The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster, 1900–18 9781526100160

Citation preview

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster, 1900–18

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster, 1900–18 Conor Mulvagh

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Conor Mulvagh 2016 The right of Conor Mulvagh to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN  978 0 7190 9926 7  hardback First published 2016 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Out of House Publishing

For Thea

Contents

List of figures

ix

List of tables

xi

Acknowledgements

xiii

List of abbreviations

xvi

Introduction 1 The constitutional context 2 Towards the age of the tetrarchs 3 Leadership in a Liberal era, 1906–9 4 Dragging Ireland into the spotlight, pulling Ulster from the morass, 1910–14 5 Estrangements and realignments: leadership in wartime, 1914–16 6 Rising and falling: Easter 1916 to winter 1918 7 Obstruction or interrogation? The tactics of parliamentary questions 8 Unity in division: voting and whipping in the Irish party

1 6 26 64 100 118 129 165 211

Conclusion

259

Bibliography

274

Index284

Figures

7.1 Oral questions by party by year expressed as a percentage of annual totals in sample 7.2 Written questions by party by year expressed as a percentage of annual totals in sample 7.3 Nationalist oral and supplementary questions expressed as percentages of annual totals in sample 7.4 Comparing Conservative and Nationalist shares of oral and supplementary questioning in sample 7.5 Average number of oral questions per member by party (in sample), 1901–18 7.6 Average number of supplementary questions per member by party (in sample), 1901–18 7.7 Average number of questions (from sample) per member: British and Irish MPs compared 8.1 Annual average participation of all MPs in division votes, 1861–1926 8.2 Nationalist average annual likeness (Rice) with Conservative and Liberal parties compared 8.3 Nationalist likeness with all other parties on ‘Irish’ votes compared with all other divisions 8.4 Nationalist–Conservative likeness on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year 8.5 Nationalist–Labour likeness on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year 8.6 Labour cohesion on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year 8.7 Nationalist likeness to other parties on drink votes and all other divisions compared 8.8 Nationalist–Conservative likeness on drink votes compared to all other divisions

182 182 189 190 193 193 194 221 227 231 232 234 234 237 238

x

8.9 Nationalist–Conservative likeness on ‘social problems’ votes compared to all other divisions 8.10 Difference between Nationalist–Conservative likeness scores on ‘social problems’ votes and all other votes 8.11 Nationalist likeness with other parties on education and other votes for 1906

Figures

242 242 246

Tables

7.1 Comparing the average number of questions per day in the current sample with the known actual average as reported in Chester and Bowring 7.2 Total number of oral and written questions asked per year, 1901–18 7.3 Total number of questions by party (sample), 1901–18 8.1 Annual average participation rates by party 8.2 Annual average Rice scores by party 8.3 Average likeness (Rice) of Irish Nationalists to other parties in the House across all divisions in sample years 8.4 Party cohesion (Rice) on drink votes compared with all other divisions 8.5 Effect of ‘social problems’ votes on party cohesion relative to votes on other issues

172 179 180 222 223 226 236 241

Acknowledgements

Looking back, I  cannot say I  ever planned to write a book about the Irish Parliamentary Party. An interest in modern Irish history led me to seek out Professor Michael Laffan when deciding upon a topic for my undergraduate dissertation in University College Dublin at the end of 2006. I  was then a student in his long-running course of the Irish revolution and the idea of studying flying columns appealed more to my twenty-year-old self than the idea of trawling through the columns of Hansard. Probably picking up on something I had said, Michael steered me in the direction of the Eoin MacNeill papers in the UCD Archives. From there, a thesis on MacNeill, John Redmond, and the splitting of the Irish Volunteers emerged. I then developed an interest in Redmond and moved from studying paramilitarism towards parliamentarianism. After a most enjoyable year at Trinity College Dublin under the supervision of Dr William E.  Vaughan, I  decided to return to UCD and to Michael Laffan where the ideas which have culminated in this book began life as a doctoral thesis. I  would like to begin by offering my sincere thanks to my two supervisors. Professor Laffan began supervising this project in January 2009. In summer 2010, Michael retired and Professor Diarmaid Ferriter took over my supervision. I could not have asked for two better or more pleasant mentors. The seamless transition in supervision that occurred between them is a testament to the professionalism of two scholars truly committed to nurturing postgraduate research. For the financial assistance given by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences – now the Irish Research Council – I would like to express my sincere thanks. Without this support, none of what followed would have been possible. Since completing the thesis from which the present work originated, my colleagues, students, and the friendly community of historians in Ireland, Britain, and beyond have shared their insights and offered new perspectives which have enhanced the quality of this book in innumerable ways.

xiv

Acknowledgements

I would like to pay particular tribute to those who have generously read and commented on different drafts and chapters of the present work. Eugenio Biagini, Sarah Campbell, Brian Casey, John Coakley, Catherine Cox, Peter Costello, Mary Daly, William Mulligan, Tom Murray, Colin Reid, Susannah Riordan, as well as the readers and the editorial team at Manchester University Press. Each of them has contributed immeasurably to making this a better book. Whatever errors and omissions remain are entirely of my own doing. I would like to offer my special thanks to the past and present members of the School of History at UCD and the School of History at TCD. Furthermore, I would like to express my appreciation to those have helped in so many different ways while I researched and wrote this book: Tom Bartlett, Charles Benson, John Borgonovo, Frank Boucher-Hayes, Maeve Casserly, Marie Coleman, Conan Connolly, Mike Cronin, Catriona Crowe, Amanda Cunningham, Sharae Deckard, Tom Desmond, Gabriel Doherty, Anne Dolan, Margaret Doyle, Mark Duncan, Myles Dungan, Bryan Fanning, Mel Farrell, Orla Feely, Suzanne Forbes, Roy Foster, Yvonne Galligan, Darragh Gannon, Tom Garvin, Brian Hanley, Dermot Hayes-McCoy, Seamus Helferty, Caitlín Higgins Ní Chinnéide, Brian Hughes, Daniel Jackson, Neil Johnson, Lar Joye, Hugh Kennedy, Michael Kennedy, Eoin Kinsella, Victor Lang, Felix Larkin, Mike Liffey, Aisling Lockhart, Gerard Lyne, Charles Lysaght, Maurice Manning, Doireann Markham, Robert Marshall, Patrick Maume, John McCafferty, Donal McCartney, James McConnel, Fearghal McGarry, Mark McKenna, Dermot Meleady, Thomas Mohr, Ronnie Moore, Eve Morrisson, Ed Mulhall, Gearoid Mulvihill, Patrick Murphy, William Murphy, Conor Neylan, the late Kevin B.  Nowlan, Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin, Donal Ó Luanaigh, Martin O’Donoghue, John O’Donovan, John O’Dowd, Colm O’Flaherty, Colette O’Flaherty, Eunan O’Halpin, Declan O’Keffee, Caroline O’Kelly, Kate O’Malley, Cian O’Rahilly, Jane Ohlmeyer, Josef Olsen, Senia Pašeta, Yetti Redmond, Paul Rouse, Stefanie Rousseau, Brian Schoen, Alan Smyth, Pauric Travers, Stuart Ward, Howard Welch, and Michael Wheatley. As to the libraries and archives in which the research for this book was conducted, I  would like to thank all the staff at the National Library of Ireland, University College Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, Clongowes Wood College Archive, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, the British Library, Parliamentary Archives (House of Lords), and the Nuffield College and Bodleian Libraries (Oxford). To my parents, Daragh and Deirdre; my sisters Clíona and Aoife; and my aunt Mary, I thank them for their patience, understanding, and heartfelt encouragement. Last but not least, I would like to thank Thea

Acknowledgements

xv

Tilley, to whom this book is dedicated, for her friendship, her love, and her unfailing support at every stage of this journey. In a final note, I  wish to pay tribute to my maternal grandmother. Monica Henchy (née Leahy) who was a dedicated scholar, linguist, and librarian. Along with her husband Patrick, she instilled in me a deep interest in the past from an early age. Although she passed away in 2014, much of what she taught and recounted to me echoes through this book. She was a tenant of the former barracks at Aughavanagh, county Wicklow between 1933 and 1937. Aughavanagh has had a fascinating history. It was built as one of five barracks spanning the length of the military road, a route of access into the impenetrable Wicklow hills which facilitated the suppression of Michael Dwyer and the remnant of the 1798 and 1803 Rebellions. Later it became a constabulary outpost, then the shooting lodge of the Parnells and, ‘as part of his inheritance from “the Chief” ’, it finally came into the hands of John Redmond, who came increasingly to use it as his principal residence in Ireland.1 Aughavanagh has always loomed large in my grandmother’s recollections of childhood. When growing up, Redmond, Parnell, and Aughavanagh came up frequently, explained to me in varying tones of reverence and revisionism which started me on a journey to find out my own answers to my own questions. Note 1 See Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond’s Last Years (London, 1919), pp. 36–8.

newgenprepdf

Abbreviations

ABP Augustine Birrell papers, BO AFIL All-for-Ireland League AJBP Arthur J. Balfour papers, BL AOH Ancient Order of Hibernians BHP Bulmer Hobson papers, NLI BL British Library, Euston Road, London BLP Andrew Bonar Law papers, PA BO Bodleian Library, Broad Street, Oxford DIB Dictionary of Irish Biography DP John Dillon papers, TCD EBP Edward Blake papers, ODPRA, microfilm, NLI HP T. M. Healy papers, UCDLA IPP Irish Parliamentary Party JBP James Bryce papers, NLI JJP Jeremiah Jordan papers, PRONI LGP David Lloyd George papers, PA MDP Antony Patrick MacDonnell papers, BO NLI National Library of Ireland, Kildare Street, Dublin NP Matthew Nathan papers, BO ODPRA Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives PA Parliamentary Archives, House of Lords, Westminster, London PRONI The Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Titanic Boulevard, Belfast RIA Royal Irish Academy, Dawson Street, Dublin RP John Redmond papers, NLI TCD Department of Manuscripts, Trinity College Dublin TD Teachta Dála: member of Dáil Éireann, the lower house of the Irish parliament UCDA University College Dublin Archives, Belfield Campus, Dublin UIL United Irish League UILGB United Irish League of Great Britain

Introduction

The key to understanding both the emergence of independent Ireland and the shape of modern Irish politics lies in the history of the Home Rule movement. This book examines the leadership and collective behaviour of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), a group of roughly eighty pledge-bound Irish Nationalist MPs, between 1900 and 1918. These years represent the final phase of a longer struggle by Irish constitutional nationalists stretching back to 1870. Home Rule MPs attended Westminster with the aim of leaving it. Their two unifying policies were land reform and the establishment of an Irish legislature – something which had not existed in Ireland since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Outside the issues of land and Home Rule, the Irish party was a green umbrella under which nationalists of many hues found shelter. Within the broad church of Irish nationalism were distillers and teetotallers, industrialists and exponents of workers’ rights, landlords and tenants, Catholics and Protestants, and proponents and opponents of female suffrage. The chairman of this grand alliance in the period under consideration was John Redmond. Redmond was a compromise candidate for the party’s leadership when supporters and detractors of Redmond’s predecessor, Charles Stewart Parnell, finally put aside their differences in 1900 after a decade of division.1 However, reunification was definitely a process rather than a single event. The egos cultivated during the 1890s and the divisions established between Parnell’s former lieutenants lay at the heart of much of the factionalism that persisted into the twentieth century among Irish constitutional nationalists. Like Parnell, one of Redmond’s successes was that he managed to maintain a relatively stable union over such a long period of time among his own forces. One of the principal aims of this work is to show that Redmond did not achieve this on his own. It examines the role played by those who were closest to Redmond in his party, arguing that a small oligarchy and not a solitary chairman was responsible both for the successes and

2

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

failures of the Irish party in the years under consideration. Identifying and charting the evolution of this oligarchy is one aim of this book, the other is to examine the collective behaviour of the IPP at Westminster. If the party ostensibly rested on two pillars of land reform and the repatriation of an Irish legislature, did it still manage to have policies, unintentionally or otherwise, on the other big questions of the day that came before the 670 assembled MPs of the imperial House of Commons at Westminster? Rather than assessing the work of the IPP through an examination of MPs’ self-perception, this study lets the actions of MPs speak for themselves. Through empirical analysis of changes in the party’s parliamentary behaviour – in division voting and parliamentary questions – light is shed on the nature of Nationalist participation in parliament. The discipline, cohesion, and vitality of the Irish party at Westminster are universally acknowledged as having been impressive. Here, this is put in hard figures. Analysis of division voting shows how rhetoric translated into action at Westminster. Changing levels of voting activity and alignment are used to explain how party policy evolved during the early twentieth century. For four decades, Home Rule dominated the Irish political landscape. At intervals, Home Rule also managed to dominate British political discourse, most notably when Home Rule bills came before parliament in 1886, 1893, and 1912–14.2 The IPP was not merely a momentary anomaly in the House of Commons. It constituted the most powerful ‘third party’ in the history of British politics until the emergence of Scottish nationalism. In addition, Irish nationalist MPs in this era represented the most serious internal threat to the existence of United Kingdom ever to have existed. While in more recent times, the Scottish National Party has hoisted a question mark over the future of England’s union with Scotland, Irish nationalist MPs successfully conducted a campaign for the legislative recognition of their demand of an Irish Home Rule parliament for nearly half a century. In examining the final phase of this chronology, encompassing the apparent triumph and subsequent collapse of the movement, the party is found at its most disciplined and also at its most distressed. Fresh research has shown how the IPP interacted with the British political parties of the day. It debunks any archaic claim of Irish exceptionalism by showing how similar both Home Rulers and Irish Unionists were to their British colleagues in certain aspects of their behaviour at Westminster. In the Irish party, discipline was strictly enforced in parliament and a deeply hierarchical system was established which extended from the chair of the parliamentary party right down to the grassroots.

Introduction

3

Between parliament and constituency, an elaborate system of clientelism and patronage developed. Historians such as Michael Wheatley and James McConnel have made significant advances in understanding the operation of patronage between parliament and parish in the closing years of the Irish party’s history.3 While Wheatley focuses specifically on the local, McConnel provides fresh insight into the relationship between the MP and his constituents as well as examining some of the groups that emerged as enemies and contenders to the Irish party in this period. Where this study differs from Wheatley and McConnel is that, here, the party is considered in the imperial House of Commons rather than in its Irish context. In so doing, it builds upon both these works, tackling some of the same questions, especially on the decline of the party, but it considers these questions through an examination of the top of the party rather than approaching them from below. If the aim here is to examine the parliamentary party as a machine, it is important to consider its nerve centre: its leadership. Like Gladstone for the British Liberals, Parnell had been a charismatic chief. His cult of leadership and the increasingly unilateral manner in which he steered Irish party policy has led some to paint this personality-driven style of leadership onto Parnell’s successors:  the leaders of nationalist Ireland in the 1890s and onwards into the early twentieth century. When he took over leadership of the reunited party in 1900, John Redmond certainly did not resemble his erstwhile hero and mentor Parnell either in his power or in his style of leadership. Political parties are never truly autocracies. Even when the leader is highly charismatic  – as Parnell and Gladstone both were  – the party leader is invariably supported, and sometimes even controlled, by a small team of advisers and enforcers. In conjunction with their titular leader, this group constitutes an oligarchy. The inner circle may often be unappointed and unofficial, as is the case here. The power and legitimacy of these advisers derives solely from their leader. This book charts the emergence, work, and breakup of just such a group during the chairmanship of John Redmond up until his death in March 1918. Emphasising that control of the party rested collectively with this oligarchy and not in Redmond’s hands alone, it will be shown how Redmond ultimately relinquished the leadership and left it to his colleagues to decide which of them would take his place just days before his unforeseen death. Overall, it has been found that divisions and discord between the members of this inner circle could have a stifling impact upon their ability to negotiate effectively with government and to shape party policy.

4

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

When functioning harmoniously, the inner leadership proved capable of impressive feats of coordinated action, leveraging the strengths of its membership to engineer solutions that were acceptable to the often discordant interests of their electorate and those with whom they were bartering in the sphere of British high politics. If the party leader is not quite as hegemonic as he or she is sometimes portrayed, then why is it that, in salvaging constitutional nationalist figures from the scrapheap of Irish collective memory, it appears that only John Redmond has fully been rehabilitated? While historians have for decades been doing the painstaking work of augmenting scholarly literature with biographies of other Irish MPs from this period, it appears that only Redmond has slowly become a household name. Even then, his revived fame is largely born out of his close association with recruitment and Ireland’s contribution to the war effort from 1914 onwards. One possible cause for this is the fact that the contemporary press typically focused on personalities. Like Parnell, Redmond became the popular embodiment of the movement over which he presided. This was especially true once the Home Rule crisis of 1912–14 broke and cartoonists and columnists began to portray John Redmond and Edward Carson as the very personifications of their irreconcilably opposed movements.4 This book not only endeavours to question the sometimes simplified image of John Redmond, it also puts the received Redmond-centred image of the IPP after 1900 under the microscope. Central to this is a fresh examination of the part played by John Dillon:  leader of the anti-Parnellite majority from 1896 and arguably the most important figure in post-Parnellite constitutional nationalism. In the reunited party after 1900, Dillon did not take up the chairmanship but he did retain his power. The story of the party after 1900 is one in which Dillon worked to purge his old opponents from the party and where he and Redmond searched for a model whereby they could work harmoniously. The new chairman relied heavily on Dillon’s popularity and his knowledge of every corner of nationalist Ireland, especially in the early years. Redmond, for his part, proved to be a more palatable face for the movement in Britain where his image and modus operandi fitted better than Dillon’s with politicians and public alike. The centenaries of Ireland’s independence struggle have brought with them an upsurge in new writings on the history of this period. Debates about constitutional nationalism have reignited. However, the resurfacing of these issues appears to have as much to do with the aftermath of the Northern Irish peace process as it does with commemoration. In the present day, the achievement of the Home Rule movement is commonly

Introduction

5

interpreted as a triumph for constitutional and non-violent methods despite the haemorrhaging of support away from Home Rule in the closing years of the First World War. By contrast, revolutionary Irish republicanism is seen to have only retrospectively received a popular mandate in the general election of November 1918. This oversimplified dichotomy between ‘moderate’ and ‘advanced’ nationalists distorts the reality of Home Rule politics before the 1916 Rising. Constitutionalism was not an ideology, it was a tactic. Home Rulers effectively fused constitutionalism with illegal and extra-parliamentary agitation during the land war in the 1880s. They also blurred the lines of constitutionalism when they took control of the paramilitary Irish Volunteer Force in the summer of 1914. Just as Home Rulers harnessed the power of the threat of violence, so too did advanced nationalists, and eventually republicans, ultimately turn to constitutional methods when violence ceased to suit their purposes at different points in the 1920s. Rather than being a party of tolerance and moderation, elements of the Irish party harboured a reverence for Fenianism and others exhibited a growing sense of Catholic triumphalism which occasionally manifested itself as sectarianism.5 At a parliamentary level, the Machiavellianism, oligarchical tendencies, and regimented discipline that made the Irish party so effective are too often underplayed and the party’s demise is instead blamed on the generational divide that separated Sinn Féiners from Home Rulers. However, before skipping to the end of this period and the origins of Ireland’s independence struggle, it stands to examine the origins of the discipline and leadership in the movement which reconstituted itself under Redmond’s chairmanship in the spring of 1900. Notes 1 Philip Bull, ‘The United Irish League and the re-union of the Irish Parliamentary Party, 1898–1900’, I.H.S., xxvi, no. 101 (May 1988), pp. 51–78. 2 Alan Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782–1992 (Dublin, 1994). 3 Michael Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish Party, Provincial Ireland 1910–1916 (Oxford, 2005)  and James McConnel, The Irish Parliamentary Party and the Third Home Rule Crisis (Dublin, 2013). 4 Redmond collected a scrapbook of caricatures of himself and his contemporaries in which he can be found depicted as everything from a hedgehog to a tiger (NLI, RP, MS 7441). 5 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp.  94–115 and Paul Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question:  Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism, 1912–16 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 56–9.

1 The constitutional context

I … pledge myself that in the event of my election to parliament I will sit, act and vote with the Irish Parliamentary Party and if … I have not fulfilled the above pledge I hereby undertake forthwith to resign my seat.1

In August 1884, at a candidate selection convention in Dungarvan, tradition holds that the Home Rule MP T.M. Healy drew up a pledge that would bind together Irish Nationalist members elected to the House of Commons. In 1885, the wording was improved as reflected in the form above and it became the ‘standard test’ for Nationalists at all elections.2 The parliamentary discipline which the pledge engendered, combined with the charismatic and autocratic leadership of ‘the Chief’, Charles Stewart Parnell, made the party a force to be reckoned with in the House of Commons.3 The force of the party pledge was ‘moral rather than quasi-legal’. Nonetheless, it transformed a loose and voluntary party structure into an association based on rigid discipline. Just as the French political scientist Maurice Duverger observed how, during the nineteenth century, the European working class realised that ‘freedom was a collective conquest’,4 so too in Ireland was the moderate, patrician outlook of the old Home Rule movement purged and replaced when a broader-based and more radically inclined generation took power in the 1880s.5 Victorian Irish Nationalism: a benchmark for radicalism Even before the pledge had been devised, the more advanced section of the Home Rule party had succeeded in bringing parliament to a standstill through the tactic of obstructionism. Piloted by Joseph Gillis Biggar, Home Rule MP for Cavan, the tactic proved so successful that the entire business of the Empire was virtually ground to a halt at the will of the Irish party in the late 1870s.6 From the mid-1870s through to the 1880s, the procedures of the House of Commons had to be drastically revised and the liberties of the individual member significantly curtailed in

The constitutional context

7

order to extract the House of Commons from the morass into which it had been dragged by Nationalist filibustering.7 The high-point of Irish nationalist achievement came in 1886 when Parnell’s party, holding the balance of power between the Tories and the Liberals in the Commons, extracted from Prime Minister William E. Gladstone the promise of a bill to provide for the home government of Ireland in exchange for support for his Liberal government. While the introduction of this, the first Home Rule Bill, resulted in the splitting of the Liberal party and the consequent defeat of the bill in the Commons, concessions had been extracted, precedents had been set, and the efficacy of Irish Nationalist involvement in parliament had been vindicated. For four years, a peaceful co-existence prevailed between the Liberals and the Irish party. In this ‘union of hearts’,8 Frank Callanan describes the unique relationship that prevailed between Irish Nationalism and British Liberalism as one in which ‘Gladstone was acclaimed in Ireland and Parnell lionised by English Liberals’.9 However, the free and uncomplicated union that followed the defeat of the first Home Rule Bill ended abruptly in 1890 when Gladstone insisted that Parnell could not remain as chairman of the Irish party following his identification as co-respondent in the O’Shea divorce case. Divisions surfaced, not merely on a moral question, but also on the deeply political question of the autonomy of parliamentary Nationalism from the Liberal party.10 The debacle ended with the schism of the IPP. On 6 December 1890, after days of intense and bitter debate, forty-four members of the parliamentary party, led by Justin McCarthy, walked out of Committee Room 15, leaving Parnell and his twenty-seven loyalists in their wake.11 This event marked the beginning of a decade-long split that would see factions form within factions and the formerly united nationalist vote hopelessly split at the polls. Despite the internal divisions within parliamentary Nationalism, a favourable electoral equilibrium in the general election of 1892 led to the introduction of a second Home Rule Bill the following February.12 However, this time, despite passing through the House of Commons, the bill was firmly rejected by the House of Lords which enjoyed a veto on legislation up to 1911. By the end of the 1890s, Irish constitutional nationalism was split four ways. On the anti-Parnellite side, divisions existed between Healyites and McCarthyites/Dillonites and, among those keeping the flame of Parnellism burning, a fissure eventually emerged between the followers of T.C. Harrington and John Redmond. In 1898, William O’Brien went outside of these lines of demarcation to found the United Irish League (UIL): a grassroots, agrarian movement which originated in the west of

8

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Ireland but which rapidly mushroomed into a nationwide phenomenon. The league quickly turned its attention beyond the purely agrarian concerns of the west and set its efforts towards the restoration of ‘unity, organisation and direction to the politics of nationalist Ireland’.13 Fearing they would be universally swept away by the popular momentum generated by the UIL, the factions of the disunited Irish party rapidly began to work towards healing the split. On 1 February 1900, the party that had divided in Committee Room 15 stood in 1890 united once again with John Redmond, MP for Waterford city and leader of the Parnellite minority, as their new chairman. A compromise candidate in a party still governed by Healy’s original pledge, Redmond was to hold this post for eighteen years until his death in March 1918. Leadership and discipline The IPP, as a regional entity that attended parliament at Westminster with the expressed purpose of securing for Ireland the return of the legislative powers lost at the Act of Union, was a body in which discipline was highly prized and hierarchy was culturally engrained. Superficially, the Irish party stood united after 1900 but, in reality, complex undercurrents of differing forms of ideology and identity flowed under the unifying umbrella of constitutional nationalism. The aim of the present study is not to chart the sagas of internal dissidence that intermittently flared up among Irish constitutional nationalists from 1900 onwards. This has been done extensively in the cases of the most prominent and outspoken mavericks in the constitutional nationalist movement: T.M. Healy, William O’Brien, Laurence Ginnell, and early Sinn Féiners centring on C.J. Dolan.14 Instead, the intention here is to examine how, from the time of the Irish party’s reunification in 1900, Irish Nationalists did in fact ‘sit, act and vote’ together at Westminster. How cohesive were Irish Nationalists as a body in Westminster and, furthermore, how harmonious were the outlooks, ideologies, and tactical preferences of its leadership? Although the reunited IPP saw several figures taking a role in policy steering in its early years, it will be especially important to examine the evolving relationships that existed between the four MPs – John Redmond; John Dillon; Joseph Devlin; and T.P. O’Connor – who would eventually exercise near total control over party policy. Personality, and clashes between these individuals, had a strong impact upon the direction and efficacy of party policy. Furthermore, the ideological and tactical divide between ‘conflict and conciliation’ – to borrow the title of

The constitutional context

9

Paul Bew’s examination of moderates and agitators within Irish nationalism – endured into the twentieth century.15 Conflict and conciliation became a line of demarcation between the two most influential figures within the party’s leadership:  John Redmond and John Dillon. Redmond was a compromiser by nature. By contrast, John Dillon was self-consciously and unapologetically a hardliner, instinctively and temperamentally disinclined to find or occupy the middle ground. The history of Anglo-Irish relations from the 1922 treaty to the Good Friday Agreement and beyond has been marked by the divergence between these two philosophies within Irish camps. In the period under consideration here, it was no less relevant. The antagonistic relationship between compromise and ‘no surrender’ shaped the direction of official Nationalist policy in these years. Depending on the balance of power between Dillon and Redmond, one or other philosophy won out, dictating how the party would plot its course. Parliamentary questions In seeking to re-evaluate the IPP, different approaches to answering the same questions must be adopted. In analysing the party’s evolving policies and their effectiveness, an examination of leadership is essential. However, the collective behaviour of the party within parliament cannot be judged solely on rhetoric and intentions. To this end, a detailed quantitative study of the entire party’s activity and parliamentary contribution will complement the study of leadership here. This is essential in arriving at a more concrete and empirically grounded picture of how the IPP actually sat, acted, and voted while at Westminster. This does not profess to be a complete or definitive examination of the behaviour of the parliamentary party. Two important and under-researched aspects of the Irish Nationalist experience at Westminster have been singled out; namely parliamentary questions and division voting. The mere enumeration of questions and votes can never be a definitive solution to the complex and multi-faceted subject of Irish Nationalist behaviour in the House of Commons. Quantitative methods only go so far and, at best, they offer a descriptive introduction to sets of sources that are too large to read and analyse in the traditional historical sense. However, in the case of the Irish party, such is the neglect of quantitative approaches to the subject, that much can be added to the current theories on the party through the quantitative contextualisation of findings that, until now, have only been substantiated through traditional archival-historical methods.

10

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Only two scholars have, to date, undertaken sustained quantitative investigations into the collective behaviour of Irish Nationalist MPs at Westminster, namely James McConnel and Mel Cousins. Their studies stand as examples to historians of what can be achieved by these methods. As much as they have shed new light on aspects of the work of the IPP at Westminster, they have raised many new questions, some of which will be tackled here.16 In studying parliamentary questions, some interesting trends have been charted. The most important of these has been the finding that Irish Nationalists became less ‘radical’ and less active at Question Time between 1901 and 1915. It will be argued that questions were an indicator of the general behavioural patterns of the party, therefore suggesting that the party became more generally docile in parliament as time went on. It might be assumed that the party adopted one level of activity under Conservative government (up to 1905)  and a steady, less obstreperous, mode of representation in the House when their traditional allies, the Liberal party, were in government (December 1905  – May 1915). However, the data presented here suggests that this was not the case. Instead, the level of Nationalist activity at Question Time indicates a fairly consistent downward trend from 1901 up to 1915. Using the level of parliamentary questions as a ‘barometer of dissent’, this will be taken as an indicator of the growing docility, lack of radicalism and decreasing levels of engagement with the business of the House of Commons among Irish Nationalists more generally. As such, it feeds into the wider literature on the decline of the party, best typified by Michael Wheatley’s grassroots study: Nationalism and the Irish Party, Provincial Ireland 1910–1916.17 Wheatley’s study charts the clear trajectory of decline in the party apparatus at local level in the period up to the Rising but concludes that the party was ‘on balance far more representative than rotten’.18 However, Wheatley only brings his analysis up to 1916. The period between the Rising and the 1918 general election are, naturally, essential to understanding the collapse of constitutional nationalism. After the Rising, it will be shown that the party had not lost its ability to show its teeth in parliament. Crucially, it was a reinvigorated and fiery John Dillon rather than John Redmond who led the charge. By bringing analysis up to 1918, what has been identified in this study is that Nationalist MPs rapidly re-radicalised, returning from the lowest ebb of 1914–15, to participate extremely actively at Westminster following the Rising. Admittedly, this was a period in which the situation in Ireland necessitated extensive interrogation of the government but the

The constitutional context

11

level of Irish questioning in that year remained high throughout and not simply in the direct aftermath of the Rising. This peak in 1916 was followed by a return to declining levels of Nationalist questioning up until the obliteration of the IPP in the general election of December 1918. This period of withdrawal will be examined in further detail both through the correspondence of the leadership and by sampling the level of questions. In this way, varying perspectives on what was happening both in private and in the public eye can be presented at this decisive juncture in the metamorphosis of sympathy from constitutional nationalism to republican separatism among the majority of the Irish electorate.19 In assessing how Nationalists voted in House of Commons divisions, a quantitative approach similar to that used to assess parliamentary questions will be employed but different research questions will be pursued. Here, the focus will be on testing the rates of participation and the levels of internal agreement within the Irish Nationalist group in comparison to the other parties sitting in parliament in this period. In addition, the similarity between the voting patterns of Irish Nationalists and other parties will be tested and tracked at five yearly intervals. The present study uses data collected by Valerie Cromwell which covers every division taken during the parliamentary sessions of 1861 to 1926 at five-yearly intervals.20 While an extensive literature exists on voting behaviour in the House of Commons regarding other parties and other time periods, only one other study has ever subjected the Irish party’s voting record to quantitative analysis, and this was for the period from 1880 to 1890.21 In light of this, the present study bridges a gap in the literature. By looking at specific issues, it has been possible to identify subjects upon which the Irish party was more closely aligned to the Conservative party than was otherwise the case. The Conservative party stood as the traditional enemy of Irish nationalism whereas, even before the ‘union of hearts’, the Liberals identified closely with both Irish constitutional nationalism and the Irish question. Supporting this, historian Eugenio Biagini has argued that Irish Home Rule was neither incompatible with, nor peripheral to, the most fundamental principles of Liberalism. He draws a clear line of continuity between the principles of Chartism and British engagement with the question of Irish Home Rule.22 Beginning with the radical section of the party, Biagini argues that ‘[their] understanding of freedom was rooted in … “neo-roman” liberty’.23 For Liberal radicals, coercion in Ireland ‘reinforced the view that self-government was liberty’.24 Issues that exacerbated the divide between the Irish and Conservative parties have also been identified and extracted. Although not a definitive list of polarising issues between these two groups, these

12

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

case studies represent a starting point in identifying the issues that either strengthened or weakened the traditional culture of animosity between the Nationalist and Conservative factions in the Commons. Situating the Irish party on the British political spectrum Apart from charting the evolution of policy and behaviour in the Irish party, an aim of the present work has been to situate the IPP on the British political spectrum, thereby writing it firmly into the British constitutional narrative. The idea of Irish exceptionalism and the view that the Irish party was a regional entity which did not fit neatly into the divide between British Conservativism and British Liberalism is one of the broader concepts which this study aims to redress. Although less prevalent in recent Irish historiography, this is something which crops up not infrequently in older histories of Westminster politics written from the British perspective. One of the starkest examples of this, reflecting an ill-conceived view of the work of Irish representatives at Westminster that can only have been cultivated from a reading of Punch and other contemporary diatribes, comes from Henry Fairlie, a noted post-war British journalist and political commentator. Writing in the late 1960s, just after a flourishing of writings by Irish historians which rehabilitated the place of the Irish party in British politics, Fairlie dismissed the Irish party as a crowd of interlopers and an anomaly in what he saw as an otherwise rigid two-party system.25 The limits of Fairlie’s knowledge of the IPP were underlined in his assertion that [a]‌third party cannot survive simply on ‘a type of support concentrated in particular constituencies’ … it is stretching the argument too far to regard the Irish Nationalists as a parliamentary party in any sense of the term which can be given any meaning. They were a guerrilla party, with revolutionary, and not parliamentary or constitutional, objectives. They could hold their support in the constituencies of Southern Ireland, not because they could draw ‘on a type of support concentrated in particular constituencies’, but because Southern Ireland was in a revolutionary situation, and its constituencies were voting for revolutionary, and not political, objectives.26

Fairlie’s is a severe example. It sees only Fenians and dynamiters carrying the torch of Irish nationalist thought between 1867 and 1916. Fairlie’s notion of the Irish party echoes that of the British officers who were deployed to Ireland after the 1918 armistice. David Fitzpatrick quotes one of them who, in 1923, recollected that ‘I think I  regarded all civilians as “shinners”, and I  never had any dealings with any of them’.27 The misrepresentation of nationalist Ireland and its members of

The constitutional context

13

parliament, however, is not the preserve of prejudiced political scientists and over-cautious British army officers. Even in otherwise strong surveys of twentieth-century Britain such as L.C.B. Seaman’s Post-Victorian Britain, the dichotomy between constitutional and advanced nationalist ideologies is oversimplified. Here, the radicalism and obstreperousness that often surfaced in the Irish party has been suppressed and, in its place, Redmond’s supporters are described as having ‘behaved as patriotic members of the United Kingdom’. This ignores the reluctance for enlistment in Ireland during the war and, prior to that, the importation of arms by supposedly constitutional nationalists as they threatened to enforce their ideology with arms if Ulster resisted Home Rule.28 Further painting a polarised picture of Irish politics, the moderate ‘dual monarchist’ origins of Griffith’s Sinn Féin are similarly written out of Seaman’s narrative and, instead, the opponents of Redmondism are described as ‘a fanatical minority dominated by Sinn Féin, a group founded by Arthur Griffith in 1904’.29 Seaman’s treatment is a notable example of the poorly researched and distorted way in which the Irish question has been written into dated – but still consulted – writings in British history. In the late Victorian context, Biagini echoes the idea that the history of Ireland and the Irish question must be subjected to greater comparison and contextualisation, arguing that, within the broader European context, ‘the Irish party was less “peculiar” than [Conor] Cruise O’Brien has argued’.30 Biagini’s aim is not simply to situate the Irish experience within the narrative of modern European history. He has likewise sought to re-write Ireland into the story of evolving British political discourse between 1876 and 1906.31 While the present study does not extend to the wider European context, a concerted effort has been made to explain the place of Irish Nationalist representation in the context of Westminster as a forum of British and imperial affairs. In rehabilitating and understanding the place of Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, the idea of trying to situate the party on a ‘left–right’ spectrum of early twentieth-century British politics is both anachronistic and ill-suited. The notion of ‘the Left’ was still an emerging concept in British politics32 and the roots of the divide between the Liberals and the Conservatives pre-date any such typology.33 Instead, the model of cleavage structures first outlined by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967 has been given preference.34 The Lipset and Rokkan model essentially works by determining the policy stances of a party on a range of broad and polarising questions or cleavages. Combined, these give an overlapping picture indicating relative party alignment. Four typical cleavages identified by

14

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Lipset and Rokkan are centre–periphery, church–state, land–industry, and owner–worker.35 When various policy positions are combined, the points that unite and divide different parties can be identified and, in this way, a more detailed picture of activity can be painted. Additional cleavages have been recognised in more recent history such as those between materialism and post-materialism and open and closed societies. Daniele Caramani points out that not all cleavages exist in all countries.36 While it has not been possible to extract any data regarding the stance of Irish Nationalists on either the land–industry or the owner–worker cleavages, more positive findings have emerged regarding the questions of both church–state and centre–periphery. The drink question, which was an emotive and polarising issue at the time, will be taken as a topic indicative of stances on the wider church–state cleavage. Since the Victorian era, temperance, Sunday closing campaigns, and the laws regulating or taxing alcohol consumption were heavily associated with non-conformist Protestantism. In light of this, votes taken in parliament on the drink question often saw members split on religious and ideological lines rather than dividing according to party. Drink has thus been identified as an important starting point for examining the church–state cleavage as part of the commitment to situate Irish Nationalism using the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model in the present study. Expanding on this, and in response to the focus of Mel Cousins’ article on the Irish party’s voting habits on social issues in the 1880s,37 the present study examines all votes classed as ‘social problems’ in Cromwell’s classification system for division votes. While the church–state element of this enquiry is necessarily less clear-cut, it has been useful to go beyond the few instances of votes on the drink issue to get a more rounded picture on the context and evolution of Irish Nationalist positioning on ‘social problems’ votes in the early twentieth century. Likewise, education votes have been examined and a clear church–state delineation can also be seen on this issue. Another category that has been isolated for separate analysis in the present work is questions relating to ‘Ireland’, in order to examine a centre–periphery issue within parliament. However, it must be noted that the Irish question had many more dimensions to it than simply periphery-versus-centre. When the Irish question was brought up in parliament, identity, creed, and ideology all muddied the waters. Thus, while analysis of votes on Ireland will be helpful in furthering understandings of Irish Nationalist alignment on the centre–periphery cleavage, if a different party had been under the microscope, the simple distinction between centre and periphery might have been better served by an examination of

The constitutional context

15

votes relating to rural Scotland or the industrialised north of England in comparison to London. These caveats will thus have to be borne in mind. Linking together the archival and the quantitative strands of this study are the narratives of policy, discipline, and decline. External pressures and crises – from the election of a sympathetic but inactive Liberal majority in 1906 to the outbreak of an armed insurrection in Dublin a decade later – all left indelible marks on the policies and the behaviour of the party at Westminster. The exploration of leadership will outline the shape of party policy and the changes in direction this took in reaction to external forces. The studies of parliamentary questions and division voting will provide a sketch of the reality of party behaviour. By judging the gap between policy and practice, the efficacy of leadership and the relative dominance of different personalities within this leadership can be better understood. Given that policy can be said to have been driven from the top down in this hierarchical and highly disciplined party, this two-pronged approach enables an understanding of the Irish party as a whole – not simply its top or base, but its collective identity. Through quantification, the over- or under-representation of certain individuals within the party, which can often emanate from the abundance or paucity of surviving sources, can be avoided and the relative importance of different issues to the party as a single entity can be better understood. Historians and Irish Nationalist representation at Westminster Six decades after their publication, two studies of the IPP still dominate that subsection of the literature which assesses the party as an organisation rather than as a group of individuals. First published in 1951, F.S.L. Lyons’ The Irish Parliamentary Party, 1890–1910 examined identity, structures, and behaviour: taking as a start-point the end of Parnell’s charismatic autocracy in 1890.38 The chronological scope of Lyons’ work extends up until the emergence of a new period of rigid central control within the party in 1910. This was marked by the ejection of William O’Brien in 1909 and the formalisation of relations with the Liberals in April 1910 in order to maintain Herbert Henry Asquith’s majority after the two elections of 1910 left the IPP with seventy-four seats; holding the balance between almost identically matched numbers of Liberal and Conservative MPs.39 Within this twenty-year window, Lyons charts the evolution of membership and of the rules governing the party. In particular, with this work, Lyons gave an invaluable insight into the emergence of the UIL and how this operated from a grassroots level in selecting candidates for the parliamentary party.40 Significantly in terms of the present

16

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

study, Lyons was the first to devote a chapter to the study of ‘the Party at Westminster’.41 In so doing, he outlined a vocabulary for discussing this sphere of party operation in isolation, setting the lines of demarcation for future scholars who wished to delineate between the wider party machine and the parliamentary party at work in Westminster.42 Looking at an earlier period in the party’s history, Conor Cruise O’Brien’s Parnell and his Party (1957) looked at the leadership of Parnell from 1880–90 and the composition of his party, taking a more political-scientific approach to that of Lyons. Among other approaches, O’Brien undertook a study of the party membership on class lines. O’Brien appears to have been the first historian to engage seriously with socio-political theory in describing and contextualising the tendency towards machine politics in the party under Parnell.43 In carrying on this tradition, Alan O’Day and Biagini have been to the fore, displaying a deep engagement with political theory in their writings. The present study builds upon the foundations laid down by these two works. Apart from Lyons and O’Brien, only one other author has conducted a sustained analysis of the Irish party in a collective sense and in a Westminster context. James McConnel’s research has filled a substantial lacuna in understandings of the parliamentary party at Westminster by giving a view ‘from the back bench’:  a history from below of the parliamentary party between 1910 and 1914.44 Additionally, McConnel has ploughed new furrows in investigating relations between the Irish party and its contenders in Ireland, especially in his analysis of the complex relationship the party had with cultural nationalism and the emergence of organised labour during the 1913 Dublin lockout.45 There is no intention to traverse the same ground here. Interestingly, the lockout takes up very little space in the correspondence between the Irish party leadership. They appear to have regarded it as a deeply unwelcome distraction from the really important issue of 1913, namely the Ulster question. A  long-standing enemy of William Martin Murphy and never a champion of urban workers, Dillon wished a curse on both their houses. Writing to O’Connor in London at the beginning of October 1913 he reported that ‘Dublin is Hell! And I don’t see the way out. Murphy is a desperate character – Larkin as bad. It would be a blessing to Ireland if they exterminate each other’.46 The present study differs both in context and chronology from the works of Lyons and O’Brien. In particular, John Dillon’s dominant, but seldom public, role within this cohort will be emphasised. It builds on Lyons’ 1968 masterful biography of Dillon. Here, Dillon’s importance is brought further into the context of his place in the power-structures of the party relative to Redmond and the other

The constitutional context

17

members of the inner leadership. One regrettable aspect of Lyons and O’Brien’s early works which assess the IPP in the round is that neither is particularly strong in situating Irish Nationalist behaviour in the House of Commons within the wider British party context. Here, the nature and extent of Irish actions will be compared quantitatively with those of all other groups and participants in the House. Only through whole-parliament analysis can the actions of Irish Nationalists at Westminster be understood in their proper context. It is not necessary here to dwell unduly on the subject of individual biographies. However, a brief commentary is justified on the use and usefulness of biographies emanating from different eras of scholarship. To take the case study of John Redmond, as a figure of central importance to the present work, the literature on his life spans from before his own death to the very present day. The first in-depth study of Redmond was written by his nephew, Louis Redmond-Howard, in 1910.47 Given the timing of its publication, Redmond-Howard’s work was perhaps designed as a counterweight to the works of Laurence Ginnell and William O’Brien emerging around this time.48 More a hagiography than a biography, Redmond-Howard’s work was joined by another, Redmond’s Vindication, written by a Rev. Robert O’Loughran in 1919.49 In a scholarly sense, the analysis of Redmond’s life begins with Stephen Gwynn’s John Redmond’s Last Years, also published in 1919.50 Gwynn had been a contemporary and parliamentary colleague of Redmond.51 Whereas both Redmond-Howard and O’Loughran now appear dated and are of little practical use, Gwynn’s biography, though structurally and stylistically dated, remains an important contemporary source in rounding out the picture of Redmond and particularly his role in the Anglo-Irish political world of the early twentieth century. In praise of Gwynn, Paul Bew describes how this ‘brilliant book … draws both on the skills of the scholar and the insights of the practising politician’.52 Even today, the value of Stephen Gwynn’s biography to historians should not be ignored. Gwynn’s son Denis was the next to tackle Redmond as a biographical subject. Despite the passage of over eighty years since its publication, Denis Gwynn’s 1932 Life of John Redmond finds a healthy balance between archival robustness and a personal acquaintance with the subject matter. This combination has ensured that Denis Gwynn’s work, though methodologically and stylistically dated, will remain an indispensable point of reference for scholars of the period for decades to come. In the intervening eight decades, several biographies and studies of Redmond have been published. Despite its brevity, Paul Bew’s

18

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

John Redmond (1995) is a useful introductory work within the life and times series.53 Drawing on the wealth of knowledge which Bew displayed in his much more detailed Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, 1890–1910,54 this small biography includes much analysis of what Redmond and particularly Redmondism meant in this period, making it an indispensable text. Joseph Finnan’s John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912–1918 (2004) is particularly useful in its treatment and analysis of Redmond and Redmondism during the war years.55 However, despite enjoying free access to the Redmond papers, Finnan has not mined the relevant archival sources with the same assiduousness as Denis Gwynn.56 Equally, Finnan’s use of secondary sources is extremely limited and staple contemporary texts, notably those from dissident nationalists, are absent from his bibliography.57 The most recent biography of Redmond is Dermot Meleady’s two-parter:  Redmond:  The Parnellite (2008) and John Redmond: The National Leader (2014).58 With such renewed interest in Redmond, it can no longer be said that the MP for Waterford city is a ‘forgotten’ figure in Irish history.59 The historiography of Westminster politics from the British perspective is equally important to the present study. George Dangerfield’s Strange Death of Liberal England marks the starting-point of a school of historical writing on British governmental politics and especially the extraordinary period of Liberal government after December 1905. The biographies of Asquith by Roy Jenkins60 and Stephen Koss61 stand out beside John Wilson’s biography of Henry Campbell-Bannerman which remains informative and authoritative regarding the short but pivotal premiership of ‘C.B.’.62 After Asquith, Lloyd George’s life has been voluminously covered, not only by his own War Memoirs63 but with numerous accounts of his life and specific studies into phases in his work.64 Nonetheless, from the perspective of the present study, the diaries of Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s secretary, mistress, and later wife, have been particularly useful.65 In trying to understand the person behind the public personality that was Lloyd George, the diaries give unparalleled access and insight into someone who rarely let his guard down in the public arena. In relation to archival sources, a more extensive outline will be given in the next chapter; suffice to note here that private papers and correspondence along with the official records of parliamentary proceedings preserved in Hansard have been the principal pillars of research in this book. Additionally, newspapers, parliamentary papers, police reports, and the published writings of participants have been used to supplement and augment the picture that has been unearthed.

The constitutional context

19

In terms of templates for the present study, one study of an Irish party and another of its British counterpart provide much inspiration. From the Irish side, Alvin Jackson’s The Ulster Party:  Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–191166 has been crucial, not so much for its content, but in showing the limits to which the work of a party at Westminster can be extracted from its wider existence at grassroots and constituency level. The present study is of its nature not as extensive as Jackson’s and aspects such as constituency correspondence and associations with paramilitarism have not been undertaken here.67 Much of this work has already been undertaken elsewhere, especially by James McConnel in relation to constituency work and the Irish party’s relations with other nationalist organisations.68 However, in order to do for constitutional nationalism what Jackson has done for Ulster unionism, there remains much to be done. The party’s work in Westminster – its tactics and discipline – and the structures as well as the dynamics of the party’s leadership are key research questions which Jackson tackled and which the present study must address regarding Irish Nationalist MPs. An unapologetically less structured work than Jackson’s, R.B. McDowell’s British Conservatism, 1832–1914 is a masterpiece of a now outmoded but nonetheless excellently researched and presented school of historical writing.69 McDowell’s work sits alongside George Dangerfield’s and A.J.P. Taylor’s in stylistic terms. It has a broad and impressionistic quality to it which has been criticised by later historians despite its vividness and its ability to synthesise and capture the zeitgeist of their chosen era.70 In the course of this reasonably short work, McDowell gives an unsurpassed treatment to the way in which the Irish question was perceived by the Tory party, linking the issue into a multitude of distinct yet related political subjects from empire to trade.71 While the present work is much less structurally indebted to McDowell than it is to Jackson, McDowell’s desire to ‘show what political opinions a member of the English conservative party might [have] be[en] committed to supporting’72 is something the present work is equally committed to ascertaining but this will be done in a more proportionally representative manner. Regarding studies of specific episodes, Neal Blewett’s The Peers, the Parties and the People is an unparalleled examination of the general elections of 1910 and preceding events.73 In a similar vein but in a more literary mode is Roy Jenkins’ Mr Balfour’s Poodle.74 Blewett condenses years of research on this complex topic into a work that is indispensable if one is to arrive at an understanding of the long- and short-term causes of the constitutional crisis that saw two general elections held in a single calendar year. Although the present study does not rely as heavily on British

20

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

archival sources as it does on Irish collections, published and archival material relating to the British governments of the era, particularly the Liberal governments that dominated the period, have been invaluable in providing an understanding of how the Irish party was perceived by the governments of the day. In terms of published primary sources, the various letters and diaries relating to H.H. Asquith remain as useful today as they did when they were first published in the 1970s. Similarly the Frances Stevenson diaries remain essential reading for understanding the functioning of the wartime coalition governments and the Cabinet machinations that resulted in reshuffles and internal coups. In a similar vein, Charles Hobhouse’s diaries of the Asquith Cabinet are useful for understanding the otherwise unrecorded governmental dimensions of the Home Rule and Ulster crises in particular.75 Much like the diaries of Frances Stevenson, the perspectives of the women behind these powerful men have been highly illuminating. Not only have the diaries of Margot Asquith and the letters from Asquith to his confidante, Venetia Stanley,76 provided important vignettes into the private opinions of the Prime Minister, it will also be shown that they are invaluable in understanding the behind-the-scenes work that was conducted between the Liberal government and the Irish party. For example, on one occasion, Margot Asquith wrote to Redmond herself with a game-changing suggestion which will be explored in Chapter 5.77 Furthermore, although she only plays a minor role here, Elizabeth Dillon (née Mathew), the wife of John Dillon, was an important figure on the margins of the Irish party leadership during her short life.78 Her opinions on the politics of her time were not simply the product of her relationship with her husband; long before she gained access to the inner workings of nationalist high politics through her marriage, she had been consumed by the Parnell crisis and the party split, although she only recorded and expressed her views in private.79 Like Margot Asquith, Mrs Dillon will be shown to have been, at times, an active participant rather than a well-informed spectator in politics at the highest level.80 By looking at both the structures and the behaviour of the Irish party, the present study contributes to the major historiographical debates that still cause divisions among historians. The nature of representation at Westminster, the question of who really led the Irish party, and the thorny issue of the party’s decline and electoral destruction will all be addressed. This study does not intend to put any of these questions to

The constitutional context

21

rest. Constitutional nationalist representation at Westminster remains a multi-layered narrative, and the collective actions of roughly eighty MPs cannot be condensed into a single definitive study. By bringing new quantitative insights to the records of the House of Commons which have not traditionally been utilised in this sense, at least by historians of Irish nationalism, the hope here is to augment and enrich the modern view of the party, bringing fresh comparative context to already available archival sources. Notes 1 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Parnell and His Party, 1880–90 (London, 1957), p.  143. O’Brien notes that this is the standard formulation of the party pledge which was used at conventions from 1885 onwards. O’Brien also records that there are more than eighty signed pledge-forms surviving in the papers of T.C. Harrington in the National Library of Ireland. 2 T.M. Healy, Leaders and Letters of My Day (2 vols, London, 1928), i, p. 205. 3 Eugenio Biagini refers, with reference to Max Weber, to the ‘Caesarist’ ascendancy of Parnell. Eugenio F.  Biagini, British Democracy and Irish Nationalism 1876–1906 (Cambridge, 2007), p. 197. It should be noted that Frank Callanan contests the idea that Parnell’s power was absolute. Instead, he sees the Parnell split of 1890–91 as the culminating point of a latent insolvency of power. In Callanan’s words, ‘the skilfully cultivated nationalist myth of Parnell’s omnipotence in the preceding decade masked a deepening crisis of governance within nationalism which the split starkly exposed’. Frank Callanan, The Parnell Split, 1890–91 (Cork, 1992), p. 3. 4 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties:  Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State [Les partis politiques], trans. Barbara and Robert North (3rd edn, London, 1964), p. 170. 5 David Thornley, Isaac Butt and Home Rule (London, 1964), p. 330 et seq. 6 The annual conference of the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain praised obstructionism as a tactic and called on the Irish party to emulate the example shown by Joseph Biggar. Alan O’Day, Irish Home Rule, 1867–1921 (Manchester, 1998), p. 44. 7 For a summary of how obstruction emerged and evolved from 1874 onwards, see O’Day, Irish Home Rule, pp. 43–52. 8 To borrow a chapter title from O’Brien, Parnell, p. 193 et seq. 9 Frank Callanan, ‘Parnell, Charles Stewart’ in J.  McGuire and J.  Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography (9 vols, Cambridge, 2009), vii, 1079. 10 On this, see Callanan, Parnell Split, pp. 26–7. 11 Callanan, Parnell Split, p. 53. 12 Similar to the situation that had occurred in the general election of 1885, in 1892, Irish Nationalists won eighty-one seats (seventy-two anti-Parnellites and nine Parnellites). In Britain, neither side had an outright majority. The Liberals won 272 seats while the Conservative and Liberal Unionists

22

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

won 313. Election results taken from F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1832–1987 (Dartmouth, 1989), p. 15. 13 Quoting Bull, ‘United Irish League’, p. 52. 14 On Healy see Frank Callanan, T.M. Healy (Cork, 1996). On O’Brien, Joseph V.  O’Brien, William O’Brien and the Course of Irish Politics, 1881–1918 (Berkeley, 1976). Particularly valuable works on Ginnell are Wheatley, Nationalism and Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation:  Irish Nationalist Life, 1891–1918 (Dublin, 1999). On Dolan, see Lawrence William White, ‘Dolan, Charles Joseph’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds),  Dictionary of Irish Biography, iii, pp. 362–3. 15 Paul Bew, Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, 1890–1910: Parnellites and Radical Agrarians (Oxford, 1987). 16 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party and Mel Cousins, ‘The voting behaviour of the IPP on social issues in the House of Commons 1881–90’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive paper no. 30102 (April 2011). 17 Wheatley, Nationalism. 18 Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 250. 19 Although not the focus of the present work, it should be noted that the extension of franchise in 1918 (which included the granting of the vote to women over thirty years of age subject to a property qualification) represented the single largest extension of franchise since 1884. 20 Valerie Cromwell, House of Commons Voting, 1861–1926 [computer file] (Colchester: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1991). Study Number: 2833. The project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), ESRC funded research project E00230051. I should like to acknowledge the original data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections and the UK Data Archive. The original data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the data collections, and the UK Data Archive bear no responsibility for their further analysis or interpretation made in the present study. No data was recorded for the year 1866 in Cromwell’s study. 21 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’. 22 Biagini, British Democracy, pp.  3–5. Biagini even dubs British democracy and Irish nationalism the ‘sequel’ to his earlier work on the post-Chartist generation: Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860–1880 (Cambridge, 1992). 23 Not only did democratic institutions have to exist, but they also had to derive popular legitimacy from the will of the people. Biagini, British Democracy, p. 51 [quoting Quentin Skinner]. 24 Biagini, British Democracy, p. 51 [italics are from the original]. 25 Interestingly, Fairlie had been greatly influenced by the work of Maurice Duverger on this point: Henry Fairlie, The Life of Politics (London, 1968), p. 114. 26 Fairlie, Life of Politics, p. 115. 27 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, 1913–1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Cork, 1998), p. 26.

The constitutional context

23

28 L.C.B. Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain, 1902–1951 (London, 1966), p. 121. 29 Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain, p. 121. 30 Biagini, British Democracy, p. 21. 31 Biagini, British Democracy, pp. 20–2. 32 For a synopsis of the emergence of the parliamentary Labour movement, see Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups (London, 1965), pp. 109–25. 33 Beer, Modern British Politics, chapters i, ii, and ix. 34 The concept of cleavage structures was first articulated in a formal sense in Seymour M.  Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, 1967). 35 Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments:  an introduction’ in Lipset and Rokkan (eds), Party Systems, p. 47. 36 Daniele Caramani, ‘Party systems’ in Daniele Caramani (ed.), Comparative Politics (3rd edn, Oxford, 2014), pp. 217–22. 37 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’. 38 F.S.L. Lyons, The Irish Parliamentary Party, 1890–1910 (London, 1951). 39 The December elections of 1910 returned:  Liberal, 272 (275 in January); Labour, 42 (40 in January); Conservative and Unionist, 272 (273 in January): Denis Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond (London, 1932), p. 187. 40 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 140–57. Another important work in understanding the emergence of the UIL and its impact on parliamentary nationalism is Bull, ‘United Irish League’, pp. 51–78. 41 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 218–54. 42 The most notable advance in terms of this has been the work of James McConnel. McConnel’s work conforms closely to some of the structural designs of Lyons’ study presenting chapters both on the constituency work of members and their work in Westminster. McConnel surpasses Lyons’ study in examining the perception of the IPP from varying Irish perspectives: something that Lyons never attempted in a systematic sense. McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party. 43 Specifically, the theories of Moisei Ostrogorski and Robert Michels: O’Brien, Parnell, p. 148. 44 This was first outlined in James McConnel, ‘The view from the backbench:  Irish Nationalist MPs and their work, 1910–1914’ (PhD thesis, Durham, 2002) and subsequently in McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party. 45 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, ­chapters  6 and 7.  See also, James McConnel, ‘The Irish Parliamentary Party, industrial relations and the 1913 Dublin lockout’, Saothar, xxviii (2003), pp. 25–36. 46 John Dillon to T.P. O’Connor, 1 October 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/195). 47 Louis Redmond-Howard, John Redmond:  The Man and the Demand, a Biographical Study in Irish Politics (London, 1910). 48 Laurence Ginnell, Land and Liberty (Dublin, 1908) and William O’Brien, An Olive Branch in Ireland and its History (London, 1910). 49 Robert O’Loughran, Redmond’s Vindication (London, 1919).

24

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

50 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years. 51 Stephen Gwynn had been MP for Galway City from 1906–18. The first biography of Gwynn himself was published in 2011; see Colin Reid, The Lost Ireland of Stephen Gwynn: Irish Constitutional Nationalism and Cultural Politics, 1864–1950 (Manchester, 2011). 52 Paul Bew, John Redmond (Dundalk, 1995), p. 3. 53 Bew, Redmond. 54 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation. 55 Joseph P.  Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912–1918 (Syracuse, 2004). 56 Admittedly, Gwynn had the Redmond papers in his personal possession while he wrote his book. Brian Kirby, Papers of John Redmond, Collection List No. 118 (unpublished, NLI, Dublin, 2006), p. 7. 57 Of particular note, Finnan makes no reference or acknowledgement of either William O’Brien’s Olive Branch, or Healy’s Leaders and Letters of My Day. Finnan, Redmond. 58 Dermot Meleady, Redmond:  The Parnellite (Cork, 2008)  and Dermot Meleady, John Redmond: The National Leader (Dublin, 2014). 59 For just one example of Redmond being described as ‘forgotten’ see Irish Independent, 24 November 2013. 60 Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1964). 61 Stephen Koss, Asquith (London, 1976). 62 John Wilson, CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1973). 63 War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (new edn, 2 vols, London, 1938). 64 See especially John Grigg’s three-part study:  The Young Lloyd George (London, 1973); Lloyd George: The People’s Champion, 1902–1911 (London, 1978); and Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916 (London, 1985). Stephen Constantine, Lloyd George (London, 1992). Kenneth O.  Morgan, The Age of Lloyd George (London, 1971). 65 Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George, a Diary, ed. A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1971). 66 Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–1911 (Oxford, 1989). 67 Jackson, Ulster Party, ­chapters 5 and 7. On Irish party constituency work, see McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 71 et seq. 68 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party. 69 R.B. McDowell, British Conservatism, 1832–1914 (London, 1959). 70 For a discussion of this style of writing, as typified by George Dangerfield, see Peter Stansky, ‘ “The strange death of Liberal England”:  fifty years after’; Michael Brock, ‘The strange death of Liberal England [review]’; and Carolyn W. White, ‘ “The strange death of Liberal England” in its time’ in Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, xvii, no. 4 (winter, 1985), pp. 401–3, 409–23, and 425–47 respectively. 71 McDowell, British Conservatism, pp. 111–12. 72 McDowell, British Conservatism, p. 9.

The constitutional context

25

73 Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London, 1972). 74 Roy Jenkins, Mr Balfour’s Poodle: An Account of the Struggle between the House of Lords and the Government of Mr Asquith (2nd edn, London, 1968). 75 Charles Hobhouse, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet: From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse, ed. Edward David (London, 1977). 76 H.H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, ed. Michael and Eleanor Brock (Oxford, 1982). 77 The Autobiography of Margot Asquith, ed. Mark Bonham Carter (London, 1962), pp. 284–5. 78 She died in childbirth in 1907. The implications of this event on the history of the Irish party will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 79 Vanessa M.  Curley, ‘The life and times of Elizabeth Mathew’ (MA thesis, University College Dublin, 1995), pp. 94–101. 80 On Elizabeth Dillon and her role as a ‘political wife’, see Curley, ‘Elizabeth Mathew’, pp. 133–57.

2 Towards the age of the tetrarchs

Get the advice of everybody whose advice is worth having – they are very few – and then do what you think best yourself. – Parnell’s advice to John Dillon1

Sometimes a machine is best understood by stripping down its essential parts. In organisational terms, the core of the IPP was not a formally appointed structure but a closed cabal that increasingly came to dictate the direction of party policy. What one learns from the examination of the core  – its architecture and relationship to the other constituent parts – reveals much about the true nature of the whole. So dominant did the policy-making core of the Irish party become that analysis of its operation and evolution will constitute a major part of the wider study of the party being undertaken here. Leaders are not, in the modern democratic model, solitary Caesars. Instead, a small clique or oligarchy symbiotically take and hold power. Entry to this group is strictly limited and controlled. This tendency towards rule by the few is summed up by the German political theorist Robert Michels. First published in 1908, his ‘iron law of oligarchy’ states that ‘it is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors … Who says organisation, says oligarchy’.2 Michels suggested that the greater threat to the unity of an oligarchy lies in the ‘struggle among the leaders themselves’ rather than from external threats.3 Given the trajectory of the Irish party leadership under consideration here, this is an important factor to be borne in mind. While the fate of oligarchies is often dictated through internal struggle, in modern democratic organisations, the formation of these elites can only occur with the consent of the ‘masses’:  in this case the membership of the parliamentary party and, through them, the grassroots of the party.4 Once power is won, however, the masses are content to allow ‘a certain degree of tyranny on the part of their elected leaders’ in what Michels has dubbed the ‘Bonapartist ideology’.5

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

27

While it is certain that the leadership of the IPP exercised a high level of control over the direction of policy, it will be shown that this was not so absolute that it could be described as ‘tyranny’. When the grassroots were steadfast on an issue, the leadership followed rather than led the masses. Despite the limitations of his powers, opponents of the Irish party were quick to draw parallels between the leadership of John Redmond and the dictatorial rule of Napoleon Bonaparte. In one Punch cartoon from 1912, the artist prophesised the defeat of Redmond, dressed with trademark hat and coat as Napoleon on horseback and leading his army of bruised and battered followers back from a confrontation with the unionists of Ulster. Redmond may have been a source of ridicule in this depiction but, nonetheless, his enemies drew a clear parallel between Redmondism and Bonapartism.6 Inner leadership: oligarchy in the IPP In his examination of the party’s engagement with the debate on federalism in 1910, Michael Wheatley refers to an ‘inner leadership’ of the IPP consisting of John Redmond (Waterford City), John Dillon (Mayo East), T.P. O’Connor (Liverpool, Scotland Division), and Joseph Devlin (Kilkenny North, Belfast West).7 While there were many other official offices and titles within the party’s organisational structure – whips, secretaries, treasurers – this informal grouping of four MPs emerged organically in the decade after party reunification (1900) and was responsible for the planning, articulation, and execution of Irish party policy until 1918. The present study has a clear conclusion in 1918: this was the year of the death of the party’s chairman, the failure of the Irish Convention, and the crushing defeat experienced by the party in the general election of that year. These events combined to put an abrupt end to the IPP’s existence as the representative political organisation for majority Irish nationalism. The aim of this chapter is to examine the complex inter-relationships between the inner leadership of the IPP between 1900 and 1918. By so doing, the changing political climates both at Westminster and in Ireland will be shown to have alternatively strained and strengthened relations within the party leadership. Of even greater significance is the effect that the changing nature of friendships and alliances within the inner leadership had upon the political situation and on the focus of party policy. While these effects have been noted in passing in various texts over the past century, an in-depth study into the cause and effect of these relationships is lacking from the overall historiography of the party.

28

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

F.S.L. Lyons – in what has remained an authoritative study of the party between 1890 and 1910 since its publication in 1951  – does not pay much attention to the internal power dynamics at the top of the party’s hierarchy. Instead, he focuses on the party’s overall composition and its legislative record, predominantly on the national question.8 Meanwhile, both Conor Cruise O’Brien and Eugenio Biagini have given quite detailed attention to the power dynamics of the party, but only in a nineteenth-century context.9 In terms of the impact of the IPP, Lyons stands as arguably the most important historian to have written on the subject. His biography of John Dillon is one of the most comprehensive accounts of Irish nationalist politics in these years. The aim in this chapter, however, is to pull back from Lyons’ focus on events through the lens of Dillonism so as to give a more complete and rounded treatment of the party’s leadership. In doing this, correspondence between the MPs who would eventually emerge as the sole members of the party’s inner leadership forms the cornerstone of the archival work underpinning this research. Only the private papers of Redmond and Dillon survive, thus occluding the relationship that existed between Joseph Devlin and T.P. O’Connor. However, the depth of information contained in both sides of the correspondence between Redmond and Dillon, as well the letters in the Redmond and Dillon papers from O’Connor and Devlin, constitutes one of the most valuable sources of the party’s record both in Ireland and in Westminster. In terms of primary source material, this is complemented by the survival of three volumes of party minute books (1900–18), which provide a punctuated record of the party’s official decisions and resolutions, just as Hansard preserves the political record of the party at Westminster.10 In addition to these and other primary sources, biographies have also been consulted extensively. These range from near contemporaneous accounts to more modern studies. While the former provide invaluable first- and second-hand anecdotes and otherwise lost information about the lives being examined here, the value of the latter comes from their attention to detail and their comprehensive nature.11 Collectively, these later accounts represent many lifetimes worth of scholarship, summarising as they do vast swathes of primary material and previous works on the subjects involved. Instead of looking at the lives of the four leaders under examination here, the aim is to study the interactions and intersections between these four individuals, in a manner similar to that in which Richard Aldous studied the inter-relations and personal differences between Gladstone and Disraeli in his joint study, The Lion and the Unicorn.12

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

29

Tetrarchy In describing the inner leadership of four that controlled the party from circa 1909 onwards, one can look to earlier models of shared leadership for precedents. In 1910, journalist and contemporary Francis Cruise O’Brien referred to John Dillon as a ‘Roman patriot transplanted into modern times’.13 Another comparison with antiquity might perhaps be useful in explaining the delicate power-sharing model that existed at the head of the IPP. In 285 AD, the Roman Emperor Diocletian elevated Marcus Aurelius Valerius Maximian as his co-ruler, initiating a period of collegiate government – termed ‘diarchy’ – with the intention that the then sprawling Roman Empire ‘could face challenges in two different areas at the same time without compromising unity’.14 In the Roman case, Diocletian’s governmental reforms were designed to combat immediate challenges and to buttress the strength of the Empire. Redmond and Dillon were mindful of the same factors when they forged their alliance in 1900 against the backdrop of the potential marginalisation of their respective movements by the UIL. The rivalries that had kept them apart for a decade were gradually put aside during this delicate reunification process. Here follows a brief background and context to the history of the first Roman tetrarchy. Following the elevation of Maximian, beneath the two Augustii were elevated Flavius Valerius Constantinius  – later Constantine the Great – and Gaius Galerius Maximianus [Galerius] as Caesari in 293 AD. Caesar was essentially the rank of junior emperor, one who ruled alongside his Augustus and was acknowledged as the automatic successor to him upon his death. As H.P. L’Orange puts it, ‘with this Diarchy – with one Augustus in the East and one in the West – the process of division was introduced which led into the Tetrarchy’s “symmetric” state order, with four ruling emperors’.15 A central aspect to the Roman model of tetrarchy was geographical separation and the establishment of clearly defined and exclusive territorial areas of responsibility within the Empire. Each tetrarch wielded supreme power in his own territory and yet the unity of the collegiate government was stressed in ritual, public art, coinage, and even marriage so as to ensure that tetrarchy would lead to a stronger unified whole rather a dynastic four-way fragmentation of the Empire.16 The main point to stress here is that tetrarchy is not so much employed as a comparison simply because it was a system of leadership by four persons. The numbers involved are irrelevant. What is more important is that it represents a comparative model for power-sharing. In this sense, a loose form of tetrarchy could be said to have existed at the top of

30

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the IPP as a means of apportioning power between the strong-men of its reunited wings after 1900. Just as in the Roman model, the system of leadership in the Irish party after 1900 eventually came to address the problems of succession and the issues arising from the existence of a sprawling organisation which, in the Irish party case, was due to the existence of a wider nationalist movement including the Irish diaspora. Most of all, both systems limited the ability of any one member to act unilaterally without the consent and consensus of his colleagues. Redmond did not claim supreme authority over the party as Parnell had done. While it was still the centralised political machine that it had been in Parnell’s day, after reunification, the Irish party’s course and purpose would be decided with the consensus of four, and not on the authority of the chairman alone.17 Although a cult of Redmondism had been built up to some extent during and after the Home Rule crisis, Redmond did not view himself as in any way superior to his closest colleagues. Ultimately, he was even content to relinquish the chairmanship for the good of the party when his health and standing within the party began to wane in early 1918. Similarly, Diocletian and Maximian did not jealously cling to power. They also dutifully retired to make way for the promotion of their Caesari whose own roles were then taken over by new men in what was intended to be a self-perpetuating cycle of orderly succession.18 Much of the focus in this and subsequent chapters will be on the relationship between Redmond and Dillon, as they most certainly held more prominent positions than either Devlin or O’Connor within the party. However, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that the Irish party was a body governed by four and not two in the period from 1909 to 1918. In particular, O’Connor and Devlin were seen to operate autonomously from the stewardship of either Redmond or Dillon in negotiating on behalf of the party in the early phases of the Home Rule crisis, a clear example of how they were integral members of the leadership and not merely auxiliaries to Redmond and Dillon. O’Connor had been a member of primary importance in the inner circle of leadership since reunification but, during the first decade of the new century, Joseph Devlin was identified and elevated as the most promising of the new MPs in the party. By 1909, the IPP had stabilised its leadership, where policy steering and power within the party rested in the hands of just four MPs. This was partially achieved through the whittling away of internal threats within the party as well as the deaths of several trusted policy advisers who had been members of the highest tier of the party hierarchy. O’Connor was the most important of only a few senior figures who remained close to both Redmond and Dillon throughout the entire

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

31

period under examination. O’Connor played a key advisory role within the leadership. Incidentally, he also acted as a peace-maker in later years when tensions between Redmond and Dillon arose over recruitment and the First World War. Despite all this, the most important asset that O’Connor, and only O’Connor, could bring to the leadership was his ability to act as a point of access to the highest echelons of the Liberal party through his extensive links to British political and press circles. His work in this regard would be increasingly valuable to the party after 1906 when the Liberals came to power and even more so during negotiations on the Ulster question (1913–14 and 1916). The second major factor in the emergence of the tetrarchy was the gradual elevation of Joseph Devlin within the party. For Redmond and Dillon, Devlin – having truly proved himself during the Home Rule crisis – came to embody the one role within the reunified party that Parnell had never been able to fill: that of a protégé; a talented young MP who could be singled out as a potential successor to the chairmanship of the party. Although it is unclear whether Devlin was consciously identified as a potential successor, it remains that, as noted by one of his biographers, he would eventually be asked to fill the chairmanship in 1918.19 This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that Devlin did not even hold a seat in the House of Commons until 1902. With Devlin’s advancement in the party hierarchy, he joined Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor at the top of an organically formed and informally constituted policy-making core. A  stable equilibrium of power-sharing was thus achieved. In terms of gauging the stability of the Irish party tetrarchy and its success as an experiment in power-sharing, the inner leadership – which eventually stabilised in its membership by 1909 – superficially appeared to have survived until the death of the chairman in 1918. However, it will be shown that, by 1914/15, the unity of the tetrarchy would be tested by disagreements arising over the question of recruitment and participation in the war effort. While the Redmond–Dillon axis around which the leadership revolved would survive this trial, the more intense strain resulting from the 1916 Rising and its protracted aftermath would serve to alter fundamentally the functioning and efficacy of the tetrarchy. While this did not ruin the long-standing internal friendships underlying the shared leadership of the party, a profound ideological and policy gap emerged and intensified after the Rising, primarily between Dillon and Redmond. Politically and professionally, their alliance would never be fully re-established following the strains of 1916. Territorially speaking, while constant movement between Ireland and Westminster was a fact of life for all bar O’Connor, it can be said that

32

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

certain spheres of responsibility came to be occupied by the tetrarchs of the Irish party. On the one hand, Redmond and O’Connor took leading roles in the party’s work at Westminster. Likewise in Ireland, Dillon had long established, mostly through a network of correspondence and contacts, an unparalleled knowledge and understanding of Irish politics at every level, and in almost every district. Vanessa Curley gives a good account of Dillon going between London and Dublin from the perspective of his wife’s diaries. She records how Elizabeth Dillon would accompany John to London for the start of the parliamentary session which traditionally ran from February to mid-August, although it frequently ran on much longer. Elizabeth would stay with John until he was settled and then she would return to Dublin ‘where her husband would rejoin her whenever possible’. Interspersed with visits to his aunt’s house in his constituency of East Mayo at Ballaghaderrin and with holidays to Elizabeth’s family’s residence at Killiney, it is clear from Curley’s analysis of Elizabeth Dillon’s diaries that, from her perspective at least, Dublin unambiguously remained John’s home throughout his political career.20 Even when Redmond and O’Connor came to be seen as aloof from the changing nature of the public mood in Ireland during the war, Dillon managed to keep his finger firmly on the pulse of rapidly evolving nationalist public opinion. Devlin also succeeded in keeping up to date with sentiment in Ireland throughout the period. In 1904, he had risen to the General Secretaryship of the party’s grassroots and national organisation, the UIL.21 Through this appointment, he began to acquire a much deeper understanding of the political terrain in Ireland. Thus, Dillon and Devlin kept a vigilant eye on events in Ireland while O’Connor stood guard in Westminster. Redmond, meanwhile, as chairman, endeavoured to spread himself across both spheres as much as possible.22 In this way, the Irish party leadership loosely divided its work and responsibilities of oversight between Ireland and Britain. However, the point should not be laboured too much and, in general, apart from existing as a body to decide and direct party policy, the tetrarchy’s form and functions were extremely fluid, with all its members adapting to innumerable roles in both Ireland and Britain throughout its existence. To expand further on the loose nature of power-sharing, it must be stressed here that the group was highly informal, even to the point of transcending the official rank structure of the party which included whips and treasurers. The only formally recognised member of the party’s leadership was its head and chairman John Redmond, who was re-elected to the chair annually for the eighteen years of this study.23 By contrast, the policy-making core of the party was something which

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

33

evolved organically around Redmond from the time of unification and never received formal recognition from either the party or the UIL. Contenders to the crown: challenges to the dominance of the tetrarchs It has already been mentioned that a working equilibrium between the inner leadership of Dillon, Redmond, O’Connor, and Devlin was arrived at gradually in the first decade of the new century. The ‘baton convention’ of 1909 – which will be covered in greater detail later – marks the point at which the lingering dissidence of the Healy and O’Brien factions were finally externalised from the IPP once and for all. Thenceforth, the tetrarchy – who had performed their roles to varying degrees since 1900 – could function as the undisputed custodians of power within the official constitutional nationalist movement after this point. The internal consolidation of the leadership began with the expulsion of the ever-divisive Timothy Michael Healy from the party in December 1900. Despite Healy’s assertion that Redmond only ‘feebly opposed’ his expulsion at the UIL conference of December 1900, this event marked a significant early milestone in the creation of the tetrarchy of Dillon, Redmond, O’Connor, and Devlin.24 The other major contender for inclusion in the leadership, as will be discussed at length below, was William O’Brien. More so than Healy, O’Brien played a key role in the early leadership of the party and the wider movement up to his resignation in 1903.25 While the ever-changing relationships of the Healy and O’Brien wings to the official party would remain a source of concern for the leadership throughout the party’s history, the claim of both of them to any part in the very highest levels of party leadership had been largely ruled out by 1903. Another central figure, more to the Irish movement than to the Irish party, was Michael Davitt. He had been inactive in parliamentary politics since his resignation from parliament in protest over the ‘naked British aggression’ of the Boer War.26 Davitt’s ability to influence Irish political discourse, if not the inner leadership directly, is best evidenced by Davitt’s intense involvement in the debate surrounding Wyndham’s Land Act of 1903. As F.S.L. Lyons points out, Dillon held a deep respect for Davitt’s opinions on agrarian issues. Although seldom put to use, it can be seen that Davitt thus maintained an ability to influence the party’s policies from the outside after 1900.27 Thus, while it represents one of the most profoundly-felt losses to Irish nationalism in the period, Davitt’s death in May 1906 removed yet another influential outsider who had been on the margins of the

34

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Nationalist hierarchy, thus leaving the inner leadership freer to make decisions with more unilateral authority.28 Similarly, the exit from Irish politics of Edward Blake, who suffered a stroke in 1907 and returned to his native Canada – he died there in 1909 – also marked a key event in the emergence of the tetrarchy. While Blake had nothing comparable to the iconic political reputation of Davitt, he had played an integral role in the reunification of the party and, as a close confidante of Dillon, had an important advisory role in the inner leadership in the early years of the new century.29 This will be touched on at various points throughout this chapter. Blake’s exit from Irish politics in 1907 – in conjunction with the crisis surrounding the Irish Council Bill in that year – finally allowed the inner leadership to operate as a single cohesive unit, with an extremely high level of control over party policy resting solely and collectively in the hands of just these four MPs. It is important to stress here that, as has just been illustrated, the leadership of the party had a wider base up to 1909 and several figures took part in policy steering who would later, through disagreements or death, not continue in their role. Arguably the tetrarchy proper can only be said to have existed in a concrete form after 1909. Here, so as to chart the evolution of those who would eventually become the unchallenged leaders of the party, it has been decided that focus in the first decade of the twentieth century should be maintained predominantly on the four MPs that would eventually come to dominate policy steering in the party. The complicated involvement of O’Brien, Healy, Blake, and Davitt with the leadership has been left aside for the most part but they will nonetheless be mentioned and acknowledged at pivotal junctures.30 While the tetrarchy proper would not find equilibrium until after 1909, it has already been noted that the foundations of an informal inner circle at the top of the Irish party can be traced back to the end of the 1890s and the negotiations around the reunification of the divided strands of the constitutional nationalist movement. In negotiating a settlement, the basis of a working relationship between the two most important members of the tetrarchy  – Redmond and Dillon  – was established. The hostility and distrust that had categorised this relationship in the 1890s would be the first and most fundamental hurdle to be overcome in establishing a collaborative leadership for the unified party. Reunification The reunification of the Irish party had a long gestation with tentative steps having been made in that direction by T.M. Healy as early

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

35

as January 1896.31 The pace of change was accelerated greatly in 1898 with the foundation of William O’Brien’s UIL. Initially a west of Ireland agrarian movement, Philip Bull has observed that ‘by the middle of 1899 there was little doubt left as to the function which the UIL was serving: it was to restore unity, organisation and direction to the politics of nationalist Ireland’.32 Thus, it can be said that the UIL played a central role in the reunification of the party and to a large extent the vogue for unity within the grassroots of nationalism at the turn of the century can be attributed to the initial enthusiasm of O’Brien and his league. Despite the general mood of conciliation circulating in 1899, the rift between Dillon and Redmond  – both politically and personally  – remained as strong as it had been earlier in the 1890s. In the papers of Edward Blake, one gets a glimpse at the extent of this rift. In February 1899, Dillon remained intransigent on the subject of a meeting or negotiations with Redmond, resisting pressure from Michael Davitt, who was ‘very sore’ at Dillon and Blake’s unwillingness to do so.33 Attesting to Dillon’s personal animosity towards Redmond, perhaps the most telling evidence comes from Dillon’s wife, Elizabeth, who, with a looseness of expression totally uncharacteristic of her husband, enthusiastically wrote to Blake early in 1899 saying that, while she wished to refrain from referring to politics, ‘Redmond’s candidates’ defeat [in the local government elections] really is a tremendous triumph’.34 While the sentiments of Elizabeth Dillon cannot be said to have directly mirrored her husband’s, this rare glimpse of the Dillons celebrating the political defeat of Redmondite candidates just one year before the reunification of the Nationalist movement bears revealing witness to the state of feeling in the Dillon household. It is not intended to give an extensive account of the reunification of the Irish party here. Instead, a few observations are warranted on how the process of reunification served to shape the relationships between the post-unification party leadership and, in particular, relations between Redmond and Dillon which, it has already been shown, were undergoing a metamorphosis around the turn of the century. In 1900, the legacy of the split endured, not only on the almost tribal lines of proand anti-Parnellism but, more importantly, on the question of the IPP’s political independence at Westminster. Lyons, amongst others, has been keen to stress the importance of the relationship between the Nationalist and Liberal parties as being a central issue to the Parnell split.35 Into the twentieth century, although the principles had been blurred slightly around the edges, Dillon and Redmond personified these divergences in policy, the former standing for strong alliance with the Liberal party as the surest route to Irish self-government, whereas Redmond

36

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

firmly upheld the belief that the preservation of Irish Nationalist independence at Westminster was essential to maximising the efficacy of Irish MPs as a political force.36 In subsequent chapters, this issue will be tackled quantitatively. For now, it remains to investigate the sentiments of the party leadership towards alignment with the Liberal party. It is important to note that, of the tetrarchy, three were, broadly speaking, anti-Parnellites before reunification. Dillon and O’Connor were definitively so and Devlin, though not yet a parliamentarian, associated with the anti-Parnellite faction despite the fact that he was only nineteen at the time of the split. Through Thomas Sexton, then MP for West Belfast, Devlin gravitated towards Dillonism. Redmond alone represented the spirit of Parnellism and, with it, the tradition of Irish party independence at Westminster. Dillon, meanwhile, was among the strongest advocates of the Liberal alliance school of thought. Likewise, T.P. O’Connor, with his strong links to British Liberalism, and because he was the only Nationalist MP sitting for an English constituency, was also a strong advocate of close relations between the Liberal and Irish parties, as well as being a key point of contact between the two parties. The subtleties of Devlin’s stance on this issue are the most difficult to establish. Having only become an MP in 1902, he was somewhat freer from the legacy of the split. Devlin’s long-standing and deep political loyalty to John Dillon suggests that Devlin would have gravitated towards the anti-Parnellite policy of Liberal–Irish alliance. However, at some level, by not having experienced the split as an MP, Devlin was freer to transcend the ideological divide on the issue of the Liberal alliance. In the immediate prelude to the reunification of the parliamentary party between the summer of 1899 and spring of 1900, Dillon’s distrust for Redmond and Healy endured. However, he did become more tolerant of the general idea of reunification at this point. F.S.L. Lyons sees that Dillon, like all the Nationalist heavyweights of the time, was simply reacting to the fact that, if the Nationalist political establishment did not act decisively at this time, it would effectively be eclipsed by the grassroots swell embodied in the UIL.37 The nature of the relationship between Dillon and Redmond at this point, echoing this spirit of burying old grudges, is shown plainly in a letter from the former to William O’Brien very shortly after reunification and the election of Redmond to the chair. Exposing the depth of scepticism held by Dillon over Redmond’s leadership, he stated frankly that Redmond had no more chance of being elected than I  had of being elected Lord Mayor of London. I considered then that your support for him was a great

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

37

mistake, and I will confess that everything which has occurred since has confirmed me in that view. He and I are on perfectly good terms – so far as personal intercourse goes – but our relations are not based on any deception on my part, for I told him frankly that I was totally opposed to his election … Having acquiesced in his election I shall give him fair play so long as I remain a member of the party. But more than fair play I cannot give him – for I have no faith in him.38

Dillon’s attitude of bare tolerance towards Redmond would gradually evolve into active co-operation over the following year, aided in no small part by the efforts of O’Connor, who wished to see Redmond and Dillon joining forces at the head of the party. From the summer of 1900, O’Connor had frequently encouraged Dillon to meet and discuss matters with Redmond and to ally with him against Healy, rather than viewing Redmond as part of the Healy camp so despised by Dillon.39 The expulsion of Healy from the party in December 1900 can be seen as a watershed. It severed the objectionable link between Redmondism and Healyism and thus made the former infinitely more palatable to Dillon at a stroke.40 In his biography of Redmond, Denis Gwynn later observed that Healy’s expulsion removed ‘that constant source of exasperation in the party meetings’.41 The mandate for unity provided by the general election result in October 1900,42 coupled with the removal of Healy, thus marks the final emergence of a ‘united’ party nearly a year after official unification. Gwynn also observed that Healy’s removal allowed for the re-inclusion of William O’Brien, who had been hovering on the margins of the party up to this point. Not wishing to engage in party meetings while the underlying tensions between Dillon and Healy endured, O’Brien had chosen to concentrate on his work in the UIL while Healy was still a force within the parliamentary party.43 In charting the triumph of Dillonism in these years, it is ironic to note that this, Dillon’s first coup against a potential rival, allowed for the elevation of O’Brien within the party hierarchy. O’Brien would quickly become an extremely potent force in policy formation and would take a leading role in the direction of the party when he came to push for a land settlement – which will be discussed at length below – bringing him into conflict with Dillon. At this point, two years after the expulsion of Healy, Dillon would launch an equally successful campaign to remove, or at least externalise, this second internal threat to his dominance in the policy-making core of the party. Redmond’s gradual realignment with Dillon rather than either Healy or O’Brien signalled the beginnings of the tetrarchy.

38

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Underlining the significance of the establishment of a working equilibrium between Dillon and Redmond – and the removal of Healy that facilitated it  – to the future shape of the party leadership, O’Connor wrote to Dillon in a reflective mood on Christmas Eve 1900, observing that ‘things look hopeful to me now … and with Healy thrown out and Redmond in the chair, I feel as if my work in Irish politics were done’.44 O’Connor was in fact turning his attention to matters in England, both political and commercial.45 His desire to take a step back from politics was genuine. The tumultuous establishment of a united Irish party had taken its toll on O’Connor. His role in the background – smoothing over differences and rivalries while simultaneously playing a central role in the ousting of Healy – had been extremely taxing on him. Nonetheless, he clearly looked back on his achievements with satisfaction and pride. In assessing the formation of the inner leadership, while Dillon and Redmond would emerge as the dominant players in the years ahead, O’Connor’s role should not be underestimated; indeed it was indispensable. O’Connor’s long-standing friendship with Dillon meant that he was one of very few who could tame the agitator mentality that lay at the heart of Dillon’s political character. Consequent to his efforts, the credit for bridging the gap between Redmond and Dillon during 1900 lies heavily with O’Connor. As the central axis around which all other participants in the party’s leadership would revolve in the future, the formation of this bond between Redmond and Dillon marked the culmination of the first phase in the evolution of the tetrarchy. The equilibrium that had been reached would remain largely stable until the upheaval in politics that would occur in 1905–6 with the handover of power from the Conservatives to the Liberals. Correspondence between Dillon and Redmond preserved in the Redmond papers for the years 1900 to 1903 attests to the tumultuous state of Ireland and the oppositional stance taken by the Irish party in Westminster in this period. Much of the party’s attention was heavily focussed on the issue of evicted tenants during 1900 and 1901, with Dillon in particular devoting much time and effort to tenant relief in close co-operation with Michael Davitt.46 In terms of the party’s work at Westminster, its involvement in a number of non-Irish issues, as well as some illuminating private statements on Home Rule, broadens our view of the party’s activity at this time. In 1901, Dillon and Redmond were both reviewing a proposed Copyright Bill – the details of which are of no consequence here – with Dillon writing to Redmond that his views on the subject were detailed enough to warrant explanation in person.47 While this may appear to

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

39

be a minor point, given the charged agrarian situation in Ireland at this time,48 parliamentary work on this subject attests to the broad range of the IPP’s legislative concerns and also to the fact that, even at this early point, the leadership continued the party’s practice of involving itself in the passage of non-Irish legislation.49 By 1902, the two most significant non-Irish issues upon which the Irish party directed its attention were the ongoing South African conflict and the Education (England and Wales) Bill which passed through parliament that year. In terms of the party leadership, the main point is that Dillon’s view of the government’s policy at this point was far less conciliatory or moderate than that of either Redmond or O’Connor. Correspondence between the leadership on the South African conflict further illuminates understanding of the tetrarchs’ differing stances on the war. In January 1902, demonstrating his abilities as a parliamentary tactician, Dillon was drafting an amendment to a resolution on the war and decided to stick entirely to the issue of the British concentration camps in South Africa rather than a more general condemnation of the war. In addition, this amendment was to be held back, with the Irish party awaiting Liberal action on the subject, but in the event of Campbell-Bannerman ‘funking’ the point, as Dillon suspected he might, the Irish party would be ready to tackle the government on the war and the camps.50 An exchange between Dillon and Joseph Chamberlain in March 1902 epitomises the depth of the former’s feelings on the war. Dillon ended up being suspended from the chamber after he was accused by the Speaker of ‘crying out that soldiers who were serving under the British Crown were traitors’. Dillon then called Chamberlain himself a ‘damned liar’.51 This was Dillon the agitator in full flight, with little care for the decorum or politeness of parliamentary procedure. In this mode, Dillon carried on many of the traditions of opposition pioneered by Joseph Biggar and Parnell. Redmond, and O’Connor for that matter, could rarely, if ever, be seen engaging in such spirited behaviour in the House. When looking at the evolution of Dillon as a politician, this example should be remembered as a benchmark, to show just how much Dillon had toned down his style in the years from 1906 until 1916, making his debut as a statesman in 1914 at the Buckingham Palace Conference. However, it is equally important to remember this outburst from 1902 when looking at Dillon’s final years in the House. In the wake of the 1916 Rising, and facing a coalition including strong Unionist elements, Dillon regained much of the characteristics of the agitator which he had so spectacularly unleashed in 1902. This example goes to the core of the differences in behaviour and attitude between Dillon on one hand and Redmond and

40

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

O’Connor on the other. The history of the evolution of the Irish party leadership closely follows the changing nature of Dillon’s attitudes to the governments of the day and his level of co-operation and engagement with the political process. Before leaving discussion of 1902, the stance and work of the leadership in relation to the Education (England and Wales) Bill of that year warrants attention. The dilemma the bill posed to the IPP was significant. The Catholic church in both England and Ireland urged the Irish party to support the Conservatives’ bill while the Liberals, as the Irish party’s parliamentary allies, expected the Nationalists to support their strong opposition to a bill that conflicted so strongly with the pedagogical concerns of non-conformist voters. That the bill had nothing to do with Ireland made Nationalist involvement in its passage even more contentious. Several years later, when English education was again before the House, Redmond reminded the chamber that, in supporting the 1902 bill, the Irish party had ‘alienated the friendship of many friends of Ireland’, underlining how education would always force the party to choose between the Liberals as their allies in Westminster and the Catholic church, which buttressed the party in Ireland.52 The most illuminating letter in the correspondence between the Irish party leadership on this subject is from T.P. O’Connor to John Dillon in late August 1902. O’Connor, from the sedate environment of the spa town at Vichy, observed that Catholic enthusiasm for a Tory education bill was misplaced and constituted an inadvisable justification for the party to support a Conservative bill.53 This view was not that of the majority of the Irish party and it strongly reflected O’Connor’s English radical background. As the only IPP MP sitting for an English constituency, O’Connor’s view on the subject was highly valuable both to the leadership and the party generally. However, O’Connor was aware that his sentiments did not reflect those of the Nationalist majority, who were in favour of the controversial move of supporting a Conservative bill. One contributory factor to O’Connor’s reluctance to press his opinions regarding the Education Bill on the rest of the Irish party was that Redmond was in America on a fundraising tour at this time.54 Seemingly, Redmond’s absence from the political scene had an impact on O’Connor’s stance on the bill, perhaps suggesting at a closeness in their opinions on the subject. This proximity is hinted at by a much later speech by Redmond in which he defended the party’s record in siding with the Conservative government in an effort to defend Catholic education.55 Noting the complexities of the situation, and Redmond’s absence, O’Connor informed Dillon that, despite his views on the subject, he would be ‘seized with a

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

41

diplomatic chill when the session opens; and that will necessitate a visit of mine to the Continent until Redmond returns’.56 Indeed, O’Connor noted that most of the Irish party would be ‘predisposed to go one way on education because I had advocated another’.57 The scale of the chasm that separated O’Connor from other Irish Nationalist MPs can be judged from a letter which O’Connor received in November 1902 from the independent nationalist and Healyite member for South Armagh, John Campbell, who repeated an allegation made in the Irish Independent accusing O’Connor of having ‘solicited, or induced, wealthy Liberals to put money in “T.P’s Weekly” on the ground that you would square the Irish Party in the matter of the Education Bill’.58 While this can be seen as typical of Healyite attitudes towards the official IPP, the view is reflective of prevailing distaste for following the Liberals in their opposition to the bill. While Dillon and Redmond were able to act independently of the Liberals on the subject of English education, O’Connor was more mindful of his hard-won alliances with high-ranking Liberals. This would be the first of many instances throughout the period under consideration that O’Connor’s uniqueness within the party and his distance from the realities of nationalist sentiment in Ireland would be exposed as a point of concern within the party leadership. T.P. O’Connor’s role in the early leadership Before going on to other parliamentary issues in these years, the place of O’Connor within the inner leadership during the Conservative era, and his respective ties and loyalties to Dillon and Redmond, should be explored in greater detail. T.P. O’Connor was, first and foremost, an ally of Dillon. He had been his colleague and close confidante prior to 1900, and that role continued unbroken thereafter. O’Connor’s relationship with Redmond is less clear-cut however. On the one hand, when O’Connor wrote to Redmond in these early years, he consistently wrote with a warmness that was characteristic of his written style.59 On the other hand, O’Connor was in significantly more frequent contact with Dillon. Perhaps the most important point is that O’Connor continued to act as a key link-man between Redmond and Dillon as he had done during the reunification process at the turn of the century. His value to the party was that he was best placed out of his colleagues to perform ongoing work in London on behalf of the party. In addition, O’Connor brought with him links to many senior Liberals. These would prove invaluable to the party after December 1905.

42

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

In the years of Conservative government up to 1905, the question of Home Rule at Westminster rested on the old two-pronged tactic of coercion and conciliation. On the one hand, the situation with evicted tenants and cattle driving was reminiscent of the Land War.60 Meanwhile, the policy of conciliation, better known as ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ in this period, manifested itself in a number of ways, building to a climax with Wyndham’s colossal Land Act of 1903 and the politically disastrous devolution scheme that followed on its success in 1904 and 1905.61 Given the endurance of Victorian-era Conservative attitudes to Home Rule among some members of the government, the Irish party leadership adopted their default reaction to carrot-and-stick tactics. This involved a blend of agrarian rhetoric as exemplified by Dillon and low-level obstruction in parliament; particularly the harassment of the Irish Chief Secretary at Question Time.62 Towards the Land Conference While the Irish party’s controversial support for Balfour’s Education Bill was a prominent part of its parliamentary activity in 1902, in Ireland, agrarian issues predominated, reflected in the ongoing cycle of agitation and coercion which, although never dormant, was notably intensifying in many districts between 1901 and 1902. Naturally, of the party leadership, it was Dillon who was most concerned and directly involved in such affairs. Banding together with O’Brien  – whose UIL had much to do with the re-kindling of agitation around the turn of the century – the party actively involved itself in agrarian unrest, with a large section of MPs addressing meetings – many of which had been proclaimed illegal – across the country.63 The increase in tension on the ground, as well as the prevailing vogue for constructive unionism that had spread to certain sections of the Irish landlord class, culminated in the autumn of 1902 with an open letter from the ‘hitherto unknown’ landlord’s son: Captain John Shawe-Taylor of Galway.64 Here, he proposed the convocation of a conference to discuss a solution based on the principles of putting landlord and tenant representatives opposite one another.65 The idea of a conference quickly acquired government support when George Wyndham, in his capacity as Chief Secretary, gave the proposal ‘not ambiguous official consecration’ two days after Shawe-Taylor’s letter.66 Shawe-Taylor had named Redmond, William O’Brien, and the then Lord Mayor of Dublin, T.C. Harrington, as tenant representatives alongside the independent Unionist T.W. Russell who represented Ulster Protestant tenant interest. Dillon’s absence from any tenant delegation

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

43

would have been notable. Based on background, Dillon was a more logical choice than Redmond, who having recently inherited his uncle’s estate was, in fact, a landlord himself.67 In a sense, this marked the first in a series of absences from top-level negotiations in the rest of Dillon’s career. Mindful of Dillon’s reputation as a hot-head, it is most likely that Shawe-Taylor’s omission stemmed from Dillon’s potential destabilising effect on any potential settlement. William O’Brien himself later reflected that the inclusion of Dillon, Davitt, or Sexton – all of whom would have been obvious candidates for a tenant delegation  – was in fact fortunate as it might have meant that ‘the Land Conference would possibly never have come off’.68 In this instance, while the ostensible reason for his absence was simple, in that he had not been invited, the reality was more nuanced. Regardless of the contents of Shawe-Taylor’s letter, the landlord side of the conference set a clear precedent that would allow for Dillon’s attendance should he or his colleagues have wished for him to attend. The landlord representatives named in Shawe-Taylor’s letter flatly refused to take any part in a conference. Instead, Lord Dunraven convened a committee of moderate landlords to nominate representatives. Therefore, the four landlord delegates facing the tenant representatives were entirely different from those initially proposed.69 One other possible reason for Dillon’s exclusion from this invitation was that he was in America at this point, and had fallen ill by the time the conference had met, but not before the Irish party’s delegation had been fixed.70 Secondary sources disagree as to the extent to which Dillon’s health impacted on his ability to attend  – or to be considered as a delegate to – the conference. In 1951, F.S.L. Lyons stated that Dillon’s American trip ‘need not have been an insuperable obstacle to his attendance at the conference’.71 However, when Lyons came to write his biography of Dillon, published in 1968, the author was a little more earnest about the gravity of Dillon’s condition and its effects on Dillon’s ability to attend to politics. He concluded that Dillon was ‘to all intents and purposes out of Irish politics’ between October 1902 and April 1903.72 Having returned from America early in January 1903, John and Elizabeth Dillon subsequently set sail for Egypt in an effort to give John some opportunity for recuperation away from the strains of work for the party. Lyons’ later writings do not wholly dismiss the fact that Dillon could have participated in negotiations if he had decided to do so. In 1968, he still maintained that this was a ‘crucial time in Irish affairs with the land question … on the point of solution’ and given that ‘Dillon’s views on that matter were so much out of line with those of his most influential colleagues, it was perhaps as well that he was removed from the scene’.73

44

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

It will be shown later that Dillon was very much aware that his presence often did more to hinder consensus than to promote it. In later years, he would often elect not to participate in negotiations citing this very reason as his justification. In light of the above, it can only be concluded that Dillon’s absence stemmed from a personal conviction that he would not enter into talks with the landlord interest. Dillon’s abstention from major conferences and negotiations would become a theme of his later career in politics. A combination of his self-awareness that he was not a natural conciliator and a will to retain an advisory role in the shadows would ensure that, with the notable exception of the Buckingham Palace Conference in 1914, Dillon would habitually opt to leave the business of direct negotiation to others.74 Regardless of the motives for absenting himself, Dillon’s subsequent stance on the Land Conference exposed a significant policy rift within the party leadership. Elizabeth Dillon recorded that her husband’s policy during the summer of 1902 was to ‘ “fill up the gaols” – but he does not explain what is to happen after that’.75 In practical terms, ‘filling up the gaols’ translated into a policy of public disobedience and agrarian disorder in an attempt to provoke reaction and repression from the authorities. In contrast to the Plan of Campaign or other previous instances of organised agrarian unrest, Elizabeth Dillon’s fear was that her husband had not worked out a political strategy for what to do after such a reaction been elicited. Furthermore, the campaign would not be able to make meaningful political capital out of the imprisonments. In addition, she was mindful of the personal turmoil that would ensue if her husband himself might be imprisoned again.76 Lyons notes that O’Connor, for one, was deeply opposed to Dillon’s radicalism. From his standpoint in England, O’Connor was keenly aware that, while Dillon wished to raise the temperature in Ireland, the land agitators had already secured a captive audience at Westminster.77 The resulting impression throughout political circles – both Tory and Liberal – was that Ireland was ‘utterly disturbed’ by the summer of 1902.78 Having distanced himself from any responsibility for the findings of a conference that would, in O’Brien’s words, ‘[reduce] to definite figures the tenants’ claim upon the soil of Ireland’,79 Dillon was free to oppose the settlement hammered out by Redmond and his colleagues at the Mansion House in Dublin. In the interlude between his return from America and his departure for Egypt, Dillon signalled to his colleagues the beginning of his divergence from the party line of ‘unity’ and ‘conciliation’ as championed by O’Brien and upheld by Redmond.80 Since the conference, this mood won widespread support within the party,

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

45

even if there was caution about extending this optimism to the resulting Land Bill. Official party policy on the conference was that it endorsed its findings ‘in the fullest manner’ but only as ‘the most moderate terms the Irish people ought to or will accept as a settlement of the Land question’.81 It is important to draw attention to this caution, as it shows there may have been an element within the Irish party less convinced of the prospects of a full legislative solution emanating from the Mansion House Conference. When the first moves at implementing its findings got underway, Dillon would echo and build upon this cautious scepticism. However, while his protest would begin as a lonely voice within the party leadership, it would culminate in one of the greatest policy shifts in the reunited party’s history. In his first letter to Dillon between his return from America and his departure to Egypt, T.P. O’Connor tried to ascertain Dillon’s stance on the proposed settlement and tentatively offered his own views on the situation from his vantage point in London. O’Connor saw the immediate benefits of the land conference report on public opinion in England, which had been greatly damaged by agrarian disturbances in Ireland up to that point. Now, O’Connor saw that ‘the reception that the report has received in many quarters and the discovery that we are not all lunatics and cut-throats, has undoubtedly laid the foundation for a calmer consideration of the National demand when it comes on’.82 Clearly, O’Connor was not so in tune with the importance of the land issue in Ireland as were the rest of his party colleagues. Nonetheless, he appears to have embraced the report and its positive aspects at this point. He also saw a real link between it and the possibility of some measure for Irish self-government being introduced. Thus, O’Connor can be placed in the Redmond–O’Brien camp on the land question. Despite the stance of one of his closest colleagues, Dillon gave his first indication that he would ‘diverge from the line taken by his friends’ when he refused to attend a meeting with Sir Antony MacDonnell to discuss the implementation of the report in early February 1903.83 Dillon found support from Davitt and another former party colleague, Thomas Sexton of the Freeman’s Journal,84 which now took the line that the landlords were being treated too kindly, taking on O’Brien’s ‘faltering weekly’, the Irish People, in a significant press battle.85 The rift between Dillon and his colleagues was self-contained and largely reversible in this early phase. Wyndham introduced his Land Bill in late March 1903 and immediately its financial provisions  – which were significantly more favourable to landlords than those proposed at the conference  – opened the door for Dillon’s more open and active opposition to the scheme. Again, in this, he was backed by Sexton in the

46

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

press.86 Sexton’s support for Dillon was important as the attacks issued by the Freeman’s Journal on O’Brien’s conciliationist policies gave significant weight to Dillon’s arguments. They ensured that his criticisms would not be construed as coming from a dissident hardline voice in the wilderness. In addition, the Freeman’s Journal still held sufficient influence, and market share, to make it an important tool nationally in representing the alternate standpoint to the conciliatory line that was still holding primacy in the Irish party. In assessing the gradual purging of O’Brien and his ideologies from the party in 1903, the Freeman’s Journal should be seen as having had an important role and as having been integral to building the wider momentum against conciliation within the constitutional nationalist movement.87 Of major and long-term significance for the later emergence of the tetrarchy, Dillon was selective in his targets at this point, focussing his criticism on the government on one hand and O’Brien on the other. Redmond, O’Connor, and Edward Blake all managed to maintain cordial relations with Dillon throughout the course of the bill’s passage and its aftermath. Far from distancing himself from these colleagues at this time, Dillon acknowledged that his anti-conciliatory stance was a minority one in the Irish party and he sought Redmond’s help in inserting certain amendments into the financial clauses of the bill which Dillon held to be crucial.88 By trying to please Dillon while still co-operating with O’Brien, Redmond engaged in a dangerous sort of double diplomacy at this time. On the one hand, he kept Dillon sweet by working with him on amendment proposals. Meanwhile, Redmond continued secretly to negotiate with Wyndham, sounding him out on how far the Irish Office would be willing to go in altering the generous terms offered to landlords.89 It was not the subject matter but rather the nature of these negotiations that forced Redmond to conceal their existence from Dillon. Such close co-operation between the party chairman and the Chief Secretary was the epitome of conciliation and constructive unionism. Dillon had his suspicions that understandings had been arrived at between the party and the Irish Office during his absence in America and, had Dillon become aware of Redmond’s actions, it would almost certainly have forced him to denounce the chairman with a vitriol similar to that which he would shortly unleash upon O’Brien.90 Although an extremely precarious manoeuvre, by conducting his business with Wyndham in secret, Redmond managed to avert any clash with Dillon, thus maintaining their cordial relationship at a time when Redmond’s proximity to O’Brien threatened to end the tentative alliance which would, in time, form the bedrock of the tetrarchy.

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

47

Conciliation confronted: Dillon’s return Attesting to the level of prominence O’Brien still had in the party at this point, one of O’Brien’s biographers notes how he ‘effectively bulldozed’ a convention of the UIL into endorsing the findings of the land conference while Dillon was abroad for health reasons. Out of this, O’Brien secured from the League full sanction for himself and Redmond to guide the Land Bill through the House of Commons.91 The stage was set for an internal battle within the party but one that would be played out very publicly. While Dillon would begin this confrontation as a lone voice in the wilderness, by the end he had successfully reversed his fortunes, reasserting control of the party and ousting what he saw as O’Brien’s conciliationist usurpation of the movement. O’Brien and Dillon characterised two opposing viewpoints on the bill when it came to be debated in the House of Commons. In his contributions to the debates on the bill, Dillon cautiously but unflinchingly supported significant amendments to the bill, saying that, in reference to one such amendment, the Irish party’s silence on the negative aspects of the bill was unrepresentative, and that ‘if they were forced to decide … in the Division Lobby – and he trusted they would not be – they would have, in favour of the Amendment, at least ten to one of the Irish representatives’.92 Despite having the weight of the National Convention against him, Dillon maintained this oppositional and maverick stance in the House throughout the passage of the bill, which became law in mid-August. The endgame of the O’Brien–Dillon rivalry within the party began in late August, when Dillon’s disagreement over the Land Act developed into a more general disagreement with O’Brien’s ‘conference plus business’ model for solving all of Ireland’s problems, including Home Rule.93 Beginning with a speech to his constituents in Swinford, Dillon launched his public assault against O’Brien by asserting that he had ‘no faith in the doctrine of conciliation’.94 A good explanation of Dillon’s views can be found in a letter to Redmond, written somewhat later, in early October 1903. Here, Dillon solidly distanced himself from the then prevailing policy in the party and drew a line between himself and O’Brien. He told Redmond, ‘I – as you know – have all along been opposed to the policy of allowing the initiative on – and the direction of large Irish Questions to be taken out of the hands of the Irish Party and handed over to Conferences summoned by outsiders’.95 Faced with this clear breach, Redmond would have to choose his side decisively and promptly, with lasting consequences both for party policy and for the future shape of the party leadership.

48

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Following the opening shots at Swinford, Dillon and O’Brien waged their conflict through the press, with Dillon using Sexton’s sympathy and alignment with his cause to harness the large and powerful Freeman’s Journal, whereas O’Brien was forced to rely on the dwindling influence and circulation of his weekly Irish People.96 Again looking in from the outside, T.P. O’Connor chastised Dillon for his vitriol, stating that the dissent and division he could so plainly see through reading both organs was ruining what represented one of the best chances Ireland had yet seen for pursuing legislative independence.97 Again ignoring O’Connor’s counsel, Dillon and the Freeman’s Journal persisted, eventually forcing O’Brien to pursue one last desperate tactic. Hoping to ‘shock the party and public opinion into realising the need for unity behind a clear policy’, O’Brien resigned from the party.98 Following his exit, an emergency party meeting extended an olive branch, asking O’Brien to reconsider but this effort was futile.99 With the resignation, the Dillon faction was able to capitalise and consolidate within the party and the leadership, successfully marginalising O’Brien and shifting party policy away from ‘conference plus business’.100 O’Brien’s removal from the party was the most important since the expulsion of Healy at the end of 1900 and it would not be until the identity crisis faced by the party in 1906 that anything comparable would shake the foundations of the inner leadership. Dillon had gone from a position of being a lone voice, ideologically at odds with all other members of the party leadership, not to mention the majority of the rank and file, to a position where he was able, through external pressure, to force O’Brien’s resignation. While O’Brien would briefly re-enter the party in response to the Sinn Féin crisis of 1907–8, his role in the leadership was firmly at an end. By the end of the decade, the anti-clerical O’Brien had found an unlikely ally in the fiercely pro-church Healy. They joined forces through O’Brien’s All-for-Ireland League (AFIL): the strongest and most credible alternative to official Irish Nationalism, bar Sinn Féin, ever to emerge. As a haven for dissident and disaffected former party members, the League posed a real threat to the official Irish party in the two general elections of 1910. Returning to 1903, the immediate effect of O’Brien’s departure was that the two most prominent and vocal potential members of the party’s inner leadership – O’Brien and Healy – were both firmly excluded from involving themselves with policy formation or decision-making at the head of the Irish party. In addition, in the way the long and complicated saga of the land question had played out between 1902 and 1903, Dillon had managed to preserve his friendship with both Redmond and O’Connor. Combined with the rise of Joseph Devlin and the exit of

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

49

Edward Blake, both of which will be discussed below, the shape of the tetrarchy that would decisively lead the party from the end of the first decade of the twentieth century until its demise in 1917–18 was becoming clearer. In the intervening years, the complex inter-relationships within the tetrarchy would continue to evolve. Cognisant of all the above, the removal of O’Brien and the manner in which it came about can be seen to have been one of the most important formative events in the history of the Irish party leadership. Before moving on, it should be stated that the role of William O’Brien up to this point in the party’s history has been deliberately under-represented here. Clearly, from his position as the founder and driving force behind the UIL to his unparalleled importance in the land question up to Wyndham’s 1903 Land Act, O’Brien had been a central player in the policy direction of the party. However, the object here is to include O’Brien only in as much as he influenced the emergence and development of the tetrarchy of Redmond, Dillon, O’Connor, and Devlin. Like Edward Blake, O’Brien can clearly be included in any description of the party leadership in the early years of this study. Unlike Blake, however, evidence on the composition of certain key meetings in these early years suggest that, while O’Brien had a strong and influential role in agrarian matters, Blake was more closely linked to overall policy formation within the party. Blake alone was included in certain small gatherings to discuss policy between 1901 and 1906 between Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor  – the nucleus of the later tetrarchy. There are some instances of other members being included in small policy formation meetings but all three future tetrarchs frequently discuss consultation exclusively between Redmond, Dillon, O’Connor, and Blake in these years indicating the shape of a policy-making core at this time.101 However, both Blake and O’Brien would be outside the official party by the end of 1909, albeit for very different reasons. Thus, they played only a supporting role in the emergence of the tetrarchy, and in an effort to more sharply focus analysis here, much of the detail of both O’Brien’s and Blake’s roles in the party’s leadership has been deliberately omitted.102 1904: towards devolution No sooner had he forced O’Brien’s exit from the party and public life generally, than Dillon  – arguably reeling from the stress of his most recent campaign  – embarked on yet another retreat to Italy and the Mediterranean in January 1904.103 Even upon his return in June, he did

50

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

not fully re-enter public life and only spoke in the House of Commons on three days in 1904: 13 June, 27 July, and 3 August.104 This time away from full political participation continued until the opening of the 1905 session in February, when Dillon finally resumed his traditional levels of parliamentary activity. Having reasserted his role at the head of the party, for Dillon to extract himself from public life for this length of time had a drastic effect on the balance of power in the leadership. While the situation at the end of 1903 could rightly be described as the triumph of Dillonism within the leadership and the party, his subsequent sabbatical from public life gave Redmond the opportunity to consolidate his own position as chairman. He had previously been torn between Dillon and O’Brien, desperately trying to accommodate both within a unified party and finding little space for his own voice during the turmoil. Redmond’s real evolution from chairman towards a more chief-like status would take more than a decade. However, in the vacuum of dominant figures created in 1904, he would find much more room to assert himself and consolidate his position as a leader of the party after the great upheavals of 1903.105 Despite the freedom of manoeuvre that his departure offered to Redmond, Dillon’s absence during 1904 added to a series of problems that left the party particularly short of senior personnel, especially when it came to participation in debates. In May, Redmond lamented to Dillon – who was then in Venice – that he was without the services of O’Connor, Blake, John Gordon Swift MacNeill, and even his brother Willie, all of whom had been ‘laid up’ with a variety of ailments for the greater part of the session.106 This constituted the majority of the heavyweights of the parliamentary party and, as such, Redmond was extremely hard-pressed at Westminster. Thus, despite his freedom from the dominant voices of Dillon, Healy, and O’Brien in the party, his lack of supporting senior MPs meant that Redmond was severely restricted in his ability to capitalise on his opportunity to assert his role in parliament during 1904. The real crisis in Irish politics came at the end of the 1904 session, when Redmond was away fundraising in America, and Chief Secretary Wyndham was also absent from his post, recuperating on an extended holiday.107 The devolution scheme, which had been formulated by progressive unionists on foot of their successes at the Land Conference and eagerly taken up by Sir Antony MacDonnell in the Irish Office, provoked a major crisis in British politics. The minutiae of the saga need not be entered into here except inasmuch as they relate to the leadership of the Irish party. Denis Gwynn notes one early divergence between Redmond and Dillon owing to their contrasting receptions of the scheme. While Dillon proclaimed from Dublin that the scheme was wholly inadequate

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

51

as a solution to the national question and merely represented the culmination of ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, Redmond – remote from the happenings at Westminster and Dublin on his tour of America  – responded enthusiastically to the summary of proceedings he had received by that point.108 Redmond viewed the move as ‘simply a declaration for Home Rule’ and, therefore, ‘quite a wonderful thing’ given that its origins lay in Irish unionism.109 In his admittedly partisan account of these years, William O’Brien is keen to emphasise this divergence between Redmond and Dillon. He construes Dillon’s stance as a ‘flagrant’ flaunting of party discipline in defiance of his chairman and the party; stressing that O’Brien’s own conciliation policy had not officially been recanted by either the party or the directory of the UIL by this point.110 While it is true that the party had not officially resolved to abandon the conciliationist approach, O’Brien’s estrangement from the party and the triumph of Dillonism at the end of 1903 clearly demonstrated that the de facto policy of the party had entirely moved away from conciliation. Any belief by O’Brien that the party still harboured sympathy with his views but was muted under the iron fist of Dillon thus constituted nothing more than wishful thinking. The simplest, and perhaps the most probable, reason for Redmond’s early enthusiasm for the devolution scheme is that he was not in full possession of the facts while in America. Indeed, there is no evidence that he had received any correspondence from his colleagues in the leadership briefing him on the scheme before he issued his statement.111 The only other factor at play here was Redmond’s own enthusiasm for getting unionists on board with the Home Rule issue. In this sense, Redmond was a conciliator but his subsequent alignment with Dillon would confirm that he had chosen his faction. When Redmond did return home, he appears to have offered little resistance to Dillon’s reading of the situation. F.S.L. Lyons records that once consensus for Dillon’s view was achieved, which is not noted as having received any opposition from Redmond, ‘the two leaders bent all their energies to making whatever political capital they could out of the situation’.112 The opportunity for making political capital arose when Wyndham returned from his absence to find himself at the centre of a crisis where his Under-Secretary, Sir Antony MacDonnell, claimed that he had worked in the full knowledge of the Chief Secretary, and that he had assumed that his superior was in ‘full sympathy with the spirit of the efforts to carry farther the programme for constructive reforms’.113 In fact, nothing could have been further from the truth, and Wyndham balked at the disregard and independence of action shown by his Under-Secretary. Wyndham’s condemnation of devolution, and

52

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the ensuing crisis it provoked in the government and in wider unionist circles, gave the Irish party leadership an opening to unleash a full scale campaign discrediting the administration that had allowed the policy to receive official support in the first instance.114 Before concluding on the ramifications of the devolution crisis on the party leadership, it is worth mentioning that O’Connor, who did not play a role in the crisis to the extent his colleagues did, is attributed with the phrase ‘devolution is the Latin for Home Rule’, suggesting his views were more sympathetic on the question than those which prevailed in the party generally.115 However, as L.W. Brady, a biographer of O’Connor, has pointed out, O’Connor’s cautious optimism over the devolution proposals was nullified by the fact that co-operation with the Conservatives ‘had proved difficult in practice and the devolution dispute had shown that some parts of the Irish problem were intractable’.116 In a wider sense, this willingness to consider devolution on its merits and not as an element of ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ reveals the conciliationist and moderate nature of O’Connor’s political thought, especially when compared to the more hardline attitudes of Dillon towards constructive unionism. Regardless of his position on devolution, O’Connor’s role as a link between the Irish party and mainstream British politics would become increasingly relevant following this debacle, as the crisis contributed in no small part to the more general malaise in the government during 1905. Deeply divided by the tariff reform question, Balfour’s government stumbled towards its eventual collapse, which led to the elevation of Henry Campbell-Bannerman to the premiership of a Liberal caretaker government in December 1905. Having been a close ally of the Liberals in opposition during the previous decade, O’Connor now found himself in a pivotal position, with old friends elevated to high places.117 Coupled with Campbell-Bannerman’s announcement of a legislative scheme for Ireland – which was welcomed by Redmond despite bearing all the hallmarks of the gradualism that would eventually lead to turmoil in 1907 – the Irish party leadership emerged from the Conservative era optimistic.118 With an imminent general election, the party looked forward to a new era of Liberal dominance, where Ireland might enjoy major legislative advances. The entry of Joseph Devlin Turning to the entry of Joseph Devlin into the ranks of the parliamentary party and his rapid rise to prominence, Devlin’s talents as an organiser were identified early on by all three of the men who would later become

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

53

his closest colleagues in the party leadership. Having pleaded with Redmond not to suggest his name for a vacancy in Galway in October 1901, Devlin finally acceded to fill the unopposed vacancy in Kilkenny North when it arose in February 1902.119 Even before his candidacy was accepted, he was in America, undertaking an extremely impressive fundraising tour which also sought to buttress the grassroots structure of the UIL there through the establishment of a string of new branches.120 O’Connor appears to have been the most impressed with Devlin’s early skills and potential, writing to Dillon in late 1903 that ‘the more I see of Devlin, the more confidence I have in his intelligence; his entire honesty, of course, could never be doubted’.121 This link with O’Connor proved valuable for Devlin earlier in 1903, when O’Connor vouched for Devlin’s reputability and reliability on foot of an enquiry from Dillon. This view was then transmitted to Redmond.122 In this light, it can be asserted that all Devlin’s future colleagues in the inner leadership of the party were aware of his worth and potential by this point. One element that should not be overlooked here is Devlin’s long-standing role within the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH). The Order described itself as ‘a powerful auxiliary in helping on the work of politically emancipating our land’.123 It provided important financial assistance for the UIL, particularly during elections. For Devlin it gave him the advantage of leading an association that had branches worldwide and was second only to the UIL in terms of representing constitutional nationalism in communities at home and abroad.124 Although not central to his rise, Devlin’s success in growing and redefining the Order was yet another example of his organisational talents. Continued links with the organisation throughout his career gave Devlin prestige as the leader of a powerful wing of the broader nationalist movement: just one more element of his growing reputation which qualified him for promotion. In particular, through his work as an organiser and later General Secretary for the United Irish League of Great Britain (UILGB) – of which O’Connor was president – Devlin found a platform from which his talents could be fully demonstrated. O’Connor had, in fact, sought Devlin out for the role, and had to convince him to take it, as Devlin apparently shied from the offer out of modesty.125 Again, close co-operation with O’Connor ensured that he would move closer into the admiration and trust of the leadership. Following on from this, Devlin’s greatest opportunity for advancement came in August 1904, when a vacancy arose for the position of General Secretary of the UIL in Dublin. His predecessor, John O’Donnell, was a loyal O’Brienite and had been manoeuvred into resignation in response to developments at the top of the party in the months previous.126 Not

54

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

wishing the vacancy to remain unfilled, and mindful that Redmond was about to embark on yet another fundraising tour of America, Dillon suggested that Devlin fill the role in an interim capacity, his plan being that ‘if during the interval between now and your return any one occurs to us who could do the work here instead of Devlin – it will be easy to appoint him and let D[evlin] return to his work in Great Britain’.127 This was a major advance for Devlin and, in fact, he did retain the role, allowing him to cement his position as the most promising young MP in the Irish party. With the shift of his focus from Britain to Ireland, in many respects he would become an understudy for Dillon as an overseer of the party and the movement in Ireland. With experience of British politics from serving his political apprenticeship under O’Connor in England, and now having secured one of the most prestigious roles in Irish organisation, when the Liberal era dawned in 1906, Devlin was ready and well placed to assume an even more central position within the leadership of the party. In view of his meteoric rise, one must ask the question: why Devlin? From the forty or so MPs who had joined the parliamentary party in its first decade since reunification, why was Devlin singled out for the leadership? The answer would appear to lie squarely with his organisational ability, the element of his political curriculum vitae that stood out above all others. Evidence to support this can be found in 1903, in a letter from O’Connor to Dillon in which he, somewhat despairingly, noted that ‘of the younger men of the Party, except Joe Devlin, there does not seem much to expect. Conor O’Kelly, I hope, may develop; and perhaps Pat McHugh may be able to do some good work; but on the whole it is a very poor look-out’.128 This frank observation suggests that the overall calibre of new party members had fallen since reunification, possibly owing to the new nomination systems enforced by the UIL.129 Having mentioned this, it should not be inferred here that Devlin was simply the ‘best of a bad lot’. As much as Devlin possessed many attributes that marked him out for advancement, the story of his rise also exposes the closed nature of the leadership. Perhaps learning from the errors of Parnell, who surrounded himself with talent but cultivated no clear successor, Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor may have viewed Devlin as their collective protégé. Despite this, and Devlin aside, as has been demonstrated already in this chapter, the leaders were keen to streamline the machine at the head of the party. That Devlin was the only ‘young’ MP to be plucked from the ranks is compelling evidence of the existing leadership’s unwillingness to share or dilute the level of power that had been won by the end of 1903. While such a policy had

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

55

its clear disadvantages, one certainty is that they had picked a protégé of rare talent in Devlin. In addition to his political attributes, Devlin’s personal friendships, particularly with O’Connor and the Dillon family, arguably stood in his favour.130 Whatever the reasons for his ascent in the early years of the twentieth century, it is also important to analyse here the benefits which the inclusion of Devlin brought to the inner leadership of the party. The most immediate benefit of Devlin’s inclusion was the addition of youth. The average age of Devlin’s three senior party colleagues as they fought the second general election of 1910 was fifty-eight, whereas Devlin was a few months away from his fortieth birthday. To further contextualise this, the average age across the whole Irish party in 1910 was 50.4 years. The average age of the Irish Unionist party in the same year was almost identical at 50.9 years.131 While it would have had little direct impact on voters, its general effect on popular perceptions of the party can be seen to have been significant. By the second decade of the twentieth century, a growing section of public opinion in Ireland came to view the Irish party as old, stagnated, and outdated. The presence of Devlin at the centre of its leadership can be seen to have acted as a powerful counterweight to the party’s detractors. The second key trait that Devlin represented within the leadership was his identity as an Ulster Catholic. This would become increasingly valuable as the Home Rule crisis intensified and the spectre of partition began to surface from 1913 onwards. Without Devlin, the leadership represented, from a constituency point of view, South Leinster in the form of Waterford City, Connaught in the form of East Mayo and the Irish in Britain through O’Connor’s seat in Liverpool (Scotland Division). As a Belfast native, representing the constituency of West Belfast, Devlin possessed an authority and a credibility that his colleagues could not hope to match when it came to selling to Ulster the Home Rule settlements proposed between 1912 and 1917. As will be argued later, being the only Ulsterman in the tetrarchy provoked an ideological crisis in Devlin. However, his success in keeping Ulster nationalists loyal to the party can be seen in the survival of constitutional nationalism in the North after 1918 and his conclusive electoral victory over de Valera in the newly drawn constituency of Belfast City, Falls.132 Much like Redmond representing south Leinster and O’Connor’s affiliation with Liverpool, Devlin’s brand of nationalism included a strong constituency and regional loyalty which would secure him a seat for life, long after the majority of his southern Irish colleagues had lost theirs.133 In conclusion, while the reunification of the IPP ostensibly occurred on 1 February 1900, in reality, it was a process rather than a singular event.

56

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

It unfolded in three distinct strands: the coming together of old rivals, the purging of unwanted contenders, and the elevation of a protégé who the leadership could agree represented the future of the new party. All these processes had begun by the end of 1905. However, none of them were complete. Whereas there was unanimity on the choice of Joseph Devlin as the future of the party, echoes of the split persisted, purges and power-plays prevailed, and – behind the Redmondite façade – John Dillon established himself as the powerhouse of the new party. Once the dual threats of William O’Brien and Tim Healy were addressed and temporarily neutralised, it could be said that the party began to recover from the effects of O’Brienism. While the mechanisms that the UIL had brought to the party endured, their potential for reforming the party was not realised. With the gradual establishment of the tetrarchy, the transparency and democracy heralded by the UIL was not allowed to penetrate much below surface level. Its momentum was usurped and, at the heart of the party, men who had led opposing factions in the 1890s compromised with each other, consolidated their position, and ensured that power would not slip from their collective grasp. From the perspective of the leadership, the future was bright as the Irish party stood at the dawn of a Liberal era. Internal stability was high and the efficacy of the UIL at constituency level would be vindicated in January 1906, when Nationalists secured a degree of electoral cohesion not seen since the 1880s. Finally, a hostile government had given way to a new Prime Minister who was not only a former Irish Chief Secretary but was also the most committed Home Ruler in the upper echelons of his party since Gladstone. However, there were ominous clouds in the distance. The party had secured its electoral victory at the price of individual freedoms. Disaffected dissidents were circling and, inside the party, some members began to show signs of strain over the length of time it was taking for Home Rule to gain a foothold on the legislative agenda at Westminster. The Liberals would be given a chance to find a solution to the Irish question but, in the provinces, Nationalists were becoming impatient. In time, the leadership would face pressure from its followers to reassess its relationship with the new government. There would be no ‘union of hearts’ in the twentieth century. Any Liberal–Nationalist alliance would emanate from careful strategic consideration rather than from emotion. Notes 1 Biagini, British Democracy, p. 198 citing O’Brien, Parnell, p. 145 [n. 1]. The original quote is reported in O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 47. It is unclear from

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

57

this original source whether these words were actually spoken or whether they were a literary invention or embellishment contrived by William O’Brien. 2 Robert Michels, Political Parties:  A  Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, ed. Seymour Lipset (1st Eng. edn, London, 1915: new edn, New Brunswick, 1999), p. 365. 3 Michels, Political Parties, p. 172 et seq. 4 Michels, Political Parties, p. 212. 5 Michels, Political Parties, p. 215. 6 E.T. Reed [illustrator], ‘1914: the return from Belfast’, Punch, 17 January 1912. This image is reproduced in Finnan, Redmond, p.  39 [­ figure  6]. Redmond was represented as Napoleon in numerous other caricatures. For example, see ‘The Nationalist ‘Nap[oleon]’, Evening Times, 20 November 1913. 7 Michael Wheatley, ‘John Redmond and federalism in 1910’, Irish Historical Studies, xxxii, no. 127 (May 2001), p. 343. 8 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party. 9 O’Brien, Parnell and Biagini, British Democracy, esp. pp. 190–205. 10 IPP Minute Books (3 vols, NLI, MS 12,080–2) [covers the period 31 December 1900–6 November 1918 inclusively]. 11 The contrast between the two biographies of T.P. O’Connor clearly illustrates this point. See Hamilton Fyfe, T.P. O’Connor (London, 1934)  and L.W. Brady, T. P. O’Connor and the Liverpool Irish (London, 1983). 12 Richard Aldous, The Lion and the Unicorn: Gladstone vs Disraeli (London, 2007). 13 The Leader, 12 March 1910, quoted in F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon: A Biography (London, 1968), p. 325. 14 Roger Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy (Edinburgh, 2004), p. 6. 15 H.P. L’Orange, Art Forms and Civic Life in the Late Roman Empire (Princeton, 1965), p. 43. 16 The system was supported by Diocletian’s wider reforms in administration, with the establishment of dioceses as further internal sub-units of the Empire, with a vicar [vicarius] administering over each diocese: Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, p. 25. On the importance of unity and how it was cemented, see pp. 72–6. 17 On the ‘Caesarist’ ascendancy of Parnell, see Biagini, British Democracy, p. 197. 18 See David S.  Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180–395 (London, 2004), pp. 340–2 and Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, pp. 76–80. 19 Loughlin, ‘Devlin, Joseph’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, p. 243. 20 Curley, ‘Elizabeth Mathew’, pp. 138–9. 21 Loughlin, ‘Devlin, Joseph’, p. 241. 22 This is not to suggest that either Dillon or Devlin were in any way absentees from Westminster but rather that Redmond and O’Connor had begun to

58

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

lose touch in Ireland. Records show that Dillon was increasingly involved in the debates of the House of Commons during these years, indeed the scale of his contributions outstripped that of Redmond after 1911. To take the instance of 1911 [full session], the Parliamentary Gazette reported that Dillon’s speeches filled 116 full columns of Hansard whereas Redmond only contributed 33 columns to the official record in the same period. James Howarth (ed.), Parliamentary Gazette, no.  22 (London, January 1912). According to the Gazette, this trend was repeated in subsequent years, although the publication cannot be judged to be 100 per cent accurate. Dillon’s name was omitted from a league table rounding up the full session of 1910 despite the fact that he had contributed thirty-two columns up to the Whitsuntide recess. See Howarth, Parliamentary Gazette, nos 18 and 19 (London, 1910/11). 23 For the minutes of party meetings, including the annual election of party officers, see IPP Minute Books (3 vols, NLI, MS 12,080–2) [covers the period 31 December 1900–6 November 1918 inclusively]. 24 Healy, Leaders and Letters, ii, 453. On Healy’s expulsion, see Callanan, Healy, p. 441. 25 O’Brien, O’Brien, pp. 126–37. 26 Lyons, Dillon, p. 182. 27 Lyons, Dillon, p. 228. 28 For the profound sadness felt by Dillon over Davitt’s passing, see Lyons, Dillon, p. 267. 29 See Blake to Dillon, 14 September 1899 (ODPRA, EBP:  microfilm, NLI, p4682/421) and Margaret Banks, Edward Blake Irish Nationalist: A Canadian Statesman in Irish Politics, 1892–1907 (Toronto, 1957), pp. 197–232. 30 On the factional struggles with constitutional Nationalism, see Bew, Conflict and Conciliation and Maume, Long Gestation. 31 Banks, Blake, p. 207. 32 Bull, ‘United Irish League’, p. 52. 33 John Dillon to Blake, 28 February 1899 (ODPRA, EBP:  microfilm, NLI, p4682/396), emphasis appears in the original. 34 Elizabeth Dillon to Blake, 18 January 1899 (ODPRA, EBP: microfilm, NLI, p4682/388) the elections referred to are the local government elections, see Irish Times, 17 January 1899. 35 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 28–30. 36 On the Parnellites’ particular emphasis that the split was political rather than personal or moral, see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 28–9. 37 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 89 and Bull, ‘United Irish League’, p. 52. 38 Dillon to O’Brien, 14 March 1900, quoted in Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 91. 39 In particular, see O’Connor to Dillon, 28 September 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/95) and O’Connor to Dillon, 15 October 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/99) where O’Connor impresses upon Dillon the necessity of meeting with Redmond and seeing if ‘an understanding [could] be had with him’.

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

59

40 On Healy’s expulsion, see Callanan, Healy, p. 441. 41 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 97. 42 Although Healy was not officially expelled from the IPP until December 1900, candidates loyal to him ran in opposition to official Irish party candidates selected through the machinery of the UIL. The IPP lost only four seats in seventeen run-offs with independent (Healyite) Nationalist opponents. In addition, one Healyite, J.L. Carew, was elected unopposed in Meath South. Overall, the October 1900 elections secured 76 seats for the reunited Irish party in Ireland (out of 103 nationally). Brian M.  Walker, Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland, 1801–1922 (Dublin, 1978), pp. 158–63. 43 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 97, quoting a letter from O’Brien to Redmond cited in O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 127. 44 O’Connor to Dillon, 24 December 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/111). 45 O’Connor intended to start a new weekly within a few months. He saw a disassociation from Irish politics as being important to this enterprise as such a venture had the potential to be ‘injured, if not destroyed, by national prejudices’. O’Connor to Dillon, 24 December 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/111). 46 For examples, see Dillon to Redmond, 4 August 1900, 21 December 1900, and 24 January 1901 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/3/A). 47 Dillon to Redmond, 12 May 1901 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/3/A). 48 Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 117–36. 49 On the longer history of Irish involvement in non-Irish issues, see Alan O’Day, The English Face of Irish Nationalism:  Parnellite Involvement in British Politics, 1880–86 (rev. edn, Aldershot, 1994). 50 Dillon to Redmond, 11 January 1902 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/3/A). 51 The Speaker’s accusation that Dillon called British soldiers traitors was in fact false, and a careful reading of the passage in Hansard confirms this: Hansard 4, xx, cols 588–93 (20 March 1902). For Dillon’s own defence of his actions, see Dillon to Redmond, 22 March 1902 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/3/B). 52 Hansard 4, clvi, col. 1504 (10 May 1906). 53 O’Connor to Dillon, 26 August 1902 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/122). 54 See ‘Return of Mr John Redmond’, Irish Times, 18 December 1901. 55 Hansard 4, clvi, col. 1504 (10 May 1906). 56 O’Connor to Dillon, 26 August 1902 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/122). 57 O’Connor to Dillon, 26 August 1902 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/122). 58 John Campell, [sic] to O’Connor, 14 November 1902 [copy] (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/1). 59 Lyons, Dillon, p. 326. 60 For a sample of prosecutions from 1901–2, including cases involving five separate IPP MPs, see ‘Prosecutions under Criminal Law and Procedure Act since formulation of the United Irish League’ (NAI, CSORP, CO 904/20/563–71). 61 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600–1972 (London, 1988), p. 435. 62 For a particularly rowdy performance by the Irish party in the House at Question Time, see sitting of 1 June 1905; Hansard 4, cxlvii, cols 430–57.

60

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

63 The most detailed record of party involvement in UIL meetings and activities related to agrarian agitation can be found in ‘The British in Ireland, CO 904, part one: anti-government organisations, 1882–1921’: CO 904/20/593 et seq.: reports of UIL meetings, 1901. 64 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 99. 65 For the full text of Shawe-Taylor’s letter (2 September 1902), see O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 140. 66 O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 141. 67 Redmond would go on to sell these holdings under the terms of Wyndham’s Land Act. See Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp.  103–4. There are extensive files of correspondence relating to the sale of these lands in 1903 contained within Redmond’s papers (NLI, RP, MSS 15,241/10; 15,242/2–4, 10, 13, 14; 15,247/7). Lieutenant-General John Patrick Redmond, John’s uncle, had died on 7 March 1902, see Irish Times, 8 March 1902. 68 O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 143. 69 On Dunraven’s initiative, see O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 147. For a description of each of the landlord nominees, see pp. 169–71. 70 News of Dillon’s illness reached Elizabeth Dillon on 24 November 1902 (Lyons, Dillon, p. 263). For details of this illness and its personal and political repercussions for Dillon, see Lyons, Dillon, pp. 263–7. 71 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 102[n]‌. 72 Lyons, Dillon, p. 227. 73 Lyons, Dillon, p. 265. 74 William O’Brien claimed that both Dillon and Michael Davitt had fallen into the ‘habit of shrinking from offering definite advice or initiating action’ by 1902. It should, however, be remembered that this was written at a later date, when O’Brien was engaged in a bitter contest with the party through the AFIL: O’Brien, Olive Branch, pp. 143–4. 75 Diary of Elizabeth Dillon, 27 July 1902, quoted in Lyons, Dillon, p. 226. 76 On Elizabeth Dillon’s fears over John returning to prison, see Lyons, Dillon, p. 227. 77 Lyons, Dillon, p. 226, quoting O’Connor to William O’Brien, 12 August 1902. 78 Lyons, Dillon, p. 226, quoting O’Connor to William O’Brien, 12 August 1902. 79 O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 143. 80 See O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 149 and Lyons, Dillon, p. 228. 81 Resolution proposed by Capt. Donelan, seconded by William Lundon, and carried unanimously, minutes of IPP meeting of 16 February 1903, IPP Minute Book, vol. I (NLI, MS 12,080). 82 O’Connor to Dillon, 17 January 1903 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/124). 83 Lyons, Dillon, p. 228. 84 George Wyndham, then Chief Secretary, was very much behind O’Brien at this point. He saw Dillon’s alliance with Sexton as a union of the disenchanted and he believed that the pair were ‘joined together to “spike” conciliation’. George Wyndham to his father, 21 November 1903 [354], in Life and Letters of Wyndham, ii, pp. 474–5.

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

61

85 O’Brien, O’Brien, p.  151. O’Brien’s struggle with the Freeman’s Journal was finally settled in court through a pyrrhic victory for O’Brien in a libel action against the paper, see Felix M. Larkin, ‘Sexton, Thomas’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, viii, p. 834. 86 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 152. 87 See Felix M. Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman: Thomas Sexton, W.H. Brayden and the Freeman’s Journal, 1892–1916’ in Ciara Breathnach and Catherine Lawless (eds), Visual, Material and Print Culture in Nineteenth Century Ireland (Dublin, 2010), pp. 216–18. 88 For examples, see Dillon to Redmond, 23 May 1903 and Dillon to Redmond [telegram] 2 July 1903 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/4). 89 These secret negotiations were carried out through correspondence, with Wilfrid Scawen Blunt acting as a safe conduit for letters between Redmond and the Chief Secretary. Lyons, Dillon, p. 231. 90 Lyons, Dillon, pp. 230–1. 91 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 153. 92 Hansard 4, cxxiii, col. 1061 (16 June 1903). 93 Lyons identifies this as O’Brien’s own term for his conciliation model as exemplified by the December 1902 land conference:  Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p.  198. This is further substantiated in O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 184. 94 Freeman’s Journal, 26 August 1903, quoted in Lyons, Dillon, p. 236. 95 Dillon to Redmond, 3 October 1903 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/5). 96 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 151. The Irish People eventually ceased publication for two years beginning in November 1903, O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 159. 97 O’Connor to Dillon, 4 October 1903 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/127). 98 Bull, ‘O’Brien, William’, p. 92. 99 See minutes of IPP meeting of 24 November 1903, IPP Minute Book, vol. I (NLI, MS 12,080). 100 As above, see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p.  198 and O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 184. 101 O’Connor to Dillon, 3 March 1904 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/133); Dillon to Redmond, 23 May 1903 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/4); Redmond to Dillon, 3 February 1905 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/122). For an early inclusion of Devlin to this cohort, see Redmond to Dillon, 28 June 1905 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/145). 102 Written by a fellow O’Brien, Joseph V. O’Brien’s 1976 biography remains a valuable work. Likewise, on Blake, Margaret Banks’ 1957 biography has yet to be surpassed in assessing his entire Irish career. O’Brien, O’Brien and Banks, Blake. 103 See Lyons, Dillon, pp. 266–7. 104 See Hansard 4:  cxxxv, cols 1497–501; cxxxviii col. 1322; and cxxxix, cols 724–5. 105 This typology is examined in detail in Brian Farrell (ed.), Chairman or Chief? The Role of Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin, 1971).

62

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

106 Redmond to Dillon, 17 May 1904 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/74). The amount of illness can be seen as hard evidence, if evidence were needed, to support the contemporary perception that the IPP lacked youth and dynamism in these years. 107 On the devolution crisis, see A.C. Hepburn, ‘The Irish Council Bill and the fall of Sir Antony MacDonnell, 1906–7’, Irish Historical Studies, xvii, no. 68 (September 1971), pp. 470–98. 108 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 106. 109 Quoted in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 106. 110 O’Brien, Olive Branch, p. 327. 111 Gwynn records that Redmond based his opinion on the summary of the scheme that was supplied to the United States press: Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 106. 112 Lyons, Dillon, p. 274. 113 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 105, italics have been added here for emphasis. 114 F.S.L. Lyons, ‘The Irish Unionist party and the devolution crisis of 1904–5’, Irish Historical Studies, vi, no. 21 (March 1948), p. 19[n]‌. 115 Quoted in Brady, O’Connor, p. 164. 116 Brady, O’Connor, p. 165. 117 J.A. Spender records the depth of friendship between O’Connor and Campbell-Bannerman, citing an instance when the latter wrote to his ‘old friend’ to suggest some good French books during a bout of illness near the end of his life. J.A. Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G. C. B. (2 vols, London, 1923), ii, pp. 379–80. 118 On Campbell-Bannerman’s ‘step-by-step’ approach to Irish policy, and his ‘surprise’ at Redmond’s acceptance of this, see A.J.A. Morris, ‘Bannerman, Sir Henry Campbell (1836–1908)’ in H.C.G. Matthew and B.  Harrison  (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/32275) (14 January 2011). See also, Wilson, CB, p. 109. 119 On Devlin’s refusal of the Galway seat in 1901, see Devlin to Redmond [telegram], 18 October 1901 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/1). 120 Devlin’s first letter to Redmond from this tour is dated 17 February 1902. His election in Kilkenny North was formalised on 26 February. See Devlin to Redmond, 17 February 1902 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/1) and Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, p. 163. 121 O’Connor to Dillon, 19 December 1903 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/129). 122 See Dillon to Redmond, 27 February 1903 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/4). 123 From an address from the Belfast and County Antrim Branch of the AOH to Joseph Devlin c. 1906, quoted in Lord Ashtown (Frederick Oliver Trench), The Unknown Power behind the Irish Nationalist Party: Its Present Work and Criminal History (London, 1907), p. 6. Despite its obvious partisanship on the subject, this contemporary exposé of the work of the AOH has value due to the rarity of alternative sources in trying to piece together the composition and functioning of the Order.

Towards the age of the tetrarchs

63

124 For example see the importance of the AOH in Australia and America in fundraising for the 1906 general election, Ashtown, Unknown Power, pp. 137–8. 125 See A.C. Hepburn, Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland in the Era of Joe Devlin, 1871–1934 (Oxford, 2008), p. 99. 126 For a summary of events see Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, pp. 100–1. 127 Dillon to Redmond, 14 August 1904 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/4). 128 O’Connor to Dillon, 19 December 1903 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/129). 129 On the functioning of the UIL’s nomination system from the summer of 1900 onwards, see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 149–57. 130 Devlin had a great admiration for Elizabeth Dillon as well as her husband. Devlin’s telegram of condolence upon her death emphasises the depth of Devlin’s feeling: Devlin to Dillon [telegram], 15 May 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6729/116). 131 Party average ages taken from Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 158. 132 Devlin won in the straight contest by 8,488 votes to 3,245:  Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, p. 186. 133 Like Redmond, both O’Connor and Devlin continued to be MPs until their deaths in 1929 and 1934 respectively. Interestingly, it should be noted that O’Connor chafed under the burden of having to actually go to Liverpool to contest his seat in 1900. That Christmas, in a melancholic mood, he contemplated giving up the seat. On the inconvenience of having to spend long periods of time in Liverpool, see O’Connor to Dillon, 24 and 25 September 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/89 and 6740/91). On O’Connor’s desire to vacate his seat, see O’Connor to Dillon, 24 December 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/111).

3 Leadership in a Liberal era, 1906–9

[I]‌t is well known to all students of political manoeuvres that a body of politicians, though they have comparatively few adherents in the rank and file, is often disproportionately powerful from the fact that it has its leaders within the very heart of the citadel, or, to use the less reverent American expression, that its leaders have more or less control of the ‘machine’. – T.P. O’Connor, 19081

1906: a sympathetic government Following the Liberal landslide in the 1906 general election, the Irish party found itself in the unusual position of having its long-standing ally, the Liberal party, in government. However, the general election that copper-fastened the primacy of the Liberal party resulted in such a resounding victory that the new government had no need for Irish support in the chamber. As a result, the Irish question was relegated to a lower priority than it had occupied for many years previous while a raft of legislation promised in the Liberal manifesto was put before parliament. For the Irish party leadership, having doggedly opposed a hostile government for ten years, the reversal of the political situation in 1905–6 necessitated a complete rethink of Nationalist parliamentary tactics. Individuals within the Irish party leadership would respond in very different ways to this challenge. In late November 1905, in the dying days of Balfour’s Tory government, Campbell-Bannerman had managed to secure cautious support from the IPP for a new Liberal policy on Ireland that was based on the principle of gradualism:  a ‘step-by-step’ approach to Home Rule. T.P. O’Connor had been busily working to arrange a meeting between Redmond and Campbell-Bannerman for some time and, writing from Mayo, Dillon was very anxious that such a meeting should take place before the Liberal leader made public his intended Irish policy.2 Redmond made a speech in Glasgow on 10 November warning that devolution

Leadership in a Liberal era

65

style proposals would not satisfy Irish Home Rulers. Four days later, he and O’Connor met with Campbell-Bannerman in London.3 The Irish party leadership were aware that Campbell-Bannerman faced an uphill battle on the Irish question within his own party from Rosebery and his allies on the Liberal Imperialist wing of the party. Behind the scenes on the Irish side, John Dillon appears to have been the principal strategist, advising Redmond that he should do all in his power to buttress Campbell-Bannerman’s position prior to the election. As Dillon saw it; ‘If the Liberals quarrel with us after the election – we shall have it in our power to make their position an impossible one. And unless absolutely driven to it by the conduct of Asquith and Rosebery I  do not think we should do or say anything calculated to make a sweeping defeat of the Unionist Party and the formation of a strong Liberal Government impossible’.4 Thus, Irish Nationalists would tolerate Campbell-Bannerman limiting his commitment to Home Rule to the principle of gradualism if it guaranteed a united Liberal party and thus a resounding defeat of the Conservatives at the polls. In a speech to his constituents at Stirling on 23 November, Campbell-Bannerman aired the gradualist policy he had sounded out with Redmond and O’Connor in London nine days previously.5 By 25 November, Rosebery made a fatal miscalculation, recording his objection to Home Rule in a speech at Bodmin in Cornwall which ultimately split him from Campbell-Bannerman and left him isolated from the other Liberal Imperialists who accepted C.B.’s gradualist approach to the Irish question.6 The IPP faced into the transfer of government optimistically and with trust and faith in the new Prime Minister. However, Dillon had made a dangerous miscalculation on the electoral prospects of the Liberals. His complex strategy would have worked if Irish Nationalists could exploit a narrow margin between the two big British parties. Even before the election, F.S.L. Lyons notes that Dillon had become concerned ‘about the reality of Liberal promises, such as they were’.7 When the election was held in January of 1906, the extent of Dillon’s miscalculation became apparent. The Liberals won almost 60 per cent of seats in the Commons; rendering Nationalist support, and thus the prioritisation of Irish legislation, irrelevant. With electoral confirmation that the Liberal government was there to stay, 1906 represents a metamorphosis in the evolving form and function of the Irish party leadership. The entire nature of the work of Irish party was changing, particularly at Westminster, where it had to diverge from the well-worn path of habitual opposition to adopt a delicate balance of co-operation, informal alliance, and the imposition of

66

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

intermittent pressure on the Liberal executive. Despite these challenges, in his response to the King’s Speech in February 1906, Redmond enthusiastically greeted this new dawn in politics, stating that The Party whose raison d’être was opposition to the Irish question on the basis of self-government has been swept out of existence, and the Party which has been publicly pledged for twenty years to a settlement of the question on the basis of self-government has been returned to power by an overwhelming majority.8

Nevertheless, while the Tories had actively opposed Home Rule, it now appeared that the Irish question would suffer an equally unfavourable fate due to Liberal inactivity and procrastination. As F.S.L. Lyons has noted, despite assurances from the government that Irish legislation was in the pipeline in 1906, the fact that concrete proposals did not come to light until 1907 put a question mark over the date at which measures on Irish government reform were actually put in motion by the Liberal government.9 Regardless of the Liberal government’s sincerity and its intended timeframe for Irish reform, the change of government certainly necessitated a sea-change in the policy of the Irish party. Focus will now turn to how the leadership reacted to this challenge. An end to government hostility on the Irish question, coupled with the short-term paralysis of the question, makes 1906 a significant turning point in the policy direction and parliamentary tactics of the Irish party. Prior to the prorogation of parliament, a meeting of the Irish party on 10 February 1906 resolved that ‘the Irish National Party cannot enter into alliance with or give permanent support to any English Party or Government which does not make the question of National Self-Government for Ireland a cardinal point in its programme’.10 Bearing in mind the historical divergence – going back to the 1890s – between Redmondism and Dillonism on the issue of the Liberal alliance, this resolution might at first appear to reflect the independent parliamentary stance as championed by traditional Parnellism/Redmondism. However, when one considers the inclusion of the words ‘permanent’ and ‘cardinal’, it becomes clear that this policy was less dogmatic than it could have been. While the Irish party clearly wanted to be seen to be tough on the Liberals regarding the Irish question, it was, in fact, signalling its acceptance of a temporary and conditional alliance with the new government based on the inclusion of the Home Rule question in Campbell-Bannerman’s programme for government. The party had, in fact, adopted something closer to the traditional anti-Parnellite stance from the time of the split, acceding to support of the Liberal government in all but name. Despite its conditionality, this marked a new era

Leadership in a Liberal era

67

in Irish party relations with the British government. Notwithstanding the many strains that would be placed upon this informal alliance, close co-operation with the Liberals would remain party policy from that point onwards. The leadership faced a new and utterly different challenge to that which it faced during the Tory era. F.S.L. Lyons has cited a breakfast meeting on 14 November 1905 at which Redmond and O’Connor met with Campbell-Bannerman as evidence of the cordiality that existed between the parties at this point. Here the prospective Prime Minister renewed his expression of commitment to Home Rule. However, it is believed that subsequent meetings, particularly with the new Chief Secretary, James Bryce, provide a more realistic impression of the nature of the Nationalist–Liberal alliance.11 Lyons also presents the idea that the apparent opportunity for Home Rule at the end of 1905 was nullified, in the short term at least, by the changed situation after the general election.12 The Campbell-Bannerman meeting of 1905 was held prior to the elections and represented the ideal and theoretical equilibrium between the two parties. Meetings, particularly those with Bryce, between the general election and the prorogation of parliament in early 1906 show the true situation that faced the Nationalist leadership as a new era in British politics dawned. One landmark event in this transition was the first meeting Redmond and Dillon had with Bryce since the elections. Here, the Irish party’s desired direction for the government’s Irish policy was signalled to the Chief Secretary. The points for discussion, as outlined in a letter from Dillon to Redmond on the subject, were: the release of the Galway prisoners,13 the measures to be promised in the King’s Speech – and the more I think over it the more convinced I am that we must demand these measures – I.  Repeal of Coercion Act II. Labourers Bill III. Amendment of Land Bill – We could never face the country if there were no promise of an Amending Land Bill. IV. The paragraph in the King’s Speech dealing with the question of Irish Government. V. Irish Language and other minor matters.14

This shows Dillon engaged in a salvage and consolidation exercise following the relegation of the party’s demands to the lower rungs of the government’s programme. The demands outlined here reflect a lingering hope in the Irish party that the Liberals would make good on their commitments to Ireland in spite of their landslide. However, seeking the

68

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

inclusion of a paragraph on Irish government in the King’s Speech fell far short of Campbell-Bannerman’s pre-election assurances on fresh initiatives for Ireland. In this sense, the Irish party was revising its demands downwards to meet the realities of the changed political situation. Dillon was scaling back his own demands to maintain the appetite of the Liberals for his programme of reforms for Ireland. The first four of the points for discussion listed above reflected a desire to end some of the most objectionable policies of the previous administration, namely coercion and unjust laws on land and government. The final two demands on the list show the leadership turning its attention to the immediate future, to a political climate where the introduction of legislation sympathetic to Ireland would be a realistic and achievable expectation. The primacy of agrarian and coercion matters in this programme reflects the influence of Dillon on the course of Irish legislation. Of the leadership, he was more concerned with the land-question than the others, a fact evidenced by Wyndham’s observation during the Land Act negotiations of 1903 that he was ‘a pure agrarian sore-head’.15 The inclusion of the Irish language issue in this list is noteworthy. The sentiments of the party leadership on the subject were complex. In broad terms, it can be said that all members of the tetrarchy viewed the language favourably. However, none were by any means zealots or even personally committed enthusiasts on the subject. The inclusion of this on the party’s legislative programme arguably had more to do with grassroots pressure from party members active in the Gaelic League, with the classification of the language as a ‘minor’ issue probably reflecting its place in Dillon’s personal hierarchy of legislative demands. Paul Bew has provided the most comprehensive overview of Dillon’s shifting attitude on the language question. Having ‘embraced the Gaelic League enthusiastically in 1897’, Bew explains that Dillon’s attitude ‘cooled considerably’ following a number of disputes, including one in Dillon’s constituency.16 Like other organisations including, in their time, the UIL and the Irish Volunteers, the Gaelic League was viewed as both a threat and an opportunity by Dillon and his colleagues in the leadership. Interestingly, Redmond had, with Dillon’s knowledge, approached the League’s president, Douglas Hyde, as a potential parliamentary party candidate as early as 1904. As Redmond put it to Dillon, Hyde’s candidature ‘would certainly minimise any chance of friction between us and the Gaelic League in the future’.17 Hyde, whose apolitical stance saw him manoeuvred out of the League’s presidency by more advanced nationalists eleven years later, turned down repeated offers from Redmond to join the party.

Leadership in a Liberal era

69

By 1909, unable either to mollify or to influence the League, Dillon’s attitude hardened decisively. At a UIL convention in February, he vocally opposed a key pillar of Gaelic League policy:  the Irish language as a compulsory requirement for matriculation to the newly formed National University of Ireland.18 Lyons notes that, overall, Dillon fell short of the Gaelic League in his vision for the language, disagreeing with compulsion for a variety of reasons; not least due to his concerns for the Anglo-Irish section of the Irish population.19 Before progressing to the content of the King’s Speech, it is important here to discuss some minor changes to internal party rules and policies that were adopted in early 1906. At a party meeting on 14 February 1906, the day after the prorogation of parliament, these were passed as a series of resolutions. The first stated that members should not accede to requests ‘by constituents and others to use their influence in the direction of securing appointments under Government’.20 This suggests that such requests had been received by party members in the past. The author and proposer of this resolution is not identified in the party minutes but this measure can be viewed as part of the chairman’s efforts to clean up the party and enforce good party discipline at the opening of a new session. Following this resolution, two further measures were adopted. Strictly speaking, these were not resolutions and they were not voted on. In both cases, the minutes cryptically record that ‘an understanding was arrived at’.21 The first of these was that members ‘should not back British bills without consulting the Chairman’ and the second, that members ‘before attending deputations to ministers should seek the advice of the Chairman of the Party’.22 Firstly, one might question what had, in fact, happened to the tight and well-oiled parliamentary machine from Parnell’s day. Redmond had obviously given MPs a reasonably free hand in their parliamentary work during the Conservative era. Taken together, these measures represented a centralisation of power in the hands of the chairman – and his inner circle of advisers – and a dilution of individual MPs’ autonomy in engaging with both government and parliament. In that way, this otherwise forgotten party meeting represented a significant transition in the rules and procedures of the party at Westminster. In reality, it marked a major milestone in the evolution of Redmond’s style of leadership, to use Brian Farrell’s typology, from chairman to chief.23 Returning to the King’s Speech, when the day came, it transpired that the new government’s commitment to Irish government reform was vague and generalistic. The King’s Speech addressed the Irish question in the following terms: ‘[the government] have under consideration plans for improving and effecting economies in the system of government

70

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

in Ireland and for introducing into it means for associating the people with the conduct of Irish affairs.’24 With hindsight, the historian can see how this could be viewed as a clear signpost pointing towards the Irish Council Bill of 1907, a bill that was seen to be too moderate to warrant Nationalist support. However, in the immediate aftermath of the King’s Speech, reactions to the government’s new stated policy on Ireland were mixed. In the House, Redmond’s main concern was to ensure that the Irish question did not get buried under the Liberal’s electoral landslide. He carefully coaxed the government on the subject in his reply to the King’s Speech, making sure to counter the traditional arguments from unionist quarters.25 Despite his many private assertions that he would ‘make a very strong protest’ if the King’s Speech did not go far enough for Ireland,26 John Dillon remained generally sedate and silent in the early days of the 1906 session. He did not directly attack the government over its decidedly gradualist stance on Ireland, choosing instead to aim his criticism at the more traditional target of the Ulster Unionist party.27 As F.S.L. Lyons has shown, the reasoning behind this was tactical. The unexpected introduction of an Ulster Unionist amendment designed to force the government into a premature disclosure of its scheme for Ireland meant that Dillon was forced to hold his tongue in the face of the government’s failure to make good its full commitment to Ireland in the King’s Speech. Under the circumstances, Dillon restricted himself to a veiled threat, declaring that the seasoned parliamentary veterans of the Irish party would ‘not [be] difficult to deal with … so long as they were convinced that those with whom they were dealing were honest and in earnest’.28 The other part of the King’s Speech of 1906 that was to have a profound impact on Irish party policy was the primacy of English and Welsh education reform in the government’s legislative programme.29 It is not intended to provide a full treatment of Irish involvement in the English education question here but it will suffice to say that the issue forced the Irish party leadership into an area where Dillon feared to tread, Redmond was uneasy but eager to please the English Catholic hierarchy, and T.P. O’Connor was at odds with the bulk of the Irish party, just as he had been when similar ground had been traversed in 1902.30 As always with the English education question, Catholics in England – of whom 90 per cent were reportedly of Irish descent31 – were urged by their church to side with the Tories, who would always safeguard denominational interest and its funding. Meanwhile, from an Irish nationalist standpoint, the UILGB, presided over by O’Connor, had busily worked to ensure the Irish – largely Catholic – vote in Great Britain went to the Liberals. Now the Irish party faced a situation where the candidates it

Leadership in a Liberal era

71

had backed in Britain were working against the Catholic-Irish population on an issue that would affect them tangibly at local level.32 In the context of the Irish party leadership, the outcome of this complex dilemma was that Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor all took different stances on the question. Given its importance as a piece of legislation, and the potential implications of the Irish party sticking its neck out on a purely British issue, the leadership’s lack of clarity can be seen to have been very dangerous and inadvisable. On the one hand, Redmond took the line that he would support the English Catholic hierarchy, going against the Liberals and necessitating a full explanation of his involvement in the question in the House of Commons. The chairman stuck to his principles, arguing in the House that ‘I do not believe Ireland will lose a single friend by open and candid adherence to principle’.33 Dillon, meanwhile, was lukewarm on the issue. Despite briefly involving himself in the debate on the second reading, he failed to come out strongly on either side of the education debate. The strongest assertion he could give was that, given the choice between a purely secular education system and simple Bible-reading, he would ‘unhesitatingly accept the purely secular’.34 While this echoed Liberal sentiments on the issue, and betrayed Dillon’s own personal anti-clerical streak, he was nonetheless happy to accompany Redmond to meetings with Archbishop Bourne of Westminster.35 Thus, Dillon ideologically sided with the Liberals, but for diplomatic reasons, he straddled the fence on the issue. T.P. O’Connor shared this stance, ideologically falling into the Liberal camp, but being forced to pay lip service to the English Catholic hierarchy, in this case for a different reason. O’Connor’s reliance on the votes of his English constituents and his role in the UILGB meant that his stance on the bill was one that fought for the maintenance of state support for Catholic schools based on their importance to his constituents, and to Catholics all across England and Wales.36 While L.W. Brady sees this as evidence that O’Connor was turning to ‘British domestic issues’ by 1906, from the perspective of the IPP, he was as active and involved as ever.37 Whereas he may have given more attention to his constituents on other issues, his involvement on the education issue was a clear collaboration with Dillon and Redmond. In his capacity as an Irish party MP, he was acting as a member of the party chosen by the English Catholic hierarchy to represent them on this issue. The views and actions of Joseph Devlin on the English education question in 1906 are irrelevant, as he was in Australia on a fundraising tour throughout the entire saga.38 However, despite this, brief exploration of the 1906 English Education Bill demonstrates that, when faced with an

72

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

English issue, and one in which the Irish party’s two greatest allies – the church and the Liberal party – were at loggerheads, the leadership was ideologically fragmented. Again proving that the Parnell split had more to do with politics than religion, Redmond, the old Parnellite, sided with the church, whereas Dillon and O’Connor broadly if somewhat mutedly stuck to their support for the Liberals. Owing to the discord among the leadership over education in 1906, the result was that the party as a whole eventually followed a policy closest to that of O’Connor, paying lip service to Catholic interest, but not wanting to be pushed so far as to have to offer stiff resistance to the Liberals as a result. Though Machiavellian, the policy had its merits: it kept the church on side with the party and simultaneously it did not go so far as to damage cordial relations with the Liberals. It should not be automatically assumed that discord over English education was a weakness within the leadership. Firstly, the issue was not of sufficient gravity to Ireland to warrant strict unity of leadership. The ability to allow three of the most senior Nationalist politicians to adopt slightly differing stances on the question without internal fallout testifies to the strength of the inner leadership. Secondly, bearing in mind that the party leadership could happily co-operate privately while simultaneously presenting divergent public stances on this issue, this freedom gave the party the ability to be different things to different audiences. To the Catholic Irish in England, O’Connor was championing their cause. For the Liberals, they could see Dillon making positive gestures in their direction, although he could not always extend this support to siding with the Liberals in the division lobbies.39 Finally, Redmond was able to placate the English bishops without having to resort to a full-scale attack on an otherwise friendly administration. Thus, while one could leave 1906 by stating that the inner leadership of the IPP was in a state of disarray over the education question, they had actually managed to navigate the party safely through very treacherous waters, keeping the government, the Catholic church, and the Catholic-Irish public in both Britain and Ireland on side. In this light, if one can take the leadership’s actions here as having been intentional – and that is by no means clear or certain – they had accounted well for themselves in their first major legislative crisis in the new era of Liberal government. 1907: disappointments and dissent One of the core arguments in the present book is that, in charting the emergence and evolution of the inner leadership of the IPP, the events

Leadership in a Liberal era

73

occurring between 1907 and 1909 represent a watershed in this chronology. Not only were important legislative and internal party battles waged in this short period, but it also witnessed a number of external events that had a profound impact on the leadership in a variety of ways. In addition, following the ill-fated Irish Council Bill of 1907, which will be discussed below, there was a distinct shift in focus away from Westminster and towards Ireland. Whereas before, the Irish party had to convince the Liberals in order to push through its demands, now the situation would be inverted and the party would have to consult its electorate in order to respond with consensus to what the government and the Irish Office had put before them for consideration. The first major impact on the Irish situation to occur in 1907 was a change of personnel at the head of the Irish Office. Bryce resigned as Chief Secretary in January when he received the ambassadorship to Washington. The reluctance with which Bryce originally took up the Irish Office post can be gauged by a memorandum written by him shortly after accepting the portfolio from the Prime Minister. Here he recorded how he had Told him [Campbell-Bannerman] that I  could accept the Irish Sec’yship only as an experiment, and that if fatigue pressed too much for my health I was to be at liberty to retire, and that I presumed that if there was any higher office then vacant, I should be considered for that, to be appointed to it if possible; and that if I wished to go to H.[ouse] of Lords, peerage would be given.40

In this frame of mind, it is not surprising that Bryce was both unremarkable and often unengaged with the Irish question and the Nationalist leadership during his term of office. While Bryce’s term in Irish administration had been brief and inglorious, his successor, Augustine Birrell, would cast a much longer shadow in the Irish Office, serving there for nine years, including some of the most momentous ever seen in the history of Ireland’s constitutional demands for self-government. Birrell had come directly from the Board of Education, where his dealings with the Irish party over the Education Bill of 1906 had laid the foundations for a cordial working relationship. Attesting to the lack of consultation between the government and the Irish party leadership at this time, T.P. O’Connor admitted to Redmond on 18 January that he could neither ‘confirm nor deny the report that Birrell is the new Chief Secretary’.41 This also testifies to another problem that cropped up intermittently within the leadership in these years. O’Connor’s frequent trips out of town, for health, social, and recreational reasons meant that he was often more of a part-time tetrarch.

74

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

While both Redmond and Dillon appear to have endured his absenteeism with good will in their letters, it seems likely that at certain junctures O’Connor’s trips to the continent and the English countryside must have frustrated his colleagues to some extent.42 As the most constant link between the leadership and the government in these years, the practical implications of his frequent and often extended absences cannot be overlooked. When Bryce had floated the idea of an Irish Council with devolved powers over certain aspects of Irish government and administration, the Irish party leadership flatly rejected the proposal. Denis Gwynn observes that Birrell’s policy was to tackle the question ‘from a more liberal [with a lower-case ‘l’] point of view’.43 Indeed, Birrell’s entire approach to the business of the Irish Office distinguished him from Bryce. In essence, he would deal with the Nationalist leadership with his characteristic charm and light-heartedness, beginning with a ‘cheerful note from him [informing] Redmond that he was now installed in his new headquarters’.44 While this may appear trivial, the difference in style between Bryce and Birrell was to have a profound effect on the leadership of the IPP over the coming years. Redmond in particular was taken by Birrell’s affability and natural charm, whereas Dillon maintained his habitually cautious façade in dealing with British politicians of all shades. In the short term, this did not cause any major divisions within the leadership. However, as will be seen, divergent attitudes on the issue of how the party should conduct itself with the government, and the Irish Office in particular, would lead to subtle yet important changes in the interrelationships between the tetrarchs. Redmond and O’Connor represented the party in a meeting with Birrell shortly after he took office in February 1907.45 In sharp contrast to the lead-up to the King’s Speech of 1906 and dealings with Bryce, Birrell seemed determined that consultation with the Irish party leadership would be a hallmark of his term in office. Mention of the university question, promise of an acceptably far-reaching paragraph on Home Rule and even a positive note on the evicted tenants on the Clanricarde estate were all to be included in the 1907 King’s Speech; a speech that would finally placate the leaders of the Irish party.46 The Clanricarde estate had been an enduring and high profile problem in the Irish land question since the Marquis of Clanricarde had refused to accept the 1903 Land Act and had replaced his own evicted tenants with a ‘besieged band of “planters” ’.47 The Clanricarde issue, O’Connor noted, was brought up by Birrell himself, without any prompt from his Nationalist guests. Having waited patiently in the wings for Irish legislation while Bryce was in office, it appeared that 1907 was to be the year of the Irish. Interestingly, there

Leadership in a Liberal era

75

is very little evidence that Dillon played any significant role, advisory or other, in these negotiations with Birrell. His correspondence with the rest of the party leadership at this time appears to have focused more on issues in Ireland. In an initial instructional letter to Redmond, Dillon informed the chairman that ‘T.P.’ would meet him in London and give him ‘full information on the situation [there]’.48 Following this, Dillon turned his attention almost entirely to matters in Ireland, leaving Redmond and O’Connor to negotiate with Birrell and the Prime Minister without his further advice. This shift in Dillon’s priorities is attested to by a lapse in updates from O’Connor to Dillon after his and Redmond’s interview with Birrell reported on 9 February.49 Quite apart from the link between the Council Bill and the crisis it provoked in the party, some roots can be traced back further when assessing the situation that unfolded in 1907. Michael Wheatley has carefully linked the origins of a general malaise in grassroots nationalism back to mid-1906, citing a proclamation by Laurence Ginnell  – a highly vocal but notoriously independently-minded member of the IPP – as representing one of the earliest events in the history of a longer crisis.50 In the course of a local commemoration speech at the bridge of Finea on the Westmeath–Longford–Cavan border held in August 1906, Ginnell stressed his support for the official parliamentary party, while at the same time stating that ‘he would not put obstacles in the way of any other public body of Irishmen who thought they could help Ireland by any other policy’.51 This was a clear vote of confidence for the nascent Sinn Féin movement and, as such, it was strictly at odds with official party policy. While Wheatley shows that, on a local level, the Mullingar branch of the UIL swiftly issued a repudiation to counter Ginnell’s dangerous proclamation, it would appear that the Irish party leadership took little notice and even less action on foot of Ginnell’s dissident and provocative speech.52 While nothing immediately came of this early instance of dissent, it is important to highlight it. It shows the links between the discord that would erupt within the party in 1907 and a shifting mood at grassroots level going back to 1906 when the dawning of the Liberal era at Westminster had not resulted in tangible change in Ireland. The manifestation of these grassroots sentiments was represented by more than the stance taken by Ginnell and a small body of agrarian agitators. Other disparate elements within the more advanced wings of nationalism began to organise and articulate their programme at this point. Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin would be central to articulating this brand of alternative nationalism. In this case, the manner in which the leadership dealt with this threat would have deep ramifications both

76

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

within the parliamentary party and among the nationalist electorate on the ground in Ireland. Despite the deep roots and enduring nature of dissidence within nationalism, 1907 was a central moment in the longer history of dissent within the constitutional movement. Dillon told a gathering of his constituents that it would be ‘the most critical and fateful year’ since 1890.53 In the shadow of 1912, 1914, and 1916, the importance of 1907 has been somewhat eclipsed. The aim here is to show that the events of that year actually had the most profound effect upon the evolution of the Irish party’s inner leadership in its formative years. Pointing to the significance of the Council Bill in this respect, Dillon told a public meeting at Ballinrobe that nationalists’ response to the scheme would be a measure of the unity of the Nationalist movement. He went on to explain that what he feared most of all was another devolution-style proposal; one which would be a cloak for an ‘audacious attempt … to break up that army which has been enrolled during the last twenty-five years’.54 Acknowledging the ever precarious nature of Irish party unity, what Dillon envisaged, or warned against, in 1907, was a renewed split: undoing the monumental achievement of 1900 at a time when a sympathetic, if not entirely proactive, government had the potential to alleviate Ireland’s grievances. Dillon did not conceal his scepticism over the prospects of a satisfactory revision of Bryce’s council scheme. However, the fear that the Irish question might slip from the Liberal agenda altogether forced him to stow his misgivings and hope that pressure could be put on Birrell to ameliorate his proposals before they were made public.55 Redmond’s take on the Council Bill largely echoed that of Dillon. In essence, while neither member was at all satisfied with the adequacy of the scheme before them, it was arguable that – for tactical reasons – Irish support for the bill was necessary.56 To reject it would, in no uncertain terms, entail the rejection of ‘any hope of a measure of full self-government in that session’.57 The conundrum was how to pitch this to the nationalist public in Ireland and more specifically to the national delegates of the UIL who would have to sanction the party’s stance on it through a convention which was duly held on 24 May 1907. How could the party leadership advocate a settlement that fell so far short of Home Rule despite its tactical advantages? In reality it could not. With no real stake in the bill, which was a purely governmental initiative, Redmond was free to pre-empt public opinion and advocate its rejection. Ultimately, an unexpected tragedy just prior to the convention would deprive the party chairman of the support of John Dillon at this critical juncture. The

Leadership in a Liberal era

77

absence of Dillon would ensure that any opportunity to explain and carry through a more complicated line of argument, involving either temporary or full support of the Council Bill through the Commons, was no longer credible. Before moving on to the prelude to the convention and the unforeseen event that would leave Redmond standing before the delegates without his most powerful ally, it is appropriate here to divert and examine the role of Edward Blake, as a senior Nationalist figure up to 1907 and an important player in the early leadership of the party prior to his resignation. In May 1907, Blake suffered a stroke, the culmination of years of ill health. This precipitated his resignation from all aspects of political work and his return to his native Canada to live out his last years in seclusion.58 As touched on earlier, Edward Blake played a highly important advisory role in the wider leadership of the party up to 1907. His biographer has shown that he played a key part in negotiating the Irish Council Bill and in analysing drafts proposals on the scheme negotiated between the government, Dillon, and Redmond.59 Even before the Council Bill crisis, Blake had signalled to his senior colleagues that, owing to his ailing health, this would be his last session with the party.60 Blake had taken an important role in the leadership since his work during the reunification in 1900. He had aided Redmond in drafting resolutions to define the party’s complex stance on the Land Bill in 1903. Furthermore, Blake had held the fort for the party at Westminster when O’Brien unexpectedly took the Chiltern Hundreds at the culmination of his battle with Dillon and the Freeman in late 1903 and into 1904.61 In this second instance, Blake filled the role traditionally taken up by O’Connor as the party’s guardian and watchdog at Westminster: the senior party figure who was ‘on call’ to respond to any issues in parliament in the absence of equally senior party colleagues.62 Arguably the most significant role taken by Blake in the business of the party came at the end of his career, when, ending a long seclusion from public life due to health concerns, he looked forward to participating in ‘negotiations for the preparation of a new Home Rule Bill’; what would eventually become the Irish Council Bill.63 Perhaps enthusiastic about the prospect of contributing to one last piece of important Irish legislation, Blake initially appears to have been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the bill among the highest tiers of the party hierarchy. In her biography of Blake, Margaret Banks indicates that Blake may have had an important influencing role on Redmond in this regard, having highlighted the positive points contained within early drafts of the scheme. Reflecting the gradualist sentiments of English Liberalism rather than the ‘no half-measures’ stance favoured by many of his party

78

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

colleagues, Blake noted that ‘we can always … as we prove our capacity to use wisely what we have got, press for addition to the powers [granted in the Council Bill]’.64 Redmond’s initial enthusiasm for the bill – subject, of course, to improvement in key areas – can be attributed in no small part to Blake’s desire to ‘bring the scheme to fruition’ from an early date. This desire was not shared by other senior colleagues.65 Meanwhile Blake echoed the overwhelming disappointment of the leadership when Birrell forwarded a revised draft entitled ‘Skeleton of a Plan’.66 Blake shared the views of the rest of his colleagues that a bill which so manifestly failed to go far enough in granting legislative freedom to an Irish assembly could not be supported. As the National Convention of the UIL approached in the summer of 1907, Blake, Dillon, and Redmond collaborated closely in drafting a resolution to sum up party policy on the bill. Although all were now resolved to advocate the bill’s rejection at the convention, the conclusion to an early draft of Redmond’s resolution stated that, unless major defects in the draft legislation were ‘remedied’, the party could not support the second reading of the bill.67 It would appear it was Blake’s influence, combined with Redmond’s own convictions, that resulted in this more moderate stance than the one eventually adopted. By clinging to the prospect of significant amendment, Redmond and Blake appear to have held out hope that, despite the meagreness of the proposal now before them, they could extract further concessions from Birrell and not have their efforts amount to nothing. The shape of the resolution that eventually went before the convention has much more to do with Dillon and Devlin, who were more cognisant of the public mood in Ireland, and in Dublin especially, in the prelude to the convention. Having consulted them on the state of feeling in Dublin, Redmond amended his position, concluding that ‘the best thing for the Party and the movement is to reject the bill’.68 While there was unity in the leadership’s ultimate stance at the convention, one sees that there were subtle differences on a policy front. In any case, the strength of feeling against the bill in Ireland meant that a hard line would have to be adopted, and any hopes of favourable amendments abandoned. At this point in the mounting crisis over the Irish Council Bill, the sudden death of John Dillon’s wife Elizabeth – following a bout of pneumonia which culminated in a stillbirth  – had profound consequences for Dillon both personally and politically.69 Elizabeth had not only been a spouse to Dillon, she was a committed and involved nationalist in her own right.70 Attesting to this, her participation in discussions and debates in the Dillon household over the years had made a lasting impression on many of John Dillon’s colleagues who had encountered

Leadership in a Liberal era

79

her.71 Among the leadership, Devlin appears to have held Mrs Dillon in high esteem, frequently sending on his best wishes to her in his correspondence with her husband.72 On hearing the ‘heartbreaking’ news of her death, Devlin promptly wired Dillon conveying his shock, expressing how he was ‘grieved beyond expression’.73 O’Connor echoed these sentiments, saying that he was ‘inexpressibly grieved by [the] dreadful loss’.74 Redmond’s communication on the subject does not survive but it would seem highly improbable that he did not communicate immediately on receiving the news of his colleague’s tragic loss. Dillon’s intense grief can be measured by a short piece entitled A Short Narrative of the Illness and Death of My Dearest Love written by him the following month while still coming to terms with his loss.75 Dillon had loved his wife deeply and was now left without his closest confidante and with the added burden of having to support their six surviving children. While his wife’s death would have a lasting effect on Dillon in countless ways, the immediate consequences for nationalism were extremely serious. The absence of one of Ireland’s foremost Nationalists from proceedings could not have come at a worse time. Redmond had been anxiously chasing Dillon for advice and draft resolutions right up to the day of his wife’s death.76 Now, as the National Convention that would decide the Irish Council Bill’s fate loomed ominously, Redmond was left to go before the country alone. Without his ‘principal adviser and colleague’,77 Redmond stood before the convention and, in a very comprehensive resolution, announced that the party would be advocating the rejection of the bill, thereby upholding traditional policy of the party; namely, that ‘half-measures’ would not suffice in the resolution of Ireland’s problems.78 Writing in 1932, Denis Gwynn – son of an Irish party MP who had written an earlier biographical account of Redmond’s career79  – attempted to defend Redmond’s reputation in face of the popular supposition that Redmond had been in favour of the Irish Council Bill until relatively soon before the convention. Gwynn uses a selection of the correspondence between Redmond and Dillon to show how the idea that Redmond ‘was almost personally responsible for the bill and that he hoped earnestly that the Convention would endorse it’ was ‘utterly untrue’.80 There is no basis to suggest that Redmond was responsible for the contents or shape of the bill. While Redmond did not ‘hope earnestly’ for an endorsement of the Irish Council scheme from the convention, he did see the tactical benefit of supporting the bill. Its rejection by the representatives of nationalist Ireland in the shape of the UIL convention can be seen as representing the limits of the leadership’s powers. It set an important precedent for the years of the Home Rule crisis – an insistence that the electorate

80

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

would have its say on the final shape of any settlement of the Irish question. Later, government intransigence on partition would show the limits of the power of the nationalist body politic but 1907 and the rejection of the Council Bill firmly showed the necessity of getting voters behind any settlement. Lyons was a firm believer in the power that national conventions gave to the body politic. He felt that in 1907 this power was actual rather than theoretical and the assembled members of the convention were not afraid to use it.81 Events such as the Buckingham Palace Conference82 would show how the leadership learned from this, keeping the public informed during the formative stages of that settlement rather than presenting them with the final text. Finally, the 1907 National Convention showed the power of the UIL at grassroots level and the ways in which it could be used as a platform for dissidence. Redmond’s experience at the 1907 UIL convention as evidenced here tallies closely with Eugenio Biagini’s findings about the Liberal party’s grassroots organisation, the National Liberal Federation. Focusing on the late nineteenth century, Biagini found that, despite the dominance of party managers within that organisation  – chief among them F.W. Schnadhorst83 – national conventions were not a ‘wirepuller’s paradise’ and the democratic nature of national conventions meant that party leaders had to act with prudence in their dealings with delegates. If they were to have policies endorsed by conventions, they would have to treat the wishes of delegates with respect.84 Policies could not simply be railroaded through the democratic structures of either party. In the Irish case, with the majority of branches hostile to gradualism, Redmond had to bow to popular sentiments in 1907. While an overwhelming majority of all UIL branches rejected the Irish Council Bill at the 1907 convention, the fallout from this galvanised a much smaller section who were more generally opposed to the orthodoxy of the Irish party leadership and eager to abandon attendance at Westminster as the cornerstone of the Nationalist tactics. The next test for the leadership would be a number of highly significant exits from – and re-entrances to – the party in the second half of 1907 and into early 1908. By provoking this upheaval in party membership as will be dealt with presently, the longer-term fallout from the rejection of the Irish Council Bill would provoke yet another crisis for the leadership. How they dealt with this would noticeably change the internal equilibria of both the party and the tetrarchy. For a section of Irish nationalism, the opportunity presented by the formation of the Liberal government in 1905 had stagnated with the rejection of the Council Bill. If a dressed-up form of devolution was the best that could be offered, the appetite for parliamentary abstention became a more palatable option for sections both inside the party

Leadership in a Liberal era

81

and nationwide. Having had a slow start in the years previous, Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin became something of a mecca for the disaffected following the rejection of the Council Bill. As Paul Bew has argued, in a climate of national discontent that prevailed between 1907 and 1908, ‘many currents flowed into Sinn Féin’.85 While it drew an understandable following from a younger section of nationalists and those of a more advanced persuasion, it also managed to attract a number of Irish party MPs into its ranks. By this good fortune, Griffith could capitalise on the difficulties of a party whose prestige had ‘sunk to a very low ebb’ in the turmoil following the nation’s rejection of the Council Bill.86 Despite being a new and relatively low-profile member of the parliamentary party, C.J. Dolan, MP for North Leitrim, became the icon of this phase in the early history of Sinn Féin. Having allowed time for Griffith’s ideas to permeate across Ireland, Dolan ran as Sinn Féin’s first candidate when he resigned from the IPP and ran against it at the beginning of 1908.87 Despite this, Dolan was actually the least well known or prominent of the three parliamentary party MPs who defected from the IPP to Sinn Féin at this point. James O’Mara MP was more senior, having represented Kilkenny South since 1900. Far more significant was the case of Thomas Esmonde (Wexford North), senior whip of the Irish party. He had been active in the party since the Parnell era, having entered parliament in 1885. His defection thus represented the most significant coup for Griffith’s organisation. The long drawn-out saga of these three defections need not be entered into in detail here but a brief examination of these members’ motives is necessary. In their letters of resignation, both Dolan and Esmonde explained that they had fallen out of sympathy with the party and both indicated the centrality of Griffith’s abstentionist doctrine to their decisions. Claiming that Irish people were becoming ‘more and more accustomed to the legislative union’, Dolan stated that, while in the Parnell era the party was capable of using its presence in Westminster to obstruct legislation, ‘the rules of the House of Commons have been altered, and Westminster is no longer a battlefield on which Irishmen wage war on British institutions’.88 More so even than O’Brien’s resignation in 1903, defections to Sinn Féin were deeply rooted in ideology and, in Dolan’s case, by leaving it to his constituents to express their views on the merits of his alternative, the party faced a potentially disastrous threat. Given that Griffith’s policy would remove the Irish party from its work at Westminster, assimilation of the Sinn Féin demand was not an option, as had been the eventual remedy for the threat of the UIL in 1900. Lacking other options, the decision of the leadership was to close its ranks, creating an augmented unity through reconciliation with O’Brien, Healy,

82

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

and their respective followers in an effort to present Sinn Féin with one united front of opposition to their repudiation of constitutionalism. Joseph V. O’Brien gives a detailed insight into the manner in which this new unity with O’Brien and Healy operated in practical terms, showing that it required an immense effort of diplomacy, the use of sympathetic middlemen from within the Irish party and no small amount of compromise.89 Redmond had to push Dillon to accept some level of concession in this respect. Dillon’s determination to rid the party of Healy and O’Brien only a few years previously should not be forgotten, and Redmond’s ability to persuade his colleague of the necessity of rehabilitating these erstwhile dissidents attests both to the perceived severity of the Sinn Féin threat and to Redmond’s skill in bringing Dillon on side. Redmond not only faced Dillon’s reluctance but also a vicious rumour mill, which at one point accused Dillon of threatening the chairman with his own resignation if Healy were readmitted to the party.90 Although correspondence betrays no coolness or friction between Redmond and Dillon at this time, one can imagine the difficulty of Redmond’s position: trying to lay the foundations of an agreement that would see the reconstruction of an enlarged party but one that would be even more unstable than that which emerged in 1900.91 Nonetheless, the threat posed by Sinn Féin justified this risk in Redmond’s eyes. Progress was slow, as many differing opinions had to be accommodated and satisfied before the re-incorporation of the factions into the official party could be confirmed. This process stretched into 1908, when O’Brien led the way, declaring that his faction would ‘answer the summons to the next party meeting’.92 This ushered in a wider mood for unity, finally bringing Healy in from the cold after a full seven years. Likewise, Thomas Esmonde, fearful for his seat, decided to take the opportunity to renounce his association with Sinn Féin and return to Redmond’s flock, ‘on the basis of the treaty of peace’.93 While Redmond wryly observed that Esmonde’s letter had been sent with a Sinn Féin stamp on the envelope, the enclosed sentiments were genuine, and Esmonde’s readmission – albeit with a standing nowhere near that which he had held before his flirtation with Sinn Féin – marked a significant triumph for the party in winning back the most prominent of the Sinn Féin defectors.94 Although the unity achieved by the beginning of 1908 cost the party significantly in terms of stability and ideological cohesiveness, one important advantage for the party can be seen from a reading of the party minute books. In the meeting which formalised this reunification, a long resolution concerning readmission of members placed a strong emphasis on the need for all MPs to sign the party pledge.95 While

Leadership in a Liberal era

83

Redmond had secured this new unity, this was Dillon’s resolution, and with his stress on the pledge, he hoped to safeguard the party against the sort of internal dissent that had been so ruinous in the wake of the Irish Council Bill. Knowing the party once again included his old enemies, while Dillon’s strategy could not force consensus, it would at least encourage it and, most importantly, it ensured that any member stepping out of line as Esmonde had done would be forced to resign and then fight for his seat. As it stood, with dissent shored up, the party now only faced one electoral challenge. It was through Redmond’s spirit of conciliation coupled with Dillon’s mood of defiance that the Sinn Féin threat was reduced to just one electoral contest. Following the defeat of Dolan by the official Irish party candidate in the North Leitrim by-election, held on 21 February, the painful chapter of the party’s long 1907 crisis could be consigned to the past – for the moment at least – and the rest of 1908 would offer a brighter legislative outlook for the party and a more stable political environment in Ireland. 1908: temporary détente The 1907 crisis thus concluded with Redmond presiding over an enlarged party, with dissident voices brought in from the cold as part of a concerted effort to combat the immediate threat of Sinn Féin. Following the electoral contest in North Leitrim, the strength of Griffith’s movement had been established and effectively countered. P.A. Meehan, the official Irish party candidate, had beaten Dolan comfortably by a margin of 1,946 votes. Sinn Féin nonetheless looked to their 1,157 votes as a measure of the growing national sympathy for their movement and policies.96 By quantifying this threat in terms of votes, the IPP could move on, confident that threats to its hegemony had been removed from the immediate horizon. A result of this was that the leadership could at last begin to focus on its own development. While attesting to the scars of the previous year on the cohesion of the party, it is nonetheless noteworthy that John O’Callaghan, General Secretary of the UIL of America, reported to Redmond at the end of January 1908 that there was ‘a feeling of satisfaction that the ranks have been closed up’.97 In comparison to the course of the party’s history between 1909 and 1918, 1908 can be seen as a year of relative calm in a series of otherwise tumultuous years. Nonetheless, 1908 was a legislatively important year. It saw the passage of legislation on the Irish university question and old age pensions – which would have an unexpectedly high uptake in Ireland – as well as the introduction of an essential re-financing scheme

84

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

for the 1903 Wyndham Land Act.98 In terms of the party leadership, Devlin’s role in affairs grew from strength to strength. The significance of O’Connor was also re-established as focus returned to Westminster after the political excitement of events in Ireland subsided. O’Connor was also forced into substantial political exertions through his role as head of the UILGB when a long-awaited promotion to Cabinet caused an electoral contest in Manchester North-West. Having waited in the wings of the Liberal party since its coming to power, Winston Churchill was finally elevated to Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade in April 1908.99 The move meant that he was required to re-contest his seat. This represented an unexpected chance for the Irish party leadership to extract a pledge of support for Home Rule from a prominent Liberal on the eve of his elevation to the Cabinet table. With such a figure able to influence government policy on Ireland, a success in this endeavour would represent a major coup for the Irish party, particularly in the wake of the failed and wholly inadequate Council Bill. L.W. Brady notes that the resignation and death of Henry Campbell-Bannerman which precipitated Churchill’s cabinet appointment saw the replacement of a friend of Ireland with Herbert Henry Asquith, a key Liberal Imperialist. While ‘C.B.’ had been full of good intentions for a settlement of the Home Rule question, Asquith held a decidedly less cordial attitude towards Irish nationalism.100 Indeed, in 1905, T.M. Healy provided arguably the frankest assessment of his character, dubbing him ‘a cold-blooded Yorkshireman, thoroughly selfish and without a genuine trait’.101 The ascension of Asquith to the prime ministry made the extraction of a pledge on Home Rule from Churchill all the more imperative. While subsequent events would see Asquith bring a Home Rule Bill all the way to the Statute Book, his track record on the subject at this point made it clear that, in the Roseberyite tradition from which he came, his was not an overly-sympathetic attitude to the cause of Irish self-government. Correspondence between the Irish party leadership on Churchill and Home Rule highlights an important point in regard to the territorial divisions within their ranks at this point. As time went on, differing interpretations of events, from the rival vantage points of London and Ireland, would become increasingly important to the internal dynamics of the tetrarchy, so it is particularly instructive to flag this early example. O’Connor’s early efforts to extract a commitment to Home Rule from Churchill attest to his aloofness from the political climate in Ireland. In mid-April, he enthusiastically wrote to Dillon that Churchill had conceded ‘to advocate the introduction within the present Parliament of an improved Councils Bill, that is to say, a Bill that would give real control

Leadership in a Liberal era

85

to Ireland of her chief business’.102 To O’Connor, this represented a valuable progression on the Liberal party’s Irish policy and constituted a good deal. As a Liberal Cabinet minister, Churchill’s reiteration of gradualism was hardly exceptional; it essentially reflected the sentiments of the new Prime Minister. However, in writing to Dillon, O’Connor clearly had not understood the deep abhorrence that was now associated with the concept, and even the term, ‘Irish Council’. It harked back to Sir Antony MacDonnell’s fruitless 1905 devolution idea. Furthermore, it smacked too much of the ‘step by step’ approach through which those aligned with Asquith put the Irish question on the long finger. Gradualism had been cautiously accepted by Dillon in 1905 as part of an unsuccessful electoral gamble. After the Sinn Féin saga of 1907–8 it was impossible for the IPP to court such a weak commitment. Regardless of assurances from Churchill, this could only play out in Ireland as a Liberal Imperialist policy; another ‘half measure’ of Home Rule. An alarmed Devlin conveyed his concerns about this to Dillon. T.P.’s communication had been sent to all his colleagues in the inner leadership as a circular. In a short cover letter when forwarding his copy of it to Dillon, Devlin expressed his concern that ‘he [O’Connor] is either in favour of, or is urging the Liberal leaders to introduce another Councils Bill. In my opinion nothing could well be more fatal than such a step and especially if the course suggested had any official sanction from any responsible member of the Party’.103 His suspicion that the suggestion of another Council Bill may have emanated from O’Connor shows that Devlin clearly had significant concerns over his colleague’s understanding of feeling in Ireland. His clarification that no ‘responsible’ member should officially sanction such a policy suggests that Devlin’s opinion of O’Connor’s judgement and ability to articulate Irish policy in English political circles had been brought into question by this incident. The effects of the Churchill campaign upon the internal relationships of the tetrarchy stop here. However, it is important to examine this early instance of O’Connor’s aloofness from the realities of Irish political life. This would, to varying degrees, become a recurring problem during the Home Rule crisis and in the war years. To sum up on Irish involvement in Churchill’s Manchester campaign, subsequent to his first proposal, Churchill lobbied the Cabinet, and secured a pledge from Asquith that Home Rule would be dealt with in the next session. Coupled with this were concessions for Catholic schools in England, an issue that would be far more emotive to a lot of Manchester’s Irish community.104 In view of these concessions, both the leadership and the UILGB put their full support behind Churchill’s candidature. The loss of the seat to

86

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the Conservative candidate – albeit by a margin of only 429 votes – may in fact attest to the relatively low influence of nationalist versus Catholic and other pressure groups in what was one of England’s most ethnically Irish constituencies. Local Catholic bishops, angered over Liberal education policy, had apparently told Catholic voters they ‘would be justified in voting Tory’.105 Reflecting on the defeat, Redmond placed blame for the defeat at the feet of T.M. Healy, who intervened in support of the church in the course of this debacle.106 Despite this reversal, Redmond believed that the party could take positives from the Manchester campaign, optimistically writing to Dillon that ‘it is a great thing for the future to have Churchill committed [to Home Rule]’.107 On 9 May, Churchill rebounded from his defeat at Manchester, winning a decisive victory against a Liberal Unionist rival in the comparatively safer constituency of Dundee. While the 1908 session saw the realisation of some significant portions of the Irish party’s general programme of reform – most notably the Irish Universities Act – the functioning and interrelations of the inner leadership did not experience any significant changes in this period. In general, excepting issues such as Churchill’s by-election contest, surviving correspondence between members of the tetrarchy at this point is relatively sparse. Moving towards 1909, however, the Liberals’ renewed efforts on the land question would finally cause the unity forged with O’Brien, Healy, and their followers back in 1908, to disintegrate. Meanwhile, Lloyd George’s budget of that year would prove controversial, provoking dissent in Ireland and leaving the tetrarchy facing difficult dilemmas in balancing their Liberal alliance with the concerns of the Irish nationalist electorate. 1909: splits and dilemmas While the readmission of O’Brien, Healy, and their followers at the beginning of 1908 did not upset the balance of the party leadership, it had signalled an unusual level of conciliation from a party – and from Dillon in particular  – that had worked so hard to purge itself of the threats of Healyism and O’Brienism during its early history. In this sense, the thaw of 1907–8 can be seen as a low point in the history of Dillon’s dominance in the party. Nonetheless, his strength, and that of the rest of the tetrarchy, in deciding party policy remained largely unchanged. Joseph V. O’Brien, in his biography of William O’Brien, suggests that the policy of wholesale readmissions was seen as a necessary part of the party’s response to the threat posed by Sinn Féin in the run-up to the North Leitrim by-election.108 There appears to have been a sense that, with the

Leadership in a Liberal era

87

party’s victory in that contest, the immediate threat had passed and the mandate for unity at any cost had expired. As the year progressed, this harmony began to exist in name only. The physical unity of the party had not been reflected in an ideological rapprochement between Dillonism, O’Brienism, and Healyism in any meaningful sense. In this climate, any attempt by O’Brien or Healy to push for a say in the policy direction of the party would result in a break in this tentatively maintained and increasingly hollow unity. Facing reluctance from Redmond, and the potential hostility of Dillon, when O’Brien began to push for a revival of his conciliationist model of ‘conference plus business’ as a means of addressing renewed land problems during 1908, he moved closer to breaking his links with the party yet again.109 This time, the tetrarchy was strongly united in its unwillingness to bend under O’Brien’s pressure and, although he had resolved to attend the national convention to consider the Land Bill in February 1909, his biographer considers that he had ceased to view himself as a member of the party by the end of 1908.110 Signalling the extent of his own loyalty, not merely to the party but to Dillon in particular, Joseph Devlin would play a leading role in the formal – and physical – termination of the party’s association with both O’Brien and Healy early in 1909. In the National Convention to discuss the proposed land settlement which was held in February, O’Brien failed to secure a hearing and was shouted down by hecklers.111 Interpretations of what occurred at the conference vary from O’Brien’s own sensational reports of violent suppression of his views in what he dubbed the ‘baton convention’, to F.S.L. Lyons’ portrayal of Devlin as agent-provocateur, who officiated in his role as General Secretary of the UIL, and was accused of introducing a cohort of Belfast and AOH henchmen to the assembly to silence O’Brien.112 In his memoir of these years, O’Brien devotes an entire chapter to the subject. Its title: ‘Molly Maguire, Imperatrix!’ is a reference to Devlin’s AOH and their heavy-handed role in the physical expulsion of O’Brien from the League he himself had founded.113 O’Brien’s expulsion directly precipitated the foundation of the AFIL. After initial reluctance, Healy joined O’Brien’s new organisation, which now formed a refuge for the disaffected, particularly those who had followed either Healy or O’Brien back into the party during the thaw of 1907–8.114 The false unity of 1908 had thus spectacularly ended. The newly formalised axis between O’Brien and Healy, which had emerged gradually since O’Brien’s resignation in 1903, would cause much trouble for the party. Not only did it offer a questioning alternative to the Irish party’s ever more rigid alliance with the Liberals in parliament but it would

88

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

offer the Irish voting public alternative candidates, particularly in the heartland of dissidence centring on Cork, in the two general elections of 1910.115 For the tetrarchy, while they would have to counter these new threats to the party’s hegemony, the externalisation of dissent was critical in developing its ability to run the party unilaterally and without fear for its integrity during the decisive years between 1910 and 1914. This integrity was crucial. With Redmond and his closest colleagues agreed on the future direction of party policy, it was favourable to have a smaller, stronger party beneath them showing no signs of further splits or ruptures. The ‘people’s budget’ and the changing fortunes of the party at Westminster In essence, the relationship between the Irish party and the Liberal government had been based on a string of compromises from its inception. In 1906, Redmond and his colleagues had stood back and allowed the new government to pursue its own programme of reforms, acknowledging that the pledge to address the Irish question would be fulfilled in due course.116 The Nationalist position had been weakened by the poor showing of the Tories in the 1906 general election and Irish Nationalist support had not been needed by the government up to the end of 1909. It took a careful mixture of agitation and diplomacy to ensure that Irish demands received legislative attention. This was aided in no small way by the differing roles of the members of the tetrarchy. Dillon could represent a more hardline stance and the others, particularly O’Connor and Redmond, could use more gentle leverage to extract concessions through negotiations at Westminster. The budget drafted by David Lloyd George in 1909 would eventually lead to the government actively needing Irish party support for its programme for parliamentary reform. While this ostensibly looked like a favourable opportunity for Ireland, the contents of the budget would prove a bitter pill to swallow. Redmond and his colleagues, along with all shades of Nationalist opinion at Westminster, initially opposed the budget, which proposed radical changes to both direct and indirect taxation. The most offensive provisions for Irish members were on land taxes and a range of increased duties on tea, tobacco, and liquor. In the case of the latter, Redmond spoke out vociferously in the House, arguing that these duties were not only hitting the poorer classes in Ireland more so than any other section of society but that they represented a callous clawing back of the money lost by the government due to Ireland’s disproportionate uptake of the Old Age Pensions Act.117 Pensions were an important part of Lloyd

Leadership in a Liberal era

89

George’s ‘people’s budget’, as the radical amendments to taxation were to be used to fund, among other things, a raft of new social insurance and welfare initiatives. Giving an anecdote about the simple pleasures derived from pipe-smoking, Redmond linked the debate to the other major aspect of expenditure envisaged by this harsh budget:  British naval expansion. He put it to Lloyd George that ‘for his Dreadnoughts’ he was going to tax the tobacco of the peasantry on the western Irish seaboard.118 In this example, one can see how the Nationalist leadership was cognisant of the potential for considerable grassroots opposition in Ireland if the party was seen to support this budget. The leadership’s strategy was to attempt to remedy the most objectionable clauses of the budget through negotiation and the threat of amendment. There was significant horse-trading and certain concessions, such as on land and whiskey duties, were extracted in the course of the long passage of the bill through the Commons. As the government faced a fight on the majority of the bill’s clauses, Lloyd George was keen to negotiate rather than fight opposition where possible. O’Connor reported to Dillon that the one subject upon which Lloyd George appeared ‘nervous’ was tobacco as he feared an alliance of Irish Nationalists and British Labour MPs might emerge to spike it.119 O’Connor’s role in identifying these opportunities can therefore be seen as having been highly valuable as the Irish party worked to save face by counteracting the most publicly unpopular elements of the budget. Highlighting the different roles within the tetrarchy, Redmond wrote to Dillon in June, before the party had publicised its provisional acceptance of land taxes, on which they later extracted valuable concessions.120 Mindful of the public reaction to the announcement of Irish party support for this measure, regardless of the level of amendment, Redmond counselled Dillon to meet with the editor of the Freeman’s Journal to ‘let him understand what our attitude will be generally on the Budget’.121 Redmond had learned from previous crises the necessity of preparing the ground in Ireland before settlements were presented to the people. Just as in previous instances of political delicacy, the Freeman’s Journal was an important organ for putting the right spin on things. At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to digress briefly to explain the changing nature of the relationship between the party and the Freeman’s Journal during this period and the resulting effect on the ability of the party to portray itself favourably in print. The wavering of the Freeman’s Journal during the passage of the 1909 budget and the ensuing parliamentary crisis marked the end of editorial independence of the paper from the party. After 1912, financial difficulties meant that the Freeman’s Journal’s support for the party became

90

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

virtually guaranteed. After several years of bankrolling the paper, in 1912 the party finally took control of the Freeman’s Journal both commercially and in terms of content. The necessity for this arose due to the growing dominance of the Irish Independent after 1905 when William Martin Murphy re-launched the paper as a half-penny broadsheet; half the price of the Freeman’s Journal. It transformed Ireland’s newspaper market in much the same way in which Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail had revolutionised the newspaper trade in Britain. From 1905, the rising fortunes of the Independent instigated the steady decline of the Freeman’s Journal and it rapidly became apparent that the latter paper was failing to hold market share against its reinvigorated rival.122 The speed with which these changes came about can be gauged by the fact that, after 1908, the Freeman’s Journal never again paid dividends to its shareholders.123 No longer a commercially viable business, the Freeman’s value came to be linked to its ability to put a positive slant on the activities of the Irish party in a rapidly changing newspaper market.124 Apart from the party’s capitalisation of the paper, 1912 saw the Irish party leadership oust Thomas Sexton from his role as chairman of the Freeman’s board of directors. Sexton had held the position since 1893. This step ensured that the paper would be more consistent in its support of party policy.125 Incidentally, while Sexton was forced out, W.H. Brayden managed to retain his position as the paper’s editor. Despite this strand of continuity in the editorship, the paper can be seen to have toed the party line much more faithfully after 1912 than it had under Sexton. This does not, however, signal a change in loyalty on the part of Brayden as editor. On the contrary, this can be attributed to the appointment of Sir Walter Nugent MP as the new chairman of the board of directors and the installation of ‘party stalwarts’, including John Muldoon MP, as directors alongside him.126 Essentially, editorial control of the Freeman’s Journal had always resided with the board of directors more so than with the paper’s editor. Consequently, the appointment of the new directors successfully brought the paper into line without necessitating a change in the editorship. In terms of optics, a change in directors was an administrative decision whereas a change in editor could have been spun by those hostile to the leadership as an exercise in repression. Despite the declining commercial fortunes and circulation of the paper, after 1912, its fidelity to the party line would not be a cause for the leadership’s concern. Even in the aftermath of the Rising, the level of control exercised by the party over the paper would ensure that any hint of dissent or deviation could be swiftly and decisively addressed.127 In steering editorial policy on the Rising, the party and the leadership showed they were more cognisant

Leadership in a Liberal era

91

of the power of public opinion than they had been during the passage of the 1909 budget. The drawn out nature of the 1909 budget’s passage through the Commons posed another problem for the Irish party leadership. The concurrent passage of the last legislative measure on the Irish land question further necessitated a strong Irish presence. The cost and effort of retaining the party at Westminster for such an extraordinarily long period caused Redmond and Dillon to plan for contingencies. With Birrell’s Land Bill facing an adjournment in mid-July, Redmond began to turn his mind to sending the bulk of the party back to Ireland until further developments on either the land or budgetary fronts arose.128 Redmond finally took the decision to repatriate the party in early September, making sure to leave a core of designated caretakers at Westminster to oversee certain clauses of the budget and other developments.129 1909 had been an arduous year for the Irish party leadership. Monitoring grassroots and dissident sentiments in Ireland while events progressed at Westminster saw the tetrarchs adopting differing roles during the arduous and extended passage of the 1909 budget through the Commons. Ultimately, the Lords’ rejection of the budget and the ensuing constitutional crisis resulted in a monumental change in the Irish party’s position at Westminster. The ensuing general election in January, the first of two in 1910, returned a strong Irish party. The showing for O’Brienite and Healyite candidates of the AFIL, while significant, did not make the inroads that some in the Irish party had feared. On balance, Dillon viewed the results of the January elections in Ireland as ‘decidedly good’.130 A certain amount of damage had been done, however, through the League’s accusations that Redmond’s party had been in favour of the budget, which had received widespread condemnation in Ireland.131 This had the potential to resurface as a political weapon, and the issue would recur until the resolution of the parliamentary crisis in 1911. Nonetheless the party enjoyed a reasonably strong position in Ireland as the clash in Britain over the Lords played out.132 Outlining his preferred policy for the party at Westminster in the wake of the January elections, O’Connor revealed a determination for decisive action and the rapid resolution of British political issues so that the party could finally focus on the national demand. He told Dillon ‘our policy is quite clear; that is to go straight ahead, and do what we think right, fight through thick and thin with the Liberals, until we get the [House of Lords] Veto question tackled and settled, and then to get them to propose Home Rule immediately or break with them’.133 Dillon’s reply hinted at a more cautious approach to the Liberal alliance, re-emphasising his habitually more hardline approach to questions of

92

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

English politics. Perhaps mindful of the potential capital that the AFIL could make of it in Ireland, Dillon made it clear that concessions in a subsequent budget would have to be procured in order for the party to be able to support the passage of Lloyd George’s present bill, which was still equally objectionable to Nationalists as it had been to the Lords.134 In planning party policy for the forthcoming session, Dillon’s correspondence at this time also shows the continued centrality of Devlin to decision-making despite the fact that his role in the working of the tetrarchy at this time is not overly prominent in the surviving archival correspondence. In arranging a policy meeting between himself, O’Connor, and Redmond, Dillon noted to O’Connor that ‘[Devlin] must of course be with us when we decide what is to be done’.135 This was not simply a tokenistic inclusion. The true nature of Devlin’s stature, and proof that he was a fully-fledged member of the inner leadership of the party by 1910, can be judged by comments made by Redmond to an American audience in late November 1910 that ‘the Government of Ireland is carried on at 39 O’Connell Street, Dublin [the headquarters of the UIL], and Mr Joseph Devlin is the real Chief Secretary’.136 While Redmond was obviously speaking with bravado and a degree of exaggeration reserved for American audiences, Devlin’s importance in the National movement and his firm place within the tetrarchy by this point is apparent. Before parliament had even reconvened after the January 1910 elections, O’Connor was able to state with certainty that a second general election would be necessary, reporting to Dillon in Dublin that the King simply would not give up the House of Lords without another fight at the polls.137 O’Connor was back in his favoured role: the watchdog at Westminster, using his close contacts that now extended to the Cabinet to give his colleagues advance notice and exclusive insights into the most recent developments in the highest echelons of London political circles. From the intelligence he provided, one can see the extent to which the tetrarchy never really took its eye off electoral politics during 1910. The death of King Edward VII in the middle of this crisis precipitated a temporary détente between the Tories and the Liberals. This pushed the expected date of a general election out from summer to winter. When a conference to resolve the crisis broke up in November, an election date was fixed for 1 December.138 In the interim, Redmond would play a key role in securing the party’s position. Accompanied by O’Connor, he travelled to America in October to raise much needed funds for the now inevitable second general election.139 The party had been greatly stretched by the increased number of contests in January owing to the opposition of Healy and O’Brien’s AFIL. Without the injection of additional funds, a second general election

Leadership in a Liberal era

93

would have financially crippled the Irish party. The Tory press would use Redmond’s mission to paint him as the ‘dollar dictator’, returning to impose his will on the Liberals.140 In effect, they were not far wrong but, most importantly, Redmond had presided over one of the most successful fundraising trips in the party’s history; raising $100,000 for the beleaguered party funds.141 In Britain, the second general election of the year produced a virtually identical result to the first. The December elections returned 272 Liberals (versus 275 in January); 272 Conservative and Liberal Unionists (273 in January); and 42 Labour MPs (40 in January).142 In Ireland, with the power of the O’Brien–Healy axis diminished somewhat, the Irish party consolidated its position. The AFIL, which was ‘always geographically confined’ to Munster, now receded even further with the League not winning any seat outside of Cork.143 Key Irish party victories included the re-conquest of seats in East Kerry and North Louth which had been won by AFIL candidates in January.144 This confirmed the primacy of the IPP and the UIL in Irish politics.145 The net totals saw the official Irish party gaining three seats, one at the expense of the AFIL and two at the expense of Unionists whose number in Ireland dropped to ten and nineteen respectively. Including T.P. O’Connor’s Liverpool seat, the Irish party now held a decisive bloc of seventy-four seats at Westminster. The IPP had confirmed its position at the centre of events. Once the Parliament Act had been passed, the House could finally devote itself to the passage of Home Rule. It would be an all-consuming task. While they would face the sternest of opposition both in the Commons and the Lords, as well as unprecedented levels of extra-parliamentary threat, Redmond and his party were within reach of the ultimate goal; the justification for their attendance at Westminster. This would be the crucible of the tetrarchy. An examination of the workings and inter-relationships of the inner leadership in the period from 1910 to 1914 will cover the most important work collectively undertaken by the tetrarchs. It was to be the culmination of a life’s work for each of them. Notes 1 T.P. O’Connor, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1908), pp. 82–3. 2 O’Connor to Redmond, 10 November 1905 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/1) and Dillon to Redmond, 2 November 1905 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/8). 3 O’Connor, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, pp.  72–5. L.W. Brady unhelpfully mistakes the date of the meeting to have been 24 November but multiple sources corroborate the date as having been 14 November. Brady, O’Connor, p. 169. 4 Dillon to Redmond, 2 November 1905 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/8).

94

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

5 Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, ii, p. 182. On Redmond’s Glasgow Speech, see p. 180. 6 Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, ii, p. 183 and Wilson, CB, p. 406. 7 Lyons, Dillon, p. 281. 8 Hansard 4, clii, col. 180 (19 February 1906). 9 Lyons, Dillon, p. 283. 10 Minutes of IPP meeting of 10 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 11 See Lyons, Dillon, p. 280. 12 Lyons, Dillon, p. 283. 13 The ‘Galway prisoners’ had been imprisoned for agrarian offences under Walter Long’s brief tenure as Chief Secretary in 1905. See Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 122. 14 Dillon to Redmond, 20 January 1906 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/9). 15 Wyndham to his father, 21 November 1903 [354], in J.W. Mackail and G. Wyndham (eds), Life and Letters of George Wyndham (2 vols, London, 1925), ii, 474. 16 Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question, pp. 85–6. 17 Redmond to Dillon, 7 March 1904 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/72). 18 Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question, p. 86. 19 Lyons, Dillon, pp. 305–7. 20 Minutes of IPP meeting of 14 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 21 Minutes of IPP meeting of 14 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 22 Minutes of IPP meeting of 14 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 23 On this distinction, see Farrell (ed.), Chairman or Chief. 24 Hansard 4, clii, col. 23 (19 February 1906). 25 Hansard 4, clii, cols 180–93 (19 February 1906). 26 For example, see Dillon to Redmond, 7 February 1906 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/9). 27 Hansard 4, clii, cols 433–9 (21 February 1906). 28 Lyons, Dillon, p. 284. 29 This point is best made by Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 122–3. 30 For a fuller analysis of this question, see Conor Mulvagh, ‘Rome ruler? John Redmond, a Catholic voice in a Liberal chamber, 1906–1918’ (MPhil thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2008), pp. 18–26. 31 Hansard 4, clvi, cols 1509–10 (10 May 1906). 32 See Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 122–3. 33 Hansard 4, clvi, col. 1506 (10 May 1906). 34 Lyons, Dillon, p. 285. 35 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 122. 36 Hansard 4, clvi, cols 1048–9 (7 May 1906). 37 See Brady, O’Connor, pp. 176–7.

Leadership in a Liberal era

95

38 For correspondence between Redmond and Devlin during the latter’s fundraising tour in 1906, see NLI, RP, MS 15,181/2. 39 For instance, Hansard 4, clix, cols 959–1079 (27 June 1906). 40 James Bryce, memorandum on meeting with Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 9 December 1905 (NLI, JBP, MS 11,011). 41 O’Connor to Redmond, 18 January 1907 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/1). 42 In June 1905, Redmond tersely commented in a letter to Dillon how O’Connor had not turned up to a meeting Redmond had scheduled with Edward Blake and Joe Devlin. It is unclear where he was on this occasion. Redmond to Dillon, 28 June 1905 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/145). 43 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 141. 44 Referenced in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 141. 45 A comprehensive report of this meeting can be found in O’Connor to Dillon, 9 February 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/146). 46 O’Connor to Dillon, 9 February 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/146). 47 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 136–7. 48 Dillon to Redmond, 17 January 1907 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/14). 49 O’Connor to Dillon, 9 February 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/146 et seq.). 50 See chapter entitled ‘Laurence Ginnell’s revolt’ in Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 117–36. 51 Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 120–1. 52 See Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 120–1. 53 Speech of John Dillon at Foxford, Co. Mayo. Cited in Lyons, Dillon, p. 292. 54 Weekly Freeman’s Journal, 26 January 1907, cited in Lyons, Dillon, p. 292. 55 Lyons, Dillon, p. 293. 56 Banks, Blake, p. 320. 57 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 116, referring to Redmond to Dillon, 9 May 1907 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/14). 58 On the state of Blake’s health on his departure from Ireland, attesting to the strain he had put upon himself up to that point, see O’Connor to Dillon, 17 August [1907] (TCD, DP, MS 6740/190). 59 Banks, Blake, pp. 309–25. 60 See Blake to Redmond, 28 February 1907, quoted in Banks, Blake, p. 319. 61 Banks, Blake, pp. 285, 291. 62 Evidence of J.J. Clancy (Dublin North) occupying the position of parliamentary caretaker for Nationalist interests can be seen in Redmond to Dillon [telegram], 2 September 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/403). 63 Banks, Blake, p. 309. 64 Quoting Blake to Redmond, 13 November 1906: Banks, Blake, p. 312. 65 Banks, Blake, p. 316. 66 Banks, Blake, pp. 317–19. 67 Banks, Blake, pp. 320–1. 68 Quoting Redmond to Blake, 18 May 1907, Banks, Blake, p. 323. 69 The cause of Elizabeth’s death was recorded as pneumonia. Recently, Bridget Hourican has argued that medical incompetence played a role. The account

96

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

in Lyons, although dated from the medical perspective, does not put so much weight on the perceived incompetence of a young gynaecologist during her last days:  see Lyons, Dillon, pp.  269–72 and Bridget Hourican,  ‘Dillon, Elizabeth’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, iii, p. 287. 70 On the politics and ideology of Elizabeth Dillon, see Curley, ‘Elizabeth Mathew’. 71 On the depth of the relationship between Mr and Mrs Dillon, see Lyons, Dillon, pp.  249–52. On T.P. O’Connor’s friendship with Elizabeth Dillon, see O’Connor to Dillon, 31 July 1900 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/77). 72 For just one of many examples, see Devlin to Dillon, 29 June 1904 (TCD, DP, MS 6729/104). 73 Devlin to Dillon [telegram], 15 May 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6729/116). 74 T.P. O’Connor to Dillon, 15 May 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/148). 75 Hourican, ‘Dillon, Elizabeth’, p.  287. A  full summary of the document is given in Lyons, Dillon, pp. 269–72. 76 In particular, see Redmond to Dillon [telegram], 14 May 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/221a). 77 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 147. 78 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 148. 79 See Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years. Stephen Gwynn had been MP for Galway City from 1906–18. 80 Denis Gwynn provides a stout defence of Redmond, claiming that he in no way supported the Irish Council Bill prior to the convention: Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 147. 81 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 199. 82 See pp. 113–14 below. 83 Eric Taylor, ‘Schnadhorst, Francis  (1840–1900)’ in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb. com/view/article/37938) (29 March 2012). 84 Biagini, British Democracy, pp. 187–8. 85 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 215. 86 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 177. 87 Griffith’s ideas were summed up in his 1904 manifesto which advocated abstention as a means to give Ireland the dual monarchy system achieved by the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867. Arthur Griffith, The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland (Dublin, 1904: new edn Dublin, 2003), see esp. pp 139–63 (‘The Sinn Féin policy’). 88 C.J. Dolan to Thomas Esmonde, 21 June 1907, reproduced in full in minutes of IPP meeting of 27 July 1907, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 89 O’Brien, O’Brien, pp. 180–3. 90 On the rumour of Dillon’s threatened resignation, see Redmond to Dillon, 16 November 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/231). 91 Redmond to Dillon, 16 November 1907 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/231). 92 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 183.

Leadership in a Liberal era

97

93 Redmond to Dillon, 21 January 1908  – quoting Esmonde’s letter (TCD, DP, MS 6747/253). 94 Patrick Maume notes that Esmonde had in fact come up with the concept of the ‘Sinn Féin stamp’ as a fundraising device for Griffith. See Patrick Maume, ‘Esmonde, Sir Thomas Henry Grattan’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, iii, p. 652. 95 Minutes of IPP meeting of 16 January 1908, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 96 Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, p. 171. 97 O’Callaghan to Redmond, 31 January 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/258). 98 On Augustine Birrell’s 1909 Land Act, which stemmed from a need to refinance the Wyndham Act of 1903, see Diarmaid Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland, 1900–2000 (London, 2005), pp. 62–3. 99 See Brady, O’Connor, p. 183. 100 Brady, O’Connor, p. 183. 101 T.M. Healy to Maurice Healy, 12 December 1905 (UCDA, HP, P6/A/24/45). An edited version of this letter, in which the clause about Asquith’s selfishness is omitted, is included in Healy, Leaders and Letters, ii, p. 475. 102 O’Connor to Dillon, 13 April 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/153). 103 Devlin to Dillon, 15 April 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6729/130). 104 Brady, O’Connor, p. 184. 105 Brady, O’Connor, p. 184. 106 Redmond to Dillon, 25 April 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/311). 107 Redmond to Dillon, 25 April 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/311). 108 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 180. 109 O’Brien, O’Brien, pp. 186–7. 110 O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 187. 111 Lyons, Dillon, p. 303. 112 Lyons, Dillon, pp. 303–4 and O’Brien, Olive Branch, pp. 441–56. 113 O’Brien, Olive Branch. 114 On Healy’s gradual alignment with O’Brien’s AFIL, see Callanan, ‘Healy’, pp. 576–7. 115 On the gradual rapprochement between O’Brien and Healy, including the significance of Healy’s representation of John O’Donnell, a follower of O’Brien, in a court case in late 1905, see Callanan, Healy, p.  453. The AFIL had been founded in March 1909 (Irish Times, 27 March 1909). It fielded eleven candidates in the January 1910 elections and twenty-one in December. Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 171–82. 116 It should be noted that the Nationalists did not give the Liberal government an entirely smooth run in 1906, particularly on the education question. Mulvagh, ‘Rome ruler’, p. 61. 117 Hansard 5 (Commons), iv, cols 783–807 (3 May 1909); on old age pensions, see col. 788. 118 Hansard 5 (Commons), iv, col. 791 (3 May 1909). 119 O’Connor to Dillon, 20 September 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/160).

98

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

120 Concessions were secured in late July, see Redmond to Dillon, 23 July 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/398). 121 Redmond to Dillon, 16 June 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/369). 122 On the reinvention of the Irish Independent in 1905 and the commercial impact this had on the Freeman, see Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman’, pp.  219–20. L.M. Cullen observes that sales of the Irish Independent had reached 100,000 copies per day by 1917; L.M. Cullen, Eason and Son: A History (Dublin, 1989), p. 307. 123 Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman’, p. 219. 124 On the proliferation of smaller papers of the radical press during the early twentieth century, see Virginia E. Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced-Nationalist Press: Ireland, 1900–1922 (New York, 1985). 125 See Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman’, pp.  219–20 and Larkin, ‘Sexton, Thomas’, p. 835. 126 Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman’, p. 220. 127 Following the 1916 Rising, both Brayden and Nugent argued for the paper ‘to take a harder line on the Rebels than the Irish party leadership would countenance’. As a result, the former was replaced and the latter resigned. The Freeman’s premises on North Prince’s Street were also destroyed during the rebellion. Larkin, ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman’, p.  221 and Felix M.  Larkin, ‘Brayden, William John Henry’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, i, pp. 791–2. 128 Redmond to Dillon, 12 July 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/399). 129 J.J. Clancy was left to take charge of death duties in the budget: Redmond to Dillon [telegram], 2 September 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/403). Similarly, O’Connor, as a London resident, was left to represent the party on spirit tax: John Mooney to Redmond, 23 September 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/410). 130 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 February 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/165). In total, the IPP took seventy seats, having put forward eighty-four candidates. Of the seats lost, three were won by Unionists and eleven by varying shades of independent Nationalists including the AFIL. Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 171–6. 131 Lyons, Dillon, p. 313. 132 The IPP enjoyed a net gain of three seats in the December 1910 general election. Crucially, they had taken two key seats from the AFIL. The results in December 1910 in Ireland were IPP, 73; Unionists, 20; AFIL, 8; independent nationalists, 2. Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 171–82. 133 O’Connor to Dillon, 31 January 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/164). 134 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 February 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/165). 135 Dillon to O’Connor, 4 February 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/166). 136 Quoting The Times (25 November 1910) reporting on Redmond’s speech at Utica: Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 135. 137 O’Connor to Dillon, 10 February 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/173). 138 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 48.

Leadership in a Liberal era

99

139 On Redmond’s enthusiasm for the success of this trip, see Redmond to Dillon, 3 October 1910 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/459). 140 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 48. 141 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 184. 142 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 187. 143 For a British perspective on the power of the AFIL after the January elections see memorandum marked ‘Quite Confidential’, 31 March 1910 (PA, LGP, C/20/2/1). 144 See O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 201. 145 See Callanan, Healy, p. 474. The League fielded fourteen candidates outside of Cork, none of whom were successful: O’Brien, O’Brien, p. 201.

4 Dragging Ireland into the spotlight, pulling Ulster from the morass, 1910–14

To-day the cry of civil war is on the lips of the most responsible and sober-minded of my people. – George V, 21 July 19141

By 1909, with the Sinn Féin scare behind them after victory in North Leitrim, the decision was taken by the IPP leadership to put an abrupt end to its détente with the O’Brien and Healy factions. Although the party would now have to face down the AFIL at the polls, the ostracisation of mavericks made for a more orderly party and afforded much greater freedom to the leadership in the steering of party policy. A second and equally important development occurred between the January and December general elections of 1910 when the party formalised its voting alliance with the Liberals. In return for supporting Lloyd George’s controversial budget and House of Lords reform, Asquith agreed to introduce a Home Rule bill similar to those which had been rejected by the Commons and the Lords in 1886 and 1893 respectively. The Asquith–Redmond pact now became the bedrock underpinning the working of the government’s majority. Once the Parliament Act was passed in 1911, the veto of the Lords on money bills was removed and the upper house retained only the power of delay on ordinary legislation. Through this coup, the realisation of a Liberal policy that had been enshrined in the 1890s was within sight and the way was clear for Home Rule to be introduced.2 With a conclusive Liberal-Nationalist majority in the Commons and the House of Lords castrated, Home Rule could almost be deemed a legislative certainty once it had been introduced. Accepting this parliamentary fait accompli, opponents of Irish legislative autonomy began to drift towards extra-parliamentary methods. With the emergence of paramilitary organisations and the threat of force from those pledged to the defence of the Union, Nationalists could not simply play a waiting game in parliament. The Orange card that had been threatened in 1886 and 1893 would now be played to full advantage.

Ireland in the spotlight

101

As Ronan Fanning observes, an added dimension in 1912 was that the Home Rule Bill represented for Conservatives embittered by the destruction of aristocratic privileges in the Lords saw in Home Rule an opportunity to resist the Parliament Act. As the British Unionist F. E. Smith told Edward Carson in 1913, ‘That Act was revolutionary; perhaps we have our one and only chance of defeating it by counter-revolutionary means’.3 Thus, when the parliamentary path of Home Rule seemed most certain on paper, the leadership would end up having to fight harder than ever before to bring the Home Rule bill onto the statute book. In time, both sides would resolve to exchange methods parliamentary for tactics paramilitary. In parliament, the Irish party’s anxiousness to get the bill passed by any means possible meant that, partition aside, there would be little opposition to any perceived limitations or shortcomings in the bill as had been the case when the Irish Council Bill had been thrown back in Birrell’s face in 1907. The Ulster crisis would be the first of several intense challenges that would test the integrity and the working relationships within the tetrarchy. Despite these early signs of stress, the apogee of constitutional nationalist achievement came in September 1914 when the third Home Rule Bill became law, being placed on the Statute Book along with an amending act that postponed its operation until the conclusion of hostilities in Europe and with provision for the agreed settlement of the Ulster question. From triumph to crisis: Home Rule, 1912–14 In assessing the work of the tetrarchy during the passage of the third Home Rule Bill, it is important to examine one of the earliest events in the chronology of the crisis. Following the report of the Commission on Irish Finance (1911–12), chaired by H.W. Primrose, both the cabinet and the Irish party began to consider the proposals and counter-proposals on the financial provisions of an Irish Home Rule Bill.4 Having been kept informed of the commission’s proceedings through the Catholic Bishop of Ross, Dr Denis Kelly, Redmond and Dillon believed that they possessed a reasonably accurate prospectus of a new Hiberno-Imperial financial equilibrium.5 However, the Primrose report was deemed to be too favourable to Ireland by the government. They enlisted Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General, to draft a more conservative scheme. It was this blueprint which eventually featured in the Home Rule Bill.6 In their dealings with Bishop Kelly, Redmond and Dillon worked and negotiated jointly on the financial aspects of the Home Rule question. The Redmond–Dillon partnership became the cornerstone of IPP negotiating

102

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

strategy throughout the crisis. The degree of consensus and co-operation among the pair was never stronger or closer. This was not to be a happy stabilisation of the shifting Redmond–Dillon relationship, however, as the outbreak of the war witnessed a pendulum swing from camaraderie to coolness between the two men at the top of the Irish party. From the party’s reunification onwards, Dillon was the most powerful and influential of the tetrarchs, and negotiations during the Home Rule crisis would see governmental acknowledgement of this fact.7 Now increased emphasis was put on Dillon’s views even outside the party hierarchy. As the man who had shied away from the negotiating table in 1902–3, and who, with legitimate reason, could not attend the party conference in 1907, Dillon now found himself moving towards the public side of the tetrarchy’s work. He had always comfortably represented his views in parliament and to his constituents but now Dillon would begin to play a role in direct negotiation with the government, making less frequent use of Redmond and O’Connor as conduits for his opinions. Devlin too would assume an even greater importance within the tetrarchy as the passage of Home Rule descended into a crisis. As the only tetrarch representing Catholic Ulster, when unionist opposition began to escalate he would be called upon to articulate a justification of the party’s concessions on Ulster. Furthermore, Devlin’s voice and presence were now more sought after at Westminster as well as in Ulster. As the clamour of dissent aired by Ulster unionism both in parliament and in consultation with the government began to increase, the Irish party looked to the Ulster representative within its own leadership to act as a mouthpiece for the nationalists of the province. In this way, the half of the tetrarchy more used to residence in Ireland and representation of the Irish side of the party’s work now found itself directly engaging with the government at a level for which it was fully prepared but not yet experienced. While the Irish Council Bill debacle of 1907 had eventually witnessed a shift in focus of the tetrarchy’s work to Ireland, the Home Rule crisis saw an initial swing in the leadership’s work towards Westminster, where both formal and informal lobbying was combined with some of the most concerted efforts ever undertaken by the party as a whole in the chamber. Despite this shift in the territorial focus of its work, however, the passage of the Home Rule Bill did not destabilise the tetrarchy. Although tetrarchs would encounter personal adversity, the tetrarchy served to buttress rather than undermine its own integrity. Each member had been working towards this end for his entire political career. The structures and patterns of work that had been developed since unification were now put to the test. Redmond headed the parliamentary effort as

Ireland in the spotlight

103

chairman and O’Connor continued to act as both a high level informant and an indispensable background negotiator for his colleagues. Dillon, while undertaking an increased workload in Westminster, continued to assimilate, analyse, and act upon the vast amount of information and intelligence reaching him from all corners of Ireland. Devlin’s role, as has already been touched upon, experienced the most noticeable change. The one element of the Home Rule debate around this time, which ultimately turned the bill’s passage into a crisis, was the spectre of partition. While the party leadership was universal in its condemnation and rejection of the proposal, the subsequent bartering saw the party making concessions on Ulster that would have profound long-term consequences for the leadership. Given his Belfast base, Devlin became ever more central to the party’s work on this subject. As Carsonism grew as a force both in Westminster and in the extra-parliamentary arena – particularly with the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant and the foundation of the Ulster Volunteer Force – the government was forced to acknowledge and yield to Ulster’s grievance. With the Home Rule project now in real jeopardy, the tetrarchy turned its attention to the difficult choice of compromising on Ulster to save Home Rule. Devlin was naturally the least enthusiastic of the four on this subject. It was O’Connor who emerged as the most sanguine of the tetrarchs on the Ulster question, further displaying his aloofness from the realities of Ireland; or perhaps a pragmatism born out of his more nuanced understanding of the currents within the Liberal party. While O’Connor did not in any way deviate from the party’s anti-partitionist stance, he was the first of the leadership to advocate for negotiation and compromise with the Ulster Unionists. O’Connor’s colleagues sternly resisted his earliest efforts to transmit their views on Ulster to the Prime Minister in writing, which O’Connor viewed as an essential prelude to further progress. It appears that the rest of the tetrarchy held the view that, if Ulster were put on the table, it would only be fit for carving. As such they would avoid facing down unionist Ulster for as long as they reasonably could. On 28 September 1913, just four days after the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council’s provisional government, John Redmond travelled to Kerry, visiting the birthplace of Daniel O’Connell before travelling onward to Cahirciveen. There he outlined his policy on Ulster in response to the most recent developments in the province. Redmond told his audience that his silence up to that point had been deliberate, as he had not wished to say anything ‘which might interfere with the prospect, no matter how vague … of Home Rule being passed by agreement’.8 Following the foundation of the Ulster government, Redmond

104

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

could no longer stay silent. He denounced the ‘implacable’, ‘irreconcilable’ stance of Unionist Ulster claiming it had its root in ‘the old spirit of ascendancy’.9 However, Redmond announced that, despite this, he would gladly discuss with Edward Carson ‘every single provision of the [Home Rule] Bill with the earnest and sincere desire to accommodate every detail … to the needs and desires of those men whom [Carson] represent[ed]’. Redmond’s sole stipulation was that the principle of Home Rule, ‘having succeeded after thirty years of unparalleled sacrifice and having been passed twice by a majority of over a hundred [in the House of Commons]’, would not be up for discussion. While this may appear a generous offer, the state of feeling in Ulster had, by the autumn of 1913, deteriorated to such an extent that Redmond’s offer amounted to little more than rhetoric. Understandably, he would not budge on the principle of Home Rule. More defiantly, he would not entertain or make comment on the exclusion of Ulster, which had been defeated by a vote of the House of Commons as far back as June 1912.10 Following his speech at Cahirciveen, Herbert Henry Asquith’s cabinet began to increase the pressure on Redmond to come out with some clear statement of policy on the Ulster question. It was at this point that the government identified T.P. O’Connor as the most moderate of the Irish party leadership on this issue, and pressed him to secure a clear statement of policy from Redmond. O’Connor’s efforts to extract an Ulster policy from Redmond began somewhat ominously when Lloyd George was sent to discuss the idea with O’Connor.11 Even at this early stage, O’Connor appears to have viewed some level of concession on Ulster as a necessity of tactics rather than a rigid issue of Nationalist principle. Writing to Dillon at the end of September 1913, O’Connor argued that concessions on control of education or even time-limited exclusion for the North-East were worth considering, saying that It is evident to me that the Tory Party as a whole is somewhat alarmed by the position of Carson and would grasp at any compromise which would save their faces.12

By launching a pre-emptive strike, O’Connor hoped to regain the initiative from the Unionists. O’Connor also wrote to Devlin at this time, explaining that [Lloyd George] had proposed at the beginning of the struggle that Ulster should get the option [of a plebiscite], feeling confident then that it would be refused, and that he still thought this would have been wise tactics.13

O’Connor continued, assuring Devlin that Lloyd George had

Ireland in the spotlight

105

Discussed quite calmly and amicably our difficulty in agreeing to a proposal which would look like the betrayal of our fellow-Nationalists in Ulster.14

As far as the rest of the party leadership was concerned, Redmond had already given the government an indication of his party’s position at Cahirciveen including an unambiguous rejection of partition.15 Dillon felt strongly that any further statement of intent by the party, particularly in writing, was deeply inadvisable. From O’Connor’s vantage point, Dillon’s insistence that the party had already outlined a policy on Ulster though Redmond’s Cahirciveen speech was deeply flawed. In many ways, the Cahirciveen policy was no policy at all: it ignored the strength and depth of unionist opposition and pledged the party to plough on in its demand for Home Rule without seriously acknowledging the depth of feeling or the scale of the threat emanating from Ulster. Eventually, O’Connor admitted defeat in his crusade of conversion. Signalling this, he wrote to Dillon on 17 October displaying an atypical degree of anger and frustration towards his party colleagues. To his old friend and ally, Dillon, he wrote: My dear John, I still remain strongly and even violently of opinion that the silence of you gentlemen in Ireland has created a situation of intense difficulty, which might easily have been avoided; but I will say no more about it.16

In short, O’Connor had given up, abandoning his strongly held views on the necessity of a statement from Redmond to Asquith. O’Connor’s pleas had not entirely been ignored. Letters had been sent, but they contained no meaningful clarification or any hint of modification in the Irish party’s stance. Of these, the most important came from Devlin who wrote to Percy Illingworth, the Liberal chief whip, explaining his thoughts on Ulster. As distinct from O’Connor’s request for an unambiguous statement of policy – ideally from Redmond to the Prime Minister – Devlin was keen to stress to both Dillon and Illingworth that his letter was ‘purely personal and commits no one, but contains facts they [the Liberal party] ought to know’.17 Claiming to reflect the mood both of Ulster and of Liberal constituents in England and Scotland canvassed during by-election campaigns there, Devlin informed the Liberal chief whip that there was widespread distaste for any ‘shilly-shallying’ over the resolution of the Ulster question. In Britain, ‘one note sounded clearly … the note of “No Compromise” ’.18 Interestingly, at this point in negotiations, the view among cabinet was that it was Dillon, the hardliner, rather than the more conciliatory

106

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Redmond that was dictating Irish party policy on Ulster. Charles Hobhouse, political diarist and then minister without portfolio in Asquith’s Cabinet recorded the feeling among his colleagues that a letter sent by Redmond to the Prime Minister in late November had been ‘largely written by Dillon, for it used phrases and voiced opinions identical with those which he used in separate conversations he had had with Ll[oyd] G[eorge] and [Walter] Runciman’.19 However, the policy of intransigence being pushed by Dillon was rapidly becoming untenable owing to the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary machinations of the unionists. While O’Connor had been urging his colleagues to outline a clear Ulster policy to the Prime Minister, Asquith had been receiving more readily offered suggestions and representations from the Unionist side. Andrew Bonar Law had met Asquith in early November and had outlined his position, stressing that he spoke for nobody but himself. While open to definitions on the geographical scope of the area under consideration, Bonar Law explained that the permanent exclusion of an as-yet-undetermined portion of Ulster was the least that the Unionist party could accept. Hinting at the power behind his position and the relative moderation of his stance, Bonar Law reminded Asquith that ‘he could not, of course, speak for the extreme men amongst his own supporters or amongst the supporters of Carson in Ulster’.20 When Asquith met with Redmond later in November 1913, he reported the contents of his earlier meeting with Bonar Law, outlining how the Cabinet were at an impasse until they could ascertain whether Redmond could find any further room for compromise now that the Unionist position had been stated. Echoing the implicit threat behind Bonar Law’s stance, in the course of his meeting with Redmond, Asquith expressed his concern that it was now necessary to work towards ‘some settlement which would avoid bloodshed in Ulster’.21 The spectre of bloodshed was not mere scaremongering, although this was no doubt Asquith’s intent. The Prime Minister informed Redmond that the Carsonites were already in possession of at least 5,000 rifles and relayed an early warning from the War Office that army officers would likely resign their commissions if called upon to put down an ‘Ulster insurrection’. Asquith noted that reports from some quarters predicted a level of resignations as high as 30 per cent.22 Although the Premier dismissed this as exaggerated, his reporting of these facts to Redmond was clearly designed to convey the gravity of the situation. Lloyd George would shortly follow up on this, advising Redmond that the authorities had uncovered 95,000 rounds of ammunition in Belfast and were working towards their seizure.23

Ireland in the spotlight

107

It is not clear how explicitly, or by what channels, Redmond conceded his acceptance of the principle of Ulster exclusion to the government following his meetings with Asquith and Lloyd George on 17 November. The situation was very fluid throughout this period and it appears that the conditional tense became common parlance with the government attempting to ascertain what nationalists would do if one or other course was pursued by the Unionists. The historian’s ability to understand this entire period is hampered greatly by the fact that an enormous gap exists in the correspondence of T.P. O’Connor preserved in the Redmond papers with no letter extant between the two for a period from 22 December 1910 until 10 July 1914.24 This is despite the fact that references exist to O’Connor writing to Redmond during this period.25 Lacking these vital letters – if they ever existed in the first place – the closest one can come to dating Redmond’s acceptance is in a letter from O’Connor to Dillon on 26 November, in which O’Connor documents the convoluted series of concessions and caveats by which Redmond finally relinquished the principle of partition to the government. Writing from his apartment in London, O’Connor reported: Redmond agrees with you that the temporary exclusion of Ulster w[oul]d be better than the loss of H[ome] Rule now; but he also believes that the Tories would not accept it; and of course as he said, though that proposition of the advantage of accepting temporary exclusion was better than the loss of the bill, it was better on paper; we might find it difficult to get it accepted by our own people. But still he is ready as you are, to accept the responsibility.26

Justifying the momentous decision they had now made, O’Connor observed to Dillon that the party would in any case be forced to vote for a government amendment proposing temporary exclusion. To vote against it, or even to abstain, would mean the government could not carry the proposal and the Home Rule Bill would be lost. In a postscript to this most crucial of letters, O’Connor reported on Redmond’s mood to Dillon, stating that Redmond thinks if H[ome] Rule be now defeated, it is the end of the present party and of all its old leaders; I just chronicle hurriedly without commenting. I think R[edmond] is probably right. Of course R[edmond] also feels strongly as we all do, the immense draw-back it would be to the working of the Irish Parliament if we had bloodshed and smouldering rebellion in Ulster.27

Although O’Connor’s meaning is not fully clear, the final sentence appears to indicate that Redmond actually saw an advantage to the

108

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

strictly temporary exclusion of Ulster in that it would allow a southern Home Rule parliament to get on with the task of legislating in the artificial peace of partition rather than a divisive united Ireland. In March and April of 1914, exactly what the government had warned Redmond and Dillon about came to pass. The Curragh incident and the Larne gun-running were two significant Unionist propaganda victories during the Home Rule crisis.28 They point to a stark lack of proactivity on the part of the government. Given their clear and detailed knowledge of both these threats as far back as November 1913, their significance here lies in the prominence given to them in Redmond’s memorandum of his interview with Asquith. They can be seen to have been central elements in convincing the Irish party chairman, who had seemingly entered his interview resolved not to yield on Ulster, of the severity of the crisis there and the need for an immediate change of tack to salvage the situation. Coupled with the contents of similar interviews with a series of Cabinet members during November, the immediacy of the Ulster crisis as conveyed to Redmond by Asquith can be seen as having been key to extracting concessions from the Irish party over partition. While Asquith was working on Redmond, Lloyd George was simultaneously working towards the conversion of Dillon. If Lloyd George’s memorandum of this interview can be taken at face value, Lloyd George had extracted from Dillon an even more explicit concession on partition than Redmond’s. Dillon’s one caveat was that partition was only palatable ‘inasmuch as it was accompanied by the carrying into law of Home Rule for the rest of Ireland’.29 Lyons questions the credibility of Lloyd George’s recollection of this interview:  believing a situation where Dillon was more amenable to conciliation than Redmond to be improbable to the point of disbelief. However, Lloyd George’s memorandum of what passed between himself and Dillon should not be rubbished entirely.30 In a letter to O’Connor, Dillon outlined his stance, stating that when negotiating with Lloyd George I kept [a] perfectly open mind to consider the proposition [of temporary exclusion] when the time came and assented to accept it or reject it – after giving full weight to all the circumstances of the time.31

Lloyd George had thus not misunderstood Dillon. Referring to the scheme for temporary exclusion, Lloyd George’s memo noted that [Dillon] was anxious the Irish leaders should be free during the next few months to state that no proposal of the kind had been made to the other side, and that they (the Irish leaders) had not assented to such a scheme.

Ireland in the spotlight

109

He thought that if put forward at the last moment, when the Bill was going through, [temporary exclusion] might be tactically a very wise plan to propose, and that then the Irish leaders might carry it in Ireland.32

Bearing this in mind, it is entirely plausible that Dillon made all the commitments claimed of him in this memorandum. Far from refusing to accept the idea of partition, Dillon saw a strictly time-limited exclusion of Ulster as a valuable tactical weapon to be held in reserve for later phases of the struggle to get Home Rule onto the Statute Book. Thus, by the end of November – through a mixture of implicit threat and inducement – the government had succeeded in gaining the nominal approval of three-quarters of the Irish party leadership for the principle of partition.33 It was a major coup; only Devlin, as MP for West Belfast, remained. The concessions made privately in November marked a fundamental departure in the policy of the Irish party. Internal focus would now shift to the delicate task of bringing Devlin around to the idea. It is not sensationalist to state that Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor were keeping Devlin in the dark following their meetings at Downing Street in November. Having been converted to acceptance of time-limited partition, they now had to break the news to their Belfast colleague. Dillon apparently dreaded the task and was anxious that Devlin should not receive any premature half-truths about the complicated nature of the concessions offered by Dillon to Lloyd George. In an early communication following his return to Dublin in late November 1913, Dillon chastened O’Connor, informing him that ‘I cannot communicate your letter to Joe Devlin – because of the sentences conveying impression that I  have agreed to temporary exclusion of Ulster’.34 As demonstrated above, Dillon had in fact conceded to future temporary exclusion in his meeting with Lloyd George. The only conclusion that can be made here is that Dillon wanted a chance to explain the new position to Devlin in person, in the hope that he would be able to bring him around to his colleagues’ way of thinking on the question. O’Connor had brought Devlin to see Lloyd George late in 1913 and had not fared well in finding any accommodation between the two.35 Reflecting the difficulty his colleagues faced in reaching out to Devlin, O’Connor wrote to Dillon in the closing days of 1913, appearing almost to have recanted his acceptance of concessions for Ulster. He told Dillon that ‘any form of exclusion of Ulster will place us in an almost impossible position. I fear that we should lose Devlin and all he represents, and you know what a loss that would be to us’.36 A.C. Hepburn reports that the feeling in British political circles was that Devlin would eventually

110

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

be converted by his colleagues, and that Dillon would be pivotal to this conversion.37 Further substantiating the idea that the tetrarchs were engaged in a desperate attempt to convert their Ulster colleague at this point, Hepburn relates observations made by T.M. Healy to his brother in early February 1914 that ‘Devlin’s colleagues were concealing the truth of the situation from him’ and that although Healy himself felt that ‘Devlin cannot give in … I see Dillon arguing with him constantly’.38 Following the intense negotiations of November and December 1913, O’Connor resolved to take a holiday to Algiers and Tunis. The importance of this was not the destination – indeed O’Connor’s preference was to visit Palestine.39 Instead, what is of note is who O’Connor was accompanied by on his trip. His travelling companion was none other than Lloyd George. The pair were apparently accompanied by the Australian mining magnate and Liberal MP for Shropshire, Wellington Division: Sir Charles Solomon Henry.40 This underlines the level of access enjoyed by O’Connor at this time to members of the Cabinet and the Liberal elite. Of these, none was closer to O’Connor in these years than Lloyd George. Dillon approved of O’Connor’s travel plans, glad to think that O’Connor would have an opportunity to ‘learn exactly what the situation is – and how his mind stands’ and adding ‘If you hear anything interesting from George while you are away you might write to me’.41 Just as the government’s earlier tactic had been to use T.P. O’Connor to soften up his colleagues during October 1913, it now fell to Redmond and Dillon to convince Devlin – the last defender of an unadulterated thirty-two county Home Rule Bill – of the necessity of this difficult compromise. If Healy’s story of open arguments between Dillon and Devlin was accurate, and there is little reason to doubt it, Devlin’s conversion was not won easily, and it took a monumental effort to convince him to exclude his own native province from the terms of the settlement, even on a temporary basis. After virtual stasis in negotiation between the IPP leadership and the government since the November deliberations, a memorandum from Lloyd George to Redmond jump-started the process. Here, Lloyd George outlined a stratagem which, he was convinced, would force the Unionists either to accept proposals that did not alter the text of the Home Rule Bill or be forced to appear unreasonable in the eyes of the British electorate. The lynchpin of this strategy was that, if the Unionists conceded to passing the Home Rule Bill, in full, they would then be guaranteed the option of voting to exclude themselves from its provisions for an agreed time period. If the offer was rejected, Lloyd George was convinced that it ‘would put the other side entirely in the wrong, as far as the British public is concerned’.42 What was needed from the

Ireland in the spotlight

111

Nationalists, therefore, was approval to offer time-limited exclusion. At the behest of his colleagues within the leadership, Devlin finally committed his views on the situation as it now stood to paper. This signalled a grudging capitulation to months of pressure from his colleagues and an acknowledgement of the gravity of the situation. Dated 20 February 1914, Devlin’s memorandum was circulated among his colleagues in the leadership and a copy was sent to Lloyd George.43 Instead of yielding outright to Lloyd George’s call for temporary exclusion, Devlin’s concession closely reflected a novel solution to the Ulster question which had recently been proposed by the former Irish unionist MP Sir Horace Plunkett. Plunkett’s proposal was to offer Ulster temporary inclusion rather than exclusion from Home Rule. After a trial period, Ulster counties could then vote by plebiscite to opt out of Dublin rule. Centring on this tenet, Devlin conceded to three special provisions for Ulster. These were: the right of Ulster counties to opt out of Home Rule after ten years; the right of Ulster unionists to extra representation in an Irish parliament; and ‘such an arrangement of the Senate as would afford them an additional safeguard against unfair treatment’.44 With this, Devlin had finally surrendered the principle of territorial integrity. That his concession was for time-delayed county option rather than temporary exclusion – as the rest of the leadership had conceded back in November – was irrelevant. The essential point was that he had compromised. With his memorandum, he gave written acknowledgement to the exceptional position of Ulster. Furthermore, he acknowledged the ultimate right of counties with a unionist majority to democratically exclude themselves from the jurisdiction of a Home Rule parliament, albeit after a trial period. Promptly, Lloyd George reacted to Devlin’s memorandum. His reply exploited the instability in Ulster to draw the Belfastman the one step remaining between temporary exclusion and temporary inclusion. Lloyd George explained; As to the general considerations urged in Mr Devlin’s memorandum they are more or less common ground. Information in the possession of the Ministry indicates, however, that he underestimates the danger of civil disturbance in Ulster. I agree the words ‘civil war’ are much too portentous a description … however … the Government could hardly hope to quell [‘riots on a large and menacing scale’] without some effusion of blood.45

A follow-up meeting was arranged at the Treasury on 27 February. Asquith absented himself and Lloyd George, accompanied by Birrell, met Redmond, Dillon, and Devlin. Here, as Ronan Fanning observes, Lloyd George ‘disingenuously agreed’ to Redmond’s one condition: that

112

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

whatever concession was agreed to there and then ‘would be their last word’.46 With this, temporary exclusion was swept aside and temporary inclusion was accepted by the IPP leadership on the strict provision that it would be limited to three years.47 This accord was confirmed in writing following a confirmatory meeting between the entire tetrarchy and Asquith, Birrell, and Lloyd George on Monday, 2 March.48 Devlin was immediately dispatched to Ulster where he met privately with leading figures in the nationalist community, especially the bishops and clergy, to sound them out and bring them onside with the new departure. Having verbally agreed to three-year exclusion with the Nationalists on Monday, Cabinet met on Wednesday and Asquith produced his qualified formal reply to Redmond’s offer. The Cabinet accepted Redmond’s concession ‘[w]‌ithout tying our hands … in regard to matters of detail’.49 By Friday, Birrell informed Redmond that the detail had changed, three years had become six. Reacting to this so-sudden betrayal, the IPP’s ire was matched only by its powerlessness to do anything about it. Redmond was assuaged when Churchill delivered a ‘fiery’ speech at Bradford on 14 March at the same time as a squadron of battleships moved into position off Belfast Lough.50 In an apparent coincidence, Devlin spoke at Bradford the very next day. Here and in a subsequent speech at the House of Commons, he castigated Asquith for kowtowing to the unionists by offering them six years, with two British general elections intervening on foot of threats from a faction he described as not the Protestants of Ulster but merely ‘a little section of political conspirators’.51 Regardless of Devlin’s protestations, the die had been cast. With unionists still intransigent, temporary exclusion was now an enshrined principle. In this way, within three weeks, the impasse arrived at in November had been broken and Lloyd George was at the centre of the gambit. The catalyst for everything had been Devlin. He had been carefully drawn out and, once he had conceded, play after play had been executed in relentless succession until Lloyd George had achieved what he wanted – Nationalist approval for the principle of partition. The concept of exclusion had all along been Lloyd George’s preferred option. It was he and Churchill who had first mooted ‘contracting out’ in Cabinet fully two years previous, before the third Home Rule Bill had been introduced, in February 1912.52 For the tetrarchy, Devlin’s concessions marked the end of a difficult and divisive chapter in the leadership’s history. Never, before or since, had its members collectively endeavoured so earnestly to convert the will of another colleague. It was a dark chapter in the leadership’s history, and, later on, Devlin would come to regret even more acutely having

Ireland in the spotlight

113

ever yielded on the partition question.53 For the other tetrarchs, exclusion was a tactic: something to be bought and sold, albeit at the highest price. For Devlin, however, his acceptance of this deal represented nothing short of a Faustian pact. His own constituents and the nationalists of Ulster now stood a real risk of being excluded from the planned Home Rule Ireland for the sake of the bulk of nationalists in the south. While Devlin still earnestly hoped for a united Home Rule Ireland, his actions, along with those of his colleagues, had now all but yoked the idea of partition to any future deal to settle the question of Irish legislative independence. Towards a conference The culmination of the government’s efforts to solve the Ulster crisis came in the summer of 1914 at a stage where there was a threat of disobedience among a section of the army’s officer class in Ireland. Alongside this, the arming of both unionist and nationalist paramilitary factions combined with enduring deadlock in the political process to convince many that Ireland was on the cusp of civil war. Given the concurrent situation in Europe that threatened to spill out into a continental conflict, it appeared as if the whole Empire was tearing at the seams by July of 1914. In an effort to remove the Ulster question from a political arena in which European concerns were now dominating, a conference was called under the auspices of the King at Buckingham Palace, sitting for four days between 21 and 24 July. Here, representatives of both the Ulster and British Unionist parties sitting opposite Lloyd George and the Prime Minister as representatives of the government were joined by Redmond and Dillon in what would become a media spectacle for Unionists and Nationalists alike. Unionist and Nationalist representatives stuck to their opposing viewpoints while maintaining an air of cordiality as befitted the tone of a conference convened by the King.54 At the sessions of the conference, the Irish party’s acceptance of partition evolved. The question of time limit was set aside while the opposing parties decided instead to focus on the proposed area for exclusion. A number of formulae were proposed as possible frameworks for determining an acceptable area for exclusion:  some producing bizarre and utterly unworkable permutations when applied to a map.55 By attending these negotiations Redmond and Dillon further embedded their acknowledgement of temporary exclusion first given to Asquith and Lloyd George back in November 1913. The conference should not be misconstrued as a sincere attempt by either the Irish party or the Unionist leaderships to arrive at a real

114

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

solution to the Ulster question. From the outset, all parties  – bar the government – were happy to acquiesce in an amicable deadlock. The real action of the Buckingham Palace Conference occurred outside the palace where all representatives were given an opportunity to parade in front of the media spotlight and demonstrate their bravado in the face of the enemy.56 Aside from Nationalist and Unionist grandstanding, there were also tender scenes. Redmond and Carson took the opportunity to publicise their abilities to rise above factionalism with ‘a good shake hands for the sake of the old days together on the circuit’.57 Even James Craig, who had reportedly never spoken to John Dillon before the conference, extended him a hand of friendship as the conference broke.58 This posing was far from trivial. For Redmond and Dillon it gave them the chance to present themselves as credible and capable statesmen of imperial calibre representing their views at the highest forum in the Empire. It was a high point in Redmond’s career, despite the fact that he and Dillon had achieved nothing but a perpetuation of stalemate. Through his statesman-like performance, Redmond had greatly increased his own personal standing in the eyes of an adoring nationalist public. The Freeman’s Journal gave much coverage to the enthusiastic receptions that greeted Redmond and Dillon on their entrances to and exits from the palace during the conference. Of particular note were the cheers given by the Irish Guards at Wellington Barracks as the Nationalist delegates passed by on their way from Buckingham Palace on 22 July and, attesting to the growing public profile of the chairman, cheers of ‘up Redmond’ were reported on the same day from the crowds that flocked to the gates of the palace throughout the conference.59 While the Buckingham Palace Conference was seen as a failure, this did not diminish the added legitimacy and status it conferred upon the nationalist delegates in its aftermath.60 Redmond’s ability to bring nationalist Ireland into the war effort several months later can be directly linked to the elevation of his own prestige at Buckingham Palace. However, while there would be short-term benefits for the tetrarchy from Redmond and Dillon’s performance at the conference, the longer-term consequences of perpetuating a stalemate in Ulster would eventually become apparent. Notes 1 George V, ‘Speech to the Buckingham Palace Conference [published]’, 21 July 1914 (NLI, RP, MS 15,257/3). 2 The Liberals’ 1891 ‘Newcastle programme’ set out a roadmap of party policy that would eventually be implemented following the 1906 general election. This included many grand schemes such as Irish Home Rule, death duty and land tax increases, Welsh and Scottish church disestablishment, a redefinition

Ireland in the spotlight

115

of the relationship between Commons and Lords, and various other ‘democratic and social reforms’, Biagini, British Democracy, p. 187. 3 Ronan Fanning, Fatal Path:  British Government and Irish Revolution, 1910–1922 (London, 2013), p. 57. 4 Report by the Committee on Irish Finance, 1 [Cd  6153], H.C. 1912–13, xxxiv, 5–40. 5 The nature and extent of the party’s contact with the Bishop of Ross regarding the financial architecture of the third Home Rule Bill is discussed at length in Mulvagh, ‘Rome ruler’, pp.  48–58. For a more comprehensive look at the work of the Primrose Committee itself, see Patricia Jalland, ‘Irish home-rule finance: a neglected dimension of the Irish question, 1910–14’, Irish Historical Studies, xxiii, no. 91 (May 1983), pp. 233–53. 6 It has been stressed that the Primrose Commission was a purely advisory body, whereas it fell to Samuel to draft the financial provisions that would be incorporated into the third Home Rule Bill: Jalland, ‘Home-rule finance’, p. 239. 7 See Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 66–9. 8 Freeman’s Journal, 29 September 1913. 9 Freeman’s Journal, 29 September 1913. 10 An amendment to exclude four Ulster counties was raised in the House of Commons by the Liberal MP for Cornwall, T.G.R. Agar-Robartes, but successfully defeated. See Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question, p. 56. 11 O’Connor to Dillon, 30 September 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/194). 12 O’Connor to Dillon, 30 September 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/194). 13 O’Connor to Devlin, 1 October 1913 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/3). 14 O’Connor to Devlin, 1 October 1913 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/3). 15 Dillon agreed ‘fully and heartily’ with Redmond’s Cahirciveen speech: Dillon to O’Connor, 2 October 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/196). For a summary of the speech from an Irish Unionist perspective, see Irish Times, 6 October 1913. 16 O’Connor to Dillon, 17 October 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/208). 17 Devlin to Dillon, 12 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/164). 18 Devlin to Illingworth, 7 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/164). 19 Diary entry for 25 November 1913, Hobhouse, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet, p. 151. 20 All this is reported in ‘Interview:  Mr. Redmond with Mr. Asquith [17 November  1913] (dictated by Mr. Redmond)’, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/508). A large portion of this is reproduced in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 234–6. 21 ‘Interview: Mr. Redmond with Mr. Asquith [17 November 1913] (Dictated by Mr. Redmond)’, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/508). 22 ‘Interview: Mr. Redmond with Mr. Asquith [17 November 1913] (Dictated by Mr. Redmond)’, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/508). 23 See Lyons, Dillon, p. 341. 24 Correspondence with O’Connor, 1910–16 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215 2A). 25 Dillon to O’Connor, 2 October 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/196).

116

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

26 O’Connor to Dillon, 26 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/212). 27 O’Connor to Dillon, 26 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/212). 28 On the Curragh incident, see I.F.W. Beckett (ed.), The Army and the Curragh Incident 1914 (London, 1986), James Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (London, 1964), and A.P. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (London, 1956). Short summaries of the Larne gun-running can be found in F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (London, 1971), p.  308 and J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1912–1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 18. 29 Lloyd George, ‘Interview with Mr John Dillon, at No. 11 Downing St.’, 17 November 1913 (PA, LGP, C/20/2/4). 30 On Lyons’ suspicions and a justification for his stance, see Lyons, Dillon, pp. 338–40. 31 Dillon to O’Connor, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/213). 32 Lloyd George, ‘Interview with Mr John Dillon, at No. 11 Downing St.’, 17 November 1913 (PA, LGP, C/20/2/4). 33 See Lyons, Dillon, p. 340. 34 Dillon to O’Connor, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/213). 35 O’Connor to Dillon, 17 December 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/217). 36 O’Connor to Dillon, 30 December 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/219). 37 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 148. 38 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 148. 39 Brady, O’Connor, pp. 213–14. 40 O’Connor to Dillon, 17 December 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/217). 41 Dillon to O’Connor, 20 December 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/218). 42 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 257. 43 Only the first page of this memorandum is extant in the Redmond papers: ‘Mr Devlin’s memo’, 20 February 1914 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/3) but the last three pages are transcribed in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 258–9. The Lloyd George papers contain a complete copy: [unsigned and undated memorandum], 6pp, typescript (PA, LGP, C/2/6). 44 PA, LGP, C/2/6. 45 Lloyd George memorandum, 23 February 1914, cited in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 260. 46 Fanning, Fatal Path, p. 102. 47 Fanning, Fatal Path, p. 102. 48 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 267. 49 Fanning, Fatal Path, p. 103. 50 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 151. 51 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 151. 52 See Fanning, Fatal Path, p. 63. 53 O’Connor to Dillon, 18 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/308) [discussed subsequently]. 54 The British Unionist representatives were Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne while Carson and Craig represented Ulster. The conference was chaired by the speaker of the House of Commons, James Lowther.

Ireland in the spotlight

117

55 A good summary of the details of this can be found in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 338–41. 56 Conor Mulvagh, ‘Amicable in tone yet fruitless in result: politicians, press and public and the Buckingham Palace Conference, 1914’, History Studies: University of Limerick History Society Journal, viii (2007), pp. 89–90. 57 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 343. 58 Lyons, Dillon, p. 353. 59 Freeman’s Journal, 23 July 1914. Crowds on Thursday, 23 July were estimated at 5–6,000 people, and comprising a ‘large Irish element’, Freeman’s Journal, 24 July 1914. 60 For examples of how the Irish party made the most of the media interest surrounding the conclusion of the Buckingham Palace Conference, see Mulvagh, ‘Amicable in tone’, pp. 89–91.

5 Estrangements and realignments: leadership in wartime, 1914–16

[Redmond] had behind him no longer that United Irish Party ‘who never hedge within their pledge’, but a large concourse of petty-minded money-grabbers … who grumble at his patriotisms and would desert him tomorrow if they saw the way to stick to their £400 a year without him. – Augustine Birrell, c. 19151

Much as it exasperated Asquith, the outcome of Buckingham Palace Conference must have seemed like a masterstroke of brinkmanship both for the Nationalist and Ulster Unionist delegations. The moderate nationalist press proudly portrayed Redmond and Dillon as defenders of nationalism from the reactionary forces of Ulster unionism. Despite the amicable scenes witnessed at the conference’s conclusion, nationalist Ireland had stood its ground, especially on the difficult question of Fermanagh and Tyrone.2 For the tetrarchy, the conference had elevated Redmond and Dillon to the status of imperial statesmen rather than mere provincial politicians. Ignoring the utter stalemate that emerged from Buckingham Palace, in terms of perception, July 1914 saw the Irish party leadership at its zenith. While it can be said that the period up to the end of July 1914 represented the most significant episode of public co-operation between Redmond and Dillon, other developments suggested the beginnings of a more independent streak in the leadership style of John Redmond. This stemmed from the way he chose to tackle the growth of the Irish Volunteers, a private army headed by Professor Eoin MacNeill, which had been founded in November 1913 to defend Home Rule but which, up to the summer of 1914, had existed entirely outside the control of the Irish party.3 By May 1914, Redmond moved to take control of the movement by demanding the inclusion of an equal number of his own nominees on the then twenty-five-strong provisional committee. Following a saga which saw both bungling and defiance, the founders capitulated in the name of unity and Redmond’s nominees were grudgingly accepted onto a committee that was already infiltrated by members of the Irish Republican

Estrangements and realignments

119

Brotherhood who would go on to plot the 1916 Rising in secret. In the months following Redmond’s coup, the Irish party leader found that having the Volunteers under his control had benefits in terms of facing down the threat of Carsonism. When war clouds broke over Europe in August, Redmond convinced himself that control of this 170,000-strong movement was his trump card at Westminster. How he would choose to play it, however, would ultimately have profound consequences for his relationship with Dillon and the unity of the party leadership. Irish history writing on this period is replete with accounts of the manner in which external events intervened – in the shape of the Serbian crisis and the outbreak of the First World War – to change utterly the prospects of a Home Rule Bill that had seemed an inevitability into one that squeezed onto the Statute Book next to an ominous amending act in September 1914. Despite the outpouring of congratulation for Redmond and his party, the Amending Act would ensure that Home Rule would not become a reality until the end of hostilities in Europe and pending an agreeable resolution to the Ulster question. Thus, as matters stood at the outbreak of the First World War, nationalist Ireland had achieved its demand of self-government in name but not in fact. As the war dragged on into years rather than the few short months promised, the popularity won on the Home Rule issue dissipated and Redmond’s unfaltering support for the imperial war effort ensured that his popularity in Ireland would, in many ways, be coupled with that of the conflict itself. For the leadership, the momentum of summer 1914 was quickly lost. Rather than the new dawn they envisaged, the war ensured that the tetrarchs would find their working relationships strained to breaking point as the constitutional nationalist movement unknowingly set its course for failure. In 1966, León Ó Broin wrote rather cryptically of ‘an estrangement’ between Redmond and Dillon in the latter stages of 1914. Ó Broin goes into little detail on this, simply stating that Dillon had ‘never been happy about Redmond’s pledge at the declaration of the war’ in addition to a perceived weakness on Redmond’s part in his dealings with the government and the War Office.4 While it is true that there was a ‘divergence’ – to use Lyons’ term – between the two by March 1915, Ó Broin is incorrect to pre-date this to the outbreak of the First World War.5 Examination of the correspondence between the leaders shows no sign of division in the period with patterns of interaction between the two carrying on as normal throughout 1914 and early 1915.6 It appears that, in identifying this ‘estrangement’, Ó Broin had fallen victim to a false rumour, compounded by an unfamiliarity with the private correspondence between Redmond and Dillon in these years.7 By

120

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

1970, following a lead given him by F.X. Martin, F.S.L. Lyons appears to have found the source of Ó Broin’s misinformation. Contained within a memorandum by Eoin MacNeill is a noteworthy piece of Dublin gossip that was circulating in late 1914. It claimed that, having pledged the Volunteers to the war effort on 3 August in the Commons, ‘Mr Redmond was met immediately afterwards by Mr Dillon with the strongest reproaches for having made an unauthorised and unconsidered declaration of policy’.8 While this was certainly not a policy that Dillon would personally have promulgated, and he may have had misgivings about it and the unilateral manner in which Redmond made his proclamation, in no way did this lead to an immediate souring of relations between the two. Before proceeding to the actual estrangement that did occur in March 1915, there are some important changes in the relationships between the tetrarchs between August 1914 and March 1915 that require analysis, as they mark the beginning of shifts in the workings and inter-relationships of the tetrarchy that would endure and evolve until 1918. Firstly, perhaps riding on his successes at Buckingham Palace in late July, Redmond began to act in an uncharacteristically unilateral manner at the beginning of August 1914. Having been synonymous with conciliation and party unity, Redmond had to this point lived up to his title of chairman, ensuring that he acted with the knowledge and support of Dillon, O’Connor, and Devlin at the very least, and usually waiting for whole-party approval before acting on major issues throughout the period under consideration. Following the Buckingham Palace Conference, however, Redmond was brought into closer than ever contact with the highest echelons of the government, the opposition, and even the sovereign himself. The extent to which this closeness could be used to influence Redmond can be seen by a letter written by Margot Asquith to Redmond on 1 August, more than likely written with her husband’s knowledge, in which she shrewdly tempted Redmond with the idea ‘that he had the opportunity of his life of setting an unforgettable example to the Carsonites if he would go to the House of Commons on the Monday and in a great speech offer all his soldiers to the Government’.9 It can be taken that Redmond paid heed to Mrs Asquith’s exhortation given that, as suggested, he publicly committed his Volunteers to the defence of Ireland’s coastline that very Monday, 3 August 1914, the day before Britain declared itself in the war. This was the first of a series of promises that would culminate with his announcement that Volunteers should go ‘wherever the firing line extends’ in his watershed speech to Volunteers assembled at Woodenbridge, county Wicklow, on 20 September.10

Estrangements and realignments

121

Stephen Gwynn, in writing the first proper biography of the chairman, lauded Redmond’s announcement to the House on 3 August 1914 as the moment when he ignored his traditional role within the party and acted ‘in a new capacity, as leader, at a great moment, acting in his own right’.11 It certainly marked a turning point in his role as chairman, and shows that, caught up in a great zeal for the war, Redmond was prepared to act without first consulting Dillon, a step that broke with all procedure over the fourteen-year-long history of leadership in the united party. More surprisingly, Gwynn records that, when Redmond leant over the benches to consult with O’Connor just prior to his announcement, O’Connor informed the chairman that he thought the risk ‘too great’ and advised against Redmond making such an announcement.12 If this account can be taken as accurate, it marks a major turning point in the history of the tetrarchy. As already noted, correspondence bears testament to the fact that Redmond’s pledge did not precipitate an immediate rift within the inner leadership. Given the severity of the crisis facing nationalism at this point, it would appear that Dillon and O’Connor buried any misgivings they had about Redmond’s bold new policy in the interests of presenting a united front. Nonetheless, the seeds of tension had been sown. It is clear from the above passage where Redmond stood in relation to the war  – what is less clear-cut is the stance of the other members of the inner leadership on the issue. In the eyes of the Chief Secretary, Redmond had his whole party behind him. In November 1914, Birrell informed his Cabinet colleagues that ‘amongst the Parliamentary party, not the slightest trace of sedition or opposition to the war is noticeable; in fact, the extent to which the contrary spirit has been exhibited is very remarkable’.13 However, beneath the surface, a groundswell, beginning with Dillon, was at best lukewarm in its support for the war effort. In November, it is true that the war was popular among supporters of the Irish party. However, as the casualty lists lengthened, enthusiasm slackened. While the irreconcilables such as Dillon appear to have never harboured any real enthusiasm for the war effort, a tipping point for many within the Irish nationalist middle class in which so many of the parliamentary party would have circulated appears to have been the military failure and catastrophic loss of life that accompanied Churchill’s disastrous scheme to invade the Ottoman Empire. On 25 April 1915, contingents of Dublin and Munster Fusiliers were decimated in the initial waves of amphibious landings at Gallipoli. In Dublin, writer and diarist Katharine Tynan14 expressed how Dublin was ‘full of mourning’ at the loss of Irish lives in this ‘horrible disaster’.15 For Tynan, ‘so many of our friends had gone out in the 10th Division to perish at Suvla. For the first time came bitterness, for we

122

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

felt that their lives had been thrown away and their heroism had gone unrecognised’.16 Thus, at the end of spring 1915, sentiments in Ireland were turning against the carnage of the war. By proxy, opinion was also turning against Redmond’s policy of forging a new Irish nationhood in the trenches of the Western front and in the even more distant theatres of the Near and Middle East. The Redmondite National Volunteers had all but ceased public activity in Ireland by this point and recruitment had begun to taper off after the initial rush to the colours.17 Despite his reluctance over Redmond’s pledge, O’Connor was a firm supporter of the war effort.18 His practical contribution to recruitment manifested itself with his efforts to enlist the Irish in England, particularly the large Irish communities in Newcastle and other northern industrial towns including his own constituency of Liverpool.19 His initial reluctance on Redmond’s pledge of August 1914 stemmed more from concerns over timing, it coming so soon after the Bachelor’s Walk killings which had provoked such a hostile reaction to the British army among large sections of the Irish nationalist public.20 Despite L.W. Brady’s observations that O’Connor’s English radical streak led him more into the pacifist camp, he nonetheless showed his colours in his journalistic writings, recognising early on ‘the necessity of closing up our [British and Irish] ranks’ in the face of the German threat.21 Devlin too was a strong supporter of the war effort, having taken much political flak in later years for his role in recruiting Catholic Belfast.22 In the spectrum of Nationalist stances on the war issue, A.C. Hepburn has placed Devlin ‘closer to Redmond than Dillon in terms of positive support for the war effort’.23 Given Devlin’s traditional alignment with Dillon when the latter disagreed with Redmond, this is somewhat unexpected. It may attest to the charisma and appeal of Redmondism, even to those within the highest echelons of nationalism, at the opening of the war. There appears to be no evidence to support L.W. Brady’s claim that, following Redmond’s pledge of 3 August, Devlin ‘with his greater fears for the future of Ulster, was enraged’.24 The closest one can come to is a cryptic reference to Devlin’s desire to have an urgent consultation with John Dillon the day after Redmond’s announcement.25 However, Devlin’s prompt alignment with Redmond’s war policy suggests that, as an Ulster Nationalist, he would have been as happy as any Irish MP with the idea of Orange and Green coming together in ‘an Irish unity sealed with blood’.26 If Ulster was to be included in a Home Rule parliament, the trenches were as good a place as any to forge a new ‘all-Ireland’ identity and a unifying narrative between the two sides of Ulster’s sectarian divide.

Estrangements and realignments

123

Having identified Dillon as the other end of a narrow spectrum from Redmond on this issue, it now stands to establish, in as much as one can, Dillon’s complex stance on the First World War. Lyons’ biography of Dillon is indispensable in this regard as he achieved a deeper understanding of Dillon’s personality, outlook, and psyche than any historian subsequently writing on the events of this era. He observes that Dillon’s stance on recruiting and the war generally ‘was superficially similar to Redmond’s, but in reality profoundly different’.27 Like Redmond, Dillon felt a debt of honour to Britain following the placement of Home Rule on the Statute Book, and ‘loyal support of Britain [in the war]’ was the best means of achieving this.28 However, Dillon had long harboured concerns over Sir Edward Grey’s foreign policy. On 5 August 1914, the day after Britain entered the conflict, an exasperated Dillon wrote to T.P. O’Connor that ‘The world is now reaping the bitter harvest of the Triple Entente & Grey’s foreign policy which for years I  have denounced to deaf ears’.29 Dillon’s traditional anti-war stance is best exemplified by his actions and proclamations during the Boer War. In 1902, he had been suspended from the House on this account. Anti-imperialism in 1902 did not automatically make Dillon an opponent of war in 1914. However, it contributed to the fact that he did not ‘become emotionally involved (as Redmond did) and he was entirely unmoved by war hysteria’.30 The final point which Lyons is keen to stress – and it is one of central importance to the evolution of the tetrarchy at this time – is that Dillon was at home in Dublin that August. Consequently, Dillon had a better understanding of the real nature of public opinion on the ground in Ireland than either Redmond or O’Connor. He was more pessimistic about the grassroots reaction to the events of August and September, observing that the painfully slow process of getting Home Rule onto the Statute Book (18 September) caused much dissatisfaction.31 This was to mark the beginning of a pattern that would endure for the rest of the history of the tetrarchy, with Dillon spending an even greater than usual amount of time in Ireland and Redmond and O’Connor losing touch with Irish sentiments on the ground even more so than in the past. O’Connor was humble enough to confess to Dillon in 1915 that, being so extracted from the realities of the situation, he did not trust his own judgement ‘on questions which concern Irish opinion in Ireland’.32 Tellingly, no such expression of humility can be found from Redmond. His frequent trips to the seclusion of Aughavanagh in south Wicklow appear to have convinced him that he was more tuned in to the currents of Irish political discourse in these years than he was in fact.33 To quote Stephen Gwynn, ‘[Aughavanagh] became increasingly and exclusively

124

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

his [Redmond’s] home in Ireland. It was, indeed, Ireland itself for him. In it and through it he knew Ireland intimately … Ireland to him meant Aughavanagh’. From Dublin, the well-connected and well-informed Dillon was able to keep his finger on the ever-changing pulse of Irish nationalism.34 In Aughavanagh, Redmond escaped from it and, in Westminster, with nothing comparable to the extensive web of correspondents maintained by Dillon throughout the war, Redmond carried on, either oblivious to or incredulous of the slow but growing rumblings of discontent, believing instead that his war policy was more popular than was the case. Less prominent in this narrative of the war years is Joe Devlin, who appears to have best straddled the gap between Dublin and London at this time. Not only did he carry out important work in Ireland – not least a protracted and successful recruiting campaign in Ulster35 – but he was also able to meet with Dillon in the latter’s home and bring him up to speed on the finer points of the political situation in London.36 The most significant testament to the value of Devlin in Westminster as well as in Ireland during the war is given by T.P. O’Connor, who confided to Dillon that Devlin, and not Redmond, would be the ideal man to nominate if there was to be a Nationalist counterweight to Carson in the wartime coalition when the idea first circulated in March 1915.37 In this way, the outbreak of war had as profound an impact on the inter-relations between the inner leadership of the Irish party as it did for Ireland in a broader sense. As demonstrated, there was no immediate estrangement between Redmond and Dillon at the outbreak of the conflict but that the foundations for a disagreement had been laid. At the beginning of March, tensions boiled over when Dillon, incensed by the emerging disaster of Nationalist involvement with the War Office over recruiting, wrote to T.P. O’Connor, venting his anger and disapproval with Redmond’s intransigence on the issue.38 Dillon quickly began to impart his feelings quite openly to O’Connor. Expecting that Redmond would be ‘disappointed and annoyed’ with Dillon’s decision, he told O’Connor ‘the truth is that I never felt enthusiastic about this British recruiting campaign – It seemed to lay us open to a very ugly retort in view of the published figures of recruiting’.39 The main focus of Dillon’s grief centred on Redmond’s enduring yet futile efforts with regards to the new Irish Divisions. Redmond had been lobbying two individuals in particular in relation to this. The first of these was Field Marshal Lord Horatio Kitchener in the War Office, and the second was commanding officer of the 16th (Irish) Division, General Sir Laurence Parsons. Of the latter, Dillon ventured that ‘for a long time I have had a strong feeling that Old Parsons was an Ass – and a rather

Estrangements and realignments

125

Orange Ass  – but the Chairman would hear nothing against him’.40 F.S.L. Lyons has observed that designation of ‘the chairman’ was ‘usually a storm signal with Dillon’ and conveyed his disapproval with Redmond whenever invoked.41 In this case, it would appear to be just so. Evidently, Dillon had held his tongue for too long on the subject of recruiting. By March 1915, months of pent up dissatisfaction about Redmond and his pro-war policies, exacerbated by the treatment experienced by the party in dealing with the British military authorities, came to the surface all at once. Dillon’s denunciation of ‘the Chairman’ was, however, not without self-reflection, showing that there was some opening for a future rapprochement between himself and Redmond. Before concluding this most revealing of letters, he confided in O’Connor that I have all along felt in a great difficulty in dealing with all these questions – because as I explained to you already – I hold views about the origin of the War – so different from those held by you and the Chairman and the public generally – that I distrust my judgement to some extent – and do not like to take a strong line in discussing matters of this kind with the Chairman as I otherwise would.42

While Dillon was now speaking his mind on these difficult issues, he was doing so from an uncomfortable position, where he felt he was unrepresentative of the broader party or public view. From the point of view of the tetrarchy, this saw a temporary splitting of the leadership in two on the war issue. On one side were Redmond and O’Connor, who were prepared to persevere in lobbying the military despite their overwhelming inflexibility and obstinacy in dealing with the Irish party. On the other, Devlin sided with Dillon, believing that party involvement in recruiting in particular, and the war effort more generally, was detrimental to the Nationalist programme and to the country. In this way, ideologically as well as territorially, the tetrarchy was divided as the tide in the war shifted during 1915 and the protracted conflict that O’Connor had prophesied – and Redmond had dreaded – gradually became a reality. In practical terms, the rift between Redmond and Dillon at this time did not greatly affect the operational ability of the tetrarchy to make decisions or to steer party policy. The most significant impact it appears to have had is that Dillon began to formulate decisions autonomously or in consultation with O’Connor or Devlin, only referring to Redmond post facto for approval.43 It must be stressed that O’Connor remained a close and trusted confidante of Dillon’s throughout this rift while at the same time maintaining close and cordial relations with Redmond. This meant that the only real estrangement existed between Dillon and

126

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Redmond. O’Connor’s maintenance of close relations with both sides of the rift ensured that he could act as an interlocutor between the two in a period when correspondence and contact largely dried up between Redmond and Dillon. While several cordial letters from Redmond to Dillon survive from the period, no trace of reciprocation can be found from Dillon.44 This is not to say that Redmond and Dillon did not meet in this period, indeed the Weekly Irish Times of 10 April 1915 carried a photograph on its front page of the pair reviewing Volunteers together.45 However, the sombre expressions on both their faces – and on Dillon’s in particular – may attest to the state of feeling between the two. O’Connor’s central role in attempting to heal relations can be seen in mid-April 1915, when he organised a lunch for the tetrarchy in his own home, stating that they had ‘many things to talk about’.46 This was the first concrete evidence of the inner leadership convening, in its entirety and in the same room, since the opening of the rift at the beginning of March. An even clearer sign of a thaw in relations can be found in late May, when Dillon admitted to O’Connor that ‘Redmond and I are thoroughly agreed on policy’; a sentiment that had not been expressed for some time.47 While there would be other minor divergences between Dillon and Redmond in the twelve months leading up to April 1916, this was the most severe. By the spring of 1916, the tetrarchy had reached a stable, cordial, and co-operative wartime equilibrium. Like the rest of Irish history, Easter 1916, to use Yeats’ much quoted tautology, would leave the shape and purpose of the tetrarchy ‘changed, changed utterly’.48 Notes 1 Birrell, quoted in León Ó Broin, The Chief Secretary:  Augustine Birrell in Ireland (London, 1969), p. 151. 2 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911–1918 (6 vols, London, 1938), i, p. 155. 3 For early commentary on the formation of the Irish Volunteers, see O’Connor to Dillon, 27 November 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/214) and 1 December 1913 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/216). 4 León Ó Broin, Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising (London, 1966, rev. edn, 1970), p. 50. 5 See Lyons, Dillon, p. 364. 6 It should be noted that there are several letters from Dillon missing from the Redmond papers for this period but which are referred to in Redmond’s replies in the Dillon papers. Nonetheless, in both Redmond’s letters and the few surviving replies from Dillon, all evidence points to the continuation of a strong and warm working relationship between the two in this period. In particular, see Dillon to Redmond, 17 December 1914 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/20).

Estrangements and realignments

127

7 In writing his history of Dublin Castle in these years, Ó Broin did not consult either the Dillon or Redmond papers. The former were available, but not catalogued, in the RIA at the time (see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 265–6) and the vast majority of the latter were deposited in the NLI in 1956 (accession no. 1154). For a list of Ó Broin’s primary sources, see Ó Broin, Dublin Castle, p. 186. 8 Eoin MacNeill, undated memorandum [1915?] (NLI, BHP MS 13,174/13), cited in Lyons, Dillon, p. 355. 9 Autobiography of Margot Asquith, pp. 284–5. 10 For reportage of Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech, see Freeman’s Journal, 21 September 1914. 11 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 129. 12 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 131. 13 Augustine Birrell, ‘The state of Ireland’ [cabinet memorandum], 24 November 1914 (BO, ABP, MS Eng. c. 7035, fol. 365). 14 Frances Clarke, ‘Hinkson (née Tynan), Katharine’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, iv, pp. 713–14. 15 Keith Jeffery notes how Tynan, whose two sons enlisted, represented the views of ‘middle-class Dublin professionals’. Many who died at Gallipoli were members of the ‘pals’ formations revolving around various sporting organisations in Dublin at the time. Keith Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge, 2000), p. 44. 16 Katharine Tynan, quoted in Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War, p. 44. 17 Thomas P.  Dooley, ‘Politics, bands and marketing:  army recruitment in Waterford city, 1914–15’, Irish Sword, xviii, no. 72 (winter, 1991), p. 207 [­figure 1]. 18 For example, O’Connor was the enthusiastic architect of a visit of Irish party delegates to Paris in 1915 in support of the war effort. O’Connor to Dillon, 5 April 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/244). 19 For an early insight into O’Connor’s Newcastle recruiting work; see O’Connor to Dillon, 6 November 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/227). 20 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 131. 21 Brady, O’Connor, p. 218. 22 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 282. 23 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 166. 24 Brady, O’Connor, p. 218. 25 Devlin to Dillon [telegram], 4 August 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/165). 26 Subheading to a report of a speech by Redmond, Freeman’s Journal, 17 September 1914. 27 Lyons, Dillon, p. 360. 28 Lyons, Dillon, p. 360. 29 Dillon to O’Connor, 5 August 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/224). On the longer history of Dillon’s opposition to Grey’s foreign policy, see Lyons, Dillon, pp. 321–2. 30 Lyons, Dillon, p. 360. 31 Lyons, Dillon, p. 360.

128

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

32 O’Connor to Dillon, 25 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/252). 33 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 37. 34 For examples, see Dillon to O’Connor, 5 August 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/224) and 5 September 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/225). 35 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, pp. 170 and 282. 36 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239) is a key letter in demonstrating Devlin’s importance both in Westminster and Ireland. 37 O’Connor to Dillon, 25 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/252). 38 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239). 39 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239). 40 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239). 41 Lyons, Dillon, p. 364. 42 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239). 43 The clearest example of this, showing Dillon consulting with both O’Connor and Devlin, but only seeking approval from Redmond, can be found in Dillon to O’Connor, 25 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/241). 44 Redmond to Dillon, 29 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6748/549). 45 Weekly Irish Times, 10 April 1915. Devlin was also present at the event. 46 O’Connor to Dillon, 18 April 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/247). 47 Dillon to O’Connor, 24 May 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/251). 48 W.B. Yeats, ‘Easter 1916’ in Michael Robartes and the Dancer (Dublin, 1920: facsimile reprint Dublin, 1970), pp. 9–11.

6 Rising and falling: Easter 1916 to winter 1918

The people of Ireland are universally described as absolutely incapable of united action. At the same time the political machine is so monstrously efficient as to suppress all individual freedom. – Tom Kettle, 19091

Tuned in to the political undercurrents in Ireland, and specifically in Dublin, both Dillon and Devlin were very much alert to the threat posed by Sinn Féin and advanced nationalists from the early stages of the war onwards.2 Not only were Sinn Féin elements actively engaging in an anti-recruitment strategy that had roots going back as far as Griffith’s Transvaal Committee during the second Boer War but they were making new inroads among the nationalist body politic.3 As early as September 1914, Dillon could see ‘how the Sinn Feiners are preparing the ground … carrying an extremely active propaganda throughout the Country’.4 Highlighting the continuing ideological divergence between Dillon and Redmond, their views on Sinn Féin differed profoundly, with Redmond having nowhere near the same level of appreciation for the scale or seriousness of this growing and emergent threat. Michael Wheatley has noted that, in late July 1915 in an interview with the New York World, Redmond dismissed Sinn Féin as nothing more than ‘a temporary cohesion of isolated cranks in various parts of the country’ who did not ‘count for a row of pins’.5 Further attesting to his ignorance of the extent of the threat posed, Redmond followed up his original statements claiming that ‘the truth is that Ireland is in a profound state of peace’.6 While it is true that Redmond did not take the threat of advanced nationalism with the level of seriousness that it warranted, such statements should be assessed in their original contexts. The statements quoted by Wheatley were intended for American consumption, exaggerating the positives and downplaying the threat posed to the Redmondite project by advanced nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, while these passages quoted by Wheatley faithfully represent Redmond’s public position on Sinn Féin and associated threats,

130

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

they may overstate the optimism of his outlook. Even Redmond could see there was a credible threat emanating from advanced nationalist quarters. Furthermore, recruiting was not progressing at a rate which either he or the military authorities had hoped. Nonetheless, both Redmond and O’Connor remained ignorant of the true scale of this threat right up to the outbreak of the Rebellion whereas Dillon and Devlin were at least cognisant of the advanced nationalist threat as it existed on the ground in Ireland. The level to which Sinn Féin posed a danger to the party had elevated by April 1916, a point attested to by a letter from Devlin to Dillon, written exactly a fortnight before the Rising, in which the former vented his frustration over the government’s mishandling of events in Ireland. Devlin believed that Dublin Castle’s incompetence in managing Irish affairs was so profound that ‘if the Government had intended deliberately to add to our difficulties they could not have selected a better means or a better time to carry out that object’.7 In this climate of public dissatisfaction and with the Irish party apparently powerless to influence government policy on Ireland, an exasperated Devlin wrote to Redmond. On 10 April, Dillon wrote, ‘the amazing thing to me is that everybody in Ireland has not been driven into the Sinn Fein movement’.8 In time, Devlin’s fears would be realised. After the Rising, the initial wave of public anger at the rebels’ exploits would swiftly mutate into support and sympathy in reaction to the executions, the imposition of martial law, and the generally ‘draconian reaction of the authorities to the Rebellion’.9 However, for the time being, this insight serves to demonstrate the links between the war, the stagnancy of nationalist politics, and the role this played in attracting hitherto loyal Irish party supporters into the ranks of Sinn Féin prior to the Rising. It is not correct to say that the Rising came out of the blue for Redmond. Apart from the less-specific warnings of Sinn Féin’s resurgence, Redmond had received warnings well before the outbreak of hostilities that a violent plot was planned. The most clear and concrete warning of what was to come was delivered to Redmond in early March 1916, from Chicago, where Bernard McGillian, a Belfast native and Gaelic Leaguer working there as a journalist, had received quite detailed information about a plot then being formulated by Irishmen in America centring on John Devoy.10 Having learned of the plot, a concerned McGillian wrote to both Redmond and MacNeill on similar lines in the hope that they could intervene. To Redmond he wrote: It has just come to my knowledge that a dastardly plot to drench Ireland in blood is being hatched in this country – in fact is completed as to plans

Rising and falling

131

and only lacks the sinews of war which are now being raised. The intention is to foment a ‘rising’ in Ireland next Summer, which, of course, would be drowned out in blood. Then the conspirators would point to this crushing of the spirit of Irish liberty and say ‘we told you not to trust Redmond. He and his party have betrayed you. Behold the proofs’.11

Ignoring the ambiguity and inaccuracy of McGillian’s expected date of the insurrection, the level of detail contained within the rest of the letter was impressively accurate, including particulars of how an Irish Race Convention recently held in New  York was actually a front to entice German sympathisers to provide financial backing for the project.12 Knowing how such a letter would appear to Redmond, McGillian mentioned his long-standing acquaintance with T.J. Hanna, Redmond’s secretary, and with John Dillon himself, saying that these men would vouch that he was not ‘an alarmist’ and his claims were genuine.13 Redmond’s response to this urgent letter was to defer to Dillon. Although Dillon’s response has not survived in Redmond’s papers, Redmond does not appear to have followed up on McGillian’s urgent appeal. His primary concern at this time was with recruitment and with the growing instability of the Cabinet.14 In an interesting aside, McGillian’s letter to MacNeill was opened by the censor and was even read by the director of military intelligence in Ireland, Major Ivor Price. Like Redmond, Price took no action on foot of the letter and allowed it to go through to MacNeill complete with a ‘censored’ label showing it had been read.15 The conclusion that can be drawn from the McGillian letter in relation to the tetrarchy is that it points to the scale of the ideological and comprehension gap between Redmond and Dillon over the perceived threat posed by advanced and physical force nationalism prior to the Rising. While Redmond clearly did not have the local knowledge of the situation that Dillon and Devlin did, he was aware of the threat posed, but he did not take it with the same level of gravity as did his colleagues in Dublin. That said, not even Dillon nor Devlin appear to have acted upon their concerns over Sinn Féin to any great extent and, even after seeing the McGillian letter, Dillon, like Redmond, made no discernible effort to act on the information received. Both Birrell in London and Matthew Nathan in Dublin had intermittently consulted with Redmond and Dillon respectively over the risk posed by physical force nationalists.16 Despite these warnings, the Irish party leadership did not take the threat seriously. Thus, planning for the Rising went on with neither the Irish party nor Dublin Castle overly concerned by the activities of the soon-to-be insurgents.17 In assessing the prelude to the 1916 Rising, one last communication between Dillon and Redmond deserves attention

132

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

as it clearly demonstrates the relative positions of the two literally on the eve of the Rebellion. It shows the extent of knowledge among the tetrarchy of the scale, nature, and imminence of the threat that loomed towards the end of Holy Week 1916. On Sunday, 23 April, Dillon wrote to Redmond that ‘Dublin is full of most extraordinary rumours. And I have no doubt in my mind that the Clan men – are planning some devilish business – what it is I cannot make out. It may not come off – But you must not be surprised if something very unpleasant and mischievous happens this week’.18 Given the long drawn-out saga of Easter Week that preceded the outbreak of hostilities on Easter Monday, the revelation that Dillon knew something was afoot in Dublin by Easter Sunday is hardly ground-breaking. What is significant about this letter is that it represents the last in a series of warnings received by Redmond that the Rising was imminent. Dillon does not deserve much credit for sensing something was afoot on the eve of the Rising when Dublin was alive with rumblings but, at the very least, it shows he was not aloof from the reality of Dublin politics in the way Redmond was by this stage. At any rate, this last warning would come too late, as by the time it reached Redmond in London, the Rising would have already been underway. Redmond’s inactivity in the face of persistent warnings would now come back to haunt him. The results for the party, the country, and indeed the tetrarchy would prove irreversible. On Easter Monday 1916 the leadership of the Irish Party was scattered across Britain and Ireland. Redmond and O’Connor were in London while Devlin was in his home constituency of West Belfast. Of the four, only Dillon was on the scene in Dublin when the insurrection that would catalyse the metamorphosis of Irish politics began. While the correspondence between three members of the tetrarchy during and immediately after the Rising has been well served by their respective biographers, Devlin’s activities at this time are the most intriguing. On the one hand, a flurry of correspondence travelled between Dillon and Redmond by the most extraordinary channels – through the Irish Office’s coded wire and in person via messengers and even soldiers19 – in this period. These measures became necessary due to the crippling of communications that followed the seizure of the General Post Office and the imposition of martial law, not to mention the general sense of chaos that prevailed in Dublin into early May. On the other hand, Devlin, stuck in Belfast, appears to have been incommunicado for at least eight full days beginning on Easter Monday 1916.20 A.C. Hepburn notes that he addressed soldiers’ families’ fundraisers in the Falls and Smithfield wards on 25 April, claiming that Devlin was, at that time, seemingly unaware of events in Dublin.21 While this seems highly unlikely, it was

Rising and falling

133

nonetheless the case that the rest of the tetrarchy was unable to get in contact with Devlin for the entire week of the hostilities. Devlin’s importance within the tetrarchy by this stage can be gauged by the fact that the rest of the inner leadership was extremely anxious to obtain his views on the situation before taking any definite action, particularly in their dealings with the government.22 Dillon’s wish was that, when Devlin finally made it to Dublin and they had had an opportunity to talk, Dillon would remain there as the only member of the inner leadership to have been in situ during the fighting. Devlin would then proceed to London, as Dillon’s emissary, to link up with O’Connor and Redmond, fully brief them on the situation and then the three would presumably engage in talks with the government.23 Redmond too was anxious for Devlin’s views, exclaiming to Dillon that ‘I am very unhappy at being unable to get into communication with Devlin, and I think you should, by hook or by crook, get him to come to Dublin, so that you could let me know your joint views’.24 Dillon had been on the ground throughout the fighting and Devlin was stranded in Belfast but still Redmond was keen to have Devlin’s views as much as Dillon’s before proceeding. While A.C. Hepburn mistakenly records that Devlin made it to Dublin on 5 May, a letter from a greatly relieved Dillon confirms that he had actually arrived three days earlier and was in Dillon’s home on North Great George’s Street by 4.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 2 May.25 Having been reunited with the lost tetrarch, Dillon proceeded as planned, keeping Devlin with him until the following morning and then sending him to London fully briefed on Dillon’s views on, among other things, a successor to the Lord Lieutenancy.26 Dillon’s surprising decision to remain in Dublin in the aftermath of the Rising, however, requires some analysis. As stated, Dillon was the only member of the inner leadership to be in Dublin during the Rising. He had witnessed at first hand the fighting and its consequences. His house had soldiers and the relatives of captured rebels alike crossing its threshold and he had been in closer than ever contact with the government authorities in Ireland as a result of the crisis.27 In light of this, surely Dillon would have been in the strongest position to represent the party and the concerns of nationalist Ireland to the House of Commons in its aftermath. While a variety of reasons could be offered as to why Dillon elected to stay in Dublin, the strongest, and the one which Dillon most frequently proffered himself, was that he could not bring himself to leave his children at such a time of danger.28 A widower with six children, it should not be forgotten that Dillon had family responsibilities far greater than any of his colleagues in the leadership. While Redmond had likewise lost his wife in 1889, his

134

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

second marriage ten years later brought him ‘much domestic happiness and unfailing devotion’.29 Redmond’s ability to travel and work without having to worry about the welfare of his children gave him much more political and personal mobility than Dillon. Meanwhile, Devlin was a committed bachelor, whereas O’Connor was separated, childless, and living with a new partner for several years by this point.30 For Dillon, therefore, just as at the time of his wife’s death in 1907, it can be seen that his unswerving diligence as a father did necessarily impact upon his ability to partake in political work at a key juncture. Despite the urgent requests of Redmond and O’Connor, Dillon’s decision not to travel immediately to London can be seen to have had a profound impact on the shape of the party’s early responses at Westminster to the Dublin insurrection. Defending enemies: Redmond, the Rising, and Westminster In the absence of Dillon, the tetrarchy faced the House of Commons in the aftermath of the Rising, focusing on the plight of prisoners and the need for urgent debate on the situation in Ireland. Both O’Connor and  – when he eventually arrived  – Devlin remained silent in the chamber, although they played a key role in negotiating with the government behind the scenes in those crucial days up to 10 May when Dillon made his first appearance in the House in over two months. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Rising, it fell to Redmond to represent the party publicly at Westminster. On Thursday, 27 April, the fourth day of the Rising, Redmond made his first statement to the House of Commons on the Rising. Wishing to prevent the ongoing situation in Dublin from being used ‘as a weapon against any party’, Redmond explained that ‘the overwhelming majority of the people in Ireland … [shared] the feeling of detestation and horror with which we [the Nationalist party] have regarded these proceedings’.31 This was arguably a faithful representation of the mood on the ground at this time. The dramatic swing in public opinion, catalysed by the executions, would take a short time to gain momentum. However, Redmond’s statement has been labelled a ‘sweeping generalisation’ by Lyons, who observed that, because of the rapidity with which events were now changing in Ireland, Redmond’s first statement after the Rising quickly became redundant, having been superseded by the pace of events.32 When Redmond’s first post-Rising contribution to the House is compared with that of Dillon, one can begin to see the widening ideological gap between the pair. On his return to Westminster, Dillon spoke in the Commons with the zeal and moral purpose of his former self during the

Rising and falling

135

Boer War debates at the turn of the century. Dillon immediately represented the real and pressing concerns arising on the ground. He honed in on the continuing executions, seeking assurances from Asquith that no more ‘military executions by secret military tribunals’ would be carried out and he sought clarification that none had taken place since the last confirmed reports two days previous.33 Furthermore, Dillon sought clarification on a number of issues which were then the subject of rumour in Dublin, some of which Redmond could not even countenance as genuine from his isolation in London. Although a long list, it is worth quoting in full, as it shows the extent to which Dillon was the only member of the tetrarchy with a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Ireland and, as such, his arrival in Westminster signalled a significant change in the party’s mission and outlook there. Dillon asked Asquith: (1) Whether any prisoners have been shot without trial or have been shot after trial without any public announcement of their names, and, if so, how many; (2) Whether there is any, and, if any, what authority with power to check or control the military officers now ruling Ireland; whether the Lord Lieutenant or any officials of the Irish Government have any authority over them; and how long it is proposed to maintain this military dictatorship; (3) On what ground the whole of Ireland has been placed under martial law, and why searches of houses and wholesale arrests are being carried out in districts where there was no disturbance and in which the population remained peaceful and loyal; (4) Whether he can state the circumstances under which Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington was shot at Portobello Barracks; (5) Whether he can explain why Sir Roger Casement has been brought to London, and is apparently to have a public trial before a civil tribunal, whilst comparatively obscure men whom he has been largely responsible for seducing into rebellion have been sentenced and executed in Ireland by secret military tribunal; and (6) Whether the censorship is preventing the publication of expressions of opinion from the United States of America and other neutral countries on the policy of the military executions in Dublin?34

All at once, Dillon had identified the most pressing and central issues emerging in the aftermath of the Rebellion in a way that no other Member of Parliament could articulate. It is true that Redmond had been working to put a halt to the executions, both in private and in the House. However, his pleas to Asquith lacked the sincerity and conviction of Dillon’s and Redmond proved more malleable on the subject than Dillon ever would. In a memorandum of an interview with Asquith on 3 May, Redmond recorded that he had ‘urged the P.M. to prevent executions. He said some few were necessary, but they would be very few. I protested’.35

136

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Lyons has shown that Dillon did not hold the guarantees of Asquith in the same high regard as Redmond, smarting at the broken assurances given to the chairman that no more executions would take place, only to find out that four more rebels, and only one of them a signatory of the Proclamation, had been executed on 8 May.36 In assessing Redmond’s thoughts and actions around this time, Denis Gwynn illustrates that Redmond may not have been entirely in sympathy with the plight of all rebels to the extent that Dillon was. In his first press statement after the Rising, Redmond described the insurrection as a ‘wicked move’ by an ‘insane movement’ who had committed ‘treason to the cause of Home Rule’.37 With words like this, the extent to which Redmond did in fact wish for clemency for the ringleaders is questionable. The insurrection had been as much an attack on him and his party as it was on British rule in Ireland. Further inference can be drawn from Redmond’s utterance in the House on 3 May, when he had knowledge of the first of the executions, that the insurrection had been ‘dealt with with firmness, which was not only right, but it was the duty of the Government to so deal with it’.38 He proceeded to ‘beg the Government … not to show undue hardship or severity to the great masses of those who are implicated, on whose shoulders there lies a guilt far different from that which lies upon the instigators and promoters of the outbreak’.39 While this could have been interpreted as an appeal to his audience for clemency, it had a clear inference that the sternest punishment was justified for the ringleaders. Redmond only wished for the rank and file to be spared harsh treatment and at this early date he showed no concern whatsoever for the instigators. The first three of these had been executed that very morning.40 As yet, Redmond was unable to comprehend the significance of this event. Later that day, and aware of what had occurred earlier in Dublin, Redmond wrote to Dillon. Apparently satisfied with the situation, Redmond explained that Asquith tells me that he gave orders to the War Office to go slowly, and said he was shocked when he read the news of the three men being shot. I begged him to promise me that no one else would be executed. He said he could not give an absolute promise to that effect but that except in some very special cases that was his desire and intention.41

Those before the firing squad had been no friends of the party and, callously or not, Redmond was more concerned with the safety of the rank and file. In light of the idea of proceeding slowly with the executions, the fate of the ringleaders only mattered insofar as it had a bearing on public opinion in Ireland. Redmond would learn the full scale of this effect in time.

Rising and falling

137

In stark contrast, Dillon precariously stuck his neck out in the House on the subject, and showed just how far he stood from Redmond in his sympathies. In a move that provoked uproar, especially from Conservative and Unionist members,42 Dillon defended the rebels’ actions, telling the House: I declare most solemnly, and I am not ashamed to say it in the House of Commons, that I  am proud of these men. They were foolish; they were misled … I say I am proud of their courage, and, if you were not so dense and so stupid, as some of you English people are, you could have had these men fighting for you, and they are men worth having.43

Not only does this demonstrate Dillon’s position in contrast to that of Redmond but, in referring to the bravery of the rebels, and the failure of the British to recruit them to their own war effort, this could be viewed as a slight on Redmond, given that he was so intrinsically linked to the Irish recruitment campaign. Dillon’s speech had an ‘electrifying effect’ among nationalists in Britain and Ireland. Dermot Meleady notes how the speech conferred a ‘moral respectability on the rebels’, a development Redmond viewed as ‘most lamentable’.44 Much of what has been documented here is well trodden ground in the historiography of the Rising. However, it outlines both how and why Redmond and Dillon suffered a much more profound ideological divergence in May 1916 than they did earlier over recruitment. Unlike the estrangement of March 1915, this time there was little evidence of palpable bitterness on either side. Nonetheless, Dillon had set a new course, and it differed greatly from that of Redmond. As early as 20 May 1916, Dillon confessed to O’Connor that he differed ‘profoundly’ from Redmond on the way forward.45 While there would be frequent instances of co-operation between them in the two short years that Redmond had left, a Rubicon had been crossed, and the professional relationship between the two most significant members of the leadership had been fundamentally altered. Picking up the pieces: the tetrarchy after the Rising The British government’s last attempt at direct involvement in the resolution of the Irish question came in the summer of 1916, when Lloyd George was charged with reopening negotiations between nationalist and unionist representatives. One striking aspect of these renewed negotiations was that Devlin found himself taking up a much more central position in London and joining O’Connor in opening the nationalist side of negotiations with Lloyd George over a final settlement to the Irish question. The starting point for the new settlement would be where both

138

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

parties had left off at the Buckingham Palace Conference, with acknowledgement by the Irish party that some form of temporary exclusion for an area of between four and six counties was an inevitable compromise if Home Rule was to be salvaged. Unlike the Buckingham Palace Conference, however, these were not face-to-face discussions between nationalist and unionist representatives. While there had been an element of media ‘spin’ and posturing involved in July 1914, the attempted post-Rising settlement was to be functional and direct, and there would be no room for the sentimentality and politeness that had been a hallmark of the King’s conference almost two years earlier. As the closest of the Irish party leadership to Lloyd George, O’Connor played a significant role in the 1916 negotiations. Denis Gwynn has noted that the other members of the leadership remained suspicious of Lloyd George, twice shy since they had been bitten in their dealings with him over the 1909 budget and the concessions won by Lloyd George on Ulster in 1913.46 O’Connor, on the other hand, believed that he had a strong relationship with Lloyd George and he saw this closeness as his conduit to influence in the Cabinet. However, L.W. Brady believes O’Connor’s perceived level of influence over the future Prime Minister was overestimated and of more theoretical than practical value by this point.47 Nonetheless, O’Connor’s links with Lloyd George and his personal enthusiasm for a settlement ensured that the negotiations lasted longer than they otherwise might.48 O’Connor and Devlin held preliminary meetings with Lloyd George and others close to him in London to discuss the terms of a settlement. In one of the most significant of these early meetings, Lord Northcliffe, as a friend of Lloyd George and an Irishman by birth, met with Devlin to discuss possible terms of settlement.49 In the course of their discussions, which dwelt for some time on the Ulster question, Devlin told Northcliffe that he felt an immediate settlement for Ireland was of paramount importance.50 For this to have come from Devlin, as the only nationalist leader representing Ulster, was a clear signal to Lloyd George that there was some fertile ground for a settlement in the Nationalist camp. However, a letter from O’Connor to Dillon three days later gives a little more insight into Devlin’s personal misgivings on the subject. Here, O’Connor revealed to Dillon that he had ‘been with Joe almost night and day … he [Devlin] is a man of somewhat uncertain moods, as you know, and now and then he relapses into regrets that he ever consented to help us with regard to Ulster two years ago; and things of that kind, which to me are sheer madness’.51 Evidently, for Devlin to be negotiating for Home Rule with Ulster already off the table was a far more painful prospect than he

Rising and falling

139

would betray to any member of the British establishment. O’Connor went on to explain that, despite these private misgivings, he was confident that Devlin would fall into line with the rest of the leadership, saying that ‘this, however, is not his [Devlin’s] ordinary mood, and I think I am justified in regarding him as in entire agreement with … Redmond and myself’.52 Even more so than Devlin, Redmond and O’Connor were anxious for a settlement. Indeed, they appeared desperate to reach one, and they did not hold the Irish party’s bargaining position in nearly as high regard as Devlin, and especially Dillon, did at this point. Indeed, R.F. Foster has used Redmond’s willingness to jettison Fermanagh and Tyrone – the counties over which he had scuttled the Buckingham Palace Conference – in the course of the 1916 negotiations as evidence of the extent to which he was ‘desperate … to achieve any settlement going’.53 Thus, the territorial divide within the tetrarchy surfaced again, with the London men – Redmond and O’Connor  – out of touch with the situation in Ireland and more influenced by individuals directly and indirectly linked to the government in London. One issue on which a harmonisation of attitudes within the tetrarchy had to be achieved, however, was Ulster. Lloyd George eventually settled on a scheme which would see the immediate enactment of Home Rule for twenty-six counties, and the continued attendance of Irish MPs at Westminster for the duration of the war. Once the European conflict had ended, an imperial conference would be held to forge a final settlement for Ulster.54 While in theory this preserved a glimmer of hope for a united Home Rule Ireland, in reality, the intransigence of Ulster Unionists in previous negotiations, most notably at the Buckingham Palace Conference, made it clear to the Irish party leadership that this would necessitate an acceptance of partition in all but name. As such, this constituted a substantial extension on four-county temporary exclusion which had been so painfully conceded in 1914. O’Connor worked hard on Devlin’s natural aversion to any further compromise on partition. He was very anxious that Devlin would be brought on side while he and Redmond were in London working on the early stages of the settlement. O’Connor reported back to Dillon in Dublin that he had ‘been a little anxious about Joe’s position, especially as he varied it from time to time. But he has now definitely made up his mind that there must be some sacrifices about Ulster’.55 Clearly, there had been some amount of pressure put on Devlin to fall into line and it appears that it was O’Connor, rather than Redmond, who had been central to this effort. It was essential that Devlin become an advocate of any new settlement, not for its prospects at the negotiating table, but more

140

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

because it was Devlin who would ultimately have to go before Ulster and sell the deal to the nationalist community there.56 After much internal pressure, just as in 1914, Devlin was brought around to grudgingly accept a further weakening of Ulster’s prospects for inclusion in Home Rule. Capitalising on his capitulation, Dillon and Redmond accompanied Devlin to Belfast where they entered into the Herculean task of selling the Lloyd George settlement to a convention of Ulster nationalists on 23 June 1916.57 Devlin’s influence on the convention was profound and, following a forty-five minute speech in support of a policy upon which he himself still harboured doubts, the convention endorsed Lloyd George’s proposals:  475 in favour and 265 against.58 Having made this monumental sacrifice for the greater good of Home Rule, Devlin would never again consent to go so far in bartering away his native province to safeguard a Dublin parliament. There remains one member of the tetrarchy whose views of the Lloyd George settlement have not as yet been fully discussed. Despite the scale of concessions asked of Devlin, it would in fact be Dillon who emerged as the weak link in the tetrarchy in terms of enthusiasm for settlement. Although he was not opposed to the idea of the negotiations, Dillon had a deep self-awareness about the extent to which his inherently combative nature heightened his personal feelings on the state of Ireland. In this frame of mind, Dillon told O’Connor that it was ‘much better for me not to be in London – at the time of the first Conference between Redmond and Asquith – as I am almost certain I should feel compelled to dissent and object – it is far better to leave the field clear to those who believe that a workable arrangement is possible’.59 Such scepticism on the prospects of a deal and such blatant mistrust in the intentions of the government from a figure as central as Dillon show, clearer than ever, the scale of the ideological gap that now separated him from Redmond and O’Connor. As had been the case in relation to Redmond’s war policy in 1914, however, Dillon resolved that while he could not work towards a settlement, he would not work against one. The role of the Rising in this souring of relations between Dillon and his London colleagues is clear. A week after this first letter, having been convinced to come to London by the joint efforts of O’Connor and Redmond, Dillon reasserted his conviction that he would be a negative influence in any negotiations. Apologising to O’Connor for his apparent rudeness to him as they left the London Metropole Hotel, Dillon explained how this was Proof of the effect on me of the horrible nervous strain I have undergone for the last month – and especially for the last ten days. This painful incident

Rising and falling

141

goes to strengthen the conviction – that it would have been better for me to keep out of these conferences and negotiations. The truth is that I am in a frame of mind wholly unfitted for conference or negotiations.60

In reality, Dillon’s frame of mind stemmed from more than just stress: it reflected a deeper disillusionment and exasperation over the contemporary political situation. These insights into Dillon’s self-conscious unwillingness to negotiate go to the root of his new political position. Dillon’s actions and outlook were defined by what he had experienced in Dublin during and after the Rising. The impact of the executions was chief among these. The wholesale shift in public opinion and the clear implications of this on the entire political outlook for Ireland weighed on Dillon in a way neither Redmond nor O’Connor could begin to feel. While even the absentee O’Connor had journeyed to Dublin to witness the altered mood of the Irish public in the aftermath of the Rising at first hand, only Dillon had fully understood it and its implications.61 In the end, the party’s hard-won success in selling the Lloyd George scheme to Ulster came to nothing through the duplicity and back-tracking of the scheme’s own author. Bending to the influence of Unionist sentiments in Cabinet, Lloyd George was forced to agree to a revision of the scheme that would make partition permanent and also see the immediate removal of Irish MPs from Westminster.62 Faced with such a fundamental and objectionable change to the terms of the scheme, the Irish party now flatly refused to have anything to do with it. Following Lloyd George’s volte-face, a dejected Devlin issued a vitriolic attack on the government, wishing for its collapse on foot of this betrayal.63 What was important for the integrity of the tetrarchy is that new lines of demarcation had been drawn. With his disillusionment at the failure of the Lloyd George settlement, Devlin moved even further into the Dillon camp. Two opposing sides thus emerged within the tetrarchy as the government gave up on direct intervention. For Lloyd George, who would be Prime Minister of a strongly Unionist coalition Cabinet by December, he now resolved that in future he would leave it to Ireland to sort out its own difficulties as he set his sights on winning the war in Europe. The Irish Convention The failure of Lloyd George’s 1916 negotiations resulted in the temporary stagnation of the Irish question. However, by the early summer of 1917, Lloyd George  – Prime Minister since December  – was committed to the idea of leaving resolution of the question in the hands of a body representative of all shades of opinion in Ireland. On 21 May

142

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the convocation of an ‘Irish Convention’ was announced. Sir Horace Plunkett, a reforming Southern Irish Unionist and architect of the time-limited inclusion proposals for Ulster which Devlin had favoured in February 1914, would become the convention’s chairman. The assembly was to be as representative as possible but Sinn Féin’s boycott of this convention meant that the most significant emergent force in nationalism was not present.64 While Sinn Féin possessed no real mandate until the general election of 1918, key by-election victories had shown its political potential by this juncture. Despite its abstention – along with William O’Brien and the Dublin and Cork trades councils  – from the eventual body of 101 delegates, the convention brought together an otherwise broad section of representatives, where Redmond was able to assert that ‘for the first time … Ireland has been asked … to settle these problems for herself’.65 Among the Irish party, none was more committed or enthusiastic about the prospect of a convention as the chairman himself. Having suffered politically from the failure to settle in 1916, Redmond now cast his lot in with that of the convention with a zeal and wholeheartedness comparable to that which he had displayed in getting behind the war effort in 1914. Just as his alignment with the war effort acted as a gradually growing series of lead weights resting on Redmond’s career and popularity, the Irish Convention would further add to Redmond’s burden. The wholeheartedness with which Redmond committed himself to certain initiatives can be seen as a positive trait in his personality but his inability to choose the right ones can be seen as a major flaw. Dillon’s attitude to the convention was deeply hostile from the outset. Although he gave significant consideration and comment on the various permutations for its composition that were circulating in late May, he was adamant that he himself would not participate in the convention.66 It is true that he believed that he was more of a hindrance than a help to consensus but one cannot avoid the impression that Dillon simply did not believe that this, or any settlement for that matter, could be reached and that he was only prepared to observe the convention’s implosion from a safe distance. Indeed, O’Connor, whose removal from the scene will be discussed presently, was informed by Dillon not to be ‘too enthusiastic about [the] Convention, or put all your money on its success’.67 Meanwhile, Joseph Finnan has optimistically interpreted Dillon’s comment in early September that ‘so far [the convention] has gone marvellously well. The spirit is excellent and there does really appear to be an off chance of an agreement’.68 While this shows that the early sessions of the convention had surpassed Dillon’s low expectations, his belief in an ‘off chance’ of an

Rising and falling

143

agreement can hardly be construed as resounding optimism. Writing about this period, Dillon’s own biographer speaks of the ‘cold-blooded realism … [that] was entirely characteristic of Dillon’.69 This would seem to ring a lot closer to the reality of Dillon’s consistent position on the convention. Looking at his stance from a more cynical perspective, one might reason that, with the prospect of a post-war general election looming, Dillon did not wish to associate himself with failure any more than he already had and that he was happy to leave it to others to attend to the business of yet another set of doomed negotiations. With Redmond fully behind the convention and Dillon steadfastly against either participation or support for it, the rift on the future direction of Irish party policy which had opened up after the Rising had deepened profoundly. It now stands to discuss the policy and actions of Devlin and O’Connor at this pivotal juncture. Their stances were neither as clearly defined nor as intransigent as those of Dillon or the chairman. After the withdrawal of Redmond and Devlin to Dublin in late May 1916, a displeased O’Connor had been left to conduct negotiations with Lloyd George in London alone. Although he did not relish being left to his own devices – notwithstanding that this was his traditional role within the tetrarchy  – it appears that his reluctance to engage in this work stemmed from the prospect of having to deal with Lloyd George.70 The difficulty of O’Connor’s position, as well as the overwhelming sense of disunity that prevailed in the tetrarchy at this point, is highlighted by O’Connor’s receipt of three conflicting drafts on the composition of the convention from Dillon, Redmond, and Devlin, then stationed in Mayo, Dublin, and Belfast respectively.71 That not even two of the three leaders then in Ireland had met in person to discuss the composition of the convention before sending their proposals to O’Connor speaks volumes on both the state of feeling in, and the functioning of, the tetrarchy by this point in time. With the convention up and running, O’Connor’s role in London became somewhat redundant. There would be no movement on the Irish question there until the representatives assembled at Trinity College had reported their findings. However, the convention was not the only worry of the Irish party at this point. Both Redmond and Dillon appear to have been apprehensive about the financial outlook for the wider Nationalist organisation. In searching for solutions, Redmond and Dillon looked to redeploy O’Connor and give him a leading role in party overseas fundraising, a role to which he was arguably not best suited. Spurred particularly by concerns over the finances of the Freeman’s Journal, and seemingly on Redmond’s request, in June 1917 O’Connor was chosen to go on a fundraising trip to North America with the salvation of the

144

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

paper and the replenishment of the party’s war chest in mind as the prospect of a difficult general election loomed.72 O’Connor’s record on fundraising was admittedly impressive. He participated in a joint mission to Canada and the United States with Redmond in 1910 which raised $100,000 for the then beleaguered party funds. However, it is still questionable whether O’Connor was the right man for the job in 1917.73 Of the tetrarchs, O’Connor showed the least capacity for endurance and the ability to engage in hard and physically taxing work.74 Prior to the war, O’Connor was only able to bear the strains of London life by interspersing it with frequent and often long respite periods, be they on the continent or in the English countryside. This practice had been forcibly curtailed with the outbreak of the war but O’Connor still remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of a long and arduous American tour. In a letter to Redmond on the subject at the end of May, O’Connor stated that, while he would agree to undertake the trip, ‘I have practically made up my mind not to go to America till September. If I leave within a week or ten days from now I  shall get into the suffocating heat of July, and excessive heat is a thing that always prostrates me; besides I would find everybody away’.75 In a last ditch effort to avoid the transatlantic expedition, O’Connor offered as an alternative that he would ‘try a campaign among my English friends to raise some thousands of pounds to carry us over to the end of the year’.76 Given these efforts to stall or avoid the trip, it can hardly be said that O’Connor presented himself as an enthusiastic candidate for the job. Accompanied by Richard Hazleton, O’Connor eventually departed on or around 12 June. While the trip’s outcome cannot entirely be blamed on O’Connor, it was, in short, a disaster. By 9 July, O’Connor was in Washington, explaining how a mixture of hostility and ambivalence there was making progress more difficult than expected.77 Just as in many constituencies in Ireland, the UIL structures in America had been neglected and ignored since 1910 and, like Ireland, this climate had provided fertile ground for more advanced nationalist movements.78 By August, O’Connor was complaining that New  York was empty and would remain so until the summer heat dissipated in September as he had forewarned prior to his departure.79 By the end of August, despite ‘gentle’ pressure from Dillon to send on £10,000, O’Connor admitted to Devlin that, regarding fundraising: ‘I haven’t yet started’.80 By December, six months into his trip, O’Connor had collected only £8,000 of his conservative and self-imposed collection goal of £20,000.81 He decided to extend his stay up to July 1918 in a last attempt to reverse the fortunes of the mission up to that point. However,

Rising and falling

145

yet again, the combination of a public mood entirely unsuited to financial appeals from constitutional nationalists and O’Connor’s own reluctance and lethargy resulted in a pitifully fruitless tour.82 In assessing the impact of O’Connor’s tour on the tetrarchy, one must first state that it failed in its primary aim, and that the inability to raise funds resulted in yet another crippling blow to the already dying party. Not only did it mean that the Freeman’s Journal could not function effectively in countering Sinn Féin propaganda, with the general election of 1918 looming, a cash-strapped Irish party stood even less chance of survival against the rising tide of Sinn Féinism signalled by the string of by-election victories in 1917 and 1918. However, the repercussions of O’Connor’s trip went beyond the financial. In effect, by going to America when he did, and by staying there for so long, O’Connor extracted himself from Irish political life as his party went through its death throes. Given that O’Connor remained away for events as monumental as Redmond’s death and the conscription crisis, one must question whether O’Connor was in fact escaping the turmoil of Irish politics by opting to remain in America. Whatever his reasoning, the absence of O’Connor from June 1917 until the summer of 1918 ensured that the tetrarchy had ceased to function as a four-man team by that point. Although O’Connor could and very occasionally did engage with events in Ireland while he was away, in general he ceased to function in his advisory, as well as his intermediary, role within the tetrarchy.83 From America, he complained to Devlin that he was virtually cut off from all of his party colleagues, having received only four communications – two of which were from Redmond and one from Devlin – in the first two-and-a-half months of his tour.84 While it was true that these were exceptionally busy times for MPs back home, and there may have been a degree of exaggeration about O’Connor’s claim, one cannot help considering the possibility that O’Connor was being ignored and marginalised by his party colleagues. Admittedly, as O’Connor represented an English constituency, he did not have as regular contact with the rank and file of the party as he otherwise might, but the stark absence of communication from his fellow tetrarchs is striking. One possibility is that, with the shift in the Irish question from Westminster to Dublin, O’Connor’s relevance as a tetrarch was diminished and his voyage to America only formalised his marginalisation. Turning attention to Devlin, his evolving alignment between Redmond and Dillon over the course of the Irish Convention is arguably the most complex factor in assessing this final phase in the history of the party’s inner leadership. Unlike Dillon, Devlin had agreed to attend the Irish Convention alongside Redmond.85 As a representative of nationalist

146

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Ulster, the only other member with nearly as much standing or clout as Devlin was Patrick O’Donnell, Catholic Bishop of Raphoe: the party’s strongest and most loyal supporter within the Catholic hierarchy.86 Representing this most affected section of the Irish nationalist community, Devlin’s voice carried much weight at the convention. His inclusion in the streamlined ‘council of nine’, a key subgroup of the convention, can be seen to have had as much to do with his identity as an Ulster nationalist as it did with his standing in the Irish party. Devlin’s attitude to the convention was both complex and fluid. A.C. Hepburn notes that there was a widespread belief in the run-up to the convention that Devlin had been ‘paralysed by two factors: the impossibility of going against Dillon, and the conviction that his public concessions in 1916 could not be repeated’.87 Essentially, Devlin had lost his way by this point. Although he committed himself to the convention as fully as he could, privately he contemplated leaving public life if this attempt at an Irish settlement were to fail, as all previous ones in which he had involved himself had done.88 While Devlin had entered the convention as Redmond’s party ally, he began to despair of a settlement, bringing him back in line with Dillon’s scepticism on the prospects for success. Southern unionists who were dealing closely with Devlin at this time began to believe that there had been a split in the Nationalist camp and that, as Lord Midleton believed, ‘Dillon and Devlin are canvassing against Redmond’.89 While this was a gross exaggeration of the facts as they stood, by December, Devlin was reporting to Dillon that sittings at the convention were becoming ‘very unsatisfactory’.90 Finally, a rift opened up between Devlin and Redmond over a proposed settlement initiated by the Southern unionist Lord Midleton. In brief, the scheme proposed ‘a government on the colonial model’ giving an Irish parliament control of ‘internal taxation, the administration of the country, the judicature and police’.91 The scheme went, so Midleton claimed, ‘to the extreme limit of safety from the imperial standpoint’.92 Whereas Redmond would come to see the prospect of workable consensus in the scheme, Devlin did not wish to be drawn into accepting a settlement that might once more come to nothing.93 Devlin thus had a strong conviction against the scheme but, nonetheless, he did not wish for it to precipitate a breach with Redmond. To Dillon, he expressed his hope that he could consult with Redmond on the matter shortly, as the chairman was delayed in Aughavanagh due to snow and could not attend the sessions of the convention when the scheme had been made public.94 In this light, an ideological rift had emerged between Devlin and Redmond over policy at the convention. However, Devlin would not

Rising and falling

147

allow this to damage his relationship with the chairman as Dillon had allowed his own previous disagreements with Redmond to do. In this way, Devlin was the inheritor of Redmond’s spirit of unity: he earnestly desired to be equally at home in the Dillon and Redmond camps, if and when they did not lie side by side. If O’Connor’s decision to remain in America had tangibly marked the end of the normal functioning of the tetrarchy as it had existed for over a decade, then Redmond’s sudden and premature death on 6 March 1918 formally marked the end of an era. The succession process that followed would define the shape of a party that would limp on until the general election of December confirmed that its position as the representative of majority nationalism in Ireland had come to an end. Redmond’s death would expose elements of the relationship between Dillon and Devlin that had been obscured while the chairman had been alive. Just as with the absence of O’Connor, this further dismemberment of the tetrarchy would give a brief glimpse of the inner workings of the party’s leadership before it finally collapsed nine months later. One interesting but often overlooked facet of the transition of power from Redmond to Dillon is that it found its beginnings prior to, and not after, Redmond’s unexpected death. Furthermore, Redmond himself had engaged with the subject of succession in the final days of his life. The first suggestion that a change might occur at the head of the party did not come from within the leadership but from Richard Hazleton, who was at that time accompanying O’Connor in America. In a letter to Devlin lamenting the course of events in Ireland and stating that only strong leadership would save the country, Hazleton rather unexpectedly hypothesised on 18 February – over a fortnight before Redmond’s death – that ‘if by any chance things so shape themselves as to lend to the retirement of the Chairman I hope either Dillon or you will be ready to shoulder the burden, detestable as the prospect would be’.95 There are a number of factors that make this statement even more surprising than it otherwise might appear. It also raises a number of important questions about the origins of such an idea. Firstly, Hazleton had been absent from Ireland for over eight months. What had brought him to contemplate a change in the chairmanship at this point? Secondly, did O’Connor’s presence have anything to do with the subject matter of Hazleton’s contemplations? There is no evidence to illuminate either of these points but, if O’Connor was thinking along the same lines or had discussed the matter with Hazleton, then the implications for the inter-relationships of the tetrarchy and the nature of O’Connor’s feelings towards Redmond and the leadership of the party must come in for major reconsideration.

148

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Another point to note is the recipient of Hazleton’s letter. Why did he divulge his thoughts to Devlin? It would seem fairly clear that an element of this was that Hazleton was nailing his colours to the mast about his future in the party. Indeed, he continued, ‘I would much rather be out of Irish politics myself in such circumstances, but if you or Dillon would decide to carry on I would like to be with you’.96 The last point to note in relation to this letter is that it now resides in Dillon’s papers. Taking this into account, it can thus be surmised that, far from representing private musings between two friends and colleagues, Hazleton’s letter and its contents received the attention of O’Connor, Devlin, and Dillon in one way or another, leaving Redmond in the dark while the rest of the leadership gave serious consideration to the question of succession. While this does not alter the meaning of Hazleton’s comments, it adds greatly to their significance. Whether any of this came to the attention of Redmond or not is entirely unclear. However, eight days after Hazleton had written his letter, Redmond, mindful of the rapidly deteriorating state of his health but by no means contemplating his own mortality, dictated a letter to Dillon. Despite his stubbornness in supporting the now deadlocked Irish Convention and the ideological gap that persisted between himself and Dillon, this letter revealed the humility of Redmond; the stoicism with which he held his office; and his overwhelming desire to see the best possible outcome from the political situation for the party and the nation as a whole. This, coupled with the fact that it is one of the most poignant and unreserved letters to have ever passed between Redmond and Dillon, justifies its reproduction in full here. My dear Dillon, As no doubt you have been aware, my general health has been bad for a considerable time, and recently I have suffered very much more. Since I  came to London, I  have been practically ill all the time; and, finally, the doctors have come to the conclusion that an operation is necessary. They seem to think that I am suffering from gall stones; but, of course, they cannot tell with any certainty until they have had a look all round inside. I have arranged for an operation to take place this week. Of course, you understand that this means I will be completely hors de combat for a very considerable time; and it occurs to me that it would be wrong for the Party to any longer postpone regularising its position by holding its annual meeting. I had hoped that, even if the Convention broke down, I  might have been able to have maintained my position as Chairman until the General Election, although I have considered for a long time past that I would find myself probably out of sympathy with the general view of the Party as to policy, if the Convention breaks down, and, therefore, unable to continue after the election.

Rising and falling

149

Now, however, it is quite clear that I can do nothing for some months to come; and I think it would be well for the Party to hold a meeting soon, and to learn these facts, and to make up its mind as to the Chairmanship. It would be absurd for me to remain as Chairman, when I am constantly absent and unable to do anything, and, of course, in a position where I could have no share in guiding the policy of the Party. Will you show this letter to Joe Devlin, and have a talk with him about it? Of course, I will not be able to attend to any correspondence, after the next few days, for some time. Very truly yours, J.E. Redmond97

If one contrasts this chairman with Parnell, it would appear that Redmond had learned a valuable lesson from his mentor about clinging to power. In another sense, despite the fact that Redmond clearly saw a future for himself after his impending operation – indeed he was only sixty-one – one gets the impression here that with this letter Redmond was putting his affairs in order.98 Furthermore, it shows that Redmond was aware of his position within the party, and the unpopularity of some of his policies and actions. Finally, it is a lasting testament to the depth of friendship between Redmond and Dillon. The pair had their ideological differences. These occasionally boiled over into personal animosity during the war years but mostly on Dillon’s part. Redmond, meanwhile, retained a trust and genuine friendship with Dillon until the end. Far from being sentimental, it is important to represent the true nature of the relationship between Redmond and Dillon as it stood on the eve of the chairman’s death. In many ways, this relationship had been central to the direction of party policy for the previous eighteen years, and even more than with the tetrarchy, a huge portion of the power within the IPP resided in an unequal and shifting balance between these two MPs. After Redmond: the end of the tetrarchy While Redmond had discussed the handover of power in his last days, the line of succession remained unclear when the chairman’s untimely death occurred on 6 March. Just as Hazleton had indicated in his letter in February, there were only two real candidates for selection:  Dillon and Devlin. Both had attributes in their favour, often opposite but nonetheless positive. For instance, Devlin possessed a youth and a vigour that was seen as having the potential to jump-start the ailing party. However, Dillon had a level of experience that Devlin could not hope to match. In the end, the chairmanship was first offered to Devlin.99 He had arguably played a greater and a more public role than Dillon in all attempts to settle the Irish question since the Rising. By refusing to participate in

150

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the Irish Convention and by holding back from Lloyd George’s negotiations in 1916, Dillon had marginalised himself from actual involvement in deliberations, although it has been shown here that he played an indispensable advisory role behind the scenes. In fact, by offering the chairmanship to Devlin, it is possible that Dillon was trying to preserve his traditional background role in the leadership of the party. He had wielded an immense amount of power indirectly through Redmond for years and there was no benefit to his stepping into the limelight – or the firing line – at this late point in proceedings. In analysing Devlin’s nomination for the chair, it is also important to note that, despite his close involvement in the failures of 1916 and 1917, Devlin’s name had not become associated with these political disasters in the same way as their stains had stuck to Redmond’s reputation. Much of this can be seen to have stemmed from Devlin’s relative youth:  he turned forty-seven shortly before Redmond’s death. By contrast, Dillon was sixty-six at this stage, five years older than the chairman. By putting a younger man forward for the chairmanship, the party would be ushering in a new dawn and injecting some much needed vitality into an organisation that was seen as old, corrupt, and decrepit in contrast to the youthful and revolutionary identity of the post-Rising Sinn Féin party. R.F. Foster has been to the forefront in documenting the generational tensions between constitutionalists and advanced nationalists. He sees the ‘fiasco’ surrounding the Irish Council Bill in 1907 as being central to this. He claims that the aftermath of the Bill’s rejection ‘pointed up the fact that the Parnellite generation of politicians were old, increasingly out of touch with both the new elements of labour politics and fringe extremists’.100 The links between the wider constitutional nationalist movement and corruption were something stressed by labour organisers and particularly in the context of Dublin Corporation, which was dominated by the UIL. In 1913, a housing inquiry found that sixteen Corporation members owned eighty-nine tenements and second-class homes between them.101 Despite all this, and seemingly out of reverence for his superior in the tetrarchy, Devlin declined the offer of the chair, deferring to Dillon. Of Dillon, there was also much to be said in support of his candidacy. He had shown a profound understanding of the altered public mood following the Rising. He had stuck his neck out in defending the rebel rank and file in parliament and he had absented himself from the Irish Convention in a manner not dissimilar to that of Sinn Féin itself. While still a vehement opponent of Sinn Féinism and its ideologies, if there was someone to represent the reformed nature of the Irish party after the Rising, it was Dillon. Whatever the relative merits of both prospective candidates,

Rising and falling

151

there was no actual contest. While a number of ‘moderate’ MPs tried to propose Devlin at the party meeting to decide the issue on 12 March, he made a ‘noble and brave’ speech which ‘put an end to any attempt to exploit his name as a candidate’.102 With his own name out of the running, it was Devlin himself who proposed Dillon for the chairmanship. Dillon was not, in fact, present at this meeting but his name was nonetheless ratified.103 Thus, in absentia, Dillon became – to use F.S.L. Lyons’ phrase – the ‘leader of a lost cause’.104 Marking time? The last phase of the inner leadership The present study finds a natural conclusion to the history of a ‘tetrarchy’ following Redmond’s death. It should not, however, be assumed that there were not drastic new changes as Dillon stepped into the limelight after almost two decades of constant activity in the shadows. Naturally, a new equilibrium was formed between Dillon and Devlin at the top of the party. The return of O’Connor from America in the summer of 1918 provided an additional dimension to the situation and the ever looming prospect of a general election, which eventually came in December, hung heavily over the entire party. While the party faced into the First World War fighting the Unionists over Ulster, they would emerge on the other side fighting Sinn Féin for tenure as the representatives of the nationalist body politic. Dillon, who had always taken to electioneering with a zeal far in excess of Redmond, now faced the Sinn Féin threat with ‘spirit and vigour’. However, as Frank Callanan puts it, ‘the rhythm of events and of the war itself across the seemingly interminable year of 1918 was unremittingly adverse to the Irish party’.105 An important caveat must be entered here. There were ten by-elections involving Irish party candidates between the end of the Easter Rising and the 1918 general election. Eight of these were contested against Sinn Féin candidates. At the end of 1917, the indications were that the Irish party was on the ropes, having lost four contests in a row. However, in February, March, and April of 1918, by-elections were fought in Armagh South, Waterford City (Redmond’s own seat), and Tyrone East respectively. In each of these showdowns, the Sinn Féin candidate was beaten decisively by his Irish party opponent. Admittedly, two of these elections were caused by the death of John Redmond. His son, William Archer, then a serving captain in the Irish Guards, vacated his Tyrone East seat upon winning Waterford City.106 However, as the general election would show, these victories were less representative of the picture elsewhere in Ireland. The final by-election of 1918 gave a foretaste of what was to

152

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

come with Arthur Griffith, the father of Sinn Féin, beating his Irish party rival, John F. O’Hanlon, editor of the local Anglo-Celt, by a margin of 1,214 votes in Cavan East.107 When the general election finally came in December 1918, the party fared disastrously. Overall it won six seats, but only one of these, Waterford City, where Redmond’s son was re-elected, lay outside the province of Ulster. Within the northern province, electoral pacts had been agreed to avoid splitting the nationalist vote. However, two straight contests were held between Sinn Féin and Irish party candidates. In Armagh South, Sinn Féin polled just 79 votes against the sitting Irish party candidate’s 4,345. In the newly drawn constituency of Belfast City Falls, Devlin beat the abstentionist Sinn Féin MP for East Clare and senior surviving commandant of the 1916 Rising, Éamon de Valera, by a resounding 8,488 to 3,245 votes.108 Victories like these attested to the strength of the Irish party, and probably also Devlin’s AOH, among northern nationalists. Nationwide, the franchise factor should not be discounted. Taking only the seats in which an Irish party candidate faced a contest, the average number of electors per constituency was 6,642 at the last general election in December 1910. In 1918, franchise extension swelled this figure to an average of 19,539, an almost threefold increase. Finally, not only had the electoral machine of the Irish party declined in the intervening years, it now faced an unprecedented number of contests. In December 1910, Irish party candidates faced contenders, be they unionist or alternative nationalists, in thirty constituencies; in 1918 that number had risen to an unprecedented fifty-four contests. There is much to be learned from a close reading of the figures in this most transformative of Irish elections. Conclusions There is a universality to any study of leadership. While this work has focused on the IPP, it has explored themes that run much deeper and surface in different ways in every organisation, be it political or commercial. The cause and effect between personal relationships and external events is profound and has been extensively documented here. On the one hand, the tetrarchy that eventually emerged at the head of the Irish party endeavoured to steer policy in its chosen direction. However, events such as the outbreak of the First World War and the Easter Rising precipitated an inverse reaction where external events were seen to cause crises within the structures of the tetrarchy, forcing it to evolve, adapt, and increasingly fragment. In many ways, the leadership of the IPP was a traditional oligarchy. No one member of the tetrarchy held dictatorial powers over either the

Rising and falling

153

party as a whole or over his colleagues within the leadership. As such, this has been a study into power, and the sharing of power between a small group of individuals working collectively towards common goals. In sharing power, delicate balances were established, particularly that between Redmond, as the public head of the movement, and Dillon, as the de facto policy strategist and arguably the most powerful nationalist of the period. This balance was in constant flux, with Dillon accruing a great deal of power in the early years. In this period, the comparatively humble chairman constantly sought Dillon’s advice on policy and deferred to his better judgement while simultaneously remaining idle as Dillon purged the wider party of Healy and O’Brien as rivals: potential threats to his hegemony in policy-making. The alliance of Redmond, the Parnellite, and Dillon  – as a leading light in the internally fractured anti-Parnellite camp – was an extremely unlikely one. The reasons for the alliance appear to have been circumstantial rather than planned. In reality, the reunification of the party was both unintended and initially undesired by many of its participants. In the words of Eugenio Biagini, the UIL’s aim of ‘recreating party unity from the bottom up [was] an operation which the parliamentary leaders of all factions did not welcome, but had to accept in 1900’.109 It has been shown that reunification was a reaction to the political potential of the UIL as a new force in nationalist politics. In the clamour to resuscitate the public’s interest in the traditional constitutional movement and simultaneously assimilate the threat of the UIL, the party reunified. Redmond’s appointment to the chair occurred almost by accident; it was a contrived compromise that could hardly have been expected to endure for eighteen years when his name was proposed in 1900. A dominant figure in party politics going back to the Parnell era, Dillon was always going to be a dominant player in the party. His alliance with Redmond developed gradually and, initially, his enthusiasm for his colleague only stretched as far as bare tolerance and an acknowledgement of him only as the titular leader of the party. The manner in which T.P. O’Connor managed to smooth over the difficulties that existed between Redmond and Dillon during and directly after the unification process can be seen to have been essential to forming the pivotal axis of the inner leadership: the Redmond–Dillon alliance. In the early years, it has been shown how an uneasy truce between Dillon and Redmond developed into a solid and fruitful working relationship due to O’Connor’s perseverance – along with the removal of T.M. Healy as a source of discord within the party at the end of 1900. In purging Healy from the party’s ranks, Dillon had shown an unrivalled level of skill and an unparalleled desire to centralise the

154

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

leadership on himself. While Redmond had been close to Healy, and to O’Brien, Dillon viewed both as enemies within the ranks. Having expelled Healy, he turned his attention to O’Brien, who was both ideologically and personally closer to Redmond than Healy had been. In this case, Dillon carefully kept the chairman on side while he waged a full-scale public campaign against O’Brien through Sexton and the Freeman’s Journal. In successfully engineering O’Brien’s resignation from the party while managing to maintain his links with Redmond, Dillon can thus be seen to have had a pivotal role in changing the nature of the leadership around 1903. By turning a string of loose alliances at the top of the party into a more cohesive, focused, and above all streamlined leadership, Dillon built the first dedicated inner leadership, comprising of himself, Redmond, O’Connor, and, for a time, Edward Blake. Blake’s early role in the party has not been examined in great detail here as his exit from political life in 1907 meant that he did not participate in the seminal years of the party’s involvement at Westminster and his role in creating a tetrarchy consisting of Redmond, Dillon, O’Connor, and Devlin was only a supporting one. While Blake played a key advisory role, it was not sufficiently different from that of O’Connor to warrant special explanation and, in essence, his departure – representing the removal of a complicating figure who was neither integral nor dispensable to the leadership – was his greatest contribution to the emergence of the tetrarchy:  a strictly limited leadership of four. In discussing the centralising of power at the top of the Irish party, it has been argued here that the entry of Devlin does not, in fact, repudiate the old argument that the Irish party leadership was a closed shop and that there was little chance of promotion for young members within the party beyond a certain level. What has been stressed here is that Devlin was the exception to a rule. While it was obvious to the existing leadership that they would have to nurture a protégé, there was no great appetite to widen the membership of the leadership unnecessarily. This is not to say that members such as J.J. Clancy and John Swift MacNeill, and later Tom Kettle and Stephen Gwynn, did not play prominent roles in some of the party’s affairs, but their potential was capped and, unlike the tetrarchs, their roles were advisory rather than directive. By keeping out all other MPs from the highest echelons of policy formation within the party, the leadership can be viewed as a deeply centralised machine with a profound unwillingness among its membership to dilute the power that they had acquired within the party. In no sense had the Irish party ever been a democracy and even its party meetings were carefully orchestrated scenes of political theatre, where the decisions of the

Rising and falling

155

few were given sanction, usually unanimously, by the rank and file of the party.110 When viewed as a closed and centralised body, one can see hostility towards dissidents – such as Healy and O’Brien – and the existence of a glass ceiling in the party hierarchy as constituent parts of a single desire for strong, streamlined, and centralised leadership. If one were to look for a real life case-study for Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’,111 the IPP provides a fine example, exhibiting a closely guarded and tightly knit model of leadership and succession which strongly and successfully resisted attempts at democratisation – in the shape of the early UIL – and dissenting voices such as Healy’s wishing for a role in the steering of policy. Given that Redmond’s conciliatory nature was a hallmark of his chairmanship, the establishment of an oligarchy at the top of the party which was free from any dissenters or contenders was something which was personally favoured and engineered by Dillon during the Redmond era. Dillon has received much attention in the present study and not without just cause. While preferring to remain out of the public gaze, Dillon most certainly controlled the inner workings of the party throughout the period under examination. From taking a personal hand in many of the party’s by-election contests to directing Redmond and O’Connor in their dealings with the government, Dillon was able to spend a significant portion of his time in Dublin, presiding over every affair of the party remotely through his sprawling web of correspondence and through innumerable meetings with personal contacts who could both keep him informed and do his bidding, be it in Ireland or at Westminster. It should not be inferred from this that Dillon was without his own advisers. For one, he took increasing heed of Redmond’s own views up to 1914/15 and the flow of ideas between the two was by no means unidirectional. More so, Dillon had a series of close confidantes with whom he teased out the challenges before him and from whom he took advice and counsel on a variety of subjects. Both O’Connor and Edward Blake filled this role in the party’s structures. In addition, the role of Elizabeth Dillon should not be overlooked. Her influence on Dillon’s views was evidently significant, although analysis of its nature and extent must be left to other historians.112 In spite of his relative youth, as his career progressed, Joe Devlin won increasing respect from Dillon. The apprehension with which Dillon greeted the idea of having to convince Devlin to accept the concessions given to Lloyd George in late 1913 and early 1914 illustrates the depth of the relationship between Dillon and his young colleague. In addition, Devlin’s ability to defend his position in the early stages highlights his power in relation to his more senior and

156

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

experienced colleagues. The extent to which he was able to sway Dillon before eventually yielding to the overwhelming pressure of events on concessions for Ulster is a testament to Devlin’s own power and standing during the Home Rule crisis. Turning to the rise of Redmondism, it has been shown here that, while he began his career in the unified party as a chairman rather than a chief, Redmond rose in assertiveness, particularly as the pace towards Home Rule gathered after 1910. By holding the balance of power at Westminster, Redmond had become the ‘king-maker’. The British political establishment began to focus on Redmond as a powerful figure who would be able to influence significantly the direction of policy at Westminster in the near future.113 As Dillon shied away from interactions with the British political establishment, Redmond was left unhindered to soak up the limelight of the parliamentary and Home Rule crises as an individual and the recognised leader of the ‘Irish race’ between 1910 and 1914. Dillon would only make one significant foray into the media spotlight by appearing alongside Redmond at the Buckingham Palace Conference in 1914. True to form, while Dillon played an important role in the actual negotiations in the palace, Redmond would steal the show at the gates, lapping up the attention of the press and becoming synonymous with the whole subject of Home Rule and Ulster to a wider imperial and world audience. It should also not be forgotten that Redmond had been the focus of opposition propaganda in this period, being painted as the ‘dollar dictator’ by unionists on both sides of the Irish Sea.114 As there is no greater fame than infamy, this would further enhance Redmond’s overall standing in the minds of the Irish and British publics alike. Controversially, Redmond would cash in his enhanced prestige in 1914 to advocate Irish involvement in the First World War. By directing his influence into this project, Redmond would eventually ruin his own political career and the fortunes of his party. Having gambled on a short and triumphant war, the longevity and barbarity of the conflict meant that Redmond’s popularity, linked in Ireland to enthusiasm for the war, would enter into a downward spiral up to 1918. A second consequence of Redmond’s support for the war was his estrangement from Dillon over recruiting. Previous policy divergences among the tetrarchs had been one thing but that which emerged in relation to the war was by far the most severe up to that point in the reunited party’s history. The war had also driven a territorial wedge through the tetrarchy. On the one hand, both Redmond and O’Connor became increasingly insulated from the realities of life on the ground in Ireland. Dillon and Devlin meanwhile continued to enjoy a keen appreciation of the Irish

Rising and falling

157

political and social climate during the war years. With this ideological schism festering in the leadership, the outbreak of the Easter Rising brought its magnitude into sharp focus. Now the tetrarchy appeared to be ripping at the seams, with Redmond and Dillon taking profoundly divergent standpoints on the Rising in the House of Commons. While there would be nominal co-operation subsequent to this, the ideological gap between Redmond and Dillon, spilling out towards O’Connor and Devlin, marked an irreversible shift in the internal relations within the tetrarchy. Though this schism did not result in a complete breakdown in the friendship between Redmond and Dillon, the political axis which their co-operation had come to represent was wobbling. By 1917, Dillon’s flat refusal to participate in the Irish Convention had greatly damaged the tetrarchy’s ability to describe itself as a cohesive unit. The divide that had opened up with O’Connor during the war was also a cause for concern within the tetrarchy. Once again, friendships weathered the strains but, from Dublin, Dillon despaired at his colleague’s lack of insight into the Irish situation. O’Connor had always been a London man but, as the epicentre of Irish politics moved away from Westminster towards Dublin, especially after the Rising, O’Connor became less influential and also less relevant to the work of the leadership. The lack of correspondence from his colleagues after he eventually departed on his fundraising trip to America in July 1917 suggests his views on the Irish situation had become either irrelevant or unwanted by this point. As seen above, only Devlin could straddle the divide that now existed between Redmond and Dillon. It is perhaps for this reason that he was first approached, in preference to Dillon, to lead the party after Redmond’s death. Turning to the question of Devlin’s place in the tetrarchy during the final years of this study, arguably the darkest tarnish on the collective reputation of the rest of the tetrarchy was their manoeuvring of Devlin into acceptance of partition, first in principle, and later in fact. The psychological effects of this project on the Belfastman were arguably even greater than the potentially disastrous political consequences that such a move entailed. Devlin’s biographer has suggested that he suffered from an ‘over-dependence on alcohol’ and the strains placed on him between 1914 and 1918 can be seen to have exacerbated problems with his state of health as well as his state of mind.115 It is not being suggested here that other members of the tetrarchy sold out Joe Devlin in the last years of this study, leaving him to fend for himself in the political wilderness that Northern Irish politics became for Nationalist MPs after 1918. However, there is clearly evidence that points to Devlin having been ‘used’ by his colleagues in their desire to

158

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

bring a Dublin-based Home Rule settlement to fruition at any cost. It was clear from early on in the Home Rule crisis that the cost of settlement would be Ulster. What would only become clear with the passage of time was that Devlin too would potentially have to be sacrificed in pushing through the various settlements that never came to fruition between 1913 and 1918. For Devlin to have emerged from the general election of 1918 with his seat in Belfast intact – especially considering that his electoral opponent was de Valera – can only be described as a miracle. Devlin had been forced into making a string of concessions which directly impacted upon the political aspirations of his constituents and his fellow nationalists across the six counties. The gradual manner in which concessions, stopping just short of full partition, were extracted from Devlin had more to do with the tactical mind of Lloyd George than with any of Devlin’s Irish party colleagues. However, that his colleagues twice convinced Devlin to go far beyond positions with which he was comfortable attests to a level of Machiavellianism and political selfishness from the other tetrarchs that, even now, is difficult to fully comprehend. While some time has been devoted to the negative aspects of the tetrarchy’s chequered history here, the reader should not be left with the impression that the leadership emerged and dissolved with crippling rifts and discord. Although a deeply undemocratic ethos that prevailed among its membership, this had its benefits in the achievement of many of the party’s goals. Because the Irish party existed in a political world, it would seem obvious to associate its structures and management with democracy; however, the way in which the party was run more closely reflects that of municipal government, a single party representing the vast majority of nationalists in Ireland.116 As with any body that unanimously elected the same leader for eighteen years running, it should be remembered that resolutions and decisions made by conventions of the Irish party were often only a formality.117 Similarly, the party was more corporate than democratic in its purges in the early years. Given the prominence of O’Brien’s ‘conference plus business’ model in party policy prior to his resignation in 1903, Dillon’s coup can be viewed as something of a hostile takeover bid. The legislative record of the Irish party is an impressive one. While the mixed fortunes of the third Home Rule Bill had more to do with circumstance, the party was successful in actively working towards the passage of much legislation beneficial to the nationalist cause: various land acts; a university act; even the safeguarding of Catholic education in England and Wales on two separate occasions and under two opposing governments ranked among its achievements. The legacy of party management left by Parnell had been one of strong, central leadership, with a heavy reliance on the abilities of able

Rising and falling

159

lieutenants to carry out their chief’s bidding both at Westminster and in Ireland. While there was a strong representation of the anti-Parnellite tradition in the leadership of the reunited party, arguably the greatest champion of Parnell’s vision for a party leadership was, in fact, John Dillon. On one hand, there would not be one clear ‘chief’ as there had been with Parnell. Power would be shared between Redmond and Dillon in the reunited party. However, the centralisation of power which had been pioneered by Parnell was thoroughly and firmly re-established. On top of this, although the stable of capable lieutenants available to the tetrarchy did not match that enjoyed by Parnell in either size or calibre, the leadership was nonetheless extremely efficient in managing the talents of its rank and file. In a final comparison with Parnell, the tetrarchy actually outperformed their old chief in one crucial area: the identification and cultivation of a protégé. While the then dubious honour of the chairmanship would eventually pass to Dillon in 1918, the Augusti of the tetrarchy had planned their retirement strategy from an early date. That successive crises eventually crippled the Irish party and its leadership is irrelevant here:  the nourishment of Joe Devlin’s talents to safeguard the party’s future represents one of the greatest foresights of the leadership. Notes 1 Thomas M.  Kettle, ‘On crossing the Irish Sea’ in T.M. Kettle, The Day’s Burden: Studies, Literary and Political (London, 1910), p. 26. 2 Importantly, Redmond was not the sole conduit of information to the Irish Office. Whereas Redmond met frequently with Birrell in London, Dillon was in regular contact with Birrell’s Under-Secretary, Matthew Nathan, in Dublin. Nathan’s correspondence to Birrell as well as the Under-Secretary’s own memoranda of interviews from this period are particularly important in understanding the depth of contact between Dillon and the Under-Secretary: correspondence from Nathan to Birrell (BO, ABP, MS Eng. c. 7033) and Matthew Nathan, memoranda of interviews, 3 vols, 1914–1916 (BO, NP, MS Nathan 467–9). 3 On the Transvaal Committee as the precedent for anti-enlistment campaigns, see Marnie Hay, Bulmer Hobson and the Nationalist Movement in Twentieth-Century Ireland (Manchester, 2009), pp. 59–60. 4 Dillon to O’Connor, 5 September 1914 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/225). 5 Westmeath Independent, 7 August 1915, cited in Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 224. 6 Westmeath Independent, 16 August 1915, cited in Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 224. 7 Devlin to Dillon, 10 April 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/169). 8 Devlin to Dillon, 10 April 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/169).

160

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

9 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 484. 10 On McGillian, see Eoin MacNeill, ‘Memorandum II’ (written sometime between June and October 1917) (NLI, BHP, MS 13/4), reproduced in full with foreword and explanatory notes in ‘Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 Rising’, ed. F.X. Martin, in Irish Historical Studies, xii, no. 47 (March 1961), pp. 226–71. 11 Bernard McGillian to Redmond, 6 March 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/609). 12 Bernard McGillian to Redmond, 6 March 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/609). 13 Bernard McGillian to Redmond, 6 March 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/609). 14 See Redmond to Dillon, 20 March 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/611). 15 On Price, McGillian, and MacNeill, see Martin’s notes in MacNeill, ‘Memorandum II’. 16 On the frequency of contact between Redmond and Birrell in London and Dillon and Nathan in Dublin, see Ó Broin, Dublin Castle, p. 50. 17 The archival release of secret documents years after the Rising show that the Royal Navy were the only organisation which fully knew of the plans for the rebellion. See Eunan O’Halpin, ‘British intelligence in Ireland, 1914–1921’ in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension:  Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984), p. 57. 18 Dillon to Redmond, 23 April 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 19 A letter discussing all the different conduits of information between Dublin and London and their respective downsides is Dillon to Redmond, 2 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 20 Dillon observed that he had not actually heard from Devlin since ‘Monday week’ (16 April 1916) in a letter to T.P. O’Connor dated ‘Tuesday evening’, 2 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/302). 21 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 175. 22 On 2 May alone, Dillon noted Devlin’s absence and expected arrival in no less than three communications now in the Redmond papers (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 23 Dillon to O’Connor, 2 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/302). 24 Redmond to Dillon, 4 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/622). Devlin was already in Dublin by the time this letter was written. In addition, this letter would not have reached Dillon for at least another day as it was hand delivered by Annie O’Brien, a secretary in the UIL offices on O’Connell Street [MS note on envelope provides details of this]. 25 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 175. Dillon to Redmond, 8.15[p.m.], 2 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 26 Although Wimborne did not share Birrell’s fate in Asquith’s post-Rising cull, it would appear from this that the feeling in Nationalist circles was that, as Lord Lieutenant, Wimborne, would be compelled to resign. 27 See Dillon to Redmond, 30 April [1916] (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22) and Dillon to O’Connor, 17 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/307) for just some examples of Dillon’s experiences during April/May 1916. 28 See Dillon to Redmond, 8.15[p.m.], 2 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22).

Rising and falling

161

29 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 97. See also Meleady, Redmond: The Parnellite, pp. 77–8 and 316. 30 See Bessie O’Connor to Redmond, 1 March 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B) giving details of her former husband’s marital and legal status. T.P. O’Connor’s first biographer is more discrete in his treatment of his subject’s relationship with Mrs Crawford, referring to it as a ‘sympathetic companionship’ and stating that the couple lived ‘near one another’, Fyfe, O’Connor, pp. 200–1. 31 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxi, col. 2512 (27 April 1916). 32 Lyons, Dillon, p. 373. 33 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, cols 631–2 (10 May 1916). 34 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 632 (10 May 1916). 35 Redmond, ‘Memorandum of an interview with Asquith’, 3 May 1916, cited in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 480. 36 Lyons, Dillon, pp. 379–80. 37 Quoted in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 481. 38 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 37 (3 May 1916). 39 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 37 (3 May 1916). 40 Pearse, Clarke, and MacDonagh were the first to be executed. Including Casement, the final number was sixteen. 41 Redmond to Dillon, 3 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/620). 42 Reflecting on the period since the Rising, in late June 1916 and in reference to Dillon’s utterances in the House, Robert Cecil, then Minister for Blockade, recorded in a private memorandum that ‘Mr Dillon remains in my judgement what he has always been – a convicted enemy of this country’. This memorandum appears to have been sent to Andrew Bonar Law as it now sits among his private papers. Robert Cecil, ‘Ireland’ [memorandum], 26 June 1916 (PA, BLP MS BL/63/C/62, fols 1–2). 43 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 945 (11 May 1916). 44 Meleady, National Leader, p. 375. 45 Dillon to O’Connor, 20 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/310). 46 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 505. 47 Brady, O’Connor, p. 231. 48 Brady, O’Connor, p. 233. 49 See Devlin’s memorandum of this interview, marked ‘secret’, 15 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/3). 50 Devlin, memorandum of interview with Lord Northcliffe, 15 May 1916 (Secret) (NLI, RP, MS 15,181/3). 51 O’Connor to Dillon, 18 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/308). 52 O’Connor to Dillon, 18 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/308). 53 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 486. 54 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 176. 55 O’Connor to Dillon, 19 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/309). 56 On the difficulty faced by Devlin in this task, see Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 507–8. 57 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 178.

162

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

58 A full breakdown of the voting in the Ulster Convention is contained in Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 179. 59 Emphasis is Dillon’s own. Dillon to O’Connor, 20 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/310). This letter cuts off abruptly, but it continues in a fragment labelled 6741/333, in which Dillon lists some of his grievances around the actions of the Government. 60 Dillon to O’Connor, 27 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/311). 61 On O’Connor’s impressions of Dublin during a brief visit to attend a party meeting there, see Brady, O’Connor, p. 232. 62 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 180. 63 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, pp. 180–1. 64 Sinn Féin had at least one unofficial voice in the convention in the form of Edward MacLysaght. See Edward MacLysaght, ‘Some memories of the Irish Convention 1917–1918’, Capuchin Annual (1968), pp. 345–50. 65 Redmond to Lloyd George, 17 May 1917, quoted in Finnan, Redmond, p. 218. On the abstentions, see Lyons, Dillon, p. 418. 66 See Dillon’s memorandum on the proposed basis for an Irish Convention, reproduced in Lyons, Dillon, p. 417. 67 Dillon to O’Connor, 1 June 1917, quoted in Lyons, Dillon, p. 419. 68 Dillon to O’Connor, 4 September 1917, quoted in Finnan, Redmond, p. 219. 69 Lyons, Dillon, p. 418. 70 L.W. Brady claims that in negotiating with Lloyd George, O’Connor’s patience was ‘tested as never before’, Brady, O’Connor, p. 239. 71 See O’Connor to Redmond, 28 May 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B). See also, Lyons, Dillon, p. 417. 72 L.W. Brady mistakenly states that it was July when Redmond asked O’Connor to go on the trip. O’Connor had, in fact, left for America with Richard Hazleton around 12 June (Irish Times, 13 June 1917). Correspondence shows that Redmond had discussed such a fundraising venture with O’Connor before the end of May. See O’Connor to Redmond, 31 May 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B) and Brady, O’Connor, p. 240. 73 On the fundraising trip of 1910, see Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 184 and Brady, O’Connor, p. 203. 74 O’Connor suffered from diabetes throughout the period under examination here. See Fyfe, O’Connor, p. 326. An insight into the state of O’Connor’s health and its impact on his work can be seen in a letter, written from the spa town of Carlsbad, Germany in August 1909. These types of letters, as well as O’Connor’s retreats from the strains of work, were not at all infrequent. O’Connor to Dillon, 14 August 1909 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/158). 75 O’Connor to Redmond, 31 May 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B). 76 O’Connor to Redmond, 31 May 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B). 77 O’Connor to Redmond, 9 July 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B). 78 On the decline of UIL grassroots organisation in Ireland, see Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 44–8. In county Longford, Wheatley recounts how professional organisers were employed in 1915 to counteract the ‘drastic slump’ that had occurred at branch level: Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 233.

Rising and falling

163

79 O’Connor to Redmond, 6 August 1917 (NLI, RP, MS 15,215/2/B). 80 O’Connor to Devlin, 31 August 1917 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/181). 81 Brady, O’Connor, pp. 241–2. 82 For Dillon’s efforts to accentuate the positive aspects of the trip, namely its effects on hearts and minds in America, during a homecoming dinner in O’Connor and Hazleton’s honour, see Irish Times, 7 August 1918. 83 One noted intervention is O’Connor’s written involvement in the conscription crisis protests, noted in Brady, O’Connor, p. 242. 84 O’Connor to Devlin, 24 August 1917 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/180). 85 The IPP representatives at the convention were:  Redmond, Devlin, J.J. Clancy (Dublin County North), Stephen Gwynn (Galway City), and T.J. Harbison (Tyrone East after April 1918). For a full list of the convention’s delegates, see Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention, 52–3 [Cd 9019], H.C. 1917–18, x, 748–9. 86 For the longer history of O’Donnell’s involvement with the Irish party, see Mulvagh, ‘Rome ruler’. 87 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 185. 88 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 186. 89 Lord Midleton to J.H. Bernard, 17 October 1917, cited in Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 187. 90 Devlin to Dillon, 20 December 1917 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/184). 91 To quote a summary of the Midleton scheme given by R.B. McDowell, The Irish Convention, 1917–18 (London, 1970), pp. 129–30. 92 McDowell, Irish Convention, p. 130. 93 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 187. 94 Devlin to Dillon, 20 December 1917 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/184). 95 Hazleton to Devlin, 18 February 1918 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/190). 96 Hazleton to Devlin, 18 February 1918 (TCD, DP, MS 6730/190). 97 Redmond to Dillon, 26 February 1918 (TCD, DP, MS 6749/669). A copy can be found in NLI, RP, MS 15,182/25. 98 Redmond’s death can be considered young when compared to his two senior colleagues in the leadership. Dillon died at seventy-five in 1927 while O’Connor lived to be eighty-one, dying in 1929. Perhaps attesting to the strain of chairing a strong and united party, an obvious analogue is Parnell, who was only forty-five when he died in 1891, at a time of comparable turmoil in Irish politics. 99 Loughlin, ‘Devlin, Joseph’, p. 243. 100 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 458. 101 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 437. 102 According to Richard McGhee’s account of the meeting which he sent to Dillon the following day. McGhee to Dillon, 13 March 1918 (TCD, DP, MS 6757/1059) quoted in Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 191. 103 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 191. 104 The title of the penultimate chapter in his biography: Lyons, Dillon, p. 432 et seq. 105 Callanan, ‘Dillon, John’, p. 300.

164

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

106 Marie Coleman, ‘Redmond, William Archer’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, viii, pp. 420–2. 107 On O’Hanlon, see Cavan GAA official website, ‘History, 1910–1920’ (http:// cavangaa.ie/about/history/) (31 July 2015)  and Walker, Parliamentary Election Results. 108 All these figures are taken from Walker, Parliamentary Election Results. 109 Biagini, British Democracy, p. 172. 110 On the conventions of the Irish National League (the national organisation of the Parnellite era) and their stage-management, see Biagini, British Democracy, pp. 196–7. 111 ‘Who says organisation, says oligarchy’: Michels, Political Parties, p. 365. 112 As with any investigation into matters relating to John Dillon, the most fruitful starting point is Lyons, Dillon. See especially p.  226, where Elizabeth can be found clearly disagreeing with her husband’s agitation policy. 113 Representing this impression is a cartoon from Punch (2 February 1910), which shows Redmond enthroned at Westminster, holding the British Constitution as an orb in his right hand: Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 172 [plate]. 114 For one example of this kind of propaganda in mainland Britain, see a cartoon issued by the Unionist party in 1910 depicting Redmond as ‘the dollar princess’, reproduced in Gwynn, Life of Redmond, plate facing p. 192. On the ‘dollar dictator’ see Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 48. 115 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 191. 116 Seymour Lipset, ‘Introduction’ in Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties [Démocratie et l’organisation des partis politiques], vol. I: England, ed. Seymour M.  Lipset (London, 1902:  new edn, New Brunswick, 1982), p. lx. 117 Biagini, British Democracy, pp. 196–7.

7 Obstruction or interrogation? The tactics of parliamentary questions

Look at the Question Paper of this House on a Monday or Thursday in any week you like to select. What does it include, or, rather, what does it not include? Delay in the postal service of some hamlet in Connemara, a dispute about trawling in the Moray Firth, a decision perhaps in a poaching case by some rural bench in Wales, a case of deportation in East Africa, the position of the Mahomedan community in the new-Presidency of Bengal, the efficiency or inefficiency of the rifle that is served out to the Army or to the Territorial Force, the sea worthiness of the latest type of ‘Dreadnought’; and, perhaps, the international relations between Great Britain and Germany. … Now I ask this question: Has any deliberative assembly in the history of the world ever taken upon itself such a grotesquely impossible task? – Herbert Henry Asquith speaking on the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill, 11 April 19121

In 1966, historian Maureen Wall used the simple method of taking a ruler and measuring column inches in printed volumes of Dáil debates to examine the relative amount of time spent on different subjects in the course of business.2 In doing so, Wall exposed the fallacy of a long held assumption that the partition of Ireland had been a pressing and much discussed issue during the Anglo-Irish treaty debates in the winter of 1921–22. Looking at the data quantitatively – rather than simply undertaking a detailed textual examination of speech content – Wall showed that only nine out of 338 columns in the debates had actually tackled the question of partition, with two-thirds of these contributions coming from just three TDs representing the border county of Monaghan.3 Wall’s fresh insight was intended to provoke historians and the general public alike to reassess the prevailing orthodoxy that, somehow, partition had been a hotly contested issue during the Treaty debates. Acknowledging the distorted memory of the Irish people in this respect, in 1969, Garret FitzGerald stated to Dáil Éireann that: ‘this debate is the first occasion in the history of the State in which we are seriously facing the problem of

166

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Partition. That issue was not faced even in the Treaty debate. We deluded ourselves it was’.4 Three years before FitzGerald’s contribution, it was Wall who had offered the hard quantitative evidence which debunked utterly this myth. In the period thereafter, historians and public alike were forced to conclude that, within the Dáil chamber at least, TDs were far more concerned with ‘the crown, the oath and the empire’ than they were with the subject of partition, possibly owing to a misplaced faith in the proposed Boundary Commission.5 Wall’s short article on partition has provided the inspiration for the present chapter. Official reports such as Dáil debates and Hansard – the official reports of the proceedings of the British Houses of Parliament – should be viewed as sources of valuable and usually under-utilised statistical data that can provide empirical evidence to support observations made through archival and other primary research. As such, when viewed quantitatively rather than simply for its content, Hansard can contribute to scholarly debates surrounding parliamentary behaviour and discussions over the intents and actions of participants in chamber politics. In trying to further modern understandings of the workings of the IPP as a participant in the British House of Commons, Hansard presents numerous opportunities – and almost as many difficulties – in terms of the nature and amount of data it provides. In terms of parliamentary behaviour generally, the star players both of the official Irish party and the Healyite/O’Brienite wings were frequent contributors to debates in the House of Commons, filling many column inches and keeping up with the best of their British counterparts.6 Division voting, an area where Irish MPs generally were active but by no means exceptional in the level of their participation, will be discussed extensively in the next chapter.7 One area in which Irish Nationalist activity does stand out, however, is Question Time. Despite its size relative to the British parties, the Irish party consistently featured prominently in the league tables of top questioners published intermittently over this period. For the first half of 1905, Nationalist MPs took five of the top ten highest questioner slots, with John Gordon Swift MacNeill (Donegal South) coming second only to the extremely active James Weir (Liberal, Ross and Cromarty) in that period.8 Between the opening of the 1916 session on 15 February and the Whitsuntide recess on 1 June, the dissident nationalist Laurence Ginnell (Westmeath North), asked 453 questions, almost double that of his nearest rival.9 Evidently, certain Nationalists found a particular parliamentary niche in questioning and – in the context of the present study – further analysis is clearly justified. Parliamentary questions remain an under-appreciated source in the history of party politics. Their content can often appear mundane when

Obstruction or interrogation?

167

viewed in isolation. However, writing in the mid-1950s, in his treatise on the emergence and evolution of this ‘unique British institution’, Patrick Howarth characterised questioning as intrinsic to ‘our dearest liberties’ and described the practice as an ‘indispensable part of [the British] constitution’.10 As questions provide a rare insight into the parliamentary behaviour of a very broad section of MPs, they are a valuable source for historians attempting to assess the parliamentary work of political parties as a whole rather than simply analysing headline-grabbing speeches and the interventions of a party’s leadership and ‘star players’ as representative evidence of the actions or intentions of the party collectively. The aim of the present chapter is to analyse questions not for their own merit but rather as an indicator of parliamentary behaviour more generally. By assessing the level of Nationalist questioning relative to the work of other parties, the objective is to assess how radical the Irish party was in the House of Commons and how patterns in its behaviour evolved over time. As the comments made by Asquith in introducing the third Home Rule Bill quoted at the start of this chapter indicate, the burden of interrogation weighed heavily on the government. While Asquith’s quote suggests an innocent motivation behind the high levels of questioning witnessed in the House, here it will be argued that all parties, and not just Irish Nationalists, could and did engage in obstructive questioning at certain points. One of the overall aims of this work is to examine whether a de-radicalisation of Nationalist parliamentary behaviour occurred at any point in the years under consideration. If such a trend can be identified, it must be asked when this de-radicalisation occurred, how long it lasted, and why. In terms of Irish constitutional nationalism, Michael Wheatley outlines the divergence between the ideology and outlook of the party’s chairman and the majority within Irish constitutional nationalism. Wheatley argues that, whereas provincial constitutional nationalist sentiment was steeped in the language of ‘Catholicity, sense of victimhood, glorification of struggle … and antipathy to England’, Redmondism – ‘socially conservative, conciliatory, and imperialist’11 – ‘remained a minority taste’ in Irish political life.12 As will be highlighted here, many Nationalist MPs maintained an enthusiasm for obstructionist behaviour in the House – something for which Question Time provided ample opportunity. Bearing this in mind, the division between ‘moderate’ forms of nationalism and a less conciliatory grassroots nationalist identity as outlined by Wheatley above can reasonably be extended into membership of the parliamentary party itself, where factional demarcations always lingered. Not only were differences between Healyism, O’Brienism, and the official party a factor, as has already been explored in previous chapters,

168

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the foundations of the reunited IPP were built on a marriage of convenience between Redmond and Dillon in 1900. In this way, the echoes of Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factionalism carried on from the 1890s. One of the most significant differences between Question Time and other political behaviour in the House of Commons is that questions were not controlled by parties to the extent to which whips managed voting in divisions. As well as being the most ‘democratic’ form of parliamentary behaviour therefore, it was also the least regulated. In the absence of stringent party discipline, through an exploration of parliamentary questions there is scope to understand the interests, and in some cases the idiosyncrasies, of less prominent party members. Historiography and scholarship on parliamentary questions Regarding the historiography of the parliamentary question, D. Norman Chester and Nona Bowring’s 1962 study of questions in the House of Commons remains the most comprehensive and accomplished study into the institution. One thing that Chester and Bowring address in considerable detail is the evolution of the parliamentary question and the rules and procedure that govern it. Questioning underwent significant reform and revision during the period under investigation here. The most extensive reforms to Question Time to occur in this period were those presided over by A.J. Balfour in 1902. Balfour’s reforms resulted in a profound restructuring of the procedural rules governing the timing and tabling of questions.13 Balfour formalised and reined in Question Time, which had become quite complicated and liable to exploitation by disruptive-minded members. The immediate impetus for Balfour’s reforms stemmed from the opposition’s relentless enquiries concerning government policy in the second Boer War and continuing Irish Nationalist abuse of Question Time.14 Despite putting much thought and effort into them, the impact of Balfour’s reforms was relatively short-lived. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, Question Time was once again descending into levels of anarchy reminiscent of the most unruly sittings of 1901 and early 1902. Balfour’s main purpose in pushing through his reforms was to reduce the amount of time spent by the House on questions and generally to make the process more efficient. In a memorandum circulated among House of Commons members of Cabinet, Balfour explained that his reforms intended to put an end to ‘petty methods of annoyance’ practised by certain members at Question Time. Balfour explained further that ‘these methods are of value only to those whose object is, not solely

Obstruction or interrogation?

169

or even principally, to criticise legislation, but to injure the House of Commons’.15 It was not just the pro-Boer Liberals who were of concern to Balfour when he formulated these reforms. Irish Nationalists were equally to the forefront of Balfour’s mind as he strove to reduce the disorder that was prevailing in the Commons. The parliamentary sketch writer Sir Henry Lucy wrote in support of Balfour’s procedural reforms, congratulating the Leader of the House that ‘a long stride has been taken in the desirable direction of delivering the House of Commons from the tyranny of the minority, frequently represented by an individual of the standing of Mr. Swift MacNeill [Irish party] or Mr Channing [Liberal]’.16 Clearly MacNeill and his colleagues within the Irish party had succeeded in arresting the attention of the government through their incessant questioning, forcing the Cabinet to devise new procedures to limit the freedoms of the House in order to protect the government from the threat of future subversion. How this Nationalist tactic would benefit Ireland is questionable, but this strategy of low-level obstruction had certainly encumbered the government, and reminded all parties in the House of the fact that, so long as Irish Nationalists had to go to Westminster, they retained the potential to be a thorn in the side of any government unfriendly to them or hostile to their legislative objectives. Balfour’s reformed format for Question Time debuted in the House of Commons on 5 May 1902. The most important aspects of Balfour’s reforms were that a formal distinction between oral and written questions was introduced and the time that could be spent on oral questioning was strictly limited to forty minutes per day. This latter provision was to ensure that Question Time would not encroach on other, more important, business before the House.17 It should also be noted that further reforms to the schedule and procedures of the House were introduced in 1906 under the new Liberal government. However, these had little impact on questioning save that they extended the time allocated for oral questions to between forty-five and fifty-five minutes.18 Interestingly, two top ranking Nationalists, John Redmond and John Swift MacNeill, intervened in this debate, arguing that a full hour needed to be set aside for questions. Unsurprisingly, when their proposal was put to a vote, it was convincingly defeated.19 It has long been understood that Irish Nationalist MPs had a history of using and abusing Question Time with a vigour uncharacteristic among the rest of the membership of the House of Commons. Examining parliamentary questions during the early days of the Home Rule movement, Patrick Howarth has charted the effects of concerted Irish obstructionism on parliamentary procedure.20 Chester and Bowring followed up on this, making frequent – if only passing – reference to the impact of Irish

170

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

‘ardent questioners’ on the proceedings of the House. Chester notes how the number of questions ‘in the first fourteen years or so of the [twentieth] century were … swollen by the large number of Questions asked by a few Irish Members’.21 To more fully understand Irish Nationalist questioning, more detailed analysis than currently exists is needed. In examining the role of Irish Nationalist involvement in questioning, only James McConnel has so far made a detailed study of parliamentary questioning among Irish Nationalist MPs. His research focuses on a smaller timeframe (1910 to 1914)  but on these sessions he has conducted considerable statistical analysis.22 The present study builds upon this, offering a more longue durée perspective which investigates the broader evolution of Nationalist questioning, going back to 1901 and up as far as 1918.23 This approach underlines the idea that the era of the reunified party – the period of Redmond’s chairmanship – should be viewed as a single and natural chronological bracket in the longer history of the party.24 The more fundamental difference between the present study of questions and McConnel’s is that the latter addresses some quite different lines of enquiry to those under consideration here. McConnel’s primary focus is to determine the content of Nationalist questioning and to see if and how this changed in the course of the years studied (1910–14). The present chapter intends to focus predominantly on the evolving tactical application – as opposed to the changing content – of questions. McConnel’s study has already shown how there was a strong focus on the land issue within Irish Nationalist questioning. In this way, the present study builds on the work of McConnel. While content informs us about the interests of MPs and their constituents, there is still more that questions can reveal. By assessing collectively the behaviour of Nationalist MPs in relation to questions, and taking questions as a barometer of wider behavioural patterns, the ways in which the policies and tactics of the party were translated into reality can be observed. By assessing questions year-on-year, the evolution of Nationalist behaviour can be charted and the party’s response to important events in the chronology of this study can be empirically analysed. Methodology of survey design and data collection, and validation of sample The present survey consists of analysis of 306 randomly chosen sittings (seventeen per annum) of the House of Commons in which there was a ‘Question Time’ between January 1901 and November 1918.25 Only sittings that have been digitised have been included in the sample.26 In the case of supplementary questions, from an official parliamentary

Obstruction or interrogation?

171

perspective only interjections which took an interrogative form were judged to be in order and this was determined at the discretion of the Speaker.27 For the sake of completeness, all supplementary interjections, regardless of whether they were judged to be in or out of order or whether they took an interrogatory form or not, have been recorded here so long as the identity of their enunciator was recorded. The study employs a five party distinction for analysing questions. The party categorisations employed in the present study are: ‘Conservative and Liberal Unionist’, ‘Liberal,’ ‘Irish Nationalist’, ‘Labour’, and ‘Irish Unionist’.28 Although not perfect, these designations allowed for a comprehensive, logical, and robust analysis of MPs across a period where parties, most notably the Conservative and Liberal Unionists, redefined their titles and associations. Independents within these five broad categories were included in their respective designations. Treatment of Irish Nationalists differs from McConnel’s study in this respect but, to provide consistency of analysis over a longer timeframe and for whole-parliament analysis, this was found necessary.29 The sample collected here can be cross-checked with a small number of other studies and known facts about the overall number of questions asked annually in the period to determine the extent to which the levels of questions recorded here might be representative of the actual totals. Comparing questions per day in sample and total Only five of the eighteen years under consideration here are more than 15 per cent away from the known actual figure. Furthermore, even factoring in these years, the average level of agreement across all years is 13.4 per cent. Given that only 306 Question Times have been analysed out of the 2,145 that occurred in this period, the level of agreement as reported above can be judged to be satisfactory.30 Only 1916 stands out as deviating substantially from the known actual level of questions, with the sample indicating one-third fewer questions per day than the actual average. The warning flagged over the accuracy of data for 1916 here will have to be taken into account throughout the rest of the chapter. Given the significance of this year in Irish history, 1916 will naturally warrant considerable comment in assessing the evolution of Nationalist questions. However, any conclusions made about the levels of questions asked in 1916 must be taken with a certain degree of caution based on the disparity between the sample and known actual level of questions highlighted here. Other comparisons between the present study and previous work can be undertaken to validate and check the accuracy of this sample. For 1910, James McConnel examined all questions in the first week of each

172

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Table 7.1  Sample validation, comparing the average number of questions per day in the current sample with the known actual average as reported in Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 87–8. Year

Average number of questions per day (sample)

Average number of questions per day (actual)

Percentage difference between sample and actual

1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918

63 37 45 49 65 86 74 90 64 95 98 117 98 78 79 88 101 100

69 50 50 60 71 96 98 102 86 111 112 119 110 74 88 128 108 105

8.7 26.0 10.0 18.3 8.5 10.4 24.5 11.8 25.6 14.4 12.5 1.7 10.9 –5.4 10.2 31.3 6.5 4.8

Note: Total numbers of questions per annum taken from ‘Number of questions to ministers appearing on the order paper 1901–1960’ in Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 87–8.

month in which parliament sat. Based on an examination of Hansard, this puts the number of Question Times surveyed by McConnel at twenty-two. He reports that Nationalists asked 464 questions in this time period, giving a Nationalist daily average of 21.09 questions.31 The present study, which examines 17 Question Times for every year, records 405 Nationalist questions in 1910. This gives a daily average of 23.82 Nationalist questions in the same period, a figure impressively close to that observed by McConnel, further validating the accuracy of the present survey. The tactics of questioning: charting evolving usage patterns At this point, it is instructive to take just one example from 1901 – the highest period of Nationalist questioning in this study – to explore further the idea that activity at Question Time can be seen as indicative of

Obstruction or interrogation?

173

the level to which a party was satisfied with the government of the day. On 22 April 1901, ‘one of the commons’ foremost procedural experts’,32 John Swift MacNeill – Nationalist MP for Donegal South – asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies a relatively unsensational question about the upset caused in Cape Colony by the Colonial Secretary’s unauthorised publication of correspondence which had been forwarded on to him.33 Despite the fact that this was only the second question of the day, when the then Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, provided an abrupt answer, concluding that he had nothing to add to what he had already said on the subject, MacNeill, aided by his colleague for Cork North, J.C. Flynn, attempted to unleash a salvo of supplementary questions, but was greeted with the prompt intervention of the Speaker who called for order stating that MacNeill was abusing the privilege of posing supplementary questions by entering into an argument with the Secretary of State.34 Far from obeying the Speaker, MacNeill simply returned to his interrogation of the Colonial Secretary, only to have the Speaker immediately rule him out of order and proceed to the next question.35 Unfortunately for the Speaker and the government, the next tabled question was yet another to the Colonial Secretary, this time from William Redmond (Clare East). This was to herald a barrage of organised and concerted questions and supplementary interjections from a team of Nationalist members including MacNeill, William Redmond, John Dillon, and Jasper Tully in what was a clear attempt to obstruct parliamentary businesses through questioning. Including eighteen questions posed to officials in the Irish Office, Nationalist MPs asked a total of forty-one oral and thirty-five supplementary questions that day. In all, Nationalists accounted for 51 per cent of all oral questions and 70 per cent of all supplementary interjections on 22 April in one of the clearest cases of what this chapter will dub ‘neo-obstructionism’: harassment of the government and the holding up of parliamentary business through a disproportionately high level of party activity during Question Time. The term ‘neo-obstructionism’ is used here to distinguish this more benign form of behaviour from the more malicious brand of filibustering through which Nationalists including Joseph Biggar and Charles Stewart Parnell almost ground parliament to a halt in the late 1870s and early 1880s.36 In contrast, the behaviour at Question Time analysed here seems to have been intended to annoy the executive and increase the workload of the administration rather than to precipitate an actual parliamentary crisis as had been the objective in Parnell’s early years. That having been said, in 1900, George Wyndham observed to the

174

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

leader of the House that ‘[the Irish party] mean, if they can, to imitate Parnell’s Parliamentary tactics’.37 The level of Nationalist activity at Question Time on 22 April 1901 can be considered to have been unusually high. Overall, 1901 witnessed the highest levels of Irish Nationalist activity at Question Time with the sample here indicating a daily average of twenty-seven questions per day from Irish Nationalist MPs. The average number of questions per day from Irish Nationalist MPs across the whole survey is nineteen. To put the 1901 figure in its comparative context, of the other party groupings studied, the daily average number of questions for 1901 was twelve, twenty, one, and one for the Conservative, Liberal, Labour, and Irish Unionist groupings respectively – further underlining the immense contribution made by Irish Nationalists to Question Time in that year. In discussing the historiography of parliamentary questions above, it has already been noted that high levels of Irish Nationalist questioning have been observed throughout the 1880s and 1890s by Patrick Howarth and Chester and Bowring.38 Although no specific study has looked at the level of Nationalist questioning for all years up to 1901, the supposition here is that, if this were investigated, the high level of Nationalist questioning witnessed for 1901 in the present study may constitute the tapering-off of a long period of obstruction stretching back at least to the 1890s.39 Even factoring in the inflationary effect the Boer War had on the number of Nationalist questions, it would seem likely that the scale of Nationalist questioning observed in 1901 would have been representative of similar levels of activity going back, perhaps without interruption, to the heyday of real Irish Nationalist obstructionism before 1885. While the present study cannot reach back to the beginning of Home Rule involvement in the House of Commons, it does cover the last two decades of the existence of the IPP at Westminster. As such, the intention here is not to chart the rise in Irish questioning, obstruction, and disobedience, but rather its gradual decline, beginning from the high-water mark of 1901. Declining levels of Irish Nationalist questioning in this period will be used here not as proof but rather as an indicator of relative levels of parliamentary activity and agreement with the policies of the governments of the day. By so doing, the hope is that the de-radicalisation of Irish constitutional nationalism at Westminster can be charted. Further to the aim of charting the growing moderation of the IPP, it is always important to study Irish Nationalist involvement in the House of Commons in a comparative context. With this in mind, the relative level of Irish Nationalist activity compared with other party groupings

Obstruction or interrogation?

175

in the House of Commons has also been recorded and analysed. One of the most significant findings in this respect has been that, just as the data indicates a steady de-radicalisation in Irish party behaviour between 1901 and 1915, in certain specific types of questioning, the exact opposite has been observed in the British Conservative party. Among Conservatives, the level of party activity saw a discernible increase over the period from 1906 onwards, pointing towards a radicalisation of the party and a steadily increasing level of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Liberal government that came to power in December 1905. Types of questioning The most extensive discussion of the difference between oral and written questions, and why members would favour one form over the other, can be found in Chester and Bowring’s Questions in Parliament. Although the difference between oral and written questions is discussed primarily in terms of the contemporary (1962) nature of the distinction,40 the arguments put forward are broadly applicable to the period from 1901 to 1918. While Chester states that, given a random sample of oral and written questions, ‘even those experienced in handling Questions would have difficulty in sorting them into the two groups’,41 he goes on to state that government supporters ‘will be more inclined to be considerate of the Minister [by asking written questions]’, reflecting the fact that, not only was a written question easier for the government to process administratively but that questioners wishing to challenge or discredit the government through questioning favoured an oral answer and the opportunity it provided to pose supplementary questions.42 In addition to this, certain types of enquiry, particularly where the answer took the form of a long list or a table of statistics, lent themselves to written answer.43 Bearing all this in mind, while there is no specific rule that states oral questions are asked for one reason and written questions for another, generally it can be maintained that oral questions are more likely to be asked by members dissatisfied with the government  – be they in opposition or on the government backbenches – whereas written questions are more likely to be asked either for the purposes of obtaining information or by members who are supportive of the government. The one form of question not yet discussed is the supplementary. Much more so than oral questions, the level of supplementary interjections made during Question Time acts as a useful barometer of dissent and disapproval with the actions and policies of the government of the day. Focusing on the 1880s, Chester and Bowring note that, ‘instead of being mainly a method whereby a Member extracted publicly a piece of information … they [supplementary questions] were now being used,

176

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

by a very small group it is true, to harass and cross-examine Ministers and to air Members’ grievances’.44 Although Chester and Bowring do observe that supplementary questions could occasionally be asked in overt support of the minister in question, in a general sense the supplementary was much more commonly used to oppose than to support.45 Whether it was a government backbencher dissatisfied with the speed with which the government was addressing his grievance or the Nationalist member seeking to expose the inequity of Irish land law, the vast majority of supplementary questions indicated a member’s dissatisfaction either with the government or with the answer which had been offered to an oral question. Bearing the above in mind, oral and supplementary questions may thus collectively be considered as more ‘radical’ forms of questioning: expressing dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. Written questions, on the other hand, should be judged not to convey this same level of discontent. Parties The measurement and analysis of Nationalist levels of questioning would be meaningless if they were simply assessed in isolation. In assessing parliamentary questions in the context of political affiliation, the way in which the members of the House are grouped into parties is important, as different methods of aggregation can produce very different results. The present chapter has opted for a five-way split, using the broad categories of Conservative and Liberal Unionist;46 Liberal; Irish Nationalist; Labour; and Irish Unionist to group MPs.47 The assignations here have been determined according to the party affiliations of candidates recorded in F.W.S. Craig’s British Parliamentary Election Results and Brian Walker’s Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland for British and Irish constituencies respectively.48 Nationalism was never a monolithic entity during the period under consideration. Apart from the two major dissident groupings centring on William O’Brien and T.M. Healy that intermittently broke away from and reconciled with the official IPP during the period, the impact of independent Nationalist MPs, most notably the maverick Laurence Ginnell (Westmeath North), who was ousted from the official Irish party in 1909, cannot be underestimated or understated in terms of questioning. Indeed, in 1915, T.P. O’Connor wrote to John Dillon that, allied with Arthur Lynch,49 the floor of the House was ‘entirely occupied’ by Ginnell, attesting to his disproportionate level of contribution both to debates and Question Times at that point.50 It is because of this need to accommodate all Irish Nationalist members in one category that, while the previous chapters focused on the

Obstruction or interrogation?

177

IPP, both parliamentary questions and division voting must, by necessity, use the broader bracket of ‘Irish Nationalists’ to classify these MPs. To subdivide Nationalists any further than this would be impractical and unworkable because of the amount of subdivisions among dissident nationalists and the frequency with which members either left or re-affiliated with the official Irish party. In addition, this amalgamation of all Nationalists into one category simply reflects the fact that the same has been done in the cases of independent Conservative, Liberal, Labour, and Irish Unionist members. These include independent or sometime-independent Conservatives, Liberals, Ulster Unionists, and Labour members such as John Wakefield Weston, John Cathcart Wason, Thomas Henry Sloan, and Charles Stanton respectively. The result has been the construction of five logical, manageable, and comprehensive groupings suitable for analysis and comparison. Turning to the Irish Unionists, this group’s questions have been logged separately to the rest of the Conservative and Liberal Unionist party. In his study of questions, James McConnel groups all these MPs, British and Irish alike, as one under the title of ‘Unionist’.51 However, one of the research questions of the present study pertains to the difference between British and Irish MPs, separating the groups geographically rather than by party affiliation. Behavioural similarities between Irish Nationalists and Irish Unionists were observed which were not replicated in the voting practices of British MPs. This will be seen to justify the methodology and the subdivisions applied here. On a point of terminology, whereas, particularly after the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1912, Conservative-aligned Irish MPs would usually be referred to as ‘Ulster Unionists’, the more accurate term of ‘Irish Unionist’ has been applied here to accommodate for Unionist MPs sitting for constituencies outside of Ulster, most notably Edward Carson and Bryan Ricco Cooper who sat for Trinity College and South County Dublin respectively.52 The final point that must be made in relation to assigning party labels to MPs is that members identified as ‘Lib-Lab’ in Craig’s British Parliamentary Election Results have been recorded under the banner of ‘Labour’ here.53 Ordinarily this would not be the case but questioning is not regulated by party whips. Ideology rather than obedience is being tested and this categorisation allows for a more complete picture of labour-leaning MPs to be presented. This approach is consistent with how Valerie Cromwell coded this group in what remains the largest ever survey of voting behaviour in the House of Commons.54 Although Lib-Lab members clearly aligned themselves ideologically with the cause of Labour, it should be remembered that some Lib-Lab members, most notably John Burns (Battersea and Clapham), were highly involved

178

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

in the high politics of the Liberal party proper. Campbell-Bannerman appointed Burns to the presidency of the Local Government Board in December 1905, ‘the first working man to achieve cabinet rank’.55 However, Lib-Lab members participated heavily in the emergence of British Labour, particularly in the early years of the twentieth century through active involvement in the Labour Representation Committee.56 Kenneth Morgan observes that most Lib-Lab members did not go as far as to take the leap from seeing Labour as a pressure group to viewing Labour as an independent party.57 Furthermore, while 40 per cent of Lib-Lab MPs joined the Labour party proper at some stage over the period, no Lib-Lab MP chose to shed his dual-citizenship and become a full Liberal member.58 Mindful of this in particular, it would seem only natural that Lib-Lab MPs, who in the first years of the century simply represented the more moderate end of the Labour Representation Committee spectrum, should continue to be grouped with Labour when analysing questions. Accounting for inflation: question levels, 1901–18 Contextualising Irish questioning with the same information from other party groupings is rendered all the more important when one realises that the total annual number of questions asked in the House could vary quite dramatically year-on-year due both to the difference in the number of days the House sat every year and also the level of activity witnessed when the House was sitting. Table 7.2 displays the overall changes in the level of questioning (oral and written questions combined) in the House of Commons between 1901 and 1918. To factor out the potentially distorting effect of the above fluctuations, the percentage share of the annual totals (oral, written, supplementary) asked by each party has been examined and will be used as a better indicator of the relative changes to the level of questioning between the parties. Furthermore, the idea of factoring in the sizes of the parties pro-rata will be explored as a way of accounting for the fact that, of the five party groupings included in this study, the number of MPs in each could vary from as low as ten for the combined Labour/Lib-Lab grouping at the 1900 general election to 384 for the Conservatives in the same period.59 Questions as a barometer of dissent Results Having explored the nature of the data, the relative levels of questioning between the parties across the three question sub-categories60 can now

179

Obstruction or interrogation?

Table 7.2  Total number of oral and written questions asked (by all parties) per annum. Data taken from Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 87. Year 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1914–16 1916 1917 1918

Oral questions 6,448 5,332 2,544 3,719 4,120 8,614 7,439 10,181 8,799 6,002 11,984 16,127 7,162 5,701 10,535 13,246 16,344 10,223

Written questions n/a 1,836 1,992 2,214 2,124 3,251 2,708 3,630 3,452 2,199 3,455 3,786 1,774 2,004 2,441 2,497 2,802 1,802

Total 6,448 7,168 4,536 5,933 6,244 11,865 10,147 13,811 12,251 8,201 15,439 19,913 8,936 7,705 12,976 15,743 19,146 12,025

be examined to see if questions can be used as indicators of support, radicalism, or dissent with the government of the day among the five party groupings of the House of Commons. Table 7.3 shows the number of each type of question asked by the five different groupings under analysis here across the entire study. 15,977 oral, 8,291 written, and 12,080 supplementary questions were asked across the 306 Question Times studied. This averages fifty-two oral, twenty-seven written, and thirty-nine supplementary questions in the ‘typical’ session. As written questions were not read in the House, this gives a figure of a little over one minute to address each question, including all supplementary interjections. Total number of questions asked by parties, 1901–18 Taking oral and written questions to constitute actual tabled interrogations  – supplementary questions are somewhat different as already outlined – Irish nationalists asked 24 per cent, nearly one in four, of all parliamentary questions in this sample. For a political group which consistently held roughly 8 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons over the entire period under examination to have been so heavily involved in parliamentary interrogation attests to the zeal with which

180

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Table 7.3  Total number of the three different question types asked by each party, 1901–18, percentages shown in brackets and italics.

Oral Written Supplementary

Conservative

Liberal

Nationalist

Labour

Irish Unionist

5,454 (34.1) 2,467 (29.8) 4,366 (36.1)

4,934 (30.9) 2,296 (27.7) 3,447 (28.5)

3,383 (21.2) 2,359 (28.5) 2,796 (23.1)

1,481 (9.3) 824 (9.9) 906 (7.5)

725 (4.5) 345 (4.2) 565 (4.7)

constitutional nationalists exercised this privilege. Especially when compared to the Labour and Irish Unionist groupings who were, admittedly, not as large, Irish Nationalists punched well above their elected weight in the chamber. However, further investigation is needed to understand what precisely this study of parliamentary questions indicates about Nationalist behaviour in the House. Whereas the focus in this study is on questions as a tactic rather than their role as part of a patron–client dyad with constituents, the high figure for Irish Nationalist written questions does corroborate McConnel’s argument that questions were central to the operation of patronage.61 However, the fact that Nationalist MPs used questions to address the concerns of constituents does not mean that these same questions could not also be used to tactical parliamentary advantage. Instead, it would seem that there was a symbiosis between representatives and their constituents whereby constituents provided their MP with fodder to expose the excesses and failings of Westminster government in Ireland and MPs in turn managed to give imperial-level attention to concerns that otherwise would have remained purely local or regional issues. While the data in Table 7.3 is important, it is merely a starting point. In an era where there were four general elections and governments included coalitions, caretakers, and resounding majorities, it is important to consider the year-on-year evolution of questioning patterns. Isolating the years of Conservative rule between 1901 and 1905, it was found that Nationalists asked 36 per cent of all scripted questions (oral and written questions combined) and 49 per cent of supplementary questions in these five years. Bearing in mind that only 8 per cent of the members of the Commons were responsible for this activity, and in light of the earlier case study from April 1901 into how these questions and interjections played out on the floor of the House, the data makes a strong case for the theory that Irish members were engaging in a concerted campaign of (neo-)obstructionism at Question Time up to 1905.

Obstruction or interrogation?

181

Further underlining how a party’s questioning patterns changed with circumstance, the Conservatives asked 45 per cent of all their 5,454 oral questions in the five years between the victory of the Liberals in January 1910 and the beginning of 1915, the year in which the wartime coalition government was formed. One interesting phenomenon to emerge out of the data is the high levels of questioning witnessed by Liberals when the party was at the height of its powers. Liberals asked more oral questions than any other group in the years 1906–8. This apparent paradox can be explained by the fact that Liberals were so numerous in the House in this period, having won just short of 60 per cent of the seats. While presumably satisfied with their own government, 397 MPs, regardless of their satisfaction with the executive of the day, were capable of making a significant impact; especially when to do otherwise would have left a vacuum ready to be filled by British Unionists and Irish Nationalist malcontents. Recovering from the Liberal landslide: Irish questioning after 1906 Analysis up to this point has been relatively crude, simply taking the raw numbers and comparing them despite the noted fluctuations in the overall level of questioning year-on-year. To delve deeper into the data, annualised levels of questions need to be broken down and qualified further by factoring in other data such as party size and the annual number of sittings. One of the primary aims of this chapter is to examine whether Irish Nationalist MPs de-radicalised in their behaviour from the peak of Nationalist activity in 1901 and, if so, in what years did this occur. The first step in moving towards a more refined model of inter-party comparison is to make some effort to factor out the distorting effect that fluctuations in the overall number of questions have when comparing the relative party shares of questions year-on-year. The simplest way of doing this is to express each party’s questions as a percentage of the annual total. Extracting Nationalist figures out of ­figures 7.1 and 7.2, it immediately becomes apparent that Irish Nationalists used oral and written questions for quite different ends. Firstly, it is important to note that, while Nationalist MPs asked a high proportion of oral questions and a relatively low level of written questions during the Conservative era, the situation reversed in the Liberal era, with the level of oral questions generally dropping between 1906 and 1915 and the level of written questioning rising sharply in 1905 and remaining at above 30 per cent of the annual total until 1912, the year in which the third Home Rule Bill entered parliament, adding further support to the present thesis that Nationalist questioning moderated over time. However, whereas oral

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

60 50 Con

40

Lib

30

Nat

20

Lab

10

IU

07 19 08 19 09 19 10 19 11 19 12 19 13 19 14 19 15 19 16 19 17 19 18

06

19

05

19

04

19

03

19

19

19

19

02

0

01

% party share of quesons per annum

182

50 40

Con

30

Lib

20

Nat

10

Lab IU

05 19 06 19 07 19 08 19 09 19 10 19 11 19 12 19 13 19 14 19 15 19 16 19 17 19 18

19

04

19

02

03

19

19

01

0

19

% party share of quesons per annum

Figure 7.1  Oral questions by party by year expressed as a percentage of annual totals in sample. Black lines at 1905–6 and 1915–16 delineate changes of government, December 1905 and May 1915. (Conservative to Liberal and Liberal to wartime coalition respectively.)

Figure 7.2  Written questions by party by year expressed as a percentage of annual totals in sample. Black lines at 1905–6 and 1915–16 delineate changes of government, December 1905 and May 1915. (Conservative to Liberal and Liberal to wartime coalition respectively.) The trends observed in oral questioning are roughly mirrored in the changing levels of supplementary questioning. A third graph has thus not been included. Oral and supplementary percentage shares for the IPP and Conservatives will be graphed presently.

and supplementary question show a gradual and largely uninterrupted decline from 1901 to 1915, fluctuations in written questions adopt one (lower) level in the radical period from 1902–4 and then a consistently higher level from 1905 onwards. The drop in written questions in 1918 is the result of John Dillon’s policy of parliamentary abstention in reaction to the passage of a bill for the conscription of Ireland on 16 April 1918.62

Obstruction or interrogation?

183

When considering the above data, one must bear in mind the changes of government that occurred during the period under consideration. The most significant of these changes occurred in December 1905 when Balfour’s Conservative government lost power and Henry Campbell-Bannerman became leader of a Liberal caretaker government. Following this, the general election in January 1906 resulted in a landslide for the Liberals with their number of seats rising from 183 at the last election (1900) to 397 in 1906, giving the party a monumental majority in the House.63 It should be noted at this point that the overall number of Nationalist seats in the House remained reasonably constant throughout the entire period in question, ranging from eighty-two in 1900 to their highest overall share of seats (eighty-four) in December 1910.64 This obviously ignores the effect of dissident nationalist movements, culminating in the efforts of the AFIL to deprive Redmond’s official IPP of seats. However, even when nationalist dissidents were at their most popular, in the January 1910 elections, the AFIL won only eight seats, and almost all of them in Munster, marking what Frank Callanan has termed the ‘high-water mark of the O’Brienites’.65 The noticeable difference in the level of questioning before and after 1905/6 indicates the way in which Nationalists changed their parliamentary behaviour to reflect the change in government. In discussing the party leadership, it has already been noted how the party underwent a crisis of tactics in 1906. This was due to the fact that the political climate in Westminster had been utterly transformed for Irish Nationalists. They went from being faced with a government that was overtly hostile to Home Rule to one that was avowedly sympathetic to the cause of Irish self-government. However, owing to the overwhelming Liberal victory in the general election of 1906, Home Rule was far from the top of the agenda of a party that had been swept to the top of the polls on the promise of free trade and a raft of new social legislation.66 This tactical crisis can also be seen through contemporary correspondence. In May 1906, T.P. Gill – formerly a Nationalist MP and then secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction67 – wrote to Redmond suggesting to him that he might consider reining in his MPs at Question Time and even setting up an internal IPP committee to monitor and regulate the content of Nationalist questions. Gill explained that his proposal stemmed from comments made to him by the Under-Secretary for Ireland, Sir Antony MacDonnell. Remarkably, here we have evidence of a senior Irish civil servant, who had to deal with the administrative consequences of Irish Nationalist questions,

184

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

voicing through an intermediary his angst at the level and content of Irish Nationalist questions very shortly after the transition of power between the Conservatives and the Liberals. Gill outlined Sir Antony’s problems to Redmond, explaining that MacDonnell had: asked me would I mention one matter to you. Questions are asked from time to time by members of the Party dealing with the Land Purchase Acts and other matters which tend rather to give an injurious impression and thus to increase difficulties in the working of the Acts. The impression is injurious not to the government but to the people amongst whom it is attempted to work the Acts – For instance there was a question with which he was dealing, asked I think by James O’Kelly for some day next week … He does not think these sort of questions just now do any good.68

Given that MacDonnell represented a strand of continuity between the Conservative era and the early phase of the Liberal government that came to power at the end of 1905, the timing of his protestation about Nationalist questioning is interesting. It is possible that MacDonnell had believed that, with the change of government, a natural abatement in the level and tone of Nationalist questioning would naturally occur. That he had not witnessed this change by the beginning of March 1906 suggests that the continuation of these inconvenient and potentially damaging questions into a period of Liberal government convinced him that he should finally make his views on irksome Nationalist questioning known to the Irish party chairman. What is important about this letter is not simply that MacDonnell wanted to make his views on questioning known to the Irish party leadership but that Gill surpassed the Under-Secretary’s wishes by offering his own suggestions for how the Irish party might moderate and regulate its questioning: What occurs to me about this and similar types of questions generally is this: that the party ought to have a policy about them and a settled procedure. At present the custom is no doubt the old one – the individual member puts down questions … on his own responsibility without consulting anyone … In the case of questions which are likely to cause difficulties of every kind, or which involve considerations of policy, I  don’t think individual members ought to ask them without consultation with you or other specially authorised party chiefs. In my opinion it would be a good plan, under present circ[umstance]s to have a small committee of the party for dealing with questions which ought to sit for a fixed time every day, and that all questions whatsoever ought to pass through the committee and none be put down to which it objected.

Obstruction or interrogation?

185

T. P. O’Connor was speaking about the practice of asking questions and supplementary questions when I was in the House the other evening. I am sure it is a matter on which the party as a whole ought to have a well considered policy and procedure. Apart from all other considerations such an arrangement would greatly conduce to general efficiency and convenience.69

This letter represents the most extensive and direct proposal for the internal reform of the conventions and practices governing questioning in the Irish party. That it was made just after the 1905–6 transition of government serves to further underline the fact that this was a period where Irish Nationalist questioning underwent its most profound tactical revision. There is no evidence, either from Redmond’s private correspondence or from the party minute books, that Redmond did anything about Gill’s suggestions in a formal way and it is almost certain that a committee such as Gill proposed was not established. This would have required official endorsement and a party resolution and would thus have featured in the party’s minutes, which it does not.70 However, despite Redmond’s lack of formal action, judging by the gradual decrease in the level of Nationalist questions after 1906, it would appear that – influenced by Gill and MacDonnell’s concerns or not – the party engaged in a level of self-regulation and a de-radicalisation of questioning as part of a more general revision of Irish party parliamentary tactics following the Liberal landslide of 1906. The minute books of the IPP around this time also reflect this sense that the January election results had caused a tactical crisis for constitutional nationalism and offer further archival substantiation to the theory emerging in the data here. In the party’s first meeting since the elections, a resolution was passed stating that ‘the Irish National Party cannot enter into alliance with or give permanent support to any English Party or Government which does not make the question of National Self-Government for Ireland a cardinal point in its programme’.71 It would appear from the above that, with no clear tactical alternative to questioning at this early stage, and unsure of what impact the election of a vast Liberal majority would have on the Irish question, Nationalists did not significantly alter their behaviour at Question Time in 1906. It has been seen already through correspondence that the leadership of the party was unsure of how best to alter tactics to reflect the equilibrium of the new parliament and they were frustrated by Liberal inaction on the Irish question. Returning to the data here, one finds that Nationalist oral questions for 1906 were down only 4.9 per cent on the figure for the previous

186

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

year. In fact, the greatest fluctuation in Nationalist oral questioning during this parliament occurred in 1907, the year in which the new Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, introduced the ill-fated Irish Council Bill. Although a convention of the UIL would reject the scheme in May of that year, the sense that the Liberal government was now working towards Home Rule may account for at least some of the massive drop of 52 per cent in the overall number of Nationalist oral questions between 1906 and 1907.72 Meanwhile, it will be shown presently that the slump in the level of supplementary questions – which can be seen as a measure of more overt dissatisfaction with government – pre-dated the drop in oral questions, occurring in 1906, where a 36 per cent fall in the number of Nationalist supplementary questions is witnessed between 1905 and 1906. Supporting the theory that the tactical realignment of the Irish party after 1906 was gradual, a letter from T.P. O’Connor to John Dillon in the autumn of 1908 shows how the Irish party had by that point arrived at a new strategic equilibrium. The prevailing sentiment among the leadership of the IPP by then was that intense questioning was an increasingly ineffective method of securing concessions and prompting the Liberal government into action. Consultation thus took preference over interrogation in the strategic thinking of the Irish party leadership. One letter highlights this new disdain which was felt among the leadership for tactics that had been championed by members such as Dillon, and adopted by the vast bulk of the party, throughout the Conservative era. In reporting the actions of the maverick Nationalist group centring on T.M. Healy and William O’Brien in the Commons on 15 October 1908, O’Connor informed Dillon that: The demonstration to-day was a complete fizzle. Fancy Healy, O Brien, and the gang took possession of our seats on the third Bench. O’Brien asked his question and then repeated it twice over as you will see, and got no satisfaction. Of course we had communicated our views to the Government. I thought it was unnecessary and, indeed, might be prejudicial to say anything [at Question Time], so I just sat tight.73

Following up on this in Hansard, it transpires that O’Brien had asked the Prime Minister ‘whether he will receive the joint deputation, representing the landowners and tenants of the South of Ireland, which was appointed at the recent meeting in Cork to lay before the Ministry their views as to the threatened deadlock in land purchase’.74 In the classic format of obstructionist questioning, O’Brien proceeded to ask two further oral questions, which in turn were followed by one supplementary

Obstruction or interrogation?

187

each from himself and Tim Healy.75 This ‘demonstration’ was punctuated not only by the Prime Minister’s apologetic yet unwavering refusals to receive the deputation referred to in O’Brien’s questions, but also by the interjection of the former Conservative Chief Secretary, Walter Long,76 who seized upon the opportunity to highlight the irony of the lethargic manner with which the Irish land question was being dealt with by the supposedly sympathetic Liberal government.77 This instance highlights how the leadership of the official Irish party appreciated that argumentative questioning of the Liberal government was not only ineffectual but also had the potential to be counter-productive, allowing Conservatives and Unionists the opportunity to expose and exploit discord between Nationalists and Liberals. The fact that O’Connor had chosen to take the diplomatic route of private consultation with the government on the issue strongly emphasises this point. The mainstream of Irish Nationalist MPs had finally and fundamentally reformed their political tactics to reflect the changed political climate in which they were forced to operate after 1906. Meanwhile the mavericks who would go on to form the AFIL continued to employ traditional oppositional parliamentary tactics. This is not to say that Irish Nationalist questioning collapsed completely in this period, but rather that the nature of this questioning changed. It has already been shown that the levels of radical forms of questioning among Irish Nationalists underwent a noticeable decline between 1906 and the 1916 Rising. Conversely, written questioning, which can be seen as a more docile form of interrogation, accounted for only 26.36 per cent of the Nationalist total between 1902 and 1905  – encompassing the period of Conservative government, but excluding the 1901 figure where all questions were oral. Meanwhile, in the period from 1906 to the end of 1909 – the years of the first Liberal parliament – this figure jumped dramatically to almost 48 per cent.78 Corroborating this interpretation of written questions as a more moderate form of behaviour, McConnel states that ‘the significance of this [the level of written questioning] is obvious: written questions were not part of Question Time, they imposed little burden on the Chief Secretaries personally and they did not entitle the MP to any awkward supplementary questions’.79 The Nationalist solution to the tactical crisis of 1906 was that consultation with the new Liberal government soon became the preferred modus operandi for the leadership of the IPP. In tracing the evolution of this phenomenon, it is important to note that the Irish party had complained about the unapproachability of James Bryce when he was Chief Secretary between December 1905 and January 1907. In contrast, when Augustine Birrell succeeded Bryce to the Chief Secretaryship, he put great

188

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

emphasis on granting Nationalist MPs access to his office, something that became a hallmark of his Chief Secretaryship.80 This can be seen to account for the most significant dip in oral questioning having occurred in 1907 and not in 1906. Birrell had already built up a rapport with Nationalists during his unsuccessful attempt to pass an Education Bill for England and Wales while he was President of the Board of Education in 1906.81 Now, as Chief Secretary, he was central to facilitating the Irish party’s tactical realignment towards consultation. While it will be shown presently that the sustained constitutional crisis from 1909 to 1911 would place stresses upon the new consultation model, in general it can be seen that – right up until the outbreak of the 1916 Rising – the official Irish party maintained its preference for consultation over obstructionist-style questioning in dealing with the government.82 The crisis of consensus: questioning and the Nationalist response to the 1909 budget The de-radicalisation of Nationalist questioning in response to the Liberal landslide of 1906 was not immune to the impacts of intervening crises. The most noticeable buck to the de-radicalising trend in Nationalist questioning between 1906 and 1915 occurred in 1909, when Nationalists initially opposed Lloyd George’s ‘people’s budget’.83 The IPP was placated in 1910 when it brokered an arrangement with Asquith on Home Rule, reflecting the new equilibrium achieved in the January elections of that year.84 In exchange for support on House of Lords reform and the controversial budget that had precipitated this constitutional crisis, the Liberals promised to introduce a new Home Rule Bill. Incidentally, the unprecedented spike in Conservative activity around this time can also be linked to those same budgetary and constitutional questions as the Conservative party began to resist the government’s programme with a zeal which had not been seen for decades. Having accounted for this spike in activity around 1909–11, the question of de-radicalisation during the period remains to be addressed. Taking oral and supplementary questions and using shares of the annual total to account for the changing level of questions year-on-year, a quite noticeable downward trend in Nationalist questioning becomes evident up to 1915. From this data, one gets a clear indication that Irish Nationalist MPs de-radicalised in their parliamentary behaviour during this period and particularly in reaction to the election of a Liberal government in 1906 that soon showed itself to be sympathetic to the principle of Irish Home Rule. Furthermore, in periods of Liberal government where it has already been established that the Irish party was dissatisfied with the policies

189

70 60

Oral

50 40 Supplementary Quesons

30 20 10

18

17

19

16

19

15

19

14

19

13

19

12

19

11

19

10

19

09

19

08

19

07

19

06

19

05

19

04

19

03

19

19

19

19

02

0

01

% party share of quesons per annum

Obstruction or interrogation?

Figure 7.3  Nationalist oral and supplementary questions expressed as percentages of annual totals in sample, 1901–18.

of the government – namely around the ‘people’s budget’ in 1909 and especially following the 1916 Rising – the proportion of both oral and supplementary questions asked by Nationalist MPs spiked. In addition, in accounting for the extremely low levels of Nationalist questioning in 1914 and 1915, it is important to consider that Home Rule had finally been placed on the Statute Book in September 1914, and that the promise of enacting Home Rule precipitated a shift towards loyalty, not only for Empire but, as these results would suggest, for the government that had finally made good on the primary legislative goal of Irish nationalism. Joseph Finnan has shown that, satiated by Home Rule’s presence on the Statue Book, nationalists translated their loyalty into military service in the First World War in this, the heyday of Redmondism.85 Likewise, as shown by figure 7.3, the level of Irish Nationalist questioning abated and the parliamentary behaviour of the party moderated, at Question Time if not elsewhere. With loyalty and obedience at an all-time high in 1915, this marks the end-point of the gradual de-radicalisation of the Irish party which stretched back to the high-point of neo-obstruction in 1901. There is one other point on this otherwise downward sliding scale which must be addressed before progressing. It is noteworthy that, in 1902–3, the level of Nationalist questioning, and particularly oral and supplementary questioning, dropped unexpectedly.86 Paul Bew’s Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland provides the most plausible explanation for this anomaly, charting as it does the rise of conciliation as the guiding principle in the Irish party in the period between the Mansion House Conference of December 1902 and the eventual ousting of William O’Brien – the principal advocate of conciliation within the Irish party – by the more radically inclined Dillon in November 1903.87 This mood of

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

70

Conservave oral

60 50 40

Conservave supplementary

30

Naonalist oral

20 Naonalist supplementary

10

04 19 05 19 06 19 07 19 08 19 09 19 10 19 11 19 12 19 13 19 14 19 15 19 16 19 17 19 18

03

19

19

19

19

01

0

02

% party share of quesons per annum

190

Figure 7.4  Comparing Conservative and Nationalist oral and supplementary questioning expressed as percentage shares of annual totals in sample. Vertical lines indicate changes in government (1906 Liberal and May 1915 wartime coalition).

compromise in the Irish party coincided with the high-point of constructive unionism, or ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’.88 The fact that the most ‘radical’ forms of Irish questioning dipped around 1903 was, interestingly, accompanied by a spike in Conservative questioning, particularly supplementary questioning, where Conservatives asked 50 per cent more supplementary questions in 1903 than they had done in 190289 only to see the figure return from its peak of sixty-eight questions in this sample to a more modest forty-one in 1904.90 However, while this does suggest some form of backbench dissent was festering in the ranks of the Conservative party during 1903, the caveat should be included that this cannot be linked directly to the unpopular policy of constructive unionism and appears to have been linked to wider backbench dissatisfaction among Conservatives with the policies of Balfour’s government. If one looks at which government departments fielded these questions from Conservative MPs, it transpires that 27 per cent of Conservative questions in 1903 were directed at either the War Office or the Admiralty, with 14, 13, and 12 per cent going to the Board of Trade, Prime Minister (First Lord of the Treasury), and the Colonial/India Offices respectively. Despite the fact that the reaction is not linked to any one singular policy or subject, it is consistently the case that indicators of Conservative ‘­radicalism’ correspond with low levels of Nationalist ‘radicalism’ and vice versa throughout the period under consideration. This is best illustrated in ­Figure 7.4. Figure 7.4, more than any other in this study, indicates that there was an inverse relationship between the level of Nationalist and Conservative ‘radical’ questioning. The trend indicated strongly suggests that there

Obstruction or interrogation?

191

is a link between the shares of questions asked by Nationalist and Conservative members. In terms of establishing the tactical and ideological position of the Irish party in relation to other groups within the House of Commons, it is clear from the above that Nationalists acted in a directly opposite manner to the Conservatives regarding their behaviour at Question Time. In this way, the different levels of activity at Question Time support the idea that the Irish party was at the polar opposite end of the spectrum to the Conservatives, who actually mirrored Irish Nationalist tactics when faced with a crisis in parliament. It is important to note that, while the data indicates a clear link between the number of Nationalist and Conservative questions asked, there is a mathematical basis for part of this. Given that the time allocated to parliamentary questions was strictly limited, if one party asked more questions, there was less time for other parties to participate. As such, questioning is a zero-sum game.91 However, the fact that there were three other participants in this equation  – Liberals, Labour, and Irish Unionist  – shows that a large proportion of Question Time was dominated by either Conservatives or Nationalists and one’s relative domination impacted upon the others regardless of what was happening among the other parties. The party size factor: Irish over-representation at Question Time Having identified that Nationalists generally de-radicalised their behaviour in the House during this period, it is important to factor in party size when discussing the relative level of questions asked by the different parties. One thing to bear in mind in this respect is that not all members acted equally at Question Time. James McConnel has previously noted how certain MPs could make a name for themselves because of their energy and perseverance in questioning. In particular, McConnel notes how Michael Flavin, MP for Kerry North, earned the nickname ‘Supplementary Flavin’ for himself through his persistent (ab)use of this privilege.92 Furthermore, Chester and Bowring mention that an unofficial publication, The Parliamentary Gazette, which appeared from 1905 to 1942, usually gave twice yearly lists of the members of the Commons who asked the highest number of parliamentary questions.93 Of particular interest here is the Gazette’s league tables of frequent questioners. To take one example, the figures for the first half of 1906 show that, while the Liberal member for Ross and Cromarty, James Galloway Weir, topped the list of persistent questioners having asked 138 questions in the session up to the Whitsuntide recess, the four

192

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

next highest questioners were all Irish, with two each coming from the IPP and Ulster Unionist group.94 The corresponding table for the first half of 1905, when the Conservative party was in government, saw five Nationalists and one Unionist among the top ten questioners.95 Firstly, this re-enforces the point that Nationalist activity at Question Time did not fall off overnight with the coming to power of a Liberal administration in December 1905. There was a residual obstreperousness among Irish Nationalist MPs into 1906. Even taking the full session of 1906, there were still five Irish Nationalists among the top ten questioners for the session.96 By 1907, substantiating the thesis that it took a year of Liberal government for Irish Nationalist questioning to moderate, only one Irish Nationalist – William Field (Dublin, St Patrick’s) – appeared among the full session’s top ten questioners.97 Another interesting trend emerging here is that Irish Unionists appear to have been highly active questioners and that this fact has been obscured heretofore by their comparatively tiny size within the Commons. Furthermore, given that four of the top five questioners for the first half of 1906 were Irish  – albeit of different political persuasions – it is possible that the phenomenon observed in Irish Nationalist questioning may in fact be partially accounted for by national rather than party affiliation. Bearing this in mind, party and ‘Irishness’ must now be factored in to examine their effects upon the levels of questioning across the period under consideration. Taking the very rough indication of party size at the most recent general election,98 Figures 7.5 and 7.6 indicate the total number of oral and supplementary questions per year in the sample divided by the number of members per party, giving the average number of questions per capita, by party, by year (sample).99 Viewed collectively, these figures confirm what has already been observed: that the nature of Nationalist questioning changed gradually in response to the Liberal electoral landslide of 1906. The levels of oral and supplementary questioning relative to the Conservative party fell dramatically after this point, reaching their lowest ebb in 1915 when the level of Irish oral and supplementary (‘radical’) questioning was actually the lowest of any party for that year. The following two years (1916 and 1917) witnessed a complete reversal, particularly in supplementary questioning, where levels of Nationalist questioning not seen since 1901 were observed. The ways in which the 1916 Rising and its aftermath impacted on Nationalist questioning will be discussed at length later. It is important to note that, when party size is accounted for, Irish Unionist levels of oral and supplementary questioning, which have barely

193

Obstruction or interrogation?

Quesons per member

6 5 Con

4

Lib

3

Nat

2

Lab

1

IU

04 19 05 19 06 19 07 19 08 19 09 19 10 19 11 19 12 19 13 19 14 19 15 19 16 19 17 19 18

03

19

19

01

19

19

02

0

5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

Con Lib Nat Lab

17 19 18

16

19

15

19

14

19

13

19

12

19

11

19

10

19

09

19

08

19

07

19

06

19

05

19

19

04

19

03

19

19

19

02

IU

01

Quesons per member

Figure 7.5  Average number of oral questions per member by party by year, 1901–18: ‘radical’ indicator.

Figure 7.6  Average number of supplementary questions per member by party by year, 1901–18: ‘radical’ indicator.

registered on previous figures and tables, are found to be the highest in the House between 1907 and 1910. As has been touched on already, the minuscule size of the Irish Unionist grouping – an average of nineteen seats (2.8 per cent of the House) over the period  – meant that little more than one question per day from any member of the party would equate to a rise of one full point on any of the above graphs (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). Mindful of the susceptibility of Irish Unionist data to easy distortion, what all these graphs quite clearly demonstrate is that Irish MPs, regardless of their political persuasion, over-represented themselves in terms of questioning for nearly every year of this survey. However, what these graphs do not adequately convey is the extent of this over-representation. Figure 7.7 details the overall average number of questions for Irish MPs (Nationalist and Unionist combined) compared with the combined figure for all British MPs in the period.100

194

Average number of quesons per member

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Oral

Wrien

Brish MPs

20.93

9.85

Supplementary 15.38

Irish MPs

39.88

26.25

32.63

Figure 7.7  Average number of questions per member asked by British and Irish MPs out of sample totals, 1901–18.

There were 567 British and 103 Irish seats in the House of Commons throughout the period under consideration. There are two MPs that do not fit into this categorisation: T.P. O’Connor, MP for Liverpool (Scotland Division) has been consistently included in the Irish Nationalist figure and J.B. Dougherty, Liberal MP for Londonderry (2 December 1914–14 December 1918) has been recorded as a Liberal, and therefore is classed under the ‘British’ total here. Dougherty appears to have only asked one (written) question that has been included in the present survey: Hansard 5 (Commons), ci, col. 2133 (2 February 1918). The results here are unexpectedly unambiguous. When group size is factored in, it becomes clear that Irish MPs, regardless of party affiliation, dominated parliamentary questioning in this period and Irish Unionists were often just as active in their questioning as their Nationalist rivals. This shows that, even factoring in the explosion in the overall number of Conservative questions that marked the years around 1912, Irish members were consistently more involved in questioning, member-for-member, across the entire period. One interesting facet of amalgamating Nationalist and Irish Unionist question levels is that it inadvertently factors out any indication of de-radicalisation, due to the fact that, when Nationalist members were docile, Irish Unionists were often increasingly active and vice versa. However, returning to Figures 7.5 and 7.6, it is particularly interesting that in 1914 and 1915 Irish Unionist levels of ‘radical’ questioning fell, mirroring the trend in Nationalist numbers, perhaps indicating that both sides were moderating their behaviour in a spirit of wartime unity. Evidence of the IPP’s new-found loyalty to the Crown in 1914 can be seen in the singing of ‘God save the King’ in the Commons on 18 September, the day the Government of Ireland Act was eventually placed on the Statute Book. Charles Hobhouse, then Postmaster General in

Obstruction or interrogation?

195

Asquith’s Cabinet, recorded that this singing was something in which the Irish members present ‘joined heartily’.101 Behind the scenes, issues such as the War Office’s persistent unwillingness to give special acknowledgement to (southern) Irish recruits and the government’s unsuccessful attempt to have Carson donate the rifles of the Ulster Volunteers to the Belgian government exposed the limits and fragility of Irish co-operation with the war effort on both sides. Outwardly, both Redmond and Carson enthusiastically supported the war despite what was going on behind the scenes. They encouraged their followers to demonstrate their loyalty through military enlistment.102 In this final enquiry into the overall levels of different types of questions, while nothing as clear as the de-radicalising trend in Nationalist questioning observed earlier can be seen, the fact that Irish parties, regardless of ideology, asked a far higher average number of questions per member than their British counterparts suggests that fuller participation in – or maybe usurpation of – Question Time is more an ‘Irish’ than a specifically Nationalist trait. However, while the data here – and the results of the league tables from Howarth’s Gazette – suggest that certain Irish Unionist members were extremely active in their questioning, the impact which the collective efforts of approximately eighty Nationalist members had on the shape of Question Time can be seen to have been far greater than the destabilising effect that less than twenty Irish Unionists could have caused. Re-radicalisation: Nationalist questions after the Rising It has already been made clear when observing other levels of Nationalist questioning, particularly the level of oral and supplementary questions, that the de-radicalising trend observed up to 1915 was sharply reversed in 1916 due to the unprecedented levels of disorder in Ireland and the metamorphosis of the Irish question that year. In the previous chapter, it was noted how the Rising re-kindled a natural affinity for a more radical brand of nationalism in John Dillon, who began to re-assert himself within the IPP after having held his tongue while Redmond had thrown his support, and that of the party, behind the government and the war effort from August 1914 onwards.103 Before examining how questioning re-radicalised after the Rising, the nature of Irish Nationalist questions in the doldrum period between September 1914 and the 1916 Rising must be considered. Even at this low ebb, questions were not entirely rejected as a potent method of provoking government action. In March 1916, H.J. Tennant, Under-Secretary to the War Office, wrote to John Redmond, aware that the Irish party chairman was intending to pose a question regarding Irish units at Gallipoli. Following the initial

196

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

landings of the Gallipoli campaign, Redmond had been infuriated by the massacre of Irishmen from the Dublin and Muster Fusiliers – men that he had personally helped to recruit. In the aftermath of the tragedy, Redmond’s aim was to ensure that the loss of these men would not go unacknowledged, and he embarked on a personal campaign to seek recognition for individual acts of gallantry committed by Irish soldiers during the landings. To view Redmond’s intentions here from the obverse, his project was to create a national foundation narrative out of military valour overseas. Just as it had proved to be for the Australians and New Zealanders, Redmond saw in the actions of Irishmen at Gallipoli material through which his increasingly imperially tinted vision of Irish nationalism could be articulated. To begin with, in January 1916, Redmond corresponded and met with several army officers but received little in the line of action from Tennant at the War Office.104 By March, Redmond had decided to go public with his questions. Apparently perturbed by this prospect, it was then that Tennant resumed his correspondence with Redmond, informing him that ‘I have been in communication with Sir Ian Hamilton [Commander of Military Forces in the Dardanelles Campaign]105 with further reference to the Irish battalions in Gallipoli about which you propose to put down a question. General Hamilton thinks that it would be well if you were to see him before you ask any questions in the House’.106 Thus, after weeks of futile endeavour by other approaches, the mere threat of an unwelcome parliamentary question secured for Redmond an interview with the officer commanding the entire Gallipoli campaign. It would appear that Redmond was assuaged by his interview and, as Denis Gwynn explains, Redmond found Hamilton ‘very willing to give assistance, even in breach of military etiquette, when all other efforts failed’.107 Whatever the level of assistance Hamilton afforded to Redmond, the important point in terms of the present study is that, as a reading of Hansard shows, Redmond never put down the question referred to in Tennant’s letter. From this, it is clear that even at this, the lowest ebb of Nationalist questioning, the mere threat of difficult questions being raised in the House retained the potential to spur government officials into action. In this way, even when they were being used with diminishing frequency by the Irish party, the memories of past barrages of questions were enough to convince the Liberal government that appeasement and consultation were preferable to provoking the open hostility of Nationalists at Question Time. However, events external to Westminster would ensure the termination of this symbiotic relationship between the Irish party leadership and the government. Just as the Rising had changed every other facet of Irish politics,

Obstruction or interrogation?

197

parliamentary behaviour also began to radicalise in response to events in Ireland. A growing section of the Irish party, including key members of the leadership, began to abandon consultation and consensus in favour of more traditional and public methods of holding the government to account. Questioning would play a central role in this reversal of tactics. The limits of consultation: reacting to the Rising In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, one obtains a rare glimpse into how the leadership of the Irish party planned and drafted their parliamentary questions and, most importantly, what they hoped to achieve with them in dramatically altered parliamentary conditions created by the Dublin insurrection. Writing from Dublin to London only eight days after the surrender of the rebels, Dillon wrote a quick note to Redmond as he prepared to depart for Westminster. In the midst of this crisis, parliamentary questions took an uncharacteristic importance in Dillon’s strategic thinking.108 Dillon first informed Redmond that the draft of a question on the executions sent to him for approval did not reflect the realities of the situation as viewed from Dublin. To this end, Dillon enclosed suggested draft questions which he thought better reflected the real and pressing concerns of the situation as he perceived it. Two of Dillon’s suggestions for questions were: ‘what is the total number of prisoners arrested and now in the hands of the authorities in connection with the Irish Insurrection? And what policy the Government proposes to adopt in regard to arrests in districts where no disturbance or breach of the peace took place.’109 Dillon continued with more detailed suggestions, including a draft question on the summary execution of Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, which Dillon had fixed upon from an early date as one of the most blatant instances of atrocity conducted by Crown Forces in connection with the Rising.110 Further emphasising that Dillon’s views on the form and content of questions differed substantially from Redmond’s at this early stage, Dillon proceeded to chastise Redmond over the drafts of questions he had received for approval. Regarding one of these, Dillon wrote: I trust you did not put the question on Disarmament [of the National Volunteers] – I cannot tell you how strongly I feel on this question. I know that in the present panic – many people would highly approve. But I am convinced that in the long run it would prove a disaster for the Party – if we were to initiate and beg for a policy of disarmament.111

It would appear from a reading of Hansard that the effect of Dillon’s letter was to delay any major questioning from Redmond until Dillon had joined him in London. Redmond only asked one question before Dillon

198

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

reached Westminster, and it appears to reflect the changes suggested by Dillon in his letter: Mr. John Redmond (by Private Notice): asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the continuance of military executions in Ireland has caused rapidly increasing bitterness of exasperation amongst large sections of the population who have not the slightest sympathy with the insurrection; and whether, following the precedent set by General Botha in South Africa, he will cause an immediate stop to be put to military executions?112

By contrast to Redmond’s restraint, on his first day back in the House, Dillon proceeded to ask a string of questions, covering everything from the executions to the continuance of martial law in Ireland.113 These questions included many of the subjects which he had mentioned or outlined in his letter to Redmond on 7 May, suggesting that Redmond had simply stood aside and deferred to Dillon’s superior comprehension of the situation at this point. The impact of the Rising on the already strained political axis between Redmond and Dillon has already been explored extensively. What is particularly significant here is that the Rising prompted a return to the preferred policy on questioning that had been advocated by the leadership of the Irish party throughout the Liberal era – namely that private consultation with the administration was favourable to sustained or disruptive questioning as a means of provoking government action. However, as explored previously in the context of leadership, here again we see a tactical  – and even an ideological  – divergence between Redmond and Dillon in the wake of the Rising, with the latter far more enthusiastic about exposing the failings of the government through the issuing of carefully planned and hard-hitting questions across the floor of the House. This was a manifestation of Dillon’s more natural tendency towards radicalism when compared with the views of his colleagues within the Irish party leadership. Unlike Redmond, Dillon’s continued to maintain close contact with a diverse cross-section of the Irish nationalist electorate and possessed a keen understanding of the public mood in Ireland, especially Dublin. This can be seen to have contributed to this rift over the future direction of party policy among its leadership. The British reaction to the events of Easter 1916, meanwhile, can be seen to account for Dillon’s growing radicalism and his renewed expressions of disdain for conciliation. One other thing that should be noted in terms of post-1916 questioning is that, even though a significant drop in Nationalist questions is observed in this study for the year 1918, the small number of cases which have been recorded nonetheless put into question F.S.L. Lyons’ assertion that the Irish party ‘resolved to abandon attendance at Westminster’ in

Obstruction or interrogation?

199

reaction to the passage of a bill for the conscription of Ireland on 16 April 1918.114 While the boycott of parliament reported by Lyons appears to have been observed for a time, in the last three sittings of 1918 analysed in this survey, Nationalists posed twenty oral, thirty-nine written, and twenty-six supplementary questions between them, confirming what Lyons omits: that the IPP abandoned its abstention policy and returned to parliament before contesting the 1918 general election.115 Indeed, by examining the speaking record of some prominent party loyalists, one finds that members such as J.P. Farrell and William Field were back asking questions on the floor of the House as early as 22 July, demonstrating that Dillon’s abstention policy was reasonably short-lived.116 In addition, written questions continued to be put by Nationalist members during the period, indicating either a level of disobedience among party members or the existence of loopholes in the terms of the abstention as stipulated by Dillon, allowing for remote participation in questioning through the mailing of questions.117 Clearly, the Irish party was actively differentiating itself from the abstentionist policy of Sinn Féin in the eyes of the electorate. As usual, questions were one of the best means of making constituents aware of the work being done on their behalf at Westminster. Conclusions In conclusion, this study has looked primarily at the evolving tactical application of parliamentary questioning by Nationalists in the House of Commons. When high levels of ‘radical’ type questioning are compared with known periods of dissatisfaction and opposition by certain parties it has been shown that they coincide closely. In this way, we can investigate other spikes in radical style questioning to see what provoked this behaviour. In the Nationalist case, it has been shown that the years of Conservative government covered by the study (1901–5) witnessed high levels of questioning. This indicates not only dissatisfaction with government but, from an investigation into the way these questions were put, parliamentary interrogation by Irish Nationalists can be seen to have constituted an active form of confrontation with the government. Although not as harmful or hostile as the obstruction of the 1880s, this questioning was nonetheless a central pillar of the ‘neo-obstructionist’ tactics designed to irritate ministers and civil servants and generally to convince parliament that the burden placed on its business by Irish issues could only be lifted by the repatriation of control over Ireland’s affairs to a Home Rule legislature.

200

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Moving into the Liberal era, charting parliamentary questions here has enabled the precise dating of the years in which the IPP de-radicalised in response to the change of government at the end of 1905. No less than in other areas of this study, it has been shown that this change of government was a turning point in the history of Nationalist involvement in Westminster. Tactically, the party had to completely re-invent itself. This was done gradually, and only when the party was assured of the commitment of the government – particularly Birrell as Chief Secretary – to take the Irish question seriously. This de-radicalisation within the Irish party ushered in by the change of government continued, albeit with some minor reversals, right up to the beginning of 1916. The falling levels of radical questioning in these years are important evidence in quantifying the extent to which the Irish party supported the Liberal government in these years. The nature of this alliance in the higher echelons of the party has already been explored in previous chapters and demonstrates that the rank and file of the party was obedient to the Irish party leadership’s desire to preserve the Liberal alliance, even in questioning: the one parliamentary activity in which individual party members had a considerable amount of autonomy from the party machine. By 1908, documentary evidence has even been found to support the idea that ‘radical’ or obstructionist-style questioning was by then frowned upon by the IPP leadership but still actively used by nationalist dissidents from the Healy and O’Brien factions. With archival sources to corroborate this, it becomes clear that the Nationalist reaction to the Liberal landslide was to shift tactics away from parliamentary interrogation towards consultation with the relevant ministers or officials as a surer means to secure concessions. Questioning was therefore reserved as a last resort, especially sensitive topics would be held out as a threat if action was not taken by government. The Irish party was placated through negotiation and the fluid alliance which had existed up to that point was formalised between the two general elections of January and December 1910. Furthermore, the staggering rise in the levels of Conservative oral and supplementary questioning around 1912 closely coincides with known periods of deep dissatisfaction among Conservatives with government policies. This supports one of the core arguments made here: that by identifying peaks in the number of ‘radical’ type questions asked by any party or grouping, the researcher has an effective barometer with which to identify periods of parliamentary dissatisfaction and dissent among that cohort. Returning to Nationalist ‘radical’ questioning, the steep rise in this form of Nationalist questioning in 1916, following the lowest ebb in the level of Nationalist questioning in 1915, supports the idea explored in

Obstruction or interrogation?

201

the previous chapter that – with John Dillon reasserting his role in policy steering at this time – the IPP underwent a stark reversal in parliamentary tactics in response to the Easter Rising. The gradual breakdown of relations with the government that followed the Rising, coupled with growing Unionist dominance of the coalition government throughout 1916 and 1917, meant that Irish Nationalist questioning returned to the old pattern of ministerial harassment and attempts at parliamentary obstruction similar to that witnessed between 1901 and 1905. If, as this chapter has argued, the changing levels of questioning can be used as an indicator of broader parliamentary activity, historical insight into the chronology of Nationalist engagement with Westminster politics has been enhanced. From a tactical perspective, the study of questions reveals that Irish Nationalists did indeed transform in response to the Liberal’s landslide victory in the 1906 general election. This chapter has shown how important parliamentary questions were as an element of Nationalist activity at Westminster, something that, excepting McConnel, has been largely overlooked in writings on the parliamentary party heretofore. Alan O’Day’s Irish Home Rule, 1867–1921 devotes little attention to parliamentary questions. Although keen to stress their importance, O’Day does not see the tactical role of questions beyond their value as a component of constituency service which allowed ‘little known MPs’ to take up ‘frequently … mundane matters’ as a way of compensating for the ‘sagging umbrella of Home Rule’ in the political vacuum of the 1890s.118 McConnel’s work, though much more comprehensive, continues on this premise.119 By contrast, tactics have been a central focus in the present chapter. Close analysis of the data highlights the fact that intensive questioning  – or even the threat of questioning  – from Nationalist representatives remained an imposing form of governmental harassment which provoked combative reforms, attempts at negotiation, and even pleas to desist from Cabinet ministers and senior civil servants during the period. Finally, as important as Question Time was to the Irish, Nationalist members were central to defining the institution of Question Time in the House of Commons in this era. Nationalists asked almost a quarter of all questions in the period under consideration and some of the most profound and lasting changes to the procedure governing questions were undertaken in direct response to the ways in which Nationalist members abused their privileges. Thus, the efficacy of Irish Nationalist questioning is evidenced by attempted governmental regulation and curtailment on the scale and nature of such questioning. Questions proved that the party remained true, albeit at a lower level of intensity, to the Parnellite

202

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

aim of disrupting business at Westminster until powers were restored to College Green in Dublin. Incidentally, the success of the most extensive revisions to questioning – those undertaken by Balfour in 1902 – is brought into question by the fact that Balfour’s own party successfully used questioning to obstructionist ends, impeding the business of the House to unprecedented levels around 1912. The escalating usurpation of Question Time by the Conservative party between 1909 and 1912 thus shows that the Nationalist de-radicalisation observed in the ten years up to 1915 was brought about from within and was not simply a reflection of the efficacy of the various reforms aimed at curtailing radical behaviour in the House. When the newly elected House of Commons assembled in 1919, the political vacuum left by the IPP must have been profound. While British politics was hardly lacking in new crises with which to occupy itself in the 1920s, one must wonder what the House of Commons looked, sounded, and felt like for British MPs once the seemingly unending drama that accompanied Irish Nationalist representation in the House was removed after four decades of habitually intense and vocal activity going back to the late 1870s. Nowhere was the vacuum left by the Irish party’s absence from Westminster more keenly felt than at Question Time. The re-radicalisation of Nationalist behaviour after the 1916 Rising served as a final and stark reminder to both parliament and the British people that the Irish party retained the potential to obstruct vocally and publicly hold to account the government when the circumstances warranted it. As the experience of Conservative questioning around 1912 has shown, the behaviour pioneered by Irish members was eventually mimicked by other parties. Governments, regardless of their composition or majority, would intermittently experience obstruction and harassment at Question Time in the decades that followed. However, even bearing in mind that de-radicalisation was the most significant trend in Nationalist questioning identified here, when the Irish party’s behaviour was at its most disruptive – as it was in 1901 – Nationalists proved the extent of their own ingenuity and adaptability as an independent parliamentary force. They exposed the fact that members intent on doing so could always find ways to circumvent the procedural safeguards of parliament and thereby usurp the order of business.120 In this way, Irish Nationalism left its indelible mark on the institution of Question Time in the House of Commons. Notes 1 Hansard 5 (Commons), xxxvi, col. 1404 (11 April 1912). 2 Maureen Wall, ‘Partition: the Ulster question (1916–1926)’ in T.D. Williams (ed.), The Irish Struggle, 1916–1926 (London, 1966), p. 87.

Obstruction or interrogation?

203

3 Wall, ‘Partition’, p. 87. 4 Garret FitzGerald, ‘Private business – situation in six counties: motion’, Dáil Éireann deb., ccxli, no. 9, col. 1496. On the ‘false chronology’ of partition having been ‘woven into “history” ’ in the early years of independence, see Michael Hayes, ‘Dáil Éireann and the Irish Civil War’, Studies:  An Irish Quarterly Review, lviii, no. 229 (spring, 1969), p. 15. 5 Wall, ‘Partition’, p. 87. 6 In 1904, John and William Redmond were recorded as the most talkative Irish Nationalists, making 109 and 75 columns worth of debate contributions respectively. These ranked thirteenth and twenty-third among the entire House of Commons in that year’s league table. By contrast, Edward Carson, the leading Irish Unionist, spoke ninety columns, putting him two places below John Redmond at number fifteen in the table. James Howarth (ed.), The Premier Parliamentary Record and Review (London, 1905), p. 18. 7 One snapshot of national voting patterns is provided in the second issue of the Premier Parliamentary Gazette (1905). The average number of votes registered by Scotch, English, Welsh, and Irish members for the full session of 1904 were 175, 167, 153, and 149 respectively. A much more detailed analysis of participation, both by party and by nationality, will be provided in Chapter 8. James Howarth (ed.), The Premier Parliamentary Record and Review, no. 2 (Provincial edn, London, March 1905), pp. 6–7. 8 James Howarth (ed.), The Premier Parliamentary Record and Review, no. 3 (Subscriber’s edn, London, March 1905), p. 28. 9 The next highest questioner was James Hogge (Liberal, Edinburgh East) with 282 (oral) questions. James Howarth (ed.), Parliamentary Gazette, no. 36 (London, July 1916), p. 86. 10 Patrick Howarth, Questions in the House: The History of a Unique British Institution (London, 1956), p. 7. 11 Michael Wheatley explains that these strands are now used by historians to describe Redmondism. Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 10. 12 Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 266 and 79 respectively. 13 D.N. Chester and N.  Bowring, Questions in Parliament (Oxford, 1962), pp. 61–84. 14 Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 50–1. 15 ‘A. J. B.’ [Arthur Balfour], ‘Memorandum on hours of business in the House of Commons’, cabinet paper no.  839 [dated 15 August 1901, printed 16 August 1901], quoted in Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 51. 16 Henry Lucy, The Balfourian Parliament (London, 1906), p.  156 (2 May 1902), quoted in Ruddock F.  Mackay, Balfour:  Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 1985), p. 112. 17 The scope of Balfour’s reforms is outlined in detail in Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 61–6 and 73–80. 18 See Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 84–6. 19 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 86. 20 Howarth, Questions in the House, pp. 168–200. On the intensification of Irish obstruction during the 1870s, see pp. 181–4.

204

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

21 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p.  91 (reference to Irish Nationalists as ‘ardent questioners’, p. 197). 22 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 29–46. 23 Although the IPP officially reunited in February of 1900, the year 1900 has not been analysed for two main reasons. Firstly, the new parliament elected in September of that year only sat for one month in December. The parliament sitting up until August 1900 had been elected in 1895 and Nationalists therein reflected the divisions of the split. Secondly, as Chester and Bowring begin their analysis in 1901 and not 1900, the starting point here corresponds with that in the core work in the historiography of parliamentary questions. 24 As this study has argued, ‘Redmond era’ is far too simplistic a label to describe the outlook and ideology of the IPP at this time. Similarly, ‘unified’ is a relative term in these years, and the level of dissent and minor schism has already been detailed elsewhere in the present work. 25 ‘Randomness’ was achieved by using a random date generator provided by random.org. Website designed by Mads Haahr of the School of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin. See www.random.org/history/ (21 June 2011) and www.scss.tcd.ie/Mads.Haahr/ (21 June 2011). 292 was the minimum number of cases needed to provide statistically significant results. This was then rounded up to 306 to give an equal whole number of Question Times per annum. Calculations were made in G*Power, an online statistical calculator available from www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html (31 July 2015). F. Faul, E. Erdfelder, A. Buchner, and A.G. Lang, ‘Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses’, Behavior Research Methods, xli (2009), pp. 1149–60. 26 In total, 95 per cent of printed volumes from the fourth and fifth series of Hansard have been uploaded to the website and with 97 and 93 per cent success rates respectively. The date ranges of the fourth and fifth series are 9 March 1892–21 December 1908 [199 volumes] and 16 February 1909–13 March 1981 [1000 volumes] respectively. Vol. 199, the last volume in the fourth series, has not been successfully uploaded to the Hansard Digitisation Project. Hansard is currently in its sixth series. For full details see http:// hansard.millbanksystems.com/volumes (18 June 2011). 27 On the procedures governing questions (oral, written, and supplementary), a succinct summary can be found in L.A. Abraham and S.C. Hawtrey, A Parliamentary Dictionary (2nd edn, London, 1964), pp. 169–70. 28 In some other studies, the ‘Conservative and Liberal Unionist’ bracket is amalgamated with ‘Irish Unionist’ under the banner of ‘Unionist’ resulting in a four-way split. For an example, see McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 194. 29 On this, see McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 33. 30 Chester and Bowring provide a very useful table of the numbers of questions and Question Times, compiled from House of Commons records from 1901 to 1960. Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 87–8. 31 See McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 187[n]‌.

Obstruction or interrogation?

205

32 Patrick Maume, ‘MacNeill, John Gordon Swift’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, vi, p. 160. 33 Hansard 4, xcii, cols 890–1 (22 April 1901). 34 For an insight, albeit in a later period, into the chaos of Question Time from the perspective of the clerks of Hansard, see William Law, Our Hansard; or, The True Mirror of Parliament: A Full Account of the Official Reporting of the Debates in the House of Commons (London, 1950), pp. 27–9. 35 Hansard 4, xcii, col. 891 (22 April 1901). 36 See O’Brien, Parnell, pp. 58–9 in particular. O’Day, English Face also engages considerably with this subject. 37 George Wyndham to Arthur Balfour, 26 November 1900 (BL, AJBP, Add. MS 49803, cxxi, fol. 142r). 38 Howarth, Questions in the House, pp.  168–200, Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 91, 197. 39 It should be noted that Patrick Maume has suggested that the split of the 1890s resulted in the ‘collapse of Irish obstruction as members of the Irish Party fought among themselves in Ireland’. Thus, the 1901 figure seen here could just as easily constitute a revival of Nationalist levels of activity not seen in a decade. See Maume, Long Gestation, p. 12. 40 Further inducements for members to ask written rather than oral questions were introduced in 1947 and 1960. Chester and Bowring, Questions, pp. 111–12. 41 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 113. 42 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 113. 43 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 113. 44 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 44. 45 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 5. 46 ‘Conservative and Liberal Unionist’ was the official title of this grouping until a formal merger in 1912. ‘Liberal Unionists’ had split from Gladstone’s Liberal party in the 1886 over the Home Rule question. ‘Liberal Unionist’ members became increasingly indistinguishable from their Conservative Party colleagues in all but their lineage in this period. See F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1885–1918 (Dartmouth, 1989), pp. xiv–xv. See also Jonathan Parry, ‘Cavendish, Spencer Compton, marquess of Hartington and eighth duke of Devonshire (1833–1908)’ in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography(www.oxforddnb. com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/article/32331?docPos=2) (4 July 2011)  and D.J. Dutton, ‘Chamberlain, Sir (Joseph) Austen  (1863–1937)’  in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb. com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/article/32351?docPos=1) (4 July 2011). 47 Only one MP could not be classified under this system and has therefore been excluded from the study. Noel Pemberton Billing, who sat for Hertford, Herefordshire between 1916 and 1921 was, genuinely, an independent member. A  former Royal Flying Corps squadron commander, Billing ran on a campaign centred on the issue of reforming the conduct of the war in the air and, after 1918, he ran candidates in opposition to all the main

206

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

parties in by-elections under the banner of an organisation calling itself ‘the Vigilantes’. See G.R. Searle, ‘Billing, Noel Pemberton (1881–1948)’ in Matthew and Harrison  (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb.com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/article/37192) (28 June 2011). 48 Craig, British Election Results 1885–1918 and Walker, Parliamentary Election Results. 49 Although a noted maverick and a sometime critic of Redmond, Lynch was a member of the official IPP: Owen McGee, ‘Lynch, Arthur Alfred’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, v, pp. 616–17. 50 O’Connor to Dillon, 3 July 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/261). 51 McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 194. 52 Cooper only sat for Dublin South between January and December 1910. He went on to serve as a TD for the same constituency in the 1920s, initially as an independent and then as a Cumann na nGaedheal deputy. Cooper had served with the Tenth (Irish) Division in the First World War. See Bryan Ricco Cooper, The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli (London, 1918) and Matthew Kelly, ‘Cooper, Bryan Ricco (1884–1930)’ in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb.com.eproxy. ucd.ie/view/article/65843) (28 June 2011). 53 A concise explanation of this distinction can be found in Craig, British Election Results 1885–1918, pp. xiv–xv. 54 Valerie Cromwell, ‘Guide to the dataset associated with the ESRC funded research project E00230051 “Computer analysis by multidimensional scaling of the House of Commons divisions lists”…’, p. 9: Cromwell, House of Commons Voting. 55 Kenneth D.  Brown, ‘Burns, John Elliott  (1858–1943)’ in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb. com/view/article/32194) (18 April 2012). 56 On this see Kenneth O. Morgan, Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist (London, 1975), p. 109. 57 Morgan, Hardie, p. 127. 58 Thirteen of the thirty-two MPs designated as ‘L(Lab)’ by Craig over the period also sat as official members of the Labour Party at one point or another in the same period. 59 The total number of seats in the House of Commons in this period was 670. 60 Oral, written, and supplementary. 61 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 34. 62 Lyons, Dillon, p.  433. Discussed in greater detail subsequently in this volume. 63 Factoring in Lib-Lab members who would have technically been classed as members supporting the new government. Election figures taken from Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1832–1987, pp. 17–21. 64 Figures include T.P. O’Connor (Liverpool, Scotland) and are taken from summaries provided in Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher (eds), British Electoral Facts, 1832–2006 (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 15–19.

Obstruction or interrogation?

207

65 This includes the seven O’Brienites and T.M. Healy’s seat in North Louth. Healy’s brother, Maurice, lost his seat in the January elections but was subsequently returned in Cork North-East as O’Brien’s nominee. O’Brien, having won in two constituencies, elected to sit for Cork City. Callanan, Healy, p. 463. 66 On the centrality of the trade issue to the 1906 general election, see George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (rev. edn, London, 1966), p. 22. On the fate of the Liberals’ education and social reforms, see pp. 25–7. 67 See C.J. Woods, ‘Gill, Thomas Patrick’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, iv, pp. 88–9. 68 T.P. Gill to Redmond, 9 March 1906 (NLI, RP, MS 15,190/2). 69 T.P. Gill to Redmond, 9 March 1906 (NLI, RP, MS 15,190/2). 70 There was no meeting of the IPP between 19 February and 4 April, in meetings during April and May there is no record of the subject of questions or new internal regulations for them having been discussed. IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 71 Minutes of IPP meeting of 10 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 72 Another factor which must be considered is the so-called ‘ranch war’ which began in 1906. See Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 120. 73 T.P. O’Connor to John Dillon, 15 October 1908 (TCD, DP, MS 6740/155). 74 Hansard 4, cxciv, col. 491 (15 October 1908). 75 Hansard 4, cxciv, col. 492–3 (15 October 1908). 76 Then Unionist MP for South County Dublin, and previously Conservative member for Bristol South (1900–6), Long had very briefly served as Chief Secretary for Ireland between the resignation of George Wyndham in March 1905 and the fall of Balfour’s government in December of that same year. Long came to be seen as the chief expert on Ireland within Conservative and Unionist circles for the rest of his career in politics. See Alvin Jackson, ‘Long, Walter Hume, first Viscount Long (1854–1924)’  in Matthew and Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb. com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/article/34591?docPos=2) (2 July 2011). 77 Hansard 4, cxciv, col. 493 (15 October 1908). 78 47.77 per cent. 79 McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 194. 80 Eunan O’Halpin, ‘Birrell, Augustine’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, i, p. 556. See also Ó Broin, Chief Secretary, pp. 5–6. 81 Ó Broin, Chief Secretary, p. 6. 82 This is not to say that the Irish Nationalist questioning collapsed completely in this period, but rather that the nature of questioning changed. The most ‘radical’ types of questioning (oral and supplementary) saw a marked decline in this period. Conversely, the level of written questioning among Nationalists between 1901 and 1905 (Conservative era) was 18.53 per cent of the total for that period whereas the figure jumps to 47.77 per cent

208

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

for the period from 1906 to the end of 1909: the years of the first Liberal parliament. 83 For a highly comprehensive contemporary summation of Nationalist grievances see Hansard 5 (Commons), iv, cols 783–95 (3 May 1909). Alvin Jackson stresses the influence of interests such as the drinks lobby on the Irish party in opposing the budget. Alvin Jackson, Home Rule:  An Irish History, 1800–2000 (London, 2003), p. 107. 84 On the shaky nature of the arrangement arrived at between the Liberal and Nationalist parties at this time, see Jackson, Home Rule, p. 107. 85 See Joseph Finnan’s chapter entitled ‘Let Irishmen come together in the trenches: the Irish party and the Great War, 1914–1918’: Finnan, Redmond, pp. 78–116. 86 See Figure 7.3. 87 On conciliation, see Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, ­chapter 4 (pp. 96–121). On Dillon’s natural aversion to conciliation, see report of his sentiments towards Wyndham’s 1903 Land Act: Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 102. 88 On the long history of constructive unionism, see Andrew Gailey, Ireland and the Death of Kindness:  The Experience of Constructive Unionism, 1890–1905 (Cork, 1987). 89 The gross numbers of Conservative supplementary questions for 1902 and 1903 are thirty-four and sixty-eight respectively. 90 In percentage terms, Conservative supplementary questions accounted for 13, 30, and 14 per cent of the annual supplementary totals for the entire House of Commons for the years 1902, 1903, and 1904 respectively. 91 On this concept  – taken from a mathematical and game-theory perspective – see John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton, 1953), pp. 84–5. 92 McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 191. 93 Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 196. 94 Laurence Ginnell (Irish party, Westmeath North) asked 131 questions; J.B. Lonsdale (Unionist, Armagh Mid) 127; T.H. Sloan (independent Unionist, Belfast South) 107; and William Field (Irish party, Dublin, St Patrick’s) 102 questions. Irish Times, 12 June 1906. 95 Of the others, three were Liberals. One Conservative, T.  Gibson Bowles, took his place as the seventh highest questioner in the period with ninety-five questions asked. The Premier Parliamentary Gazette and Review, no.  3 (Subscribers edn, London, June 1905), p. 28. 96 Parliamentary Gazette, Session 1907, no. 8 (London, February 1907), p. 88. 97 Field took the number three slot with 231 questions, one hundred questions short of the top questioner, J.B. Lonsdale (Unionist, Armagh Mid). Parliamentary Gazette, Session 1907, no. 11 (London, September 1907), p. 93. 98 The relevant general elections are 1900, 1906, and December 1910. As Chester and Bowring explain, a more sophisticated level can be calculated

Obstruction or interrogation?

209

by accounting for the small number of members – Speaker, Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, and members of the executive – who are not entitled to ask questions. Chester and Bowring, Questions, p. 193. 99 Party sizes are calculated to reflect the party groupings used in survey – accounting for the accommodation of ‘Lib-Lab’ members under the ‘Labour’ bracket among other things. Factoring in these assumptions, the sizes of the parties following the general elections of 1900, 1906, January 1910, and December 1910 respectively are as follows: Conservative: 384, 139, 253, and 255. Liberal: 177, 372, 267, 261. Nationalist: 82, 83, 82, 84. Labour: 10, 57, 48, 51. Irish Unionist: 17, 19, 20, 19. Party affiliations were determined using the assignations given in Craig, British Election Results 1885–1918 and Walker, Parliamentary Election Results and include affiliated independents. 100 As there was no redistribution of seats act passed in the period under consideration, the number of seats remained constant at 567 for Britain and 103 for Ireland. The figures reported here assume full occupancy. However, Valerie Cromwell’s data-sets  – discussed at length in the next chapter  – indicate the average seat-fill between 1901 and 1916 (at five yearly intervals) was 667, three short of full occupancy. Data derived from Cromwell, House of Commons Voting. 101 Diary entry for 18 September 1914, Hobhouse, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet, p. 192. 102 On the ‘storm in a slop basin’ precipitated by Kitchener’s refusal to accede to Redmond’s request for a special badge for the new Irish Division, see H.H. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 29 December 1914 [239], in Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.  343. On Carson’s refusal to donate arms to the Belgians, see diary entry for 21 August 1914, Hobhouse, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet, p. 183. 103 On Redmond’s gradual alignment with the war effort and his pledging in the House of Commons of his Volunteers, see Conor Mulvagh, ‘The road to Woodenbridge: tension and disunity in the Irish Volunteers’ (BA thesis, University College Dublin, 2007), pp. 45–53. 104 Denis Gwynn devotes some time to explaining this episode: Gwynn, Life of Redmond, pp. 444–6. 105 See George H. Cassar, ‘Hamilton, Sir Ian Standish Monteith (1853–1947)’ in Matthew and Harrison  (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb.com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/article/33668?docPos=1) (25 August 2011). 106 H.J. Tennant to Redmond, 14 March 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,229/1). 107 Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 446. 108 Dillon to Redmond, 7 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 109 MS notes accompanying Dillon to Redmond, 7 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22).

210

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

110 The question drafted by Dillon on this subject was put in the simplest of terms: ‘under what circumstances was Mr Sheehy Skeffington shot at the Portobello Barracks?’: MS notes accompanying Dillon to Redmond, 7 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 111 Dillon to Redmond, 7 May 1916 (NLI, RP, MS 15,182/22). 112 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 283 (8 May 1916). 113 See in particular a string of six questions asked without interruption: Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 632 (10 May 1916). 114 Lyons, Dillon, p. 433. 115 The dates in question are 7 August, 21 October, and 18 November 1918. 116 Hansard 5 (Commons), cviii, col. 1438 (22 July 1918)  and Hansard 5 (Commons), cviii, cols 1811–12 (24 July 1918). 117 For an example of one of these written questions, see Hansard 5 (Commons), cvi, col. 1003 (30 May 1918). The possibility that these written questions answered during the Nationalist abstention simply constitute a small backlog left over from questions submitted in April must also be considered. 118 O’Day, Irish Home Rule, pp. 184–5. 119 It should be noted that McConnel does give some time to discussing questions as a form of obstruction. McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 31. 120 For just one of the more modern innovations intended to make the government’s task more difficult, see the development of ‘transfer-proof’ questions as a circuitous method allowing members to interrogate the Prime Minister on ‘any issue under the sun’:  Paul Silk (with Rhodri Walters), How Parliament Works (London, 1987), p. 193.

8 Unity in division: voting and whipping in the Irish party

We had the courage of our convictions, and went into the Division Lobby – and that is the test. – John Redmond, 10 May 19061

Introduction: House of Commons division voting in the 1880s, the normative position Of all the activities carried out by MPs, voting is the most inclusive. In his study of the IPP, F.S.L. Lyons outlined a typology of different kinds of MPs. Among these he included the ‘star players’ of the party, who led debates and were lauded for their oratory. These, however, only constituted a small fraction of a much bigger party. For Lyons, the majority of the Irish party was comprised of ‘silent members’, doing exactly as their party pledge required of them: sitting, acting and – most importantly  – voting as instructed by the whips of their party.2 Since it was written in the early 1950s, Lyons’ description of a two-tiered party has been highly influential. More recently, James McConnel has undertaken a comprehensive reconstruction of the IPP from the backbenchers’ perspective.3 This examined how the foot soldiers of the party conducted their work both in the constituencies and at Westminster.4 For the purposes of the present work, a downside of McConnel’s otherwise comprehensive examination of Irish party backbench activity is that it does not give any detailed consideration to division voting.5 This chapter maintains that, by examining a large section of these roll-call votes, the collective identity  – as opposed to a front- or back-bench perspective – of the Irish party at Westminster can be better understood. Furthermore, by using the actual voting data, empirical evidence can be produced to support and quantify conclusions made in both memoirs and histories of the period. Following on from Lyons’ typology of membership, it is argued that voting behaviour can go some way to advancing an understanding of

212

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the collective ideology  – as opposed to the identity and demographic make-up  – of the entire body of Irish Nationalist MPs. In the earlier examination of leadership, the focus was manifestly and unapologetically top-down: examining how a tetrarchy of just four MPs contributed to steering party policy between 1900 and 1918. The present chapter acts to balance out the picture of the party presented, looking at how Nationalist members collectively articulated their policies in the division lobbies. In this way, building on the work of James McConnel, it is hoped that this study can contribute to further giving voice to the ‘silent’ majority of the Irish party. Context: the long history of House of Commons voting behaviour In the 1880s, the party of Parnell had frequently demonstrated its independence from both the Conservative and the Liberal parties. Historians view the parliament returned in 1885 as the first in which the Irish party, by holding the balance of power, presented itself as a ‘permanent Third Party, allied to neither of the others and strong enough to prevent either from having a working majority’.6 Although a fully-functioning Parnellite–Conservative coalition was both conceptually unthinkable and practically unworkable, the Irish party could and did side with the Tories on occasions either for ideological reasons or to remind parliament of its independence and potential for volatility.7 Like other parliamentary behaviour, divisions taken in the course of business were an opportunity for Irish Nationalists to display their obstreperousness and their autonomy. The paradigm shift that occurred in British politics during the 1880s – with the substantial extension of franchise in 1884, the Home Rule crisis and the reactive curtailment of parliamentary liberties in response to obstructionism  – means that the political world of the early 1880s is not fully comparable with that of the early twentieth century. Despite the increasing power of party whips and the growth of machine politics, there is much to be learnt from Victorian-era division voting which can serve to contextualise and enhance understandings of voting in the period under consideration here. The data upon which this chapter is based is derived from a study undertaken by Valerie Cromwell of the University of Sussex, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and deposited in the UK Data Archive (University of Essex) in August 1991. This represents the culmination of work undertaken by Cromwell going back to the early 1980s when she examined divisions in 1861 as discussed above.8 The files deposited consist of the voting record and other biographical data for each individual MP that sat in the House of Commons between 1861 and 1926 at five-yearly intervals.9 Cromwell’s is a highly comprehensive

Unity in division

213

survey and the voting behaviour of every single MP in every single division in each of the selected years has been recorded. Given that the study works at five-yearly intervals, the files relevant to the present study are those for 1901, 1906, 1911, and 1916. The techniques employed here are basic in comparison with the more complex methodologies applied in previous studies but it is hoped that the results produced will be more accessible and more easily intelligible. By combining accessibility with as broad a scope as possible, it is hoped that a readily comprehensible picture of how MPs voted in the years under consideration can be painted. From this, the relative position of Irish Nationalists as a body of MPs within the Commons can be estimated and explained, showing where the default position for Nationalist MPs was situated and also highlighting those issues which witnessed deviations and unusual behaviour by Nationalist members. In 2011, Mel Cousins published an article exploring the voting patterns of Home Rule MPs in votes on social issues between 1881 and 1890.10 Significantly, this remains the only in-depth examination of Irish Nationalist division voting in any period. As such, the present study has little on which to build. Excepting a brief analysis of attendance at division votes between 1910 and 1914 by James McConnel,11 Nationalist behaviour in the division lobbies in the twentieth century remains virtually uncharted territory for historians. Based on a comparison of the literature referenced here and the findings of the present study, it seems that one of the main differences between nineteenth- and early twentieth-century voting behaviour in the House of Commons was that the growing formalisation of political party structures resulted in ever increasing cohesion among members of the same parties in the division lobbies. As Cromwell herself notes, in 1882, Gilbert and Sullivan satirised the stifling effect of party discipline upon voting behaviour in their comic opera Iolanthe where Private Willis observes how When in that House MPs divide, If they’ve a brain and cerebellum, too, They’ve got to leave that brain outside, And vote just as their leaders tell ‘em to.12

Adding statistical credence to Private Willis’ claims, Mel Cousins’ study of division voting in the 1880s reports average cohesion scores13 for the Conservative, Liberal and Irish parliamentary parties of 69, 83, and 79 respectively (on a scale from 0–100) on a sample of nine divisions on social issues.14 Factoring in all votes in the present study (1901–16 at five-yearly intervals), the average cohesion scores for the same parties

214

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

across the 1,500 divisions under consideration are 90, 85, and 97 respectively.15 What this clearly shows is that the power of machine politics had increased, dramatically so in British parties where it had not traditionally been as high, between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This same phenomenon was noticed and examined by the Russian Liberal and political scientist Moisei Ostrogorski who published his treatise in 1902.16 This tendency within parties of the House of Commons emphasises and quantifies the extent to which party machines had reined in the voting practices of their members in the period between the 1880s and the 1900s. The days of loose affiliation and individual autonomy gave way to more centralised, efficient, and top-down authority within the parliamentary parties of the House of Commons between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Figures for Liberal party cohesion in division votes in 1886 reported by the political scientist W.C. Lubenow further substantiate the idea that there was still some way to go in terms of party obedience in the Victorian era. Lubenow found extremely low cohesion among Liberals on foreign policy issues with average cohesion scores of just 32 and 58 for Gladstonian Liberals and Liberal Unionists respectively across eight foreign policy votes during 1886.17 A key question for the present chapter to address is to what extent the power of central control and the machine within parliamentary parties increased throughout the period 1900–18. Did all parties enjoy a greater degree of discipline and voting cohesion by the early twentieth century? Was this an ongoing metamorphosis or had systems stabilised by the turn of the century? In addition, issues upon which parties experienced schisms will also be highlighted, showing how certain issues were either highly emotive or not worth the imposition of strict party discipline even into the second decade of the twentieth century. Finally, it is important to consider the similarity between Irish Nationalist voting behaviour and that of the other parties of the day. A method for estimating the proximity or ‘likeness’ between two parliamentary groupings will be outlined presently. When this index of likeness is applied to different categories of votes, Irish Nationalists were found to be closer to their traditional allies, the Liberal party, on certain issues. However, the distance that separated them from British Conservatives was sometimes eroded when certain specific issues went to be settled in the division lobbies. Exploration of data and sources One factor worth bearing in mind, particularly in relation to the cohesion of party voting is that, in the case of all parties, this study has

Unity in division

215

used the party labels ascribed by Cromwell in her data files. A reading of Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, particularly in the years prior to 1911, underlines that party identification was less strictly defined than it would later become.18 Not all parties were pledge-bound with the same degree of stringency as the Irish party. However, in every party studied here, there were internal fractures, and accommodations were made for differing viewpoints under each of the five collective party umbrellas of Conservative, Liberal, Nationalist, Labour, and Irish Unionist that have been used in this study.19 Just as there were ‘independent’ Conservative and Liberal MPs, there were also splinters within the Irish nationalist movement, most notably the AFIL, a dissident breakaway group formed in March 1909 in an attempt to disrupt the hegemony of Redmond’s party machine.20 For the sake of equal treatment, no further subdivision of factions has been undertaken beyond Cromwell’s five-way categorisation. The one subdivision that has been made here that does not appear in comparable studies is a distinction between ‘Conservative and Liberal Unionist’ politicians in Great Britain and Unionists representing Irish – predominantly Ulster – constituencies.21 Here, Irish and British Unionists have been segregated for analysis. As certain figures and tables below will outline, the voting patterns of British and Irish Unionists seldom deviated greatly from one another. However, in order to examine the differences in voting behaviour between the opposing sections of the Irish members, Irish Unionists have been treated separately from the British Conservative figures in the present study. On the subject of sources, until relatively recently, division voting presented a considerable problem to historians. While the actions of every MP are documented in the voting records preserved in Hansard, the sheer amount of data meant that it was extremely difficult to undertake studies tackling large datasets. Nowadays, House of Commons voting records are available in two important digital formats, firstly through Cromwell’s 1991 database and subsequently through the digitisation of Hansard parliamentary debates to a fully searchable online resource, a project that began in 2005 and which is ongoing.22 As part of the Hansard digitisation project – which provides a near-complete online and open access set of House of Commons and House of Lords debates from 1803 to 2005 – a complete set of downloadable comma-separated-value (.csv) files detailing the names of members dividing in all divisions covered by the Hansard digitisation project is also available. For the purposes of data analysis here, Cromwell’s study has been employed as it is much more readily usable for work of this nature given that it contains files detailing the party affiliation of each member.

216

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

However, the Hansard digitisation project has proved invaluable by allowing for divisions to be contextualised through examination of the debates that preceded them. When looking at specific issues, it has been found that contextualisation of voting through debate analysis is an imperative element of any detailed analysis. Without examining the preceding debates it is often impossible to establish why members or whole parties voted the way they did. In an area such as division voting, there is little or no archival trace left to explain the motivations behind the voting behaviour of the vast bulk of MPs sitting during this period. In all but the most important votes, the only written testament as to why members voted one way or another can be found in the preceding debates. Given that 1,500 divisions occurred across the four years under consideration here, it is clear that the majority of these votes were not viewed as significant by the members themselves but simply as part of the daily reality of parliamentary life. Two other important types of sources are available in helping to explain Irish Nationalist voting behaviour. The first exists within the well catalogued papers of the Irish party leadership. Only a rare few sets of papers for members outside the very highest echelons of the Irish Nationalist movement survive and these have been excellently analysed by James McConnel in his study of the IPP from the perspective of the backbenches.23 Monographs and memoirs of specific individual MPs are useful but they can only provide information on an increasing number of individual perspectives rather than contributing to the understanding of the party as a unit.24 While the papers of backbenchers have been used effectively by McConnel to build on the work of Conor Cruise O’Brien and F.S.L. Lyons in examining the composition and activities of the Irish party at Westminster, the focus here is on quantification and bringing a degree of empiricism to the present understanding of voting behaviour rather than its illumination through individual case studies. An emphasis has thus been placed on a statistical rather than archive-based methodology here. Apart from House of Commons debates, one other important primary source exists which allows for further investigation of Irish party policy, namely the minute books of the IPP.25 Although comparatively little in the minutes relates directly to division voting, these books nonetheless facilitate an examination of how intention was translated into action between party meetings and the division lobbies. Only on rare occasions did the party minutes record how members were expected to vote on the issues before the House. In general, the most overt references within the party minutes to division voting took the form of housekeeping notices to MPs informing them that increased attendance was required and that

217

Unity in division

they were not to leave the House before important late-night divisions.26 Having thus examined both the data and the primary sources available to the present study, it stands to discuss the methodology that will be used for assessing the data at hand. A number of established statistical methods for analysing voting behaviour along with their specific merits and demerits will now be discussed. Selecting appropriate tests Mel Cousins’ study of Nationalist voting behaviour in the 1880s has inspired much of the methodological framework of the present chapter although both the chronologies and the research questions involved differ significantly. Cousins focuses on three specific tests to explore the voting data: cohesion, likeness, and participation (referred to as ‘turnout’ in Cousins’ study).27 Cousins settled on the Rice cohesion index when undertaking his analysis of voting in the 1880s. Developed by Stuart A. Rice in the 1920s, these tests combine simplicity with robustness, they are still used to this day. Despite some shortcomings addressed below, they remain the best fit for a robust test of parliamentary roll-call voting. The additional advantage of using the same three tests as Cousins is that the findings here are directly relatable to those Cousins presents for the 1880s. Of the three tests, potentially the most problematic is the test for cohesion. Rice’s formula for calculating the cohesion of any group in division voting is as follows:28  Yi − Ni   Y + N  × 100 i i

Essentially, there is no perfect measure for cohesion and all alternatives to the Rice method have their individual shortcomings. An investigation into the application of a much more sophisticated ‘Agreement Index’ was undertaken for the present study but the fact that House of Commons voting has no formal structure to register an abstention means that the test, which has worked very well in analysing European Parliament voting, could not be applied here.29 Cousins acknowledges that one of the major flaws of the Rice index is that it does not take account of non-voting.30 Cousins gives the hypothetical example of a vote by one party of 100 members in which ten people all vote yes but the other ninety do not vote at all. This party would get the same cohesion score as a party where everyone turns out and votes in the same direction.31 Interestingly, in the substantial literature on Rice indices that has evolved since the 1920s, non-voting has only recently emerged as a

218

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

major point of criticism with other scholars.32 Instead, political scientists have traditionally tended to focus on the fact that Rice indices are highly susceptible to the size of the group under consideration.33 Smaller parties tend to have more volatile cohesion scores because, in a small party, the deviation of just one MP represents a higher percentage of the party total and will thus naturally skew the cohesion score significantly. This could be seen as a purely academic point but when one considers that, in the present study, the Labour party had only two MPs in 1901, the shortcomings of Rice scores becomes evident. A vote in which one of the two Labour MPs voted and the other deliberately abstained – i.e. the party is split – would get a perfect cohesion score. Meanwhile, in such a small party, if the MPs were to split in the division lobby, with one voting ‘aye’ and the other ‘no’, the party would receive a cohesion score of zero. For a single defection to occur in a large party, the resulting cohesion score would not suffer dramatically.34 As such, any comparison of Rice scores between large and small parties should be taken with a degree of caution. Abstention is the other problem with producing reliable data on House of Commons voting. It is possible that one specific trait of parliamentary practice in the House of Commons can be seen to account in no small part for the problem here. That is pairing. Simply put, pairing is a semi-formal process, arranged through the whips of two opposing parties whereby one MP who knows that he will be absent or otherwise unable to vote for a specific time period, can apply to his whip to join him with an MP of an opposing party who will not register his vote in any division that may occur in the course of proceedings on a specified date. In this way, by both MPs absenting themselves, the margin between the government and the opposition at the division is not affected.35 The consequences of pairing to the calculation of cohesion scores for division voting is that, among those who did not vote, an indeterminable proportion would have otherwise registered a preference on the issue had they not been paired with an absent member. Equally, it should be borne in mind that public speeches, campaigning, and constituency work ensured that many MPs were frequently absent from parliament. In assessing the absence of so many members therefore, it must be assumed that the vast majority of absent members would have sided with their party had they been available to vote and that poor attendance does not in any way indicate mass conscientious abstention. Whereas all other parties engaged in pairing in this period, the Irish party refused to participate in the practice. This held true to a tradition that had existed since the days of Parnell.36 Reflecting on his time as an MP, former Irish party member and sometime Chief Whip John Boland

219

Unity in division

(Kerry South) explained that pairing as a convention was ‘deemed by English members to be essential to a pleasant life in parliament’.37 However, for the Irish party, Boland suggests that pairing was contrary to its ethos, stating that, ‘for us, such a thing as pairing did not exist. We voted in divisions as a party’.38 Similar in its underlying principles to the cohesion index, Stuart Rice also developed an index which gives a very rough approximation of the similarity or ‘likeness’ between two parties or any other sets of members on a given roll-call vote. The formula for calculating likeness is best explained by A.R. Clausen, who explains An ‘index of likeness’ … is computed as the complement of the difference in the proportion of two groups voting in a given direction. For example, if the same proportion of each of two groups votes Yea, the difference in proportion is 0, and the score on the likeness index is its proportional complement, 100. Without the calculation of the proportional complement the Rice index may be treated as one of the ‘unlikeness’ of two groups.39

Mathematically, likeness can be calculated by applying the following formula:40 100 − (%Yi − %Yj )

It should be noted that likeness is sensitive to cohesion and does not simply reflect the majority position of parties. Therefore, the same likeness score  – absolute likeness  – can be achieved in a division where groups ‘i’ and ‘j’ are internally split right down the middle and in a division where both groups vote for or against the motion with complete internal and collective unanimity. Theoretically, this is not a problem, as the index succeeds in representing the similarity of group behaviour between the two parties. However, it should be borne in mind that equal likeness scores do not always reflect identical voting behaviour.41 Finally, it should be acknowledged that a number of variations and alternatives to the Rice likeness index exist but, given that a Rice index has been selected to measure cohesion, Rice’s likeness index has also been given preference for the sake of consistency.42 Analysis of overall annualised voting patterns: participation, cohesion, and likeness Participation The level of participation in division voting among parties has proved to be surprisingly fertile ground for analysis. To contextualise fully the levels of participation between 1901 and 1916, a brief exploration of

220

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

participation rates across the entirety of Cromwell’s study is necessary. As figure 8.1 clearly illustrates, participation rates fluctuated significantly over the period in question. However, it is notable that the highest (1906) and the lowest (1916) annual average participation scores for a period stretching over sixty-five years both occur within the chronological confines of the present study and within a single decade of each other. It is true that both these years were unusual for various reasons. 1906 witnessed the single greatest electoral landslide between 1900 and 1918. It is hard to explain why the Liberal landslide resulted in an increase in the number of divisions. The level of voting arguably had more to do with the issues under discussion than with the new equilibrium brought about by the general election. As will be discussed in greater detail presently, there was a disproportionately high level of education voting in 1906, with the government pitted against both the Tories and Irish Nationalists over certain provisions of the proposed education bill. Conversely, in 1916, in a period of national government, the number of issues that went to a vote plummeted to just sixty-seven (the annual average between 1861 and 1926 being 348). Most of the divisions during 1916 concerned wartime issues, with conscription emerging as the most consistently contentious subject in the Commons that year. Figure 8.1 shows average annual participation in divisions among all members of parliament that were ‘available’ to vote – those elected, sworn in, and alive when each division occurred – between 1861 and 1926 at five-year intervals (excluding 1866 for which no data has been recorded). Excepting 1891,43 there was a gradual rise in participation rates in divisions between 1861 and 1906. The dip witnessed in 1911 was followed up by a major fall in participation in 1916, with drops of 5.3 per cent and 23 per cent on the previous years’ figures.44 It is unclear which direction participation went in after 1926. The figures for the 1920s indicate a return to high participation with the 1926 figure standing at 53.9, not far from the 1906 all-time high of 55.8. However, as 1906 so patently illustrates, highs in one year were no guarantee of a continuing upward trend thereafter. Focusing back on the years relevant to the present study, if 1916 can be discounted as a war and coalition related outlier, the years before the First World War must be seen as a period of particularly high levels of participation in House of Commons division voting. The overall average participation level (1861–1926) stands at 40.1 per cent whereas the level for the decade 1901–11 is considerably higher at 50.8 per cent. Turning from overall figures to the totals for Nationalist MPs, by looking at the raw annual average participation rates by party (see Table 8.1), one finds that, in 1901 – when the IPP was in opposition to the ruling

221

60 50 40

Annual average parcipaon (%)

30 20 10

26

21

19

16

19

11

19

06

19

01

19

96

19

91

18

86

18

81

18

76

18

18

18

18

71

0 61

Average parciapon by year (%)

Unity in division

Figure 8.1  Average level of participation by all MPs in division voting by year, 1861–1926 (five-year intervals). Data derived from Cromwell, House of Commons Voting, 1861–1926 [computer file].

Conservative government  – participation was at its highest and was, in fact, almost 17  percentage points above the average for the rest of the House of Commons. Further substantiating claims made already, it can be seen that Irish Nationalists were the most active opponents of the Conservative government, at least in 1901. Analysis of parliamentary questions has shown that 1901  – the most intense year for Irish Nationalist questioning – was followed by further high levels of questioning in 1904 and 1905 at the end of the Conservative era. Although data on division voting is only available at five-year intervals, given the coincidence between extreme levels of Irish Nationalist division participation and parliamentary questions in 1901, it would not be surprising if a more detailed study revealed that the party’s voting activity surged at the tail end of the Conservative era (1904–5), mirroring what has been shown about the level of parliamentary questions in the same period. An important distinction between parliamentary questions and divisions must be outlined here. On the one hand, parliamentary questioning was essentially a zero-sum game: if one party used up more of Question Time, through obstruction or otherwise, less time was left for others to interrogate the government.45 Conversely, in division voting, the level of participation among one group does not directly influence the participation of another. Notwithstanding, when governments only had a small majority or were reliant on the support of another party, as was the case between the Liberals and Irish Nationalists from 1910 onwards, there was an onus on the governing party and its supporters to maintain a constantly strong presence in the division lobbies. Table  8.1 shows the evolution of Nationalist participation in voting following the peak in 1901.

222

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Table 8.1  Average participation in division votes by party, 1901–16 (five-year increments). Year

Conservative and Liberal Unionist

Liberal

Nationalist

Labour

Irish Unionist

Whole parliament

1901 1906 1911 1916

47.7 44.9 44.5 26.2

35.0 60.2 54.3 32.6

64.4 52.4 52.9 13.8

46.4 64.5 66.6 35.3

47.2 39.4 28.2 14.8

46.1 55.8 50.5 27.4

Annual average participation rates by party Data for 1906 provides a snapshot of participation at the beginning of the golden age of Liberal government. Here, one must consider the annual average participation figures for the other parties and contrast these with the Irish figure. What is seen is a divergence between government (including the broadly sympathetic Labour party) and the opposition:  namely Conservative and Liberal Unionists including the Irish Unionists. Right in the middle of all this, just below the House average, are the Irish Nationalists. They clearly occupied the middle ground in terms of participation between the parties of government, whose level of activity was greatly increased, and the opposition, whose involvement in division voting had entered into a protracted decline by 1906. In assessing parliamentary questions, it has already been shown that the Irish party was unsure of how to align itself with the new Liberal government throughout 1906. As discussed previously, the new government’s Irish policy was broadly sympathetic to some form of Irish self-government but the massive Liberal majority in the Commons meant that they did not need to placate Irish Nationalist demands. Away from the Irish question, Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s government was sufficiently busy with implementing a raft of socially progressive legislation that had been the cornerstone of their manifesto in the British election campaign. Thus, on a very basic level, there was neither opportunity nor inclination to prioritise the Irish question in 1906. In contrast to his successor, Augustine Birrell, as Chief Secretary in 1906, James Bryce epitomised the contemporary Liberal attitude to Ireland which could best be summarised as sympathy coupled with inactivity. Whereas 1907 proved to be a pivotal year for the Irish question  – with the appointment of Augustine Birrell and the rejection of the ‘half measure’ that was the Irish Council Bill by a national convention of the UIL – 1906 can be viewed in many ways as a period of waiting on the Home Rule question.46 However, despite this and the lower than average

223

Unity in division

Table 8.2  Rice cohesion scores shown as annualised averages by party. Abstentions have not been factored in to averages and the Labour score for 1901 has been omitted as the party only held two seats at that point. Year

Conservative

Liberal

Nationalist

Labour

Irish Unionist

1901 1906 1911 1916

93.7 85.2 93.2 71.1

71.1 93.8 93.2 61.4

97.4 95.6 97.5 89.4

N/A 92.7 89.8 60.3

95.9 88.1 97.7 93.0

participation of the Irish party in division votes, 1906 was by no means a year of inactivity for the Irish party, particularly in voting terms. 158 of the 501 divisions taken that year addressed an issue relating to the education question. Birrell, then President of the Board of Education, was earnestly trying to pass his Education (England and Wales) Bill that was intended to replace the 1902 act which so angered the non-conformist section of the electorate who had been pivotal in bringing about the Liberal landslide.47 Regarding cohesion, the averaged annualised totals for each party do not paint a particularly surprising picture. Using the Rice cohesion index, the cohesion scores of both Irish Nationalists and Irish Unionists were found to be generally higher than those of any British grouping. Annual average Rice scores by party If anything, the most notable element in Table  8.2 is the consistently high level of Nationalist cohesion between 1901 and 1911. The Conservative and Irish Unionist scores were predictably more cohesive in 1901  – under the premiership of the Conservative Lord Salisbury – dropping by 1906. Similarly – and predictably given their formation of a government – Liberal cohesion strengthened in 1906. With a rise of 22.7 points, the Liberal score represents the single largest increase in the average annual cohesion score of any party in the years under consideration. From this, it becomes apparent that being in government increased a party’s cohesion score. Interestingly, with the exception of the Irish Unionist score for 1906, annual average cohesion in the two Irish parties was higher than cohesion among any of the British parties. While the 1916 scores for British parties can virtually be discounted due to the fact that a coalition government existed and the standard party distinctions were consequently blurred and superseded, the figures

224

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

for other years show that Irish voting, and particularly Nationalist Irish voting, was well disciplined. While the previous chapter documented the return to radicalism among Nationalists in 1916, data from division voting provides an important rejoinder. The above figures show that party discipline did not suffer at a point when the party was in crisis both in Ireland and at Westminster. While the crisis year of 1916 did not witness internal disunity among Nationalists in voting terms, participation in division voting among Nationalists experienced a virtual collapse at this point, with the participation level dropping by 39 per cent from the 1911 level as Table 8.1 has shown. With a national government in place, it is arguable that there was less of a need for Nationalist MPs to turn out and vote. As early as July 1915, T.P. O’Connor, then acting as something of a caretaker for Irish party interests in the House, noted that two dissident and highly vocal Nationalists, Arthur Lynch and Laurence Ginnell, held a virtual monopoly on Irish contributions to debate.48 Seemingly in the period between the establishment of Asquith’s coalition government in May 1915 and the Easter Rising of 1916 there was very little for Nationalists to do in the House. The Home Rule question had stagnated, having been crudely mothballed at the outbreak of the war. With the exception of a Lloyd George led assault on public house opening hours and excise duty on liquor, there was little cause to muster the IPP to any great actions at Westminster in this period.49 In 1916, only four divisions occurred before the Easter Rising and by far the most prevalent issue of that year was the conscription question, accounting for almost 28 per cent of divisions. While the Irish party held a clear stance of opposition to conscription, there was little to be achieved by fighting the issue in the division lobbies against a national coalition in favour of its imposition. Again, just like cohesion, in relation to participation, 1916 can be seen as a year in which region rather than party had more of an influence on group behaviour. Both Nationalists and Unionists representing Irish constituencies recorded average participation rates of 13.8 and 14.8 per cent respectively compared with an average of 28.9 per cent among all British members. Further accounting for the low level of Irish participation in 1916, very few Irish issues went to a vote in that year, with only five of the sixty-seven divisions taken in 1916 relating to Ireland. Within his study of division voting in the 1880s, Mel Cousins notes that, much like 1916 in the present study, 1886 was an ‘exceptional’ year.50 Even apart from the unprecedented political upheavals of 1886 – the Home Rule crisis, the splitting of the Liberal party, two general elections – like 1916, 1886 was also a year of low voting activity, with only 143 divisions having occurred.51

Unity in division

225

Likeness between parties At the outset of this project, one of the primary aims was to situate the IPP on the political spectrum at Westminster with respect to the Conservative and Liberal parties. Rather than viewing the British parliament as being split along a left–right axis, the model of cleavages outlined by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967 has been given preference.52 It was clear that the early twentieth-century House of Commons was divided by layers of issues rather than by ideology. Only with the growth of the British Labour party did the concept of ‘the Left’ properly enter Westminster politics.53 Based on the principles enshrined by Lipset and Rokkan this would seem to have been more applicable in this case. Lipset and Rokkan outline a number of cleavages in their study which are broadly applicable to political systems around the world:  centre–periphery, state–church, land–industry, and owner–worker.54 While all of these can be said to have been in some way present in the House of Commons in the period under consideration, they can often be hard to identify specifically. There are, however, some more obvious and overt cleavages on specific questions and issues of the day that might better illuminate the political landscape in which the Irish party existed. Education, the drink question, and ‘social problems’ votes can all be seen to inform the stance of parties on the church–state cleavage. As explained already, non-conformity and Liberalism were closely linked.55 Similarly, the old adage held that the Church of England was simply ‘the Conservative party at prayer’, although R.B. McDowell argues that these bonds weakened significantly as the nineteenth century progressed.56 In between these two associations of party with creed, unionist Ulster’s fear that Home Rule would mean ‘Rome Rule’ drew an equally strong connection between Irish nationalism and Roman Catholicism. Thus, the three largest factions within parliament represented, in turn, the three major religions in the Union, which was significant as both Anglicanism and Catholicism favoured the same policies in terms of education and interactions with the state more generally. Thus, Irish Nationalists were naturally more inclined to side with the Conservatives on the church–state cleavage. By contrast, when it came to an issue of the centre versus the periphery, Nationalists had much more in common with the Liberals. The Irish issues, though not an ideal subject given their multi-faceted nature, will be used here as a broad indicator of Irish Nationalist alignment on the centre–periphery issue. Using the Rice likeness index, it has been possible to estimate the proximity between the parties under consideration in the present study. In due course, likeness will be used as a central test in evaluating the

226

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Table 8.3  Average likeness (Rice) of Irish Nationalists to other parties in the House across all divisions (1,500 total) in sample years. Average likeness

Rice likeness score

Nationalist– Conservative likeness

Nationalist– Liberal likeness

16.2

78.4

Nationalist– Nationalist–Irish Labour likeness* Unionist likeness 81.5

13.5

* Labour total excludes data for 1901 as Labour group size (2) is insufficient to produce meaningful results.

effect of different issues on Irish Nationalist behaviour and the party’s position in parliament relative to the other groups in the House. For the time being, the raw average likeness scores between Nationalists and others must be considered in order to provide a starting point for further analysis. Average likeness (Rice) of Irish Nationalists to other parties in the House across all divisions in sample years The Labour and Irish Unionist scores are of only marginal interest here. The key question at hand concerns the likeness between Irish Nationalists and the two main British political parties of the day. As can be plainly seen from the above, Irish Nationalists were overwhelmingly more similar to the Liberal party in their voting behaviour than they were to the Conservatives. To further understand the nuances of these relationships, the Nationalist–Conservative and Nationalist–Liberal likeness scores must be subdivided by year. What ­Figure  8.2 illustrates quite clearly is that Nationalist-Liberal likeness was rising between 1901 and 1911 before experiencing a catastrophic collapse in 1916. On the other hand, likeness between Irish Nationalists and British Conservatives can be seen to have begun at an extremely low level in 1901 but ended up less than ten points away from the corresponding Liberal score in 1916. Before going any further, it must be stressed that the four ‘sample’ years under consideration here are hardly normal and it is more the case that the four years can be taken as representing four different stages in the political timeline under consideration, namely: Conservative government, 1901; Liberal majority (Nationalist autonomy), 1906; Liberal coalition, 1911 (formalised pact between Liberal and Irish parties); and wartime coalition, 1916. Of the four years documented in ­Figure 8.2, 1911 stands out for special consideration. On the one hand, the Liberal party’s likeness to the Nationalists hit an all-time high of ninety-six points while an otherwise

227

Unity in division Naonalist–Conservave likeness

Naonalist–Liberal likeness 96.0

78.4 Likeness (Rice index)

65.4 47.1 38.9 27.7 11.3

6.5 1901

1906

1911

1916

Figure 8.2  Nationalist average annual Rice likeness scores with Conservative and Liberal parties compared on all votes in given years.

upwards linear trend in Conservative likeness to Nationalists was temporarily interrupted and reversed. The unique nature of voting in 1911 emerges repeatedly in the present chapter. The reasoning behind the consistently unusual figures in this year relate to the fact that, between the two general elections of 1910, Redmond and Asquith forged a pact to formalise their already de facto alliance.57 It now stands to break down the annual totals discussed above thematically. By so doing, the ways in which different issues distorted the overall levels of cohesion, participation, and likeness can be understood more clearly. A  host of different ‘filters’58 were applied and tested in order to achieve this. However, only a select few important issues have been brought forward for discussion below. Many themes were analysed and then put aside because they were shown to have little effect on voting behaviour, at least in relation to Irish Nationalists. Category voting Focusing on likeness, the purpose of the following section is to identify specific issues – each of which will be broadly indicative of a more fundamental political cleavage – which had a significant positive or negative effect on the proximity of Irish Nationalists to their most notable opponents in the House of Commons:  the British Conservative and Liberal Unionist party. Three topics have been identified which go to the heart of Nationalist alignment in the House. Firstly, it will be shown how the Irish question exacerbated the divide between Irish Nationalists

228

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

and British Conservatives. Following this, the education question and ‘social problems’ votes – especially the drink question – will be examined to show how these issues could foster greater-than-usual closeness between Nationalists and Conservatives. While the levels of similarity between Conservatives and Nationalists on ‘social problems’ and education were broadly similar, the factors that caused this increased likeness will be shown to be quite different:  one being ideologically rooted and the other based on external influences, namely the lobbying of Nationalists by the Catholic church and of the Conservatives by the Church of England. Case study: musical copyright Before progressing to discuss Irish, education, and social voting, the somewhat unusual subject of musical copyright presents itself as a case study in the importance of context. It shows points made in the course of a debate prior to a vote in the House of Commons must be appreciated as intrinsic to understanding the motivations behind individual member voting. Of significance to the IPP, what this case study of musical copyright shows is that the most unlikely of subjects could be made relevant to the Irish struggle by Nationalist MPs. In July 1906, the House of Commons had before it a new Musical Copyright Bill which was intended to replace the existing act of 1902.59 When discussing a clause which would effectively remove the defence of ignorance from those found distributing sheet music which was, unbeknownst to them, pirated, Eugene Crean,60 Nationalist member for Cork South-East, intervened in the debate to support the proposed amendment. Crean explained how nationalists could easily relate to the question because: In Ireland every man on his trial was considered to be guilty before he stood in the dock. This Bill proposed exceptional legislation against the poorest of the poor, men who sometimes could not read the very name of the song they were trying to sell. A man might be deprived of making an honest living because he was afraid to sell a piece of music on which there was no publisher’s name. They were dealing with men who were incapable of defending themselves and could not afford to employ solicitors. They were beginning on the lowest rung of the ladder and letting the real culprits off.61

While this was a predictable position for an Irish nationalist – representing the plight of underdogs, the poor, and the marginalised  – when it came to voting on the proposed amendment, a rift was exposed within the Nationalist party that had at its heart indicators of both the future

Unity in division

229

unity of the party and of how the Irish party would react to the apparently false dawn ushered in by the new Liberal government. When the first division was taken after this debate – in which Crean had so clearly outlined how an Irish nationalist might interpret this socially regressive approach to the regulation of traders living on meagre incomes  – seven Nationalist MPs stood with Crean in support of the motion. They were among seventy-one MPs who wished to allow for the defence of ignorance when it came to prosecuting the sale of pirated sheet music. Distancing themselves from Crean and his cohort, twenty-eight Nationalists stood among the 213 members who defeated the amendment.62 Within Valerie Cromwell’s database of division voting, it is possible to cross-reference voting with a series of biographical details about MPs. This was undertaken with regard to the thirty-six Nationalist MPs voting in division 220 (Musical Copyright Bill) of 1906.63 Members were classified and sorted by profession, constituency, date of birth, and educational background in an attempt to identify any common threads running through these two factions of the Nationalist party. Apart from the fact that the average age of MPs supporting the amendment was almost nine years younger than those siding with the parliamentary majority, absolutely no correlation between these figures and their voting behaviour could be ascertained from this biographical data.64 From this, it became clear that Cromwell’s biographical data alone would not explain why the Irish party was split on this issue. Only by researching the backgrounds and biographies of the eight Nationalist dissidents – those voting ‘aye’ in division 220 – in some considerable detail was it possible to get closer to the possible motivations for their voting alignment here. Of the eight, only three had entries in the Dictionary of Irish Biography.65 Details on the others were pieced together from correspondence, newspapers, and secondary sources.66 Eventually, it was found that, of these eight MPs, two went on to become members of Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin and a further two became members of the breakaway AFIL.67 All four either resigned or were expelled from the parliamentary party between 1907 and 1909 for expressing their political independence from the orthodoxy of the parliamentary party.68 As can be seen from the level of analysis undertaken here, it would be completely unfeasible to carry out similar studies on more than a handful of divisions. In general, the cruder but nonetheless well-established techniques of statistical enquiry centring on cohesion, participation, and likeness will be used as the primary methods of assessing different

230

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

categories of divisions. Returning to musical copyright, it would seem from this analysis that defection from the party line could be used as a warning sign of discontent and as an indicator of where possible future fault lines might occur in a given party. However, the presence of at least one strong party loyalist, Vincent P. Kennedy – who was actually a cousin of John Redmond69 – among the eight musical copyright dissidents shows that the theory is by no means watertight. At the very most, deviation from the party line in division voting should be seen as a method of flagging the potential for future defection or dissent by a party member. Nonetheless, the practice could prove useful for future political biographers. If this technique were applied to an individual’s voting record over a long period of time – which would be a relatively straightforward process with Cromwell’s data files  – a picture would quickly emerge indicating both the chronology and the extent of that member’s discontentment within his or her party or other grouping. In the context of the present study, the conclusion that can be drawn from the case study of the Musical Copyright Bill is that, when members were allowed free rein to express their views on an issue not directly related to Ireland, an ideological fissure running through the Irish party was exposed. If the example of musical copyright can be taken as evidence of this, then the divide was in existence as early as 1906, long before the failure of the Irish Council Bill in 1907 and the subsequent Sinn Féin and O’Brien–Healy defections occurred. Persons who would later defect from the party were already marking themselves out in debates and divisions as malcontents. In the classifications of party machines, it can be said that the Irish constitutional nationalist movement was an umbrella organisation, temporarily united in the pursuit of Home Rule. To explore briefly one of the ‘what ifs’ of Irish history, if the third Home Rule Bill had been realised, theory states70 that what had been superficially a monolithic, one-party nationalist movement, would have divided to form a two-party nationalist system in a Home Rule parliament. Regionalism: ‘Irish’ and non-Irish division voting compared In assessing division voting, the differences of cohesion, participation, and likeness between Irish Nationalists and other parties in divisions specifically related to Ireland confirm some general assumptions and offer some additional insights. In the present study, exactly 8 per cent of the 1,500 divisions under consideration have been classified as pertaining to Ireland in Valerie Cromwell’s subject classifications.71 In terms of situating Nationalist MPs on the ideological spectrum of the House of Commons, perhaps one of the most striking results in

231

Unity in division Likeness on Irish votes

Likeness on all other divisions 88.9

Likeness (Rice index)

73.4

10.3

78.9

16.7

Naonalist–Conservave Naonalist–Liberal

81.0

8.9

13.9

Naonalist–Labour* Naonalist–Irish Unionist

Figure 8.3  Nationalist likeness to other parties – full study: all votes in 1901, 1906, 1911, 1916 – showing ‘Irish’ votes [n=120] and all other issues [n=1380] separately. * Labour total excludes data for 1901 as Labour group size (2) is insufficient to produce meaningful results.

relation to ‘Irish’ voting is that, when Irish votes were factored out of the equation, likeness between Nationalists and the Conservative party increased by more than 60 per cent. Naturally, the Irish question was one which diametrically divided Nationalists and Conservatives, splitting them into two ideologically irreconcilable camps.72 Despite this, as Mel Cousins’ study into voting patterns on social issues in the 1880s has shown, on a small number of specific issues, Irish Nationalists felt in closer agreement with Tories than they did with Liberals.73 In ­Figure 8.3, the effect of the Irish question on inter-party Nationalists alliances can be seen. It has already been seen here that Nationalist MPs were much closer to the Liberals than to the Conservatives when all votes were banded together. On non-Irish issues, while this trend was in no way altered, the extent of Nationalist–Conservative disagreement was noticeably diminished on non-Irish issues compared with ‘Irish’ divisions, with the Rice likeness score of 16.7 and 10.3 respectively.74 Admittedly, this is not much more of a leap than the corresponding Nationalist–Liberal likeness scores: 73.4 on ‘Irish’ issues compared with 78.9 otherwise. The reasoning behind lower-than-average Nationalist–Liberal likeness on Irish questions will be discussed presently. For the moment, it stands to address the Conservative figures, breaking them down further to annual averages. When Nationalist–Conservative likeness scores are analysed year-onyear, it can be seen that, during periods of Liberal government, while the

232

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster Irish votes

All other divisions

Likeness (Rice index)

40.5

28.6 23.8 18.1 11.5 5.2

6.6 1.1

1901

1906

1911

1916

Figure 8.4  Nationalist–Conservative likeness (Rice) on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year.

Irish question still divided Nationalists and Conservatives, outside of the Irish question, there was some room for greater – but by no means overwhelming – similarity. While the extremely low Nationalist–Conservative scores for both the ‘Irish’ and non-Irish likeness in 1911 can be attributed to the fact that this was the only year under consideration here in which a formal alliance existed between the Nationalist and Liberal parties, the scores for 1906 and 1916 show that in the Liberal era – and even the period of wartime coalition – there was a notable difference in agreement between ‘Irish’ and non-Irish divisions among the Nationalist and Conservative parties. Even factoring in 1911, when a formalised alliance between Redmond and Asquith distorted other voting patterns, the difference between Nationalist–Conservative likeness on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues remained consistent with scores for the previous interval with non-Irish votes scoring annual averages of 10.5 and 10.4 points higher than the corresponding score for ‘Irish’ votes in 1906 and 1911 respectively. While the importance of the Irish question to early twentieth-century Westminster politics should not be underestimated, by factoring it out, the level of agreement between two parties that have traditionally – and correctly – been seen as diametrically opposed rises noticeably. Thus, by filtering out the Irish question, one begins to get closer to understanding where the basis for any ideological similarity between Nationalists and the Conservative party lay. The other unusual result concerning ‘Irish’ issues is that the data shows the Labour party was not only the greatest ally of Irish nationalism, but that Labour MPs were consistently more ‘like’ Irish Nationalists

Unity in division

233

in ‘Irish’ votes than they were in non-Irish divisions. A significant caveat must be entered here concerning the growing similarity of group size between Nationalists and the Labour party over time. Both could be described as ‘medium sized’ parties from 1906 onwards. The Liberals and Conservatives were distinctly large political entities, consistently holding hundreds of seats during this period. The Irish Unionist grouping, meanwhile, was distinctly small, with fewer than 20 members in all years under consideration. Labour and the Irish Nationalists however, had party sizes ranging from twenty-nine to eighty-four in the period 1906–18.75 After December 1910, the size of the Labour party had grown to forty-two, making it by far the most analogous to the Irish Nationalist group in size terms.76 The tendency for group size to distort Rice scores has long been discussed in academic literature and it is likely that group size might exaggerate Nationalist–Labour likeness relative to Nationalist–Liberal likeness which can be presumed to have been broadly similar to Nationalist–Liberal likeness scores.77 However, the fact remains that, when all Irish votes are bundled together, the Labour party stands out as the only party which had a consistently higher likeness to Nationalist MPs on ‘Irish’ votes compared to non-Irish votes throughout the entire study.78 Unlike previous scores, here it is not the scale of similarity that is different. The actual direction of Nationalist–Labour likeness on Irish votes is different to that of all other groupings and cannot be discounted as simply a statistical anomaly. There was, therefore, something inherently different between the Nationalist–Labour and the Nationalist–Liberal relationship on this question. By inquiring into the Labour party’s own cohesion and participation scores on this issue, this unexpected data can be teased out further. Taking likeness year by year, the effect of the Irish question on Nationalist–Labour likeness is seen to be greatest in 1911 and weakest during the coalition government of 1916, in which Labour was a participant and the Irish party was not. It can be stated that, although the Labour party’s participation in Irish votes was lower than in other divisions, this was a trend replicated across all British parties and, if anything, Labour’s participation was slightly higher than the British average. Average British participation in Irish votes was 43.9 per cent compared with 64.6 per cent among Irish MPs (Nationalists and Unionists combined). Labour participation on Irish votes was 46.8 per cent compared with 59 per cent on all other issues. The most exciting supporting result here is that, when Irish votes are factored out, both British and Irish MPs are seen to have participated in divisions in equal numbers, with overall participation rates of

234

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster Irish votes

All other divisions

99.8 89.4

85.3

Likeness (Rice index)

79.4

62.6

1906

1911

55.4

1916

Figure 8.5  Nationalist–Labour likeness (Rice) on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year. Note: 1901 excluded due to negligible party size in that year.

97.7

Cohesion on 'Irish' votes 98.6 93.4

Cohesion on non-Irish votes 93.1

Cohesion (Rice index)

79.4 59.9

1906

1911

1916

Figure 8.6  Labour cohesion (Rice) on ‘Irish’ and non-Irish issues by year.

50 and 50.5 per cent respectively. As regards cohesion, however, there is further evidence to show that the Labour party was a strong ally of the Nationalists in parliament. Labour’s Rice cohesion scores year-on-year show a consistently higher level of cohesion among Labour MPs on ‘Irish’ votes compared to all other votes as evidenced by ­Figure 8.6. The fact that Labour sided with the Irish party in this period, coupled with extremely high levels of cohesion on ‘Irish’ votes, means it can be concluded that members of the British Labour party were even stronger supporters of the Irish party on Irish issues than the Liberals themselves. This is most likely explained by the persistence of Liberal Imperialism within the British Liberal party during the entire period, thus causing

Unity in division

235

a degree of internal fissure simply not present in a Labour party that was more homogenous in its outlook on Ireland. Such was the state of disagreement over the Irish question within the Liberal party that Ronan Fanning’s Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution, 1910–1922 has brought into question the whole bona fides of Asquith’s Cabinet on the Irish question during the third Home Rule crisis. Fanning explains that even proponents of Irish Home Rule like Birrell, Lloyd George, and Churchill had all privately conceded as early as 1911 that the implementation of the project was impossible.79 The drink issue: case study In looking at division voting on specific issues, although it does not account for a great proportion of votes in the present sample, the drink question still manages to represent an important initial point of enquiry into the complex relationship between Irish Nationalists and the Conservative party in the division lobbies. One important asset to the historian in this regard is that the long history of the drink question has been excellently served by the scholarship of Elizabeth Malcolm, whose work on temperance in Victorian-Irish society and politics provides an invaluable insight into the evolving state of political sentiment towards the drink issue from the 1870s up to 1900.80 As such, the roots of this question can be explored, from an Irish perspective, right back to the origins of the Home Rule movement. Using this context, the stances adopted by Irish Nationalists at Westminster in the early twentieth century can be put in their proper historical context. Writing about parliament and the drink question in the Victorian era, Brian Harrison observed that, ‘in permissive bill debates,81 the sound of the division bell caused members to rush out of the house instead of rushing in; in a division where public feeling ran high both for and against, members wanted to save their consciences and their seats’.82 With powerful pressure groups on both sides, drink as a political issue was extremely divisive in Victorian society. On one side was the drinks industry – brewers, distillers, publicans – and on the other, temperance organisations, many of which were backed by religious groups. With temperance strongly linked to non-conformist sentiment, there was a strong religious aspect to divisions over the drink question.83 Data from the present study suggests that, in the early twentieth century, the drink question was no less divisive than it had been in the Victorian era. The lines of demarcation between Liberal and Conservative were thus clearly delineated. Importantly, Irish Nationalists gravitated more towards the Conservative position on this question than was otherwise the case. By turning attention to the education question and the wider

236

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Table 8.4  Average party cohesion (measured on the Rice cohesion index) on drink votes compared with average cohesion on all other divisions. Party Party cohesion on drink votes (n=23) Party cohesion on all other votes (n=1,477)

Conservative Liberal Nationalist

Labour Irish Unionist

64.9

87.6

60.1

93.7

85.7

90.1

84.8

97.1

90.5

93.7

topic of ‘social problems’ presently, the nature of Nationalist alignment can be explored further and the Irish party can be situated more precisely on the political spectrum at Westminster. Although only a handful (twenty-three) of the 1,500 divisions under consideration related to the drink question, they were a surprisingly illuminating subset of votes that saw unusual patterns of likeness between Irish Nationalists and other groupings in the House of Commons. As such, they are important in explaining and contextualising the changing nature of inter-party alliances at Westminster between 1901 and 1916. In general, it can be seen from Table 8.4 that internal party cohesion among both the Nationalist and Conservative parties was significantly lower when it came to the drink question. Party cohesion (Rice index) on drink votes compared with all over divisions Even in divisions where there was virtual cross-party consensus – such as on the Sale of Intoxicating Liquor to Children Bill (1901) – dissenting minorities emerged in both the Nationalist and Conservative parties to oppose elements of the bill. Interestingly, at this time, there were two whiskey distillers within the IPP: Samuel Young (Cavan East) and Major John E. Jameson (Clare West).84 Even Young and Jameson could not agree when it came to children’s drinking, with Young supporting it while Jameson objected on two points. Firstly, Jameson argued that it was wrong to put the onus for safeguarding children on licensees rather than on parents and guardians. Secondly, he made a protracted argument about the fact that the proposed measures rendered it impossible for boys aged under sixteen to work in the licensed trade, a move which would adversely affect family incomes and the employment prospects of young people.85 Thus, even on a bill as seemingly straightforward as this, in the first division taken, twenty-three Conservatives and ten Nationalists stood against a cross-party majority of 409 members of parliament on the sale of liquor to children.86

237

Unity in division Drink votes

Likeness (Rice index)

72.3

78.5

All other divisions 81.6 70.7

53.0 39.6

15.6

Naonalist–Conservave Naonalist–Liberal

13.1

Naonalist–Labour* Naonalist–Irish Unionist

Figure 8.7  Average Nationalist likeness to other parties on drink votes and all other divisions compared. * Labour total excludes data for 1901 as Labour group size (2) is insufficient to produce meaningful results.

For a governing party as large as the Conservative party, a defection of this size was not catastrophic, representing just 6.1 per cent of the whole party.87 For Nationalists, however, ten dissenting votes represented 12.2 per cent of all those in the party eligible to vote. Having addressed the considerable effect that the drink question had on both Nationalist and Conservative party cohesion likeness between these two parties on this issue must now be considered. Looking at Nationalist similarity to all other parties on the issue, the impact of the drink question on the otherwise traditionally adversarial relationship between the Nationalist and Conservative parties is stark. Clearly, this was one issue upon which Nationalists found a greater than usual level of common ground with the Conservative party. What is even more stark than the picture painted above is that, when broken down into annual averages, Nationalist–Conservative likeness on the drink question can be seen to have been even greater for much of the period, with the formal Nationalist–Liberal alliance of 1911 distorting an otherwise overwhelmingly clear picture of Conservative–Nationalist likeness on the drink question. In ­Figure  8.8, the fact that the traditional Nationalist–Conservative relationship is reversed on the drink question is plain to see. The relationship between Nationalists and the Conservatives on this issue can be viewed as particularly strong due to the fact that, within the seven divisions taken on the drink question in 1906, five related specifically to Ireland. It has already been conclusively shown above that the divergence in voting preference between Nationalists and Conservatives was

238

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster Drink votes 84.9

84.8

Likeness (Rice index)

All other divisions 77.5

38.1 26.9 12.3

5.6 1901

1906

11.3

1911

1916

Figure 8.8  Nationalist–Conservative likeness (Rice) on drink votes compared to all other divisions. The number of divisions on the drink question occurring in each year was 5, 7, 10, and 1 for 1901, 1906, 1911, and 1916 respectively.

even more profound on the Irish question than on other topics. However, when it came to the sale of intoxicating liquors in Ireland, a remarkable set of events transpired. In this instance, the Liberal government sided with Irish Unionists in support of a motion for a second reading of a bill to curtail opening hours of licensed premises and to extend the geographical scope of Sunday closing which was introduced by the independent Ulster Unionist and notable teetotaller T.W. Russell.88 While the Liberals and Ulster Unionists joined forces on the issue, majorities of both the Nationalist and Conservative parties – both of whom experienced internal disunity on the question – banded together in opposing the bill. Further attesting to the irregularity of these voting patterns and underlining the divisive nature of the issue, John Redmond was even seen to split from his own brother in four of the five divisions taken in the course of the debate.89 Although not directly related to the votes under consideration here, an excerpt from the diary of Frances Stevenson, then Lloyd George’s secretary and mistress, explains how one prominent Cabinet minister perceived the relationship between drink and the two Irish factions. Writing in 1915, as a series of controls aimed at lowering alcohol consumption and consequently raising munitions production were under consideration, Stevenson recorded the sentiments of a minister who was sick to the teeth with the Irish party’s intransigent stance on this issue. He [Lloyd George] says that if the question of Home Rule ever comes up again … he for one will not give the Irish his support. It would mean … putting Ulster, which is a fairly sober province, under the heel of the rest of

Unity in division

239

Ireland, which has so clearly shown itself to be dominated by the whiskey and beer interests.90

Lloyd George was acting on hard evidence rather than sentiment in this instance. Contained within his private papers is a letter from Joseph Devlin to T.P. O’Connor, presumably forwarded by the latter, in which Devlin talked sympathetically of large deputations of publicans seeking meetings with himself and Redmond.91 Interestingly, from Devlin’s perspective, there was a sectarian undertone to the temperance movement in Belfast. To O’Connor, he observed that ‘there is a horde of anti-Popery temperance people whose one object in life is to destroy the propoerty [sic] of the Catholic traders in Belfast, and to ruin them in the only business they have been allowed to enter’.92 It should be remembered that Devlin had begun his working life in the Belfast pub trade.93 The publicans were lobbying the Irish party to intercede with Lloyd George on their behalf over the proposed extension of wartime drinking restrictions to Ireland. This whole episode from 1915 underlines the complex set of circumstances that led to closer alignment between traditional enemies on the drink question. Just as British Conservatives would side with Irish Nationalists in defence of a trade well represented in both their parties, so too did religious sentiment foster a closer than usual alignment between British Liberal and Ulster Unionist on this most polarising of issues. As well as being able to transcend the traditional divide on Irish matters, the similarity of Nationalist–Conservative likeness between votes on drink and all other votes in 1911 further attests to the efficacy of the Liberal–IPP alliance and its consequences for Nationalist division voting behaviour. Asquith and Redmond had agreed on a formal alliance in April 1910 following the general election in January. In December, when a virtually identical parliament was returned, the Irish party was needed to give the Liberals a majority in the House. Whereas prior to 1911 drink had been a point of relative agreement between Nationalists and Conservatives, by formalising its alliance with the Liberals, the IPP cancelled out any previously held freedom to drift towards the Conservatives on issues of ideological proximity such as the drink question. This is something which is borne out in the figures here. In a final note on the drink question, it should be mentioned in passing that the figure for 1916 represents just a single division, and this was atypical in itself as it dealt with the regulation of public houses as part of the programme to increase wartime munitions production. In the course of debate on the 1916 drink vote, the Liberal member for the Arfon division of Caernarvonshire warned those intending to support the resolution before the House that the public would

240

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Look upon a vote for this Resolution as a vote for the extension of drinking facilities during the War. Do it if you dare to do it. This trade is a trade that is injurious to the interests of the country during the War, and that is why the [Defence of the Realm] Act was passed to control this trade, and it is a trade that needs controlling.94

Thus, despite the unusual circumstance brought about by the war, the debate can be seen to have roused the old temperance versus drinks industry divide going far back into the nineteenth century. That all ten of the Nationalists who voted in this division sided with the majority of the Conservative party – who were themselves split 69:20 – in supporting the resolution and thus voting for ‘the extension of drinking facilities’ shows that, in 1916, the old lines of demarcation were revisited, further supporting the argument that voting behaviour on the drink question in 1911 was distorted by the April 1910 pre-election pact between Asquith and Redmond. One can thus conclude that the drink question appears to represent the strongest case of an issue where the normative position for Irish Nationalists was to side with the Conservative party. Social problems votes Developing on the drink question, ‘social problems’ is a term employed as a primary category in Cromwell’s own classification of divisions. It includes all the drink votes listed above but it also accommodates an array of other issues and the categorisation has been applied to more than 10 per cent of all divisions in the present study.95 This is an important line of enquiry as ‘social issues’ are the focus of Mel Cousins’ study of IPP voting in the 1880s. As such, this is the only field in which there is any pre-existing literature relating directly to Irish Nationalist voting behaviour. There was likewise a heavy focus on the drink issue in Cousins’ study; nine out of twenty-two divisions related to one aspect or another of the drink question. However, of the other thirteen divisions examined by Cousins, the Contagious Diseases Acts, parliamentary franchise, and labourers’ allotments were just some of the votes examined under the banner of ‘social issues’. Although not fully comparable to the Valerie Cromwell’s subject classifications, the issues examined by Mel Cousins are broadly similar to those categorised as ‘social problems’ votes here. In the present study, ‘social problems’ ranged from street betting to the provision of meals for schoolchildren and from cremation to marriage with a deceased wife’s sister.96 Clearly these issues are somewhat eclectic but, when taken collectively, a party’s stance on them can be taken to indicate its broad social outlook. In the context of political cleavages,

241

Unity in division

Table 8.5  The effect of ‘social problems’ votes on party cohesion relative to votes on other issues. Party Conservative Liberal Nationalist Labour* Irish Unionist

Rice cohesion score on ‘social Rice cohesion score on all problems’ votes (n=170) other votes (n=1,330) 76.1 89.6 89.4 79.7 89.5

91.4 84.3 97.5 90.8 94.0

Difference –15.3 5.3 –8.1 –11.1 –4.5

* Labour total excludes data for 1901 as Labour group size (2) is insufficient to produce meaningful results.

the political fault line that is being examined in this context is between a laissez-faire attitude to social legislation and varying degrees of social control. One important caveat before going any further with analysis of ‘social problems’ votes is that, just as with the drink question, all groups in the House of Commons were generally less internally cohesive when it came to voting on social issues, with the exception of the Liberal party which again demonstrated itself to have had a greater sense of shared values on social issues. Table 8.5 makes the effect of social issues on each party’s internal cohesion clear. This diminished level of cohesion must be borne in mind when analysing likeness scores on this issue. Party cohesion on ‘social problems’ votes Moving from cohesion to likeness scores, Liberal–Nationalist likeness on ‘social problems’ votes saw little discernible difference between ‘social problems’ votes and other votes for all years excluding 1916, when there was significantly less similarity between the two parties on ‘social problems’ votes compared with all other votes that year. Excepting 1916, a period of coalition government, the difference in Liberal–Nationalist likeness between ‘social problems’ and all other votes never rose above five points.97 Thus, it can be said that ‘social problems’ had little effect on Liberal–Nationalist likeness. By contrast, ­Figure 8.9 illustrates the difference between Conservative–Nationalist likeness on ‘social problems’ divisions compared with other votes. Overall, Conservative–Nationalist likeness was an average twelve points higher on ‘social problems’ votes than on other issues across the entire study but this only begins to tell the story of the complex relationship between the two parties on this subset of divisions. When the numeric difference between Conservative and Nationalist scores in ­Figure 8.9 is considered, a clear picture begins to emerge. On the one hand, likeness scores on all other divisions fluctuated quite

242

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Likeness (Rice index)

Likeness on 'social problems' votes

41.7

Likeness in all other divisions

40.5

39.5 26.8

38.7

18.9 8.9

4.5 1901

1906

1911

1916

Numeric difference between likeness (Rice) scores

Figure 8.9  Average annual Nationalist–Conservative likeness on the Rice index for ‘social problems’ votes versus all other issues by year. 40 35 Difference between Naonalist– Conservave likeness on 'social problems' votes and all other votes

30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1901

1906

1911

1916

Figure 8.10  The difference in Nationalist–Conservative likeness scores (Rice index) between ‘social problems’ votes and all other votes.

dramatically year-on-year due to the ever-changing political situation. However, with the exception of 1911 – already accounted for as a unique year in Nationalist voting terms – Nationalist–Conservative likeness on ‘social problems’ votes remained remarkably constant, and consistently higher than divisions on other issues throughout the period with low variance in the scores for 1901, 1906, and 1916.98 In a final comment on Nationalist–Conservative likeness scores, the changing difference between likeness on ‘social problems’ votes and likeness on all other divisions should be considered. While other figures

Unity in division

243

mentioned here do not necessarily show any strong trend emerging over time, when the difference between the two sets of scores is considered, it becomes clear that the higher levels of Nationalist–Conservative likeness seen on ‘social problems’ votes was more important in 1901 than it became later on. With the recently reunified Irish party heavily engaged in disrupting and harassing the Conservative government in 1901, social issues provided rare common ground. However, a sharp fall in this divergence (24.6 points) had occurred between the 1901 high and the early stages of the Liberal era in 1906. By 1916, a time of wartime coalition, overall Nationalist–Conservative likeness had risen to such an extent that it almost equalled the score for ‘social problems’ votes, which, as seen already, returned to a level remarkably close to that prior to 1911.99 The point being argued here is not that Irish Nationalists were closer to the Conservatives  – their political rivals  – than they were to the Liberals, as their de facto allies, on ‘social problems’ votes. It should be recalled that Nationalists had overall likeness scores of 86.4 with the Liberals and only 26.8 with the Conservatives on ‘social problems’ votes. Instead, what has been shown is that ‘social problems’ votes had a strong positive effect on Nationalist–Conservative likeness whereas they had little effect on Nationalist–Liberal likeness scores. In this way, if any common ground is to be identified between Irish Nationalists and the Conservative party in parliament, ‘social problems’ votes were a clear occasion of proximity between these otherwise instinctive parliamentary enemies. If ‘social problems’ votes cultivated an increased ideological proximity between Nationalists and Conservatives, the education question would find the two parties yet again siding together but with tactical, electoral, and constituency considerations to the fore. Education voting Like ‘social problems’, education was traditionally a subject upon which Nationalists and Conservatives found some common ground. As the de facto parliamentary representatives of Anglicanism and Catholicism respectively, both Conservatives and Irish Nationalists found themselves making intercessions on the subject of denominational education at various times in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the entire chronological scope of this study (1900–18), two years in particular saw major attempts to reform education in England and Wales. In 1902, the Conservative government passed the Education (England and Wales) Act which was seen to favour denominational interests, particularly the Church of England, and consequently provoking non-conformist opposition.100 However, divisions taken during the 1902 act’s passage are not

244

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

included within the sample years under consideration here. As such, only one major milestone in the legislative history of British education can be examined through the votes included in this study. When the Liberals won the 1906 general election, the new government put educational reform as a top tier priority. The power of the non-conformist vote in bringing Campbell-Bannerman’s government to power could not be ignored and the 1902 act had been a source of genuine grievance to those of non-conformist faiths. Augustine Birrell, as President of the Board of Education in 1906, was determined to push through both infrastructural reforms and also reforms aimed at ameliorating the social conditions experienced by the poorest schoolchildren. Importantly, the Irish party had been persuaded to vote with the Conservatives during the 1902 education debates by the Catholic bishops, who found common cause with the Anglican-backed Conservatives in strengthening the rights of denominational interests in education. By 1906, the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster (later Cardinal) Francis Bourne had identified John Redmond and his party as the most reliable guardians of Catholic interests in parliament. The bill was deeply unpalatable to Catholics in Britain due to its proposed removal of state funding for church-run schools. Using the Duke of Norfolk in the Lords and Redmond in the Commons, Bourne obtained assurances from Redmond that the Irish party would work towards securing favourable concessions and, if necessary, amendments to the new Liberal Education Bill of 1906.101 Obviously, Archbishop Bourne’s demands placed Redmond and his party in a very delicate position between the Catholic church and the Liberal party: one a clear electoral ally of the Irish party and the other the surest friend to the Home Rule cause in parliament. Previous research has undertaken detailed archival examination of Irish Nationalist involvement in the education debacle of 1906.102 Here, the votes emanating from the education debates can be assessed statistically in order to determine just how much Irish Nationalists deviated from their political alignment with the Liberal party as a result of the interventions of Archbishop Bourne and others on behalf of the Catholic interest. Only two of the four years under consideration here warrant mention when it comes to the education question. In 1911, there were only four votes concerning education and in 1916 there were none. In 1901, however, a much more considerable 8.3 per cent of the 481 divisions held that year dealt with education and among them several concerned Irish or Scottish education. 1906, however, was exceptional due to the focus given to education in that year. Both the importance and contentiousness

Unity in division

245

of education reform are attested to by the fact that almost a third of all divisions taken in 1906 specifically related to education.103 When the figures on education votes in 1906 are compared with all other votes in that year, the results obtained, while not unexpected in their direction, are considerable in their magnitude. With the notable exception of Irish Unionists on both counts, all parties were more cohesive and also participated in greater numbers in education votes that they did in other divisions. Taking the participation rate for the whole House of Commons, education votes saw on average 64.5 per cent of members voting whereas the average participation for all other votes was 51.7 per cent. With reference to cohesion, as might be expected, the Liberals, as the governing party and with education so high on their legislative agenda, had an average cohesion score of 92.6 on education votes compared with 83.7 for all other votes in 1906. Although the Nationalist cohesion score was highest at 98.4 points, this speaks more of the high level of party discipline and unity within the nationalist movement in 1906 than of anything else.104 Corroborating this, the Nationalist cohesion score for all other votes in this year was not far behind at 96.2 points. The Conservative average cohesion figures of 90.7 for education and 89.5 for all other votes again show a high degree of cohesion and perhaps point to the fact that, for all bar the Liberals, education was just another issue to be fought over in the heady parliamentary atmosphere that accompanied the Conservative–Liberal handover of power in 1905–6. It is, however, likeness rather than cohesion that provides the more dramatic results in terms of the 1906 education votes. Here, the extent to which Nationalists turned against the Liberals and sided with the Conservatives at the behest of the Catholic church in England can now be quantified and even qualified somewhat. Figure  8.11 shows quite powerfully how the education question dramatically altered alliances and other patterns of behaviour in the Commons during 1906. Bearing in mind the universally high levels of cohesion on the subject, the likeness scores presented here testify to an upheaval in alliances rather than simply a common level of internal dissent among the parties. The raw data on education votes is not the important factor here; instead, the difference between the likenesses for education votes should be viewed in comparison with likenesses for all other votes. Clearly the education question was one which flipped alliances and animosities on their heads in the Commons of 1906. The established Liberal leaning of Irish nationalism was effaced and the degree to which Nationalists habitually voted against Conservative members from both sides of the Irish Sea was eroded. Clearly in the 1906 education votes, an issue has

246

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster Educaon

All other votes 87.8

Likeness (Rice index)

81.8

56.8

56.4

42.2

38.6

12.1

Naonalist–Conservave Naonalist–Liberal

9.4 Naonalist–Labour Naonalist–Irish Unionist

Figure 8.11  Comparing Nationalist likeness with other parties on education and other votes for 1906.

been identified that goes to the heart of Irish Nationalist ideology, or at least loyalty, in parliament. As has already been explained, the Irish party was essentially acting as intercessor for the Catholic church and, as such, its proximity to the Conservative position on this issue is more utilitarian than ideological. This is a key difference between Nationalist–Conservative proximity on ‘social problems’ votes and this issue. Nonetheless, it has now been shown that both ‘social problems’ and the education question diminished the distance between Nationalists and Conservatives and weakened the traditional tactical alignment between Irish Home Rulers and the sympathetic Liberal party. Conclusions: what divisions can tell us? The evolution of Nationalist behaviour in division voting The first thing that becomes clear from a broad analysis of division voting patterns is that Irish Nationalists retained an extremely high level of cohesion throughout all years of this study. This attests to the strength of Irish party discipline and also to the general like-mindedness of Nationalists as a political cohort. High average cohesion is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the organised dissent of eight Nationalists after the December 1910 elections105 under the banner of the AFIL does not seem to have had any discernible impact on the general cohesiveness of Nationalists as regards division voting.106 From this, one can conclude that the effect of the AFIL was more profound on grassroots and constituency politics in Ireland.107 In the division lobbies,

Unity in division

247

all Nationalists continued to vote with the same degree of unity as they had in previous years and presented a united front at Westminster. In fully contextualising the high level of Nationalist cohesiveness, it should not be forgotten that similar levels of cohesion were seen within the Irish Unionist camp. Throughout the entire study, group cohesion among the two Irish parties stood at 95.1 points on the Rice cohesion index compared with an average of 87.9 points among British parties. This suggests that greater discipline among regional political groupings was not unique to Nationalists. While cohesion was consistently higher among Irish groupings than their British counterparts,108 the same cannot be said of Irish Nationalist participation. As to what participation figures can tell us about the state of the Irish party, one of the key questions in the scholarly literature on the IPP is on the party’s diminished influence and relevance before the 1918 general election. The question that has divided historians is whether this decline was caused solely by the pressures of the Ulster crisis and the First World War or whether a deeper malaise had seeped up through the party from grassroots level in the years prior to the outbreak of First World War.109 Among historians of the Liberal party, a similar rift has long been in existence between the ‘accidentalists’ and the ‘inevitablists’ over the nature of that party’s decline from an electoral high in 1906 to a series of disastrous performances at the polls from 1918 onwards from which the party never recovered.110 Accidentalists argue that the First World War and associated crises intervened to put pressure on an otherwise sound, stable, and unified Liberal party which then split between supporters of Asquith and supporters of Lloyd George in late 1916 precipitating the end of its traditional role as the primary counterweight to the Conservative party. Meanwhile, the inevitablist school points to systemic problems and older factional rifts within the Liberal party in explaining its decline. In addition, inevitablists place a strong emphasis on the expanding working-class electorate which was inclined to vote for the more progressive Labour party over the more established Liberals as time went on.111 Reflecting on the distinction made between the two schools of thought on Liberal decline, it seems that the labels ascribed to both sides of the historiographical debate are also applicable to the debate surrounding the decline of the Irish party in the same period. Whereas the Liberals were faced with the growth of Labour, the Irish party had to cope with the emergence of Sinn Féin as a political force. In this way, the question of whether the war or a longer – inevitable – decline was responsible for the electoral decimations of the parties in 1918 is equally applicable to both the Irish party and the Liberals.

248

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

In using division data as a means of informing the historiographical debate, Geoffrey Hosking and Antony King concluded that division data supports the accidentalist case, as no major rift before 1914 could be identified in their survey of roll call votes.112 While the same can be said for Irish party cohesion – suggesting an accidentalist conclusion – Nationalist participation data tells a different story. It has been shown that Nationalist participation fell sharply from a high of 64.4 per cent in 1901 – more than 20 per cent higher than the average participation rate for the rest of the House in that year  – to roughly 52 per cent in both 1906 and 1911. Although these figures were still higher than the corresponding Conservative and Irish Unionist figures (as parties of opposition), it is clear that a downward trend had begun in terms of Nationalist participation in division voting. This fact is rendered all the more notable when one considers that the Irish party leadership and the whips began making concerted efforts to increase members’ attendance at Westminster during 1911, including the ‘naming and shaming’ of absentee members.113 Here, the full impact of this campaign can be measured, showing that all this effort resulted in a rise in division participation of just 0.5 per cent on the 1906 figure.114 Despite the best efforts of the leadership, it would seem that the Irish party’s attendance was already in decline long before the outbreak of the First World War. Following a reasonably steady attendance between the 1906 and 1911 figures, the average annual attendance among Irish Nationalists plummeted to just 13.8 per cent in 1916, representing both the steepest drop and the lowest average attendance score of any party in that year. Taken in isolation, this 1916 figure might be seen to fuel the accidentalist case. However, reversal in Nationalist participation rates from being best in the House in 1901 to worst in 1916 did not happen overnight. The complete inefficacy of efforts to increase participation in 1911 further compounds the problem. If a concerted drive to boost attendance culminated in a negligible rise in division participation, a strong case can be made in support of the argument that the rot had set in for the Irish party before any of the stresses endured between 1913 and 1918 are factored into the equation. Natural allies? The evolution of the Irish–Liberal alliance Apart from contributing to the debate on the decline of the Irish party, this study has also been able to provide much needed quantitative corroboration to the history of the Nationalist–Liberal alliance, which only existed as an informal and mutually beneficial compact in 1906 but had been formalised in 1910 owing to the radically altered parliamentary equilibrium that year. This study represents the first attempt to

Unity in division

249

systematically examine how the alliance between Asquith and Redmond in 1910 played out in the voting lobbies of the Commons. It transpires that it was very effective. As results such as those on the drink question have shown, a natural tendency among Nationalists to side with the Conservatives on specific issues was reversed entirely in 1911, with any semblance of Nationalist parliamentary independence disappearing under a strict, issue-independent, alignment to Asquith’s Liberals. Likeness with the Liberal party, already high (78.4 point average in 1906), peaked in 1911 with a score of 96 points on the Rice index. This meant the parties were virtually identical in their voting behaviour in a year where both were yolked in the symbiotic pursuit of parliamentary reform and Irish legislative independence. Although no intervening data is available, it can tentatively be inferred from parliamentary questions data  – a barometer of dissent  – in the previous chapter that this trend continued up until 1915. There were no signalled shifts of policy in the interim that would have disrupted the relationship established in 1910 and, although there were intermittent spats on certain issues, the Liberal–Nationalist alliance was extremely strong at the outbreak of the war. In the end, however, the figures for 1916 have repeatedly shown the extent to which the Irish party had radicalised following the Easter Rising. The spectre of extending conscription to Ireland alongside martial law and the continued internment of Irishmen – rebels and innocents alike – all fostered a crisis mentality among Nationalist politicians during 1916. Perhaps the best way of summing up the remarkable nature of Nationalist voting behaviour in that year is to say that, out of the sixty-seven divisions taken, Nationalists went against the coalition government’s majority position on twenty-five occasions and abstained entirely on seventeen more. At a time of patriotic unity within parliament, Irish Nationalists thus marked themselves out as implacable malcontents. Perhaps it is not surprising that Lloyd George’s Irish policy the following year was to remove the Irish question from parliament and leave it to a body of Irishmen to solve their own predicament at the Irish Convention assembled at Trinity College, Dublin, leaving Britain free to address the more urgent problem of turning the tide in the war. Votes on specific issues: quantifying the autonomy of Irish Nationalism Another core aim within the present study was to identify specific factors that altered the level of likeness between Irish Nationalists and the two main British political parties. Beginning with the drink question, it was shown that, when extracted, these votes saw significantly higher levels of likeness between Nationalists and Conservatives than

250

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

on other issues. More generally, all ‘social problems’, of which these ‘drink’ votes were a subset, were occasions for closer proximity between these habitual enemies. The other instance in which heightened levels of Nationalist–Conservative likeness were witnessed was on the education question. However, when it came to education, it has been shown that heightened likeness was arrived at through the simultaneous lobbying of the Nationalists and Conservatives by the Catholic and Anglican churches in Britain respectively. Thus, whereas ‘social problems’ saw the two parties standing together in the division lobbies due to heightened agreement on the issue at hand, in education votes, they arrived at the same destination but by different routes. If the above-listed issues represented common ground between Nationalists and Conservatives, it is therefore equally important to identify the issues which most accounted for the strong polarisation of these two parties. In education and drink votes, likeness scores as high as 42 and 53 points were recorded between Nationalists and Conservatives. It was therefore imperative that the leading factors responsible for the predictably low overall likeness score of 16.2 points between these two groups be identified. Of the many factors that were tested, what this study has shown is that the Irish question did indeed lie at the heart of the instinctive and habitual rift between Irish Nationalism and British Conservatism. By examining not only overall trends but also categories, this study has advanced understanding of how Nationalist voting behaviour existed and evolved in fact rather than in theory. Through Valerie Cromwell’s massive contribution to scholarship with the digitisation and categorisation of all votes in the sample years discussed here, it has been possible to represent the actual state of voting in the House rather than having to draw inference from a carefully chosen sample. Although this has meant that no data for the intervening years has been considered, it can be asserted that the four sample years explored here represent snapshots of four different and equally pivotal stages within an extraordinary period of British political history. Finally, this chapter does not conclude by claiming to be in any way a definitive study in Nationalist division voting behaviour. Future studies should consider how Irish Nationalist MPs voted in the uncharted world of the 1890s, which remains terra incognita between Mel Cousins’ study of the 1880s and the present analysis. Equally, it would be interesting for future studies to assess how voting patterns at Westminster shifted to fill the vacuum formed in 1918 after more than four decades of Irish Nationalist involvement in British and imperial affairs. Admittedly the removal of Irish MPs was not the only new feature on the radically

Unity in division

251

altered post-1918 political landscape, but it would nonetheless be extremely interesting to consider the legacy of Nationalism, a force that truly altered the face of British politics. Notes 1 Hansard 4, clvi, col. 1505 (10 May 1906). 2 Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 222–3. 3 McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’ and McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party. 4 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, Parts I and III respectively. 5 The exception to this is a discussion of participation rates and the difficulty of keeping the party’s attendance levels at Westminster high once the Irish party was needed to give the Liberal Government a majority after 1910. See McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, pp. 238–45 and McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 214–21. 6 O’Brien, Parnell, p. 159. 7 For one such vote from 1884, see O’Brien, Parnell, pp. 97–8. 8 Cromwell, House of Commons Voting. 9 Excepting 1866 for which there is no data. 10 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’. An earlier version of this paper was given to the Irish Historical Society in November 2007. 11 McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 214–21. 12 W.S. Gilbert, Iolanthe or the Peer and the Peri (London, 1882)  (http:// math.boisestate.edu/gas/iolanthe/iollib.pdf) (29 December 2011), quoted in Valerie Cromwell, ‘Mapping the political world of 1861: a multidimensional analysis of House of Commons’ division lists’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, viii, no. 2 (May 1982), p. 281. 13 This concept will be discussed at length presently. 14 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 12. 15 Cohesion and the scales used to measure it will be explained and discussed at length later in this chapter. 16 Ostrogorski, Democracy and Organization. 17 Cohesion scores reported here have been calculated from raw data given in W.C. Lubenow, ‘Irish Home Rule and the great separation in the Liberal party in 1886:  the dimensions of parliamentary Liberalism’, Victorian Studies, xxvi, no. 2 (winter, 1983), p. 168 [table 3]. 18 In Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, members provided a self-identification of the groups and causes they were affiliated to and associated with in parliament. The main difficulty arises in the case of fringe members of the Liberal party, who were keen to stress the nuisances of their ideological affiliations. To take just one example, in 1901, John Burns styled himself as ‘ “A Socialist:” advocates nationalisation of the land, railways, mines, “and the means of production,” Home Rule, payment of members, adult

252

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

man and woman suffrage, the investment of County Councils, District and Parish Councils “with full and popular powers,” and “Legal Eight Hours Day,” regulation of the drink traffic by “direct veto,” &c., &c.’. By 1906, as President of the Local Government Board in Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal Government, Burns self-identified as ‘A Labour Member’. By 1911, Burns had moderated his self-identification, describing himself simply as ‘A Liberal’. By contrast, F.W.S. Craig consistently identifies Burns as ‘L(Lab)’ at every election from 1900 to 1918. See Dod’s Parliamentary Companion (London, 1901, 1906, 1911) and Craig, British Election Results 1885–1918. 19 Whereas they were combined with Labour in the previous chapter, Lib-Lab MPs have been grouped with the Liberal party here as they did not fall under the Labour party whip. The justification for their inclusion with Labour members in the previous chapter was due to the fact that ideology rather than obedience was being measured. The practice of whipping here makes this impossible. 20 The League officially held its first meeting in Kanturk, county Cork, on 20 March 1909 (Irish Times, 27 March 1909). For a good summary of the foundation and outlook of the AFIL, see Callanan, Healy, pp. 463–73. 21 See McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 190 [table 1]. 22 Edward Wood, ‘Digitising Hansard: putting two hundred years of parliamentary debates online’ (www.cilip.org.uk/get-involved/special-interest-groups/ government/Documents/hansard_digitisation.pdf) (30 March 2012). See also http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ (5 January 2012). The Hansard Digitisation Project is led by the Directorate of Information Services of the House of Commons and the Library of the House of Lords and, although the vast majority of volumes of Hansard have been uploaded to the website, the project’s work is ongoing. 23 McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’. A  full list of manuscript collections left by parliamentary party members (less than a dozen and among these the Redmond and Dillon papers) can be found in McConnel’s bibliography, p. 286. 24 Notable examples of memoirs are William O’Malley’s Glancing Back:  70 Years’ Experience and Reminiscences of Press Man, Sportsman, and Member of Parliament(London, 1933) and John Boland, Irishman’s Day: A Day in the Life of an Irish MP (London, 1944). In terms of biographies, Colin Reid’s study of Stephen Gwynn is a valuable addition to the very small number of biographies dedicated to the backbench MPs of the party. Notable examples are J. Anthony Gaughan, A Political Odyssey:  Thomas O’Donnell (Dublin, 1983); Íde Ní Liatháin, The Life and Career of P.A. McHugh, a North Connacht Politician, 1859–1909: A Footsoldier of the Party (Dublin, 1999); Reid, Gwynn. 25 IPP Minute Books (3 vols, NLI, MS 12,080–2) [covers the period 31 December 1900–6 November 1918 inclusively]. 26 For example, see minutes of IPP meeting of 25 March 1901, IPP Minute Book, vol. I (NLI, MS 12,080) in which attention was drawn to the fact that MPs had attended afternoon sittings but ‘left the House subsequently and did not take part in divisions late at night’.

Unity in division

253

27 Within the present study, the term ‘turnout’ has been reserved exclusively to describe the percentage of the electorate turning out to cast a ballot at an election. For division voting and all other types of parliamentary activity, ‘participation’ has been used to describe the level of involvement among members thereby distinguishing between these two very different political processes. 28 Yi is the number of ‘aye’ votes expressed by group ‘i’ on a given vote, Ni is the number of ‘noe’ votes. This formula was first described in Stuart A. Rice, ‘The behaviour of legislative groups: a method for measurement’, Political Science Quarterly, xl, no. 1 (March 1925), pp. 62–3. In some cases, scholars do not multiply the whole equation by 100, thereby reporting the cohesion score as ranging from 0–1 rather than 0–100. For examples see, Scott W. Desposato, ‘Correcting for small group inflation of roll-call cohesion scores’, British Journal of Political Science, xxxv, no. 4 (October 2005), pp. 734–5 (0–1 scale) and Aage R. Clausen, ‘The measurement of legislative group behaviour’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, xi, no. 2 (May 1967), p. 213 (0–100 scale). 29 On the ‘Agreement Index’, see Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland, ‘Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001’, British Journal of Political Science, xxxv (2005), pp. 209–34. For the application of the Agreement Index to votes of the Finnish Eduskunta, see Antii Pajala, Aleks Jakulin, and Wray Buntine, ‘Parliamentary group and individual voting behaviour in the Finnish Parliament in year 2003: a group cohesion and voting similarity analysis’ (2004) (http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/ viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.103.2295) (23 November 2011). 30 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 3. 31 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 3. 32 Hix et al., ‘Power to the parties’. 33 In particular see Clausen, ‘Measurement of legislative group behaviour’, pp. 217–18 and Desposato, ‘Correcting for small group inflation’. 34 The election results here are taken from Rallings and Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, p. 16 as Cromwell’s data files are indexed by member, not by seat. Double counting would thus occur if a frequency table was produced using this data. 35 A concise definition of pairing can be found in Abraham and Hawtrey, Parliamentary Dictionary, p. 134. 36 O’Brien, Parnell, p. 264[n]‌. 37 Boland, Irishman’s Day, p.  23. James McConnel alludes to the fact that the Irish party’s ban on pairing was reintroduced in 1900 after a lapse in the ban during the 1890s but gives no further detail on the history of the ban: McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 251. 38 Boland, Irishman’s Day, p. 23. 39 Clausen, ‘Legislative group behaviour’, p. 221. 40 Where %Yi and %Yj denote the respective percentages of groups ‘i’ and ‘j’ voting ‘aye’ on a given vote.

254

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

41 For an extensive discussion of the Rice indices including analysis of Herman Beyle’s suggested improvements to Rice’s tests, see David B.  Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York, 1959), pp. 320–30. 42 For one variant to the Rice likeness index, dubbed the ‘mean absolute difference’ or ‘MAD’ index, see Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan:  Party Government in the House (Berkeley, 1993), pp.  220–4 cited in Hix et al., ‘Power to the parties’, p. 216[n]‌. 43 A fall of 4.2 per cent was recorded for 1891. The figure for 1876 is also 0.2 per cent lower than that for 1871 but this difference can be considered negligible. 44 The average participation rates for the whole House were 55.8, 50.5, and 27.4 per cent respectively for 1906, 1911, and 1916. 45 On zero-sum theory, see von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, pp. 84–5. 46 On the rejection of the Irish Council Bill as a ‘half-measure’, see Gwynn, Life of Redmond, p. 148. 47 See James F.  Meenan, ‘Augustine Birrell in Ireland’, Studies:  An Irish Quarterly Review, lix, no. 233 (spring, 1970), p. 31. 48 T.P. O’Connor to John Dillon, 3 July 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/261). On the history of Lynch’s earlier friction with the official IPP leadership, see McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 55–6. 49 On this, see Joseph Devlin to T.P. [O’Connor], 20 March 1915 (PA, LGP, LG/C/6/10/13) and Stevenson, Lloyd George, p.  47 [diary entry for 6 May 1915]. 50 Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 8. 51 The annual average number of divisions taken across all years in Cromwell’s study:  1861–1926 at five-year intervals (excluding 1866)  was 348. Cromwell, House of Commons Voting. 52 Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. 53 See Beer, Modern British Politics, pp. 126–37. 54 Lipset and Rokkan outline a multitude of cleavages upon which societies can divide in the course of their analysis. However, they arrive at a point where they advocate just these four. Lipset and Rokkan go on to argue that each of these four key cleavages has traditionally occurred, in the order listed, in many polities throughout modern history. Furthermore, the authors suggest that the process is cyclical. Lipset and Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures … an introduction’, p. 47. 55 Without explicitly referencing Lipset and Rokkan, Geoffrey Hosking and Anthony King detail a number of internal cleavages that existed within the Liberal party around this time. They identify religion, social reform and foreign policy as the three key cleavages within the Liberal party itself. Geoffrey Hosking and Anthony King, ‘Radicals and Whigs in the British Liberal party, 1906–1914’ in William O.  Aydelotte (ed.), The History of Parliamentary Behaviour (Princeton, 1977), p. 143. 56 McDowell, British Conservatism, p.  72. On the ‘Conservative party at prayer’, see John K. Walton, Disraeli (London, 1990), p. 17.

Unity in division

255

57 On this see Blewett, Peers, the Parties and the People, p. 147. 58 Using Cromwell’s categorisations, it was possible to search and sort all divisions. The ‘filters’ referred to here are terms created in the present study but related to one or more of Cromwell’s original designations. 59 For a synopsis of the 1902 act, see Hansard 4, cxxx, cols 1158–60 (26 February 1904). 60 Crean is identified as one of 12 extremely radical parliamentary protestors in Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 236[n]‌. 61 Hansard 4, clx, cols 1458–9 (16 July 1906). 62 Hansard 4, clx, col. 1463 (16 July 1906) [division no. 220]. 63 There were five divisions taken on the subject on 16 July 1906. Division 220 has been chosen as it was the best attended of the musical copyright votes in 1906. 64 The average age of those (eight) Nationalists voting ‘aye’ was forty-one years as opposed to fifty for those Nationalists (twenty-eight in number) opposing the amendment. 65 Eugene Crean, C.J. Dolan, and James O’Mara: Dictionary of Irish Biography (correct as of January 2015). 66 Finding aids and catalogues to the Redmond and Dillon papers (NLI and TCD respectively) were consulted as well as the Freeman’s Journal, Irish Times, and the Anglo-Celt. 67 C.J. Dolan and James O’Mara resigned their seats as members of the IPP in 1907 and joined the nascent Sinn Féin party. Dolan unsuccessfully ran as the first Sinn Féin candidate in the ensuing North Leitrim by-election of 21 February 1908. Eugene Crean and John O’Donnell, both firm O’Brienites, were members of the AFIL by 1909. O’Donnell was expelled from the IPP in 1907 ostensibly for his failure to attend a party meeting. See Fintan Lane, ‘Crean, Eugene’, Lawrence William White, ‘Dolan, Charles Joseph’ and Shaun Boylan, ‘O’Mara, James’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography; ii, pp. 984–5; iii, pp.  362–3; and vii, pp.  687–8 respectively. On John O’Donnell, see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 120[n]‌. 68 Of particular significance in this respect are the minutes of the meeting of the IPP held on 27 July 1907: IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 69 See McConnel, ‘View from the backbench’, p. 177. It appears that the closeness of this relationship may have been tentative as McConnel puts the word ‘cousin’ in inverted commas. 70 Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 206 et seq. 71 120 divisions related to Ireland within the present study. 72 On the roots and underlying principles of Conservative opposition to the Home Rule movement from its inception see McDowell, British Conservatism, pp. 106–12. 73 The strongest likeness score between the Irish party and the Conservatives recorded in Cousins’ study can be seen on the vote for the Public Houses (Ireland) (Sunday) Closing Bill (9 May 1888, division 280). Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 14 [­figure 9].

256

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

74 It should be noted that increased likeness between Nationalists and Conservatives on non-Irish issues arguably has more to do with changes in Conservative voting behaviour on ‘Irish’ votes rather than with any deliberate alignment between Conservatives and Nationalists on other issues. 75 The Labour party held only two seats in 1901 but this had risen to twenty-nine by 1906 and forty-two after the December elections of 1910: Rallings and Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, pp. 16–21. 76 Figures taken from Rallings and Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, pp. 16–21. 77 On this see Desposato, ‘Correcting for small group inflation’, pp. 731–3 in particular. 78 The likeness figure for 1901 has not been factored in as the Labour party only consisted of two MPs in that year. This is the smallest theoretical size for any ‘group’ and all Rice scores become extremely distorted and meaningless as group size approaches two. 79 Ronan Fanning, Fatal Path:  British Government and Irish Revolution, 1910–1922 (London, 2013), p. 351. 80 See Elizabeth Malcolm, ‘The drink question in Ireland, 1856–1901’ (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 1980)  and Elizabeth Malcolm, ‘Ireland Sober, Ireland Free’: Drink and Temperance in Nineteenth-Century Ireland (Dublin, 1986), pp. 206–75. 81 Permissive bill: a bill introduced into parliament several times between 1864 and 1877, intended to give each parish the right to refuse the issue of licences to sell intoxicating liquors. Oxford English Dictionary Online (www.oed. com.eproxy.ucd.ie/view/Entry/141216?redirectedFrom=permissive#eid) (3 January 2012). 82 Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians:  The Temperance Question in England 1815–1872 (London, 1971), p. 261, quoted in Elizabeth Malcolm, ‘Drink question in Ireland’, p. 348. 83 On religion and the drink question across Ireland and Britain, see Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, pp.  163–7; Malcolm, ‘Ireland Sober, Ireland Free’, pp. 276–7; and W.R. Lambert, Drink and Sobriety in Victorian Wales, c. 1820–c. 1895 (Cardiff, 1983), pp. 213–14. 84 On the occupations of these two members, see Lyons, Irish Parliamentary Party, p. 169. 85 Hansard 4, xci, cols 578–86 (20 March 1901). 86 Hansard 4, xci, cols 626–8 (20 March 1901) [division no. 80]. 87 Including the admittedly high proportion of non-voters (158 out of 375 members). 88 Attesting to his pivotal role in the temperance movement, Elizabeth Malcolm devotes an entire section to Russell in her chapter entitled ‘Personalities and principles:  the case against drink’, Malcolm, ‘Drink question in Ireland’, pp. 235–51. 89 See Hansard 4, clvii, cols 1565–633 (25 May 1906). 90 Diary entry for 10 May 1915, Stevenson, Lloyd George, p. 49.

Unity in division

257

91 Joseph Devlin to T.P. [O’Connor], 20 March 1915 (PA, LGP, LG/C/6/10/13). 92 Joseph Devlin to T.P. [O’Connor], 20 March 1915 (PA, LGP, LG/C/6/10/13). 93 Loughlin, ‘Devlin, Joseph’, p. 243. 94 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxvi, col. 1479 (26 October 1916). 95 170 out of 1,500 divisions to be precise. 96 On marriage with a deceased wife’s sister  – which is also addressed in Cousins, ‘Voting behaviour’, p. 12 – see Donald Read, England, 1868–1914 (London, 1979), p.  422 and N.F. Anderson, ‘The “Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill” controversy: incest anxiety and the defence of family purity in Victorian England’, Journal of British Studies, xxi (1982), pp. 67–86. 97 In the four ‘social problems’ divisions during 1916, the Liberals scored a likeness of 29.9 with Nationalists compared with an average of 48.6 points on all other votes in that year. 98 Variance between ‘social problems’ votes for 1901, 1906, and 1916 is 1.2 compared with 301.4 for all other divisions. Even factoring in the 1911 scores, variance on ‘social problems’ was more than half that of all other issues (118.2 versus 253). 99 In 1916, Nationalists and Conservatives were only 1.8 points closer on ‘social problems’ votes than on all other issues. 100 A good summary of the provisions of the 1902 act can be found in R.K. Webb, Modern England: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (2nd edn, London, 1980), p. 456. 101 Reginald J.  Dingle, Cardinal Bourne at Westminster (London, 1934), pp. 14–15. 102 Mulvagh, ‘Rome ruler’, pp. 18–26. 103 158 of the 501 divisions related to education based on Cromwell’s classifications. Cromwell, House of Commons Voting [computer file]. 104 It should, however, not be forgotten that, although more a grassroots problem, Michael Wheatley has exposed the true depth of the rifts created by the so-called ‘ranch war’ of 1906–9. Wheatley, Nationalism, pp. 118–31 in particular. 105 Walker, Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 177–82. 106 Indeed cohesion among all Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons actually rose from 95.6 in 1906 to 97.5 in 1911 (measured on the Rice cohesion index). See above, Table 8.2. 107 On the emergence of the AFIL in Ireland, see Maume, Long Gestation, pp. 99–119. 108 It should be noted that Irish Unionists witnessed a brief slump in their average annual cohesion score in 1906, going from 95.9 in 1901 to 88.1 five years later. This put them second last in the 1906 rankings with only the Conservatives achieving a lower score (85.2). Nationalists topped the cohesion tables in 1901 (97.4) and 1906 (95.6) and Irish Unionists in 1911 (97.7) and 1916 (93). Numbers in brackets indicate the highest Rice cohesion score in the given year. 109 A key work in this historiography is Wheatley, Nationalism.

258

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

110 See Hosking and King, ‘Radicals and Whigs’, pp. 136–41. The terms ‘accidentalist’ and the ‘inevitablist’ were coined in this article. 111 Hosking and King, ‘Radicals and Whigs’, p. 138. 112 Hosking and King, ‘Radicals and Whigs’, p. 155. 113 Full commentary on how the whips and the leadership attempted to increase attendance from 1911 onwards can be found in McConnel, Irish Parliamentary Party, pp. 215–18. 114 Bearing in mind the caveat that AFIL are included in the 1911 figure but no such faction existed in 1906.

Conclusion

Far from being a ‘guerrilla party, with revolutionary, and not parliamentary or constitutional, objectives’, the present study has shown that, by the opening of the twentieth century, the IPP was in fact part of the furniture at Westminster. On the one hand, its behaviour could at times be obstreperous to the point of provoking hostility from Conservative and Liberal governments alike. However, by shining a comparative light on events, it has been shown that this behaviour was no more extreme than that of the Conservative party when it felt threatened between 1909 and 1912. If anything, it was Conservatives and Unionists rather than Nationalists who pushed the limits of both intra- and extra-parliamentary agitation. Within parliament this was most pronounced in the reaction to parliamentary reform. Externally, the formation, drilling, and arming of a volunteer force far outstripped its nationalist counterpart in terms of organisation and armament despite numerical inferiority. Re-envisaging the parliamentary party at Westminster Throughout the present work, a single set of research questions, over a singular chronology, has been tackled. However, two contrasting methodologies have been used to give the fullest possible perspective on the policy and practice of the work of Irish Nationalist representation in the House. The nature of the party’s work at Westminster, as opposed to Ireland, has been the primary focus. In looking at the internal dynamics of the party’s leadership – the tetrarchy of John Redmond, John Dillon, Joseph Devlin, and T.P. O’Connor – it has been possible to examine the ways in which these relationships evolved in reaction to external events. In contemporary politics, many parties now give ordinary card-carrying members from outside the parliamentary party choice – or the illusion of choice – in the selection of their chief.1 In contrast, at the turn of the last century, leader selection was something that, while chosen by consensus and by a vote of the parliamentary party, was de facto selected by an

260

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

inner circle of influential individuals behind closed doors and through sealed envelopes. This was not just the case in the Irish party; similar patterns were replicated in other groupings. The structures of the Irish party are perhaps best explained through the political writings of the time rather than those of later eras. Moisei Ostrogorski’s exploration of the growth and operation of the machine in English politics conforms closely to what has been seen both here, on a parliamentary level, and in other histories at a grassroots level.2 Interestingly, what political scientists such as Maurice Duverger fail to represent comprehensively is how a regional entity such as the Irish party fitted into what they described as strictly ‘two-party’ systems.3 Taking Ostrogorski’s typologies, Irish constitutional nationalism, at least at grassroots level, functioned more like a municipal political model. Introducing Ostrogorski, Seymour Lipset offers detailed comment on how one-party systems with a strong tendency towards machine politics inevitably occur when the electorate in a city, province, or region vote overwhelmingly for the same party. In this scenario, this faction holds sway over patronage and power and, without the threat of credible opponents at the polls, ‘many groups may be denied access to the municipal [in this case “party”] decision making system’.4 True to form, this is precisely the situation that has been outlined here within the nationalist circles in Ireland. Like Ostrogorski, Robert Michels’ account of the formation and functioning of oligarchies and the reality of collaborative party governance tallies closely with the present study. A very narrowly based oligarchy dominated the Irish party. Entry to this cabal was strictly regulated and limited, and control of policy was jealously guarded from interlopers and dissidents within the party’s ranks. Having temporarily made peace with O’Brien and Healy during the Sinn Féin crisis of 1907–1908, the ‘baton convention’ of 1909, ruthlessly stage-managed by Devlin and his men from the AOH, was nothing short of a purge. William O’Brien’s final estrangement with the party was achieved by force, and not by words as had happened in 1903. As 1909 drew to a close, with dissent externalised, the tetrarchy presided unopposed over a streamlined and highly disciplined party. In the process, the unity of all Irish nationalists that had been so carefully constructed in 1900 was now gone. Before the First World War, it was the AFIL and not Sinn Féin that constituted the greatest threat to the electoral hegemony of the IPP. By using the pledge to expel Healy, its original author, the primacy of obedience within the party was upheld. However, the representative nature of the Irish party was diminished.

Conclusion

261

As strong autonomous voices, both William O’Brien and T.M. Healy posed real threats to the tetrarchy. O’Brien in particular had a real influence on the direction of constitutional nationalism between 1898 and 1903. The UIL gave him a platform that threatened the position of others and his belief in ‘conference plus business’ received official party sanction with his and Redmond’s attendance at the Mansion House Conference (December 1902 – January 1903). However, Dillon and his allies in both the press and the party saw off these threats. Healy was formally expelled as early as December 1900 and O’Brien was ousted by the end of 1903. Although they would resurface, by this point the party had begun to revolve around the Redmond–Dillon axis. The dominance of Dillonism In particular, the dominance of the tetrarchy can be viewed as the triumph of Dillonism. In the more recent historiography of constitutional nationalism, much prominence has been given to John Redmond, painting him as a strong and charismatic leader of the parliamentary party.5 This image derives largely from the period 1910–14 when public enthusiasm for Redmond was at its peak. Following on from the work of Paul Bew,6 Michael Wheatley has provided an important counter-argument, reminding historians that Redmondism was never more than a ‘minority taste’ within the broad church of Irish nationalism.7 In the present work, the recent vogue for focussing on the personality of Redmond has been critically interrogated. In the first decade of the twentieth century, John Dillon dominated behind the scenes as a Richelieu-type figure who was capable of purging other pretenders who got close to Redmond, the public face of the movement. Despite quiet periods where he retreated from public life for health and family reasons, Dillon retained his influential position over the direction of party policy. Even in the years when Redmond was at the height of his popularity, Dillon still stood on at least an equal footing with the chairman in the shaping of party policy. The Buckingham Palace Conference represented one of the clearest instances of Dillon stepping out from the background and onto the public stage; this time as a statesman rather than a provincial politician. In this entire study into the leadership, only one clear instance of Redmond acting unilaterally – without consultation or consent from his fellow tetrarchs  – has been identified. In pledging the Irish Volunteers to the war effort in August 1914, Redmond acted against the advice of T.P. O’Connor and against the will of John Dillon.8 This incident, coupled with Redmond’s escalating support for the imperial war effort,

262

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

precipitated an ‘estrangement’ with Dillon. While attempts were made to reconcile these differences between the autumn of 1914 and the spring of 1916, a divergence of opinion over the party’s alignment to the war effort festered between Redmond and Dillon. More generally, the whole tetrarchy was drifting apart, with very few face-to-face meetings between all four members in this period. In addition, the spectre of partition provoked major crises of conscience in Dillon and especially in Devlin. For Devlin, the bargaining away of his native province and his own central role in selling partition to the assembled delegates of nationalist Ulster weighed heavily upon his mind. By contrast, isolated from the realities of Irish life in London, O’Connor began to look upon partition from a purely utilitarian perspective. If Home Rule was to be saved, Ulster would, at least for a time, have to be sacrificed. Redmond too was insulated from the realities of Irish political debate by this stage, living in something of a bubble between the isolated idyll of Aughavanagh and bustling metropolis of London. When John Dillon returned to the House of Commons on 10 May 1916, he displayed a radicalism he had seldom unleashed since the Liberals’ electoral landslide in 1906. In a tactical sense, Dillon now began emulating Sinn Féin’s radicalism and its disdain for participation and negotiation with a Cabinet in which Unionism was a growing force. With this, the ideological gap that separated him from Redmond grew during 1916 and 1917. One of the darkest stains on the collective reputations of the tetrarchy that has been brought into sharper focus here is the way in which Joseph Devlin, elevated to the ranks of the leadership as the only protégé of any substance among the turn-of-the-century influx to the parliamentary party, was forced to trade Ulster for the good of southern nationalism. Having conceded to the principle of time-limited exclusion for a section of Ulster under pressure from his colleagues in 1913, the burden of compromise continued to be piled high on Devlin’s shoulders. Devlin’s steadfast obedience, which had elevated him from a life as a ‘Belfast bottle-washer’9 to the highest echelons of nationalist political life, was epitomised by his performance at the Ulster convention of the UIL in June 1916. The feat of convincing the delegates of nationalist Ulster to vote themselves out of Lloyd George’s latest Home Rule settlement took a massive toll on Devlin. Since the re-opening of negotiations after the Rising, he had experienced feelings of great personal regret for ever having involved himself in the bartering away of his native province.10 This remorse was a major contributory factor in the breakdown of unity within the tetrarchy. Though he tried to bridge the ideological gap between Redmond and Dillon at this point, Devlin would eventually be

Conclusion

263

forced to side with his long-time political mentor in defiance of his chairman when matters came to a head at the Irish Convention in early 1918. In addressing the break-up of collaborative leadership in the Irish party, it was argued that T.P. O’Connor was effectively sidelined when he was sent on his ill-conceived fundraising mission to America in the late summer of 1917. Despite being one of John Dillon’s closest confidantes and advisors, it could, somewhat speculatively, be argued that O’Connor’s blasé acceptance of the principle of partition and his fixation with the cult of Lloyd George were factors in what was clearly a contrived move to extract him from Westminster politics at this decisive juncture in the Irish question. Whereas previously, O’Connor’s close ties with the Liberal party had been one of the party’s greatest assets, in the ascendancy of Lloyd George, O’Connor’s overlapping loyalties between the old English Radical and Irish Home Rule traditions was something that was more likely to be used by Lloyd George against the Irish party. Although there is no explicit documentary evidence from either Redmond or Dillon to corroborate this, it appears that O’Connor’s role within the tetrarchy was approaching the end of its shelf-life at the same time as Devlin’s usefulness was becoming greater. Devlin was not only influential in Ulster nationalism but he was also the earmarked successor to the chairmanship. In 1918 he was more useful as a fundraiser in America than as a participant in a crisis that, with an election looming, was being fought out across Ireland rather than in London as had previously been the case. Cleavage structures: qualifying the political alignment of the Irish party The prevailing notion of the ‘union of hearts’ between the Irish Nationalist and British Liberal parties extends into the twentieth century. Officially, the IPP refused to countenance formal alliance with any political party before 1910; something enshrined in an official party resolution in February 1906 following the election of the Liberal government.11 In practice, however, likeness between the Irish party and the Liberals was consistently strong throughout the period under consideration. The formalisation of ties from April 1910 onwards naturally led to near-total (96 point) voting similarity12 between the parties in 1911. However, it is overly simplistic to state that the Irish party and the Liberals were constant allies in the division lobbies. Here, insight into Irish Nationalist voting alignment has been significantly enhanced. The religious outlook of core voters was a clear stumbling block between Nationalists and Liberals and whether it was on the drink question, education, or

264

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

the more general issue of ‘social problems’, such votes widened the gap between these two groups and simultaneously provided rare common ground between Home Rulers and British Conservatives. Given that only four years in a period stretching from 1900 to 1918 have been analysed, it would be wrong to make definitive conclusions about the evolution of Irish Nationalist voting habits in the House. Whereas in parliamentary questions, it was possible, with a smaller sample, to identify the 1916 Rising as the point at which the party changed its patterns of behaviour, it is impossible to know how the voting behaviour observed in 1916 relates to years either side of this milestone with the data that was used in this study. Even though this data is extremely comprehensive – assessing every vote in every division in the given years – it can never represent more than a snapshot of the broader evolution of voting behaviour. It is likely that other contributory factors  – inspection of convent laundries in 1907, customs and excise in 1909, and the payment of MPs in 1910 for ­example – would all have provided some further degree of ideological common ground between Irish Nationalists and British Conservatives. Similarly, the Irish issue lay at the heart of Nationalist–Conservative acrimony. To conclude on where the Irish party was situated on the spectrum of Westminster politics, it can be said that it was more closely orientated to the Liberal party than Conservatives on the centre–periphery cleavage. However, there were strong conservative leanings among Nationalists on social questions. While it has not been displayed quantitatively here, speeches – such as Redmond’s in 1909, when he put it to Lloyd George that the tobacco of the peasantry on the west of Ireland would be taxed to pay for dreadnoughts13 – suggest the prevalence of a strong economic conservatism among the IPP. No more than they appeared lukewarm on the merits of Liberal proposals to ameliorate the English system of education or to roll out a system of national insurance, the IPP was equally unwilling to countenance the increases in taxation that would finance these schemes. This could simply have been a manifestation of Redmond’s ancestral identity as a member of the Irish Catholic gentry. However, the fact remains that, stretching back to Parnell’s advocacy of protectionism, there was a strand of continuity between Irish Nationalist and British Conservative economic thought.14 Governmental interactions with the Irish party In studying the ways in which the British governments of the era chose to negotiate and put pressure on different members of the tetrarchy at different times, some interesting insights have been gained on the ways

Conclusion

265

in which British governments, particularly the Liberals, handled the Irish party. From the time of the Home Rule crisis onwards, Asquith knew which tetrarch to make his first port of call if he was to get the optimum response. He also knew which members of his Cabinet worked best at securing assurances and commitments from specific members of the leadership. Asquith himself, and at a crucial moment, his wife, ensured that Redmond was on board with the war effort as early as August 1914, bringing Redmond into line ahead of his colleagues. Similarly, T.P. O’Connor was singled out on the partition question when it became clear that the Londoner was not so entrenched in his position on the North as were some of his colleagues. Significantly, O’Connor’s biographer has noted how he was ‘enthralled’ by Lloyd George’s performances, something that must have been noted among the Cabinet.15 Thus, Lloyd George was sent by Asquith to open up a dialogue with O’Connor in the autumn of 1913. These discussions would ensure for the government that one tetrarch was on board. With a convert in the camp, the rest would follow, convincing themselves and each other to moderate their respective positions on this most painful of dilemmas. Importantly, Dillon, the hardliner, was rarely if ever the Liberal government’s first point of contact, despite the overwhelming amount of power he wielded in the party.16 In May 1916, personally aware of his own intransigence and desirous to leave the way open for his more diplomatic and moderate colleagues, Dillon made it clear to O’Connor that the chances of settlement would be greater if he were not present for the opening of negotiations with Asquith. With a guarded stoicism that marked the ne plus ultra of his diplomacy by this point, Dillon confessed that ‘I am almost certain I  should feel compelled to dissent and object  – it is far better to leave the field clear to those who believe that a workable arrangement is possible’.17 A  year later, as the Irish Convention rapidly descended into deadlock, Dillon continued to isolate himself from negotiation. However, when cracks appeared in the convention, his mood hardened and he rescinded even his tacit support for the conciliatory efforts of his colleagues. To the Southern unionists, the rift was so clear and so public that Lord Midleton observed to an ally that both Dillon and Devlin were now actively ‘canvassing against Redmond’.18 If the government could win over one member of the leadership, they had secured a convert that could turn others. In 1912, it would have been inconceivable that Devlin would have budged on the question of partition. However, after heated exchanges with Dillon, Devlin was eventually brought on side.19 Having won one convert in O’Connor, and a second in Redmond, the principle of partition was thus eventually

266

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

accepted by all four tetrarchs. In a centralised and machine-style party, acceptance then filtered down, first to the majority of the parliamentary party, and then to the grassroots, with Devlin’s own speech proving decisive in winning over the assembled delegates of nationalist Ulster. In analysing division votes and parliamentary questions in the present work it has been possible to trace the state of party discipline and the evolution of collective behaviour. Cohesion among Nationalist MPs at division votes has acted as a rough but valuable indicator of the state of obedience within the Irish party. The figures for 1916 have shown that, despite the monumental strains placed upon the constitutional nationalist ideal in that year, the primacy of the leadership and the rule of the whips held firm. Naturally, non-aligned mavericks such as Laurence Ginnell still spoke out both at Question Time and in debates, but the party faithful, be they Redmondites or Dillonites at their core, held firm. Even by late 1917 and early 1918, when Redmond’s hold within the party was weakening, it was not to Sinn Féin or the Healy–O’Brien axis that the discontented looked, but inwards, to Dillon and Devlin as the future saviours of the party. In this way, the efficacy of collaborative governance within the party was confirmed. Loyalty did not leak, it simply mutated to conform with the shifts developing in the ruling oligarchy. To his credit, Redmond saw and respected this move, and his dying wish was for Dillon or Devlin to take the reins and to lead the party to success in a general election in which, in the spring of 1918, it was arguably already doomed to defeat. Just as divisions have been able to provide snapshots of the shape of party discipline at five-year intervals, parliamentary questions have provided a more chronologically complete – albeit less detailed – representation of radicalism within the party. Again, this has correlations with the state of feeling amongst the leadership. The sense, both in the wider party and in the leadership, appears to have been that Nationalists became more comfortable in their relations with the Liberal government as the years went on between December 1905 and 1915. For the leadership, consultation replaced confrontation. In the wider party, agitation continued to be adopted during 1906. In provincial Ireland, this period witnessed the continuation of agrarian unrest while Bryce, as an inactive and reluctant Chief Secretary, was at the helm. More than the coming to power of the Liberals, Augustine Birrell’s promotion – if it can be called that – to the Irish Office appears to have been instrumental to the metamorphosis of Nationalist sentiment and behaviour both in the House of Commons and in the government’s dealings with the leadership. On the Irish side, T.P. O’Connor did much to facilitate the closer union of the two groups up until the formalisation of ties in April 1910. Thereafter,

Conclusion

267

he was a key player in bringing the Irish party through obstacles that jeopardised the integrity of its alliance with Asquith’s government, most importantly on the Ulster question. Power structures, tactics, and oligarchy in the parliamentary party Oligarchy evolved within the Irish party in a very similar way to the model first outlined by Robert Michels. In particular, Michels’ comments on ‘the struggle among the leaders themselves’ has been shown to have much resonance with the events outlined in this study.20 Furthermore, Michels’ revised edition of Political Parties, written in 1915, included a section on ‘Party-Life in War-Time’.21 Here, Redmond’s identification with the war effort can be seen to have conformed to a model that was replicated by political leaders throughout Europe at the time. In examining the question of writing the IPP into the British constitutional narrative, therefore, it is important to note that, far from exhibiting Irish exceptionalism, the actions of the Irish party in 1914 conformed closely to the actions of politicians across Europe in a moment that did not distinguish between entente (allied) and central powers or between core and peripheral political groups. In a sociological sense, Michels saw a Europe where empires were yielding to the demands of nationality; something that would persist throughout the twentieth century.22 More so than ideology, Irish Nationalist tactics, their theoretical conceptualisation, implementation, and evolution, have been the central focus of this study. As early as 1904, Griffith’s Resurrection of Hungary argued that the tactic of participation at Westminster had outlived its usefulness.23 Even factoring in the high point of Nationalist agitation in the House in 1901, the radicalism seen in the days of Biggar and Parnell had faded by the twentieth century. Slow failure or paschal fallout? The end of constitutional nationalism One of the most interesting historiographical dimensions of the story of the Irish party is the question of its decline. In a wider sense, the process of its demise is by no means unique to the history of the Irish party and the question of why parties fail has long interested academics and political participants alike.24 A similar trajectory was followed by the British Liberal party after the First World War.25 This study has looked back through the history of the (re-)united Irish party, and of constitutional nationalist representation at Westminster, for indicators of tension, de-radicalisation, and declining participation

268

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

in the years before the party’s fall. Tensions within the leadership have been revealed, and it has been shown here that the open disagreements and estrangements witnessed among the leadership from 1915 onwards had their roots in much deeper ideological cleavages centring on the tactical divide between conciliation and constitutional agitation as preserved in the political philosophies of Redmond and Dillon respectively. Of course it was in the IPP’s interest to claim that the reunification of 1900 was highly successful. However, the reality was that there remained much jostling and jealousy under the green umbrella. It has also been shown that any fissures that did emerge over the land question and the party’s response to constructive unionism in 1902–3 were patched over and the tetrarchy presented a genuinely united front in the face of internal dissidents from 1907 to 1909 and in response to the wider political crisis from 1909 to 1913. Partition planted the seeds of doubt in the mind of Joseph Devlin during 1913 but his trust in his more senior colleagues kept him in line and he brought the grassroots of Ulster along with him, encouraging them to endorse the temporary exclusion of an undetermined section of their own province.26 The tensions that arose between Dillon and Redmond – over recruitment in 1915 and over the insurrection in Dublin the following year – brought matters to a head. It would seem that these divisions within the leadership were indeed instrumental to the fall of the party, as the split over the future direction of policy and tactics on such central issues as the war and the Rising paralysed the previously effective model of collaborative leadership at the top of the party. In parliamentary terms, divisions emerged between Redmond and Dillon over recruitment. With docility and low attendance at Westminster prevailing among the rank and file of the official Irish party, an opening was made in the summer of 1915 for malcontents and mavericks to dominate the Nationalist contribution to the proceedings of the Commons.27 However, it would be rumblings among the party faithful as opposed to the efforts of the mavericks that eventually toppled Redmond from the chairmanship. Referring to American trade unionism, Seymour Lipset argues that ‘if they are seen primarily as single purpose organisations, and if the organisation fulfils its primary purpose … its leadership are permitted considerable leeway in other areas, viewed as less salient policy areas’.28 Despite having outlined the work done on non-Irish issues by the Irish party, the Home Rule movement was, at its roots, just such a single purpose organisation. If Lipset’s assertions can be taken as being sociologically accurate, then the ability of the leadership to bring the Irish party with them on the budget issues in 1909, and even on the recruitment in

Conclusion

269

1914, is the proof that these were not top-tier policy issues. However, partition and the watering-down of the 1914 Government of Ireland Act were questions upon which the rank and file would not consent to large-scale conciliation such as Redmond began to entertain in early 1918. If the study of leadership has helped to progress understandings of the nature of the emergence of fissures and the dénouement of policy failures within the leadership of the party, then parliamentary questions and division voting have helped to explain the chronology of the party’s demise. While a steady decline has been charted from 1901 to 1915 in the intensity of Nationalist questioning in the Commons, the re-radicalisation of questions after Easter 1916 raises as many questions as it answers regarding the impact of the insurrection on Nationalist activity at Westminster. Division voting suggests an equally downward trend in parliamentary participation but this was a phenomenon mirrored across all parties in the exceptional year – for both Ireland and Britain – of 1916. Returning to the question of decline or fall, what both the quantitative data and the archival sources emphasise is that 1916 was a seminal year in which the IPP reeled from the political effects of the Rising, the executions, and the imposition and endurance of martial law across large parts of Ireland. Roy Foster has argued that the First World War was one of the most decisive events in modern Irish history and, in a broad sense, he is correct.29 However, the 1916 Rising – as something that was spawned by, but not fully part of, the First World War – was the real agent of change in the context of politics and the Irish party. The Rising caused a spike in Nationalists questions and a concurrent exodus from the division lobbies. More importantly, it sent Redmond and Dillon, as the two horses that were pulling the Irish party, on divergent paths. By 1918, under Dillon, the Irish party was engaging in abstentionist tactics, mimicking its political rivals in Sinn Féin and diminishing its relevance in a parliament that was glad to externalise from its order papers the distraction that Ireland had become and leave it to the Irish to solve their own problems; allowing the Cabinet get on with winning the war.30 Conciliation, which had been championed by O’Brien at the opening of the new century, had been preserved, but not celebrated, in the spirit of Redmondism. It had sprung forth in the pledging of the Irish Volunteers to the defence of Irish soil. When, at Woodenbridge on 20 September 1914, the chairman advanced his position, calling for service on the front line, he provoked a split between moderates and militants in the Volunteers.31 However, while Redmondism attempted to culturally demobilise Anglophobia, the hagiography of Wolfe Tone and

270

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

Robert Emmet developed by men like R.R. Madden in the Victorian era remained a potent exemplar of a more advanced brand of nationalism, whose spirit was kept alive.32 It was not just Pearse and Connolly who looked to these ideological antecedents. Tutored by the future Fenian leader James Stephens in his youth,33 Dillon was also respectful of a tradition that, through the Young Irelanders, carried a notional strand of continuity through to the incarceration and land agitation which defined his own early political career.34 Because Sinn Féin, who took up the mantle from the IPP in 1918, were looking for virtually the same goals that their predecessors had sought, the line of demarcation between constitutional and advanced nationalism thus rested on the question of tactics. Once the strains of the war and the Rising combined, there was no clear agreement on tactics among the tetrarchy of the Irish party. As a result, the movement entered into a reactive phase, lurching from crisis to crisis with no overarching policy or tactical framework extant in the party since Home Rule had been placed on the Statute Book. This resulted in the party’s retention of just six seats in the 1918 elections. The study of parliamentary questions here would argue that a chance to renew the appeal of constitutional nationalism after 1916 – although present – was lost, and the slow decline in parliamentary behaviour which had continued for over a decade now reached crisis point. While parliamentary questions might point towards a slow decline hypothesis, the exceptional impact of events between 1914 and 1918 were what tipped the party into the abyss. This is not to say that there were not systemic and festering problems at the top of the party. These were echoed by the demise of the UIL at branch level as documented by Michael Wheatley. However, both nationally and locally, these failings were not irreparable. For the tetrarchs, one of the most serious long-term problems was the failure to draw in young talent to the ranks of the party. Joseph Devlin had been singled out as an exceptional young MP. However, Tom Kettle and others who had come together in the ‘Young Ireland’ branch of the UIL35 showed promise but these aspirant young men were only ever consulted rather than being trusted to participate in the process of policy steering by the leadership. The real problem, however, stemmed from the failure to recruit prominent and promising figures into the party. The first of these failures came with Douglas Hyde’s refusal to consider entering politics as an IPP candidate in 1904. The party had wanted to recruit Hyde not for his obvious talents as an orator and an organiser, but as a tool to win over Gaelic League voters.36 This cynical type of calculation dominated in a party in which the machine was very

Conclusion

271

powerful and candidate selection was – in reality if not on paper – highly centralised.37 While Hyde may have been on the party’s radar, men like Pearse and Plunkett were almost certainly not. Arguably these failed revolutionaries possessed neither the oratorical nor the organisational acumen to rival the skills exhibited by O’Connor or Devlin. However, as Dillon explained in his defence of the rebels on 11 May 1916, ‘they [were] men worth having’.38 In light of the reverence these revolutionaries won in the minds of the nationalist public, Dillon might have done well to listen to his own advice and to have recruited men like these into the UIL, and even brought the best of them into the IPP. Instead, the party was obsessed with discipline and, in purging dissidence, it inadvertently shut out the best of an emerging and impatient generation of political activists that would become frustrated with the party they perceived as stagnant, clientelist, and timid in the face of a bold and dynamic unionist movement in Ulster. Senia Pašeta provides an important vignette into ‘Ireland’s last Home Rule generation’, showing how there was a cohort of highly educated and politically active young men and women who anticipated the Home Rule dawn and their role working within a new administration that never came. For the more radical of these, when Home Rule was put on hiatus by the First World War, they gravitated towards alternatives to the Irish party.39 In this way, while the structures of the parliamentary party were functioning quite well and internal party discipline was in good shape at least up to 1916 if not beyond, the Easter Rising constituted a powder-keg placed under the old structures of Irish life and governance. Of the old institutions targeted by the rebels, the IPP was certainly on the list. The irony for the tetrarchy was that, by driving out dissent, and by refusing to rejuvenate or spread the power-base within the party, the leadership fuelled the movement that would eventually consume it. In this respect, the history of the Irish party should stand as a lesson and a textbook case in the study of political parties. Where discipline is prized, innovation is excluded and the party that shuts out the talent of the next generation will re-encounter these potential political allies, not as friends, but as enemies either on the streets or at the ballot boxes. Notes 1 For a cross-section of modern-day party leadership selection models in five English-speaking Westminster countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom), see William Cross and André Blais, ‘Who selects the party leader?’, Party Politics, xviii, no. 2 (2012), pp. 127–50.

272

The Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster

2 The parliamentary experience is best summed up in Bew, Conflict and Conciliation. Meanwhile, the most valuable addition to the study of grassroots Irish nationalism in recent historiography has been Wheatley’s Nationalism. 3 Duverger, Political Parties, p. 206 et seq. 4 Lipset, ‘Introduction’ in Ostrogorski, Democracy and Organisation, p. lx. 5 By far the clearest example of this is Finnan’s Redmond. 6 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation. 7 Wheatley, Nationalism, p. 79. 8 Gwynn, Redmond’s Last Years, p. 131 and Dillon to O’Connor, 1 March 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/239). 9 On Devlin’s beginnings in Kelly’s Cellars public house, see Loughlin, ‘Devlin, Joseph’, p. 241. 10 O’Connor to Dillon, 18 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/308). 11 It should be noted that this refusal to enter into alliances was not absolute. Minutes of IPP meeting of 10 February 1906, IPP Minute Book, vol. II (NLI, MS 12,081). 12 Nationalist-Liberal likeness stood at 96 points (Rice likeness index) in 1911. 13 Hansard 5 (Commons), iv, col. 791 (3 May 1909). 14 On Redmond’s gentry lineage, see Meleady, Redmond: The Parnellite, p. 6 et seq. Michael Wheatley provides a definition of ‘Redmondism’ (as opposed to Redmond’s own political thought); Wheatley, Nationalism, p.  6. On Parnell’s belief in protectionism, F.S.L. Lyons records that Arthur Griffith found in Parnell ‘a precursor for the Sinn Féin policy of self-reliance’; F.S.L. Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell (London, 1977), p. 608. 15 Brady, O’Connor, p. 236. 16 George Wyndham’s dismissal of Dillon as ‘a pure Agrarian sore-head’ appears to have been an impression that endured even among some in the Liberal party. Wyndham to his father, 21 November 1903 [354], in Life and Letters of Wyndham, ii, p. 474. 17 Dillon to O’Connor, 20 May 1916 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/310). 18 Lord Midleton to J.H. Bernard, 17 October 1917, cited in Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 187. 19 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 148. 20 Michels, Political Parties, Part II, chapter vi. 21 Michels, Political Parties, pp. 357–63. 22 Michels, Political Parties, p. 357. See also Tom Garvin, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996), pp. 9–10. 23 Griffith, Resurrection of Hungary. In more recent historiography, Michael Laffan has branded Griffith’s manifesto a ‘bizarre political tract’. Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland:  The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–23 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 3. 24 Although more a study of the aftermaths rather than the processes that lead to party failure, a valuable study of diverse national cases is Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds), When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton, 1988).

Conclusion

273

25 On this, see Hosking and King, ‘Radicals and Whigs’, pp. 136–58. 26 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 178. 27 O’Connor to Dillon, 3 July 1915 (TCD, DP, MS 6741/261). 28 Seymour Lipset, ‘Introduction’ in Michels, Political Parties, pp. 31–2. 29 See Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 471. 30 This sentiment had first been expressed in the context of the Irish Convention. See D.G. Boyce and Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘The unknown chief secretary:  H.  E. Duke and Ireland, 1916–18’, Irish Historical Studies, xx, no. 79 (March 1977), p. 303. 31 See Mulvagh, ‘Road to Woodenbridge’, p. 50 et seq. 32 See R.R. Madden, The United Irishmen, their Lives and Times (2 vols, London, 1842) and R.R. Madden, The Life and Times of Robert Emmet, Esq. (Dublin, 1847). 33 Frank Callanan, ‘Dillon, John’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, p. 296. 34 On Dillon’s own early radicalism, Lyons wrote, ‘Dillon wanted a new policy which should be a real, fighting policy …’, Lyons, Dillon, p. 28. 35 Kettle had been a founding member of this intellectual and dynamic Dublin branch of the League. Donal Lowry, ‘Kettle, Thomas Michael (“Tom”)’ in McGuire and Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography, v, pp. 164–5. 36 In particular see Redmond to Dillon, 7 March 1904 (TCD, DP, MS 6747/72). 37 On the origins of centralisation in Irish party candidate selection, see Biagini, British Democracy, p. 191. 38 Hansard 5 (Commons), lxxxii, col. 945 (11 May 1916). 39 Senia Pašeta, ‘Ireland’s last Home Rule generation: the decline of constitutional nationalism in Ireland, 1916–30’ in Mike Cronin and John M. Regan (eds), Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922–49 (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 13–31.

Bibliography

Manuscript sources Bodleian Library, Oxford

Augustine Birrell papers Antony Patrick MacDonnell papers Matthew Nathan papers

British Library, London

Arthur J. Balfour papers Henry Campbell-Bannerman papers

National Library of Ireland, Dublin

Edward Blake papers (Ontario Dept of Public Records and Archives: microfilm, NLI, p4682) James Bryce papers Timothy Charles Harrington papers (as part of Niall C. Harrington papers) Bulmer Hobson papers (MS 13,174/13) Irish Parliamentary Party Minute Books (3 vols, NLI, MS 12,080–2) [Covering 31 December 1900–6 November 1918 inclusively] John Redmond papers

Parliamentary Archives, London Andrew Bonar Law papers David Lloyd George papers

Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast Jeremiah Jordan papers

Trinity College Dublin (Department of Manuscripts) John Dillon papers

University College Dublin Archives Timothy Michael Healy papers

Bibliography

275

University College Dublin Library (microform)

The British in Ireland, CO 904, part one:  anti-government organisations, 1882–1921: CO 904/20–21

Newspaper sources Anglo-Celt Freeman’s Journal Irish Times Weekly Irish Times

Official publications Dáil Éireann … díosbóireachtaí páirliminte (parliamentary debates); tuairisg oifigiúil (official report) (Dublin, Stationery Office). Dod’s Parliamentary Companion (London, published annually from 1832). Howarth, James (ed.). The Premier Parliamentary Record and Review (London, 1905) [series only produced four issues before change of title, see next]. Howarth, James (ed.). Parliamentary Gazette (London, 1906–42). The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), third, fourth, and fifth series, House of Commons and House of Lords (London). Report by the Committee on Irish Finance, 1–34 [Cd  6153], H.C. 1912–13, xxxiv, 5–39. Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to Inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin, 13 [Cd 7273], H.C. 1914, xix, 61–106. Report of the proceedings of the Irish Convention, 1–176 [Cd  9019], H.C. 1917–18, x, 697–872.

Contemporary printed sources and memoirs Ashtown, Lord (Frederick Oliver Trench). The Unknown Power behind the Irish Nationalist Party: Its Present Work and Criminal History (London, 1907). Asquith, H.H. Letters to Venetia Stanley, ed. Michael and Eleanor Brock (Oxford, 1982). Asquith, Margot. The Autobiography of Margot Asquith, ed. Mark Bonham Carter (London, 1962). Boland, John. Irishman’s Day: A Day in the Life of an Irish MP (London, 1944). Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis, 1911–1918 (6 vols, London, 1938), i. Cooper, Bryan Ricco. The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli (London, 1918). Gilbert, W.S. Iolanthe or the Peer and the Peri (London, 1882) (http://math. boisestate.edu/gas/iolanthe/iollib.pdf) (29 December 2011). Ginnell, Laurence. Land and Liberty (Dublin, 1908). Griffith, Arthur. The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland (Dublin, 1904: new edn Dublin, 2003). Gwynn, Stephen. John Redmond’s Last Years (London, 1919).

276

Bibliography

Healy, T.M. Leaders and Letters of My Day (2 vols, London, 1928). Hobhouse, Charles. Inside Asquith’s Cabinet:  From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse, ed. Edward David (London, 1977). Kettle, T.M. The Day’s Burden: Studies, Literary and Political (London, 1910). Law, William. Our Hansard; or, The True Mirror of Parliament:  A  Full Account of the Official Reporting of the Debates in the House of Commons (London, 1950). Mackail, J.W., and Guy Wyndham (eds). Life and Letters of George Wyndham (2 vols, London, 1925). MacLysaght, Edward. ‘Some memories of the Irish Convention 1917–1918’, Capuchin Annual (1968), pp. 345–50. MacNeill, Eoin. ‘Memorandum II’ (written sometime between June and October 1917), Bulmer Hobson papers, NLI, MS 13/4, reproduced in full with foreword and explanatory notes in ‘Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 Rising’, ed. F.X. Martin, in Irish Historical Studies, xii, no. 47 (March 1961), pp. 226–71. Madden, R.R. The Life and Times of Robert Emmet, Esq. (Dublin, 1847). Madden, R.R. The United Irishmen, their Lives and Times (2 vols, London, 1842). O’Brien, William. An Olive Branch in Ireland and its History (London, 1910). O’Connor, T.P. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1908). O’Loughran, Robert. Redmond’s Vindication (London, 1919). O’Malley, William. Glancing Back: 70 Years’ Experience and Reminiscences of Press Man, Sportsman, and Member of Parliament (London, 1933). Redmond-Howard, Louis. John Redmond:  The Man and the Demand, a Biographical Study in Irish Politics (London, 1910). Stevenson, Frances. Lloyd George, a Diary, ed. A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1971). War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (new edn, 2 vols, London, 1938). Yeats, W.B. ‘Easter 1916’ in Michael Robartes and the Dancer (Dublin, 1920: Irish University Press facsimile reprint, 1970), pp. 9–11.

Secondary sources Abraham, L.A., and S.C. Hawtrey. A Parliamentary Dictionary (2nd edn, London, 1964). Aldous, Richard. The Lion and the Unicorn:  Gladstone vs Disraeli (London, 2007). Anderson, N.F. ‘The “Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill” controversy: incest anxiety and the defence of family purity in Victorian England’, Journal of British Studies, xxi (1982), pp. 67–86. Aydelotte, William O. ‘Quantification in history’, American Historical Review, lxxi, no. 3 (April 1966), pp. 803–25. Aydelotte, William O. ‘Voting patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840s’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, v, no. 2 (January 1963), pp. 134–63. Banks, Margaret. Edward Blake Irish Nationalist:  A  Canadian Statesman in Irish Politics, 1892–1907 (Toronto, 1957). Beckett, I.F.W. (ed.). The Army and the Curragh Incident 1914 (London, 1986).

Bibliography

277

Beer, Samuel H. Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups (London, 1965). Bew, Paul. Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, 1890–1910:  Parnellites and Radical Agrarians (Oxford, 1987). Bew, Paul. Ideology and the Irish Question:  Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism, 1912–16 (Oxford, 1994). Bew, Paul. John Redmond (Dundalk, 1995). Biagini, Eugenio F. British Democracy and Irish Nationalism 1876–1906 (Cambridge, 2007). Biagini, Eugenio F. Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860–1880 (Cambridge, 1992). Blewett, Neal. The Peers, the Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London, 1972). Boyce, D.G., and Cameron Hazlehurst. ‘The unknown chief secretary:  H.  E. Duke and Ireland, 1916–18’, Irish Historical Studies, xx, no. 79 (March 1977), pp. 286–311. Brady, L.W. T.P. O’Connor and the Liverpool Irish (London, 1983). Brock, Michael. ‘The strange death of Liberal England [review]’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, xvii, no. 4 (winter, 1985), pp. 409–23. Bull, Philip. ‘The United Irish League and the re-union of the Irish Parliamentary Party, 1898–1900’, I.H.S., xxvi, no. 101 (May 1988), pp. 51–78. Callanan, Frank. T.M. Healy (Cork, 1996). Callanan, Frank. The Parnell Split, 1890–91 (Cork, 1992). Caramani, Daniele (ed.). Comparative Politics (3rd edn, Oxford, 2014). Chester, D.N., and Nona Bowring. Questions in Parliament (Oxford, 1962). Clark, G. Kitson. The Making of Victorian England (London, 1962). Clausen, Aage R. ‘The measurement of legislative group behaviour’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, xi, no. 2 (May 1967), pp. 212–24. Constantine, Stephen. Lloyd George (London, 1992). Cousins, Mel. ‘The voting behaviour of the Irish parliamentary party on social issues in the House of Commons 1881–90’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive paper no.  30102 (April 2011) (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30102/1/ MPRA_paper_30102.pdf) (29 December 2011). Cox, Gary, and Matthew McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley, 1993). Craig, F.W.S. British Electoral Facts, 1832–1987 (Dartmouth, 1989). Craig, F.W.S. British Parliamentary Election Results 1885–1918 (Dartmouth, 1989). Cromwell, Valerie. ‘Mapping the political world of 1861:  a multidimensional analysis of House of Commons’ division lists’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vii, no. 2 (May 1982), pp. 281–97. Cross, William, and André Blais. ‘Who selects the party leader?’, Party Politics, xviii, no. 2 (2012), pp. 127–50. Cullen, L.M. Eason and Son: A History (Dublin, 1989).

278

Bibliography

Curley, Vanessa M. ‘The life and times of Elizabeth Mathew’ (MA thesis, University College Dublin, 1995). Dangerfield, George. The Strange Death of Liberal England (rev. edn, London, 1966). Desposato, Scott W. ‘Correcting for small group inflation of roll-call cohesion scores’, British Journal of Political Science, xxxv, no. 4 (October 2005), pp. 731–44. Dingle, Reginald J. Cardinal Bourne at Westminster (London, 1934). Dooley, Thomas P. ‘Politics, bands and marketing: army recruitment in Waterford city, 1914–15’, Irish Sword, xviii, no. 72 (winter, 1991), pp. 204–19. Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties:  Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State [Les partis politiques], trans. Barbara and Robert North (3rd edn, London, 1964). Fairlie, Henry. The Life of Politics (London, 1968). Fanning, Ronan. Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution, 1910–1922 (London, 2013). Farrell, Brian (ed.). Chairman or Chief? The Role of Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin, 1971). Faul, F., E. Erdfelder, A. Buchner, and A.G. Lang. ‘Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses’, Behavior Research Methods, xli (2009), pp. 1149–60. Fergusson, James. The Curragh Incident (London, 1964). Ferriter, Diarmaid. The Transformation of Ireland, 1900–2000 (London, 2005). Finnan, Joseph P. John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912–1918 (Syracuse, 2004). Fitzpatrick, David. Politics and Irish Life, 1913–1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Cork, 1998). Foster, R.F. Modern Ireland, 1600–1972 (London, 1988). Fyfe, Hamilton. T.P. O’Connor (London, 1934). Gailey, Andrew. Ireland and the Death of Kindness:  The Experience of Constructive Unionism, 1890–1905 (Cork, 1987). Garvin, Tom. 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996). Garvin, Tom. Judging Lemass: The Measure of the Man (Dublin, 2009). Gaughan, J. Anthony. A Political Odyssey: Thomas O’Donnell (Dublin, 1983). Glandon, Virginia E. Arthur Griffith and the Advanced-Nationalist Press: Ireland, 1900–1922 (New York, 1985). Grigg, John. Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916 (London, 1985). Grigg, John. Lloyd George: The People’s Champion, 1902–1911 (London, 1978). Grigg, John. The Young Lloyd George (London, 1973). Gwynn, Denis. The Life of John Redmond (London, 1932). Harrison, Brian. Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815–1872 (London, 1971). Hay, Marnie. Bulmer Hobson and the Nationalist Movement in TwentiethCentury Ireland (Manchester, 2009). Hayes, Michael. ‘Dáil Éireann and the Irish Civil War’, Studies:  An Irish Quarterly Review, lviii, no. 229 (spring, 1969), pp. 1–23.

Bibliography

279

Hepburn, A.C. Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland in the Era of Joe Devlin, 1871–1934 (Oxford, 2008). Hepburn, A.C. ‘The Irish Council Bill and the fall of Sir Antony MacDonnell, 1906–7’, Irish Historical Studies, xvii, no. 68 (September 1971), pp. 470–98. Heyck, T.W., and William Klecka. ‘British Radical M.P.s, 1874–1895: new evidence from discriminant analysis’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, iv, no. 2 (autumn, 1973), pp. 161–84. Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland. ‘Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001’, British Journal of Political Science, xxxv (2005), pp. 209–34. Hosking, Geoffrey, and Anthony King. ‘Radicals and Whigs in the British Liberal party, 1906–1914’ in William O. Aydelotte (ed.), The History of Parliamentary Behaviour (Princeton, 1977), pp. 136–58. Howarth, Patrick. Questions in the House:  The History of a Unique British Institution (London, 1956). Jackson, Alvin. Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000 (London, 2003). Jackson, Alvin. The Ulster Party:  Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–1911 (Oxford, 1989). Jalland, Patricia. ‘Irish home-rule finance:  a neglected dimension of the Irish question, 1910–14’, Irish Historical Studies, xxiii, no.  91 (May 1983), pp. 233–53. Jeffery, Keith. Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge, 2000). Jenkins, Roy. Asquith (London, 1964). Jenkins, Roy. Mr Balfour’s Poodle:  An Account of the Struggle between the House of Lords and the Government of Mr Asquith (2nd edn, London, 1968). Kirby, Brian. Papers of John Redmond, Collection List No. 118 (unpublished, NLI, Dublin, 2006). Koss, Stephen. Asquith (London, 1976). Kruskal, Joseph B., and Myron Wish. Multidimensional Scaling (London, 1978). L’Orange, H.P. Art Forms and Civic Life in the Late Roman Empire (Princeton, 1965). Laffan, Michael. The Resurrection of Ireland:  The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–23 (Cambridge, 1999). Lambert, W.R. Drink and Sobriety in Victorian Wales, c. 1820 – c. 1895 (Cardiff, 1983). Larkin, Felix M. ‘Two gentlemen of the Freeman: Thomas Sexton,W.H. Brayden and the Freeman’s Journal, 1892–1916’ in Ciara Breathnach and Catherine Lawless (eds), Visual, Material and Print Culture in Nineteenth Century Ireland (Dublin, 2010), pp. 210–22. Lawson, Kay, and Peter H. Merkl (eds). When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton, 1988). Lee, J.J. Ireland, 1912–1985 (Cambridge, 1989). Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan (eds). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, 1967).

280

Bibliography

Lubenow, W.C. ‘Irish Home Rule and the great separation in the Liberal party in 1886: the dimensions of parliamentary Liberalism’, Victorian Studies, xxvi, no. 2 (winter, 1983), pp. 161–80. Lucy, Henry. The Balfourian Parliament (London, 1906). Lyons, F.S.L. Charles Stewart Parnell (London, 1977). Lyons, F.S.L. Ireland since the Famine (London, 1971). Lyons, F.S.L. The Irish Parliamentary Party, 1890–1910 (London, 1951). Lyons, F.S.L. ‘The Irish Unionist party and the devolution crisis of 1904–5’, Irish Historical Studies, vi, no. 21 (March 1948), pp. 1–22. Lyons, F.S.L. John Dillon: A Biography (London, 1968). Mackay, Ruddock F. Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 1985). Malcolm, Elizabeth. ‘The drink question in Ireland, 1856–1901’ (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 1980). Malcolm, Elizabeth. ‘Ireland Sober, Ireland Free’:  Drink and Temperance in Nineteenth-Century Ireland (Dublin, 1986). Maume, Patrick. The Long Gestation:  Irish Nationalist Life, 1891–1918 (Dublin, 1999). McConnel, James. The Irish Parliamentary Party and the Third Home Rule Crisis (Dublin, 2013). McConnel, James. ‘The Irish Parliamentary Party, industrial relations and the 1913 Dublin lockout’, Saothar, xxviii (2003), pp. 25–36. McConnel, James. ‘The view from the backbench:  Irish Nationalist MPs and their work, 1910–1914’ (PhD thesis, Durham, 2002). McDowell, R.B. British Conservatism, 1832–1914 (London, 1959). McDowell, R.B. The Irish Convention, 1917–18 (London, 1970). McGarry, Fearghal. ‘Nationalism and the Irish party:  provincial Ireland 1910–1916’ [review], History Ireland, xiv, no.  2 (March–April 2006), pp. 68–9. Meenan, James F. ‘Augustine Birrell in Ireland’, Studies:  An Irish Quarterly Review, lix, no. 233 (spring, 1970), pp. 26–39. Meleady, Dermot. John Redmond: The National Leader (Dublin, 2014). Meleady, Dermot. Redmond: The Parnellite (Cork, 2008). Michels, Robert. Political Parties:  A  Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, ed. Seymour Lipset (1st Eng. edn, London, 1915: new edn, New Brunswick, 1999). Morgan, Kenneth O. The Age of Lloyd George (London, 1971). Morgan, Kenneth O. Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist (London, 1975). Mulvagh, Conor.‘Amicable in tone yet fruitless in result: politicians, press and public and the Buckingham Palace Conference, 1914’, History Studies: University of Limerick History Society Journal, viii (2007), pp. 77–92. Mulvagh, Conor. ‘The road to Woodenbridge: tension and disunity in the Irish Volunteers, 1914’ (BA thesis, University College Dublin, 2007). Mulvagh, Conor. ‘Rome ruler? John Redmond, a Catholic voice in a Liberal chamber, 1906–1918’ (MPhil thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2008). Ní Liatháin, Íde. The Life and Career of P.  A. McHugh, a North Connacht Politician, 1859–1909: A Footsoldier of the Party (Dublin, 1999).

Bibliography

281

O’Brien, Conor Cruise. Parnell and His Party, 1880–90 (London, 1957). O’Brien, Joseph V. William O’Brien and the Course of Irish Politics, 1881–1918 (Berkeley, 1976). Ó Broin, León. The Chief Secretary: Augustine Birrell in Ireland (London, 1969). Ó Broin, León. Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising (London, 1966, rev. edn, 1970). O’Day, Alan. The English Face of Irish Nationalism: Parnellite Involvement in British Politics, 1880–86 (rev. edn, Aldershot, 1994). O’Day, Alan. Irish Home Rule, 1867–1921 (Manchester, 1998). O’Halpin, Eunan. ‘British intelligence in Ireland, 1914–1921’ in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension:  Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984), pp. 54–77. Ostrogorski, Moisei. Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties [Démocratie et l’organisation des partis politiques], vol. I:  England, ed. Seymour M. Lipset (1st Eng. edn, London, 1902:  new edn, New Brunswick, 1982). Pajala, Antii, Aleks Jakulin, and Wray Buntine. ‘Parliamentary group and individual voting behaviour in the Finnish Parliament in year 2003: a group cohesion and voting similarity analysis’ (2004) (http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ summary?doi=10.1.1.103.2295) (23 November 2011). Pašeta, Senia. ‘Ireland’s last Home Rule generation:  the decline of constitutional nationalism in Ireland, 1916–30’ in Mike Cronin and John M. Regan (eds), Ireland:  The Politics of Independence, 1922–49 (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 13–31. Potter, David S. The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180–395 (London, 2004). Rallings, Colin, and Michael Thrasher (eds). British Electoral Facts, 1832–2006 (Aldershot, 2007). Read, Donald. England, 1868–1914 (London, 1979). Rees, Roger. Diocletian and the Tetrarchy (Edinburgh, 2004). Reid, Colin. The Lost Ireland of Stephen Gwynn:  Irish Constitutional Nationalism and Cultural Politics, 1864–1950 (Manchester, 2011). Rice, Stuart A. ‘The behaviour of legislative groups: a method for measurement’, Political Science Quarterly, xl, no. 1 (March 1925), pp. 60–72. Ryan, A.P. Mutiny at the Curragh (London, 1956). Seaman, L.C.B. Post-Victorian Britain, 1902–1951 (London, 1966). Silk, Paul (with Rhodri Walters). How Parliament Works (London, 1987). Spender, J.A. The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G.C.B. (2 vols, London, 1923). Stansky, Peter. ‘  “The strange death of Liberal England”:  fifty years after’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, xvii, no. 4 (winter, 1985), pp. 401–3. Thornley, David. Isaac Butt and Home Rule (London, 1964). Truman, David B. The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York, 1959). Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton, 1953).

282

Bibliography

Walker, Brian M. Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland, 1801–1922 (Dublin, 1978). Wall, Maureen. ‘Partition:  the Ulster question (1916–1926)’ in T.D. Williams (ed.), The Irish Struggle, 1916–1926 (London, 1966). Walton, John K. Disraeli (London, 1990). Ward, Alan. The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782–1992 (Dublin, 1994). Webb, R.K. Modern England: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (2nd edn, London, 1980). Wheatley, Michael. ‘John Redmond and federalism in 1910’, Irish Historical Studies, xxxii, no. 127 (May 2001), pp. 343–64. Wheatley, Michael. Nationalism and the Irish Party, Provincial Ireland 1910–1916 (Oxford, 2005). White, Carolyn W. ‘  “The strange death of Liberal England” in its time’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, xvii, no. 4 (winter, 1985), pp. 425–47. Wilson, John. CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1973).

Dictionary of Irish Biography, James McGuire and James Quinn (eds) (9 vols, Cambridge, 2009)

Boylan, Shaun. ‘O’Mara, James’. Bull, Philip. ‘O’Brien, William’. Callanan, Frank. ‘Dillon, John’. Callanan, Frank. ‘Healy, Timothy Michael’. Callanan, Frank. ‘Parnell, Charles Stewart’. Clarke, Frances. ‘Hinkson (née Tynan), Katharine’. Coleman, Marie. ‘Redmond, William Archer’. Foley, Aideen, and Lawrence William White. ‘O’Brien, Francis Cruise’. Hourican, Bridget. ‘Dillon, Elizabeth’. Laffan, Michael. ‘Redmond, John Edward’. Lane, Fintan. ‘Crean, Eugene’. Larkin, Felix M. ‘Brayden, William John Henry’. Larkin, Felix M. ‘Sexton, Thomas’. Loughlin, James. ‘Devlin, Joseph’. Lowry, Donal. ‘Kettle, Thomas Michael (“Tom”)’. Maume, Patrick. ‘Esmonde, Sir Thomas Henry Grattan’. Maume, Patrick. ‘Field, William’. Maume, Patrick. ‘Harrington, Timothy Charles’. Maume, Patrick. ‘MacNeill, John Gordon Swift’. McGee, Owen. ‘Lynch, Arthur Alfred’. McGee, Owen. ‘O’Connor, Thomas Power’. O’Day, Alan. ‘Biggar, Joseph Gillis’. O’Day, Alan. ‘McCarthy, Justin’. O’Halpin, Eunan. ‘Birrell, Augustine’. White, Lawrence William. ‘Dolan, Charles Joseph’. Woods, C.J. ‘Gill, Thomas Patrick’.

Bibliography

283

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds) (Oxford, 2004: online edn, January 2008) (www.oxforddnb.com)

Brown, Kenneth D. ‘Burns, John Elliott (1858–1943)’. Cassar, George H. ‘Hamilton, Sir Ian Standish Monteith (1853–1947)’. Davis, John. ‘Primrose, Archibald Philip, fifth earl of Rosebery and first earl of Midlothian (1847–1929)’. Dutton, D.J. ‘Chamberlain, Sir (Joseph) Austen (1863–1937)’. Jackson, Alvin. ‘Long, Walter Hume, first Viscount Long (1854–1924)’. Kelly, Matthew. ‘Cooper, Bryan Ricco (1884–1930)’. Longford, Elizabeth. ‘Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen (1840–1922)’. Matthew, H.C.G. ‘Asquith, Herbert Henry, first earl of Oxford and Asquith (1852–1928)’. Morris, A.J.A. ‘Bannerman, Sir Henry Campbell (1836–1908)’. Parry, Jonathan. ‘Cavendish, Spencer Compton, marquess of Hartington and eighth duke of Devonshire (1833–1908)’. Searle, G.R. ‘Billing, Noel Pemberton (1881–1948)’. Taylor, Eric. ‘Schnadhorst, Francis (1840–1900)’. Wrigley, Chris. ‘Henderson, Arthur (1863–1935)’.

Internet sources Cromwell, Valerie. House of Commons Voting, 1861–1926 [computer file] (Colchester: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1991). Study Number: 2833. Haahr, Mads. Random.org (www.random.org/history/). Wood, Edward. ‘Digitising Hansard: putting two hundred years of parliamentary debates online’ (www.cilip.org.uk/get-involved/special-interest-groups/ government/Documents/hansard_digitisation.pdf).

Index

agrarian question see land question alcohol see drink question and temperance Aldous, Richard 28 All-for-Ireland League (AFIL) 48, 87, 91–3, 100, 183, 187, 215, 229, 246, 260 see also O’Brien, William Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) 53, 87, 152, 260 Anglicanism see under Protestants and Protestantism Asquith, Herbert Henry 18, 20, 118, 140 during Easter Rising and aftermath 135–6 and IPP leadership 265 lack of sympathy for Home Rule, and gradualist approach 65, 84–5 and Liberal Party split (1916) 247, 249 pact with Redmond (1910) 227, 232, 239, 240, 249 as prime minister 15, 224 promises and enacts Home Rule 85, 100, 165, 167, 188, 235 and Ulster question 104, 105, 106–7, 108, 111–12, 113, 267 Asquith, Margot 20, 120, 265 Bachelor’s Walk killings 122 Balfour, Arthur J. 42, 52, 64, 168–9, 183, 190, 202 Banks, Margaret 77 Bew, Paul 9, 17–18, 68, 81, 189, 261 Biagini, Eugenio 11, 13, 16, 28, 80, 153 Biggar, Joseph Gillis 6, 39, 173, 267 Birrell, Augustine 73–5, 76, 78, 101, 111–12, 118, 121, 131, 186, 187–8, 200, 222–3, 235, 244, 266 see also under Land Acts

Blake, Edward 34, 35, 46, 49, 50, 77–8, 154, 155 Blewett, Neal 19 Boer War see South Africa Boland, John 218–19 Bonar Law, Andrew 106 Boundary Commission 166 Bourne, Archbishop Francis 71, 244 Brady, L.W. 52, 71, 84, 122, 138 Brayden, W.H. 90 Bryce, James 67, 73, 74, 76, 187, 222, 266 Buckingham Palace Conference (1914) 39, 44, 80, 113–14, 118, 120, 138, 139, 156, 261 budget of 1909 see under Lloyd George, David Bull, Philip 35 Burns, John 177–8 Callanan, Frank 7, 151, 183 Campbell, John 41 Campbell-Bannerman, Henry (‘C.B.’) 18, 39, 52, 56, 64–5, 66–7, 68, 73, 75, 84, 178, 183, 222, 244 Caramani, Daniele 14 Carson, Edward 4, 101, 103, 104, 106, 114, 119, 120, 124, 177, 195 Casement, Sir Roger 135 Catholic church and Catholics 5, 55, 167, 225, 228, 239 Catholic hierarchy in England 70–1, 86, 244, 245 Catholic voters in England 70–2, 86 in Ulster 55, 102, 122, 239 see also education question Chamberlain, Joseph 39, 173

Index Chester, D.N. and Bowring, N. 168, 169–70, 172, 174, 175–6, 179, 191 Churchill, Winston 84–6, 112, 121, 235 Church of England see Protestants and Protestantism Clancy, J.J. 154 Clanricarde, Marquis of 74 Clausen, A.R. 219 coercion policy 11, 42, 67, 68 Commission on Irish Finance (1911–12) 101 Connolly, James 270 conscription see under First World War Conservative (and Liberal Unionist) Party 7, 13, 19, 38, 65, 66, 88, 92, 93, 137, 141, 181, 183, 187, 240 devolution proposal (1904–5) 52 and drink question 239–40 and education question 40, 70, 86, 220, 225, 243–4, 245 in government 10, 42, 69, 184, 186, 199, 221, 226 in Home Rule crisis 101, 104, 106–7, 113–14 IPP and 10, 11–12, 40, 52, 212, 214, 220–1, 264 Liberal Unionists 86, 214 see also under questions in parliament; voting in divisions conventions see Irish Convention; Irish Race Convention; United Irish League (UIL) Cooper, Bryan Ricco 177 Cousins, Mel 10, 14, 213, 217, 224, 231, 240, 250 Craig, F.W.S. 176, 177 Craig, James 114 Crean, Eugene 228–9 Cromwell, Valerie 11, 14, 177, 212, 213, 215, 220, 229, 230, 240, 250 Curley, Vanessa 32 Curragh incident (1914) 106, 108, 113 Dangerfield, George 18, 19 Davitt, Michael 33–4, 35, 38, 43, 45 de Valera, Éamon 55, 152, 158 Devlin, Joseph 134, 155–9, 271 as anti-Parnellite 36 and AOH 87, 260 attuned to public opinion 32, 78, 129

285 conciliatory character 147 defeats de Valera in 1918 general election 152, 158 during Easter Rising and aftermath 132–3, 134, 137–40, 141, 142, 143, 145–52 and education question 71 in Home Rule crisis 30, 102–5, 109–13, 265–6, 268 as leading Ulster nationalist 55, 102–3, 109–13, 122, 138–41, 145–6, 156, 158, 239, 262–3, 265–6, 268 and Liberal Party 36, 105 potential leader of IPP 149–51, 266 as rising star of IPP 30, 31, 48, 52–6, 84, 92, 154, 262, 270 and Sinn Féin 131 as tetrarch or member of inner leadership of IPP 8, 27, 30–3, 49, 54, 120, 259 and Dillon 36, 53–5, 79, 92, 105, 122, 124, 125, 141, 146–7, 150, 151, 155–6, 157, 265 and O’Connor 28, 53–5, 85, 109, 124, 138–9 and Redmond 53, 92, 109, 110, 122, 130, 145, 146–7, 265, 266 and UIL 32, 53, 87, 92 and war recruitment 122, 124, 125 devolution crisis (1904–5) 42, 50–2, 85 Devoy, John 130 Dillon, Elizabeth 20, 32, 35, 43, 44, 78–9, 155 Dillon, John 16, 20, 26, 28, 29, 30–56, 74–83, 84–9, 155–9, 176, 186 absences from public life 49–50, 76–7, 78–9 absent self from negotiations 42–4, 140–1, 156, 157, 265 anti-clericalism 71 as anti-Parnellite 4, 36, 153 attuned to public opinion 32, 78, 103, 123, 124, 129–32, 141, 155, 198 Dillonism and Dillonites 7, 28, 36, 37, 50, 51, 66, 87, 261–3, 266 during Easter Rising and aftermath 10, 132–40, 142–3, 144, 145–8, 197–8, 201, 271 and education question 71–2 family life 133–4

286 Dillon, John  (cont.) in Home Rule crisis 101–3, 104–11, 113–14, 118, 265 intransigence and radical leanings 9, 39, 43–8, 52, 88, 91–2, 105–6, 140–1, 195, 198, 262, 265, 270 and Irish Council Bill 76, 77, 78, 79 and Irish language 68–9 and land question 33, 38, 42–7 and Liberal party 35–6, 64–5, 66–8, 70, 71, 72, 265 in parliament 39, 42, 47, 50, 70, 103, 134–5, 137, 173, 198–9, 262 successor to Redmond as IPP leader 149–51, 159, 266 as tetrarch or member of inner leadership of IPP 8, 27, 29–34, 49, 54, 120, 259 and Devlin 36, 53–5, 79, 92, 105, 122, 124, 125, 141, 146–7, 150, 151, 155–6, 157, 265 and O’Connor 37, 38, 41, 46, 48, 79, 102, 125, 142, 155, 157, 263 and Redmond 4, 9, 16, 29–31, 34, 35, 36–8, 46, 48, 50–1, 71, 79, 82–3, 101–2, 118, 119–20, 122, 124–6, 129, 131, 137, 148–9, 150, 153–7, 159, 168, 169, 197–8, 261–2, 264, 268, 269 and war recruitment 119–25, 195, 261–2, 268 see also under Healy, T.M. divisions, parliamentary see voting in divisions Dolan, C.J. 8, 81, 83 drink question and temperance 14, 89, 225, 228, 235–41, 249–50, 263 Dublin lockout (1913) 16 Dunraven, Lord 43 Duverger, Maurice 6, 260 Easter Rising (1916) background 119, 129–32 IPP and Rising 10–11, 31, 90, 126, 140–1, 157, 189, 249 awareness of plans for 130–2 immediate reactions to 132–7 in negotiations after 137–46 radicalisation of parliamentary questions after 195–8, 201, 264, 269–71

Index education question 14, 40–1, 70–2, 85–6, 104, 158, 225, 228, 235, 243–6, 250, 263, 264 Education (England and Wales) Bill (1902) 39, 40, 42, 223, 243–4 Education (England and Wales) Bill (1906) 71–2, 73, 188, 220, 223, 244–6 see also Universities (Ireland) Act; university question Edward VII, King 92 elections by-elections 105 Churchill in (1908) 85–6 IPP or Sinn Féin in 83, 86, 142, 145, 151–2, 155 general election (1892) 7 general election (1900) 37, 183 general election (1906) 15, 52, 56, 64–7, 88, 183, 185, 192, 201, 220, 222 general elections (1910) 15, 19, 48, 88, 100, 188 first election (January) 91–2, 183, 188, 239, 240 second election (December) 55, 92–3, 152, 183, 233, 246 general election (1918) 5, 11, 27, 55, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151–2, 158, 199, 202, 247, 266, 270 local government (1899) 35 Emmet, Robert 270 Esmonde, Thomas 81, 82–3 Fairlie, Henry 12 Fanning, Ronan 101, 111, 235 Farrell, Brian 69 Farrell, J.P. 199 Field, William 192, 199 filibustering or obstructionism see under parliament Finnan, Joseph 18, 142, 189 First World War and recruitment in Ireland 13, 31, 114, 119–26, 156, 189, 195–6, 261–2, 265, 267, 268 conscription 145, 182, 199, 220, 224, 249 Redmond’s Woodenbridge speech (1914) 120, 269 FitzGerald, Garret 165–6

287

Index Fitzpatrick, David 12 Flavin, Michael 191 Flynn, J.C. 173 Foster, R.F. (Roy) 139, 150, 269 Freeman’s Journal 45–6, 48, 77, 89–90, 114, 143, 145, 154 Gaelic League 68–9, 130, 270 Gallipoli 121, 195–6 George V, King 100, 113, 120 Gill, T.P. 183–5 Ginnell, Laurence 8, 17, 75, 166, 176, 224, 266 Gladstone, William E. 3, 7, 28 Grey, Sir Edward 123 Griffith, Arthur 13, 75, 81, 83, 129, 152, 229, 267 Gwynn, Denis 17, 18, 37, 50, 74, 79, 136, 138, 196 Gwynn, Stephen 17, 121, 123, 154 Hamilton, Sir Ian 196 Hanna, T.J. 131 Harrington, T.C. 7, 42 Harrison, Brian 235 Hazleton, Richard 144, 147–8, 149 Healy, T.M. (Timothy Michael) 50, 84, 110 author of IPP pledge 6 axis with O’Brien 48, 87–8, 92–3, 266 clericalism 48, 86 and Dillon 37, 82, 153–4 Healyites and Healyism 7, 37, 41, 86, 87, 91, 166, 167, 200 and Redmond 33, 154 relations with IPP 8, 33, 34, 36, 37–8, 48, 56, 86–7, 100, 153–4, 155, 176, 186–7, 230, 260–1 temporary reconciliation with IPP (1908–9) 81–2, 86–7 Henry, Sir Charles Solomon 110 Hepburn, A.C. 109–10, 122, 132, 133, 146 Hobhouse, Charles 20, 106, 194–5 Home Rule First Home Rule Bill (1886) 2, 7, 100 Second Home Rule Bill (1893) 2, 7, 100 Home Rule Crisis (1912–14) 2, 4, 30, 31, 55, 84, 85, 93, 100–13, 118, 119, 122–3, 138–40, 156, 157–8, 165, 167, 181, 188, 189, 194, 230, 235, 247, 269, 270, 271 see also Ulster; unionists and unionism

Hosking, Geoffrey 248 Howarth, Patrick 167, 169, 174, 195 Hyde, Douglas 68, 270–1 Illingworth, Percy 105 IPP see Irish Parliamentary Party Irish Convention (1917–18) 27, 141–50, 157, 249, 263, 265 Irish Council Bill (1907) 34, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76–81, 83, 84, 85, 101, 102, 150, 186, 222, 230 Irish Independent 41, 90 Irish language 67–9 Irish (National) Volunteers 5, 68, 118–19, 120, 126, 259, 261, 269 National Volunteers 122, 197 Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) 1–2, 6–12 in 1918 general election 11, 27, 147, 199, 247, 266, 270 and balance of power at Westminster 7, 15, 156, 212 British political spectrum, position in 12–15 decline 3, 10, 20, 27, 152, 174, 247, 267–71 dissidents and independent nationalists 8, 33, 41, 46, 48, 56, 75–6, 80, 82–3, 88, 91–3, 155, 176–7, 183, 200, 215, 224, 229, 230, 246, 260, 268, 271 see also All-for-Ireland League (AFIL); Healy, T.M.; O’Brien, William economic conservatism 264 grassroots influence on leadership 79–80 as pledge-bound party 6, 8, 66, 82–3, 118, 211, 215, 260 relations with Liberal and Conservative parties 35–6 reunification of 1900 and aftermath 1, 8, 27, 29–31, 34–7, 54, 55–6, 153, 268 reunification of 1908 and aftermath 80, 82–3, 86–8, 100 scholarly assessments of 15–18 structures of 2–3, 15–16, 26–7 see also Liberal Party; parliament; Parnell, Charles Stewart; questions in parliament; tetrarchy; United Irish League (UIL); voting in divisions

288 Irish People 45, 48 Irish Race Convention (New York, 1916) 131 Irish Republican Brotherhood 118–19 Irish Unionists see unionists and unionism Jackson, Alvin 19 Jameson, John E. 236 Jenkins, Roy 18, 19 Kelly, Bishop Denis 101 Kennedy, Vincent P. 230 Kettle, Tom 129, 154, 270 King, Antony 248 Kitchener, Horatio, Lord 124 Koss, Stephen 18 Labour Party (of Britain) 93, 225, 247 IPP and 89 and ‘Lib-Lab’ MPs 177–8 see also under questions in parliament; voting in divisions Land Acts 184 Birrell’s Land Act (1909) 87, 91 Wyndham’s Land Act (1903) 33, 42, 45–7, 49, 68, 74, 77, 84 Land Conference (1902) 42–5, 47, 189, 261 land question 1, 2, 5, 7–8, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42–6, 48, 49, 67, 68, 74, 86, 87, 158, 170, 184, 186, 266, 268, 270 Larkin, James 16 Larne gun-running (1914) 108 Liberal Party 3, 11, 13, 18, 80, 84, 92–3, 103, 105, 169, 175, 183, 184, 185–6, 187, 192, 196 decline 247, 267 divided on Irish question 234–5 and drink question 238–9 and education question 40, 41, 71, 85–6, 244–5 in government 15, 20, 39, 52, 54, 56, 64–8, 70–3, 75, 76, 80, 85–8, 91–3, 110, 169, 175, 183–8, 192, 196, 198, 200–1, 220, 222–3, 232, 266 gradualist approach to Home Rule 52, 64, 65, 70, 77, 80, 85 IPP and 7, 10, 20, 31, 35–6, 39, 40, 41, 52, 56, 64–8, 70–3, 75, 76, 85–8, 91–3, 110, 169, 175, 183–8, 192,

Index 196, 198, 200–1, 212, 214, 222–3, 225, 264–5, 266 alliance of 1910 15, 56, 66–7, 100, 188, 200, 221, 226–7, 232, 237, 239, 240, 248–9, 263 Liberal Imperialists 65, 84, 85, 234 see also under questions in parliament; voting in divisions Liberal Unionists see under Conservative (and Liberal Unionist) Party Lipset, Seymour 13–14, 225, 260, 268 Lloyd George, David 18, 20, 224 and drink question 238–9 during Easter Rising and 1916 negotiations 137–41, 143, 150, 249, 262 and Home Rule 235, 238–9 and Liberal Party split (1916) 247 and O’Connor 110, 263, 265 ‘people’s budget’ (1909) 86, 88–92, 100, 188, 264 as prime minister 141 and Ulster question 104, 106–13, 141, 155, 158, 262 Long, Walter 187 L’Orange, H.P. 29 Lubenow, W.C. 214 Lucy, Sir Henry 169 Lynch, Arthur 176, 224 Lyons, F.S.L. 15–17, 28, 33, 35, 36, 43, 44, 51, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 80, 87, 108, 119–20, 123, 125, 134, 136, 151, 198–9, 211, 216 McCarthy, Justin 7 McConnel, James 3, 10, 16, 19, 170, 171–2, 177, 180, 187, 191, 201, 211, 212, 213, 216 MacDonnell, Sir Antony 45, 50, 51, 85, 183–4, 185 McDowell, R.B. 19, 225 McGillian, Bernard 130–1 McHugh, Pat 54 MacNeill, Eoin 118, 120, 130, 131 MacNeill, John Gordon Swift 50, 154, 166, 169, 173 Madden, R.R. 270 Malcolm, Elizabeth 235

Index Mansion House Conference (1902) see Land Conference Martin, F.X. 120 Meehan, P.A. 83 Meleady, Dermot 18, 137 Michels, Robert 26, 155, 260, 267 Midleton, Lord 146, 265 Morgan, Kenneth 178 Muldoon, John 90 Murphy, William Martin 16, 90 Musical Copyright Acts (1902, 1906) 38, 228–30 Nathan, Matthew 131 Nationalists see Irish Parliamentary Party National Liberal Federation 80 National University of Ireland 69 non-conformism see under Protestants and Protestantism Norfolk, Duke of 244 Northcliffe, Lord 90, 138 Nugent, Sir Walter 90 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 13, 16–17, 28, 216 O’Brien, Francis Cruise 29 O’Brien, Joseph V. 82, 86 O’Brien, William 17, 36–7, 50, 81–2, 92–3, 142, 158, 269 anti-clericalism 48 axis with Healy 48, 87–8, 92–3, 266 ‘conference plus business’ policy 47, 48, 87, 158, 261 and Dillon 37, 46, 47–8, 77, 82, 87, 140, 154, 189, 261 and land question 37, 42–3, 44, 45, 47, 49 O’Brienites and O’Brienism 53, 56, 86, 87, 91, 166, 167, 183, 200, 230, 260–1 and Redmond 46, 87, 154 relations with IPP 8, 15, 33, 37, 46, 48–9, 51, 56, 77, 86–7, 100, 153, 155, 176, 186–7, 189 temporary reconciliation with IPP (1908–9) 81–2, 86–7 and UIL 7, 35, 37, 42, 49, 51, 261 see also All-for-Ireland League (AFIL) Ó Broin, León 119–20 obstructionism see under parliament O’Callaghan, John 83

289 O’Connor, T.P. 16, 28, 36, 39–41, 50, 147–8, 151, 154, 271 absences from public life 73–4 aloofness from Irish public opinion 32, 45, 84–5, 103, 123, 130, 139, 145, 156 American fundraising trip (1917–18) and marginalisation 143–5, 263 an anti-Parnellite 36 closeness to Liberal party and role as watchdog at Westminster 31, 32, 36, 41, 52, 64–5, 67, 70, 72, 74–5, 77, 84–5, 89, 91–2, 103, 110, 138, 143, 224, 239, 263, 265, 266 conciliatory character 31, 37–8, 41, 52, 88, 126, 153 and devolution proposals (1904–5) 52 during Easter Rising and aftermath 132, 134, 137, 138–41, 142, 143, 262 and education question 40–1, 70–2 as English-based MP 36, 38, 40, 55, 70–2, 93, 157 in Home Rule crisis 103–10, 133, 265 and land question 44, 45 in parliament 32, 39, 176, 185, 186, 187, 224 as tetrarch or member of inner leadership of IPP 8, 27, 30–2, 33, 49, 54, 120, 145, 259 and Devlin 28, 53–5, 85, 109, 124, 138–9 and Dillon 37, 38, 41, 46, 48, 79, 102, 125, 142, 155, 157, 263 and Redmond 41, 74, 104, 107, 121, 122, 147 and UILGB 70–1, 84 and Ulster question 266–7 and war recruitment 122, 124–5, 261 O’Day, Alan 16, 201 O’Donnell, Bishop Patrick 146 O’Donnell, John 53 O’Dougherty, J.B. 194 O’Hanlon, John F. 152 O’Kelly, Conor 54 O’Kelly, James 184 Old Age Pensions Act (1908) 83, 88 O’Loughran, Robert 17 O’Mara, James 81 Ostrogorski, Moisei 214, 260

290 parliament abstention of IPP (1918) 182, 198–9, 269 attendance rate of IPP MPs 248 House of Lords veto 7, 91–2, 100–1, 188 obstructionism or filibustering 6–7, 42, 81, 167, 169, 173–4, 180, 186, 188, 189, 199–202, 212, 221 see also questions in parliament; voting in divisions Parliament Act (1911) 93, 100–1 Parnell, Charles Stewart 16, 26, 264 and split in IPP 1, 4, 7–8, 20, 31, 35–6, 66, 72, 168 style of leadership of IPP 3, 6, 30, 39, 54, 69, 149, 158–9, 173–4 Parsons, Sir Laurence 124 partition see under Ulster Pašeta, Senia 271 Pearse, Patrick 270, 271 Plunkett, Sir Horace 111, 142, 271 Price, Ivor 131 Primrose, H.W. 101 Protestants and Protestantism 42, 112 Anglicanism 225, 228, 243–4, 250 non-conformism 14, 40, 223, 225, 235, 243–4 questions in parliament 2, 9–11, 42, 165–202, 221, 222, 249, 264, 266, 269, 270 Conservative (and Liberal Unionist) Party 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 188, 190–4, 200, 202 ‘Irish Nationalists’ (IPP and others) 168–74, 176–7, 179–81, 183–96, 198–202 radicalisation and de-radicalisation 10, 167, 174–5, 181, 185, 188–90, 191, 194–5, 197, 198, 200, 202, 224, 266, 269 ‘Irish Unionists’ 171, 174, 176, 177, 180, 191–5 Labour Party 171, 174, 176, 177–8, 180, 191 Liberal Party 171, 174, 176, 177–8, 180, 181–2, 191

Index recruitment see First World War Redmond, John aloofness from public opinion 32, 123–4, 129–32, 134, 135, 156, 262 ‘Bonapartist’ ideology 26 as chairman of IPP 1, 3, 4, 8, 32–3, 50, 69, 91, 120, 153, 156, 184–5, 261 conciliatory character 9, 51, 83, 88, 105–6, 155, 269 consolidation of leadership 50 death and succession 147–9, 266 and devolution proposals (1904–5) 50–2 and Douglas Hyde 68 during Easter Rising and aftermath 10, 131–7, 139–42, 197–8, 265 and education question 40–1, 70–2, 86, 244 fundraising tours 40, 50–1, 54, 92–3 in Home Rule crisis 101–9, 110, 111–12, 118–19 and IPP reunification of 1908 82–3 and Irish Convention 142–3, 145–7 and Irish Council Bill 74–5, 76–80 and land question 42–3, 44, 45, 46–7, 77 and Liberal party 35–6, 64–5, 66, 67, 70, 88–9, 93, 100, 105–7, 111–12, 113–14, 135–6, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249 and O’Brien 46, 87, 154 in parliament 32, 39, 40, 50, 134, 136, 169, 198, 211, 238, 264 Parnell, contrast with 3, 30, 54, 149 as Parnellite 7, 8, 36, 72, 153 Redmondism 66, 156, 167, 189, 261, 269 scholarly assessments of 17–18 as tetrarch or member of inner leadership of IPP 8, 27, 29–34, 49, 54, 120, 259 and Devlin 53, 92, 109, 110, 122, 130, 145, 146–7, 265, 266 and Dillon 4, 9, 16, 29–31, 34, 35, 36–8, 46, 48, 50–1, 71, 79, 82–3, 101–2, 118, 119–20, 122, 124–6, 129, 131, 137, 148–9, 150, 153–7, 159, 168, 169, 197–8, 261–2, 264, 268, 269 and O’Connor 41, 74, 104, 107, 121, 122, 147

291

Index and Volunteers 118–19, 120–2 and war recruitment 31, 114, 120–2, 124–6, 156, 195–6, 261–2, 265, 267, 268 Woodenbridge speech (1914) 120, 269 Redmond, William Archer 151, 152 Redmond, William (Willie) 50, 173, 238 Redmond-Howard, Louis 17 religious divisions 14, 40, 70–2, 225, 235, 239, 263 see also Catholic church and Catholics; drink question; education question; Protestants and Protestantism; Ulster Rice, Stuart A., and Rice indices 217–18, 219, 223, 225–7, 231–4, 236–8, 241–2, 246, 247, 249 Rokkan, Stein 13–14, 225 Rosebery, Lord 65, 84 Runciman, Walter 106 Russell, T.W. 42, 238 Salisbury, Lord 223 Samuel, Herbert 101 Schnadhorst, F.W. 80 Seaman, L.C.B. 13 Sexton, Thomas 36, 43, 45–6, 48, 90, 154 Shawe-Taylor, John 42–3 Sheehy-Skeffington, Francis 135, 197 Sinn Féin 5, 8, 13, 75, 229, 247 in 1907–8 48, 81–3, 85, 86, 100, 230, 260 after 1914 129–30, 131 after 1916 Rising 142, 145, 150–2, 262, 269 and 1918 general election 199, 270 Sloan, Thomas Henry 177 Smith, F.E. 101 Solemn League and Covenant see Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant South Africa and Boer War 33, 39, 123, 129, 135, 168–9, 173, 174, 198 Stanley, Venetia 20 Stanton, Charles 177 Stephens, James 270 Stevenson, Frances 18, 20, 238 Taylor, A.J.P. 19 Tennant, H.J. 195, 196

‘tetrarchy’ 29–34 classical antecedents 29–30 members of see Devlin, Joseph; Dillon, John; O’Connor, T.P.; Redmond, John Tone, Wolfe 269 Tory Party see Conservative Party Tully, Jasper 173 Tynan, Katharine 121 UIL see United Irish League UILGB see United Irish League of Great Britain Ulster in 1918 general election 152 ‘a fairly sober province’ 238 partition discussed in Dáil Éireann 165–6 Protestant tenant interest 42 ‘Ulster question’ and prospect of exclusion from Home Rule (partition) 13, 16, 31, 55, 80, 101–14, 118, 119, 138–42, 151, 156, 157, 158, 262, 263, 265, 267, 268–9 and war recruitment 122, 124 see also Devlin, Joseph; Home Rule; unionists and unionism Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant 103, 177 Ulster Unionist Council 103 Ulster Volunteer Force 103, 195, 259 unionists and unionism 137–8, 156, 187, 259 constructive unionism 42, 46, 50–2, 190, 268 and drink question 238–9 after Easter Rising 137, 139, 142, 146 in Home Rule crisis 100–14 IPP’s similarity to 2 Irish or Ulster Unionists 19, 27, 42, 55, 70, 93, 102, 103–5, 111, 112, 113, 118, 152, 239, 265, 271 as part of coalition government 39, 141, 201, 262 terminology used in designating 177, 215 see also Conservative (and Liberal Unionist) Party; questions in parliament; voting in divisions

292 United Irish League (UIL) 15, 42, 75, 150, 271 in America 83, 144 Ancient Order of Hibernians and 53, 87 beginnings 7–8, 15, 35 in Britain see United Irish League of Great Britain (UILGB) conventions 80, 158 convention of 1900 33 convention of 1903 47 convention of 1907 76–80, 186, 222 convention of 1909 (‘baton convention’) 33, 69, 87, 260 Ulster provincial convention of 1916 140, 262, 266 and Devlin 32, 53, 87, 92 and IPP 33, 56, 93 as grassroots or constituency structure 7, 35, 36, 53, 56, 114, 153, 155, 270 potential threat to leadership 8, 29, 36, 56, 68, 81, 153 selection of parliamentary candidates 15, 54 and O’Brien 7, 35, 37, 42, 49, 51, 261 United Irish League of Great Britain (UILGB) 53, 70, 71, 84, 85 Universities (Ireland) Act (1908) 86, 158 university question 74, 83 voting in divisions 2, 9, 11, 14, 72, 168, 177, 211–51, 263–4, 266, 269 cohesion of parties 213–14, 217–19, 223, 224, 227, 229–30, 233–4, 236–7, 241, 245–8, 266 Conservative (and Liberal Unionist) Party 215, 233 cohesion 213, 223, 236, 241, 245 participation 222, 223, 248 ‘Irish Nationalists’ (IPP and others) 212–17, 220–50 cohesion 213, 223, 230, 236, 245, 246–7 Nationalist–Conservative likeness 214, 225–8, 231–2, 235–43, 245–6, 249–50, 264 Nationalist–Irish Unionist likeness 226, 227, 231, 237, 246

Index Nationalist–Labour likeness 226, 231–5, 237, 246 Nationalist–Liberal likeness 214, 226–7, 231, 233, 237, 241, 243, 245–6, 249 participation 220–2, 223, 224, 230, 247, 248, 267, 269 radicalisation and de-radicalisation 224, 249 ‘Irish Unionists’ 215, 225, 233 cohesion 223, 236, 241, 245, 247, 248 participation 222, 223, 224, 233, 248 Labour Party 215, 218, 232–5, 236, 247 cohesion 233, 234, 236, 241, 245 participation 222, 223, 233 Liberal Party 215, 234–5, 238, 241 cohesion 213, 214, 223, 236, 241 participation 222, 223 likeness between parties 214, 217, 219, 225–34, 236, 237–8, 239, 241–3, 245–6, 249–50, 263 participation (or ‘turnout’) by parties 2, 11, 166, 195, 199, 217, 219–24, 227, 229, 230, 233, 245, 247–8, 267, 269 voting by topic drink question 225, 228, 235–40, 241, 249–50 education 243–5 ‘social problems’ 14, 225, 228, 236, 240–3, 246, 250, 264 Walker, Brian 176 Wall, Maureen 165–6 Wason, John Cathcart 177 Weir, James Galloway 166, 191 Weston, John Wakefield 177 Wheatley, Michael 3, 10, 27, 75, 129, 167, 261, 270 Wilson, John 18 Woodenbridge speech, Redmond’s (1914) 120, 269 Wyndham, George 42, 45, 46, 50, 51, 68, 173 see also under Land Acts Young, Samuel 236 Young Ireland 270