and ­water. This was the area where the aforementioned Haitian “cutting” massacre took place, and it had always been “difficult to live and underdeveloped in terms of social and economic infrastructure.” Dominican famers in this region w ­ ere the poorest in the nation, and anyone with less than one hundred tarea ­here—­because of the soil’s infertility—­had a very hard time surviving.20 As noted e­ arlier, the Japa­nese settlers received only seventy to eighty tarea on average. They called this the “fundamental prob­lem” and would spend much energy finding out why they did not receive the promised three hundred tarea. ­Those who brought their savings used it to rent additional land from Dominican farmers, but the rent always was raised drastically and abruptly with a good harvest, making their investment in land eco­nom­ically meaningless. The Dajabón settlement received an additional two families in 1956 and twenty-­ eight families in 1957. The last group received even less land and of worse soil quality. The Masacre River that supplies ­water to this area was (and still is) a small and shallow river that mea­sured only two meters deep even at its deepest point; the ­water volume went further down in the dry season. The Dominican government designated rice to be the crop for this colonia, but ­there was clearly not enough w ­ ater to go around. Settlers’ first work was to extend the canal on their own with shovels.21 As the number of families increased, conflicts over ­water among Japa­nese settlers and with Dominican farmers became constant and even violent. Mr. N, for example, was attacked by a Dominican farmer a­ fter a quarrel over w ­ ater. Mr. N ended up chopping off two fin­gers of this Dominican farmer and was sued.22 The prob­lem for Constanza was the shortage of land and economic unsustainability. Japa­nese settlers h ­ ere w ­ ere able to enjoy good harvests of vegetables and flowers thanks to good climate, but the market was too small as Dominicans did not eat fresh produce at the time. They needed to first create consumers by teaching Dominicans how to eat fresh vegetables. Constanza also settled more than a hundred Hungarians and Spaniards. In addition, other Japa­nese settlers started moving ­here from their original

Mizuno

235

settlements; by early 1957 Constanza h ­ oused a total of sixty-­one Japa­nese families. This was clearly too many farmers for too ­little a market. The more yield they harvested, the lower the price went. It was simply not eco­nom­ ically sustainable. H ­ ere, too, ­there was not enough land to go around. Each ­family was supposed to receive one hundred tarea but did not. Half of the first thirty families in Constanza ended up moving to Harabacoa.23 Neiba, Doverjé, La Altagracia, and Agua Negra, all in an extremely hot and dry area, ­were most challenging. Rocks filled the land in Neiba. Soil was so thin that, no ­matter how many times one dug rocks out, each rainfall washed soil away and layers of rocks reappeared.24 Doverjé was covered by salt, and promised irrigation works w ­ ere never completed. La Altagracia and Agua Negra ­were barren, steep hills covered by rocks. Agua Negra at least had ­water miles away. La Altagracia had none. With such infertile soil, a farmer would need at least five hundred tarea of land to make ends meet. They ­were promised two hundred tarea in ­t hese colonias but found themselves with even smaller plots. All families left t­ hese four settlements, except for one in Agua Negra. Near the La Altagracia settlement stand tombstones for ­those Japa­nese who committed suicide.25 The Dominican colonia law mandated that settlers tend the land in order to keep it. Despite the land bearing ­little or no crops, therefore, the Japa­nese still spent time and energy weeding the land to avoid forced evacuation. Once they left a colonia, they lost subsidies and housing. In short, they w ­ ere ­either stuck in the colonia, living off the savings they brought from Japan, or they left the settlement and used their savings to survive completely in­de­pen­dently. Eventually most families accumulated debt, with ­little prospects of paying it off. ­After 1960, a series of po­liti­cal turns put their lives in even more precarious situations. First, economic sanctions ­were imposed on the country by the Organ­ization of American States (OAS) as a response to Trujillo’s assassination attempt of Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt, who had e­ arlier collaborated with Cuba’s Castro against Trujillo. The OAS sided with Betancourt as his social democracy had gained more support among Latin American leaders than Trujillo’s dictatorship. The Kennedy administration too, fearing a second Cuba, turned its back on its longtime ally and endorsed the OAS economic sanctions. International sanctions lasted from August 1960 till January 1962, putting tremendous stress on the Dominican economy. Dominican farmers who exported their crops to the US, including ­those Japa­nese in Constanza and Harabacoa, suddenly lost income.26

236

Chapter 10

Then Trujillo was assassinated on May 31, 1961. While celebrated by Dominicans, the collapse of the Trujillo regime was a final blow to his Japa­ nese “guests.” They lost subsidies, protection, and a prospect of receiving the promised land. Their widely publicized arrival was still a fresh memory in the country, and they had dutifully joined Trujillo’s birthday parade ­every year.27 Dominicans whose land had been taken away by Trujillo to create colonias japonesas now turned their anger at them. The majority of impoverished Dominicans ­were also upset that the Japa­nese had received special housing and subsidy privileges. Wrathful Dominicans stole tools and animals from the Japa­nese immigrants, burned their storage huts, took over their fields, and destroyed their harvest. Election campaign cars lambasted, “Go home, Japa­nese!” When two Japa­nese youth ­were injured by Dominicans and brought the case to the court, the Dominican judge ruled against the Japa­nese who dared to challenge Dominicans and put them in prison for ten days.28 The Japa­nese settlers requested help from the Japa­nese Embassy and Kaikyōren officials stationed in the DR. Initially, many of them wanted to relocate to another Latin American country to start over. But as they waited for the Japa­nese officials’ response, which was slow and reluctant, the Japa­ nese settlers learned to their surprise that their land in the colonias could not be sold or mortgaged to borrow money, since they ­were corono, “contracted settlers” on the state-­owned land. In Japan, they had been told they would be landowning in­de­pen­dent farmers. U ­ nder Dominican law, however, the right to the land was only granted ­after eight or ten years if they did not leave their colonia, and even then, it would be extremely difficult for the state-­owned land to become their private property. In despair and angry, the Japa­nese settlers began demanding repatriation, sending letters directly to MOFA and Diet members in Japan. In September 1961, the Ikeda cabinet fi­nally approved the use of the State Aid Law to repatriate them. Repatriation was challenging. As Dominican ports ­were closed u ­ nder the sanctions, the Japa­nese w ­ ere lifted out of the airport to get to Panama where the Japa­nese ship was waiting. Moreover, ongoing armed conflicts closed the airport periodically and unexpectedly. It took five separate trips over several months to get all repatriates out of the DR. Meanwhile, MOFA and Kaikyōren tried to persuade as many Japa­nese settlers as pos­si­ble to move to another Latin American country rather than returning to Japan. MOFA had been scrutinized in Diet sessions since May and tried to control damage by minimizing the number of

Mizuno

237

repatriates.29 In the end, 133 families repatriated, while 70 families moved to another Latin American country, and 47 families stayed in the DR.30 Once in Japan, the returnees demanded reparations and an apology from the government. They w ­ ere extremely b ­ itter about the gap between the conditions promised by the Japa­nese government when recruited and the real­ity they faced in the DR and, most of all, their destroyed lives. Most families had sold off all their properties to emigrate—­settler applicants needed to prove their financial ability to be eligible—­and came back with only accumulated debts. The families from Harabacoa even refused to disembark the ship at Yokohama without appropriate reparations. MOFA proposed 10,000 yen per adult and 5,000 yen per minor, but the repatriates refused; such a small amount would do nothing to start a new life when they had nothing, “not even a winter coat.”31 Their demand for reparations and an apology continued. The Dominica Japa­nese Federation, formed in 1968 by both ­those who stayed in the DR and ­those who repatriated back, continued their fight. In 1987, to claim that they had suffered from a violation of ­human rights by the Japa­nese government, they solicited the support and advice of the Tokyo Association of ­Lawyers. Tokyo l­ awyers, recognizing the gravity of the case, brought it to the Federation of ­Lawyers of Japan. Sympathetic ­lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals volunteered their time and sent a team to the DR in 1991 and 1992. Their investigation produced a series of publications, such as the aforementioned Dominican Emigrants ­Were the Abandoned ­People, that became the foundation for ­those of us who study and write about the Dominican case. MOFA made vari­ous efforts to prevent a lawsuit, including pressuring the Dominican government to amend the situations. For example, in 1998, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Japa­nese settlement, the Dominican Agrarian Institute presented portions of land in La Luisa in Monte Plata Province to Japa­nese families to compensate for the “historic error that the [Dominican] government committed.” Most Japa­nese families rejected this offer, however; “We are very thankful for the Dominican Republic” but could not accept the “land of poor quality” to compensate for “the very shameful attitude of the government of Japan.”32 They insisted that it was the Japa­nese government, not the Dominican government, that was to be blamed.33 Their goal was reparations and an apology from the Japa­nese government. In July 2000, 170 Japa­nese emigrants sued the Japa­nese government, and the case lasted for six years. The Tokyo District Court ruled that the

238

Chapter 10

government had indeed failed to fulfill its responsibility in executing the emigration program; it did, however, ultimately drop the case based on the statute of limitations. Too many years had passed for this injustice to be addressed by the court. The ­matter was settled out of the court, with Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s official apology and lump-­sum compensation payment being given in exchange for not pursuing the case further. U ­ nder a special law enacted in November 2006, the Japa­nese government provided not only the 170 plaintiffs but all emigrant participants of the Dominican program with a one-­time, tax-­exempt compensation ranging from 500,000 to 2 billion yen per emigrant.

What Went Wrong? Vari­ous investigations w ­ ere made of the Dominican case to find out what went wrong. The Diet hearings took place in 1961 and 1962 and again in 1983, ­lawyers and journalists investigated in the 1980s and the 1990s, and ­there was the 2000 court case. Japa­nese settlers and repatriates themselves collected testimonies and documents throughout ­those de­cades. Dominican documents and official correspondences ­were examined by Alberto Despradel, a Dominican ambassador to Japan in the 1980s, who published his findings in Spanish in 1994. H ­ ere I highlight several impor­tant findings from t­ hese sources. The “fundamental prob­lem” of land occurred ­because MOFA and Kaikyōren provided wrong information to applicants. This was precisely ­because the Japa­nese government began recruiting before it reached the official arrangement with the Dominican government. The Japa­nese government’s recruitment text, distributed in March 1956, stated that emigrants would be granted 300 tarea of land for f­ ree, but what was officially agreed between the two governments two months ­later was “up to 300 tarea.” Even though this ­mistake was made only in the first Dajabón recruitment, the widely circulated misinformation lingered beyond the first group. The prob­lem of ­water shortage reveals an even more disturbing picture of MOFA’s maneuvering. From the very beginning, MOFA officers knew— in fact, ­were initially very concerned with—­the need to extend the existing irrigation in Dajabón in order for Japa­nese farmers to survive. Japa­nese officers sent to the DR in August 1955 to survey colonia locations clearly pointed out the prob­lem, and Ambassador Yoshida demanded Dominican

Mizuno

239

commitment to the canal’s extension in an official correspondence that ­November: “Dajabón seems most appropriate for the Japa­nese. However, considering the low precipitation of the area, the existing irrigation canal needs to be extended. Therefore, the Embassy of Japan requests to learn from your Ministry of Agriculture ­whether such extension construction could take place before the arrival of Japa­nese families and if so, when.”34 The Dominican government replied on March 1, 1956, that the emigration should be postponed as the canal extension could not take place immediately. Startled, MOFA dropped the request and insisted that the program be launched swiftly and as scheduled b ­ ecause Japa­nese settlers had already been recruited. In fact, this correspondence took place in March as Kaikyōren was recruiting emigrants in Japan. MOFA’s early promotion of the program, it turned out, was not only to spur enthusiasm among potential Japa­nese applicants but also, disturbingly, to pressure the reluctant ­Dominican government with a fait accompli. The prob­lems with Neiba, Doverjé, La Altagracia, and Agua Negra also reveal this disturbing pattern. When Dajabón and Constanza reached the maximum capacity of settlers, the Dominican government opened more colonias for Japa­nese, as explained above. An agricultural construction engineer from the Japa­nese Ministry of Agriculture, Nakada Kōhei, was dispatched in September  1957 to survey new locations. That the Japa­nese government sent an engineer instead of an agronomist indicates that irrigation was the main concern. Nakada barely spent ten days for his survey—­ given poor road conditions in the region, it should have taken him more time to do adequate surveys in multiple and distant locations—­and provided a falsely positive evaluation.35 On Neiba, where Japa­nese settlers found layers of rocks with ­little dirt, he reported that “excellent and deep soil surprises me. With ­water, anything can grow ­here.”36 On Doverjé, Nakada reported that “three million dollars have been spent for the canal that can irrigate more than 200,000 tarea of land ­here. . . . ​Soil has slightly higher salt content but other­wise is good.” The canal was not yet built when he visited ­there and was never completed. Instead, soil covered by a white layer of salt was waiting for Japa­nese settlers.37 A ­later MOFA report even admitted that it was “incomprehensible to even want to invest in agricultural settlements in such an extremely terrible location.”38 ­Later in Tokyo, when settler repatriates from the DR confronted Nakada about his erroneous report, he confessed, “To be honest, your emigration had been already determined two months before I left Japan for that survey. That did influence

240

Chapter 10

my report.” Pressed on this issue again in the Diet hearing, Nakada admitted that his survey was “potentially imperfect.”39 While he rejected the accusation of any wrongdoing on his part, it became clear that he provided a report that would support the falsely rosy recruitment text that had already been circulated in Japan by MOFA and Kaikyōen. The Japa­nese government never surveyed La Altagracia and Agua Negra before sending its citizens ­there. In fact, before the settlers left Japan for La Altagracia and Agua Negra, the Dominican government had told MOFA not to send more Japa­nese ­because it could not responsibly host them any longer. By spring 1958, the Dominican government’s capacity to continue the expensive Dominicanization program was substantially down: the economy was in recession, Trujillo’s dictatorship was weakening, and the costly immigration program had lost support in the government.40 MOFA, however, begged the Dominican government to let in more Japa­nese as they had already sold their properties and w ­ ere only waiting to depart. Even a­ fter Trujillo himself ordered the discontinuance of the program on June 24, 1958, as official correspondence makes clear, MOFA nagged, begged, and managed to send two more groups to La Altagracia. Setō Tatsuhiko was one of ­these last 1959 settlers. When he applied to the program, Japan was in the midst of celebrating the crown prince’s wedding. Setō could not care less about this historic imperial marriage with the first commoner bride, as he was dreaming about toiling and sweating for a coffee plantation he would own. Setō spent his youth in the military deployed in China and the Okinawan islands and grew fond of snowless winter. When he arrived in La Altagracia, a shelter was waiting for him, but he never received any land.41 Amazingly, even a­ fter this group, MOFA continued to pressure the Dominican government to accept more immigrants, albeit in vain. Th ­ ere ­were at least three times during the entire emigration program when the Dominican government told the Japa­nese government to postpone or stop the program—­t he beginning, the m ­ iddle, and t­ oward the end. Each time, MOFA insisted that the program must go on ­because Japa­nese settlers had already been recruited. Unlike the other state-­sponsored Latin American programs, the Japa­ nese government never concluded an immigration treaty with the Dominican government. Instead, MOFA used the piecemeal approach described above, adjusting the settlement arrangement via correspondence and pressuring the Dominican government to receive more rounds of settlers, caus-

Mizuno

241

ing confusion, incoherency, and misinformation. The absence of the treaty was thus a clear contributing ­factor to the failure of the program. According to Despradel, a former Dominican diplomat to Japan, “the fact that ­there was no treaty agreement between the two countries to stipulate the procedure and content of immigration is a regrettable error of Japa­nese diplomacy. For t­ hose of us familiar with how diplomacy works between sovereign countries, this is beyond comprehension.”42 MOFA ­later explained that it lost a chance to conclude a treaty b ­ ecause of Trujillo’s assassination, but documents show that the chance was lost b ­ ecause MOFA’s priority, at each stage of the program, was placed on sending more emigrants before Trujillo would discontinue the program. Why did MOFA continue the program as hastily and forcefully as it did, despite all the prob­lems? Why did it even promote overseas emigration when the Japa­nese economy had started to exhibit the growth? The following and last section answer t­ hese questions.

Economic Diplomacy and International Cooperation a­ fter the Empire Scholars writing on postwar Japa­nese emigration often contextualize it in the so-­called overpopulation discourse. Although the sudden increase in population a­ fter 1945 was an impor­tant context, a closer look reveals that policy makers and MOFA did not regard overseas emigration as an effective mea­sure against the population prob­lem. This was already clear in the first articulation of postwar emigration policy, the Resolution Regarding the Population Prob­lem, which unanimously passed the Diet on May 13, 1949: “It is difficult to expect emigration to solve the overpopulation prob­ lem. Yet, if the world accepts Japa­nese immigrants, that significance w ­ ill be im­mense.” What was viewed impor­tant was rather the symbolic significance of the world accepting Japa­nese settlers again. As if “Japa­nese immigrants” represented the worst of Japa­nese aggressive expansionism, being able to resume overseas emigration was regarded as the litmus test for the world’s attitude t­oward a new Japan. A separate resolution submitted by the Population Prob­lem Council a few months ­later too maintained that overseas emigration could only offer “a psychological remedy to the sense of overpopulation at home.”43 In fact, by the time the emigration program began, the Population Prob­lem Council ­stopped seeing it even as a solution at all.44

242

Chapter 10

Emigrants w ­ ere indeed expected to actively contribute to the Japa­nese economy. As MOFA’s Emigration Bureau stated in its “Policies Regarding Overseas Emigration” (October 1954), “A solution to the population prob­lem basically lies in creating jobs, which can be done only through promoting industry and expanding trade. Therefore, emigration abroad should be promoted from this perspective.” The document estimated the monetary contribution of Brazilian Japa­nese to be 1.8 billion yen and concluded, “In short, the purpose of emigration policy is to expand as widely as pos­si­ble opportunities to earn foreign currency in order to help the Japa­nese economy. For this reason, we need to send out as many excellent emigrants as pos­si­ble.”45 Their remittance, though significant, was not the end goal. What soon became expected of overseas emigrants was to be the vanguard in reopening Japan’s economic relations with the world. Japan’s economy strug­gled to recover for many years ­after the defeat. The Korean War gave it a boost, but the war boom ended shortly. Japan needed trade, and for that it needed to reconstruct its ties with Asia, the major resource supplier and market that sustained Japa­nese industrial growth in the 1930s and war­time. The bottleneck was the issue of war reparations that prevented normalization. As soon as regaining sovereignty, therefore, Japan started negotiations, and the reparations and quasi-­reparations treaties ­were concluded with Burma (1954), the Philippines and Thailand (1955), Indonesia and Laos (1958), Vietnam and Cambodia (1959), and more in the succeeding de­cades. Reparations w ­ ere paid in the form of Japa­nese goods and ser­v ice. Japan built dams and ports, provided machines and technical training, and helped establish such factories as fish canneries and textile factories as reparations, which led to commercial trade deals. The golden triangle of US capital, Japa­nese technology, and the Asian market worked well for the American Cold War scheme, the Japa­nese economy, and the newly in­de­pen­dent developmentalist military regimes in Asia.46 Asia, however, was not an option for Japa­nese emigration. A ­ fter Japan’s brutal aggression, expecting Asian countries to welcome Japa­nese settlers was unrealistic. Moreover, the collapse of the Japa­nese empire triggered violent wars for in­de­pen­dence and civil wars throughout East and Southeast Asia. China, the largest prewar trade partner and destination for Japa­ nese emigrants, became inaccessible a­ fter 1949. Latin Amer­i­ca, in contrast, was po­liti­cally more stable, f­ ree from reparations issues, and open to Japa­nese immigrants. While Brazil exhibited some anti-­Japanese sentiment, its Japa­nese community, now the largest out-

Mizuno

243

side of Japan, had made a g­ reat contribution to Brazilian agriculture and economy and was ­eager to see the flow of Japa­nese immigrants resuming. Similarly, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, and Paraguay ­resumed Japa­nese immigration. Japan’s pro–­Latin American policy was solidified ­under Kishi Nobusuke, minister of foreign affairs and prime minister from December 1956 till July 1960. While not part of MOFA’s “three diplomatic princi­ples”—­ working with the UN, the “­free world,” and Asia—­Latin Amer­i­ca indeed occupied a significant place in Kishi’s diplomacy and economic planning. With American and Eu­ro­pean aid and capital pouring in, Latin Amer­i­ca became the destination of “the twentieth ­century’s ­great migration of capital and technology.” The Kishi administration felt Japan too should get into this market before too late. Latin American votes ­were also impor­tant for Japan’s ­r unning for a nonpermanent member seat on the United Nations Security Council. In addition, the Japa­nese business community had been pressing impossible demands for normalizing diplomacy with mainland China while maintaining close ties with Taiwan; Latin Amer­i­ca would serve as an attractive alternative to pre­sent to the business community.47 ­A fter all, in the words of the MOFA Blue Book, Latin Amer­i­ca was “extremely rich in resources and thinly populated: it is the frontier of the twentieth ­century.”48 To this Latin Amer­i­ca, Kishi promoted emigration as “a kind of investment” integral to what he called “economic diplomacy.”49 The term “economic diplomacy” existed before 1945, but it gained significance and popularity in the 1950s as post-­empire Japan sought to secure its place in the world.50 Kishi defined economic diplomacy as composed of expanding trade, sending emigrants for the host country’s development, and providing technological and business expertise. He contrasted this to the prewar Japa­nese expansion centered on territorial concerns.51 In Kishi’s strategy, t­hese three—­trade, emigration, and technical aid—­should go hand in hand to promote each other, and its ultimate effect was Japa­nese economic development that would solve the unemployment prob­lem. Overseas emigration was not about getting rid of “as large a number of Japa­nese as proportionate to the population increase, which would be impossible.” Rather, Kishi maintained, the real point of emigration was: The presence of overseas Japa­nese . . . ​­w ill lead to the expansion of Japa­nese trade and economic cooperation, which ­w ill broaden the Japa­nese economic base. [Emigration] is extremely effective for international cooperation [kokusai

244

Chapter 10

kyōryoku]. . . . ​To promote overseas emigration means to expand the economic base to feed the Japa­nese population. . . . ​I see overseas emigration as the most impor­tant part of my economic diplomacy.52

In other words, postwar kaitaku emigrants to Latin American had an impor­tant dual mission. They ­were emigrating to help the land and agricultural development of the host country so that Japan would be accepted back by the international community; but in addition, “kaitaku of the new Japa­nese market is what is expected in economic diplomacy,” in the words of Kishi.53 Kishi’s economic diplomacy boosted emigration and capital investment in Latin Amer­i­ca. The Emigration Promotion Com­pany’s bud­get for 1957 increased by 500 million yen. By 1959, it had purchased the total of 370,307 hectares in Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentine for Japa­nese settlers (for approximately 800 million yen).54 The number of emigrants to Latin Amer­ i­ca drastically increased as well; the 1957 figure doubled that of 1955, and it continued to rise ­until 1960.55 MOFA’s 1958 five-­year emigration plan aspired to send 11,000 emigrants in 1959 and 5,000 e­ very year a­ fter that. The expansion of the Latin American emigration program went hand in hand with capital investment. The Japa­nese government made an agreement with Brazil in 1957 to provide 30 billion yen in technical aid to build a steel mill in Brazil (with billions more added l­ater), Usiminas (Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerasis S.A.), and this directly resulted in the conclusion of the immigration treaty between the two countries in 1960.56 The 1959 immigration treaty with Paraguay, which stipulated the ac­cep­tance of 805,000 Japa­nese over thirty years, went with Paraguay’s high-­price-­tag order of commercial ships and Japan’s financial aid to build them.57 As anticipated by Kishi and the Japa­nese business community, t­ hese aid proj­ects increased business opportunities in Latin Amer­i­ca. Indeed, Japa­nese private capital investment in Latin Amer­i­ca exceeded that in Asia in the late 1950s.58 To further promote emigration and trade, Kishi became the first prime minister to tour Latin Amer­i­ca; he spent two weeks visiting Brazil, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and Mexico from July 24 till Aug 6, 1959, ­after briefly touring Eu­ro­pean countries. This was, in fact, precisely the time that the last two groups of Japa­nese emigrants ­were sent to La Altagracia despite the Dominican government’s stern request not to. The Japa­nese government regarded the Dominican

Mizuno

245

­ epublic as an impor­tant “dollar earning market,” and MOFA thus strongly R supported pursuing it as a trading partner.59 I suspect that MOFA insisted on launching and continuing the Dominican emigration program despite all the foreseeable prob­lems not only ­because President Trujillo initially offered unpre­ce­dentedly favorable conditions but also ­because of the prospect of ­f uture business in dollars. This is, in my view, reflected in one notable feature of the Dominican program: the inclusion of fisherman. It is not clear w ­ hether it was Trujillo’s request or the Japa­nese government’s suggestion, but five fishermen families from Kagoshima emigrated to the DR to develop fishery in the bay of Manzanillo, also called Pepillo Salcedo, located next to the border with Haiti and slightly north of Dajabón. The port of Pepillo Salcedo was active, as Grenada Fruit Co. used it to ship bananas to the US from its plantation in the DR. The Japa­nese fishermen ­were tasked with transferring their fishing skills and fish-­processing knowledge to create an industry ­there. But documents also suggest that Japa­nese officials w ­ ere using this as an opportunity for a joint venture business. In December 1955, Natsubori Genzaburō, a Diet member representing Aomori Prefecture, where he had developed a large fishing industry, was sent to the DR to discuss the above-­mentioned irrigation extension issue. Natsubori’s equally impor­tant agenda was to discuss a plan for establishing a Dominican-­Japanese joint fish cannery.60 This was precisely the time when the Japa­nese government was negotiating a reparations treaty with the Philippines government, which included granting fishing boats and helping to establish canneries to export fish products to the US. No cannery was created in Manzanillo in the end, but the case reveals how state-­sponsored immigration programs went hand in hand with business and aid opportunities. Fishing in Manzanillo did not go well. ­There ­were no fish in the bay. The Japa­nese fishery families ­were the first to be repatriated to Japan in 1961. While Kishi insisted that his economic diplomacy was dif­fer­ent from the prewar colonial policy, connections with Manchuria are clear. The first president of the Overseas Emigration Promotion Com­pany was Tanaka Tetsusaburō, former president of the Central Bank of Manchuria. The second president, Ōshima Magoshirō, had managed Chosen Bank, Tōyō Colonization Co., and Nanyo Colonization Co. and was also Kishi’s friend since high school.61 As discussed ­earlier, the Japa­nese in the DR ­were settled in the agricultural colonies along the Haitian border as a h ­ uman buffer.

246

Chapter 10

Rec­ords do not show that Japa­nese officials ­were ever concerned about this aspect, unlike the irrigation issue that did initially raise their concern. It is tempting—­and prob­ably not too farfetched—to suspect that it was all too familiar to the Japa­nese officials to question such a usage of farmer settlers. The continuity with the Manchuria kaitaku proj­ect can be most strongly seen in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). As historians such as Sidney Xu Lu and Itō Atsushi have made clear, although MOFA and Kaikyōren w ­ ere the main engine of the postwar migration machine, MAF too played an impor­tant part.62 While MOFA regarded the population prob­lem as the issue of unemployment and economic growth, to MAF leaders, it was essentially the continuation of the “second and third son” prob­lem. Before 1945, MAF used Manchuria as a solution to ­those agrarian sons who could not inherit land. When they came back to Japan, as discussed ­earlier, MAF routed them to kaitaku villages throughout naichi, together with other second and third sons from overcrowded cities and villages. Creating in­de­pen­dent, landowning farmers had been the ministry’s goal since the prewar period and continued to be so a­ fter the war; and, just like e­ arlier, it promoted postwar overseas emigration as part of its agrarian village rehabilitation campaign. In 1961, MAF announced the Policies regarding Overcrowded Kaitaku Villages and urged struggling farmers to leave their postwar kaitaku villages so that the remaining farmers could own a plot large enough for eco­nom­ically sustainable farming.63 This new policy took place as emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca began to decline ­after 1961. The failed DR program, widely covered in the media, dampened enthusiasm for overseas emigration among Japa­nese. By then, l­abor shortages in urban industries had started to pull the youth from agrarian villages. MAF set aside a portion of the bud­get specifically to emigrate a large number of failed kaitaku villa­gers to Latin Amer­i­ca. For many of them, it was the third kaitaku migration: first to Manchuria, then to the Japa­nese kaitaku village, and again to Latin Amer­i­ca.64 Despite, or perhaps b ­ ecause of, the clear continuity from the Manchuria program, the new language of “international cooperation” was an impor­ tant identity for postwar overseas emigration. Kishi’s economic diplomacy worked in the sense that technical and economic aid made pos­si­ble the Japa­nese economic growth we call “the miracle economy.” In the 1960s, although agricultural emigration continued, the Japa­nese government increasingly promoted “technical emigration” instead, sending engineers and

Mizuno

247

other experts with university degrees to Latin Amer­i­ca.65 “Economic diplomacy” and “international cooperation” w ­ ere literally merged in 1974, when the overseas emigration agency and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency ­were joined to create the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The Dominican proj­ect was the biggest blemish in the history of MOFA emigration policy. The collective repatriation in 1961 exposed MOFA’s incapacity and untrustworthiness and led to the decline of overseas emigration that the Japa­nese government had pushed for its economic diplomacy. The unpre­ce­dented lawsuit in 2000 scrutinized the past yet again and confirmed the Japa­nese government’s wrongdoing. But the Dominican proj­ect was not an isolated case nor a mere anomaly. It epitomized the postwar emigration proj­ect that was so forcefully and irresponsibly carried out as part of national economic diplomacy. As the ­earlier chapters in this book demonstrate, prewar emigration too was tied to trade and economic expansion. If prewar emigration was for the expansion of the empire, however, it was territorial extraction that propelled and defined postwar emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca. The rise and fall of the Japa­ nese empire in Asia intimately connected Latin Amer­i­ca to Japan. Postwar emigrants ­were expected to develop the agricultural land in Latin American countries and open the market for post-­empire Japan. To view postwar emigrants as simply an excess population to be abandoned would obscure the economic and po­liti­cal dimensions of the postwar emigration program.

Notes I am extremely grateful for the hospitality, documents, and interview time I received in the Dominican Republic from many, especially Hidaka Toshie, Hidaka Mamaru, Takegama Tōru, Yoshimoto Sumiko, and Iguchi Shizu. Many have passed away since then. I also thank Mike Ryan for helping me with the Spanish materials and Takahashi Yukiharu and Yano Hisako for sharing their time in Japan. 1. ​Takahashi, Karibuka no; and Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin. Also impor­ tant are former Kaikyōren officer Wakatsuki Yasuo’s works, such as Gaimushō ga keshita Nihonjin; and Genshirin no nakano Nihonjin.

248

Chapter 10

2. ​L. Young, Total Empire. 3. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese Settler. 4. ​Quoted in Konno and Takahashi, Dominika imin, p. 61. 5. ​ Nihon keizai shinbun, November  11, 1955, quoted in Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin, p. 19. 6. ​Originally in Dominika ijū jūgoshūnen kinensai ijūshi hensan iinkai, Dominika ijūshi jūgonen, excerpted in Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai. Karibu no shima, pp. 39–40. 7. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, p. 29. 8. ​L. Young, Total Empire, pp. 328, 335. 9. ​Tama, “  ‘ Manshū imin,’ ” p. 61. 10. ​Wakatsuki, Sengo hikiage, pp. 252–253. 11. ​See Nozoe, Kaitaku nōmin, ch. 4 and 5. 12. ​Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development. 13. ​Turits, “World Destroyed.” 14. ​Horst and Asagiri, “Odyssey of Japa­nese Colonists,” p. 338. 15. ​Augelli, “Agricultural Colonization,” pp. 17–22. Also see Hazel, “Whiteness in Paradise.” 16. ​ La Nación, “Llega a Ciudad Trujillo Primer Grupo de Agricultores Japoneses,” July 27, 1956; La Nación, “El Secretario de Agricultura Da Bienvenida a Inmigrantes,” July 28, 1956; El Caribe, “Presidente Elogia Laboriosidad de Colonia Japonesa,” July 29, 1956. 17. ​ El Caribe, “Presidente Elogia Laboriosidad de Colonia Japonesa,” July 29, 1956. 18. ​Gaimushō chūnanbei ijūkyoku, Sengo no kaigai ijū, p.  224. Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin, pp. 56–57. 19. ​Augelli, “Agricultural Colonization,” pp. 22–26. 20. ​Despradel, La migración japonesa, p. 35. 21. ​Takahashi, Karibukai no, ch. 2. 22. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, pp. 67–68. 23. ​Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin, pp. 56–57. 24. ​Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin, pp. 34–37. 25. ​Takahashi and Konno, Dominika imin, pp. 41–47. 26. ​Brown-­Joh, “Economic Sanctions.” 27. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, p. 70. 28. ​Takahashi, Karibukai no, pp. 152–157. Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, p. 44. 29. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, pp. 37–38. 30. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, p. 13. 31. ​Takahashi, Karibukai no, p. 166. Upon repatriation, most families relied on welfare. It has been reported that the government threatened to cut off welfare to force them to give up any campaigns for reparations. Dominika imin soshō genkokudan, Dominika nyūsu retā, 1:2. 32. ​Cruz, “A la Búsqueda.” 33. ​For example, the Japa­nese Dominican community made this stance clear in an opinion piece published in a major Dominican daily. Comité para la Agilización, “En Torno a los Reclamos,” Listín Diario, July 8, 1998. 34. ​Despradel, La migración japonesa, p. 17.

Mizuno

249

35. ​Nakada even published a book, Journey in Latin Amer­i­ca, based on this trip in the following year. Nakada and Nanbō, Chūnanbei kikō. 36. ​Takahashi, Dominica imin, p. 35. 37. ​Takahashi, Dominica imin, pp. 38–40. 38. ​Gaimushō, Sengo no kaigai ijū, p. 223. 39. ​Kokkai shūgiin, Kessan iinkai 7-­gō. 40. ​Despradel, La migración japonesa, pp. 62–63. 41. ​Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai, Karibu no shima, pp. 49–54. 42. ​Despradel, La migración japonesa, p. 13. 43. ​Jinkō mondai shingikai, Jinkō mondai shingikai ketsugi. 44. ​Jinkō mondai shingikai, Jinkō shūyōryoku ni kansuru. 45. ​Gaimushō, Sengo no kaigai ijū, pp. 68–69. 46. ​Mizuno, “Kula Ring.” As I argued ­there, such an arrangement was not unique in the immediate postwar world plagued with dollar shortage; Britain, for example, paid back its war­time debt to India via technical aid. 47. ​Hasegawa, “Kishi naikaku,” p. 163. 48. ​Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō (1957). 49. ​Kokkai shūgiin, Yosan iinkai 14-­gō. 50. ​Takase, “ ‘Keizai gaikō’ gainen,” p. 22. 51. ​Kokkai shūgiin, Yosan iinkai 14-­gō. 52. ​Kokkai shūgiin, Yosan iinkai 14-­gō. 53. ​Kokkai shūgiin, Yosan iinkai 14-­gō. 54. ​Gaimushō chūnanbei ijūkyoku, Sengo no kaigai ijū, p. 5. 55. ​Iacobelli, Postwar Emigration, p. 18. 56. ​Hasegara, “Kishi naikaku,” p. 186. 57. ​Nakayama, “Sengo Nihon karano Paraguai ijū,” p. 27. 58. ​Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō (1958). 59. ​Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō (1957). 60. ​Despradel, La migración japonesa, pp. 20–21. 61. ​Nakayama, “Sengo Nihon karano Paraguai ijū,” p. 25. 62. ​Lu, Making of Japa­nese Settler, ch. 8; Itō, Nihon nōmin seisakushiron, pp. 220–223. 63. ​Sengo kaitakushi henshū iinkai, Sengo kaitakushi, pp. 358–363. 64. ​Nozoe, Kaitaku nōmin, p. 156 65. ​For example, see Yamaguchi, Burajiru gijutsu ijūsha.

c h a p t e r

11

­Were Issei in Brazil Imperialists? Emigration-­Driven Expansionism in Nikkei Lit­er­a­ture Ignacio López-­C alvo

J

apanese Brazilian lit­er­a­ture represents a valuable tool to explore the social memory of the ethnic community that produced it. As a therapeutic tool of self-­exploration, this cultural production often tries to make sense of the past by historicizing the collective life experiences of the Nikkei community in Brazil. Both remembering and “strategic” forgetting play a key role in the formation of this literary discourse. In this sense, I find it equally telling when it addresses imperialism, its connection to state-­ guided emigration, or the acts of terrorism carried out by Shindō Renmei as when it consciously chooses to ignore them. ­These collective silences, amnesia, or denial of certain painful episodes suggest that the certain topics are still considered a taboo or an open wound that is yet to heal. Therefore, even if the literary repre­sen­ta­tion may sometimes veer away from ­actual historical events, what interests me the most is how the Nikkei community remembers or reconstructs its past through writing. This essay explores how the role of emigration in prewar imperial expansionist plans and postwar neo­co­lo­nial designs is ­either addressed or avoided in lit­er­a­t ure written by Brazilian authors of Japa­nese ancestry. It pays par­tic­u­lar attention to the creation of Shindō Renmei as the missing link between imperialism and emigration-­driven expansionism.1 I have selected what I consider the main literary texts addressing state-­g uided emigration in relation with Japa­nese expansionism and imperialism. As ­w ill be noticed, ­because I was not able to find lit­er­a­t ure by Nikkei ­women writers addressing ­these issues, all the selected authors are men. Shindō Renmei (meaning League of the Way of Emperor’s Subjects) was an Issei (first-­generation) terrorist organ­ization in 1940s São Paulo and Paraná. It was founded in 1942 by the fanatically nationalist Junji Kikawa, 250



López-­Calvo

251

a former col­o­nel of the Japa­nese Imperial Army, a­ fter an episode of vio­ lence between Nikkeijin and Brazilians in Marília. He ordered acts of sabotage against Japa­nese immigrants producing silk and peppermint, arguing that t­ hese products w ­ ere being exported to the United States for the creation of parachutes and explosives respectively. In addition, claiming that the news about Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II was mere American propaganda, Kikawa ordered, from 1946 to early 1947, his young assassins (known as Tokkōtai) to terrorize or kill with firearms or katanas several Makegumi (­t hose “defeatists” or “dirty hearts,” typically wealthier and more culturally integrated, who publicly acknowledged that Japan had lost the war). Regarding the reach of this organ­ization, Jhony Arai and Cesar Hirasaki explain, “Most Japa­nese not only believed that Japan had been victorious, but they also paid dues to the sect. Th ­ ere w ­ ere more than 120,000 sympathizers who paid monthly fees and nearly 20,000 associates in sixty branches scattered throughout São Paulo.”2 To convince their followers, Shindō Renmei’s leaders ordered the manipulation of journal photo­graphs. L ­ ater, they took advantage of their credulous followers by selling them by-­then-­worthless yen, fake return tickets to Japan, or land in the Asian colonies (some among the victimized would commit suicide as a result) and assuring them that Japa­nese ships would soon come to take them back to Japan or to its Asian colonies. In the end, at least 23 Japa­nese immigrants ­were killed and 147 ­others ­were wounded by the Kachigumi (the “victorists,” who refused to believe or acknowledge Japan’s defeat; they w ­ ere typically poorer community members who w ­ ere still planning to return to the fatherland). Yet only 14 Tok­ kōtai ­were convicted of murder. Moving on to the relation between state-­g uided emigration and empire, “brokers of empire” is the term that Jun Uchida uses to describe ­those Japa­nese settlers in the Korean peninsula who, as merchants, journalists, ideologues, or semiofficial agents, among many other professions, affected ­every aspect of the Japa­nese colonial experience. Uchida maintains that even if most of them w ­ ere guided by personal profit and national interest was only secondary to them, their activities (especially ­those of pioneers between 1910 and 1930) ­were still inextricable from the Japa­nese empire’s expansionist proj­ect, as they de facto mediated the colonial management of the peninsula. Whereas ­these settlers ultimately became tools for Japan’s domination of K ­ orea, Sidney Xu Lu argues, in his The Making of Japa­nese Settler Colonialism: Malthusianism and Trans-­Pacific Migration, 1868–1961,

252

Chapter 11

that the activities of Japa­nese immigrants in Latin Amer­i­ca w ­ ere interconnected with the imperial proj­ect as well, but in their case, rather than domination, their ostensible role was to expand the empire’s po­liti­cal influence, improve Japan’s international reputation and commerce, bring remittances, and create sources of food and raw material. Several Japa­nese Brazilian works call attention to the fact that among the immigrants arriving to the port of Santos w ­ ere proud veterans of the recent Russo-­Japanese War (1904–1905). Thus, the artist and essay writer Tomoo Handa’s Memórias de um imigrante japonês no Brasil (Memoirs of a Japa­nese immigrant in Brazil, 1980), originally written in Japa­nese in 1970, describes former military officers and soldiers arriving with their military decorations: “Some men had been soldiers in the last (Russian-­Japanese) war and brought their decorations on their chests.”3 Other works also reveal that the found­ers of the terrorist organ­ization Shindō Renmei, the first terrorist group in the Amer­i­cas, ­were former military officers. Thus, Ryoki ­Inoue’s novel Saga: A história de quatro gerações de uma família japonesa no Brasil (Saga: The history of four generations of a Japa­nese f­ amily in Brazil, 2006) argues that t­ hese former military officers who arrived among ­those Japa­nese immigrants between 1928 and 1933 had been assigned the mission “to create points of re­sis­tance against western po­liti­cal and cultural domination in countries where the Japa­nese community was beginning to have an impact, both demographically and eco­nom­ical­ly.”4 However, I see most of ­these immigrants as mere pawns of the Japa­ nese government’s cap­i­tal­ist social engineering. They w ­ ere first victims of a nation-­state that, seeing them as an undesirable, impoverished, excess population of landless peasants and less-­skilled l­ abor, sold them to the Brazilian government as “the whites of Asia.”5 Within the framework of a cap­i­tal­ist scheme, their emigration and ­labor abroad ­were planned with sights set firmly on their potential for providing food supplies and raw materials for Japan, as well as for creating new markets for Japa­nese products, thus spurring international trade. The Japa­nese government also expected its diasporic communities to help the national economy with their remittances and to conduct themselves as model, modern Japa­nese citizens who would improve the country’s international prestige. On the other hand, Japa­nese immigrants ­were likewise victimized by a Brazilian government lobbied by wealthy coffee plantation ­owners from the states of São Paulo and Paraná, who ­were desperately looking for exploitable, cheap ­labor,



López-­Calvo

253

twenty years ­after the abolition of African slavery and soon ­after their failure to attract Eu­ro­pean farm workers. L ­ ater, continued emigration during the 1950s and 1960s captured “postwar Japan’s international agenda of peacefully expanding its sphere of influence in the western world.”6 Tellingly, even ­after the Japa­nese government and immigration agencies became aware of the appalling living and working conditions on Brazilian coffee plantations, they continued to recruit and send emigrants mostly from the archipelago’s southwestern regions to Brazil (the main destination in the Western hemi­sphere since the 1920s, a­ fter Hawai‘i, Canada, and the United States closed their borders to Japa­nese immigration). While, in theory, this was done in order to offset overpopulation on the archipelago and as a philanthropic mission to bring economic development to overseas rural areas supposedly in need of (Japa­nese) pro­gress, the true goal was to expand the empire and Japan’s po­liti­cal sphere of influence, all the while alleviating social tensions, unemployment, and widespread poverty at home. As the po­liti­cal scientist Toake Endoh explains, “­Others call the emigration program nothing but kimin (dumpling ­people [sic]) for having abandoned the mi­grants in the hostile and difficult natu­ral or socioeconomic climates of foreign countries over ten thousand miles away. Some former emigrants have filed suit against the Japa­nese migration authorities, who the plaintiffs believe ­were responsible for their plight and affliction.” 7 Endoh adds that the Japa­nese government’s focus on the southwest had po­liti­cal motivations: “Class relations that developed uniquely in the southwestern region ­were fomenting social antagonism against the economic and po­liti­cal establishment. The dispossessed or marginalized population was radicalizing their ideology and actions against their class e­ nemy and the state.”8 One may, therefore, accuse some of ­these Japa­nese immigrants of being gullible for believing false promises of becoming rich in a tropical land before returning home in a handful of years but hardly of being full-­blown imperialists trying by choice to dominate and oppress the population of a developing country on the other side of the world; that would be tantamount to confusing a manipulative government with its own victimized ­people who w ­ ere indolently displaced and neglected for the sake of the national economy. In other words, the prob­lem with conceiving of Japa­nese immigrants in Brazil as imperialists is that it only bears in mind the positionality of the Meiji and subsequent Japa­nese governments, thus neglecting

254

Chapter 11

the subjectivities and lived experiences of the often exploited Issei immigrants themselves, many of whom had previously been victims of Japan’s imperial expansionism and demands for epistemicidal acculturation.

Prewar Emigration-­Driven Expansionism in Nikkei Lit­er­a­ture By way of illustration, Okinawa was one of the prefectures that had sent more emigrants since 1908. Yet Okinawans, like other nations in the East Asian colonies, had previously been forced by Japan’s assimilation policy (dōka) to adopt Japa­nese language and cultural practices, all the while becoming second-­class citizens without the same rights as Naichijin. Naichijin’s racism against Okinawans is denounced, for example, in ­Inoue’s Saga, where a sergeant of Okinawan ancestry named Tomita Arakaki tells Nelson, a mixed-­race Japa­nese Brazilian: “When I have to talk with a Japa­nese, the expression on his face when I give my name is more than enough to show me that I’m not welcome.”9 The diaspora in South Amer­i­ca initially produced a “colonial lit­er­a­ture” (shokumin bungaku) that, as the Japa­nese lit­er­a­t ure scholar Seth Jacobowitz observes, not only helped reflect on what it meant to be Japa­nese abroad but also contributed to sharing useful knowledge for imperial ideology: Although literary scholars regard its theme of overseas migration to Brazil as something of an outlier in the modern Japa­nese canon, in fact a considerable body of popu­lar immigrant lit­er­a­t ure was published in Japan from 1908 into the 1940s in the pro-­expansionist journals Shokumin Sekai (Colonization World), Burajiru (Brazil), Kaigai (The Overseas Journal), and Shokumin (The Colonial Review) that demand serious scholarly attention. ­These works ­were published alongside articles that valorized the heroic immigrants fanning out around the world to represent an expansionist Japa­nese race and empire. In turn ­these texts contributed to a corpus of shared knowledge between empire planners, pro-­expansionist organ­izations such as the Nippon Rikkôkai, readers at home, and immigrants who took the plunge overseas.10

With time, however, the Brazilian Nikkei community and its writers would progressively disassociate from the ancestral fatherland, no longer perceiving themselves as imperial subjects or even as Japa­nese. The historical



López-­Calvo

255

and geopo­liti­cal contexts b ­ ehind their identitarian evolution are often reflected in the nomenclature used: from the initial “immigrant” or “colonial” lit­er­a­t ure by overseas “compatriots” or “brethren” to postwar Nikkei lit­er­a­ture. In this sense, the Japa­nese lit­er­a­ture scholar Edward Mack notes, “It is far more common to see references to dôhô (brethren) and hôjin (countrymen) than the proper noun Nihonjin when referring to the ethnically Japa­nese colonists.”11 Understandably so, the use of the term “colonial” to refer to prewar lit­er­ a­t ure by Japa­nese immigrants in Brazil may puzzle ­today’s readers—­after all, Brazil was a sovereign state rather than a formal colony of Japan. It is nevertheless indicative of the intimate relationship among state-­guided immigration (including immigration to South Amer­i­ca’s remote hinterlands), commerce, and imperialism within the discourse of prewar territorial expansionism and foreign policy. Further complicating the issue, ­after World War II Japa­nese Brazilians often used the Portuguese term colonia (or koronia, meaning “community”) and colono (settler) to refer to themselves without necessarily reflecting ­either an imperial subjectivity or the Japa­ nese empire, which by then no longer existed. As in the rest of the Amer­i­cas, Brazilians w ­ ere aware of the empire of Japan’s aggressive militarism and imperialism, paying par­tic­u­lar attention to its recent victory over the Rus­sian empire, the first instance in modern times in which a Eu­ro­pean nation had been defeated by a non-­European one. For this reason, the Nikkei community was sometimes perceived by xenophobic politicians as a potential or real “fifth column” that was secretly preparing for an imminent landing of the Japa­nese Imperial Navy. Throughout the Amer­i­cas, Japa­nese men ­were at times suspected of being imperial officers in hiding or even innate, exceptional soldiers, as happened during the Mexican Revolution. In Brazil, this ste­reo­t ype was heightened by the fact that many Nikkei, discriminated against for de­cades, had found a positive, nationalist self-­image in Japan’s territorial annexations during World War II, which they would sometimes celebrate loudly in public. Soon the Nikkei began to be considered “internal enemies.” A scene in the sansei (third-­generation) author Oscar Nakasato’s first novel, Nihonjin (2011), re­ creates this situation: “One day, Ojiichan recalled, a Nihonjin from Araçatuba had been beaten to death b ­ ecause they suspected that he was a spy of the Japa­nese government. And when Japan won the b ­ attle against Singapore in 1942, and many thought the war was nearing its end, he and some friends had to celebrate in a low voice, as if they w ­ ere all criminals.”12 This

256

Chapter 11

widespread suspicion, along with the nativist and nationalistic mea­sures of forced assimilation taken by Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo against the teaching of Japa­nese language, owning Japanese-­language books, and even speaking Japa­ nese in public (many Nikkei w ­ ere monolingual Japa­ nese speakers) made the Nikkei community increasingly desperate and defensive. It is also useful to contextualize the birth of Japa­nese Brazilian lit­er­a­ ture within the framework concept of hakkō ichiu (eight crown cords, one roof). Reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s concept of Lebensraum and fascist Italy’s spazio vitale, imperial Japan’s hakkō ichiu, which initially was supposed to refer to racial harmony and equality u ­ nder the moral guidance and leadership of the Japa­nese emperor, would l­ ater turn out to denote policies and practices of racism, territorial expansion, and settler colonialism. ­These militarist mea­sures ­were ostensibly designed to secure food supplies, raw materials, and commodities for the empire of Japan’s protracted, imperial wars. Hakkō ichiu, therefore, soon became associated with world domination and military force. From this perspective, the Japa­nese government proposed a purportedly benevolent “new order in East Asia,” l­ater known as the Greater East Asia Co-­Prosperity Sphere, which was supposed to be aimed at uniting East Asia in a brotherhood led by a paternalistic Japan (interestingly, the concept of “co-­prosperity” was also used to describe the Japa­nese immigrants’ activities in Brazil). U ­ nder the motto “Asia for the Asians!” and u ­ nder the guise of liberation from Western imperial and colonial domination, the Japa­nese government tried to justify brutal force in East Asia by appealing to national my­thol­ogy about the divine foundation of the country. Concomitantly, at a time when social Darwinism and eugenics w ­ ere considered respectable, mainstream scientific discourses in the West, the Japa­nese created their own version of scientific racism to justify colonization. Thus, Okinawans ­were considered backward aborigines in need of Japa­nese civilization: “The Japa­nese government initiated a series of mea­ sures intended to extinguish ‘uncivilized’ Okinawan customs (including their language and their ‘irrational’ shamanistic spiritual practices).”13 The Asian American studies scholar Wesley Ueunten also discloses this type of ethnic indoctrination in schools: “Okinawan ­children learned that their native tongue and culture ­were barbaric and backward, not fitting for subjects of the emperor. Thus began the stigmatization of the Okinawan identity.”14 For the most part, Nikkei lit­er­a­ture in Latin Amer­i­ca, while reflecting the oppression and disenfranchisement of Nikkei communities—­particularly



López-­Calvo

257

during the inception of the immigration pro­cess and during World War II—­ tends to con­ve­niently avoid acknowledging Japa­nese imperialism and colonialism or postwar neoimperialism and neo­co­lo­nial­ism. Yet, as w ­ ill be seen in the ensuing pages, ­there are works that do establish tenuous links between imperial expansionism and emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca. Thus, some Brazilian Nikkei novelists portray their Issei (first-­generation immigrant) characters as victims of imperial ideology. Sooner or ­later, ­these characters come to the conclusion that they have been conned by the exaggerations and false advertising of emigration companies. Beyond fiction, autobiographical texts, such as Handa’s Memórias de um imigrante japonês no Brasil, also recall real-­life immigrants’ anger against the state and nongovernmental emigration companies’ representatives and interpreters: “­There was something serious about the immigrants’ resentment against the emigration com­pany and its members. Historia da expansão dos japoneses (History of the expansion of the Japa­nese) recalls: ‘Dramatically, Mizuno and Uetsuka’s party was received with baboon spears, hoes, and sickles. . . . ​Tomojiro Ibaragi climbed to the top of a tripod ladder and delivered a skillful speech encouraging the fight.’ ”15 Handa also recalls how the immigrants protested through their songs: ­ ose who said that Brazil was good lied, Th the emigration com­pany lied; to the opposite side of the Earth I arrived, spun in Paradise, to see Hell.16

It seems safe to assume, then, that t­ hese immigrants had begun to suspect that the o­ wners and representatives of emigration companies ­were becoming rich at their expense. Rather than fulfilling their dream of becoming wealthy in four or five years and returning home “wearing a golden brocade,” as they had been promised, most Japa­nese immigrants actually had no chance of even saving enough money for a return ticket (it has been estimated that only 10 ­percent made the longed-­for return to Japan). And even when they did save enough for a return ticket, for many it would have been a shameful dishonor to make the return ­after failing to achieve their financial goals. Thus, in Nakasato’s novel Nihonjin, we learn: “Hideo would not subject himself to the humiliation of returning to Japan in the same condition as when he left.”17

258

Chapter 11

But this type of reaction went beyond issues of personal pride, as the Japa­nese government demanded from their emigrants to become ambassadors of a modern and successful Japan to the rest of the world. The historians Daniel Masterson and Sayaka Funada-­Classen echo this real-­life, official pressure: “Before leaving the port of Kobe, ­these Brazil-­bound Japa­nese and Okinawan immigrants ­were addressed by a representative of the Japa­ nese government, who warned them that they should ‘not disgrace Japan’ and that if they did not succeed they should not return to Japan, even in death.”18 Besides reflecting official attempts at raising the international prestige of Japan, one may also won­der w ­ hether t­ hese words ­were uttered with full knowledge that most of ­these hapless emigrants would not succeed eco­nom­ically for many years. As it happens, Nikkei cultural production reflects the fact that many Japa­nese immigrants, outraged by the exploitation they suffered on plantations where only two de­cades e­ arlier their pre­de­ces­sors w ­ ere enslaved Africans, fled the plantations to look for opportunities in the cities or across the border, in Argentina. The opening chapters in Nakasato’s Nihonjin recall the emperor’s encouragement of “temporary” emigration abroad as a patriotic duty. It also re­creates the gullibility of emigrants who believe the emigration com­pany’s promises: “One of them, beside Hideo, spoke loudly so that every­one heard his proj­ect, so that every­one shared his dreams: staying in Brazil for four years, five years . . . ​Then, with a lot of money in his pocket, open a small restaurant in Yokohama.”19 Other passages, however, pre­sent obedient imperial subjects beginning to suspect that they are being used by their government. Still, they do not renounce their own feeling of superiority ­toward the host country, a pos­si­ble reflection of imperialist ideology and the association of colonialism/imperialism with modernity. Thus, an artist named Kimura on the ship that takes them to Brazil declares that they w ­ ill never see Japan again and expresses his pessimism about their f­uture: “An underdeveloped country where epidemics are pos­si­ble. No one was told ­whether doctors would be available should someone fall sick.”20 The immediate reaction of another passenger named Inabata is to accuse him of lack of patriotism or re­spect for the emperor’s wishes: “He wants us to emigrate, to spend some time in a foreign land, but to come back l­ater, with a lot of money, and help in the development of the country. It ­w ill be our contribution.”21 Years l­ ater, the narrator’s grand­father, Hideo, ­w ill recall how Brazilian plantation o­ wners would make them purchase products in their overpriced



López-­Calvo

259

stores, thus preventing them from saving their earnings; yet Japa­nese immigrants had no one to complain to. Still, he does not blame the emperor for encouraging emigration aboard, believing that he was not aware of the situation on Brazilian plantations. L ­ ater, while inebriated at a party, another Japa­nese immigrant called Sato informs Hideo that, according to some educated Brazilians he has met in the city, the emperor had tricked the immigrants: “And that t­ hese gaijins had told him that the emperor of Japan had deceived the poor farmers and the unemployed in the city, saying that they should emigrate ­because they could make money quickly in Brazil. But that, in fact, it was a proj­ect to expel the poor population, that ­were in excess in the country.”22 By then a member of Shindō Renmei, an organ­ization that promised to unify the Japa­nese community and to assure its fidelity to the emperor, Hideo cannot tolerate such accusations; irritated, he calls Sato a drunkard and a traitor to his country, before striking him. As mentioned, some characters in Nihonjin are aware of the paradox of migrating to a less developed country. Likewise, in their study of Japa­ nese emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca, Masterson and Funada-­Classen recall a real-­life Issei settler from Tietê with this same feeling of superiority: “ ‘It has been thirty years since our countrymen landed in this country. Since then, 20,000, young and old, men and w ­ omen have been sacrificed. It is not the way for us to leave our ancestors, leaving their cemeteries. . . . ​Our immigration w ­ ill mean something only if our blood purifies the Brazilian impurity with our superior tradition.’ ”23 It is clear, then, that some immigrants living in state-­sponsored settlements in Brazil had internalized their government’s po­liti­cal propaganda, which described its migration-­driven expansionism as a sort of Japa­nese version of the Eu­ro­pean mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission): they w ­ ere benevolently seeking “coexistence and co-­prosperity” (kyōzon kyōei) as well as the modernization of underdeveloped South American countries. This type of paternalistic mentality has also been described by the historian Sidney Xu Lu when referring to postwar emigration: “As Japan’s overseas migration restarted at the beginning of the 1950s, South American countries that received most of the Japa­nese postwar emigrants ­were no longer portrayed as empty; nevertheless, they continued to be described as primitive but abundant in natu­ral wealth, waiting for the civilized Japa­nese to explore and utilize.”24 Some Japa­nese Brazilian novels and other works also echo the Nikkei community’s resentment ­toward a Japa­nese empire that betrayed and abandoned them overseas. In par­tic­u­lar, immigrants felt disappointed and

260

Chapter 11

frustrated upon seeing Japa­nese diplomats leave Brazil months a­ fter this country’s formal declaration of war against the empire of Japan in August 1942. Thus, the non-­Nikkei Fernando Morais, in his essay Corações sujos: A historia da Shindo Renmei (Dirty hearts: The history of Shindō Renmei, 2000), recalls: “Immigrants resented what was seen as a lack of patriotism on the part of Japa­nese diplomats, who left the country immediately ­after relations with Brazil w ­ ere severed, leaving more than 200,000 p ­ eople 25 to their own devices.” Along with the long-­distance nationalism that the prewar Japa­nese state had promoted among the diaspora, their feeling cheated by their own government plausibly propelled massive support for the fraudulent Shindō Renmei, which began to function as a de facto ­replacement for the departed diplomats’ leadership. I argue that the creation of Shindō Renmei can be considered the missing link between imperialism and emigration-­driven expansionism. As Tsugio Shindo explains, “The Kachigumi [­those claiming Japan was victorious] case was a kind of outside expression of the damage caused by the madness and obscurantism of the militaristic education.”26 Shindō Renmei’s vio­lence damaged the Nikkei community’s reputation in Brazil. This shameful episode of Nikkei terrorism reveals the long reach of an ethnocentric, fascist indoctrination that included emperor worship, the belief in Japan’s military invincibility, and the preservation of purportedly Japa­nese spiritual and cultural values—­the essentialist concept of yamato-­damashii (Japa­nese spirit; literally meaning “the ­great spirit of harmony”). Among other works, Jorge J. Okubaro’s O súdito (Banzai, Massateru!) (The subject [Banzai, Massateru!], 2008), Fernando Morais’s Corações sujos: A historia da Shindo Renmei, and Vicente Amorim’s film Corações sujos (2011) attempt to explain the pro­cess of radicalization that led their protagonists to fanatical, intraethnic vio­lence. All three works coincide in highlighting first the negative effects of the Estado Novo’s forced assimilation mea­ sures aimed at a social group that was suddenly considered a metonymy or dangerous extension of imperial Japan within Brazilian territory. They also point at the existential anxiety felt by a community caught in between two aggressively nationalist discourses, the Japa­nese and the Brazilian ones. In par­tic­u­lar, they focus on the violent clash that took place soon ­after World War II between the majority Kachigumi and the Makegumi. The very existence of this terrorist organ­ization reflects the malaise of a community that, for the most part, had never planned to stay in Brazil in­def­ initely. Although in the end Shindō Renmei’s leaders took advantage of



López-­Calvo

261

the naïveté and imperialistic fanat­i­cism of members of the Nikkei community, initially the organ­ization’s ostensible goal was to make sure that ­after Japan’s victory, every­one in the community would have the option to return to the fatherland or its Asian colonies without having renounced their Japa­nese ancestral customs and yamato-­damashii, which included the belief in Japan’s invincibility and the veneration of the emperor. Having been taught from an early age about the invincibility of Japan and the divine nature of the emperor, a confirmation bias or backfire effect quickly kicked in by which they chose to ignore the news about Japan’s defeat, instead reaffirming their deep-­seated beliefs. Morais’s essay Corações sujos: A historia da Shindo Renmei explores the community’s self-­denial ­after the war: “Devoted to the most rigid Japa­nese military traditions, blind followers of the Emperor, they defended the false claims of Japan’s victory with arguments they considered indisputable: in 2600 years, Japan had not lost a war; in the extremely remote possibility that the homeland was defeated, the world would then witness the ‘terrible deaths of one hundred million ­people,’ by collective suicide, following the Emperor’s lead.”27 Overall, Japa­nese Brazilian cultural production revisits the painful Shindō Renmei episode as a sort of collective catharsis, a self-­exploration that leads to a rejection of extremist nationalism. Along ­these lines, a character named Mariano in Júlio Miyazawa’s novel Yawara! A travessia Nihondin-­Brasil (Yawara! Crossing Nihondin-­Brazil, 2006) decries Japa­nese imperialism and colonialism during World War II, as well as the Japa­nese government’s disregard for the Nikkei community in Brazil: “It turns out that all of this is not ­going to change the minds of many Japa­nese descendants. That we w ­ ere massacred ­here in Brazil and had to deal with it alone. That’s what I’m trying to say the entire time: Japan abandoned us! Japan dumped us ­here so that we would ­handle it alone.”28 And the same feeling of abandonment resurfaces in Morais’s Corações ­sujos: A história da Shindo Renmei: “Immigrants resented what they saw as lack of patriotism on the part of Japa­nese diplomats, who left the country immediately a­ fter Japan broke diplomatic relations with Brazil, leaving more than 200,000 of them on their own.”29 ­These passages disclose the fictional characters’ progressive delinking from the imperial proj­ect, a first step ­toward full Brazilian citizenship. Nihonjin pre­sents the birth of Shindō Renmei as an offshoot of the Japa­ nese militaristic, imperial ideology that was taught in Japa­nese schools and was ­later exported to Brazil. In the novel, whereas Hideo, the protagonist,

262

Chapter 11

joins the terrorist group, his outraged son Haruo opposes it and defiantly declares his loyalty to Brazil. This same imperial indoctrination is reflected in the pervasive sense of racial superiority expressed by Japa­nese characters in several other novels. Thus, in Ryoki I­noue’s Saga a man named Ryuiti Fukugawa openly tells his wife that Japa­nese immigrants are superior to local Brazilians: “We d ­ on’t have to be considered equals, mainly ­because w ­ e’re not equal. We are superior and that’s what we need to show them!”30 And following the colonial imperative to improve the international image of Japan through the achievements of its emigrants, Nikkei college students in Saga try to follow their parents’ maxim: “We need to show that ­we’re superior. We are better in all ­things. Second place is nothing but defeat.”31 Yet while, like much of Brazilian Nikkei lit­er­a­ture, Saga also devotes many of its pages to celebrate the multiple achievements of the Japa­nese Brazilian community, it also addresses the darker episode of Shindō Renmei’s vio­lence in the context of Japa­nese imperial ideology. The connection between state-­sponsored immigration and Japa­nese imperialism is enhanced by the presence of the former military officer Junji Kikawa among the leadership ranks of the terrorist organ­ization. But perhaps the passage in Saga in which the links between imperialism and immigration are made more explicit is the following one: One of the preponderant f­ actors for this distortion of objectives was the strong presence of Japa­nese expatriates among Japa­nese former military men who came to Brazil between 1928 and 1933. Many of them came h ­ ere with the explicit mission of creating, in the countries where the Japa­nese colony was beginning to be significant, both demographically and eco­nom­ically, nuclei of re­sis­tance to Western po­liti­cal and cultural domination. They became members of Shindô-­Renmei and started to publicize the yamato damashii, literally imposing their ideas even if through vio­lence. The leader of the association was Junji Kikawa, an ex-­officer of the Japa­nese Imperial Army and a fanatical follower of the divinity represented by Emperor Hirohito.32

Likewise, Okubaro’s O súdito (Banzai, Massateru!), a story based on the biography of the author’s Okinawan ­father, Massateru Hokubaru, explic­ itly connects immigration with imperial expansionism: “Japa­nese emigration policy in the period before World War II had clearly become a means for Japa­nese territorial expansion.”33 O súdito also emphasizes the intersectionality of Massateru’s condition as an Okinawan—­therefore a victim of



López-­Calvo

263

Japa­nese imperialism himself—in the city of Osvaldo Cruz: “Along with the strug­gle to adapt and integrate into Brazilian society, Massateru, like other Okinawans, faced another difficulty: being accepted by the other Japa­nese.”34 Although for the most part, Massateru is in denial about the discrimination he suffers from Naichijin, he hates it when they derogatively call him “Mr. Okinawa.”35 A fanatic member of Shindō Renmei, Massateru is nevertheless sympathetically portrayed as a victim of a Japa­nese nationalist education during his childhood in Okinawa that turned him into “a real subject of the Japa­nese Empire though, deep inside, he remained an Okinawan.”36 This nationalist indoctrination received in grade school w ­ ill continue once in Brazil, where Massateru and his friends eagerly receive and read accessible fascist and expansionist propaganda sent from Japan, including Kokutai no hongi (Princi­ples of National Policy) and Kyōiku chokugo (The Imperial Rescript on Education). ­These texts reinforce their entrenched values: belief in the emperor’s divine nature; the invincibility of Japan (temporarily “proven” by recent territorial conquests); willingness to give one’s life for the fatherland; re­spect for one’s superiors; loyalty, filial piety, and patriotism. In addition, Okubaru speculates that since immigrants could no longer count on the remains of their ancestors for worship, they intensified their emperor worship practices as a replacement. Altogether, Okubaru pre­ sents immigration and imperialism as inseparable from each other: sending mi­grants to Brazil was part and parcel of imperial expansionism. As seen, to keep control of ­these mi­grants’ minds, the Japa­nese government would send imperialist propaganda. This suggests that beyond the economic support of imperial proj­ects via new markets for Japa­nese products and new sources of food and raw materials, emigration to South Amer­i­ca was conceived as a po­liti­cal move that would expand the po­liti­cal sphere of influence of Japan, thus offsetting the authority of the West. As is well known, the emulation of Eu­ro­pean imperialism and colonialism was actually a self-­defense tactic: at the time Japan was attempting to pre­sent itself as a modern, power­f ul nation in order to appear not suitable for Western colonization. In this context, the historian and Asian American studies scholar Eiichiro Azuma elaborates on the concept of “adaptive settler colonialism,” the Japa­nese version of a borderless settler colonialism in Asia that was based on an imported notion of frontier conquest that was modeled on the American West. According to him, prewar emigration-­led expansionism was conceived by the Japa­nese government

264

Chapter 11

as a preamble for empire making: “Agrarian settler colonialism was always integral to modern Japa­nese imperialism, and it constituted one of the many ways in which state officials and social leaders a­ dopted policies and initiated reforms that w ­ ere intended to both defend the nation against being colonized by western powers and demonstrate that they w ­ ere worthy imperialists as well in the Eurocentric international order of the time.”37 However, Azuma adds, Japa­nese settler colonialism was dif­fer­ent from traditional Eu­ro­pean colonialism and settler colonialism “in terms of its definitive emphasis on coexistence and assimilation—in rhe­toric at least—­ more than exclusion and annihilation.”38 As stated, immigrant farmers ­were used to pre­sent Japan to the world as a benevolent, modern nation that could improve local economies with its capital, know-­how, and technological advancement. In East Asia, not only did they legitimize imperialism but in some cases—­like ­t hose of Hokkaido, Taiwan, ­Korea, and Manchuria—­ they also groomed the land for an eventual invasion. Although the circumstances ­were obviously quite dif­fer­ent in South Amer­i­ca, the concept of adaptive settler colonialism may give nuance to how the Japa­nese state understood emigration to Brazil, as well as to how the mi­grants saw themselves as imperial subjects within a supposedly patriotic mission. In this sense, immigrant lit­er­a­t ure is a key source to ­either corroborate or disavow Azuma’s claim that immigration was, along with imperialism, a key component of Japa­nese expansionism. Yet it is also impor­tant to bear in mind that first-­person narratives must not be taken, at face value, as historical truth. Thus, Edward Mack, in his review of what he terms “paracolonial” lit­er­a­t ure in Brazil, reminds us that t­here ­were also significant numbers of sojourners who ­either actively and positively pursued migration out of a desire to return to Japan “wearing a golden brocade” (nishiki o kite) ­after achieving wealth abroad, and émigrés, who went abroad looking to create utopian socie­ties or achieve alternate, cosmopolitan identities. The fact that any homogenizing description of emigrants is insufficient should come as no surprise; what is perhaps more in­ter­est­ing is the possibility that this singular image of the hard-­ struggling and self-­ sacrificing peasant mi­grant might be a self-­romanticizing narrative embraced and developed by the emigrants themselves.39

A real-­life attempt to create one of ­these new “­little Japans” or “perfect Japans,” in this case a Christian, socialist society in the state of São Paulo,



López-­Calvo

265

is re­created in the Japa­nese American Karen T. Yamashita’s novel Brazil-­ Maru (1992). The leaders of this utopian community ­were precisely fleeing Japan’s aggressive militarism at the time. Therefore, in this fictional text based on the real-­life upper-­c lass immigrant Isamu Yuba and the Yuba Farm he founded and led in the 1920s, one finds the opposite case: immigrants who do not share the Japa­nese state’s imperial ideology and actively attempt to escape from it. Yet imperial ideology would still follow them to that remote hinterland: in Brazil-­Maru, the original founder and leader of the community of Esperança ends up being murdered by a group of Kachigumi who consider him a traitor to his country.

Postwar Immigration, Neocolonization, and Cultural Production As Lu explains, while Japan claimed the need of additional land abroad in order to accommodate its excess population, at the same time it believed in the need for a continued domestic population growth that would ultimately aid in the construction of the empire: “It rationalizes migration-­driven expansion, which I call ‘Malthusian expansion,’ as both a solution to domestic social tensions supposedly caused by overpopulation and a means to leave the much-­needed room and resources in the homeland so that the total population of the nation could continue to increase. In other words, Malthusian expansionism is centered on the claim of overpopulation, not the ­actual fear of it, and by the desire for population growth, not the ­actual anxiety over it.”40 A purported and in­ven­ted overpopulation, therefore, justified Japan’s extension of its sphere of influence beyond its Asian “backyard,” with transcendental consequences that continue to reverberate t­ oday. By revealing the thinking and discourse of the mi­grants and their descendants themselves, Japa­nese Brazilian cultural production provides further insight into how state-­led emigration (imin) to Brazil, a sovereign state, shared many of the traits, logic, and goals of colonial emigration (shokumin) or settler colonialism within the Japa­nese empire, thus exposing “the profound overlaps and connections between emigration and settler colonialism in the modern world, two historical phenomena that have been conventionally understood in isolation from one another.”41 Japan’s “Malthusian expansion,” which according to Lu begins with the Meiji Restoration (i.e., before the empire), would continue during the 1950s and 1960s

266

Chapter 11

with further emigration to South Amer­i­ca: “Though no longer performed by a militant and expanding empire, the postwar migration was still legitimized by the same discourse of overpopulation while driven by the same institutions and networks that w ­ ere established during Japa­nese migration to South Amer­i­ca and Manchuria before 1945.”42 As seen, even if ­t hese connections are not always explicit in literary texts, it would not be too far-­fetched to aver that Japa­nese emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca and, by extension, part of Latin American Nikkei lit­er­a­ ture ­were first linked to imperialism and a sui generis type of colonialism and ­after the war to neo­co­lo­nial­ism (although Japa­nese immigration to Brazil, which began in 1908, was forbidden in 1941 a­ fter the Pearl Harbor attack, it was resumed in 1952). An explicit reference to this type of neo­ co­lo­nial­ism is made in Miyazawa’s novel Yawara when Mariano states: “I made acid remarks about Japan, pointing out its colonialist stance, which was negotiating the acquisition of Brazilian land the size of a state, almost the size of Japan itself, for a soy plantation proj­ect that would demand the arrival of thousands of Japa­nese ­people.”43 But it is also impor­tant to note how part of Japa­nese Brazilian cultural production may be purposely silencing ­these links to prewar colonialism and postwar neo­co­lo­nial­ism. Indeed, along with emigration to the states of São Paulo and Paraná, the post-­war Japa­nese government invested in the agricultural development of the Brazilian Amazon basin in hopes of rebuilding its own national economy. Yet while texts such as the Issei Katsuzō Yamamoto’s 1984 collection of essays Toda uma vida no Brasil (An entire life in Brazil, originally published in Japa­nese in 1973 u ­ nder the title Burajiru to gojūshichinen), celebrate, full of ethnic pride, Nikkei farmers’ contributions to the modernization of the Brazilian economy through their agricultural prowess, no reference is ever made in the text to the efforts to benefit the postwar Japa­nese reemerging economy (if indeed the author was ever aware of them). Thus, in an article titled “Virtude que sobrevive” (Virtue that survives), originally published in Jornal Paulista in July 1975, Yamamoto applauds the pioneering Nikkei’s supposedly altruistic and selfless motivations: “It seems to me that Japa­nese immigrants have an essential interest in introducing something that does not exist in Brazil. We have the examples of tea, black pepper, jute, fruit trees such as persimmon, peach, chestnut, apple, ­etc., as well as flowers, orchids, vegetables, ­etc. Each of ­these products resulted from our precursors’ ­great efforts. As a general rule—­there are exceptions—­pioneers do not make money from



López-­Calvo

267

their initiatives. They ­were prob­ably more ­eager to innovate than to make money.”44 Moreover, from postcolonial and ecocritical perspectives, neither can one read references in Toda uma vida no Brasil to the autochthonous population that was plausibly displaced or to the environmental destruction brought about by the pro­cess of felling trees (desmatamento) and reclaiming Cerrado lands (an extensive ecoregion in Brazil with plains, tropical broadleaf woodlands, and scrublands) for agricultural development. Considering himself an “ex-­Japanese,” Yamamoto, a former Japa­nese soldier, devoted his more than half a c­ entury in Brazil to the improvement of commercial relations between Japan and Brazil and to the Projeto Cerrado, a frontier expedition and agricultural development proj­ect in the Cerrado, which, in Yamamoto’s own words, he envisioned as the solution to provide enough food for Brazilians. Several of the articles published since July 1979 are devoted to express his enthusiasm for the Projeto Cerrado, described as a Nippo-­Brazilian venture in which several Nikkei, including himself, have demonstrated their sense of civic duty and Brazilian patriotism. Thus, in “Felicidade” (Happiness), originally published in Jornal Paulista in 1979, Yamamoto declares: “Having contributed his capital to the Cerrado Proj­ect, he felt at ease b ­ ecause he was fulfilling his duty with Brazil. . . . ​­There is an evident and vigorous sense of civic duty, beginning with an understanding that it is necessary to join forces in order to implement the plan for the development of the cerrado.”45 The author, therefore, celebrates the fact that the pioneering spirit of the first immigrants has survived among postwar immigrants and nisei, thus demonstrating that they are not only motivated by money or material interest but also by the plea­sure of fulfilling a dream and bettering Brazil. As Jacobowitz clarifies, “­there ­were well-­defined policies backing up efforts to keep immigrants to Brazil linguistically, culturally, and nationalistically, within the fold (or folk) of the Empire.”46 Yet, while at first displaying an imperial subjectivity, Japa­nese Brazilian lit­er­a­t ure progressively steered away from imperial and colonialist ideology. This way, it echoed diaspora politics and the pro­cess by which a community that was, according to (neo) imperial/(neo)colonial designs, supposed to be forever linked to the Japa­nese state eventually detached from it, switching instead its national alliances to the host country. Two major historical events aided this diasporic shift in identity of a community that is now split between Brazil and Japan: first,

268

Chapter 11

World War II left Japan so devastated that it was no longer a desirable country to which one would return; secondly, the dekasegi (temporary workers) phenomenon that began in the late 1980s made many Brazilian Nikkei realize that, while they had proudly preserved their Japa­nese cultural identity in Brazil for several generations, back in the ancestral home they w ­ ere no longer recognized as fellow citizens; they had instead been demoted to gaijin (foreigners). This literary corpus negotiates, therefore, the transition from a Japa­nese identity overseas fundamentally connected to their homeland and native language but with par­tic­u­lar “colonial” (shokumin) characteristics specific to their Brazilian experience (prevalent during the prewar period) to a Nikkei, ethnic minority identity through which the previous sojourner mentality has been left ­behind. A ­ fter World War II, Brazilian Nikkei created their own ethnic and social originations in­de­ pen­dently from the Japa­nese government. This shift in national identity formation was often (not always) marked by a transition from Japa­nese to Portuguese language in their literary production. In this way, Japa­nese Brazilian cultural production redefines the ideas of Brazilianness and Japa­neseness from both a national and a transnational perspective. Like the dekasegi phenomenon, the literary reflection of the internal conflict between Okinawans and the Japa­nese from the mainland also evidences internal cracks that help question Japa­nese and Nikkei cultural essentialism. At the same time, while during the inception of the emigration pro­cess to South Amer­i­ca, Nikkei authors often deployed an imperial subjectivity in their historical accounts and fictionalization of the Brazilian experiment, with time they delinked from an ideology that was intimately tied to aggressive fascism and bigoted nationalism, contributing instead to a symbolic remapping of the transnational Brazilian space. Altogether, Japa­nese Brazilian cultural production reveals multifaceted po­l iti­cal, economic, and sociocultural connections between state-­g uided emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca on the one hand and the expansion of Japa­ nese imperialism and colonialism in East Asia on the other, which allows us to look at both intertwined phenomena as part of the same imperial and (neo)colonial expansionist policies and practices.

Notes 1. ​Regarding the title I chose for this chapter, a few years ago, ­a fter I gave a talk on my book Japa­nese Brazilian Saudades: Diasporic Identities and Cultural Production (2019),



López-­Calvo

269

one of my colleagues complained that I had failed to recognize that the Nikkei arriving in Brazil in 1908 w ­ ere “imperialists.” While, indeed, many of ­these immigrants ­were—­whether consciously or unconsciously—­part of Japan’s imperial proj­ect, I would hesitate to call them imperialists. 2. ​“A esmagadora maioria dos japoneses não só acreditava na vitória do Japão como dava contribuições à seita. Eram mais de 120 mil simpatizantes que pagavam mensalidades e cerca de 20 mil associados em 60 filiais espalhados por São Paulo.” Arai and Hirasaki. 100 anos da imigração, p. 134. 3. ​“Alguns dos homens foram soldados na última guerra (russo-­japonesa) e traziam ao peito as suas decorações.” Handa, Memórias, p. 5. Other texts recall the same scene: “It has been said that among the immigrants who landed, some flaunted proudly the medal received in the Russo-­Japanese war, won by the Japa­nese” (“Dizem que, entre os imigrantes que desembarcaram, alguns ostentavam orgulhosamente a medalha recebida na guerra russo-­japonesa, vencida pelos japoneses” [Shindo, Passos da imigração, p. 146]). 4. ​“Criar nos países onde a colônia japonesa começava a ser significativa, tanto do ponto de vista demográfico como de econômico, núcleos de resistência à dominação política e cultural do Ocidente.” I­ noue, Saga, p. 168. 5. ​Lesser, Discontented Diaspora, p. 5. 6. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan, p. 8. 7. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan, p. 2. 8. ​Endoh, Exporting Japan, p. 12. 9. ​“—­Quando tenho de conversar com um japonês, a expressão de seu rosto no instante em que digo meu nome é mais do que suficiente para me mostrar que não estou sendo bem recebido.” I­ noue, Saga, p. 225. 10. ​Jacobowitz, “­Bitter Brew,” p. 15. 11. ​Mack, “Paracolonial Lit­er­a­t ure,” p. 119. 12. ​“ Um dia, lembrou ojiichan, um nihonjin de Araçatuba fora espancado até a morte porque desconfiaram que era um espião de governo japonês. E quando o Japão venceu a batalha contra Cingapura, en 1942, e muitos pensavam que a guerra estava próxima do fim, ele e alguns amigos tiveram que comemorar em voz baixa, como se fossem todos criminosos” Nakasato, Nihonjin, p. 92. 13. ​Nakasone, “Impossible Possibility,” p. 18. 14. ​Ueunten, “Japa­nese Latin American,” p. 102. 15. ​“Havia qualquer coisa de grave no ressentimento dos imigrantes contra a companhia de emigração e seus membros. Registra a Historia da expansão dos japoneses: ‘Aparatosamente, recebeu-se a comitiva de Mizuno e Uetsuka com lanças de babu, enxaas e foices’ . . . ​‘Tomojiro Ibaragi, subui ao topo de uma escada tripé e pronnciou hábil discurso incitando à luta’ ” Handa, Memórias, p. 53. 16. ​Mentiu quem disse que o Brasil era bom, mentiu a companhia de emigração; no lado oposto da Terra cheguei, fiado no Paraíso, para ver o Inferno. Handa, Memórias, p. 164. 17. ​“Hideo não se submeteria à humilhação de voltar ao Japão na mesma condição em que saíra de lá.” Nakasato, Nihonjin, pp. 110–111.

270

Chapter 11

18. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese, p. 44. 19. ​“Um, ao lado de Hido, falava alto para que todos conhecessem seu projeto, para que todos compartilhassem seus sonhos: ficar no Brasil durante quatro anos, cinco anos . . . ​Depois, com bastante dinheiro no bolso, abrir um pequeno restaurante em Yokohama.” Nakasato, Nihonjin, p. 11. 20. ​“Um país subdesenvolvido, onde podia haver epidemias. Não lhes haviam dito se haveria médico quando alguém ficasse doente.” Nakasato, Nihonjin, p. 13. 21. ​“Ele quer que emigremos, que fiquemos um tempo em terra estrangeira, mas que voltemos depois, com bastante dinheiro, e ajudemos no desenvolvimento do país. Será a nossa contribução.” Nakasato, Nihonjin, p. 14. 22. ​“E que esses gaijins lhe tinham dito que o imperador do Japão enganara os agricultores pobres e os desempregados da cidade, dizendo que deveriam emigrar porque poderiam ganhar dinheiro rapidamente no Brasil. Mas que, na verdade, era um projeto para expulsar a população pobre, que havia muitos excedentes no país.” Nakasato, Nihonjin, p. 72. 23. ​Masterson and Funada-­Classen, Japa­nese, pp. 84–85. 24. ​Lu, Making, p. 16. 25. ​“Os imigrantes se ressentiam do que era tido como falta de patriotismo dos diplomatas japoneses, que deixaram o país imediatamente após o rompimento de relações com o Brasil, abandonando mais de 200 mil pessoas à própria sorte.” Morais, Corações sujos, p. 63. 26. ​“O caso Kachi-­gumi foi uma espécie de balanço no exterior dos danos causados pela loucura e obscurantismo da educação militarista.” Shindo, Passos da imigração, p. 232. 27. ​“Devotos das mais rígidas tradições militaristas japonesas, seguidores cegos do imperador, sustentavam a teoria da vitória do Japão com argumentos que consideravam indiscutíveis: em 2600 anos o Japão jamais perderá uma guerra; na remotíssima hipótese de que a pátria tivesse sido derrotada, o mundo teria testemunhado a ‘morte honrosa de 100 milhões de japoneses,’ que se suicidariam coletivamente, acompanhando o mesmo gesto do imperador.” Morais, Corações sujos, p. 89. It also quotes a Japa­nese man named Koketsu, who is ­later tortured by the military police, arguing that ­there is evidence of Japan’s victory: “If Japan had lost the war, all the Japa­nese would be dead” (“Se Japão tivesse perdido a guerra, todos os japoneses estariam mortos” [12]). 28. ​“Acontece que tudo isso não vai mudar a cabeça de muitos descendentes de japoneses. Que fomos massacrados aqui no Brasil e tivemos que virar sozinhos. E isso que estou tentando dizer o tempo todo: o Japão nos abandonou! O Japão nos largou aqui para nós nos virarmos souzinhos.” Miyazawa, Yawara!, p. 170. 29. ​“Os imigrantes se ressentiam do que era tido como falta de patriotismo dos diplomatas japoneses, que deixaram o país imediatamente após o rompimento de relações com o Brasil, abandonando mais de 200 mil pessoas à própria sorte.” Morais, Corações sujos, p. 63. 30. ​“—­Não temos de ser considerados iguais, mesmo porque não somos iguais a eles. Nós somos superiores, e é isso que teremos que mostrar!” I­ noue, Saga, p. 79. 31. ​“—­Temos de mostrar que somos superiores. Somos os melhores em tudo. O segundo lugar não é mais do que uma derrota.” ­Inoue, Saga, p. 127.



López-­Calvo

271

32. ​“Um dos fatores preponderantes para essa distorção de objetivos foi a forte presença de exmilitares japoneses entre os imigrantes nipônicos que vieram para o Brasil entre 1928 e 1933. Muitos deles vieram para cá tendo como missão exatamente criar nos países onde a colônia japonesa começava a ser significativa, tanto de ponto de vista demográfico como de económico, núcleos de resistência à dominação política e cultural do Ocidente. Tornaram-se membros da Shindô-­Renmei e passaram a divulgar o yamato damashii literalmente impondo suas ideias ainda que de forma violenta. O líder da associação era Junji Kikawa, exoficial do Exército Imperial Nipônico e seguidor fanático da divindade representada pelo imperador Hirohito.” ­Inoue, Saga, p. 168. 33. ​“A política emigratória japonesa na época anterior à Segunda Guerra Mundial tornou-se claramente um dos meios de expansão territorial japonesa.” Okubaro, O súdito, p. 124. The creation in 1923 of the empire of Japan’s Takumu-shō (Ministry of Colonial Affairs) was a key instrument in this pro­cess. 34. ​“Além da dificuldade de adaptação e integração à sociedade brasileira, Massateru, como outros okinawanos, enfrentava outra: a de aceitação até mesmo por outros japoneses.” Okubaro, O súdito, p. 367. 35. ​“Okinawa-­san.” Okubaro, O súdito, p. 368. 36. ​“ Um verdadeiro súbito do império japonês, mesmo que, na essência, continuasse sendo um okinawano.” Okubaro, O súdito, p. 54. 37. ​Azuma, In Search, p. 2. 38. ​Azuma, In Search, p. 6. 39. ​Mack, “Paracolonial Lit­er­a­t ure,” pp. 95–96. 40. ​Lu, Making, p. 4. 41. ​Lu, Making, p. 3. 42. ​Lu, Making, pp. 8–9. 43. ​“Eu fazia comentários ácidos sobre o Japão, falando sobre sua postura colonialista, que negociava a aquisição de terras brasileiras do tamanho de um estado, quase do tamanho do próprio Japão, num projeto de plantio de soja, que demandaria a vinda de milhares de japoneses.” Miyazawa, Yawara!, p. 170. 44. ​“Parece-me que os imigrantes nipônicos nutrem interesse essencial na introdução de algo que não existe no Brasil. Temos os exemplos do chá, pimenta do reino, juta, árvores frutíferas como caqui, pêssego, castanha, maçã, e­ tc. Assim como flores, orquídeas, verduras, ­etc. Cada um desse produtos resultou de grandes esforços de nossos precursores. Regra geral—­existem exceções—os pioneiros não ganham dinheiro com suas iniciativas. Tiveram provavelmente mais vontade de realizar do que de ganhar dinheiro.” Yamamoto, “Virtude que sobrevive,” p. 87. 45. ​“Participando do capital do Projeto Cerrado, sentiu-se tranquilo porque estava cumprindo com seu dever para com o Brasil . . . ​Existe um evidente e vigoroso sentido de dever cívico, partindo da compreensão de que é preciso unir forças para levar avante o plano de aproveitamento do cerrado.” Yamamoto, “Felicidade,” p. 153. 46. ​Jacobowitz, “­Bitter Brew,” p. 18.

Bibliography

Abel, Jessamyn R. “Cultural Internationalism and Japan’s War­time Empire: The Turns of the Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai.” In Tumultuous De­cade: Empire, Society, and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan, edited by Masato Kimura and Tosh Minohara, 17–43. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013. Alberto, Paulina L., and Eduardo Elena. “Introduction: The Shades of the Nation.” In Rethinking Race in Modern Argentina, edited by Paulina L. Alberto and Eduardo Elena, 1–22. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Alegria, Ciro, and Alfredo Saco. “Japa­nese Spearhead in the Amer­i­cas.” ­Free World 2, no. 1 and 2 (1942): 81. ANJA (Association of Nikkei and Japa­nese Abroad). Kaigai Nikkeijin, no. 62. Yokohama: ANJA, 2008. Anon. “Chōsen shoseki zasshishō kumiaishi.” In Zenkoku shosekishō sōran, edited by Kinju Gotō, 1-11. Tokyo: Shinbun no shinbunsha, 1935. APJ (Asociación Peruano Japonesa). Memoria. Lima: APJ, 2006. Arao, Yoshimitsu. Menka to menka torihiki. Tokyo: Kogyo kyoikusha shuppan, 1929. Aruzenchin jihō. “Seigo-­ran no kaisetsu ni saishite dokusha-­shokun ni tsugu.” December 8, 1934. Aruzenchin jihō. “Sermones Laicos de José Ingenieros.” December 15, 1934. Aruzenchin jihō. “Shinya-­shi kokusai bunka shinkōkai no renraku-in ni ninmei saru.” December 15, 1934. Aruzenchin jihō. “Trozos Escogidos de Literatura Argentina.” December 12, 1934. Aruzenchin Nihonjin Iminshi Hensaniinkai, ed. Aruzenchin Nihonjin iminshi. Buenos Aires: Zaia Nikkei Dantai Rengōkai, 2002. Asahara Jōhei. Nihon kaiun hatten shi. Tokyo: Chōryūsha, 1978. Asociación Japonesa en la Argentina, ed. El Incidente en Manchuria y el Tratado Anti-­ Bélico y el de Las Nueve Potencias. Buenos Aires: Imprenta Tailhade y Cia, 1932. Augelli, John P. “Agricultural Colonization in the Dominican Republic.” Economic Geography 38, no. 1 (January 1962): 15–27. Azuma, Eiichiro. Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japa­ nese Amer­i­ca. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

273

274 Bibliography Azuma, Eiichiro. “Community Formation across the National Border: The Japa­nese of the U.S.-­Mexican Californias.” Review: Lit­er­a­ture and Arts of the Amer­i­cas 39, no. 1 (2006): 39–41. Azuma, Eiichiro. “Historical Overview of Japa­nese Emigration, 1868–2000.” In Encyclopedia of Japa­nese Descendants in the Amer­i­cas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei, edited by Akemi Kikumura-­Yano, 32–38. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira, 2002. Azuma, Eiichiro. In Search of Our Frontier: Japa­nese Amer­i­ca and Settler Colonialism in the Construction of Japan’s Borderless Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019. Azuma, Eiichiro. “Japa­nese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-­Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-­ Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril.’ ” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 2 (2014): 255–276. Azuma, Eiichiro. “ ‘Pioneers of Overseas Japa­nese Development’: Japa­nese American History and the Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial Japan.” Journal of Asian Studies 67, no. 4 (2008): 1187–1226. Bacon, Francis. The Works of Lord Bacon with an Introductory Essay, Volume I. London: William Ball, 1778. Barnhart, Edward, N. “Japa­nese Internees from Peru.” Pacific Historical Review 31, no. 2 (1962): 169–178. Beals, Carleton. “Japan Invades Latin Amer­i­ca.” American Mercury 34, no. 133 (1935): 299–306. Bentivegna, Diego. “Juan E. Cassani y Juan Mantovani: Humanismo, lectura y comunidad nacional en dos pedagogos espiritualistas.” Signo y seña 17 (2007): 289– 312. Blanchard, Peter. “Asian Immigrants in Peru, 1899–1923.” Canadian Association of Latin American and Ca­rib­bean Studies 4, no. 7 (1979): 60–75. Briggs, Vernon M., Jr. International Migration and ­Labour Mobility: The Receiving Countries. CAHRS Working Paper #94-19. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and L ­ abor Relations, Center for Advanced H ­ uman Resource Studies, 1996. http://­digitalcommons​.­ilr​.­cornell​.­edu ​/­cahrswp​/­243. Brown-­John, Lloyd. “Economic Sanctions: The Case of the O.A.S. and the Dominican Republic, 1960–1962.” Ca­rib­bean Studies 15, no. 2 (July 1975): 73–105. “Burajiru jijō tenrankai: Kobe Mitsukoshi gofukuten ni okeru,” Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki 1, no. 9 (1927): 93–96. Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai. Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi 2. São Paulo: Toppan Press insatsu shuppan, 2013. Burajiru Nihon Imin 100-­Shūnen Kinen Kyōkai Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai (Burajiru Nihon imin). Burajiru Nihon imin hyakunenshi 3. Tokyo: Fūkyōsha, 2010. Burajiru Nikkeijin Jittai Chōsa Iinkai. Burajiru no Nihon imin, kijutsu-­hen. Tokyo: Burajiru Nikkeijin jittai chōsa iinkai, 1964. Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai, ed. Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi. Tokyo: Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hatten shi kankō iinkai (Raten Amerika chūō kai nai), 1941. Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūjo. Yūwa jigyō nenkan. Osaka: Buraku kaihō kenkyūjo, 1927– 1933.

Bibliography

275

Casal, Pedro. La marina japonesa. Buenos Aires: Publicada por G. Yoshio Shinya, 1936. Castellón, Alvaro, and Pozo, José Miguel. “Historia de las relaciones bilaterales Chile y Japón.” In Chile y Japón un siglo de amistad, edited by Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, 129–160. Santiago: Comisión Chilena de celebración del centenario de las relaciones Chile-­Japón, 1997. Castillo-­Munõz, Verónica. The Other California: Land, Identity, and Politics on the Mexican Borderlands. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017. ­Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: MacMillan, 1998. Chang, David A. “Looking at the Pacific from the Pacific.” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 3 (2016): 23–27. Chang, Jason Oliver. Chino: Anti-­Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880–1940. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017 Chida, Tomohei, and Peter N. Davies. The Japa­nese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A History of Their Modern Growth. London: Athlone, 1990. Choate, Mark I. Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. “Chūzai gaikoku shisetsu wo mukaete: Sōgonnaru rekishiteki kōkei no tenkai,” Shokumin 9, no. 3 (1930): 6–11. Clarke, David J. “The Development of a Pioneering Steamship Line: William Wheelwright and the Origins of the Pacific Steam Navigation Com­pany.” International Journal of Maritime History 20, no. 1 (June 2008): 221–250. Connell, Thomas, III. “The Internment of Latin-­A merican Japa­nese in the United States during World War II: Peruvian-­Japanese Experience (World War II).” PhD diss., Florida State University, 1995. Conrad, Sebastian. What Is Global History? Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2016. Corações sujos. Dir. Vicente Amorim. Perf. Tsuyoshi Ihara, Takako Tokiwa, Eiji Okuda. Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, eds. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. Cruz, Elina Maria. “A la búsqueda de corregir la historia.” Rumbo 340 (August 7, 2000): 30–36. De La Pedraja, René. Oil and Coffee: Latin American Merchant Shipping from the Imperial Era to the 1950s. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998. DeLaney, Jeane. “Immigration, Identity, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1850–1950.” In Immigration and National Identities in Latin Amer­i­ca, edited by Nicola Foote and Michael Goebel, 91–114. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Délano, Alexandra. “Immigrant Integration vs. Transnational Ties? The Role of the Sending State.” Social Research 77, no. 1 (2010): 237–268. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Kafka: ­Toward a Minor Lit­er­a­ture. Translated by Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. Desprael, Alberto. La migración japonesa hacia la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Editora Colores, 1994. Dezem, Rogério. “Um exemplo singular de política emigratória: Subsídios para compreender o pro­cesso de formação dos núcleos ijûchi de colonização japonesa no estado

276 Bibliography de São Paulo (1910–1930).” In Cem anos da imigração japonesa: História, memória, e arte, edited by Francisco Hashimoto, Janete Leiko Tanno, and Monica Setuyo Okamoto, 151–166. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2008. Dickinson, Frederick. World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Dinmore, Eric Gordon. “A Small Island Nation Poor in Resources: Natu­ral and ­Human Resource Anx­i­eties in Trans–­World War II Japan.” PhD diss., Prince­ton University, 2006. Dominika imin soshō genkokudan, Dominika nyūsu retā, vol. 1 (August 19, 2001): 2. Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai. Karibu no shima no kakujin tachi: Dominika ijūshi nijūgoshūnen kinenshi. Santo Domingo: Dominika Nihonjin rengōkai nijūgoshūnen kinen gyōji shikko iinkai, 1981. Emmerson, John. The Japa­nese Thread. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978. Endoh, Toake. Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration t­ oward Latin Amer­i­ca. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009. Endoh, Toake. Nanbei kimin seisaku no jitsuzō. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2016. Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, ed. Historia del inmigrante Japonés en la Argentina. Vol. 1. Buenos Aires: Federación de Asociaciones Nikkei en la Argentina, 2004. Franceschini, Victorio. Sentido del espiritualismo Japonés. Buenos Aires: Instituto Cultural Argentino-­Japonés, 1939. Fujioka Shirō. Ayumi no ato. Los Angeles: Ayumi no ato kankō kōenkai, 1957. Fukuda Sanji. “Senkō wo assuru ei e aru daikankanshiki ni narabini kaikō hakurankai ni okeru kaigai hattenkan.” Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki 4, no. 11 (1930): 72–73. Fukuhara Hachirō. “Wa ga kuni no ishokumin hatten ni Burajiru no kōya ni hiyaku wo nasu: Tōshi Jigyō no Shōkai.” Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki 2, no. 11 (1928): 58–59. Fukuhara Hachirō. “Zenjin mitō no Burajiru genya wo tōsa shite.” Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki 1, no. 4 (1927): 26–29. Fukumoto, Mary. Hacia un nuevo sol: Japoneses y sus descendientes en el Peru. Lima, Peru: Asociacion Peruano-­Japonesa del Peru, 1997. Fukuoka Buraku-­shi Kenkyūkai, ed. Fukuokaken hisabetsu burakushi no shosō. Fukuoka: Fukuoka burakushi kenkyūkai, 1979. Fukuoka Kaigai Kyōkai. Hakkō 42. Fukuoka: Fukuoka kaigai kyōkai, 1930. Gaimushō, ed. Nihon gaikō bunsho. 222 vols. Tokyo: Nihon kokusai rengōkai, Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, and Gaimushō, 1936–2020. Gaimushō, ed. Waga gaikō no kinkyō. Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1957. https://­w ww​.­mofa​.­go​ .­jp​/­mofaj​/­gaiko​/ ­bluebook​/­1957​/­s32​-­2​-­1​-­3​.­htm#2. Gaimushō, ed. Waga gaikō no kinkyō. Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1958. https://­w ww​.­mofa​.­go​ .­jp​/­mofaj​/­gaiko​/ ­bluebook ​/­1958​/­s33​-­1​-­3​.­htm. Gaimushō, Amerika-­k yoku. Shōwa jūninendo oyobi jūsannendo amerika-­kyoku daini-ka kankei shitsumu hōkoku. Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1937. Gaimushō chūnanbei ijukyoku. Sengo no kaigai ijū to ijū gyōmu no ato. Tokyo: Gaimushō chūnanbei ijukyoku, 1966.

Bibliography

277

Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan. Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: “Amazonia” sangyō kabushiki gaisha (HITKZ: ASKG), J120, J3-6. Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan. Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha (HITKZ: KKKG), vol. 10, J120, J3-1. Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan. Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Nanbei takushoku kabishiki gaisha (HITKZ: NTKG), vol 2, J120, J3-2. Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan. Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: “Zai hakkoku hōjin shōsha seisan kankei” (HITKZ: ZHHSSK), J120, J3. Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan. Honpōjin imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai ijū kumiai (HITKZ: KIK), vol. 30, J120, J3-5. Gaimushū gaikō shiryōkan. Honpōjin imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha (HITKZ: KKKG), vol. 11, J120, J3-1. Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu. Waga kokumin no kaigai hatten: Ijū hyakunen no ayumi, shiryōhen. Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1971. Galindo, Sergio Hernández. La guerra contra los japoneses en México durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial: Kiso Tsuru y Masao Imuro, migrantes vigilados. Mexico City: Itaca, 2011. García, Jerry. Looking like the E ­ nemy: Japa­nese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US Hegemony, 1897–1945. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2014. Gardiner, C. Harvey. Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japa­nese and the United States. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981. Gardiner, Harvey. The Japa­nese and Peru, 1873–1973. Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975. Garner, Paul. British Lions and Mexican Ea­gles: Business, Politics, and Empire in the ­Career of Weetman Pearson in Mexico, 1889–1919. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. Garon, Sheldon. Molding the Japa­nese Minds: The State in E ­ very Life. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University, 1997. Garon, Sheldon. “Transnational History and Japan’s Comparative Advantage.” Journal of Japa­nese Studies 43, no.1 (2017): 65–92. Gashū Kyūhei. Aruzenchin dohō gojū-­nenshi. Tokyo: Seibundō shinkō-­sha, 1955. Gasquet, Alex. El llamado de oriente. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2015. Geiger, Andrea. Subverting Exclusion: Transpacific Encounters with Race, Caste, and Borders, 1885–1928. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. González, Fredy. Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017. Gotō, Shinpei. “Ishokumin koshukai kaikaishiki shukuji.” Tokyo: Nihon imin kyokai, 1917. Gotō, Shinpei. “Teikoku daigaku shokumin kōza keikaku.” Shokumin sekai 1, no. 1 (1908): 4–5. Green, Nancy L., and François Weil. Citizenship and ­Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007. Greenstein, Elijah J. “Sailing u ­ nder a Rising Sun: A Global History of Japa­nese Shipping in Empire and at War.” PhD diss., Prince­ton University, 2019.

278 Bibliography Guevara, Victor J. Las grandes cuestiones nacionales: El petroleo-­los ferrocarriles la inmigracion japonesa, el problema moral. Cuzco: Talleres tipograficos de H. G. Rozas Cucesores, 1939. Handa, Tomoo. Imin no seikatsu no rekishi: Burajiru Nikkeijin no ayunda michi. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo Brasileiros, 1970. Handa, Tomoo. Memórias de um imigrante Japonês no Brasil. Translated by Antonio Nojiri. T. A. Queiroz. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo-­Brasileiros, 1980. Handa, Tomoo. O imigrante Japonês: História de sua vida no Brasil. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo-­Brasileiros, 1987. Ha­ra Hiroki. “Senkanki Nagasaki-­ken ni okeru kaigai imin ni tsuite.” Kyūshū daigaku keizai gakkai keizaigaku kenkyū 56, no. 4 (1990): 61–79. Harootunian, Harry. History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practices, and the Question of Everyday Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Hasegawa Hayato. “Kishi naikaku no taigai Keizai senryaku ni okeru Raten Amerika.” Hitotsubashi hōgaku 9, no.1 (March 2010): 143–198. Hashimoto, Francisco. Sol nascente no Brasil: Ultura e mentalidade. São Paulo: HVT Arte & Cultura, 1995. Hashimoto Motome. Nihon shuppan hanbaishi. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1964. Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. The Age of Mass Migration: C ­ auses and Economic Impact. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Hattori Toyosaburo. Aruzenchin: Seiji keizai shinten no rekishi. Buenos Aires: Toyosaburō Hattori, 1986. Hattori Toyosaburo. “Aruzenchin wo kokorozasu dōshi ni okuru.” Shokumin 9, no. 11 (1930): 123–127. Hattori Toyosaburo. “Yime ni mo mita moiwayama, maruyama.” In Moiwa, Maruyama, edited by Sapporoshi Kyōiku Iinkai Bunka Shiryōshitu, 308–310. Sapporo: Hokkaidō shinbunsha, 1980. Hayashiya Eikichi. “Nihon to Raten Amerika no gaikō kankei.” In Nihon to Raten Amerika no kankei—­Nihon no kokuzaika ni okeru Raten Amerika, edited by Hajime Mizuno, 1–13. Tokyo: Instituto Iberoamericano, Sophia University, 1990. Hibi, Yoshitaka. “Imin to Nihon shoten: Sanfuranshisuko wo chūshin ni.” In Japanīzu Amerika: Imin bungaku, shuppan bunka, shūyōjo, 85–108. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2014. Hibi, Yoshitaka. “Karahuto ni okeru Nihonjin shotenshi nōto: Senzen gaichi no shomotsuryūtsū 3.” JunCture: Choiki-­teki Nihon bunka kenkyu 7 (2016): 58–67. Hibi, Yoshitaka. “Manshū no honyatachi: Manshū shoseki shuppan kabushiki gaisha seiritsu made.” Intelligence 20 (2020): 102–117. Higa, Marcelo. “Desarrollo histórico de la inmigración japonesa en la Argentina hasta la Segunda Guerra Mundial.” Estudios migratorios Latinoamericanos 10, no. 30 (1995): 471–512. Higashide, Seiichi. Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese-­Peruvian Internee in U.S. Concentration Camps. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993. Hirabayashi, Lane Ryo, Akemi Kikumura-­Yano, and James A. Hirabayashi. New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and ­People of Japa­nese Descent in the Amer­i­cas and from Latin Amer­i­ca in Japan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Bibliography

279

Hiroshima-­ken. Hiroshimaken ijūshi: Tsūshi-­hen. Hiroshima: Hiroshima-­ken, 1993. Hiroshima-­ken. Hiroshimakenshi, kindai 2, tsushi 6. Hiroshima: Hiroshima-­ken, 1981. Hiroshima-­shi, Kikaku Chōsei-­k yoku Bunka Tantō, ed. Kaigai ijū— ­chōsa kenkyū repōto. Hiroshima: Hiroshima-­shi, 1985. Holloway, Thomas. Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Horiuchi Shinsen. “Nanbei yuki.” Shokumin sekai 1, no. 1 (1908): 38–45. Horst, Oscar H., and Katsuhiro Asagiri. “The Odyssey of Japa­nese Colonists in the Dominican Republic.” Geo­g raph­i­cal Review 90, no. 3 (July 2000): 335–358. Hosokawa Shūhei. Nikkei Burajiru imin bungaku 1. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2012. Hu-­DeHart, Evelyn. “The Chinese of Baja California Norte, 1910–1934.” Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies: Baja California and North Mexican Frontier 12 (1985–1986): 11–12. Iacobelli, Pedro. “The Empire of Japan and the Southern Cone’s Neutrality a­ fter Pearl Harbor.” In Unknown Conflicts of the Second World War, edited by Chris Murray, 23– 36. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019. Iacobelli, Pedro. “James Tigner and the Okinawan Emigration Program to Latin Amer­i­ca.” In Transnational Frontiers of Asia and Latin Amer­i­ca Since 1800, edited by Jaime Moreno and Bradley Tatar, 255–266. London: Routledge, 2017. Iacobelli, Pedro. Postwar Japa­nese Emigration to South Amer­i­ca from Japan and the Ryukyu Islands. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. Iacobelli, Pedro, and Nicolás Camino. “Diplomacia pública japonesa en la prensa chilena durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial.” Cuadernos de historia 42, no. 2 (2018): 73–97. Iacobelli, Pedro, Shinnosuke Takahashi, and Danton Leary eds. Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration and Social Movement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Ichioka, Yuji. The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japa­nese Immigrants, 1885–1924. New York: F ­ ree Press, 1988. Ichioka, Yuji. “Japa­nese Associations and the Japa­nese Government: A Special Relationship, 1909–1926.” Pacific Historical Review 46 (1977): 409. Ichioka, Yuji, Gordon H. Chang, and Eiichiro Azuma. Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japa­nese American History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Iikubo Hideki. “Burajiru imin kara Manshu imin e no kessetsuten.” Management in Asia Market, Technology and Organ­ization Part II, ISS Joint Research Proj­ect, University of Tokyo, no. 5 (2002): 103–129. Iikubo Hideki. “Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha to kaigai ijū kumiai rengōkai: 1920– 40 nendai ni okeru kaigai ishokumin toriatsukai kikan no hensen.” Yokohama shiritsu daigaku ronsō shakai kagaku keiretsu 61, no. 1–3 (2010): 61–93. Ikeda, Michiko. Japan in Trade Isolation: 1926–1937 and 1948–1985. Tokyo: International House Press, 2008. Ikushima Shigekazu. Amazon ijū sanjūnenshi. São Paulo: Sanpauro Shinbunsha, 1959. Imai Keiko. Aruzenchin no shuyō shinbun ni miru Nihon ninshiki. Tokyo: Jōchi daigaku iberoamerika kenkyūjo, 2006.

280 Bibliography Imin Hachijūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. Burajiru Nihon imin hachijūnenshi. São Paulo: Burajiru Nihon bunka kyōkai, 1991. Imin Shūyōjo. Imin shūyōjo e nyūjo ni tsuite. Kobe: Imin shūyōjo, 1928. Inamura Tetsuya. 1999. “Menkao: Okada Ikumatsu—­Peru Nihonjin imin to ashienda.” Kikan Minzokugaku 23, no. 2 (1999): 44–55. Ingenieros, José. La evolución sociológica Argentina: De la barbarie al imperialismo. Buenos Aires: Librería J. Menendez, 1910. ­Inoue Masaji. “Imin gyōsei ni kansuru hiken kōyō.” In Honpō imin toriatsukainin kankei zakken kaigai kōgyō (kabu) kaigai tokōsha meibo, 4. Tokyo: Gaikō shiryō-­k an, 1929. ­Inoue, Ryoki. Saga: A história de quatro gerações de uma família japonesa no Brasil. São Paulo: Globo S. A., 2006. Instituto Cultural Argentino-­Japonés, ed. Ciclo de conferencias dictadas en el instituto y correspondientes al año 1940. Buenos Aires: Museo Social Argentino, Instituto Cultural Argentino-­Japonés, 1940. Irie, Toraji. “History of Japa­nese Migration to Peru, Part I.” Hispanic American Historical Review 31, no. 3 (1951): 437–452. Irie, Toraji. “History of Japa­nese Migration to Peru, Part II.” Hispanic American Historical Review 31, no. 4 (1951): 648–664. Irie, Toraji. “Zai-­a Nihon-­jin sōseiki.” La Plata Hōchi, January 1, 1951, 9–10. Iriye, Akira. ­After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Iriye, Akira. “The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918–1931.” In Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy, edited by Bernard Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, 237–269. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1974. Iriye, Akira. Pacific Estrangement: Japa­nese and American Expansion 1897–1911. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. Ishikawa Tatsuzō. Ishikawa Tatsuzō sakuhin shū. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1972. Ishikawa, Tomonori, ed. Nikkei imin shiryōshū dai 2 ki Nanbei-­hen dai 23 kan shōwa senzenki-­hen 2: Nanbei an’nai ge Aruzenchin hoka 12 kakoku hen. 1932; repr., Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 1999. Ishi Osamu. “Senkanki Nihon no keizai gaikō.” In Nihon no gaikō, Volume 1, Ggaikōshi senzenhen, edited by Toshikazu ­Inoue, 157–181. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2013. Itō Atsushi. Nihon nōmin seisaku shiron. Kyoto: Kyoto daigaku shuppankai, 2013. Izumi Sei’ichi. Imin: Burajiru imin no jittai chōsa. Tokyo: Kokon shoin, 1957. Jacobowitz, Seth. “A ­Bitter Brew: Coffee and ­Labor in Japa­nese Brazilian Immigrant Lit­er­a­t ure.” Estudos japoneses 41 (2019): 13–30. Jacobowitz, Seth. Review of Struggling Upward, by Timothy Van Compernolle, Journal of Japa­nese Studies 46, no. 2 (2020): 518–523. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Kaigai ijū tōkei: Shōwa 27 nen–62 nen. Tokyo: Kokusai kyōryoku jigyōdan. 1987. Jinkō mondai shingikai. Jinkō mondai shingikai ketsugi, November 1949. http://­w ww​ .­ipss​.­go​.­jp​/­history​/­shingikai​/­data​/­J000008911​.­pdf. Jinkō mondai shingikai. Jinkō shūyōryoku ni kansuru ketsugi, August 8, 1955. http://­w ww​ .­ipss​.­go​.­jp​/­history​/­shingikai​/­data​/­J000008913​.­pdf.

Bibliography

281

Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha. Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha gensei yōran. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha, 1932. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha. Nanbei Burajiru jijō. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha, 1934. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha. Nanbei Burajirukoku to Nihon ishokumin. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki gaisha, 1922. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Burajiru ishokuminchi shashinchō. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1924. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, ed. Burajiru ni okeru hōjin no hatten. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1919. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, ed. Burajiru ni okeru hōjin no hatten. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1920. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Burajiru yōgo tehodoki. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1926. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha shoshi. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1935. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Nanbei Burajiru jijō. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1932. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Nanbei Burajiru jijō. Tokyo: Kaigai Kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1936. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Nanbei Burajiru jijō to toko annai. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1931. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha. Sekai ni okeru jinkō mondai no genjō. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1927. Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha Chōsabu. Zenkoku chūshōnō no bunpu oyobi sono keizai jōtai. Tokyo: Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha, 1918. Kamei Hideo. Nijū seiki zenki no bungaku. June 6, 2022. http://­k​-­sekirei​.­la​.­coocan​.­jp​ /­others​/­20th​_­02​.­html. Kamotsu-ka, ed. Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku. [Tokyo]: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha kamotsuka, 1932. Kaneda Kinji. Shōwa jūninen ban, saikin ni okeru Burajiru oyobi nippaku kankei no ugoki. Tokyo: Takumu-­shō, takumu-­k yoku shuppan. 1937. Kashū Mainichi Shimbunsha, Kamai Nenkan: The Year Book and Directory, 1939–1940. Los Angeles: Kashū mainichi shimbunsha, 1940. Kawakatsu, Heita. The Lancashire Cotton Industry and Its Rivals. Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 2018. Kawasaki kisen kabushiki gaisha, ed. Kawasaki kisen gojū-­nenshi. Kobe: Kawasaki kisen kabushiki gaisha, 1969. Kerig, Dorothy Pierson. “Yankee Enclave: The Colorado River Land Com­pany and Mexican Agrarian Reform in Baja California, 1902–1944.” PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 1988. Kihumura, Akemi, and Yano Inouye. Encyclopedia of Japa­nese Descendants in the Amer­ i­cas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Kimura Kazuaki. Shōwa sakka no nanyōkō. Tokyo: Sekai shisōsha, 2004.

282 Bibliography Kingsberg, Miriam. “Becoming Brazilian to Be Japa­nese: Emigrant Assimilation, Cultural Anthropology, and National Identity.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 1 (2014): 67–97. Kingsberg, Miriam. “Japan’s Inca Boom: Global Archaeology and the Making of a Postwar Nation.” Monumenta Nipponica 69, no. 2 (2014): 221–254 Ko, Chisu Teresa. “From Whiteness to Diversity: Crossing the Racial Threshold in Bicentennial Argentina.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 14 (2014): 2529–2546. Ko, Chisu Teresa. “­Toward Asian Argentine Studies.” Latin American Research Review 51, no. 4 (2016): 271–289. Kōchi, Paul. Imin no aiwa: An Immigrant’s Sorrowful Tale. Translated by Ben Kobashigawa. Los Angeles: self-­published, 1978. Kokaze Hidemasa. Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun: Kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995. Kokkai shūgiin. Kessan iinkai 7-­gō. February 14, 1962. Kokkai shūgiin. Yosan iinkai 14-­gō. March 6, 1957. Kotani Satoshi. “Nihon-­g un to interijensu: Seikō to shippai no jirei kara.” Bōei kenkyujo kiyō 11, no. 1 (2008): 43–68. Kōya­ma, Rokurō. Imin yonjūnenshi. São Paulo: Rokurō kōya­ma, 1949. Kō Youngran. “ ‘ Texas’ o meguru gensetsuken: Shimazaki Tōson hakai to bōchōron no keifu.” In Disukūru no teikoku: Meiji sanjūnendai no bunka kenkyū, edited by Kaneko Akio, Takahashi Osamu, and Yoshida Morio, 273–302. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2000. Kurashige, Lon, Madeline Y. Hsu, and Yujin Yaguchi. “Introduction: Conversations on Transpacific History.” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 2 (2014): 183–188. Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-­Network-­Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Lausent-­Herrera, Isabelle. Pasado y presente de la comunidad japonesa en el Peru. Lima: IEP, 1991. Lee, Erika. “The ‘Yellow Peril’ in the United States and Peru: A Transnational History of Japa­nese Exclusion, 1920s–­World War II.” In Transnational Crossroads: Remapping the Amer­i­cas and the Pacific, edited by Camilla Fojas and Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., 315–358. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012. Lesser, Jeffrey. A Discontented Diaspora: Japa­nese Brazilians and the Meanings of Ethnic Militancy, 1960–1980. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. Lesser, Jeffrey. Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Strug­gle for Ethnicity in Brazil. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999. Lewis, Michael. Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Lobo Collantes, Juan Franco. “En defensa del mercado interno. Importación japonesa y empresarios textiles en el Perú, 1929–1939.” Apuntes: revista de ciencias sociales 47, no. 86 (2020): 91–115. Lone, Stewart. The Japa­nese Community in Brazil, 1908–1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. New York: Palgrave, 2001. López, Ruth Mandujano. “From Sail to Steam: Coastal Mexico and the Reconfiguration of the Pacific in the Nineteenth ­Century.” International Journal of Maritime History 22, no. 2 (December 2010): 247–275.

Bibliography

283

López, Ruth Mandujano. “Transpacific Mexico: Encounters with China and Japan in the Age of Steam (1867–1914).” PhD diss., University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2012. López-­Calvo, Ignacio. Japa­nese Brazilian Saudades: Diasporic Identities and Cultural Production. Louisville: University Press of Colorado, 2019. López-­Durán, Fabiola. Eugenics in the Garden: Transatlantic Architecture and the Crafting of Modernity. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2018. Lu, Sidney Xu. “Colonizing Hokkaido and the Origin of Japa­nese Trans-­Pacific Expansion, 1869–1894.” Japa­nese Studies 36, no. 2 (2016): 251–274. Lu, Sidney Xu. “A G ­ reat Convergence: The American Frontier and the Origins of Japa­ nese Migration to Brazil.” Journal of Global History (OnlineFirst, 2021): 1–19. https://­doi​.­org​/­10​.­1017​/­S1740022821000231. Lu, Sidney Xu. The Making of Japa­nese Settler Colonialism: Malthusianism and Trans-­ Pacific Migration, 1868–1961. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Lyman, Stanford  M. The Asian in North Amer­i­ca. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-­Clio, 1970. Mack, Edward. “Nihon bungaku no ‘hate’: Sanpauro no Endō shoten.” Ritsumeikan gengo bunka kenkyū 20, no.1 (2008): 179–185. Mack, Edward. “Paracolonial Lit­er­a­t ure: Japanese-­Language Lit­er­a­t ure in Brazil.” Ilbon yŏn’gu 16 (2011): 89–128. Mackintosh, Jonathan. Review of Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin Amer­ i­ca, by Toake Endoh. Reviews in History, no. 857. Accessed May 19, 2022. https://­ reviews​.­history​.­ac​.­uk​/­review​/­857. Maeyama, Takashi. Esunishiti to Brazirujin. Tokyo: Oshanomizu shobo, 1996. Maeyama, Takashi. Ethnicity, Secret Socie­ties, and Associations: The Japa­nese in Brazil. New York: Garland, 1994. Manzenreiter, Wolfram. “The Japa­nese Emigrant Empire: Imperial Aspirations and Diaspora Engagement.” In Global Diasporas in the Age of High Imperialism, edited by Ulrike Kirchberger and Steven Ivings, 41–65. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018. Masamune, Hakuchō. “Jin’ai: Dust.” Translated by Robert Rolf. Monumenta Nipponica 25, no. 3/4 (1970): 407–414. Masterson, Daniel, and Sayaka Funada-­Classen, eds. The Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004. Masuda, Shozo, ed. Estudios Latinoamericanos en Alemania y Japón. Tokyo: Fundación Shibusawa para el Desarrollo de la Etnología, 2000. Matsuda, Matt K. Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, P ­ eoples, and Cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Matsuura Akira and Sasagawa Keiko. Tōyō kisen to eiga. Osaka: Kansai daigaku shuppanbu, 2016. McDonald, Kate. “Asymmetrical Integration: Lessons from a Railway Empire,” Technology and Culture 56, no. 1 (January 2015): 115–149. McDonald, Kate. Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017. Migita Mariana Harumi. Mariana sensei no tabunka kyōsei ressun: Burajiru de umare, Nihon de sodatta shōjo no monogatari. Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2013.

284 Bibliography Miller, Edward S. Bankrupting the ­Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Imin dokuhon. Tokyo: Keizai orai-­sha, 1955. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga kokumin no kaigai hatten: Iju 100-­nen no ayumi. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971. Mishima, Sōsen. “One House.” Colonization World 1, no. 5 (1908): 248–253. Mita, Chiyoko. Bastos: Uma comunidade étnica japonesa no Brasil. São Paulo: Humanitas, FFLCH/USP, 1999. Miyazawa, Júlio. Yawara! A Travessia Nihondin-­Brasil. Edição do Autor, 2016. Mizuno, Hiromi. “A Kula Ring for the Flying Geese: Japan’s Technology Aid and Postwar Asia.” In Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development and the Cold War Order, 1–40. London: Bloomsbury, 2018. Mizutani Bangaku. Hokubei Aichi kenjinshi. Sacramento: Hokubei Aichi kenjinkai, 1920. Mochizuki Masaharu. “Wagakuni shuppanbutu yushutu no aramashi.” In Sōgyō nijūgo-­nen no kaikoroku, 45–50. Tokyo: Nihon shuppan bōeki, 1967. Modell, John. The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: The Japa­nese of Los Angeles. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. Morais, Fernando. Corações sujos: A historia da Shindo Renmei. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000. Mori, Koichi. “ ‘Gengo’ wo meguru iminshi: Burajiru Nikkeijin no gengo jyōkyō ni kansuru minzokushi-­teki kōsatu.” In Burajiru Nikkei, okinawa-­kei shakai ni okeru gengo sesshoku, by Mayumi Kudō, Kōichi Mori, Santō Isao, Lee Kil-­Yong, and Nakatō Yasue, 31–143. Tokyo: Hitsuji shobō, 2009. Morimoto, Amelia. Los inmigrantes japoneses en el Perú. Lima: Taller de Estudios Andinos, Universidad Nacional Agraria, 1979. Morimoto, Amelia. Peru no Nihonjin imin. Tokyo: Nihon hyoron-­sha, 1992. Morimoto, Amelia Hayashi. Migración y comunidad de origen Japonés en Peru. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1989. Moriya Takashi. “Burajiru Nikkei imin shōsetsu ron.” Bulletin of the Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Hosei University 12 (2011): 133–156. Moriyama, Alan Takeo. Imingaisha: Japa­nese Emigration Companies and Hawai‘i, 1894– 1908. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1985. Morris-­Suzuki, Tessa. “Anti-­A rea Studies.” Communal/Plural 8 (2000): 9–23. Muñoz, José R. Sanchís. Japón y la Argentina: Historia de sus relaciones. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1997. Murasaki Nagaaki. Taiwan, niitakadō shoten murasaki nagaaki: Jiseki to kaisoroku. Edited by Hibi Yoshitaka. Kanazawa: Kanazawa bumpokaku, 2020. Muscolino, Micah. “Fisheries Build Up the Nation: Maritime Environmental Encounters between Japan and China.” In Japan at Nature’s Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power, edited by Ian Jared Miller, Julia Adeney Thomas, and Brett L. Walker, 56–70. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013. Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie, eds. The Japa­nese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1984.

Bibliography

285

Nagano ken kaitaku jikōkai Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai (Nagano ken). Naganoken Manshū kaitakushi: Sōhen. Nagano: Nagano ken kaitaku jikkō kai Manshū kaitakushi kenkō kai, 1984. Nagata Shigeshi. Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hattenshi 2. Tokyo: Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hattenshi kenkōkai, 1953. Nagata Shigeshi. Kaigai risshiden. Tokyo: Nihon rikkōkai, 1926. Nagata Shigeshi. “Manshū no shinano mura (1).” Rikkō sekai 347 (1933): 19–29. Nagata Shigeshi. Shinano kaigai ijūshi. Nagano: Shinano kaigai kyōryokukai, 1952 Naimu-­shō, Shakai-­k yoku, Shakai-bu. Kokumin kosei undō gaikyō. Tokyo: Naimu-­shō, shakai-­k yoku, 1934. Nakada Kōhei and Nanbō Shinsaku. Chūnanbei kikō: Nihonjin nyūshokuchi chōsa no kiroku. Tokyo: Chūgai shobō, 1958. Nakagawa Keiichirō. Ryōtaisen-­kan no Nihon kaiungyō: Fukyō-ka no kutō to yakushin. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1980. Nakamoto, Jorge. “Discriminación y aislamiento: el caso de los japoneses y sus descendientes.” In Primer seminario sobre poblaciones inmigrantes, edited by Amelia Morimoto, 175–203. Lima: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 1988. Nakamura Tōmin, ed. Burajiru Fukuoka kenjin hattenshi. São Paulo: Zaihaku fukuoka kenjinkai, 1977. Nakano Hideo. Tōyō kisen rokujūshi-­nen no ayumi. Tokyo: Nakano hideo, 1964. Reprinted in 2017 by Yumani shobō. Nakasato, Oscar. Nihonjin. São Paulo: Benvirá, 2011. Nakasone, Ronald Y. “An Impossible Possibility.” In Okinawan Diaspora, edited by Ronald Y. Nakasone, 3–25. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002. Nakayama Hiroko. “Sengo Nihon karano Paraguai ijū ni miru shūdan ijūchi shakai keisei: Kōchiken inada-­gun taishō-­chō no machigurumi ijū to Nihonjin ishiki.” PhD diss., Hosei University, 2016. Narusawa Eiju. “Yūwa undō to seisaku.” In Suihei undō shi no kenkyū, edited by Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo, 4. Tokyo: Buraku mondai kenkyūjo shuppanbu, 1973. National Diet Library, Japan. “100 Years of Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil.” 2014. Accessed July 8, 2022. https://­w ww​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/ ­brasil ​/­e​/­index​.­html. Negawa Sachio and I­ noue Shō’ichi, eds. Ekkyō to rendō no Nikkei imin kyōikushi. Tokyo: Mineruva shobō, 2016. Negawa Sachio and Shōichi Inōe. Ekkyō to rendō no Nikkei imin kyōikushi: Fukusū bunka taiken no shiza. Kyoto: Minerubashobō, 2016. NHK News Web. “Abe shushō, ‘kokunan tomo ieru jōkyō’ shōshika taisaku susumeru yō shiji,” December  26, 2019. https://­w ww3​.­nhk​.­or​.­jp​/­news​/ ­html​/­20191226​ /­k10012229511000​.­html. Nichiboku Kyōkai. Nichiboku kōryūshi. Tokyo: PMC shuppan, 1990. Nihon Aruzenchin Kyōkai, ed. Nihon Aruzenchin kyōkai no ayumi. Tokyo: Nihon Aruzenchin kyōkai, 1968. Nihon-­jin Aruzenchin Ijū-­shi Hensan Iinkai, ed. Nihon-­jin Aruzenchin ijū-­shi. 1971. Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi. Mexico City: Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi hensan iinkai, 1971.

286 Bibliography Nihon keieishi kenkyūjo. Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha hyaku-­nen shi. Tokyo: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha, 1988. Ninomiya, Masato. “O centenário do Tratado de Amizade, Comércio e Navegação entre Brasil e Japão.” Revista USP 28 (1996): 245–250. Nippon Rikkō Kai Sōritsu Hyaku Shūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō Iinkai Kinenshi Hensan Senmon Iinkai (Nippon Rikkō Kai). Nippon rikkō kai hyakunen no kōseki: Reiniku kyūsai, kaigai hatten undō, kokusai kōken. Tokyo: Nippon rikkō kai, 1997. Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha, ed. Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-­nen shi. Tokyo: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha, 1935. Nishida, Mieko. Diaspora and Identity: Japa­nese Brazilians in Brazil and Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2018. Nishi Nihon Bunka Kyōkai, ed. Fukuokakenshi, tsūshi hen kindai 2, sangyō keizai 2. Fukuoka: Fukuoka, 2000. Nishita Toshihiro. “Shidehara Kijūrō no kokusai ninshiki: Daiichiji sekai taisen go no tenkanki wo chūshin toshite.” Kokusai seiji 139 (2004): 96–99. Noguchi Takeji. “Dai ikkai shokumin bungaku-­sho ni tsuite.” Culture 2, no. 8 (1939): 59. Nonomiya, Genzō. Nanbei saiko no shinnichikoku Peru to ichiman gosennin no zairyūdōhō. Tokyo: Seiunsha, 1934. Normano, J. F. “Japa­nese Emigration to Brazil.” Pacific Affairs 7, no. 1 (March 1934): 42–61. Normano, J. F. “Japa­nese Emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca.” Genus 3, no. 1/2 (May 1938): 47–90. Normano, J. F., and Gerbi Antonello. The Japa­nese in South Amer­i­ca: An Introductory Survey with Special Reference to Peru. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. Nozoe Kenji. Kaitaku nōmin no kiroku: Nōsei no hizumi wo otte. Tokyo: Nippon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1976. Ōgimi, Chōtoku. Saikin no Peru jijo. Tokyo: Kaigai kenkyujo, 1932. Ogishima, Toru. “Japa­nese Emigration.” International L ­ abour Review 34, no. 5 (November 1936): 618–651. Ogouchi Gokyō. Colonization King: A Novel of Success (Shokumin-­ō: Risshi Shōsetsu). Tokyo: Aritomokan, 1907. Ōkagawa Kō, “‘Kyogyōka’ ni yoru giji benchā tōshi fando to risuku kanri,” Shiga Daigaku Keizai Gakubu kenkyū nenpō 14 (2007): 14–15. Okimura, Teikichi. Sonriendo: Novela del ambiente Japonés. Buenos Aires: Rosso, 1934. Okimura, Teikichi, and Remy Burena. Un Japonés y un Suramericano. Buenos Aires: Editorial Mikuni, 1933. Okubaro, Jorge J. O súbito (Banzai, Massateru!). São Paulo: Terceiro Nome, 2008. Ōkuma Shigenobu. “Yamato minzoku bōchō to shokumin jigyō.” Shokumin sekai 1, no. 1 (1908): 1–3. Onaha, Cecilia. “Sensen no ijūsha no nagare.” In Nihon Aruzenchin kōryūshi: Harukana tomo to 100nen, edited by Nihon Aruzenchin Kōryūshi Henshūiinkai, 208–222. Tokyo: Nihon Aruzenchin kōryūshi henshūiinkai, 1999.

Bibliography

287

Osaka Jinken Rekishi Shiryōkan. Manshū imin to hisabetsu buraku: Yūwa seisaku no gisei to natta kutami kaitakudan. Osaka: Osaka jinken rekishi shiryōkan, 1989. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha. Eigyō hōkokusho. Osaka: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, 1917, 1918. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, ed. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-­nen shi. Osaka: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, 1934. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha. Umi. Osaka: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, 1939; repr., Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2018. Ōsaka shōsen mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha, ed. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha hachijū-­nen shi. Tokyo: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, 1966. Oshima Kiichi. Nanbei Aruzenchin. Tokyo: Shokuminsha, 1931; repr., Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 1999. Ōta Kōji. Hashimoto Umetarō. Tokyo: Hashimoto Umetarō-­kun denki hensankai, 1939. Ota Mishima, M. Siete migraciones japonesas en México, 1890–1978. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1982. Ota Mishima, María Elena. Destino México. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1997. Patrick, Hugh I. “The Economic Muddle of the 1920’s.” In The Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, edited by James William Morley, 211–260. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1971. Peattie, Mark. Nan’yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japa­nese in Micronesia, 1885–1945. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988. Peru Shimpo. Inmigración japonesa al Perú: 75 aniversario 1899–1974. Lima: Peru shimpo, 1975. Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pyle, Kenneth. The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Prob­lems in Cultural Identity, 1885– 1895. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969. Rafu Shimpōsha. Rafu Nenkan: The Year Book and Directory, 1937–1938. Los Angeles: Rafu Shimpōsha, 1937. Ra Korumena Nijusshūnenshi Kankōkai. Paraguai koku saisho no Nihonjin ijūchi, ra korumena nijusshūnenshi. Tokyo: Ra korumena nijusshūnenshi kankōkai, 1958. Rapoport, Mario. “Argentina y la Segunda Guerra Mundial: Mitos y realidades.” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe 6, no. 1 (1995): 5–21. Rippy, J. Fred. “The Japa­nese in Latin Amer­i­ca.” Inter-­American Economic Affairs 3, no. 1 (1949): 50–65. Rodríguez Pastor, Humberto. “Poderío del peón y empresario Nikumatsu Okada en el valle de Chancay.” Investigaciones Sociales 2, no. 36 (2016): 41–54. Rokujūnen no Ayumi Henshūiinkai. Nihon shuppan bōeki kabushikigaisha: Rokujūnen no ayumi. Tokyo: Nihon shuppan bōeki, 2002. Romero, Robert Chao. “Transnational Chinese Immigrant Smuggling to the United States and Cuba, 1882–1916.” Amerasia Journal 30, no. 3 (2005): 1–16. Ruoff, Kenneth J. Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The War­time Cele­bration of the Empire’s 2,600th Anniversary. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.

288 Bibliography Saga-­ken Nōrin-bu Nōgyō Shinkō-ka. Saga-­ken kaigai ijū shi. Saga: Fukuhiro insatsu, 1986. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Saitō Hiroshi. Burajiru no Nihonjin. Tokyo: Maruzen kabushiki gaisha, 1960. Sakaguchi Mitsuhiko. “Dare ga imin wo okuridashita no ka: Kan taihenyō ni okeru Nihonjin no kokusai idō gaikan.” Ritsumeikan gengo bunka kenkyū 21, no. 4 (2010): 53–66. Sakurai, Célia. Romanceiro da imigração japonesa. São Paulo: Editora Sumaré/FAPSESP, 1993. Sam, Silvio, and Reimei Yoshioka. Dekassegui: Com os pés no chão . . . ​no Japão. São Paulo: Ysayama, 1999. Sand, Jordan. “Reconfiguring Pacific History: Reflections from the Pacific Empires Working Group.” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 3 (2016): 1–6. Satō Jin. “Motazaru kuni” no shigen ron: Jizoku kanō na kokudo o meguru mō hitotsu no chi. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011. Satō Yukimasa. “Nihon to Aruzenchin ni okeru shinya yoshio to sono kazoku.” Hirosaki gakuin daigaku eibei bungaku 22 (2009): 1–15. Schumpeter, Joseph. Imperialism and Social Classes. Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1955. Sengo kaitakushi henshū iinkai. Sengo kaitakushi. Tokyo: Zenkoku kaitaku nōgyō kyōdō kumai rengōkai, 1967. Seoane, Manuel. “The Japa­nese Are Still in Peru.” Asia and the Amer­i­cas 43, no. 12 (1943): 674–676. Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed. Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyō shi. Tokyo: Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, 1943. Shaw, Albert. “South Amer­i­ca and Asiatic ­Labor.” American Review of Reviews 36, no. 5 (1907): 622–623. Shibasaki Atsushi. Kindai Nihon to kokusai bunka kōryū: Kokusai bunka shinkōkai no sōsetsu to tenkai. Tokyo: Yūshindō kōbun-­sha, 1999. Shibusawa Ei’ichi Kinen Zaidan Kenkyūbu. Jitsugyōka to Burajiru ijū. Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 2012. Shiga Shigetaka. Nan’yō jiji. Tokyo: Maruzen shōsha shoten, 1891. Shimazaki, Tōson. The Broken Commandment. Translated by Kenneth Strong. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974. Shindō Toyoo. Buraku kaihō undō no shiteki tenkai. Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 1981. Shindo, Tsugio. Passos da imigração japonesa no Brasil. Translated by Aiko Tatsuta, Arísia Marico Noguchi, Jorge Nagao, and Júlia Hoçoya. São Paulo: Associacão Cultural Recreativa Akita Kenjin do Brasil, 2006. Shinya, Yoshio. “Aruzenchin tsūshin.” In Saga-­ken kaigai ijū-­shi, edited by Saga-­ken Nōrin-bu Nōgyō Shinkō-ka, 294. Saga: 1986. Shinya, Yoshio. El concepto invariable del “Estado Familia” en Japón. Buenos Aires: 1941. Shinya, Yoshio. “Gaikoku imin ni taisuru akoku-­jin no ikō.” Zai-­a Nihon-­jin 42 (August 1924): 11–14. Shinya, Yoshio. Imperio del Sol Naciente, su maravillosa evolución moderna. Buenos ­A ires: Librería Cervantes, 1934.

Bibliography

289

Shinya, Yoshio. La verdad sobre la cuestión Manchuriana. Buenos Aires: Librería Cervantes, 1933. Shinya, Yoshio. “Llamamiento a la juventud.” Aruzenchin jihō, December 22, 1934. Shinya, Yoshio. Los ideales del Japón. Buenos Aires: Instituto Cultural Argentino Japonés, Museo Social Argentino, 1939. Shinya, Yoshio. “Nanbei no hōko Aruzenchin.” In Zai-­aruzenchin Nikkei-­jin roku, edited by La Plata Hōchi-­sha, 8–9. Buenos Aires: La Plata Hōchi-­sha, 1968. Shinya, Yoshio. “Nihon no daihyō-­teki shōhin: Kinu no handokachiifu.” In Zai-­ aruzenchin Nikkei-­jin roku, edited by La Plata Hōchi-­sha, 10. Buenos Aires: La Plata Hōchi-­sha, 1968. Shinya, Yoshio. “Nihon no shōin ga akoku no hansei wo unagasu.” In Zai-­aruzenchin Nikkei-­jin roku, edited by La Plata Hōchi-­sha, 13. Buenos Aires: La Plata Hōchi-­ sha, 1968. Shinya, Yoshio. Pequeña contribución a la grandeza Argentina. Buenos Aires: Aruzenchin jihō-­sha, 1935. Shiode Hiroyuki. Ekkyōsha no seijishi: Ajia taiheiyō okeru Nihonjin no imin to shokumin. Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015. “Shokumin kyōkai setsuritsu shoisho.” Shokumin kyōkai hōkokusho 1 (April  1893): 105–107. Shūgiin iinkai kaigi roku. 1909. Teikoku gikai kaigi roku kensaku shisutemu. https://­ teikokugikai​-­i​.­ndl​.­go​.­jp​/­#​/­. Smith, Robert J. “The Ethnic Japa­nese in Brazil.” Journal of Japa­nese Studies 5, no. 1 (1979): 53–77. Sneider, Vern. The Tea­house of the August Moon. New York: Signet Books, 1951. Socieda de Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa. Uma epopeia moderna: 80 anos da imigração japonesa no Brasil. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1992. Sohō, Tokutomi. Shōrai no Nihon. Tokyo: Keizai Zasshi-­sha, 1886. Sugiyama Kazuo. Kaiungyō to kin’yū: Fukyōki no shikin chōtatsu. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1981. Sumire. “La patria eres tú.” Aruzenchin jihō, February 9, 1935. Suzuki Jōji. Nihonjin dekasegi imin. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992. Suzuki, Teiiti. The Japa­nese Immigrant in Brazil. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1969. Tagawa Mariko. “Imin” shichō no kiseki. Tokyo: Yūshōdō shuppan, 2005. Takahashi, Sanmin. “Shokumin sekai hakkan no shushi.” Shokumin sekai 1, no.  1 (1908): 22–23. Takahashi Yukiharu. Karibukai no “rakuen”: Dominika imin sanjūnen no kisei. Tokyo: Ushio shuppansha, 1987. Takahashi Yukiharu and Konno Toshihiko. Dominika imin wa kimin datta. Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1993. Takaki, Ronald. Strangers from a Dif­fer­ent Shore: A History of Asian Americans. Boston: ­Little, Brown, 1989. Takao, Kitamura. Issei toshite Amerika ni ikite. Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1992. Takaoka Kumao. “Burajiru imin ron.” Chuō kōron 40 (1925): 53–67.

290 Bibliography Takase Hirofumi. “ ‘Keizai gaikō’ gainen no rekishiteki kentō: Sengo Nihon wo jirei ni.” Hiroshima Journal of International Studies 19 (2013): 21–38. Takekoshi Yosaburō. “Shokumin bungaku o furiokoseyo.” Shokumin sekai 1, no. 1 (1908): 5–7. Takenaka, Ayumi. “The Japa­nese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization.” Latin American Perspectives 31, no. 3 (2004): 77–98. Takenaka, Ayumi. “The Paradox of Diaspora Engagement: A Historical Analy­sis of Japa­nese State-­Diaspora Relations.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 6 (2020): 1129–1145. Takeuchi, Marcia. O perigo amarelo: Imagens do mito, realidade do preconceito (1920–1945). São Paulo: Associação Editorial Humanitas, 2008. Takeuchi Yō. Nihonjin no shusse kan. Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 1978. Takino, Yurina. “Dai ichiji taisengo no kaigai ishokumin seisaku jigyo no keisei to tenkai—­naimusho shakaikyoku no sannyu to kaigai hatten he no kitai.” Shigaku zasshi 129, no. 3 (2020): 1–34. Takumu-­shō, Takumu-­k yoku. Menka ni kansuru chōsa. Tokyo: Takumu-­shō. 1930. Takumu-­shō, Takumu-­k yoku. Perū koku zairyū hōjin no nōgyō hōmen ni okeru hatten jōkyō. Tokyo: Takumu-­shō. 1931. Tama Shinnosuke. “ ‘Manshū imin’ kara ‘Manshū kaitaku’ he: Nicchū sensō kaishigo no nichiman nōsei ittaika ni tsuite.” Hirosaki daigaku keizai kenkū 19 (November 1996): 61–74. Tatsuki Mariko. “Intensifying Competition and the Streamlining of Japa­nese Shipping Companies: The Pacific Routes between the Two World Wars.” Business History 35, no. 3 (1993): 88–107. Tatsuki Mariko. “Kaiun fukyō to teikisen no gōrika: Ōsaka shōsen no kēsu.” Shakai keizai shigaku 52, no. 3 (1986): 303–335. Teishinshō, ed. Teishin jigyō shi. 7 vols. Tokyo: Teishin kyōkai, 1940–1941. Terán, Oscar, ed. José Ingenieros: Pensar la nación. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986. Thompson, Stephen I. “Assimilation and Nonassimilation of Asian-­Americans and Asian Peruvians.” Comparative Studies in Socie­ties and History 21, no. 4 (1979): 572–588. Thompson, Stephen I. “Survival of Ethnicity in the Japa­nese Community of Lima, Peru.” Urban Anthropology 3, no. 2 (1974): 243–261. Tigner, James L. The Okinawans in Latin Amer­i­ca: Investigations of Okinawan Communities in Latin Amer­i­ca, with Exploration of Settlement Possibilities. Washington, DC: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, 1954. Tigner, James Lawrence. “Japa­nese Immigration into Latin Amer­i­ca: A Survey.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 23 (1981): 457–482. Tigner, James Lawrence. “The Ryukyuans in Peru.” The Amer­i­cas 35, no. 1 (1978): 20–44. Titiev, Mischa. “The Japa­nese Colony in Peru.” Far Eastern Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1951): 227–247. Toda Teijirō. “Nihon kaiun no yakushin to panama keiyu kōro.” In Bōeki kaki daigaku kōgishū, edited by Yokohama bōeki kyōkai, 94–127. Yokohama: Yokohama bōeki kyōkai, 1937.

Bibliography

291

Tokunaga Yū. “Hainichi iminhō to zai-­Mekishiko Nihonjin.” Imin gakkai nenpō 24 (June 2018): 65–81. Tokunaga, Yu. “Japa­nese Farmers, Mexican Workers, and the Making of Transpacific Borderlands.” Pacific Historical Review 89, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 179–190. Torres, Luis Rocca. Japoneses bajo el sol de Lambayeque. Lima: Comisión Conmemorativa del Centenario de la Inmigración Japonesa al Perú, 1997. Tōson, Shimazaki, and Arishima Ikuma. Toson Shimazaki y sus conferencias. Translated by Shinya Yoshio. Buenos Aires: 1937. Tsuchida, Nobuya. “The Japa­nese in Brazil, 1908–1941.” PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1978. Tsuda, Takeyuki. Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japa­nese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Tsutsui, William M. “The Pelagic Empire: Reconsidering Japa­nese Expansion.” In Japan at Nature’s Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power, edited by Ian Jared Miller, Julia Adeney Thomas, and Brett L. Walker, 21–38. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013. Turits, R. L. “A World Destroyed, a Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic.” Hispanic American Historical Review 82, no. 3 (2002): 589–635. Uchida, Jun. Brokers of Empire: Japa­nese Settler Colonialism in K ­ orea, 1876–1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2011. Uchida, Jun. “From Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japa­nese Expansion from the Periphery.” Journal of Japa­nese Studies 22, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 57–90. Uchida, Jun. “ ‘Pacific Empire’ as a Useful Analytical Category.” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 3 (2016): 28–31. Uchiyama Katsuo. Sōbō no kyūjūninen: Burajiru imin no kiroku. Tokyo: Tokyo shinbunsha, 2001. Ueno Eishin. Shutsu Nippon ki. Tokyo: Shakai shisōsha,1995. Ueunten, Wesley. “Japa­nese Latin American Internment from an Okinawan Perspective.” In Okinawan Diaspora, edited by Ronald Y. Nakasone, 90–111. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002. Uscanga, Carlos. “La armada imperial japonesa en México: ¿Búsqueda de una alianza militar o despliegue de estrategias geopolíticas?” Estudios de Asia y África 56, no. 3 (2021): 545–576. Van Compernolle, Timothy. Struggling Upward: Worldly Success and the Japa­nese Novel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Asia Center, 2016 Van Den Veer, Peter. Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. Vasquez, Mario. Immigration and Mestizaje in 19th ­Century Peru. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Wada Atsuhiko. “ ‘Risshi shōsetsu’ no yukue: Shokumin sekai to iu dokusho kūkan.” In Disukūru no teikoku: Meiji sanjūnendai no bunka kenkyū, edited by Kaneko Akio, Takahashi Osamu, and Yoshida Morio, 303–332. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2000.

292 Bibliography Wada Atsuhiko. “Sanpauro Endō shoten kankō ‘bunka’ no ichi: Tsuketari, sōmokuji.” Riterashīshi kenkyū 13 (2020): 1–16. Wakatsuki, Yasuo. Gaimushō ga kishita Nihonjin: Nanbei imin no hanseiki. Tokyo: Mainichi shinbunsha, 2001. Wakatsuki, Yasuo. Genshirin no nakano Nihonjin: Naibei ijūchi no sonogo. Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1973. Wakatsuki, Yasuo. Sengo hikiage no kiroku. Tokyo: Jiji shuppansha, 1991. Wakatsuki, Yasuo, and Suzuki Jori. Kaigai iju seisaku shi ron. Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan, 1975. Wakatsuki, Yasuo, and Iyo Kunimoto. La inmigración japonesa en Bolivia: Estudios históricos y socio-­económicos. Tokyo: Universidad de Chuo, 1985. Wako, Shungoro. Bauru kannai no Nihonjin. São Paulo: Fazenda Tietê, 1938. Weiner, Michael, ed. Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity. London: Routledge, 1997. Weinstein, Barbara. The Color of Modernity: São Paulo and the Making of Race and Nation in Brazil. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015. Weston, José Manuel Carrasco. “Un sol naciente en el Perú (1900–1945): Inmigrantes empresarios. Los casos de Nikumatsu Okada y Cintaro Tominaga.” Tiempo y economía 7, no. 1 (2020): 153–168. Wiarda, Howard J. Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo’s Dominican Republic. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968. Woodard, James P. A Place in Politics: São Paulo, Brazil, from Seigneurial Republicanism to Regionalist Revolt. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Wray, William D. “Japan’s Big-­Th ree Ser­v ice Enterprises in China, 1896–1936.” In The Japa­nese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, 31–64. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1989. Wray, William D. Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870–1914: Business Strategy in the Japa­ nese Shipping Industry. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984. Wray, William D. “Opportunity vs. Control: The Diplomacy of Japa­nese Shipping in the First World War.” In The Merchant Marine in International Affairs, 1850–1950, edited by Greg Kennedy, 59–83. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Yadira, Perez Hazel. “Whiteness in Paradise: Japa­nese Immigrant Narratives of Identity, Collection Action, and Japan’s National Responsibility.” Asian Ethnicity, June 25, 2015. https://­doi​.­org​/­10​.­1080​/­14631369​. ­2015​.­1025895. Yamada Michio. Fune ni miru Nihonjin imin shi. Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1998. Yamagata Jirō. “Sōkan no ji.” Burajiru: Ishokumin to bōeki 1, no. 1 (1927): 4–5. Yamaguchi Masakuni. Burajiru gijutsu ijūsha ga mita sekai. Nagano: Kashiwa kikaku, 2009. Yamamoto, Katsuzo. Toda uma vida no Brasil. Translated by José Yamashiro. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo-­Brasileiros, 1984. Yamamuro Shin’ichi. “Ajia ninshiki no kijiku.” In Kindai Nihon no ajia ninshiki, edited by Furuya Tetsuo, 3–45. Kyoto: Ryoku’in shobō, 1996. Yamashita, Karen T. Brazil-­maru. Minneapolis: Coffee House, 1992.

Bibliography

293

Yamashita Shin-­Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha Shashi henshū iinkai, ed. Shashi: Gappei yori jūgo-­nen. Tokyo: Yamashita shin-­Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha, 1960. Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yūzō. Bōeki to kokusai shūshi. Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1979. Yanase Keisuke. Shakaigai no shakai, eta hinin. Tokyo: Sekai bunko, 1901. Yano Tooru. Nihon no nanshin to tōnan ajia. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1976. Yokohama, Kenkichi. “Un relato breve sobre la laca japonesa.” Aruzenchin jihō, October 15, 1938. Yoneda Fujio. Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan. Tokyo: Kaiji sangyō kenkyūjo, 1958. Yoshiyama Kitoku. Chūmoku subeki Mekishiko. San Francisco: Nichiboku kenkyūsha, 1928. Young, Elliot. Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Amer­i­cas from the Coolie Era through World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Young, Louise. Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013. Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of War­time Imperialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Zaibei Nihonjinkai. Zaibei Nihonjinshi. San Francisco: Zaibei Nihonjinkai, 1940.

Contributors

Eiichiro Azuma is Professor of History and Asian American Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, who specializes in transpacific Japa­nese migration and interimperial relations between the United States and Japan. He is author of the award-­winning Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japa­nese Amer­i­ca (2005) and coeditor of two anthologies, including the Oxford Handbook of Asian American History (2016). His latest research monograph, In Search of Our Frontier: Japa­nese Amer­i­ca and Settler Colonialism in the Construction of Japan’s Borderless Empire (2019), received the 2020 John K. Fairbank Prize in East Asian History from the American Historical Association. Andre Kobayashi Deckrow is a postdoctoral associate in the Heritage Studies and Public History program and the Department of History at the University of Minnesota. He received his PhD from the History—­East Asia program at Columbia University. A historian of global migration, his current book proj­ect examines Japa­nese state-­sponsored migration to Brazil in the early twentieth c­ entury. He is interested in questions of colonialism, national identity, and l­egal regimes of citizenship. He has also contributed to public history proj­ects in the Twin Cities and Southern California that examine local migration history in global contexts. Toake Endoh is Professor of Po­liti­cal Science at Josai International University. She is author of Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin Amer­i­ca (2009) and Nanbei “ kimin” seisaku no jitsuzō (2016). Endoh’s other research interests are Japan’s immigration policy and mi­grant deportation regime from a comparative perspective and mi­grant protection from disasters. Her articles 295

296 Contributors

appear in Asian and Pacific Migration Review, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Chūō kōron, and other journals. Facundo Garasino is a research fellow at the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. He is currently working on a transnational history of migration, nation building, and development in Japan and South Amer­i­ca. He has recently published “Japan’s Last Colonial Frontier: Settler Migration, Development, and Expansionism in the Brazilian Amazon,” in Transpacific Visions: Connected Histories of the Pacific across North and South (2021). Elijah Greenstein is a historian of modern Japan with interests in maritime, spatial, and transportation history. He received his PhD in East Asian studies from Prince­ton University in 2019, and he was a postdoctoral fellow in the Program on US-­Japan Relations at Harvard University from 2019 to 2020. He is currently a Sessional Lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia. Yoshitaka Hibi is Professor of Modern Japa­nese Lit­er­a­t ure and Culture at the Gradu­ate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. His research interests include Japa­nese immigrant lit­er­a­t ure in North Amer­i­ca, print cultural history, the I-­novel, and romans à clef. He is author of “Japanophone Poems in Motion: Languagescapes of Itō Hiromi and Tian Yuan,” in Subjekt und Liminalität in der Gegenwartsliteratur (2020); “Inheriting Books: Overseas Bookstores, Distributors, and Their Networks,” in PAJLS (2019); and Japanīzu amerika: Imin-­bungaku, shuppan-­bunka, shūyōjo (2014). He has also written many articles on modern Japa­nese print culture before World War II and modern Japa­nese lit­er­a­t ure. Pedro Iacobelli is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Institute of History at Universidad de los Andes, Chile. He received his MA and PhD from the Australian National University and previously worked in the Center for Asian Studies at Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. He is the author of Postwar Japa­nese Emigration to South Amer­i­ca from Japan and the Ryukyu Islands (2017) and coeditor of Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements (2016) and Rethinking Postwar Okinawa: Beyond American Occupation (2017).

Contributors

297

Seth Jacobowitz is Assistant Professor of Japa­nese in the Department of World Languages and Lit­er­a­t ures at Texas State University. He is author of Writing Technology in Meiji Japan: A Media History of Modern Japa­nese Lit­er­ a­ture and Visual Culture (2016), which was awarded the ICAS Book Prize in the Humanities in 2017. He is also the translator of the Edogawa Rampo Reader (2008) and Fernando Morais’s Dirty Hearts: The History of Shindō Renmei (2021). He is currently working on his next research monograph, Japa­ nese Brazil: Immigrant Lit­er­a­ture and Overseas Expansion, 1908–1945, ­under advanced contract with Vanderbilt University Press. Ignacio López-­Calvo is Presidential Chair in the Humanities, Director of the Center for the Humanities, and Professor of Lit­er­a­t ure at the University of California, Merced. He is the author of more than one hundred articles and book chapters, as well as nine single-­authored books and seventeen essay collections. His latest books are The Mexican Transpacific: Nikkei Writing, Visual Arts, Per­for­mance (forthcoming), Saudades of Japan and Brazil: Contested Modernities in Lusophone Nikkei Cultural Production, Dragons in the Land of the Condor: Tusán Lit­er­a­ture and Knowledge in Peru, and The Affinity of the Eye: Writing Nikkei in Peru. Sidney Xu Lu is Annette and Hugh Gragg Associate Professor of Transnational Asian Studies at Rice University. He is a social and cultural historian of nineteenth-­and twentieth-­century Japan and is author of The Making of Japa­nese Settler Colonialism: Malthusianism and Trans-­Pacific Migration, published by Cambridge University Press in 2019. He is completing a new book, ­Great Convergence: Japa­nese Brazilian Migration in the Age of Empires, which discusses how the evolution of Japa­nese communities in Brazil influenced and transformed Japa­nese colonialism in Asia. Hiromi Mizuno is an intellectual and cultural historian, interested in t­ hings that move—­capital, ­people, stuff, technologies, and so forth. In Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan (2001) and Engineering Asia (2018), she explored the significance of the “Scientific Japan” slogan in the Japa­nese empire and postwar Asia. Her current proj­ects include a book on agricultural modernization and how nitrogen circulated in twentieth-­ century Asia. She is Associate Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.

298 Contributors

Ayumi Takenaka is Associate Professor of Sociology in the College of Global Liberal Arts, Ritsumeikan University in Japan. She previously taught in the US and the UK. Her primary areas of research interest are in cross-­national movements of ­people, goods, and food. She is currently conducting research on the evolution of culinary culture among Japa­nese immigrants and their descendants across the Amer­i­cas.

Index

Page numbers in boldface type refer to figures and tables. Act No. 7505 (Peru, 1932), 19 Act to Restrict the Immigration of Aliens by Two Percent (Brazil, 1935), 19 Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, 67 agriculture: coffee production, 19, 135, 145, 146, 147, 151–153, 156, 162; in Dominican Republic, 231–235, 238–240; in Manchuria, 229–230; migrant labor as essential to, 18–19; rice production, 148–149, 156–157, 234; sugar production, 19, 112, 132. See also cotton textile industry; farmer-centered migration; landownership; trade and trade networks Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 208 Alger, Horatio, Jr., 181 Aliança Colony, 72–76, 86, 156 Aliansa jihō (newspaper), 196 Alien Land Laws (1913, 1920), 108, 111 Allemart Oliva, Luis Santiago, 133 Amadeo, Tomás, 214, 215 Amazonia Industrial Company (Amazonia Sangyō Kabushiki Gaisha), 86–87 American Anti-War Treaty of NonAggression and Conciliation (1935), 220 American Booksellers Union of Japan, 194, 195 Amorim, Vicente, 260

Ando Kiyoshi, 198 Anti-Asian Association (Peru), 128 anti-Japanese sentiment: in Brazil, 19, 87, 89n10, 164, 255–256; and business restrictions, 137–138; in Dominican Republic, 236; and immigration restrictions/exclusions, 17, 19, 67, 71, 86, 89n10, 99, 110, 117, 137–138, 161–162, 163–164, 168, 212–213, 219; and landownership restrictions, 108, 111, 116–117, 124n68; in Latin America, overview, 19; in Peru, 19, 128, 137–139; and sovereignty concerns, 31; in United States, 2, 17, 67, 71, 99, 108, 116–117, 219 Aoyagi Ikutaro, 155 APJ (Chūō Nihonjin kai; Japanese Peruvian Association), 129–130, 140 Argentina: earliest Japanese migrants in, 199, 210; immigration policy, 212–213; Japanese bookstores in, 199–204; Japanese culture as compatible with, 214–218; nationalism, 217–221; neutrality during World War II, 222, 226n70; postwar Japanese migration to, 227, 244; white nation ideology, 212–213, 217, 218, 219, 225n55 Aruzenchin jihō (newspaper), 200–202, 204, 207n39, 216–217, 221, 225n42 Aruzenchin Jihō Company, 200

299

300 Index Asahi shinbun (newspaper), 55–56 Asano Sōichirō, 44, 115, 116, 124n62 assimilation, 138, 139, 254, 256, 260 Associação Nipo-Brasileira (JapanBrazil Association, or Nippaku Kyōkai), 78 Bastos Colony, 76, 156 Beals, Carleton, 137 Benrisha, 207n33 book distribution networks: in the Americas, overview, 193–196; bookstores in Argentina, 199–204; bookstores in Brazil, 196–199; impact on Japanese immigrant culture, 191–192, 204–206 Brazil: Aliança model of migration to, 72–76; anti-Japanese sentiment in, 19, 87, 89n10, 164, 255–256; coffee production in, 19, 135, 145, 146, 147, 151–153, 156, 162; cotton production in, 28–29, 78, 86, 134–135; earliest Japanese migrants in, 38, 94, 145, 170, 196; golden era of Japanese migration to (1921–1934), 17–18, 63, 65–66, 82, 83, 86, 163; identitarian evolution of Nikkei community in, 254–255, 267–268; immigration policy, 86, 89n10, 117, 160, 161–162, 163–164; Japanese associations in, 130; Japanese bookstores in, 196–199; Kaikō model of migration to, overview, 69–71, 145–147; Kaikō promotion of agricultural potential in, 148–150; Kaikō promotion of independent farming in, 69, 146, 152, 153–159; Kaikō promotion of modernization of, 160–161, 162; Kasato Maru iconography in, 185–186, 187; labor unions in, 29–30; Nantaku model of migration to, 76–80, 80, 81; naturalization and citizenship, 131; postwar Japanese migration to, 227, 229, 242–243, 244; remigrants from Southern California, 119n3; shipping networks, 41, 46–49, 47, 50; sovereignty concerns, 31; subsidies for Japanese migration to, 71, 79 Braziru jihō (newspaper), 196, 197

Britain: colonization, 30; cotton industry, 4, 28, 132, 134; emigration programs, 140–141; in League of Nations, 66; shipping networks, 40–41, 50, 51 Bunka (Culture; magazine), 192, 198–199, 205 Burajiru (Brazil; journal), 72, 78, 173, 254 Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai, or Burataku (Brazilian Colonization Company Limited), 76, 152 burakumin (people of the hamlets), 23–24, 26–27, 34n19, 184 Burakumin Liberation Movement, 183 Burakumin’s National Levelers Association, 24 Bureau of Social Affairs (Shakai Kyoku), 26, 70, 71. See also Ministry of Colonial Affairs Burroughs, Edgar Rice, Tarzan of the Apes, 190n39 business elites: cotton industry ventures in South America, 134–136; cotton industry ventures in US-Mexican borderlands, 111–117, 113, 124n62; mercantile ventures in US-Mexican borderlands, 105; migration programs in Brazil, 76–82. See also Shinya Yoshio California: border crossing into, 99–102, 104, 120–121n29, 121n35; earliest Japanese migrants in, 94, 96, 98–99; Japanese bookstores in, 194; Japanese consulates and associations in, 110–111, 130; landownership legislation, 108, 111. See also US-Mexican borderlands Canada, 11, 40, 96, 170, 193 Caribbean. See Dominican Republic El Caribe (newspaper), 233 Casal, Pedro, 223n12 Cassani, Juan Emilio, 221 Castro, Fidel, 235 Center for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, KBS), 209, 216, 217, 219, 220 Central America. See Dominican Republic

Index 301 Central Association for Japan-Brazil Trade Associations, 30 Central Japanese Association (Chūō Nihonjin kai; Japanese Peruvian Association, APJ), 129–130, 140 Central Review (Chūō kōron; magazine), 174, 196 Chile, 40–41 China: Japanese occupation of (1937), 53; Sino-Japanese wars, 38, 87, 219; trade and shipping networks, 41, 44, 54, 67, 242; wars with Japan, 38, 87. See also Manchuria; Taiwan Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 103 Chinese immigrants, 41, 103, 120n24, 123n54, 124n68, 128 Chūō kōron (Central Review; magazine), 174, 196 citizenship, Japanese, 30–31, 131 civilizational narrative, 85, 149, 176, 217–221, 256, 259 class struggles. See rural poor and working class coal miners, 23–24, 27 coffee industry, 19, 135, 145, 146, 147, 151–153, 156, 162 The Colonial Review (Shokumin; journal), 72, 173, 254 Colonization World (Shokumin sekai; journal): expansionist editorial tone in first issue, 175–179; layout and front covers, 174–175; as precedent-setting in publishing settler colonist fiction, 169, 171, 173, 185, 187–188, 254; “South America Bound” publication, 168, 169, 170, 184–185 Colorado River Land Company (CRLC), 109, 114–117, 122n37, 124n62 commerce. See trade and trade networks communism, 22, 24–25 Compañia Sud Americana de Vapores (Chile), 40–41 Conference for Overseas Colonial Migration (Kaigai Shokumin Taikai), 84 Corações sujos (film), 260 COTIA Trade Union, 29–30

cotton textile industry: Japan’s growth as rival in, 4, 28, 133, 137; and landownership ventures in US-Mexican borderlands, 109, 114–117, 124n62; Latin America as alternative supplier for Japanese raw material, 28–29, 78, 86, 134; in Peru, 29, 132–133, 134, 135–137; restrictions on Japanese imports, 134, 137; shipping networks, 50–51, 86, 114; and unionization, 29–30 CRLC (Colorado River Land Company), 109, 114–117, 122n37, 124n62 culture: and assimilation, 138, 139, 254, 256, 260; Japanese, as compatible with Argentina, 214–217; Japanese, as contribution to Argentine nation building, 217–221; Japanese, maintained in host countries, 95, 157–158, 191–192. See also book distribution networks; language barriers; Nikkei literature; racial and ethnic discourses; settler colonist fiction Dan Takuma, 24 Despradel, Alberto, 238, 241 Dezem, Rogério, 167n43 diaries, and bookstores, 203, 205 Domecq García, Manuel, 214, 215, 223n12 Dominica Japanese Federation, 237 Dominican Agrarian Institute, 237 Dominican Republic: agricultural challenges for Japanese migrants, 234–235; anti-Japanese sentiment in, 236; arrival of first Japanese migrants, 232–233; economic development program under Trujillo, 230–232; economic sanctions against, 235; and Japanese economic diplomacy, 243–246; Japanese migrants as repatriates from Manchuria, 229, 230, 246; Japanese migration program as failure, 227–228, 237–241, 247; repatriation of Japanese migrants, 236–237, 248n31 Duncan Fox & Co., 132, 138

302 Index East Asia. See specific countries and regions economy: in Dominican Republic, under Trujillo, 230–232; entwined ethnic economies in US-Mexican borderlands, 109–110; and Great Depression, 19, 51, 129, 230; of Japanese post-imperial government, 242–247; OAS economic sanctions, 235; and overpopulation, 21, 148–149; transborder business opportunities, 105. See also agriculture; shipping networks; subsidies and financial aid; trade and trade networks education. See schools 80% Law (Peru, 1932), 137 emigration policy and management: Aliança model, 72–76; consulates and associations, 110–111, 129–132; double commodity concept, 28, 35n42; downstream pattern, 20–21, 33; establishment of Ministry of Colonial Affairs, 82–84; government subsidies, 21, 25–27, 70–71, 72–74, 82–83, 87; Kaikō model, 69–71; Latin America as alternative to Anglophone America and Asia, 2–3, 4, 40, 107, 176–177; migrant/ colonist distinction, 153; models, overview, 68–69; Nantaku model, 76–80, 80, 81; postwar, 32–33, 227–228, 237–241, 247; as solution to overpopulation, 21–22, 70, 77–78, 97, 148–149, 168, 176, 228, 241, 253, 265; as solution to sociopolitical instability and protests, 22, 23–25, 27, 69–70, 148, 253; transnational statehood approach, 28–32; welfare and relief framing, 21, 26–28, 71; western Japan as target of, 22, 25–26. See also specific migration companies Endō, Tsunesaburō, 197 Endoh, Toake, 64, 146, 253 Endō Shōten, 192, 194, 197–199, 205 Enomoto Takeaki, 1, 182 ethnicity. See culture; racial and ethnic discourses European immigrants, 3, 18, 71, 128, 138, 160, 213, 219, 232

expatriation and repatriation, 20, 30–31, 131, 229, 230, 234, 236–237 Export Subsidy Law (Japan, 1930), 134 family-centered migration: emphasized by Japanese government, 20; in Kaikō promotional materials, 150, 157–158 family values, 220, 225n52 farmer-centered migration: in Aliança model of migration, 72–74; in Kaiko model of migration, 146–147, 151–159 fiction. See Nikkei literature; settler colonist fiction financial aid. See subsidies and financial aid French colonies, 193, 231 frontier and pioneer ideology, 2, 93, 96–98, 102, 123n56, 263 Fukuoka prefecture, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 Funada-Classen, Sayaka, 258, 259 funding. See subsidies and financial aid Furness Withy (Britain), 51 Furuya Bōeki Gaisha, 194 Gendai (magazine), 197, 201, 203 Gentlemen’s Agreement (1907–1908), 99, 107, 110, 168, 170, 176, 216 German Micronesia, 66, 67, 77 Gō Ryūsaburō, 115–116, 124n58 Gotō Shinpei, 131, 177, 178 government. See Japanese imperial government; Japanese post-imperial government; Japanese prefectural government; legislation; politics Great Depression, 19, 51, 129, 230 Great Kantō Earthquake (1923), 21, 71 Haiti, 231, 232 Hashimoto Umetarō, 115–116, 117, 123n56, 124n62 Hattori Toyosaburō, 201, 202 Hawai‘i: earliest Japanese migrants in, 17, 26, 33n1, 94, 96, 97; Japanese bookstores in, 193 Hiroshima prefecture, 22, 23, 27 La Hoja Amarilla (newspaper), 128 Hokkaido Daily (newspaper), 229

Index 303 Horiguchi Kuma’ichi, 211, 216 Horiuchi Shinsen, 181; “South America Bound” (“Nanbei yuki”), 168–169, 170–171, 184–185, 186; “The Torch” (“Aohi”), 186 Horizon (magazine), 198 Ie no hikari (magazine), 72 Iguape Colony, 69, 146, 152, 153, 154, 155–159 Immigration Act (US, 1924), 2, 17, 71, 117 Immigration and Business Restrictions Law (Peru, 1936), 137 Immigration and Colonization Law (Argentina, 1876), 212–213 imperialism. See Japanese colonial empire; Japanese imperial government; Japanese imperial ideologies Inagaki Manjirō, 3 indentured labor, 128 Indian (Asian) immigrants, 120n24, 124n68, 128 Inoue, Ryoki, Saga: overview, 252; on racism against Brazilians, 262; on racism against Okinawans, 254 Inoue Masaji, 80–82, 84 Instituto Cultural Argentino Japonés (Argentine-Japanese Cultural Institute), 208–209, 214–216, 220, 221–222 Ishikawa Tatsuzō, 69, 90n20; Sōbō, 51, 63, 87, 188 Ishizaka Yojiro, Wakai hito, 198 ishokumin concept (colonial-migration), 97–98 Izumi Sei’ichi, 5 Japanese Association of Huaral, 133 Japanese-Brazilian Cotton Co., 135 Japanese colonial empire: expansion into Latin America, contextual overview, 2–5; expansion into Latin America, scholarship on, 2, 5–7, 64, 172–173; peaceful expansion ethos, 66–67, 176, 179; total empire concept, 65. See also Japanese imperial government; Japanese imperial ideologies

Japanese imperial government: failure of Dominican program, 227–228, 237–241; and Latin American sovereignty, 30–32; migration state concept, 68, 88; passport regulations, 99, 101, 110; paternalistic outreach, 28–31; resistance to anti-Japanese discrimination, 19–20, 138–139; subsidization of emigration programs, 21, 25–27, 70–71, 82–83, 87; subsidization of shipping and shipbuilding, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 50, 54, 55; subsidization of trade and industrial development, 134, 136. See also emigration policy and management; Japanese imperial ideologies; shipping networks; specific departments and organizations Japanese imperial ideologies: adaptive settler colonialism concept, 263–264; civilizational narrative, 85, 149, 176, 217–221, 256, 259; double commodity concept, 28, 35n42; hakkō ichiu concept, 256; nationalism and patriotism discourse, 98, 102, 131, 171, 178, 258, 260–263; overpopulation discourse, 21–22, 70, 77–78, 97, 148–149, 168, 176, 228, 241, 253, 265; overseas development discourse, 64, 66–67, 95, 96–98, 102, 130, 149, 252 Japanese Industrial Society, 133 Japanese military: deployed against labor protesters, 23–24; former soldiers as immigrants in Latin America, 240, 252; support of migration campaigns to Asia, 85, 88 Japanese-Peruvian Commerce Treaty (Peru, 1928), 137 Japanese post-imperial government: economic concerns, 242–247; failure of Dominican program, 227–228, 237–241, 247; and overpopulation discourse, 241, 265–266 Japanese prefectural government, 25–26, 72–74 Japanese Striving Society (Nippon Rikkō Kai), 72, 87, 254

304 Index Kagawa Toyohiko, Daisan kisou no ue ni, 203 Kaigai (The Overseas Journal; journal), 72, 173, 254 Kaigai ijū (journal), 229 Kaigai Ijū Kumiai Hō (Overseas Migration Cooperative Societies Law), 74 Kaigai Ijū Kumiai Rengōkai (Federation of Overseas Migration Cooperative Societies), 74, 80–82, 83, 87 Kaigai ijū shinkō kabushiki gaisha (Overseas Emigration Promotion Company), 229, 244, 245 Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, or Kaikō (Overseas Development Company): campaigns in Asia, 87; cotton production investment, 29, 135; early promotional materials, 147–150; establishment and purpose, 68, 69–70, 145–147; government subsidies, 25, 70–71, 83; interpretation of Brazil’s immigration history and policy, 160, 163–164; promotion of Brazil’s modernization, 160–161, 162; promotion of economic mobility through coffee plantation labor, 151–153; promotion of independentfarming ideal and Iguape Colony, 69, 146, 152, 153–159; sponsorship of NBIC venture, 113; targeting rural population for emigration, 25, 148–149 Kaigai kyōkai rengōkai, or Kaikyōren (Federation of Japan Overseas Associations), 229, 236, 238–240, 246 Kaigai no Nippon (Overseas Japan; journal), 173 kaitaku, as concept, 228, 230, 244, 246 Kaiun Kokusaku (National Shipping Policy; 1937), 54, 55 Kanebo Textile Company, 78, 79, 82 Karatsu shinpō (newspaper), 212 Kasato Maru (ship), 38, 40, 47, 48–49, 65, 170, 185–186, 187, 196 Kashū mainichi (newspaper), 122n41 Kawasaki Steamship Company (Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha), 54–55, 57, 58, 61n75

KBS (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai; Center for International Cultural Relations), 209, 216, 217, 219, 220 Kodomo no sono (magazine), 196 Kodo Remmei (Federation of Imperial Doctrine), 131 Koizumi Jun’ichirō, 238 Kōkoku Imin Gaisha (Imperial Emigration Company), 47 Kokumin shinbun (newspaper), 211, 212, 224n22 Kokuritsu Kaigai Imin Shuyōjo (National Kaigai Emigrant Camp), 69 Kokuritsu Kobe Imin Shūyōjo (National Kobe Emigrant Camp), 82 Kokuryūkai (Amur River / Black Dragon Society), 121n29 Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai (KBS, Center for International Cultural Relations), 209, 216, 217, 219, 220 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste, 225n55 landownership: in Aliança model of migration, 73–74, 76, 90n41; antiJapanese legislation on, 108; in Dominican program, 229, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238; and Japanese cotton industry ventures in Latin America, 109, 114–117, 124n62, 132–133, 135; in Kaiko model of migration, 146–147, 151–159; Mexican legislation on, 122n36; in Nantaku model of migration, 76, 78, 79; in NBIC colony attempt, 111–113, 113; and poverty in western Japan, 21, 22; and sovereignty concerns in Latin America, 31–32 language barriers: and book distribution networks, 191–192; and Japaneselanguage schools, 87, 131, 157–158, 159, 165; learning host country language, 6, 97, 160–161, 191, 200; legislation against Japanese language in host countries, 87, 256 Latin America: Japanese migration to, contextual overview, 2–5; Japanese migration to, growth and challenges, 17–21, 18; Japanese migration to,

Index 305 scholarship on, 2, 5–7, 64, 172–173; sovereignty concerns, 30–32. See also specific countries League of Nations, 66, 214, 220 Lee, Catherine, 189n1 legislation: business restrictions, 137–138; immigration restrictions/exclusions, 17, 19, 67, 71, 86, 89n10, 99, 110, 117, 137–138, 161–162, 163–164, 168, 212–213, 219; landownership restrictions, 108, 111, 116–117, 121n35, 124n68; on nationality, 30–31; on political radicalization, suppression of, 24; on prefectural migration cooperative societies, 74; on racial improvement, 128, 212–213; on shipping subsidization, 38; trade restrictions, 67, 134, 137, 138 Leguía, Augusto B., 19 Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), 96 Libreria Oriental (Orientaru Shoten), 201–202 magazines and newspapers: emigration promotion in, overview, 72; major titles in Argentina, 201, 203; major titles in Brazil, 196–197; pro-Japanese propaganda in, 216–217; in USMexican borderlands, 122n41. See also book distribution networks; settler colonist fiction Malthusian expansionism, 27, 49, 97, 168, 228, 265–266. See also overpopulation discourse Manchuria: Japanese bookstores in, 193; Japanese invasion of (1931), 53, 85, 214; migration campaigns in, 30, 67, 85–86, 87, 93, 98, 229–230; repatriation of Japanese migrants from, 229, 230, 246 Mantetsu (Southern Manchuria Railway Company), 83 Matsuura Trading Company (Matsuura Bōeki-ten), 211 Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), 107 Mexico: border crossing through, 99–105, 100–101, 104, 120–121n29, 120nn23– 24, 121n35; immigration restrictions,

117; landownership in, 122n36, 124n68; pro-immigration policy of postrevolutionary, 109; promoted as ideal emigration location, 26; shipping networks, 42–45. See also US-Mexican borderlands migration companies. See specific companies migration state, as concept, 68, 88 military. See Japanese military Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 229, 230, 246 Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumu-shō), 22, 71, 82–84, 85, 271n33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 228, 236–237, 238–241, 242, 243–246, 247 Mishima Sōsen, “One House” (“Ikkenya”), 186 Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, 52, 55 Mitsukoshi Department Store, Kobe, 78 Miyasaka Kunihito, 36n63 Miyazawa, Júlio, Yawara! A travessia Nihondin-Brasil, 261, 266 Morais, Fernando, Corações sujos: A historia da Shindo Renmei, 260, 261 Morioka Emigration Company (Morioka Imin Gaisha), 70, 130, 135 Nanbei Takushoku Kabushiki Gaisha, or Nantaku (South America Colonization Company Limited), 25, 76–80, 80, 81, 83 Naomichi Ōishi, Nikutai no ikusa, 204 nationalism and patriotism: in Argentina, 217–221; in Japanese imperial ideology, 98, 102, 131, 171, 178, 258, 260–263; in Peru, 129; of Shindō Renmei, 131, 250–251, 260–263 nationality, Japanese, 30–31, 131 National Shipping Policy (Kaiun Kokusaku; 1937), 54, 55 NBIC (Nichi-Boku Industrial Corporation), 111–113, 113 Nemoto Tadashi, 1 newspapers. See magazines and newspapers New Youth (Shin seinen; journal), 172

306 Index Nichi-Boku Industrial Corporation (NBIC), 111–113, 113 Nichihaku shinbun (newspaper), 196 Nihon Imin Kyōkai (Japan Emigration Association), 21 Nihon Shuppan Bōeki Co., Ltd., 192, 195 Nikkeijin, 5–6 Nikkei literature: absence of postwar neocolonialism theme, 266–267; and identitarian evolution of Brazilian Nikkei community, 254–255, 267–268; theme of imperialistic fanaticism, 260–262, 263, 264–265; theme of resentment against Japanese government, 257–260, 261, 262–263 Nippai Gaisha, 194 Nippaku shinbun (newspaper), 197 Nippon Rikkō Kai (Japanese Striving Society), 72, 87, 254 Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha (NYK), 38, 41, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58 North-human-South material discourse (hokujin nanbutsu ron), 77 NYK (Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha), 38, 41, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58 Ogouchi Gokyō, Colonization King: A Novel of Success (Shokumin-ō: Risshi Shōsetsu), 180, 180–181 Okada, Ikumatsu (Nikumatsu), 133, 135, 136, 139 Organization of American States (OAS), 235 Orientaru Shoten (Libreria Oriental), 201–202 Ōsaka Shōsen Kabushiki Gaisha (OSK), 38, 48, 49, 50–51, 52–53, 53, 54, 55–57, 58 Ōshima Magoshirō, 245 Ōshiro Masao, 204 Ōshiro Shoten (Tairyudō), 204 OSK (Ōsaka Shōsen Kabushiki Gaisha), 38, 48, 49, 50–51, 52–53, 53, 54, 55–57, 58 overpopulation discourse, 21–22, 70, 77–78, 97, 148–149, 168, 176, 228, 241, 253, 265

Overseas Development Company. See Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Gaisha, or Kaikō Overseas Emigration Association (OEA), 25, 26 Pacific Steam Navigation Company (Britain), 40–41 Pacific War. See World War II Panama Canal, 43, 45, 49, 50–51, 57, 114–115 Panama Maru (ship), 50 Paraguay, 227, 229, 244 passport regulations, 99, 101, 110 Peru: anti-Japanese sentiment in, 19, 128, 137–139; and border crossing by Japanese contract laborers, 101, 103; cotton production in, 29, 132–133, 134, 135–137; earliest Japanese migrants in, 17, 38, 127–128, 170; Japanese associations in, 129–132; Japanese community (Nikkei) in modern-day, 139–140; limits on Japanese migration to, 117; nationalism in, 129; promoted as ideal emigration location, 26; shipping networks, 41; sovereignty concerns, 31; sugar production in, 19, 132 Peruvian Cotton Company, 135 Philippines, 54, 70, 87, 193, 242, 245 pioneer and frontier ideology, 2, 93, 96–98, 102, 123n56, 263 La Plata Hōchi (newspaper), 222, 224n22 La Plata Maru (ship), 52, 63 politics: early Japanese migrants as political activists, 96–97; radicalization, 22, 23–25, 70, 131, 250–251, 260–263; sociopolitical unrest in western Japan, 22, 23–25, 27, 69–70, 148, 253. See also Japanese imperial government; Japanese post-imperial government; Japanese prefectural government; legislation poverty. See rural poor and working class prefectural government, Japanese, 25–26, 72–74

Index 307 racial and ethnic discourses: Argentine white nation ideology, 212–213, 217, 218, 219, 225n55; assimilation concerns, 138, 139, 254, 256, 260; caricatures of Africans, 190n39; civilizational narrative, 85, 149, 176, 217–221, 256, 259; in Dominican-Haitian conflict, 231; ethnic studies scholarship, 5–6; Japanese characterization of Brazilians, 85, 262; Japanese characterization of Mexican, 112; on Japanese presence in Latin America, overview, 4–5; Okinawans discriminated against, 22, 254, 256, 262–263; racial improvement legislation, 128, 212–213. See also anti-Japanese sentiment; culture radicalization, political, 22, 23–25, 70, 131, 250–251, 260–263 repatriation and expatriation, 20, 30–31, 131, 229, 230, 234, 236–237 rice production, 148–149, 156–157, 234 Rikkōkai, 173 Rio Cape Line (Britain), 51 risshi shōsetsu (novels of success), 169, 180 rural poor and working class: and overpopulation discourse, 21, 148–149; and primogeniture system, 21, 34n11, 184; sociopolitical unrest in western Japan, 23–25, 27, 69–70, 148, 253; as target of imperial emigration policy, 22, 25–26; welfare and relief programs from imperial government, 21, 26–28, 71 Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), 38, 40, 212, 252, 255 Saga prefecture, 22 Saitō Hiroshi, 5 Saneatsu Mushanokōji, Saigō Takamoriden, 207n39 schools: colonization studies in Japanese universities, 177, 178; Japanese educational system as model for Argentina, 221; Japanese-language, 87, 131, 157–158, 159, 165; and learning host country language, 6, 97, 160–161, 191, 200

Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 87, 219 Seikō Zasshi Sha, 168, 173, 175, 181 Seishu shimpō (newspaper), 196 Setō Tatsuhiko, 240 settler colonist fiction: elevated status in Ishikawa’s Sōbō, 188; as genre, 168–169, 171, 186–187; literary precedents, 180–184; rise in popularity, 171–172; South America focus, 184–185, 186; state patronization of, 178. See also Nikkei literature settlers, as term, 10 Shakai Kyoku (Bureau of Social Affairs), 26, 70, 71. See also Ministry of Colonial Affairs Shakaishugi (Socialism; magazine), 179 Shiga Shigetaka, Nan’yō Jiji, 1–2 Shigen Kyoku (Bureau of Resources), 77 Shikiba Ryūzaburō, Hitozuma no kyōyō, 204 Shimazaki Tōson, 216; The Broken Commandment (Hakai), 182–184 Shinano Overseas Association (Shinano Kaigai Kyōkai), 73, 74, 90n40 Shindō Renmei (Way of the Subjects of the Emperor’s League), 131, 250–251, 260–263 Shin seinen (New Youth; journal), 172 Shintani Kusujirō, 109 Shinya, Violeta, 216, 224n15 Shinya and Company (Shinya y Compañía), 211 Shinya Yoshio: early career, 210–213; family, 211, 223n11, 224n15; ideological views, overview, 208–210; Japanese imperial ideologies translated into Argentine nationalism, 217–222; leadership in cultural diplomacy, 214–217; Empire of the Rising Sun: Its Extraordinary Modern Evolution, 218; The Truth on the Manchurian Incident, 214 shipbuilding industry: British dominance, 40; government subsidies, 54, 55; labor strikes, 27; technological advances, 52–53, 55

308 Index shipping networks: competitive conditions, 40–41, 51–52; East Coast route, extension of, 45–49; global scope of, 37–38, 44–45, 49, 51; government subsidies, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50; oceanic domination discourse, 55–56; reopening after World War II, 57–58; reorganization after World War I, 50–53, 53; reorganization and expansion after Great Depression, 53–55; routes to Latin America, overview, 39, 40, 58n5; value of Japan-Latin America trade, 42, 48; West Coast route, extension of, 41–45 Shōgaku ichinensei (magazine), 203 Shōjo kurabu (magazine), 196, 201 Shokumin (The Colonial Review; journal), 72, 173, 254 Shokumin Dōshikai (Colonial Migration Association), 84 Shokumin Kyōkai (Colonial Association), 1 Shokumin seka. See Colonization World Shōnen kurabu (Young Men’s Club; magazine), 190n39, 196, 201 Shufu no tomo (magazine), 196 Sieria, 176–177 Singapore, 48, 49, 51, 255 Sino-Japanese War, First (1894–1895), 38 Sino-Japanese War, Second (1937–1945), 87, 219 Sinya Yoshio, 199 slave labor, 18, 128 Socialism (Shakaishugi; magazine), 179 Society for Politics and Education (Seikyōsha), 96 sociopolitical unrest, 22, 23–25, 27, 69–70, 148, 253 South America. See Latin America; specific countries South America Colonization Company Limited (Nanbei Takushoku Kabushiki Gaisha, or Nantaku), 25, 76–80, 80, 81, 83 Southeast Asia. See specific countries and regions

Southern Manchuria Railway Company (Mantetsu), 83 Southern Sakhalin, 93, 193 South Seas region (Nan’yō), 1, 49, 77, 93, 168, 193 South Seas Society, 115–116 sovereignty, and Japan’s transnational statehood, 30–32 subsidies and financial aid: for emigration programs, 21, 25–27, 70–71, 72–74, 82–83, 87; from host governments, 71, 79, 232–233, 235, 236; relief programs, 21, 71; for shipping and shipbuilding, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 50, 54, 55; for trade and industrial development, 134, 136 Success (journal), 173 sugar industry, 19, 112, 132 The Sun (Taiyō; magazine), 174 Tagawa Suiho, New Year’s in the Tropics (Nanyō no oshōgatsu), 190n39 Tairyudō (Ōshiro Shoten), 204 Taiwan, 26, 30, 93, 98, 207n34, 243 Taiwan nichinichi shinbun (newspaper), 207n34 Taiwan Seitō (Sugar Production) Company, 112 Taiyō (The Sun; magazine), 174 Takekoshi Yosaburō, 177–178; Japanese Rule in Formosa, 177; Nangoku-ki, 177 Takumu Jihō (Colonial Ministry newsletter), 29 Takumū Shō (Ministry of Colonial Affairs), 22, 71, 82–84, 85, 271n33 Tanaka Gi’ichi, 24, 79 Tehuantepec National Railway, 43–44, 45 Teikoku Keizai Kaigi (Imperial Conference on Economy), 71 Terashima Shigenobu, 49 Texas, 183–184, 190n30 textile industry. See cotton textile industry Thailand, 193, 242 Tietê Colony, 76 TKK (Tōyō Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha), 38–40, 41–45, 46, 50, 51–52 Tokutomi Sohō, 224n22 Tokyo Club, 120–121n29

Index 309 Tokyo Nichinichi News Agency, 84 Toriumi Chujirō, 199 Tōtaku (Oriental Development Company), 83 total empire, as concept, 65 Tottori Overseas Association (Tottori Kaigai Kyōkai), 74 Tōyama Mitsuru, 26 Toyama Overseas Association (Toyama Kaigai Kyōkai), 74 Tōyō Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha (Oriental Steamship Company), 9 Tōyō Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha (TKK), 38–40, 41–45, 46, 50, 51–52 Toyo Menka of Mitsui Bussan, 135 trade and trade networks: fishing industry, 245; natural resource extraction, 76–79; railways, 43–44, 45; restrictions, 67, 134, 137, 138; and war reparations, 242, 245; wartime, 4, 46, 48, 50, 57. See also agriculture; cotton textile industry; shipping networks transborder migrants: culture of defiance as border crossers, 99–105, 104, 120–121n29, 120nn23–24, 121n35; fluid boundaries of ethnic community, 109–111; southward remigration, 107–109, 111, 119n3; unique experience of, overview, 95–96 transportation networks. See shipping networks Tres Barras Colony, 76 Trujillo Molina, Rafael, 230–233, 235–236, 240, 241, 245 Tsuda, Takeyuki, 14n24 Uchida Kakichi, 44–45 Uchida Rōan, “Year’s End” (“Kure no nijūhachi nichi”), 182 Umetani Mitsusada, 75, 76, 85 unionization, 24, 29–30 United States: anti-Chinese sentiment in, 103; anti-Japanese sentiment in, 2, 17, 67, 71, 99, 108, 116–117, 219; cotton industry, 28, 50–51, 109, 114–115, 132, 134; immigration policy, 2, 17, 67, 71, 99, 103, 110, 117, 168, 170, 176, 219;

Japanese bookstores in, 193, 194–195; Japanese migration to, 17, 96–97, 183–184, 190n30; and new world order, 66; shipping networks, 43, 44, 46, 50–52, 54–55, 57. See also US-Mexican borderlands; specific states United States and Brazil Mail Steamship Company, 46 universities, colonization studies in, 177, 178 US-Mexican borderlands: border-crossing culture of defiance in, 99–105, 104, 120–121n29, 120nn23–24, 121n35; dynamics of, overview, 95; entwined transborder ethnic economies, 109–110; fluid Japanese jurisdictional boundaries in, 110–111; Japanese landownership ventures in, 111–117, 113; southward Japanese remigration, 107–109, 111 Valle, J. R., 211, 212 Vargas, Getúlio, 19, 20, 87, 89n10, 161–164, 256 Vila Nova Colony, 74, 76 Wada Atsuhiko, 169, 182, 197, 198 Wakamiya Sadao, 50 Wako Shungorō, 72–73, 150 Washington Post (newspaper), 45 whiteness, 212–213, 217, 218, 219, 225n55 White Preference Law (Peru, 1873), 128 Women’s Kurabu (magazine), 197 Woodard, James, 162 working class. See rural poor and working class World War I (1914–1918): new world order after, 66; trade impacted by, 46, 48, 50 World War II (1939–1945): Argentine neutrality, 222, 226n70; Japanese book distribution impacted by, 195; Japanese cultural diplomacy impacted by, 221–222; Japanese war reparations, 242, 245; Shindō Renmei denial of Japanese defeat, 131, 250–251, 260–263; trade impacted by, 4, 57 W. R. Grace & Co., 132

310 Index Yamaguchi prefecture, 22 Yamamoto, Katsuzō: “Felicidade,” 267; Toda uma vida no Brasil, 266; “Virtude que sobrevive,” 266–267 Yamamoto Gonbei, 21, 25 Yamashita, Karen T., Brazil-Maru, 265 Yamashita Steamship Company (Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Gaisha), 54, 55, 61n75

Yamato Minzoku (Club of Men of the Same Race of Old Japan), 131 Yokohama Shōji Co., Ltd., 194, 195 Yomiuri hōchi shinbun (newspaper), 221–222 Yōnen kurabu (magazine), 201 Yoshikawa Eiji, Shinran, 203 Yoshio Natsuo, A Woman’s Feeling, 204 Yoshio Shinya, Pequeña contribution para la grandeza Argentina, 202