The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War: An Explication of Livy Book 31 3515068538, 9783515068536

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Valerie M. Warrior

The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War An Explication of Livy Book 31

HISTORIA Einzelschriften 97

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

VALERIE M. WARRIOR

THE INITIATION OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

HISTORIA ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE REVUE D’HISTOIRE · ANCIENNE JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY RIVISTA

·

DI STORIA ANTICA

EINZELSCHRIFTEN HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HEINZ HEINEN/TRIER FRANÇOIS PASCHOUD/GENEVE KURT RAAFLAUB/WASHINGTON · D.C. HILDEGARD TEMPORINI/TÜBINGEN

GEROLD WALSER/BASEL

HEFT 97

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

1996

VALERIE M. WARRIOR

THE OF

INITIATION THE

SECOND WAR

MACEDONIAN

ANEXPLICATION OF LIVY BOOK 31

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

1996

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

[Historia / Einzelschriften] Historia: Zeitschrift füralte Geschichte. Einzelschriften. – Stuttgart: Steiner Früher Schriftenreihe Reihe Einzelschriften zu: Historia NE: Historia-Einzelschriften H.97. Warrior, Valerie M.: Theinitiation Macedonian war. –1996

of thesecond

Warrior, Valerie M.:

Theinitiation of thesecond Macedonian war: anexplication of Livy book 31 / Valerie M. Warrior. –Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996 (Historia: Einzelschriften; H.97)

8 06853– 515– ISBN 3–

ISO 9706

Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig undstrafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fürÜbersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung odervergleichbare Verfahren sowie fürdieSpeicherung inDatenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 1996 byFranz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Druckerei Peter Proff, Eurasburg. Printed in Germany

MEIS PARENTIBUS

This study has its origin in a seminar on Livy’s fourth decade given by Lily 1963. Atthat time politics Ross Taylor attheUniversity of Wisconsin in 1962– and prosopography seemed more attractive than the apparently impossible question of thechronological sequence of events before theSecond MacedonianWar.Theworkof Briscoe andDerow reopened thequestion. The sources for the beginning of the Third Macedonian Waroffered a more comprehensive account of events leading to theinitiation of a waroverseas. Discussions with Ernst Badian revealed that the chronological problems presented by Livy’s combination of Polybian andRoman sources werenotasintractable as

wasgenerally assumed. The reconstruction of events before the outbreak of hostilities between Rome andPerseus of Macedon inevitably called for a similar reconstruction of the events that culminated in the invasion of Greece in 200 B.C. First, however, an attempt to discern which years were intercalated wasnecessary. This investigation revealed further problematic chronological sequences, all of which occur in a context of making war.AsI reviewed Rome’s increasing involvement in the eastern Mediterranean, twofactors became increasingly apparent: theimportance of reading Livy ascontinuous narrative (which Lily Ross Taylor advocated more than a generation ago), andthe coordination of military activity with diplomacy andtheconsular year. At various stages Ernst Badian, T. James Luce, Jerzy Linderski and Wolfgang Haase generously reviewed drafts. Mythanks go to them and, for more recent advice, to Hildegard Temporini, Gerold Walser andAlexander F. Wensler. Responsibility for anyerrors rests with me.

CONTENTS

9

PREFACE CHAPTER I:

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS: HISTORY ANDHISTORIOGRAPHY

13

CHAPTER II:

DESIGN, STRUCTURE, ANDCHRONOLOGY

23

CHAPTER III:

CHRONOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION

37

I: From the Acarnanian profanation of theEleusinian Mysteries to the Athenian declaration of waronPhilip andthe raids of Nicanor andPhilocles (autumn 201 to summer 200)

SECTION

37

SECTION II: The embassy to Rome from Attalus andthe Rhodians;

the appointment andmission of C.Claudius Nero, P.Sempronius Tuditanus andM.Aemilius Lepidus (autumn 201 toApril 200*)

43

SECTION III: Theconsul’s return to Rome; thesenate’s appointment of M. Valerius Laevinus with propraetorian imperium; coordination March 200*) of diplomacy andmilitary forces (November 201–

52

SECTION IV: Events in Rome from the consuls’inauguration to 14.1); theanomaly of the departure for their provinces (L. 31.5.1– late departure of theconsular army for Macedonia (mid-January to late October*)

61

SECTION V: Events in the eastern Mediterranean from late April 200 to the arrival of theconsular army andthefall of Abydus (late October 200*)

74

SECTION VI: The campaigns of autumnus 200 andconsular 199;

theremaining events of consular 200

CONCLUSION

82 91

APPENDIX

I: The interpretation of autumno ferme exacto (L. 31.22.4)

95

APPENDIX

II: Athenian appeals to the Romans

97

8

Contents

APPENDIX III: The activities of M. Aurelius (Cotta)

101

TABLE OF DATES

105

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

109

INDEXES

*

1. General

113

2. Authors andpassages

116

Throughout this study is adopted,

the convention of italicizing dates in an extrapolated

Julian calendar

PREFACE

Less than two years after peace hadbeen made with Carthage, the Roman people voted for war with Philip V of Macedon and sent a consular army across the Adriatic to begin the conflict known as the Second Macedonian War, an action that ultimately led to Roman domination of the eastern Mediterranean. That Livy, ourfullest extant source, sawthis waras a major turning point in the history of Rome is indicated by his placement of the beginning of the war in the opening chapters of the first book of the fourth 10). From a modern perspecdecad andby an elaborate preface (L. 31.1.1– narrative gives an initial impression of incohetive, however, the ensuing rence or even outright confusion. Livy offers little direct comment on the actions he is relating, his apparent technique being to lead the reader to interpret events forhimself asthenarrative unfolds.1 Theinitiation of Rome’s first major military involvement in the eastern Mediterranean hasthus becomeoneof themost controversial topics in Greco-Roman history. Different interpretations have arisen because Livy’s narrative techniques andthe overall design of his work arefrequently overlooked.2 Scholars have their own specialized interests, often focusing on political andmilitary history to theexclusion of religious matters which canbe animportant indicator of contemporary concerns.3 This fragmentation of scholarship hasresulted in the distortion, if not the destruction, of the integrity of Livy’s original composition andthus of hisimplied interpretation of theevents that culminatedin theRoman invasion of Greece. 1

2

3

See thecomment of T. P. Wiseman, “Lying Historians: Seven Types of Mendacity,”in

Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World (1993), ed. C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman, 136: “ Historia as enquiry is what sets apart the great historians of classical antiquity (Thucydides, Polybius, Tacitus); but it always had to coexist with aphegesis [sc. narrative or story], andin many authors aphegesis ruled alone.” Two important exceptions are the work of T. J. Luce, Livy: The Composition of his 285. 74, andA. C. Scafuro, CA6 (1987) 249– History (1977) [henceforth Livy] 3–

Thepurely secular approach is apparent inE. S. Gruen, TheHellenistic World andthe Coming of Rome (1984) [henceforth HWCR]. More recently, however, Gruen shows a The Advent of the keen awareness of the interplay of politics andreligion in a paper, “ 33. On Magna Mater,”in Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy (1990) 5– The religion see A. Watson, The State, Lawand Religion: Pagan Rome (1992) 58: “ Roman state andRoman religion were intertwined. The gods protected andstrengthenedthe state... Onthis approach, whathastobe stressed is theutility of religion to the state.”

10

Preface

Source criticism has played particular havoc with the integrity of the narrative. Several crucial passages in which Livy gives a condensed account of selected events that apparently relate to Rome’s decision to make waron Macedon have been variously rejected or reconstructed primarily because they are assumed to derive from Roman annalists who are alleged to have been seeking tojustify Rome’s military intervention in200. Evidence thought to derive from Polybius is thus regarded as superior to that from Roman sources, even though little has survived of Polybius’original account for this period. As a result of these various approaches to the ancient testimony, the opening chapters of Livy book 31 have become an archive from which scholars have selected material to make hypotheses which often reflect their owncontemporary attitudes rather than those of the society that Livy sought to depict. Those whoreject the Roman sources see the Roman invasion of Greece as an act of “defensive imperialism,”whereas those who accept both the Roman and Polybian evidence regard her actions as calculated, deliberate aggression.4 But Polybius’view maynothave been so different from that of the Roman annalists.5 Atthebeginning of his work, Polybius notes that after the defeat of Hannibal the Romans realized they had accomplished “ the greatest andmost important step towards their universal aim. Thus andthen for the first time, they were emboldened to reach out for the rest andcross with forces into Greece andthe regions of Asia” (1.3.6). Of the Polybian excerpts relating to theoutbreak of the Second Macedonian War, twopreserve the terms offered to Philip which were also publicized by a Roman embassy traveling in Greece andtheeastern Mediterranean (P. 16.27 and34). This testimony reveals Roman insistence on obedience to their commands andanattempt to secure thesupport, oratleast theneutrality, of theGreeks in the period preceding the outbreak of actual hostilities. The precise integration of these excerpts into the chronological framework yielded byLivy’s narrative in book 31 is problematic because Livy has all but omitted to mention the Roman embassy’s activities in mainland Greece. Notwithstanding these various historiographical problems, the ancient testimony offers evidence concerning politics, religion, diplomacy, logistics andmilitary preparations at thetime of the initiation of the Second Macedonian War, thus enabling the reader to assess Rome’s actions and intentions at a critical point in thehistory of theMediterranean world. Twopublications, TheLaws of War: Constraints on Warfare, andOnthe Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, have recently brought the

4 5

Cf. thework of M. Holleaux, theprincipal advocate of “defensive imperialism,”in the first edition of the Cambridge Ancient History vol. VIII (1930) with that of R. M. Errington in the second (1989). 15. See P. S. Derow, JRS 69 (1979) 1–

Preface

11

question of the initiation of war by Greeks andRomans into the context of international relations in the history of western civilization.6 In the former, Ober’s consideration of the informal rules operating in interstate warfare and in wars against non-Greek peoples, although stopping short of the period of Roman involvement in the Hellenistic world, nevertheless serves as a reminder of the diplomatic andmilitary moves that preceded the conflict between Rome andMacedon. Kagan’s case study of the origins of the Second Punic Warlikewise underscores theneedtoreconsider theorigins of thewarwhich followed so quickly upon Rome’s victory over Carthage. Modern accounts of Rome’s foreign policy at theendof thethird century are far from comprehensive. The reader whowishes to examine the motives for the Roman invasion of Greece is confronted by a complex body of scholarship offering divergent andoften conflicting interpretations. Logistics andstrategy are given scant consideration despite the fact that timing, a key factor in theinitiation of anywar, is of particular importance whenever troops hadto be transported overseas to fight in potentially hostile territory. In the case of the Second Macedonian War, the chronological sequence of the diplomatic and military moves which led to the declaration of war by the Roman People andto theultimate dispatch of a consular army to Greece has been distorted andconfused because of scholars’fragmented approach to the testimony of Livy and Polybius. Divergencies will continue to proliferate unless there is a return to the ancient sources anda re-evaluation of method.

6

TheLaws of War: Constraints on Warfare (1994),edd. M. Howard, G. J. Andreopoulos and M. R. Shulman; D. Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (1995). See also, Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (1991), edd. Richard NedLebow andBarry S. Strauss.

CHAPTER I

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS: HISTORY ANDHISTORIOGRAPHY

A brief survey of the major problems presented by modern scholarship will reveal how the divergent interpretations have developed and, at the same time, offer anopportunity to re-evaluate method. Since theworkof Nissen there hasbeena marked distrust of evidence that cannot be shown to derive from Polybius, whereas Polybian material has of Robeen accepted without question.1 Anything deemed “annalistic”or “ man origin”tends to be regarded as inferior and so rejected, frequently without adequate justification.2 Holleaux rejected mention of appeals by the Athenians at 31.1.10 (preces Atheniensium) and 31.5.6 (Atheniensium nova legatio) on chronological grounds.3 This rejection has become the basis for rejecting other allegedly annalistic testimony. The despatch to Greece of M. 4, Valerius Laevinus (31.3.3) andthepresence there of M.Aurelius (30.26.2– 6) fall under suspicion, apparently because they arementio10; 31.3.4– 42.1– 6).4 The nedby Livy in the same sentence as theAthenian embassy (31.5.5– inclusion of theAthenians asadscripti tothePeace of Phoenice atL. 29.12.14 1

2

3 4

H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten undfünften Dekade des Livius (1863, reprinted 1975) 119 ff. The Polybian evidence represents our one firm Cf. the assertions of Gruen, HWCR 396: “ Allreconstructions based onhypothetical fittings-together of annalifoundation”and(p.395): “ stic and Polybian material stand on shaky ground. Best not to rest any findings on such 66: “ It is enough to point reconstructions. Wecling to what is known.”See also Luce, Livy 65– out that the chronology of events that Livy’s source gave is demonstrably in error on some major points, since noone would quarrel with thepremise that Polybian dating must form the basis of anyreconstruction.”Such assertions, however, overlook thefact that thefragments of Polybius yield very few chronological notations, those given being extremely broad; see 26. Warrior, AJAH 6 (1981) 24– 96 = Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecque vol. 5 (1955) Holleaux, REA 22 (1920) 77–

28. 9– The expeditions of Aurelius and Valerius are rejected by G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (1923) 4.1.21 n.55, Holleaux, CAH 8.156 n. 1,F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (1940, reprinted 1967) 127, n.7. See thecomment of T. R. S. Broughton, TheMagistrates of theRoman In fact, thewhole group of annalistic data on Republic [henceforth MRR] vol. 1(1952) 322 n.3: “ 11), Macedonian help for Hannibal at Zama (L. 30.26), the embassy of M. Aurelius (30.42.2– 6 and5.5), form a connected unit andthe notices on M. Furius (30.42.5) onLaevinus (31.3.3– which seems quite unreliable, andcompletely inconsistent with theharsh answer given by the 16, App. Mac. 4)” . On the Senate to the Aetolian envoys in the autumn of 202 (L. 31.29.4–

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is rejected chiefly onthe grounds that they were inserted as part of the later

annalistic justification of going to war in 200.5 Rejection of the Athenian appeal mentioned at 31.1.10 and5.6 leads to the rejection of all testimony connected with Athens and with any Roman interest in other parts of Greece during the period between the Peace of Phoenice and the Roman decision to invade Greece in 200. In preferring testimony which is claimed to derive from Polybius andrejecting material fromRoman sources, thefact thatwelack Polybius’accounts of thePeace of Phoenice andthe beginning of the Second Macedonian Waris overlooked. Such an approach not only implies distrust of the few references to the Roman calendar butalso results indistortion of theannalistic framework that Livy is seeking to maintain. Though scepticism of information deriving from Roman sources is in order, the method that currently prevails is open to question: each case for rejection should be examined on its ownmerits and re-evaluated in the context in which Livy presents the information. We should, moreover, seek anexplanation for thepresumed needfor theRoman sources tojustify Roman behavior.6 Exclusion of Livy’s references to religious matters canfurther distort his implied interpretation of events.7 Such treatment of his work was even foreseen by Livy himself. Whenwriting of prodigies at a crucial point in the Third Macedonian War,heunderscores theimportance of religion in Roman political life, noting his contemporaries’ disregard of the gods (neglegentia deorum), the belief that the gods foretell nothing (nihil deos portendere) and the fact that prodigies are no longer officially reported or recorded. In a rare as I write of antiquity, notonly does myown authorial comment, he states: “ mindbecome in some wayorother old-fashioned, butalso a certain religious scrupulosity (religio) keeps me from regarding those matters which the wisest men of former times thought required action by the state (publice suscipienda) as something unworthy (pro indignis) to be reported in my

5 6

7

question of this reference to anAetolian embassy, see below p.83 n. 16. Gruen, HWCR222 n. it is embedded in a dubious 86, questions the authenticity of Laevinus’ expedition, since “ annalistic account.” 6, rejects inclusion of thepeople of Ilium, the 28, andCAH(1930) 135– Holleaux, Études 5. 24– Spartans, Eleans, Messenians andAthenians as annalistic additions. Cf. J. W. Rich, Declaring War in the Period of Transmarine Expansion [henceforth DWTE] Then there is thequestion of the annalistic fabricator: noonehasever troubled to (1976) 79: “

suggest a motive for his conduct.” This tendency to overlook religious matters is now beginning to be corrected. A paper, Roman Religion in Livy” published in 1993 but originally delivered in 1988, J. Linderski, “ [henceforth RRL], inLivius, Aspekte seines Werkes, ed.W.Schuller, Konstanzer Althistorische 70, focuses on an examining Livy’s reports of Vorträge und Forschungen, 31 (1993) 53– manifestations of the disruption of thepaxdeorum. See also therecent work of D. S. Levene, Religion in Livy (1993) whoexamines howreligious matters, especially prodigies, are integra-

tedinto Livy’s narrative.

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history.8 Included in his narrative are accounts, albeit sometimes terse and apparently random, of religious ceremonies, rituals, portents, prodigies and expiations that were an integral part of political life in the middle republic.9 Consideration of the historical and literary contexts reveals that Livy has inferred from his source, ultimately theannales maximi, theRoman concern toensure andpreserve thepeace between thegodsandthestate (pax deorum) without which Rome could notbe successful.10 In context of events before thedeparture of theconsul P.Sulpicius Galba for the war against Philip in 200 (L. 31.14.1), Livy notes the religiosity of the state especially at the beginning of newwars (civitas religiosa in principiis maxime novorum bellorum), remarking ontheconcern “ that nothing might be left undone that hadever been done before”(31.9.6). References toreligious events recur throughout the narrative, the most prominent of which are reports of expiation ofprodigies of twohermaphrodites anda case ofrenewed sacrilege in thetreasury of Persephone at Locri.11 These passages, whenread

2: non sumnescius ab eadem neglegentia qua nihil deos portendere vulgo nunc 8 L. 43.13.1– credant, neque nuntiari admodum ulla prodigia inpublicum neque in annales referri. ceterum et mihi vetustas res scribenti nescio quopacto antiquus fit animus et quaedam religio tenet, quae illi prudentissimi viri publice suscipienda censuerint, ea pro indignis habere, quae in meosannales referam. For brief discussion of this passage, seeLevene, Religion inLivy 22– 24 116. with bibliography and 115– 9 See A. Watson, TheState, LawandReligion: Pagan Rome (1992) 58: “ The Roman state and Roman religion were intertwined. The gods protected andstrengthened the state. The priests werepublic officials whoperformed therites that thegods wished orrequired. If therites were notdulyperformed, thegodswereunder noobligation toprotect thestate. Piety wasnotusually required, whether from priest or private citizen, but performance of the rites was. On this approach, what has to be stressed is the utility of religion to the state.”See also M. Beard andJ. North edd., Pagan Priests: Religion andPower intheAncient World (1990) 31, whoemphasize wasseentohavethepower ofdeciding whatconstituted a signsent therole of thesenate which “ bythegodsandit controlled human responses tosuchsigns.” 5, whofollows the suggestion of A. Klotz, 10 OnLivy’s source, see R. Drews, CP 83 (1988) 294– 49 (originally published inNeue WegezurAntike 1940– Livius undseine Vorgänger (1964) 44– 1941), that the prodigy lists in Livy derive from excerpts from the annales maximi made by Valerius Antias, andnotes, p. 296: “ theAnnales maximi were a practical rather than a literary text andwerecomposed fora religious purpose: theywerea record ofpastprodigies, expiations andeventus (the latter including especially military victories anddefeats ... everything, inother words, that indicated whether thepaxdeorum wasruptured or intact).”Onthepaxdeorum, see 56: “Roman state religion wasnotinterested inindividual thecomments of Linderski, RRL55– salvation; its only concern wassalus publica, the security of the Roman State, or, in Roman The and59: “ terms, thepreservation ofpaxdeorum, thepeace between thegodsandthestate,” prodigium shows that either thepaxdeorum hadbeenruptured, orthat it is going toberuptured, andthat dire consequences might follow unless thedeity is appeased.” 11 L. 31.5.4: prayer onthedayof theconsuls’inauguration; 5.7: report of consuls concerning the completion of prayers, the gods’ approval and the haruspices’ response that extension of 15: assurances of thegods’favor atthe boundaries, victory anda triumph wereportended; 7.14– conclusion of the consul’s speech to the Comitia Centuriata after its rejection of the first warvote; 8.2: a three-day supplication after the war-vote; 8.3: discussion of fetial procedure 10: the vowof games and a gift to Jupiter together concerning delivery of indictio belli; 9.5–

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not simply in their immediate context butalso in light of earlier accounts of similar manifestations during theSecond Punic War,indicate a serious rupture of thepaxdeorum atthevery time that a military venture wasprojected.12 Theneedtorestore thefavor of thegodsandsore-establish public confidence in the newly-declared waroffers a partial explanation for the fact that the consular army did not leave Rome until almost the endof the campaigning season (autumno ferme exacto, L. 31.22.4 cf. 14.1), in late October.13 Scholars have long been puzzled by the anomaly of this late departure. Attempts have beenmadetoexplain theapparent delay bypositing all orpart of an elaborate hypothesis originally advanced by McDonald andWalbank whofollowed Holleaux in therejection of annalistic material.14 They make a direct connection between fetial procedure mentioned by Livy at 31.8.3 (presumably annalistic) andthe démarches of a Roman embassy to Nicanor 3) though not inAthens in the spring of 200 mentioned byPolybius (16.27.1– by Livy, andto Philip at Abydus in autumn 200 mentioned by both Polybius 5). This connection entails distorting 7; L. 31.18.1– and Livy (P. 16.34.2– Livy’s narrative andpostulating an interval of several months between the twovotes for warin the Comitia Centuriata, although Livy’s account implies that the second vote passed almost immediately after the first wasrejected (31.6.3–8.1). Those scholars who accept various parts of this extended hypothesis see Rome as practising defensive imperialism. The underlying cause of the Second Macedonian Waris seen in a pact between Philip of Macedon and Antiochus of Syria to divide the possessions of the Ptolemaic kingdom, an arrangement mentioned but once by Livy (31.14.5).15 Elaborating on the ancient sources, Holleaux considered that this pact wasmade originally in winter of 203/2 but kept secret until it wasfinally divulged to the Romans by the embassy from Attalus andthe Rhodians mentioned by Polybius 16.24.3 and Livy at 31.2.1. Upon hearing of this pact, the Senate is said to have

4: reports of the plundering of the temple with the comment on the religiosity of the state; 12.1– 13.1prodigy list andexpiation of thetwo of Persephone atLocri andexpiatory measures; 12.5– hermaphrodites; 14.1: Galba’s vows on the Capitoline andhis departure.

12 13 14 15

72. See below pp. 68– 96. For discussion of this temporal notation, see Appendix I, pp.95– 207. A. H. McDonald andF. W. Walbank, JRS 27 (1937) 180– P. 3.2.8, 15.20.2, App. Mac. 4; L. 31.14.5; Justin 30.2.8; Porphyry, FGrHist 260 F.44; John of 342 in rejecting the Antioch, frag. 54. I follow R. M. Errington, Athenaeum 49 (1971) 341– 9 withthat at 3.2.8 and15.20.2. Onthe identification of theagreement mentioned atP. 16.1.8– question of the authenticity of the pact, see F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on 473, J. Briscoe, ACommentary onLivyXXXI Polybius [henceforth HCP2] vol. 2 (1967) 471– 39 andGruen, HWCR387. –XXXXIII (1973) [henceforth Comm. 1] 37–

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the policy of non-intervention in Greece anddecided on warwith

In a reconsideration of the evidence, Walbank (1965) declares: “ The sequence of events recorded in Polybius and the Polybian parts of Livy confirms Holleaux’s thesis that the Romans left Greece after the Peace of Phoenice without anyintention of returning andthat theSecond Macedonian Warrepresents a remarkable volte-face in their eastern policy.”17This hypothesis, either in its entirety or in part, continues to have its adherents.18 Neither Polybius norLivy, however, state that anypact wasrevealed by the embassy of Attalus and the Rhodians. The source of this interpretation is Appian (Mac. 4) whosounds a note of caution byprefacing his account with thewords “there is a tale,”stating that theRhodians informed theRomans of a pact.19 Theinfluence of Holleaux reached its culmination in theworkof Petzold (1940).20 But the balance was already being redressed by Klotz’s Livius und seine Vorgänger. Attempts to assert the validity of the Roman sources were also made by Magie (1939), Bickerman (1945), andBalsdon (1954).21 Both Bickerman andBalsdon explicitly reject thehypothesis thatthere wasa direct connection between fetial procedure andthedémarches of theRoman embassyinAthens andAbydus.22 Balsdon makes a goodgeneral case for accepting Livy’s combination of Polybian andannalistic material, while also rejecting the hypothetical long interval between the two war-votes. He gives little consideration, however, tothequestion of Julian equivalents of Roman dates. During the 1970s, theRoman sources began togaingreater acceptance. In hiscommentary onLivy books 31 to 33, Briscoe (1973) accepts more of the previously rejected annalistic testimony, although his comments onchrono205) 16 Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques auIIIe siècle avant J.C. (273– 66, 151. For 96, CAH(1930) 149– 332, REA 22 (1920) 77– (1920) [henceforth RGMH] 276– followers of Holleaux, seeW.Dahlheim, Struktur undEntwicklung desrömischen Völkerrechts im dritten undzweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (1968) 240. For a brief refutation of Holleaux’ 70 B.C. [hencehypothesis, see W. V. Harris, WarandImperialism in Republican Rome, 327– A 214. See also the comment of Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 37: “ forth WIRR] (1979) 212– hypothetical ‘false account’of a ‘secret pact’; it is a wonderful tour-de-force onHolleaux’s part to have persuaded historians to accept his ownunsubstantiated hypothesis in place of Livy’s reasonable account.”

17 Walbank, JRS 53 (1963) 5. 404. 18 E.g., D. Golan, Athenaeum 63 (1985) 389– 354, ingeniously suggests that the pact was a later 19 Errington, Athenaeum 49 (1972) 336– fabrication by the Rhodians to persuade theRomans to intervene against Perseus. 20 K.-E. Petzold, Die Eröffnung deszweiten römisch-makedonischen Krieges (1940). 21 Klotz, Livius undseine Vorgänger (1940, reprinted 1964); Magie, JRS 29 (1939) 32–44;E. J. 42. See also Bickerman, RPh 148; Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 30– Bickerman, CP 40 (1945) 137– 176. 81, 161– 61 (1935) 59– 41. 22 Bickerman. CP 40 (1945) 139: Balsdon. JRS 44 (1954) 37–

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logy are nowopen to question, since he himself has subsequently (1981)

revised his opinion about the equivalents of Roman dates in anextrapolated Julian calendar as the result of a more systematic approach to calendar insomecases theannalistic problems byMarchetti andDerow.23 Noting that “ account is preferable tothePolybian,”Briscoe touches uponmethod with the onemustdecide each case onhistorical grounds alone, andwithout remark: “ 24Thedanger of general preconceptions about thereliability of theannalists.” examihistoriographic s such preconceptions is further illustrated byTränkle’ nation of selected passages from Livy andPolybius.25 Inhis study Declaring WarinthePeriod of Transmarine Expansion, Rich makes extensive use of annalistic material in his reconstruction of events prior to the declaration of waron Philip as he directly challenges the hypotheses of Holleaux, McDonald and Walbank.26 Rejecting the suggestion that there wasa long interval between thefirst andsecond war-votes, heconsiders that the Comitia Centuriata would have passed the rogatio for warwithin a month orsoof thebeginning of thenewconsular year. Hedoesnot, however, correlate the passing of this vote with the travels of the Roman envoys in 27). Denying thatthere is a direct connection between fetial Greece (P. 16.25– procedure andthedémarches of theRoman envoys inAthens andAbydus, he maintains that there was no standard procedure for the presentation of demands for satisfaction at this time. ForRich, theenvoys were simply publicizing a senatus consultum setting outtheterms onwhich Philip could maintain peace with Rome. Hedoes not, however, examine therelative chronology of all theevents which culminated inthedespatch of a consular armyinautumn 200, presumably because he is primarily concerned with the diplomatic preliminaries of war.27 Harris’WarandImperialism inRepublican Rome, 327 –70 B.C., sets the beginning of the Second Macedonian War in a broader historical context, 6. On chronology see, 23 Briscoe, Comm.1.11–12; accepting L. 30.26.2–4 and 42.1–10; 31.3– 24 and XXXVII (1981) [henceforth Comm.2] 19– Briscoe, A Commentary onLivybooks XXXIV– 281; P. 356 and 30 (1976) 265– below p. 34 n. 42; P. S. Derow, Phoenix 27 (1973) 345– 426. 496 andBCH 100 (1976) 401– Marchetti, AC42 (1973) 473– For a long time, following Nissen, ‘annalistic‘wasregarded as 24 Comm.1.12; see also 11 n. 2: “ almost equivalent to ‘false.’...” 25 H.Tränkle, Livius undPolybius (1977). See also theremarks of Briscoe, “Livy andPolybius,” in Livius, Aspekte seines Werkes, ed. W. Schuller, Konstanzer Althistorische Vorträge und Forschungen, 31 (1993) 39. Infact those whohave rejected it (sc. theannalistic tradition) have generally 26 Rich, DWTE 80: “ done so in a very cavalier fashion; all too often its annalistic origin seems to be regarded as enough to condemn it.” 87. Conspicuously omitted is the despatch of forces under M. Valerius 27 Rich, DWTE 73– 6 and5.5) andits correlation with the travels of the embassy originally Laevinus (L. 31.3.3– 4) which is probably to be identified with the embassy appointed to visit Ptolemy (L. 31.2.1– 58. 27 and34. Ontheauthenticity of theformer, see below pp.54– reported atP. 16.25–

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showing howwar had virtually become a way of life for the Romans. He briefly refutes Holleaux’hypothesis that revelation of the Syro-Macedonian pact by the embassy of Attalus and the Rhodians caused the Romans to reverse their policy of non-intervention in Greece. Finding Livy’s account “ weak,”he nevertheless accepts the basic authenticity of the annalistic evidence of Roman involvement in Greece during the years 203– 200.28 The chronology of the travels of the Roman embassy in Greece, however, are mentioned but cursorily, as are most of the other events noted by Livy as preceding the departure of theconsular force for Greece. 29 Inthesameyear, Derow challenged theconcept of defensive imperialism in a paper entitled “Polybius, Rome andthe East,”arguing that “Holleaux’s account of Rome andGreece in theyears immediately preceding thesecond Macedonian war cannot be said to be based upon, or to be confirmed by, Polybius.”Hebegins byciting Polybius’general assertion (1.3.6) that it was after the defeat of Hannibal that the Romans realized that they “ hadaccomplished the greatest and most important step towards their universal aim (ἡτ ῶ νὃ λ ω νἐπ ). Thus and then for the first time (ο ή ο ιβ λ ὕ τ ω ςκ α ὶτό τ ε ) they were emboldened toreach outtheir hands fortherest andcross ρ ῶ τ ν ο π with forces into Greece andthe regions of Asia.”Emphasizing the words “ thus and then for the first time,”Derow analyzes the notion of Rome’s universal aim in context of the Roman demands for obedience contained in the senate’s ultimata publicized by the Roman envoys in Greece and the 27 and34), maintaining that Polybius regareastern Mediterranean (P. 16.25– dedthe Second Macedonian War as “consciously undertaken by Romans 30 consciously aiming at world control.” Debate onRoman imperialism wasrenewed.31 A conference washeld in 1982, the proceedings of which were published in 1984.32 Of particular importance are Harris’essay, “ Current Directions in the Study of Roman Imperialism”andthat of Linderski, si vispacem, para helium: Concepts of “ Defensive Imperialism,”an acute analysis in which he traces the concept to Mommsen via de Sanctis, Tenney Frank and Holleaux, showing how their 4, 40.6, 42.1–10, see below Appendix III, pp. 101– 103. L. 30.26.1– 218. Harris, WIRR 212– 15, quotations from pp.8 and4. Derow, JRS 69 (1979) 1– 9. For a discussion of 81; J. North, JRS 71 (1981) 1– A. N. Sherwin White, JRS 70 (1980) 177– 175withbibliography. See thequestion of imperialism andself-defence, seeHarris, WIRR 163– Laus imperii,”in Imperialism in theAncient World, edd. P. D. A. Garnsey and also P. A. Brunt, “ 8, andA. M. Eckstein, Senate andGeneral: 191, Gruen, HWCR3– C. R. Whittaker (1978) 159– 194 B.C. (1987) xi-xxii. Individual Decision-making andRoman Foreign Relations, 264– 32 The conference washeld at the American Academy in Rome in November 1982 under the bilingual title Roman Republican Imperialism: the State of the Questions. L’imperialismo di TheImperialism Roma repubblicana: problematiche attuali. Theproceedings arepublished as“ of Mid-Republican Rome,”Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome [henceforth MAAR], ed. W.V. Harris (1984).

28 29 30 31

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interpretations areinfluenced bytheir owncontemporary political ideology.33 Meanwhile, ina paper originally delivered in 1979, Badian prefers tothink in terms of hegemony as he continues to probe the issues of Rome’s involvement in theeastern Mediterranean, stressing the significance of thedemands proclaimed by the Roman embassy during its travels (P. 16.27 and 34).34 Eckstein also puts theproblem of terminology into thebroader perspective of Greco-Roman history, while reminding us of the danger of imposing our contemporary concepts on the behavior of the ancients.35 For Linderski, imperialism”is inevitable.36 however, the term “ Mistrust of the Roman sources andfaith in the superiority of Polybius continues in the work of Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (1984), to the extent that he questions the possibility of a chronological reconstruction based on a combination of the temporal notations in the testimony of Livy and Polybius.37 Gruen’s work on the Second Macedonian Waris also complicated bya thematic approach which involves considerable recapitulation of events while also obscuring the relative chronology that is inherent in the ancient testimony. Hismeticulous citation of thesources, both ancient andmodern, results in statements of alternative possibilities, a factor that is exemplified in his discussion of the origins of thewar.38 Inthelast tenyears, thependulum hascontinued toswing infavour of the Roman sources, so that Holleaux’ hypotheses are hardly mentioned in the second edition of the Cambridge Ancient History (1989). Here Errington offers a consistent and coherent reconstruction of events in the eastern Mediterranean in thelate third andearly second century byaccepting most of Livy’s testimony as it stands and combining it with evidence from the Polybian excerpts. Authenticity of evidence deriving from Roman sources, however, is merely assumed, evidently because of thenature of thepublication which permits few footnotes andonly the basic bibliography. For Erring33 34

35

36

si vispacem, para Current Directions intheStudy of Roman Imperialism,”Linderski, “ Harris, “ 164. 34, 133– bellum: Concepts of Defensive Imperialism,”in MAAR, 13– E. Badian, “Hegemony andIndependence: Prolegomena toa study of therelations of Rome and the hellenistic states in the second century B.C.,”in Proceedings of the VIIth Congress of the International Federation of Classical Studies I, ed. J. Harmatta (Budapest 1984) [henceforth 414; see also Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.) (1958) 55–83. Prolegomena] 397– One should therefore be wary of the expression “Roman Eckstein, Senate and General xvi: “ imperialism”–at least when it implies something much more ruthless than the imperialism of Roman imperialism”sometimes comes close to being other ancient states... .The expression “ simply a term of abuse, based ontheeventual Roman success insurmounting (via both military anddiplomatic skill) every external threat.” But imprecise are many other expressions pertaining to In Harris, MAAR (1984) 153 n.1: “ human affairs; those whowish to purge imperialism from thelanguage have nogreater chance

of success than those whowish to purge it from history.” 37 See above n.2. 38 See also the comment of T. Yoshimura, AJAH9 (1984) 22 n. 65.

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ton, Rome’s involvement, both diplomatic andmilitary, continued in Greece after thePeace of Phoenice in 205 through to thearrival of a consular force in Apollonia in the late autumn of 200, a reconstruction that makes good sense

interms of thepolitical situation intheeastern Mediterranean attheendof the

third century.39

Theproliferation of thepiece-meal, archival approach is exemplified bya recent paper, “ Greek and Roman Diplomacy on the Eve of the Second Macedonian War.”Meadows takes upScullard’s suggestion that there were twoembassies, each withthesamepersonnel, onein201going toPtolemy, as L. 31.2.3 indicates, andanother in 200 visiting Greece, the islands andthen Antiochus andPtolemy, as indicated by P. 16.25– 27 and34, andL. 31.18.6. Hesuggests that theEgyptian embassy which arrived inRome soon after the Comitia Centuriata hadvoted for war(L. 31.9.1– 5) wasPtolemy’s response toa Roman embassy sent toEgypt intheprevious year (L. 31.2.3– 4). Hethus has Roman envoys make a quick visit to Egypt during the winter months, return to Rome in March 200 only to depart almost immediately for Greece once thewar-vote hadbeenpassed. Thechronology is implausibly tight. It is, moreover, unlikely that three such prominent Roman nobiles as P. Sempronius Truditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM.Aemilius Lepidus were willing to be absent from Rome on a relatively minor diplomatic mission during the winter of 201/200 when important decisions on policy towards Macedon werepending. Meadows also accepts part of thehypothesis of McDonald and Walbank, positing that the indictio belli was delivered to Philip by M. Aemilius Lepidus at Abydus. Hedoes not, however, examine Rich’s reconstruction of the travels andfunctions of the Roman envoys in Greece in the summer of 200. In short, by focusing on diplomatic moves to the almost complete exclusion of themilitary situation, hedenies himself theopportunityof viewing events within the larger framework of Roman foreign policy.40 This brief survey of modern interpretations of the ancient testimony underscores the need to address problems of historiography before attempting historical interpretation. Especially necessary is a more rigorous approach to thequestion of theauthenticity of information reported inpassages that areconsidered to derive from Roman sources. The first step, however, is ananalysis of the design andstructure of book 31 so that Livy’s account of the beginning of the Second Macedonian War can be examined in its original, integral context.41 Only then will it be possible to reconstruct the relative 261. 39 Errington, CAH(1989) 244– 60; H.H.Scullard, History oftheRoman World (2nded. 40 A.R. Meadows, Historia 42 (1993) 40– 1951) 232 n.3. 41 Ontheimportance of setting anevent “morecomprehensively inits historical context,”seethe The Context, Performance andMeaning of Ritual: The British comment of D. Cannadine in “ 1977,”in TheInvention of Tradition, ed.E. Monarchy andthe ‘Invention of Tradition’, c. 1820–

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chronology of thepolitical events, diplomatic moves andmilitary preparations that preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities. Such a reconstruction, deriving from a concurrent explication of Livy’s narrative, is the essential basis for considering notonly theorigins of theSecond Macedonian Warbut also therelated question of Roman imperialism.

The very act of locating theoccasion or thetext in its Hobsbawm andT. Ranger (1983) 105: “ appropriate context is notmerely toprovide thehistorical background, butactually to begin the process of interpretation.”

CHAPTER II

DESIGN, STRUCTURE, ANDCHRONOLOGY1 Distinctive features of Livy’s narrative pose peculiar problems for the modernhistorian whofails totake account of literary design andstructure. Inthe extant books at least, Livy organizes his material according to pentads and decads within which he locates major units of history. Particular emphasis is achieved by the placement of selected themes or events at keypoints in the overall structure of thework.2 Certain events arethen singled outforelaboration as an individual set-piece (Einzelerzählung).3 The strategic location of selected topics, however, particularly when used in combination with an extended treatment of certain related events, creates a variation inthepace of the narrative, a factor which can result in compression, distortion or even omission of material that a modern historian would consider essential. A prime example of such an anomaly is presented by location of the beginning of theSecond Macedonian Warintheopening chapters ofbook 31, where Livy’s apparent desire to place the declaration of war as close as possible to the beginning of the fourth decad has resulted in related events of consular 201being allocated a meretwochapters. This compression contrasts with nine chapters devoted to events in Rome which preceded the departure

1

2

3

All dates are B.C. Throughout this study the convention of italicizing dates in anextrapolated Julian calendar is adopted. Since consuls entered office on 15 March during this period, as L. 31.5.2 indicates, references will beinterms of theconsular year, rather thantheyear beginning 1 January andending 29 December. 36. As Scafuro has observed, CA6 (1987) 252: “Both historical and Luce, Livy xxiv and 34– literary considerations were important forLivy’s arrangement of this material.” K.Witte, ÜberdieFormderDarstellung inLivius’Geschichtswerk,“RhM65 (1910) especially 97, showed howLivy adapted Polybi419, nowreprinted separately (Darmstadt 1969) 96– 418– usbypresenting his narrative in theform of Einzelerzählungen, individual stories, orepisodes. Heconcluded, however, thatLivy began thecomposition of hisworkwithout adequate advance preparation, but went from one period to another without attempting to combine the various episodes into larger integrated units. This conclusion is refuted by the work of E. Burck, Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius (1934, repr. with a newintroduction, 1964), andEinführung in TheThird Decade”inLivy, ed.T. A.Dorey diedritte Dekade desLivius (1950) summarised as“ (1971) 21– 46. See also Luce, Livy XVII– XVIII.

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of theconsul for Macedonia.4 Such animbalance hasgiven some scholars an impression of confusion, if notincoherence.5 Inbooks 31 through 45 which cover theperiod of Rome’s warsintheeast through to 167, events within a particular consular year are presented in chronological sequence according to geographical area.6 This treatment of material ona year byyear basis, however, tends toobscure thecohesion of an individual book since, as the scene shifts from one geographical area to another, there is a needforrecapitulation orflashback.7 Reconstruction of the chronological sequence of events is rendered more difficult because of the different systems of dating apparent in Livy’s sources. Passages deriving from Polybius refer to the seasons, whereas those deriving from Roman sources yield dates according to theRoman calendar which became dislocatedfrom the seasons if intercalation wasnot made on a regular basis.8 In this chapter, analysis of the design andstructure will first reveal the book’s complexity. Concurrent explication will address anyapparent incoherence orconfusion. Thelast section will examine problems of chronology and setforth a method of reconciling thetwodating systems andrelating events to dates in anextrapolated Julian calendar. Design andStructure

10 is an integral unit forming a proemium in which Livy anChapter 1.1– nounces the major themes of the next five, if not ten or fifteen books. He expresses his awareness of the problem of organizing the material that confronted himasheturns totheperiod of Rome’s warsintheMediterranean. With the first word of book 31, he introduces himself into the narrative, commenting on his relief at reaching the end of the Second Punic War: me 4 5

6

7 8

The term Macedonia does not denote Macedon itself, i.e., the area over which Philip directly 61 andbelow ruled, butrather theprovincia assigned to the consul; see Briscoe, Comm. 1.60– p. 52 n. 2. E.g., R. Syme, Tacitus (1958) I.139, who considers that Livy is “betrayed by ignorance of politics andwarfare, bylack of critical principles, and, above all, byincapacity todominate the material with design and structure.”Later (p.148), he suggests that Livy should have had a was not different approach to the beginning of the fourth decad, but concludes that he “ competent to doit, andtheresult is confusion.”See also Briscoe, Comm. 1.40 n. 1, whoavers the whole thing (the opening chapters of book 31) is far too muchof a rag-bag.” that “ 32, gives a general analysis of books 1 through 45, in which he shows the overall Luce, Livy 3– structure andthedivisions according to theme within this larger structure which, he believes, is 307, Briscoe, Comm. 1. 49, A. Hus, Livy’s own. See also P. Stadter, Historia 21 (1972) 287– xvii, for a summary of views on the pentadic Tite-Live, tome XXI, livre XXXI (Paris 1977) vii– and decadic structure with bibliography. 74. 35, see Luce, Livy 33– Onthe cohesiveness of books 31–

Onintercalation in the 190s, see Warrior, “Intercalation andtheAction of M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 B.C.),”in Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, 6 (1992) [henceforth 126. 144, especially 123– Studies] 119–

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in parte laboris ac periculi fuerim, adfinem belli Punici pervenisse. He remarks on the proportion of the work devoted to the twowars with Carthage as compared with that given to the early history of Rome. At the conclusion of this authorial intervention, he compares himself tomenwhoare ledonby shallow water near the shore andthen wadefurther into the sea. Whatever progress he makes, he is getting himself into deeper waters which are, as it were, bottomless (velut profundum), a comment that is disingenuous rather than despairing.9 The comparison serves also as metaphor for Rome’s increasing involvement throughout the Mediterranean

quoque iuvat velut ipse

world.

The transition to the newtheme is succinctly made with the statement, “ warwith Macedon followed peace with Carthage”(pacem Punicam bellum Macedonicum excepit, 31.1.6), as Livy proceeds to mention Rome’s two main adversaries, Philip andthe Aetolians, in the ensuing sentences.10 The scene hasthusbeen setfornotonly thenextpentad buttheentire decad, since theAetolians reappear in the waragainst Antiochus andbook 40 ends with thedeath of Philip. The whole chapter, with its carefully juxtaposed repetition of bellum andpax, bears thestamp of anindividual style andinterpretation. The reasons for Rome’s resumption of warare summarized in the final sentence of theproemium, theconclusion of which is marked bythewords ad renovandum helium.11 Although Livy does not use specific Thucydidean or Polybian terms, heimplies that theunderlying causes of thewarwere Roman anger at Philip not only because of the treacherous peace he hadconcluded with the Aetolians and other allies in that region, but also because of the military assistance andmoney which hehadrecently sent toHannibal andthe Carthaginians inAfrica. Once the Romans hadpeace with Carthage (vacuos deinde pace Punica), they were aroused to renew war (ad renovandum bellum) by anappeal from theAthenians (preces Atheniensium) whose fields 6: iamprovideo animo, velut quiproximis litori vadis inducti mare pedibus ingredi9 L. 31.1.5– untur, quidquid progredior, in vastiorem mealtitudinem ac velut profundum invehi, et crescere paene opus, quodprima quaeque perficiendo minui videbatur. Cf. Briscoe, Comm.1. 51, who sees Livy’s statement asmore “gloomy”thanthepraefatio (4.13) andthinks it “suggests thatL. hadnoclear conception of theeconomy of hiswhole work whenheembarked onit.” 10 L. 31.1.8: ceterum coeptum bellum adversus Philippum decem ferme ante annis triennio prius depositum erat, cumAetoli et belli et pacis fuissent causa. 11 L. 31.1.9–10: vacuos deinde pace Punica iamRomanos et infensos Philippo cumob infidam adversus Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem, tumobauxilia cumpecunia nuper in Africam missa Hannibali Poenisque, preces Atheniensium, quos agro pervastato in urbem 10). Bickerman, CP 40 (1945) 138 compulerat, excitaverunt ad renovandum bellum (31.1.9– 10 as a summary of the annalistic tradition giving the reason for Roman regards L. 31.1.8– intervention in Macedon which he considers is consistent andcoherent. Cf. Briscoe, Comm. 10 as part of the narrative: “Livy gives no comprehensi1.40, whomistakenly takes sections 8– ve, coherent account either of the actual events leading to the outbreak of waror of Roman motives in undertaking it.”On the question of Philip sending assistance to Hannibal, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.55 andbelow Appendix III, p.103.

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hadbeen ravaged by Philip. This final statement of the proemium indicates that Livy considered this Athenian appeal to betheimmediate cause of what is generally known as theSecond Macedonian War.

It should, incidentally, be noted that this designation is a modern rather than contemporary Roman concept.12 TheFasti Capitolini record the waras bellum Philippicum.13 Polybius (3.32.7) likewise calls it thePhilippic War.” “ In the proemium to book 31, Livy denotes the two earlier wars against Carthage as the First and Second Punic Wars (31.1.3– 4) but refers to “ the Macedonian war” (31.1.6) and“ the waragainst Philip which hadbeen laid aside three years before”(31.1.8), while also speaking of “ renewal of war” (31.1.10).14 Inthenarrative, thesenate is saidtohavediscussed “ thematter of Philip and the allies”(31.3.1), andthe declaration of war by the Comitia Centuriata is variously described as“ against king Philip” (31.5.1), “ onPhilip, king of theMacedonians”(31.5.9), and“ onPhilip andtheMacedonians over whomheruled”(31.6.1). This warwasevidently regarded by both Polybius and Livy’s Roman sources as the resumption of unfinished business with Philip. Seldom, however, is the integrity of Livy’s proemium (31.1.1– 10) recognized.15 The final sentence is frequently taken as the beginning of the narrative rather than the conclusion of his summary of the reasons for the 10). This misunderstanding hasresulted in Livy’s renewal of war(L. 31.1.6– reference to anAthenian appeal (preces Atheniensium, 31.1.10) being considered as the first event recorded by Livy in his account of the events that preceded the declaration of war by the Comitia Centuriata, an assumption which has created a chronological problem for some scholars whothus reject a later reference to the arrival in Rome of an Athenian embassy at the beginning of consular 200 (Atheniensium nova legatio at 31.5.6).16 Thebeginning of thenarrative of events that ledupto therenewal of war between Rome andMacedon is marked by thephrase “ at approximately the same time”(sub idemfere tempus, L. 31.2.1) noting the arrival in Rome of ambassadors from Attalus andthe Rhodians. There follows a highly abridged account of events of consular 201, most of which have evidently been selected because of their relevance to theimpending war: thesenate’s recep12 Bickerman, CP40 (1945) 137 n. 1, andDerow, JRS 69 (1979) 11with n. 30. 13 A. Degrassi, ed., Inscriptiones Italiae XIII,1,48. Florus 1.23.28 also writes in terms of two wars, oneagainst Philip andtheother against Perseus. 14 Cf. the apparent gloss at the conclusion of Livy’s summary of the terms of the Peace of Phoenice at 29.12.16: iusseruntque omnes tribus, quia verso inAfricam bello omnibus aliis in praesentia levari bellis volebant.

15 Bickerman’s comments onits integrity, CP40 (1945) 138, have been largely disregarded. 16 Holleaux, Études 5.10–15, followed by Walbank, Philip 312. Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 35 and Briscoe, Comm. 1.55, also fail torealise that thereference to theAthenian appeal is part of the proemium. See further Appendix II, pp.91– 98.

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tion of envoys from Attalus and the Rhodians (2.1– 2), the despatch of a Roman embassy to Ptolemy (2.3– 4), anuprising in Gaul (2.5–11), thereturn of theconsul to Rome, a meeting of thesenate which decided to despatch M. 3.6), and events exitu anni (4.1– Valerius Laevinus to Macedonia (2.11– 7). Although Livy’s source for chapters 2 and 3 is generally assumed to be annalistic,17 little has survived of Polybius’account of the beginning of this war. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the Polybian version was at variance with that of the Roman annalists.18 Indeed, references in Polybius to an embassy sent to Rome by Attalus and the Rhodians (P. 16.24.3) and to the presence of a Roman embassy in Greece (P. 16.25– 27 and34) aregenerally used to supplement Livy’s meager account.19 After this abbreviated account, Livy changes thepace of thenarrative as heelaborately records the opening of consular 200 with the inauguration of theconsuls, a public sacrifice andprayer forthenewwarwithPhilip (31.5.1– 4). Variation in pace continues within the nine chapters devoted to events in Romeprior tothedeparture of theconsuls fortheir provinces. There is a brief report of thearrival of despatches fromM.Aurelius andM.Valerius Laevinus in Greece and of an embassy from Athens (Atheniensium nova legatio, 9). Anelaborate account of the submission of thevote for warto the 31.5.5– Comitia Centuriata ensues. The vote, though initially rejected, was passed 8.1), evidently without undue after a speech by the consul in a contio (6.3– delay. Fetial procedure, allocation of armies, an embassy from Ptolemy which arrived in the midst of preparations for war (in ipso adparatu belli), more religious ceremonies for the success of the war, a Gallic tumultus, despatch of anembassy to Carthage andNumidia andreception of onefrom 11.18). The section ends with more detailed Vermina are then noted (8.1– reports of sacrilege in thetreasury of Persephone atLocri, prodigies andtheir 10), andtheconsuls’administration of thepayment onloans expiation (12.1– 9). madeduring the Second Punic War(13.1– The terse notation turn (14.1) with which Livy marks the ceremonial departure of the consul P. Sulpicius Galba for Macedonia also makes a transition toa retrospective survey of those events intheeastern Mediterraneanwhich Livy apparently regarded asrelevant to thedespatch of theconsular army to northwest Greece. Later notice of the Roman arrival in Epirus at almost the end of the campaigning season (autumno ferme exacto, 22.4) yields a terminus ante quemfor the events described in chapters 5 through 13. Throughout this section, however, there is noindication of thechronology of events beyond their sequence in thenarrative.

47, onLivy’s “distortion”of annalistic sources. 17 E.g., Briscoe’s comments, Comm. 1.46– 15, quoted above p.19. 18 See also Derow, JRS 69 (1979) 1– 45. 19 See below pp. 43–

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After noting the consul’s arrival in Greece, Livy records his reception of anembassy fromAthens which wasunder siege bytheMacedonians andthe subsequent despatch of Roman forces, noting that Philip himself was not present in Athens butwasattacking Abydus (14.3– 5). Philip’s earlier lack of success innaval battles against Attalus andtheRhodians is mentioned (14.4), an apparent allusion to the battles of Chios andLade in the campaigning season of 201.20 There follows Livy’s sole reference to theSyro-Macedonian Pact (14.5).21 The pluperfect tense of the verb contraxerant and the verb’s unusual location at the beginning of a sentence mark a flashback summarizing the events that had led to the Athenian declaration of war on Philip (14.6). This section concludes with a report of Philip’s reception of the news of the arrival of the Roman consular forces in Epirus andof their going into winter quarters (18.9). The organization of the retrospective survey is complex, the overall design apparently Livy’s own. The basic source is Polybius, though somewhatadapted byLivy togive a different emphasis.22 Twodramatic set-pieces, the Athenian declaration of waron Philip andPhilip’s siege of Abydus, are located amidst a number of other related events which are recounted in varying detail. The resulting narrative is uneven, the transitions between the various episodes being particularly elliptical. Tabulation of the events will help elucidate thevarious problems presented byLivy’s idiosyncratic selectionandreworking of his sources.

2: 14.1–

Departure

14.3:

Consul’s reception of Athenian embassy; despatch of Roman forces toAthens

of consul from Rome andarrival in Macedonia

20 L. 31.14.5: iam cumRhodiis et Attalo

21 22

navalibus certaminibus, neutro feliciter proelio, vires expertus. The chronological sequence of these battles and of Philip’s raid on Pergamum (P.16.1) is much disputed, see Harris, WIRR 214 n.7 (Lade followed by Chios); and cf. 500, andErrington CAH(1989) 253 (Chios, Pergamum, Lade). Walbank, HCP2.497– L. 31.14.5: sedanimos eifaciebat praeter ferociam insitam foedus ictum cumAntiocho, Syriae rege, divisaeque iamcumeoAegypto opes, cuimorte audita Ptolomaei regis ambo imminebant; 17. see above pp.16– The change from a Roman source to Polybius probably occurs at 14.3. Cf. Magie, JRS 29 (1939) 33 n.5: “ The material contained in this passage seems to have been derived from Polybius, butit is rather a collection of items of information than the presentation, even in an abridged form, of anypart of theoriginal narrative.”See also Briscoe, Comm. 1.94, whonotes 5 arePolybian orannalistic. Seealso, Comm. 1.47, that it is “wrong”to askwhether sections 3– 19 are neither annalistic norPolybian. They are It follows that chapters 14– where he states: “ Livy’s own reworking of two discordant accounts.”The “distortions”that Briscoe sees in chapter 14 arepartly theresult of his acceptance of McDonald andWalbank’s hypothesis of a three to four month interval between the first and second votes for war by the Comitia 45 that 15 March was sometime in Centuriata. This, and his assumption in Comm.1. 42– December (see below p. 34 n. 42) invalidates much of his work onchronology in this section.

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5: 14.4–

Philip’s presence at Abydus at time of Athenian request to consul; mention of earlier battles with Attalus and Rhodians, Macedonian Pact andof Syro–

10: 14.6–

Background toAthenian warv.Philip: profanation of Eleusinian Mysteries by twoAcarnanians; their execution; Acarnanian appeal to Philip; raid onAttica

15.7: Arrival of Attalus and Rhodians in Aegina after pursuit of 14.11– Philip; their reception in Athens; Athenian vote for war v. Philip; conferral

of honors onAttalus andRhodians

to

11: 15.8–

Attalus Rhodes

16.2:

Philocles’raid onAttica

6: 16.3–

Philip’s march to Abydus

8: 16.6–

Delays of Attalus andRhodians

18.8: 17.1–

5) Siege of Abydus; Lepidus’encounter with Philip (18.1–

18.9:

Philip’s return to Macedon; news that Romans are in winter quarters inApollonia andCorcyra

in Aegina

awaiting Aetolian reply; Rhodian return

Inhis summary of events that culminated in theAthenian declaration of war onPhilip, Livy recounts theexecution of twoAcarnanians whohadprofaned the Eleusinian Mysteries, an appeal to Philip by the Acarnanians, a raid on Attica, thearrival ofAttalus andtheRhodians inAegina andtheir subsequent visit to Athens at the time of the Athenian declaration of war (L. 31.14.6– 15.8). A later note that the celebration of the Mysteries occurred in the 2) yields a following year about the time of the autumn equinox (L. 31.47.1– fixed andindependent point in the seasonal calendar, late September 201, to which the sequence of subsequent events canbe related. Exact chronology, however, is obscured bytheterseness of the summary. The raid on Attica is merely said to have been the original provocation, regular war(bellum iustum) wasdeclared later (postea).23 After this anticipatory mention of the Athenian vote for war, the subject abruptly changes to 23 L. 31.14.10: hic exercitus primo terram Atticam ferro ignique depopulatus cumomnis generis praeda inAcarnaniam rediit. et irritatio quidem animorum eaprima fuit; postea iustum bellum decretis civitatis ultro indicendo factum.

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Attalus andthe Rhodians when, in another elliptical sentence, Livy relates that they hadcome to Aegina after pursuing Philip as hewithdrew to Macedon, andthat Attalus crossed to the Piraeus to confirm his alliance with the Athenians.24 Determination of the dates of the raid onAttica, the arrival of Attalus andthe Rhodians inAegina, andtheAthenian vote for waris crucial. Although Livy’s reference to the raid (14.10) would suggest that Philip’s response to the Acarnanian request was immediate and that it involved Macedonian participation, the logistics of the situation suggest that it is unlikely that Philip could have reacted so quickly. Correlation with a Polybian excerpt which mentions Philip’s presence in Bargylia (16.24.1) andwith L. 31.14.11 suggests that hedidnotreturn to Macedon until theearly spring of 200.25 This part of theretrospective survey (L. 31.14.6–12) thus covers the period from September 201 toApril 200. There are some further anomalies. In addition to theraid mentioned at L. 31.14.10, twofurther, butclearly distinct, raids onAttica areattested, oneby Polybius, the other byLivy. In context of Philip’s departure for Thrace, Livy mentions that Philip despatched Philocles to ravage Attica (L. 31.16.2). A 3), however, records a raid by Nicanor andhis Polybian excerpt (P. 16.27.1– meeting with unnamed Roman ambassadors whogave himanultimatum to be delivered to Philip.26 These Roman ambassadors are generally identified with those named byLivy ashaving been sent to Ptolemy: C. Claudius Nero, P.Sempronius Tuditanus andM.Aemilius Lepidus (L. 31.2.3).27 Comparison 5) reveals that of Livy’s account with another Polybian excerpt (P. 16.25.2– Livy does not specifically mention the presence in Athens of this Roman embassy. Nordoesherefer totheir earlier travels inwestern Greece, asnoted inthePolybian excerpt at 16.27.4. Hemerely recounts theAthenian reception of Attalus andtheRhodians, Attalus’letter to theAthenians, their conferral of honors on him, andtheAthenian declaration of waron Philip (L. 31.14.11– 15.8). Later, in reporting a meeting between M.Aemilius Lepidus andPhilip 5), hefails to mention Lepidus’delivery of a senatus inAbydus (L. 31.18.1– ultimatum, anincident described indetail inanother Polybian excerpt (16.34.2– 4). As has long been recognized, Livy has apparently suppressed two important diplomatic exchanges that preceded the outbreak of hostilities with Philip. Although it is Livy’s general practice to give the minimum of detail concerning embassies, hisomission of theRoman envoys’presence inAthens, Attalus enim rex Rhodiique persecuti cedentem in Macedoniam Philippum cum Aeginam venissent, rex Piraeum renovandae confirmandaeque cumAtheniensibus societatis causa traiecit. 39. See below pp.38– Onthequestion of theraids of Nicanor andPhilocles being distinct, seeWalbank, HCP2.536– 7, Briscoe, Comm. 1.44 and 100, andbelow p. 41. See below p. 45.

24 L. 31.14.11: 25 26 27

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their meeting with Nicanor, the ultimatum which they sent to Philip via 3), andthe updated ultimatum delivered to Philip himself Nicanor (16.27.2–

4) is exceptional. A possible explanation lies in the in Abydus (P. 16.34.2– peculiar design of book 31.28 Inclusion of the embassy’s appointment to Greece andits travels toAthens would have meant protracting theaccount of theevents of consular 201, thus deferring the dramatic opening of consular 200. Later, in the retrospective survey, the narrative focuses on Attalus’ efforts to persuade the Athenians to declare war on Philip and so omits 8). 15.8, cf. P. 16.25.4– specific mention of theRoman embassy (L. 31.14.11– That the Roman envoys were present, however, is implied by Livy’s report thatAttalus, ina letter which wasreadto theAthenian Assembly, encouraged theAthenians to declare war “while they hadhim, the Rhodians, andnow 29In addition, twoPolybian excerpts mention Attaparticularly theRomans.” lus’pleasure that the Romans were ready to engage in warwith Philip (P. 16.25.4) anda hostility to Philip shared by the Rhodians, Romans andAttalus (P. 16.26.6), thus suggesting that the Roman envoys had brought news that theComitia Centuriata hadvoted for waragainst Philip.30 Focus on Attalus’activities probably also accounts for omission of the

envoys’delivery of the Roman ultimatum to Nicanor andthe latter’s raid. Criticism of the failure of Attalus andthe Rhodians to take action against Philip provides a transition into anaccount of Philip’s despatch of Philocles to invade Attica andhis ownmarch through Thrace to Abydus (31.16.1–6).31 Thefinal episode in this retrospective survey of eastern affairs is a detailed description of the siege of Abydus within which Lepidus’ interview with 7) is reduced to a minor confrontation within the larger Philip (P. 16.34.1– Einzelerzählung of the siege of Abydus. Livy has evidently sacrificed details of diplomacy for the sake of creating a dramatic narrative focusing on the personalities of Attalus, Philip andLepidus. Theconclusion of theretrospective survey is marked bya striking comparison. Innoting Philip’s return tohiskingdom andhishearing thenewsof the Roman arrival in Epirus, Livy remarks that the disaster atAbydus roused the Romans to waragainst Philip in the same waythat thedestruction of Saguntumhadroused them to war with Hannibal (31.18.9).32 This comment is a

1: “thetruth appears simply tobethatLivy didnotregard either 28 Cf.Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 40– thepresence of theenvoys atAthens ortheir activities there asbeing of thefirst importance.” 4: in litteris autem... adhortatio capessendi belli, dumse, dumRhodios, tumquidem 29 L. 31.15.3– dumetiam Romanos haberent. 66.. 30 For discussion, see below pp.48 and65– 31 L. 31.15.10–11. This criticism mayhave its origins ina lost section of Polybius andP. 16.28.3. See Briscoe, Comm. 1.100, andH. Tränkle, Livius undPolybios (Basel 1977) 94 n. 92. 32 L. 31.18.9: Philippus imposito Abydi praesidio in regnum rediit. cumvelut Sagunti excidium Hannibali, sic Philippo Abydenorum clades ad Romanum bellum animos fecisset, nuntii occurrerunt consulem iaminEpiro esse etApolloniam terrestres copias, navales Corcyram in hiberna deduxisse.

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contrived thematic link with which Livy connects thedecads andpentads by reminding thereader of earlier episodes, while also providing anapproximate correlation for theendof thesiege of Abydus with thearrival of theconsular force in Epirus.33 There follows a brief section onnon-eastern affairs before autumn 200: a Roman embassy to Africa, the question of a triumph ex Hispania, and an 22.3). After a third reference to theRoman landing uprising in Gaul (31.19.1– in Macedonia, Livy begins an account of the Roman campaigns in 200 and 47.3) which is punctuated bya report of a meeting of theAetolian 199 (22.4– 32.5). This report is cast League attheendof thewinter of 200/199 (31.29.1– in the form of a debate in which theMacedonian case is presented (31.29.2– 16), followed by the case against Philip which is voiced first by theAthenians (31.30.1–11) andthen by a Roman legate whoresponds to theearlier Mace20). Finally theAetolian strategos Damocritus addonian charges (31.31.1– vocates deferring thedecision about joining theRoman cause (31.32.3). This debate at the Panaetolica with its balance of direct andindirect speeches is thus another dramatic set-piece focusing ononeof theprotagonists of thenew 9).34 The strategic location of decad mentioned in the proemium (31.1.1.8– this elaborately constructed debate highlights thesituation atthebeginning of thefirst full campaigning season, creating a suspense that is later resolved by the Aetolian decision to join Rome once they hadnews of Roman success

41.1). (31.40.9–

47.3) is devoted to the The penultimate section of the book (31.33.1– of 199: the campaign season campaigning fighting in Macedonia during the 40.6), a flashback to the Aetolian decision to join of the consul Galba (33.4– 43.7), and theRomans andtheconsequent fighting innortheast Greece (40.7– 47.3). Again theflashback is anaccount of naval warfare intheAegean (44.1– marked by the pluperfect tense of a verb which is placed in an unusual position, the second wordof the sentence.35 The book concludes with a brief account of theremaining foreign anddomestic events of consular 200 (47.4– 50.11).

6: “Just one precious chronological link exists, deriving from Polybi33 Cf. Gruen, HWCR 395– the fall of Abydus finally turned us.”Heaccepts 18.9 so literally that heconcludes (p. 396): “ I cannot Briscoe, CR36 (1986) 95, inhisreview of Gruen, comments: “ Roman minds to war.” believe that theRoman army waited atBrindisi fornewsof Philip’s reaction to theultimatum” 79. (delivered by Lepidus at Abydus). See further below pp.78– 34 Briscoe, Comm.1.129, notes Livy’s alternation of direct andindirect speech andthe“carefully contrived balance”of the whole debate. 35 L. 31.40.7: Philippum averterant Aetoli...; cf. 31.14.6: contraxerant autem sibi cumPhilippo bellum Athenienses.... Emphasis on the flashback is achieved by two further pluperfect tenses, conciverat (40.9) and restituerant (41.1).

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Chronology

From the content of the material he wasrelating, Livy would have realized thattheRoman calendar wasoutof synchronization withtheseasonal calendar, but he evidently did not know the extent of the misalignment. Thus, when changing sources, he used an imprecise phrase or autoschediasm, such as “ about the same time (sub idem tempus) ”or “during these days (per eos dies),”to signify an imprecise chronological relationship to an event previously described.36 Three further types of temporal notation are apparent: seasonal notations (usually deriving from Polybius in the context of campaigning andnon-campaigning seasons), references to the Roman calendar (precise dates, references to religious festivals, to theconsular year which at this time began on March 15, andto events, such as elections, that can be related to such dates), andwords andphrases denoting chronological sequence.37 In addition to these various notations, a useful referent in estimating the beginning and end of naval campaigning seasons andthe periods at which naval operations described intheancient sources would have beenfeasible is provided by a modern table giving the mean number of days in various locations in Greece with windforce atleast Beaufort 6 which is considered to be an “uncertain andrisky sailing condition for ancient vessels.”38 Only one specific Roman calendar date can be inferred in book 31: the Ides of March 200, when the newconsuls took office andputa resolution to the senate about the newwar.39 Although the exact relation of the seasonal calendar to theRoman cannot beprecisely determined, report of aneclipse in 190 dated by Livy 37.4.4 to 11July 190 provides a precise synchronism from which equivalents in an extrapolated Julian calendar can be made. This eclipse canbe calculated to have occurred on14 March 190.40 Theother basis for establishing the operation of the Roman calendar during this period is given by the chronology of events in 203.41 From these two termini it is evident that there were two, orpossibly three, intercalations between consular

7, andWarrior, Chiron 18 (1988) 341. 36 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (1923) 4.1.396– 37 For a tabulation of the categories of temporal expressions of book 42, see Warrior, AJAH 6 18. 21, with discussion 1– (1981) 19– 38 A table of data fromAirForce command, Hellenic National Meteorological Service is reprinted in E. N. Borza, Ancient Macedonia 2 (1979) [henceforth AM]303. 3: idibus Martiis, quo die turn consulatus inibatur.... Other temporal expressions 39 L. 31.5.2– which can be related to the Roman consular year occur at 4.1 (exitu anni) andat 49.8, where there is a reference to the return of theconsul to hold theelections for 199. 40 On the eclipse equation, see F. K. Ginzel, Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen 218, A. K. Michels, The Calendar of theRoman Republic Chronologie (1911) 2.529 and210– (1967), 102 n.31, P. S. Derow, Phoenix 27 (1973) 346. 41 Ovid (Fast. 6.769) gives the date of the defeat of Syphax as 22 June, and estimates of the campaign that preceded that battle can be made from chronological indications given by 24, with bibliography. Polybius andLivy; see Briscoe, Comm. 2.17–

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years 203 and 191.42 Arguments can be made for twointercalations, one in consular 191 when a lawon intercalation wasenacted (lex Acilia de interca3) lando), and the other in consular 193 when evidence in Livy (35.6.2– suggests that dislocation of the consular year from the seasons caused a conflict between the civic and military duties of the consuls. No such evidence exists for an intercalation in anyother year. Intercalation in consular 193 and 191 would mean that consular 200 began on 14 January 200 and consular 199 on4 January 199.43 Thus, at thetime that warwasdeclared on Philip of Macedon, the Roman calendar waseight weeks in advance of an extrapolated Julian calendar.44 The structure of book 31 andits concomitant recapitulation automatically create a number of chronological correlations within the book itself. Three 2, references to the consular force, its departure from Rome at 31.14.1– Philip’s hearing of its arrival inEpirus at 18.9, andthetime of arrival at 22.4, provide a framework for the chronology of the whole book.45 The third reference provides a fixed, though imprecise point in the seasonal calendar, autumno ferme exacto, to which wecanrelate many of the events described both in the retrospective survey andin the general narrative. Although this phrase is notoriously difficult to interpret precisely, it seems tooimply a date as late as the latter part of October or even early November.46 In addition to notice of the Roman arrival in Macedonia autumno ferme exacto (31.22.4), there are several other seasonal references in the context of military operations.47 To these can be added a few references to the grain Comm. 2.24, for variants as implied by various combinations of 25 presumahypothetical intercalations between 203 and188. Briscoe’s work in Comm. 2.17– 45; henow blysupercedes some of hiscomments onchronology in Comm.1, especially pp.42– believes that theJulian equivalent of 15March 200 is 14January 200, rather than“some time in December”asin Comm.1.42. There is, however, nonote of this change of viewinaddenda and corrigenda in the paperback edition of Comm. 1 (1989). The date 14 January 200 is also produced bythree intercalations inconsular years 201, 197 and193. Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 274, argues for intercalations inconsular years 203 and191, thusproducing theequivalent 266– 78 n. 58 also favors only one intercalation in consular 5 February, whereas Rich, DWTE 75– 191, calculating the equivalent of 15 March 200 as 6 February, though he later (JRS 73 (1983) 240) considers that the question of anintercalation between 203 and192 must remain open. 43 Warrior, Studies 131–137, with table (p.122). 44 In the main body of the ensuing text it will be assumed that only consular 193 and191 were intercalary years, butreference will bemade, usually inthefootnotes, to thepossibility that the equivalent of 15 March 200 wasc. 5 February 200. 2: tum P. Sulpicius ...profectus ab urbe Brundisium venit... altero die quam a 45 L. 31.14.1– Brundisio solvit inMacedoniam traiecit, 18.9: nuntii occurrerunt consulem iaminEpiro esse et Apolloniam terrestres copias, navales Corcyram in hiberna deduxisse, 22. 4: consul alter cum autumno ferme exacto inprovinciam venisset. 96. 46 See Appendix I, pp. 95– 47 L. 31.33.2: principio veris; 33.7: exhibernis; 44.1: ea aestate, principio aestatis; 47.1: autumna-

42 See the table in Briscoe,

le aequinoctium.

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harvest which is known to have occurred in early summer.48 Mention of the profanation of theEleusinian Mysteries of 201bytwoAcarnanians (31.14.7) gives a fixed point in the seasonal calendar, since Livy notes that in the following year (200) this celebration took place about the time of the autumn 2).49 Thus wehave anapproximate date in late September equinox (31.47.1– 201 to which subsequent events canberelated. There is a crucial external seasonal correlation: a Polybian excerpt (P. 3) refers toPhilip’s presence inBargylia “whenthewinter (χ 16.24.1– ) ώ ε ν ιμ in which Publius Sulpicius was appointed consul in Rome was already beginning”andtoPhilip’s awareness thatembassies hadbeensenttoRometo act against him. These unnamed embassies are to be identified with the envoys from Attalus andthe Rhodians whose arrival in Rome is reported by Livy 31.2.1.50 The Polybian reference to Philip in Bargylia can thus be correlated, albeit imprecisely, withLivy’s account of theenvoys’report tothe senate about Philip’s activities inAsia. These ambiguities notwithstanding, thenumber of relative chronological expressions makes it possible to reconstruct the chronological sequence of most, if notall, of theevents described in book 31.

48 L. 31.2.7: iam enim maturae erant segetes (in northern Italy). L. 31.36.5–8 and 39.3–4 refer to the gathering of grain in the mountains of northern Greece. K. D. White, Roman Farming (1970) 173 andn. 1,citing Hesiod WD385, 614 points outthat inGreece wheat wassowninthe late fall andearly winter (20 October to 25 November) andharvested in the latter part of May. 2: iamautumnale aequinoctium instabat; et estsinus Euboicus, quemCoela vocant, 49 L. 31.47.1– suspectus nautis. itaque ante hiemales motus evadere inde cupientes .... regem statum initiorum Cereris, utsacris interesset, tenuit. 56, andWalbank. HCP 530. 50 Briscoe. Comm. 1.55–

CHAPTER III

CHRONOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION

Section I: FromtheAcarnanian profanation of theEleusinian Mysteries to the Athenian declaration of waronPhilip andtheraids of Nicanor and Philocles (autumn 201 to summer 200)

The earliest event recorded in book 31 is the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries in the autumn of 201. At thebeginning of theretrospective survey, Livy relates that theAthenians hadundertaken waragainst Philip because of a raid on Attica which was occasioned by the Athenian execution of two Acarnanians whohadprofaned theEleusinian Mysteries.1 Reference to these Mysteries, which we know were celebrated in the following year about the 2), provides anapproximate date in time of the autumn equinox (L. 31.47.1– theseasonal calendar asa fixed terminus towhich thesubsequent sequence of events in consular 201 and 200 can be related. In terms of the Athenian calendar, theofficial program of theGreater Eleusinian Mysteries is consideredto have begun on 15 Boedromion andlasted nine days.2 Since Andocides (de Myst.1.111) attests that, according to a law established by Solon, the Athenian Boule convened attheEleusinion ofAthens tohear thereport of the Archon Basileus andhis assistants regarding the conduct of the celebration and possible incidents, it is likely that the question of the Acarnanians’ profanation was raised at such a meeting of the Boule on 24 Boedromion 201.3 Onthe basis of anapproximate synchronism with thebeginning of the Mysteries around the time of the autumn equinox, it follows that the Boule metin early October 201 to discuss the profanation. Thus it is unlikely that the twoAcarnanians were executed muchbefore mid-October. 1

2 3

L. 31.14.6–8: contraxerant autem sibi cumPhilippo bellum Athenienses haudquaquam digna causa, dumex vetere fortuna nihil praeter animos servant. Acarnanes duoiuvenes per initiorum dies ... Onthe possible Polybian origin, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.95. 47. G. Mylonas, Eleusis andtheEleusinian Mysteries (1961) 243– 118, 85, and HSCP 48 (1937) 116– S. Dow, “Prytaneis,”Hesperia Supplement 1 (1937) 81– dates a meeting of the Boule in the Bouleuterion andin theEleusinion to 24 Boedromion 212/ 211 B.C., andhethinks that this meeting is to beassociated withthemeeting of theBoule inthe Eleusinion which wasrequired by lawon the dayafter the Mysteries (Andoc. de Myst 1.111). 61. See also J. Mikalson, TheSacred and Civil Calendar of theAthenian Year (1975) 60–

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Livy states that the Acarnanians reported the execution to Philip and prevailed (impetravit) onhimto send Macedonian forces andallow them to make waronAthens with Macedonian assistance. Mention at 31.14.10 of a raid onAttica by “this army”(hic exercitus) undoubtedly implies Macedonian participation andPhilip’s sanction of the raid. The wording as it stands, however, raises someminor questions of chronology andlogistics, since Livy does not indicate when these events occurred, nordoes he say where Philip waswhentheAcarnanians madetheir request.4 However, since other testimony in Livy (31.14.11) anda Polybian excerpt (16.24.1) indicate that Philip wasin the eastern Aegean throughout thewinter of 201/200, theraid byhic exercitus is unlikely to have occurred before spring 200. According to Polybius, Philip was in Bargylia “when the winter was ) in which Publius ν ο έ υ μ ο χ ρ τα ὴκα δ ν ο ῶ ςἠ ο ῦχειμ already beginning (τ 5The excerpt makes it quite clear Sulpicius wasappointed consul in Rome.” that thenaval campaigning season wasdrawing to a close. Whenhe sawthat Attalus andthe Rhodians were notdisbanding butincreasing their fleet and ) in Bargylia. Heis ή ν ιβ τρ ια νδ ὴ ν ο ε ςτ μ ύ ιο ο garrisons, Philip remained (π also said to have been aware that the war in Africa was over and that embassies had been sent to Rome to act against him, the latter reference providing aninvaluable temporal correlation with the arrival in Rome of an embassy from Attalus and the Rhodians reported by Livy (31.2.1).6 Polybius further notes that Philip dreaded sailing fromBargylia because heforesaw the danger of the sea but did not want to winter in Asia since he feared the Aetolians and the Romans. Despite his anxieties, he was forced for the ) toremain where hewas, leading thelife of a wolf ν ό ρ α ὸπ τ ὰ τ α moment (κ (P. 16.24.4). Subsequent mention of his actions at Mylasa, Alabanda and Magnesia confirms that Philip remained in the eastern Aegean through the winter.7 Philip’s return to Macedon is implied in the elliptical sentence in which Livy notes thatAttalus andtheRhodians cametoAegina after pursuing Philip 4

5

6 7

L. 31.14.9–10: id tamfoede atque hostiliter factum gens Acarnanum ad Philippum detulit impetravitque ab eo utdatis Macedonum auxiliis bellum se inferre Atheniensibus pateretur. hic exercitus primo terram Atticam ferro ignique depopulatus cum omnis generis praeda in Acarnaniam rediit. et irritatio quidem animorum ea prima fuit; postea iustum bellum decretis civitatis ultro indicendo factum. As noted above (p. 34 n. 42), Briscoe’s reconstruction of this 44) is vitiated from the episode andrelated events such as the nova legatio at 5.6 (Comm. 1.42– outset because he wasworking onthe assumption that theJulian equivalent of 15 March was “ sometime inDecember”(p. 42). Fordiscussion of Polybius’seasonal notations anda refutation of thehypothesis of P. Pédech, νbegan c. 7 November with ώ La Méthode historique dePolybe (1964) 461, that Polybius’χειμ 5. See also Holleaux, the cosmical setting of the Pleiades, see Warrior, AJAH 6 (1981) 24– 7, on la mauvaise saison.” Études 4.286– “ See above p. 35 n. 50. 8; see also Polyaenus 4.18.2 on his escape ruse. P. 16.24.6–

Section I

39

as he withdrew to Macedon.8 His anticipation of the danger of the sea probably occurred in the latter part of October or early November in the general context of the approach of December andJanuary which areusually the stormiest months of theyear in theeastern Mediterranean. Sailing conditions through to February suggest that he would have been confined to the area of Bargylia until the beginning of March.9 Even if he hadmanaged to escape ina small boat andgoalong thecoast andthenfromisland toisland as andwhenthe weather permitted, it is very unlikely that thefleets of Attalus andtheRhodians could or would have followed during thewinter months.10 Newsof theexecution of thetwoAcarnanians could hardly have reached Acarnania anda request for aidsent from there to Philip inAsia Minor much before mid-November. In this case, Macedonian forces could nothave been sent to form an army with theAcarnanians for the invasion of Attica before mid-December atthevery earliest. It is more likely that theAcarnanians sent their plea for assistance to Philip, not to Asia, but rather to Pella in the expectation thathewould return there forthewinter. Philip maythusnothave known of theproblem until sometime inMarch. Ineither event, it is unlikely that Macedonian troops could have been involved in a raid onAttica before spring 200. Theconclusion that a raid which involved theMacedonian armywasnot madeuntil sometime in thespring of 200 is supported byanearlier reference in Livy. In context of early consular 200 butbefore thereport that thevote for warwith Macedon wasputto the Comitia Centuriata, Livy relates that the newAthenian embassy”(Atheniensium nova legatio) arrival in Rome of a “ wasoneof twoevents that occurred opportunely for arousing popular sentiment in favour of the war. This embassy told the senate that the king was approaching their borders and that Athens would soon fall into his power if help were not sent.11 From the tenses of the infinitives of the indirect speech, appropinquare andfuturam (sc. esse), it is reasonable to infer that the raid wasnotafait accompli, butmerely imminent. If thetense of venit is pressed, persecuti cedentem in Macedoniam Philippum cum Aeginam venissent, rex Piraeum renovandae confirmandaeque cumAtheniensibus societatis causa traiecit. 9 The table of data reprinted in Borza, AM303, indicates that for Lemnos themean number of days with wind force at least Beaufort 6 is as follows: 6.3 in September, 8.8 in October, 7.1 in November, 11.9 inDecember, 12.5 inJanuary, 10.4 inFebruary, 8.4 inMarch, and6.0 inApril. 10 Holleaux, Études 4. 288, followed by Walbank, Philip 129 andHCP 2.533, ad loc. P. 16.24.1, andin W. L. Adams, andE. N.Borza,edd., Alexander theGreat andtheMacedonian Heritage 44, whoargues that (1982) 231, dates his escape to early spring 200. Cf. Briscoe, Comm. 1.42– Philip could have escaped inDecember orJanuary. 11 L. 31.5.6: nova legatio venit, quae regem appropinquare finibus suis nuntiaret, brevique non agros modo sed urbem etiam in dicione eius futuram nisi quid in Romanis auxilii foret. For more detailed discussion of the nova legatio and other references to Athenian appeals, see 99. Appendix II pp. 97–

8 L. 31.14.11: Attalus enim rex Rhodiique

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this embassy toRomemaynothave leftAthens muchbefore thebeginning of thenewconsular year, i.e. in thelatter part of December.12 TheAthenians had

evidently learned of the Acarnanian appeal to Philip sometime after the execution of theAcarnanians andanticipated problems atthebeginning of the next campaigning season. They not only sent envoys to Rome but also to Ptolemy (L. 31.9.1).13 The aim would have been for the nova legatio to present its request to the senate as soon as the newmagistrates hadentered office butbefore the allocation of the provinces.14 All thelogistics suggest that a raidwhich involved theMacedonian army wasnotmadeuntil sometime in thespring of 200. Philip hadarrived back in Macedon in early March, at roughly the same time that Attalus arrived in Aegina. Aminor naval engagement between Athenians andMacedonians is attested by incidental references in Livy (31.15.5) andPolybius (16.26.9). The Rhodians are said to have recovered four Athenian warships which had been seized not long before by the Macedonians.15 This testimony, which occurs incidentally in context of the Athenian reception of Attalus andthe Rhodians, indicates that there wastime for Philip to receive theAcarnanian appeal after his escape from Bargylia and begin hostilities against Athens before the Athenian reception of Attalus andthe Rhodians andthe formal this army”(hic Athenian vote for war with Macedon. The land raid by “ exercitus) is also to be dated at this time, aninterpretation which fits Livy’s statement (31.14.10) that the raid was the original provocation andformal war was declared later.16 If the raid andthe naval warfare occurred in late March or early April, the Athenian declaration of war on Philip which is also mentioned by Polybius (16.26.) should be dated to the latter part of April. Thevarious invasions ofAttica needsomeclarification. Asalready noted, there are three references to raids onAttica: that byhic exercitus reported by Livy at 31.14.10 which wehave shown belongs to early spring 200 andwas, as Livy states, the original provocation to formal war (14.10–11); that by Nicanor mentioned only by Polybius (16.27.1) after his account of the Athenian vote forwaragainst Philip; andthatbyPhilocles mentioned only by Livy (31.16.2). Since the testimony of Polybius (16.27.1) indicates that the

12 Atthis time of year, travelling theshort distance from Corcyra to Brundisium would have been merely a matter of waiting forfavorable weather conditions; seeBorza, AM299, whoconsiders that ancient sea-faring continued throughout the year as andwhenthe weather permitted. implies anearlier embassy, seeAppendix II, 68. Onthepossibility that“new” 13 Seebelow pp.67– p. 98. 50.1 where, at the beginning of consular 189, Aetolian ambassadors were 14 Cf. L. 37.49.1– received before theprovinces weredesignated because of thelikelihood of warwithAetolia. On 63. the arrival of the embassy in Rome, see further below pp. 62– 15 Walbank, Philip 312, HCP2 536 plausibly suggests that thenaval action wasoff Euboea. 16 For text, see above p. 38 n. 4.

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raid of Nicanor occurred while Roman ambassadors were inAthens,17 this is not to be identified with the raid by hic exercitus described at L. 31.14.10 which evidently preceded the Athenian vote for war. Nor is the raid of Philocles, mentioned at L. 31.16.2, to be identified with that described at L. 31.14.10, since Livy notes that Philip sent Philocles to raidAttica at the same 3). time that hehimself marched through Thrace (L. 31.16.2– A further hypothesis should be mentioned. It is just possible that the Acarnanians alone had made a raid in November 201 without waiting for Philip’s assent. They would havereturned toAcarnania, asL. 31.14.10 states, andMacedonian troops would have been despatched later in theearly spring of 200 after Philip’s return from Bargylia. In this case, hic exercitus would be the result of the erroneous conflation of tworaids. Athens would thus have suffered four raids as a result of her execution of the Acarnanians whohad

profaned the Mysteries. Thesequence of events that ledtotheRoman invasion of Greece cannow be summarized. The Athenian execution of twoAcarnanians in autumn 201 caused three appeals for military intervention: the first to Philip from the Acarnanians, and two from the Athenians, one to Rome and the other to Egypt. Intheeastern Aegean Attalus andtheRhodians werebuilding uptheir fleets, having earlier sent embassies to Rome to complain of Philip’s activities. Philip remained in the area of Bargylia throughout thewinter. Whenhe escaped from Bargylia in early March, he acceded to theAcarnanian request, ordering hostilities against Athens. In late March, there was a land raid on Attica and a naval engagement in which the Macedonians captured four Athenian vessels which were subsequently recovered bytheRhodians. After the Macedonian invasion of Attica and the Rhodian success, Attalus was invited toAthens where, as Polybius 16.25.2 indicates, healso metthenewly arrived Roman ambassadors. While Attalus andthe Roman embassy were in Athens, the Athenians voted for war, probably after midApril. Some time later, probably in response to the Athenian declaration of war, Nicanor invaded Attica, met with the Roman ambassadors andtook a message from 3). The raid of Philocles was evidently Philip’s them to Philip (P. 16.27.1– response to that message andis thus to be dated sometime in late May200.18 Thearrival of theRoman consular force atalmost theendof thecampaigning season is the Roman response to theAtheniensium nova legatio. But by this time Athens wasunder siege andanother embassy wasinApollonia awaiting thearrival of theRoman consular army (L. 31.14.3).

31. 17 OnLivy’s omission of this embassy’s presence in Greece, see above p. 30– 18 Thus. Walbank, HCP 2. 537.

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It is nowpossible to tabulate thechronology of these various events. One of thebases for this chronology is thedate of theEleusinian Mysteries, which provides a fixed and independent seasonal date from which AcarnanianMacedonian affairs can be calculated. Another is Polybius’ reference to whenwinter wasalready beginning.”Thethird Philip’s presence inBargylia “ is the beginning of the new consular year 200. It is within this frame of reference thatwehaveplaced theAtheniensium nova legatio mentioned inthe annalistic section of Livy’s narrative.

of Eleusinian Mysteries

late September 201

Profanation

late October-early

Philip’s concern about approach

of non-sailing season

November

of twoAcarnanians inAthens

mid-October

Execution

November

Appeal of Acarnanians to Philip Acarnanian raid onAthens without Macedonians?

mid-December (mid-January 200)

Athenian concern about reprisals anddespatch of nova legatio to Rome, andembassy to Egypt (31.9.1)

14 January 200 (5 February)

Beginning of newconsular year, Reception in Rome of nova legatio

early March

Philip escapes from Bargylia followed by Attalus and Rhodians who go to Aegina.

late March

Macedonian invasion four Athenian ships

midApril to late april

Attalus andRhodians gotoAthens, meet Roman ambassadors; Athenian vote for warv.Philip

early May

Raid of Nicanor who meets with Roman envoys.

of Attica;

Nicanor takes Roman message

late May

Philip sends Philocles

Macedonians capture

to Macedon.

to raidAttica andmarches east-

wards

late October

Arrival

inApollonia of theconsular army

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Section II: Theembassy toRomefromAttalus andtheRhodians; theappointment andmission of C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus andM.Aemilius Lepidus (autumn 201 toApril 200)

If, as argued above, theevents described inthefinal sentence of chapter 1 are a general statement of theorigins of thewar,1 thearrival inRome of ambassadors fromAttalus andtheRhodians is thefirst event of 201 to be specifically at approximately the recorded in book 31. Moreover, the autoschediasm, “ same time”(sub idemfere tempus), does notyield a precise correlation with any of the events mentioned in the proemium. An imprecise terminus ante quemfor thedeparture of this embassy is, however, provided bythePolybian reference to Philip’s awareness, “when the winter wasalready beginning in which P. Sulpicius wasappointed consul in Rome,”that embassies hadbeen 3). This reference canbe correlated sent to Rome to act against him(16.24.1– with thepresence inRome of ambassadors fromAttalus andtheRhodians, as indicated by the relative position in Livy’s narrative of their reception in Rome andthe senate’s reply. Philip’s reported anxieties at the approach of winter probably occurred in the latter part of October or early November of 201.2 Some time would have

elapsed between the despatch of thePergamene andRhodian envoys andhis realisation that the enemy fleets were notbeing disbanded butstrengthened. If the envoys crossed the Aegean during the early part of September, they could have arrived in Rome by the endof that month. The assumption of a date in mid-October as the terminus ante quemfor the arrival of these envoys in Rome would mean that another three months of the civic year remained. This wasclearly anopportune time to have an audience with the senate and present possible agenda for the next consular year. Livy gives a minimum of detail about the events that occasioned the embassy from Attalus and the Rhodians, merely noting that the envoys of Attalus andtheRhodians reported thatcities inAsia were also being harassed by Philip (nuntiantes Asiae quoque civitates sollicitari, 31.2.2). This mention of Philip’s depredations is supplemented in the retrospective survey by a cryptic allusion to his lack of success in naval battles against Attalus andthe Rhodians andby a more extended reference to the Syro-Macedonian Pact (31.14.4– 5). There is no mention of any specific “request”or “appeal.”The common assumption is that the ambassadors asked for military help against Philip.3 It is, however, possible that they asked for arbitration of their differences with Philip.4 1 2 3 4

26. See above pp. 25– 39. See above pp.38– 8. E.g. Harris, WIRR 207– 102, followed by Eckstein, Historia 37 (1988) 416. Thus Gruen, HWCR 101–

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Attalus’appeal would have been as an adscriptus to the Peace of Phoenice, a treaty which wasa safeguard notonly for Roman interests in Greece butalso for those people whose names were included among thepro-Roman adscripti.5 Indeed, adscriptio, a Greek rather than Roman practice, seems to have served as aninvitation for pro-Roman adscripti to take their problems to Rome.6 The Rhodians who, together with Egypt andAthens, hadattempted to mediate between Rome and Philip during the First Macedonian War, probably came as amici.7 The senate avoided animmediate commitment with thediplomatic reply that they would consider the matter (curae eam remsenatui fore). In the next sentence, however, Livy notes that the entire question of warwith Macedon (consultatio de Macedonico bello integra) was referred to the consuls who were then in their provinces (31.2.2). Meanwhile (interim) three ambassadors, C. Claudius Nero (cos. 207), M. Aemilius Lepidus, andP. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 204), were despatched (missi) to Ptolemy to ask for his loyalty should the Romans be forced by injustices to undertake waragainst Philip (si coacti iniuriis bellum adversus Philippum suscepissent).8 The location andterseness of thisreport of thesenate’s reaction serve tounderscore the importance of the information Livy is imparting.9 Mention of the 5

6

7 8

L. 29.12.14: ab regefoederi adscripti Prusia Bithyniae rex, Achaei, Boeoti, Thessali, Acarnanes, Epirotae, ab Romanis Ilienses, Attalus rex, Pleuratus, Nabis Lacedaemoniorum tyrannus, Elei, Messenii, Athenienses. Onadscriptio, Badian, Flamininus: Philhellenism andRealpolitik (1970) 52 with n. 79, notes: “ It (adscriptio) means, roughly, that the adscriptus, without any positive action onhispart, is secured against hostilities.”See also Errington, CAH(1989) 105: “ The precise significance of this procedure is uncertain, but it is clear that it meant that the named communities must at least have participated explicitly in thegeneral terms of thepeace asRoman amici, although theycannot havebeenaffected bythespecific territorial terms agreed between Philip andRome.” wehave 8, after discussing theadscripti to thePeace of Phoenice, states: “ Harris, WIRR 207– yet another case where Rome created conditions which ledalmost inevitably to anappeal for military help. Here, though Holleaux denied it, there is thesketch (ébauche) of a forward policy a desire in the Greek world.”See also Eckstein, Senate and General xiv-xv, whospeaks of “ (of theRomans) to surround themselves with as large a system of friendly or subordinate states the Romans soon came to identify their ownself-interest with the as possible,”noting that “ maintenance (andoccasionally theexpansion) of that system.... There is never a suggestion that theRomans engineered these requests for help, butit is notsurprising that they often answered them positively whenthey came.” Onthe relationship with Rhodes andthe attempted mediation, see below Appendix II, p. 100. 5: subidemfere tempus et abAttalo rege et Rhodiis legati venerunt nuntiantes Asiae L. 31.2.1– quoque civitates sollicitari. his legationibus responsum est curae eam rem senatui fore; consultatio de Macedonico bello integra ad consules, qui tunc inprovinciis erant, reiecta est. interim ad Ptolomaeum Aegypti regem legati tres missi, C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, ut ... et peterent ut, si coacti iniuriis bellum adversus Philippum suscepissent, pristinum animum erga populum Romanum conservaret. On Egypt’s

9

amicitia with Rome, see below p. 100. Theancient testimony, whenscrutinized withcare, makes surprisingly Cf. Gruen, HWCR534: “

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possibility of war with Philip was bound to encourage not only Attalus and theRhodians butother enemies of Macedon, asthearrival of thenova legatio from Athens would soon prove. Reference to thedespatch of C. Claudius Nero, M.Aemilius Lepidus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus to Ptolemy at 31.2.3 is supplemented by other sources which record the presence of unnamed ambassadors in western Greece, Athens, Rhodes, of just M. Aemilius Lepidus in Abydus, and a mission to Antiochus and Ptolemy.10 Since Livy 31.2.3 identifies the three envoys and Polybius 16.34.2, followed by Livy 31.18.1, names Lepidus as being sent to meet withPhilip atAbydus, there canbe little doubt that oneand the same embassy visited western Greece, Athens, Rhodes andthen went on to meet Antiochus and Ptolemy.11 Evidently, at some time after its initial appointment, this embassy was given an additional commission to visit Greece andAntiochus. Several questions must thus be resolved: when was the embassy given its second assignment, when did it depart from Rome, whatis thechronology of its travels, whatwasits charge andpurpose, andare its activities to be identified with fetial procedure? TwoPolybian excerpts enable ustoreconstruct theitinerary. Oneexcerpt (P. 16.25.4) relating theAthenian reception ofAttalus andtheRhodians atthe time of theAthenian declaration of warrefers to a meeting inPiraeus between Attalus andsome (unnamed) Roman ambassadors whohadapparently just arrived (P. 16.25.2). Our earlier discussion of events in Athens after the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries hasshown that theAthenian vote for war was in the latter part of April.12 Correlation of P. 16.25.4 with Livy’s account of theAthenian war-vote at 31.15.4 thusyields thesame approximate time for the arrival of theRoman envoys at Piraeus. A further excerpt indicates that Roman ambassadors were present in Athens at thetime Nicanor invaded Attica andgave hima message for Philip with the conditions which were necessary to remain at peace with Rome

10

little of these missions [from Rhodes and Pergamum].... The possibility arises that these missions possessed much less importance than is customarily ascribed to them.” 27.5 reports Roman ambassadors in the area of Athens, andtheir departure to meet P. 16.25.1– 7 report thepresence of Roman envoys in 7 andL. 31.18.1– Antiochus andPtolemy; P. 16.34.1– Rhodes and a meeting between Lepidus and Philip at Abydus; App. Mac. 4, reports that notto molest notto invade Egypt”andPhilip “ (unnamed) ambassadors instructed Antiochus “ theRhodians, theAthenians, orAttalus, oranyother ally.”Just. 30.3.3 and31.1 also notes this “ order.”Ontheunlikelihood that Lepidus wasappointed at this time as tutor to Ptolemy (Justin 30.2.8, 31.1.2; Val. Max. 6.6.1), see Badian, Studies in Greek and Roman History (1964) 113– 3 with 114, and R. K. Sherk, Rome and the Greek East to the death of Augustus (1984) 2– bibliography. OnLivy’s omission of the presence of the embassy in Greece, see above pp.30–

33. 43, whoposits that there were two embassies; see above p. 11 Cf. Meadows, Historia 42 (1993) 40– 21.

12 See above p. 40.

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(16.27.2– 3). The conclusion of this excerpt records the ambassadors’presence in Epirus, Athamania, Aetolia andAchaea andnotes that they delivered to the people of western Greece the same message as that given to Nicanor, ending with the statement, “ then, having sent the message to Nicanor, the envoys sailed away to meet Antiochus andPtolemy to come to terms with 5). Although it is not clear from the syntax of the Polybian them”(16.27.3– excerpt whether the peoples of western Greece were informed of Rome’s intentions towards Philip before or after Nicanor, theuse of “ then”(τ ό τ εδ ) έ suggests that the message was delivered first to the peoples of these areas while the Roman envoys were enroute forAthens.13 The date of theenvoys’departure from Rome is problematic. Acceptance of Livy’s correlation (interim ... missi 2.3) of thedespatch of thethree Roman envoys with the senate’s reception of the embassy from Attalus and the Rhodians sometime before mid-October 201 would give anexcessively long period between their departure from Rome andtheir arrival inAthens in midApril, even though they visited Epirus, Athamania, Aetolia andAchaea. This anomaly hascaused modern scholars toposit different dates fortheembassy’s departure, apparently according to their conception of its purpose.14 Contrary to the implication of interim ... missi (L. 31.2.3), the three Roman ambassadors evidently did not depart immediately after their appointment in October 201. It is most unlikely that twosuch senior senators as C. Claudius Nero andP. Sempronius Tuditanus, both of whom hadsignificant experience in Greece during the First Macedonian War, left Rome before the return of theconsul andthediscussion of warwith Macedon promised bythe senate (L. 31.2.2). Livy subsequently reports the return of the consul andthe convening of the senate which then authorised the despatch to Macedonia of 3), a decision which M. Valerius Laevinus with thirty-eight ships (L. 31.3.1– wewill argue marks the second stage of the senate’s resolve to make waron Philip.15 Discussion of policy toward Macedon would have affected themission of P.Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM.Aemilius Lepidus. Rather than going directly to thank Ptolemy for his past services and ask for his continued loyalty, these envoys were nowgiven a more urgent mission in Greece before proceeding further east to Ptolemy andalso Antiochus. The first part of their task would have been to reaffirm the Peace of Phoenice which Tuditanus himself had concluded with Philip, renew earlier con-

13 Walbank, HCP 2. 538. 14 Holleaux, Études 5.19 and345, asserts that the envoys left inApril 200. Walbank, HCP 2.534, 8, who suggests late winter after theconsuls’entry into office. Cf. Briscoe, Comm. 1.44 and56– 74, also accepts L.31.2.3 asevidence believes that they left inlate autumn 201. Rich, DWTE 73– for the embassy’s departure, but rejects Livy’s testimony concerning its destination and purpose.

58. 15 Onthe question of thehistoricity of Laevinus’commission, see below pp.53–

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nections with the Epirots and, as Polybius (16.27.5) indicates, proclaim to them, Amynander ofAthamania, theAetolians andtheAchaeans themessage that wassent to Philip viaNicanor. With theexception of theAetolians, these western Greeks were adscripti to the Peace of Phoenice written in by Philip (L. 29.12.14). Tosecure their support, oratleast their neutrality, wasevidently the Roman aim.16 Notice that the Roman envoys conveyed the message to theAetolians at Naupactus andtheAchaeans atAegium (P. 16.27.4) suggests that enroute for Athens they attended the spring meetings of the two leagues. Since they reached Athens in the latter part of April, they probably left Rome in midMarch, that is, about six weeks after the beginning of consular 200. Livy’s use of the words interim ... missi (31.2.3) is not to be taken literally, but is rather to be viewed as an ellipsis or inaccuracy resulting from his summarizing of anoriginal such as “meanwhile they (i.e. thesenate) decided to send.” After the senate’s decision to despatch M. Valerius Laevinus with ships to Macedonia, diplomacy hadapparently beenputonholduntil thebeginning of spring. Consideration of the relative chronology of events in Greece andRome indicates that thedeparture of theRoman envoys for Greece wascoordinated with thepassing of the vote for warby the Comitia Centuriata. Examination of Livy’s narrative will show that there are no grounds for assuming a long period between thefirst andsecond votes in theComitia Centuriata. The vote for waragainst Philip could have been passed by the endof Roman April at the very latest, i.e., c. 28 February if theJulian equivalent of 15 March is 14 January.17 Warwould thus have been formally declared by the time that the envoys left Rome in mid-March. Evidence in Polybius confirms that, when in Athens, the Roman envoys were aware that theComitia Centuriata hadvoted for war.Attalus, onmeeting theRomans at Piraeus, is said to have been gratified that Rome wasready to engage in war with Philip (P. 16.25.4). Another excerpt, in context of the Athenian vote for war against Philip, hasAttalus refer to hostility to Philip shared by the Rhodians, Romans andhimself (16.26.6). Livy, in the retrohaving”the Romans spective survey (31.15.4), also mentions theAthenians “ as well as Attalus andthe Rhodians, a reference which suggests not simply the support of the Roman envoys butalso news of theRoman vote for war.18 These allusions, though frequently dismissed or otherwise explained by 16 Errington, A History of Macedonia (1990) 200: “One function of the legates was indeed to deliver theultimatum, buttheir maintask wasto arouse anti-Macedonian sentiment inGreece.” 17 Orc. 21 March if the equivalent is 5 February. For refutation of the Holleaux, McDonald and Walbank hypothetical three to four month interval between the votes andfordiscussion of the 67. promulgation, rejection andpassing of the warvote, see below pp.64– 18 L. 31.15.4: turnquidem dumetiam Romanos haberent (sc. Athenienses). See above p. 31.

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scholars who follow McDonald and Walbank in positing a three to four month interval between thethefirst andsecond war-votes, should be taken at face value.19 3 and34.3– 4) state clearly andprecisely TwoPolybian excerpts (16.27.2– the Roman terms for keeping peace that the ambassadors issued first to the Epirots at Phoenice, to Amynander in Athamania, to the Aetolians at Naupactus, to the Achaeans at Aegium, to Nicanor in Attica and, in a revised version, to Philip himself at Abydus. In the first, the Romans urged (π ρ α α κ α λ ο ῦ σ ι) Philip not to make war on the Greeks and to submit to ) the ηρ arbitration in an impartial tribunal (δ ίκ α ρ ῳ ίῳ κ ιτ ςὑπ έ χ ε ινἐ νἴσ μ ή α τ ) suffered byAttalus. Once he didthis he could remain wrongs (ἀ δ α ικ η γ νἄ ή ε ν ινἐξ ἰρ atpeace (ε ε σ τ ι) with theRomans but, if herefused to obey (π ε ίθ ε σ θ α ι), the consequences would be the opposite. Theterms later conveyed byM.Aemilius Lepidus to Philip atAbydus are ῳ ) expressly stated to be the wish of the senate (δ έ ή δ ο κ τ τ γ α κ ιτ ῇσ λ υ (16.34.3). Philip wasagain urged not to make waron anyof the Greeks, but there were some additions. He was not to lay hands on any of Ptolemy’s possessions, andwasto submit to arbitration the question of compensation to the Rhodians as well as to Attalus. If he did this, there would be peace (ε η ή νἄ ν γ ἰρ ε ινἔξ ε ιθ ρ χ ), ε α ῖν έ σ τ α ι) but, if he was unwilling to comply (π ω τ ο hewould soon findhimself atwarwithRome (ἑ ίμ ρ ςὑπ ά ρ ξ ὸ ε ιντ ὸ νπ ς ν).20 Roman insistence on obedience to their orders has ο μ α ίο υ λ εμ Ῥ ω ςπ ό been discerned by Derow, whonotes that this is thefirst time in Polybius that such a demand occurs andthat “from this point on the orders/obedience (or failure to obey) syndrome permeates Rome’s dealings with the Hellenistic world.”21 Philip’s failure to obey would lead to war, as the first Polybian excerpt implies (16.27.3) andthe second (16.34.4) makes explicit. In context of the appointment of theRoman embassy to Egypt, Livy also mentions thepossibility that Rome might be forced to warbecause of unspecified wrongs (iniuriae), a reference that is to be connected with the wrongs suffered byAttalus andtheRhodians as a result of Philip’s harassment of thecities of Asia Minor

19 E.g., Briscoe, Comm.1.98, who notes that Livy “does not exclude Polybius’ mention of the If challenged, he (sc. Livy) Romans,”andexplains the apparent anachronism by suggesting: “ could nodoubt say that Attalus knew that Rome hadnowdecided to go to warwith Philip.” if he didnotat once accept these terms,”an 20 The translation in theLoeb (p. 75) is misleading: “ 51). Note apparent reflection of the assumption that this is fetial procedure (see below pp.50– also thechange of tense of theparticiple at 16.27.3 where theaorist is used, whereas thepresent participle at 34.4 probably indicates Lepidus’awareness that theconsular army would soon be 78. in Apollonia; see below pp.77– 21 JRS 69 (1979) 5, with (n.16), a list of the relevant passages and expressions demanding λ κ α ρ α ε ῖνwith 7, who equates π α obedience. See also T. Yoshimura, AJAH 9 (1984) 6–

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asreported byPolybius (16.27.3 and34.4).22 Livy’s later report of themotion submitted to the Comitia gives as reason for declaring war the wrongs inflicted on allies of the Roman People (ob iniurias armaque illata sociis populi Romani (L. 31.6.1).23 In this context, the “ allies”include not only Attalus andthe Rhodians butalso theAthenians whose nova legatio hadjust been received by the senate (L. 31.5.6).24 The references at L. 31.2.4 and6.1 are consistent andcompatible with theevidence of thePolybian excerpts, the first reflecting the diplomatic pretext given in the demands conveyed to the

Greeks andPhilip himself.25 The details as given in these Polybian excerpts indicate that the envoys were giving maximum publicity to a senatus consultum which they could update according to circumstances. The offer to arbitrate a question of alleged wrongs suffered by non-Greeks marks a newdeparture in Roman policy. As Badian pointed out more than a generation ago, the clauses concerning the Greeks indicate that Rome was unilaterally undertaking the protection of non-allied states.26 This is, moreover, apparently the first time that the Romans offered arbitration, hitherto a tool of Greek diplomacy.27

imperare.

22 L. 31.2.4: si coacti iniuriis bellum adversus Philippum suscepissent. The Loeb translation, “ their wrongs,”seems to imply that the Romans had suffered injustice. Although Briscoe, Comm. 1.70, does notcomment adloc. oncoacti iniuriis, incommenting oniniurias at 31.6.1 in context of the war-vote, he observes that 2.1 alludes to the injuries “reported by Rhodes and Attalus.”See also Errington, CAH(1989) 255 n. 38. Cf. Rich, DWTE 74, whoretains Livy’s notice of the despatch of the embassy, butrejects the destination andpurpose as an annalistic Polybius provides ouronly reliable information.” fabrication, onthe grounds that “ 23 This passage, though generally regarded as annalistic, is retained by most scholars, except W. Dahlheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (1968) 242– 4 n. 23, whorejects the whole account of the war-vote at this time.

24 The Athenians are also referred to as socii at L.31.5.8. On the use of socius, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.53 with bibliography: “ socius can refer to the existence of amicitia as well as to the possession of afoedus.” 25 Thus Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 33: “That the alleged aggression of Philip against Attalus and Rhodes supplied, rightly or wrongly, theRoman pretext indiplomacy forgoing to waris certain too, from Polybius’account.” 26 Badian, Foreign Clientelae 68, sees theRoman message as “only a further extension of anold just as, originally, Rome had invented a method of Roman political idea,”and continues: “ evading the requirements of fetial law... so nowstates were unilaterally taken under Roman protection without even the formality of a treaty.”Hefinds “nothing harsh”in the request to differences”with Attalus, noting that the term adikemata “ does notprejudge discuss Philip’s “ the issue: judgement is still to come.” 27 Gruen, HWCR 101, remarks that there is no sign of Roman arbitration in the Illyrian or First Macedonian Wars. He notes (n. 22) that the Romans hadbeen asked to arbitrate an internal dispute at Saguntum in 221 (P. 3.15.7 and30.2), buta decision bytheSenate wasovertaken by thesiege of Saguntum andthequestion became oneof sending military aid(App. Ib. 11).Fora 101. Onarbitration, see also Bickermann, Rev. list of Greek examples, see Gruen, HWCR 96–

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Various attempts have been made to connect the “ démarches”of the embassy in Athens andAbydus with fetial procedure. The demands given to Nicanor (P. 16.27.2) have been identified with delivery of a formal demand for satisfaction (rerum repetitio) andthose issued byM.Aemilius Lepidus to Philip himself (P. 16.34.3) with the formal declaration of war (belli indictio).28 That there is a connection is notto be disputed. The question is oneof precise identification.29 That the action prescribed by the fetials for delivery of the belli indictio was not a part of the duties of this embassy is clearly indicated by Livy. After the passing of the war-vote, the question arose whether the indictio should be delivered to Philip in person or to the nearest guard post in Macedonian territory; the fetials stipulated that it be delivered by a non-senator.30 Since all three envoys were probably senators, this stipulation was evidently designed to exclude them from delivery of the formal belli indictio.31 In the case of the rerum repetitio, however, there is no direct evidence to prove or disprove identification with the demands presented to Nicanor. Nevertheless, although the content of the Roman message might be cited in support of identification, themore likely time for issuing a rerum repetitio is after theconsul hadconvened thesenate to discuss a response to theembassy 2). Aformal request for reparation from Attalus andthe Rhodians (L. 31.3.1– was probably sent directly to Pella in (mistaken) anticipation of Philip’s return from Bargylia at the endof the campaigning season. The suggestion that the three ambassadors had, as part of the various duties in Greece and points further east, thetask of also carrying outfetial procedure is unlikely. To

417. 3, Eckstein, Historia, 37 (1988) 414– 77, Badian, Prolegomena 402– Phil 61 (1935) 76– 197, Walbank, HCP 12, McDonald andWalbank, JRS 27 (1937) 189– 28 Holleaux, Études 5. 11– 2, Briscoe, Comm. 38, 41– 2.543– 4, Bickerman, CP 40 (1945) 139, Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 37– 405, andN.G. L. Hammond, TheMacedonian State 1.45, D. Golan, Athenaeum 63 (1985) 389– 78, for a summary of the various interpretations. 6. See Rich, DWTE 76– (1989) 345– 29 Cf. Rich, DWTE 78: “there wasnodirect link between thewarvote andeither of theembassy’s “ démarches”to Macedon, and it is misleading to speak of the embassy as presenting an ultimatum or declaring war.”Gruen, HWCR 395, discusses the connection, expresses some scepticism, asserting that thetruth is “quite beyond recovery.” 5: consultique fetiales ab consule Sulpicio, bellum quod indiceretur regi Philippo, 30 L. 31.8.3– utrum ipsi utique nuntiari iuberent, an satis esset infinibus regni quodproximum praesidium esset, eo nuntiari. fetiales decreverunt, utrum eorumfecisset, recte facturum. consuli a patribus permissum utquem videretur ex iis qui extra senatum essent, legatum mitteret ad bellum regi indicendum. See further below p. 67. 4, find some 31 McDonald and Walbank, JRS 27 (1937) 194–197, and Walbank HCP 2.543– support for the connection in the Polybian excerpt which mentions that the envoys had instructions to address the king personally (16.34.2). Both Polybius (P. 16.34.2) and Livy (31.18.1), however, make it clear that Lepidus wassent to Philip by the other members of the embassy, notoninstructions from theconsul Galba. TheMcDonald Walbank hypothesis is also 65. For dependent on positing a long delay between the two war votes, see below pp. 64– 137. arguments that Lepidus wasa senator, see Rich, DWTE 128–

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entrust delivery of either a rerum repetitio or a belli indictio to this embassy would have meant that there wasnoguarantee of when theprocedure would be completed. This is not, however, to suggest that the demands recorded in the Polybian excerpts were substantially different from the terms of the formal rerum repetitio andbelli indictio. Indeed, they were probably identical. The envoys notonly reinforced fetial procedure butwere also agents for Roman propaganda throughout Greece andtheeastern Mediterranean. Combination of Livy’s testimony concerning theoriginal appointment of theembassy with that of Polybius hasenabled ustoreconstruct thechronologyof theembassy’s mission andso discern its purpose, Livy’s omission of its presence in Greece notwithstanding. The actual appointment belongs to the period shortly after the arrival in Rome of the embassy of Attalus and the Rhodians, that is, sometime inthelate autumn of 201. Atthetime of theinitial response to Attalus and the Rhodians, the senate temporized by naming C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Aemilius Lepidus as ambassadors to Egypt, while also mentioning the possibility of war with Philip. After the return of the consul butbefore the departure of the envoys, the senate reviewed its eastern policy, appointed M. Valerius Laevinus 3), and gave the to cross to Macedonia with thirty-eight ships (L. 31.3.2– recently appointed ambassadors anextended mission in the eastern Mediterranean to publicize a senatus consultum containing theterms whereby Philip could avoid war. A rerum repetitio mayalso have been sent to Philip at this

time.

By thetime that theenvoys left Rome in mid-March, warbetween Rome and Macedon had been authorized by the Comitia Centuriata. The envoys, however, were acting under senatorial directives formulated before warhad been formally declared. Their main task wasto win support by publicizing Roman intentions towards Philip. Thedemands asreported inthetwoPolybian excerpts (P. 16.27.2 and34.3) indicate that the senate wasproclaiming a new policy: that of protecting the interests not only of one of the adscripti to the Peace of Phoenice but also those of the Greeks andPtolemy. This new policy is to be seen against the background of the threat posed to the balance of power bytheweakness of Egypt after thedeath of Ptolemy IV,Antiochus’ invasion of Coele Syria, Phoenicia and Palestine, and Philip’s recent campaigns in Asia Minor. Now that she had defeated Hannibal, Rome was resuming her interests in the eastern Mediterranean. As Livy notes in the proemium (31.1.8), waragainst Philip hadonly been suspended (depositum). A vital question remains: was Rome’s offer of arbitration serious or merely intended to supply a pretext for waragainst Philip? Consideration of the relative chronology of the order for M. Valerius Laevinus to cross to northwest Greece, the passing of the war-vote in Rome, the travels of the three Roman envoys andtheir publicizing of the senatus consultum before it

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was delivered to Philip will indicate that the offer was but a formality.32 At any rate, Philip apparently regarded it as such since he marched through Thrace to the Hellespont where he laid siege to Abydus in order to gain control of the Hellespont.33 Even if the offer wasgenuine, the senate hada strategy that could not fail. If Philip accepted arbitration, his aggressions would cease andRoman diplomatic prestige in the Hellenistic world would be enhanced at his expense. If he refused, the Romans hada further pretext for a warwhich was already officially declared. The embassy from Attalus andtheRhodians hadgiven thesenate anopportunity forwhich some Roman nobiles hadbeen hoping ever since thePeace of Phoenice hadbeen formulated. Section III: The consul’s return to Rome, the senate’s appointment of M. Valerius Laevinus with propraetorian imperium, coordination of March 200) diplomacy andmilitary forces (November 201–

4), Livy reports a After theappointment of thethree envoys toEgypt (31.2.1– campaign in Gaul from which theconsul P.Aelius Paetus returned to convene 3.1), a meeting which could have been held in early the senate (31.2.5– November if the senate actually requested theconsul’s return.1 The question of Philip andthe allies’complaints wasgiven precedence anda motion was passed by a well-attended senate that the consul should choose a manwho should be invested with imperium to cross to Macedonia after taking command of a fleet which Cn. Octavius was bringing back (reduceret) from Sicily. M.Valerius Laevinus wassent aspropraetor (propraetor missus) tothe area of Vibo where hetook over thirty-eight ships from Octavius andcrossed to Macedonia, i.e. Epirus in northwest Greece.2 There he was met by the legate M.Aurelius whogave himdetails of Philip’s preparations for war.The 57. 32 Onthe chronology of Laevinus’expedition see below pp.56– 76. 33 See further below pp.75–

1 The phrase for a close

2

eodem tempore with which Livy introduces this report (31.2.5) cannot be pressed correlation with events in a different area, since at this point Livy has probably changed from Polybius to a Roman source. Cf. thedesignation of Laevinus’earlier provincia asGreece andMacedonia (L. 24.44.5) when his imperium wasprorogued for213 after hehadtaken Oricum andwintered there (L. 24.40.1– 17). “Macedonia”wasdesignated as aprovincia for consular 200 (L. 31.6.1). Cf. notice of the consul’s crossing of the Adriatic: 31.14.2: (sc. consul) in Macedoniam traiecit. Later, in 192 before warwasdeclared onAntiochus, thepraetor M. Baebius Tamphilus wasassigned classis et Macedonia as hisprovincia (35.20.10), given orders to cross inMacedoniam if the situation required (35.23.5), andfinally ordered to cross to Epirus andholdhis troops around Apollonia (35.24.7). Earlier, at 30.42.5, M.Aurelius is said to have sent Furius to Rome exMacedonia.

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twomenagreed that theRomans should undertake this warwithgreater effort lest Philip invade Italy as Pyrrhus had earlier and that Aurelius should communicate in writing with the consuls and senate.3 Later, the arrival in Rome of a despatch from Aurelius andLaevinus is oneof twoevents said to have been opportune for arousing men’s minds to war.4 Most of theearlier passage hasbeen translated, notparaphrased, because, if accepted as authentic, the senate’s decision to send Laevinus to Vibo, near the coast of southwest Italy, to take over Octavius’ships andthence cross to Macedonia constitutes a further reaction to the news brought by the envoys from Attalus andthe Rhodians. The aimwasto mobilize a naval force in the Straits of Otranto andestablish a naval base atCorcyra anda beach-head near Apollonia in northwest Greece.5 This mobilization would have not only demonstrated the seriousness of themessage publicized bytheembassy of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM. Aemilius Lepidus but also offered a direct challenge to Philip by reasserting Roman interest in the area of northwest Greece. If these ships were sent across theAdriatic andRoman forces were actually on Greek soil before the Comitia Centuriata hadvoted for war, as Livy’s narrative implies, such activity could even have been construed as anact of war. Scholars, however, have disregarded Livy’s account of themeeting of the senate, adducing various reasons rejecting andLaevinus’entire mission, his appointment, despatch, meeting with M. Aurelius, the latter’s report to him 6) andtheir joint report to Rome at the beginning of consular 200 (31.3.2– 6).6The main grounds for rejecting Laevinus’expedition are that it is (31.5.5– 3

4 5

6

5: cumprimum senatum habuit, universis postulantibus ne quamprius remquamde L. 31.3.1– Philippo ac sociorum querellis ageret, relatum extemplo est; decrevitque frequens senatus ut P. Aelius consul quemvideretur ei cumimperio mitteret, quiclasse accepta quamexSicilia Cn. Octavius reduceret, in Macedoniam traiceret. M. Valerius Laevinus propraetor missus circa Vibonem duodequadriginta navibus ab Cn.Octavio acceptis in Macedoniam transmisit. ad quem cumM.Aurelius legatus venisset edocuissetque eumquantos exercitus, quantum navium comparasset rex.... maiore conatu Romanis id capessendum bellum esse, ne cunctantibus iis auderet Philippus quod Pyrrhus prius ausus ex aliquanto minore regno esset, haec scribere eadem Aurelium consulibus senatuique placuit. The M. Aurelius mentioned here andat 30.26. 9 is generally identifed with M. Aurelius Cotta whose death is 4, 42.2–11 and 31.5.5– 2– reported at 31.50.5; see Appendix III, p.101 n. 1. 62. See below pp. 61– L. 31.18.9 notes theconsul’s landing inEpirus andhissending of forces to Apollonia andships to Corcyra; see also L. 31.22.4 and 27.1. Wind force at Corcyra is at its highest in winter: December, 3.4, January 2.2 andFebruary 2.2 (Borza, AM303). Onthestrategic importance of 58, N.G.L. Hammond, this area of Epirus, see M. Crawford, TheRoman Republic (1993) 57– JRS 58 (1968) 1– 21 andbelow p. 82 n. 3 with text. De Sanctis, Storia 4.1.21 n.55, Holleaux, CAH(1930) 156 n.1, K.-E. Petzold, Die Eröffnung des zweiten römisch-makedonischen Krieges (Berlin 1940) 71, Walbank, Philip 127, n.7 and Broughton, MRR1.322 n.3. In support of authenticity, see J. H. Thiel, Studies on the History of 221, Briscoe, Roman Sea Power in Republican Times [henceforth Sea Power] (1946) 212, 219– 214, andErrington, CAH(1989) 245 and256. 61, Harris, WIRR 213– Comm. 1.12 and60–

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an apparent doublet of the operations conducted by the same man at the beginning of theFirst Macedonian Warinthevery areato which Livy says he wassent in 201. A second argument involves an alleged inconsistency with Livy’s earlier accounts of the withdrawal of the Roman fleet from Africa. That thesecond reference to Laevinus’expedition occurs inthesame context as Aurelius’mission and the arrival of the nova legatio from Athens at the 6) apparently provides further support for beginning of consular 200 (31.5.5– 6. By contamination, as it rejecting notice of the entire mission at L. 31.3.2– were, Laevinus’expedition also becomes anannalistic invention.7 Earlier references to M.Aurelius aresimilarly rejected, both theembassy onwhich heserved withC.Terentius Varro andC. Mamilius in203 (30.26.2– 4) and his protracted stay in Greece through to 201 (30.42.1–10).8 The method is dubious, anall ornothing approach which, asit appears inthemore recent scholarship, fails to investigate theauthenticity of each event per se.A more explicit andrigorous approach to the question of the authenticity of information given in passages which are deemed to be of dubious annalistic origin is clearly needed.9 In order to discern what canbe regarded as historical andwhatis theresult of later invention, elaboration orembellishment, the report of each event oraction should beexamined separately almost clause by clause before being considered in its broader historical context. The extraordinary terms of Laevinus’ appointment imply authenticity. The senate ordered theconsul P.Aelius Paetus to select a manwhowould be invested with imperium to take command of Octavius’fleet andtransport it to Macedonia (L. 31.3.2). Theimperium, however, wasonly that of a propraetor (propraetor missus, L. 31.3.3), even though the man chosen, M. Valerius Laevinus, had already held the consulship.10 Delegation of the choice of a commander to a consul contrasts with other grants of imperium toprivati at this time andwasevidently intended to avoid the granting of imperium pro 7 E.g., Broughton, MRR1.322 n. 3 andGruen, HWCR222 n. 86. Thelatter finds Livy’s account of it is embedded in a too fragile to support any hypotheses”because “ Laevinus’ expedition “ dubious annalistic account, grossly inflating the transgressions of Philip.”He concludes: , noting that nothing further is “ Laevinus mayhave been appointed (my italics) in late 201” this venture.”He also cites Livy’s reference to heard of the expedition which he dubs “ Laevinus’death in 200 (L. 31.50.1). None of these points, however, proves that the mission never existed, especially since Livy’s information on naval matters is rarely as complete or comprehensive as wewould like. Laevinus’fleet wasprobably merged with theships taken by 221, whopoints Galba from Lentulus (31.14.2) in autumn 200. See also Thiel, Sea Power 220– outthat nothing is heard of C. Claudius Centho once L. Apustius comes to theAegean area (L. 31.14.3, 22.5, 44.1).

8 Forexample, thestatement of Broughton, MRRI 322 n. 3, quoted above, p.13 n.4. 9 See the comment of Rich, DWTE 79, quoted above, p.14 n.6. 10 On the reading propraetor missus, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.61, and his Teubner text (1991). Apparently at this time, a consul could only bestow imperium at a lower level than his own, a point

I owe to E. Badian. Cf. Briscoe,

Comm. 1.61.

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consule like that given by popular vote to P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus in 210 andlater bythesenate tohissuccessor inSpain, L. Cornelius Lentulus, in 206.11 By this means, the senate wasable to achieve the temporary appointment of an experienced manwhose propraetorian imperium would not prevent the allocation of Macedonia as a province to oneof theconsuls elected for consular 200. Laevinus’appointment attheendof consular 201 wasintended as a stopgapuntil warhadbeen voted by theComitia Centuriata andthe levy completed. The strategy is evident –the mounting of a task force to patrol the Adriatic and secure a beach-head in Epirus in preparation for a full-scale invasion by a consular army.12 In addition, Roman mobilization in the Straits of Otranto would have warned Philip of whatwould happen if hedidnotstop his aggression, while also challenging himto oppose aninvasion. But to do thelatter would force himto withdraw hisfleet from theAegean.13 Whatever option Philip took, the Romans could not fail. Moreover, even if Philip brought hisfleet totheAdriatic, Romehadreestablished hernaval supremacy in that area. But if one rejects Laevinus’expedition as an annalistic fiction, the Roman intervention in autumn 200 becomes a surprising volte face, as Holleaux andhis followers are obliged to maintain.14 The logistics and timing of Laevinus’ appointment further support the historicity of his mission to deploy thirty-eight ships that had just been brought back from Africa. That the consul’s return from his province and Laevinus’ appointment preceded the elections of the magistrates of 200 is indicated by Livy’s narrative. Since these elections are recorded among 7) andsince elections were apparentevents thathappened exitu anni (31.4.1– ly held within the last six weeks of the consular year, the approximate terminus ante quemforLaevinus’appointment is early December 201, orlate in that month if consular 200 began c. 5 February.15 Two earlier annalistic passages indicate that ships would have been available in the waters off southern Italy from which a detachment of thirty11 On Scipio’s appointment, see L. 26.18.3–19.9 That Lentulus’ appointment was pro consule, rather thanpropraetore as noted at L. 28.38.1, is indicated by L. 29.13.7 (sub anno 204) and 31.20.1 (sub anno 200), andbynotice of hisimplied prorogation (sub anno 205) atL. 28.45.10: andalso 30.27.9 (sub anno 202). 12 Writing at the time of the allied landings in Normandy, Thiel, Sea Power 221, notes: “this mission (sc. of Laevinus) is highly probable in itself: if it hadnot been handed down, we ought almost to postulate it!” 204. 13 OnPhilip’s naval weakness, see Thiel, Sea Power 202– oneof themost amazing reversals of policy known to thehistory of 14 E. g., Walbank, Philip 127: “ 236 n.6. the Republic.”For bibliography, see Dahlheim, Struktur 235– 15 Examination of Livy’s accounts of theelections held between 217 and167 suggests that they were notheldbefore theendof January, theonly extant election dates being 26 January 169, 18 5); see also February 187 and 171, and 10 March 178 (L. 43.11.6, 38.42.1, 42.28.4, 40.59.4– Mommsen, Staatsrecht 1.583.

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eight could have beenmadeavailable fora mission tonorthwest Greece. Livy 8 indicates that Cn.Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 201) wasassigned fifty 30.41.6– ships from two fleets, that of P. Villius off Sicily andthat of Cn. Octavius off Africa; the rest of the fleet, if Scipio didnotwant Octavius to command the forty ships that Scipio wasto retain, wasto be brought back under Octavius. Livy later (30.44.13) states that Scipio ordered Octavius to take the fleet to Sicily andhand it over to Lentulus. That this wasdone is indicated by two references inbook 31. Incontext of theappointment of M.Valerius Laevinus, it is noted that Octavius wasbringing ships back from Sicily (reduceret) and, at the beginning of theretrospective survey, theconsul Galba is said to have selected ships from the fleet of Cn. Cornelius on arriving in Brundisium (L. 31.14.2). The thirty-eight ships that Laevinus took to Macedonia (L. 31.3.5) would thus have come from thenumber that Octavius hadbrought back from Africa.16 Twoquestions arise: when andwhere would these ships have arrived in Italian waters? The location in Livy’s narrative of Scipio’s instructions to Octavius after ratification of peace with Carthage suggests that the latter would have withdrawn from Africa by the end of the campaigning season of 201. The imperfect tense of reduceret (31.3.2) implies that, at least as far as the senate knew, the withdrawal from Africa hadbeen made andthe ships were somewhere off Sicily. Mention of Vibo, where Laevinus is said to have been sent to take over Octavius’fleet, is sounusual asto suggest authenticity. This area, about sixty miles north of Rhegium where the Latin colony later known asViboValentia wascommissioned in 192(L. 35.40.5), is thesouthernmost point from which Laevinus could have sailed to intercept ships returning from Sicily. Hewould thenhave taken theships to Brundisium where, at thebeginning of theFirst Macedonian War, hehadbegun his earlier operations against Philip (L. 24.10.4 and 11.3). That Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 201) followed Octavius toBrundisium is indicated bynotice that P.Sulpicius Galba (cos. 200) received ships from Lentulus at Brundisium before departing for Macedonia (L. 31.14.2). Although the logistics of Laevinus’ muster at Brundisium are credible, the time of his alleged sailing to Macedonia is problematic since either terminus ante quemfor the appointment of Laevinus, early or late December 201, implies winter sailing.17 Sailing to Brundisium from the coastal waters of Sicily would not have been difficult. A winter muster at Brundisium is feasible, especially in view of a later notice in Livy that a consular army was

182, 212; Briscoe, Comm. 1.60. 16 Thiel, Sea Power 181– 17 The rendezvous with Octavius’ships suggests that Laevinus wasappointed in early rather than late December, thus supporting the contention that there were only twointercalations between 7 with table (p.122). 2, and 131– 203 and 191; see Warrior, Studies 121–

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ordered to muster at Brundisium by4 January 191 in readiness for operations against Antiochus the Great.18 That all thirty-eight ships crossed the Adriatic during winter is unlikely. In his desire to summarise the events that preceded the declaration of waron Philip, Livy has evidently combined notice of Laevinus’ appointment with that of his crossing to Greece, misplacing the latter because either he or his source has failed to take account of the relation of the seasons to the new consular year.19 The problem of the date of the actual crossing of theAdriatic notwithstanding, the critical information extrapolated from Livy’s account is that, before a vote for war was submitted to the Comitia Centuriata, M. Valerius Laevinus was given an extraordinary grant of imperium to deploy thirty-eight ships in the Straits of Otranto and prepare a beach-head at Apollonia for a full-scale invasion. But if Laevinus didnottake his fleet across theAdriatic until March 200, reports of his meeting in Greece with M.Aurelius andthe arrival in Rome of 6 and5.5) a despatch from them at the beginning of consular 200 (L. 31.3.4– areevidently to be rejected. Ontheother hand, since communications by sea were notcompletely suspended during winter, it is conceivable that Laevinus went in advance of thefleet to confer withAurelius. If consular 200 began on 14 January, only a meeting is feasible. If it began c. 5 February, a visit anda message to Rome are possible, though the schedule is tight. Rejection of a winter visit by Laevinus, however, does not negate the authenticity of his orders to take command of Octavius’ ships and proceed to Macedonia.20 Laevinus would have wintered atBrundisium andsailed toApollonia asearly as possible in the spring, by which time consular 200 would have begun and the war-vote passed.21 The possibility of unauthorized war would thus have been avoided. Laevinus’previous service inthis area aspraetor andpropraetor from 215 to 211 and as consul and proconsul from 210 to 207 constitutes a further argument for, rather than against, the historicity of his command just before the beginning of the Second Macedonian War.22 Historical probability, as 18 L. 36.3.13: idibus Mais. Forarguments supporting theretention of this date, seeBriscoe, Comm. 2. 28 and275. 19 Cf. hisearlier telescoping of notices of theappointment anddespatch of three envoys appointed to Egypt; see above p. 47. 9, whosuggests that theSenate decided onwar“soon 20 E.g., Harris, WIRR 214, citing L. 31.5.7– theanalysis attributed toM.Aurelius is after” Aurelius’report toLaevinus, while also opining: “ both vague andmanifestly exaggerated...; norcan there have been anydocumentary basis for this part of the annalistic account.”On the question of the historicity of Aurelius’presence in 103. Greece, see Appendix III pp. 101– 21 The latest date for thepassing of the war-vote is c. 28 February or c. 21 March 200; see below 66. pp. 65– 22 Thus Briscoe, Comm. 1.60, contra Holleaux, CAH8.156 n. 1, Walbank, Philip 127 n. 7. Cf. A.

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indicated by both logistics and timing of the appointment, outweighs the objections of those who would reject the testimony for 201 as a doublet. Laevinus hadnot only putan endto Philip’s naval power in theAdriatic in 214; he hadalso secured thecrucial alliance with theAetolians in 212/211.23 If the senate wasconsidering a return of Roman forces to northwest Greece, hewasexactly themantoputincharge of renewed operations intheStraits of Otranto. That Laevinus wasin charge of these naval operations would have sent a particularly strong signal that Rome was contemplating re-opening hostilities. Indeed, his appointment could well be the point at which the senate decided on war with Philip. The elections of themagistrates for 200 arebriefly related among events that occurred exitu anni (31.4.1). Elected as consuls were P. Sulpicius Galba andC. Aurelius Cotta (L. 31.4.4). Galba, whowould soon be allotted Macedonia as his province (L. 31.6.1), hadheld the consulship in 211, serving in Greece from that year to 206 andcooperating with Attalus of Pergamum in naval warfare in 208.24 Hehadbeen succeeded in Greece by P. Sempronius Tuditanus, whowasnot only a member of the embassy which wasabout to publicize theterms onwhich Philip could remain atpeace withRome, buthad earlier hadconcluded thePeace of Phoenice after the Epirots hadnegotiated his meeting with Philip.25 M. Valerius Laevinus, in addition to extensive service in the First Macedonian War, also had a connection with Attalus through his mission in 205 to bring the Magna Mater from Pessinus.26 Now that the senate wascontemplating renewal of hostilities with Philip, Rome’s “ eastern experts”were clearly being recruited forboth diplomatic andmilitary tasks.27 A further factor emerges from thepreceding chronological reconstruction: coordination between the naval operations of M. Valerius Laevinus and the arrival of theembassy of C. Claudius Nero, P.Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Aemilius Lepidus in Greece. The activities of this embassy should be viewed against the background of the presence of Laevinus with a squadron of thirty-eight ships intheStraits of Otranto andhiscrossing toApollonia. By thetime that theenvoys reached northwest Greece inMarch 200, thethreat of Atilius Serranus, whowasinvolved

in the naval preparations in 192 and 172 (L. 35.20.11–13,

22.2 and42.27.4).

23 For sources onLaevinus, see therelevant years inMRRI. 24 Briscoe, CR 36 (1986) 94: “Galba wasputupfor election by people whoforesaw (or were 207. On the albeit actually working for) war with Macedon,”contra Gruen, HWCR 204– unsuccessful operations of Galba andAttalus, seeThiel, Sea Power 128. 25 OnthePeace of Phoenice, seeL. 29.12.8–16; Zon. 9.11, cf. App.Mac. 3.

26 See L. 29.10.4–11.8 and 14.5–14 and MRR 1 304. For discussion of the significance of this 33. episode, see Gruen, Studies in Greek Culture andRoman Policy (1990) 5– 7, whoattempts to refute theviewthat a lobby of “eastern experts”was 27 Cf. Gruen, HWCR203– active at this time.

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force contained in the senatus consultum would have been backed by the presence on Greek soil of Roman troops, those of Laevinus, if not also Aurelius. Weare dealing with a Roman version of gun-boat diplomacy. Later, in context of events leading up to the declaration of war on Antiochus the Great, Livy comments on the need for a combination of diplomacy andmilitary forces “ to hold the sympathy of the allies.”28Flamininusandfour other ambassadors spent several months inGreece ona diploma34.1, 39.1– 8). Roman forces were sent to tic mission (L. 35.23.5, 31.1– Greece under A. Atilius Serranus ostensibly to operate against Nabis (L. 35.22.3 and23.4). Later in the same year a task force, similar to that of M. Valerius Laevinus, was sent to Apollonia under M. Baebius Tamphilus (L. 8). A similar pattern occurs in 172: before the Comitia Centuriata 35.24.7– had voted for war against Perseus of Macedon, an embassy and a small military force were despatched toApollonia inthelate autumn orearly winter (L. 42.36.8– 37.1) in advance of a consular force sent in thefollowing spring (L. 42.48.9–49.1).29 The mission of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM.Aemilius Lepidus in 200 is apparently thefirst instance of a new method of beginning war overseas: diplomacy backed by the presence in Greece of forces which had been commissioned before a vote for war had been submitted to theComitia Centuriata. On the basis of the above examination it is now possible to set out in tabular form the sequence of the events discussed so far. It is, however, necessary to adda note of caution. This dating of themajor events of late 201 is dependent on the dating of the arrival in Rome of the Rhodian and Pergamene ambassadors before mid-October 201, andthat for early 200 is dependent on the dating of the escape of Philip from Bargylia sometime in March. Although each of these estimates is dependent on the use of statistical data about sailing conditions in therelevant areas, therelative chronological sequence ineach case would notbeaffected if theactual dates were different. It should, however, again be emphasised that the date of the Eleusinian Mysteries provides a fixed and independent nodal point in the seasonal calendar from which Acarnanian-Macedonian affairs are calculated.

28 L. 35.23.5: noncopiis modo sedetiam auctoritate opus erat ad tenendos sociorum animos. For reconstruction of the chronology of events in 192 andFlamininus’ embassy, see mypaper, “ Evidence in Livy onRoman Policy Prior to Warwith Antiochus the Great,”in Transitions to 146 B.C., edd. Edward M. Harris and Robert W. Empire in the Greco-Roman World, 360– 375. Wallace (Oklahoma 1996) 356– 11. 29 For the sequence, see Warrior, AJAH 6 (1981) 5 and8–

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September 201 (or earlier)

Despatch to Rome of envoys fromAttalus and Rhodians

late September

Profanation

before mid- October

Senate’s reception of envoys from Attalus and Rhodians: appointment of three envoys to Egypt

mid-October

Execution

October

Withdrawal

November

Appeal of Acarnanians to Philip Return of consul to Rome Meeting of senate: appointment of Laevinus to Macedonia, additional commission of Roman embassy

late November

Laevinus’rendezvous with Octavius

early December

Laevinus’muster

exitu anni

Election of magistrates for consular 200

14 January 200

Beginning of newconsular year Reception of Athenian nova legatio

early March

Philip escapes from Bargylia followed by Attalus andRhodians who go to Aegina

mid-March

Laevinus sails with thirty-eight ships toApollonia Three Roman envoys leave for Epirus, Athens, etc.

March-early April

Macedonian invasion of Attica, Macedonians capture four Athenian ships Roman envoys attend meetings of Aetolian and Achaean Leagues

late March-early April mid to late April

of theEleusinian Mysteries

of twoAcarnanians inAthens of ships from Africa by Octavius?

at Brundisium

Attalus andRhodians go toAthens, meet newly-arrived Roman envoys; Athenian vote for warv. Philip

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Section IV: Events in Rome from the consuls’inauguration to departure for 14.1); the anomaly of the late departheir provinces (L.31.5.1– ture of the consular army for Macedonia (mid-January to late October)

The principal task in this section will be to seek an explanation for the apparent anomaly of thedeparture of theconsular armyfor Macedonia so late in the campaigning season (autumno ferme exacto, 31.22.4) andthus refute themodern hypotheses which have sodistorted anddisrupted theintegrity of Livy’s narrative. Consular 200 opens dramatically, as Livy notes that war against king Philip wasbegun a fewmonths after peace hadbeen granted to theCarthaginians. On the Ides of March (14 January 200), the consul Galba offered a motion which was passed by the senate that the consuls should perform a public sacrifice andmake a prayer that “ whatever the senate andthe Roman People shall resolve for the common good andwith reference to beginning a new war, may this decision turn out well and happily (bene ac feliciter eveniret) for the Roman people, the allies andthe Latin name,”a formulaic phrase that Livy will twice repeat in context of the passing of the motion for war.1 This is butthe first of several religious ceremonies that were conducted before the departure of the consular army for Macedonia, a feature which underscores the importance of securing the gods’favor (pax deorum) before hostilities with Macedon began.2 Events move swiftly after this elaborate introduction. Following the sacrifice, theconsuls were required to submit to the senate questions concerning the good of the state (de republica) andthe provinces (31.5.4). During these days (per eos dies), twoevents are said to have occurred opportunely for arousing men’s minds to war (opportune irritandis ad bellum animis): a despatch from M. Valerius Laevinus andM.Aurelius andthe so-called nova legatio from Athens.3 Arguments have already been made to support the 1

2

3

4: anno quingentesimo quinquagesimo primo ab urbe condita, P. Sulpicio Galba L. 31.5.1– C. Aurelio consulibus, bellum cum rege Philippo initum est, paucis mensibus post pacem Carthaginiensibus datam. omnium primum eamremidibus Martiis, quo die tumconsulatus inibatur, P. Sulpicius consul rettulit senatusque decrevit, uti consules maioribus hostiis rem divinam facerent quibus diis ipsis videretur cumprecatione ea: quod senatus populusque Romanus de re publica deque ineundo novo bello in animo haberet, ea res utipopulo Romano sociisque ac nomini Latino beneacfeliciter eveniret. Ofthesix occurrences of theformula bene ac feliciter eveniat in Livy, five are in context of a senatorial decree ordering propitiatory prayers for a war that is about to be declared, three being in the context of the Second Macedonian War(31.5.4, 7.15, 8.2); seeF. V. Hickson, Roman Prayer Language: Livy andthe 8, whosuggests that these formulae were probably in 73 and 145– Aeneid of Vergil (1993) 70– use in Livy’s owntime. L. 31.5.4 and7, 7.14–15, 8.2, 9.5–10, 12.1–13.1, 14.1. Onthepax deorum, see above pp. 14–16. 6: per eosdies opportune irritandis adbellum animis et litterae ab M.Aurelio legato L. 31.5.5– et M. Valerio Laevino propraetore adlatae et Atheniensium nova legatio venit...

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historicity of this embassy andthe mission of Laevinus, although reports of Laevinus’meeting withAurelius andtheir joint despatch toRome (31.3.5 and 5.5) before thebeginning of consular 200 are to be rejected onchronological grounds.4 Theapparent gloss ontheopportuneness of these twoevents is thus only partially correct, applying only to the arrival of envoys from Athens who, Livy notes, announced that theking wasapproaching their borders and that, in a short time, not only their farms but Athens itself would be in his power unless the Romans sent help (31.5.6). After hearing the Athenian envoys, the senate thanked the allies for their loyalty but said that they would respond to the request for help when the provinces hadbeen allocated and wardeclared onPhilip.5 TheAthenian embassy (nova legatio) is to be identified with theAthenian appeal (preces Atheniensium) mentioned at the end of the introduction to book 31, anevent which is said to have influenced theRomans to renew war with Philip (31.1.10). Earlier consideration of the chronology and the logistics of the situation has shown that the Athenians are unlikely to have suffered anyreprisals from the Macedonians in the early winter of 201/200.6 Nor hadthey yet voted for war against Philip.7 They would, however, have known of the embassy of Attalus and the Rhodians sent to Rome in the autumn of 201, the appointment of the three envoys to Egypt andprobably also the appointment of M. Valerius Laevinus. The Roman response to Attalus and the Rhodians was bound to attract further sollicitations from other Greek states, particularly one that was an adscriptus to the Peace of Phoenice. Asnoted earlier, thesequence of events asgiven byLivy, where the reception of thenova legatio precedes thesortition of theprovinces, suggests that this embassy wasplanned to coincide with the definition of business for the newconsular year.8 Close reading of Livy’s narrative reveals that theAthenian embassy did not receive an audience with the senate until after the consuls hadreported that sacrifice hadbeen duly made (rem divinam rite peractam esse), the gods hadgiven approval andthe haruspices hadannounced that the entrails were propitious, portending anextension of territory (prolationem finium), victory 8). The Romans evidently had to be assured that that and a triumph (31.5.7– the gods were favorable to their cause before they heard further complaints 4 5

6 7 8

98, and 102. 58 andbelow pp.97– See above pp. 39–40, 52– 9: senatus inde consultum factum est, utsociis gratiae agerentur, quoddiusollicitati L. 31.5.8– ne obsidionis quidem metufide decessissent; deauxilio mittendo turn responderi piacere cum consules provincias sortiti essent atque is consul cui Macedonia provincia evenisset ad populum tulisset, ut Philippo, regi Macedonum, indiceretur bellum. The statement in theproemium, quos agro pervastato in urbem compulerat (1.10), is evidently exaggerated andshould notbepressed for temporal precision. See above p. 40 OnAthens’appeal as anadscriptus, seeAppendix II, pp.99–100. Onthetiming, seeabove p.40.

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about Philip, or so Livy would have the reader believe. More significant, however, is theharuspices’forecast of theextension of Roman territory, since Livy later reports, though not in identical terms, similar guarantees by the haruspices in context of the inauguration of the consuls for 191 and the declaration of waronAntiochus the Great.9 The strategic placement of these notices early in book 31 andat the very beginning of book 36 marks Livy’s subtle emphasis onwhat wewould term Roman imperialism. Although the senate hadindicated its willingness to make waron Philip both by the appointment of M. Valerius Laevinus and by the increased commission of P.Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM.Aemilius Lepidus, the Roman People still hadto be convinced, as the rejection of the first vote by the Comitia Centuriata and the war weariness noted by Livy (31.6.3) subsequently reveals. More than three months had elapsed since Philip’s depredations in the eastern Mediterranean hadbeen reported to the senate. But nowAthens wasabout to be attacked by Hannibal’s former ally. Theimminent plight of theAthenians wasa moreeffective cause topresent to the Roman People than the earlier alarm about lesser known cities in more distant Asia Minor. Whenfaced withthetask of persuading thepeople tovote forwar,thenobiles probably portrayed Philip’s impending invasion ofAthens as a threat to Italy itself with Philip as the newbogeyman whohadreplaced Hannibal.10 Although the nova legatio was probably received in the latter part of January, the actual sending of military aid to the Athenians was much belated. The Roman response is to be identified with the despatch of C. Claudius Centho with twenty warships by the consul Galba immediately upon his arrival in Macedonia (31.14.3), anevent which didnot take place until almost the end of the campaigning season (autumno ferme exacto, 31.22.4). By that time, both Athens and Rome had declared war on Philip, Cephisodorus hadprobably come to Rome, another Athenian embassy had been sent to await the arrival of the consul in Apollonia, andAthens had suffered at least three invasions andwasunder siege.11 Consideration of the mean number of days with wind-force at least Beaufort 6 at Kythera, however, surprisingly indicates that November is the best time of year to round

9 L. 36.1.3: ea omnia sacrificia laeta fuerunt, primisque hostiis perlitatum est. et ita haruspices responderunt, eo bello terminos populi Romani propagari, victoriam ac triumphum ostendi. 10 Onuseof theAthenian appeal astheofficial pretext forwar, seeBickerman, CP40 (1945) 140– 141. See also thecomments of M.G. Morgan, CP 83 (1988) 247: “Academics understandably place great faith in thebelief that governments andpeoples act rationally.... Neither reality nor wargaming substantiates this belief.... a case canreadily be made for the proposition that the nobiles, bereft of hindsight, regarded the king with far more suspicion than we think justifiable.” 83. 99. OnCentho’s campaign, see below pp.82– 11 See below Appendix II, pp.98–

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Cape Malea, the next best time being July.12 These statistics not only give additional support to the hypothesis that the Roman landing wasin October rather than September, butalso suggest that the arrival so late in the campaigning season maynotbe the anomaly that is generally assumed. A modern hypothesis has gained wide acceptance as an explanation of this apparent anomaly. McDonald andWalbank, following Holleaux, postulate a long delay between the first andsecond warvotes by the People. They elaborate this hypothetical delay in order to support Holleaux’hypothesis in

which he interprets the Roman message to Nicanor outside Athens as the rerum repetitio and the meeting of M. Aemilius Lepidus with Philip at Abydus as the belli indictio. They propose a “ modified”fetial procedure, suggesting that the message delivered to Nicanor was a combination of an earlier rerum repetitio andbelli indictio which lacked the final authority of the vote of the Comitia. When this authorisation came through, Lepidus delivered the belli indictio to Philip at Abydus.13 Thus, by reckoning retrogressively from Livy’s reported date of the landing of the Roman forces autumno ferme exacto which they consider was sometime in September, they insert a delay of several months between thefirst andsecond votes. Holleaux’ hypotheses, however, are based on his distrust of annalistic material. First he rejects the annalistic references to anAthenian appeal to 6 and5.5–6).14 He Rome andtheexpedition of M.Valerius Laevinus (31.3.3– then suggests a connection between fetial procedure mentioned by Livy at 5 (presumably annalistic) andthedémarches of theRoman ambassadors 8.3– to Nicanor mentioned by Polybius though not by Livy, and to Philip at Abydus mentioned by both Polybius andLivy. But, as we have noted, it is unlikely that thethree Roman ambassadors were responsible for thedelivery of the formal rerum repetitio especially since they proceeded further east before returning to Rome (P. 16.27 and 34). Nor is the démarche of M. Aemilius Lepidus toPhilip inAbydus tobeidentified withthebelli indictio.15 By positing a direct connection between the war-vote mentioned by Livy (31.6.3– 8.1, presumably annalistic) andthe ultimatum delivered to Philip at Abydus, McDonald andWalbank are forced to distort Livy’s narrative and postulate a long delay between the two war-votes, thus assuming that the second vote of the Comitia more or less preceded Lepidus’ meeting with Philip and the arrival of the consular army in Macedonia autumno ferme exacto. 12 See Borza, AM303: Jan. 12.2, Feb. 9.4, Mar. 11.0, Apr.9.9, May8.3, June 8.4, July 7.5, August 8.4, September 9.3, October 11.6, November 6.3, December 12.3. 197, 268, McDonald andWalbank, JRS 27 (1937) 196– 13 Holleaux, Études 5.11–12, RGMH267– 544. For a summary of the adherents andopponents of maintained by Walbank, HCP 2. 543– 78. Walbank’s hypothesis, see Rich, DWTE 76– 98. 14 OnHolleaux’mistaken chronology, see Appendix II, pp.97– 51. 15 See above pp. 50–

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Nothing in Livy’s narrative suggests a long delay between the twovotes (31.6.1– 8.1). After thesenate’s response to theAthenian embassy andallocation of provinces, a vote for war was put to the Comitia Centuriata. The motion, though rejected atfirst, waspassed after theconsul Galba hadheldan informal meeting (contio). Noris there anyreason whyeither an annalist or Livy himself would have wanted to conceal such a delay nor why, after the initial rejection of the war-vote, the nobiles were willing to wait several months before resubmitting it.16 Such a long interval between the two warvotes is highly implausible, an evident fiction of modern scholarship.

The sequence of events as given in Livy’s narrative

produces

a logical

and coherent account of the progression of preparations for war which is consistent with the fact that a new consular year had begun and a new campaigning season imminent. Theoneinconsistency that hasbeen found in Livy’s account is a minor one, the reference to the Athenian embassy as “ new”(nova). Although Livy records the sortition of the provinces and submission of the proposal for war with Philip to the Comitia Centuriata immediately after the reply to the Athenians without any indication of how soon after the Ides of March these events took place, it is a reasonable assumption, there being noevidence tothecontrary, that once theconsuls had entered office everything was done with the minimum of delay to put the proposal totheComitia Centuriata attheearliest possible time sothatthelevy could begin. P. Sulpicius Galba, the consul to whom Macedonia had fallen by lot, presented the motion “ whether they wished andordered that warbe declared uponKing Philip andtheMacedonians overwhomheruled, onaccount of the injuries he hadinflicted andthe warhe hadmade on the allies of the Roman People.”17According to thelate republican calendar, theearliest comitial day after 15 March was18March, followed bytwomore comitial days on20 and 21 March.18 On the assumption that the promulgatio had been made by 21 March, this would mean that the earliest possible date for the rogatio would have been 14April if weallow for a trinundinum of twenty-five days. There 29). These comitial days, are four more comitial days at the endof April (26– based onthe late Republican calendar, produce themaximum interval for the Itsproponents (sc. thehypothetical three tofourmonth delay) seemto 16 Rich, DWTE 79, and80: “ suppose that the senate, after having been thwarted by the assembly ona matter of the greatest moment, meekly waited several months before making a second attempt to get its way....” 6.1. Doubt has been expressed about Livy’s report of the operation of the lot in the 17 L. 31.– allocation of Macedonia to Galba, since his re-election to the consulship coincides with a ten year gapsince his first consulship: for bibliography, see Gruen, HWCR205 n.5. A fragment of Ennius, Ann. 329 Vahlen, 324 Skutsch, corroborates Livy’s testimony that thelot wasused; see F. Millar, JRS 74 (1984) 3, and O. Skutsch, The Annals of Q. Ennius (1985) 502. See Badian, 32, onthe probable manipulation of the lot. Flamininus 31– 18 Michels, Calendar, table 4.

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early second century. In actual fact, the intervals were probably much less, especially since it is doubtful that a trinundinum was in force at this time.19 Livy’s narrative indicates that the rogatio wasdefeated byalmost all the centuries atthefirst meeting of theComitia butpassed after theconsul Galba, at the behest of the senate, hadsummoned aninformal meeting (contio) and urged the people to pass the motion.20 Objections by the tribune Q. Baebius were apparently brushed aside (31.6.4– 6). There is no mention of a new promulgatio andno reason to suppose that much time elapsed between the first rejection of themotion andits passage. Onthebasis of thecomitial days of thelate Republican calendar, thewarvote hadprobably beenpassed bythe People by the end of April at the very latest.21 The two possible Julian equivalents of 30 April are either c. 28 February, or less likely c. 21 March, either of which dates would have made it possible for a consular army to make anearly start in thecampaigning season. But if, as is more likely, there wasnotrinundinum in useatthis time, these equivalents would be almost one month earlier; in which case there should have been more than enough time. This reconstruction of Livy’s account of the chronology of thepassing of vote is consistent with other apparent allusions to Rome’s the Roman war– decision to make waron Philip by both Livy andPolybius in context of the Athenian vote for waragainst Macedon, anevent which wehave dated to the end of April. As noted in section II, two Polybian excerpts mention the hostility shared by the Romans, Rhodians andAttalus (16.26.6) andAttalus’ pleasure onmeeting theRoman embassy at thePiraeus that Rome wasready to engage in warwith Philip (16.25.4). Livy, in theretrospective survey, also alludes to Roman support for the Athenians (31.15.4).22 The speech of theconsul P.Sulpicius Galba persuading thepeople to vote for war concludes with assurance of the gods’ favorable response to his earlier prayer that the warwould turn outwell andhappily (bene acfeliciter 206, whoargues for twenty-five 19 Onthelength of thetrinundinum, seeMichels, Calendar 191– 5, considers that the term means “over three market days. A. W. Lintott, CQ 15 (1965) 281– days”andnota specific number of days. The lapse of a trinundinum between thepromulgatio and the rogatio of a law was not required until the lex Caecilia Didia of 98; see Michels, Calendar 41– 42. 20 L. 31.6.1: P. Sulpicio provincia Macedonia sorti evenit, isque rogationem promulgavit, vellent iuberent Philippo regi Macedonibusque...bellum indici; 6.3: rogatio de bello Macedonico primis comitiis ab omnibus ferme centuriis antiquata est; 6.5: aegre eamrempassi patres, ...et consulem pro se quisque hortari ut de integro comitia rogationi ferendae ediceret...; 7.1: consul in campo Martio comitiis, priusquam centurias in suffragium mitteret, contione advocata...; 8.1: ab hac oratione in suffragium missi, uti rogaret, bellum iusserunt. OnL. 31.8.1, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.76

39, reasserts theunity of chapters 6.1 to 21 Rich, DWTE 78,following Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 38– 8.1, andconsiders that theassembly hadvoted forwar“within a month orso of thestart of the , butdoes notelaborate theprecise sequence of events. Cf. Errington’s estimate, consular year” 22

. CAH(1989) 257, “probably by May” 48. See above pp.47–

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eveniret).23 Further rituals followed thepassing of thevote. Onthe authorization of the senate, a three daysupplication wasdeclared by the consuls. The gods were again implored that the war would turn out well and happily (31.8.2).24 Galba then consulted the fetials whether the belli indictio should be made to Philip in person, or whether it would suffice to deliver it to the nearest guard-post in Macedonian territory. Their decision was that either waywascorrect. Although wearenottold howthedeclaration wasdelivered beyond the fact that the senate permitted the consul to send anyone he chose 5), it was probably delivered by one of other than a senator (L. 31.8.3– Galba’s menwhen the Roman force arrived in the autumn. Fetial procedure hadbecome a mere technicality performed bya minor official after religious ceremonies in the city itself; diplomacy wasin the hands of the three envoys originally appointed to Egypt. As Badian has observed: “ by the time Rome entered theHellenistic concert of powers, attheendof thethird century B.C., shehaddeveloped a religious ceremonial far removed from theprimitive ius fetiale and a diplomatic arsenal well adapted to taking advantage of the 25 greater flexibility it offered.” All the business of the public sacrifice andprayer for the success of the war, the reception of theAtheniensium nova legatio, allocation of provinces to thevarious magistrates, getting theComitia to pass thewarvote, thethree daysupplication andfetial procedure seem to have followed in rapid succes8.5). Details of the levy of troops for the consuls and praetors sion (6.5– (31.8.5–11) are then given. Galba was authorized to enroll two legions and also allowed to enlist volunteers from Scipio’s army from Africa, though no veteran wastobeenrolled against hiswill (31.8.6). This presumably disposed of theobjections raised bythetribune Q.Baebius (31.6.5). Meanwhile, aswe have shown, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero and M. Aemilius Lepidus were preparing to publicize the terms on which Philip could remain atpeace with Rome andM. Valerius Laevinus wasready to cross theAdriatic with his squadron of thirty-eight ships.26 During the actual preparations for war(in ipso adparatu belli), anembassy arrived from Ptolemy advising the Romans that theAthenians hadrequested his aid against Philip (L. 31.9.1). This Egyptian embassy has no direct connection with the embassy of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero

huius vobis sententiae non consul modo auctor est sed etiam dii immortales, qui mihi sacrificanti precantique ut hoc bellum mihi, senatui vobisque, sociis ac nomini Latino, classibus exercitibusque nostris bene acfeliciter eveniret, laeta omnia prosperaque portendere. 24 Onthe formula bene acfeliciter eveniat, see above p. 61 n. 1. Onthe supplication, see Briscoe, The supplicatio as a preliminary to waris probably a later 7 with bibliography: “ Comm. 1.76–

23 L. 31.7.15:

development from thesupplicatio as anexpiation after disasters.” 25 Badian, Prolegomena 410. 59. 26 On this coordination, see above pp. 58–

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andM.Aemilius Lepidus mentioned at L. 31.2.3– 4.27As argued above, their diplomatic mission to Egypt waspostponed when M. Valerius Laevinus was given hismilitary commission, anaction that signaled theRoman response to reports of Philip’s depredations. Ptolemy, evidently mindful of his longstanding amicitia, took the prudent course of informing the Romans of this request from another state which also had diplomatic relations with Rome. With carefully worded diplomacy, he stated that he would take no action in Greece without Roman authorization, offering either to remain athome if the Romans intended to defend their allies or to defend the Athenians against Philip if theRomans preferred to remain at home (L. 31.9.2– 3). The senate’s reply that the Roman People intended to defend its allies (L. 31.9.4– 5) not only absolved Ptolemy of responsibility, but implicitly acknowledged his acceptance of Roman authority. His initiative in sending this embassy to Rome demonstrated the loyalty that the senate hadwanted in the autumn of 201. TheAthenians, however, were still waiting for help. At this point in the narrative, Livy remarks: “ The state, ever concerned with religious matters (civitas religiosa) especially at the beginning of new wars, after supplications andprayers at all the seats of the gods, ordered the consul to whom Macedonia hadbeen assigned to vowgames anda gift to Jupiter so that nothing might be left undone that had ever been done befo28A delay of unspecified duration wascaused by a legalistic altercation re.” between the consul Galba andthepontifex maximus whosaid that a vowfor anindefinite amount wasnotpermissible. Thepontifices, after anappeal by the consul, over-ruled the pontifex maximus, stating that a vow for an indeterminate sumwasnotonly allowable buteven more correct (L. 31.9.8). A compromise ensued: thecost wastobe determined bythesenate atthetime the vow was paid. Political and economic considerations were clearly at work, butopposition to theimpending warmaywell havebeen anunderlying factor.29 There is no indication, however, that this altercation delayed preparations for war. Noris Galba’s late departure for Macedonia to be explained by a Gallic when everyone’s thoughts were uprising which was suddenly reported “ 47, whodates the arrival in Rome of this embassy to 27 Cf. Meadows, Historia 42 (1993) 40– March 200, andattempts to prove that it wasthe Egyptian response to the Roman embassy mentioned at L. 31.2.2 which, he believes, hadbeen sent to Egypt in late 201; see above p. 21. 6: cumdilectum consules haberent pararentque quae ad bellum opus essent, civitas 28 L. 31.9.5– religiosa, inprincipiis maxime novorum bellorum, supplicationibus habitis iametobsecratione circa omnia pulvinaria facta, nequidpraetermitteretur quodaliquando factum esset, ludos lovi donumque vovere consulem, cuiprovincia Macedonia evenisset, iussit. Onthe vowing of ludi, 80 with bibliography. see Comm. 1.79– 1, views the matter as a struggle between pro- andanti29 L. 31.9.7–10. Briscoe, Comm. 1. 80– Sulpicius’reason for wanting to Scipionic factions butalso discerns economic considerations: “ vowanindeterminate sumof money wasnodoubt thefact that theaerarium wasindire straits, anda firm commitment would be impossible.”

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focused on the Macedonian war.”30Livy’s narrative makes it quite clear that theother consul C. Aurelius Cotta wasgiven theoption of going inperson to suppress the Gallic revolt if theinterest of thestate permitted (siper commodum rei publicae posset) or delegating the task (L. 31.11.1– 3). Since the uprising was dealt with by the praetor L. Furius Purpurio (L. 31.21.1– 22.3) andCotta didnotreach his province until thefighting there wasalmost over (31.47.4), the interest of the state evidently required the consul’s continued presence in Rome.31 Explication of Livy’s narrative reveals that Cotta wasdetained in Rome because the pax deorum hadbeen ruptured. When it was reported that the temple of Persephone at Locri had been plundered, Cotta was ordered to communicate the senate’s wish that aninvestigation (quaestio) be held in the same way as a sacrilege by Pleminius, one of Scipios officers, had been investigated three years earlier, the money be found or replaced and, if it seemed fitting, expiatory sacrifices (piacularia) be performed as the ponti4). That this incident prevented fices hadpreviously prescribed (L. 31.12.3– the departure of both consuls is indicated by Livy’s notice that the consuls were willing (vellent) to leave for their provinces “after all the religious scruples had been allayed”(expiatis omnibus religionibus), the sacrilege at Locri investigated andthemoney replaced (L. 31.13.1).32 In order fully to comprehend the impact that news of this sacrilege would have had in Rome, Livy’s narrative must be read in light of the earlier 22). Onthatoccasion, a threat totheprojected invasion of sacrilege (L. 29.18– Africa by P.Cornelius Scipio is implied in the speech of the Locrian envoys who informed the senate that the goddess had punished Pyrrhus for his desecration of hertemple by wrecking his fleet anddenying himanyfurther 4). Pyrrhus, whohadalso been engaged in an overseas success (L. 29.18.3– enterprise, is saidtohave learned fromthedisaster tohisfleet that thegodsdo exist: qua tanta clade edoctus tandem deos esse (L. 29.18.6). The threat to Scipio becomes explicit in the envoys’plea that the senate notundertake any lest they (sc. action either in Italy or Africa until the crime was expiated, “ Scipio’s men) makeamends notonly bytheir ownblood butalso bya disaster 33Thepeculiar significance of thesacrilege of 200 lies in thefact to the state.” 30 L. 31.10.1:

31 32 33

omnium animis in bellum Macedonicum versis repente, nihil minus eo tempore timentibus, Gallici tumultus fama exorta. Thehypothesis of B. L. Twyman, Ancient Macedonia 672, that news of the fall of Placentia (31.10.1–11.2) caused Galba’s departure IV (1986) 667– tobedelayed distorts thesequence asgiven inLivy, thusexemplifying thedangers of thepiecemeal approach. L. 31.47.4: consul alter C. Aurelius ad confectum bellum cuminprovinciam venisset.... L. 31.13.1: expiatis omnibus religionibus –nametiam Locris sacrilegium pervestigatum ab Q. Minucio erat, pecuniaque ex bonis noxiorum in thensauros reposita –cumconsules inprovincias proficisci vellent, privati frequentes .... L. 29.18.9: quibus, per vosfidem vestram, patres conscripti, priusquam eorum scelus expietis

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that, like the sacrilege of 204, it occurred at a time when the Romans were again about to launch anoverseas invasion. Livy juxtaposes the newsacrilege at Locri with a list of prodigies which, he notes, were also reported about the same time, thus inflaming concern to expiate the temple’s violation.34 The list culminates in a report of monstrous births (animalium obsceni fetus), including twohumans whose sex could not be determined, one a new-born andthe other a sixteen-year-old. These halfmale creatures, abominated above all (ante omnia abominati semimares), were ordered to be carried out to sea as had been done with a similar 8).Astheabbreviated account of therenewed monstrosity in207 (L. 31.12.5– sacrilege atLocri wasintended torecall theessentials of Pleminius’sacrilege, so now Livy’s skilful use of variatio evokes earlier accounts of similar child of uncertain sex, between male andfemale, monstrosities.35 In 209, a “ which the people refer to as hermaphrodites”(androgyni) hadbeen expiated amid other prodigies (L. 27.11.6). But twoyears later, when Hasdrubal was uncertain whether it wasmale or female”was about to invade Italy, a birth “ dealt with separately. Haruspices summoned from Etruria ordered that this disgusting andrepulsive prodigy (foedum ac turpe prodigium) be drowned at sea. The pontiffs were also consulted anddecreed that a hymn be sung by twenty-seven maidens. The temple of Juno Regina, however, wasstruck by lightning while thehymnwasbeing practised in thetemple of Jupiter Stator, whereupon the haruspices ordered a gift andsacrifices to Juno (L. 27.37.5–

15).

Reports of twohermaphrodites combined with another sacrilege at Locri would have portended the most terrible rupture of the pax deorum to date.36

34

35

36

neque in Italia neque in Africa quicquam rei gesseritis, ne quodpiaculi commiserunt nonsuo solum sanguine sedetiam publica clade luant. For further discussion of theimplications of this 73 with bibliography. incident, seeLevene, Religion inLivy 72– L. 31.12.5: curam expiandae violationis eius templi prodigia etiam sub idem tempus pluribus locis nuntiata accenderunt. 8: in Sabinis incertus infans natus, masculus anfemina esset, alter sedecim iam L. 31.12.6– annorum item ambiguo sexu inventus.... ante omnia abominati semimares iussique in mare extemplo deportari, sicut proxime C. Claudio M. Livio consulibus deportatus similis prodigii fetus erat. Cf. L.27.11.4: natum ambiguo inter marem acfeminam sexuinfantem, quosandrogynos volgus, utpleraque, faciliore ad duplicanda verba Graeco sermone, appellat..., 27.37.5: natum infantem esse quadrimo parem, necmagnitudine tammirandum quamquodis quoque, ut Sinuessae biennio ante, incertus masanfemina esset natus erat. See also the later report of a similar phenomenon in consular 186: L. 39.22.5: subidemtempus et ex Umbria nuntiatum est semimarem duodecim ferme annos natum inventum. idprodigium abominantes arceri Romano agro necarique quamprimum iusserunt. Levene, Religion inLivy79, merely sees theprodigy list asundermining thepositive material of the earlier the sacrifices reported earlier in book 31 andthe sacrilege at Locri as wiping out “ andleading to“divine threats totheRomans ontheeveof war.”See also p. impression of piety” InBook 31 wecantherefore seetheprodigy lists andother religious material being usedto 81: “ foreshadow thewarin anappropriate manner.”

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The senate, as the body that attended to such reports, hadno option but to acknowledge (suscipere) theprodigies.37 Livy specifically notes that all these disgusting and monstrous creatures seemed to be signs that nature was confusing species.38 Orders were also given to consult the decemvirs who recommended the same rites that had been performed earlier for such a prodigy. In addition (praeterea), they ordered that a hymn andsacrifices be offered to Juno, evidently as a safeguard against anyfurther portent such as the lightning strike of 207.39 That consuls could notleave Rome until theprodigies hadbeen expiated is indicated by Livy’s narrative for theconsular years 216, 213, 209, 208 and 207.40 The narrative for 208 contains oneof thetwospecific references to the pax deorum in thethird decade andso is particularly relevant to the situation of 200.41 Moreover, religio is mentioned twice, being said to have detained the consuls because they did not easily obtain favorable sacrifices, and subsequently being deemed perverse (prava) in context of a prodigy at Cumae where mice hadgnawed thegoldinthetemple of Jupiter. After listing the prodigies, Livy continues: “there was a one day supplicatio for the prodigies, full-grown victims were slain for several days without a favorable result and, for a long time (diu), the pax deorum was not secured.”The section concludes with thecryptic comment that thedire consequences of the portents fell upon the heads of the consuls, though the state remained unharmed.42 The deaths of the two consuls are later recorded, M. Claudius Marcellus in battle andT. Quinctius Crispinus as a result of wounds received in the same battle (L. 27.27.7–11, 33.6). In a passage clearly influenced by Polybius (10.32.7–12), Livy notes the death of Marcellus as being pitiable 37 FromLivy’s various accounts of prodigies, Linderski, RRL58, reconstructs theformal stages of theprocuratio prodigiorum: (i) nuntiatio, report of a prodigy to a magistrate, (ii) relatio of the magistrate to the senate, (iii) a decision by the senate, usually in consultation with priests, whether to reject or acknowledge (suscipere) it, (iv) interpretation of the prodigy which was entrusted by decree of the senate to either haruspices or decemviri sacris faciundis, (v) presentation of their findings to thesenate, (vi) a senatorial decree ordering themagistrates or priests to carry outtheritual of expiation. 38 L. 31.12.8: foeda omnia et deformia errantisque in alienos fetus naturae visa. 39 L. 31.12.9: nihilo minus decemviros adire libros deportento eo iusserunt. decemviri ex libris

res divinas easdem quae proxime secundum id prodigium factae essent imperarunt. carmen praeterea ab ter novenis virginibus cani per urbem iusserunt donumque lunoni reginae ferri. 2), 196 5), 197 (32.29.1– 8; 24.44.7; 27.11.1, 23.1, 37.1. Likewise in 198 (32.9.1– 40 L. 22.36.7–

41

(33.26.6), 192 (35.21.2), 191 (36.37.1), 190 (37.1.1) et al. 57, notes the paucity of specific references by Livy to thepax deorum in Linderski, RRL 56–

context of the respublica: eight in thefirst decade, twointhethird andonein the fifth. 4: consules religio tenebat, quodprodigiis aliquot nuntiatis nonfacile litabant .... 42 L. 27.23.1– Cumis –adeo minimis etiam rebus prava religio inserit deos –mures in aede lovis aurum rosisse... horum prodigiorum causa diem unum supplicatio fuit. per dies aliquot hostiae maiores sine litatione caesae, diuque nonimpetrata pax deorum. in capita consulum republica incolumi exitiabilis prodigiorum eventus vertit.

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(miserabilis) andinconsistent with hisprevious career because hehadimprudently exposed himself, his colleague andalmost the entire state to extreme danger.43 Records deriving from the annales maximi evidently indicated to Livy that thedeaths of thetwoconsuls in208 were thought tohave beencaused by failure to restore thepax deorum, whereas in the following year expiation of the hermaphrodite hadensured Rome’s victory over Hasdrubal.44 Expiation of Pleminius’sacrilege hadlikewise averted disaster, since Scipio’s invasion led to the defeat of Hannibal. Thus in 200, when confronted by reports of renewed sacrilege at Locri andprodigies which included not one but two hermaphrodites, the senate followed the precedents established during the Second Punic War, ordering a quaestio into the sacrilege with anynecessary expiations andas full anexpiation of theprodigies as possible. The similarities with 208, 207 and204 would seem to be more than fortuitous. Religio was being enlisted for political ends. Although the Comitia Centuriata had been persuaded to vote for war, opposition to the warremained. An anonymous anti-war faction would seem to have been playing on the memory of earlier ruptures of the pax deorum in order to delay, if not prevent, the invasion of Greece. Again, however, Livy gives no indication that preparati-

onsfor warwere affected. Next an economic problem arose when, as Livy notes, “ all the religious (vellent) to leave for scruples hadbeen allayed andthe consuls were willing their provinces”(31.13.1). The consuls haddeclared that the third payment onloans madein210 could notberepaid because of requirements for thenew war. Explicit mention of the size of the fleet andthe armies suggests that preparations for invasion were notyet complete.45 In response to complaints from thecreditors, thesenate decreed that theconsuls wereto appraise public 9). It wasonly after fulfilling land andlease it at a nominal rent (L. 31.13.1– this assignment that P.Sulpicius Galba wasable to leave for Macedonia, asis indicated by the introductory wordturn with which Livy marks his ceremonial departure after vows on the Capitol (14.1) andby the temporal clauses in the preface to Livy’s account of the loan problem (13.1).46 43 L. 27.27.11: mors Marcelli cumalioqui miserabilis fuit, tumquod nec pro aetate –iam enim maior sexaginta annis erat –neque pro veteris prudentia ducis taminprovide se conlegamque etprope totam rempublicam inpraeceps dederat. 44 Livy’s cryptic comment at 27.23.4 seems to avoid the question of whether the consuls did indeed obtain favorable sacrifices (litatio). See Linderski, RLL 57, whonotes that Plut. Marc. 29 reports that theconsuls left Romeonlyafter alltheceremonies prescribed bythemanteis 28– hadbeenperformed. 45 L. 31.13.3: quia consules, cumad novum bellum, quod magna classe magnisque exercitibus gerendum esset, vix aerarium sufficeret, negaverunt esse unde iis inpraesentia solveretur. As Briscoe, Comm. 1.91, notes: “this is oneof thefewdetailed pieces of information oneconomic matters in these books.” turn P. Sulpicius secundum vota

46 L. 31.14.1:

in Capitolio nuncupata paludatis lictoribus

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Administrative tasks, bothreligious andsecular, tookprecedence overthe consuls’ military assignments, apparently detaining them through the summer.47 These tasks, rather than a hypothetical time lapse between thetwowarvotes in theComitia Centuriata, explain the late departure of both consuls for their provinces while also implying opposition to the war. But Galba maynothave been unduly alarmed. Preparations for anoverseas invasion were bound to take time, as the Romans had learned when Scipio invaded Africa. Galba’s first duty wasto ensure morale at home and the safety of hisforces uponarrival in Macedonia. Fromhisearlier service in Greece, he would have known that November wasthe safest time to send a squadron of ships to Athens.48 Hewould also have been aware that flooding in the coastal plain near Apollonia in the autumn would notprevent military operations if they were encamped on the higher ground.49 If help could not be sent to Athens before July, brief campaigns in late October andNovember would still be possible in the Apsus valley and in the waters of the Saronic Gulf.50 The stage hadbeen set for a show-down with Philip in late consular 201 bytheappointment of theembassy under P.Sempronius Tuditanus andbythe extraordinary commission of M. Valerius Laevinus. By spring of 200, war hadbeen authorized by the Comitia Centuriata andthe levy wasunderway. The embassy hadbegun its anti-Macedonian propaganda in Greece, publicizing theconditions under which Philip could remain atpeace with Rome. The Straits of Otranto were controlled by Laevinus’fleet andApollonia hadbeen reinforced. Athenian requests notwithstanding, the urgency to send the consular army to northwest Greece diminished when Philip, after receiving the Roman message from Nicanor, marched eastwards through Thrace.51 Galba’s late arrival, albeit not initially desired, wasnotinopportune.

ab urbe Brundisium venit et... in Macedoniam traiecit; onthe reading paludatis, see Briscoe, Comm. 1.94 andhis Teubner text (1991). This notice forms a dramatic transition into theretrospective survey of events inGreece. Livy notes that Cotta departed “after he hadcompleted what hadto be done in Rome”(L. 31.22.3). This notice is followed by mention of Galba’s arrival in Macedonia autumno ferme exacto. 64. See above pp.63– Hammond, JRS 58 (1968) 1 n.3, contra Holleaux, Études 4 (1952) 74 n. 1,who believed that flooding intheplain would make all military operations impossible after September. See further below p. 82 n. 3. 84. Note also thatL. Apustius didnotbring his 8, seebelow pp.82– 23.12, and27.1– L. 31.22.5– ships from Corcyra to theAegean until thebeginning of summer (L. 31.44.1), see below p. 88. This wasprobably in late May, see below, p. 76.

profectus

47 48 49 50

51

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Section V: Events in the eastern Mediterranean from late April 200 to the arrival of theconsular army in Macedonia andthefall ofAbydus (late October)

At this point in the reconstruction, some recapitulation is necessary. Philip hadescaped from Bargylia in early March. By the middle of March he would have arrived in Macedon, andAttalus inAegina. Livy’s reference toAttalus’ presence inAegina andAthens (31.14.11) is to be correlated with thePolybi26) which relates the Athenian invitation to Attalus, the an excerpt (16.25– arrival of the Roman ambassadors at the Piraeus, andthe Athenian vote for war against Philip in the latter part of April. Between Attalus’ arrival in

Aegina andhis reception in Athens, there wasa naval engagement between Athens andMacedon (P. 16.26.9, L. 31.15.5) anda Macedonian raidonAttica (L. 31.14.10). After theRhodians hadrecovered fourAthenian vessels captured by the Macedonians, Attalus andthe Rhodians were invited to Athens. During their visit, theAthenians voted for waragainst Philip.1 In considering events in theeastern Mediterranean during the spring and summer of 200, most scholars have worked back from the approximate synchronism between thedate of thearrival of theRoman consular force and the fall of Abydus which are generally considered to have occurred in early September. Manyof these reconstructions arealso influenced bythehypothetical three to four month time lapse between the two votes in the Comitia Centuriata andthefrequently interdependent connection with fetial procedure.2 The current reconstruction combines two different, if not entirely new, factors: a later date fortheRoman arrival, andtheassumption that theRoman ambassadors, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. Claudius Nero andM. Aemilius Lepidus, were not responsible for the official delivery of either the rerum repetitio or the belli indictio. Two dates are crucial: late April when the Athenians voted for war against Philip, and late October, the time of the Roman arrival inMacedonia, as argued inAppendix 1.Themethod will be to proceed sequentially from the situation at the end of April when both the Romans andAthenians hadvoted for waragainst Philip, theRoman embassy was in Athens andthe consular force was still some five months from its departure. Although Livy fails to mention the presence of the Roman envoys in Athens specifically, the Polybian excerptor gives fairly precise correlations between Attalus’receiving the Athenian invitation, his hearing news of the arrival of theRoman embassy atthePiraeus andhisactual going fromAegina 1 2

41. See above pp. 37– 6 andErrington, CAH(1989) 9, Rich, DWTE 75– Exceptions are Balsdon, JRS 44 (1954) 38– 9. These scholars, however, donotsystematically examine thechronology andtheJulian 258– equivalents for theevents of spring/summer 200.

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to the Piraeus,

noting that he met the Roman envoys at the Piraeus who accompanied him to Athens (P. 16.25.1– 6). As we have argued, Attalus’ pleasure at theRoman readiness to engage in warwith Philip (P. 16.25.4) and references totheRomans inhisexhortation totheAthenians todeclare waron Philip, as reported by both Polybius (16.26.6) and Livy (31.15.4), indicate that the Roman ambassadors hadinformed him that the Roman People had voted for war with Philip, an inference which those scholars who date the Roman declaration of warto September are forced to explain.3 Polybius (16.25.1) states that anAthenian embassy to Attalus in Aegina congratulated himon what hadhappened, anapparent allusion to the recapture of the Athenian ships by the Rhodians who were also received and congratulated in Athens. The naval engagement between Athens andMacedon and the raid on Attica had probably caused the abolition of the two “ Macedonian”tribes inAthens. Thenaming of a tribe after Attalus during his visit toAthens mentioned by Polybius andLivy wasevidently inplace of one of these tribes.4 Although Attalus refused to appear before the Athenian Assembly in person, his written exhortation was read to the Assembly, whereupon the Athenians voted to declare war on Philip (P. 16.26.1– 8, L. 5). Later, at some unspecified time, Nicanor invaded Attica, metwith 31.15– the Roman ambassadors whogave himtheconditions for maintaining peace. 3), thus apparently complying with theRoman Nicanor withdrew (P. 16.27.1– request toconvey themessage toPhilip. Since Nicanor’s invasion sounds like Philip’s response to theAthenian declaration of war, it is probably to be dated to early May. Nicanor’s delivery of the Roman terms would merely have confirmed what Philip already knew. Given his anxiety in the previous autumn when Attalus and the Rhodians sent ambassadors to Rome (P. 16.24.3), he may even have been informed of theRoman response during hisenforced sojourn in Bargylia over the winter. Hehadprobably received a formal rerum repetitio on his return to Macedon.5 The terms proclaimed by the Roman envoys would have been reported to himwell before Nicanor returned from Athens. Hewould also have known of Laevinus’mobilization andtheRoman vote for

war.

Philip evidently rejected the offer of arbitration outright, regarding the terms as non-negotiable, if notfraudulent.6 If heaccepted, hewould lose face,

3 4

5 6

48. See above pp.47– 35. Cf. Habicht, Studien zur Geschichte 6; Walbank, HCP 2.534– 9, L. 31.15.5– P. 16.25.8– 150, whodates the abolition to autumn 201. Athens, 145– For the argument that the rerum repetitio is not to be identified with the message sent via 51. Nicanor, see above pp.50– If Philip chose to regard the legatio andits senatus consultum Errington, CAH(1989) 260: “ merely as a Roman attempt to wintime andinfluence inGreece, hewasright; its demands were a fraud, andPhilip seems to have recognized them as such.”

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whereas Roman prestige in the Hellenistic world would correspondingly increase. Roman control of theStraits of Otranto wasa fait accompli. Tohead westwards andoppose a Roman invasion was out of the question, since he could notmuster naval support in that area.7 Confrontation with Rome would have tobeonlandatsomelater date. Thus, probably inlateMay,hecontinued the offensive against Athens by sending Philocles with two thousand infantry andtwohundred cavalry to devastate Attica, andhehimself set outeastward (L. 31.16.2–3).8 Control of the Hellespont would not only give him access to Asia, as Polybius notes (16.29.2), but also increase his influence in a vital shipping area, thus putting himin a stronger position to deal with Rome when that became necessary.9 Some minor problems arepresented byLivy’s account of Philip’s various aggressions in Thrace. Although the notations seem to signify chronological sequence (inde, postremo, deinceps, inde, quoque), the sequence conflicts with the logical geographical progression. The likely solution is that Livy, being ignorant of the geography of Thrace, has mistaken Polybius’order of importance for that of chronological sequence.10 Theduration of themarch is difficult to estimate because Livy’s account is so condensed. The advance of Philip II through Thrace to the Chersonese in the latter part of the campaigning season of 352 took around two months and, in his later attack on Thrace in 346, he left Pella sometime in March andwasback there again in June.11 Two months, however, is probably a generous allowance for the various activities ascribed to Philip V.Thus, if the latter left Pella some time in the latter part of May, he could easily have reached Abydus by the end of

July.

The meeting between Philip andM. Aemilius Lepidus is probably to be dated to early August, since a Polybian excerpt (16.34.2) makes it quite clear that Lepidus wassent fromRhodes toAbydus whenthenewsof thesiege had spread.12 The same excerpt gives an imprecise correlation between Attalus’ hearing the news, his going across the Aegean to Tenedos, and Lepidus’ 7 See above p.55. 8 For the dating of theraid of Philocles, see above p. 41. 9 Errington, CAH (1989) 259: “Whoever controlled the Hellespont at the time of the great summer grain-cargoes exerted a major influence onthe fates of innumerable Greek cities.”On Sea-power andthe Antigonids,”in Philip V’s motives for attacking Abydus, see Walbank, “ Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage, edd. W. L. Adams andE. N. Borza, (Washington 1982) 232, whonotes that thePolybian fragment from theSuda placed by so that he editors at 16.29.1 is misplaced, andthat Philip’s reason is correctly given at 29.2: “ might have Abydus as a stepping stone, if heproposed to cross again into Asia.”

10 Briscoe, Comm. 1.100–101. 11 OnPhilip II’s campaigns against Thrace, see J. R. Ellis, Philip II andMacedonian Imperialism 88 and110.. (1976) 87– 12 Cf. Livy’s less precise ante deditionem (31.18.1) which introduces his abridged version of Polybius’description of theinterview between Philip andLepidus.

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sailing toAbydus from Rhodes where theRoman envoys hadheard about the siege.13 Theonly evidence concerning theduration of the siege is Livy’s note that it detained Philip a long time (diu tenuit, 31.16.6). If the above estimate of the duration of Philip’s march through Thrace is correct andthe siege had begun by the end of July, correlation of its end with the Roman arrival in Macedon autumno ferme exacto indicates that it lasted over two and a half months.14 Nothing is known of the activities of the Roman embassy between mention of their meeting with Nicanor, when they are said to have sailed away to meet Antiochus and Ptolemy (P. 16.27.3– 4), and their presence in Rhodes when they deferred their mission to the kings on hearing that Philip was at Abydus (P. 16.34.2). This leaves a hiatus of almost three months between thedate wehaveposited fortheir delivery of themessage to Nicanor andmention of them in Rhodes. Although thePolybian excerptor implies that the Roman envoys left Athens immediately after the meeting with Nicanor, they maynot have departed until they hadnews of Philip’s reaction to their ultimatum. When they heard of his march eastward, they probably went to Rhodes where they were well placed to receive information about his activities. Attalus remained inAegina reportedly hoping to enlist thesupport of the Aetolians (L. 31.15.9), buthe wasalso in a position where he could monitor events and act as liaison for information from Rome. The Roman envoys would have crossed theAegean in June, followed byAttalus in early August when he heard news of the siege of Abydus, as Polybius indicates (16.34.1). From Rhodes the revised Roman demands were delivered to Philip himself. Livy’s description of the meeting between Philip andM. Aemilius 5) clearly derives from Polybius but is abbreviated and Lepidus (31.18.1– distorted. The Polybian excerptor states that the ambassadors wished to address Philip personally, as they had been instructed, and sent Lepidus (16.34.2). Livy, however, relates that Lepidus was sent “ as the three envoys hadagreed”(31.18.1). Lepidus is portrayed as protesting attacks onAttalus and the Rhodians and the current siege of Abydus, whereas the Polybian version has Lepidus also ask about attacks on the Athenians andthe Cians. Livy’s omission of theAthenians is consistent withhisattempt to suppress the embassy’s presence in Athens. As he omitted to mention the ultimatum delivered to Nicanor, so nowhe nowhere mentions this offer of arbitration. Hemerely refers to warwhenhehasPhilip saythat, if theRomans provoked 13 P. 16.34.1. After hisreception by theAthenians, Attalus wasidle in Aegina for some time; see Livy 31.15.9 andAppendix II, p. 99 n. 11. 316, who suggests that Lepidus’meeting with Philip occurred on or 14 Cf. Walbank, Philip 315– after a long siege,”whereas about 1 September, asserting that Philip took Aenus andMaronea “ him. Heestimates that thelatter siege “musthavelasted atleast a fortnight.” checked” Abydus “ Cf. Bickermann, Rev. Phil. 61 (1935) 174 n.3, whosuggests that Philip was at Abydus for six weeks.

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himby war, they would find that thekingdom andname of Macedon, noless

noble than that of Rome, bred confidence in him.15 Thanks to the Polybian excerpt the circumstances of Lepidus’ meeting with Philip can be reconstructed. Several months had elapsed since the Comitia Centuriata hadvoted for war. The rerum repetitio hadbeen rejected andthe conditions delivered byNicanor blatantly disregarded. In addition to 3), are compensation for the Rhodians, a the earlier demands (P. 16.27.2– request notto lay hands onanyof Ptolemy’s possessions andactual mention 4), terms which reflect Rome’s response to Philip’s of war (P. 16.34.3– continued aggression in the eastern Aegean. As suggested above, the demands delivered byLepidus areprobably essentially thesame as those of the actual indictio belli which would soon be delivered to a Macedonian guardpost on the arrival of the consular army.16 By this time, the Roman envoys, andprobably Philip too, would have known that the consular army would arrive in Epirus before the campaigning season ended. Nolonger wasnegotiation between Philip andthe Romans or arbitration of the grievances of Attalus andthe Rhodians possible, a factor which seems tobereflected inthedespatch of thejunior envoy Lepidus. If the Roman offer had been seriously intended, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, the negotiator of the Peace of Phoenice, would have met with Philip.17 Lepidus’ interview with Philip wasa mereformality, fulfilling thesenate’s instructions, gratifying Attalus andtheRhodians, while also advertizing theRoman cause. Philip, apparently undeterred, returned to the siege of Abydus.18 Two correlations between the arrival of the consular force under P. Sulpicius Galba andthe siege of Abydus indicate that thecity wastaken very shortly after the Romans had landed in Macedonia. At the conclusion of his account of the siege, Livy states that Philip left a garrison at Abydus and 4 makes it returned tohiskingdom (31.18.8). Since thecorrelation at31.14.3– clear that the siege was still in progress at the time Galba despatched C. Claudius Centho to Athens, Abydus maynot have fallen until early November.19 Livy’s survey of eastern affairs closes with a comparison between the

4. Briscoe, Comm. 1.106, notes that thelanguage is “considerably more florid than 15 L. 31.18.1– 31. that of Polybius.”OnLivy’s suppression of diplomatic details, see pp.30– 16 See above p. 50. 17 As Errington, CAH(1989) 260–1, discerns. 18 Cf. theassertion byGruen, HWCR397: “Philip rejected theterms at Abydus, as hehadignored them whenforwarded byNicanor, disbelieving that thedilatory Republic would actually resort to invasion.”He also thinks Philip wasunlikely to refuse a settlement andsuggests that war resulted from miscalculation on both sides. On Gruen’s (mistaken) chronology, see HWCR 6, quoted above p. 32 n. 33. 395– 19 L. 31.14.3– 4: missus extemplo (sc. Galba, after hisarrival inMacedonia) Athenas estC.Claudius Cento cumviginti longis navibus et mille militum. neque enim ipse rexAthenas obsidebat; eo maxime tempore Abydum oppugnabat, iam cum Rhodiis et Attalo navalibus certaminibus, neutro feliciter proelio, vires expertus.

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fall of Saguntum andthat of Abydus andnotice that Philip received news of the Roman landing in Epirus (31.18.9). Asnoted earlier, thecomparison is a contrived link giving a dramatic conclusion to theretrospective survey which began at 14.1. The implication (L. 31.18.9) that theRomans were aroused to war against Philip by the destruction of Abydus in the same way that they had been aroused to war against Hannibal by the destruction of Saguntum is patently incorrect, since the Roman People hadvoted for warmore than six months before the consular army left for Macedonia. After Lepidus’ return to Rhodes, the three ambassadors continued on their wayto meetAntiochus andPtolemy “ to arrange a settlement”(ἐ π ὶτ ὰ ς δ ια λ ύ σ ε ις), as was indicated in an earlier Polybian excerpt (16.27.5). Although it is impossible todiscern theprecise significance of thisphrase, the historical context suggests theappropriateness of a Roman offer of mediation in the war between Egypt andSyria. The main objective, however, would have been to ensure Syrian neutrality in the impending warbetween Rome andMacedon.20 Having completed their propaganda campaign inGreece and the Aegean area, the Roman envoys went to meet the two other major Hellenistic monarchs, confident in the success of their mission knowledge that hostilities with Philip were about to begin.

andin the

The chronology of the events discussed thus far can nowbe set forth: September 201 (or earlier)

Despatch to Rome of envoys from Attalus and Rhodians

late September

Profanation

before mid- October

Senate’s reception of envoys from Attalus and Rhodian; mission to Egypt decreed

mid-October

Execution

October

Return

November

Return of consul to Rome Meeting of senate: appointment of Laevinus to Macedonia, additional commission of Roman embassy

of the Eleusinian Mysteries

of twoAcarnanians inAthens

of ships fromAfrica under Octavius

20 Thus, Walbank, HCP2.533: “part of their duty wasto arrange a settlement between Egypt and Antiochus.... subsequent events indicate that the real purpose of the embassy was to secure Seleucid neutrality, if necessary at the expense of Egypt.”

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late November

Laevinus’rendezvous with Octavius

early December

Laevinus’muster

mid-December

Athenian concern about reprisals anddespatch nova legatio

exitu anni

Election of magistrates for consular 200

14 January 200

Beginning of newconsular year Reception of Athenian nova legatio

by c. 28 February (end of April)

Roman vote for warwith Macedon passed

early March

Philip escapes from Bargylia followed by Attalus andRhodians whogo toAegina.

mid-March

Laevinus sails with thirty-eight ships toApollonia Three Roman envoys leave for Epirus, Athens,

of ships at Brundisium of

etc. March-early April

Macedonian invasion of Attica, Macedonians capture four Athenian ships; abolition of Macedonian tribes Roman embassy leaves W. Greece for Athens, attending spring meetings of Aetolian and Achaean Leagues

mid to late April

Attalus andRhodians go to Athens, meet newlyarrived Roman ambassadors Athenian vote for warv. Philip

early

May

Nicanor raids Attica, receives Roman demands

late May

Philip begins march through Thrace Philocles raids Attica

June

Philip marches through Thrace Roman envoys go to Rhodes

early August

Beginning

of siege of Abydus

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81

early August

Meeting of Lepidus and Philip Embassy proceeds toAntiochus andPtolemy

late October-early

Consular force lands inApollonia (autumno fermeexacto) Delivery of formal belli indictio Fall of Abydus

November

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Section VI: Thecampaigns inGreece during autumnus 200 andconsular 199;

theremaining events of consular 200.

of thedeparture of theconsul P.Sulpicius Galba from Rome (31.14.1) andnewsof hisarrival inEpirus (31.18.8– 9) frame Livy’s survey of events in theeastern Mediterranean. In Brundisium, Galba enrolled veteran volunteers from the army of Scipio Africanus, selected anunspecified number of ships from the fleet of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and crossed with two legions to Macedonia.1 With M. Valerius Laevinus’thirty-eight ships, there could have Notice

been approximately seventy-five Roman vessels operating in Greek waters, since anearlier notice indicates that Lentulus hadfifty ships (30.41.6– 8).2At the endof the retrospective survey, Galba is said to be in Epirus andto have sent his army to Apollonia andhis fleet to Corcyra to winter (31.18.9). In a third reference to theinvasion, Livy notes thetime of arrival, autumno ferme exacto, reporting that Galba wasin winter quarters in the vicinity of Apollonia (circa Apolloniam hibernabat) with thefleet drawn upat Corcyra (31.22.4– 5). The consul’s camp is more precisely described as being located between Apollonia andDyrrachium by theApsus river (31.27.1), evidently onhigher ground away from theflooding onthecoastal plain.3 Twocampaigns ensued: oneby landunder L. Apustius along theApsus valley as far as theborders of 8) andonein thewaters offAthens andChalcis (31.22.5– Macedon (31.27.1– 23.12), causing Philip to march south as far as the Peloponnese (31.24.1– 26.13). Despite their belated arrival, theRomans usedtheendof thecampaigning season to maximum effect in both western andeastern Greece. Inresponse totherequest of theAthenian ambassadors whometGalba on his arrival in Epirus, twenty warships anda thousand soldiers were immediately sent to Athens under C. Claudius Centho (31.14.3). As noted, the wind force around Cape Malea is at its lowest in November.4 Centho would thus have left the safe haven of Corcyra in early November, completed his campaign andbeen in the shelter of the Piraeus before conditions in the Saronic gulf deteriorated inDecember.5 Hisarrival off Piraeus stopped raids onAttica 1

2

3 4 5

L.31.14.1: tumP. Sulpicius secundum vota in Capitolio nuncupata paludatis lictoribus profectus ab urbe Brundisium venit et veteribus militibus voluntariis ex Africano exercitu in legiones discriptis navibusque ex classe Cn. Cornelii electis altero die quama Brundisio solvit in Macedoniam traiecit. L. 31.8.6 records the enrollment of twolegions. Thiel, Roman Sea Power 212, suggests plus or minus 75 ships which he reckons was the number in consular 198. for purposes of movement andcommunication an occupying Hammond, JRS 58 (1968) 1: “ force must possess the rising ground which runs from Apollonia in the south through Kuç, Lushnejë andKavajë to Epidamnus in thenorth.” See Borza, AM303, cited above p. 64 n. 12. Holleaux, BCH 56 (1932) 537 = Études 4.341 n. 3, is probably correct in reckoning about a month from thedespatch of Centho to thetaking of Chalcis. Thetwoworst months of theyear for sailing off Athens areDecember (2.3), andJanuary (2.4); see Borza, AM303.

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bylandfromCorinth andbyseafromChalcis.6 TheRomans attacked Chalcis but did not hold it because of lack of forces (31.22.8–23.12).7 Although Livy records Philip’s return to his kingdom after the siege of Abydus (31.18.9), hedoes notsaywhere hewaswhenheheard of theRoman landing inEpirus. Heis next reported atDemetrias where hereceived newsof the Roman attempt on Chalcis. Hewent immediately to Chalcis but quickly returned to the mainland, marching through Boeotia to Athens (31.24.1– 25.1). Frustrated in his attempts to take Athens andEleusis, he marched to Argos, appearing unexpectedly at a meeting of theAchaean League with an offer to help theAchaeans in their waragainst Nabis of Sparta if they would give him troops to occupy Oreus, Corinth andChalcis (31.25.1– 7). But the Achaean strategos Cycliadas ruled the question out of order on a technical point, since this would have involved the Achaean League in war with Rome.8 Less than ten days probably elapsed between the fall of Chalcis and Philip’s appearance atArgos.9 Hewould thus have been inArgos attheendof November or beginning of December, a date which would fit the implication that Cycliadas hadrecently assumed office.10 Hethenreturned to Corinth and Attica (31.25.11). After unsuccessful attacks on Eleusis andthe Piraeus, he 13) andthence to Macedon, ravaged Attica, withdrew to Boeotia (31.26.1– probably in mid to late December.11 The phrase eo tempore (31.27.1) with which Livy connects the campaign of L. Apustius with Philip’s activities is clearly anautoschediasm. Apustius’ march up the Apsus valley would have begun shortly after the Roman arrival.12 He first ravaged the frontiers of Macedon, capturing three towns. 6 L.31.22.5–8. Livy also records the arrival of three Rhodian quadriremes and the presence of 7. three Athenian open vessels; seeBriscoe, Comm. 1.116– 7 Five weeks is probably a generous estimate of thelength of time between theRoman arrival in Apollonia andthe raid onChalcis; cf. Holleaux, Études 4.341 n.3. 8 L.31.25.4–11. Onthis synkletos, see Briscoe, Comm.1.121–122. 9 Thus Walbank, Philip 317. 10 Modern scholars have held that, by the beginning of the second century, entry into office occurred at anytime from the autumn equinox to early November: A. Aymard, REA30 (1928) : cf., 282 in autumn” ; HCP. 1.630, 2.220: “ 2, Walbank, Philip 300 n.3: “the autumn equinox” 352, on the basis of L. 31.25.3 and two other November.”W arrior, Chiron 18 (1988) 350– “ instances in 207 and 198, argues that there is no positive evidence to indicate an Achaean strategos entering office as late as November, andsuggests that the time of election andentry into office hadprobably beenbrought into alignment withtheAetolian practice, i.e. immediately after the autumn equinox; cf. P. 4.37.2. Although in that discussion the Roman landing was early or mid-September,”the basic argument is not affected, since Livy refers to a dated to “ decline in the military power of the Achaeans as a result of the transfer of command from Philopoemen to Cycliadas (L.31.25.3) which implies that Cycliadas had not just assumed office.

2, reckons a month for Philip’s march from Chalcis into the PeÉtudes 4.341– loponnese andback. 4) is not remarkable; Livy’s failure to mention the illness of P. Sulpicius Galba (Zonaras 9.15.3–

11 Holleaux, 12

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Onhis return, he took Antipatrea by force, burned andtore down the walls. Another town, Codrion, surrendered to the Romans andwasoccupied by a garrison; a third wastaken bystorm (31.27.3– 6). Theravaging of theborders of Macedon would have been brief. The siege operations in theApsus valley

could have been finished by the end of November.13 That the main objective of Apustius’campaign wasto clear a bridgehead for future operations east of Antipatraea is substantiated by examination of the topography of the campaign at the beginning of thefollowing year. This town, situated in a narrow pass (infaucibus angustiis sitam urbem), 31.27.2 hasbeen identified with the modern Berat through which “ the subsidiary routes from the east pass as if

a funnel.”14 Livy remarks on the success of Apustius’expedition before noting that Pleuratus of Illyria, Amynander of Athamania, Bato of theDardani andother unnamed princes andchieftains cametotheRoman campoffering assistance. The Roman strategy for the next campaigning season is indicated by the consul’s response. He would accept the help of Pleuratus and the Dardani when he led the army into Macedon. Amynander was given the task of winning theAetolians over to the Roman side, andinstructions were sent to 4). Attalus regarding naval warfare (31.28.1– Mention of Philip’s despatch of envoys to theAetolians forms a transition to a dramatized account of the regular late winter meeting of the Panaetoli16). ca.15 The Macedonian envoys arethefirst to present their case (31.29.2– Anallusion in their speech torejection of anearlier Aetolian appeal to Rome (31.29.4), notmentioned elsewhere byLivy, hascaused controversy over the date andauthenticity of such anappeal, theonly other mention of anappeal to Rome being in Appian (Mac. 4) whoplaces the incident after the Rhodian through

embassy

in 201.16 The Athenians

recount Philip’s depredations

in Attica

Although Zonaras refers to Apustius as praetor, he was probably legatus pro praetore, see MRRI. 325. 3, of tenor twelve days is tooshort 13 Holleaux’suggestion, BCH56 (1932) 537 = Études 4. 342– for the activities described. Cf. Walbank, Philip 317, whoconsidered that such an expedition would not have begun in October because of the autumn rains but, according to Briscoe, Historia 26 (1977) 250 with n.15, he is nowof the opinion that an expedition extending into November is “ notimpossible.” 3, and P. Cabanes, L’Épire de la mort de 14 Hammond, JRS 58 (1968) 1, JRS 56 (1966) 42– Pyrrhos à la conquête romaine (1976) 269 with map. 4. Since theIdes of March 199 are 29.1. Onthe dating see, Walbank, HCP. 1. 453– 15 L. 31.28.4– to be equated with either 4 January or 26 January 199 (see Briscoe, Comm. 2. 25), theRoman consular year would have been half waythrough either May or June if we assume that the conference washeld c. 15 March. 297, changes thedate to 202 before thebattle of Zama. Fora refutation 16 Holleaux, RGMH293– 211, whorejects the authenticity of Holleaux’arguments see, Badian, Latomus 17 (1958) 209– of such an appeal, arguing that Livy has incorporated into this speech a late annalistic fiction 51 andProlegomena that wasprobably invented to show Roman dignity. See Flamininus 50– 8, also refutes Holleaux, butargues for authenticity, 410 with n. 61. Derow, JRS 69 (1979) 7–

cf. Briscoe, Comm.1.125.

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(31.30.1–11) and the Roman legate responds to the Macedonian charges (31.31.1– 20). The debate concludes with brief arguments by the Aetolian strategos Damocritus whosuggests deferring anydecision andadvocates the convening of a special council when they wished to discuss peace or war (31.32.2– 5). After the debate at the Panaetolica, Livy turns to the warfare of consular 199. Since the new consular year would have begun on 4 January 199, prorogation of the imperium of P. Sulpicius Galba is to be assumed.17 The chronology of thevarious campaigns is difficult toreconstruct, since there are no precise correlations between the fighting in the different areas. The only clues are a fewreferences to the grain harvest which began in early summer,

the beginning and end of the naval campaigning season, pluperfect tenses denoting the beginning of a flashback and the sequence of events in the

narrative.18 TheRomans marched through theterritory of theDassaretii (31.33.4– 5). In order to avoid crossing the Apsus andGenusus which are in full spate at the beginning of the campaigning season, they probably took a route over rougher territory, a suggestion which tallies with Livy’s mention (31.33.6– 7) of Philip’s ignorance of theRoman whereabouts. When they were encamped “ near Lyncus on the river Bevus”probably to the south of Lake Lychnitis, there was an unexpected encounter between Roman scouts and Philip’s cavalry in which thirty-five Romans and forty Macedonians fell (31.33.7– 9To supplement his forces, Philip recalled his sonPerseus from Pelago11).1 nia, a move which Livy notes opened the passes into Macedon to Pleuratus andthe Dardanians.20 accepting Appian’s dating and suggesting plausible political reasons for a Roman refusal in 201. Theauthenticity of theappeal is assumed byBroughton, MRR I322 n. 3 andHarris, WIRR 213 with n. 3. See also Briscoe, Comm.1.130 with bibliography, andGruen, HWCR 396 n. 214. 17 MRRI. 328. Thedate of the arrival of his successor P. Villius Tappulus (cos. 199) is notgiven, 7 but was evidently after Galba’s return at the end of the campaigning season. Livy 32.3.2– notes that, on his arrival, Villius was confronted with a mutiny. This passage is deemed annalistic by Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen 132, butaccepted by Briscoe, Comm. 1.172 as probably Polybian. After noting that Villius wintered in Corcyra (L. 32.6.1), Livy mentions a report byValerius Antias of a victory byVillius butconcludes with theremark thatother Greek 8). andLatin writers record that Villius didnothing worthy of remark (L. 32.6.5– 18 L. 31.36.5: parum tuta frumentatio erat; 36.9: vagos frumentatores; 39.4: frumentum quod in agris erat. On the time of the harvest, see above p. 35 n. 48. Three seasonal expressions are given byLivy for thenaval campaign: principio veris for Philip’s anticipation of thebeginning of operations by Attalus andthe Roman detachment under Centho (33.2), eiusdem principio aestatis for the departure of the rest of the fleet under Apustius from Corcyra, the rounding of Cape Malea andthearrival off Scyllaeum (44.1), andthenotice of theendof thecampaign iam autumnale aequinoctium instabat (47.1).

19 L. 31.33.6: adLyncum stativa posuit prope flumen Bevum. Onthe location, see Hammond, JRS 46. 56 (1966) 43 n.19, andon the campaign as a whole, pp.43– 20 L. 31.34.6: itaque revocato filio praesidioque quod infaucibus Pelagoniae erat ... Pleurato Dardanisque iter in Macedoniam patefecit.

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Philip fortified a position just over a mile from theRoman camp. Failing to bring him to a pitched battle, the Romans moved to Ottolobus where foraging for grain was easier and safer (31.34.1– 36.6). After an initial setback, they won a minor cavalry skirmish in which Philip, thrown from his horse, narrowly escaped being trampled to death (31.37.9). References to the gathering of grain suggest June as the terminus post quemfor these encounters.21 Requesting a truce, Philip withdrew to Bruanium, perhaps inflicting a defeat on the Romans near Pluinna where the Romans hadencamped after replenishing their grain from Pelagonia.22 Both Romans and Macedonians then moved further east. Themajor engagement of thecampaign, near themodern Banitza, occurredwhentheRomans succeeded in forcing thepass into Eordea, probably in 40.1).23 However, since Philip still controlled the eastlate August (31.39.6– ward route to Edessa andPella, the Romans headed south, plundering Eordaea and receiving the surrender of Celetrum in the upper reaches of the Haliacmon.24 Proceeding to the territory of the Dassaretii, they took and garrisoned Pelium as a convenient base for making attacks into Macedon (31.40.5) before returning toApollonia, probably by theApsus valley.25 The pluperfect tense of averterant marks the beginning of a flashback.26 Emphasis on the flashback continues with twomore pluperfect tenses (conciverat, 40.9, and restituerant, 41.1) as Livy relates the Aetolian decision to join the Romans. A later notice that thenaval campaign in theAegean ended shortly before the autumn equinox (iam autumnale aequinoctium instabat, 31.47.1) confirms that this decision was made not at the regular autumn meeting which we know from Polybius (4.37.2) was held at the autumn equinox, butin anextraordinary assembly as suggested byDamocritus at the regular spring meeting (L. 31.32.4). Damocritus is said to have stirred upthe 9. Although Livy (31.36.6) says that Ottolobus was about 21 L. 31.36.5– original Roman camp, its exact location is unknown.

eight miles from the

4, plausibly suggests that 39.5, terrorem praebuit (sc. 22 L. 31.38.9–39.6.6; Walbank, Philip 143–

23

Philippus) subitum hosti, conceals a Roman defeat. Though nota major engagement, this fight for thepass of Banitza was Walbank, Philip 144: “ the most important battle in the war, excepting, of course, thefinal battle of Cynoscephalae.” Walbank, Philip 319, deduces the time of the battle from the fact that Livy (31.40.9–10) does notmention it ashaving influenced theAetolian decision tojoin theRomans; see below p. 86 n.

27. 4 Walbank, Philip 144. 24 L. 31.40.1– 25 The location of Pelium is disputed. Walbank, Philip 144 and Hammond, Epirus (1967) 616, locate it near Koritsa, whereas Cabanes, L’Épire 320 n. 232, notes analternative location west 87 for anassessment of Lake Lychnitis in theupper reaches of theGenusus. See below pp.86–

of Galba’s campaign. 26 L. 31.40.7: Philippum averterant Aetoli et Athamanes et Dardani et tot bella repente alia ex aliis locis exorta. Cf. the useof thepluperfect contraxerant earlier at 31.14.6 to introduce the flashback within theretrospective survey.

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Aetolians “ after news of the cavalry battle at Ottolobus, the invasion of Macedon by the Dardanians andIllyrians, the arrival of the Roman fleet at Oreus, andthe impending blockade of the Macedonian cities on the eastern seaboard.”27Of these events, the first two date to the early part of the summer. The arrival of the Roman fleet off Oreus wassomewhat later, as is apparent from notices that the combined fleet of Attalus andthe Romans came south after operations off the Chalcidice (31.45.9– 16) and that Apustius did not leave Corcyra until the beginning of summer (principio aestatis, 31.44.1), probably in late June.28 At Heraclea, an Aetolian delegation met with Apustius and Attalus, apparently before the decision to besiege Oreus.29 It is unclear, however, whether the Aetolians decided to join the Romans before or after this meeting. Walbank, citing a reference to the Romans’ lavish promises to the Aetolians (L. 31.46.5), argued that the decision followed the meeting at Heraclea.30 Briscoe, however, puts it before the meeting, arguing that it was only the approach of theRoman fleet to Oreus (adventus, 40.10), andnotthe actual siege, that caused theAetolians tojoin theRomans.31 Since theAetolian decision was apparently made before the battle of Banitza, we can only conclude that it occurred before the end of August. The Aetolians joined Amynander andtheAthamanians, penetrating Thessaly as far as the borders of Magnesia. They were, however, averted from invading southern Macedon by Amynander’s desire to take Gomphi. Caught unawares by Philip while they were recklessly plundering Thessaly, they were routed.32 The Roman strategy, outlined in context of the consul’s winter meeting 3), of coordinating an with Pleuratus, Bato and Amynander (31.28.1– invasion from the west with support from Illyrians andDardanians from the north andAetolians andAthamanians from the south didnotsucceed. By the time the Athamanians and Aetolians marched east, Galba had apparently turned westward to consolidate a base at Pelium.33 The Dardanian invasion hadbeen premature, occurring after the skirmish in Lyncestis (31.33.7–11) butbefore the battle near Banitza, a time too soon for a rendezvous with the 27 L. 31.40.9–10: Aetolos Damocritus praetor... proximo concilio adarma conciverat postfamam equestris ad Ottolobum pugnae Dardanorumque et Pleurati cumIllyriis transitum in Macedoniam, ad hoc classis Romanae adventum Oreum et super circumfusas tot Macedoniae gentes maritimam quoque instantem obsidionem.

28 See above p. 64. n. 12 for sailing conditions off Cape Malea. 5. In an apparent gloss, Livy notes that the Aetolians were dismissed from this 29 L. 31.46.1– meeting with hope rather than actual help, although the Romans promised everything (L. 31.46.5).

30 31 32 33

Walbank, Philip 145.

Briscoe, Comm. 1.146. L. 31.41.1–42.9. See also Walbank, Philip 146.

See above p. 85.

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Romans.34 With theexception of taking Celetrum andestablishing thefort at Pelium, Galba hadgained little, a factor that is probably to be attributed to difficulty in maintaining supplies.35 The phrase haec ea aestate ab Romanis Philippoque gesta terra (31.44.1) makes the transition to the naval campaign of 199. Despite Philip’s reported anticipation that Attalus and the Romans would move from Aegina at the beginning of spring (31.33.2), there wasapparently no action until Apustius arrived from Corcyra andjoined Attalus near Scyllaeum at the beginning of summer (ea aestate, L. 31.44.1). Although notmentioned by Livy, Apustius probably brought thirty ships to addto thetwenty that hadoperated under C. Claudius Centho at the endof the previous campaigning season.36 Apustius’ arrival triggered anoutburst of anti-Macedonian feeling among theAthenians whopassed a decree eliminating all references to Philip in inscriptions and memorials tohimandhisancestors andimposed thedeath penalty onanyone whoproposed rescinding this decree, while also heaping honors onAttalus 45.2).37 andthe Romans (31.44.2– The combined Pergamene, Rhodian andRoman fleets operated as far as 46.1). As already noted, ApuAcanthus before returning to Euboea (31.45.3– stius andAttalus met with anAetolian delegation at Heraclea sometime in 46.1) which ended just August. There followed the siege of Oreus (31.45.16– before the autumn equinox (31.47.1). Apustius wanted to get away from Euboean waters before the stormy weather (hiemales motus). Leaving thirty ships at Piraeus for the next campaigning season, he himself returned to 2) presumably to meet upwith P. Sulpicius Galba andthe Corcyra (31.47.1– consular army, although heprobably didnotround Cape Malea until November when the wind force is at its lowest.38 The remainder of book 31 is a flashback to events in Rome, Italy and other parts of the Mediterranean world in the latter part of consular 200.39 34 See above p. 86. 35 Hammond, JRS 56 (1966) 46: “Whatbrought theRomans backfromMacedonia wasnotloss of men but lack of supplies, as is clear not only from Livy who insists on the matter of supplies ....”See also Walbank, Philip 147. 36 Thiel, Sea Power 213. 37 Note the anti-Athenian bias at the conclusion of this episode (31.44.9): “This wasthe Athenians’waragainst Philip, waged with letters andwords, which constitute their sole strength,”a comment that is generally thought to derive from Polybius; see Briscoe, Comm.1.150. 38 Onhiemales motus see Appendix I p. 95 n. 6. See above p. 64 n. 12. 9), 39 Earlier, after noting Philip’s reception of the news of theRoman arrival in Epirus (31.18.8– Livy reports two events which evidently preceded the departure of the consuls for their provinces: a Roman embassy to Africa, an unsuccessful bid for a triumph. In Numidia the envoys aresaidtohave accepted theoffer of 100cavalry fromMasinissa whohadthese shipped 4). The Roman ambassadors also with supplies of wheat and barley to Macedonia (31.19.3– 6). After relating the granting of an ovatio visited Vermina to make a peace settlement (19.5– rather than a triumph, Livy returns to events in Gaul. The campaign of L. Furius Purpurio

Section VI

89

Livy resumes his account of the campaign against the Gauls which he had interrupted at 31.22.3. C. Aurelius Cotta had arrived in Gaul to assume his command only tofindthat thecampaign wasover. Angry because thepraetor, L. Furius Purpurio, hadfought in his absence, Cotta sent Purpurio to Etruria. The latter, however, went to Rome torequest a triumph which waseventually granted.40 Further events in Rome are briefly reported: the celebration of the games vowed byScipio asconsul inAfrica, a landdistribution tohisveterans, andthe appointment of a commission to fill upthe number of colonists at 6). Report of a victory in Spain is followed bythereturn of Venusia (31.49.4– 12). The Cotta and the results of the elections for consular 199 (31.49.7– conclusion of book 31 is marked by a miscellany of domestic events which Livy typically gives at the endof a consular year.41

40

41

concludes with notice of thearrival of C.Aurelius Cotta to take over fromPurpurio which forms 4). a transition to Galba’s arrival in Macedonia autumno ferme exacto (L. 31.22.3– 11. Onthepossible political implications of theaffair andtherights and 49.3 and8– L. 31.47.4– wrongs of Purpurio’s case, see Briscoe, Comm 1.158. The miscellany includes references to the deaths of M. Valerius Laevinus andM. Aurelius 5). Cotta (L. 31.50.4–

CONCLUSION Explication andintertextual exegesis have affirmed the coherence of book 31, while also revealing Livy’s narrative techniques. That his synthesis of material deriving fromPolybian andRoman sources is coherent should notbe surprising, different methods of dating notwithstanding. Whatis surprising is that scholars have accepted theapparent incoherence of Livy’s narrative, thus postulating an uncomprehending or mindless author. Livy has, however, proved to be neither a slavish copier nor anuncritical compiler butrather a historian with his ownindividual presentation andinterpretation. His selection of material maynotbenotascomprehensive norhis synthesis asexact as a modern historian would wish. Our examination has revealed an overall grasp of the subject matter, despite some minor inconsistencies. Although the complex structure of thenarrative gives theimpression of anirregular jig-saw puzzle, reconstruction of thechronological sequence of events hasshown that theRoman sources arenotso lightly to be dismissed. Norarethedifferences between Polybian andRoman sources asgreat ashasgenerally been maintained. A pattern of Roman opportunism begins when the senate responded to complaints from Attalus and the Rhodians about Philip’s depredations. The initiation of theSecond Macedonian Warwasnoadhoc affair, however. The potential for the renewal of Roman influence in the Hellenistic World had been built into thePeace of Phoenice bytheuseof adscriptio. This treaty, so briefly mentioned byLivy, is often underestimated because of thestructure of his work andloss of Polybius. Emphasis ontheconclusion of theHannibalic Warin the concluding books of the third decade andthe strategic placement of the beginning of the Second Macedonian Warin the opening chapters of book 31 have resulted in a skeletal account of the events that preceded the war-declaration. The ancients, however, didnotregard this as a separate war butas a renewal of the “Philippic War,”as is evinced bytheFasti Capitolini, Polybius, andthe opening chapters of book 31.1Nomenclature apart, Livy’s discernment that the renewal of hostilities with Macedon is a major turning point in thehistory of the Roman republic remains unquestioned. The first event reported in thenarrative of book 31, thearrival of envoys from Attalus andthe Rhodians, indicates that their reports of Philip’s aggressions in the eastern Mediterranean presented the senate with a pretext to renew war with Macedon and an opportunity to reestablish control of the 1

See above pp.25– 26.

92

Conclusion

Straits of Otranto. A series of carefully calculated moves culminated in an unopposed invasion of Greece in October 200, thus supporting Polybius’ assertion that it was only after the defeat of Hannibal that the Romans realized that they could achieve their “ universal aim” and“reached out their hands for the rest”of the Mediterranean world (P. 1.3.6). Despite minor setbacks in theinitial refusal of theComitia Centuriata to vote for war, a rupture of thepax deorum, andaneconomic problem which caused the departure of the consular army to be later than wasprobably preferred, the success of the Roman invasion wasensured by naval control of the Straits of Otranto, the despatch of a small military task force to northwest Greece anda diplomatic offensive in Greece andtheAegean area. Livy’s technique ashistorian is that of narrator, notexplicator. Heleaves the reader not only to infer the psychological atmosphere that would have been created by reports of the sacrilege at Locri andthe twohermaphrodites but also to recall his earlier accounts of similar occurrences andso discern possible reasons for the reporting of these incidents at this particular time. Juxtaposed with thetworeligious episodes is theconsuls’preoccupation with the loan repayment. The significance of these episodes is underscored bythe proportion of thenarrative devoted totheir recounting. Three remarks that are probably to be attributed to Livy himself have also been discerned: the opportune arrival of the Athenian nova legatio and the despatch from M. 6), the state’s concern with Valerius Laevinus and M. Aurelius (L. 31.5.5– religio at the beginning of newwars (L. 31.9.1) andthe comment that the disgusting monstrosities seemed tobesigns thatnature wasconfusing species

(L. 31.12.8).2 Also prominent among Livy’s narrative techniques is strategic placement of selected events for elaboration, a device which automatically creates a variation in pace. The cost, however, can be distortion or even omission of events that Livy evidently did not consider of prime importance for his audience, as in the case of the almost total suppression of the presence of Roman ambassadors in Greece. Discussion of the possible causes of the war is likewise excluded by Livy’s evident desire to place the declaration of war as close as possible to the beginning of book 31. Variety of expression (variatio) is another distinctive technique whereby the reader’s interest is sustained. Four references to the Roman landing in Epirus gradually build up a more precise description of the location of the Roman forces.3 The different ways in which thewarwith Philip is denoted in 2 3

Other apparent glosses by Livy have been discerned at L. 27.23.1– 4 (religio andtherupture of 5 (the need for combination of military forces and the pax deorum in 208) and L. 35.23.4– diplomacy before the declaration of waronAntiochus). L. 31.14.2: in Macedoniam traiecit; 18.9: nuntii occurrerunt consulem iam in Epiro esse et Apolloniam terrestres copias, navales Corcyram in hiberna deduxisse 22.4: circa Apolloniam hibernabat; 27.1: inter Apolloniam ac Dyrrachium adApsum flumen habebat castra.

Conclusion

93

the opening chapters of book 31 reveal the use of variatio as a stylistic device.4 A similar avoidance of repetition is apparent in the reporting of the haruspices’pronouncements at the beginning of the wars against Philip and Antiochus. In theformer, extension of territory (prolatio finium), victory and a triumph areportended (portendi), whereas inthelatter theboundaries of the Roman people areto beenlarged (terminos Romanos propagari), andvictory and a triumph foreshadowed.5 More elaborate examples of variatio are apparent in the reporting of hermaphrodites in 209, 207 and 200. Such extended use of variatio both contributes to the interconnectedness of the workasa whole anddemonstrates Livy’s control overhissubject matter. Also underscored is thequestion of howfar ahead Livy planned thedisposition of his material. From a historical point of view, acceptance of the authenticity of M. Valerius Laevinus’military mission hasprofound implications for the question of Roman imperialism. Hisappointment toward theendof consular 201 marks the point at which the senate wasprepared to renew warwith Macedon. Hisinitial assignment wastoreassert Roman influence in theHellenistic World by reestablishing control of the Straits of Otranto. With consummate calculation, the Romans prepared to declare warandmount an invasion of Greece, while also offering a peaceful settlement. A rerum repetitio wassent to Philip stating the terms whereby warcould be avoided. In the early spring of 200, atthesame time thatLaevinus’task force sailed toEpirus, anembassy went eastwards proclaiming theterms already offered to Philip. The Comitia Centuriata already hadvoted for warandpreparations for a full-scale invasi-

on were going

ahead, despite some opposition. Attempts to arouse popular superstition were assuaged by elaborate rituals. In the meantime, Laevinus secured a naval base at Corcyra and a beach-head on the mainland near Apollonia. Consideration of weather conditions off the coast of southern Greece shows that thearrival of theconsular armyinOctober 200 is notasanomalous asscholars havegenerally assumed. Given thefact thattheRoman fleet hadto round Cape Malea, theAthenians could nothave expected help before July at theearliest. Examination ofthelogistics ofmounting anoverseas invasion has further vindicated thehistorical veracity of Livy’s synthesis of Polybian and 4

5

L. 31.1.6: bellum Macedonicum; 1.8: bellum adversus Philippum decem ferme ante annis triennio prius depositum erat, 5.1: bellum cumrege Philippo initum est; 5.9: ut Philippo, regi Macedonum, indiceretur bellum; 6.1: vellent iuberent Philippo regi Macedonibusque qui sub regno eius essent. L.31.5.7: prolationem finium victoriamque et triumphum portendi, cf. L.36.1.3: terminos Romanos propagari, victoriam ac triumphum ostendi. Cf. also L. 42.20.4: haruspices inbonum

id prodigium, prolationemque finium et interitum perduellium portendi responderunt, and42.30.9: haruspices ita responderunt: si quid rei novae inciperetur, id maturandum esse: victoriam, triumphum, propagationem imperii portendi

versurum

94

Conclusion

Roman sources. From Scipio’s invasion of Africa, the Romans had gained experience of timing an overseas expedition and maintaining a force in potentially hostile territory. TheFirst Macedonian Warhadfamiliarized them with thepolitics anddiplomatic methods of the Hellenistic world as well as the geographical areas inwhich battle would bejoined. These lessons theRomans nowusedto advantage bycoordinating a demonstration of naval power inthe Adriatic with a propaganda mission to Greece. Philip’s decision to ignore the Roman offer of peace andmarch to the Hellespont wascritical, allowing a consular armytolandunopposed andconduct twosuccessful campaigns inthe late autumn of200.Butthatdecision wasmadeintheknowledge thattheStraits of Otranto were already under Roman control. Rome hadachieved a cunning means of initiating overseas warwhich shewasto repeat in herwars against Antiochus of Syria andPerseus of Macedon: diplomacy backed by threat of military force.

APPENDIX I

The interpretation of autumno ferme exacto (L.31.22.4) Livy’s useof autumnus is rare, there being only eight occurrences of thenoun and one of the adjective autumnalis.1 Although autumno ferme exacto is generally assumed to be of Polybian origin, Polybius has no word for “ au2 Heuses three terms to refer to the seasons: χειμ tumn.” ώ ν , “winter,”the non-campaigning season or la mauvaise saison”as Holleaux termed it,3 , the season ρ α , “spring” ὴὥ ρ ιν ἐ α ε ία(sc. ερ “ when campaigns began, andθ ) or θ ο έρ ς , “summer,”the campaigning season. Variations denote the ρ α ὥ beginning, middle andendof “ winter”and“ summer.”But no Livian rendering of the few Polybian phrases denoting the end of “summer”and the several different phrases for the beginning of “ winter”is extant.4 The four occurrences of autumnus which mention either “winter”or going into winter quarters are clearly in the context of late campaigning (22.32.1, 28.37.5, 31.22.4 and38.27.9). A simile in context of the siege of Veii shows that autumnus was the time at which campaigns should be concluded andshelter sought forthewinter.5 Theadjective autumnalis occurs in context of the cessation of naval hostilities in consular 199 because of approaching adverse weather conditions (hiemales motus); combination with thenounaequinoctium addstemporal precision.6 Theoccurrence of modified 1

autumnus: 5.6.2; 22.32.1; 25.26.7; 28.37.5; 29.35.15; 31.22.4; 38.27.9; 45.27.5; autumnalis:

2

125, assumed that Livy switched to Polybius as his Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen 119– 440, Briscoe, Comm. 1.115, Historia 26 source at 31.14.1; see also Holleaux, Études 4.339–

3

Holleaux, Études 4.339. Onthe seasons, see P. Pédech, La méthode historique de Polybe (Paris 26. 464, Warrior, AJAH6 (1981) 24– 1964) 461– There are six references to the endof summer: “when summer wasalready ending”(3.19.12, 28.2.1), “while summer was already ending”(25.4.1), “while it was still summer”(32.10.1), “ for the remaining part of summer”(4.66.7; 5.5.7). The onset of winter is variously denoted: “ before winter”(29.3.1 and32.1.4), “when winter wasalready taking hold”(2.54.13), “while whenwinter was[already] beginning”(16.24.1, winter wasstill at its beginning”(30.19.14), “ 20.3.1), “when winter was already advancing”(4.67.6), “when winter was approaching”

31.47.1.

(1977) 249.

4

5

6

(5.30.1).

L. 5.6.2: et si nonsit aestate perfectum bellum, hiemem opperiri nec sicut aestivas aves statim autumno tecta ac recessum circumspicere 2: iamautumnale aequinoctium instabat; etestsinus Euboicus, quemCoela vocant, L. 31.47.1– suspectus nautis. itaque ante hiemales motus evadere inde cupientes Piraeum, undeprofecti ad 9, bellum erant, repetunt. Apustius ... navigat Corcyram. Briscoe, Historia 26 (1977) 248–

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as medium autumni (38.27.9), iam extremum autumni erat (28.37.5) andquum autumni erat (22.32.1) shows that autumnus extended over some considerable period. Thetime at which autumnus ended undoubtedly varied fromyear toyear. Instances of hiems with instare, appetere, accedere, impedire andopprimere indicate that Livy (orhis sources) is thinking in terms of theonset of weather conditions that are unfavourable to campaigning, be it on land or sea, rather than a season beginning ona fixed date.7 In noting Flamininus’late arrival in his province, Livy says that he could have finished the warif he hadarrived earlier, or if hiems had been later.8 Autumnus was the period in which campaigns by land and sea should be concluding, a time which usually coincided with a change in weather conditions. It could begin as early as late August andextend well into November. If autumno ferme exacto does derive from a Polybian original, it is likely that Livy was attempting to maintain the distinction between a Polybian phrases such

phrase for the end of “summer”and notations for the onset of “ winter” through the use of autumnus for the former, whereas for the latter he would have used some such phrase as hiemps iam instabat.9 But by modifying 10Livy suggests a refinement autumnus with the participle exactus, “spent,” beyond that implied bytheextant Polybian phrases for theendof “summer.” If the scope of autumnus is the last third of Polybius’“summer,”application of exactus should restrict the period to the latter half of October andearly November. This interpretation is very different from the generally accepted hypothesis of Holleaux whodates the Roman arrival before the equinox, in mid-September.11

7

8 9 10 11

hiemales motus stands inantithesis considering that thepassage derives from Polybius, notes: “ to, andis explained byautumnale aequinoctium, andhiemales musthave a temporal reference.” However, herejects Pédech’s suggestion, La méthode 462 n.179, that hiemalis means stormy. Apustius’ voyage to the Aegean andhis return from Euboea to Corcyra via Cape Malea (L. , rather than 2) illustrates the danger of thinking in terms of “winter”and“summer” 31.47.1– distinguishing the campaigning andnon-campaigning seasons; see above 88. 26, for reservations about Pédech’s suggestion that Polybius’ See Warrior, AJAH 6 (1981) 24– νbegan c. 7 November. ώ ιμ χ ε L. 32.28.7: aut si hiems magis serafuisset. Cf. L. 32.4.7, 33.41.9; see Briscoe, Comm. 1.116, Historia 26 (1977) 248. Cf. L. 10.25.10: hiems hauddum exacta. 340, followed by Walbank, Philip 317, Pédech, La méthode 462, Holleaux, Études 4.338– 6, Golan, Athenaeum 63 (1985) 389. Gruen, HWCR 392 n.194, gives Briscoe, Comm. 1.115– winter,”Briscoe, Historia 26 (1977) 250, mid-September or October. In a note on Polybius’ “ repudiates his earlier acceptance of Holleaux’date andsuggests mid-October to November as the meaning of autumno ferme exacto.

APPENDIX II

Athenian appeals

to theRomans

Livy makes three references toAthenian appeals totheRomans forassistance. AnAthenian appeal, preces Atheniensium, is mentioned byLivy at 31.1.10 in a section which was earlier posited as part of the proemium.1 A “ new Athenian embassy,” Atheniensium nova legatio (31.5.6), came toRome atthe beginning of consular 200, reporting that a Macedonian raid wasimminent. The third reference occurs in context of the arrival in Macedonia of P. Sulpicius Galba (cos. 200) with a consular armyattheendof thecampaigning season, an appeal which caused the consul to send forces to relieve Athens which wasthen under siege (31.14.3). In addition to these Livian references, a mission to Italy by anAthenian, Cephisodorus, is recorded by Pausanias (1.36.6) who was probably drawing on the inscription on Cephisodorus’ tomb. Thefirst task inthis section is toestablish thechronology of thevarious

appeals, reaffirm the identification of the preces Atheniensium with the Atheniensium nova legatio anddiscern whether Cephisodorus’ embassy can be identified with anyof theembassies mentioned by Livy. A summary of current scholarship is necessary since the structure of the opening chapters ofLivy andthequestion ofequivalent dates inanextrapolated Julian calendar have presented difficulties that have notyet been coherently or consistently resolved. For example, Holleaux, Balsdon and Meadows consider theAthenian appeals mentioned at 31.1.10 and31.5.6 as references to twoseparate requests, onebelonging to consular 201 andthe other to the beginning of consular 200. Holleaux andWalbank find this chronologically impossible andsoreject thenova legatio asanannalistic fiction. Balsdon and Meadows, however, manage to incorporate two embassies into their reconstructions.2 The possibility that the two references are to one andthe same embassy was recognized by Briscoe, but rejected on chronological grounds because at thetime of writing heconsidered that theequivalent of 15 March 200 was “some time in December.”He nevertheless accepts the authenticity of the nova legatio and attempts to reconcile the chronology.3 1 2 3

26. See above pp. 24– 84 = Études 5.10–15, Walbank, Philip 312. Balsdon, JRS 44 Holleaux, REA 22 (1920) 77– (1954) 35. Meadows, Historia 42 (1993) 41 with n. 5, citing Briscoe, Comm. 1.43. 4 and 69) that this embassy may have been Briscoe, Comm. 1.42 and 55. He suggests (pp. 43– misplaced, that it arrived later in the consular year, andthat this mayhave been a factor that

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he later considers that theJulian equivalent of 15 March 200 is c. 14 January,4 his difficulties with the nova legatio have probably diminished, andso there is no need either to reject or to alter the chronology of this embassy. TheAtheniensium nova legatio is reported among events atthebeginning of consular 200 which occurred before the war-vote was presented to the Comitia Centuriata. Livy notes that this wasoneof twoevents that occurred opportunely for arousing public opinion for war (opportune irritandis ad bellum animis).5 This appeal was undoubtedly caused by Athenian fear of Macedonian reprisals because of the execution of twoAcarnanians whohad profaned theEleusinian Mysteries (L. 31.14.6– 10), areference which provides a date (late September 201) that is independent of the so-called annalistic However, since

sources.6 If we accept that consular 200 began c. 14 January, Athenian ambassadors could have left Athens as late as mid-December andarrived in Rome for the beginning of the new consular year in mid-January.7 This scenario would fit notonly thelocation of thenova legatio among theevents at the beginning of consular 200 prior to the war-vote, but also the earlier statement at the endof the proemium that preces Atheniensium aroused the Romans to renew war(31.1.10). Since the term nova legatio implies that this was not the first Athenian request, anearlier embassy could have been sent in late October shortly after the execution of theAcarnanians. However, unless weassume that there had been some earlier embassy which Livy hasomitted tomention, it follows that heis incorrect in hisuseof nova as applied to thearrival of anembassy at5.6. Such an error would thus be an omission apparently resulting from the summary nature of the opening chapters.8 Whether or not the nova legatio waspreceded by another embassy, consideration of the literary context and thechronology indicates that thereferences at 1.10 and5.6 areto oneandthe same Athenian embassy which arrived in Rome in time for the beginning of consular 200. The question of thenumber of Athenian appeals to theRomans is further complicated by Pausanias’ report of a funerary inscription recording Cephisodorus’ mission to Italy. Cephisodorus is said to have gained the alliance of Attalus, Ptolemy, theAetolians, Rhodians andCretans, a general

4 5 6 7

8

made the Comitia reverse its vote about warwith Macedon, a suggestion which is connected with, anddependent upon, his acceptance of the hypothesis of McDonald andWalbank that there wasa lengthy time lapse between thetwowarvotes. 26, andabove p. 34 n. 42. Briscoe, Comm. 2. 21– 63. See pp. 61– See above p. 35 with n. 49. 40. See above pp. 39– Cf. Briscoe, Comm. 1.55, whosuggests that Livy has misinterpreted his ownearlier general reference to thepreces Atheniensium in the introduction at 1.10 as a specific reference.

Appendix

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99

statement concerning his diplomatic achievements.9 But the statement that he sailed to Italy to askforprotection whenAttalus, Ptolemy andtheCretans hadfailed to send help andthe Rhodian ships were of little use against the Macedonian hoplites mustrefer to theactual campaigning season, thusruling out identification with the nova legatio which arrived in Rome in early

January 200.10

Cephisodorus’ mission to Italy belongs to the period when the Roman embassy had left Athens (P. 16.27.5) and fits the context of Philocles’ invasion (L. 31.16.2) andthe siege of Athens which wasunderway whenthe consular army under Galba arrived in Epirus (31.14.3). Reference in the inscription to Attalus’failure to help the Athenians can be correlated with Livy’s derogatory mention of Attalus’idleness in Aegina (L. 31.15.9– 11), thus suggesting that Cephisodorus left for Rome some time inJune orJuly.11 The despatch of C. Claudius Centho to Athens by Galba (L. 31.14.3) at almost theendof thecampaigning season is thusthebelated Roman response to at least three Athenian appeals: the nova legatio at the beginning of consular 200 (L. 31.5.6), Cephisodorus’ mission to Italy (Paus. 1.36.1) in mid-summer, andthe embassy that metGalba onhis arrival inApollonia (L.

31.14.3).12

The Athenians appealed to Rome probably as adscripti to the Peace of Phoenice, just as Attalus haddone in the autumn of 201.13 There is no good reason to question their inclusion in Livy’s list (29.12.14), although it is rejected by Holleaux and his followers as an annalistic fiction invented to justify the Second Macedonian War.14 Polybius’report (2.12.8) that a Roman embassy visited Athens and Corinth at the end of the First Illyrian War suggests that Rome entered a relationship of amicitia with these two long-

68. 9 TheAthenian appeal to Egypt is probably that referred to atL.31.9.1; seepp.67– Inanycase, if Kephisodorus wasondiplomatic missions 10 Cf. Meadows, Historia 42 (1993) 52: “ in Greece in the autumn/winter of 201, his second embassy described by Pausanias as visiting 7.” Rome canonly be that in February 200 described byLivy 31.5.5– 11 After his reception by the Athenians, Attalus went to Aegina where he didnothing for some time while hewaited fora reply fromtheAetolians who,hehoped, would declare waronPhilip (L. 31.15.9–11). Livy’s aliquamdiu nihil agentem evidently derives from Polybius whospeaks of Attalus andtheRhodians; see Briscoe, Comm. 1.100. Attalus left Aegina ν ία of theὀλ ο π ο ιγ on hearing of the siege of Abydus (P. 16.34.2). Onthe date of the Roman envoys’departure from Athens, see p. 77. 12 Although Livy incidentally reports that theAthenians sent anappeal toEgypt (31.9.1), either he didnot know of Cephisodorus’ mission to Italy, or he mayhave ignored it in the interests of brevity because it would have interrupted thethematic arrangement of his narrative. 13 Onadscriptio, see p. 44. 6. For bibliography concerning 28, CAH(1930) 135– 71, Études 5. 24– 14 Holleaux, RGMH258– the inclusion of these various peoples, see C. Habicht, Studien zur Geschichte Athens in 141. hellenistischer Zeit (1982) 138–

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established maritime powers in 228.15 A similar bond had been established with Egypt in 273 andperhaps earlier with Rhodes.16 Later, during the First Macedonian War,Athens, Egypt andRhodes attempted toresolve thehostilities between Philip andRome, an action that one might reasonably expect from amici of Rome who had long been involved with the major Hellenistic powers.17 TheRoman contact withAthens immediately after theFirst Illyrian War,Athens’attempt to mediate anendto theFirst Macedonian War,herlater enrollment asanadscriptus tothePeace of Phoenice, andherappeal to Rome atthebeginning of consular 200 under thattreaty allmakegeo-political sense in the context of the late third century.

15 Although Polybius only mentions an embassy, Zon. 8.19, notes that the Romans entered into φ ιλ ίαwith Athens. Briscoe, Comm. 1.69, suggests that the embassy “probably led to the 7 n. 16, however is ambivalent: “ establishment of amicitia.”Gruen, HWCR56– The [Zonaras] passage is open to doubt, perhaps part of the later exaggeration of Rome’s connection with Athens. But there would be nothing surprising about a vague φ ιλ ίαestablished by friendly diplomatic contact.“ 16 Polybius (30.5.6) notes that by 167 Rhodes hadshared in Roman achievements for 140 years. 46 found 140 years incredible andreduced it to 40. The date c. 306 is Holleaux, RGMH 30– 49. See Walbank, HCP 3. 423– defended by H.Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (1957) 1– 426, for discussion of the evidence. OnEgypt’s amicitia with Rome, see L. Per. 14, Dio fr. 41 = Zon. 8.6.11, App. Sic. 1, Eutrop. 2.15, anddiscussion in Gruen, HWCR62– 3 with bibliography. 17 Onthe mediation, see L. 27.30.4, 28.7.13–15; P. 11.4.1; App. Mac.3.

APPENDIX III

TheActivities of M.Aurelius (Cotta)1 References to the presence of a small Roman force in western Greece from consular 203 through to at least the end of consular 201 are frequently rejected almost automatically aspart andparcel of theprocess bywhich any reference to Roman interest in Greece between the Peace of Phoenice and beginning of consular 200 is regarded as an annalistic invention.2 Livy reports that Rome responded to a request from unnamed allied cities in Greece, by sending C. Terentius Varro, C. Mamilius andM. Aurelius Cotta with three quinqueremes to protest to Philip the violation of his treaty with theRomans (L. 30.26.2– 4).3That Cotta remained in Greece is indicated by a later report of complaints made by a Macedonian embassy in Rome at the beginning of consular 201 (L. 30.42.2–10). That he was still there at the time of the arrival in late consular 201 of M. Valerius Laevinus is explicit in an 6) andfrom thereport sent account of his meeting with Laevinus (L. 31.3.3– 8). to Rome byhimandLaevinus atthebeginning of consular 200 (L. 31.5.5– Wehave argued above for the authenticity of Laevinus’mission.4 It remains to examine per se the references to M. Aurelius, in order to distinguish rhetorical embellishment from probable historical fact and so reassess the likelihood of the historicity of the actions that are attributed to him. Rome’s interest in the eastern shores of the Adriatic goes back to the To use a settlement after the First Illyrian War.5 As Hammond has noted, “ modern phrase, she intended to maintain ‘not a military presence but a military capability –a capability to get troops there if they were needed.’ 6A 1

2 3

”

The appointee in northwest Greece, named as M. Aurelius at L. 30.26.4, 42.3 and 10; 31.3.4 and 5.5, is most probably to be identified with M. Aurelius Cotta, the decemvir sacrorum, whose death Livy records among events at theendof consular 200 (L. 31.50.5); see Klebs, RE far from II 2487 andMRRI 313. Cf. Briscoe, Comm. 1. 61, whoregards the identification as “ certain.” MRR I 322 n.3 andGruen, HWCR 222, n. 86, quoted above p. 13 n. 4. 4: ceterum exitu superioris anni cum legati sociarum urbium ex Graecia questi L. 30.26.2– essent vastatos agros ab regiis praesidiis profectosque in Macedoniam legatos ad res repetendasnonadmissos adPhilippum regem... legatos adregem quihaec adversus foedus facta videri patribus nuntiarent mittendos censuit senatus.

4

5 6

58. See pp. 53–

As discerned long ago by Badian, BSR 20 (1952), 33. History (1964) 1– JRS 58 (1968) 9.

reprinted

in Studies in Greek and Roman

102

Appendix III

clause inthepeace ofPhoenice under which theParthini, Dimallum, Bargullum andEugenium were to belong to Rome (L. 29.12.13) wasevidently designed to protect herallies in thecoastal areas of Epidamnus, Apollonia andOricum. The use of adscriptio and the identity of those listed as Roman adscripti (29.12.13–14) suggests Rome’s intention to continue, if not extend, her involvement in theeastern Mediterranean.7 Therequest of unnamed allies in 203 andRome’s response in despatching Varro, Mamilius andAurelius (L. 4) areevidence of Rome’s continuing interest in thearea. That these 30.26.2– allied cities were probably in Illyria is suggested by a reference in Polybius (18.1.14) to a demand by Flamininus in 198 that Philip hand over “those places in Illyria which he had occupied since the Peace of Epirus.” 8 Although the allied request of 203 and the despatch of the Roman embassy make geo-political sense in context of theperiod after the Peace of Phoenice, thecontinued presence of M.Aurelius through to atleast theendof 201 andhismeeting withM.Valerius Laevinus, asreported inLivy (30.42.2– 6) aremoreproblematical. Rhetorical embellishment 6 and5.5– 10and31.3.3– is apparent in Aurelius’report to Laevinus concerning Philip’s preparations 5), and in the suggestion that Philip might invade Italy for war (31.3.3– (31.3.6). Moreover, aswehave shown, chronological considerations indicate that a meeting in late consular 201 between Laevinus andAurelius is unlikely, thereport of thearrival of a despatch from them at thebeginning of consular 200 being an evident fiction.9 In context of thebeginning of consular 201 (L. 30.42.2–10), Macedonian envoys in Rome alleged thatAurelius hadremained, raised anarmy andmade war contrary to the treaty, repeatedly engaging in regular battles with Macedonian commanders. The Macedonian ambassadors demanded that the Macedonian mercenaries whohadserved with Hannibal and been captured by the Romans, be returned to them. M. Furius, an emissary of Aurelius, rebutted the charges, claiming that Philip had sent Sopater, a leading Macedonian, to Africa with four thousand Macedonian troops andmoney to support Hannibal. Aurelius, according to Furius, hadremained to prevent the Roman allies who were exhausted by raids, violence and injustice from defecting to Philip. Hehadkept strictly within thefrontiers of theallied cities, engaging only in defensive operations.10 The senate accepted Furius’report, expressing approval that Aurelius was defending the allies of the Roman

7 Onadscriptio, see above p. 44. 8 The connection is suggested byErrington, CAH(1989) 245. 62. 9 See above pp.57 and61– 10 L. 30.42.5: ne sociipopuli Romani fessi populationibus vi atque iniuria ad regem deficerent; finibus sociorum non excessisse; dedisse operam ne impune in agros eorum populatores transcenderent.

103

Appendix III

by arms since he wasunable to do so by the obligations of a treaty (30.42.2–10).11

people

Thetechnical precision apparent inthese references toAurelius’continued presence in Greece have an authentic ring, notwithstanding possible exaggeration in the Macedonian claim that Aurelius had conducted a levy (dilectu habito) andengaged in regular battles (signis conlatis). If Aurelius did engage in hostilities, he was not very successful, as is suggested by Flamininus’later demand for thereturn of cities occupied byPhilip since the Peace of Phoenice (P. 18.1.14). The complaints of the Macedonian embassy are also comprehensible in context of theperiod between theRoman victory atZamaandthewithdrawal of Roman troops fromAfrica. ThattheMacedonian 4 troops mentioned by Livy in thetworeferences to M.Aurelius (L. 30.26.3– and 42.4) and also listed as having fought at Zama (L. 30.33.5) are not 2) is a included by Polybius among the mercenaries at Zama (P. 15.11.1– problem, butnotonethat constitutes grounds forrejecting theauthenticity of M. Aurelius’presence in Greece.12 Thus, from the four references to Aurelius’mission to Greece, a kernel of historical truth canbe discerned, indicating a small Roman presence in the coastal area of Epirus aimed at protecting Roman interests anddeterring Philip from further aggression. Aurelius went tothis areain203 andseems tohaveremained there until thetime of hisdeath which is reported as occurring in consular 200 (L. 31.49.5). If sohis meeting with M. Valerius Laevinus andtheir joint despatch to Rome are probably to be dated to spring 200, having been misplaced byLivy’s source andglossed, probably by Livy himself.13

11 L. 30.42.10: et M. Aurelium e republica facere, gratumque id senatui esse quod socios populi Romani, quando iurefoederis nonpossit, armis tueatur.

12 Onthe question of the mercenaries, see Walbank, HCP2.456, andBriscoe,

13

bibliography. See above p. 62.

Comm.

1. 55 with

TABLE OF DATES September 201 (or earlier)

Despatch toRomeof envoys fromAttalus andRhodi-

late September

Profanation

ans

of theEleusinian Mysteries

Senate’s reception of envoys from Attalus and

Rhodians; appointment

of three envoys to Egypt

mid-October

Execution of twoAcarnanians inAthens

October

Return

November

Appeal of Acarnanians to Philip Return of consul to Rome. Meeting of senate: appointment of Laevinus toMacedonia, additional commission of Roman embassy

late November

Laevinus’rendezvous with Octavius

early December

Laevinus’muster

mid-December

Athenian concern about reprisals and despatch nova legatio

exitu anni

Election of magistrates for consular 200

14 January 200

Beginning of newconsular year Reception of Athenian nova legatio

by c. 28 February (end of April)

Roman vote for warwith Macedon passed

early March

Philip escapes from Bargylia followed byAttalus and Rhodians who go to Aegina.

mid-March

Laevinus sails with thirty-eight ships to Apollonia Three Roman envoys leave for Epirus, Athens, etc.

of ships fromAfrica under

Octavius

at Brundisium

of

106

March-early April

Table

of Dates

Macedonian invasion

of Attica,

ture fourAthenian ships

Macedonians cap-

late March-early April Roman envoys attend spring meetings of Aetolian

andAchaean Leagues

midto late April

Attalus and Rhodians go to Athens, meet newlyarrived Roman envoys Athenian vote for warv. Philip

early May

Nicanor raids Attica, receives Roman demands

late May

Philip begins march through Thrace Philocles raids Attica

June

Philip marches through Thrace Roman envoys go to Rhodes

early August

Beginning of siege of Abydus Meeting of Lepidus andPhilip Embassy proceeds toAntiochus andPtolemy

late October-early

Consular force lands in Apollonia (autumno ferme exacto) Delivery of formal indictio belli Despatch of Centho with ships to Athens Fall of Abydus

November

November

Campaign of L. Apustius borders of Macedon

early November

Centho rounds Cape Malea, reaches Piraeus, Macedonian raids stop

late November

Roman attempt

late November-early December

Philip fails totakeAthens, attends Achaean League at Argos Apustius returns toApollonia

mid-December

Philip ravages Attica andreturns

in Apsus

mountains and

onChalcis; Philip at Demetrias

to Macedon

Table

of Dates

107

of newconsular year

4 January 199

Beginning

winter 199

Pleuratus, Amynander and Bato offer assistance Romans

late March

Meeting of Aetolian League: decision deferred Perseus garrisons Axius valley

May-June

Skirmishing

June

Dardanians andIllyrians invade Macedonia Apustius leaves Corcyra forAegean

late June

Romans

July

Roman naval operations

July

Philip’s escape in cavalry skirmish near Ottolobus Roman defeat at Pluinna

August

Approach of Roman fleet to Oreus Aetolians meet Attalus andApustius Aetolian decision tojoin Rome

late August

Battle of Banitza; Galba’s advance into Eordaea

late August-early September

Aetolians routed

September

Galba takes Celetrum andgarrisons Pelium, returns to Apollonia

mid-September

Endof siege or Oreus; Roman fleet withdraws from Euboea andreturns toAthens

to

in Lyncestis; Philip recalls Perseus

at Ottolobus in northern Aegean

at Heraclea

andAthamanians invade Thessaly, butare

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in derAussenpolitik im zweiten Jahrhundert vor

INDEXES

1. General Abydus: 16, 17, 18, 21, 28, 29, 30, 32, 45, 48, 64,

74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81. Acanthus: 88. Acarnania: 46, 48. Acarnanians: 29, 30, 35, 37, 38, 39,40,41,42, 60, 98. Achaea, Achaean League: 46, 47, 48, 60, 80. Adriatic: 9, 57, 58; see also Otranto, Straits of, adscriptio: 13, 44, 91, 102. adscripti: 13, 44, 47, 51, 62, 99, 100, 102. Aegean: 32, 77, see also Otranto, Straits of. Aegina: 29, 30, 38, 39, 40, 42, 74, 75, 77, 88, 99. Aegium: 47, 48. P. Aelius Paetus (cos. 201): 52, 53. M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 187,175): 21, 30, 31, 45, 46, 51, 58, 59, 64; meeting withPhilip, 76, 77, 78. Aetolia, Aetolian League: 32, 46, 80, 86; seealso Panaetolica. Aetolians: 25, 38, 47, 48, 58, 77, 84, 87, 98. Africa: 32, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 67, 69, 73, 103. amicitia, amici: 44, 68, 99, 100. Amynander of Athamania: 48, 84, 87. annales maximi: 15, 72 annalists: 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 27, 56, 99,101; see also Roman sources. Antiochus III of Syria: 16, 21, 25, 45, 46, 51, 57, 58, 59, 63, 77, 79,94; pactwithPhilip V, 16, 18,

28, 29, 43.

Antipatrea: 84. Apollonia: 20, 29, 41, 42, 52 withn.2, 53, 57, 58,

59, 60, 63, 73, 80, 81, 86, 93, 99, 102; see also

Epirus. L. Apustius Fullo (pr. 196): 82, 83, 84, 87, 88. Apsus: 73, 82, 83, 85, 86. arbitration: 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 75, 77. Argos: 83. Athamania, Athamanians: 46, 84, 87; see also Amynander. Athenians, execution of Acarnanians: 37, 39; preces Atheniensium, 13, 14, 25, 26, 62, 97; nova legatio, 13, 14, 26, 27, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 92, 97, 98, 99; embassy

of Cephisodorus, 63, 97, 98, 99; embassy toP. Sulpicius Galba, 28, 81, 97; as adscripti to peace ofPhoenice, 13, 14,99; asamici ofRome, 100; declaration of waronPhilip, 28, 29, 99–

30, 31, 40, 42, 47, 60, 66, 74, 75; embassy to inAegina, 75; embassy toPtolemy, 40, 41, 67; naval encounter withMacedonians, 40, 63,75; elimination of references to Philip, 88. Athens: 16, 17, 18, 31, 39, 40, 45, 62, 63, 73, 74, 75, 77, 82, 83, 99. Attalus I of Pergamum: 17, 18,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 66, 74, 78, 79, 80, 84, 91, 98, 99; crosses Aegean toAegina, 38, 39; goes to Athens, 74, 75; leaves Athens, 77; naval campaign of 199, 84, 87, 88; seealso embassy of Attalus andRhodians. A. Atilius Serranus (cos. 170): 59. Attica, raids on:29, 30, 38, 40, 41, 42, 60, 76, 82, 83; see also hic exercitus, Nicanor and PhiAttalus

locles.

C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 200): 58, 69, 89. M. Aurelius (Cotta) (leg. 203): 13, 27, 52, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62, 89 n. 41, 92, 101, 102, 103. autoschediasm: 33, 43. autumno ferme exacto: 27, 34, 61, 63, 64, 77, 95, 96. Q. Baebius (tr. pl. 200): 66, 67. M. Baebius Tamphilus (cos. 181, pr. 192): 59. Banitza: 86, 87. Bargylia: 35, 38, 41, 42, 50, 59, 60, 74, 75, 80. Bato: 84, 87. belli indictio: 21, 50, 51, 64, 67, 74, 78. Bevus, river: 85. Boeotia: 83. Bruanium: 86. Brundisium: 56, 57, 60, 82. calendar, calendar, calendar, calendar,

Athenian: 37. Julian: 17, 24, 97. misalignment: 33, 34. Roman: 14, 17, 24, 33, 34, 35.

114

Indexes

calendar, seasonal: 24, 29, 33, 34, 35. Carthage, Carthaginians: 9, 11, 25, 27, 56, 61. Celetrum: 86, 88. Cephisodorus: 63, 97, 98, 99. Chalcis: 82, 83. Chalcidice: 87. Chios, battle of: 28 with n. 20. chronology: 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 33, 34, 35,

85.

77. C. Claudius Centho (leg. 200–199): 63, 78, 82, 88, 99. C. Claudius Nero (cos. 207): 21, 32, 45, 46, 51, 58, 59. M.Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222, 214, 210, 208): 71, 72. Cians:

Codrion: 84. Comitia Centuriata: 16, 17, 18,21, 26, 27, 31,47,

51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 78, 92, 93, 98. comitial days: 65. contio: 27, 65. Corcyra: 29, 53, 82, 87, 88. Corinth: 83, 99. Cn.Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 201): 56, 82. L. Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 199): 55. P.Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos. 205, 194): 55, 56, 61, 67, 69, 72, 73, 82, 89, 93. Cretans: 98, 99. Cycliadas: 83. Damocritus: 32, 85, 86. Dardanians: 84, 85, 87. Dassaretis: 85, 86. decemviri: 71. Demetrias: 83. Dyrrachium: 82.

eclipse: 33. Edessa: 85. Egypt: 21, 40, 41, 42, 60, 67, 100; see also Ptolemy. elections: 33, 55, 58, 60. Eleusinian Mysteries: 29, 35, 37, 38, 42, 45, 59,

60, 98.

Eleusis: 83. embassy from Athens to Ptolemy: 40, 41. embassy fromAttalus andRhodians toRome: 17,

18, 26, 27, 35, 41, 60, 62, 75, 79; arrival in

Rome, 43, 44, 51, 52, 59, 60, 91. embassy from Ptolemy to Rome: 21, 27, 67, 68. embassy of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, C. ClaudiusNeroandM.Aemilius Lepidus: 17,18,19,

20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 53, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 68, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80; time of appointment anddespatch, 44, 45, 46; terms of senatus consultum, 46, 48, 49; connection with fetial procedure, 48, 50, 51; purpose, 51, 52, 53; démarches, 16, 17, 18,50, 51, 64, 75, 77, 78; coordination with M.Valerius Laevinus, 58, embassy inAthens, 74, 75; leaves Athens, 77; Lepidus meets Philip, 78, 79; envoys leave Rhodes, 79. Eordaea: 86.

Epidamnus: 82 n. 3, 102. Epirots: 58. Epirus: 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 46, 52 withn.2, 53, 78,

82, 83, 92, 99, 103.

equinox, autumn: 29, 35, 37, 86, 88, 96. Euboea: 88. expiation: 12, 27, 7, 71, 72.

Fasti Capitolini: 26, 91.

fetial procedure: 16, 17, 18,27,50,51,64,67; see also belli indictio andrerum repetitio. L. Furius Purpurio (cos. 196): 69, 89. M. Furius (leg. 201): 13 n. 4, 102.

Gaul, Gauls: 27, 32, 52, 68, 69, 89. Genusus: 85. Gomphi: 87. Hannibal: 25, 31, 51, 63, 72, 79, 92, 102. haruspices: 62, 63, 70. Hasdrubal: 70, 72. hegemony: 19. Hellespont: 52, 76 with n. 9, 94. hermaphrodites: 15, 70, 72, 92, 93. Heraclea: 87, 88. hic exercitus: 38, 40, 41, 42, 60.

Illyria, Illyrians: 83, 87, 102; see also Pleuratus. Illyrian war, first: 99, 101. imperialism: 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 63, 93. imperium propraetore: 52, 54, 55, 57. intercalation: 24 withn.8, 33, 34 withnn.42 and

43.

Juno Regina: 70, 71. Jupiter: 68. Jupiter Stator:

70.

Lade, battle of: 28 with n. 20. levy: 67, 73, 103. Livy: cohesion, coherence, 9, 24, 91; proemium, 24, 25, 26; useof flashback, 24, 32; pluperfect to mark flashback, 28, 32, 85, 86; pace of

1. General narrative, 23, 27; omission of material, 23, 30, 31, 77; strategic placement of material, 9, 23, 32, 91, 92; variatio, 23, 27, 70, 92, 93; glosses,

59, 62, 86 n. 28, 92, 103. loan payment: 27, 72, 90.

Locri, temple of Persephone: 15, 27, 69, 70, 72,

92.

Lyncestis: 87. Lyncus: 85. Macedon: 24, n. 4, 30, and52 n. 2, 83. Macedonia: 27, 32, 34, 51, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 82; thedistinction between Macedonia the Roman provincia andMacedon, theterritory over which Philip ruled, 24, n. 4 and52 n. 2; Roman arrival in, 32, 34, 74, 95, 96. Macedonian invasions of Attica: 38, 40, 41 (see also Nicanor and Philocles); mercenaries in Africa, 25, 102, 103; naval encounter with Athenians, 40, 60; tribes in Athens, 75. Macedonian war, first: 44, 54, 56, 58, 94, 100. Macedonian war,second: 9, 11, 16, 17, 18,20,21, 25, 57, nomenclature, 26. Magna mater: 58. Malea, Cape: 63, 64 with n. 12, 82, 88, 93, 96 n.

6, C. Mamilius (leg. 203): 54, 101, 107; seealso M. Aurelius. mediation: 44, 79, 100. misalignment of calendar:

33, 34.

Nabis of Sparta: 59. Naupactus: 47, 48. Nicanor: 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50, 64, 73,

75, 77, 78. Numidia: 27. Cn. Octavius (pr. 205): 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60. Oreus: 82, 86, 87. Otranto, Straits of: 53, 55, 57, 58, 73, 75, 92, 93, 94. Ottolobus: 86, 87. Panaetolica: 32, 84, 85.

Pausanias: 97, 98. pax deorum: 15, 16, 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 92. Pelagonia: 85, 86. Pelium: 86, 87, 88.

Pella: 39, 50, 76, 86.

Persephone, temple of: seeLocri. Perseus: 59, 85, 94. Philip II of Macedon: 76. Philip V of Macedon: 15, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31,

115

40, 41, 42, 43, 53, 55, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 79, 84, 101,103; pact with Antiochus of Syria, 16, 18, 28, 29, 43; meeting with Lepidus, 75, 76, 77, 78; campaigns of 199, 85, 86, 87, 88. Philocles: 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 76, 99. Phoenice: 48. Phoenice, peace of: 13, 14, 17, 20, 47, 51, 52, 58, 62, 78, 90, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103. Piraeus: 30, 45, 47, 66, 74, 82, 88. Q. Pleminius (leg. 205): 69, 70, 72. Pleuratus of Illyria: 84, 85, 87. Pluinna: 86. Polybius, as source: 10, 13, 17, 18, 19,20, 24, 27, 28, 33, 91, 93. pontifices: 68, 70. pontifex maximus: 68. portents: 14, 15; see also prodigies. precatio: 61, 66, 67, 68.. prodigies: 14, 15, 27, 27, 70, 71, 72. prolatio finium: 62, 63, 93. promulgatio: 65, 66. provinces, allocation: 62, 67. Ptolemy V Epiphanes: 21, 27, 40, 42, 45, 46, 51, 67, 68, 77, 78, 79, 98, 99. Punic war, second: 10, 24, 35. Pyrrhus of Epirus: 53, 69. quaestio: 69, 72. T. Quinctius Crispinus (cos. 208): 71. T. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 198): 59, 96, 102,

103. religio: 14, 27, 71, 72; civitas religiosa, 15, 68,

92, 93.

rerum repetitio: 50, 51, 64, 74, 75, 78, 93. return of consul from province: 52, 55. Rhegium: 56. Rhodes: 45, 76, 77, 79, 100. Rhodians: 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44,

45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 60, 62, 66, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 88, 91, 98, 99; see also embassy of

Attalus andRhodians. Rhodian recovery of Athenian warships: 42. rogatio: 18; 66. Roman People: 61, 63, 66, 79; see also comitia centuriata. Roman sources: 14, 17,20, 24,27, 91, 93; seealso annalists.

sacrilege: 15, 69, 70, 72, 92; see also Locri. Saguntum: 31, 78, 79. sailing conditions: 33 with n. 38, 39, 63, 64, 73,

81, 87, 93, 95 n.6.

116

Indexes

Scyllaeum: 88. P. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 204): 21, 30, 45, 46, 47, 51, 58, 59, 73. senate: 19, 27, 52, 67, 68, 78, 100; susceptio of prodigies, 71. senatus consultum: 18, 19,30, 31, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 77, 78. Sicily: 56. Sopater of Macedon: 102. Spain: 32, 89. P.Sulpicius Galba (cos. 211, 200): 15,27, 32,56, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 78, 82, 85, 87, 88, 97, 99. supplicatio: 67, 68, 71. synchronisms: 33, 35, 37, 74, 78, 79. Syro-Macedonian pact: 16withn. 15, 18, 28, 29,

43.

Thrace: 52, 73, 76, 77.

65, 66.

trinundinum:

M. Valerius Laevinus (cos. 210): 13, 27, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 73, 75, 81, 88 n. 41, 92, 93, 101, 102, 103; appointment aspropraetor withimperium, 52, 54, 55, 57. Vibo: 53, 56. P. Villius Tappulus (cos. 199): 56. vote, Athenian, forwaragainst Philip: 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 42, 47, 60, 66, 74, 75. vote, Roman, for waragainst Philip: 16, 17, 18, 64, 65, 66, 67, 75, 80, 92; see also Comitia Centuriata. winter quarters:

C. Terentius Varro (cos. 216): 54, 101, 102; see also M. Aurelius. Thessaly: 86.

Zama, battle

28, 35.

of: 103.

2. Authors andpassages References book.

toLivyexclude passages frombook31.Thefigures inboldtypeindicate thepages inthis

Andocides de Myst.,

Fasti Capitolini Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae 13.1.48: 26 n.

111: 37. Appian

Mac.

3: 58 n. 25, 100 n. 17. 4: 13 n. 4,16 n. 15, 17, 45 n. 10, 84.

Sic.

1: 100 n. 16. Cassius Dio

4: 86 n. 22. 18.58.1–

Dio Cassius; see Cassius Dio Ennius Annales

329 Vahlen, 324 Skutsch: 65 n. 17. Eutropius

2.5: 100 n. 16.

13, 91. Florus

1.23.28: 26 n. 13. Hesiod

and Days 385, 614: 35 n. 48.

Works

John of Antioch frag. 54: 16 n. 15. Justin

30, 2.8: 16 n. 15, 45 n. 10. 31.1.2: 45 n. 10. Livy 5.6.2: 95 nn. 1, 5. 10.25.10: 96 n. 10. 22.32.1: 95, 96. 8: 71 n. 40. 22.36.7–

2. Authors andpassages 24.10.4, 11.3: 56. 24.40.1: 52 n. 2. 24.44.5: 52 n. 2. 24. 44.7: 71 n. 40. 25.26.7: 95. 26.18.3, 38.1: 55 n. 11. 27.11.1: 71 n. 40. 6: 70. 27.11.4– 4: 71 nn. 40 and42, 72 n. 44, 92. 27.23.1– 27.27.7–11: 71, 72 n. 43. 27.30.4: 100 n. 17. 27.33.6: 71, 72. 27.37.1: 71 n. 40. 27.37.5–15: 70. 28.7.13–15: 100 n. 17. 28.37.5: 95, 96. 28.38.1: 55 n. 11. 28.45.10: 55 n. 11. 11.8: 58 n. 26. 29.10.4– 29.12.8–16: 14, 44, 47, 58 n. 25, 99, 102. 29.13.7: 55 n. 11. 29.14.5–14: 58 n. 25. 22.12: 69. 29.18.1– 29.35.15: 95. 4: 13, 19 n. 28, 53 n. 3, 54, 101, 102, 30.26.2– 103. 30.27.9: 55 n. 11. 8: 56, 82. 30.41.6– 30.42.1–10: 13, 19 n. 28, 52 n. 2, 53 n. 3, 54, 101, 102, 103. 30.44.13: 56. 32.4.7: 96 n. 9. 8: 85 n. 17. 32.6.5– 2: 71 n. 40. 32.9.1, 29.1– 33.41.9: 96 n. 9. 33.26.6: 71 n. 40. 3: 34. 35.6.2– 35.20.10–12: 52 n. 2, 57 n. 22. 35.21.2: 71 n. 40. 35.22.3: 59. 5: 52 n. 2, 59, 92. 35.23.4– 8: 59. 35.24.7– 8: 59. 34.1, 39.1– 35.31.1– 35.40.5: 56. 36.1.3: 63 n. 9, 93 n. 5. 36.3.13: 57. 36.37.1: 71 n. 40. 37.3.1: 71 n. 40. 38.27.9: 95, 96. 38.42.1: 55 n. 15. 39.22.5: 70 n. 35. 5: 55 n. 15. 40.59.4– 42.20.4, 30.9: 93 n. 5.

117

42.27.4: 57 n. 22 42.28.4: 55 n.15 42.36.8: 59. 43.11.6: 55 n. 15. 2: 14, 15. 43.13. 1– 45.27.5: 95 n. 1. Ovid Fasti

6.769: 33 n. 41. Pausanias

1.36.6: 97, 98, 99. Plutarch Marcellus

28, 29: 72. Polyaenus

4.18.2: 38 n. 7. Polybius

1.3.6: 10, 19, 92. 2.12.8: 99. 2.54.13: 95 n. 4. 3.2.8, 16 n. 15. 3.15.7: 49 n. 27. 3.19.12: 95 n. 4. 3.30.2: 49 n. 27. 3.32.7: 26. 4.37.4: 83 n. 10, 86. 4.66.7: 95 n. 4. 4.67.6: 95 n. 4. 5.5.7: 95 n. 4. 5.30.1: 95 n. 4. 12: 71. 10.32.7–

11.4.1: 100 n. 17. 5: 16, 27, 30, 35, 38, 39 n. 10, 42, 43, 16.24.1–

95 n. 4. 8: 38 n. 7. 16.24.6– 9: 18, 19,21, 27, 31,41, 45, 66, 74, 75. 16.25.1– 10: 18, 19, 21, 27, 31, 40, 45, 47, 66, 16.26.1– 74, 75. 5: 10, 16, 18,19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 40, 16.27.1– 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 64, 77, 78, 79, 99. 16.28: 31 n. 31. 16.29.2: 76. 12: 10,16,18 n. 27,19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 16.34.1– 31, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 64, 77, 78, 99 n. 11. 18.1.14: 102, 103. 20.3.1: 95 n. 4. 25.4.1: 95 n. 4. 28.2.1: 95 n. 4. 29.3.1: 95 n. 4. 30.5.6: 100 n. 16. 30.19.14: 95 n. 4.

118

Indexes

32.1.4: 95 n. 4. 32.10.1: 95 n. 4. Porphyry

FGrHist

260. 44: 16 n. 15. Valerius Maximus

6.6.1: 45 n. 10.

Zonaras

8.6.11: 100 n. 16. 8.19, 100 n. 15. 9.11: 58. 9.15.3: 83 n. 12.

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7 6277–

79. Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zuEntwicklung undBeurteilung vonAlleinherrschaft imvorhellenisti-

5 schen Griechenland. 1993. 345 S., kt.6278– 80. Brian M.Lavelle: TheSorrow andthe Pity. A Prolegomenon toa History ofAthens under the 510 B.C. 1993. 147 S., kt. Peisistratids, 560– 8 6318– 81. Wolfgang Leschhorn: Antike Ären. Zeitrechnung, Politik undGeschichte imSchwarzmeerraum undinKleinasien nördlich desTau9 ros. 1993. XI, 576 S. m. 10 Taf., kt. 6018– 82. UweWalter: AnderPolis teilhaben. Bürgerstaat undZugehörigkeit imarchaischen Grie6 6370– chenland. 1993. 242 S., kt.

83. Michael Rostowzew: Skythien und der

Bosporus, Band II. Wiederentdeckte Kapitel undVerwandtes. A.d.Grundlage d. russ. EditionvonV.Ju. Zuevm.Kommentaren u.Beitr. übers. u. hrsg. vonHeinz Heinen. 1993. VIII, 263 S., 36 Taf. u. 4 Ktn. in Kartentasche, kt. 4 6399–

84. Julia Sünskes Thompson: Demonstrative Legitimation der Kaiserherrschaft im Epochenvergleich. Zur politischen Macht des stadtrömischen Volkes. 1993. VII, 103 S., kt. 6415-X

85. Werner Huß: Dermakedonische

König und die ägyptischen Priester. Studien zur Geschichte des ptolemaiischen Ägypten. 1994. 4 6502– 238 S., kt.

86. Gerold Walser: Studien zur Alpengeschichte in antiker Zeit. 1994. 139 S. u. 10 Taf., kt. 2 6498– 87. David Whitehead, Ed.: From Political Ar-

chitecture to Stephanus Byzantius. Sources for the Ancient Greek Polis. 1994. 124 S., 11 5 6572– Abb., kt. (zugleich: Papers fromthe Copenhagen Polis Centre, Vol. 1) 88. Bernhard Kremer: DasBildderKelten bis in augusteische Zeit. Studien zurInstrumentalisierung eines antiken Feindbildes bei griechischen undrömischen Autoren. 1994. 362S., kt.

2 6548– 89. Joachim Szidat: Historischer Kommentar zuAmmianus Marcellinus BuchXX-XXI. Teil Ill: Die Konfrontation. 1996. 293 S., kt. 9 (vgl. Bde. 31 u. 38) 6570– 90. Odile De Bruyn: La compétence de l’Aréopage en matière de procès publics. Des origines de la polis athénienne a la conquête 146avant J.-C.). romaine delaGrèce (vers 700– 3 6654– 1995. 226 S., kt. 91. Lothar Wierschowski: Die regionale Mobilität inGallien nachdenInschriften des 1. bis 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. Quantitative Studien zurSozial- undWirtschaftsgeschichte derwestlichen Provinzen des Römischen Reiches. 5 6720– 1995. 400 S., kt.

92. Joachim Ott: DieBeneficiarier. Untersuchungen zu ihrer Stellung innerhalb der RangordnungdesRömischen Heeres undzuihrer Funk8 6660– tion. 1995. 246 S., kt. 93. Andrew Drummond: Sallust andthe Execution of the Catilinarian Conspirators. 1995. 136 S., kt.

8 6741–

94.Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen: Kaisertum und Bildungswesen im spätantiken Konstantinopel. 1995. VIII, 189 S., kt. 6760– 4 Herman Hansen andKurtRaaflaub (Eds.): Studies inthe Ancient Greek Polis. 1995. 219 S., kt. 6759– 0

95.Mogens

96. Martin Jehne (Hg.): Demokratie inRom? Die Rolle des Volkes in d3er Politik der römischen Republik. 1995. VII, 141 S., kt. 6860– 0

97. Valerie M.Warrior: The Initiation of the Second Macedionian War. An Explication of Livy Book 31. 1996. Ca. 120 S., kt. 6853– 8 98. Raimund Friedl: DerKonkubinat imkaiserzeitlichen Rom. VonAugustus bis Septimius Severus. 1996. 417 S., kt. 6 6871–

99.Christopher Tuplin: Achaemenid Studies.

1 1996. Ca. 240 S., kt. 6901– 100. Marlis Weinmann-Walser (Hg.): Historische

Interpretationen. Gerold Walser zum75.Geburtstag dargebracht vonFreunden, Kollegen undSchülern. 1995. 212 S. m. 3 Taf., kt. 6 6739– 101. Leonhard A. Burckhardt: Bürger undSoldaten. Aspekte der politischen undmilitärischen Rolle athenischer Bürger imKriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. 1996. 300 S., 5 6832– kt. 102. Julia Heskel: The North Aegean Wars, 371– 8 6917– 360 B.C. 1996. Ca. 180 S., kt. 103. Lukas Thommen: Lakedaimonion Politeia. Die Entstehung der spartanischen Verfas6 sung. 1996. 170 S, kt. 6918– 104. Luisa Prandi: Fortuna e realtà dell’opera di 6947-X Clitarco. 1996. Ca. 200 S., kt. 105. Jerzy Linderski (ed.): Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic. 1996. X, 234 S. u. 1 Taf., kt. 8 6948– 106. Karl Christ: Griechische Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. 1996. 238 S. m.7 1 6915– Taf., kt.

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